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HISXOHY 


WAR  m  THE  PENINSULA 


AND   IN   TBK 


SOUTH  OF  FRANCE; 


FROM    THE    YEAR    1807    TO    THE    YEAR    1814. 


BT 


^^      W.    F.    P.    NAPIER,    C.  B., 

COLONEL    H.    P.    FORTY-THIRD    REGIMENT,    MEMBER    OF    THE    ROYAL    SWEDISH 
ACADEMY    OF    MILITARY    SCIENCES. 


D.    &    J.    SADLIER    &    CO.,     31    BARCLAY   STREET. 

MONTREAL :—i;UKM':R    OK    NOTRE    DAME    &    FRANCIS    XAVIER    STREETS. 


N  3  / 


NOTICE. 


Or  ihe  manuscript  authorities  consulted  for  this  history,  those  marked  with  the  letter  S.  the  author 
owes  to  the  Kiniiness  of  marshal  Soult. 

For  the  notes  dictated  by  Napoleon,  and  the  plans  of  campaign  sketched  out  by  king  Joseph,  he  is 
indebted  to  his  grace  the  duke  of  Wellington. 

The  returns  of  the  French  army  were  extracted  from  the  original  half-monthly  statements  presented 
by  marshal  Berthier  to  the  emperor  Napoleon. 

Of  the  other  authorities  it  is  unnecessary  to  sny  more,  than  that  the  author  had  access  to  the  origi- 
n:il  papers,  wiih  the  exception  of  Dupot  I's  Memoir,  of  which  a  copy  only  was  obtained. 


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.-\'<'\c£^m^': 


PREFACE 


^m:eiiio-A-N^  editioist. 


The  greater  the  number  of  authorities  on  any  period  of  human  history,  the  more 
likely  is  the  historical  student  to  arrive  at  a  true  and  just  appreciation  of  the  epoch, 
the  events,  and  the  men  of  which  they  treat.  Every  writer,  according  to  his  idiosyncrasy, 
attaches  himself  to  especially  develope  some  branch  of  the  subject  which  is  more  particularly 
adapted  for  successful  treatment  by  his  peculiar  talent,  to  the  neglect  very  often  of  other  and 
more  important  portions  of  the  theme.  A  scholar  and  man  of  a  purely  literary  turn  will 
allow  his  desire  of  making  his  work  a  harmonious  whole, —  of  producing  a  literary 
chef  d' oeuvre^  artistic  in  the  arrangement  of  its  parts  and  boldly  striking  in  its  general  effect, 
to  injure  the  exactitude  and  correctness  necessary  in  all  petty  details  of  a  work  which 
aspires  to  a  high  historical  character.  The  writer  of  diplomatic  tendencies  will  be  apt  to 
look  upon  the  Cabinet  as  the  principal  feature  in  his  story,  and  the  Camp  as  a  mere 
mechanical  accessory.  He  will  occupy  himself  with  the  discussions  of  councils,  the  disputes 
of  diplomatists,  the  issuing  of  protocols,  and  the  stipulations  of  treaties,  and  will  give  but  an 
accessory  importance  to  the  movements  of  armies,  the  plans  of  strategists,  and  the  vicis- 
situdes of  the  battle-field.  The  soldier  will  most  probably  enthusiastically  dwell  upon 
and  develope  the  plans  and  tactics  of  military  leaders,  and  describe  with  scientific  minute- 
ness every  remarkable  movement  or  achievement,,  and  will  be  inclined  to  look  upon 
cabinets,  ministers  and  diplomatists  as  noxious  individuals,  who,  by  their  discussions, 
indecision  and  procrastination,  are  but  impediments  to  the  soldier's  march  to  success. 
Thus  is  it  that  multiplicity  of  authorities  is  conducive  to  the  development  of  truth.  One 
writer  supplies  the  deficiency  of  another;  this  author  corrects  the  errors  of  that;  and  they 
mutually  complete  each  other.  The  history  of  any  epoch  or  event  cannot  be  said  to  have 
been  luritten  until  it  has  been  re-wriiien  several  times  and  by  several  hands.  For  those 
reasons,  our  author's  history  of  the  Peninsular  War  was  wanting  to  complete  one  portion 
of  the  history  of  that  great  struggle,  though  it  had  already  been  treated  by  many  before 


4  PREFACE   TO   THE   AMERICAN   EDITIOIT. 

he  determined  to  iake  up  Lis  pen   and  leave  us  a  record  of  the  war  of  Spanish  indo 
pendence. 

No  book  having  a  human  origin  is  without  its  faults,  and  our  author  has  not  escaped  the 
penalty  of  humanity.  His  work  teems  with  excellent  qualities,  and,  indeed,  they  more 
than  counterbalance  his  errors,  which,  whatever  they  are,  are  certainly  not  intentional,  but 
rather  the  effect  of  education,  national  or  professional  prejudice.  We  purpose  briefly  to 
point  out  the  more  salient  beauties  and  virtues  of  the  work,  as  well  as  conscientiously  to 
signalize  its  vices  and  deformities,  that  the  general  reader  or  historical  student  may  the 
more  readily  enjoy  and  profit  by  the  former,  and  guard  against  and  detect  the  latter. 

The  author  of  the  History  of  the  War  in  the  Peninsula  was  peculiarly  fitted  for  the  task 
of  relating  the  military  history  of  that  contest.  He  was  himself  a  soldier,  and  an  actor  in 
many  of  the  stirring  scenes  he  so  strikingly  describes.  His  proficiency  in  military  science 
rendered  him  capable  of  appreciating  the  strategetical  movements  of  the  belligerents  in  the 
campaign,  so  that  his  battle  scenes  are  not  the  vague  and  misty  outlines  of  a  man  of  peace 
describing  the  operations  of  war.  His  descriptions  of  actual  conflict  are  vivid  to  intensity, 
and  full  of  movement.  The  reader's  imagination  sees  in  his  stirring  page  the  "magnifi- 
cently stern  array,"  and  hears  in  his  impetuous  prose  the  terrible  sounds  of  the  fight,  until 
the  enthusiasm  of  the  student,  however  pacifically  inclined  he  may  naturally  be,  is  roused 
by  the  exciting  picture,  and  he  becomes  himself  an  actor  in  the  scene,  and  pauses  breath- 
lessly for  the  trumpet-command  of  "  Charge !"  The  author's  style  is  exceedingly  vigorous 
£Lid  terse.  It  has  a  plain  and  simple  vehemence,  which  is  both  captivating  and  imposing. 
He  knows  nothing  of  amplification.  He  tells  his  story  in  the  fewest  words  possible ; 
marches  straight  to  a  fact,  seizes  it,  and  places  it  before  the  reader  without  any  useless 
preliminaries,  takes  some  fortress  of  error  built  up  with  care  and  pains  by  some  precedent, 
interested  or  partial  historian,  by  a  coup  de  main,  and  razes  it  to  the  ground.  His  narrative 
is  full  of  life,  motion  and  impulsiveness;  his  portraiture  of  character,  bold,  striking  and 
impressive.  His  every  word  possesses  significance,  and  every  phrase,  to  use  a  simile  1(.\S3 
perhaps  in  good  taste  than  in  consonance  with  the  subject,  is  a  piece  of  historical  artillery 
charged  to  the  muzzle  with  the  grape  of  meaning.  His  honest  and  chivalrous  nature 
enabled  him  to  rise  above  the  then  popular  British  prejudice  against  the  French.  While 
he  is  careful  to  guard  the  military  reputation  of  his  own  countrymen  from  injustice,  he  is 
equally  solicitous  to  do  justice  to  the  prowess  of  the  French  army,  and  the  military  skill 
of  the  great  men  who  commanded  it.  He  pays  a  proper  tribute  to  the  military  genius  of 
the  great  Napoleon,  whom  he  places  on  the  loftiest  pedestal  in  the  Pantheon  of  the  great 
captains  of  modern  times.  He  loves  to  paint  him  as  the  great  champion  of  equality  and 
the  popular  principle,  contending  against  the  allied  forces  of  privilege  and  aristocracv. 
Tiie  errors  of  the  great  commander  he  ascribes  to  the  force  of  circumstances,  and  extends 
even  to  the  political  ideas  of  the  first  Bonaparte  an  admiration  which  to  many  will  appear 
exaggerated.  He  docs  ample  justice  to  the  character  and  military  talents  of  SoULT,  and 
defends  him  from  the  calumnies  of  prejudiced  writers.  The  figure  of  the  Iron  Duke  stands 
out  in  bold  and  rugged  outline,  second  only  in  greatness  and  majesty  to  his  imperial  rival. 
He  shows  what  an  efF.'ct  fortuitous  circumstances  have  in  neutralizing  the  talents  and 


PREFACE   TO   THE   A:\IERICAX    EDITION.  "  5 

efforts  of  a  general,  and  shows  liow  the  disasters  that  cabinets,  newspnpcrs  and  popnlnr 
opinion  too  frequently  ascribe  to  inefficiency  on  the  part  of  the  commander,  are  purely  tho 
result  of  a  combination  of  adventitious  eventualities. 

The  principal  blemish  of  the  work  consists  in  the  rather  unjust  spirit  in  which  Spain  and 
her  people  are  treated.  The  Portuguese  are  highly  lauded,  while  the  Spaniards  are 
severely  censured.  It  contemns  the  patriotic  pride  of  Spain,  so  impatient  of  English 
dictation,  and  has  the  highest  praise  for  the  docility  of  Portugal  to  English  leadership. 
It  is  rare  to  find  a  book  written  by  an  Englishman  in  which  an  English  prejudice  will  not 
somewhere  insinuate  itself  The  sympathies  of  Spain  ever  turned  more  naturally  to 
France  than  to  England,  while  Portugal  might  be  called  a  mere  province  of  the  latter. 
Here  lies  the  principal  cause  of  the  author's  unfavorable  treatment  of  Spain.  The  insig- 
nificance of  the  part  in  the  struggle  which  he  assigns  to  Spanish  patriotism,  developed  in 
the  Partida  bands,  is  explained  by  the  acquired  antipathy  of  the  disciplinarian  and  the  man 
of  science  to  all  descriptions  of  undisciplined  and  unscientific  warfare.  This  professional 
prejudice  is  shown  unmistakably  towards  the  end  of  the  work,  wdiere  he  acknowledges  the 
increased  efficiency  of  the  Partidas,  but  ascribes  it  to  the  increase  of  discipline  among  them. 
He  neglects  the  history  of  the  efforts  of  Spanish  patriotism  throughout  the  war,  and 
attaches  himself  more  particularly  to  the  achievements  of  the  English  arms.  This  was  only 
natural  in  an  English  soldier,  and  it  is  in  its  account  of  that  especial  portion  of  the  war  that 
bis  work  has  its  highest  historical  value. 

While  fighting  for  the  principle  of  hereditary  dignity  and  privilege  represented  by  his 
own  country,  the  author  of  this  History  sympathized  ardently  with  the  principle  of  equality 
and  rank  according  to  merit,  of  which  he  considered  Napoleon  Bonaparte  the  representa- 
tive. His  political  opinions  were  strongly  tinged  with  republicanism.  He  sympathized 
with  the  unrepresented  and  unrecognized  mass,  and  held  the  opinion  that  legislatures,  in- 
stead of  adding  to  the  intrinsic  influence  which  property  gives  to  its  possessor,  should  coun- 
terpoise its  power,  by  giving  political  importance  to  the  working  classes.  He  boldly  and 
honestly  condemns  the  egotistical  policy  of  his  own  government,  and  pictures  the  position 
of  his  country,  at  the  commencement  of  the  war,  in  colors  by  no  means  flattering:  "Eng- 
land, omnipotent  at  sea,  was  little  regarded  as  a  military  power.  Her  enormous  debt  was 
yearly  increasing  in  an  accelerated  ratio,  and  this  necessary  consequence  of  anticipating  the 
resources  of  the  country  and  dealing  in  a  factitious  currency,  was  fast  eating  into  the  vital 
strength  of  the  State :  for,  although  the  merchants  and  great  manufacturers  were  thriving 
from  the  accidental  circumstances  of  the  times,  the  laborers  were  suffering  and  degenerating 
in  character ;  pauperism,  and  its  sure  attendant,  crime,  were  spreading  over  the  land,  and 
the  population  was  fast  splitting  into  distinct  classes, — the  one  rich  and  arbitrary,  the  other 
poor  and  discontented ;  the  former  composed  of  those  who  profited,  the  latter  of  those  who 
suffered  by  the  war.  Of  Ireland  it  is  unnecessary  to  speak  ;  her  wrongs  and  her  misery, 
peculiar  and  unparalleled,  are  too  well  known  and  too  little  regarded,  to  call  for  remark." 
Such  sentiments  as  these  were  not  likely  to  find  favor  with  the  privileged  classes  in  Eng- 
land, and  the  consequence  was  that,  on  the  first  appearnnce  of  our  author's  work,  a  strong 
feeling  of  aristocratic  prejudice  was  arrayed  against  it.     The  fairness  with  which  the  French 


6  PREFACE   TO   THE   AMERICAN    EDITION". 

were  treated  injured  its  sale  among  that  class  of  Englishmen  who  believed  themselves  the 
highest  expression  of  humanity  in  every  development  of  talent  and  genius,  and  their  coun. 
try  the  great  champion  of  order,  and  the  leader  of  civilization.  Pitting  less  than  six 
Frenchmen  against  one  Englishman  was  looked  upon  by  them  as  treason  of  the  blackest 
dye,  and  it  required  the  Crimean  struggle  to  show  them  that  an  Englishman  may  engage 
an  unaided  Frenchman  and  find  an  adversary  worthy  of  his  sword.  These  ignorant  pre- 
judices are  fast  being  dispelled,  in  England,  by  the  development  of  popular  intelligence,  the 
rapidity  of  communication,  and  the  facility  of  intercourse  with  other  nations.  These 
increased  oppportunitics  of  judging  themselves  by  comparison,  have  enabled  Englishmen  to 
learn  that  they  can  be  met,  and  in  many  things  surpassed  by  those  nations  for  whom  their 
contempt  was  but  the  fruit  of  their  ignc^rance.  With  tlie  increase  of  this  enlightenment  the 
reputation  of  our  author  increases,  and  he  is  now  the  popular  historian  of  the  Peninsular  War. 
In  America  his  book  will  acquire  the  authoritative  position  it  deserves.  Its  success 
among  us  will  compensate  for  the  difficulties  which  national  and  class-prejudice  threw  in  its 
"way  in  the  author's  native  country.  It  is  certainly  one  of  the  mn^^f  retn;irkable  modern 
works  of  its  kind,  and  as  a  military  authority,  with  regard  to  the  operations  of  the  English 
and  French  armies  in  the  Peninsula  and  in  the  South  of  France,  from  the  year  1807  to  the 
year  1814,  it  stands  in  acknowledged  pre-eminence. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


IlSniODUCTION 


BOOK  I. 


CHAPTER  1. 


CHAPTER  II. 


Pasre  9 


Dissensions  in  the  Spanish  court — Secret  treaty  and  convention 
of  l-'ontainebltau — Junot's  army  enters  Spain — Dupont's  and 
Moncey's  corps  enter  Spain — Duhesme's  corps  enters  Cata- 
lonia— Insurrection  of  Aranjuez  and  Madrid — Charles  the 
Fourth  abdicates — F'erdinand  proclaimed  kin^ — Murat  mar- 
ches to  Madrid — Refuses  to  recognize  Ferdinand  as  King — 
The  sfvord  of  Francis  the  First  delivered  to  the  French 
general  —  Savarv  arrives  at  Madrid  —  Ferdinand  goes  to 
oayonne — Charles  the  Fourth  goes  to  Bayonne — The  for- 
tresses of  St.  Sebastian,  Figueras,  Panipeluna,  and  Barce- 
lona, treacherously  seized  bv  the  French — Riot  at  Toledo, 
23d  of  April,  Tuiinilt  at  Madrid  2d  May,  Charles  the  Fourth 
abdicates  a  second  time  in  favour  of  Napoleon — Assembly 
of  Notables  at  Bayonne — Joseph  Buonaparte  declared  king 
of  Spain — Arrives  at  Madrid  -  -  -  11 

CHAPTER  III. 

Council  of  Castile  refuses  to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance — Su- 
preme Junta  established  at  Seville — Marquis  of  Solano  mur- 
dered at  Cadiz,  and  the  conde  d'Aguilar  at  Seville — Inter- 
course between  Castanos  and  sir  Hew  Dalrymple — General 
Spencer  and  admiral  Purvis  offer  to  co-operate  with  the 
Spaniards — Admiral  Rossilv's  squadron  surrenders  to  Moria 
—  General  insurrection  —  Massacre  at  Valencia  —  Horrible 
murder  of  Filanghieri  ....  16 

CHAPTER  IV. 

New  French  corps  formed  in  Navarre — Duhesme  fixes  himself 
at  Barcelona — Importance  of  that  city — Napoleon's  military 
plan  and  arrangements  -  -  -  -         19 

CHAPTER  V. 

First  operations  of  marshal  Bessieres — Spaniards  defeated  at 
Cabc^on,  at  Segovia,  at  Logrono.  at  Torquemada — French 
take  St.  Ander — Lefebre  Desnouettes  defeats  the  Spaniards 
on  the  Ebro,  on  the  Huecha,  on  the  Xalon — First  siege  of 
Zaragoza — Observations  -  -  •  -         22 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Operations  in  Catalonia — General  Swartz  marches  against  the 
town  of  Manresa,  and  general  Chabran  against  Taragona — 
French  defeated  at  Biuch — Chabran  recalled — Burns  Arbos 
— Marches  against  Brurh  —  Retreats  —  Duhesme  assaults 
Gerona — Is  repulsed  with  loss — Action  on  the  Llobregat — 
General  insurrection  of  Catalonia — Figueras  blockaded  — 
General  Reilie  relieves  it — First  siege  of"  Gerona — The  mar- 
quis of  Palacios  arrives  in  Catalonia  with  the  Spanish 
troops  from  the  Balearic  isles,  fledared  captain-general  un- 
der St.  Naicis«us,  re-establishes  the  line  of  the  Llobregat — 
The  count  of  CaKlagues  forces  the  French  lines  at  Gerona — 
Duhesme  raises  the  siege  and  returns  to  Barcelona— Ob- 
servations— Mnncey  marches  against  Valencia,  defeats  the 
Spaniards  at  Pajaso,  at  the  Siete  Aguas,  and  at  Quarte — 
Attacks  Valencia,  is  repuked,  marches  into  Murcia — Forces 
the  passage  of  the  Xucar,  defeats  Serbellani  at  San  Felippe, 
arrives  at  San  Clemeiite — Insurrection  at  Cuenca, quelled  by 
general  Caulincourt — Observations      -         •         •         •       25 

CHAPTER  Vn. 

Second  operations  of  Bessieres — Blake's  and  Cuesta's  arniicg 
unite  at  Benevente- -Generals  disagree — Bailie  of  Rio  Seco 
— Bessieres'  enrieavour  to  corr\ipt  the  Spanish  generals 
fails — Bessieres  marches  to  invade  Gallicia,  is  recalled,  and 
falla  back  to  Burgos — Observations         -  -  -         31 


CHAPTER  VIII. 
Dupont  marches  against  Andalusia,  forces  the  br/dge  of  Alco- 
lea,  takes  Cordoba — Alarm  at  Seville — Castanos  arrives, 
forms  a  new  army — Dupont  retreats  to  Andujar,  attacks  the 
town  of  Jaen — Vedcl  forces  the  pass  of  Despenas  I'erros,  ar- 
rives at  Baylen — Spanish  army  arrives  on  the  Guadalquivir 
— General  Gobert  defeated  and  killed — fienerals  Vedel  and 
Darfour  retire  to  Carolina — General  Reding  takes  posses- 
sion of  Baylen — Dupont  retires  from  Andujar — Battle  of 
Baylen — Dupont's  capitulation,  eighteen  thousand  French 
troops  lay  down  their  arms — Observations — Joseph  holds  a 
council  of  war,  resolves  to  abandon  INIadrid — Impolicy  of  so 
doing  ....  .  -        33 

BOOK  II. 

CHAPTER  I. 
The  Asturian  deputies  received  with  enthusiasm  in  England — 
Ministers  precipitate — Imprudent  choice  of  agents — Junot 
marches  to  Alcantara,  joined  by  the  Spanish  contingent,  en- 
ters Portugal,  arrives  at  Abranles,  pushes  on  to  Lisbon — • 
Prince  regent  emigrates  to  the  Brazils,  reflections  on  that 
transaction — Dangerous  position  of  the  French  army — Por- 
tuguese council  of  regency  —  Spanish  contingent  well  re- 
ceived— General  Taranco  dies  at  Oporto,  is  succeeded  by 
the  French  general  Quesncl — Solano's  troops  retire  to 
Badajos — Junot  takes  possession  of  the  Alemtejo  and  the 
Algarves;  exacts  a  forced  loan;  is  created  duke  of  Abranteg; 
suppresses  the  council  of  regency;  sends  the  flower  of  the 
Portuguese  army  to  France — Napoleon  demands  a  ransom 
from  Portugal — People  unable  to  pay  it — Police  of  Lisbon — 
Junot's  military  position;  his  character";  political  position — 
Pef>plc  discontented — Prophetic  eggs — Sebastianists — The 
capture  of  Rossilv's  squadron  known  at  Lisbon — Pope's 
nuncio  takes  refuge  on  board  the  English  fleet — Alarm  of 
the  French         .-----  39 

CHAPTER  n. 
The  Spanish  general  Belesta  seizes  general  Quesnel  and  retires 
to  Gallicia — Insurrection  at  Oporto — Junot  disarms  and  con- 
fines the  Spanish  soldiers  near  Lisbon — General  Avril'i 
column  returns  to  Estremos — General  Loison  marches  from 
Almeida  against  Oporto;  is  attacked  at  Mezani  Frias;  cross<-« 
the  Ehjero;  attacked  at  Castro  d'Airo;  recalled  to  Lisbon — 
French  driven  out  of  the  Algarves — The  fort  of  Figuera* 
taken — Abrantes  and  Elvas  threatened — Setuval  in  commo- 
tion— General  Spencer  appears  o-fl  the  Tagiis — Junot's  plan — 
Insurrection  at  Villa  Viciosa  suppressed — Colonel  Maransin 
takes  Beja  with  great  slaughter  of  the  patriots — The  insur- 
gents advance  from  Leria,  fall  bark — Action  at  Leiria — Loi^ 
son  arrives  at  Abrantes — Observations  on  his  march — French 
army  concentrated — The  Portuguese  general  Leite,  aided  by 
a  Spanish  corps,  takes  post  at  Kvora  —  Loison  crosses  the 
Tagns;  defeats  Leite's  advanced  guard  at  Montemor — Battle 
of  pA'ora — Town  taken  and  pillaged — Unfriendly  conduct  of 
the  Spaniards — Loison  reaches  Elvas;  collects  provisions;  i» 
recalled  by  Junot — Observations         -  -  -  43 

CHAPTER  IIL 
Political  and  military  retrospect — Mr.  Fox's  conduct  contrasted 
with  that  of  bis  successors  —  General  Spencer  sent  to  the 
Mediterranean — Sir  John  Moore  withdrawn  from  thence; 
arrives  in  England;  sent  to  Sweden  —  Spencer  arrives  at 
Gibraltar — Ceuta,  the  object  of  his  expedition — Spanish  in- 
surrection diverts  his  attention  to  Cadiz;  wishes  to  occupjr 
that  city — Spaniards  averse  to  it — Prudent  conduct  of  Sir 
Hew  Dalrymple  and  lord  Collingwood  —  Spencer  sails  to 
Ayatnonte';  returns  to  Cadiz;  sails  to  the  month  of  the  Ta- 
gus;  riturns  to  Cadiz  —  Prince  Leooold  ofSicily  ajid  th» 
duke  of  Orleans  arrive  at  Giliraltiir— Curious  intrigue— Army 
as9eml)led  at  Cork  hy  the  Wlii'^^  a'^niinis-lratron,  with  a  view 
to  pernianpiit  conquest  in  Sniilh  America,  the  only  disposa- 
ble  British  force— Sir  A.  VVellesley   takts  the  <  onimand— 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 


Contra;]irtory  instrurtions  of  the  ministers — Sir  John  Moore 
returns  iVoin  Sweden;  ordered  to  Portugal — Sir  Hew  Dal- 
ryiuple  appointed  roniinander  of  the  forces — Confused  ar- 
rangements made  by  the  ministers      -         -         -         -         46 

CHAPTER  IV. 
Sir  A.  Wellesley  quits  his  troops  and  proceeds  to  Coruna — Junta 
refuse  assistance  in  men,  but  ask  for  and  obtaui  monev — Sir 
Arthur  fjofs  to  Oporto;  arranges  a  plan  with  the  bishop: 
proceeds  to  the  Tagus;  rejoins  his  troops;  joined  by  Spen- 
cer; disembarks  at  the  MonJego;  has  an  interview  with 
peneral  Freire  d'Aiidrada;  marches  to  Leria — Portuguese 
insurrection  weak — Junot's  position  and  dispositions — La- 
borde  marches  to  Alcoba^a,  Loison  to  Abrantis — General 
Freire  separates  from  the  British — Junot  quits  [/isbon  with 
the  reserve — Laborde  takes  post  at  Rori^a — Action  of  Rori- 
^ — Laborde  rtweats  to  Montachiqiie — Sir  A.  Wellesley 
marches  to  Vimiero — Junot  concentrates  his  army  at  Torres 
Vedras  •  •  -  -  -        '     -  60 

CHAPTER  V, 

Portuguese  take  Abrantes — Generals  Acklana  ond  Anstruther 
land  and  j:)in  tlie  army  at  Vimiero — Sir  Ha  rv  Burrard  ar- 
rives—  Battle  of  Vimiero — Junot  defeated — Sir  Hew  Dul- 
rymple  arrives — Armistice — Terms  of  it — Junot  retuins  to 
I-isbon  —  Negotiates  for  a  convention  —  Sir  John  Moore's 
troops  land — State  of  the  public  mind  in  Lisbon — The  Rus- 
sian admiral  negotiates  separately — Convention  concluded  — 
Tne  Russian  fleet  surrenders  upon  terms — Conduct  of  the 
people  at  Lisoon — The  Monteiro  Mor  requires  sir  C  harles 
Cotton  to  interrupt  the  execution  of  the  convention — Sir 
John  Hope  appointed  commandant  of  Lisbon;  represses  all 
disorders — Disputes  between  the  French  and  English  com- 
nilssioners — Reflections  thereupon         -  -  -         55 

C^IAPTER  VL 
The  bishop  and  junta  of  Oporto  aim  at  the  supreme  power; 
wish  to  establish  the  seat  of  governmert  at  Oporto;  their 
intrigues;  strange  proceedings  of  general  Detken;  reflections 
thereupon — Clamour  raised  against  ttie  coiivention  in  Eng- 
land and  in  Portugal;  soon  ceases  in  Portugal — The  Spanish 
general  G.iliizzo  refuses  to  acknowledge  the  convention;  in- 
vest.' fort  Laiippe;  his  proceedings  absurd  and  unjustifiable 
— S  John  Hope  marches  asrainst  him;  he  alters  his  con- 
duct— Garrison  of  Laiippe — Marc.'i  to  Lisbon — Embarked — 
Garrison  of  Almeida;  march  to  Oporto;  attacked  and  plun- 
dered by  the  Portuguese — Sir  Hew  Dalrymple  and  sir  Harry 
Burrard  recalled  to  England — Vile  conduct  of  the  daily  I 
press — Violence  of  public  feeling — Convention,  improperly 
called,  of  Cintra — Observations — On  the  action  of  Rorigi — 
On  the  battle  of  Vimiero — On  the  convention     -         -        61 

BOOK  III. 

CHAPTER  I. 

tumparison  between  the  Portuguese  and  Spanish  people — The 
general  opinion  of  French  weakness  and  Spanish  strength 
and  energy,  fallacious — Contracted  jiolicy  of  the  English 
cabinet — Account  of  the  civil  and  military  agents  employed 
— Manv  of  iheni  are  without  judgment — Mischievous  effects 
thereot" — Operations  of  the  Spanisli  armies  after  the  battle  of 
Bavlen — Murciau  army  arrives  at  Madrid — Valencian  army 
marches  to  the  relief  of  Zaragoza — General  Verdier  raises 
the  siege — Castanos  enters  Madrid — Contumacious  conduct 
ofGaIt.zzo — Disputes  between  Blake  and  Cuesta — Dilator^' 
conduct  of  the  Spaniards — Sagacious  observation  of  Napo- 
leon— Insurrection  at  Bilboa;  quelled  by  general  Merlin — 
French  corps  approaches  Zaragoia — Palafox  alarmed,  threat- 
ens the  council  of  Castile — Council  of  war  held  at  Madrid  — 
Plan  of  operations — Castanos  unable  to  march  from  want  of 
money — Bad  conduct  of  the  pmta  of  Seville — Vigorous  con- 
duct of  m^pr  Cox — Want  ol  arms — Extravagant  project  to 


duct  ot  m^i 

procure  them  -  -  -  -  -    '        69 

CHAPTER  n. 
Internal  political  transactions — F'actions  in  Gallicia,  Asturias, 
Leon,  and  Castile — Flagitious  confluct  of  the  junta  of  Se- 
ville— Mr.  Stuart  endeavours  to  establish  a  northern  cortes — 
Activity  of  tiio  council  of  Ca«tile;  projioses  a  supreme  gov- 
ernment agreeable  to  the  public — local  juntas  become  gene- 
rally Oflious — Cortes  meet  at  Lugo;  declare  for  a  central  and 
iupreme  government  —  Deputies  appointed — Clamours  of  the 
Galliciaii  junta  and  bishop  of  Oiense — Increasing  influence 
of  the  council  of  Castile — I^nderhand  proceerlings  of  the 
junta  of  Seville,  disconcerted  by  the  quickness  of  the  Bailv 
Valdez — Character  of  Cuesta;  f^e  denies  the  legality  of  the 
northern  cortes,  abandons  the  line  of  military  operations, 
returns  to  Seg.ivia,  arr<  ?t«  the   Bally  Valdez  and   other  de- 

riuties  fr)m  Lugo — Cent"al  and  supreme  gf)vernment  estab- 
i«hed  .it  Aratiiitez,  Florida  Blanra  pr'-«ident — Vile  intrigues 
of  the   local  junt.u — Cuesta  removed  from  the  conimaud  of 


his  arm)-;  ordered  to  Aranjuez — -ropular  feeling  in  favour 
of  the  central  junta;  vain  arid  interested  prdcFFTlings  of  that 
body;  its  timidity,  inactivity,  and  folly:  refLSi  s  tj  name  a 
generalissuno — Foreign  rtlatiuiis — Mr.  Canning  Lavts  Mr. 
Stewart  without  any  instructions  for  three  months — Mr. 
Frere  appointed  envoy-extraordinary, &c.         -         -  74 

CHAPTER  III. 
Political  position  of  Napoleon;  he  resolves  to  crush  th« 
Spaniards;  his  energy  and  activity;  marches  his  armies  from 
every  part  of  Europe  towards  Spain;  his  oration  to  his  sol- 
diers—  Conference  at  Erfurlh — Negotiations  for  peace — 
Petulant  conduct  of  Mr.  Canning — 160,000  Conscripts  en- 
rolled in  France — Power  of  that  country — Napoleon  s  speech 
to  the  senate — He  repairs  to  Bayoniie — Reniiasntss  of  the 
English  cabinet — Sir  John  Moore  appointed  to  lead  an  army 
into  .Spain;  sends  his  artillery  by  the  Macirid  road,  and 
marches  himself  by  Almeida — The  central  junta  impatient 
for  the  arrival  of  the  English  army — Sir  David  liaiid  arrives 
at  Coruna;  is  refused  permis.-ion  to  disembark  liis  troops — 
Mr.  PVere  and  the  marquis  of  Romana  arrive  at  Coruna; 
account  of  the  latter's  esca])e  from  the  Danish  l^^lts — Centi'al 
junta  resolved  not  to  appoint  a  generalissimo — Gloomy  aspect 
ofali'airs  ..--..  80 

CHAPTER  IV. 
Movements  oi  ihe  Spanish  generals  on  the  Ebro;  their  absurd 
confidence,  their  want  of  system  and  concert  —  General 
opinion  that  the  French  are  weak — Real  strength  of  the  king 
— Marshal  i\ey  and  general  Jourdan  join  the  army — Military 
errors  of  the  king  exposed  by  Napoleon,  who  instructs  him 
how  to  make  war — Joseph  proposes  six  plans  of  operation- 
Observations  thereupon  ....  86 

CHAPTER  V. 

Position  and  strength  of  the  French  and  Spanish  armies — Blake 
moves  from  Reynosa  to  the  Upper  Ebro;  sends  a  division  to 
Bilbao;  French  retire  from  that  town — Ney  quits  his  posi- 
tion near  Lngrono,  and  retakes  Bilbao — The  ainiies  of  the 
centre  and  right  approach  the  F'bro  and  the  Aragun — Vari- 
ous evolutions — Blake  attacks  and  takes  Bilbao — Head  of 
the  grand  French  army  arrives  in  Spain — The  Castllians  join 
the  army  of  the  centre — The  A.-turian3  join  Blake — Apathy 
of  the  central  junta — Castanos  joins  the  army;  holds  a  con- 
ference with  Palafox;  their  dangerous  position;  arrange  a 
plan  of  operations — The  Spaniards  cross  the  Ebro — The 
king  orders  a  general  attack — Skirmish  at  Sanguessa  at 
Logrono,  and  Lerim — The  Spaniards  driver  back  over  'he 
Ebro — Logrono  taken — Colonel  Cruz,  with  a  Spanish  bat- 
talion, surrenders  at  Lerim — Francisco  Palafox,  the  military 
deputy,  arrives  at  Alfaro;  his  exceeding  folly  and  presump- 
tion; controls  and  insuits  Castanos — Force  of  tlie  French 
army  increases  hourly:  how  composed  and  disposer! — Blake 
ascends  the  valley  of  Durango — Battle  of  Zornosa — French 
retake  Bilbao — Combat  at  Valmaceda — Observations     -     90 

BOOK  IV. 
CHAPTER  L 
Napoleon  arrives  at  Bayonne — Blake  advances  towards  Bilbao 
— The  count  Eelvidere  arrives  at  Burgos — The  first  and  fourth 
corps  advance — Combat  of  (luents — Blake  retreats — Napo- 
leon at  Viltoria:  his  plan — Soult  takes  the  coniniand  ,of  the 
second  corps — Battle  of  (jamonal — Burgos  taken — Battle  of 
Espinosa — Flight  from  Reynosa — Soult  overruns  the  Mon- 
tagna  de  St.  Ander,  and  scours  Leon — Napoleon  fixes  his 
head-quarters  at  Burgos,  clianges  his  front,  lets  10,000  loose 
cavalry  upon  Castile  and  Leon — Marshals  Lasues  and  Ney 
directed  against  Castanos — Folly  of  the  central  junta — Gene- 
ral St.  Juan  occupies  the  pass  of  the  Somosierra — Folly  of 
the  generals  on  the  Ebro — Battle  of  Tudela       -        -         96 

CHAPTER  II. 
Napoleon  marches  against  the  capital;  forces  the  pass  tf  the 
Somn'ierra — St.  Juan  murdered  by  his  men — Tumult.s  is 
Madrid — French  army  arrives  there;  the  Retiro  stormed-* 
Town  capitulates — Remains  of  Castanos's  army  driven  acros* 
tlie  Tagus;  retire  to  Cuenca — Napoleon  explains  his  policy 
to  the  nobles,  clergy,  and  tribunals  of  Madrid — His  vast 
plans,  enormous  force — Defenceless  state  of  Spain      -       101 

CHAPTER  HI. 
Sir  John  Moore  arrives  at  Salamanca;  hears  of  the  battle  of 
Es))inosa — His  dangerous  position;  discovers  the  real  state 
of  affairs;  contemplates  a  hardy  enterprise;  hears  of  the  de- 
feat at  Tudela;  resolves  to  retreat;  waits  for  general  Hope's 
division — Danger  of  that  general;  his  able  conduct — Central 
junta  fly  to  Badajos — Mr.  Frere,  incapable  of  judging  rightly, 
opposes  the  retreat;  his  weakness  and  levity;  insults  tlie 
general;  sen  's  colontl  Chariiiilly  to  Salamanca — Manly  con. 
duct  of  sir  John  Moore;  his  able  and  bold  plan  of  opera- 
tions -  -----  105 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  IV. 
British  nrmy  advances  towards  Burgos — French  oulposts  sur- 
pristd  at  Kiieda — Letter  tVoni  Beithier  to  Soull  intercepted — 
Direction  ol  tlie  march  chang^ed — Mr.  Stuart  and  a  member 
of  the  junta  airive  at  head-quarters — Arrogant  and  ijisulting 
letter  of  Mr.  l<"rere — Noble  answer  of  sir  John  Moore — 
Bntisli  army  united  at  Mayorga;  their  force  and  composition 
— Inconsistent  conduct  of  Roniana;  his  character — Soult's 
position  and  forces;  concentrates  liis  army  at  Carrion — Com- 
bat of  cavaliT  at  Sahagun — The  British  army  retires  to 
Benevente — Tlic  emperor  moves  from  Madrid,  passes  the 
Guadarama,  arrives  at  Tordesillas,  expects  to  interrupt  the 
Britisii  line  of  retreat,  fails — Bridge  of  Casiro  Gonzalo  de- 
stroyed— Combat  of  cavalry  at  Beneventf — General  Lefebre 
taken — Soult  forces  the  bridge  of  iMansilla;  takes  Leon — 
The  emperor  unites  his  army  at  Astorga;  hears  of  the  Aus- 
trian war;  orders  marshal  Soult  to  pursue  the  English  army, 
and  returns  to  France  -  -  -  -         111 

CHAPTER  V. 
Sir  John  Moore  retreats  to^vards  Vigo;  la  closely  pursued — 
Miserable  scene  at  Bembibre — Excesses  at  Villa  Frauca — 
Combat  at  Calcabel'os — Death  of  geneial  Colbert — ?ilarch 
to  Nogales — Line  of  retreat  changed  from  Vigo  to  Coruna — 
Skilful  passage  of  the  bridge  of  Const^.ntino;  skirmish  there 
— The  army  halts  at  Lugo — Sir  John  Moore  oft'eis  battle;  it 
is  not  accepted;  he  makes  a  forced  march  to  Betanzos;  loses 
niany  stragglers;  rallies  the  army;  reaches  Coruna — The 
army  takes  a  position — Two  large  stores  of  powder  exploded 
— Fleet  arrives  in  the  liarbour;  army  commences  embark- 
ing— Sattle  of  Coruna — Death  of  sir  John  Moore — His  cha- 
racter -  -  -  -  -  -116 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Observations — The  conduct  of  JVapoleon  and  that  of  the  Eng- 
lish cabinet  compared — The  emperor's  military  dispositions 
examined — Propriety  of  sir  John  Moore's  operations  dis- 
cussed— Diagram,  exposing  tlie  relative  situations  of  .Spanish, 
French,  and  English  armies — Propriety  of  sir  John  iNIoore's 
retreat  discu'sed;  and  the  question,  wliether  he  should  have 
fallen  back  on  Portugal  or  Gallicia,  investigated — Sir  John 
Moore's  judgment  defended;  his  conduct  calumniated  bv 
interestecl  men  for  party  purposes  ;  eulogised  by  marshal 
Soult,  by  Napoleon,  by  the  duke  of  Wellington        -         123 

BOOK  V. 

CHAPTER  I. 
Slight  effect  produced  in   England   by  the  result  of  the  ram- 

f)aign — Debates  in  parliament — Treaty  with  Spain — Napo- 
eon  receives  addresses  at  Valladolid — Joseph  enters  .Madrid 
— Appointed  the  emperor's  lieutenant — Distribution  of  the 
French  armv — The  duke  of  Dantzig  forces  the  bridge  of 
Ahnaraz — Toledo  entered  b}'  the  first  corps — Infaiitado  and 
Paldcios  ordered  to  advance  upon  Madrid — Cuesta  appointed 
to  the  command  of  GailuzZ3's  troops — Florida  Blanca  dies  at 
Seville — Succeeded  in  the  presidency  by  the  marquis  of 
Astorsra — Monej'  arrives  at  Cadiz  from  Mexico — Bad  con- 
duct of  the  central  junta — State  of  the  Spanish  armj- — Con- 
stancy of  the  soldiers — Infantado  moves  on  to  Tarancon — 
His  advanced  guard  defeated  there — French  retire  towards 
Toledo — Disputes  in  the  Spanisli  army — Battle  of  Lfcles — 
Retreat  of  Infantado — Cartoajal  supersedes  him,  and  ad- 
vances to  Ciiidad  Real — Cuesta  takes  post  on  the  Tagus,  and 
breaks  down  the  bridge  of  Almaraz  -  .         ]30 

CHAPTER  n. 

Operations  in  Aragon — Confusion  in  Zaragoza — The  third  and 
fifth  corps  invfst  that  city — Fortification  described — Monte 
Torrero    taken — .\ltack    on    the   suburb    repulsed — Mortier 
takes  post  at  Calatayud — The  convent  of  San  Joseph  taken— ,r|. 
The   l)riJge-head   carried — Huerba    passed — Device   of  theT  ~ 
S|)an!sh   leaders  to  encourage  the  besieged — .Marquis  of  La- 
lan  takes  post  on  the  Sierra  de  Alcubierre — Lasnes  arrives 
in  the  F'rench  camp — Recals  Mortier — Lazan  deteated — Gal- 
lant  exploit   of  Mariano   Galindo — The   wai'is  of  the   town 
taken   by  assault — General  Lacoste  and  colonel   San  Genis 
«!din       -------         134 

CHAPTER  III. 

System  of  terror — Thr  convent  of  St.  Monica  taken — Spaniards 
attempt  to  retake  it,  but  fail — St.  Augustin  taken — French 
chans-e  their  mode  of  attack — Spaniards  change  their  mode 
of  defence — Terrible  nature  of  the  contest — Convent  of  Jesus 
taken  on  the  side  of  the  suburb — .\ttack  of  the  suburb  re- 
pulsed— Convent  of  Francisco  taken — Mine  exploded  under 
the  university  faila.  and  the  besieged  are  repulsed — The 
Co??')  passed — Fresh  mines  worked  under  the  universitv, 
and  ir  six  other  places — French  soldiers  dispirited — Lasnes 


encourages  them — The  houses  leading  down  to  the  quay 
carried  by  storm — An  enormous  mine  under  the  univtrsitt 
being  sprung,  that  building  is  carried  by  assault — 1  lie  suburb 
h  taken — Baron  V  ersage  kdlfcd,and  two  thoui^tind  Spaniardi 
surrender — .Successl'ul  attack  on  tlie  right  bank  of  the  Ebro 
—  Palafox  demands  terms,  which  are  refused — 1  ire  resumed 
— Miserable  condition  of  the  city — Terrible  pestilence,  and 
horrible  sufferings  of  the  besieged — Zaragoza  surrenders — 
Observations  .....         133 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Operations  in  Catalonia — St.  Cyr  commands  the  seventh  corp« 
— Passes  tiie  frontier — State  of  Catalonia — Palacios  fixes  his 
head-[|uarters  at  Villa  Franca — Duhtsme  forces  the  line  of 
the  Llubregat — Returns  to  Barcelona — English  army  from 
Sicily  designed  to  act  in  Catalonia — Frevented  bj'  ^Ju^at — 
Duhesnie  i'orages  El  Valles — .\ction  of  San  Culgat — General 
Vives  supersedes  Palacios — Spanish  army  augments — Block- 
ade of  Barcelona — Siege  of  Rosas — Foil;  and  negligence  of 
the  junta — Entrenchments  in  the  town  carried  by  the  be- 
siegers— Marquis  of  Lazan,  with  six  thousand  men,  reaches 
Gerona — Lord  Cochrane  enters  the  Trinity — Repulses  seve- 
ral assaults  —  Citadel  surrenders  5th  December  —  St.  Cyr 
marches  on  Barcelona — Crosses  the  Ter — Deceives  Lazan — 
Turns  Hostalrich  —  Defeats  Milaus  at  San  Celoni — Battle 
of  Moliuo  del  Rey     .....         141 

CHAPTER  V, 

Tumult  in  Taragona — Reding  proclaimed  general — Reinforce, 
ments  join  the  Spaniards — .Actions  at  Bruch — Lazan  ad- 
vances, and  fights  at  Castel  Ampurias — He  quarrels  w  ith 
Reding, and  marches  towards  Zaragoza — Reding's  plans — St. 
Cyr  breaks  Reding's  line  at  Llacuna — Actions  at  Capelade^ 
Igualada,  and  St.  Magi — French  general,  unable  to  take  tlie 
abbey  of  Creuz,  turns  it,  and  reaches  ViUaradona — Joined  by 
Souhani's  division,  takes  post  at  Vails  and  Ik- — Reding  ral- 
lies his  centre  and  left  wing — Endeavours  to  reach  Taragona 
— Battle  of  Vails  —  Weak  condition  of  Tortosa — St.  C_\r 
"blockades  Taragona — Sickness  in  that  city — St.  Cyr  re- 
solves to  retire — Chabran  forces  the  bridge  of  Molino  del 
Rev — Conspiracy  in  Barcelona  fails — Colonel  Bridie  arrives 
with  a  detachment  from  Aragon — St.  Cvr  I'etires  behind  the 
Llobregat — Pino  defeats  VV'impfen  at  Tarrasa — Reding  dies 
— His  character — Blake  is  appointed  captain-general  of  the 
CornniUa  —  Changes  the  line  of  operations  to  Aragon  — 
Events  in  that  province  —  Suchet  takes  command  of  the 
French  at  Zaragoza — Colonel  Perena  and  Raget  oblige  eight 
French  companies  to  surrender — Blake  advances — Battle  of 
Alcanitz — .Suchet  falls  back — Disorder  in  his  army — Blake 
neglects  Catalonia — St.  Cyr  marches  by  the  valltv  ot  Con- 
gosto  upon  Vich — .Action  at  the  defile  of  Garriga — Lecchi 
conducts  the  prisoners  to  the  Fluvia — St.  Cyr  hears  of  the 
Austrian  war — Barcelona  victualled  by  a  French  squadron — 
Observations  .....         146 

BOOK   VI. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Transactions  in  Portugal — State  of  that  country — Neglected 
by  the  British  cabinet — Sir  J.  Cradock  appointed  to  com- 
mand the  British  troop? — Touches  at  Coruna — .At  Oporto — 
State  of  this  city  —  Lusitanian  legion — State  of  Lisbon — 
Cradock  endeavours  to  reinforce  jVIoore  —  Mr.  Villiers  ar- 
rives at  Lisbon — Pikesgiven  to  the  populace — Destitute  state 
of  the  army — MrrFrere7"aTI<rothers,  urge  Cradock  to  move 
into  Spain — The  reinforcements  for  Sir  J.  Moore  halted  at 
Castello  Branco  —  General  Cameron  sent  to  Almeida  — 
French  advanced  guard  reaches  Merida — Cradock  relin- 
quishes the  design  of  reinforcing  the  army  in  Spain,  and 
concentrates  his  own  troops  at  Saccavem — Discontents  in 
Lisbon — Defenceless  state  and  danger  of  Portugal — Relieved 
by  Sir  J.  Moore's  advance  to  SahaguA  -  -         154 

CHAPTER   11. 

French  retire  from  Merida — Send  a  force  to  Plasencia—  The 
direct  intercourse  between  Portugal  and  sir  J.  Moore's  army 
interrupted — Military  description  of  Portugal — Situation  of 
the  troops— Cradock'aerain  pressed,  by  Mr.  Frere  and  others, 
to  move  into  Spain — The  ministers  ignorant  of  the  real  state 
of  affairs— Cradock  hears  of  Moore's  advance  to  Saliaguii — 
embarks  two  thousand  men  to  reinforce  hini — Hears  of  the 
retreat  to  Coruna,  and  re-lands  them — Admiral  Berkely  ar- 
rives at  Lisbon — Ministers  more  anxious  to  get  possession 
of  Cadiz  than  to  defend  Porttigal—Five  thousand  nun,  un- 
der general  Sherbrooke.  embarked  at  Portsmouth — Sir 
George  Smith  reaches  Cadiz— State  of  that  city— He  de- 
mands troops  from  Lisbon- Generr.I  .Mackenzie  sails  frow 
thence,  with  troops  — Negrliaticns  with,  the  junta  — Mr 
Frere's  weak  proceedings — Tumult  in  Cadiz — The  negotia 
tion  fails  ...  -  lo 


xu 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  III. 

WeakLfss  of  the  British  anuy  in  Portugal — General  Cameron 
marches  lo  Lisoon — Sir  ft.  Wilson  remains  near  Ciudad 
Rodrigo — Sir  J.  Cradock  prepares  to  take  a  defensive  posi- 
tion at  Passo  d'Arcos  —  Double-dealing  of  the  regenry  — 
The"  populace  murder  foreigners,  and  insult  the  British 
troops — Anarrhv  in  Oporto — British  government  ready  to 
abandon  Portugal — Change  their  intention — Militarvj^steni 
Q|^^Forlu«r»J — The  regepcv  demand  an  KnglisK'  general— 
Beresford  is  sent  to  ti.eni — Sherbrooke's  and  Mackenzie's 
troops  arrive  at  Lisoon — Berf  sford  arrives  there,  and  takes 
the  command  of  the  native  force — Change  in  the  aspect  of 
affairs — Sir  J.  Cradock  encamps  at  Luniiar — Relative  posi- 
tions of  the  allied  and  French  armies — Marshal  Beresford 
desires  sir  J.  Cradock  to  inarch  against  Soult — Cradock  re- 
fuses— Various  unwise  projects  broached  by  different  per- 
sons ......  160 

BOOK  VII. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Coruna  and  Ferrol  surrender  to  Soult — He  is  ordered,  by  the 
emperor,  to  invade  Portugal — The  first  corps  is  directed  to 
aid  this  operation — Soult  goes  to  St.  Jago — Distressed  state 
of  the  second  corps — Operations  o(  Roiiiana  and  .state  of  Gal- 
licia — Soiilt  commences  his  march — Arrives  on  the  Minho — 
Occupies  Tuy,  ^  igo,  and  Guardia — Drags  large  boats  over 
.  land  from  Guardia  to  Campo  Saucos — Attempts  to  pass  the 
\     Minlio — U  repulsed  by  the   l^.^ringnf -^p^^f agg^nfry — Inipar- 

Q  tance  of  this  repulse — Soult  changes  his  plan — .Marches  on 
Orensp — Defeats  the  Insurgents  at  Franquera,  at  Ribidavia, 
and  in  (he  valley  of  the  Avia — Leaves  his  artillery  and  stoieS| 
in  Tuy — Defeats  the  Spanish  insurgentx  in  several  places 
and  prepares  to  invade  Portugal — Defenceless  state  of  tli 
northern  provinces  of  that  kingdom — Bernadim  Friere  ad- 
vances to  the  Cavado  river — Silveira  advances  to  Chaves — 
Concerts  operations  with  Romana — DJ.'putes  between  the 
Portuguese  and  Spanish  troops — Ignorance  of  the  gejie- 
Ffclj  ------  165 

CHAPTER  n. 
Soult  enters  Portugal — Action  at  Monterey — Franceschi  makes 
gr>~at  slaughter  of  the  Spaniards — Portuguese  retreat  upon 
Cha»  • «  — Romana  (lies  to  Puebia  Scnabria — Portuguese  muti- 
ny —Three  thousand  throw  themselves  into  Chaves — Soult 
takes  that  town — Marches  upon  Braga — Forces  the  defiles  of 
Ruivaens  and  Venda  IS'oTa — Tumults  and  disorders  in  the 
Poituguese  camp  at  Braga — Murder  of  general  Friere  and 
others — Battle  of  Braga — Soult  marches  against  Oporto — 
Disturbed  state  of  that  town — Silveira  retakes  Chaves — The 
Fiench  force  the  passage  of  the  Ave — The  Portuguese  mur- 
dei-  t'leir  general  Vallonga — French  appear  in  front  of  Opor- 
to— Negotiate  with  the  bishop — Violence  of  the  people — 
111  neral  Fov  taken — Battle  of  Oporto — The  city  stormed 
T»'th  great  slaughter  ...  -  169 

CHAPTER  m. 

0|  "rations  of  the  first  and  fourth  corps — General  state  of  the 
French  army — Description  of  the  valley  of  the  Tagus — Inert- 
ipss  of  marshal  Victor — .\lbuquerque  and  Cartoajal  dispute 
The  latter  atlvances  in  La  Mancha — CJeneral  Sebastiani  wins 
'he  battle  of  Ciudad  Real — .Marshal  Victor  forces  the  passage 
>f  the  Taeus,  and  drives  Cuesta's  army  from  all  its  positions 
—French  cavalry  checked  at  Miajadas — V'irtor  crosses  the 
(luadiana  at  Medellin — Albuqnenpie  joins  Cuesta's  army — 
Battle  of  Medellin — Spaniards  totallv  defeated — Victor  or- 
Hered,  by  the  king,  to  invade  Portugal — Opens  a  secret  com- 
munication with  some  persons  in  Badaios — The  peasants  of 
Alhuera  di-icover  the  plot,  which  fails — Operations  of  gene- 
ral Lapisse — He  drives  back  sir  R.  Wilson's  posts,  and 
makes  a  slight  attempt  to   take   Ciudad    Rodrigo — Marches 

\ suddenly  towards  the  Tagus,  and  forces  the  bridge  of  Alcan- 
tara— Joins  Victor  at  Merida — General  insurrection  along 
the  Poituguese  frontier — The  central  junta  remove  Cartoajal 
from  the  command,  and  increase  Cuesta's  authority,  whose 
army  is  reinforced  —  Joseph  discontented  with  Lapisse's 
movement — Orders  Victor  t\>  retake  the  bridge  of  Alcan- 
tara   175 

CHAPTER  IV. 
TThe  bishop  of  Oporto  flies  to  Lisbon,  and  joins  the  regency — 
Humanity  of  marshal  Soult — The  Anti-Brafjanza  party  re- 
vives in  the  north  of  Portugal — The  leaders  make  proposals 
to  Sciilt — He  encourages  them — Error  arising  out  of  this 
proceeding — EiTects  of  Soult's  policy — .\ssassination  of  colo- 
nel Lanieth  —  I'.xecution  at  Arifana  —  Di«tribution  of  the 
French  troons — Franreschi  opposed,  on  the  \'ouga.  by  ("ol  >- 
nel  Trant — Lnison  falls  hank  behind  the  Sonza — He.uilelil 
marches  to  the  relief  of  T«y — The  Spaniards,  aided  by  somr- 
English  frigatcSi  oblige  thirteen  hunJred  French  to  cupituhtc 


at  Vigo — Heudelet  retui:*  ?,-  Braga— The  insurrection  IB 
the  Entie  Minho  e  Dour.:  (eases — Silveira  menaces  OportC 
— Laborde  reinforces  Loison,  and  drives  Silveira  over  th« 
Tamega — Gallant  conduct  and  death  of  colonel  Patrick  al 
Amarante — Combats  at  Aniarant< — French  repulsed — Ingt- 
niuL,s  ilevice  of  captain  Brochard — The  bridge  of  .Amarante 
carried  by  storm — Loison  advances  to  the  Douro — Is  sud- 
denly checked — Observations     -         .         .         .         .       180 

BOOK  VIII. 

CHAPTER  L 
Anarchy  in  Portugal— Sir  J.  Cradock  quits  the  command — Sir 
A.  W  elle.sley  arrives  at  Lisbon — Happy  eflecl  of  his  presence 
— Nominated  captain-general — His  military  position  descri- 
bed— Resolves  to  march  against  Sonll — Reaches  Coimbra — 
Conspiracy  in  the  French  Army — D'Argeiiton's  proctedingl 
Sir  A.  W  ellesley's  situation  compared  with  that  of  sir  J. 
Cradock 187 

CHAPTER  n. 
Campaign  on  the  Douro — Relative  position  of  the  French  and 
English  armies — Sir  Arthur  W'ellesley  marches  to  the  Vou- 
ga — Sends  Beresford  to  the  Douro — A  division  under  gene- 
ral Hill  passes  the  lake  of  Ovar — .\ttemjit  to  surprise  1- ran- 
ceschi  fails — Combat  of  Grijon — The  French  re-cross  the 
Douro  and  destroy  the  bridge  at  Oporto  —  Passage  of  the 
Douro—  Soult  retreats  upon  Amarante — Beresford  reachei 
Amarante — Loison  retreats  from  that  town — Sir  Arthur  mar- 
ches upon  Braga— Desperate  situation  of  Soult — His  tnergy 
— He  crosses  the  Sierra  Cataliiia — R<  joins  Loison — Rtachti 
Carvalho  d'Este — Falls  back  to  Salamonde — Daring  action 
of  major  Dulong — The  French  pass  the  Ponte  Nova  and  tLe 
Saltador,  and  retreat  by  Montalegre — Soult  enters  Ortnse — • 
Observations         -         -        -        -         -         -         -         -190 

CHAPTER  IIL 

Romana  surprises  Villa  Franca — Ney  advances  to  Lugo — Ro- 
mana retreats  to  the  Asturias — Reforms  the  government  there 
— Ney  invades  the  Asturias  by  the  west — Boiiet  and  Kel- 
lerman  enter  that  province  by  the  east  and  by  the  south — 
General  Mahi  flies  to  the  valley  of  the  Sy  I — Romana  embark» 
at  Gihon — Balksteros  takts  St.  Andero — Defeated  by  Bo- 
net — KeJiernian  returns  to  Valladolid — Ney  marches  for 
Coruna — Certra  defeats  Maucune  at  St.  Jago  Composltlla— 
Mahi  blockades  Lugo — It  is  relieved  by  Soult — Romana  re- 
joins his  army  and  marches  to  Orense — Lapisse  storms  tha 
bridge  o(  Alcantara — Cuesta  advances  to  the  Guadiana — 
Lapisse  retires — Victor  concentrates  liis  army  at  Torrtnio- 
cha— lEll'ect  ofthe  war  in  Germany  upon  that  of  Spain — Sir 
A.  W^llesley~encairipS"^'~Al5'ntnns^=;TlVe Tfrid ge  of  Alcan- 
tara destroyed — Victor  crosses  the  T^gus  at  Almaraz — Beres- 
ford returns  to  the  north  of  Portugal — Ney  and  Soult  com- 
bine operations — Soult  scours  the  valleys  of  the  S\l — Ro- 
mana cut  off  from  Castile  and  thrown  back  upon  CJrense — 
Ney  advances  towards  Vigo — Combat  of  San  Pavo — Misun- 
derstanding between  him  and  Soult — Ney  retreats  to  Coru- 
na— Soult  marches  to  Zamora — Franceschi  falls  into  the 
haiuls  of  the  Capuchino — His  melan<  holy  fate — Ney  aban- 
dons Gailacia — View  of  affairs  in  Aragon — Battles  of  Maiia 
and  Belchite  -  ....  197 

CHAPTER  IV. 

State  ofthe  British  army — Embarrassmentsof  sir  Arthur  AVel- 

lesley — State  and  numbers  ofthe  French  armies — State  and 

Vllnnmbers  of  the  Spanish  armies — Some  account  of  the  parfi- 

\l  ]dns,  commonly  called  g-iierillns — "Tntligues  C5f"Mr.   t  rere — 

ljConiTilrt--of  ttie  centiaTju"lita — Their  inhuman  treatment  of 

the  French  prisoners — Corruption  and  incapacity — State  of 

the  Portuguese  army — Impolicy  ofthe  British  government — 

Expedition  of  Walcheren — E.\pedition  against  Italy         202 


CHAPTER  V. 

Campaign  of  Talavera — Choice  of  operations — Sir  Arthur  W^el- 
lesley  moves  into  Sjiain — Joseph  marches  against  Vcneg-a? — 
Orders  Victor  to  return  to  Talavera — Cuesta  arrives  at  Al- 
maraz— Sir  Arthur  reaches  Plasencia — Interview  with  Cuesta 
— Plan  of  operation  arranged — Sir  Arthur,  embarrassed  hr 
the  want  of  provisions,  detaches  sir  Robert  W'ilson  up  the 
Vera  de  I'lasencia,  passes  the  Tietar,  and  uniUs  with  Cuesta 
at  Oropesa — Skirmish  at  Talavtra —  Bad  conduct  of  the 
Spanish  troops — Victor  takes  post  beliind  the  Alberche— 
Cuesta's  absurdity — Victor  retires  from  the  .Mbeiche — Sir 
Arthur,  in  want  of  provisions,  refuses  to  pass  that  river — In- 
trigues of  Mr.  Frere — The  junta  .secretly  orders  Venegas  not 
to  execute  his  part  of  the  operation  -         -        207 

CHAPTER  VL 

Cuosta  passes  the  Alberche — Sir  Arthur  Welle«lfy  fiends  twj 
Enjjiiih  divisions  to  support  him — Soult  is  appointed  lo  coin 


TA3LE    OF    CONTENTS. 


nand  the  second,  fifth,  and  sixth  corps — He  proposes  to  be- 
siege Ciudad  Rodrigo  and  tlireaten  Lisbon — He  enters  Sala- 
manca, and  sends  general  Foy  to  Madrid  to  concert  the  plan 
of  operations- -Tlie  king  quits  Madrid — Unites  his  whole 
army — crosses  the  Guadarania  river,  and  attacks  Cuesta — 
C^iuibat  of  Alcabon — Spaniards  fall  back  in  confusion  to  the 
Alberciie — Cuesta  refuses  to  pass  that  river — His  dangerous 
position— The  French  advanct- — Cuesta  re-crosses  tiie  Tietar 
— Sir  Arthur  Wellesley  draws  up  tlie  combined  forces  on  the 
position  (jf  Talavera — Tlie  king  crosses  tlie  Tittar — Skir- 
nii'>hat  Casa  de  Salinas — Coniliat  on  the  evening  of  the  27lh 
— I'anic  in  the  Spanish  army — Combat  on  the  morning  of 
the  23th — The  king  holds  a  council  of  war — -Jourdan  and 
Victor  propose  dilierent  plans — The  king  loilows  that  of  Vic- 
tor— Battle  of  Talavera — The  French  re-cros»  the  Alberche 
— General  Craufurd  arrives  in  the  English  camp — His  extra- 
ordinary march — Observations         ....  212 

CHAPTER  Vn. 
rhe  king  goes  to  Iliesras  with  the  fourth  corps  and  reserve — 
Sir  R.  VVilson  advances  to  Escalona — Victor  retires  to  Ma- 
queda — Conduct  of  the  Spaniards  at  Talavera — Cuesta's  cru- 
elty— The  allied  generals  hear  of  Soult's  movement  upon 
Banos — Hassecour's  division  marches  towards  that  point — 
The  pass  of  Hanos  forced — Sir  A.  Wellesley  marches  against 
Soult — Proceedings  of  that  marshal — He  crosses  the  Bejar, 
and  arrives  at  Hasencia  with  three  corps  d'armce — Cuesta 
abandons  the  British  hospitals,  at  Talavera,  to  the  eneniv, 
and  reti'eats  upon  Oropesa — Dangerous  position  of  the  allies 
— Sir  Arthur  crosses  the  Tagiis  at  Arzobispo — The  F'rench 
arrive  near  that  bridge — Cuesta  passes  the  Tagus — Combat 
of  Arzobispo — Soult's  plans  overruled  by  the  king — Nev  de- 
feats sir  R.  Wilson  at  Banos,  and  returns  to  France     -     219 

CHAPTER  VHI. 

Venegas  advances  to  Aranjues — Skirmishes  there — Sebastian! 
crosses  the  Tagus  at  Toledo — Venegas  concentrates  his  army 
— Battle  of  Alnionacid — Sir  Arthur  Wellesley  contemplates 
passing  the  Tagus  at  the  Puente  de  Cardinal,  is  prevented 
by  the  ill-conduct  of  the  junta — His  troops  distressed  for 
provisions — He  resolves  to  retire  into  Portugal — False  charge 
made  by  Cuesta  against  the  British  army  refuted — Beres- 
ford's  proceedings— Mr.  Frere  superseded  by  lord  Welles- 
ley— The  English  arniv  abandons  its  position  at  Jarareijo  and 
marches  towards  Portugal — Consternation  of  the  junta — Sir 
A.  WellesJev  defends  his  conduct,  and  refuses  to  remain  in 
Spain — Takes  a  position  within  the  Portuguese  frontier — 
Sickness  in  r.he  army         ...  .  .     223 

CHAPTER  IX. 
General   observations  on   the  campaiofn — Comparison  between 
the  operations  of  sir  John  Moore  andsir  A.  Wellesley  -     227 

BOOK  IX. 

CHAPTER  I. 

[nartivitv  ol  the  Asturians  and  Gallicians — Guerilla  system  in 
Navarre  and  Arasron — The  Partidas  surround  the  third  corps 
— Blake  obandr>iis  Aragon— Suchefs  operations  against  the 
Partidas — Combat  of  Treniendal — The  advantages  ofSucbet's 
position — Troubles  at  rwiupeluna — Suchet  ordered  bv  Na- 
pokon  to  repair  there — Ouservations  on  the  Guerilla  sys- 
tem -  -  -  -  -  -         -    232 

CHAPTER  II. 

Continuation  of  the  operations  in  Catalonia — St.  Cyr  sends 
Lecchi  to  the  An;purdan;  he  returns  with  the  intelligence  of 
the  Austrian  war — Of  ^'erdier's  arrival  in  the  Ampurdan, 
and  of  Au^ereau's  appointment  to  the  comman'l  of  the  seventh 
corps — Augcreau's  infl'-.ted  proc!nt".ation — It  is  torn  down  by 
t!ie  Catalonians — He  remains  sick  at  Pcrpignan — St.  Cyr 
continues  to  coinmaiid — Refuses  to  obey  Joseph's  orders  to 
remove  intD  Aragon — Presses  Verdier  to  commence  the  siege 
of  Gerona — Reinforces  Verlier — Remains  himself  at  Vich — 
Constancy  of  the  Spaniards — St.  Cyr  marches  from  Vich, 
defeats  thrie  Spanish  battalions,  and  captures  a  convoy — 
Storms  St,  Felieu  de  Quixols — Takes  a  position  to  cover 
Verdier''  operations — Sies^e  of  Gerona — State  of  the  con- 
tending iiarties — Assault  of  Monjouic  fails — General  F'ontanes 
jtorms  Prtianns — Wimphen  and  the  Milaiis  makes  a  vain 
Rttein|ii  to  throw  succours  into  Gerona — Monjouic  aban- 
d-jned  ......  235 

CHAPTER  III. 
Claros  and  Rovira  attack  Bascara  and  spread  dismay  along 
the  French  frontier — Two  Spanish  officers  pass  the  Ter  and 
enter  Gerona  with  succours — Alvarez  reinoiwlrates  with  the 
junta  of  Catalonia — liad  conduct  of  the  latter — Blake  advan- 
ces to  the  aid  of  the  city — Pestilence  there — Affects  the 
French  armv — St.  Cyr's  finnnpss — Bl  ike's  timid  operations 
-O'Donne!    fight*   Souhain.  but  withou.  iuccess — St.  Cyr 


takes  a  position  of  battle — Garcia  Conrle  forces  the  F  rencli 
lines  and  introduces  a  convoy  into  Gerona — Blake  retires- 
Siege  resumed — Garcia  Conde  comes  out  of  the  city — Kidi- 
culaus  error  of  the  F'rtncli — Conde  forcfs  the  French  line* 
and  escapes — Assault  on  Gerona  fails — Blake  advances  a  se- 
cond time — Sends  anotlier  convoy  under  the  command  of 
O'Donnel  to  the  cit) — O  Doiinel  with  the  head  of  the  convoy 
succeeds,  the  remain;ler  is  cut  oil — Blake's  incapacity — He 
retires — St.  Cyr  goes  to  Perpignan — Augertau  tukes  the  coiu- 
niand  of  the  siege — O'Donnel  breaks  through  the  Frtnch 
lines — Blake  aflvances  a  third  time — Is  beaten  by  Souhani — 
Pino  takes  Hostalrich — Admiral  Martin  intercepts  a  French 
squadron — Captain  Hollowell  destroys  a  convoy  in  Kosas- 
bay — Distress  in  Geicna — AKarez  is  seized  witli  delirium,  and 
the  city  surrenders — Observations       ...         23tt 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Plot  at  Seville  against  the  Supreme  Junta  defeated  by  lord 
Wellesley — Jui-ta  propose  a  new  form  of  government — Op- 
posed by  Romana— -Junta  announce  the  convocation  of  the 
national  Cortez,  but  endeavour  to  deceive  the  peojjle — A 
Spanish  army  assembled  in  the  Morena  under  F'guia — Bassc- 
cour  sends  cavalry  to  reinforce  Del  Parque,  who  coiicf  ntratea 
the  Spanish  army  of  the  left  at  Ciudad  Rodrigo — He  is  joined 
by  the  (jallician  divisions — Santocildes  occupies  Astoiga — 
French  endeavour  to  surprise  him,  but  are  repulsed — Ballas- 
teros,  t|uits  the  .Asturias,  and  niarchina:  by  Astoiga  attempts 
to  storm  Zainora — Enters  Portugal — Del  Parque  demandsthe 
aid  of  the  Portuguese  army — Sir  A.  Wellesley  refuses,  giving 
his  reason  in  detail — Del  Parque's  operations — Battle  of  Ta- 
mames — Del  Parque  occupies  Salamanca,  but  htaring  tliat 
French  troops  were  assembling  at  Valladolid  retires  to  Be- 
jar      ------  -         243 

CHAPTER  V. 

Areizaga  takes  the  command  of  Eguia's  army  and  is  ordered  to 
advance  against  Madrid — Folly  of  the  Supreme  Junta — Ope- 
rations in  La  Mancha — Combat  of  Dos  Barrios — Cavalry 
combat  of  Ocana — Battle  of  Ocana — Destruction  of  the  Span- 
ish ariuy  ......      246 

CHAPTER  VI. 

King  Joseph's  re'urn  to  Madrid — Del  Parque's  operations — 
Battle  of  x\iba  de  Tormes — Dispersion  of  the  Spanish  troops 
— Thtir  great  sufferings  and  patience — The  Supreme  Junta 
treat  sir  A.  Wellesleys  couiise  s  with  contempt — He  breaks 
up  from  the  Guadiana  and  moves  to  the  Mondt  go — Vindica- 
tion of  his  conduct  lor  having  remained  so  long  on  the  Gua- 
diana—  French  remain  torpid  about  Madrid  —  Observa- 
tions ......  250 

BOOK  X. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Joseph  prepares  to  invade  Andalusia — Distracted  state  of  affairs 
in  that  province — Military  position  and  resources  described 
— Invasion  of  Andalusia — Passes  of  the  Moivna  lorced  by  ihe 
French — Foolish  deceit  of  the  Supreme  Junta— Tumult  in 
Seville — Supreme  Junta  dissolved — Junta  of  Seville  re-as- 
sembles, but  dispersed  immediately  after — The  F  rem  h  take 
Jaen — Sabastiani  enters  Grenada — King  Joseph  enters  Cor- 
doba and  afterwards  marches  against  Seville — Albuquerque'3 
march  to  Cadiz — Seville  surrenders — Insurrection  at  Malaga 
put  down  by  Sebastiani — Victor  invests  Cadiz — Faction  in 
that  city — .\Iortier  marches  against  Ba  lajos — The  visconde 
de  Gand  flies  to  Ayamonte — Inhospitable  conduct  of  the 
bishop  of  Algarve       .....         253 

CHAPTER  IL 

Operations  in  Navarre,  Aragon,  and  Valencia — Pursuit  of  the 
student  Mina — Suchtt's  preparations — His  incursion  against 
Valencia — Returns  to  Aragon — DitHculty  of  the  war  in  Cata. 
Ionia — Operations  of  the  seventh  corps — French  detachments 
surprised  at  Mollet  and  San  Per|)etua — Augerfnu  enters 
Barcelona — Sends  Duhesme  to  France — i^eturns  lo  (Jerona 
— O'Donnel  rallies  the  Sjjanish  army  near  Ct-iitellas — Com- 
bat of  Vich — Spaniards  make  vain  etibrts  to  raise  the  block- 
ade of  Hostalrich — Augereau  again  advances  to  Barcelona — 
Sends  two  divisions  to  Reus — Occiii)i<s  Manreza  an  I  Villa 
F'ranca — French  troops  defeated  at  Villa  F'ranca  and  Fspara- 
puera — Swnrtz  abandons  Manreza — Is  det'eated  at  Savadel — 
Colonel  Villatte  communicates  with  the  hiid  corps  by  Falret 
— Severoli  retreats  from  Reus  to  Villa  l^.-anca — Is  hanissed 
on  the  march — Aun-ereau's  unskilful  conduct — Hostalrich 
falls — Gallant  exploit  of  the  governor,  Julian  F^sti-ada — Cru- 
elty  of  Augereau  .....     258 

CHAPTER  IH. 
Suchet  marches  against  Lerida — Dfsrript'on  of  that  fortress— 
Suchet   inarches  to  Tare^a— O'Donnel  advances  from  Tarn 


XIV 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 


gcna--Surhet  returns  to  Bnfagucr — Combat  of  Margalcf-^ 
Sieg-e  of  Lrrida — The  city  stormed — Suchet  drives  the  inha- 
bitants into  the  ritade?  and  thus  forces  it  to  surrender        263 

CHAPTER  IV. 

hefiertions  on  that  act— Lazan  enters  Alcaniti,  but  is  driven 
out  by  the  French— Colonel  Puit  taken  with  a  convoy  by 
Villa  Canipa,  and  assassinated  afterthe  action— Siegeof  Me- 
quincnza— Fall  of  that  place— iMorella  taken— Suchet  pre- 
pares to  enter  Catalonia— Strength  and  resources  of  that 
province  -  -  -  "  *  ■*"" 

CHAPTER  V. 
Operations  in  Andalusia— Blockade  of  Cadiz— Desertions  in 
that  citv — Renency  formed— Albuquerque  sent  to  England — 
Dies  then — R.geiicy  consent  to  admit  British  troops — Gene- 
ral Colin  C;imi)b.ll  obtains  leave  to  put  a  garrison  in  Ceuta, 
ami  to  destroy  tlic  Spanish  lines  at  San  Roque— General 
William  Stewart  arrives  at  Cadiz- Seizes  Matagorda— Tem- 
pest destroys  many  vessels— Mr.  Henry  Wellesley  and  gene- 
ral (Jrahani  arrive' at  Cadiz— Apathy  of  the  Spaniards— Gal- 
lant deiencc  of  Matagorda— Heroic  conduct  of  a  sergeant's 
wife— Gt  neral  Campbell  sends  a  detachment  to  occupy  Ta- 
rifa— French  prisoners  cut  the  cablesofthe  |>rison-huiks,and 
drift  during  a  tempest- General  Lacey's  expedition  to  the 
Ronda— liisbad  conduct— Returns  to  Cadiz— Reflections  on 
the  state  of  alTaiis        ...  -  -       268 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Continuation  of  the  operations  in  Andalusia — Description  of  the 
Soanisli  and  l'(>iliig\!i-se  lines  of  position  south  of  the  Tagus 
—Situation  of  tiie  armies  in  Estremadura — Complex  opera- 
tions in  that  province — Soult's  policy         ...        272 

CHAFFER  VH. 

Situation  of  the  armies  north  of  the  Tagus — Operations  in  Old 
Castile  and  the  Asturias — Ncy  menaces  Ciudad  Rodrigo — 
Loison  repulsed  from  Aslorga — Kellerman  chases  Carrera 
from  the  Gata  mountains — Obscurity  of  the  French  projects 

Sie'J-e   of  Astorga — Mahi  driven    into  Gallicia — Spaniards 

defeafed  at  Monibouey— Ney  concentrates  the  sixth  corps  at 
Salamanca — The  ninth  corps  and  the  imperial  guards  enter 
Soain — Massena  assumes  the  command  of  the  army  of  Portu- 

fat  and  of  the  northern  provinces — Nev  commences  the 
rst  siege  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo — Julian  Sanchez  breaks  out  of 
the  town — .Masseua  arrives  and  alters  the  iilan  of  attack — 
Daring-action  of  three  French  soldiers — Place  surrenders — 
Andreas  Herrasti — His  fine  conduct — Reflections  upon  the 
Spanish  character  ....  275 

BOOK  XL 

CHAPTER  I. 

Lord  Wellington's  policy — Change  of  administration  in  Eng- 
land- Duel  between  Lord  Castlereagh  and  Mr.  Canning- 
Lord  W(  lleslev  joins  the  new  ministry — Debates  in  Parlia- 
ment— Factious  violence  on  both  sides— Lord  Wellington's 
sagacity  and  tinnness  vindicated — His  views  for  the  defence 
of^Portugal — Ministers  accede  to  his  demands — Grandeur  of 
Napoleon's  designs  against  the  Peninsula — Lord  Wellington 
enters  into  fresh  explanation  with  the  English  ministers — 
Discusses  the  state  of  the  war — Similarity  of  his  views  with 
those  of  sir  Jolm  Moore — His  reasons  for  not  advancing  into 
Spain  explained  and  vindicated  -  -  -         278 

CHAPTER  H. 

Greatness  of  Lord  Wellington's  plans— Situation  of  the  belli- 
gerents desriihed — State  of  llie  French — Character  of  Joseph 

Of  his  Ministers — Disputes  with  tlie  Marshals — Napoleon's 

policy — Militarv  governments — Aimeiiara  sent  to  Paris- 
Curious  deception  executed  by  the  marquis  of  Romana,  Mr. 
Stuart,  and  tlie  hist>rian  Cabanes — Prodigious  force  of  the 
French  army — State  of  Spain — Inertness  of  Gallicia — Secret 
plan  of  the  Regency  for  encourajring  the  Guerillas — Opera- 
tions of  those  bands'— Injustice  and  absurdity  of  the  Regency, 
with  respect  to  Soutii  America — England — State   of  parties 

Factious  injustice  on  both   sides — Dilliculty  of  raising  mo- 

nPV  — lUillion"  committee — William  Cobbett— Lord  King — 
Mr.  Vansiltart — Extravagance  of  the  Ministi  rs  -State  of 
Portugal— Parties  in  that  country — Intrigues  of  the  Patriarch 
and  the  Souza's — Mr.  Stuart  is  appointed  Plenipotentiary — 
His  firmness— Princess  Carlotta  (daims  the  regency  of  the 
whole  Peninsula,  and  the  succession  to  the  throne  of 
Spain  ...---  282 

CHAPTER  IH. 

fx>rd  Wellington's  scheme  for  the  defence  of  Portugal— Vast- 
new  of  his  desi2:ns — IVumbpr  of  his  troops  — Descriptiin  of 
tb«  country— Plan  of  defence  analysed  -DiTioulty  of  supply- 


ing the  army — Resources  of  the  belligerents  compared — Ch»p 
racter  of  the  British  soldier  ...  23i 

CHAPTER  IV. 
Character  of  Miguel  Alava — Portuguese  government  demand 
more  English  troops — Lord  Wellington  refuses,  and  reproach- 
es the  Regency — Tlie  factious  conduct  of  (he  latter — (Cha- 
racter of  the  light  division — G(  neral  Crawfurd  passes  tliB 
Coa — His  activity  and  skilful  arrangements — Is  joined  by 
Carrera — Skirmish  at  Barba  del  1  uerco — Carrera  invites 
Ney  to  desert — Romana  arrives  at  head-quarters — Lord  \V  el- 
liiigton  refuses  to  succour  Ciudad  Rodrigo — His  decision 
vindicated — Crawfurd's  ability  and  obstinacy — He  niaiutaius 
his  position — Skirmish  at  Alameda — Captain  Eraiikcnberg'j 
gallantry — Skirmish  at  Villa  de  Puerco — ('(dont  I  Talbi.t 
killed — Gallantry  of  the  French  captain  Guaclu — Combat  cl 
the  Coa — Coni]jarison  between  general  Ficton  and  general 
Crawfurd  -  -  -  -  -  -     ill] 

CHAPTER  V. 

Slight  ojierations  ir.  Gallicia, Castile,  the  Asturias,  Estremadura, 
and  Andalusia — Reynier passes  thel'agus — Hill  makes  a  par- 
allel movement — Romana  spreads  his  troops  over  Fslri  niadura 
— Lord  Wellington  assembles  a  reserve  at  Thomar — Ciitichl 
situation  of  Silveira — Captures  a  Swiss  battalion  at  Putbla 
dc  Seiiabria — Romaiia's  troo]js  defeated  at  B*  nvt  nida— Las- 
cy  and  captain  Cockburne  land  troops  at  Moguer  but  are 
forced  to  reimbark — Lord  Wellington's  plan — How  thwarted 
— Siege  of  Almeida — Allies  advance  to  Frexadas — The  maga- 
zine of  Almeida  explodes — Treachery  of  Hareiros — Town 
surrenders- — The  allies  withdraw  behind  the  Mondego — Fort 
of  Albuquerque  ruined  by  an  explosion — Reynier  marches 
on  Sabugal,  but  returns  to  Zarza  Mayor — Napolenn  directs 
Massena  to  advance — Description  of  the  country  —  Erroneous 
notions  of  lord  Wellington's  views  entertained  by  botii 
armies  ......  298 

CHAPTER  VL 

Third  Invasion  of  Portugal — Napoleon's  prvidence  in  military 
aflairs  vindicated — Massena  concentrates  iJis  corps — Occupies 
(luarda — Passes  the  Mondego — Marches  on  \  iseu — Lord 
Wellington  falls  back — Secures  Coinibra,  passes  to  the  riirht 
bank  of  tlie  Mondego,  and  is  joined  by  the  reserve  from  I'fio- 
mar — General  Hill  anticipates  his  orders,  and  b\  a  forced 
march  readies  the  Alva — The  allied  army  is  thus  interposed 
between  the  French  and  Coimbra — Daring  action  of  colons  1 
Trant — Contemporaneous  events  in  Estremadura,  and  the 
Condado  de  JViebla — Romana  defeated — Gallantry  of  the 
Portuguese  cavalry  undergeneral  Madden — Dangerous  crisis 
of  aflairs — Violence  of  the  Souza  faction — An  indiscreet  let- 
ter from  an  English  officer,  creates  great  confusion  at  Opor 
to — Lorti  Wellington  rebukes  the  Portuguese  Rtgenc\ — He 
is  forced  to  alter  his  plans,  and  resolves  to  ofier  battle- 
Chooses  the  position  of  Busaco  ...      299 

CHAPTER  VII. 
General  Pack  destroys  the  bridges  on  the  Criz  and  Dao — Re 
markable  panic  in  the  light  division — The  second  and  sixth 
Corps  arrive  in  front  of  Busaco — Ney  and  Regnier  desire  to 
attack,  but  Massena  delays — The  eighth  corps  and  the  cav- 
alry arrive — Battle  of  Busaco — Massena  turij»  the  right  of 
the  allies — Lord  Wellington  falls  back,  and  orders  the  north- 
ern militia  to  close  on  the  French  rear — Cavalry  skirmish  on 
the  Mondego — Coinibra  evacuated,  dreadful  scene  there — • 
Disorders  in  the  army — Lord  Wellington's  firmness  contrast- 
ed with  iMassena's  indolence — Observations  -  302 

CHAPTER  VIH. 
Massena  resumes  his  march — The  militia  close  upon  his  rear^ 
Cavalry  skirmish  nearLeiria — Allies  retreat  u|)on  the  lines — 
Colonel  Trant  surprises  Coimbra — The  I'rench  anii\  con- 
tinues its  march — Cavalry  skirmish  at  Rio  Mayor — (ieneial 
Crawfurd  is  surprised  at  Alemquer  and  r<  treats  by  the 
wrong  road — Dangerous  results  ol  this  error — Description  of 
the  lines  of  Torres  Vedras — Massein  arrives  in  front  of  them 
— Romana  reinforces  lord  Vv''eHinglon  with  two  Spanish  di- 
visions— Remarkable  works  executed  by  the  light  division  at 
Aruda — The  French  skirmish  at  Sobral — Cieiural  Harvey 
woun(l<;d — General  St.  Croix  i:il!ed — Massena  lakfs  a  per- 
manent |)osition  in  front  of  the  Lines — He  is  harassed  on  the 
rear  and  flanks  by  the  British  cavalry  and  the  Portuguese 
militia  .....  307 

CHAPTER  IX. 

State  of  Lisbon — Embargo  on  the  vessels  in  the  river — Factious 
conduct  of  the  Patriarch — The  desponding  letters  from  th« 
army — Base  policy  of  ministers — Alarm  of  lord  Liverpool — 
Lord  Wellington  displays  the  greatest  firmness,  vigour,  and 
dignity,  of  mind  —  He  rebuk<s  the  Portuguese  Regency,  and 
exposes   the  duplicity  and    presumption  of  the    Patriarch* 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 


taction — Violence  of  this  faction — Curious  revelation  made 
by  Baron  Eben  and  the  editorof  the  Biaziliense — Lord  VVel- 
leslev  awes  the  couit  of  Kio  Janeiro — Strengthens  the  au- 
ihoritr  of  lord  Wellington  and  Mr.  Stuart — The  French 
Beizc  the  Isj-iiids  in  the  river — Foolish  conduct  of  the  govern- 
or of  Setiivr.l — General  Fane  sent  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Ta- 
gus — Lord  Wellington's  embarrassments  become  more  seri- 
ous— The  heigiits  of  Almada  fortified — Violent  altercation  of 
the  Regency  upon  this  subject — The  Patriarch  insults  iMr. 
Stuart  and  nearly  ruins  the  common  cause         -         -         311 

CHAPTER  X. 

Massena's  pertinacity — He  collects  boats  on  the  Tagus,  and  es- 
tablishes a  depot  at  Santareni — Sends  general  ^"oy  to  Pari:; 
— Casts  a  brid^^e  over  the  Zezere — Abandons  his  position  in 
front  of  the  Lines — Is  followed  by  lord  Wellington — Exploit 
of  Serjeant  Baxter — Massena  assumes  tlie  position  of  Santa- 
rem — Lorti  Wellington  sends  general  Hill  across  ttie  Tagus — 
Prepares  to  attack  the  French — Abandons  this  design  and 
assumes  a  permanent  position — Policj-  of  the  hostile  generals 
exposed — (Jeneral  Gardanne  arrives  at  Cardigos  with  a  ron- 
Toy,  but  retreats  again — The  French  nrarauders  spread  to 
the  Mon  lego — Lord  Wellington  demands  reinforcements — 
Bereslbrd  takes  the  command  on  the  left  of  the  Tagus — Ope- 
rations of  the  militia  in  Beira — General  Drouet  enters  Portu- 
gal with  the  ninth  corps — Joins  Massena  at  Espinhal — Occu- 
pies Leiria — Claparede  defeats  Silveira  and  takes  Lamego — 
Returns  to  the  Monilego — Seizes  Guarda  and  Covilhoa — 
Foy  returns  from  France — The  duke  of  Abrantes  wounded 
ID  a  skirmish  at  Rio  Mayor — General  Pamplona  organizes  a 
secret  communication  with  Lisbon — Observations  -     314 

BOOK  XII. 

CHAPTER  L 

General  sketch  of  the  state  of  the  war — Lord  Wellington  ob- 
jects to  niaritinie  operations — Expedition  to  Fuengirola — 
Minor  operations  in  Andalusia — National  Cortez  assemble  in 
tiie  Isla  de  Leon- -Its  proceedings — New  regency  chosen — 
Factions  des<'ribed — Violence  of  all  parties — Unjust  treat- 
meat  of  the  colonies         ...  .         .  320 

CHAPTER  II. 

Soult  assumes  the  direction  of  the  blockade  of  Cadiz — His  flo- 
tilla— Kilters  the  Trocca  !ero  canal — Vili;' olroys,  or  cannon 
mortars,  employed  bv  the  French — In^.r.i.i'  iiv  oftiic  Spaniards 
— Napoleon  directs  Soult  to  aid  Masser.a--  Jlas  some  notion 
of  evacuating  Andalusia — Soulf's  first  expedition  to  Estre- 
madura — Carries  the  bridge  of  Merida — Besieges  Olivenza 
— Ballasteros  defeated  at  Castellejos — Flies  into  Portugal — 
Romana's  divisions  march  from  Carlaxo  to  the  succour  of 
Olivenza — That  place  surrenders — Romana  dies — His  cha- 
racter— Lord  Wellington's  counsels  neglected  by  the  Spa- 
nish generals — First  siege  of  Badajos — -Mendizahel  arrives — 
Files  the  Spanish  army  into  Badajos — Makes  a  grand  sally — 
Is  driven  back  with  loss — Pilches  his  camp  round  San  Chiis- 
toval — Battle  of  the  Gebora — Continuation  of  the  blockade 
of  Cadiz — Rxpedition  of  the  allies  under  general  Lapena — 
Battle  of  Barosa — Factions  in  Cadiz         ...  324 

CHAPTER  in. 

Siege  of  Badajos  continued — Imas  surrenders — His  cowardice 
and  freacliery — AU)uquprque  and  Valencia  de  Alcantara  ta- 
ken by  the  French — Soult  returns  to  Andalusia — Relative 
Btate  of  the  armies  at  Santareni — Retreat  of  the  French — 
Mai^ena's  able  movement — Skirmish  at  Ponibal — Combat  of 
Redinha — Massena  halls  atCondeixa — Monthrun  endeavours 
to  seir.e  Coiinbra — Baffled  by  colonel  Trant — Condeixa  burnt 
by  the  French — Combat  of  Casal  Nova — General  Cole  turns 
the  French  Hank  at  Panella — Combat  of  Foz  d'Aronce — iMas- 
»e;ia  retires  behind  the  Alva 330 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Allies  halt  for  provisions — State  of  the  campaign — Passage  of 
th*,'  Ciira — Passage  of  the  Alva — Massena  retires  to  Celerico 
.-Resolves  to  march  upon  Coria — Is  prevented  by  Ney,  who 
If  depriveil  of  his  command  and  sent  to  France — Massena 
abandons  Cthrico  and  takes  post  at  Guarda — The  allies 
oblige  the  French  to  quit  that  position,  anrl  Massena  takes  a 
new  one  behind  the  Coa — Combat  of  .Sabugal — Trant  crosses 
the  Coa  and  cuts  the  communication  between  Almeida  and 
Ciiidad  Rodrigo — His  dauLier — He  is  released  by  the  British 
cavalry  and  artillery — Massena  abandons  Portugal         -    33G 

CHAPTER  V. 
£stim-ite   of  the  French   loss — Anecdote  of  Colonel  Waters — 
Lord  WellinTton's  crrent  conceptions  explained — How  impe- 
ded— Affa'rd  ill  thf  louth  of  Spain — Formation  of  the  fourth 


and  fifth  Spanish  armie? — S'^fce  cf  Conipo  Mnyor — Pla.-« 
falls — Excellent  conduct  of  rj  ajr"  Tallaia — Btresford  sur- 
prises .Montbrun — Combat  of  Cavalry — Canipo  Mayor  reco- 
vered— Beresford  takes  cantonments  round  I'.lvas — His  diffi- 
culties—  Reflections  upon  his  proceedings  —  He  throw*  > 
bridge  near  Jerunienlia  and  passes  tlie  Guadiana — Outpost 
of  cavalry  cut  off  by  the  French — Castanos  ariives  at  Elva* 
— Arrangements  relative  to  the  chief  command  —  Beresford 
advances  against  Latour  Maubourg,  who  returns  to  Llerena 
— General  Cole  takes  Olivenza — Cavaliy-skirnii<>h  near  Usa- 
gre — Lord  Wellington  arrives  at  Elvas,  exaniims  Badajos — 
Skirmish  there — Arranges  the  0])erations — Political  difficul- 
ties— Lord  Wellington  returns  to  the  .Agueda — Operations  in 
the  north — Skirmishes  on  the  Agueda — Massena  advsmcea 
to  Ciudad  Rodrigo — Lord  Wellington  reaches  the  army' — 
Retires  behind  the  Dos  Casas — Combat  of  Fuentes  Oiioro — 
Battle  of  Fuentes  Onoro — Evacuation  of  Almeida         •     339 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Lord  V\'^ellington  quits  the  army  of  Beira — Marshal  Berosford'g 
operations — Colonel  Cclborne  beats  up  the  French  quarters 
in  Estreniadura,  and  intercepts  their  convoj's — !■  irst  English 
siege  of  Badajos — Captain  Squire  breaks  ground  before  Sai> 
Cristoval — His  works  overwhelmed  by  the  French  fire — 
Soult  advances  to  rdieve  the  place — Beresford  raises  the 
siege — Holds  a  conference  with  the  Spanish  generals,  and 
resolves  to  fight — Colonel  Colborne  rejoins  the  army,  which 
takes  a  position  at  Albnera — Allied  cavalry  driven  in  by  the 
French — General  Blake  joins  Beresford — General  Cole  ar- 
rives on  the  frontier — Battle  of  Albuera  -  -     347 

CHAPTER  VII. 
Continuation  of  the  battle  of  Albuera — Dreadful  state  of  both 
armies — Soult  retreats  to  Solano — General  Hamilton  resumes 
the  investment  of  Badajos — Lord  Wellington  reaches  the 
field  of  battle — Third  and  seventh  divisions  arrive — Beresford 
follows  Soult — The  latter  abandons  the  castle  of  Villalba 
and  retreats  to  Lerena — Cavalry  action  at  Usagre — Beresford 
quits  the  army — General  Hill  reassnnies  the  command  of  the 
second  divisior,,  and  lord  Wellington  renews  the  siege  of 
Badajos — Observations         -  ....  351 

BOOK  XIII. 
CHAPTER  I. 

Lord  Wellington's  sieges  vindicated — Operations  in  Spain  — 
State  of  Gallicia — Change  of  commanders — Bond's  opera- 
tions in  the  Asturias — Activity  of  the  Pai  tides — Their  system 
of  operations — Mina  cajilures  a  large  convoy  at  Ariaban — 
Bessieres  contracts  his  position — Bonet  abandons  the  Astu. 
rias — Santocildes  advances  into  Leon — French  dismantle  As- 
torga — Skirmish  on  the  Orbigo — General  ineflTicienry  of  the 
Gallicians  and  Asturians — Operations  in  the  eastern  provinces 
— State  of  Aragon — State  of  Catalonia — State  of  Valencia — 
Suchet  marches  against  Tortoza — Fails  to  burn  the  t>oat- 
bridge  there — M'Donnel  remains  at  Gerona — The  Valen- 
cians  and  Catalonians  combine  operations  against  .Suchet — 
O'Donnel  enters  Tortoza — Makes  a  sally  and  is  repulsed — 
The  Valencians  defeated  near  Uldecona — Operations  of  tbo 
seventh  corps — M-Donald  reforms  the  discipline  of  the  troops 
—  Marches  with  a  convoy  to  Barcelona  —  Returns  to  Ge- 
rona and  dismantles  the  out-works  of  that  place — O'Donnel'i 
plans — M'Donald  marches  with  a  second  convoy — Reaches 
Barcelona  and  returns  to  Gerona — Marches  with  a  third  cok- 
voy — Forces  the  pass  of  Ordal — Enters  Reus  and  opens  the 
communications  with  Suchet  ...  355 

CHAPTER  H. 

O'Donnel  withdraws  his  troops  from  Falcct  and  surrounds  the 
seventh  corps — M'Donald  retires  to  Lerida — Arranges  a  ne»v 
plan  with  Suchet — Ravages  the  plains  of  Urgel  and  the  high- 
er valleys — The  people  become  dfsperate — O'Donnel  cuts 
the  French  communication  with  the  Ampurdan — Makes  n 
forced  march  towards  Gerona — Surprises  Swartz  at  Abispal 
— Takes  Filieu  and  Palamos — Is  wounded  and  returns  to 
Taragona — Campo  Verde  marches  to  the  Cer(!ano— M'D^iin- 
ald  enters  Solsona — Campo  Verde  returns — Combat  of  Car- 
dona— The  French  retreat  to  Guisona,  and  the  sev«  nth  corp« 
returns  to  Gerona— M'Donald  marches  with  a  fomth  convoy 
to  Barcelona— Makes  new  roads — Advances  to  P<  u«-— The 
Spaniards  harass  his  llanks— He  forages  the  Garriga  distrirt 
and  joins  the  third  corps— Operations  of  Suchet— General 
Leval  dies— Operations  of  the  Partidas- Ilnti  of  th.e  secret 
junta  to  starve  A rasron— General  Cbrif'i'l'i  defeats  Villa 
'Campa— Siichet's  dilTicullies- He  assemblts  the  notables  of 
Aragon  and  reorganizes  that  province— lie  defeats  and  lak«» 
general  Ni.vprro  at  Falcet— Bassecour's  operfttions — He  u 
defeated  at  Uldecona  -  •  351 


m 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  III. 
T'Jrtoia — Its  governor  feeble — Tlie  Spaniards  outside  disputing 
and  negligent — Captain  Fane  lands  at  raianios — Is  taken — 
O'Donntl  resigns  and  is  succeeded  Ijy  Caa)po  V'erde — De- 
•rription  of  Tortoza — It  is  invested — A  division  of  the  seventli 
rorps  piared  under  Surhet's  roniiniind — Si<go  of  Tortoia — 
Tlic  place  noiToiiates — Surhefs  daring  ronduct — The  gov- 
ernor surrenders — Suchet's  activitv — Habert  taives  the  fort 
of  Balaguer — M'Donald  moves  to  Reus — Sai-sfield  defeats  and 
kills  I 'genii) — .M'Uonald  marches  to  I.erida — Suchet  goes  to 
Zarngoza — The  confidence  of  the  Cataia:!s  revives  —  The 
inantier  in  which  the  belligerents  obtained  provisions  explain- 
ed- The  Catalans  attack  I'erillo,  and  Canipo  Verde  endeav- 
ours to  surprise  Monjuic,  but  is  defeated  with  great  loss — 
Napoleon  changes  the  org^inization  of  the  third  and  seventh 
corps-  The  former  becomes  the  arniy  of  Aragon — The  latter 
the  army  of  Catiilonia  ....  363 

CHAPTER  IV. 
8achet  prepares  to  besiege  Taragona — The  power  of  the  Par- 
tidas  described — Their  actions — They  are  dispersed  on  the 
frontier  of  Aragon — The  Valencians  fortify  Saguntuni — Are 
defeated  a  sec(jnd  time  at  Lldecona- — Suchet  comes  to  Leri- 
da — M'Donal  1  passes  with  an  escort  from  them  to  Barcelona 
— His  troops  burn  Manresa — Sarslield  harasses  his  march — 
Napoleon  divides  the  invasion  of  Catalonia  into  two  parts — 
Sinking  state  of  the  province — Rovira  surprises  Fort  Fernan- 
do de  Figueres — Operations  which  follow  that  event  367 

CHAPTER  V. 

Suchet's  skilful  conduct — His  error  about  English  finance — 
Outline  of  his  arran^enie nts  fo.  the  siege  of  Taragona — He 
makes  French  contracts  for  the  supplv  of  his  armv — Forages 
the  high  valleys  and  the  frontiers  of  Castile  and  Valencia — 
Marches  to  Taragona — Description  of  that  place — Campo 
Verde  enters  the  place — Su;:het  invests  it — Convention  rela- 
tive to  the  sick  concluded  between  St.  Cyr  and  Reding  faith- 
Jolly  observed — Sarsfield  comes  to  Momblanch — Skirmish 
with  the  Valencians  at  Amposta  and  Rapita — .'<iecre  of  Tara- 
gona— Rapita  and  .Momblanch  abandoned  by  Suchet — Tara- 
rona  reinforced  from  Valencia — The  Olive  stormed — Campo 
V'erde  quits  Taragona, and  Senens  de  Contreras  assumes  the 
chief  command — Sarsfield  enters  the  place  and  takes  charge 
of  the  Port  or  lower  town — French  break  ground  before  the 
lower  town — The  Francoli  stormed — Campo  Verde's  plans 
to  succour  the  place — General  Abbe  is  called  to  the  siege — 
Sarsfield  quits  the  place — The  lower  town  is  stormed — The 
upper  town  attacked — Suchet's  diff.-ulties  increase — Campo 
Verde  comes  fo  the  succour  of  the  ])lace,  but  retires  without 
effecting  any  thing — Colonel  Skerrett  arrives  in  the  harbour 
with  a  British  force — Does  not  land — Gallant  conduct  of  the 
Italian  sollier  Bianchini — The  upper  town  is  stormed  with 
di-eadful  slaughter  ....  371 

CHAPTER  VI. 
Pochet  marches  against  Campo  Verde — Seizes  Villa  Nueva  de 
Sitjes  and  makes  fifteen  hundred  prisoners — ("ampo  Verde 
retires  to  Igualada — Suchet  goes  to  Barcelona — A  council  of 
war  held  at  Cervera  by  Campo  Verde — It  is  resolved  to 
abandon  Uie  province  as  a  lost  countrv — Confusion  ensues — 
I^acv  arrives  and  assumes  the  conunand — Eroles  throws  him- 
(«elf  into  Montserrat — Snchet  sends  detachments  to  the  vallev 
of  Con-roeta  and  that  of  Vich,  and  opens  the  communication 
with  M'Donald  at  Figueras — Returns  to  Reus — Created  a 
marshal  -Destroys  the  works  of  the  lower  town  of  Tarasrona 
— T^krs  Montserrat — Nesrotintes  with  Cuesta  few  an  exchange 
of  the  French  prisoners  in  the  island  of  Cabrera- -Stopped 
bv  the  interference  of  .Mr.  Wellesley — Mischief  occasioned 
by  the  privateers— Lacy  reorganizes  the  province — Suchet 
returns  to  Zarajroza,  and  chases  the  Partidas  from  the  frontier 
of  Aragon — Habert  defeats  the  Valencians  at  Amposta — The 
Komalenes  harass  the  French  forts  near  Montserrat — Fis:ue- 
ras  surrenders  to  M'Donald — Napoleon's  clemency — Obser- 
vations— Operations  in  Valencia  and  Murcia  •        377 

BOOK  XIV. 

CHAPTER  I. 
Mate  of  political  affairs — Situation   of  king  .loseph — His   dis- 
putes with  Napoleon — He  resigns  his  crown  and  quits  Spain 
^The  emjieror  grants  liiin  new  terms  and  obliges  him  to  re- 
turn— Political  state  of  France  as  regards  the  war  382 

CHAPTER  If. 
Phtit'iral  state  of  Ensriand  with  reference  to  the  war — Retro- 
tp«'ctive  view  of  affairs — Enormous  subsidies  granfe<l  to  Spain 
— The  arroj^ance  and  rapacity  of  the  juntas  encouraged  l)v 
Mr.  Canning— His  strange  proceedings — Mr.  Stuart's  abili- 
ties and  true  judgment  of  affairs  shewn — He  proceeds  to  Vi- 


enna— State  of  politics  in  Germany — He  is  recalle;! — Tht 
misfortunes  of  the  Spaniards  princijially  owing  to  Mr.  Can- 
ning's incapacity — The  evil  genius  of  the  Peninsula — His 
Conduct  at  Lisbon — Lord  Wellesley  s  policy  totidlv  Oiflerent 
from  iMr.  Canning's — Parties  in  the  cabinel-^Lord  Wclltslev 
and  Mr.  Perceval — Character  of  the  latter — His  narroH  pof- 
icv — Letters  describing  the  imbecility  of  tlie  cabinet  in  1810 
and  1811  ......         334 

CHAPTER  IH. 
Political  state  of  Spain — Disputes  amongst  the  leaders — Sir  J. 
Moore's  early  and  just  perception  of  the  state  of  aOaiis  con- 
firmed by  lord  Wellington's  experience — Points  of  interest 
atiecting  England — The  reinforcement  of  the  niilitar)  force 
— The  claims  of  the  princess  Carlolta — The  prevention  of  a 
war  with  Portugal — The  question  of  the  colonies — Cisnero's 
conduct  at  Buenos  Ayres — Duke  of  Infantada  demanded  by 
Mexico — Proceedings  of  the  Engli.sh  ministers — Governor  of 
Cura^ia — Lord  Wellesley  proposes  a  mediation — Mr.  Bar- 
daxi's  strange  assertion — Lord  Wellingion's  judgnu  nt  on  the 
question — His  discernment,  sagacity,  and  wistlom  shewn  387 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Political  state  of  Portugal — Mr.  Villiers'  mission  expensive  and 
ine/Kcient — Mr.  Stuart  succeeds  him — Finds  ever\  thing  in 
confusion — His  etl'orts  to  restoie  order  successful  at  first — 
Cortes  proposed  by  lord  Wellesley — Opposed  by  the  regen- 
cy, by  Mr.  Stuart,  and  by  lord  V\  ellington — Observations 
thereon — Changes  in  the  regency — Its  partial  and  weak  con- 
duct^Lord  Strangford's  proceedings  at  Rio  Janeiro  ouly 
productive  of  mischief — Mr.  Stuarts  efi'orts  opposed,  and 
successfully  by  the  Souza  faction — Lord  \\  ellington  thinks 
of  abandoning  the  contest — Writes  to  the  prince  legent  of 
Portugal — The  regency  continues  to  embarrass  the  English 
general — Effect  of  their  conduct  upon  the  ainiy — Miserable 
state  of  the  country — The  British  cabinet  grants  a  iVtsh  suh 
sidy  to  Portugal — Lord  Wellington  complains  that  he  is  sup- 
plied ivith  only  one-sixth  of  the  money  necessary  to  larry 
on  tlie  conttst — Minor  follies  ot  tlie  regency — The  cause  of 
Massena's  harshness  to  the  people  of  I'oitugal  explained — 
Case  of  Mascarhenas — His  execution  a  foul  murder — Lord 
Wellington  reduced  to  the  greatest  difficulties — He  and  Mr. 
Stuart  devise  a  plan  to  supply  the  ann_\  by  trading  in  grain 
— Lord  Wellington's  embanassments  increase — Reasons  ■why 
he  does  not  abandon  Portugal — His  plan  of  campaign       391 

CHAPTER  V. 

Second   English  siege  of  Badajos — Means  of  the  allies  very 

scanty — Place  invested — San  Chiistoval   assaulted — The  af- 

lies  repulsed — Second  assault  fails  likewise — The  siege  turned 

into  a  blockade — Observations  ...  395 

CHAPTER  VI. 
General  Spencer's  operations  in  Beira — Pack  blows  up  Almei- 
da— Marmont  marches  bj-  the  passes  to  the  Tagus,  and  Spen- 
cer marches  to  the  .Alemtejo — Soult  and  Marmont  advance 
to  succour  Bada'os — The  siege  is  raised,  and  the  allies  pass 
the  Guadiana — Lord  Wellington's  position  on  the  Caja  de- 
scribed— Skirmish  of  cavalry  in  which  the  British  are  defeat- 
ed— Critical  period  of  the  war — French  marshals  censured 
for  not  giving  battle — Lord  Wellington's  firmness — Inactivi- 
ty of  the  Spaniards — Blake  moves  to  the  C'ondado  de  Aitbia 
— He  attacks  the  castle  of  Niebia — The  i  rench  armies  letire 
from  Badajos,  and  Soult  marches  to  Andalusia — Succours 
the  castle  of  Niehla — Blake  flies  to  Ayanionte — Sails  lor  Ca- 
diz, leaving  liallasteros  in  the  Condado — l-'rench  move 
against  him — He  embarks  his  infantry  and  sends  his  cavalry 
through  Portugal  to  Estremadura — Blake  lands  at  Almeria 
and  joins  the  Murcian  army — (loes  to  Vab  ncia,  and  during 
his  absence  Soult  attacks  his  army — Rout  of  Baza — Soult  re- 
turns to  Andalusia — His  actions  eulogised         -         -         398 

CHAPTER  VH. 
Slate  of  the  war  in  Spain — Marmont  ordered  to  take  a  central 
position  in  the  valley  of  the  Tagus — Constructs  forts  at  Al- 
maraz — French  aflairs  assume  a  favomublt  aspect — Lord 
Wellington's  ditliculties  au;;iiient — Re  moiistrances  sent  to 
the  Brazils — System  of  intelligence  desciTlied — Lord  Wei. 
lington  secretly  prepares  to  besiege  Cindad  Rodrigo — Mar- 
ches into  Beira,  leaving  Hill  in  the  Alemtejo — French  caval- 
ry take  a  convoy  of  wine,  get  drunk  and  lose  it  again — Gen- 
eral Dorsenne  invades  Galllcia — Is  stopped  by  the  arrival  o 
the  allies  on  the  Agueda — Blockade  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo.— 
Carlos  Espana  commences  the  formation  of  a  new  Spanisk 
army  —  Preparations  tor  the  siege — Hill  sends  a  brigade  to 
Castello  Branco  .....         40J 

CH  A IT-ER  VI H. 

The  garrison   of  Ciudad  Rodrigo  make  some  successful  eicnr- 
iioDs — Morilio  operates  against  the  French  in  Estreniadara 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 


XVil 


isdefeafed  and  driven  to  A!buc|uerqiie — Civil  affairs  of  Por- 
tugal— Bad  coiidiict  of  the  rogenry — They  imagine  tlie  nar 
to  be  decided,  and  endeavour  to  diive  lord  Weliiiigloii  away 
from  Portugal — Indications  tliat  Napoleon  vvoidd  assume  tl;e 
cornniand  in  tlie  Peninsula  observed  by  lord  Wellington — 
He  expects  a  combined  attack  on  Lisbon  by  sea  and  land — 
Marmont  aiid  Dorsenne  collect  convoys  and  unite  at  Tania- 
mes — Advance  to  succour  Ciudad  Rodrigo — Combat  of  Klbo- 
don — Allies  retire  to  Guinaldo — To  Aldea  Ponte — Combat 
of  Allea  Ponte — The  allies  retire  to  Soita — The  French  re- 
tire— Observations         ....  -      406 

BOOK  XV. 
CHAPTER  I. 

State  of  the  war  in  Spain — Northern  provinces — State  of  Gal- 
licia — Attempt  to  introduce  English  otFiccrs  into  the  Spanish 
service — Tra(ficked  for  by  the  S[)anish  government — Reptiled 
by  the  Spanish  militarv — The  English  government  eiicour- 
Bge  the  Partidas — Lord  Wellington  sends  the  chiefs  presents 
— His  after  opinion  of  them — Sir  H.  Douglas  succeeds  gene- 
ral Walker — ^liserable  state  of  Gallicia  described — Disputes 
between  the  civil  and  military — Anomalous  proceedings  of 
the  English  government — Gross  abuses  in  the  Spanish  army 
— Expedition  against  America  fitted  out  in  Gallicia  with  tlie 
English  suppliis  intended  for  the  defence  of  the  province — 
— Sir  PL  Douglas's  policy  towards  the  Partidas  criticisetl — 
Events  in  the  Asturias — Santaiuler  surprised  by  Poilier — 
Reille  and  ('atiarelli  scour  Biscay  and  the  Rioia— Bonet  in- 
rades  the  Asturias — Defeats  Moscoso.  Paul  Lodosa.and  Men- 
dizabel,  and  occupies  Oviedo — In  Gallicia  the  people  prefer 
the  French  to  tlieir  own  armies — In  Estremadura,  Drouet 
joins  Girard  and  menaces  Hill — These  movements  parts  of  a 
great  plan  to  be  conducted  by  Napoleon  in  person       -     411 

CHA  PTER  II. 

Conquest  of  Valencia — Sucliet's  preparations  described — Na- 
poleon's system  eminentl/  nietliodual — State  of  Valencia — 
Si-chet  invades  that  pro'  /nee — lilake  concenlriites  his  force 
to  fight — His  advanced  p  i^rd  put  to  tlight  by  tiie  French  ca- 
valry—  He  retires  to  thf  city  of  Valencia — Siege  of  Sagun- 
tuiu-  The  French  repu  .ed  in  an  assault — Palombini  defeats 
Obispo  near  Segorbe —  larispe  defeats  C.  O  Doiinel  at  Ben- 
eguazil — Oropesa  take'  — The  French  batteri'S  open  against 
Saguntjin — Second  9i  >ault  repulsed — Suchet's  embarrass- 
ments — Operations  i'l  his  rear  in  Catalog 'i — Medas  islands 
taken — L&iy  propos".»  to  form  a  general  di-^il  al  Palamos — 
Discouraged  bv  »i'  'l.  Peilevv — The  Spaiiianio  blow  up  the 
works  of  Berga,  '.r  .  fix  their  chief  depot  at  Busa — Descrip- 
tion of  that  plac  J  -  'Lacy  surprises  the  French  in  the  town  ot 
Igualada — Eioh  J  <aJtes  a  convoy  iiearJoibas — The  French 
quit  tiie  castle  of  Igualada  and  ji)in  the  gai  risun  of  Montser- 
rat — That  place  abandoned — Eioles  takes  Ceivera  and  Bel- 
puig — Beats  the  French  national  guards  in  Cerdana — Invades 
and  ravages  the  French  frontier — Returns  by  Ripol  and  takes 
post  in  tiie  pass  of  Garriga — Miians  occupies  Mataro — Sars- 
field  embarks  and  sails  to  the  coa-t  of  the  Ampurdan — Tliese 
measures  prevent  the  march  of  the  French  ronvoy  to  Barce- 
lona— State  of  Arrigon — Tlie  Empecinado  and  Duran  invade 
it  on  one  side — Miiia  invades  it  on  the  other — Calalayud  la- 
ken — Sexeroli's  division  reinforces  Miisnier,  and  the  Partidas 
are  [)ursued  to  Dnroca  and  IMolino — ,Mlna  enters  the  Cinco 
Villas — Defeats  f  Icven  hundred  Italians  at  Ayerbe — Carries 
his  prisoners  to  Motrico  in  Biscay — Mazzuchelli  defeats  the 
ICiiipeciiiado  at  Cubiliejos — Blake  caIN  in  all  his  troops  and 
prepares  for  a  bntlle — Sucliet's  position  described — Blake's 
aisposition3 — Bt.tlle  of  Saguntum — Observations        -      414 

CHAPTER  HI. 

Siichet  resolve?  to  invest  the  city  of  Valencia — Blake  reverts 
to  his  former  system  of  acting  on  the  French  rear — Napo- 
leon orders  general  Reille  to  reinforce  Siichet  with  tv^•o  divi- 
sions— Lacy  disarms  the  Catalan  Somntenes — Their  ardour 
diminishes — Tiie  F'rench  dfstro}' several  bands,  blockade  the 
Merlas  islands,  and  occupy  Mataro — Several  towns  aOected 
to  the  French  interest — Bad  conduct  of  the  privateers — Lacy 
encourages  assassination — Surhet  advances  to  the  Guadala- 
viar — Spanish  defences  descriiied — Tlie  French  force  the 
passaire  of  the  river — Battle  of  Valencia — Mahi  flies  to  Aicira 
— Suchets  invests  the  Spanish  camp — lilake  attempts  to  break 
out,  is  repulsed — The  camp  abandoned — The  city  is  bom- 
barded— Commotion  within  the  walls  —  Blake  surrenders 
with  his  wliolft  army— Suchet  created  duke  of  Albufera — 
Shameful  conduct  of  the  junta  of  the  province — Monlbrun 
arrives  with  three  rlivisions — Summons  Alirant,  and  returns 
to  Toledo — Villa  Campa  marches  from  Cartliagena  to  Alba- 
racin — Gnndia  and  Denia  taken  bv  the  French — They  be- 
siege Peniscoln — Lacy  r.  enaces  Taraerona — Defeats  a  French 
baitalion  at  Villa  Seca     Battle  of  Altafulla — Siege  of  Penis- 


cola — The   French  army  in  Valencia  weakened   by  draughM 
— Sucliet's  conquests  cease — Observations         -  419 

CHAPTER  IV. 
Operations  in  Andalusia  and  Estremadura  —  Descriptl^in  of 
Souk's  position — Events  in  Estremadura — Ba!!esteros  arrives 
at  Algesiras — Advances  to  Ah'ala  deCiazules — Is  drivtnback 
— Sou  It  designs  to  besiege  Tarifa — Concludes  a  convention 
with  the  emperor  of  Morocco — It  is  frustrated  bv  England — 
BuUesteros  cooped  upunder  the  guns  of  Gibraltar  by  Semel^ 
and  Godinot — Colonel  Skerrett  sails  for  Tarifa — The  French 
march  against  Tariia — Are  stopped  in  the  j  ass  of  La  Pena  by 
the  fire  of  the  British  ships — They  retire  from  San  Hoque — 
General  Godinot  shoots  himself — General  Hill  suipr'ses  gen- 
eral Girard  at  Aroyo  Molino,  and  returns  to  tlie  Alenitejo — 
P^renrh  reinforced  in  Estremadura — Their  movements  check- 
ed by  insubordination  amongst  the  troops — Hill  again  advan- 
ces— Endeavours  to  surprise  the  French  at  Merida — Fine 
conduct  of  captain  Neveux — Hill  marches  to  Aliiiendrali  jos 
to  fight  Droutt — The  latter  retires — Phiilipon  sends  a  paity 
from  Badajos  to  forage  the  banks  of  the  Guatliana — Color.tl 
Abercrombie  defeats  a  squadron  of  cavalry  at  Fuente  del  Ma- 
estro— Hill  returns  to  the  Alenitejo  -  .  424 

CHAPTER  V. 

Soult  resolves  to  besiege  Tarifa — Ballesferos  is  driven  a  second 
time  under  the  guns  of  Gibraltar — Laval  invests  Tarifa — 
Siege  of  Tarifa — The  assault  repulsed — Siege  is  raised — The 
true  history  of  this  siege  exposed — Colonel  Skerrett  not  the 
author  of  the  success  ....  428 

BOOK  XVI. 

CHAPTER  I. 
Political  situation  of  king  Joseph — Political  state  of  Spain — Po- 
litical state  of  Portugal — Military  operalicns — .Julian  Sanchei 
captures  the  governor  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo — General  Thie- 
bault  introduces  a  convoy  and  a  new  governor  into  liial  for. 
tress — Difficulty  of  military  o])erations  on  the  Agueda — The 
allied  armj-,  being  pressed  lor  provisions,  takes  wide  canton- 
ments, and  preparations  are  secretly  made  for  the  siege  of 
Ciudad  Rodrigo         -  .  .  .  .        43J 

CHAPTER  II. 
Review  of  the  different  changes  of  the  war — Enormous  efforts 
of  Napoleon — Lord  Wellington's  situation  described — His 
great  plans  explained — His  firmness  and  resolution  under 
difficulties — Distressed  state  of  his  army — The  prudence  and 
ability  of  Lord  Filzroy  Somerset  —  Dissemination  of  the 
French  army — Lord  Wellington  seizes  the  opportunity  to 
besiege  Ciudad  Rodrigo  .....        435 

CHAPTER  IIL 

Means  collected  for  the  siege  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo — Major  Stur- 
geon throws  a  bridge  over  the  Agueda — Siege  of  Ciudad 
Rodrigo  —  Colonel  Colborne  storms  fort  P'lancesco — The 
scarcity  of  transport  baulks  lord  Wellington's  calculations — 
Marmont  collects  troops — I  Ian  of  the  attack  changed — Two 
breaches  are  made  and  the  city  is  stormed — Observations    438 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Execution  of  the  French  partizans  and  English  deserters  found 
in  Ciudad  Rodrigo — The  works  are  re[)aired — Marmont  col 
Iccts  his  army  at  Salamanca — Bonet  abandons  tiie  AsturiaS' 
Souliam  advances  to  Matilla — Hill  arrives  at  Castello  Branc 
— The  French  army  harassed  by  winter  marches  and  by  tb 
Partidas — Marmont  again  spreads  his  divisions  —  Agueda 
overflows,  and  all  communication  with  Ciudad  Rodrigo  is  cut 
otl" — Lord  Wellington  prepares  to  besiege  Badajos — Prelim- 
inary measures — Impeded  by  bad  weather — Ditriculties  and 
embarrassments  arise — The  allied  army  marches  in  an  unniil. 
ilary  manner  towards  the  Alenitejo — Lord  Wellington  pro- 
poses some  financial  measures — Gives  up  Ciudad  to  the  Span- 
iards— The  fifth  division  is  left  in  Beira — Carlos  d'Fspngna 
and  general  Victor  Alten  are  posted  on  the  Yeltes — Tho 
Portuguese  militia  march  for  the  Coa — Lord  Wellington 
reaches  FIvas — He  is  beset  with  difficulties — Falls  sick,  but 
recovers  rapidly         .....  441 

CHAPTER  V. 
The  allies  cross  the  Guadiana — Beresford  invests  Badajos — 
Generals  Graham  and  Hill  command  the  covering  army — 
Drouet  retires  to  Hornaches  in  the  Llerena — Third  English 
siege  of  Badajos — Sallv  of  the  garrison  repulsed — Works  im- 
peded by  the  rain — The  besieged  rake  the  trenches  from  the 
right  bank  of  the  (Juadiana — The  fifth  division  i*  called  up 
to  the  siege — The  river  rises  and  carries  awny  the  bridge 
and  the  siege  is  upon  the  point  ot  being  raised — Two  flyinj 


;/ 

e    O 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 


bri(lges  am  pst.iblisliod — Tbo  fifth  divis'on  invest  St.  Christn- 
val — •Till!  Picuriiia  stiiimeil — 'I'lic  battories  opnn  usraiiii't  ihe 
Sun  Uo(|iie — Tlie  covciin'.^  iinny  liiivc  irenoral  Diouet  IVom 
the  SL'ivna  iuto  tlie  Moreiia — Maruiont  collects  his  forces  in 
Leon — The  Spanish  oIHcims  and  the  Portuirucne  government 
ne-jlect  ill!"  sn[)i)lioM  of  Ciudad  RodrJLro  and  Ahiieida — Soult 
ndvanccs  from  Cordova  tov^'aid  Llereiia — The  filtli  division 
is  bronirht  over  tlie  Guadiana — Tlie  works  of  tlie  siege  are 
pressed — An  atli'in]it  to  tilow  u])  the  dam  of  the  inundation 
fails — The  two  breaches  become  jiracticab'e — Soult  ell'ects 
liis  junction  with  Dronet  and  advances  to  the  succour  of  the 
place — Graliain  and  Hill  fall  back — The  bridsc  of  Merida  is 
dc-trnyed — The  assault  is  ordered,  but  countermanded — A 
third  breach  is  foiined — The  fortress  is  stormed  with  a  dread- 
ful slauglitur,  and  the  city  is  sacked  by  the  allies    -  443 

CHAPTER  VI. 

The  state  of  Ciudad  Rodriufo  and  Almeida  oblis^es  lord  Wellino;- 
ton  to  rcliniiui-h  his  dcsij-n  of  invadin;^  Andalusia — Soidt's 
operations  described — Ho  reaches  Villa  Franca — Hears  of 
the  I'all  of  Badajos  and  retires — PenneVillemur  and  Morillo 
move  from  the  N'ieb'a  a.^'ainst  8<'ville — Ballesteros  having 
deieated  Maransin  at  Cartamti.  comes  from  the  Honda  against 
Seville — A  French  convoy  is  stopped  iu  tlie  Morena,  and  the 
>vhole  of  Andalusia  is  in  cominofiou — Seville  is  saved  by  the 
subtlety  of  a  Spaniard  in  the  French  interest — Balle-teros 
retiies — A.s-anlts  Zahara  and  is  repul.^ed — Sends  a  division 
a'.;:aiust  Ossuna.  which  is  also  repulsed  by  the  E^copeterot — 
Drives  g(,'nei-al  Rev  from  Allora  to  Malaga — Soult  marches 
from  Llcrena  toward  Seville  and  gcieral  Conrou.x  brings  a 
b'i:,'ade  up  friun  the  Guadalcte  to  attack  Ballesteros — Sir  S. 
Cotton  defeats  general  Peyreymont's  cavalry  near  Usagre — 
Soult  concentrates  his  army  near  Seville  to  fi  Tht  the  allies — 
Lo'"d  Wellington  marches  to  Beira — Marmont's  operations — 
He  man^hes  ag  linst  Ciudad  Kodngo  —Carlos  d'Espana  retires 
toward  Almeida,  and  Victor  Alten  toward  Penaraacor — The 
Fi*er.ch  appear  before  Almeiila — General  Tratit  arrives  on  the 
Cabetja  Neirro — The  French  retiio  and  Trant  unites  with  .1. 
■Wilson  at  Guardti — Marmout  advances  U^  Sabugal — Victor 
Ahen  abandons  Penamacor  and  Castello  franco,  and  cros.scs 
the  Tairns — The  Portuguese  eeneral  Lecor  opposes  the  ene- 
my with  --kill  and  courage — Marmont  drives  Trant  from  Guar- 
da  and  defeats  his  militia  on  the  Mondeito — Lord  Wellington 
crosses  the  Tagus  and  enters  Castello  Branco — Marmont's 
position  jterilous — Lord  Wellington  advances  to  attack  him — 
He  retreats  over  the  Acrue<hi, — The  allied  armv  is  spread  in 
wide  cantonments,  and  the  fortresses  are  victualled  450 

CHAPTER  Vn. 

General  observations — The  campaign  considered— The  justice 
of  Na[)oleon's  views  vindicated,  and  Marmont's  operations 
censured  as  the  canse  of  the  French  misfortunes — The  opcr- 
nt'ons  of  the  army  of  the  centre  and  of  the  south  examined — 
Lord  Wellington's  operations  enlo'^ized — (extraordinary  ad- 
ventures of  Captain  Colquhon  Grant — The  operations  of  the 
niege  of  Badajos  examined — Lord  Wellington's  conduct  vin- 
dicated ......  454 

BOOK   XVII. 

CHAPTER,  L 


nmmary  of  the  political  state  of  affairs — Lord  Wcllesley  re- 
wgns — Mr.  Perceval  killed  —  New  administration — Story  of 
the  war  resumeil — Wellington's  precautionary  measures  de 
ecribed — He  relintiuishes  the  design  of  invading  Andalusia 
and  re.solves  too[)eratc  in  the  north — Reasons  why — Surprise 
of  Almaraz  by  general  Hill — False  alarm  given  by  sir  William 
Erskine  prevents  Hill  from  takin','  lh(!  fort  of  Mirabete — Wel- 
lington's discontent — Uiillcult  moral  position  of  English  gen- 


erals 


CHAPTER  IL 


Progress  of  the  war  in  different  parts  of  Spain — State  of  Galli- 
cia — French  precautions  and  successes  against  the  Partidas 
of  the  north — Marmont's  arrangements  in  Caslilc — Maritime 
expedition  suggested  by  sir  Howard  DouL'las — The  curate 
Merino  defeats  some  Frencli  near  Aranda  de  Duero — Mina's 
activity — Harasses  the  enemy  in  Ara-'on — Is  surpriseil  at 
Robrcs  by  Pannetier — F.scni>es  with  diillculty — licap|)ears  in 
the  Rioja — Gains  the  defiles  of  Navas  Tolosa — Captures  two 
convoys — Is  chased  by  general  Abbe  and  n(!arly  crushed, 
^vllerl•by  the  Partidas  in  the  north  are  discouraged — Those 
in  other  parts  become  more  enterprising — The  course  of  the 
Ebro  from  Tuilela  to  Tortoza  so  inrosted  by  them  that  the 
army  of  the  Khro  is  formed  by  drafts  from  Suchct's  forces 
and  pf.ned  under  general  lleille  to  repress  them — Operations 
of  Pdlonibini  against  the  Partidas — He  moves  toward  Mad- 


rid— Returns  to  the  Ebro — Is  ordered  to  join  the  king's  array 
— Operations  in  Ara,'Ou  and  Catalonia — The  (Jatalonians  are 
cut  od'  from  the  coast  line — Eroles  raises  a  new  rlivision  ia 
Talarn — .\dvances  in  Aragon — Defeats  general  Bourke  at 
Rhorla — Is  driven  into  Catalonia  by  Severoli — Decaen  defeats 
Sarslield  and  goes  to  Lcrida — Lacy  concentrates  in  the  mount. 
ains  of  Olot — Descends  iipmi  Mattaro — Flies  thence  dis- 
gracefully—  Lamarque  defeats  Sarslield — Lacy's  bad  conduct 
— Miserable  state  of  Catalonia  -  -  -  <68 

CHAPTER  in. 

Operations  in  Valencia  and  Murcia — Suchet's  able  goverrwnent 
of  Valencia — O'Donel  organizes  a  new  army  in  Murcia — Or- 
igin of  the  Sicilian  expedition  to  Spain — Secret  intriguea 
against  Na|)oleon  in  Italy  and  other  parts — Lord  William 
Bentiiick  proposes  to  invade  Italy — Lord  Wellington  opposes 
it — The  Russian  admiral  Tclitchagotf  projects  a  descent  npou 
Italy — Vacillating  conduct  of  the  ICnglish  ministers  product- 
ive of  great  mi.schief — Lord  William  Bentinck  sweeps  tha 
money-markets  to  the  injury  of  Lord  Wtillington's  opera- 
tions— Sir  John  M(}re's  plan  for  Sicily  rejected — His  ability 
and  foresight  proved  by  the  ultimate  result — Evil  eti'ects  of 
bad  government  shown  by  examples  -  -  471 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Operations  in  Andalusia  and  Estremadura — Advantage  of  Wei- 
linirton's  position — Soult's  plans  vast,  but  w<dl  considered — 
He  designs  to  besiege  Tarifa,  Alicant.  and  Cartha'jena.  and 
march  upon  Lisbon — Restores  the  F'rench  interest  at  the 
court  of  Morocco — English  embassy  to  the  Moori.sh  empe- 
ror fails — Soult  bombards  Cadiz,  and  menaces  a  serious  at- 
tack— Ballesteros,  his  rash  conduct — He  is  deleated  at  Bornos 
—  Effect  of  his  defeat  upon  the  allies  in  Estremadura — Foy 
snc'ours  the  fort  of  Mirabete — Hill  is  reinforced — Drouct  falls 
back  to  Azagua — Followed  by  Hill — General  Sialic  defeated 
by  Lallemandc  in  a  cavalry  combat  at  Macquilla — Exploit 
of  cornet  Strenowitz — General  Barrels  marches  to  reinforce 
Drouet  by  the  road  of  St.  Ollala — Hill  falls  back  to  Albuera 
— His  di.sinterested  conduct  ...  -  473 

CHAPTER  V, 

Political  situation  of  France — Secret  policy  of  the  European 
courts — ('auses  of  the  Russian  war — Napoleon's  trrandeur 
and  power — Scene  on  the  Niemen — Design  attributed  to 
Napoleon  of  concentrating  the  French  armies  behind  the 
Ebro— No  traces  of  such  an  intention  to  be  discovered — 
His  proposals  for  peace  considered — Political  state  of  Eng. 
land — Extiavagance.  harshness,  and  impiovident  conduct  of 
English  ministers — Dispute  with  Ameiica-  Political  state  of 
Spain — Intrigues  of  Carlotta — New  scheme  of  nnidiation  with 
the  colonies — Mr.  Sydenham's  opinion  of  it — New  constitu. 
tion  adopted — Succession  to  tlie  crown  fixed — Abolition  of 
the  inquisition  agitated — Dangerous  state  of  the  country — • 
Plot  to  deliver  up  Ceuta— Foreign  policy  of  Spain — Nego- 
tiations of  Bardaxi  at  Stockholm — Fresh  English  subsidy- 
Plan  of  enlisting  Spanish  soldiers  in  British  regiments  fails- 
Bobral  oflers  to  cairy  off  Ferdinand  from  Valencay,  but  Fer- 
dinand  rejects  his  olfer — Joseph  talks  of  assembling  a  cortea 
at  Madrid,  but  secretly  negotiates  with  that  in  the  Isla       470 

CHAPTER  VL 

Political  state  of  Portugal — Lord  Strangford's  conduct  con- 
demned— Lord  Wellesley  resolves  to  recall  him  and  send 
lord  Louvaiue  to  Rio  Janeiro — Rea.sons  why  this  did  not  take 
place — Lord  Strantrtbrd's  career  checked  by  the  fear  of  being 
removed — Lord  Wellington  obtains  full  powers  from  the 
Brazils — Loid  Castlereagh's  vigorous  interference — Death 
of  Linhares  at  Rio  Janeiro — Domingo  Souza  succeeds  him 
as  chief  minister,  but  remains  in  London — Lord  VVellingtou'a 
moderation  toward  the  Portuguese  regency — His  embarras.s- 
ing  situation  described — His  o[»inion  of  the  Spanish  and  Por- 
tugese public  men — His  great  diligence  and  foresight  aided 
by  the  inilustry  and  vigour  of  Mr.  Stuart,  supfjort  the  war — 
liis  administrative  views  and  plans  described — Opposed  by 
the  regency — He  desires  the  prince  regent's  return  to  Poi-trr- 
gal  without  his  wife — Carlotta  prepares  to  come  without  the 
P'iiice — Is  stopped — Mr.  Stuart  proposes  a  military  govera- 
ment.  but  lord  VN'ellington  will  not  consent— (Jreat  desertion 
from  the  Portugese  army  in  conseciuenc-e  of  their  distressed 
state,  frtnn  the  negligence  of  the  govermnent — Severe  ex«m- 
ples  do  not  check  it — The  character  of  the  Portugese  troops 
declines — Dilliculty  of  procuring  specie — Wellington's  re- 
sources imfiaired  by  the  shameful  cupidity  of  English  nu-i- 
chants  at  Lisbon  and  Oporto — Proposal  lor  a  P(u-tugnese 
bank  made  by  Domingo  Souza,  Mr.  Vansitlart.  and  Mr.  Vil- 
liers — Lord  Wellington  ridicules  it — He  permits  u  contraband 
trade  to  be  carried  on  with  Lisbon  by  Soult  lor  the  sake  of 
the  resources  it  furuishes       •  •  <  480 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS, 


xiz 


BOOK  XVIII. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Numbers  of  the  French  in  the  Periinsulii  shewn — Joscjih 
coaimanJor-iu-cliiel' — His  dissensions  with  the  French 
generals — His  plans — Opposed  by  Soult,  who  reconimends 
diif'rciit  operations  and  refuses  to  obey  the  king — Lord 
Wellin:rton's  plans  described — His  nunjbers — Colonel 
Sturj;eon  skilfully  repairs  the  bridge  of  Alcantara — The 
adva.ta^c  of  this  incisure — The  navigation  of  the  'i'agus 
and  the  Douro  ini[)roved  and  extended — Piasli  conduct  of 
a  Cv>:nniissary  on  the  Douro — Remarkable  letter  of  lord 
Welliiiiiton  to  lord  Liverpool — Arrangements  for  securing 
the  allies'  flanks  and  operating  against  tlie  enemy's  flanks 
de^icnbed — Marmont's  plans — His  military  character — He 
restores  discifilinc  to  the  army  of  Portugal — His  measures 
for  that  purpose  and  the  state  of  the  French  army  describ- 
ed and  compared  with  the  state  of  the  British  army  and 
Wellington's  measures        -----       484 

CHAPTER  IL 

Campaign  of  1812 — Wellington  advances  to  the  Tormes — 
Marniont  retires — The  allies  besiege  the  forts  of  Salaman- 
ca— General  aspect  of  all'airs  changes  and  becomes  gloomy 
— The  king  concentrates  the  army  of  the  centre — Mar- 
mont  returns  to  the  Tormes  and  cannonades  the  allies  on 
the  position  of  San  ('hristoval — Vaiious  skirmishes — Ad- 
venture of  Mr.  Mackay — Marmont  retires  to  Monte  Rubia 
— (Jrosses  the  Tormes  with  a  ]>art  of  his  army — Fine  con- 
duct of  general  Uuck's  German  cavalry — Graham  crosses 
the  Tormes  and  Marmont  retires  again  to  Monte  Rubia — 
Observations  on  this  movement — Assault  on  San  Vin- 
cente  fails — Heroic  death  of  general  Bowes — Siege  sus- 
pended for  want  of  ammunition — It  is  renewed — Cajetano 
is  stormed — San  Vincentc  being  on  Are  surrenders — Mar- 
mont retires  to  the  Duero  followed  by  Wellington — The 
French  rear-guard  sutlers  some  loss  between  Rucda  and 
'J'oidesillas — Positions  of  the  armies  described — State  of 
alTairs  in  other  parts  described — Procraslination  of  the 
Gallician  army — General  Bonet  abandons  the  Asturias — 
Coincidence  of  Wellington's  and  Napoleon's  views  upon 
that  subject — Sir  Home  Po[)ham  arrives  with  his  squadron 
on  the  coast  of  Biscay — }Iis  operations — Powerful  effect 
of  thein  upon  the  campaign — Wellington  and  Marmont 
alike  cautious  of  b.-inging  on  a  battle — extreme  difficulty 
and  distress  of  Wellington's  situation  -  -         -       459 

CHAPTER  HL 

Bonet  arrives  in  the  French  camp — Marmont  passes  the  Du- 
ero—Combat  of  Castrejon — Allies  retire  across  the  Gua- 
rena — Combat  on  that  river — Observations  on  the  move- 
ments— Marmont  turns  Wellington's  flank — Retreat  to 
San  Christoval — Marniont  passes  the  Tormes — Battle  of 
Salamanca — Anecdote  of  Mrs.  Dalbiac  -         -      495 

CHAPTER  IV. 

(Jlau7.el  passes  the  Tormes  at  Alba — Cavalry  combat  at  La 
Serna — Chauvel's  cavalry  joins  the  French  army — The 
king  reaches  Blasco  Sancho — Retires  to  Espinar  on  hear- 
ing of  the  battle — Receives  letters  from  Cinuzel  which  in- 
duce him  to  inarch  on  Segovia — Wellington  drives  Clau- 
zel  across  the  Duero — Takes  Valladolid — Brings  Santocil- 
des  over  the  Duero — Marches  upon  Cuellar — The  king 
abandons  Segovia  and  recrosses  the  GuaJarama — State  of 
alfdirs  in  other  [larts  of  Sjiain — General  Long  defeats  Lal- 
lemand  in  Estremadnra — Caflarelli  is  drawn  to  the  coast 
by  Popham's  expedition — Wellington  leaves  Clinton  at 
Cueliar.  and  passes  the  Guadaraina — (Cavalry  combat  at 
Majadahonda — The  king  unites  his  army  at  Valdemoro — 
Miserable  state  of  the  French  convoy — .loseph  passes  the 
Tagus;  hears  of  the  arriv;;!  of  the  Sicilian  expedition  at 
Alicant — Retreats  u;>on  Valencia  instead  of  Andalusi.a — 
Maunoint's  bri'j;ade  succours  the  garrison  of  Cuenca.  is 
beaten  at  TTtiel  by  Villa  (ximpa — Wellington  enters  Ma- 
drid—  The  Retiro  surrenders — Emjiecinado  takes  Guada- 
laxara — Extr;iordinarv  journey  of  colonel  Fabvier — Na- 
joleon  hears  of  Marmont's  defeat — His  generous  conduct 


towards  that  marshal — Receives  tliD  king's  report  against 
Soult — liis  maenanimity — Observations        -         -       503 

BOOK  XIX. 

CHAPTER  L 

State  of  the  war — Eastern  oj^erations — Jjacy's  bad  conduct 
— French  anny  of  the  l^bio  dissolved — I  acv's  secret 
agents  blow  up  the  magazines  in  Lerida — He  is  afraid  to 
storm  the  place — Calumniates  Sarsfield — Suchet  comes  to 
Reus — The  hermitage  of  St.  Dimas  surrendered  to  Decaen 
by  colonel  Green — 'J'he  French  gei:eral  burns  the  convent 
of  Montserrat  and  marches  to  Lerida — General  Maitland 
with  the  Anglo-Sicilian  army  ap[iears  oH'  Palamos — Sails 
for  Alicant — Reflections  on  this  event — 0])crali()ns  in  Mur- 
cia — O'Donel  defeated  at  Castalla — Maitland  lands  at  Ali- 
cant— Siichet  concentrates  his  forces  at  Xaliva — Entrench- 
es a  camp  there — Maitland  advances  to  Alcoy — His  diffi- 
culties— Returns  to  Alicant — 'J'he  king's  army  arrives  at 
Almanza — The  remnant  of  Mau])oiiit's  brit;ade  arrives 
from  Cuenca — Suchet  reoccupies  Alcoy — O'Donel  comes 
up  to  Yecla — Maitland  is  reinforced  trom  Sicily  and  en- 
trenches a  camp  under  the  walls  of  Alicant  -         -       510 

CHAPTER  II. 

Operations  in  Andalusia — The  king  orders  Soult  to  abandon 
that  province — Soult  urges  the  king  to  join  him  with  tlie 
other  armies — Joseph  reiterates  the  order  to  abandon  An- 
dalusia— Soult  sends  a  letter  to  the  minister  of  war  ex- 
pressing his  suspicions  that  Joseph  was  about  to  make  a 
sej;arate  peace  with  the  allies — The  king  intercepts  this 
letter,  and  sends  colonel  D>;sprez  to  Moscow,  to  represent 
Soult's  conduct  to  the  emperor — Napoleon's  magnanimity 
— W<-llini;ton  anxiously  watches  Soult's  movements — Or- 
ders Hill  to  flgiit  Drouet,  and  directs  general  Cocke  to  at- 
tack llie  French  lines  in  front  of  the  Isla  de  Leon — Bal- 
lesteros,  pursued  by  Leval  and  Villatte,  skirnushes  at  Coin 
— Enters  Malaga — Soult's  preparations  to  abandon  Anda- 
lusia— Lines  before  the  Isla  de  Leon  abandoned — Soult 
marches  towards  Grenada — Colonel  Skerrit  and  ('ruz  Mur- 
geon  land  at  Huelva — Attack  the  French  rear-guard  al 
Seville — Drouet  marches  ujion  Hucscar — Soult.  moving  by 
the  mountains,  reaches  Hellin,  and  effects  his  junction 
with  the  king  and  Suchet— IVIailland  desires  to  return  t(i 
Sicily — Wellington  prevents  him — V/cIIington's  general 
plans  considered — State  of  aflairs  in  Castile — ClauzrJ 
comes  down  to  Valladolid  with  the  French  army — Saiiti> 
c'l'ides  retires  to  Torrelobaton,  and  Clinton  falls  back  to 
Arevalo — Foy  marches  to  carry  off  the  French  garrisons 
in  Tjcon — Astorga  surrenders  before  his  arrival — He  march- 
es to  Zamora  and  drives  Silvcira  into  PortUiial — Menaces 
Salamanca — Is  recalled  by  Clauzel — The  Partidas  get  r.os- 
session  of  the  French  jjosts  on  the  Biscay  coast — T:\ke 
the  city  of  Bilboa — Reille  abandons  several  posts  in  Arasron 
— The  northern  provinces  become  ripe  for  insurrections  Li 

CHAPTER  TIL 

Wellinofton's  combinations  described — Foolisli  arrangements 
of  the  English  ministers  relative  to  Spanish  clothing — 
AVant  of  money — Political  persecution  in  Madrid — Miser- 
able state  of  that  citv — Character  of  the  Madrilenos — 
Wellington  marches  against  Clauzel — Device  of  the  Por- 
tuguese regency  to  avoid  supplying  thoir  troops — Welling- 
ton enters  Valladolid — Waits  for  ("astanos — His  opinion 
of  the  Spaniards — Clauzel  retreats  to  Burgos — His  able 
generalship — The  allies  enter  Burgos,  which  is  in  danger 
of  destruction  from  the  Partidas — Reflections  upon  the 
movements  of  the  two  armies — Siege  of  the  castle  of  Bur- 
gos    520 

CHAPTER  IV. 

State  of  the  war  in  various  parts  of  Spain — Josejih's  distress 
for  money — Masscna  declines  the  command  of  the  army 
of  Portugal — Caflarelli  joins  that  army — Reinforcements 
come  from  France — Mischief  occasioned  by  the  English 
newspapers — Sonham  takes  the  coiiimand — Operations  of 
the  Partidas — Hill  reaches  Toledo — S  uham  advaiu-es  tc 
relieve  the  castle  of  Burgos — Skirmish  at  Monasterio- 


XX 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 


Wellington  takes  a  position  of  battle  in  front  of  Burgos — 
SccoikI  skirmish — Wellington  weak  in  artillery — Negli- 
gence of  the  British  government  on  that  head — The  rela- 
tive situation  of  the  hcUigerents — Wellington  ollered  the 
chief  conunaiul  of  the  Spanish  armies — His  reasons  for 
accepting  it — Contumacious  conduct  of  Ballesteros — He 
is  arrested  and  sent  to  Ceuta — Suchet  and  Jourdan  refuse 
the  command  of  the  army  of  the  south — t>oult  reduces 
(Jliincliilla — 'I'he  king  communicates  with  Souliam — Hill 
communicates  with  Welliiigton — Retreat  from  Burgos — 
Combat  of  Vente  de  Pozo — Drunkenness  at  'I'orquemada 
— Condiat  on  the  Carion — Wellington  retires  behind  the 
Pisucr'j;a — Disorders  in  the  rear  of  the  army — Souham 
skirmishes  at  the  bridge  of  Cuhefon — Wellington  orders 
Hill  to  retreat  from  the  Tagiis  lo  the  Adaja — 8ouham  fails 
to  force  the  bridges  of  Valladolid  and  Simancas — 'I'he 
French  captain  Guingret  swims  the  Duero  and  surprises 
the  bridge  of  Tordesillas — Wellington  retires  behind  the 
Duero — Makes  a  rapid  movement  to  gain  a  position  in 
front  of  tlie  bri('ge  of  Tordesillas,  and  destroys  the  bridges 
of  Toro  and  Zamora,  which  arrests  the  maich  of  the 
French 526 

CHAPTER  V. 

The  king  and  Soult  advance  from  Valencia  to  the  Tagus — 
General  Hill  takes  a  position  of  battle — The  French  pass 
the  Tagus — Skirmish  at  the  Puente  Largo — Hill  blows  up 
the  Rctiro  and  abandons  Madrid — Riot  in  that  city — At- 
tachment of  the  Madrilenos  towards  the  British  troops — 
The  hostile  armies  pass  the  Guadararna — Souham  restores 
the  bridge  of  Toro — Wellington  retreats  towards  Sala- 
manca and  orders  Hill  lo  retreat  upon  Alba  de  'J'ormes — 
The  allies  take  a  position  of  battle  behind  tlie  'J'ornies — 
The  Spaniards  at  Salamanca  display  a  hatred  of  the  Bri- 
tish— Instances  of  their  ferocity — Soult  cannonades  the 
castle  of  Allia — The  king  re  Tganizes  the  French  armies— 
Soult  and  Jourdan  propose  ditlerent  plans — Soult's  plan 
adopted — French  pass  the  Tormes — Wellingion  by  a  re- 
markable movement  gains  the  Valmusa  river  and  retreats 
— Misconduct  of  the  troops — Sir  Edward  Paget  taken 
prisoner — ("ombat  on  the  Huehra — Anecdote — Retreat 
from  thence  to  (Jiudad  Rodrigo — The  armies  on  both  sides 
take  winter  cantonments      -         -  -         -       532 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Continuation. of  the  partizan  warfiire — General  Lameth  made 
governor  of  Santona — Reille  takes  the  command  of  the 
army  of  Portugal — Drouct,  count  D  Erlon,  commaruls 
that  of  the  centre — Works  of  Astorga  dcstroxed  by  the 
Spaniards — Mina's  operations  in  Aragon — Villa  Campa's 
operatmns — Em[)ecinado  and  others  enter  Madrid — The 
duke  Del  Par.pie  enters  La  Maiicha — Elio  and  Bassecour 
march  to  Albacete  and  communicate  with  the  Anglo-Sicil- 
ian army — 'Vhe  kin'i  enters  Madrid — Soult's  cavalry  scour 
La  Mancha — Suchet's  operations — General  Donkin  men- 
aces DiMiia — (Jeneral  W.  Clinton  takes  the  conmiand  of 
the  Anglo-Sicilian  army — Suchet  entrenches  a  camp  at 
Xativa — The  Anglo-Sieiliaa  army  falls  into  tlisrcpnte — 
General  Campbell  takes  tlie  command — Inactivity  of  the 
army — The  Frayle  surjjrises  a  convoy  of  French  artillery 
— 0))erations  in  Catiilonia — Dissensio  'S  in  that  province 
— Eroies  and  (>odrington  menace  Tarragona — Erolcs  sur- 
prises a  French  detachment  at  Arbeca — Lacy  threatens 
ATataro,  and  Hostairich  returns  to  Vich — Manso  defeats  a 
Fienc'li  delachment  near  Moliiio  del  Rev — Dociien  defeats 
the  unitcil  Calaloiiian  army,  and  j)enetrates  to  V'ich — The 
S[>anisii  divisions  separate — Colonel  Villamil  attempts  to 
suiprisc  Sail  Felipe  de  Balaguer — Atta.ks  it  a  second 
time  in  concert  with  ('odrin>j;ton — The  place  succoured  by 
tiie  garrison  of  'J'orto/a — I/acy  sulfers  a  French  convoy  to 
reach  Bircclona.  is  ai-cu-^cd  of  trcacliery  and  displaced — 
The  regular  warfare  in  Calalonia  ceases — The  parli/.an 
warfaic  continues — England  the  real  support  of  the 
war  . 540 

CHAPTER  VIL 

General  observations — Wellington  ref>roachcK  the  army — His 
censures  i rid iscrinn mite — Analvsis  of  his  campaign —  (Criti- 
cisms of  Jomini  and  others  examined — Ertors  of  execution 


— The  French  operations  analyzed — Sir  John  More's  re. 
treat  compared  with  lord  Wellington's  -         -       544 

BOOK  XX. 

CHAPTER  L 

Political  affairs — Their  influence  on  the  war — Napoleon's  in- 
vasion  of  Russia — Its  influence  on  the  contests  in  the  Pen« 
insula — State  of  feeling  in  England — Lord  Wcllesley 
charges  the  ministers,-  and  esyiecially  Mr.  Perceval,  with 
imbecility — His  [irnofs  thereof — Aliility  ar.d  zeal  of  lord 
Wellington  and  Air.  Stuart  shewn — Absurd  plans  of  the 
count  of  Funchal — Mr.  Villiers  and  Mr.  Vansittart — 'I'he 
English  ministers  propose  to  sell  the  Portuguese  crown 
and  church  lands — 'J'he  folly  and  injustice  of  these  and 
other  schemes  exposed  by  lord  Wellington — He  goes  to 
Cadiz — His  reception  there — New  organization  of  the 
Spanish  armies — Wellington  goes  to  Lisbon,  where  he  ia 
enthusiastically  received — His  departure  fr(.ni  (Cadiz  the 
signal  of  renewed  dissensions — (Caiiotta's  iiitiiiTues — De- 
cree  to  abolish  the  inquisition  opposed  by  the  clergy — The 
regency  aid  the  clergy — Are  disj. laced  by  the  cortes — New 
regency  apjiointcd — The  American  j^arty  in  the  cortes 
adopt  Carlotta's  cause — Fail  from  fear  of  the  peoiile-— 
Many  bishops  and  church  dignitaries  are  arrested,  ;nid 
others  fly  into  Portugal — The  Pope's  nuncio,  Gravina,  op- 
poses the  cortes — His  benefices  sequestered — He  flics  to 
Portugal — His  intrigues  there — Secret  overtures  made  to 
Joseph  by  some  of  the  Spanish  armies  -         -       549 

CHAPTER  n. 

Political  state  of  Portugal- — Wellington's  difTcultics — Tin 
pr  >por  conduct  of  some  English  ships  of  war — Piratical 
violence  of  a  Scotch  merchantman — Disorders  in  the  mili- 
tary system — Irritation  of  the  people — Misconduct  of  the 
magistrates — Wellington  and  Sluart  grapjile  with  the  di'5- 
orders  of  the  administration — The  latter  calls  fur  the  inter- 
ference of  the  British  government — \'\  elliiigt(in  writes  a 
remarkable  letter  to  the  prince  regent,  and  re(]uesls  him  to 
return  to  Portugal — Partial  amendment — The  efiicic  ncy 
of  the  army  restored:  but  the  coimtry  remains  in  an  un- 
settled state — The  prince  unable  to  quit  the  Brazils — ('ar^ 
lotta  prepares  to  come  alone — Ls  stopped  by  the  interfe 
rence  of  the  British  government — An  auxiliary  Russian 
force  is  offered  to  lord  Wellington  by  admiral  Greig — The 
Russian  andiassador  in  London  disavows  the  oi'Vr — The 
emperor  Alexander  proposes  to  mediate  between  England 
and  America — 'J'he  emjieror  of  Austria  ofliirs  to  mediate 
for  a  general  peace — Both  oilers  are  refused  -       556 

CHAPTER  in. 

Napoleon's  embarrassed   position — His  wonderful  activity— 
His  designs  explained — The  war  in  S[)ain  becomes  sec- 
ond; 
armi 
geroi 

[irovinces  creeps 
N-apoleon  orders  the  king  to  fix  his  quarters  at  Valladolid, 
to  menace  Portugal,  and  to  reinforce  the  army  of  the  north 
— Joseph  complains  of  liis  generals,  find  especially  of 
Soult — Napoleon's  magnanimity — Joseph's  comjilaints  not 
altogether  without  foundation     -         -         -         -         561 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Operations  south  of  theTaaus — Eroles  and  Codrington  seek 
to  entrap  the  governor  of 'i'arragona — 'i'liey  fiil — Sarsfitid 
and  \'illa  Campa  unite,  but  disperse  at  the  afiproach  of 
Panneticr  and  Severoli — Sucliet's  (losition — Great  force  of 
the  allies  in  his  front — The  y(ninger  Soult  engages  the 
Spanish  cavalry  in  La  Mancha — General  Daricau  marchca 
with  a  column  towards  Valencia — Receives  a  large  convoy 
and  returns  tu  La  Mancha — Absurd  rumours  about  the 
ICn'jflish  army  rife  in  the  French  cam|) — Some  of  lora 
Wellington's  sjiies  (letecte<l — Soult  is  recalled — (iazan  as- 
sumi-s  the  eomman<l  of  the  army  of  the  south — Suchct's 
liosition  described — S|i-  John  Murray  takes  the  command 
of  the  Anglo-Sicilian  troops  at  Alicant — Attairks  the 
French  posts  at  Alcoy — His  waul  of  vigour — He  project* 


His  designs  explained — 1  he  war  in  S[iain  becomes  ser/» 
ondary — Many  thousand  old   soldiers  withdrawn  from  the  |    ( 
armies — The  I'artidas  become  more  disciplined  and  dan-  /    / 
gerons — New  bands  are  raised  in  Biscay  and  (Tlnipuscoa,,\r^ 
and  the  insurrection  of  the  northern  iirovinces  creeps  on — --'v-^ 


TABLE    OF   CONTENTS. 


XXI 


a  maritime  attack  on  the  rity  of  Valencia,  but  drops  tlie  ] 
i]csiu;n  because  lonl  William  Bentinck  recalls  some  of  his 
troops — Remarks  upon  his  proceedings — Suchet  surprises 
a  Spanish  division  at  Yecia,  and  then  advances  against : 
Murray — Takes  a  thousand  Spanish  prisoners  in  Villena —  ! 
Murray  takes  a  jjosition  at  Caslalla — His  advanced  guard 
driven  from  13iar — Second  battle  of  Castalla — Remarks  564 

CHAPTER  V. 

C;>erations  north  of  the  Tagus — Position  of  the  French 
armies — Palombini  marches  from  Madrid  to  join  the  army 
of  the  north — Various  combats  take  place  with  the  Parti- 
das — Foy  fails  to  surprise  the  British  post  at  Bejar — Caf- 
tarelii  demands  reinforcements — Joseph  misconceives  the 
emperor's  plans — Wellington's  plans  vindicated  against 
French  writers — Soult  advises  Joseph  to  hold  Madrid  and 
the  mountains  of  Avila — Indecision  of  the  king — He  goes 
to  Valladolid — Concentrates  the  f^-ench  armies  in  Old 
Castile — A  division  under  Leval  remains  at  Madrid — Reil- 
le  sends  reinforcements  to  the  army  of  the  north — Various 
skirmishes  with  tiie  Partidas — Leval  deceived  by  false  ru- 
mours at  Madrid — Joseph  wishes  to  abandon  that  capital — 
Northern  insurrection — Operations  of  Caffarelli,  Palom- 
bini, Mendizabel,  Longa  and  Mina — Napoleon  recalls  Caf- 
farelli— Clauzel  takes  the  command  of  the  army  of  the 
north — Assaults  Castro  but  fails — Palombini  siurmishes 
with  Mendizabel — Introduces  a  convoy  into  Santona — 
Marches  to  succour  Bilboa — His  operations  in  Guiposcoa 
— The  insurrection  gains  strength — Clauzel  marches  into 
Navarre — Defeats  Mina  in  the  valley  of  Roncal  and  pur- 
sues him  into  Aragon — Foy  acts  on  the  coast — Takes 
Castro — Returns  to  Bilboa — Defeats  the  Biscayan  volun- 
teers under  Mugartegui  at  Villaro,  and  those  of  Guipuscoa 
under  Artola  at  Lequitio — The  insurrectional  junta  flies — 
Bermeo  and  Isaro  are  taken — Operations  of  the  Partidas 
on  the  great  line  of  communication     -         -  570 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Wcllingtoi  /estores  the  discipline  of  the  allied  army — Rela- 
tive strength  of  the  belligerent  forces — W'ellington's  plans 
described — Lord  W,  Bentinck  again  proposes  to  invade 
Italy — W^ellington  opposes  it — The  opening  of  the  cam- 
paign delayed  by  the  weather — State  of  the  French  army 
— Its  movements  previous  to  the  opening  of  the  cam- 
paign      ........         578 

CHAPTER  VIL 

Ijangerotis  discontent  of  the  Portuguese  army — Allayed  by 
Wellington — Noble  conduc^of  the  soldiers — The  let't  wing 
of  the  allies  under  general  Graham  marches  through  the 
Tras  OS  Montes  to  the  Esla — The  right  wing  under  Wel- 
lington advances  against  Salamsnca — Combat  there — The 
alii'^s  pass  the  Tormes — Wellington  goes  in  person  to  the 
Esla — Passage  of  that  river — Cavalry  combat  at  Morales 
— The  two  wings  of  the  allied  amiy  unite  at  Toro  on  the 
Duero — Remarks  on  that  event — W'ellington  marches  in 
advance — Previous  movements  of  the  P'rench  described — 
They  pass  the  Carion  and  Pisuerga  in  retreat — The  allies 
pass  the  (Jarion  in  pursuit — Joseph  takes  post  in  front  of 
Burgos — Wellington  turns  the  Pisuerga  with  his  left  wing 
and  attacks  the  enemy  with  his  right  v^'ing — Combat  on 
the  Hormaza — The  French  retreat  behind  Pancorbo  and 
blow  up  the  castle  of  Burgos — W^ellington  crosses  the  Up- 
per Ebro  and  turns  the  French  line  of  defence — Santander 
is  adopted  as  a  depot  station  and  the  military  establish- 
ments in  Portugal  arc  broken  up — Jose])h  changes  his  dis- 
positions of  defence — The  allies  advance — Combat  of  Os- 
ma — Combat  of  St.  Millan — Combat  of  Subijana  Morillas 
— The  French  armies  concentrate  in  the  basin  of  Vittoria 
behind  the  Zadora     -         -         -         -         -         -         581 

CHAPTER  VIIL 

Confused  state  of  the  French  in  the  basin  of  Vittoria — Two 
convoys  are  sent  to  the  rear — The  king  takes  up  a  new 
order  of  battle — The  (Jallicians  march  to  seize  Orduna  but 
are  recalled — Graham  marches  across  the  hills  to  Murguia 
— Relative  strength  and  position  of  the  hostile  armies — 
Battle  of  Vittoria — Joseph  retreats  by  Salvalierra — Wei- 1 


lington  pursues  him  up  the  Borundia  and  Araciuil  valleys 
— Sends  Longa  and  Giron  into  Guipuscoa — Joseph  halts 
at  Yrursun — Detaches  the  army  of  Portugal  to  the  Bidas- 
soa — Retreats  with  the  army  of  the  centre  and  the  army 
of  the  south  to  Pampeluna — Wellington  detaches  Graham 
throuch  the  mountains  by  the  pass  of  St.  Adrian  into 
Gui[)Uscoa  and  marches  himself  to  Pampeluna — Combat 
with  the  French  rear-guard — Joseph  retreats  up  the  valley 
of  Roncevalles — General  Foy  rallies  the  French  troops  in 
Guipuscoa  and  lights  the  Spaniards  at  Montdragon — Re- 
treats to  Bergara  and  Villa  Franca — Graham  enters  Gui- 
puscoa— Combat  on  the  Orio  river — Foy  retires  to  Tolosa 
— Combat  there — The  French  posts  on  the  sea-coast  aban- 
doned with  exception  of  Santona  and  St.  Sebastian — Foy 
retires  behind  the  Bidassoa — Clauzel  advances  toviards 
Vittoria — Retires  to  Logrono — Wellington  endeavours  to 
surround  him — Clauzel  makes  a  forced  march  to  'i'udela 
— Is  in  great  danger — Escapes  to  Zaragoza — Halts  there — 
Is  deceived  by  Mina  and  finally  marches  to  Jaca — Gazan 
re-enters  Spain  and  occupies  the  valley  of  Bastan — O'Don- 
el  reduces  the  forts  of  Pancorbo — Hill  drives  Gazan  from 
the  valley  of  Bastan — Observations  •         -         588 

BOOK  XXI. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Lord  W^ellington  blockades  Pampeluna,  besieges  San  Sebas- 
tian— Operations  on  the  eastern  coast  of  Spain — General 
Elio's  misconduct — Sir  John  Murray  sails  to  attack  Tarra- 
gona— Colonel  Prevot  takes  St.  Felipe  de  Balaguer — Sec- 
ond siege  of  Tarragona — Suchet  and  Maurice  Mathicu  en- 
deavour to  relieve  the  place — Sir  John  .Murray  raises  the 
siege — Embarks  with  the  loss  of  his  guns — Disembarks 
again  at  St.  Felipe  de  Balaguer — Lord  William  Bertiiick 
arrives — Sir  John  Murray's  trial — Observations     -        596 

CHAPTER  H. 

Danger  of  Sicily — Averted  by  Murat's  secret  defection  from 
the  emperor — Lord  William  Btntinck  re-enitarks — His 
design  of  attacking  the  city  of  Valencia  frustrated — Del 
Parque  is  defeated  on  the  Xucar — The  Anglo-Sicihai.s 
disembark  at  Alicant — Suchet  prepares  to  attack  the  allies 
Prevented  by  the  battle  of  Vittoria — Abandons  Valencia 
— Marches  towards  Zaragoza — Clauzel  retreats  to  France 
— Paris  evacuates  Zaragoza — Suchet  retires  to  'i'arragona 
— Mines  the  walls — Lord  William  Bentinck  }>ap:is  the 
Ebro — Secures  the  Col  de  Balaguer — Invests  Tanagona 
— Partial  insurrection  in  Upper  Catalonia — Con>bat  of 
Salud — Del  Parque  joins  lord  William  Bentinck  who  pro- 
jects an  attack  upon  Suchct's  cantonments — Suchet  con- 
centrates his  army — Is  joined  by  Dccaen — Advances— 
The  allies  retreat  to  the  mountains — Del  Parque  invests 
Tortosa — His  rear-guard  attacked  by  the  garrison  while 
passing  the  Ebro — Suchet  blows  up  the  walls  of  Tarrago- 
na— Lord  William  desires  to  besiege  Tortosa — Hears  that 
Suchet  ha?  detached  troops — Sends  Del  Parque's  army  to 
join  lord  Wellington — Advances  to  Villa  Franca — Combat 
of  Ordal — The  allies  retreat — Lord  Frederick  Bentinck 
fights  with  the  French  general  Myers  and  wounds  him — • 
Lord  William  returns  to  Sicily — Observailons      -         603 

CHAPTER  TIL 

Siege  of  San  Sebastian — Convent  of  San  Bartolomeo  storm- 
ed— Assault  on  the  place  fails — Causes  thereoi^ — Siege 
turned  into  a  blockade,  and  the  guns  embarked  at  Passages 
— French  make  a  successful  sally        -        -        -         611 

CHAPTER  TV. 

Soult  appointed  the  emperor's  lieutenant — Arrives  at  Bay- 
onne — Joseph  goes  to  Paris — Sketch  of  Napoleon's  political 
and  military  situation — His  greatness  of  mind — Soull's 
activity — Theatre  of  operations  described — Soult  resolves 
to  succour  Pampeluna — Relative  positions  and  numbers 
of  the  contending  armies  described      -         -         -         616 

CHAPTER  V. 

Soult  attacks  the  right  of  the  allies— Cmibat  of  R-ncevalIra 
— Combat  of  Linzoaiu — Count  D'Erion  attacks  the  allies' 


TABLE    OF   CONTENTS. 


right  centre — Combat  of  ^Taya — General  Hill  takes  a  po-  ' 
sition  at  Irneta — General   Pietou  and   Gole  retre;it  down  , 
the  Val  dc  Zubiri — Tiiey  turn  at  Iluarte  and  offer  bat- 
tle— Ijoril  V.cliington  arrives — Combat  of  the  27th — First 
battle  of  !^i!;roren — Various  movements — D'Eilon  joins 
Soult  who  attacks  general  Ilili — Second  battle  of  Saurorcii 
— Fov  is  cut  oirfroMi  the  main  army — Night  march  of  the 
light  "division — Soult  rctriiits — ('onihut  of  Dona  Maria — 
Dangerous  position  of  the  French  at  St.  Estevan — Soult 
marches  down  the  Bidassoa — Forced  inarch  of  the  light 
division— Terrible  scene  near  the  bridge  of  Yanzi — Com-  I 
bat   of  Echallar   and   Ivantelly — IN'arrow  escape   of  lord 
Welhngton — Observations  ....         621 

BOOK  XXII. 

CHAPTER  I. 

New  positions  of  the  armies — Lord  Melville's  mismanagement 
of  the  naval  co-operation — Siege  of  San  Sebastian — Pro- 
gress of  the  second  attack  ...         -         638 

CHAPTER   n. 

Storming  of  San  Sebastian — Lord  Wellington  calls  for  vol- 
unteers from  the  first,  fourth  and  light  divisions — The 
place  is  assaulted  and  taken — Th(^  town  burned — The  cas- 
tle is  bombarded  and  surrenders — Observations       -       642 

CHAPTER  HI. 

Soult's  views  and  positions  during  the  siege  described — He 
endeavours  to  succour  the  place — Attacks  lord  Wellington 
— Combats  of  San  Marcial  and  Vera — The  French  are 
repulsed  the  same  day  that  San  Sebastian  is  stormed — 
Soult  resolves  to  adopt  a  defensive  .<;ystem — Observa- 
tions       ........         646 

CHAPTER   IV. 

The  duke  of  Berry  proposes  to  invade  France,  promising  the 
aid  of  twenty  thoa^asid  insurgents — Lord  Wellington's 
views  on  this  suhject^His  personal  acrimony  against  Na- 
poleon— That  monarch's  policy  and  character  defended — 
Dangerous  state  of  aH'airs  in  Catalonia — Lord  Wellington 
designs  to  go  there  himself,  but  at  the  desire  of  the  allied 
sovereigns  and  the  English  government  resolves  to  estab- 
lish a  part  of  his  army  in  France — His  ;)lans  retarded  by 
aMMents  and  bad  weather — Soult  unable  to  divine  his  pro- 
ject—Passao'e  of  the  Bidassoa — Second  condiat  of  Vera — 
Colonel  Colbirne's  gr.^at  presence  of  mind — Gallant  action 
of  lieutenant  Havelock — '/'he  French  lose  the  redoubt  of 
Parre  and  abandon  the  great  Rliune — Obseriations       651 

CHAPTER   V. 

Soult  retakes  t'le  redoubt  of  >'arre — Wellington  organizes 
the  army  in  three  great  divisions  under  sir  Rowlai;d  Hill, 
marshal  Beresford,  and  sir  John  Hope — Disinterested  con- 
duct of  the  last-named  oihcer — Soult's  immense  intrench- 
ments  described — His  correspondence  with  Suchet — Pro- 
poses to  ret  ike  the  oirensive  and  unite  their  armies  in  Ara- 
gon — Suchet  will  not  accede  to  his  views,  and  makes  in- 
accurate stateme%ls — I^ord  Wi^llington,  hearing  of  advan- 
tages gained  by  the  allied  sovereigns  in  Germany,  resolves 
to  invade  France — Blockide  and  fall  of  Pampeluna — Lord 
Wellington  oraanizes  a  brigade  under  lord  Aylmer  to  be- 
siege Santona,  but  afterwards  changes  his  design     -     659 

CHAPTER    VI. 

Political  state  of  Portugal-  -Violence,  ingratitude  and  folly 
of  the  government  of  that  country — Political  .state  of  Spain 
— Various  factions  described,  tln'ir  violence,  insolence  and 
folly — Scandalous  scenes  at  (^adiz — Several  Spanish  gene- 
rals desire  a  revolution — Lord  Wellinalon  describes  the 
(miserable  slate  of  the  country — Anticipates  the  necessity 
of  putting  down  the  cortez  by  {>ircc — Resigns  his  command 

I  of  the  Spanish  armies — The  Entrlish  mii.istors  propose  to 
removi-  liim  to  Ctcrmany — The  new  cortez  reinstate  him 
as  generalissimo  on  his  own  terms — He  expresses  fears 
that  the  cause  will  finally  fail,  a:.d  advises  the  English 
aiinistcrs  to  withdraw  the  Britibh  army        -        .         664  j 


BOOK   XXIII. 

CHAPTER  L 

War  in  the  south  of  France- -Soult's  political  difficultiea — 
Privations  of  the  allied  troops — Lord  U  ellington  a] ■peals 
to  their  military  honour  with  ell'cct — Averse  to  olltnsive 
operations,  but  when  JN'apoleon's  disasters  in  Gennany  bt> 
came  knovvn,  again  yields  to  the  wishes  of  the  allied  sov- 
ereigns — His  disi)ositions  of  attack  retarded — Thcv  are 
described — Battle  of  the  ISivelle — Observations — Deatha 
and  characters  of  Mr.  Edward  Freer  ai»d  colonel  Thomas 
Lloyd 672 

CHAPTER  II. 

Soult  occupies  the  intrenched  camp  of  Bayonne,  and  the  hne 
of  the  IS'ive  river — Lord  Wellington  unable  to  pursue  his 
victory  from  the  state  of  the  roads — Bridge-head  of  Cam- 
bo  abandoned  by  the  French — Excesses  of  the  Spanish 
troops — Lord  M  ellington's  indignation — He  sends  them 
hack  to  Spain — Various  skinnishes  in  front  of  Bavonne— 
The  generals  John  Wilson  and  Vandeleur  are  wounded — 
I  Mina  plunders  the  Val  de  Baigorri — Is  beaten  by  the  na- 
/  tional  guards — Passage  of  the  INive  and  battles  in  front  of 
Bayonne — Combat  of  the  lOth — Combat  of  the  11th — 
Combat  of  the  12th — Battle  of  St.  Pierre — Observa- 
tions          680 

CHAPTER   in. 

Respective  situations  and  views  of  lord  Wellington  and  Soult 
— Partisan  warfare — The  Basques  of  the  Val  de  Baigorri 

^  excitedhj  arms  by  the  excesses  of  Mina's  troops — General 
Harispe  takes  the  command  of  the  insurgents — VAnuztl 
advances  beyond  the  Biduuze  river — General  movements 
— Parii.san  combats- — Excesses  committed  by  the  Sj  Pii- 
iards — Lord  Wellineton  reproaches  their  generals — .His 
vigorous  and  resolute  conduct — He  menaces  the  French 
insursents  of  the  valleys  with  lire  and  sword,  and  the  in- 
surrection subsides — Soult  hems  in  the  allies'  right  closely 
— Partisan  combats  continued — Remarkable  instances  of 
the  habits  e.-Uablished  between  the  French  and  British  sol- 
diers of  the  light  division — Shipwrcckr  ^n  the  coast     68 1 

CHAPTER   IV. 

Political  state  of  Portugal — Political  state  of  Spain — Lord 
Wellington  advises  the  English  government  to  [)repaie  Joj 
a  war  with  Spain,  and  to  seize  San  t-'cbastian  as  a  security 
for  tiie  withdiawal  of  the  British  and  Portuguese  troops — 
The  seat  of  government  and  the  new  cortez  are  rein'-vxJ 
to  Madrid — 'I'he  duke  of  >an  Carlos  arrives  sccrftiy  with 
the  treaty  of  Valenfay — It  is  njected  by  the  Sianish  re- 
gency and  corttz — Lord  Wellington's  views  on  the  sub- 
ject   G'J5 

CHAPTER    V. 

Political  state  of  Napoleon — Guileful  policy  of  the  allied  s<v. 
ereigns — M.  de  St.  .'\ignan — General  n  flection!- — Inse'- 
tled  policy  of  the  English  nuiii?ter.« — They  'neglect  loril 
M  ellington — He  rem.jnstratcs  and  exposes  the  denuded 
slate  of  his  army       ..----         7G0 

CHAPTER  VL 

Continuation  of  the  war  in  the  eastern  p.iovinces— Sychcl's 
erroneous  statements — Sir  William  Clinton  repairs  Tarra- 
gona— Advances  to  Villa  Fr.anca — Suchet  endeavours  to 
surprise  him — Fails — The  French  cavalry  cut  oil  an  Eng- 
lish detachment  at  Ordal — The  duke  of  ."^an  Carlos  passf,i 
through  the  French  post.s— Copons  favourable  to  his  mis- 
sion — Clinton  and  .Manso  endeavour  to  cut  oil"  the  French 
troojis  at  Molino  del  Rey — They  fail  through  the  miscon 
duct  of  Copons — Napoleon  recalls  a  great  bo<iy  of  Suehet's 
troops,  whereupon  he  reinforces  the  garri.soii  of  Barcelor.a 
and  retires  to  Gerona — Van  Halen — He  endeavours  to  1)6- 
guilethe  governor  of  Tortosa — Falls — Succeeds  at  Lerida, 
Mequinenza  and  .Monzon — Sketch  of  the  siege  of  Monzoii 
— It  is  defended  by  the  Italian  soldier  St.  JactfUes  for  one 
hundred  and  forty  days — Clinton  and  Copons  invest  Bar 
ctlona — The  beguiled    garrisons  of  Lerida,  .Mcquiuenz* 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 


XXI  u 


and  Mniizon  arrive  at  Martorel — Are  surrounded  and  sur- 
render on  termr — Capitulation  violated  by  Copons — King 
Fcrdiiiand  returns  to  Spain — His  character — Clinton 
breaks  up  his  army — His  conduct  eulogized — Ijamentalde 
sally  tVom  Barcelona — The  French  garrisons  beyond  the 
Ebro  return  to  France  and  Habert  evacuates  Barcelona — 
Fate  of  the  prince  of  Conti  and  the  duchcs?  of  Bourbon 
—Siege  of  Santona  .         .         -         .         -         70(> 

BOOK    XXIV 

CHAPTER  I. 

Napoleon  recalls  several  divisions  of  infantry  and  cavalry 
from  Souk's  army — P^mbarrassmcnts  of  that  marshal — M. 
Batbedat,  a  banker  of  Bayonne.  oilers  to  aid  the  allies  secret- 
ly with  money  and  provisions — La  Roche-Jacquelin  and 
other  Bourbon  partisans  arrive  at  the  allies'  liead-quartcrs — 
The  duke  of  Angouli^me  arrives  tliere — Lord  Wellington's 
political  views — General  reflections — Soult  embarrassed  by 
the  hostility  of  the  French  people — Lord  Wellington  em- 
barrassed by  the  hostility  of  the  Spaniards — Soull's  re- 
markable project  for  the  defence  of  France — Napoleon's 
reasons  for  neglecting  it  put  hypotb.etically — I^ord  Wel- 
lington's situation  suddenly  ameliorated — His  wise  policy, 
foresight  and  diligence — Resolves  to  throw  a  bridge  over 
the  Adour  b-'low  Bayonne,  and  to  drive  Soult  from  that 
river — Soult's  system  of  defence — Numbers  of  the  con- 
tending armies — Passage  of  the  Gaves — Combat  of  Garris 
— Lord  Wellington  forces  the  line  of  the  Bidouze  and 
Gave  do  Maulvlon — Soult  takes  the  line  of  the  Gave  d'Ol  >- 
ron  and  resolves  to  change  his  system  of  operation        714 

CHAPTER  n. 

)  trd  Wellington  arrests  his  movements  and  returns  in  person 
to  St.  Jean  de  Luz  to  throw  his  bridge  over  the  Adour — 
is  prevented  by  bad  weather  and  returns  to  the  Gave  de 
Mauloon — Passage  of  tiie  Adour  by  sir  Jolm  Hope — Dif- 
ficulty of  the  operation — The  flotilla  pa^-ses  the  bar  and 
enters  the  river — The  French  sally  from  Bayonne,  but  are 
repulsed,  and  the  stupendous  bridL^e  is  cast — Citadel  in- 
vested after  a  severe  action — Lord  Wellington  passes  t[:c 
Gave  d'Olaron  and  iiivests  Navarreins — Soult  concentrates 
his  army  at  Orthez — Beresford  passes  the  Gave  de  Pau 
near  Peirchorade — Battle  of  Orthez — Soult  changes  his 
line  of  operations — Combat  of  Aire — Observations      721 

CHAPTER  TIL 

Koult's  perilous  situation — He  falls  back  to  Tarbrs — Napo- 
leon sends  him  a  plan  of  operations — His  reply  and  vie  ws 
stated — Lord  Wellington's  embarrassment^ — ?^ou!t's  pro- 
clamation— Ob.icrvations  upon  it — Lord  Wellington  calls 
up  Freyre's  CJallicians  and  detaches  Beresford  against  Bor- 
deaux— The  mayor  of  that  city  revolts  from  Napoleon — 
Beresford  enters  Bordeaux  and  is  followed  by  the  duke  of 
Angoubmip — Feyrs  of  a  reaction — The  mayor  issues  a 
false  proclamatio:i — Lo'd  Wellington  expresses  his  indig- 
nation— Rebukes  the  duke  of  Angoul^me — Recalls  Beres- 
ford, but  leaves  lord  Dalhousie  with  the  seventh  division 
and  some  cavalry — Decaen  commences  the  organization  of 
the  army  of  the  Gironde — Admiral  Penrose  enters  the  Ga- 
ronne— Remarkable  exploit  of  the  commissary  Ogilvic — 
Lord  Daihousie,  passes  the  Garonne  and  the  Dordogne. 
and  defeats  L'Huilli;T  at  Etavdiers — Admiral  Penrose  de- 
stroys the  Frencli  flotilla — The  French  set  fire  to  their 
ships  of  war — The  British  seamen  and  marines  land  and 
destroy  all  the  French  batteries  from  Blaye  to  the  mouth 
of  the  tiaroune  -.-.--         731 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Wellington's  and  Soult's  situations  and  forces  described — 
Folly  of  the  I'^nslish  ministers — Freyre's  Gnllicians  and 
Ponsonby's  heavy  cavalry  join  lord  Wellington — He  or- 


ders Giron's  Andalus-ians  and  Del  Prin;nr's  army  to  entsr 
France — Soult  suddenly  lakes  the  olit  i,.--ive — ("cuibats  y--( 
cavalry — Partisan  cxp'oditicn  of  captain  Dania — Welling- 
ton menaces  the  peasantry  with  flie  and  sword  if  they  tak« 
up  arms — Soult  retires — Lord  Wellijigton  advances 
Combat  of  Vic  en  Bigorre — Death  and  character  of  coin- 
nel  H  nry  Sturgeon — Daring  exploit  of  caiilain  WiJl'iun 
Light — Conibat  of  Tarbes — Soult  retreats  by  forced  iriaich 
es  to  Toulouse — \\'ellington  follows  more  slowly — Cav 
airy  combat  at  St.  Gaudens — The  allies  arrive  in  front  of 
Toulouse — Rellections       .         .         -         -         .         737 

CHAPTER  V. 

Views  of  the  commanders  on  each  side — Wf  llington  de?;igna 
to  throw  a  bridge  over  the  Garonne  at  Portet  above  'J'ou- 
louse,  but  below  the  confluence  of  the  Arricge  and  Gur- 
onne — The  river  is  found  too  wide  for  tlw  pontoons — Ho 
changes  his  design — Cavalry  action  at  St.  Martin  de  Toiuh 
— General  Hill  passes  the  Garonne  at  Pensaj.^url  above  thn 
confluence  of  the  Arriege — Marches  upon  Cuilcgabcile — . 
Crosses  the  Arricge — Finds  the  cc;:ntry  too  dirp  for  his 
artillery  and  returns  to  Pcnsaguel — Kccrosscs  the  Garonne 
— Soult  fortifies  Toulouse  and  tlic  Mont  Rave — Lord 
Wellington  sends  his  pontoons  dow^n  the  Garonne — Pa.s- 
ses  that  river  at  Grenade,  filtcen  niiit^s  belcw  'J  oulcuse, 
with  twenty  thousand  men — i'he  river  fio(;ds  and  hig 
bridge  is  talieia  up — The  waters  subside — The  biidge  is 
again  laid — The  Spaniards  pass — Lord  Wellington  ad- 
vances up  the  right  bank  to  Fenouilhet- — Condiut  of  cav- 
alry— 'Jlie  eighteenth  hussars  win  the  bridge  of  Croix 
d'Orade — Lord  Wellington  resolves  to  attack  Soult  on  the 
9th  of  April — Orders  the  pontoons  to  be  taken  up  and  re- 
laid  higher  up  the  Garonne  atSeilh,  iii  the  riight  of  the 
8th — 'I'inic  is  lost  m  the  execution  and  the  attack  is  defer- 
red— The  light  division  cross  at  Seilh  on  the  uioniing  of 
the  ICth— Battle  of  Toulouse  ...         742 


CHAPTER  VL 
General  observations  •^nd  reflections 


749 


APPENDIX. 
No.  L 

Two  letters   fmm  sir  A.  Wellesley  to  sir  Harry  Bui 
rard  -         -         -         -  ...     758 

No.  n. 

■i.rticlt;R  of  the  convention  for  the  eyacu.?.t'.on  of  Portu- 
gal     759 

No.  UL 

Despatch   fi-nm   the  cohlL'  de  Bsh'cdore   relative   lo  the 
battle  of  Gamonai      .-.---     761 

Nc.  IV. 

Extract  of  a  letter  from  the  duke  of  Dalmatic  »o  the  au- 
thor    -     7(>1 

No.  V. 

Especiil   return    of  loss   during  sir  John  Moore's  cam- 
paign -        -  • 761 

No.  VI. 
Three  letters  from  lord  Coliingwood  to  sir  Hew  Dalrym 


pie 


76a 


xxvr 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 


1 


No.  VII. 


No.  XV. 


Proceedings  of  major-ijeneral  McKenzie's  detachment 
from  Lisbon  to  Cadiz  -         -         -         -         -     764 

No.  VIII. 

Letter  from  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  to  sir  J.  Cradock;  two 
frcvm  the  same  to  lord  Castlereaujh ;  lord  Wellington 
to  the  marquis  Wellesley;  general  Hill  to  sir  A. 
Wellesley;  colonel  Stopford  to  lieutenant-general  Sher- 
brooke        ..--.--.     766 

No.  IX. 
Letter  from  major-general  F.  Ponsonby  -        -     771 

No.  X. 

Extracts  of  letters  from  lord  Wellington  to  lord  Liverpool, 
and  one  from  sir  John  Moore  to  majoi-general  M'Ken- 
zie,  commanding  in  Portugal      -         -         -         -     771 

No.  XL 
Extracts  of  letters  from  lord  Wellington         -         -     774 

No.  XII. 

Letter  from  licut.-gen.  Graham  to  the  riarht.  hon.  Henry 
Wellesley — Letter  from  general  F.  Ponsonby,  battle  of 
Barossa — From  col.  Light,  battle  of  Albuera       -     779 

No.  XIII. 

Extracts  from  the  correspondence  of  capt.  Squire,  of  the 
engineers  -        - 781 


No.  XIV. 
General  Campbell  to  lord  Liverpool 


781 


Siese  of  Tarragona,  capt.  Codrington's  correspondence, 
&.C. -     781 

No.  XVL 

Siege  of  Tarifa,  extracts  from  memoirs  and  letters  of  offi- 
cers ------...     786 

No.  XVII, 

On  the  storming  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo  and  Badajos     -     788 

No.  XVIII. 

ESCALADK    OF    ST.  VtNCENT. 

Extract  from  a  memoir  by  capt.  Edward  P.  Hopkins     790 
No.  XIX. 

BATTLE    OF    SALAMANCA. 

Extract  from  a  memoir  by  colonel  Money — Extract  of  a 
letter  from  sir  Jfenry  Watson — Extract  from  a  letter  of 
colonel  Towns^-nd       -         -         -         -         -         -791 

No.  XX. 

marmont's  operations. 
Colonel  Le  Mesurier  to  brigadier-eeneral  Trant — Extract 
from  a  memoir  of  general  Tiant         ...     791 

No.  XXL 

COMBAT    OF    MAYA. 

Extract  from  a  manuspvipt  memoir  by  capt.  Norton     792 
No.  XXI I. 

COMBAT    OF    RONCEVALLES. 

General  Cole  to  lord  Wellington — Marshal  Soiilt  to  die 


minister  of  var 


;9>s 


HISTORY 


OF   THB 


PENINSULAR    WAR 


BOOK    I. 


INTRODUCTION. 


CHAPTER  I. 


Thj  hostility  of  the  European  aristocracy  caused  the 
enthusiasm  of  republican  France  to  take  a  military 
direction,  and  forced  that  poweruil  nation  into  a  course 
Df  policy  which,  however  outrageous  it  might  appear, 
was  in  reality  one  of  necessity.  Up  to  the  treaty  of 
Tilsit,  the  wars  of  France  were  essentially  defensive, 
— for  the  bloody  contest  that  wasted  the  continent  so 
many  years,  was  not  a  struggle  for  preeminence  be- 
tween ambitious  powers,  not  a  dispute  for  some  access- 
ion of  territory,  nor  for  the  political  ascendency  of  one 
or  other  nation,  but  a  deadly  conflict,  to  determine 
whether  aristocracy  or  democracy  should  predominate, 
whether  e-quality  or  privilege  should  henceforth  be  the 
principle  of  European  governments. 

The  French  Revolution  was  pushed  into  existence 
oefore  the  hour  of  its  natural  birth.  The  power  of  the 
aristocratic  principle  was  too  vigorous  and  too  much 
identified  Avith  that  of  the  monarchical  principle,  to  be 
successfully  resisted  by  a  virtuous  democratic  effort, 
much  less  could  it  be  overthrown  by  a  democracy  riot- 
;ng  in  innocent  blood,  and  menacing  destruction  to 
oolitical  and  religious  establishments,  the  growth  of 
centuries,  somewhat  decayed  indeed,  yet  scarcely 
showing  their  grey  hairs.  The  first  military  events 
of  the  Revolution,  the  disaffection  of  Toulon  and  Ly- 
ons, the  civil  war  of  La  Vendee,  the  feeble,  although 
successful  resistance  made  to  the  duke  of  Brunswick's 
invasion,  and  tlie  frequent  and  violent  change  of  rulers 
whose  fall  none  regretted,  were  all  proofs  that  the 
French  revolution,  intrinsically  too  feeble  to  sustain 
he  physical  and  moral  force  pressing  it  down,  was 
lAst  sinking,  wlien  the  wonderful  genius  of  Napoleon, 
bafiling  all  reasonable  calculation,  raised  and  fixed  it 
on  the  basis  of  victory,  the  only  one  capable  of  sup- 
porting the  crude  production. 

Nevertheless  that  great  man  knew  the  cause  he  up- 
held was  not  sufliciently  in  unison  with  the  feelings 
of  the  age,  and  his  first  care  was  to  disarm,  or  neu- 
tralize, monarchical  and  sacerdotal  enmity,  by  restor- 
ing a  church  e-sta-blishrnent,  and  by  becoming  a  mon- 
arch hinrself.    Once  a  sovereign,  hi?  vigorous  character, 


his  pursuits,  his  talents,  and  the  critical  nature  of  th« 
times,  inevitably  rendered  him  a  despotic  one ;  yet 
while  he  sacrificed  political  Ifberty,  which  to  the  great 
bulk  of  mankind  has  never  been  more  than  a  pleasing 
sound,  he  cherished  with  the  utmost  care  equality,  a 
sensible  good  that  produces  increasing  satisfaction  as  it 
descends  in  the  scale  of  society.  But  this,  the  real 
principle  of  his  governme«t  and  secret  of  his  populari- 
ty, made  him  the  people's  monarch,  not  the  sovereign 
of  the  aristocracy,  and  hence,  Mr.  Pitt  called  him  '  tho 
child  and  the  champion  of  democracy,'  a  truth  as  evi- 
dent as  that  Mr.  Pitt  and  his  successors  w^ere  the  chil- 
dren and  the  chjanpionSirof  aristocracy  :  hence  also  the 
privileged  classes  of  Europe  consistently  transferred 
their  natural  an'*  '  iplacablo  hatred  of  the  French  revo- 
lution to  his  peison;  for  they  saw,  that  in  him  innova- 
tion had  found  a  protector,  that  he  alone  having  given 
preeminence  to  a  system  so  hateful  to  them,  was  really 
what  he  called  himself,  '  the  State.' 

The  treaty  of  Tilsit,  therefore,  although  it  placed 
Napoleon  in  a  commanding  situation  with  regard  to 
the  potentates  of  Europe,  unmasked  the  real  nature  of 
the  war,  and  brought  him  and  England,  the  respective 
champions  of  equality  and  privilege,  into  more  direct 
cp'iiaot ;  peace  could  not  be  between  them  while  both 
were  strong,  and  all  that  the  French  emperor  had  hither- 
to gained,  only  enabled  him  to  choose  his  future  field 
of  battle. 

When  the  catastrophe  of  Trafalgar  forbade  him  to 
think  of  invading  England,  his  fertile  genius  had  con- 
ceived the  plan  of  sapping  her  naval  and  commercinl 
strength  by  depriving  her  of  the  markets  for  her  manu- 
factured goods,  that  is,  he  prohibited  the  reception  of 
English  wares  in  any  part  of  the  continent,  and  exacted 
from  allies  and  depen'-lants  the  most  rigid  compliancn 
with  his  orders  ;  but  this  '  continental  system,'  as  it 
W2<s  called,  became  inoperative  when  French  troops 
were  not  present  to  enforce  his  commands ;  it  was  thus 
in  Portugal,  where  British  influence  was  really  para- 
mount, akhough  the  terror  inspired  by  the  French  arms 
seemed  at  times  to  render  it  doubtful.  Fear  is  however 
momentary,  while  self-interest  is  lasting,  and  Portugal 
was  butan  unguarded  province  of  England  ;  from  thence 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR 


[Book  I. 


and  from  Gibraltar,  English  goods  freely  passed  into 
Spain.  To  cliec-k  this  traffic  by  force  was  not  easy, 
and  otherwise  impossible. 

Spain  stood  nearly  in  the  same  position  with  regard 
to  France  that  Portiicr-al  did  to  England  ;  a  warm  feel- 
ing of  friendship  for  the  enemy  of  Great  Britain,*  was 
the  natural  consequence  of  Vie  unjust  sei7ire  of  the 
Spanish  frigates  in  a  tiine  of  peace  ;  but  although  this 
rendered  the  Fre-nch  cause  popular  in  Spain,  and  the 
court  of  Aladrid  was  from  weakness  subservient  to  the 
French  Emperor,  nothing  could  induce  the  people  to 
refrain  from  a  profitable  contraband  trade  ;  they  would 
not  pay  that  respect  to  the  wishes  of  a  foreign  power, 
which  they  refused  to  the  regulations  of  their  own  gov- 
ernment. Neither  was  the  aristocraticai  enmity  to  Na- 
poleon asleep  in  Spain.  A  proclamation  issued  by  the 
Prince  of  Peace  previous  to  the  battle  of  Jena,  although 
hastily  reca'led  when  the  result  of  that  conflict  was 
known,  sufficitMitly  indicated  the  tenure  upon  which  the 
friendship  of  the  Spanish  court  was  held. 

This  state  of  affiiirs  drew  the  French  Emperor's  at- 
tention towards  the  Peninsula,  and  a  chain  of  remarka- 
ble circumstances,  which  fixed  it  there,  induced  him  to 
remove  the  reigning  family,  and  place  his  brother  Jo- 
seph on  the  throne  of  Spain. f  He  thought  that  the 
people  of  that  country,  sick  of  an  effete  government, 
would  he  quiescent  under  such  a  change;  and  although 
it  should  prove  otherwise,  the  confidence  he  reposed  in 
his  own  fortune.,'  OnrivalLed'  fateHjs;,  and  vast  power, 
made  him  disteg-ard  the  eonseijuert^^e^s,  while  the  cra- 
vings of  his.milLtary  aud , p.oUticjil  systepi,  the  danger 
to  be  apptehenjled  fx-om  t"h«:vdcinjtypf  a.  Bourbon  dy- 
nasty, and  abov»  all 'the  tem'pWtltins'o'ftered  by  a  mir- 
aculous folly  which  outrun  even  his  desires,  urged  him 
to  a  deed,  that  well  accepted  by  the  people  of  the  Pe- 
ninsula, would  have  proved  beneficial,  but  being  en- 
forced contrary  to  their  wishes,  was  unhallowed  either 
by  justice  or  benevolence. 

In  an  evil  hour,  for  his  own  greatness  and  the  hap- 
piness of  others,  he  commenced  this  fatal  project.  Foun- 
ded in  violence,  and  executed  with  fraud,  it  spread  des- 
olation through  the  fairest  portions  of  the  Peninsula, 
was  calamitous  to  France,  destructive  to  himself;  and 
llie  conflict  between  his  hardy  veterans  and  the  vindic- 
tive race  he  insulted,  assumed  a  character  of  unmitiga- 
ted ferocity  disgraceful  to  human  nature, — for  the  Span- 
iards did  not  fail  to  defend  their  just  cause  with  heredi- 
tary cruelty,  while  the  French  army  struck  a  terrible 
halance  of  barbarous  actions.  Napoleon  observed  with 
surprise  the  ur!<--»xpccted  energy  of  the  people,  and  there- 
fore bent  his  whole  force  to  the  attainment  of  his  object, 
vphile  England  coming  to  the  assistance  of  the  Penin- 
sula employed  all  her  resources  to  frustrate  his  efforts. 
Thus  thie  two  leading  nations  of  the  world  were  brought 
into  contact  at  a  moment  when  both  were  disturbed  by 
angry  passions,  eager  for  great  events,  and  possessed 
of  surprising  power. 

The  extent  and  population  of  the  French  empire,  in- 
cluding the  kingr.om  of  Italy,  the  confederation  of  the 
Rhine,  the  Swiss  Cantons,  tlie  Duchy  of  Warsaw,  and 
vhe  dependant  states  of  Holland  and  Naples,  enabled 
Buonaparte,  through  the  medium  of  the  conscription, 
to  array  an  army,  in  number  nearly  equal  to  the  great 
Jiost  that  followed  the  Persian  of  Old  against  Grecice  ; 
like  that  multitude  also,  his  troops  were  gathered  from 
many  nations,  but  they  were  trained  in  a  Roman  dis- 
cipline, and  ruled  by  a  Carthaginian  genius.  Count 
Mathieu  Dumas,  in  a  work  that,  with  unrivalled  sim- 
plicity and  elegance,  tells  the  military  story  of  the 
world  for  ten  years,  has  shown,  how  vigorous  and  well- 
contrived  was  the  organization  of  Napoleon's  army; 
the  French  Officers,  accustomed  to  victory,  were  as  bold 


*  Monsii-ur  de  Channsfjny's  Report,  21st  Oct  1307. 

*  Na^jolton  in  Las  Caiias,  vol.  ii.  4th  part. 


and  enterprising,  as  the  troops  they  led  were  hardy  and 
resolute,  and  to  this  powder  at  land,  the  l"]mpcror  joined 
a  formidable  marine.*  The  ships  of  France  were,  in- 
deed, chained  in  her  harbours,  but  her  naval  strength 
was  only  rehuked,  not  destroyed.  Inexhaustible  re- 
sources for  building,  vast  establishments,  a  coast  line 
of  many  thfuand  miles,  and,  above  all,  the  creative 
genius  of  Napoleon,  were  fast  nursing  up  a  navy,  the 
efficiency  of  which,  the  war  then  impendiRg  between 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  promisi^d  to  aid.t 
Maritime  commerce  was  certainly  fainting  in  France, :f 
but  her  internal  and  continental  traffic  was  robust,  her 
manufactures  were  rapidly  improving,  her  debt  small, 
her  financial  operations  conducted  on  a  prudent  plan 
and  with  exact  economy,  the  supplies  were  all  raised 
within  the  year  without  any  great  piessure  from  taxa- 
tion, and  from  a  sound  metallic  currency. |)  Thus  there 
seemed  no  reason  to  think  that  Napoleon  could  fail  of 
bringing  any  war  to  a  favourable  termination.  By  a 
happj'  combination  of  vigour  and  flattery,  of  order, 
discipline,  and  moral  excitement,  admirably  adapted 
to  the  genius  of  his  people,  he  had  created  a  pow^r 
which  appeared  resistless;  and  in  truth  would  have 
been  so  if  applied  to  only  one  great  object  at  a  time, 
but  this  the  ambition  of  the  man,  or  rather  the  force 
of  circumstances,  did  not  permit. 

On  the  other  hand,  England,  omnipotent  at  sea,  was 
little  regarded  as  a  military  power.  Her  enormous 
debt  was  yearly  increasing  in  an  accelerated  ratio,  and 
this  necessary  consequence  of  anticipating  the  resources 
of  the  country  and  dealintr  in  a  factitious  currency,  was 
fast  eating  into  the  vital  strongth  of  the  state  :  for  al- 
though the  merchants  and  great  manufacturers  were 
thriving  from  the  accidental  circumstances  of  the  times, 
the  labourers  were  suffering  and  degenerating  in  charao 
ter;  pauperism,  and  its  sure  attendant  crime,  wer» 
spreadinj^r  over  the  land,  and  the  population  was  fast 
splitting  ii:to  distinct  classes, — the  one  rich  and  arbi- 
trary, the  other  poor  and  discontented,  the  former  com- 
posed of  those  who  profited,  the  latter  of  those  who 
suffered  by  the  war.  Of  Ireland  it  is  unnecessary  to 
speak ;  her  wrongs  and  her  misery,  peculiar  and  unpar- 
alleled, are  too  well  known,  and  too  little  regarded,  to 
call  for  remark. 

Tills  general  comparative  statement,  so  favourable  to 
France,  would,  however,  be  a  false  criterion  of  the  rela- 
tive strength  of  the  belligerents,  with  regard  to  the  ap- 
proaching struggle  in  the  Peninsula.  A  cause  mani- 
festly unjust  is  a  heavy  weight  upon  the  operations  of 
a  general ;  it  reconciles  men  to  desertion — it  sanctifies 
want  of  zeal  and  is  a  pretext  for  cowardice  ;  it  renders 
hardships  more  irksome,  dangers  more  obnr.xious,  and 
glory  less  satisfactory  to  the  mind  of  the  soldier.  Now 
the  invasion  of  the  Peninsula,  whatever  might  have 
been  its  real  origin,  was  an  act  of  violence  on  the  part 
of  Napoleon  repugnant  to  the  feelings  of  mankind  ;  the 
French  armies  were  burthened  with  a  sense  of  its  ini- 
quity, the  British  troops  exhilarated  by  a  contrary  sen- 
timent. All  the  continental  nations  had  smarted  under 
the  sword  of  Napoleon,  but  with  the  exception  of  Prus- 
sia, none  were  crushed;  a  common  feeling  of  humilia- 
tion, the  hope  of  revenge,  and  the  ready  subsidies  of 
England,  were  bonds  of  union  among  their  govern- 
ments stronger  than  the  most  solemn  treaties.  Fraiice 
could  only  calculate  on  their  fears,  England  was  secure 
in  their  self-love. 

The  hatred  to  what  were  called  French  principles 
was  at  this  period  in  full  activity.  The  privileged 
classes  of  every  country  hated  Napoleon,  because  his 
genius  had  given  stability  to  the  institutions  that  grew 


»   Expose  de  I'Einpirc,  1807-8-9-1:3. 

f  Napoleon's  Memoirs,  La»  Caaas,  7th  part.     Lord  Collinj- 
woo'J's  lett.-rs. 

t  I>.p3.se  1808-9.     Napoleon,  in  Las  Casas,  vol   ii.  4tli  paM. 
I)  Ibid,  tjth  jart. 


1807.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR, 


11 


o'lt  f)f  the  revolution,  because  his  victories  had  baffled  | 
tlieir  calculations,  and  shaken  their  hold  of  power.     As  > 
the  chief  of  revolutionary  France,  he  was  constrained  to  ^ 
continue  his  career  until    the  final    accomplishment  of  j 
her  destiny, — and   this    necessity,   overlooked   by  the  j 
great  l)ulk  of  mankind,  afforded    plausible  g^rouud  fori 
imputinq:  insatiable  ambition  to  the  French  g-overnment 
and   to  the   French    nation,  of  which  ample   use  was 
made.      Rapacity,   insolence,    injustice,   cruelty,  even  j 
cowardice,  were  said  to  be  inseparable  from  the  charac-  i 
ter  of  a  Frenchman,  and,  as  if  such  vices  were  nowhere 
else  to  be  found,  it  was  more   than  insinuated  that  all 
the   enemies   of  France  were   inherently  virtuous   and  ; 
disinterested.      Unhappily,  history  is  but  a  record  of 
crimes,  and  it  is  not  wonderful  that  the  arrogance  of  j 
men,   buoyed  up    by   a  spring-tide   of  military  ^lory,  j 
should,   as  well   amonof  allies,  as   amoncr  vanquished  j 
enemies,  have   produced    sufficient  disgust,  to  insure  a 
ready  belief  of  any  accusation  however  false  and  ab-  ^ 
surd.  i 

Napoleon  was  the  contriver  and  the  sole  support  of 
a  political  system  that  required  time  and  victory  to  con- 
solidate ;  he  was  the  connectinir  link,  between  the  new 
interests  of  mankind  and  what  of  the  old  were  left  in  a 
state  of  vicrour,  he  held  them  too-ether  strontrly,  but  he 
was  no  favourite  witi\  either,  and  consequently  in  dan- 
ger from  both;  his  power,  unsanctified  by  time,  de- 
pended not  less  upon  delicate  management  than  upon 
vigorous  exercise  ;  he  had  to  fix  the  foundations  of,  as 
well  as  to  defend,  an  empire,  and  he  may  be  said  to 
have  been  rather  peremptory  than  despotic  ;  there  were 
points  of  administration  with  which  he  durst  not  med- 
dle even  wisely,  much  less  arbitrarily.  Customs, 
prejudices,  and  the  dregs  of  the  revolutionary  license, 
interfered  to  render  his  policy  complicated  and  diffi- 
cult, but  it  was  not  so  with  his  inveterate  adversa- 
ries. The  delusion  of  parliamentary  representation 
enabled  the  English  government  safely  to  exercise  an 
urdimited  power  over  the  persons  and  the  property  of 
ihe  nation,  and,  through  the  influence  of  an  active  and 
corrupt  press  it  exercised  nearly  the  same  power  over 
the  public  mind.  The  commerce  of  England,  pene- 
trating, as  it  were,  into  every  house  on  the  face  of  the 
globe,  supplied  a  thousand  sources  of  intelligence, — 
the  spirit  of  traffic,  which  seldom  acknowledges  the 
ties  of  country,  was  universally  on  the  side  of  Greal 
Britain,  and  those  twin-curses,  paper-money  and  public 
credit,  so  truly  described  as  'strer.gth  in  the  beginning, 
but  weakness  in  the  end,'  were  recklessly  used  by 
statesmen,  whose  policy  regarded  not  the  interests  of 
posterity.  Such  were  the  adventitious  causes  of  En- 
gland's power,  and  her  natural,  legitimate  resources, 
were  nnny  and  great.  If  any  credit  is  to  be  given  to 
the  census,  the  increasing  population  of  the  United 
Kincrdom  amounted  at  this  period  to  nearly  twenty 
millions,  and  France  reckoned  but  twenty-seven  mill- 
ions when  Frederick  the  Great  declared  that,  if  he  were 
her  king,  '  not  a  gun  should  be  fired  in  Europe  with- 
out his  leave.' 

The  French  army  was  undoubtedly  very  formidable 
from  numbers,  discipline,  skill,  and  bravery;  but,  con- 
trary to  the  general  opinion,  the  British  army  was  in- 
ferior to  it  in  none  of  these  points  save  the  first,  and  in 
discipline  it  was  superior,  because  a  national  army  iill 
always  hear  a  sterner  code  than  a  mixed  force  will  suf- 
fer. Amongst  the  latter,  military  crimes  may  be  pun- 
ished, but  moral  crimes  can  hardly  be  repressed;  men 
will  submit  to  death  for  a  breach  of  great  regulations 
which  they  kRow  by  experience  to  be  useful,  but  the 
constant  restraint  of  petty,  though  wholesome  rules, 
they  will  escape  from  by  desertion,  or  resist  by  muti- 
ny, when  the  ties  of  custom  and  countr)'  are  removed  ; 
for  the  disgrace  of  bad  conduct  attaches  not  to  them, 
but  to  the  nation  under  whose  colours  they  serve. 
Great  indeed  is  that  genius  that  can  keep  men  of  differ- 


ent nations  firm  to  their  colours,  and  preserve  a  rigid 
discipline  at  the  same  time.  Napoleon's  niilitarj'  sys- 
tem was,  from  this  ca>ise,  inferior  to  l>he  British,  which, 
if  it  be  purely  administered,  combines  the  solidity  of 
the  Germans  with  the  lapidity  of  tn<  French,  exclud- 
ing the  mechanical  dulness  of  the  one.  and  the  danger- 
ous vivacity  of  the  other;  yet,  before  the  campaign  in 
the  Peninsula  had  proved  its  excellence  in  every  branch 
of  war,  the  English  army  was  absurdly  under-rated  in 
foreign  countries,  and  absolutely  despised  in  its  own. 
It  was  reasonable  to  suppose  that  it  did  not  possess  that 
facility  of  moving  in  large  bodies  which  long  practice 
had  given  to  the  French,  but  the  individual  soldier  was 
most  falsely  stigmatized  as  deficient  in  intelligence 
and  activity,  the  officers  ridiculed,  and  the  idea  that  a 
British  could  cope  with  a  French  army,  even  for  a  sin- 
gle campaign,  considered  chimerical. 

The  English  are  a  people  very  subject  to  receive, 
and  to  cherish  false  impressions;  proud  of  their  creduli- 
ty as  if  it  were  a  virtue,  the  majority  will  adopt  any  fal- 
lacy, and  cling  to  it  with  a  tenacity  proportioned  to  its 
grossness.  Thus  an  ignorant  contempt  for  the  British 
soldiery  had  been  long  entertained,  before  the  ill-suc- 
cess of  the  exped. lions  in  1794  and  1799  appeared  to 
justify  the  general  prejudice.  The  true  cause  of  those 
i'ailures  was  not  traced,  and  the  excellent  discipline  af- 
terwards introduced  and  perfected  by  the  duke  of  York 
was  despised.  England,  both  at  home  and  abroad, 
was,  in  1S08,  scorned  as  a  military  power,  when  shs 
possessed,  without  a  frontier  to  swallow  up  large  ar- 
mies in  expensive  fortresses,  at  least  two  hundred  thou- 
sand of  the  best  equipped  and  best  disciplined  soldiers 
in  the  universe,*  together  with  an  immense  recruiting 
establishment;  and  through  the  medium  of  the  militia, 
the  power  of  drawing  upon  the  population  without 
lim.it.  It  is  true  that  of  this  number  many  were  neces- 
sarily employed  in  the  defence  of  the  colonies,  but 
enough  remained  to  compose  a  disposable  force  greater 
thdn  that  with  which  Napoleon  won  the  battle  of  Aus- 
terlitz,  and  double  that  with  which  he  conquered  Italy. 
In  all  the  materials  of  war,  the  superior  ingenuity  and 
skill  of  the  English  mechanics  were  visible,  and  that 
intellectual  power  which  distinguishes  Great  Britain 
amongst  th^  nations,  in  science,  arts,  and  literature, 
was  not  wanting  to  her  generals  in  the  hour  of  danger. 


CHAPTER  II 

Dissensions  in  the  Spanish  court — Secret  treaty  and  convention 
of  Fontaintbleau — Junot's  army  t  nters  Spain — Dupont's  and 
jNIonrey's  corps  enter  Spain — Duhewiie's  corns  enters  Cata- 
lonia—Insurrection of  Aranjuez  and  iMadriJ — Cliailes  tlie 
1  oii:th  abdicates— Ferdinand  proclaimed  kin;^ — Murat  mar- 
ches to  Madrid — Refuses  to  recognize  Ferdinand  as  iiina--The 
s'v  rd  of  Francis  the  First  delivered  to  the  French  fienical — 
Savary  arrives  at  Madrid — F'erdinand  g.>€s  to  BayoTine— The 
fortresses  of  St.  Sebastian,  Fig-ueras,  Paiiiptluna,  and  Barce- 
•  ona,  treacherously  seized  bv  tlie  French — Riot  .t  Toledo  23J 
of  \pril,  Tumult  at  .Madrid  2d  May, Charles  the  Fourtii  ab- 
di^.t  es  a  second  time  in  favour  of  Napoleon — Assen)b!y  ol 
the  Notables  at  Bayonne — Joseph  Buonaparte  declared  king 
of  Spain — Arrives  at  Madrid. 

For  many  years  antecedent  to  the  French  invasion, 
the  royal  family  of  Spain  were  distracted  with  domes- 
tic quarrels  ;  the  son's  hand  was  against  his  mother, 
the  fiilher's  against  his  son,  and  the  court  was  a  scene 
of  continual  broils,  under  cover  of  which  artful  men,  as 
is  usual  in  such  cases,  pushed  their  own  interest  for- 
ward, while  they  seemed  to  art  only  for  the  sake  of  the 
party  whose  cause  they  espoused.  Charles  IV.  at- 
tributed this  unhappy  state  of  his  house  to  the  intrigues 


»  See  Abstract  of  the  m'.litaty  force   ■>(  Great  Brituin  in 
13U3. 


12 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  I. 


of  his  sis^fr-in-law,  tho  qiiRen  of  the  Two  Sicilies  ;* 
he  hinr^plf,  a  weak  and  inefficient  old  man,  was  (rnvern- 
ed  hy  Ill's  wife,  and  she  ag^ain  by  don  Manuel  GodoVif 
of  whose  person  it  is  said  she  was  enamoured  even  to 
follv.  From  the  rank  of  a  simple  gentleman  of  the 
Toyal  cruards,  this  person  had  been  raised  to  the  high- 
est digrnities,  and  the  title  of  Prinre  of  the  Peace  was 
conferred  upon  him  whose  name  must  be  for  ever  con- 
nected with  otie  of  the  blooi'iest  wars  that  fill  the  page 
of  history. 

Ferdinand,  prince  of  tl  e  Asturias,  hated  this  favour- 
ite, and  the  miserable  death  of  his  young  wife,  his  own 
youth,  and  apparently  forlorn  condition,  created  such 
an  interest  in  his  favour,  that  the  people  partook  of  his 
feelings  ;  thus  the  disunion  of  tiie  royal  family  extend- 
ing its  effects  bevond  the  precincts  of  the  court,  involv- 
ed the  nation  in  ruin.  Those  who  know  how  Spaniards 
hate  will  comprehend  why  Godoy,  who,  though  sensu- 
al, was  a  mild,  good-natured  man,  has  been  so  over- 
loaded with  imprecations,  as  if  he,  and  he  alone,  had 
been  the  cause  of  the  disasters  in  Spain,  It  was  not 
so.  The  canon.  Escoiquiz.  a  subtile  politician,  who 
appears  to  have  been  the  chief  of  Ferdinand's  party,:^ 
finding  the  influence  of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  too 
strong,  looked  for  support  in  a  powerful  quarter,  and 
under  his  tuition,  Ferdinand  wrote  upon  the  llth  of 
October,  1807,  to  the  emperor  Napoleon. |]  In  this  let- 
ter hf"  complained  of  the  influence  which  bad  men  had 
obtained  over  his  father,  prayed  for  the  interference  of 
the  '  hero  destined  by  Providence,'  so  run  the  text,  '  to 
save  Europe  and  to  support  thrones  ;'  asked  an  alliance 
by  marriage  with  the  Buonaparte  family,  and  finally 
desired  that  his  communication  might  be  kept  secret 
from  his  father,  lest  it  should  be  taken  as  a  proof  of 
disresp<»ct.  Me  received  no  answer,  and  fresh  matter 
of  quarrel  being  found  by  his  enemies  at  home,  he  was 
placed  in  arrest,  and  upon  the  29lh  of  October,  Charles 
denounced  hiin  to  the  emperor  as  guilty  of  treason,  and 
of  having  projected  the  assassination  of  his  own  moth- 
er. Napoleon  caught  eagerly  at  this  pretext  for  inter- 
fering in  the  domestic  policy  of  Spain, — and  thus  the 
lionour  and  independence  of  a  great  people  were  placed 
in  jeopardy,  by  the  squabbles  of  two  of  the  most  worth- 
less persons. 

Some  short  time  before  this,  Godoy,  either  instiga- 
ted by  an  ambition  to  found  a  dynasty,  or  fearing  that 
the  death  of  the  king  would  expos*  him  to  the  ven- 
geance of  Ferdinand,  had  made  proposals  to  the  French 
court  to  concert  a  plan  for  the  conquest  and  division  of 
Portugal,  promising  the  assistance  of  Spain,  on  condi- 
tion that  a  principality  for  himself  should  be  set  apart 
from  the  spoil.  Such  is  the  turn  given  by  Napoleon  to 
tliis  affair.  But  the  article  which  provided  an  indem- 
nification for  the  king  of  Etruria,  a  minor,  who  had  just 
been  obliged  to  surrender  his  Italian  dominions  to 
France,  renders  it  doubtful  if  the  first  offer  came  from 
Godoy,  and  Napoleon  eagerly  adopted  the  project  if  he 
did  not  propose  it.  The  advantages  were  all  on  his 
side.  Under  the  pretext  of  supporting  his  army  in 
Portugal,  he  might  fill  Spain  with  his  troops  ;  the  dis- 

tuite  between  the  father  and  the  son,  now  referred  to 
lis  arbitration,  placed  the  golden  apples  within  his 
reach,  and  he  resolved  to  gather  the  fruit  if  he  had  not 
planted  the  tree. 

A  secret  treaty  was  immediately  concluded  at  Fon- 
tainebleau,  between  marshal  Duroc  on  the  part  of 
France,  and  Eugenio  Izquerdo  on  the  part  of  Spain. 
This  treaty,  together  with  a  convention  dependant  on 
it,  was  signed  the  27th,  and  ratified  by  Napoleon  on 
the  2f)th  of  October,  the  contracting  parties  agreeing 
on  the  following  conditions. 


•  Nf llerto.     The  ana|»Tam  of  Llorenfe. 

+  Vide  I)L)bhdo'»  Ltttera.  J  JN'apolcon  in  Las  Casas. 

|]  A'ellerto. 


The  house  of  Braganza  to  be  driven  forth  of  Portu- 
gal, and  that  kingdom  divided  into  three  portions. 
The  province  of  Entre  Minho  e  Duero,  including  the 
town  of  Oporto,  to  be  called  the  kingdom  of  North 
Lusitania,  and  given  as  an  indemnification  to  the  dis» 
possessed  sovereign  of  Etruria. 

The  Alemtejo  and  the  Algarves  to  be  erected  into  a 
principality  for  Godoy,  who,  taking  the  title  of  pritica 
of  the  Algarves,  was  still  to  be  in  some  respects  de- 
pendant upon  the  Spanish  crown. 

The  central  provinces  of  Estremadura,  Beira,  and  the 
Tras  OS  Monies,  together  with  the  town  of  Lisbon,  to  be 
held  in  deposit  until  a  general  peace,  and  then  to  be  ex- 
changed under  certain  conditions  for  English  conquests. 

The  ultramarine  dominions  of  the  exiled  family  to 
be  equally  divided  between  the  contracting  parties,  and 
in  three  years  at  the  longest,  the  king  of  Spain  to  be 
gratified  with  the  title  of  Emperor  of  the  two  Ameri- 
cas. Thus  much  for  the  treaty.  The  terms  of  the  con- 
vention were  : 

France  to  employ  25,000  infantry  and  3,000  cavalry. 
Spain  24,000  infantry,  30  guns,  and  3,000  cavalry. 

The  French  contingent  to  be  joined  at  Alcantara  by 
the  Spanish  cavalry,  artillery,  and  one-third  of  the  in- 
fantry, and  from  thence  to  march  to  Lisbon.  Of  the 
remaining  Spanish  infantry.  10,000  were  to  take  posses- 
sion of  the  Entre  Minho  e  Duero  and  Oporto,  and  6,000 
were  to  invade  Estremadura  and  the  Algarves.  In  the 
mean  time  a  reserve  of  40,000  men  was  to  be  assem- 
bled at  Bayonne,  ready  to  take  the  field  by  the  20th  of 
November,  if  England  should  interfere,  or  the  Portu- 
guese people  resist. 

If  the  king  of  Spain  or  any  of  his  family  joined  the 
troops,  the  chief  command  to  be  vested  in  the  person 
so  joining,  but,  with  that  exception,  the  French  gener- 
al to  be  obeyed  whenever  the  armies  of  the  two  nations 
came  into  contact,  and  during  the  march  through  Spain, 
the  French  soldiers  were  to  be  fed  by  that  country,  and 
paid  by  their  own  government. 

The  revenues  of  the  conquered  provinces  to  be  ad- 
ministered by  the  general  actually  in  possession,  and 
for  the  benefit  of  the  nation  in  whose  name  the  prov- 
ince was  held. 

Although  it  is  evident,  that  this  treaty  and  conven- 
tion favoured  Napoleon's  ulterior  operations  in  Spain, 
by  enabling  him  to  mask  his  views,  and  introduce  large 
bodies  of  men  into  that  country  without  creating  much 
suspicion,  it  does  not  follow,  as  some  authors  have  as- 
serted, that  they  were  contrived  by  the  emperor  for  the 
sole  purpose  of  rendering  the  Spanish  royal  family 
odious  to  the  world,  and  by  this  far-fetched  expedient, 
to  prevent  other  nations  from  taking  an  interest  in  their 
fate,  when  he  should  find  it  convenient  to  apply  the 
same  measure  of  injustice  to  his  associate,  that  they 
had  accorded  to  the  family  of  Braganza.  To  say  noth- 
ing of  the  weakness  of  such  a  policy,  founded,  as  it 
must  be,  on  the  error,  that  governments  acknowledge 
the  dictates  of  justice  at  the  expense  of  their  supposed 
interests,  it  must  be  observed  that  Portugal  was  intrin- 
sically a  great  object.  History  does  not  spe-ak  of  tho 
time  when  the  inhabitants  of  that  country  were  defi- 
cient in  spirit,  the  natural  obstacles  to  an  invasion  had 
more  than  once  frustrated  the  efforts  of  large  armies, 
and  the  long  line  of  communication  between  Bayonne 
and  the  Portuguese  frontier,  could  only  be  supported 
by  Spanish  co-operation.  Add  to  this,  the  facility  with 
which  England  could,  and  the  probability  that  she 
would,  succour  her  ancient  ally,  and  the  reasonable 
conclusion  is,  that  Napoleon's  first  intentions  were  \a 
accordance  with  the  literal  meaning  of  the  treaty  of 
Fontainebleau,  his  subsequent  proceedings  being  tha 
res\ilt  of  new  projects,  conceived,  as  the  wonderous 
imbecility  of  the  Spanish  Bourbons  became  manifest.* 

*  Voice  I'roiu  St.  Helena,  /ol.  ii. 


1807  J 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


13 


Again,  the  convention  provided  for  the  org^anization  of 
a  larire  Spanish  force,  to  be  stationed  in  the  north  and 
south  of  Portup^al,  that  is,  in  precisc'y  the  two  places 
from  whence  they  could  most  readily  march  to  the  as- 
sistance of  their  country,  if  it  was  invaded.  In  fact 
the  division  of  the  marquis  of  Solano  in  the  south, 
and  that  of  general  Taranco  in  the  north  of  Portui^al, 
did.  when  the  Spanish  insurrection  broke  out,  (Nov. 
1807,)  form  the  strentjth  of  the  Andalusian  and  Gallician 
armies,  the  former  of  which  gained  the  victory  at  Bay- 
len,  while  the  lalter  contended  for  it,  although  inef- 
fectually, at  Rio  Seco. 

The  French  force,  destined  to  invade  Portugal,  was 
already  assembled  at  Bayonne,  under  the  title  of  the 
"  First  army  of  the  Garonne,"  and  actually  entered 
Spain  before  the  treaty  was  signed.  It  was  commanded 
by  general  Junot,  a  young  man  of  a  bold,  ambitious 
disposition,  but  of  greater  reputation  for  military  talent 
than  he  was  able  to  support;  and  his  soldiers,  princi- 
pally conscripts,  were  ill  fitted  to  endure  the  hardships 
which  awaited  them.  At  first  by  easy  marches,  and 
in  small  divisions,  he  led  his  troops  through  Spain,  but 
the  inhabitants,  either  from  a  latent  fear  of  what  was 
to  follow,  or  from  a  dislike  of  foreigners  common  to 
all  secluded  people,  were  not  friendly.*  When  the 
head  of  the  columns  reached  Salamanca,  the  general 
halted,  intending  to  complete  the  organiz  tion  of  his 
troops  in  that  rich  country,  and  there  to  await  the  most 
favourable  moment  for  penetrating  the  sterile  frontier 
which  guarded  his  destined  prey ;  but  political  events 
marched  faster  than  his  calculations,  and  fresh  instruc- 
tions from  the  emperor  prescribed  an  immediate  ad- 
vance upon  Lisbon  ;  .Tunot  obeyed,  and  the  family  of 
Braganza,  at  his  approach,  fled  to  the  Brazils.  The 
series  of  interesting  transactions  which  attended  this 
invasion  will  be  treated  of  hereafter,  at  present,  I  must 
return  to  Spain,  now  bending  to  the  first  gusts  of  that 
hurricane,  which  soon  swept  over  her  with  destructive 
violence. 

The  accusation  of  treason  and  intended  parricide, 
preferred  by  Charles  IV.  against  his  son  Ferdinand, 
(Dec.  1807,)  gave  rise  to  some  judicial  proceedings, 
which  ended  in  the  submission  of  the  prince,  who  be- 
ing absolved  of  the  imputed  crime,  wrote  a  letter  to 
his  father  and  mother,  acknowledging  his  own  fault, 
but  accusing  the  persons  in  his  confidence,  of  being 
the  instigators  of  deeds  which  he  himself  abhorred. | 
The  intrigues  of  his  advisers,  however,  continued,  and 
the  plans  of  Napoleon  advanced  as  a  necessary  conse- 
quence of  the  divisions  in  the  Spanish  court. 

By  the  terms  of  the  convention  of  Fontainebleau, 
forty  thousand  men  were  to  be  held  in  reserve  at  Bay- 
onne ;  but  a  greater  number  were  assembled  on  differ- 
ent points  of  the  frontier,  and  in  the  course  of  Decem- 
ber, two  corps  had  entered  the  Spanish  territory,  and 
were  quartered  in  Vittoria,  Miranda,  Briviesca,  and  the 
neighbourhood.  The  one  commanded  by  general  Du- 
pont,  was  called  the  second  army  of  observation  of  the 
*Gironde.'  The  other,  commanded  by  marshal  Mon- 
cey,  took  the  title  of  the  army  of  observation  of  the 
'  Cote  d'Ocean.'  In  the  gross,  they  amounted  to  fifty- 
three  thousand  men,  of  which  above  forty  thousand 
were  fit  for  duty  ;:j:  and  in  the  course  of  the  month  of  De- 
cember, Dupont  advanced  to  Valladolid,  while  a  rein- 
forcement for  Junot,  four  thousand  seven  hundred  in 
number,  took  up  their  quarters  at  Salamanca.  It  thus 
appeared  as  if  the  French  troops  were  quietly  follow- 
ing the  natural  line  of  communication  between  France 
r^nd  Portugal ;  but  in  reality,  Dupont,  and  Moncey's 
positions  cut  off  the  capital  from  all  intercourse  with 
the  northern  provinces,  and  secured  the  direct  road  from 


*   Thebault,  Exp.  du  Portugal. 
+  Ntlltrto.     Hist  ria  de  la  Gue 


iuerra  contra  Nap. 
Return  of  the  French  army.    Appendix.    Journal  of  Du- 


Bayonne  to  Madrid.*  Small  divisions  under  different 
pretexts  continually  reinforced  these  two  bodies,  and 
through  the  Eastern  Pyrenees  twelve  thousand  men, 
commanded  by  general  Duhesme,  penetrated  into  Cata- 
lonia, and  established  themselves  ia  Barcelona. 

In  the  mean  time  the  dispute  between  the  k'lnrr 
(March  1808.)  and  his  son,  or  rather  between  the 
Prince  of  the  Peace  and  the  advisers  of  Ferdinand,  wag 
brought  to  a  crisis  by  insurrections  at  Aranjnez  and 
Madrid,  which  took  place  upon  the  17lh,  18th,  and 
19th  of  March,  1808,  The  old  king,  deceived  by  in- 
trigues, or  frightened  at  the  difficulties  which  sur- 
rounded him,  had  determined,  as  it  is  supposed  by 
some,  to  quit  Spain,  and  take  refage  in  hiy  American 
dominions,  and  preparations  were  made  for  a  flight  to 
Seville,  when  the  prince's  grooms  commenced  a  tu- 
mult, in  which  the  populace  of  Aranjuez  soon  joined, 
and  were  only  pacified  by  the  assurance  that  no  jour- 
ney was  in  contemplation. 

Upon  the  18th,  the  people  of  Madrid,  following  the 
example  of  Aranjuez,  sacked  the  house  of  the  obnox- 
ious Manuel  Godoy,  and  upon  the  19th  the  riots  having 
recommenced  at  Aranjuez,  that  minister  secreted  him- 
self, but  his  retreat  being  discovered,  he  was  maltreat- 
ed, and  on  the  point  of  being  killed,  when  the  soldiers 
of  the  royal  guard  rescued  him.  Charles  IV.,  terrified 
by  the  violent  proceedings  of  his  subjects,  had  abdi- 
cated the  day  before,  and  this  event  beina  proclaimed 
at  Madrid  on  the  20th,  Ferdinand  was  declared  king, 
to  the  great  joy  of  the  nation  at  large :  little  did  the 
people  know  what  they  rejoiced  at,  and  time  has  since 
taught  them  that  the  fable  of  the  frogs  demanding  a 
monarch  had  its  meaning. 

During  these  transactions,  (March  1808,)  Murat, 
grand  duke  of  Berg,  who  had  taken  the  command  of 
all  the  French  troops  in  Spain,  quitted  his  quarters  at 
Aranda  de  Duero,  passed  the  Somosierra,  and  entered 
Madrid  the  23d,  with  Moncey's  corps  and  a  fine  body 
of  cavalry;  Dupont  at  the  same  time,  deviating  from 
the  road  to  Portugal,  crossed  the  Duero,  and  occupied 
Segovia,  the  Escurial,  and  Aranjuez.  Ferdinand  who 
arrived  at  Madrid  on  the  24th,  was  not  recognised  by 
Murat  as  king;  nevertheless,  at  the  demand  of  his 
powerful  guest,  he  delivered  to  him  the  sword  of  Fran- 
cis I.  with  much  ceremony.  Meanwhile  Char'es  pro- 
tested to  Murat  that  his  abdication  had  been  forced,  and 
also  wrote  to  Napoleon  in  the  same  strain.  This  state 
of  affairs  being  unexpected  by  the  emperor,  he  sent 
general  Savary  to  conduct  his  plans,  which  appear  to 
have  been  considerably  deranged  by  the  vehemence  of 
the  people,  and  the  precipitation  with  which  Murat  had 
seized  the  capital. t  But  previous  to  Savary's  arrival, 
Don  Carlos,  the  brother  of  Ferdinand,  departed  from 
Madrid,  hoping  to  meet  the  emperor  Napoleon,  whose 
presence  in  that  city  was  conf.deuiiy  expected  ;  and 
upon  the  10th  of  April,  Ferdina.'id,  having  first  ap- 
pointed a  supreme  junta,  of  winch  his  uncle,  Don  An 
tonio,  was  named  president  and  Murat  a  member,  com- 
menced his  own  remarkable  journey  to  Bayonne.  The 
true  causes  of  this  measure  have  not  yet  been  devel- 
oped;  perhaps,  when  they  shai!  be  known,  some  petty 
personal  intrigue,  may  be  found  to  have  had  a  greater 
influence  than  the  grand  mac!  inations  attributed  to 
Napoleon,  who  could  not  have  anticipated,  much  less 
have  calculated,  a  great  political  scheme  upon  such  a 
surprising  example  of  weakness. 

The  people  everywhere  manitested  their  anger  at  this 
journey;  in  Vittoria  they  cut  the  traces  of  Fc-dinand'g 
carriage,  and  at  different  times  several  gallant  men  of- 
fered, at  the  risk  of  their  lives,  to  carry  him  off  by  sea, 
in  defiance  of  the  French  troops  quartered  along  llie 


poat's  Operations  MSS. 


*  Noffs  of  Napoleon,  found  in  the  portfolio  of  king  Joseph 
at  the  battle  of  Vittoria. 
f  Napuleou  iu  Lai  Cata*. 


14 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  I. 


road.  Un/noved  by  their  entreaties  and  zeal,  and  re- 
gardless of  the  warning  contained  in  a  letter  that  he  re- 
ceived at  this  period  from  Napoleon,  (vvlio,  witliholding 
the  title  of  majesty,  sharply  reproved  him  for  his  past 
conduct,  and  scarcely  expressed  a  wish  to  meet  him) 
Ferdinand  continued  his  progress,  and,  on  the  20th  of 
April,  ISOS,  found  himself  a  prisoner  in  Bayonne.  In 
Uie  meantime,  Charles  under  the  protection  of  Murat, 
resum«>d  his  authority,  obtained  the  liberty  of  Godoy, 
and  quittintr  Spain,  also  threw  himself  his  cause  and 
KinsTdom,  into  the  emperor's  hands. 

These  events  were  in  themselves  quite  enough  to 
urge  a  more  cautious  people  than  the  Spaniards  into  ac- 
tion ;  but  other  measures  had  been  pursued,  which  prov- 
ed, beyond  tlie  possibility  of  doubt,  that  the  country 
was  destined  to  be  the  spoil  of  the  French.  The  troops 
of  that  nation  had  been  admitted,  without  reserve  or  pre- 
caution, into  the  ditTerent  fortresses  upon  the  Spanish 
frontier,  and,  taking  advantage  of  this  hospitality  to 
forward  the  views  of  their  chief,  they  got  possession, 
hy  various  artifices,  of  the  citadels  of  St.  Sebastian  in 
Guipuscoa,  of  Pampeluna  in  Navarre,  and  of  the  forts 
of  Figueras  and  Monjuik,  and  the  citadel  of  Barcelona 
in  Catalonia.  Thus,  under  the  pretence  of  mediating 
between  the  father  and  the  son,  in  a  time  of  profound 
peace,  a  foreign  force  was  suddenly  established  in  the 
capital,  on  the  communications,  and  in  the  principal 
frontier  fortresses  ;  its  chief  was  admitted  to  a  share  of 
the  government,  and  a  fiery,  proud,  and  jealous  nation 
was  laid  prostrate  at  the  feet  of  a  stranger,  without  a 
blow  being  struck,  without  one  warning  voice  being 
raised,  without  a  suspicion  being  excited,  in  suflicient 
time,  to  guard  against  those  acts  upon  which  all  were 
gazing  with  stupid  amazement. 

It  is  idle  to  attribute  this  surprising  event  to  the 
subtlety  of  Napoleon's  policy,  to  the  depth  of  his  deceit, 
or  to  the  treachery  of  Godoy  ;  such  a  fatal  calamity 
could  only  be  the  result  of  bad  government,  and  the  con- 
sequent degradation  of  public  feeling.  It  matters  but 
little  to  those  who  wish  to  derive  a  lesson  from  experi- 
ence, whether  it  be  a  Godoy  or  a  Savary  that  strikes  the 
last  bargain  of  corruption,  the  silly  father  or  the  rebel- 
lious son,  that  signs  the  final  act  of  degradation  and  in- 
famy. Fortunately,  it  is  easier  to  oppress  the  people  of  all 
countries,  than  to  destroy  their  generous  feelings  ;  when 
all  patriotism  is  lost  among  the  upper  classes,  it  may  still 
be  found  among  the  lower  ;  in  the  Peninsula  it  was  not 
found,  but  started  into  life  with  a  fervor  and  energy 
that  ennobled  even  the  wild  and  savage  form  in  which 
it  appeared  ;  nor  was  it  the  less  admirable  that  it  burst 
forth  attended  by  many  evils ;  the  good  feeling  dis- 
played was  the  people's  own,  their  cruelty,  folly,  and 
perverseness,  were  the  effects  of  a  long  course  of  mis- 
government. 

There  are  many  reasons  why  Napoleon  should  have 
meddled  with  the  interior  affairs  of  Spain,  there  seems 
to  be  no  good  one  for  his  manner  of  doing  it.  The 
Spanish  Bourbons  could  never  liave  been  sincere  friends 
to  France  while  Buonaparte  held  the  sceptre,  and  the 
moment  that  the  fear  of  his  power  ceased  to  operate,  it 
was  quite  certain  that  their  apparent  friendship  would 
change  to  active  hostility  ;  the  proclamation  issued  by 
the  Spanish  cabinet  Just  before  the  battle  of  Jena  was 
evidence  of  this  fact.  But  if  the  Bourbons  were  Na- 
poleon's enemies,  it  did  not  follow  that  the  peo|)le 
sympathized  with  their  rulers;  his  great  error  was  that 
lie  looked  only  to  the  court,  and  treated  the  nation  with 
contempt.  Had  he,  before  he  openly  meddled  in  their 
nffairs,  brought  the  people  into  hostile  contact  with  their 
government, — and  how  many  points  would  not  such  a 
government  have  offered! — instead  of  appearing  as  the 
treacherous  arbitrator  in  a  domestic  quarrel,  he  would 
have  been  hailed  as  the  deliverer  of  a  great  people. 

The  journey  of  Ferdinand,  the  liberation  of  Godoy, 
ihe  flight  of  Charles,  the  appointing   Mura:  ^s  be  a 


member  of  the  governing  junta,  and  the  movements  of 
the  French  troops  who  were  advancing  from  all  part* 
towards  Madrid,  aroused  the  indignation  of  the  nation, 
and  tumults  and  assassinations  had  taken  place  in  va- 
rious parts;  at  Toledo  a  serious  riot  occurred  on  the 
23d  of  April,  the  peasants  joined  the  inhabitants  of 
the  town,  and  it  was  only  by  the  advance  of  a  division 
of  infantry  and  some  cavalry  of  Dupont's  corps,  then 
quartered  at  Aranjuez,  that  order  was  restored.*  The 
agitation  of  the  public  mind,  however,  increased,  the 
French  troops  were  all  young  men,  or  rather  boys,  ta- 
ken from  the  last  conscription,  and  disciplined  after 
they  had  entered  Spain  ;  their  youth  and  apparent  fee- 
bleness excited  the  contempt  of  the  Spaniards,  who 
pride  themselves  much  upon  individual  prowess,  and 
the  swelling  indignation  at  last  broke  out. 

Upon  the  2d  of  May,  a  carriage  being  prepared,  as 
the  people  supposed,  to  convey  Don  Antonio,  the  un- 
cle of  Ferdinand,  to  France,  a  crowd  collected  about  it, 
their  language  indicated  a  determination  not  to  permit 
the  last  of  the  royal  family  to  be  spirited  away,  the 
traces  of  the  carriage  were  cut,  and  loud  imprecations 
against  the  French  burst  forth  on  every  side  ;  at  that 
moment  colonel  La-Grange,  aide-de-camp  to  Murat,  ap- 
peared, he  was  assailed  and  maltreated,  and  in  an  in- 
stant the  whole  city  was  in  commotion.  The  French 
soldiers,  expecting  no  violence,  were  killed  in  every 
street,  about  four  hundred  fell,  and  the  hospital  was  at- 
tacked, but  the  attendants  and  sick  men  defended  them- 
selves; and  meanwhile  the  alarm  having  spread  to  the 
camp  outside  the  city,  the  French  cavalry  galloped  in 
to  the  assistance  of  their  countrymen  by  the  gate  of 
Alcala,  while  general  Lanfranc,  with  three  thousand 
infantry,  descending  from  the  heights  on  the  n.^rth-west 
quarter,  entered  the  Calle  Ancha  de  Bernardo.  As  he 
crossed  the  end  of  the  street  Maravelles,  Daois  and 
Velarde,  two  Spanish  officers  who  were  in  a  state  of 
great  excitement,  discharged  a  cannon  at  the  passing 
troops,  and  were  immediately  attacked  and  killed  oy 
some  voltigeurs  ;  the  column,  however,  continued  it3 
march,  releasing,  as  it  advanced,  several  superior  offi- 
cers, who  were  in  a  manner  besieged  by  the  populace. 
The  cavalry  at  the  other  end  of  the  town,  treating  the 
affair  as  a  tumult,  and  not  as  an  action,  made  some 
hundred  prisoners,  and  some  men  were  killed  or  maimed 
by  the  horses,  but  marshal  Moncey,  genera!  Harispe, 
and  Gonzalvo  O'Farril,  restored  order.|  Neverthe- 
less, after  nightfall,  the  peasantry  of  the  neighbour- 
hood, who  were  armed  and  in  considerable  numbers, 
beset  the  city  gates,  and  the  French  guards  firing  upon 
them,  killed  twenty  or  thirty,  and  wounded  more. 

In  the  first  moment  of  irritation,  Murat  ordered  all 
the  prisoners  to  be  tried  by  a  military  commission, 
which  condemned  them  to  death;  but  the  municipality 
interfering,  represented  to  that  prince  the  extreme  cru- 
elty of  visiting  this  angry  ebullition  of  an  injured  and 
insulted  people  with  such  severity,  whereupon  admit- 
ting the  weight  of  their  arguments,  he  forbade  any 
executions  on  the  sentence.  Yet  it  is  said  that  gener- 
al Grouchy,  in  whose  immediate  power  the  prisoners  re- 
mained, after  exclaiming  that  his  own  life  had  been  at- 
tempted, that  the  blood  of  the  French  soldiers  was  not 
to  be  spilt  with  impunity,  and  thai  the  prisoners  having 
been  condemned  by  a  council  of  war,  ought  and  should 
be  executed,  proceeded  to  shoot  them  in  the  Prado. 
Forty  were  thus  slain  before  Murat  could  cause  his 
orders  to  be  effectually  obeyed.  The  next  day  some 
of  the  Spanish  authorities  having  discovered  that  a  co- 
lonel, commanding  the  imperial  guards,  still  retained 
a  number  of  prisoners  in  the  barracks,  applied  to  have 
them  also  released.  Murat  consented,  but  it  is  said  by 
some,  although  denied  by  others  of  greater  authority, 


*   Journal  of  Dupont's  Operation?  MSS. 
t  Memoir  of  Azauza  and  O'Farril. 


1803.1 


NATMER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


15 


that  tlie  colonel  gcttinor  intelligence  of  what  was  pass- 
ing, and  being  enraged  at  the  loss  of  so  many  choice 
soldiers,  put  forty-five  of  his  captives  to  death  before 
the  order  arrived  to  stay  his  bloody  proceedings.* 

Such  were  nearly  the  circumstances  that  attended  this 
celebrated  tumult,  in  which  tlie  wild  cry  of  Spanish 
warfare  was  first  heard,  and  as  many  authors,  adopting 
without  hesitation  all  the  reports  of  the  day,  have  rep- 
resented it,  sometimes  as  a  wanton  and  extensive  mas- 
sacre on  the  part  of  the  French,  sometimes  as  a  barba- 
rous political  stroke  to  impress  a  dread  of  their  power, 
1  thini<  it  necessary  to  remark — First,  that  it  was  com- 
menced by  the  Spaniards;  their  fiery  tempers,  the  irri- 
tation produced  by  passing  events,  and  the  habits  of 
violence  which  they  had  acquired  in  their  late  success- 
ful insurrection  against  Godoy,  rendered  an  explosion 
inevitable.  vSecond,  that  if  the  French  had  secretly 
stimulated  this  disposition,  and  had  resolved  in  cold 
blood  to  make  a  terrible  example,  they  would  have  pre- 
pared some  check  on  the  Spanish  soldiers  of  the  gar- 
rison ;  they  would  not  have  left  their  own  hospital  un- 
guarded, still  less  have  arranged  the  plan  so,  that  their 
loss  should  far  exceed  that  of  the  Spaniards ;  and 
surely  nothing  would  have  induced  them  to  relinquish 
the  profit  of  such  policy  after  having  suffered  all  the 
injury!  Yet  marshal  Moncey,  and  general  Harispe 
were  actively  engaged  in  restoring  order ;  and  it  is  cer- 
tain that,  including  the  peasants  shot  outside  the  gates, 
and  the  executions  afterwards,  the  whole  number  of 
Spaniards  slain  did  not  amount  to  one  hundred  and 
twenty  persons,  while  several  hundred  French  fell.| 
Of  the  imperial  guards  seventy  men  were  wounded, 
and  this  fact  alone  would  suffice  to  prove  that  there 
was  no  premeditation  on  the  part  of  Murat;:J:  for  if  he 
was  base  enough  to  sacrifice  his  own  men  with  such 
unconcern,  he  would  not  have  exposed  the  select  sol- 
diers of  the  French  empire  in  preference  to  the  con- 
scripts who  abounded  in  his  army. 

The  affair  itself  was  certainly  accidental,  and  not 
very  bloody  for  the  patriots,  but  policy  induced  both 
sides  to  attribute  secret  motives,  and  to  exaggerate  the 
slaughter.  The  Spaniards  in  the  provinces,  impressed 
with  an  opinion  of  French  atrocity,  were  thereby  ex- 
cited to  insurrection  on  the  one  hand  ;  and,  on  the  other, 
the  French,  well  aware  that  such  an  impression  could 
not  be  effaced  by  an  accurate  relation  of  what  did  hap- 
pen, seized  the  occasion  to  convey  a  terrible  idea  of 
their  own  power  and  severity.  It  is  the  part  of  his- 
tory to  reduce  such  amplifications.  But  it  is  impos- 
sible to  remain  unmoved  in  recording  the  gallantry  and 
devotion  of  a  populace  that  could  thus  dare  to  assail 
the  force  commanded  by  Murat,  rather  than  abandon 
one  of  tiieir  princes  ;  such,  however,  was  the  character 
of  the  Spaniards  throughout  this  war,  they  were  prone  to 
sudden  and  rash  actions,  and  though  weik  in  military 
execution,  fierce  and  confident  individually,  and  they 
had  always  an  intuitive  perception  of  what  was  great 
and  noble. 

The  commotion  of  the  2d  of  May  was  the  forerunner 
of  insurrections  in  every  part  of  Spain,  few  of  which 
were  so  honourable  to  the  actors  as  that  of  Madrid. 
Unprincipled  villains  hailed  the  opportunity  of  direct- 
ing the  passions  of  the  multitude,  and  under  the  mask 
of  patriotism,  turned  the  unthinking  fury  of  the  people 
against  whomever  it  pleased  them  to  rob  or  to  destroy. 
Pillage,  massacres,  assassinations,  cruelties  of  the 
most  revolting  kind,  were  every  where  perpetrated,  and 
tht'  intrinsic  goodness  of  the  cause  was  disfigured  by 
the  enormities  committed  at  Cadiz,  Seville,  Badajos, 
and  other  places,  but  chiefly  at  Valencia,  pre-eminent 
io   barbarity  at  a  moment  when  all  were   barbarous ! 


•   See  ^en.  Harispe's  observations  at  the  end  of  thii  volume, 
■f   Manifesto  of  the  council  of  Castile.     Page  28. 
\  Surgical  Cauipuigns  of  Barron  Larre/. 


The  first  burst  of  popular  feeling  being  thus  laisdi* 
rected,  and  the  energy  of  the  people  wasted  in  asseis- 
sinations,  lassitude  and  fear  succeeded  to  the  insolencje 
of  tumult  at  the  approach  of  real  danger ;  for  i'  is  one 
thing  to  shine  in  the  work  of  butchery,  and  another  to 
establish  that  discipline  which  can  alone  sustain  tlie 
courage  of  the  multitude  in  the  hour  of  trial. 

To  cover  the  suspicious  measure  of  introducing  more 
troops  than  the  terms  of  the  convention  warranted,  a 
variety  of  reports  relative  to  the  ultimate  intentions  of 
the  French  emperor  had  been  propagated  ;  at  one  time 
Gibraltar  was  to  be  besieged,  and  officers  were  dis- 
patched to  examine  the  Mediterranean  coasts  of  Spain 
and  Barbary  ;  at  another,  Portugal  was  to  become  the 
theatre  of  great  events  ;  and  a  mysterious  importance 
was  attached  to  all  the  movements  of  the  French  ar- 
mies, with  a  view  to  deceive  a  court  that  fear  and  sloth 
disposed  to  the  belief  of  any  thing  but  the  truth,  and 
to  impose  upon  a  people  whose  unsuspicious  ignorance 
was  at  first  mistaken  for  tameness. 

In  the  mean  time,  active  agents  were  employed  to 
form  a  French  party  at  the  capital  ;  and,  as  the  insur- 
rections of  Aranjuez  and  Madrid  discovered  the  fierce- 
ness of  the  Spanish  character,  Napoleon  enjoined  more 
caution  and  prudence  upon  his  lieutenant  than  the  lat- 
ter was  disposed  to  practise.  In  fact,  Murat's  precipi- 
tation was  the  cause  of  hastening  the  discovery  of  his 
master's  real  views  before  they  were  ripe  for  execution. 
For  Dupont's  first  division  and  cavalry  had  crossed  the 
Duero  as  early  as  the  14th  of  March,  and  upon  thff 
10th  of  April  had  occupied  Aranjuez,  while  his  sec- 
ond and  third  divisions  took  post  at  the  Escurial 
and  at  Segovia,  thus  encircling  the  capital,  which  was 
soon  occupied  by  Moncey's  corps.  It  was  then  evi- 
dent that  Muiat  designed  to  control  the  provisional  gov- 
ernment left  by  Ferdinand  ;  and  the  riot  at  Toledo,  al- 
though promptly  quelled  by  the  interference  of  the 
French  troops,  indicated  the  state  of  the  public  mind, 
before  the  explosion  at  Madrid  had  placed  the  partie,* 
in  a  state  of  direct  hostility.  Murat  seems  to  hav« 
been  intrusted  with  only  a  half  confidence,  and  as  iiia 
natural  impetuosity  urged  him  to  play  a  rash  rather 
than  a  timid  part,  he  appeared  with  the  air  of  a  con- 
queror before  a  ground  of  quarrel  was  laid.  His  poli- 
cy was  too  coarse  and  open  for  such  difficult  affairs, 
yet  he  was  not  entirely  without  grounds  for  his  pro- 
ceeding; a  letter  addressed  to  him  about  this  time  by 
Napoleon  contained  these  expressions  :  '  The  dtJu  of 
Infantado  has  a  party  in  Madrid ;  it  will  attack  you  i 
dissipate  it,  and  seize  the  government.^ 

At  Bayonne  the  political  events  kept  pace  with  thoso 
of  Madrid.  Charles  IV.  having  reclaimed  his  rights  in 
presence  of  Napoleon,  commanded  the  infant,  Don 
Antonio,  to  relinquish  the  presidency  of  the  governing 
junta  to  Murat,  who,  at  the  same  time,  received  the  ti- 
tle of  lieutenant-general  of  the  kingdom.  This  ap- 
pointment, and  the  restoration  of  Charles  to  the  :egal 
dignity,  were  proclaimed  in  Madrid,  with  the  acquies- 
cence of  the  Council  of  Castile,  on  the  10th  of  May; 
but  five  days  previous  to  that  period,  the  old  monarch 
had  again  ceded  his  authority  to  Napoleon,  and  Ferdi- 
nand and  himself  were  consigned,  with  large  pensions^ 
to  the  tranquillity  of  private  life.  The  throne  of  Spaiu 
being  thus  rendered  vacant,  the  right  to  fill  it  was  as- 
sumed by  the  French  emperor  in  virtue  of  the  cession 
made  by  Charles  IV.,  and  he  desired  that  a  king  might 
be  chosen  from  his  own  family.  After  some  hesitation, 
the  council  of  Castile,  in  concert  with  the  municipali- 
ty of  Madrid  and  the  governing  junta,  declared  that 
their  choice  had  fallen  upon  Joseph  Buonaparte,  whc 
was  then  king  of  Naples  ;  and  cardinal  Bourbon,  primate 
of  Spain,  first  cousin  of  Charles  IV.,  and  archbishop 
of  Toledo,  not  only  acceded  to  this  arrangement,  but 
actually  wrote  to  Napoleon  a  letter  testifying  his  ad- 
hesion to  the  new  order  of  things.     As  it  was  easy  te 


18 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


[Book  1. 


fjretel  the  result  of  the  election,  the  king  of  Naples  was  ' 
already  journeying  towards  Bayonne,  where  he  arrived 
on  the  7lh  of  June.  The  principal  men  of  Spain  had 
neen  previously  invited  to  meet  in  that  town  upon  the 
15th,  with  a  view  to  obtain  their  assent  to  a  constitution 
prepared  by  Napoleon ;  and  at  this  meeting,  called  '  the 
Assembly  of  Notables,'  ninety-one  Spaniards  of  emi- 
nence appeared.  They  accepted  Joseph  as  their  king, 
proceeded  to  discuss  the  constitution  in  detail,  and  af- 
ter several  sittings  adopted  it,  and  swore  to  maintain  its 
provisions.  Thus  finished  the  first  part  of  this  eventful 
drama.  | 

The  new  constitution  was  calculated  to  draw  forth  j 
all  the  resources  of  Spain;  compared  to  the  old  system  ■ 
it  was  a  blessing,  and  it  would  have  been  received  as  i 
Buch  under  different  circumstances,  but  now  arms  were  j 
to  decide  its  fate,  for  in  every  province  the  cry  of  war 
had  been  raised.  In  Catalonia,  in  Valencia,  in  Anda- 
lusia, Estremadura,  Gallicia,  and  the  Asturias,  the  peo- 
ple were  gathering,  and  fiercely  declaring  their  determi- 
nation to  resist  French  intrusion.  Nevertheless  Joseph, 
upparently  contented  with  the  acquiescence  of  the 
ninety-one  notables,  and  trusting  to  the  powerful  sup- 
port of  his  brother,  crossed  the  frontier  on  the  9th  of 
July;  and  on  the  TJth  arrived  at  Vittoria.  The  inhabi- 
tants still  remembering  the  journey  to  Bayonne,  seem- 
ed disposed  to  hinder  his  entrance;  but  their  opposi- 
tion did  not  break  out  into  actual  violence,  and  the  next 
morning  he  continued  his  progress  by  Miranda  del  Eb- 
To,  Breviesca,  Burgos,  and  Buitrago.  The  20th  of 
July  he  entered  Madrid,  and  on  the  24th  he  was  pro- 
claimed king  of  Spain  and  the  Indies,  with  all  the  solem- 
nities usual  upon  such  occasions,  thus  making  himself 
the  enemy  of  eleven  millions  of  people,  the  object  of  a 
nation's  hatred  !  W  ith  a  strange  accent,  and  from  the 
midst  of  foreign  bands,  he  called  upon  a  fierce  and 
haughty  race  to  accept  of  a  constitution  which  they  did 
not  understand,  and  which  few  of  them  had  ever  heard 
of.  his  only  hope  of  success  resting  on  the  strength  of 
his  brother's  arms,  his  claims  uDor".  the  consent  of  an 
imbecile  monarch,  and  the  weakness  of  a  few  pusillani- 
mous nobles,  in  contempt  of  the  rights  of  millions  now 
arming  to  oppose  him.  This  was  the  unhallowed  part 
of  the  enterprise;  this  it  was  that  rendered  his  offered 
constitution  odious,  covered  it  with  a  leprous  skin^and 
drove  the  noble-minded  far  from  the  pollution  of  its 
touch  ! 


CHAPTER  III. 

Council  of  Castile  refuses  to  take  the  oath  of  alle^^iance — Su- 
preme junta  estalilished  at  Seville — ^Marquis  of  bolano  niur- 
oered  at  Cadiz,  and  the  coiKie  d'Aguilar  at  Seville — Inter- 
course between  Castanos  and  sir  Hew  Dalryniple — General 
Spencer  and  adniirrd  Purvis  offer  to  co-0|)erate  with  the 
Spaniarls-^Admiral  Rostily's  squadron  surrenders  to  Morlu — 
General  insurrtction — Massacre  at  Valencia — Horrible  niur- 
de.r  of  Kilanghieri. 

Joseph  being  proclaimed  king,  required  the  council 
of  Castile  to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  prescribed  by 
the  constitution  ;  hut,  with  unexpected  boldness,  that 
body,  hitherto  obsequious,  met  his  orders  with  a  remon- 
strance, for  war,  virtually  declared  on  the  2d  of  May, 
was  at  this  time  raging  in  all  parts  of  the  peninsula, 
nnd  the  council  was  secretly  apprized  that  a  great  mis- 
fortune had  befallen  the  French  arms.*  It  was  no  long- 
er a  question  between  Joseph  and  some  reluctant  public 
bodies ;  it  was  an  awful  struggle  between  great  nations ; 
and  how  the  spirit  of  insurrection,  breaking  forth  simul- 
taneously in  every  province,  was  nonxished  in  each,  un- 
til it  required  the  consistence  of  regular  warfare,  I  will 
now  relate. 


*  Memoir  of  O'Farril,  and  Azaaza. 


Just  before  the  tumult  . '  Arasjuez,  the  marquis  of 
Solano  y  Socoro,  commaLuing  the  Spanish  auxiliary 
force  in  the  Aleiutejo,  had  received  an  order  from  Godoy^ 
to  withdraw  his  division,  and  post  it  on  the  frontier  of" 
Andalusia,  to  cover  the  projected  journey  of  Charles 
IV.  Napoleon  was  aware  of  this  order,  but  would  not 
interrupt  its  execution,  wherefore  Solano  quitted  Portu- 
gal without  difficulty,  and  in  the  latter  end  of  May, 
observing  the  general  agitation,  repaired  to  his  govern- 
ment of  Cadiz,  in  the  harbour  of  which  place  five 
French  sail  of  the  line  and  a  frigate,  under  admiral 
Rossily,  had  just  before  taken  refuge  from  the  English 
fleet.  Seville  was  in  a  great  ferment,  and  Solano,  in 
passing  through  was  required  to  put  himself  at  the  head 
of  an  insurrection  in  favour  of  Ferdinand  VII.,  he  re- 
fused, and  passed  on  to  bis  own  government ;  but  there 
also  the  people  were  ripe  for  a  declaration  against  the 
French.  A  local  government  was  established  at  Seville, 
which  assuming  the  title  of '  Supreme  Junta  of  Spain 
and  the  Indies,'  declared  war  in  form  against  the  intru- 
sive monarch,  commanded  all  men  between  the  ages 
of  sixteen  and  forty-five  to  take  arms,  called  upon  the 
troops  of  the  camp  of  San  Roque  to  acknowledge  their 
authority,  and  ordered  Solano  to  attack  the  French 
squadron.  That  unfortunate  man  would  not  acknowl- 
edge the  authority  of  this  self-constituted  government, 
and  as  he  hesitated  to  commit  his  country  in  war  against 
a  power  whose  strength  he  knew  better  than  he  did  the 
temper  of  his  own  countrymen,  he  was  murdered.  His 
ability,  his  courage,  his  amiable  and  unblemished 
character,  have  never  been  denied,  and  yet  there  is  too 
much  reason  to  believe  that  the  junta  of  Neville  sent  an 
agent  to  Cadiz  for  the  express  purpose  of  procuring  his 
assassination.  This  foul  stain  upon  the  cause  was  en- 
larged by  the  perpetration  of  similar,  or  worse  deeds, 
in  every  part  of  the  kingdom.  At  Seville  the  conde 
d'Aguilar  was  dragged  from  his  carriage,  and  without 
even  the  imputation  of  guilt,  inhumanly  butchered  ; 
and  here  again  it  is  said  that  the  mob  were  instigated 
by  a  leading  member  of  the  junta,  count  Gusman  de 
Tilly,  a  man  described  as  '  capable  of  dishonouring  a 
whole  nation  by  his  crimes,'  while  his  victim  was  uni- 
versally admitted  to  be  virtuous  and  accomplished. 

As  early  as  April,  general  Castaiios,  then  command- 
ing the  camp  of  Sari  Roque,  had  entered  into  communi- 
cation with  sir  Hew  Dalrymple,  the  governor  of  Gibral- 
tar. He  was  resolved  to  seize  any  opportunity  that  of- 
fered to  resist  the  French,  and  he  appears  to  have  been 
the  first  Spaniard,  who  united  patriotism  with  prudent 
calculation  :  readily  acknowledging  the  authority  of  the 
junta  of  Seville,  and  stifling  the  workings  of  self-inter- 
est, with  a  virtue  by  no  means  common  to  his  country- 
men at  that  period.  When  the  insurrection  first  broke 
out,  admiral  Purvis  commanded  the  British  squadron 
off  Cadiz,  and  in  concert  with  general  Spencer,  w  ho 
happened  to  be  in  that  part  of  the  world  with  five  th,^u- 
sand  men,  offered  to  co-operate  with  Solano,  in  an  attack 
upon  the  French  ships  of  war  in  the  harbour.  Upon  the 
death  of  that  unfortunate  man,  this  offer  was  renewed 
and  pressed  upon  don  Thomas  Morla,  his  successor;  but 
he,  for  reasons  hereafter  to  be  mentioned,  refused  all 
assistance,  and  reduced  the  hostile  ships  iiimself.— » 
Castafios,  however,  united  himself  closely  with  the 
British  commanders,  and  obtained  from  thum  supplies 
of  arms,  ammunition,  and  money  ;  and  at  the  instance 
of  sir  Hew  Dalrymple,  the  merchants  of  Gibraltar  ad- 
vanced a  loan  of  forty-two  thousand  dollars  for  the  ser- 
vice of  the  Spanish  patriots.  * 

Meanwhile  the  assassinations  at  Cadiz  and  Seville 
were  imitated  in  every  part  of  Spain  ;  hardly  can  a 
town  be  named  in  which  some  innocent  and  worthy  per- 
sons were  not  slain.  |     Grenada  had  its  murders ;  Car- 


•  Sir  Flew  Dalryniple's  correspondence. 

t  Moniteur.     Aianza  and  O'Farril  :     Nellerto. 


1808. 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


17 


thagena  rivalled  Cadiz  in  ruthless  cruelty,  and  Valencia 
reeked  with  blood.  Don  Miiruel  de  Saavedra,  the 
oovernor  of  that  city,  was  killed,  not  in  the  first  fury  of 
cemmotion,  which  he  escaped,  but,  having  returned, 
v.-as  deliberately  sacrificed.  Balthazar  Calvo,  a  canon 
of  the  church  of  San  Isido,  at  Madrid,  came  down  to 
Valencia,  and  having  collected  a  band  of  fanatics  com- 
menced a  massacre  of  the  French  residents  ;  and  this 
ruthless  villain  continued  his  slaughters  unchecked,  un- 
til French  victims  failing,  his  raging  thirst  for  murder 
urged  him  to  menacethejimta,  who  with  the  exception  of 
the  English  consul  Mr.  Tupper,  had  given  way  to  his 
previous  violence,  but  now  readily  found  the  means  to 
crush  his  power.  The  canon,  while  in  the  act  of  brav- 
inor  their  authority,  was  seized  by  stratagem,  and  soon 
afterwards  strangled,  together  with  two  hundred  of  his 
band.  The  conde  de  Serbelloni,  captain-general  of  the 
province,  then  proceeded  to  organize  an  array,  the  old 
count  Florida  Blanca  placed  himself  at  the  head  of  the 
Wurcian  insurrection,  and  his  force  acted  in  unison  with 
that  of  Valencia. 

In  Catalonia  the  occupation  of  Barcelona  repressed 
the  popular  effervescence,  but  the  feeling  was  the  same, 
and  an  insurrection,  breaking  out  at  the  town  of  Man- 
resa,  soon  spread  to  all  the  unfettered  parts  of  the  prov- 
ince. 

In  Aragon  the  arrival  of  don  Joseph  Palafox  kin- 
dled the  fire  of  patriotism.  He  had  escaped  from  Bay- 
onne,  and  his  family  were  greatly  esteemed  in  a  coun- 
•jry  where  it  was  of  the  noblest  among  a  people  absurd- 
ly vain  of  their  ancient  descent.  The  captain-general, 
fearful  of  a  tumult,  ordered  Palafox  to  quit  the  prov- 
ince, but  this  circumstance,  joined  to  some  appearance 
of  mystery  in  his  escape  from  Bayonne,  encreased  the 
passions  of  the  multitude  ;  a  crowd  surrounded  his 
abode,  and  forced  him  to  assume  the  command,  the 
captain-general  was  confined,  some  persons  were  mur- 
dered, and  a  junta  was  formed.  Palafox  was  consid- 
ered by  his  companions  as  a  man  of  slender  capacity 
and  creat  vanity,  and  there  is  nothing  in  his  exploits 
to  create  a  doubt  of  the  justness  of  this  opinion  ;  it  was 
not  Palafox  that  upheld  the  glory  of  Aragon,  it  was  the 
spirit  of  the  people,  wbich  he  had  not  excited,  and  could 
60  little  direct,  that  for  a  long  time  after  the  commence- 
ment of  the  first  siege,  he  was  kept  a  sort  of  prisoner  in 
Zaragoza,  his  courage  and  fidelity  being  distrusted  by 
the  population  which  he  is  supposed  to  have  ruled. 

The  example  of  Aragon  aroused  the  Navarrese,  and 
Logrono  became  the  focus  of  an  insurrection  which  ex- 
tended along  most  of  the  valleys  of  that  kingdom. 
In  the  northern  and  western  provinces,  the  spirit  of  in- 
dependence was  equally  fierce  and  as  decidedly  pro- 
nounced, accompanied  also  by  the  same  excesses.  In 
Badajos  the  conde  de  la  Torre  del  Frenio  was  butch- 
ered by  the  populace,  and  his  mangled  carcass  dragged 
through  the  streets  in  triumph.  At  Talavera  de  la 
Reyna,  the  corregidor  with  difficulty  escaped  a  similar 
fate  by  a  hasty  flight;  Leon  presented  a  wide,  unbro- 
ken scene  of  anarchy,  and,  generally  speaking,  in  all 
the  great  towns  violent  hanos  were  laid  upon  those 
who  opposed  the  people's  wishes. 

Gallicia  seemed  to  hold  back  for  a  moment,  but  the 
example  of  Leon,  and  the  arrival  of  an  agent  from  the 
Asturias,  where  the  insurrection  was  in  full  force,  pro- 
duced a  general  movement.  A  junta  was  formed,  and 
Filanghieri,  the  governor  of  Coruiia,  an  Italian,  was 
c.illed  upon  to  exercise  the  functions  of  royalty  by  de- 
claring war  in  form  against  France.  Like  every  man 
of  sense  in  Spain  he  was  unwilling  to  commence  a 
revolution  upon  such  uncertain  grounds,  and  the  impa- 
tient populace  sought  his  death  ;  he  w^s  saved  at  the 
moment  by  the  courage  of  an  officer  of  his  staff,  yet 
his  horrible  f  ite  was  only  deferred.  Being  a  man  of 
talent  and  sincerely  attached  to  Spain,  he  exerted  him- 
self to  orga  lize  tlie  r  'ilary  resources  of  the  provinc*, 


and  no  suspicion  attached  to  his  conduct ;  hut  such  was 
the  inherent  ferocity  of  the  peo-ple  and  of  the  lime,  tlial 
the  soldiers  of  the  regiment  of  Navarre  seized  him  z} 
Villa  Franca  del  Bierzo,  and,  as  some  say,  stuck  him 
full  of  bayonets,  while  others  assert  that  tliey  plante.i 
their  weapons  in  the  ground,  and  then  tossing  him  oi; 
to  their  points,  left  him  tiiere  to  struggle,  and  then  d\i- 
banded  themselves. 

The  Asturians  were  the  first  who  proclaimed  th^ir 
indefeasible  right  of  choosing  a  new  government  when 
the  old  one  ceased  to  afford  them  protection.  Tliey 
established  a  local  junta,  declared  war  against  the 
French,  and  despatched  deputies  to  England  to  solicit 
assistance.  Meanwhile,  although  the  gr«at  towns  ii 
Biscay  and  the  Castiles  were  overawed  by  fifty  thou- 
sand bayonets,  the  peasantrj' commenced  a  war,  in  their 
own  manner,  against  the  stragglers  and  the  sick,  an<l 
thus  a  hostile  chain  surrounding  the  French  army  wr.a 
completed  in  every  link. 

This  universal,  and  nearly  simultaneous  effort  of  the 
Spanish  people  was  beheld  by  the  rest  of  Europe  with 
astonishment  and  admiration  ;  astonishment  at  the  en- 
ergy thus  suddenly  put  forth  by  a  nation  hitherto 
deemed  unnerved  and  debased  ;  admiration  at  the  de- 
voted courage  of  an  act,  which,  seen  at  a  distance  and 
its  odious  parts  unknown,  appeared  with  all  the  ideal 
beauty  of  Numantian  patriotism.  In  Ensrland  tlie  en- 
thusiasm was  unbounded  ;  dazzled  at  first  with  the 
splendour  of  such  an  agreeable,  unlooked-for  spectacle, 
men  of  all  classes  gave  way  to  the  impulse  of  a  sfenei- 
ous  sympathy,  and  forgot,  or  felt  disinclined  to  analyse, 
the  real  causes  of  this  apparently  masrnanimous  exer- 
tion. It  may,  however,  be  fairly  doubted  if  tiie  disin- 
terested vigour  of  the  Spanish  character  was  the  true 
source  of  the  resistance;  it  was,  in  fict,  produced  by- 
several  co-operating  causes,  many  of  which  were  an>'- 
thing  but  commendable.  Constituted  as  modern  state* 
are,  with  little  in  their  systems  of  government  or  edu- 
cation adapted  to  nourish  intense  feelings  of  patriotism, 
it  would  be  miraculous  indeed  if  such  a  result  was  oh 
tained  from  the  pure  virtue  of  a  nation,  wliich  for  two 
centuries  had  groaned  under  the  pressure  of  civil  and 
relioious  despotism. 

The  Spanish  character,  with  relation  to  public  affcirs, 
is  distinguished  by  inordinate  pride  and  arrogance. 
Dilatory  and  improvident,  the  individual  as  well  as  the 
mass,  all  possess  an  absurd  confidence  that  every  thing 
is  practicable  which  their  heated  iniao;inations  suggest; 
once  excited,  they  can  see  no  difficulty  in  the  execu- 
tion of  a  project,  and  the  obstacles  th^'y  encounter  are 
attributed  to  treachery;  hence  the  sudden  murder  of  so 
many  virtuous  men  at  the  conmencemt  nt  of  this  com- 
motion. Kind  and  warm  in  his  attachments,  but  bit- 
ter in  his  anger,  the  Spaniard  is  nntient  under  priva- 
tions, firm  in  bodily  sufferin--,  [.rone  to  suauen  passion, 
vindictive,  bloody,  rememberir?  ^  asult  longer  than  .if 
jury,  and  cruel  in  his  revenge.  With  a  strong  natural 
perception  of  what  is  noble,  his  promise  is  lofty,  but 
as  he  invariably  permits  his  passions  to  get  the  mas- 
tery of  his  reason,  his  performance  is  mean.  In  the 
progress  of  this  war,  the  tenacity  of  vengeance  pecu- 
liar to  the  nation  supplied  the  want  of  cool,  perseve- 
ring intrepidity ;  but  it  was  a  poor  substitute  for  that 
essential  quality,  and  led  rather  to  deeds  of  craft  and 
cruelty  than  to  daring  acts  of  patriotism.  Now  the 
abstraction  of  the  royal  family,  and  the  unexpected  pre- 
tension to  the  crown,  so  insultingly  put  fortli  by  Napo- 
leon, had  aroused  all  the  Spanish  pride,  and  tlie  tumults 
of  Madrid  and  Aranjuez,  prepared  the  public  mind  fir 
a  violent  movement ;  the  protection  afforded  by  the 
French  to  tlie  obnoxious  Godoy  increased  the  ferment 
of  popular  feeling,  because  a  dearly  cherished  ven- 
geance was  thus  frustrated  at  the  moment  of  its  ex- 
pected accomplishment,  and  the  disappointment  excited 
ull  l'^  It  fierceness  of  anger  which  wi'h  Spaniards  is,  foi 


18 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  J 


the  moment,  uncontrollalile  ;  and  then  came  the  tumult 
of  Madrid,  which,  swollen  and  distorted,  was  cast  like 
Caesar's  body  before  the  people  to  urge  them  to  phren- 
zy;  they  arose,  not  to  meet  a  danger  the  extent  of 
■which  they  had  calculated,  and  were  prepared  for  the 
sake  of  independence  to  confront,  but  to  crratify  the  fu- 
ry of  their  hearts,  and  to  slake  their  tiiirst  of  blood. 

Durinir  Godoy's  administration  the  property  of  the 
church  iiad  been  trenched  upon,  and  it  was  evident, 
from  the  example  of  France  and  Italy,  that  under  the 
new  system,  tlie  operation  would  be  repeated  ;  this 
was  a  matter  that  involved  the  interests,  and,  of  course, 
stimulated  the  activity  of  a  multitude  of  monks  and 
priests,  who  found  no  difficulty  in  persuading  an  igno- 
rant and  bigoted  people,  that  the  aggressive  stranger 
was  also  the  enemy  of  religion  and  accursed  of  God. 
With  processions,  miracles,  prophecies,  distribution  of 
reliques,  and  the  appointment  of  saints  to  tlie  command 
of  the  armies,  they  fanaticised  the  mass  of  the  patriots, 
and  in  every  part  of  the  peninsula  the  clergy  were  dis- 
tinguished for  their  active  zeal ;  monks  and  friars  were 
invariably,  either  leaders  in  the  tumults,  or  at  the  side 
of  those  who  were,  instigating  them  to  barbarous  ac- 
tions. Buonaparte  found  the  same  cause  produce  simi- 
lar effects  during  his  early  campaigns  in  Italy;  and  if 
the  shape  of  that  country  had  been  as  favourable  for 
protracted  resistance,  and  a  like  support  had  been  fur- 
nished by  Great  Britain,  the  patriots  of  Spain  would 
have  been  rivalled  by  modern  Romans.* 

The  continental  system  of  mercantile  exclusion  was 
another  spring  of  this  complicated  machinery.  It 
threatened  to  lessen  the  already  decayed  commerce  of 
the  maritime  towns,  and  the  contraband  trade,  which 
has  alwaj's  been  carried  on  in  Spain  to  an  incredible 
extent,  was  certain  of  destruction  ;  with  that  trade  the 
fate  of  one  hundred  thousand  excise  and  custom-house 
officers  was  involved. |  It  required  but  a  small  share 
of  penetration  to  perceive,  that  a  system  of  armed  reve- 
nue officers,  organized  after  the  French  manner,  and 
stimulated  by  a  vigorous  administration,  would  quickly 
put  an  end  to  the  smuggling,  which  was,  in  truth,  only 
a  consequence  of  monopolies  and  internal  restrictions 
upon  the  trade  of  one  province  w'ilh  another — vexations 
abolished  by  the  constitution  of  Bayonne  :  hence  all 
the  activity  and  intelligence  of  the  merchants  engaged 
in  foreign  trade,  and  all  the  numbers  and  lawless  vio- 
lence of  the  smugglers,  were  enlisted  in  the  cause  of 
the  country,  swelling  the  ranks  of  the  insurgent  patri- 
ots ;  and  hence  also,  the  readiness  of  the  Gibraltar  mer- 
chants to  advance  the  loan  before  spoken  of. 

'I'he  state  of  civilization  in  Spain  was  likewise  ex- 
actly suited  to  an  insurrection,  for  if  the  people  had  been 
a  little  more  enlightened,  they  would  have  joined  the 
French,  if  very  enl  ightened,  the  invasion  could  not  have 
happened  at  all.  But  in  a  country  where  the  comforts 
of  civilized  society  are  less  needed,  and  therefore  less 
attended  to  than  in  any  other  part  of  Europe  ;  where  the 
warmth  and  dryness  of  the  climate  render  it  no  sort  of 
privation,  or  even  inconvenience,  to  sleep  for  the  great- 
est part  of  the  year  in  the  open  air;  and  where  the 
universal  custom  is  to  go  armed,  it  was  not  difficult  for 
any  energetic  man  to  assemble  and  keep  together  large 
masses  of  the  credulous  peasantry.  No  story  could  be 
too  gross  for  their  belief,  if  it  agreed  with  their  wishes. 
*  Es  verdad,  los  dicen,'  '  It  is  true,  they  say  it,'  is  the 
invariable  answer  of  a  Spaniard  if  a  doubt  is  expressed 
of  the  truth  of  an  absurd  report.  Temperate,  posses- 
sing little  furniture,  and  generally  hoarding  all  the  gold 
he  can  get,  he  is  less  concerned  for  the  loss  of  his 
hojse  than  the  inhabitant  of  another  country  would  be, 
and  the  etforl  that  he  makes  in  relinquishing  his  abode, 
must  not  be  measured  by  the  scale  of  an  Englishman's 


*  Napoleon's  Memoires,  Campagne  d'ltalie,  Venise. 
\  Welkslej's  letter  to  Uurrard. 


exertion  in  a  like  case  ;  once  engaged  in  an  adventure, 
the  lightness  of  his  spirits  and  the  brilliancy  of  his 
sky,  make  it  a  matter  of  indifference  to  the  angry  peas- 
ant whither  he  wanders. 

The  evils  which  had  afflicted  the  country  previous 
to  the  period  of  the  French  interference  also  tended  to 
prepare  the  Spaniards  for  violence,  and  aided  in  turn- 
ing that  violence  against  the  intruders.  Famine,  od- 
prcssinn,  poverty,  and  disease,  the  loss  of  commerce, 
and  unequal  taxation,  had  pressed  sorely  upon  them. 
For  such  a  system  the  people  could  not  be  enthusias- 
tic, but  they  were  taught  to  believe,  that  Godoy  was 
the  sole  author  of  the  misery  they  suffered,  that  Ferdi- 
nand would  redress  their  grievances;  and  as  the  French 
were  the  protectors  of  the  former,  and  the  oppressors 
of  the  latter,  it  was  easy  to  add  this  bitterness  to  their 
natural  hatred  of  the  domination  of  a  stranger,  and  it 
was  so  done.* 

Such  were  the  principal  causes  which  combined  to 
produce  this  surprising  revolution,  from  which  so  many 
great  events  flowed,  without  one  man  of  eminent  tal- 
ent being  cast  up,  to  control  or  direct  the  spirit  thu3 
accidentally  excited.  Nothing  more  directly  shows 
the  heterogeneous  nature  of  the  feelings  and  interests, 
which  were  brought  together,  than  this  last  fact,  which 
cannot  be  attributed  to  a  deficiency  of  natural  talent, 
for  the  genius  of  the  Spanish  people  is  notoriously  ar- 
dent, subtle,  and  vigorous ;  but  there  was  no  common 
bond  of  feeling,  save  that  of  individual  hatred  to  the 
French,  which  a  great  man  could  lay  hold  of  to  influ- 
ence large  masses.  Persons  of  sagacity  perceived, 
very  early,  that  the  Spanish  revolution,  like  a  leafy 
shrub  in  a  violent  gale  of  wind,  greatly  agitated,  but 
disclosing  only  slight  unconnected  stems,  afforded  no 
sure  hold  for  the  ambition  of  a  master-spirit,  if  such 
there  were.  It  was  clear  that  the  cause  would  fail,  un- 
less supported  by  England,  and  then  England  would 
direct  ail,  and  not  suffer  her  resources  to  be  wielded 
for  the  glory  of  an  individual,  whose  views  and  policy 
might  afterwards  thwart  her  own  ;  nor  was  it  difficult 
to  perceive  that  the  downfall  of  Napoleon,  not  the  re- 
generation of  Spain,  was  the  object  of  her  cabinet. 

The  explosion  of  public  feeling  was  fierce  in  its  ex- 
pression, because  political  passions  will  always  be  ve- 
hement at  the  first  moment  of  their  appearance  among 
a  people  new  to  civil  commotion,  and  unused  to  per- 
mit their  heat  to  evaporate  in  public  discussions.  The 
result  was  certainly  a  wonderful  change  in  the  affairs 
of  Europe,  it  seems  yet  undecided  whether  that  change 
has  been  for  the  better  or  for  the  worse;  and  in  the 
progress  of  their  struggle,  the  Spaniards  certainly  de- 
veloped more  cruelty  than  courage,  more  violence  than 
intrepidity,  more  personal  hatred  of  the  French  than 
enthusiasm  for  their  own  cause.  They  opened,  in- 
deed, a  wide  field  for  the  exertions  of  others,  they  pre- 
sented a  fulcrum  upon  which  a  lever  was  rested  that 
moved  the  civilized  world,  but  assuredly  the  presiding 
genius,  the  impelling  power,  came  from  another  quar- 
ter; useful  accessories  they  were,  hut  as  principals 
they  displayed  neither  wisdom,  spirit,  nor  skill  suffi- 
cient to  resist  the  j)rodigious  force  by  which  they  were 
assailed.  If  thej' appeared  at  first  heedless  of  danger, 
it  was  not  because  they  were  prepared  to  perish,  rathei 
than  submit,  but  that  they  were  leckless  of  provoking 
a  power  whose  terrors  they  could  not  estimate,  and  in 
their  ignorance  despised. 

It  is,  however,  not  surprising  that  great  expec'atio.is 
were  at  first  formed  of  the  heroism  of  the  Spaniards, 
and  those  expectations  were  greatly  augmented  by  their 
agreeable  qualities.  There  is  not  upon  the  face  of  the 
earth  a  people  so  attractive  in  the  friendly  intercourse 
of  society.  Their  majestic  language,  fine  persons,  ai>d 
becoming  dress,  their  lively  imaginations,  the  inexprcs- 

*  Historia  dc  la  Gucrra  contra  Napolfou, 


1808.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


19 


sible  beauty  of  their  women,  and  the  air  of  romance 
whicli  thev  throw  over  every  action,  and  infuse  into 
every  feeling-,  all  combine  to  delude  the  senses  and  to 
impose  upon  the  judgment.  As  companions,  they  are 
incomparably  the  most  agfreeable  of  mankind,  but  dan- 
£r(-T  and  disappointmrnt  attend  the  man  who,  confidiniiT 
in  their  promises  and  energy,  ventures  upon  a  difficult 
enterprise.  '  Never  do  to-day  what  you  can  put  off  un- 
til to-morrow,'  is  the  favourite  proverb  in  Spain,  and 
rigidly  followed. 


CHAPTER  IV 

New  French  corps  formed  in  Navarre — Duhesme  fixes  him- 
Sf  li'at  Barcelona — Importance  of  that  city — Napcleon'sinili- 
tarv  plan  and  arrangements. 

The  commotion  of  Aranjuez  undeceived  the  French 
emperor,  lie  perceived  that  he  was  enffagred  in  a  deli- 
cate enterprise,  and  that  the  people  he  had  to  deal  with 
were  anythinnr  but  tame  and  quiescent  under  insult. 
Determined,  however,  to  persevere,  he  pursued  his  po- 
litical intrifjues,  and  without  relinquishing  the  hope  of 
a  successful  termination  to  the  affair  by  such  means, 
he  arrano-pd  a  profound  plan  of  military  operations,  and 
so  distributed  his  forces,  that  at  the  moment  when 
Spain  was  pouring  forth  her  swarthy  bands,  the  masses 
of  the  French  army  were  concentrated  upon  the  most 
important  points,  and  combined  in  such  a  manner,  that, 
from  their  central  position,  they  had  the  power  of  over- 
whelming each  separate  province,  no  three  of  which 
could  act  in  concert  without  first  beating  a  French 
corps.  And  if  any  of  the  Spanish  armies  succeeded 
in  routing  a  French  force,  the  remaining  corps  could 
unite  without  difficulty,  and  retreat  without  danger.  It 
was  the  skill  of  this  disposition  which  enabled  seventy 
thousand  men,  covering  a  great  extent  of  country,  to 
brave  the  simultaneous  fury  of  a  whole  nation  ;  an  ar- 
my less  ably  distributed  would  have  been  trampled  un- 
der foot,  and  lost  amidst  the  tumultuous  uproar  of 
eleven  millions  of  people. 

In  a  political  point  of  view  the  inconvenience  which 
would  have  arisen  from  suffering  a  regular  army  to 
take  the  field,  was  evident.  To  have  been  able  to 
characterise  the  opposition  of  the  Spanish  people,  as  a 
partial  insurrection  of  peasants,  instigated  by  some  evil- 
disposed  persons  to  act  against  the  wishes  of  the  res- 
pectable part  of  the  nation,  would  have  given  some 
colour  to  the  absorbing  darkness  of  the  invasion.  And 
to  have  permitted  that  which  was  at  first  an  insurrec- 
tion of  peasants,  to  take  the  form  and  consistence  of 
regular  armies  and  methodical  warfare,  would  have 
been  a  military  error,  dangerous  in  the  extreme.  Na- 
poleon, who  well  knew  that  scientific  war  is  only  a 
wise  application  of  force,  laughed  at  the  delusion  of 
those  who  regarded  the  want  of  a  regular  army  as  a 
favourable  circumstance,  and  who  hailed  the  undisci- 
plined peasant  as  the  more  certain  defender  of  the 
country.  He  knew  that  a  general  insurrection  can 
never  last  long,  that  it  is  a  military  anarchy,  and  inca- 
pable of  real  strength  ;  he  knew  that  it  was  the  disci- 
plined battalions  of  Valley  Forge,  not  the  volunteers 
of  Lexington  that  established  American  independence; 
that  it  was  the  veterans  of  Arcole  and  Marengo,  not  the 
republicans  of  Valmy,  that  fixed  the  fate  of  the  French 
revolution.  Hence  his  efforts  were  directed  to  hinder 
thf  Spaniards  from  drawing  together  any  great  body 
of  regular  soldiers,  an  event  that  might  easily  happen, 
for  the  gross  amc^unt  of  the  organized  Spanish  force 
was,  in  the  month  of  May,  about  one  hundred  and 
twenty-seven  thousand  men  of  all  arms.  Fifteen  thou- 
sand of  these  were  in  Holstein,  under  the  marquis  of 
Romana,  but  twenty  thousand  were  already  partially 
concentrated  in  Portugal,  and  the  remainder,  in  whici: 


were  comprised  eleven  thousand  Swiss  and  thirty 
thousand  militia,  were  dispersed  in  various  parts  of 
the  kingdom,  principally  in  Andalusia.  Besides  this 
force,  there  was  a  sort  of  local  reserve  called  the  ur- 
ban militia,  much  neglected  indeed,  and  more  a  name 
than  a  reality,  yet  the  advantage  of  such  an  institution 
was  considerable  ;  men  were  to  be  had  in  abundance, 
and  as  the  greatest  difficulty  in  a  sudden  crisis  is  to 
prepare  the  framework  of  order,  it  was  no  small  re- 
source to  find  a  plan  of  service  ready,  the  principle  of 
which  was  understood  by  the  people.* 

The  French  army  in  the  Peninsula  about  the  same 
period,  although  amounting  to  eighty  thousand  men, 
exclusive  of  those  under  .lunot  in  Portugal,  had  not 
more  than  seventy  thousand  capable  of  active  opera- 
tions, the  remainder  were  sick  or  in  depots.  The  pos- 
session of  the  fortresses,  the  central  position,  and  the 
combination  of  this  comparatively  small  army,  gave  it 
great  strength,  but  it  had  also  many  points  of  weak- 
ness ;  it  was  made  up  of  the  conscri[)ts  of  different  na- 
tions, French,  Swiss,  Italians,  Poles,  and  even  Portu- 
guese whom  Junot  had  expatriated  ;  and  it  is  a  curious 
fact,  that  some  of  the  latter  remained  in  Spain  until  the 
end  of  the  war.  A  few  of  the  imperial  guards  were 
also  employed,  and  here  and  there  an  old  regiment  of 
the  line  was  mixed  with  the  young  troops  to  give  them 
consistence,  yet  with  these  exceptions  the  French  army 
must  be  considered  as  a  raw  levy,  fresh  from  the  plough 
and  unacquainted  with  discipline  :j"  so  late  even  as  the 
month  of  August,  many  of  the  battalions  had  not  com- 
pleted the  first  elements  of  their  drill, :|:  and  if  they  had 
not  been  formed  upon  good  skeletons,  the  difference  be- 
tween them  and  the  insurgent  peasantry  would  have 
been  very  trifling.||  This  fact  explains,  in  some  meas- 
ure, the  otherwise  incomprehensible  checks  and  de- 
feats, which  the  French  sustained  at  the  commence- 
ment of  the  contest,  and  it  likewise  proves  how  little 
of  vigour  there  was  in  Spanish  resistance  at  the  mo- 
ment of  the  greatest  enthusiasm. 

In  the  distribution  of  these  troops  Napoleon  attended 
principally  to  the  security  of  Madrid.  As  the  capital, 
and  the  centre  of  all  interests,  its  importance  was 
manifest,  and  the  great  line  of  communication  between 
it  and  Bayonne  was  early  and  constantly  covered  with 
troops.  But  the  imprudence  with  which  the  grand 
duke  of  Berg  brought  up  the  corps  of  Moncey  and 
Dupont  to  the  capital,  together  with  his  own  haughty, 
impolitic  demeanour,  drew  on  the  crisis  of  affairs  be- 
fore the  time  was  ripe,  obliged  the  French  monarch  to 
hasten  the  advance  of  other  troops,  and  to  make  a 
greater  display  of  his  force  than  was  consistent  with 
his  policy.  For  Murat's  movement,  while  it  threat- 
ened the  Spaniards  and  provoked  their  hostility,  isolated 
the  French  army,  by  stripping  the  line  of  communica- 
tion, and  the  arrival  of  fresh  battalions  to  remedy  this 
error  generated  additional  anger  and  suspicion  at  a  very 
critical  period. 

It  was,  however,  absolutely  necessary  to  fill  the  void 
left  by  Moncey's  advance,  and  a  fresh  corps  sent  into 
Navarre,  being,  by  successive  reinforcements  increased 
to  twenty-three  thousand  men,  received  in  June  the 
name  of  the  '  army  of  the  Western  Pyrenees.'  §  Mar- 
shal Bessieres  assumed  the  command,  and,  on  the  first 
appearance  of  commotion,  fixed  his  head  quarters  at 
Burgos,  occupied  Vittoria,  Mir,  nda  de  Ebro,  and  other 
towns,  and  pushed  advanced  posts  into  Leon.  This 
position,  while  it  protected  the  line  from  Bayonne  to 
the  capital,  enabled  him  to  awo  the  Asturias  and  Bis- 
cay, and  also  by  giving  him  the  command  of  the  valley 
of  the  Duero  to  keep  the  kingdom  if  Leon  and  the  pr> 
vince  of  Segovia  in  check.     The  town  and  castle  of 


*   Historia  de  la  Guerra  contra  Napoleon  I5uonaparte. 

+  Napoleon's  notes.  \  'I'liiehanlt. 

II  Dupont's  Journal,  MSS.  J  Napoleon's  note* 


20 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR, 


[Book  T. 


Bursfos,  put  into  a  state  of  defence,  contained  his  dep'ts, 
and  bi.caine  the  centre  and  pivot  of  his  operations,  while 
interniedi  ite  posts,  and  the  fortresses,  connected  iiim 
with  Uayonne,  where  a  reserve  of  twenty  thousand  men 
was  formed  under  general  Drouet,  then  commanding 
the  eleventh  military  division  of  France. 

Hy  tlie  convention  of  Fontainehleau,  the  emperor  was 
entitled  to  send  forty  thousand  men  into  the  northern 
parts  of  Spain,  and  tliough  the  right  thus  acquired  was 
grossly  abused,  t!ie  exercise  of  it,  being  expected,  creat- 
ed at  first  but  little  alarm  ;  it  was  however  different  on 
the  eastern  frontier.  Napoleon  had  never  intimated  a 
wish  to  pass  forces  by  Catalonia,  neither  the  treaty  nor 
tlie  convention  authorized  such  a  measure,  nor  could 
the  pretence  of  supporting  Junol  in  Portugal  be  advanc- 
ed as  a  mask ;  *  nevertheless,  so  early  as  the  9th  of 
February  eleven  thousand  infantry,  sixteen  hundred 
cavalry,  and  eighteen  pieces  of  artillery,  under  the  com- 
mand of  general  Duhesme,  |  had  crossed  the  frontier  at 
La  Jonquera,  and  marched  upon  Barcelona,  leaving  a 
detachment  at  the  tov,-n  of  Figueras,  the  strong  citadel 
of  wliich  commands  the  principal  pass  of  the  mountains. 
Arrived  at  Barcelona.  Duhesme  prolonged  his  residence 
there,  under  the  pretext  of  wailing  for  instructions  from 
Madrid  relative  to  a  pretended  march  upon  Cadiz  ■,'\:  but 
his  secret  orders  were  to  obtain  exact  information  con- 
cerning the  Catalonian  fortresses,  dep  'ts,  and  magazines, 
— to  ascertain  the  state  of  public  feeling, — to  preserve 
a  rigid  discipline, — scrupulously  to  avoid  giving  any 
offencH  to  the  Spaniards,  and  to  enter  into  close  com- 
munication with  marshal  Moncey,  at  that  time  com- 
manding the  whole  of  the  French  army  in  the  north  of 
Spain. 

The  political  affairs  were  then  beginning  to  indicate 
serious  results,  and  as  soon  as  the  troops  in  the  north 
were  in  a  condition  to  execute  their  orders,  Duhesme, 
whoso  report  had  been  received,  was  directed  to  seize 
upon  the  citadel  of  Barcelona  and  the  fort  of  Monjuick. 
'J'he  citadel  was  obtained  by  stratagem  ;  the  fort,  one 
of  the  strongest  in  the  world,  was  surrendered  by  the 
governor  Alvarez,  because  that  brave  and  worthy  man 
knew,  that  from  a  base  court  he  should  receive  no  sup- 
port. It  is  said  that,  stung  by  the  disgrace  of  his  sit- 
uation, he  was  at  one  time  ready  to  spring  a  mine  be- 
neath the  French  detachments,  yet  his  mind,  betraying 
his  spirit,  sur.k  under  the  weight  of  unexpected  events. 
What  a  picture  of  human  weakness  do  these  affairs  pre- 
sent ! — the  boldest  shrinking  from  the  discharge  of  thfir 
trust  like  t!ie  meanest  cowards,  the  wisest  following 
the  march  of  events,  confounded,  and  without  a  rule  of 
action  !  If  sufh  a  firm  man,  as  Alvarez  afterwards 
proved  himself  to  be,  could  think  the  disgrace  of  sur- 
renfi(^ring  his  charge  at  the  demand  of  an  insolent  and 
perfiJious  guest,  a  smaller  misfortune  than  the  anger 
of  a  miserable  court,  what  must  the  state  of  public  feel- 
ing have  been,  and  how  can  those  who,  like  O'Farril 
and  Azanza,  served  the  intruder,  be  with  justice  blam- 
ed, if,  amidst  the  general  stagnation,  they  could  not 
perceive  ti»e  elements  of  a  salutary  tempest.  At  the 
view  of  such  scenes  Napoleon  might  well  enlarge  his 
ambitious  designs,  his  fault  was  not  in  the  projection,  but 
in  the  rough  execution  of  his  plan  ;  another  combina- 
tion would  have  ensured  success,  and  the  resistance  be 
encountered  only  snows,  that  nations,  like  individuals, 
are  but  the  creatures  of  circumstances,  at  one  moment 
weak,  trembling,  and  submissive,  at  another  proud, 
haughty,  and  daring;  every  novel  combination  of 
events  has  an  effect  upon  public  sentinumt  distinct 
from,  and  often  at  variance  with  what  is  called  national 
character. 

The  treacherous  game  played  at  Barcelona  was  re- 
newed at  Figueras,  with  equal  success,  the  citadel  of 


•  ?t.  Cvr.  •)•  Nnpolrnn'"  notes. 

{  UuLljiu.'s  Instructious,  .'ar.  23ili.  Vide  St.  Cjr. 


that  place  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  detachment  left 
there;  a  free  entrance,  and  a  secure  base  of  operations, 
was  thus  established  in  Catalonia;  and  when  the  mag- 
azines of  Barcelona  were  filled,  Duhesme,  whose  corps 
took  the  name  of  the  '  army  of  the  Eastern  Pyrenees.' 
concluded  that  his  task  was  well  accomplished.  The  af- 
fair was  indeed  a  momentous  one, and  Napoleon  earnestly 
looked  for  its  termination,  before  tlie  transactions  at 
Madrid  could  give  an  unfavourable  impression  of  his 
ulterior  intentions,  for  he  saw  the  importance  which, 
under  certain  circumstances,  a  war  would  confer  upon 
Barcelona,  which  with  its  immense  population,  great 
riches,  good  harbour,  and  strong  forts,  might  be  called 
the  key  of  the  south  of  France  or  Spain,  just  as  it  hap- 
pened to  be  in  the  possession  of  the  one  or  the  other  na- 
tion. The  proximity  of  Sicily,  where  a  large  British 
foMe  was  kept  in  a  state  of  constant  preparation,  made 
it  more  than  probable  that  an  English  army  would  be 
quickly  carried  to  Barcelona,  and  a  formidable  syste- 
matic war  be  established  upon  the  threshold  of  France, 
and  hence  Napoleon,  seeing  the  extent  of  the  danger, 
obviated  it,  at  the  risk  of  rendering  abortive  the  attempt 
to  create  a  French  party  in  Madrid.  The  greater  evil  of 
finding  an  English  army  at  Barcelona  left  no  room  for 
hesitation;  thirty  or  forty  thousand  British  troops  occupy- 
ing an  intrenched  camp  in  front  of  that  town,  support- 
ed by  a  powerful  fleet,  and  having  reserve  depts  in 
Sicily  and  the  Spanish  islands,  might  have  been  so 
wielded  as  to  give  ample  occupation  to  a  hundred  and 
fifty  thousand  enemies.  Under  the  protection  of  such 
an  army,  the  Spanish  levies  might  have  been  organized 
and  instructed  ;  and  as  the  actual  numbers  assembled 
could  have  been  easily  masked,  increased,  or  diminish- 
ed,-and  the  fleet  always  ready  to  co-operate,  the  south 
of  France,  whence  the  provisions  of  the  enemy  must 
have  been  drawn,  would  have  been  exposed  to  descents, 
and  all  the  inconvenience  of  actual  hostilities.  Tha 
Spanish  provinces  of  Valencia,  Murcia,  and  even  Anda- 
lusia, being  thus  covered,  the  war  would  have  been 
drawn  to  a  head,  and  concentrated  about  Catalonia,  the 
most  warlike,  rugged,  sterile  portion  of  Spain.  Du- 
hesme's  success  put  an  end  to  this  danger,  and  the 
affairs  of  B?rcelona  sunk  into  comparative  insignifi- 
cance ;  nevertheless,  that  place  was  carefully  watched, 
the  troops  were  increased  to  twenty-two  thousand  men, 
their  general  corresponded  directly  with  Napoleon,  and 
Barcelona  became  the  centre  of  a  system  distinct  from 
that,  which  held  the  other  corps  rolling  round  Madrid 
as  their  point  of  attraction. 

The  capital  of  Spain  is  situated  in  a  sort  of  basin, 
formed  by  a  semicircular  range  of  mountains,  which, 
under  the  different  denominations  of  the  Sierra  de 
Guadarama,  the  Carpentanos,  and  the  Sierra  de  Gua- 
dalaxara,  sweep  in  one  uitbroken  chain  from  east  to 
west,  touching  the  Tagus  at  either  end  of  an  arch,  of 
which  that  river  is  the  chord.  All  direct  communica- 
tions between  Madrid  and  France,  or  between  the  for- 
mer and  the  northern  provinces  of  Spain,  must  there- 
fore necessarily  pass  over  one  or  other  of  these  Sier- 
ras, which  are  separated  from  the  great  range  of  the 
Pyrenees  by  the  valley  of  the  Ebro,  and  from  the  Bis- 
cayan  and  Asturian  mountains  by  the  valley  of  the 
Duero. 

Now  the  principal  roads  which  lead  from  France  di- 
rectly upon  Madrid  are  four. 

The  first  a  royal  causeway,  which  passing  the  fron- 
tier at  Irun  runs  under  St.  Sebastian,  and  through  a 
wild  and  mountainous  country,  full  of  dangerous  de- 
filed, to  the  Ebro  :  it  crosses  that  river  by  a  stone  bridge 
at  Miranda,  goes  to  Burgos,  and  then  turning  short  to 
the  left,  is  carried  over  the  Duero  at  Aranda.  After- 
wards encountering  the  Carpentanos  and  the  Sierra  de 
Guadalaxara  it  penetrates  them  by  the  strong  pass  of 
the  Somosierra,  and  descends  upon  the  capital. 

The  se  -and,  v,  hich  is  an  ii;fcrioi  road,  commences  at 


1808.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


21 


St>  Jean  P'lPd  de  Port  unites  with  the  first  at  Pampe- 
lona,  runs  through  Taffalla,  crosses  the  Ebro  at  Tude- 
In,  and  enters  the  basin  of  Madrid  by  the  eastern  range 
of  the  Sierra  de  Guadalaxara,  where  the  declination 
of  the  mountains  presents  a  less  rugged  barrier  than 
the  snowy  summits  of  the  northern  and  western  partot 
the  chain. 

The  third  threads  the  Pyrenees  by  the  way  of  Jaca, 
passes  the  Ebro  at  Zaragoza,  and  uniting  with  the 
second,  likewise  crosses  th-e  Guadalaxara  ridge. 

The  fourth  is  the  great  route  from  Perpignan  by  Fi- 
gneras,  Gerona,  Barcelona,  Cervera,  Lerida,  and  Zara- 
goza,  to  Madrid. 

Thus  Zaragoza,  which  contained  fifty  thousand  in- 
habitants and  was  one  of  the  great  Spanish  magazines 
for  arms,  furnished  a  point  of  union  for  two  great  roads 
and  was  consequently  of  strategic  importance;  an  army 
in  position  there  could  operate  on  either  bank  of  the 
Ebro,  intercept  the  communication  between  the  Eas- 
tern and  Western  Pyrenees,  and  block  three  out  of  the 
four  great  mutes  to  Madrid.  If  the  French  had  occu- 
pied it  in  force,  their  army  in  the  capital  would  have 
been  free  and  unconstrained  in  its  operations,  and 
might  have  acted  with  more  security  against  Valen- 
cia; and  the  danger  from  the  united  forces  of  Gallicia 
and  Leon  would  also  have  been  diminished,  when  the 
road  of  Burgos  ceased  to  be  the  only  line  of  retreat 
from  the  capital.  Nevertheless,  Napoleon  neglected 
Zaragoza  at  first,  because,  having  no  citadel,  a  small 
body  of  troops  could  not  control  the  inhabitants,  and  a 
large  force,  by  creating  suspicion  too  soon,  would  have 
prevented  tlie  success  of  the  attempts  against  Pampe- 
lona  and  Barcelona,  objects  of  still  greater  importance; 
neither  was  the  heroic  defence  afterwards  made  within 
a  reasonable  calculation. 

The  grand  duke  of  Berg  and  the  duke  of  Rovigo  re- 
mained at  Madrid,  and  from  that  central  point  appeared 
to  direct  the  execution  of  the  French  emperor's  projects ; 
but  he  distrusted  their  judgment,  and  exacted  the  most 
detailed  information  of  every  movement  and  transaction. 
In  the  course  of  June,  Murat,  who  was  suffering  from 
illness,  quitted  Spain,  leaving  behind  him  a  troubled 
people,  and  a  name  for  cruelty  which  was  foreign  to  his 
character.  Savary  remained  the  sole  representative  of 
the  new  monarch,  and  his  situation  was  delicate.  He 
was  in  the  midst  of  a  great  commotion,  and  as  upon 
every  side  he  beheld  the  violence  of  insurrection,  and  the 
fury  of  an  insulted  nation,  it  behoved  him  to  calculate 
with  coolness  and  to  execute  with  vigour.  Each  Span- 
ish province  had  its  own  junta  of  government,  and  they 
were  alike  enraged,  yet  not  alike  dangerous  in  their 
anger.  The  attention  of  the  Catalonians  was  complete- 
ly absorbed  by  Duhesme's  operations,  but  the  soldiers 
which  had  composed  the  Spanish  garrisons  of  Barce- 
lona, Monjuick,  and  Figueras,  quitted  their  ranks  after 
tlie  seizure  of  those  places,  and  joined  the  patriotic  stan- 
dards in  Murcia  and  Valencia  ;  the  greatest  part  belong- 
ed to  the  S{)anish  and  Walloon  guards,  and  they  formed 
a  good  basis  foranarmy  which  the  riches  of  the  two  pro- 
vinces and  the  arsenal  of  Carthagena  afforded  ample 
military  resources  to  equip.  *  The  French  had,  howev- 
er, nothing  to  fear  from  any  direct  movement  of  tnis 
arrny  against  Madrid,  as  such  an  operation  could  only 
bring  on  a  battle  ;  but  if.  by  a  march  towards  Zaragoza, 
the  Valencianshad  united  with  the  Aragonese,  and  then 
operated  against  the  line  of  communication  with  France, 
the  insurrection  of  Catalonia  would  have  been  sup- 
ported, and  the  point  of  union  for  three  great  provinces 
fixed.  In  the  power  of  executing  this  project  lay  the 
Bting  of  the  Valencian  insurrection,  and  to  besiege 
Zaragoza  and  pievent  such  a  junction  was  the  remedy. 

Tiie  importance  of  Andalusia  was  greater.  Tlie 
regular  troops  which,  under  the  command  of  the   un- 


*  Cabane's  War  m  Catalonia,  1st  Part. 


happy  Solano,  had  been  withdrawn  Trom  Portugal, 
were  tolerably  disciplined  ;  a  large  veteran  force  was 
assembled  at  the  camp  of  San  Roque  under  general 
Castauos,  and  the  garrisons  of  Ceuta,  Alo-eziras,  Ca- 
diz, Granada,  and  other  places  being  unitecf,  the  whole 
formed  a  considerable  army,  while  a  superb  cannon 
foundry  at  Seville,  and  the  arsenal  of  Cadiz,  furnished 
the  means  of  equipping  a  train  of  artillery.  An  active 
intercourse  was  maintained  between  the  patriots  and  fhd 
English,  and  the  juntas  of  Granada,  Jaen.  and  Coido- 
va  and  the  army  of  Estremadura,  admitted  the  su- 
premacy of  the  junta  of  Seville.  Thus  Andalusia, 
rich,  distant  from  tlie  capital,  and  well  fenced  by  the 
Sierra  Morena,  afforded  the  means  to  establish  a  sys- 
tematic war,  by  drawing  together  all  the  scattered  ele- 
ments of  resisiance  in  the  southern  and  western  prov- 
inces of  Spain  and  Portugal.*  This  danger,  pregnant 
with  future  consequences,  was,  however,  not  immedi- 
ate ;  there  was  no  line  of  offensive  moment,  against 
the  flank  or  rear  of  the  French  army,  open  to  the  Anda- 
lusian  patriots  ;  and  as  a  march  to  the  front,  against 
Madrid,  would  have  been  tedious  and  dangerous,  the 
true  policy  of  the  Andalusians  was  palpably  defen- 
sive. 

In  Estremadura  neither  the  activity  nor  means  of  the 
junta  were  at  first  suflicient  to  excite  much  attention  ; 
but  in  Leon,  Old  Castille,  and  Gallicia,  a  cloud  was 
gathering  that  threatened  a  perilous  storm.  Don  Gre- 
joria  Cuesta  was  captain-general  of  the  two  former 
kingdoms.  Inimical  to  popular  movements,  and  of  a 
haughty,  resolute  disposition,  he  at  first  checked  the 
insurrection  with  a  rough  hand,  and  thus  laid  the  foun- 
dation for  quarrels  and  intrigues,  which  afterwards  im- 
peded the  military  operations,  and  split  the  northern 
provinces  into  factions  ;  yet  finally,  he  joiuf-d  the  side 
of  the  patriots.  Behind  him  the  kingdom  of  Gallicia, 
under  the  direction  of  Filanghieri,  had  prepared  a  large 
and  efficient  force,  chiefly  composed  of  the  strong  and 
disciplined  body  of  troops  \\hich,  under  the  command 
of  Tarranco.  had  taken  possession  of  Oporto,  and  after 
that  general's  death  had  returned  with  Belosta  to  Gal- 
licia; the  garrisons  of  Ferrol  and  Coruf.a,  and  a  num- 
ber of  soldiers  flying  from  the  countries  occupied  by 
the  French,  swelled  this  army,  the  agents  of  Great  Bri- 
tain were  active  to  blow  the  flame  of  insurrection,  and 
money,  arms,  and  clothing  were  poured  into  the  prov- 
ince through  their  hands,  because  Coruua  afforded  an 
easy  and  direct  intercourse  v.'ith  England.  A  strict 
connexion  was  also  maintained  between  the  Gnllician 
and  Portuguese  patriots,  and  the  facility  of  establishing 
the  base  of  a  regular  systematic  war  in  Gallicia  was, 
therefore,  as  great  as  in  Andalusia;  the  resources  were 
perhaps,  greater,  on  account  of  the  proximity  of  Great 
Britain,  and  the  advantage  of  position  at  this  time  was 
essentially  in  favour  of  Gallicia,  because,  while  the 
sources  of  her  strength  were  as  well  covered  from  the 
direct  line  of  the  French  operations,  the  slightest  offfin- 
sive  movement  upon  her  part,  by  threatening  the  com- 
munications of  the  French  army  in  Madrid,  endangered 
the  safety  of  any  corps  marching  from  the  capital 
against  the  southern  provinces.  To  be  prepared  against 
the  Gallician  forces  was,  therefore,  a  matter  of  pressing 
importance,  a  defeat  from  that  quarter  would  have  been 
felt  in  all  parts  of  the  army  ;  and  no  considerable,  or 
sustained  operation,  could  be  undertaken  against  the 
other  insurgent  forces  until  the  strength  of  Gallicia  had 
been  first  broken. 

Biscay  and  the  Asturias  wanted  regular  troops  and 
fortified  towns,  and  the  contracted  shape  of  those  prov- 
inces placed  them  completely  v.ithin  the  power  of  the 
French,  who  had  nothing  to  fear  as  long  as  they  could 
maintain  possession  of  the  sea-p'.;it«. 

From  this  sketch  it  results  that  Savary,  in  classing 


«  Mr.  Stuait's  Letters  ;  vide  Parliamentary  IVpcrs,  1310. 


22 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  I. 


the  (lan^rrs  r*  !•  •  situation,  should  have  rated  Gallicia 
and  Leon  in  tl.c  »  st,  Zarag^oza  in  the  second,  Andalu- 
sia in  the  third,  t^.id  Valencia  in  the  fourth  rank,  and 
by  that  scale  he  onould  have  regfulatrd  his  operations. 
It  was  thus  Napoleon  looked  at  the  affair,  but  the  duke 
of  Rovigfo,  waveriniT  in  his  opinions,  nesjl-ected  or  niis- 
tinderstood  the  spirit  of  his  instructions,  lost  the  control 
of  the  operations,  and  sunk  amidst  the  confusion  which 
he  had  himself  created. 

Nearly  fifty  thousand  French  and  eighty  g-uns  were 
disposable  for  offensive  operations  in  the  beginning  of 
June;  collected  into  one  mass,  such  an  army  was  more 
than  sufficient  to  crush  any  or  all  of  the  insurgent  ar- 
mies combined,  but  it  was  necessarj'  to  divide  it,  and 
1o  assail  several  points  at  the  same  time.  In  doing 
ibis,  the  safety  of  each  minor  body  depended  upon  the 
stability  of  the  central  point  from  whence  it  emanated, 
and  again  the  security  of  that  centre  depended  upon 
the  strength  of  its  communications  with  France  ;  in 
other  words,  Bayonne  was  the  base  of  operations 
a<gainst  Madrid,  and  Madrid  in  turn  became  the  base 
of  oper.itions  airainst  Valencia,  Murcia,  and  Andalusia. 
To  combine  all  the  movements  of  a  vast  plan,  which 
■would  rrnhrace  the  operations  against  Catalonia,  Ara- 
cfon,  Biscay,  the  Asturias,  Gallicia,  Leon,  Castillo,  An- 
dalusia, Murcia,  and  Valencia,  in  such  a  simple  man- 
ner, as  that  the  corps  of  the  army  working  upon  one 
principle  might  mutually  support  and  strengthen  each 
other,  and  at  the  same  time  preserve  their  communica- 
tion with  France,  was  the  great  problem  to  be  solved. 
Napoleon  felt  that  it  required  a  master  mind,  and  from 
Bayonne  he  put  all  the  different  armed  masses  in  mo- 
tion himself,  and  with  the  greatest  caution  ;  for  it  is  a 
mistaken  notion,  although  one  very  generally  enter- 
tained, that  he  plunged  headlong  into  the  contest,  with- 
out foresight,  as  having  to  do  with  adversaries  he  des- 
pised. 

In  his  instructions  to  the  duke  of  Rovigo,  he  says, 
*  In  a  war  (f  this  sort  it  is  neccssury  io  act  with  pa- 
Itence,  coohiess,  and  upon  cnkiilutivn.''  '  In  civil  wars  it 
is  ike  irnporlanl  pairits  only  which  should  be  guarded — 
we  mvst  not  go  to  all  places  ,■''  and  he  inculcates  the  doc- 
trine, that  to  spread  the  troops  over  the  country  with- 
out the  power  of  uniting  upon  emergency,  would  be  a 
dangerous  display  of  activity.  The  principle  upon 
which  he  proceeded  may  be  illustrated  by  the  compari- 
son of  a  closed  hand  thrust  forward  and  the  fingers  af- 
terwards extended  :  as  long  as  the  solid  part  of  the 
member  was  securely  fixed  and  guarded,  the  return  of 
the  smaller  portions  of  it  and  their  flexible  movement 
Was  feasible  and  without  great  peril ;  whereas  a  wound 
given  to  the  hand  or  arm,  not  only  endangered  that 
part,  but  paralyzed  the  action  of  the  whole  limb. 
Hence  all  the  care  and  attention  with  which  his  troops 
were  arranged  along  the  road  to  Burgos  ;  hence  all  the 
measures  cf  precaution  already  described,  such  as  the 
seizure  of  the  fortresses  and  the  formation  of  the  re- 
serves at  Bayonne. 

The  insurrection  having  commenced,  Bessieres  was 
crdered  to  put  Burgos  into  a  state  of  defence, — to  de- 
tach a  divisirn  of  four  or  five  thousand  men,  under 
general  Lefebre  Desnouettes,  against  Zaragoza, — to 
keep  down  the  insurgents  of  Biscay,  Asturias,  and  Old 
Caslille, — and  to  observe  the  army  assembling  in  Gal- 
licia ;  he  was  likewise  enjoined  to  occupy  and  watch 
with  jealous  care  the  port  of  St.  Ander  and  the  coast 
towns.  A  reinforcement  of  nine  thousand  men  was  also 
prepared  for  Duhesme,  which,  it  was  supposed,  would 
enable  him  to  tranquillize  Catalonia,  and  co-operate 
with  a  division  marcliing  from  Madrid  against  Valen- 
cia. The  reserve  under  general  Drouet  was  nourished 
by  drafts  from  the  interior:  it  supplied  Bessieres  with 
reinforcements,  and  afforded  a  detachment  of  four  thou- 
sand men  to  watch  the  openings  of  the  valleys  of  the 
Pyrenees,  esp^f^ially  towards  the  caatlc  of  Jaca,  thou 


in  possession  of  the  Spanish  insurgents.*  A  s)nallei 
reserve  was  established  at  Perpignan,  another  i)ody 
watched  the  openings  of  the  eastern  frontier ;  and  al' 
the  generals  commanding  corps,  or  even  detachmeais, 
were  directed  to  correspond  daily  with  general  Drouet. 

The  security  of  the  rear  heing  thus  provided  for,  the 
main  body  at  Madrid  commenced  offensive  operations. 
Marshal  ?»loneey  was  directed,  with  part  of  his  corps 
upon  Cuenca,  to  intercept  the  march  of  the  Valenciau  ar- 
my upon  Zaragoza  ;■[  general  Dupont,  with  ten  tliousand 
men,  marched  towards  Cadiz,  and  the  remainder  of  his 
and  Moncey's  troops  being  kept  in  reserve,  were  dis- 
tributed in  various  parts  of  La  Mancha  and  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Madrid.  Napoleon  likewise  directed,  that 
Segovia  should  be  occupied  and  put  in  a  state  of  de- 
fence ;  that  Cohort's  division  of  Moncey's  corps  should 
co-operate  with  Bessieres  on  the  side  of  Valladolid, 
and  tiiat  moveable  cohmms  should  scour  the  country 
in  rear  of  the  acting  bodies,  uniting  again  at  stated 
times,  upon  points  of  secondary  interest.^  Thus  link- 
ing his  operations  together.  Napoleon  hoped,  by  grasp- 
ing as  it  were  the  ganglia  of  the  insurrecticn,  to  para- 
lyze its  force,  and  reduce  it  to  a  few  convilsive  mo- 
tions, which  would  soon  subside;  the  execuuon  of  his 
plan  failed  in  the  feeble  hands  of  his  lieutfnants,  but 
it  was  well  conceived,  embraced  every  prob;  ble  imme- 
diate chance  of  war,  and  even  provided  for  the  uncer- 
tain contingency  of  an  English  army  landing,  upon  the 
llanks  or  rear  of  his  corps,  at  either  extremity  of  the 
Pyrenean  frontier. 

Military  men  would  do  well  to  reflect  upon  the  prur 
dence  which  the  French  emperor  displayed u])on  this 
occasion.  Not  all  his  experience,  his  power,  his  for- 
tune, nor  the  contempt  which  he  felt  for  the  prowes-s  of 
his  adversaries,  could  induce  him  to  relax  in  his  pre- 
cautions; every  chance  was  considered,  ard  every 
measure  calculated  with  as  much  care  and  circum- 
spection as  if  the  most  redoubtable  enemy  was  opposed 
to  him.  The  conqueror  of  Europe  was  as  fearful  of 
making  false  movements  before  an  army  of  peasants, 
as  if  Frederick  the  Great  had  been  in  his  front,  and  yet 
he  failed !     Such  is  the  uncertainty  of  war  ! 


CHAPTER  V. 

First  operations  of  marshal  Bessieres— Spaniards  defeated  at 
Cabecon,  at  Sej^ovia,  at  Logrono,  at  Toi(]ueniadB — Frt  iich 
take  St.  Ander — Leftbre  Dtsnouettes  defeats  the  Spaniards 
on  the  Ebro,  on  the  Huecha,  on  tlie  Xalon — !•  irst  siege  of 
Zaragoza — Observations. 

As  all  the  insurrections  of  the  Spanish  provinces 
took  place  nearly  at  the  same  period,  the  operations  of 
the  F.'ench  divisions  were  nearly  simultaneous;  I  shall, 
therefore,  narrate  their  proceedings  separately,  classing 
them  by  the  effect  each  produced  upon  the  stability  of 
the  intrusive  government  of  Madrid. 

OPERATIONS  OF  MARSHAL  BESSIERES. 

This  officer  had  scarcely  fixed  his  quarters  at  Burgos 
when  a  general  movement  of  revolt  took  place. |j  On 
his  right,  the  bishop  of  St.  Ander  excited  the  inhabi- 
tants of  the  diocese  to  take  arms.§  In  his  rear,  a  me- 
chanic assembled  some  thousand  armed  peasants  at 
the  town  of  Logrono.  In  front,  five  thousand  men  took 
|)ossession  of  the  Spanish  artillery  depot  at  Segovia, 
and  an  equal  number  assembling  at  Paiencia,  advanced 
to  the  town  of  Torquemada,  while  general  Ciiesta,  with 
some  regular  troops  and  a  body  of  organized  peasantry, 
took  post  on  the  Pisuerga  at  Cabegon. 


*  Napoleon's  notes. 

+  Journal  of  Moncey's  Operations  MSB. 

t   Napoleon's  notes. 

i  V'ictuires  et  Cojiquetes  dc»  Francais. 


Moniteur. 


1808.;i 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULVR   WAR. 


23 


Bessieies  immediately  divided  his  disposable  force, 
which  was  not  more  than  twelve  thousand  men,  into 
several  columns,  and  traversing-  the  country  in  all  di- 
rection?, disarmed  the  towns  and  interrupted  the  com- 
binaiiona  of  the  insurgents,  while  a  division  of  Du- 
pont's  corps,  under  jjene-ral  Frere,  marched  from  the 
side  of  Madrid  to  aid  his  efforts.  General  Verdier  at- 
tacked Lotrrono  on  the  6th  of  June,  dispersed  the  peas- 
antry, and  put  the  leaders  to  death  after  the  action. 
General  Lasalle,  departing  from  Burgos  with  a  brigade 
of  light  cavalry,  passed  the  Pisuerga,  fell  upon  the 
Spaniards  at  Torquemada  on  the  7th,  broke  them,  and 
pursuing  with  a  merciless  sword,  burnt  that  town,  and 
entered  Palencia  on  the  8th.  Meanwhile  Frere  defeat- 
ed the  Spanish  force  at  Segovia,  taking  thirty  pieces 
of  artillery  ;  and  general  Merle  marching  through  the 
country  lying  between  the  Pisuerga  and  the  Duero  with 
a  division  of  infantry,  joined  Lasalle  at  Duenas  on  the 
lyh  ;  from  tlience  they  proceeded  to  Cabegon,  where 
Cuesta  accepting  battle,  was  overthrown,  with  much 
slaughter,  the  loss  of  his  artillery,  and  several  thou- 
sand musquets. 

The  fl;^.t  country  being  thus  subdued,  Lasalle's  cav- 
alry remained  to  keep  it  under,  while  Merle,  marching 
jiorthward,  commenced  operations,  in  concert  with  gen- 
eral Duces,  against  the  province  of  St.  Ander.  On 
the  20lh,  the  latter  general  drove  the  Spaniards  from 
the  pass  of  Soncillo  ;  the  21st,  he  forced  the  pass  of 
Venta  de  Escudo,  and  descending  the  valley  of  the 
river  Pas,  approached  St.  Ander ;  on  the  2-2d,  Merle, 
after  some  resistance,  penetrating  by  Lantueno,  fol- 
lowed the  course  of  the  Besaya  to  Torre  La  Vega, 
then  turning  to  his  right,  entered  St.  Ander  on  the  23d  ; 
Ducos  arrived  at  the  same  time,  the  town  submitted,  and 
the  bishop  fled  with  the  greatest  part  of  the  clergy. 
The  authorities  of  Segovia,  Valladolid,  Palencia,  and 
St.  Ander  were  then  compelled  to  send  deputies  to  take 
the  oath  of  allegiance  to  Joseph.  By  these  operations, 
the  above-named  provinces  w^ere  completely  disarmed, 
and  so  awed  by  the  activity  of  Bessieres  that  no  further 
insurrections  took  place,  his  cavalry  raised  contributions 
ar.d  collected  provisions  without  the  least  difficulty; 
Frere's  division  then  returned  to  Toledo,  and  from  thence 
marched  to  San  Clemente,  on  the  borders  of  Murcia. 

While  Bessieres  thus  broke  the  northern  insurrec- 
tions, the  march  of  general  Lefebre  Desnouettes  against 
the  province  of  Aragon  brought  on  the  first  siege  of 
Zaragoza.  To  that  place  had  flocked  from  the  most 
distant  parts,  soldiers,  flying  from  Madrid  and  Pampe- 
lona,  the  engineers  of  the  school  of  Alcala,  and  all  the 
retired  officers  in  Aragon.*  With  their  assistance 
Palafox's  forces  were  rapidly  organized,  and  numerous 
butialions  were  posted  on  the  roads  leading  to  Navar- 
re. The  baron  de  Versage,  an  officer  of  the  Wal- 
loon guards,  occupied  Calatayud  with  a  regiment  com- 
posed of  students,  and  made  a  levy  there  to  protect  the 
powder-mills  of  Villa  Felice,  and  to  keep  a  communi- 
cation with  Soria  and  Siguenza.  The  arsenal  of  Zara- 
goza sujiplied  the  patriots  with  arms  ;  the  people  of  Tu- 
dela  broke  their  bridge  on  the  Ebro,  and  Palafox  rein- 
forced them  with  five  hundred  fuzileers. 

It  was  in  this  situation  of  affairs  Lefebre  commenced 
his  march  from  Pampelona  the  7th  of  June,  at  the  head 
of  three  or  four  thousand  infantry,  some  field  batteries, 
and  a  regiment  of  Polish  cavalry. |  On  the  9th  he 
forced  the  passage  of  the  Ebro,  put  the  leaders  of  the 
insurrection  to  death,  after  the  action,  and  then  con- 
tinued his  movement  by  the  right  bank  to  the  Mallen.:^: 
On  the  Huecha,  Palafox  with  ten  thousand  infantry, 
two  hundred  dragoons,  and  eight  pieces  of  artillery, 
disputed  the  passage,  but  on  the  13th,  he  was  over- 
hrown.     The    14th,  the   French   reached  the   Xalen, 


*  C;ivallfro.         |   S.  Jounnl  of  Lefebre's  op  rations.    MS. 
t  Moniteur    V'ictoires  et  Conquetesdes  l'"rancais.  Cavallero. 


where  another  combat  and  another  victory  carried  Lefe- 
bre across  that  river.  The  15th  he  was  on  the  Iluer- 
ba,  in  front  of  the  heroic  city. 

FIRST  SIEGE  OF  ZARAGOZA. 

Zaragoza  contained  fifty  thousand  inhabitants.  Situ- 
ated on  the  right  bank  of  the  Ebro,  it  was  connected 
with  a  suburb,  on  the  opposite  side,  by  a  handsome 
stone  bridge  ;  its  immediats  vicinity  was  flat,  and  on 
the  side  of  the  suburb  low  and  marshy.  The  small 
river  Huprba,  running  thiough  a  deep  ckft,  cut  the 
plain  on  the  right  bank,  and  taking  '.is  course  cjoao  to 
the  walls,  tell  into  the  Ebro  nearly  opposite  to  the 
mouth  of  the  Gallego,  which,  descending  from  th-e 
mountains  on  the  opposite  side,  also  cut  the  plain  on 
the  left  bank.  The  convent  of  St.  Joseph,  built  on  the 
right  of  the  Huerba,  covered  a  bridge  over  that  torrent, 
and,  at  the  distance  of  cannon-shot,  a  step  of  land 
commenced,  which,  gradually  rising,  terminated  at 
eighteen  hundred  yards  from  the  convent,  in  a  hill 
called  the  Monte  Torrero.  On  this  hill,  which  com- 
manded all  the  plain  and  overlooked  the  town,  several 
storehouses,  built  for  the  use  of  the  canal,  were  en- 
trenched, and  occupied  by  twelve  hundred  men,  and 
the  canal  itself,  a  noble  work,  furnished  water  carriage 
without  a  single  lock  from  Tudela  to  Zaragoza.* 

The  city,  surrounded  by  a  low  brick  wall,  presented 
no  regular  defences,  and  possessed  very  few  guns  in  a 
serviceable  state ;  but  the  houses  were  strongly  con- 
structed, and  for  the  most  part  of  two  stories,  each 
story  vaulted,  so  as  to  be  nearly  fire-proof.  Every 
house  had  its  garrison,  and  the  massive  convents,  ris- 
ing like  castles,  around  the  circuit  and  inside  the  place, 
were  crowded  with  armed  men.  Such  was  Zaragoza 
when  Lefebre  Desnouttes  appeared  before  it,  his  pre- 
vious movements  having  cut  the  direct  communication 
with  Calatayud,  and  obliged  the  baron  Versage  to  re- 
tire to  Belchite  with  his  volunteers  and  fresh  levies. 

Palafox  had  occupied  the  olive  groves  and  houses  on 
the  step  of  land  between  the  convent  of  St.  Joseph  and 
Monte  Torrero,  but  his  men,  cowed  by  their  previous 
defeats,  were  easily  driven  from  thence  on  the  IBth.f 
The  town  was  then  closely  invested  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  Ebro,  and  so  great  was  the  terror  of  the  Span- 
iards, that  some  of  the  French,  penetrating  without  dif- 
ficulty into  the  street  of  St.  Engracia,  were  like  to  have 
taken  the  city.:}:  Palafox,  accompanied  by  his  brother 
Francisco,  an  aide-de-camp,  and  one  hundred  dragoons, 
endeavoured,  under  pretence  of  seeking  succour,  to  go 
forth  on  the  side  of  the  suburb  at  the  moment  when  the 
French  were  entering  on  the  side  of  flngracia,  but  th'i 
plebeian  leaders,  suspicious  of  his  intentions,  would  net 
suffer  him  to  depart  without  a  guard  of  infantry,  com- 
manded by  Tio,  or  good  man  Jorge.  It  was  this  per- 
son and  Tio  Marin,  who  by  their  energy  contributed 
most  to  the  defence  of  the  city  in  the  first  siege  ;  but 
for  them  Palafox  who  has  gathered  the  honours,  would 
have  fled  at  one  gate,  while  the  enemy  was  pressing  in 
at  another,  and  Zaragoza  was  then  on  the  verge  of  des- 
truction, for  the  streets  were  filled  with  clamour,  the 
troops  making  little  resistance,  and  all  things  in  confu- 
sion. But  the  French,  either  fearful  of  an  ambuscade 
or  ignorant  of  their  advantages  suddenly  retired,  and 
then  the  people  as  if  inspired,  changed  from  the  ex- 
treme of  terror  to  ihat  of  courage,  suddenly  feij  '.o  cast- 
ing up  defences,  piercing  loop-holes  in  the  walls  of  the 
houses,  and  constructing  ramparts  with  sand-bags, 
working  with  such  vigour,  that  under  the  direction  of 
their  engineers,  in  twenty-four  hours  the}-  put  the  place 
in  a  condition  to  withstand  an  assault.  VV'hercupon 
Lefebre,  confining  his  operations  to  the  right  hank  of 
the  Ebro,  established  posts  close  to  the  gates,  and 
waited  for  reinforcements. 


*   Cavallero.   Riep;e  of  Zarapoza. 

t  S.  Journal  of  Lefebre's  Operations  MSS.         {  Cav^Jllero. 


34 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


"Book  T. 


Meanwhile  Palafnx,  crnssinnr  tla  Rbro  at  Pina,  joined 
Versapre  at  Beichite,  and  havincr  collected  seven  or 
»\g]\t  thousand  men  and  four  pieces  of  artillery,  grained 
the  Xalon  in  rear  of  the  French.  Frcm  thence  he  pro- 
posed to  advance  throufjh  Epila  and  relieve  Zarar^oza 
by  a  battle,  but  his  officers,  amazed  at  this  project, 
resisted  his  authority,  and  would  have  retired  upon 
Valencia.*  Nevertheless,  igrnorant  of  war,  and  proba- 
bly awed  by  Tio  Jorcre,  he  expressed  his  determination 
to  fight,  saying,  with  an  imposing  air,  '  that  those  who 
feared  mi'jflit  retire.'  Touched  with  shame,  all  agrreed 
to  follow  him  to  Epila,  but  two  French  rcgimeni«,  de- 
tached by  Lefebre,  met  him  on  the  march,  and  the 
Spaniards,  unable  to  form  any  order  of  battle,  were  not- 
withstanding their  superior  numbers,  defeated  with  the 
loss  of  three  thousand  men.  Palafox,  who  did  not  dis- 
play that  firmness  in  danger  which  his  speech  prom- 
ised, must  have  fled  early,  for  he  reached  Calatayud  in 
the  night,  although  many  of  his  troops  arrived  there 
unbroken  the  next  morninor.  After  this  disaster,  leav- 
ing Versage  at  Calatayud,  to  make  fresh  levies,  the 
Spanish  chief  repaired,  with  all  the  beaten  troops  that 
he  could  collect  to  Beichite,  and  from  thence  regained 
Zaragoza  on  the  2nd  of  July. 

Meanwhile  Lefebre  had  taken  the  Monte  Torrero  by 
assault,  and  on  the  2'Jth  of  June,  was  joined  by  general 
Verdier  with  a  division  of  infantry  and  a  large  batter- 
ing train  ;  and  being  then  twelve  thousand  strong,  at- 
tacked the  convents  of  St.  Joseph  and  the  Capuchins, 
the  very  day  that  Palafox  returned.  A  first  assault  on 
St.  Joseph's  failed,  but  the  second  succeeded,  and  the 
Capuchins,  after  some  fighting,  was  set  fire  to  bv  the 
Spaniards  and  abandoned.  All  this  time  the  suburb 
was  left  open  and  free  for  the  besieged  ;  and  Napoleon, 
who  blamed  this  mode  of  attack,  sent  orders  to  throw  a 
bridge  across  the  Ebro, — to  press  the  siege  on  the  left 
bank, — and  to  profit  of  the  previous  success,  by  raising 
a  breaching  battery  in  the  convent  of  St.  Joseph. |  A 
bridge  was  accordingly  constructed  at  St.  Lambert,  two 
liundred  yards  above  the  town,  and  two  attacks  were 
cariied  .>n  at  the  same  time.  A  change  also  took  place 
in  the  -ijommand,  for  hitherto  the  French  troops  employ- 
ed in  the  siege  formed  a  part  of  marshal  Bessieres' 
corps,  but  the  emperor  now  directed  Lefebre  to  rejoin 
that  marshal  with  a  brigade,  and  then  constituting  the 
ten  thousand  men  who  remained  with  Verdier  a  separ- 
ate corps,  gave  liim  the  command. 

Verdier  continued  to  press  the  siege  as  closely  as  his 
numbers  would  permit,  but  around  him.  the  insurgents 
were  rapidly  organising  small  armies,  and  threatened  to 
enclose  him  in  his  camp,  wherefore  he  sent  detach- 
ments against  them  •,X  ^^'^  it  is  singular  that,  with  so 
few  men,  while  daily  fighting  with  the  besieged,  he 
should  have  been  able  to  scour  the  country,  and  put 
down  the  insurrection,  as  far  as  Lerida,  Barbastro,  Tu- 
dela,  Jacca  and  Calatayud,  without  any  assistance  save 
what  the  garrison  of  Pampelona  could  give  him  from 
the  side  of  Navarre.  In  one  of  these  expeditions  the 
powder-mills  of  Villa  Felice,  thirty  miles  distant,  were 
destroyed,  and  the  baron  V^ersage  was  defeated,  and 
forced  to  retire  with  his  division  towards  Valencia.  || 

During  the  course  of  July,  Verdier  made  several  as- 
saults on  the  gate  of  El  Carmen  and  the  Portillo,  but  he 
was  repulsed  in  all,  and  the  besieged  having  been  rein- 
forced by  the  regiment  of  Estremadura.  composed  of 
eight  hundred  old  soldiers  made  a  sally  with  two  thousand 
men  to  retake  the  Monte  Torrero;  they  were,  however, 
beaten,  with  the  loss  of  their  commander,  and  regular  ap- 
proaches were  then  commenced  by  the  French  against 
the  quarter  of  St.  Engnicia  and  the  castle  of  Aljaferia. 
The  2nd  of  August,  the.  besieged  were  again  reinforced 
by  two  hundred  men  of  the  Spanish  guards  and  volun- 

•  Cavallero.         +S.  -nrnal  of  Lefebre 'g  Operations,  MSS. 
I  Napoleon'i  Notes.  |J  Cavallero. 


teers  of  Aragon,  who  brought  some  artillery  with  them, 
but  the  French  aiso,  were  strengthened  by  two  old  rejri- 
ments  of  the  line,  wlii(,-h  increased  their  numbers  to  fif- 
teen thousand  men;  and  on  the  3rd  of  August  the 
breaching  batteries  opened  against  St.  Engracia  and 
Aljaferia  ;  the  mortars  threw  shells  at  the  same  time, 
and  a  Spanish  magazine  of  powder  blowing  up  in  tiie 
(~^osso  a  public  walk  formed  on  the  line  of  the  ancient 
Moorish  ramparts,  destroyed  several  housps.  and  killed 
many  of  the  defenders.  The  place  was  then  summon- 
ed, but  as  Palafox  rejected  all  offers,  a  breach  in  the 
convent  of  St.  Engracia  was  stormed  on  the  4lh.  The 
French  penetrated  to  the  Cosso,  and  a  confused  and  ter- 
rible scene  ensued,  for  while  some  Spaniards  defended 
the  houses  and  some  drew  up  in  the  streets,  others  fled 
by  the  suburb  to  the  country,  where  the  cavalry  fell  i.-pon 
them.*  Cries  of  treason,  the  sure  signals  for  assassina- 
tions, were  everywhere  heard,  and  all  seemed  lost, 
when  a  column  of  the  assailants,  seeking  a  way  to  the 
bridge  over  the  Ebro,  got  entangled  in  the  Arco  de 
Cineja,  a  long  crooked  street,  and  being  attacked  in 
that  situation,  were  driven  back  to  the  Cosso  ;  others 
began  to  plunder,  and  the  Zaragozans  recovering  cour- 
age, fought  with  desperation,  and  finally  set  fire  to  tha 
convent  of  Francisco  :  at  the  close  of  day  the  French 
were  in  possession  of  one  side  of  the  Cosso,  and  the 
Spaniards  of  the  other.  A  hideous  and  revolting  spec- 
tacle was  exhibited  during  this  action,  for  tlie  public 
hospital  being  set  on  fire,  the  madmen  confined  there, 
issued  forth  among  the  combatants,  muttering,  shout- 
ing, singine",  and  moping,  each  according  to  the  char- 
acter of  his  disorder,  while  drivelling  idiots  mixt-d 
their  unmeaning  cries  with  the  shouts  of  contendin^r 
soldiers. f 

The  Spaniards  now  perceived  that,  with  courage,  tho 
town  might  still  be  defended,  and  frtim  that  day  the 
fighting  was  murderous  and  constant;  one  party  en- 
de-.v:ir:ng  to  take,  the  other  to  defend  the  hcuses. 
In  this  warfare,  where  skill  was  nearly  useless,  Ver« 
dier's  force  was  too  weak  to  make  a  rapid  progress, 
and  events  disastrous  to  the  French  arms  taking  phce 
in  other  parts  of  Spain,  he  received,  about  the  10th, 
orders  from  the  king  to  raise  the  siege,  and  retire  to 
Logrona.    Of  this  operation  I  shall  speak  in  due  tirne.^ 

OBSERVATION'S. 

L  Mere  professional  skill  and  enterprise  do  not  con- 
stitute a  great  general.  Lefebre  Desnouettes,  by  his 
activity  and  boldness,  with  a  tithe  of  their  numbers, 
defeated  the  insurgents  of  Aragon  in  several  actions, 
and  scoured  the  open  country;  but  the  same  Lefebre, 
wanting  the  hiirher  qualities  of  a  general,  failed  miser- 
ably where  that  intuitive  sagacity  which  reads  passinor 
events  aright,  was  required.  There  were  thousands  in 
the  French  army  who  could  have  done  as  well  as  lie, 
probably  not  three  who  could  have  reduced  Zaragoza  ; 
and  yet  it  is  manifest  that  Zaragoza  owed  her  safety  to 
accident,  and  that  the  desperate  resistance  of  the  inha- 
bitants was  more  the  result  of  chance  than  of  any  pecu- 
liar virtue. 

2.  The  feeble  defence  made  at  Mallen,  at  the  Xalon, 
at  the  Monte  Torrero,  at  Epila;  the  terror  of  the  be- 
sieged on  the  IGlh,  when  the  French  penetrated  into 
the  town  ;  the  flight  of  Palafox  under  the  pretence  of 
seeking  succour;  nay.  the  very  assault  which  in  such 
a  wonderful  manner  called  forth  the  eneruy  of  the  Zar- 
agozans. and  failed  only  because  the  French  troops 
plundered,  and,  by  missing  the  road  to  the  bridge,  mis- 
sed that  to  victory,  proves,  that  the  file  of  the  city  was 
determined  by  accident,  in  more  than  one  of  those  nico 
conjunctures,  which  mt^n  of  genius  know  how  to  seize, 
but  others  leave  to  the  decision  of  fortime.     However, 

•  Cavallero.  +  Ibid. 

I  S.     Journal  of  Lefebre's  Operations,  ^ISS. 


1808.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


25 


it  must  be  acknowledg-ed  that  Lefebro  and  Verdipr,  es- 
pecially the  latter,  displayed  both  vio-our  and  talent; 
for  it  was  no  mean  exploit  to  quell  the  insurrections  to 
a  distance  of  fifty  miles  on  every  side,  at  the  same 
time  investinrr  double  their  own  numbers,  and  pushing 
the  attack  with  such  ardour  as  to  reduce  to  extremity  a 
rity  so  detended. 

3.  The  current  romantic  tales,  of  women  rallyinrr  the 
I  troops  and  leadinrrthem  forward  at  the  most  danjrerous 
I  periods  of  this  sioiTp,  I  have  not  touched  upon,  and  may 

j  perhaps  he  allowed  to  doubt;  yet  it  is  not  unlikely,; 

I  thai  when  suddenly  environed  with  horrors,  the  deli- 

'  cite  sensitiveness  of  women,  drivinn;-  them  to  a  kind 

I  of  phrenzy.  mifrht  produce  actions  above  the  heroism 

of  men,  and  in  patient  sufferinof  their  superior  fortitude 

is  acknowledfjed  by  all  nations:  wherefore  I  neither 

wholly  believe,  nor  will  deny,  their  exploits  at  Zarag-o- 

za,  merely  reRTarkin^,  that  for  a  long  time  a*''<:;rwards, 

Spain  swarmed  with  heroines  from  that  city,  clothed 

in  half  uniforms,  and  loaded  with  weapons. 

4.  The  two  circumstances  that  principally  contribu- 
ted to  the  success  of  the  defence  were,  the  bad  disci- 
pline of  the  French  soldiers,  and  the  system  of  terror 
which  was  established  by  the  Spanish  leaders,  who- 
ever those  leaders  were.     Few  soldiers  can  be  restrain- 
ed from  plunder  when  a  town  is  taken  by  assault,  yet 
there  is  no  period   when  the  chances    of  war    are  so 
sudden  and  so  decisive,  none  where  the  moral  respon- 
sibility of  a  s^eneral  is  so  g^reat.     Will  military  reg-u- 
lations  alone  secure  the  necessary  discipline  at  such  a  ' 
moment  1     The  French  army  are  not  deficient  in  a  stern 
code,  and  the  Enorlish  army,  tiken  altog-elher,  is  prob-  ! 
ably  the  best  refrulated  of  modern  times  ;  but  here  it  is 
seen  that  Lefebre  failed   to  take  Zaratroza  in  default  of 
discipline;  and  in  the  course  of  this  work  it  will  ap- 
pear, that  no  wild  horde  of  Tartars  ever  fell  with  more  \ 
licenee  upon  their  rich  effeminate  neitrhbours,  than  did  j 
the  English  troops  upon  the  Spanish  towns  taken  by 
storm.     The  infcence  to  be  drawn  is,  that  national  in-  | 
stitutions  orlv  will  produce  that  moral   discipline  ne- ; 
cessary  to  make  a  soldier  capable  of  fulfilling^  his  whole  j 
duty;  yet  vhe  late  Lord   Melville  was  not  ashamed  to 
declare  in  parliament  that  the  worsi  men  make  the  best  [ 
soldiers;    and    this  odious,  narrow-minded,  unworthy, 
maxim,  had  its  admirers.     That  a  system  of  terror  was  j 
at  Zaragfoza  successfully  employed  to  protract  the  de- 
ferice  is  undoubted.     The  commandant  of  Monte  Tor-  1 
rero,  ostensibly  for  sufferingf  himself  to  be  defeated,  ] 
but  according  to  some  for  the  gratification  of  private 
malice,  was  tried  and  put  to  death  ;  a  general  of  artil-  ; 
lery  was  in  a  more  summary  manner  killed  without 
any  trial,  and  the  chief  engineer,  a  man  of  skill  and  un- 
daunted   courage,    was    arbitrarily    imprisoned.     The 
Fligrhtest  word,   or  even   gesture,   of  discontent,    was 
punished  with  instant  death.*  A  stern  band  of  priests, 
and   plebeian-leaders,  in  whose  hands  Palafox  was  a 
tool,  ruled  with  such  furious  energy,  that  resistance  to 
the  enemy  was  less  dangerous    than  disobedience  to 
their  orders:   stispicion  was  the  warrant  of  death,  and 
this  system  once  begun,  ceased  not  until  the  town  was 
takeu-^in  t!ie  second  siege. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

Operations  in  Catalonia — Gpneral  Swartz  marches  ag-ainsf  the 
tjwn  of  Mnnrf Si,  and  "general  Chabran  a'r^onst  Tar:;g-ona — 
p'renrh  defeattH  at  Briirh — Chabran  roralled — Burns  Arbos 
—  Marches  a<rainst  Bruch — Retreats — Diiliesnie  assaults  Ge- 
rona — Is  repulsPtl  with  liss- — Action  on  the  Llobre^at — Gen- 
eral insurrpction  of  Catalonia — Fiirueras  blorka'leil — (ieneral 
Rfille  relieves  it — ■'-'irst  siege  of  Gerona — The  marquis  of 
Palacios  arrive^  mi  Catalonia  with  the   Spanish  troops  from 


*  Cavallero. 


the  Balearic  isles,  declared  captairi-goneral  iinf'rr  St.  Nar- 
cissus, re-establi:jhes  the  line  of  the  Llobrf  gat — The  count  of 
Cal  Jaguts  forces  the  P^rench  lines  at  Gerona — Duhesnie  rais- 
es the  siege  and  returns  to  Barce'ina — Observations — Mon 
cej- marches  against  Valenr la,  defeats  the  Spaniards  at  Pajaso, 
at  the  Siete  Aguas,  and  at  Quarte — Attaclis  Valencia,  is  re- 
pulsed, marches  into  Murcia — forces  the  passage  of  the 
Xut'ar,  defeats  Serbelloni  at  San  Felippe,  arrives  at  San  Cle- 
niente — Insurrection  at  Cuenca,  quelled  by  g^eneral  Caulin- 
court — Observations. 

When  Barcelona  fell  into  the  power  of  the  French, 
the  Spanish  garrison  amounted  to  nearly  four  thousand 
men,  wherefore,  Duhesme,  daily  fearing  a  riot  in  the 
city,  connived  at  their  escape  in  parties,  and  even  sent 
the  regiment  of  Estremadura  entire  to  Lerida  ;*  but, 
strange  to  relate,  the  gates  were  shut  against  it !  and 
thus  discarded  by  both  parties,  it  made  its  way  into 
Zaragoza  during  the  siege  of  that  place.  Many  thou- 
sand citizens  also  fled  from  Barcelona,  and  join'=;d  the 
patriotic  standards  in  the  neighbouring  provinces. 

After  the  first  ebullition  at  Manresa,  the  insurrection 
of  Catalonia  lingered  awhile,  yet  the  junta  of  Gerona 
continued  to  excite  the  people  to  lake  arms,  and  it  was 
manifest  that  a  general  commotion  approached. f  This 
was  a  serious  affair,  for  there  were  in  the  beginning  of 
June,  including  those  who  came  out  of  Barcelona,  five 
thousand  veteran  troops  in  the  province,  and  in  the  Ba- 
learic islands  above  ten  thousand;  Sicily  contained  an 
English  army,  and  English  fleets  covered  the  Medi- 
terranean.:}; Moreover,  by  the  constitution  of  Catalonia, 
the  whole  of  the  male  population  fit  for  war  are  obliged 
to  assemble,  at  certain  points  of  each  district,  with 
arms  and  provisions,  whenever  the  alarum  bell,  called 
the  somaten,  is  heard  to  ring,  hence  the  name  of  soma- 
tenes;  and  these  warlike  peasants,  either  from  tradition 
or  experience,  are  well  acquainted  with  the  military 
value  of  their  mountain  holds. 

Hostilities  soon  commenced.  Duhesme,  following 
his  instructions,  detached  general  Chabran,  with  five 
thousand  two  hundred  men,  to  secure  Tarragona,  and 
Tortosa,  to  incorporate  the  Swiss  regimeutof  Winipfea 
with  his  own  troops,  and  to  aid  marshal  Moncey  in  an 
attack  on  Valencia.  At  the  same  time  general  Swartz 
having  more  than  three  thousand  Swiss,  Germans,  and 
Italians,  under  his  command,  was  detached  by  the  way 
of  Martorel  and  Montserrat  to  Manresa. |i  His  orders 
v/ereto  raise  contributions  to  put  down  the  insurrection, 
to  destroy  the  powder-mills  at  the  last  town,  to  get 
possession  of  Lerida,  to  incorporate  all  the  Swiss  troops 
found  there  in  his  own  brigade,  to  place  five  hundred 
men  in  the  citadel,  and  finally  to  penetrate  into  Aragon, 
and  co-operate  with  Lefebre  against  Zaragoza. 

These  two  columns  quilted  Barcelona  the  3d  and  the 
4th  of  June,  but  a  heavy  rain  induced  Swartz  to  halt 
the  .5th  at  Martorel  ;  the  6th  he  resumed  his  march 
without  any  military  precautions,  although  the  object 
of  his  expedition  was  known,  and,  the  somaten  ringing 
out  among  the  hills,  the  peasants  of  eight  districts  were 
assembled  in  arms.§  These  men  having  taken  a  resolu- 
tion to  defend  the  pass  of  Bruch,  the  most  active  of  the 
Manresa  and  Igualada  districts,  assisted  by  a  few  old 
soldiers,  immediately  repaired  there,  and  when  Swartz 
came  on  in  a  careless  manner,  opened  a  heavy  but  dis- 
tant fire  from  the  rocks.  Some  confusion  arose,  but 
the  Catalans  were  soon  beaten  from  their  fastness,  and 
pursued  for  four  or  five  miles  along  the  main  road,  to 
Casa  Mansana,  where  a  cross  road  leads  to  Manresa, 
here  one  part  broke  away,  while  the  others  continued 
their  flight  to  Igualada. 

Swartz,  a  man  evidently  destitute  of  talent,  halted  at 
the  very  moment  when  his  success  was  complete,  and 


f  Napoleon's  Notes. 


*  Cabanes,  1st  Part. 

I  Cabanes,  1st  Fart.  . 

II  St.  Cyr.    V.jtoires  et  Conquefes  des  Francois.    Foy.   Ca- 
banes.  i  i^'^'^- 


2& 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


[Book  I. 


the  Catalans,  seeing  his  hesitation,  first  rallied  in  the 
rear  of  Casa  Mansana,  then  returned  to  the  attack,  and 
finally  dro/e  the  advanced  g-uard  back  upon  the  main 
body-  The  French  jjeneral  now  became  alarmed,  form- 
ed a  square,  and  retired  hastily  towards  Esparraguera, 
followed  and  flanked  by  clouds  of  somatenes,  whoso 
cnurriP'e  and  numbers  increased  every  moment.  At 
EsparrafTTH-ra,  which  was  a  lons^  sinirle  street,  the  inha- 
bitants had  prepared  an  ambusb,  but  Swartz,  who  arri- 
ved at  twilio-ht.  (Touinof  intelliofence  of  their  desicrn, 
passed  to  the  risrlit  and  left  r.f  the  houses,  and  continu- 
ing his  flififht,  readied  IMartorel  the  7th.  He  lost  a 
pun  and  many  men  by  this  in<Tlorious  expedition,  from 
which  he  returned  in  such  disorder,  and  with  his  sol- i 
diersRodiscoura<xed,  thai  Duhesme  thousfht  it  necessary 
to  recal  Chabran  from  Tarratjona.  That  general,  al- 
though the  coiii>tiy  westward  of  the  Llobregat  is  rugged 
and  (lifTicult  for  an  army,  had  reached  Tarragona  on  the 
Sth  without  encnintering  an  enemy ;  but  when  he  at- 
tempted to  return,  tbe  line  of  his  march  was  intercept- 
ed bv  the  insuroents.  who  took  post  at  Vendrill,  Arbos, 
and  Villa  Franca,  and  spread  themselves  along  the 
banks  of  the  Llobregat.  As  he  approached  Vendrill 
the  somatenes  fell  back  to  Arbos,  and  were  defeated 
there,  whereupon  the  French  set  fire  to  the  towm,  and 
proceeded  to  \'illa  Franca.  Here  the  excesses  so  com-  • 
mon  at  this  time  among  the  Spaniards  were  not  spared  ; 
the  governor,  an  old  man,  and  several  of  his  friends,  \ 
had  been  murdered,  and  the  perpetrators  of  these 
crimes,  as  might  be  expected,  made  little  or  no  defence 
against  the  enemy.  Meanwhile  general  Lechi  moved 
out  of  Barcelona,  and  actino-  in  concert  with  Swartz's  I 
brigade,  which  had  reached  Martorel.  cleared  the  banks 
of  the  LlobrefT-at  and  formed  a  junction  at  J^an  Felice 
•with  Chabran  on  the  11th.  The  latter,  after  a  day's 
rest,  then  marched  with  his  own  and  Swartz  brigade  i 
on  Manresa  to  repair  the  former  disgrace,  and  he  arri-  [ 
ved  at  Bnich  the  14th  ;  but  the  somatenes  assisted  by  j 
some  regular  troops  with  artillery,  were  again  there, 
and  Chabran,  more  timid  even  than  Swartz.  finding 
that  in  a  partial  skirmish  he  made  no  impression,  took 
the  extraordinary  resolution  of  retreating,  or  rather  fly- 
insr  from  these  gallant  peasants,  who  pursued  him 
with  scoffs  and  a  galling  fire  back  to  the  very  walls  of 
Barcelona. 

Tliese  successes  spurred  on  the  insurrection.  Gero- 
na,  Rosas.  Ilostalrich.  and  Tarrasrona  prepared  for  de- 
fence. The  somatenes  of  the  Ampurdan,  obliged  the 
French  commandant  to  quit  the  town  of  Figueras,  and 
shut  himself  up  with  three  hundred  men  in  the  citadel, 
while  others,  g;Hhering  between  the  Ter  and  the  Besos, 
intercepted  all  communication  between  France  and 
Barcelona.  In  this  predicament,  Duhesme  resolved  to 
make  a  sudden  attempt  on  Gerona,  with  six  thousand 
of  his  best  troops,  and  einrht  pieces  of  artillery;  but  as 
tlie  fortress  of  Hostalrich  stood  in  the  direct  road,  he 
followed  the  coast  line,  and  employed  a  French  priva- 
teer, then  in  the  harbour,  to  attend  his  march.  The 
somatenes  soon  got  intelligence  of  his  desio-ns  ;  one 
multitude  took  pesession  of  the  heitjhts  of  Moncada, 
which  are  six  mi'es  from  Barcelona,  and  overhang  the 
road  to  Hostalrich  ;  another  multitude  was  posted  on 
the  ridge  of  Mongat,  which,  at  the  same  distance  from 
Barcelona  abuts  on  tbe  sea,  and  these  last  were  pro- 
tected on  the  left  by  an  intrenched  castle  with  a  battery  j 
of  fifteen  gtins,  and  on  the  right  were  slightly  connect-! 
pd  with  the  people  at  Moncaila.  The  17ih,  Duhesme,  • 
after  s/^me  false  movements,  defeated  them,  and  a  de- 
tachment from  Barcelona  dispersed  those  at  IMoncada 
the  same  day;  the  18th,  the  town  of  Mattarowas  taken 
Brd  plundered,  the  somatenes  were  again  def(>ated  at 
the  pass  of  St.  Pol,  and  at  nine  o'ch^ck  in  tlie  morning; 
of  the  20th,  the  French  appeared  befjre  Gerona.  | 

This  town,  built  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Ter,  is  cut' 
in  two  by  the  Ona.    To  the  eastward  it  is  confined  by  I 


strong  rocky  hills,  whose  points  filling  the  space  be- 
tween the  dfia  and  the  Ter,  overlook  the  town  at  dif 
ferent  distances.  Fort  Mont  .louy,  a  regular  fortification, 
crowned  the  nearest  hill  or  table  land,  at  five  hundred 
yards'  distance;  three  other  forts,  namely  tlial  of  the 
Constable,  that  of  queen  Ann,  and  that  of  Capuciiins, 
all  connected  by  a  ditch  and  rampart,  formed  one  ir- 
regular outwork,  a  thousand  yards  in  length,  and  com- 
manding all  the  ridge  to  the  south-east.  The  summit 
of  this  ridge  is  five,  eight,  and  twelve  hundred  yards 
from  Gerona,  and  sixteen  hundred  from  Fort  Mont 
Jouy,  and  is  separated  from  the  latter  by  tlie  narrow 
valley  and  stream  of  the  Gallegan. 

South-west,  between  the  left  of  the  Ofia  and  the  Ter, 
the  country  is  comparatively  flat,  but  full  of  hollows 
and  clefts  close  to  the  town,  and  the  body  of  the 
place,  on  that  side,  was  defended  by  a  ditch  and  five 
regular  bastions  connected  by  a  wall  with  towers.  To 
the  west  the  city  was  covered  by  the  Ter,  and  on  the 
east  fortified  by  a  long  wall  with  towers  having  an 
irregular  bastion  at  each  extremity,  and  some  small 
detached  works  placed  at  the  opening  of  the  valley  of 
Gallegan.  Three  hundred  of  the  regiment  of  Uitonia 
and  some  artillery-men  composed  the  garrison  of  Gero- 
na ;  thev  were  assisted  by  volunteers  and  by  the  citi- 
zens, and  the  somatenes  also  assembled  on  the  left  of 
the  Ter  to  defend  the  passags  of  that  river. 

Duhesme,  after  provoking  some  cannon-shot  from 
the  forts,  occupied  the  village  of  St.  Eugenia  in  the 
plain,  and  making  a  feint  as  if  to  pass  the  Ter  by  the 
bridge  of  Salt,  engaged  the  somatenes  in  a  useless 
skirmish.  Great  part  of  the  day  was  spent  by  him  in 
preparing  ladders  for  the  attack ;  at  five  o'clock  in  the 
evening  the  French  jrtillery  opened  from  the  heights 
of  Palau,  and  then  a  column  crossing  the  OTia  passed 
between  the  outworks  and  the  town,  threw  out  a  de- 
tachment to  keep  the  garrison  of  the  fornner  in  check, 
and  assaulted  the  gate  of  El  Carmen.*  This  attempt 
failed  completelj',  and  with  great  loss  to  the  assailants. 
Two  hotirs  after,  another  column  advancing  by  the  left 
of  the  Oi"^,a,  assaulted  the  bastion  of  Santa  Clara,  but 
with  so  little  arrangement  or  discipline,  that  the  storm- 
ing party  had  only  three  or  four  ladders  ;f  and  although 
by  favour  of  the  hollows  they  reached  the  walls  unper- 
ceived,  and  the  Neapolitan  colonel  Ambrosio  and  the 
engineer  Lafaille  actually  gained  the  top  of  the  ram- 
parts, the  confusion  amongst  the  assailants  was  such, 
that  no  success  w^as  obtained.  Duhesme.  tried  negoci- 
ation  on  the  following  day,  )'et  dreading  a  longer 
absence  from  Barcelona,  broke  up  on  the  22d,  and 
returned  by  forced  marches,  leaving  Chabran  with 
some  troops  in  Mattaro  as  he  passed.  During  his  ab- 
sence the  victorious  somatenes  of  Bruch  had  descended 
the  Llobregat,  rallied  those  of  the  lower  country,  and 
getting  artillery  from  Tarragona  and  other  fortresses, 
planted  batteries  at  the  difl'erent  passages  of  the  river, 
and  entrenched  a  line  from  San  Boy  to  Martorel, 
Regular  officers  now  took  the  command  of  the  peas- 
ants. Colonel  Milans  assembled  a  body  at  Granollers ; 
don  .luan  Claros  put  himself  at  the  head  of  the  peasants 
of  the  Ampurdan;  colonel  Baget  look  the  command  of 
those  at  Bruch. 

Chabran,  after  a  few  days'  rest  at  Mattaro,  made  a  for- 
aging excursion  through  the  district  of  El  Valles,  but 
!Milaus,  who  held  the  valley  of  the  Congosta,  encoun- 
tered him  near  Granollers,  and  both  sides  claimed  the 
victory;  Chabran,  however,  retired  to  Barcelona,  and 
Milans  remained  on  the  banks  of  the  Besos.  The  30th, 
Duhesme  caused  the  somatenes  on  the  Llobregat  to  be 
attacked,  sent  Lechi  to  menace  those  at  the  bridge  o*" 
Molinos  del  Hey,  and  the  brigades  of  Bessieres  and 
Goullus,  to  cross  at  San  Boy;  the  latter  having  sur- 
prised a  battery  at  that  point,  turned  the  whole  line, 


*  St.  Cyr. 


t  Lafaille. 


1808.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


27 


ZTii  Lechi  then  crossinp^  the  river  by  the  briilge  of  Mo- 
linos,  ascendcH  the  left  bank,  took  all  the  artillery, 
burnt  several  villages,  and  put  the  insurgenln  to  flio-ht. 
They  however  rallied  ajrnin,  at  Bruch  and  Igualada, 
and  returning'  the  Gth  of  Jul}%  infested  the  immediate 
vicinity  of  Barcelona,  taking  possession  of  all  the  liills 
between  San  Boy  and  Moncada,  and  connecting  their 
operations  with  colonel  Rlilans.  Other  parties  collected 
between  the  Besos  and  the  Ter,  and  the  line  of  insur- 
rection was  extended  to  the  Ampurdan  ;  .Tuan  Clares 
occupied  the  flat  country  about  Rosas,  and  the  French 
garrison  of  Figueras  having  burnt  the  town,  were 
blocked  up  in  the  fort  of  San  Fernando  by  two  thousand 
somatenes  of  the  Pyrenees;  a  nest  of  Spanish  privateers 
was  formed  in  Palamos  Bay,  and  two  English  frigates, 
the  Imperieuse  and  the  Cambrian,  watched  the  coast 
from  Rosas  to  Barcelona.  A  supreme  junta  was  now 
established  at  Lerida,  and  opened  an  intercourse  with 
Aragon,  Valencia,  Seville,  Gibraltar,  and  the  Balearic 
islands;  it  also  decreed,  that  forty  tercios,  or  regime  nts 
of  one  thousand  men,  to  be  selected  from  the  somatenes, 
should  be  paid  and  organized  as  regular  troops,  and  that 
forty  others  should  be  kept  in  reserve,  but  without  pay. 

This  state  of  affairs  being  made  known  to  Napoleon 
through  the  medium  of  the  moveable  columns  watching 
the  valleys  of  the  eastern  Pyrenees,  he  ordered  general 
Reille,  then  commanding  the  reserve  at  Perpignan,  to 
take  the  first  soldiers  at  hand  and  march  to  the  relief  of 
Figueras ;  after  which,  his  force  being  increased  by 
drafts  from  the  interior  of  France  to  nine  thousand,  he 
was  to  assault  Rosas  and  besiege  Gerona  ;  and  the  em- 
peror imagined,  that  the  fall  of  the  latter  place  would 
induce  the  surrender  of  Lerida,  and  would  so  tranqiiil- 
lize  Catalonia,  that  five  thousand  men  might  again  be 
detached  towards  Valencia.  On  receiving  this  order, 
Reille,  with  two  battalions  of  Tuscan  recruits,  cenduet- 
ed  a  convoy  safely  to  Figueras  and  raised  the  blockade, 
but  not  without  difficulty,  for  his  troops  were  greatly 
terrified,  and  could  scarcely  be  kept  to  their  colours.* 
He  however  relieved  the  place  the  lOlh  of  July,  and 
the  same  day,  Duhesme,  who  had  been  preparinyf  for  a 
second  attack  on  Gerona,  quitted  Barcelona  with  six 
thousand  infantry,  some  cavalry,  a  battering  train  of 
twenty-two  pieces,  and  a  great  number  of  country  car- 
riages to  transport  his  ammunition  and  stores,  leaving 
Lechi  in  the  city  with  five  thousand  men.  Meanwhile 
Reille,  having  victualled  Figueras  and  received  a  part 
of  his  reinforcements,  proceeded  to  invest  Rosas;  but 
he  had  scarcely  appeared  before  it,  when  Juan  Claros 
raised  the  country  in  his  rear,  and  Captain  Otway,  of 
the  Montague,  landing  with  some  marines,  joined  the 
migueletcs,  whereupon  the  French  retired  with  a  loss 
of  two  hundred  men. ■{" 

Duhesme  pursued  his  march  by  the  coast,  but  the 
somatenes  broke  up  the  road  in  his  front,  Mil.ins  hung 
on  his  left,  and  Lord  Cochrane,  with  the  Imperieuse 
fiigate  and  some  Spanish  vessels,  cannonaded  his  right. 
Thus  incommoded,  he  halted  five  days  in  front  of  Are- 
nas de  Mar,  and  then  dividing  his  force,  sent  one  part 
across  the  mountains  by  Villagorguin,  and  another  by 
San  Isicle.  The  first  column  made  an  attempt  on  Hos- 
talrich,  and  failed;  the  second,  beating  Milans,  dis- 
persed the  somatenes  of  the  Tordera,  and  finally, 
Duhesme  united  his  forces  before  Gerona,  but  he  lost 
many  carriages  on  his  march.  The  23d  he  passed  the 
Ter,  and  dispersed  the  migueletes  that  guarded  the  left 
bank.  The  24th  general  Reille,  coming  from  Figueras 
with  six  thousand  men,  took  post  at  Puonte  INIayor,  and 
the  town  was  invested,  from  that  point,  by  the  heights 
of  San  Miguel  to  the  Monte  Livio;  from  Monte  Livio 
by  the  plain  to  the  bridge  of  Sail;  and  from  thence 
along  the  left  bank  of  the  Ter  to  Sarria.    The  garrison, 


•  Foy's  History. 

•••  Lord  CoUingwood'g  despatch,  Aug 


27.     Foy's  History. 


consisting  of  five  hundred  migueletes  and  four  hundred 
of  the  regiment  of  Lltonia,  was  reinforced  on  the  25th 
by  thirteen  hundred  of  the  regiment  of  Barcelona,  who 
entered  the  town  with  two  guns  ;  the  defences  were  la 
bad  repair,  hut  the  people  were  resolute. 

In  the  night  of  the  27lh,  a  French  column  passed  the 
valley  of  the  Galligan,  gained  the  table  land  of  Mont 
Jouy.  and  of  three  towers,  which  the  Spaniards  aban- 
doned in  a  panic.  This  advantage  so  elated  Duhesme, 
that  he  resolved,  without  consulting  his  engineer,  to 
break  ground  on  that  side;*  but  at  this  period  a  great 
change  in  the  affairs  of  Catalonia  had  taken  place. f 
The  insurrection  hitherto  confined  to  the  exertions  of 
the  unorganized  somatenes,  was  now  consolidated  by  a 
treaty  between  lord  Collingwood,  who  commanded  the 
British  navy  in  the  INIedilerranean,  and  the  marquis  of 
Palacios,  who  was  captain-general  of  the  Balearic  isles; 
thus  the  Spanish  fleet  and  the  troops  in  INIinorca,  Ma- 
jorca, and  Ivica,  became  disposable  for  the  service  of 
the  patriots.:!:  Palacios  immediately  sent  thirteen  hun- 
dred men  to  the  port  of  San  Felice  di  Quixols  to  rein- 
force the  garrison  of  Gerona,  and  these  men  entered 
that  city,  as  we  have  seen,  on  the  25th,  while  Palacios 
himself  disembarked  four  thousand  others,  together 
with  thirty-seven  pieces  of  artillery,  at  Tarragona,  an 
event  which  excited  universal  joy,  and  produced  a  sur- 
prising eagerness  to  fight  the  Frencli.  The  supreme 
junta  immediately  repaired  to  that  town,  declared  Pala- 
cios their  president,  and  created  him  commander-in-chief, 
subject,  however,  to  their  tutelar  saint.  Narcissus,  who 
was  appointed  generalissimo  of  the  forces  by  sea  and 
land,  the  ensigns  of  authority  being,  with  due  solemni- 
t)',  placed  on  his  coffin. 

The  first  object  with  Palacios  was  to  re-establish  the 
line  of  the  Llobregat.  To  effect  this,  the  c;u?it  of  Cal- 
dagues,  with  eighteen  hundred  men  and  four  guns, 
marched  from  Tarragona  in  two  columns,  the  one  mov- 
ing by  the  coast  way  to  San  Boy,  and  the  other  by  the 
royal  road,  through  Villafranca  and  Ordal.  Caldagnes, 
in  passing  by  tlie  bridge  of  Molino  del  Hey,  established 
a  post  there,  and  then  ascending  the  left  bank,  fixed  his 
quarters  at  Martorel,  where  colonel  Baget  joined  him 
with  three  thousand  migueletes  of  the  new  levy.  Now 
the  Llobregat  runs  within  a  few  miles  of  Barcelona, 
but  as  the  right  bank  is  much  the  steepest,  the  lateral 
communications  .easier,  and  as  the  heights  command  a 
distinct  view  of  everything  passing  on  the  opposite  side, 
the  line  taken  by  Caldagues  was  strong,  for  the  country 
in  his  rear  was  rough  with  defiles,  and  very  fitting  for 
a  retreat  after  the  loss  of  a  battle. 

General  Lechi,  thus  hemmed  in  on  the  west,  was 
also  hampered  on  the  north,  because  the  mountains  fill- 
ing the  space  between  the  Llobregat  and  the  Besos,  ap- 
proach in  tongues  as  near  as  two  and  three  miles  from 
Barcelona,  and  the  somatenes  of  the  Manresa  and  Vails 
districts  occupying  them,  skirmished  daily  with  the 
French  outposts.  And  beyond  the  Besos,  which  bounds 
Barcelona  on  the  eastward,  a  lofty  continuous  ridge,  ex- 
tending to  Ilostalrich,  runs  parallel  to  and  at  the  dis- 
tance of  two  or  three  miles  from  the  sea  coast,  separa- 
ting the  main  from  the  marine  roads,  and  sending  its 
shoots  down  to  the  water's  edge  ;  this  ridge  also 
swarmed  with  somatenes,  who  cut  off  all  communica- 
tion with  Duhesme,  and  lay  in  leaguer  round  the  castle 
of  Mongat,  in  which  were  eighty  or  ninety  French. 
The  Cambrian  and  the  Imperieuse  frigates  blockaded 
the  harbour  of  Barcelona  itself;  and,  on  the  .31st,  lord 
Cochrane  having  brought  his  vessel  alongside  of  INIon- 
gat,  landed  his  marines,  and,  in  concert  with  the  soma- 
tenes, took  it,  blew  up  the  works,  and  rolled  the  rocks 
and  ruins  down   in  such  a  manner  as  to  destroy  the 


*   St.  CjT.     Campaign  in  Catalonia. 

t  Calwnes' History. 

i  St.  Cyr.     Cabanes'  History,  2d  Part. 


28 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR, 


[Book  I. 


To?.(l.*  Thus,  at  the  very  moment  that  Duhesme  com- 
menced the  siepre  of  Gernna,  he  was  cut  oiT  from  his 
own  base  of  operations,  ami  the  communication  between 
Fifjueras  and  general  Rcille's  division  was  equally  in- 
Pecure  ;  for  the  latters  convoys  were  attacked  the  2Sth 
of  July  and  the  3d  of  Aucrust;  and  so  fiercely  on  the 
6lh,  that  a  Neapolitan  battalion  was  surrounded,  and 
lost  one  hundred  and  fifty  men.[ 

Palacios,  whose  forces  increased  daily,  now  wished  1 
to  make  an  effort  in  favour  of  Gerona,  and  with  this 
view  sent  the  count  of  Caldajiues,  at  tlie  head  of  three 
or  four  thousand  men,  part  miirueletes,  part  refjulars,  to 
interrupt  the  progress  of  tiie  siege,  intending  to  follow 
himself  with  greater  forces.  Caldngues  marched  by 
Tarrasa,  Sabadell,  Granollers,  and  San  Celoni,  and 
reached  Hostalrich  the  mnrning  of  the  10th,  where  his 
ff>rce  was  increased  to  five  thousand  men  and  four  guns. 
The  l3th,  he  entered  Ll.igostera,  and  the  14th  Castel- 
lar,  a  small  place  situated  behind  the  ridges  that  over- 
look Gerona,  and  only  five  miles  from  the  French 
camps.  Here  .Tuan  Claros  with  two  thousand  five  hun- 
dred migueletes,  mixed  with  some  Walloon  and  Span- 
ish Guards  from  Rosas,  met  him,  as  did  also  Milans 
witii  eight  I'.undred  somatenes.  A  communication  with 
the  junta  of  Gerona  was  then  opened.  Fort  Mont  Jouy 
was  upon  the  point  of  surrendering,  but  the  French, 
who  were  ignorant  «(  Caldagues'  approach,  had,  con- 
trary to  good  discipline,  heaped  their  forces  in  the  plain 
between  the  let't  of  the  Ona  and  the  Ter,  but  only  kept 
a  slender  guard  on  the  hills,  while  a  single  battalion 
protected  the  batteries  raised  against  Mont  Jouy.  Being 
an  enterprising  man,  the  Spanish  general  resolved  to 
make  an  immediate  effort  for  the  relief  of  the  place,  and, 
after  a  careful  observation,  sent,  on  the  16th,  several 
columns  against  the  weak  part  of  the  besiegers'  line, 
the  garrison  sallied  forth  at  the  same  time  from  Mont 
Jouy,  and  the  French  guards  being  taken  between  two 
fires,  wee  quickly  overpowered,  and  driven  first  to  the 
Puf-nte  Mayor  and  finally  over  the  Ter.  The  Catalans 
re-formed  on  the  hills,  expecting  to  be  attacked  ;  but 
Duhesme  and  Reille  remaiopd  quiet  until  dark,  and 
then  breaking  up  the  siege,  fled,  the  one  to  Figueras, 
the  other  to  Barcelona,  leaving  both  artillery  and  stores 
behind. 

Duhesme  at  first  wished  to  retreat  by  the  coast,  but 
at  Callella  he  learned  that  the  road  w;is  cut,  that  an 
English  frigate  was  ready  to  rake  his  columns,  and 
that  the  somatmes  were  on  all  the  heights,  wherefore, 
destroying  his  ammunition,  he  threw  his  artillerj'  over 
the  rocks,  and,  taking  to  the  mountains,  forced  a  pas- 
sage through  the  somatenes  to  Mongat,  where  Lcchi 
met  him  and  covered  the  retreat  to  Barcelona. 

Observation  1st. — Three  great  communii'ations 
pierce  the  Pyrenean  frontier  of  Catalonia,  leading  di- 
rectly upon  Barcelona. 

The  first,  or  Pnycerda  road  penetrates  between  the 
sources  of  the  Segre  and  the  Ter. 

'I'be  second,  or  Campredon  road,  between  the  sources 
of  the  Ter  and  the  Fluvia. 

riie  third,  or  Figueras  road,  between  the  sources  of 
the  Miiga  and  the  sea-coast. 

The  first  and  second  unite  at  Vicqne;  the  second  and 
third  are  connected  by  a  transverse  road  running  from 
Olot,  by  Castle  P'ollit,  to  Gerona;  the  third  also  divid- 
ing near  the  latter  town,  leads  with  one  branch  through 
Hostalrich,  and  with  the  other  follows  the  line  of  the 
icoast.  After  the  union  of  the  first  and  second  at  Vicque, 
a  single  route  pursues  the  stream  of  the  Besos  to  Bar- 
celona, thus  turning  the  Miiga,  the  Fluvia,  the  Ter,  the 
Tordera,  Besos,  and  an  infinity  '^f  minor  streams,  which 
in  their  rapid  course  to  the  .Mediterranean,  furrow  all 
the  country  between  the  eastern  Pyrer.  -cs  and  Barce- 


lona. The  third,  which  is  the  direct  and  best  commu- 
nication between  Perpignan  and  the  capital  of  Catalo- 
nia, crosses  all  the  above-named  rivers,  and  their  deep 
channels  and  sudden  floods  offer  serious  obstacles  to 
the  march  of  an  army. 

All  these  rnads,  with  the  exception  of  that  from  Olot 
to  Gerona,  are  separated  by  craggy  mountain  ridges 
scarcely  to  be  passed  by  troops  :  and  the  two  first  lead- 
iucr  throutrh  wild  and  savage  districts,  are  incommodeil 
by  defiles,  and  protected  by  a  number  of  old  castles  and 
walled  places,  more  or  less  capable  of  resistance.  The 
third,  passing  through  many  rich  and  flourishing  places, 
is  however  completely  blocked,  to  an  invader,  by  the 
strong  fortresses  of  Figueras  and  Rosas  on  the  Muga, 
of  Gerona  on  the  Ter,  and  Hostalrich  on  the  Tordera. 
Palamos  and  other  castles  likewise  impede  the  coast 
road,  which  is  moreover  skirted  by  rocky  mountains, 
and  exposed  for  many  leagues  to  the  fire  of  a  fleet.  Such 
is  Catalonia,  eastward  and  northward  of  Barcelona. 

On  the  west,  at  five  or  six  miles  distance,  the  Llobre- 
gat  cuts  it  off  from  a  rough  and  lofty  tract,  through 
which  the  Cardena,  the  Noga,  the  Foix,  Gaya,  Angue- 
ra,  and  Francoli  rivers,  breaking  down  deep  channels, 
descend,  in  nearly  parallel  lines,  to  the  coast,  and  the 
spaces  between  are  gorged  witli  mountains,  and  studdert 
witii  fortified  places  which  command  all  the  main  roads. 

So  few  and  contracted  are  the  plains  and  fertile  val- 
leys, that  Catalonia  may,  with  the  exception  cf  the  rich 
parts  about  Lerida,  and  the  Urgel,  be  described  as  a 
huge  mass  of  rocks  and  torrents,  incapable  of  supplying 
subsistence  even  for  the  inhabitants,  whose  prosperity 
depends  entirely  upon  manufactures  and  commerce. 
Barcelona,  the  richest  and  most  populous  city  in  Spain, 
is  the  heart  of  the  province,  and  who  masters  it,  if  he 
can  hold  it,  may  suck  the  strength  of  Catalonia  away. 
But  a  French  army,  without  a  commanding  fleet  to  as- 
sist, can  scarcely  take  or  keep  Barcelona;  the  troops 
must  be  supplied  by  regular  convoys  from  France,  the 
fortresses  on  the  line  of  communication  must  be  taken 
and  provisioned,  and  the  active  intelligent  population 
of  the  country  must  be  beaten  from  the  rivers,  pursued 
into  their  fortresses,  and  warred  down  by  exertions 
which  none  but  the  best  troops  are  capable  of:  for  the 
Catalans  are  robust,  numerous,  and  brave  enough  after 
their  own  manner. 

Observation  2d. — It  follows  from  this  exposition, 
that  Duhesme  evinced  a  surprising  want  cf  fore- 
thought and  military  sagacity,  in  neglecting  to  secure 
Gerona,  Hostalrich,  and  7\irragona,  with  garrisons, 
when  his  troops  were  received  into  those  places.  It 
was  this  negligence  that  rendered  the  timid  operations 
of  Swartz  and  Chahran  capital  errors;  it  was  this  that 
enabled  some  poor,  injured,  indignant  peasants  to  kin- 
dle a  mighty  war,  and  in  a  very  few  weeks  obliged  Na- 
poleon to  send  thirty  thousand  men  to  the  relief  of  Bar- 
celona. 

Observation  3d. — Duhesme  was  experienced  in  bat- 
tles, and  his  energy  and  resources  of  mind  have  been 
praised  by  a  great  authority  ;*  but  undoubtedly  an  ab- 
sence of  prudent  calculation  and  arrangement,  a  total 
neglect  of  military  discipline,  marked  all  his  opem 
tions  in  Catalonia,  witness  his  mode  of  attack  on  Ge- 
rona, the  deficiency  of  ladders,  and  the  confusion  of  the 
assaults  ;f  witness  also  his  raising  of  the  second  siege, 
and  absolute  flight  from  Caldagues,  whose  rash  en- 
terprise, although  crowned  with  success,  should  have 
caused  his  own  destruction.  In  those  affairs  it  is  cer- 
tain Duhesme  displayed  neither  talent  nor  vigour;  but 
in  the  severities  he  exercised  at  the  sacking  of  Matta- 
ro,  in  the  burning  of  villages,  which  he  executed  to  the 
extreme  verge  of',  if  not  beyond  what  the  harshest  laws 
of  war  will  justify,  an  odious  energy  was  apparent  ;:^ 


Lord  CoIIing^ood'i  despatchei. 


f  St.  Cyr. 


*   Napoleon.  f   ^^t-  f^.V. 

J  Jy'apoleou'B  notes.    St.  Cjr.    Cabaues. 


1808.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR    WAR. 


29 


and  as  the  ardour  of  the  somateneswas  rather  increased 
than  repressed  by  these  rigorous  proceeding's,  iiis  con- 
duct may  be  deemed  as  impolitic  as  it  was  barbarous. 
It  is  however  to  be  remembered  that  Duhesme  has  not 
wanted  defenders,  who,  assertino^  that  he  was  humane 
and  just,  accuse  Lechi,  his  equal  in  rank,  of  being  the 
author  of  the  severities  exercised  at  Barcelona.* 

Observation  4th. — In  Catalonia  all  the  inherent  cru- 
elty (*f  the  Spaniards  was  as  grossly  displayed  as  in 
any  other  province  of  Spain;  the  Catalans  were  like- 
wise vain  and  superstitious.  But  their  courage  was 
higher,  their  patriotism  purer,  and  their  efforts  more 
sustained,  the  somatenes  were  bold  and  active  in  bat- 
tle, the  population  of  the  towns  firm,  and  some  of  the 
juntas  apparently  disinterested  ;  the  praise  merited  and 
bestow'cd,  upon  the  people  of  Zaragoza  is  great,  yet 
Gerona  more  justly  claims  the  admiration  of  m.ankind. 
For  the  Aragonese  troops  were  by  Lefebre  driven  from 
the  open  country  in  crowds  to  their  capital,  and  little 
was  wanted  to  induce  them  to  surrender  at  once  ;  it 
was  not  until  the  last  hour  that,  gathering  courage 
from  despair,  the  people  of  Zaragoza  put  forth  all  their 
energy,  whereas  those  of  Gerona,  although  attacked 
by  a  greater  force,  and  possessing  fewer  means  of  de- 
fence, without  any  internal  system  of  terror  to  coun- 
terbalance their  fear  of  the  enemy,  manfully  and  suc- 
cessfully resisted  from  the  first.  The  people  of  Zara- 
goza rallied  at  their  heauhstone,  those  of  Gerona  stood 
firm  at  the  porch.  But  quitting  these  matters,  I  must 
now,  following  the  order  I  have  marked  out,  proceed  to 
relate  the  occurrences  in  Valencia. 

OPERATIONS  OF  MARSHAL  MONCEY. 

The  execution  of  Calvo  and  his  followers  changed 
the  horrid  aspect  of  the  Valencian  insurrection  ;  the 
epirit  of  murder  was  checked,  and  the  patriotic  energy 
assumed  a  nobler  appearance.  Murcia  and  Valencia 
were  united  as  one  province,  and  towards  the  end  of 
June,  nearly  thirty  thousand  men,  armed  and  provided 
nith  artillery,  attested  the  resources  of  these  rich  prov- 
inces, and  the  activity  of  their  chiefs.  The  Valencians 
then  conceived  the  plan  of  marching  to  the  assistance 
of  the  Aragonese  ;  but  Napoleon  had  already  pre- 
scribed the  rneasuies  which  were  to  render  such  a 
movement  abortive. 

An  order,  dated  the  .?Oth  of  May,  had  directed  Mon- 
key to  move,  with  a  column  often  thousand  men,  upon 
Cuenca;  from  that  point  he  was  to  watch  the  country 
Comprised  between  the  lower  Ebro  and  Carthagena, 
and  he  was  empowered  to  act  against  the  city  of  Va- 
lencia if  he  judged  it  fitting  to  do  so.  The  position 
of  Cuenca  was  advantageous;  a  short  movement  from 
thence  to  the  left  would  place  Moncey's  troops  upon 
the  direct  line  between  Valencia  and  Zaragoza,  and 
enable  him  to  intercept  all  communication  between 
those  towns;!  and  a  few  marches  to  the  right  would 
place  him  upon  the  junction  of  the  roads  leading  from 
Carthagena  and  V'alencia  to  Madrid.  If  he  thought  it 
essential  to  attack  Valencia,  the  division  of  general 
Chabran  was  to  co-operate  from  the  side  of  Catalonia, 
by  which  combination  the  operations  of  Lefebre  Des- 
nouettes  at  Zaragoza,  and  those  of  Duhesme  in  Cata- 
lonia, were  covered  from  the  Valencians ;  and  at  the 
same  time  the  flank  of  the  French  army  at  Madrid  was 
protected  on  the  side  of  Murcia. 

The  Gth  of  June  Moncey  marched  from  Aranjuez  by 
Santa  Cruz,  Tarancon,  Carascoso,  and  Villa  del  Osma, 
and  reached  Cuenca  the  11th.  Here  receiving  infor- 
mation of  the  rapid  progress  of  the  insurrection,  of  the 
state  of  the  Valencian  army,  and  of  the  projected 
movement  to  relieve  Zaragoza,  he  resolved  to  make 
an  attempt  against  the  city  of  Valencia. :J:     In  this  view, 


*  I^falUe 
\  Ibid. 


f  S.  Journal  of  Moncfy's  Operations  MSS. 


supposing  general  Chabran  to  be  at  Tortosa,  he  or- 
dered him  to  march  upon  Castellon  de  la  Plana,  a 
town  situated  at  some  distance  eastward  of  the  river 
Guadalaviar,  proposing  him&elf  to  clear  the  country 
westward  of  that  river,  and  he  fixed  the  25th  of  June 
as  the  hatest  period  at  which  the  two  columns  were  to 
communicate  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  Valencia. 

Halting  from  the  11th  to  the  Ujth  at  Cuenca,  he 
marched  the  17th  to  Tortola,  the  18th  to  Buenaches, 
the  19ih  to  Malilla,  the  20th  to  Minglanilla,  and  the 
21st  to  Pesquiera ;  but  from  Buenaches  to  Pcsquiera 
no  inhabitants  were  to  be  seen,  the  villages  were  de- 
serted, and  either  from  fear  or  hatred,  every  living  per- 
son fled  before  his  footsteps.  At  length,  a  Swiss  regi- 
ment, some  of  the  Spanish  guards,  and  a  body  of  armed 
peasantry,  made  a  stand  at  the  bridge  of  Pajaso,  upon 
the  river  Gabriel,  and  the  manner  in  which  the  country 
had  been  forsaken,  the  gloomy  and  desolate  marches, 
and  the  sudden  appearance  of  an  armed  force  ready  to 
dispute  this  important  pass,  prognosticated  a  desperate 
conflict ;  yet  the  event  belied  the  omens,  scarcely  any 
resistance  was  made. 

Moncey,  having  informed  general  Chabran  of  this 
success,  appointed  the  27th  and  28th  for  a  junction  un- 
der the  vralls  of  Valencia.  The  next  day  he  took  a 
position  at  Otiel  ;  *  but  hearing  that  the  defeated  patri- 
ots had  rallied  and,  reinforced,  to  the  number  of  ten  or 
twelve  thousand,  were  intrenching  themselves  upon  his 
left,  he  quitted  the  direct  line  of  march  to  attack  them 
in  their  post  of  Cabrillas,  which  was  somewhat  in  ad- 
vance of  the  Siete  Aguas.  The  Spanish  position  was 
of  extraordinary  strength,  the  flanks  rested  upon  stee]> 
rocky  mountains,  and  the  only  approach  to  the  front 
was  through  a  long  narrow  defile,  formed  by  high 
scarped  rocks,  whose  tops,  inaccessible  from  the  French 
side  were  covered  with  the  armed  peasantrj'  of  the 
neighbourhood.  As  a  direct  assauh  upon  such  a  po- 
sition could  not  succeed,  and  general  Harispe  was  di- 
rected to  turn  it  by  the  right,  while  the  cavalry  and  artil- 
lery occupied  the  attention  of  the  Spaniards  in  front ; 
that  general  soon  overcame  the  obstacles  of  ground, 
reached  the  Spanish  troops,  and  defeated  thein,  with 
the  loss  of  all  their  cannon,  ammunition  and  baggage, 
and  also  of  the  Swiss  regiment  which  came  over  to  the 
victors.  This  action  happened  on  the  24th,  it  freed 
Moncey's  left  flank,  and  he  resumed  his  march  by  the 
direct  road  to  Valencia,  where  he  arrived  the  twenty- 
seventh.  The  ancient  walls  remained,  all  the  ap- 
proaches were  commanded  by  works  hastily  repaired 
or  newly  raised,  the  citadel  was  in  a  state  of  defence, 
and  the  population  were  willing  to  fight. 

A  city,  containing  eighty  thousand  people  actuated 
by  violent  passions,  cannot  be  easily  overcome  ;  and 
Valencia,  built  upon  low  ground,  and  encircled  with  nu- 
merous canals  and  cuts,  made  for  the  purposes  of  irri- 
gation, had  its  deep  ditches  filled  with  water,  so  that 
no  approach  could  be  made  except  against  the  gates. 
An  assault  seemed  hopeless,  but  it  is  said  that  the  mar- 
shal had  corrupted  a  smuggler,  who  promised  to  betray 
the  city  during  the  heat  of  the  assault,  and  it  is  proba- 
ble that  some  secret  understanding  of  that  kind  in- 
duced him  to  make  an  attempt  which  would  otherwise 
have  been  rash  and  unmilitary. 

Don  Joseph  Caro.  a  brother  to  the  marquis  of  Ro- 
mana,  was  with  four  thousand  men  entrenched  behind 
the  canal  of  the  Guadalaviar.  five  miles  in  advance  of 
the  city  gates ;  and  as  the  village  of  Quarte,  and  some 
thickly  planted  mulberry  trees,  helped  to  render  this 
post  very  strong,  Moncey,  who  attacked  it  upon  the 
27th,  met  with  a  vigorous  resistance.  Caro  was,  how- 
ever, beaten,  and  chased  into  the  city,  with  the  loss  of 
some  cannon,  and  on  the  28th  the  French  drove  in  the 
outposts,  and  occupied  all  the  principal  avenues  of  the 


•  S.  Journal  of  Moocej's  Opei^tions  M.SS. 


30 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  I. 


town.     Enthusiastic  as  the  Valencians  were  while  the  I 
enemy  was  at  a  distance,  Monce3''s  appearance  filled  j 
them  wilh  terror,  and  ii  is  possible  that  a  vig-orous  as- 
sault niiufht  have  succeeded  at  the  first  moment  of  con-  j 
Btejrnation  ;  vet  the  favourable  opportnnity.  if  it  really  | 
existed,  quickly  passed   away.      Padre    liico,  a  friar' 
distinofuished  by  his  resolution,  traversi-d  the  streets, 
■with  a  cross  in  one  hand  and   a  sword   in  the  other,  | 
arousinor  the  sinkinir  spirit  and  excitincr  ihe  fanaticism  j 
of  the  multitude;  Xhe  fear  of  retaliation  for  the  massa- | 
ere  of  the  French  residents,  and  the  certainty  that  Mon- 
cey's  troops  were  few,  powerfully  seconded  his  efforts, 
and  as  it  is  usual  for  undisciplined  masses  of  people  to 
pass  suddenly  from  one  extreme  to  another,  fear  was 
soon  succeeded  b\'  enthusiasm. 

After  dispnsinpr  his  field-pieces  at  the  most  favoura- 
ble points,  Moncey.  while  the  impression  of  Caro's 
defeat  was  fresh,  summoned  the  g^overnor.  The  latter 
answered.  'That  he  would  defend  the  city,'  and  the 
French  fire  then  opened  ;  but  the  heavy  cruns  of  the 
Spaniards  soon  overpowered  it.  A  warm  skirmish 
about  the  houses  of  the  suburbs  and  at  the  gates  en- 
sued, and  the  Valencians  foug-ht  so  well,  that  when  the! 
niofht  fell,  no  impression  had  been  made  on  the  defen- 
ces; the  assailants  were  repulsed  with  loss  at  every 
point,  and  the  situation  of  the  French  marshal  became 
delicate.  The  persons  sent  to  seek  Chabran  could  gfain 
no  intelljorence  of  that  jjpneral's  movements;  the  secret 
connexions  in  the  town,  if  any  there  were,  had  failed  ; 
the  ammunition  was  nearh^  expended,  and  the  army 
was  encumbered  with  seven  or  eiiiht  hundred  wounded 
men,  and  amonor  them  the  general  of  engineers.  Mon- 
cey, swayed  b}'  these  circumstances,  relinquished  his 
attack,  aiid  the'29th  fell  back  to  Quarte. 

\Vhen  it  is  considered  that  in  a  great  city  only  a 
small  number  of  persons  can  estimate  justly  the  im- 
mense advantages  of  their  situation  and  the  compara- 
tive weakness  of  the  enemy,  it  must  be  confessed  that 
the  spirit  displayed  by  the  Valencians  upon  this  occa- 
sion was  very  sfreat ;  unfortunately  it  ended  here, 
nothinor  worthy  of  such  an  energetic  commencement 
was  afterwards  performed,  although  very  considerable 
armies  were  either  raised  or  maintained  in  the  prov- 
ince. 

At  Quarte,  the  French  ascertained  that  the  captain- 
general,  Serbelloni.  was  marching  upon  Almanza  to  in- 
tercept the  communication  wilh  Chieva  and  Bunol, 
whereupon  Moncey  resolved  to  relinquish  the  line  of 
Cuenca.  and  attack  him  before  he  could  quit  the  king-- 
dom  of  Murcia.*  This  vigrorous  resolution  lie  executed 
with  great  celerity;  for,  directing  the  head  of  his  col- 
umn towards  Torrente,  he  continued  his  march  until 
night,  halting  a  short  distance  from  that  town,  and  by 
a  forced  march  the  next  diy  reached  Alrira,  only  one 
ieague  from  the  river  Xurar.  From  his  bivouac  at  that 
place  he  despatched  advice  to  general  Chabran  of  this 
change  of  affairs,  and  meanwhile  Serbelloni,  surprised 
in  the  midst  of  his  movement,  and  disconcerted  in  his 
calculations  by  the  decision  and  rapidity  of  Moncey, 
took  up  a  position  to  defend  the  passage  of  the  Xucar. 
'ITie  line  of  that  river  is  strong,  and  offers  many  advan- 
tageous points  of  resistance,  but  the  Spaniards  impru- 
dently occupied  both  banks,  and  in  this  exposed  situa- 
tion they  were  attacked  on  the  morning  of  the  1st  of 
July.  The  division  on  the  F'rench  side  of  the  river 
■was  overthrown,  the  passage  forced  without  loss  of 
time,  and  Serbelloni  retired  to  the  heights  of  San  Fe- 
lice, which  covered  the  main  road  leading  from  Alcira 
to  Almanza,  hoping  to  secure  the  defiles  m  front  of  the 
latter  town  before  the  enemy  could  arrive  there.  But 
Moncey  was  again  too  quick  for  him  ;  leaving  San  Fe- 
lice to  his  left,  he  continued  his  march  on  another  route, 
and  by  a  strt  nuous  exertion  seized  the  gorge  of  the  de- 

*  Jour'ial  of  Mun''ef . 


files  near  Almanza  late  in  the  night  of  the  2d,  and 
when  the  Spanish  troops  approaclied  his  position,  lie 
dispersed  them  at  day-break  on  the  3d,  and  captured 
some  of  their  guns.  The  road  being  now  open,  Mon- 
cey entered  Almanza,  and  then  marched  by  Bonete,  and 
Chinchilla  to  Albacete,  where  he  got  intelligence  that 
Frere's  division,  which  he  expected  to  find  at  San 
Clemente,  was  gone  to  Requena. 

To  understand  this  movement  of  Frere,  it  must  be 
known,  that,  when  Dupont  and  Moncey  marched  a- 
gainst  Anil«ilusia  and  Valencia,  two  divisions  were  re- 
tained by  Savary  to  scour  the  country  near  Madrid,  and 
to  connect  the  operations  of  the  main  bodies ;  but  they 
were  ill-managed.  General  Gobert,  who,  following 
Napoleon's  orders,  should  have  been  at  Valladolid,  re- 
inforced Dupont ;  and  general  Frere  was  sent  to  Reque- 
fia  to  reinforce  Moncey.  when  he  should  have  been  at 
San  Clemente,  a  central  point,  from  whence  he  could 
have  gained  the  road  of  Seville,  that  of  Valencia  and 
Cuenca,  or  that  of  Carthagena.  Meanwhile  the  people 
of  the  Cuenca  district  having  suddenly  overpowered  a 
detachment  left  there  by  Moncey,  Savary  ordered  Frere 
to  move  from  San  Clemente  to  Requena,  and  sent  Cau- 
laincourt  from  Taracon  to  quell  the  insurgents,  which 
was  effected  with  great  slaughter  on  the  3d  of  July  ; 
and  the  town  of  Cuenca  was  pillaged.  Hence  when 
Frere,  who  quitted  San  Clemente  the  26th,  reached 
Requeiia,  he  found  the  country  quiet,  heard  of  Caulain- 
court's  success,  and  discovered  that  IMoncey,  having 
crossed  the  Xucar,  was  on  the  road  to  San  Clemente. 
Then  retracing  his  steps,  he  returned  to  the  latter  place 
with  troops,  sickly,  wearied,  and  exhausted  by  these 
longf  useless  marches  in  t!ie  heat  of  summer. 

Moncey  now  re-organized  his  forces,  and  was  pre- 
paring artillery  and  other  means  for  a  second  attempt 
against  Valencia,  when  he  was  interrupted  by  Savary, 
who,  alarmed  at  the  advance  of  Cuesta  and  Blake,  re- 
called Frere  towards  Madrid.  The  marshal,  extremely 
offended  that  the  duke  of  Rovigo,  inflated  with  momen- 
tary power,  should  treat  him  with  so  little  ceremony, 
then  abandoned  San  Clemente,  and  returned  by  the  way 
of  Ocana  to  the  capital.* 

OBSERVATIONS. 

1.  The  result  of  marshal  Moncey 's  campaign  was 
published  by  the  Spaniards,  as  a  great  and  decisive 
failure,  and  produced  extravagant  hopes  of  final  suc- 
cess ;  a  liappy  illusion,  if  the  chiefs  had  not  partaken 
of  it,  and  pursued  their  wild  course  of  mutual  flattery 
and  exaggeration,  without  reflecting  that  in  tr«fth  there 
was  nothing  very  satisf;ictory  in  the  prospect  of  affiiirs. 
Moncey's  operation  Avas  in  the  nature  of  a  moveable 
column,  the  object  of  which  was  to  prevent  the  junc- 
tion of  the  Valencian  army  with  the  Arag  nese;  the 
attempt  upon  the  town  of  Valencia  was,  th(>refore,  a 
simple  experiment,  which,  successful,  would  have  pro- 
duced great  effects,  failing,  was  of  trifling  consequence 
in  a  military  point  of  view.  Valencia  was  not  the  es- 
sential object  of  the  expedition,  and  the  fate  of  the 
general  campaign  depended  upon  the  armies  in  Old 
Castile. 

2.  It  was  consoling  that  a  rich,  and  flourishing  town, 
had  not  fallen  into  the  power  of  the  enemy ;  but  at  the 
same  time,  a  want  of  real  nerve  in  the  Spanisii  insur- 
rection was  visible.  The  kingdoms  of  .Murcia  and  \  a- 
lencia  acted  in  concert,  and  contained  two  of  the  richest 
sea-port  towns  in  the  Peninsula;  their  united  forca 
amounted  to  thirty  thousand  organized  troops,  exclu- 
sive of  the  armed  peasants  in  various  districts,  ami  the 
populace  of  Valencia  were  deeply  committed  by  the 
massacre  of  the  F'rench  residents.  Here  then,  if  in 
any  place,  a  strenuous  resistance  was  to  be  expected  ; 
nevertheless,  marshal  Moncey,  whose  whole  force  was, 
at  first,  only  eight  thousand  French,  and  never  exceeded 

*  Foy't  Hiitorj. 


1808.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


31 


ten  thousand  men.  continued  marcl-.ing^  and  fipfhting 
without  cessation  for  a  month,  forced  two  of  the  stroncr- 
est  mountain  passes  in  the  world,  crossed  several  larire 
and  difficulirivers,  and  carried  the  war  into  the  streets  of 
Valencia.  Disanpciiited  of  assistance  from  Catalonia, 
he  yet  extricated  himself  from  a  difficult  situation,  de- 
feated his  opponents  in  five  actions,  killed  and  wound- 
ed a  nunibei  of  them,  equal  in  amount  to  the  whole  of 
his  own  force,  and  made  a  circuit  of  above  three  hun- 
dred miles  throun-h  a  hostile  and  populous  country, 
without  havincr  sustained  any  serious  loss,  without  any 
desertion  from  the  Spanish  battalions  incorporated  with 
his  own,  and  what  was  of  more  importance,  having 
those  battalions  much  increased  by  desertions  from  the 
enem3^  In  short,  the  jrreat  object  of  the  expedition 
had  been  attained,  the  plan  of  relieving  Zaragoza  was 
entirely  frustrated,  and  the  organization  of  an  efficient 
Spanish  force  retarded.  But  Moncey  could  hardly 
have  expected  to  succeed  against  the  town  of  Valen- 
cia; for  to  use  Napoleon's  words,  'a  city  with  eighty 
thousand  inhabitants,  barricatloed  street,^,  and  artillery 
■placed  at  th"  gates,  cannot  be  taken  by  the  collar. 

3.  General  Frere's  useless  march  to  Reque^'a  was 
very  hurtful  to  the  French,  and  the  duke  of  Rovigo 
was  rated  by  the  emperor  for  his  want  of  judgment 
upon  the  occasion  :  'It  was  a  folly,'  the  latter  writes, 
'to  dream  of  reinforcing  Moncey,  because,  if  that  mar- 
shal failed  in  taking  the  city  by  a  sudden  assault,  it  be- 
came an  affair  of  artillery,  and  twenty  thousand  men, 
more  o\  less,  would  not  enable  him  to  succeed.' — '  Frere 
could  do  nothing  at  Valencia,  but  he  could  do  a  great 
deal  at  San  Clemente;  because  from  that  post  he  could 
support  either  iNIadrid  or  general  Dupont.' 

4.  Moncey  was  slightly  blamed  by  the  emperor  for 
not  halting  within  a  day's  march  of  Valencia,  in  order 
to  brt-ak  the  spirit  of  the  people,  and  make  them  feel 
the  weight  of  the  war;  but  this  opinion  was  probably 
formed  upon  an  imperfect  knowledge  of  the  local  de- 
tails. The  marshal's  line  of  operations  from  Cuenca 
was  infested  by  insurgent  bands,  his  ammunition  was 
nearly  exhausted,  he  could  hear  nothing  of  Chabran's 
division,  the  whole  force  of  Murcia  was  collecting  upon 
his  flank  and  rear,  the  country  behind  him  was  favora- 
ble for  his  adversaries,  and  his  army  was  encumbered 
by  a  number  of  wounded  men;  it  was  surely  prudent, 
under  L^ui-h  circumstances,  to  open  his  communication 
again  with  Madrid  as  quickly  as  possible. 

By  some  authors,  the  repulse  at  Valencia  has  been 
classed  with  the  inglorious  defeat  of  Dupont  at  Baylen, 
but  there  was  a  wide  difference  between  the  events,  the 
generals,  and  the  results.  Moncey.  although  an  old 
man,  was  vigorous,  active,  and  decided,  and  the  check 
he  received  produced  little  effect.  Dupont  was  irreso- 
lute, sloAV,  and  incapable,  if  not  worse,  as  I  shall  here- 
after show  ;  but  before  describing  his  campaign,  I  must 
narrate  ihe  operations  of  the  Gallician  army. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Second  operations  of  Bessierfs — Bkke's  and  Cuesta's  armies 
unite  at  Benevpnle--Generals  disngree — Battle  of  Rio  Seco 

,  — Bfsiiere:?'  enJeavDur  to  corrupt  the  Spanish  generals  fails 
— Bessieres  inarches  to  invade  Gallicia,  is  recalled,  and  falls 
back  to  Burgos-— Observations. 

OPERATIONS  OF  BESSIERES  AGAINST  BLAKE   AND  CUESTA. 

While  Bcssieres'  moveable  columns,  ranging  over 
the  Asturian  and  Biscayan  mountains,  dispersed  the 
insurgent  patriots  of  those  provinces,  Cuesta,  undis- 
mayed by  his  defeat  at  Cabezon,  collected  another  ar- 
my at  Benevente,  and  prepared  to  advance  again  to- 
wards Burgos  ;  and  he  was  supported  by  the  Gallici- 
an army,  which  Filanghieri  had  organized  without  dif- 
ficulty, because  the  abundant  supplies  poured  in  from 


England  were  beginning  to  be  felt,  and  patriotism  is 
never  more  efhcacious  than  when  supported  by  large 
sums  of  money.  Taranco's  soldiers  joined  to  the  gar- 
risons of  Ferrol  arid  Corur.a,  had  been  reinforced  with 
new  levies,  to  twenty-five  thousand  men,  and  being 
well  equipped,  and  provided  witli  a  considerable  train 
of  artillery,  were  assembled  at  Manzanal,  a  strong  pos 
in  the  mountains,  twelve  miles  behind  Astorga. 

The  situation  of  that  city  offered  great  advantages  to 
the  Spaniards,  for  the  old  Moorish  walls  whfrh  sur- 
rounded it  were  complete,  and  susceptible  of  beintr 
strengthened,  so  as  to  require  a  regular  siege  ;  but  a 
siege  could  not  be  undertaken  by  a  small  force,  while 
the  army  of  Gallicia  was  entrenched  at  Manzanal,  and 
while  Cuesta  remained  at  Benevente;  neither  could 
Bessieres,  with  any  prudence,  attack  the  Gallicians  at 
Manzanal  while  Cuesta  was  at  Benevente,  and  wiiile 
Astorga  contained  a  strong  garrison.  Filanghieri,  who 
appears  to  have  had  some  notion  of  its  value,  had  com- 
menced forming  an  entrenched  camp  in  the  mountains; 
but  being  slain  by  his  soldiers,  Joachim  Blake  suc- 
ceeded to  the  command,  and  probably  fearing  a  similar 
fate,  if  the  army  remained  stationary,  left  one  divis- 
ion at  Manzanal,  and  with  the  remainder  marched  to- 
wards Benevente  to  unite  with  Cuesta. 

Bessieres  immediately  collected  his  scattered  col- 
umns at  Palencia,  and  his  plan,  founded  upon  instruc- 
tions from  Bayonne,  was  to  make  a  rapid  movement 
against  Cuesta,  in  the  hope  of  beating  him,  while  Blake 
was  still  behind  Leon;  then  wheeling  to  the  right,  to 
drive  the  Gallicians  back  to  the  mountains,  to  overrun 
the  flat  country  with  his  numerous  cavalry,  to  open  a 
communication  with  Portugal,  and  after  receiving  cer- 
tain reinforcements,  preparing  for  him,  to  subdue  Gal- 
licia, or  assist  Junot,  as  might  seem  most  fitting  at  the 
time.* 

At  this  period  the  king  was  on  his  journey  to  Mad- 
rid, and  the  military  system  of  Napoleon  was  brought 
to  its  first  great  crisis;  for  unless  Bessieres  was  suc- 
cessful, there  could  be  no  sure  footing  for  the  French 
in  the  capital ;  and  as  Madrid  was  the  base  of  Moncey's 
and  Dupont's  operations,  the  farther  prosecution  of  theii 
plans  depended  upon  the  result  of  the  approaching 
strug'jle  in  the  plains  of  Leon.  Napoleon,  foreseeing 
this  crisis,  had  directed  Savary  to  occupy  Segovia,  to 
send  general  Gobert's  division  to  Valladolid,  and  to 
hold  Vedel's  and  Frere's,  the  one  in  La  Maiicha,  a  few 
marches  from  the  capital,  and  the  other  at  San  Clemen- 
te, a  central  point  connectincr  Moncey,  Dupont,  and 
Madrid.  But  Savary,  unable  to  estimate  justly  the 
relative  importance  of  the  different  operations,  sent  Ve- 
del  and  Gobert  into  Andalusia,  to  reinforce  Dupont, 
when  he  should  rather  have  recalled  the  latter  to  the 
northern  side  of  the  Sierra  Morena  ;  he  caused  Frere, 
as  we  have  seen,  to  quit  San  Clemente,  and  march  by 
Requefia  against  Valencia,  at  th?  moment  when  Mon- 
cey was  retiring  from  that  city  through  Alurcia  to  San 
Clemente;  thus  he  dispersed  and  harassed  his  reserves 
by  long  marches  to  the  south  without  any  definite  ob- 
ject, when  the  essential  interests  were  at  stake  in  the 
north.  Now,  struck  with  fear  at  the  approach  of  Cu 
esta  and  Blake,  whose  armies  he  had  hitherto  disre< 
garded,  he  precipitately  recalled  Frere,  Vedel,  Goliert, 
and  even  Dupont,  to  !\Iadrid;  too  late  to  take  part  with 
Bessieres  in  the  coming  battle,  but  exactly  timed  to 
frustrate  Moncey's  projects,  and,  as  we  shall  hereafter 
find,  to  ensure  the  ruin  of  Dupont.  In  this  manner, 
steering  his  vessel  against  every  wind  that  blew,  he 
could  not  fail  of  storms. 

Greatly  was  Napoleon  discontented  with  these  er- 
rors; he  relied,  and  with  reason,  on  the  ability  of  bes- 
sieres for  a  remedy,  but  to  Savary  he  sent  the  follow- 
ing instructions,  dated  the  13th  of  .July: 


*  Journal  of  Bessieres'  Operations  MSS.  Napoleon's  not;». 


32 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  1. 


marches  and 

army  is  hcco 

'  Marsha! 

with  JiJ0cen  til 


•  The  French  a^^airs  t?i  Spain  would  be  in  an  excellent 
etatt  if  GoberCs  division  had  marched  upon  VulIadoUd, 
and  Frtre''s  had  occupied  San  Ciemente,  u-i'h  a  moveable 
column,  three  or  finir  marches  tjj)on  the  route  (f  general 
Dtipnnl.  Gobert  having  been  directed  upon  Jhipont, 
Frere  heins  %'i'h  Munccij,  harassed  and  enfeebled  by 
itermarches,   the  position  of  the  French 

advantageous, 
res  fs  this  day  at  Medina  del  Rio  S-co 
nd  men,  irfunlry,  cavalry,  and  artille- 
ry;  the  loth  or  lulh  he  will  attack  Benevcnte,  open  a 
communication  with  Portugal,  drive  the  rebels  into  Gnlli- 
cia,  and  seize  upon  Leon.  If  his  operations  succeed  l/ivs, 
and  in  a  bril.'iant  manner,  the  position  if  the  French  army 
will  an^ain  be  as  good  as  it  iras. 

'  If  general  Cuesfa  retires  from  Ber.cvente  without  fight- 
ing, he  will  move  by  Zeimora  and  Salamanca  to  gain 
Avila  and  Segovia,  certain  that  then  Bessitres  cannot  jmr- 
8u?  hi:.!,  as,  in  that  case,  he  would  be  menaced  by  the  army 
of  Gallicia,  whose  advanced  guard  is  at  Leon.  The  gene- 
ral who  commands  at  Madrid  must  then  be  able  to  assemble 
six  or  sei'cn  thousand  men  and  march  upon  Cuesfa  ;  the 
citadel  (f  Segovia  must  be  occupied  by  three  or  four  hun- 
dred convalescents,  with  some  guns  and  six  icetAs^  biscuit. 
Jl  was  a  s,r  cat  fault  not  to  have  occupied  this  citadel  when 
the  major-general  ordered  it  ,■  of  all  the  possible  positions, 
Segovia  is  the  most  dangerous  f,r  the  army ;  the  capital 
of  a  province,  and  situated  between  two  routes;  it  deprives 
the  army  rf  all  its  cummunicaiions,  and  the  enemy  once 
pos'ed  in  th^  citadel,  the  French  army  cannot  dislodge  him. 
Three  or  four  hundred  coiwalescents,  a  good  commandant, 
and  a  squad  if  artillery,  icill  render  the  castle  of  Segovia 
impregnable  fir  some  time,  and  will  insure  to  the  army 
tht  irnfortant  position  ff  Segovia. 

'  ^  general  Cuesta  throivs  himsef  into  Gallicia  without 
figh'ing  or  si'ffering  a  dtfat,  the  position  rf  the  army 
will  become  better ;  rf  coune  it  will  be  still  better  if  he  does 
so,  (fter  having  suffered  a  drftat. 

'  If  marshal  Bessieres  faces  Cuesfa  at  Benevente  without 
attacking  him,  or  if  he  is  repulsed  by  him,  his  object  u-ill 
always  be  to  cover  Burgos,  and  to  hold  the  enemy  in  check 
as  long  as  possih'e ;  he  anild,  perhaps,  be  reirfureed  with 
the  three  thousand  troops  of  the  line  which  accompany  the 
king,  but  th-'n  tht:re  would  be  no  room  for  hesitation.  If 
Bessieres  retires  wilhiut  a  battle,  he  must  be  reiiforced  in- 
i-'ani'y  with  six  thousand  men.  If  he  retreats  after  a  bat- 
tle wherein  he  has  suffered  great  kss,  it  will  be  necessary 
to  make  great  di.spo:tiiions ;  to  recall  Frere,  Gobert,  Cau- 
lair.courl,  and  Vedel,  by  firced  inarches  to  Madrid  ,■  to 
withdraw  Dupnnt  into  tht  Sierra  M'.reiw,  or  even  bring 
him  nearer  to  Madrid  {keeping  him  always,  however,  seven 
or  eight  marches  off),  then  to  crush  Cuesta  and  all  the  Gaili- 
eion  army,  ivhile  Dvpont  will  serve  as  an  advanced  guard 
to  h'dd  the  army  'f  Andalusia  in  check.'' 

Howevf-r,  before  Bessieres  could  collect  his  troops, 
Blake  effected  a  junction  with  Cuesta,  at  Benevente, 
and  three  plans  were  rpen  to  those  generals. 

1.  To  remove  into  the  mountains,  and  take  a  position 
covering  Gallicii. 

2.  To  maintain  the  head  of  the  Gallician  army  in 
advance  of  Astorga,  while  Cuesta,  with  his  Castilians, 
pusliingby  forced  marches  through  Salamanca  and  Avila, 
reached  Segcvia. 

3.  To  advance  farther  into  the  plains,  and  try  the  fate 
of  a  battle. 

This  last  was  rash,  seeing  that  Bessieres  was  well 
provided  with  horsemen,  and  that  the  Spaniards  had 
scarcely  any  ;  but  Cuesta,  assuming  the  chief  command, 
adopted  it.  He  left  a  division  at  Benevente  to  protect 
l>is  stores,  and  advanced,  much  against  Blake's  wishes, 
with  twenty-five  thousand  re^u!ar  infantry,  a  few  hun- 
dred cavalry,  and  from  twenty  to  thirty  pieces  of  artil- 
lery, in  the  direction  of  Palrncia.  His  march,  as  we 
liave  seen,  dismayed  Savary.  To  usn  Napoleon's 
expressions,  he  v<  ho  had  beeu  '  hUurlo  acting  as  if  the 


army  of  Gallicia  was  not  in  existence,^  row  acted  *as  if 
Bessieres  teas  already  beaten-'  but  that  Oiarshal,  f.rm  and 
experienced,  rather  than  risk  an  action  of  such  impor- 
tance with  insufficient  means,  withdrew  even  the  gar- 
rison from  the  important  post  of  St.  Ander,  and  having' 
quickly  collected  fifteen  thousand  men  and  thirty  pieces 
of  artillery  at  Palcncia,  moved  forward  on  the  i2th  of 
July  to  the  encounter. 

His  line  of  battle  consisted  of  two  divisions  of 
infantry,  one  of  light  cavalry,  and  twenty-four  guns, 
his  reserve  was  formed  of  four  battalions  and  some  horse 
grenadiers  of  the  imperial  guards,  wilh  si\  pieces  of 
artillery.  On  the  13th  he  halted  at  Ampudia  and  Torre 
de  Mormojon,  butadvancingon  the  14tli  in  two  columns, 
he  drove  in  an  advanced  guard  of  one  hundred  and  fifty 
Spanish  cavalry,  and  arrived  about  nine  o'clock  in  front 
of  Rio  Seco,  where  Cuesta's  army  was  drawn  up  like 
some  heavy,  domestic  animal,  awaiting  the  spring  of  an 
active  wild  beast.* 

BATTLE  OF    RIO  SECO. 

The  first  line  of  the  Spaniards  with  all  the  heavy 
guns  were  posted  along  the  edge  of  a  sir  p  of  land 
which  had  an  abrupt  fall  towards  tlie  French.  The 
second  line,  composed  of  the  best  tree  [s,  augmented 
but  not  strengthened  by  some  eighteen  thousand  armed 
peasants,  was  displayed  at  a  great  distance  behind  the 
first,  and  the  town  of  Rio  Seco  was  in  rear  of  the  centre. 
Bessieres  was  at  first  startled  at  their  nunlh^rs,  and 
doubted  if  he  should  attack  ;  but  soon  perceiving  the 
vice  of  Cuesta's  disposition,  he  ordered  gener.!n>asalle 
to  make  a  feint,  against  the  front,  with  the  light  caval- 
ry, while  he  himself,  marching  obliquely  to  the  right, 
outstretched  the  left  of  the  Spaniards,  and  suddenly 
thrust  Merle's  and  Mouton's  divisions  and  the  imperial 
guards,  horse  and  foot,  between  the  lines,  and  threw 
the  first  into  confusion  ;  at  that  moment  LasrJle  charged 
furiously,  the  Spanish  front  went  down  at  once,  and 
fifteen  hundred  dead  bodies  strewed  the  field. | 

The  victor's  ranks  were  disordered,  and  Cuesta  made 
a  gallant  effort  to  retrieve  the  day,  for,  supported  by  the 
fire  of  all  his  remaining  artillery,  he  advanced  with  his 
second  line  upon  the  French,  and  his  right  wing  fall- 
ing on  boldly,  took  six  guns;  but  his  left  hung  back, 
and  the  flank  of  the  right  was  thus  exposed.  Bessie- 
res, with  great  readiness,  immediately  charged  on  this 
naked  flank  with  ISIerle's  division  and  the  horse  grena- 
diers, while  the  fourteenth  provisionary  regiment  made 
head  against  the  front ;  a  fierce  short  strucgle  ensued, 
and  the  Spaniards  were  overborne,  were  broken  and 
dispersed  :  meanwhile  the  first  line  rallied  in  the  town 
of  Rio  Seco,  but  being  a  second  time  defeated  by 
Mouton's  division,  fled  over  the  plains,  pursued  by  the 
light  cavalry  and  suffering  severely  in  their  fliglit.  X 

Five  orsix  thousand  Spaniards  were  killed  and  wound- 
ed on  the  field,  twelve  hundred  prisoners,  eighteen 
guns,  and  a  great  store  of  ammuniiion,  remained  in  the 
hands  of  the  French,  and  the  vanquished  sougi:t  safety 
in  all  directifuis,  chiefl)'  on  the  side  of  Benevente.  [) 
Blake  and  Cuesta  separated  in  wrath  with  each  other, 
the  former  made  for  the  mountains  of  Gallicia,  and  the 
latter  towards  Leon,  while  the  division  Ittt  at  Bene- 
vente dispersed.  The  French  who  had  lost  fifty  killed 
and  three  hundred  wounded,  remained  at  Rio  Seco  all 
the  15th,  and  the  16ih  advanced  to  Benevente,  where  they 
found  many  thousand  EnoHsh  muskets  and  vast  quan- 
tities of  ammunition,  clothing  and  provisions.  'I'he 
communication  wilh  Portugal  was  now  open,  and  Bes- 
sieres at  first  resolved  to  give  his  hand  to  Junot,  but 
hearing  that  the  fugitives  were  likely  to  rally  on  the 
side  of  Leon,  he  pursued  them  by  the  road  of  Villa- 
fere.  On  his  march,  learning  that  Cuesta  was  gone  to 
Mayorga,  he  turned  aside  to  that  place,  and  on  the  5J2d 


»  S.  Journal  of  Cessii  res' Opt  rations.  f  Ibid, 

}  Ibid.  y  iMr.  Stuart's  Papere. 


1808.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


33 


captured  there  another  pn-eat  collection  of  stores ;  for 
the  Spanish  general  with  the  usual  improvidence  of  his 
nation,  had  established  all  his  magazines  in  the  open 
towns  of  the  flat  country. 

After  this  Bessieres  entered  the  city  of  Leon  and 
remained  there  until  the  29th,  during  which  time  he 
received  the  submission  of  the  municipality,  and  pre- 
■  pared  to  carry  the  war  into  Gallicia.  Meanwhile  the 
junta  of  Castile  and  Leon,  whose  power  had  hitherto 
been  restrained  by  Cuesta,  retired  to  Puente-Ferrada, 
assumed  supreme  authority,  and  the  quarrel  between 
the  rrenerals  having  become  rancorous,  they  sided  with 
Blake.  This  appeared  to  Bessieres  a  favourable  occa- 
sion to  tamper  with  the  fidelity  of  the  chiefs.  He 
therefore  sent  his  prisoners  back,  argued  the  hopeless 
state  of  the  insurrection,  offered  the  viceroyalty  of 
Mexico  to  Cuesta,  and  promised  military  ranks  and 
honours  to  Blake.  But  as  neither  would  listen  to  him, 
he  had  reached  Puente  Orbigo  the  31st,  intending  to 
break  into  Gallicia,  when  he  was  suddenly  recalled 
to  protect  the  king;  for  Dupont  had  surrendered  with 
a  whole  army  in  Andalusia.  The  victory  of  Rio  Seco 
was  rendered  useless,  the  court  was  in  consternation, 
and  Bessieres  immediately  returned  to  Mayorga,  where 
he  took  a  defensive  position. 

OBSERVATIONS. 

1.  As  Blake  was  overruled  by  Cuesta,  he  is  not 
responsible  for  the  errors  of  this  short  campaign ;  but 
the  faults  were  gross  on  both  sides,  and  it  seems  diffi- 
cult to  decide  whether  Savary  or  Cuesta  made  the 
^eatcst  number.  If  Savary  had  sent  Gobert's  division 
to  Valladolid,  Bessieres  would  have  had  twenty-two 
thousand  men  and  forty  pieces  of  artillery  in  the  field ; 
a  torce  not  at  all  too  great,  when  it  is  considered  that 
the  fiite  of  three  French  armies  depended  upon  a  battle, 
to  which  the  Spaniards  might  have  brought  at  least 
double  the  number.  On  the  other  hand,  Cuesta  having 
determined  upon  an  offensive  movement,  disregarded 
the  powerful  cavalry  of  his  enemy,  and  chose  a  field 
of  battle  precisely  in  the  country  where  that  arm  would 
have  the  greatest  advantage  ;  when  he  should  have 
brought  every  man  to  bear  upon  the  quarter  which  he 
did  attack,  he  displayed  his  ignorance  of  the  art  of 
war,  by  fighting  the  battle  of  Rio  Seco  with  twenty- 
five  thousand  men  only,  leaving  ten  thousand  disci- 
plined troops  in  the  rear,  to  guard  positions  which 
could  not  be  approached  until  he  himself  was  first 
beaten.  Neither  was  the  time  well  chosen  for  his  ad- 
vance. Had  he  waited  a  few  days,  the  port  of  St. 
Ander  would  have  been  attacked  by  eight  English 
frigates,  and  a  detachment  of  Spanish  troops  under  the 
command  of  general  da  Ponte ;  an  enterprise  that 
would  have  distracted  and  weakened  Bessieres,  but 
which  was  relinquished  in  consequence  of  the  battle  of 
Rio  Seco. 

2.  Once  united  to  Blake,  Cuesta's  real  base  of  opera- 
tions was  Gallicia,  and  he  should  have  kept  all  his 
stores  within  the  mountains,  and  not  have  heaped  them 
up  in  the  open  towns  of  the  flat  country,  exposed  to  the 
marauding  parties  of  the  enemy  ;  or  covered,  as  at  Be- 
nevente,  by  strong  detachments  which  weakened  his 
troops  in  the  field  and  confined  him  to  a  particular  line 
of  operations  in  the  plain. 

3.  The  activity  and  good  sense  of  marshal  Bessieres 
overbalanced  the  errors  of  Savary.  and  the  victory  of 
Rio  Seco  was  of  infinite  importance,  because,  as 
we  have  seen,  a  defeat  in  that  quarter  would  have 
sliaken  the  French  military  system  to  its  centre; 
it  would  also  have  obliged  the  king,  then  on  his  jour- 
ney to  Madrid,  to  halt  at  Vittoria,  until  the  distant 
divisions  of  the  army  were  recalled  to  the  capital,  and 
5J  powerful  effort  made  to  crus-h  the  victorious  enemy. 
Napoleon's  observations  are  full  of  strong  expressions 
c.f  discontent  at  the  imprudence  of  his  lieutenant. — ''A 

4 


check  given  to  Dupont,''  he  says, '  would  have  a.  slight  cf- 
f^d,  but  a  wound  received  by  Bessieres  would  give  a 
locked  jaw  to  Ike  whole  army.  Not  an  inhabitant  if 
Madrid,  not  a  peasajit  of  the  valleys  that  docs  not  feel  that 
the  affairs  of  Spain  are  involved  in  the  affairs  of  Bes- 
sieres ;  how  unfortunate,  then,  that  in  such  a  great  event 
yuu  have  ivi fully  given  the  enemy  twenty  chances  against 
yourself.''  When  he  heard  of  the  victory,  he  exclaim- 
ed, that  it  was  the  battle  of  Almanza,  and  that  Bes- 
sieres had  saved  Spain.  The  prospect  was  indeed 
very  promising;  the  king  had  arrived  in  Madrid, 
bringing  with  him  the  veteran  brigade  of  general  Rey 
and  some  French  guards,  and  all  fears  upon  the  side  of 
Leon  being  allayed,  the  affairs  of  Andalusia  alone  re- 
mained of  doubtful  issue  ;  for  Zaragoza,  hard  pushed 
by  Verdier,  was  upon  the  point  of  destruction,  in  de- 
spite of  the  noble  courage  of  the  besieged.*  Nor  did 
the  subjugation  of  Andalusia  appear  in  reason  a  hard 
task,  seeing  that  Moncey  was  then  at  San  Clemente, 
and  from  that  point  threatened  Valencia,  without  losing 
the  power  of  succouring  Dupont,  while  Frere's  and 
Caulaincourt's  troops  were  disposable  for  any  operation. 
In  fine  the  French  army  possessed  the  centre,  the 
Spaniards  were  dispersed  upon  a  variety  of  points  on 
the  circumference  without  any  connexion  with  each 
other,  they  were  in  force  only  upon  the  side  of  Andalu- 
sia, and  the  great  combinations  of  the  French  emperor 
were  upon  the  point  of  being  crowned  with  success, 
when  a  sudden  catastrophe  overturned  his  able  calcu- 
lations and  raised  the  sinking  hopes  of  Spain. 

It  was  the  campaign  in  Andalusia  which  produced 
such  important  t  fi:ects,  and  it  offers  one  of  tlie  most 
interesting  and  curious  examples,  recorded  by  history, 
of  the  vicissitudes  of  war ;  disorder,  unaccompanied  by 
superior  valour,  triumphed  over  discipline  ;  inexperien- 
ced officers  were  successful  against  practised  generals, 
and  a  fortuitous  combination  of  circumstances  enabled 
the  Spaniards,  without  any  skill,  to  defeat  in  one  day 
an  immense  plan,  wisely  arranged,  emtiracing  a  variety 
of  interests,  and  until  that  moment  happily  conducted 
in  all  its  parts.  This  blow,  which  felled  Joseph  from 
his  throne,  marked  the  French  army  with  a  dishonour- 
able scar,  the  more  conspicuous,  because  it  was  the 
only  one  of  its  numerous  wounds  that  misbecame  it. 


CHAPTER  VIIL 

Dupont  marclies  ag'ainst  Andalusia,  forces  the  bridge  of  Alro- 
tea,  takes  Cordoba — Alarm  at  Seville — Castanos  arrives,  forms 
a  new  army — Dupont  rttreats  to  Andujar,  attacfcs  the  toviii 
of  Jaen — Vedel  forces  the  pass  of  Dcspenas  Perros,  arrives 
at  Bavlen — Spanish  army  arrives  on  the  Guadalquivir — Ge- 
neral Gobert  defeated  and  killed — Generals  Vedel  and  Dar- 
four  retire  to  Carolina — General  Reding  takes  possession  of 
Baylen — Dupont  retires  from  Andujar — Battle  of  Bavlen — 
Duponts  capitulation,  eighteen  thousand  French  troops  la}' 
down  their  arms — Observations — Joseph  holds  a  council  of 
war,  resolves  to  abandon  Madrid — Impolicy  of  so  doing. 

OPERATIONS    IN   ANDALUSIA. 

Dupont  was  ordered  to  march  against  Cadiz  with 
a  force  composed  of  the  Spanish-Swiss  regiments  of 
Preux  and  Reding — Barbou's  division  of  French  in- 
fantry; Fresia's  division  of  cavalry — a  marine  battal- 
ion of  the  imperial  guards,  and  eighteen  pieces  of  ar- 
tillery.]" Three  thousand  infantry,  five  hundred  cavalry, 
and  ten  guns,  were  to  join  him  at  Seville,  from  tho 
army  of  Portugal  ;  three  other  Swiss  regiments  were 
in  Andalusia,  and  it  was  expected  that  both  they,  and 
the  troops  at  San  Roque,  would  join  the  French  army. 

In  the  latter  end  of  May  he  traversed  La  Mancha, 
entered  the  Sierra  Morena  by  the  pass  of  Despenas 
Perros,  and   proceeded  by  Carolina  and  Baylen  to  Aii- 


ISapoleon's  Noteg.     |  Journal  of  Dupont's  Operations,  MS. 


34 


NAPIKR'S   PKMNSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  I. 


dujar,  where  he  arrived  the  2d  of  June.  There  he  was 
informed  that  a  supreme  junta  of  government  was  es- 
tablished at  Seville,  that  minor  juntas  ruled  in  Granada, 
Jaen,  and  Cordoba  ;  that  war  was  formally  declared 
n^inst  the  French,  that  the  whole  of  Andalusia,  was 
in  arms  and  the  Swiss  reoriments  ranirpd  under  the 
Spanish  banners  :  lastly,  that  prpneral  Avril,  command- 
ing- the  detachment  expected  from  PortULnil,  had  halted 
in  1\ivora,  and  was  preparing^  to  return  to  Lisbon. 

Alarmed  by  this  intellifjence,  Dupont  wrote  to  Murat 
and  Savary  to  demand  reinforcements,  and  in  the  mean 
time  closed  up  the  rear  of  his  columns,  and  established 
an  hospital  in  Andujar.  The  6th  he  crossed  the  Gua- 
dalquivir, and  continued  his  march  towards  Cordoba, 
followiuCT  the  left  bank  of  the  river.  But  two  leagues 
from  that  ancient  city  the  road  recrossed  the  Guadal- 
quivir by  a  long  stone  bridge,  at  the  farthest  end  of 
which  stood  the  village  of  Alcolea ;  and  when  the 
French  general  arrived  there  at  daybreak  on  the  7th, 
his  progress  was  opposed  by  the  Spanish  general  Eche- 
varia,  who  had  fortified  the  head  of  the  bridge,  placed 
twelve  guns  in  battery  on  the  right  bank,  and  was  pre- 
pared to  dispute  the  passage,  with  a  force  composed  of 
three  thousand  regulars,  supported  by  ten  thousand  new 
levies  and  smugglers.  Besides  these  troops,  a  small 
reserve  was  left  in  a  camp  close  to  Cordoba,  and  a  cloud 
of  armed  peasants,  from  the  side  of  Jaen,  hovered  on 
the  hills  behind  the  French,  ready  to  fall  on  the  rear 
when  they  should  attack  the  bridge. 

Dupont  having  observed  this  disposition,  placed  the 
cavalry,  the  Swiss  regiments,  and  the  marine  battalion 
in  reserve,  facing  to  the  hills,  and  with  the  division  of 
Barbou  stormed  the  head  of  the  bridge.  The  Span- 
iards there,  making  a  feeble  resistance,  were  driven 
across  the  river,  and  their  whole  line  immediately  fled 
to  the  camp  at  Cordoba.  The  multitude  on  the  hills 
descended  during  the  battle,  but  were  beaten  back  by 
the  cavalry  witb  loss,  and  the  French  general,  then 
leaving  the  marine  battalion  at  Alcolea,  to  secure  the 
bridge,  marched  with  the  rest  of  his  forces  to  complete 
the  victory.  At  his  approach  the  Spaniards  took  re- 
fuge in  the  town,  and  opened  a  fire  of  musketry  from 
the  walls,  whereupon  the  French,  bursting  the  gates 
with  ilieir  field-pieces,  broke  in,  and  after  a  short  and 
confused  fight  Echevaria's  men  fled  along  the  Seville 
Toad,  pursued  by  the  cavalry.  As  the  inhabitants  took 
no  part  in  the  contest,  and  received  the  French  without 
any  signs  of  aversion,  the  first  disorders  attendant  on 
the  action  were  soon  suppressed,  the  town  was  protect- 
ed from  pillage,  and  Dupont,  fixing  his  quarters  there, 
Bent  patroles  as  far  as  Ecija  without  finding  an  enemy. 

In  Seville  the  news  of  this  disaster,  and  the  arrival 
of  the  fugitives,  struck  such  a  terror,  that  the  junta 
were  only  prevented  from  retiring  to  Cadiz  by  their 
dread  of  the  populace,  they  even  entertained  thoughts 
of  abandoning  Spain  altogether,  and  flying  to  South 
America.*  Castanos,  who  a  few  days  before  had  been 
declared  captain-general  of  the  armies,  and  was  at  this 
time  in  march  with  seven  thousand  troops  of  the  line 
from  San  Roque,  repaired  to  Seville  the  9th,  and  after 
a  short  conference  with  the  junta,  proceeded  to  take  the 
command  of  Echevaria's  forces  ;  the  greater  part  of 
these  were  re-assembled  at  Carmona,  but  in  such  con- 
fusion, and  so  moody,  that  Castanos  returned  immedi- 
ately. Having  persuaded  the  president  Saavedra  to 
accompany  him,  he  fixed  his  head-quarters  at  Utrera, 
where  he  gathered  two  or  three  thousand  regulars  from 
the  nearest  garrisons,  directed  all  the  new  levies  to  re- 
pair to  him,  and  hastened  the  march  of  his  own  men 
from  San  Roque.  |  He  also  pressed  general  Spencer  to 
diseml)ark,  and  take  up  a  position  with  the  British  for- 
ces at  Xeres  ;  hut  that  officer,  for  reasons  hereafter  to 
be    mentioned,  sailed    to  Ayamonte, — a  circumstance 


»  Ntll.rlo. 


I  Sir  Hew  DalrymjAc's  Papers. 


which  augmented  the  general  distrust  of  the  English, 
prevailing  at  the  time,  and  secretly  fomented  by  Morla, 
and  by  several  members  of  the  junta. 

Andalusia  was  lost,  if  Dupont  had  advanced.  His 
inactivity  saved  it.  Instead  of  pushing  his  victory,  he 
wrote  to  Savary  for  reinforcements,  and  to  general 
Avril,  desiring  that  he  would,  without  delay,  come  to 
his  assistance,  remaining  himself  meanwhile  in  Cordo- 
ba, overwhelmed  with  imaginary  dangers  and  difficul- 
ties. For  although  Castanos  had  in  a  few  days  col- 
lected at  Carmona  and  Utrera,  seven  or  eight  thousand 
regulars,  and  above  fifty  thousand  new  levies  ;  and 
although  Dupont's  desponding  letters  were  intercepted 
and  brought  to  him,  such  was  the  condition  of  altairs 
that,  resigning  all  thoughts  of  making  a  stand,  he  had, 
under  the  pretence  of  completing  the  defences  of  Cadiz, 
embarked  the  heavy  artillery  and  stores  at  Seville,  re- 
solving, if  Dupont  should  advance,  to  burn  the  timbers 
and  harness  of  his  field  artillery,  and  retreat  to  Cadiz. 
Nevertheless  he  continued  the  organization  of  his  for- 
ces, filled  up  the  old  regiments  with  new  levies,  and 
formed  fresh  battalions,  in  which  he  was  assisted  by 
two  foreigners ;  the  marquis  de  Coupigny,  a  crafty 
French  emigrant,  of  some  experience  in  war,  and  Red- 
ing, a  Swiss,  a  bold,  enterprising,  honest  man,  but  with- 
out judgment,  and  of  very  moderate  talents  as  an  officer. 

Castafios  wished  to  adopt  a  defensive  plan,  to  make 
Cadiz  his  place  of  arms,  and  to  form  an  entrenched 
camp,  where  he  hoped  to  be  joined  by  ten  or  twelve 
thousand  British  troops,  and,  in  security,  to  organize 
and  discipline  a  large  army  ;  but,  in  reality,  he  had 
merely  the  name  and  the  troubles  of  a  commander-in- 
chief,  without  the  power.*  Morla  was  his  enemy,  and 
the  junta,  containing  men  determined  to  use  their  au- 
thority for  their  own  emolument  and  the  gratification 
of  private  enmity,  were  jealous  lest  Casta  .os  should 
control  their  proceedings  ;  they  thwarted  him,  humour- 
ed the  caprice  and  insolence  of  the  populace,  and  med- 
dled with  affairs  foreign  to  the  matter  in  hand.  But  as 
the  numbers  at  Utrera  increased,  the  general  confidence 
augmented,  and  a  retreat  was  no  longer  contemplated  ; 
plans  were  laid  to  surround  Dupont  in  Cordoba,  and 
one  detachment  of  peasants,  commanded  by  regular 
officers,  was  sent  to  occupy  the  passes  of  the  Sierra 
Morena,  leading  into  Estremadura;  another  detach- 
ment marched  from  Grenada,  accompanied  by  a  regi- 
ment of  the  line,  to  seize  Carolina,  and  cut  off  the 
communication  with  La  Mancha;  a  third,  under  colo- 
nel Valderafios,  prbposed  to  attack  the  French  in  Cor- 
doba without  any  assistance  ;  and  this  eagerness  for 
action  was  increased  by  a  knowledge  of  the  situation 
of  affairs  in  Portugal,  and  by  rumours  exaggerating  tiie 
strength  of  Filanghieri  and  Cuesta.  It  was  believed 
that  the  latter  had  advanced  to  Valladolid,  and  had 
offered  Murat  the  option  of  abiding  an  attack,  or  retir- 
ing immediately  to  France  by  stated  marches,  and  that, 
alarmed  at  Cuesta's  power,  the  grand  duke  was  forti- 
fying the  Retiro.  These  reports,  so  congenial  to  the 
wishes  and  vanity  of  the  Andalusians,  caused  the  de- 
fensive plan  proposed  by  Castanos  to  be  rejected  ;  and 
when  Dupont's  des|)atches,  magnifying  his  own  danger 
and  pressing  in  the  most  urgent  manner  for  reinforco- 
ments,  were  again  intercepted  and  brought  to  bead-quar- 
ters,  it  was  resolved  to  attack  Cordoba  immediately. 

Dupont's  fears  outstripped  the  Spaniard's  impatience. 
After  ten  days  of  inactivity,  by  wiiich  he  lost  the  im- 
mediate fruit  of  his  victory  at  Alcolea, — the  lead  in  an 
offensive  campaign,  and  all  the  imposing  moral  force 
of  the  French  reputation  in  arms,  he  resolved  to  fall 
back  to  Andujar,  because  Savary  would  not  promise 
any  succwur  save  what  Moncey,  after  subduing  Valen- 
cia, could  give  by  the  circuitous  route  of  Murcia.  j"  This 


*  Sir  Hew  Dalryinple's  Papers, 
f  Jaurnul  of  Dupout'a  OperatioM. 


1808.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR    WAR. 


35 


retreat  was  commenced  the  17th  nf  June,  and  the  French 
wero  followed  as  far  as  Carpio  hy  the  advanced  guard 
of  the  Andalusians,  under  general  Coupigny.* 

Along-  the  line  of  march,  and  in  the  town  of  Andu- 
jar,  where  he  arrived  the  evening  of  the  18th,  Dupont 
found  terrible  proofs  of  Spanish  ferocity  ;  his  strag- 
glers had  been  assassinated,  and  his  hospital  taken  ; 
the  sick,  the  medical  attendants,  the  couriers,  the  staff 
officers,  in  fine,  all  who  had  the  misfortune  to  be  weak- 
er than  the  insurgents,  were  butchered,  with  circum- 
stances cf  extraordinary  barbarity,  and  upwards  of  four 
hundred  men  had  perished  in  this  miserable  manner 
since  the  fight  nf  Alcolea.t  The  fite  of  colonel  Rene 
was  horrible.  He  had  been  sent  on  a  mission  to  Por- 
tuofal,  previous  to  the  breaking  out  of  hostilities,  and 
was  en  his  return,  travelling  in  the  ordinary  mode, 
without  arms,  attached  to  no  army,  engaged  in  no  op- 
erations of  war.  but  being  recognised  as  a  Frenchman, 
he  was  Sf  ized,  mutilated,  and  then  being  placed,  liv- 
inij.  between  two  plrnks  was  sawed  in  two. 

At  Andujar  the  French  general  collected  provisions, 
and  prepared  to  maintain  himself  until  he  should  be 
reinforced  ;  yet  wishing  to  punish  the  city  of  Jaen, 
from  whence  the  bands  had  come  to  murder  his  sick, 
he  sent  captain  Baste,  a  naval  officer,  with  a  battalion 
of  infantry  and  some  cavalry,  to  accomplish  that  object. 
The  soldiers,  inflamed  by  the  barbarity  of  their  ene- 
mies, inflicted  a  severe  measure  of  retaliation,  because 
it  is  the  nature  of  cruelty  to  reproduce  itself  in  war; 
and  for  this  reason,  although  the  virtue  of  clemency  is 
to  all  persons  becoming,  it  is  peculiarly  so  to  an  offi- 
cer, the  want  of  it  leading  to  so  many  and  such  great 
evils.  Meanwhile  the  Andalusian  army  remained  quiet, 
and  Dupont.  who  knew  that  general  Vedel,  with  a  di- 
vision of  infantry,  and  escortinor  a  large  convoy  for  the 
army,  was  marching  through  La  Mancha,  sent  captain 
'  Baste  with  a  second  detachment  to  clear  the  pass  of 
Despefas  Perros.  which  was  now  occupied  hy  insur- 
gents and  smugglers  from  Grenada  to  the  number  of 
three  thousand.  Th_?  pass  was  of  incredible  strength, 
and  the  Spaniards  had  artillery,  and  were  partially  en- 
trenched ;  however  their  commander,  a  colonel  of  the 
line,  deserted  to  the  enemy,  and  before  Baste  could 
arrive,  Vedel  had  forced  his  way  to  Carolina,  where 
he  left  a  detachment,  and  then  descended  to  Baylen,  a 
small  town  sixteen  miles  from  Andujar.  But  other 
insurgents  came  from  Grenada,  to  Jaen,  and  would 
have  moved  on  Despeilas  Perros  and  Carolina,  by  the 
Linhares  road  ;  wherefore  Vedel  sent  general  Cassagne 
against  them,  Jaen  was  again  taken,  and  the  Grenadans 
were  driven  back  with  slaughter;  but  the  French  w^ho 
lost  two  hundred  men,  returned  on  the  5th  to  Baylen 
without  the  provisions,  to  obtain  which  had  been  one 
object  of  the  expedition. 

Notwithstanding  these  successes,  and  that  Vedel, 
besides  his  own  division,  brought  reinforcements  for 
Barbou's  division  and  the  cavalry,  Dupont's  fears  in- 
creased. His  position  at  Andujar  covered  the  main 
mad  from  Seville  to  Carolina ;  but  eight  miles  lower 
down  the  river,  it  could  be  turned  by  the  bridge  of 
Marmolexo ;  sixteen  miles  higher  up  by  the  roads 
leading  from  Jaen  to  the  ferry  of  Mengibar  and  Bay- 
len ;  and  beyond  that  line  by  roads  from  Jaen  and 
«  Grenada  to  Uzeda,  Linhares,  and  the  passes  of  El  Rey 
and  Despenas  Perros.  The  dryness  of  the  season  had 
rendered  the  Guadalquivir  fordable  in  many  places  ;  the 
regulri.r  force  under  Castaiios  was  daily  increasing  in 
strength  ;  the  population  around  was  actively  hostile, 
and  the  young  French  soldiers  were  drooping  under 
privations  and  the  heat  of  the  climate  :  six  hundred 
were  in  hospital,  and  the  whole  were  discouraged. :j:  It 


*  Aapolfon's  Notes. 

+  Whittinfjhani.     Journal  of  Dupont.     Fo~'s  History.     Vic- 
loires  et  Conquetes. 

J  Dupont's  Journal.     Toy's  Ilistorj. 


is  in  such  situations  that  the  worth  of  a  veteran  is 
found  ;  in  battle  the  ardour  of  youth  often  appears  to 
shame  the  cool  indifference  of  the  old  soldier,  but  when 
the  strife  is  between  the  malice  of  fortune  and  fortitude, 
between  human  endurance  and  accumulating  hardships, 
the  veteran  becomes  truly  formidable,  when  the  youuf 
soldier  resigns  himself  to  despair. 

After  the  actions  at  Jaen.  Vedel  posted  general  Li- 
gier  Bellair's  brigade  at  the  ferry  of  Mengibar,  with  a 
post  beyond  the  river,  but  on  the  13th  this  post  was 
driven  across  the  Guadalquivir,  and  on  the  15th,  Go- 
bert,  who  should  have  been  at  Rio  Seco  with  Bessieres, 
arrived  at  Baylen  with  a  division  of  infantry  and  some 
cuirassiers.  Vedel  then  advanced  to  Mengibar,  and  it 
was  full  time,  seeing  that  the  whole  vSpanish  army  was 
on  the  opposite  bank  of  the  river.*  For  when  Dupont's 
retreat  from  Cordoba  had  frustrated  the  plan  of  the 
Spaniards  to  surround  him,  Castafios  would  have  re- 
turned to  his  old  project  of  a  rigorous  defensive  system, 
but  the  junta,  although  at  first  they  acquiesced,  were 
unsettled  in  their  policy,  and  getting  intelligence  of 
Vedel's  march,  had  ordered  Castaiios  to  attack  Du- 
pont at  Andujar  before  the  reinforcements  could  arrive. | 

The  Spanish  general  had  twenty-five  thousand  regu- 
lar infantry,  two  thousand  cavalry,  and  a  very  heavy 
train  of  artillery.  Large  bodies  of  armed  peasantry, 
commanded  by  officers  of  the  line,  attended  this  army, 
and  the  numbers  varied  from  day  to  day,  but  the  whole 
multitude  that  advanced  towards  the  Guadalquivir 
could  not  have  been  less  than  fifty  thousand  mr«i ; 
hence  the  intellio-ence  that  Vedel  had  actually  arrived 
did  not  much  allay  the  general  fierceness.  Castar.os, 
however,  was  less  sanguine  than  the  rest,  and  learninir 
that  Spencer  had  again  returned  to  Cadiz  with  his  di- 
vision, he  once  more  requested  him  to  land  and  advance 
to  Xeres,  to  afl^ord  a  point  of  retreat  in  the  event  of  a 
disaster,  and  the  English  general  consented  to  disem- 
bark, but  refused  to  advance  farther  than  Port  St.  Mary.ij^ 

From  the  1st  of  July  the  Spanish  army  occupied  a 
position  extending  from  Carpio  to  Porcuiias,  and  the 
llth,  a  council  of  war  being  held,  it  was  resolved  that 
Reding's  division  should  cross  the  Guadalquivir  at  the 
ferry  of  Mengibar,  and  gain  Baylen  ;  !|  that  Coupigny 
should  cross  at  Villa  Nueva,  and  support  Reding;  and 
that  Castaiios,  with  the  other  two  divisions,  advancing 
to  the  heights  of  Argonilla,  should  attack  Andujar  in 
front,  while  Reding  and  Coupigny  should  descend 
from  Baylen  and  attack  it  in  the  rear  :  some  detach- 
ments of  light  troops  under  colonel  Cruz  were  also  or- 
dered to  pass  the  Guadalquivir  by  Marmolexo,  and 
to  seize  the  passes  leading  through  the  Morena  to  Es- 
tremadura.  The  13th,  Reding,  with  the  first  division, 
and  three  or  four  thousand  peasantry,  marched  towards 
Mengibar,  and,  as  I  have  said,  drove  the  French  post 
over  the  Guadalquivir,  while  Coupigny,  with  the  second 
division,  took  the  road  of  Villa  Nueva.  §  The  15lh,  Cas- 
taiios crowned  the  heights  of  Argonilla,  in  front  of  An- 
dujar, with  two  divisions  of  infantry,  and  a  multitude 
of  irregular  troops ;  Coupigny  skirmished  with  the 
French  picquets  at  Villa  Nueva,  and  Reding  attacked 
Ligier  Bellair,  but  when  Vedel  came  up  retired.  If 
When  Dupont  saw  the  heights  of  Argonilla  covered 
with  enemies  he  sent  to  Vedel  for  succour,  broke  the 
bridge  of  Marmolexo,  occupied  an  old  tower  on  the 
bridge  of  Andujar,  and  detached  cavalry  parties  to  watch 
the  fords  above  and  below  the  town.  The  15th  Casta- 
iios cannonaded  the  bridge  of  Andujar,  while  colonel 
Cruz,  with  four  thousand  men,  crossed  the  river  near 
Marmolexo.  The  16th  he  attacked,  and  Cruz  fell  up- 
on the  French  rear,  but  was  chased  into  the  hills  by  a 
single  battalion,  and  about  two  o'clock  Vedel,  who  had 


*  Vedel's  Precis  of  Operations. 

•f  Whittinghani's  Correspondence.  MSS.  {  Ibid. 

II  Ibid.  {  Ibid.  T  Du^oonfs  Journal      I'oj, 


S6 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR, 


[Book  I. 


marched  all  night,  arrived,  which  put  an  end  to  the  ac- 
tion. * 

Durinor  those  events,  Reding  passed  the  Guadalquivir 
at  Menjjihar,  and  drove  Ligicr  Belhiir  before  him,  Go- 
berl  arrTved,  and  renewed  the  action,  but  fell  mortally 
■wounded,  and  trpneral  Dufour  suceeeiled  him.  The 
Frenrh  then  returned  to  Baylen,  HedinjT  to  Meng^ibar, 
and  Dufour,  findiiig  the  Spaniards  did  not  push  their 
success,  raslily  credited  a  rumour  that  they  were  in 
march  by  l/mhares,  and  therefore  retreated  to  Carolina. 
Meanwhile  Dupont,  hearing,  on  the  evening  of  the  IGlh, 
that  Mengibar  had  been  forced,  sent  Vedel  again  to 
Baylen,  luit  with  instructions  so  vague  that  he  was  in- 
duced to  follow  Dufour  on  the  17th,  whereupon  Reding, 
who,  strange  to  say,  had  remained  tranquil  at  Mengi- 
bar,  being  now  reinforced  by  Coupigny,  seized  Baylen 
in  the  uFsht,  and  throwing  out  a  detachment  on  \he 
side  of  Carolina,  took  a  position  focing  Andujar  with 
about  twenty  thousand  men  including  a  multitude  of 
peasants. 

The  armies  were  thus  interlaced  in  a  singular  man- 
ner, Dupont  between  Reding  and  Castafios,  Reding  be- 
tween Dupont  and  Vedel,  and  the  affair  became  one  of 
time,  yet  Castailos  remained  tranquil  in  his  camp,  and 
Dupont,  although  he  knew  on  the  17lh  of  Vedel's  march 
to  Carolina,  did  not  quit  Andujar  until  the  night  of  the 
18lh.  His  movement  was  unobserved  by  Castanos, 
and  at  day-break  he  reached  the  Tiedras,  a  torrent  with 
ruo-tred  banks,  only  two  miles  from  Reding's  position 
which  was  strong,  well  shaded  with  olive-trees,  and 
intersected  by  deep  ravines.  Dupont,  hoping  that  Ve- 
del would  return,  immediately  passed  the  Tiedras, 
and  leavine  Barbou  with  a  few  battalions  on  that  stream, 
to  check  Castafios  if  he  should  arrive  during  the  action, 
fell  on,  yet  feebly,  and  with  few  troops ;  for  his  march 
had  been  nnmilitary,  and  his  best  soldiers  were  employ- 
ed guarding  the  baggage,  which  was  enormous,  and 
mixed  with  the  columns.  For  some  time  the  French 
appeared  to  gain  ground,  but  fatigued  by  their  night's 
work,  and  unable  to  force  the  principal  points,  they  be- 
came discouraged  ;  the  Swiss  then  went  over  to  the 
Spaniards,  and  about  twelve  o'clock,  after  losing  two 
thousand  men,  killed  and  wounded,  Dupont  proposed 
an  armistice  with  a  view  to  a  convention,  which  Red- 
ing, hard  pressed,  willingly  granted. 

Vedel  had  quitted  Carolina  at  five  in  the  morning  of 
the  19ih.  The  sound  of  battle  became  distinct  as  he 
advanced,  yet  he  halted  at  Guaroman,  two  leagues 
from  Baylen,  and  remained  there  until  three  o'clock,  to 
refresh  his  men,  and  to  ascertain  if  any  enemy  was  at 
Linhares  ;  |  when  the  firing  had  entirely  ceased,  he  re- 
sumed his  march,  and  coming  upon  the  rear  of  Reding, 
attacked,  and  after  some  fighting,  captured  two  guns 
and  made  fifteen  hundred  prisoners  ;  j^  an  aide-du-camp 
of  Dupont's  then  brought  him  an  order  to  cease  the  at- 
tack, whereupon  he  awaited  the  result  of  this  singular 
crisis. 

Castanos  who  did  not  discover  Dupont's  march  until 
eight  hours  after  the  latter's  departure  from  Andujar, 
had  sent  La  Pena's  division  in  pursuit,  but  remained 
himself  in  that  town.  II  La  Pena  reached  the  Tiedras 
about  five  o'clock,  and  soon  after,  one  Villoutreys  pas- 
sed his  posts,  going  to  ask  CastaHos'  consent  to  the 
terms  accepted  by  Reding,  and  on  the  20th  generals 
Marescot  and  Chabcrt  likewise  passed  to  Andujar,  be- 
ing empowered  by  Dupont  to  conclude  a  convention.  § 
They  demanded  permission  for  the  French  army  to  re- 
tire peaceably  upon  Madrid,  and  Castanos  was  ready 
to  grant  this,  but  Savary's  lelt(>r,  written  just  before  the 
battii'  of  Rio  Seco,  to  recal  Dupont,  was  intercepted, 
and  brought  at  this  moment  to  the  Spanish  head-quarters. 


The  aspect  of  affairs  immediately  chnnn-ed,  and  a  con- 
vention was  no  longer  in  question.  Dupont's  troops 
were  required  to  lay  down  their  arms,  and  become  pri- 
soners of  war,  on  condition  of  being  sent  by  sea  to 
France,  and  Vedel's  division  was  to  surrender,  and  be 
sent  to  France  likewise,  but  not  as  prisoners  of  war : 
without  hesitation  these  terms  were  accepted. 

Meanwhile  Vedel  had  proposed  to  Dupont  to  make  a 
joint  attack  upon  Reding,  and  general  Prive  gave  a  like 
counsel,  but  the  French  general  refused,  and  sent  Vedel 
orders  to  give  up  his  prisoners,  and  retreat  to  Carolina.  * 
Castaf.os  menaced  Dupont  with  death  if  Vedel  did  not 
return,  and  the  latter,  on  receiving  his  commander's  or- 
ders to  that  effect,  did  come  back  to  Baylen  the  22d, 
and  surrendered.  Thus  above  eighteen  thousand 
French  soldiers  laid  down  their  arms,  before  a  raw  ar- 
my incapable  of  resisting  half  that  number  led  by  an 
able  man.  Nor  did  this  end  the  disgraceful  transaction, 
for  Villoutreys,  as  if  to  show  how  far  fear  and  folly  com- 
bined, will  carry  men,  passed  the  Morena  with  a  Spanish 
escort,  and  gathering  up  the  detachments  left  by  Du- 
pont in  La  Mancha,  even  to  within  a  short  distance  of 
Toledo,  sent  them  to  Andujar  as  prisoners  under  the 
convention.  Nay,  he  even  informed  Castanos  how  to 
capture  two  French  battalions  that  had  been  left  to 
guard  the  passes  into  La  Mancha ;  and  these  unheard- 
of  proceedings  were  quietly  submitted  to  by  men  be- 
longing to  that  army  which  for  fifteen  years  had  been 
the  terror  of  Europe  ;  a  proof  how  much  the  character 
of  soldiers  depends  upon  their  immediate  chief. 

This  capitulation,  shameful  in  itself,  was  shamefully 
broken.  The  French  troops,  instead  of  being  sent  to 
France,  were  maltreated,  and  numbers  of  them  murder- 
ed in  cold  blood,  especially  at  Lebrixa,  where  above 
eighty  officers  were  massacred  in  the  most  cowardly 
manner.  Armed  only  with  their  swords,  they  kept  tlie 
assassins  for  some  time  at  bay,  and  gathering  in  a  com- 
pany, upon  an  open  space  in  the  town,  endeavoured  t© 
save  their  lives,  but  a  fire  from  the  neighbouring  houses 
was  kept  up  until  the  last  of  those  unfortunate  gentle- 
men fell.  No  distinction  was  made  between  Dupont's 
and  Vedel's  troops,  and  all  who  survived  the  march  to 
Cadiz,  after  being  exposed  to  every  species  qf  indigni- 
ty, were  cast  into  the  hulks  at  Cadiz,  whence  a  few 
hundreds  escaped,  two  years  afterwards,  by  cutting  the 
cables  of  their  prison-ship,  and  drifting  in  a  storm  upon 
a  lee  shore  :  the  remainder,  transported  to  the  desert 
island  of  Cabrera,  perished  by  lingering  torments  in 
such  numbers,  that  few  remained  alive  at  the  termina- 
tion of  the  war.  Dupont  himself  was  permitted  to  re- 
turn to  France,  and  to  take  with  him  all  the  generals  ; 
and  it  is  curious  that  general  Prive,  who  had  remons- 
trated strongly  against  the  capitulation,  and  had  press- 
ed Dupont,  on  the  field,  to  force  a  passage  through  Red- 
ing's army,  was  the  only  one  left  behind,  f 

Don  Thomas  Morla,  after  a  vain  attempt  to  involve 
lord  Collingwood  and  sir  Hew  Dalrymple  in  the  trans- 
action, formally  defended  the  conduct  of  the  junta  in 
breaking  the  capitulation  ;  and  soon  afterwards  betray- 
ed his  own  country  with  the  readiness  that  might  be 
expected  from  his  shameless  conduct  on  this  occasion. 

OBSERVATIONS. 

I.  The  gross  amount  of  Dupont's  corps  when  it  first 
entered  Spain  was  about  twenty-four  thousand  men, 
with  three  thousand  five  hundred  horses ;  of  these 
twenty-one  thousand  were  fit  for  duty.  X  It  was  after- 
wards strengthened  by  a  provisionary  regiment  of  cui- 
rassiers, a  marine  battalion  of  the  guard,  and  the  two 
Swiss  regiments  of  Prenx  and  Reding.  It  could  not 
therefore  have  been  less  than  twenty-four  thousand 
fighting  men  when  Dupont  arrived  in  Andalusia;  and 
as  the  whole  of  Vedel's,  and  the  greatest  part  of  Go- 


•  Vfidfl's  Irfris.  t  Foy. 

J  Journal  of  Dupo-.t's  Oportfions.     MSS. 
(l  Whittinghaiu's  Corrciij.ond  nee      MSS. 


Ibid. 


*  Vp(if  I's  Prdcis  of  Operations. 
{  Rtti|rn  o;'  the  French  army. 


f  Victoires  et  Conquetcs. 


18(}8.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


37 


bert's  division,  had  joined  before  the  capitulation,  and 
as  eiohteen  thousand  men  laid  down  their  arms  at  Bay- 
len,  Diipont  must  have  lost  by  wounds,  desertion,  and 
deaths  in  hospital  or  the  field,  above  five  thousand  men. 

2.  The  order  which  directed  his  corps  upon  Cadiz 
was  drspatt^'hed  from  Bayonne  before  the  Spanish  insur- 
rection broke  out ;  it  was  therefore  strange  that  Dupont 
should  have  persevered  in  his  march,  when  he  found 
affairs  in  such  a  different  state,  from  that  contemplated 
by  Napoleon  at  the  time  the  instructions  for  this  expe- 
dition were  framed.  If  the  emperor  considered  it  ne- 
cessary to  reinforce  the  division,  which  marched  under 
Dupont's  own  command,  with  a  detachment  from  the 
army  in  Portugal,  before  the  insurrection  broke  out,  it 
was  evident  that  he  never  could  have  intended,  that 
that  general  should  blindly  follow  the  letter  of  his  or- 
ders, when  a  great  and  unexpected  resistance  was  op- 
posed to  him,  and  that  the  detachment  from  Portugal 
was  unable  to  eff'ect  a  junction.  The  march  to  Cordo- 
ba was  therefore  an  error,  and  it  was  a  great  error,  be- 
cause Dupont  confesses  in  his  memoir,  he  advanced 
under  the  conviction  that  his  force  was  too  weak  to  ob- 
tain success,  and,  consequently,  having  no  object,  his 
operations  could  only  lead  to  a  waste  of  lives. 

3.  At  Cordoba,  Dupont  remained  in  a  state  of  torpor 
for  ten  days.  This  was  the  second  error  of  a  series 
which  led  to  his  ruin;  he  should  either  have  followed 
up  his  victory  and  attacked  Seville  in  the  first  moment 
of  consternation,  or  he  should  have  retired  to  Andujar 
while  he  might  do  so  without  the  appearance  of  being 
compelled  to  it.  If  he  had  followed  the  first  plan, 
the  city  would  inevitably  have  fallen  before  him,  and 
thus  time  would  have  been  gained  for  the  arrival  of  the 
second  and  third  division  of  his  corps.  It  may  be  ob- 
jected, that  ten  thousand  men  dared  not  penetrate  so 
far  into  a  hostile  country;  but  at  Alcolea,  Dupont 
boasts  of  having  defeated  forty  thousand  men  without 
any  loss  to  himself:  from  such  armies,  then,  he  had 
nothing  to  fear,  and  the  very  fact  of  his  having  pushed 
his  small  force  between  the  multitudes  that  he  defeated 
upon  the  7th,  proves  that  he  despised  them.*  '  He  retired 
from  (Jordoba.'  he  says  in  his  memoir,  '  because  to 
fight  a  battle  when  victory  can  be  of  no  use,  is  against 
all  discretion  ;'  but  to  make  no  use  of  a  victory  when 
it  is  gained,  comes  to  the  same  thing,  and  ho  should 
never  have  moved  from  Andujar,  unless  with  the  deter- 
mination of  taking  Seville.  These  errors  were,  how- 
ever, redeemable;  the  position  behind  the  Guadalquivir, 
the  checks  given  to  the  patriots  at  Jean  after  the  arri- 
val of  Vedel  at  Carolina  upon  the  27th,  above  all,  the 
opportune  junction  of  Gobert  at  the  moment  when  Cas- 
tanos  and  Reding  appeared  in  front  of  the  French  line, 
proved  that  it  was  not  fortune,  but  common  sense,  that 
deserted  Dupont.  The  Spanish  forces  divided, and  ex- 
tended from  Argonilla  to  INIengibar,  were  exposed  to  be 
beaten  in  detail  ;  but  as  their  adversary  was  indulgent 
to  them,  their  false  movements  were  successful,  and, 
amidst  the  mass  of  greater  errors  on  both  sides,  ap- 
peared like  acts  of  wisdom. 

4.  At  Mengibar  a  variety  of  roads  branch  oflT,  lead- 
ing to  Jaen,  to  Linhares,  to  Baylen,  and  other  places. 
From  Andujar,  a  road  nearly  parallel  to  the  Guadal- 
quivir runs  to  the  ferry  of  Mengibar,  and  forms  the 
base  of  a  triangle,  of  which  Baylen  may  be  taken  as 
the  apex.  The  distance  of  this  latter  town  from  the 
ferry  is  about  six  miles,  from  the  ferry  to  Andujar  is 
about  eighteen,  and  from  the  latter  to  Baylen  the  dis- 
tance may  be  sixteen  miles.  P'ifteen  miles  above  Bay- 
len, the  town  of  Carolina,  situated  in  the  gorge  of  the 
Sierra  Morena,  was  the  point  of  communication  with 
La  Mancha,  and  the  line  of  retreat  for  the  French  in 
the  event  of  a  defeat ;  hence  Baylen,  not  Andujar,  was 
the  pivot  of  operations.     The  French  force  was  infe- 


Dupont's  Journal  of  Operation* 


rior  in  numtier  to  that  under  Casta~os,  yet  Dupont 
spread  his  divisions  upon  several  points,  and  the  natu- 
ral results  followed.  The  Spaniards,  althouirh  the 
most  unwieldy  body,  took  the  lead  and  became  the  as- 
sailants ;  the  French  divisions  were  worn  out  bj^  use- 
less marches  ;  the  orders  of  their  chief  were  mista- 
ken or  disobe3'ed  ;  one  position  being  forced,  another 
was  of  necessity  abandoned,  confusion  ensued  ;  and 
finally  Dupont  saj's  he  surrendered  with  eighteen  ih'iit- 
<!and  men,  because  his  fighting  force  was  reduced  to 
(wo  thnmand  :*  such  an  avowal  saves  the  honour  of 
his  soldiers,  but  destroys  his  own  reputation  as  a  gen* 
eral.  The  first  question  to  ask  is,  what  became  of  the 
remainder  ?  Why  had  he  so  few  when  ten  thousand  of 
his  army  never  fired  a  shot?  It  nuist  be  confessed  that 
Dupont,  unless  a  worse  explanation  can  be  given  of 
his  conduct,  was  incapable  to  the  last  degree.  But 
thi,s  worse  explanation  has  been  given.  His  own  offi- 
cers, as  well  as  the  Spaniards,  assert  that  his  baggage 
was  filled  with  plunder,  and  that  he  surrendered  to 
save  it ! 

5.  There  were  two  plans,  either  of  which  promised 
a  reasonable  chance  of  success,  under  the  circumstances 
in  which  the  French  army  was  placed  on  the  14th 
1st.  To  abandon  Andujar,  send  all  the  incumbrances 
into  La  Mancha,  secure  the  passes,  unite  the  fighting 
men  at  Carolina,  and  fall  in  one  mass  upon  the  first 
corps  of  Spaniards  that  advanced:  the  result  of  such 
an  attack  could  hardly  have  been  doubtful,  but  if,  con- 
trar)'  to  all  probability,  the  Spaniards  had  been  suc- 
cessful, the  retreat  was  open  and  safe.  2dly.  To  se- 
cure Carolina  by  a  detachment,  and  placing  small  bo- 
dies in  observation  at  Andujar  and  the  ferry  of  Mengi- 
bar, to  unite  the  army  on  the  15th  at  Baylen.  and  in 
that  central  position  aw^ait  the  enemy.  If  the  two 
corps  of  the  Spanish  army  had  presented  themselves 
simultaneously  upon  both  roads,  the  position  was  strong 
for  battle,  and  the  retreat  open;  if  one  approached  be- 
fore the  other,  each  might  have  been  encountered  and 
crushed  separately.  Dupont  had  a  force  more  than 
sufficient  for  this  object,  and  fortune  was  not  against 
him. 

6.  On  the  Spanish  side  the  direction  in  which  Red- 
ing marched  was  good,  but  it  should  have  been  followed 
by  the  whole  army.  The  heights  of  Argonilla  would 
have  screened  the  march  of  Castarios,  and  a  few  troops 
with  some  heavy  guns  left  in  frost  of  the  bridge  of 
Andujar,  would  have  sufficed  to  occupy  Dupont's  atten- 
tion. If  the  latter  general  had  attacked  Castafos  upon 
the  morning  of  the  16th,  when  Vedel's  division  arrived 
from  Baylen,  the  twelve  thousand  men  thus  united  by 
accident,  would  easily  have  overthrown  the  two  Span- 
ish divisions  in  front  of  Andujar;  and  Reding,  if  he 
had  lost  an  hour  in  retreating  to  Jaen,  might  have  been 
taken  in  flank  by  the  victorious  troops,  and  in  front  by 
Gobert,  and  so  destroyed.  Instead  of  availing  iiimself 
of  this  opening,  the  French  general  sent  A'edel  back 
to  Baylen,  followed  himself  two  days  after,  and  being 
encountered  by  Reding,  vainly  hoped  that  the  divisions, 
which  with  so  much  pains  he  had  dispersed,  would 
reunite  to  relieve  hiin  from  his  desperate  situation. 

7.  In  the  action  Dupont  clung  tenaciously  to  the 
miserable  system  of  dividing  his  troops,  when  his  only 
chance  of  safety  was  to  force  Reding  before  CastaTos 
could  arrive  upon  the  Tiedras;  it  was  a  wretched  mis- 
application of  rules,  to  have  a  reserve  watching  that 
torrent,  and  to  fight  a  formal  battle  with  a  first  and 
second  line,  and  half  a  dozen  puny  columns  of  attack. 
An  energetic  off^.cer  would  have  formed  iiis  troops  in  a 
dense  mass,  and  broken  at  once  through  the  opposing 
force  upon  the  weakest  point;  there  are  few  armies  so 
good,  that  such  an  assault  would  not  open  a  passage 
through  them;  seven   thousand   infantry  with   cavalry 

*    >."*upont's  Journal,  MSS. 


38 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR, 


[Book  f. 


and  artillery  is  a  powerful  column  of  attack,  and  the 
Spanish  line  could  not  have  withstood  it  for  a  moment. 
The  battle  should  have  been  one  of  half  an  hour;  Du- 
pont,  by  his  ridiculous  evolutions,  made  it  one  of  ten 
hours,  and  yet  so  badly  did  the  patriots  fiffht,  that  in 
all  that  lime  not  a  sinfjle  prisoner  or  ^un  fell  into  their 
hands,  and  the  fact  of  Redinor's  enterinsr  at  all  into  a 
convention,  proves  his  fears  for  the  final  result.  It  is 
truly  astonishing  that  Dupont,  who,  from  his  rank, 
must  have  been  well  acquainted  with  Napoleon's  Ital- 
ian campaigfns,  should  have  caught  so  little  of  the 
spirit  of  his  master.  And  then  the  capitulation  of 
Vedel,  after  his  retreat  was  actually  effected  !  Vedel, 
who  might  have  given  battle  and  disputed  the  victory 
by  himself  without  any  great  imprudence  !  Joseph 
called  Dupont's  capitulation,  a  '  Jtfeclion.^ 

8.  Castaiios,  although  active  in  preparation,  discov- 
ered but  little  talent  in  the  field  ;  his  movements  were 
slow,  uncertain,  and  generally  false.  The  attempt  to 
turn  the  French  position  at  Andujar  by  detaching  four 
thousand  men  across  the  river,  was  ill  conceived  and 
badly  supported  ;  it  was  of  that  class  of  combinations 
to  which  the  separate  march  of  Reding's  corps  be- 
longed. To  the  latter  general  the  chief  honour  of  the 
■victory  is  due;  yet,  if  Vedel  had  returned  from  Caro- 
lina upon  the  19th,  with  the  rapidity  which  the  occa- 
sion required,  Reding  would  have  repented  taking  post 
at  Baylen  ;  it  was  undoubtedly  a  daring  step  ;  but  in- 
stead of  remaining  at  that  place,  he  should  have  de- 
scended instantly  upon  the  rear  of  Dupont,  leaving  a 
coips  of  observation  to  delay  the  march  of  Vedel. 
Time  not  being  taken  into  his  calculation.  Reding  acted 
like  a  bold,  but  rash  and  unskilful  ofl^icer.  Fortune, 
however,  favoured  his  temerity,  and  with  her  assistance 
■war  is  but  child's  play. 

Intelligence  of  the  capitulation  of  Baylen  was  se- 
cretly spread  among  the  Spaniards  in  Madrid  as  early 
as  the  23d  or  24th  of  July;  but  the  French,  although 
alarmed  by  rumours  of  some  great  disaster,  were  una- 
ble to  acquire  any  distinct  information,  until  the  king 
sent  two  divisions  into  La  Mancha  to  open  the  commu- 
nication; these  troops  having  reached  Madrilejos,  one 
hundred  and  twenty  miles  from  Baylen,  met  Villou- 
treys  wiih  his  Spanish  escort  collecting  prisoners,  and 
apparently  intending  to  proceed  in  his  disgraceful  task 
to  the  very  gates  of  Madrid  ;*  the  extent  of  the  disas- 
ter thus  became  known,  anfl  the  divisions  retraced  their 
steps.  Joseph  then  called  a  council  of  war,  and  it  was 
proposed  to  unite  all  the  French  forces,  place  a  small 
garrison  in  the  Retiro, and  fall  upon  the  Spanish  armies 
in  succession  as  they  advanced  towards  the  capital. 
But  a  dislike  to  the  war  was  prevalent  amongst  the 
higher  ranks  of  the  French  army,  the  injustice  of  it 
■was  too  glaring;  hence  the  reasons  for  a  retreat  which 
might  perchance  induce  Napoleon  to  desist,  being  lis- 
tened to  with  more  complacency  than  this  proposal,  it 
was  resolved  to  abandon  Madrid  and  retire  behind  the 
Kbro.  The  operation  commenced  on  the  1st  of  Aui^ust. 
The  king  marched  by  the  i^omosierra,  and  Bessieres, 
posted  at  Mayorga,  covered  the  movenu^nt  until  the 
court  reached  Burgos,  and  then  fell  back  himself;  in  a 
short  time  the  French  were  all  behind  the  Ebro,  the 
siege  of  Zaragoza  was  raised,  and  the  triumphant  cry 
of  the  Spaniards  was  heard  throughout  Europe. 

This  retreat  was  undoubtedly  hasty  and  ill  considered; 
whether  as  a  military  or  politicval  measure  it  was  unwise. 
Bessieres,  with  seventeen  thousand  victorious  troops, 
and  forty  pieces  of  artillery,  paralyzed  the  northern  pro- 
vinces; the  Spanish  army  of  Andalusia  was  too  distant 
from  that  of  Valencia  to  conC(  rt  a  combined  movement, 
and  if  they  had  fornu^d  a  junction,  their  united  forc(^  could 
rot  have  exceeded  forty  thous-and  fighting  men,  ill  prt- 
rided,  and  commanded  by  jealous  independent  chiefs. 


Fo}''s  History. 


Now  the  king,  without  weakening  Bessieres'  corps  toe 
much,  could  have  collected  twenty  thousand  infantry, 
five  thousand  cavalry,  and  eighty  pieces  of  artillery  ;  the 
battle  of  Rio  Seco  shows  what  such  an  army  could  have 
effected,  and  every  motive  of  prudence  and  of  honour 
called  for  some  daring  action  to  wipe  olT  the  ignominy 
of  Baylen. 

Let  it  be  conceded  that  .Toseph  could  not  have  main- 
tained himself  in  Madrid ;  the  line  of  the  Duero  was  then 
the  true  position  for  the  French  army.  Taking  Aranda 
as  a  centre,  and  occupying  the  Somosierra,  Segovia, 
Valladolid,  Palencia,  Burgos,  and  Soria  on  the  circum- 
ference, two  ordinary  marches  would  have  carried  the 
king  to  the  succour  of  any  part  of  his  position,  and  the 
northern  provinces  would  thus  have  been  separated  I'rom 
the  southern.  Then  Blake  dared  not  have  made  a  flank 
march  to  the  Guadarama,  Castafios  dared  not  have  re- 
mained in  the  basin  of  Madrid,  and  the  siege  of  Zaragoza 
might  have  been  continued ;  because  from  Aranda  to 
Zaragoza  the  distance  is  not  greater  than  from  Valencia, 
or  from  Madrid,  and  from  Soria  it  is  only  three  marches ; 
wherefore  the  king  could  h-ave  succoured  Verdier  if  the 
Valencians  attacked  him,  and  it  was  impossible  for  Cas- 
tafios to  have  arrived  at  Zaragoza  under  a  month.  Now 
by  taking  up  the  line  of  the  Ebro,  Napoleon's  plan  of 
separating  the  provinces,  and  confining  each  to  its  own 
exertions,  was  frustrated,  and  Joseph  virtually  resigned 
the  throne;  for  however  doubtful  the  prudence  of  oppo- 
sing the  French  might  have  been  considered  before  the 
retreat,  it  became  imperative  upon  all  Spaniards,  to  aid 
the  energy  of  the  multitude  when  that  energy  was  proved 
to  be  efficient. 

In  this  manner  Napoleon's  first  effort  against  Spain 
was  frustrated.  Yet  he  had  miscalcuhated  neither  the 
difficulties,  nor  the  means  to  overcome  them ;  for  al- 
though Bessieres  was  the  only  general  who  perfectly 
succeeded  in  his  operations,  the  plan  of  the  emperor  was 
so  well  combined,  that  it  required  the  destruction  of  a 
whole  army  to  shake  it  at  all.  Even  when  the  king,  by 
committing  the  great  fault  of  abandoning  Madrid  and 
raising  the  siege  of  Zaragoza,  had  given  the  utmost 
force  to  Dupont's  catastrophe,  it  was  only  the  political 
position  of  the  French  which  was  shaken  ;  their  military 
hold  of  the  country  was  scarcely  loosened,  and  the  Span- 
iards were  unable  to  follow  up  their  victory.  But  there 
was  another  operation,  too  great  indeed  for  Joseph,  yet 
such  a  one  as  in  Napoleon's  hands  would  have  fixed 
the  fate  of  the  Peninsula.  The  king  might  have  di- 
rected the  troops  before  Zaragoza,  and  the  detachments 
upon  the  communication  with  France,  to  have  assembled 
round  Pampeluna,  while  he,  uniting  with  Bessieres, 
made,  not  a  retreat,  but  a  march  with  forty  thousand 
men  into  Portugal.  He  would  have  arrived  about  the 
period  of  the  battle  of  Vimiero,  and  the  English  would 
have  been  overwhelmed ;  a  demonstration  ag-ainst  Seville 
or  Cadiz  would  then  have  sufficed  to  keep  the  Spanish 
armies  from  gathering  on  the  p]bro,  and  three  months 
hater.  Napoleon  was  on  th'dt  river  with  two  hundred 
thousand  men ! 

The  moral  effect  of  the  battle  of  Baylen  was  surpri- 
sing; it  was  one  of  those  minor  events  which,  insignifi- 
cant in  themselves,  are  the  cause  of  great  changes  in  the 
affairs  of  nations.  The  defeat  of  Rio  Seco,  the  prejjara- 
tions  of  Moncey  for  a  second  attack  on  Valencia,  the 
miserable  plight  of  Zaragoza,  the  desponding  view  taken 
of  affairs  by  the  ablest  men  of  Spain,  and,  above  all,  the 
disgust  and  terror  excited  among  the  p'atriot>-  by  the 
excesses  of  the  populace,  weighed  heavy  on  the  Spanish 
cause.  One  victory  more,  and  probably  the  moral  as 
well  as  the  physical  force  of  Sp-ain  would  have  been 
crushed  ;  but  the  battle  of  BayliHi,  opening  as  it  were  a 
new  cral.T  for  the  Sp-anish  fire,  -all  their  pride,  and  vanity, 
and  arrogance  burst  forth,  the  glory  of  past  ages  seemed 
to  be  renewed,  every  m-an  conceived  himself  a  second 
Cid,  and  perceived  in  the  suiTender  of  Dupont,  not  tlie 


ISOS.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR    WAR. 


89 


deliverance  of  Spain,  'nit  the  immediate  conquest  of 
France.  '  We  are  much  obliged  to  our  good  friends  the 
English,'  was  a  common  phrase  among-  them  when  con- 
versing with  the  officers  of  Sir  John  Moore's  army ;  '  we 
thank  them  for  their  good-will,  and  we  shall  escort  them 
through  France  to  Calais ;  tJie  journey  will  be  pleasanter 


than  a  long  voyage,  we  shall  not  give  them  the  trouble 
of  fighting  the  French,  but  will  be  pleased  at  having 
them  spectators  of  our  victories.'  This  absurd  confi- 
dence might  have  led  to  great  '.hings  if  it  had  been  sup- 
ported by  wisdom,  activity,  or  valour  ;  but  i  Was  'a 
voice,  and  nothing  more.' 


BOOK    II. 


CHAPTER  I. 

The  Asturian  deputies  received  with  enthusiasm  in  P'.ngland — 
Ministers  precipitate — Imprudent  choice  of  agents — Junot 
marciies  to  Alcantara,  joined  by  the  Spanish  contingent,  en- 
ters Portugal,  arrives  at  Abi-antes.  puslies  on  to  Lisbon^ 
Prince  regent  emigrates  to  the  Brazds,  reflections  on  that 
.ransaction — Dangerous  position  of  the  French  army — Portu- 
guese council  of  regency — Spanish  contingent  well  received 
— General  Taranco  dies  at  Oporto,  is  succeeded  by  the 
French  general  Quesnel — Solano's  troops  retire  to  Badajos — 
funot  takes  possession  of  the  Alenitejo  and  the  Algarves;  ex- 
acts a  forced  loan;  is  created  duke  of  Abrantes;  suppresses 
the  council  of  ""egency;  sends  the  flower  of  the  Portuguese 
arnu  to  I  rancc — Napoleon  demands  a  ransom  from  Portu- 
gal— People  unable  to  pay  it — Police  of  Lisbon — Junot's  mili- 
tary position;  his  character;  political  position — People  dis- 
contented— Prophetic  eggs — Sebastianists — The  capture  of 
Rossily's  squadron  known  at  Lisbon — Pope's  nuncio  takes 
refuge  onboard  the  English  fleet — Alarm  of  the  French. 

The  uninterrupted  success  that,  for  so  many  years,  at- 
tended the  arms  of  Napoleon,  gave  him  a  moral  influence 
doubling  his  actual  force.  Exciting  at  once  terror,  ad- 
miration, and  hatred,  he  absorbed  the  whole  attention 
of  an  astonished  world,  and,  openly  or  secretly,  all  men 
acknowledged  the  power  of  his  genius;  the  continent 
bowed  before  him,  and  in  England  an  increasing  number 
of  absurd  and  virulent  libels  on  his  person  and  charac- 
ter, indicated  the  growth  of  secret  fear.  Hence,  his 
proceedings  against  the  Peninsula  were  viewed,  at  first, 
with  anxiety,  rather  than  with  tlie  hope  of  arresting  their 
progress;  yet  when  the  full  extent  of  the  injustice  be- 
came manifest,  the  public  mind  was  vehemently  excited  ; 
a  sentiment  of  some  extraordinary  change  being  about 
to  take  place  in  the  affairs  of  the  world,  prevailed  among 
all  classes  of  society ;  and  when  the  Spanish  people  rose 
against  the  man  that  all  feared,  the  admiration  which 
energy  and  c  lurage  exact,  even  from  the  base  and  timid, 
became  enthusiastic  in  a  nation  conscious  of  the  same 
virtues. 

No  factious  feelings  interfered  to  check  this  enthusi- 
asm. The  party  in  power,  anxious  to  pursue  a  warlike 
system,  necessary  to  their  own  political  existence,  saw 
with  joy  that  the  stamp  of  justice  and  high  feeling 
would,  for  the  first  time,  be  affixed  to  tlieir  policy.  The 
party  out  of  power  having  always  derided  tlie  impotence 
of  the  ancient  dynasties,  and  asserted  that  regular  ar- 
mies alone  were  insufficient  means  of  defence,  could 
not  consistently  refuse  their  approbation  to  a  struggle 
originating  with,  and  carried  on  entirely  by  the  Spanish 
multitude.  The  people  at  large  exulted  that  the  superi- 
ority of  plebeian  virtue  and  patriotism  was  acknowl- 
edged. 

The  arrival  of  the  Asturian  deputies  was,  therefore, 


universally  hailed  as  an  auspicious  event;  their  wishes 
were  forestalled,  their  suggestions  v.-ere  attended  to  with 
eagerness,  their  demands  were  readily  complied  with; 
nay,  the  riches  of  England  were  so  profuse! 3'  tendered 
to  them  by  the  ministers,  that  it  can  scarcely  be  doubted, 
the  after  arrogance  and  extravagance  of  the  Spaniards, 
arose  from  the  manner  in  which  their  first  applications 
were  met.  There  is  a  w-ay  of  conferring  a  favour  tj  at 
appears  like  accepting  one,  and  this  secret  being  dis- 
covered by  the  English  cabinet,  the  Spaniards  soon  de- 
manded as  a  right,  what  they  had  at  first  solicited  as  a 
boon.  In  politics  it  is  a  grievous  fault  to  be  too  gene- 
rous; gratitude,  in  state  affairs,  is  unknown,  and  as  the 
appearance  of  disinterested  kindness  never  deceives,  it 
should  never  be  assumed. 

The  capture  of  the  Spanish  frigates  had  placed  Great 
Britain  and  Spain  in  a  state  of  hostility  without  a  dec- 
laration of  war;  the  invasion  of  Napoleon  produced  a 
friendly  alliance  between  those  countries  without  a 
declaration  of  peace  ;  for  the  cessation  of  hostilities  was 
not  proclaimed  until  long  after  succours  had  been  sent 
to  the  juntas.  The  ministers  seemed,  by  their  precipi- 
tate measures,  to  be  more  afraid  of  losing  the  assis- 
tance of  the  Spaniards,  than  prepared  to  take  the  lead 
in  a  contest  which  could  only  be  supported  by  the  power 
and  riches  of  Great  Britain.  Instead  of  adopting  a  sim- 
ple and  decisive  policy  towards  Spain;  instead  of  send- 
ing a  statesman  of  high  rank  and  acknowledged  capa- 
city to  sustain  the  insurrection,  and  to  establish  the 
influence  of  England  by  a  judicious  application  of  money 
and  other  supplies ;  the  ministers  employed  a  number 
of  obscure  men  in  various  parts  of  the  Peninsula,  who, 
without  any  experience  of  public  affairs,  were  empow- 
ered to  distribute  succours  of  all  kinds  at  their  own 
discretion.  Instead  of  sifting  carefully  the  infurmation 
obtained  from  such  agents,  and  consulting  distinguished 
military  and  naval  officers  in  the  arrangement  of  some 
comprehensive  plan  of  operations,  which,  being  well 
understood  by  those  who  were  to  execute  it,  might  be 
supported  vigorously,  the  ministers  formed  crude  pro- 
jects, parcelled  out  their  forces  in  small  ex})editions 
without  any  definite  object,  altered  their  plans  with 
every  idle  report,  and  changed  their  commanders  a.. 
lightly  as  their  plans. 

Entering  into  formal  relations  with  ever)'  knot  of 
.Spanish  politicians  that  assumed  the  title  of  a  supreme 
junta,  the  government  dealt,  with  unsparing  hands,  en- 
ormous sup|)lies  at  the  demand  of  those  self-elected  au- 
thorities ;  they  made  no  conditions,  took  no  assurance 
that  the  succours  should  be  justly  applied  ;  and  with  af- 
fected earnestness  disclaimed  all  ii.tcMlion  of  interfering 
with  the  internal  arrangements  01  .h«j  Spaniards,  whtia 


40 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  II. 


the  ablest  men  in  Spain  expected  and  wished  for  such 
an  interference  to  repress  the  folly  and  violence  of  tlieir 
countrymen  ;  and  when  England  was  entitled,  both  in 
j)olicy  and  justice,  not  only  to  interfere,  but  to  direct 
the  councils  of  the  insurs^ents.*  The  latter  had  soli- 
cited and  obtained  her  assistance,  the  cause  was  be- 
come common  to  both  nations  ;  and  for  the  welfare  of 
both,  a  prudent,  just,  and  vioorous  interference  on  the 
part  of  the  most  powerful  and  enlirrhtened,  was  neces- 
sary to  prevent  that  cause  from  beinfr  ruined  by  a  few 
itrnorant,  and  conceited  men,  accidentally  invested  with 
authority. 

The  numbers  and  injudicious  choice  of  military 
agents  were  also  the  source  of  infinite  mischief,  selected, 
as  it  would  appear,  principally  because  of  their  acquain- 
tdnce  with  the  Spanish  languatre,  few  of  tliose  agents 
had  any  knowledge  of  war  beyond  the  ordinary  duties 
of  a  regiment,  and  there  was  no  concert  among  them, 
for  there  was  no  controlling  power  vested  in  any  ;  each 
did  that  which  seemed  good  to  him.j  Readily  affect- 
ing to  consult  men  whose  inexperience  rendered  them 
amenable,  and  whose  friendship  could  supply  the  means 
of  advancing  their  own  interest  in  a  disorganized  state 
of  society,  the  Spanish  generals  received  the  agents 
with  a  tiattering  and  confidential  politeness,  that  divert- 
ed the  attention  of  the  latter  from  the  true  objects  of 
their  mission.  Instead  of  ascertaining  the  real  numbers 
and  efficiency  of  the  armies,  they  adopted  the  inflated 
language  and  extravagant  opinions  of  the  chiefs,  with 
whom  they  lived  ;  and  their  reports  gave  birth  to  most 
erroneous  notions  of  the  relative  strength  and  situation 
of  the  contending  forces  in  the  Peninsula.  Some  ex- 
ceptions there  were,  but  the  ministers  seemed  to  be 
better  pleased  with  the  sanguine  than  with  the  cautious, 
and  made  their  own  wishes  the  measure  of  their  judg- 
ments. Accordingly,  enthusiasm,  numbers,  courage, 
and  talent,  w'ere  gratuitously  found  for  every  occasion, 
but  money,  arms,  and  clothing,  were  demanded  inces- 
santly, and  supplied  with  profusion;  the  arms  were, 
however,  generally  left  in  their  cases  to  rot,  or  to  fall 
into  the  hands  of  the  enemy  ;  the  clothing  seldom 
reached  the  soldier's  back  ;  and  the  money,  in  all  in- 
stances misapplied,  was  in  some  embezzled  by  the  au- 
thorities, into  whose  hands  it  fell,  in  others  employed 
to  create  disunion,  and  to  forward  the  private  views  of 
the  juntas,  at  the  expense  of  the  public  welfare:  it  is 
a  curious  fact,  that  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  the 
war,  an  English  musket  was  rarely  to  be  seen  in  the 
hands  of  a  Spanish  soldier.  But  it  is  time  to  quit  this 
subject,  and  to  trace  the  progress  of  Junot's  invasion 
of  Portugal,  by  which  the  whole  circle  of  operations  in 
the  Peiiinsula  will  be  completed,  and  the  reader  can 
then  take  a  general  view  of  the  situation  of  all  parties, 
at  the  moment  when  sir  Arthur  Wellesley,  disembark- 
ing at  the  IMondego,  commenced  those  campaigns 
which  furnished  the  subject  of  this  history. 

INVASION  OF  PORTUGAL  BV  JUNOT. 

Peremptory  orders  had  obliged  Junot  to  commence 
operations  at  an  unfavourable  time  of  year,  before  his 
preparations  were  completed,  when  the  roads  were 
nearly  impracticable,  and  while  some  of  his  troops 
were  still  in  the  rear  of  Salamanca. :|:  Hence  his  march 
from  that  town  to  Alcantara,  where  he  elTected  his  junc- 
tion in  the  latter  end  of  November,  1807,  with  the  part 
of  the  Spanish  force  that  was  to  act  under  his  immedi- 
ate orders,  was  very  disastrous,  and  nearly  disorgani- 
zed his  inexperienced  army.  The  succours  he  expected 
To  receive  at  Alcantara  were  not  furnished,  and  the  re- 
pugnance of  the  Spanish  authorities  to  aid  him,  was  the 
cause  of  so  much  embarrassment,  that  his  chief  officers 
doubted  the  propriety  of  continuing  operations  under 


»  Mr.  Stuart's  Letters.     Lord  W.  Bcntinck's  Ditto. 
+  Vide  Instructions  fo"   Sir  Tho.  Dye\   &c.     Parliamentarj' 
Paper*,  1809.  J  Thiebau 


the  accumulating  difficulties  of  his  situation  ;  but  Ju- 
not's firmness  was  unabated.  He  know  that  no  Eng- 
lish force  had  landed  at  Lisbon;  and  as  the  cowardice 
of  the  Portuguese  court  was  notorious,  he  without  hes- 
itation undertook  one  of  those  hardy  enterprises  v\  liioh 
astound  the  mind  by  their  success,  and  leave  the  histo- 
rian in  doubt  if  he  should  praise  the  happy  daring,  oi 
stigmatise  the  rashness  of  the  deed. 

Without  money,  without  transport,  without  ammuni- 
tion sufficient  for  a  general  action,  and  with  an  auxilia- 
ry force  of  Spaniards  by  no  means  well  disposed  to  aid 
him,  Junot,  at  the  head  of  a  raw  army,  penetrated  the 
mountains  of  Portugal  on  the  most  dangerous  and  diffi- 
cult line  by  which  that  country  can  be  invaded.  He 
was  ignorant  of  what  was  passing  in  the  interior,  he 
knew  not  if  he  was  to  be  opposed,  nor  what  means 
were,  prepared  to  resist  him,  but  trusting  to  the  inert- 
ness of  the  Portuguese  government,  to  the  rnpidity  of 
his  own  movements,  and  to  the  renown  of  the  French 
arms,  he  made  his  way  through  Lower  Beira,  and  sud- 
denly appeared  in  the  town  of  Abrantes,  a  fearful  and 
unexpected  guest.  There  he  obtained  the  first  informa- 
tion of  the  true  state  of  affairs.  Lisbon  was  tranquil, 
and  the  Portuguese  fleet  was  ready  to  sail,  but  the 
court  still  remained  on  shore.  On  hearing  this,  Junot, 
animated  by  the  prospect  of  seizing  the  prince  regent, 
pressed  forward,  and  reached  Lisbon  in  time  to  see  the 
fleet,  having  the  royal  family  on  board,  clearing  the 
mouth  of  the  Tagus,  One  vessel  dragged  astern  with- 
in reach  of  a  battery,  the  French  general  himself  fired  a 
gun  at  her,  and  on  his  return  to  Lisbon,  meeting  some 
Portuguese  troops,  he  resolutely  commanded  them  to 
form  an  escort,  for  his  person,  and  thus  attended,  pas- 
sed through  the  streets  of  the  capital.  Nature,  alone 
had  opposed  the  progress  of  the  invaders,  yet  such 
w-ere  the  hardships  endured,  that  of  a  column  which 
numbered  twenty-five  thousand  at  Alcantaia,  two  thou- 
sand tired  grenadiers  only  entered  Lisbon  with  their 
general ;  fatigue,  and  want,  and  tempests,  had  scatter- 
ed the  remainder  alon  j  two  hundred  miles  of  rugged 
mountains,  inhabited  by  a  warlike  and  ferocious  peas- 
antry, well  acquainted  with  the  strength  of  their  fast- 
nesses, and  proud  of  the  many  successful  defences 
made  by  their  forefathers  against  former  enemies.  Lis- 
bon itself  contained  three  hundred  thousand  inhabitants 
and  fourteen  thousand  regular  troo]5s  were  collected 
there  ;  a  powerful  British  fleet  was  at  the  mouth  of  the 
harbour,  and  the  commander,  sir  Sidney  Smith,  had 
urged  the  court  to  resist,  oflering  to  land  his  seamen 
and  marines  to  aid  in  the  defence  of  t\w  town,  but  his 
offers  were  declined  ;  and  the  people,  disgusted  with 
the  pusillanimous  conduct  of  their  rulers,  and  confound- 
ed by  the  strangeness  of  the  scene,  evinced  no  desire  to 
impede  the  march  of  events.  Thus  three  weak  batta- 
lions sufficed  to  impose  a  foreign  yoke  upon  this  great 
capital,  and  illustrated  the  truth  of  Napoleon's  maxim  : 
— !hat  in  war  thu  moral  is  to  the  physical  force  as  three 
parts  to  one. 

The  prince  regent,  after  having,  at  the  desire  of  the 
French  government,  ex|)elled  the  British  factory,  sent 
the  British  minister  plenipotentiary  away  trom  his  court, 
sequestered  British  property,  and  shut  the  ports  of  Por- 
tugal against  British  merchants  ;  after  having  degraded 
himself  and  his  nation  by  performing  every  submissive 
act  which  France  could  devise  to  insult  his  weakness, 
was  still  reluctant  to  forego  the  base  tenure  by  which 
he  hoped  to  hold  his  crown.  Alternately  swayed  by 
fear  and  indolence,  a  miserable  example  of  helpless  fol- 
ly, he  lingered  until  the  reception  of  a  .Moniteur  which, 
dated  the  13th  of  November,  announced,  in  startling 
terms,  that  the  ^  house  (f  Bra^anza  had  ceased  to  reigr..'' 
Lord  Strangford,  the  British  plenipotentiary  whose  ef- 
forts to  make  the  royal  family  emigrate,  had  entirely 
fiiled.  was  then  on  board  the  squadron,  with  the  inten- 
tion of  returning  to  England  ;   but  sit   Sydney  Smith, 


1808.J 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


41 


seizingf  the  favourable  moment,  threatened  to  boiiihard 
Lisbon,  if  the  prince  regent  iiesitated  any  lontrer,  and 
thus  urged  on  both  sides,  the  latter  embarked  with  his 
whole  court,  and  sailed  for  the  Brazils  on  the  29th  of 
Novenib(  r,  a  few  hours  before  .Tunot  arrived. 

Lord  Strano-ford's  despatch,  relating  this  event,  al- 
though dated  the  29th  of  November,  on  board  tlie  Hi- 
bernia,  was  written  the  19th  December,  m  London,  and 
was  so  worded,  as  to  create  a  notion  that  his  exertions 
during  the  27tli  and  2Sth  had  caused  the  emigration,  a 
notion  quite  contrary  to  the  fact.  For  the  prince  regent 
of  Portugal,  yielding  to  the  united  pressure  of  the  ad- 
miral's menaces,  and  the  annunciation  in  the  Moniteur, 
had  embarked  on  the  27th,  before  lord  Strangford  reach- 
ed Lisbon  ;  and  actually  sailed  on  the  29th,  withrut 
having  had  an  interview  with  that  nobleman,  who  con- 
sequently had  no  opportunity  to  advance  or  retard  the 
event  in  question.  Nevertheless,  lord  Strangford  re- 
ceived the  red  riband,  and  sir  Sydney  Smith  was  neg- 
lected. 

This  celebrated  emigration  was  beneficial  to  the  Bra- 
zils in  the  highest  degree,  and  of  vast  importance, 
to  Enijland  in  two  ways,  for  it  ensured  great  commer- 
cial advantages,  and  it  threw  Portugal  completely  into 
her  jiower  in  the  approaciiing  conflict;  but  it  was  dis- 
graceful to  the  prince,  insulting  to  the  brave  people  he 
abandoned,  and  impolitic,  inasmuch  as  it  obliged  mien 
to  inquire  how  far  subjects  were  bound  to  a  monarch 
who  deserted  them  in  their  need  1  how  far  the  nation 
could  belong  to  a  man  who  did  not  belong  to  the  nation  1 
It  has  been  observed  by  political  economists,  that 
where  a  gold  and  paper  currency  circulate  together,  if 
the  paper  be  depreciated  it  will  drag  down  the  gold 
w  ith  it,  and  deteriorate  the  whole  mass  ;  but  after  a  time, 
the  metal  revolts  from  this  unnatural  state,  and  asserts 
its  own  intrinsic  superiority  :  so  a  privileged  class, 
corrupted  by  power  and  luxury,  drags  down  the  nation- 
al character.  Yet  there  is  a  point  when  the  people, 
like  the  gold,  no  longer  suffering  such  a  degradation, 
W'ill  separate  themselves  with  violence  from  the  vices 
of  their  efleminate  rulers,  and  until  that  time  arrives, 
a  nation  may  appear  to  be  sunk  in  hopeless  lethargy, 
when  it  is  really  capable  of  great  and  noble  exertions; 
and  thus  it  was  witii  ihe  Portuguese  who  were  at  this 
time  unjustly  despised  by  enemies,  and  mistrusted  by 
friends. 

The  invading  army,  in  pursuance  of  the  convention 
of  Fontainebleau,  was  divided  into  three  corps.  *  Tiie 
central  one,  composed  of  the  French  troops,  and  a 
Spanish  division  under  general  Caraffa,  had  penetrated 
by  the  two  roads,  which  from  Alcantara  lead,  the  one 
by  Pedragoa,  the  other  by  Scbreira  Formosa  ;  but  at 
Abrantes,  Caraffa's  division  had  separated  from  the 
French,  and  took  possession  of  Thomar,and  meantime  the 
right,  under  general  Taranco,  marching  from  Gallicia, 
had  established  itself  at  Oporto,  while  the  marquis  of 
Solano,  with  the  left,  entered  the  Alemtejo,  and  fixed 
liis  quarters  at  Setuval.  The  Spanish  troops  did  not 
suffer  on  tlieir  route  :  but  such  had  been  the  distress  of 
the  French  army,  that  three  weeks  afterwards,  it  could 
only  nmster  ten  thousand  men  under  arms,  and  the 
privations  encountered  on  this  march  led  to  excesses, 
which  first  produced  that  rancorous  spirit  of  mutual 
hatred,  so  ^-emarkable  between  the  French  and  Portu- 
guese. Young  soldiers  always  attribute  their  sufferings 
to  the  ill-will  of  the  inhabitants,  it  is  difficult  to  make 
them  understand  tliat  a  poor  peasantry  have  nothing  to 
spare  ;  old  soldiers,  on  the  contrary,  blame  nobody, 
but  know  how  to  extract  subsistence,  and  in  most  cases 
without  exciting  enmity. 

.Tunot  passed  the  month  of  December  in  collecting 
his  army,  securing  the  great  military  points  about  Lis- 
bon, and  in  preparations   to  supplant  the  power  of  a 

•  TluLl/ac!  .  Foj 


council  of  regency,  to  whom  the  piince  at  his  depar- 
ture had  delegated  the  sovereign  authority.  As  long 
as  the  French  troops  were  scattered  on  the  line  of 
march  and  the  fortresses  held  by  Portuguese  garrisons,  it 
would  have  been  dangerous  to  provoke  the  enmity,  or 
to  excite  the  activity  of  this  council,  hence  the  members 
were  treated  with  studious  respect ;  yet  they  were  of 
the  same  leaven  as  the  court  tliey  emanated  from,  and 
the  quick  resolute  proceedings  of  .Tunot  soon  deprived 
them  of  any  importance  conferred  by  the  critical  situa- 
tion of  affairs  during  the  first  three  weeks. 

The  Spanish  auxiliary  forces  were  well  received  'n 
the  north  and  in  the  Alemtejo,  and  as  general  "^{"aranco 
died  soon  after  his  arrival  at  Oporto,  the  French  gene- 
ral Quesnel  was  sent  to  command  that  province.  Junct 
had  meanwhile  taken  possession  of  Elvas,  and  detached 
general  Maurin  to  the  Algarves,  with  sixteen  hundred 
men;  and,  when  Solano  was  ordered  by  his  court  to 
withdraw  from  Portugal,  nine  French  battalions  and  the 
cavalry,  under  the  command  of  Kellerman,  took  posses- 
sion of  the  Alemtejo,  and  occupied  the  fortress  of 
Setuval.*  At  the  same  time  CaraflTa's  division,  being 
replaced  at  Thomar,  by  a  French  force,  was  distributed 
in  sinall  bodies  at  a  considerable  distance  from  each 
other,  on  both  sides  of  the  Tagus,  immediately  round 
Lisbon.")"  As  the  provisions  of  the  treaty  of  Fontaine- 
bleau were  unknown  to  the  Portuguese,  the  Spanish 
troops  met  with  a  better  reception  than  the  French, 
and  the  treaty  itself  was  disregarded  by  Tunot,  whose 
conduct  plainly  discovered  that  he  considered  Portugal 
to  be  a  possession  entirely  belonging  to  France.  For 
when  all  the  stragglers  were  come  up,  and  the  army 
recovered  from  its  fatigues,  and  when  a  reinforcement 
of  five  thousand  men  had  reached  Salamanca,  on  its 
march  to  Lisbon  the  French  general  assumed  the  chief 
authority.:}^  Commencing  by  a  forced  loan  of  two 
hundred  thousand  pounds,  he  interfered  with  the  diffe- 
rent departments  of  state,  and  put  Frenchmen  into  all 
the  lucrative  offices,  while  his  promises,  and  protesta- 
tions of  amity,  became  loud  and  frequent  in  proportion 
to  his  encroachments. II 

At  last  being  by  Napoleon  created  duke  of  Abrar- 
tes,  he  threw  off  all  disguise,  suppressed  the  council 
of  regency,  seized  the  reins  of  government,  and  while 
he  established  irtany  useful  regulations,  made  the  na- 
tion sensibly  alive  to  the  fact  that  he  was  a  despotic 
conqueror.  The  flag  and  the  arms  of  Portugal  were 
replaced  by  those  of  France;  eigfht  thousand  men 
were  selected  and  sent  from  the  kingdoin  und^r  the 
command  of  the  rnarquis  d'Alorna  and  Gomez  Frere, 
two  noblemen  of  the  greatest  reputation  for  military 
talent  among  the  nati\'-  officers;  five  thousand  more 
were  attached  to  the  P  lench  army,  and  the  rest  were 
disbanded.  An  extraordinary  contribution  of  four  mil- 
lion sterling,  decreed  by  Njpoleon,  was  then  demanded 
under  the  curious  title  of  a  ransom  for  the  state,  but  this 
sura  was  exorbitant,  and  Juiiot  prevailed  on  the  em- 
peror to  reduce  it  one  half.§  He  likewise  on  his  own 
authority,  accepted  the  forced  loan,  the  confiscated 
English  merchandise,  the  church  h  late,  and  the  royal 
property,  in  part  payment;  yet  the  people  were  still 
unable  to  raise  the  whole  arnount,  for  the  court  had 
before  taken  the  greatest  part  of  the  church  plate  and 
bullion  of  the  kingdom,  and  had  also  drawn  large  sums 
of  money  from  the  people,  under  the  pretext  of  defen- 
ding the  country  ;  and  with  this  treasure  they  departed, 
leaving  the  public  functionaries,  the  army,  private 
creditors,  and  even  domestic  servants,  unpaid. 

But,  al  hough  great  discontent  and  misery  prevailed, 
the  tranquillity  of  Lisbon,  during  the  first  month  after 
the  arrival  of  the  French  was  remarkable;  no  disturb- 
ance look  place,  and    the  populace   were    completely 


•'  Return  of  the  J'rench  ariny. 

\    Ibid.  11  Tbiebault. 


+  Foy. 
{  toy. 


42 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[r?noK  fl. 


controlled  by  the  activitj  f  a  police,  first  established 
uiidor  the  prince  regent's  government  by  the  count  de 
Novion,a  I'rench  emigrant,  and  continued  by  Junot  on 
an  extended  scale.  No  cai)ilal  city  in  Europe  suffers 
Fo  much  as  Lisbon  from  the  want  of  good  police  regu- 
lations, and  the  French  general  conferred  an  unmixed 
benefit  on  tlie  inhabitants  by  giving  more  effect  to 
Novion's  plans  ;  yet,  so  deeply  rooted  is  the  prejudice 
m  favour  of  ancient  customs,  tiiat  no  act  gave  the  Por- 
tuguese more  offence,  than  the  having  the  streets 
cleansed,  and  the  wild  dogs,  who  infested  them  by 
thousands,  killed.  A  French  Serjeant,  distinguished 
by  his  zeal  in  destroying  those  disgusting  and  danger- 
ous animals,  was  in  revenge  assassinated. 

In  the  course  of  March  and  April,  Junot's  military 
system  was  completed.*  The  arsenal  of  Lisbon,  one 
of  the  finest  establishments  in  Europe,  contained  all 
kinds  of  naval  and  military  stores  in  abundance,  and 
tea  thousand  workmen  excellent  in  every  branch  of 
business  appertaining  to  war,  hence  the  artillery,  the 
carriages,  the  ammunition,  with  all  the  minor  equip- 
ments of  the  army,  were  soon  renewed  and  put  in  the 
best  possible  condition,  and  the  hulks  of  two  line-of- 
battle  shi^is,  three  frigates,  and  seven  lighter  vessels 
of  war,  were  refitted,  armed,  and  moored  across  the 
river  to  defend  the  entrance,  and  to  awe  the  town.  The 
army  itself,  perfectly  recovered  from  its  fatigues,  rein- 
forced, and  better  disciplined,  was  grown  confident  in 
its  chief  from  tlie  success  of  the  invasion,  and  being 
well  fed  and  clothed,  was  become  a  fine  body  of  robust 
men,  capable  of  any  exertion.  It  was  re-organized  in 
three  divisions  of  infantry  and  one  of  cavalry.  General 
La  Borde  commanded  the  first,  general  Loison  the  sec- 
ond, general  Travot  the  third,  general  Margaron  the 
fourth,  and  general  Taviel  directed  the  artillery.  Gen- 
eral Keilerman  commanded  in  the  Alemtejo,  general 
Quesnel  in  Oporto,  general  Maurin  in  the  Algarves,  and 
Junot  himself  in  Lisbon. 

The  i"ortresses  of  Faro  in  Algrave,  of  Almeida,  of 
Elva,  La-Lippe,  St.  Lucie,  Setuval,  Palmela,  and  those 
between  Lisbon  and  the  mouth  of  the  Tagus,  of  Eri- 
cia  and  Peniche,  were  furnished  with  French  garrisons ; 
Esiremos,  Aldea-Gallegos,  Santarem,  and  Abrantes 
were  occupied,  and  put  in  such  a  state  of  defence  as 
their  decayed  ramparts  would  permit. 

The  whole  army,  including  the  French  workmen  and 
marines  attached  to  it,  amounted  to  above  fifty  thousand 
men,  of  which  above  forty-four  thousand  were  fit  for 
duty;|  that  is  to  say,  fifteen  thousand  five  hundred 
Spaniards,  five  thousand  Portuguese,  and  twenty-four 
thousand  four  hundred  French. 

Of  tlie  latter  1000  were  in  Elvas  and    La    Lippe, 
1000  in  Almeida, 
1000  in  Peniclie, 
KiOO  in  the  Algarves, 
2892  in  Setuval, 
750  in  Abrantes, 

450  cavalry   were    kept   in  Valencia 
d'Alcantara,  in   Spanish    Estre- 
madura, 
and  350  distributed  in  the  proportion  of 
fifteen  men  to  a  post,  guarded  the  lines  of  communica- 
tion which  were  established  from  Lisbon  to  Elvas,  and 
from  Almeida  to  Coimbra.  Above  fifteen  thousand  men 
remained  disposable. 

Lisbon,  containing  all  the  civil,  military,  naval  and 
greatest  jiart  of  the  commercial  establishments;  th(! 
only  fine  harbour,  two-eighths  of  the  population,  and 
two-thirds  of  the  riches  of  the  whole  kingdom,  formed 
a  centre!,  which  was  sefuired  by  the  main  body  of  the 
French,  while  on  the  circumference  a  number  of  strong 
posts  gave  support  to  the  operations  of  their  moveable 
columns.     The  garrison  in   Peniche  secured  the  only 


•  Thiebault. 


f  Return  of  the  French  aniiy. 


harbour  between  the  Tagus  and  the  IVIondego,  in  which 
a  large  disembarkation  of  English  troops  could  take 
place;  the  little  port  of  Figueras,  held  by  a  small  garri- 
son, blocked  the  mouth  of  the  latter  river;  the  division 
at  Thomar  secured  all  the  great  lines  of  communication 
to  the  north-east,  and  in  conjunction  with  the  garrison 
of  Abrantes,  commanded  both  sides  of  the  Zezere.  From 
Abrantes  to  Estremos  and  Elvas,  and  to  Setuval,  the 
lines  of  communication  were  short,  and  through  an  open 
country  suitable  for  the  operations  of  the  cavalry,  which 
was  all  quartered  on  the  south  bank  of  the  Tagus. 
Thus,  without  breaking  up  the  mass  of  the  army,  the 
harbours  were  sealed  against  the  English;  a  great  and 
rich  tract  was  enclosed  by  posts,  and  rendered  so  per- 
vious to  the  troops,  that  any  insurrection  could  be  reach- 
ed by  a  few  marches,  and  immediately  crushed  ;  the 
connexion  between  the  right  and  left  banks  of  the  Tagus 
at  Lisbon  was  secured,  and  the  entrance  to  the  port  de- 
fended by  the  vessels  of  war  which  had  been  refitted 
and  armed.  A  light  squadron  was  also  prepared  to  com- 
municate with  South  America,  and  nine  Russian  line- 
of-battle  ships  and  a  frigate,  under  the  command  of  ad- 
miral Siniavin,  which  had  taken  refuge  some  time  be- 
fore from  the  English  fleet,  were  of  necessity  engaged 
in  the  defence  of  the  harbour,  forming  an  unwilling,  but 
not  an  unimportant  auxiliary  force. 

These  military  arrangements  were  Junot's  own,  and 
suitable  enough  if  his  army  had  been  unconnected 
with  any  other;  but  they  clashed  with  the  general  views 
of  Napoleon,  who  regarded  the  force  in  Portugal,  only 
as  a  division  of  troops  to  be  rendered  subservient  to  the 
general  scheme  of  subjecting  the  Peninsula;  wherefore 
in  the  month  of  May,  he  ordered,  that  general  Avril, 
with  three  thousand  infantry,  five  hundred  cavalry,  and 
ten  guns,  should  co-operate  with  Dupontin  Andalusia; 
and  that  general  Loison,  with  four  thousand  infantry, 
should  proceed  to  Almeida,  and  from  thence  co-operate 
with  Bessieres  in  the  event  of  an  insurrection  taking 
place  in  Spain.  General  Thiebault  complains  of  this 
order  as  injurious  to  Junot,  ill  combined,  and  the  result 
of  a  foolish  vanity,  that  prompted  the  emperor  to  direct 
all  the  armies  himself;  yet  it  would  be  difficult  to  show 
that  the  arrangement  was  faulty.  Avril's  division,  if 
he  had  not  halted  at  Tavora,  for  which  there  was  no 
reason,  would  have  ensured  the  capture  of  Seville;  and 
if  Dupont's  defeat  had  not  rendered  the  victory  of  Rio 
Seco  useless,  Loison's  division  would  have  been  emi- 
nently useful  in  controlling  the  country  behind  Bessie- 
res,  in  case  the  latter  invaded  Gallicia  ;  moreover  it 
was  well  placed  to  intercept  the  communication  be- 
tween the  Castilian  and  the  Estremaduran  armies. 
The  emperor's  combinations,  if  they  had  been  fully  exe- 
cuted, would  have  brought  seventy  thousand  men  to 
bear  on  the  defence  of  Portugal. 

Such  was  the  military  attitude  of  the  French  in  May, 
but  their  political  situation  was  far  from  being  so  fa- 
vourable. Junot's  natural  capacity,  though  considera- 
ble, was  neither  enlarged  bj"^  study  nor  strengthened  by 
mental  discipline.  *  Of  intemperate  habits,  indolent  in 
business,  prompt  and  brave  in  action,  quick  to  give  of 
fence  yet  ready  to  forget  an  injury,  he  was,  at  one  mo- 
ment a  great  man,  the  next  below  mediocrity,  and  at  all 
times  unsuited  to  the  task  of  conciliating  and  govern- 
ing a  peoj)l(!  like  the  Portuguese,  who,  with  passions 
as  sudden  and  vehement  as  his  own,  retain  a  sense  of 
injury  or  insult  with  incredible  tenacity.  He  had  many 
(litlicullies  to  encounter,  and  his  duty  towards  France 
was  in  some  instances  incompatible  with  good  policy 
towards  Portugal,  yet  he  was  not  without  resources  for 
establishing  a  strong  French  interest,  if  he  had  posses- 
sed the  ability  and  disposition  to  soothe  a  nation  that, 
without  having  suffered  a  defeat,  was  suddenly  bowed 
to  a  foreign  yoke. 


•  Napoleon,  in  Las  Casas.     I'oy. 


180S. 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


43 


But  the  pride  and  the  poverty  of  the  Portuo-iiese,  and 
the  intluence  of  ancient  usagres,  interfered  with  Junot's 
pnliey.  7'lie  monks,  and  most  of  the  nchility,  were 
inimical  to  it,  and  ail  the  activity  of  the  expelled  Brit- 
ish factory,  and  the  secret  warfare  of  spies  and  writers 
in  the  pay  of  Eng'land,  were  directed  to  undermine  his 
plans,  and  to  render  him  and  his  nation  odious.  On 
the  other  hand,  he  was  in  possession  of  the  government 
and  of  the  capital,  he  had  a  fine  army,  he  could  ofler 
novelty,  so  dear  to  the  multitude,  and  he  had  the  name 
and  the  fame  of  Napoleon  to  assist  him.  The  promises 
of  power  are  always  believed  bj"^  tiie  many,  and  there 
were  abundance  of  grievances  to  remedy,  and  wrongs 
to  redress,  in  Portugal.  Among  the  best  educated  men, 
especially  at  the  universities,  there  existed  a  strong 
feeling  against  the  Braganza  family,  and  such  an  earn- 
est desire  for  reformed  institutions,  that  steps  were 
actually  taken  to  have  prince  Eugene  declared  king  of 
Portugal  ;  *  nor  was  this  spirit  extinguished  at  a  much 
later  date. 

With  these  materials  and  the  military  vanity  of  the 
Portuguese  to  work  upon,  Junot  might  have  establish- 
ed a  powerful  French  interest;  under  an  active  govern- 
ment, the  people  would  not  long  have  regretted  the  loss 
of  an  independence  that  had  no  wholesome  breathing 
amidst  the  corrupt  stagnation  of  the  old  system.  But 
the  arrogance  of  a  conqueror,  and  the  necessities  of  an 
army,  Avhich  was  to  be  subsisted  and  paid  by  an  im- 
poverished people,  soon  gave  rise  to  all  kinds  of  op- 
pression ;  private  abuses  followed  close  upon  the  heels 
of  public  rapacity,  and  insolence  left  its  sting  to  rankle 
in  the  wounds  of  the  injured.  The  malignant  humours 
broke  cut  in  quarrels  and  assassinations,  and  the  severe 
punishments  that  ensued,  many  of  them  unjust  and 
barbarous  in  the  highest  degree,  created  rage,  not  terror, 
for  the  nation  had  not  tried  its  strength  in  battle,  and 
would  n5t  believe  that  it  was  weak.  Meanwhile  the 
ports  being  rigorously  blockaded  by  the  English  fleet, 
and  the  troubles  in  Spain  having  interrupted  the  com- 
merce in  grain,  by  which  Portugal  had  been  usually 
supplied  from  that  country,  the  unhappy  people  suffer- 
edunderthetriple  pressure  of  famine,  war-contributions, 
and  a  foreign  yoke.  |  With  all  external  aliment  thus 
cut  off,  and  a  hungry  army  gnawing  at  its  vitals,  the 
nation  could  not  remain  tranquil ;  yet  the  first  five 
months  of  Junot's  government  was,  with  the  exception 
of  a  slight  tumult  at  Lisbon,  when  the  arms  of  Portu- 
gal were  taken  down,  undisturbed  by  commotion.  Nev- 
ertheless the  whole  country  was  ripe  for  a  general  in- 
surrection. 

The  harvest  proved  abundant,  and  Junot  hailed  the 
prospect  of  returning  plenty  as  a  relief  from  his  princi- 
pal difficulty;  but  as  one  danger  disappeared,  anotiier 
presented  itself.  The  Spanish  insurrection  excited  the 
hopes  of  the  Portuguese,  and  agents  from  the  neigh- 
bouring jimtas  communicated  secretly  with  the  Spanish 
generals  in  Portugal ;  the  capture  of  the  French  f^eet 
in  Cadiz  became  known,  assassinations  multiplied,  the 
pope's  nuncio  fled  on  board  the  English  fleet,  and  all 
things  tended  to  an  explosion.  The  English  agents 
were,  of  course,  actively  engaged  in  promoting  this 
spirit,  and  the  appearance  of  two  English  fleets  at  dif- 
ff^rent  points  of  the  coast,  having  troops  on  board,  pro- 
duced great  alarm  among  the  French,  and  augmented 
the  impatient  fierceness  of  the  Portuguese. 

Among  the  various  ways  in  which  the  people  dis- 
covered their  hatred  of  the  invaders,  one  was  very  char- 
acteristic ;  an  egg  being,  by  a  chemical  process,  marked 
with  certain  letters,  was  exhibited  in  a  church,  and  the 
letters  were  interpreted  to  indicate  the  speedy  coming 
of  don  Sebastian,  king  of  Portugal,  who,  like  Arthur 
of  Romantic  memory,  is  supposed  to  be  hidden  in  a 
secret  island,  waiting  for  the  destined  period  to  re-ap- 


Foy. 


+  Thiebault. 


pear  and  restore  his  coimtry  to  her  ancient  glory.  The 
trick  was  turned  against  the  contrivers;  other  egog 
prophesied  in  the  most  unpatriotic  manner,  yet  the  be- 
lief of  the  Sebastianists  lost  nothing  of  its  zeal;  many 
people,  and  those  not  of  the  most  uneducated  classes, 
wore  often  observed  upon  the  highest  points  of  iho 
hills,  casting  earnest  looks  towards  the  ocean,  in  the 
hopes  of  descrying  the  island  in  which  their  long-lost 
hero  is  detained. 


CHAPTER  IL 

The  Spanish  general  Bellesta  seizes  general  Quesnel  and  retires 
to  (jalllrja — Insurreftion  at  Oporto — Junot  dis-.irnis  and  con- 
fines the  Spanish  sohlitr?  near  Lisbon — General  Avril  s  col- 
uri)n  returns  to  Estrenios — General  Loisoti  marches  from 
Almeida  against  Opurto;  is  attacked  at  iilezam  Frias  ;  cross- 
es the  Duero  ;  attacked  at  Castro  d'Airo  ;  recalled  to  I>isbon 
— French  driven  out  of  the  Algarves — The  fort  of  P'igueras 
taken — Abrantes  and  Elvas  threatened — Setuval  in  commo- 
tion— General  Spencer  appears  oli  the  Tagus — Junot's  plan 
— Insurrection  at  Villa  Viciosa  suppressed — Colonel  jMaran- 
siii  takes  Beja  with  great  slaughter  of  the  patriots — The  in- 
surgents advance  from  Leiria,  fall  back — Action  at  Leiria — 
Loison  arrives  at  Abraiitfs — Observations  on  his  march — 
Frencli  army  concentrated — The  Portuguese  general  Leite, 
aided  by  a  Sjianish  corps,  takes  post  at  Fvora — Loison  cros- 
ses theTajcus;  defeats  Leite's  advanced  guard  at  Montcmor — 
Battle  ofEvora — Town  taken  and  pillaged — Unfriendly  con- 
duct of  the  Spaniard^ — Loison  reachts  FIvas;  collects  provi- 
sions; is  recalled  by  Junot — Observations. 

The  first  serious  blow  was  struck  at  Oporto.  The 
news  of  what  had  taken  place  all  over  Spain  was  known 
there  in  June,  and  general  Bellesta,  the  chief  Spanish 
officer,  immediately  took  an  honourable  and  resolute 
part.  He  made  Ihe  French  general  Quesnel,  with  his 
staff,  prisoners ;  after  which,  calling  together  the  Por- 
tuguese authorities,  he  declared  that  they  were  free  to 
act  as  they  judged  most  fitting  for  their  own  interests, 
and  then  marched  to  Gallicia  with  his  army  and  cap- 
lives.  The  opinions  of  the  leading  men  at  Oporto  were 
divided  upon  the  great  question  of  resistance,  but,  after 
some  vicissitudes,  the  boldest  side  was  successful ;  tlie 
insurrection,  although  at  one  moment  quelled  by  the 
French  party,  was  finally  established  in  Oporto,  and 
soon  extended  along  the  banks  of  the  Douro  and  the 
Minho,  and  to  those  parts  of  Beira  which  lie  between 
the  Mondego  and  the  sea-coast. 

Junot  being  informed  of  this  event,  perceived  that  no 
time  was  to  be  lost  in  disarming  the  Spanish  regiments 
quartered  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Lisbon,  which  was 
not  an  easy  operation.  Carraifa's  division  was  above 
six  thousand  men,  and  without  employing  the  garrisons 
of  the  citadel  and  forts  of  Lisbon,  it  was  difficult  to 
collect  an  equal  force  of  French  ;  the  suspicions  of  the 
Spanish  regiments  had  been  already  excited,  they  were 
reluctant  to  obey  the  French  generals,  and  one,  quar- 
tered at  Alcacer  do  Sal,  had  actually  resisted  the  orders 
of  the  general-in-chief  himself.*  To  avoid  a  tumult 
was  also  a  great  object,  because  in  Lisbon  fifteen  thou- 
sand Gallicians  were  ordinarily  engaged  as  porters  and 
water-carriers,  and  if  a  popular  movement  had  been  ex- 
cited, these  men  would  naturally  have  assisted  their 
countrymen.  Notwithstanding  these  difhculties,  Ju- 
not, in  the  night  of  that  day,  upon  which  he  received 
the  information  of  Bellesta's  defection,  arranged  all  his 
measures,  and  the  next  day,  the  Spanish  troops  being 
under  various  pretexts  assembled  in  such  numbers  and 
in  such  places,  that  resistance  was  useless,  were  dis- 
armed, and  placed  on  board  the  hulks  in  the  Tagus, 
with  exception  of  eight  hundred  of  the  regiment  of 
Murcia  and  three  hundred  of  that  of  Valencia,  who  es- 
caped. Thus,  in  the  course  of  twenty-four  hours,  and 
with  very  little  bloodshed,  Junot.  by  his  promptness 
and  dexterity,  averted  a  very  serious  danger. 

«  Thiebault. 


44 


NAPIEirS    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  II. 


Althoucrh  thi';  stroke  produced  considerable  effect,  it 
did  not  prevent  the  insurrection  from  becomintr general; 
all  couriers  and  officers  carryincr  orders,  or  coinmandinqr 
small  posts  of  communications,  were  suddenlj'  cut  otf ; 
Junot,  reduced  by  a  single  blow  from  fifty  to  twenty- 
eig'ht  thousand  men.  found  himself  isolated,  and  de- 
pendent upon  his  individual  resources,  and  the  courage 
of  his  soldiers,  for  the  maintenance  of  his  conquest, 
and  even  for  tlie  preservation  of  his  army.  The  Rus- 
Bian  squadron,  indeed,  contained  six  thousand  seamen 
and  marines,  hut  while  they  consumed  a  oreal  quantity 
of  provisions,  it  was  evident,  from  certain  symptoms, 
that  thev  could  not  be  depended  upon  as  useful  allies, 
except  in  the  case  of  an  English  fleet  attempting  to 
force  the  entrance  of  the  river.  In  this  situation  the 
duke  of  Abrantes  would  have  seized  Badajos,  but  was 
deterred  by  the  assembling  of  an  Eslremaduran  army, 
then  under  the  command  of  general  (Jaluzzo.  However, 
Avril's  column,  having  failed  to  join  Dupont,  returned 
to  Estremos,  and  it  is  probable  that  Junot  never  in- 
tended that  it  should  do  otherwise. 

Meanwhile  Loison,  then  in  Upper  Beira,  was  ordered 
to  march  upon  Oporto.*  He  had  reached  Almeida  on 
the  5lh  of  Jun(\  one  daj'  previous  to  Bellesta's  defec- 
tion, and  on  the  12lh,  when  he  read  the  order,  partly 
by  menace,  partly  by  persuasion,  got  possession  of 
Fort  Conception,  a  strong,  but  ill-placed  Spanish  work 
on  that  frontier.  He  first  attempted  to  penetrate  the 
Entre-Mitiho  e  Douro  by  Amarante,  but  as  his  division 
was  weak,  and  that  it  was  possible  Bellesta  might  re- 
turn and  fill  upon  his  flank,  he  advanced  timidly.  At 
Mezam  Frtas  he  was  opposed,  and  his  baggage  was  at 
the  same  time  menaced  by  other  insurgents,  whereupon 
he  fell  back  to  Villa  Real,  and  after  a  trifling  skirmish 
at  that  place,  crossed  the  Douro  at  Lamego,  and 
marched  to  Castro  d'Airo,  where  he  turned  and  defeated 
the  armed  peasants  of  the  mountains,  who  had  particu- 
larly harassed  his  flanks.  From  Castro  d'Airo  he 
moved  upon  Coimbra.  whence  he  dislodged  a  body  of 
insurtjeiits.  and  was  about  to  scour  the  country,  when 
he  received  one  of  twenty-five  despatches,  the  rest  had 
been  intercepted,  sent  by  Junot  to  recall  him  to  Lisbon. 
He  immediately  uuited  his  columns,  placed  his  sick 
and  weakly  men  in  Almeida,  raised  the  garrison  up  to 
twelve  hundred  and  fifty  men,  and  then  having  ruined 
the  defences  of  Fort  Conception,  commenced  his  march 
to  Lisbon  by  the  way  of  Guirda. 

But  while  these  events  were  passing  in  the  Beira  an 
insurrection  also  broke  out  in  the  Algarves  wliere 
general  Maurin  commanded.  It  begun  near  Faro,  and 
Maurin  himself,  lying  sick  in  that  town,  was  made 
prisoner.  Some  Portuguese  troops  attached  to  the 
French  force  then  joined  the  insurgents  ;  the  Spaniards 
from  Andalusia  prepared  to  cross  the  Cuadiana,  and 
general  Spencer  appeared  off  Ayamonte  with  five  thou 
Band  British  troops.  The  French  colonel  Maransin, 
'/fho  had  succeeded  Maurin,  immediately  retired  to 
Hertola.  leaving  his  baggage,  military  chest,  and  above 
a  hundred  prisoners, besides  killed  and  wounded,  in  the 
hands  of  the  patriots,  who,  finding  that  Spencer  would 
not  land,  did  not  pursue  beyond  the  Algarve  moun- 
tains. 

The  circle  of  insurrection  was  now  fast  closin<T 
round  Junot.  Emissaries  from  Oporto  excited  the  peo- 
ple to  rise  as  far  as  Coimbra,  where  a  French  post  was 
overpowered,  and  a  junta  was  formed  whose  eflbrts 
spread  the  flame  to  Condeixa,  Pombal,  and  Leira.  A 
student  named  Zagalo,  mixing  boldness  with  address, 
lobliged  a  Portuguese  oflicer  and  a  hundred  men  to  sur- 
render the  fort  of  Figueras  at  the  mouth  of  the  Mon- 
dego ;  Abrantes  was  threatened  by  the  insurgents  of 
the  valley  of  the  Zezere,  and  the  Spaniards,  under  Ga- 
luzzo,  crossing  the  Guadiana,  at  Juramenha,  occupied 

•  Thiebault 


that  place  and  Campo  Mayor;  thus  a  great,  although 
confused  body  of  men  menaced  Kellerman  at  Elvas, 
yet,  supported  by  the  strength  of  the  town  and  fort  La- 
Lippe,  he  easily  maintained  himself.  Avril  remained 
unmolested  at  Estremos,  and  Evora.  held  by  a  small 
garrison,  was  tranquil;  but  the  neighbourhood  of  Setu- 
val  was  in  commotion,  the  populace  of  Lisbon  was  un- 
quiet, and,  at  this  critical  moment,  general  Spencer,  who 
had  quitted  Ayamonte  and  whose  force  report  magnified 
to  ten  thousand  men,  appeared  at  the  mouth  of  tlie  Ta- 

trus.* 

Junot  held  a  council  of  war.  and  after  hearing  the 
opinions  of  the  principal  general  oflicers  decided  on  the 
following  plan  :  1.  To  collect  the  sick  in  such  hospi- 
tals as  could  be  protected  by  the  ships  of  war.  2.  To 
secure  the  Spanish  prisoners  by  mooring  the  hulks  in 
which  they  were  confined  as  far  as  possitilefrom  the  city. 
3.  To  arm  and  provision  the  forts  of  Lisbon,  and  re- 
move the  powder  from  the  magazines  to  the  ships.  4. 
To  abandon  all  other  fortresses  in  Portugal,  with  ex- 
ception of  Setuval,  Almeida,  Elvas,  and  Peniche,  and 
to  concentrate  the  army  in  Lisbon.  In  the  event  of  bud 
fortune,  the  duke  of  Abrantes  determined  to  defend  the 
capital  as  long  as  he  was  able,  and  then  crossing  the 
Tagus,  move  upon  lOlvas.  and  from  thence  rv'treat  to 
Madrid,  Valladolid,  or  Segovia,  as  he  might  find  it  ex- 
pedient. This  well  conceived  plan  was  not  executed, 
the  first  alarm  soon  died  away,  Spencer  returned  to  Ca- 
diz, and  when  the  insurrection  was  grappled  v.ith,  it 
proved  to  be  more  noisy  than  dangerous. 

Kellerman  having  recalled  Maransin  from  Mertola, 
was  preparing  to  march  on  Lisbon,  when  the  inhabi- 
tants of  the  town  of  Villa  Viciosa  rose  on  a  company  of 
French  troops,  and  drove  them  into  an  old  castle;  yet 
when  Avril  came  from  Estremos  to  their  succour,  the 
Portuguese  fled,  and  a  very  few  were  killed  in  the  pur- 
suit. The  town  of  Beja  followed  the  example  of  Villa 
Viciosa,  but  colonel  Maransin,  who  was  ready  to  retire 
from  Mertola,  marched  in  that  direction  with  such  ra- 
pidity, that  he  passed  over  forty  miljs  in  eighteen  hours, 
and  falling  suddenly  upon  the  p-.i*iiots,  defeated  them 
with  considerable  slaughter,  a^)]  pillaged  the  [Jace. 
He  had  eighty  men  killed  or  /  canded,  and  feiueral 
Thiebault  writes,  that  an  ob'-t'ra'e  combat  took  place 
in  the  streets.  But  the  Po!«j^".eso  ■norer  mad**-  i.ead  for 
a  moment  against  a  slrcf,'  '/ody  during  ti  ,;  whole 
course  of  the  insurre  ctio'i ,  fov,  i-^.dedd,  v  ».'.  jt  possi- 
ble for  a  collection  of  »i'.-jab".e  peasuri'p,  ai.ned  with 
scythes,  pitchforks,  a  (cv/  old  foWi.'j,'-y  ■  joes,  and  a 
little  bad  powder,  undir  the  comm'^''i'  -j)  some  igno- 
rant countryman,  or  fanatic  friar,  to  ^^^tltain  a  battle 
ag-ainst  an  eflicient  and  active  corps  Ci  V  /.^nch  soldiers  ] 
For  there  is  this  essential  differerce  'J  be  observed  in 
judging  between  the  Spanish  and  f '.rtuguese  insurrec- 
tions ;  the  Spaniards  had  many  g^eat  and  strong  towns 
free  from  the  presence  of  the  I''ieiich,  and  larire  prov- 
inces in  which  to  collect  and  train  forces  at  a  distance 
from  the  invaders;  while  in  Portugal,  the  naked  peas- 
ants were  forced  to  go  to  battle  the  instant  even  of 
assembling.  The  loss  v/h'ch  Maransin  sustained  must 
have  arisen  from  the  stragglers,  who  in  a  consecutive 
march  of  forty  miles  would  have  been  numerous,  hav- 
ing been  cut  off  and  ki'led  by  the  peasantry. 

This  blow  quieted  the  Alemtejo  for  the  moment, 
and  Kellerman  haviiig  cleared  the  neighbourhood  of 
Elvas  of  all  Spanish  parties,  placed  a  commandant  in 
La-Lippe,  concentrated  the  detachments  under  Maran- 
sin and  Avril.  and  proceeded  himself  towards  Lisbon, 
where  the  duke  of  Abrantes  was  in  great  perplexity. 
The  intercepting  of  his  couriers  and  isolated  officers 
being  followed  by  the  detection  of  all  his  spies,  had 
exposed  him,  without  remedy,  to  every  report  which 
the  t'!  i.*s  of  his  army,  or  the  ingenuity  of  the  people, 

*  Thiebault. 


1808.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


45 


could  o-ive  birth  to;  and  there  are  few  nations  that 
can  pretend  to  vie  with  the  Portuguese  and  Spaniards 
in  tlie  fabrication  of  plausible  reports.  Amon^  those 
current,  the  captivity  of  Loison  was  one;  but  as  noth- 
in:r  was  certainly  known,  except  that  the  insurgents 
from  the  valley  of  the  Mondego  were  marching  towards 
Lisbon,  general  Margaron  was  ordered  to  disperse  them, 
and.  if  possible,  to  open  a  communication  with  general 
Loison.  He  advanced,  with  three  thousand  men  and 
six  pieces  of  artillerj',  to  Leiria,  whither  the  patriots 
had  retired,  in  disorder,  when  they  heard  of  his  ap- 
proach ;  the  greater  part  dispersed  at  once,  but  those 
who  remained  were  attacked  on  the  5th  of  July,  and  a 
scene  similar  to  that  of  Beja  ensued  ;*  the  French 
boasted  of  victory,  the  insurgents  called  it  massacre 
and  pillage.  In  a  combat  with  armed  peasantry,  it  is 
difficult  to  know  where  the  fighting  ceases  and  the  mas- 
sacre begins;  men  dressed  in  peasant's  clothes  are  ob- 
served firing  and  moving  about  without  order  from 
place  to  place, — when  do  they  cease  to  be  enemies  ? 
They  are  more  dangerous  when  single  than  together  ; 
they  can  hide  their  muskets  in  an  instant  and  appear 
peaceable ;  the  soldier  passes,  and  is  immediately  shot 
from  behind. 

The  example  at  Leiria  did  not  however  deter  the  peo- 
ple of  Thom.ar  from  declaring  against  the  French,  and 
the  neighbourhood  of  Alcobaga  rose  at  the  same  time. 
Margaron  was  thus  placed  between  two  new  insurrec- 
tions at  the  moment  he  had  quelled  one  ;  English  fleets, 
with  troops  on  board,  were  said  to  be  hovering  oflT  the 
coast,  and  as  the  most  alarming  reports  relative  to  Loi- 
son were  corroborated,  his  safety  was  despaired  of, 
when,  suddenly,  authentic  intelligence  of  his  arrival  at 
Abrantes  revived  the  spirits  of  the  general-in-chief  and 
the  army. 

After  arranging  all  things  necessary  for  the  security 
of  Almeida,  he  had  quitted  that  town  the  2d  of  July,  at 
the  head  of  three  thousand  four  hundred  and  fifty  men, 
and  arrived  at  Abrantes  upon  the  8th ;  having  in  seven 
days  passed  through  Guarda,  Attalaya,  Sarsedas,  Cor- 
teja,  and  Sardoval.  During  this  rapid  march  he  dis- 
persed several  bodies  of  insurgents  that  were  assembled 
on  the  line  of  his  route,  especially  at  Guarda  and  At- 
talaya, and  it  has  been  said  that  twelve  hundred  bodies 
were  stretched  upon  the  field  of  battle  near  the  first 
town;  but  twelve  hundred  slain  would  give  five  thou- 
sand wounded,  that  is  to  say,  six  thousand  two  hun- 
dred killed  and  wounded  by  a  corps  of  three  thousand 
four  hundred  and  fifty  men  in  hnlf  an  hour !  and  this 
without  cavalry  or  artillery,  and  among  fastnesses  that 
vie  in  ru^gedness  with  any  in  the  world  !  The  truth 
is,  that  the  peasants,  terrified  by  the  reports  that  Loi- 
son himself  spread  to  favour  his  march,  fled  on  all 
sides,  and  if  two  hundred  and  fifty  Portuguese  were 
killed  and  wounded  during  the  whole  passage,  it  was 
the  utmost.  The  distance  from  Almeida,  to  Abrantes 
is  more  than  a  hundred  and  eighty  miles,  the  greatest 
part  is  a  mountain  pathway  rather  than  a  road,  and  the 
French  were  obliged  to  gather  their  provisions  from  the 
country  as  they  passed ;  to  forage,  to  fight  several  ac- 
tions, to  pursue  active  peasants  well  acquainted  with 
the  country  so  closely  as  to  destroy  them  by  thousands, 
and  to  march  a  hundred  and  eighty  miles  over  bad 
roads,  and  all  in  seven  days,  is  impossible. 

The  whole  French  army  was  now  concentrated. 
But  though  Kellerman  had  quelled  the  insurrection  at 
AlcobaQa,  and  that  of  Thomar  was  quieted,  the  insur- 
gents from  Oporto  were  gathering  strength  at  Coimbra, 
and  the  last  of  the  native  soldiers  deserted  the  French 
colours  ;  the  Spanish  troops  at  Badajos,  strengthened 
by  a  body  of  Portuguese  fugitives,  and  commanded  by 
one  Moretti,  were  also  preparing  to  enter  the  Alemtejo, 
find   that  province  was  again  in  commotion  ;]"  for  the 


*  r-i.i.    ^^^.li•i!;,.■lM•^ 


■'p  TV^Vpa. 

.  •)..>.   !i;09. 


English  admiral  had  opened  a  communication  with  the 
insurgents  on  the  side  of  Setuval,  and  the  patriots  were 
assembled  in  considerable  numbers  at  Alcacer  do  Sal. 

In  this  dilemma  Junot  resolved  to  leave  the  northern 
people  quiet  for  a  while,  and  attack  the  Alemtejo,  be- 
cause that  was  his  line  of  retreat  upon  Spain,  from 
thence  only  he  could  provision  the  capital,  and  there 
also,  his  cavalr}'  could  act  with  the  most  effect.  Ac- 
cordingly, Loison,  with  seven  thousand  infantry, 
twelve  hundred  cavalry,  and  eight  pieces  of  artillery, 
crossed  the  Tagus  the  ^Sth  of  July,  and  marched  by 
Os  Ppgoens,  Vendanovas,  and  Montemor.  At  the  lat- 
ter place  he  defeated  an  advanced  guard,  which  fled  to 
Evora,  where  the  Portuguese  general  Leite  had  assem- 
bled the  mass  of  the  insurgents,  and  assisted  by  three 
or  four  thousand  Spanish  troops  under  Moretti,  had 
taken  a  position  to  cover  the  town.  When  Loison  dis- 
covered them,  he  directed  Margaron  and  Solignac  to 
turn  their  flanks,  and  fell  upon  their  centre  himself; 
the  battle  was  short,  for  the  Spanish  auxiliaries  per- 
formed no  service,  and  the  Portuguese  soon  took  to 
flight,  but  there  was  a  great  and  confused  concourse,  a 
strong  cavalry  was  let  loose  upon  the  fugitives,  and 
many  being  cut  off  from  the  main  body,  were  driven 
into  the  town,  which  had  been  deserted  by  the  princi- 
pal inhabitants ;  there,  urged  by  despair,  they  endea- 
voured to  defend  the  walls  and  the  streets  for  a  few 
moments,  but  were  soon  overpowered,  the  greater  part 
slain,  and  the  houses  pillaged.  The  French  lost  two 
or  three  hundred  men,  and  the  number  of  the  Portu- 
guese and  Spaniards  that  fell  was  very  considerable  ;* 
disputes  also  arose  between  them,  and  the  latter  ravag- 
ed the  country  in  their  retreat  with  more  violence  than 
the  French. 

Loison,  after  resting  two  days  at  Evora,  proceeded 
to  Elvas,  and  drove  away  the  numerous  Spanish  par- 
ties which  had  again  infested  the  neighbourhood  of 
that  fortress,  and  were  become  obnoxious  alike  to  Por- 
tuguese and  French.  He  then  scoured  the  country 
round,  and  was  accumulating  provisions  to  form  maga- 
zines at  Elvas,  when  he  was  suddenly  interrupted  by  a 
despatch  from  the  duke  of  Abrantes,  recalling  him  to 
the  right  bank  of  the  Tagus,  for  the  British  army,  so 
long  expected,  had,  at  last,  descended  upon  the  coast, 
and  manly  warfare  reared  its  honest  front  amidst  the 
desolating  scenes  of  insurrection. 

OBSERVATIONS. 

L  Loison's  expedition  to  the  Alemtejo  was  an  opera- 
tion of  military  police,  ratiier  than  a  campaign.  Junot 
wished  to  repress  the  spirit  of  insurrection  by  sudden 
and  severe  examples,  and  hence  the  actions  of  his  lieu- 
tenant were  of  necessity  harsh;  but  they  have  been 
represented  as  a  series  of  massacres  and  cruelties  of 
the  most  revolting  nature,  and  Loison  disseminated 
such  stories  to  increase  the  terror  which  it  was  the  ob- 
ject of  his  expedition  to  create.  The  credulity  of  the 
nation  that  produced  the  Sebastianists  was  not  easily 
shocked,  the  Portuguese  eagerly  listened  to  tales  so  de- 
rogatory to  their  enemies,  and  so  congenial  to  their  own 
revengeful  dispositions  ;  but  the  anecdotes  of  French 
barbarity  current  for  two  years  after  the  convention  of 
Cintra  were  notoriously  false,  and  the  same  stories  be- 
ing related  by  persons  remote  from  each  other  is  no  ar- 
gument of  their  truth.  The  report  that  Loison  was  cap- 
tured, on  his  march  from  Almeida,  reached  Junot  through 
fifty  difl^erent  channels;  there  were  men  to  declare  that 
they  had  beheld  him  bound  with  cords;  f  others  to  tell 
how  he  had  been  entrapped ;  some  named  the  places  he 
had  been  carried  through  in  triumph,  and  his  habitual 
and  characteristic  expressions  were  quoted  ;  the  story 
was  complete,  and  the  parts  were  consistent,  yet  the 
whole  was  no*  only  false,  but  the  rumour  had  not  even 
the  slightest  foundation  of  truth. 


Tiiivbault. 


+  Ibid. 


46 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  II 


2.  The  PoTtufriiPse  aoroiinls  of  the  events  of  this  pe- 
riod are  angry  amplifications  of  every  real  or  pretended 
act  tf  French  harharity  and  injustice  ;  the  crimes  of 
individuals  are  made  matter  of  accusation  against  the 
whole  army.  The  French  accounts  are  more  plausible, 
yet  scarcely  more  safe  as  autliorities,  seeing  that  they 
are  written  by  men  who  being  for  the  most  part  actors 
in  the  scenes  they  describe,  are  naturally  concerned  to 
defend  their  own  characters  ;  their  military  vanity  also 
has  had  its  share  in  disguising  the  simple  facts  of  the 
insurrection;  for  willing  to  enhance  the  merit  of  the 
troops,  they  have  exaggerated  the  number  of  the  insur- 
gents, the  obstinacy  of  the  combats,  and  the  loss  of  the 
patriots.  English  party  writers,  greedily  fixing  upon 
such  relations,  have  changed  the  name  of  battle  into 
massacre;  and  thus  prejudice,  conceit,  and  clamour, 
have  combined  to  violate  the  decorum  of  history,  and 
to  perpetuate  error. 

3.  It  would,  however,  be  an  egregious  mistake  to 
suppose,  that  because  the  French  were  not  monsters, 
tliere  existed  no  cause  for  the  acrimony  with  w'hich 
their  conduct  has  been  assailed.  The  duke  of  Abran- 
tes,  although  not  cruel,  nor  personally  obnoxious  to  the 
Portuguese,  was  a  sensual  and  violent  person,  and  his 
habits  were  expensive  ;  such  a  man  is  always  rapaci- 
ous, and  as  the  character  of  the  chief  influences  the 
manners  of  those  under  his  command,  it  may  be  safely 
assumed  that  his  vices  were  aped  by  many  of  his  fol- 
lowers.* Now  the  virtuous  general  Travot  was  es- 
teemed, and  his  person  respected,  even  in  the  midst  of 
tumult,  by  the  Portuguese,  while  Loison  was  scarcely 
safe  from  their  vengeance  when  surrounded  by  his 
troops  ;  the  execrations  poured  forth  at  the  mere  men- 
tion of  '  the  bloody  Maneta,'  as,  from  the  loss  of  his 
hand,  he  was  called,  proves  that  he  must  have  commit- 
ted many  heinous  acts;  and  Kellerman  appears  to  have 
been  as  justly  stigmatised  for  rapacity,  as  Loison  was 
for  violence. 

4.  It  has  been  made  a  charge  against  the  French 
generals,  that  they  repressed  the  hostility  of  the  Por- 
tuguese and  Spanish  peasants  by  military  executions; 
but  in  doing  so,  they  only  followed  the  custom  of  war, 
and  they  are  not  justly  liable  to  reproof,  save  where  they 
may  have  carried  their  piinishments  to  excess,  and  dis- 
played a  wanton  spirit  of  cruelty.  All  armies  have  an 
undoubted  right  to  protect  themselves  when  engaged  in 
hostilities.  An  insurrection  of  armed  peasants  is  a 
military  anarchy,  and  men  in  such  circumstances  can- 
not be  restrained  within  the  bounds  of  civilised  warfare. 
They  will  murder  stragglers,  torture  prisoners,  destroy 
hospitals,  poison  wells,  and  break  down  all  the  usages 
that  soften  the  enmities  of  modern  nations;  they  wear 
no  badge  of  an  enemy,  and  their  devices  cannot,  there- 
fore, be  guarded  against  in  the  ordinary  mode ;  their 
war  is  one  of  extermination,  and  it  must  be  repressed 
by  terrible  examples,  or  the  civilised  customs  of  mo- 
dern warfare  must  be  discarded,  and  the  devastating 
system  of  the  ancients  revived.  The  usage  of  refusing 
quarter  to  an  armed  peasantry,  and  burning  their  villa 
ges,  however  luijust  and  barbarous  it  may  appear  at 
first  view,  is  founded  upon  a  principle  of  necessity,  and 
is  in  reality  a  vigorous  infliction  of  a  partial  evil,  to 
prevent  universal  calamity:  hut  however  justifiable  it 
may  be  in  tlie(;r3',  nf)wisc  man  will  hastily  resort  to  it, 
and  no  good  man  will  carry  it  to  any  extent. 


CHAPTER  IIL 

Political  and  riiilitary  rctrospprt — Mr.  Fox's  rondurt  rontrastcd 
with  that  of  hissiirrpssors — (itneral  Spenctr  sent  to  the  Medi- 
terranean— Sir  John  Moore  withdrawn  from  thtnce;  arrives  in 
England;  sent  to   Sweden — Spencer  arrives  at  Gibraltar — 


•  Napoleon  i     T.-".  CnsM. 


Ceuta,the  object  of  his  expedition — Spanish  insurrection  di- 
verts his  attention  to  Cadiz  ;  wishes  to  occupy  that  city — • 
Spaniards  averse  to  it — Prudent  conduct  of  sir  Hew  Dalrjm- 
plf  and  lord  Colli ne;wood — Spencer  sails  to  Ajanionte  ;  re-  * 
turns  to  Cadiz  ;  sails  to  the  mouth  of  the  Taofus  ;  returns  to 
Cadiz — Prince  Leopold  of  Sicily  and  the  duke  of  Orleans 
arrive  at  Gibndtar — Curious  intrigue — Army  assembled  at 
Cork  by  the  Whig  administration,  with  a  view  to  jiermanent 
conquest  in  south  America,  tlie  only  disposable  British  force 
— Sir  A.  Wellesley  takes  the  command — Contradictory  in- 
structions of  the  ministers — Sir  John  Moore  returns  from 
Svveden;  ordered  to  Portugal — Sir  Hew  Dalrvmple  appoint- 
ed commander  of  the  forces — Confused  arrangements  made 
by  the  tuinisters. 

The  subjugation  of  Portugal  was  neither  a  recent 
nor  a  secret  project  of  Napoleon's.  In  1H06,  Mr.  Fox, 
penetrating  this  design,  had  sent  lord  Rosslyn,  lord 
St.  Vincent,  and  general  Simcoe,  on  a  politico-military 
mission  to  Lisbon,  instructing  them,  to  warn  the  court 
that  a  French  army  destined  to  invade  Portugal  was 
assembling  at  Bayonne,  and  to  offer  the  assistance  of 
a  British  force  to  meet  the  attack.*  The  cabinet  of 
Lisbon  afl^ected  to  disbelieve  the  information,  Mr.  Fox 
died  during  the  negotiation,  and  as  the  war  with  Prus- 
sia diverted  Napoleon's  attention  to  more  important 
objects,  he  withdrew  his  troops  from  Bayonne.  The 
Tory  administration,  which  soon  after  overturned  the 
Grenville  party,  thought  no  further  of  this  afi^air,  or  at 
least  did  not  evince  as  much  foresight  and  ready  zeal 
as  its  predecessors.  They,  indeed,  sent  sir  Sydney 
Smith  with  a  squadron  to  Lisbon,  but  their  views  seem 
to  have  been  confined  to  the  emigration  of  the  royal 
family,  and  they  intrusted  the  conduct  of  the  negotia- 
tion to  lord  Strangford,  a  young  man  of  no  solid  influ- 
ence or  experience. 

But,  the  Russian  squadron,  under  admiral  Siniavin, 
suddenly  entered  the  Tagus,  and  this  unexpected  event 
produced  in  the  British  cabinet,  an  activity  which  the 
danger  of  Portugal  had  not  been  able  to  excite.  It 
was  supposed,  that  as  Russia  and  England  were  in  a 
stale  of  hostility,  the  presence  of  the  Russian  ships 
would  intimidate  the  prince  regent,  and  prevent  him 
from  passing  to  the  Brazils,  wherefore  sir  Charles 
Cotton,  an  admiral  of  higher  rank  than  sir  Sydney 
Smith,  was  sent  out  with  instructions  to  force  the  en- 
trance of  the  Tagus.  and  attack  Siniavin. f  Gcncra\ 
Spencer,  then  upon  the  point  of  sailing  with  five  thou- 
sand men  upon  a  secret  expedition,  was  ordered  to  touch 
at  Lisbon,  and  ten  thousand  men,  under  sir  John  Moore, 
were  withdrawn  from  Sicily  to  aid  tins  enterprise  ;  j^ 
but  before  the  instructions  for  the  commanders  were 
even  written,  the  prince  regent  was  on  his  voyage  to  the 
Brazils,  and  Junot  ruled  in  Lisbon.  When  sir  John 
Moore  arrived  at  Gibraltar,  he  could  hear  nothing  of  sir 
Sydney  Smith,  nor  of  general  Spencer,  and  ].roceeded 
to  England,  which  he  reached  the  31sl  of  December, 
1807.  From  thence,  after  a  detention  of  four  months 
on  ship-beard,  lu>was  despatched  upon  that  well-known 
and  eminently-foolish  expedition  to  Sweden,  which 
ended  in  such  an  extraordinary  manner  ;||  and  which 
seems  from  the  first  to  have  had  no  other  object,  tlian 
the  factifuis  one  of  keeping  an  excellent  general  and  a 
superb  division  of  troops  at  a  distance  from  the  only 
country  where  their  services  were  really  required. 

Meanwhile  general  Spencer's  armament,  long  baflled 
by  contrary  winds,  and  once  forced  back  to  port,  was 
finally  dispersed  in  a  storm,  and  a  part  arrived  at  Gib- 
raltar, by  single  ships,  the  latter  end  of  January,  1808. 
Sir  Hew  Dalrymple,  the  governor  of  that  fortress, 
hearing,  on  the  5th  of  February,  that  a  French  fleet  had 
just  passed  the  Strait,  and  run  up  the  Mediterranean, 
became  alarm(>d  for  Sicily,  and  caused  the  first  comers 
to  proceed  to  that  island  on  the  11th;  but  Spencer 
himself,  whose  instructions  included  an  attack  on  Ccu- 
ta,  did  not  arrive  at  Gibraltar  until  the  10th  of  March, 


*   Parliamentary  Papers,  1809. 

}   Sir  John  Mooie's  Journal,  MS. 


+  Ibid. 
II   Ibid. 


1808.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULIR    WAR, 


47 


wher  the  deficiency  in  his  armament  was  supplied  bji 
a  draft  from  the  garrison,  and  a  council  was  held  to 
arranp^p  the  plan  of  attack  on  Ceuta  ;  the  operation  was 
however  finally  judired  impracticable. 

The  objects  of  Spencer's  expedition  were  manifold. 
He  was  to  co-operate  with  Moore  anrainst  the  Russian 
fleet  in  the  Tagrus  ;  he  was  to  take  the  French  fleet  at 
Cadiz  ;  he  was  to  assault  Ceuta;  and  he  was  to  make 
an  attempt  on  the  Spanish  fleet  at  Port  \Iahon  !  But  the 
wind  which  brouofht  Moore  to  Lisbon  blowed  Spencer 
from  tliat  port,  and  a  consultation  with  admiral  Purvis 
convinced  him  that  the  French  fleet  in  Cadiz  was  invul- 
nerable to  his  force  ;  Ceuta  was  too  stromr;  and  it  only 
remained  lo  sail  to  Port  Mahon,  when  the  Spanish  in- 
surrection breakinar  out,  drew  him  back  to  Cadiz  with 
altered  views.  In  the  relation  of  Dupont's  campaifjn, 
I  have  already  touched  upon  Spencer's  proceedings  at 
Cadiz  ;  bul  in  this  place  it  is  necessary  to  give  a  more 
detailed  sketch  of  those  occurrences,  which  forttmately 
brought  him  to  the  coast  of  Portugal,  at  the  moment 
when  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  was  commencing  the  cam- 
paign of  Vimiero. 

When  the  French  first  entered  Spain,  general  Casta- 
fios  commanded  the  Spanish  troops  at  San  Roque.  In 
that  situation  he  was  an  object  of  interest  to  Napoleon, 
who  sent  two  French  officers  privately  to  sound  his  dis- 
position ;  Castauos,  who  had  secretly  resolved  to  op- 
pose the  designs  of  the  emperor,  thought  those  officers 
were  coming  to  arrest  him,  and  at  first  determined  to 
kill  them,  and  fly  to  Gibraltar,  but  on  discovering  his 
mistake  treated  them  civilly,  and  prosecuted  his  original 
plans.*  Through  the  medium  of  one  Viali,  a  merchant 
of  Gibraltar,  he  opened  a  communication  with  sir  Hew 
Dalrymple,  and  the  latter,  who  had  been  closely  watch- 
ing the  progress  of  events,  encouraged  him  in  his  views, 
and  not  only  promised  assistance,  but  recommended 
several  important  measures,  such  as  the  immediate  sei- 
zure of  the  French  squadron  in  Cadiz,  the  security  of 
the  Spanish  fleet  at  Minorca,  and  a  speedy  communica- 
tion with  South  America:  however,  before  Castalos 
could  mature  his  plans,  the  insurrection  took  place  at 
Seville,  and  he  acknowledged  the  authority  of  the  junta. 

Meanwhile  Solano  arrived  at  Cadiz,  and  general 
Spencer,  in  co;ij unction  with  admiral  Purvis,  pres=ied 
him  to  attack  tlie  French  squadron,  oflering  to  assist  if 
he  would  admit  the  English  troops  into  the  town.  So- 
lano, whose  mind  was  not  made  up  to  resist  the  inva- 
ders, expressed  great  displeasure  at  this  proposal  to  oc- 
cupy Cadiz,  and  refused  to  treat  at  all  with  the  Briti=ih, 
an  event  not  unexpected  by  sir  Hew.  for  he  knew  that 
most  of  the  Spaniards  were  mistrustful  of  the  object  of 
Spencer's  expedition,  and  the  offer  was  made  without 
his  concurrence.  Thus  a  double  intercourse  was  car- 
ried on  between  the  British  and  Spanish  authorities,  the 
one  friendly  and  confidential  between  sir  Hew  and  C  is- 
taiios,  the  other  of  a  character  proper  to  increase  the 
suspicions  of  the  Spaniards.  And  when  it  is  consider- 
ed that  Spain  and  England  were  nominally  at  war:  that 
the  English  commanders  were  acting  without  the  au- 
thority of  their  government;  that  the  troops,  which  it 
was  proposed  to  introduce  into  Cadiz,  were  in  that  p  irt 
of  the  world  for  the  express  purpose  of  attacking  Ceuta, 
and  had  already  taken  the  island  of  Perexil  close  to  that 
fortress,  little  surprise  can  be  excited  by  Solano's  con- 
duct. When  he  was  killed,  and  Morla  had  succeeded 
to  the  command,  Spencer  and  Purvis  renewed  thoir 
offers ;  but  Morla  also  declined  their  assistance,  and 
having  himself  forced  the  French  squadron  to  surrender, 
by  a  succession  of  such  ill-directed  attacks,  that  some 
doubt  was  entertained  of  his  wish  to  succeed,  he  com- 
menced a  series  of  low  intrigues  calculated  to  secure 
his  own  personal  safety,  while  he  held  himself  ready 
to  betray  his  country  if  the  French  should  prove  the 
strongest. 


*  Sir  Hew  Dalrymple'*  Correspondence,  MS. 


After  the  reduction  of  the  enemy's  ships,  the  people 
were  inclined  to  admit  the  English  troops,  but  the  local 
junta,  swayed  by  Morla's  representations,  were  averse  to 
it;*  and  he,  while  confirming  this  disposition,  secretly 
urged  Spencer  to  persevere  in  his  oflTer,  saying  that  he 
looked  entirely  to  the  British  force  for  the  future  defence 
of  Cadiz  :  thus  dealing,  he  passed  with  the  people  for 
an  active  patriot,  yet  made  no  preparations  for  resist- 
ance, and  by  his  double  falsehood  preserved  a  fair  ap-. 
pearance  both  with  the  junta  and  the  English  general. 
With  these  affairs  sir  Hew  Dalrymple  did  not  meddle, 
he  early  discovered  that  Morla  was  an  enemy  of  Casta- 
fios.  and  having  more  confidence  in  the  latter,  carried  on 
the  intercourse  at  first  established  between  them,  with- 
out reference  to  the  transactions  at  Cadiz.  He  also 
supplied  the  Spanish  general  with  arms  and  two  thou- 
sand barrels  of  powder,  and  placing  one  English  officer 
near  him  as  a  military  correspondent,  sent  another  in 
the  capacity  of  a  political  agent  to  the  supreme  junta  at 
Seville. 

When  Castafios  was  appointed  commander-in-chief 
of  the  Andalusian  army,  and  had  rallied  Echevaria'3 
troops,  he  asked  for  the  co-operation  of  the  British  force, 
and  offered  no  objection  to  their  entering  Cadiz,  but  he 
preferred  having  them  landed  at  Almeria  to  march  to 
Xeres.  General  Spencer  confined  his  offers  to  the  occu- 
pation of  Cadiz,  and  when  Morla  pretended,  that  to  fit 
out  the  Spanish  fleet  was  an  object  of  immediate  impor- 
tance, colonel  sir  George  Smith,  an  officer  employed  by 
general  Spencer  to  conduct  the  negotiations,  promised, 
on  his  own  authority,  money  to  pay  the  Spanish  sea» 
men,  who  were  then  in  a  state  of  mutiny.  However 
lord  Collingwood  and  sir  Hew  Dalrymple  refused  to 
fulfil  this  promise,  and  the  approach  of  Dupont  causinor 
Morla  to  wnsh  Spencer's  troops  away,  he  persuaded  that 
general  to  sail  to  Ayamonte,  under  the  pretence  of  pre- 
venting Avril's  division  from  crossing  the  Guadiana, 
although  he  knew  well  that  the  latter  had  no  intention 
of  doing  so.  The  effect  produced  upon  colonel  Maran- 
sin  by  the  appearance  of  the  British  force  off  Ayamonte 
has  been  already  noticed.  General  Thiebault  says  that 
Spencer  might  have  struck  an  important  blow  at  that  pe- 
riod against  the  French  ;  but  the  British  troops  were 
unprovided  Avith  any  equipment  for  a  campaign,  and  to 
have  thrown  five  thousand  infantry,  without  cavalry  and 
without  a  single  place  of  arms,  into  the  midst  of  an  ene- 
my who  occupied  all  the  f  rtresses.  and  who  could  bring 
twenty  thousand  men  into  the  field,  would  have  been 
imprudent  to  the  greatest  degree.  General  Spencer, 
who  had  by  this  time  been  rejoiu'^d  by  his  detachment 
from  Sicily,  only  made  a  demonstration  of  landing,  and 
having  thus  materially  aided  the  insurrection,  returned 
to  Cadiz,  from  whence  he  was  almost  immediately  sum- 
moned to  Lisbon,  to  execute  a  new  project,  which  prov- 
ed to  be  both  ill-considered  and  fruitless. 

Sir  Charles  Cotton,  being  unable  to  force  the  entrance 
of  the  Tagus  without  troops,  had  blockaded  that  post 
with  the  utmost  rigour,  expecting  to  force  the  Russian 
squadron  to  capitulate  for  want  of  provisions.  This 
scheme,  which  originated  with  lord  Strangford,  never 
had  the  least  chance  of  success,  and  only  augmented 
the  privations  and  misery  of  the  wretched  inhabitants  ;  f 
Junot,  therefore,  had  recourse  to  various  expedients  to 
abate  the  rigour  of  the  blockade  with  regard  to  them, 
and  among  others,  employed  a  Portuguese,  named 
Sataro,  to  make  proposals  to  the  English  admiral.  This 
man,  who  at  first  ])relended  that  he  came  without  thb 
privity  of  the  French,  led  sir  Charles  to  believe  that 
only  four  thousand  French  troops  remained  in  Lisbon, 
and  under  that  erroneous  impression,  the  latter  desired 
general  Spencer  might  join  him,  for  the  purpose  of 
attacking  the  enemy  while  they  were  so  weak.  Spen- 
cer, by  the  advice  of  sir  Hew    Dalrymple   and  lord 

*  Sir  Hfw  Dalrvniple'g  Correspondence, 

t  Mr.  Caiiniug  to  lord  Castlerea^h,  'iath  Dec.  1807. 


48 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  11. 


Colling^vood,  obeyed  the  summons,  but  on  his  arrival 
was  led  to  doubt  the  correctness  of  the  admiral's  infor- 
mation ;  *  instead  of  four  thousand,  it  appeared  that 
there  could  not  be  less  than  fifteen  thousand  French  in 
or  near  Lisbon,  and  the  attack  was  of  course  relinquish- 
ed, f  Spencer  returned  to  Cadiz.  Casta:  os  ag-ain 
pressed  liim  to  co-operate  with  the  Spanish  forces,  and 
he  so  far  consented,  as  to  disembark  them  at  the  port 
of  St.  Mary,  and  even  agreed  to  send  a  detachment  to 
Xeres  ;  yet  deceived  by  IMorla,  who  still  gave  him 
hopes  of  finally  occupying  Cadiz,  he  resolved  to  keep 
the  greater  part  close  to  that  city.:^ 

At  this  period  the  insurrection  of  Andalusia,  attract- 
ed all  the  intriguing  adventurers  in  the  Mediterranean 
towards  Gibraltar  and  Seville,  and  the  confusion  of 
Agraniant's  camp  would  have  been  rivalled,  if  the 
prudent  firmness  of  sir  Hew  Dalrymple  had  not  check- 
ed the  first  efforts  of  those  political  pests.  Among  the 
perplexing  follies  of  the  moment,  one  deserves  partic- 
ular notice,  on  account  of  some  curious  circumstances 
that  attended  it,  the  full  explanation  of  which  I  must, 
however,  leave  to  other  historians,  who  may  perhaps 
find  in  that  and  the  like  affairs,  a  key  to  that  absurd 
policy,  which  in  Sicily  so  long  sacrificed  the  welfare 
of  two  nations  to  the  whims  and  follies  of  a  profligate 
court.  The  introduction  of  the  salique  law  had  long 
been  a  favourite  object  with  the  Bourbons  of  Spain  ;  but 
it  had  never  been  promulgated  with  the  formalities  ne- 
cessary to  give  it  validity,  and  the  nation  was  averse 
to  change  the  ancient  rule  of  succession  ;  this  law  was, 
however,  now  secretly  revived  by  some  of  the  junta 
of  Seville  who  wished  to  offer  the  regency  to  the 
prince  of  Sicily,  because,  Ferdinand  and  his  brother 
dying  without  sons,  the  regent  would  then  succeed  to 
the  prejudice  of  the  princess  Carlotta  of  Portugal. 
With  this  object  in  view,  the  chevalier  Robertoni,  a 
Sicilian  agent,  appeared  early  at  Gibraltar,  and  from 
thence,  as  if  under  the  auspices  of  England,  attempt- 
ed to  forward  the  views  of  his  court,  until  sir  Hew 
Dalrymple,  being  accidentally  informed  that  the  British 
cabinet  disapproved  of  the  object  of  his  mission,  sent 
hi;n  away-ll 

Meanwliile  Castaf.os,  deceived  by  some  person  en- 
gaged in  the  intrigue,  was  inclined  to  support  the  pre- 
tensions of  the  Sicilian  prince  to  the  regency,  and  pro- 
posed to  make  use  of  sir  Hew  Dalrymple's  name  to 
give  weight  to  his  opinions,  a  circumstance  which  w'ould 
have  created  great  jealousy  in  Spain,  if  sir  Hew  had  not 
promptly  refused  his  sanction.  The  affur  then  seemed 
to  droo|)  for  a  moment,  but  in  the  middle  of  July  an 
English  man  of  war  suddenly  appeared  at  Gibraltar, 
havinir  on  board  prince  Leopold  of  Sicily,  a  complete 
court  establishment  of  chamberlains  with  their  keys, 
and  ushers  with  their  white  w^ands ;  §  and  the  duke  of 
Orleans,  who  attended  his  brother-in-law  the  prince, 
making  no  secret  of  his  intention  to  negotiate  for  the  re- 
gency of  Spain,  openly  demanded  that  he  should  be 
received  into  Gibraltar.  Sir  Hew,  foreseeing  all  the 
mischief  of  this  proceeding,  promptly  refused  to  permit 
the  prince  orany  of  his  attendants  to  land,  and  the  cap- 
tain of  the  ship,  whose  orders  were  merely  to  carry  him 
to  Gibraltar,  refused  to  take  him  back  to  vSicily. 
Finally,  to  relieve  his  royal  highness  from  this  awkward 
situation,  sir  Hew  consented  to  receive  him  as  a  guest, 
provided  that  he  divested  himself  of  his  public  charac- 
ter, and  that  the  duke  of  Orleans  departed  instantly 
from  the  fortress. 

Sir  William  Drummond,  British  envoy  at  Palermo, 
Mr.  Vlali,  and  the  duke  of  Orleans,  were  the  ostensi- 
ble contrivers  of  this  notable  scheme,  by  which,  if  it 
had  succeeded,  a  small  party  in  a  local  junta,  would 
have  appointed  a  regency  for  Spain,  paved  the  way  for 


•  Sir  Hew  Dalrymple's  Correspondence. 

+   rarliiiiiicnttiry  Fsip-rs,  1809. 

i  Sir  Hew  Duli>inple'3  Corrcip->n  Jence.     |1  Ibi 


Ibid. 


altering  the  laws  of  succession  in  that  country,  estab- 
lished their  own  sway  over  the  other  juntas,  and  crea- 
ted interminable  jealousy  between  England,  Portugal, 
and  Spain.  With  whom  the  plan  originated  does  not 
very  clearly  appear.  Sir  William  Druuuuoud's  repre- 
sentations induced  sir  Alexander  Ball  to  provide  the 
ship  of  war,  nominally  for  the  conveyance  of  the  duke 
of  Orleans,  in  reality  for  prince  Leopold,  with  whoi;o 
intended  voyage  sir  Alexander  does  not  appear  to  have 
been  made  acquainted.  That  the  prince  should  have 
desired  to  be  r  gent  of  Spain  was  natural,  but  that  he 
should  have  been  conveyed  to  Gibraltar  in  a  British 
ship  of  the  line,  when  the  English  government  disap- 
proved of  his  pretensions,  was  really  curious.  Sir 
William  Drummond  could  scarcely  have  proceeded 
such  lengths  in  an  affair  of  so  great  consequence,  with 
out  secret  instructions  from  some  member  of  his  own 
government,  yet  lord  Castlereagh  expressed  unqual- 
ified approbation  of  sir  Hew's  decisive  conduct  upon 
the  occasion  !  Did  the  ministers  act  at  this  period 
without  any  confidential  communication  with  each 
other?  or  was  lord  Casllereagh's  policy  secretly  and 
designedly  thwarted  by  one  of  his  colleagues  ]  But  it 
is  time  to  quit  this  digression  and  turn  to 

THE  PROCEEDINGS  IN    PORTUGAL. 

The  bishop  of  Oporto  being  placed  at  the  head  of 
the  insurrectional  junta  of  that  town,  claimed  th(i  assist- 
ance of  England.  '  We  hope,'  said  he,  'for  an  aid  of 
three  hundred  thousand  cruzado  novas ;  of  arms  and 
accoutrements  complete,  and  of  cloth  for  forty  thou- 
sand infantry  and  for  eight  thousand  cavalry  ;  tiiree 
thousand  barrels  of  cannon  powder,  some  cargoes  of 
salt  fish,  and  other  provisions,  and  an  auxiliary  body  of 
six  thousand  men  at  least,  including  some  cavalry.' 
This  extravagant  demand  would  lead  to  the  supposition 
that  an  immense  force  had  been  assembled  by  the  pre- 
late, yet  he  could  never  at  any  time  have  put  five  thou- 
sand organized  men  in  motion  against  the  French,  and 
had  probably  not  even  thought  of  any  feasible  or  ra- 
tional mode  of  employing  the  succours  h& demanded; 
the  times  were  however  favourable  for  extravagant  de- 
mands, and  his  were  not  rejected  by  the  English  minis- 
ters, who  sent  agents  to  Oporto  and  other  parts,  with 
power  to  grant  supplies.  The  improvident  system 
adopted  for  Spain,  being  thus  extended  to  Portugal, 
produced  precisely  the  same  effects,  that  is,  cavils, 
intrigues,  waste,  insubordination,  inordinate  vanity  and 
ambition,  among  the  ignorant  upstart  men  of  the  day. 
More  than  half  a  year  had  now  elapsed  since  Napo- 
leon first  poured  his  forces  into  the  Peninsula,  every 
moment  of  that  time  was  marked  by  some  extraordina- 
ry event,  and  one  month  had  passed  since  a  general 
and  terrible  explosion,  shaking  the  unsteady  structure 
of  diplomacy  to  pieces,  had  left  a  clear  space  for  the 
shock  of  arms;  yet  the  British  cabinet  was  still  unac- 
quainted with  the  real  state  of  public  feeling  in  the 
Peninsula,  and  with  the  Spanish  character;  and  ulthougli 
possessing  a  disposable  army,  of  at  least  eighty  thou- 
sand excellent  troops,  was  totally  unsettled  in  its  plans, 
and  unprepared  for  any  vigorous  ellbrt.*  Agents  were 
indeed  despatched  to  every  accessible  province,  the 
publico  treasure  was  scattered  with  heedless  j)rofusion, 
and  the  din  of  preparation  was  heard  in  every  depart- 
ment:  but  the  bustle  of  confusion  is  easily  inisiaken 
for  the  activity  of  business,  and  time  removing  the 
veil  of  official  mystery  covering  those  transactions, 
has  exposed  all  their  dull  and  meagre  features ;  it  is 
now  clear,  that  the  treasure  was  squandered  without 
judgment,  and  the  troops  dispersed  without  meaning. 
Ten  thousand  exiled  to  Sweden  proved  the  truth  of 
Oxenstiern's  address  to  his  son  ;  as  many  more  idly 
kept  in  Sicily  were  degraded  into  the  guards  of  a  vi 
cious  court;  Gibraltar  was  unnecessarily   filled  with 


»  Purl.  Pjp.  l,.u;(:i.KlU.i«.i-.-i.  t.  »ii  A.  W  .  II  .-h  ,  ...si  Jill, 


1808.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


49 


fig'hting  men,  and  general  Spencer,  with  five  thousand 
excellent  soldiers,  was  doomed  to  wander  between  Ceu- 
ta,  Lisbon,  and  Cadiz,  seeking,  like  the  knight  of  La 
Mancha,  for  a  foe  to  combat. 

A  considerable  force  remained  in  England,  but  it 
was  not  ready  for  service,  when  the  minister  resolved 
to  send  an  expedition  to  the  Peninsula,  and  nine  thou- 
sand men  collected  at  Cork,  formed  the  onlj'  disposa- 
ble army  for  immediate  operations.  The  Grey  and 
Grenville  administration,  so  remarkable  for  unfortunate 
military  enterprises,  had  assembled  this  handful  of 
men  with  a  view  to  permanent  conquests  in  South 
America!  upon  what  principle  of  policy  it  is  not  neces- 
sary to  inquire,  but  such  undoubtedly  was  the  inten- 
tion of  that  administration,  perhaps  in  imitation  of  the 
Roman  senate,  who  sent  troops  to  Spain  when  Hanni- 
bal was  at  the  gates  of  the  city.  The  Tory  administra- 
tion relinquishing  this  scheme  of  conquest,  directed 
sir  Arthur  Wellesley  to  inform  general  Miranda,  the 
military  adventurer  of  the  day,  not  only  that  he  must 
cease  to  expect  assistance,  but  that  all  attempts  to  sep- 
arate the  colonies  of  Spain  from  the  parent  state  would 
be  discouraged  by  the  English  government ;  thus  the 
troops  assembled  at  Cork  became  available,  and  sir  Ar- 
thur Wellesley  being  appointed  to  command  them, 
sailed  on  the  12th  of  .luly,  to  commence  that  long  and 
bloody  contest  in  the  Peninsula  which  he  was  destined 
to  terminate  in  such  a  glorious  manner. 

Two  small  divisions  were  soon  after  ordered  to 
assemble  for  embarkation  at  Ramsgate  and  Harwich, 
under  the  command  of  generals  Anstruthcrand  Acland, 
yet  a  considerable  lime  elapsed  betbre  they  were  ready 
•J  sail,  and  a  singular  uncertainty  in  the  views  of  the 
ministers  at  this  period  subjected  all  the  military 
operations  to  perpetual  and  mischievous  changes.  * 
General  Spencer,  supposed  to  be  at  Gibraltar,  was 
directed  to  repair  to  Cadiz,  and  there  await  sir  Arthur's 
orders,  and  the  latter  was  permitted  to  sail  under  the 
impression  that  Spencer  was  actually  subject  to  his 
command  ;|  other  instructions  empowered  Spencer,  at 
his  own  disCiCtion,  to  commence  operations  in  the 
south,  without  reference  to  sir  Arthur  Wellesley's  pro- 
ceedings^ admiral  Purvis,  who,  after  lord  Colling- 
wood's  arrival,  had  no  separate  command,  was  also 
authorised  to  undertake  any  enterprise  in  that  quarter, 
and  even  to  control  the  operations  of  sir  Arthur  Wel- 
lesley by  calling  for  the  aid  of  his  troops,  that  general 
being  enjoined  to  'pay  all  due  obedience  to  any  such 
requisition  !'||  Yet  sir  Arthur  himself  was  informed, 
that  'the  accounts  from  Cadiz  were  bad  ;' that 'no  dispo- 
sition to  move  either  there  or  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Gibraltar  was  visible,'  and  that  '  the  cabinet  were  un- 
willing he  should  go  far  to  the  soutliward,  whilsf'the 
spirit  of  exertion  appeared  to  reside  more  to  the  north- 
ward.' Again,  the  admiral,  sir  Charles  Cotton,  was 
informed  that  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  was  to  co-operate 
with  him  in  a  descent  at  the  mouth  of  the  Tagus,  but  sir 
Arthur  himself  had  no  definite  object  given  for  his  own 
operations,  although  his  instructions  pointed  to  Portu- 
gal. 'I'hus  in  fact  no  one  officer,  naval  or  military, 
knew  exactly  what  his  powers  were,  with  the  exception 
ofridmiral  Purvis,  who,  being  only  second  in  command 
for  his  own  service,  was  really  authorised  to  control  all 
the  operations  of  the  land  forces,  provided  he  directed 
them  to  that  quarter  which  had  been  declared  unfavour- 
able for  any  operations  at  all !  These  inconsistent 
orders  were  calculated  to  create  confusion  and  prevent 
all  vigour  of  action,  but  more  egregious  conduct  fol- 
lowed. 

In  recommending  Portugal  as  the  fittest  field  of  action, 
the  ministers  were  chiefly  guided  by  the  advice  of  the 

*    Farlianifntarv  Papers,  1808.  f   Ibid. 

J   Lil.  CastltreaRh  to  sir  A.  VVelk'siey,  30th  June. 
II  I'lid.  Lcl.  Castlereagh  to  gen.  S[jencer,  '^'dtU  and 30th  Juue. 
Cli.  tj  adin.  I'urvh  2*1*^    Uiiie. 


Asturian  deputies.  Yet  having  received  sir  Hew  Dal- 
rymplc's  despatches  to  a  late  date,  their  own  informa- 
tion must  have  been  more  recent  and  more  extensive 
than  any  that  they  could  obtain  from  those  dep\ities, 
who  had  left  Spain  at  the  commencement  of  the  insur' 
rection,  who  were  ill  informed  of  what  was  passing  in 
their  own  province,  utterly  ignorant  of  the  state  of  any 
other  part  of  the  Peninsula,  and  under  any  circumstan- 
ces incapable  of  judging  rightly  in  such  momentous 
affairs.*  But  though  sir  Arthur  Wellesley's  instructions 
were  vague  and  confined  with  respect  to  military  oper- 
ations, he  was  expressly  told  that  the  intention  of  the 
government,  was  to  enable  Portugal  and  Spain  to  throw 
oft'  the  French  yoke,  and  ample  directions  were  given 
to  him  as  to  his  future  political  conduct  in  the  Peninsu- 
la. He  was  informed  how  to  demean  himself  in  any 
disputes  that  might  arise  between  the  two  insurgent 
nations,  how  to  act  with  relation  to  the  settlement  of 
the  supreme  authority  during  the  interregnum.  He 
was  directed  to  facilitate  communications  between  the 
colonies  and  the  mother  country,  and  to  oflTer  his  good 
offices  to  arrange  any  difierences  between  them.  Tha 
terms  upon  which  Great 'Britain  would  acquiesce  in 
any  negotiation  between  Spain  and  France  were  impar- 
ted to  him,  and  finally  he  was  empowered  to  recommend 
the  establishment  of  a  paper  system  in  the  Peninsula, 
as  a  good  mode  of  raising  money,  and  attaching  the 
holders  of  it  to  the  national  cause;  the  Spaniards  were 
not,  however,  sufficiently  civilised  to  adopt  this  recom- 
mendation, and  barbarously  preferred  gold  to  credit,  wt 
a  time  when  no  man's  life,  or  faith,  or  wealth,  or  power, 
was  worth  a  week's  purchase. 

Sir  Hew  Dalrymple  was  also  commanded  to  furnish 
sir  Arthur  with  every  information  that  might  be  of  use. 
in  the  operations,  and  when  the  tenor  of  these  instruc- 
tions,  and  the  great  Indian  reputation  enjryed  by  sir 
Arthur  Wellesley  are  considered,  it  is  not  possible  to 
doubt  that  he  was  first  chosen  as  the  fittest  man  to 
conduct  the  armies  of  England  at  this  important  con- 
juncture.)" Yet  scarcely  had  he  sailed  when  he  was 
superseded,  not  for  a  man  whose  fame  and  experiencn 
might  have  justified  such  a  change,  but  by  an  extraor- 
dinary arrangement,  which  can  hardly  be  attributed  to 
mere  vacillation  of  purpose,  he  was  reduced  to  the  fourth 
rank  in  that  army,  for  the  future  governance  of  which, 
he  had  fifteen  days  before  received  the  most  extended 
instructions.  Sir  Hew  Dalrj'mple  was  now  appointed 
to  the  chief  command,  and  sir  Jolm  Moore,  v,ho  had 
suddenly  and  unexpectedly  returned  from  the  Baltic, 
having  by  his  firmness  and  address  saved  himself  and 
his  troops  from  the  madness  of  the  Swedish  monarch, 
was  with  marked  disrespect,  directed  to  place  himself 
under  the  orders  of  sir  Harry  Burrard,  and  proceed  to 
Portugal.  Thus  two  men  comparatively  unknown  and 
unused  to  the  command  of  armies,  superseded  the  only 
generals  in  the  British  service  whose  talents  and  expe- 
rience were  indisputable.  The  secret  springs  of  this 
proceeding  are  not  so  deep  as  to  baffle  investigation  , 
but  that  task  scarcely  belongs  to  the  general  liislorian, 
who  does  enough  when  he  exposes  the  effects  of  envy, 
treachery,  and  base  cunning,  without  tracing  those 
vices  home  to  their  possessors. 

Notwithstanding  these  changes  in  the  command, 
the  uncertainty  of  the  minister's  plans  continued.  Tiie 
same  day  that  sir  Hew  Dalrymple  was  appointed 
to  be  commander-in-chief,  a  despatch,  containing  the 
following  i)roject  of  campaign,  was  sent  to  sir  Arthur 
Wellesley::):  'The  motives  which  have  induced  the 
sending  so  large  a  force  to  that  quarter  (the  coast  of 
Portugal,)  are,  1st,  to  provide  efl'ectually  for  an  attack 
upon  the  Tagus;  and, '2illy,  to  have  such  an  addition- 
al force  disposable  beyond  what  may  be  indispensably 


*  Pari.  Pap.  Ld.  Castlereagh  to  sir  A.  Wellesley,  30th  Junt. 
t   Pari.  Pap.  Ld.  Castl.  reagh  to  sirH.  Paliviiij  le,  2Uth  June, 
i  Pari.  Pap.  Ld.  Castlncugh  to  sir  A.  WiUeslty,  15th  July. 


ho 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  11. 


requisite  for  thnt  operntion,  ns  may  atlmit  of  a  detach- 
ment being  made  to  the  southward,  either  with  a  view 
to  secure  Cadiz,  if  it  should  be  threatened  by  the 
French  force  under  general  Dupont,  or  to  co-operate 
with  the  Spanish  troops  in  reducing  that  corps,  if  cir- 
cumstances should  favour  such  an  operation,  or  any  other 
that  may  be  concerted.  His  Majesty  is  pleased  to 
direct  that  the  attack  upon  the  Tw^us  should  be  consider- 
ed as  the  first  object  to  be  attended  to  ;  and  as  the  whole 
force  of  which  a  statement  is  enclosed,  when  assembled, 
•will  amount  to  not  less  than  thirty  thousand,  it  is  coti- 
sidered  that  both  services  may  be  provided  for  amply. 
The  precise  distribution,  as  between  Portugal  and 
Andalusia,  both  as  to  time  and  proportion  of  force, 
must  depend  upon  circumstances,  to  be  judged  of  on 
the  spot;  and  should  it  be  deemed  advisable  to  fulfil 
the  assurance  which  lieutenant  general  sir  Hew  Dal- 
rymple  appears  to  have  given  to  the  supreme  junta  of 
Seville,  under  the  authority  of  my  despatch  of  (no 
date),  that  it  was  the  intention  of  his  Majesty  to  em- 
ploy a  corps  of  ten  thousand  men  to  co-operate  with  the 
Spaniards  in  that  quarter;  a  corps  of  this  magnitude 
may,  I  should  hope,  be  detached  without  prejudice  to 
the  main  operation  against  the  Tagus,  and  may  be 
reinforced,  according  to  circumstances,  after  the  Tagus 
has  been  secured.  But  if,  previous  to  the  arrival  of 
the  force  under  orders  from  England,  Cadiz  should 
be  seriously  threatened,  it  must  rest  with  the  senior 
officer  of  the  Tagus,  at  his  discretion  to  detach,  upon 
receiving  a  requisition  to  that  effect,  such  an  amount 
of  force  as  may  place  that  important  place  out  of  the 
reach  of  immediate  danger,  even  though  it  should  for  the 
time  suspend  operations  against  the  Tagus.'' 

The  inconsistent  folly  of  this  despatch  is  apparent, 
but  the  occupation  of  Cadiz  was  a  favourite  project  with 
the  Cabinet,  which  was  not  discouraged  by  Spencer's 
unsuccessful  effort  to  gaiji  admittance,  nor  by  the  repre- 
sentations of  sir  Hew  Dalrymple,  who  had  grounds  to 
believe  that  the  attempt  would  bring  down  the  army 
under  CastaHos  to  oppose  it  by  force.  Neither  did  the 
minister  consider  that,  in  a  political  view,  such  a  mea- 
sure, pressed  as  a  preliminary,  would  give  a  handle  for 
misrepresentation,  and  that,  in  a  military  view,  the  bur- 
den of  Cadiz  would  clog  operations  in  Portugal.  Adopt- 
ing all  projects,  and  weighing  none,  they  displayed  the 
most  incredible  confusion  of  ideas  ;  for  the  plan  of  send- 
ing ten  thousand  men  to  Seville,  was  said  to  be  in 
pursuance  of  a  promise  made  by  sir  Hew  Dalrymple  to 
the  junta,  whereas  the  despatch  of  that  general,  quoted 
as  authority  for  this  promise  of  help,  contained  notiiing 
of  the  kind,  and  was  even  written  before  any  junta  exist- 
ed! 

In  England,  at  this  period,  personal  enmity  to  Napo- 
leon, and  violent  party  prejudices,  had  so  disturbed  the 
Judgments  of  nien  relative  to  that  monarch,  that  any  in- 
formation speaking  of  strength  or  success  for  him,  was 
regarded  with  suspicion  even  by  the  ministers,  who,  as 
commonly  happens  in  such  cases,  becoming  the  dupes 
of  their  own  practices,  listened  with  complacency  to  all 
those  tales  of  mutiny  among  his  troops,  disaffection  of 
his  generals,  and  insurrections  in  France,  which  the 
cunning  or  folly  of  their  agents  transmitted  to  them. 
Hence  sprung  such  projects  as  the  one  above,  the  false 
calculations  of  which  may  be  exposed  by  a  short  com- 
parative statement.  The  whole  English  force  was  not 
much  above  thirty  thousand  men,  distributed  off  Cadiz, 
off  the  coast  of  Portugal,  on  the  eastern  parts  of  Eng- 
land, and  in  the  Channel.  The  French  in  Spain  and 
Portugal  were  about  a  hundred  and  twenty  thousand 
men,  and  they  possessed  all  the  Portuguese,  and  most 
of  the  Spanish  fortresses.  The  English  army  had  no 
reserve,  no  fixed  plan,  and  it  was  to  be  divided,  and  to 
act  upon  a  double  line  of  operations.  The  ?>ench 
had  a  strong  reserve  at  Bayonne,  and  the  grand  French 
arii.y  of  f'.ur  hundred  thousand  veteran-  v  is  untouched, 


and  ready  to  succour  the  troops  in  the  Peninsula  if  they 
required  it. 

Happily,  this  visionary  plan  was  in  nc  )articular  fol- 
lowed by  the  generals  entrusted  with  the  conduct  of  it. 
A  variety  of  causes  combined  to  prevent  the  execution. 
The  catastrophe  of  Baylen  marred  the  great  combina- 
tions of  the  French  emperor,  fortune  drew  the  scattered 
divisions  of  the  English  army  together,  and  the  deci- 
sive vigour  of  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  sweeping  away 
these  cobweb  projects,  obtained  all  the  success  that  the 
bad  arrangements  of  the  ministers  would  permit.  In  the 
next  chapter,  resuming  the  thread  of  the  history,  I  shall 
relate  the  proceedings  of  the  first  British  campaign  in 
the  Peninsula.  But  I  judged  it  necessary  to  make  an 
exposition  of  the  previous  preparations  and  pl.ins  of  the 
cabinet,  lest  the  reader's  attention  not  being  fully  awa- 
kened to  the  difficulties  cast  in  the  way  of  the  English 
generals  by  the  incapacity  of  the  government,  should, 
with  hasty  censure,  or  niggard  praise,  do  the  former  in- 
justice ;  for,  as  a  noble  forest  hides  many  noisome 
swamps  and  evil  things,  so  the  duke  of  Wellington's 
actions  have  covered  the  innumerable  errors  of  the  min- 
isters. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Sir  A.  Wellesley  quits  his  troops  and  proceeds  to  Coruna 
Junta  refuse  assistance  in  men,  hut  ask  for  and  obtain  money 
— Sir  Arthur  ffoes  to  Oporto;  arrangesa  plan  witli  the  bish- 
op; proceeds  to  the  Ta^iis;  rejoins  his  troops;  joined  ')y 
Spencer;  disembarks  at  tiie  Mondego;  has  an  interview  with 
general  Freire  d'Andrada;  marches  to  Leria — Portuguese  in- 
surrection weak — Junot's  position  and  dispositions — Laborde 
marches  to  Alcobaca,  Loison  to  Abrantts — (ieneral  Freire 
separates  from  the  British — Junot  quits  Lisbon  with  the  re- 
serve— Laborde  takes  post  at  Rorica — Action  of  Rorica — I,a- 
borde  retreats  to  Montecliique^Sir  A.  Wellesley  marches  to 
Viniiero — Junot  concentrates  his  army  at  Torres  Vedras. 

A  FEW  days  after  sailing  from  Cork,  sir  Arthur  Wel- 
lesley, quitting  the  fleet,  repaired  in  a  frigate  to  Coru^i, 
where  he  arrived  the  20th  of  .Tuly,  and  immediately 
held  a  conference  with  the  Gallieian  junta,  by  whom 
he  was  informed  of  the  battle  of  Rio  Seeo.*  The  ac- 
count was  glossed  over  in  the  Spanish  manner  and  tlie 
issue  of  that  contest  had  caused  no  change  of  policy, 
if  policy  that  may  be  called,  which  was  but  a  desire  to  ob- 
tain money  and  to  avoid  personal  inconvenience.  The  aid 
of  troops  was  rejected,  but  arms  and  gold  were  demanded, 
and  while  the  conference  went  on,  the  last  was  supplied, 
for  an  English  frigate  entered  the  harbour  with  two  hun- 
dred thousand  pounds.  The  junta  recommended  that  t!ie 
British  should  he  employed  in  the  north  of  Portugal, 
promised  to  aid  them  by  sending  a  Spanish  division  to 
Oporto,  and  supported  their  recommendation  with  an 
incorrect  statement  of  the  number  of  men,  Spanish  and 
Portuguese,  who,  they  asserted,  were  in  arms  near  that 
city.  They  gave  also  a  still  more  inaccurate  estimate 
of  the  forces  under  Junot,  and  in  this  manner  persuaded 
sir  Arthur  not  to  land  in  their  province  :  yet,  at  the  mo- 
ment they  were  rejecting  the  assistance  of  the  British 
troops,  the  whole  kingdom  of  Gallicia  was  lying  at  the 
mercy  of  marshal  Bessicres,  and  there  were  neithe* 
men  nor  means  to  impede  the  progress  of  his  victorious 
army. 

Mr.  Charles  Stuart,  appointed  envoy  to  the  (rallician 
junta,  had  arrived  with  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  at  Corui~ia, 
and  quickly  penetrated  the  flimsy  veil  of  Spanish  en- 
thusiasm, informed  his  government  of  the  true  state  of 
affairs  ;  but  his  despatches  were  unheeded,  while  the 
inflated  reports  of  tlie  subordinate  civil  and  military 
agents  were  blazoned  fortii,  and  taken  as  sure  guides. 
Meanwhile  sir  Arthur  proceeded  to  Oporto,  where  ha 
found  colonel  Browne,  an  active,  intelligent  officer,  em- 

*  Sir  A.  WellesIey'B  Narrative.     Court  of  Inquiry. 


1808.  J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


51 


ploj'ed  to  distribute  succours.  From  his  reports  it  ap- 
j^f'rirs  that  no  Spanish  troops  were  in  the  north  of  Por- 
tHtral,  and  that  all  the  Portuo^uese  force  was  upon  the 
Monde^o,  to  the  south  of  which  river  the  insurrection 
had  already  spread.  A  French  division  of  eight  thou- 
sand men  was  supposed  to  be  in  their  front,  and  some 
preat  disaster  was  to  be  expected,  for,  to  use  colonel 
Browne's  words,  '  with  every  sfood  will  in  the  people, 
their  exertions  were  so  short-lived,  and  with  so  little 
combination,  that  there  was  no  hope  of  their  hein^  able 
to  resist  the  advances  of  the  enemy;*  in  fact,  only  five 
thousand  regulars  and  militia,  half  armed  and  associat- 
ed with  ten  or  twelve  thousand  peasants  without  any 
arms,  were  in  the  field  at  all.  A  largp  army  was,  how- 
ever, made  out  upon  paper  by  the  ".dshop  of  Oporto, 
who,  havino'  assembled  his  civil  /nd  military  coadju- 
tors in  council,  proposed  variou?  plans  of  operation  for 
the  allied  forces,  none  of  which  sir  Arthur  was  inclined 
to  adopt  ;'\  but  after  some  discussion  it  was  finally  ar- 
ranfjed  that  the  prelate  and  the  paper  army  should  look 
to  the  defence  of  theTras  os  Montes  against  Bessieres, 
and  that  the  five  thousand  soldiers  on  the  Mondego 
should  co-operate  with  the  British  forces. 

Tills  bring  settled,  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  hastened  to 
consult  with  sir  Charles  Cotton  relative  to  the  descent 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Tagus,  which  had  so  long  haunted 
the  imaginations  of  the  ministers.  The  strength  of 
the  French,  the  bar  of  the  river,  the  disposition 
of  the  forts,  and  the  difficulty  of  landing  in  the  imme- 
diate neighbourhood,  occasioned  by  the  heavy  surf 
playintr  upon  all  the  undefended  creeks  and  bays,  con- 
vinced him  that  such  an  enterprise  was  unadvisable,  if 
not  iinpracticablf.  There  remained  a  choice  of  landing 
to  the  north  of  Lisbon  at  such  a  distance  as  to  avoid 
the  danger  of  a  disputed  disembarkation  ;  or  of  proceed- 
ing to  tiie  southward  to  join  general  Spencer,  and  com- 
mence operations  in  that  quarter  against  Dupont.:}:  Sir 
Arthur  Wellesley  decided  against  the  latter,  which 
promised  no  good  result  while  Junot  held  Portugal  and 
Bessieres  hung  on  the  northern  frontier;  for  he  foresaw 
that  the  jealousy  of  the  Spaniards,  evinced  by  their 
frequent  refusal  to  admit  English  troops  into  Cadiz, 
would  assuredly  bring  on  a  tedious  negotiation,  and 
waste  the  season  of  action  before  the  army  could  obtain 
a  place  of  arms  ;  or  that  the  campaign  must  be  com- 
menced without  any  secure  base  of  operations. [|  Noth- 
ing was  then  known  of  the  Spanish  troops,  except  that 
they  were  inexperienced,  and  without  good  aid  from 
them,  it  would  have  been  idle  with  fourteen  thousand 
men  to  take  the  field  against  twenty  thousand,  strongly 
posted  in  the  Sierra  Morena,  and  communicating  freely 
with  the  main  body  of  the  French  army.  A  momenta- 
ry advance  was  useless  !  and  if  the  campaign  was  pro- 
tacted,  the  line  of  operations  running  nearly  parallel  to 
the  frontier  of  Portugal,  would  have  required  a  covering 
ar.ny  on  the  Guadiana  to  watch  the  movements  of  Junot. 

The  double  line  of  operations,  proposed  by  lord  Cas- 
tlereagh,  was  contrary  to  all  military  principle,  and  as 
Spencer's  despatches  announced  that  liis  division  was 
at  St.  Mary's,  near  Cadiz,  and  disengaged  from  any 
connexion  with  the  Spaniards — a  fortunate  circum- 
stance, scarcely  to  have  been  expected, — sir  Arthur  sent 
him  orders  to  sail  to  the  mouth  of  the  Mondego,  whith- 
er he  himself  also  repaired,  to  join  the  fleet  having  his 
own  army  on  board. 

Off"  the  Mondego  he  received  the  despatches  an- 
nouncing sir  Hew  Dalrymple's  appointment  and  the 
sailing  of  sir  John  Moore's  troops,  but  this  mortifying 
intelligence  did  not  relax  his  activity  ;  he  directed  fast- 
sailing  vessels  to  look  out  for  Anstruther's  armament, 
and  conduct  it  to  the  Mondego,  and  having  heard  of 


*  Parliamentnry  Papers,  1809. 

t  Sir  A.  Wfllesley's  Narrative.  Court  of  Inquiry,     t  Ibid. 

y  Sir  H.  Dalrymplt's  and  lordCcllingwood'j  Correspondence. 


Dupont's  capitulation,  resolved  without  waiting  for  gen- 
eral Spencer's  arrival,  to  disembark  his  own  troops  and 
commence  the  campaign — a  determination  that  marked 
the  cool  decisive  vigour  of  his  character.  He  was,  in- 
deed, sure  that,  in  consequence  of  Dupont's  defeat, 
Bessieres  would  not  enter  Portugal  ;  yet  his  informa- 
tion led  him  to  estimate  Junot's  own  force  at  sixteen  to 
eighteen  thousand  men,  a  number,  indeed,  below  the 
truth,  yet  sufficient  to  make  the  hardiest  general  pause 
before  he  disembarked  with  only  nine  thousand  men,  and 
without  any  certainty  that  his  fleet  could  remain  even 
for  a  day  in  that  dangerous  offmg  :■*  another  man,  al&o, 
was  coming  to  profit  from  any  success  that  might  be 
obtained,  and  a  failure  would  have  ruined  his  own 
reputation  in  the  estimation  of  the  English  public,  al- 
ways ready  to  deride  the  skill  of  an  Indian  general. 

It  was  difficult  to  find  a  good  point  of  disembark- 
ation. The  coast  of  Portugal,  from  the  Minho  to  the 
Tagus,  presents  with  few  exceptions,  a  rugged  and 
dangerous  shore  ;  all  the  harbours  formed  by  the  rivers 
have  bars,  that  render  most  of  them  difffcult  of  access 
even  for  boats ;  with  the  slightest  breeze  from  the  sea- 
board, a  terrible  surf  breaks  along  the  whole  line  of 
coast,  forbidding  all  approach  ;  and  when  the  south 
winds  which  commonly  prevails  from  August  to  tlie 
winter  months,  blows,  a  more  dangerous  shore  is  not 
to  be  found  in  au)"^  part  of  the  world. 

The  small  peninsula  of  Peniche,  about  seventy  miles 
northward  of  the  Lisbon  Rock,  alone  offered  a  safe 
and  accessible  bay,  perfectly  adapted  for  a  disembarka- 
tion ;  but  the  anchorage  was  completely  within  range 
of  the  fort,  which  contained  a  hundred  guns  and  a  gar- 
rison of  a  thousand  men.  The  next  best  place  was  the 
Mondego  river,  and  as  the  little  fort  of  Figueras,  taken, 
as  I  have  before  related,  by  the  student  Zagalo,  and 
now  occupied  by  English  marines,  secured  a  free  en- 
trance, sir  Arthur  commenced  landing  his  troops  there 
on  the  1st  of  August.  The  weather  was  calm,  yet  the 
operation  was  so  difficult,  that  it  was  not  completed 
before  the  5th,  and  at  that  moment,  by  singular  good 
fortune,  general  Spencer  arrived ;  he  had  not  received 
sir  Arthur's  orders,  but  with  great  promptitude  had 
sailed  for  the  Tagus  the  moment  Dupont  surrendered, 
and  by  sir  Charles  Cotton  had  been  directed  to  Mon- 
dego.f  The  united  forces,  however,  only  amounted  to 
twelve  thousand  three  hundred  men,  because  a  vete- 
ran battalion,  being  destined  for  Gibraltar,  was  left  on 
board  the  ships. 

When  the  army  was  on  shore,  the  British  general  re- 
paired to  Montemor  Velho,  to  confer  with  don  Bernar- 
dim  Freire  d'  Andrada,  the  Portuguese  commander-in- 
chief,  who  proposed  that  the  troops  of  the  two  nations 
should  relinquish  all  communication  with  the  coast,  and 
throwing  themselves  into  the  heart  of  Beira,  commence 
an  offensive  campaign.  He  promised  ample  stores  of 
provisions,  but  sir  Arthur  having  already  discovered 
the  weakness  of  the  insurrection,  placed  no  reliance  on 
those  promises;  wherefore  furnistiing  Freire  with  five 
thousand  stand  of  arms  and  ammunition,  he  refused  to 
separate  from  his  ships,  and  seeing  clearly  that  the 
insurgents  were  unable  to  give  any  real  assistance, 
resolved  to  act  with  reference  to  the  probability  of  their 
deserting  him  in  danger.  The  Portuguese  general,  dis- 
appointed at  this  refusal,  reluctantly  consented  to  join 
the  British  army,  yet  pressed  sir  Arthur  to  hasten  to 
Leiria,  lest  a  large  magazine  filled,  as  he  affirmed, 
with  provisions  for  the  use  of  the  British  army,  should 
fall  into  the  enemy's  hands.  After  this  the  two  gen 
erals  separated,  and  the  necessary  preparations  being 
completed,  the  advanced  guard  of  the  English  army 
quitted  the  banks  of  the  Mondego  on  the  9tli,  taking 
the  road  to  Leiria,  and  the  10th,  sir  Arthur  Wellesley 
followed  with  the  main  body. 


*   Sir  A.  Wellcsley's  Narratire.    Court  of  Inquiry,     f   lb 


52 


NAPIER  S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  IT. 


His  plnn  pmbracrd  three  principal  objects  : 

1.  To  hold  on  by  the  sea-coast,  as  well  for  the  sake 
of  his  supplies,  as  to  avoid  the  drain  upon  his  army, 
which  the  proteftion  of  magazines  on  shore  would  oc- 
casion, and  also  to  cover  the  disembarkation  of  the  re- 
inforcements expected  from  Enirland. 

2.  To  keep  his  troops  in  a  mass,  that  he  might  strike 
an  important  blow. 

3.  To  strike  that  blow  as  near  Lisbon  as  possible, 
that  tlie  affairs  of  Portugal  might  be  quickly  brought 
to  a  crisis. 

He  possessed  very  good  military  surveys  of  the 
ground  in  the  immediate  neighbourhood  of  Lisbon,  and 
he  was  anxious  to  carry  on  bis  operations  in  a  part  of 
the  country  where  he  could  avail  himself  of  tliis  re- 
source ;  *  but  the  utter  inexperience  of  his  commis- 
sariat staff,  and  the  want  of  cavalry,  rendered  his 
movements  slow,  and  obliged  him  to  be  extremely  cir- 
cumspect; especially  as  the  insurrection,  although  a 
generous,  was  a  feeble  effort,  and  its  prolongation 
rather  the  result  of  terror  than  of  hope  ;  the  blow  had 
been  hastily  struck  in  the  moment  of  suffering,  and  the 
patriots,  conscious  of  weakness,  trembled  when  they 
reflected  on  their  own  temerity.  Bernardim  Freire  had 
received  arms  and  equipments  complete  for  five  thou- 
sand soldiers,  yet  his  army  at  Leiria  did  not  exceed 
six  thousand  men  of  all  arms  fit  for  action,  and  besides 
this  force,  there  were  in  all  the  provinces  north  of  the 
Tagus  only  three  thousand  infantry,  under  the  com- 
mand of  the  marquis  of  Valladeres,  half  of  whom  were 
Spaniards  :|  lience  it  appears,  that  nothing  could  be 
more  insignificant  than  the  insurrection,  nothing  more 
absurd  than  the  lofty  style  adopted  by  the  junta  of 
Oporto  in  their  communications  with  the  British  min- 
isters. 

L'pon  the  other  side,  Junot,  who  had  received  infor- 
."nation  of  the  English  descent,  in  the  Mondego,  as 
early  as  the  2d,  was  extremely  embarrassed  by  the  dis- 
tance of  his  principal  force,  and  the  hostile  disposi- 
tion of  the  ii:habitants  of  Lisbon.:!:  He  also  was  ac- 
quainted with  the  disaster  of  Dupont,  and  exaggerated 
notions  of  the  essential  strength  of  the  Portuguese  in- 
surgents were  generated  in  his  own  mind,  and  in  the 
minds  of  his  principal  officers.  The  patriots  of  the 
Alemtejo  and  Algarves,  assisted  by  some  Spaniards, 
and  aniniatf^d  by  manifestos  and  promises  assiduously 
promulgated  from  the  English  fleet,  had  once  more  as- 
sembled at  Alcacer  do  Sal,  from  whence  they  threat- 
*>ned  the  garrisons  of  St.  Ubes,  and  the  French  posts 
on  the  south  bank  of  the  Tagus,  immediately  opposite 
to  Lisbon.  That  capital  was  very  unquiet.  The  an- 
ticipation of  coming  freedom  was  apparent  in  the  wrath- 
ful looks  and  stubborn  manners  of  the  populace,  and 
superstition  was  at  work  to  increase  the  hatred  and 
the  h(  pes  of  the  multitude;  it  was  at  this  time  the 
prophetic  eggs,  dt-ncuncing  death  to  the  French,  and 
deliverance  to  the  Portuguese,  appeared.  But  less 
equivf  cal  indications  of  approaching  danger  were  to 
be  drawn  frcm  the  hesitations  of  Junot,  who,  waveringr 
between  his  fear  of  an  insurrection  in  Lisbon,  and  his 
desire  to  check  the  immediate  progress  of  the  British 
army,  gave  certain  proof  of  an  intellect  yielding  to  the 
pressure  of  events. 

Loison,  having  seven  or  eight  thousand  men.  was 
now  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Estremos;  two  thousand 
five  hvmdred  men  W(>re  in  the  fortresses  of  Elvas  ai;d 
Almeida,  a  few  hundred  were  at  Abrantcs,  a  thousand 
in  Santiirem,  and  the  same  number  in  Peniche  ;  general 
Thomieres,  with  one  brigade,  was  in  the  vicinity  of 
Alcobaf;a,  and  the  rest  of  the  army  was  quartered  at 
Lisbon  ami  on  a  circuit  round,  including  both  sides  of 
the  river.     The  Tagus  itself  was  guarded  on  the  north 

*   Sir  A.  Welleslpy's  IVarrative.    Court  of  Inqiiirv. 

f  Proccedi.^<Js  of  the  Court  of  Inquirj'.  ^  Tl.ii'jault. 


bank  by  the  forts  of  Cascacs,  .St.  Antonio,  St.  Julian's. 
Belem,  and  the  citadel,  between  wiiich  smaller  works 
kept  up  a  continued  line  of  offence  agaii;st  ships  en- 
tering by  the  northern  passage  of  the  harbour.  On 
the  southern  bank,  fort  Bugio,  built  upon  a  low  sandy 
point,  crossed  its  fire  with  St.  Julian's  in  the  defence 
of  the  entrance.  Upon  the  heights  of  Almada  or  Pal- 
mela,  stood  the  fort  of  Palmela,  and  St.  Ubes  and  Traf- 
faria  completed  the  posts  occupied  by  the  French  »n 
that  side.*  The  communication  between  the  north  and 
south  banks  was  kept  up  by  the  refitted  Portuguese 
ships  of  war,  by  the  Russian  squadron,  and  by  the  in- 
numerable boats,  most  of  them  ver}'  fine  and  large, 
with  which  the  Tagus  is  covered. 

Such  was  the  situation  of  the  army  on  the  .3d,  when 
Junot  ordered  Loison  to  march  by  Portalegre  and 
Abrantes,  and  from  thence  effect  a  junction  with  gen- 
eral Laborde,  who,  with  three  thousand  infantry,  five 
or  six  hundred  cavalry,  and  five  pieces  of  artillery, 
quitted  Lisbon  upon  the  6tli,  and  proceeded  by  Villa 
Franca,  Rio  Mayor,  and  Candeiros  ;  being  charged  to 
observe  the  movements  of  the  British,  and  to  cover  the 
march  of  Loison,  with  whom  he  expected  to  form  a 
junction  at  Leiria.  Junot  himself  remained  in  Lisbon 
thinking  to  control  the  inhabitants  by  his  presence. f 
He  embarked  all  the  powder  from  the  magazines,  took 
additional  precautions  to  guard  his  Spanish  prisoners, 
and  put  the  citadel  and  forts  into  a  state  of  siege  ;  but 
disquieted  by  the  patriots,  assembled  at  Alcacer  do 
Sal,  he  sent  general  Kellennan  with  a  moveable  col- 
umn to  disperse  them,  directing  him  to  scour  tlie  coun- 
try between  that  place  and  Setuval,  to  withdraw  the 
garrison  from  the  latter,  to  abandon  all  the  French  posts 
on  the  south  of  the  Tagus  except  Palmela,  and  to  col- 
lect the  whole  force  in  one  mass  on  the  heights  of  Al- 
mada, \ihere  an  entrenched  camp  had  been  already 
commenced.  But  Kellerman  had  scarcely  departed, 
when  two  English  regiments,  the  one  from  Madeira, 
the  other  from  Gibraltar,  arriving  off  the  bar  of  Lisbon, 
distracted  anew  the  attention  of  the  French,  and  in- 
creased the  turbulence  of  the  populace  ;  and  in  this 
state  of  perplexity  the  duke  of  Abrantes  lingered  until 
the  15th,  when  the  progress  of  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley 
forced  him  to  assume  the  command  of  the  army  in  the 
field. 

Loison  entered  Abrantes  the  9th,  and  the  same  day 
Laborde  arrived  at  Candeiros,  from  which  point  be 
could,  with  facility,  either  move  upon  Alcobaoa  and 
Leiria,  or  form  a  junction  with  Loison  upon  the  side  of 
Santarem.  The  10th,  Loison  halted  at  Abrantes,  and 
Laborde  moved  to  Alcobaca,  where  he  was  joined  by 
Thomieres  and  the  garrison  of  Peniche.  Hence  the 
armies  on  both  sides  were  now  in  a  state  of  attraction 
towards  each  other,  indicated  an  approaching  shock, 
and  while  the  news  of  Bessieres'  victory  at  Rio  Seco 
produced  a  short  lived  exultation  in  the  French  camp, 
intelligence  of  Joseph's  flight  from  Madrid  reached  tl;e 
British  army,  and  increased  its  confidence  of  victory^ 

Sir  Arthur's  advanced  guard  entered  Leiria,  and  was 
there  joined  by  Bernardim  Freire  and  the  Portuguese 
army,  which  immediately  seized  the  magazine  witiiout 
making  any  distribution  to  the  British  troops,  the  main 
body  of  which  only  arrived  the  11th,  but  the  whole 
marched  in  advance  upon  the  12th. :{:  Laborde  had  em- 
ployed the  11th  and  r2th  seeking  for  a  position  in  the 
vicinity  of  Batalha,  and  finding  the  ground  too  exten- 
sive for  his  force,  fell  back  in  the  night  of  the  12ih  to 
Obidos,  a  town  wiih  a  Moorish  castle  built  on  a  gen- 
tle eminence  in  the  middle  of  a  valley. |j  Occupying 
this  place  with  his  piquets,  he  placed  a  small  detach- 
ment at  the  windmill  of  Brilos,  three  miles  in  front, 
and  retired  the  14th  to  Roriga,  a  village  six  miles  tc 


»  Thitbault. 

}   Procctding-s  of  the  Court  of  Inquirj-. 


+  Ib;<l. 

11  Thi.bai.lt. 


1805.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


53 


the  sov.fhwnrd,  sifunted  at  the  intersection  of  the  roads 
leading  to  Torres  Vedras,  Montecliique,  and  Alcoenlre, 
and  overlonkincr  the  whole  valley  of  Obidos.  This  po- 
sition ennbUd  hiin  to  preserve  his  communication  with 
Lcison  open,  but  as  it  uncovered  Peniche,  the  fourth 
Swiss  regiment,  with  the  exception  of  the  flank  com- 
panies, was  sent  to  re-garrison  that  important  point, 
and  at  the  same  time  three  hundred  men  were  detached 
to  the  right  by  Bomhairal,  Cadaval,  and  Segura,  to  ob- 
tain intelligence  of  Loison. 

That  general,  by  a  demonstration  on  the  side  of  Tho- 
mar  the  11th,  had  ascertained  that  Leiria  was  in  the 
hands  of  the  British,  and  f(dl  back  the  same  day  upon 
Torres  Novas,  then  following  the  course  of  the  Tagus 
he  arrived  at  Santarem  upon  the  13th,  but  in  such  an 
exhausted  state,  that  he  was  unable  to  renew  his  march 
until  the  15th.  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley's  first  movemeni 
had  thus  cut  the  line  of  communication  between  Loi- 
son and  Laborde,  caused  a  loss  of  several  forced 
marches  to  the  former,  and  obliged  the  latter  to  risk  an 
action  with  more  than  twice  his  own  numbers.  But  as 
the  hostile  troops  approached  each  other,  the  Portu- 
guese chiefs  became  alarmed  ;  for,  notwithstanding  the 
confident  language  of  their  public  manifestos  and  the 
bombastic  style  of  their  conversation,  an  internal  con- 
viction that  a  French  army  was  invincible  pervaded  all 
ranks  of  tiie  patriots.  The  leaders,  aware  of  their  own 
deficiency,  and  incredulous  of  the  courage  of  the  Eng- 
lish soldiers,  dreaded  the  being  conmiittcd  in  a  decisive 
contest ;  because  a  defeat  would  deprive  them  of  all 
hope  to  make  terms  with  the  victors,  whereas  by  keep- 
ing five  or  six  thousand  men  together,  they  could  at 
any  time  secure  themselves  by  a  capitulation.  The 
junta  of  Oporto  also,  who  were  already  aiming  at  su- 
preme authority,  foresaw  that,  in  the  event  of  a  suc- 
cessful battle,  it  would  be  more  advantageous  for 
their  particular  views  to  be  provided  with  an  army 
untouched  and  entirely  disconnected  with  a  foreign  gen- 
eral ;  and  Freire  being  well  instructed  in  the  secret 
designs  of  this  party,  resolved  not»to  advance  a  step 
beyond  Leiria.  However  to  cover  his  real  motives,  he 
required  the  British  comm.ander  to  supply  him  with 
provisions,  choosing  to  forget  the  magazine  which  he 
had  just  appropriated  to  himself,  and  as  readily  forget- 
ting the  formal  promises  of  the  bishop  of  Oporto,  who 
had  undertaken  to  feed  the  English  army. 

This  extraordinary  demand,  that  an  auxiliary  army, 
just  disembarked,  should  nourish  the  native  soldiers, 
instead  of  being  itself  fed  by  the  people,  was  met  by 
sir  Arthur  Wellesley  with  a  strong  remonstrance.  He 
easily  penetrated  the  secret  motive  which  caused  it, 
yet  feeling  that  it  was  important  to  have  a  respectable 
Portuguese  force  acting  in  conjunction  with  his  own, 
he  first  appealed  to  the  honour  and  patriotism  of  Freire, 
warmly  admonishing  him,  that  he  was  going  to  forfeit 
all  pretension  to  either,  by  permitting  the  British  army 
to  fight  without  his  assistance.  This  argument  had  no 
effect  upon  don  Bernardim,  and  he  parried  the  imputa- 
tions, against  his  spirit  and  zeal,  by  pretending  that 
his  intention  was  to  operate  independently  on  the  line 
of  the  Tagus;  hence  after  some  further  discussion,  sir 
Arthur  changing  his  tone  of  rebuke  to  one  of  concilia- 
tion, recommended  to  him  not  to  risk  his  troops  by  an 
isolated  march,  but  to  keep  in  the  rear  of  the  British 
and  wait  for  the  result  of  the  first  battle.  This  advice 
was  agreeable  to  Freire,  and  at  the  solicitation  of  col- 
onel Trant,  a  military  agent,  he  consented  to  leave 
fourteen  hundred  infantry,  and  two  hundred  and  fifty 
cavalry,  under  the  immediate  crmmand  of  the  B^nglish 
gf'ueral.  But  the  defection  of  the  native  force  was  a 
fii.rious  evil,  it  shed  an  injurious  moral  influence,  and 
deprived  sir  Arthur  of  the  aid  of  troops  whose  means 
of  gaining  intelligence,  and  whose  local  knowledge, 
might  have  compensated  for  his  want  of  cavalry. 
Nevertheless,  continuing  his  own  march,  his  advanced 


guard  entered  Caldas  the  15th,  on  w\iich  day  also  Jnnot 
reluctantly  quitted  Lisbon,  with  a  reserve  composed  of 
two  thousand  infantry,  six  hundred  cavalry,  and  ten 
pieces  of  artillery,  carrying  with  him  his  grand  pare 
of  ammunition,  and  a  military  chest,  containing  forty 
thousand  pounds. 

General  Travot  was  left  at  Lisbon,  with  above  seven 
thousand  men,  of  which  number  two  battalions  were 
formed  of  stragglers  and  convalescents.*  He  held  both 
sides  of  the  I'agus,  and  Palmela,  the  Bugio  fort,  and 
the  heights  of  Almada,  were  occupied  by  two  thousand 
men,  to  protect  the  shipping  from  the  insurgents  of 
the  Alemtejo,  who,  under  the  orders  of  the  Monteiro 
Mor,  were  again  gathering  at  Setuval ;  a  thousand 
were  on  board  the  vessels  of  war  to  guard  the  Spanish  *" 
prisoners,  and  the  spare  powder  ;  two  thousand  four 
hundred  were  in  the  citadel  and  supporting  the  police  ; 
a  thousand  were  distributed  in  the  forts  of  Belem,  St, 
.Lilian's,  Cascaes,  and  Ericeia,  which  last  is  situated 
to  the  northward  of  the  Rock  of  Lisbon,  and  commands 
a  small  harbour  a  few  miles  west  of  Mafra ;  finally,  a 
thousand  were  al  Santarem,  protecting  a  large  depot 
of  stores.  Thus,  if  the  garrisons  of  Elvas,  Peniche, 
and  Almeida  be  included,  nearly  one-half  of  the  French 
army  was,  by  .Tunot's  combinations,  rendered  inactive, 
and  those  in  the  field  were  divided  into  three  parts, 
without  any  certain  point  of  junction  in  advance,  yet 
each  too  weak  singly  to  sustain  an  action.  The  duke 
of  Ahrantes  seems  to  have  reigned  long  enough  in 
Portugal,  to  forget  that  he  was  merely  the  chief  of  an 
advanced  corps,  whose  safety  depended  upon  activity 
and  concentration. 

The  French  reserve  was  transported  to  Villa  Franca 
by  water,  from  whence  it  was  to  march  to  Otta,  but 
the  rope  ferry-boat  of  Saccavem  being  removed  by  the 
natives,  it  cost  twenty  four  hours  to  throw  a  bridge 
across  the  creek  at  that  place;  and  on  the  17th  when 
the  troops  were  on  their  march,  Junot  hastily  recalled 
them  to  Villa  Franca,  because  of  a  report  that  the 
English  had  landed  near  the  capital.  This  rumour, 
proving  false,  the  reserve  resumed  the  road  to  Otta, 
under  the  command  of  general  Thiebault,  and  .Tunot 
himself  pushed  forward  to  Alcoentre,  where  he  found 
Loison,  and  assumed  the  personal  direction  of  that 
general's  division.  Meanwhile  sir  Arthur  Wellesley 
was  pressing  Laborde.  The  25th  he  had  caused  the 
post  at  Brilos  to  be  attacked,  and  the  piquets  to  be  driven 
out  of  Obidos,  but  two  companies  of  the  95th,  and 
two  of  the  5th,  battalion,  60th,  after  gaining  the  wind- 
mill without  loss,  pursued  the  retiring  enemy  with 
such  inconsiderate  eagerness,  that  at  the  disU'.nce  of 
three  miles  from  their  support,  they  were  out-flanked 
by  two  superior  bodies  of  French,  and  were  only  saved 
by  the  opportune  advance  of  general  Spencer,  j"  Two 
officers  and  twenty-seven  men  were  killed  and  wound- 
ed in  this  slight  aflTiMr,  which  gave  a  salutary  check  to 
the  rashness,  without  lowering  the  confidence  of  the 
troops,  and  on  the  lOth,  Laborde's  position  was  exam- 
ined. 

The  main  road  from  Obidos  passed  through  a  valley, 
which  was  closed  to  the  southward  by  some  high  table 
land,  on  which  stood  the  village  of  Roric;a,  and  the 
French  being  posted  on  a  small  plain  immediately  in 
front  of  that  place,  overlooked  all  the  country  as  far  as 
Obidos.  All  the  favourable  points  of  defence  in  front, 
and  on  the  nearest  hills  at  each  side,  were  occujued  by 
small  detachments,  and  one  mile  in  the  rear,  a  steep 
ridge,  extending  about  three  quarters  of  a  mUo  east 
and  west,  and  consequently  parallel  1o  the  French  po- 
sition, offered  a  second  line  of  great  strength.  The 
main  road  led  hy  a  steep  defile  over  this  ridge,  which 
was  called  the  height  of  Zambugeira  or  Columbeira. 
Beyond   it,  very    lofty  mountains  stretching  from   the 

•  Thiebault.  f  Sir  V.  Wellesley's  despatch. 


54 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  II. 


sea-coast  to  the  Tagiis  like  a  wall,  filled  all  the  space 
between  that  river  atid  the  ocean,  down  to  the  Rock  of 
Lisbon  ;  and  the  valley  leading  from  Obidos  to  Roricja 
was  bounded  on  the  left  by  a  succession  of  ridges  ris- 
ing like  steps,  until  they  were  lost  in  the  great  mass 
of  the  Sierra  de  Baragueda,  itself  a  shoot  from  the 
Monte  Junto. 

Laborde's  situation  was  truly  embarrassing,  Loison 
was  still  at  Alcoentre,  and  the  reserve  at  Villa  Franca, 
that  is,  one  and  two  marches  distant  from  Rorica; 
hence  if  he  retired  upon  Torres  Vcdras,  his  communi- 
cation with  Loison  would  be  lost,  and  to  fall  back  on 
Montechique  was  to  expose  the  line  of  Torres  Vedras 
and  Mafra;  to  march  upon  Alcoentre,  and  unite  with 
Loison,  was  to  leave  open  the  shortest  road  to  Lisbon, 
and  to  remain  at  Roriga  was  to  fight  three  times  his  own 
force.  Nevertheless,  encouraged  by  the  local  advanta- 
ges of  his  position,  and  justly  confident  in  his  own 
talents,  Laborde  resolved  to  abide  his  enemy's  assault, 
in  the  feeble  hope  that  Loison  might  arrive  during  the 
action. 

COMBAT  OF  RORICA. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  17th,  thirteen  thousand 
four  liundred  and  eighty  infantry,  four  hundred  and 
seventy  cavalry,  and  eighteen  guns  issued  from  Obidos, 
and  soon  afterwards  broke  into  three  distinct  columns 
of  battle. 

The  left,  commanded  by  general  Ferguson,  was 
composed  of  his  own  and  Bowes'  brigade  of  infantry, 
reinforced  by  two  hundred  and  fifty  riflemen,  forty 
cavalry,  and  six  guns,  forming  a  total  of  four  thousand 
nine  hundred  combatants.  He  marched  by  the  crests 
of  the  hills  adjoining  the  Sierra  de  Baragueda,  being 
destined  to  turn  the  right  flank  of  Laborde's  position, 
and  to  oppose  the  eflorts  of  Loison,  if  that  general, 
who  was  supposed  to  be  at  Rio  Mayor,  should  appear 
during  the  action. 

The  right,  under  colonel  Trant,  composed  of  a  thou- 
sand Portuguese  infantry,  and  fifty  horse  of  the  same 
nation,  moved  by  the  village  of  St.  Amias,  with  the 
intention  of  turning  the  left  flank  of  the  French. 

Tlie  centre,  nine  thousand  in  number,  with  twelve 
guns,  was  commanded  by  sir  Arthur  in  person,  and 
inarched  straight  against  the  enemy  by  the  village  of 
Mahined.  It  was  composed  of  generals  Hill's,  Night- 
ingale's, Catlin  Cravvfurd's,  and  Fane's  brigades  of 
British  infantry,  four  hundred  cavalry,  two  hundred  and 
fifty  of  which  were  Portuguese,  and  there  were  four 
hundred  light  troops  of  the  same  nation. 

As  this  column  advanced.  Fane's  brigade,  extending 
to  its  left,  drove  back  the  French  skirmishers,  and  con- 
nected the  march  of  Ferguson's  division  with  the  cen- 
tre. When  the  latter  approached  the  elevated  plain 
upon  whicli  Laborde  was  posted,  general  Hill  who 
moved  upon  the  right  of  the  main  road,  being  suppor- 
ted by  the  cavalry,  and  covered  by  the  fire  of  his  light 
troops,  pushed  forward  rapidly  to  the  attack  ;  on  his 
left,  general  Nightingale  displayed  a  line  of  infantry, 
preceded  by  the  fire  of  nine  guns,  and  Crawfurd's 
brigade,  with  the  remaining  pieces  of  artillery,  formed 
a  reserve.  At  this  moment.  Fane's  riflemen  crowned 
the  nearest  hills  on  the  right  flank  of  the  French,  the 
Portuguese  troops  showed  the  head  cf  a  column  beyond 
St  Amias,  upon  the  enemy's  left,  and  general  Ferguson 
was  seen  descending  fmrn  the  higher  grounds  in  the 
Tear  of  Fane.  Laborde's  position  appeared  desperate, 
yet  with  the  coolness  and  dexterity  of  a  practised  war- 
rior, he  evaded  the  danger,  and,  covered  by  his  excel- 
lent cavalry,  fell  back  rapidly  to  the  heights  of  Zambu- 
geira,  and  a  fresh  disposition  of  the  English  became 
Indispensable  to  dislodge  him  from  that  formidable  post. 

Colonel  Trant  now  continued  his  march  to  turn  the 
left  of  the  new  field  of  battle  ;  Ferguson  and  Fane 
vere  united,  and  directed  through  tite  mountains  to 
outflank  the  French  right ;  Hill  and   Nightingale  ad- 


vanced against  the  front,  which  was  of  singular 
strength,  and  only  to  be  approached  by  narrow  paths 
winding  through  deep  ravines.  A  swarm  of  skirmish 
ers,  starting  forward,  soon  plunged  into  the  passes,  and 
spreading  to  the  right  and  left,  won  their  way  among 
the  rocks  and  tangled  evergreens  that  overspread  the 
steep  ascent;  with  still  greater  difliculty  the  supporting 
columns  followed,  their  formation  being  disordered  in 
the  confined  and  rugged  passes,  and  while  the  hollows 
echoed  with  a  continued  roll  of  musketry,  the  shouts 
of  the  advancing  troops  were  loudly  answered  by  the 
enemy,  while  the  curling  smcke,  breaking  out  from  the 
side  of  the  mountain,  marked  the  progress  of  the 
assailants,  and  showed  how  stoutly  the  defence  was 
maintained. 

Laborde,  watching  anxiously  for  the  arrival  of  Loi- 
son, gradually  slackened  his  hold  on  the  left,  but  clung 
tenaciously  to  the  right,  in  the  hope  of  yet  efTectir.g  a 
junction  with  that  general,  and  the  ardour  of  the  9th  and 
29th  regiments,  who  led  the  attack,  favoured  this  skil- 
ful conduct.  It  was  intended  that  those  battalions 
should  take  the  right-hand  path  of  two  leading  np  the 
same  hollow,  and  thus  have  come  in  upon  Laborde's 
flank  in  conjunction  with  Trant's  column;  but  as  tha 
left  path  led  more  directly  to  the  enemy,  the  29th  fol- 
lowed it  the  9th  being  close  behind,  and  both  regiments 
advanced  so  vigorously,  as  to  reach  the  plain  above, 
long  before  the  flank  movements  of  Trant  and  Ferguson 
could  shake  the  credit  of  the  position.  The  right  of 
the  29th  arrived  first  at  the  top,  under  a  heavy  fire,  and 
ere  it  could  form,  colonel  Lake  was  killed,  and  some 
French  companies  coming  in  on  the  flank,  gallantly 
broke  through,  carrying  with  them  a  major  and  fifty  or 
sixty  other  prisoners.  The  head  of  the  regiment  thus 
pressed,  fell  back  and  rallied  on  the  left  wing,  below 
the  brow  of  the  hill,  and  being  there  joined  by  the  9th, 
whose  colonel,  Stewart,  also  fell  in  this  bitter  fight,  the 
whole  pushed  forward,  and  regained  the  dangerous 
footing  above.  Laborde,  who  brought  every  arm  into 
action  at  the  proper  time  and  place,  endeavoured  to  de- 
stroy these  regiments  before  they  could  be  succoured, 
and  failing  in  that,  he  yet  gained  time  to  rally  his  left 
wing  upon  his  centre  and  right;  but  the  5th  regiment, 
following  the  right-hand  path,  soon  arrived,  the  English 
gathered  thickly  on  the  heights,  and  Ferguson,  who 
had  at  first  taken  an  erroneous  direction  towards  the 
centre,  recovered  the  true  line,  and  was  rapidly  passing 
the  right  flank  of  the  position.  The  French  general 
commenced  a  retreat  by  alternate  masses,  protecting  his 
movements  by  vigorous  charges  of  cavalry,  and  at  the 
village  of  Zambugeira  he  attempted  another  stand  ;  but 
the  English  bore  on  him  too  heavily,  and  thus  disputing 
the  ground,  he  fell  back  to  the  Quinta  de  Bugagliera, 
where  he  halted  until  his  detachments  on  the  side  of  Se- 
gnra  rejoined  him.  After  this  taking  to  the  narrow  pass 
of  Runa,  he  marched  all  night  to  gain  the  position  of 
Montechique,  leaving  three  guns  on  the  field  of  battle, 
and  the  road  to  Torres  Vedras  open  for  the  victors.* 
The  loss  of  the  French  was  six  hundred  killed  and 
wounded,  among  the  latter  Laborde  himself;  and  the 
British  also  suflered  considerably,  for  two  licutcniant- 
colonels  and  nearly  five  hundred  men  were  killed,  ta- 
ken, or  wounded,  and  as  not  more  than  four  thousand 
men  were  actually  engaged,  this  hard-fought  action  was 
very  honourable  to  both  sides. 

The  firing  ceased  a  little  after  four  o'clock,  when  sir 
Arthur,  getting  intelligence  that  Loison's  division  was 
at  Bombaral  only  five  miles  distant,  took  up  a  position 
for  the  night  in  an  oblique  line  to  that  which  he  had 
just  forced,  his  left  resting  upon  a  height  near  the  field 
of  battle,  and  his  right  covering  the  road  to  Louriiiham. 
Believing  that  Loison  and  Laborde  had  effc^cted  their 
junction  at  the  Quinta  de  Bugagliera,  and  that  both 
were  retiring  to  Montechique,  the  English  general  re- 


•  Thiebault. 


IS08.J 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


55 


solved  to  marcli  the  next  morning  to  Torres  Vedras,  by 
wliich  he  would  have  secured  an  entrance  into  the  moun- 
tains. But  before  nigbt-lall  he  was  informed  that  gen- 
eral Anstruther's  and  general  Acland's  divisions,  ac- 
companied by  a  large  fleet  of  store  ships,  were  off  the 
coast,  the  dangerous  natureof  which  rendered  it  necessa- 
ry to  provide  for  their  safety  by  a  quick  disembarka- 
tion ;  he  therefore  changed  his  plans,  and  resolved  to 
seek  for  some  convenient  post,  that,  being  in  advance 
of  his  present  position,  would  likewise  enable  him  to 
cover  the  landing  of  these  reinforcements;  the  vigour 
of  Laborde's  defence  had  also  an  influence  upon  this 
occasion,  for  before  an  enemy  so  bold  and  skilful,  no 
precaution  could  be  neglected  with  impunity.* 


CHAPTER  V. 

Fortusruese  take  Abrantes — Generals  Acland  and  Anstruther 
land  and  join  the  Biitish  army  at  Viniiero —  Sir  Harry  Bur- 
rard  arrives — Battle  of  Viniiero — Junot  defeated — Sir  Hew 
Dalrymple  arrives — Armistice — Terms  of  it — Junot  returns 
to  Lisbon — Negotiates  for  a  convention — Sir  John  Moore's 
troops  land — State  of  the  public  mind  in  Lisbon — The  Rus- 
sian admiral  negotiates  separately — Convention  concluded — 
The  Russian  fleet  surrenders  upon  terms — Conduct  of  the 
people  at  Lisbon — The  Monteiro  Mor  requires  sir  Charles 
Cotton  to  interrupt  the  execution  of  the  convention — Sir 
Jjhn  Hope  appointed  commandant  of  Lisbon;  represses  all 
disorders — Disputes  between  the  French  and  English  commis- 
sioners— Reflections  thereupon. 

While  the  combat  of  Roriga  was  fighting,  some  Por- 
tuguese insurgents  attacked  Abrantes,  and  the  garrison, 
being  ill  commanded,  gave  way  and  was  destroyed  ; 
thus  nothing  remained  for  Junot  but  a  battle,  and  as  sir 
Arthur  marched  to  Lourinham  on  the  18th,  the  French 
general  quilted  Cereal  with  Loison's  division,  and  keep- 
ing the  east  side  of  the  Baragueda  ridge,  crossed  the 
line  of  Laborde's  retreat,  and  pushed  for  Torres  Vedras, 
which  he  reached  in  the  evening  of  the  same  day.  The 
19th  he  was  joined  by  Laborde,  and  the  20th  by  his  re- 
serve, when  he  re-organized  his  army,  and  prepared  for 
a  decisive  action.  Meanwhile  Wellesley  took  a  position 
at  Vimiero,  a  village  near  the  sea-coast,  and  from 
thence  sent  a  detachment  to  cover  tht;  march  of  general 
Anstruther's  brigade,  which  had,  with  great  difficulty 
and  some  loss,  been  landed  on  the  morning  of  the  18th 
en  an  open  sandy  beach  called  the  bay  of  Maceira. 
The  20th  the  French  cavalry  scouring  the  neighbouring 
country,  carried  off  some  of  the  women  from  the  rear 
of  the  English  camp,  and  hemmed  the  army  round 
so  closely,  that  no  information  of  Junot's  position  could 
be  obtained  ;  but  in  the  night  general  Acland's  brigade 
was  disembarked,  by  which  the  army  was  increased  to 
sixteen  thousand  fighting  men,  with  eighteen  pieces  of 
artillery,  exclusive  of  Trant's  Portuguese,  and  of  two 
Britisii  regiments,  under  general  Beresford,  which  were 
with  the  fleet  at  the  mouth  of  the  Tagus.  Thus  the 
principal  mass  of  the  English  army  was  irrevocably 
engaged  in  the  operations  against  Junot,  while  the  min- 
isters were  still  so  intent  upon  Cadiz,  that  they  had 
sent  Anstruther  out  with  an  appointment  as  governor 
of  that  city  ! 

F]stimating  the  whole  French  army  at  eighteen  thou- 
sand men,  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  judged,  that  after  pro- 
viding for  the  security  of  Lisbon,  Junot  could  not  bring 
more  than  fourteen  thousand  into  the  field  ;  he  design- 
ed, therefore,  not  only  to  strike  the  first  blow,  but  to 
follow  It  up  so  as  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  rallying 
and  renewing  the  campaign  upon  the  frontier.  In  this 
view  he  had,  before  quitting  the  Mondego,  written  to 
sir  Harry  Burrard  an  exact  statement  of  his  own  pro- 
ieedings    and    intentions,  and    recommended    that   sir 


*  Sir  A.  Wellesley's  Evidence.     Court  of  Inquiry. 


John  Moore,  with  his  division,  should  disembark  at 
the  Mondego.  and  march  without  delay  to  wSantarem,  by 
which  he  would  protect  the  left  of  the  army,  block  the 
line  of  the  Tagus,  and  at  the  same  time  threaten  th<* 
French  communication  between  Lisbon  and  Elva^ 
And  without  danger,  because  Junot  would  be  forced  to 
defend  Lisbon  against  the  coastarmy;  or  if,  relinquishing 
the  capital,  he  endeavoured  to  make  way  to  Almeida  by 
Santarem,  the  ground  there  was  so  strong  that  sir  John 
Moore  might  easily  maintain  it  against  him.  More- 
over, the  marquis  of  Valladeras  commanded  three  thou- 
sand men  at  Guard  a,  and  general  Freire,  with  five  thou- 
sand men,  was  at  Leiria,  and  might  be  persuaded  to 
support  the  British  at  Santarem. 

From  Vimiero  to  Torres  Vedras  was  aboutnine  miles, 
and  although  the  number  and  activity  of  the  French 
cavalry,  completely  shrouded  Junot's  position,  it  was 
known  to  be  strong,  and  very  difficult  of  approach,  by 
reason  of  a  long  defile  through  which  the  army  must 
penetrate  in  order  to  reach  the  crest  of  the  mountain ; 
there  was,  however,  a  road  leading  between  the  sea- 
coast  and  Torres  Vedras,  which,  turning  the  latter, 
opened  a  way  to  Mafra.  Sir  Arthur  possessed  very 
exact  military  surveys  of  the  country  through  which 
that  road  led,  and  he  projected,  by  a  forced  march  ou 
the  21st,  to  turn  the  position  of  Torres  Vedras,  and  to 
gain  Mafra  with  a  strong  advanced  guard,  while  the 
main  body,  seizing  some  advantageous  heights,  a  few 
miles  short  of  that  town,  would  he  in  a  position  to  in- 
tercept the  French  line  of  march  to  Montechique.*  The 
army  was  therefore  reorganized  during  the  20th  in  eight 
brigades  of  infantry  and  four  weak  squadrons  of  cavalry, 
and  every  preparation  was  made  for  the  next  day's  en- 
terprise, but  at  that  critical  period  of  the  campaign  the 
ministerial  arrangements,  which  provided  three  com- 
manders-in-chief, begun  to  work.  Sir  Harry  Burrard 
arrived  in  a  frigate  off  the  bay  of  Maceira,  and  sir  Ar- 
thur, thus  checked  in  the  midst  of  his  operations  on  the 
eve  of  a  decisive  battle,  repaired  on  board  the  frigate, 
to  make  a  report  of  the  situation  of  affairs,  and  to  renew 
his  former  recommendation  relative  to  the  disposal  cf 
sir  John  Moore's  troops.  Burrard,  who  had  previous- 
ly resolved  to  bring  the  latter  down  to  Maceira,  con- 
demned this  project,  and  forbade  any  offensive  move- 
ment until  the  whole  army  should  be  concentrated, 
whereupon  sir  Arthur  returned  to  his  camp. 

The  ground  occupied  by  the  army,  although  very  ex- 
tensive, and  not  very  clearly  defined  as  a  position,  was 
by  no  means  weak.  The  village  of  Vimiero,  situated 
in  a  valley,  through  which  the  little  river  of  Maceira 
flows,  contained  the  pare  and  commissariat  stores.  The 
cavalry  and  the  Portuguese  were  on  a  small  plain  close 
behind  the  village,  and  immediately  in  its  front  a  rug- 
ged isolated  height,  with  a  flat  top,  commanded  all  the 
ground  to  the  southward  and  eastward  for  a  considera- 
ble distance.  Upon  this  height  Fane's  and  Anstruther's 
brigades  of  infantry,  with  six  guns,  were  posted ;  the 
left  of  Anstruther's  occupied  a  churchyard  which  block- 
ed a  road  leading  over  the  extremity  of  the  height  of 
the  village;  the  right  of  Fane's  rested  on  the  edge  of 
the  other  extremity  of  the  hill,  the  base  of  which  wag 
washed  by  the  Maceira. 

A  mountain,  that  commenced  at  the  coast,  swept  in 
a  half  circle  close  behind  the  right  of  the  hill  upon 
which  these  brigades  were  posted,  and  commanded,  at 
rather  long  artillery  range,  all  its  upper  surface.  Eight 
guns,  and  the  first,  second,  third,  fourth,  and  eighth 
brigades  of  infantry,  occupied  this  mountain,  which 
was  terminated  on  the  left  by  a  deep  ravine  that  divi- 
ded it  from  another  strong  and  narrow  range  of  heights 
over  which  the  road  from  Vimiero  to  Lourinham 
passed  ;  the  right  of  these  last  heights  also  overtopped 
the  hill  in  front  of  the  village,  but  the   left,  bending 


*  Sir  A.  Wellesley'g  evidence.    Court  o(  Inquirj. 


56 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  II. 


suddenly  backward,  after  the  form  of  a  crook,  returned 
to  the  coast,  and  ended  in  a  lofty  clifF.  There  was  no 
water  upon  this  last  named  ridoe,  wherefore,  only  the 
40th  regiment  and  some  piquets  were  placed  there. 
The  troops  hcing  thus  posted,  on  the  night  of  the  ?Oth, 
about  twelve  o'clock,  sir  Arthur  was  aroused  by  a  Ger- 
man officer  of  dragoons,  who  galloped  into  the  camp, 
and  with  some  consternation  reported,  that  Junot,  at 
the  head  of  twenty  thousand  men,  was  coming  on  to 
the  attack,  and  distant  but  one  hour's  march.  Undis- 
turbed by  this  inflated  report,  he  merely  sent  out  pa- 
troles,  warned  the  piquets  to  be  on  the  alert,  and  before 
day-break  had  his  troops,  following  the  British  custom, 
under  arms;  but  the  sun  rose  and  no  enemy  appeared. 
However,  at  seven  o'clor^k  a  cloud  of  dust  was  observ- 
ed beyond  the  nearest  hills,  and  at  eight  o'clock  an  ad- 
vanced guard  of  horse  was  seen  to  crown  the  heights 
to  the  southward,  sending  forward  scouts  on  every  side. 
Scarcely  had  this  body  been  discovered,  when  a  force 
of  infantry,  preceded  by  other  cavair)',  was  descried 
moving  along  the  road  from  Torres  Vedras  to  Lourin- 
ham,  and  threatening  the  left  of  the  British  position; 
column  after  column  followed  in  order  of  battle,  and 
it  soon  became  evident  that  the  French  were  coming  to 
fight,  but  that  the  right  wing  of  the  English  was  not 
their  object. 

The  second,  third,  fourth,  and  eighth  brigades  were 
immediately  directed  to  cross  the  valley  behind  the 
village,  and  to  take  post  on  the  heights  before  mention- 
ed as  being  occupied  by  the  piquets  only;  as  they 
reached  the  ground,  the  second  and  third  were  dispos- 
ed in  two  lines  facing  to  the  left,  and  consequently  for- 
ming a  right  angle  with  the  prolongation  of  Fane  and 
Anstruther's  front.  The  fourth  and  eighth  brigades 
were  to  have  furnished  a  third  line,  but  before  the  lat- 
ter could  reach  the  summit  the  battle  commenced. 
From  the  flank  of  all  these  troops,  aline  of  skirmishers 
was  thrown  out  upon  the  face  of  the  descent  towards 
the  enemy,  the  cavalry  was  drawn  up  in  the  plain  a 
little  to  the  right  of  the  village  of  Vimiero,  and  the 
fifth  brigade  and  the  Portuguese  were  detached  to  the 
returning  part  of  the  crook  to  cover  the  extreme  left, 
and  to  protect  the  rear  of  the  army.  The  first  brigade, 
under  general  Hill,  remained  on  the  mountain  which 
the  others  had  just  quitted,  and  formed  a  support  for 
the  centre  and  a  reserve  for  the  whole.  The  ground 
bet%veen  the  two  armies  was  so  wooded  and  broken, 
that  after  the  French  ha3  passed  the  ridge  where  they 
had  been  first  descried,  no  correct  view  of  their  move- 
ments could  be  obtained,  and  the  British,  being  weak 
in  cavalry,  were  forced  to  wait  patiently  until  the  col- 
umns of  attack  were  close  upon  tliem. 

•Funot  had  quitted  Torres  Vedras  the  evening  of  the 
20th,  intending  to  fall  on  the  English  army  at  day- 
break, but  the  difficulty  of  tiie  defile  in  his  front  re- 
tarded bis  march  for  many  hours,  and  fatigued  his 
troops.  When  he  first  came  in  sight  of  the  position 
of  Vimiero,  the  British  order  of  battle  appeared  to  him 
as  being  on  two  sides  of  an  irregular  triangle,  the  apex 
of  which,  formed  by  the  hill  in  front  of  the  village, 
was  well-fHrnished  with  men,  while  the  left  face  ap- 
peared naked,  for  he  could  only  see  the  piquets  on  that 
side,  and  the  passage  of  the  four  brigades  across  the 
valley  was  hidden  from  him.  Concluding,  then,  that 
the  principal  force  was  in  the  centre,  he  resolved  to 
form  two  connected  attacks,  the  one  against  the  apex, 
the  other  against  the  left  face  ;  he  thougiit  that  the  left 
of  the  position  was  an  accessible  ridge,  whereas  a  deep 
ravine,  trenched  as  it  were  along  the  base,  rendered  it 
utterly  impervious  to  an  attack,  except  at  the  extremity, 
over  which  the  road  from  Torres  Vedras  to  Lourinham 
passed.  Junot  had  nearly  fourteen  thousand  fighting 
men,  organised  in  four  divisions,  of  which  three  were 
of  infantr}'  and  one  of  cavalry,  with  twenty-three  pieces 
of  very  small  artillery  ;  each  division  was  composed 


of  two  brigades,  and  at  ten  o'clock,  all  being  prepared, 
he  commenced  the 

BATTLE  OF  VIMIERO. 

Laborde  marched  with  one  brigade  against  the  cen- 
tre, general  Brennier  led  another  against  the  left,  and 
Loison's  brigades  followed  in  the  same  order  at  a  short 
distance.*  Kellerman  with  a  reserve  composed  of 
grenadiers,  moved  in  one  body  behind  Lf  ison.  and  the 
cavalry  under  Margaron,  about  thirteen  hundred  in  num- 
ber, was  divided,  part  being  on  the  right  of  Brennier, 
partin  the  rear  of  the  reserve.  The  artillery,  distributed 
among  the  columns,  opened  its  fire  wherever  the  ground 
was  favourable.  It  was  designed  that  Laborde.'s  and 
Brennier's  attacks  should  be  simultaneous,  but  the  lat- 
ter, coming  unexpectedly  upon  the  ravine  before  men- 
tioned as  protecting  the  English  left,  got  entangled 
among  the  rocks  and  water-courses,  and  thus  Lr.borde 
alone  engaged  Fane  and  Anstruther  under  a  heavy  and 
destructive  fire  of  artillery,  which  played  on  his  front 
and  flank  ;  for  the  eighth  brigade  being  then  in  the  act 
of  mounting  the  heights  where  the  left  was  posted,  ob- 
serving the  advance  of  the  French  columns  against  the 
centre,  halted,  and  opened  a  battery  against  their 
right.f 

Junot,  perceiving  this  failure  in  his  combinations, 
ordered  Loison  to  support  Laborde's  attack  with  one 
brigade  of  his  division,  and  directed  general  Sclignac, 
with  the  other,  to  turn  the  ravine  in  which  Brennier 
was  entangled,  and  to  fall  upon  the  extremity  of  the 
English  line;  general  Fane  seeing  Loison's  advance, 
and  having  a  discretionary  power  to  use  the  reserve  ar- 
tillery, immediately  directed  colonel  Robe  to  bring  it 
into  action,  and  thus  formed  with  the  divisional  guns  a 
most  powerful  battery  in  opposition.  Meanwhile,  Loi- 
son and  Laborde  formed  a  principal  and  two  secondary 
columns  of  attack,  one  of  which  advanced  against 
Fane's  brigade,  while  the  other  endeavoured  to  pene- 
trate by  a  road  which  passed  between  the  ravine  and 
the  church  on  the  extreme  left  of  Anstruther ;  but  the 
main  column,  headed  hy  Laborde  in  person,  and  pre- 
ceded by  a  multitude  of  light  troops,  mounted  the  face 
of  the  hill  with  great  fury  and  loud  cries.  'I'he  Eng- 
lish skirmishers  were  forced  in  upon  the  lines  in  a  mo- 
ment, and  the  French  masses  arrived  at  the  summit; 
yet  shattered  by  the  terrible  fire  of  Robe's  artillery,  and 
breaililess  from  their  exertions,  and  in  this  state,  first 
receiving  a  discharge  of  musketry  from  the  fitlielh 
regiment  at  the  distance  of  half-pistol  shot,  they  were 
vigorously  charged  in  front  and  flank,  and  overlhrowr 
At  the  same  time  the  remainder  of  F'ane's  brigade  re 
pulsed  the  minor  attack,  and  colonel  Taylor,  with  the 
very  few  horsemen  he  commanded,  passing  cut  by  the 
right,  rode  fiercely  among  the  confused  and  retreating 
troops,  and  scattered  them  with  great  execution  ;  but 
then  Maroaron's  cavalry  came  suddenly  down  upon 
Taylor,  who  was  there  slain,  and  the  half  of  his  fee- 
ble squadron  cut  to  pieces. 

Kellerman  look  advantage  of  this  check  to  threw 
one  half  of  his  reserve  into  a  pine  wood  flanking  the 
line  of  retreat,  and  the  other  half  he  had  before  sent  to 
reinforce  the  attack  on  the  church.  The  forty-third 
regiment  were  engaged  in  a  hot  skirmish  amongst  some 
vineyards,  when  these  French  grenadiers  arrived,  at  a 
brisk  pace,  and  beat  back  the  advanced  companies,  but 
to  avoid  the  artillery  which  ransacked  their  h-ft,  they 
dipped  a  little  into  the  ravine,  and  were  taken  on  the 
other  flank  by  the  guns  of  the  eighth  and  fourth  l)rig- 
adcs.  Then,  when  the  narrownpss  of  the  way  and  the 
sweep  of  the  round  shot  was  disordering  the  French 
ranks,  the  forty-third  rallying  in  one  mass,  came  furt 
ously  down  upon  the  head  of  the  column,  and,  after 
short,  desperate  fight,  drove  it  back  in  confusion,  but 
the  regiment  suflTered  very  severely. 


»  Thiebault.  Foy. 


t  Sir  A.  Welleslej's  despatch. 


1808.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR, 


57 


The  French  were  now  discomfited  in  the  centre,  the 
woods  and  hollows  were  filled  with  their  wounded  and 
Btragglinfj  men,  and  seven  gfuns  were  lost.  They  re- 
tired up  the  edge  of  the  ravine  in  a  direction  almost 
parallel  to  the  British  line,  leavinq^  the  road  from 
t  Vimiero  to  Torres  Vedras  open  to  their  opponents;  sir 
Arthur  WellesJey,  however,  strictly  forhade  any  pur- 
suit at  that  moment,  partly  because  the  orenadiers  in 
the  pine  wood  flanked  the  line  of  the  French  retreat, 
and  partly  because  Margaron's  horsemen,  ridinw  stiffly 
between  the  two  armies  were  not  to  be  linfhtly  med- 
dled with.  Meanwhile,  Brennier  being-  still  hampered 
in  the  ravme,  general  Solignac  passed  along  the  crest 
of  the  ridge  above,  and  came  upon  general  Ferguson's 
brigade,  which  was  posted  at  the  left  of  the  English 
position ;  but  where  the  French  expected  to  find  a 
weak  flank,  they  encountered  a  front  of  battle,  on  a 
depth  of  three  lines,  protected  by  steep  declivities  on 
either  side,  a  powerful  artillery  swept  away  their  fore- 
most ranks,  and  on  their  right  the  fifth  brigade  and  the 
Portuguese  were  seen  marching  by  a  distant  ridge  to- 
wards the  Lourinham  road,  threatening  the  rear. 

Ferguson  instantly  taking-  the  lead,  bore  down  upon 
the  enemj',  the  ridge  widened  as  the  English  advanced, 
the  regiments  of  the  second  line  running  up  in  suc- 
cession, increased  the  front,  and  constantly  filled  the 
ground,  and  the  French,  falling  fast  under  the  fire,  drew 
back  fighting,  until  they  reached  the  declivity  of  tiie 
ridg-e  ;  their  cavalry  made  several  efforts  to  check  the 
advancing  troops,  but  the  latter  were  too  compact  to  be 
disturbed  by  these  attempts.  Solignac  himself  was 
carried  from  the  field  severely  wounded,  and  his  reti- 
ring column,  continually  outflanked  on  the  left,  was  cut 
oft'  from  the  line  of  retreat,  and  thrown  into  the  low 
ground  about  the  village  of  Perenza,  where  six  guns 
■were  captured.  General  Ferguson  leaving  the  eighty- 
second  and  seventy-first  regiments  to  guard  those  piec- 
es, was  continuing  to  press  the  disordered  columns, 
when  Brennier  having  at  last  cleared  the  ravine,  came 
suddenly  in  upon  those  two  battalions,  and  retook  the 
artillery;  but  his  success  was  only  momentary,  the 
surprised  troops  rallied  upon  the  higlier  ground,  poured 
in  a  heavy  fire  of  musquetry,  and  with  a  shout  return- 
ing to  the  charge,  overthrew  him  and  recovered  the 
guns.  Brennier  himself  was  wounded  and  made  pris- 
oner, and  Ferguson  having  thus  completely  separated 
the  French  brigades  from  each  other,  would  have  forced  , 
the  greatest  part  of  Solignac's  to  surrender,  if  an  un-  | 
expected  order  had  not  obliged  him  to  halt:  the  dis- i 
comfited  troops  then  reformed  under  the  protection  of 
their  cavalry  with  admirable  quickness,  and  making  an 
orderly  retreat,  were  scon  united  to  the  broken  brigades  1 
which  were  falling  back  from  the  attack  on  the  centre.  ! 

Brennier,    Avho,    the    monient   he    was    taken,    was 
brought  to  sir  Arthur  Wellesley,  eagerly  demanded  if  : 
the  reserve  under  Kellerman  had  yet  charged  1  sir  Ar- 
thur, ascertair.ing  from  other  prisoners  that  it  had,  was  i 
then    satisfied  that  all   the  enemy's  attacks   were  ex-  i 
hausted,  that  no  considerable  body  of  fresh  troops  could 
be  hidden  among  the  woods  and  hollows  in  his  front, 
and  that  the  battle  was  won.    It  was  only  twelve  o'clock,  I 
thirteen  guns   had  been  taken  ;  the   fourth  and  eighth  [ 
brigades  had   suffered  very  little  ;  the   Portuguese,  the 
fifth  and  the  first  brigades  had  not  fired  a  shot,  and  the 
latter  was  two  miles  nearer  to  Torres  V^edras  than  any 
part  of  the  French  army,  which  was  moreover  in  great 
contusion.     The    relative    numbers    before    the    action  ; 
were  considerably  in  favour  of  the  English,  the  result 
of  the  action  had  increased  that  disparity  ;  a  portion  of 
the  army  had  defeated  the  enemy  when  entire,  a  portion 
then  could  effectually  follow  up  the  victory  ;  sir  Arthur 
therefore  resolved  with  the  five  brigades  on  the  left  to 
press  Junot  closely,  hoping  to  drive  him  over  the  Sierra 
da  Baragucda,  and  force  him   upon   the  Tagus,  while 
Hill,  Anstruther,  and  Fane,  seizing  the  defile  of  Torres 


Vedras,  should  push  on  to  Montechique  and  cut  him 
.^fT  from  Lisbon. 

If  this  able  and  decisive  operation  had  been  executed, 
Junot  would  probably  have  lost  all  his  artillery  and 
several  thousand  stragglers,  and  then,  buff'eted  and 
turned  at  every  point,  would  have  been  glad  to  seek 
safety  under  the  guns  of  Almeida  or  Elvas;  and  even 
that,  he  could  only  have  accomplished,  because  sir 
John  Moore's  troops  were  not  landed  in  the  .Mondego. 
But  sir  Harry  Burrard,  who  was  present  during  the  ac- 
tion, altliough  partly  from  delicacy,  and  partly  from  ap- 
proving of  sir  Arthur's  arrangements,  he  had  not  hith- 
erto interfered,  now  assumed  the  chief  command  ;  from 
him  the  order  which  arrested  Ferguson  in  his  victorious 
career  had  emanated,  and  by  him  further  oflensive  ope- 
rations were  forbidden,  for  he  resolved  to  wait  in  the 
position  of  Vimiero  >mtil  the  arrival  of  sir  John  Moore. 
The  adjutant-general  Clinton,  and  colonel  Murray  the 
quarter-master-general,  supported  sir  Harry's  views, 
and  sir  Arthur's  earnest  representations  could  not  alter 
their  determination. 

Burrard's  decision  was  certainly  erroneous,  yet  error 
is  common  in  an  art  which  at  best  is  but  a  choice  of 
diificulties  ;  the  circumstances  of  the  moment  were  im- 
posing enough  to  sway  most  generals.  'J'he  JVench  had 
failed  in  the  attacks,  yet  tliey  rallied  with  surprisin.r 
quickness  under  the  protection  of  a  strong  aid  gallant 
cavalry  ;*  sir  Harry  knew  that  his  own  artillery  carri- 
ages were  so  shaken  as  to  be  scarcely  fit  for  service; 
the  draft  horses  were  few  and  bad,  and  the  commissari- 
at pare  on  the  plain  was  in  the  greatest  confusion,  for 
the  hired  Portuguese  carmen  were  making  otf  with 
their  carriages  in  all  directions  ;  the  English  cavalry 
was  totally  destroyed,  and  finally,  general  Spencer  had 
discovered  a  line  of  fresh  troops  on  the  ridge  behind 
that  occupied  by  the  French  army.  Weighing  all  these 
things  in  his  mind,  with  the  caution  natural  to  age, 
Burrard  was  reluctant  to  hazard  the  fortune  of  the  day 
upon  what  he  deemed  a  perilous  throw.  Thus  the  duke 
of  Abrantes,  who  had  displayed  all  that  reckless  cour- 
age to  which  he  originally  owed  his  elevation,  was  en- 
abled, by  this  unexpected  cessation  of  the  battle,  lo  re- 
form his  broken  infantry  ;  twelve  hundred  fresh  men 
joined  him  at  the  close  of  the  contest,  and  then  covered 
by  his  cavalry,  he  retreated  with  order  and  celerity 
until  he  regained  the  command  of  the  pass  of  Torres 
Vedras,  so  that  when  the  day  closed,  the  relative  posi- 
tion of  the  two  armies  was  the  same  as  on  the  evening 
before. 

One  general,  thirteen  guns,  and  several  hundred  pri- 
soners, fell  into  the  hands  of  the  victors,  and  th(^  total  loss 
of  the  French  was  estimated  at  three  thousand  men,  an 
exaggeration,  no  doubt,  but  it  was  certainly  above  two 
thousand,  for  their  closed  columns  had  been  exposed 
for  more  than  half  an  hour  to  sweeping  discharges  of 
grape  and  musquetry,  and  the  dead  lay  thickly  together. 
General  Thiebault,  indeed,  reduces  the  number  to 
eighteen  hundred,  and  asserts  that  the  whole  amount 
of  the  French  army  did  not  much  exceed  twelve  thou- 
sand men,  from  which  number  he  deducts  nearly  three 
thousand  for  the  sick,  the  stragglers,  and  all  those  other 
petty  drains  which  form  the  torment  of  a  general-in- 
chief.  But  when  it  is  considered  that  this  army  was 
composed  of  men  selected  and  organized  in  provisiona- 
ry  battalions,  expressly  for  the  occasion  ;+  that  onc-lialf 
had  only  been  in  the  field  for  a  fortnight,  and  that  the 
whole  had  enjoyed  two  days'  rest  at  Torres  Vedras,  it  is 
evident  that  the  number  of  absentees  bears  too  great  a 
proportion  to  the  combatants.  A  French  order  of  bat- 
tle found  upon  the  field  gave  a  total  of  fourteen  thou- 
sand men,  present  under  arms,  of  which  thirteen  hun- 
dred were  cavalry  ;  and  this  amount  agrees  too  closely 
with  other  estimates,  and  with   the  observations  made 

*  Proceedings  of  the  Court  of  Inquiry.  f  Thiebault. 


68 


NAPIER'S   PEN    XSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  II. 


at  the  lime  to  leave  any  reasonable  doubt  of  its  authen- 
ticity or  correctness. 

The  arranoremcnts  made  by  sir  Harry  Burrard  did 
not  remain  in  force  a  long^  lime.  Early  on  the  mornintr 
of  the  22d,  sir  Hew  Dalrymple  disembarked  and  as- 
sumed the  chief  command  ;  thus,  in  the  short  space  of 
twenty-four  hours,  durinor  which  a  battle  was  fought, 
the  army  fell  successively  into  the  hands  of  three  men, 
who,  coming  frcm  the  ocean,  with  different  views,  ha- 
bits, and  information,  had  not  any  previous  opportunity 
Df  ccmmuring  even  by  letter,  so  as  to  arrange  a  com- 
niop  (xan  cf  operations  :  and  they  were  now  brought 
fogpther  at  a  critical  moment,  when  it  was  more  than 
probable  they  must  all  disagree,  and  that  the  public 
service  must  suffer  from  that  want  of  vigour  which  is 
inherent  to  divided  councils.  For  when  sir  Hew  Dal- 
rymple was  appointed  to  the  command,  sir  Arthur 
VVellesIey  was  privately  recommended  to  him,  by  the 
minister,  as  a  person  who  should  be  employed  with 
more  than  usual  confidence;  and  this  unequivocal  hint 
w-as  backed  up  with  too  much  force  by  the  previous 
reputation  and  recent  exploits  of  the  latter,  not  to  pro- 
duce some  want  of  cordiality.*  Sir  Arthur  could  not 
do  otherwise  than  take  the  lead  in  discussing  affairs  of 
■which  he  had  more  than  laid  the  foundation,  and  sir 
Hew  would  have  forfeited  all  claims  to  independence 
in  his  command,  if  he  had  not  exercised  the  right  of 
judging  for  himself  between  the  conflicting  opinions  of 
his  predecessors. 

After  receiving  information  upon  the  most  important 
points,  and  taking  a  hasty  view  of  the  situation  of  the 
army, — although  the  wounded  were  still  upon  the 
ground,  and  the  wains  of  the  commissariat  were  e:n- 
ployed  in  removing  them, — sir  Hew  decided  to  advance 
upon  the  23d,  and  gave  orders  to  that  etTect.f  Never- 
theless, he  entirely  agrreed  in  opinion  with  sir  Harry 
Burrard,  that  the  operation  was  a  perilous  one,  which 
it  required  the  concentration  of  all  his  troops,  and  the 
application  of  all  his  means,  to  bring  to  a  good  conclu- 
sion; and  for  this  reason  he  did  not  rescind  the  order 
directing  sir  John  Moore  to  fall  down  to  Maceira.  This 
last  measure  was  disapproved  of  by  sir  Arthur,  who 
observed  that  the  provisions  on  shore  would  not  sup- 
ply more  than  eight  or  nine  days'  consumption  for 
the  troops  already  at  Vimiero;  that  the  country  would 
be  unable  to  furnish  any  assistance,  and  that  the  fleet 
could  not  be  calculated  upon  as  a  resource,  because  the 
first  of  the  gales  common  at  that  season  of  the  year 
would  certainly  send  it  away  from  the  coast,  if  it  did 
not  destroy  a  great  portion  of  it.  Sir  Hew  thought  the 
evil  of  having  the  army  separated,  would  be  greater 
than  the  chance  of  distress  from  such  events.  His 
position  was  certainly  difficult.  The  bishop  of  Oporto 
had  failed  in  his  promise  of  assisting  the  troops  with 
draft  cattle, — as,  indeed,  he  did  in  all  his  promises;  X 
the  artillery  and  commissariat  were  badly  supplied 
with  mules  and  horses  ;  the  cavalry  was  a  nullity,  and 
the  enemy  was,  with  the  exception  of  his  immediate 
loss  in  killed  and  wounded,  sullering  nothing  from  his 
defeat,  which,  we  have  seen,  did  not  deprive  him  of  a 
single  position  necessary  to  his  defence.  While  weigh- 
ing this  state  of  affairs,  he  was  informed  that  general 
Kellerman,  escorted  by  a  strong  body  of  cavalry,  was 
at  tlie  outposts,  and  demanded  an  interview.  For  Junot, 
after  regaining  Torres  Vedras,  had  occupied  Mafra, 
and  was  preparing  to  fighi  again,  when  he  received  in- 
telligence that  Lisbon  was  on  the  point  of  insurrection  ;|| 
wherefore,  sending  forward  a  false  account  of  the 
action,  he  followed  it  up  with  a  reinforcement  for  the 
garrison,  and  called  a  council  of  war  to  advise  meas- 
ures with   respect  to  the  English.     It  is  an  old  and 


I'rocccdings  of  the  Court  of  Inqiiiry 

PirH.  Laliyiiiplc's  IS'aiTjtivp.     Couri 

t  Proceedings  ol  the  Court  of  Inquiry. 


+  Sir  H.  Lali  yiiiplc's  IS'aiTjtivp.     Court  of  Inquiry. 

"  '■  '■      ■    ■  -'     "■      — '  '     ^  II  Thiebaull. 


sound  remark  that  '  a  counci*.  c '  war  never  lights, 
and  Kellerman's  mission  was  the  result  of  the  above 
consultation. 

That  general  being  conducted  to  the  quarters  of  the 
commander-in-chief,  demanded  a  cessation  of  arms, 
and  proposed  the  ground-work  of  a  convention  under 
wiiich  Junot  oflered  to  evacuate  Portugal  without  fur- 
ther resistance.  Nothing  could  be  more  opportune 
than  this  proposition,  and  sir  Hew  Dalrymple  readily 
accepted  of  it,  as  an  advantage,  which  would  accrue, 
without  any  drawback  to  the  general  cause  of  the  Pe- 
ninsula. He  knew,  from  a  plan  of  operations,  sketch- 
ed by  the  chief  of  the  French  engineers,  colonel  Vin- 
cent, and  taken  by  the  Portuguese,  that  Junot  possess- 
ed several  strong  positions  in  front  of  Lisbon  ;  and 
that  a  retreat  either  upon  Almeida,  or  across  the  river 
upon  Elvas,  was  not  only  within  the  contemplation  of 
that  general,  but  considered  in  this  report  as  a  matter 
of  course,  and  perfectly  easy  of  execution.  Hence  the 
proposed  convention  was  an  unexpected  advantage  of- 
fered in  a  moment  of  difficulty,  and  the  only  subject  of 
consideration  was  the  nature  of  the  article?-  proposed 
by  Kellerman  as  a  basis  for  the  treaty.  Sir  Hew  being 
necessarily  ignorant  of  many  details,  had  recourse  to 
sir  A.  W'ellesley  for  information,  and  the  latter,  taking 
an  enlarged  view  of  the  question  in  all  its  bearings, 
coincided  as  to  the  sound  policy  of  agreeing  to  a  con- 
vention, by  which  a  strong  French  army  would  be 
quietly  got  out  of  a  country  that  it  had  complete  mili- 
tary possession  of;*  and  by  which  not  only  a  great  mo- 
ral effect  in  favour  of  the  general  cause  would  be  pro- 
duced, but  an  actual  gain  made,  both  of  men  and  time, 
for  the  further  prosecution  of  the  war  in  Spain.  By 
the  convention,  he  observed, 

1.  That  a  kingdom  would  be  liberated,  w'ith  all  its 
fortresses,  arsenals,  &c.,  and  that  the  excited  popula- 
tion of  the  Peninsula  might  then  be  pushed  forward  in 
the  career  of  opposition  to  France,  under  the  most  fa- 
vourable circumstances. 

2.  That  the  Spanish  army  of  Estremadura,  which 
contained  the  most  efficient  body  of  cavalry  in  the 
Peninsula,  could  be  reinforced  with  the  four  or  five 
thousand  Spanish  soldiers  who  were  prisoners  on  board 
the  vessels  in  the  Tagus  ;  and  would  be  enabled  to 
unite  with  the  other  patriot  armies  at  a  critical  period, 
when  every  addition  of  force  must  tend  to  increase  the 
confidence  and  forward  the  impulse,  which  the  victory 
of  Baylen  and  the  flight  of  Joseph  had  given  to  the 
Spaniards.  Finally,  that  the  sacrifice  of  lives  to  be 
expected  in  carrying  the  French  positions  in  Portugal, 
all  the  difficulties  of  reducing  the  fortresses,  and  the 
danger  of  losing  a  communication  with  the  fleet,  w'ould 
be  avoided  by  this  measure,  the  result  of  which  would 
be  as  complete,  as  the  most  sanguine  could  expect, 
from  the  long  course  of  uncertain  and  unhealthy  opera- 
tions which  must  follow  a  rejection  of  the  proposal. f 
But,  while  admitting  the  utility  of  the  measure  itself, 
he  differed  with  the  commander-in-chief  as  to  the  mode 
of  proceeding,  and  a  long  discussion,  in  which  Sir  H. 
Burrard  took  a  part,  followed  the  opening  of  Keller- 
man's  mission.  Sir  Arthur's  first  objection  w-as,  that, 
in  point  of  form,  Kellerman  was  merely  entitled  to  ne- 
gotiate a  cessation  of  hostilities  ;  sir  Hew  Dalrymple 
judged  that,  as  the  good  policy  and  the  utility  of  the 
convention  were  recognized,  it  would  be  unwise  to  drive 
the  French  to  the  wall  on  a  point  of  ceremony,  and 
therefore  accepted  the  proposition.  The  basis  of  a 
definitive  treaty  was  then  arranged,  subject  to  the  final 
approbation  of  sir  ('harles  Cotton,  without  whose  con 
currence  it  was  not  to  be  binding. 

Articles  1st  and  2d  declared  the  fact  of  the  armistice 
and  provided  for  the  mode  of  future  proceedings. 
Article  3d  indicated  the  river  Sisandre  as  the  line  of 


*  Proceedings  of  the  Court  of  Inquiry. 


+  Ibid. 


iKOa.  ] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WlR. 


59 


clfmarcation  bttweeii  the  two  armies.     The  position  of 
Torres  Vedras  to  he  occupied  by  neither. 

Article  4th.  Sir  Hew  Dalrymple  eno-pcred  to  have 
the  Pnrtunfiiese  included  in  the  armistice,  and  their 
boundary  line  was  to  extend  from  Leiria  to  Thoniar. 

Article  5th  declared,  thai  the  French  were  not  to  be 
considered  as  prisoners  of  war,  and  that  themselves 
ai/d  their  property,  public  and  private,  were,  without 
any  detainer,  to  be  transported  to  France.  To  this 
article  sir  Arthur  objected,  as  affording  a  cover  for  the 
abstraction  of  Portuguese  property,  whereupon  Keller- 
man  said,  that  it  was  to  be  taken  in  its  fair  sense  of 
property  justly  obtained,  and  upon  this  assurance  it  was 
admitted. 

Article  fith  provided  for  the  protection  of  individuals. 
It  ofuaranlped  from  political  persecution  all  French 
residents,  all  subjects  of  powers  in  alliance  with  France, 
and  all  Portuguese  who  had  served  the  invaders,  or 
become  obnoxious  for  their  attachment  to  them. 

Article  7th  stipulated  for  the  neutrality  of  the  port 
of  Lishrn  as  far  as  the  Russian  fieet  was  concerned.  At 
first  Kellerman  proposed  to  have  the  Russian  fleet 
guaranteed  from  capture,  "with  leave  to  return  to  the 
Baltic,  but  this  was  peremptorily  refused  ;  indeed,  the 
whole  proceeding  was  designed  to  entangle  the  Russians 
in  the  French  negotiation,  that,  in  case  the  armistice 
should  be  broken,  the  former  might  be  forced  into  a  co- 
operation with  the  latter. 

Sir  Arthur  strenuously  opposed  this  article ;  he   ar- 
gued.  1.     That  the  interests   of  the  two  nations  were 
not  blended,  and  that  they  stood  in  different  relations 
towards  the  British  armv.     2.  That  it  was  an   impor- 
tant object  to  keep  them  separate,  and  that  the  French 
general,  if  pressed,  would  leave  the  Russians  to  their 
fate.     3.  That  as  the  British   operations  had  not  been 
so  rapid  and  decisive  as  to  enable  them  to  capture  the 
fleet  before  the  question  of  neutrality  could  be  agitated, 
the  right  of  the  Russians  to   such    protection  war  un- 
doubted ;  and  in  the  present  circumstances  it  was  desi- 
rable to  grant  it,  because  independent  of  the  chances  of 
their  final   capture,  they  would  be  prevented  from  re- 
turning to  the   Baltic,  which   in   fact  constituted    their 
only  point  of  interest  when  disengaged  from  the  French  ; 
but,  that,  viewed  as  allies  of  the  latter,  they  became  of  1 
great  weight.     Lastly,  that  it  was  an  affair  which  con- j 
cerned  the  Portuguese,  Russians,  and  British,  but  with  | 
which  the  French  could  have  no  right  to  interfere.    Siri 
Hew  findino-  that  the  discussion   of  this   question   be- 
came lengthened,  and  considering  that  sir  Charles  Cot-i 
ton    alone    could   finally  decide,    admitted   the    article 
merely  as  a  form,  without  acquiescing  in  the  propriety 
of  it. 

Article  8th  provided,  that  all  guns  of  French  calibre, 
and  the  horses  of  the  cavalry,  were  to  be  transported 
to  France. 

Article  0th  stipulated,  that  forty-eight  hours'  notice 
should  be  given  of  the  rupture  of  the  armistice. 

To  this  article  also  sir  Arthur  objected  ;  he  consider- 
ed it  unnecessary  for  the  interests  of  the  British  army,  i 
and  favourable  to  the  French  ;  because,  if  hostilities 
recommenced,  the  latter  would  have  forty-eight  hours 
to  make  arrangements  for  their  defence,  for  the 
passage  of  the  Tagus.  and  for  the  co-operation  of  the 
Russian  fleet.  Upon  the  other  hand,  sir  Hew  thought 
it  was  an  absolute  advantage  to  gain  time  for  the  pre- 
parations of  the  British  army,  and  for  the  arrival  of  sir 
John  Moore's  reinforcements. 

By  an  additional  article  it  was  provided,  that  all  the 
fortresses  held  by  the  French,  which  had  not  capitula- 
ted before  the  25th  of  August,  should  be  given  up  to 
the  British;  and  the  basis  of  a  convention  being  thus 
arranged,  general  Kellerman  returned  to  his  chief,  and 
colonel  George  Murray  was  ordered  to  carry  the  pro- 
posed articles  to  the  English  admiral. 

Previous  to  his  landing,  sir  Hew  had  received  none 


of  the  letters  addre^'sed  to  him  by  sir  Arthur  Wellesley, 
he  had  met  with  no  person  during  his  voyage  from 
whom  h  ?  could  obtain  arithentic  information  of  the  state 
of  aff;8iis,  and  his  time  being  at  first  occupied  by  the 
negotiations  with  Kellerman,  he  w'as  uninformed  of 
many  details  of  importance.  Now.  the  day  after  Kel- 
lerman's  departure,  don  Bernardim  Freire  Andrada,  the 
Portuguese  commander-in-chief,  came  to  remonstrate 
against  the  armistice  just  concluded  ;  but,  from  the  cir- 
cumstances before-mentioned,  it  so  happened  that  sir 
Hew  was  utterly  ignorant  of  the  existence  of  don  Ber- 
nardim and  his  army,  at  the  time  the  armistice  was 
discussed,  and  it  was  therefore  difficult  for  him  to  man- 
age this  interview  with  propriety,  because  Andrada  had 
some  plausible,  although  no  real,  ground  of  complaint. 
His  remonstrances  were,  however,  merely  intended  for 
the  commencement  oi  an  intrigue,  to  which  I  shall  here- 
after revert. 

Col  nel  Murray  soon  reached  the  fleet,  and  presented 
the  articles  of  convention  to  sir  Charles  Cotton,  hut  the 
latter  refused  to  concur  therein,  declaring  that  he  would 
himself  conduct  a  separate  treaty  for  the  Russian  ships. 
With  this  answer  colonel  Murr  .y  returned  on  the  24th, 
having  first,  in  reply  to  a  question  put  by  the  French 
officer  who  accompanied  him  on  board  the  Hibernia,  de- 
clared, that  nothing  had  passed  between  him  and  sir 
Charles  Cotton  which  ought  to  preclude  further  nego- 
tiation. Sir  Hew  Dalrymple  was  now  urged  by  sir 
Arthur  Wellesley  to  give  notice,  without  further  expla- 
nation, that  hostilities  would  recommence,  leaving  it  to 
Junot  to  renew  propositions,  if  he  chose  to  do  so,  sepa- 
rately from  the  Russians.*  Sir  Hew.  however,  felt 
himself,  in  honour,  bound  by  colonel  Murray's  obser- 
vation to  the  French  officer,  and  would  not  take  advan- 
tage of  the  occasion  ;  he  likewise  felt  disinclined  to 
relinquish  a  negotiation  which,  from  certain  circum- 
stances, he  deemed  upon  the  point  of  being  crowned 
with  success.  He  therefore  despatched  Cf)lonel  Murray 
to  Lisbon,  with  directions  to  inform  Junot  of  the  admi- 
ral's objection,  and  to  give  notice  of  the  consequent 
rupture  of  the  armistice,  Murray  himself  being  provi- 
ded, however,  with  full  powers  to  enter  into  and  con- 
clude a  definitive  treaty  upon  a  fresh  basis.  The  army 
was,  at  the  same  time,  pushed  forward  to  Ramalhal, 
and  sir  J.  Moore's  troops  were  landed  at  Maceira  Bay, 
but  the  order  to  repair  to  that  place  did  not  reach  them 
until  several  regiments  had  been  disembarked  in  the 
Mondego;f  the  re-shipping  of  these,  together  with 
contrary  winds,  had  caused  a  delay  of  four  days,  and 
at  Maceira  great  difficulty  and  some  loss  was  sustained 
in  getting  on  shore,  an  operation  only  effected  by  five 
days  of  incessant  exertion  on  the  part  of  the  navy  ;  the 
boats  were  constantly  swamped  by  the  surf,  and  such 
was  its  furv  that  not  more  than  thirty  remained  fit  for 
service  at  the  conclusion. 

On  the  27th,  information  was  received,  from  colonel 
Murray,  that  a  fresh  treaty  was  in  -agitation  upon  an 
admissible  basis  ;  and  the  next  day  the  army  took  a 
new  position,  a  part  occupying  Torres  Vedras,  and  the 
remainder  being  placed  in  the  rear  of  that  town.  Mean- 
while, in  Lisbon,  the  agitation  of  the  public  mind  was 
excessively  great ;  hope  and  fear  were  magnified  by 
the  obscurity  of  affairs,  and  the  contradictory  news 
which  was  spread  by  the  French,  and  by  those  who 
held  communication  with  the  country,  had  increased 
the  anxious  feeling  of  joy  or  grief  almost  to  phrensy. 
Junot  made  every  effort  to  engaofe  admiral  Smiavin  in 
the  negotiation,  and  the  necessity  by  which  the  latter 
was  forced  to  put  his  ships  in  a  hostile  and  guarded 
attitude,  contributed  powerfully  to  control  the  popu- 
lace, and  give  strength  to  an  opinion  industriously 
spread,  that  he  would  make  common  cause  with  the 
French.     Nevertheless    Siniavin   had    no  intention   of 


*  Iroceediugs  of  tin  Court  of  laquir/. 


t  Ibid 


60 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  II, 


this  kind,  and  vory  rnrlj'  ^ve  notice  that  he  would 
treat  separately;  wherefore  the  French  being-  thus  left 
to  tliemselves,  had  no  resource  but  their  own  dexterity, 
and  brought  all  the  ordinary  machinery  of  diplomatic 
s\ibtiety  into  play.  Amongj  other  schemes,  Junot  open- 
ed a  senarate  communication  with  sir  Hew  I)a!rym]ile 
at  the  moment  when  colonel  Murray,  invested  witli  full 
powers,  was  enoao-ed  in  daily  conferences  with  Keller- 
man  ;  and  the  dilTirulty  of  con^.infj  to  a  conclusion,  was 
much  increased  by  the  natural  sources  of  suspicion  and 
jealousy  incident  to  such  a  singjul-ar  transaction,  where 
two  foreitrn  nations  were  seen  bargaining,  and  one  of 
them  honestly  bargaining,  for  the  goods  and  interests 
of  a  third,  yet  scarcely  hinting  even  at  the  existence  of 
the  latter.  The  French  being  the  weakest,  were  most 
subtle,  and  to  protect  the  vital  questions' advanced  ex- 
travagant claims;  on  the  other  hand,  the  Portuguese 
leaders,  no  longer  fearing  a  defeat,  protested  against 
the  convention,  passed  the  line  of  demarcation,  attack- 
ed the  French  palroles.  and  menaced  an  attack  from 
the  side  of  Santarem.  This  movement,  and  the  breach 
of  faith  in  attacking  the  patroles,  were  promptly  and 
distinctly  disavowed  by  sir  Hew  ;  yet  they  kept  sus- 
picion awake,  and  the  mutual  misunderstandings  arose 
at  last  to  such  a  height,  that  Junot,  seeming  for  a  mo- 
ment to  recover  all  his  natural  energy,  threatened  to 
burn  the  public  establishments,  and  make  his  retreat 
good  at  the  expense  of  the  city  ;  a  menace  which  no- 
thing could  have  prevented  him  from  executing.  Fi- 
nally, however,  a  definitive  treaty  was  concluded  at 
Lisbon  on  the  30th,  and  soon  afterwards  ratified  in 
form. 

This  celebrated  convention,  improperly  called  '  of 
Cintra,'  consisted  of  twenty-two  original,  and  three 
supplementary  articles,  upon  the  expediency  of  many 
of  which,  sir  Arthur  Wellesley,  and  the  commander-in- 
chief  disagreed,  but  as  their  disagreement  had  reference 
to  the  detiils  and  not  to  the  general  principle,  the  his- 
torical importmce  is  not  sufficient  to  call  for  remark. 
An  informality  on  the  part  of  Junot,  caused  some  delay 
in  the  ratification  of  the  instrument;  the  British  army 
mar'jhed  notwithstanding  to  take  up  the  position  near 
Lisbon,  assigned  to  it  by  the  11th  article  of  the  treaty, 
and  on  the  march,  sir  Hew  Dalrymple  met  two  Rus- 
sian officers,  who  were  charged  to  open  a  separate  ne- 
gotiation for  the  Russian  squadron;  he,  however,  re- 
fused to  receive  their  credentials,  and  referred  them  to 
sir  Charles  Cotton.  Thus  baffled  in  an  attempt  to 
carry  on  a  double  treaty,  for  a  naval  one  was  already 
commenced,  Siniavin,  whose  conduct  appears  to  have 
been  weak,  was  forced  to  come  to  a  conclusion  with 
the  English  admiral.  At  first  he  claimed  the  protec- 
tion of  a  neutral  port,  but  as  singly  he  possessed  none 
of  that  weigiit  which  circumstances  had  given  him  be- 
fore the  convention  with  Junot,  his  claim  was  answered 
by  an  intimation,  that  a  British  flag  was  flying  on  the 
forts  at  the  mouth  of  the  Tagus ;  and  this  was  true,  for 
the  third  and  forty-second  regiments,  under  the  com- 
mand of  major-general  Beresford,  having  landed  and 
taken  possession  of  them,  in  virtue  of  tlie  convention, 
the  British  colours  were  improperly  hoisted  instead  of 
the  Portuguese.  Foiled  again  by  this  proceeding,  the 
justice  of  whicii  is  somewhat  doubtful,  Siniavin  finally 
[agreed  to  surrender  upon  the  following  terms  : 

1.  The  Russian  ships,  with  their  sails,  stores,  &c. 
[were  to   be   held   by  England,  as  a  deposit,  until    six 

months  after  the  conclusion  of  a  peace  between  the  two 
governments  of  the  contracting  parties. 

2.  The  admiral,  officers,  and  seamen,  without  any 
restriction  as  to  their  future  services,  were  to  be  trans- 
ported to  Russia,  at  the  expense  of  the  British  govern- 
ment. 

But  two  additional  articles  were,  subsequently  to  the 
ratification  of  the  original  treaty,  proposed  by  the  Rus- 
8iaa«,  and  assented  to  by  the  English  admiral.     The 


first  stipulated  that  the  imperial  flag  should  be  display- 
ed, even  in  the  British  harbours,  as  long  as  the  Rus- 
sian admiral  remained  on  board.  The  second  provided 
that  the  ships  themselves  and  their  stores  should  be 
delivered  again  at  the  appointed  time,  in  the  same  state 
as  when  surrendered.  'I'he  rights  of  the  Portuguese 
were  not  referred  to,  but  sir  Charles  Cotton  was  justi 
fied  by  his  instructions,  which  authorised  him  to  make 
prize  of  the  Russian  fleet.*  Siniavin  thus  suflTered  all 
the  inconvenience  of  hostil'des,  and  the  shame  of  stri- 
king his  colours  without  having  violated  in  any  manner 
the  relations  of  amity  in  which  his  nation  stood  with 
regard  to  Portugal.  On  the  other  hand,  for  the  sake 
of  a  few  old  and  decaying  ships,  the  British  govern- 
ment made  an  injudicious  display  of  contempt  for  the 
independence  of  their  ally,  because,  with  singular  in- 
consistency, they  permitted  the  officers  and  crews,  the 
real  strength  of  the  squadron,  to  rt-turn  to  the  Baltic, 
although  scarcely  a  year  had  elapsed,  since  the  nation- 
al character  was  defiled  in  that  quarter,  to  suppress  a 
navy  inimical  to  Great  Britain.  This  inconsistency 
belonged  wholly  to  the  ministers  ;  for  the  two  original 
articles  of  the  treaty  only  were  confirmed  by  them,  and 
they  were  copied  from  the  Admiralty  instructions  de- 
livered to  sir  Charles  Cotton  four  months  previous  to 
the  transaction. "f"  Yet  that  officer,  by  the  very  men  who 
had  framed  those  instructions,  was,  with  matchless  ef- 
frontery, rebuked  for  having  adopted  a  new  principle 
of  maritime  surrender  ! 

On  the  2d  of  September  head-quarters  were  establish- 
ed at  Oyeras ;  the  right  of  the  army  occupied  the  forts 
at  the  mouth  of  the  river,  the  left  rested  upon  the 
heights  of  Bellas.  The  French  army  concentrated  in 
Lisbon,  posted  their  piquets  and  guards  as  if  in  front 
of  an  enemy,  and  at  niglit  the  sentries  fired  upon  who- 
ever approached  their  posts,  the  police  disbanded  of 
their  own  accord,  and  the  city  became  a  scene  of  tur- 
bulence, anarchy,  and  crime.:}:  Notwithstanding  the 
presence  of  their  enemies,  the  inhabitants  of  the  capital 
testified  their  joy,  and  evinced  their  vengeful  feelings 
in  a  remarkable  manner;  they  refused  to  sell  any  pro- 
visions, or  to  deal  in  any  manner  with  the  French  ; 
they  sung  songs  of  triumph  in  their  hearing,  and  in 
their  sight  fabricated  thousands  of  small  lamps  for  the 
avowed  purpose  of  illuminating  the  streets  at  their  de- 
parture ;  the  doors  of  many  of  the  houses  occupied  by 
the  troops  were  marked  in  one  night;  men  were  obser- 
ved bearing  in  their  hats  lists  of  Portuguese  or  French- 
men designed  for  slaughter,  and  the  quarters  of  Loison 
were  threatened  with  a  serious  attack.  Yet  amidst  all 
this  disorder  and  violence,  general  Travot,  and  some 
others  of  the  French  army,  fearlessly  and  safely  traver- 
sed the  streets,  unguarded  save  by  the  reputation  of 
their  just  and  liberal  conduct  when  in  power,  a  fact  ex- 
tremely honourable  to  the  Portuguese,  and  conclusive 
of  the  misconduct  of  Loison. ||  Junot  himself  was  me- 
naced by  an  assassin,  but  he  treated  the  aftliir  with 
magnanimity,  and  in  general  he  was  respected,  al- 
though in  a  far  less  degree  than  Travot. 

The  dread  of  an  explosion,  which  would  have  com- 
promised at  once  the  safety  of  his  army  and  of  the  city, 
induced  the  French  general  to  hasten  the  period  when 
an  English  division  was  to  occupy  the  citadel  and  take 
charge  of  the  public  tranquillity.  Meanwhile  emissa- 
ries from  the  jimta  of  Oporto  fomented  the  disposition 
of  the  populace  to  commit  themselves  by  an  attack 
upon  the  French,  the  convention  was  reprobated,  and 
endeavours  were  fruitlessly  made  to  turn  the  tide  of 
indignation  even  against  the  English,  as  abettois  of 
the  invaders.  The  judge  of  the  people,  an  energetic, 
but  turbulent  fellow,  issued  an  inflammatory  address 

*  Pari.  Pap.  1809. 

■f  Ibid.     Adiiiiraltv  Ini-tructions  to  sir  C.Cotton,  16th  Ap'-il, 
liJOn      Mr.  WilkblVy  i'<\>'  to  Kir  C.  CottJP   ITth  ?cpt.  1808. 
{  ThiLb«ult.  II  Ibid. 


i808.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


61 


in  which,  calling  for  a  suspension  of  the  treaty,  he  de- 
signated the  French  as  rohbers  and  insulters  of  religion ; 
the  Monteiro  Mor,  who  commande<l  a  rabble  of  peas- 
antry, which  he  dignified  with  the  title  of  an  army, 
took  possession  of  the  south  bank  of  the  Tagus,  and 
iVom  his  quarters  issued  a  protest  against  the  conven- 
tion, the  execution  of  which  he  had  the  audacity  to 
call  upon  sir  Charles  Cotton  to  interrupt ;  the  latter  sent 
his  cenimunications  to  sir  Hew  Dalryniple,  who  treated 
them  with  the  contemptuous  indignation  they  merited. 
Sir  John  Hope  being  appointed  English  command- 
ant of  Lisl)on,  took  possession  of  the  castle  of  Belem 
on  the  10th,  and  of  the  citadel  the  12th,  and,  by  his 
firm  and  vigorous  conduct,  reduced  the  effervescence  of 
the  public  mind,  and  repressed  the  disorders  which  had 
arisen  to  a  height  that  gave  opportunity  for  the  commis- 
sion of  any  villany.  The  duke  of  Abrantes,  with  his 
fitaff,  embarked  tlie  13th.  The  first  division  of  his  army 
sailed  the  15th  ;  it  was  followed  by  the  second  and  third 
divisions  ;  ,and  on  the  30th,  all  the  French,  except  the 
g-arrisons  of  Elvas  and  Almeida,  were  out  of  Portugal. 
But  the  execution  of  the  convention  had  not  been 
carried  on  thus  far  without  much  trouble  and  contesta- 
tion. Lord  Proby,  the  English  commissioner  appointed 
to  carry  the  articles  of  the  treaty  into  effect,  was  joined 
by  major-general  Beresford  on  the  5th,  and  their  united 
labours  were  scarcely  sufficient  to  meet  the  exigences 
of  a  task,  in  the  prosecution  of  which  disputes  hourly 
arose.  Anger,  the  cupidity  of  individuals,  and  oppor- 
tunity, combined  to  push  the  French  beyond  the  bounds 
of  honour  and  decency,  and  several  gross  attempts 
were  made  to  appropriate  property  which  no  interpre- 
tation of  the  stipulations  should  give  a  colour  to ; 
amongst  the  most  odious  were  the  abstraction  of  manu- 
scripts, and  rare  specimens  of  natural  history,  from  the 
national  museum;  and  the  invasion  of  the  deposito 
publico,  or  funds  of  money  awaiting  legal  decision  for 
their  final  appropriation.  Those  dishonest  attempts 
were  met  and  checked  with  a  strong  hand,  and  at  last 
a  committee,  consisting  of  an  individual  of  each  of 
the  three  nations,  was  appointed  by  the  commissioners 
on  both  sides.  Their  office  w^as  to  receive  reclama- 
tions, to  investigate  them,  and  to  do  justice  by  seizing 
upon  all  contraband  baggage  embarked  by  the  French  ; 
a  measure  attended  with  excellent  effect.  It  must,  how- 
ever, be  observed,  that  the  loud  complaints  anr!  violence 
of  the  Portuguese,  and  the  machinations  of  the  bishop 
of  Oporto,  seem  to  have  excited  the  suspicions  of  the 
British  and  influenced  their  acts,  more  than  the  real 
fricts  warranted;  for  the  national  character  of  the  Por- 
tuguese was  not  then  understood,  nor  the  extent  to 
which  they  supplied  the  place  of  true  reports  by  the 
fabrication  of  false  ones,  generally  known. 

Party  writers  have  not  been  wanting  since  to  exag- 
gerate the  grounds  of  complaint.  The  English  have 
imputed  fraud  and  evasions  of  the  most  dishonourable 
kind  to  the  French,  and  the  latter  have  retorted  by  ac- 
cusations of  gratuitous  insult,  and  breach  of  failh,  in- 
asmuch as  their  soldiers,  when  on  board  the  British 
ships,  were  treated  with  cruelty  in  order  to  induce  them 
to  desert.  It  would  be  too  much  to  affirm  that  all  the 
error  was  on  one  side,  but  it  does  appear  reasonable 
and  consonant  to  justice  to  decide,  that  as  the  French 
were  originally  aggressors  and  acting  for  their  own  in- 
terest, and  that  the  British  were  interfering  for  the  pro- 
tection of  the  Portuguese,  an  indecorous  zeal  on  the  part 
of  the  latter,  if  not  commendable,  was  certainly  more 
excusable  than  in  their  opponents.  Upon  the  ground 
of  its  being  impossible  for  Junot  to  know  what  was 
doing  in  his  name,  the  British  commissioners  acqnitted 
him  of  any  personal  impropriety  of  conduct,  and  his 
public  orders,  which  denounced  severe  punishments 
for  such  rnalprrcticcs  corroborated  this  testimony  ;  yet 
K'^llrrinnn.  in  his  communications  with  sir  Hew  I);il- 
-yrripl'-.   liiil    •]i  t.  sf-runU'    V'   ill^•i^.nate   nV.iilurb   to   the 


duke's  disadvantage.*  But,  amidst  all  these  conflict- 
ing accusations,  the  British  commander's  personal  good 
fiiith  and  scrupulous  adherence  to  justice  has  never 
been  called  in  question. 

To  define  the  exact  extent  to  which  each  party  should 
have  pushed  their  claims  is  not  an  easy  task,  yet  an 
impartial  investigator  would  begin  by  carefully  sepa- 
rating the  original  rights  of  the  French,  from  those 
rights  which  tiiey  acquired  by  the  convention  ;  and 
much  of  the  subsequent  clamour  in  England  against 
the  authors  of  that  treaty  sprung  from  the  error  of 
confounding  these  essentially  distinct  grounds  of  ar- 
gument. Conquest  being  the  sole  foundation  of  the 
first,  defeat,  if  complete,  extinguished  them  ;  if  incom- 
plete, nullified  a  part  only.  Now  the  issue  of  the  ap- 
peal to  arms  not  having  been  answerable  to  the  justice 
of  the  cause,  an  agreement  ensued,  by  which  a  part 
was  sacrificed  for  the  sake  of  the  remainder,  and  upon 
the  terms  of  that  agreement  the  whole  question  of  right 
hinges.  If  the  French  were  not  prisoners  of  war,  it 
follows  that  they  had  not  forfeited  their  claims,  founded 
on  the  right  of  conquest,  but  they  were  willing  to  ex- 
change an  insecure  tenure  of  the  whole,  for  a  secure 
tenure  of  a  part.  The  difficulty  consisted  in  defining 
exactly  what  was  conceded,  and  what  should  be  recov- 
ered from  them.  With  respect  to  the  latter,  the  res- 
titution of  plunder  acquired  anterior  to  the  convention 
was  clearly  out  of  the  question  ;  if  officially  obtained, 
it  was  part  of  the  rights  bargained  for,  if  individually, 
to  what  tribunal  could  the  innumerable  claims  which 
would  follow  such  an  article  be  referred  1  Abstract  no- 
tions of  right  in  such  matters  are  misplaced.  If  an  ar- 
my surrenders  at  discretion,  the  victors  may  say  with 
Brennus,  'Woe  to  the  vanquished;'  but  a  convention 
implies  some  weakness,  and  must  be  weighed  in  the 
scales  of  prudence,  not  in  those  of  justice. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

The  bishop  and  junta  of  Oporto  aim  at  the  sujjreme  power, 
VI  ish  to  estabh-sh  tlie  stat  of  govtrnnient  at  Oporto  ;  theii 
intrij;nes  ;  strang-e  proceedings  of  g;eneral  Decken  ;  rejec- 
tions thereupon — Clamour  raised  ag^ainst  the  convention  in 
England  and  in  Portugal  ;  soon  ceases  in  Portugal — The 
Spanish  general  Galuzzo  refuses  to  acknowledge  the  conven- 
tion ;  invests  fort  Lalippe  ;  his  proceedings  absurd  and  un- 
justifiable—Sir John  Hope  marches  against  him  ;  he  alters 
his  conduct — Garrison  of  Lab'ppe — March  to  Lisbon — Em- 
barked— Garrison  of  AIn)eida  ;  march  to  Oporto  ;  attacked 
and  plundered  by  the  Portuguese — Sir  Hew  Dalrymple  and 
sir  Harry  Burrard  recalled  to  England — Vile  conduct  of  the 
daily  press — Violence  of  public  feeling — Convention,  im- 
properly called,  of  Cintra — Observations — on  the  action  of 
Rorica — On  the  battle  of  Vimiero — On  the  convention. 

The  interview  that  took  place  at  Vimiero,  between 
don  Bernardim  Freire  d'Andrada  and  sir  Hew  Dalrym- 
ple, has  been  already  noticed  as  the  commencement  of 
an  intrigue  of  some  consequence.  The  Portuguese  chief 
objected  at  the  time  to  the  armistice  concluded  with 
Kellerman,  ostensibly  upon  general  grounds,  but  really, 
as  it  appeared  to  sir  Hew,  because  the  bishop  and  jun- 
ta of  Oporto  were  not  named  in  the  instrument.  At 
the  desire  of  Freire,  one  Ayres  Pinto  de  Souza  was  re- 
ceived at  the  English  head-quarters  as  the  protector  of 
Portuguese  interests  during  the  subsequent  negotia- 
tion, and  he  was  soon  apprised  that  a  treaty  for  a  defi- 
nitive convention  was  on  foot,  himself  and  his  general 
being  invited  to  state  their  views  and  wishes  before  any 
further  steps  were  taken.  Neither  of  them  took  any 
notice  of  this  invitation,  but  when  the  treaty  was  con- 
cluded clamoured  loudly  against  it.  The  British  army 
was,  they  said,  an  auxiliary  force,  and  should  only  act 
as  such;  nevertheless,   it  had  assumed   the  right  of 

*    Sir  !.'.  D.  Iryiiipl   "s  i\anut!ve.     Court  of  Inquiry. 


62 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  IT. 


treating:  with  the  French  fnr  Portuguese  interests,  and 
a  convention  h;ul  been  concluded  whicii  protected  tlie 
enemy  from  the  punishment  due  to  his  rapine  and  cru- 
elty ;  it  was  more  favourable  than  the  strength  of  the 
relative  parties  warranted,  and  no  notice  had  been  taken 
of  the  Portuguese  government,  or  of  the  native  army 
in  the  Alemtejo  ;  men  who  were  obnoxious  to  their 
countrymen,  for  having  aided  the  invaders,  were  pro- 
tected from  a  just  vengeance ;  finally  the  fortresses 
were  bargained  for,  as  acquisitions  appertaining  to  the 
British  arm)' :  a  circumstance  which  must  inevitably 
excite  great  jealousy  both  in  Portugal  and  Spain,  and 
injure  the  general  cause,  by  affording  an  opportunity 
for  the  French  emissaries  to  create  disunion  among  the 
allied  nations.  They  dwelt  also  upon  the  importance 
of  the  native  forces,  the  strength  of  the  insurrection, 
and  insiimatcd  that  separate  operations  were  likely  to 
be  carried  on  notwithstanding  the  treaty. 

Noble  words  often  cover  pitiful  deeds;  this  remon- 
etrance.  apparently  springing  from  the  feelings  of  a  pa- 
triot whose  heart  was  ulcerated  by  the  wrongs  his 
country  had  sustained,  was  but  a  cloak  for  a  miserable 
interested  intrigue.  The  bishop  of  Oporto,  a  meddling- 
ambitious  priest,  had  early  conceived  the  project  of 
placing  himself  at  the  head  of  the  insurrectional  au- 
thorities, and  transferring  the  seat  of  government  from 
Lisbon  to  Oporto.  He  was  aware  that  he  should  en- 
counter grpat  opposition,  and  he  hoped  that  by  invei- 
gling the  English  general  to  countenance  these  preten- 
6ions,  he  might,  with  the  aid  of  Freire's  force,  and  his 
own  influence,  succeed  in  the  object  of  his  wishes. 
With  this  view  he  wrote  a  letter  to  sir  Charles  Cotton 
dated  the  fourth  of  August,  in  which  was  enclosed,  as 
the  letter  describes  it,  "The  form  of  government  with 
which  the}',  the  junta  of  Oporto,  meant  to  govern  Por- 
tugal when  the  city  of  Lisbon  should  be  free  from  the 
French  ;  and  this  letter,  together  with  its  enclosure, 
being  transmitted  to  sir  Arthur  Wellesley,  he  placed 
them  among  other  public  documents  in  the  hands  of 
sir  Hew  Da'.rymple  when  the  latter  first  landed  at  Ma- 
ceira.  In  the  document  itself  it  was  declared  that 
"The  body  of  government  had  taken  the  glorious  reso- 
lution of  restoring  the  Portuguese  monarchy  in  all  its 
extent,  and  of  recovering  the  crown  of  Portugal  for 
its  lawful  sovereign,  don  Juan  VI.,  their  prince."  But 
this  "  glorious  resolution"  was  burlhenrd  with  many 
forms  and  restrictions;  and  although  the  junta  profess- 
ed tlie  intention  of  re-establishing  a  regency,  they  de- 
clared, "  that  if  this  new  regency  should  be  interrupted 
by  a  new  invasion  of  the  French,  or  by  any  oilier  thing, 
the  junta  would  immediately  take  the  government  on 
itself,  and  exercise  the  authority  and  jurisdiction  which 
it  had  done  ever  since  its  instiiution." 

Thus  prepared  for  seme  cabal,  sir  Hew  Dalr}mple 
was  at  no  loss  for  an  answer  to  Freire's  remonstrance. 
He  observed,  that  if  the  government  of  Portugal  had 
rot  been  mentioned  in  the  treaty,  neither  had  that  of 
England,  nor  that  of  France.  The  convention  was 
piirely  military,  and  for  the  present  concerned  only  the 
commanders  in  the  field.  With  regard  to  the  occupa- 
tion of  the  fortresses,  and  the  fact  of  the  British  army 
being  an  auxiliary  force,  the  first  was  merely  a  measure 
of  military  precaution  absolutely  necessary,  and  the 
latter  was  in  no  way  rendered  doubtful  by  any  act 
which  had  been  committed;  he  sir  Hew  was  instructed  by 
his  government  to  assist  in  restoring  the  prince  regent 
of  Portugal  to  his  lawful  rights,  without  any  secret  or 
interested  motives  ;  finally,  the  Portuguese  general  had 
been  invited  to  assist  in  the  negotiations,  and  if  he  had 
not  done  so,  the  blame  rested  with  himself.  To  this 
sir  Hew  might  have  justly  added,  that  the  conduct  of 
Freire  in  withdrawing  his  troops  at  the  most  critical 
moment  of  the  campaign,  by  no  means  entitled  him  to 
assume  a  high  tone  towards  those  whom  he  had  so 
disgracefully  deserted  in  the  hour  of  danger. 


The  Portuguese  general  was  silenced  by  this  plain 
and  decided  answer;  yet  the  English  general  was 
quicklj'  convinced  that  the  bishop  and  his  coadjutors, 
however  incapable  of  conducting  great  affairs,  were 
experienced  plotters.  In  his  first  interview  vvitii  An- 
drada,  sir  Hew  Dalrj'mple  had  taken  occasion  to  ob- 
serve, that  "no  government  lawfully  representing  the 
prince  regent  actually  existed  in  Portugal;"  in  i'act,  a 
junta,  calling  itself  independent,  was  likewise  estab- 
lished in  Algarve,  and  the  members  of  the  regency  le- 
gally invested  by  the  prince  with  supreme  authority 
were  dispersed,  and  part  of  them  in  the  power  of  the 
French.  This  observation,  so  adverse  to  the  prelate's 
views,  was  transmitted  to  him  by  Freire,  together  with 
a  copy  of  the  armistice  ;  and  he  was  well  aware  that  a 
definite  convention,  differing  materially  from  the  ar- 
mistice, was  upon  the  point  of  being  concluded,  the 
refusal  of  sir  Charles  Cotton  to  concur  in  the  latter, 
having  rendered  it  null  and  void.  Nevertheless,  pre- 
serving silence  on  that  point,  the  bishop  forwarded  the 
copy  of  the  armistice  to  the  chevalier  Da  Souza,  Por- 
tuguese minister  in  London,  accompanied  by  a  letter 
filled  with  invectives  and  misrepresentations  of  its 
provisions  ;  the  chevalier  placed  this  letter  with  its 
inclosures,  in  the  hands  of  Mr.  Canning,  the  English 
secretary  of  state  for  foreign  affairs,  and  at  the  same 
time  delivering  to  him  an  official  note,  in  which,  adopting 
the  style  of  the  prelate  and  junta,  he  spoke  of  them  as 
the  representatives  of  his  sovereign,  and  the  possessors 
of  the  supreme  power  in  Portugal. 

Nor  were  the  efforts  of  the  party  confined  to  formal 
communications  with  the  ministers,  the  daily  press 
teemed  with  invectives  against  the  English  general's 
conduct ;  ex-parte  statements,  founded  on  the  provis- 
ions of  an  armistice  that  was  never  concluded,  being 
thus  palmed  upon  a  public,  always  hasty  in  judging 
of  such  matters,  a  prejudice  against  the  convention  was 
raised  before  either  the  terms  of,  or  the  events  which 
led  to  it,  were  known.  For  sir  Hew,  forgetting  the 
ordinary  forms  cf  off:cial  intercourse,  had  neglected  to 
transmit  information  to  his  government  until  fifteen 
days  after  the  commencement  of  the  treaty,  and  the 
ministers,  unable  to  contradict  or  explain  any  of  Souza's 
assertions,  were  thus  placed  in  a  mortifying  situation, 
by  which  thi  ir  minds  were  irritated  and  disposed  to 
take  a  prejudiced  view  of  the  real  treaty.  Meanwhile 
the  bishop  pretended  to  know  nothinor  of  theconvention, 
hence  the  silence  of  Freire  during  the  negotiation  ;  but 
that  once  concluded,  a  clamoL.  was.  by  the  party, 
raised  in  Portugril,  similar  to  what  had  already  been 
excited  in  England  :  thus  both  nations  appeared  to  be 
equally  indignant  at  the  conduct  of  the  general,  when, 
in  fact,  his  proceedings  were  unknown  to  either. 

It  would  appear  that  the  bishrp  had  other  than  Por- 
tuguese coadjutors.  The  baron  Von  Decken,  a  Hano- 
verian officer,  was  appointed  one  of  the  military  agents 
at  Oporto;  he  was  subject  to  sir  Hew  Dalrymple's 
orders,  but  as  his  mission  was  of  a  detached  nature,  he 
was  also  to  criiimunicate  directly  with  the  secretary 
cf  state  in  England.  Von  Decken  arrived  at  Oporto 
upon  the  I7th  August,  and  the  s.'-rne  evening,  in  concert 
with  the  bishop,  concocted  a  project  admirably  adapted 
to  forward  the  views  of  the  latter ;  they  agreed  that 
the  prelate  was  the  fittest  person  to  be  at  the  heart  of 
the  government,  and  that  as  he  cculd  not  or  pretended 
he  could  not,  quit  Oporto,  the  seat  of  government  ought 
to  be  transferred  to  that  city. 

Two  obstacles  to  this  arrangement  were  foreseen  ; 
first,  the  prince  regent  at  his  departure  had  nominated 
a  regency,  and  left  full  instructions  for  tlie  filling  up  of 
vacancies  arising  from  death  or  other  causes  ;  secondly, 
the  people  of  Lisbon  and  of  the  southern  provinces 
would  certainly  resist  any  plan  for  changing  the  seat 
of  government ;  hence  to  obviate  these  difficulties.  Von 
Decken  wrote  largely  in  commendation  of  the  proposed 


k808.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR    WAR. 


63 


arranoreiTient,  vilifyingf  the  conduct  of  the  rpgency,  and 
virg'ing  sir  Hew  not  only  to  give  his  sanction  to  the  am- 
bitious project,  but  to  employ  the  British  troops  in  con- 
trolling' the  people  of  Lisbon,  should  they  attempt  to 
frustrate  the  bishop's  plans.  To  conciliate  the  mem- 
bers of  the  regency,  it  was  proposed  to  admit  a  portion 
of  them  into  the  new  government,  and  Francisco  Noron- 
ha,  Francisco  da  Cunha,  the  Rlonteiro  Mor,  and  the 
principal  Castro,  were  named  as  being  the  only  men 
Avho  were  faithful  to  their  sovereign.  Now  the  last 
had  accepted  the  office  of  minister  of  worship  under  the 
French,  and  was  consequently  unfaithful ;  but  he  was 
the  half  brother  of  the  bishop,  Castro  being  legitimate- 
ly born.  Under  the  pretext  of  sparing  the  feelings  of 
the  people  of  Lisbon,  it  was  further  proposed  to  appoint 
a  Portuguese  commandant,  subject  to  the  British  gover- 
nor, yet  with  a  native  force  under  his  orders,  to  conduct 
all  matters  of  police,  and  the  bishop  took  the  occasion 
to  recommend  a  particular  general  for  that  office.  F^i- 
nally,  civil  dissension  and  all  its  attendant  evils  were 
foretold  as  the  consequences  of  rejecting  this  plan. 

Sir  Hew  Dalrymple's  answer  was  peremptory  and 
decisive.  He  reprimanded  general  Von  Decken,  and 
at  once  put  an  end  to  the  inshop's  hopes  of  support  from 
the  English  army.  This  second  repulse,  for  sir  Hew's 
answer  did  not  reach  Oporto  until  after  Freire's  report 
had  arrived  there,  completed  the  mortification  of  the 
prelate  and  his  junta,  and  they  set  no  bounds  to  their 
violence.  EtTorts  were  made  to  stimulate  the  populace 
of  Lisbon  to  attack  both  French  and  English,  in  the 
hope  that  the  terrible  scene  which  niust  have  ensued, 
would  effectually  prevent  the  re-estab'ishment  of  the 
old  regency,  and  at  the  same  time  render  the  transfer  of 
the  seat  of  government  to  Oporto  an  easy  task.  Hence 
the  outrageous  conduct  of  the  Monteiro  Mor  and  of  the 
judge  of  the  people,  and  the  former's  insolent  letter  call- 
ing upon  sir  Ciiarles  Cotton  to  interrupt  the  execution 
of  the  convention. 

The  3d  September,  sir  Hew  Dalrymple  received  in- 
structions, from  home,  relative  to  the  formation  of  a 
new  regency,  which  were  completely  at  variance  with 
the  plan  arranged  between  the  bishop  and  general  Von 
Decken,  yet  no  diinculty  attended  the  execution  ;  and 
here,  as  in  the  case  of  prince  Leopold,  we  are  arrested 
by  the  singularity  of  the  transaction.  General  Charles 
Stewart,  brother  of  lord  Castlereagii,  was  the  bearer  of 
Von  Decken's  first  letter;  he  would  not  knowingly  have 
lent  himself  to  an  intrigue,  subversive  of  his  brother's 
views,  as  explained  in  the  official  instructions  sent  to 
sir  Hew  ;  neither  is  it  likely  that  Von  Decken  should 
plunge  into  such  a  delicate  and  important  affair  in  one 
hour  after  his  arrival  at  Oporto,  if  he  had  not  been  se- 
cretly authorised  by  some  member  of  the  English  cabi- 
net :  are  we  then  to  seek  for  a  clue  to  these  mysteries, 
in  that  shameful  Machiavelian  policy  that  soon  after- 
wards forced  lord  Castlereagh  to  defend  his  public 
measures  by  a  duel  ? 

But  the  usual  fate  of  plans  laid  by  men  more  cun- 
ning than  wise,  attended  the  bishop  of  Oporto's  pro- 
jects ;  he  was  successful  for  a  moment  in  rendering  the 
convention  of  Cintra  odious  to  the  Portuguese,  yet  the 
great  mass  of  the  people  soon  acknowledged  with 
gratitude  the  services  rendered  them  by  the  English, 
rejoicing  at  the  fulfilment  of  a  treaty  which  freed  their 
country  at  once  from  the  invaders.  And  well  might 
they  rejoice  when  they  beheld  above  twenty-five  tliou- 
sand  bold  and  skilful  soldiers,  reluctantly  quitting  the 
strong  holds  of  the  kingdom,  and  to  the  last  maintain- 
ing the  haughty  air  of  an  army  unsubdued,  and  capable, 
on  the  slightest  provocation,  of  resorting  once  more  to 
the  decision  of  battle.  The  Portuguese  people  were 
contented,  but  the  Spanish  general  Galluzzo  appears 
to  have  favoured  the  views  of  the  Oporto  faction.  De- 
tachments of  his  troops,  and  Portuguese  refugees  prin-t 
cipally  from  the  northern  provinces   and  commanded 


by  a  Spaniard,  were  acting-  in  conjunction  with  the  in- 
surgents of  the  Alemtejo.  Many  disputes  had  arisen 
between  the  two  nations,  as  I  have  already  related,  for 
the  Spaniards  treated  Portugal  as  a  conquered  country, 
denied  the  authority  of  tiie  Portuguese  general  Leite, 
who  was  not  of  the  bishop's  party,  and  insulted  him 
personally;  they  even  seized  his  military  chest  at  Cam- 
po  Mayor,  and  in  all  things  acted  with  the  utmost  vio- 
lence and  rapacity. 

Galluzzo  himself  was  required  by  his  own  govern- 
ment to  join  the  Spanish  armies  concentrating  on  the 
pjbro  ;  but  instead  of  obeying,  he  collected  his  forces 
near  Elvas,  and  when  he  heard  of  the  convention  con- 
cluded at  Lisbon,  invested  Fort  Lalippe,  and  refused  to 
permit  the  execution  of  the  treaty  relative  to  that  im- 
pregnable fortress.  Colonel  Girod  de  Novillard  com- 
manded the  French  garrison,  and  profiting  from  its  situ- 
ation, had  compelled  the  inhabitants  of  Elvas  to  shut 
their  gates  also  against  the  Spaniards,  and  to  supply  the 
fort  daily  with  provisions.  Galluzzo's  proceedings  were 
therefore  manifestly  absurd  in  a  military  point  of  view, 
for  his  attacks  were  confined  to  a  trifling  bombardment  of 
Lalippe  from  an  immense  distance,  and  the  utmost  dam- 
age sustained  or  likely  to  be  sustained  by  that  fortress, 
was  the  knocking  away  the  cornices  and  chimneys  of  the 
governor's  house,  every  other  part  being  protected  by 
bomb  proofs  of  the  finest  masonry. 

Through  lord  Burghersh,  who  had  been  appointed  to 
communicate  with  the  Spanish  troops  in  Portugal,  Gal- 
luzzo was,  early  in  September,  officially  informed  of 
the  articles  of  the  convention,  and  that  the  troops  of  his 
nation,  confined  on  board  the  hulks  at  Lisbon,  were  by 
that  treaty  released,  and  would  be  clothed,  armed,  and 
sent  to  Catalonia.  Sir  Hew  Dalrymple  also  wrote  to 
the  Spanish  general  on  the  5th  of  September  to  repeat 
this  intelligence  and  to  request  that  his  detachment 
might  be  withdrawn  from  the  Alemtejo,  where  they 
were  living  at  the  expense  of  the  people  ;  Galluzzo, 
however,  took  no  notice  of  either  communifatinn  ;  pre- 
tending that  he  had  opened  his  fire  against  Lalippe  be- 
fore the  date  of  the  convention,  and  that  no  third  party 
had  a  right  to  interfere,  he  declared  he  would  grant  no 
terms  to  the  garrison,  nor  permit  an)'  but  Portuguese  to 
enter  the  fort.  Yet  at  this  moment  the  Spanish  armies 
on  the  Ebro  were  languishing  for  cavalrv,  which  he 
alone  possessed  ;  and  his  efforts  were  so  despised  by 
Girod,  that  the  latter  made  no  secret  of  his  intention, 
if  the  fate  of  the  French  army  at  Lisbon  should  render 
such  a  step  advisable,  to  blow  up  the  works,  and  march 
openly  through  the  midst  of  Galluzzo's  troops. 

Colonel  Ross  being  finally  detaciied,  with  the  2Glh 
regiment  to  receive  the  fort  from  colonel  Girod,  and  to 
escort  the  garrison  to  Lisbon  under  the  terms  of  the 
convention,  sent  a  flag  of  truce,  and  major  Colborne, 
who  carried  it.  was  also  furnished  with  an  autograph 
letter  from  Kellerrnan  ;  be  was  received  with  civility, 
but  Girod  refused  to  surrender  his  post  without  mere 
complete  proof  of  the  authenticity  of  the  treaty,  and 
with  the  view  of  acquiring  that,  he  proposed  that  a 
French  officer  should  proceed  to  Lisbon  to  verify  the 
information.  He  did  not  affect  to  disbelieve  Colborne's 
information,  but  he  would  not  surrender  his  charjre 
while  the  slightest  doubt,  capable  of  being  removed, 
was  attached  to  the  transaction;  and  so  acting  he  did 
well,  and  like  a  good  soldier.  General  D'Arcy,  who 
commanded  the  Spanish  investing  force,  was  persuad- 
ed to  grant  a  truce  for  six  days,  to  give  time  for  the 
journey  of  the  officers  appointed  to  go  to  Lisbon,  but 
on  their  return  it  was  not  without  great  difficulty 
and  delay  that  they  were  permitted  to  conmiunicato 
with  colonel  Girod  ;  and  no  argument  could  prevail  upon 
the  obstinate  Galluzzo  to  relinquish  the  siege.  After 
a  warm  intercourse  of  letters,  sir  Hew  Dalrymple  or- 
dered sir  John  Hope  to  advance  to  Estremos  with  a 
considerable  body  of  troops,  to  give  weight  to  his  re- 


64 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  U. 


Hionstrancps.  and,  if  pushed  to  extremity,  even  to  force 
(he  Spaniard  to  desist  from  his  unwnrrantahle  preten- 
sions;  for  it  must  he  observed,  that  Gr.lluzzo  was  not 
only  puttinjj  aside  the  convention  hy  which  he  profiled 
himself,  but  violating  the  independence  of  the  Portu- 
guese, who  desired  his  absence  from  their  territory. 
He  was  likewise  setting  at  noutrht  the  authority  of  his 
own  CTOvernnient;  for  the  army  of  Estremadiira  pretrud- 
ed  to  act  under  the  orders  of  the  junta  of  Seville,  and 
IjriETuna,  an  accredited  aorpiit  of  that  junta,  at  the  mo- 
ment receiving,  from  sir  Ilew  Dalryniple,  the  Spanish 
prisoners  liberated  by  the  effect  of  the  convention,  to- 
gether with  money  and  arms,  to  prepare  them  for  im- 
mediate service  in  Catalonia,  whither  they  were  to  be 
transported  in  Kritish  vessels.  One  more  effort  was, 
however,  made  to  persuade  the  intractable  Galluzzo  to 
submit  to  reason,  before  recourse  was  had  to  violent 
measures,  which  must  have  produced  infinite  evil. 
Colonel  Graham  repaired  upon  the  25th  of  September 
to  Badajos,  and  his  arofuments  backed  up  bj'  the  ap- . 
proach  of  the  powerful  division  under  Hope,  were  final-! 
ly  successful.  | 

Colonel   Girod  evacuated  the  forts,  and  his  garrison  , 
proceeded  to  Lisbon,  attended  by  the  52d  regiment  as 
an  escort;  the  rival  troops  agreed  very  well  together, 
striving  to  outdo  each  other  by  the  vigour  and  the  mili- 
tary order  of  their  marches,  but  the  Swiss  and  French  ! 
soldiers  did  not  accord,  and  many  of  the  latter  wished  i 
to  desert.     At  Lisbon  the  whole  were  immediately  em- 
barked, and  the  transports  being  detained  for  some  time  ' 
in  the  river,  major  de  Bosset,  an  officer  of  the  Chasseurs 
Britanniques,  contrived   to  persuade  near   a  thousand 
of  the  men  to  desert,  who  were  afterwards  received  into  ; 
the   British  service.*    Girod  complained  of  this  as  a 
breach  of  the  convention,  and  it  must  be  confessed  that 
it  was  an  eqiiivocal  act,  yet  one  common  to  all  armies,  [ 
and  if  done  simply  by  persuasion  very  excusable. 

Almeida  surrendered  without  any  delay,  and  the  garri- 1 
son  being  marched  to  Oporto,  were  proceeding  to  em-  j 
bark,  when   the  populace  rose  and  would   have   slain 
them  if  great  exertions  had  not  been  made  hy  the  Brit-, 
ish  officers  to  prevent  such  a  disgraceful  breach  of  faith,  j 
The  escort,  although  weak,  was  resolute  to  sustain  the 
honour  of  their  nation,  and  would  have  fired  upon  the; 
multitude  if  the  circumstances  had  become  desperate, 
yet  several  of  the   French  soldiers  were  assassinated,  j 
and,  in  spite  of  every  effort,  the  baogage  was  landed,  [ 
and  the  whole  plundered,  the  excuse  being,  that  church  ; 
plate  was  to  be  found  amongst  it;  an  accusation  easily] 
made,  dithcult  tu  be  disproved   to  the  satisfaction  of  a 
violent  mob,  and  likely  enough  to  be  true.  I 

This  tumult  gives  scope  for  reflection  upon  the  facili  I 
ty  with  which  men  adapt  themselves  to  circumstances,  1 
and  reofulate  their  most  furious  passions,  by  the  scale  i 
of  self-interest.      In    Oporto,  the  suffering,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  invasion,  was  trifling  compared  to  the  mis-  j 
ery  end\ired  in  Lisbon,  yet  the  inhabitants  of  the  former  ] 
were  much  more  outrageous  in  their  anger.     In  Lisbon, 
the  very  persons  who  had  inflicted  the  worst  evils  upon  : 
the  people  were  daily  exposed,  more  or  less,  to  violence,  j 
yet  suffered  none  ;  while  in  Oporto,  it  was  with  extreme  j 
diflficulty  that  men,  until  that  moment  unseen  of  the  I 
nmltitude,  were  rescued  from  their  frantic  revenge.     In 
both  cases  fear  regulated  the  degree  of  hatred   shown,  I 
and  we  may  conclude  from  hence,  that  national   insur- 
reelions,  however  spontaneous  and  vehement,  if  the  re- 
sult of  hatred   only,  will   never  successfully  resist  an 
CTganized  force,  unless  the  mechanical  courage  of  dis- 
cipline be  grafted  upon  the  first  enthusias.n.  I 

While  the  vexatious  correspondence  with  Galluzzo' 
was  going  on.  sir  Hew  Ualryinple  renewed  his  inter- 
course with  Castanos,  and  prepared  to  prosecute  the , 
war  in  Spain.     The  Spanish  prisoners,  about  four  thou- 1 

•  Appendix  ta  colontl  De  BossJfs  T.irga,  p.  '34.  T!  itbr.ult  . 


sand  in  number,  were  sent  to  Catalonli,  and  the  British 
army  was  cantoned  principally  in  the  Alemtejo  alongthe 
road  to  Badnjos;  some  officers  were  despatched  to  ex- 
amine the  roads  through  Beira,  with  a  view  to  a  move- 
ment on  that  line,  and  general  Anstruther  was  directed 
to  repair  to  the  fortress  of  Almeida,  for  the  purpose  of 
regulating  every  thing  which  might  concern  the  passage 
of  the  army,  if  it  should  be  found  necessary  to  enter 
Spain  by  that  route.  Lord  William  Bentinck  was  also 
despatched  to  Madrid,  having  instructions  to  communi- 
cate with  the  Spanish  genc-rals  and  with  the  central 
junta,  and  to  arrange  with  them  the  best  line  of  uiarch, 
the  mode  of  providing  magazines,  and  the  plan  of  cam- 
paign. But  in  the  midst  of  these  affairs,  and  before  the 
garrison  of  Elvas  arrived  at  Lisbon,  sir  Hew  Dalrym- 
ple  was  called  home  to  answer  for  his  conduct  relative 
1o  the  convention ;  the  command  then  devolved  upon  sir 
Harry  Burrard,  and  he,  after  holding  it  a  short  time, 
also  returned  to  England,  there  to  abide  Ihe  fury  of  the 
most  outraijeous  and  disgraceful  public  cl-iniour  that  was 
ever  excited  hy  the  falsehoods  of  venal  politir-al  writers. 

The  editors  of  the  daily  press,  adoptj'.'g  -all  the  mis- 
representations of  the  Portuguese  miiii.st(  r.  and  conclu- 
ding that  the  silence  of  government  was  the  consequence 
of  its  dissatisfaction  at  the  convention,  broke  forth  with 
such  a  torrent  of  rabid  malevolence,  that  all  feelings 
of  right  and  justice  were  overborne,  and  the  voice  of 
truth  entirely  stifled  by  their  obstreperous  cry.  Many 
of  tiie  public  papers  were  printed  with  mourning  lines 
around  the  text  which  related  to  Portuguese  aflairs, 
all  called  for  punishment,  and  some  even  talked  of 
death  to  the  guilty,  before  it  was  possible  to  know  if 
any  crime  had  been  committed  ;  the  infamy  of  the  con- 
vention was  the  universal  subject  of  conversation,  a 
general  madness  seemed  to  have  seized  all  classes,  and, 
like  the  Athenians  after  the  sea-fight  of  ArginusEc.  the 
English  people,  if  their  laws  would  have  permitted  the 
exploit,  would  have  condemned  their  victorious  gpne- 
rals  to  death. 

A  court  was  assembled  at  Chelsea  to  inquire  into  the 
transactions  relating  to  the'armistice  and  the  definite 
convention.  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley,  sir  Harry  Burrard, 
sir  Hew  Dalrymple,  and  the  principal  generals  enga- 
ged at  Vimiero,  were  called  before  it;  a  minute  inves- 
tiiji'ion  of  all  the  circumstances  took  place,  and  a  de- 
tailed report  was  made,  at  the  end  of  which,  it  was 
stated  that  no  further  judicial  measures  seemed  to  be 
called  for.  This  was  nolsatisf\ictory  to  the  government, 
and  the  members  of  the  court  were  require  d  to  slate, 
individually,  whether  they  approved  or  disapproved  of 
the  armistice  and  convention.  It  then  appeared,  that 
four  approved  and  three  disapproved  of  the  convention, 
and  among  the  latter  the  earl  of  Moira  distinguished 
himself  hy  a  laboured  criticism,  which,  however,  left 
the  pith  of  the  question  entirely  untouched.  The  pro- 
ceedings of  the  hoard  were  dispassionate  and  impartial, 
but  the  report  was  not  luminous;  a  circumstance  to  be 
regretted,  because  the  rank  and  reputation  of  the  mem- 
bers were  sufficientl}'  great  to  secure  them  from  the 
revenge  of  parly,  and  no  set  of  men  were  ever  more 
favourably  placed  for  giving  a  severe  and  just  rebuke 
to  popular  injustice. 

Thus  ended  the  last  act  of  the  celebrated  convention 
of  Cintra,  the  very  nanje  of  which  will  always  be  a 
signal  record  of  the  ignorant  and  ridiculous  vehemence 
of  the  public  feeling;  for  the  armistice,  tne negotiations, 
the  convention  itself,  and  the  execution  of  its  provis- 
ions, were  all  commenced,  conducted  and  concluded, 
at  the  distance  of  thirty  miles  from  Cintra,  with  which 
place  they  had  not  the  slightest  connexion,  political, 
military,  or  local.  Yet  lord  Byron  has  gravely  sung, 
that  the  convention  was  sifjned  in  the  marquis  of  Mari- 
alva's  house  at  Cintra,  and  the  author  of  the  '  Diary  of  an 
Invalid,'  improving  upon  the  poet's  discovery,  detect- 
ed the  stains  tf  ink   sj.ill  by  .Imict  ui'(>n  the  (.cDasioa  ! 


1808.J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR, 


65 


OBSERVATIONS. 

1.  General  Thiebault  says,  that  the  scattered  state 
of  the  French  army  in  the  beginning  of  August  render- 
ed its  situation  desperate,  and  that  the  slowness  of 
sir  Aithur  Wellesley  saved  it.  Others  again  have 
accused  the  latter  of  rashness  and  temerity.  Neither 
of  these  censures  appear  to  be  well  founded.  It  is  true 
that  Junot's  army  was  disseminated  ;  yet  to  beat  an  army 
in  detail,  a  general  must  be  perfectly  acquainted  with  the 
country  1:2  is  to  act  in,  well  informed  of  his  adversa- 
ry's movements,  and  rapid  in  his  own.  Now  rapidity 
in  war  depends  as  much  upon  the  experience  of  the 
troops  as  upon  the  energy  of  the  chief;  but  the  Eng- 
lish army  was  raw,  the  staff  and  commissariat  mere 
novices,  the  artillery  scantily  and  badly  horsed,  few 
baggage  or  draft  animals  were  to  be  obtained  in  the 
country,  and  there  were  only  a  hundred  and  eighty  caval- 
ry mounted.  Such  impediments  are  not  to  be  removed 
in  a  moment,  and  therein  lies  the  difference  betwixt  the- 
ory and  practice,  between  criticism  and  execution. 

2.  To  disembark  the  army  without  waiting  for  the 
reinforcements,  was  a  bold  yet  not  a  rash  measure. 
Sir  Arthur  Wellesley  knew  that  the  French  troops 
were  very  much  scattered,  although  he  was  not  aware 
ot  the  exact  situation  of  each  division,  and,  from  the 
bishop  of  Oporto's  promises,  he  had  reason  to  expect 
good  assistance  from  the  Portuguese,  who  would  have 
been  discouraged  if  he  had  not  landed  at  once.  Weigh- 
infT  these  circumstances,  he  was  justified  in  disembark- 
ing his  troops,  and  the  event  proved  that  he  was  right; 
he  had  full  time  to  prepare  his  army,  his  marches  were 
methodical,  and  he  was  superior  in  numbers  to  his  ene- 
my in  each  battle  ;  his  plans  were  characterized  by  a 
due  mixture  of  enterprise  and  caution,  well  adapted  to 
his  own  force,  and  yet  capable  of  being  enlarged  with- 
out inconvenience  when  the  reinforcement  should  arrive. 

3.  In  the  action  of  Roriga  there  was  a  great  deal  to 
Rdmire,  and  some  grounds  for  animadversion.  The 
movement  against  Labcrde's  first  position  was  well 
conceived  and  executed,  but  the  subsequent  attack, 
against  the  heights  of  Zambugeira,  was  undoubtedly 
fsulty,  as  the  march  of  Ferguson's  and  Trant's  divi- 
sions would  have  dislodged  Laborde  from  that  strong 
ridge  without  any  attack  on  the  front.  It  is  said  that 
such  was  sir  Arthur's  project,  and  that  some  mistake 
in  the  orders  caused  general  Ferguson  to  alter  the  di- 
rection of  his  march  from  the  flank  to  the  centre.  This, 
if  true,  does  not  excuse  the  error,  because  the  comman- 
der-in-chief being  present  at  the  attack  in  front,  might 
have  restrained  it  until  Ferguson  had  recovered  the  right 
direction  ;  it  is  more  probable  that  sir  Arthur  did  not 
expect  any  very  vigorous  resistance,  that  wishing  to 
press  the  French  in  their  retreat  he  pushed  on  the  action 
too  fast,  and  Laborde,  who  was  unquestionably  no  or- 
dinary .general,  made  the  most  of  both  time  and  circum- 
stances. 

4.  Towards  the  close  of  the  day,  when  the  French  had 
decidedly  taken  to  the  mountains,  the  line  of  Loison's 
march  was  in  the  power  of  the  English  general.  If 
he  had  sent  two  thousand  men  in  pursuit  of  Laborde, 
left  one  thousand  to  protect  the  field  of  battle,  and  with 
the  remaining  ten  thousand  marched  against  Loison, 
whose  advanced  guard  could  not  have  been  far  off,  it  is 
probable  that  the  latter  would  have  been  surprised  and 
totally  defeated  ;  at  all  events  he  could  r.nly  have  saved 
himself  by  a  hasty  retreat,  which  would  have  broken 
Jun  »t's  combinations  and  scattered  his  army  in  all  di- 
rections. Sir  Arthur  Wellesley,  however,  marched  to 
Lourinham,  to  cover  the  imm.ediate  landing  of  his  rein- 
forcement and  stores,  and  this  was  prudent,  because  a 
south-west  wind  would  in  one  night  liave  sent  half  the 
fleet  on  sh.ore  in  a  surf  unequalled  for  fury  ;  such  indeed 
was  the  difficulty  of  a  disembarkation,  that  a  detach- 
ment from  the  garrison  of  Pcniche  would  have  sufficed 
to  fruiitrate  it.     Th(r  existence  of  •'  French  reserve,  es- 


timated by  report  at  four  thousand  men,  was  known,  iia 
situation  was  unknown,  and  it  might  have  been  on  the 
coast  line;  hence  great  danger  to  Anstruther,  if  he  at- 
tempted a  landing  without  being  covered,  greater  still 
if  he  remained  at  sea.  The  reasons  then  for  the  march 
to  Lourinham  were  cogent,  and,  perhaps,  outwei^jhed 
the  advantages  of  attacking  Loison,  yet  it  seems  to 
have  been  an  error  not  to  have  occupied  Torres  Vedras 
on  the  18th  ;  the  disembarkation  of  Anstruther's  force 
would  have  been  equally  secured,  while  the  junction 
of  the  French  army,  and  the  consequent  battle  of  Vi- 
miero  would  have  been  prevented. 

5.  It  is  an  agreeal)le  task  to  render  a  just  tribute  of  ap- 
plause to  the  conduct  of  a  gallant  although  unsuccess- 
ful enemy,  and  there  is  no  danger  of  incurring  the  im- 
putation of  ostentatious  liberality,  in  asserting,  that  La- 
borde's  operations  were  exquisite  specimens  of  the  art 
of  war.  The  free  and  confident  manner  in  which  he 
felt  for  his  enemy — the  occupation  of  Brilos,  Obidos, 
and  Roriga  in  succession,  by  which  he  delayed  the  final 
moment  of  battle,  and  gained  time  for  Loison — th« 
judgment  and  nice  calculation  with  which  he  maintain- 
ed the  position  of  Roriga — the  obstinacy  with  which  he 
defended  the  heights  of  Zambugeira,  were  all  proofs  of 
a  consummate  knowledge  of  war,  and  a  facilitj'  of  com- 
mand rarely  attained. 

6.  Sir  Arthur  \^'e]Iesley  estimated  Laborde's  numbers 
at  six  thousand  men,  and  his  estimation  was  corr.iborat- 
ed  by  the  information  gained  from  a  wounded  French 
officer  during  the  action.  It  is  possible  that  at  Alco- 
baga  there  might  have  been  so  many,  but  I  havo 
thought  it  safer  to  rate  them  at  five  thousand,  for 
the  following  reasons : — First,  it  is  at  all  times  very 
difilcult  to  judge  of  an  enemy's  force  by  the  eye,  and 
it  is  nearl}'  impossible  to  do  so  correctly  when  he  is 
skilfully  posted,  and  as  in  the  present  case,  desirous  of 
appearing  stronger  than  he  really  was;  secondly,  the 
six  hundred  men  sent  on  the  I4th  to  Peniche,  and  three 
companies  employed  on  the  ICth  and  17th  to  keep  open 
the  communication  with  Loison  by  Bcmbaral,  Cadavnl, 
and  Segura  must  be  deducted  ;  thirdly,  Laborde  him- 
self, after  the  convention,  positively  denied  that  he  liad 
so  many  as  six  thousand.*  General  Thiebault  indeed 
says,  that  only  one  thousand  nine  hundred  were  present 
under  arms,  but  this  assertion  is  certainly  inaccurate, 
and  even  injurious  to  the  credit  of  Laborde,  because  it 
casts  ridicule  upon  his  really  glorious  deed  of  arms  ;  it 
is  surprising  that  a  well-informed  and  able  writer  should 
disfigure  an  excellent  work  by  such  trifling. 

7.  Vimiero  was  merely  a  short  combat,  yet  it  led  to 
important  results,  because  .lunot  v.'as  unable  to  compre- 
hend the  advantages  of  his  situation.  Profitable  lessons 
may  however  be  drawn  from  every  occurrence  in  war, 
and  Vimiero  is  not  deficient  in  good  subjects  for  milita- 
ry speculation.  To  many  officers  the  position  of  the 
British  appeared  weak  from  its  extent,  and  dangerous 
from  its  proximity  to  the  sea,  into  which  the  army  must 
have  been  driven  if  defeated.  The  last  objection  is 
well  founded,  and  suggests  the  reflection  that  it  is  un- 
safe to  neglect  the  principles  of  the  art  even  for  a  mo- 
ment. The  ground  having  been  occupied  merely  as  a 
temporary  post,  without  any  view  to  fighting  a  battle, 
the  line  cf  retreat  by  Lourinham  was  for  the  sake  of  a 
trifling  convenience  left  uncovered  a  few  hours.  The 
accidental  arrival  of  sir  Harry  Burrard  arrested  the  ad- 
vanced movement  projected  by  sir  Arthur  Wellesley 
for  the  21st,  and  in  the  mean  time  Junot  took  the  lead, 
and  had  he  been  successful  upon  the  left,  there  would 
have  been  no  retreat  for  the  British  army.  But  thft 
extent  of  the  position  at  Vimiero,  although  considerable 
for  a  small  army,  was  no  cause  of  weakness,  becausp 
the  line  of  communication  from  the  right  to  the  left  was 
much  shorter  and  much  easier  for  the  British  defence 


*  Sir  A.  Wtll'.sk'j 's  e\  licence.   Court  of  luauirv. 


66 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  II. 


than  it  was  for  the  French  attack  ;  and  the  centre  was 
very  stronjT  and  perfectly  covered  the  movement  of  the 
right  wing.  Sir  Arthur,  when  he  phiced  tlie  bulii  of 
the  combatants  in  tliat  quarter,  did  all  that  was  possible 
to  remedy  the  only  real  defect  in  his  position,  that  of 
having  no  line  of  retreat. 

8.  The  project  of  seizing  Torres  Vedras  and  Mafra, 
at  the  close  of  the  battle,  was  one  of  thos<'  prompt  dar- 
ing conceptions  that  distinguish  great  generals,  and  it 
is  absurd  to  blame  sir  Harry  Bnrrard  for  not  adopting 
it.  Men  are  not  gifted  alike,  and  even  if  the  latter  had 
not  been  conllrmed  in  his  view  of  the  matter  by  the  ad- 
vice of  his  staff,  there  was  in  the  actual  situation  of  af- 
fairs ample  scope  foi  v'ioubt;  the  facility  of  executing 
sir  Arthur's  plan  was  not  so  apparent  on  the  field  of  bat- 
tle as  it  may  be  in  the  closet.  The  French  cavalry  was 
numerous,  unharmed,  and  full  of  spirit ;  upon  the  dis- 
tant heights  behind  Junot's  arm)s  a  fresh  body  of  infan- 
try had  been  discovered  by  general  Spencer,  and  the 
nature  of  the  country  prevented  any  accurate  judgment 
of  its  strength  being  formed  ;  the  gun-carriages  of  the 
British  army  w'ere  very  much  shaken,  and  they  were 
HO  badly  and  so  scantily  horsed,  that  doubts  were  en- 
tertained if  the)'  could  keep  up  with  the  infantry  in  a 
long  march  ;  the  commissariat  was  in  great  confusion, 
the  natives,  as  we  have  seen,  were  flying  with  the 
country  transport;  the  Portuguese  troops  gave  no  prom- 
ise of  utility,  and  the  English  cavalry  was  destroyed. 
To  overcome  obstacles  in  the  pursuit  of  a  great  object  is 
the  proof  of  a  lofty  genius  ;  but  the  single  fact  that  a 
man  of  sir  George  Murray's  acknowledged  abilities  was 
opposed  to  the  attempt,  at  once  exonerates  sir  Harry 
Burrard's  conduct  from  censure,  and  places  the  vigour 
of  sir  Arthur  Well(>sley's  in  the  strongest  light.  It 
was  doubtless  ill-judged  of  the  former,  aware  as  he 
was  of  the  ephemeral  nature  of  his  command,  to  inter- 
fere at  all  with  the  dispositions  of  a  general  who  was 
in  the  full  career  of  victory,  and  whose  superior  talents 
and  experience  were  well  known;  yet  it  excites  indig- 
nation to  find  a  brave  and  honourable  veteran  borne 
to  the  earth  as  a  criminal,  and  assailed  by  the 
most  puerile,  shallow  writers,  merely  because  his  mind 
was  net  of  the  highest  clafs.  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley 
himself  was  the  first  to  declare  before  the  court  of  in- 
quiry that  sir  Harry  Burrard  had  decided  upon  fair  mili- 
tary reasons. 

GENERAL  PLAN  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN. 

I.  Although  double  lines  of  operation  are  generally 
disadvantageous  and  opposed  to  sound  principles,  the 
expediency  of  landing  sir  John  Moore's  troops  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Mondego,  and  pushing  them  forward  to 
Santarem,  was  unquestionable ;  unless  the  probable 
consequences  of  such  a  movement  are  taken  into  con- 
sideration, sir  Arthur  Wellesley's  foresight  can  not  be 
justly  appreciated. 

Lisbon,  situated  near  the  end  of  the  tongue  of  land 
lying  between  the  sea-coast  and  the  Tagus,  is  defended 
to  the  northward  by  vast  mountains,  that,  rising  in  suc- 
cessive and  nearly  parallel  ranges,  end  abruptly  in  a 
line  extending  from  Torres  Vedras  to  Alhandra  on  the 
Tagus  ;  and  as  these  ridges  can  only  be  passed  at  cer- 
tain points  by  an  army,  the  intersectionsof  the  different 
roads  form  so  many  strong  positions.  Moreover  the 
great  mass  of  the  Monte  Junto  which  appears  to  lead 
perpendicularly  on  to  the  centre  of  the  first  ridge,  but 
stops  short  at  a  few  miles  distance,  sends  a  rugged 
shoot,  called  the  Sierra  de  Barragueda,  in  a  slanting 
direction  towards  Torres  Vedras,  from  which  it  is  only 
divided  by  a  deep  defile. 

F'rom  this  conformation  it  results,  that  an  army 
marchirg  from  the  Mondego  to  Lisbon,  musteitherpass 
behind  the  Monte  Junto,  and  follow  the  line  of  the  Ta- 
pus,  or  ket  ping  thf  western  side  of  that  mountain, 
come  iipcn  th"  pcsltion  of  Torres  Vedras. 


If  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  had  adopted  the  first  line  of 
operations,  his  subsistence  must  have  been  drawn  by 
convoys  from  the  Mondego,  the  enemy's  numerous  ca* 
valry  would  then  have  cut  his  communications,  and  in 
that  state  he  would  have  had  to  retreat,  or  to  force  the 
positions  of  Alhandra,  Alverca,  and  finally  thehrightg 
of  Bellas,  a  strong  position  the  right  flank  of  which 
was  covered  by  the  creek  of  Saccavem,  and  the  left 
flank  by  the  impassable  Sierra  dos  Infiernos.  On  the 
other  line,  Torres  Vedras  was  to  be  carried,  and  then 
Mafra  or  Montechique,  following  the  direction  of  Junot's 
retreat.  If  Mafra  was  forced,  and  it  could  not  well  be 
turned,  a  line  of  march,  by  Cassim  and  Quelus,  upon 
Lisbon,  would  have  been  open  to  the  victors  ;  but  that 
route,  besides  being  longer  than  the  road  through  Mon- 
techique and  Lonres,  would,  while  it  led  the  English 
army  equally  away  from  the  fleet,  have  entangled  it 
among  the  fortresses  of  Ereceira,  Sant  Antonio,  Casca- 
es,  St.  Julian's,  and  Belem.  Again,  supposing  the  po- 
sition of  Montechique  to  be  stormed,  the  heights  of 
Bellas  offered  a  third  line  of  defence;  and  lastly,  the 
citadel  and  forts  of  Lisbon  itself  would  have  sufficed 
to  cover  the  passage  of  the  river,  and  a  retreat  upon 
Elvas  would  have  been  secure. 

Thus  it  is  certain,  that  difficulties  of  the  most  serious 
nature  awaited  the  English  army  while  acting  on  a 
single  line  of  operations,  and  the  double  line  proposed 
by  sir  Arthur  was  strictly  scientific.  P'or  if  sir  John 
Moore,  disembarking  at  the  Mondego,  had  marched 
first  to  Santarem  and  then  to  Saccavem,  he  would  have 
turned  the  positions  of  Torres  Vedras  and  Montechique  ; 
and  sir  Arthur,  on  the  other  side,  would  have  turned 
the  h'^ights  of  Bellas  by  the  road  of  Quelus,  and  Jimot's 
central  situation  could  not  have  availed  him,  because 
the  distance  between  the  British  corps  would  be  mere 
than  a  day's  march,  and  their  near  approach  to  Lisbon 
would  have  caused  an  insurrection  of  the  populace. 
The  duke  of  Abrantes  must  then  either  have  abandoned 
that  capital  and  fallen  vigorously  upon  sir  John  Moor?, 
with  a  view  tc  overwhelm  him  and  gain  Almeida  or  Elvas, 
cr  he  must  have  concentrated  his  forces,  and  been  prepar 
ed  to  cross  the  Tagus  if  he  lost  a  battle  in  front  of 
Lisbon.  In  the  first  case,  the  strength  of  the  country 
afl^orded  Moore  every  fiicility  for  a  successful  resistance, 
and  sir  Arthur's  corps  would  have  quickly  arrived  upon 
the  rear  of  the  French.  In  the  second  case,  Junot 
would  have  had  to  fight  superior  numbers,  with  an  in- 
veterate populace  in  his  rear,  and  if,  fearing  the  result 
of  such  an  encounter,  he  had  crossed  the  Tagus,  and 
pushed  for  Elvas,  sir  John  Moore's  division  could 
likewise  have  crossed  the  river,  and  harassed  the 
French  in  their  retreat.  The  above  reasoning  being 
correct,  it  follows  that  to  re-embark  sir  John  Moore's 
army  after  it  had  landed  at  the  Mondego,  and  to  bring 
it  down  to  Maceira  bay,  was  an  error  which,  no  conven 
tion  intervening,  might  have  proved  fatal  to  the  success 
of  the  campaign  ;  and  this  error  was  rendered  more 
important  by  the  danger  incurred  from  the  passage,  for, 
as  the  transports  were  not  sea-worthy,  the  greatest  part 
would  have  perished  had  a  gale  of  wind  come  on  from 
the  south-west.* 

2.  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley's  project  of  seizing  l\Iafra 
by  a  rapid  march  on  the  morning  of  the  21st,  was  ex- 
ceedingly bold  ;  its  successful  execution  would  have 
obliged  .lunot  to  make  a  hurried  retreat  by  Enxara  dos 
Cavalleiros  to  Montechique,  at  the  risk  of  being  attack- 
ed in  flank  during  his  march  ;  if  he  had  moved  by  the 
longer  route  of  Rufia  and  Sobral,  it  is  scarcely  to  be 
doubted  that  the  British  army  would  have  reached  Lis- 
bon before  him.  But  was  it  possible  so  to  deceive  an 
enemy,  inured  to  warfiire,  as  to  gain  ten  miles  in  a 
march  of  sixteen  1  was  it  possible  to  evade  the  vigilance 
of  an  experienced  general,  who,  being  posted  only  nine 


*  Captain  I'l.'.ti -f y,  "^'  icol.ii's  evi'.'.enci     ""-Tirt  of  Inquiry. 


1308.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


67 


mill's  off,  posspssed  a  formidable  cavalry,  the  efforts  of 
which  could  neither  be  checked  nor  interrupted  bj'  tlue 
small  escort  of  horse  in  the  British  camp  1  was  it,  in 
tine,  possible  to  a^'oid  a  defeat,  during  a  flank  march, 
a!on<T  a  road,  crossed  and  interrupted  by  a  river,  and 
several  deep  gullies  which  formed  the  beds  of  moun- 
tain torrents  ?  These  are  questions  which  naturally 
occur  to  every  military  man.  The  sticklers  for  a  rigid 
adherence  to  system  would  probably  decide  in  the  ne- 
{jative ;  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  was,  however,  not  only 
prepared  to  try  at  the  time,  but  he  afterwards  deliber- 
ately affirmed  that,  under  certain  circumstances  of 
ground,  an  operation  of  that  kind  would  succeed.  To  in- 
vestigate such  questions  is  the  best  study  for  an  officer. 

A  night  march  is  the  most  obvious  mode  of  effecting 
such  an  enterprise,  but  not  always  the  best  in  circum- 
stances where  expedition  is  required  ;  great  generals 
have  usually  pref-rred  the  day-time,  trusting  to  their 
own  skill  in  deceiving  the  enemy,  while  their  arm}"^ 
made  a  forced  march  to  gain  the  object  in  view  ;  thus 
Turenne,  at  Landsberg,  was  successful  ao-ainst  the 
archduke  Leopold  in  broad  day-light,  and  Caesar  in  a 
more  remarkable  manner  overreached  Afranius  and 
Petrieus,  near  Lerida.  Nor  were  the  circumstances  at 
Vimiero  unfavourable  to  sir  Arthur  Wellesley.  He 
might  have  pushed  a  select  corps  of  light  troops,  his 
cavalry,  the  marines  of  the  fleet,  the  Portuguese  auxil- 
i:'.ries,  and  a  few  field  pieces,  to  the  entrance  of  the 
defile  of  Torres  Vedras  before  day  break,  with  orders 
to  engage  the  French  outposts  briskly,  and  to  make 
demonstrations  as  for  a  general  attack.  There  is  no 
doubt  that  such  a  movement,  if  skilfully  conducted, 
would  have  completely  occupied  the  enemy's  attention, 
while  the  main  body  of  the  army,  marching  in  great 
coats,  and  hiding  the  glitter  of  their  arms,  might  have 
profited  from  the  woods  and  hollows  through  which  the 
by-road  to  Mafra  led,  and  gained  such  a  start  as  would 
have  insured  the  success  of  the  enterprise. 

Let  us,  however,  lake  a  view  of  the  other  side.  Let 
us  suppose  that  Junot,  instructed  by  his  spies  and  pa- 
troles,  or  divining  the  intention  of  the  British  general, 
held  the  masking  division  in  check  with  a  small  force, 
and  carrying  the  remainder  of  his  army  by  the  Puente 
de  Roll,  or  some  other  cross  road,  and  there  were  seve- 
ral, against  the  flank  of  the  English,  had  fallen  upon 
the  latter  while  in  march  hemmed  in,  as  they  would 
be,  between  the  sea  and  the  mountains,  and  entangled 
amonff  hollows  and  torrents.  What  then  would  have 
been  the  result?  History  answers,  by  pointing  to  Con- 
d.^  and  the  battle  of  Senef.  It  must,  however,  be  con- 
fessed, that  it  could  be  no  ordinary  general  that  con- 
ceived such  a  project,  and  notwithstanding  the  small 
numbers  of  the  opposing  armies,  success  would  have 
ranked  sir  Arthur  high  among  the  eminent  commanders 
of  the  world,  if  he  had  never  performed  any  other  ex- 
ploit. '  The  statue  of  Hercules,  cast  by  Lysippus,  al- 
though only  a  foot  high,  expressed,'  says  Pliny,  '  the 
muscles  and  bones  of  the  hero  more  grandly  than  the 
colossal  figures  of  other  artists.' 

3.  So  many  circumstances  combine  to  sway  the 
judgment  of  an  officer  in  the  field  which  do  not  after- 
wards appear  of  weight,  that  caution  should  always  be 
the  motto  of  those  who  censure  the  conduct  of  an  un- 
fortunate commander;  nevertheless,  the  duke  of  Abran- 
tes'  faults,  during  this  campaign,  were  too  glaring  to 
be  mistaken.  He  lingered  loo  long  at  Lisbon  ;  he  was 
undecided  in  his  plans;  he  divided  his  army  unneces- 
sarily; he  discovered  no  skill  on  the  field  of  battle. 
Wlien  the  English  army  was  landed,  affairs  were 
brought  to  a  crisis,  and  Junot  had  only  two  points  to 
consider.  .  Could  the  French  forces  under  his  com- 
mand defend  Portugal  without  assistance,  and  if  not, 
how  were  its  operations  to  be  made  most  available  for 
furthering  Napoleon's  general  plans  against  the  Pen- 
insula]    The  first  point  could  no*  be  ascertained  until 


a  battle  with  sir  Arthur  had  been  tried  ;  the  second  evi- 
dently required  that  Junot  should  keep  his  army  con- 
centrated, preserve  the  power  of  retreating  into  Spain, 
and  endeavour  to  engage  the  British  troops  in  the  sieg- 
es of  Elvas  and  Almeida.  If  the  two  plans  had  been 
incompatible,  the  last  was  certainly  preferable  to  the 
chance  of  battle  in  a  country  universally  hostile.  But 
the  two  plans  were  not  incompatible. 

The  pivot  of  Junot's  movements  was  Lisbon;  he 
had  therefore  to  consider  how  he  might  best  fall  upon 
and  overthrow  the  English  army,  without  resigning  the 
capital  to  the  Portuguese  insurgents  during  the  opera- 
tion. He  could  not  hope  to  accomplish  the  first  effectu- 
ally without  using  the  great  mass  of  his  forces,  nor  to 
avoid  the  last  except  by  skilful  management,  and  the 
utmost  rapidity.  Now  the  cii;adel  and  forts  about  Lis- 
bon, were  sufficiently  strong  to  enable  a  small  part  of 
the  French  army  to  control  the  populace,  and  to  resist 
the  insurgents  of  the  Alemtejo  for  a  few  days.  The 
Russian  admiral,  although  not  hostile  to  the  Portu- 
guese, or  favourable  to  the  French,  was  forced,  by  his 
fear  of  the  English,  to  preserve  a  guarded  attitude,  and 
in  point  of  tact,  did  materially  contribute  to  awe  the 
multitude,  who  could  not  but  look  upon  him  as  an  ene- 
my. The  Portuguese  ships  of  war  which  had  been 
fitted  out  by  Junot,  were  floating  fortresses  requiring 
scarcely  any  garrisons,  yet  efficient  instruments  to  con- 
trol the  city,  without  ceasing  to  be  receptacles  for  the 
Spanish  prisoners,  and  safe  depHs  for  powder  and 
arms,  which  might  otherwise  have  fallen  into  the  power 
of  the  populace.  Wherefore,  instead  of  delaving  so  long 
in  the  capital,  instead  of  troubling  himself  about  the  as- 
semblage of  Alcacer  do  vSal,  instead  of  detaching  Laborde 
with  a  weak  division  to  cover  the  march  of  Loison, 
Junot  should  have  taken  the  most  vigorous  resolutions 
in  respect  to  Lisbon,  the  moment  he  heard  of  the  Eng- 
lish descent.  He  should  have  abandoned  the  left  bank 
of  the  Tagus,  with  the  exception  of  Palmela  and  the 
Bugio,  which  was  necessary  to  the  safety  of  his  ship- 
ping; he  should  have  seized  upon  the  principal  fami- 
lies of  the  capital,  as  hostages  for  the  good  behaviour 
of  the  rest;  he  should  have  threatened,  and  been  pre- 
pared, to  bombard  the  city  if  refractory ;  then,  leavincr 
nothing  more  than  the  mere  garrisons  of  the  citadel, 
forts,  and  ships  behind  him,  have  proceeded,  not  to 
Leiria.  which  was  too  near  the  enemy  to  be  a  secure 
point  of  junction  with  Loison,  but  to  Santarem,  where 
both  corps  might  have  been  united  without  danger  and 
without  fatigue.  General  Thomieres,  in  the  mean 
time,  putting  a  small  garrison  in  Peniche  could  have 
watched  the  movement  of  the  British  general,  and  thus 
from  eighteen  to  twenty  thousand  men  would  have  been 
assembled  at  Santarem  by  the  13th  at  farthest,  and  from 
thence,  one  march  would  have  brought  the  whole  to 
Batalha,  near  which  place  the  lot  of  battle  might  have 
been  drawn  without  trembling.  If  it  proved  unfavoura- 
ble to  the  French,  the  ulterior  object  of  renewing  the 
campaign  on  the  frontier  was  in  no  manner  compro- 
mised. The  number  of  large  boats  that  Lisbon  can  al- 
ways furnish,  would  have  sufficed  to  transport  the  beat- 
en army  over  the  Tagus  from  Santarem  in  a  few  hours, 
especially  if  the  stores  had  been  embarked  before  Junot 
moved  towards  Batalha;  and  the  French  army,  once  la 
the  Alemtejo,  with  a  good  garrison  in  Abrantes,  could 
not  have  been  followed  until  the  forts  at  the  mouth  of 
the  Tagus  were  reduced,  and  the  fleet  sheltered  in  the 
river.  Thus,  long  before  the  British  could  have  appear- 
ed in  force  in  the  Alemtejo,  the  fortress  of  Elvas  would 
have  been  provisioned  from  the  magazines  collected  by 
Loison  after  the  battle  of  Evora,  and  the  campaign 
could  have  been  easily  prolonged  until  the  great  French 
army,  coming  from  Gerinany,  crushed  all  opposition. 

The  above  is  not  a  theory  broached  after  the  event. 
That  Junot  would  attempt  something  of  the  kind,  was 
the  data  upon  which  the   English  general  formed  his 


68 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


[Book  IT. 


plans,  and  the  intercepted  memoir  of  colonel  Vincent 
treated  such  an  operation  as  a  matter  of  course.  Ju- 
not'?  threats  durino;'  the  negotiation  prove  that  he  was 
not  ignorant  of  liis  own  resources,  hut  his  mind  was 
depressed,  and  liis  desponding  mood  was  palpable  to 
those  around  him  ;  it  is  a  curious  fact,  that  Satlaro,  the 
Portuguese  agent,  who,  for  some  purpose  or  other  was 
in  the  British  camp,  told  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  before 
the  battle  of  Vimiero,  that  Junot  would  willingly  . 
evacuate  Portugal  upon  terms.  ' 

4.  When  the  French,  being  fourteen  thousand  in 
number,  occupied  Torres  Vedras,  that  position  was 
nearly  impregnable ;  but  though  seventeen  thousand 
British  could  scarcely  have  carried  it  by  force,  they 
might  have  turned  it  in  a  single  march  by  the  coast 
road,  and  Junot  neither  placed  a  detachment  on  that 
side,  nor  kept  a  vigilant  watch  by  his  patroles ;  hence, 
if  sir  Arthur  Wellesley's  intended  movement  had  not 
been  arrested  by  orders  from  Burrard,  it  must  have  suc- 
ceeded, because  Junot  was  entangled  in  the  defiles  of  I 
Torres  Vedras  from  six  o'clock  in  the  evening  of  the  j 
20lh,  until  late  in  the  morning  of  theiilst.*  The  two 
armies  would  thus  have  changed  camps  in  the  space  of 
a  few  hours,  without  firing  a  shot ;  Junot  would  have 
lost  Lisbon,  and  have  been  placed  in  the  most  ridicu- 
lous situation. 

5.  In  the  battle,  the  duke  of  Abrantes  showed  great 
courage,  but  no  talent.  His  army  was  inferior  in  num- 
bers, yet  he  formed  two  separate  attacks,  an  evident 
error,  that  enabled  sir  Arthur  to  beat  him  in  detail  with- 
out difficulty.  He  was  the  less  excusable,  because  the 
comparatively  easy  nature  of  the  ground  over  which  the 
road  from  Torres  Vedras  to  Lourinham  led,  and  the 
manner  in  which  the  English  army  was  heaped  to  the 
right  when  the  position  first  opened  to  the  view,  plain- 
ly indicated  the  true  line  of  attack.  Junot  should,  with 
all  his  forces  concentrated  for  one  effort,  have  fallen  in 
upon  the  left  of  his  opponent's  position  :  if  victorious, 
the  sea  would  have  swallowed  those  who  escaped  his 
eword,  if  repulsed,  his  retreat  was  open,  and  his  loss 
could  not  have  b"en  so  great  in  a  well-conducted  single 
effort,  as  it  was  in  the  ill-digested,  unconnected  attacks 
that  took  place. 

G.  The  rapidity  with  which  the  French  soldiers 
rallied,  and  recovered  their  order  after  such  a  severe 
check,  was  admirable,  but  their  habitual  method  of  at- 
tacking in  column  c:innot  be  praised.  Against  the  Aus- 
trians.  Russians,  and  Prussians,  it  may  have  been  suc- 
cessful, but  against  the  British  it  must  always  fail  ;  be- 
'•ause  the  English  infantry  is  sufficiently  firm,  intelli- 
gpnt,  and  well-disciplined,  to  wait  calmly  in  lines  for 
the  adverse  masses,  and  sufficiently  bold  to  close  upon 
them  with  the  bayonet.  The  column  is  undoubtedly 
excellent  for  all  movements  short  of  the  actual  charge, 
but  as  the  Macedonian  phalanx  was  unable  to  resist  the 
open  formation  of  the  Roman  legion,  so  will  the  close 
column  be  unequal  to  sustain  the  fire  and  charge  of  a 
good  line  aided  by  artillery.  The  natural  repugnance 
of  men  to  trample  on  their  own  dead  and  wounded,  the 
cries  and  groans  of  the  latter,  and  the  whistling  of  the 
cannon-sl'.ots  as  they  tear  open  the  ranks,  produce  the 
greatest  disorder,  especially  in  the  centre  of  attacking 
columns,  which  blinded  by  smoke,  unsted fast  of  footing, 
and  bewildered  by  words  of  command,  coming  from  a 
multitude  of  officers  crowded  together,  can  neither  see 
what  is  taking  place,  nor  make  any  effort  to  advance  or 
retreat  without  increasing  the  confusion  :  hence  no  ex- 
ample of  courage  can  be  useful,  no  moral  effect  can  be 
produced  by  the  spirit  of  individuals,  except  upon  the 
head,  which  is  often  firm,  and  even  victorious  at  the 
moment  when  the  rear  is  (lying  in  terror.  Nevertheless, 
well  managed  columns  are  the  very  soul  of  military  op- 
erations, in  them  is  the  victory,  and  in  them  also  is 


safety  to  be  found  after  a  defeat ;  the  secret  consists  in 
knowing  when  and  where  to  extend  the  front. 

ARMISTICE. CONVENTION. 

1.  It  is  surprising,  that  Junot  having  regained  Torres 
Vedras.  occupied  Mafra,  and  obtained  an  armisticre,  did 
not  profit  by  the  terms  of  the  latter  to  prepare  f.ir  cross- 
ing the  Tagus  and  establishing  the  war  on  the  fron- 
tiers. Kellerman  ascertained  during  his  negotiation, 
that  sir  John  Moore  was  not  arrived  ;  ii  was  clear  that, 
until  he  did  arrive,  the  position  of  Montechique  could 
neither  be  attacked  nor  turned,  and  there  was  notiiing 
in  the  armistice  itself,  nor  the  war  in  which  it  had  been 
agreed  to,  which  rendered  it  dishonourable  to  take 
such  an  advantage.  The  opening  thus  left  for  Junot  to 
gain  time,  was  sir  Arthur  Wellesley's  principal  objec- 
tion to  the  preliminary  treaty. 

2.  With  regard  to  the  convention,  although  some  of 
its  provisions  were  objectionable  in  point  of  form,  and 
others  imprudently  worded,  )^et  taken  as  a  whole,  it 
was  a  transaction  fraught  with  prudence  and  wisdom. 
Let  it  be  examined  upon  fair  military  and  political 
grounds,  let  it  even  be  supposed  for  the  sake  of  ar- 
gument, that  sir  Arthur,  unimpeded  by  sir  Harry 
Burrard,  had  pursued  his  own  plan,  and  that  Junot, 
cut  off  from  Lisbon  and  the  half  of  his  forces,  had 
been  driven  up  the  Tagus  ;  he  was  still  master  of  fly- 
ing to  Almeida  or  Elvas,  the  thousand  men  left  in  San- 
tarem  would  have  joined  him  in  the  Alemtejo,  or  fallen 
down  to  the  capital,  and  what  then  would  have  been 
the  advantages  that  could  render  the  convention  unde- 
sirable 1  The  British  army,  exclusive  of  ^loore's  di- 
vision, had  neither  provisions,  nor  means  of  transpor- 
ting provisions  for  more  than  ten  days,  and  the  fleet 
was  the  only  resource  when  that  supply  should  be 
exhausted  ;  but  a  gale  from  any  point  between  south 
and  north-west,  would  have  driven  the  ships  away  or 
cast  them  on  a  lee-shore.  It  was  therefore  indispensa- 
ble first  to  secure  the  mouth  of  the  Tagus,  for  the  safety 
of  the  fleet;  and  this  could  only  be  done  by  occupying 
Cascaes,  Bugrio,  and  St.  Julian's,  the  last  of  which 
would  alone  have  required  ten  days  open  trenches,  and 
a  battering  train,  which  must  have  been  dragged  by 
men  over  the  mountains  ;  for  the  artillery  horses  were 
scarcely  able  to  draw  the  field  guns,  and  no  country  ani- 
mals were  to  be  found.*  In  the  mean  time,  the  French 
troops  in  Lisbon,  upon  the  heights  of  Almada,  and  in 
the  men-of-war,  retiring  tranquil!}''  through  the  Ahnnie- 
jo,  would  have  united  with  Junot,  or,  if  he  had  fallen 
back  upon  Almeida,  they  could  have  retired  upon  Elvas 
and  La-Lyppe.  In  this  argument  the  Russians  have 
not  been  considered,  but  whatever  his  secret  wishes 
might  have  been,  Siniavin  must  have  surrendered  his 
squadron  in  a  disgraceful  manner,  or  joined  the  French 
with  his  six  thousand  men  ;  and  it  may  here  he  observ- 
ed, that  even  after  the  arrival  of  sir  John  Moore,  only 
twenty-five  thousand  British  infantry  were  fit  for  duty. 

Let  it  now  be  supposed  that  the  forts  were  taken,  the 
English  fleet  in  the  river,  the  resources  of  Lisbon  or- 
ganized, the  battering  guns  and  ammunition  necessary 
for  the  siege  of  Elvas  transported  to  Abrantes  by  water ; 
seventy  miles  of  land  remained  to  traverse,  and  then 
three  months  of  arduous  operations  in  the  sickly  sea- 
son, and  in  the  most  pestilent  of  situatii^ns,  would  have 
been  the  certain  consequences  of  any  attempt  to  reduce 
that  fortress.  Did  the  difficulty  end  there?  No  !  Al- 
meida remained,  and  in  the  then  state  of  the  roads  of 
Portugal,  and  taking  into  consideration  only  the  certain 
and  foreseen  obstacles,  it  is  not  too  much  to  s-^y,  that 
six  inonths  more  would  have  been  wasted  before  the 
country  would  have  been  entirely  freed  from  the  inva- 
ders ;  but  long  before  that  period  Napoleon's  eagles 
would  have  soared  over  Lisbon  again!     The  conclu- 


Thitb;iult. 


*  rroceeJiiigs  of  tlic  Court  cf  Inquiry-. 


1808.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


69 


sion  is  inevitable;  the  convention  was  a  great  and  solid 
advantage  for  the  allies,  a  blunder  on  the  part  of  the 
French. 

With  the  momentary  exception  of  Junot's  threat  to 
burn  Lisbon  if  his  terms  were  not  complied  with,  we 
look  in  vain  for  any  traces  of  that  vigour  which  urged 
the  march  from  Alcantara  ;  we  are  astonished  to  per- 
ceive the  man,  who,  in  the  teeth  of  an  English  fleet, 
in  contempt  of  fourteen  thousand  Portuguese  troops, 
ai.d  regardless  of  a  population  of  three  hundred  thou- 
sand souls,  dared,  with  a  few  hundred  tired  grenadiers, 
to  seize  upon  Lisbon,  so  changed  in  half  a  year,  so 
sunk  in  energy,  that,  with  twenty-five  thousand  good 
soldiers,  he  de;lined  a  manly  efl'ort,  and  resorted  to  a 


convention  to  save  an  army  which  was  really  ii.  very 
little  danger.  But  such  and  so  variable  is  the  human 
mind,  a  momentary  slave  of  every  attraction,  yet  ulti- 
mately true  to  self-interest.  When  Junol  entered  Por- 
tugal, power,  honours,  fame,  even  a  throne  was  within 
his  view ;  when  he  proposed  the  convention,  the  gor- 
geous apparition  was  gone;  toil  and  danger  were  at 
hand,  fame  flitted  at  a  distance,  and  he  easily  persuaded 
himself  that  prudence  and  vigour  could  not  be  yoked 
together.  A  saying  attributed  to  Ntipoleon  perfectly 
describes  the  convention  in  a  few  words.  "  I  was  go- 
ing to  send  Junot  before  a  council  of  war,  when,  fortu- 
nately, the  English  tried  their  generals,  and  saved  me 
the  pain  of  punishing  an  old  friend  !" 


BOOK   III. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Conipsrison  bfvween  the  Portuguese  and  Spanish  people — The 
general  opinion  of  Irench  weakness  and  Spanish  strength  and 
ener;:y,  fallacious — Contracted  policy  of  the  English  cabinet — 
Account  of  the  civil  and  military  agents  employed — iNlany 
of  them  act  without  judgment — Mischievous  f  nects  f hereo'^ — 
Operations  of  the  Sfjanish  arnu'es,  after  the  battle  of  Baylen 
— Murcian  army  arrives  at  Madrid — Valencian  army  marches 
to  the  relief  of  Zaragoza — General  V'erdfer  raises  the  siege 
— Castanos  enters  Madri.l — Contumacious  conduct  of  Galiizzn 
— Disputes  between  Blake  and  Cufsta — Dilatory  conduct  o'. 
the  Spaniards — Sagacious  observation  of  Napoleon — Insur- 
rection at  Bilboa  ;  quelled  by  general  Merlin — French  corps 
approaches  Zaragoza — Palafox  alarmed,  threatens  the  council 
of  Castile — Council  of  war  held  at  Madrid — Plan  of  opera- 
tions— Castiinos  unable  to  march  trom  want  of  money— Bad 
conduct  of  the  junta  of  Seville — Vigorous  conduct  of  major 
Cox — Want  of  anus — Extra\agant  project  to  procure  them. 

The  convention  of  Cintra  followed  by  the  establish- 
ment of  a  regency  at  Lisbon,  disconcerted  the  plans  of 
the  bishop  and  junta  of  Oporto,  and  Portugal  was  re- 
stored to  a  stcte  of  comparative  tranquillity;  for  the 
Portuiruese  people,  being  of  a  simple  character,  when 
they  found  their  country  relieved  from  the  presence  of 
a  French  army  readily  acknowledged  the  benefit  deriv- 
ed from  the  convention,  and  refused  to  listen  to  the 
pernicious  counsels  of  the  factious  prelate  and  his  mis- 
chievous coadjutors.  Thus  terminated  what  may  be 
called  the  convulsive  struggle  of  the  Peninsular  war. 
Up  to  that  period  a  remarkable  similarity  of  feeling 
and  mode  of  acting  betrayed  the  cominon  origin  of  the 
Spanish  and  Portuguese  people;  a  wild  impatience  of 
foreign  agofression,  extravagant  pride,  vain  boasting, 
and  a  passionate  reckless  resentment,  were  common  to 
both ;  but  there  the  likeness  ceased,  and  the  finer  marks 
of  national  character  which  had  been  impressed  upon 
them  by  their  different  positions  in  the  political  world, 
became  distinctly  visible. 

Spain,  holding,  from  time  immemorial,  a  high  rank 
among  the  great  powers,  and  more  often  an  (>ppressor 
than  oppressed,  haughtily  rejected  all  advice.  Uncon- 
Bcious  of  her  actual  weakness  and  ignorance,  and  re- 
membering only  her  former  dignity,  she,  ridiculously, 
assumed  an  attitude  which  would  scarcely  have  suited 


her  in  the  days  of  Charles  V.  ;  whereas  Portugal, 
always  fearing  the  ambition  of  a  poMf rful  neighbour, 
and  relying  for  safety  as  much  upon  her  alliances  as 
upon  her  own  intrinsic  strength,  was  from  habit  inclin- 
ed to  prudent  calculation,  and  readily  submitted  to  the 
direction  of  England.  The  turbulence  of  the  first  led 
to  defeat  and  disaster ;  the  docility  and  patience  of  the 
second  were  productive  of  the  most  beneficial  results. 
The  diflTerence  between  these  nations  was,  however, 
not  immediately  perceptible,  at  the  period  of  the  conven- 
tion the  Portuguese  were  despised,  while  a  splendid 
triumph  was  anticipated  for  the  Spaniards.  It  was 
affirmed  and  believed,  that  from  every  quarter  enthusi- 
astic multitudes  of  the  latter  were  pressing  forward  to 
complete  the  destruction  of  a  baffled  and  dispirited 
enemy  ;  the  vigour,  the  courage,  the  unmatched  spring 
of  Spanish  patriotism,  was  in  every  man's  mouth. 
Napoleon's  power  and  energ)'  seemed  weak  in  opposi- 
tion. Few  persons  doubted  the  truth  of  such  tales, 
and  yet  nothing  could  be  more  unsound,  more  eminent- 
ly fallacious,  than  the  generally  entertained  opinion  of 
French  weakness  and  of  Spanish  strength.  The  re- 
sources of  the  former  were  unbounded,  almost  untouch- 
ed ;  those  of  the  latter  were  too  slender  even  to  sup- 
port the  weight  of  victory  ;  in  Spain  the  whole  struc- 
ture of  society  was  shaken  to  pieces  by  the  violence 
of  an  effort  which  merely  awakened  the  slumbering 
strength  of  F^rance.  Foresight,  promptitude,  arr.mge- 
ment,  marked  the  proceedings  of  Napoleon,  but  with 
the  Spaniards  the  counsels  of  prudence  were  punished 
as  treason,  and  personal  interests,  everywhere  springing 
up  with  incredible  force,  wrestled  against  the  public 
good.  At  a  distance  the  insurrection  appeared  of  low- 
ering proportions  and  mighty  strength,  A\he[i  in  truth, 
it  was  a  fantastic  object,  stained  with  blood,  and  totter- 
ing from  weakness.  The  helping  hand  of  England 
alone  was  stretched  forth  for  its  support,  all  other  as- 
sistance was  denied,  for  the  continental  powers,  although 
nourishing  secret  hopes  of  profit  from  the  struggle, 
with  calculating  policy,  turned  coldly  from  the  patriots' 
cause.  The  English  cabinet  was,  indeed,  sanguitie, 
and  resolute  to  act.  yet  the  ministers,  while  anticipa- 
ting si.^cess  in  a  preposterous  manner,  displayed  littJa 


70 


NAPIER'S   PEN    NSULAR   WVR, 


[Book  IH. 


industry,  and  less  judgment,  in  their  preparations  for 
the  struggle;  nor  does  it  appear  that  the  real  freedom 
of  the  Peninsula  was  much  considered  in  their  councils. 
They  contemplated  this  astonishinor  insurrection  as  a 
mere  military  opening  through  which  Napoleon  might 
be  assailed,  and  they  neglected,  or  rather  feared,  to  look 
towards  the  great  moral  consequences  of  such  a  stu- 
pendous event, — consequences  which  were,  indeed, 
Jibove  their  reach  of  policy  :  they  were  neither  able, 
nor  willing,  to  seize  such  a  singularly  propitious  occa- 
sion for  conferring  a  benefit  upon  mankind. 

It  is,  however,  certain,  that  this  opportunity  for  res- 
toring the  civil  strength  of  a  long  degraded  people,  by 
b  direct  recurrence  to  first  principles,  was  such  as  had 
seldom  been  granted  to  a  sinking  nation.  Enthusiasm 
■was  aroused  without  the  withering  curse  of  faction  ; 
the  multitude  were  ready  to  follow  whoever  chose  to 
lead,  the  weight  of  ancient  authority  was,  by  a  violent 
external  shock,  thrown  off,  the  ruling  power  fell  from 
the  hands  of  the  few,  and  was  caught  by  the  many, 
■without  the  latter  having  thereby  incurred  the  odium 
of  rebellion,  or  excited  the  malice  of  mortified  grandeur. 
There  was  nothing  to  deter  the  cautious,  for  there  was 
nothing  to  pull  down  ;  the  foundation  of  the  social 
structure  was  already  laid  bare,  and  all  the  materials 
were  at  hand  for  building  a  noble  monument  of  human 
genius  and  virtue,  the  architect  alone  was  wanting;  no 
anxiety  to  ameliorate  the  moral  or  physical  condition  of 
the  people  in  the  Peninsula  was  evinced  by  the  ruling 
men  of  England,  and  if  any  existed  amongst  those  of 
Spain,  it  evaporated  in  puerile  abstract  speculations. 
Napoleon,  indeed,  oifered  the  blessing  of  regeneration 
in  exchange  for  submission,  but  in  that  revolting  form, 
accompanied  by  the  evils  of  war,  it  was  rejected,  and 
amidst  the  clamorous  pursuit  of  national  independence, 
the  mdependence  of  man  was  trampled  under  foot.  The 
mass  of  the  Spanish  nation,  blinded  by  personal  hatred, 
thought  only  of  revenge;  the  leaders,  arrogant  and  in- 
capable, neither  sought  nor  wished  for  any  higher  mo- 
tive of  action:  without  unity  of  design,  devoid  of  ar- 
rangement, their  policy  was  mean  and  personal,  their 
military  efforts  were  abortive,  and  a  rude,  unscientific 
•warfare  disclosed  at  once  the  barbarous  violence  of  the 
Spanish  character,  and  the  utter  decay  of  Spanish  insti- 
tutions. 

After  Joseph's  retreat  from  Madrid,  the  insurrection 
of  Spain  maybe  said  to  have  ceased ;  from  that  period 
it  became  a  war  between  France  and  the  Peninsula  ; 
the  fate  of  the  latter  was  entrusted  to  organized  bodies 
of  men,  and  as  the  first  excitement  subsided,  and 
danger  seemed  to  recede,  all  the  meaner  passions  resum- 
ed their  empire.  Hence  the  transactions  of  the  memora- 
hle  period  wliich  intervened  between  the  battles  of  Bay- 
len  and  Coruf  a  wereexceedingly  confused,  and  the  his- 
tory of  them  must  necessarily  partake  somewhat  of  that 
confusion.  'J'he  establishment  of  a  central  supreme  junta, 
the  caprices  of  the  Spanish  generals,  and  their  in- 
terminable disputes  ;  the  proceedings  of  the  French 
army  before  the  arrival  of  the  emperor ;  the  operations 
of  the  grand  army  after  his  arrival,  and  the  campaign 
of  the  British  auxiliary  force;  form  so  many  distinct 
actions,  connected  indeed  by  one  great  catastrophe,  yet 
each  attended  by  a  number  of  minor  circumstances  of  no 
great  historical  importance  taken  separately,  but  when 
combined,  showin<r  the  extent  and  complicated  nature 
of  the  disease  which  destroyed  the  energy  of  Spain. 
For  the  advantage  of  clearness,  therefore,  it  will  be 
necessary  to  sacrifice  chronological  order;  and  as  fre- 
quent reference  must  be  made  to  the  proceedings  of  a 
class  of  men  whose  interference  had  a  decided,  and  in 
many  cases  a  very  disastrous  influence  upon  the  affairs 
of  that  period,  I  shall  first  give  a  brief  account  of  the 
English  agents,  under  which  denomination  both  civil 
and  military  men  were  employed,  yet  the  distinction 
was  rather  nominal  than  real,  as  generally  speaking, 


each  person  assumed  the  right  of  acting  in  both  capaci 
ties. 

The  envoy,  Mr.  Charles  Stuart,  was  the  chief  of  the 
civil  agents  ;  the  persons  subordinate  to  him  were,  Mr. 
Hunter,  Mr.  Duff,  and  others,  consuls  and  vice-consuls. 

Mr.  Stuart  sailed  with  sir  A.  Welksley,  and  was 
left  at  Coruna  when  that  officer  touched  there,  previous 
to  the  operations  in  Portugal. 

Mr.  Hunter  was  stationed  at  Gihon  in  the  Asturias. 

Mr.  Duflf  proceeded  to  Cadiz,  and  the  others  in  like 
manner  were  employed  at  difl^erent  ports.  They  were 
all  empowered  to  distribute  money,  arms,  succours  of 
clothing  and  ammunition,  and  the  want  of  system  and 
forethought  in  the  cabinet  was  palpable  from  the  injudi- 
cious zeal  of  these  inferior  agents,  each  of  whom  con- 
ceived himself  competent  to  direct  the  whole  of  the  po- 
litical and  military  transactions ;  Mr.  Stuart  was  even 
put  to  some  trouble  in  establishing  his  right  to  control 
their  proceedings. 

The  military  agents  were  of  two  classes  ;  those  sent 
from  England  by  the  government,  and  those  employed 
by  the  generals  abroad. 

SirThomas  Dyer,  assisted  by  major  Roche  and  captain 
Patrick,  proceeded  to  the  Asturias.  The  last  officer  re- 
mained at  Oviedo,  near  the  junta  of  that  province  ;  ma- 
jor Roche  went  to  the  head-quarters  of  Cuesta  ;  sir 
Thomas  Dyer,  after  collecting  some  information,  return- 
ed to  England. 

Colonel  Charles  Doyle,  having  organized  the  Spanish 
prisoners  at  Portsmouth,  sailed  with  them  to  Coruna. 
He  was  accompanied  by  captain  Carrol  and  capl-air.  Ken- 
nedy, and  during  the  passage  a  singular  instance  of  tur- 
bulent impatience  occurred;  the  prisoners,  who  had 
been  released,  armed,  and  clothed  by  England,  and  who 
'had  been  as  enthusiastic  in  their  expressions  of  patriot- 
ism as  the  most  sanguine  could  desire,  mutinied,  seiz- 
ed the  transports,  carried  them  into  different  ports  of 
the  Peninsula,  disembarked,  and  proceeded  each  to  hia 
own  home. 

Colonel  Browne  was  djespatched  to  Oporto,  and  major 
Green  to  Catalonia. 

Those  employed  by  the  generals  commanding  armies 
were  captain  VVhittingham,  who  was  placed  by  sir  Hcnv 
Dalrymple  near  general  Castafios,  he  accompanied  the 
head-quarters  of  the  Andalusian  army  until  the  battle 
of  Tudela  put  an  end  to  his  functions.  INlajor  Cox,  ap- 
pointed also  by  sir  Hew  Dalrymple,  remained  near  the 
junta  of  Seville,  where  his  talents  and  prudent  conduct 
were  of  great  service;  it  would  have  been  fortunate  if 
all  the  persons  employed  as  agents  had  acted  with  as 
much  judgment  and  discretion. 

All  the  above  named  gentlemen  were  in  full  activity 
previous  to  the  commencement  of  the  campaign  in  Por- 
tugal ;  but  when  the  convention  of  Cintra  opened  a  way 
for  operations  in  Spain,  sir  Hew  Dalrymple  sent  lord 
William  Bentinek  to  Madrid,  that  he  might  arrange  a 
plan  of  co-operation  with  the  Spanish  generals,  and 
transmit  exact  intelligence  of  the  state  of  affairs.  Such 
a  mission  was  become  indispensable.  Up  to  the  period 
of  lord  William's  arrival  in  Madrid,  the  military  intelli- 
gence received  was  very  unsatisfactory.  The  letters 
from  the  armies  contained  abundance  of  common-place 
expressions  relative  to  the  enthusiasm  and  patriotism 
visible  in  Spain ;  vast  plans  were  said  to  be  under 
consideration,  some  in  progress  of  execution,  and  com- 
plete success  was  confidently  predicted  ;  but  by  some 
fatality,  every  project  proved  abortive  or  dis'astrous, 
without  lowering  the  confidence  of  the  prognosticators, 
or  checking  the  mania  for  grand  operations,  which 
seemed  to  be  the  disease  of  the  moment. 

The  PiUglish  ministers  confirmed  the  appointment  of 
lord  William  Bentinek,  and  at  the  same  time  reorganiz- 
ed the  system  of  the  military  agents,  by  marking  out 
certain  districts,  and  ap])ointing  a  general  off'cer  to  su- 
perintend each.     Thus,  major-general  Broderick  was 


1808.J 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


71 


jeiit  to  Gallicia;  major-general  Leith,  with  a  large 
staff,  proceeded  to  the  Asturias ;  major-general  Sontag 
went  to  Portugal.  At  the  same  time,  sir  Robert  Wil- 
son, being  furnished  with  arms,  ammunition,  and  cloth- 
ing fcir  organizing  three  or  four  thousand  men  levied  by 
the  bishop  of  Oporto,  took  with  him  a  large  regimental 
staff,  and  a  number  of  Portuguese  refugees,  and  suc- 
ceeded in  forming  a  partizan  corps,  afterwards  known 
as  the  liUsitanian  legion.*  Brigadier-general  Decken, 
also  a  German,  being  first  destined  for  Spain,  was  coun- 
term-'.nded  at  sea  and  directed  to  Oporto,  where  he 
arrived  on  the  17th  of  August,  and  immediately  com- 
menced thnt  curious  intrigue  which  has  been  already 
menii  )ned  in  the  campaign  of  Vimiero.  The  scope  of 
general  Leith's  mission  was  wide  ;  Biscay,  Castillo, 
Leon,  and  even  Catalonia,  were  placed  under  his  super- 
intendence, and  he  appears  to  have  had  instructions  to 
prepare  the  way  for  the  disembarkation  of  an  English 
army  on  the  coast  of  Biscay. 

When  sir  Jolm  Moore  assumed  the  command  of  the 
army,  he  sei^t  colonel  Graham  to  reside  at  the  Spanish 
head-quarters  on  the  Ebro,  and  directed  lord  William 
Bentinck  to  remain  at  Madrid  to  forward  the  arrange- 
ments for  commencing  the  campaign.  Lord  William 
found  in  Mr.  Stuart  an  able  coadjutor,  and  in  the  letters 
of  these  two  gentlemen,  and  the  correspondence  of  ma- 
jor Coxe,  then  at  Seville,  is  to  be  found  the  history  of 
the  evils  whicli  at  this  period  afflicted  unhappy  Spain, 
and  ruined  her  noble  cause.  But  the  power  of  distribu- 
ting supplies,  and  the  independent  nature  of  their  ap- 
pointments, gave  to  the  military  agents  immediately 
employed  by  the  minister,  an  extraordinary  influence, 
whicn  was  very  injudiciously  exercised.  They  forgot 
the  real  objects  of  their  inission,  and  in  many  cases  took 
a  leading  part  in  affairs  with  which  it  was  not  politic 
in  them  to  have  meddled  at  all. 

Thus  Colonel  Doyle  having  left  captain  Kennedy  at 
Conia,  and  placed  captain  Carrol  at  the  head-quarters 
of  Blake's  army,  repaired  in  person  to  Madrid,  where 
he  was  received  with  marked  attention,  obtained  the 
rank  of  a  general  officer  in  the  Spanish  service  for  him- 
self, that  of  lieutenant-colonel  for  captains  Carrol  and 
Kennedy,  and  from  his  letters  it  would  appear,  that  he 
had  a  large  share  in  conducting  many  important  meas- 
ures, such  as  the  arrangement  of  a  general  plan  of  opera- 
tions, and  the  formation  of  a  central  and  supreme  gov- 
ernment. He  seems  to  have  attached  himself  principal- 
ly to  the  duke  of  Infantado,  a  young'  man  of  moderate 
capacity,  but  with  a  strong  predilection  for  those  petty 
intrigues  which  constituted  the  policy  of  the  Spanish 
court. f  Captain  Whittingham  likewise  gained  the 
confidence  of  Castaaos  to  such  a  degree,  that  he  was  em- 
ployed by  him  to  inspect  the  different  Spanish  corps  on 
the  Ebro  early  in  September,  and  to  report  upon  their 
state  of  efficiency  previous  to  entering  upon  the  execu- 
tion of  the  plan  laid  down  for  the  campaign.:};  But  not- 
withstanding the  favourable  position  in  which  these  offi- 
cers stood,  it  does  not  appear  that  either  of  them  obtain- 
ed any  clear  idea  of  the  relative  strength  of  the  contend- 
ing forces;  their  opinions,  invariably  and  even  extrav- 
gantly  santruine,  were  never  borne  out  by  the  result. 

The  Spaniards  were  not  slow  to  perceive  the  advan- 
tages of  encouraging  the  vanity  of  inexperienced  men 
who  had  the  control  of  enorinous  supplies  ;  and  while  all 
outward  demonstrations  of  respect  and  confidence  were 
by  tliem  lavished  upon  subordinate  functionaries,  espe- 
cially upon  those  who  had  accepted  of  rank  in  their  ser- 
vice, the  most  strenuous  exertions  of  lord  William  Ben- 
tinck and  Mr.  Stuart  were  insufficient  to  procure  the  adop- 
tion of  a  single  beneficial  measure,])  or  even  to  establish 


»  Sir  H.  Dahymrl?g  Papers  MS. 

•f  Sir  John  Moore's  CorrtspTndence,  MS. 

i  Whittiiijhani's  Letters,  MS. 

y  Ml.  Stuarfs  Ltttera.MS.  Lord  W.  Bentingk's  Lettcri.MS. 


the  ordinary  intercourse  of  official  business.  TTie  leading 
Spaniards  wished  to  obtain  a  medium  through  which  to 
create  a  false  impressir)n  of  tlie  state  of  affairs,  and  thus 
to  secure  supplies  and  succours  from  England,  without 
being  fettered  in  the  application  of  them  ;  the  subordi- 
nate agents  answered  this  purpose,  and,  satisfied  with 
their  docility,  the  generals  were  far  from  encouraging 
the  residence  of  more  than  one  British  agent  at  their 
head-quarters.  Captain  Birch,  an  intelligent  engineer 
officer,  writing  from  Blake's  camp,  says, '  General  Brod- 
erick  is  expected  here ;  but  I  have  understood  that 
the  appearance  of  a  British  general  at  these  head-quar- 
ters, to  accompany  the  army,  might  give  jealousy.* 
General  Blake  is  not  communicative,  yet  captain  Carrol 
appears  to  be  on  the  best  footing  with  him  and  his 
officers  ;  and  captain  Carrol  tells  me  that  he  inform3 
iiim  of  more  than  he  does  any  of  his  generals.'  Soon 
after  this,  general  Broderick  did  arrive,  and  complained, 
that 'general  Blake's  reserve  was  such  that  he  could 
only  get  answers  to  the  most  direct  and  particular  ques- 
tions, hut  by  no  means  candid  and  explicit  replies  to 
general  inquiries.'! 

No  object  could  be  more  perfectly  accomplished  ; 
nothing  could  be  more  widely  different  than  Spanish  af- 
fairs, judged  of  by  the  tenor  of  the  military  agents 
reports,  and  Spanish  affairs  when  brought  to  the  test  of 
battle  ;  yet  the  fault  did  not  attach  so  much  to  the  agents 
as  to  the  ministers  who  selected  them.  It  was  difficult 
for  inexperienced  men  to  avoid  the  snare.  Living  with 
the  chiefs  of  armies  actually  in  the  field,  being  in 
hal)its  of  daily  intercourse  with  them,  holding  rank  in 
the  same  service,  and  dependent  upon  their  politeness 
for  every  convenience,  the  agent  was  in  a  manner  forced 
to  see  as  the  general  saw,  and  to  report  as  he  wished  ; 
a  simple  spy  would  have  been  far  more  efficacious! 

Sir  John  Moore,  perceiving  the  evil  tendency  of  sucJi 
a  system,  recalled  all  those  officers  who  were  under  his 
immediate  control,  and  strongly  recommended  to  min- 
isters that  only  one  channel  of  communication  should 
exist  between  the  Spanish  authorities  and  the  Br'ish 
army.  He  was  convinced  of  the  necessity  of  this 
measure,  by  observing,  that  each  of  the  military  agents 
considered  the  events  passing  under  his  own  peculiar 
cognizance  as  the  only  occurrences  of  importance. 
Some  of  those  officers  treated  sir  Hew  Dalrymple  and 
himself,  as  persons  commandingan  auxiliary  force  which 
was  to  be  moved,  divided,  and  applied  at  the  requisi- 
tion of  every  inferior  agent,  and  all  the  military  store? 
of  the  British  empire,  as  placed  at  their  disposal.  Mr. 
Hunter  demanded  English  cavalry  and  horse  artillery 
to  act  with  the  Spaniards  in  the  Asturian  plains,  and 
infantry  to  garrison  their  seaport  towns.  Sir  Thomas 
Dyer  was  convinced  that  the  horsemen  and  guns  should 
have  been  at  Rio  Seco,  in  Leon,  and  that,  with  the  aid 
of  two  thousand  British  cavalry  and  twenty  pieces  of 
artillery,  the  Spaniards  would  in  six  weeks  have  all 
the  French  troops  '  in  a  state  of  siege.'  General  Leith 
says:  '  Whatever  may  be  the  plan  of  operations,  and 
whatever  the  result,  I  beg  leave,  in  the  strongest  man- 
ner, to  recommend  to  your  consideration,  the  great  ad- 
vantage of  ordering  all  the  disposable  force,  of  horse  oi 
car  artillery,  and  light  infantry,  mounted  on-  horses  or 
mules  of  the  country,  without  a  moment's  delay  to  move 
on  Palencia,  where  the  column  or  columns  will  receive 
such  intelligence  as  may  enable  them  to  give  the 
most  effectual  co-operation.':}:  Captain  Whittingham, 
at  the  same  period,  after  mentioning  the  wish  of  gener- 
al Castaros  that  some  British  cavalry  should  join  him, 
writes,  'I  cannot  quit  this  subject  without  once  more 
repeating,  that  the  efforts  of  the  cavalry  will  decide 
the  fate  of  the  campaign.     Should  it  be  possible  for 


*  Sir  John  Moore's  CorrespDndence   MS. 
+  r,ett(rto  Mr.  Stuart,  MS.     S^pf.  13. 
t  Sir  John  Moore's  Takers, MSS. 


72 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Boor  III. 


your  fxcnllency  to  strid  one  thousand  or  fifteen  hun- 
dred horse,  the  advantages  that  would  result  are  in- 
calculable.' And  while  thef^e  pressing  recommenda- 
tions came  the  one  from  Oviedo.  the  other  fromTudela, 
colonel  Doyle,  writinjr  from  Madrid,  thus  expresses 
himself:  '  Certain  it  is,  that  if  your  army  were  here, 
the  French  would  evacuate  Spain  before  you  crot  with- 
in a  week's  march  of  them ;  indeed,  even  the  light 
cavalry  and  two  thousand  light  troops  sent  on  cars,  to 
keep  up  with  the  cavalry,  to  show  our  friends  the  na- 
ture of  outpost  duty,  would,  I  think,  decide  the  ques- 
tion.'— 'A  respectable  corps  of  British  troops,  landed 
in  Catalonia,  would  so  impose,  that  I  have  no  doubt  of 
the  good  effects.'  This  last  proposition  relative  to 
Catalonia  was  a  fivouriteplan  of  all  the  leading  men  at 
Madrid  ;  so  certain  were  they  of  success  on  the  Ebro, 
that,  finding  no  British  force  was  likely  to  be  granted, 
they  withdrew  eight  or  nine  thousand  men  from  the  ar- 
my near  Tudela.  and  directed  them  upon  Lerida. 

Thus  much  I  have  thought  it  necessary  to  relate 
about  the  agents,  and  now  quitting  that  subject,  I  shall 
narrate 

THE    OPERATIONS  OF    THE    SPANISH  ARMIES  IINtJIEDIATELY 
AFTER  THE   BATTLE    OF    BAYI,EN. 

When  that  victory  caused  Joseph  to  abandon  Madrid, 
the  patriotic  troops,  guided  by  the  caprice  of  the  gene- 
rals, moved  in  a  variety  of  directions,  without  any  fix- 
ed object  in  view,  and  without  the  slightest  concert ; 
all  persons  seemed  to  imagine  that  the  war  was  at  an 
end,  and  that  rejoicing  and  triumph  alone  ought  to  oc- 
cupy the  minds  of  good  Spaniards. 

The  Murcian  and  Valencian  army  separated.  Gen- 
eral Llamas,  with  twelve  thousand  infantry,  and  a  few 
cavalry,  took  the  road  to  Madrid,  and  arrived  there  be- 
fore any  of  the  other  generals.  St.  Marc,  a  Fleming 
by  birth,  with  greater  propriety,  carried  the  Valencians 
to  the  relief  of  Znragoza.  On  the  road  he  joined  his 
forces  with  those  of  the  baron  de  Versage,  and  the 
united  troops,  amounting  to  sixteen  thousand,  entered 
Zaragoza  on  the  15th,  one  day  after  Verdier  and  Lefe- 
bre  had  broken  up  the  siege  and  retired  to  Tudela, 
leaving  their  heavy  guns  and  many  storesbehind  them; 
they  were  pursued  by  the  Valencians  and  Aragonese, 
but  on  the  19th  their  cavalry  turned  and  defeated  the 
Spanish  advanced  guard.  On  the  20th  Lefebre  aban- 
doned Tudela,  and  took  a  position  at  Milagro.  On  the 
21st,  St.  Marc  and  Versage  occupied  Tudela,  and  the 
peasantry  of  the  valleys,  encouraged  by  the  approach 
of  a  regular  army,  and  by  the  successful  defence  of 
Zarngoza,  assembled  on  the  left  flank  of  the  French, 
and  threatened  their  communications.  Meanwhile 
I^alafox  gave  himself  up  to  festivity  and  rejoicing,  and 
did  not  benfin  to  repair  the  defences  of  Zaragoza  until 
the  end  of  the  month;  he  also  assumed  supreme  au- 
thority, and  in  various  ways  discovered  inordinate  and 
foolish  presumption,  decreeing,  among  other  acts, 
that  no  Aragonese  should  be  liable  to  the  punishment 
of  death  for  any  crime.* 

The  army  of  Andalusia  was  the  most  efficient  body 
of  men  in  arms  throughout  Spain,  it  contained  thirty 
ihoiisand  regular  troops,  provided  with  a  good  train  of 
artillery  and  flushed  with  recent  victory ;  j'et  it  was 
constrained  to  remain  idle  by  the  junta  of  Seville,  who 
detained  it  to  secure  a  supremacy  over  the  other  juntas 
of  Andalusia,  and  even  brouglu  back  a  part  to  assist 
at  an  ostentatious  triumjil"  'r.  that  city.f  It  was  not 
until  a  full  month  after  ihi^  -  'oitulation  of  Dupont,  that 
Castafios  made  his  entry  into  .he  capital,  at  the  head 
of  a  single  division  of  seven  thousand  men ;  another 
of  the  same  force  was  left  at  Toledo,  and  the  rest  of 
his  a:nry  quartered  at  Puerto  del  Rey,  St.  Helena,  and 
Carolina,  in  the  Sierra  Morena.:^: 


•  ''avallero.  +  Cox'g  Correspondence.  MSS. 

I  Wh.itingham'*  Correspoodence.  MSS. 


Of  the  Estremaduran  army  the  infantry  was  at  first 
composed  only  of  new  levies,  but  it  was  afterwards 
strengthened  by  some  battalion  of  the  Walloon  and 
Royal  Guards,  and  supplied  by  sir  Hew  Dalrymple 
with  every  needful  equipment.  Following  the  terms  of  a 
treaty  between  the  juntas  of  Badajoz  and  Seville,  the 
cavalry,  four  thousand  strong,  was  to  be  given  to  Cas- 
tar.os.  but,  Cuesta  excepted,  no  other  general  had  any 
horsemen.  This  cavalry  was  useless  in  Estremadura, 
yet  orders  and  entreaties  and  the  interference  of  sir 
Hew  Dalryinple,  alike  failed  to  make  Galluzzo  send  it- 
either  to  the  capital  or  to  Blake  ;  nor  would  he.  as  we 
have  seen,  desist  from  his  pretended  siege  of  La-Lyppe, 
although  it  delayed  the  evacuation  of  Portugal. 
Meanwhile  the  Spanish  captives,  released  by  the  con- 
vention of  Cintra,  were  clothed,  armed,  and  sent  to 
Catalonia  in  British  transports,  which  also  carried  ten 
thousand  musquets,  with  ammunition,  for  the  Catalans.* 

It  has  been  before  stated,  that  one  thousand  five  hun- 
dred Spaniards,  commanded  by  the  marquis  of  Valla- 
deras,  co-operated  with  the  Portuguese  during  the  cam- 
paign of  Vimiero;  they  never  penetrated  beyond  Guar- 
da,  and  being  destitute  of  money,  were  reduced  to 
great  distress,  for  they  could  not  subsist  where  they 
were,  nor  yet  march  away:  sir  Hew,  by  a  timely  ad- 
vance of  ten  thousand  dollars,  relieved  them,  and  Val- 
laderas  joined  Blake,  when,  after  the  defeat  of  Rio  Seco, 
that  general  had  separated  from  Cuesta,  and  sheltered 
himself  from  the  pursuit  of  Bessieres  in  the  mountains 
behind  Astorga.f  Blake's  reserve  division  had  not  been 
engaged  in  that liattle,  and  theresources  of  the  province, 
aided  by  the  succours  from  England,  were  sufficient  lo 
place  him  again  at  the  head  of  thirty  thousand  infan- 
try.t  Hence,  when  Bessieres  retired  after  the  defeat  of 
Baylen,  Blake  occupied  Leon,  Astorga,  and  the  pass  of 
Manzanal  ;  and  as  he  dared  not  enter  the  plains  with- 
out cavalry,  the  junta  of  Castille  and  Leon,  then  at 
Ponteferrada,  ordered  Cuesta,  who  had  one  thousand 
dragoons  at  Arevalo,  to  transfer  them  to  the  Gallician 
army.  Instead  of  obeying,  the  arbitrary  old  man,  exas- 
perated by  his  defeat,  and  his  quarrel  with  Blake,  reti- 
red to  Salamanca,  collected  and  armed  ten  thousand 
peasants,  annulled  the  proceedings  of  the  junta,  and 
menaced  the  members  with  punishment  for  resisting 
his  authority  as  captain-general. ||  On  the  other  hand, 
Blake  protected  them,  and  while  the  generals  disputed, 
three  thousand  French  cavalry,  descending  the  Douro, 
scoured  the  plains,  and  raised  contributions  in  face  of 
both  their  armies. 

Finally,  Blake,  finding  the  obstinacy  of  Cuesta  in- 
vincible, quitted  his  cantonments  early  in  Se[)tember, 
and  skirling  the  plains  on  the  north-east,  carried  his 
army  by  forced  marches  to  the  Maf  tana  St.  Ander,  a 
ru<£ged  district,  dividing  Biscay  from  the  Asfurias.  The 
junta  of  the  latter  province  had  received  enormous  and 
ver}"^  timely  succours  frcm  England,  but  made  no  exer- 
tions answerable  to  the  amount  of  the  assistanc*;  grant- 
ed, or  to  the  strength  and  importance  of  the  district; 
eiofhleen  thousand  men  were  said  to  be  in  arms,  but 
only  ten  thousand  were  promised  to  Blake,  and  but 
eight  thousand  joined  his  army.§ 

In  Catalonia  the  war  was  conducted  by  both  sides 
without  much  connexion,  or  dependance  on  the  move- 
ments of  the  main  armies,  and  at  this  period  it  hiid  lit- 
tle influence  on  the  general  plan  of  campaign.  Thus 
it  appears,  that  one  month  after  the  capitulation  of 
Dupont,  only  nineteen  thousand  infantry  wiihoutcaval- 
ry,  and  those  under  tb.e  command  of  more  than  one 
general,  were  collected  at  Madrid  ;  that  oidy  sixteen 
thousand  men  were  in  line  upon  the  Ebro,  and  that  the 
remainder  of  the  Span'sh  armies,  exclusive  of  that  in 
Catalonia,  computed  at  eleven  thousand  men,  were  ma- 

»  SirH.Dalrvniple'g  Papers.  MSS.  +  Ibid. 

t  iJovlc's  I.<  Iters.  ||  I\Ir.  Stuart's  Corrcsp<  ndenca. 

{  Capt.  Carrol's  Letter*. 


1808.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR    WAR. 


73 


ny  clays'  march  from  the  enemy,  and  from  one  ano4,her  ; 
that  the  chiefs,  at  discord  with  iheir  respective  juntas, 
and  at  variance  amonrr  themselves,  were  inactive,  or, 
as  in  the  case  of  Galhizzo,  doing  mischief. 

These  fpehle  and  dilatory  operations  of  the  armies, 
were  jiartly  owing  to  the  inaptitude  of  the  generals,  hut 
the  principal  causes  were  the  unhounded  vanity,  arro- 
gance, and  selfishness  of  the  local  o-overnments,  among 
whom  th.e  juntas  of  Gallicia  and  Seville  were  remarka- 
ble for  their  amiiition.  The  time  which  should  have 
been  passed  in  concerting  measures  for  pushing  the  vic- 
tory of  Baylen,  was  spent  hy  them  in  devisingschemes 
to  ensure  the  permanency  of  their  own  power,  and  the 
monej'  and  resources,  hoth  of  England  and  Spain,  w'ere 
applied  to  further  this  pernicious  object;  in  every  part 
of  the  country  a  spirit  of  interested  violence  prevailed, 
the  ardour  of  patriotism  was  chilled, and  the  exertions 
of  sensible  men  were  rendered  nugatory,  or  served  as 
a  signal  for  their  own  destruction. 

The  argument  to  be  drawn  from  this  state  of  affairs 
is  conclusive  against  the  policy  of  .Joseph's  retreat. 
Without  drafting  a  man  from  the  garrisons  of  Pampe- 
luna  and  St.  Sebastian  ;  without  interfering  with  the 
moveable  columns  employed  on  the  communications  of 
Biscay  and  Navarre,  that  monarch  drew  together  about 
fifty  thousand  good  troops,  in  twenty  daj's  after  he  had 
abandoned  his  capital.  At  the  head  of  such  a  force,  or 
even  of  two-thirds  of  it,  he  might  have  bid  defiance  to 
the  inactive,  half-organized,  and  scattered  Spanish  ar- 
mies, and  it  was  so  necessary  to  have  maintained  him- 
self in  Madrid,  that  scarcely  any  disproportion  of  num- 
bers should  have  induced  him  to  abandon  it  without  an 
effort  ;  but  the  disaster  of  Diipont  had  created  in  .To- 
&?:)h's  mind  a  respect  for  Spanish  prowess,  while  from 
his  sagacious  brother  it  only  drew  the  following  obser- 
vation :  '  The  whole  <f  Ihe  Spanii^h  forces  are  not  capable 
nf  heating  iwenty-Jive  fhmisand  French  in  a  reasoiiab/e 
position.^  'l^he  error  of  abandoning  the  capital  would, 
if  the  Spaniards  had  been  capable  of  pursuing  any  ffen- 
eral  plan  of  action,  have  been  latal ;  hut  the  stone  of  Cad- 
mus had  been  cast  among  them,  and  the  juntas,  turning 
upon  one  another  in  hate,  forgot  the  conmion  enemy. 

Ferdinand  was  now  again  proclainaed  king  of  Spain, 
and  the  pomp  and  rejoicing,  attendant  on  this  event, 
put  an  end  to  all  business,  except  that  of  intrigue. 
CastaHos  assumed  the  title  of  captain-general  of  Ma- 
drid ;  a  step  which  seems  to  have  heen  taken  by  him, 
partly  to  forward  his  being  appointed  generalissimo, 
and  partly  with  a  view  to  emancipate  himself  from  the 
injurious  control  of  the  Seville  junta;  for,  although 
the  authority  of  the  captains-general  had  been  superse- 
ded in  most  of  the  provinces  by  the  juntas,  it  was  not 
universally  the  case.  He  expected,  and  with  reason, 
to  be  appointed  generalissimo  of  the  Spanish  armies, 
but  he  was  of  an  indolent  disposition,  and  it  was  mani- 
fest that  until  a  central  and  supreme  government  was 
established,  such  a  salutary  measure  would  not  be 
adopted.  In  the  mean  time,  the  council  of  Castillo,  al- 
though not  generally  popular  with  the  people,  and  ha- 
ted b}'  the  juntas,  was  accepted  as  the  provisional  head 
of  Ine  state  in  the  capital  ;  yet  its  authority  was  merely 
nominal,  and  the  necessity  of  showing  some  front  to 
the  enem)'  seems  to  have  been  the  only  link  of  connex- 
ion between  the  Spanish  armies. 

'['he  evil  consequences  flowing  from  this  want  of 
vn'Uy  were  soon  felt.  Scarcely  had  the  French  quitted 
Madrid,  when  the  people  of  Biscay  prepared  to  rise, 
and  such  an  event,  prudently  conducted  and  well  sup- 
ported, would  have  been  of  incalculable  advantage,  but 
the  nicest  arrangement,  and  the  utmost  prudence,  were 
necessary  to  insure  success  ;  for  the  Biscayans  had 
neither  arms  nor  ammunition,  the  French  were  close  to 
them,  and  the  nearest  Spanish  force  was  the  feeble  As- 
turian  levy.  A  previous  junction  of  Blake's  army  with 
the  latter  was  inc'ispensab.'.'     that  once  effected,  and 


due  preparation  made,  the  insurrection  of  Biscay,  pro- 
tected by  forty  thousand  regular  troops,  and  supplied 
from  the  sea-board  with  money  and  stores,  would  have 
forced  the  French  to  abandon  theEhro  or  to  fight  a  battle, 
which  Blake  might  have  risked,  provided  that  the  An- 
dalusian,  Murcian,  Valencian,  and  Aragonese  troops 
assembling  about  Tudela,  were  prepared  to  move  at  the 
same  time  against  the  left  flank  of  the  enemy.  In  ev- 
ery point  of  view  it  was  an  event  pregnant  with  impor- 
tant consequences,  and  the  impatience  of  the  Biscay- 
ans should  have  been  restrained  rather  than  encourag- 
ed ;  yet  the  duke  of  Infantado,  colonel  Doyle,  and  oth- 
ers, at  Madrid,  made  streiuious  efforts  to  hasten  the 
explosion,  and  the  crude  manner  in  which  they  conduct- 
ed this  serious  affair  is  exposed  in  the  following  ex- 
tracts from  colonel  Doyle's  dpsi)atclies  : — 

'I  proposed  to  general  Blake  that  he  should  send 
officers  to  Biscay  to  stir  up  the  people  there,  and  into 
the  Asturias  to  beg  that,  of  their  15,000  men,  8,000 
might  be  pushed  into  Biscay  to  Bilbao,  to  assist  the 
people,  who  were  all  ready,  and  only  waited  for  arms 
and  ammunition,  for  both  of  which  I  wrote  to  Mr. 
Hunter  at  Gihon,  and  learned  from  him  that  he  had  sent 
a  large  supply  of  both,  and  some  money  to  i'iibao, 
where  already  14,000  men  had  enrolled  themsfives. 
The  remainder  of  the  Asturians  I  begged  might  instant- 
ly occupy  the  passes  frona  Castillo  into  the  Asturias 
and  Biscay,  that  is  to  say,  from  Reynoia  in  the  direction 
of  Bilbao.'  Some  days  after  he  says,  '  My  measures 
in  Biscay  and  Asturias  have  perfectly  succeeded  ;  the 
reinforcements  of  arms,  an. munition  and  men  (5,000 
stand  of  arms,  and  ammunition  in  proportion),  liave 
reached  Bilbao  in  safety,  and  the  Asturians  have  taken 
possession  of  the  passes  I  pointed  out,  so  that  we  are 
all  safe  in  that  part  of  the  world.' 

In  this  fancied  state  of  security  affairs  remained  un- 
til the  I6'h  of  August;  Blake  was  still  in  the  moun- 
tains of  Gallicia,  hut  the  English  succours  arrived  in 
the  port  of  Bilbao,  and  the  explosion  took  place.  Gen- 
eral Merlin,  with  three  thousand  grenadiers,  immedi- 
ately came  down  on  the  unfortunate  Biscayans,  Bilbao 
was  taken,  and  to  use  the  gloomy  expression  of  king 
.Joseph,  '  the  fire  of  insurrection  was  quenched  with 
the  blood  of  twelve  hundred  men.'  Fortunately,  the 
stores  were  not  landed,  and  the  vessels  escaped  from 
the  river.  Thus,  at  a  blow,  one  of  the  principal  re- 
sources which  Blake  had  a  right  to  calculate  upon  in 
his  future  operations  was  destroyed  ;  and  although  the 
number  admitted  by  the  Spaniards  to  have  fallen  was 
less  than  the  above  quotation  implies,  the  spirit  of  re- 
sistance was  severely  checked,  and  the  evil  was  un- 
mixed and  deplorable.  This  unfortunate  event,  how- 
ever, created  little  or  no  sensation  beyond  the  immediate 
scene  of  the  catastrophe  ;  triumphs  and  rejoicings  oc- 
cupied the  people  of  Madrid  and  Zaragoza,  and  it  is 
difl^cult  to  say  how  long  the  war  would  have  been  ne 
glected,  if  Palafox  had  not  been  roused  by  the  re-ap 
pearance  of  a  French  corps,  which  retook  Tudela,  and 
pushed  on  to  the  vicinity  of  Zaragoza  itself. 

This  movement  took  place  immediately  after  the  ex- 
pedition against  Bilbao,  it  was  intended  to  suppress  the 
ins  irrection  of  the  valleys,  and  to  clear  the  left  flank 
of  the  French  army.  Palafox  thus  roughly  aroused, 
wrjte  intemperately  to  the  council  of  CastiJle,  order- 
ing that  all  the  troops  in  the  capital  should  he  forward- 
ed to  the  Ebro,  and  menacing  the  members  personally 
for  the  delay  which  had  already  occurred.*  Being  a 
young  man  without  any  weight  of  character,  and  his 
remonstrances  founded  only  upon  his  own  danger,  and 
not  supported  by  any  general  plan  or  clear  view  of  af- 
fairs, the  presumptuous  tone  of  his  letters  gave  general 
offence  :  he  chiefly  aimed  at  Castafios,  who  was  not 
under  his  command,  and  moreover,  the  junta  of  Seville 


*  Whittinsrhanrs  Letters.  MSS. 


74 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[EuoK  m. 


refused  to  pay.  or  to  subsist  the  Andalusian  army,  if  it 
moved  heyoivd  the  capital  before  a  central  g-overnmer.t 
should  be  established.  But  the  same  junta  resorted  to 
every  kind  of  intrigue,  to  retard,  if  not  entirely  to  pre- 
vent the  execution  of  the  latter  measure.  It  was,  how- 
ever, necessary  to  do  something,  and  a  coimcil  of  all  the 
generals  commandintr  armies  was  held  at  Madrid  on 
the  5th  of  September.*  Castafios,  Llamas,  Cuesta, 
the  duke  of  Infintado,  and  some  others  assembled  ; 
Blake  gave  his  proxy  to  the  duke,  Palafox  was  repre- 
sentf^d  by  a  colonel  of  his  own  staff.t  Cuesta  pro- 
posed that  a  commander-ill-chief  should  be  appointed, 
the  others  were  too  jealous  to  adopt  this  proposal,  yet 
tliey  agreed  to  pursue  the  following  plan  of  operations  : 

Llamas,  with  the  Murcians.  to  occupy  Taranzona, 
Agreda.  and  Borja.  La-Pe~;a,  with  the  two  divisions 
of  Andalusia  already  in  the  capital,  to  march  by  Soria, 
and  take  possession  of  Logrona  and  Najera.  T'he  oth- 
er divisions  of  that  army  to  follow  in  due  time,  and 
when  La-Pei'.a  should  be  established  in  LogroTta,  Lla- 
mas was  to  advance  to  Cascante,  Corella,  and  Cala- 
horra.  « 

This  united  force  was  to  be  called  the  army  of  the 
centre,  and  once  securely  fixed  in  its  positions,  Palafox, 
under  whose  command  St.  Marc's  division  acted,  was 
to  push  forward  to  Santjuessa  by  the  left  bank  of  the 
Ebro,  and  thus  turn  the  enemy  on  the  Aragon  river. 
In  the  m^-an  time  it  was  hoped  that  Blake  would  arrive 
at  Palencia,  and  form  his  junction  with  the  Asturians, 
and  Cuesta  promised  to  march  upon  Burgo  del  Osma, 
to  fill  up  the  space  between  Blake  and  the  army  of  the 
centre.  The  head  of  La-Pefia's  column  was  to  be  at 
Soria  on  the  15th  of  September,  and  the  junta  confident- 
ly expected  that  this  vicious  plan,  in  Avhich  every  sound 
military  principle  was  violated,  and  the  enemy's  troops, 
considered  with  regard  to  position,  as  a  fixed  immove- 
able mass,  would  cause  the  total  destruction  of  the 
French  army  :  the  only  fear  entertained  was,  that  a 
hasty  flight  into  France  would  save  it  from  Spanish 
vengeance  !  And  captain  Whittingham,  echoing  the 
sentiments  of  the  Spanish  generals  with  reference  to  this 
plan,  writes,  '  As  far  as  my  poor  judgment  leads  me,  I 
am  satisfied  that  if  the  French  persist  in  maintaining 
their  present  position,  we  shall,  in  less  than  six  weeks, 
have  a  second  edition  of  the  battle  of  Baylen  !' 

But  to  enable  La-Pena  and  Llamas  to  march,  pecu- 
niary aid  was  requisite,  there  was  a  difficulty  in  raising 
money  at  Madrid,  and  the  maritime  provinces  intercep- 
ted all  the  Engflish  supplies.  In  this  dilemma,  colo- 
nel Doyle  drew  bills  upon  the  English  treasury,  and 
upon  the  government  at  Seville,  making  the  latter  pay- 
able out  of  two  millions  of  dollars  just  transmitted  to 
the  junta  through  Mr.  DutT.t  It  is  probable  that  such 
an  unprincipled  body  would  have  dishonoured  the  bills, 
if,  just  before  they  were  presented,  major  Cox  had  not 
remonstrated  strongly  upon  the  destitute  condition  of 
the  army,  and  his  representations,  although  at  first 
haughtily  and  evasivi^ly  received,  became  effectual 
when  the  junta  discovered  that  a  plot  against  their  lives, 
supposed  to  have  been  concocted  at  Madrid,  was  on 
the  eve  of  execution  :  in  fact,  they  had  become  hateful 
from  their  domineering  insolence  and  selfishness,  and 
the  public  feeling  was  strongly  against  them.  Alarmed 
for  the  consequences,  they  sent  off  200,000  dollars  to 
Madrid,  and  published  a  manifesto,  in  which  they  in- 
serted a  letter,  purporting  to  be  from  themselves  to 
Castanos,  dated  on  the  8th,  and  giving  him  full  pow- 
ers to  act  as  he  judged  fitting  for  the  public  good. 
Their  objects  were  to  pacify  the  people,  and  to  save 
their  own  dignity  by  appearing  to  have  acted  volunta- 


»   Wh'uin!r'iam'9T>ettpr».  MSS. 
t  Mr.  St'inrt's  I.rtters.  Parlinmentarv  Papers. 
t  Sir   Hew   Dairyiiiple'i  Correspondence.   Doyle's  Letters. 
Cox's  Do. 


rily,  but  Casta'~os  published  the  letter  in  Madrid  with 
its  true  date  of  the  11th.  and  then  it  became  manifest, 
that  to  :iiajor  Cox's  remonstrance,  and  not  to  any  sense 
of  duty,  tins  change  of  conduct  was  due. 

Doyle's  bills  having  been  negotiated,  the  troops  in 
the  capital  were  put  in  motion,  and  40,000  fresh  levies 
were  enrolled,  yet  the  foresight  and  activity  of  Napo- 
leon in  disarming  the  country  had  been  so  effectual, 
that  only  3,200  firelocks  could  be  prccured.  A  curious 
expedient  then  presented  itself  to  the  imagination  of 
the  duke  of  Iniantado,  and  other  leading  persons  in 
^ladrid  :  colonel  Doyle,  at  their  desire,  wrote  to  sir 
Hew  Dalrymple,  in  the  name  of  the  supreme  council, 
to  request  that  (he  firelocks  of  JuiwPs  urmy,  and  ike 
arms  of  the  Poriiiouese  people,  might  be  forwarded  to 
the  frontier,  and  from  thence  carried  by  post  to  the  capi- 
tal. And  this  novel  preposition  was  made  at  a  time 
when  England  had  already  transmitted  to  Spain  160,- 
000  muskets,  a  supply  considerably  exceeding  the 
whole  number  of  men  organized  throughout  the  coun- 
try. Fifty  thousand  of  these  arms  had  been  sent  to 
Seville,  where  the  junta  shut  them  up  in  the  arsenals, 
and  left  the  armies  defenceless;  for  to  nesrlect  or  mis- 
use real  resources,  and  to  fasten  with  avidity  upon  the 
most  extravagant  projects,  is  peculiarly  Spanish.*  No 
other  people  c"uld  have  thought  of  asking  for  a  neigh- 
bouring nation's  arms  at  such  a  conjuncture.  No  other 
than  Spanish  rulers  could  have  imagined  the  absurdity 
of  supplying  their  levies,  momentarily  expecting  to 
fight  upon  the  Ebro,  with  the  arms  of  a  French  army 
still  unconquered  in  Portugal.  But  this  project  was 
only  one  among  many  proofs  afforded  at  the  time,  that 
Cervantes  was  as  profound  an  observer  as  he  was  a 
witty  reprover  of  the  extravagance  of  his  countrymen. 


CHAPTER  IL 

Internal  political  transactions— Factions  in  Gallicia,  Asturias, 
Leon,  and  Castille — Flagitious  conduct  of  the  junta  of  Se- 
ville— Mr.  Stuart  endeavours  to  establish  a  northern  cortes 
— Activity  of  the  council  of  Castil/a;  projioses  a  supreme 
government  agreeable  to  the  public — Local  juntas  become 
generally  odious — Cortes  meet  at  Lugo  ;  declare  for  a  cen- 
tral and  supreme  government — Deputies  appointed — Cla- 
mours of  the  Gallician  junta  and  bishop  of  Ottnse — In- 
creasins:  influence  of  the  Castille — Underhanded  proceedings 
of  the  junta  of  Seville,  disconcerted  by  ti)e  rpiickness  of 
the  Bailv  V'aldez — Character  of  Cuesta  ;  he  denies  the  le- 
gralitv  of  the  northern  cortes,  abandons  the  line  of  military 
operations,  returns  to  Segovia,  arrests  the  Baily  \  a!df  7  and 
other  deputies  from  Lugo — Central  and  supreme  govern- 
ment established  at  Aranjuez — Popular  feeling  in  favour  of 
the  central  junta  ;  vain  and  interested  proceedings  of  that 
body  :  its  timidity,  inactivity,  and  folly  ;  rt  fisses  to  name  a 
generalissimo — Foreign  relations — Mr.  Canning  leaves  Mr. 
Stuart  without  any  instructions  for  three  months — j\lr.  Frere 
appointed  envoy  extraordinary,  ifec. 

INTERNAL  POLITICAL  TRANSACTIONS. 

With  the  military  affairs,  thus  mismanaged,  the  civil 
and  political  transactions  proceeded  step  by  step,  and 
in  the  same  crooked  path.  Short  as  the  period  was 
between  the  first  breaking  forth  of  the  insurrection,  and 
the  arrival  of  Mr.  Stuart  at  Corura,  it  was  sufficient  to 
create  disunion  of  the  worst  kind.f  The  juntas  of 
Leon,  of  the  Asturias,  and  of  Gallicia,  were  at  open 
discord,  and  those  provinces  were  again  split  into  par- 
ties, hating  each  other  with  as  much  virulence  as  if  they 
had  beep,  of  a  hundred  years'  growth.  The  money  and 
other  supplies  sent  by  the  English  ministers  were  con- 
sidered, by  the  authorities  into  whose  hands  they  fell, 
as  a  peculiar  donation  to  themselves,  and  appropriated 
accordingly.     l"he  junta  of  one  province  would  not  as« 


*  Parliamentary  Papers,  1810. 

f  Mr.  Stuart's  Letters.    Parliamentary  Papers. 


1808.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR 


sist  another  with  arms  when  there  was  a  surplus,  nor 
permit  their  troops  to  march  agninst  the  enemy  beyond 
the  precincts  of  the  particular  province  in  which  they 
were  first  orjranized.*  The  ruling  power  was  in  the 
hands  of  the  provincial  nobility  and  gentry,  men  of  nar- 
row contracted  views,  unused  to  business,  proud,  arro- 
gant— as  extreme  ignorance  suddenly  clothed  with  au- 
thority will  always  be — and  generally  disposed  to  em- 
ploy their  newly  acquired  power  in  providing  for  their 
relations  aiid  dependants  at  the  expense  of  the  com- 
mon cause,  which  with  them  was  quite  subordinate  to 
the  local  interests  of  tlieir  own  particular  province.  A 
jealousy  of  their  neighbours  regulated  the  proceedinn-s 
of  all  the  juntas,  and  the  means  they  resorted  to  for 
increasing  their  own,  or  depressing  a  rival  govern- 
ment's influence,  were  equally  characterised  by  ab- 
surdity and  want  of  principle. 

The  junta  of  Gallicia  did  their  utmost  to  isolate  that 
province,  as  if  with  a  view  to  a  final  separation  from 
Spain  and  a  connexion  with  Portugal.  They  com- 
plained, as  of  an  injury,  that  the  army  of  Estremadu- 
ra  had  obeyed  the  orders  of  the  junta  of  Seville,  yet 
they  formed  an  independent  alliance  with  the  junta  of 
Oporto,  and  sent  troops,  as  we  have  seen,  under  Valla- 
deras,  to  aid  the  war  in  Portugal  ;f  but,  at  the  same 
time,  they  refused  to  unite  in  any  common  measure  of 
defence  with  the  provinces  of  Castille,  until  a  formal 
treaty  of  alliance  between  them  was  negotiated,  signed, 
and  ratified  ;  and  their  selfishness  and  incapacity  crea- 
ted so  much  disgust  in  their  own  district,  that  plots 
were  formed  to  overthrow  their  authority.  The  bish- 
op of  Orense  and  the  archbishop  of  St,  Jago  were 
tiieir  decided  enemies.  The  last-named  prelate,  an  in- 
triguing man,  secretly  endeavoured  to  draw  Blake, 
with  the  army,  into  his  views,  and  even  wrote  to  him 
to  desire  that  he  would  lead  the  troops  against  the  gov- 
ernment of  CoruHa  ;:j:  the  junta  having  intercepted  the 
letters,  arrested  the  archbishop,  yet  their  own  stability 
and  personal  safety  were  still  so  insecure,  that  many 
persons  applied  to  Mr.  Stuart  to  aid  in  changing  the 
form  of  government  by  force.  The  Asturians  were 
even  worse;  they  refused  to  assist  Blake  when  his  ar- 
my was  suffering,  although  the  stores  required  by  him, 
and  supplied  by  England,  were  rotting  in  the  har- 
bours where  they  were  first  landed;  money  also,  sent 
out  in  the  Pluto  frigate  for  the  use  of  Leon,  was  de- 
tained at  Gihon,  and  Leon  itself  never  raised  a  single 
soldier  for  the  cause.  Thus,  only  two  months  after  the 
first  burst  of  the  insurrection,  corruption,  intrigue,  and 
faction,  even  to  the  verge  of  civil  war,  were  raging  in 
the  northern  parts  of  Spain. 

Like  passions  being  at  work  in  the  south,  the  same 
consequences  followed.  The  junta  of  Seville,  still 
less  scrupulous  than  that  of  Gallu?a,  made  no  secret 
of  their  ambitious  views.  They  stifled  all  local  pub- 
lications, and  even  suppressed  the  public  address  of 
Florida  Blanca,  who.  as  president  of  the  Murcian 
junta,  had  recommended  the  formation  of  a  supreme 
central  government;  they  wasted  their  time  in  vain 
and  frivolous  disputes,  and,  neglecting  every  conctern 
of  real  importance,  sacrificed  the  general  welfare  to 
views  of  private  advantage  and  interest.  They  made 
promotions  in  the  army  without  regard  to  public  opin- 
ion or  merit;  they  overlaid  all  real  patriotism,  and  be- 
stowed on  their  own  creatures  places  of  emolument, 
to  the  patronage  of  which  they  had  not  a  legal  right; 
they  even  usurptid  the  royal  prerogative  of  appointing 
canons  in  the  church,  and  their  cupidity  equalled  their 
ambition.  They  intercepted, as  I  have  already  related, 
the  pecuniary  supplies  necessary  to  enable  the  army  to 
act,  and  they  complained  that  La  Mancha  and  Madrid,  in 
whose  defence  they  said  ^  their  troops  were  sacrificing 

*   Mr.  Stuart's  Letters.     Parliamentary  Papers. 

t  Mr.  Stuiirt's  Lttters,    MS  \  Ibid. 


themselves,'  did  not  subsic*  and  supply  the  force  wif 
Castanos.*  Under  the  pretence  of  formintr  a  nucieua 
for  disciplining  thirty  thousand  levies  as  a  reserve,  they 
retained  five  battalions  at  Seville,  and,  having  by  this 
draft  weakened  the  army  in  tlie  field,  they  neglected 
the  rest,  and  never  raised  a  man.  The  canonries  filled 
up  by  them  had  been  vacant  for  several  years,  and  the 
salaries  attached  to  those  offices  had  been  apnropriated 
to  the  public  service;  the  junta  now  applied  the  money 
to  their  own  and  their  creatures'  emolument,  and  at  one 
period  thry  appeared  to  have  contrniplated  an  open  jjar- 
tition  of  the  funds  received  from  I'wigland  among  them- 
selves. Against  this  flagitious  junta  also,  the  public 
indignation  was  rife.  A  plot  was  formed  to  assassin- 
ate the  members ;  the  municipal  authorities  remon- 
strated with  them,  the  archbishop  of  Toledo  protested 
against  their  conduct,  the  junia  of  Grenada  refused  to 
acknowledge  their  supremacy ;]"  and  yet  so  great  was 
their  arrogance,  so  unprincipled  their  ambition,  that 
the  decided  and  resolute  opposition  of  Casta;  os  alone 
prevented  them  from  commencing  a  civil  war,  by 
marching  the  victorious  army  of  Baylen  against  the  re- 
fractory Grenadans.  Such  was  the  real  stale  of  Spain, 
and  such  the  patriotism  of  the  juntas,  who  were  at  this 
time  filling  I'hirope  with  the  sound  of  their  own  praise. 

In  the  northern  parts,  Mr.  Stuart  endeavoured  to  re- 
duce the  chaos  of  folly  and  wickedness  to  some  deoree 
of  order,  and  to  produce  that  unity  of  design  and  action, 
without  which,  it  was  impossible  to  resist  the  mighty 
adversary  that  threatened  the  independence  of  the  Pen- 
insula. He  judged  that  to  abate  the  conflicting  pas- 
sions of  the  moment,  a  supreme  authority,  upon  which 
the  influence  of  Great  Britain  could  be  brought  to  beai 
with  full  force,  was  indispensable;  and  that  to  convoke 
the  ancient  cortes  of  tne  realm  was  the  most  certain  and 
natural  method  of  drawincr  the  strength  and  energy  of 
the  nation  into  one  compact  mass  ;  hut  there  Napoleon 
again  interfered,  for  by  an  able  distribution  of  the  French 
forces,  all  direct  communication  between  the  northern 
and  southern  provinces  was  intercepted.  Bessieres, 
Dupont,  and  Moncey  at  that  time  occupied  a  circle 
round  Madrid,  and  would  have  prevented  the  local  gov- 
ernments of  the  north  from  uniting  with  those  of  the 
southern,  if  they  had  been  inclined  to  do  so. 

A  union  of  deputies  from  the  nearest  provinces,  to 
be  called  the  northern  cortes,  then  suggested  itself  to 
Mr.  Stuart  as  a  preliminary  step,  which  would  ensure 
the  convocation  of  a  general  assembly  when  such  a 
measure  should  become  practicable ;  accordingly  he 
strenuously  urged  its  adoption,  but  his  eflbrts,  at  first, 
produced  no  good  results.^  It  was  in  vain  that  he  rep- 
resented the  danger  of  remaining  in  a  state  of  anarchy, 
when  so  many  violent  passions  were  excited,  and  such 
an  enemy  was  in  the  heart  of  the  country.  It  was  in 
vain  that  he  pointed  out  the  difficulties  that  the  want 
of  a  supreme  authority  fastened  on  the  intercourse  with 
the  British  cabinet,  which  could  not  enter  into  sepa- 
rate relations  with  every  provincial  junta.  The  Span- 
iards, finding  that  the  supplies  were  not  withheld,  that 
their  reputation  for  patriotism  was  not  lowered  in  Eng- 
land by  actions  which  little  merited  praise;  finding,  in 
short,  that  the  English  cabinet  was  weak  enough  to 
gorge  their  cupidity,  flatter  their  vanity,  and  respect 
their  folly,  assented  to  all  Mr.  Stuart's  reasoning,  but 
forwarded  none  of  his  propositions,  and  continued  to 
nourish  the  disorders  that  were  destroying  the  common 
cause. 

The  jarring  interests  which  agitated  the  northern 
provinces  were  not  even  subdued  by  the  near  approach 
of  danger;  the  result  of  the  battle  of  Rio  Scco  rather 
inflamed  than  allayed  the  violence  of  party  feeling,  and 
if  Bessieres  had  not  been  checked  by  the  disaster  of 


*  Sir  II.  Diilrvnipln's  Papers.    Coxe's  Correspondence. 
f  Ibid.  I  Stuart's  CorresponJfcnce.  I'ail.  Pap. 


76 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR 


[Book  HI. 


Dnport,  he  would  have  encountered  few  obstacles  in  ' 
establishing-  Joseph's  authority  in  Gallicia  and  Old 
Castille.  For  the  enthusiasm  of  those  provinces  never 
rose  to  a  oreat  pitch,  and  as  Bessieres  was  prepared  to 
use  address  ls  well  as  force,  he  would  have  found  sup- 
port amongst  the  factions,  and  the  n  inforcements  ccn- 
tinual!}'  arriving  from  France  would  h.ave  enabled  him 
to  maintain  his  acquisition.  The  abilitj'.  of  the  emper- 
or's dispositions  would  then  have  been  apparent;  for 
while  Bessieres  held  Gallicia,  and  Dupont  hung  on  the 
southern  frontier  of  Portugal  with  twent3--five  thousand 
men,  .Tunotcoiild  have  securely  concentrated  his  army  in 
the  neighbourhood  of  Lisbon,  and  have  rendered  an  Eng- 
lish disembarkation  on  the  coast  nearly  impracticable.  ' 
Napoleon's  combinations  were  overturned  by  the 
disgraceful  capitulation  of  Baylen,  and  when  Joseph 
evacuated  Madrid  a  fresh  impulse  was  given  to  the 
spirit  of  ihe  people  ;  but,  unfortunately  for  Spain,  as  a 
wider  scope  for  ambition  was  obtained,  the  workings 
of  self-interest  increased,  fresh  parties  sprung  up,  and 
new  follies  and  greater  absurdities  stifled  the  virtue  of 
the  country,  and  produced  irremediable  confusion,  end- 
ing in  ruin.  The  fact  of  Dupont's  capitulation  was  made 
tnown  to  the  council  of  Castille  before  king  Joseph  was 
informed  of  it,  and  the  council,  foreseeing  all  the  conse- 
quences of  such  an  event,  immediately  refused,  as  I  have 
already  related,  to  promu!<rate  officially  his  accession  to 
the  throne.  The  king  permitted  this  act  of  disobedience 
to  pass  without  much  notice,  for  he  was  naturally 
averse  to  violence,  and  neither  he,  nor  his  brother  Na- 
poleon, did  at  any  period  of  the  contest  for  Spain  con- 
strain a  Spaniard  to  accept  or  retain  office  under  the  in- 
trusive government.*  Joseph  went  further.  Before  he 
abandotied  Madrid,  he  released  his  ministers  from  their 
voluntary  oath  of  allegiance  to  himself,  leaving  them 
free  to  choose  their  party  once  more.  Don  Pedro  Ceval- 
los  and  the  marquis  of  Pinuelo  seized  the  occasion  to 
change  with,  what  appeared  to  them,  changing  fortune  ; 
the  five  others  remained  steadfast,  preferring  an  ameli- 
orated government,  under  a  foreign  prince,  to  what  they 
believed  to  be  a  ho])eless  struggle,  but  which,  if  suc- 
cessful, they  knew  must  end  in  a  degrading  native  des- 
potism :  perhaps,  also,  a  little  swayed  by  their  dislike 
to  England,  and  by  the  impossibility  of  obtaining  that 
influence  among  their  countrymen,  which,  under  other 
circumstances,  their  talents  and  characters  would  have 
ensured. 

The  boldness  of  the  council  of  Castille  was  not  pub- 
licly chastised  by  the  intruding  monarch,  yet  secretly 
he  punished  the  members  by  a  dexterous  stroke  of  po- 
licy. General  Grouchy  wrote  to  Castafios,  saying,  that 
as  circumstances  required  the  presence  of  the  French 
troops  in  another  quarter,  he  invited  the  Spanish  gene- 
ral to  take  immediate  possession  of  Madrid,  for  the 
preservation  of  public  tranquillity.  This  was  construed 
to  mean  the  entire  evacuation  of  Spain,  and  a  report  so 
congenial  to  the  vanity  and  indolence  of  the  Spaniards 
was  greedily  received  ;  it  contributed  to  the  subsequent 
Bupineness  of  the  nation  in  preparing  for  its  defence, 
j  and  Joseph,  by  appealing  to  Castafios,  and  affecting  to 
J  treat  the  council  of  Castille  as  a  body  who  had  lost  all 
linfluenee  with  the  nation,  gave  a  handle  to  its  enemies, 
Iwhich  the  latter  failed  not  to  lay  hold  of.  The  juntas 
dreaded  that  the  influence  of  the  council  would  destroy 
their  own.  That  of  Gallicia  would  not  even  commu- 
nicate with  them,  but  affirmed  that,  individually,  the 
members  were  attached  to  the  French,  and  that,  collec- 
livoly.  they  hdd  been  the  most  active  instrument  of  the 
usurper's  government.  The  junta  of  Seville  endeav- 
oured not  only  to  destroy  the  authority  of  the  existing 
members,  but  to  annul  the  body,  as  an  acknowledged 
tribunal  of  the  state.f     This  proscribed   council,  how- 


•   Azarza  and  O'Farrii,  Mem. 

1  Sir  llfevv  Dalniiiple  >  laj  ..rt    '.'vie's  Correspondence. 


ever,  was  not  wanting  to  itself,  the  individuals  com.po- 
sing  it  did  not  hesitate  to  seize  the  reins  of  govern- 
ment the  moment  the  French  had  departed  ;  and  the 
prudence  with  which  they  preserved  tranquillity  in  the 
capital,  preventing  all  re-action,  while  it  proves  that 
they  were  not  without  me  rit,  forms  a  striking  contrast 
to  the  conduct  of  the  provincial  juntas,  under  whose 
savage  sway  every  kind  of  excess  was  committed,  and 
even  encouraged. 

Aware  of  the  hrstility  they  had  to  encounter,  the 
metubers  of  the  council  lost  no  time  in  forming  a  party 
to  support  themselves.  Don  Arias  Men  y  Velarde,  dean 
or  president  for  the  time  being,  wrote  a  circular  lettrr 
to  the  local  juntas,  pointing  c  ut  the  necessity  of  estr.b- 
lishing  a  central  and  supreme  power,  and  proposing 
that  deputies  from  each  province,  or  nation,  as  they 
were  sometimes  called,  should  repair  to  Madrid,  ai.d 
there  concert  with  the  council  the  best  mode  of  carry- 
ing such  a  measure  into  efiect.  If  this  proposal  hid 
been  adopted,  all  power  would  inevitably  have  fallen 
into  the  hands  of  the  proposers.  Confessedly  the  first 
public  body  in  the  state,  and  well  acquainted  with  the 
forms  of  business,  the  council  m.ust  necessarily  have 
had  a  preponderating  influence  in  the  assrmbly  of  dele- 
gates ;  and  it  appeared  so  reasonable  that  it  should  take 
the  lead,  when  an  efficient  authority  was  required  to 
direct  the  violence  of  the  people  in  a  useful  channel, 
before  the  moment  of  safety  was  passed,  that  all  the 
juntas  trembled  at  the  prospect  of  losing  their  misused 
power.  The  minor  ones  submitted, and  agreed  to  sei.d 
deputies,  the  stronger  and  more  ambitious  felt  that 
subtlety  would  avail  more  than  open  opposition  to  the 
project. 

The  council  followed  up  this  blrw  by  the  publication 
of  a  manifesto,  containing  an  accurate  detail  of  the 
events  of  the  revolution,  dt  fending  the  part  taken  hy 
its  members,  and  claiming  a  renewal  of  the  confidence 
formerly  reposed  in  them  by  the  nation.  This  impor- 
tant state  paper  was  so  ably  written,  that  a  large  party, 
especially  at  Valh'dolid,  was  immediately  formed  in 
favour  of  its  authors,  and  the  junta  of  Seville  were  so 
sensible  of  the  increasing  influence  of  the  council, 
that  they  intercepted  a  copy  of  this  manifesto,  address- 
ed to  sir  Hew  Dalrymple,  and  strictly  suppressed  all 
writings  favourable  to  the  formation  of  a  supreme  cen- 
tral authority,  nothing  they  dreaded  more.*  But  it  was 
no  longer  possible  to  resist  the  current,  which  had  set 
strongly  in  favour  of  such  a  measure;  the  juntas,  how- 
ever they  might  oppose  its  progress,  could  not  openly 
deny  the  proprietj'  of  it,  and  in  every  province,  individ- 
uals of  talent  and  consideration  called  for  a  change  in 
the  Hydra  polity  which  oppressed  the  countrj',  and  was 
inefficient  against  the  enemy. +  Every  British  function- 
ary, civil  or  military,  in  communication  with  the  Span- 
iards, also  urged  the  necessity  of  concentrating  the  ex- 
ecutive power. 

All  the  provincial  juntas  were  become  universally 
odious  ;:j:  some  of  the  generals  alone,  who  had  sudden- 
ly risen  to  command  under  their  rule,  were  favourable 
to  them.  Palafox  was  independent,  as  a  captain-gen- 
eral, whose  power  was  confirmed  by  success;  C-asta/ios 
openly  declared  that  he  would  no  longer  serve  under 
their  control  ;  Cuesta  was  prepared  to  put  them  down 
by  force,  and  to  re-establish  the  royal  audieiizas  and 
the  authority  of  the  captains-general  according  to  tho 
old  practice.  In  this  state  of  affairs,  the  retreat  of 
Bessieres'  army  having  freed  the  conuiiunication  with 
the  southern  parts,  removed  all  excuse  for  procrastina- 
tion, arid  the  juntas  of  (iailicia,  Castille,  Leon,  and  the 
Asturias,  giving  way  to  the  unceasing  remonstrances 
of  Mr.  Stuart,  at  his  instance  agreed  to  meet  in  cortes. 
at  Lugo ;  Gallicia,  however,  first  insisted  upon  a  for- 

*  Mr.  Stunrt's  Corresporidrnce.   Ccxe's  Co-respondence 
f  Mr.  Sfjart'i  Corrtsjoiidence.  id. 


1808.] 


NAPIER'S   pen:   >STJLAR   WAR, 


77 


mal  ratification  of  that  treaty  with  Castille  which  has 
been  already  menlioned. 

When  the  moment  of  assembling  arrived,  the  Astu- 
rians,  without  assigning  any  reason,  refused  to  fulfil  the 
enpagement  they  had  entered  into,  and  the  three  re- 
nnining  juntas  held  the  session  without  them.  The 
bishop  of  Orense,  and  the  junta  of  Gallicia,  were  pre- 
pared to  assert  the  supremacy  of  that  province  over  the 
ethers.  But  the  Baily  Vaidez  of  Castille,  an  able  and 
disinterested  man,  being  chosen  president  of  the  con- 
Tocation,  proposed,  on  the  first  day  of  assembly,  that 
deputies  should  be  appointed  to  represent  the  three 
provinces  in  a  supreme  junta,  to  be  assembled  in  some 
tentral  place,  for  the  purpose  of  convoking  the  ancient 
cortes  of  the  whole  kingdom,  according  to  the  old  forms, 
and  of  settling  the  administration  of  the  interior,  and 
the  future  succession  to  the  throne.  This  proposition 
■was  immediately  carried  by  the  superior  number  of  the 
Castillians  and  Leonese,  although  the  bishop  of  Oren- 
se protested  against  it,  and  the  Gallician  members 
strongly  opposed  an  arrangement,  by  which  their  pro- 
vince was  placed  on  the  same  footing  as  others  ;  a 
glaring  injustice,  they  urged,  when  the  numbers  of  the 
Gallician  army  were  taken  into  consideration,  for  the 
local  feeling  of  ambition  was  uppermost,  and  the  gene- 
ral cause  disregarded.  The  other  party  answered,  with 
great  force,  that  the  Gallician  army  was  paid,  armed, 
and  clothed  by  England,  and  fed  by  Castille  and  Leon. 
Meanwhile  the  influence  of  the  council  of  Castille 
greatly  increased,  and  the  junta  of  Seville,  quickened 
by  fear,  t'^ok  the  lead  in  directing  what  they  could  not 
prevent;*  the  convocation  of  the  cortes  they  knew 
would  be  fatal  to  their  own  existence.  Wherefore,  in 
a  public  letter,  addressed  to  the  junta  of  Gallicia,  dated 
one  day  previous  to  the  circular  of  don  Arias  Mon,  but 
evidently  written  after  the  receipt  of  the  latter,  they 
opprsed  the  assembling  of  the  cortes,  on  the  ground 
that  it  was  '  the  prerogative  of  the  king  to  convoke  that 
body  ;  and  if  it  was  called  together  by  any  other  au- 
thority, the  provinces  would  not  obey;'  '  there  would 
be  no  unanimity.'  The  futility  of  this  argument  is  ap- 
parent ;  the  question  was  not  one  of  form,  but  of  expedi- 
ency. If  the  nation  was  in  favour  of  such  a  step,  and 
afler  facts  proved  that  th«  people  were  not  opposed  to 
it.  the  same  necessity  whicn  constituted  the  right  of 
the  junta  to  declare  war  against  the  French,  another 
prerogative  of  the  monarch,  would  have  sufficed  to  le- 
galize the  convocation  of  the  national  assembly.  But 
their  sole  object  was  to  preserve  their  own  power.  They 
mrintained  that  the  juntas,  being  chosen  by  the  nation, 
were  the  only  legitimate  depositaries  of  authority,  that 
to  members  of  their  own  bodies  only  could  any  of  that 
authority  be  delegated  ;  then  adopting  the  suggestion 
contained  in  the  letter  of  Arias  Mon,  they  proposed 
that  two  deputies  from  each  supreme  junta  should  re- 
puir,  not  to  Madrid,  but  to  Ciudad  Real,  or  Almagro, 
and  at  the  moment  of  meeting  be  in  fact  constituted 
governors  general  of  the  kingdom,  and  as  such  obeyed  ; 
nevertheless,  the  local  governments  were,  with  due 
subordination  to  the  central  junta,  to  retain  and  exercise 
in  their  own  provinces  all  the  authority  with  which 
they  had  already  invested  themselves.  Thus  they  had  on- 
ly to  choose  subservient  deputies,  and  their  power  would 
be  more  firmly  fixed  than  before  ;  and  this  arrangement 
would,  doubtless,  have  been  adopted  by  the  junta  of 
Oallicia,  had  not  the  rapidity  with  which  Vaidez  car- 
ried his  proposition,  prevented  that  cause  of  discord 
from  being  added  to  the  numerous  disputes  which  al- 
ready distracted  the  northern  provinces. 

Mr,  Stuart  proceeded  to  Madrid,  and,  wherever  he 
passed  found  the  same  violence  of  local  party  feeling, 
the  same  disofust  at  the  conduct  of  the  oligarchical  gov- 
ernments.    Pride,  vanity,  corruption,  and  improvidence 


?i  r.  Fiiirl's  Coire.'pon'Jence. 


were  everywhere  obtrusively  visible.  T>ie  ilspute  be- 
tween Blake  and  Cuesta,  which  was  raging  at  the 
period  of  the  battle  of  Rio  Seco,  a  period  when  divis- 
ion was  most  hurtful  to  the  military  operations,  was 
now  allayed  between  the  generals ;  yet  their  political 
partizans  waged  war  with  more  bitterness  than  ever, 
as  if  with  the  intent  to  do  the  greatest  possible  mischief, 
by  continuing  the  feud  among  the  civil  branches  of  the 
government,  when  union  was  most  desirable  in  that 
quarter.  The  seeds  of  division  had  taken  deep  root.* 
On  the  one  side  was  the  Bailey  Vaidez,  deputy  to  the 
supreme  junta,  on  the  other  Cuesta;  a  man  not  to  be 
offended  with  impunity  when  he  had  power  to  punish, 
for  he  was  haughty  and  incredibly  obstinate.  He  had 
been  president  of  the  council  of  Castille,  and  he  was 
captain-general  of  Castille  and  Leon  when  the  insur- 
rection first  broke  out;  but  disliking  all  revolutionary 
movements,  although  as  inimical  to  a  foreign  domina- 
tion as  any  of  his  countrymen,  he  endeavoured  to  re- 
press the  public  effervescence,  and  to  maintain  the  tran- 
quillity of  the  country  at  the  risk  of  losing  his  life  as  a 
traitor, 

Cuesta  was  an  honest  man,  insomuch  as  the  Spanish 
and  French  interests  being  put  in  competition,  he  would 
aid  the  former,  yet,  between  his  country's  cause  and 
his  own  passions,  he  was  not  honest.  He  disliked, 
and  with  reason,  the  sway  of  the  local  juntas,  and, 
with  consistency  of  opinion,  wished  to  preserve  the 
authority  of  the  captains-general  and  the  royal  audien- 
zas.  both  of  which  had  been  overturned  by  the  estab- 
lishment of  those  petty  governments.  But,  sullen  and 
ferocious  in  his  temper,  he  supported  his  opinion  with 
an  authority  and  severity  which  had  no  guide  save  his 
own  will  ;  and  he  was  prepared,  if  an  opportunity  of- 
fered, to  exercise  military  influence  over  the  supreme, 
as  well  as  over  the  subordinate  juntas.  He  had  him- 
self appointed  one  for  Leon  and  Castille  as  a  sort  of 
council,  subordinate  to  the  authority  of  the  captain- 
general  ;  yet,  after  the  battle  of  Rio  Seco,  the  mem- 
bers fled  to  Ponteferrada,  assumed  the  supreme  author- 
ity, and,  putting  themselves  under  the  protection  of 
his  enemy  Blake,  disregarded  Cuesta's  orders,  and 
commanded  him,  their  superior,  to  deliver  up  his  ca- 
valry to  the  former  general.  Upon  this  he  annulled  ail 
their  proceedings  at  Ponteferrada,  and  now  asserting 
that  the  election  of  Vaidez  and  his  colleagues  was  void, 
as  being  contrary  to  the  existing  laws,  directed  new 
juntas  to  be  assembled  in  a  manner  more  conformable  to 
existing  usages,  and  a  fresh  election  to  be  made. 

His  mandates  were  disregarded  ;  Vaidez  and  the 
other  deputies  proceeded  in  defiance  of  them  towards 
the  place  appointed  for  the  assembly  of  the  central  and 
supreme  government.  Cuesta,  in  return,  without  hes- 
itation, abandoned  the  operations  of  thecampaign,  which, 
in  the  council  of  war  held  at  Madrid,  he  had  promised 
to  aid,  and  falling  back  to  Segovia  with  twelve  thou- 
sand men,  seized  the  deputies,  and  shut  up  Vaidez  a 
close  prisoner  in  the  tower  of  that  place,  declaring  his 
intention  to  try  him  by  a  military  tribunal  for  disobedi- 
ence. And  such  was  the  disorder  of  the  times,  that 
he  was  not  without  plausible  arguments  to  justify  this 
act  of  stubborn  violence,  for  the  original  election  of 
members  to  form  the  junta  of  Castille  and  Leon  had 
been  anything  but  legal  ;  several  districts  had  been 
omitted  altogether  in  the  representations  of  those  king- 
doms, many  deputies  had  been  chosen  by  the  city  of 
Leon  alone,  and  Vaidez  was  named  president,  although 
neither  a  native  nor  a  proprietor,  and  for  those  reasons 
ineligible  to  be  a  deputy  at  all  :  the  kingdom  of  Leon 
also  had  appointed  representatives  for  those  districts  iu 
Castille  which  were  under  the  domination  of  the 
F'rench,  and  when  the  enemy  retired,  the  Castillians  in 
vain  demanded  a  more  equitable  arrangement. 


*    Mr,  Stu:i:f  b 


spoi: 


•js 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  III. 


However,  amidst  all  this  confusion  and  violencp,  the 
plan  of  uiiitinij  to  form  a  central  iiovernmrnt  trained 
ground  all  overtlie  kingdom.  Seville,  Catalonia,  Ara- 
gon,  Miircia.  Valencia,  and  Asturias,  appointed  their  dep- 
uties, and  althoujrh  fresh  disputes  relative  to  ttie  place 
of  assembly  arose,  after  some  time  it  was  atrreed  to 
m<el  at  Aranjuez.  This  royal  residence  was  chosen 
contrary  to  the  wishes  of  many,  and  notahly  ao^ainst 
the  opinion  of  Jovellanos.  an  eloquent  person,  and  of 
great  reputation  for  intfo-rity,  but  of  a  pertinacious 
temper,  unsuitable  to  the  times:  he  urged,  that  the  capi- 
tal was  the  meetest  spot,  and  he  was  answered,  that 
the  turbulent  disposition  nf  the  inhabitants  of  Madrid 
would  impede  the  formation  of  a  government,  and  that 
the  same  objection  would  exist  against  the  choice  of 
any  other  large  town.  It  is  extraordinary  tliat  such  an 
argument  should  be  held  in  Spain  at  a  moment  when 
the  people  were,  in  all  the  oflicial  and  public  papers, 
represented  as  perfectly  enthusiastic  and  united  in  one 
common  sacred  pursuit,  and  in  the  British  parliament 
were  denominated  the  '  universal  Spanish  nation  !' 

To  srek  thus  for  protection  in  a  corner,  instead  of 
manfully  aid  confidently  identifying  themselves  with 
the  pecple,  and  ccuriingf  publicity,  augured  ill  for  the 
intentions  of  the  deputies,  nor  was  the  augury  belied 
by  the  event.  The  junta  of  Seville,  who  had  so  bit- 
terly reviled  the  council  of  Castille,  for  having  par- 
tially submitted  to  the  usurper,  had  notwithstanding, 
chosen  for  their  own  deputies,  don  Vincent  Hore,  a 
known  creature  of  the  prince  of  peace,  and  the  count 
de  Tilly  Guzman,  who  was  under  the  stigma  of  a  ju- 
dicial sentence  for  robbery.*  Hore  declined  the  ap- 
pointment, hut  Tilly,  braving  the  public  disgust,  repair- 
ed to  Aranjuez,  and  his  place  as  resident  with  the 
head-quarters  of  the  Andalusian  army  was  filled  up 
by  Mifiiano,  another  member  of  the  junta,  who  receiv- 
ed an  enormous  salary  for  performing  the  mischievous 
duties  of  that  office.  The  instructions  given  by  the 
different  provinces  to  the  deputies  were  to  confine  their 
deliberations  and  votes  to  such  subjects  as  they  should, 
from  time  to  time,  receive  directions  from  their  constit- 
uents to  treat  of,  and  Seville  again  took  the  lead  in  this 
fraudulent  policy  :  and  when  public  indignation,  and 
the  remonstrances  of  some  rigiit-minded  persons, 
obligred  the  juntas  of  that  town  and  of  Valencia,  to  re- 
scind these  instructions,  both  substitiited  secret  orders 
of  the  same  lencr.  In  short,  the  greater  part  of  the 
deputies  were  the  mere  tools  of  the  juntas,  agents, 
watciiing  over  the  interests  of  their  employers,  and, 
conscious  of  demerit,  anxious  to  hide  themselves  from 
the  just  indiuiiation  of  the  public  until  they  had  conso- 
lidated their  power;  hence  the  dislike  to  large  towns, 
and  the  intrigues  for  fixing  the  government  at  Aranjuez. 
Count  Florida  Rlanca,  a  man  in  the  last  stage  of  de- 
crepitude, was  chosen  first  president  in  rotation  fir 
three  months,  and  all  idea  of  forming  an  independent 
executive  was  abandoned  ;  for  when  Jovellanos  pro- 
posed to  estaidish  a  reirency  selected  from  their  own 
body,  his  plan  was  rejected  on  the  ground  that  the 
members  were  not  authorised  to  delegate  their  powers 
even  to  one  another:  it  was  palpable  that  the  juntas 
had  merely  appeared  to  comply  with  the  public  wish 
for  a  central  government,  but  were  determined  not  to 
part  with  one  iota  of  their  own  real  pf)wer. 

The  first  act  of  authority  executed  by  the  assembly, 
was  a  necessary  assertion  of  its  own  dignity,  which  had 
been  violated  in  the  case  of  Valdez  Cuesta,  who  was 
personally  unpopul'.'.r.  and  feared  by  the  central,  as  well 
as  by  the  provincihl  juntas,  was  summoned  to  release 
his  captive,  and  to  repair  to  Aranjuez,  that  cognizance 
might  be  taken  of  his  proceedings  ;  he  was  at  the 
same  time  denounced  by  tlie  juntas  of  C'astille  and 
Leon  as  a  traitor,  and  exposed  to  great  danger  of  pop- 

*   Co'.fc'n  Cam  fpondenre. 


ular  commotion.  At  first,  he  hauahrily  repelled  the 
interference  of  Castanos  and  Florida  Blanca,  yet  final- 
ly he  was  forced  to  bend,  and  after  a  sharp  correspon- 
dence with  Mr.  Stuart,  whose  influence  was  usefully 
employed  to  strengthen  the  central  government,  he  re- 
leased his  prisoner,  and  quitting  the  comiuand  of  the 
army,  appeared  at  Aranjuez.*  No  formal  proceedings 
were  had  upon  the  case,  but  after  much  mutual  recrim 
ination,  Valdez  was  admitted  to  the  exercise  of  his 
functions,  and  the  old  general  was  detained  at  the  seat 
of  government,  a  kind  of  state  prisoner  at  large,  until, 
for  the  misfortune  of  his  country,  he  was,  by  subse- 
quent events,  once  more  placed  at  the  head  of  an  army. 
About  this  time  lord  William  Bentinck  joined  Mr. 
Stuart  at  Madrid.  Perfectly  coinciding  in  opinions, 
they  laboured  earnestly  to  give  a  favourable  turn  to  af- 
fairs, by  directing  the  attention  of  the  central  junta  to 
the  necessity  of  military  preparations,  and  active  exer- 
tion for  defence  ;  but  the  picture  of  discord,  folly,  and 
improvidence  exhibited  in  the  provinces,  was  here  dis- 
played in  more  glaring  colours.  The  lesser  tribunals 
heing  called  upon  to  acknowledge  the  authority  of  the 
assembled  deputies,  readily  obeyed,  and  the  council  of 
Castille,  reluctant  to  submit,  yet  too  weak  to  resist, 
endeavoured  to  make  terms,  but  was  forced  to  an  nn- 
conclitional  submission.  A  good  management  of  the 
revenue,  a  single  chief  for  the  army,  and,  above  all, 
the  total  suppression  of  the  provincial  juntas,  were  the 
three  next  objects  of  public  anxiety. f  With  respect 
to  the  army,  no  doubt  was  at  first  entertained  that  Cas- 
tanos would  be  appointed  commander-in-chief,  his  ser- 
vices entitled  him  to  the  office,  and  his  general  moder- 
ation and  conciliating  manners  fitted  him  for  it  at  a 
time  when  so  much  jealous}'  was  to  be  soothed,  and  so 
I  many  interests  to  be  reconciled.  The  past  expei;d*tvire 
of  the  money  received  from  England  was  also  a  Piib- 
ject  of  great  importance,  and  it  was  loudly  required  loat 
an  account  of  its  disbursement  should  be  demanded  ol' 
the  local  juntas,  and  a  surrender  of  the  residue  inst..ntlj 
enforced. 

These  just  expectations  lasted  but  a  short  time. 
Scarcely  were  the  deputies  assembled,  when  every 
prospect  of  a  vigorous  administration  was  blasted.:}:  Di- 
viding themselves  into  sections,  answering  in  number 
to  the  departments  cf  state  under  the  old  king,  they  ap- 
pointed a  secretary  not  chosen  from  their  own  body,  to 
each,  and  declared  all  and  every  one  of  these  sections 
supreme  and  independent,  having  equal  authorit)-. 

Florida  Blanca  informed  I\Ir.  Stuart  and  lord  Wil- 
liam Bentinck  that  Caslafos  would  be  named  general- 
issimo, and  the  two  last  named  were  even  directed  to 
confer  upon  the  plan  of  campaign  for  the  British  troops, 
then  marching  from  Portugal  to  the  assistance  of  the 
Spaniards.  The  necessity  of  having  a  single  chief  at 
the  head  of  the  armies  was  imperious,  and  acknowl- 
edged by  every  individual,  military  or  civil,  yet  such 
was  the  force  of  jealousy,  and  so  stubborn  were  the 
tools  of  the  different  junt.is,  that  in  despite  of  the  ex- 
ertions of  Mr.  Stuart  and  lord  William  Bentinck,  and 
the  influence  of  the  Bri'isli  cabinet,  the  generals  were 
all  confirmed  in  their  separate  and  independent  com- 
mands. The  old  and  miserable  system  of  the  Dutch 
deputies  in  Marlborough's  time,  and  of  the  commissa- 
ries of  tlie  convention  during  the  French  revolution, 
was  partially  revived;  and  the  English  government 
were  totally  disregarded,  at  a  time  when  it  had  sup- 
plied Spain  with  two  hundred  thousand  muskets,  clo- 
thing, ammunition  of  all  kinds,  in  proportion,  and  six- 
teen millions  of  dollars. !|  Such  ample  succours,  if 
rightly  managed,  ought  to  have  secured  unlimited  in- 
fluence ;  but  as  the  benefits  came  through   one  set  of 


*  Mr.  Stuart's  Correspondence.  Colonel  Graham's  Ditto. 
+  Mr.  Stuart's  Correspondence.  t   Ibid. 

II  Mr.  Canning's  Instructions  to  Mr.  Du.T,  MSS. 


1808.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR, 


79 


persons,  r.r.d  'he  doma'ds  throutrli  another,  the  first  were 
taken  as  :f  ritrh'..  *he  hist  unheeded,  and  thus  the  re- 
sources of  Great  Britain  were  wasted  without  materi- 
ally improving  the  condition  of  Spain.  The  armies 
were  destitute,  the  central  ofovernment  was  without 
credit,  and  notwithstanding  the  ample  subsidies,  had 
contracted  a  larije  debt ;  yet  with  an  insolence  of  tone 
appertaining  rather  to  conquerors  dictating  terms,  than 
to  grateful  allies  demanding  further  assistance,  they 
rcfjuired  from  England  an  instant  gift  of  ten  millions 
of  dollars,  and  stores  to  an  amount  that  would  have 
sufficed  a  well-governed  army  for  many  years. 

The  provincial  juntas  were  still  permitted  to  retain 
tlieir  power  within  their  own  districts,  and  the  greatest 
timidity  marked  all  the  proceedings  of  the  central  gov- 
ernment in  relation  to  those  obnoxious  bodies.  Atten- 
tive, however,  to  their  own  interests,  the  members  of 
the  supreme  junta  decreed,  1st.  that  their  persons 
should  be  inviolable;  2d.  that  the  president  should 
have  the  title  of  highness,  with  a  salary  of  25.000 
crowns  a-year ;  3d.  that  each  of  the  deputies,  taking 
the  title  of  excellency,  should  have  a  yearly  salary  of 
5000  crowns  ;  lastly,  that  the  collective  body  should 
be  addressed  by  the  title  of  majesty.*  Thinking  that 
they  were  then  sufficiently  confirmed  in  power  to  ven- 
ture upon  a  public  entry  into  Madrid,  they  made  prepa- 
rations to  ensure  a  favourable  reception  from  the  popu- 
lace ;  that  is,  they  resolved  to  declare  a  general  amnesty, 
to  lower  the  duties  on  tobacco,  and  to  fling  large  sums 
among  the  people  during  the  procession  ;  and  in  the 
midst  of  all  this  pomp  and  vainty,  the  presence  of  the 
enemy  on  the  soil  was  scarcely  remembered,  and  the 
details  of  business  were  totally  neglected. |  This  last 
was  a  prominent  evil  which  extended  to  the  lowest 
branches  of  administration  ;  self-interest,  indeed,  pro- 
duced abundance  of  activity,  but  every  department,  al- 
most every  man,  seemed  struck  with  tor])or  when  the 
public  weltlire  was  at  stake,  and  withal,  an  astonishing 
presumption  was  common  to  the  highest  and  the  lowest. 

To  supply  the  place  cf  a  generalissimo,  a  council,  or 
board  of  general  officers  was  prnjected,  on  whose  re- 
ports the  junta  proposed  to  regulate  the  military  ope- 
rations. Castafios  was  destined  to  be  president,  but 
some  difficulty  arising  relative  to  the  appointment  of 
the  other  members,  the  execution  of  the  plan  was  de- 
ferred, with  the  characteristic  remark,  'that  when  the 
enemy  was  driven  across  the  frontier,  Castaiios  would 
have  leisure  to  take  his  seat.':j:  The  idea  of  a  defeat, 
the  possibility  of  failure,  never  entered  their  minds; 
the  government,  evincing  neither  apprehension,  nor  ac- 
tivity, nor  foresight,  were  contented  if  the  people  be- 
lieved the  daily  falsehoods  they  promulgated  relative 
to  the  enemy,  and  the  people,  equally  presumptuous, 
were  content  to  be  so  deceived  ;  in  fine,  all  the  symp- 
toms of  a  ruined  cause  were  already  visible  to  discern- 
ing eyes.  The  armies  nt^glected  even  to  nakedness; 
the  soldier's  constancy  under  privations  cruelly  abused  ; 
disunion,  cupidity,  incapacity,  in  the  higher  orders;  the 
patriotic  ardour  visibly  abating  among  the  lower  class- 
es ;  the  rulers  crasping,  improvident,  boasting;  the 
enemy  powerful,  the  people  insubordinate,  the  fighting 
men  without  arms  or  bread  ;  as  a  whole,  and  in  all  its 
parts,  the  government  unfitted  for  its  task  ;  the  system, 
cumbrous  and  ostentatious,  was.  to  use  the  comprehen- 
sive words  of  Mr.  Stuart,  'neither  calculated  to  inspire 
courage  nor  to  increase  enthusiasm.' 

The  truth  of  this  picture  will  be  recognized  by  men 
who  are  yet  living,  and  whose  exertions  were  as  inces- 
sant as  unavailing  to  remedy  those  evils  at  the  time  ;  it 
will  be  recoiiuizpd  by  the  friends  of  a  great  man,  who 
fell  a  victim  to  the  folly  and  base  intrigues  of  the  day; 
it  will  be  recognized  by  that  general  and  army,  who, 


*   Stuar;'s  Corrpspnndence.     Lord  W.  Bentinck's  Ditto, 
■j  Lorv  AV.  Bentinok's  Correspon'.eiice.  \  IbiJ. 


winning  their  own  unaided  way  through  Spain,  found 
that  to  trust  Spaniards  in  war  w^as  to  lean  acrainsi  a 
broken  reed.  To  others  it  may  appear  exatrgeratcd,  for 
without  having  seen,  it  is  difficult  to  believe  the  extent 
of  a  disorder  that  par&lyzed  the  enthusiasm  of  a  whole 
people. 

EXTERNAL  POLITICAL  RELATIONS  OF  SPAIN. 

At  first  these  were  of  necessity  confined  to  England, 
Sicily,  and  Portugal  ;  the  rest  of  the  Old  World  was 
either  subject  to  Buonaparte  or  directly  under  his  in-° 
fluence,  but  in  the  New  World  it  was  diffi^rent.  The 
Brazils,  after  the  emigration  of  the  royal  family  of  Bra- 
ganza,  became  important  under  every  point  of  view,  and 
relations  were  established  between  the  junta  and  that 
court,  that  afterwards,  under  the  cortez,  created  consid- 
erable interest,  and  threatened  serious  embarrassments 
to  the  operations  of  the  duke  of  Wellington.  The  ul- 
tra-marine possessions  of  Spain  were  also,  of  course, 
a  matter  of  great  anxiety  to  both  sides,  and  Napoleon's 
activity  balanced  the  natural  preponderance  of  the 
mother-country.  The  slowness  of  the  local  juntas,  or 
rather  their  want  of  capacity  to  conduct  sucli  an  alfair, 
gave  the  enemy  a  great  advantage,  and  it  was  only  ow- 
ing to  the  exertions  of  .Mr.  Stuart  in  the  north,  and  of  sir 
Hew  Dalrymple  and  lord  Collingwood  in  the  south, 
that,  after  the  insurrection  broke  out,  vessels  were  des- 
patched to  South  America  to  confirm  the  colonists  in 
their  adherence  to  Spain,  and  to  arrange  the  mcde  of 
securing  the  resources  of  those  great  possessions  lor 
the  parent  state.*  The  hold  which  Spain  retained  over 
her  colonies  was,  however,  very  slight;  her  harsh  re- 
strictive system  had  long  before  weakened  the  attach- 
ment of  the  South  Americans,  and  the  expedition  of 
Miranda,  althouofh  unsuccessful,  had  kindled  a  fire 
which  could  not  be  extinguished;  it  was  apparent  to 
all  able  statesmen,  that  Spain  must  relinquish  her  ar- 
bitrary mode  of  governing,  or  relinquish  the  colonies 
altogether;  the  insurrection  at  home  only  rendered  this 
more  certain,  every  argument,  every  public  manifesto 
put  forth  in  Europe,  to  animate  the  Spaniards  against 
foreign  aggression,  told  against  them  in  America;  yet 
for  a  time  the  latter  transmitted  the  produce  of  the 
mines,  and  many  of  the  natives  served  in  the  Spanish 
armies. 

Napoleon,  notwithstanding  his  activity,  and  the  of- 
fers which  he  made  of  the  viceroyalty  of  Mexico  to 
Cuesta,  Castanos,  Blake,  and  probably  to  others  resid- 
ing in  that  country,  failed  to  create  a  French  party  of 
any  consequence  ;  for  the  Americans  were  unwilling  to 
plunge  into  civil  strife  for  a  less  object  than  their  own 
independence.  The  arrogance  and  injustice  of  Old 
Spain,  however,  increased,  rather  than  diminished,  un- 
der the  sway  of  the  insurrectional  government ;  and  at 
last,  as  it  is  well  known,  a  general  rebellion  of  the 
South  American  states  established  the  independence 
of  the  fairest  portion  of  the  globe,  and  proved  how  lit- 
tle the  abstract  love  of  freedom  influenced  the  resist- 
ance of  the  old  country  to  Napoleon. 

The  Spanish  intercourse  with  the  Enorlish  court, 
which  had  been  hitherto  carried  on  through  the  medi- 
um of  the  deputies,  who  first  arrived  in  Lonaon  to 
claim  assistance,  was  now  plact^d  upon  a  regular  foot 
ing.  The  deputies  themselves,  at  the  desire  of  Mr, 
Canning,  were  recalled,  admiral  A[)odaca  was  appoint- 
ed minister  plenipotentiary  at  St.  .lames's,  and  Mr. 
•John  Hookham  Frere  was  accredited,  with  the  same 
diplomatic  rank,  near  the  central  junta.  Mr.  Stuart, 
whose  knowledge  of  the  state  of  the  coimtry,  whose 
acquaintance  with  the  character  of  the  leading  persons, 
and  whose  able  and  energetic  exertions  had  so  much 
contributed  to  the  foranation  of  a  central  government, 
was  superseded  by  this  injudicious  appointment;  and 
thus  the  great  political   machine,  with   every  wiieel   in 


»  Mr.  Stuart's  Oorrcspon'ciicc,  MS.     Sir  Hew  1;  Ir^uiple. 


80 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR, 


[Book  III. 


violent  action,  was,  at  the  most  critical  moment,  left 
without  any  controllinor  power  or  ornidin^  influence. 
For  Mr.  Stuart,  who,  on  his  own  responsibility,  had 
quitted  Coruna,  ami  repnired  to  Madrid,  and  hadrem.it- 
led  the  most  exact  and  important  information  of  what 
was  passing,  remained  for  three  months  witliout  receiv- 
ing a  single  line  from  Mr.  Canning,  approving  or  dis- 
approving of  his  proceedings,  or  giving  him  instr;;c- 
tions  how  to  act  at  this  important  crisis  :  a  strange 
remissness,  indicating  the  bewildered  state  of  the  min- 
isters, who  slowly  and  with  difficulty  followed,  when 
they  should  have  been  prepared  to  lead.  Their  tardy 
abortive  me.isures  demonstrated,  how  wide  the  space 
between  a  sophist  and  a  statesman,  and  how  danger- 
ous to  a  nation  is  that  public  feeling,  which,  insatiable  of 
words,  disregards  the  actions  of  men,  esteeming  more 
the  interested  eloquence  and  wit  of  an  orator  like  De- 
mades,  than  the  simple  integrity,  sound  judgment,  and 
great  exploits  of  a  general  like  Phocion. 

Such  were  the  preparations  made  by  Spain,  in  Sep- 
tember and  October,  to  meet  the  exigencies  of  a  period 
replete  with  danger  and  difficulty.  It  would  be  instruc- 
tive to  contrast  the  exertions  of  the  '  enthusiastic  Span- 
iards' during  these  three  months  of  their  insurrection, 
with  the  efforts  of 'discontented  France'  in  the  hundred 
days  of  Napo'eon's  second  reign.  The  junta  were, 
however,  net  devoid  of  ambition,  for  before  the  battle 
of  Baylen.  that  of  Seville  was  occupied  with  a  project 
of  annexing  the  Algarves  to  Spain,  and  the  treaty  of 
Fontainebleau  was  far  from  being  considered  as  a 
dead  letter. 


CHAPTER  III. 

Polit'c:il  position  cf  Napoleon:  he  resolves  to  crush  the  Span- 
iunls  ;  lis  t  iiergy  and  artivity;  marches  his  armies  from 
tT.  ry  p;irt  o:  Europe  towards  Spain;  his  oration  to  his  sol- 
citrs — CuniVrence  at  Ert'urth — Negotiations  for  peace — 
r<  till  ii.t  rc>ncluct  of  Mr.  Canning — 160,000  conscripts  en- 
rollijtl  in  France — }*3\ver  of  that  country — Napoleon's  speech 
tothesf  natf — He.  leprsirsto  Bayonne — Reniissnessof  theEng- 
lisH  cabini-t — Sir  John  Moore  appointed  to  lead  an  armv 
int'J  Spain  ;  senrls  his  artillery  by  the  Madrid  road,  and 
marches  hiinsi  If  by  AlmeiJa — The  central  junta  impatient 
f;)r  t'le  rrr  v;il  of  the  Engl.sh  army — Sir  David  Baird  arrives 
nt  (.'oruna  ;  is  refused  permission  to  di«embark  his  troops — 
Mr.  Frerj-  and  the  in::rquis  of  Ronnna  arrive  at  Coruna  ;  ac- 
count of  the  lat  er  s  escape  from  the  Drnish  Isles — Central 
junta  resolved  not  to  appoint  a  generulissiuio — Gloomy  aspect 
cf  aiji:s. 

Napoleon,  surprised  and  chagrined  at  the  disgrace 
which,  for  the  first  time,  his  armies  had  sustained,  was 
yet  nofliinsr  di:;mayed  by  a  resistance  which  he  had 
early  contemplat»d  as  not  improbable.*  With  a  pier- 
cing glance  he  had  observed  the  efforts  of  Spain,  cal- 
culated the  power  of  toreign  influence  in  keeping  alive 
the  spirit  of  rrsistance,  and  assigning  a  just  value  to 
tlie  succours  which  England  could  afford,  foresaw  the 
danger  which  might  accrue,  if  he  suffered  an  insur- 
rection of  peasants,  which  had  already  dishonoured 
the  glory  of  his  arm.s,  to  attain  the  consistency  cf  reg- 
ular government,  to  league  with  powerful  nations,  and 
to  become  disciplined  troops.  To  defeat  the  raw  lev- 
ies which  the  Spaniards  had  hitherto  opposed  to  his 
soldiers  was  an  easy  matter,  but  it  was  necessary  to 
crush  them  to  atoms,  that  a  dread  of  his  invincible 
power  might  still  pervade  the  world,  and  the  secret  in- 
fluence of  his  genius  remain  unabated.  The  constitu- 
tion of  Bayonne  would,  he  was  aware,  weigh  heavy  in 
the  scale  against  those  chaotic  governments,  neither 
monarchical,  nor  popular,  nor  aristocratic,  nor  federal, 
which  the  Spanish  revolution  was  throwing  up ;  but 
before  the  benefit  of  that  could  fce  felt  b)'  the  many, 
before  he  could  draw  any  advantages  from  his  moral 


*   Letter  to  Ttlurat.  las  Case*. 


resources,  it  was  necessary  to  develop  all  his  militar) 
strength. 

'I'he  moment  was  critical  and  dangerous.  He  was 
surrounded  by  enemies  whose  pride  he  had  wounded, 
but  whose  means  of  offence  he  had  not  destroyed;  if 
he  bent  his  forces  again.st  the  Peninsula,  Enoland  might 
ag-.iin  excite  the  continent  to  arms,  and  Kussia  and 
Austria,  once  mo're  handing  togrethrr,  mi<rht  raise  Prus- 
sia and  renew  the  eternal  coalitions.  The  designs  of 
Austria,  although  covered  by  the  usual  artifices  of  that 
cunning,  rapacious  court,  were  not  so  hidden  but  that, 
earlier  or  later,  a  war  with  her  was  to  be  expected  as  a 
certain  event,  and  the  inhabitants  of  Prussia,  subdued 
and  oppressed,  could  net  be  supposed  tranquil.  The 
secret  societies  that,  under  the  name  of  Tugenbuntie, 
Gymnasiasts,  and  other  denominations,  have  since  been 
persecuted  by  those  who  were  then  glad  to  avail  them- 
selves of  such  assistnnce,  were  just  beginning  to  dis- 
close their  force  and  plans.*  Aharon  do  Nostiz,  Stein 
the  Prussian  councillor  of  state,  generr.Is  Sharnhost 
and  Gneizenan,and  colonel  Schill,  apper^r  to  have  been 
the  principal  contrivers  and  pptrors  cf  thc'e  societies, 
so  characteristic  of  Germans,  who,  regular  and  plod- 
ding even  to  a  proverb  in  their  actions,  possess  the 
most  extravagant  imaginations  of  any  people  en  the 
face  of  the  earth.  But  whatever  the  ulterior  views  of 
these  associaticns  may  have  been,  at  this  period  they  were 
universally  inimical  to  the  French  ;  their  intent  was  to 
drive  the  latter  over  the  Rhine,  and  they  were  a  source 
of  peril  to  the  emperor,  the  more  to  be  feared,  as  the 
extent  of  their  influence  could  not  be  immediately  as- 
certained. Russia,  little  injured  by  her  losses,  was 
more  powerful  perhaps  from  her  defeats,  because  more 
enlightened  as  to  the  cause  of  them.  Napoleon  felt 
that  it  would  tax  all  his  means  to  repel  the  hostility  of 
such  a  great  empire,  and  that,  consequently,  his  Span- 
ish operations  must  he  confined  in  a  manner  unsuita- 
ble to  the  fame  of  his  arms.  With  a  long-sighted  poli- 
cy, he  had,  however,  prepared  the  means  of  obviating 
this  danger,  by  what  has  been  called  the  conference  at 
Erfurth,  w  hither  he  now  repaired  to  meet  the  czar,  crn- 
fiding  in  the  resources  of  his  genius  for  securing  the 
friendship  of  that  monarch. 

At  this  period,  it  may  be  truly  said,  that  Naptdeon 
supported  the  weight  of  the  world  ;  every  movement 
of  his  produced  a  political  convulsion  ;  yet  so  sure,  so 
confident  was  he,  of  his  intellectual  superiority,  that  he 
sought  hut  to  gain  one  step,  and  doubted  not  to  over- 
come all  resistance,  and  preserve  his  ascendancy  ;  time 
was  to  him  victory,  if  he  gained  the  one,  the  other  fol- 
lowed :  hence,  sudden  and  prompt  in  execution,  he 
made  one  of  those  gigantic  efforts  which  have  stamped 
this  age  with  the  greatness  of  antiquity.  TTis  armies 
were  scattered  over  p]urope.  In  Italy,  in  Dalmatia.  on 
the  Rhine,  the  Danube,  the  Elbe  ;  in  Prussia,  Den- 
mark, Poland,  his  legions  were  to  be  found  ;  over  that 
vast  extent,  above  five  hundred  thousand  disciplined 
men  maintained  the  supremacy  of  France.  From  those 
bands  he  drew  the  imperial  guards,  the  select  soldiers 
of  the  warlike  nation  he  g(  verned.  the  terror  of  the 
other  continental  troops  ;  these  and  the  veterans  of  .le- 
na,  of  Austcrlitz.  of  Friedland,  reduced  in  number,  but 
of  confirmed  hardihood,  were  marched  towards  Spain  ; 
a  host  of  cavalry,  unequalled  for  enterprise  and  knowl- 
edge of  war,  were  also  directed  agrainst  that  devoted 
land,  and  a  long  train  of  gallant  soldiers  followed,  until 
two  hundred  thousand  men,  accustomed  to  battle,  had 
penetrated  the  gloomy  fastnesses  of  the  western  Pyre- 
nees, while  forty  thousand  of  inferior  reputation,  drawn 
from  the  interior  vf  France,  frrm  Naples,  from  Tusca- 
ny, and  from  Piedmont,  assembled  on  the  eastern 
ridges  of  those  giganlic  hills.  The  march  of  this  mul- 
titude was  incessant,  and  as  the  troops  passed  the  capi- 


»  r.an 


in  s  (.Lnipaij;!).  18;3. 


:»08.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


81 


tal.  Napoleon,  neglectful  of  nothing  which  could  excite 
their  courage,  and  swell  their  military  pride,  addressed 
to  them  one  of  his  nervous  orations.  In  the  tranquilli- 
ty of  peace  it  may  seem  inflated,  but  on  the  eve  of  bat- 
tle it  is  thus  a  general  should  speak. 

'  Soldiers  !  after  triumphing  on  the  banks  of  the 
Vistula  and  the  Danube,  witii  rapid  steps  you  have 
passed  through  Germany.  This  day,  without  a  mo- 
ment of  repose,  I  command  you  to  traverse  France. 
Soldiers  !  I  have  need  of  you  !  The  hideous  presence 
of  the  leopard  contaminates  the  peninsula  of  Spain  and 
Portugal.  In  terror  he  must  fly  before  you.  Let  us 
bear  our  triumphal  eagles  to  the  pillars  of  Hercules; 
there  also  we  have  injuries  to  avenge  !  Soldiers  !  you 
have  surpassed  the  renown  of  modern  armies,  but  have 
}ou  yet  equalled  the  glory  of  these  Romans,  who,  in 
one  and  the  same  campaign,  were  victorious  upon  the 
Rhine  and  the  Euphrates,  in  Illyria  and  upon  the  Ta- 
gus  ]  A  long  peace,  a  lasting  prosperity,  shall  be  the 
reward  of  your  labours,  but  a  real  Frenchman  could  not, 
ought  not,  to  rest  until  the  seas  are  free  and  open  to  all. 
Soldiers!  all  that  you  have  done,  all  that  you  will  do, 
for  the  happiness  of  the  French  people,  and  for  my  glo- 
ry, shall  be  eternal  in  my  heart !' 

Thus  saying,  he  sent  his  army  towards  the  frontiers 
of  Spain,  and  himself  hastened  to  meet  the  emperor 
Alexander  at  Erfurth.  Their  conference,  conducted 
upon  the  footing  of  intimate  friendship,  produced  a 
treaty  of  alliance  offensive  and  defensive,  and  the  fate 
of  Spain  was,  by  the  one,  with  calm  indifference, 
abandoned  to  the  injustice  of  the  other  ;  but  the  acces- 
sion of  strength  with  this  treaty,  and  the  manifest  per- 
sonal partiality  of  Alexander,  gave  to  the  French 
emperor,  inspired  him  perhaps  with  the  idea,  that  the 
English  cabinet  would,  if  a  fair  occasion  offered,  glad- 
ly enter  into  negotiations  for  a  general  peace. 

The  two  emperors  wrote  a  joint  letter  to  the  king  of 
England.  '  The  circumstances  of  Europe  had,'  they 
said,  '  brought  them  together  ;  their  first  thought  was 
to  yir-ld  to  the  wish  and  the  wants  of  every  people,  and 
to  seek,  in  a  speedy  pacification,  the  most  efficacious 
remedy  for  the  miseries  which  oppressed  all  nations. 
The  long  and  bloody  war  which  had  torn  the  continent 
»"as  at  an  end,  without  the  possibility  of  being  renew- 
ed. If  many  changes  had  taken  place  in  Europe,  if 
many  states  had  been  overthrown,  the  cause  was  to  be 
found  in  the  state  of  agitation  and  misery  in  which  the 
stagnation  of  maritime  commerce  had  placed  the  great- 
est nations  ;  still  greater  changes  might  yet  take  place, 
and  all  of  them  contrary  to  the  policy  of  the  English 
nation.  Peace,  then,  was,  at  once,  the  interest  of  the 
people  of  the  continent,  as  it  was  the  interest  of  the 
people  of  Great  Britain.  We  entreat  your  majesty,' 
they  concluded,  '  we  unite  to  entreat  your  majesty  to 
listen  to  the  voice  of  humanity,  to  silence  that  of  the 
passions,  to  seek,  with  the  intention  of  arriving  at  that 
object;  to  conciliate  all  interests,  and  thus,  preserving 
all  powers  which  exist,  insure  the  happiness  of  Europe 
and  of  this  generation,  at  the  head  of  which  Providence 
has  placed  us.' 

To  this  joint  letter  Mr.  Canning  replied  by  two  let- 
ters addressed  to  the  French  and  Russian  ministers, 
accompanied  by  an  official  note.  In  that  addressed  to 
the  Russian,  he  observed  that,  '  however  desirous  the 
king  might  be  to  reply  personally  to  the  emperor,  he 
was  prevented  by  the  unusual  mode  of  communication 
adopted,  which  had  deprived  it  of  a  private  and  person- 
al character.  It  was  impossible  to  pay  that  mark  of 
respect  to  the  emperor,  without  at  the  same  time  ac- 
knowledging titles  which  he  had  never  acknowledged. 
The  proposition  for  peace  would  be  communicated  to 
Sweden,  and  to  the  existing  government  of  Spain.  It 
was  necessary  that  his  majesty  should  receive  an  im- 
mediate assurance,  that  France  acknowh'dged  the 
government   of  Spai"   '^s   a   party   to   the   negotiation. 


That  such  was  the  intention  of  the  emperot  could  not 
be  doubted,  when  the  lively  interest  manifested  by  his 
imperial  majesty  for  the  welfare  and  dignity  of  the 
Spanish  monarchy  was  recollected.  No  other  assur- 
ance was  wanted,  that  the  emperor  could  not  have  been 
induced  to  sanction  by  his  concurrence  or  approbation, 
usurpations,  the  principles  of  which  were  not  less  un- 
just than  their  example  was  dangerous  to  all  legitimate 
sovereigns.' 

The  letter  addressed  to  Mons.  de  Champagny,  dtjke 
of  Cadore,  merely  demanded  that  Sweden  and  Spain 
should  be  admitted  as  parties  to  the  negotiation.  The 
official  note  commenced  by  stating  the  king's  desire  for 
peace,  on  terms  consistent  with  his  honour,  his  fidelity 
to  his  engagements,  and  the  permanent  repose  of  Eu- 
rope. "  The  miserable  condition  of  the  continent,  the 
convulsions  it  had  experienced,  and  those  with  which 
it  was  threatened,  were  not  imputable  to  his  majesty 
If  the  cause  of  so  much  misery  was  to  be  found  in  the 
stagnation  of  commercial  intercourse,  although  his  ma- 
jesty could  710/  be  expected  to  hear  with  tmqun/ijied  re- 
gret, that  the  system,  devised  for  the  destruction  of  the 
commerce  of  his  subjects,  had  recoiled  upon  its  authora 
or  its  instruments;  yet,  as  it  was  neither  the  disposi- 
tion of  his  majesty,  nor  in  the  character  of  the  people 
over  whom  he  reigned,  to  rejoice  in  the  privations  and 
unhappiness  even  of  the  nations  which  were  combined 
against  him,  he  anxiously  desired  the  termination  of 
the  sufferings  of  the  continent."  The  note  then,  after 
stating  that  the  progress  of  the  war  had  imposed  new 
obligations  upon  Great  Britain,  claimed  for  Sicily,  for 
Portugal,  for  Sweden,  and  for  Spain,  a  participation  in 
the  negotiations.  "Treaties,  it  stated,  existed  with 
the  three  first,  which  bound  them  and  England  in  peace 
and  war.  With  Spain  indeed  no  formal  instrument 
had  yet  been  executed,  but  the  ties  of  honour  were,  to 
the  king  of  England,  as  strong  as  the  most  solemn 
treaties  ;  wherefore  it  was  assumed,  that  the  central 
junta,  or  government  of  Spain,  was  understood  to  be  a 
party  to  any  negotiation  in  which  his  majesty  was  in- 
vited to  engage." 

The  reply  of  Russia  was  peremptory.  The  claims 
of  the  sovereigns,  allies  of  Great  Britain,  she  would 
readily  admit.  But  the  insurgents  of  Spain,  Russia 
would  not  acknowledge  as  an  independent  power.  The 
Russians,  and  England  it  was  said  could  recollect  one 
particular  instance,  had  always  been  true  to  this  prin- 
ciple; moreover,  the  emperor  had  acknowledged  Joseph 
Buonaparte  as  king  of  Spain,  and  was  united  to  the 
French  emperor  for  peace  and  for  war;  he  was  resolv- 
ed not  to  separate  his  interests  from  those  of  Napoleon. 
After  some  further  arguments  touching  the  question, 
the  reply  concluded  by  offering  to  treat  upon  the  basis 
of  the  'uti  possidetis,'  and  the  respective  power  of  the 
belligerent  parties,  or  upon  anyhasis,  for  the  conclusion 
of  an  honourable,  just,  and  equal  peace. 

The  insulting  tone  of  Mr.  Canning's  communication 
produced  an  insulting  reply  from  Mons.  de  Champag- 
ny, which  also  finished  by  proposing  the  '  uti  posside- 
tis' as  a  basis  for  a  treaty,  and  expressing  a  hope,  that 
without  lOsing  sight  of  the  inevitable  results  of  the 
force  of  states,  it  would  be  remembered,  that  between 
great  powers  there  could  be  no  solid  peace  but  that 
which  was  equal  and  honourable  for  both  parties. 
Upon  the  receipt  of  these  replies,  the  English  minister 
broke  oflTthe  negotiations,  and  all  chance  of  peace  van- 
ished ;  but  previous  to  the  conclusion  of  this  remark- 
able correspondence,  Napoleon  had  returned   to  Paris. 

What  his  real  views  in  proposing  to  treat  were,  it  is 
difficult  to  determine.  He  could  not  have  expected 
that  Great  Britain  would  relinquish  the  cause  of  Spain  ; 
he  must  therefore  have  been  prepared  to  make  some 
arrangement  upon  that  head,  unless  the  whole  proceed- 
ing was  an  artifice  to  sow  distrust  amonff  his  enemies. 
Tlie  English   ministers   asserted    that  U  was  so,  but 


82 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR, 


[Book  III. 


what  enemies  were  they  amoncr  whom  he  could  create 
this  uneasy  feeling T  Sweden,  Sicily,  Portugal!  the 
notion  as  applied  to  them  was  ahsurd  ;  it  is  more  pro- 
bable that  he  was  sincere.  He  said  so  at  St.  Helena, 
and  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  the  period  at  which 
the  conferences  of  Krfurth  took  place,  warrant  a  belief 
in  that  assertion.*  The  menacing  aspect  of  Austria,  the 
recent  loss  of  Portug-al,  the  hitherto  successful  insurrec- 
tion of  Spain,  the  secret  societies  of  Germany,  the  de- 
sire of  consolidating  the  Polish  dominions,  and  placing, 
•while  lie  miirhl,  a  barrier  to  the  power  of  Russia  on 
that  side,  the  breach  which  the  events  of  tlie  Peninsula 
made  in  his  continental  system  of  excluding  British 
goods,  and  the  commercial  distresses  of  Europe,  were 
cogent  reasons  for  a  peace  ;  they  might  well  cause  him 
to  be  suspicious  of  the  future,  and  render  him  anxious 
for  an  excuse  to  abandon  an  unjust  contest,  in  vvhich 
he  could  not  fail  to  sufTer  much,  and  to  risk  more  than 
he  could  g-ain.  In  securing  the  alliance  of  Russia,  he 
only  disentangled  a  part  of*  the  Gordian  knot  of  poli- 
tics ;  to  cut  the  remainder  with  his  sword  was,  at  this 
conjuncture,  a  task  which  even  he  might  have  been 
''oubtfiil  of.  The  fact  that  his  armies  were  marching 
upon  Spain,  proves  nothing  to  the  contrary  of  this  sup- 
position. Time  was  to  him  of  the  utmost  consequence. 
His  negotiations  proving  abortive,  it  would  have  been 
too  late  to  have  reinforced  his  troops  on  the  Ebro,  and 
the  event  evinced  the  prudence  of  his  measures  in  that 
respect. 

The  refusal  to  admit  the  Spaniards  as  a  party  to  the 
conferences  for  peace  is  scarcely  more  conclusive;  to 
have  done  that  would  have  been  to  resign  the  weapon 
in  his  hands  before  he  entered  the  lists.  That  England 
could  not  abandon  the  Spaniards  is  unquestionable,  but 
that  was  not  a  necessary  consequence  of  continuing  the 
negotiations.  There  was  a  bar  put  to  the  admission  of 
a  Spanish  diplomatist,  but  no  bar  was  thereby  put  to 
the  discussion  of  Spanish  interests;  the  correspondence 
of  tlie  English  minister  would  not  of  necessity  have 
compromised  Spanish  independence,  it  need  not  have 
lelaxed  in  the  slijhtest  degree  the  measures  of  hostili- 
tv.  nor  retarded  the  succours  preparing  for  the  patriots. 
And  when  we  consider  the  great  power  of  Napoleon's 
arms,  the  subtlety  and  force  of  his  genius,  the  good 
fortune  which  had  hitherto  attended  his  progress  in 
war,  the  vast  additional  strength  which  the  alliance  of 
Russia  conferred  at  the  moment;  and  when,  to  oppose 
all  this,  we  contrast  the  scanty  means  of  Spain,  and 
the  confusion  into  which  she  was  plunged,  it  does  ap- 
pear as  if  her  welfare  would  have  been  better  consulted 
by  an  appeal  to  negotiation  rather  than  to  battle.  It  is 
true  iliat  Austria  was  arming,  yet  Austria  had  been  so 
ofien  conquered,  was  so  sure  to  abandon  the  cause  of 
the  patriots,  and  every  other  cause  when  pressed  ;  so 
certain  to  sacrifice  every  consideration  of  honour  or 
faith  to  the  suggestions  of  self-interest,  that  the  inde- 
pendence of  Spain,  through  the  medium  of  war  could 
only  be  regarded  as  the  object  of  uncertain  hope;  a 
prize  to  be  gained,  if  gained  at  all,  by  wading  through 
torrents  of  blood,  and  sustaining  every  misery  that  fa- 
mine and  the  fury  of  devastatii  g  armies  could  inflict. 
To  avoid,  if  possible,  such  dreadful  evils  by  negotia- 
ting was  wor'.h  trial,  and  the  force  of  justice,  when 
urged  by  the  minister  of  a  great  nation,  would  have 
been  ditficult  to  withstand  ;  no  power,  no  ambition,  can 
resist  it  and  be  saf  •. 

But  such  an  enlarged  mode  of  proceeding  was  not  in 
accord  with  the  shifts  and  subterfuges  that  characteriz- 
ed the  policy  of  the  day,  when  it  was  thought  wise  to 
degrade  the  dignity  of  suc'i  a  correspondence  by  a  ridi- 
culous denial  of  Napoleon's  titles ;  and  praiseworthy 
lo  render  a  state  paper,  in  which  such  serious  interests 
were  discussed,  offensive  and  mean,  by  miserable  sar- 


»  O'Mcara.     Voice  from  St.  Helena,  toI. 


casm.  evincing  the  pride  of  an  author  rather  than  the 
gravity  of  a  statesman.  There  is  sound  oround  also 
for  believing  that  hope,  derived  from  a.  silly  intrigue 
carried  on  throuali  the  princess  of  Tour  and  Taxis,  with 
Talleyrand  and  some  olliers,  who  were  even  then  ready 
lo  betray  Napoleon,  was  the  real  cause  of  the  negotia- 
tion having  been  broken  off  by  Mr.  Canning.  Mr. 
Whitbread  declared  in  the  House  of  Commons,  that  he 
saw  no  reason  for  refusing  to  treat  with  France  at  that 
period,  and  although  public  clamour  afterwards  induc- 
ed him  to  explain  away  this  expression,  he  needed  not 
to  be  ashamed  of  it;  for  if  the  opinion  of  Cicero,  that 
an  unfair  peace  is  preferable  to  the  justest  war.  was 
ever  worthy  of  attention,  it  was  so  at  this  period,  when 
the  success  of  Spain  was  doubtful,  her  misery  certain, 
her  salvation  only  to  be  obtained  through  the  baptism 
of  blood  ! 

Upon  the  18th  of  October  Napoleon  returned  to 
Paris,  secure  of  the  present  friendship  and  alliance  of 
Russia,  but  uncertain  of  the  moment  when  the  stimulus 
of  English  subsidies  would  quicken  the  hostility  of 
Austria  into  life  ;  yet,  if  his  peril  was  great,  his  pre- 
parations to  meet  it  were  likewise  enormous.  He  call- 
ed out  two  conscriptions.  The  first,  taken  from  the 
classes  of  1806,  7,  8,  and  9,  afforded  eighty  thousand 
men  arrived  at  maturity  ;  these  were  destined  to  replace 
the  veterans  directed  against  Spain,  The  second,  ta- 
ken from  the  class  of  1810,  also  produced  eighty  thou- 
sand, which  were  disposed  of  as  reserves  in  the  dfpos 
of  France.*  The  French  troops  left  in  Germany  were 
then  concentrated  on  the  side  of  Austria  ;  Denmark 
was  evacuated,  and  one  hundred  thousand  soldiers 
were  withdrawn  from  the  Prussian  states.  The  army 
of  Italy  was  powerfully  reinforced,  and  placed  under 
the  command  of  prince  Eugene,  who  was  assisted  by 
marshal  Massena.  Murat  also,  who  had  succeeded 
Joseph  in  the  kingdom  of  Naples,  was  directed  to  as- 
semble a  Neapolitan  army  on  the  shores  of  Calabria, 
and  to  threaten  Sicily.  In  short,  no  measures  that  pru- 
dence could  suggest  were  neglected  by  this  wonderful 
man,  to  whom,  the  time  required  by  Austria  for  the 
mere  preparation  of  a  campaign  seemed  sufficient  for 
the  subjection  of  the  whole  Peninsula. 

The  session  of  the  legislative  body  was  opened  on 
the  24th  of  October ;  the  emperor,  in  his  speech  from 
the  throne,  after  giving  a  concise  sketch  of  the  politi- 
cal situation  of  Europe,  touched  upon  Spain.  '  In  a 
few  days  I  go,^  said  he,  '  to  put  myself  at  the  head  of 
my  armies,  and,  with  the  aid  of  God,  to  crown  the  king 
of  Spain  in  Madrid  !  to  plant  my  eagles  on  the  towers 
of  Lisbon  !'  Then  departing  from  Paris  he  repaired  lo 
Bayonne,  but  the  labours  of  his  ministers  continued  ; 
their  speeches  and  reports  more  elaborately  explicit 
than  usual,  exposed  the  vast  resources  of  France,  and 
were  well  calculated  to  impress  upon  the  minds  of  men 
the  danger  of  provoking  the  enmity  of  such  a  powerful 
nation.  From  those  documents  it  appeared  that  the 
expenses  of  the  year,  including  the  interest  of  the  na- 
tional debt,  were  under  thirty  millions  sterling,  and 
completely  covered  by  the  existing  taxes,  drawn  from 
a  metallic  currency  ; f  that  no  fresh  bur  hens  would  be 
laid  upon  the  nation ;  that  numerous  public  works  were 
in  progress  ;  that  internal  trade,  and  the  commerce 
carried  on  by  land  were  flourishing,  and  nearly  one 
million  of  men  were  in  arms  ! 

The  readiness  with  which  Mr.  Canning  broke  off 
the  negotiation  of  Erfurth,  and  defied  this  stupendous 
power,  would  lead  to  the  supposition  that  on  the  side 
of  Spain  at  least  he  was  prepared  to  encounter  it  with 
some  chance  of  success  ;  yet  no  trace  of  a  matured 
plan  is  to  be  found  in  the  instructions  lo  the  generals 
commanding  in  Portugal  previous  to  the  25th  of  Sep- 

*  Iniprrial  Decree,  llth  Sept.  18C8. 
•J-  Expose  de  I'Enipirc,  1309. 


'SO?.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


83 


teinber,  nor  was  the  project  then  adopted,  one  which 
discovered  any  adequate  knowledge  of  the  force  of  the 
enemy,  or  of  the  state  of  affairs  :  indeed  the  conduct  of 
the  cabinet  relative  to  the  Peninsula  was  scarcely  su- 
perior to  that  of  the  central  junta  itself.  Several  vague 
projects,  or  rather  speculations,  were  communicated  to 
the  frenerals  in  Portugal,  but  in  none  of  them  was  the 
strength  of  the  enen  y  alluded  to,  in  none  was  there  a 
settled  plan  of  operations  visible!  it  was  evident  that 
the  prodigious  activity  of  the  emperor  was  not  taken 
into  consideration,  and  that  a  strange  delusion  relative 
to  his  power,  or  to  his  intentions,  existed  among  the 
English  ministers. 

It  was  the  Cth  of  October  before  a  despatch,  contain- 
ing tlie  first  determinate  plan  of  campaign,  arrived  at 
Lisbon.*  Thirty  thousand  infantry  and  five  thousand 
cavalry  were  to  be  employed  in  the  north  of  Spain,  of 
which  ten  thousand  were  to  be  embarked  at  the  Eng- 
lish ports,  and  the  remainder  to  be  composed  of  regi- 
ments, drafted  from  the  army  then  in  Portugal ;  sir 
John  Moore  was  appointed  to  command  the  whole,  and 
he  was  authorised,  at  his  own  discretion,  to  effect  a 
junction  by  a  voyage  round  the  coast,  or  by  a  march 
through  the  interior.  He  chose  the  latter,  1.  because  a 
voyage  at  that  season  of  the  year  would  have  been  te- 
dious and  precarious ;  2.  because  the  intention  of  sir 
Hew  Dalrymple  had  been  to  enter  Spain  by  Almeida, 
and  the  few  arrangements  which  that  general  had  pow- 
er to  make  were  made  with  a  view  to  such  a  march  ; 
3.  because  he  was  informed  that  the  province  of  Gal- 
licia  would  be  scarcely  able  to  equip  the  force  coming 
from  England,  under  the  command  of  sir  David  Baird. 
But  Moore  was  directed  to  take  the  field  immediately, 
to  fix  upon  some  place,  either  in  Gallicia  or  on  the  bor- 
ders of  Leon,  for  concentrating  ihe  whole  army,  and 
the  specific  plan  of  operations  was  to  be  concerted  af- 
terwards with  the  Spanish  generals!  This  was  a  light 
and  idle  proceeding,  promising  no  good  result,  for  the 
Ebro  was  to  be  the  theatre  of  war,  and  the  head  of  the 
great  French  host  coming  from  Germany,  was  already 
in  the  passes  of  the  Pyrenees  ;  the  local  difficulties  im- 
peding the  English  general's  progress  were  also  abun- 
dant, and  of  a  nature  to  make  that  which  was  ill  be- 
gun, end  worse,  and  that  which  was  well  arranged, 
f  lil.  To  be  first  in  the  field  is  a  great  and  decided  ad- 
vantage, yet  here  the  plan  of  operations  was  not  even 
arranged,  when  the  enemy's  first  blows  were  descend- 
ing. 

Sir  John  Moore  had  much  to  execute,  and  with  little 
help.f  He  was  to  organize  an  army  of  raw  soldiers, 
and  in  a  poor  and  unsettle  1  country  ;  just  relieved  from 
the  pressure  nf  a  harsh  and  griping  enemy,  he  was  to 
procure  the  transport  necessary  for  his  stores,  ammuni- 
tion, and  even  for  the  conveyance  of  the  officers'  bag- 
gage. Assisted  by  an  experienced  staff,  such  obstacles 
do  not  very  much  impede  a  good  general,  but  here,  few 
of  the  subordinate  officers  had  served  a  campaign,  and 
every  branch  of  the  administration,  civil  and  military, 
was  composed  of  men,  zealous  and  willing  indeed,  yet 
new  to  a  service,  where  no  energy  can  prevent  the  ef- 
fects of  inexperience  from  being  severely  felt.  The 
roads  through  Portugal  were  very  bad,  and  the  rainy 
season,  so  baleful  to  an  army,  was  upon  the  point  of 
selling  In  ;  time  pressed  sorely  when  it  was  essential  | 
to  be  quick,  and  gold,  which  turneth  the  wheels  of  I 
war,  was  wanting.  And  this,  at  all  times  a  great  evil,! 
was  the  more  grievously  felt  at  the  moment,  inasmuch ! 
as  the  Portuguese,  accustomed  to  fraud  on  the  part  of 
their  o\vn  government,  and  to  forced  contributions  by 
the  French,  could  not  readily  be  persuaded  that  an 
army  of  foreigners,  paying  with  promises  alone,  might 
be  trusted  :  nor  was  this  natural  suspicion  allayed   b^ 


*  T.ord  Castlpreagfh'g  Despatch 
t  Sir  John  Moore's  Papers. 


Pari.  Pap. 


observing  that,  while  the  general  and  his  troops  were 
thus  kept  without  money,  all  the  subordinate  agents 
dispersed  througiiout  the  country  were  amply  supplied. 
Sir  David  Baird,  who,  with  his  portion  of  troops,  was 
to  land  at  Coruua,  and  to  equip  in  a  country  already 
exhausted  by  Blake's  army,  was  likewise  encompassed 
with  difficulties  ;  for  from  Corufia,  to  the  nearest  point, 
where  he  could  effect  a  junction  with  the  forces  march- 
ing from  Lisbon,  was  two  hundred  miles,  and  he  also 
was  without  money. 

No  general-in-chief  was  appointed  to  command  the 
Spanish  armies,  nor  was  sir  John  Moore  referred,  by 
the  English  ministers,  to  any  person  with  whom  h-i 
could  communicate  at  all,  much  less  concert  a  plan  of 
operations  for  the  allied  forces.  He  was  unacquainted 
with  the  views  of  the  Spanish  government ;  and  he 
was  alike  uninformed  of  the  numbers,  composition,  and 
situation  of  the  armies  with  whom  he  was  to  act,  and 
those  with  whom  he  was  to  contend.  Twenty-five 
thousand  pounds  in  his  military  chest,  and  his  own 
genius,  constituted  his  resources  for  a  campaign,  which 
was  to  lead  him  far  from  the  coast,  and  all  its  means 
of  supply.  He  was  first  to  unite  the  scattered  portions 
of  his  forces  by  a  winter  march  of  three  hundred  miles; 
another  three  hundred  were  to  be  passed  before  he 
reached  the  Ebro  ;  there  he  was  to  concert  a  plan  of 
operations  with  generals  acting  each  independent  of 
the  other,  their  corps  reaching  from  the  northern  sea- 
coast  to  Zaragoza,  themselves  jealous  and  quarrelsome, 
their  men  insubordinate,  differing  in  customs,  disci- 
pline, language,  and  religion  from  the  English,  and 
despising  all  foreigners  ;  and  all  this  was  to  be  accom- 
plished in  time  to  defeat  an  enemy  who  was  already  in 
the  field,  accustomed  to  great  movements,  and  conduct- 
ed by  the  most  rapid  and  decided  of  men.  It  must  he 
acknowledged  that  the  ministers'  views  were  equally 
vast  and  inconsiderate,  and  their  miscalculations  are 
the  more  remarkable,  as  there  was  not  wanting  a  man, 
in  the  highest  military  situation,  to  condemn  their  plan 
at  the  time,  and  to  propose  a  better. 

The  duke  of  York,  in  a  formal  minute,  drawn  up  for 
the  information  of  the  government,  observed,  that  the 
Spanish  armies  being  unconnected  and  occupying  a  great 
extent  of  ground,  were  weak;  that  the  French  being 
concentrated,  and  certain  of  reinforcement,  were  strong; 
that  there  could  be  no  question  of  the  relative  value  of 
Spanish  and  French  soldiers,  and  that,  consequently, 
the  allies  might  be  beaten  before  the  British  could  ar- 
rive at  the  scene  of  action  ;  the  latter  would  then  un- 
aided have  to  meet  the  French  army,  and  it  was  essen- 
tial to  provide  a  sufficient  number  of  troops  to  meet 
such  an  emergency.  That  number  he  judged  should 
not  be  less  than  sixty  thousand  men,  and  by  a  detailed 
statement,  he  proved  that  such  a  number  could  have 
been  furnished  without  detriment  to  any  other  service, 
but  his  advice  was  unheeded. 

At  this  period,  also,  the  effects  of  that  incredible 
folly  and  weakness,  which  marked  all  the  proceedings 
of  the  central  junta,  were  felt  throughout  Spain.  In 
any  other  country,  the  conduct  of  the  government 
would  have  been  attributed  to  insanity.  So  apathetic 
with  respect  to  the  enemy  as  to  be  contemptible,  so 
active  in  pursuit  of  self-interest  as  to  become  hateful  ; 
continually  devising  how  to  render  itself  at  once  des- 
potic and  popular,  how  tc  excite  enthusiasm  and  check 
freedom  of  expression ;  how  to  enjoy  the  luxury  of 
power  without  its  labour,  how  to  acquire  great  reputa- 
tion without  trouble,  how  to  he  indolent  and  victorious 
at  the  same  moment.*  Fear  prevented  the  members 
from  removing  to  Madrid  after  every  preparation  had 
been  made  for  a  public  entrance  into  that  capital.  They 
passed  decrees,  repressing  the  liberty  of  the  press  on 
the  ground  of  the  deceptions  practised  upon  the  public, 

*  Mr.  Stuart's  Letter!.  MS. 


«4 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  III 


yet  tlieiTi'splvos  never  hesitated  to  deceive  the  British 
agents,  the  generals,  the  government,  and  their  own 
countrympn.  by  the  most  flaoilious  falsehoods  upon 
every  subject,  whether  of  greater  or  less  importance. 
Thfy  hedged  their  own  dignity  round  with  ridiculous 
and  misplaced  forms,  opposed  to  the  vital  principle  of 
an  insurrectional  g-ovemment,  devoted  their  attention  to 
abstract  speculations,  recalled  the  exiled  .Tesuits,  and 
inundated  the  country  with  long  and  laboured  state 
papers,  while  the  pressing  business  of  the  moment  was 
Jeft  uncared  for.  Kvery  application  on  the  part  of  lord 
William  Bentinck  and  Mr.  Stuart,  even  for  an  order  to 
expedite  a  common  courier,  was  met  by  difficulties  and 
delays,  and  it  was  necessary  to  have  recourse  to  the 
most  painful  solicitations  to  obtain  the  slightest  atten- 
tion;  nor  did  that  mode  always  succeed. 

Sir  .John  Moore  strenuously  grappled  with  the  diffi- 
cnlties  besetting  him,  and  well  knowing  the  value  of 
time  in  military  transactions,  urged  forward  the  prepa- 
rations with  all  possible  activity.  He  was  very  desir- 
ous that  troops  who  had  a  journey  of  six  hundred  miles 
to  make  previous  to  meeting  the  enemy,  should  not,  at 
the  commencement,  be  overwhelmed  by  the  torrents  of 
rain,  which,  in  Portugal,  descend  at  this  period  with 
such  violence  as  to  destroy  the  shoes,  ammunition,  and 
accoutremeiits  of  a  soldier,  and  render  him  almost  unfit 
for  service.  The  Spanish  generals  recommended  that 
the  line  of  march  should  be  conducted  by  Almeida, 
(>iud;:d  Rodrigo,  Salamanca,  Valladolid.  and  Burgos  ; 
and  that  the  magazines  for  the  campaign  should  be 
formed  at  one  of  ihe  latter  towns.  This  coincided  with 
the  previous  preparations,  and  the  army  was  therefore 
organized  in  three  columns,  two  of  which  were  directed 
upon  Almeida,  by  the  routes  of  Coimbra  and  Guarda, 
while  the  third,  c'mprising  the  artillery,  the  cavalry, 
and  the  regiments  quartered  in  the  Alemtejo,  was  des- 
tined to  move  by  Alcantara,  upon  Ciudad  Rodrigo. 
Almeida  itself  was  chosen  for  a  place  of  arms,  and  all 
the  reserve-stores,  and  provisions,  were  forwarded 
there,  as  time  and  circumstances  would  permit;  but 
the  want  of  more\',  the  unsettled  state  of  the  country, 
and  the  inexperience  of  the  commissariat,  rendered  it 
difficult  to  procure  the  means  of  transport  even  for  the 
Jight  baggagp  of  the  regiments,  although  the  quantity 
of  the  latter  was  reduced  so  much  as  to  create  discon- 
tent. Oiie  Sataro,  the  same  person  who  has  been 
already  mentioned  as  an  agent  of  Junot's  in  the  nego- 
tiation with  sir  Charles  Cotton,  engaged  to  suppl}'  the 
army,  but  dishonestly  failing  in  his  contract,  so  embar- 
rassed t'le  operations,  that  the  general  resigned  all 
hope  of  being  able  to  move  with  more  than  the  light 
baggage,  the  ammunition  necessary  for  immediate  use, 
and  a  scinty  supply  of  medicines  ;  the  formation  of  the 
magazines  at  Almeida  was  also  retarded,  and  the  future 
subsistence  of  the  troops  was  thus  thrown  upon  a  raw 
2ommiS'ari;it,  unprovided  with  money.  The  general, 
howeve-,  relying  upon  its  increasing  experience,  and 
upon  the  activity  of  Lord  William  Bentinck  and  Mr. 
Stuart,  did  not  delay  his  march,  and  he  sent  agents  to 
Madrid  and  other  places  to  make  contracts,  and  to  raise 
money  ;  for  such  was  the  policy  of  the  ministers,  that 
they  siir>plied  the  Spaniards  with  gold,  and  left  the 
English  army  to  g^^t  it  back  in  loans. 

Miny  of  the  regiments  were  actually  in  movement 
when  an  unexpected  difficulty  forced  the  commander- 
in-chief  to  make  a  fresh  disposition  of  the  troops.    The 
state  of  the  Portuguese  roads  north  of  the  Tagus  was  I 
unknown,  hiit  the  native  ofiicers  and  the  people  had  ( 
alike  declared   that  they  were  impracticable  for  artil- ! 
lery ;  the  opinion  of  colonel  Lopez,  a  military  commis- 
sary sent,  by  the  Spanish  government,  to  facilitate  the 
march  of  the  British,  coincided  with  this  information;  ' 
and   the  report  of  captain   Delancey,  one   of  thi;   most 
intelligent  and  enterprising  of  those  officers  of  the  quar-  1 
ler-master-goneral's  department,  who  were  employed  | 


to  examine  the  lines  of  route,  corroborated  the  genenil 
opinion.  Junot  had  indeed,  with  infinite  pains,  carried 
his  guns  along  these  roads,  but  his  carriages  had  bren 
broken,  and  the  batteries  rendered  unserviceable  by 
the  operation  ;  wherefore  Moore  reluctantly  determined 
to  send  his  artillery  and  cavalry  by  the  south  bink  of 
the  Tagus,  to  Talavera  de  la  Reyna,  from  whence  they 
might  gain  Naval  Carneiro,  the  Escurial,  the  pass  of 
the  Guadarama  mountains,  Espinar,  Arevalo,  and  Sal- 
amanca. He  would  have  marched  the  whole  army  by 
the  same  route,  if  this  disagreeable  intelligence  re- 
specting the  northern  roads  had  been  obtained  earlier; 
but  when  the  arrangements  were  all  made  for  the  sup- 
plies to  go  to  Almeida,  and  when  most  of  the  regiments 
were  actually  in  movement  towards  that  town,  it  was 
too  late  to  alter  their  destination. 

This  separation  of  the  artillery,  although  it  violated 
a  great  military  principle,  which  prescribes  that  the 
point  of  concentration  for  an  army  should  be  beyond 
the  reach  of  the  enemy,  was  here  a  matter  of  apparent 
necessity  ;  and  no  danger  was  apprehended  from  the 
offensive  operations  of  an  adversary,  represented  to  be 
incapable  of  maintaining  his  own  line  of  defence. 
Valladolid  and  Burgos  were  considered  by  the  Span 
iards  as  safe  places  for  the  English  mag-azines ;  Aloore 
shared  so  much  of  the  universal  confidence  in  the 
Spanish  enthusiasm  and  courage,  as  to  suppose,  that 
Salamanca  would  not  be  an  insecure  point  of  concen- 
tration for  his  columns,  while  covered  by  such  numer- 
ous patriotic  armies  as  were  said  to  be  on  the  Ehro. 
One  brigade  of  six-pounders  he  retained  with  the  head- 
quarters, but  the  remainder  of  his  artillery,  consisting 
of  twenty-four  pieces,  the  cavalry,  amounting  to  a  thou- 
sand troopers,  the  great  pare  of  the  army,  containing 
many  hundred  carriages  and  escorted  by  three  thousand 
infantry,  he  sent  by  the  road  of  Talavera,  under  the 
command  of  sir  John  Hope,  an  officer  qualified  by  his 
talents,  firmness,  and  zeal,  to  conduct  the  most  impor- 
tant enterprises. 

The  rest  of  the  army  marched  in  three  columns.  The 
first  by  Alcantara  and  Coria,  the  second  bj'  Abrantcs, 
the  third  by  Coimbra,  all  having  Ciudad  Rodrigo  as 
the  point  of  direction ;  and  with  such  energy  did  the 
general  overcome  all  obstacles,  that  the  whole  of  the 
troops  were  in  movement,  and  head-quarters  quittf^d 
Lisbon  the  2Gth  of  October,  just  twenty  days  after  the 
receipt  of  the  despatch  which  appointed  him  to  the 
chief  command  ;  a  surprising  diligence,  but  rendered 
necessary  by  the  pressure  of  circumstances.  'The  ar- 
my,' to  use  his  own  words.  '  run  the  risk  of  finding 
itself  in  front  of  the  enemy  with  no  more  ammunition 
than  the  men  carried  in  their  pouches:'  'but  had  I 
waited,'  he  adds,  '  until  every  thing  was  forwarded,  the 
troops  would  not  have  been  in  Spain  until  the  spring, 
and  I  trust  that  the  enemy  will  not  find  out  our  wants 
as  soon  as  they  will  feel  the  effects  of  what  we  have.' 

The  Spaniards,  however,  who  expected  'every  body 
to  fly,  except  themselves,'  thought  him  slow,  and  were 
impatient,  and  from  every  quarter  indeeil  letters  arriv- 
ed, pressinor  him  to  advance.  Lord  William  Bentinck 
and  Mr.  Stuart,  witnesses  of  the  sluggish  incapacity 
of  the  Spanish  government,  judged  that  such  a  suppoit 
was  absolutely  necessary  to  sustain  the  reeling  strength 
of  Spain.  Tlie  central  junta  was  awakened  for  a  mo- 
ment. Hitherto,  as  a  mask  for  its  ignorance,  it  had 
treated  the  French  power  with  contempt,  and  the  Span- 
ish generals  and  the  people  echoed  the  sentiments  of 
the  government;  but  now,  a  letter  addressed  by  the 
governor  of  Bayonne  to  general  Jourdan,  stating  that 
sixty  thousand  infantry,  and  seven  thousand  cavalry, 
would  reinforce  the  French  armies  between  the  IGth  of 
October  and  the  IGth  of  November,  was  intercepted, 
and  made  the  junta  feel  that  a  <Tisis  for  wliich  it  was 
unprepared  was  approaching:  then  with  the  fo]]y  usu- 
ally attendantoniniprovi  'ence,  these  men, who  haJhe.Mi 


I80S.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


85 


io  slow  themsp!ves,  required  that  others  should  be  su- 
pernaturally  quick  as  danger  pressed. 

In  the  mean  time  sir  David  Baird's  forces  arrived  at 
Corufia.  liord  William  Bentinck  had  given  intima- 
tion of  their  approach,  and  the  central  junta  had  re- 
peatedly assured  him,  that  every  necessary  order  was 
given,  and  that  every  facility  would  be  afforded,  for 
their  disembarkation  and  supply.  This  was  untrue; 
no  measures  of  any  kind  had  been  taken,  no  instructions 
issued,  no  preparations  made  ;  the  junta  of  Corufia  dis- 
liked the  personal  trouble  of  a  disembarkation  in  that 
port,  and  in  the  hope  that  Baird  would  be  driven  to 
another,  refused  him  permission  to  land,  until  a  com- 
munication was  had  with  Aranjuez;*  yet  fifteen  days 
elapsed,  before  an  answer  could  be  obtained  from  a 
government,  who  were  daily  pestering  sir  John  Moore 
with  complaints  of  the  tardiness  of  his  march. 

Sir  David  Baird  came  without  money  ;  sir  John  could 
only  give  him  £8000,  a  sum  which  might  have  been 
mistaken  for  a  private  loan,  if  the  fact  of  its  being  pub- 
lic property  were  not  expressly  mentioned  ;]■  yet  at  this 
time  I\Ir.  Frere,  the  plenipotentiary,  arrived  at  Coruiia, 
with  two  millions  of  dollars,  intended  for  the  use  of  the 
Spaniards  ;  and  while  such  large  sums  contrary  to  the 
earnest  recommendations  of  Mr.  Stuart  and  major  Cox, 
were  lavished  in  that  quarter,  the  penury  of  the  Eng- 
lish general  obliged  him  to  borrow  the  funds  in  Mr. 
Frere's  hands.  Thus  assisted  the  troops  were  put  in 
motion,  but  wanting  all  the  equipments  essential  to  an 
army,  they  were  forced  to  march  by  half  battalions, 
conveying  their  scanty  stores  on  country  cars,  hired 
from  day  to  day  ;  nor  was  that  meagre  assistance  ob- 
tained but  at  great  expense,  and  by  compliance  with  a 
vulgar  mercenary  spirit  predominant  among  the  author- 
ities of  (iallicia.  The  junta  frequently  promised  to 
procure  the  carriages,  but  did  not;  the  commissaries, 
pushed  to  the  wall  by  the  delay,  offered  an  exorbitant 
remuneration  ;  the  cars  were  then  forthcoming,  and  the 
procrastination  of  the  government  proved  to  be  a  con- 
certed plan  to  defraud  the  military  chest.  In  fine,  the 
local  rulers  were  unfriendly,  crafty,  fraudulent,  the 
peasantry  suspicious,  fearful,  rude,  disinclined  toward 
strangers,  and  indifferent  to  public  affairs;  a  few  shots 
only  were  required  to  render  theirs  a  hostile  instead  of  a 
friendly  greeting. 

With  -Mr,  Frere  came  a  fleet,  conveying  a  Spanish 
force,  under  the  marquis  of  Romana.  When  the  in- 
surrection first  broke  forth,  that  nobleman  commanded 
fourteen  or  fifteen  thousand  troops,  who  were  servino- 
with  the  French  armies,  and  how  to  recover  this  disci- 
plined body  of  men  from  the  enemy  was  a  subject  of 
early  anxiety  with  the  junta  of  Seville. ;j;  Castanos,  in 
his  first  intercourse  with  sir  Hew  Dalrymple,  signified 
his  wish  that  the  British  government  should  adopt  some 
mode  of  apprising  Romana,  that  Spain  was  in  arms, 
and  should  endeavour  to  extricate  him  and  his  army 
from  the  toils  of  the  enemj',  and  finally  a  gentleman 
named  M'Kenzie  was  employed  by  the  English  min- 
isters to  conduct  the  enterprise.  The  Spanish  troops 
were  quartered  in  Holstein,  Sleswig,  Jutland,  and  the 
islands  of  Funen,  Zealand,  and  Langeland  ;  Mr. 
M'Kenzie.  through  the  medium  of  one  Robertson,  a 
catholic  priest,  opened  a  communication  with  Romana, 
and  as  neither  the  general,  nor  the  soldiers  he  command- 
ed, hesitated,  a  judicious  plan  was  concerted.  Sir 
Richard  Keats,  with  a  squadron  detached  from  the  Bal- 
tic fleet,  suddenly  appeared  off  Nyborg,  in  the  island 
of  Funen,  and  a  majority  of  the  Spanish  regiments 
quartered  in  Sleswig  immediately  seized  all  the  craft 
in  the  different  harbours  of  that  coast,  and  pushed 
across  the  channel  to  Funen  ;  Romana,  with  the  assis- 


*   Capf,  Kennedy's  Letter.  Pari.  Pap. 

t   Sir.'ohfi  Moore  to   Lor!  Castlereaj^h,  27lh  Oct. 

\  Sir  Hew  Dalrymple'g  Correspondence. 


tance  of  Keats,  had  already  seized  the  port  and  castle 
of  Nyborg  without  opposition,  save  from  a  small  Da- 
nish ship  of  war  that  was  moored  across  the  mouth 
of  the  harbour,  and  from  thence  the  Spaninrds  passed 
to  Langeland,  where  they  embarked  above  nine  thous- 
and strong,  on  board  the  English  fleet  commanded  by 
sir  James  Saumarez.  The  rest  of  the  troofts  either  re- 
mained in  Sleswig  or  were  disarmed  by  the  Danish  force 
in  Zealand.  This  enterprise  was  conducted  with  pru- 
dent activity,  and  the  unhesitating  patriotism  of  the 
Spanish  soldiers  was  very  honourable,  but  the  danger 
was  slight  to  all  but  Mr.  Robertson.  Romana,  after 
touching  at  England,  repaired  to  CoruTa;  his  troops 
did  not,  however,  land  at  that  port,  but  at  St.  Andero, 
where  they  were  equipped  from  the  English  stores,  and 
proceeded  by  divisions  to  join  Blake's  army  in  Biscay. 

Among  the  various  subjects  calling  for  sir  John 
Moore's  attention,  there  was  none  of  greater  interest 
than  the  appointment  of  a  generalissimo  to  the  Spanish 
armies.  Impressed  with  the  imminent  danger  of  procras- 
tination or  uncertainty  in  such  a  matter,  he  desired  lord 
William  Bentinck  and  Mr,  Stuart  to  urge  the  central 
government  with  all  their  force  upon  that  head  ;  to 
lord  Castlereagh  he  represented  the  injury  that  must 
accrue  to  the  cause,  if  the  measure  was  delayed  ;  and 
he  proposed  to  go  himself  to  Madrid,  with  a  view  of 
adding  weight  to  these  representations.  Subsequent 
events  frustrated  this  intention,  and  there  seems  no 
reason  to  imagine,  that  his  personal  remonstrances 
would  have  influenced  a  government  described  by  Mr. 
Stuart,  after  a  thorough  experience  of  its  qualities,  as 
'  never  having  made  a  single  exertion  for  the  public 
good,  neither  rewarding  merit  nor  punishing  guilt,*  and 
being  for  all  useful  purposes  'absolutely  null.'  The 
junta's  dislike  to  a  single  military  chief  was  not  an 
error  of  the  head,  and  reason  is  of  little  avail  against 
the  suggestions  of  self-interest. 

The  march  of  the  British  troops  was  as  rapid  as  the 
previous  preparations  had  been  ;  but  general  Anstruther 
had,  unadvisedly,  halted  the  leading  column  in  Almei- 
da, and  when  Moore  reached  that  town  on  the  8th  of 
November,  he  found  the  whole  of  the  infantry  assem- 
bled there,  instead  of  heiug  on  the  road  to  Salamanca. 
The  condition  of  the  men  was,  however,  superb,  and 
their  discipline  exemplary  ;  on  that  side  ail  was  well, 
yet  from  the  obstacles  encountered  by  sir  David  Baird, 
and  the  change  of  direction  in  the  artillery,  it  was  evi- 
dent that  no  considerable  force  could  be  brought  into 
action  before  the  end  of  the  month.  Meanwhile,  the 
Spaniards  were  hastening  events.  Despatches  from  lord 
William  Bentinck announcrd  that  the  enemy  remained 
stationary  on  the  Ehro,  although  reinforced  by  ten 
thousand  men;  that  Castanos  was  about  to  cross  that 
river  at  Tudela;  and  that  the  army  of  Aragon  was  mo- 
ving by  Sor  upon  Roncevalles,  with  a  view  to  gain  the 
rear  of  the  French,  while  Castafos  assailed  their  left 
flank.  Moore,  judging  that  such  movements  would 
bring  on  a  battle,  the  success  of  which  must  be  very 
doubtful,  became  uneasy  for  his  own  artillery.  His 
concern  was  increased  by  observing,  that  the  guns 
might  have  kept  with  the  other  columns  ;  'and  if  any 
thing  adverse  happens,  I  have  not,'  he  wrote  to  general 
Hope,  'necessity  to  plead  ;  theroad  we  are  now  travel- 
ling, that  by  Villa  Veiha  and  Guarda,  is  practicable 
for  artillery;  the  brigade  under  W  ilmot  has  already 
reached  Guarda,  and,  as  far  as  I  have  already  seen,  the 
road  presents  few  obstacles,  and  those  easily  surmount- 
ed ;  this  knowledge  was,  however, only  acquired  by  our 
own  officers,  when  the  brigade  was  at  Castello  Hranco, 
it  was  not  certain  if  it  could  proceed.'  He  now  desir- 
ed Hope  no  longer  to  trust  any  reports,  but  seek  a  shor- 
ter line,  by  Placentia,  across  the  mountains  to  Sala- 
manca. 

Up  to  this  period,  all  reports  from  the  agents,  all  in- 
formation from  the  government  at  home,  all  communi- 


86 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


[Book  III. 


cation  j  public  and  private,  coincided  upon  one  subject. 
The  Spaniards  were  an  enthusiastic,  an  heroic  people,  a 
natioti  of  unparalleled  energy!  thtir  armies  were  brave, 
they  vere  numerous,  they  were  confident !  one  hundred 
and  eighty  thousand  men  were  actually  in  line  of  battle, 
extending  from  the  sea-coast  of  Biscay  to  Zaragoza  ,•  the 
IVench,  reduced  to  a  fmtrth  of  this  number,  cooped  up  in 
n  corner,  were  shrinking  from  an  encounter ;  they  were 
deserted  by  the  t^nperor,  thei,  were  trembling,  they  were 
sfirithss !  Nevertheless,  tlie  general  was  somewhat 
distrustful  ;  he  perceived  the  elements  of  disaster  in 
the  divided  commands,  and  the  lengthened  lines  of  the 
Spaniards,  and  early  in  October  he  had  predicted  the 
miscliief  that  such  a  system  would  produce.  "  As 
long  as  the  French  remain  upon  the  defensive,"  he  ob- 
served. "  it  will  not  be  so  much  felt,  but  the  moment 
an  attack  is  made,  some  great  calamity  must  ensue  :" 
however,  he  was  not  without  faith  in  the  multitude  and 
energy  of  the  patriots,  when  he  considered  the  great- 
ness of  their  cause. 

Castafios  was  at  this  time  pointed  out  by  the  central 
junta  as  the  person  with  whom  to  concert  a  plan  of 
campaign,  and  sir  John  Moore,  concluding  that  it  was 
a  preliminary  stop  towards  making  that  officer  general- 
issimo, wrote  to  him  in  a  conciliatory  style,  well  calcu- 
lated to  ensure  a  cordial  co-operation.  It  was  an  en- 
couraging event,  the  English  general  believed  it  to  be 
the  commencement  of  a  better  system,  and  looked  for- 
ward with  more  hope  to  the  opening  of  the  war,  but 
this  favour.'.!)le  state  soon  changed  ;  far  from  being  cre- 
ated chief  of  all,  Castanos  was  superseded  in  the  com- 
mand he  already  held,  the  whole  folly  of  the  Spanish 
character  broke  forth,  and  confusion  and  distress  follow- 
ed. At  that  moment  also  clouds  arose  in  a  quarter, 
■which  had  hitherto  been  all  sunshine;  the  military 
agents,  as  the  crisis  approached,  lowered  their  sanguine 
tone,  and  no  longer  dwelt  upon  the  enthusiasm  of  the 
armies  ;  they  admitted,  that  the  confidence  of  the  troops 
was  sinking,  and  that  even  in  numbers  they  were  in- 
terior to  the  French.  In  truth,  it  was  full  time  to 
change  their  note,  for  the  real  state  of  affairs  could  no 
longer  be  concpaled  ;  a  great  catastrophe  was  at  hand  ; 
but  what  of  wildness  in  their  projects,  or  skill  in  the 
enemy's,  what  of  ignorance,  vanity,  and  presumption 
in  the  generals,  what  of  fear  among  the  soldiers,  and 
■what  of  fortune  in  the  events,  combined  to  hasten  the 
ruin  of  the  Spaniards,  and  how  that  ruin  was  effected, 
I,  quitting  the  English  army  for  a  time,  will  now  re- 
late. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Movrrnpnts  of  tSp  Spanish  f^encrals  on  the  F.hro  ;  their  absurd 
confidenrp,  (heir  want  of  syfteni  and  concert — (ieneral  opin- 
ion t'^at  the  I''nnch  are  weak — Rial  strength  of  the  kin<^ — 
Marshal  IVev  and  general  Jourdan  join  the  arm}' — Military 
errors  of  the  kinfr  exposed  by  Kapoleon,  who  instructs  him 
how  to  make  wai — Joseph  proposes  six  plans  of  operation — 
Operations  thereupon. 

In  the  preceding  chapters  I  have  exposed  the  weak- 
ness, the  fully,  tiie  improvidence  of  Spain,  and  shown 
liow  the  had  passions  and  sordid  vic^ws  of  her  leaders 
were  encouraged  h'y  tlie  unwise  prodigality  of  England. 
1  have  dissect*  d  the  Till  boast  and  meagre  preparations 
of  the  governments  in  both  countries,  laying  bare  the 
bones  and  sinews  of  the  insurrection,  and  by  compar- 
ing their  loose  and  feeble  structure,  with  the  strongly 
knitted  frame  and  larpe  proportions  of  the  enemy,  pre- 
pared the  reader  for  the  inevitable  issue  of  a  conflict 
between  such  ill-matclied  champions.  In  the  present 
book,  I  shall  r*  count  the  sudd(  n  and  terrible  manner  in 
which  the  Spanish  armii  s  were  f)verthrown,  during  the 
tempestuous  prncrrrss  of  the  French  emperor.  Yet, 
previous  to  relating  these  disasters,  I  must  revert  to  the 


period  immediately  following  the  rereat  of  king  Jo- 
seph, and  trace  those  early  operations  of  the  French 
and  Spanish  forces,  which,  like  a  jesting  jirologue  to  a 
deep  tragedy,  unworthily  ushered  in  the  great  catastro- 
phe. 

CAMPAIGN    OF     THE    FRENCH     AND     SPANISH     ARMIES     BE- 
FORE   THE    ARRIVAL    OF    THE    EMPEROR. 

After  general  Cuesta  was  removed  from  the  com- 
mand, and  the  junta  of  Seville  had  been  forced  by  ma- 
jor Coxe  to  disgorge  so  much  of  the  English  subsidy 
as  sufficed  for  the  immediate  relief  of  the  troops  in 
Madrid,  all  the  Spanish  armies  closed  upon  the  Ebro. 

General  Blake,  reinforced  by  eight  thousand  Astu- 
rians,  established  his  base  of  operations  at  Reynosa, 
opened  a  communication  with  the  English  vessels  off 
the  port  of  St.  Andero,  and  directed  liis  views  towards 
Biscay.* 

The  Castilian  army,  conducted  by  general  Pigna- 
telli,  resumed  its  march  upon  Burtro  del  Osma  and 
Logroiia. 

The  two  divisions  of  the  Andalusian  troops  under 
LapeiTa,  and  the  Murcian  division  of  general  Llamas, 
advanced  to  Taranzona  and  Tudela.| 

Palafox,  with  the  Aragonese  and  Valencian  divi- 
sions of  St.  Marc,  operated  from  the  side  of  Zaragoza. :|: 

The  conde  de  Belvidere,  a  weak  youth,  not  twenty 
years  of  age,  marched  with  fifteen  thousand  Estrema- 
dv.rans  upon  Logrofia,  as  forming  part  of  Castafios' 
army,  but  soon  received  another  destination. I| 

Between  all  these  armies  there  was  neither  concert 
nor  connexion,  their  movements  were  regulated  by 
some  partial  view  of  affairs,  or  by  the  silly  caprices  of 
the  generals,  who  were  ignorant  of  each  other's  plans, 
and  little  solicitous  to  combine  operations.  The  weak 
characters  of  many  of  the  chiefs,  the  inexperience  of 
all,  and  this  total  want  of  system,  opened  a  field  for 
intriguing  men,  and  invited  unqualified  persons  to  inter- 
fere in  the  direction  of  affairs  :  thus  we  find  colonel 
Doyle,  making  a  journey  to  Zaragoza,  and  priding  him- 
self upon  having  prevailed  with  Palafox  to  detach  se- 
ven thousand  men  to  Sanguessa.  Captain  Whitiing- 
ham,  without  any  knowledge  of  Doyle's  interference, 
earnestly  dissuading  the  Spaniards  from  such  an  enter- 
prise. The  first  affirming  that  the  movement  would 
"  turn  the  enemy's  left  flank,  threaten  his  rear,  and  have 
the  appearance  of  cutting  off  his  retreat."  The  second 
arguing,  that  Sanguessa,  being  seventy  miles  from  Za- 
ragoza, and  only  a  few  leagues  from  Pampeluna,  the 
detachment  would  itself  be  cut  off.  Doyle  judged  that, 
drawing  the  French  from  Caparosa  and  Milagro,  it 
would  expose  those  points  to  Llamas  and  La-Pei.a; 
that  it  would  force  the  enemy  to  recall  the  reinforce- 
ments said  to  be  marching  against  Blake,  enable  that 
general  to  form  a  junction  with  the  Asturians,  and  then 
with  the  forty  thousand  men  thus  collected,  possess 
himself  of  the  Pyrenees ;  and  if  the  French  army,  es- 
timated at  thirty-five  thousand  men,  did  not  fly,  cut  it 
off  from  France,  or,  by  moving  on  Miranda,  sweep 
clear  Biscay  nnd  Castille.  Palafox,  pleased  with  ibis 
plan,  sent  AVhittingham  to  inform  Llamas  and  La-Pefa, 
that  O'Neil  would,  with  six  thousand  men,  march  or 
the  15th  of  September  to  Sanguessa.  Those  generals 
disapproved  of  the  movement  as  dangerous,  prema- 
ture, and  at  variance  with  the  plan  arranged  in  tlu;  conn 
cil  of  war  held  at  Madrid,  but  Palafox,  regardless  of 
their  opinion,  persisted;  §  O'Neil  accordingly  occupied 
Sanguessa,  drew  the  attention  of  the  enemy,  and  was 
immediiilely  driven  across  the  Alagon  river. 

In  this  manner  all  their  projects,  characterized  by  a 
profound  ignorance  of  war,  were  lightly  adopted  and 
as  lightly  abandoned,  or  ended  in  disasters  ;  yet  victorj 


*   (lencral  Rroderick's  Correspondence. 

■f  (-'apt.  Whillinghani.  t   Colonel  Dovle. 

U  Castanos'  Vindication.     {  Wlirttingliaui's  Correspondence 


1808.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR    WAR. 


87 


was  mor^!  confidently  anticipated,  than  if  consummate 
skill  had  presidfd  over  the  arrangements;  and  this 
vain-fjlorious  feeling,  extending  to  the  niilitnry  agents, 
was  hy  them  prop<igated  in  England,  where  the  fore- 
boasting  was  nearly  as  loud,  and  as  absurd,  as  in  the 
Peninsula.  The  delusion  was  universal  ;  even  lord 
William  Bentinck  and  Mr.  Stuart,  deceived  by  the 
curious  consistency  of  tht!  Spanish  falsehoods,  doubted 
if  the  French  army  was  able  to  maintain  its  position, 
and  believed  that  the  Spaniards  had  obtained  a  moral 
ascendancy  in  the  field.* 

Drunk  wiih  vanity  and  folly,  and  despising  the  '  rem- 
nants' of  the  French  army  on  the  Ebro,  which  they  esti- 
mated at  frr  m  thirty-five  to  forty  thousand  men,  the  Span- 
ish government  proposed  that  the  British  army  should  be 
directed  upon  Catalonia  ;  and  when  they  found  that  this 
proposal  was  not  acceded  to,  they  withdrew  ten  thou- 
sand men  frem  the  Murcian  division,  and  sent  them  to 
the  neighbourhood  of  Lerida.  The  innate  pride  and 
arrogance  of  tiie  Spaniards  were  also  nourished  by  the 
timid  and  false  operations  of  king  Joseph.  Twenty 
days  after  the  evacuation  of  Madrid,  that  monarch  was 
at  the  head  of  above  fifty  thousand  fighting  men,  ex- 
clusive of  eight  thousand  employed  to  maintain  the 
ccmmunications,  and  to  furnish  the  garrisons  of  Pam- 
peluna,  Tolosa,  Irun,  St.  Sebastian  and  Bilbao;  exclu- 
sive also  of  tlie  Catalonian  army,  which  was  seventeen 
thousand  strong,  and  distinct  from  his  command.  A 
strong  reserve  assembled  at  Bayonne,  under  general 
Drnuet,  supplied  reinforcements,  and  was  itself  suppor- 
ted by  drafts  from  the  interior  of  France;  six  thousand 
men,  forming  mioveable  columns,  watched  the  openings 
of  the  Pyrent  es,  from  St.  John  Pied  de  Port  to  Rousillon, 
and  g'jarded  the  frontier  against  Spanish  incursions  ; 
and  a  second  reserve,  composed  of  Neapolitans,  Tus- 
cans, and  Piedmontese,  was  commenced  at  Belgarde, 
with  a  view  of  supporting  Duhesme  in  Catalonia. 
How  the  king  quelled  the  nascent  insurrection  at  Bil- 
bao, and  how  he  dispersed  the  insurgents  of  the  valleys 
in  Aragon,  I  have  already  related  ;  but  after  those  opera- 
tions, the  French  army  made  no  movement.  It  was 
re-organized,  and  divided  into  three  grand  divisions  and 
a  reserve.  Bessieres  retained  the  command  of  the  right 
wing,  Moncey  assumed  that  of  the  left,  and  Ney,  arri- 
ving from  Paris,  took  charge  of  the  centre  ;  the  reserve, 
chiefly  composed  of  detachments  from  the  imperial 
guard,  remained  near  the  person  of  the  king,  and  the 
old  republican  general  Jourdan,  a  man  whose  day  of 
glory  belonged  to  another  a?ra,  re-appeared  upon  the 
military  stage,  and  filled  the  office  of  major-general  to 
the  army. 

With  such  a  force,  and  so  assisted,  there  was  nothing 
in  Spain,  turn  which  way  he  would,  capable  of  oppos- 
ing king  Joseph's  march,  but  the  incongruity  of  a  camp 
with  a  court  is  always  productive  of  indecision  and  of 
error ;  the  tnir.cheon  does  not  fit  every  hand,  and  the 
French  army  soon  felt  the  inconvenience  of  having  at 
its  head  a  monarch  who  was  not  a  warrior.  Joseph 
remained  on  the  defensive,  without  understanding  the 
force  of  the  maxim.  '  that  cffensive  movements  are  ihe 
foundah'on  of  a  good  (ftfeiicc  ;''  he  held  Bilbao,  and,  con- 
trary to  the  advice  of  the  generals  who  conducted  the 
operations  on  his  left,  abandoned  Tudela,  to  choose  for 
his  field  of  battle,  Milagro,  a  small  town  situated  near 
the  confluence  of  the  Arga  and  Aragon  with  the  Ebro."(" 
While  Bessieres  held  Burgos  in  force,  his  cavalry  com- 
manded the  valley  of  the  Duero,  menaced  Palencia  and 
Valladolid.  and  scouring  the  plains,  kept  Blake  and 
Cnesta  in  check  ;  instead  of  reinforcing  a  post  so  ad- 
vantageous, the  king  relinquished  Burgos  as  a  point 
oeyond  his  line  of  defence,  and  Bessieres'  troops  were 
posted  in  successive  divisions  behind  it,  as  far  as  Pu- 


*  Lord  W.   Peiitinck's  CorrciponJenre.  MS.  Dovle's  cor- 
respondence. MS.  f  Napoleon's  notes. 


ente  Lara  on  the  Ebro.  Ney's  force  then  lined  that 
river  down  to  LogroHo,  the  reserve  was  quartered  be- 
hind Miranda,  and  Trevino,  a  small  obscure  place,  was 
chosen  as  the  point  of  battle,  for  the  right  and  cen- 
tre.* 

In  this  disadvantageous  situation  the  army,  with 
some  trifling  changes,  remained  from  the  middle  of 
August  until  late  in  September,  during  wiiich  time  the 
artillery  and  carriages  of  transport  were  repaired,  mag- 
azines were  collected,  the  cavalry  remounted,  and  the 
preparations  made  for  an  active  campaign  when  the  re- 
inforcements should  arrive  from  Gt-rmany.  But  tha 
line  of  resistance  thus  offered  to  the  Spaniards  evinced 
a  degree  of  timidity,  which  the  relative  strength  of  the 
armies  by  no  means  justified  ;  the  left  of  the  French 
evidently  leaned  towards  the  great  communication  with 
France,  and  seemed  to  refuse  the  support  of  Pampelu- 
na  ;  Tudela  was  abandoned,  and  Burgos  resigned  to 
the  enterprise  of  the  Spaniards;  all  this  indicated  fear, 
a  disposition  to  retreat  if  the  enemy  advanced.  The 
king  complained  with  what  extreme  difficulty  he  ob- 
tained intelligence,  yet  he  neglected  by  forward  move- 
ments to  feel  for  his  adversaries  ;  wandering  as  it  were 
in  the  dark,  he  gave  a  loose  to  his  imagination,  and 
conjuring  up  a  phantom  of  Spanish  strength,  which  had 
no  real  existence,  anxiously  waited  for  the  develop- 
ment of  their  power,  while  they  were  exposing  thdr 
weakness  by  a  succession  of  the  most  egregious  blun- 
ders. 

Joseph's  errors  did  not  escape  the  animadversion  of 
his  brother,  whose  sagacity  enabled  him,  although  at  a 
distance,  to  detect,  through  the  glare  of  the  insurrec- 
tion, all  its  inefficiency  ;  he  dreaded  the  moral  effect 
produced  by  its  momentary  success,  and  was  prepar- 
ing to  crush  the  rising  hopes  of  his  enemies  ;  but  de- 
spising the  Spaniards  as  soldiers,  Joseph's  retreat,  and 
subsequent  position,  displeased  him,  and  he  desired  his 
brother  to  check  the  exultation  of  the  patriots,  by  act- 
ing upon  a  bold  and  well-considered  plan,  of  which  ho 
sent  him  the  outline.  His  notes,  dictated  upon  the  oc- 
casion, are  replete  with  genius,  and  evince  his  absolute 
mastery  of  the  art  of  v.-ar.  "  It  was  too  late,"  he  said, 
"  to  discuss  the  question,  whether  Madrid  should  have 
been  retained  or  abandoned  ;  idle  to  consider,  if  a  po- 
sition, covering  the  siege  of  Zaragoza,  might  not  have 
been  formed  ;  useless  to  examine,  if  the  line  of  the  Du- 
ero was  not  better  than  that  of  the  Ebro  for  the  French 
army.  The  line  of  the  Ebro  was  actually  taken,  and 
it  must  be  kept;  to  advance  from  that  river  without  a 
fixed  object  would  create  indecision,  this  would  bring 
the  troops  back  again,  and  produce  an  injurious  moral 
effect.  But  M'hy  abandon  Tudela,  why  relinquish  Bur- 
gos] Those  towns  were  of  note,  and  of  reputation, 
the  possession  of  them  gave  a  moral  influence,  and 
moral  force  constituted  two-thirds  of  the  strength  of 
armies.  Tudela  and  Burgos  had  also  a  relative  impor- 
tance; the  first,  possessing  a  stone  bridge,  was  on  the 
communication  of  Pampelunaand  Madrid,  it  command- 
ed the  canal  of  Zaragoza,  it  was  the  capital  of  a  prov- 
ince. When  the  army  resumed  offensive  operations, 
their  first  enterprise  would  be  the  siege  of  Zaragoza; 
from  that  town  to  Tudela,  the  land  carriage  was  three 
days,  but  the  water  carriage  was  only  fourteen  hours, 
wherefore  to  have  the  besieging  artillery  and  stores  at 
Tudela,  was  the  same  as  to  have  them  at  Zaragoza  ;  if 
the  Spaniards  got  possession  of  the  former,  all  Navar- 
re would  be  in  a  state  of  insurrection,  and  Pampeluna 
exposed.  Tudela  then  was  of  vast  importance,  but 
Milagro  was  of  none,  it  was  an  obscure  place,  without 
a  bridge,  and  commanding  no  communication;  in  short, 
it  was  without  interest,  defended  nothing  !  led  to  noth- 
ing !  A  river,"  said  this  great  commander,  "thougii 
it  should  be  as  large  as  the  Vistula,  and  as  rapid  as  the 


*  S,  Journal  of  the  king's  operatic ns.  MS, 


88 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  III. 


Danube  atjts  mouth,  is  nothing,  t.nless  there  are  good 
points  of  passage,  and  a  head  quick  to  take  the  offen- 
sive ;  the  Kbro  as  a  drftnce  was  loss  than  nothing,  a  mere 
line  of  demarcation  !  and  Milagro  was  useless.  The 
enemy  might  neglect  it,  be  at  Estella,  and  from  thence 
gain  Tolosa.  before  any  preparation  could  be  made  to 
receive  him  ;  he  might  come  from  Soria,  from  Logro- 
no,  or  from  Zaragoza. 

'Again,  Burgos  was  the  capital  of  a  province,  the 
centre  of  many  communications,  a  town  of  great  fame, 
and  of  relative  value  to  the  French  army  ;  to  occupy 
it  in  force,  and  offensively,  would  threaten  Palencia, 
Valladolid,  Aranda,  and  even  Madrid.  It  is  necessa- 
ry,' observed  the  emperor,  '  to  have  made  war  a  long 
time  to  conceive  this  ;  it  is  necessary  to  have  made  a 
number  of  offensive  enterprises,  to  know  how  much 
the  smallest  event,  or  even  indication,  encourages  or 
discourages,  and  decides  the  adoption  of  one  enterprise, 
instead  of  another.'  '  In  short,  if  the  enemy  occu- 
pies Burgos,  LogroHo,  and  Tudela,  the  French  army 
will  be  in  a  pitiful  position.  It  is  not  known  if  he  has 
left  Madrid  ;  it  is  not  known  what  has  become  of  the 
Gallician  army,  and  there  is  reason  to  suspect  that  it 
may  have  been  directed  upon  Portugal ;  in  such  a  state, 
to  take  up,  instead  of  a  bold,  menacing,  and  honcua- 
ble  position  like  Burgos,  a  confined,  shameful  one  like 
Trevino,  is  to  say  to  the  enemy,  you  have  nothing  to 
fear,  go  elsewhere,  we  have  made  our  dispositions  to  go 
farther  :  or  we  have  chosen  our  ground  to  fight,  come 
there,  without  fear  of  being  disturbed.  But  what  will 
the  French  general  do  if  the  enemy  marches  the  next 
day  upon  13urgos?  Will  he  let  the  citadel  of  that 
town  be  taken  by  six  thousand  insurgents'?  if  the 
French  have  left  a  garrison  in  the  castle,  how  can  four 
or  five  hundred  men  retire  in  such  a  vast  plain'?  and, 
from  that  time,  all  is  gone  ;  if  the  enemy  masters 
the  citadel,  it  cannot  be  retaken.  If,  on  the  contrary, 
we  should  guard  the  citadel,  we  must  give  battle  to 
the  enerny,  because  it  cannot  hold  out  more  than 
three  days,  and  if  we  are  to  fight  a  battle,  why 
should  Bessieres  abandon  the  ground  where  we  wish  to 
fight  1 

These  dispositions  appear  badly  considered,  and 
when  the  enemy  shall  march,  our  troops  will  meet  with 
Buch  an  insult  as  will  demoralize  them  if  there  are 
only  insurgents  or  light  troops  advancing  against  them. 
If  fifteen  thousand  insurgents  enter  Burgos,  retrench 
themselves  in  the  town,  and  occupy  the  castle,  it  will 
be  necessary  to  calculate  a  march  of  several  days  to 
enable  us  to  post  ourselves  there,  and  to  retake  the 
town,  which  cannot  be  done  without  some  inconveni- 
ence;  and  if,  during  this  time,  the  real  attack  is  upon 
Logrono  or  Pampeluna,  we  shall  have  made  counter- 
marches without  use,  which  will  have  fatigued  the  army. 
If  we  hold  it  with  cavalry  only,  is  it  not  to  say  we  do 
not  intend  stopping,  and  to  invite  the  enemy  to  come 
there  ■?  It  is  the  first  time  that  an  army  has  quitted  all 
its  offensive  positions  to  take  up  a  bad  defensive  line, 
and  to  affect  to  choose  its  neld  of  battle,  when  the 
thousand  and  one  combinations  which  might  take  place, 
and  the  distance  of  the  enemy,  did  not  leave  a  proba- 
bility of  being  able  to  foresee  if  the  battie  would  take 
place  at  Tudela,  between  Tudela  and  Pampeluna,  be- 
tween Soria  aiul  the  Ebro,  or  between  Burgos  and  Mi- 
randa.' Then  followed  an  observation  which  may  be 
studied  with  advantage  by  those  authors  who,  unac- 
quainted with  the  simplest  rudiments  of  military  sci- 
ence, censure  the  conduct  of  generals,  and  are  pleased, 
from  some  obscure  nook,  to  point  out  their  errors  to  the 
world  ;  authors  who,  profoundly  ignorant  of  the  numbers, 
situation,  and  resources  of  the  opposing  armies,  pretend, 
nevertheless,  to  detail  with  great  accuracy  the  right 
method  of  executing  the  most  difl^cult  and  delicate 
operations  of  war.  As  the  rebuke  of  Turenne,  who 
frankly  acknowledged  to   Louvois  that  he  could   pass 


the  Rhine  at  a  particular  spot,  if  the  latter's  fing'-r  were 
a  bridge,  has  been  lost  upon  such  men.  perhaps  ihe  more 
recent  opinion  of  Napoleon  may  be  disregarded.  '  But 
it  is  not  permitted,'  says  that  coasuunuate  general,  '  it 
is  not  permitled,  at  the  distaiice  of  three  hundred  lengucs, 
and  ivithont  even  a  state  uf  the  situutidii  af  the  arniy,  to 
direct  what  should  he  done  /' 

After  having  thus  protected  himself  from  the  charge 
of  presumption,  the  emperor  proceeded  to  recommend 
certain  dispositions  for  the  defence  of  the  Ebro.  The 
Spaniards,  he  said,  were  not  to  be  feared  in  the  field  ; 
twenty-five  thousand  French  in  a  good  position  would 
suffice  to  beat  all  their  armies  united,  and  this  opinion 
he  deduced  from  the  events  of  Dupont's  campaign,  of 
which  he  gave  a  short  analysis.  Let  Tudela,  he  said, 
be  retrenched  if  possible;  at  all  events  it  should  be  oc- 
cupied in  force,  and  offensively  towards  Zaragoza.  '  Let 
the  general  commanding  there,  collect  provisions  on 
all  sides,  secure  the  boats,  with  a  view  to  future  ope- 
rations when  the  reinforcements  should  arrive,  and 
maintain  his  communication  with  Logrono  by  the  right 
bank  if  he  can,  but  certainly  by  the  left ;  let  his  corps 
be  considered  as  one  of  observation.  If  a  body  of 
insurgents  only  approach,  he  may  fight  them,  or  keep 
them  constantly  on  the  defensive  by  his  movements 
against  their  line  or  against  Zaragoza;  if  regular  troops 
attack  him,  and  he  is  forced  across  the  Ebro,  let  him 
then  operate  about  Pampeluna  until  the  general-in-chief 
has  made  his  dispositions  for  the  main  body  :  in  this 
manner  no  prompt  movement  upon  Estella  and  Tolosa 
can  take  place,  and  the  corps  of  observation  will  have 
amply  fulfilled  its  task. 

Let  marshal  Bessieres,  with  all  his  corps  united, 
and  reinforced  by  the  light  cavalry  of  the  army,  encamp 
in  the  wood  near  Burgos  :  let  the  citadel  be  well  occu- 
pied, the  hospital,  the  d<  pots,  and  all  encumbrances 
sent  over  the  Ebro  ;  let  him  keep  in  a  condition  to  act, 
be  under  arms  every  day  at  three  o'clock  in  the  morn- 
ing, and  remain  until  the  return  of  his  patroles  :  he 
should  also  send  parties  to  a  great  extent,  as  far  as  two 
days'  march.  Let  the  corps  of  the  centre  be  placed  at 
Miranda  and  Briviesca,  and  all  the  encumbrances  be 
likewise  sent  across  the  Ebro  behind  Vitloria  ;  this 
corps  should  be  under  arms  every  morning,  and  send 
patroles  by  the  road  of  Soria,  and  wherever  the  enemy 
may  be  expected  :  and  it  must  not  be  lost  sight  of, 
that  these  two  corps,  being  to  be  united,  they  should 
be  connected  as  little  as  possible  with  Logrono,  and 
consider  the  left  wing  as  a  corps  detached,  having  a 
line  of  operations  upon  Pampeluna,  and  a  sep;irate 
part  to  act.  Tudela  is  preserved  as  a  post  contigu- 
ous to  the  line.  Be  well  on  tlie  defensive,  he  con- 
tinues, in  short,  make  war  !  that  is  to  say,  get  infor- 
mation from  the  alcaldes,  the  curates,  the  posts,  the 
chiefs  of  convents,  and  the  principal  proprietors,  yon 
will  then  he  perfectly  informed.  The  patroles  should 
always  be  directed  upon  the  side  of  Soria,  and  of  Bur- 
gos, upon  Palencia,  and  upon  the  side  of  Aranda,  they 
could  thus  form  three  posts  of  interception,  and  send 
three  reports  of  men  arrested  ;  these  men  should  be 
treated  well,  and  dismissed  after  they  had  given  the  in- 
formation desired  of  them.  Let  the  enemy  then  come, 
and  we  can  unite  all  our  forces,  hide  our  marches  from 
him,  and  fall  upon  his  flank  at  the  moment  he  is  med 
itatingan  offensive  movement.' 

With  regard  to  the  minor  details,  the  emperor  thu? 
expressed  himself:  '  Soria  is  not,  I  believe,  more  thao 
two  short  marches  from  the  actual  position  of  the  army, 
and  that  town  has  constantly  acted  against  us  ;  an  ex- 
pedition sent  there  to  disarm  it,  to  take  thirty  of  the 
principal  people  as  hostages,  and  to  obtain  provisions, 
would  have  a  good  effect.  It  would  be  useful  to  occu- 
py St.  Ander,  it  will  be  of  advantage  to  move  by  thf 
direct  road  of  Bilbao  to  St.  Ander.  It  will  be  neces- 
sary to  occupy  and  disarm   Biscay  and  Navarre,  and 


1808.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


89 


every  Spaniard  talven  in  arms  there  should  be  shot.* 
The  manufactories  of  arms  at  Placencia  should  be 
watched,  to  hinder  them  from  working  for  the  rebels. 
The  port  of  Pancorbo  should  be  armed  and  fortified 
with  great  activitj',  ovens  and  magazines  of  provisions 
and  ammunition  should  be  placed  there;  situated  near- 
ly half  way  between  Madrid  and  Bayonne,  it  is  an  in- 
termediate post  for  the  army,  and  a  point  of  support 
for  troops  operating  towards  Gallicia.  The  interest  of 
the  entmy,' he  resumes,  '  is  to  mask  his  forces;  by 
hiding  he  true  point  of  attack,  he  operates  in  such  a 
manrie,',  that  the  blow  he  means  to  strike  is  never  indi- 
cated in  a  positive  way.  and  the  opposing  general  can 
only  guess  it  by  a  well-matured  knowledge  of  his  own 
position,  and  of  the  mode  in  which  he  makes  his  offen- 
sive system  act,  to  protect  his  defensive  system. 

We  have  no  accounts  of  what  the  enemy  is  about,  it 
is  said  that  no  news  can  be  obtained,  as  if  this  case  was 
extraordinary  in  an  army,  as  if  spies  were  common  ; 
they  must  do  in  Spain  as  they  do  in  other  places.  Send 
parties  out.  Let  them  carry  off,  sometimes  the  priest, 
sometimes  the  alcalde,  the  chief  of  a  convent,  the  mas- 
ter of  the  post  or  his  deputy,  and,  above  all,  the  letters. 
Put  these  persons  under  arrest  until  they  speak  ;  ques- 
tion them  twice  each  day,  or  keep  them  as  hostages  ; 
charge  them  to  send  foot  messengers,  and  to  get  news. 
Wiien  we  know  how  to  take  measures  of  vigour  and 
force,  it  is  easy  to  get  intelligence.  All  the  posts,  all 
the  letters  must  be  intercejited  ;  the  single  motive  of 
procuring  intelligence  will  he  sufficient  to  authorise  a 
detachmi  nt  of  four  or  five  thousand  men,  who  will  go 
into  a  great  town,  will  take  the  letters  from  the  post, 
will  seize  the  richest  citizens,  their  letters,  papers,  ga- 
zettes, &c.  It  is  beyond  doubt,  that  even  in  the  French 
lines,  the  inhabitants  are  all  informed  of  what  passes, 
of  course,  out  of  that  line  they  know  more  ;  what,  then, 
should  prevent  you  from  seizing  the  principal  men  ] 
Let  them  be  sent  back  again  without  being  ill  treated. 
It  is  a  fact  that  when  we  are  not  in  a  desert,  but  in  a 
peopled  country,  if  the  general  is  not  well  instructed,  it 
is  because  he  is  ignorant  of  his  trade.  The  services 
which  the  inhabitants  render  to  an  enemy's  general  are 
never  given  from  affection,  nor  even  to  get  money;  the 
truest  method  to  obtain  them  is  by  safeguards  and  pro- 
tections to  preserve  their  lives,  their  goods,  their  towns, 
or  their  monasteries !' 

Joseph,  although  by  no  means  a  dull  man,  seems  to 
have  had  no  portion  of  his  brother's  martial  genius. 
The  operations  recommended  by  the  latter  did  not  ap- 
pear to  the  king  to  be  applicable  to  the  state  of  affairs  ; 
he  did  not  adopt  them,  but  proposed  others,  in  discus- 
sing which,  he  thus  defended  the  policy  of  his  retreat 
from  Madrid.  '  When  the  dcffction  of  twenty-two 
thousand  men  (Dupont's)  caused  the  king  to  quit  the 
capital,  the  disposal)le  troops  remaining  were  divided 
in  three  corps,  namely,  his  own,  marshal  Bessieres',  and 
general  Verdier's,  then  besieging  Zaragoza  ;  but  these 
bodies  were  spread  over  a  hundred  leagues  of  ground, 
and  with  the  last  the  king  had  little  or  no  connexion. 
His  first  movement  was  to  unite  the  two  former  at  Bur- 
gos, afterwards  to  enter  into  communication  with  the 
third,  and  then  the  line  of  defence  on  the  Ebro  was 
adopted  ;  an  operation,  said  the  king,  dictated  by  sound 
reason — Because  when  the  events  of  Andalusia  fore- 
boded a  regular  and  serious  war,  prudence  did  not  per- 
mit three  corps,  the  strongest  of  which  was  only  eigh- 
teen thousand  men.  to  separate  to  a  greater  distance 
than  six  days'  march,  in  the  midst  of  eleven  millions 
of  people  in  a  state  of  hostility.  But  fifty  thousand 
French  could  defend  with  success  a  line  «f  sixty 
leagues,  and  could  guard  the  two  grand  communications 


*  Nnvarxf  anl  Biscay  heino;- within  the  French  line  of  defence, 
tlip  inl  abifants  were,  according  to  the  civiliaus,  (ie_/acio  i'  rtncli 
•ubjects. 


of  Burgos  and  Tudela,  against  enemies  who  had  not, 
up  to  that  period,  been  able  to  carry  to  either  point 
above  twenty-five  thousand  men.  In  this  mode  fifteen 
thousand  French  could  be  united  upon  either  of  those 
roads.' 

Joseph  was  dissatisfied  with  Napoleon's  plans,  and 
preferred  his  own.  The  disposable  troops  at  his  com- 
mand, exclusive  of  those  at  Bilbao,  were  fifty  thousand, 
which  he  distributed  as  follows.  The  right  wino-  oc- 
cupied Burgos,  Pancorbo,  and  Puente  Lara.  The  cen- 
tre was  posted  between  Haro  and  Logrono.  The  left 
extended  from  Logroiio  to  Tudela,  and  the  latter  town 
was  not  occupied.  He  contended,  that  this  arrangement, 
at  once  offensive  and  defensive,  might  be  advantageous- 
ly continued  if  the  great  army,  directed  upon  Spain, 
arrived  in  September,  since  it  tended  to  refit  the  army 
already  there,  and  menaced  the  enemy ;  but  that  it 
could  not  be  prolonged  until  November,  because  in 
three  months  the  Spaniards  must  make  a  great  progress, 
and  would  very  soon  be  in  a  state  to  take  the  offensive, 
with  grand  organized  corps  obedient  to  a  central  ad- 
ministration, which  would  have  time  to  form  in  Madrid. 
Everything  announced,  he  said,  that  the  month  of  Oc- 
tober was  one  of  those  decisive  epochs  which  gave,  to 
the  party  who  knew  how  to  profit  from  it,  the  priority 
of  movements  and  success,  the  progress  of  which  it 
was  difficult  to  calculate. 

In  this  view  of  affairs,  the  merits  of  six  projects 
were  discussed  by  the  king. 

First  project.  To  remain  in  the  actual  position.  This 
was  declared  to  be  unsustainable,  because  the  enemy 
could  attack  the  left  with  forty  thousand,  the  centre  w  ith 
forty  thousand,  the  right  with  as  many.  Tudela  and 
Navarre,  as  far  as  Logrofio.  required  twenty-five  thou- 
sand men  to  defend  them.  Burgos  could  not  be  defend- 
ed but  by  an  army  in  a  state  to  resist  the  united  for- 
ces of  Blake  and  Cuesta,  which  would  amount  to  eigh- 
ty thousand  men;  it  was  doubtful  if  the  twenty  thou- 
sand bayonets  which  could  be  opposed  to  them,  could 
completely  beat  them  ;  if  they  did  not,  the  French 
would  be  harassed  by  the  insurgents  of  the  three  pro- 
vii«e£,  Biscay,  Navarre,  and  Giiipuscoa,  who  would 
interpose  between  the  left  wing  and  France. 

Second  project.  To  carry  the  centre  and  reserve  by 
Tudela,  towards  Zaragoza  or  Albazan.  United  with 
the  left,  they  would  amount  to  thirty  thousand  men, 
who  might  seek  for,  and,  doubtless,  would  defeat  the 
enemy,  if  he  was  met  with  on  that  side.  In  the  mean- 
time, the  right  wing,  leaving  garrisons  in  the  citr.del 
of  Burgos  and  the  fort  of  Pancorbo,  could  occupy  tha 
enemy,  and  watch  any  movements  in  the  Montaf.a 
St.  Ander,  or  disembarkations  that  might  rake  place 
at  the  ports.  But  this  task  was  considered  difHcult, 
because  Pancorbo  was  not  the  onl)'  defile  accessible  to 
artillery;  three  leagues  from  thence  another  road  led 
upon  Miranda,  and  there  was  a  third  passage  over  the 
point  of  the  chain  which  stretched  between  Haro  and 
Miranda. 

Third  project.  To  leave  the  defence  of  Navarre  to 
the  left  wing.  To  carry  the  centre,  the  reserve,  and 
the  right  wing,  to  Burgos,  and  to  beat  the  enemy  be- 
fore he  could  unite  ;  an  easy  task,  as  the  French  would 
be  thirty  thousand  strong.  IMeanwhile,  Moncey  would 
keep  the  Spaniards  in  check  on  the  side  of  Tudela,  or, 
if  unable  to  do  that,  he  was  to  inarch  up  the  Etiro,  by 
Logroiio  and  Briviesca,  and  join  the  main  body  :  the 
communication  with  France  would  be  thus  lost,  but  the 
army  might  maintain  itself  until  the  arrival  of  the  em- 
peror. A  modification  of  this  project  was,  that  Moncey, 
retiring  to  the  entrenched  camp  of  Pampeluna,  should 
there  await  either  the  arrival  of  the  emperor,  or  the 
result  of  the  operations  towards  Burgos. 

Fourth  project.  To  pass  the  Ebro  in  retreat,  and  to 
endeavour  to  lempt  the  enemy  to  fight  in  tlie  plain  be>» 
tween  that  river  and  V'ittoria, 


00 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


[Book  III. 


Fifth  project.  To  retire,  supporting  the  left  upon 
Pampeluna,  the  ri^ht  upon  Montdragon. 

Sixth  prtject.  To  leave  garrisons,  with  the  means 
of  a  six  weeks'  defence,  in  Pampeluna,  St.  Sebastian, 
Pancorbo,  and  Burgos.  To  unite  the  rest  of  the  army, 
march  against  the  enemy,  attack  him  wherever  lie  was 
found,  and  then  wait,  either  near  Madrid  or  in  that 
jountrv,  into  which  the  pursuit  of  the  Spaniards,  or 
the  facility  of  living  should  draw  the  army.  This  plan 
relinquished  the  communications  with  France  entirely. 
bin  it  was  said  that  the  grand  army  could  easily  open 
ihem  again  ;  the  troops,  already  in  Spain,  would  be  sufli- 
ciently  strong  to  defy  all  the  efforts  of  the  enemy,  to 
disconcert  all  his  projects,  and  to  wait  in  a  noble  atti- 
tude the  general  impulse  which  would  be  given  by  the 
arrival  of  the  emperor. 

Of  all  these  projects,  the  last  was  the  favourite  with 
the  kinir.  who  strongly  recommended  it,  and  asserted, 
that  if  it  was  followed,  alTairs  would  be  more  prosper- 
ous when  the  emperor  arrived  than  could  be  expected 
from  any  other  plan.  Marshal  Ney  and  general  Jour- 
dan  approved  of  it,  but  it  would  appear  that  Napoleon 
had  other  views,  and  too  little  confidence  in  his  broth- 
er's military  judgment,  to  entrust  so  great  a  matter  to 
his  guidance. 

OBSERVATIONS. 

1.  It  is  undoubted,  that  tliere  must  always  be  some 
sympathy  of  genius  in  the  man  who  is  to  execute 
another's  conception  in  military  affairs.  Without 
that  species  of  harmony  between  their  minds,  the  thou- 
sand accidental  occurrences  and  minor  combinations 
which  must  happen  contrary  to  expectation,  will  inevi- 
tably embarrass  the  executor  to  such  a  degree,  that  he 
will  be  unable  to  see  the  most  obvious  advantages; 
and  in  striving  to  unite  the  plan  he  has  received  with 
his  own  views,  he  will  adopt  neither,  but  steering  an 
unsteady  reeling  course  between  both,  will  fail  of  suc- 
cess. The  reason  of  this  appears  to  be,  that  a  strong, 
and,  if  the  term  may  be  used,  inveterate  attention  must 
be  fixed  upon  certain  great  principles  of  action  in  war, 
to  enable  a  general  to  disregard  the  minor  events  and 
inconveniences  which  cross  his  purpose  :  minor  they 
are  to  the  great  object,  but  in  themselves  sufficient  to 
break  down  the  firmness  and  self-possession  of  any  but 
extraordinary  men. 

2.  The  original  memoir  from  which  Joseph's  pro- 
jects have  been  extracted,  is  so  Hotted  and  interlined, 
that  it  would  be  unfair  to  consider  it  as  a  mature  pro- 
duction, 'i'iie  great  error  which  pervades  it,  is  thecon- 
iectured  data  upon  which  he  founds  his  plans,  and  the 
little  real  information  which  he  appears  to  have  had  re- 
lative to  the  Spanish  forces,  views,  or  interior  policy. 
His  plans  were  based  upon  tlie  notion  that  the  central 
iunta  would  be  able  and  provident,  the  Spaniards  uni- 
ted, the  armies  strong  and  well  guided,  none  of  which 
was  true.  Again,  he  estimated  Cuesta  and  Blake's 
armies  at  eighty  thousand,  and  considered  them  as  one 
body  ;  but  they  were  never  united  at  all,  and  if  they 
had,  they  would  scarcely  have  amounted  to  sixty  thou- 
sand. 'I'he  bold  idea  of  throwing  himself  into  the  interi- 
or came  tf)o  late,  he  should  b.ave  thought  of  that  before  he 
quitted  Madrid,  or  at  least  before  the  central  government 
was  established  at  that  capital.  His  operations  might 
have  been  successful  against  the  miseralile  armies  op- 
posed to  him,  but  against  good  and  moveable  troops  they 
wnuld  not,  as  the  emperor's  admirable  notes  prove. 
The  first  project,  wanting  those  offensive  combinations 
discussed  by  Napoleon,  was  open  to  all  his  objections, 
as  being  timid  and  incomplete.  'I'he  second  was  crude 
and  ill-considered,  for,  according  to  the  king's  estimate 
of  the  Spanish  force,  thirty  thousand  men  on  each  wing 
might  oppose  the  heads  of  his  columns,  while  sixty 
thousand  could  still  have  bec^n  united  at  Logro.io  ; 
these  might  pass  the  Ebro,  excite  an  insurrection  in 
Navarre,  (juipu.scon,  and  Biscay,  seize  Tolosa  and  Mi- 


randa, and  fall  upon  the  rear  of  the  French  army,  w  hich, 
thus  cut  in  two,  and  its  communications  intercepted, 
would  have  been  extremely  embarrassed.  The  third 
was  not  better  judged.  Burgos,  as  an  olTcnsive  post, 
protecting  the  line  of  defence,  was  very  valuable,  and 
to  unite  a  large  force  there  was  so  far  prudent;  but  if 
the  vSpaniards  retired,  and  refused  battle  with  their  left, 
while  the  centre  and  right  operated  by  Logro:  o  and 
Sanguessa,  what  would  have  been  the  result?  the 
French  right  must,  without  any  definite  object,  either 
have  continued  to  advance,  or  remained  stationary  with- 
out communication,  or  returned  to  fight  a  battle  for  those 
very  positions  which  they  had  juvU  quitted.  The  fourth 
depended  entirely  upon  accident,  and  is  not  worth  argu- 
ment. The  fifth  was  an  undisguised  retreat.  The 
sixth  was  not  applicable  to  the  actual  situation  of  af- 
fairs, the  king's  force  was  no  longer  an  independent 
body,  it  was  become  the  advanced  guard  of  the  great 
army,  marching  under  Napoleon.  It  was  absurd,  there- 
fore, to  contemplate  a  decisive  movement,  without  hav- 
ing first  matured  a  plan  suitable  to  the  whole  mass  that 
was  to  be  engaged  in  the  execution  :  in  short,  to  per- 
mit an  advanced  guard  to  determine  the  cperations  of 
the  main  body,  was  to  reverse  the  order  of  military  af- 
fairs, and  to  trust  to  accident  instead  of  design.  It  is 
curious,  that  while  Joseph  was  proposing  this  irruption 
into  Spain,  the  Spaniards  and  the  military  agents  of 
Great  Britain  were  trembling  lest  he  should  escape 
their  power  by  a  precipitate  flight.  "  }Far  is  not  a 
conjectural  art  .'" 


CHAPTER  V. 

Position  and  strength  of  the  French  and  Spanish  armieg — 
Blake  moves  from  Reynosa  to  the  U])per  Ebro;  sends  a  di- 
vision to  Bilbao;  French  retire  from  that  town — Ney  quita 
his  position  near  Logrono,  and  retakes  Bilbao — Tlie  armies 
of  the  centre  and  right  approach  the  Ebro  and  tlie  Aragon — 
Various  evolutions — Blake  attacks  and  takes  Bilbao — Head 
of  the  grand  French  army  arrives  in  Spain — The  Castiilians 
join  the  army  of  the  centre — The  Asturians  join  lilake — 
Apathy  of  the  central  junta — Castanos  joins  the  arniy  ;  holds 
aconferenee  with  Palafox;  theirdangerous  position;  arrange 
a  plan  of  operations — The  Spaniards  cross  the  Ebro — The 
king  orders  a  gt'neral  attack — Skirmish  at  Sanguessa,  at 
Logrono.and  Lerini — The  Spaniards  driven  back  over  the 
Ebro — Logrono  taken — Colonel  Cruz,  with  a  Spanish  batta- 
lion, surrenders  at  Lerim — l-'rancisco  Falafox,  tlie  military 
deputv,  arrives  at  Alfaro;  his  exceeding  folly  and  presump- 
tion; controls  and  insults  Castanos — Force  of  the  French 
anny  increases  hourly;  how  composed  and  disposed — Blake 
ascends  the  valley  01*  Durango — Battle  of  Zornosa — French 
retake  Bilbao — Combat  at  Valmaceda — Observations. 

The  emperor  overruled  the  offensive  projects  of  the 
king,  and  the  latter  was  forced  to  distribute  the  centre 
and  right  wing  in  a  manner  more  consonant  to  the  spirit 
of  Napoleon's  instructions  ;  but  he  still  neglected  to 
occupy  Tudela,  and  covered  his  left  wing  by  the  Ara- 
gon river. 

The  18th  of  .September,  the  French  army  was  posted 
in  the  following  manner  : — * 

fTliree  divisions  of  infantry  in 

Under  Arms,  j       from  ot    Paiicurbo,  at  Brivi- 

Right  wing.  Marshal  Bossicres     15,5;  5^      csca,  Santa  Miiria,  and  ("u- 

I       ba  ;    li^ht    cavalry    behind 

(.      Burgos. 


Centre     .     Marshal  Ney     . 
Left  wing     Marshal  Monccy 


13,756     Logrono,  Nalda,  and  Najera. 
fMilixgro,     Lodosa,    Capiiroxa, 

1GG3G-;      "'"'  '^""'■"'  ''''^  gnrrlson  of 
'        \       I'anipiluna  was  also   under 
I.      Moncey'ti  command. 


Reserve  of  the  kin?. 

General  Piihgny  .     5,413 
Imperial  (.'uard. 

General  Dorsenne     2,423  I 

Total 7,833  { 

Garrisons 6,004    PampoluDa. 


Miranda,    lluro,    and   PuenU 
Lara. 


*  Journal  of  the  king's  operations,  MS. 


1S03.J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


91 


General  -Monthion 1,500     F.illiao. 

('Comp;)-!e'I   of  small    garrisons 

I      and  moveahlu  cohimns,  t'uar- 
General  La  Grange 6,979-;      ding  the  coir.ir.unicaiions  nf 

I       Biscay,  Alava,  and  Guipus- 

1      coa. 


Baynnne,  and  watcliinij  the 
val!iy<  of  I  he  Pyrenees  open- 
ing into  Navarre. 


2G,000 


i2nno 

13,000 


1,300 
100 


Grsnd  resTve.  C 

MivriMe  columns   1.PP4 

S:at!(inarv    .     .      00,00,5  ■( 

to'al.  conim,-iu;lod   by  /   21,939  I 

General  Drouet      j  ( 

Total  9^,2?9  present  under  arms,  exclusive  of  the 
troops  in  Catalonia  ;  and  when  the  communications 
■were  secured,  the  fortresses  g-arrisoned  and  the  fort  of 
Pancorho  armed,  there  remained  ahove  fifty  thousand 
sabres  and  bayonets  disposable  on  a  line  of  battle  ex- 
tendingr  from  Bilbao  to  Alfaro. 

To  oppose  this  formidable  force  the  Spanish  troops 
were  divided  into  three  principal  masses,  denominated 
the  armies  of  the  right,  centre,  and  left. 

Infantry.  Cavalry.  Gu  m.  •]        First  Line. 
The  first  romposed  of  the  divisions  i 

of  S',  M.irc  and  O'Neil,  iinmber- 

ed  about    .     .  17,500         500     24  1      Men.        Guns. 

The  sacond.  composed  of  the  divi-  j.     75,400     8b 

sions   of  La-pena,   Llamas,    and 

Caro • 

Th"  third  consisting  entirelyofOal- 

licians.  about 30,000 

In  the  second   line   the   Castillians 

w-re  ai  S' ;:ovia 

Th-  Es'ren-adurans     at   Talavera 
Two   .A-dTln-i.in  divisions  were  in 

La    Manclia 14,000 

Aod  the  .Asturians  (posted  at  L!a- 

n-sl  «vrecal.ed    ' 18,000 

This  estimate,  founded  upon  a  number  of  contempo- 
rary returns  and  other  documents,  proves  the  monstrous 
pxagfreratinns  put  forth  at  this  time  to  deceive  the 
Spanish  people  and  the  English  provernment.  The 
Spaniards  pretended  that  above  one  hundred  and  forty 
thousand  men  in  arms  were  threatenino-  the  French  po- 
sitions on  the  Ebro,  whereas  less  than  seventy  six 
thossand  w-ere  in  line  of  battle,  and  those  exceedinjrlv 
ill-armf>d  and  provided.  The  rijht  under  Palafox,  held 
the  country  between  Zarag-oza  and  Sang-uessa,  on  the 
Ara?on  river;  the  centre  under  Castaiios.  occupied  Bor- 
ja,  Taranzona,  and  Aoreda ;  the  left  under  Blake,  was 
posted  at  Reynosa.  near  the  sources  of  the  Ebro.  The 
relative  position  of  the  French  and  Spanish  armies  was 
also  very  disadvanfao-eous  to  the  latter.  P^rom  the 
rigrht  to  the  left  of  their  line,  that  is,  from  Reynosa  to 
Zaracroza.  was  twice  the  distance  between  Bavonne  and 
Vitt'^ria.  and  the  roads  more  difficult ;  the  reserve  un- 
der Drouet  was  conseqnenflv  in  closer  military  commu- 
nication with  kin?  .Joseph's  army  than  the  Spanish 
wings  were  with  another. 

The  patriots  were  acting- without  concert  upon  dou- 
ble external  lines  of  operation,  and  agrainst  an  enemy 
far  stiperior  in  quickness,  knowledge,  and  organization, 
and  even  in  numbers. 

The  French  were  superior  in  cava1r\',  and  the  base 
of  their  operations  rested  on  three  great  fortresses, — 
Bnvcnne.  St.  5>>hastian,  and  Pampeluna  ;  they  could 
in  three  days  carrv  the  centre  and  the  reserve  to  either 
flank,  and  unite  thirty  thousand  combatants  without 
drawmo-  a  man  from  their  garrisons. 

The  Spaniards  held  but  one  fortress,  Zaragoza,  and 
beinor  divided  in  corps,  under  different  g-enerals  of 
eqital  authority,  they  could  execute  no  combined  move- 
ment with  rapidity  or  precision,  nor  under  any  circum- 
stances could  they  unite  more  than  40,000  men  at  a 
given  point. 

Tn  this  situation  of  affairs,  greneral  Blake,  his  army 
orgranized  in  six  divisions,  each  five  thousand  strony, 
broke  up  from  Reynosa  on  the  17tb  of  September.* 
One  division  advanced  on  the  side  of  Burtros,  to  cover 
the  march  of  the  main  body,  which,  threaflinjr  the  val- 
ley of  Villarcayo,  turned  the  right  of  marshal  Bessieres, 


*  Correspoadence  of  Captain  C^rol.     Ibid.  General  Brod- 
erick. 


and  reached  the  Ebro;  two  divisions  occupied  Traspa- 
derna  and  Frias,  and  established  a  post  at  Oi'.a,  on  the 
right  bank  of  that  river;  a  third  division  took  a  posi- 
tion at  Medina  ;  a  fourth  held  the  town  of  Erran  and  the 
Sierra  of  that  name  ;  a  fifth  halted  in  the  town  of  Vil- 
larcayo, to  preserve  the  communication  with  Reynosa; 
and  at  the  same  time  8000  Asturiaus,  under  general 
Acevedo,  quitted  the  camp  at  Llanes,  and  advanced  to 
St.  Ander. 

General  Broderick  arrived  in  the  Spanish  camp, 
Blake  importuned  him  for  money,  and  obtained  it ;  but 
treated  liiin  otiierwise  with  great  coldness,  and  with- 
held all  information  relative  to  the  movements  of  the 
army.  English  vessels  hovering  on  the  coast  were 
prepared  to  supply  the  Biscayans  with  arms  and  am- 
munition, and  Blake  thinking  himself  in  a  situation  to 
revive  tiie  insurrection  in  that  province,  and  to  extend 
it  to  Guipuscca,  detached  his  fourth  division,  and  five 
guns,  under  the  command  of  the  marquis  of  Portaztro, 
to  attack  general  Monthion  at  Bilbao.*  The  king  get- 
ting knowledge  of  the  march  of  this  division,  ordered 
a  brigade  from  his  right  wing  to  fall  on  its  flank  by  the 
valley  of  Ordufa,  and  caused  general  Merlin  to  rein- 
force Monthion  by  the  valley  of  Durango,  while  Bes- 
sieres aided  these  dispositions  with  a  demonstraiion  oa 
the  side  of  Frias.  The  combination  was  made  too  late, 
Portazjro  was  already  master  of  Bilbao  :|  Monthion 
had  retired  on  the  20th  to  Durango,  and  Bessieres  fell 
back  with  his  corps  to  Miranda,  Haro,  and  Puente  La- 
ra, having  first  injured  the  defences  of  Burgos. 

The  king  then  took  post  with  the  reserve  at  Vitloria, 
and  Ney  iinmediately  abandoning  his  position  on  the 
Ebro,  carried  his  whole  force,  by  a  rapid  march,  to  Bil- 
bao, where  he  arrived  on  the  evening  of  the  SMh  ;  at 
the  same  time,  general  jMerle's  division  executed  a 
combined  movement  from  Miranda  upon  Osma  and 
Barbaceha.  Portazgo  being  thus  overmatched,  occu- 
pied tlie  heights  above  Bilbao,  until  nightfall,  and  then 
retreated  to  Valmaceda,  where  he  found  the  third  divi- 
sion, for  Blake  had  changed  his  position,  and  now  oc- 
cupied Frias  with  his  right,  Quincoes  with  his  centre, 
and  Valmaceda  with  his  left;  all  the  Spanish  artillery 
was  in  the  town  of  Villarcayo,  guarded  by  a  division  ; 
and  in  this  situation,  holding  the  passes  of  the  moun- 
tains, Blake  awaited  the  arrival  of  the  Asturians,  who 
were  marching  by  the  valley  of  Villarcayo.  Thus  the 
second  effort  to  raise  Biscay  failed  of  success. :f: 

In  the  mean  time,  O'Neil,  following  colonel  Doyle'a 
plan  before  mentioned,  entered  Sanguessa,  and  was 
beaten  out  of  it  again,  with  the  loss  of  two  guns. 
However,  the  Castillian  army  approached  tlie  Ebro  by 
the  road  of  Soria;  General  La-Pei'.a  occupied  Logrofio, 
Nalda,  and  Najera  ;!|  Llamas  and  Caro  occupied  Corel- 
la,  Cascante,  and  Calahorra,  and  O'Neil  took  post  in 
the  mountains,  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Aragon,  facing 
Sanguessa.  The  peasantry  of  the  valleys  assembled 
in  considerable  numbers,  the  country  between  Zarago- 
za and  the  Aragon  river  appeared  to  be  filled  with 
troops,  and  Moncey  withdrawing  from  the  Ebro, 
took  a  position,  w  ith  his  left  flank  at  the  pass  of  San- 
guessa, his  centre  at  Falces.  and  his  right  at  Estella. 
Ney  also,  leaving  Murlin  with  three  thousand  men  at 
Bilbao,  returned  to  the  Ebro,  but  finding  that  Lcgrono 
was  occupied  in  force  by  the  Spaniards,  halted  at  Guar- 
dia  on  the  5th  of  October,  and  remained  in  observation. § 

On  the  4th,  the  king  and  Bessieres,  at  the  head  of 
Mouton's  and  Merle's  divisions,  quitted  Miranda,  and 
advanced  along  the  road  of  Osma,  with  tiie  intention 
of  feeling  for  Blake  on  the  side  of  Frias  and  Medina; 
the  Spaniards  were  then  in  force  at  Valmaceda,  but 
Joseph,  deceived  by  false  information,  imagined  that 


*  Corrfspondence  of  g'eneral  Ltith. 
t  Journal  of  the  king  •  Operation-^,  MS. 
t   Ccirre-ipoiulenrf-  ol'  p;fneral  I.eith. 
Ij  Journal  of  the  kiug't  Optratiuus,  MS. 


jlbid. 


92 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  ITJ 


they  were  a^in  in  march  towards  Bilbno,  and  there- 
fore pushed  on  to  Lodio,  with  the  intention  of  attarkinpf 
Blake  durinix  the  movement;  at  Lodio  he  ascertained 
the  trutli,  anil  being  uneasy  about  iMoncey,  returned  the 
7th  to  Murquia,  wliere  be  left  Merle  to  protect  tbe  rear 
of  tbe  troops  at  Bilbao,  and  then  proceeded  to  Miranda 
with  the  division  of  Moutcn.  On  the  12lh,  Blake, 
still  intent  upon  tbe  insurrection  of  Biscay,  placed  a 
division  at  Ordufia,  and  attacked  Bilbao  witb  eighteen 
thousand  men.*  Merlin  retired  figbting  up  tbe  valley 
of  Durango  as  far  as  Zornosa,  but  being  joined  there 
b}'  general  Verdier,  with  six  battalions,  turned  and 
checked  the  pursuit.  At  this  time,  however,  the  leading 
columns  of  tbe  great  Trench  army  were  passing  the 
t-panish  frontier;  Laval's  division  advanced  to  Duran- 
go :  f^'ebastiani,  with  six  thousand  men,  relieved  Merle 
at  Murquia,  wbo  repaired  to  Miranda;  Verdier  return- 
ed to  Vittoria,  and  Lefebre,  duke  of  Dantzic,  assumed 
the  command  of  the  three  divisions  posted  atDurango. 

On  tbe  Spanish  side,  the  marquis  of  Romana's  divi- 
sion had  disembarked  on  the  JHh  at  St.  Ander,  and  the 
infantry,  eight  thousand  strong,  completely  equipped 
and  provided  from  the  English  stores,  proceeded  by 
slow  marches  to  join  Blake.  The  Asturians  had  halt- 
ed at  Villarcayo,  but  the  Estremaduran  army,  under 
the  conde  de  iielvedere,  v/as  put  in  motion,  and  the 
Castillian  forces  arrived  upon  the  Ebro;  the  first  and 
third  divisions  of  the  Andalusian  army  were  on  the 
march  from  La  Mancha,  and  Castanos,  quilting  Madrid, 
proceeded  towards  Tudela.  All  things  announced  the 
approach  of  a  great  crisis,  yet  such  was  the  apathy  of 
the  supreme  junta,  that  the  best  friends  of  Spain  hop- 
ed for  a  defeat,  as  the  only  mode  of  exciting  sufficient 
energy  in  the  government  to  save  the  state,  and  by 
some  it  was  thought  that  even  that  sharp  remedy  would 
bo  insulTicient.  A  momentary  excitement  was,  how- 
ever, caused  by  the  interce])ted  letter  to  Jourdan  before 
spoken  of;  the  troops  in  the  second  line  were  ordered 
to  proceed  to  the  Ebro  by  forced  marches,  letters  were 
written,  pressing  for  the  advance  of  the  British  army, 
and  Castanos  was  enjoined  to  drive  the  enemy,  with- 
out delay,  beyond  the  frontier.  But  this  sudden  fury 
of  action  ended  with  those  orders.  Sir  David  Baird's 
corps  was  detained  in  the  transports  at  Coruiia,  wait- 
ing for  permission  to  land  ;  no  assisvance  was  afforded 
to  sir  .John  Moore;  and  although  the  subsidies,  already 
paid  by  England,  amounted  to  ten  millions  of  dollars, | 
and  that  Madrid  was  rich,  and  willing  to  contribute  to 
the  exigencies  of  the  moment,  the  central  junta,  while 
complaining  of  the  watit  of  money,  would  not  be  at 
the  trouble  of  collecting  patriotic  gifts,  and  left  the 
armies  'to  all  the  horrors  of  famine,  nakedness,  and 
misery. ':(:  The  natural  consequence  of  such  folly  and 
wickedness  ensued  ;  tbe  people  ceased  to  be  enthusias- 
tic, and  tbe  soldiers  des(>rted  in  crowds. 

The  conduct  of  the  generals  was  not  less  extraordi- 
nary. Blake  had  vohmtarily  commenced  the  campaign 
without  magazines,  and  wil  hout  any  plan,  except  that  of 
raising  the  provinces  of  Biscay  and  Guijjuscoa.  With 
the  usual  blind  confidence  of  a  Spaniard,  he  pressed 
forward,  ignorant  of  the  force  or  situation  of  bis  ad- 
versaries, never  dreaming  of  a  defeat;  and  so  little 
experienced  in  tbe  detail  of  command,  that  he  calcula- 
ted upon  the  nrdi::ary  quantity  of  provisions  contained 
in  an  English  frigate,  which  cruised  off  the  coast,  as  a 
resource  for  bis  army,  if  tbe  country  should  fail  to  sup- 
ply him  with  subsistence  ;||  his  artillery  had  only  seven- 
t)'  rounds  for  each  gun,  his  men  were  without  great- 
coats, many  without  shoos,  and  tbe  snow  was  begin- 
ning to  fall  in  the  mountams.5  That  be  was  able  to 
make  anv  impression  is  a  proof  that  king  Joseph  pos- 


»  Journal  of  thf  kinjr's  Operations,    MS. 

+  Parii  inunt.iry  Pitin-rs.  \   ViiKlic.Klion  of  Castanos. 

II  (ten*  r;il  Hrn'lf.rirk's  Lfttor.     Pari.  Pap. 

{  Birch's  Letters  to  Leitli.  MS. 


sessed  little  militarj' talent ;  the  French,  from  the  habi- 
tude of  war,  were  indeed  able  to  baffle  Blake  without 
diiricultv,but  tbe  strategic  importance  of  the  vallev  of 
Ordui.a  they  did  not  appreciate,  or  he  would  have  been 
destroyed :  the  lesson  given  by  Napoleon,  when  he 
defeated  VVurmser  in  the  valley  of  the  Brenta,  might 
have  been  repeated,  under  mere  favourable  circum- 
stances, at  Ordufia  and  Durango. 

But  if  genius  was  asleep  with  the  French,  it  was 
dead  with  the  Spaniards.  As  long  as  Blake  remained 
betAveen  Frias  and  Valmr.ceda,  his  position  was  toler- 
ably secure  from  an  attack,  because  the  Montana  S't. 
Ander  is  exceedingly  rugged,  and  tbe  line  of  retreat 
by  Villarcayo  was  open ;  nevertheless  he  was  cooped 
up  in  a  corner,  and  ill  placed  for  offensive  movements, 
which  were  tbe  only  operations  be  thought  of.  In- 
stead of  occupying  Burgos,  and  repairing  the  citadel, 
he  descended  on  Bilbao  witb  the  bulk  of  his  army, 
thereby  discovering  his  total  ignorance  of  war;  for 
several  great  valleys,  the  upper  parts  of  which  were 
possessed  by  the  French,  met  near  that  town,  and  it 
was  untenable,  the  flank  of  his  army  was  always  ex- 
posed to  an  attack  from  the  side  of  Ordufia,  and  bis 
line  of  retreat  was  in  the  power  of  Bessieres.  'I'o 
protect  his  flank  and  rear,  Blake  detached  largely,  but 
that  weakened  the  main  body  without  obviating  the 
danger ;  nor  did  he  make  amends  for  bis  bad  disposi- 
tions by  diligence;  for  his  movements  were  slow,  bis 
attacks  without  vigour,  and  his  whole  conduct  displayed 
temerity  without  decision,  rashness  without  enterprise. 

The  armies  of  the  centre  and  right  were  not  better 
conducted.  Castailos  having  quitted  Madrid  on  the 
8th  of  October,  arrived  at  Tudela  on  the  17th,  and  on 
tbe  20th  held  a  conference  witb  Palafox  at  Zaragoza. 
The  aggregate  of  their  forces  did  not  much  exceed 
fort3'-five  thousand  men,  of  which  from  two  to  three 
thousand  were  cavalry,  and  sixty  pieces  of  artillery 
followed  the  divisions ;  which  were  posted  in  the  fol 
lowing  manner : — 

ARMY    OF    THE    CENTRE, 27,000. 

General  Pignatelli,  with  ten  thousand  Castiliian  in- 
fantry, one  thousand  five  hundred  cavalry,  and  fourteeii 
guns,  at  Logrofio. 

General  Grimarest,  with  the  second  division  of  An 
dalusia,  five  thousand  men,  at  Lodosa. 

General  La-Pena,  with  tbe  fourth  division,  five  thou- 
sand infantry,  at  Callahorra. 

The  pare  of  srcillery,  and  a  division  of  infantry,  foni 
thousand,  at  Ctiutruenigo. 

The  remainder  at  Tudela  and  the  neighbouring  vil 
lages. 

ARMY    OF    ARAGON, 18,000. 

O'Neil  with  seven  thousand  five  hundred  men,  heli^ 
Sor,  Lumbar,  and  Sanguessa. 

Thirty  miles  in  tbe  rear,  St.  Marc  occupied  Exca 
witb  five  thousand  five  hundred  men. 

Palafox,  with  five  thousand  men,  remained  in  Zar 
agoza. 

The  Ebro  rolled  between  these  two  corps,  but  view 
ed  as  one  army  their  front  lines  occupied  two  sides  ot 
an  irregular  triangle,  of  which  Tudela  was  tbe  apex, 
Sanguessa  and  Logrofio  the  extremities  of  the  base. 
From  the  latter  points,  tbe  rivers  Ebro  and  Aragon, 
which  meet  at  Milagro,  describe,  in  tlieir  double  course, 
an  are,  the  convex  of  which  was  opposed  to  tbe  Span- 
iards. The  streams  of  tbe  Ega,  the  Arga,  and  the 
Zidasco  rivers,  descending  from  the  Pyrenees  in  paral- 
lel courses,  cut  the  chord  of  this  arc  at  nearly  equal 
distances,  and  fall,  the  two  first  into  tbelObro,  tlie  last 
into  the  Aragon,  and  all  the  roads  leading  from  Pam- 
peluna  to  the  Ebro  follow  tbe  course  of  those  torrents. 

Marshal  Moncey's  right  was  at  Estclla  on  the  Ega, 
his  centre  held  Kalces  andTafalla  on  the  Arga  and  the 
Zidasco,  bis  left  was  in  front  of  Sanguessa  on  tbe  Ara- 
gon; the  bridges  of  Olite  and  Peralta  .  ".s  secured  by 


1808.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


93 


Rdvhnced  parties,  atid  Caparosa,  where  there  was  an- 
other bridge,  was  ocrupied  in  force.  In  this  situation 
he  oould  operate  t'rccly  between  the  torrents,  which  in- 
tersected his  line,  he  commanded  all  the  roads  leading 
to  the  Ebro,  and  he  could,  from  Caparosa,  at  any  mo- 
ment, issue  forth  against  the  centre  of  the  Spanish 
armies.  Now  from  Tudela  to  Sanguessa  is  fifty  miles, 
from  Tudela  to  Logrofio  sixty  miles,  but  from  Tudela 
to  Caparosa  is  only  twelve  miles  of  good  road  ;  where- 
fore, the  extremities  of  the  Spanisfi  line  were  above 
one  hundred  miles,  or  six  days'  march  from  each  other, 
while  a  single  day  would  have  sufficed  to  unite  the 
French  within  two  hours'  march  of  the  centre.  The 
weakness  of  the  Spaniards'  position  is  apparent. 

If  Palafox,  crossing  the  Aragon  at  Sanguessa,  ad- 
vanced towards  Pampeluna,  Moncey  would  be  on  his 
left  flank  and  rear ;  if  he  turned  against  Moncey,  the 
garrison  of  Pampeluna  would  fall  upon  his  right ;  if 
Castancs,  to  favour  the  attack  of  Palafox,  crossed  the 
Ebro  at  Logroiio,  Ney,  being  posted  at  Guardia,  was 
ready  to  take  him  in  flank ;  if  the  two  wings  endeav- 
oured to  unite,  their  line  of  march  was  liable  to  be 
intercepted  at  Tudela  by  Moncey,  and  the  rear  of  (-as- 
tanos  be  attacked  by  Ney,  who  could  pass  the  Ebro 
at  Logroiio  or  Lodosa.  If  they  remained  stationary, 
they  might  easily  be  beaten  in  detail. 

Any  ether  than  Spanish  generals  would  have  been 
filled  with  apprehension  on  such  an  occasion;  but  Pa- 
lafox and  Castafios,  heedlesb  of  their  own  danger,  tran- 
quilly proceeded  to  arrange  a  plan  of  offensive  opera- 
tions singularly  absurd.*  They  agreed  that  the  army 
of  the  centre,  leaving  a  division  at  Lodosa  and  another 
at  Calahorra,  should  make  a  flank  march  to  the  right, 
and  take  a  position  along  the  Aragon,  the  left  to  be  at 
Tudela,  the  right  at  Sanguessa ;  that  is,  with  less  than 
twenty  thousand  men  to  occupy  fifty  miles  of  country 
close  "to  a  powerful  and  concentrated  enemy.  In  the 
meantime,  Palafox,  with  the  Aragonese,  crossing  the 
river  at  Sanguessa,  was  to  extend  in  an  oblique  line  to 
Honcesvalles,  covering  the  valleys  of  Talay,  Escay, 
»nd  Roncal,  with  his  centre,  and  reinforcing  his  army 
by  the  armed  inhabitants,  who  were  ready  to  flock  to 
his  standard. f  Blake  was  invited  to  co-operate,  in 
combination,  by  Guipuscoa,  so  as  to  pass  in  the  rear 
of  the  whole  French  army,  unite  with  Palafox,  and 
thus  cut  off  the  enemy's  retreat  into  France,  and  inter- 
cept his  reinforcements  at  the  same  time. 

Castaiios  returned  to  Tudela  on  the  •23d,  and  pro- 
ceeded to  Logroiio  on  the  25th,  the  grand  movement 
heing  to  commence  on  the  37th.  But  on  the  21st, 
Griinarest  had  pushed  forward  strong  detachments 
across  the  Ebro  to  Mendavia,  Andosilla,  Sesma,  and 
Carcur,  and  one  over  the  Ega  to  Lerim — the  Castillian 
outposts  occupied  Viana  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Ebro 
— the  Aragonese  divisions  were  already  closing  upon 
Sanguessa,  and  a  multitude  of  peasants  crowded  to  the 
same  place  in  the  hope  of  obtaining  arms  and  ammuni- 
tion. Moncey,  deceived  by  this  concourse  of  persons, 
estimated  the  force  in  Sanguessa  at  twenty  thousand, 
when,  in  fact,  it  was  only  eight  thousand  regular  troops  ; 
and  his  report,  and  the  simultaneous  movement  of  the 
Spaniards  on  both  extremities,  made  the  king  to  ap- 
prehend a  triple  attack  from  Logroiio,  Lodosa,  and  San- 
guessa. He  immediately  reinforced  Ney  with  Merlin's 
division  from  Bessieres'  corps,  and  directed  him  to 
clear  the  left  bank  of  the  Ebro,  while  Bonnet's  divi- 
sion, also  taken  from  Bessieres,  descended  the  right 
bank  from  Haro  to  Briones.:}:  A  division  of  Moncey's 
corps,  stationed  at  Estella,  received  orders  to  follow 
the  course  of  the  Ega,  and  second  Ney's  operations; 
and  a  part  of  the  garrison  of  Pampeluna,  posted  at 
Montreal  and  Salinas,  was  commanded  to  advance  up- 


*  Sir  John  Moore's  Papprs.     Colonel  Graham's  Corregpon- 
4cn-e.  f  Ibid.    Colo-i  1  Dovle's  Correspond- i.ce. 

1   .1  i   rn::l  n'  th"    .in.,.  O    .  .    tior.g.     M.S. 


on  Nardues,  and  make  a  demonstration  agair»f  San- 
guessa. 

When  Castai^os  arrived  at  Logrofio  these  operations 
were  in  full  activity.  Ney  had,  on  the  24th,  .iriven 
back  the  Castillian  outposts,  crowned  the  height  ap- 
posite that  town  on  the  25th,  and  was  cannonading  the 
Spaniards'  position.  On  the  26th,  he  renewed  his  fire 
briskly  until  twelve  o'clock,  at  which  time  Castanos, 
after  giving  Pignatelli  strict  orders  to  defend  his  post 
unless  he  was  turned  by  a  force  descending  the  right 
bank  of  the  Ebro,  proceeded  himself  to  Lodosa  and 
Calahorra.*  Meanwhile  the  French  from  lOstella  fall- 
ing down  the  I'ga,  drove  the  Spanish  parties  out  of 
Mendavia,  Andosilla,  Carcur,  and  Sesma;  and  Gri- 
marest  retired  from  Lodosa  to  La  Torre  with  such 
precipitation,  that  he  left  colonel  Cruz,  a  valuable  of- 
ficer, with  a  light  battalion,  and  some  volunteers,  at 
Lerim,  where  he  was  taken  after  a  creditable  resist- 
ance.| 

Pignatelli,  regardless  of  Castaiios'  orders,  retired 
from  Logroiio,  and  abandoned  all  his  guns  at  the  foot 
of  the  Sierra  de  Nalda,  only  a  few  miles  from  the  ene- 
my ;  then  crossing  the  mountains,  he  gained  Centru- 
enigo  in  such  disorder,  that  his  men  continued  to  arrive 
for  twenty-four  hours  consecutively.  On  the  right, 
O'Neil  skirmished  with  the  garrison  of  Pampeluna, 
and  lost  six  men  killed,  and  eight  wounded,  but  in  the 
Spanish  fashion,  announced,  that,  after  a  hard  actioa 
of  many  hours,  the  enemy  was  completely  overthrown. 
On  the  27th,  Merlin's  division  rejoined  Bessieres  at 
Miranda,  and  Bonnet,  retiring  from  Briones,  took  post 
in  front  of  Pancorbo.  Castanos,  incensed  at  the  ill 
conduct  of  the  Castillians,  dismissed  Pignatelli  and 
incorporated  his  troops  with  the  Andalusian  divi- 
sions ;  fifteen  hundred  men  of  the  latter,  being  sent 
back  to  Nalda  under  the  conde  de  Cartoajal,  re- 
covered the  lost  guns,  and  brought  them  safe  to 
Centruenigo. 

Dissensions  followed  these  reverses.  Palafox  ar- 
rogantly censured  Castanos,  and  a  cabal,  of  which  ge- 
neral Coupigny  appears  to  have  been  the  principal 
mover,  was  formed  against  the  latter.  The  junta,  ex- 
asperated that  Castanos  had  not  already  driven  the 
enemy  beyond  the  frontier,  encouraged  his  traducers, 
and  circulated  slanderous  accusations  themseh'es,  as  if 
his  inaction  alone  had  enabled  the  French  to  remain  in 
Spain;  they  sent  Francisco  Palafox,  brother  of  the 
captain-general,  and  a  member  of  the  supreme  junta, 
to  head-quarters,  avowedly  to  facilitate,  but  really  to 
control  the  military  operations,  and  he  arrived  at  Alfaro 
on  the  29th,  accompanied  by  Coupigny,  and  the  conde 
de  Montijo,  a  turbulent  factious  man,  shallow  and  vain, 
but  designing  and  unprincipled.  Castanos  waited  up- 
on this  representative  of  the  government,  and  laid  be- 
fore him  the  denuded  state  of  the  army  ;:|:  the  captain- 
general,  Palafox,  also  came  up  from  Zaragoza,  and  a 
council  of  war  was  held  at  Tudela,  on  the  5th  of  No- 
vember. The  rough  manner  in  which  the  Spaniards  had 
just  been  driven  from  the  left  bank  of  the  Ebro,  made 
no  impression  on  the  council,  which  persisted  in  the 
grand  project  of  getting  in  the  rear  of  the  French,  al- 
though it  was  known  that  sixty  thousand  fresh  men  had 
joined  the  latter.  Deeming  it,  however,  fitting  that 
Blake  should  act  the  first,  it  was  resolved  to  await  his 
time,  and,  as  an  intermediate  operation,  it  was  agreed 
that  the  army  of  the  centre,  leaving  six  thousand  men 
at  Calahorra,  and  a  garrison  at  Tudela,  should  cross 
the  Ebro  and  attack  Caparosa  :||  French  parties  had, 
however,  pushed  as  far  as  Valtierra,  and  in  the  skir- 
mishes which  ensued,  the  conduct  of  the  Castillian 
battalions  was  discreditable.§   Joseph  Palafox  then  r»- 


*  Whitlinghani's  Correspondence.    MS. 

f  Colonel  Graliam's  Correspondence.     MS. 

t  Castanos' Vindication.  ,  ^'i 

II  Clnl-inel  Gra'am's  (Jorrespondence.     MS.  ;   J 

{   Wuitti.i^La  I.  b  Co.r  spondcnce.     MS. -^ 


94 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  III, 


turned  to  Zaragoza,  and  the  deputy  separated  himself 
from  C'-asti'-iios. 

Tlip  less  sustained  liy  desertion  and  the  previous 
combats  was  considorablo,  but  some  Murcian  levies, 
and  a  part  of  the  first  and  third  Andalusian  divisions 
joined  the  army  of  tbe  centre,  which  now  mustered 
twenty-six  thousand  irfaiitry,  and  nearly  three  thousand 
cavalry  under  arms,  with  fifty  or  sixty  pieces  of  artil- 
lery. The  positfons  of  the  army  extended  from  Cala- 
horra,  by  Haro,  to  Tudela.  La-Pena  held  the  first  town 
with  five  thon^and  men;  Grimarest  and  Caro  comman- 
ded eiorht  tliousand  at  the  second  ;  head-quarters,  with 
thirteen  thousand  five  hundred  men,  were  fixed  in  the 
last;  Cartoajal  remained  with  eleven  hundred  in  the 
Sierra  de  Nalda,  and  eitrht  hundred  were  posted  at 
Ansejo.*  T'^om  these  points,  in  pursuance  of  the  plan 
arranored,  the  troops  were  actually  in  movement  to  cross 
the  Ebro,  when  despatches  from  Blake  announced  that 
he  had  met  with  some  disaster  on  the  31st,  the  extent 
of  which  he  did  not  communicate. 

This  news  arrested  the  attack,  and  the  preposterous 
transactions  that  ensued,  resembled  the  freaks  of  Cali- 
gula rather  than  the  operations  of  real  war.  First,  it 
was  arranored  that,  the  army  should  abandon  Tudela, 
and  take  a  position  in  two  lines,  the  extremities  of  the 
one  to  rest  on  (Jalahorra  and  Amedo,  the  second  to  ex- 
tend from  Alfaro  to  Fitero,  and  the  deputy  ordered 
O'Neil,  with  the  army  of  Arajjon,  to  occupy  the  latter 
of  these  lines  forthwith;!  O'Neil,  however,  refused  to 
stir  without  instructions  from  thecaptain-sreneral.  This 
was  on  the  9th,  on  the  10th  the  plan  was  changed. 
Castaiios  fixed  his  head-quarters  at  Centruenicro,  and 
the  deputy  proposed  that  O'Neil  should  descend  the 
rijrht  bank  of  the  Araoron  river,  and  attack  Caparosa  in 
the  rear;  that  the  troops  in  Tudela  should  attack  it  in 
front;  and  that  a  division  should  make  a  demonstration 
of  passiiKT  th.^  Ebro  in  boats,  opposite  to  Milagro,  in 
order  to  favour  this  attack.  Castanos  assented,  and  on 
the  12th  a  division  assembled  opposite  Milagro,  while 
La-Pena.  w'ith  two  divisions,  marched  against  Capa- 
rosa ;  suddenly,  the  whimsical  deputy  sent  them  orders 
to  repair  to  Lodosa,  forty  miles  higher  up  the  Ebro,  to 
attack  the  bridge  at  that  place,  while  Grimarest,  cross- 
ing in  the  boats  at  Calahorra,  should  ascend  the  left 
bank  of  the  Ebro,  and  take  it  in  rear.  La  Pena  and 
Villarcayo,  confounded  by  this  change,  wrote  to  Cas- 
tanos for  an  explanation,  and  this  was  the  first  intima- 
tion that  the  latter,  who  was  lying  sick  at  Centruenigo, 
received  of  the  altered  dispositions.:!^  He  directed  his 
lieutenants  to  obey,  but  being  provoked  beyond  endu- 
rance, wrote  sharply  to  the  junta,  dennanding  to  know 
who  was  to  command  the  army ;  and  after  all  this  in- 
solence and  vapouring  no  operation  took  place  :  Fran- 
cisco Palafox  declaring,  that  his  intention  was  merely 
to  make  a  demonstration,  ordered  the  troops  to  their 
quarters,  and  then,  without  assigning  any  reason,  de- 
prived La-Pena  of  his  command,  and  appointed  Car- 
toajal  in  his  place. II 

It  was  at  this  time  that  sir  John  Moore's  letter  arriv- 
ed, but  Castaiios,  no  longer  master  of  his  own  opera- 
tions, could  ill  concert  a  plan  of  compaicin  with  the 
general  of  another  army;  he  could  not  even  tell  what 
troops  werp  to  be  at  his  nominal  disposal !  for  the  Estre- 
maduran  force,  originally  destined  for  his  command, 
was  now  directed  by  the  junta  upon  Burgos,  and  the 
remfiinder  of  his  first  and  third  division  was  detained 
in  Madrid.  His  enemies,  especially  Montijo,  were  ac- 
tive in  spreading  reports  to  his  disadvantage,  the  deser- 
ters scattered  over  the  country  declared  that  all  the  gen- 
erals were  traitors,  and  the  p(>r.|)lo  of  the  towns  and 
villages,  deceived  by  the  central  junta,  and  excited  by 

•  Whittinsrham's  Correspondence.  MSS. 
+  Grafiani's  Correspondence.  MS. 

I  Castunos'  Vindication. 

II  Gralimn's  Correspondence.   MS. 


false  rumours,  respected  neither  justice  nor  government, 
and  committed  the  most  scandalous  excesses.*  Blake's 
situation  was  not  more  prosperous.  The  road  from 
IJnyonne  to  Vittoria  was  encumbered  with  the  advanc- 
ing columns  of  the  great  French  army. 

An  imperial  decree,  issued  early  in  September,  in- 
corporated the  troops  already  in  Spain  with  the  grand 
army  then  marching  from  Germany,  and  the  united 
forces  were  to  compose  eight  divisions,  called  '  C.orps 
d'Armee,'  an  institution  analogous  to  the  Roman  legion  ; 
because  each  '  Corps  d'Armee,'  although  adapted  for 
action  as  a  component  part  of  a  large  army,  was  also 
provided  with  light  cavalry,  a  pare,  and  train  of  artil- 
lery, engineers,  sappers  and  miners,  and  a  complete 
civil  administration,  to  enable  it  to  take  the  field  as  an 
independent  force.  The  imperial  guards  and  the  heavy 
cavalry  of  the  army  were,  however,  not  included  in 
this  arrangement;  the  first  had  a  constitution  of  their 
own,  and  at  this  time  all  the  heavy  cavalry,  and  all 
the  artillery,  not  attached  to  the  '  Corps  d'Armee,' 
were  formed  into  a  large  reserve.  As  the  columns  ar- 
rived in  Spain,  they  were  united  to  the  troops  already 
there,  and  the  whole  was  disposed  conformably  to  the 
new  organization. 

Marshal  Victor,  duke  of  Belluno,  comman(icd  the  First  Corps. 

Marshal  Bpssieres,  duke  of  Istria  .  .  Second  t'orps. 

Mirslial  Mdiicuy,  duke  of  t^orne^'liano  .  .  Third  Corps. 

Marshal  I>(^f(bre,  duke  of  Dantzic         .  .  Fourth  Corps. 

Marshal  Mortier,  duke  of 'freviso         .  .  Fiflh  Corps. 

Marshal  Ney   duke  of  Elchingen  .  .  Sixth  Corps. 

Gueral  Sr.Cjr  .  .  Stventh  Cup* 

General  Jui.ot,  duke  of  Abrantes         .  .  Eighth  Corps. 

The  seventh  corps  was  appropriated  to  Catalonia, 
but  the  remainder  were,  in  the  latter  end  of  October, 
assembled  or  assembling  in  Navarre  and  Biscay.  Gen- 
c^'al  Merlin,  with  a  division,  held  Zornosa,  and  ob- 
served Blake,  who  remained  tranquilly  at  Bilbao.  Two 
divisions  of  the  fourth  corps  occupied  Durango  and 
the  neighbouring  villages.  One  division  and  the  light 
cavalry  of  the  first  corps  was  at  Vittoria,  a  second  di- 
vision of  the  same  corps  guarded  the  bridge  of  Mur- 
guia  on  the  river  Bayas,  and  commanded  the  entran(;e 
to  the  valley  of  Orduna.j"  Haro,  Puente,  Lara,  Mi- 
randa, and  Pancorbo  were  maintained  by  the  infantrj 
of  the  king's  body  guard  and  the  second  corps ;  and 
the  light  cavalry  of  the  latter  covered  the  plains  close 
up  to  Briviesca.  The  reinforcements  were  daily  crowd- 
ing up  to  Vittoria,  and  the  king,  restrained  by  the  em- 
peror's orders  to  a  rigorous  system  of  defence,  occupied 
himself  with  the  arrangements  attendant  on  such  an 
immense  accumulation  of  force,  and  left  Blake  in  quiet 
possession  of  Bilbao.  The  latter  mistook  this  appa- 
rent inactivity  for  timidity  ;  he  was  aware  that  rein- 
forcements, in  number  equal  to  his  whole  army,  had 
joined  the  enemy,  yet,  with  wonderful  rashness,  resolv- 
ed to  press  forward,  and  readily  agreed  to  attempt  a 
junction  with  Palafox,  in  the  rear  of  the  French  posi- 
tion. 

At  this  time  Romana's  infantry  were  approaching 
Bilbao,  and  the  Estremadurans  were  in  march  for  Bur- 
gos; but  the  country  was  nearly  exhausted  of  provi- 
sions, both  armies  felt  the  scarcity,  desertion  prevailed 
among  the  Spaniards,  and  the  Biscayans,  twice  aban- 
doned, were  fearful  of  a  third  insurrection.  Prudence 
dictated  a  retreat  towards  Burgos,  but  Blake  reso.ved 
to  advance.  First  he  posted  general  Acevedo  with  the 
Asturians  and  the  second  division  at  Ordtifia;  then  he 
left  a  battalion  at  Miravelles,  to  preserve  the  communi- 
cation with  Billrao;:!^  finally  he  marched  himself,  on 
the  21tb,  at  the  head  of  seventeen  thousand  fighting 
men,  divided  in  three  columns,  to  attack  Zornosa.  The 
right  cohimn  ascended  the  valley  of  Durango  by  Gal- 
dacano,  the  centre  by  Larabezua,  the  left  by  Rigoytia; 


*   Vindiration  of  Castanos. 

t  Jotirml  of  the  kins^'s  opcratious.  MS. 

}   Carrol's  Correspondence. 


1808.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR, 


95 


Rnd  general  Acevedo  penetrated  thrnuirh  the  mountains 
of  Gorbea  by  Ozoco  and  Villaro,  with  a  view  to  seize 
Manares  and  St.  Antonia  d'Urquitiola.  It  was  intended 
by  this  operation  to  cut  the  communication  between 
Miranda  on  the  Ebro,  and  the  town  of  Duranffo,  and 
thus  to  intercept  the  retreat  of  marshal  Noy,  and  oblijre 
him  to  surrender  with  sixteen  thousai^d  men;*  for 
Blake  was  utterly  ignorant  of  his  adversary's  position, 
and  imag-ined  that  he  had  only  two  corps  to  deal  with. 
He  believed  that  the  kinor,  with  one,  was  in  his  front 
at  Duran<To  and  !\Iont  Drajon,  and  that  Ne}'  with  the 
other,  was  at  ^Miranda;  but,  in  fact,  the  latter  was  at 
that  moment  attacking  Pignatelli  at  Logrono. 

As  the  Spanish  army  a])proached  Zornosa,  Merlin, 
abandoning  the  town,  drew  up  on  some  heights  in  the 
rear.  Bad  weather,  and  the  want  of  provisions,  check- 
ed further  operations  imtil  the  evening  of  the  25th, 
when  the  Spanish  division  at  Rigoytia  attempted  to 
turn  the  rig-ht  flank  of  the  French ;  at  the  same  time 
Blake  marched  against  the  centre  and  left,  and  ^lerlin 
fell  back  to  Durango.  The  duke  of  Dantzic,  alarmed 
by  these  movements,  concentrated  Sebastiani's  and 
Laval's  division,  and  a  Dutch  brig-ade  of  infantry  at 
Durango;  and  as  his  third  division,  under  general  Va- 
lence, was  not  come  up,  the  king  reinforced  him  with 
Villatte's  division  of  the  first  corps,  and  ordered  Mer- 
lin's force,  which  was  composed  of  detachments,  to 
join  their  re"pective  regi.nents.f 

Until  the  .30th  the  armies  remained  quiet,  but  at  day- 
break on  the  3 1st,  the  Spaniards  were  formed  in  a 
checqusred  order  of  battle  across  the  Durango  read, 
five  Uiiles  bevond  Zornosa,  and  close  to  the  enemy's 
position.  The  duke  cf  Dantzic,  apprised  by  the  pre- 
vious movements  that  he  was  going  to  be  attacked,  be- 
came impatient;  the  state  of  the  atmosphere  pr 'vent- 
ed him  from  discovering  the  order  of  march,  or  the  real 
force  of  the  Spaniards,  but  he  know  that  Blake  had 
the  power  of  uniting  nearly  fifty  thousand  men,  and 
concluding  that  such  a  force  was  in  his  front,  he  re- 
solved to  anticipate  his  adversaries  by  a  sudden  and 
vigorous  assault. +  In  fact,  the  Spanish  generals  were 
so  little  o-Jiided  by  the  rules  of  war,  that  before  their 
incapacity  was  understood,  their  very  errors  being  too 
gross  for  belief,  contributed  to  their  safetj'.  Blake  had 
commenced  a  great  offensive  movement,  intending  to 
beat  the  troops  in  his  front,  and  to  cut  off  and  capture 
Ney's  corps  of  sixteen  thousand  men.  In  six  days, 
although  unopoosed.  he  advanced  less  than  fifteen 
miles;  and  so  disposed  his  forces,  that  cut  of  thirty-six 
thousand  mon.  he  had  only  seventeen  thousand  infantry, 
■without  artillery,  upon  the  field  of  battle.  His  adver- 
sary, at  the  head  of  twenty-five  thousand  men,  formed 
in  three  columns  of  attack,  then  descended  from  the 
heights.  II 

COMBAT    OF    DURANGO. 

A  thick  fog  covering  the  mountain  sides,  filled  all 
the  valleys,  and  a  few  random  shots  alone  indicated 
the  presence  of  the  hostile  armies,  when  suddenly  Vil- 
latte's division  appearing  close  to  the  Spanish  vanguard, 
with  a  brisk  onset  forced  it  back  upon  the  third  divi- 
sion ;  Sebastiani's  and  Laval's  followed  in  succession ; 
a  fire  of  artillery,  to  which  Blake  could  make  no  reply, 
opened  along  the  road,  the  day  cleared,  and  the  Spanish 
army,  heaped  in  confused  masses,  was,  notwithstand- 
ing the  example  of  personal  courage  given  by  Blake, 
and  the  natural  strength  of  the  country,  driven  from 
one  position  to  another.  At  mid-day  it  was  bej^ond 
Zornosa,  and  at  three  o'clock  in  full  flight  for  Bilbao, 
which  place  it  gained,  in  a  state  of  great  confusion, 
during  the  night ;  but  the  next  day  Blake  crossed  the 
Salcedon,  and  took  a  position  at  Nava.§    The  duke  of 

*  Rrot'.erick's  norresponHenre, 

+   S.  Joiirml  of  tlie  kinp:"s  operations.  MS.  |   Ibidem. 

S  Carrol's  Correspondence. 
S.  Journal  o.*"  op«  ratiooa.  ,MS.  Leith's  Correspondence.  MS. 


Dantzic  pursued  as  far  as  Guef-es,  and  then  leavino 
general  Villatte,  with  seven  thousand  men,  to  ( bserve 
the  enemy,  returned  to  Bilbao.  Twelve  vessels,  laden 
with  English  stores,  were  in  the  river,  but  contrived 
to  escape. 

The  king  was  displeased  with  the  precipitancy  cf 
marshal  Lefebre,  but  to  aid  him  ordered  the  division 
cf  the  first  corps,  stationed  at  Murgnia,  to  descend  (he 
valley  of  Orduua,  as  far  as  Amurio";  at  the  same  time, 
Mouton's  division  was  detached  from  the  second  corps 
towards  Barbarena,  from  whence  it  was,  according  to 
circumstances,  either  to  join  the  troops  in  the  valley 
of  Ordufia,  or  to  watch  Medina  and  Quincoes,  and  press 
Blake  in  his  retreat,  if  he  retired  by  Vallarcayo.  The 
French  were  ignorant  of  the  situation  of  general  Ace- 
vedo, but  the  day  of  the  action  at  Zornosa,  that  general 
was  at  Villaro,  from  whence  he  endeavoured  to  rejoin 
Blake,  by  marching  to  Valmaceda ;  he  reached  Mira- 
valles,  in  the  valley  of  Orduna,  on  the  3d,  at  the  mo- 
ment when  the  head  of  the  French  troops  coming  from 
Murguia  appeared  in  sight,  and  after  a  slight  skirmish, 
the  latter,  thinking  they  had  to  deal  with  the  whole  of 
Blake's  army,  retired  to  Ordufa. 

Acevedo  immediately  pushed  for  the  Salcedon  river, 
and  Villatte  who  first  got  notice  of  his  march,  dividing 
his  own  troops,  posted  one  half  at  Orantia,  on  the  road 
leading  from  Miravalles  to  Nava,  the  other  on  the  road 
to  Valmaceda,  thus  intercepting  the  Spaniards'  line  cf 
retreat.*  Blake,  informed  of  Acevedo's  danger,  in  the 
night  of  the  4th,  prom.ptly  passed  the  bridge  of  Nava, 
meaning  to  fall  suddenly  upon  the  nearest  French  ;  but 
they  were  aware  of  his  intention,  and  sending  a  de- 
tachment to  occupy  Gordujuela,  a  pass  in  the  moun- 
tains, leading  to  Bilbao,  rejoined  Villatte  on  the  Val- 
maceda road.  Five  Spanish  divisions  and  some  of  Ro- 
maiia's  troops  were  now  assembled  at  Orantia,  Blake 
left  two  in  reserve,  detached  one  against  Gordujuela, 
and  with  the  other  two  drove  Villatte  across  the  Sal- 
cedon. That  general  rallied  en  the  left  bank  and  renewed 
the  action,  but  at  this  moment  Acevedo  appeared  in 
sight,  and  sending  two  battalions  by  a  circuit  to  gain 
the  rear  of  the  French,  with  the  remainder  joined  in 
the  combat.  Villatte  then  retired  fighting,  and  encoun- 
tering the  two  battalions  in  his  retreat,  brcke  through 
them,  and  reached  Gueres,  j'et  with  considerable  less 
of  men,  and  he  also  left  one  gun  and  part  of  his  bag- 
gage in  the  hands  of  the  Spaniards.  Thus  ended  a 
series  of  operations  and  combats,  which  had  lasted 
for  eleven  days. 

OBSERVATIONS. 

1.  The  duke  of  Dantzic's  attack  at  Durango  was 
founded  upon  false  data  ;  it  was  inconsistent  with  the 
general  plan  of  the  campaign,  hasty,  ill-combined,  and 
feebly  followed  up ;  and  it  was  an  unpardonable  fault 
to  leave  Villatte  without  support,  close  to  an  army 
that  had  met  with  no  signal  defeat,  and  that  was  five 
times  his  strength.  The  march  of  Victor's  division  was 
too  easily  checked  at  Miravalles,  and  for  five  days,  gene- 
ral Acevedo,  with  at  least  eight  thousand  men,  wandered 
unmolested  in  the  midst  of  the  French  columns,  and 
finally  escaped  without  any  extraordinary  elTort. 

2.  General  Blake's  dispositions,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  his  night-march  from  Nava  to  Orairtia,  will,  il 
studied,  afford  useful  lessons  in  an  inverse  sense.  From 
the  24th  of  October  to  the  4th  of  November,  he  omit- 
ted no  error  that  the  circumstances  rendered  it  pcssit)Ie 
to  commit;  and  then,  as  if  ashamed  of  the  single  judi- 
cious movement  that  occurred,  he  would  not  profit  by 
it.  When  Romana's  infantry  had  partly  arrived,  and 
the  remainder  were  in  the  vicinity  of  Nava,  the  whole 
Spanish  army  was,  contrary  to  all  reasonable  expecta- 
tion, concentrated;  above  thirty  thousand  fighting  men 
were  united  in  one  mass,  harassed,  but  not  much  dia- 


»  S.  Journal  of  operations.  MS.     Captain  Carro'. 


96 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[POOK    IV 


couratrod,  and  the  conde  de  Belvedere,  with  twelve 
thousand  intnntr)',  tw«  Ivr  hundred  cavalry,  and  thirty 
pieces  ol"  artillery,  was  close  to  l>ur<ros.  If  Blake  Intd 
been  at  all  acquainted  with  tb.e  frinciples  of  his  art, 
lie  would  tiicn  have  taken  advaiitaae  of  Villatle's 
retreat,  to  march  by  Espinosa,  and  Villarcayo,  to  the 
upper  Ebro;  from  thence  he  could  have  gained  Bursfos, 
broujrht  up  the  artillery  from  Reynosa,  and  imiting 
Belvedere's  troops  to  his  own,  have  opened  a  com- 
munication with  the  Entrlish  army.  In  that  position, 
with  a  plentiful  country  behind  him,  his  retreat 
open,  and  his  army  provided  with  cavalry,  he  mifiht 
have  commenced  a  repular  system  of  operations; 
but  with  incredible  obstinacy  and  want  of  judg-ment, 
he  now  determined  to  attack  Bilbao  again,  and  to 
renew  the  ridiculous  attempt  to  surround  the  French 
anny  and  unite  with  Palafox  at  the  foot  of  the  Py- 
renees. 


Such  were  the  commanders,  Ae  armies,  the  rulers, 
upon  whose  exertions  the  British  cabiiicl  reiud  for  tho 
securit-y  of  sir  John  Moire's  troops,  during  their  double 
march  "from  Lisbon  and  Ccruiia !  It  was  in  such  a 
state  of  affairs  that  the  English  ministc-s,  anticipating 
the  speedy  and  complete  destruction  of  the  French 
forces  in  Spain,  were  sounding  the  trumpet  for  an  im- 
mediate invasion  of  France  !  Of  Franco,  defended  by 
a  million  of  veteran  soldiers,  and  governed  by  the 
mitrhtiest  genius  of  two  thousand  ye.Ts !  As  if  the 
vast  military  power  of  that  warlike  nation  had  sudden- 
ly beoome  extinct,  as  if  Baylen  were  a  second  Zama, 
and  Hannibal  flying  to  Adrumetum  instead  of  passing 
the  Iberus  !*  But  Napoleon,  with  an  executi(>n  more  rap- 
id than  other  men's  thcughts,  was  already  at  V  ittoria,  and 
his  hovering  eagles  cast  a  gloomy  shadow  over  Spain. 


*  Lord  W.  Bentinck's  Correspondence. 


BOOK   IV. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Wapolpon  orrivfs  at  Bayonne— Blake  advanres  toward  Bilbao 
— The  count  Belvedere  arrives  at  Burgos — The  first  and 
'jurth  corps  advance — Combat  of  Guenes — Blake  retreats — 
IVap.'Iton  at  Vittoria  ;  his  plm — Soult  takes  the  command 
of  the  second  corps — Bat'le  of  Ganional — Burg-os  taken — 
Battle  of  Espinosa — Flisrht  from  Rnynosa — Soult  overruns 
the  Montagna  de  St.  Ander,  and  scours  Leon — Napoleon 
f\x  r  his  l;ead-qna-trrs  at  Burgos,  changes  his  front,  bts 
10,*00  loose  cavalry  upon  Castille  and  Leon — Marshals  Las- 
ncs  an-l  Ni-y  directed  against  Castanos — Folly  of  the  central 
junta — General  St.  Junn  occunies  the  pass  of  the  Somosierra 
— Folly  of  the  generals  on  tne  Ebro — Battle  of  Tudela. 

Aftkr  the  opening  of  the  legislative  sessions,  the 
emperor  repaired  to  Bayonne.  He  arrived  there  on  the 
3d  of  November.  It  was  his  intention  that  the  pre- 
sumption of  the  Spanhsh  generals  should  be  encouraged 
by  a  strict  defensive  system  until  the  moment  when  the 
blow  he  v;as  prepared  to  strike  could  fall  v/ith  the 
greatest  effect ;  hence  the  precipitate  attack  at  Zornosa 
displeased  hi'n,  nor  was  he  satisfied  with  the  subse- 
quent measures  of  the  king,  for  he  thought  that  Mou- 
ton's  division  would  be  endangered  between  the  army 
of  Blake  and  that  of  the  conde  de  Belvedere.*  To 
prevent  any  accident,  he  judged  it  necessary  that  Kes- 
•ieres  should  advance  with  the  whole  of  the  second 
corps  to  Burgos  ;  that  marshal  Victor  should  march  b}'' 
Amurio  to  Valmaceda;  and  that  marshal  Ijofebre  should 
immedintoU' renew  his  attack  on  that  position  from  the 
side  of  Bilbao.  Thus  at  the  very  moment  when  Blake 
was  leading  his  harassed  and  starving  troops  back  to 
Bilbao,  two  corps,  amounting  to  fifty  thousand  men, 
were  in  full  march  to  meet  him,  and  a  third,  having 
airoady  turnnd  his  right  flank,  was  on  his  rear. 

The  Spanish  general  advanced  from  Valmaceda  on 
the  7th,  and  thinking  that  only  fific*ri  hundred  men 
were  in  Guei~ies,  prepared  to  surround  them.f  Two 
divisions,  making  a  circuit  to  the  left,  passed  through 
Abellana  and  Sopoerte,  with  a  view  to  gain  the  bridge 
of  Sodupe,  ill  the  rear  of  Guenes,  while  two   other 

•  S.  .Journal  of  the  kinj^'s  operations.  MS. 
^  Captain  Carrol's  Correspondence. 


divisions  attacked  that  position  in  front ;  the  remainder 
of  the  army  followed  at  some  distance,  but  the  advan- 
ced guard  of  the  4th  corps  was  in  Guenes,  and  after 
an  action  of  two  hours,  the  Spaniards  were  thrown  in- 
to such  confusion  that  night  alone  saved  them  from  a 
total  rout.  The  same  day,  one  of  their  flanking  divi- 
sions was  encountered  and  beaten  near  Sopoerte,  and 
the  retreat  of  the  other  being  intercepted  on  the  side 
of  Abellana,  it  was  forc^^d  to  make  for  Portagalete  on 
the  sea-coast,  and  from  thence  to  St.  Andero.*  Blake, 
whose  eyes  were  now  opening  to  the  peril  of  his  situa- 
tion, resolved  to  retire  upon  Espinosa  de  losMonteros, 
a  mountain  position,  two  marches  distant,  where  he 
designed  to  rest  bis  troops,  and  draw  sup])lies  from  his 
magazines  at  Reynosa.  Falling  back  to  \"almaceda  in 
the  night,  he  gained  Nava  the  next  day,  and  on  the 
9th  was  at  Espinosa.  The  late  division  of  Romana's 
infantry  joined  him  on  the  march,  and  with  exception 
of  the  men  cut  oiT  at  Abellana;  the  whole  army  was 
concentrated  on  strong  ground  commanding  the  inter- 
section of  the  roads  from  St.  Andero,  Villarcayo,  and 
Reynosa. 

Napoleon,  accompanied  by  the  dukes  of  Dalmatia 
and  Montebello,  quitted  Bayonne  the  morning  of  the 
8th,  and  reached  V ittoria  in  the  evening.  He  was  met 
by  the  civil  and  military  chiefs  at  the  gates  (f  the  town, 
hut  refusing  to  go  to  the  house  prepared  for  his  recep- 
tion, jumped  off  his  horse,  entered  the  first  small  inn 
that  he  observed,  and  calling  for  his  maps,  and  a  report 
of  the  situation  of  the  armies  on  both  sides,  proceeded 
to  arrange  the  plan  of  his  campaign. 

The  first  and  fourth  corps,  after  uniting  at  Valma- 
ceda, had  separated  again  at  Nava  on  the  9lli,  Victor 
was  therefore  pursuing  the  track  of  Blake,  and  Lefebre 
was  marching  u])on  Villarcayo  by  IMedina.  The  se- 
cond corps  was  concentrating  at  Brivicsca.  The  third 
corps  occupied 'J'afalla,  Peraltes,  Caparosa.and  Estrel- 
la.  The  sixth  corps,  the  guards,  and  the  reserve,  were 
distributed  from  V ittoria  to  Miranda,  and  a  division, 
under  the  command  of  general  La   Grange,   was  at 


•  Genir^l  L.  it'j's  C 


1R08.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


97 


Guardia,  connecting  the  poeilions  of  the  third  and  sixth 
corps.  The  fifth  corps  wajc  still  behind  the  frontier, 
and  the  ei<rhth,  composed  cS  the  troops  removed  from 
Portugal  by  the  convent><".a  of  Cintra,  was  marching 
from  the  French  sea-pt*rts,  where  it  had  disembarked. 

On  the  Spanish  side,  the  conde  de  Belvedere  was  at 
Burgos;  Castanos  and  Palafox,  unknowing  of  their 
danger,  were  planning  to  cut  of!  the  French  army,  and 
Blake  was  flying  to  Espinosa.  The  English  army 
were  scattered  from  Corur.a  to  Talavera  de  la  Reyna. 
On  these  facts,  and  in  two  hours  the  emperor  had  ar- 
ranged his  plans. 

Moncey  was  directed  to  leave  a  division  in  front  of 
Pampeluna,  in  observation  of  the  Spaniards  on  the 
Aragon,  to  concentrate  the  remainder  of  the  third  corps 
at  Lodosa,  and  remain  on  the  defensive  until  further 
orders.  La  Grange  was  reinforced  by  Colbert's  bri- 
gade of  light  cava'ry  from  the  sixth  corps,  and  directed 
upon  Logrofio.  The  first  and  fourth  corps  were  to 
press  Blake  without  intermission.  The  sixth  to  march 
towards  Arando  de  Duero.  The  duke  of  Dalmatia  ap- 
pointed to  command  the  2d  corps,  was  ordered  to  fall 
headlong  upon  the  conde  de  Belvedere,  and  the  emperor, 
with  the  imperial  guards  and  the  reserve,  followed  the 
movement  of  the  second  corps.* 

These  instructions  being  issued,  the  enormous  mass 
rf  the  French  army  was  put  in  motion  with  a  celerity 
that  marked  the  vigour  of  Napoleon's  command. 
Marshal  Soult  departed  on  the  instant  for  Briviesca, 
arrived  at  day-break  on  the  9lh,  received  the  second 
corps  from  Bessieres,  and  in  a  few  hours  was  in  full 
march  for  the  terrace  of  Monasterio,  which  overlooks 
the  plains  of  Burgos ;  head-quarters  were  established 
tliere,  during  the  night,  and  Franceschi's  light  cavalr)' 
took  the  road  of  Zaldueilo  to  Arlanzon,  with  orders  to 
cross  the  river  of  that  name,  to  descend  the  left  bank, 
cut  the  communication  with  Madrid,  and  prevent  the 
Spaniards  rallying  at  the  convent  of  the  Chartreuse, 
if  defeated  near  Burgos. 

At  four  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  10th,  Soult 
was  again  in  march  from  Monasterio,  and  at  six  o'clock 
general  Lassalle's  cavalry  reached  Villa  Fria.  The 
conde  ds  Belvedere,  being  informed  of  their  approach, 
posted  the  Spanish  army  at  Gamonal,  and  taking  four 
thousand  infantr}%  eight  guns,  and  the  whole  of  his 
cavalry,  fell  upon  Lassalle.  The  latter  skirmished  for 
a  while,  and  then,  following  his  orders,  retired  slowly 
to  Rio  Bena,  but  at  eight  o'clock,  the  French  infantry, 
which  had  advanced  b}' two  roads,  was  reunited  at  this 
town,  and  immediately  pushed  forward  on  Villa  Fria, 
Belvedere  was  dri*fen  back  upon  Gamonal,  and  the 
Spanish  army  was  discovered  in  line  of  battle.  The 
right  was  in  a  wood,  leaving  a  clear  space  of  some 
extent  unoccupied  between  it  and  the  river  Arlanzon ; 
the  left  was  posted  in  the  walled  park  ofVellimer; 
thirty  pieces  of  artillery  covered  the  front,  and  seven 
or  eight  thousand  armed  peasants  were  arrayed  on  the 
lieiglits,  immediateh'  behind  the  regular  troops;  these 
latter  amounted  to  eleven  thousand  one  hundred  and 
lil'ty  infantry,  and  eleven  hundred  and  fifty  cavalry. 
This  was  the  best  army  at  that  time  in  Spain  ;  it  was 
composed  of  the  Walloon  and  Spanish  guards,  the  re- 
giments of  Mavorca,  Zafra,  and  Valencia  de  Alcantara  ;| 
the  hussars  of  Valencia,  the  royal  carbineers,  and  som.e 
volunteers  of  good  families;  it  was  completely  equip- 
ped, and  armed  principally  from  the  English  stores, 
yet  Its  resistance  was  even  more  feeble  than  that  made 
by  the  half-famished  peasants  of  Blake's  force. 

BATTLE    OF    GAMOKAL. 

Lassalle,  with  the  light  cavalr\%  leading  down  upon 
the  Spanish  right,  filled  the  plain  between  the  river 
and  the  wood,  and  at  the  same  moment  the  Spanish 


»  S.  A'ars':'  I  SouK's  oneration?,  MSS. 
+  S.  Journul  ai  opera  ions.  MS. 
8 


artillery  opened  along  the  whole  cf  the  line ;  then  tho 
French  infiintry,  formed  in  colunir^  of  regiments,  ar- 
rived, and  Mcuton's  division,  compcliMfl  cf  old  soldiers, 
broke  at  once  into  the  wood  at  a  charging  pace.  Gen- 
eral Bonnet  followed  closely,  but  so  rapid  and  efTectua. 
was  the  assault  of  Moutcn's  veterans  that  the  Spaniards 
fled  in  disorder  before  Bonnet's  troops  could  fire  a  slu  t ; 
their  left  wing,  although  not  attacked,  followed  the 
example  of  the  right,  and  the  whole  mass,  victors  and 
vanquished,  rushed  into  the  town  of  Burgos  with  extra- 
ordinary violence  and  uproar.  Bessieres,  who  retained 
the  command  of  all  the  heavy  cavalr}',  passed  at  full 
gallop  toward  the  Madrid  road,  where  it  crosses  the 
Arlanzon,  sabring  the  fugitives,  and  taking  all  the  gun3 
v."hich  had  escaped  IMouton,  Avhile,  on  the  other  side  cf 
the  river,  Franceschi  was  seen  cutting  in  pieces  sonie 
Catalonian  light  troops  stationed  there,  and  barring  all 
hopes  of  flight.  Never  was  a  defeat  more  instanta- 
neous, or  more  complete.  Two  thousand  five  hundred 
Spaniards  were  killed  ;  twenty  guns,  thirty  ammuni- 
tion wagons,  six  pair  cf  colours,  and  nine  hundred  men 
were  taken  on  the  field ;  four  thousand  musquets  were 
found  unbroken,  and  the  fugitives  dispersed  far  and 
wide.  Belvedere  himself  escaped  to  Lerma,  where 
he  arrived  in  the  evening  of  the  day  on  which  the. 
battle  was  fought,  and  meeting  some  battalions,  prin- 
cipally composed  of  volunteers,  on  their  march  to  join 
his  army,  retired  with  them  to  Aranda  deUuero  during 
the  night ;  but  first,  with  true  Spanish  cxaugeration, 
wrote  a  despatch,  in  which  he  asserted  that  tl;c  French, 
repulsed  in  two  desperate  attacks,  had,  after  thirteen 
hours'  hard  fighting,  succeeded  in  a  third. 

All  the  ammunition  and  stores  of  the  defeated  army 
were  captured  in  Burgos;  and  the  indefatigable  Scult, 
who  was  still  upon  the  post-horse  which  he  had  mount- 
ed at  Briviesca,  who  had  travelled  from  Payonne  to 
Burgos,  taken  the  latter  town,  and  gained  a  decisivw 
victory  all  within  the  space  of  fifty  hours,  nov,-  detach- 
ed one  column  in  pursuit  on  the  side  of  Lerma,  another 
towards  Palencia  and  Valladolid,  and  marched  him- 
self with  a  third,  on  the  very  day  of  the  battle,  to- 
wards Reynosa,  where  he  hoped  to  intercept  Blake's 
line  of  retreat  to  the  plains  of  Leon.*  This  last-men- 
tioned general  had  reached  F'Spinosa,  as  we  have  seen, 
en  the  eveninn-  of  the  9th,  with  six  divisions,  itcluding 
Romana's  infantry,  who  also  draggred  with  them  six 
guns  of  a  small  calibre  ;  but  the  separation  of  the  fourth 
division  at  Abellana,  the  deserters,  and  the  losses 
sustained  in  battle,  had  reduced  his  army  belcw  twen- 
ty-five thousand  fighting  men ;  and  the  park  of  am- 
munition and  artillery,  guarded  by  two  thousand  in- 
f.mtry,  were  behind  Reynosa,  at  Aquilar  del  Campo, 
on  the  road  to  Leon;  yet  his  position  was  strong,  and 
he  hoped  to  remain  in  it  for  some  days  unmolested. 
His  left  wing,  composed  of  the  Asturi?ns  and  the  fir'-t 
division,  occupied  some  heights  which  covered  the 
road  of  St.  Andero;  the  centre,  consisting  of  the  third 
division,  and  the  reserve,  formed  a  line  across  the  road 
of  Re)-nosa,  which  leads  through  Espinosa  directly  to 
the  rear;  the  second  division  was  established  on  a 
commanding  height,  a  little  on  the  right  hand  of  the 
town ;  Romana's  infantry  Avere  posted  in  a  wood,  two 
miles  in  advance  of  tl.e  right,  and  the  vangua  d,  with 
six  guns,  foraied  a  reserve  behind  the  centre  of  tho 
position. I 

BATTLE    OF    ESPINOSA. 

On  the  10th,  the  duke  of  Belluno  came  up,  and  at 
two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  the  head  of  a  Fr':^nch 
column  driving  back  Romana's  infantry,  seized  the 
wood,  but  the  Spaniards,  reinforced  by  the  third  divi- 
sion, renewed  the  combat;  a  second  co'umn  then  rpen- 
ed  its  fire  upon  the  Spanish  centre,  thus  weakened  by 
the  advance  of  the   third  division,  and  at  the   sanie 


•  Carrol's  Correspondence, 


t  Ibid. 


98 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  IV. 


time  some  light  troops  ascending  the  heights  en  the 
left,  menaced  that  wing  of  Blake's  army.  Meanwhile 
the  contest  on  the  right  was  maintained  with  vigour, 
and  the  Spaniards  supported  by  the  fire  of  the  six 
gi;ns  in  their  centre,  even  appeared  to  be  gaining  ground, 
when  the  night  closed  and  put  an  end  to  the  action, 
leaving  the  French  in  possession  cf  the  wood,  and  of 
a  ridge  of  hills,  which  at  the  distance  of  a  cannon  shot, 
run  parallel  to  the  centre  of  the  position. 

The  generals  S.  Roman  and  Riquielme  were  mor- 
tally wounded  on  the  Spanish  side,  and  at  daylight 
the  next  morning,  Mctor,  who  had  relieved  his  left 
with  fresh  troops  during  tbe  night,  renewed  the  attack. 
General  Maison,  throwing  out  a  cloud  of  skirmishers 
along  the  front  of  the  Spanish  centre  and  kft  wing, 
under  cover  of  their  fire,  passed  rapidly  to  his  own 
right,  and  fell  upon  the  Asturians  and  the  first  division. 
Blake,  obyerving  this  movement,  detached  a  column 
cf  grenadiers  to  reinforce  the  latter,  and  advanced  in 
person  with  three  regiments  from  the  centre  to  take 
Alaison  in  flank  during  his  march,  but  it  was  too  late; 
three  Asturian  generals  fell  at  the  first  fire  and  the 
^■roops  of  that  kingdom  fled  without  Availing  for  the 
enemy  :  they  were  soon  followed  by  the  first  division, 
and  Maison  continuing  his  course  without  a  check, 
intercepted  the  line  cf  retreat  by  St.  Andero,  and  also 
that  by  the  town  of  Espinosa.  In  the  mean  time,  the 
French  troops  posted  on  the  parallel  ridge,  before  spoken 
of,  attacked  the  centre,  and  when  the  division  in  the 
wood  also  advanced  against  the  right,  the  whole  Spa- 
nish arm)-  gave  way  in  terrible  confusion ;  crowding 
heavily  towards  the  river  Trueba  which  swept  with  a 
bound  round  the  rear,  the  men  endeavoured  to  escape, 
some  by  the  fords,  some  by  the  town,  some  by  the 
hills  on  the  right;  but  the  weather  was  bad,  the  road 
stfep,  the  overthrow  fatal.  Those  whom  the  sword 
missed,  went  to  their  own  provinces,  carrying  disma}' 
into  the  remotest  parts  of  Gallicia,  Leon,  Castille,  and 
the  Asturias.  Blake  himself  reached  Reynosa  on  the 
12th.  and  then  rallied  about  seven  thousand  fugitives, 
without  artillery,  without  arms,  without  spirit,  and 
without  hope. 

It  has  been  said  that.  Spartan-like,  Romana's  soldiers 
died  to  a  man  in  their  ranks;  yet  in  1812,  captain  Hill 
of  the  royal  navy,  being  at  Cronstadt,  to  receive  Span- 
iards taken  by  the  Russians  during  Napoleon's  retreat, 
found  that  the  greater  portion  were  men  who  had  es- 
caped with  Romana  from  the  Danish  Isles  in  1808; 
captives  at  Espinosa,  they  had  served  Napoleon  for 
four  years,  passed  the  ordeal  of  the  Moscow  retreat, 
and  were  still  above  four  thousand  strong ! 

A  line  of  retreat  by  Aguilar  del  Campo,  where  his 
artillery  remained,  was  still  open  to  Blake,  who  thouorht 
to  remain  at  Reynosa,  to  restore  order,  and  then  retire 
through  Leon  upon  sir  David  Baird's  division,  the  head 
of  which  was  now  near  Astorga.  But  his  total  igno- 
rance of  the  French  operations  and  strength  again  mis- 
led him;  he  looked  only  to  the  side  of  Espinosa,  and 
already  Soult's  cavalry  was  upon  his  line  of  retreat, 
and  the  duke  of  Dantzic  was  hastening  by  the  valley 
of  Villarcayo  towards  Reynosa.*  Upon  the  13th,  he 
was  attacked  by  Soult's  advanced  guard,  and  being 
ROW  utterly  confounded,  he  fled  with  four  or  five  thou- 
sand men  through  the  valley  of  C^abuerniga,  and  took 
refuge  at  Arnedo,  in  tbe  heart  of  the  Asturian  moun- 
tains, where  the  marquis  of  Romana  joined  him,  and 
assumed  the  command  of  a.l  that  remained  of  this 
unfortunate  army. 

Blake  being  thus  disposed  of,  marshal  Lefebre,  after 
a  halt  of  a  few  days  to  refresh  his  troops,  took  the 
road  of  Carrion  and  Valladolid,  while  Soult  concen- 
trated the  2d  corps  at  Reynosa,  and  seized  St.  Ander 
where  he  captured  a  quantity  of  English  stores.  This 
done,  the,  duke  of  Dalmatia  spread  his  columns  over 


•  £.  Journal  of  operations.  MS. 


the  whole  of  the  Montaiia,  pursuing,  attacking,  and  dis- 
persing every  body  of  Spaniards  which  yet  held  to- 
gether, and  filling  all  places  with  alarm.  Every  thing 
military  belonging  to  the  patriots  was  thus  driven  over 
the  snowy  barrier  of  the  Asturian  hills,  and  Soult  hav- 
ing left  a  detachment  at  San  \'incente  de  Rarqueira, 
scoured  the  banks  of  theDeba,  took  the  town  of  rotes, 
and  overrun  Leon  with  his  cavalry  as  far  as  Sahagun 
and  Saldana.  ?ileanwhile  the  duke  cf  Eellune,  quit- 
ting Espinosa,  joined  the  emperor,  whose  head-quar- 
ters were  fixed  at  Burgos,  after  the  defeat  of  Belvedere.* 

These  battles  of  Espinosa  and  Gamonal,  and  the 
subsequent  operations  of  marshal  Soult,  laid  the  north 
of  Spain  prostrate,  secured  the  whole  coast  from  St. 
Sebastian  to  the  frontier  of  the  Asturias,  and  by  a  ju- 
dicious arrangement  cf  small  garrisons,  and  moveable 
columns,  the  provinces  of  Guipuscoa,  Navarre,  Biscay, 
and  the  Baslon  de  Laredo  were  fettered.  Thus  the 
communication  of  the  army  with  France  could  no  longer 
be  endangered  by  insurrection  in  the  rear;  the  wide 
and  fertile  plains  cf  Old  Castille  and  Leon  were 
thrown  open  to  the  French,  and  forbidden  to  the  separ- 
ated divisions  of  the  British  army.  These  great  ad- 
vantages, the  result  of  Napoleon's  admirable  combina- 
tions, the  fruits  of  ten  days  of  active  exertion,  obtain- 
ed so  easily,  and  }'et  so  decisive  of  the  fate  of  the 
campaign,  prove  the  weakness  of  the  system  upon 
which  the  Spanish  and  British  governments  were  at 
this  time  acting ;  if  that  can  be  called  a  system  where 
no  one  general  knew  what  another  had  done,  was  doing, 
or  intended  to  do. 

But  Eurgcs,  instead  of  Vittoria,  was  now  become 
the  pivot  of  operations,  and  the  right  of  the  army 
being  secured,  the  emperor  prepared  to  change  his 
front,  and  bear  down  against  the  armies  of  Castafoa 
and  Palafox,  with  a  similar  impetuosity.  It  was  how- 
ever first  necessary  to  ascertain  the  exact  situation  {,f 
the  British  force.  Napoleon  believed  that  it  was  ccn- 
centrated  at  Valladolid.  and  he  detached  three  divisions 
of  cavalry  and  twenty-four  pieces  of  artillery,  ly 
Lerma  and  Palencia,  with  orders  to  cross  the  Douero, 
to  turn  the  flank  of  the  English,  threaten  their  com.- 
munications  with  Portugal,  and  thus  force  them  to  re- 
tire ;  it  was,  however,  scon  discovered  that  the  heads 
of  their  columns  had  not  penetrated  beyond  Salamanca 
and  Astorga,  and  that  many  days  must  elapse  before 
they  could  be  concentrated,  and  in  a  conditicn  to  ret 
offensively.  Certain  of  this  fact,  the  emperor  lot  loose 
his  three  divisions  of  cavalry,  and  eight  thousaiid  horse- 
men sweeping  over  the  plains,  vexed  all  Leon  and 
Castille;  the  captain  general  Pignatelli  shamei'ully 
fled,  and  the  authorities  every  where  shrunk  from  the 
tempest;  the  people  dii^played  no  enthusiasm,  and 
disconcerted  by  the  rapid  movements  of  the  French 
spread  a  thousand  confused  and  contradictory  reports, 
while  the  incursions  of  the  cavalry  extended  to 
the  neitrhbourhood  of  Astorga,  to  Benevente,  Zamora, 
Toro,  Tordesilla,  and  even  to  the  vicinity  of  Salaman- 
ca. Such  was  the  fear  or  the  apathy  of  the  inhabitants, 
that  thirty  dragoons  were  sulfioient  to  raise  contribu- 
tions at  the  gates  of  the  largest  towns  ;f  and  after  the 
overthrow  of  Espinosa  was  known,  ten  troopers  could 
safely  traverse  the  coimtry  in  any  direction. 

The  front  of  the  French  army  being  now  changed, 
the  second  corps,  hitherto  the  leading  column  of  attack, 
became  a  corps  of  observation,  covering  the  right  flank, 
and  protecting  the  important  point  of  Burgos,  where 
large  magazines  were  establishing,  and  upon  which 
the  reinforcements  continually  arrfving  from  France 
were  directed.  Of  the  other  corps,  the  first,  the  guards, 
and  a  part  of  the  reserve  were  at  Burgos;  Ney,  with 
the  sixth,  was  at  Aranda  de  Douero ;  this  elTicer's 
march  from  Ebro  had  been  made  to  intercept  the  Eslre- 
madurans  on  the  side  of  Madrid,  and  although  theii 

•  S.  Journal  of  operations.  MS.    f  Sir  John  Moort '.«  Paperfc 


1803.] 


NAPIER'S  PENINSULAR    WAR. 


90 


sudden  destniction  at  Gamonal  rendered  this  unneces- 
sary, Noy  was  equally  well  placed  to  cut  Castanos 
off  from  the  capital.  Meanwhile  as  Lagrange  had  oc- 
cupied LosTrouo,  and  Moncey  was  with  three  divisions 
of  infantry  and  one  of  cavalry  at  Lodosa,  the  Spanish 
army  of  the  centre  was  turned,  menaced,  and  excised 
from  Madrid,  before  Castanos  was  even  aware  that 
the  campaign  h?.d  commenced. 

In  passinsT  the  mountains  near  Tolosa,  Lasnes,  duke 
of  Montebello.  fell  from  his  horse,  and  was  left  at 
Vittoria,  and  his  hurT.s  were  dangerous ;  a  rapid  and 
interesting  cure  was  iiowever  effected  by  wrapping 
him  in  the  skin  of  a  sheep  newly  slain,*  and  the  em- 
peror then  directed  him  to  assume  the  command  of 
Lagrange's  division  and  Colbert's  light  cavalry,  to 
unite  them  with  the  third  corps  at  Lodosa,  and  to  fall 
upon  Castaiios  in  front.  At  the  same  time  he  ordered 
Ney  to  ascend  the  course  of  the  Douero  with  the  light 
cavalrvand  two  divisions  of  the  sixth  corps,  to  connect 
his  left  with  the  right  of  Lasnes,  and  to  gain  Agreda 
by  the  road  of  Osma  and  Soria,  from  whence  he  could 
intercept  the  retreat  of  Castanos,  and  place  himself  on 
the  rear  of  the  Spanish  army.  To  support  this  opera- 
tion, the  first  corps,  and  Latour  Maubourg's  division 
of  hea%^'  cavalry  being  drawn  from  the  reserve,  pro- 
ceeded by  Lerma  and  Aranda,  and  from  thence  slowly 
followed  the  direction  of  Ney's  march.  The  emperor, 
with  the  guards,  and  the  remainder  of  the  reserve,  con- 
tinued at  Burgos,  where  the  citadel  was  repaired  and 
armed,  magazines  formed,  and  arrangements  made  to 
render  it  the  great  depot  of  the  army ;  and  all  the  rein- 
forcements coming  from  France  were  directed  upon 
this  town,  and  proclamations  were  issued,  assuring  the 
country  people  of  protection,  if  they  would  be  tranquil 
and  remain  in  their  houses. 

Ten  days  had  now  elapsed  since  Napoleon,  breaking 
forth  from  Vittoria,  had  deluged  the  country  with  his 
troops,  and  each  day  was  marked  by  some  advantage 
gained  over  the  Spaniards,  but  these  misfortunes  were 
still  unknown  at  Tudela  and  disregarded  at  the  capital. 
The  remnants  of  Belvedere's  army  had  rallied  in  the 
pass  of  the  Somosierra,  and  on  the  side  of  Segovia;]" 
the  troops  belonging  to  the  army  of  the  centre,  which 
had  been  detained  in  Madrid,  were  forwarded  to  the 
former  place,  those  left  behind  from  Cuesta's  levies 
were  ordered  to  the  latter.  General  St.  Juan,  an  officer 
of  reputation,  tcok  the  command  at  the  Somosierra.:}: 
general  Heredia  repaired  to  Segovia,  an  intermediate 
camp  of  detachrr.ents  was  formed  at  Sepulveda,  and 
the  men  thus  collected  were,  by  the  junta,  magnified 
into  a  great  army  sufficient  to  protect  Madrid.  That 
tlie  left  wing  of  the  French  army  was  still  unbroken 
upon  the  Ebro,  the  central  junta  attributed,  not  to  the 
enemy's  strength,  but  to  the  dilatory  proceedings  of 
Castanos  ;||  wherefore  depriving  him  of  the  command, 
they  gave  it  to  Romana,  precisely  at  the  moment  when 
it  was  impossible  for  the  latter  general  to  reach  the 
army  he  was  to  lead  ;  but  the  junta  wanted  a  battle, 
and,  uncorrected  by  Blake's  destruction,  doubted  not 
of  victory. 

The  proceedings  at  Tudela  also  continued  to  be 
worthy  of  the  time,  for  the  madness  of  the  generals, 
and  the  folly  of  the  deputy  had  increased  rather  than 
abated.  The  freaks  of  Francisco  Palafox,  and  their 
ridiculous  termination  on  the  12th  of  November,  I  have 
already  related,  and  a  few  days  sufficed  to  give  birth 
to  new  plans  equally  absurd,  but  more  dangerous,  as 
the  crisis  approached  nearer.  This  time  Castanos  took 
the  lead.  He  knew  upon  the  10th  that  the  Estrema- 
duran  army  was  at  Burgos,  and  that  the  French  were 
marching  on  that  town;  from  that  moment,  despairing 
of  the  junction  of  the  British  army,  and  likewise  of 


•  Baron  Larrev's  Sursrical  CampaigTis. 
+  Mr.  Stuart.  Lord  W.  Benliiick.  MSS. 
II  Ibid. 


t  Ibid. 


his  own  first  and  third  divisions  which  had  been  left 
in  Madrid,  he  sent  orders  to  Belvedere  to  unite  himself 
with  Blake.*  His  letters  never  reached  that  officer, 
who  was  defeated  before  they  were  written,  and  Cas- 
tanos, feeling  that  he  himself  was  in  a  dangerous  posi- 
tion, and  that  some  decided  measure  was  required, 
conceived  so  extraordinary  a  plan,  that  it  would  ba 
difficult  to  credit  it  upon  any  authority  but  his  own. 
He  proposed  to  carry  the  army  of  the  centre,  reduced 
in  numbers  and  ill-disciplined  as  it  was,  by  the  Concha 
de  Haro  and  Soria,  towards  Burgos,  to  fall  upon  the 
emperor's  rear-griard,  and,  as  a  preliminary  step,  he 
determined  to  beat  the  army  in  his  front  ;|  but  Palafox 
had  also  a  plan  for  attacking  Moncey  on  the  side  of 
Sanguessa,  and  the  first  measure  necessary  was  to 
combine  these  double  operations.  It  was  agreed  there- 
fore that  Caparosa  should  be  garrisoned  by  fcur  thou- 
sand infantry,  that  the  bridgehead  at  that  place  should 
be  fortified,  and  that  O'Neil  should  be  reinforced  at 
Sanguessa  by  detachments  from  the  centre  until  his 
troops  amounted  to  nineteen  thousand  infantry  and 
twelve  hundred  cavalry  ;:(:  he  was  then  to  break  down 
the  bridge,  place  guards  at  all  the  passages  on  the  Ara- 
gon,  come  down  to  Caparosa,  cross  the  river,  and 
threaten  Peraltes  and  Olite  on  the  ITth;  but  on  the 
18th,  he  was  to  turn  suddenly  to  the  left,  and  get  in 
rear  of  Lodosa,  while  La-Peiia  and  Coupign)%  march- 
ing from  Centiuenigo,  should  attack  Moncey  in  front. 

This  great  movement  was  openly  talked  of  at  the 
head-quarters  of  the  Spanish  generals  for  several  days 
before  its  execution  ;l|  and  these  extraordinary  com- 
manders, who  were  ignorant  of  Blake's  disasters,  an- 
nounced their  intention  of  afterwards  marching  towards 
Vittoria  to  lighten  the  pressure  on  that  officer  if  he 
should  be  in  difficulty ;  or  if,  as  his  dispatches  of  the 
5th  had  assured  them  he  was  successful,  to  join  in  a 
general  pursuit.  Castaiios,  however,  concealed  his 
real  project,  which  was  to  move  by  the  Concha  de  Haro 
towards  Burgos. 

It  was  found  impossible  to  procure  a  sufficient  num- 
ber of  boats  to  lay  a  bridge  over  the  Ebro  at  Alfaro, 
thus  the  reinforcements,  intended  for  O'Xeil,  were  forc- 
ed to  make  a  circuit  by  Tudela,  and  lost  three  or  four 
days  ;§  however,  on  the  14th  O'Neil  arrived  at  Capa- 
rosa, after  breaking  the  bridge  of  Sanguessa,  and  on 
the  15th  the  reinforcements  joined  him.  The  ITth, 
the  day  appointed  for  the  execution  of  the  plan,  Cas- 
tanos received  notice  of  his  own  dismissal  from  the 
command,  yet  he  persevered  in  his  project.  La-Pena 
and  Coupigny  were  put  in  motion  to  pass  the  bridges 
of  LogroiiO  and  Lodosa,  and  the  fords  between  them, 
but  general  O'Neil,  instead  of  executing  his  part,  first 
refused  to  stir  without  an  order  from  .Joseph  Palafox, 
who  was  at  Zarao-oza,  and  then  changing  his  ground, 
complained  that  he  was  without  bread. •[  Castanos 
besought  him  to  move  upon  the  18th,  urging  the  ne- 
cessity of  the  measure,  and  the  danger  of  delay ;  but 
the  deputy,  Palafox,  who  had  hitherto  approved' of  the 
project,  suddenly  quitted  the  head-quarters,  and  went 
to  Caparosa,  from  whence,  in  concert  with  O'Neil,  ho 
wrote  to  demand  a  further  reinforcement  from  the  cen- 
tre, of  six  thousand  infantry  and  some  more  cavalry, 
without  which,  they  affirmed  that  it  would  be  danger- 
ous to  pass  the  Aragon  river.  Castaiios  preserved  his 
temper,  invited  the  deputy  to  return  to  the  right  bank 
of  the  Ebro,  and  opposed  the  demand  for  more  troops 
on  the  ground  of  the  delay  it  would  cause;  but  novsr 
the  captain-general  Palafox,  agreeing  with  neither  side, 
proposed  a  new  plan,  and  it  is  difficult  to  say  how  lonff 
these  strange  disputes  would  have  continued,  if  aa 
umpire  had  not  interposed,  whose  award  was  too  strong- 
ly enforced  to  be  disregarded. 


*  Castanos'  Viodiration.  •!■  IS'H. 

I  Colontl  Gia  luiiis  Correspondence.  MSS.  ||   ibid, 

j  Ibic.  ^   Castanos'  VindicatioQ. 


100 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  IV 


Castailos  was  with  the  divisions  of  Coupigny  and 
La-Pe  a  at  Calahorra  on  the  19tli,  when  he  received 
information  that  a  French  corps?  was  advancing  upon 
Logro'"o;*  it  was  Lasnes,  with  liatrrantje's  and  Col- 
bert's troops,  yet  the  Spaniard  concluded  it  to  he  Ney, 
for  he  was  ignorant  of  the  changes  wliich  had  taken 
place  since  the  8th  of  the  month.  It  was  likewise 
reported,  that  Moncey,  whose  force  he  estimated  at 
twelve  thousand,  when  it  really  was  above  twenty  thou- 
sand, had  concentTated  at  l.odosa,  and,  at  the  same 
time,  the  bisliop  of  Osma  announced  that  twelve  thou- 
sand men,  under  Dessolles,  were  marching  from  the 
Ride  of  Aranda  do  Duero.  On  the  21st,  the  intelligence 
that  Defsclles  had  passed  Almazan,  and  that  Moncey 
•was  in  motion,  was  confirmed;!  Castaiios  then  relin- 
quishing his  offensive  projects,  prepared  to  retire,  and 
it  was  full  ti:Tie ;  for  marshal  Ney,  who  left  Aranda  on 
the  19th,  had  passed  Almazan  on  the  20th,  dispersed 
several  small  hands  of  insurgents,  and  entered  Soria 
on  the  21st,  so  that  when  Castanos  determined  to  fall 
back  on  t!ie  21st.  his  flank  was  already  turned,  and  his 
retreat  up^n  Madrid  in  the  enemy's  power.  The  Span- 
ish artilhry  was  at  Centruenigo,  and  a  large  detach- 
ment was  with  O'Neil  atCaparosa;  but  during  the 
night  of  the  21st  and  22d  Castafios  retired  to  the 
heights  which  extend  fromTudelaby  Cascante,  Novel- 
las, Taranzrna,  and  Monteguda.:}: 

On  the  morning  of  the  22d  Lasnes  w^as  seen  march- 
ing upon  Calahorra;  at  this  moment  the  only  supply 
of  monev  whicli  the  central  junta  had  transmitted  for 
his  amy  arrived  at  Tudela,  and,  to  complete  the  pic- 
ture of  di-tracte.'l  councils,  O'Neil  refused  to  fall  back 
upon  (^aparosa  w-ithout  the  order  of  Palafox.  For- 
tunately the  latter  arrived  at  the  moment  in  Tudela, 
and  a  conference  taking  place  between  him  and  Casta- 
fios the  same  diy,  they  agreed  that  the  Aragenese  army 
should  ero'js  the  Ebro,  and  occupy  the  heights  over 
Tudela,  while  the  rest  of  the  troops  should  stretch 
away  in  line  as  far  as  Taranzona;  nevertheless,  in  de- 
fiance of  all  orders,  entreaties,  or  reasoning,  the  ob- 
stinate O'Neil  remained  in  an  olive-wood  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  river  during  the  night  of  the  22d,  leaving 
the  key  of  the  position  open  to  the  enemy. 

A  council  of  war  was  held,  the  discussion  was  tur- 
bulent, and  the  opinions  discordant;  Palafox  insisted 
on  the  defence  of  Aragon,  as  the  principal  or  rather 
the  only  object  to  be  attended  to  ;||  and  he  wished  the 
whole  army  to  pass  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Ebro,  and 
confine  its  operations  to  the  protection  of  Zaragoza  on 
that  side, — a  nroposal  which  alone  was  sufficient  to 
demonstrate  his  total  incapacity  for  military  affairs. 
Castaiios  reasoned  justly  against  this  absurdity,  but 
the  important  moments  passed  in  useless  disputation, 
and  ttie  o-puerals  came  to  no  conclusion.  Meanwhile, 
marshal  Lasnes,  bringing  with  him  Maurice  Mathieu's 
division  of  the  sixth  corps,  which  had  just  arrived  from 
France,  concentrated  above  thirty  thousand  infantry, 
four  or  five  thousand  cavalry,  and  sixty  pieces  of  artil- 
lery, and  rnarchinnf  by  Alfaro,  appeared,  at  eight  o'clock 
in  the  morning  of  the  23d,  in  front  of  the  Spanish  out- 
posts, close  to  Tudela,  just  at  the  moment  when  the 
Aragonese  were  passing  the  bridge  and  ascending  their 
position. 

BATTLE  OF  TUDELA. 

From  forty  to  fifty  guns  were  distributed  along  the 
front  of  the  Spanish  army,  which,  numbering  about 
forty-fivf,  thousand  fighting  men,  was  extended  on  a 
rano-e  of  easy  hills  from  Tudela  to  Taranzona,  a  distance 
of  more  than  ten  miles.  Two  divisions  of  the  army 
of  the  centre  connected  the  Aragonese  with  the  fourth 
iivision,  which  occupied  Cascante,  three  divisions 
were  in  Taranzona,  and   there  were   no  intermediate 

•  Caslnnos'  Vin'licntion.  . 

+  Castanos'  Account  of  the  Bntllp  of  Tii'lrla. 

j  Ibid  |]  Ijid.  aaJ  Lis  Vindication. 


posts  between  these  scattered  bodies.  The  weakness 
attendant  on  such  an  arrangement  being  visible  to  tho 
enemy  at  the  first  glance,  Lasnes  hastened  to  make 
his  dispositions,  and  at  nine  o'clock  general  Morlot, 
with  one  division,  attacked  the  heights  above  the  town. 
Maurice  Mathieu,  supported  by  the  cavalry  of  Lefcbre 
Desnouettes,  assailed  the  centre,  and  general  Lagrange 
advanced  against  Cascante.  The  Aragonese  resisted 
Morlot  with  vigour,  and  even  pressed  him  in  the  plain 
at  the  foot  of  the  hills,  but  Maurice  Mathieu  having 
gained  possession  of  an  olive-wood,  and  a  small  ridge 
which  was  connected  with  the  centre  of  the  Spanish 
position,  after  some  sharp  fighting  pierced  the  lino, 
and  then  Lefebre,  breaking  through  the  opening  wMth 
his  cavalry,  wheeled  up  to  the  left,  and  threw  the  right 
wing  into  hopeless  confusion.  The  defi'atrd  soldiers 
fled  towards  the  bridge  of  Tudela,  pursued  by  the  vic- 
torious horsemen.  In  the  meantime  La-Pena,  descend- 
ing from  Cascante  with  the  fourth  division,  drove  in 
Lagrange's  advanced  guard  of  cavalry,  yet  he  was 
soon  encountered  at  a  charging  pace  by  the  infantry, 
was  beaten,  and  fell  back  to  Taranzona,  where  three 
divisions  had  remained  during  the  whole  of  the  action, 
which,  strictly  speaking,  was  confined  to  the  heights 
abi've  Tudela.  Palafox  was  not  in  the  battle,  and 
O'Neil,  Avith  the  right  wing  and  the  centre,  fled  to  Za- 
ragoza with  such  speed,  that  some  of  the  fugitives  are 
said  to  have  arrived  there  the  same  evening. 

When  La  Pena  was  driven  back  upon  Taranzona, 
the  left  wing  had  commenced  an  orderly  retreat  towards 
Borja,  when  some  cavalry,  detached  by  Ney  from  the 
side  of  Soria,  coming  in  sight,  caused  great  confusion  ; 
a  magazine  blew  up,  in  the  midst  of  the  disorder  crit;3 
of  treason  were  heard,  the  columns  dissolved  in  a  few 
moments,  and  the  read  to  Borja  was  covered  with  a 
disorganized  multitude.  This  ended  the  celebrated 
battle  of  Tudela,  in  which  forty  thousand  men  were 
beaten  and  dispersed  by  an  efl"ort  that,  hein^  i...  .i^elf 
neither  very  vigorous  nor  well  sustained,  was  neverthe- 
less sufficient  to  demonstrate  the  incapacity  of  Spanish 
generals,  and  the  want  of  steadiness  in  Spanish  sol- 
diers. 

Several  thousand  prisoners,  thirty  pieces  of  artillery, 
and  all  the  ammunition  and  baggage,  fell  into  the  hands 
of  the  French,  who  rated  the  killed  and  wounded  verj 
high.  The  total  loss  may  be  estimated  at  eight  or 
nine  thousand  men.*  Fifteen  thousand  escaped  to  Za- 
ragoza; a  detachment  of  two  thousand,  under  the  conde 
de  Cartoajal  and  general  Lilli,  left  in  the  mountains 
of  Nalda,  were  cut  off  by  the  result  of  the  action,  and 
two  divisions,  whose  numbers  were  increased  by  fugi- 
tives from  the  others,  were  rallied  atC-alatayud  on  the 
25th,  but  they  were  half  starved  and  mutinous.  At 
Calatayud,  Castanos  received  two  despatches  from  (ha 
central  junta,  virtually  restoring  him  to  the  commanJ, 
for  the  first  empowered  him  to  unite  the  Aragonese  at- 
my  with  his  own,  and  the  second  desired  him  to  co- 
operate with  St.  Juan  in  the  Somosierra  to  protect  the 
capital. f  The  battle  of  Tudela  disposed  of  the  first 
despatch,  the  second  induced  Castafios  to  march  by 
Siguenza  upon  Madrid. 

In  the  meantime.  Napoleon,  recalling  the  greatest 
part  of  his  cavalry  from  the  open  country  of  Castillo, 
and  having  left  seven  or  eight  thousand  men  in  l^urgos, 
had  fixed  his  head-quarters  at  Aranda  de  Duero  on  the 
2.3d  ;  but  from  the  difficulty  of  transmitting  despatches 
through  a  country  in  a  state  of  insurrection,  intelligence 
of  the  victory  at  Tudela  only  reached  him  on  the  2r)th, 
and  he  was  exceedingly  discontented  that  (vastanoa 
should  have  escaped  the  hands  of  Ney.:}:  That  mar 
shal  had  been  instructed  to  reach  Soria  by  the  21st,  to 
remain  there  until  Lasnes  should  be  in  front  of  the 


*  Kleventh  Bvilletin.  Virtoireg  et  Conquetrs. 

f  Castanos'  Arcannt  of  the  Biittl  ■  of  Tii''fb,an''  Vin'liriilion 

\  S.  Jouru..l  of  op<.rat.yiis.  ?.i3.     Ekveu'.li  Bulletin. 


1808.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  W XR; 


lUl 


Spaniards,  and  thon  to  pass  by  Agreda,  and  intercept 
the  retreat  of  the  latter,  and  on  the  evening  of  the  21st, 
general  Jomini  and  colonel  D'Esmenard,  staff-officers 
of  the  sixth  corps,  arrived  with  an  escort  of  eighty  cav- 
alry at  Soria.  This  town  is  situated  upon  a  rocky 
height,  with  a  suhurb  below,  and  the  conde  de  Carto- 
ajal,  who  was  retiring  from  the  mountains  of  Nalda, 
happening  to  be  in  the  upper  part,  the  magistrates  en- 
deavoured to  entrnp  the  French  officers.  For  this  pur- 
pose, they  were  met  at  dusk  by  the  municipality,  and 
invited  to  enter  the  town  with  great  appearance  of 
cordiality ;  but  their  suspicir^ns  were  excited,  the  plan 
failed,  Cartoajal  marched  during  the  night,  and  the 
next  day  the  sixth  corps  occupied  the  place. 

Genernl  Jomini,  whose  profound  knowledge  of  the 
theory  of  war  enabled  him  to  judge  accurately  of  the 
events  that  were  likely  to  occur,  urged  Ney  to  con- 
tinue his  march  upon  Calatayud,  without  any  rest; 
the  marshal,  however,  either  offended  with  the  heat  of 
Jomini's  manner,  or  from  some  other  cause,  resolved 
to  follow  the  letter  of  his  instructions,  and  remained 
ai  Soria  the  23d  and  24th,  merely  sending  out  some 
light  cavalry  on  the  side  of  Medina  Cell  and  Agreda. 
On  the  25th  he  marched  to  the  latter  town,  and  the 
26th  crossed  the  field  of  battle,  passinsr  through  Cas- 
cante ;  the  2Tth,  he  arrived  with  one  division,  at  Mal- 
len,  a  town  between  Tudela  and  Zaragoza,  his  advanced 
guard  being  at  Arlozon  on  the  Xalon.*  To  the  errone- 
ous direction  and  dilatory  nature  of  these  movements, 
Castaiios  owed  the  safety  of  the  troops,  which  Avere 
reassembled  at  Calatayud. 

Ney  must  have  been  acquainted  with  the  result  of 
the  battle  on  the  25th,  and  it  is  remarkable  that  he 
should  have  continued  on  the  road  towards  Agreda, 
when  a  single  march  by  Medina  Celi  would  have 
brought  him  upon  the  line  of  retreat  from  Calatayud  to 
Sic^uenza.  Bv  some  writers  these  errors  have  been  at- 
tributed to  Key's  jealousy  of  marshal  Lasnes  ;  by 
others  it  has  bc^n  asserted  that  the  plunder  of  Soria 
detained  him.  The  falsehood  of  the  latter  charge  is, 
however,  evident  from  the  fact,  that  with  'he  exception 
of  a  requisition  for  some  shoes  and  great  coats,  no 
contribution  was  exacted  from  Soria,  and  no  pillage 
took  place  at  all ;  and  with  respect  to  the  former  ac- 
cusation, a  better  explanation  may  be  found  in  the  pe- 
culiar disposition  of  this  extraordinary  man,  who  was 
notoriouslv  indolent,  and  unlearned  in  the  abstract 
science  of  war.  It  was  necessary  for  him  to  see,  in 
order  to  act,  and  his  character  seemed  to  be  asleep  un- 
til some  imminent  danger  aroused  all  the  marvellous 
energy  and  fortitude  with  which  nature  had  endowed 
him. 

The  success  at  Tudela  fell  short  of  what  Napoleon 
had  a  rinfht  to  expect  from  his  previous  dispositions, 
yet  it  sufficed  to  break  the  Spanish  strength  on  that 
fiide,  and  to  lay  open  Aragron.  Navarre,  and  New  Cas- 
tille,  as  the  northern  part  of  Spain  had  been  before 
opened  by  the  victory  of  Espinosa.  From  the  fron- 
tiers of  France  to  those  of  Portugal,  from  the  sea-coast 
to  the  Tnrrus,  the  country  was  now  overwhelmed; 
Madrid,  Zaragoza,  and  the  British  armv,  indeed,  lifted 
their  heads  a  little  wav  above  the  rising  waters,  but 
the  eve  looked  in  vain  for  an  efficient  barrier  ag-ainst 
the  flood,  which  still  poured  on  with  unabated  fury. 
And  as  the  divided,  weak  state  of  the  English  troops 
led  the  emperor  to  conclude  that  sir.Tohn  Moore  would 
instantly  retire  into  Portugal,  he  ordered  Lasnes  to  pur- 
sue Palafox — to  seize  the  important  position  of  Monte 
Torrero — to  summon  Zaragoza,  and  to  offi^r  a  complete 
Amnesty  to  all  persons  in  the  town,  without  reserva- 
tir)n,thus  bfarinj  testimony  to  the  gallantry  of  the  first 
defence.  His  own  attention  was  fixed  on  Madrid. 
That  capital  was  the  rallyinij  point  of  all  the  broken 
Spanish,  and  of  all  his  own  pursuing  divisions,  and 


it  was  the  oefitre.of  allitUere'st?  ;'  a'cpmrntinding' 
from  when'ce  a  SeiAeficlaJ  sl':eam  of  political   bi 


g  height 
benefits 

might  descend  to  allay,  or  a  driving  storm  of  war  pout 
down  to  extinjniish  the  fire  of  insurrection.* 


*  S  Jouroal  of  operations.  MS. 


CHAPTER   n. 

Napoleon  marches  ajrainst  the  capital  ;  frrces  the  pa's  of 
the  Somosierra — St.  Juan  murdered  by  his  n'en — TumuUs  \n 
Marlrit! — French  army  arrives  there;  the  Retiro  stormed — ■ 
Town  capitulates — Remains  of  Castanos's  army  driven  across 
the  Tagus;  i<;tir,=  to  Cuenca — Napoleon  expl.iiiis  his  policy 
to  the  nobles,  clersry,  and  Irihunals  of  .Marhi  i — His  vast 
plans,  enormous  force — Defenceless  state  of  Spain. 

The  French  patroles  sent  towards  the  Somosierra 
ascertained,  on  the  21st,  that  above  six  thousand  men 
were  entrenching  themselves  in  the  gorge  of  the  moun- 
tains ;  that  a  small  camp  at  Sepulveda  blocked  the 
roads  leading  upon  Segovia;  and  that  general  Heredia 
was  preparing  to  secure  the  passes  of  the  Guadarama. 
Napoleon  having,  however,  resolved  to  force  tl  e  So- 
mosierra, and  reach  the  capital  before  (^astafios  could 
arrive  there,  ordered  Ney  to  pursue  the  army  of  the 
centre  without  intermission,  and  directed  the  fourth 
corps  to  continue  its  march  from  Carrion  by  Palencia, 
Vailadolid,  Olmedo,  and  Segovia.  The  moveinent  of 
this  corps  is  worthy  of  the  attention  of  miilitary  men. 
We  shall  find  it  confusinq;- the  spies  and  country  people 
— overawing  the  flat  country  of  Leon  and  Castille — 
protecting  the  right  flank  of  the  army — menacing  Gal- 
licia  and  Salamanca — keeping  the  heads  of  Moore's 
and  Baird's  columns  from  advancing  and  rendering  it 
dangerous  for  them  to  attempt  a  junction — threatening 
the  line  of  Hope's  march  from  the  Tagus  to  the  Gua- 
darama— dispersing  Heredia's  corps,  and  finally  turning 
the  pass  of  Somosierra,  without  ever  ceasing  to  belong 
to  the  concentric  movement  of  the  great  army  upon 
Madrid. 

But  the  time  lost  in  transmitting  intelligence  of  th« 
victory  at  Tudela  was  productive  of  serious  conse- 
quences.f  The  officer  despatched  with  these  fresh  in- 
structions, found  Ney  and  Moncey  (Lasnes  was  sick 
at  Tudela),  each  advanced  two  days'  march  in  the 
wrong  direction.  The  firpt,  as  we  have  seen,  was  at 
Mallen,  preparing  to  attack  Zaragoza;  the  second  was 
at  Almunio,  near  Calatayud.  pursuing  Cnstancs.  They 
were  consequently  obliged  to  countermarch,  and  during 
the  time  thus  lost,  the  people  of  Zarag-oza.  recovering 
from  the  consternation  into  which  they  were  at  first 
thrown  by  the  appearance  of  the  flying  troops,  made 
arrangeiuents  for  a  vigorous  defence.  Casta'' os  also 
escaped  to  Sis-uenza.  without  any  further 'oss  than  what 
was  inflicted  in  a  sligfht  action  at  Burvieca.  where  gen- 
eral Maurice  Mathieu's  division  came  up  with  his 
rear-guard. 

The  emperor  quitted  Aranda  on  the  28th  with  the 
guards,  the  first  corps,  and  the  reserve,  and  marchea 
towards  Somosierra.  Head-quarters  were  at  Bouce- 
quillas  on  the  29th,  and  a  detachment  being  sent  to 
attack  the  camp  at  Sepulveda,  was  beTten.  with  a  loss 
of  fifty  or  sixty  men ;  yet,  the  Spaniards,  str\ick  with 
a  panic  after  the  action,  quitted  their  post,  which  was 
very  stronsf,  and  fled  in  disorder  towards  Se<Tovi;'.  The 
.?Oth,  the  French  advanced  guard  reached  the  foot  of 
the  Somosierra,  where  general  St.  .Tuan.  whose  force 
now  amounted  to  ten  or  twelve  thousand  men,  was  ju- 
diciously posted.  Sixteen  pieces  of  artillery,  planted 
in  the  neck  of  the  pass,  swept  the  road  alonn-thi^  whole 
ascent,  which  was  exceed^ntrly  stpop  an!  f^v.-iurablft 
for  the  defence;  the  infantry,  advantao-eously  placed 
on  the  right  and  left,  were  in  lines,  one  above  another, 
and  some  ontrenchments,  made  in  the  more  open  parts, 
strengthened  the  whole  position. 


•  S.  Journal  of  operations.  MS.  '"t  ^°*^- 

imiyERSlTY  OF  CALIFORWU 
RIVERSIDE 


102 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  IV. 


^'^^S^ASSI"  OF' THU.' SOMOSIERBA. 

At  day-bieali,  thre-j  Fier.'ch'baU<.'lions  qtfackcd  St. 
Juan's  risrht,  three  more  assailed  his  left,  and  as  many 
marched  along  the  causeway  in  the  centre,  supported 
by  six  ofuns.  The  French  winors,  spreading^  over  the 
mountain  side,  commenced  a  warm  skirmisliing'  fire, 
vhicli  was  as  warmly  returned,  while  the  frowning 
battery  at  the  top  of  the  causeway  Avas  held  in  readiness 
to  crush  the  central  column,  when  it  should  come 
vithin  rano-e.  At  that  moment  Napoleon  rode  into  the 
mouth  of  the  pass,  and  attentively  examined  the  scene 
before  him ;  the  infantry  were  making  no  progress, 
and  a  thick  fog  mixed  with  smoke  hung  upon  the  as- 
cent ;  suddenly,  as  if  by  inspiration,  he  ordered  the 
Polish  cavalry  of  his  guard  to  charge  up  the  causeway, 
and  seize  the  Spanish  batter}'.  In  an  instant  the  fore- 
most ranks  of  the  first  squadron  Avere  levelled  with  the 
earth  by  the  fire  of  the  great  battery,  and  the  remain- 
der were  thrown  into  confusion,  but  general  Krazinski 
as  suddenly  rallied  them,  and  covered  by  the  smoke 
and  the  morning  vapour  led  them  sword  in  hand  up  to 
the  mountain.  As  these  gallant  horsemen  passed,  the 
Spanish  infantry  on  each  side  fired  and  fled  towards 
the  summit  of  the  causeway,  and  when  the  Poles,  cut- 
ting down  the  gunners,  took  the  battery,  the  whole 
arrny  was  in  flight  abandoning  arms,  ammunition,  and 
baggage. 

This  surprising  exploit,  in  the  glory  it  conferred  up- 
on one  party,  and  the  disgrace  it  heaped  upon  the  other, 
can  hardly  be  paralleled  in  the  annals  of  war.  It  is 
indeed  almost  incredible,  even  to  those  who  are  ac- 
quainted with  Spanish  armies,  that  a  position,  in  itself 
nearly  impregnable,  and  defended  by  twelve  thousand 
men,  should,  Avithout  any  panic,  but  merely  from  a  de- 
liberate sense  of  danger,  be  abandoned,  at  the  Avild 
charge  of  a  few  squadrons,  Avhich  tAvo  companies  of 
good  infantry  Avould  ha\'e  eflfectually  stopped  :  yet  some 
of  the  Spanish  regiments  so  shamefully  beaten  here, 
had  been  Anctorious  at  Baylen  a  feAV  months  before,  and 
general  St.  .Tuan's  dispositions  at  Somnsierra  were  far 
better  than  Reding's  at  the  former  battle !  The  charge 
itself,  vieAved  as  a  simple  military  operation,  was  extra- 
vagantly rash  ;  but  taken  as  the  result  of  Napoleon's 
eagacious  estimate  of  the  real  A-alue  of  Spanish  troops, 
and  his  promptitude  in  seizing  the  advantage  oflered 
by  the  smoke  and  fog  that  clung  to  the  side  of  the 
mountain,  it  Avas  a  most  felicitous  example  of  intuitive 
genius.  The  routed  troops  Avere  pursued  toAvards  Bui- 
rrago  by  the  French  cavalry.  Sc.  Juan  himself  broke 
through  the  French  on  the  side  of  Sepuh^eda,  and 
gained  the  camp  of  Heredia  at  Segovia,  but  the  caval- 
ry of  the  fourth  corps  approached,  and  the  tAVo  generals 
crossing  the  Guadarama,  united  some  of  the  fugitives 
from  Somosierra,  on  the  Madrid  side  of  the  mountains, 
and  Avere  about  to  enter  that  capital,  Avhen  the  appear- 
ance of  a  P'rench  patrole  terrified  the  vile  coAvards 
that  followed  them  ;  the  multitude  once  more  fled  to 
Talavera  de  la  Reyna,  and  there  consummated  their 
intolerable  villany  by  murdering  their  unfortunate  gen- 
eral, and  fixing  his  mangled  body  to  a  tree,  after  which, 
dispersing,  they  carried  dishonour  and  fear  into  their 
respective  provinces.* 

The  Scmosierra  being  forced,  the  imperial  army 
came  down  from  the  mountains — the  sixth  corps  has- 
tened on  from  the  side  of  Alcala  and  Cuadalaxara — 
the  central  junta  fled  from  Aranjuez,  and  the  remnant 
of  the  forces  under  Castanos,  being  intercepted  on  the 
Bide  of  Madrid,  and  pressed  by  Ney  in  the  rear,  turned 
towards  the  Tairus.  The  junta  flying  Avith  indecent 
haste,  spread  a  thousand  false  reports,  and  Avith  more 
than  ordinary  pertinacity,  endeavotired  to  deceive  the 
people  and  the  Eno-lish  general ;  a  task  in  Avhich  they 
Avere  strongly  aided  by  the  weak  credulity  of  Mr.  Frere, 


the  British  plenipotentiary,  who  accompanied  them  in 
their  flight  toward  Badajos ;  Mr.  Stuart,  hoAvcA'er, 
being  endowed  Avith  greater  discretion  aud  firmness, 
remained  at  Madrid  until  the  enemy  had  actually  com- 
menced the  investment  of  that  town. 

Castanos,  after  the  combat  of  Burvieca,  had  con- 
tinued his  retreat  unmolested  by  Ney,  Avho  never  re- 
covered the  time  lost  by  the  false  movement  upcn  MaU 
len ;  but  although  the  Spaniards  escaped  the  SAVord, 
their  numbers  daily  diminished,  their  sullerings  increas- 
ed, and  their  insubordination  kept  pace  Avith  their  pri- 
vations. At  Alcazar  del  Key.  Castanos  resigned  the 
command  to  general  La-Pena,  and  proceeded  toTruxil- 
lo  himself,  Avilh  an  escort  of  thirty  infantry  and  fifteen 
dragoons,  a  number  scarcely  sufficient  to  protect  his 
life  from  the  ferocity  of  the  peasants,  Avho  Avcre  stirred 
up  and  prepared,  by  the  falsehoods  of  the  central  junta, 
and  the  villany  of  the  deserters,  to  murder  him.* 
MeauAvhile  Madrid  was  in  a  state  of  anarchy  seldom 
equalled.  A  local  and  military  junta  Avere  formed  to 
conduct  the  defence,  the  inhabitants  took  arms,  a  mul- 
titude o  peasants  from  the  neighbourhood  entered  the 
place,  and  the  regular  forces,  commanded  by  the  mar- 
quis of  Castellar,  amounted  to  six  thousand  men,  Avith 
a  train  of  sixteen  guns ;  the  pavement  was  taken  up, 
the  streets  Avere  barricadoed,  the  houses  Avere  pieicud, 
and  the  Retire,  a  weak  irregular  Avork,  Avhich  com- 
manded the  city,  was  occupied  in  strength.  Don  Tho- 
mas Morla  and  the  prince  of  Castelfranco  Avere  the 
chief  men  in  authority;  the  people  demanded  ammuni- 
tion, and  Avhen  they  received  it,  discovered,  or  said, 
that  it  was  mixed  with  sand,  and  as  some  person  ac- 
cused the  marquis  of  Perales,  a  respectable  cid  gen- 
eral, of  the  deed,  a  mob  rushed  to  his  house,  murdered 
him,  and  dragged  his  body  about  the  streets ;  niany 
others  of  inferior  note  also  fell  victimj  to  this  fury,  for 
no  man  was  safe,  none  dared  assume  authority  to  con- 
trol, none  dared  give  honest  advice;  the  houses  Avere 
throAvn  open,  the  bells  of  the  convent  and  churches 
rung  incessantly,  and  a  band  of  ferocious  armed  men 
traversed  the  streets  in  all  the  madness  of  popular  .n- 
surrection.  Eight  days  had  now  elapsed  since  the 
first  preparations  for  defence  Avere  made,  and  each  day 
the  public  effervescence  had  increased,  the  domiiiioi:, 
of  the  mob  had  become  more  decisiAe,  their  violence 
more  uncontrollable ;  the  hubbub  Avas  extreme,  Avhen, 
on  the  morning  of  the  2d  of  December,  three  heavy 
divisions  of  French  cavalry  suddenly  appeared  on  the 
high  ground  to  the  north-west,  and  like  a  dark  cloud 
OA'erhung  the  troubled  city. 

At  twelve  o'clock  the  emperor  arriA'^ed,  and  the  duke 
of  Istria,  by  his  command,  summoned  the  toAvn,  but 
the  officer  employed  Avas  upon  the  point  of  being  mas- 
sacred by  the  irregulars,  when  the  Spanish  soldiers, 
ashamed  of  such  conduct,  rescued  him.  This  deter- 
mination to  resist  was,  hoAvever,  notwithstanding  the 
fierceness  displayed  at  the  gates,  very  unpalatable  tc 
many  of  the  householders,  numbers  of  Avhom  escaped 
from  diffisrent  quarters  ;f  deserters  also  came  over  to  the 
French,  and  Napoleon,  Avhile  Availing  for  his  infantry 
examined  all  the  weak  points  of  the  city. 

Madrid  Avas  for  many  reasons  incapable  of  defence. 
There  Avere  no  bulwarks;  the  houses,  althoiigh  stroner 
and  Avell  built,  Avere  not,  like  many  Spanish  towns, 
fire  proof;  there  Avere  no  outAvorks,and  the  hi  ights  on 
Avhich  the  French  cavalry  were  posted,  the  palace,  and 
the  Retiro,  completely  commanded  the  city ;  the  per- 
fectly open  country  arotmd  would  have  enabled  the 
French  cavalry  to  discover  and  cut  off  all  convoys,  and 
no  precaution  had  been  taken  to  ])rovide  subsistence 
for  the  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  peoj)le  contained 
Avithin  the  circuit  of  the  place.  The  desire  of  the 
central  junta,  that  this  metropolis  should  risk  the  hor 


*  Colore!  Graham's  Correspondence. 


*  Castanos'  Vindication. 


\  Fourteenth  Bulletin. 


1808.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


103 


rors  of  a  storin,  Avas  therefore  equally  silly  and  barbar- 
ous; their  own  criminal  apathy  had  deprived  Madrid 
of  the  power  of  procrastinating  its  defence  until  reliev- 
ed from  without,  and  there  was  no  sort  of  analogy  be- 
tween the  situation  of  Zaragoza  and  this  capital.  Na- 
poleon knew  it  well ;  he  was  not  a  man  to  plunge 
headlong  into  the  streets  of  a  great  city,  among  an 
armed  and  exciteri  population ;  he  knew  that  address 
in  negotiation,  a  little  patience,  and  a  judicious  em- 
ployment of  artillery,  would  soon  reduce  the  most 
outrageous  to  submission,  and  he  had  no  wish  to  destroy 
the  capital  of  his  brother's  kingdom. 

In  the  evening  the  infantry  and  artillery  arrived,  and 
were  posted  at  the  most  favourable  points.  The  night 
was  clear  and  bright,  and  in  the  French  camp  all  was 
silent  and  watchful,  but  a  tumultuous  noise  was  heard 
from  every  quarter  of  the  city,  as  if  some  mighty  beast 
was  stnifTgling and  howling  in  the  toils.*  At  midnight 
a  second  summons  was  sent  through  the  medium  of  a 
prisoner,  and  the  captain-general  Castellar  attempted 
to  gain  time  by  an  equivocal  reply  ;  but  the  French 
light  troops  stormed  the  nearest  houses,  and  one  bat- 
tery of  thirty  guns  opened  against  the  Retire,  while 
another  threw  shells  from  the  opposite  quarter,  to  dis- 
tract the  attention  of  the  inhabitants.  This  building, 
situated  on  a  rising  ground,  was  connected  with  another 
range  of  buildings  erected  on  the  same  side  of  the 
Prado,  which  is  a  public  walk  nearly  encircling  the 
town,  and  into  which  some  of  the  principal  streets 
opened,  upon  the  above  mentioned  range.  In  the  morn- 
ing, a  practicable  breach  was  made  in  the  Retire  wall, 
and  the  difference  between  military  courage  and  fero- 
city became  apparent;  for  Villatte's  division  breaking 
in,  easily  rruted  the  garrison,  and,  pursuing  its  success, 
seized  all  the  public  buildings  connected  with  it,  and 
then  crossing  the  Prado,  gained  the  barriers  erected  at 
the  entrance  of  the  streets,  and  took  possession  of  the 
Immense  palace  of  the  duke  of  Medina  Celi,  which 
was  in  itself  the  key  to  the  city  on  that  side. 

Such  a  vigorous  commencement  created  great  terror, 
the  town  was  summoned  for  the  third  time,  and  in  the 
afternoon,  Morlaand  another  officer  came  out  to  demand 
a  suspension  of  arms,  necessary,  they  said,  to  persuade 
the  people  to  surrender.  The  emperor  addressed  Morla 
in  terms  of  great  severity,  reproaching  him  for  his 
Bcandalous  conduct  towards  Dupont's  army.  '  Injustice 
and  bad  faith,'  he  exclaimed,  '  always  recoil  upon 
those  who  are  guilty  of  either.'  A  saying  well  ap- 
plied to  that  Spaniard,  and  Napoleon  himself  confirmed 
Us  philosophic  truth  in  after  times.  'The  Spanish 
ulcer  destroyed  me  !'  was  an  expression  of  deep  anguish 
which  escaped  from  him  in  his  own  hour  of  misfortune. 
Morla  returned  to  the  town,  his  story  was  soon  told  : 
before  six  o'clock  the  next  morning  Madrid  must  sur- 
render or  perish  !  Dissensions  arose.  The  violent  ex- 
citement of  the  populace  was  considerably  abated,  but 
the  armed  peasantry  from  the  country,  and  the  poorest 
inhabitants  still  demanded  to  be  led  against  the  enemy, 
and  a  constant  fire  was  kept  up  from  the  houses  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  the  Prado,  by  which  the  French 
general  Maison  was  wounded,  and  general  Bruyeres 
killed.  Nevertheless  the  disposition  to  fight  became 
each  moment  weaker,  and  finally  Morla  and  Castel- 
franco  prepared  a  capitulation ;  the  captain-general 
Castellar,  however,  refused  to  sign  it.  and  as  the  town 
was  only  invested  on  one  side,  he  effected  his  escape 
with  tlie  regular  troops  during  the  night,  carrying  with 
him  sixteen  guns.  The  people  then  sunk  into  a  quies- 
cent state,  and  at  eight  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the 
4th,  Madrid  surrendered. 

That  Morla  was  a  traitor  there  is  no  doubt,  and  his 
personal  cowardice  was  excessive ;  but  Castelfranco 
appears  to  have  been  rather  weak  and  ignorant  than 
treacherous,  and  certainly  the  surrender  of  Madrid  was 


•  Fourteenth  BulWin. 


no  proof  of  his  guilt ;  that  event  was  inevitable.  The 
boasting  uproar  of  the  multitude,  when  tiiey  are  per- 
mitted to  domineer  for  a  few  days,  is  not  entliusiasm ; 
the  retreat  of  Castellar  with  the  troops  of  the  line  dur- 
ing the  progress  of  the  negotiation  was  the  wisest 
course  to  pursue,  and  proves  that  he  acquiesced  in  the 
propriety  of  surrendering.  That  the  people  neither 
could  nor  would  defend  the  city  is  quite  evident ;  for 
it  is  incredible  that  Morla  and  Castelfranco  should 
have  been  able  to  carry  through  a  capitulation  in  so 
short  a  period,  if  the  generals,  the  regular  troops,  the 
armed  peasantry,  and  the  inhabitants,  had  been  all,  or 
even  a  part  of  them,  determined  to  resist. 

Napoleon,  cautious  of  giving  offence  to  a  population 
so  lately  and  so  violently  excited,  carefully  provided 
against  any  sudden  reaction,  and  preserved  the  strictest 
discipline ;  a  soldier  of  the  imperial  guard  was  shot  in 
one  of  the  squares  for  having  a  plundered  watch  in  his 
possession ;  the  infantry  were  placed  in  barracks  and 
convents,  the  cavalry  were  kept  ready  to  scour  the 
streets  on  the  first  alarm,  and  the  Spaniards  were  all 
disarmed.  The  emperor  then  fixed  his  own  quarters 
at  Chamartin,  a  country  house  four  miles  from  Madrid, 
and  in  a  few  days  everything  presented  the  most  tran- 
quil appearance,  the  shops  were  opened,  the  public 
amusements  recommenced,  and  the  theatres  were  fre- 
quented. The  iidiabitants  of  capital  cities  are  easily 
moved,  and  easily  calmed,  self-interest  and  sensual  in- 
dulgence unfit  them  for  noble  and  sustained  efforts ; 
they  can  be  violent,  ferocious,  cruel,  but  are  seldom 
constant  and  firm. 

During  the  operations  against  Madrid,  La-Pena, 
after  escaping  from  the  sixth  corps,  arrived  at  Guada- 
laxara  with  about  five  thousand  men ;  on  the  2d,  tiie 
dukes  of  Infantado  and  Albuquerque  leaving  the  capi- 
tal, joined  him;  and,  on  the  4th,  Venegas  came  up 
with  two  thousand  men.  AVhile  these  generals  were 
hesitating  what  course  to  pursue.  Napoleon,  apprized 
of  their  vicinity,  directed  Bessieres  with  sixteen  squad- 
rons upon  Guadalaxara,  supporting  him  by  Ruffin's 
division  of  the  first  corps;  at  the  approach  of  this  cav- 
alry, the  main  body  retired  through  the  hills  by  Sanc- 
torcaz  towards  Aranjuez,  and  the  artillery  crossed  the 
Tagus  at  Sacedon;  Ruffin's  division  immediately 
changed  its  direction,  and  cut  the  Spaniards  off  from 
La  Mancha  by  the  line  of  Ocana.  Meanwhile  a  mu- 
tiny among  the  Spanish  troops  forced  La-Pena  to  resign, 
and  the  duke  of  Infantado  was  chosen  in  his  place. 
The  Tagus  was  then  crossed  at  several  points,  and  after 
som.e  slight  actions  with  the  advanced  cavalry  of  the 
French,  this  miserable  body  of  men  finally  saved 
themselves  at  Cuenca,  where  many  deserters  and  fugi- 
tives, and  the  brigades  rf  Cartoajal  and  Lilli,  which 
had  escaped  the  different  French  columns,  also  arrived, 
and  the  duke  proceeded  to  organize  another  army. 

On  the  French  side,  the  fourth  corps  reached  Segovia, 
passed  the  Guadarama,  dispersed  some  armed  peasants 
assembled  at  the  Escurial,  and  then  marched  toward 
Almaraz,  to  attack  general  Galluzzo,  who,  having  as- 
sembled five  or  six  thousand  men  to  defend  the  left 
bank  of  the  Tagus,  had,  with  the  usual  skill  of  a  Span- 
ish general,  occupied  a  line  of  forty  miles.*  The  first 
French  corps  entered  La  Mancha  at  the  same  time,  and 
Toledo  immediately  shut  its  gates  ;  but,  although  the 
junta  of  that  town  publicly  proclaimed  their  resolution 
to  bury  themselves  under  the  ruins  of  the  city,  at  the 
approach  of  a  French  division,  they  betrayed  a  most 
contemptible  cowardice.  Thus,  six  weeks  had  suf- 
ficed to  dissipate  the  Spanish  armies;  the  glitlering 
bubble  was  bursted,  and  a  terrible  reality  remained. 
From  St.  Sebastian  to  the  Asturias,  from  the  Asturias 
to  Talavera  de  la  Reyna,  from  Tala-vera  to  the  gates 
of  the  noble  city  of  Zaragoza,  all  was  sulmiissiun,  and 
beyond  that  boundary,  all  was  apathy  or  dread.     Ten 


»  Sir  John  Moore's  Papers. 


104 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


[Book  IV 


thousand  French  soldirrs  could  safely,  as  retrarded  the 
Spaniards,  have  marched  from  one  extremity  of  the 
Peninsula  to  the  other. 

After  the  fall  of  Madrid,  king  Joseph  remained  at 
Burofos,  issuing  proclamations,  and  carryinof  on  a  sort 
of  underplot,  throiio-h  the  medium  of  his  native  minis- 
ters; the  views  of  the  latter  naturally  turned  towards 
the  Spanish  interests  as  distinct  from  the;  French,  and 
a  source  of  infinite  mischief  to  Joseph's  cause  was 
thus  opened,  for  that  monarch,  anxious  to  please  and 
conciliate  his  subjects,  ceased  to  be  a  Frenchman  with- 
out becominjr  a  Spaniard.  At  this  time,  however,  Na- 
poleon assumed  and  exercised  all  the  ritrhts  of  con- 
quest, and  it  is  evident,  from  the  tenor  of  his  speeches, 
proclamations,  and  decrees,  that  some  ulterior  project, 
in  which  the  king-'s  personal  interests  were  not  concern- 
ed, was  contemplated  by  him.  It  appeared  as  if  he 
wished  the  nation,  in  imitation  of  the  old  kinor,  to  offer 
the  crown  to  himself  a  second  time,  that  he  might  ob- 
tain a  plausible  excuse  for  adopting  a  new  line  of  policy 
by  which  to  attract  the  peo])le,  or  at  least  to  soften 
their  pride,  which  was  now  the  main  obstacle  to  his 
success. 

An  assemblage  of  the  nobles,  the  clergy,  the  cor- 
porations, and  the  tribunals  of  Madrid,  waited  upon 
him  at  Chamartin,  and  presented  an  address,  in  which 
they  expressed  their  desire  to  have  Joseph  among  them 
again.*  The  emperor's  reply  was  an  exposition  of 
the  principles  upon  which  Spain  was  to  be  governed, 
and  offers  a  fine  field  for  reflection  upon  the  violence 
of  those  passions  which  induce  men  to  resist  positive 
good,  and  eagerly  seek  for  danger,  misery,  and  death, 
rather  than  resign  their  prejudices. 

'I  accept,'  said  he,  'the  sentiments  of  the  town  of 
Madrid.  I  regret  the  misfortunes  that  have  befallen 
it,  and  I  hold  it  as  a  particular  good  fortune  that  I  am 
enabled,  under  the  circumstances  of  the  m.oment,  to 
Kpare  that  city,  and  to  save  it  from  yet  greater  mis- 
fortunes. 

'I  have  hastened  to  take  measures  fit  to  tranquillize 
all  clasfps  of  citizens,  knowing  well  that  to  all  people, 
and  to  all  men,  uncertainty  is  intolerable. 

'  I  have  preserved  the  religious  orders,  but  I  have 
restrained  the  number  of  monks ;  no  sane  person  can 
douV(t  that  they  are  too  numerous.  Those  who  are 
truly  called  to  this  vocation  by  the  grace  of  God  will 
remain  in  their  convents ;  those  who  have  lightly  or 
from  worldly  motives  adopted  it,  will  have  their  exis- 
tence secured  among  the  secular  ecclesiastics,  from  the 
surplus  of  the  convents. 

'  I  have  provided  for  the  wants  of  the  most  interest- 
.ng  and  useful  of  the  clers^y,  the  parish  priests. 

'I  have  abolished  that  tribunal  against  which  Europe 
and  the  age  alike  exclaimed.  Priests  ought  to  guide 
consciences,  but  they  should  not  exercise  any  exterior 
or  corporal  jurisdiction  over  men. 

'I  have  taken  the  satisfaction  which  was  due  to  my- 
self and  to  my  nation,  and  the  part  of  vengeance  is 
completed.  Ten  of  the  principal  criminals  bend  their 
heads  before  her ;  but  for  all  others  there  is  absolute 
and  entire  pardon. 

'  I  have  suppressed  the  rights  usurped  by  the  nobles 
during  civil  wars,  when  the  kings  have  been  too  often 
obliged  to  abandon  their  own  rights  to  purchase  tran- 
quillity and  the  repose  of  their  people. 

'  I  have  suppressed  the  feudal  rights,  and  every  per- 
son can  now  establish  inns,  mills,  ovens,  weirs,  and 
fisheries,  and  give  free  play  to  their  industry;  only 
observing  the  laws  and  customs  of  the  place.  The 
eelf-love,  the  riches,  and  the  prosperity  of  a  small 
number  of  men,  was  more  hurtful  to  your  agriculture 
than  the  heats  of  the  dog-days. 

'  As  tiiere  is  but  one  God,  there  should  be  in  one 
estate  but  one  justice ;    wherefore  all    the   particular 


*  Moniteu: 


■jurisdictions  having  been  usurped,  and  being  contrary 
to  the  national  rights,  I  have  destroyed  them.  I  have 
also  made  known  to  all  persons  that  which  each  can 
have  to  fear,  and  that  which  they  may  hope  for. 

'  The  English  armies  I  will  drive  from  the  Peninsula. 
Zaragoza,  Valencia,  Seville,  shall  be  reduced  either 
by  persuasion  or  by  the  force  of  arms. 

'There  is  no  obstacle  capable  of  retarding  for  any 
length  of  time  the  execution  of  my  will.  But  that 
which  is  above  my  power,  is  to  constitute  the  Span- 
iards a  nation,  under  the  orders  of  the  king,  if  they 
continue  to  be  imbued  with  the  principle  of  division, 
and  of  hatred  towards  France,  such  as  the  English 
partizans  and  the  enemies  of  the  continent  have  in- 
stilled into  them.  I  cannot  establish  a  naticn,  a  king, 
and  Spanish  independence,  if  that  king  is  not  sure  of 
the  atTection  and  fidelity  of  his  subjects. 

'The  Bourbons  can  never  again  reign  in  Europe. 
The  divisions  in  the  royal  family  were  concerted  by 
the  English;  it  was  not  either  king  Charles  or  his 
favorite,  but  the  duke  of  Infantado,  the  instrument  of 
England,  that  was  upon  the  point  of  overturning  the 
throne.  The  papers  recenll)' found  in  his  house  prove 
this;  it  was  the  preponderance  of  England  that  they 
wished  to  establish  in  Spain.  Insensate  project!  which 
would  have  produced  a  land  war  without  end,  and 
caused  torrents  of  blood  to  be  shed. 

'  No  power  influenced  by  England  can  exist  upon 
the  continent;  if  any  desire  it,  their  desire  is  fdly, 
and  sooner  or  later  will  ruin  them ;  I  shall  be  obliged 
to  govern  Spain,  and  it  v.ill  be  easy  for  me  to  do  it  by 
establishing  a  viceroy  in  each  province.  However,  I 
will  not  refuse  to  concede  my  rights  of  conquest  to  the 
king,  and  to  establish  him  in  !\ladrid,  when  the  thirty 
thousand  citizens  assemble  in  the  churches,  and  on 
the  holy  sacrament  take  an  oath,  not  with  the  mouth 
alone,  but  with  the  heart,  and  without  any  Jesuitical 
restriction,  "to  be  true  to  the  king,  to  love  and  to  sup- 
port him."  Let  the  priests  from  the  pulpit  and  in  the 
confessional,  the  tradesmen  in  their  correspondence 
and  their  discourses,  inculcate  these  sentiments  in 
the  people ;  then  I  will  relinquish  my  rights  of 
conquest,  then  I  will  place  the  king  upon  the  throne, 
and  I  will  take  a  pleasure  in  showing  myself  the  faith- 
ful friend  of  the  Spaniards. 

'The  present  generation  may  differ  in  opinions ;  too 
many  passions  have  been  excited  ;  but  your  descendanta 
will  bless  me  as  the  regenerator  of  the  nation  :  they 
will  mark  my  sojourn  among  you  as  memorable  days, 
and  from  those  days  they  will  date  the  prosperity  of 
Spain.  These  are  my  sentiments,  go  consult  youl 
fellow  citizens,  choose  your  part,  but  do  it  frankly, 
and  exhibit  only  true  colours.' 

The  ten  criminals  were  the  dukes  of  Infantado,  of 
Hijar,  Medini  Celi,  and  Ossuna;  marquis  Santa  Cruz; 
counts  Fernan,  Minez,  and  Altamira ;  prince  of  Cas- 
tello  Franco,  Pedro  Cevallos,  and  the  bishop  of  St. 
Ander,  were  proscribed,  body  and  goods,  as  traitors  to 
France  and  Spain. 

Napoleon  now  made  dispositions  indicating  a  vast 
plan  of  operations.  It  would  appear  that  he  intended 
to  invade  Gallicia,  Andalusia,  and  Valencia,  by  his 
lieutenants,  and  to  carry  his  arms  to  Lisbon  in  person 
Upon  the  20th  December  the  sixth  corps,  the  guards, 
and  the  reserve,  were  assembled  under  his  own  imme- 
diate control.  The  first  corps  was  stationed  at  Toledo, 
and  the  light  cavalry  attached  to  it  scoured  the  roads 
leading  to  Andalusia,  up  to  the  foot  of  the  Sierra  Mo- 
rena.  The  fourth  corps  was  at  Talavera,  on  tlie  march 
towards  the  frontier  of  Portugal.  The  second  corps 
was  on  the  Carrion  river,  preparing  to  advance  against 
Gallicia.  The  eighth  corps  was  broken  up  :  the  divi- 
sions composing  it  were  ordered  to  join  the  second, 
and  Junot,  who  commanded  it,  repaired  to  the  thinl 
corps,  to  supply  the  place  of  marshal  Moncey,  who 
was  called  to  Madrid  for  a  particular  service, — doubt- 


I808.J 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR    WAR. 


lOS 


less  an  exppfliticn  n<T?iiRst  Valencia.  The  fifth  corps, 
wiiich  had  arrived  at  Vittoria,  was  directed  to  reinforce 
the  third,  then  employed  ajrainst  Zaragoza.  The  sev- 
enth was  always  in  Catalonia. 

Vast  as  this  plan  of  campaisfn  appears,  it  was  not 
beyond  the  emperor's  means;  for,  without  takintr  into 
consideration  his  own  genius,  activity,  and  vigour, 
there  were  on  his  muster  rolls,  above  three  hundred 
and  thirty  thousand  men,  and  above  sixty  thousand 
horses ;  two  hundred  pieces  of  field  artillery  followed 
the  corps  to  battle,  and  as  many  more  remained  in  re- 
serve. Of  this  monstrous  army,  two  hundred  and 
fifty-five  thousand  men,  and  fifty  thousand  horses,  were 
actually  under  arms,  with  their  different  regiments, 
while  tliirty-two  thousand  were  detached  or  in  garri- 
sons, preserving  tranquillity  in  the  rear,  and  guarding 
the  communications  of  the  active  force.  The  remain- 
der were  in  hospital,  and  so  slight  had  been  the  re- 
sistance of  the  Spanish  armies,  that  only  nineteen 
hundred  prisoners  were  to  be  deducted  from  this  mul- 
titude. Of  the  whole  host  two  hundred  and  thirteen 
thousand  were  native  Frenchmen,  the  residue  were 
Poles,  Germans,  and  Italians;  thirty-five  thousand 
men  and  five  thousand  horses,  were  available  for  fresh 
enterpiis'',  without  taking  a  single  man  from  the  ser- 
vice of  the  lines  of  communication.  What  was  there 
to  oppose  this  fearful  array  ]  What  consistency  or  vi- 
frour  in  the  councils  ■?  What  numbers  ?  What  discipline 
and  spirit  in  the  armies  of  Spain  1  What  enthusiasm 
among  the  people?  What  was  the  disposition,  the 
means,  what  the  activity  of  the  allies  of  that  country  1 
The  answers  to  these  questions  demonstrate  that  the 
fate  of  the  Peninsula  hung  at  this  moment  upon  a 
thread,  and  that  the  deliverance  of  that  country  was 
due  to  other  causes  than  the  courage,  the  patriotism, 
or  the  constancy  cf  the  Spaniards. 

First,  with  regard  to  their  armies.  Tlie  duke  of 
Infautado  resided  with,  rather  than  commanded,  a  few 
thousand  v/retched  fugitives  at  ('uenca,  destitute,  mu- 
tinous, and  C!wed  in  spirit.  At  Valencia  there  was  no 
army,  for  that  which  belonn-ed  to  the  province  wag 
shut  up  in  Zaragozn,  and  dissentions  had  aiisen  be- 
tween Palafcx  and  the  local  junta  in  consequence.* 
In  the  passes  of  the  Sierra  Morena  were  five  thousand 
raw  levies,  hastily  made  by  the  junta  of  Seville,  after 
the  defeat  of  St.  Juan.  Galluzzo,  who  had  under- 
taken to  defend  the  Tagus,  with  six  thousand  timid 
and  ill-armed  soldiers,  was  at  this  ti  ne  in  flight,  hav- 
ing been  suddenly  attacked  and  defeated  at  Almarezby 
a  detachment  of  the  fourth  corps.  Romana  was  near 
Leon,  at  the  head  of  eighteen  or  twenty  thousand 
nmav/ays,  collected  by  him  after  the  dispersion  at 
Reynosa;t  but  of  this  number  only  five  thousand  were 
armed,  and  none  were  subordinate,  or  capable  of  being 
disciplined,  for,  when  checked  for  misconduct,  the  mar- 
quis complained  that  they  deserted.  In  G'allicia  there 
was  no  army,  and  in  the  Asturias  the  local  government 
were  so  corrupt,  so  fiithless,  and  so  oppressive,  that 
the  spirit  cf  the  people  was  crushed,  and  patriotism 
reduced  to  a  name. 

The  members  of  the  central  junta  had  at  first  thought 
of  going  to  Badajos,  but,  being  terrified,  fled  to  Se- 
ville,■);  and  their  inactivity  was  more  conspicuous  in  this 
season  of  adversity  than  before,  contrasting  strangely 
with  the  pompous  and  inflated  language  of  their  public 
papers:  all  their  promises  were  fallacious,  their  inca- 
pacity glaring,  their  exertions  ridiculous,  abortive,  and 
the  junta  of  Seville,  still  actuated  by  their  own  ambi- 
tious views,  had  now  openly  reassumed  all  their  former 
authority.  In  short,  the  strength  and  spirit  of  Spain 
■was  broken,  the  enthusiasm  was  nu  1,  except  in  a  few 
p'aces,  and  tho  emperor  was,  with  respect  to  the  Span- 

*  Infanta'lo's    Lptters.      Narrative   of   Moore's   Campaign. 
StufTl's  and  Frcre's  Letters.         f  Sir  John  Moore's  Papers. 
1  Stuait. 


iaids,  perfectly  master  of  operations.  He  was  in  the 
centre  of  the  country  ;  he  held  the  capital,  the  fortresses, 
the  command  of  the  great  lines  of  communication  be- 
tween the  provinces;  and  on  the  wide  military  horizon, 
no  cloud  intercepted  his  view,  save  the  heroic  city  of 
Zaragoza  on  the  one  side,  and  a  feeble  British  army 
on  the  other.  Sooner  or  later,  he  observed,  and  v.ith 
truth,  that  the  former  must  fall,  as  it  was  an  affair  of 
artillery  calculation.  The  latter  he  naturally  supposed 
to  be  in  full  retreat  for  Portugal;  but  as  the  fuurth 
corps  was  nearer  to  Lisbon  than  the  British  general,  a 
hurried  retreat  alone  could  bring  the  latter  in  time  to 
that  capital,  and  consequently  no  preparations  for  de- 
fence could  be  made  sufficient  to  arrest  the  sixty  thou- 
sand Frenchmen  which  the  emperor  could  carry  there 
at  the  same  moment.  The  subjugation  of  Spain  ap- 
peared inevitable,  when  the  genius  and  vigour  of  Sir 
.1.  Moore  frustrated  Napoleon's  plans  at  the  very  mo- 
ment of  execution  ;  the  Austrian  war  breaking  out  at 
the  instant,  drew  the  master-spirit  from  the  scene  of 
contention,  and  England  then  put  forth  her  vast  re- 
sources, which  being  fortunately  wielded  by  a  general 
equal  to  the  task  of  delivering  the  Peninsula,  it  was 
delivered.  But  through  what  changes  of  fortune,  by 
what  unexpected  helps,  by  what  unlooked-for  and  ex- 
traordinary events,  under  what  difficulties,  by  whose 
perseverance,  and  in  despite  of  whose  errors,  let 
posterity  judge,  for  in  that  judgment  only  will  im- 
partiality and  justice  be  found. 


CHAPTER  in. 

Sir  John  Moore  arrives  at  Salamanca;  hears  of  the  1  attl^  nf 
Espinosa — His  dangerous  position;  discovers  the  real  state 
of  al!'airs;  contemplates  a  hardy  enterpiise;  h<  a!"*  of  tlie 
defeat  atTudela;  resolves  to  retreat;  waits  lor  g'eneral  ITope'i 
division  —  Danger  of  that  general  ;  his  alale  condiRt — 
Central  junta  l\y  to  Badajos — Mr.  Frere,  incapable  of  ju  fg- 
ing  rightly,  opposes  the  retreat;  his  weakness  and  levity; 
insults  the  general;  sends  Colonel  Charniiliy  to  Salamaa  a 
— Manly  conduct  of  sir  John  Moore;  his  able  an;,  bold  plan 
of  operations. 

OPERATIONS    OF   THE    hh   TISH    ARMY. 

While  at  Madrid,  Napoleon  he^  -  that  sir  .Tohn 
Moore,  having  relinquished  his  communication  with 
Lisbon,  was  menacing  the  French  line  of  operations 
on  the  side  of  Burgos  ;  this  intelligence  obliged  him 
to  suspend  all  his  designs  against  the  south  of  vSpain 
and  Portugal,  and  to  fix  his  whole  attention  upon  that 
general's  movements.  The  reasons  which  induced 
Moore  to  divide  his  army,  and  to  send  general  Hope 
with  one  column  by  the  Tagus,  while  the  other  march- 
ed under  his  own  personal  command,  by  Almeida  and 
Ciudad  Rodrigo,  have  been  already  related  ;  as  like- 
wise the  arrangements  which  brought  sir  David  Baird 
to  Corufia,  without  having  permission  to  land  his  troops, 
and  without  money  to  equip  them,  when  they  were 
sulfered  to  disembark. 

The  8th  of  November,  sir  .John  Moore  was  at  Almeida, 
on  the  frontierof  Portugal,  his  artillery  wasatTruxillo, ' 
in  Spanish  Estremadura,  and  sir  David  Baird's  divi- 
sion was  at  Coruna.  General  Blake,  pursued  by  fifty 
thousand  enemies,  was  that  day  flying  from  Nava  to 
Espinosa;  Castafios  and  Palafox  were  quarrelling  at 
Tudela.  The  conde  de  Belvedere  was  at  Purges,  with 
thirteen  thousand  bad  troops,  and  Napoleon  was  at 
Vittoria,  with  one  hundred  and  seventy  thousand  good 
troops. 

At  this  time  the  letters  of  lord  William  Bentinck 
and  colonel  Graham,  exposing  all  the  imprudence  of 
the  Spanish  generals,  were  received,  and  di.squieted 
the  P^nglish  general.  He  already  foresaw  that  his 
junction  with  the  other  divisions  of  his  army  might  be 
impeded  by  the  result  of  an  action,  which  the  Span- 


106 


N.VPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


[B'/OK  IV. 


lards  appeared  to  be  courting,  contrary  to  all  sound 
policy  ;  but  as  no  misfortune  had  yet  befallen  them,  he 
continued  his  march,  hopingr  '  that  all  the  bad  which 
miirht  happen,  would  not  happen.' 

The    11th  he   crossed    the    frontier  of  Spain,    and 
marched  to  Ciudad   Rodrigo ;  on  that  day  Blake  was 
completely  discomfited    at    Espinosa,  and  the  Estre-  ] 
maduran  army,  beaten  the  day  before  at  Gamonal,  was 
utterly  mined  ar.rt  dispersed. 

'I'he  13tti  t...  .'  ead  ot  the  British  columns  entered 
Salamanca,  a"  t.e  moment  when  Hiake's  tugitive  force 
was  hr.ai  y  disorganized  at  Reynosa.  -eavmg  the  first, 
secorid,  and  fourth,  French  corps,  amounting  to  near 
seventy  thousand  men.  free  to  act  against  any  quarter. 

Jmt  John  Moore  participated  at  first  in  the  universal 
bp.iet",  tliat  the  nation  was  enthusiastic,  and  fixed  in  a 
neteriniiiation  to  dispi:te  every  step  with  the  invaders; 
and  after  he  had  detected  the  exaggerations  of  the  mili- 
tary agents,  and  perceived  the  want  of  capacity  in  the 
Spanish  generals  and  rulers,  he  still  trusted  that  the 
spirit  of  the  people  would  compensate  for  their  defi- 
ciency of  skill.  What  then  was  his  surprise  to  find, 
that  the  defeat  of  the  conde  de  Belvedere,  an  event 
which  laid  Castille  open  to  the  incursions  of  the  enemy, 
which  uncovered  the  march  of  the  British,  and  com- 
promised their  safety,  had  created  no  sensation  among 
the  people;  that  the  authorities  had  spread  no  alarm, 
taken  no  precautions,  delivered  out  no  arms,  although 
many  thousands  were  stored  in  the  principal  towns, 
and  neither  encouraged  the  inhabitants  by  proclama- 
tions, ncr  enrolled  any  of  them  for  defence!  He  him- 
self was  not  informed  of  this  important  occurrence  until 
a  week  after  it  happened,  and  then  only  through  a 
single  official  channel. 

Valladolid,  where  the  enemy's  cavalry  were,  was 
but  three  marches  from  Salamanca,  and  as  not  more 
than  f  ur  thousand  of  ISIoore's  infantry  had  come  up 
to  the  latter  town,  it  was  evident  that  if  the  French 
advanced  in  force,  the  British  must  fall  back  towards 
Ciudad  Rodrigo.  Nevertheless  the  general,  assem- 
bling the  local  authorities,  explained  the  nature  of  his 
position,  endeavoured  to  excite  their  ardour,  and,  not- 
withstanding the  apathetic  state  of  the  public  mind, 
resolved  not  to  retire  unless  forced  back  by  superior 
numbers  ;  he  even  hastened  the  arrival  of  his  rear  divi- 
sions, but  sent  orders  to  both  Hope  and  Baird  to  con- 
centrate their  troops  and  be  prepared  for  a  retreat.  His 
exhortations  produced  no  effect  upon  the  junta  or  the 
people  ;  the  former  were  stupified  and  timid,  the  latter, 
although  declaring  their  hatred  of  the  invaders,  would 
not  stir  in  deience;  the  first  feeling  of  indignation 
against  the  French  was  exhausted,  and  there  was  noth- 
ing to  supply  its  place ;  the  fugitives  from  t*lie  armies 
passed  daily  without  shame,  and  unreproached  by  their 
countrymen.  In  this  state  the  English  general  re- 
mained until  the  18th,  his  army  was  closing  up,  and 
the  French  cavalry  withdrew  from  Valladolid  to  Pa- 
Icncia,  when  the  news  of  Blake's  defeat  reached  Sala- 
manca, not  by  rumour,  or  by  any  direct  communication 
from  the  Montana  St.  Ander,  but  through  Mr.  Stuart, 
tight  days  subsequent  to  the  date  of  the  action ;  the 
central  junta  did  not  even  inform  the  minister  pleni- 
potentiary until  thirty  hours  after  having  received  of- 
ficial intelligence  of  it  themselves.* 

\\  ant  of  transport  and  supplies  had  obliged  the 
British  to  march  in  small  and  successive  divisions,  it 
was,  therefore,  the  23d  of  November  before  the  centre, 
consisting  of  twelve  thousand  infantry,  and  a  battery 
of  six  guns,  was  concentrated  at  Salamanca.  On  that 
day,  Casta'':OS  and  Palafox  being  defeated  at  Tudela, 
and  their  armies  scattered  without  a  chancp  of  rallying 
again  in  the  field,  the  third  and  sixth  French  corps 
became  disposable.  The  emperor  also,  victorious  on 
both  flanks,  and  with  a  fresh  base  of  operations  fixed 


•  Mr.  Frtre's  Letter  to  the  Juata. 


at  Burgos,  was  then  free  to  move,  with  the  g  ;ards  and 
the  reserve,  cither  against  Madrid  or  in  the  direction 
of  Salamanca;  detachments  of  hia  *  ,ny  were  already 
in  possession  of  Valladolid,  the  very  town  which,  a 
few  days  before,  the  Spanish  government  had  indicated 
for  the  base  of  sir  John  Moore's  operations,  and  the 
formation  of  his  magazines.*  The  26th  the  head  of 
sir  David  Baird's  column  was  in  Astorga,  but  the  rear 
extended  beyond  Lugo,  while  the  head  of  Hope's  di- 
vision was  at  the  Escurial,  and  the  rear  at  Talavera 
But  the  second  French  corps  was  on  the  Deba,  threat- 
ening  Leon  and  the  Asturias;  the  cavalry  covered  the 
plains;  the  fonrth  corps  was  descending  by  Carrion 
and  Valladolid,  to  seize  the  pass  of  the  Guadarama; 
the  emperor  himself  was  preparing  to  force  the  Somo- 
sierra. 

From  this  summary  of  contemporary  events,  it  is 
evident,  that,  notwithstanding  sir  John  Moore  had  or- 
ganised, equipped,  and  supplied  his  army,  and  marched 
four  hundred  miles,  all  in  the  space  of  six  weeks,  he 
was  too  late  in  the  field ;  the  campaign  was  decided 
against  the  Spaniards  before  the  British  had,  strictly 
speaking,  entered  Spain  as  an  army.  And  it  is  certain, 
that  if,  instead  of  being  at  Salamanca,  Escurial,  and 
Astorga,  on  the  23d,  the  troops  had  been  united  at 
Burgos  on  the  8lh,  such  was  the  weakness  of  the 
Spanish  forces,  the  strength  of  the  enemy,  and  such 
the  skill  with  which  Napoleon  directed  his  movements, 
that  a  difficult  and  precarious  retreat  was  the  utmost 
favour  that  could  be  expected  from  Fortune  by  the 
English. 

Sir  John  Moore's  situation  on  his  arrival  at  Sala- 
manca, gave  rise  to  serious  reflections.  He  had  been 
sent  forward  without  a  plan  of  operations,  or  any  data 
upon  which  to  found  one ;  his  instructions  merely 
directed  him  to  open  communication  with  the  Spanish 
authorities,  for  the  purpose  of  '  framing  the  plan  of 
campaign.'  But  general  Castarcs,  with  whom  he  wa3 
desired  to  correspond,  was  superseded  immediately 
afterwards,  and  the  marquis  of  Romana,  his  successor, 
was  engaged  in  rallying  the  remains  of  Blake's  force 
in  the  Asturias,  at  a  distance  of  two  hundred  miles 
from  the  only  army  with  which  any  plan  of  co-opera- 
tion could  be  formed,  and  of  whose  proceedings  he 
also  was  ignorant.  No  channel  of  intelligence  liad 
been  pointed  out  to  Moore,  and  as  yet  a  stranger  in  the 
country,  and  without  money,  he  could  net  establish 
any  certain  one  for  himself.  It  was  the  will  of  the 
people  of  England,  and  the  orders  of  the  government, 
that  he  should  push  forward  to  the  assistance  of  the 
Spaniards,  and  he  had  done  so,  without  magazines, 
and  without  money  to  form  them ;  trusting  to  the  of- 
ficial assurance  of  the  minister,  that  above  a  hundred 
thousand  Spanish  soldiers  covered  his  march,  that  the 
people  were  enthusiastic  and  prepared  for  any  exertion 
to  secure  their  own  deliverance,  but  he  found  them 
supine  and  unprepared ;  the  French  cavalry,  in  parties 
as  weak  as  twelve  men,  traversed  the  country,  and 
raised  contributions,  without  difficulty  or  opposition. 
This  was  the  state  of  Castille,  and  the  letters  of  Mr. 
Stuart  and  lord  William  Bentinck  amply  exposed  the 
incapacity,  selfishness,  and  apathy  of  the  supreme  go- 
vernment at  Aranjuez.  The  correspondence  of  colonel 
Graham  painted  in  the  strongest  colours  the  confusion 
of  affairs  on  the  Ebro,  the  jealousy,  the  discord  of  the 
generals,  the  worse  than  childisli  folly  of  the  deputy 
Palafox  and  his  creatures.  Sir  David  Baird's  expe- 
rience proved,  that  in  Gallicia  the  people  were  inert  as 
in  Castille  and  Leon,  and  the  authorities  more  absurd 
and  more  interested.  General  Hope  expressed  a  like 
opinion  as  to  the  ineptitude  of  the  central  junta;  and 
even  the  military  agents,  hitherto  so  sanguine,  had 
lowered  their  tone  of  exultation  in  a  remarkable  manner 

Napoleon's  enormous  force  was  unknown  to  sir  Joha 


*  Sir  JoUn  Moore's  Paptn. 


IROS. 


NAPIER'S   PExMNSULAR  WAR. 


107 


Moorp.  but  he  know  that  it  could  not  be  loss  than 
eighty  thousand  fighting  men,  and  that  thirty  thousand 
more  wore  momentarily  expected,  and  might  have  ar- 
rived ;  he  knew  that  Elake  and  the  conde  de  Belvedere 
were  totally  defeated,  and  that  Caslaiios  must  inevit- 
ably be  so  if  he  hesitated  to  retreat.  The  only  con- 
clusion to  be  drawn  from  these  fpcts  was,  that  the 
Spaniards  were  unable,  or  unwilling,  to  resist  the 
enemy,  and  that  the  British  would  have  to  support  the 
contest  alone,  unless  they  could  form  a  junction  with 
Castaf;cs,  before  the  latter  was  entirely  discomfited 
and  destroyed  ;  but  there  was  no  time  for  such  an  opera- 
tion, and  the  first  object  was,  to  unite  the  parcelled 
divisions  of  the  Ei^lish  army. 

From  Astorga  to -ralamanca  was  five  marches;  from 
Salamanca  to  the  Escurial  was  six  marches;  but  it 
would  have  required  five  days  to  close  up  the  rear 
upon  Salamanca,  six  days  to  enable  Hope  to  concen- 
trate at  the  Escurial,  and  sixteen  to  enable  Baird  to 
assemble  at  Astorga.  Hence  twenty  days  were  re- 
quired for  the  English  arm.y  to  unite  and  act  in  a 
body,  and  to  have  advanced  in  their  divided  state 
would  have  been  equally  contrary  to  military  principle 
and  to  common  sense.  A  retreat,  althou£ch  it  was 
prescribed  by  the  rules  of  scientific  war,  and  in  unison 
with  the  instructions  of  the  govenimcnt,  which  for- 
bad the  Efeneral  to  commit  his  troops  in  any  serious 
afi'air  before  the  whole  were  united,  would  have  been, 
while  the  Spanish  army  of  the  centre  still  held  the 
field,  ungenerous  :  the  idea  was  repuijnant  to  the  bold 
and  daring  spirit  of  Moore.  Rather  than  resort  to  such 
a  remedy  for  the  false  position  his  government  had 
placed  him  in,  he  contemplated  a  hardy  and  dangerous 
enterprise,  such  as  none  but  great  minds  are  capable 
of.  He  proposed,  if  he  could  draw  the  extended  wings 
of  his  army  togfether  in  good  time,  to  abandon  all  com- 
munication with  Portugal,  and  throwing  himself  into 
the  heart  of  Spain,  to  rally  Castaiios'  army,  if  it  yet 
existed,  upon  his  own.  to  defend  the  southern  provinces, 
and  trust  to  the  eflect  which  such  an  appeal  to  the 
patriotism  and  courage  of  the  Spaniards  would  produce. 

But  IMoore  also  considered,  that  the  question  was 
not  purely  military ;  the  Spanish  cause  was  not  one 
which  could  be  decided  by  the  marches  of  a  few  auxil- 
iary troops;  its  fate  rested  on  the  vigour  of  the  rulers, 
the  concert  of  the  generals,  the  unity  of  the  exertions, 
and  the  fixed  resolution  of  the  people  to  suffer  all 
privations,  and  die  rather  than  submit;  to  him  it  ap- 
peared doubtful  that  such  a  spirit,  or  the  means  of 
creating  it,  existed,  and  more  doubtful  that  there  was 
capacity  in  the  government  to  excite  or  to  direct  it 
when  aroused  ;  no  men  of  talent  had  yet  appeared, 
and  good-will  was  in  itself  nothing  if  improperly 
treated.  Wherefore  he  turned  to  the  Engrlish  pleni- 
potentiary, who  had  just  superseded  Mr.  Stuart  near 
the  central  junta;  for  he  had  been  directed  by  the 
ministers  to  communicate  with  him  upon  all  important 
points,  to  receive  with  deference  his  opinion  and  ad- 
vice, and  the  present  was  an  occasion  to  which  those 
instructions  were  peculiarly  applicable.  Mr.  Frere  had 
come  fresh  from  the  English  government,  ho  was  ac- 
quainted with  its  views,  he  was  in  the  most  suitable 
position  to  ascertain  what  degree  of  elasticity  the  Span- 
ish cause  really  possessed,  and  the  decision  of  the 
question  belonged  as  much  to  him  as  to  the  general, 
because  it  involved  the  whole  policy  of  the  English 
cabinet  with  respect  to  Spain ;  it  was  likewise  the 
more  proper  to  consult  him  because,  as  a  simple  opera- 
tion of  v.-ar,  the  proposed  movement  was  rash.  All 
the  military  and  many  political  reasons  called  for  a 
retreat  upon  Portugal,  which  would  take  the  army  back 
upon  its  own  resources,  ensure  its  concentration,  in- 
crease its  strength,  protect  British  interests,  and  leave 
it  free  either  to  return  to  Spain,  if  a  favourable  oppor- 
tunity should  occur,  or  to  pass  by  sea  to  Andalusia, 
and  co.ninience  -he  campaign  in  the  south. 


Such  were  the  reflections  that  induced  sir  John 
Moore  to  solicit  Mr.  Frere's  opinion  upon  the  general 
policy  of  the  proposed  operation.  But  in  so  doing  he 
never  had  the  least  intention  of  consulting  him  u]ion 
the  mode  of  executing  the  m.ilitary  part,  of  which  he 
conceived  himself  to  be  the  best  judge,  and  while 
awaiting  the  reply,  he  directed  sir  David  Baird,  if  the 
enemy  showed  no  disposition  to  molest  him.  to  push 
the  troops  on  to  Salamanca  as  fast  as  they  sh.ould  ar- 
rive at  Astorga.  Sir  David  was  prcceediniT  to  do  so, 
when  Elake  advised  him  that  a  considerable  French 
force  was  collecting  at  Rio  Seco  and  Amphdia.  with  a 
view  of  interrupting  the  march ;  this  arrested  bi3 
movement,  he  was  even  preparing  to  fall  back,  w  hen 
he  'vas  stopped  by  Moore,  whose  information  !ed  him 
to  believe  that  Blake's  report  was  false.  Valuable 
time  was  thus  lost,  but  it  was  the  march  of  the  frurth 
corps  then  traversing  the  line  from  Carrion  to  the  Gua- 
darama,  that  gave  rise  to  this  contradictory  intellin-ence, 
for  the  many  various  changes  in  the  French  positions, 
and  the  continual  circulation  of  their  light  cavalry 
through  the  plains,  bewildered  the  spies  and  the  peas- 
ants. 'J'he  force  of  the  enemy  on  different  points  also 
confused  the  higher  agents,  who,  believing  the  greatest 
amount  of  the  invading  army  to  be  from  a  hundred  to 
a  hundred  and  twenty  thousand  men,  could  never  re- 
concile the  reports  with  this  standard,  and  therefore 
concluded  that  Napoleon  exaggerated  his  real  numbera 
to  create  terror. 

Moore  had  written  to  I\Ir.  Frere  on  the  27th  of  No- 
vember, Baird  was  to  march  by  Benevente  on  the  1st, 
and  Hope  by  Tordesillas ;  the  troops  at  Salamanca  by 
Zamora  and  Toro,  and  all  the  arrangements  for  the 
execution  of  the  project  were  completed  when,  in  the 
night  of  the  2Sth,  a  despatch  from  INIr.  Stuart  made 
known  the  disaster  at  Tudela.  This  again  changed 
the  aspect  of  affairs;  the  question  proposed  to  Mr. 
Frere  was  no  longer  doubtful.  The  projected  mcvc- 
ment  had  been  founded  upon  the  chance  (f  rallijiiis;  the 
Spanish  armies  lcJii:\d  the  Ta^us,  a  hazardous  and  dar- 
ing experiment  when  first  conceived,  but  now  that 
Castanos  had  nolong^er  an  army,  now  that  the  strength 
of  Spain  was  utterly  broken,  to  have  persisted  in  it 
would  have  been  insanity;  the  French 'could  be  over 
the  Tagus  before  the  lUitish.  and  there  were  no  Span- 
ish armies  to  rally.  The  defeat  at  Tudela  tcck  place 
the  2.3d  of  November;  Eaird's  brigrades  could  not  be 
united  at  Astorga  before  the  4th  of  December,  and  to 
concentrate  the  whole  of  the  arm.y  at  Salamanca,  re- 
quired a  flank  march  of  several  days  over  an  open 
plain;  an  operation  not  to  be  thought  of,  within  a  few 
marches  of  a  skilful  enemy,  who  possessed  such  an 
overwhelming  force  of  artillery  and  cavalry. 

As  long  as  Castanos  and  Palafcx  kept  the  field, 
there  was  reason  to  believe  that  the  French  stationed 
at  Burpfos  would  not  make  any  serious  attempt  on  the 
side  of  Astorgra,  but  that  check  being  now  removed,  an 
unmilitary  flank  march  would  naturally  draw  their 
attention,  and  brins'  them  down  upon  the  parcelled  di- 
visions of  the  English  troops.  The  object  of  succour- 
ing the  Spaniards  called  for  great,  but  not  for  useless 
sacrifices.  The  Enfjlish  general  was  prepared  to  con- 
front any  danger  and  to  execute  any  enterprise  which 
held  out  a  chance  of  utility,  but  he  also  remembered 
that  the  best  blood  of  Engfland  was  committed  to  his 
charo-e,  that  not  an  English  army,  but  the  very  heart, 
the  pith  of  the  military  power  of  his  country  was  in 
his  keeping,  it  was  entrusted  to  his  prudence,  and  his 
patriotism  spurned  the  idea  of  seeking  personal  renown 
by  hetrayin<r  that  sacred  trust.  'JMie  political  reasons 
in  favour  of  marchincr  towards  .Madrid,  scarcely  bal- 
anced the  military  objections  before  the  battle  of  Tu- 
dela; after  that  event,  the  latter  acquiring  doible  forct;, 
left  no  room  for  hesitation  in  the  mind  of  any  man 
capable  of  reasoning  at  all,  and  sir  John  Mooro  S^Mv 
ed  to  fall  back  into  Portugal. 


108 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  IV 


He  ordcrod  sir  David  Eaird  to  regfain  Coruna  or 
Vi<ro,  and  (o  carry  his  troops  by  sfa  to  Lisbon ;  yet 
wishing,  if  possible,  to  unite  with  Hope  before  the 
retrotrrade  movement  commenced,  he  directed  Baird  to 
show  a  bold  front  for  a  few  days  in  order  to  attract 
the  enemy's  attention.  The  neo-lijTonce,  the  false  in- 
tellitrence,  t!ie  frauds,  the  opposition  approaching;' to  hos- 
tility, experienced  by  sir  David  Baird  during;  his  march 
from  ("^onir'a,  had  so  reduced  that  fjenerars  hopes,  that 
he  prepared  for  this  retreat  without  reluctance;  he  was  in 
direct  communication  with  Homana,  but  the  inter- 
course between  them  had  ratlier  confirmed  than  weak- 
ened the  impression  en  Baird's  mind,  that  it  was  im- 
possible to  depend  upon  the  promises,  the  information, 
or  the  judofment  of  any  Spanish  general.  In  the  mean 
time,  Napoleon  f.Tced  the  Somosierra,  and  summoned 
M'drid  :  the  supreme  junta  fled  towards  Badajos;  St. 
Juan  was  murdered  at  Talavera.  the  remnant  of  Cas- 
tanos's  armv  was  driven  towards  the  Tafjus  ;  the  fourth 
corps  approached  Segovia,  and  sir  John  Hope's  situa- 
tion became  very  critical. 

His  column,  consistincr  cf  three  thousand  infantry, 
nine  hundred  cavalry,  the  artillery,  and  the  great  pare 
of  ammunition  had  been  obliged,  from  the  want  of 
money  and  supplies,  to  move  in  six  divisions,  each  be- 
ing a  day's  n.arrh  behind  the  other.*  At  Almaraz,  he 
endeavoured  to  discover  a  way  across  the  mountains  to 
Ciudad  Rodiigo.  and  a  road  did  exist,  but  the  peasants 
and  muleteers  declared  it  to  be  impracticable  for  car- 
riages, and  consequently  unfit  fcr  the  convoy  ;  the  truth 
of  their  assertions  was  much  doubted,  but  sir  John  was 
daily  losing  horses  from  the  glanders,  and,  with  a 
number  but  just  suflicient  to  drag  his  guns  and  convoy 
along  a  good  road,  he  feared  to  explore  a  difficult  pas- 
feage  over  the  Sierras. 

When  his  leading  division  had  reached  Talavera,  den 
Thomas  Morja,  then  secretary  at  war,  anxious  to  have 
the  troops  more  minutely  divided,  proposed  that  the 
regiments  should  march  through  Madrid  in  ten  divis- 
ions on  as  many  successive  days,  the  first  to  reach  the 
capital  on  the  2'3d  of  November,  which  would  exactly 
have  brought  the  convoy  into  the  jaws  of  the  French 
army.f  Hope  immediately  repaired  in  person  to  Ma- 
drid, held  a  conference  with  Morla,  and  quickly  satis- 
fied himself  that  every  thing  was  in  confusion,  and 
that  the  .Spanish  government  had  neither  arranged  a 
general  plan,  nor  was  capable  of  conducting  one.  Con- 
vinced of  this  unfortunate  truth,  he  paid  no  attention 
to  Morla's  proposition,  but  carried  his  troops  at  once 
by  the  road  of  Naval  Carnero  to  the  Esci;rial,  where 
he  halted  to  close  up  the  rear,  and  to  obtain  bullocks 
to  assist  in  dragginir  the  pare  over  the  Guadarama. 
The  2Sth,  he  crossed  the  mountain,  and  entered  the 
open  flat  country ;  the  2Rth  and  29lh  the  infantry  and 
guns  were  at  Villa  Castin  and  St.  Antonia,  the  pare 
was  at  Espinar,  and  the  cavalry  advanced  on  the  road 
to  Arevalo.  General  Heredia  was  then  at  Segovia, 
but  the  duke  of  Dantzic  was  at  Valladidid  and  Placen- 
tia,  and  his  patroles  were  heard  of  at  (^oca,  only  a  few 
miles  from  Arevalo,  and  in  the  course  of  the  day  a  des- 
patch from  Mr.  Stuart  announced  the  catastrophe  at 
Tudela,  and  the  dispersion  of  the  camp  at  Sepulveda; 
at  the  same  time  the  outposts  of  cavalry  in  the  front 
reported  that  four  hundred  French  horse  were  at  Olme- 
do,  only  twelve  miles  from  Arevalo,  and  that  fourthou- 
eand  others  were  in  the  neighbourhood  ;  the  scouts  at 
St.  Garcia,  on  the  right,  also  tracked  the  French  again 
at  Anaya,  near  Segovia. 

Hope's  situation  was  now  truly  embarrassing.  If 
he  fell  back  to  the  Guadarama,  the  army  at  Salaman- 
ca would  be  without  ammunition  or  artillery.:}:  If  he 
advanced,  it  must  be  by  a  flank  movement  of  three 
days,  with  a  heavy  convoy,  over  a  flat  country,  and 

•  Sir  .Inhn  Moorr's  Papers.  Hopf^'n  Lfttfri. 

f  Lor  J  W.Bentinck'i  Letter*.    {  Gen.  Hoj  ••'»  Reports.MS. 


WMthin  a  few  ho\ns'  march  of  a  very  superior  cavalry. 
If  he  delayed  where  he  was,  even  for  a  few  hours,  th« 
French  on  the  side  of  Segovia  might  get  between  him 
and  the  pass  of  Guadarama,  and  then,  attacked  in 
front,  flank,  and  rear,  he  would  be  reduced  to  the  shame- 
ful necessity  cf  abandoning  his  convoy  and  guns  to 
save  his  men  in  the  mountains  of  Avila.  A  man  of 
less  intrepidity  and  calmness  would  have  been  ruined. 
Hope,  as  enterprising  as  he  was  prudent,  without  any 
hesitation  ordered  the  cavalry  to  tlirow  out  parties  cau- 
tiously towards  the  French,  and  maintain  a  confident 
front  if  the  latter  approached,  then  moving  the  infantry 
and  guns  from  Villacastin,  and  tlie  ccnvo}-  from  Espi- 
nosa,  by  cross  roads,  to  Avila,  he  continued  his  march 
day  and  night  until  thej'  reached  Pcneranda.  Mean- 
while the  cavalry  to  cover  this  movement  closed  gradu- 
ally to  the  left,  and  finally  occupied  Fonliveros  on  the 
2nd  of  December.  The  infantry  and  the  draught  ani- 
mals were  greatly  fatigued ;  but  the  danger  was  not 
over;  the  patroles  reported  that  the  enemy,  to  the  num- 
ber of  ten  thousand  infantry,  two  thousand  cavalry,  and 
forty  guns,  were  still  in  Olmcdo ;  this  v,as  the  eternal 
fourth  corps,  which  thus  traversing  the  country,  continu- 
ally crossed  the  heads  of  the  English  columns,  and 
seemed  to  multiply  the  forces  of  the  French  at  all 
points.  Hope  immediately  drew  his  infantry  and  cav- 
alry up  in  position,  and  obliged  the  artillery  and  the 
convoy  to  proceed  without  rest  to  Alba  de  Tcrmes, 
where  a  detachment  from  Salamanca  met  them,  and 
covered  their  march  to  that  town.  This  vigorous  and 
skilful  march  was  thus  concluded,  for  the  division  re- 
maining at  Peneranda  collected  its  stragglers,  and 
pushed  outposts  to  Medino  del  Campo,  Madrigal,  and 
'i'orecilla,  while  the  fourth  corps  unwittingly  pursued 
its  march  to  the  Guadarama. 

Sir  John  Moore's  resolution  to  retreat  upon  Portugal 
created  a  great  sensation  at  Madrid  and  at  Aranjue z.  'J  he 
junta  feared,  and  with  reason,  that  such  a  palpable 
proof  of  the  state  to  which  their  negligence  md  inca- 
pacity had  reduced  the  country,  would  endanger  their 
authority  and  perhaps  their  lives;*  and  although  they 
were  on  the  point  of  flying  to  Badajos  themselves,  they 
were  anxious  that  others  should  rush  headlong  into 
danger.  Morla,  and  those  who,  like  him,  were  pre* 
pared  to  abandon  the  cause  cf  their  country,  felt  mor- 
tified at  losing  an  opportunity  of  commemorating  their 
defection  by  a  single  act  of  perfidy ;  and  the  English 
plenipotentiary  was  surprised  and  indignant  that  a  gen- 
eral of  experience  and  reputation  should  think  for  him- 
self, and  decided  upon  a  military  operation  without  a 
reference  to  his  opinion. 

Mr.  Frere,  although  a  person  cf  some  scholastic  at- 
tainments, was  very  ill  qualified  for  the  duties  of  hia 
situation,  which  at  this  moment  required  temper,  sa- 
gacity, and  judgment.  Greatly  overrating  his  own  tal- 
ents for  public  afl'airs,  he  had  come  cut  to  Spain  im- 
pressed with  false  notions  of  what  was  passing  in  that 
country,  and  tenaciously  clinging  to  the  pictures  of  his 
imagination,  resented  the  intrusion  of  reason,  and  petu- 
lantly spurned  at  facts.  The  defeat  of  the  conde  de 
Belvedere  at  Gamonal,  a  defeat  that  broke  the  centre 
of  the  Spanish  line,  uncovered  the  flank  and  rear  cf 
Castaiios'  army,  opened  a  way  to  Madrid  and  rendered 
the  concentration  of  the  British  divisions  unsafe  if  not 
impossible,  he  curiously  called  the  '  unlucky  affair  of 
the  10th  at  Burgos.'  After  the  battle  of  Tudela  he 
estimated  the  whole  IVencb  army  on  the  side  )t  Bur- 
gos and  Valladolid  at  eleven  thousand  men,  when  i.\cy 
were  above  one  hundred  tliousand  ;  and  yet,  with  in- 
formation so  absurdly  defective,  he  was  prompt  to  in- 
terfere with,  and  eager  to  control,  the  military  combi- 
nations of  the  general,  which  were  founded  upon  the 
true  and  acknowledged  principles  of  tlie  art  of  war.f 

*    Mr.  Stuarfs  Corrf  spondence. 
f  JS'arrative  of  Moore's  Campaign. 


1M)8.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


109 


Moore,  while  anxiously  watching^  the  dangerous  pro- 
gress of  sir  John  Hrpe,  was  suddenly  assailed  by  the 
representations  and  remonstrances  of  all  these  offend- 
ed, mortified,  and  disappointed  persons,  and  as  the 
question  of  retiring  was,  by  the  defeat  of  Tudela,  ren- 
dered so  purely  military,  and  the  necessity  of  it  so 
palpable,  the  general,  although  anticipating  some  ex- 
pressions of  discontent  from  the  Spanish  government, 
was  totally  unprepared  for  the  torrent  of  puerile  im- 
pertinences with  which  he  was  overwhelmed. 

Morla,  a  subtle  man,  endeavoured  first  to  deceive 
Mr.  Stuart,  by  treating  the  defeat  of  Castanos  lightly, 
and  stating  officially  that  he  had  saved  the  greatest 
part  of  his  army  at  Siguenza,  and  was  on  the  march 
to  join  St.  Juan  at  the  Somosierra  ;*  to  this  he  added, 
that  there  were  only  small  bodies  of  French  cavalry 
in  the  flat  country  of  Castillo  and  Leon,  and  no  force 
o.n  that  side  capable  of  preventing  the  junction  of  sir 
John  Moore's  army.  This  was  on  the  evening  of  the 
30th,  but  the  emperor  had  forced  the  pass  of  the  So- 
TOosierra  on  that  morning,  and  the  duke  of  Dantzic 
■was  at  Valladolid.  The  same  day  Mr.  Frere,  writing 
from  Aranjuez  in  answer  to  the  general's  formal  com- 
munication, and  before  he  was  acquainted  with  his  in- 
tention to  fall  back,  deprecated  a  retreat  upon  Portugal, 
and  asserted  that  the  enthusiasm  of  the  Spanish  was 
unbounded,  except  in  Castille  and  Leon,  where,  he  ad- 
mitted, they  were  more  passive  than  they  should  be.j 
He  even  stated,  that  twenty  thousand  men  were  actu- 
ally assembled  in  the  vicinity  of  the  capital,  and  that 
Castarios  was  falling  back  upon  them;  that  reinforce- 
ments were  arriving  daily  from  the  southern  provinces, 
and  that  the  addition  of  the  British  army  would  form 
a  force  greatly  superior  to  any  the  French  could  bring 
against  that  quarter,  in  sufficient  time.  It  was  certain, 
he  said,  that  the  latter  were  very  weak,  and  would  be 
afraid  to  advance,  while  the  whole  country,  from  the 
Pyrenees  to  the  capital,  was  in  arms  upon  their  left 
flank.  Rumours  also  were  rife  that  the  conscription 
had  been  resisted,  and  this  was  the  more  probable,  be- 
cause every  great  effort  made  by  France  was  accom- 
panied by  weakness  and  internal  disturbance,  and  a 
pastoral  letter  of  the  bishop  of  Carcassonne  seemed 
to  imply  that  it  was  so  at  that  time.  '  Good  policy, 
therefore,  required,  that  the  French  should  be  attacked 
before  their  reinforcements  joined  them,  as  any  success 
obtained  at  that  moment  would  render  a  conscription 
for  a  third  attempt  infinitely  difficult,  if  not  impracti- 
cable; but  if,  on  the  other  hand,'  said  this  inconsider- 
ate person,  '  the  French  are  allowed,  with  their  present 
forces,  to  retain  their  present  advantages,  and  to  wait 
the  completion  of  their  conscription,  they  would  pour 
into  Spain  with  a  number  of  troops  which  would  give 
them  immediate  possession  of  the  capital  and  the  cen- 
tral provinces.'  Two  days  after  the  dale  of  this 
letter,  the  emperor  was  actually  at  the  capital ;  and 
Mr.  Frere,  notwithstanding  the  superior  Spanish  force 
which  his  imagination  had  conjured  up,  was,  with  the 
junta,  flying  in  all  haste  from  those  very  central  prov- 
inces, France  remaining,  meanwhile,  strong,  and  free 
from  internal  dissension. 

This  rambling  epistle  was  not  despatched  when  the 
general's  intention  to  fall  back  upon  Portugal  was 
made  known  to  Mr.  Frere,  but  he  thought  it  so  admi- 
rably calculated  to  prevent  a  retreat,  that  he  forwarded 
it,  accompanied  by  a  short  explanatory  note,  which 
was  offensive  in  style,  and  indicative  of  a  petulant  dis- 
position. At  the  same  time,  Augustin  Bueno  and  Ven- 
tura Escalente,  two  generals  deputed  by  the  junta  to 
remonstrate  against  sir  John  Moore's  intended  retreat, 
arrived  at  head-quarters,  and  they  justified  the  choice 
of  their  employers,  being  in  folly  and  presumptuous 


*  Moore's  Papers.     Mr.  Stuart's  Correspondence, 
f  Moore's  Papurs.     Pierf's  Corrf spondencu. 


ignorance  the  very  types  of  the  government  they  rep 
resented.  Asserting,  that  St.  Juan,  with  twenty  thou 
sand  men  under  his  command,  had  so  fortified  the  pass 
of  the  f^oiTiosicrra,  that  it  could  not  be  forced  by  aiiy 
num.her  of  enemies,  and  that  reinforcements  were  dai- 
ly joining  him,  they  were  proceeding  to  create  immense 
Spanish  armies,  when  the  general  stopped  their  gar- 
rulity by  introducing  colonel  Graham,  who  had  been  a 
witness  of  the  dispersion  of  Castanos's  army,  and 
had  just  left  the  unfortunate  St.  Juan  at  Talavcra,  sur- 
rounded by  the  villanous  runagates,  who  murdered  him 
the  next  day.*  It  may  be  easily  supposed,  that  such 
representations,  and  from  such  men,  could  have  no 
weight  with  the  commander  of  an  army  ;  in  fact,  the 
necessity  of  retreating  was  rendered  more  imperious 
by  these  glaring  proofs  that  the  junta  and  the  English 
plenipotentiary  were  totally  ignorant  of  what  was  pass- 
mg  around  them. 

But  Napoleon  was  now  in  full  career;  he  had  raised 
a  hurricane  of  war,  and,  directing  its  fury  as  he  pleas- 
ed, his  adversaries  were  obliged  to  conform  their  move- 
ments to  his,  and  as  the  circumstances  varied  from 
hour  to  hour,  the  determination  of  one  moment  was 
rendered  useless  in  the  next.  The  appearance  of  the 
French  cavalry  in  the  plains  of  Madrid,  had  sent  the 
junta  and  ]Mr.  Frere  headlong  towards  Badajos,  yetthe 
pc'ple  of  Madrid,  as  we  have  seen,  shut  their  gates, 
and  displayed  the  outward  signs  of  a  resolution  to  im- 
itate Zaragoza  ;  the  neighbouring  peasants  flocked  in 
to  aid  the  citizens,  and  a  military  junta,  composed  of 
the  duke  of  Infantado,  the  prince  of  Castel  Franco, 
the  riiarquis  of  Castellar,  and  don  Thomas  Morla.  was 
appointed  to  manrge  the  defence.  Morla,  being  re- 
solved to  make  a  final  effort  to  involve  the  British  ar- 
my in  the  destniction  of  his  own  country,  easily  per- 
suaded the  duke  of  Infantado  to  quit  Madrid  on  a  mis- 
sion to  the  army  of  the  centre;  and  thus  the  traitor 
was  left  S'lle  master  of  the  tov/n,  because  the  duke  and 
himself  on!}^  had  any  influence  with  that  armed  mob 
which  had  murdered  the  marquis  of  Perales,  and  fill- 
ed the  city  with  tumult. 

When  the  French  emperor  summoned  the  junta  to 
surrender,  Morla,  in  concert  with  the  prince  of  Castel 
Franco,  addressed  a  paper  to  sir  John  Moore,  in  which 
it  was  stated  that  '  twenty-five  thousand  men  under 
Castanos,  and  ten  thousand  from  the  Somosierra,  were 
marching  in  all  haste  to  the  capital,  w^here  forty  thou- 
sand others  were  in  arms.  Nevertheless,  apprehend- 
ing an  increase  of  force  on  the  enemy's  side,  the  jun- 
ta hoped  the  English  army  would  either  march  to  the 
assistance  of  Madrid,  or  take  a  direction  to  fall  upon 
the  rear  of  the  French  ;  and  not  doubting  that  the 
English  general  had  already  formed  a  junction  with 
Blake's  army,'  which  they  well  knew  had  been  dis- 
persed, '  they  hoped  he  would  be  quick  in  his  opera- 
tions.' This  paper  was  sent  by  a  government  messen- 
ger to  Salamanca,  but  ere  he  could  reach  that  place, 
Morla,  who  had  commenced  negotiations  before  the 
despatch  was  written,  capitulated,  and  Napoleon  was 
in  Madrid.  This  communication  alone  would  not  have 
been  sufficient  to  arrest  Moore's  retrograde  movement, 
for  he  was  become  too  well  acquainted  with  what  fa- 
cility Spanish  armies  were  created  on  paper,  to  rely  on 
any  statement  of  their  numbers  ;  but  Mr.  Stuart  also 
expressed  a  belief  that  Madrid  would  make  a  vigorous 
resistance,  and  the  tide  of  false  information  having  set 
in  with  a  strong  current,  every  moment  brought  fresh 
assurances  that  a  great  spirit  had  arisen. 

On  the  day  that  Morla's  communication  arrived, 
there  also  appeared  at  head-quarters,  one  Charmilly, 
a  French  adventurer.  This  man,  who  has  been  since 
denounced  in  the  British  parliament  as  an  organizer 
of  assassination  in    St.  Domingo,  and  a  fraudulent 

»  I\Toore"s  Papers. 


110 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Cook  IV. 


ftankriipt  in  London,  came  as  the  confidential  agent  of 
Mr.  Frere.  He  has  been  in  Madrid  durinij  tlie  nicflu 
of  the  first,  and  left  it  immediately  after  havintj  held 
a  conference  with  Morla,  the  next  morninor.  Takinqf 
the  road  to  Talavera,  he  met  with  the  plenipotentiary, 
to  whom  he  spoke  with  such  enthusiasm  of  the  spirit 
and  preparations  of  the  inhabitants  in  the  capital,  that 
Mr.  Frere,  readily  confiding  in  him,  and  imparting  his 
own  views,  not  only  entrusted  him,  a  stranger,  with 
letters  to  the  British  general,  but  charged  him  with  a 
mission  to  obstniot  the  retreat  into  Portugal.  Thus 
instructed,  (^harmilly  hastened  to  Salamanca,  and  pre- 
sented Mr.  Frere's  first  missive,  in  which  that  gentle- 
man, after  alluding  to  former  representations,  and  to 
the  information  of  which  colonel  Charmilly  was  the 
bearer,  viz.  the  enthusiasm  in  the  capital,  made  a  for- 
mal remonstrance,  to  the  effect  that  propriety  and  pol- 
icy demanded  an  immediate  advance  of  the  British  to 
support  this  generous  effort.  Charmilly  also  demand- 
ed a  personalinterview,  which  was  granted,  yet  Moore, 
havincr  some  suspicion  of  the  man,  whom  he  had  seen 
before,  listened  to  his  tale  of  the  enthusiasm  and  vig- 
orous character  displayed  at  Madrid,  with  an  appear- 
ance of  coldness  that  baffled  the  penetration  of  the  ad- 
venturer, who  retired  under  the  impression  that  a  re- 
treat was  certain. 

But  for  many  years  so  much  ridicule  had  been  at- 
tached to  the  name  of  an  English  expedition,  that 
weak-headed  men  claimed  a  sort  of  prescriptive  right 
to  censure,  without  regard  to  subordination,  the  con- 
duct of  their  general.  It  had  been  so  in  Egypt,  where 
a  cabal  was  formed  to  deprive  lord  Hutchinson  of  the 
command,  it  had  been  so  at  Buenos  Ayres,  at  Ferrol, 
and  in  Portugal,  it  was  so  at  this  time  in  sir  John 
Moore's  army ;  and  it  will  be  found,  in  the  course  of 
this  work,  that  the  superlative  talents,  vigour,  and  suc- 
cess of  the  duke  of  Wellington,  cculd  not  even  at  a 
lale  period  cf  the  war  secure  him  from  such  vexatious 
folly.  The  three  generals  who  commanded  the  sepa- 
rate divisions  of  the  army,  and  who  were  in  conse- 
quence acquainted  with  all  the  circumstances  of  the 
moment,  were  perfectly  agreed  as  to  the  propriety  of 
a  retreat,  but  in  other  quarters  indecent  murmurs  were 
so  prevalent  amonj  officers  of  rank  as  to  call  for  re- 
buke ;  and  Charmilly,  ignorant  of  the  decided  charac- 
ter of'the  general-in-chief,  concluding  that  this  tem- 
per was  favourable  to  the  object  of  his  mission,  pre- 
sented a  second  letter,  which  I\Ir.  Frere  had  charged 
him  to  deliver,  should  the  first  fail  of  effect.  The  pur- 
port of  it  was  to  desire,  that  if  sir  John  Moore  still 
persisted  in  his  intention  of  retreating,  '  Ihe  bearer 
might  be  previously  examined  before  a  council  of  tear  ,•' 
in  other  words,  that  Mr.  Frere,  convinced  of  sir  John 
Moore's  incapacity  and  want  of  zeal,  was  determined 
to  control  his  proceedings  even  by  force.  And  this  to 
a  British  general  of  \o\ts  experience  and  confirmed 
reputation,  and  by  the  hands  of  a  foreign  adventurer  !!! 
Tiie  indignation  of  a  hi<jh  spirit  at  such  a  foolish,  wan- 
*ton  insult,  may  be  easily  imagined.  He  ordered  Char- 
milly to  quit  the  cantonments  of  the  British  army  in- 
stantly. His  anger,  however,  soon  subsided.  Quar- 
rels, among  the  servants  of  the  public,  could  only 
prove  detrimental  to  his  country,  and  he  put  his  per- 
sonal feelintrs  on  one  side.  The  information  brought 
by  Charmilly,  separated  from  the  indecorum  of  his 
mission,  was  in  itself  important;  it  cf)nfirmed  the  es- 
sential fart,  lliat  Madrid  was  actually  resisting,  and 
that  the  spirit  and  energy  of  the  country  was  awaking. 

Hitherto  his  own  observation  had  led  sir  John  Moore 
to  doubt,  if  the  people  took  sulficient  interest  in  the 
cause  to  make  any  eflectual  effort,  all  around  himself 
was  apathetic  and  incapable;  his  correspondents,  witii 
the  exceptions  of  Mr.  Frere,  nay,  even  the  intercepted 
letters  jf  French  officers,  had  agreed  in  describing  the 
genera!  f'-eling  of  the  country  as  subsiding  into  indif- 


ference, and  to  use  his  owm  words,  ^  Spain  was  without 
armies,  <y;enerals,  era  government.''  But  now  the  fire 
essential  to  the  salvation  of  the  nation  seemed  to  be 
kindling,  and  Moore  feeling  conscious  of  ability  to 
lead  a  British  arm}',  hailed  the  appearance  of  an  en- 
thusiasm which  promised  success  to  a  just  cause,  and 
a  brilliant  career  of  glory  to  himself.  That  the  metro- 
polis should  thus  abide  the  fury  of  the  conqueror  was 
indeed  surprising,  it  was  a  great  event  and  full  of 
promise,  and  the  situation  of  the  army  w-as  likewise 
improved,  general  Hope's  junction  was  accomplished; 
and  as  the  attention  of  the  French  was  turned  towards 
Madrid,  there  was  no  reason  to  doubt  that  Baird's  junc- 
tion could  likewise  be  effected.  On  the  other  hand, 
there  was  no  certainty  that  the  capital  would  remain 
firm  when  danger  pressed,  none  that  it  would  be  able 
to  resist,  none  that  the  example  would  spread  ;  yet 
without  it  did  so,  nothing  was  gained,  because  it  was 
only  by  an  union  of  heart  and  hand  throughout  the 
whole  country,  that  the  great  power  of  the  French 
could  be  successfully  resisted. 

In  a  matter  so  balanced,  Moore,  as  might  be  expect- 
ed from  an  enterprising  general,  adopted  the  boldest 
and  most  generous  side.  He  ordered  Baird,  who,  af- 
ter destroying  some  stores,  had  fallen  back  to  Villa 
Franca,  to  concentrate  his  troops  at  Astorga,  and  he 
himself  prepared  for  an  advance;  but  as  he  remained 
without  any  further  information  cf  the  fate  of  Madrid, 
he  sent  colonel  Graham  to  obtain  intelligence  of  what 
was  passing,  and  to  carry  his  answer  to  Morla.  This 
resolution  being  taken,  he  wrote  to  Mr.  Frere,  calmly 
explaining  the  reasons  for  his  past  conduct,  and  those 
which  actuated  him  in  forming  a  fresh  plan  of  opera- 
tion. '  I  wish  anxiously,'  said  this  noble-minded  man 
in  conclusion,  '  I  wish  anxiously,  as  the  king's  minis- 
ter, to  continue  upon  the  most  confidential  footing  with 
you,  and  I  hope  as  we  have  but  one  interest,  the  pub- 
lic welfare,  though  we  occasionally  see  it  in  different 
aspects,  that  this  will  not  disturb  the  harmony  which 
should  subsist  between  us.  Fully  impressed  as  1  am 
with  these  sentiments,  I  shall  abstain  from  any  remarks 
upon  the  two  letters,  from  you.  delivered  to  me  last 
night  and  this  morning  by  colonel  Charmilly,  or  on 
the  message  which  accompanied  them.  I  certainly  at 
first  did  feel  and  expressed  much  indignation  at  a  per- 
son like  him  being  made  the  channel  of  a  communica- 
tion of  that  sort  from  you  to  me.  Those  feelings  are 
at  an  end,  and  I  dare  say  they  never  will  be  created  to- 
wards you  again.' 

The  plan  of  operations  now  occupied  his  m.ind.  The 
Somosierra  and  the  Guadarama  were  both  in  posses- 
sion of  the  enemy,  wherefore  no  direct  movement  could 
be  made  towards  Madrid,  and  as  the  rear  cf  Baird's 
troops  was  still  several  marches  behind  Astorga,  a  gen- 
eral movement  on  the  side  of  the  capital  could  not 
commence  before  the  12th  of  the  month.  Zaragoza, 
the  general  knew,  was  determined  to  stand  a  second 
siege,  and  he  had  the  guarantee  of  the  first  that  it 
would  be  an  obstinate  stand  ;  he  had  received  from  the 
junta  of  Toledo  a  formal  assurance  of  their  resolution 
to  bury  themselves  under  the  ruins  of  the  town,  sooner 
than  submit;  and  he  was  informed  from  several  quar- 
ters that  the  southern  provinces  were  forwarding 
crowds  of  fresh  levies.  Romana  at  this  time  also  was 
in  correspondence  with  him,  and.  with  the  usual  exag- 
geration of  a  Spaniard,  declared  his  ability  to  aid  hiin 
with  an  army  of  twenty  thousand  men.  I'pon  this 
data  sir  John  Moore  formed  a  plan,  bearing  the  stamp 
of  genuine  talent  and  enterprise,  whether  it  be  exam- 
ined as  a  political  or  a  militarj'  measure. 

He  supposed  the  French  emperor  to  be  more  anxious 
to  strike  a  heavy  blow  against  the  English,  and  to 
shut  them  out  of  Spain,  than  ^  overrun  any  particular 
province,  or  get  possession  of  any  town  in  the  Penin- 
sula.    He  resolved,  therefore,  to  throw  himself  «p^« 


1808.] 


NATIER'S    PEiNlNSULAR  WAR. 


Ill 


Ihe  coirmunications  of  the  French  army,  hoping-,  if 
fortune  was  favourable,  to  inflict  a  severe  loss  upon 
the  troops  which  guarded  them  before  aid  could  arrive. 
If  Napoleon,  suspending^  his  o])erations  against  the 
south,  should  detach  them  largely,  Madrid  would 
thereby  be  succoured  ;  if  he  did  not  detach  largely, 
the  British  could  hold  their  ground.  Moore  knew 
well  that  a  great  commander  would  in  such  a  case  be 
more  likely  to  unite  his  whole  army,  and  fall  upon  the 
troops  which  thus  ventured  to  place  themselves  on  his 
line  of  operations;  but,  to  relieve  the  Spaniards  at  a 
critical  moment,  and  to  give  time  for  the  southern  pro- 
vinces to  organize  their  defence  and  recover  courage, 
he  was  willing  thus  to  draw  the  whole  of  the  enemy 
upon  himself.  He  felt  that,  in  doing  so,  he  compro- 
inised  the  safety  of  his  own  army,  that  he  must  glide 
along  the  edge  of  a  precipice,  that  he  must  cross  a 
gulf  on  a  rotten  plank  :  but  he  also  knew  the  martial 
qualities  of  his  soldiers,  he  had  confidence  in  his  own 
genius,  and  the  occasion  being  worthy  of  a  great  deed, 
he  dared  essay  it  even  against  Napolson. 

Colonel  Graham  returned  on  the  Olh,  bringing  the 
first  intimation  of  the  capitulation  of  the  capital.  He 
had  been  able  to  proceed  no  farther  than  Talavera, 
where  he  encountered  two  members  of  the  supreme 
junta.  By  them  he  was  told  that  the  French,  being 
from  twenty  to  thirty  thousand  strong,  possessed  the 
Retire;  that  the  people  retained  their  arms,  and  that 
La-Pe  a,  with  thirty  thousand  men  of  the  army  of  the 
cent;e,  was  at  Guadalavara ;  that  fourteen  thousand  of 
St.  Juan's  and  Heredia's  forces  were  assembled  at 
Almarez  ;  and  that  Romana,  with  whom  they  anxious- 
ly desired  the  English  should  unite,  had  likewise  an 
army  of  thirty  thousand  fighting  men :  finally,  they 
assured  colonel  Graham  that  the  most  energetic  meas- 
ures were  in  activity  wherever  the  enemy's  presence 
d'd  not  control  the  patriots. 

Mortifying  as  it  was  to  find  that  Madrid,  after  so 
nmch  boasting,  should  have  held  out  but  one  day,  the 
event  itself  did  not  destroy  the  ground  of  Moore's  reso- 
lution to  advance.  Undoubtedly  it  was  so  much  lost; 
it  diminished  the  hope  of  arousing  the  nation,  and  it 
increased  the  danger  of  the  British  army,  by  letting 
loose  a  greater  number  of  the  enemy's  troops  ;  but  as 
a  diversion  for  the  south  it  might  still  succeed,  and  as 
long  as  there  was  any  hope,  the  resolution  of  the  En- 
glish general  was  fixed,  to  prove  that  he  would  not 
abandon  the  cause,  even  when  the  Spaniards  were 
abandoninQr  it  themselves. 


CHAPiER  iV. 

British  army  advances  towards  Burgos — French   outposts  sur- 
prised at  Ruerla — Letter  from  Bcrthier  to  Soult  intercepted 

—  Dirertijn  of  the  march  changed — Mr.  Stuart  and  a  mem- 
ber ot  the  junta  arrive  at  head  quarters — Arrogant  and  in- 
suhing  lett.^r  of  Mr.  I'rere — Noble  answer  of  Sir  John  Moor^' 

—  British  army  united  at  Mayorga  ;  their  force  and  compo- 
sition— Inconsistent  conduct  of  Romana  ;  his  character — 
Souit's  [Josition  and  forces  ;  concentrates  his  army  at  Cur- 
rion — Combat  of  Cavalry  at  Sahagun — The  British  army  re- 
tires to  Benevente — The  emperor  moves  from  Madrid, 
passes  the  Guadarama,  arrives  at  Tordesiilas,  expects  to  in- 
terrupt the  British  line  of  retreat,  fails — Bridge  of  Castro 
Gonzulo  destroyed — Combat  of  cavalry  at  Bfnevente — Gene- 
ral Lefebre  taken — Soult  forces  the  bridge  of  Mansilla  ; 
takes  Leon — The  emperor  unites  his  armv  at  Astorga  ;  hears 
of  the  Austrian  war  :  orders  marshal  Soult  to  pursue  the  En- 
glish army,  and  returns  to  France. 

The  forward  movement  of  the  British  army  commenced 
on  the  11th  of  December.  Moore's  first  intention  was 
to  march  with  his  own  and  Hope's  division  to  Vallado- 
lid,  with  a  view  to  cover  the  advance  of  iiis  stores  and 
to  protect  the  junction  of  sir  David  Baird's  troops,  the 
rear  of  which  was  still  behind  Astorga ;  nevertheless 
preparations  fora  retread  upon  Portujjal  were  continued, 


and  sir  David  was  ordered  to  form  magazines  at  tie- 
nevente,  Astorga,  Villa  Franca,  and  lAigo,  by  which 
arrangement  two  lines  of  operation  were  secured,  and 
a  greater  freedom  of  action  obtained. 

The  13th  head-quarters  were  at  Alaejos ;  two  brig- 
ades and  lord  Paget's  cavalry  at  Toro  ;  general  Hope 
at  Torrecilla  ;  general  Charles  Stewart's  horsemen  at 
Rueda,  having  the  night  before  surpriseil  thi^re  fifty  in- 
fantry and  thirty  dragoons,  who  declared,  that  in  the 
French  army  it  was  believed  that  the  English  were 
retreating  to  Portugal. 

At  Alaejos  an  intercepted  despatch  of  the  prince  of 
Neufchatel  was  brought  to  head-quarters,  and  the  con- 
tents were  important  enough  to  change  the  direction  of 
the  march.  It  was  addressed  to  the  duke  of  Dalmatia, 
and  described  Madrid  as  perfectly  tranquil,  the  shops 
open,  and  the  public  amusements  going  forward  as  in 
a  time  of  profound  peace.  The  fourth  corps  of  tiie 
army  was  said  to  be  at  Talavera,  on  its  way  towards 
Badajos,  and  this  movement,  it  was  observed,  would 
force  the  English  to  retire  to  Portugal,  if,  contrary  to 
the  emperor's  belief,  they  had  not  already  done  so. 
The  fifth  corps  was  on  the  march  to  Zaragoza,  and  the 
eighth  to  Burgos.  Soult  was  therefore  directed  to 
drive  the  Spaniards  into  Gallicia,  to  occupy  Leon,  Be- 
nevente,  and  Zamora,  and  to  keep  the  flat  country  in 
subjection,  for  which  purpose  his  two  divisions  of  in- 
fantry, and  the  cavalry  brigades  of  Franceschi  and 
Debelle,  were  considered  sutficient. 

It  is  remarkable  that  this  the  first  correct  information 
of  the  capitulation  of  Madrid  should  have  been  thus 
acquired  from  the  enemy,  ten  days  after  the  event  had 
taken  place;  nor  is  it  less  curious,  that  while  Mr. 
Frere's  letters  were  filled  with  vivid  descriptions  of 
Spanish  enthusiasm.  Napoleon  should  have  been  so 
convinced  of  their  passiveness,  as  to  send  this  impor- 
tant despatch  by  an  oflTicer,  who  rode  post,  without  an 
escort,  and  in  safety,  until  his  abusive  language  to  the 
post-master  at  V^aldestillos  created  a  tumult,  in  which 
he  lost  his  life.  Captain  Waters,  an  Eng'ish  officer 
sent  to  obtain  intelligence,  happening  to  arrive  in  that 
place,  heard  of  the  murder,  and  immediately  purchased 
the  despatch  for  twenty  dollars;  and  the  accidental 
information  thus  obtained  was  the  more  valuable,  as 
neither  money  nor  patriotism  liad  hitherto  induced  the 
Spaniards  to  bring  any  intelligence  of  the  enemy's 
situation,  and  each  step  the  army  had  made  was  in  the 
dark.  It  was  now  however  certain  that  Burgos  was 
or  would  be  strongly  protected,  and  that  Baird's  line 
of  march  was  unsafe  if  Soult,  following  these  instruc- 
tions, advanced.  On  the  other  hand,  as  the  French 
appeared  to  be  ignorant  of  the  British  movements, 
there  was  some  chance  of  surprising  and  beating  the 
second  corps  before  Napoleon  could  come  to  its  suc- 
cour. Hope,  therefore,  was  ordered  to  pass  the  Duero 
at  Tordesiilas,  and  direct  his  march  upon  Villepando; 
head-quarters  were  removed  to  Toro;  and  Valdcraa 
vas  given  as  the  point  of  junction  to  Baird's  division, 
the  head  of  which  was  now  at  Benevente. 

The  16th  Mr.  Stuart  arrived  at  Toro,  accompanied 
by  Don  F.  X.  Caro,  a  member  of  the  Spanish  govern- 
ment, who  brought  two  letters,  the  one  from  the  junta, 
the  other  from  i\lr.  Frere.*  That  from  the  junta  com 
plained,  that  when  Romana  proposed  to  unite  fourteen 
thousand  picked  men  to  the  British  army,  with  a  view 
to  make  a  forward  movement,  his  ofr(  r  had  been  disre- 
garded, and  a  retreat  determined  upon,  in  despite  of 
his  earnest  remonstrances;  this  retreat  they  declared 
to  be  uncalled  for,  and  highly  impolitic,  '  as  the  enemy 
was  never  so  near  his  ruin  as  in  that  moment.'  If  tiie 
Spanish  and  British  armies  should  unites,  they  said,  it 
would  give  'liberty  to  the  Peninsula,'  that  'Romana, 
wi*h  his  fourteen  thousand  select  men,'  was  still  ready 
to  join  sir  John  Moore,  and  that  '  thirty  thousatid  fresh 


*   Sir  John  Moore's  Paper*     MSS. 


112 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


"Book  IT. 


levies  would,  in  a  month,  be  added  to  the  ranks  of  the 
allied  uirce.' 

This  tissue  of  falsehoods,  for  Romnna  had  approved 
of  the  int(  ntion  to  retreat,  and  never  had  above  six 
thousand  men  armed,  was  addressed  to  Mr.  Frere,  and 
by  him  transmitted  to  the  jreneral,  loc^ether  with  one 
from  himself,  which,  in  allusion  to  tlie  retreat  upon 
Portup^al,  contained  the  following  extraordinary  pas- 
sages :  *  'I  mean  the  immense  responsibili:y  with 
which  you  charge  yourself  by  adoplinor,  upon  a  sup- 
osed  Uiililary  necessity,  a  measure  which  must  be 
loiiowed  by  immediate,  if  not  final,  ruin  to  our  ally, 
and  by  indelible  disgrace  to  the  country  with  whose 
resources  you  are  entrusted.'  '  I  am  unwilling  to  en- 
large upon  a  subject  in  which  my  feelings  must  be 
stifled,  or  expressed  at  tlie  risk  of  offence,  which,  wilh 
such  an  interest  at  stake,  I  should  feel  unwilling  to 
excite,  but  this  much  I  must  say,  that  if  the  British 
army  had  been  sent  abroad  for  the  express  purpose  of 
doing  the  utmost  possible  mischief  to  the  Spanish 
cause,  with  the  single  exception  of  not  firing  a  shot 
against  their  troops,  they  would,  according  to  the 
•>easures  now  announced  as  about  to  be  pursued,  have 
roiiipletely  fulfilled  their  purpose.' 

These  letters  were  dated  at  Truxillo ;  for  the  junta, 
^ifs.  hinking  themselves  safe  at  Badajos,  had  procced- 
evl  so  far  on  their  way  to  Seville,  and  on  that  side  the 
t'rench  had  continued  to  advance,  the  remnants  of  the 
Spanish  armies  to  flj',  and  every  thing  bore  the  most 
gloomy  appearance.  Mr.  Frere  knew  this.  In  a  sub- 
sequent letter  he  acknowledged  that  the  enthusiasm 
was  extinguished,  and  a  general  panic  commencing  at 
the  moment  when  he  was  penning  these  offensive  pas- 
sages. He  was  utterly  ignorant  of  the  numbers,  the 
situation,  and  the  resources  of  the  enemy,  but  he  form- 
ed hypotheses,  and  upon  the  strength  of  them  insulted 
bir  John  Moore,  and  endangered  the  interests  of  his 
country.  In  this  manner  the  British  general,  while 
struggling  with  unavoidable  difficulties,  had  his  mind 
harassed  by  a  repetition  of  remonstrances  and  repre- 
sentations, in  which  common  sense,  truth,  and  decency 
■were  alike  disregarded  ;  but  he  did  not  fail  to  show 
how  little  personal  feelingfs  weighed  with  him  in  op- 
pes'tion  to  the  public  welfare.  He  had  reason  to  sup- 
pose Mr.  Frere  had  received  his  letteir  relative  to  Char- 
mi'ily's  mission,  yet  as  it  was  not  acknowledged,  he 
took  adv3ntnore  of  the  omission,  and  with  singular  pro- 
priety ?nd  dignity  thus  noticed  the  plenipotentiary's 
ecord  insulting  communication.  '  mth  respect  to 
your  le'ter  deliver ^d  la  vie  at  Torn  by  Mr.  Stuart,  I  shall 
r.ot  remark  upon  if.  It  is  in  the  style  of  the  two  which 
were  brouirlit  to  me  by  colonel  Charmil/y,  and  consequent- 
ly was  answered  by  my  letter  of  the  Gth,  of  which  I  send 
you  a  duplicate  ;  that  subject  is  I  hope  at  rest  /' 

At  Toro  sir  .Tohn  Moore  ascertained  that  Romana, 
although  aware  of  the  advance  of  the  British,  and  en- 
gaged to  support  them,  was  retiring  into  Gallicia. 
Nominally  commander-in-chief  of  the  Spanish  armies, 
he  was  at  the  head  of  a  few  thousand  miserable  sol- 
diers, for  the  Spaniards,  vi-ith  great  ingenuity,  contrived 
to  have  no  general  when  they  had  an  army,  and  no 
army  when  they  had  a  ireneral.t  After  the  dispersion 
of  Blake's  people  at  Reynosa,  Romana  rallied  about 
five  thousand  men  at  Renedo,  in  the  valley  of  CJaber- 
nuigo,  and  endeavoured  to  make  a  stand  on  the  borders 
of  the  Asturias,  but  without  any  success,  for  the  vile 
conduct  of  the  Asturian  junta,  joined  to  the  terror  crea- 
ted by  the  French  victories,  had  completely  subdued 
the  spirit  of  the  peasantry,  and  ruined  the  resources  of 
that  province.  Romana  complained  that,  when  check- 
ed for  misconduct,  his  soldiers  quitted  their  standards  : 
indeed,  that  any  should  have  been  found  to  join  their 
colors  is  to  be  admired ;  for,  among  the  sores  of  Spain, 


•   Sir  John  Moore's  Papers.     MSS. 

f  Ibid,    Col ijnfcl  Scree's  CorT<sp and! cnce.     General  .'.cl;h. 


theT3  were  none  more  cankered,  more  disgusting,  than 
the  venality,  the  injustice,  the  profligate  corruption  cf 
the  Asturian  authorities.  ^Yithout  a  blush,  they  open- 
ly divided  the  English  subsidies,  and  defrauded,  nit 
only  the  soldiers  of  their  pay  and  equipments,  but  tl  e 
miserable  peasants  of  their  hire,  doubling  the  wretch- 
edness of  poverty,  and  deriding  the  misery  they  occa- 
sioned by  pompous  declarations  of  their  own  virtue. 

From  the  Asturias  Romana  had  led  the  remnants  of 
Blake's  force  to  Leon  about  the  period  of  Moore's  ar- 
rival at  Salamanca;  like  others,  he  had  been  deceived 
as  to  the  real  state  of  the  country,  and  at  this  time  re- 
pented that  he  had  returned  to  Spain.  He  was  a  per- 
son of  talent,  quickness,  and  information,  but  disquali- 
fied by  nature  for  military  command  ;  a  lively  princi- 
ple of  error  pervaded  all  his  notions  of  war,  and  no 
man  ever  bore  the  title  of  a  general  who  was  less  ca- 
pable of  commanding  an  army.  Neither  svas  he  ex- 
empt from  the  prevailing  weakness  of  his  countrymen. 
At  this  moment,  when  he  iiad  not  streii'^lh  to  stand 
upright,  his  letters  were  teeming  with  gig;intic  olTen- 
sive  projects  ;  and  although  he  had  before  approved  of 
the  intention  to  retreat,  he  was  now  as  ready  to  urge  a 
forward  movement,  promising  to  co-operaie  with  twen- 
ty thousand  soldiers  when  he  could  scarcely  muster  a 
third  of  that  number,  and  those  only  half  armed,  and 
scarcely  capable  of  distinguishing  their  own  standards  : 
and  at  the  very  time  he  made  the  promise,  he  was  re- 
tiring into  Gallicia,  not  meaning  to  deceive,  for  he  waa 
as  ready  to  advance  as  to  retreat,  but  this  species  cf 
boasting  is  inherent  in  his  nation.  It  has  been  assert- 
ed that  Caro  offered  the  chief  command  of  the  Spanisli 
armies  to  sir  John  Moore,  and  that  the  latter  refused 
it.  This  is  not  true.  Caro  had  no  power  to  do  so, 
and  there  were  no  armies  to  command ;  but  that  gen- 
tleman, in  his  interview,  either  was,  or  affected  to  be, 
satisfied  of  the  soundness  of  the  English  general's 
views,  and  ashamed  cf  the  folly  of  the  junta. 

The  18th,  head-quarters  were  at  Castro  Nuevo,  from 
which  place  ^loore  wrote  to  Romana,  informing  hira 
of  his  intention  to  fall  upon  Soult ;  he  desired  his  co- 
operation, and  requested  that  the  marquis  would,  ac- 
cording to  his  own  plan  given  to  the  British  minister 
in  London,  reserve  the  Asturias  for  his  own  line  of 
communication,  and  leave  Gallicia  to  the  British.  Tiie 
latter  Avere  now  in  full  march.  Baird  was  at  Bene- 
vente,  Hope  at  Villepando,  and  the  cavalry  scouring 
the  country  on  the  side  of  Valladolid,  had  several  suc- 
cessful skirmishes  and  took  a  number  of  prisoners ; 
the  French  could  be  no  longer  ignorant  of  the  move- 
ment, and  the  En<jlish  gf^neral  brought  forward  hia 
columns  rapiL'ly.  On  the  20th,  the  whole  of  the  forces 
were  united,  the  cavalry  at  Melgar  Abaxo,  the  infantry 
at  Mayorga  and  as  much  concentrated  as  the  necessity 
of  obtaining  cover  in  a  country  devoid  of  fuel,  and  det  p 
with  snow,  would  permit;  the  weather  was  exceed- 
ingly severe,  and  the  march':'S  long,  but  a  more  robust 
set  of  men  never  took  the  field,  their  discipline  waa 
admirable,  and  there  were  very  few  stragglers,  the  ex- 
perience of  one  or  two  campaigns  alone  was  wanting 
to  make  a  perfect  army.  The  number  was  however 
small  ;  nominally  it  was  nearly  thirty-five  thousand, 
but  four  regiments  were  still  -in  Portugal,  and  three 
more  were  left  by  sir  David  Baird  at  Lugo  and  Astcr- 
ga;  one  thousand  six  hundred  and  eighty-seven  men 
were  detachfd,  and  four  thousand  and  five  were  in 
hospital ;  hence  the  actual  number  present  under  arms 
on  the  19lh  of  December,  was  only  nineteen  thousand 
and  fifty-three  infantry,  two  thousand  two  hundred  and 
seventy-eight  cavalry,  and  one  thousand  three  hundi-jd 
and  fifty-eight  gunners ;  forming  a  total  of  twenty- 
three  thousand  five  hundred  and  eighty-three  men,  with 
sixty  pieces  of  artillery,  'i'hey  were  organized  in 
three  divisions,  a  reserve,  two  light  brigades  of  infan- 
tr)%  and  one  division  of  cavalry  ;  four  batteries  were 
a'.lacheil  to  the  iiif-intiy,  two  to  the  cavalry,  and  one 


ISOS."" 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


113 


was  kepi  in  reserve.  Meanwhile  Romana,  who  had 
been  able  to  bring  forward  very  few  men,  promised  to 
march  in  two  columns  by  Almanzer  and  Guarda,  and 
sent  some  information  of  the  enemy's  position.  But 
sir  John  Moore  depended  little  upon  his  intelligence, 
when  he  found  him,  even  so  late  as  the  19th  of  Decem- 
ber, upon  the  faith  of  information  from  the  junta,  re- 
presenting Madrid  as  still  holding  out;  and,  when  the 
advanced  posts  were  already  engaged  at  Sahagun, 
proposing  an  interview  at  Benevente  to  arrange  the 
plan  of  operations. 

On  the  French  side,  Soult  was  concentrating  his 
force  on  the  Carrion.  After  his  rapid  and  brilliant 
success  at  the  opening  of  the  campaign,  his  corps  was 
ordered  to  remain  on  the  defensive,  until  the  move- 
ments against  Tudela  and  Madrid  were  completed,  and 
the  despatches  directing  him  to  recommence  his  offen- 
sive operations,  were,  as  we  have  seen,  intercepted  on 
the  12th;  but  on  the  16th  he  became  acquainted  with 
the  advance  of  the  English  army.*  At  that  period 
general  Bonnet's  division  occupied  Barquera  de  San 
Vincente  and  Potes,  on  the  Deba,  watching  some 
thousand  Asturians  whom  Ballasteros  had  collected 
near  Llanes ;  Merle's  and  Mermet's  divisions  were  on 
the  Carrion,  Franceschi's  dragoons  at  Valladolid,  De- 
belle's  at  Sahagun.  The  whole  formed  a  total  of  six- 
teen or  seventeen  thousand  infantry,  and  twelve  hun- 
dred cavalry,  present  under  arms,  of  which  only  eleven 
thousand  infantry  and  twelve  hundred  cavalry  could, 
without  uncovering  the  important  post  of  St.  Andero, 
be  opposed  to  the  advance  of  the  British. j"  Soult, 
alarmed  at  this  disparity  of  force,  required  general 
Mathieu  Dumas,  commandant  at  Burgos,  to  direct  all 
the  divisions  and  detachments,  passing  through  that 
town,  whatever  might  be  their  original  destination, 
upon  the  Carrion,  and  this  decisive  conduct  was  ap- 
proved of  by  the  emperor.:}^ 

On  the  21st,  Bonnet's  division  was  still  on  the  Deba, 
out  Mermet's  was  in  the  town  of  Carrion,  Merle's  at 
Saldana;  Franceschi's  cavalry  had  retired  from  Val- 
ladolid to  Riberos  de  la  Cuesca,  Debelle's  continued 
at  Sahagun,  and  thirteen  hundred  dragoons,  under  gen- 
eral Lorge,  arrived  at  Palencia  from  Burgos.  Mean- 
time, the  fifteenth  and  tenth  British  hussars  having 
quitted  Melgar  Abaxo  during  the  night,  came  close  to 
Sahagun  before  daylight  on  the  21st.  The  tenth 
marched  straight  to  the  town,  while  the  fifteenth  turn- 
ed it  by  the  right,  and  endeavoured  to  cut  off  the  ene- 
my ;  a  patrole  gave  the  alarm,  and  when  four  hundred 
of  the  fifteenth  had  reached  the  rear  of  the  village, 
they  were  opposed  by  a  line  of  six  hundred  French 
dragoons.  The  tenth  were  not  in  sight,  but  lord  Pa- 
pet,  after  a  few  movements,  charged  with  t)  15th, 
broke  the  enemy's  line,  and  pursued  them  for  s.rtie  dis- 
tance. Some  twenty  killed,  two  lieutenant-colonels, 
and  eleven  other  officers,  with  a  hundred  and  fifty-four 
men  prisoners,  were  the  result  of  this  affair,  which  las- 
ted about  twenty  minutes.  Debelle  then  retired  to 
Santerbas ;  the  English  infantry  occupied  Sahagun, 
and  hcad-qviarters  were  established  there.  During 
tliese  events  Romana  remained  at  Mancilla,  and  it  was 
evident  that  no  assistance  could  be  expected  from  him. 
The  truth  was,  that,  ashamed  of  exposing  the  weak- 
ijess  and  misery  of  his  troops,  he  kept  away,  for,  after 
all  ills  promises,  he  could  not  produce  six  thousand 
fighting  men.  His  letters  however,  were,  as  usual, 
extremely  encouraging.  Tht  French  force  in  Spain 
was  excetciingly  weak,  Falafox  had  not  been  defeated  at 
Tudcia ,  Soult,  including  Boiuiei^s  division,  had  scarce- 
ly nine  thousand  men  (f  all  arms  ,•  it  was  an  object  to 
surround  and  destroy  him  before  he  could  be  succoured ; 
—and  other  follies  of  this  nature. 

The  English  troops  having  now  outmarched  their 


•   S.    Journal  cf  opcrr.tions. 

9 


MS. 


t  Ibid.        \  Ibid. 


supplies,  halted  the  22d  and  23d,  and  Soult,  whow 
intention  was  to  act  on  the  defensive,  hastened  the 
march  of  the  reinforcements  from  the  side  of  Burgoi, 
yet  being  fearful  for  his  communication  with  Piacen- 
tia,  he  abandoned  SaldaHa  on  the  23d,  and  concentra- 
ted his  infantry  at  Carrion.*  Debelle's  cavalry  again 
advanced  to  Villatilla  and  Villacuenda,  Franceschi  re- 
mained at  Riberos,  the  dragoons  of  general  Lorge  oc- 
cupied Paredes,  and  general  Dumas  pushed  on  the  di- 
visions of  the  eighth  corps,  of  which  Laborde's  was 
already  arrived  at  Palencia  :  Loison's  and  Heudelet's 
followed  at  the  distance  of  two  days'  march,  but  they 
were  weak.  Sir  John  Moore's  plan  was  to  move  du- 
ring the  night  of  the  23d,  so  as  to  arrive  at  Carrion  by 
daylight  on  the  24th,  to  force  the  bridge,  and  afterwarda 
ascending  the  river,  to  fall  upon  the  main  body  of  the 
enemy,  which  his  information  led  him  to  believe  was 
still  at  Saldafia.  This  attack  was,  however,  but  a  se- 
condary object,  his  attention  was  constantly  directed 
towards  Madrid.  To  beat  the  troops  in  his  front  would 
be  a  victory  of  little  value  beyond  the  honour,  because 
the  third  and  fourth  corps  were  so  near;  the  pith  of 
the  operation  was  to  tempt  the  emperor  from  Madrid, 
and  his  march  from  that  capital  was  to  be  the  signal 
for  a  retreat,  vv-hich  sooner  or  later  was  inevitable. 

To  draw  Napoleon  from  the  south  was  Moore's  de- 
sign, and  it  behoves  the  man  to  be  alert  who  interpose? 
between  the  lion  and  his  prey.  On  the  23d,  Romana 
first  gave  notice  that  the  French  were  in  motion  from 
the  side  of  Madrid  ;  and  in  the  night  of  the  23d,  when 
the  troops  were  actually  in  march  towards  Carrion ; 
this  intelligence  was  confirmed  by  the  general's  own 
spies,  all  their  reports  agreed  that  the  whole  French 
army  was  in  movement  to  crush  the  English  :  the 
fourth  corps  had  been  halted  at  Talavera,  the  fifth  at 
Vittoria,  the  eighth  was  closing  up  to  reinforce  the  se- 
cond, and  the  emperor  in  person  was  marching  towards 
the  Guadarama.  The  principal  objects  of  sir  John 
Moore's  advance  were  thus  attained  ;  the  siege  of  Za- 
ragoza  was  delayed,  the  southern  provinces  were  al- 
lowed to  breathe,  and  it  only  remained  for  him  to  prove, 
by  a  timely  retreat,  that  this  offensive  operation,  al- 
though hazardous,  was  not  the  result  of  improvident 
rashness,  nor  weakness  of  mind,  but  the  hardy  enter- 
prise of  a  great  commander  acting  under  peculiar  cir- 
cumstances. As  a  military  measure,  his  judgment 
condemned  it;  as  a  political  one,  he  thought  it  of 
doubtful  advantage,  because  Spain  was  really  passive; 
but  he  had  desired  to  give  the  Spaniards  an  opportuni- 
ty of  making  one  more  struggle  for  independence. 
That  was  done.  If  they  could  not,  or  would  not  pro- 
fit of  the  occasion,  if  their  hearts  were  faint  or  their 
hands  feeble,  the  shame  and  the  loss  were  their  own  f 
the  British  general  had  done  enough ;  enough  for  hon- 
our, enough  for  utility,  more  than  enough  for  prudence, 
the  madness  of  the  times  required  it.  His  army  was 
already  on  the  verge  of  destruction,  the  enemy's  force 
was  hourly  increasing  in  his  front,  the  first  symptoms 
of  a  retreat  would  bring  it  headlong  on,  and  in  the 
mean  time  the  emperor  threatened  the  line  of  commu- 
nication with  Gallicia,  and  by  the  rapidity  of  his  march 
left  no  time  for  consideration. 

After  the  first  burst,  by  which  he  swept  the  northern 
provinces,  and  planted  his  standards  on  the  banks  of 
the  Tagus,  that  monarch  had  put  all  the  resources  of 
his  subtle  genius  into  activity,  endeavouring  to  soften 
the  public  mind,  and  by  engrafting  benefits  on  the  ter- 
ror his  victories  had  created,  to  gain  over  the  people  ; 
but,  at  the  same  time,  he  was  gathering  in  his  extend- 
ed wings,  and  preparing  for  a  new  flight,  which  would 
have  carried  him  over  the  southern  kingdoms  of  Iho 
Peninsula,  and  given  him  the  rocks  of  Lisbon  as  a  rest- 
ing-place for  his  eagles.     Madrid  was  trajiquil,  and 


S.  Jourual  of  operations.     MS. 


114 


NAPIER'S  PENINSULAR  AVAR, 


[Book  IV. 


Toledo,  notwithstandingr  her  heroic  promises,  had  ne- 
ver shut  lier  n^ates  ;  one  division  of  the  first  corps  oc- 
cupied that  town,  anotiier  was  in  Ocafia,  and  tlie  liglit 
cavalry  sroured  the  whole  of  La  IMancha,  even  to  the 
borders  of  Andalusia  ;  tiie  fourth  corps,  and  Milhaud's 
and  Lasalle's  horsemen,  were  at  Talavera,  preparincr 
to  march  to  Badajos,  and  sixty  thousand  men,  with 
one  hundred  and  fifty  guns  and  fifteen  days'  provisions 
in  carls,  were  reviewed  at  the  oratps  of  Madrid  upon 
the  I'Jth;  three  days  afterwards  they  were  in  full 
marcli  to  intercept  the  line  of  sirJohn  Moore's  retreat. 

Napoleon  was  informed  of  that  p^eneral's  advance 
on  tiie  21st,  and  in  an  instant  the  Spaniards,  their  jun- 
tas, and  their  armies,  were  dismissed  from  his  thoughts  ; 
his  corps  were  arrested  in  their  different  movements, 
ten  thousand  men  were  left  to  control  the  capital,  and 
on  the  evening  of  the  22d,  fifty  thousand  men  were  at 
the  foot  of  the  Cuadarama.  A  deep  snow  choked  the 
passes  of  the  Sierra,  and,  after  twelve  hours  of  inef- 
fectual toil,  the  advanced  guards  were  still  on  the  wrong 
side;  the  general  commanding  reported  that  the  road 
was  impracticable,  but  Napoleon,  dismounting,  placed 
liimself  at  the  head  of  the  column,  and,  amidst  storms 
of  hail  and  drifting  snow,  led  his  soldiers  over  the 
mountain.  INIany  men  and  animals  died  during  the 
passage,  which  lasted  two  days,  but  the  emperor  per- 
sonally ur<jing  on  the  troops  with  unceasing  vehemence, 
reached  Villacastin,  fifty  miles  from  Madrid,  on  the 
24th,  and  the  2r)th  he  was  at  Tordesillas  with  the 
guards  and  the  divisions  of  Lapisse  and  Dessoles;  the 
dragoons  of  La  Houssaye  entered  Valiadolid  on  the 
same  da)',  and  marshal  Ney,  with  the  sixth  corps,  was 
at  Rio  Seco. 

From  Tordesillas  Napoleon  communicating  with 
Soult,  informed  him  of  these  movements,  concluding 
his  despatch  thus  :  '  Our  cavalry  scmils  are  already  at 
Beneven'e.  If  the  Ernrlish  pass  tn  clay  in  their  position, 
they  are  lost ;  if,  nn  the  contrary,  they  attack  you  tuith 
all  their  force,  retire  one  day\i  march  ;  the  farther  they 
proceed,  the  belter  fir  us.  If  they  retreat,  pursue  them 
closely.^*  Then,  full  of  hope,  he  hastened  himself  to 
Valderas.  but  had  the  mortification  to  learn  that,  not- 
withstanding his  rapid  march,  having  scarcely  rested 
night  or  day,  he  was  twelve  hours  too  late.  The  Bri- 
tish were  across  the  Esia  !  In  fact  Soult  was  in  full 
pursuit  when  this  letter  was  written,  for  sir  John  Moore, 
well  aware  of  his  own  situation,  had  given  orders  to 
retreat  the  moment  the  intelligence  of  Napoleon's 
march  from  ]\Iadrid  reached  him,  and  the  heavy  bag- 
gage was  immediately  moved  to  the  rear,  while  the  re- 
serve, the  light  brigades,  and  the  cavalry  remained  at 
Sahagun,  the  latter  pushing  patroles  up  to  the  enemy's 
lines,  and  skirmishing  to  hide  the  retrograde  march. 

The  24th,  general  Hope,  with  two  divisions,  had 
gone  back  i)y  the  road  of  !\Liyorga,  Baird,  with  another. 
by  that  of  Valencia  de  San  Juan,  where  there  was  a 
ferry-boat  to  cross  the  EsIa  river.  The  marquis  of 
Romana  understook  to  guard  the  bridge  of  Mansilla. 
The  enemy's  dragoons,  under  Lorge,  arrived  the  saine 
day  at  Frcchilla,  and  the  division  of  Laborde  entered 
Paredes.  The  25th  the  general-in-chief,  with  the  re- 
serve and  light  brigades,  followed  the  route  of  Hope's 
column  to  Valderas,  and  the  2Gth  Baird  passed  the 
Esla  at  Valencia,  and  tof)k  post  on  the  other  side,  but 
with  some  diHiculty,  for  the  boat  was  small,  the  fords 
deep,  and  the  river  rising.  The  troops,  under  the  com- 
mander-in-chief, approached  the  bridge  of  Castro  Gon- 
zalo  early  in  the  morning  of  the  2Gth,  but  the  stores 
were  a  long  time  passing,  a  dense  fog  intercepted  the 
view,  and  so  nicely  ti;ned  was  the  march,  that  the 
scouts  of  the  imperial  horsemen  were  already  infesting 
the  flank  of  the  column,  and  even  carried  off  some  of 
the  liaggage. 

As  the  left  bank  of  the  river  commanded  the  bridtre, 

*  S.  Jjurnal  of  operations.  MS. 


I  general  Robert  Crawfurd  remained  with  a  brigade  of 
infantry  and  two  cuns  to  protect  the  passage,  for  the 
cavalry  was  still  in  the  rear,  watching  S'oult,  who, 
aware  of  the  retreat,  was  pressing  forward  in  pursuit. 
Meanwhile  lord  Paget,  after  passing  Mayorga,  was  in- 
tercepted by  a  strong  body  of  horse,  which  belonged 
to  Ney's  corps  and  was  en;battled  on  a  swelling  ground 
close  to  the  road.  Though  the  soil  was  deep,  and  soak- 
ed with  snow  and  rain,  two  squadrons  of  the  tenth, 
riding  stiffly  up,  gained  the  summit,  and  notwithstand 
ing  the  enemy's  advantage  of  numbers  and  ])osition. 
killed  twenty  men  and  captured  one  h\mdred.  This 
was  a  bold  and  hardy  action;  but  the  English  cavalry 
had  been  engaged  more  cr  less  for  twelve  successive 
days,  with  such  fortune  and  bravery,  that  above  five 
hundred  prisoners  had  already  fdlen  into  their  hands, 
and  their  leaders  being  excellent,  their  confidence  was 
unbounded. 

From  Mayorga  lord  Paget  proceeded  to  Benevente; 
but  the  duke  of  Dalmatia,  with  great  judsTment,  now 
pushed  for  Astcrga  by  the  road  of  Mancilla,  where- 
upon Romana,  leaving  three  thousand  men  and  two 
guns  to  defend  the  bridtre  at  the  latter  place,  fell  back 
to  Leon.*  Thus,  by  a  critical  march,  Moore  recovered 
his  communications  with  Gallicia,  and  liad  so  far  baf- 
fled the  emperor,  but  his  position  was  by  no  means  safe, 
or  even  tenable. 

The  town  of  Benevente,  a  rich  open  place,  remark- 
able for  a  small,  but  curious  Moorisii  castle,  contirm- 
inor  a  fine  collection  of  ancient  armour,  is  situated  in  a 
plain  that,  extending  from  the  Gallician  mountains  to 
the  neighbourhood  of  Burgos,  appears  to  be  boundless. 
The  river  Esla  winded  through  it,  about  four  miles  in 
front  of  Benevente,  and  the  bridge  of  Castro  Gonzalo 
was  the  key  to  the  town ;  but  the  right  bardc  of  the 
Esla  was  completely  commanded  from  the  further  side, 
and  there  were  many  fords.  Eicchteen  miles  higher 
up,  at  Valencia  de  San  Juan,  a  shorter  road  from  Ma- 
yorga to  Astorga,  crossed  the  river  by  the  ferry-boat; 
and  at  Mancilla,  the  passage  being  only  defended  by 
Spaniards,  was,  in  a  manner,  open  to  Soult,  for  Ro- 
mana had  not  destroyed  the  arches  of  the  bridge. 
Beyond  Mancilla,  under  the  hills  skirting  this  great 
plain,  stood  the  town  of  Leon,  which  was  inclosed 
vvitii  walls  and  capable  of  resisting  a  sudden  assault. 

Moore  aware  of  his  incapacity  resolved  to  remain 
no  longer  than  was  necessary  to  clear  out  iiis  maga- 
zines at  Benevente,  and  to  cover  the  march  of  his 
stores.  But  the  road  to  Astorga  by  Leon  was  much 
shorter  than  that  through  Benevente,  and  as  Romana 
was  inclined  to  retreat  to  Gallicia  Sir  John  requested 
that  he  would  maintain  himself  at  Leon  as  long  as  he 
could,  and  repeated  his  desire  to  have  that  province 
left  open  for  the  English  army.  Romana,  who  assent- 
ed to  both  these  requests,  had  a  great  rabble  with  him, 
and  as  Leon  was  a  walled  place,  and  a  number  of  citi- 
zens and  volunteers  were  willing,  and  even  eager  to 
fight,  the  town  miaht  have  made  resistance.  Moore 
hoped  that  it  would  do  so,  and  gave  orders  to  break 
down  the  bridge  at  Castro  Gonzalo  in  his  own  front, 
the  moment  the  stragglers  and  baggage  should  have 
passed  ;  but  at  this  time  the  bad  example  of  murmur- 
ing given  by  men  of  high  rank  had  descended  lower, 
many  regimental  oflicers  neglected  their  duty,  and 
what  with  the  dislike  to  a  retreat,  the  severity  of  the 
weather,  and  the  inexperience  of  the  army,  the  previ- 
ous fine  discipline  of  the  troops  was  broken  down: 
such  disgraccf^Lil  excesses  had  been  committed  at  Val- 
deras, that  the  general  issued  severe  orders,  justly  re- 
proaching the  soldiers  for  their  evil  deeds,  and  appeal* 
ing  to  the  honour  of  the  army  to  amend  them. 

On  the  night  of  the  20th,  the  light  cavalry  of  the  im- 
perial guard,  riding  close  up  to  the  bridge  of  Castro 
Gonzalo,  captured  some  women  and  baggage,  and  en- 


*  S.  Jourual  of  0])erations.  MS. 


1P08.I 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


116 


leavoured  to  Rurprise  the  post,  which  gzve  rise  to  a 
reinarkuble  display  of  courage  and  discipline.  John 
Walton  and  Kichard  Jackson,  private  soldiers  cf  the 
forty- liiird,  being  posted  beyond  the  bridge,  were  di- 
rected, on  the  approach  of  an  enemy,  the  one  to  stand 
firm,  the  other  to  fire  and  run  back  to  the  brow  of  the 
hill,  to  give  notice  whether  there  were  many  or  few. 
Jackscn  fired,  but  was  overtaken,  and  received  twelve 
or  fourteen  sabre  cuts  in  an  instant;  nevertheless  he 
cane  staggering  en,  and  gave  the  signal,  while  W  alton, 
with  ecpral  resolution,  stood  his  ground,  and  wounded 
several  of  the  assailants,  who  then  retired,  leaving  him 
unhurt,  but  his  cap,  knapsack,  belts,  and  musket  were 
cut  in  above  twenty  places,  his  bayonet  was  bent 
double,  and  notched  like  a  saw.  The  27th,  the  cavalry 
and  the  stragglers  being  all  over  the  river,  general 
C'rawfurd  commenced  the  destruction  cf  the  bridge 
amidst  torrents  of  rain  and  snow,  and  while  half  the 
troops  worked  the  other  half  kept  the  enemy  at  bay 
from  the  heights  on  the  left  bank,  for  the  cavalry  scouts 
of  tlie  imperial  guard  were  spread  over  the  plain. 

At  ten  o'clock  at  niaht  a  large  party  of  French  fol- 
lowing some  waggons,  again  endeavoured  to  pass  the 
piquets  and  gallop  down  to  the  bridge  ;  that  failing, 
a  few  dismounted,  and  extending  to  the  right  and  left, 
commenced  a  skirmishing  fire,  while  others  remained 
ready  to  charge,  if  the  position  of  the  troops,  which 
they  expected  to  ascertain  by  this  scheme,  should  otfer 
an  opportunity.  The  event  did  not  answer  their  ex- 
pectations, and  this  anxiety  to  interrupt  the  work  in- 
duced general  Crawfurd  to  destroy  two  arches  of  the 
bridge,  and  to  blow  up  the  connecting  buttress  ;  yet  the 
masonry  was  so  solid  and  difficult  to  pierce,  that  it 
was  nrt  until  twelve  o'clock  in  the  night  of  the  28th 
that  a;l  the  prrparations  were  completed.  The  troops 
then  descended  the  heights  on  the  left  bank,  and  pass- 
ing with  the  greatest  silence,  by  single  files,  over 
planks  laid  across  the  brrken  arches,  gained  the  other 
side  without  loss  ;  an  instance  of  singular  good  for- 
tune, for  the  night  was  dark  and  tempestuous,  the  river 
rising  rapidly  with  a  roaring  noise,  was  threatening  to 
burst  over  the  planks,  and  the  enemy  was  close  at  hand. 
To  have  resisted  an  attack  in  such  an  awkward  situa- 
tion would  have  been  impossible,  but  happily  the  re- 
treat cf  the  trorps  was  undiscovered,  and  the  mine 
was  sprung  with  good  effr ct. 

(Crawfurd  n.arched  to  Benevente,  where  the  cavalry 
and  the  reserve  still  remained.  Here  several  thousand 
infantry  slept  in  the  upper  part  of  an  immense  convent 
built  round  a  square,  and  a  frightful  catastrophe  was 
impending;  for  the  lower  galleries  w^ere  so  thickly 
stowed  with  t!  e  horses  of  the  cavalry,  that  it  w"as 
scarcely  possible  to  pass  them,  there  was  but  one  en- 
trance, and  two  officers  of  the  forty-third,  returning 
from  the  bridge,  on  entering  the  convent,  perceived  that 
a  large  window-shutter  was  on  fire,  that  in  a  few  mo- 
ments the  straw  under  the  horses  would  ignite,  and 
six  thousand  men  and  animals  must  inevitably  perish 
in  the  flames.  One  of  ihese  officers,  captain  Lloyd,  a 
man  of  great  strenofth,  activity,  and  of  a  presence  of 
mind  which  never  failed,  made  a  sign  of  silence  to  his 
companion,  and  then  springing  on  to  the  nearest  horse, 
run  along  the  backs  of  the  others,  until  he  reached  the 
blazing  shutter,  which  he  tore  off  its  hinges  and  cast 
out  of  the  window,  and  then  awakening  a  few  men, 
cleared  the  passage  without  any  alarm,  which  in  such 
a  case  would  have  been  as  destructive  as  the  fire. 

Two  days'  rest  had  been  gained  at  Benevente,  but 
as  very  little  could  be  done  to  remove  the  stores,  the 
greatest  part  were  destroyed.  The  army  was  and  had 
been  from  the  first  without  sufficient  means  of  trans- 
port, the  general  had  no  money  to  procure  it,  and  the 
ill-will  of  the  Spaniards,  and  the  shuffling  conduct  of 
the  juntas  added  infinitely  to  their  difficulties.  But 
time  pressed.  Hope  and  Fraser  marched  by  La  Baneza, 
and  reached  Astorga  the  29lh,  where  Baird  joined  them 


fiom  A^alencia  de  San  Juan  ;  on  the  same  day  the  rt 
serve  and  ("rawfurd's  brigade  quitted  Fenevente.  Tht 
cavalry  remained  in  the  town,  having  prrtif  s  to  watch 
the  fords  of  the  Esla.  In  this  state  of  affairs  general 
Leftbre  Df  sneueltes,  seeing  only  a  few  cavalry  pests 
on  the  great  plain,  rather  hastily  concluded  that  there 
was  nothirg  to  support  them,  and  crossing  the  river  at 
daybreak,  by  a  ford  a  little  way  above  the  bridge,  with 
six  hundred  horsemen  cf  the  imperial  guard,  advanced 
into  the  plain.  'J'he  piquets  under  mrjor  Loftus  Ot- 
way  retired  fighting,  and  being  joined  bj  a  part  of  the 
third  German  hussars,  even  charged  the  leading  Frer.ch 
squadrons  with  some  effect.  General  C.  Stewart  then 
took  the  command,  and  the  ground  was  obstinately 
disputed,  but  the  enemy  advanced.  At  this  moment 
the  plain  was  covered  with  stragglers,  baggage-mules, 
and  followers  of  the  army,  the  town  wr.s  filled  with 
tumult,  the  distant  piquets  and  videttes  were  seen  gal- 
loping in  from  the  right  and  left,  the  French  were 
pressing  forward  boldly,  and  every  appearance  indi- 
cated that  the  enemy's  whole  anriy  was  coming  up 
and  passing  the  river. 

Lord  Paget  ordered  the  tenth  hussars  to  mount  and 
form  under  the  cover  of  some  houses  at  the  edge  of  the 
town,  for  he  desired  to  draw  the  enemy,  whose  real  si- 
tuation he  had  detected  at  once,  well  into  the  plain  be- 
fore he  attacked;  in  half  an  hour,  every  thir.g  was 
ready,  and  he  gave  the  signal.  Then  the  tenth  hussars 
galloped  forward,  the  piquets  that  were  already  engag- 
ed closed  together,  and  the  whole  charged.  The  scene 
changed  instantly  ;  the  enemy  were  seen  flying  at  full 
speed  towards  the  river,  the  British  following-  close  at 
their  heels,  until  the  French  squadrons,  without  break- 
ing their  ranks,  plunged  into  the  stream,  and  gained 
the  opposite  heights,  where,  like  experienced  soldiers, 
they  wheeled  instantly,  and  seemed  inclined  to  come 
forward  a  second  tiinc,  hut  a  battery  cf  two  guns  open- 
ed upon  them,  and  after  a  few  rounds  they  retired. 
During  the  pursuit  in  the  plain,  an  officer  was  observed 
separating  himself  from  the  main  body,  and  making 
towards  another  part  of  the  river,  beinj  followed,  and 
refusing  to  stop,  he  was  wounded  and  brought  in  a 
prisoner.     It  was  general  Lefebre  Desnouettes. 

Although  the  imperial  guards  were  outnumbered  in 
the  end,  they  were  very  superior  at  the  commencement 
of  this  action,  which  was  stiffly  fought  on  both  sides, 
for  the  British  lost  fifty  men,  and  the  French  left  fifty- 
five  killed  and  wounded  on  the  field,  besides  the  ge- 
neral and  other  officers  ;  according  to  Baron  Larrey, 
seventy  of  those  w^ho  recrossed  the  river  were  also 
W'ounded,  making  a  total  loss  of  above  two  hundred 
excellent  soldiers.*  Lord  Paget  maintained  his  posts 
on  the  Esla,  under  an  occasional  cannonade,  until  the 
evening,  and  then  withdrew  to  La  Baneza;  and  while 
these  things  were  passing.  Napoleon  arrived  at  VaU 
deras,  Ney  at  Villaton,  and  Lapi^se  at  Toro.  The 
French  troops  were  w'orn  down  with  fatiofue,  yet  the 
emperor  still  urged  them  on.  The  duke  of  Dalmatia, 
he  said,  would  intercept  the  English  at  Astorga,  and 
their  labours  would  he  finally  rewarded.  Nevertheless, 
the  destruction  of  the  bridge  of  Castro  Gonzalo  was  so 
well  accomplished,  that  twenty-four  hours  were  re- 
quired to  repair  it,  the  fords  were  now  impassable,  and 
it  was  the  30th  before  Bessieres  could  cross  the  Esla, 
but  on  that  day  he  passed  through  Benevente  with  nine 
thousand  cavalry,  and  bent  his  course  towards  La  Ba- 
neza;! '•^P  same  day  Franceschi  carried  the  bridge  of 
Mansillade  las  Mulas  by  a  single  charge  of  his  lighl 
horsemen,  and  captured  the  artillery  and  one  half  of 
the  Spanish  division  left  to  protect  it.  Romana  im- 
mediately abandoned  Leon  and  many  stores,  and  the 
31st  the  duke  of  Dalmatia  entered  that  town  without 
firing  a  shot,  while  the  duke  of  Istria,  with  his  caval- 
ry, took  possession  of  La  Baneza ;  the  advanced  nosts 


*  Larrcy's  Surgical  Campaign. 


t  BuU<  '«. 


IIG 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  IV. 


were  then  pushed  forward  to  the  Puente  d'Orvi^o  on 
one  side,  and  the  Puente  de  Valembre  on  the  other.* 
The  rear  of  the  English  army  was  still  in  Astoria, 
the  head-quarters  having  arrived  there  only  the  day 
before. 

In  the  preceding  month  large  stores  had  been  gra- 
dually brought  up  to  this  town  by  sir  David  Baird, 
■?nd  as  there  were  no  means  of  transport  to  remove 
them,  orders  were  given,  after  supplyinij  the  immediate 
wants  of  the  army,  to  destroy  them  ;  but  Romana,  who 
would  neither  defend  Leon  nor  Mansilla,  had,  contrary 
to  his  promises,  pre-oecupied  Astorga  with  his  fugitive 
army,  and  when  the  English  divisions  marched  in,  such 
1  tumult  and  confusion  arose,  that  no  orders  could  be 
executed  with  regularity,  no  distribution  made,  nor  the 
destruction  of  the  stores  bs  effected.  The  disorder 
thus  unexpectedly  produced  was  very  detrimental  to 
tbe  discipline  of  the  troops,  which  the  unwearied  ef- 
forts of  the  general  had  partly  restored ;  the  resources 
which  he  had  depended  on  for  the  support  of  his  sol- 
diers became  mischievous,  and  contributed  to  disorga- 
nise instead  of  nourishing  them.  And  he  had  the  fur- 
ther vexation  to  hear  Romana,  the  principal  cause  of 
this  misfortune,  proposing,  with  troops  unable  to  resist 
a  thousand  light  infantry,  to  recommence  offensive 
operations  on  a  plan,  in  comparison  with  which  the 
visions  of  Don  Quixote  were  wisdom. 

On  the  31st.  the  flank  brigades  separated  from  the 
army  at  Bnnillas,  and  bent  their  course  by  cross  roads 
towards  Orense  and  Vigo,  being  detached  to  lessen  the 
pressure  on  the  commissariat,  and  to  cover  the  flanks 
of  the  army ;  Eraser's  and  Hope's  divisions  entered 
Villa  Franca,  and  Baird's  division  was  at  Bembibre ; 
the  reserve,  with  the  head-quarters,  halted  at  Cambar- 
ros,  a  village  six  miles  from  Astorga,  until  the  cavalry 
fell  back  in  the  night  to  the  same  place,  and  then  the 
reserve  marched  to  Bembibre.  The  marquis  of  Ro- 
mana. after  doingr  so  much  mischief  by  crossing  the 
line  of  march,  left  his  infantry  to  wander  as  they  pleas- 
ed, and  retired  with  his  cavalry  and  some  guns  to  the 
•valley  of  the  Miiiho,  and  the  rest  of  his  artillery  mixed 
with  the  British  army,  but  most  of  it  was  captured  be- 
fore reaching  Lugo. 

Upon  the  1st  of  .January  the  emperor  took  posses- 
sion of  Astorga,  where  seventy  thousand  French  in- 
fi^.ntry,  ten  thousand  cavalry,  and  two  hundred  pieces 
of  artillery,  after  many  days  of  incessant  marching, 
were  now  united.  The  congregation  of  this  mighty 
force,  while  it  evinced  the  power  and  energy  of  the 
French  monarch,  attested  also  the  genius  of  the  Eng- 
lish general,  who,  with  a  handful  of  men,  had  found 
the  means  to  arrest  the  course  of  the  conqueror,  and  to 
draw  him,  with  the  flower  of  his  army,  to  this  remote 
and  unimportant  part  of  the  Peninsula,  at  the  moment 
when  Portugal,  and  the  fairest  provinces  of  Spain, 
were  prostrate  beneath  the  strength  of  his  hand.  That 
Spain,  being  in  her  extremity,  sir  John  Moore  succour- 
ed her,  and  in  the  hour  of  weakness  intercepted  the 
blow,  which  was  descending  to  crush  her,  no  man  of 
candour  and  honesty  can  den)^.  For  what  troops,  what 
preparations,  what  courage,  what  capacity  was  there 
in  the  south  to  have  resisted,  even  for  an  instant,  the 
progress  of  a  man,  who,  in  ten  days,  and  in  the  depth 
of  winter,  crossing  the  snowy  ridge  of  the  Carpen- 
tinos,  had  traversed  two  hundred  miles  of  hostile  coun- 
try, and  transported  fifty  thousand  men  from  Madrid  to 
Astorga  in  a  shorter  time  than  a  Spanish  courier  would 
have  taken  to  travel  the  same  distance  ? 

This  stupendous  march  was  rendered  fruitless  by 
the  quickness  of  his  adversary  ;  but  Napoleon,  though 
he  had  failed  to  destroy  the  English  army,  resolved, 
nevertheless,  to  cast  it  forth  of  the  Peninsula,  and 
being  himself  recalled  to  France  by  tidings  that  the 
Austrian  storm  was  ready  to  burst,  had  fixed  upon  the 

*  S.  Journal  of  operations.  MS. 


duke  of  Dalmatia  to  continue  the  pursuit.  For  this 
purpose  three  divisions  of  cavalry,  and  three  of  infan- 
try were  added  to  his  former  command  ;  but  of  these 
last,  the  two  commanded  by  generals  Loison  and  Heu- 
delet  were  several  marches  in  the  rear,  and  general 
Bonnet's  remained  always  in  the  MontaTa  de  St.  An- 
der.  Hence  the  whole  number  bearing  arms  which 
the  duke  led  immediately  to  the  pursuit,  was  about 
twenty-five  thousand  men,  of  which  four  thousand  two 
hundred  were  cavalry,  composing  the  divisions  of  Lor- 
ges.  La  Houssaye,  and  Franceichi.*  Fifty-four  guns 
were  with  the  columns,  Loison's  and  Ileudelet's  divi- 
sions followed  by  forced  marches,  and  Soult  was  sup- 
ported by  Ney  with  the  sixth  corps,  wanting  its  third 
division,  but  mustering  above  sixteen  thousand  men 
under  arms,  the  flower  of  the  French  army,  together 
with  thirty-seven  pieces  of  artillery.  Thus  including 
Laborde,  Heudelet,  and  Loison's  division,  nearly  sixty 
thousand  men  and  ninety-one  guns  were  put  on  the 
track  of  the  English  army.  INleanwhile  the  emperor 
returned  to  Valladolid,  where  he  received  the  addresses 
of  the  notables  and  deputies  from  Madrid  and  other 
great  towns,  and  strove,  by  promises  and  other  means, 
to  win  the  good  opinion  of  the  public.  Appointing 
.Joseph  to  be  his  lieutenant-general,  he  allotted  separate 
provinces  for  each  'corps  d'armre,'  and  directing  the 
imperial  guard  to  return  to  France,  after  three  days' 
delay  he  departed  himself  with  scarcely  any  escort, 
but  with  an  astonishing  speed  that  frustrated  the  de- 
signs which  the  Spaniards  had  as  some  say  formed 
against  his  person. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Sir  John  Moore  retreats  towards  Vigo;  is  rloselv  pursued— 

Miserable  scene  at   Bembibre — Excesses  at  Villa   Fr  hum 

Combat  at  Calcabtllos — Death  of  n:eneral  Colbert — ^Ia  ch 
to  Novates — Line  of  retreat  rhaiiged  from  Vigo  to  Conina 
— Skil  ul  passage  of  the  bridge  of  Constantino;  siiirmish 
there — The  army  halts  at  Lujo — Sir  John  Moore  otiers  bat- 
tle; it  is  not  accepted;  he  makes  a  forced  march  to  Betan- 
zos;  loses  many  stragglers:  rallies  the  army;  reaches  Co- 
runa — The  army  takes  a  position — Two  IrtrgA  stores  of  pow- 
der exploded — Fleet  arrives  in  the  harbour;  army  commen- 
ces embarking — Battle  of  Coruna — Death  of  sir  John  Rloore 
— His  character. 

The  duke  of  Dalmatia,  a  general,  who,  if  the  emperor 
be  excepted,  was  no  wise  inferior  to  an}'  of  his  nation, 
commenced  his  pursuit  of  the  English  army  with  a 
vigor  that  marked  his  eager  desire  to  finish  the  cam- 
paign in  a  manner  suitable  to  the  brilliant  opening  at 
Gamonal.  The  main  bodj'  of  his  troops  followed  the 
route  of  Foncevadon  and  Ponteferrada ;  a  second  col- 
umn took  the  road  of  Cambarros  and  Bembibre  ;  Fran- 
ceschi  entered  the  valley  of  the  Syl,  and  moving  up 
that  river,  turned  the  position  of  Villa  Franca  del 
Bierzo.f 

Thus  sir  John  Moore,  after  having  twice  baflled  the 
emperor's  combinations,  was  still  pressed  in  his  retreat 
with  a  fury  that  seemed  to  increase  every  moment. 
The  separation  of  his  light  brigades,  a  measure  which 
he  reluctantly  adopted  by  the  advice  of  his  quarter- 
master-general, had  weakened  the  army  by  three  thou- 
sand men,  yet  he  still  possessed  nineteen  thousand  of 
all  arms,  good  soldiers  to  fight,  and  strong  to  march, 
although  shaken  in  discipline  by  the  disorders  at  Val- 
deras,  and  Astorga;  for  the  general's  exertions  to  re- 
store order  and  regularity  were  by  many  officers  slight- 
ly seconded,  and  by  some  with  scandalous  levity 
disregarded.  There  was  no  choice  but  to  retreat.  The 
astonishing  rapidity  with  which  the  emperor  had 
brought  up  his  overbearing  numbers,  and  thrust  the 
English  army  into  Gallicia,  had  rendered  the  natural 
strength   of  that   country   unavailing;    tlie    resources 


*  S.  Jonrnal  of  operatioiiii.  MS.  f  Ibid. 


1808.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


117 


were  ifyv,  even  for  an  army  in  winter  quarters,  and  for 
a  campaign  in  that  season,  there  were  none  at  all.  All 
the  draught  cattle  that  could  be  procured  would  scarce- 
ly have  supplied  the  meaus  to  transport  ammunition 
for  two  battles,  whereas  the  French,  sweeping  the  rich 
plains  of  Castille  with  th'^ir  powerful  cavalry,  might 
have  formed  magazines  at  Astorga  and  Leon,  and  from 
thence  have  been  supplied  in  abundance,  while  the 
English  were  starving. 

Before  he  advanced  from  Salamanca,  Moore,  foresee- 
ing that  his  movement  nmst  sooner  or  later  end  in  a 
retreat,  had  sent  officers  to  examine  the  roads  of  Gal- 
licia  and  the  harbours  which  offered  the  greatest  ad- 
vantages for  embarkation ;  by  the  reports  of  those 
officers,  which  arrived  from  day  to  day,  and  by  the 
state  of  the  magazines  which  he  had  directed  to  be 
formed,  his  measures  were  constantly  regulated.*  The 
magazines  of  Astorga,  Renevente,  and  Labaneza,  were, 
by  untoward  circumstances,  and  the  deficiency  of  trans- 
port, rendered,  as  we  have  seen,  of  no  avail  beyond  the 
momentary  supply  they  afforded,  and  part  of  their  con- 
tents falling  into  the  enemy's  hands,  gave  him  some 
cause  of  triumph  ;  but  those  at  Villa  Franca  and  Lu- 
go contained  about  fourteen  days'  consumption,  and 
there  were  other  small  magazines  formed  on  the  line 
of  Orense  and  Vigo. 

More  than  this  could  not  have  been  accomplished. 
It  was  now  only  the  fifteenth  day  since  sir  John  Moore 
had  left  Salamanca,  and  already  the  torrent  of  war,  di- 
verted from  the  south,  was  foaming  among  the  rocks 
of  Gallicia.  Nineteen  thousand  British  troops,  posted 
in  strong  ground,  might  have  offered  battle  to  very  su- 
perior numbers,  but  where  was  the  use  of  merely  fight- 
ing an  enemy  who  had  three  hundred  thousand  men  in 
Spain  1  Nothing  could  be  gained  by  such  a  display 
of  courage,  and  the  English  general,  by  a  quick  re- 
treat, might  reach  his  ships  unmolested,  embark,  and 
carrying  his  army  from  the  narrow  corner  in  which  it 
was  cooped  to  the  southern  provinces,  establish  there 
a  good  base  of  operations,  and  renew  the  war  under 
favorable  circumstances.  It  was  by  this  combination 
of  a  fleet  and  army,  that  the  greatest  assistance  could 
be  given  to  Spain,  and  the  strength  of  England  become 
most  formidable.  A  few  days'  sailing  would  carry  the 
troops  to  Cadiz,  but  six  weeks'  constant  marching 
would  not  bring  the  French  army  from  Gallicia  to  that 
neighbourhood.  The  northern  provinces  were  broken, 
subdued  in  spirit,  and  possessed  few  resources ;  the 
southern  provinces  had  scarcely  seen  an  enemy,  were 
rich  and  fertile,  and  there  also  was  the  seat  of  govern- 
ment. Sir  John  Moore  reasoning  thus,  resolved  to  fall 
down  to  the  coast  and  embark,  with  as  little  loss  or 
delay  as  might  be  ;  but  Vigo,  (yorufia,  and  Ferrol  were 
the  principal  harbours,  and  their  relative  advantages 
could  not  be  determined  except  by  the  reports  of  the 
engineers,  none  of  which,  so  rapidly  had  the  crisis  of 
alfairs  come  on,  were  yet  received  ;  and  as  those  re- 
ports could  only  be  obtained  from  day  to  day,  the  line 
of  retreat  became  of  necessity  subject  to  daily  change. 

When  the  duke  of  Dalmatia  took  the  command  of 
the  pursuing  army,  Hope's  and  Frazer's  divisions 
were,  as  I  have  said,  at  Villa  Franca,  Baird's  at  Bem- 
bibre,  the  reserve  and  cavalry  at  Cambarros,  six  miles 
from  Astorga.  Behind  Cambarros,  the  mountains  of 
Gallicia  rose  abruptly,  but  there  was  no  position,  be- 
cause, after  the  first  rise  at  the  village  of  Rodrigatos, 
the  ground  continually  descended  to  Calcabellos,  a 
small  town,  only  four  miles  from  Villa  Franca,  and  the 
old  road  of  Foncevadon  and  Ponteferrada,  which  turned 
the  whole  line,  was  choked  with  the  advancing  col- 
umns of  the  enemy. f  The  reserve  and  the  cavalry 
therefore  marched  during  the  night  to  Bembibre,  and 
on  their  arri"al  Baird's  division  proceeded  to  Calca- 


*   Sir  John  M(^ore's  P,ipers.    MSS. 

f  See  coluat-l  Carniichael  Sniitii's  report. 


bellos ;  but  in  the  immense  wine  vaults  of  Bembibre 
many  hundred  of  his  men  remained  behind  inebriated, 
the  followers  of  the  army  crowded  the  houses,  and  a 
number  of  Romana's  disbanded  men  were  mixed  with 
this  heterogeneous  mass  of  marauders,  drunkards,  mu- 
leteers, women,  and  children  ;  the  weather  was  dread- 
ful, and,  notwithstanding  the  utmost  exertions  of  the 
general-in-chief,  when  the  reserve  marched  the  next 
morning,  the  number  of  those  unfortunate  wretches  was 
not  diminished.  Leaving  a  small  guard  to  protec* 
them,  sir  John  Moore  proceeded  to  Calcabellos,  yel 
scarcely  had  the  reserve  marched  out  of  the  village, 
when  some  French  cavalry  appeared,  and  in  a  moment 
the  road  was  filled  with  the  miserable  stragglers,  who 
came  crowding  after  the  troops,  some  with  shrieks  of 
distress  and  wild  gestures,  others  with  brutal  exclama- 
tions, while  many,  overcome  with  fear,  threw  away 
their  arms,  while  those  who  preserved  them  were  too 
stupidly  intoxicated  to  fire,  and  kept  reeling  to  and  fro, 
alike  insensible  to  their  danger  and  to  their  disgrace. 
The  enemy's  horsemen  perceiving  this,  bore  at  a  gal- 
lop through  the  disorderly  mob,  cutting  to  the  right 
and  left  as  they  passed,  and  riding  so  close  to  the  col- 
umns, that  the  infintry  were  forced  to  halt  in  order  to 
check  their  audacity. 

At  Calcabellos  the  reserve  took  up  a  position.  Baird 
then  marched  to  Herrerias,  and  the  general-in-chief 
went  on  to  Villa  Franca.  But  in  that  town  great  ex- 
cesses had  been  committed  by  the  preceding  divisions  ; 
the  magazines  were  plundered,  the  bakers  driven  away 
from  the  ovens,  the  wine  stores  forced,  and  the  com- 
missaries prevented  from  making  the  regular  distribu- 
tions ;  the  doors  of  the  houses  were  broken,  and  the 
scandalous  insubordination  of  the  soldiers  proved  that 
a  discreditable  relaxation  of  discipline  on  the  part  of 
the  officers  had  taken  place.  Moore  arrested  this  dis- 
order, and  caused  one  man  taken  in  the  act  of  plunder- 
ing a  magazine  to  be  hanged  in  the  market-place  ;  then 
issuing  severe  orders  to  prevent  a  recurrence  of  such 
inexcusable  conduct,  he  returned  to  Calcabellos,  which 
the  enemy  were  now  approaching. 

The  Guia,  a  small,  but  at  this  season  of  the  year  a 
deep  stream,  run  through  that  town,  and  was  crossed 
by  a  stone  bridge.  On  the  Villa  Franca  side  a  lofty 
ridge,  rough  with  vineyards  and  stone  walls,  was  oc- 
cupied by  two  thousand  five  hundred  infantry,  with  a 
battery  of  six  guns;  fnir  hundred  riflemen,  and  about 
the  same  number  of  cavalry,  were  posted  on  a  hill  two 
miles  beyond  the  river,  to  watch  the  two  roads  of  Hem* 
bibre  and  Foncevadon.  In  this  situatif)n,  on  the  3d  of 
January,  a  little  after  noon,  the  French  general  Colbert 
approached  with  six  or  eight  squadrons,  hut  observing' 
the  ground  behind  Calcabellos  so  strongly  occupied, 
demanded  reinforcements.  Soult,  believing  that  the 
English  did  not  mean  to  make  a  stand,  re])lied  by  or- 
dering Colbert  to  charge  without  delay,  and  the  latter, 
stung  by  the  message,  obeyed  with  precipitate  ftiry. 
From  one  of  those  errors  so  frequent  in  war,  the  Brit- 
ish cavalry,  thinking  a  greater  force  was  riding  against 
them,  retired  at  speed  to  Calcabellos,  and  the  riflemen, 
who,  following  their  orders,  had  withdrawn  when  the 
French  first  came  in  sight,  were  just  passing  tha 
bridge,  when  a  crowd  of  staff-officers,  the  cavalry,  and 
the  enemy,  came  in  upon  them  in  one  mass  ;  in  the 
confusion  thirty  or  forty  men  were  taken,  and  ('olbert, 
then  crossing  the  river,  charged  on  the  spur  up  th« 
road.  The  remainder  of  the  riflemen  had  howevei 
thrown  themselves  into  the  vineyards,  and  when  the 
enemy  approached  within  a  few  yards,  opened  such  a 
deadly  fire,  that  the  greatest  number  of  tlie  French 
horsemen  were  killed  on  the  spot,  and  among  the  rest 
Colbert  himself;  his  fine  martial  figure,  his  voice,  his 
gestures,  and,  above  all,  his  great  valour,  had  excited 
the  admiration  of  the  British,  and  a  general  feeling  of 
sorrow  was  predoniiuant  when  the  gallnnt  soldier  fell. 
Some  French  voltigeurs  now  crossed  the  river,  and  a  fe^ 


118 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  IV. 


of  the  52d  rcgfiment  descended  from  the  upper  part  of 
the  rido^e  to  the  assistance  of  the  riflemen,  when  a  sharp 
skirmish  commenced,  in  which  two  or  three  hundred 
men  of  both  sides  were  killed  or  wounded.  Towards 
evening,  Merle's  division  of  infantry  appeared  on  the 
hills  in  front  of  the  town,  and  made  a  demonstration 
of  crossing  opposite  'o  the  left  of  the  English  posi- 
tion, but  the  battery  of  the  latter  cheeked  liiis  move- 
ment, and  night  coming  on  the  combat  ceased. 

As  the  road  from  Villa  Franca  to  Lugo  led  through 
a  rugged  country,  the  cavalry  were  now  sent  on  to  the 
latter  town  at  once,  and  during  the  night  the  French 
patroles  breaking  in  upon  the  rifle  piquets,  wounded 
eome  men,  but  were  beaten  back  without  being  able  to 
discover  that  the  English  troops  had  abandoned  the 
position.  'Ibis  however  was  the  case,  and  the  reserve 
reached  Ilerrerias,  a  distance  of  eighteen  miles,  on  the 
morning  of  the  4th,  Baird's  division  being  then  at  No- 
gales,  Hope's  and  Eraser's  near  Lugo. 

At  Herrerias,  the  English  general,  who  constantly 
directed  the  movements  of  the  rearguard  himself,  re- 
ceived the  first  reports  of  the  engineers  relative  to  the 
harbours.  It  appeared  that  Vigo,  besides  its  greater 
distance,  ofTered  no  position  to  cover  the  embarkation, 
but  Corufia  and  Betanzos  did.  llie  march  to  Vigo 
was  of  necessity  abandoned,  the  ships  were  directed 
round  to  Corufia,  and  Moore,  who  now  deeply  regret- 
ted the  separation  of  his  light  brigades,  sent  forward 
instructions  for  the  leading  division  to  halt  at  Lugo, 
where  he  designed  to  rally  the  army,  and  give  battle 
if  the  enemy  would  accept  it.  These  important  orders 
were  carried  to  sir  David  Baird  by  one  of  the  aides  de 
camp  of  the  commander-in-chief,  but  sir  David  for- 
warded them  by  a  private  dragoon,  who  got  drunk  and 
lost  the  despatch.  This  blameable  irregularity  was 
ruinous  to  general  Frazer's  troops ;  in  lieu  of  resting 
two  days  at  Lugo,  that  general,  unwitting  of  the  order, 
pursued  his  toilsome  journey  towards  St.  Jago  de 
Compostella,  and  then  returning  without  food  or  rest, 
lost  more  than  four  hundred  stragglers. 

On  the  5lh,  the  reserve  having,  by  a  forced  march 
of  thirty-six  miles,  gained  twelve  hours'  start  of  the 
enemy,  reached  Nogales,  at  which  place  they  met  a 
large  convoy  of  English  clothing,  shoes,  and  ammuni- 
tion, intended  for  Romana's  army,  yet  moving  towards 
the  enemy, — a  circumstance  characteristic  of  the  Span- 
ish mode  of  conducting  public  atfairs.  There  was  a 
bridge  at  Nogales  which  the  engineers  failed  to  destroy, 
but  this  was  a  uiatter  of  little  consequence  ;  the  river 
was  fordable  above  and  below,  and  the  general  was 
wnwilling,  unless  for  some  palpable  advantage,  which 
seldom  p.resented  itself,  to  injure  the  communications 
of  a  country  that  he  was  unable  to  serve  :  moreover, 
the  bridges  were  commonly  very  solidly  constructed, 
and  the  arches  having  little  span,  could  be  rendered 
passable  again  in  a  shorter  time  than  they  could  be  de- 
stroyer!. At  this  period  of  the  retreat  also  the  road 
was  covered  with  baggage,  sick  men,  women,  and  plun- 
derers, all  of  whom  would  have  been  thus  sacrificed  ; 
for  the  peasantry,  altluiugh  armed,  did  not  molest  the 
enemy,  but  fearing  both  sides  alike,  carried  their  effects 
inti/  the  mountains  :  even  there  the  villanous  marau- 
ders followed  them,  and  in  some  cases  were  by  the 
Spaniards  killed, — a  just  punishment  for  quitting  their 
colours.  Under  the  most  favourable  circumstances, 
the  tail  of  a  retreating  force  exhibits  terrible  scenes  of 
distress,  and  on  the  road  near  Nogales  the  followers  of 
the  army  were  dying  fast  from  cold  and  hunger,  The 
soldiers,  barefooted,  harassed,  and  weakened  by  their 
excesses  at  Bembibre  and  Villa  Franca,  were  dro|)ping 
to  the  rear  by  hundreds,  while  broken  carts,  dead  ani- 
rnals,  and  the  piteous  appearance  of  women  with  chil- 
dren, struggling  or  falling  exhausted  in  the  snow, 
completed  a  picture  of  war,  which,  like  Janus,  has  a 
double  fice. 

rraiiccschi,  who,  after  turning  Villa  Franca,  had 


secured  the  valley  of  the  Syl  and  captured  many 
Spanish  prisoners  and  baggage,  now  regained  the  line 
of  march  at  Becerea,  and  towards  evening  the  French 
array,  recovering  their  lost  ground,  passed  Nogales, 
galling  the  rear-guard  with  a  continual  skirmish,  and 
here  it  was  that  dollars  to  the  amount  of  twenty-five 
thousand  pounds  were  abandoned.*  'i'his  small  sum 
wfis  kept  near  head-quarters  to  answer  sudden  emer- 
gencies, and  the  bullocks  that  drew  it  being  tired,  the 
general,  who  could  not  save  tlie  money  without  risking 
an  ill-timed  action,  had  it  rolled  down  the  side  of  the 
mountain,  whence  part  of  it  was  gathered  by  the  ene- 
my, part  by  the  Gallician  peasants.  The  returns  laid 
before  parliament  in  1809  made  the  sum  00,000/.,  and 
the  whole  loss  during  the  campaign  nearly  77,000/., 
but  it  is  easier  to  make  an  entry  of  one  sum  for  a 
treasury  return,  than  to  state  the  details  accurately ; 
the  money-agents  were,  like  the  military-agents,  acting 
independently,  and  all  losses  went  down  under  the 
head  of  abandoned  treasure.  Officers  actually  present, 
agree,  that  the  only  treasure  abandoned  by  the  army 
was  that  at  Nogales,  and  that  the  sum  was  25,000/. 
M  hen  it  was  ordered  to  be  rolled  over  the  brink  of  the 
hill,  two  guns,  and  a  battalion  of  infantry,  were  en 
gaged  with  the  enemy  to  protect  it,  and  some  person 
in  whose  charge  the  treasure  was,  exclaiming,  '  It  is 
money'.''  the  general  replied,  'so  are  shot  and  shells.'. 
Accidents  will  happen  in  wars.  An  oflicer  of  the  guards 
had  charge  of  the  cars  that  drew  this  treasure,  and  in 
passing  a  village,  another  officer  observing  that  the 
bullocks  were  exhausted,  took  the  pains  to  point  out 
where  fresh  and  strong  animals  were  to  be  found,  but 
the  escorting  officer,  either  ignorant  of,  or  indiffisrent 
to  his  duty,  took  no  notice  of  this  recommendation, 
and  continued  his  march  with  the  exhausted  cattle. 

Towards  evening  the  reserve  approached  Constan- 
tino, the  l>ench  were  close  upon  the  rear,  and  a  hill 
within  pistol-shot  of  the  bridge  offered  them  such  an 
advantage,  that  there  was  little  hope  to  effect  the  pas- 
sage without  great  loss.  Moore  however  posted  the 
riflemen  and  the  artillery  on  the  hill,  so  as  to  mask  the 
hasty  passage  of  the  reserve,  and  the  enemy,  ignorant 
of  the  vicinity  of  a  river,  were  cautious,  until  they 
saw  the  guns  go  off  at  a  trot,  and  the  rifleman  follow 
at  full  speed  ;  then  they  pursued  briskly,  but  when  they 
reached  the  bridge  the  British  were  over,  and  a  good 
line  of  battle  Was  formed  on  the  other  side.  A  fight 
commenced,  and  the  assailants  were  continually  rein- 
forced as  their  columns  of  march  arrived,  yet  general 
Paget  maintained  the  post  with  two  regiments  until 
nightfall,  and  then  retired  to  Lugo,  in  front  of  which 
the  whole  army  was  now  assembled. 

A  few  of  the  French  cavalry  showed  themselves  on 
the  Cth,  but  the  infantry  did  not  ap])ear,  and,  the  7th, 
sir  John  Moore,  in  a  general  order,  gave  a  severe  but 
just  rebuke  to  the  officers  and  soldiers  for  their  pre- 
vious want  of  discipline,  at  the  same  time  announcing 
his  intention  to  ofler  battle.  It  has  been  well  said, 
that  a  British  army  may  be  gleaned  in  a  retreat,  but 
cannot  be  reaped,  whatever  may  be  their  misery,  the 
soldiers  will  always  be  found  clean  at  review,  ready 
at  a  fight;  and  scarcely  was  this  order  issued,  when 
the  line  of  battle,  so  attenuated  before,  was  filled  with 
vigorous  men,  full  of  confidence  and  valour.  Fifteen 
hundr(!d  had  fallen  in  action  or  dropped  to  the  rear,  but 
as  three  fresh  battalions,  left  by  sir  David  Baird  when 
he  first  advanced  from  Astorga,  had  rejoined  the  army 
between  Villa  Franca  and  Lugo,  nineteen  thousand 
combatants  were  still  under  arms. 

The  right  of  the  English  position  was  in  compara- 
tively flat  ground,  and  partially  protected  by  a  bend 
of  the  Minho.  The  centre  was  amongst  vineyards, 
with  low  stone  walls.  The  left,  which  was  somewhat 
withdrawn,  rested  on  the  mountains,  being  supported 


*  S.  Journal  of  operatloas.  MS. 


1808.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


119 


and  covered  by  the  cavalry.  It  was  the  intention  of 
t}ie  general  to  engajje  deeply  with  his  right  and  centre, 
before  he  closed  with  his  left  wing,  in  which  he  had 
posted  the  flower  of  his  troops,  thinking  thus  to  bring 
on  a  decisive  battle,  and  trusting  to  the  valour  of  the 
men  to  handle  the  enemy  in  such  sort  as  that  he  should 
be  glad  to  let  the  army  continue  its  retreat  unmolested. 
Other  hope,  to  re-embark  the  troops  without  loss,  there 
was  none,  save  by  stratagem.  Soult,  an  experienced 
genenl,  commandinij  soldiers  habituated  to  war,  might 
be  tf  nij'ti^d,  but  could  never  be  forced,  to  engage  in  a 
decisive  battle  among  those  rugged  mountains,  where 
whole  days  would  pass  in  skirmishing,  without  any 
progress  being  made  towards  crippling  an  adversary. 

It  was  mid-day  before  the  French  marshal  arrived 
in  person  at  the  head  of  ten  or  twelve  thousand  men. 
and  the  remainder  of  his  power  followed  in  some  dis- 
array, for  the  marches  had  not  been  so  easy  but  that 
many  even  of  the  oldest  soldiers  had  dropped  behind. 
As  the  columns  came  up,  they  formed  in  order  of  bat- 
tle along  a  strong  mountainous  ridge  fronting  the  Eng- 
lish, and  as  the  latter  were  not  distinctly  seen,  from 
the  inequalities  of  the  ground,  Soult  doubted  if  they 
were  all  before  him ;  wherefore  taking  four  guns,  and 
some  squadrons  conmianded  by  colonel  Lallemande, 
he  advanced  towards  the  centre,  and  opened  a  fire, 
which  was  immediately  silenced  by  a  reply  from  fif- 
teen pieces.  The  marshal  being  then  satisfied  that 
something  more  than  a  rear-guard  was  in  his  front, 
r"tired.  About  an  hour  after  he  made  a  feint  on  the 
riglU,  and  at  the  same  time  sent  a  column  of  infantry 
and  five  guns  against  the  left.  On  that  side  the  three 
regiments  which  had  latel}' joined  were  drawn  up,  and 
the  French  pushing  the  outposts  hard,  were  gaining 
the  advantage,  when  Moore  arrived,  rallied  the  light 
troops,  and  with  a  vigorous  charge  breaking  the  ad- 
verse column,  treated  it  very  roughly  in  the  pursuit. 
The  estimated  loss  of  the  French  was  between  three 
and  four  hundred  men. 

As  it  was  now  evident  that  the  British  meant  to  give 
battle,  the  duke  of  Dalmatia  hastened  the  march  of 
Laborde's  division,  which  was  still  in  the  rear,  and 
requested  marshal  Ney,  who  was  then  at  Villa  Franca, 
to  detach  a  division  of  the  sixth  corps  by  the  Val  des 
Orres  to  Orense ;  Ney,  however,  merely  sent  some 
troops  into  the  valle)'  of  the  Syl,  and  pushed  his  ad- 
vanced posts  in  front  as  far  as  Nogales,  Poyo,  and 
Dances.*  At  daybreak  on  the  8th  the  two  armies 
were  still  embattled.  On  the  French  side,  seventeen 
thoiisand  infantr}',  four  thousand  cavalry,  and  fifty 
pieces  of  artillery  were  in  line,  but  Soult  deferred  the 
attack  until  the  9th. |  On  the  English  part,  sixteen 
thousand  infantry,  eighteen  hundred  cavalry,  and  forty 
pieces  of  artillery,  impatiently  awaited  the  assault,  and 
blamed  their  adversary  for  delaying  a  contest  which 
they  ardently  desired  ;  yet  the  darkness  fell  without  a 
shot  having  been  fired,  and  with  it  fell  the  English 
grneral's  hope  to  engage  his  enemy  on  equal  terms. 
What  was  to  be  done?  assail  the  French  position? 
remain  another  day  in  expectation  of  a  battle?  or,  in 
secresy,  gain  a  march,  and  get  on  board  without  being 
molested,  or  at  least  obtain  time  to  establish  the  army 
in  a  good  situation  to  cover  the  embarkation  ?  The 
first  operation  was  warranted  neither  by  present  nor  by 
future  advantages,  for  how  could  an  inferior  army  ex- 
pect to  cripple  a  superior  one,  posted  as  the  French 
were,  on  a  strong  mountain,  v/ith  an  overbearing  caval- 
ry l(.  proti^ct  their  infantPr',  should  the  latter  be  beaten  ; 
and  \Ahen  twenty  thousand  fresh  troops  were  at  the 
distance  of  two  short  marches  in  the  rear  ?  The  Brit- 
ish army  was  not  provided  to  fight  above  one  battle ; 
there  were  no  drau>ht  cattle,  no  means  of  transporting 
reserve  ammunition,  no  magazines,  no  hospitals,  no 
second  line,  no  provisions,  a  defeat  would  have  been 


*  S.  Journal  of  operations.   MS. 


t  Ibid. 


ruin,  a  victory  useless.  A  battle  is  alvrajs  a  serious 
affair,  but  two  battles  under  such  circumstances,  though 
both  should  be  victories,  would  have  been  destruction. 
But  why  fight  at  all,  after  the  army  had  been  rallied, 
and  the  disasters  of  the  march  from  Astorga  had  been 
remedied  1  What,  if  beating  first  Soult  and  then  Ney, 
the  British  had  arrived  once  more  above  Astorga,  with 
perhaps  ten  thousand  infantry,  and  half  as  many  hun- 
dred cavalry.  From  the  mountains  of  Gallicia  their 
general  might  have  cast  his  eyes  as  far  as  the  Sierra 
Morena,  without  being  cheered  by  the  sight  of  a  single 
Spanish  army,  none  existed  to  aid  him,  none  to  whom 
he  might  give  aid.  Even  Mr.  Frere  acknowledged 
that  at  this  period  six  thousand  ill-armed  men  collected 
at  Despefias  Peros,  formed  the  only  barrier  betwee  i 
the  French  and  Seville,  and  sir  John  Moore  was  sert 
out  not  to  waste  English  blood  in  fruitless  battles,  but 
to  assist  the  universal  Spanish  nation ! 

The  second  proposition  was  decided  by  the  state  of 
the  magazines ;  there  was  not  bread  for  another  day's 
consumption  remaining  in  the  stores  at  Lugo.  It  was 
true  that  the  army  was  in  heart  for  fighting,  but  dis- 
tressed by  fatigue  and  bad  weather,  and  each  moment 
of  delay,  increased  privations  that  would  soon  have 
rendered  it  inefficient  for  a  campaign  in  the  south,  the 
only  point  where  its  services  could  now  be  effectual.* 
For  two  whole  da3's  Moore  had  offered  battle,  this  was 
sufficient  to  rally  the  troops,  to  restore  order,  and  to 
preserve  the  reputation  of  the  army.  Lugo  was  strong 
ground  in  itself,  but  it  did  not  cover  Coru'a,  the  road 
leading  from  Orense  to  St.  Jago  da  Compostella  turned 
it,  the  French  ought  to  have  been  on  that  line,  and 
there  was  no  reason  to  suppose  that  they  were  not ; 
Soult,  as  we  have  seen,  pressed  Ney  to  follow  it.  It 
was  then  impossible  to  remain  at  Lugo,  and  useless  if 
it  had  been  possible.  The  general  adopted  the  third 
plan,  and  prepared  to  decamp  in  the  night;  he  ordered 
the  fires  to  be  kept  bright,  and  exhorted  the  troops  to 
make  a  great  exertion,  which  he  trusted  would  be  the 
last  required  of  them. 

The  country  immediately  in  the  rear  of  the  position 
was  intersected  by  stone  walls  and  a  number  of  intri- 
cate lanes,  precautions  were  taken  to  mark  the  right 
tracks,  by  placing  bundles  of  straw  at  certain  distan- 
ces, and  officers  were  appointed  to  guide  the  columns. 
At  ten  o'clock  the  regiments  silenth'  quitted  their 
ground,  and  retired  in  excellent  order ;  but  a  moody 
fortune  pursued  sir  .John  INIoore  throughout  this  cam- 
paign, baffling  his  prudence,  and  thwarting  his  views, 
as  if  resolved  to  prove  the  unyielding  firmness  of  his 
mind.  A  terrible  storm  of  wind  and  rain,  mixed  with 
sleet,  commenced  as  the  army  broke  up  from  the  posi- 
tion, the  marks  were  destroyed,  and  the  guides  lost  the 
true  direction ;  only  one  of  the  divisions  gained  the 
main  road,  the  other  two  were  bewildered,  and  when 
daylight  broke,  the  rear  columns  were  still  near  to  Lti- 
go.  The  fatigue,  the  depression  of  mind,  occasioned 
by  this  misfortune,  and  the  want  of  shoes,  broke  the 
order  of  the  march,  and  the  stragglers  were  becoming 
numerous,  when,  unfortunately,  Baird,  who  was  with 
the  leading  division,  thinking  to  relieve  the  men  during 
a  halt  which  took  place  in  the  night,  desired  them  to 
take  refuge  from  the  weather  in  some  houses  a  little 
way  off  the  road.  Complete  disorganization  followed 
this  imprudent  act,  from  that  moment  it  became  im- 
possible to  make  the  soldiers  keep  their  ranks,  plunder 
succeeded,  the  example  was  infectious,  and  what  with 
real  suffering,  and  evil  propensity  encouraged  by  this 
error  of  inexperience,  the  main  body  of  the  army, 
which  had  bivouacked  for  six  hours  in  the  rain,  arrived 
at  BetanzQS  on  the  evening  of  the  'Jlh,  in  a  str.te  very 
discreditable  to  its  discipline. 

The  commander-in-chief,  with  the  reserve  and  the 
cavalry,  as  usual,  covered  the  march,  and  in  the  course 


»  Sir  John  Moore's  Papers. 


120 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[BcoK  IV 


of  it  he  ordered  several  bridrres  to  be  destroyed,  but 
the  engineers  failed  of  success  in  every  attempt.*  For- 
tunately, the  enemy  did  not  come  up  with  the  rear  be- 
fore the  evenincf,  and  then  only  with  their  cavalry, 
otherwise  many  prisoners  must  have  fallen  into  their  I 
hands  ;  for  the  number  of  stragirlors  uncovered  by  the 
passage  of  the  reserve  was  so  numerous,  that  when 
pressed,  they  united,  under  sergeant  Newman,  of  the 
43d  regiment,  and  repulsed  the  French  cavalry  them- 
selves :  a  signal  proof  that  the  disorder  w*as  occasioned 
as  much  by  insubordination  in  the  regiments  as  by  the 
fatigue  of  the  march.  The  reserve  commanded  by 
general  Edward  Paget,  an  officer  distinguished  during 
the  retreat  by  his  firmness,  ability,  and  ardent  zeal, 
remained  in  position,  during  the  night,  a  few  miles 
from  Iktanzos ;  the  rest  of  the  army  was  quarteied  in 
that  town,  and  as  the  enemy  could  not  gather  in 
strength  on  the  10th,  the  commander-in-chief  halted 
that  da}',  and  the  cavalry  passed  from  the  rear-guard 
to  the  head  of  the  column.  The  1 1th,  the  French  in- 
terrupted those  employed  to  destroy  the  bridge  of  Be- 
tanzos,  but  from  some  mismanagement,  although  the 
twenty-eighth  regiment  repulsed  the  first  skirmishers, 
the  bridge,  constructed  of  wood,  was  only  partially 
destroyed.  In  the  meantime  sir  John  Moore  assem- 
bled the  army  in  one  solid  mass.  The  loss  of  men  in 
the  march  from  Lugo  to  Betanzos  had  been  greater 
than  that  in  all  the  former  part  of  the  retreat,  added  to 
all  the  waste  of  the  movement  in  advance  and  the  loss 
sustained  in  the  different  actions  :  nevertheless,  four- 
teen or  fifteen  thousand  infantry  were  still  in  column, 
and  by  an  orderly  march  to  Coru~a  under  the  personal 
direction  of  the  commander-in-chief,  demonstrated,  that 
inattention  and  the  want  of  experience  in  the  oOlcers, 
was  the  true  cause  of  those  disorders,  which  had  af- 
flicted the  army  far  more  than  the  sword  of  the  enemy 
or  the  rigour  of  the  elements. 

As  the  troops  approached  Corufia,  the  general's 
looks  were  directed  towards  the  harbour,  but  an  open 
♦•xpanse  of  water  painfully  convinced  him,  that  to  For- 
tune at  least  he  was  no  way  beholden  ;  contrary  winds 
still  detained  the  fleet  at  Vigo,  and  the  last  consuming 
exertion  made  by  the  army  was  rendered  fruitless  ! 
The  men  were  put  into  quarters,  and  their  leader  await- 
ed the  progress  of  events. 

The  bridge  of  El  Burgo  was  destroyed,  and  also 
that  of  Cambria,  situated  a  few  miles  up  the  Mero 
river,  but  the  engineer  employed  at  the  latter,  mortified 
at  the  former  failures,  was  so  anxious  to  perform  his 
duty  in  an  effectual  manner,  that  he  remained  too  near 
the  mine,  and  was  killed  by  tiie  explosion.  Meanwhile 
three  divisions  occupied  the  town  and  suburbs  of  Co- 
!una,  and  the  reserve  was  posted  betw'een  the  village 
of  El  Burgo,  and  the  road  of  St.  .Tago  de  Compostella. 
For  twelve  days  those  hardy  soldiers  had  covered  the 
retreat,  during  wnich  time  they  had  traversed  eighty 
miles  of  road  in  two  marches,  passed  several  nights 
under  arms  in  the  snow  of  the  mountains,  were  seven 
times  engaged  with  the  enemy,  and  now  assembled  at 
the  outposts,  having  fewer  men  missing  from  the 
ranks,  iticlnding  those  who  had  fallen  in  battle,  than 
any  other  division  in  the  army  :  an  admirable  instance 
of  tlie  value  of  good  discipline,  and  a  manifest  proof 
of  the  malignant  injustice  with  which  sir  John  \Ioore 
has  been  accused  of  precipitating  his  retreat  beyond 
the  measure  of  human  stren<,rth. 

The  town  of  Corufia,  although  sufficiently  strong  to 
oblige  an  enemy  to  break  ground  before  it,  was  weak- 
ly fortified,  and  to  the  southward  commanded  by  some 
heights  close  to  the  walls.  Sir  John  Moore  therefore 
caused  the  land  front  to  be  strengthened,  and  occupied 
the  citadel,  but  disarmed  the  sea  face  of  the  works, 
»nd  the  inhabitants  cheerfully  and  honourably  joined 


*  Mr.  James  Moore's  Narrative. 


in  the  labour,  although  they  were  fully  aware  that  tht 
English  intended  to  embark,  and  that  they  would  in- 
cur the  enemy's  anger  by  taking  a  part  in  tiie  uiililary 
operations.  wSuch  fl.i.shes  of  light  from  the  dark  cloui 
which  at  this  moment  covered  Spain  may  startle  the 
reader,  and  make  him  doubt  if  the  Spaniards  culd  have 
been  so  insufficient  to  their  own  defence  as  they  have 
been  represented  in  the  course  of  this  history.  I  answer, 
that  the  facts  were  as  I  have  told  them,  and  that  it  was 
such  paradoxical  indications  of  character  that  deceived 
the  world  at  the  time,  and  induced  men  to  believe  that 
that  reckless,  daring  defiance  of  the  power  of  France 
so  loudly  proclaimed  by  the  patriots  would  be  strenu- 
ously supported.  Of  proverbially  vivid  imagination 
and  quick  resentments,  the  Spaniards  feel  and  act  in- 
dividually rather  than  nationally,  and  during  this  war, 
that  which  appeared  constancy  of  purpose,  was  but  a 
repetition  of  momentary  fury;  a  succession  of  electric 
sparks  generated  by  a  constant  collision  with  the 
French  army,  and  dail}'  becoming  fainter  as  custom  re- 
conciled them  to  those  injuries  and  insults  which  are 
commonly  the  attendants  of  war. 

Procrastination  and  improvidence  are  the  besetting 
sins  of  the  nation.  At  this  moment  large  magazines 
of  arms  and  ammunition,  which  had  been  sent  in  tlie 
early  part  of  the  preceding  year  from  England,  were 
still  in  Corufia  unappropriated  and  unregarded  by  a 
nation  infested  with  three  hundred  thousand  enemies, 
and  having  a  hundred  thousand  soldiers  unclothed  and 
without  wi  apons.  Three  miles  from  the  town  they 
had  piled  four  thousand  barrels  of  powder  in  a  maga- 
zine built  upon  a  hill,  and  a  smaller  quantity,  collected 
in  another  storehouse,  was  at  some  distance  from  the 
first.  To  prevent  them  falling  a  prey  to  the  enemy, 
Moore  caused  both  to  be  exploded  on  the  I3th,  and 
the  inferior  one  blew  up  with  a  terrible  noise,  which 
shook  the  houses  in  the  town ;  but  when  the  train 
reached  the  great  store,  there  ensued  a  crash  like  the 
bursting  forth  of  a  volcano;  the  earth  trembled  for 
miles,  the  rocks  were  torn  from  their  bases,  and  the 
agitated  waters  rolled  the  vessels  as  in  a  storm  ;  a  vast 
column  of  smoke  and  d>ist,  shooting  out  fiery  sparks 
from  its  sides,  arose  perpendicularly  and  slowly  to  a 
great  height,  and  then  a  shower  of  stones,  and  frag- 
ments of  all  kinds,  bursting  out  of  it  with  a  roaring 
sound,  killed  many  persons  who  remained  too  near  the 
spot.  Stillness,  slightly  interrupted  by  the  lashing  of 
the  waves  on  the  shore,  succeeded,  and  the  business 
of  the  war  went  on.  The  next  measure  was  a  painful 
one  ;  for  the  ground  in  front  of  Corufia  is  impracti- 
cable for  cavalry,  and  as  the  horses  were  gt  neraily 
foundered,  and  it  was  impossible  to  embark  them  all 
in  the  face  of  an  enemy,  a  great  number  were  reluc- 
tantly ordered  to  be  shot;  these  poor  animals,  already 
worn  down  and  feet  broken,  would  otherwise  have  been 
distributed  among  the  French  cavalry,  or  used  as  draft 
cattle,  until  death  relieved  them  from  procrastinated 
sufferings. 

But  the  French  were  now  collecting  in  force  on  the 
Mero,  and  it  became  necessary  to  choose  a  position  of 
battle.  A  chain  of  rocky  elevations,  conunencing  on 
the  sea-coast  north-west  of  the  place,  and  ending  on 
the  Mero  just  behind  the  village  of  El  Burgo,  offered 
an  advantageous  lino  of  defence,  covered  by  a  branch 
of  the  Mero,  which  washing  a  part  of  the  base,  would 
have  obliged  the  enemy  to  advance  by  the  road  of 
Compostella.  This  ridge  was  however  too  extensive 
for  the  English  army,  and  if  not  wholly  occupied,  the 
F'rench  might  have  turned  it  by  the  right,  and  moved 
along  a  sucoession  of  eminences  to  the  very  gates  of 
(^oru'a.  There  was  no  alternative,  but  to  take  posses- 
sion of  an  inferior  range,  enclosed  as  it  were  within 
the  other,  and  completely  commanded  by  it  within 
cannonshot ;  here  therefore  the  army  was  posted.  Mean- 
while the  French  army  had  been  so  exhausted  with 


1809.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


12t 


eontinual  toil,  that  it  was  not  completely  assembled  on 
the  Mero  before  the  12ih.  On  that  day  the  infantry 
took  post  opposite  El  Burgro,  the  cavalry  of  La  Hoiis- 
saye  lined  the  river  as  far  as  the  ocean,  and  Franceschi, 
crossing  at  the  brid2"e  of  Celas,  seven  miles  hitrher  up 
the  river,  intercejited  some  stores  arriving  from  St. 
Jago,  and  made  a  few  prisoners.  The  14th,  the  bridges 
at  El  Burgo  being  rendered  practicable  for  artillery, 
two  divisions  of  infantry,  and  one  of  cavalry,  passed 
the  river,  and  to  cover  this  march  some  guns  opened 
on  the  English  posts  but  were  soon  silenced  by  a  su- 
perior fire.  In  the  evening,  the  transports  from  Vigo 
hove  in  sight,  and  soon  after  entered  the  harbour  of 
Corufia,  and  the  dismounted  cavalry,  the  sick,  all  the 
best  horses,  and  fifty-two  pieces  of  artillery,  were  em- 
barked during  the  night,  eight  British  and  four  Span- 
ish guns  only  being  retained  on  shore  ready  for  action. 

On  the  15th,  Laborde's  division  arrived.  The  French 
then  occupied  the  great  ridge  enclosing  the  British 
position,  placed  their  right  on  the  intersection  of  the 
roads  leading  from  St.  Jago  and  Betanzos,  and  their 
left  upon  a  rocky  eminence  which  overlooked  both 
lines  ;*  after  this  they  extended  their  cavalry,  support- 
ed by  some  troops  on  their  own  left,  and  a  slight  skir- 
mish took  place  in  the  valley  below.  The  English 
piquets  opposite  the  right  of  the  French  also  got  en- 
gaged, and  were  so  galled  by  the  fire  of  two  guns, 
that  colonel  M'Kenzie.  of  the  fifth  regiment,  pushed 
out  with  some  companies  to  seize  the  battery  ;  a  line 
of  infantry,  hitherto  concealed  by  some  stone  walls, 
immediately  arose,  and  poured  in  such  a  fire  of  mus- 
quetry,  that  the  colonel  was  killed,  and  his  men  forced 
back  with  loss. 

In  tiie  course  of  the  night,  .Soult  with  great  diiHculty 
established  a  battery  of  eleven  heavy  guns  on  the  rocks 
which  closed  the  left  of  his  line  of  battle,  and  then 
formed  his  order  of  battle. f  Laborde's  division  was 
posted  on  the  right,  having  one  half  on  the  high  ground, 
and  the  other  half  on  the  descent  towards  the  river. 
Merle's  division  was  in  the  centre.  Mermet's  division 
formed  the  left.  The  position  was  covered  in  front  of 
the  right  by  the  villages  of  Palavia  Abaxo  and  Portosa, 
and  in  front  of  the  centre  by  a  wobd.  The  left  was 
secured  by  the  rugged  heights  where  the  great  battery 
was  established,  which  was  about  twelve  hundred  yards 
from  the  right  of  the  British  line,  and  midway  the  little 
village  of  Elvina  was  held  by  the  piquets  of  the  fif- 
tieth British  regiment.:j:  The  late  arrival  of  the  trans- 
ports, the  increasing  force  of  the  enemy,  and  the  dis- 
advantageous nature  of  the  ground  had  greatly  aug- 
mented the  difficulty  and  danger  of  the  embarkation, 
and  several  general  officers  now  proposed  to  the  com- 
mander-in-chief, that  he  should  negotiate  for  leave  to 
retire  to  his  ships  upon  terms.  There  was  little  chance 
of  such  a  proposal  being  agreed  to  by  the  enemy,  and 
there  was  no  reason  to  try.  The  army  had  suffered, 
but  not  from  defeat,  its  situation  was  dangerous,  but 
far  from  desperate ;  wherefore  the  general  would  not 
consent  to  remove  the  stamp  of  energy  and  prudence, 
which  marked  his  retreat,  by  a  negotiation  that  would 
have  given  an  appearance  of  timidity  and  indecision  to 
his  previous  operations,  as  opposite  to  their  real  cha- 
racter as  light  is  to  darkness  ;  his  high  spirit  and  clear 
judsfmcnit  revolted  at  the  idea,  and  he  rejected  the  de- 
grading advice  without  hesitation. 

All  the  encumbrances  of  the  army  were  shipped  in 
the  night  of  the  15th  and  morning  :)f  the  16th,  and 
everything  was  prepared  to  withdraw  the  fighting  men 
as  soon  as  the  darkness  would  permit  them  to  move 
without  being  perceived  ;  and  the  precautions  taken 
would,  without  doubt,  have  insured  the  success  of  this 
difficult  operation,  but  a  more  glorious  event  was  des- 
tined to  give  a  melancholy  but  graceful  termination  to 


*  Noble's  Expedition  de  Gallire.         * 

J  Sir  John  Moore's  Letter  to  Ld.  Cusllereagh. 


t  Ibid. 


the  campaign.  About  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  a 
general  movement  along  the  French  line  gave  notice 
of  an  approaching  battle,  and  the  British  infantry, 
fourteen  thousand  five  hundred  strong  immediately  oc- 
cupied the  inferior  range  of  hills  already  spoken  of. 
The  right  was  formed  by  Baird's  division,  and,  from 
the  oblique  direction  of  the  ridge,  approached  the  ene- 
my, while  the  centre  and  left  were  of  necessity  with- 
held in  such  a  manner  that  the  French  battery  on  the 
rocks  raked  the  whole  of  the  line.*  General  Hope's 
division,  crossing  the  main  road,  prolonged  Baird's 
line  to  the  left,  and  occupied  strong  ground  abutting  on 
the  muddy  bank  of  the  Mero.  A  bridg.d.-  of  Baird  s 
division  remained  in  column  behind  the  right  wing, 
and  in  like  manner  a  brigade  of  Hope's  division  was 
behind  the  left  wing,  while  Paget's  reserve,  posted  at 
Airis,  a  small  village  in  rear  of  the  centre,  looked 
down  the  valley  which  separated  Baird's  right  from 
the  hills  occupied  by  Franceschi's  cavalry  ;  a  battilion 
detached  from  the  reserve  kept  these  horsemen  in  check, 
and  was  itself  connected  with  the  main  body  by  a  chain 
of  skirmishers  extended  across  the  valley.  Eraser's 
division  held  the  heights  immediately  before  the  g  it?s 
of  Corufia,  watching  the  coast  road,  but  it  was  also 
ready  to  succour  any  point. 

These  dispositions  were  dictated  by  the  nature  of  the 
ground,  which  was  very  favourable  to  the  enemy ;  for 
Franceschi's  cavalry  reached  nearly  to  the  village  of 
San  Cristoval,  a  mile  beyond  Baird's  right,  and  hence 
sir  John  Moore  was  forced  to  weaken  his  fmnt  and 
keep  Frazer's  division  in  reserve  until  Soult's  attack 
should  be  completely  unfolded.  There  was,  however, 
one  advantage  on  the  British  side  ;  many  thousand 
new  English  musquets,  found  in  the  Spanish  stores, 
were  given  to  the  troops  in  lieu  of  their  rusty,  battered 
arms,  and  as  their  ammunition  was  also  fresh,  their 
fire  was  far  better  sustained  than  that  of  the  enemy. 

BATTLE    OF    CORUNA. 

When  Laborde's  division  arrived,  the  French  force 
was  not  less  than  twenty  thousand  men,  and  the  duko 
of  Dalmatia  made  no  idle  evolutions  of  display,  fo. 
distributing  his  lighter  guns  along  the  front  of  his  po- 
sition, he  opened  a  fire  from  the  heavy  battery  on  his 
left,  and  instantly  descended  the  mountain  with  three 
columns,  covered  by  clouds  of  skirmishers.  The  Bri- 
tish piquets  were  driven  back  in  disorder,  and  the  vil- 
lage of  Elvina  was  carried  by  the  first  French  column, 
which  then  dividing,  attempted  to  turn  Baird's  right 
by  the  valley,  and  to  break  his  front  at  the  same  time. 
The  second  column  made  against  the  English  centre, 
and  the  third  attacked  Hope's  left  at  the  village  of 
Palavia  Abaxo.  The  weight  of  Soult's  guns  overmatch- 
ed the  English  six-pounders,  and  the  shot  swept  tlie 
position  to  the  centre ;  but  sir  John  Moore  observing 
that,  according  to  his  expectations,  the  enemy  did  not 
show  any  body  of  infantry  beyond  that  which  moving 
up  the  valley  outflanked  Baird's  right,  ordered  general 
Paget  to  carry  the  whole  of  the  reserve  to  where  the 
detached  regiment  was  posted,  and,  as  he  had  before 
arranged  with  him,  to  turn  the  left  of  the  French  attack 
and  menace  the  great  battery.  Meanwhile,  he  directed 
Eraser  to  support  Paget,  and  then  throwing  back  the 
fourth  regiment,  which  formed  the  right  of  I3aird's  di- 
vision, he  opened  a  heavy  fire  upon  the  flank  of  the 
troops  penetrating  up  the  valley,  while  the  fiftieth  and 
forty-second  regiments  met  those  breaking  through  El- 
vina. The  ground  about  that  village  being  intersected 
by  stone  walls  and  hollow  roads,  a  severe  scrambling 
fight  ensued,  the  French  were  forced  back  with  great 
loss,  and  the  fiftieth  regiment  entering  the  village  with 
them,  after  a  second  struggle  drove  them  beyond  it. 
Seeing  this,  the  general  ordered  up  a  battalion  of  the 
guards  to  fill  the  void  in  the  line  made  by  the  ad- 


*  Vide  Plan  of  thi,-  Battle 


122 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  IV. 


Tance  of  those  regiments,  whereupon  the  forty-second, 
with  the  exception  of  its  grenadiers,  mistaking  his  in- 
tention, retired,  and  at  that  moment  the  enemy,  being 
reinforced,  renewed  the  fight  beyond  the  village;  the 
officer  commanding  the  fiftieth*  was  wounded  and 
taken  prisoner,  and  Elvina  then  became  the  scene  of  a 
second  struggle,  which  being  observed  by  the  com- 
mander-in-chief, he  addressed  a  few  animating  words 
to  tlie  forty-second,  and  caused  it  to  return  to  the  attack. 
During  this  time  Paget,  with  the  reserve,  had  descend- 
ed ir.tD  the  valley,  and  the  line  of  the  skirmishers  being 
thus  supported,  vigorously  checked  the  advance  of 
the  enemy's  troops  in  that  quarter,  while  the  fourth 
regiment  galled  their  flank  ;  at  the  same  time  the  centre 
and  left  of  the  army  also  became  engaged,  sir  David 
Baird  was  severely  wounded,  and  a  furious  action  en- 
sued along  the  line,  in  the  valley,  and  on  the  hills. 

Sir  John  Moore,  while  earnestly  watching  the  result 
of  the  fight  about  the  village  of  Elvina,  was  struck  on 
the  left  breast  by  a  cannon  shot ;  the  shock  threw  him 
from  his  horse  with  violence,  but  he  rose  again  in  a 
silting  posture,  his  countenance  unchanged,  and  his 
stedfast  eye  siill  fixed  upon  the  regiments  engaged  in 
his  front,  no  sigh  betra)'ing  a  sensation  of  pain.  In  a 
few  moments,  when  he  was  satisfied  that  the  troops 
were  gaining  ground,  his  countenance  brightened,  and 
he  suffered  himself  to  be  taken  to  the  rear.  Then  was 
seen  the  dreadful  nature  of  his  hurt.  The  shoulder 
was  shattered  to  pieces,  the  arm  was  hanging  by  a 
piece  of  skin,  the  ribs  over  the  heart  were  broken,  and 
bared  of  flesh,  and  the  muscles  of  the  breast  torn  into 
long  strips,  which  were  interlaced  by  their  recoil  from 
the  dragging  of  the  shot.  As  the  soldiers  placed  him 
in  a  blanket  his  sword  got  entangled,  and  the  hilt  en- 
tered the  wound  ;  captain  Hardinge,  a  staff  officer,  who 
was  near,  attempted  to  take  it  off,  but  the  djang  man 
stopped  him,  saying,  '  It  is  as  icell  as  it  is.  I  had  ra- 
ther it  should  go  out  of  the  field  loith  me  ,-'  and  in  that 
manner,  so  becoming  to  a  soldier,  Moore  was  borne 
from  the  fight.j" 

Meanwhile  the  army  was  rapidly  gaining  ground. 
The  reserve  overthrowing  every  thing  in  the  valley, 
obliged  La  Houssaye's  dragoons,  who  had  dismounted, 
to  retire,  turned  the  enemy  on  that  side,  and  even  ap- 
proached the  eminence  upon  which  the  great  battery 
was  posted  ;  on  the  left,  colonel  NichoUs,  at  the  head 


*  The  author's  eldest  brother;  he  was  said  to  be  slain. 
When  the  French  renewed  tiie  attacii  on  Elvina,  he  was  some- 
what in  advance  of  that  village,  and  alone,  tor  the  troops  were 
gcatlered  by  the  nature  of  the  ground.  Being  hurt  in  the  leg, 
Le  en.ieavoured  to  retire,  but  was  overtaken,  and  thrown  to  tl;e 
ground  with  five  wounds;  a  French  drummer  rescued  him,  and 
when  a  sol  litr  witli  whom  he  had  been  struggling  made  a  se- 
cond attempt  to  kill  him,  the  drummer  oni;e  more  interfered. 
The  morning  after  the  battle  marshal  Soult  sent  his  own  sur- 
geon to  major  IN'apier,  and,  with  a  kindness  and  consideration 
very  uncommon,  wrote  to  Wapoleon,  desiring  that  his  prisoner 
might  not  be  sent  to  F'rance,  which,  from  the  system  of  refus- 
ing exchanges,  would  have  ruined  his  professional  prospects; 
the  drummer  also  received  the  cross  of  the  legion  of  honour. 
V/hen  the  second  corps  quitted  Coruna,  marshal  Soult  recoin- 
ruenJed  his  prisoner  to  the  attention  of  marshal  JVey,  and  the 
latter  treated  him  rather  with  the  kindness  of  a  friend  than 
the  civility  of  an  enemy;  he  lodged  him  with  the  French  con- 
sul, supplied  him  with  money,  gave  him  a  general  invitation  to 
his  house,  and  not  only  retrained  from  sending  him  to  France, 
but  when  b)'  a  flag  of  truce  he  knew  that  major  Kapler's  mo- 
t!)<;r  was  mourning  for  him  as  dead,  he  permitted  him,  and  with 
him  the  few  soldiers  taken  in  the  action,  to  go  at  once  to  Eng- 
iand,  merely  exacting  a  promise  that  none  should  serve  until 
exchanged.  I  would  not  have  touched  at  all  upon  these  pri- 
vate adventures,  were  it  not  that  gratitude  demands  a  public 
acknowledgment  of  such  generosity,  and  that  demand  is  ren- 
dered more  imperative  by  the  after  misfortunes  of  marshal  JVev. 
That  brave  and  n-jlile-niinded  man's  fate  is  but  too  well  knowii  ! 
He  who  had  fouglit  (we  hundred  battles  for  France,  not  one 
against  her,  was  shot  as  a  traitor  !  Could  the  bitterest  enemy 
of  the  IJourbons  have  more  strongly  marked  the  differtace  be- 
tween their  interests  and  those  of  the  nadon  '.' 

f  Mr.  Jcimes  Moore's  Narrative.     Hardinge 's  Letter. 


of  some  companies  of  the  t'onrteenth,  carried  Palavia 
Abaxo,  which  genera!  Foy  defended  bist  feebly  ;  in  the 
centre,  the  obstinate  dispute  for  Elvina  had  terminated 
in  favour  of  the  British,  and  when  the  night  set  in, 
their  line  was  considerably  advanced  beyond  the  origi- 
nal position  of  the  morning,  while  the  French  were 
falling  hack  in  confusion,  if  at  this  time  general  Era- 
ser's division  had  been  brought  into  action  along  with 
the  reserve,  the  enemy  could  hardly  have  escaped  a 
signal  overthrow;  for  the  little  ammunition  Soult  had 
been  able  to  bring  up  was  nearly  exhausted,  the  river 
Mero,  with  a  full  tide,  was  behind  him,  and  the  diffi- 
cult communication  by  the  bridge  of  El  Euigo  was 
alone  open  for  a  retreat.  On  the  other  hand,  to  continue 
the  action  in  the  dark  was  to  tempt  forttme  ;  the  French 
were  still  the  most  num.ercus,  and  their  ground  was 
strong,  moreover  the  disorder  they  were  in,  offered  such 
a  favourable  opportunity  to  get  on  board  the  ships,  that 
sir  John  Hope,  upon  whom  the  command  of  the  army 
had  devolved,  satisfied  with  having  repulsed  the  attack, 
judged  it  more  prudent  to  pursue  the  original  plan  cf 
embarking  during  the  night.  '1  his  operation  was  ef- 
fected M'ithoul  delay,  the  arrangements  being  so  com- 
plete that  neither  confusion  nor  difficulty  occurred.  The 
piquets,  kindling  a  number  of  fires,  covered  the  retreat 
of  the  columns,  and  being  themselves  withdrawn  at 
daybreak,  were  embarked,  under  the  protection  of  gene- 
ral Hill's  brigade,  which  was  posted  near  the  ramparts 
of  the  town. 

When  the  morning  dawned,  the  French,  observing 
that  the  British  had  abandoned  their  position,  pushed 
forward  some  battalions  to  the  heights  of  St.  Lucie, 
and  about  midday  succeeded  in  establishing  a  battery, 
which  playing  upon  the  shipping  in  the  harbour  caused 
a  great  deal  of  disorder  among  the  transports  ;  several 
masters  cut  their  cables,  and  four  vessels  went  ashore, 
but  the  troops  being  immediately  removed  by  the  men 
of  war's  boats,  the  stranded  vessels  were  burnt,  and 
the  whole  fleet  at  last  got  out  of  harbour.  General 
Hill's  brigade  then  embarked  from  the  citadel,  wiiile 
general  Beresford,  with  a  rear  guard,  kept  possession 
of  that  work  until  the  18th,  when  the  wcunded  being 
all  put  on  board,  his  troops  likewise  embarked  ;  the 
inhabitants  faithfully  maintained  the  town  asrainst  the 
French,  and  the  fleet  sailed  for  England.  'J'he  loss  of 
the  British  was  never  officially  published,  but  was  es- 
timated at  eight  hundred,  and  that  of  the  French  at 
three  thousand.  The  latter  is  undoubtedly  an  exagge- 
ration, yet  it  must  have  been  very  great,  for  the  arms 
of  the  English  were  all  new,  the  ammunition  fresh,  and 
whetl'.er  from  the  peculiar  construction  cf  our  musquets, 
the  physical  strength  aiid  coolness  cf  the  men,  or  from 
all  combined,  it  is  certain  that  the  fire  of  an  English 
line  is  the  most  destructive  known.  The  nature  of  the 
ground  also  prevented  any  movement  of  artillery  on 
either  side,  and  the  French  columns  in  their  attack 
were  exposed  to  grape,  which  they  could  not  return 
because  of  the  distance  of  their  batteries. 

Thus  ended  the  retreat  to  Coru!";a;  a  transaction 
which,  up  to  this  day,  has  called  forth  as  much  of 
falsehood  and  malignity  as  servile  and  interested  wri- 
ters could  offer  to  the  unprincipled  leaders  of  a  base 
faction,  but  which  posterity  will  regard  as  a  genuine 
example  of  ability  and  patriotism.  From  the  spot 
where  he  fell,  the  general,  who  had  conducted  it,  was 
carried  to  the  town  by  a  parly  of  soldiers,  his  blood 
flowed  fast,  and  the  torture  of  his  wound  was  great, 
yet  such  was  the  unshaken  firmness  of  his  ii.ind,  that 
those  about  him,  judging  from  the  resolution  of  his 
countenance  that  his  hurt  was  not  nrortal,  expressed  a 
hope  of  his  recovery  ;  hearing  this,  he  looked  stedfastly 
at  the  injury  for  a  moment,  and  then  said,  '  No,  I  feet 
that  to  be  impossible.''*  Several  times  he  caused  hisat« 
tendants  to  stop  and  turn  him  round,  that  he  inighl 

*  Captain  Hardinje's  Letter. 


1809.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR  WAR. 


12.1 


behold  the  field  of  battle,  and  when  the  firino-  indicated 
the  advance  of  Ibe  British,  he  discovered  his  satisfac- 
tion, and  permitted  the  bearers  to  proceed.  Beintr 
broujrht  to  his  lodgings,  the  surgeons  examined  his 
wound,  hut  there  was  nn  hope,  the  pain  increased,  and 
be  '-poke  with  great  di(!iculty.  At  intervals  he  a'^ked 
if  the  French  were  beaten,  and  addressing  his  old  friend, 
colonel  Anderson,  he  said,  '  Ynii  kiiaw  that  I  a/ways 
U'ifhed  to  die  this  way.''*  Again  he  asked  if  the  enemy 
were  defeated,  and  being  told  they  were,  observed,  '•It 
is  a  s;rpul  satisfaction  to  me,  to  know  we  have  beaten  the 
Frewh.''  His  countenance  continued  firm  and  his 
thoughts  clear ;  once  only,  when  he  spoke  of  his  mother, 
he  became  agitated ;  but  he  often  inqui.'ed  after  the 
safety  of  his  friends,  and  the  officers  of  his  staff,  and 
he  did  not  even  in  this  moment  forget  to  recommend 
thosu  whose  merit  had  given  them  claims  to  promotion. 
His  strength  failed  fast,  and  life  was  just  extinct,  when 
with  an  unsubdued  spirit,  as  if  anticipating  the  base- 
ness of  his  posthumous  calumniators,  he  exclaimed, 
'  /  hope  the  people  of  England  will  be  sa.tified  !  I  hnpe 
my  cuun'ry  will  do  me  Justice  .'^  In  a  few  minutes  af- 
terwards he  died,  and  his  corpse,  wrapped  in  a  military 
cloak,  was  interred  by  the  officers  of  his  staff  in  the 
*cit.idel  of  Corura,  the  guns  of  the  enemy  paid  his  fu- 
neral honours,  and  Soult,  with  a  noble  feeling  of  respect 
for  his  valour,  raised  a  monument  to  his  memory. 

Thus  ended  the  career  of  sir  John  Moore,  a  man 
whose  uncommon  capacity  was  sustained  by  the  purest 
virtue,  and  governed  by  a  disinterested  patriotism 
more  in  keeping  with  the  primitive  than  the  luxurious 
age  of  a  great  nation.  His  tall  graceful  person,  his 
dark  searching  eyes,  strongly  defined  forehead,  and 
sinoularly  expressive  mouth,  indicated  a  noble  dispo- 
sition and  a  refined  understanding,  while  the  lofty  sen- 
timents of  honour  hal)itual  to  his  mind,  being  adorned 
by  a  subtle  playful  wit,  gave  him,  in  conversation,  an 
ascendency  that  he  always  preserved  by  the  decisive 
vigour  of  his  actions.  He  maintained  the  right  with  a 
vehemence  bordering  on  fierceness,  and  every  important 
transaction  in  which  he  was  engaged  increased  his  repu- 
tation for  talent,  and  confirmed  his  character  as  a  stern 
enemy  to  vice, a  steadfast  friend  to  merit,  a  iustand  faith- 
ful servant  of  his  country.  The  honest  loved  him.  the 
dishonest  feared  him  ;  for  while  he  lived  he  did  not  shun, 
but  scorned  and  spurned  the  base,  and  with  characteristic 
propriety,  they  spurned  at  hi:n  when  he  was  dead. 

A  soldier  from  his  earliest  youth.  Moore  thirsted  for 
the  honours  of  his  profession,  and  feeling  that  he  was 
worthy  to  lead  a  British  army,  hailed  the  fortune  that 
placed  him  at  the  head  of  the  troops  destined  for  Spain. 
As  the  stream  of  time  passed,  the  inspiring  hopes  of 
triumph  disappeared,  but  the  austerer  glory  of  suflTer- 
injT  remained,  and  with  a  firm  heart  he  accepted  that 
gift  of  a  severe  fate.  Confiding  in  the  strength  of  his 
genius,  he  disregirded  the  clamours  of  presumptuous 
ignorance,  and  opposing  sound  military  views  to  the 
foolish  projects  so  insolently  thrust  upon  him  by  the 
ambassador,  he  conducted  his  long  and  arduous  retreat 
with  sagacity,  intelligence,  and  fortitude ;  no  insult 
disturbed,  no  falsehood  deceived  him,  no  remonstrance 
shook  his  determination  ;  fortune  frowned  without  sub- 
duing his  constancy  ;  death  struck,  but  the  spirit  of  the 
man  remained  unbroken  when  his  shattered  body 
scarcely  afforded  it  a  habitation.  Having  done  all  that 
was  just  towards  others,  he  remembered  what  was  due 
to  himself;  neither  the  shock  of  the  mortal  blow,  nor 
the  lingering  hours  of  acute  pain  which  preceded  his 
dissolution,  could  quell  the  pride  of  his  gallant  heart, 
or  lower  the  dignified  feeling  with  which,  conscious  of 
merit,  he  at  the  last  moment  asserted  his  right  to  the 
gratitude  of  the  country  he  had  served  so  truly. 

If  glory  be  a  distinction,  for  such  a  man  death  is  not 
a  leveller ! 

*  Mr.  James  Moore's  Narrative.    . 


CHAPTER  VI. 

OBSERVATIOV'S GENERAL  VIEW   OF  THE  CAMPAIGN. 

Observations— The  conduct  of  Napoleon  an'1  that  ofthe  Fn"- 
lish  cnbniet  cuin|)ared— The  eii:peror's  mililarj  rlispositioiis 
exaniir.ed — Propri.  ty  of  sir  Jphn  Moore's  operations  discuss- 
ed— Diac^ram,  expjsin^  the  rJitive  positions  ol  Spanish, 
French,  and  En>;)ish  armies — Propriety  of  Sir  .John  Moore's 
retreat  (discussed;  anci  the  qutstion,  whether  h(  should  have 
fallen  back  on  Portuj^al  or  G;iHicia,  invcstigati  d — Sir  Joha 
Moore's  judjiment  defended;  his  conduct  calumniated  by 
intrrested  men  for  parly  purposes;  eul  i^ised  by  marshal 
Soult,  by  JNfapoleon,  by  the  duke  of  Wellington. 

Mr.  Canning,  in  an  official  communication  to  the 
Spanish  deputies  in  London,  observed,  that  '  the  con- 
duct of  the  campaign  in  Portugal  was  unsatisfactory, 
and  ina<leqnate  to  the  brilliant  successes  with  which  "it 
opened.'  In  the  relation  of  that  campaign,  it  has  been 
shown  how  little  the  activity  and  foresight  ofthe  cabi- 
net contributed  to  those  successes,  and  the  following 
short  analysis  will  prove  that,  with  respect  to  the  cam- 
paign in  Spain  also,  the  proceedings  of  the  ministers 
were  marked  alike  by  tardiness  and  incapacity. 

.loseph  abandoned  Madrid  the  3d  of  August,  and  on 
the  llth  of  the  same  month,  the  French  troops  from 
the  most  distant  parts  of  Europe  were  in  motion  to  re- 
medy the  disasters  in  the  Peninsula. 

'i"he  1  St  of  September  a  double  conscription,  furnishing 
one  hundred  and  sixty  thousand  men,  was  called  out  to 
replace  the  troops  withdrawn  from  Poland  and  Germany. 

The  4th  of  September  the  emperor  announced  to  the 
senate,  that  '  he  was  resolved  to  push  the  aflfairs  of  the 
Peninsula  with  the  greatest  activity,  and  to  destroy 
the  armies  which  the  Enjjlish  had  disembarked  in  that 
country. 

The  llth,  the  advanced  guard  of  the  army  coming 
from  Germany  reached  Paris,  and  was  there  publicly 
harangued  by  the  emperor. 

The  8th  of  November  that  monarch  broke  into  Spain 
at  the  head  of  three  hundred  thousand  men,  and  the 
5th  of  December,  not  a  vestige  of  the  Spanish  armies 
remaining,  he  took  possession  of  Madrid. 

Now  the  Asturian  deputies  arrived  in  London  the 
fith  of  .Tune,  and  yet  on  the  '20th  of  August — the  battle 
of  Vimiero  being  then  unfnught,  and,  consequently,  the 
fate  of  the  campaign  in  Portugal  uncertain, — the  Eng- 
lish minister  invited  sir  Hew  Dalrymple  to  discuss 
three  plans  of  operations  in  Spain,  each  founded  upon 
data  tttterly  false,  and  all  objectional  in  detail.  He 
also  desired  that  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  should  go  to  the 
Asturias  to  ascertain  what  facilities  that  country  offer- 
ed for  the  disembarkation  of  an  English  army;  and 
the  whole  number  of  troops  disposable  for  the  caip- 
paign,  exclusive  of  those  already  in  Portugal,  he  stated 
to  be  twenty  thousand,  of  which  one  half  was  in  Eng- 
land and  the  other  in  Sicily.  He  acknowledged  that  no 
information  yet  received  had  enabled  the  cabinet  to  de- 
cide as  to  the  application  of  the  forces  at  home,  or  the 
ulterior  use  to  be  made  of  those  in  Portugal,  yet,  with 
singular  rashness,  the  whole  ofthe  southern  provinces, 
containing  the  richest  cities,  finest  harbours,  and  most 
numerous  armies,  were  discarded  from  consideration  ; 
and  sir  Hew  Dalrymple,  who  was  well  acquainted 
with  that  part  of  Spain,  and  in  close  and  friendly  cor- 
respondence with  the  chiefs,  was  directed  to  confine 
his  attention  to  the  northern  provinces,  of  which  he 
knew  nothing. 

The  reduction  of  .Tunot's  army  in  Portugal,  and  the 
discomfiture  of  Joseph  on  the  Ebro,  were  regarded  as 
certain  events,  and  the  observations  of  the  minister 
were  principally  directed,  not  to  the  best  mode  of  at- 
tack, but  to  the  choice  of  a  line  of  march  that  would 
ensure  the  utter  destruction  or  captivity  of  the  whole 
French  army;  nay,  elated  with  extravagant  hopes, 
and  strano-elv  despisingr  Napoleon's  power,  he  instruci- 
ed  Lord  William  Bentiuck  to  urge  the  central  junta  to 


124 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  IV. 


an  invasion  of  France,  as  soon  as  the  army  on  the  Ebro 
should  be  annihilated.  Thus  it  appears  that  the  Emr- 
lish  ministers  were  either  profoundly  igrnorant  of  the 
real  state  of  affairs,  or  that,  with  a  force  scattered  in 
England,  Portugal,  and  Sicily,  and  not  exceeding 
forty-five  thousand  men,  they  expected  in  one  cam- 
paign, first  to  subdue  twenty-six  thousand  French  un- 
der Junot,  then  to  destroy  eighty  thousand  under  Jo- 
seph, and  turning  the  tide  of  war,  to  invade  France. 

The  battle  of  Viniiero  took  place,  and  sir  Arthur 
WcUcsley  naturally  declined  a  mission  more  suitable 
to  a  staff"  captain  than  a  victorious  commander;  but 
before  sir  Hew's  answer,  exposing  the  false  calcula- 
tions of  the  minister's  plans,  could  be  received  in  Eng- 
land, a  despatch,  dated  the  Sd^fSeptember,  announced 
the  resolution  of  the  governmenPlo  employ  an  army  in 
the  northern  provinces  of  Spain,  and  directed  twenty 
thousand  men  to  be  held  in  readiness  to  unite  with 
other  forces  to  be  sent  from  England.  Nevertheless, 
this  project  also  was  so  immature,  that  no  intimation 
was  given  how  the  junction  was  to  be  effected,  whether 
by  sea  or  land  ;  nor  had  the  minister  even  ascertained 
that  the  Spaniards  would  permit  English  troops  to  en- 
ter Spain  at  all.  Three  weeks  later,  lord  William 
Bentinck,  writing  from  Madrid,  says,  '  I  had  an  inter- 
view with  Florida  lilanca,  he  expressed  his  surprise 
that  there  should  be  a  doubt  of  the  Spaniards  wishing 
for  the  assistance  of  the  English  army.'  Such  also 
was  the  confusion  at  home,  that  lord  Castlereagh  re- 
peatedly expressed  his  fears  lest  the  embarkation  of 
•Junol's  troops  should  have  absorbed  all  the  means  of 
transport  in  the  Tagus.  when  a  simple  reference  to  the 
transport  cfhce  in  London  would  have  satisfied  him, 
that  although  the  English  army  should  also  be  em- 
barked, there  would  still  remain  a  surplus  of  twelve 
thousand  tons. 

When  the  popular  cry  rose  against  the  convention 
of  Cintra,  the  generals-in-chief  were  recalled  in  suc- 
cession, as  rapidly  as  they  had  been  appointed,  the 
despatches  addressed  to  one  generally  fell  into  the 
hands  of  his  successor;  but  the  plans  of  the  ministers 
becoming  at  last  mature,  on  the  Gth  of  October  sir 
John  Moore  was  finally  appointed  to  lead  the  forces 
into  Spain.  At  this  period  the  head  of  the  grand 
French  army  was  alreadj^  in  the  passes  of  the  Pyre- 
nees, the  hostile  troops  on  the  Ebro  coming  to  blows, 
the  Spaniards  weak  and  divided,  and  the  English  forty 
marches  from  the  scene  of  action  :  yet,  said  the  minis- 
ter to  sir  John  Moore,  '  there  will  be  full  time  to  con- 
cert )'our  plan  of  operations  with  the  Spanish  generals 
before  the  equipment  of  your  army  can  be  completed.' 
Was  this  the  way  to  oppose  Napoleon  1  Could  such 
proceedings  lead  to  aught  hut  disaster]  It  has  been 
said  that  sir  Hew  Dalrymi)l(;'s  negligence  was  the 
cause  of  this  delay,  that  he  should  have  had  the  troops 
in  readiness.  But  that  general  could  not  prudently 
incur  the  expense  of  equi])ping,  for  a  march,  an  army 
that  was  likely  to  be  enibarked ;  he  could  not,  in 
short,  (livin(!  the  plans  of  the  ministers  before  they 
were  formed,  and  it  is  evident  that  the  error  attaches 
entirelj"^  to  the  government. 

The  incapacity  of  the  Spanish  generals  has  been  al- 
ready sufficiently  exposed  by  occasional  observations 
in  the  narrative,  their  faults,  glaring  and  fatal,  call  for 
no  further  remark  ;  but  the  exact  coml)inations,  the  en- 
ergy and  rapidity  of  the  French  emperor,  merit  the 
mojt  careful  examination.  His  operations  were  not, 
as  they  have  been  generally  considered,  a  pompous 
display  of  power,  to  create  an  appearance  of  conquest 
that  was  unreal;  not  a  mere  violent  irruption  with  a 
multitude  of  men,  but  a  series  of  skilful  and  scientific 
movements,  worthy  of  so  great  a  general  and  politician. 
It  is  true  that  his  force  was  immense,  and  that  the 
Spaniards  were  but  contemptible  soldiers,  yet  he  never 
neglected  the  lessons  of  experience,  nor  deviated  from 


the  strictest  rules  of  art.  With  astonishing  activity, 
and  when  we  consider  the  state  of  his  political  relatiins 
on  the  continent,  we  may  add,  with  astonishing  bold- 
ness, he  first  collected  ample  means  to  attain  his  ob- 
ject ;  then  deceiving  his  enemies  with  regard  to  his 
numbers,  position,  and  intentions,  and  chocsing  hia 
time  with  admirable  judgment,  he  broke  through  the 
weak  part  of  their  line,  and  seized  Burgos,  a  central 
point,  which  enabled  him  to  envelope  and  destroy  the 
left  wing  of  the  Spaniards,  before  their  right  could 
hear  of  his  attack,  the  latter  being  itself  turned  by  the 
same  movement,  and  exposed  to  a  like  fate.  This  po- 
sition also  enabled  him  to  menace  the  ca]!ital,  to  keep 
the  English  army  in  check,  and  to  cover  the  form.ation 
of  those  magazines  and  stores  which  were  necessary 
to  render  Burgos  the  base  and  pivot  of  further  opera- 
tions. 

Napoleon's  forces  were  numerous  enough  to  have 
attacked  Castafios  and  Palafox,  while  Blake  was  being 
pursued  by  the  first  and  fourth  corps  ;  but  trusting 
nothing  to  chance,  he  waited  for  twelve  days,  until  the 
position  of  the  English  army  was  ascertained,  the 
strength  of  the  northern  provinces  quite  broken,  and  a 
secure  place  of  arms  established.  Then  leaving  the 
second  corps  to  cover  his  communication,  and  sending 
the  fourth  corps  into  the  flat  couttry,  to  coast,  as  it 
were,  the  heads  of  the  English  columns,  and  to  turn 
the  passes  of  the  (-arpentino  mountains,  he  caused  the 
Spanish  right  wing  io  be  destroyed,  and  himself  ap- 
proached the  capital,  at  a  moment  when  not  a  vestige 
of  a  national  army  was  left ;  when  he  had  good  reason 
to  think  that  the  English  were  in  full  retreat;  when 
the  whole  of  his  own  corps  were  close  at  hand,  and 
consequently  when  the  greatest  moral  effect  could  he 
produced,  and  the  greatest  physical  power  concentrated 
at  the  same  tiuie  to  take  advantage  of  it.  Napoleon's 
dispositions  were  indeed  surprisingly  skilful  ;  for,  al- 
though marshal  Lefebre's  precipitation  at  Zornoza,  by 
prolonging  Blake's  agony,  lost  six  days  of  promise,  it 
is  certain,  that  even  reverses  in  battle  could  neither 
have  checked  the  emperor,  nor  helped  the  Sjiaiiiards. 

If  Soult  had  been  beaten  at  Gamonal,  Napoleon  was 
close  at  hand  to  support  the  second  corps,  and  the  sixth 
corps  would  have  fallen  upon  the  flank  and  rear  of  the 
Spaniards. 

If  tlie  first  corps  had  been  defeated  at  Esp'«iosa,  the 
second  and  fourth  corps,  and  the  emperor's  troops, 
would  have  taken  Blake  in  flank  and  rear. 

If  Lasnes  had  been  defeated  at  Tudela,  he  could 
have  fallen  back  on  Pampeluna,  the  fifth  and  eight 
corps  were  marching  to  support  him,  and  the  sixth 
corps  would  have  taken  the  Spaniards  in  flank. 

If  the  emperor  had  been  repulsed  at  the  Somosierra, 
the  sixth  corps  would  have  turned  that  position  by 
Guadalaxara,  and  the  fourth  corps  by  CJuadarama. 

If  sir  John  Moore  had  retreated  on  Portugal,  the 
fourth  corps  was  nearer  to  Lisbon  than  he  was  ;  and 
if  he  had  overthrown  Soult,  the  fifth  and  eiaht  corps 
were  ready  to  sustain  that  marshal,  while  Napoleon, 
with  fifty  thousand  men,  as  we  have  seen,  was  prepar- 
ed to  cut  the  British  line  of  retreat  into  Gallicia.  In 
short,  no  possible  event  could  have  divided  the  em- 
peror's forces,  and  he  constantly  preserved  a  central 
position  which  enabled  him  to  unite  his  masses  in  suf- 
ficient time  to  repair  any  momentary  disaster.  By  a 
judicious  mixture  of  force  and  poiicy  also,  be  obliged 
Madrid  to  surrender  in  two  days,  and  thus  prevented 
the  enthusiasm  which  would  doubtless  have  arisen  if 
that  capital  had  been  defended  for  any  time,  and  the 
heart  luirnin^'s  if  it  had  been  stormed.  The  seccnd 
sweep  that  he  was  preparing  to  make  when  sir  John 
Moore's  march  called  off  his  attention  from  the  south 
would  undoubtedly  liave  put  him  in  possession  of  the 
remaining  great  cities  of  the  Peninsula.  Then  the 
civil  benefits  promised  in  his  decrees  and  speeches 


1809.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


125 


/ould  lave  produced  thoir  full  effect,  and  the  result 
niay  be  judged  of  by  the  fact,  that  in  1811  and  12, 
Araofon,  Valencia,  and  Andalusia  were,  under  the  able 
administration  of  marshals  Soult  and  Suchet,  as  sub- 
missive as  any  department  of  France.  Both  generals 
raised  Spanish  battalions,  and  employed  them  not  only 
to  preserve  the  public  peace,  but  to  chase  and  put  down 
the  guerillas  of  the  neighbouring  provinces. 

Sir  John  Moore's  talents  saved  the  Peninsula  at  this 
crisis;  and  here  only  a  military  error  of  Napoleon's 
may  be  detected.  Forgetting  his  own  maxim  that  war 
is  not  a  conjectural  art,  he  took  for  granted  that  the 
English  army  was  falling  back  to  Portugal,  and  with- 
out ascertaining  that  it  was  so,  acted  upon  the  sup- 
position, 'J'his  apparent  negligence,  so  unlike  his 
usual  circumspection,  leads  to  the  notion,  that  through 
Mf:rla  he  might  have  become  acquainted  with  the  pe- 
culiar opinions  and  rash  tem))er  of  Mr.  Frere,  and 
trusted  that  the  treacherous  arts  of  the  Spaniard,  in 
conjunction  with  the  presumptuous  disposition  of  the 
plenipotentiary,  would  so  mislead  the  English  general, 
as  to  induce  him  to  carry  his  army  to  Madrid,  and  thus 
deliver  it  up  entire  and  bound.  -It  was  an  error;  but 
Napoleon  could  be  deceived  or  negligent  only  for  a 
moment.  With  what  vigour  he  recovered  himself,  and 
hastened  to  remedy  his  error !  How  instantaneously 
he  relinquished  his  intentions  against  the  south,  turned 
his  face  away  from  the  glittering  prize,  and  bent  his 
whole  force  against  the  only  man  among  his  adversaries 
that  had  discovered  talent  and  decision  !  Let  those 
who  have  seen  the  preparations  necessary  to  enable  a 
small  army  to  act,  even  on  a  pre-conceived  plan,  say 
what  uncontrollable  energy  that  man  possessed,  who, 
suddenly  interrupted  in  such  great  designs,  could,  in 
the  course  of  a  few  hours,  put  fifty  thousand  men  in 
movement  oYi  a  totally  new  line  of  operations,  and  in 
the  midst  of  winter  execute  a  march  of  two  hundred 
miles,  with  a  rapidity  hardly  to  be  equalled  under  the 
most  favourable  circumstances. 

The  indef\itigable  activity  of  the  duke  of  Dalmatia 
greatly  contributed  to  the  success  of  the  whole  cam- 
paign ;  and  it  is  a  remarkable  circumstance,  that  Soult 
and  Napoleon,  advancing  from  different  bases,  should 
have  so  combined  their  movements,  that,  after  march- 
ing, the  one  above  a  hundred,  and  the  other  above  two 
hundred  miles,  through  a  hostile  country,  they  effected 
their  junction  at  a  given  point,  and  at  a  given  hour, 
without  failure  :  nor  is  it  less  remarkable,  that  such  a 
decided  and  well-conducted  operation  should  have  been 
baffled  by  a  general  at  the  head  of  an  inexperienced 
army. 

When  Sylla,  after  all  his  victories,  styled  himself 
a  happy,  rather  than  a  great  general,  he  discovered  his 
profound  knowledge  of  the  military  art.  Experience 
liad  taught  him  that  the  speed  of  one  legion,  the  inac- 
tivity of  another,  the  obstinacy,  the  ignorance,  or  the 
treachery  of  a  subordinate  officer,  was  sufficient  to  mar 
the  best  concerted  plan — nay,  that  the  intervention  of 
a  shower  of  rain,  an  unexpected  ditch,  or  any  appa- 
rently trivial  accident,  might  determine  the  fate  of  a 
whole  army.  It  taught  him  that  the  vicissitudes  of 
war  are  so  many,  that  disappointment  will  attend  the 
wisest  combinations  ;  that  a  ruinous  defeat,  the  work 
of  chance,  often  closes  the  career  of  the  boldest  and 
most  sagacious  of  generals,  and  that  to  judge  of  a 
commander's  conduct  by  the  event  alone,  is  equally 
onjust  and  unphilosophical,  a  refuge  for  vanity  and  ig- 
norance. 

These  reflections  seem  to  be  peculiarly  applicable 
to  sir  John  Moore's  campaign,  which  has  by  sundry 
writers  been  so  unfairly  discussed.  Many  of  the  sub- 
sequent disasters  of  the  French  can  now  be  distinctly 
traced  to  the  operations  of  the  British  army.  It  can 
be  demonstrated  that  the  reputation  of  that  excellent 
man  was  basely  sacrificed  at  the  period  of  his  death, 


and  that  the  virulent  censures  passed  upon  his  conduct 
have  been  as  inconsiderate  as  they  were  unmerited  and 
cruel.  The  nature  of  the  commands  held  by  sir  John 
Moore  in  the  years  1807-8-9  forced  him  into  a  series 
of  embarrassments,  from  which  few  men  could  have 
extricated  themselves.  After  refusing  the  charge  of 
the  absurd  expedition  to  Egypt  in  1806,  which  ended, 
as  he  judged  it  must  do,  unfavourably,  he  succeeded 
to  the  command  of  the  troops  in  Sicily,  a  situation 
which  immediately  involved  him  in  unpleasant  discus- 
sions with  the  queen  of  Naples  and  the  British  envoy  ; 
discussions  to  which  the  subsequent  well-known  enmity 
of  the  cabinet  of  that  day  may  be  traced.  By  his  frank 
conduct,  clear  judgnjcnt,  and  firm  spirit,  he  soon  ob- 
tained an  influence  over  the  wretched  court  of  Palermo 
that  promised  the  happiest  results;  the  queen's  repug- 
nance to  a  reform  was  overcome,  the  ministers  were 
awed,  and  the  miserable  intrigues  of  the  day  abated, 
the  Sicilian  army  was  reorganized,  and  a  good  military 
system  was  commenced  under  the  advice  of  the  British 
general. 

This  promising  state  of  affairs  lasted  but  a  short 
time ;  the  Russian  fleet  put  into  the  Tagus,  the  French 
threatened  Portugal,  and  Sicily  was  no  longer  consi- 
dered !  Sir  John  Moore  was  ordered  to  quit  that  island, 
and  to  assemble  a  large  force  at  Gibraltar  for  a  special 
service  ;  but  the  troops  to  be  gathered  were  dispersed 
in  the  Mediterranean  from  Egypt  to  the  straits,  and 
their  junction  could  not  be  effected  at  all,  unless  the 
English  ambassador  at  Constantinople  should  succeed 
in  bringing  a  negotiation,  then  pending  between  the 
Turks  and  Russians,  to  a  happy  issue,*  Now  this 
special  service  in  question  had  two  objects,  1,  to  aid 
sir  Sydney  Smith  in  carrying  off  the  royal  family  of 
Portugal  to  the  Brazils  ;  2,  to  take  possession  of  Ma 
deira  ;  yet  neither  were  made  known  to  the  general  be- 
fore his  arrival  at  Gibraltar,  which  was  not  until  after 
Junot  had  taken  possession  of  Lisbon,  Sir  John  Moore 
then,  following  his  instructions,  proceeded  home,  and 
thus  our  interests  in  Sicily  were  again  abandoned  to 
the  vices  and  intrigues  of  the  court  of  Palermo,  On 
the  passage  he  crossed  general  Spencer  going  with  a 
force  against  Ceuta,  and  soon  after  he  had  reached 
England,  he  was  despatched  to  Sweden,  without  any 
specific  object,  and  with  such  vague  instructions,  that 
an  immediate  collision  with  the  unfortunate  Gustavus 
was  the  consequence. 

Having  with  much  dexterity  and  judgment  with- 
drawn himself  and  his  army  from  the  capricious  vio- 
lence of  that  monarch,  sir  John  was  superseded  and 
sent  to  Portugal,  with  the  third  rank  in  an  army  which 
at  that  time  no  man  had  such  good  claims  to  command 
as  himself;  the  mode  of  doing  this  was  also  offensive, 
and  it  was  evident  that  the  ministers  desired  to  drive 
him  into  private  life.  Their  efforts  were,  however, 
powerless  against  his  pure  and  elevated  patriotism.  In 
a  personal  conference  with  lord  Castlereagh,  he  ex- 
pressed his  indignation  at  the  insults  offered  to  him, 
and  then  repaired  to  his  station  at  Portsmouth,  where 
an  official  letter  followed  him,  the  purport  being  that 
his  remonstrance  being  disrespectful,  it  would  be  re- 
ferred to  the  king  for  reprehension,  and  that  measures 
would  be  taken  to  remove  him  from  what  appeared  to 
be  a  disagreeable  situation  :  in  other  words,  that  his 
resignation  was  demanded.  Without  a  moment's  hesi- 
tation, he  replied  to  this  menace,  in  a  letter  which 
breathed  the  very  spirit  of  manly  dignity  and  patriotism. 
'  I  am,'  he  wrote,  '  this  moment  honoured  with  your 
lordship's  letter  (by  messenger)  of  yesterday's  date. 
As  I  have  already  had  the  honour  to  express  my  senti- 
ments to  your  lordship  fully  at  my  last  interview,  it  is, 
I  think,  unnecessary  to  trouble  you  with  a  repetition  of 
them  now      I  am  about  to  proceed   on  the  service  on 


*  Sir  John  Moore's  Journal.  MS 


126 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  IV 


winch  I  have  born  orderfd,  and  it  shall  be  my  endravoiir  derstord  or  practised  by  the  Eno;l:ch  g^enerals  at  thia 
to  acquit  myself  with  the  same  zeal  by  which  I  have  time,  that  instead  of  the  country  being  carefully  recon- 
ever  been  actuated  when  employed  in  the  service  of  my  noitred  by  officers  of  skill,  the  march  of  the  army  w^a.f 
country.  'I'he  communication  which  it  has  been  arranfred  by  such  hasty  and  inaccurate  information  as 
thought  proper  to  make  to  bis  majesty  cannot  fail  to  could  be  collected  from  the  peasants ;'  and  that  '  by 
give  me  pleasure;  I  have  the  most  perfect  reliance  these  reports  sir  John  Moore  was  induced  to  divide  his 
on   his   majesty's  justice,  and  shall  never  feel  greater    army.' 

security  than  when  my  conduct,  my  character,  and  my  |  The  second  of  these  assertions  is  devoid  of  reason, 
honour  are  under  his  majesty's  protection.'  He  heard  and  both  are  contrary  to  fact.  Sir  David  Baird  wa« 
no  more  on  that  subject.  j  never  at  Lisbon,  but  was  sent  with  his  troops,  by  the 

The  good  fortune  of  England  was  never  more  con-  ministers  direct  from  England  to  Corufa.  The  '  gene* 
spicuous  than  at  this  period,  when  her  armies  and  fleets  ral  science  of  war  upon  the  most  extended  scale,'  is  an 
were  thus  bandied  about,  and  a  blind  chance  governed  inflated  and  unmeaning  expression,  the  most  contracted 
the  councils  at  home.  For  first  a  force  collected  from  operation  requires  that  good  information  should  be  ob- 
all  parts  of  the  Mediterranean  was  transported  to  the  tained  ;  and  as  to  the  fact,  sir  John  Moore  employed 
Baltic  at  a  time  when  an  expedition  composed  of  troops,  his  own  staff  ofhcers  to  examine  the  roads,  sought  in- 
whicb  had  but  a  simrt  time  before  come  back  from  the  formation  equally  from  noble  and  peasant,  and,  like  all 
Ealtic,  were  sailing  from  England  to  the  Mediterranean,  i  great  commanders,  regulated  his  proceedings  by  the 
An  armj'  intendt  d  to  conquer  South  America  was  hap-    general  result  of  his  inquiries. 

pily  assembled  in  Ireland  at  the  moment  w  hen  an  un-  The  first  dividing  of  the  army  was,  therefore,  the 
expected  event  called  for  their  services  in  Portugal.  A  '  act  of  the  ministers,  who  sent  Baird  to  Coruiia;  the 
division  destined  to  attack  the  Spaniards  at  Ceuta,  j  after  separation  of  the  artillery  was  sir  John  Moore's, 
arrived  at  (.'ibraltar,  at  the  instant  whm  \Ue  insurrec-  ,  the  reasons  for  which  have  been  already  stated  ;  but  it 
lion  of  Andalusia  fortimately  prevented  ihem  from  ]  is  worth  while  to  examine  what  the  effect  of  that  meas- 
making  an  attempt  that  would  have  materially  aided  I  ure  was,  and  what  it  might  have  been.  And  here  it 
Napoleon's  schemes  against  the  Peninsula.  Again,  ;  may  be  observed,  that,  although  a  brigade  of  light  six- 
three  days  after  sir  John  Moore  had  withdrawn  bis  !  pounders  did  accompany  the  troops  to  Almeida,  the 
army  from  Sweden,  orders  arrived  to  employ  it  in  '  road,  in  a  military  sense,  was  not  practicable,  for  the 
carrying  off  the  Spanish  troops  under  Romana, — an  !  guns  were  in  some  j)laces  letdown  the  rocks  by  ropes, 
operation  for  which  it  was  not  required,  and  which  i  and  in  others  carried  over  the  difficult  places  !  a  prac- 
would  have  retarded,  if  not  entirely  frustrated,  the  cam-  '  ticable  affair  with  one  brigade,  but  how  could  the  great 
paign  in  Portugal  ;  but  the  ministers  were  resolved  at :  train  of  guns  and  ammunition-waggons  that  accompa- 
anj'  cost  to  prevent  Moore  from  commanding  the  army  j  nied  sir  John  Hope,  have  passed  such  places  without 
destined  for  Portugal.  Nor  was  it  the  least  part  of  a  loss  of  time  that  would  have  proved  more  injurious 
England's  fortune  that  in  such  long-con tidmed  voyages  1  to  the  operations  than  the  separation  of  the  artillery  ? 
in  bad  seasons,  no  disaster  befol  the  huge  fleets  thus  j  The  advance  of  the  army  was  guided  by  three  contin- 
employed  in  bearing  her  strength  from  one  extremity  '  gent  cases,  any  one  of  which  arising  would  have  im- 
of  Europe  to  the  other.  j  mediately  influenced  the  operations;   L  Blake  on   the 

After  the  convention  of  Cintra,  Moore  was  again  j  left,  or  Casta'os  and  Palafox  upon  the  right,  might 
placed  at  the  head  of  an  army,  an  appointment  unex-  [  have  beaten  the  French,  and  advanced  to  the  Pyrenees, 
pected  by  him,  for  the  frank  and  bold  manner  in  which  j  2.  They  might  have  maintained  their  position  on  the 
he  expressed  himself  to  the  ministers  left  him  little  to  i  Ebro.  3.  The  arrival  of  reinforcements  from  France 
hope;  but  the  personal  goodwill  of  the  king,  and  his  j  might  have  forced  the  Spaniards  to  fall  back  upon  ihe 
own  lowerinsf  reputation,  crushed  all  opposition.    Thus,  !  upper   Duero,   on  one   side,  and  to  the   mountains  of 


in  a  few  months  after  be  bad  (|uitted  Sweden,  Moore, 
with  an  army  not  exceeding  twenty-four  thousand  men, 
was  in  the  heart  of  Spain,  opposed  to  Napoleon,  who 
having  passed  the  Pyrenees  at  the  head  of  three  hun- 
dred and  thirty  thousand  men,  could  readily  bring  two 
hundred  thousand  to  bear  on  the  British;  a  vast  dis- 
proportion of  numbers,  and  a  sufllcient  answer  to  all 
the  idle  censures  passed  upon  the  retreat  to  Corufia. 

'I'hf  most  plausible  grounds  of  accusation  against  sir 
John  Moore's  conduct,  rest  on  three  alleged  errors  : — 

1st,  That  he  divided  bis  forces; 

2dly.  That  he  advanced  against  Soult ; 

3dly.  That  he  made  a  precipitate  and  unnecessary 
retreat. 

When  a  sfeneral  aware  of  the  strength  of  his  adver- 
sary, and  of  tiie  resources  to  be  placed  at  his  own  dis- 
posal, arrantres  a  plan  of  campaio-n,  he  may  be  strictly 
judged  by  the  rules  of  art ;  but  if,  as  in  the  case  of  sir 
John  Moore,  he  is  suddenly  appointed  to  conduct  im- 
portant operations  without  a  plan  being  arranged,  or 
the  means  given  to  arrange  one,  then  it  is  evident  that 
his  capacity  or  incapacity  must  be  judged  of  by  the 
enerfry  he  disf)lays,  the  comprehensive  view  be  takes 
of  aflTairs.  and  the  rapidity  with  which  be  accommodates 
his  measures  to  events,  that  the  original  vice  of  bis  ap- 
pointment will  not  permit  him  to  control.  Sir  Walter 
Scott,  in  bis  Life  of  Napoleon,  with  that  intrepidity  of 
error  which  marks  the  work,  has  asserted,  '  That  Moore 
sent  ten  thouand  men,  under  sir  D.  Baird,  by  sea,  to 
Corufia.'  That  '  ll.e  general  science  of  war,  upon  the 
most  extended  scale,  seems  to  have  been  so  li*.'.e  uu- 


Guadalaxara  on  the  other.  In  the  first  case,  there  was 
no  risk  of  marching  by  divisions  towards  Burgos, 
which  M^as  the  point  of  concentration  given  by  the 
British  and  Spanish  ministers.  In  the  second  case, 
the  armv  could  safely  unite  at  Valladolid.  In  the  third 
case,  if  the  division  of  sir  David  Baird  had  reached 
Toro  early  in  November,  and  this  it  was  reasonable  to 
expect,  because  that  general  arrived  at  Corufia  the  13th 
of  October,  the  retrograde  movement  of  the  Spanish 
armies  would  probably  have  drawn  the  English  to  the 
Guadarama,  as  a  safe  and  central  point  between  the 
retiring  .Spanish  wings. 

Now  the  artillery  niarching  from  the  Alemtejo  by  the 
roads  of  Talavera  and  Naval  Carnero,  to  Burgos,  would 
pass  over  one  hundred  and  two  S[)aiiiHh  leagues  ;  to 
Aranda  de  Duero,  eighty-nine  leagues  ;  to  Valladolid, 
ninety-two  leagues;  while  the  columns  that  marched  hy 
Almeida  and  Salamanca  would  pass  over  one  hundr'd 
and  sixteen  leagues  to  Burgos,  and  ninety-eight  to 
Valladolid.  Wherefore,  supposing  the  Spaniards  suc- 
cessful, or  even  holding  their  own,  the  separation  of  the 
artillery  was  an  advantage,  and  if  the  Spaniards  were 
driven  hack,  their  natural  line  of  retreat  would  have 
brought  them  towards  Madrid,  Blake  by  Aranda  to  the 
Somosierra,  and  Casta' os  and  Palafox  by  Siouf.uza 
and  Tarancon,  to  cover  the  capital,  and  to  maintain  an 
interior  communication  between  the  Somosierra  and 
the  Henares  river.  The  British  artillery  would  then 
have  halted  at  P>spinar,  after  a  march  of  only  eighty 
leagues,  and  Baird  and  Moore's  corps  uniting  at 
Salamanca  early  in  November,  might  by  a  flank  march 


1809.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


127 


(0  Arevalo,  have  insured  the  concentration  of  the  whole 
ormv. 

Thus,  in  the  three  anticipated  cases,  the  separation  of 
the  arlillrrv  was  prudent,  and  promised  to  be  advanta- 
geous. Tiiere  was,  indeed,  a  fourtli  case,  that  which 
really  happened.  All  the  Spanish  armies  were  dis- 
persed in  an  instant!  utterly  effaced  !  Eut  sir  John 
Moore  could  not  have  divined  such  a  catastrophe,  while 
his  ears  were  rin!jin£r  with  the  universal  clamour  about 
the  numbers  and  enthusiasm  of  the  patriots,  and  if  he 
had  foreseen  even  a  part  of  such  disasters,  he  would 
never  have  advanced  from  Portugal.  With  the  plans 
of  the  Spanish  £rovernment  he  was  unacquainted,  but 
he  Avas  official! v  informed  that  above  one  hundred  and 
forty  thousand  Spanish  soldiers  were  between  him  and 
a  feeble  dispirited  enemy;  and  as  the  intercepted  letter 
from  the  governor  of  Bayonne  stated,  that  the  reinforce- 
ments would  only  arrive  between  the  18th  of  October 
and  the  18th  of  November,  it  was  reasonable  to  suppose 
the  French  would  not  commence  offensive  operations 
before  the  latter  period,  and  that  ainple  time  would  be 
afforded  to  concentrate  the  English  troops  under  the 
protection  of  the  Spanish  armies. 

If  sir  John  Moore  could  have  suspected  the  delusion 
under  which  the  British  government  acted  ;  if  he  could 
have  divined  the  incredible  folly  of  the  central  junta 
and  the  Spanish  generals,  or  the  inaccuracy  of  the  mili- 
tary agents  ;  if  he  could  have  supposed  that  the  .Spanish 
armies  were  weak  in  numbers,  weaker  in  spirit,  and 
destitutp  of  food  and  clothing,  or  that,  while  the  Span- 
ish authorities  were  pressing  him  to  advance,  they 
would  wantonly  detain  sir  David  Baird's  troops  seven- 
teen days  en  beard  the  transports  ;  if  he  could  have 
imagined  all  this,  undoubtedly  his  arrangements  ought 
and  would  have  been  diff  rent,  his  army  would  have 
been  kept  together,  and  the  road  to  Salamanca  through 
(/oria,  however  difficult,  would  have  been  preferred  to 
n  divided  march. 

Now  the  dangerous  and  absurd  position  of  the  Spa- 
nish armies,  and  the  remote  situation  of  the  British 
troops  in  October,  may  be  explained  by  the  annexed 
diagram.  Lisbon  being  taken  as  a  centre,  and  the 
distance  a  between  Lisbon  and  Cornea,  being  the  ra- 
dius, let  a  circle  passing  through  Madrid  be  described, 
and  let  the  tangential  line  c  be  drawn  perpendicular 
to  the  radius  a,  meeting  the  secant  b  at  Sanguessa. 
Then  it  will  be  seen  that  as  the  extreme  right  of  the 
Spaniards  wa^  prstpd  at  Sanguessa,  and  Castafios  at 
Calahnrra,  while  Blake  was  near  Durango,  and  the 
main  body  of  the  French  was  at  Vittoria,  the  latter  not 
only  divided  the  Spaniards,  bu.t  was  actually  twenty- 
five  miles  nerrer  to  Burgos  and  Valladolid  (the  points 
of  concentra'ion  for  Moore's  and  Baird's  corps,)  than 
either  Castinos  or  Blake;  and  seventy-five  miles 
nearer  than  Palafox.  On  the  10th,  the  emperor  struck 
the  first  blow,  by  beating  Belvedere  and  seizing  Bur- 
g-^s  ;  bit  sir  David  Burd  did  not  quit  Coruiia  until  the 
12th,  and  did  not  bring  up  the  wholo  of  his  troops  to 
Astorga  bef  re  the  4th  of  December;  hence  it  is  clear, 
that  whatever  road  the  artillery  had  taken,  the  British 
army  could  not  have  averted  the  ruin  of  the  Spaniards. 

Let  us  suppose  the  troops  assembled  at  Salamanca 
en  the  13th  of  November.  They  must  have  advanced 
tithei  to  Valladolid  or  to  Madrid.  If  to  Valladolid,  the 
emperor  was  at  Burgos  with  the  imperial  guards,  ten 
or  twelve  thousand  cavalry,  and  a  hundred  pieces  of 
artillery  ;  the  first  corps  was  within  a  day's  march,  the 
second  and  fourth  corps  within  three  marches,  and  the 
sixth  corps  within  two  marches.  Above  a  hundred 
thousand  French  soldiers  could,  therefore,  have  been 
concentrated  in  three  days,  and  it  is  to  be  observed 
that  sir  John  Moore  never  had  twenty-five  thousaml  in 
the  field.  It  is  said,  he  might  have  gone  to  Madrid; 
in  that  case  the  separation  of  the  artillery  would  have 
been  a  decided  advantage,  and  the  separation  of  Baird's 


corps,  which  was  not  the  general's  arrangement,  the 
error.  The  army  could  not  have  marched  from  Sala- 
manca to  Madrid  in  less  than  seven  days,  and  hence 
before  the  ^Ist  of  November,  twenty-four  thousand 
British  soldiers  could  not  have  been  collected  in  the 
capital;  but  the  fourth  French  corps,  which  reached 
Segovia  the  1st  of  December,  would  meanwhile  liave 
cut  off  the  communication  with  Portugal,  and  the  em- 
peror with  forty  thousand  men  was  at  Aranda  de  Du- 
ero.  Castanos,  who  had  been  defeated  on  the  23d  of 
November,  was  indeed  with  the  remnant  of  ai  army 
at  Guadalaxara  about  the  1st  of  December,  but  the 
sixth  corps  was  close  in  pursuit. 

Moore  must  then  have  done  one  of  three  things.  Ad- 
vanced to  the  succour  of  Castanos,  joined  St.  Juan  at 
the  Somosicrra,  or  retreated  across  the  Tagus.  In  the 
first  case,  the  emperor  would  have  forced  the  Sornosi- 
erra,  and  uniting  with  the  fourth  corps,  have  placed 
sixty  thousand  men  upon  the  English  rear;  in  the 
second  case,  the  sixth  and  fourth  corps,  turning  both 
flanks,  would  have  effected  a  junction  behind  the  So- 
mosierra,  and  cut  them  off  from  M^rid,  while  Napo- 
leon, with  forty  thousand  men,  assailed  them  in  front. 
To  retreat  over  the  Tagus  was  to,,  ^opt  the  southern 
provinces  for  a  new  base  of  operations,  and  might  have 
been  useful  if  the  Spaniards  would  have  rallied  round 
him  with  enthusiasm  and  courage;  but  would  they 
have  done  so  when  the  emperor  was  advancing  with 
his  enormous  force  ?  After-experience  proves  that  they 
would  not.  The  duke  of  Dalmatia,  in  ISIO,  with  an 
army  ver}'  inferior  to  that  under  Napoleon,  reached  the 
gates  of  Cadiz  without  a  serious  blow  being  struck  to 
oppose  him,  and  at  this  time  the  people  ol' the  south 
were  reckless  of  the  opportunity  procured  for  them  by 
sir  John  Moore's  march  on  Sahagun. 

It  has,  however,  been  said,  that  twenty-four  thou- 
sand British  troops  acting  vigorously,  could  have 
checked  the  emperor,  and  raised  the  courage  of  the 
Spaniards.  To  such  an  observation  I  will  oppose  a 
fact.  In  1815,  Napoleon  crossed  the  Sambre  with  one 
hundred  and  fifteen  th.ousand  men,  and  the  two  hun- 
dred and  ten  thousand  regular  troops  in  his  front, 
among  which  were  more  than  thirty  thousand  English, 
could  with  difficulty  stop  his  progress  after  four  days' 
fighting,  in  three  of  which  he  v.as  successful.  If  sir 
John  Moore,  at  a  subsequent  period,  was  willing  to 
risk  the  danger  of  a  movement  on  the  capital,  it  waa 
because  he  was  misinformed  of  the  French  strength, 
and  the  .Spaniards  were  represented  to  be  numeioua 
and  confident;  he  was  also  unacquainted  with  the  de- 
feat at  Tudela.  His  object  was,  by  assisting  ('astanos, 
to  arouse  the  spirit  of  the  patriots,  and  nothing  more 
strongly  evinces  his  hardihood  and  prompt  judgn\ent ; 
for,  in  liis  letter  to  Mr.  Frere,  he  distinctly  stated  the 
danger  to  be  incurred,  and  carefully  separating  the 
military  from  the  political  reasons,  only  proj)osed  to 
venture  the  army,  if  the  envoy  was  satisfied  that  the 
Spanifh  government  and  people  would  answer  to  such 
an  appeal,  and  that  the  British  cabinet  would  be  will- 
ing to  incur  the  risk  for  such  an  object.  If  he  did  not 
follow  up  his  own  proposal,  it  was  b'  cause  he  had 
discovered  that  the  army  of  Castanos  was,  not  simplj 
defeated,  but  destroyed  ;  because  the  Somosierra  has 
been  forced  by  a  charge  of  cavalry;  and  because  the 
jiasses  of  the  Guadarama,  on  his  line  of  march  to  Ma- 
drid, were  seized  by  the  enemy  before  his  own  army 
could  be  concentrated. 

Why  then  did  he  not  retreat  into  Portugal  ?  Because 
Napoleon,  having  directed  his  forces  against  the  capi- 
tal, the  British  army  was  enabled  to  concentrate;  be- 
cause Madrid  had  shut  her  gates;  because  Mr.  Frere 
and  the  Spanish  authorities  endeavored  to  deceive  him 
by  false  information  ;  because  the  solemn  declaration 
of  the  junta  of  Toledo,  that  they  would  bury  them- 
selves under  '.hf>  ruins  of  that  town  rather  than  surrco- 


12S 


NAPIER'S     'ENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  17 


der,  joined  lo  the  fact  that  Zaragoza  was  fighting  he- 
roical!}',  sooniod  to  guarantee  the  constancy  and  vigour 
of  that  patriotic  spirit  which  was  apparently  once  more 
excited;  because  the  question  was  again  become  poli- 
tical, and  it  was  necessary  to  satisfy  the  English 
people,  that  nothing  was  left  undone  to  aid  a  cause 
which  they  had  so  much  at  heart ;  because  the  peculiar 
position  of  the  French  army  at  the  moment,  afforded 
the  means  of  creating  a  powerful  diversion  in  favour 
of  the  southern  provinces.  These  are  the  unanswer- 
able reasons  for  tlie  advance  towards  Sahagun.  In  the 
details  of  execution,  that  movement  may  be  liable  to 
some  trifling  objections ;  perhaps  it  would  have  been 
better  to  have  carried  the  army  on  the  21st  at  once  to 
Carrion  and  neglected  Sahagun  and  Saldanha  ;  but  in 
its  strategic  and  political  character,  it  was  well  con- 
ceived and  well  timed,  hardy  and  successful. 

The  irritating  interference  that  sir  .John  Moore  was 
called  upon  to  repel,  and  the  treachery  and  the  folly, 
equal  in  its  effects  to  treachery,  that  he  was  oblig-^d  to 
guard  against,  have  been  sufficiently  dwelt  upon  al- 
ready; yet  before  discussing  the  retreat  from  Astorga, 
it  nia}^  be  of  some  military  interest  to  show  that  the 
line  of  Portugal,  although  the  natural  one  for  the 
British  army  to  retire  upon,  was  not  at  this  period 
necessarily  either  safe  or  useful,  and  that  greater  evils 
than  these  incurred  by  a  retreat  through  Gallicia  would 
probably  have  attended  a  retrograde  march  upon  Lisbon. 

The  rugged  frontier  of  Portugal  lying  between  the 
Duero  and  the  Tagus,  is  vulnerable  in  many  points  to  an 
invading  army  of  superior  force.  It  may  be  penetrated 
between  the  Duero  and  Pinhel,  and  between  Pinhel  and 
Guarda,  by  roads  leading  into  the  valleys  of  the  Zezere 
and  the  Mondego.  Between  the  Sierra  de  Estrella  and 
the  Sierra  de  Gata,  by  the  rrad  from  Alfiiyates  to  Sabugal 
and  Penamacor,  or  that  by  Guarda  and  Coria.  Again, 
it  may  he  pierced  between  the  Sierra  de  Gata  and  the 
Tagus  by  Idanha  Velha,  Castello  Branco,  and  Sobrei- 
ra  Formosa;  and  from  the  Tagus  to  the  Guadiana,  a 
distance  of  about  twenty  leagues,  the  Alemtejo  presents 
an  open  ceuntrj'  without  any  strong  fortress,  save  La- 
Lippe,  which  may  be  disregarded  and  passed  without 
danger.  Now  sir  John  Moore  commenced  his  forward 
movement  from  Salamanca  on  the  12th  of  December,  and 
at  that  period  the  fourth  corps,  being  at  Talavera  de  la 
Reyna,  was  much  nearer  to  Lisbon  than  the  British  army 
was,  and  the  emperor  was  preparing  to  march  on  that  ca- 
pital with  the  sixth  corps,  the  guards,  and  the  reserve. 
He  could,  as  the  duke  of  Berwick  did,  penetrate  by 
both  sides  of  the  Tagus  ;  and  what  was  to  prevent  him 
from  reaching  Li■^bon  before  the  British  force,  if  the 
latter  had  retreated  from  Salamanca  ]  he  marched  on 
a  shorter  line  and  a  better  road,  and  he  could  supply 
his  troops  by  requisitions,  a  system  that,  however 
fatal  it  may  be  in  the  end,  is  always  advantageous  at 
first;  but  Mooie  must,  from  a  scanty  military  chest, 
have  purchased  his  supplies  from  a  suspicious  pea- 
santry, rendered  more  distrustful  by  the  retreat. 

It  is  true  that  in  Lisbon,  sir  .John  Cradock  com- 
manded six  thousand  infantry  and  two  hundred  and 
fifty-eight  cavalry ;  but  the  Portuguese  provisional 
government,  who  had  only  organized  a  few  ill-com- 
posed battalions,  were  so  inactive,  that  it  was  not  until 
the  11th  of  December  that  a  proclamation,  calling  on 
the  people  to  arm,  was  issued.  In  the  arsenal  there 
were  scarcely  musquets  and  equipments  for  eight  thou- 
sand men,  and  the  new  levies  were  only  required  to 
assemble  when  the  couiiiry  snoula  oe  actually  inva- 
ded. Sir  Robert  Wilson,  having  with  great  activity 
organized  about  two  thousand  of  the  Lusitanian  legion, 
had  marched  in  the  middle  of  December  from  Oporto, 
and  this  was  all  that  could  be  opposed  to  an  army 
more  numerous,  more  favourably  situated  for  invasion, 
and  incomparably  better  commanded  than  that  with 
which  Massena  invaded  the  country  in  1810.     Thus  it 


may  be  affirmed,  that  if  a  retreat  upon  Lisbon  was  ad 
visable  before  Napolemi  took  Madrid,  it  was  not  a  safe 
operation  after  that  event,  and  it  is  clear  that  sir  John 
Moore  neither  lightly   nor  injudiciously  adopted   the 
line  of  Gallicia. 

The  arguments  of  those  who  deny  the  necessity  of 
falling  back,  even  behind  the  Esla,  are  scarcely  worth 
notice,  a  simple  reference  to  the  num'*ers  under  the 
emperor,  and  the  direction  of  his  march,  is  sufficient 
to  expose  their  futility;  but  the  necessity  of  the  con- 
tinued and,  as  it  has  been  unjustly  called,  the  precipi- 
tate retreat  to  Coruna,  may  not  be  quite  so  obvious. 
The  advance  to  Sahagun  was  intended  to  create  a  di- 
version, and  give  the  Spaniards  an  opportunity  of  mak- 
ing head  in  the  south,  it  succeeded  in  drawing  away 
the  enemy,  yet  the  S])aniards  did  not  make  any  head, 
the  central  junta  displayed  no  energy  or  wisdom;  a 
few  slight  demonstrations  by  the  marquis  of  Palacios, 
on  the  side  of  the  Sierra  Morena,  and  by  the  duke  of 
Infantado  on  the  side  of  Cuenca,  scarc'Iy  disturbed 
the  first  corps  which  remained  in  La  Maiicha ;  ten 
thousand  men  were  sufficient  to  maintaiii  Madrid  in 
perfect  tranquillity,  and  a  part  of  tli!  fjurtii  corps  even 
marched  from  Talavera  by  Placemia  on  Salamanca. 
By  the  letters  of  Mr.  Stuart,  and  the  reports  of  his 
own  spies,  the  English  general  was  informed  of  all 
these  disheartening  circumstances,  yet  the  intelligence 
arrived  slowly  and  at  intervals,  and  he,  hoping  that 
the  Spaniards  would  frnally  make  an  effort,  announced 
his  intention  to  hold  the  Gallicias ;  Mr.  Stuart's  cor- 
respondence at  last  deprived  him  of  that  hope,  and  the 
presence  of  the  emperor,  the  great  amount  of  his  force, 
and  the  vehemence  with  which  he  pressed  forward,  con 
firmed  the  unhappy  truth  that  nothing  could  be  expect- 
ed from  the  south. 

Sir  John  Moore  could  not  with  twentj'-three  thou- 
sand men  maintain  himself  against  the  whole  French 
arm}%  and  until  he  reached  Astorga  his  flanks  were 
always  exposed  ;  from  thence  he  retreated  in  compara- 
tive security,  but  the  natural  strength  of  the  country 
between  that  town  and  Coru^.a  misled  persons  of  shal- 
low judgment,  who  have  since  inconsiderately  advanc- 
ed many  vague  accusations,  such  as  that  passes  where 
a  hundred  men  could  stop  an  army  were  lightly  aban- 
donec4  ;  that  the  retreat  was  a  flight,  and  the  general's 
judgment  clouded  by  the  danger  of  his  situation.  There 
might  be  some  foundation  for  such  observations  if  mi- 
litary commanders  were  like  prize-fighters,  bound  to 
strike  always  at  the  front,  but  as  long  as  armies  are 
dependent  for  their  subsistence  and  ammunition  upon 
lines  of  communication,  the  safety  of  their  flanks  and 
rear  must  be  considered  as  of  consequence.  Moore 
was  perfectly  aware  that  he  could  fight  any  number  of 
men  in  some  of  the  mountainous  positions  on  the  road 
to  Coruna ;  yet  unless  he  could  make  a  permanent  de- 
fence, such  battles  would  have  been  worse  than  useless, 
and  a  permanent  defence  was  impossible,  inasmuch  as 
there  were  none  but  temporary  magazines  nearer  than 
Coruna,  and  there  were  neither  carriages  of  transport, 
nor  money  to  procure  them;  moreover  a  severe  wnter 
had  just  set  in,  the  people  were;  disinclined  to  aid  the 
troops,  and  as  the  province  was  poor,  few  resources 
could  be  drawn  from  the  vicinity.  Neither  was  there 
a  single  position  that  could  be  maintained  for  more 
than  a  few  days  against  a  superior  force. 

That  of  Rodrigatos  could  be  turned  by  the  old  road 
leading  to  Villa  Franca,  Villa  Franca  itself  by  the  val- 
ley of  the  Syl,  and  from  thence  the  whole  line  to  Co- 
runa might  be  turned  by  the  road  of  Orense,  which 
also  led  directly  to  Vigo  ;  and  until  he  reached  Nogales, 
Moore's  intention  was  to  retire  to  Vigo.  The  French 
could  have  marched  through  the  richest  part  of  Gallicia 
to  St.  Jago  and  Corn  "a  on  the  left,  or  from  the  Astu- 
rias,  by  the  way  of  Mondoncdo,  on  the  right;  and  if 
it  be  asked,  why  they  did  not  do  so"!    the  answer  ia 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


129 


pTompt,  the  emperor  havino^  quitted  the  army,  the  jeal- 
ousies and  misunderstandings  usual  between  generals 
of  equal  rank  impeded  the  operations.  A  coolness 
subsisted  between  marshal  Ney  and  the  duke  of  Dal- 
matia,  and  without  entering  into  the  grounds  of  their 
dilTerence,  it  is  plain  that,  in  a  military  point  of  view, 
the  judgment  of  the  latter  was  the  soundest.  The 
former  committed  a  great  error  by  remaining  at  Villa 
Franca  instead  of  pushing  his  corps,  or  a  part  of  it  as 
recommended  by  Soult,  along  the  valley  of  Orense  to 
St.  Jago  de  Compostella,  the  British  army  would  have 
been  lost  if  the  sixth  corps  had  reached  Corufia  before 
it;  and  what  would  have  been  the  chances  in  the  battle 
if  three  additional  French  divisions  had  been  engaged  ] 
Granting,  therefore,  that  the  troops  could  have  been 
nourished  during  the  winter.  Villa  Franca,  Nogales, 
Constantino  and  Lugo,  were  not  permanently  defens- 
ible by  an  army  whose  base  of  operations  was  at 
Corufia.  Hence  it  was  that  sir  John  Moore  resolved 
to  regain  his  ships  with  the  view  to  renew  the  war 
in  the  south,  and  Hannibal  himself  could  have  done 
no  more. 

Nor  was  the  mode  of  executing  the  retreat  at  all 
unbecoming  the  character  of  an  able  officer.  Lord 
Bacon  observes,  that  •  honourable  retreats  are  no  ways 
inferior  to  brave  charges,  as  having  less  of  fortune, 
more  of  discipline,  and  as  much  of  valour.'  That  is 
an  honourable  retreat  in  which  the  retiring  general  loses 
no  trophies  in  fight,  sustains  every  charge  without 
being  broken,  and  finally,  after  a  severe  action,  re-em- 
barks his  army  in  the  face  of  a  superior  enemy,  with- 
out being  seriously  molested.  It  would  be  honourable 
to  effect  this  before  a  foe  onl}'  formidable  from  numbers, 
but  it  is  infinitely  more  creditable,  when  the  comman- 
der, while  struggling  with  bad  weather  and  worse  for- 
tune, has  to  oppose  veterans  with  inexperienced  troops. 
And  to  contend  against  an  antagonist  of  eminent  abili- 
t)',  who  scarcely  suffers  a  single  advantage  to  escape 
him  during  th.s  long  and  vigorous  pursuit.  All  this 
sir  John  Mooie  did,  and  finished  his  work  by  a  death 
as  firm  and  g.orious  as  any  that  antiquit}'  can  boast  of. 

Put  to  lord  Bacon's  test,  in  what  shall  the  retreat  to 
Corufia  be  lound  deficient]  something  in  discipline 
perhaps,  but  that  fault  does  not  attach  to  the  general. 
Those  comniiinders  who  have  been  celebrated  for  mak- 
ing fine  retieats  were  in  most  instances  well  acquainted 
with  their  armies  ;  and  Hannibal,  speaking  of  the  elder 
Scipio,  derided  him,  although  a  brave  and  skilful  man. 
for  that,  being  unknown  to  his  own  soldiers,  he 
should  presume  to  oppose  himself  to  a  general  who 
could  call  to  each  man  under  his  command  by  name  ; 
thus  inculcating,  that  unless  troops  be  trained  in  the 

fieculiar  method  of  a  commander,  the  latter  can  scarce- 
y  achieve  any  thing  great.  Now  Moore  had  a  young 
'  army  suddenly  placed  under  his  guidance,  and  it  was 
scarcely  united,  when  the  superior  numbers  of  the 
enemy  forced  it  to  a  retrograde  movement  under  very 
harassing  circumstances ;  he  had  not  time,  therefore, 
to  establish  a  system  of  discipline,  and  it  is  in  the 
leading  events,  not  the  minor  details,  that  the  just  cri- 
terion of  his  merits  is  to  be  sought  for. 

Was  the  retreat  uncalled  for  ]  Was  it  unnecessarily 
precipitate?  Was  any  opportunity  of  crippling  the 
enemy  lost  1  \\'as  any  weakness  to  be  discovered  in 
the  personal  character  of  the  general  1  These  are  the 
questions  that  sensible  men  will  ask.  The  first  has 
been  already  examined,  the  second  is  a  matter  of  simple 
calculation.  The  rear  guard  quitted  Astorga  on  the  1st 
of  January,  on  the  3d  it  repulsed  the  enemy  in  a  sharp 
skirmish  at  Calcabellos,  the  6th  it  rejoined  the  main 
body  at  Lugo,  having  three  times  checked  the  pursuers 
during  the  inarch ;  it  was  unbroken,  had  lost  no  gun, 
suffered  no  misfortune.  The  whole  army  offered  battle 
at  Lugo  for  two  successive  days,  it  was  not  accepted, 
and  the  retreat  recommencing,  the  troops  reached  Be- 
10 


tanzos  on  the  morning  of  the  10th,  and  Coruna  on  the 
11th;  thus  in  eleven  days,  three  of  which  were  day.* 
of  rest,  a  small  army  passed  over  a  hundred  and  fifty 
miles  of  good  road.  Now  Napoleon,  with  fiftv  thou- 
sand men,  left  Madrid  on  the  2-2d  of  December,  and 
the  28th  he  was  at  Villapando,  having  performed  a 
march,  on  bad  roads,  of  a  hundred  and  sixty-four  miles 
in  seven  days.  The  retreat  to  Coru'.a  was  consequent- 
ly not  precipitate,  unless  it  can  be  shown,  that  it  was 
unnecessary  to  retreat  at  all  beyond  Villa  Franca ;  nei- 
ther can  it  be  asserted,  that  any  opportunity  of  crip- 
pling the  enemy  was  lost.  To  fight  a  battle  was  the 
game  of  the  French  marshal,  and  if  any  censure  will 
apply  to  his  able  campaign,  it  is  that  he  delayed  to 
attack  at  Lugo;  victorious  or  beaten,  it  would  have  in- 
creased the  embarrassments  of  his  adversary,  who  must 
have  continued  his  retreat  encumbered  with  the  wound- 
ed, or  the  latter  must  have  been  abandoned  without 
succour  in  the  midst  of  winter. 

At  Corufia  the  absence  of  the  fleet  necessarily  brought 
on  a  battle.  That  it  was  honourable  to  the  British 
troops  is  clear  from  the  fact  that  they  embarked  with 
out  loss  after  the  action.  That  it  was  absolutely  ne- 
cessary to  embark  notwithstanding  the  success,  is  a 
certain  proof  how  little  advantage  could  have  been  de- 
rived from  any  battle  fought  farther  inland  ;  and  sii 
John  Moore's  prudence  in  declining  an  action  the  mo 
ment  he  had  rallied  his  army  at  Lugo,  and  restored 
that  discipline  which  the  previous  movements  had  sha- 
ken. But,  notwiti:standing  the  clamour  wiih  which 
this  campaign  has  been  assailed,  as  if  no  army  had 
ever  yet  suffered  such  misfortunes,  it  is  certain  that 
the  nominul  loss  was  small,  the  real  loss  smaller,  and 
that  it  sinks  into  nothing  when  compared  with  the  ad- 
vantages gained.  An  army  which,  after  marching  in 
advance  or  retreat  above  five  hundred  miles  before  an 
enemy  of  immensely  superior  force,  has  only  lost,  in- 
cluding those  killed  in  battle,  four  thousand  men,  or 
a  sixth  part  of  its  numbers,  cannot  be  said  to  have  suf- 
fered severely,  nor  would  the  loss  have  been  so  great 
but  for  the  intervention  of  the  accidental  occurrences 
m.entioned  in  the  narrative.  Night  marches  are  seldon 
happy,  that  from  Lugo  to  Betanzos  cost  the  army  in 
stragglers  more  than  double  the  number  of  men  lost 
in  all  the  preceding  operations  ;  nevertheless,  the  re- 
serve in  that,  as  in  all  the  other  movem.ents,  sutfered 
little,  and  it  is  a  fact,  that  the  light  brigades  detached 
by  the  Vigo  road,  which  were  not  pursued,  made  no 
forced  marches,  slept  under  cover,  and  were  well  sup- 
plied, left,  in  proportion  to  their  strength,  as  many 
men  behind  as  any  other  part  of  the  army ;  thus  proof 
upon  proof  accumulates  that  inexperience  was  the  pri- 
mary and  principal  cause  of  the  disorders  which  at- 
tended the  retreat.  Those  disorders  were  suihcient'.y 
great,  but  many  circumstances  contributed  to  produ  ;o 
an  appearance  of  suffering  and  disorganization  whi  -.h 
was  not  real. 

Sir  John  Moore's  intention  was  to  have  proceeded 
to  Vigo,  in  order  to  restore  order  before  he  sailed  for 
England,  instead  of  which  the  fleet  steered  home  di- 
rectl)'  from  Coru'ia,  and  a  terrible  storm  scattered  it; 
many  ships  were  wrecked  ;  and  the  remainder,  driving 
up  the  channel,  were  glad  to  put  into  any  port.  The 
soldiers,  thus  thrown  on  shore,  were  spread  from  the 
Land's  End  to  Dover.  Their  haggard  appearance, 
ragged  clothing,  and  dirty  accoutrements,  tilings  com- 
mon enough  in  war,  struck  a  people  only  used  to  the 
daintiness  of  parade  with  surprise;  the  usual  exag- 
gerations of  men  just  escaped  from  perils  and  distress- 
es were  increased  by  the  uncertainty  in  which  all  were 
as  to  the  fate  of  their  comrades;  a  deadly  fever,  tho 
result  of  anxiety,  and  of  the  sudden  change  from  fa- 
tigue to  the  confinement  of  a  ship,  filled  the  hospitals 
at  every  port  with  officers  and  soldiers,  and  thus  the 
miserable  state  of  sir  John  Moore's  army  became  tLo 


130 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  V. 


topic  of  every  letter,  and  the  theme  for  every  country 
newspaper  along  the  ooast.  The  nation,  at  that  time 
unused  to  great  operations,  fortrot  that  war  is  not  a 
harmless  game,  and  judging  of  the  loss  positively,  in- 
stead of  comparatively,  was  thus  disposed  to  believe 
the  calumnies  of  interested  men,  who  were  eager  to 
cast  a  shade  over  one  of  the  brightest  characters  that 
ever  adorned  the  country.  Those  calumnies  triumphed 
for  a  moment,  but  Moore's  last  appeal  to  his  country 
for  justice  will  be  successful ;  posterity,  revering  and 
cherishing  his  name,  will  visit  such  of  his  odious  ca- 
lumniators as  are  not  too  contemptible  to  be  remem- 
bered with  a  just  and  severe  retribution,  for  thus  it  is 
that  time  freshens  the  beauty  of  virtue  and  withers  the 
efforts  of  baseness.  And  if  authority  be  sought  for  in 
a  case  where  reason  speaks  so  plainly,  future  histo- 
rians will  not  fail  to  remark,  that  the  man  whose  tal- 
ents exacted  the  praises  of  Soult,  of  Wellington,  and 
of  Napoleon,  could  be  no  ordinary  soldier. 


'  Sir  John  Moore,'  says  the  first,  '  took  every  advan- 
tage that  the  country  afforded  to  oppose  an  active  and 
vigorous  resistance,  and  he  finislied  by  dying  in  a 
combat  that  must  do  credit  to  his  memory.' 

Napoleon  more  than  once  affirmed,  that  if  he  com- 
mitted a  few  trifling  errors,  they  were  to  be  attributed  to 
his  peculiar  situation,  for  that  his  talents  and  firmness 
alone  had  saved  the  English  army  from  destruction.* 

'In  sir  John  Moore's  campaign,'  said  the  duke  of 
Wellington,  'I  can  see  but  one  error;  when  he  ad- 
vanced "to  Sahagun  he  should  have  considered  it  as  a 
movement  of  retreat,  and  sent  officers  to  the  rear  to 
mark  and  prepare  the  halting-places  for  every  brigade. 
But  this  opinion  I  have  formed  after  long  experience 
of  war,  and  especially  of  the  peculiarities  of  a  Spanish 
war,  which  must  have  been  seen  to  be  understood; 
finally,  it  is  an  opinion  formed  after  the  event.' 

*  Vivian's  Conversations  at  Elba.    Voire  from  St.  Hekna. 


BOOK    V. 


CHAPTER  I. 

l^light  effect  produced  in  England  by  the  result  of  the  cam- 
paign— Debates  in  Parliament — Treaty  with  Spain — Napo- 
ieon  receives  addresses  at  Valladolid — Joseph  enters  Madrid 
--Appointed  the  emperor's  lieutenant — Distribution  of  the 
P'rench  army — The  duke  of  Dantzig  forces  the  bridge  of  Al- 
maraz — Tolelo  entered  by  the  first  corps — Infantado  and 
Palacios  ordered  to  advance  upon  Madrid — Cuesfa  appointed 
to  the  conmiaud  of  Galiuszo's  troops — F'lorida  Blanca  dies 
at  Seville — Succeeded  in  the  presidency  by  the  marquis  of 
Astorga — Money  arrives  at  Cadiz  from  Mexico — Bad  con- 
duct of  the  central  junta — State  of  the  Spanish  army — Con- 
stancy of  the  soldiers —  Infantado  moves  on  Tarancon — His 
advanced  guard  defeated  there — French  retire  towards  To- 
ledo— Disputes  in  the  Spanish  army — Battle  of  Ucles — Re- 
treat of  Infantado — Cartoajal  supersedes  him,  and  advances 
to  Ciudad  Real — Cuesta  takes  pjst  on  the  Tagus,  and  breaks 
down  the  bridge  of  Almaraz. 

The  effect  produced  in  England,  by  the  unfortunate 
issue  of  sir  John  Moore's  campaign,  was  not  in  pro- 
portion with  the  importance  of  the  subject.  The  peo- 
ple trained  to  party  politics,  and  possessed  of  no  real 
power  to  rebuke  the  folly  of  the  cabinet,  regarded  both 
disasters  and  triumphs  with  factious  rather  than  with 
national  feelings,  and  it  was  alike  easy  to  draw  their 
attention  from  affairs  of  weight  or  to  fix  it  on  matters 
of  little  moment.  Thus,  the  duke  of  York's  conduct 
being  at  this  time  made  the  object  of  parliamentary 
inquiry,  to  drag  his  private  frailties  before  the  world 
was  thought  essential  to  the  welfare  of  the  nation, 
•while  the  incapacity  which  had  caused  England  and 
Spain  to  mourn  in  tears  of  blood,  was  left  unprobed. 
An  insular  people,  who  are  by  their  situation  protected 
from  the  worst  evils  of  war,  may  suffer  themselves  to 
be  thus  deluded  ;  but  if  an  unfortunate  campaign  were 
to  bring  a  devastating  enemy  into  the  heart  of  the 
country,  the  honour  of  a  general,  and  the  military  po- 
licy of  the  cabinet,  would  no  longer  be  considered 
as  mere  subjects  for  a  vile  sophist's  talents  in  misre- 
presentation. 


It  is  true  that  the  misfortunes  of  the  campaign  were 
by  many  orators,  in  both  houses  of  parliament,  treated 
with  great  warmth,  but  the  discussions  were  chiefly 
remarkable,  as  examples  of  astute  eloquence  withou-t 
any  knowledge  of  facts.  The  opposition  speakers, 
eager  to  criminate  the  government,  exaggerated  the 
disasters  of  the  retreat,  and  comprehending  neither  the 
motives  nor  the  movements  of  sir  John  Moore,  urged 
several  untenable  charges  against  the  ministers,  who, 
disunited  by  personal  feelings,  did  not  all  adopt  the 
same  grounds  of  defence.  Thus,  lord  Castlereagh  and 
lord  Liverpool,  passing  over  those  errors  of  the  cabi- 
net, which  left  the  general  only  a  choice  of  diff.cultiea 
at  his  outset,  asserted,  and  truly,  that  the  advanlageg 
derived  from  the  advance  to  Sahagun,  more  than  com- 
pensated the  loss  in  the  subsequent  retreat;  and  both 
those  statesmen  paid  an  honorable  tribute  to  the  merits 
of  the  commander;  but  Mr.  Canning,  unscrupulously 
resolute  to  defend  Mr.  Frere,  assented  to  all  the  erro- 
neous statements  of  the  opposition,  and  then  with  ma- 
lignant dexterity  endeavoured  to  convert  them  into 
charges  against  the  fallen  general.  Sir  John  Moore 
was,  he  said,  wholly  answerable  for  the  campaign. 
Whether  glorious  or  distressing,  whether  to  be  admired 
or  deplored,  it  was  his  own,  he  had  kept  the  govern- 
ment quite  ignorant  of  his  proceedings  !  Being  closely 
pressed  on  this  point  by  Mr.  C.  Hutchinson  and  Mr 
Whitbread,  Mr.  Canning  deliberately  repeated  the  as- 
sertion, yet  not  long  afterwards,  sir  John  Moore's  let- 
ters to  the  ministers,  written  almost  daily,  and  furnish- 
ing exact  and  copious  information  cf  ail  that  was  pass- 
ing in  the  Peninsula,  were  laid  before  the  house ! 

While  the  dearest  interests  of  the  nation  were  thus 
treated  in  parliament,  the  ardour  of  the  E-^^lish  people 
was  somewhat  abated ;  yet  the  Spanish  cause,  so 
rightful  in  itself,  was  still  popular,  and  a  treaty  was 
concluded  with  the  supreme  junta  by  wiiich  the  con- 
tracting powers  bound  themselves  to  make  common 
cause  against  France,  and  to  agree  to  no  peace  except 


1809.1 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


131 


by  common  consent.  But  the  ministers  although  pro- 
fcs^iintr  unbounded  confidence  in  the  result  of  the  strug- 
g'e,  already  looked  upon  the  Peninsula  as  a  secondary 
object;  for  the  warlike  preparations  of  Austria,  and  the 
rejHitation  of  the  archduke  Charles,  whose  talents  were 
foolishly  said  to  exceed  Napoleon's,  had  awakened  the 
dormant  spirit  of  coalitions;  and  it  was  more  agreeable 
to  the  aristocratic  feeling  of  the  English  cabinet,  that 
the  French  should  be  defeated  by  a  monarch  in  Ger- 
many, than  by  a  plebeian  insurrection  in  Spain.  The 
obscure  intrigues  of  the  princess  of  Tour  and  Taxis, 
and  the  secret  societies  on  the  continent  emanating  as 
the}'^  did  from  patrician  sources,  excited  the  sympathy 
of  the  ministers,  engaged  their  attention,  and  nourished 
those  distempered  feelings  which  made  them  see  only 
weakness  and  disaffection  rn  France,  when  throughout 
t!iat  mighty  empire,  few  desired  and  none  dared  to  op- 
pose the  emperor's  wishes  ;  when  even  secret  discontent 
was  confined  to  some  royalist  chiefs  and  splenetic  re- 
publicans whose  influence  was  never  felt,  until  after 
Napoleon  had  suffered  the  direst  reverses. 

Unable  to  conceive  the  extent  of  that  monarch's 
views,  or  to  measure  the  grandeur  of  his  genius,  the 
ministers  attributed  the  results  of  his  profound  calcu- 
lations to  a  blind  chance,  his  victories  to  treason,  to 
corruption,  to  any  thing,  but  that  admirable  skill,  with 
which  he  wielded  the  most  powerful  military  force  that 
ever  obeyed  the  orders  of  a  single  chief.  Thus  self- 
deluded,  and  misjudging  the  difficulties  to  be  encoun- 
tered, they  adopted  every  idle  project,  and  squandered 
their  resources  without  any  great  or  decided  effort. 
While  negotiating  with  the  Spanish  junta  for  the  occu- 
pation of  (^adiz,  they  were  planning  an  expedition 
against  Italy,  and  while  loudly  asser;ing  their  resolu- 
tion t;  defend  Portugal,  reserved  their  principal  force 
for  a  secret  blow  in  Holland;  their  preparations  being 
however  marked  by  a  pomp  and  publicity  totally  un- 
suited  to  war.  With  what  a  mortal  calamity  that 
pageant  closed,  shall  be  noticed  hereafter;  at  present 
it  is  fitting,  to  trace  the  operations  in  Spain,  which 
were  coincident  with  the  retreat  of  sir  John  Moore. 

It  has  already  been  stated  that  when  Madrid  surren- 
dered. Napoleon  refused  to  permit  Joseph  to  return 
there  unless  the  public  bodies  and  the  heads  of  families 
would  unite  to  demand  his  restoration,  and  swear,  with- 
out any  rnental  reservation,  to  be  true  to  him.*  Regis- 
ters had  consequently  been  opened  in  the  different 
quarters  of  the  city,  and  twenty  eight  tnousand  six 
hundred  heads  of  families  inscribed  their  names,  and 
voluntarily  swore  in  presence  of  the  host,  that  they 
were  sincere  in  their  desire  to  receive  Joseph. f  After 
this,  leputations  from  all  the  councils,  from  the  junta 
of  commerce  and  money,  the  hall  of  the  Alcades,  and 
from  the  corporation,  waited  on  the  emperor  at  Valla- 
dolid,  and  being  there  joined  by  the  municipality  of 
that  town,  and  by  deputies  from  Astorga,  Leon,  and 
other  places,  prerented  tiie  oath,  and  prayed  that 
Josepli  might  be  king.  Napoleon  thus  entreated,  con- 
sented that  his  brother  should  reassume  his  kingly 
functions. 

It  would  be  idle  to  argue  from  this  apparently  volun- 
tary submission  to  the  French  emperor,  that  a  change 
favourable  to  the  usurpation  had  been  produced  in  the 
feelings  of  the  Spanish  people;  but  it  is  evident  that 
Napoleon's  victories  and  policy  had  been  so  far  effec- 
tual, that  in  the  capital,  and  many  other  great  towns, 
the  multitude  as  well  as  the  notables  were,  either  from 
fear  or  conviction,  submissive  to  his  will ;  and  it  is  but 
reasonable  to  suppose,  that  if  his  conquests  had  not 
been  iaterrupted  by  extraneous  circumstances,  this  ex- 
ample would  have  been  generally  followed,  in  prefe- 
rence to  the  more  glorious,  but  ineffectual,  resistance 
made  by  the  inhabitants  of  those  cities,  whose  fortitude 


*  JNtllcrto. 


f  Azanza  and  O'Farril. 


and  whose  calamities  have  forced  from  mankind  a  sor- 
rowful admiration.  The  cause  of  Spain  at  this  moment 
was  in  truth  lost,  if  any  cause,  depending  upon  war, 
which  is  but  a  succession  of  violent  changes,  can  be 
called  so;  for  the  armies  were  dispersed,  the  govern- 
ment bewildered,  the  people  dismayed,  the  cry  of  re- 
sistance hushed,  and  the  stern  voice  of  Napoleon, 
answered  by  the  tread  of  three  hundred  thousand 
French  veterans,  was  heard  throughout  the  land.  But 
the  hostility  of  Austria  arrested  the  conqueror's  career, 
and  the  Spanish  energy  revived  at  the  abrupt  cessation 
of  his  terrific  warfire. 

Joseph,  escorted  by  his  French  guards,  in  number 
between  five  and  six  thousand,  entered  Madrid  the  23d 
of  January.  He  was,  however,  a  king  without  reve- 
nues, and  he  would  have  been  witiiout  even  the  sem- 
blance of  authority,  if  he  had  not  been  likewise 
nominated  the  emperor's  lieutenant  in  Spain,  by  virtue 
of  which  title  he  was  empowered  to  move  the  French 
army  at  his  will.  This  power  was  one  extremely 
unacceptable  to  the  marshals,  and  he  would  have  found 
it  difficult  to  enforce  it,  even  though  he  had  restrained 
the  exercise  to  the  limits  prescribed  by  his  brother; 
but  disdaining  to  separate  the  general  from  the  mon- 
arch, he  conveyed  his  orders  to  the  French  army, 
through  his  Spanish  ministers,  and  the  army  in  its  turn 
disdained  and  resisted  the  assumed  authority  of  men, 
who,  despised  for  their  want  of  military  knowledge, 
were  also  suspected  as  favouring  interests  essentially 
differing  from  those  of  the  troops.* 

The  iron  grasp,  that  had  compressed  the  pride  and 
the  ambitious  jealousy  of  the  marshals,  being  thus  re- 
laxed, the  passions  which  had  ruined  the  patriots  began 
to  work  among  their  enemies,  producing  indeed  less 
fatal  effects,  because  their  scope  was  more  circum- 
scribed, but  sufficiently  pernicious  to  stop  the  course 
of  conquest.  The  French  army,  no  longer  a  compact 
body,  terrible  alike  from  its  massive  strength,  and  its 
flexible  activity,  became  a  collection  of  independent 
bands,  each  formidable  in  itself,  but,  from  the  disunion 
of  the  generals,  slow  to  combine  for  any  great  object; 
and  plainly  discovering,  by  irregularities  and  insubor- 
dination, that  they  knew,  when  a  warrior,  and  when  a 
voluptuous  monarch  was  at  their  head.  These  evils 
were  however  only  felt  at  a  later  period,  and  the  dis- 
tribution of  the  troops,  when  Napoleon  quitted  Valla- 
dolid,  still  bore  the  impress  of  his  genius. 

The  first  corps  was  quartered  in  La  Mancha. 

The  second  corps  was  destined  to  invade  PortugaL 

The  third  and  fifth  corps  carried  on  the  siege  of 
Zaragoza. 

The  fourth  corps  remained  in  the  valley  of  the  Ta- 

The  sixth  corps,  wanting  its  third  division,  was  ap- 
pointed to  hold  Gallicia. 

The  seventh  corps  continued  always  in  Catalonia. 

The  imperial  guards,  directed  on  Vittotia,  contribu- 
ted to  the  security  of  the  great  communication  with 
France  until  Zaragoza  should  fall,  and  were  yet  ready 
to  march  when  wanted  for  the  Austrian  war. 

General  Dessolles,  with  the  third  division  of  the  sixth 
corps,  returned  to  Madrid.  General  Bonnet,  with  the 
fifth  division  of  the  second  corps,  remained  in  the 
Montagna  St.  Andero. 

General  Lapisse,  with  the  second  division  of  the  first 
corps,  was  sent  to  Salamanca,  where  he  was  joined  by 
Maupetit's  brigade  of  cavalry,  which  had  crossed  the 
Sierra  de  Bejar. 

The  reserve  of  heavy  cavalry  being  broken  up,  was 
distributed,  by  divisions,  in  the  following  order  — 

Latour  Maubourg's  joined  the  first  corps.  Lorge's 
and  Lahoussaye's  were  attached  to  the  second  corps. 
Lassalle's  was  sent  to  the  fourth  corps.     The  sixth 


*  King's  correspoudcnce  captured  at  Vittoria,  MSS. 


132 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  V 


corps  was  roinfrrced  ■with  two  brijades.  Milbaiurs 
divifeinn  remained  at  Madrid,  and  Kellerniaii's  jjuarded 
•tlie  lines  fif  communication  between  Tudela,  Burgos, 
and  Pa!eticia. 

Thus,  Madrid  beintj  still  the  centre  of  operations, 
the  French  were  so  distributed,  that  by  a  concentric 
movement  on  that  capital,  they  could  crush  every  in- 
surrection within  the  circle  of  their  positions;  and  the 
great  niaspcs,  beingr  kept  upon  the  principal  roads  di- 
verging frcm  ISTadrid  to  the  extremities  of  the  Peninsula, 
intercepted  all  communication  between  the  Provinces  : 
while  the  second  corps,  thrust  out,  as  it  were,  beyond 
the  circumference,  and  destined,  as  the  fourth  corps  had 
been,  to  sweep  round  from  point  to  point,  was  sure  of 
findingf  a  supporting  army,  and  a  good  lino  of  retreat, 
at  every  great  route  leading  from  Madrid  to  the  yet 
unsubdued  provinces  of  the  Peninsula.  The  commu- 
nication with  France  was,  at  the  same  time,  secured 
by  the  fortresses  cf  Burgos,  Pampeluna,  and  St.  Se- 
bastian, and  by  the  divisions  posted  at  St.  Ander,  Bur- 
gos, Bilbao,  and  Viltoria ;  it  was  also  supported  by  a 
reserve  at  Bayonne. 

The  northern  provinces  were  parcelled  out  into  mili- 
tary governments,  the  chiefs  of  which  corresponded 
with  each  other,  and  by  the  means  of  moveable  co- 
lumns, repressed  every  petty  insurrection.  The  third 
and  fifth  corps,  havint;  their  base  at  Pampeluna,  and 
their  line  of  operations  directed  against  Zaragoza, 
served  as  an  additional  covering  fdrce  to  the  communi- 
cation with  France,  and  were  themselves  exposed  to 
no  flank  attacks,  except  from  the  side  of  Cuen^a, 
where  the  duke  of  Infantado  commanded ;  but  that 
general  was  himself  watched  by  the  first  corps. 

All  the  lines  of  correspondence,  not  only  from  France 
but  between  the  different  corps,  were  maintained  by 
fortified  posts,  having^  greater  or  lesser  garrisons,  ac- 
cording to  their  importance.  Between  Bayonne  and 
Burgos  there  were  eleven  military  stations.  Between 
Burgos  and  Madrid,  by  the  road  of  Aranda  and  Somo- 
sierra,  there  were  eight;  and  eleven  others  protected 
the  more  circuitous  route  to  the  capital,  by  Valladolid, 
Segovia,  and  the  Guadarama.*  Between  Valladolid  and 
Zaragoza,  the  line  was  secured  by  fifteen  intermediate 
points.  The  communication  between  Valladolid  and 
St.  Ander  contained  eight  posts  ;  and  nine  others  con- 
nected the  former  town  with  Villa  Franca  del  Bierso, 
by  the  route  of  Benevente  and  Astorga  ;  finally,  two 
were  established  between  Benevente  and  Leon. 

At  this  period,  the  force  of  the  army,  exclusive  of 
Joseph's  French  guards,  was  three  hundred  and  twenty- 
four  thousand  four  hundred  and  eleven  men,  about 
thirfv-nine  thousand  being  cavalry. 

Fifty-eiglit  thousand  men  were  in  hospital. 

The  dep  ts,  governments,  garrisons,  posts  of  corre- 
spondence, prisoners,  and  '  haHalions  of  march,''  com- 
posed of  stragglers,  absorbed  about  twenty-five  thou- 
sand men. 

The  remainder  were  under  arms,  with  their  regiments, 
and  consecpiently,  more  than  two  hundred  and  fortv 
thousand  men  were  in  the  field  ;  while  the  great  line 
of  communic-ition  with  France  (the  military  reader  will 
do  well  to  mark  this,  the  key- stone  nf  Napoleon's 
system)  was  protected  by  above  fifty  thousand  men, 
whose  positions  were  strengthened  by  three  fortresses 
and  sixty-four  posts  of  correspondence,  each  more  or 
less  fortified. 

Having  thus  shewn  the  military  state  of  the  French, 
I  shall  now  proceed  v/ith  the  narrative  of  their  opera- 
lions,  following,  as  in  the  first  volume,  a  local  rather 
than  a  chronological  arrangement  of  events. 

OPERATIONS  IN   ESTREMADURA  AND  LA  MANCHA. 

Tlic  defeat  of  Galluzzo  has  been  incidentally  touch- 
ed upon  before.    The  duke  of  Dantzic  having  observed, 

*  .'..usLr-rolL  of  the  F'r:iich  ar.iiy.  MSS. 


that  the  Spanish  general  pretended,  with  six  thousand 
raw  levies,  to  defend  a  river  line  of  forty  mtles,  made 
a  feint  of  crossinsi  the  Tagus  at  Arzobispo,  and  then 
suddenly  descending  to  Almaraz,  forced  a  passage 
over  that  bridge,  on  the  2]lh  of  December,  killing  and 
wounding  many  Spaniards,  and  ca])turiiig  four  guns; 
and  so  complete  was  the  dispersion,  that  for  a  long 
time  after,  not  a  man  was  to  be  found  in  arms  through- 
out Estrcmadura.  The  French  cavalry  followed  the 
fugitives,  but  intelligence  of  sir  John  Moore's  advance 
to  Sahagun,  being  received,  the  pursuit  ceased  at  Me- 
rida,  and  the  fourth  corps,  which  had  left  eight  hun- 
dred men  in  garrison  at  Segovia,  then  occupied  Tala- 
vera  and  Placentia;  the  duke  of  Dantzic  was  recalled 
to  France,  and  Sebastiani  succeeded  to  his  command. 
At  this  period  also,  the  first  corps,  (of  which  Lapisse's 
division  only  had  followed  the  emperor  to  Astorga,) 
entered  Toledo  without  opposition,  and  the  French 
outposts  were  pushed  towards  Cuenija,  and  towards 
the  Sierra  Morena. 

Meanwhile,  the  central  junta,  changing  its  first  de- 
sign, retired  to  Seville,  instead  of  Badajos,  and  being 
continually  urged,  both  by  Mr.  Stuart  and  Mr.  Frere, 
to  make  some  effort  to  lighten  the  pressure  on  the 
English  army,  ordered  Palafox  and  the  duke  of  Infan- 
tado to  advance ;  the  one  from  Zaragoza  towards  Tu- 
dela, the  other  from  Cuenca  towards  Madrid.  The 
marquis  of  Palacios,  who  had  been  removed  from  Ca- 
talonia, and  was  now  at  the  head  of  five  or  six  thni- 
sand  levies  in  the  Sierra  Morena,  was  also  directed  to 
advance  into  La  Mancha ;  and  Galluzzo,  dejjrived  of 
his  command,  was  conslituled  a  prisoner,  along  with 
Cuesta,  Castafios,  and  a  number  of  other  culpable  or 
un*"ortunate  ofiicers,  who,  vainly  demanding  a  judg- 
ment on  their  cases,  were  dragged  from  place  to  place 
by  the  government. 

Cuesta  was,  however,  so  popular  in  Estremadura, 
that  the  central  junta,  although  fearing  and  detesting 
him,  were  forced  to  place  him  at  the  head  cf  Galluzzo's 
fugitives,  part  of  whom  had,  when  the  pursuit  ceased, 
rallied  behind  the  Guadiana,  and  were  now,  with  the 
aid  of  fresh  levies,  again  taking  the  form,  rather  than 
the  consistence  of  an  army.  This  appointment  was  an 
act  of  deplorable  incapacity ;  the  moral  effect  was  to 
degrade  the  government  by  exposing  its  fears  and 
weakness,  and,  in  a  military  view,  it  was  destructive, 
because  Cuesta  was  physically  and  mentally  incapable 
of  command.  Obstinate,  jealous,  and  stricken  in  years, 
he  was  heedless  of  time,  circumstances,  dispositions 
or  fitness ;  to  punish  with  a  barbarous  severity,  and  to 
rush  headlong  into  battle,  constituted,  in  his  uiind,  all 
the  functions  of  a  general. 

The  president,  Florida  Blanca,  pighty-one  years  of 
age,  died  at  Seville,  and  the  marquis  of  Astorga  suc- 
ceeded him,  but  the  character  of  the  junta  was  in  no 
manner  affected  by  the  change.  Some  fleeting  indica- 
tions of  vigour  had  been  produced  by  the  imminence 
of  the  danger  during  the  flight  from  Aranjuez,  but  a 
large  remittance  of  silver,  from  South  America,  having 
arrived  at  Cadiz,  the  attention  of  the  members  was  ab- 
sorbed by  this  object,  and  the  public  weal  was  blotted 
from  their  remembrance ;  even  Mr.  Frere,  ashamed  cf 
their  conduct,  appeared  to  acquiesce  in  the  justness  of 
sir  John  Moore's  estimate  of  the  value  of  Spanish  co- 
operation. 

The  number  of  men  to  be  enrolled  for  the  defence  of 
the  country  had  been  early  fixed  at  five  hundred  thou- 
sand, but  scarcely  one-third  had  joined  their  colours; 
nevertheless,  considerable  bodies  were  assembling  at 
different  points,  because  the  people,  especially  those 
of  the  southern  provinces,  although  dismayed,  were 
obedient,  and  the  local  authorilio^:,  at  a  distance  from 
the  actual  scene  of  war,  rigorously  enforcing  the  law 
of  enrolment,  sent  the  recruits  to  the  ar'nies ;  hoping 
thereby  either  to  stave  the  war  olT  from  tneir  own  did- 


1809.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


133 


tricts,  or  to  have  the  excuse  of  being  without  fighting 
men,  to  plead  for  quiet  submission.  The  fugitive 
iroops  also  readily  collected  again  at  any  given  point, 
partly  from  patriotism,  partly  because  the  French  were 
in  possession  of  their  native  provinces,  partly  that  they 
attributed  their  defeats  to  the  treachery  of  iheir  gene- 
rals, and  partly  that,  being  deceived  by  the  gross  false- 
hoods and  boasting  of  the  government,  they,  with 
ready  vanit}',  imagined  that  the  enemy  had  invariably 
suffered  enormous  losses.  In  fine,  for  the  reasons 
mentioned  in  the  commencement  of  this  history,  men 
were  to  be  had  in  abundance,  but,  beyond  assembling 
them  and  appointing  some  incapable  person  to  com- 
mand, nothing  was  done  for  defence.  The  officers, 
who  were  not  deceived,  had  no  confidence  either  in 
their  own  troops  or  in  the  government,  nor  were  they 
themselves  confided  in  or  respected  by  their  men  :  the 
latter  starved,  misused,  ill-handled,  possessed  neither 
the  compact  strength  of  discipline  nor  the  daring  of 
enthusiasm.  Under  such  a  system,  the  peasantry 
could  not  be  rendered  energetic  soldiers,  nor  were  they 
active  supporters  cf  the  cause ;  but  with  a  wonderful 
constancy  they  endured  for  it,  fatigue,  sickness,  naked- 
ness and  famine,  displaying  in  all  their  actions,  and  in 
all  their  sentiments,  a  distinct  and  powerful  national 
character.  This  constancy,  although  rendered  nuga- 
tory by  the  vices  and  follies  of  the  juntas  and  leading 
men,  hallowed  the  people's  efforts,  and  the  flagitious 
violence  of  the  invasion  almost  justified  their  ferocity. 

Palacios,  on  the  receipt  of  the  orders  above  men- 
tioned, advanced,  with  five  thousand  men,  to  Vilharta, 
in  La  Mancha  ;  and  the  duke  of  Infantado,  anticipating 
the  instructions  of  the  junta,  was  already  in  motion  from 
Cuen(^a,  his  army,  reinforced  by  the  divisions  of  Car- 
toajal  and  Lilli  and  by  fresh  levies,  being  about  twenty 
thousand  men,  of  which  two  thousand  were  cavalry. 
To  check  the  incursions  of  the  French  horsemen,  he 
had  a  few  days  after  the  departure  of  Napoleon  from 
Madrid,  detached  general  8enra  and  general  Venegas 
with  eight  thousand  infantry  and  all  the  horse  to  scour 
the  country  round  Tarancon  and  Aranjuez,  and  the 
former  entered  Horcajada,  while  the  latter  endeavored 
to  cut  off  a  French  detachment,  but  was  hiiiaself  sur- 
prised and  beaten  by  a  very  inferior  force.  Marshal 
Victor,  nevertheless,  withdrew  his  advanced  posts, 
and,  concentrating  Ruffin's  and  Villatte's  divisions  of 
infantry  and  Latour  Maubourg's  cavalry,  at  Villa  de 
Alorna,  in  the  vicinity  of  Toledo,  left  Venegas  in  pos- 
session of  Tarancon.  But,  among  the  Spanish  generals, 
mutual  recriminations  succeeded  their  failure :  the 
duke  of  Infantado  possessed  neither  authority  nor  ta- 
lents to  repress  their  disputes,  and  in  this  untoward 
state  of  affairs  receiving  the  orders  of  the  junta,  he  pro- 
jected a  movement  on  Toledo,  intending  to  seize  that 
place  and  Aranjuez,  break  down  the  bridges,  and  main- 
tain the  line  of  the  Tagus. 

The  10th  he  quitted  Cuentja,  with  ten  thousand  men, 
intending  to  join  Venegas,  who,  with  the  rest  of  the 
army,  was  at  Tarancon. 

The  loth,  he  met  a  crowd  of  fugitives  near  Carasco- 
sa,  and  heard,  with  equal  surprise  and  consternation, 
that  the  division  under  Venegas  was  beaten,  and  the 
pursuers  close  at  hand. 

ROUT   OF    UCLES. 

It  appeared  that  Victor,  ignorant  of  the  exact  situa- 
tion and  intentions  of  the  Spanish  generals,  and  yet 
uneasy  at  tlieir  movements,  had  marched  from  Toledo 
to  Ocafia  the  10th,  and  that  Venegas  then  abandoned 
Tarancon  and  took  post  at  Ucles.  The  French  again 
advanced  on  the  12th  in  two  columns,  of  which  one, 
composed  of  Ruffin's  division  and  a  brigade  of  cavalry, 
lost  its  way,  and  arrived  at  Alcazar;  the  other,  led  by 
Victor  in  person,  arrived  in  front  of  the  Spanish  posi- 
tiuu  at  Ucles  early  in  the  morning  of  the  13th.     This 


meeting  was  unexpected  by  either  party,  but  th© 
French  attacked  without  hesitation,  and  the  Spaniards, 
making  towards  Alcazar,  were  cut  off"  by  Hufhn,  and 
totally  discomfited.  Several  thousands  were  taken, 
others  fled  across  the  fields,  and  one  body  preservinr^ 
some  order,  marched  towards  Oca"  a,  where  meetinf 
the  French  pare,  it  received  a  heavy  discharge  of 
grape,  and  dispersed.  Of  the  whole  force,  only  one  small 
detachment,  under  general  Giron,  forc(  d  a  passage  by 
the  road  of  Carascosa,  and  so  reached  the  duke  of  In- 
fantado, who  immediately  retreated  safely  to  Cuen(;a, 
as  the  French  cavalry  was  too  much  fatigued  to  pursue 
him  briskly. 

From  Cuenca  he  sent  his  guns  towards  Valencia  by 
the  read  of  Tortola,  but  marched  his  infantry  and  ca- 
valry by  Chinchilla,  to  Tobarra  on  the  frontiers  of 
Murcia,  and  then  to  Santa  Cruz  de  Mudela,  a  town  si- 
tuated near  the  entrance  to  the  defiles  of  the  Sierra 
Morena.  This  place  he  renched  in  the  beginning  of 
February,  having  made  a  painful  and  circuitous  retreit 
of  more  than  two  hundred  miles,  in  a  bad  season  ;  his 
artillery  had  been  captured  at  Tortola,  and  his  force 
was  reduced  by  desertion  and  straggling,  to  a  handful 
of  discontented  officers,  and  a  few  thousand  men,  worn 
out  with  fatigue  and  misery.  Meanwhile,  Victor,  after 
scouring  a  part  of  the  province  of  (Juen<^a  and  dispos- 
ing of  his  prisoners,  made  a  sudden  march  upon  Vil- 
harta, intending  to  surprise  Palacios,  but  that  officer 
aware  of  Infantado's  retreat  had  already  effected  ajunc- 
tion  with  the  latter  at  Santa  Cruz  de  Mudela;  where- 
fore the  French  marshal  relinquished  the  attempt  and 
re-occupied  his  former  position  at  Toledo. 

The  captives  taken  at  Ucles  were  marched  to  Madrid  ; 
those  who  were  weak  and  unable  to  walk,  being,  says 
Mr.  Rocca,  shot  by  order  of  Victor,  because  the  Span- 
iards had  hanged  some  French  prisoners.*  If  so,  it  was  . 
a  barbarous  and  a  shameful  retaliation,  unworthy  of  a 
soldier,  for  what  justice  or  pro|)riety  is  shewn  in  re- 
venging the  death  of  one  innocent  person  by  the  mur- 
der of  another'? 

After  the  French  had  thus  withdrawn,  Infantado  and 
Palacios  proceeded  to  re-organize  tlieir  forces,  under 
the  name  of  the  Carolina  Army,  and  when  the  levies 
in  Grenada  and  other  parts  came  up,  the  duke  of  Albu- 
querque, at  the  head  of  the  cavalry,  endeavoured  to 
surprise  a  French  regiment  of  dragoons  at  Mora,  but 
the  latter  rallied  quickly,  fought  stoutly,  and  effected 
a  retreat  with  scarcely  any  less;  Albuquerque  then  re- 
tired to  Consuegra,  where  he  was  attacked  the  next  day 
by  superior  numbers,  and  got  oft' with  difficulty.  The 
duke  of  Infantado  was  now  displaced  by  the  junta,  and 
general  Urbina,  Conde  de  Cartoajal,  the  new  comman- 
der, having  restored  some  discipline,  advanced  to  Ciu- 
dad  Real,  and  took  post  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Upper 
Guadiana.  From  thence  he  opened  a  communication 
with  Cuesta,  whose  army  had  been  encreased  to  six- 
teen thousand  men,  cf  which  three  thousand  were  ca- 
valry ;  for  the  Spaniards  suffered  more  in  flight  than 
in  action,  and  the  horsemen  escaping  with  little  da- 
mage, were  more  easily  rallied,  and  in  greater  relative 
numbers  than  the  infantry.  With  these  forces,  Cuesta 
had  advanced  to  the  Tagus,  when  INIoore's  march  upon 
Sahagun  had  drawn  the  fourth  corps  across  that  river; 
the  latter,  however,  by  fortifying  an  old  tower,  still 
held  the  bridge  of  Arzobispo.  Cuesta  extended  his 
line  from  the  mountains  in  front  of  that  place,  to 
the  Puerto  de  Mirahete,  and  broke  down  the  bridge  of 
Almaraz,  a  magnificent  structure,  the  centre  arcli  of 
which  was  above  one  hundred  and  fifty  feet  liigii. 

In  these  positions  both  sides  remained  tranquil  in  La 
Mancha,  and  in  Estremadura,  and  so  ended  the  Span- 
ish exertions  to  lighten  the  pressure  upon  the  Brilish 
army ;  two  French  divisions  of  infantry,  and  as  many 


*  Rocca's  Menioi 


134 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  V. 


DTijrados  of  cavalry,  had  more  than  sufficed  to  baffle 
thorn,  and  thus  the  imminent  danger,  of  the  southern 
provinces,  when  sir  John  Moore's  vigorous  operations 
drew  the  emperor  to  the  north,  may  be  justly  estimated. 


CHAPTER  II. 

Oppratinns  in  Aragon — Confusion  in  Zarag-oza — The  third  and 
fifth  rorjis  invest  that  citv — fortification  desnibed — JVIoiite 
Toriero  taken— Attacii  on  tlie  suburb  repulsed — Morlier 
takes  post  at  CalatayuH — The  convent  of  San  Joseph  taken 
. — The  bridge-head  carried — Huerba  passed — Device  of  the 
Spanish  leaders  to  encourage  the  besieged  -Marquis  of  La- 
zan  takes  post  on  the  Sierra  de  Alcubieire — Lasnes  arrives 
in  the  French  camp — Recals  Morlier — I.azan  defeated— Gal- 
lant exploit  of  Mariano  Galindo — The  walls  of  the  town 
taken  by  assault — General  Lacoste  and  colonel  San  Genis 
slain. 

CONTINUATION    OF    THE    OPERATIONS    IN    ARAGON. 

From  the  field  of  battle  at  Tudela,  all  the  fugitives 
from  O'Neil's,  and  a  great  part  of  those  from  Casta- 
fios's  army,  fled  to  Zaragoza,  and  with  such  speed  as 
to  bring  the  first  news  of  their  own  disaster.  With 
the  troops,  also,  came  an  immense  number  of  carriages, 
and  the  military  chests,  for  the  roads  were  wide  and 
excellent,  and  the  pursuit  was  slack.  The  citizens 
and  the  neighbouring  peasantry  were  astounded  at  this 
quick  and  unexpected  calamity.  They  had,  with  a 
natural  credulity,  relied  on  the  boasting  promises  of 
their  chiefs,  and  being  necessarily  ignorant  of  the  true 
state  of  affairs,  never  doubted  that  their  vengeance 
would  be  sated,  by  a  speedy  and  complete  destruc- 
tion of  the  French.  When  their  hopes  were  thus  sud- 
denly blasted,  when  they  beheld  troops,  from  whom 
they  expected  nothing  but  victory,  come  pouring  in- 
to the  town  with  all  the  tumult  of  panic  ;  when  the 
peasants  of  all  the  villages  through  whi-ch  the  fugitives 
passed,  came  rushing  into  the  city  along  with  the  scar- 
ed multitude  of  fiyinar  soldiers  and  camp  followers, 
every  heart  was  filled  with  consternation,  and  the  date 
of  Zarngoza's  glory  would  have  ended  with  the  first 
siege,  if  the  success  at  Tudela  had  been  followed  up 
by  the  French  with  that  celerity  and  vigour  which  the 
occasion  required. 

Napoleon,  foreseeing  that  this  moment  of  confusion 
and  terror  would  arrive,  had,  with  his  usual  prudence, 
provided  the  means,  and  given  directions  for  such  an 
instantaneous  and  powerful  attack,  as  would  inevitably 
have  overthrown  the  bulwark  of  the  eastern  provinces: 
but  the  sickness  of  marshal  Lasnes,  the  difficulty  of 
communication,  the  consequent  false  movements  of 
Moncey  and  Ney,  in  fine,  the  intervention  of  fortune, 
omnipotent  as  she  is  in  war,  baffled  the  emperor's  long- 
sighted calculations.  The  leaders  had  time  to  restore 
order  amongst  tlie  multitude,  to  provide  stores,  to  com- 
plete the  defensive  works,  and,  by  a  ferocious  exercise 
of  power,  to  insure  implicit  obedience  :  the  danger  of 
resisting  the  enemy  appeared  light  when  a  suspicious 
word  or  jjpsture  was  instantly  punished  by  death. 

The  third  corps  having  missed  the  favourable  mo- 
ment for  a  sudden  assault,  and  being  reduced  by  sick- 
ness, by  losses  in  battle,  and  l)y  detachments,  to  seven- 
teen thousand  four  hundred  men  including  the  engineers 
and  artillery,*  was  too  weak  to  invest  the  city  in  form, 
and  therefore,  remained  in  observation  on  the  Xalon 
river,  while  a  battering  train  of  sixty  guns,  with  well- 
furnished  pares,  which  liad  been  by  Napoleon's  orders 
previously  collected  in  Pampeluna,  was  carried  to  Tu- 
dela and  embarked  upon  the  canal  leading  to  Zaragoza. 
Marshal  Mortier,  with  the  fifth  corps,  was  directed  to 
assist  in  the  siege,  and  he  was  in  march  to  join  Mon- 
cey, when  his  progress  also,  was  arrested  by  sir  John 


Muster  roll  of  the  French  Army,  MSS 


Moore's  advance  towards  Burg'*,  but  the  scope  of 
that  general's  operation  being  determined  by  Napo- 
leon's counter-movement,  Morlier  resumed  his  march 
to  re-inforce  Moncey,  and,  on  the  2l)th  of  December, 
1808,  ttieir  united  corps,  forming  an  army  of  thirty-five 
thousand  men  of  all  arms,  advanced  against  Zaragoza. 
At  this  time,  however,  confidence  had  been  restored  in 
the  town,  and  all  the  preparations  necessary  for  a  vi- 
gorous defence  were  completed.* 

Tiie  nature  of  the  plain  in  which  Zaragoza  is  situat- 
ed, the  course  of  the  rivers,  the  peculiar  construction 
of  the  houses,  and  the  multitude  of  convents,  have 
been  already  described,  but  the  difficulties  to  be  en- 
countered by  the  French  troops  were  no  longer  the  same 
as  in  the  first  siege.  At  that  time  little  assistance  had 
been  derived  from  science;  now,  instructed  by  expe- 
rience, and  inspired  as  it  were  by  the  greatness  of  their 
resolution,  neither  the  rules  of  art  nor  the  resources 
of  genius  were  neglected  by  the  defenders. 

Zaragoza  offered  four  irregular  fronts.  The  first, 
reckoning  from  the  right  of  the  town,  extended  from 
the  Ebro  to  a  convent  of  bare-footed  Carmelites,  and 
was  about  three  hundred  yards  wide. 

The  second,  twelve  hundred  yards  in  extent,  reached 
from  the  Carmelites  to  a  bridge  over  the  Huerba. 

'I'he  third,  likewise  of  twelve  hundred  yards,  stretch- 
ed from  this  bridge  to  an  oil  manufactory  built  beyond 
tlie  walls. 

The  fourth,  being  on  an  opening  of  four  hundred 
yards,  reached  from  the  oil  manufactory  to  the  Ebro. 

The  first  front,  fortified  by  an  ancient  wall  and  flank- 
ed by  the  guns  on  the  Carmelite,  was  strengthened  by 
new  batteries  and  ramparts,  and  by  the  Castle  of  Al- 
jaferia,  commonly  called  the  Castle  of  the  Inquisition, 
which  standing  a  little  in  advance,  was  a  square  fort, 
having  a  bastion  and  tower  at  each  corner,  and  a  good 
stone  ditch,  and  it  was  connected  with  the  body  of  the 
place  by  certain  walls  loop-holed  for  musketry. | 

The  second  front  was  defended  by  a  doulile  wall, 
the  exterior  one  of  recent  erection,  faced  with  sun-dried 
bricks,  and  covered  by  a  ditch,  with  perpendicular  sides, 
fifteen  feet  deep  and  twenty  feet  wide.  The  flanks  of 
this  front  were  formed  from  the  convent  of  the  Carmel- 
ites, by  a  large  circular  battery  standing  in  the  centre 
of  the  line,  by  a  fortified  convent  of  the  Capuchins, 
called  the  Trinity,  and  by  some  earthen  works  protect- 
ing the  head  of  the  bridge  over  the  Huerba. 

The  third  front  was  covered  by  the  river  Huerba,  the 
deep  bed  of  which  was  close  to  the  foot  of  the  ramparts. 
Behind  this  stre;'.m  a  double  entrenchment  was  carried 
from  the  bridge  head  to  a  large  ))rqj(>cting  convent  of 
Santa  Engracia,  a  distance  of  two  hundred  yards.  Santa 
p]ngracia  itself  was  very  strongly  fortified  and  armed, 
and,  from  thence  to  the  oil  manufactory,  the  line  of  de- 
fence was  prolonged  by  an  ancient  Moorish  wall,  on 
which  several  terraced  batteries  were  raised,  to  sweep 
all  the  space  between  the  rampart  ai>ri  the  Huerba. 
These  batteries,  and  the  guns  in  the  convent  of  Santa 
Engracia,  likewise  overlooked  some  works  raised  to 
protect  a  second  bridge,  that  crossed  the  river,  about 
cannon-shot  below  the  first. 

Upon  the  right  bank  of  the  Hue:ba,  and  a  little  be- 
low the  second  bridge,  stood  the  convent  of  San  Joseph, 
the  walls  of  wliich  had  been  strengthened  and  protected 
by  a  deep  ditch  with  a  covered  way  and  palisade.  It 
was  well  placed,  as  an  advanced  Mork,  to  impede  the 
enemy's  approach,  and  to  facilitate  sallies  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  river,  and  it  was  open  in  the  rear,  to  the 
fire  from  the  works  at  the  second  bridge,  both  being 
overlooked  by  the  terraced  batteries,  and  by  the  guns 
of  Santa  Engracia. 

The  fourth  front  was  protected,  by  the  Huerba,  by 

»  Caviilhero.  Doyle's  Correspondence,  MSS. 
+  Rogniat's  Siege  of  Zaragoza.     Cavalliero's  Siege  of  Za- 
ragoza. 


u 


!.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


135 


the  continuation  of  the  old  city  wall,  by  new  batteries 
and  entrenchments,  and  by  several  armed  convents  and 
laro;e  houses. 

Beyond  the  walls,  the  Monte  Torrero,  which  com- 
manded all  the  plain  of  Zaragoza,  was  crowned  by  a 
large  ill-constructed  fort,  raised  at  the  distance  of  eigh- 
teen hundred  yards  from  the  convent  of  San  Joseph. 
This  work  was  covered  by  the  royal  canal,  the  sluices 
of  which  were  defended  by  some  field-works  open  to 
the  fire  of  the  fort  itself. 

On  the  left  bank  of  the  Ebro  the  suburb,  built  in  a 
low  marshy  plain,  was  protected  by  a  chain  of  redoubts 
and  fortified  houses,  and,  some  gun  boats,  manned  by 
seamen  from  the  naval  arsenal  of  Carthagena,  com- 
pleted the  circuit  of  defence.  The  artillery  of  the  place 
was,  however,  of  too  small  a  calibre.*  There  were  only 
sixty  guns  carrying  more  than  twelve-pound  balls,  and 
there  were  but  eight  large  mortars:  there  was,  how- 
ever, no  want  of  small  arms,  and  colonel  Doyle  had 
furnished  many  English  musquets. 

These  were  the  regular  external  defences  of  Zara- 
gnza,  most  of  which  were  constructed  at  the  time,  ac- 
coiding  to  the  skill  and  means  of  the  engineers;  but 
the  experience  of  the  former  siege  had  taught  the  peo- 
ple not  to  trust  to  the  ordinary  resources  of  art,  and, 
with  equal  genius  and  resolution,  they  had  prepared  an 
internal  system  of  defence  infinitely  more  elficacious. 

It  has  been  already  observed,  that  the  houses  of 
Zaragoza  were  fire-proof,  and,  generally,  of  only  two 
stories,  that,  in  all  the  quarters  of  the  city,  the  massive 
convents  and  churches  rose  like  castles  above  the  low 
buildings,  and  that  the  greater  streets,  running  into  the 
Lmad-way  called  the  Cosso,  divided  the  town  into  a 
variety  of  districts,  unequal  in  size,  but  each  contain- 
ing one  or  more  large  structures.  Now,  the  citizens, 
sacrificing  all  personal  convenience,  and  resigning  all 
idea  of  private  property,  gave  up  their  goods,  their 
bodies,  and  their  houses  to  the  war,  and,  being  promis- 
cuously mingled  with  the  peasantry  and  the  regular 
soldiers,  the  whole  formed  one  mighty  garrison,  well 
suited  to  the  vast  fortress  into  which  Zaragoza  was 
transformed  :  for  the  doors  and  windows  of  the  houses 
were  built  up,  their  fronts  loop-holed,  internal  commu- 
nications broken  through  the  party  walls,  the  streets 
trenched  and  crossed  by  earthen  ramparts  mounted 
with  cannon,  and  every  strong  building  turned  into  a 
separate  fortification.  There  was  no  weak  point,  be- 
cause there  could  be  none  in  a  town  which  was  all  for- 
tress, and  where  the  space  covered  by  tl;e  city,  was 
the  measurement  for  the  thickness  of  the  ramparts. 

Nor  in  this  emergency  were  the  leaders  unmindful 
of  moral  force.  The  people  were  cheered  by  a  con- 
stant reference  to  the  former  successful  resistance,  their 
confidence  was  raised  by  the  contemplation  of  the  vast 
works  that  had  been  executed,  and  it  was  recalled  to 
their  recollection  that  the  wet,  usual  at  that  season  of 
the  year,  would  spread  disease  among  the  enemy's 
ranks,  impairing,  if  not  entirely  frustrating,  his  efforts. 
Neither  was  the  aid  of  superstition  neglected  :  proces- 
sions imposed  upon  the  sight,  false  miracles  bewildered 
the  imagination,  and  terrible  denunciations  of  the  divine 
wrath  shook  the  minds  of  men,  whose  former  habits 
and  present  situation  rendered  them  peculiarly  suscep- 
tible of  such  impressions.  Finally,  the  leaders  were 
themselves  so  prompt  and  terrible  in  their  punishments, 
that  the  greatest  cowards  were  likely  to  show  the  bold- 
est bearing  in  their  wish  to  escape  suspicion. 

To  avoid  the  danger  of  any  great  explosion,  the 
powder  was  made  as  occasion  required,  which  was 
the  more  easily  eff'ected,  because  Zaragoza  contained  a 
royal  dep.' t  and  refinery  for  saltpetre,  and  there  were 
powder-mills  in  the  neighbourhood,  which  furnished 
workmen  familiar  with  the  process.  The  houses  and 
trees  beyond  the  walls  were  all  demolished  and  cut 


*  Cavalhero. 


down,  and  the  materials  carried  into  the  town.  The 
public  magazines  contained  six  months'  provisions,  th« 
convents  were  well  stocked,  the  inhabitants  had  laid 
up  their  own  stores  for  several  months,  and  general 
Doyle  sent  a  convoy  into  the  town  from  the  side  of 
Catalonia;  and  there  was  abundance  of  money,  be- 
cause, in  addition  to  the  resources  of  the  town,  the 
military-chest  of  Castanos's  army,  which  had  been 
filled  only  the  night  before  the  battle  of  Tudela,  wa? 
in  the  flight,  carried  to  Zaragoza.*  Some  companiea 
of  women  were  enrolled  to  attend  the  hospitals  and  tu 
carry  provisions  and  ammunition  to  the  combatants: 
they  were  commanded  by  the  countess  of  Burita,  a  lady 
of  an  heroic  disposition,  who  is  said  to  have  displaye* 
the  greatest  intelligence  and  the  noblest  character  dur- 
ing both  sieges. 

There  were  thirteen  engineer  oflScers,  eight  hundred 
sappers  and  miners,  composed  of  excavators  formerly 
employed  on  the  canal,  and  from  fifteen  hundred  to  two 
thousand  cannoneers. f  The  regular  troops  that  fled 
from  Tudela,  being  joined  by  two  small  divisions, 
which  retreated,  at  the  same  time,  from  Sanguessa  and 
Caparosa,  formed  a  garrison  of  thirty  thousand  men, 
and,  with  the  inhabitants  and  peasantry,  presented  a 
mass  of  fifty  thousand  combatants,  who,  with  passions 
excited  almost  to  phrensy,  awaited  an  assault  amidst 
those  mighty  entrenchments,  where  each  man's  home 
was  a  fortress  and  his  family  a  garrison.  To  besiege, 
with  only  thirty-five  thousand  men,  a  city  so  preparev 
was  truly  a  gigantic  undertaking ! 

SECOND  SIEGE  OF  ZARAGOZA. 

The  20th  of  December,  the  two  marshals,  Moncey 
and  Mortier,  having  established  their  hospitals  and 
magazines  at  Alagon  on  the  Xalon,  advanced  in  three 
columns  against  Zaragoza.:}: 

The  first,  composed  of  the  infantry  of  the  third  corps, 
marched  by  the  right  bank  of  the  canal. 

The  second,  composed  of  general  Suchet's  division 
of  the  fifth  corps,  marched  between  the  canal  and  the 
Ebro. 

The  third,  composed  of  general  Gazan's  division  of 
infantry,  crossed  the  Ebro  opposite  to  Tauste,  and 
from  thence  made  an  oblique  march  to  the  Gallego 
river. 

The  right  and  centre  columns  arrived  in  front  of  the 
town  that  evening.  The  latter,  after  driving  back  the 
Spanish  advanced  guards,  halted  at  a  distance  of  a 
league  from  the  Capuchin  convent  of  the  Trinity ;  the 
former  took  post  on  both  sides  of  the  Huerba,  and, 
having  seized  the  aqueduct  by  which  the  canal  is  car- 
ried over  that  river,  proceeded,  in  pursuance  of  Napo- 
leon's orders,  to  raise  batteries,  and  make  dispositions 
for  an  immediate  assault  on  Monte  Torrero.  Mean- 
while general  Gazan,  with  the  left  column,  marching 
by  Cartejon  and  Zuera,  reached  Villa  Nueva,  on  the 
Gallego  river,  without  encountering  an  enemy. 

The  Monte  Torrero  was  defended  by  five  thousand 
Spaniards,  under  the  command  of  general  St.  Marc; 
but,  at  day-break  on  the  21st,  the  French  opened  their 
fire  against  the  fort,  and  one  column  of  infantry  having 
attracted  the  attention  of  the  Spaniards,  a  second,  un- 
seen, crossed  the  canal  under  the  aqueduct,  and,  pene- 
trating between  the  fort  and  the  city,  entered  the  former 
by  the  rear;  at  the  same  time,  a  third  column  stormed 
the  works  protecting  the  great  sluices.  These  sudden 
attacks,  and  the  loss  of  the  fort,||  threw  the  Spaniards 
into  confusion,  and  they  hastily  retired  to  the  town, 
which  so  enraged  the  plebeian  leaders  that  the  life  of 
St.  Marc  was  with  difficulty  saved  by  Palafox. 

It  had  been  concerted  among  the  French  that  general 
Gazan  should  assault  the  suburb,  simultaneously  with 
the  attack  on  the  Torrero,  and  that  ofiicer,  having  en- 


*   Doyle"*  Corresponrlenrr,  MS. 

t  Cavalhero,  Siege  of  Zarajjoza.     {  Rogniat.     \\  Cavalhero. 


136 


NAPIER'S    PENIx\SULAR   WAR. 


[Book  V. 


countered  a  body  nf  S'panish  and  Swiss  troops  placed 
somewhat  in  advance,  drove  the  former  back  so  quick- 
ly that  the  Swiss,  unable  to  make  good  their  retreat, 
were,  to  the  number  of  three  or  four  hundred,  killed  or 
taken.*  But  notwithstandincr  this  fortunate  commence- 
ment. Gazan  did  not  ;ittack  the  suburb  itself,  until  after 
the  affair  at  Monte  Torrero  was  over,  and  then  only 
upin  a  single  point,  without  any  previous  examination 
of  the  works;  hence  the  Spaniards,  recovering  from 
their  first  alarm,  reinforced  this  point,  and  Gazan  was 
forced  to  desist,  with  the  loss  of  four  hundred  men. 
This  important  failure  more  than  balanced  the  success 
against  the  Monte  Torrero;  it  restored  the  shaken  con- 
fidence of  the  Spaniards  at  a  most  critical  moment, 
and  checkino-  in  the  French,  at  the  outset,  that  impetu- 
ous spirit,  that  impulse  of  victory,  which  great  gen- 
erals so  carefully  watch  and  improve,  threw  them  back 
upon  the  tedious  and  chilling  process  of  the  engineer. 

The  21th  of  December  the  investment  of  Zaragoza 
was  completed  on  both  sides  of  the  Ebro.  Gazan  oc- 
cupied the  bridge  over  the  Gallego  with  his  left,  and 
covered  his  front  from  sorties,  by  inundations  and  cuts, 
that  the  low,  marshy  plain  where  he  was  posted,  en- 
abled him  to  make  without  difficulty. 

General  Suchet  occupied  the  space  between  the  Up- 
per Ebro  and  the  Huerba. 

Morlot's  division  of  the  3d  corps  encamped  in  the 
broken  hollow  that  formed  the  bed  of  that  stream. 

Meusnicr's  division  crowned  the  Monte  Torrero,  and 
general  Grandjean  continuing  the  circuit  to  the  Lower 
Ebro,  communicated  with  Gazan's  post  on  the  other 
side.  Several  Spanish  detachments  that  had  been  sent 
out  to  forage  were  thus  cut  off,  and  could  never  re-enter 
the  town,  and  abridge  of  boats  constructed  on  the  Upper 
Ebro  completed  the  circle  of  investment,  insuring  a  free 
intercourse  between  the  different  quarters  of  the  army. 

General  Lacoste,  an  engineer  of  reputation,  and  aid- 
de-camp  to  the  Emperor,  directed  the  siege.  His  plan 
was,  that  one  false  and  two  real  attacks  should  be  con- 
ducted by  regular  approaches  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Ebro,  and  he  still  hoped  to  take  the  suburb  by  a  sud- 
den assault.  The  trendies  were  opened  the  night  of 
the  29th,  the  30th  the  place  was  summoned,  and  the 
terms  dictated  by  Napoleon  when  he  was  at  Aranda  de 
Duero,  being  offered,  the  example  of  Madrid  was  cited 
to  induce  a  surrender.  Palafox  replied,  that — If  Madrid 
had  surrendered,  Madrid  had  been  sold :  Zaragoza 
would  neither  be  sold  nor  surrender !  On  the  receipt 
of  this  haughty  answer  the  attacks  were  commenced, 
the  right  being  directed  against  the  convent  of  San 
Joseph,  the  centre  against  the  upper  bridge  over  the 
Huerba,  tlie  left,  which  was  the  false  one,  against  the 
castle  of  Aljaferia. 

The  31st  Palafox  made  sorties  against  all  the  three 
attacks.  From  the  right  and  centre  he  was  beaten 
back  with  loss,  and  he  was  likewise  repulsed  on  the 
left  at  the  trenches;  but  some  of  his  cavalry,  gliding 
between  the  French  parallel  and  the  Ebro,  surprised 
and  cut  down  a  post  of  infantry,  stationed  behind  some 
ditches  that  intersected  the  low  ground  on  the  bank  of 
that  river.  This  trifling  success  exalted  the  enthu- 
siasm of  the  besieged,  and  Palafox  gratified  his  per- 
sonal vanity  by  boasting  proclamations,  some  of  which 
bore  the  marks  of  genius,  but  the  greater  part  were  ri- 
diculous. 

The  1st  of  January  the  second  parallels  of  the  true 
attacks  were  commenced,  and  the  next  day  Palafox 
caused  the  attention  of  the  besiegers  to  be  occupied 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  Ebro,  by  slight  skirmishes, 
while  he  made  a  serious  attack  from  the  side  of  the 
suburb  on  Gazan's  lines  of  contrevallation.  This  sally 
was  repulseo  with  loss,  but,  on  the  right  bank,  the 
Spaniards  obtained  some  success. 

*  Rognia'i. 


Marshal  Moncey  being  called  to  Madrid,  Junct  now 
assumed  the  command  of  the  third  corps,  and,  about 
the  same  time,  marshal  Morticr  was  directed  to  take 
post  at  Calatayud,  with  Suchet's  division,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  securing  the  communication  witii  Madrid,  'i'he 
gap  in  the  circle  of  invcstnient  left  by  tiiis  draft  of 
eight  thousand  men,  being  but  scantily  stopped  by  ex- 
tending Morlot's  division,  a  line  of  cont'-eval Union  was 
constructed  at  that  part  to  supply  the  place  of  numbers. 
Meanwhile  the  besieged,  hoping  and  expecting  each 
day  that  the  usual  falls  of  rain  would  render  the  be- 
siegers' situation  intolerable,  continued  their  fire  brisk- 
ly, and  worked  counter  approaches  to  the  right  of  the 
French  attacks  ;  but  the  season  was  unusually  dry, 
and  a  thick  fog  rising  each  morning  covered  the  be- 
sieger's advances  and  protected  their  worknien,  both 
from  the  fire  and  from  the  sorties  of  the  Spaniards. 

The  10th  of  January,  thirty-two  pieces  of  French 
artillery  battered  in  breach,  both  the  convent  of  San 
Joseph  and  the  head  of  the  second  bridge  on  the  Hu- 
erba, and  the  town  also  was  bombarded.  San  Joseph 
was  so  much  injured  by  this  fire  that  the  Spaniards, 
resolving  to  evacuate  it,  withdrew  their  guns ;  never- 
theless, two  hundred  of  their  men  making  a  vigorous 
sally  at  midnight,  pushed  close  up  to  the  French  bat- 
teries, but  being  taken  in  flank  wiiii  a  discharge  of 
grape,  retired,  with  loss  of  half  their  number. 

The  11th,  the  besiegers'  batteries  having  continued 
to  play  on  San  Joseph,  the  breach  became  practicable, 
and,  at  four  o'clock  in  the  evening,  some  companies 
of  infintry,  with  two  field-pieces,  attacked  by  the  right, 
while  a  column  was  kept  in  readiness  to  assail  the 
front,  when  this  attack  should  have  shaken  the  difence, 
and  two  other  companies  of  chosen  m.en  were  directed 
to  search  for  an  entrance  by  the  rear,  between  the  fort 
and  the  river. 

The  defences  of  the  convent  v/ere  now  reduced  to 
a  ditch  eighteen  feet  deep,  and  a  covered  way,  which 
falling  back  on  both  flanks  to  the  Huerba,  extended 
along  the  bank  for  some  distance,  and  was  occupied 
by  a  considerable  number  of  men,  but  when  some 
French  guns  raked  it  from  the  right,  the  Spaniards, 
crossing  the  bed  cf  the  river  in  confusion,  took  refuge 
in  the  town,  and  at  that  moment  the  front  cf  the  con- 
vent was  assaulted.  The  depth  of  the  ditch  and  the 
Spanish  fire  checked  the  assailants  a  moment,  yet  the 
chosen  companies,  passing  round  the  works,  found  a 
small  bridge,  crossed  it,  and  entered  by  the  rear,  and 
the  next  instant  the  front  was  stormed,  and  the  defen- 
ders were  all  killed  or  taken. 

The  French,  who  had  suffered  but  little  in  this  as- 
sault, immediately  lodged  themselves  in  the  convent, 
raised  a  rampart  along  the  edge  of  the  Huerba,  aiul 
commenced  batteries,  against  the  body  of  the  place 
and  against  the  works  at  the  head  of  the  upper  bridge, 
from  whence,  as  well  as  from  the  town,  they  were  in- 
commoded by  the  fire  that  played  into  the  convent. 

The  1.5th,  the  bridge-head,  in  front  of  Santa  Kn- 
gracia,  was  carried  with  the  loss  of  only  three  men  ; 
the  Spaniards  cut  the  bridge  itself,  and  sjirung  a  mine 
under  the  works,  but  the  explosion  occasioned  no  mis- 
chief, and  the  third  parallels  being  soon  completed,  the 
trenches  of  the  two  attacks  were  united,  and  the  de- 
fences of  the  besieged  were  confined  to  the  town  itself; 
they  could  no  longer  make  sallies  on  tht  right  iiauk  of 
the  Huerba  without  overcoming  the  greatest  dillicullics. 
The  passage  of  the  Huerba  was  then  effected  by  llie 
French,  and  breaching  and  counter-batteries,  mounting 
fifty  pieces  of  artillery,  were  constructed  against  the 
body  of  the  place,  and  as  the  fire  also  reached  thf!  bridge 
over  the  Ebro,  the  communication  between  the  suburb 
and  the  town,  was  interrupted. 

Unshaken  by  this  aspect  of  affairs,  the  Spanish  lead 
ers,  with  great  readiness  of  mind,  immediately  forged 
intelligence  of  the  defeat  of  llie  emperor,  and,  vvitli 


1809.1 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


137 


the  sound  of  music,  and  amidst  the  shouts  of  the  po- 
pulace, proclaimed  the  names  of  the  marshals  who  had 
been  killed  ;  asserting,  also,  that  Palafox's  brother, 
the  marquis  of  Lazan,  was  already  wasting  France. 
This  intelligence,  extravagant  as  it  was,  met  with  im- 
plicit credence,  for  such  was  the  disposition  of  the 
Cspaniarus  throughout  this  war,  that  the  imaginations 
of  the  chiefs  were  taxed  to  produce  absurdities  propor- 
tionable to  the  credulity  of  their  followers  ;  hence  the 
boasting  of  the  leaders  and  the  confidence  of  the  be- 
sieged, augmented  as  the  danger  increased,  and  their 
anticipations  of  victory  seemed  realized  when  tlie  night- 
fires  of  a  succouring  force  were  discerned,  blazing  on 
the  hills  behind  Gazan's  troops. 

The  difTinulties  of  the  French  were  indeed  fast  in- 
creasing, for  while  enclosing  Zaragoza,  they  were 
themselves  encircled  by  insurrections,  and  their  sup- 
plies so  Straitened  that  famine  was  felt  in  their  camp. 
Disputes  amongst  the  generals  also  diminished  the  vi- 
gour of  the  operations,  and  the  bonds  of  discipline 
beino-  relaxed,  the  military  ardour  cf  the  troops  natu- 
rally became  depressed.  The  soldiers  reasoned  openly 
upon  Ihe  chances  of  success,  which,  in  times  of  danger, 
is  only  one  degree  removed  from  mutiny. 

The  nature  of  the  country  about  Zaragoza  was  ex- 
ceedingly favourable  to  the  Spaniards.  The  town,  al- 
though situated  in  a  plain,  is  surrounded  at  some  miles' 
distance  by  high  mountains,  and  to  the  south,  the  for- 
tresses of  Mequinenza  and  Lerida  afforded  a  double 
base  of  operations  for  any  forces  that  might  come  from 
Catalonia,  and  Valencia.  The  besiegers  drew  their 
supplies  from  Pampeluna,  and  their  line  of  operation 
running  through  Alagon,  Tudela,  and  Caparosa,  was 
harassed  by  the  insurgents,  who  were  in  considerable 
numbers,  on  the  side  of  Epila  and  in  the  Sierra  de 
Mjela,  threatening  Alag^on  ;  while  others,  descending 
from  the  mountains  cf  Soria,  menaced  the  important 
point  of  'I'udela.  The  marquis  of  Lazan  also,  anx- 
ious 1o  assist  his  brother,  had  drafted  five  thousand  men 
from  the  Catalonian  army,  and  taking  post  in  the  Sierra 
de  Licifiena,  or  Alcubierre,  on  the  left  of  the  Ebro, 
drew  together  all  the  armed  peasantry  of  the  valleys 
as  high  as  Sanguessa.  Extending  his  line  from  Villa 
Franca  on  the  Ebro  to  Zuera  on  the  Gallego,  he  hem- 
med in  the  division  of  Gazan,  and  sent  detachments 
as  far  as  Caparosa,  to  liarass  the  French  convoys  com- 
ing from  Pampeluna, 

To  maintain  their  communications  and  to  procure 
provisions,  the  besiegers  had  placed  between  two  and 
three  thousand  men  in  Tudela,  Caparosa,  and  Tafalla, 
and  some  hundreds  in  Alagon  and  at  Montalbarra. 
Between  the  latter  town  and  the  investing  army,  six 
hundred  and  fifty  cavalry  were  stationed  ;  a  like  num- 
ber were  posted  at  vSanta  Fe  to  watch  the  openings  of 
the  Sierra  de  Muela  ;  finally  sixteen  hundred  cavalry 
and  twelve  hundred  infantry,  under  the  command  of 
general  VVathier,  were  pushed  towards  the  south  as  far 
as  Fuentes.  Wathier,  falling  suddenly  upon  an  assem- 
blage of  four  or  five  thousand  insurgents  at  Belchite, 
dispersed  them,  and  then  taking  the  tow-n  of  Alcanitz, 
established  himself  there,  in  observation,  for  the  rest 
of  the  siege.  Lazan,  however,  still  maintained  him- 
self in  the  Alcubierre. 

In  this  state  of  aflfairs  marshal  Lasnes,  having  re- 
covered from  his  long  sickness,  arrived  before  Zarago- 
za, and  took  the  supreme  command  of  both  corps  on 
the  22d  cf  January.  The  influence  of  his  firm  and  vi- 
gorous character  was  immediately  perceptible  ;  recall- 
ing Suchel's  divisior  from  Calatayud,  where  it  had 
been  linijering  without  necessity,  he  se  ,  it  across  the 
Ebro,  ordered  Mortier  to  attack  Lazan,  and  at  the 
game  time  directed  a  smaller  detachment  against  the 
insurgents  in  Zuera,*  meanwhile,  repressing  all  dis- 

*  Rogniat. 


putes,  he  restored  discipline  in  the  army,  and  pressed 
the  siege  with  infinite  resolution. 

The  detachment  sent  to  Zuera  defeated  the  insure 
gents,  and  took  possession  of  that  place  and  of  the 
bridge  over  the  Gallego.  Mortier  encountered  the 
Spanish  advanced  guard  at  Perdeguera,  and  pushed  it 
back  to  Nuestra  Seirora  de  Vagallar,  where  the  main 
bi"dy,  several  thousand  strong,  was  posted,  and  where, 
after  a  short  fight,  he  defeated  it,  took  four  guns,  and 
then  spreading  his  troops  in  a  half  circle,  extending, 
from  Huesca,  to  Pina  on  the  Ebro,  awed  the  country 
between  those  places  and  Zaragoza,  and  checked  fur- 
ther insurrection. 

Before  Lasnes  arrived,  the  besieged  had  been  much 
galled  by  a  mortar  battery,  situated  behind  the  second 
parallel  of  the  centre  attack,  and  one  Mariano  Galindo 
undertook,  with  eighty  volunteers,  to  silence  it.  He 
surprised  the  guard  of  the  trenches,  and  entered  the 
battery,  but  the  French  reserve  arrived  in  his  front,  the 
guard  of  the  trenches  rallied,  and,  thus  surrounded, 
Galindo,  fighting  bravely,  was  wounded  and  taken, 
and  his  comrades  perished,  with  as  much  glory  as  sim- 
ple soldiers  can  attain  to.  After  this,  the  armed  ves- 
sels in  the  river,  attempted  to  flank  the  batteries  raised 
against  the  Aljaferia,  but  the  French  guns  obliged 
them  to  retire,  and  the  besiegers'  works  being  carried 
over  the  Huerba,  in  the  nights  between  the  21st  and 
26th  of  January,  the  third  parallels  of  the  true  attack 
were  completed.  The  oil  manufactory,  and  other  ad- 
vantageous posts,  on  the  left  bank  of  that  river,  were 
then  incorporated  with  the  lines  .pf  approach,  and  the 
second  parallel  of  the  false  attack  was  commenced  at 
one  hundred  and  fifty  yards  from  the  Aljaferia.  These 
advantages  were,  however,  not  obtained  without  pain; 
for  the  Spaniards  frequently  sallied,  spiked  two  guns, 
and  burnt  a  post  on  the  right  of  the  besiegers'  line. 

'J'he  French  fire  now  broke  the  walls  rapidly ;  two 
practicable  breaches  were  opened  in  front  of  the  San 
Joseph,  a  third  was  commenced  in  the  Santa  Augusti- 
ne, facing  the  oil  manufactory,  a  broad  way  was  made 
into  the  Santa  Engracia,  and  at  twelve  o'clock  on  tho 
29th  of  January,  four  chosen  columns  rushing  forth, 
from  the  trenches,  burst  upon  the  ruined  walls  of  Za- 
ragoza. 

On  the  right,  the  assailants  twice  stormed  an  isola- 
ted stone  house  that  defended  the  breach  of  Saint  Au- 
gustin,  and  twice  they  were  driven  back  with  loss. 

In  the  centre,  regardless  of  two  small  mines  that  ex- 
ploded at  the  foot  of  the  walls,  they  carried  the  brevich 
fronting  the  oil  manufactory,  and  then  endeavoured  to 
break  into  the  towm  ;  but  the  Spaniards  retrenched 
within  the  place,  opened  such  a  fire,  of  grape  and 
musquetr}%  that  the  French  were  finally  content  to  es- 
tablish themselves  on  the  summit  of  the  breach,  and  to 
connect  their  lodgement  with  the  trenches  by  new 
works. 

The  third  column  was  more  successful ;  the  breach 
was  carried,  and  the  neighbouring  houses  also,  as  for 
as  the  first  large  cross  street ;  beyond  that,  the  French 
could  not  penetrate,  but  they  were  enabled  to  establish 
themselves  within  the  walls  of  the  town,  and  immedi- 
ately brought  forward  their  trenches,  so  as  to  compre- 
hend the  lodgement  within  their  works. 

The  fourth  column,  composed  of  the  Polish  soldiers 
of  the  Vistula,  vigorously  stormed  the  San  Engracia 
and  the  convent  adjoining  it;  and  then,  unchecked  by 
the  fire  from  the  houses,  and  undaunted  by  the  explo- 
sion of  six  small  mines  planted  on  their  path,  swept 
the  ramparts  to  the  left,  as  far  as  the  first  bridge  on 
the  Huerba.  The  guards  of  the  trenches,  excited  by 
this  success,  now  rushed  forward  tumultuously,  mount- 
ed the  walls,  bayoneted  the  artillery  men  at  the  guns 
in  the  Capuchin,'  and  then  continuing  their  career,  en- 
deavoured, some  to  reach  the  semicircular  battery  and 
the  Misericordia,  others  to  break  into  the  city. 


T38 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  V 


This  vrild  assault  was  soon  checked,  by  grape  from 
two  fjiins  planted  behind  a  traverse  on  the  ramparts, 
and  by  a  murderous  fire  from  the  liouses,  and  as  the 
ranks  of  the  assailants  were  thinned,  their  ardour  sunk, 
while  the  courao^e  of  their  adversaries  increased.  The 
French  were  driven  back  upon  the  Capuchins,  and  the 
Spaniards  were  already  breaking  into  that  convent  in 
pursuit,  when  two  battalions,  detached  by  general 
Morlot  from  the  trenches  of  the  false  attack,  arrived, 
and  secured  possession  of  that  point,  which  was  more- 
over untenable  by  the  Spaniards,  inasmuch  as  the  guns 
of  the  convent  of  Santa  Engracia  saw  it  in  reverse. 
The  French  lest,  on  this  da}',  more  than  six  hundred 
men,  but  La  Coste  immediately  abandoned  the  false 
attack  against  the  castle,  fortified  the  Capuchin  con- 
vent and  a  house  situated  at  an  angle  of  the  wall  abut- 
ting upon  the  bridge  over  the  Huerba,  and  then  joining 
them  by  works  to  his  trenches,  the  ramparts  of  the 
town  became  the  front  line  of  the  besiegers. 

The  walls  of  Zaragoza  thus  went  to  the  ground,  but 
Zaragoza  herself  remained  erect,  and  as  the  broken 
girdle  fell  from  the  heroic  city,  the  besiegers  started 
at  the  view  of  her  naked  strength.  The  regular  de- 
fences had,  indeed,  crumbled  before  the  skill  of  the 
assailants,  but  the  popular  resistance  was  immediately 
called,  with  all  its  terrors,  into  action!  and,  as  if  For- 
tune had  resolved  to  mark  the  exact  moment  when  the 
ordinary  calculations  of  science  should  cease,  the  chief 
engineers  on  both  sides  were  simultaneously  slain. 
The  French  general,  La  Coste,  a  young  man,  intrepid, 
skilful,  and  endowed  with  genius,  perished  like  a  brave 
soldier.  The  Spanish  colonel,  San  Genis,  died,  not 
only  with  the  honour  of  a  soldier,  but  the  glory  of  a 
patriot.  Fallingr  in  the  noblest  cause,  his  blood  stained 
the  ramparts  which  he  had  himself  raised  for  the  pro- 
tection of  his  native  place. 


CHAPTER  in. 

System  of  terror — The  convent  of  St.  Monica  taken — Span- 
iards attempt  to  retake  it,  but  fail — St.  Augrustin  taken — 
Frenrh  chaiigre  their  mode  of  attack — Spaniards  chang'e 
their  mode  of  defence — Terrible  nature  of  tiie  contest — Con- 
vent of  Jesus  taken  on  the  side  of  the  suburb — Attack  of  the 
suburb  repulsed — Convent  of  Francisco  taken — Mine  explo- 
ded under  the  university  fails,  and  the  begiesred  are  repulsed 
— The  Co«so  passed — Fresh  mines  »vorked  under  the  univer- 
sity, and  in  six  other  places — French  soldiers  dispirited — 
Lasnes  encourages  them — The  houses  leading:  down  to  the 
quay  carried  by  storm — An  enormous  mine  under  the  univer- 
sity being  sprung',  that  building  is  carried  by  assault — The 
suburb  is  taken — Baron  Versage  killed,  and  two  thousand 
Spaniards  surrender — Successful  attack  on  the  right  bank  of 
the  Fbro — Palafox  demands  terms,  which  are  refused— Fire 
resumed— Miserable  condition  of  the  citv — Terrible  pesti- 
lence, and  horrible  sufferings  of  the  besieged — Zaragoza  sur- 
renders— Observations. 

The  war  being  now  in  the  streets  of  Zaragoza,  the 
pound  of  the  alarm-bell  was  heard  in  every  quarter ; 
the  people  crowded  into  the  houses  nearest  to  the 
lodgements  of  the  enemy,  additional  barricades  were 
constructed  across  the  principal  thoroughfare?,  mines 
were  prepared  in  the  more  open  spaces,  and  the  inter- 
jal  comnumicalions  from  house  to  house  were  multi- 
iliod,  until  they  formed  a  vast  labyrinth,  the  nlricate 
windinirs  of  which,  were  only  to  be  traced  b>  .^e  wea- 
pons and  the  dead  bodies  of  the  defenders.  The  junta, 
become  more  powerful  from  the  cessation  of  regular 
warfare,  urged  the  defence  with  redoubled  energj',  yet 
increased  the  horrors  of  the  siege,  by  a  ferocity  pushed 
to  the  verge  of  frenzy  ;  every  person  who  excited  the 
suspicions  of  these  furious  men,  or  of  those  immedi- 
ately about  them,  was  instantly  put  to  death.  Amidst 
the  noble  bulwarks  of  war,  a  horrid  array  of  gibbets 
was  seen,  on  which  crowds  of  wretches  were  each 


night  suspended,  because  their  courage  sunk  under  ac- 
cumulating dangers,  or  thai  some  doubtful  expression, 
some  gesture  of  distress,  had  been  misconstrued  by 
their  barbarous  chiefs.* 

From  the  height  of  the  walls  which  he  had  conquer- 
ed, Lasnes  contemplated  this  terrific  scene,  and  judg- 
ing that  men  so  passionate,  and  so  prepared,  could  not 
be  prudently  encountered  in  open  battle,  he  resolved  to 
proceed  by  the  slow,  certain  process  of  the  mattock 
and  the  mine  :|  this  also  was  in  unison  with  the  empe- 
ror's instructions,  and  hence  until  the  •2d  of  February, 
the  efforts  of  the  French  were  only  dire.?led  to  the  en- 
largement of  their  lodgements  on  the  ramparts.  This 
they  effected  with  severe  fighting  and  by  means  of  ex- 
plosions, working  through  the  nearest  houses,  and  sus- 
taining many  counter-assaults,  of  which  the  most  noted 
and  furious  was  made  by  a  friar  on  the  Capuchins' 
convent. 

It  has  been  already  observed,  that  the  large  streets 
divided  the  town  into  certain  small  districts,  or  islands 
of  houses.  To  gain  possession  of  these,  it  was  necr-«- 
sary  not  only  to  mine  but  to  fight  for  each  house;  and 
to  cross  the  great  intersecting  streets  it  was  indispen- 
sable to  construct  traverses  above,  or  to  work  by  un- 
derground galleries ;  a  battery  raked  each  street,  and 
each  house  was  defended  by  a  garrison  that,  generally 
speaking,  had  only  the  option,  of  repelling  the  enemy 
in  front  or  dying  on  the  gibbet  erected  behind.  As 
long  as  the  convents  and  churches  remained  in  posses- 
sion of  the  Spaniards,  the  progress  of  the  French 
among  the  islands  of  small  houses  was  of  little  advan- 
tage to  them ;  the  strong  garrisons  in  the  greater  build- 
ings, enabled  the  defenders,  not  only  to  make  continual 
and  successful  sallies,  but  to  countermine  their  ene- 
mies, whose  superior  skill  in  that  kind  of  warfare,  was 
often  frustrated  by  the  numbers  and  persevering  energy 
of  the  besieged. 

To  overcome  these  obstacles,  the  batteries  opposite 
the  fourth  front,  had  breached  the  convents  of  Augustin 
and  Santa  IMonica,  and  the  latter  had  been  taken  the 
31st  of  January;  for  while  the  attack  was  hot,  a  part 
of  the  wall  in  another  direction  was  blown  in  by  a 
petard,  and  the  besiegers  pouring  through  took  the 
main  breach  in  rear,  cleared  the  convent  and  several 
houses  behind  it.  Nevertheless  the  Spaniards  opened 
a  gallery  from  the  Augiistins  and  worked  a  mine  that 
night  under  Santa  IMopica,  but  the  French  discovered 
it  and  stifled  the  miners.  The  next  day  the  breach  in 
the  Augustin  becoming  practicable,  the  attention  of 
the  defenders  was  drawn  to  it,  while  the  French 
springing  a  mine,  which  they  had  carried  under  the 
wall,  from  the  side  of  Santa  ]\Ionica,  entered  by  the 
opening,  and  the  Spaniards  thus  again  unexpectedly 
taken  in  the  rear,  were  easily  driven  out.  Rallying  a 
few  hours  after,  they  vainly  attempted  to  retake  the 
structure,  and  the  besiegers  then  broke  into  the  neigh- 
bouring houses,  and  at  one  push,  reached  the  point 
where  the  Quemada-street  joined  the  Cosso;  but  the 
Spaniards  renewed  the  combat  with  such  a  fury,  that 
the  French  were  beaten  out  of  the  houses  again,  and 
lost  more  than  two  hundred  men. 

On  the  side  of  San  Engracia  a  contest  still  more  se- 
vere took  place ;  the  houses  in  the  vicinity  were  blown 
up,  yet  the  Spaniards  fought  so  obstinately  for  tha 
ruins,  that  the  Polish  troops  were  scarcely  able  to 
make  good  their  lodgement — although  two  successive 
and  powerful  explosions  had,  with  the  buildings,  de- 
stroyed a  number  of  the  defenders. 

The  experience  of  these  attacks  induced  a  change  in 
the  mode  of  fighting  on  both  sides.  Hitherto  the  play 
of  the  French  mines  had  reduced  the  houses  to  ruins, 
leaving  the  soldiers  exposed  to  the  fire  from  the  next 
Spanish  posts ;  the  engineers,  therefore,  diminished  the 


*  Cavalhero. 


Rogniat. 


1800.J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


139 


quantity  of  powder,  that  the  ii.trrior  onl}^  mif^ht  f;il] 
aifd  the  outward  walls  stand,  and  this  metliod  was 
found  successful.  Whereupon  the  Spaniards,  with 
ready  intrpnuity,  saturated  the  timbers  of  the  lioiises 
with  rosin  and  pitch,  and  settintr  fire  to  those  which 
could  no  longer  he  maintained,  interposed  a  burning 
barrier,  which  often  delayed  the  assailants  for  two 
days,  and  always  prevented  them  from  pushinjr  their 
successes  during  the  cont'usion  that  necessarily  follow- 
ed the  bursting  of  the  mines.  The  fighting  was,  how- 
ever incessant ;  a  constant  bombardment,  the  explosion 
of  mines,  the  crash  of  falling  buildings,  clamorous 
shouts,  and  the  continued  echo  of  musquetry  deafened 
the  ear,  while  volumes  of  smoke  and  dust  cloudingr 
the  atmosphere,  lowered  continually  over  the  heads  of 
the  combatants,  as  hour  by  hour,  the  French,  with  a 
terrible  perseverance,  pushed  forward  their  approaches 
to  tlio  heart  of  the  miserable  but  glorious  city. 

Their  efforts  were  chiefly  directed  from  two  points, 
namely,  San  Engracia,  which  may  be  denominated 
the  left  attack,  and  Saint  Augustin,  which  constituted 
the  right  attack.  At  San  Engracia  they  laboured  on  a 
lint  perpendicular  to  the  Cosso,  from  which  they  were 
only  separated  by  the  large  convent  of  the  Daughters 
of  Jerusalem,  and  by  the  hospital  for  madmen,  which 
was  entrenched,  although  in  ruins  since  the  first  siege; 
the  line  of  this  attack  was  protected  on  the  left  by  the 
convent  of  the  Capuchins,  which  La  Cnste  had  forti- 
fied to  repel  the  counter-assaults  of  the  Spaniards. 
The  attack  from  the  Augustin  was  more  diffused,  be- 
cause the  localities  presented  less  prominent  features 
to  determine  the  direction  of  the  approaches,  Eut  the 
French  having  m.ounted  a  number  of  light  six-inch 
mortars,  on  peculiar  carriages,  drew  them  from  street 
to  street,  and  house  to  house,  as  occasion  offered  ;  on 
the  other  hand  the  Spaniards  continually  plied  their 
enemies  with  hand  grenades,  which  seem  to  have  pro- 
duced a  surprising  effect.  In  this  manner  the  ncver- 
ceSftsing  combat  was  prolonged  until  the  7th  of  Febru- 
ary, when  the  besiegers,  by  dint  of  alternate  mines  and 
assaults,  had  worked  their  perilous  way  at  either  at- 
tack to  the  Cosso,  yet  not  without  several  changes  of 
fortune  and  considerable  loss  ;  and  they  were  unable 
to  obtain  a  footing  on  that  public  walk,  for  the  Span- 
iards still  disputed  every  house  with  undiminished 
resolution.  Meanwhile,  Lasnes  having  caused  trench- 
es to  be  opened  on  the  let't  bank  of  the  Ebro,  plaj-ed 
twenty  guns  against  an  isolated  structure  called  the 
('onvent  of  Jesus,  which  covered  the  right  of  the 
suburb  line;  on  the  7th  of  February  this  convent  was 
carried  by  storm,  with  so  little  difficulty,  tliat  the 
French,  supposing  the  Spaniards  to  be  panic  stricken, 
entered  the  suburb  itself,  but  were  quick'y  driven  back, 
they,  however,  made  good  their  lodgement  in  the 
convent. 

On  the  town  side  the  8th.  9th,  and  10th  were  wasted 
by  the  besiegers  in  vain  attempts  to  pass  the  (>osso. 
They  then  extended  their  flunks;  to  the  right  with  a 
view  to  reach  the  quay,  and  so  connect  this  attack 
with  that  against  the  suburb  ;  to  the  left  to  obtain  pos- 
session of  the  large  and  strongly  built  convent  of  St. 
Francisco,  in  which,  after  exploding  an  immense  mine 
and  making  two  assaults  they  finally  established 
themselves. 

The  llth  and  12th,  mines,  in  the  line  of  the  right 
attack,  were  exploded  under  the  university,  a  large 
building  on  the  Spanish  side  of  the  Cosso,  yet  their 
play  was  insufficient  to  open  the  walls,  and  the  storm- 
ing party  was  beaten,  with  the  loss  of  fifty  men. 
Nevertheless,  the  besjegrers  continuing  their  labours 
during  the  1.3th,  14lh,  ISth,  16th,  and  I7th,  passed 
the  Cosso  by  means  of  traverses,  and  prepared  fresh 
mines  under  ihe  university,  yet  deferred  tlu-ir  explosion 
until  a  sinmltaneous  effort  could  be  combined  on  the 
side  of  the  suburb.     At  the  lefi  attack  also,  a  number 


of  houses,  bordering  on  the  Co:;so,  being 'gained,  a 
battery  was  established  that  raked  that  great  thorough- 
fare above  ground,  wiiile  under  it,  six  galleries  were 
carried,  and  six  mines  loaded  to  explode  at  the  same 
moment. 

But  the  spirit  of  the  French  army  was  now  exhaust- 
ed. They  bad  laboured  and  fought  without  intermis 
sion  for  fiftj  days;  they  had  crumbled  the  walls  with 
their  bullets,  burst  the  convents  with  their  mines,  and 
carried  the  breaches  with  their  bayonets; — tighting 
above  and  beneath  the  surface  of  the  earth,  they  had 
spared  neither  fire  nor  sword,  their  bravest  men  were 
falling  in  the  obscurity  of  a  subterranean  warfare,  fa- 
mine pinched  them,  and  Zaragoza  was  still  uncon- 
quered  ! 

'Before  this  siege,'  they  exclaimiod,  '  was  it  ever 
known,  that  twenty  thousand  men  should  besiege  fifty 
thousand  1  Scarcely  a  fourth  of  the  town  is  won,  and 
we  are  already  exhausted.  We  must  wait  for  rein- 
forcements, or  we  shall  all  perish  among  these  cursed 
ruins,  which  will  become  our  own  tombs,  before  we 
can  force  the  last  of  these  fanatics  from  the  last  of 
their  dens.'*^ 

Marshal  Lasnes,  unshaken  by  these  murmurs,  and 
obstinate  to  conquer,  endeavoured  to  raise  the  soldiers' 
hopes.  He  told  them  that  the  losses  of  the  besieged 
so  far  exceeded  their  own,  that  the  Spaniards'  strength 
would  soon  be  exhausted  and  their  courage  sink,  that 
the  fierceness  of  their  defence  was  already  abating; 
and  that  if  contrary  to  expectation,  they  should  renew 
the  example  of  Numaniia,  their  utter  destruction  must 
quickly  be  effected,  by  the  united  evils  of  battle,  pes- 
tilence, and  misery.  His  exhortations  were  success- 
ful, and  on  the  18th  of  February,  all  combinations 
being  completed,  a  general  assault  took  place. 

The  French  at  the  right  attack  opened  a  party-wall 
by  the  explosion  of  a  petard,  made  a  sudden  rush 
through  some  burning  ruins,  and  then  carried,  without 
a  check,  the  whole  island  of  houses  leading  oown  to 
the  quay,  with  the  exception  of  two  buildings;  the 
Spaniards  were  thus  forced  to  abandon  all  the  external 
fortifications  between  St.  Augustin  and  the  Ebro, 
which  they  had  preserved  until  that  day.  During  this 
assault  the  mines  under  the  university  containing 
three  thousand  pounds  of  powder  were  sprung,  and  the 
walls  tumbling  with  a  terrific  crash, — a  column  of  the 
besiegers  entered  the  place,  and  after  one  repulse  se- 
cured a  lodgement.  l\leanwhile  fifty  pieces  of  artillery 
thundered  upon  the  suburb,  ploughed  up  the  bridge 
over  the  Ebro,  and  by  midday  opened  a  practicable 
breach  in  the  great  convent  of  Saint  Lazar,  which  was 
the  principal  defence  on  that  side.  Lasnes,  observing 
that  the  Spaniards  seemed  to  be  shaken  by  this  over- 
whelminq;  fire,  ordered  an  assault  there  also,  and  Saint 
Lazar  being  carried  forthwith,  the  retreat  to  the  bridge 
was  thus  intercepted,  and  the  besieged  falling  mto 
confusion,  and  their  commander.  Baron  ^'^ersage,  being 
killed,  were  all  destroyed  or  taken,  with  the  exception 
of  three  hundred  men,  who,  braving  the  terrible  fire  to 
which  they  were  exposed,  got  back  into  the  town. 
General  Gazan  immediately  occupied  the  abandoned 
works,  and  having  thus  cut  off  more  than  two  thousand 
men  that  were  stationed  on  the  Ebro,  above  the  sub- 
urb, forced  them  also  to  surrender. 

This  important  success  being  followed  on  the  19th, 
by  another  fortunate  attack  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Ebro,  and  by  the  devastating  explosion  of  sixteen 
hundred  pounds  of  powder,  the  constancy  of  the  be- 
sieged was  at  last  shaken.  An  aid-de-camp  of  Palafox 
came  forth  to  demand  certain  terms,  liefore  offered  by 
the  marshal,  adding  thereto,  that  the  garrison  should 
be  allowed  to  join  the  Spanish  armies,  and  llial  a  cer- 
tain number  of  covered  carriages  should  follow  them. 


Rogiiiut. 


140 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  V. 


Lasnes  rejected  these  propt.sals,  and  the  fire  continued, 
but  the  hour  of  surrender  was  come  !  Fifty  pieces  of 
artillery  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Ebro,  laid  the  houses 
on  the  quay  in  ruins.  The  church  of  Our  T/ady  of  the 
Pillar,  under  whose  especial  protection  the  city  was 
supposed  to  exist,  was  nearly  efiaced  by  the  bonihard- 
ment,  and  ilie  six  mines  under  the  Cosso  loaded  with 
many  thousand  pounds  of  powder,  were  ready  for  a  si- 
multaneous explosion,  which  would  have  laid  a  quar- 
ter of  the  remaining  houses  in  the  dust.  In  fine,  war 
had  done  its  work,  and  the  misery  of  Zaragoza  could 
no  longer  be  endured. 

Thebonibardment  which  had  never  ceased  since  the 
10th  of  .Tanuarv.  had  forced  the  women  and  children 
to  take  refuge  in  the  vaults,  with  which  the  city  abound- 
ed :  there  the  constant  combustion  of  oil,  the  closeness 
of  the  atmosphere,  unusual  diet,  and  fear  and  restlessness 
of  mind,  had  combined  to  produce  a  pestilence  which 
soon  spread  to  the  garrison.  The  strong  and  the  weak, 
the  daring  soldier  and  the  shrinking  child,  fell  before 
it  alike,  and  such  was  the  state  of  the  atmosphere  and 
the  predisposition  to  disease,  that  the  slightest  wound 
gangrened  and  became  incurable.  In  the  beginning  of 
February  the  daily  deaths  were  from  four  to  five  hun- 
dred; the  living  were  unable  to  bury  the  dead;  and 
thousands  of  carcases,  scattered  about  the  streets  and 
ccurl-yards,  or  piled  in  heaps  at  the  doors  of  the  chur- 
ches, were  left  to  dissolve  in  their  own  corruption,  or 
to  be  licked  up  by  the  flames  of  the  burning  houses  as 
the  defence  became  contracted.  The  suburb,  the  great- 
est part  of  the  walls  and  ore-fourth  of  the  houses 
were  in  the  hands  of  the  French  ;  sixteen  thousand 
shells  thrown  during  the  bombardment,  and  the  explo- 
sion of  forty-five  tliousand  pounds  of  powder  in  the 
mines  had  shaken  the  city  to  its  foundations,  and  the 
bones  of  more  than  forty  thousand  persons  of  every 
age  and  sex,  bore  dreadful  testimony  to  the  constancy 
of  the  besieged.* 

Palafox  was  sick,  and  of  the  plebeian  chiefs,  the 
curate  of  St.  Gil,  the  lemonade  seller  of  the  (Josso, 
and  the  Ties,  Jorge,  and  Marin,  having  been  slain  in 
battle,  or  swept  away  by  the  pestilence,  the  obdurate 
violence  of  the  remaining  leaders  was  so  abated,  that 
a  fresh  junta  was  formed,  and  after  a  stormy  consul- 
tation, the  majority  being  for  a  surrender,  a  deputation 
waited  upon  Marshal  Lasnes  on  the  20th  of  February, 
to  negotiate  a  capitulation.  They  proposed  that  the 
garrison  should  inarch  out  with  the  honours  of  war; 
that  the  peasantry  should  not  be  considered  as  priso- 
ners ;  and  at  the  particular  request  of  the  clergy,  they 
also  demanded  that  the  latter  should  have  their  full  re- 
venues guaranteed  to  them,  and  punctually  paid.  This 
article  was  rejected  with  indignation,  and,  according 
to  the  French  writers,  the  place  surrendered  at  discre- 
tion ;  but  tJie  Spanish  writers  assert,  that  Lasnes  granted 
certain  terms,  drawn  up  by  the  deputation  at  the  mo- 
ment, the  name  of  Ferdinand  the  7th  being  purposely 
omitted  vii  the  instrument,  which  in  substance  ran 
thus : — 

The  garrison  to  march  out  with  the  honours  of  war; 
to  be  constituted  prisoners,  and  marched  to  France; 
tlie  ofBcvrs  to  retain  their  swords,  baggage,  and  horses ; 
the  men  their  knapsacks ;  persons  of  either  class, 
wishintf  to  serve  .Joseph,  to  be  immediately  enrolled  in 
his  ranks;  the  peasants  to  be  sent  to  their  homes  ; 
propeuy  and  religion  to  be  guaranteed. 

With  this  understanding  the  deputies  returned  to  the 
city,  where  fresh  commotions  had  arisen  during  their 
absence.  The  party  for  protracting  the  defence,  al- 
though the  least  numerous,  were  the  most  energetic  ; 
they  had  before  seized  all  the  boats  on  the  Ebro,  fear- 
ing that  Palafox  and  others,  of  whom  they  entertained 
suspicions,  would  endeavour  to  quit  the  town ;  and 


*  Cavulber'^.  Rogniat.  Suchet. 


they  were  still  so  menacing  and  so  powerful,  that  tho 
(re])uties  not  daring  to  pass  through  the  streets,  retired 
outside  the  walls  to  the  castle  of  Aljaferia,  and  from 
thence  sent  notice  to  the  junta  of  their  proceedings. 
The  dissentient  party  would,  however,  have  fallen  upon 
the  others  the  next  day,  if  the  junta  had  not  taken 
prompt  measures  to  enforce  the  surrender  ;  the  officer 
in  command  of  the  walls  near  the  castle,  by  their  or- 
ders, gave  up  his  post  to  the  French  during  the  night, 
and  on  the  21st  of  February,  from  twelve  to  fifteen 
thousand  sickly  beings,  laid  down  these  arms  which 
they  were  scarcely  able  to  handle,  and  this  cruel  and 
memorable  siege  was  finished. 

Observations. — I. — When  the  other  events  of  the 
Spanish  war  shall  be  lost  in  the  obscurity  of  time,  or 
only  traced  by  disconnected  fragments,  the  story  of 
Zaragoza,  like  some  ancient  triumphal  pillar  standing 
amidst  ruins,  will  tell  a  tale  of  past  glory,  and  already 
men  point  to  the  heroic  city,  and  call  her  Spain,  as  if 
her  spirit  were  common  to  the  whole  nation  ;  yet  i.t 
was  not  so,  nor  was  the  defence  of  Zaragoza  itself  the 
effect  of  unalloyed  virtue.  It  was  not  patriotism,  nor 
was  it  couraje.  nor  skill,  nor  fortitude,  nor  a  system 
of  Terror,  but  all  these  combined  under  peculiar  cir- 
cumstances, that  upheld  the  defence;  and  this  com- 
bination, and  how  it  was  brought  about,  should  be  well 
considered;  for  it  is  not  so  much  by  catchina  at  the 
leading  resemblances,  as  by  studying  the  ditfcrences 
of  great  affairs,  that  the  exploits  of  one  age  can  be 
made  to  serve  as  models  for  another. 

2. — The  defence  of  Zaragoza  may  be  examined  un- 
der two  points  of  view ;  as  an  isolated  event,  and  as  a 
transaction  bearing  on  the  ireneral  struQfgle  in  the  Pen- 
insula. With  respect  to  the  latter,  it  was  a  manifest 
proof,  thai  neither  the  Spanish  people,  nor  the  govern- 
nienf.  partook  of  the  Zaragozan  energ-y.  It  would  be 
absurd  to  suppose  that,  in  the  midst  of  eleven  miliions 
of  people  animated  by  an  ardent  enthusiasm,  fifty  thou- 
sand armed  men  could  for  two  months  be  besieged, 
shut  in.  destroyed,  they  and  their  works,  houses  and 
bodies,  mingled  in  one  terrible  ruin,  by  less  than  thirty- 
five  thousand  adversaries,  without  one  effort  being  made 
to  save  them!  Deprive  the  transaction  of  its  dazzling 
colours,  and  the  outline  comes  to  this:  Thirty-five 
thousand  French,  in  the  midst  of  insurrections,  did,  in 
despite  of  a  combination  of  circumstances  peculiarly 
favourable  to  the  defence,  reduce  fifty  thousand  of  the 
bravest  and  most  energetic  men  in  Spain.  It  is  true, 
the  latter  suffered  nobly  ;  but  was  their  example  imi- 
tated ?  Cerona,  indeed,  although  less  celebrated,  ri- 
valled, and  perhaps  more  than  rivalled,  the  glory  of 
Zaragoza ;  elsewhere  her  fate  spoke,  not  trumpet- 
tono-ued  to  arouse,  but  with  a  wailing  voice,  that  car- 
ried dismay  to  the  heart  of  the  nation. 

3d. — As  an  isolated  transaction,  the  siege  of  Zara- 
goza is  very  remarkable,  yet  it  would  be  a  great  error 
to  suppose,  that  any  town,  the  inhabitants  of  which 
were  equally  resolute,  might  be  as  well  defended.  For- 
tune and  bravery  will  do  much,  but  the  combinations 
of  science  are  not  to  be  defied  with  impunity.  There 
are  no  miracles  in  war !  If  the  houses  of  Zaragoza  had 
not  been  nearly  incombustible,  the  bombardment  alone 
would  have  caused  the  besieged  to  surrender,  or  to 
perish  with  their  flaming  city. 

4th. — That  the  advantages  offered  by  the  peculiar 
structure  of  the  houses,  and  the  number  of  convents 
and  churches,  were  ably  seized  by  the  Spaniards,  is 
beyond  doubt.  General  Rocrniat,  Lacoste's  successor, 
treats  his  opponent;;'  skill  in  fortification  with  conti-mpt; 
but  colonel  San  Genis'  talents  are  not  to  be  judged  of 
bv  the  faulty  construction  of  a  few  out-works,  at  a  time 
when  he  was  under  the  control  of  a  disorderly  and 
ferocious  mob  ;  he  knew  how  to  adapt  his  system  of 
defence  to  the  circumsiances  of  the  moment,  and  no 
Stronger  proof  of  real  geniu.^  can  be  given.     "  Do  not 


1809.J 


NAPIER'S   PENINSI 


R   WAR. 


141 


consult  me  ahout  i  capitulation,'  was  his  nom-non  ex- 
pression.     *■  I  shall  ricvcr  be  of  opinion  that  Zara2;oza 
can  riictkc  no  further  defence.^     Yet  neither  the  talents 
i    of  San  Genis,  nor  the  construction  of  the  houses,  would 
J  have  availed,   if  the   people  within   had  not  been  of  a 
/  temper  adequate  to  the  occasion ;  and  to  trace  the  pas- 
J  bions  by  which  they  were  animated  to  their  true  causes 
f   is  a  proper  subject  for  historical  and  military  research. 
That  they  did  not  possess  any  superior  courage  is  evi- 
dent from  the  facts  ;  the  besieged,  although  twice  the 
.camber  of  the  besiegers,  never  made  any  serious  im- 
*  ipression  by  their  sallies,  and  they  were  unable  to  de- 
fend the  breaches.     In  large  masses,  the  standard  of 
courage  which  is  established  by  discipline,   may  be 
often  inferior  to  that  produced  by  fanaticism   or  any 
other  peculiar  excitement;  but  the  latter  never  lasts 
long,  neither  is  it  equable,  because  men  are  of  different 
susceptibilit}',    follovi'ing  their   physical    and    mental 
conformation ;  hence  a  systein   of  terror  has  alwa)'s 
been  the  resource  of  those  leaders  who,  being  engaged 
in  great  undertakings,  were  unable  to  recur  to  disci- 
pline.   Enthusiasm  stalked  in  front  of  their  bands,  but 
punishment  brought  up  the  rear,  and  Zaragoza  was  no 
exception  to  this  practice. 

5ih. — It  may  be  said  that  the  majority  of  the  be- 
sieged, not  being  animated  by  any  peculiar  fury,  a 
Byslem  of  terror  could  not  be  carried  to  any  great 
length ;  a  close  examination  explains  this  seeming 
mystery.  The  defenders  were  composed  of  three  dis- 
tinct parties, — the  regular  troops,  the  peasantry  from 
the  country,  and  the  citizens ;  the  citizens,  who  had 
most  to  lose,  were  naturally  the  fiercest,  and,  accord- 
ingly, amongst  them,  the  system  of  terror  was  genera- 
ted. The  peasantry  followed  the  example,  as  all  ig- 
norant men,  under  no  regular  control,  will  do.  The 
soldiers  meddled  but  little  in  the  interior  arrangements, 
and  the  division  of  the  town  into  islands  of  posts  ren- 
dered it  perfectly  feasible  for  violent  persons,  already 
possessed  of  authority,  to  follow  the  bent  of  their  in- 
clinations :  there  was  no  want  of  men,  and  the  garri- 
son of  each  island  found  it  their  own  interest  to  keep 
those  in  front  of  them  to  their  posts,  that  the  danger 
might  be  the  longer  staved  off  from  themselves. 

r)th. — Palafox  was  only  the  nominal  chief  of  Zara- 
goza, the  laurels  gathered  in  both  sieges  should  adorn 
plebeian  brows,  but  those  laurels  dripped  with  kindred 
as  well  as  foreign  blood.  The  energy  of  the  real  chiefs, 
and  the  cause  in  which  that  energy  was  exerted,  may 
be  admired  ;  the  acts  perjietrated  were,  in  themselves, 
atrocious,  and  Palafox,  although  unable  to  arrest  iheir 
Savage  proceedings,  can  claim  but  little  credit  for  his 
own  conduct.  For  more  than  a  month  preceding  the 
surrender,  he  never  came  forth  of  a  vaulted  building, 
which  was  impervious  to  shells,  and  in  which,  there 
is  too  much  reason  to  believe,  that  he  and  others,  of 
both  sexes,  lived  in  a  state  of  sensuality,  forming  a 
disgusting  contrast  to  the  wretchedness  that  surround- 
ed them. 

OBSERVATIONS  ON  THE  FRENCH   OPERATIONS. 

1.  Before  the  arrival  of  marshal  Lasnes,  these  ope- 
rations were  conducted  with  little  vigour.  The  want 
of  unity,  as  to  time,  in  the  double  attack  of  the  Monte 
Torrero  and  the  suburb,  was  a  flagrant  error,  which 
was  not  redeemed  by  any  subsequent  activity  ;  after 
the  arrival  of  that  marshal,  the  siege  was  pursued  with 
singular  intrepidity  and  firmness ;  and  although  gene- 
v.\l  Rogniat  appears  to  disapprove  of  Suchet's  division 
Laving  been  sent  to  Calatayud,  it  seems  to  have  been 
K  judicious  measure,  inasmuch  as  it  was  necessary, — 

1.  To  protect  the  line  of  correspondence  with  Madrid. 

2.  To  have  a  corps  at  hand,  lest  the  duke  of  Infantado 
should  quit  Cuen^a,  and  throw  himself  into  the  Guada- 
.axara  district,  a  movement  that  would  have  been  ex- 
Irrn.oly  enibarrassiug  to  the  king.     Suchet's  divisicn, 


while  at  Calatayud,  fulfilled  these  objects,  without 
losing  the  power  of  succouring  Tudela,  or  of  intorcent- 
ing  the  duke  of  Infantado  if  he  attempted  to  raise  ihe 
siege  of  Zaragoza;  but,  when  the  Spanish  army  at 
Cuen^a  was  directed  to  Ucles,  and  that  the  marquisJ 
of  Lazan  was  gathering  strength  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Ebro,  it  was  undoubtedly  proper  to  recal 
Suchet. 

2. — It  may  not  be  misplaced  h<cre  to  point  out  tha 
errors  of  Infantado's  operations.  If,  instead  of  bring- 
ing on  a  battle  with  the  first  corps,  he  had  marcliod  t.-j 
the  Ebro,  established  his  depots,  and  placed  arms  at 
Mequinenza  and  Lerida,  opened  a  communication  with 
Murcia,  Valencia,  and  Catalonia,  and  joined  the  mar- 
quis of  Lazan's  troops  to  his  own ;  he  might  have 
formed  an  entrenched  camp  in  the  Sierra  de  Alcubicrrc, 
and  from  thence  have  carried  on  a  methodical  war  wiih, 
at  least,  twenty-five  thousand  regular  troops.  The  in- 
surrections on  the  French  flanks  and  line  of  communi- 
cation with  Pampeluna  would  then  have  become  for- 
midable, and,  in  this  situation,  having  the  fortresses  of 
Catalonia  behind  him,  with  activity  and  prudence  he 
might  have  raised  the  siege. 

3. — From  a  review  of  all  the  circumstances  attend- 
ing the  siege  of  Zaragoza,  we  may  conclude  that  for- 
tune was  extremely  favourable  to  the  French.  They 
were  brave,  persevering,  and  skilful,  and  they  did  not 
lose  above  four  thousand  men,  but  their  success  partly 
resulting  from  the  errors  of  their  opponents,  was  prin- 
cipally due  to  the  destruction  caused  by  the  pestilence 
within  the  town  ;  for,  of  all  that  multitude  said  to 
have  fallen,  six  thousand  Spaniards  only  were  slain  in 
battle;  and  although  thirteen  convents  and  churches 
had  been  taken  ;  yet,  when  the  town  surrendered,  forty 
remained  to  be  forced  !* 

Such  were  the  principal  circumstances  of  this  memo- 
rable siege.  I  shall  now  relate  the  contemporary  ope- 
rations in  Catalonia. 


CHAPTER   IV. 

Operations  in  Catalonia — St.  Cyrromniands  the  seventh  corps 
— Passes  the  frontifr — State  of  Catalonia — Falacius  fixes  big 
head-quarters  at  Villa  Franca — Duhesnie  forces  the  line  of 
the  Llobiegat — Returns  to  Baicelona — English  army  from 
Sicily  designed  to  act  in  Catalonia — Prevented  by  ftlurat — 
Duhesme  foragesEl  Valles — Action  of  San  Culgat — General 
Vives  supersedes  Palacios — Spanish  army  augments — Block- 
ade of  IJarcelona — Siege  of  Rosas — Folly  and  negligence  of 
the  junta — Entrenchments  in  the  town  carried  by  the  be- 
siegers— Marquis  of  Lazan,  with  six  thousand  men,  reaches 
Gerona — F^ord  Cochrane  enters  the  Trinity — Repulses  seve- 
ral assaults — Citadel  surrenders  5th  December — St.  Cyr 
marches  on  Barcelona — Crosses  the  Ter — Deceives  Lazan — 
Turns  Hostulrich — Defeats  iMilans  at  San  Celoni — Battle  of 
Cardadeu — Caldagues  retires  behind  the  Llobregal — JVegli- 
gence  of  Duhesnie — Battle  of  Molino  del  Rey. 

OPERATIONS    IN    CATALONIA. 

It  will  be  remembered,  that  when  the  second  siege 
of  Gerona  was  raised,  in  August,  1808,  general  Du- 
hesme returned  to  Barcelona,  and  general  Reille  to 
Figueras,  after  which,  the  state  of  affairs  obliged  those 
srenerals  to  remain  on  the  defensive.  Napoleon's  mea- 
sures to  aid  them  were  as  prompt  as  the  occasion  re- 
quired ;  for  while  the  siege  of  Gerona  was  yet  in  pro- 
gress, he  had  directed  troops  to  assemble  at  Perpignan 
in  such  numbers,  as  to  form  with  those  already  in  Ca- 
talonia, an  army  of  more  than  forty  thousand  men,  to  be 
called  the  '  1th  corps,''  and  to  be  commanded  by  gene- 
ral Gouvion  St.  Cyr,  to  whom  he  gave  this  short  but 
emphatic  order ;  '  Preserve  Barcelona  for  me.  If  that 
place  be  lost,  I  cannot  retake  itivith  80,000  men.'f 

The  troops  assembled  at  Perpignan  were,  the  great 


*   Rogniat. 


t  St.  Cyr's  Journal  of  Operation*. 


142 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  V, 


est  pnrt,  raw  levies  ;  Neapolitans,  Etruscans,  Ronians, 
and  Swiss,  mixed,  however,  witli  some  old  recriments ; 
but  as  the  preparations  for  the  ^rand  army  under  the 
emperor  absorhed  the  principal  attention  of  the  admi- 
nistration in  France,  genera]  St.  Cyr  was  straitened 
in  the  means  necessary  to  take  the  field,  and  his  un- 
disciplined troops,  suffering  severe  privations,  were 
ieprcssed  in  spirit,  and  inclined  to  desert.  On  the  1st 
it'  November,  Napoleon,  who  was  at  Bayonne,  sent 
irders  to  the  '  Ifh  corps'  to  commence  operations  ;  St. 
C!yr,  therefore,  put  his  division  in  motion  on  the  3d, 
ind  crossing  the  frontier,  established  his  head-quarters 
it  Figueras  en  the  5th. 

Meanwhile  in  Catalonia,  as  in  other  parts  of  Spain, 
lethargic  vanity,  and  abuses  of  the  most  fatal  kind,  had 
succeeded  the  first  enthusiasm  and  withered  the  energy 
of  the  people.  The  local  junta  had,  indeed,  issued 
abundance  of  decrees,  and  despatched  agents  to  the  su- 
preme junta,  and  to  the  English  commanders  in  the 
Mediterranean  and  Portugal,  all  charged  with  the  same 
instructions,  namely,  to  demand  arms,  ammunition, 
and  money,  and  although  the  central  junta  treated 
their  demands  with  contempt,  the  English  autliorilies 
answered  them  generously  and  freely.  Lord  '.  'filing- 
wood  lent  the  assistance  of  his  fleet;  from  Malta  and 
Sicily  arms  were  obtained,  and  sir  Hew  Dalrymple 
having  completely  equipped  the  Spanish  regiments  re- 
leased by  the  convention  of  Cintra,  despatched  them 
to  Catalonia  in  British  transports.  Yet  it  may  be 
doubted  if  the  conduct  of  the  central  junta  were  not  the 
wisest,  for  the  local  government  established  at  Tarra- 
gona had  already  become  so  neglected,  or  so  corrupt, 
that  the  arms  thus  supplied  were,  instead  of  being  used 
in  defence  of  the  country,  sold  to  foreign  merchants!* 
Such  being  the  political  state  of  Catalonia,  it  naturally 
followed  that  the  military  affairs  should  be  ill  con- 
ducted. 

The  count  of  Caldagues,  after  having  relieved  Ge- 
rona,  returned  by  Hostalrich,  and  resumed  the  line  of 
the  Llobiegat ;  fifteen  hundred  men,  drawn  from  the 
garrison  of  Carthagena,  reached  Taragona,  and  the 
marquis  of  Palacios,  accompanied  by  the  junta,  quitted 
the  latter  town,  and  fixed  his  quarters  at  Villa  Franca, 
within  twenty  miles  of  Caldagues,  and  the  latter  then 
disposed  his  troops,  five  thousand  in  number,  on  dif- 
ferent points  between  Martorel  and  San  Boy,  covering 
a  line  of  eighteen  miles,  along  the  left  bank  of  the 
river,  f 

Meanwhile  Duhesme  who  had  rested  but  a  few  days, 
marched  in  the  night  from  Barcelona  with  six  thousarid 
men,  and  having  arrived  the  2d  of  September  at  day- 
break on  the  Llobregat,  attacked  Caldagues'  line  on 
several  points,  but  principally  at  San  Boy  and  Molino 
del  Rey.  The  former  post  was  carried,  and  the  Span- 
iards were  pursued  to  Vegas,  a  distance  of  seven  or 
eight  miles,  but  at  Molino  del  Rey  the  French  were 
repulsed,  and  Duhesme  then  returned  to  Barcelona. 

It  was  the  intention  of  the  British  ministers,  that  an 
auxiliary  force  should  have  sailed  from  Sicily  about 
this  period,  to  aid  the  Catalans,  and  doubtless  it  would 
have  been  a  wise  and  timely  effort,  but  Napoleon's 
foresight  preventv'd  the  execution.  He  directed  Murat 
Id  menace  Sicily,  and  that  prince,  feigning  to  collect 
forces  on  the  coast  of  Calabria,  spread  many  reports  of 
armaments  being  in  preparation,  while,  as  a  prelimi- 
nary measure,  general  Laniarciue  carried  the  island  of 
Caprae ;  here  sir  Hudson  Lowe  first  became  known  to 
history,  by  losing,  in  a  few  days,  a  post  that,  without 
any  pretensions  to  celebrity,  might  have  been  defended 
for  as  many  years.  Mural's  demonstrations  sufficed 
to  impose  upon  sir  .John  Stuart,  antl  from  ten  to  twelve 
thousand  British  troops  were  thus  paralysed  at  a  most 
critical  period;  and  such  will  always  be  the  result  of 


Lord  Collingwooc'.'a  Corrcsponilence. 


t  Ciibanes. 


a  policy  which  has  no  fixed,  definite  object  in  view. 
When  statesmen  cannot  see  their  own  way  clearly,  the 
executive  officers  will  seldom  act  with  vigour. 

During  September  the  Spanish  army  daily  increased, 
the  tercios  of  Migueletes  were  augmented,  and  a  regi- 
ment of  hussars,  that  had  been  most  absurdly  kept  in 
Majorca  ever  since  the  beginning  of  the  insurrection, 
arrived  at  Taragona.  Palacios  however  remained  at 
Villa  Franca,  Caldagues  continued  to  guard  the  Llo* 
bregat,  and  Mariano  Alvarez  commanded  the  advanced 
guard,  composed  of  the  garrisons  of  Gerona  and  Rosas, 
the  corps  of  .luan  Claros,  and  other  partizan  chiefs. 
Francisco  Milans  and  Milans  de  Bosch,  with  six  thou- 
sand Migueletes,  kept  the  mountains,  northward  and 
eastward  of  Barcelona;  the  latter  hemming  in  the 
French  right,  the  former  covering  the  district  of  El 
ValUs,  and  watching,  like  a  bird  of  prey,  the  enemy's 
foragers  in  the  plain  of  Barcelona.  The  little  port  of 
Filieu  de  Quixols,  near  Palamos  Bay,  was  filled  with 
privateers,  and  the  English  frigates  off  the  coast,  be- 
sides aiding  the  Spanish  enterprizes,  carried  on  a  lit- 
toral warfare  in  the  gulf  of  Lyons  with  great  spirit  and 
success.  Many  petty  skirmishes  happened  between 
the  Migueletes  and  the  French;  but  on  the  10th  of 
October,  Duhesme  attacked  Milans  de  Bosch  at  St. 
Gerony  beyond  the  Besos,  and  completely  dispersed 
his  corps,  and  the  11th,  sent  colonel  Devaux,  wilii  two 
thousand  men,  against  Granollers,  which  the  Spaniards 
deserted,  although  it  was  their  chief  depot.  Devaux 
having  captured  and  destroyed  a  considerable  quantity 
of  stores  returned  the  12th  to  Mollet,  where  a  column 
of  equal  strength  was  stationed  in  support,  and  then 
occupied  the  pass  of  Moncada,  while  general  Millosse- 
witz  proceeded  with  the  second  column  to  forage  El 
Valles.  Meanwhile,  Caldagues  drawing  together  three 
thousand  infantry,  two  squadrons  of  cavalry,  and  six 
guns,  marched  by  the  back  of  the  hills  towards  Mon- 
cada, hoping  to  intercept  the  French  on  their  return  to 
Barcelona,  thus  Miiiossewitz  and  he  met  unexpectedly 
at  San  Culgat.*  In  the  confused  action  which  ensued 
the  French  were  beaten,  and  retreated  across  the  moun- 
tains to  Barcelona,  while  Caldagues,  justly  proud  of 
his  soldier-like  movement,  returned  to  his  camp  on  the 
Llobregat, t 

The  "2Sth  of  October,  Palacios  was  ordered  to  take 
the  command  of  the  levies  then  collecting  in  theSierr^., 
Morena,  and  general  Vivos  succeeded  him  in  Catalo-> 
nia.     The  army  was   now  reinforced  with  more  ivil'a:i-. 
try  from  Majorca;  the  Spanish  troops,  released  l>y  tb«  ■ 
convention  of  Cintra,  arrived  at  Villa  Franca;   sevtu 
or  eight  thousand  Grenadian  levies  were  brought  up  to 
Taragona  by  general   Reding,  and,  at   the  same  time, 
six  thousand    men  drafted   from  the  army  of  Apragon, 
reached  Lerida,  under  the  command  of  the  marquis  <>f 
Lazan.     The  whole  were  organized    in   six  divisions  : 
the  troops  in  the  Ampurdan   forming  one,  and  includ- 
ing the  garrisons  of  Hostalrich,   Gerona,   and   Rosa'?, 
this  army  of  the  rii:;ht,  as  it  was  called,  amounted  i,  j 
thirty-six  thousand  men,  of  which  twenty-two  thousand 
foot  and  twelve  hundred  horse  were  near  Barcelona  or 
in  march  for  it. 

Vives  seeing  himself  at  the  head  of  such  a  pow-r 
and  in  possession  of  all  the  hills  and  rivers  surrouijl- 
ing  Barcelona,  resolved  to  storm  that  city,  aisd  all 
things  seemed  to  favour  the  attem))t.  The  inhabitants 
were  ready  to  rise,  a  battalion  of  the  "Walloon  guan's 
who  had  been  suffered  to  remain  in  the  city  in  a  spe- 
cies of  neutrality  plotted  to  seize  one  of  the  gates,  ard 
the  French  were  so  uneasy  that  Duhesme  actually  t*>- 
solved  to  abandon  the  town  and  confine  his  de'ence  tj 
the  citadel  and  Montjouik  ;  a  resolution  from  wlucli  '  9 
was  onlj'  diverted  by  the  remonstrances  of  the  '.l>iel 
engineer  Lafaille.     In  this  state  of  affairs,  Vivei  tran*- 


*  Lafaille  campagne  do  Catalonia. 


f  Vacani. 


1808] 


NAI     ER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR, 


143 


fernn<r  his  quarters  toMartorel,  directed  a  general  attack 
on  the  French  outposts,  liut  he  was  repulsed  at  every 
point,  and  returned  to  the  mountains;  tiie  Walloon 
guards  were  then  disarmed,  the  inhabitants  awed,  and 
the  defences  of  the  town  increased.  From  that  period 
to  the  raising  of  the  blockade  the  warfare  of  the  Span- 
ish general  was  contemptible,  although  disputes  a- 
mongst  his  adversaries  had  arisen  to  such  a  height, 
that  Duhesme  was  advised  to  send  Lecchi  a  prisoner 
to  France. 

Catalonia  was  now  a  prey  to  innumerable  disorders. 
V^ives,  a  weak,  indolent  man,  had  been  the  friend  of 
Godoy,  and  was  not  popular;  he  had,  when  command- 
ing in  the  islands,  retained  the  troops  in  them  with 
such  tenacity  as  to  create  doubts  of  his  attachment  to 
the  cause,  yet  the  supreme  junta  while  privately  ex- 
pressing tlieir  suspicions,  and  requesting  lord  Colling- 
wood  to  force  him  to  an  avowal  of  his  true  sentiments, 
wrote  publicly  to  Vives  in  the  most  flattering  terms, 
and,  finally,  appointed  him  captain-general  of  Catalo- 
nia.* By  the  people,  however,  he  and  others  were  vehe- 
mentl}'  suspected,  and,  as  the  mob  governed  through- 
out Spain,  the  authorities,  civil  and  military,  were  more 
careful  to  avoid  giving  offence  to  the  multitude,  than 
anxious  to  molest  ihe  enemy,  and  hence  although  Cata- 
lonia was  full  of  strong  places,  they  were  neither 
armed  nor  provisioned,  for  all  persons  were  confident 
that  the  French  only  thought  of  retreating. 

Such  was  the  state  of  the  province  and  of  the  armies, 
when  Napoleon,  being  ready  to  break  into  the  northern 
parts  of  Spain,  ordered  St.  Cyr  to  commence  opera- 
tions. His  force  (including  a  German  division  of  six 
thousand]  men,  not  yet  arrived  at  Perpignan)  amounted 
to  more  than  thirty  thousand  men  ;  ill-composed,  how- 
ever, and  badly  provided,  and  St.  Cyr  himself  was  ex- 
tremely discontented  with  his  situation. f  The  emperor 
Lad  given  him  discretionary  powers  to  act  as  he  judged 
fittino",  only  bearing  in  mind  the  importance  of  reliev- 
ing Barcelona,  but  marshal  Berthier  neglected  the 
equipment  of  the  troops,  and  Duhesme  declared  that 
his  magazines  would  not  hold  out  longer  than  Decem- 
ber. To  march  directly  to  Barcelona  was  neither  an 
easy  nor  an  advantageous  movement.  That  city  could 
only  be  provisioned  from  France,  and,  until  the  road 
was  cleared  by  the  taking  of  Gerona  and  Hostalrich, 
no  convoys  could  pass  except  by  sea.  To  attack  those 
places  with  prudence,  it  vv,is  essential  to  get  posses- 
sion of  Rosas;  not  only  to  secure  an  intermediate  port 
for  French  vessels  passing  with  supplies  to  Barcelona, 
but  to  deprive  the  English  of  a  secure  harbour,  and  the 
Spaniards  of  a  point  from  whence  they  could,  in  con- 
cert with  their  allies,  intercept  the  communications  of 
the  French  army  and  even  blockade  Figueras,  which, 
from  the  want  of  transport,  could  not  be  provisioned  at 
this  period.  These  considerations  having  determined 
St.  Cyr  to  commence  by  the  siege  of  Rosas,  he  re- 
paired to  Fifjueras,  in  person,  the  6th  of  November, 
and,  on  the  7th,  general  Reille  being  charged  to  con- 
duct the  operation,  after  a  sharp  action,  drove  in  the 
Spaniards  before  that  place  and  completed  the  invest- 
ment. 

SIEGE    OF    ROSAS. 

This  town  was  but  a  narrow  slip  of  houses  built 
along  the  water's  edge,  at  the  head  of  the  gulf  of  the 
same  name.  The  citadel,  a  large  irregular  pentagon, 
stood  on  one  side,  and,  on  the  other,  the  mountains 
that  skirt  the  flat  and  swampy  plain  of  the  Ampurdan, 
rose,  bluff  and  rocky,  at  the  distance  of  half  a  mile. 
An  old  redoubt  was  built  at  the  foot  of  the  hills,  and, 
from  thence  to  the  citadel,  an  entrenchment  had  been 
drawn  to  cover  the  houses,  hence,  Rosas,  looking  to- 
wards the  land,  had  the  citadel  on  the  left  hand,  the 
mountains  on  the  right,  and  the  front  covered  by  this 

•  Lor  I  Cnllinn^wood's  Correspondence. 

+  Muster  rolls  of  the  French  anny,  .VI '^<^,  St.  Cyr. 


entrenchment.  The  roadstead  permitted  ships  of  the 
line  to  anchor  within  cannon-shot  of  the  place,  and  on 
the  right  hand,  coming  up  the  gulf,  a  star  fort,  called 
the  Trinity,  crowned  a  rugged  hill  about  a  mile  and  a 
quarter  distant  from  the  citadel ;  the  communication 
betv/een  it  and  the  town  being  by  a  narrow  road  car- 
ried between  the  foot  of  the  mountain  and  the  water's 
edge. 

The  garrison  of  Rosas  consisted  of  nearly  three 
thousand  men;  two  bomb-vessels,  and  an  English  se- 
venty-four (the  Excellent), were  anchored  off  the  town, 
and  captain  West,  the  commodore,  reinforced  the  gar- 
risons of  the  Trinity  and  the  citadel  with  marines  and 
seamen  from  these  vessels  ;  but  the  damages  sustained 
in  a  former  siege  had  been  only  partially  repaired; 
both  places  were  ill-found  in  guns  and  stores,  and  the 
Trinity  was  commanded  at  the  distance  of  pistol-shot 
from  a  point  of  the  mountains  called  the  Puig  Rom. 

The  force  under  Reille,  consisting  of  his  own  and 
Pino's  Italian  division,  skirmished  daily  with  the  gar- 
rison; but  the  rain  flooded  the  Ampurdan,  the  roads 
became  impassable  for  the  artillery,  and  the  opening 
of  the  trenches  was  delayed.  Meanwhile  Souham's 
division  took  post  between  the  Fluvia  and  Figueras,  to 
cover  the  siege  on  the  side  of  Gerona,  and  general 
Chabot's  Italian  brigade  was  sent  to  Rabos  and  Espol- 
las,  to  keep  down  the  Somatenes.  Before  Chabot's 
arrival,  Reille  had  detached  a  battalion  to  that  side, 
and  being  uneasy  for  its  safety  sent  three  more  to  its 
assistance,  but  too  late,  for  two  companies  had  been 
cut  off  by  the  Somatenes.  This  loss  however  proved 
beneficial,  it  enraged  the  Italians  and  checked  a  dis- 
position to  desert;  and  St.  Cyr,  unwilling  to  pursue 
the  system  of  burning  villages  and  yet  desirous  to  re- 
press the  insidious  hostility  of  the  peasants,  seized,  in 
reprizal  for  the  loss  of  his  companies,  an  equal  number 
of  villagers,  whom  he  sent  to  France.* 

At  Rosas  the  iidiabitants  embaiked  or  took  refuge 
in  the  citadel,  leaving  the  houses  and  the  entrench- 
ment covering  them,  to  the  French  ;  the  latter  were 
however  prevented  by  the  fire  of  the  Engliyh  ships 
from  making  any  permanent  lodgement,  and  in  a  few 
days,  a  mixed  detachment  of  soldiers  and  townsmen 
re-established  a  post  there. f  This  done,  on  the  8th  cap- 
tain West,  in  conjunction  with  the  governor,  made  a 
sally  but  was  repulsed,  and  on  the  9th  several  yards 
of  the  citadel's  ramparts  crumbled  away.  Fortunately 
the  enemy  did  not  perceive  tlie  accident  which  was  re- 
paired in  the  night,  and  on  the  15th  an  obstinate  as- 
sault made  on  the  Trinity  was  repulsed,  the  English 
seamen  bearing  a  principal  share  in  the  success. 

The  16th  the  roads  became  passable,  and  the  French 
battering-train  was  put  in  motion.  "^Jlie  way  leading 
up  to  the  Puig  Rom  was  repaired,  two  battalions  were 
posted  there,  on  the  point  commanding  the  Trinity, 
and  on  the  19th  three  guns  were  mounted.  The  tren- 
ches were  then  opened  at  the  distance  of  four  huudrec* 
yards  from  the  citadel,  and  the  20th  the  fire  of  thf 
French  mortars  obliged  the  vessels  of  war  to  anchor 
beyond  the  range  of  the  shells. 

During  this  time,  Souham  was  harassed  by  the  Mi- 
gueletes  from  the  side  of  Gerona,  and  the  Frei-.ch  ca- 
valry, unable  to  find  forage,  were  sent  back  to  Francs 
Napoleon,  meanwhile  rendered  uneasy  by  the  reports 
of  General  Duhesme,  directed  the  seventh  corps  to  ad- 
vance to  Barcelona,  so  as  to  arrive  there  by  the  26th 
of  November,  yet  St.  Cyr  refused  to  abandon  the  siege 
of  Rosas  without  a  more  positive  order.j:  On  tlie  other 
side  the  assistance  afforded  to  the  besieged  by  captain 
West  was  represented  to  the  Catalonian  government 
as  an  attempt  to  possess  himself  of  the  place,  and  the 
junta  readily  believing  the  tale,  entered  into  an  angry 
correspondence  with  don  Pedro  O'Daly,  t!ie  governor, 
relative  to  the  supposed  treachery,  yet  took  no  measurea 


*  St.  Cyr.         f  Captain  Wtst'si  Jespjtch.  {  St.  Cjr. 


144 


N  A  V  I  E  R  '  S    P  E  N  I  N  S  ..  .  A  R    W  A.  R. 


[Book  V. 


to  rdise  ihe  sie^e.  Ppndincr  the  correspondpnce,  how- 
ever, the  Exci41eiit  sailed  from  Rosas,  and  was  suc- 
ceeded by  tlie  Fame,  captain  Benuet,  who  immediately 
Ijr.ded  some  men  under  the  Trinity,  and  endeavoured, 
liiil  inelTectually,  to  take  the  battery  opposed  to  that 
fort. 

The  27th  the  besiegers  assaulted  the  Spaniards,  who 
had  entrenciied  themselves  in  the  deserted  houses  of 
the  town ;  a  hundred  and  sixty  were  taken,  fiftj'  es- 
■♦.aped  into  the  citadel,  and  the  rest  were  slain.  Breach- 
ing batteries  were  then  commenced  amono;  the  ruins  of 
Vlie  houses,  and  the  communication  with  the  shippinor 
Tendered  so  unsafe,  that  Lazan,  who  had  come  from 
Lerida  to  Gerona  with  six  thousand  men,  and  had  col- 
lected provisions  and  stores  at  the  mouth  of  the  Fluvia, 
with  the  intention  of  supplying  Rosas  by  sea,  aban- 
doned his  design.* 

Reille  observing  the  dilapidated  state  of  the  citadel 
now  sent  another  summons,  but  the  governor  was  firm, 
and  meanwhile  as  the  engineers  reported  the  breach  in 
the  Trinity  to  be  practicable,  an  assault  there  was  ordered 
for  the  30lh  of  November.  An  Italian  officer,  who  had 
formerly  served  in  the  fort,  being  appointed  to  lead  the 
storming  party,  asserted  that  the  breach  was  a  false 
one;  his  remonstrance  was  unheeded,  and  indeed  the 
Spanish  commandant  thought  the  post  so  untenable, 
that  two  days  before,  the  marines  of  the  Fame  had 
been  withdrawn  by  captain  Bennet.  But  at  this  mo- 
ment lord  Cochrane,  a  man  of  infinite  talent  in  his  pro- 
fession, and  of  surpassing  courage  and  enterprise,  threw 
himself  with  eighty  seamen  into  the  fort.  He  found  the 
breach  really  practicable,  yet  broken  into  an  old  gal- 
lery, which  he  immediately  filled  with  earth  and  ham- 
mocks, and  so  cut  off  the  opening;  hence  the  unfor- 
tunate Italian  could  do  nothing,  and  fell  with  all  his 
followers,  except  two  who  escaped  to  their  own  side, 
and  two,  who  being  spared  by  the  seamen,  were  drawn 
up  with  ropes.  A  second  assault,  made  a  few  days 
after,  was  likewise  repulsed. 

While  this  passed  at  the  Trinity,  the  breaching  bat- 
teries opened  against  the  citadel,  and  a  false  attack 
was  commenced  on  the  opposite  side ;  the  next  night 
the  garrison  made  a  sally  with  some  success,  but  the 
walls  were  completely  broken  by  the  French  fire,  and 
the  5th  of  December  O'Daly,  hopeless  of  relief,  sur- 
rendered with  two  thousand  four  hundred  men  :  lord 
Cochrane  then  abandoned  the  Trinity,  first  blowing  up 
the  iTiagazine. 

8t.  Cyr  observes  that  the  garrison  of  Rosas  might 
have  been  easily  carried  off,  at  night,  by  the  British 
shipping.  Tc  embark  two  thousand  five  hundred  men, 
in  the  boats  of  two  ships,  and  under  a  heavy  fire,  whe- 
ther by  night  or  day,  is  not  an  easy  operation,  yet  the 
censure  seems  well  founded,  because  sufficient  prepara- 
tion might  have  been  previously  made.  Nor  can  the 
defence  of  the  place  (with  the  exception  of  lord  Coch- 
rane's  exploit)  be  deemed  brilliant,  whether  with  rela- 
tion to  the  importance  of  the  place,  the  assistance  that 
might  have  been  rendered  from  the  sea.  or  the  number 
of  the  garrison  compared  with  that  of  the  besiegers. 
It  held  out,  however,  thirty  days,  and,  if  that  time  had 
been  well  employed  by  the  Spaniards  outside,  the  loss 
of  the  garrison  would  have  been  amply  repaid  ;  but 
Vives,  wholly  occupied  with  Barcelona,  was  indiffer- 
ent to  the  fate  of  Rosas  ;  a  fruitless  attack  on  Souham's 
posts,  by  Mariano  Alvarez,  was  the  only  effort  made 
K-  interrupt  the  siege,  or  to  impede  the  iarther  progress 
r>(  the  en'^my  :  Lazan,  although  at  the  head  of  six  or 
eeven  thousand  men,  could  not  rely  upon  more  than 
three  thousand,  and  his  applications  to  Vives  for  a  rein- 
forcement were  unheeded.]" 

The  fall  of  Rosas  enabled  St.  Cyr  to  march  to  the 
relief  of  Barcelona,  and  he  resolved  to  do  so,  although 
the  project,  at  first  sight,  appeared  rather  insane  than 


Doyle's  Correspondence,  MSS. 


t  Ibid. 


hardy  ;  for  tne  roads,  by  which  Cerona  and  Hostalrich, 
wert  10  be  turned,  being  mere  paths  impervious  to  car- 
riages, no  artillery,  and  little  ammunition,  could  be 
carried,  and  the  country  was  full  of  strong  positions. 
The  Germans  had  not  yet  arrived  at  Perpignan,  it  was 
indispensable  to  leave  Reille  in  the  Ampurdan,  to  pro- 
tect Rosas  and  Figueras,  and  these  deductions  being 
made,  less  than  eighteen  thousand  men,  including  the 
cavalry,  which  had  been  recalled  from  France,  re- 
mained disposable  for  the  operation :  but,  on  the  Spa- 
nish side,  Reding  having  come  up,  there  were  twenty- 
five  thousand  men  in  the  camp  before  Barrelona,  and 
ten  thousand  others,  under  Lazan  and  Alvarez,  were 
at  Gerona.  The  Spanish  troops  were,  however,  ex- 
ceedingly ill  organized.  Two-thirds  of  the  Migueletes 
carried  pikes,  and  many  were  without  any  arms  at  all ; 
there  was  no  sound  military  system ;  the  Spanish 
generals  were  ignorant  of  the  French  movements  and 
strength,  and  their  own  indolence  and  want  of  vigilance 
drew  upon  them  the  contempt  and  suspicion  of  tho 
people.* 

The  8ih  of  December  St.  Cyr  united  his;  army  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Fluvia.  The  yth  he  passed  tliat  river, 
and  driving  the  Spaniards  over  the  Ter,  established  his 
head-quarters  at  Me^'inya,  ten  miles  from  Gerona.  Ho 
wished,  before  pursuing  his  own  march,  to  defeaJ 
Lazan,  lest  the  latter  stiouid  harass  the  rear  of  tho 
army,  but,  finding  that  the  marquis  would  not  engage 
in  a  serious  affair,  he  made  a  show  of  sitting  down  be- 
fore Gerona  on  the  10th,  hoping  thereby  to  mislead 
Vives,  and  render  him  slow  to  break  up  the  blockade 
of  Barcelona  :)"  this  succeeded,  the  Spaniard  remained 
in  his  camp,  irresolute  and  helpless,  while  his  enemy 
was  rapidly  passing  the  defiles  and  rivers  between 
Gerona  and  the  Besos.:f: 

The  nature  of  the  country  between  Figueras  and 
Barcelona  has  been  described  in  the  first  volume,  and 
referring  to  that  description,  the  reader  will  find  that 
the  only  carriage  routes  by  which  St.  Cyr  could  march 
were,  one  by  the  sea-coast,  ana  one  leading  through 
Gerona  and  Hostalrich.  The  first,  exposed  to  the  iiro 
of  the  English  vessels,  had  been  broken  up  by  lord 
Cochrane,  in  August ;  and  to  use  the  second,  it  was 
necessary  either,  to  take  the  fortresses,  or  to  turn  them 
by  marching  for  three  days  through  the  mountains.  St. 
Cyr  adopted  the  last  plan,  trusting  that  rapidity  and 
superior  knowledge  of  war  would  enable  him  to  sepa- 
rate Lazan  and  Alvarez  from  Vives,  and  so  defeat  them 
all  in  succession. 

The  11th  of  Decen.ber  he  crossed  the  Ter  and 
reached  La  Bisbal ;  here  he  left  the  last  of  his  car- 
riages, delivered  out  four  days'  biscuit  and  fifty  rounds 
of  ammunition  to  the  soldiers,  and  with  this  provision, 
a  drove  of  cattle,  and  a  reserve  of  only  ten  rounds  of 
ammunition  for  each  man,  he  commenced  his  hardy 
march,  making  for  Palamos.  On  the  route  he  encoun- 
tered and  beat  some  Migueletes  that  .luan  Claros  had 
brought  to  oppose  him,  and,  when  near  Palamos.  he 
suflTered  a  little  from  the  fire  of  the  English  ships,  but 
he  had  gained  a  first  step,  and  his  hopes  were  iiigh. 

The  13tli,  he  turned  his  back  upon  the  coast,  and, 
by  a  forced  march,  reached  Vidreras  and  lilagostera, 
thus  placing  himself  between  Vives  and  Lazan,  f-^r 
the  latter  had  not  yet  passed  the  heights  of  Casz.  de 
Selva. 

The  14th,  marching  by  Mazanet  de  Selva  and  Mar- 
torel,  he  reached  the  heights  above  Hostalrich,  and 
encamped  at  Grions  and  Masanas.  During  this  day's 
journey,  his  rear  was  slightly  harassed  by  Lazan  and 
Claros,  but  he  was  well  content  to  find  the  strong  banks 
of  the  Tordera  undefended  by  Vives.  His  situation 
was,  however,  extremely  critical ;  Lazan  and  (ylaros 
had,  the  one  on  the  11th,  the  other  on  the  l-2th,  informed 
Vives  of  the  movement,  hence  the  bulk  of  the  Spanish 


*  Cab.anes. 


+  St.  Cvr. 


t     C»I>HI)I>«. 


1803.] 


NAPIER'S    PPJNINSULAR    WAR. 


145 


force  before;  Barcelona  might  be  expected,  at  ary  mo- 
ment, in  some  of  the  strong  positions  in  which  the 
country  abounded;  the  troops  from  Gcrona  were,  as 
we  have  seen,  close  in  the  rear,  the  Somatenes  were 
patiiering  thickly  on  the  flanks,  Hostalrich  was  in 
front,  and  the  French  soldiers  had  only  sixteen  rounds 
of  ammunition. 

St.  Cyr's  design  was  to  turn  Hostalrich,  and  get 
into  the  main  road  again  behind  that  fortress.  The 
smugglers  of  Perpignan  had  athrmed  that  there  was 
no  pathway,  but  a  shepherd  assured  him  that  there 
was  a  track  by  which  it  could  be  effected,  and,  when 
the  efforts  of  the  staff-officers  to  trace  it  failed,  St.  Cyr 
himself  discovered  it,  but  nearly  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  Somatenes  during  tiie  search. 

The  15th,  at  day-break,  the  troops  being  put  in  mo- 
tion, turned  the  fortress  and  gained  the  main  road,  and 
the  garrison  of  the  place,  endeavouring  to  harass  their 
rear,  was  repulsed ;  yet  the  Somatenes  on  the  flanks, 
emboldened  because  the  French,  to  save  ammunition, 
did  not  return  their  fire,  became  exceedingly  trouble- 
some, and  near  San  Celoni,  the  head  of  the  column 
encountered  some  battalions  of  Migueletes,  which  Fran- 
cisco Milans  had  brought  up  from  Arenas  de  Mar,  by 
the  pass  of  Villa  Gorguin. 

IMilans,  not  being  aware  of  St.  Cyr's  approach,  was 
soon  beaten,  and  his  men  fell  back,  part  to  Villa  Gor- 
guin, part  to  the  heights  of  Nuestra  Serora  de  Corde- 
ra  :  the  French  thus  gained  the  defile  of  Treintapasos, 
bit  they  were  now  so  fatigued  that  all  desired  to  halt, 
save  the  general,  who  insisted  upon  the  troops  clearing 
that  defile,  and  reaching  a  plain  on  the  other  side, 
which  was  not  effected  before  ten  o'clock.  Lazan's 
troops  did  not  appear  during  the  day,  bnt  Vivos'  army 
was  in  front,  and  its  fires  were  seen  on  the  hills  be- 
•weii  Caidadeu  and  Llinas. 

Information  of  St.  Cyr's  march,  as  I  have  already 
obr-erved,  had  been  transmitted  to  Vives  on  the  llth, 
end  there  was  time  for  him  to  have  carried  the  hulk  of 
his  forees  to  the  Tordera,  before  the  French  could  pass 
that  river;  but  intelligence  of  the  battle  of  Tudela,  and 
of  the  appearance  of  the  French  near  Zaragoza,  arrived 
fit  the  same  moment,  and  the  Spanish  general  betrayed 
the  greatest  weakness  and  indecision ;  at  one  moment 
lesolvinjT  to  continue  before  Barcelona,  at  another  de- 
signinq-  to  march  against  St.  Cyr.*  He  had,  on  the  9th, 
sent  Reding  with  six  guns,  six  hundred  cavalry,  and 
one  thousand  infantry,  to  take  the  command  in  the 
Ampurdan,  and,  the  12th,  after  receiving  Lazan's  re- 
port, he  reinforced  Reding,  who  was  still  at  Granollers, 
and  directed  him  upon  Cardadeu.  The  14th,  he  or- 
dered Francisco  IMilans  to  march  by  Mattaro  and  Are- 
nas de  Mar,  to  examine  the  coast  road,  and,  if  the 
enemy  was  not  in  that  line,  to  repair  also  to  Cardadeu. 
The  15th,  Milans,  as  we  have  seen,  was  beaten  at  St. 
Celoni,  but,  in  the  night,  he  rallied  his  whole  division 
on  tlie  heights  of  Cordera,  thus  flanking  the  left  of  the 
French  forces  at  Llinas. 

A  Spanish  council  of  war  had  been  held  on  the  13th. 
Caldagnes  advised  that  four  thousand  Migueletes 
should  be  left  to  observe  Duhesme,  and  that  the  rest 
of  the  armj'  should  march  at  once  to  fight  St.  Cyr; 
good  and  soldier-like  counsel;  but  Vives  was  loth  to 
abandon  the  siege  of  Barcelona,  and  adopting  half- 
ir.easures,  left  Caldagues,  with  the  right  wing  of  the 
army,  to  watch  Duhesme,  and  carried  the  centre  and 
the  left,  by  the  route  of  Granollers,  to  the  heights  be- 
tween Cardadeu  and  Llinas,  where,  exclusive  of  Mi- 
lans' division,  he  united,  in  the  night  of  the  15lh, 
about  eight  thousand  regulars,  besides  several  thou- 
sand Somatenes.  Duhesme  immediately  occupied  the 
posts  abandoned  by  Vives,  and  thus  sejiarated  him 
from  Caldagues,  yet  St.  Cyr's  position,  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  16th,  would  have  been  very  dangerous,  if  he 

*  Cabanes.     Dovle's  Correspondence,  MS. 
11 


had  been  opposed  by  any  but  Spanish  generals  and 
Spanish  troops. 

Vives  and  those  about  him,  irresolute  and  weak  as 
they  were  in  action,  were  not  deficient  in  boasting 
words ;  they  called  the  French  army,  in  derision,  '  the 
succour;^  and,  in  allusion  to  the  battle  of  Baylen,  an- 
nounced that  a  second  '■btill-figkt,^  in  which  Reding 
was  again  the  '  matadar,''  would  be  exhibited.*  Dupont 
and  St.  Cyr  were,  however,  men  of  a  different  temper: 
the  latter  knowing  that  the  Spaniards  were  not  troops 
to  stand  the  shock  of  a  good  column,  united  his  army 
in  one  solid  mass  at  day-break  on  the  KJth,  and  with- 
out hesitation  marched  against  the  centre  of  the  enemy, 
ordering  the  head  of  the  column  to  go  headlong  on, 
without  either  firing  or  forming  line. 

BATTLE    OF    CARDADEU. 

The  hills  occupied  by  the  Spanish  army  were  high 
and  wooded.  Vives,  in  person,  commanded  on  tho 
left;  the  other  wing  was  under  Reding,  and  the  Soma- 
tenes clustered  upon  a  lofty  ridge  which  was  separated 
from  the  right  of  the  position  by  the  little  river  Mo- 
gent.  The  main  road  from  Llinas  led  through  the 
centre  of  the  line,  and  a  second  road  branching  oil"  from 
the  first,  and  running  between  the  Mogent  and  Reding's 
ground,  went  to  Mattaro. 

The  flank  of  the  French  attacking  column  was  galled 
by  the  Somatenes,  and  halted,  general  Pino,  who  led 
it,  instead  of  falling  on  briskly,  sent  for  fresh  instruc- 
tions, and  meanwhile  extended  his  first  brigade  in  a 
line  to  his  left.  St.  Cyr  reiterated  the  order  to  fight 
in  column  ;  but  he  was  sorely  troubled  at  Pino's  error, 
for  Reding  advancing  against  the  front  and  flank  of  the 
extended  brigade,  obliged  it  to  commence  a  fire,  which 
it  could  not  nourish  from  the  want  of  ammunition. 

Li  this  difficulty  the  French  general  acted  with 
great  ability  and  vigour ;  Pino's  second  brigade  was 
(iirected  to  do  that  which  the  first  should  have  done, 
two  companies  were  sent  to  menace  the  left  of  the 
Spaniards,  and  St.  Cyr  himself  rapidly  carried  Si;u- 
ham's  division,  by  the  Mattaro  road,  against  Reding's 
extreme  right.  The  effect  was  instantaneous  and  com- 
plete, the  Spaniards  overthrown  on  their  centre  and 
right,  and  charged  by  the  cavalry,  were  beaten,  and 
dispersed  in  every  direction,  leaving  their  artillery, 
ammunition,  and  tv.^o  thousand  prisoners  behind. 

Vives  escaped  on  foot  across  the  mountain  to  Mat- 
taro, where  he  was  taken  on  board  an  English  vessel, 
but  Reding  fled  on  horseback  by  the  main  road,  and 
the  next  day,  having  rallied  some  of  the  ftigitives  at 
Monmalo,  retreated  by  the  route  of  San  Culgat  to  Mo- 
lino  del  Rey.  The  loss  of  the  French  was  only 
six  hundred  men,  and  the  battle,  which  lasted  one 
hour,  was  so  decisive,  that  St.  Cyr  resolved  to  push 
on  to  Barcelona  immediately,  without  seeking  to  de- 
feat Milans  or  Lazan,  whom  he  judged  too  timid  to 
venture  an  action  :  moreover,  he  hoped  that  Duhesme, 
who  had  been  informed,  on  the  7th,  oi  the  intended 
march,  and  who  could  hear  the  sound  of  the  artillery, 
would  intercept  and  turn  back  the  flying  troops. 

The  French  had  scarcely  quilted  the  field  of  battle 
when  Milans  arrived,  and,  finding  how  matters  stood, 
retired  to  .^.renas  de  Mar,  giving  notice  to  Lazan,  who 
retreated  to  Gerona;  St.  Cyr's  rear  was  thus  cleared. 
Meanwhile  Duhesme,  heedless  of  what  was  passinjj 
at  Cardadeu,  instead  of  intercepting  the  beaten  army, 
sent  Lecchi  to  attack  Caldagues,  who  having  concen- 
trated his  division  on  the  evening  of  the  IGth,  repulsed 
Lecchi,  and  then  retired  behind  the  Llobregat,  leaving 
behind  some  artillery  and  the  large  magazines  v\uich 
Vives  had  collected  for  the  siege.  Thus  St.  t'yr 
reached  Barcelona  without  encountering  any  of  Dii- 
hesirie's  troops,  and,  in  his  Memoirs  of  this  campaio-n, 
he  represents  thai  general  as  astonishingly  negligent; 


•  SU  Cyr. 


146 


NAPIER'S  peninsula:.    VAR. 


[Book  V 


seekino   neither  to  molest  tj.?  enemy  nor  to  meet  tlie  i 
French  firniy  ;  treating;  everything  helonying  to  the' 
service  with  indifVerence ;  making  false  returns,   and 
conniving  at  gross  malversation  in  his  generals.     Du- 
hesme,  however,  has  not  wanted  defenders. 

St.  Cyr,  now  reflecting  upon  the  facility  with  which 
his  opponents  could  be  defeated,  and  the  difficulty  of 
pursuing  tliom,  resolved  to  rest  a  few  days  at  Barcelo- 
na, in  hopes  that  the  Spaniards,  if  unmolested,  would 
re-assenible  in  numbers  behind  the  Llobregat,  and 
enable  him  to  strike  an  effectual  blow,  for  his  design 
was  to  disperse  their  forces  so  as  they  should  not  be 
able  to  interrupt  the  sieges  which  he  meditated ;  nor 
was  he  deceived  in  his  calculations.  Reding  joined 
Caldagues,  rallied  from  twelve  to  fifteen  thousand  men 
behind  the  Llobregat,  and  Vives  M-ho  had  relanded  at 
Sitjes,  sent  orders  to  Lazan  and  Milans  to  join  him 
there  by  the  way  ofValles;  the  arrival  of  the  latter 
was,  however,  so  uncertain  that  the  French  general, 
who  knew  of  these  orders,  judging  it  better  to  attack 
Reding  at  once,  united  Chabran's  division  to  his  own, 
and  on  the  20th,  advanced  to  St.  Felieu  de  Llobregat. 

The  Spaniards  were  drawn  up  on  the  heights  behind 
the  village  of  San  Vincente,  and  their  position  lofty 
and  rugged,  commanded  a  free  view  of  the  approaches 
from  Barcelona;  tiie  Llobregat  covered  the  front,  and 
the  left  was  secured  from  attack,  except  at  the  bridge 
of  Molino  del  Rey,  which  was  entrenched,  guarded  by 
a  strong  detachment,  and  protected  by  heavy  guns. 
Reding's  cavalry  amounted  to  one  thousand,  and  he 
had  fifty  pieces  of  artillery,  the  greatest  part  of  which 
were  in  battery  at  the  bridge  of  Molino  del  Rey  ;  his 
right  was,  however,  accessible,  because  the  river  was 
fordable  in  several  places.  The  main  road  to  Villa 
Franca  led  through  this  position,  and,  at  the  distance 
of  ten  or  twelve  miles  in  the  rear,  the  pass  of  Ordal 
offered  another  post  of  great  strength. 

Vives  was  at  San  Vincente  on  the  19th,  but  returned 
to  Villa  Franca  the  same  day ;  hence,  w  hen  the 
French  appeared  on  the  20th,  the  camp  was  thrown 
into  confusion,  and  a  council  of  war  being  held,  one 
party  was  for  fighting,  another  for  retreating  to  Ordal  ;* 
finally  an  officer  was  sent  to  Vives  for  orders,  and  he 
returned  with  a  message,  that  Reding  might  retreat  if 
he  could  not  defend  his  post,  but  the  latter  fearing  that 
he  should  he  accused,  and  perhaps  sacrificed  for  re- 
turning without  reason,  resolved  to  fight,  although  he 
anticipated  nothing  but  disaster.  The  season  was  ex- 
tremely severe,  snow  was  falling,  and  both  armies 
suffered  from  cold  and  wet ;  but  the  Spanish  soldiers 
were  dispirited  by  past  defeats,  and  the  despondency 
and  irresolution  of  their  generals  could  not  escape  ob- 
servation, while  the  French  and  Italian  troops  were 
confident  in  their  commander,  and  flushed  with  suc- 
cess. In  these  dispositions  the  two  armies  passed  the 
night. 

BATTLE    OF    MOLINO    DEL    REY. 

St.  Cyr  observing  that  Reding's  attention  was  prin- 
cipally directed  to  the  bridge  of  Molino,  ordered  Cha- 
bran's division  to  that  side,  with  instructions  to  create 
a  diversion  by  opening  a  fire  from  some  artillery,  and 
Ihen  retiring  as  if  his  guns  could  not  resist  the  weight 
of  the  Spanish  metal ;  in  short,  to  persuade  the  enemy 
that  a  powerful  effort  would  be  made  there  ;  but  when 
the  centre  and  right  of  the  Spaniards  should  be  attack- 
ed, Chabran  was  to  force  the  passage  of  the  bridge, 
and  assail  the  heights  beyond  it.  This  stratagem  suc- 
ceeded ;  Reding  accumulated  troops  on  his  left,  and 
neglected  bis  right,  which  was  the  real  point  of  attack. 

The  21st,  Pino's  division  crossing  the  Llobregat  at 
daylight,  by  a  ford  in  front  of  St.  Felieu,  marched 
against  the  right  of  the  Spanish  position;  Chabot's 
division  followed  ;  Souham's  which  had  passed  at  a 
ford  lower  down,  and  then,  ascended  by  the  right  bank, 

*  Cabanei. 


covered  Pino's  passage ;  the  light  cavalry  were  held 
in  reserve  behind  Chabot's  division,  and  a  regiment  of 
cuirassiers  was  sent  to  support  CJh.abran  at  Molino  del 
Rey. 

'rhe  Spanish  position  consisted  of  two  mountain 
heads,  separated  by  a  narrow  ravine  and  a  torrent,  and 
as  the  troops  of  the  right  wing  were  exceedingly 
weakened,  they  were  immediately  chased  cff  their 
headland  by  the  leading  brigade  of  Pino's  division. 
Reding  then  seeing  his  error,  changed  his  front,  draw- 
ing up  on  the  other  mountain,  on  a  new  line,  nearly 
perpendicular  to  the  Llobregat,  but  he  still  kept  a 
strong  detachment  at  the  bridge  of  Molino,  which  was 
thus  in  rear  of  his  left.  The  F'rench  divisions  formed 
rapidly  for  a  fresh  effort,  Scuham  was  on  the  right, 
Pino  in  the  centre,  Chabot  on  the  left;  and  the  latter 
gained  ground  in  the  direction  of  Villa  Franca,  endea- 
vouring to  turn  the  Spaniards'  right,  and  cut  off  their 
retreat,  while  the  light  cavalry  making  way  between 
the  mountain  and  the  river,  sought  to  connect  them- 
selves with  Chabran  at  Molino.  The  other  two  co- 
lumns, having  crossed  the  ravine  that  separated  them 
from  the  Spaniards,  ascended  the  opposite  mountain. 
The  Catalans  forming  quickly,  opposed  iheir  enemiea 
with  an  orderly  but  ill  directed  fire,  and  their  front  line 
advancing,  offered  to  charge  with  an  appearance  of 
great  intrepidity,  but  their  courage  sinking,  they  turn- 
ed as  the  hostile  masses  approached,  and  the  reserve 
immediately  opened  a  confused  volley  upon  both  par- 
ties;  in  this  disorder,  the  road  to  Villa  Franca  being 
intercepted  by  Chabot,  the  right  was  forced  upon  the 
centre,  the  centre  upon  the  left,  and  the  whole  pushed 
back  in  confusion  upon  Molino  del  Rey.  Meantime  a 
detachment  from  (-habran's  division,  passing  the  Llo- 
bregat above  Molino,  blocked  the  road  to  Martorel, 
and  in  this  miserable  situation  the  Spaniards  being 
charged  by  the  light  cavalry,  scarcely  a  man  would 
have  escaped  if  C'habran  had  obeyed  his  orders,  by 
pushing  across  the  bridge  of  Molino  upon  their  rear. 
But  that  general,  at  all  times  feeble  in  execution,  re- 
mained a  tranquil  spectator  of  the  action,  until  the 
right  of  Souham's  division  reached  the  bridge;  thus 
the  routed  troops  escaped  by  dispersion,  throwing 
away  every  thing  that  could  impede  their  flight  acrr  S9 
the  mountains.  Vives  reached  the  field  of  battle  just 
as  the  route  was  complete,  and  was  forced  to  fly  with 
the  rest.  The  victorious  army  pursued  in  three  co- 
lumns; Chabran's  in  the  direction  of  Igualada  ;  Cha- 
bot's by  the  road  of  San  Sadurni,  which  turned  the 
pass  of  Ordal ;  Souham's  by  the  royal  route  of  Villa 
Franca,  at  which  place  the  head  quarters  were  esta- 
blished on  the  22d.  The  posts  of  Villa  Nueva  and 
Sitjes  were  immediately  occupied  by  Pino,  while  Sou- 
hani  pushed  the  fugitives  to  the  gates  of  Tarragona. 

The  loss  of  the  Spaniards,  owing  to  their  swiftness, 
was  less  than  might  have  been  expected  ;  not  more 
than  twelve  hundred  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  French, 
but  many  superior  officers  were  killed  or  wounded, 
and,  on  the  22d,  the  count  de  Caldagues  was  taken,  a 
man  apparently  pedantic  in  military  affairs,  and  want- 
ing in  modesty,  but  evidently  possessed  of  both  cou- 
rage and  talent.  The  whole  of  the  artillery,  vast  quan- 
tities of  powder,  and  a  magazine  of  English  musketu, 
quite  new,  were  captured,  yet  many  of  the  Miguelites 
were  unarmed,  and  the  junta  were  unceasing  in  their 
demands  for  succours  of  this  nature  .  but  the  history 
of  any  one  province  was  the  history  of  all  Spain. 


CHAPTER   V. 

Tumult  in  Tarrag'ona — Reding;  proclaimed  g-enera! — Rciiiforre- 
iiieiits  join  the  Spaniartls — At  tioii3  at  ISnich — Lazaii  advan- 
ces, an<i  figtits  at  Casttl  Ainpurias — lif  ijuarrelsi  with  Red- 
ing,-, and  marches  towards  Zaragoza — Rodin^'a  plans— St. 
C^i'  breaks  Redin;;'s  liue  at  l.laciiiia — Actionii  at  Cap<  laded. 


1S09.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


147 


Igualada,  and  St.  Magi — French  general,  unable  to  take  the 
abbey  ot  Crtuz,  turns  it,  and  reaches  Villaradona — Joined  bv 
Souliam's  division,  takes  post  at  Vails  and  Ha — Reding  ral- 
lies hi?  centre  and  leit  vving — Endeavours  to  reach  Taragnna 
—  Cattle  of  Vails — Weak  condition  of  Tortosa — St.  C}  r 
blockades  Taragona — Sickness  in  that  city — St.  Cyr  resolves 
to  retiri: — Chabran  forces  the  bridge  of  Molino  del  Rey — 
Cons^piracy  in  Barcelona  fails — Colonel  Briche  arrives  with 
B  detachment  fioni  Aragon — St.  Cyr  retires  behind  the  Llo- 
breg-at — I'ino  defeats  \V  inipfen  at  Tarrasa — Reding  dies — 
His  character — Hlake  is  appointed  captain-general  of  the 
CoroniUa — Changes  the  line  (f  operations  to  Aragon — 
Events  in  that  province — Suchet  akes  the  connnand  of  the 
P'rcnch  at  Zaragoza— Colonel  I'ercna  and  Baget  oblige  eigiit 
French  companies  to  surrender — Blake  advances — Battle  of 
Alcanitz — Suchet  fi.lls  back — Disorder  in  liis  army — Blake 
neglects  Catalonia — St.  Cyr  marches  by  th«  valley  of  Con- 
gosto  upon  Vich — Action  at  the  defile  of  Garriga — Lecchi 
conducts  the  prisoners  to  the  Fluvia — St.  Cyr  hears  of  the 
Austrian  war — Barcelona  victualled  by  a  French  squadron — 
Observations. 

Barcelona  was  now  completely  relieved,  and  the 
captured  mag-azines  supplied  it  for  several  months  ; 
there  was  no  longer  a  Spanish  army  in  the  field,  and 
in  Tarracrnna,  where  some  eight  or  nine  thousand  of 
the  Spanish  fugitives,  from  this  and  the  former  battle, 
had  taken  refuge,  there  was  terrible  disorder.  The 
people  rose  tumultuously,  broke  open  the  public  stores, 
and  laying  hands  on  all  the  weapons  they  could  find, 
rushed  from  place  to  place,  as  if  searching  for  some- 
thing to  vent  their  fury  upon ;  they  called  aloud  for 
the  head  of  Vives,  and  to  save  his  life  he  was  cast  into 
prison  by  Reding,  who  was  proclaimed  general-in- 
chief.*  The  regular  officers  were  insulted  by  the  pop- 
ulace, and  there  was  as  usual  a  general  cry  to  defend 
the  ci\\,  mixed  with  furious  menaces  against  traitors; 
but  there  were  neither  guns,  nor  ammunition,  nor  pro- 
visions, and  during  the  first  moment  of  anarchy,  St. 
Cyr  might  certainly  have  rendered  himself  master  of 
Tarragona  by  a  vigorous  effort. f  The  opportunity  soon 
passed  away ;  the  French  general  seeking  only  to 
prccur?  subsistence,  occupied  himself  in  forming  a 
train  of  field  artillery,  while  Reding,  who  had  been  al- 
most without  hope,  proceeded  to  rally  the  army,  and 
place  the  town  in  a  state  of  defence. 

The  1st  of  .January  eleven  thousand  infantry  and 
eight  hundred  cavalry  re-assembled  at  Tarragona  and 
Reus  ;  a  Swiss  regiment  from  Majorca,  and  two  Span- 
ish regiments  from  Grenada,  increased  this  force,  and 
the  5th  three  thousand  four  hundred  men  arrived 
from  Valencia,  from  whence  also  five  thousand  mus- 
qiiels,  ammunition  in  proportion,  and  ten  thousand 
pilces  fresh  from  England,  were  forwarded  to  Tarrago- 
na, and  a  supply  of  money,  obtained  from  the  British 
agents  at  Seville,  completed  the  list  of  fortuitous 
events  following  the  disaster  of  Molino  del  Rey.:^: 
These  fortunate  circumstances  and  the  inactivity  of 
St.  Cyr,  who  seemed  paralyzed,  restored  the  confi- 
dence of  the  Catalans,  yet  their  system  remained  un- 
changed, for  in  Spain  confidence  often  led  to  insubor- 
dination, but  never  to  victory. 

A  part  of  the  fugitives  from  Molino  had  taken  refuge 
at  Bruch,  where,  being  joined  by  the  Somatenes,  they 
chose  major  Green,  an  F]nglish  military  agent,  fortheir 
general,  thinking  to  hold  that  post  which  was  consider- 
ed impregnable  ever  since  the  defeats  of  Chabran  and 
Swartz.  St.  Cyr,  glad  of  this  opportunity  to  retrieve 
the  honour  of  the  French  arms,  detached  Chabran  him- 
self the  11th  January  to  take  his  own  revenge,  but  as 
that  general  was  still  depressed  by  the  recollection  of 
his  former  defeat,  to  encourage  him,  Chabot  was  direct- 
ed from  San  Sadurni  upon  Igualada,  by  which  the  de- 
file of  Br  ch  was  turned,  and  a  permanent  defence  ren- 
dered impossible.il  Green  made  little  or  no  resistance; 
eight  guns  were  taken,  a  considerable  number  of  men 


*  Cabanes. 

[  Doyle's  Corrrspondence,  MSS. 


t  St.  Cvr. 
II  St.  Cyr. 


were  killed,  the  French  pursued  to  Igualada,  and  a  de- 
tachment,  without  orders,  even  assailed  Hmi  took  Mont- 
serrat  itself,  and  rejoined  the  main  body  williout  loss. 
Chabot  was  then  recalled  to  San  Sadurni,  and  Ciiabran 
was  quartered  at  Martorel. 

While  these  events  were  passing  beyond  the  LIo- 
bregat,  the  marquis  of  Lazan  advanced,  with  seven  or 
eight  thousand  men,  towards  Castellon  de  Ampurias. 
The  1st  of  January  he  drove  back  a  battalion  of  infan- 
try upon  Rosas  with  considerable  loss,  but  the  next 
day  general  Reille,  having  assembled  about  three  thou- 
sand men,  intercepted  his  communications,  and  attack- 
ed him  in  his  position  behind  the  Muga  ;  the  victory 
seems  to  have  been  undecided,  and  in  the  night,  Lazaii 
regaining  his  communications,  returned  to  (ierona. 

The  battle  of  Molino  del  Rey  having  abated,  for  a 
time,  the  ardour  of  the  Catalans,  Reding  was  enabled 
to  avoid  serious  actions,  while  the  Somatenes  harassed 
the  enemy  ;  and  this  plan  being  followed  during  the 
months  of  January  and  February,  was  exceedingly 
troublesome  to  St.  Cyr,  because  he  was  obliged  to  send 
small  parties  continually  to  seek  for  provision,  wliich 
the  country  people  hid  with  great  care,  strivinij  hard 
to  protect  their  scanty  stores.  In  the  beginning  of  Feb- 
ruary the  country  between  the  Llobregat  and  Tarra- 
gona was  almost  exhausted  of  food  ;  the  English  ships 
continued  to  vex  the  coast-line,  and  the  French,  besides 
deserters,  lost  many  men,  killed  and  wounded,  in  the 
innumerable  petty  skirmishes  sustained  by  the  maraud- 
ing parlies.  Still  St.  ("yr  maintained  his  positions, 
until  the  country  people,  tired  of  a  warfare  in  which 
they  were  the  chief  sufferers,  clamoured  anrainst  Red- 
ing, that  he,  with  a  large  regular  force,  should  look 
calmly  on,  until  the  last  morsel  of  food  was  discovered, 
and  torn  from  their  starving  families  ;  the  townspeople, 
also  feeling  the  burden  of  supporting  the  troops,  im- 
patiently urged  the  general  to  fight,  nor  was  this  in- 
subordination confined  to  the  rude  multitude.  Lav.an, 
although  at  the  head  of  nine  thousand  men,  remained 
perfectly  inactive  after  the  skirmish  at  Castellon  de 
Ampurias  ;  but  when  Reding  recjuired  him  to  leave  a 
suitable  garrison  in  Gerona,  and  bring  the  rest  of  his 
troops  to  Igualada,  he  would  not  obey,  and  their  dis- 
pute was  only  terminated  by  Lazan's  marching,  with 
five  thousand  men,  to  the  assistance  of  Zaragoza.  His 
operations  there  have  been  related  in  the  narrative  of 
that  siege. 

The  army  immediately  under  Reding  was  very  con- 
siderable, the  Swiss  battalions  were  numerous  and  good, 
and  some  of  the  most  experienced  of  the  Spanish  regi- 
ments were  in  Catalonia;  every  fifth  man  of  the  robust 
population  had  been  called  out  after  the  defeat  of  Mo- 
lino del  Rey,  and,  although  the  people,  averse  to  serve 
as  regular  soldiers,  did  not  readily  answer  the  call,  th& 
force  under  Reding  was,  in  the  beginning  of  Februarv, 
not  less  than  twenty-eight  thousand  men.  The  urban 
guards  were  also  put  in  activity,  and  above  fifteea 
thousand  Somatenes  assisted  the  regular  troops;  but 
there  was  more  show  than  real  power,  for  Reding  was 
incapable  of  wielding  the  regular  troops  skilfully,  and 
the  Migueletes  being  ill  armed,  without  clothing  and 
insubordinate,  devastated  the  country  equally  with  the 
enemy.  The  Somatenes,  who  only  took  arms  for  lo- 
cal interests,  would  not  fight,  except  at  the  times,  in 
the  manner,  and  in  the  place  that  suited  themselves ; 
they  neglected  the  advice  of  the  regular  officers,  revil- 
ed all  who  would  not  adopt  their  own  views,  and  caus- 
ed many  to  be  removed  from  their  commands.  The 
Spanish  generals  never  obtained  from  them  good  in- 
formation of  the  enemy's  movements  ;  yet  their  own 
plans  were  always  made  known  to  the  French,  for  at 
Reding's  headquarters,  as  at  those  of  Casta  os  before 
the  battle  of  'I'udela,  every  project  was  openly  and 
ostentatiously  discussed.  Reding  himself  was  a  man 
of  no  military  talent,  his  activity  was  of  body,  not  of 


148 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  V. 


mind  ;  but  he  was  brave  and  honourable  ;  and  popular,  I 
because,  being  without  system,  arrangement,  or  deep 
design,  and  easy  in   his  nature,   he  thwarted  no  man's 
humours,  and  thus  floated  in  the  troubled  waters  until 
their  sudden  rrflux  left  him  on  the  roeks. 

The  Catalonian  army  was  now  divided  into  four  di- 
stinct corps. 

Alvarez,  with  four  thousand  men,  held  Gerona  and 
the  Ampurdan. 

Lazan,  with  five  thousand,  was  near  Zaragoza. 

Don  Juan  Castro,  an  officer,  accused  by  the  Span- 
iards of  treachery,  and  who  afterwards  did  attach  him- 
self to  Joseph's  party,  occupied,  with  sixteen  thousand 
men,  a  line  extending  from  Olesa,  on  the  upper  Llo- 
brecrat,  to  the  pass  of  San  Cristina,  near  Tarragona ; 
this  line  running  through  Bruch,  Igualada,  and  Lla- 
cuna,  was  above  sixty  miles  long. 

The  remainder  of  the  army,  amounting  to  ten  or 
twelve  thousand  men  under  Reding  himself,  was  quar- 
tered at  Tarragona,  Reus,  and  the  vicinity  of  those 
places. 

The  troops  were  fed  from  Valencia  and  Aragon,  the 
convoys  from  tlie  former  being  conveyed  in  vessels 
along  the  coast ;  hut  the  magazines  being  accumulated 
on  one  or  two  points  of  the  line,  and  chosen  without 
•judgement,  fettered  Reding's  movements  and  regulated 
those  of  the  French,  whose  only  difficulty,  in  fact, 
was  to  procure  food. 

Early  in  February,  St.  Cyr,  having  exhausted  the 
country  about  him,  and  finding  his  communications 
much  vexed  by  the  Somatenes  and  by  descents  from 
the  English  ships,  concentrated  his  divisions  in  mas- 
ses at  Tendril,  Villa  Franca,  San  Sadurni,  and  Mar- 
torel.  The  seventh  corps  having  been  reinforced  by 
the  German  division,  and  by  some  conscripts,  amount- 
ed at  this  jieriod  to  forty-eight  thousand  men,  of  which 
forty-one  ihrusand  were  under  arms,  but  the  force  im- 
mediately with  St.  Cyr  did  not  exceed  twenty-three 
thousand  combatants.  The  relative  position  of  the 
two  armies  was,  however,  entirely  in  favour  of  the 
French  general ;  his  line  extending  from  Vendril,  by 
Villa  Franca,  to  Martorel,  was  not  more  than  thirty 
miles,  and  he  had  a  royal  road  by  which  to  retreat  on 
Barcelona  ;  whereas  the  Spanish  posts  covering  an 
extent  of  above  sixty  miles,  formed  a  half-circle  round 
the  French  line,  and  their  communications  were  more 
fugged  tlian  those  of  St.  Cyr.  Nevertheless,  it  is  not 
to  be  doubted  that,  by  avoiding  any  serious  action,  the 
Catalans  might  have  obliged  the  French  to  abandon 
the  country  between  the  Llobregat  and  Tarragona  ;  fam- 
ine and  the  coniinued  drain  of  men,  in  a  mountain 
warfare,  would  have  forced  the  latter  away,  nor  could 
they  have  struck  any  formidable  blow  to  relieve  them- 
selves, seeing  that  all  the  important  places  were  forti- 
fied towns  requiring  a  regular  siege.  The  never-fail- 
ing arrogance  of  the  Spanish  character,  and  the  un- 
stable judgement  of  Reding,  induced  him  to  forego 
these  advantages.  The  closing  of  the  French  posts 
and  some  success  in  a  few  petty  skirmishes  were  mag- 
nified, the  last  into  victories,  and  the  first  into  a  design 
on  the  part  of  the  enemy  to  fly ;  and  an  intercourse 
opened  with  some  of  the  inhabitants  of  Barcelona  gave 
hopes  of  regaining  that  city  by  means  of  a  conspiracy 
within  the  walls.  The  Catalans  had  before  made  pro- 
posals to  general  Lecchi  to  deliver  up  the  citadel  of 
that  place,  nor  is  there  any  thing  that  more  strongly 
marks  the  absurd  self-suflTiciency  of  the  Spaniards,  dur- 

ng  this  war,  than  the  repeated  attempts  they  made  to 
corrupt  the  French  commanders.  As  late  as  the  year 
1810,  Martin  Carrera,  being  at  the  head  of  about  two 
thousand  ragged  peasants,  half-armed,  arrd  only  exist- 
ing under  the  protection  of  the  English  outposts,  of- 
fered to  Marshal  Ncy,  then  investing  Ciudad  Rodrigo, 
rank  and  honours  ia  the  Spanish  army  if  he  would 
desert! 


Reding,  swayed  by  the  popular  clamour,  which  thjq 
state  of  affairs  produced,  resolved  to  attack,  and  in  tins 
view  directed  Castro  to  collect  his  sixteen  thousand 
men  to  fall  upon  the  right  flank  and  rear  of  St.  Cyr,  by 
the  routes  of  Llacuna  and  Igualada;  and  to  send  a  de- 
tachment to  seize  the  pass  of  Ordal,  to  cut  off  the 
French  line  of  retreat  to  Barcelona;  meanwhile,  ad- 
vancing with  eight  thousand  by  the  road  of  Vendril  and 
St.  Cristina,  he,  himself,  was  to  attack  the  enemy  in 
front.  All  the  Migueletes  and  Somatenes  between 
Gerona  and  the  Besos  were  to  aid  in  these  operations, 
the  object  being  to  surround  the  French,  a  favourite 
project  with  the  Spaniards  at  all  times;  and  as  they 
publicly  announced  this  intention,  the  joy  was  univer- 
sal, the  destruction  of  the  hostile  army  being  as  usual 
anticipated  with  the  utmost  confidence. 

The  Catalans  were  in  motion  on  the  14th  of  February, 
but  St.  Cyr  had  kept  his  army  well  in  hand  and  seeing; 
the  Spaniards  were  ready  to  break  in  upon  him,  re- 
solved to  strike  first.  Wherefore  leaving  Souham's 
division  at  Vendril,  to  hold  Reding  in  check,  on  the 
16th  St.  Cyr  marched  from  Villa  Franca,  with  Pino's 
division,  and  overthrew  Castro's  advanced  posts  wliich 
were  at  Lacura  and  Saint  Quinti.  The  Spanish  centre 
was  thus  pierced,  their  wings  completely  separated, 
and  Castro's  right  was  thrown  back  upon  Capellades. 

The  17th,  the  French  general  continuing  his  move- 
ment with  Pmo's  division,  reached  Capellades,  where 
he  expected  to  unite  with  Chabol  and  Chabran,  who 
had  orders  to  concentrate  there, — the  one  from  San 
Sadurni,  the  other  from  Martorel,  By  this  skilful 
movement  he  avoided  the  pass  of  Bruch,  and  concen- 
trated three  divisions  on  the  extreme  right  of  Castro's 
left  wing  and  close  to  his  magazines,  wliich  were  at 
Igualada. 

Chabot  arrived  the  first,  and,  being  for  a  little  time 
unsupported,  was  attacked  and  driven  back  with  loss 
but  when  the  other  divisions  came  up,  the  action  was 
restored,  and  the  Spaniards  put  to  flight.  They  rallied 
again  at  Pobla  de  Claramunt,  between  Capellades  and 
Igualada,  a  circumstance  agreeable  to  St.  Cyr,  because 
he  had  sent  Mazzuchelli's  brigade  from  Llacuna  direct 
upon  Igualada,  and  if  Chabot  had  not  been  so  hard 
pressed,  the  action  at  Capellades  was  to  have  been  de- 
layed until  Mazzuchelli  had  got  into  the  rear;  scarcely 
however  was  the  head  of  that  general's  column  de- 
scried, when  Castro,  who  was  at  Igualada  with  his 
reserves,  recalled  the  troops  from  Poblade  ('laramui)l.* 
T/ie  French  were  close  at  their  heels,  and  the  whole 
passed  through  Igualada,  fighting  and  in  disorder,  after 
which,  losing  all  courage,  the  Spaniards  threw  away 
their  arms,  and  fled  by  the  three  routes  of  (Jervera, 
Calaf,  and  Manresa.  They  were  pursued  all  the  17th, 
yet  the  French  returned  the  next  day  with  few  prison- 
ers, because,  says  St.  Cyr,  "  the.  Catalans  are  endowed 
by  nature  with  slrons;  knees.'''' 

Having  thus  broken  through  the  centre  of  the  vSpan- 
ish  line,  defeated  a  part  of  the  left  wing  and  taken  the 
magazines,  St.  Cyr  posted  Chabot  and  (Chabran  at 
Igualada,  to  keep  the  beaten  troops  in  check,  while 
himself,  with  Pino's  division,  marched  on  the  18th  to 
fight  Reding,  whose  extreme  left  was  now  at  St.  Magi. 
Souham  also  had  been  instructed,  when  by  precon- 
certed signals  he  should  know  that  the  attack  at  Igua- 
lada had  succeeded,  to  force  the  pass  of  Oistina,  and 
push  forward  to  Villa  Radoua,  upon  which  town  St. 
Cyr  was  now  marching. 

The  position  of  St.  Magi,  being  attacked  at  four 
o'clock  in  the  evening  of  the  18th,  was  Carried  without 
difficulty,  but  it  was  impossible  to  find  a  single  ])easant 
to  guide  the  troops,  on  the  next  day's  march  to  the 
abbey  of  Santa  Crens.  In  this  perplexity,  a  wounded 
Spanish  captain,  who  was  prisoner,  having  demanded 


«  St.  Cyr. 


1809.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAft   WAR. 


149 


to  be  alloR'ed  to  go  to  Tarragona,  St.  Cyr  assented, 
offering  to  carry  him  to  the  Creus,  and  thus  the  pri- 
soner unconsciously  acted  as  a  guide  to  his  enemies.* 
The  march  was  long  and  difficult,  and  it  was  late  ere 
they  reached  the  abbey,  which  was  a  strong  point  oc- 
cupied in  force  by  the  troops  that  had  been  beaten  from 
San  Magi  the  evening  before,  wherefore  the  French, 
after  a  fruitless  demonstration  of  assaulting  it,  took  a 
position  for  the  night.  Meanwhile,  Keding  hearing  of 
Castro's  defeat,  made  a  draft  of  men  and  gnus  from  the 
right  wing  and  was  marching  by  Pla  and  the  pass  of 
Cabra,  intending  to  rally  his  left;  liis  road  run  just 
behind  8t.  Creus,  and  he  was  passing  at  the  moment 
when  the  French  appeared  before  that  place,  but  as 
neither  general  was  aware  of  the  other's  presence,  each 
continued  his  particular  movement. 

The  2Cth  St.  Cyr  crossing  the  Gaya  river  under  a 
fire  from  the  abbey,  continued  his  rapid  march  upon 
Villa  Kadofia,  near  which  place  he  dispersed  a  small 
corps,  but  finding  that  Souham  was  not  come  up,  he 
Bent  an  officer,  escorted  by  a  battalion,  to  hasten  that 
general,  whose  non-arrival  gave  reason  to  believe  that 
the  rtaff-officers  and  spies,  sent  with  the  previous  in- 
structions, had  all  been  intercepted.  This  caused  the 
delay  of  a  day  and  a  half,  which  would  otherwise  have 
sufficed  to  crush  Reding's  right  wing,  surprised  as  it 
would  have  been,  without  a  chief,  in  the  plain  of  Tar- 
ragona. 

While  the  French  rested  at  Villa  Radona,  Reding 
pursued  his  march  to  St.  Coloma  de  Querault,  where 
he  rallied  many  of  Castro's  fugitives,  and  thus  the  as- 
pect of  affairs  was  totally  changed;  for  Souham,  after 
forcing  the  pass  of  San  Cristina,  reached  Villa  Radona 
Ihe  21st,  and,  at  the  same  tinie,  the  weakly  men,  who 
had  been  left  at  Villa  Fjanca,  also  arrived  ;  hence  more 
than  two-thirds  of  the  whole  French  army  were  con- 
centrated at  Villa  Radofia  at  the  moment  when  the 
Spanish  commander,  being  joined  by  the  detachment 
beaten  from  San  Cristina  and  by  the  troops  from  the 
abbey  of  Creus,  had  also  rallied  the  greatest  part  of  his 
forces,  at  St.  Coloma  de  Querault.  Each  general  could 
now,  by  a  rapid  march,  overwhelm  his  adversary's  right 
wing;  but  the  troops  left  by  Reding,  in  the  plain  of 
Tarragona,  could  retire  upon  that  fortress,  while  those 
left  by  St.  Cyr  at  Igualada,  were  without  support. 
When,  therefore,  the  French  general,  who,  continuing 
his  movement  on  Tarragona,  had  reached  Vails  the2'2d, 
neard  of  Reding's  march,  he  immediately  returned  with 
Pino's  division  to  Pla,  resolved,  if  the  Spanish  general 
should  advance  towards  Igualada,  to  follow  him  with 
d  sharp  spur. 

The  23d  the  French  halied  ;  Souham  at  Vails  to 
watch  the  Spanish  troops  in  the  plain  of  Tarragona ; 
Pino's  division  at  Pla,  but  sending  detachments  to  the 
abbey  of  Creus  and  towards  Santa  Coloma  to  feel  for 
Reding.  In  the  evening  these  detachments  returned 
with  some  prisoners  ;  the  one  reported  that  the  abbey 
was  abandoned  ;  the  other  that  the  Spanish  general  was 
making  his  way  back  to  Tarragona,  by  the  route  of 
Sarreal  and  Momblanch.  St.  ('yr,  therefore,  retaining 
Pino's  division  at  Pla,  pushed  hie  advanced  posts  on 
the  right  to  the  abbey,  and  in  front  to  the  defile  of 
Cabra,  designing  to  encoimter  the  Spaniards,  if  they 
rtturncd  by  either  of  these  roads  ;  and  he  ordered  Sou- 
ham to  take  post  in  front  of  Vails,  with  his  left  on  the 
Francoli  river,  his  right  towards  Pla,  and  his  advanced 
guard  at  Pixa  Moxons,  to  watch  for  Reding  by  the 
road  cf  Momblanch. 

The  24th  the  Spanish  general,  being  in  St.  Coloma, 
called  a  council  of  war,  at  which  colonel  Doyle,  the 
British  military  agent,  assisted.  One  party  was  for 
fighting  St.  Cyr,  another  for  retreating  to  Lerida,  a 
third  for  attacking  Chabran  at  Igualada,  a  fourth  for 


*  St.  Cvr. 


regaining  the  plain  of  Tarragona.  There  were  many 
opinions,  but  neither  w  isdcm  nor  resohiticn,  and  finally. 
Reding,  leaving  general  Winipfen,  a\  iih  four  thousaiul 
men,  at  San  Coloma,  decided  to  regain  Tarragcr.a,  and 
took  the  route  of  Momblanch  with  ten  thousand  of  his 
best  troops,  following  the  Spanish  accounts,  but  St. 
Cyr  says  with  fifteen  thousand.  'J  he  Catalan  general 
knew  that  Vails  was  occupied,  and  his  line  of  march 
intercepted ;  but  he  imagined  the  French  to  be  only 
five  or  six  thousand,  for  the  exact  situation  and  strength 
cf  an  enemy  were  particulars  that  seldom  troubled 
Spanish  commanders. 

BATTLE  OF  VALLS. 

While  in  full  march  M'ithout  any  scouts,  at  day-break 
on  the  25th  of  February,  the  head  of  Reding's  column 
was  suddenly  fired  upon  at  Pixa  Moxons  by  Seuham's 
detachment,  which  was  iirimediately  driven  in  upon 
the  main  body;  and  this  attack  being  vigorously  fol- 
lowed, the  whole  of  that  general's  division  gave  way. 
Under  cover  of  this  fight  the  Spanish  bc'gga^e  and 
artillery  passed  the  Francoli  river,  and  the  road  to  Tar- 
ragona being  thus  opened,  Reding  inioht  have  effected 
his  retreat  without  difficulty;  but  he  continued  to  press 
Souham  until  St.  Cyr,  who  had  early  intelligence  of 
what  was  passing,  came  down  from  Pla  upon  the  left 
flank  of  the  Spanish  army.  When  the  French  dragoons, 
which  preceded  their  infantry,  appeared  in  Souham's 
line.  Reding  re-crossed  the  Francoli  and  took  a  position 
behind  that  river  intending  to  retreat  from  thence  in  the 
evening,  but  his  able  opponent  obliged  him  again  to 
fight. 

At  three  o'clock  the  action  recommenced.  The  banks 
of  the  Francoli  were  steep  and  rugged,  and  the  position 
beyond  strong  and  difficult  of  access,  yet  the  French 
general  wishing,  as  he  hin;self  slates,  to  increase  the 
moral  ascendancy  of  his  soldiers,  ft  rbad  the  artillery, 
although  well  placed  for  execution,  to  play  en  Reding's 
battalions,  lest  they  should  fly  before  the  infantry  could 
reach  them  !  Under  this  curious  arrangemeiit  the  action 
was  begun  by  the  light  troops. 

The  French,  or  rather  Italian  infantr}',  were  superior 
in  number  to  the  Spaniards,  and  the  cc'lumns,  covered 
by  the  skirmishers,  passed  the  river  with  great  alac- 
rity, and  ascended  the  heights  under  an  exceedingly 
regular  fire,  which  was  continued  until  the  attacking 
troops  had  nearly  reached  the  summit  of  the  position ; 
then  both  Swiss  and  Catalans  wavered,  and  breaking 
ere  the  infantry  could  close  with  them,  were  instantly 
charged  by  the  French  cavalry.  Reding,  after  receiv- 
ing several  sabre  wounds,  saved  himself  at  Tarragona, 
where  the  greatest  number  of  the  vanquished  also  took 
refuge,  while  the  remainder  fled  in  the  greatest  dis- 
order by  the  routes  of  Toitosa  and  Lerida;  the  count 
of  Castel  d'Orius  and  many  other  superior  officers,  the 
artillery  and  the  bagg^age  were  taken,  and  four  thou- 
sand men  were  killed  or  wounded.  Deringf  all  these 
movements  and  actions,  Reding  received  no  assistance 
from  the  Somatenes  ;  nor  is  this  surprising,  for  it  may 
be  received  as  an  axiom  in  war,  that  armed  peasants 
are  only  formidable  to  stragglers  and  small  detach- 
ments: when  the  regular  forces  engage,  the  poor  coun- 
tryman, sensible  of  his  own  weakness,  wisely  quits 
the  field. 

St.  Cyr  lost  onU'  a  thousand  men,  and  on  the  2fith 
Souham  entered  the  rich  town  of  Reus,  where,  contrary 
to  the  general  custom,  the  inhabitants  remained  ;  Pino 
then  occupied  Pla,  Alcover,  and  Nails,  detachments 
were  sent  to  Salou  and  Villa  Seca,  on  the  sea-cviast 
west  of  Tarragona,  and  Chaboi,  recalled  from  l<4ualada, 
was  posted  at  the  Santa  Creuz,  to  watcli  W  inipfen, 
who  still  remained  at  Santa  (^oloma  de  Querault. 

The  battle  of  Vails  finished  the  regular  warfare  in 
Catalonia.  Those  detachments,  which  by  the  previous 
movements  had  been  cat  off  from  the  main  body  of  Ui« 


150 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


IBooK  T. 


■rmy,  joined  the  Soinatrnes,  and  as  partizan  rorps, 
troubled  the  communications  of  the  French  ;  !  ui  St. 
Cyr  had  no  Icmp-er  a  retjular  army  to  deal  with  in  the 
field,  and  Torlosa.  which  was  in  a  miserably  defence- 
less condition,  without  provisions,  must  have  fallen,  if 
after  the  battle  any  attempt  had  been  made  against  it. 
Lazan,  indeed,  after  his  defeat  near  Zarasjoza,  carried 
a  few  men  to  Tortosa,  where  he  dorlared  himself  inde- 
pendent of  Redinsr's  command,  but  this  battle  and  the 
fall  of  Zaragoza  had  stricken  terror  far  and  wide,  the 
neighbourino-  provinces  fearing  and  acting  each  for  its 
ov. n  safety,  had  no  regard  to  any  general  plan,  and 
the  confusion  was  universal. 

Meanwhile,  the  fugitives  from  Vails,  joined  to  the 
troops  already  in  Tarragona,  crowded  the  latter  place, 
and  an  infectious  disorder  breaking  out,  a  great  mor- 
tality ensued  ;  wherefore,  St.  Cj'r,  satisfied  that  sick- 
ness should  do  the  work  of  the  sword,  begirt  the  city 
with  a  resolution  to  hold  his  positions  while  food  could 
be  procured.  In  this  policy  he  remained  steadfast  un- 
til the  middle  of  March,  although  W  impfen  attacked 
and  drove  Chabran  in  succession  from  Igualada,  Lla- 
cuna,  and  St.  Qninti,  to  Villa  Franca  ;  and  although 
the  two  Milans  and  Claros,  acting  between  the  Besos 
and  the  Llobregat,  had  cut  his  communication  with 
Barcelona,  and  in  conjunction  with  the  English  squa- 
dron, renewed  the  blockade  of  that  city.  This  plan 
appears  injudicious;  the  sickness  in  Tarragona  did 
not  cause  it  to  surrender,  and  the  subjugation  of  Cata- 
Icmia  was  certainly  retarded  by  the  cessation  of  offen- 
sive operations.  The  object  of  the  French  general 
Fhould  have  been  to  seize  some  strong  places,  such  as 
Tortosa,  Tarragona,  Gerona,  or  Lerida.  while  the  ter- 
ror of  defeat  was  fresh  ;  his  inactivity  after  the  battle 
of  Molino  del  Rey  and  at  this  period,  enabled  the  Ca- 
talonians  to  recover  confidence,  and  t'^  put  those  towns 
in  a  state  of  defence;  thus  he  gained  nothing  but  the 
barren  glory  of  victory. 

Towards  the  middle  of  March  the  resources  of  the 
countr)'  being  all  exhausted,  he  at  last  determined  to 
abandon  the  plains  of  Tarragona,  and  take  some  posi- 
tion where  he  could  feed  his  troops,  cover  the  project- 
ed siege  of  Gerona,  and  yet  be  at  hand  to  relieve  Bar- 
celona. The  valleys  about  Vich  alone  offered  all  these 
advantages,  but  as  Claros  and  the  Milans  were  in 
force  at  Molino  del  Rey,  he  ordered  Chabran  to  drive 
them  from  that  point,  that  the  sick  and  wounded  men 
might  be  first  transferred  from  Vails  to  Barcelona. 

The  Kith  of  IMarch,  Chabran  sent  a  battalion  with 
one  piece  of  artillery  on  that  service,  and  the  Miguel- 
etes  thinking  it  was  the  advanced  guard  of  a  greater 
force,  abandoned  the  post,  but  being  undeceived,  re- 
turned, beat  the  battalion,  and  took  the  gun.  The  12th, 
Chabran  received  orders  to  march  with  his  whole  divi- 
sion, consisting  of  eight  battalions  and  three  squadrons, 
and  he  reached  the  bridge,  yet  he  returned  without 
daring  to  attack.  St.  Cyr  repeated  his  orders,  and  on 
the  14th  Hie  trc^ops,  apparently  ashamed  of  their  gene- 
ral's irresolution,  fell  on  vigorously,  carried  the  bridge 
and  established  themselves  on  the  heights  at  both 
sides  of  the  river.* 

The  communication  thus  opened,  it  W'as  found  that 
Duhesme,  pressed  by  the  Migueletes  without,  was  al- 
so extremely  fearful  of  conspiracies  within  the  walls; 
his  fears,  and  the  villainous  conduct  of  his  police,  had 
at  last  excited  the  inhabitants  to  attempt  that  which 
their  enemies  seemed  so  much  to  dread. f  In  March, 
an  insurrection  was  planned  in  concert  with  the  Mi- 
gueletes and  the  English  squadron,  and  the  latter 
coming  close  in  cannonaded  the  town  on  the  10th,  ex- 
pecting that  Wimpfen,  the  Milans,  and  Claros  would 
have  assaulted  the  gates,  which  was  to  have  been  the 
signal  for  the  insurrection  within.  The  inhabitants 
were  sanguine  of  success,  because  there  were  above 


•  "it  Cyr. 


t  Ibid. 


two  thousand  Spanish  prisoners  in  tiie  oi4y,  and  out- 
side the  walls  there  were  two  tercios  secretly  recruited 
and  maintained  by  the  citizens  ;  and  these  men  beinw 
without  uniforms,  constantly  passed  in  and  out  of  the 
town,  yet  Duhesme  was  never  able  to  discover  or  to 
prevent  them.  This  curious  circumstance  is  illustra- 
tive of  the  peculiar  genius  of  the  Spaniards,  which  in 
all  matters  of  surprise  and  stratagem  is  unrivalled. 
The  project  against  the  city  was,  however,  baffled  by 
Chabran's  actions  at  Molino  del  Rey,  which  occupied 
the  partizan  corps  outside  the  walls,  and  the  British 
squadron  exposed  to  a  heavy  gale,  and  disappointed  in 
the  co-operation  from  the  land  side,  sailed  away  the 
11th. 

St.  Cyr  intended  to  commence  his  retrograde  move- 
ment the  ISth,  but  the  17th  a  cannonade  was  heard  on 
the  side  of  Momblanch,  which  was  ascertained  to  pro- 
ceed from  a  detachment  of  six  hundred  men,  with  two 
guns,  under  the  command  of  colonel  Briche.  This  offi- 
cer being  sent  by  Mortier  to  open  the  communication 
after  the  fall  of  Zaragoza,  had  forced  his  way  through 
the  Spaiiish  partizan  corps,  and  to  favour  his  return  the 
army  halted  two  days  ;  Ijut  the  enterprize,  after  a  trial, 
appeared  so  dangerous,  that  he  relinquished  it,  and  at- 
tached himself  to  the  seventh  corps. 

Meanwhile  the  inactivity  that  succeeded  the  battle 
of  Vails,  and  the  timidity  displayed  by  Chabran  in 
the  subsequent  skirmishes,  had  depressed  the  spirits 
of  the  troops;  they  contemplated  the  approaching  re- 
treat with  great  uneasiness,  and  many  officers  infected 
with  fear  advised  the  general  to  hide  his  movements 
from  the  enemy  ;  but  he,  anxious  to  restore  their  con- 
fidence, took  the  part  of  giving  the  Spaniards  a  formal 
notice  of  his  intentions,  desiring  Reding  to  send  pro- 
per officers  to  take  over  the  hospitals  which  had  been 
fitted  up  at  Vails,  as  well  as  some  French,  wounded, 
that  could  not  be  moved.  This  done,  the  army  com- 
menced its  retreat,  reached  Villa  Franca  the  21st  of 
March,  and  the  22d  passed  the  Llobregat,  followed, 
but  not  molested,  by  some  feeble  Spanish  detachments. 
The  23d  Wimpfen,  who  had  rallied  the  Mioueletes  of 
Claros  and  the  Milans,  at  Tarrasa  after  the  affiiir  of 
the  24th,  w^as  beaten  by  general  Pino,  who  pursued 
him  to  near  Manresa,  and  then  foraging  the  country, 
returned  with  provisions  sufficient  to  feed  the  army 
without  drawing  on  the  magazines  of  Barcelona. 

During  these  proceedings,  Reding  died  in  Tarragona 
of  his  wounds.  He  had  been  received  there  with 
such  dissatisfaction  after  the  battle  of  Vails,  that 
the  interference  of  the  British  consul  was  necessary, 
to  save  him  from  the  first  fury  of  the  populace, 
who  were  always  ready  to  attribute  a  defeat  to  the 
treachery  of  the  general.  His  military  conduct  was, 
by  his  own  officers,  generally  and  justly  condemned, 
and  his  skill  in  war  was  slight,  but  his  courage  and 
honesty  were  unquestionable,  and  he  was  of  distin- 
guished humanity  ;  at  this  unhappy  period,  when  the 
French  prisoners  in  every  part  of  Spain  were  tortured 
with  the  most  savage  cruelty,  and  whpu  to  refrain 
from  such  deeds  was  to  incur  suspicion,  Redinsf  had 
the  manliness,  not  only  to  repress  all  barbarities  within 
the  range  of  his  command,  but  even  to  conclude  a  con- 
vention with  St.  Cyr,  under  which  the  wounded  men 
on  both  sides  were  to  receive  decent  treatment,  and  lo 
be  exchanged  as  soon  as  their  hurts  were  cured.*  In 
his  last  moments  he  complained  that  he  had  been  ill- 
served  as  a  general  ;  that  the  Somatenes  had  not  sup- 
ported him  ;  that  his  orders  were  neglected,  his  plans 
disclosed  to  the  enemy,  and  that  he  could  never  get 
true  intelligence;  complaints  which  the  expcri<'nce  of 
Moore,  Baird,  Cradock,  and,  above  all,  of  Wellington, 
proved  to  be  applicable  to  every  part  of  Spain,  at  every 
period  of  the  war.  Coupigny  succeeded  Ri.ding,  but 
was  soon  superseded  by  Blake,  who  was  appouiled 

»  Si.  Cyr.  " 


1809.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


151 


faptain  g'eneral  of  the  Coronilla,  or  little  crown,  a  title 

fiven  to  the  union  of  Valencia,  Aragon,  and  Catalonia, 
'he  warfare  in  Aragon  being  thus  ultimately  connect- 
ed with  that  in  Catalonia,  a  short  account  of  what  was 
passing  in  the  former  province  will  be  useful. 

When  Zaragoza  fell,  Lasnes  returned  to  France, 
and  Mortier,  who  succeeded  him,  sent  detachments 
against  Monzon,  Jaca,  Mequinenza  and  Lerida.  The 
fort  of  I\Ior7on  commanding  a  passage  over  the  Cinca 
river,  was  abandoned  by  the  Spaniards,  and  Jaca  sur- 
rendered, Ijy  which  a  new  and  important  line  of  com- 
munication was  opened  with  France ;  but  the  demon- 
stration against  Mequinenza  failed,  and  the  summons 
to  Lerida  was  fruitless.  Mortier  then  quartered  his 
troops  on  both  sides  of  the  Ebro,  from  Barbastro  to 
Alcanitz,  and  sent  colonel  Briche,  as  we  have  seen,  to 
open  a  com.nunication  with  the  seventh  corps.  This 
was  in  March,  and  in  April  Mortier  moved  with  the 
fifth  corps  to  Castile,  leaving  Junot  with  the  third 
corps  to  hold  Aragon  ;  but  that  officer  being  sick,  soon 
returned  to  France,  and  was  replaced  by  general  Su- 
chet.  The  third  corps  was  now  very  much  reduced, 
one  brigade  was  employed  to  protect  the  communica- 
tion with  Navarre,  another  was  escorting  the  prisoners 
from  Zaragoza  to  Bayonne,  and  many  artillery-men 
and  non-commissioned  officers  had  been  withdrawn  to 
serve  in  Germany :  thus  the  number  of  disposable 
troops  in  Aragfon  did  not  exceed  twelve  thousand  men 
under  arms. 

The  weakness  of  the  army  gave  the  new  general 
great  uneasiness,  which  was  not  allayed  when  he 
f''und  that  men  and  officers  were  discontented  and  dis- 
pirited. Suchet  was,  however,  no  ordinary  man ;  with 
equal  vigour  and  prudence  he  commenced  a  system  of 
discipline  in  his  corps,  and  of  order  in  his  government, 
that  afterwards  carried  him,  with  scarcely  a  check, 
from  one  success  to  another,  until  he  obtained  for  him- 
self the  rank  of  a  marshal  ;  and  for  his  troops  the  honor 
of  belonging  to  the  only  French  army  in  Spain  that 
never  suffered  any  signal  reverse.  He  at  first  hoped 
that  the  battle  of  Vails,  and  other  defeats  sustained  by 
the  Spaniards  at  this  period,  would  give  him  time  to 
re-organize  his  corps  in  tranquillity — but  this  hope 
soon  vanished.  The  peasantry,  observing  the  weak- 
ness of  the  third  corps,  only  wailed  for  a  favourable 
opportunity  to  rise,  and  the  Migueletes  and  Somatenes 
of  the  mountains  about  Lerida  and  Mequinenza,  were, 
under  the  command  of  Pereiia  and  Baget,  already  in 
activity. 

While  Junot  still  held  the  command,  Blake  drawing 
troops  from  Valencia  and  Tarragona,  had  joined  Lazan, 
and  fixed  his  quarters  at  Morella,  on  the  frontier  of 
Aragon.  Designing  to  operate  in  that  province  rather 
than  in  Catalonia,  he  endeavoured  to  re-kindle  the  fire 
of  insurrection  ;  nor  was  fortune  adverse  to  him,  for  a 
part  of  the  garrison  of  Monzon  having  made  an  un- 
successful marauding  excursion  beyond  the  Cinca,  the 
citizens  fell  upon  those  who  remained,  and  obliged 
them  to  abandon  that  post,  which  was  immediately  oc- 
cupied by  Pere~a.  The  duke  of  Abrantes  then  sent 
eight  companies  of  infantry  and  thirty  cuirassiers  to 
retake  the  place,  but  Baget  reinforced  Pereiia,  the 
French  were  repulsed,  and  the  Cinca  suddenly  over- 
floiving  behind  them,  cut  off  their  retreat;  the  caval- 
Tj,  plunging  with  their  horses  into  the  river,  escaped 
by  swimming;  the  infantry,  finding  the  lower  passages 
guarded  by  the  garrison  of  Lerida,  and  the  upper  cut 
off  by  '.he  partizan  corps,  after  three  days  marching 
and  skirmishing  surrendered.  The  prisoners  were  car- 
ried to  Tarragona,  and  soon  afterwards  exchanged,  in 
pursuance  of  a  convention  made  by  Reding  and   St. 

This  slight  success  excited  the  most  extravagant 
hopes,  and  the  garrison  of  Mequinenza  having  contriv- 
ed to  burn  liie  brli'g-e  of  boats  which  the  French  had 


thrown  over  the  Ebro  at  Caspe,  Blake  drove  the  French 
from  Bcceyta  and  Val  de  Ajorfa,  and  entered  Alcanitz. 
The  beaten  troops  retired  with  loss  to  Samper  and  Ixar; 
and  it  was  at  this  moment  when  the  quarters  on  both 
sides  of  the  Ebro  were  harassed,  and  the  wings  of  iho 
third  corps  separated  by  the  destruction  of  the  bridge 
at  Caspe,  that  Suchet  arrived  to  lake  the  command  of 
the  third  corps.  Finding  his  troops  spread  over  a  great 
tract  of  country,  and  in  danger  of  being  beaten  in  de- 
tail, he  immediately  ordered  general  Habert  to  abandon 
the  left  bank  of  the  Ebro,  cross  that  river  at  Fuentes, 
and  follow  in  reserve  upon  Lxar,  where  Suchet  him- 
self rallied  all  the  rest  of  the  troops,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  a  small  garrison  left  in  Zaragoza. 

BATTLE    OF    ALCANITZ. 

The  French  battalions  were  fearful  and  disorderly  : 
but  the  general,  anxious  to  raise  their  spirits,  marched 
towards  Blake  on  the  23d  of  May.*  The  latter  was 
in  position  in  front  of  Alcanitz  ;  a  bridge  over  the  Gua- 
dalupe was  immediately  behind  his  centre,  which  was 
covered  by  a  hill,  and  his  left  was  well  posted  near 
some  pools  of  water,  but  his  right  was  rather  exposed. 
The  F'rench  had  about  eight  thousand  infantry  and  se- 
ven hundred  cavalry  in  the  field,  and  the  Spaniards 
about  twelve  thousand  of  all  arms. 

Suchet,  observing  Blake's  dispositions,  judged,  that 
if  he  could  carry  the  hill  in  the  centre  and  so  separate 
the  Spanish  wings,  the  latter  would  be  cut  off  from  the 
bridge  of  Alcanitz,  and  obliged  to  surrender  In  thi* 
design  he  directed  a  column  against  each  wing  to  draw 
Blake's  attention  to  his  flanks,  and  when  the  skirmish- 
ers were  well  engaged,  three  thousand  men,  pushing 
rapidly  along  the  main  road,  attacked  the  hillock;  but 
a  brisk  fire  of  musketry  and  artillery  checked  their  pro- 
gress, the  Spaniards  stood  firm,  and  the  French,  after 
a  feeble  effort  to  ascend  the  hill,  began  to  waver,  and 
finally  fled  outright.  Suchet,  who  was  himself  slight- 
ly wounded,  rallied  them  in  the  plain,  and  remained 
there  for  the  rest  of  the  day,  but  without  daring  to 
renew  the  action.  In  the  night,  he  retreated,  but,  al- 
though not  pursued,  his  troops  were  seized  with  panic, 
and,  at  day-light,  came  pouring  into  Samper  with  all 
the  tumult  and  disorder  of  a  rout.  Blake's  inactivity 
enabled  the  French  general  to  restore  order,  and  he 
caused  the  man  who  first  commenced  the  alarm  to  be 
shot;  then  encouraging  the  troops,  that  they  might  not 
seem  to  fly,  he  rested  in  position  two  whole  days,  aftei 
which  he  retreated  to  Zaragoza. 

Tins  action  at  Alcanitz  was  a  subject  of  triumph 
and  rejoicing  all  over  Spain  ;  the  supreme  junta  con- 
ferred an  estate  upon  Blake  ;  the  kingdom  of  Murcia 
was  added  to  his  command,  his  army  rapidly  augment- 
ed, and  he,  greatly  elated,  and  confirmed  in  a  design 
he  had  formed  to  retake  Zaragoza,  turned  his  whole 
attention  to  Aragon,  and  totally  neglected  Catalonia. 
To  the  affairs  of  that  province  it  is  now  time  to  return. 

St.  Cyr  remained  in  Barcelona  for  a  considerable 
period,  during  which  he  endeavoured  to  remedy  the 
evils  of  Duhesme's  government,  and  to  make  himself 
acquainted  with  the  political  disposition  of  the  inhabi- 
tants. He  also  filled  tiie  magazines  with  three  months' 
provisions,  and,  as  the  prisoners  within  the  walls  were 
an  incumbrance  on  account  of  their  subsistence,  and 
a  source  of  uneasiness  from  their  numbers,  he  resolved 
to  send  them  to  France.  The  15th  of  April,  having 
transferred  his  sick  and  weakly  men  to  the  charge  of 
Duhesme,  and  exchanged  Chabran's  for  Lecchi's  divi- 
sion, he  marched  to  Granollers,  giving  out  thai  he  was 
returning  to  the  frontier  of  France,  k^st  the  (Catalans 
should  remove  their  provisio.is  from  Vich,  and  thus 
frustrate  his  principal  object. 

The  Migueletes,  under  Milans  and  Claros,  had  takea 


«  Suchet'3  Memoirs. 


152 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


FBooK  V. 


post  on  each  side  of  the  long  and  narrow  defile  of  Gar- 
riga,  in  the  valley  of  the  Con^rosto,  which  thej'  barri- 
cadoed  with  trees  and  pieces  of  rock,  and  mined  in 
several  places  ;  Wim])feii  with  his  corps  was  also  at  a 
little  distance,  ready  to  join  them  at  the  first  alarm. 
Hence,  when  on  the  IGth  Lecchi's  division,  escorting 
two  thousand  prisoners,  appeared  at  the  head  of  the 
defile,  an  action  commenced,  but  in  an  hour  the  Mi- 
gueletes  fled  on  all  sides  ;  for  St.  Cyr,  fully  aware  of 
the  strength  v^f  the  position,  had  secretly  detached  Pino 
to  attack  Wimpfen,  and,  while  Lecclii  was  engaged  at 
the  entrance,  Souham  and  Chabot,  traversing  the  moun- 
tains, arrived,  the  one  upon  the  flank,  the  other  at  the 
further  end  of  this  formidable  pass. 

The  18th,  the  French  were  established  at  Vich  ;  the 
inhabitants  had  fled  to  the  hills  with  their  eff'ects,  but 
left  their  provisions  beiiind.  Chabot's  and  Pino's  di- 
vision were  immediately  posted  at  Centellas,  San  Mar- 
tin, Tona,  and  Col  de  Sespino,  to  guard  the  entrances 
into  the  valley,  but  Souham's  division  remained  near 
the  town,  his  right  being  at  Roda  and  Manliey  on  the 
Ter,  and  his  advanced  posts  at  Gurp,  St.  Sebastian, 
and  St.  Eularia.  General  Lecchi  then  marched  with 
the  prisoners  by  Filieu  de  Pallerols  to  Besalu,  and  al- 
though he  was  attacked  several  times  on  the  march, 
delivered  his  charge  to  general  Reille,  and  returned 
without  loss,  bringing  news  of  Napoleon's  arrival  in 
Paris,  and  of  the  approaching  war  with  Austria.  On 
the  other  side,  a  moveable  column  sent  to  Barcelona 
brought  back  the  pleasing  intelligence  that  admiral 
Cosmao's  squadron,  baflling  the  extreme  vigilance  of 
Lord  Collingwood,  had  reached  that  city  with  ample 
supplies.  Thus,  in  May,  what  may  be  called  the  ir- 
regular movements  in  Catalonia  terminated,  and  the 
more  methodical  warfare  of  sieges  commenced  ;  but 
this  part  was  committed  to  other  hands ;  general  Ver- 
dier  had  succeeded  Reille  in  the  Ampurdan,  and  mar- 
shal Augereau  was  on  the  road  to  supersede  St.  Cyr. 

'Observations. — 1.  Although  his  marches  were 
hardy,  his  battles  vigorous,  and  delivered  in  right  time 
and  place ;  St.  Cyr's  campaign  may  be  characterised 
as  one  of  great  eff'orts  without  corresponding  advantages. 
lie  himself  attributes  this  to  the  condition  of  the  se- 
venth corps,  destitute  and  neglected,  because  the  em- 
peror disliked  and  wished  to  ruin  its  chief;  a  strange 
accusation,  and  unsustained  by  reason  or  facts.  What ! 
Napoleon  wilfully  destroy  his  own  armies  !  sacrifice 
forty  thousand  men,  to  disgrace  a  general,  whom  he 
was  not  obliged  to  employ  at  all.  St.  Cyr  acknow- 
ledges, that  when  he  received  his  instructions  from  the 
emperor,  he  observed  the  aflliction  of  the  latter  at  the 
recent  loss  of  Dupont's  force,  yet  he  would  have  it  be- 
lieved, that,  in  the  midst  of  this  regret,  that  monarch, 
with  a  singular  malice,  was  preparing  greater  disasters 
for  himself,  merely  to  disgrace  the  commander  he  was 
talking  to,  and  why]  because  the  latter  had  formerly 
served  with  the  army  of  the  Rhine  !  Yet  St.  Cyr  met 
with  no  reverses  in  Catalonia,  and  was  afterwards  made 
a  marshal  by  this  implacable  enemy. 

2. — That  the  seventh  corps  was  not  well  supplied, 
and  its  commander  thereby  placed  in  a  difficult  situa- 
tion, is  not  to  be  disputed  in  the  face  of  the  facts  stated 
by  St.  Cyr ;  but  if  war  were  a  state  of  ease  and  smooth- 
ness, the  fame  which  attends  successful  generals  would 
be  unmerited.  Napoleon  selected  St.  Cyr  because  he 
thought  him  a  capable  commander;  in  feeble  hands, 
he  knew,  the  seventh  corps  would  be  weak,  but,  with 
St.  Cyr  at  its  head,  he  judged  it  sufficient  to  overcome 
the  Catalonians,  nor  was  he  much  inistaken.  Barce- 
lona, the  great  object  of  solicitude,  was  saved  ;  Rosas 
was  taken  ;  and  if  Tarragona  and  Tortosa  did  not  also 
fall,  the  one  after  the  battle  of  Molino  del  Rey,  the 
other  after  that  of  Vails,  it  was  because  the  French 
general  did  not  choose  to  attack  them.  Those  towns 
were  without  the   slightest   preparation  for  defence, 


moral  or  physical,  and  must  have  surrendered  ;  nor  can 
the  unexpected  and  stubborn  resistance  of  (»erona,  Za- 
ragoza,  and  Valencia  be  cited  agiiinst  this  opinion; 
these  cities  were  previously  prepared  and  expectant  of 
a  siege,  yet,  in  two  instances,  there  was  a  moment  of 
dismay  and  confusion,  not  fatal,  only  because  the  be- 
sieging generals  wanted  that  ready  vigour  which  is  the 
characteristic  of  great  captains. 

3. — St.  Cyr,  aware  that  a  mere  calculation  of  num- 
bers and  equipment,  is  but  a  poor  measure  of  the 
strength  of  armies,  exalts  the  enthusiasm  and  the  cou- 
rage of  the  Catalans,  and  seems  to  tremble  at  the  dan- 
ger which,  owing  to  Napoleon's  suicidal  jealousy, 
menaced,  at  that  period,  not  only  the  seventh  corps  but  i 
even  the  south  of  France.  In  answer  to  this,  it  may  j 
be  observed  that  M.  de  St.  Cyr  did  not  hesitate,  with 
eighteen  thousand  men,  having  no  artillery  and  carry- 
ing only  sixty  rounds  of  musket-ammunition,  to  plungi 
into  the  midst  of  those  terrible  armies ;  to  march 
through  the  mountains  for  whole  weeks;  to  attack  the 
strongest  positions  with  the  bayonet  alone,  nay,  even 
to  dispense  with  the  use  of  his  artillery,  when  he  did 
bring  it  into  action,  lest  his  men  should  not  have  a  suf- 
ficient contempt  for  their  enemies.  And  who  were 
these  undaunted  soldiers,  so  high  in  courage,  so  confi- 
dent, so  regardless  of  the  great  weapon  of  modern 
warfare'?  Not  the  select  of  the  imperial  guards,  the 
conquerors  in  a  hundred  battles,  but  raw  levies  ;  the 
dregs  and  scrapings  of  Italy,  the  refuse  of  Naples  and 
of  Rome ;  slates  which  to  name  as  military  was  to  ri- 
dicule. With  such  soldiers,  the  battles  of  Cardadeu, 
Molino,  Igualada,  and  Vails,  were  gained;  yi-t  St.  Cyr 
does  not  hesitate  to  call  the  Migueletes,  who  were  beat- 
en at  those  places,  the  best  light  troop=  in  the  world. 
The  best  lii;;ht  troops  are  neither  mure  nor  less  iiiaii  lia 
best  troops  in  the  world  ;  but  if,  instead  of  fifteen  thou- 
sand Migueletes,  the  four  thousand  men  composing 
Wellington's  light  division  had  been  on  the  heights  of 
Cardadeu,  St.  Cyr's  sixty  rounds  of  ammunition  would 
scarcely  have  carried  him  to  Baicelona.  The  injurious 
force  with  which  personal  feelings  act  upon  the  judge- 
ment are  well  known,  or  it  might  excite  wonder,  that 
so  good  a  writer  and  so  able  a  soldier  should  advance 
such  fallacies. 

4. — St.  Cyr's  work,  admirable  in  many  respects, 
bears,  nevertheless,  the  stamp  of  carelessness.  Thus, 
he  affirms  that  Dupont's  march  to  Andalusia  encou- 
raged the  tumults  of  Aranjues,  yet  the  tumults  of  Aran- 
jues  happened  in  the  month  of  March,  nearly  three 
months  previous  to  Dupont's  movement,  which  took 
place  in  May  and  June.  Again,  he  says,  that.  Napo- 
leon, to  make  a  solid  conquest  in  the  Peninsula,  should 
have  commenced  with  Catalonia,  instead  of  over-ruti- 
ning  Spain  by  the  northern  line  of  operations  ;  an  opin- 
ion quite  unsustainable.  The  progress  of  the  seventh 
corps  was  impeded  by  the  want  of  provisions,  not  by 
the  enemy's  force;  twenty  thousand  men  could  beat 
the  Spaniards  in  the  field,  but  they  could  not  subsist. 
To  have  increased  the  number  would  only  have  in- 
creased the  difficulty.  Would  it  have  given  a  just 
idea  of  Napoleon's  power,  to  employ  the  strength  of 
his  empire  against  the  fortifit-d  towns  in  Catalonia  T 
In  what  would  the  greater  solidity  of  this  plan  have 
consisted  1  Wiiile  tlie  French  were  thus  engaged,  the 
patriots  would  have  been  organizing  their  armies; 
England  would  have  had  time  to  bring  all  her  troops 
into  line,  and  two  hundred  thousand  men  placed  be- 
tween Zaragoza  and  Tortosa,  or  breaking  into  France 
by  the  western  Pyrenees,  while  the  Austrians  were  ad- 
vancing to  the  Rhine,  would  have  sorely  shaken  the 
solidity  of  general  St.  Cyr's  plan. 

5. — 'I'he  French  emperor  belter  und'^rstood  what  he 
was  about.  He  saw  a  nation  intrinsically  powerful 
and  vehemently  excited,  yet  ignorant  of  war  and  want- 
ing the  aid  which  England  was  eager  to  give.     All 


1809.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


153 


the  elements  of  power  existed  in  the  Peninsula,  and 
they  were  fast  approximating  to  a  centre,  when  Napo- 
leon burst  upon  tliat  country,  and  as  the  g-atliering  of  a 
water-spout  is  said  to  be  sometimes  prevented  by  the 
explosion  of  a  gun,  so  the  rising  strength  of  Spain  was 
dissipated  by  his  sudden  and  dreadful  assault;  if  the 
war  was  not  then  finished,  it  was  because  his  lieu- 
tenants were  tardy  and  jealous  of  each  other.  St.  Cyr 
also  appears  to  have  fallen  into  an  error,  common 
enough  in  all  times,  and  one  very  prevalent  among  the 
Frencli  generals  in  Spain.  He  considered  his  task  as 
a  whole  in  itself,  instead  of  a  constituent  part  of  a 
greater  system.  He  judged  very  well  what  was  want- 
ing for  the  seventh  corps,  to  subjugate  Catalonia  in  a 
solid  manner,  but  he  did  not  discern  that  it  was  fitting 
that  the  seventh  corps  should  forget  Catalonia,  to  aid 
the  general  plan  against  the  Peninsula.  Rosas  surren- 
dered at  the  very  moment  when  Napoleon,  after  the 
victories  cf  Baylen,  Espinosa,  Tudela,  and  the  Somo- 
sierra,  was  entering  Madrid  as  a  conqueror;  the  bat- 
tles of  Cardadeu  and  Molino  del  Rey  may,  therefore, 
be  said  to  have  completely  prostrated  Spain,  because 
the  English  army  was  isolated,  the  Spanish  armies 
destroyed,  and  Zaragoza  invested.  \\'as  that  a  time 
to  calculate  the  weight  of  powder  and  the  number  of 
pick-axes  required  for  a  formal  siege  of  Tarragona? 
The  whole  Peninsula  was  shaken  to  the  centre,  the 
proud  hearts  of  the  Spaniards  sunk  with  terror,  and  in 
that  great  consternation,  to  be  daring,  was,  on  the  part 
oftheF'rench  generals,  to  be  prudent.  St.  Cyr  was 
not  in  a  condition  to  besiege  Tarragona  formally,  but 
he  might  have  assaulted  it  with  less  danger  than  he 
incurred  by  his  march  to  Barcelona.  The  battle  of 
Vails  was  another  epoch  of  the  same  kind  ;  the  Eng- 
lish army  had  re-embarked,  and  the  rout  of  Ucles  had 
taken  place ;  Portugal  was  invaded  and  Zaragoza  had 
just  fallen.  That  was  a  time  to  render  victory  fruit- 
ful, yet  no  attempt  was  made  against  Tortosa. 

6. — St.  Cyr,  who  justly  blames  Palacios  and  Vives 
for  remaining  betbre  Barcelona  instead  of  carrying 
their  army  to  the  Ter  and  the  Fluvia,  seems  inclined 
to  ap  >laud  Reding  for  conduct  equally  at  variance  with 
the  true  principles  of  war.  It  was  his  own  inactivity 
after  the  battle  of  Molino  that  produced  the  army  of 
Reding,  and  the  impatient  folly  of  that  army,  and  of 
the  people,  produced  the  plan  which  led  to  the  rout  of 
Igualada  and  tlie  battle  of  V^alls.  Instead  of  dissemi- 
nating thirty  thousand  men  in  a  line  of  sixty  miles, 
from  'I'arragona  to  the  Upper  Llobregat,  Reding  should 
have  put  'I'arragona  and  Tortosa  into  a  state  of  defence, 
and  leaving  a  small  corps  of  observation  near  the  for- 
mer, have  made  Lerida  the  base  of  his  operations.  In 
that  position,  keeping  the  bulk  of  his  force  in  one  mass, 
he  might  have  acted  on  St.  Cyr's  flanks  and  rear  effec- 
tually, by  the  lines  of  Cervera  and  Momblanch — and 
without  danger  to  himself;  nor  could  the  French  ge- 
neral have  attempted  aught  against  Tarragona. 

But  it  is  not  with  reference  to  the  seventh  corps 
a'one  that  Lerida  was  the  proj)er  base  of  the  Spanish 
army.  Let  us  suppose  tliat  the  supreme  junta  had 
acted  for  a  moment  upon  a  rational  system  ;  that  the 
Valencian  troops,  instead  of  remaining  at  Morella,  had 
been  directed  on  Lerida,  and  that  the  duke  of  Infanta- 
do's  f  Tce  had  been  carried  from  Cuenc^a  to  the  same 
place  instead  of  being  routed  at  Ucles.  Thus,  in  the 
beginningf  of  February,  more  than  fifty  thousand  regu- 
lar troops  would  have  been  assembled  at  Lerida,  en- 
circled by  the  fortresses  of  Monzon,  Belaguer,  Me- 
quinenza,  Tarragona,  and  Tortosa.  Its  lines  of  opera- 
tions would  have  been  as  numerous  as  the  roads.  The 
Seu  d'Urgel,  called  the  granary  of  Catalonia,  would 
have  supplied  corn,  and  the  communication  with  Va- 
lencia would  lave  been  direct  and  open.  From  this 
central  and  menacing  position,  such  a  force  might 
have  held  the  seventh  corps  in  check,  and  even  raised 


the  siege  of  Zaragoza  ;  nor  could  the  first  corps  have 
followed  Infantado's  movements  without  uncovering 
Madrid  and  abandoning  the  system  of  the  emperor's 
operations  against  Portugal  and  Andalusia. 

7. — The  French  general  praises  Reding's  project  for 
surrounding  the  French,  and  very  gravely  observes 
that  the  only  method  of  defeating  it  was  by  taking  the 
offensive  himself.  Nothing  can  be  juster;  but  he 
should  have  added  that  it  was  a  certain  method;  and, 
until  we  find  a  great  commander  acting  upon  Reding's 
principles,  this  praise  can  only  be  taken  as  an  expre.J- 
sion  of  civility  towards  a  brave  adversary.  His  own 
movements  were  very  different;  he  disliked  Napoleon 
personally,  but  he  did  not  dislike  his  manner  of  mak 
ing  war.  Buonaparte's  campaign  in  the  Alps  against 
Beaulieu,  was  no'-  unheeded  by  his  lieutenant.  For 
one  proceeding  of  St»  Cyr's,  however,  there  is  no  pre- 
cedent, nor  is  it  likelv  that  it  will  ever  be  imitated. 
He  stopped  the  fire  of  his  artillery,  when  it  was  doing 
infinite  execution,  the  better  to  establish  the  moral  as 
cendancy  of  his  troops.  What  a  sarcasm  on  the  cou 
rage  of  his  enemies  !  What  a  complete  answer  to  his 
own  complaints  that  Napoleon  had  maliciously  given 
him  a  hopeless  task  !  But,  he  says,  his  adversaries 
were  numerous  and  fought  bravely  !  Surely  he  could 
not  have  commanded  so  long  without  knowing  that 
there  is  in  all  battles  a  decisive  moment,  ichen  every 
weapon,  every  vian,  every  combination  of  force  that  can 
be  brought  to  bear,  is  necessary  to  gain  the  victory. 
Wilfully  to  neglect  the  means  of  reducing  the  enemy's 
strength,  previous  to  that  critical  period  of  an  action, 
is  a  gross  folly. 

8. — If  general  St.  Cyr's  own  marches  and  battle's 
did  not  sutficiently  expose  the  fallacy  of  his  opinions 
relative  to  the  vigour  of  the  Catalans,  lord  Colling- 
wood's  correspondence  would  supply  the  deficiency. 
That  able  and  sagacious  man,  writing  at  this  period, 
says, — 

'  In  Catalonia,  every  thing  seems  to  have  gone 
wrong  since  the  fall  of  Rosas.  The  Spaniards  are  iu 
considerable  force,  yet  are  dispersed  and  panic-struck 
whenever  the  enemy  appears.' — '  The  applications  for 
supplies  are  unlimited ;  they  want  money,  arms,  and 
ammunition,  of  which  no  use  appears  to  be  made  when 
they  get  them.' — 'In  the  English  papers,  I  see  ac- 
counts of  successes,  and  convoys  tut  off,  and  waggons 
destroyed,  which  are  not  true.  What  has  been  done 
in  that  way  has  been  by  the  boats  of  our  frigates, 
which  have,  in  two  or  three  instances,  landed  men  and 
attacked  the  enemy  with  great  gallantry.  The  Soma- 
tenes  range  the  hills  in  a  disorderly  way,  and  fire  at  a 
distance,  but  retire  on  being  approached.' — 'The  mul- 
titudes of  men  do  not  make  a  force.' 

Add  to  this  the  Spanish  historian  Cabanes'  state- 
ments that  the  Migueletes  were  always  insubordinate, 
detested  the  service  of  the  line,  and  were  many  of 
them  armed  only  with  staves,  and  we  have  the  full 
measure  of  the  Catalans'  resistance. 

It  was  not  the  vigour  of  the  Catalans,  but  of  the  Eng- 
lish, that  in  this  province,  as  in  every  part  of  the 
Peninsula,  retarded  the  progress  of  the  French.  Would 
St.  Cyr  have  wasted  a  month  before  Rosas  ]  Would 
he  have  been  hannpered  in  his  movements  by  his  fear; 
for  the  safety  of  Barcelona]  Would  he  have  failed  to 
besiege  and  take  Tarragona  and  'I'ortosa,  if  a  French 
fleet  had  attended  his  progress  by  the  coast,  or  if  it 
could  even  have  made  two  runs  in  safety  ?  To  lord 
Collingwood,  who,  like  the  Roman  Bibulus,  perished 
of  sickness  on  his  decks  rather  than  relax  in  his  watch- 
ing,— to  his  keen  judgement,  his  unceasing  vigilance, 
the  resistance  made  by  the  (Catalans  was  due.  His 
fleet  it  was,  that  interdicted  the  coast  line  to  the 
French,  protected  the  transport  of  the  Spanish  supplies 
from  Valencia,  assisted  in  the  defence  of  the  towns, 
aided  the  retreat  of  the  beaten  armies ;  In  short,  did 


154 


NAPIER'S    PEN  I      5JLAR   WAR 


[Book  Vl. 


that  which  the  Spanish  fleets  in  Cadiz  and  Carlhag'ena 
should  have  done.  But  the  supreme  junta,  equally 
disreo^ardinor  the  remonstrances  of  lord  Collingwood, 
the  g-ood  of  their  own  country,  and  the  treaty  with 
Eno-land,  by  which  they  were  bound  to  prevent  their 
ships  from  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  left 
their  fleets  to  rot  in  harbour,  although  money  was  ad- 
vanced, and  the  assistance  of  the  British  seamen  of- 
fered to  fit  them  out  for  sea. 

Having  now  related  the  principal  operations  that 


took  place  in  the  eastern  and  central  provinces  o' 
Spain,  which  wer»  so  suddenly  overrun  by  the  French 
emperor;  having  shown  that,  however  restless  the 
Spaniards  were,  unde/  the  yoke  imposed  upon  them, 
they  were  unable  to  throw  it  off;  I  shall  turn  to  Por- 
tugal, where  the  tide  of  invasion  still  flowing  onward, 
although  with  diminished  volume,  was  first  stayed, 
and  finally  forced  back,  by  a  counter  flood  of  mightie? 
strength. 


BOOK    VI. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Transartions  in  Portugjal— State  of  that  country — Neglected  by 
the  Ennli-ih  cabinet— Sir  J.  Cradock  appointed  to  coniniand 
the  British  troops — Touches  at  Coruna — At  Oporto — State 
of  this  city — Lusitanian  legion — State  of  Lisbon — Cradock 
endeavotirs  to  reinforce  Moore — Mr.  Villiers  arrives  at  Lis- 
bon— Pikes  given  to  the  populace — Destitute  state  of  the 
army — Mr.  Frere,  and  others,  urge  Cradock  to  move  into 
Spain — The  reinforcements  for  sir  J.  Moore  halted  at  Cas- 
tcllo  Branro — General  Cameron  sent  to  Almeida — French 
advanced  guard  reaches  Merida — Cradock  rtiinquislies  the 
design  of  reinforcing  the  army  in  Spain,  and  concentrates  his 
own  troo])s  at  Saccaveni — Discontents  in  Lisbon — Defence- 
less state  and  danger  of  Portugal — Relieved  by  sir  J.  Moore's 
advance  to  Sabagun. 

TRANSACTIONS  IN  PORTUGAL. 

When  sir  John  Moore  marched  from  Portugal,  the 
regency,  established  by  sir  Hew  Dalrymple,  nominally 
governed  that  country  ;  but  the  weak  characters  of  the 
members,  the  listless  habits  engendered  by  the  ancient 
system  of  misrule,  the  intrigues  of  the  Oporto  faction, 
and  the  general  turbulence  of  the  people  soon  produced 
an  alarming  state  of  anarchy.  Private  persons  usurped 
the  functions  of  government,  justice  was  disregarded, 
insubordination  and  murder  were  hailed  as  indications 
of  patriotism,  and  war  was  the  universal  cry  ;  yet  mili- 
tary preparations  were  wholly  neglected,  for  the  nation, 
in  its  foolish  pride,  believed"  that  the  French  had  nei- 
ther strength  nor  spirit  for  a  second  invasion. 

In  Lisbon  there  was  a  French  faction,  the  merchants 
were  apprehensive,  the  regency  unpopular,  and  the 
public  mind  unsettled;  in  Oporto,  the  violence  of  both 
people  and  soldiers  was  such,  that  sir  Harry  Burrard 
sent  two  British  regiments  there,  by  sea,  to  preserve 
tranquillity;  in  fine,  the  seeds  of  disorder  were  widely 
cast  and  sprouting  vigorously,  before  the  English  cabi- 
net thought  fit  to  accredit  a  responsible  diplomatist 
near  the  government,  or  to  place  a  permanent  chief  at 
the  head  of  the  forces  left  by  sir  John  Moore.  The 
conveniion  of  (^intra  was  known  in  England  in  Sep- 
tember; the  regency  was  established  and  the  frontier 
fortresses  occupied  by  British  troops  in  the  same  month ; 
yet  it  was  not  until  the  middle  of  December  that  Mr. 
Villiers  and  sir  John  Cradi;ck,  charged  with  the  con- 
duct of  the  poiilVal  and  military  proceedings  in  Por- 
tugaJ,  reached  Lisbon;  thus  the  important  interval, 
betwoen  the  departure  of  Junot  and  their  arrival,  was 
totally  neglected  by  the  English  cabinet. 

Sir  Hew  Dalrymple.  who  had  nominated  the  regency; 
eir  Arthur  Wellesley,  who,  to  local  knowledge  and 


powerful  talents,  added  the  influence  of  a  victorious 
commander,  Burrard,  Spencer,  were  all  removed  from 
Portugal  at  the  very  moment  when  the  presence  of  per- 
sons acquainted  with  the  real  state  of  affairs,  was  es- 
sential to  the  well-being  of  the  British  interests  in  that 
country.  And  this  error  was  the  offspring  of  passion 
and  incapacity ;  for,  if  the  convention  of  Cintra  had 
been  rightly  understood,  the  ministers,  appreciating  the 
advantages  of  that  treaty,  would  have  resisted  the  clam- 
our of  the  moment,  and  the  generals  would  not  have 
been  withdrawn  from  the  public  service  abroad,  to  meet 
unjust  and  groundless  charges  at  home. 

It  may  be  disputed  whether  Portugal  was  the  fittest 
theatre  for  the  first  operations  of  a  British  army;  but, 
when  that  country  was  actually  freed  from  the  presence 
of  an  enemy  ;  when  the  capital  and  the  frontier  for- 
tresses were  occupied  by  English  troops;  when  sir 
John  Moore  leaving  his  hospitals,  baggage,  and  maga- 
zines there,  as  in  a  place  of  arms,  had  marched  to  Spain, 
the  question  was  no  longer  doubtful.  The  ancient  re- 
lations between  England  and  Portugal,  the  greatness 
of  the  port  of  Lisbon,  the  warlike  disposition  of  the 
Portuguese,  above  all,  the  singularly  happy  circum- 
stance, that  there  was  neither  court  nor  monarch  to 
balance  the  English  influence,  and  that  even  the  nomi- 
nation of  the  regency  was  the  work  of  an  English  gen- 
eral, offered  such  great  and  obvious  advantages  as  could 
no  where  else  be  obtained.  It  was  a  miserable  policy 
that,  neglecting  such  an  occasion,  retaitied  sir  Arthur 
Wellesley  in  England,  while  Portugal,  like  a  drunken 
man,  at  once  weak  and  turbulent,  was  reeling  on  the 
edge  of  a  precipice. 

The  5th  of  December,  1808,  sir  John  Cradock,  being 
on  his  voyage  to  Lisbon,  touched  at  Corufia.  Fifteen 
hundred  thousand  dollars  had  just  arrived  there  in  the 
Lavinia  frigate,  but  sir  John  Moore's  intention  to  re- 
treat upon  Portugal  being  known,  Cradock  divided  this 
sum,  and  carried  away  eight  hundred  thousand  dollars; 
proposing  to  leave  a  portion  at  Oporto,  and  to  take  the 
remainder  to  Lisbon,  tliat  Moore  might  find,  on  what- 
ever line  he  retreated,  a  supply  of  money. 

From  Corufia  he  proceeded  to  Oporto,  where  he  found 
that  sir  Robert  Wilson  had  succeeded  in  organizing, 
under  the  title  of  the  Lnsitanian  Legion,  about  thirteen 
hundred  men,  and  that  others  were  on  their  way  to  re- 
inforce him  ;  but  this  excepted,  nothing,  civil  or  mili- 
tary, bespoke  either  arrangement  or  common  sense.  The 
bishop,  still  intent  upon  acquiring  supreme  rule,  was 
deeply  engaged  with  secret  intrigues,  and,  under  him, 


IROR.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


im 


A  number  of  factious  and  designing  persons,  instigated 
the  po])ulace  to  violent  actions  with  a  view  to  profit 
from  their  excesses. 

The  formation  of  this  Lusitanian  Legion  was  ori- 
ginally a  project  of  the  chevalier  da  Souza,  Portuguese 
minister  in  London;  he  was  one  of  the  bishop's  fac- 
tion, and  this  force  was  raised  not  so  much  to  repel  the 
enemy,  as  to  support  that  party  against  the  govern- 
ment. The  men  were  promised  higher  pay  than  any 
other  Portuguese  soldiers,  to  the  great  discontent  of 
the  latter;  and  they  were  clad  in  uniforms  differing  in 
c.lour  from  the  national  troops.  The  regency,  who 
dreaded  the  machinations  of  the  turbulent  priest,  enter- 
tained the  utmost  jealousy  of  this  legion,  which,  in 
truth,  was  a  most  anomalous  force,  and  as  might,  be 
expected  from  its  peculiar  constitution,  was  productive 
»f  much  embarrassment. 

Sir  John  Cradock  left  three  hundred  thousand  dollars 
at  Opcr.;o,  and  directed  the  two  British  battalions  which 
were  in  that  neighbourhood  tc  march  to  Almeida,  then 
taking  on  board  a  small  detachment  of  German  troops, 
he  set  sail  for  Lisbon.  Before  his  departure,  he  strong- 
ly advised  sir  Robert  \\  ilson  to  move  such  of  his 
legionaries  as  were  sufficiently  organized  to  Villa  Real, 
in  Tras  os  Montes,  a  place  appointed  by  the  regency 
for  the  assembly  of  the  forces  in  the  north ;  sir  Robert, 
tired  of  the  folly  and  disgusted  with  the  insolence  and 
excesses  of  the  ruling  mob,  readily  adopted  this  advice, 
so  far  as  to  quit  Oporto,  but  having  views  of  his  own, 
Vent  to  Almeida  instead  of  Villa  Real. 

The  state  of  the  capital  was  Utile  better  than  that  of 
Oporto.  There  was  arrangement  neither  for  present 
nor  for  future  defence,  and  the  populace,  albeit  less 
openly  encouraged  to  fx)mnat  excesses,  were  quite  un- 
controlled 1)}^  the  government.  The  regency  had  a 
keener  dread  of  domestic  insurrection  than  of  the  return 
of  the  French,  whose  operations  they  regarded  with 
even  less  anxiety  than  the  bishop  did,  as  being  further 
removed  than  he  was  from  the  immediate  theatre  of 
war.  Their  want  of  system  and  vigilance  was  evinced 
by  the  following  fact.  Sattaro  and  another  person, 
having  contracted  for  the  supply  of  the  British  troops, 
demanded,  in  the  name  of  the  English  general,  all  the 
provisions  in  the  public  stores  of  Portugal,  and  then 
sold  them  to  the  English  commissaries  for  his  own  profit. 

Sir  John  C'radock's  instructions  directed  him  to  re- 
inforce Moore's  army,  and  not  to  interfere  with  that 
general's  command  if  the  course  of  events  brought  him 
back  to  Portugal.  In  fact,  his  operations  were  limited 
to  the  holding  of  Elvas,  Almeida,  and  the  capital ;  for, 
although  he  was  directed  to  encourage  the  formation 
of  a  native  army  upon  a  good  and  regular  system,  and 
even  to  act  in  concert  with  it  on  the  frontier,  he  was 
debarred  from  political  interference;  even  his  relative 
situation  as  to  rank,  was  left  unsettled  until  the  arrival 
of  Mr.  Villiers,  to  whose  direction  all  political  and 
many  military  arrangements  were  entrusted. 

It  is  evident  that  the  influence  of  a  general  thus  fet- 
tered, and  commanding  only  a  small  scattered  force, 
must  be  feeble  and  insufficient  to  produce  any  real 
amelioration  in  the  military  situation  of  the  country; 
yet  the  English  ministers,  attentive  only  to  the  false 
information  obtained  from  interested  agents,  still  ima- 
gined that  not  only  the  Spanish,  but  the  Portuguese 
armies  were  numerous,  and  to  be  relied  upon  ;  and  they 
confidently  expected,  that  the  latter  would  be  ablrtfcto 
take  an  active  part  in  the  Spanish  campaign.  Cradock, 
feeling  the  danger  of  this  illusion,  made  it  his  first 
object  to  transmit  home  exact  information  of  the  real 
strength  and  efficiency  of  the  native  regular  troops. 
They  were  nominally  twenty  thousand;  but  Miguel 
PiTeira  Forjas,  military  secretary  to  the  regency,  and 
the  ablest  public  man  Portugal  possessed,  arknovv- 
Jedged  that  this  force  was  a  nullity,  and  that  there 
were  not  more  than  ten  thousand  stand  of  serviceable 


arms  in  the  kingdom,  the  greatest  part  of  which  wc  i 
English.*  The  troops  themselves  were  undisciplintj 
and  unruly  ;  the  militia  and  the  "  urdennnza,''''  or  arnieJ 
peasantry,  animated  by  a  spirit  of  outrage  rather  than 
of  enthusiasm,  evinced  no  disposition  to  submit  to  rt-g- 
ulation  ;  neither  was  there  any  branch  of  administra- 
tion free  from  the  grossest  disorder. 

The  Spanish  dollar  'lad  i  general  acceptance  in  Por- 
tugal. The  regency,  under  the  pretence  that  a  debased 
foreign  coin  would  drive  the  Portuguese  coin  out  of 
circulation,  deprived  the  df  liar  of  its  current  value. 
'I'his  regulation,  true  in  princi|)le,  and  applicable,  as 
far  as  tlie  Portuguese  gold  coin  (which  is  of  peculiar 
fineness)  was  concerned,  had,  however,  a  most  injuri- 
ous eff(>ct.  The  Spanish  dollar  was  in  reality  liiier 
than  the  Portuguese  silver  cruzado-nova,  and  would 
finally  have  maintained  its  value,  notwithstanding  this 
decree,  if  the  slur  thus  thrown  upon  it  by  the  govern- 
ment, had  not  enabled  the  money  changers  to  run  its 
value  down  for  the  moment;  a  matter  of  infinite  im- 
portance, for  the  English  soldiers  and  sailors  being  all 
paid  in  these  dollars,  at  four  shillings  and  sixpence, 
which  was  the  true  value,  were  thus  suddenly  mulcted 
fourpence  in  each,  by  the  artificial  depreciation  of  the 
moment.  The  men  attributed  this  to  fraud  in  the  shop' 
keepers,  the  retail  trade  of  Lisbon  was  interrupted,  and 
quarrels  between  the  tradesmen  and  the  soldiers  took 
place  hourly.  To  calm  this  effervescence,  a  second 
decree  was  promulgated,  directing  that  the  dollar 
should  be  received  at  the  mint  and  in  the  public  offi- 
ces at  its  real  value  ;  it  then  appeared  that  the  govern- 
ment could  profit  by  coining  the  dollar  of  four  shillings 
and  sixpence  into  cruzado-novas,  a  circumstance  which 
gave  the  whole  affair  the  appearance  of  an  unworthy 
trick  to  recruit  the  treasury.  This  happened  in  October, 
and  as  the  financial  affairs  were  ill  managed,  and  the 
regency  destitute  of  vigour  or  capacity,  the  taxe.s  were 
unpaid,  the  hard  cash  exhausted,  ai?d  the  treasilry  pa- 
per at  a  heavy  discount  when  (Cradock  arrived. 

Upon  the  scroll  thus  unfolded  he  could'  only  read 
confusion,  danger  and  misfortune  ;  such  being  the  fruits 
of  victory,  what  could  be  expected  from  disaster,  and 
at  this  period  (the  middle  of  December)  sir  John 
Moore  was  supposed  to  be  in  full  retreat  upon  Portugal, 
followed  by  the  emperor  with  one  French  army,  while 
another  threatened  Lisbon  by  the  line  of  the  Tagus. 
The  English  troops  in  the  kingdom  did  not  amount  to 
tPH  thc'usand  men,  including  the  sick,  and  they  were 
ill  equipped  and  scattered  ;  moreover,  the  capital  was 
crowded  with  women  and  children,  with  baggage  and 
non-combatants,  belonging  as  well  to  the  army  in  Spain 
as  to  that  in  Portugal.  There  were  in  the  river  three 
Portuguese  ships  of  the  line,  two  frigates,  and  eight 
other  smaller  vessels  of  war,  but  none  were  in  a  state 
for  sea,  and  the  whole  likely  to  fall  into  the  hands  of 
the  enemy,  for  in  the  midst  of  this  confusion  sir  Charles 
Cotton  was  recalled,  without  a  successor  being  ap- 
pointed. The  zeal  and  talents  of  captain  Halket,  the 
senior  officer  on  the  station,  amply  compensated  for 
the  departure  of  the  admiral,  as  far  as  professional  du- 
ties were  concerned,  but  he  could  not  aid  the  general, 
nor  deal  with  the  regency,  as  vigorously  as  an  officer  of 
higher  rank,  and  formally  accredited,  could  have  done. 

Sir  John  Cradock,  although  fully  sensible  of  his 
own  difficulties,  with  a  very  disinterested  zeal,  resolv- 
ed to  make  the  reinforcing  of  sir  John  Moore's  army 
his  first  care,  but  his  force  at  this  time  was,  as  I  have 
already  said,  less  than  ten  thousand  men  of  all  arms. 
It  consisted  of  eight  British  and  four  German  battalions 
of  infantry,  four  troops  of  dragoons,  and  thirty  pii^ces 
of  artillery,  of  which,  however,  only  six  were  horsed 
so  as  to  take  the  field.  There  was,  also,  a  battalion  of 
theCOth  regiment,  composed  principally  of  Frenchmen 

*  Cradock's  Correspondence,  MSS. 


156 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[3ooK  VI. 


recruited  from  the  prison  ships,  but  it  had  benn  spnl 
back  from  Spain,  as  the  soldiers  could  not  be  trusted 
near  their  countrymen.*  Of  these  thirteen  battalions 
two  were  in  Abrantes,  one  in  Klvas,  three  at  Lameo-o 
on  the  Duero.  One  in  Almeida,  and  the  remaining  six 
at  Lisbon.  Three  of  the  four  battalions  in  the  north 
were  immediately  directed  to  join  sir  .Tohn  Moore  by 
the  route  of  Salamanca,  and  of  those  in  the  south,  two, 
accompanied  by  a  demi-britrade  of  artillery,  were  sent 
to  him  from  Abrantes,  by  the  road  of  Castello  Branco 
and  Ciudad  Rodrigo. 

INIeanv.hile  Mr.  V'llliers  arrived,  and  sir  John  Cra- 
dock  forwan  ed  to  the  reo-pncy  a  strons^  representation 
of  the  dancrerrns  state  cf  PortugaL  He  observed  that 
there  was  neither  activity  in  the  government  nor  en- 
thusiasm among  the  people;  that  the  army,  deficient 
in  numbers,  and  still  more  so  in  discipline,  was  scat- 
tered and  neglected,  and,  notwithstanding  that  the  as- 
pect of  affai'-s  was  so  threatening,  the  regency  were 
apparently  without  any  s}  stem,  or  fixed  principle  of 
action.  He  proposed,  therefore,  that  a  general  enrol- 
ment of  all  the  people  should  take  place,  and  from 
the  British  stores  he  offered  a  supply  of  a  thousand 
muskets  and  ten  thousand  pikes.]"  This  giving  of  pikes 
to  the  people,  which  appears  to  have  been  in  compli* 
ance  with  Mr.  Villiers'  wishes,  betrayed  more  zeal 
than  prudence ;  a  general  levy,"  and  arming  with  pikes 
of  the  turbulent  populace  of  a  capital  city,  at  such  a 
conjuncture,  was  more  likely  to  lead  to  confusion  and 
mischief  than  to  any  eflfectual  defence.  The  main  ob- 
jects pressing  upon  the  general's  attention  were  how- 
ever sufficiently  numerous  and  contradictory,  to  render 
it  difficult  for  him  to  avoid  errors. 

It  was  a  part  of  his  instructions,  and  of  manifest  im- 
portance, to  send  reinforcements  to  sir  .lohn  Moore; 
yet  it  was  equally  necessary  to  keep  a  force  towards 
the  frontier  on  the  line  of  the  Tagus,  seeing  that  the 
fourth  French  corps  had  just  passed  that  river  at  Al- 
maraz,  had  defeated  Galluzzo's  army  and  inenaced  Ba- 
dajos,  whi<*h  was  without  arms,  ammunition,  or  pro- 
visions ;  m.oreover.  the  populace  there,  were  in  com- 
motion and  slaying  the  chief  persons.  Now,  sir  John 
Cradcck's  instructions  directed  him  to  keep  his  troops 
in  a  position  that  would  enable  him  to  abandon  Portu- 
gal, if  a  very  superior  force  should  press  him  ;  but  as, 
in  such  a  case,  he  was  to  carry  off  the  British  army, 
and  the  Portuguese  navy  and  stores,  destroying  what 
he  could  not  remove,  and  to  receive  on  board  his  ves- 
sels all  the  natives  who  miofht  be  desirous  of  escaping, 
it  was  of  pressing  necessity  to  ship  the  women,  chil- 
dren, baggage,  and  other  encumbrances  belonging  to 
Moore's  army,  immediately,  that  his  own  rear  might 
be  clear  for  a  sudden  embarkation.  In  short,  he  was 
to  send  his  troops  to  Spain,  and  yet  defend  Portugal  ; 
to  excite  confidence  in  the  Portuguese,  and  yet  openly 
to  carry  on  the  preparations  for  abandoning  that  country. 

Tiie  populace  of  Lisbon  were,  however,  already  un- 
easy at  the  rumours  of  an  embarkation,  and  it  was 
doubtful  if  they  would  permit  evej  the  British  non- 
combatants  to  get  on  board  (juietlv,  much  less  suffer 
the  forts  to  be  dismantled,  and  the  ships  of  war  to  be 
carried  off,  without  a  tumult,  wiiich,  at  sucli  a  con- 
juncture, would  have  been  fatal  to  all  parties.  Hence 
it  was  imperative  to  maintain  a  strong  garrison  in  Lis- 
bon and  in  the  forts  commanding  the  mouth  of  the 
river,  anrl  this  draft,  together  with  the  troops  absorbed 
by  the  fortresses  of  Almeida  and  Elvas,  reduced  the 
fighting  men  in  the  field  to  insignificance.  i 

'I'lie  regencj',  knowing  the  temper  of  the  |ieople,  and  | 
fearing  to  arm  them,   were   not  vcy  eairer  to  enforce 
the  levy  ;   anxious,  however,   to   hide   their  weakness, 
they  pronii.^ed,   at  the  urgent  solicitations  of  the  Kng- 
lish  general,  to  send  six  thousand  troops  to  Alcantara, 


•   Sir  J   Cnuiofk's  P;ipers.  MSS. 

+  Sit  J.  JrudocL'g  Cijnt:»j)oudi!iicc,  MSS. 


on  the  Spanish  frontier,  w!th  a  view  to  observe  the 
march  of  the  fourth  corps, — a  promise  which  they  ne- 
ver intended,  and  indeed  were  unable,  to  perform.  For- 
jas,  who  was  supposed  to  be  very  inimical  to  the  Brit- 
ish influence,  frankly  declared  that  they  neither  could 
nor  would  move  without  an  advance  of  money,  and  sir 
John  (^radock,  although  he  recommended  that  this  aid 
should  be  given,  had  no  power  to  grant  it  himself. 

Letters  from  sir  John  Moore,  dated  at  Salamanca, 
now  reached  Lisbon;  they  increased  tlie  anxiety  to  re- 
inforce the  army  in  S|)ain,  but,  as  they  clearly  shewed 
that  reverses  were  to  be  expected,  Cradock,  although 
resolved  to  maintain  himself  in  Portugal  as  long  as  it 
was  possible  to  do  so  without  a  breach  of  his  instruc- 
tions, felt  more  strong!}'  that  tiinely  preparation  for  an 
embarkation  should  he  made;  especially  as  the  rainy 
season,  in  which  south-west  winds  prevail,  had  set  iti, 
and  rendered  the  departure  of  vessels  from  the  Tajus 
very  uncertain.*  Meanwhile  the  internal  state  of  Por- 
tugal was  in  no  wise  amended,  or  likely  to  amend. 

The  government  had,  indeed,  issued  a  decree,  on 
the  23d  of  December,  for  organizing  the  j)opnlation  of 
Lisbon  in  sixteen  legions,  but  only  one  battalion  of 
each  was  to  parade  at  the  same  moment  for  exercise, 
and  those  only  on  Sundays,  nor  were  the  legions, =at 
any  time,  to  assemble  without  the  order  of  the  general 
commanding  the  province;  this  regulation,  which  ren- 
dered the  whole  measure  absurd,  was  dictated  by  the 
fears  of  the  regency.  A  proposal  to  prepare  the  Por- 
tuguese vessels  for  sea  was  acceded  to,  without  any 
apparent  dissatisfaction,  but  the  government  secretly 
jealous  of  their  allies,  fomented  or  encouraged  discon- 
tent and  suspicion  among  the  people.  No  etTorts  were 
made  to  improve  the  regular  force,  none  to  forward  the 
march  of  troops  to  Alcantara,  and  so  inactive  or  so  cal- 
lous were  the  regency  to  the  rights  of  humanity,  that 
a  number  of  French  prisoners,  captured  at  various  pe- 
riods by  the  Portuffuese,  and  accumulated  at  Lisbon, 
were  denied  subsistence;  sir  John  Cradock,  after 
many  fruitless  representations,  was  forced  to  charge 
himself  with  their  supply,  to  avert  the  horror  of  seeing 
them  starved  to  death.  The  provisions  necessary  for 
Fort  La  I^ippe  were  also  withheld,  and  general  Leite, 
acting  upon  the  authority  of  the  regency,  strenuously  < 
urged  that  the  British  troops  should  evacuate  that 
fortress. 

The  march  of  the  reinforcements  for  sir  John  Moore 
left  only  three  hundred  dragoons  and  seven  battalions 
available  for  the  defence  of  Portugal,  of  which  four 
were  necessarily  in  garrison,  and  the  remainder  were 
unable  to  take  the  field  in  default  of  mules,  of  which 
animal  the  country  seemed  bereft;  yet,  at  this  moment, 
as  if  in  derision,  Mr.  Frere,  the  central  junta,  the  junta 
of  Badajos,  and  the  regency  of  Portugal,  were,  with 
common  and  characteristic  foolishn(>ss,  pressing  sir 
John  Cradock  to  march  into  the  south  of  Spain,  al- 
though there  was  scarcely  a  Spanish  soldier  thf^re  in 
arms  to  assi'^t  him;  and  such  a  movement,  if  it  had 
been  either  prudent  or  practicable,  was  directly  against 
his  instructions. t 

Towards  the  end  of  December,  the  communication 
with  sir  John  Moore  was  suddenly  interrupted,  and 
the  line  of  the  Tagus  acquired  great  importance,  'i'lie 
troops  going  from  JClvas  to  the  army  in  Spain  were 
therefore  directed  to  halt  at  Castello  Branco,  and  gene- 
raWrichard  Stewart,  who  commanded  them,  being  re- 
inforc(>d  with  two  hundred  cavalry,  was  ordered,  for 
the  moment,  to  watch  the  roads  by  Salvatierra  and  the 
two  Idanhas,  and  to  protect  the  fl^'ing  bridges  at  Abran- 
tes and  Vilha  V'elha  from  the  enemy's  incursions.  At 
the  same  time,  a  promise  was  obtained  from  the  re- 
gency that  all  the  Portuijuese  troops  in  the  Aiemtejo 
should  lie  collected  at  Cam|)o  Mayor  and  Portalegre. 

Sir  John  (^rad    'k  fixed   upon  Saeavem  as  the  posi« 


Sir  J.  CradocL     ronespondcnce,  MS^. 


t  Ibid 


1808.] 


NAPIER'S   PENlN3r  .   vR   WAR. 


157 


tion  in  which  his  main  body  should  be  concentrated, 
intending  to  defi>nd  that  point  as  loner  as  he  could  with 
60  few  troops  ;  and  as  he  knew  that  Almeida,  although 
full  of  British  stores,  and  important  in  every  way, 
was,  with  respect  to  its  own  defence,  utterly  neglected 
bv  the  regency,  who  regarded  with  jealousy  even  the 
presence  of  a  British  fi  rce  there;  he  sent  brigadier- 
general  A.  Cameron,  with  instructions  to  collect  the 
convalescents  of  Moore's  army,  to  unite  them  with  the 
two  battalions  still  at  Almeida,  and  then  to  make  his 
way  to  the  army  in  Spain  ;  but  if  that  should  be  judged 
too  dangerous,  he  was  to  return  to  Lisbon.*  In  either 
case,  the  stores  and  the  sick  men  lying  at  Almeida 
were  to  be  directed  upon  Oporto. 

The  paucity  of  cavalry  was  severely  felt  on  the  fron- 
tier; it  prevented  the  general  from  ascertaining  the 
real  strength  and  objects  of  the  enemy's  parties,  and 
the  Portuguese  reprrts  were  notoriously  contradictory 
and  false.  The  14th  dragoons,  seven  hundred  strong, 
commanded  by  major-general  Cotton,  had  been  disem- 
barked since  the  22d  of  December,  and  were  destined 
for  the  army  in  Spain.  But  the  commissary  doubted 
if  he  could  forward  that  small  body  even  by  detach- 
ments, such  was  the  penury  of  the  country,  or  rather 
the  difficulty  of  drawing  forth  its  resources ;  many 
debts  of  sir  John  INIoore's  army,  were  also  still  unpaid, 
and  a  want  of  confidence  prevented  the  country  people 
from  bringing  in  supplies  upon  credit. 

In  the  midst  of  these  difficulties,  rumours  of  reverses 
in  Spain  became  rife,  and  acquired  importance,  when 
it  became  known  that  four  thousand  infantry,  and  two 
thousand  cavalry,  the  advanced  guard  of  thirty  thou- 
sand French  troops,  were  actually  at  Merida,  on  the 
road  to  Badajos  ;  the  latter  town  being,  not  only  in  a 
state  of  anarchy,  but  destitute  of  provisions,  arms,  and 
ammunition.  Had  the  Portuguese  force  been  assem- 
bled at  Alcantara,  sir  John  Cradock  would  have  sup- 
poited  it  with  the  British  brigades,  from  Abrantes  and 
Castello  Branco,  but  not  a  man  had  been  put  in  motion, 
and  he  feeling  no  confidence  either  in  the  troops  or 
promises  of  the  regency,  resolved  to  concentrate  his 
own  army  near  Lisbon.  General  Stewart  was,  there- 
fore, directed  to  destroy  the  bridges  of  Vilha  Velha 
and  Abrantes,  and  fall  back  to  Sacavera.  IMeanwhile, 
the  Lisbon  populace,  supposing  that  the  English  gene- 
ral designed  to  abandon  them  without  necessity,  were 
violently  excited.  The  regency,  either  from  fear  or 
folly,  made  no  effort  to  preserve  tranquillity,  and  the 
people  proceeded  from  one  excess  to  another,  until  it 
became  evident  that,  in  a  forced  embarkation,  the 
British  would  have  to  fight  their  allies  as  well  as  their 
enemies.  At  this  gloomy  period  when  ten  marches 
would  have  brought  the  French  to  Lisbon,  when  a 
stamp  of  Napoleon's  foot  would  have  extinguished 
that  spark  of  war  which  afterwards  blazed  over  the 
Peninsula,  sir  John  Moore  made  his  daring  movement 
upon  Sahagun,  and  Portugal,  gasping  as  in  a  mortal 
agony,  was  instantly  relieved. 


CHAPTER   n. 

French  retire  from  Merida — Send  a  force  to  Plasencia — The 
direct  intercourse  between  Portugal  and  sir  J.  Moore's  army 
interrupted — Military  description  of  Portugal — Situation  of 
the  troops — Cradock  a^ain  pressed,  by  Mr.  Frere  and  others, 
to  move  into  Spain — The  ministers  ignorant  of  the  real  state 
ot  afl'airs — Cradock  hears  of  Moore's  advance  to  Saha;run — 
Embarks  two  thousand  men  to  reinforce  him — Hears  of  the 
retreat  to  Coruna.  and  re-lands  them — Admiral  Berkeley 
arrives  at  Lisbon — Ministers  more  anxious  to  get  possession 
of  Cadiz  than  to  defend  Portugal— Five  thousand  men,  under 
peneral  Sherbrooke,  embarked  at  Portsmouth — Sir  George 
Smith  reaches  Cadiz — State  of  that  city — He  demands  troops 


Sir  J.  Cr;\;lonk's  (^orrespondenci  ,  MSS. 


U  jni  Lisbon — General  MacVenzie  sails  from  thence,  with 
troops— \eo;ntintions  vrith  the  junta- — Mr.  Frere's  weak  pro- 
ceedings— Tumult  in  Cadiz — The  negotiation  fails. 

It  was  the  advanced  guard  of  the  fourth  corps  that 
had  apjiroached  Merida  with  the  intention  of  proceed- 
ing to  Badajos,  and  the  emperor  was,  as  we  have  seen, 
preparing  to  follow;  but,  in  the  nijht  of  the  '26th  of 
December,  an  officer  carrying  the  intelligence  of  Moore's 
movement,  reached  Merida,  and,  next  morning,  the 
French  marching  hastily  to  the  Tagus,  crossed  it,  and 
rejoined  their  main  body,  from  which  another  powerful 
detachment  was  immediately  directed  upon  Placentia. 
This  retrograde  movement  obviated  the  immediatfl 
danger,  and  sir  John  Cradock  endeavoured  to  pacify 
the  people  of  Lisbon.  Ordering  Stewart's  brigade, 
which  had  been  strengthened  by  two  German  battalions, 
to  halt  at  Santarem,  he  explained  his  own  motives  to 
the  Portuguese,  and  urged  the  regency  to  a  more  frank 
and  vigorf  us  system,  than  they  had  hitherto  followed; 
for  like  the  Spanish  juntas,  they  promised  every  thing, 
and  performed  nothing;  neither  would  they,  although 
consenting,  verbally,  to  all  the  measures  proposed, 
ever  commit  themselves  by  writing,  having  the  des- 
picable intention  of  afterwards  disclaiming  that  which 
might  prove  disagreeable  to  the  populace,  or  even  to 
the  French.  Sir  John  Cradock,  however,  had  no 
power  beyond  his  own  personal  influence  to  enforce 
attention  to  his  wishes;  no  successor  to  sir  Charles 
Cotton  had  yet  arrived,  and  Mr.  Villiers  seems  to  have 
wanted  the  decision  and  judgement  required  to  meet 
surh  a  momentous  crisis. 

In  the  north,  general  Cameron,  having  sent  the  sick 
men  and  part  of  the  stores  from  Almeida  towards 
Oporto,  gave  up  that  fortress  to  sir  Robert  Wilson, 
and  on  the  5th  of  January,  marched,  with  two  British 
battalions  and  a  detachment  of  convalescents,  by  the 
Tras  OS  IMontes  to  join  the  army  in  Spain.  On  the 
9th,  hearing  of  sir  John  Moore's  retreat  to  CoruT.a,  he 
would  have  returned  to  Almeida,  but  Lapisse,  who 
had  taken  Zamora,  threatened  to  intercept  his  line  of 
march,  whereupon  he  made  for  Lamego,  and  advised 
sir  R.  Wilson  to  retire  to  the  same  place.  Colonel 
Blunt,  with  seven  companies,  escorting  a  convoy  foi 
Moore's  army,  was  likewise  forced  to  take  the  road  to 
Oporto,  and  on  that  city  all  the  British  stores  and  de- 
tachments were  now  directed. 

Notwithstanding  the  general  dismay,  sir  R.  Wilson, 
who  had  been  reinforced  by  some  Spanish  troops,  Por- 
tuguese volunteers,  and  straggling  convalescents  of 
the  British  army,  rejected  Cameron's  advice,  and  pro- 
ceeded to  practise  all  the  arts  of  an  able  partizan — that 
is  to  say,  enticing  the  French  to  desert,  spreading 
false  reports  of  his  own  numbers,  and,  by  petty  enter- 
prizes  and  great  activity,  arousing  a  spirit  of  resist- 
ance throughout  the  Ciudad  Rodrigo  country. 

The  continued  influx  of  sick  men  and  stores  at 
Oporto,  together  with  the  prospect  of  general  Came- 
ron's arrival  there,  became  a  source  of  uneasiness  to 
sir  John  Cradock.  Oporto,  with  a  shifting  bar  and 
shoal  water,  is  the  worst  possible  harbour  for  vessels 
to  clear  out,  and  one  of  the  most  dangerous  for  vessels 
to  lie  off,  at  that  season  of  the  year;  hence,  if  the 
enemy  advanced  in  force,  a  gr^at  loss,  both  of  men 
and  stores,  was  to  be  anticipated.  The  departure  of 
sir  Charles  Cotton  had  diiriinished  the  naval  means, 
and,  for  seventeen  succps'sive  days,  such  was  the  state 
of  the  wind  that  no  vessel  could  leave  the  Tagus ; 
captain  Halket,  nowever,  contrived  at  last  to  send  to 
Oporto  toniiage  for  two  thousand  persons,  and  under- 
took to  keep  a  sloop  of  war  off  that  place.*  Sir  Samuel 
Hood  also  despatched  some  vessels  from  \  igo,  but  the 
weather  continued  for  a  long  time  so  unfavourable  that 
these  transports  could  not  enter  the  harbour,  and  the 


«   Sir  J.  Cradock's  Correspondence,  MSS. 


158 


NAPIER   S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  \1 


encumbrances  hourly  increasing,  at  last  produced  the 
most  serious  embarrassments. 

Sir  John  IMoore  liaving  now  relinquished  his  com- 
munications with  Portugal,  sir  John  Cradock  had  to 
consider  how,  relying^  on  his  own  resources,  he  could 
best  fulfil  his  instructions  and  maintain  his  hold  of  that 
country,  without  risking  the  utter  destruction  of  the 
troops  intrusted  to  his  care.  For  an  inferior  army  Por- 
tugal has  no  defensible  frontier.  The  rivers  generally 
running  east  and  west,  are  fordable  in  most  places, 
subject  to  sudden  rises  and  falls,  offering  but  weak 
lines  of  resistance,  and  with  the  exception  of  the  Ze- 
jsere,  presenting  no  obstacles  to  the  advance  of  an  ene- 
my penetrating  by  the  eastern  frontier.  The  moun- 
tains, indeed,  afford  many  fine  and  some  impregnable 
positions,  but  such  is  the  length  of  the  frontier  line 
and  the  difficulty  of  lateral  communications,  that  a 
general  who  should  attempt  to  defend  it  against  supe- 
rior forces  would  risk  to  be  cut  off  from  the  capital  if 
he  concentrated  his  troops  ;  and  if  he  extended  them 
his  line  would  be  immediately  broken.  The  posses- 
sion of  Lisbon  constitutes,  in  fact,  the  possession  of 
Portugal,  south  of  the  Duero,  and  an  inferior  army  can 
only  prolect  Lisbon  by  keeping  close  to  the  capital. 

Sensible  of  this  truth,  sir  John  Cradock  adopted  the 
French  colonel  Vincente's  views  for  the  defence  of 
Lisbon,  and  proceeded,  on  the  4th  of  January,  with 
seventeen  hundred  m.en,  to  occupy  the  heights  behind 
the  creek  of  Sacavem — leaving,  however,  three  thou- 
sand men  in  the  forts  and  batteries  at  Lisbon.  At  the 
earnest  request  of  the  regency,  who  in  return  promised 
to  assemble  the  native  troops  at  Thomar,  Abrantes, 
and  Vilha  Velha,  he  ordered  general  Stewart's  brigade, 
two  thousand  seven  hundred  strong,  to  halt  at  Santa- 
rem  ;  but  the  men  had  been  marching  for  a  month  un- 
der incessant  rain,  tlieir  clothes  were  worn  out,  their 
equipments  ruined,  and  in  common  with  the  rest  of  the 
army  they  wanted  shoes.* 

Cameron  being  now  on  the  Douro,  Kemmis  with 
the  40th  regiment  at  Elvas,  and  the  main  body  under 
Cradcck  between  Santarem  and  Lisbon,  this  army  not 
exceeding  ten  thousand  men,  but  with  the  encumbran- 
ces of  an  army  of  forty  thousand,  was  placed  on  the 
three  points  of  a  triangle,  the  shortest  side  of  which 
•was  above  a  hundred  and  fifty  miles.  The  general 
commanding  could  net  bring  into  the  field  above  five 
thousand  men,  nor  could  that  immbcr  be  assembled  in 
a  condition  for  service  at  any  one  point  of  the  frontier, 
under  three  weeks  or  a  month;  moreover,  the  uncer- 
tainty of  remaining  in  the  country  at  all,  rendered  it 
difficult  to  feed  the  troops,  for  the  commissioners  being 
unable  to  make  large  contracts  for  a  fixed  time,  were 
forced  to  carry  on,  as  it  were,  a  retail  system  of  supply. 

At  this  moment  of  extreme  weakness,  Mr.  Frere, 
with  indefatigable  fnlly,  was  urging  sir  John  Cradock 
to  make  a  diversion  in  Spain,  by  the  line  of  the  Tagus, 
and  Mr.  V'illiers  was  as  earnest  that  he  should  send  a 
force  by  sea  to  Vigo.  Tlis  own  instructions  prescrii)ed 
tiie  preservation  of  Lisbon,  f^lvas,  and  Almeida;  the 
assembling,  in  concert  with  the  native  government,  of 
an  Anglo-Portuijuese  army  on  the  frontier,  and  the 
sending  of  succours  to  sir  John  Moore.  Cradock's 
means  were  so  scanty  that  the  attainments  of  any  one 
of  those  objects  was  scarcely  possible,  yet  Mr.  Can- 
ning writing  oificially  to  Mr.  Villiers  at  this  epoch,  as 
if  a  mighty  and  well  furnished  army  was  in  Portugal, 
enforced  tlie  "  necmstty  of  continuins;  to  maintain  pos- 
session if  Portu<ral,  as  lonfr  as  could  be  clone  with  the 
force  intrusted  to  nr  John  I'radocIvS  command,  remem- 
hering  always  thai  not  the  di fence  of  Portw^al  alone, 
but  the  employment  if  the  eneiny''s  military  force,  and 
the  diver-tion  ivhich  ivould  be  thus  created  in  favour  of 
ike  south  of  Spain,  tcere  objects  not  to  be  abandoned,  ex- 
cept inca-ic  of  the  most  extreme  necessity.''''  The  enemy's 

«  Sir  John  Cradock'*  Corn  (""ondence,  MSS. 


military  force!  It  was  three  hundred'  thousand  men, 
and  this  despatch  was  a  pompous  absurdity.  The  min- 
isters and  their  agents  eternally  haunted  by  the  ))han- 
toms  of  Spanish  and  Portuguese  armies,  were  incapa- 
ble of  perceiving  the  palpable  bulk  and  substance  of 
the  French  hosts  ;  the  whole  system  of  the  cabinet 
was  one  of  shifts  and  expedients,  every  week  produced 
a  fresh  project,  and  minister  and  agent,  alike,  follow- 
ed his  own  views,  without  reference  to  any  fixed  prin- 
ciple;  the  generals  were  the  only  persons  not  empow- 
ered to  arrange  military  operations. 

The  number  of  officers  employed  to  discover  the 
French  movement,  enabled  Cradock,  although  his  di- 
rect communications  were  interrupted,  to  obtain  intel- 
ligence of  Moore's  advance  towards  Sahagun  ;  where- 
fore, he  again  endeavoured  to  send  a  reinforcement  into 
Spain  by  the  way  of  Almeida.  The  difficulty  of  getting 
supplies,  however,  finally  induced  him  to  accede  to 
Mr.  Villiers'  wishes,  and  on  the  12th  of  January  he 
shipped  six  hundred  cavalr\^  and  thirteen  hundred  in- 
fantry, meaning  to  send  them  to  Vigo  ;  but  while  they 
were  still  in  the  Tagus,  intelligence  of  the  retreat  upon 
Corufiawasreceived,and  the  troops  were  disembarked.* 

The  14th  of  January  the  Conqueror  line-of-battle- 
ship,  having  admiral  Berkely  on  board,  reached  Lisbon, 
and  for  the  first  time  since  sir  John  Cradock  took  the 
command  of  the  troops  in  Portugal,  he  received  a  com- 
munication from  the  ministers  in  England. |  It  now 
appeared  that  their  thoughts  were  less  intently  fixed 
upon  the  defence  of  Portugal  than  upon  getting  pos- 
session of  Cadiz.  Their  anxiety  upon  this  subject  had 
somewhat  subsided  after  the  battle  of  Vimeira,  but  it 
revived  with  greater  vigour  when  sir  John  Moore,  con- 
templating a  movement  in  the  south,  suggested  the 
propriety  of  securing  Cadiz  as  a  place  of  arms,  and  in 
January  an  expedition  was  prepared  to  sail  for  thai 
town,  with  the  design  of  establishing  a  new  base  of 
operations  for  the  English  army.  This  project  failed, 
but  the  following  particulars  of  the  transaction  afford 
ample  proof  of  the  perplexed  unstable  nature  of  the 
minister's  policy. 

NEGOTIATION    FOR   THE    OCCUPATION    OF    CADIZ. 

While  it  was  still  unknown  in  England  that  the 
supreme  junta  had  fled  from  Aranjuez,  sir  George 
Smith,  who  had  conducted  Spencer's  negotiation  in 
1808,  was  again  sent  to  Cadiz  to  prepare  the  way  for 
the  reception  of  an  English  garrison.^  Four  thousand 
men  destined  for  this  service  were  then  embarked  at 
Portsmouth,  general  Slierbrooke  who  commanded  them, 
was  first  directed  to  touch  at  Lisbon  on  his  way  to 
Cadiz  ;  he  was  afterwards  desired  to  make  for  Corufia 
to  be  at  the  order  of  sir  J.  Moore,  yet  finally,  his  force 
being  increased  to  five  thousand  men,  he  sailed  on  the 
14lh  of  January  for  Cadiz,  under  his  first  instructions. 
Mr.  Frere  was  then  directed  to  negotiate  fur  the  ad 
mission  of  tiiese  troops  into  Cadiz,  as  the  only  condi 
tion  upon  which  a  British  army  could  be  employed  to 
aid  the  Spanish  cause  in  that  part  of  the  Peninsula. 

As  the  reverses  in  the  north  of  Spain  became  known, 
the  importance  of  Cadiz  increased,  and  the  importance 
of  Portugal  decreased  in  the  eyes  of  the  English  min- 
isters. Sir  John  Cradock  was  made  acquainted  with 
Sherbrooke's  destination,  and  was  himself  commanded 
to  obey  any  requisition  for  troops  that  might  be  made 
by  tlie  Spanish  junta;  and  so  independent  of  the  real 
state  of  affairs  were  the  ministerial  arrangements,  that 
Cradock,  whose  despatches  had  been  one  continued 
complaint  of  his  inability  to  procure  horses  for  his 
own  artillery,  was  directed  to  furnish  them  for  Sher- 
brooke's. 

Sir  George  Smith,  a  man  somewhat  hasty,  but  of 

*   Sir  John  Cradock's  Correspondence,  MSS. 

+  Cradock's  Papers,  MSS. 

\  '.-'•ipi.-rs  laid  before  Parliament,  1810. 


1809.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR, 


I5d 


remarkable  zeal  nnd  acuteness,  left  Enirland  about  tbe 
middle  of  December;  and,  on  his  arrival  at  Cadiz,  at 
once  discovered  that  there,  as  in  every  other  part  of  the 
Peninsula,  all  persons  being  eng-aged  in  theories  or  in- 
trigues, nothing  useful  for  defence  was  executed.  The 
ramparts  of  the  city  were  in  tolerable  condition,  but 
scarcely  any  guns  were  mounted,  while,  two  miles  in 
front  of  tlie  town,  an  outwork  had  been  commenced 
upon  such  a  scale  that  it  could  not  possibly  be  finished 
under  four  months,  and,  after  the  slow  mode  of  Span- 
ish proceedings,  would  have  taken  as  many  years  to 
complete. 

For  a  solid  defence  of  all  the  fortifications,  sir 
George  Smith  judged  that  twenty  thousand  good  troops 
would  be  requisite,  but  that  ten  thousand  would  suflice 
for  the  cit}',  there  were,  however,  only  five  thousand 
militia  and  volunteers  in  the  place,  and  not  a  regular 
soldier  under  arms,  neither  any  within  reach.  The 
number  of  guns  mounted  and  to  be  mounted  exceeded 
four  hundred  :  to  serve  them,  two  hundred  and  fifty 
peasants  and  volunteers  were  enrolled,  and,  being 
clothed  in  uniforms,  were  called  artillery-men. 

Knowing  nothing  of  sir  John  Moore's  march  to  Sa- 
hagun,  sir  George  Smith  naturally  calculated  upon  the 
immediate  approach  of  the  French  ;  wherefore  seeing 
the  helpless  state  of  Cadiz,  and  being  assured  that  the 
people  would  willingly  admit  an  English  garrison,  he 
wrote  to  sir  John  Cradock  for  troops.  The  latter, 
little  thinking  that,  at  such  a  conjuncture,  the  supreme 
junta  would  be  more  jealous  of  their  allies  than  fear- 
ful of  their  enemies ;  judging  also,  from  the  tenor  of 
his  latest  instructions,  that  obedience  to  this  requisition 
would  be  consonant  to  the  minister's  wishes  ;  imme- 
diately ordered  colonel  Kemmis  to  proceed  from  Elvas 
with  the  fortieth  regiment,  by  the  route  of  Seville, 
and,  at  the  same  time,  embarking  three  thousand  of  the 
best  troops  at  Lisbon,  sent  them  to  Cadiz.*  This  force, 
commanded  by  major-general  Mackenzie,  sailed  the  2d 
February,  and  reached  their  destination  the  5th  of  the 
same  month. 

Meanwhile,  Mr.  Frere,  although  acquainted  with 
the  sailing  of  Mackenzie's  armament,  was  ignorant 
that  sir  George  Smith  had  applied  to  the  governor  of 
Cadiz  fir  permission  to  take  military  possession  of  that 
town  ;|  for  Smith  had  no  instructions  to  correspond 
with  Mr.  Frere,  and  the  latter  had  opened  a  separate 
negotiation  v/ith  the  central  junta  at  Seville,  in  which 
he  endeavoured  to  pave  the  way  for  the  occupation  by 
proposing  to  have  the  troops  admitted  as  guests,  and 
he  sent  Mr.  Stuart  to  arrange  this  with  the  local  autho- 
rities. Mr  Frere  had,  however,  meddled  much  with 
the  personal  intrigues  of  the  day,  he  was,  moreover, 
of  too  slender  a  capacity  to  uphold  the  dignity  and 
just  influence  of  a  great  power  on  such  an  occasion, 
and  the  flimsy  thread  of  his  negotiation  snapped  under 
the  hasty  touch  of  sir  George  Smith.  The  supreme 
junta,  averse  to  every  thing  that  threatened  to  inter- 
rupt their  course  of  sluggish  indolence,  had  sent  the 
marquis  de  Villel,  a  member  of  their  own  body,  to 
Cadiz,  avowedly  to  prepare  the  way  for  the  admission 
of  the  troops,  but,  in  reality,  to  thwart  that  measure ; 
hence  the  circumstance  of  Mackenzie's  arrival,  with 
an  object  dlflerent  from  that  announced  by  Mr.  Frere, 
was  instantly  taken  advantage  of  to  charge  England 
with  treachery.  'I'he  junta,  knowing  Mr.  Frere  to  be 
their  own  dupe,  believed,  or  affected  to  believe,  that 
he  was  also  the  dupe  of  the  English  minister,  and  that 
the  whole  transaction  was  an  artifice,  on  the  part  of 
the  latter,  to  get  possession  of  the  city  with  a  felonious 
intent.:^:  The  admission  of  the  [British  troops  was  ne- 
vertheless earnestly  desired  by  the  inhabitants  of  Ca- 
diz, and  of  the  neighbouring  towns  ;  and  this  feeling 
was  so  well  understood  by  Mr.  Stuart  and  sir  George 

*  Sir  J.  Cradock's  Correspondence,  MSS. 

+  Pari.  Papers   1810.  {   Ibid.  , 


Smith,  that  they  would,  notwithstanding  tbe  reluctance 
of  the  supreme  junta,  have  brought  the  affair  to  a  good 
conclusion  ;  but,  at  the  most  critical  period  of  the  ne- 
gotiation, the  former  was  sent  on  a  secret  mission  to 
Vienna,  by  the  way  of  Trieste,  and  the  latter,  who 
was  in  bad  health,  died  about  the  same  period  ;  thus 
the  negotiation  failed  for  want  of  a  head  to  son- 
duct  it. 

General  Mackenzie,  like  sir  George  Smith,  thought 
that  the  object  might  be  attained:  he  observed,  indeed, 
that  the  people,  far  from  suspecting  any  danger,  were 
ignorant  of,  or  incredulous  of  the  reverses  in  the 
north,  that  nothing  had  been  done  towards  equipping 
the  fleet  for  sea,  and  that,  notwithstanding  the  earnest 
remonstrances  of  admiral  Purvis  and  Mr.  Stuart,  the 
Spaniards  would  neither  work  themselves  nor  pern.it 
the  English  sailors  to  work  for  them  ;  but  he  also  saw 
that  the  public  feeling  was  favourable  to  the  British 
troops  and  the  good  will  of  the  people  openly  ex- 
pressed. The  affair  was,  however,  now  in  the  hands 
of  Mr.  Frere. 

In  the  course  of  the  negotiations  carried  on  by  that 
minister,  the  suprepie  junta  had  propospd, 

I.  That  the  troops  should  land  at  Port  St.  Mary's, 
to  be  quartered  thei'e  and  in  the  neighbouring  towns. — 
2.  That  they  should  join  Cuesta's  army. — .3.  That 
they  should  go  to  Catalonia. — 4.  That  they  should  be 
parcelled  out  in  small  divisions,  to  be  attached  to  the 
different  Spanish  armies.  Nay,  untaught  by  their  re- 
peated disasters,  and  pretending  to  hold  the  English 
soldiery  cheap,  those  self-sufficient  men  proposed  that 
the  British  should  garrison  the  minor  fr  rlresses  on  the 
coast,  in  order  to  release  an  equal  number  of  Spaniards 
for  the  field. 

Mr.  Frere  wished  to  accept  the  first  of  these  propo- 
sals, but  general  Mackenzie,  sir  George  Smith,  and 
Mr.  Stuart  agreed  that  it  would  be  injurious  for  many 
reasons;  not  the  least  urgent  of  which  was,  that  as  the 
troops  could  not  have  been  embarked  again  without 
some  national  dishonour,  they  must  have  marched  to- 
wards Cuesta,  and  thus  have  been  involved  in  the 
campaign  without  obtaining  that  which  was  their  sole 
object,  the  po.%ses^,ion  of  Cadiz  as  a  place  (farms. 

Mr.  Frere  then  suggested  a  modification  of  the  second 
proposal,  namely,  to  leave  a  small  garrison  in  ('ac'iz, 
and  to  join  Cuesta  with  the  remainder  of  the  troops. 
At  this  time  sir  G.  Smith  was  dead;  Mr.  Stuart  had 
embarked  for  Trieste;  and  general  Mackenzie,  reluc- 
tant to  oppose  Mr.  Frere's  wishes,  consented  to  march, 
if  the  necessary  equipments  for  his  force  could  be  pro- 
cured ;  but  he  observed,  that  the  plan  was  contrary  to 
his  instructions,  and  to  the  known  wishes  of  the  Eng- 
lish government,  and  liable,  in  part,  to  the  same  objec- 
tions as  the  first  proposition.  This  was  on  the  IBth 
of  February  ;  on  the  22d,  a  popular  tumult  commenced 
in  Cadiz. 

The  supreme  junta,  desirous  to  shew  that  the  city 
did  not  require  an  Englirih  garrison  for  its  protection, 
had  sent  there  two  regiments,  composed  of  Poles,  Ger- 
mans, and  Swiss,  deserters  or  prisoners.  'I'he  people, 
aware  that  the  junta  disliked  and  intended  to  dis.trm 
the  volunteers  of  Cadiz,  were  justly  offended  that  d* 
serters  should  be  trusted  in  preference  to  themselves, 
they  stopped  the  courier,  opened  the  despatches  from 
Seville,  and  imprisoned  the  marquis  of  Villel,  who  was 
obnoxious,  because,  while  mild  to  persons  suspect'd 
of  favouring  the  French,  he  had  harshly  or  rather  bru- 
tally punished  some  ladies  of  rank.  Proceeding  froni 
one  violence  to  another,  the  populace  endeavoured  to 
kill  the  state  prisoner,  and  being  prevented  in  that, 
committed  other  excesses,  and  murdered  don  Jo?eph 
Heredia,  the  collector  of  public  rents.  Dang  the 
tumult,  which  lasted  two  days,  the  disembarlaiion  of 
the  English  troops  was  repeatedly  called  fo:  by  the 
mob,  and  two  British  oilicers  being  sent  on  shore  a.s 
mediators,  were  received  with  enthusiasm,  and  obeyed 


160 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR 


[Book  VI. 


with  respect,  a  manifest  proof  of  the  correct  view  taken 
by  sii"  Georire  Smith. 

The  24th,  tvan.-juillity  was  restored  ;  the  25th.  gen- 
eral Mackenzie,  not  haviiigr  received  from  Mr.  Frere  an 
answer  to  his  letter  of  the  18th,  sufTfrested  that  of  the 
three  Engrlish  battalions  then  in  the  harbour,  two  should 
be  placed  in  Cadiz,  and  that  the  third,  proceeding  to 
Seville,  should  there  unite  with  the  40th  re<riiTient,  and 
both  together  march  to  join  Cuesta.  Mr.  Frere.  how- 
ever, instead  of  addressing  the  junta  with  an  authority 
and  dignity  becoming  the  representative  of  a  great  na- 
tion, on  whose  support  the  independence  of  the  whole 
Peninsula  rested,  had  been  endeavouring  to  gain  his 
end  by  subtlety.  The  object  was  one  that  England 
had  a  right  to  seek,  the  Spanish  rulers  no  right  to  re- 
f\ise,  frr  the  people  wished  to  further  it,  and  the  threat 
pf  an  appeal  to  them  would  soon  have  silenced  the 
feeble  negative  of  such  a  despicable  and  suspected 
government.  Mr.  Frere,  incapable  of  taking  a  single 
and  enlarged  view,  pressed  a  variety  of  trifling  points, 
and  discussed  them  with  the  secretary  of  the  junta, 
vith  more  recard  to  epistolary  dexterity  than  to  useful 
diplomacy  ;  and  when  his  opponent  conceded  the  great 
point  of  admitting  troops  at  all,  broke  off  the  negotia- 
tion, upon  the  question,  whether  the  number  to  be  ad- 
mitted should  be  one  or  two  thousand  men  ;  as  if  the 
way  to  drive  a  wedge  was  with  the  broad  end  foremost. 

Self-bTfHed  in  that  quarter,  the  British  plenipoten- 
tiary, turning  towards  Cuesta,  the  avowed  enemy  of 
the  junta,  and  one  much  feared  by  them,  sought  to 
secure  his  assistance  by  holding  out  the  lure  of  having 
a  British  force  added  to  his  command,  but  the  sarcastic 
old  general  derided  the  diplomatist.  "Although  I  do 
not."  said  he,  "  discover  any  great  difficulty  in  the  ac- 
tual state  of  things,  which  should  prevent  his  British 
niaj  sty's  troops  from  garrisoning  Cadiz  under  such 
terms,  and  for  the  purpose  which  your  excellency  pro- 
poses. I  am  far  from  supposing  that  the  supreme  junta, 
which  is  fully  persuaded  of  the  importance  of  our  union 
with  England,  is  not  grounded  in  its  objections;  and 
your  excellency  knows  that  it  is  sufficient  that  they 
should  have  them,  to  prevent  my  giving  any  opinion 
on  so  important  a  measure,  unless  they  should  consul.' 
inf.*  With  reofard  to  the  4..'?00  men,  which  your  excel- 
lency is  pleased  to  mention,  there  is  no  doubt  that  I 
Rt.md  in  need  of  them  ;  but  I  flatter  myself,  England, 
sensible  of  the  importance  of  Eslremndura,  will  even 
lend  me  much  greater  assistance,  particularly  if,  from 
any  change  of  circumstances,  the  supreme  junta  should 
no  longer  manifest  the  repugnance  we  speak  of.'' 

This  answer  having  frustrated  the  projected  intrigue, 
Mr.  Frere,  conscious  perhaps  of  diplomatic  incapacity, 
returned  with  renewed  ardour  to  the  task  of  directing 
the  military  atfairs,  in  every  part  of  the  Peninsula. 
He  had  seen  an  intercepted  letter  of  Soult's,  addressed 
to  the  king,  in  which  the  project  of  penetrating  into 
Portugal  was  mentioned;  and  immediately  concluding 
that  ffonsral  Mackenzie's  troops  would  be  wanted  for 
the  defence  of  that  kingdom,  counselled  him  to  aban- 
don Cadiz  and  return  to  Lisbon;  but  the  general,  who 
knew  that,  even  should  he  return,  a  successful  defence 
of  Portugal  with  so  fiw  troops  would  be  impossible, 
and  tVat  every  precaution  was  already  taken  for  an  em- 
barkation in  the  last  extremity,  observed,  that  "  the 
danger  of  Lisbon  rendered  the  occupation  of  Cadiz 
3iore  important." 

General  Mackenzie's  reply  was  written  the  26th  of 
V^hruary.  On  the  3d  of  March  he  received  another 
iespatcli  from  Mr.  Frere.  Cadiz,  and  the  danger  of 
Portugal,  seemed  to  have  passed  from  the  writer's 
mind,  and  were  unnoticed  ;  entering  into  a  minutely 
inaccurate  statement  of  the  situation  of  the  Fren<-h  and 
Spanish  armies,  he  observed,  that  Soult  having  failed 
in  an  attempt  to   penetrate  Portugal  by  the  Minho,  il 

*  Fail.  rap:r».  18  0. 


was  impossible  from  the  pnsih  Tt  [  ,he  Spnnish  forces, 
assls'ed  as  they  were  hy  the  Portuguese,  that  he  could 
persevere  in  his  p.an.  Wherefore,  he  proposed  tliat  the 
British  force  then  in  the  harbour  of  Cadiz  should  pro- 
ceed in:mediately  to  Tarr^'gona,  to  aid  Reding,  and 
this  wild  scheme  was  only  frustrated  by  an  unexpected 
despatch  from  sir  John  Cradock,  recalling  the  troops 
to  Lisbon.  They  arrived  there  on  the  12th  cf  March  ; 
and  thus  ended  a  transaction  clearly  indicating  an  un- 
settled policy,  shallow  combinations,  and  a  bad  choice 
of  agents  on  the  part  (f  the  Eng'lish  cabinet,  and  a 
most  unwise  and  unworthy  disposition  in  the  supreme 
junta. 

General  Mackenzie  attributed  the  jealousy  of  the 
latter  to  French  influence;  Mr.  Frere  to  the  abrupt  pro- 
ceedings of  sir  George  Smith,  and  to  fear,  lest  the  junta 
of  Seville,  who  were  continually  on  the  watch  tore- 
cover  their  ancient  power,  should  represent  the  admis- 
sion of  the  British  troops  as  a  treasonable  proceeding 
on  the  part  of  the  supreme  government.  It  is,  hew 
ever,  evident  that  the  true  cause  was  the  f.-lse  positioa 
in  which  the  English  ministers  hrd  nriginalh'  placec 
themselves,  by  inundating  Sp;iin  with  arms  and  money, 
without  at  the  same  time  asserting  a  just  influence,  ano 
making  their  assistance  the  price  of  good  order  ano 
useful  exertion. 


CHAPTER  in. 

Weakness  of  the  Briti-.h  army  in  Portugal — General  Cameron 
marches  to  Lisbon — Sir  R.  Wilson  remains  near  Ciudad  Rod- 
rigo — Sir  J.  Cradock  prepares  to  take  a  defen^iive  position 
at  Passo  d'.\rcos — -Double  dealing  of  the  regeiicv — Tne  pop- 
ulace murder  foreigners,  and  insult  the  British  troops — 
Anarchv  in  Oporto — British  government  ready  to  abandon 
Poitiigal — Change  their  intention — Military  system  of  Por- 
tugal— The  regency  demand  an  English  general — Beresford 
is  sent  to  them — Sherbrooke"s  and  Mackenzie's  troops  arrive 
at  Lisbon — Beresford  arrives  there,  and  takes  the  command 
of  the  native  force — Change  in  the  aspect  of  allairs — Sir  J. 
Cradock  encan)ps  at  Lnmiar — Relative  positions  of  t'e  allied 
and  French  armits — Marshal  Beresford  desires  sir  J.  Cradock 
to  march  against  Soult — Cradock  refuses — Various  unwise 
projects  broached  by  ditlerent  persons. 

The  effort  made  to  secure  Cadiz  was  an  act  of  dis- 
interested zeal  on  the  part  of  sir  John  Cradock.  The 
absence  of  his  best  troops  exposed  him  to  the  most 
galling  peevishness  from  the  regency,  and  to  the  fjross- 
est  insults  from  the  populace;  with  his  reduced  force, 
he  could  not  expect  to  hold  even  a  contracted  i)ositifin 
at  the  extremity  of  the  rock  of  Lisbon  against  the 
weakest  army  likely  to  invade  Portugal ;  and  as  there 
was  neither  a  native  force  nor  a  government  to  be  de- 
pended upon,  there  remained  for  him  only  the  prospect 
of  a  forced  and,  consequently,  disgraceful  embarkation, 
and  the  undeserved  obloquy  that  never  fails  to  follow 
disaster. 

In  this  disagreeable  situation,  as  Elvas  and  Almeida 
no  longer  contained  British  troops,  his  attention  wa3 
necessarily  fixed  upon  Lisbon  and  upon  Oporto,  which 
the  violence  of  the  gales  had  rendered  a  sealed  port ; 
meanwhile,  the  hospitals  and  magazines  of  Almeida, 
and  even  those  of  Salamanca  being  sent  to  Lamego, 
had  crowded  that  place  with  fifteen  hundred  sick  men, 
besides  escorts  and  hourly  accumulating  stores.  The 
Douro  had  overflowed,  the  craft  could  not  ply,  one 
large  boat  attempting  to  descend  was  overset,  and 
eighty  persons,  soldiers  and  others,  had  perished. 
General  Cameron  also,  hearin'x  of  this  confusion,  re- 
linquished the  idea  of  embarking  at  Oporto,  and,  re- 
crossing  the  Douro,  made  for  I,isbon,  where  he  arrived 
the  beginning  of  February,  Avitli  two  thousand  inr-n, 
who  were  worn  with  fatigue,  having  marched  eight 
hundred  miles  under  continued  rains.  Sir  Roberl 
Wilson  had  sent  his  guns  to  Abrantes.  by  the  road  oi 
Idanha  Nova:  but,  nartlv  from  a  spirit  "♦"  adveuiure 


1809.' 


N  AT  I  E  R  '  S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


161 


pa.lly  from  an  erroneous  idea  that  sir  John  Cradcck 
wished  him  to  defend  the  frontier,  he  remained  Mith 
his  infantry  in  the  ncitrhbourhood  of  Ciudad  Rodritro. 
His  force  had  been  increased  by  a  Spanish  detach- 
ment under  Don  Carlos  d'Espafa,  and  by  some  volun- 
teers, but  it  was  still  weak,  and  his  operations  were 
necessarily  confmed  to  a  few  trifling  skirmishes:  yet, 
like  many  others,  his  imao^ination  so  far  outstripped 
his  judgement,  that,  when  he  had  only  fell  the  ad- 
vanced post  of  a  sintrle  division,  he  expressed  his  con- 
viction thai  the  French  were  going  to  abandon  Spain 
altogether. 

Sir  John  Cradock  entertained  no  such  false  expecta- 
tions, he  was  informed  of  the  battle  of  Corura  and  the 
death  of  .Moore,  and  he  knew  too  well  the  vigour  and 
talent  of  that  general  to  doubt  that  he  had  been  op- 
pressed by  an  overwhelming  force  ;  he  knew  also  that 
Zaragoza  had  fallen,  and  that  twenty-five  thousand 
French  troops,  were  thus  free  to  act  in  other  quarters  ; 
he  knew  that  Soull,  with  at  least  twenty  thousand 
men,  was  on  the  Minho  ;  that  Romana  was  incapable 
of  making  any  head ;  that  Portugal  was  one  wide 
scene  of  helpless  confusion,  and  tiiat  a  French  army 
was  again  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Merida,  threatening 
Lisbon  by  the  line  of  the  Tagus  ;  in  fine,  that  his  own 
embarrassments  were  hourly  increasing,  and  that  the 
moment  was  arrived  when  the  safety  of  his  troops  was 
the  chief  consideration.  The  tenor  of  the  few-  de- 
spatches he  had  received  from  England  led  him  to 
supprse  that  the  ministers  designed  to  abandon  Portu- 
gal ;  but,  as  their  intentions  on  that  head  were  never 
clearly  explained,  he  resolved  to  abide  by  the  literal 
interpretation  of  his  first  instructions,  and  to  keep  his 
hold  of  the  country  as  long  as  it  was  possible  to  do  so 
vithout  risking  the  utter  destruction  of  his  army.  To 
avoid  that  danger,  he  put  every  incumbrance  at  Lisbon 
on  board  the  transports  in  the  Tagus ;  proceeded  to 
disn;ant!e  the  batteries  at  the  mouth  of  the  river,  and 
in  concert  with  the  admiral,  made  preparations  for  car- 
rying away  or  destroying  the  military  and  naval  stores 
in  the  arsenal.  At  the  same  time,  he  renewed  his  ef- 
forts to  embark  the  sick  men  and  stores  at  Oporto ;  but 
the  weather  continued  so  unfavourable,  that  he  was 
finally  obliged  to  remove  the  invalids  and  stores  by 
land,  yet  he  could  not  procure  carriages  for  the  whole. 

After  the  arrival  of  Cameron's  detachment,  the  ef- 
fective British  force  under  arms,  including  convales- 
cents and  fifteen  hundred  stragglers  from  sir  John 
Moore's  army,  was  about  eight  thousand  men,  yet 
when  the  security  of  the  forts  and  magazines,  and  the 
tranquillity  of  Lisbon,  was  provided  for,  only  five 
thousand  men,  and  those  not  in  the  best  order,  could 
be  brought  into  the  field.  As  this  force  was  infinitely 
too  weak  to  cover  such  a  town  as  Lisbon,  the  general 
judged  that  it  would  be  unwise  to  take  up  a  position 
in  advance,  whence  he  should  be  obliged  to  retreat 
through  the  midst  of  a  turbulent  and  excited  popula- 
tion, which  had  already  given  too  many  indications  of 
ill-temper  to  leave  any  doubt  of  its  hostility  under  such 
rirf  umstances.  He,  therefore,  came  to  the  resolution 
rf  withdrawing  from  Saccavem  and  Lisbon,  to  concen- 
trate his  whole  force  on  a  position  at  Passa  d'Arccs 
rear  the  mouth  of  the  river,  where  he  could  embark 
with  least  danger,  and  where  he  had  the  best  chance 
of  defending  himself,  if  necessary,  against  superior 
numbers. 

This  reasoning  was  sound,  and  Cradock's  intention 
was,  undoubtedly,  not  to  quit  Portugal,  unless  driven 
trom  it  by  force,  or  in  pursuance  of  orders  from  Eng- 
Lind,  bib  arrangements,  however,  seem  to  have  carried 
more  the  appearance  of  alarm  than  was  eitber  politic 
or  necessary  ;  the  position  of  Passa  d'Arcos  might 
have  been  prepared,  and  the  means  ni  cessary  for  an 
embarkation  secured,  and  yet  the  bulk  of  the  troops 
kept  in  advance  until  the  last  moment.  To  display  a 
12 


bold  and  confident  front  in  war  is,  of  all  thino-s,  the 
most  essential,  as  well  to  impose  upon  friends  as  upon 
enemies;  sir  J 'hn  Cradock  did  not  fail  to  expericnco 
the  truth  of  this  maxim.  The  population  nf  Lisbon, 
alarmed  by  the  reverses  in  Spain,  yet,  like  all  the  peo- 
ple in  the  Peninsula,  confident  in  tiieir  own  prowess 
and  resolution  until  the  very  moment  of  attack,  became 
extremely  exasperated  ;  the  regency,  partly  froui  their 
natural  folly  and  insincerity,  but  more  from  the  dread 
of  the  lower  orders,  countenanced,  if  they  did  not  in- 
stigate,  the  latter  lo  commit  excesses,  and  to  inlerru])t 
the  proceedings  of  the  British  naval  and  military  au- 
thorities. The  measures  of  precaution  relative  to  the 
forts  had  originated  with  the  regency,  yet  they  now 
formally  protested  against  them,  and,  with  a  view  to 
hamper  the  general,  encouraged  their  subalterns  to 
make  many  false  and  even  ridiculous  charges  against 
the  British  executive  oflicers ;  and  it  would  appear 
that  the  remonstrances  of  the  admiral  and  generals 
were  but  imperfectly  supported  by  i\Ir.  Villiers. 

In  this  manner  the  people's  violence  was  nourished 
until  the  city  was  filled  with  tumult;  mobs,  armed 
with  English  pikes  and  muskets,  collected  night  and 
daj'  in  the  streets  and  on  the  high-roads,  and  under  the 
pretext  of  seeking  for  and  killing  Frenchmen,  attacked 
indiscriminately  all  foreigners,  even  those  in  the  Brit- 
ish service  wearing  the  British  uniform.  The  guards, 
who  endeavoured  to  protect  the  victims  of  this  ftrocit}', 
were  insulted  ;  couriers,  passing  with  despatches,  were 
intercepted  and  deprived  of  their  papers;  English  offi- 
cers were  outraged  in  the  streets,  and  such  was  the 
audacity  cf  the  people  that  the  artillery  was  placed  in 
the  squares,  in  expectation  of  an  affray.  The  stale  of 
Lisbon  was  similar  to  what  it  had  been  at  the  period 
of  Junot's  convention,  and  if  the  British  had  abandoned 
the  country  at  this  time,  they  would  have  been  assailed 
with  as  much  obloquy  by  the  Portuguese ;  for  such 
has  been,  and  will  be,  the  fate  of  all  unsuccessful  aux- 
iliaries: a  reflection  that  should  render  historians  cau 
tious  of  adopting  accusations  upon  the  authority  of 
native  writers  on  the  like  occasions. 

This  spirit  was  not  confined  to  Lisbon.  In  Oporto 
the  disposition  to  insult  the  British  was  more  openly 
encouraged  than  in  the  capital,  the  government  of  llie 
multitude  was  more  decidedly  pronounced  ;  from  the 
cities  it  spread  lo  the  villages.  The  people  of  the 
Alemtejo  frontier  were,  indeed,  remarkably  apathetic, 
but,  from  the  Minho  to  the  Tagus,  the  country  was  i;i 
horrible  confusion  ;  the  soldiers  were  scattered,  with- 
out regard  to  military  system,  and  being  unpaid  lived 
at  free  quarters ;  the  peasantry  of  the  country  assem- 
bling in  bands,  and  the  populace  of  the  towns  in  mobs, 
intercepted  the  communications,  appointed  or  displaced 
the  generals  at  their  pleasure,  and  massacred  all  per- 
sons of  whom  they  were  suspicious;  the  ammuniticn 
which  had  been  supplied  from  England  was  wasted, 
by  constant  firing  in  token  of  insubordination,  and  as 
if  the  very  genius  of  confusion  was  abroad,  some  of 
the  British  troops,  principally  malingerers,*  of  sir 
John  Moore's  army,  added  their  quota  of  misconduct, 
to  increase  the  general  distress.  » 

The  leading  instigator  of  the  excesses  at  Oporto  was 
one  Kaymundo,  a  coadjutor  and  creature  of  the  bishop's, 
a  turbulent  and  cruel  fellow,  who  by  taking  a  share  in 
the  first  insurrection  against  the  French,  obtained  a 
momentar}-  influence,  and  has  since  been  elevated,  by 
a  very  credulous  writer,  into  a  patriotic  hero.  He  was, 
however,  a  worthless  coward,  fitted  for  secret  villany, 
and  incapable  of  a  noble  action. 

This  state  of  aflfairs,  productive  of  so  much  misery 
and  danger,  continuing,  without  intermission,  caused 


*  An  appellation  given  amonp;'  solJiers  to  men  who,  under 
pretenre  of  sickness,  shrink  frciii  the  pcrCorniance  of  their  du. 
ties  iu  the  field. 


163 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  VI 


many  of  the  upper  classes  to  despair  of  their  country's 
safety  by  war,  and  increased  the  number  of  these  who 
wishing  to  attach  themselves  lo  the  fortune  of  France, 
were  ready  to  accept  of  a  foreign  prince  for  their  sove- 
reign, if  with  him  they  could  obtain  tranquillity  and 
an  ameliorated  constiiulion :  and  when  soon  after- 
wards, the  edge  of  the  enemy's  sword,  falling  upon 
the  senseless  multitude,  filled  the  streets  of  Oporto 
with  blood,  there  was  a  powerful  French  party  in  Por- 
tugal. The  bulk  of  the  [leople  were,  however,  stanch 
in  their  country's  cause;  they  were  furious  and  disor- 
derly, but  imbued  with  haired  of  the  French,  ready  at 
the  call  of  honour,  and  susceptible  of  discipline,  with- 
out any  loss  of  energy. 

The  turbulence  of  the  citizens,  the  remonstrances  of 
the  regency,  and  the  representations  of  Mr.  Villiers, 
who  was  in  doubt  for  the  personal  safety  of  the  British 
subjects  residing  in  Lisbon,  convinced  sir  John  Cradock 
that  political  circumspection  and  adroitness,  were  as 
important  as  military  arrangements  to  prevent  a  catas- 
trophe at  this  critical  period  ;  hence,  as  contrary  to 
what  might  have  been  expected,  the  enemy  had  not 
yet  made  any  actual  movement  across  the  frontier,  he 
suspended  his  design  of  falling  back  to  Passa  d'Arcos. 

In  this  unsettled  state,  affairs  remained  until  March, 
when  intelligence  arrived  that  the  French  fleet  was  at 
sea,  whereupon  two  of  the  line-of-battle  ships  in  the 
Tagus  were  despatched  to  reinforce  sir  Thomas  Duck- 
worth's squadron,  and  the  batteries  at  the  mouth  of  the 
river  were  again  armed.  Meanwhile,  Soult  was  making 
progress  in  the  north,  the  anarchy  at  Oporto  was  con- 
tinually increasing,  and  the  English  government  had 
certainly  come  to  the  resolution  of  abandoning  Portu- 
gal if  the  enemy  advanced  ;  for,  although  sir  John 
Cradcek  was  not  informed  of  their  views,  an  officer  in 
England,  well  acquainted  with  Portuguese  customs, 
actsjally  received  orders,  and  was  embarking,  to  aid  the 
execution  of  this  measure,  when  suddenly,  the  policy 
of  the  cabinet  once  more  changed,  and  it  was  resolved 
vo  reinforce  the  army.  This  resolulion,  which  may  be 
attributed  partly  to  the  Austrian  war,  partly  to  the 
failure  at  Cadiz,  partly  to  the  necessity  of  satisfying 
public  opinion  in  England,  was  accompanied  by  a 
measure,  which  laid  the  first  solid  basis  on  which  to 
build  a  reasonable  hope  of  success. 

The  Portuguese  Government,  either  spontaneously, 
or  brought  thereto  by  previous  negotiation,  had  offered 
the  command  of  their  troops,  with  the  title  of  marshal, 
to  an  English  general,  and  the  British  ministers  ac- 
cepted this  offer,  promised  supplies  of  arms,  ammuni- 
tion, clothing,  and  a  subsidy  for  the  pa)-ment  of  a  cer- 
tain number  of  regular  soldiers  ;  thus  obtaining  a  firm 
hold  of  the  military  resources  of  Portugal,  and  gain- 
ing for  the  first  time  a  position  in  the  Peninsula  suit- 
able to  the  dignity  of  England  and  the  contest  in  which 
she  was  engaged.  The  Portuguese  desired  to  have  sir 
Arthur  Wellesiey,  but  he  refused  the  offer,  and  it  is  said 
that  sir  John  Murray,  (he  who  afterwards  failed  at 
Taragona,)  sir  John  Doyle,  and  even  the  marquis  of 
Hastings,  a  man  undoubtedly  well  qualified,  sought 
for  the  office,  but  that  powerful  parliamentarj'  interest 
prevaiiitig,  Major-general  Beresford  was  finally  chosen, 
and  at  the  same  time  received  the  local  rank  of  lieuten- 
ant-general ;  lo  the  great  discontent  of  several  officers 
of  superior  rank,  who  were  displeased  that  a  man 
without  any  visible  claim  to  superiority  should  be  plac- 
ed over  their  heads. 

Information  of  this  change  was  immediately  sent  to 
sir  John  Cradock,  and  general  Sherbrooke  was  ordered 
to  repair  to  Lisbon.  Tlie  latter  was  close  to  Cadiz 
harbour  when  the  orders  overtook  him,  and  his  and 
Mackenzie's  divisions  arrived  together  in  the  Tagus  on 
the  r2lh  of  March,  thus  the  fate  of  Portugal  was  again 
fixed  by  England.  But  if  Mr.  Frere's  plan  had  been 
followed — if  Mackenzie  had   proceeded  to  Taragona, 


and  nothing  but  foul  wenther  prevented  him — if  Sher- 
brooke's  vcyage  had  not  been  delayed  by  storms,  and 
that  sailing  about  from  port  to  port,  he  had,  as  is  most 
probable,  been  engaged  in  some  other  enterprize — if 
Victor,  obeying  his  orders,  had  marched  to  Abrantes 
— if  any  of  these  events  had  happened,  sir  John  Cra- 
dock must  have  abandoned  Portugal,  and  then  how 
infinitely  absurd  the  proceedings  of  the  English  mi- 
nisters would  have  appeared,  and  how  justly  their 
puerile  combinations  would  have  excited  the  scorn  of 
Europe. 

Marshal  Beresford  reached  Lisbon  early  in  March, 
and  after  some  negotiation,  received  from  the  regency, 
power  to  appoint  British  officers  to  the  command  of 
regiments,  and  to  act  without  control  in  any  manner  he 
should  judge  fitting  to  ameliorate  the  condition  and  dis- 
cipline of  the  Portuguese  fc-ces;  and  this  was  the 
more  important,  as  the  military  polity  of  Portugal,  al- 
though fallen  into  disuse,  was  severe,  precise,  and  ad- 
mirably calculated  to  draw  forth  the  whole  strength  of 
the  nation.  The  army  could  be  completed  by  coercion; 
the  militia  were  bound  to  assemble  by  regiments,  and 
liable  to  any  service  within  the  frontiers  ;  and  the 
whole  of  the  remaining  male  population  could  be  en- 
rolled under  the  name  of  ordcnancas,  num.bered  by  bat- 
talions in  their  different  districts,  and  obliged  und  r 
very  severe  penalties  to  assemble,  at  the  orders  of  tlie 
local  magistrates,  either  to  work,  to  fight,  to  escort  con- 
voys, or  in  any  manner  to  aid  the  operations  of  the 
army. 

This  affair  arranged,  Beresford  fixed  his  quarters  at 
Thomar,  collected  the  Portuguese  troops  in  masses, 
and  proceeded  to  recast  their  system  on  the  model  of 
the  British  army  ;  commencing  with  stern  but  whole- 
some rigour,  a  reform  that,  in  process  of  time,  raised 
out  of  chaos  an  obedient,  well  disciplined,  and  gallant 
force,  worthy  of  a  high  place  among  the  best  in  p]u- 
rope  ;  for  the  Portuguese  people,  though  easily  misled 
and  excited  to  wrath,  are  of  a  docile  orderly  disposi- 
tion, and  very  sensible  of  just  and  honourable  conduct 
in  their  officers.  This  reform  was,  however,  not  ef 
fected  at  once,  nor  without  many  crosses  and  difficul 
ties  being  raised  by  the  higher  orders  and  by  the  go 
vernment  —  difliculties  that  general  Beresford  cou'.d 
never  have  overcome,  if  he  had  not  been  directed, 
sustained,  and  shielded,  by  the  master  spirit  under 
whom  he  was  destined  to  work.  The  plan  of  giving 
to  English  officers  the  command  of  the  Portuguese 
troops  was  at  first  proceeded  on  with  caution  ;  but  alter 
a  time,  the  ground  being  supposed  safe,  it  was  gradual- 
ly enlarged,  until  almost  all  the  military  situations  of 
importance  were  held  by  Englishmen,  which  combined 
with  other  causes,  gave  rise  to  numerous  intrigues,  not 
confined  to  the  natives,  and  as  we  shall  find,  in  after 
tin.es,  seriously  threatening  the  power  of  the  marshal, 
the  existence  of  the  British  influence,  and  the  success 
of  the  war. 

Sir  John  Cradock's  situation  was  now  materially 
alleviated.  The  certainty  of  the  Austrian  war  produced 
a  marked  change  in  the  disposition  of  the  regency ; 
the  arrival  of  Sherbrooke's  and  .Mackenzie's  divisions 
increased  the  British  force  to  fourteen  thousand  men, 
and  the  populace  became  more  cautious  of  offering  in' 
suits.  About  the  middle  of  March,  two  thousand  men 
being  left  to  maintain  tranquillity  in  Lisbon,  the  re- 
mainder of  the  army  was  encamped  at  Lumiar  and 
Saccavem,  and  while  these  things  were  passing  at 
Lisbon,  the  aspect  of  affairs  changed  also  in  other  parts 
of  the  kingdom. 

The  bulk  of  the  Portuguese  regular  troops,  amount- 
ing to  ten  or  twelve  thousand  men,  was  collected  by 
marshal  Beresford,  between  the  Tagus  and  the  .Mon- 
dego.  Beyond  the  valley  of  the  ^londego,  colonel 
Trant  had  assembled  a  small  corps  of  volunteers,  stu- 
dents from  the  university,  and  general  Vittoria  was  a 


1R09.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


163 


tf.e  head  of  two  rr  Jular  battalions  in  Upper  Beira. 
'1  he  bishop  of  Oporto  was  preparing  to  defend  tliat 
town,  with  a  mixed,  but  ferocious  and  insubordinate 
multitude.  General  Silveira,  with  four  or  five  thousand 
men,  had  taken  post  in  the  Tras  os  Montes,  and  Ro- 
mana,  who  had  collected  seven  or  ei^ht  thousand  at 
Monterey,  was  in  communication  with  him.  .Sir  Robert 
^^'ilson,  who  was  at  the  head  of  about  three  thousand 
men,  had  withdrawn  the  legion  from  Almeida,  and  sent 
a  detachment  to  Bejar,  but  remained  himself  on  the 
Affueda,  watching  the  advanced  pests  of  Lapisse.  A 
few  Portuguese  regiments  were  extended  from  Salva- 
tierra  and  Idanha  to  Alcantara.  A  permanent  bridge 
of  boats  was  laid  over  the  Tagus  at  Abranles,  and 
there  were  small  garrisons  in  that  town  and   at  Elvas. 

All  these  forces  united  would  not,  however,  with  the 
exception  of  the  British,  have  been  capable  of  sustain- 
ing the  shock  of  ten  thousand  French  soldiers  for 
half  an  hour,  and  the  whole  mass  of  the  latter,  then 
hanging  on  the  frontier  of  Portugal,  was  above  fifty 
thousand  ;  gathering  like  clouds  on  the  horizon,  they 
threatened  many  points,  but  gave  no  certain  indication 
of  where  the  storm  would  break.  Soult,  indeed,  with 
about  twenty  thousand  men,  was  endeavouring  to  pass 
the  Minho  ;  but  Lapisse,  although  constantly  menacing 
Ciudad  Rodrigo,  kept  his  principal  masses  at  Sala- 
manca and  Ledesma,  and  Victor  had  concentrated  his 
between  the  Alberche  and  the  Tietar.  Hence  Lapisse 
might  join  either  Soult  or  Victor,  and  the  latter  could 
march  by  Placentia  against  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  while 
Soult  attacked  Oporto ;  or  he  might  draw  Lapisse  to 
him,  and  penetrate  Portugal  by  Alcantara  ;  he  might 
pass  the  Tajjus,  attack  Cuesta,  and  pursue  him  to  Se- 
ville;  or,  after  defeating  him,  he  might  turn  short  to 
the  right,  and  enter  the  Alemtejo. 

In  this  uncertainty,  sir  John  Cradock,  keeping  the 
British  concentra'ted  at  Lumiar  and  Saccavem,  waited 
fnv  the  enemy  to  develope  his  plans,  and,  in  the  mean 
time,  endeavoured  to  procure  the  necessary  equipments 
for  an  active  campaign.  He  directed  magazines  to  be 
formed  at  Coimhra  and  Abrantes;  urged  the  regency 
to  exertion,  took  measures  to  raise  money,  and  des- 
patched officers  to  Barhary  to  procure  mules.  But  while 
t!:us  engas'ed,  intelligence  arrived  that  Victor  having 
suddenly  forced  the  passage  of  the  Tagus  at  Almaraz, 
was  in  pursuit  of  Cuesta  on  the  road  to  IMerida;  that 
Soult.  having  crossed  the  Minho,  and  defeated  Romana 
and  Silveira,  was  within  a  few  leagues  of  Oporto,  and 
that  Lapisse  had  made  a  demonstration  of  assaulting 
Ciudad  Rodrigo.  The  )unta  of  Oporto  now  veliement- 
ly  demanded  aid  from  the  regency,  and  the  latter,  al- 
though not  much  inclined  to  the  bishop's  party,  pro- 
posed that  sir  John  Cradock  uniting  a  part  of  the  Brit- 
ish forces  to  the  Portuguese  troops  under  marshal  Be- 
resford,  should  march  to  the  succour  of  Oporto.*  Be- 
resford  was  averse  to  trust  the  Portuguese  under  his 
immeriiate  command,  among  the  disorderly  multitude 
of  that  city,  but  he  thought  the  whole  of  the  British 
army  should  move  in  a  body  to  Leiria,  and  from  thence 
either  push  on  to  Oporto,  or  return,  according  to  the 
events  that  might  occur  in  the  latter  town,  and  he  en- 
deavoured to  persuade  Cradock  to  follow  this  plan. 

It  was  doubtful,  he  said,  if  V^ictor  and  Soult  intend- 
ed to  co-operate  in  a  single  plan,  but,  on  the  supposi- 
tion that  it  was  so,  he  considered  it  essential  to  drive 
back  ir  to  overcome  one  before  the  other  could  come 
to  his  assistance.  Victor  was  then  in  pursuit  of  Cu- 
esta;  if  he  continued  that  pursuit,  it  must  be  to  enter 
Seville,  or  to  cripple  his  opponent  previous  to  the  in- 
vasion of  Portugfal ;  in  either  case  he  would  be  in  the 
Sierra  Morena  before  he  could  hear  of  the  march  from 
Leiria,  and,  as  Cradock  had  daily  intelligence  of  his 
movements,  there  would  be  full  time  to  relieve  Oporto, 


»ir  John  Cradock's  Correip:c'Jence.  MSS. 


and  return  again  to  the  defence  of  Lisbon.  If,  how- 
ever, Soult  depended  on  the  co-operation  tf  Victor,  h» 
would  probably  remain  on  the  right  of  the  Duero  until 
the  other  was  on  the  Tagus,  and  Lapisse  also  would 
be  contented  for  the  present  with  capturing  Ciudad 
Rodrigo  and  Almeida. 

This  unsound  reasoning  did  not  weigh  with  sir  John 
Cradock,  who  resolved  to  preserve  his  central  position, 
covering  the  capital  at  such  a  distance  as  to  preclude 
the  danger  of  being  cut  off  from  it  by  one  army  whilt* 
he  was  engaged  with  another.  Portugal,  (he  ob- 
served,) was  in  a  state  of  anarchy  equally  incompatible 
with  firm  resistance  and  rapid  movements ;  the  pea- 
santry were  tumultuous  and  formidable  to  everybody 
but  the  enemy  ;  Beresford  bin  self  acknowledged  that 
the  regular  forces  were  mutinous,  disregardino-  their 
officers,  choosing  when  and  where  to  rest,  when  to 
fight,  when  to  remain  in  quarters,  and  altrgether  unfit 
to  be  trusted  within  the  circle  of  the  Oporto  mischief. 
The  British  troops,  therefore,  were  the  only  solid  re- 
source; but  they  were  too  few  to  divide,  and  must  act 
in  a  body,  or  not  at  all.  Lisbon  and  Oporto  were  the 
enemy's  objects;  which  was  it  most  desirable  to  pro- 
tect]— the  former  was  of  incomparably  greater  impor- 
tance than  the  latter;  the  first  was  near,  the  second 
two  hundred  miles  off;  and,  although  the  utmost  ex- 
ertions had  been  made,  the  army  was  not  yet  equipped 
for  an  active  campaign.  The  troops  were  ill-clothed, 
and  wanted  shoes ;  the  artillery  was  unhorsed  ;  the 
commissariat  possessed  only  a  fourth  part  of  the  trans- 
port necessary  for  the  conveyance  of  provisions  and 
ammunition,  and  no  activity  could  immerliately  supply 
these  deficiencies,  inasmuch  as  some  of  the  articles  re- 
quired were  not  to  be  had  in  the  country  ;  to  obtain 
others,  the  interference  of  the  regency  was  necessary, 
but  hitherto  all  applications  to  that  quarter  had  been 
without  any  effect.  Was  it  wise  then  to  commence 
offensive  operations  in  the  north  ?  The  troops  of  Soult 
and  Lapisse  united  were  estimated  at  thirty  thousand 
men.  of  which  above  five  thousand  were  cavalry;  the 
British  could  only  bring  fifteen  guns  and  twelve  thou- 
sand men,  of  all  arms,  into  the  field  ;  yet,  if  they 
marched  with  the  avowed  intention  of  relieving  Oporto, 
they  must  accomplish  it,  or  be  dishonoured  ! 

Was  it  consistent  with  reason  to  march  two  hundred 
miles  in  search  of  a  combat,  which  the  very  state  of 
Oporto  would  render  it  almost  impossible  to  gain,  and 
for  an  object  perhaps  already  lost  1  Suspicion  was  alive 
every  where,  if  Oporto  was  already  taken,  the  army 
must  come  back  ;  that  would  be  the  signal  for  fresh 
tumults — for  renewed  cries  that  the  country  was  to  be 
abandoned  ;  Lisbon  would  instantly  be  in  a  state  of  in- 
surrection, and  would  be  even  more  formidable  to  the 
British  than  the  enemy ;  besides,  it  was  impossible  to 
reckon  upon  Cuesta's  aid  in  keeping  Victor  employed. 
He  was  personally  inimical  to  the  English,  and  his 
principal  object  was  to  gain  time  for  the  increase  and 
discipline  of  his  own  force.  Victor  was  apparently 
pursuing  Cuesta,  but  his  parties  had  already  appeared 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Badajos,and  there  was  nothing 
but  a  weak  Portuguese  garrison  in  Elvas  to  impede  his 
march  through  the  Alemtejo.  To  cover  Lisbon  and 
the  Tagus  was  the  wisest  plan  ;  fixed  in  some  favourable 
position,  at  a  prudent  distance  from  that  capital,  he. 
could  wail  for  the  reinforcements  he  expected  from 
England.  He  invited  the  Portuguese  troops  to  unite 
with  him  ;  a  short  time  would  suffice  to  establish  sub- 
ordination ;  and  then  the  certainty  that  the  capital 
could  not  be  approached,  except  in  the  face  of  a  really 
formidable  army,  would  not  only  keep  the  enemy  in 
check,  but,  by  obliging  him  to  collect  in  greater  num- 
bers for  the  attempts,  would  operate  as  a  diversion  in 
favour  of  Spain. 

The  general  soundness  of  this  reasoning  is  apparent, 
and   it  must  not  '  <  objected  to  sir  John  Cradock  that 


164 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[It  OK    VI. 


he  disretjardod  the  value  of  a  central  position,  which 
mitrht  enable  him  to  forestall  the  enemy  ;  if  the  latter 
should  march  on  his  flank  ajrainst  Lisbon,  the  diffiriilty 
of  ohiaiiiiiia  true  intellijjpnce  from  the  natives  and  his 
own  want  of  cavalry  rendered  it  utterly  unsafe  fcr  him 
to  divide  his  army,  or  to  trust  it  any  distance  from  the 
capital.  Marshal  Bert-sford's  plan,  founded  on  the 
supposition  that  Cradock  could  encrapre  Soult  at  Oporto, 
and  yet  quit  him  and  return  at  his  pleasure  to  Lisbon, 
if  Victor  advanced,  was  certainly  fallacious;  the  ad- 
vantages resied  on  conjectural,  the  disadvantasjes  on 
fiosilive  data :  it  was  conjectural  that  they  could  re- 
ieve  Oporto,  it  was  positive  that  they  would  endantrer 
Lisbon.  The  proposition  was,  however,  not  made  up- 
on partial  views  ;  but  at  this  period,  other  men,  less 
qualified  to  advise,  pestered  sir  John  Cradock  with 
projects  of  a  different  stamp,  yet  deservinor  of  notice, 
as  showintr  that  the  mania  for  errand  operations,  which 
I  have  before  marked  as  the  malady  of  the  time,  was 
still  rarriuCT. 

To  make  a  suitable  use  of  the  British  army  was  the 
object  of  all  these  projectors,  but  there  was  a  marvellous 
variety  in  their  plans.  The  regency  desired  that  the 
Porlucruese  and  British  troops  should  co-operate  for 
the  rtlief  of  Oporto,  and  yet  protect  Lisbon,  objects 
which  were  incompatible.  Beresford  advised  that  the 
whole  Encrlish  army  should  march.  The  bishop  was 
importunate  to  have  some  British  soldiers  placed  under 
his  command,  and  he  recalled  sir  Robert  Wilson  to 
the  defence  of  Oporto.  It  appeared  reasonable  that 
the  lecrion  should  defend  the  city  in  which  it  was  rais- 
ed, but  ^Ir.  Frere  wrote  from  Seville,  that  Sir  Robert 
would  do  better  to  remain ;  he  therefore  accepted 
Spanish  rank,  and  refusing  obedience  to  the  prelate's 
orders,  retained  his  troops.  The  retrency,  glad  of  the 
opportunity,  approved  of  this  proceeding,  and  adopted 
the  legion  as  a  national  corps.  Meanwhile  Romana 
was  earnest  with  Cradock  for  money,  and  wanted  to 
have  a  thous-ii.d  British  soldiers  sent  to  aid  the  insur- 
rection at  Vig-o;  but  at  the  same  time,  Mr.  Frere,  and 
colonel  D'Urban,  a  corresponding  oflicer  placed  by 
Cradock  at  Cuesta's  head-quarters,  proposed  other 
plans  of  higher  pretensions.* 

Zaragozi,  said  the  latter,  has  fallen,  and  ten  thou- 
sand French  troops  being  thus  released,  are  marching 
towards  Toledo :  this  is  the  moment  to  give  a  fatal 
blow  to  Mrr-hal  Victor!  It  is  one  of  those  critical 
occasions  that  seldom  recur  in  war!  In  a  day  or  two 
eir  Robert  Wilson  will  be  on  the  Tietar  with  two  thou- 
sand five  hundred  men  ;f  augment  his  force  with  a  like 
number  r  f  Portuguese,  who  may  be  drawn  from  So- 
breira,  Idanha.  and  Salvatierra,  he  shall  thus  turn  the 
right  and  rear  of  Victor's  army,  and  his  movement  can- 
not be  interrupted  by  the  French  force  now  at  Sala- 
manca and  Alva,  because  the  communication  from 
thence  to  the  Tagus  by  the  passes  of  Banos  and  Tor- 
nevecas  is  sealed  up;  while  sir  Robert  Wilson  thus 
gets  in  the  rear  of  ^'ictor  with  five  thousand  men,  Cu- 
esta,  with  twelve  thousand  infantry  and  two  thousand 
cavalry,  shall  attack  the  latter  in  front;  a  matter  of 
easy  execution,  because  Cuesta  can  throw  a  pontoon 
bridge  over  the  Tagus,  near  Almaraz,  in  an  hour  and 
a  half,  and  the  conde  de  Cartoajal,  who  is  at  Manzan- 
ares  in  La  Mancha,  with  ten  thousand  infantry  and 
two  thousand  horse,  will  keep  Sebastiani  in  check. 
The  hope  is  great,  the  danger  small,  and  if  a  few 
British  troops  can  he  added  to  the  force  on  the  Tietar, 
the  success  will  be  infallible! 

There  were,  however,  some  grave  objections  to  this 
infallible  plan.     General  Cuesta  was  near  Almaraz, 


*  Sir  J.  Cracock's  Correspoodence,  MSS. 


t  Ibid. 


sir  John  Cradock  was  at  Lisbon,  and  sir  Robert  VVii 
son  was  at  (Jiudad  Rodrigo.  Their  circuitous  line  of 
correspondence  was  thus  above  four  hundred  miles 
long,  and  it  is  not  very  clear  how  the  combination  was 
to  be  effected  with  that  rapidity,  which  was  said  to  be 
essential  to  the  success;  neither  is  it  very  evident, 
that  operations  to  be  combined  at  such  a  distance,  and 
executed  by  soldiers  of  different  nations,  would  have 
been  successful  at  all.  On  the  one  side,  twenty  thou- 
sand raw  Portuguese  and  Spanish  levies  were  to  act 
on  double  external  lines  of  operation  ;  on  the  other, 
twenty-five  thousand  French  veterans  waited  in  a  cen- 
tral position,  with  their  front  and  flanks  covered  by  the 
Tagus  and  tlie  Tietar.  In  such  a  contest  it  is  possible 
to  conceive  a  different  result  from  that  anticipated  by 
colonel  d'Urban. 

Mr.  Frere's  plans  M'ere  not  less  extensive,  or  less 
sanguine.  When  his  project  for  assisting  Catalonia 
had  been  frustrated,  by  the  recal  of  general  Mackenzie 
from  Cadiz,  he  turned  his  attention  to  the  north.  Soult, 
he  wrote  to  sir  John  Cradock,  tired  of  the  resistance 
he  hiis  met  with,  will  probably  desist  from  his  <•  uuac- 
coiinfable  priiject  of  enhring  Portugal,  and  nccufying 
Gallicia  at  the  same  time.''  Let  the  British  army,  tiiere- 
fore,  make  a  push  to  drive  the  enemy  out  of  Salamanca, 
and  the  neighbouring  towns,  while  the  Asturians,  on 
their  side,  shall  take  possession  of  Leon  and  Astorga, 
and  thus  open  the  communication  between  the  northern 
and  southern  provinces.  Fearing,  however,  that  if  this 
proposal  should  not  be  adopted,  the  English  general 
might  be  at  a  loss  for  some  enterprise,  Mr.  Frere  also 
recommended  that  the  British  army  should  march  to 
Alcantara,  and  that  the  fortieth  regiment,  which  hither- 
to he  had  retained  at  Seville,  contrary  to  sir  John 
Cradock's  wishes,  should  join  it  at  that  place ;  and 
then,  said  he,  the  whole  operating  by  the  northern 
bank  of  the  Tagus,  may,  in  concert  with  Cuesta, 
'  heat  the  French  out  of  Toledo,  and  consequently  out  of 
Madrid.'' 

Now,  with  respect  to  the  first  of  these  plans,  Soult 
never  had  the  intention  of  holding  Callicia,  which  was 
Marshal  Ney's  province;  but  he  did  propose  to  pene- 
trate into  Portugal,  and  he  was  not  likely  to  abandon 
his  purpose,  because  the  only  army  capalde  of  oppos- 
ing him  was  quitting  that  kingdom,  and  making  a  '/;jisA' 
of  four  hundred  miles  to  drive  Lapisse  out  of  Salaman- 
ca ;  moreover,  the  Asturians  were  watched  by  general 
Bonnet's  division  on  one  side,  and  by  Kellerman  on 
the  other,  and  the  fifth  corps,  not  ten  but  fifteen  thou- 
sand strong,  having  quitted  Zaragoza,  were  at  this  time 
in  the  V'alladolid  country,  close  to  Leon  and  Astorga.* 

With  respect  to  the  operations  by  the  line  of  the 
Tagus,  which  were  to  drive  Jose])h  out  of  Madrid,  and 
consequently  to  attract  the  attention  of  all  the  French 
corps,  it  is  to  be  observed,  that  sir  John  ('radock  could 
command  about  twelve  thousand  men,  Cuesta  sixteen 
thousand,  Cartoajal  twelve  thousand,  making  a  total 
of  forty  thousand.  But  Soult  had  twenty  three  thou- 
sand, Lapisse  nine  thousand,  Victor  was  at  the  head 
of  twenty-five  thousand,  Sebastiani  could  dispose  of 
fifteen  thousand,  Mortier  of  a  like  number,  the  King's 
guards  and  the  garrison  of  Madrid  were  twelve  thou- 
sand, making  a  total  of  nearly  a  hundred  thousand  men. 
Hence  while INlr.  Frere  and  colonel  D'Urban,  confiding 
in  Soult's  inactivity,  were  thus  plotting  the  destruction 
of  Victor  and  Sebastiani,  the  first  marshal  stormed 
Oporto;  the  second,  unconscious  of  his  danger,  crossea 
the  Tagus,  and  defeated  Cuesta's  army  at  Medellin, 
and  at  the  same  moment  Sebastian)  routed  Cartoajal'a 
at  Ciudad  Real. 


*  Muster  rolls  of  the  Freoch  Vrniy,  MSS 


1809.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


165 


BOOK    VII. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Csruna  and  Ferrol  su-iendtr  to  Soult — He  is  orJered,  by  the 
emperor,  to  invade  Portugal — 7^he  first  corps  is  directed  to 
aid  tills  operation — 5oult  goes  to  St.  .'aoo — Distressed  state 
of  the  second  coips — Operations  of  Roniana  and  state  of 
Gallicia — Souk  commences  his  march — Arrives  on  the  Min- 
ho — Occupies  Tuv,  Vigo,  and  Guardia — Drags  large  boats 
over  land  from  GuarJia  to  Campo  Saucos — Attempts  to  pass 
the  Minho — Is  repulsed  b}'  the  Poituguese  peasantr}" — Im- 
portance of  th  s  repulse — Soult  chaiii^es  his  plan — INI^rches 
on  Orensp — -Defeats  tlie  insurgents  at  Franquera,  at  Ribida- 
via,  and  in  the  valley  of  the  Avia — Leaves  his  artillery  and 
stores  in  Tuy — Defeats  the  Spanish  insurgents  in  several 
places,  and  prepares  to  invade  Portugal — Defenceless  state 
of  the  northern  provinces  of  that  kingdom — Bernadim  Friere 
advances  to  the  Cavado  river — Silveira  advances  to  Chaves — 
Concerts  operations  with  R«niana — Disputes  between  the 
Po)tuguese  and  Spanish  troops — Ignorance  of  the  generals. 

PIaving  described  the  unhappy  condition  of  Portup-al 
and  (riven  a  general  view  of  the  transactions  in  Spain, 
I  shall  now  resume  the  narrative  of  Soult's  operations; 
thus  followintr  the  main  stream  of  action;  for  the  other 
marshals  were  appointed  to  tranquillize  the  provinces 
already  overrun  by  the  emperor,  or  to  war  down  the 
remnants  of  the  Spanish  armies,  hut  the  duke  of  Dal- 
niatia's  task  was  to  push  onward  in  the  course  of  con- 
quest. Nor  is  it  difficult  to  trace  him  through  the  re- 
mainder of  a  cam|)aifrn,  in  which,  traversing  all  the 
northern  provinces,  fighting  in  succession  the  armies 
of  three  different  nations,  and  enduring  every  vicissi- 
tude of  war,  he  left  broad  marks  of  his  career,  and  cer- 
tain proofs  that  he  was  an  able  commander  and  of  a 
haughty  resolution  in  adversity. 

It  has  been  observed,  in  a  former  part  of  this  work, 
that  the  inhabitants  of  Corufia  honourably  maintained 
their  town  until  the  safety  of  the  fleet  which  carried 
sir  .John  Moore's  army  from  the  Spanish  shores  was 
secure;  they  were  less  faithful  to  their  own  cause. 
Corura  might  have  defied  irregular  operations,  and 
several  weeks  must  have  elapsed  before  a  suflicient 
battering  train  could  have  been  brought  up  to  that  cor- 
ner of  the  Peninsula;  yet,  a  s-hort  negotiation  sufficed 
to  put  the  French  in  possession  of  the  place  on  the 
19th  of  .lanuary,  and  the  means  of  attacking  Ferrol 
were  immediately  organized  from  the  resources  of 
Conina. 

The  harbour  of  Ferrol  contained  eight  sail  of  the 
line,  and  some  smaller  ships  of  war.  The  fortifications 
were  regular,  there  was  an  abundance  of  artillery,  am- 
munition, and  a  garrison  of  seven  or  eight  thousand 
men,  consistii'g  of  soldiers,  sailors,  citizens,  and  armed 
countrymen,  but  their  chiefs  were  treacherous.  After 
a  comnioticn  in  which  the  admiral  Obregon  was  ar- 
rested, his  successor  Melgarejo  surrendered  upon  some- 
what better  terms  than  those  granted  to  Coruiia,  and 
thus  in  ten  days  were  reduced  two  regular  fortresses, 
which  with  more  resolution  might  have  occupied  tiiirty 
thousand  men  for  several  months. 

W  bile  yet  before  Ferrol  the  duke  of  Dalmatia  re- 
ceived the  following  despatch,  prescribing  the  imme- 
diate invasion  of  Portugal  : — * 

"  Before  his  departure  from  this  place,  (Valladolid,) 
the  emperor  foreseeing  the  embarkation  of  the  English 
army,  drew  up  instructions  for  the  ultimate  operations 

*  S.  MSS. 


of  the  duke  of  Elchingen  and  yourself.  !!(>  orders 
that  when  the  English  army  shall  be  embarked  you 
will  march  upon  Oporto  with  your  four  divisions,  that 
is  to  say,  the  division  of  Merle,  Mermet,  Delahorde, 
and  Heudelet,  the  dragoons  of  Lorge,  and  La  Hous- 
saye,  and  Franceschi's  light  cavalry,  with  llie  excep- 
tion of  two  regiments  that  his  majesty  desires  you  to 
turn  over  to  the  duke  of  Elchingen,  in  order  to  make 
up  his  cavalry  to  four  regiments." 

"Your  '■  corps  cfarmee,''  composed  of  seventeen  regi- 
ments of  infantry  and  ten  regiments  of  cavalry,  is  des- 
tined for  the  expedition  of  Portugal,  in  combination 
with  a  movement  the  duke  of  Belluno  is  going  to  effect. 
General  Loison,  some  engineers,  staff"  and  commissariat 
offi(rers,  and  thirteen  Portuguese,  all  of  whom  belonged 
to  the  army  formerly  in  Portugal  under  the  duke  of 
Abrantes,  have  received  instructions  to  join  you  im- 
mediately, and  you  can  transmit  your  orders  for  them 
to  Lugo.  This  is  the  '2Ist  of  Januar}',  and  it  is  sup- 
posed you  cannot  be  at  Oporto  before  the  5th  of  Febru- 
ary, or  at  Lisbon  before  the  16th.  Thus,  at  that  time, 
namely,  when  you  shall  be  near  Lisbon,  the  '■corps 
cfarmee'  of  the  duke  of  Belluno,  composed  of  his  own 
three  divisions,  of  the  division  Leval,  and  of  ten  or 
twelve  regiments  of  cavalry,  forming  a  body  of  thirty 
thousand  men,  will  be  at  Merida,  to  make  a  strong 
diversion  in  favour  of  your  movement,  and  in  such  a 
mode,  as  that  he  can  push  the  head  of  a  column  upon 
Lisbon  if  you  find  any  great  obstacles  to  your  en- 
trance, which  it  is,  however,  presumed  will  not  be  the 
case." 

"General  T;apisse's  division  of  infantry,  which  is 
at  this  moment  in  Salamatioa,  and  general  IMaupetit's 
brigade  of  cavalry,  will,  when  you  shall  be  at  Oporto, 
receive  the  duke  of  Islria's  orders  to  march  upon  ('iudad 
Rodrigo  and  Abrantes,  where  this  division  will  again 
be  under  the  command  of  the  duke  of  Eelliino,  who 
will  send  it  instructions  to  join  him  at  Merida  :  I  let 
you  know  this  that  you  may  he  aware  of  the  march  of 
Lapisse,  on  your  left  flank,  as  far  as  Abrantes.  Sucft 
are  the  last  orders  I  am  charged  to  give  you  in  the 
name  of  the  emperor :  you  will  have  to  report  to  the 
king  and  to  receive  his  orders  for  your  ulterior  opera- 
tions. The  emperor  has  unlimited  confidence  in  your 
talents  for  the  fine  expedition  that  he  has  charged  you 
with." 

ALEXANDER,  Prince  nf  Neufchaiel,  ^c. 

It  was  further  intended,  by  Napoleon,  that  when 
Lisbon  fell,  marshal  Victor  should  invade  Andalusia, 
upon  the  same  line  as  Dupont  had  moved  the  year  be- 
fore;  and  like  Dupont,  he  was  to  have  been  assisted 
by  a  division  of  the  second  corps,  which  was  to  cross 
the  Guadiana  and  march  on  Seville.  Meanwhile,  the 
duke  of  Elchingi^n.  whose  corps,  reinforced  by  two 
regiments  of  cavalry  and  by  the  arrival  of  strag- 
glers, amounted  to  near  twenty  thousnnd  men,  wa.s  to 
maintain  Gallicia,  confine  tiie  Aslurians  within  their 
own  frontier  line,  and  keep  open  the  crininunicalion 
with  the  second  corps.  Thus,  nominally  f  yghty  thou- 
sand, and  in  reality  sixty  thousand  n:en,  were  disposed 
for  the  conquest  nf  l.i.sbon,  and  in  such  a  maimer  that 
forty  thousand  would,  after  that  had  been  accomplished, 
have  poured  down  upon  Seville  and  Cadiz,  at  a  time 


IRO 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  VII. 


■when  neither  Portugal  nor  Andalusia  were  capable  of 
making  any  resistance.  It  remains  to  shew  from  what 
causes  this  nufrhty  preparation  failed. 

The  gross  numbers  of  the  second  corps  amounted  to 
forty-seven  thousand  ;*  but  general  Bonnet's  division 
remained  always  at  St.  Ander,  in  observation  of  the 
eastern  Astiirian  frontier,  eight  thousand  were  detached 
for  the  service  of  the  general  communications,  and  the 
remainder  had,  since  the  9th  of  November,  been  fight- 
ing and  marching  incessantly  among  barren  and  snowy 
mountains;  hence,  stragglers  were  numerous,  and  twelve 
thousand  men  were  in  hospital.  The  force,  actually 
under  arms,  did  not  exceed  twenty-five  thousand  men, 
worn  down  with  fatiijue,  barefooted,  and  without  am- 
munition. 'I'hey  had  outstripped  their  commissariat, 
the  military  chest  was  not  come  up,  the  draft  animals 
were  reduced  in  number,  and  extenuated  by  fatigue, 
the  gun-carriages  were  shaken  by  continual  usage,  the 
artillery  pare  was  still  in  the  rear;-)"  and  as  the  sixth 
corps  had  not  yet  passed  Lugo,  two  divisions  of  the 
second  corps  were  required  to  hold  Coruna  and  Ferrol. 
Literally  to  obey  the  emperor's  orders  was  consequent- 
ly impossible,  wherefore  Soult  taking  quarters  at  St. 
Jago  di  Compostella,  proceeded  tore-organize  his  army. 

Ammunition  was  fabricated  from  the  loose  powder 
found  in  Corufa;  shoes  were  obtained  partly  by  re- 
quisition, partly  from  the  Spanish  magazines,  filled  as 
they  were  with  stores  supplied  by  England  ;  the  artil- 
lery were  soon  refitted  and  the  greatest  part  of  the 
stragglers  were  rallied.  In  six  days,  the  marshal 
thought  himself  in  a  condition  to  obey  his  orders,  and, 
although  his  troops  were  still  suffering  from  fatigue  and 
privation,  marched,  on  the  first  of  February,  with  nine- 
teen thousand  infantry,  four  thousand  cavalry,  and  fifty- 
eight  pieces  of  artillery  ;  but,  to  understand  his  opera- 
tions, the  state  of  Gallicia  and  the  previous  movements 
of  Romana  must  be  described. 

When  the  Spanish  army,  on  the  2d  of  January, 
crossed  the  line  of  sir  John  Moore's  march,  it  was  al- 
ready in  a  state  of  disorganization.  Romana,  with  the 
cavalry,  phmged  at  once  into  the  deep  valleys  of  the 
Syl  and  the  Minho,  but  the  artillery  and  a  part  of  his 
infantry  were  overtaken  and  cut  up  by  Franceschi's 
cavalry ;  the  remainder  wandered  in  bands  from  one 
place  to  another,  or  dispersed  to  seek  food  and  shelter 
among  the  villages  in  the  mountains.  General  Men- 
dizabel,  with  a  small  body,  halted  in  the  Val  des  Orres, 
and  placing  guards  at  the  Puente  de  Bibey,  a  point  of 
singular  strength  of  defence,  he  purposed  to  cover  the 
approaches  to  Orense  on  tliat  side;  but  Romana  him- 
self, after  wan.lering  for  a  time,  collected  two  or  three 
thousand  men,  and  took  post,  on  the  15th,  at  Toabado, 
a  village  about  twenty  miles  from  Lugo.  Meanwhile 
Ney  arrived  at  that  place,  having  detached  some 
cavalry  from  Villa  Franca  to  scour  the  valleys  on  his 
left,  and  also  -sent  Marchand'a  division  by  the  road  of 
Orense  to  St.  Jago  and  ("oruna.  Marchand  dispersed 
Mendizabel'b  troops  on  the  17th,  and  after  halting  some 
days  at  Orense.  where  he  established  an  hospital,  con- 
tinued his  march  to  St.  Jago. 

The  d(  feat  of  Meudizabel  and  the  subsequent  move- 
ments of  Marc'iand's  division  completed  tlie  dispersion 
of  Romana's  army  ;  the  greatest  part  throwing  away 
their  arms,  returned  to  their  homes,  and  he  himself, 
with  his  cavalry,  and  the  few  infantry  that  would  fol- 
low him,  crossed  the  Minho,  passed  the  mountains,  and, 
descending  into  the  valley  of  the  Tamega,  took  refuge, 
on  the  21st,  at  Oimbra,  a  place  on  the  frontier  of  Por- 
tugal, close  to  Mfiiilercy,  where  there  was  a  small  ma- 
gazine, collected  for  the  use  of  sir  John  Moore's  army. 
In  this  obscure  situation,  unheeded  by  the  French,  he 
entered  intc  comnmnication  with  the  Portuguese  gen- 
eral Silveira,  and  with  sir  John  Cradock,  demanding 

•   Mii«tPr  roll"  of  the  French  army.  MSS. 

f  S.  Juunial  oT  Upciutioiiii  of  tbe  necoud  corpi,  MSS. 


money  and  arms  from  the  latter;  he  endeavoured  also 
to  reassemble  a  respectable  body  of  troops,  but  Blake 
and  other  officers  deserted  him,  and  these  events  and 
the  o-eneral  want  of  patriotic  spirit  drew  from  him  the 
foUowino-  observation  : — "  I  know  not  wherein  the  pa- 
"  triotism,  so  loudly  vaunted,  consists  ;  any  reverse, 
"  any  mishap,  prostrates  the  minds  of  these  people, 
"  and,  thinking  only  of  saving  their  own  persons,  they 
"  sacrifice  their  country  and  compromise  their  com- 
"  mander." 

The  people  of  Gallicia,  poor,  scattered,  living  hard- 
ly, and,  like  all  mountaineers,  very  tenacious  of  the 
little  property  they  possess,  disregarded  political  events 
which  did  not  immediately  and  visibly  aflect  their  in- 
terests. They  were,  willi  the  exception  of  those  of 
the  sea-port  towns,  but  slightly  moved  by  the  aggres- 
sion of  the  French,  as  long  as  that  aggression  did  not 
extend  to  their  valleys,  and  hence,  at  first,  they  treated 
the  English  and  French  armies  alike.  Sir  David 
Baird's  division,  in  its  advance,  paid  generously  for 
supplies,  yet  it  was  regarded  with  jealousy  and  de- 
fniuded.  Soult's  and  Moore's  armies,  passing  like  a 
whirlwind,  were  beheld  with  terror,  and  the  people 
fled  from  both.  'I'he  British  and  German  troops  that 
marched  to  Vigo  being  conducted  without  judgement, 
were  licentious,  and  as  their  number  was  small,  the 
people  murdered  stragglers,  and  showed  without  dis- 
guise their  natural  hatred  of  strangers.  On  several 
occasions,  parties  sent  to  collect  cars  for  the  convey- 
ance of  the  sick,  had  to  sustain  a  skirmish  before  the 
object  could  be  obtained,  and  five  officers,  misled  by 
a  treacherous  guide,  were  scarcely  saved  from  death 
by  the  interference  of  an  old  man,  whose  exertions, 
however,  were  not  successful  until  one  of  the  officers 
had  been  severely  wounded  in  the  head.  Ou  the  othei 
hand,  general  Marchand  discovered  so  little  symptoms 
of  hostility,  during  his  march  to  Orense,  that  he  left 
his  hospital  at  that  town  without  a  guard,  undtjr  the 
joint  care  of  Spanish  and  French  surgeons,  and  the  du- 
ties of  humanity  were  faithfully  discharged  by  the  for- 
mer without  hindrance  from  the  people. 

This  quiescence  did  not  last  long:  the  French  gen- 
erals were  obliged  to  subsist  their  troops,  by  requisi- 
tions extremely  onerous  to  a  people  whose  property 
chiefly  consisted  of  cattle.  The  many  abuses  and  ex- 
cesses which  always  attend  this  mode  of  supplying  an 
army  soon  created  a  spirit  of  hatred  that  Romana  la- 
boured incessantly  to  increase,  otid  he  was  successful ; 
for,  although  a  bad  general,  he  possessed  intelligence 
and  dexterity  suited  to  the  task  of  exciting  a  popula- 
tion. Moreover,  the  monks  and  friars  laboured  to  the 
same  purpose;  and,  while  Romana  denounced  death 
to  those  who  refused  to  take  arms,  the  clergy  menaced 
eternal  perdition;*  and  all  this  was  necessary,  for  the 
authority  of  the  supreme  junta  was  only  acknowledged 
as  a  matter  of  necessity — not  of  liking.  Gallicia,  al- 
though apparently  calm,  was,  theref  ire,  ripe  (or  a  gen- 
eral insurrection,  at  the  moment  when  the  duke  of 
Dalmatia  commenced  his  march  from  St.  Jago  di  Com- 
postella. 

From  that  town  several  roads  lead  to  the  Minho; 
the  principal  one  running  by  the  coast  line  crosses  the 
Ulla,  the  Umia,  the  Vedra,  and  the  Octaven,  and  pas- 
ses by  Pontevedra  and  Redondela,  to  'i'uy  a  dilapida- 
ted fortress,  situated  on  the  Spanish  side  of  the  Miuho. 
The  second,  crossing  the  same  rivers  near  to  their 
sources,  passes  by  the  Monte  de 'IVnteyros,  and,  enter- 
ing the  valley  of  the  Avia,  follows  the  course  of  that 
river  to  Ribidavia,  a  considerable  town,  situated  at  the 
confluence  of  the  Avia  with  the  Minho,  having  a  stone 
bridge  over  the  former,  and  a  barque  ferry  on  the  latter 
river.  The  third,  turning  the  sources  of  the  Avia.  con- 
nects St.  Jago  with  Orense,  and  from  Orense  another 
road  passes  along  the  right  bank   of  the  Minho,  and 


*  Roiuana's  Mauifesto. 


1809.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


167 


connects  the  towns  of  Ribidavia,  Salvatierra,  and  Tuy, 
ending  at  G  lardia,  a  small  fortress  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Minho. 

As  the  shortest  route  to  Oporto,  and  the  only  one 
convenient  for  the  artillery,  was  that  leading  by  Re- 
dondeia  and  Tuy,  and  from  thence  by  the  coast,  the 
duke  of  Ualmalia  formed  the  plan  of  passing  the  Minho 
between  Salvatierra  and  Guardia  ;*  wherefore  on  the 
1st  of  February,  Franceschi,  followed  by  the  other  di- 
visions in  succession,  took  the  Pontevedra  road,  and  at 
Redondela  defeated  a  small  body  of  insurgents,  and 
capturetl  four  pieces  of  cannon,  after  which  Vigo  sur- 
rendered to  one  of  his  detachments,  while  he  himself 
marched  upon  Tuy,  and  took  possession  of  that  town 
and  Guardia.  During  these  operations  La  Houssaye's 
dragoons,  quitting  Mellid,  had  crossed  the  Monte  de 
Tenteyro,  passed  tlirough  Ribidavia,  and  taken  posses- 
sion of  Salvatierra,  on  the  Minho;  and  general  Soult, 
the  marshal's  brother,  who  had  assembled  three  thou- 
sand stragglers  and  convalescents,  between  Astorga 
and  Carrion,  received  orders  to  enter  Portugal  by  Pu- 
ebla  de  Senabria,  and  thus  join  the  main  body. 

Tlie  rainy  season  was  in  full  torrent,  every  stream 
and  river  overflowed  its  banks,  the  roads  were  deep, 
and  the  difficuhy  of  procuring  provisions  great.  These 
things,  and  the  delivering  over  to  marshal  Ney  the 
administration  of  Ferrol  and  Coruna,  where  the  Span- 
ish government  and  Spanish  garrisons  were  not  only 
retained  but  paid  by  the  French,  delayed  the  rear  of 
the  army  so  long  that  it  was  not  until  the  15th  or  16th 
that  the  whole  of  the  divisions  were  assembled  on  the 
Minho,  between  Salvatierra,  Guardia,  and  Kedondela. 

'I'iie  ^linlio,  from  Melgacjo  to  the  mouth,  forms  the 
frontier  of  Portugal,  the  banks  on  both  sides  being 
guarded  by  a  number  of  fortresses,  originally  of  con- 
siderable strength,  but  at  this  time  all  in  a  dilapidated 
condition.  The  Spanish  fort  of  Guardia  fronted  the 
Portuguese  fort  of  Caminha;  Tuy  was  opposed  by 
^"alenza;  which  was  garrisoned,  and  the  works  in 
somewhat  a  better  condition  than  the  rest;  Lapella, 
Moncao,  and  Melga^o,  completed  the  Portuguese  line. 
But  the  best  defence  at  this  moment  was  the  Minho 
itself,  which,  at  all  times  a  considerable  river,  was 
now  a  broad  and  r.iging  flood,  and  the  Portuguese  or- 
denanzas  and  militia  who  were  in  arms  on  the  other 
side  had  removed  all  the  boats.  Nevertheless  Soult, 
after  exansining  the  banks  with  care,  decided  upon  pass- 
ing at  Campo  S-^ucos,  a  little  village  where  the  ground 
was  flatter,  more  favourable  and  so  close  to  Caminha 
that  the  army,  once  across,  could  easily  seize  that  place, 
and  the  same  day  reach  Viana  on  the  Lima,  from  whence 
to  Oporto  was  only  three  marches. 

To  attract  the  attention  of  the  Portuguese,  La  Hous- 
Paye,  who  was  at  Salvatierra,  spread  his  dragoons  along 
the  Minho,  and  attempted  to  push  small  parlies  across 
that  river,  above  MelgaQo  ;•  but  the  bulk  of  the  army 
was  concentrated  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Campo  Sau- 
cos,  and  a  detachment  seized  the  small  seaport  of 
Bayona,  in  the  rear.  A  division  of  infantry,  and  three 
hundred  French  marines  released  at  Corur:a  and  at- 
tached to  the  second  corps,  were  then  employed  to 
transport  some  large  fishing  boats  and  some  heavy  guns 
from  the  harbour  and  fort  of  Guardia  overland  to  (^am- 
po  Saucos.  This  was  effected  by  the  help  of  rollers 
over  more  than  two  miles  of  rugged  and  hilly  ground  ; 
it  was  a  work  of  infinite  labour,  but  from  the  11th  to 
the  15ih.  the  troops  toiled  unceasingly,  and  the  craft 
was  launched  in  a  small  lake  at  the  confluence  of  the 
'i'amuga  river  with  the  Minho. 

In  the  night  of  the  15th  the  heavy  guns  were  placed 
in  battery,  and  three  hundred  soldiers  being  embarked, 
the  boats  manned  by  the  marines,  dropped  silently 
down  the  Tamuga  into  the  Minho,  and  endeavoured  to 
reach  the  Portuguese  side  of  the  latter  river  duringr  the 


»  S.  Journal  of  Operations,  MSS. 


darkness  ;  yet  whether  from  the  violence  of  the  flood, 
or  w;?nt  of  skill  in  the  men,  the  landing  was  not  ef- 
fected before  day-break,  and  the  ordcnanza  fell  with 
great  fury  upon  the  first  who  got  on  shore,  the  fore- 
most being  all  elain,  the  others  pulled  back,  and  re- 
gained their  own  side  with  great  difficulty.  This  action 
was  infinitely  creditable  to  the  Portuguese,  and  it  had 
a  surprising  influence  on  the  issue  of  the  campaign.  It 
was  a  gallant  action,  because  it  might  reasonably  have 
been  expected  that  a  tumultuous  assemblage  of  half- 
armed  peasants,  collected  on  the  instant,  would  have 
been  dismayed  at  the  sight  of  many  boats  filled  with 
soldiers,  some  pulling  across  and  others  landing  under 
the  protection  of  a  heavy  battery  that  thundered  from 
the  midst  of  a  multitude  of  troops,  who  clustered  on 
the  heights,  orthronged  to  the  edge  of  the  opposite  bank 
in  eager  expectation.  It  was  an  event  of  leading  im- 
portance, inasmuch  as  it  baffled  an  attempt  that,  being 
successful,  would  have  ensured  the  tail  of  Oporto  by 
the  21st  of  February,  which  was  precisely  the  period 
when  general  Mackenzie's  division  being  at  Cadiz,  sir 
John  Cradock's  troops  were  reduced  to  almost  noth- 
ing; when  the  English  ministers  only  waited  for  an 
excuse  to  abandon  Portugal ;  when  tlie  people  of  that 
country  were  in  the  very  extremity  of  disorder;  when 
the  Portuguese  army  was  a  nullity,  and  when  the  re- 
gency was  evidently  preparing  to  receive  the  French 
with  submission.  It  was  the  period,  also,  when  Soult 
was  expected  to  be  at  Lisbon,  following  the  Emperor's 
orders,  and,  consequently,  Lapisse  and  Victor  could 
not  have  avoided  to  fulfil  their  part  of  the  plan  for  the 
subjugation  of  Portugal. 

The  duke  of  Dalmatia's  situation  was  now,  although 
not  one  of  imminent  danger,  extremely  embarrassing, 
and  more  than  ordinary  quickness  and  vigour  were  re- 
quired to  conduct  the  operations  with  success.  Posted 
in  a  narrow,  contracted  position,  he  was  hemmed  in  on 
the  left  by  the  Spanish  insurgents,  who  had  assembled 
immediately  after  La  Houssaye  passed  Orense,  and 
who,  being  possessed  of  a  very  rugged  and  difficult 
country,  were,  moreover,  supported  by  the  army  of  Ro- 
mana,  which  was  said  to  be  at  Orense  and  Ribidavia. 
In  the  French  general's  front  was  the  Minho,  broad, 
raging,  and  at  the  moment  impassable,  while  heavy 
rains  forbad  the  hope  that  its  waters  would  decrease. 
To  collect  sutficient  means  for  forcing  a  passage  would 
have  required  sixteen  days,  but  long  before  that  period, 
the  subsistence  for  the  army  would  have  entirely  failed, 
and  the  Portuguese,  being  alarmed,  would  have  greatly 
augmented  their  forces  on  the  opposite  bank.  There 
remained  then  only  to  retrace  his  steps  to  St.  Jago,  or 
breaking  through  the  Spanish  insurgents,  to  ascend 
the  Minho,  and  open  a  way  into  Portugal  by  seme 
other  route. 

Soult's  attempt  to  pass  the  river  had  been  baffled  on 
the  15th  of  February,  and  on  the  16th  he  was  in  full 
march  towards  Ribidavia  upon  a  new  line  of  operations, 
and  this  promptitude  of  decision  was  supported  by  an 
equally  prompt  execution.  La  Houssaye,  with  his 
dragoons,  quitted  Salvatierra,  and,  keeping  the  edgo  of 
the  Minho,  was  galled  by  the  fire  of  the  Portuguese 
from  the  opposite  bank,  and  before  evening,  he  twice 
broke  the  insurgent  bands,  and,  in  revenge  for  some 
previous  excesses  of  the  peasantry,  burnt  the  villages 
of  Morentan  and  Cobreira  :  meanwhile  the  main  body 
of  the  army,  passing  the  Tea  river,  at  Salvatierra  and 
Puente  d'Arcos,  marched,  by  successive  divisions, 
along  the  main  road  from  Toy  to  Ribidavia. 

Between  Franquera  and  Canizar  the  route  was  cut 
by  the  streams  of  the  Morenta  and  Noguera  rivers,  ana 
behind  those  torrents,  eight  hundred  Gallicians,  having 
barricadoed  the  bridges  and  repulsed  the  advanced 
parties  of  cavalry,  stood  upon  their  defence.  The  17th, 
at  daybreak,  the  leading  brigade  of  Heudelet's  division 
forced  the  passage,  and  pursued  the  .Spaniards  briskly, 
but,  when  within  a  short  distance  of  Ribidavia,  liie 


168 


NAPIER'S    PKNINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  VTT. 


latter  rallied  upon  eitjlit  or  ton  thousand  insurgents, 
arrayed  in  order  of  battle,  on  a  stronnr  hill,  covering 
the  approaches  to  that  to\vn.  At  this  sight  tf^e  ad- 
vanced guard  halted  until  the  remainder  of  the  d.  'sion 
and  a  brigade  of  cavalry  were  come  up.  and  then,  un- 
der the  personal  direction  of  Soult,  the  French  assailed 
and  drove  the  Gallicians,  fighting,  through  the  town 
and  across  the  Avia.  The  loss  of  the  vanquished  was 
very  considerable,  the  bodies  of  twenty  priests  were 
found  amongst  the  slain,  and  either  from  fear  or  patriot- 
ism, every  inhabitant  had  quitted  Kibidavia. 

The  ISth,  a  brigade  of  infantry  scouring  the  valley 
of  the  Avia,  dispersed  three  or  four  thousand  of  the  in- 
Furgents,  who  were  disposed  to  make  a  second  stand 
on  that  side;  a  second  brigade,  pushing  on  to  Barhan- 
tes,  seized  a  ferry-boat  on  the  Minho,  close  to  that 
place,  and  being  joined,  the  same  evening,  by  the  in- 
fantry who  had  scoured  the  vallej'  of  the  Avia,  and  b}' 
Franceschi's  cavalry,  on  the  19th  entered  Orense  in 
time  to  prevent  the  bridge  over  the  Minho  from  being 
rut;  La  Houssaye's  dragoons  then  took  post  at  Ma- 
side,  while  the  remainder  of  the  horse  and  Laborde's 
infantry  united  at  Ribidavia;  the  artillery  were  how- 
ever still  between  Tuy  and  Salvatierra,  under  the  pro- 
tection of  Merle's  and  ]\Iermet's  divisions.  Thus,  in 
three  days,  the  duke  of  Dalmatia  had,  with  admirable 
celerity  and  vigour,  extricated  his  army  from  a  con- 
tracted unfavourable  country,  strangled  a  formidable 
insurrection  in  its  birth,  and  at  the  same  time  opened 
a  fresh  line  of  communication  with  St.  Jago,  and  an 
»3asy  passage  into  Portugal. 

The  20th,  a  regiment  being  sent  across  the  Minho, 
by  the  ferries  of  Barbantes  and  Ribidavia,  defeated  the 
insurgents  of  the  left  bank,  advanced  to  the  Arroyo 
river,  and  took  post  on  the  heights  of  Merea.  The 
army  with  the  exception  of  the  division  guarding  the 
puns  was  concentrated  the  same  day  at  Orense;  but 
the  eiforts  of  the  artillery  had  been  baffled  by  the  dif- 
ficulties of  the  road  from  Tuy  to  Ribidavia,  and  this 
circumstance  viewed  in  conjunction  w'ith  the  precarious 
stale  of  the  communication,  a  daily  increasing  sick-list, 
and  the  number  of  small  detachments  required  to  pro- 
tect the  rear,  seemed  to  forbid  the  invasion  'of  Portugal. 
A  man  of  ordinary  genius  would  have  failed.  The 
duke  of  Dalmatia  with  ready  boldness  resolved  to  throw 
the  greatest  part  of  his  artillery  and  the  whole  of  his 
other  incumbrances  into  Tuy,  as  a  place  of  arms,  then 
lelinquishing  all  communication  with  Gallicia,  for  the 
moment,  to  maich  in  one  mass  directly  upon  Oporto; 
from  w  lence,  il  successful,  he  proposed  to  re-open  his 
commi  nication  with  Tuy,  by  the  line  of  the  coast,  re- 
cover 1  is  artillery  and  re-establish  a  regular  system  of 
operations. 

In  pursuance  of  this  resolution,  sixteen  of  the  light- 
est gims  and  six  ho\\itzers,  with  a  proportion  of  am- 
munition-waggons, were,  with  infinite  labour,  and  dif- 
ficulty, transported  to  Ribidavia;  the  remaining  thirl v- 
six  pieces  and  a  vast  pare  of  carriages,  carryinor  am- 
munition, and  hospital,  and  commissariat  stores,  were 
put  into  'I'uy,  where  general  La  Martiniere  was  left 
with  an  establishment  of  artillery  and  engineer  officers, 
a  garrison  of  five  hundred  men  fit  to  carry  arms,  and 
nine  hundred  sick.*  All  the  stragglers,  convalescents, 
and  detachments,  coming  from  St.  .Tago,  and  the  mili- 
tary chest,  which  was  still  in  the  rear,  guarded  by  six 
hundred  infantr)',  were  likewise  directed  upon  Tuy,  the 

(rates  were  shut,  and  La  Martiniere  was  abandoned  to 
lis  own  resources. 

The  men  in  hospital  at  Ribidavia  were  now  forward- 
ed to  Orense,  and  the  marshal's  quarters  were  esta- 
blished at  the  latter  town  on  the  '24th,  but  other  ob- 
stacles were  to  be  vanquished  before  the  army  could 
commence  the  march  into  Portugal.  The  gun-carriages 


*  S.  .lournal  of  operations,  MSS. 


had  been  so  shr.ken  in  the  transit  from  Tuy  to  Ribidavia 
that  three  days  were  required  to  repair  them  ;  it  was 
extremely  difficult  to  obtain  provisions,  and  numerous 
hands  of  the  peasants  were  still  in  arms,  nor  were  they 
quelled  until  coinbats  had  taken  place  at  (iurzo,  on  the 
Monte  Blanco,  in  the  Vnl  d'Ornef.,  and  up  the  valley 
of  Avia,  in  which  the  French  wasted  time,  Irst  men, 
and  expended  ammunition  that  could  not  he  replaced. 
Soult  endeavoured  to  soften  the  people's  feelings  hy 
kindness  and  soothing  proclamations:  and  as  he  en- 
forced a  strict  discipline  among  his  troops,  his  humane 
and  politic  demeanour,  joined  to  the  activity  of  his 
moveable  columns,  abated  the  fierceness  of  the  pea- 
santry.  The  iidiabitants  of  Ribidavia  soon  returned  to 
their  houses,  those  of  Orense  had  never  been  very  vio- 
lent, and  now  becoming  friendly,  even  lent  assistance 
to  procure  provisions.  It  was  not,  however,  an  easy 
task  to  restrain  the  soldiers  within  the  bounds  of  hu- 
manity: the  frequent  conbats,  the  assassination,  the 
torturing  of  isolated  men,  and  the  privations  endured, 
had  so  exasperated  the  French  troops,  that  the  utni'^st 
exertions  of  their  general's  authority  could  not  always 
control  their  revenge. 

While  the  duke  of  Dalmatia  was  thus  preparing  for 
a  formidable  inroad,  his  adversaries  were  a  prey  to  the 
most  horrible  anarchy.  The  bishop,  always  intent  to 
increase  his  own  power,  had  assembled  little  short  of 
fifty  thousand  armed  persons  in  Oporto,  and  coinmenced 
a  gigantic  line  of  entrenchment  on  the  hills  to  the  north- 
ward of  that  city.  This  worse  than  useless  labrur  so 
completely  occupied  all  persons,  that  the  defence  of 
the  strong  country  lying  between  the  Duero  and  the 
Minho  was  totally  neglected,  and  when  the  second 
corps  appeared  on  the  bank  of  the  latter  river,  the 
northern  provinces  were  struck  with  terror;  then  it  was 
that  the  people,  for  the  first  time,  understood  the  ex- 
tent of  their  danger ;  then  it  was  that  the  bishop,  arous- 
ed from  bis  intrigues,  became  sensible  that  the  French 
Avere  more  terrible  enemies  than  the  regency.  Once 
impressed  with  this  truth,  he  became  clamorous  for 
succour;  he  recalled  Sir  Robert  Wilson  from  the  Ague* 
da,  he.hurried  on  the  labour  cf  the  entrenchments,  and 
he  earnestly  pressed  sir  .John  Cradock  for  assistance, 
demanding  arms,  ammunition,  and  a  reinforcement  of 
British  soldiers.  Sir  Robert  Wilson,  as  I  have  alrendj 
related,  disregarded  his  orders  ;  but  the  British  gen- 
eral, although  he  refused  to  furnish  him  with  troops, 
supplied  him  with  arms,  and  very  ample  stores  of  pow- 
der, sending  artiller}'  and  engineer  officers  to  super- 
intend the  construction  of  the  defensive  works,  and  to 
aid  in  the  arrangements  for  a  reasonable  system  cf 
operations. 

The  people  were,  however,  become  too  headstrong 
and  licentious  to  be  controlled,  or  even  advised,  and 
the  soldiers  being  drawn  into  the  vortex  of  insubor- 
dination, universal  and  hopeless  confusion  prevailed. 
Don  Bernadim  Friere  was  the  legal  conmiander-in- 
chief  of  the  Entre  Minho  e  Douro,  hut  all  the  generals 
claimed  equal  and  independent  authorit}',  each  over  his 
own  force;  and  this  was,  perhaps,  a  matter  of  self- 
preservation,  for  genera,  and  traitor  were,  at  that  period, 
almost  synonymous  ;  to  r bey  the  orders  of  a  superior 
against  the  momentary  wishes  cf  the  multitude  was  to 
incur  instant  death.  Nor  were  there  men  wanting  who 
found  it  profitaltle  to  inflame  the  passions  of  the  mob, 
and  direct  its  blind  vengeance  against  innocent  persons 
adverse  to  the  prelate's  faction,  which  was  not  without 
opponents  even  in  Oporto. 

Such  was  the  unhappy  state  of  nffinirs.  when  the  un- 
disciplined gallantry  of  the  peasants,  baffling  the  efforts 
of  the  French  to  cress  the  Minho  at  C'ampo  Saucos, 
obliged  Soult  to  march  by  Orense.  A  ]inrt  of  the  regu- 
lar troops  were  immediately  sent  forward  to  the  f'avado 
river,  where  they  were  joined  by  the  nrdrnrrnza-zud  the 
militia  of  the  district,  but  all  in  a  state  of  fearful  insub- 


1809.] 


NAPIER  S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


169 


ordination,  and  there  were  no  arrangements  made  for  the 
regular  distribution  of  provisions,  or  of  any  one  neces- 
sary supply.  Among  the  troops  despatched  from  Oporto 
was  the  second  battalion  of  the  Lusita.iian  legion,  nine 
hundred  strong,  well  armed,  well  equipped,  and  com- 
manded by  baron  Kben,  a  native  of  Prussia,  who,  with- 
out any  known  services  to  recommend  him,  had  sud- 
denly attained  the  rank  of  major  in  the  British  service. 
This  man  destined  to  act  a  conspicuous  part  in  Por- 
tuguese traged}',  had  been  left  at  Oporto  when  sir 
Robert  Wilson  marched  to  Almeida ;  his  orders  were 
to  follow  with  the  second  battalion  of  the  legion,  when 
its  clothing  and  equipment  should  be  com])leted,  but 
he  retained  the  troops,  to  push  his  own  fortune  under 
the  prelate's  auspices. 

G(!neral  Freire  having  reached  the  Cavado,  was 
joined  by  fourteen  or  fifteen  thousand  militia  and  orde- 
nanzas ;  fixing  his  head-quarters  at  Braga,  he  sent 
detachments  to  occupy  the  posts  of  Salamonde  and 
Ruivaens  in  his  front,  and,  unfortunately  for  himself, 
endeavoured  to  restrain  his  troops  from  wasting  their 
ammunition  by  wanton  firing  in  the  streets  and  on  the 
roads.  This  exertion  of  command  was  heinously  re- 
sented ;  Freire,  being  willing  to  uphold  the  authority 
of  the  regency,  had  been  for  some  time  obnoxious  to 
the  bishop's  faction;  already  he  was  pointed  to  as  a 
suspected  person,  and  the  multitude  were  inimically 
disposed  towards  him. 

Meanwhile,  general  Silveira,  assuming  the  command 
of  the  Tras  OS  Monies,  advanced  to  Chaves,  and  put 
himself  in  comnmnication  with  the  marquis  of  Romana, 
who,  having  remained  tranquil  at  Oimbra  and  Mon- 
terey since  the  21st  of  January,  had  been  joined  by  his 
dispersed  troops,  and  was  again  at  the  head  of  nine  or 
ten  thousand  men.  Silveira's  force  was  about  four 
thousand,  half  regulars,  half  militia,  and  he  was  accom- 
panied by  many  of  the  ordenancas ;  but  here,  as  else- 
where, all  were  licentious,  insuhordinate,  and  disdain- 
ful of  their  general ;  moreover  the  national  enmity  be- 
tween them  and  the  Spaniards  having  overcome  their 
sense  of  a  common  cause  and  common  danger,  the 
latter  were  evilly  treated,  and  a  deadly  f(jud  subsisted 
between  the  two  armies.  The  generals,  indeed,  agreed 
to  act  in  concert,  offensively  and  defensively,  yet  nei- 
ther of  them  were  the  least  acquainted  with  the  num- 
bers, intention,  or  even  the  position  of  their  antagonists  : 
and  it  is  a  proof  of  Romana's  unfitness  for  command 
that  he,  having  the  whole  population  at  his  disposal, 
was  yet  ignorant  of  every  thingr,  relating  to  his  enemy 
that  it  behoved  him  to  know.  The  whole  of  the  French 
force  in  Gallicia,  at  this  period,  was  about  forty-five 
thousand  men,  Romana  estimated  it  at  twenty-one 
thousand  ;  the  number  imder  Soult  was  above  twenty- 
four  thousand,  Romana  supposed  it  to  be  twelve  thou- 
sand ;  and  among  these  he  included  general  Marchand's 
division  of  the  sixth  corps,  which  he  always  imagined 
to  he  a  part  of  the  duke  of  Dalmatia's  army. 

The  Spanish  general  was  so  elated  at  the  spirit  of 
the  peasants  about  Ribidavia,  that  he  anticipated  noth- 
ing but  victory ;  he  knew  also  that  on  the  Arosa,  an 
estuary,  running  up  towards  St.  Jago  de  Compostella, 
the  inhabitants  of  Villa  Garcia  had  risen,  and,  being 
joined  by  all  the  neighbouring  districts,  were  preparing 
to  attack  Vigo  and  'I'uy  ;  hence,  partly  from  his  Span- 
ish temperament,  partly  from  his  extreme  ignorance  of 
war,  he  was  convinced  that  the  French  only  thought 
of  making  their  escape  out  of  Gallicia,  and  that  even 
in  that  they  would  be  disappointed.  To  effect  their 
destruction  more  certainly,  he  also,  as  we  have  seen, 
pestered  sir  John  Cradock  for  succours  in  money  and 
ammunition,  and  desired  that  the  insurgents  on  the 
Arosa  might  be  assisted  with  a  thousand  British  sol- 
diers.* Cradock  anxious  to  support  the  cause,  although 
he  retused  the  troops,  sent  ammunition,  and  five  tliou- 

*  Cradock's  Correspondence,  MSS, 


sand  pounds  in  money,  hut  before  it  arrived  Romana 
was  beaten,  and  in  flight. 

The  combined  Spanish  and  Portuguese  forces, 
amounting  to  sixteen  thousand  regulars  and  militia, 
besides  ordenancas,  were  posted  in  a  straggling  uncon- 
nected manner  along  the  valley  of  the  Taniega,  extend- 
ing from  Monterey,  Verim,  and  Villaza,  to  near  Chave?, 
a  distance  of  more  than  fifteen  miles.  This  was  the 
first  line  of  defence  for  Portugal.  Freire  and  Eben, 
with  fourteen  guns  and  twenty-five  thousand  men,  were 
at  Braga,  in  second  line,  their  outposts  being  on  the 
Cavado  and  at  the  strong  passes  of  Ruivaens  and  Venda 
Nova;  but  of  these  twenty-five  thousand  only  six 
thousand  were  armed  with  muskets,  and  it  is  to  be  ob- 
served that  the  militia  and  troops  of  the  line  differed 
from  the  armed  peasantry  only  in  name,  save  that  their 
faulty  discipline  and  mutinous  disposition  rendered 
them  less  active  and  intelligent  as  skirmishers,  witi> 
out  making  them  fitter  for  battle.  The  bishop,  with 
his  disorderly  and  furious  rabble,  formed  the  third  line, 
occupying  the  entrenchments  that  covered  Oporto, 
Such  was  the  state  of  affairs,  and  such  were  the  depo- 
sitions made  to  resist  the  duke  of  Dalmatia ;  but  his 
army,  although  galled  and  wearied  by  continual  toil, 
and,  when  halting,  disturbed  and  vexed  by  the  multi' 
tude  of  insurrections,  was,  when  in  motion,  of  a  power 
to  overthrow  and  disperse  these  numerous  bands,  even 
as  a  great  ship  feeling  the  wind,  breaks  through  and 
scatters  the  gun-boats  that  have  gathered  round  her  in 
the  calm. 


CHAPTER  II. 

Soult  enters  Portugal — Artion  at  Monterfv— France  st:hi  make* 
jireat  slaughter  of  the  Spanianls — Portu<ruese  reti'eat  ujjon 
Chaves — Romana  (lies  to  Puebia  Senibria — Portuguese  mu- 
tiny— Three  thousand  throw  thenistlvts  into  Chaves — Soult 
take-  that  town — Marches  upon  Braga — Forces  the  defiles 
of  Ptuivaens  an  I  Venrla  Nova — Tumults  and  disori'ers  in  the 
Portuguese  camp  at  Braga — Murder  of  general  Freire  and 
others — flattie  of  Braga — Soult  marches  against  Oporto — 
Disturbed  state  of  that  town — Silveira  retakes  Chaves — The 
F'rench  force  the  passage  of  the  Ave — The  PortULiuese  mur- 
der their  general  Vallonga — f  reiich  appear  in  tVont  of  Oporto 
— Negotiate  with  the  bislo'i — Violence  of  the  people — (Jen- 
eral  Foy  taken — Battle  of  Oporto-  The  city  stormed  with 
great  slaughter. 

SECOND    INVASION    OF    PORTUGAL. 

The  Entre  Minho  e  Douro  and  the  Tras  os  Montes 
lying  together,  form  the  northern  part  of  Portugal  ;  the 
extreme  breadth  of  either,  when  measured  from  the 
frontier    to    the  Douro,  does  not  exceed  seventy  miles. 

The  river  Tamega,  running  north  and  south,  and  dis- 
charging itself  into  the  Douro,  forms  the  boundary  line 
between  them  ;  but  there  is,'  to  the  west  of  this  river, 
a  succession  of  rugged  mountain  ridges,  which,  under 
the  names  of  Sierra  de  Gerez,  Sierra  de  Cabrera,  and 
Sierra  de  Santa  Catalina,  form  a  second  barrier,  nearly 
parallel  to  the  Tamega,  and  across  some  part  of  these 
ridges,  an  invader  coming  from  the  eastward,  must  pass 
to  arrive  at  Oporto. 

Oth^r  Sierras,  running  also  in  a  parallel  direction 
with  the  Tamega,  cut  the  Tras  os  Montes  in  such  a 
manner,  that  all  the  considerable  rivers  flowing  north 
and  south  tumble  into  the  Douro.  But  as  the  western 
ramifications  of  the  Sierras  de  Gerez  and  Oab.era  shoot 
down  towards  the  sea,  the  rivers  of  the  Entre  Douro  e 
Minho  discharge  their  waters  into  the  ocean,  and  con- 
sequently flow  at  rifjht  angles  to  those  of  Tras  os 
Montes.  Hence  it  follows,  that  an  enemy  penetrating 
to  Oporto,  from  the  north,  would  have  to  pass  the 
Lima,  the  Cavado,  and  the  Ave,  to  reach  Oporto ;  and 
if,  coming  from  the  east,  he  invaded  the  Tras  os  Mon- 
tes, all  the  rivers  and  intervenitig  ridges  of  that  pro- 
vince must  be  crossed,  before  the  Entre  Minho  e  Douro 
could  be  reached. 


170 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   W^R. 


[Book  VII. 


The  duke  of  Dalmalia  was,  however,  now  in  siicli 
8  position,  near  the  sources  of  the  Lima  and  the  Ta- 
mepa  rivers,  that  he  could  choose  w'hetlier  to  penetrate 
by  the  valley  of  tlie  first  into  the  Entie  Minhoe  Douro, 
or  by  the  valley  of  the  second  into  the  Tras  os  Mon- 
ies, and  there  was  also  a  third  road,  leading  between 
tJiose  rivers  through  Montalegre  upon  Braga;  bvil  this 
latter  route,  passing  over  the  Sierra  de  Gerez,  was  im- 
practicable for  artillery. 

The  French  general  had,  therefore,  to  consider — 

1.  If,  following  the  course  of  the  Lima,  he  should 
disperse  the  insurgents  between  that  river  and  the 
Minho,  and  then  recovering  his  artillery  from  Tuy,  pro- 
ceed against  Oporto  by  the  main  road  leading  along 
the  sea  coast. 

2.  If  he  should  descend  the  Tamega,  take  Chaves, 
nnd  then  continuing  his  route  to  Villa  Real,  near  the 
Douro,  take  the  defences  of  Tras  os  Montes  in  reverse  ; 
or,  turning  to  the  right,  cross  the  Sierra  de  Cabrera  by 
the  pass  of  Ruivaens,  enter  Braga,  and  so  go  against 
Oporto. 

The  first  project  was  irregular,  and  hazardous,  inas- 
much as  Romana  and  Silveira  could  have  fallen  upon 
the  flank  and  rear  of  the  French  during  iheir  march 
tlirough  a  difficult  country  ;  but  as  the  position  of  those 
generals  covered  Chaves,  to  attack  them  was  a  prelim- 
inary measure  to  either  plan,  and  with  this  object, 
Soult  moved  on  the  4th  of  March.  The  5th,  his  van 
being  at  Villa  Real  and  Penaverde,  he  sent  a  letter  by 
a  ling  of  truce  to  Romana  in  which  after  exposing  all 
the  danger  of  the  lalter's  situation,  he  advised  him  to 
submit ;  no  answer  was  returned,  nor  would  the  bearer 
have  been  suffered  to  pass  the  outposts,  but  that  Ro- 
mana himself  was  in  the  rear,  for  he  dreaded  that  such 
an  occurrence  would  breed  a  jealousy  of  his  conduct, 
and.  perhaps,  cause  his  patriotism  to  be  undervalued.* 

'I'his  failing,  three  divisions  of  infantry  and  one  of 
cavalry  marched  the  next  morning  against  Monterey, 
while  La  Iloussaye's  dragoons,  taking  the  road  of 
Laza,  covered  the  left  flank,  and  pushed  parties  as  far 
as  La  Gudina,  on  the  route  of  Puebla  do  Senabria.  The 
fourth  division  of  infantry  remained  at  Villa  del  Rey, 
to  cover  the  passage  of  the  sick  and  wounded  men 
from  Orense,  for  the  duke  of  Dalmatia,  having  no  base 
of  operations,  transported  his  hospitals,  and  other  in- 
cumbrances, from  place  to  place  as  the  army  moved  ; 
acting  in  this  respect  after  the  manner  of  the  Roman 
generals,  when  invading  a  barbarous  country. 

As  the  French  advanced,  the  Spaniards  abandoned 
their  positions  in  succession,  spiked  the  guns  in  the 
dilapidated  works  of  Monterey,  and  after  a  slight  skir- 
misii  at  Verim,  took  the  road  to  Puebla  de  Senabria; 
but  Franceschi  followed  close,  and  overtaking  two  or 
three  thousand  as  they  were  passing  a  rugged  moun- 
tain, assailed  their  rear  with  a  battalion  of  infantry, 
and  at  the  same  time  leading  his  horremen  round  both 
fl?nks,  headed  the  column,  and  obliged  it  to  halt.)-  The 
Spaniards,  trusting  to  the  rough  ground,  drew  up  in 
cne  large  square  to  receive  the  charge.  Franceschi 
had  four  regiments  of  cavalry,  each  regiment  settled 
itself  against  the  face  of  a  square,  and  then  the  whole, 
with  loud  cries,  bore  down  swiftly  upon  their  opponents; 
the  latter  unsteady,  irresolute,  dismayed,  shrunk  from 
the  fierce  assault,  and  were  instantly  trampled  down 
in  heaps.  Those  who  escaped  the  horses'  hoofs  and 
the  c(\trc  of  the  sword  became  [irisoners,  but  twelve 
hundred  bodies  were  stretched  lifeless  on  the  field  of 
battle,  and  Franceschi  continued  his  movements  on  La 
Gudina. 

Romana  was  at  Semadems,  several  miles  in  the 
rear  of  Verim,  when  his  vanguard  was  attacked,  and 
there  was  notiiing  to  prevent  him  from  falling  back  to 
(Shaves  with  his  main  body,  according  to  a  plan  before 

•   Sir  J.  Crarloclc's  papprs,  MRS. 
\  S.  Journal  of  Operutiuii^,  MSS. 


agreed  upon  between  him  and  Silveira  ;  but  erther  from 
fear,  or  indignation  at  the  treatment  his  soldiers  had 
received  at  the  hands  of  the  Portuguese,  he  left  Sil- 
veira to  his  fatr,  and  made  off  with  six  or  seven  thou- 
sand men  towards  Braganca;  from  thence  passing  by 
Puebla  de  Senabria,  he  regained  the  valley  of  the  Syl. 
Meanwhile,  two  thousand  Portuguese  infantry,  with 
some  guns,  issuing  from  the  side  of  Viilaza,  cut  the 
French  line  of  march  at  the  moment  when  Franceschi 
and  Ileudelet  having  passed  Monterey,  Lahorde  was 
approaching  that  place ;  a  slight  combat  ensued,  the 
Portuguese  lost  their  guns,  and  were  driven  down  the 
valley  of  the  Tamega  as  far  as  the  village  of  Outeiro, 
within  their  own  frontier.*  Tliis  defeat,  and  the  flight 
of  Romana,  had  such  an  effect  upon  the  surrounding 
districts  that  the  Spanish  insurgents  returned  in  crowds 
to  their  habitations  and  delivered  up  their  arms.  Some 
of  the  clerg)',  also,  changing  their  opinions,  exhorted 
the  people  to  peace,  and  the  prisoners  taken  on  the  6th, 
being  dissatisfied  with  Romana's  conduct,  and  moved 
by  their  hatred  of  the  Portuguese,  entered  the  French 
service. 

These  affairs  occupied  Soult  until  the  9th,  during 
wdiich  period  his  outposts  were  pushed  towards  Chaves, 
Montalegre,  and  La  Gudina,  but  the  main  body  remain- 
ed at  Verim  to  cover  the  arrival  of  the  sick  at  Monterey, 
while  Silveira,  thus  beaten  at  Viilaza,  and  deserted  by 
Romana,  fell  back  on  the  7lli  to  a  strong  mountain  po- 
sition, one  league  behind  Chaves,  from  whence  he  could 
command  a  view  of  all  the  French  movements  as  far 
as  Monterey  ;  his  ground  was  advantageous,  but  his 
military  talents  were  moderate,  his  men,  always  insub- 
ordinate, were  now  mutinous,  and  many  of  the  officers 
were  disposed  to  join  the  French.  He  wished  to  aban- 
don Chaves,  but  his  troops  resolved  to  defend  it,  and 
three  thousand  five  hundred  men  actually  did  throw 
themselves  into  that  town,  in  defiance  of  him  ;  for  he 
was  already,  according  to  the  custom  of  the  day,  pro- 
nounced a  traitor  and  declared  worthy  of  that  death 
which  he  would  inevitably  have  suffered,  but  that  some 
of  his  soldiers  still  continued  to  respect  his  orders. 

The  IOth,»the  convoy  of  French  sick  was  close  to 
Monterey,  and  as  Romana's  movement  was  known  to 
be  a  real  flight,  and  not  made  with  a  design  to  create 
fresh  insurrections  in  the  rear,  the  French  troops  were 
again  put  in  motion  towards  Chaves  ;|  Merle's  division 
however  remained  at  Verim  to  protect  the  hospital,  and 
Franceschi's  took  the  road  of  La  Gudina,  as  if  he  had 
been  going  towards  Salamanca.  A  report  that  he  had 
actually  entered  that  town  reached  Lisbon,  and  was 
taken  as  an  indication  that  Soult  would  not  pass  the 
Portuguese  frontier  at  Chaves,  but  Franceschi  quickly 
returned,  by  Osonio  and  Feces  de  Abaxa,  and  being 
assisted  by  Heudelet's  division,  invested  Chaves  on 
the  left  bank  of  the  Tamega,  while  Lahorde,  Mermet, 
La  Houssaye,  and  Lorge,  descending  the  right  bank, 
beat  the  Portuguese  outposts,  and  getting  jiossession 
of  a  fort  close  under  the  walls,  completed  the  invest- 
ment of  the  town.  The  place  was  immediately  sum- 
moned to  surrender,  but  no  answer  was  returned,  and 
the  garrison,  like  men  bereft  of  their  wits  and  fighting 
with  the  air,  kei)t  up  a  continual  fire  of  musketry  and 
artillery  until  the  l'2tb,  when  they  surrendered  on  re- 
ceiving a  second  summons,  more  menacing  than  the 
first.  The  13lh  the  P'rench  entered  the  tcwn,  and  Sil- 
veira retired  to  Villa  Real. 

'I'he  works  of  (shaves  were  in  a  bad  state ;  few  of 
the  fifty  guns  mounted  on  the  ramparts  were  fit  for 
service,  but  there  was  a  stone-hridye,  and  the  town 
was  in  many  respects  more  suitable  for  a  place  of  arms 
than  Monterey  ;  wherefore  the  sick  were  brought  down 
from  the  latter  place,  and  an  hospital  was  established 
for  twelve  hundred  men,  tiie  number  now  unfit  to  carry 
arms.     Tlie  fighting  men  were  reduced  to  twenty-one 


*  S.  Jourual  of  Opcratious,  MSS. 


•»  Ibid. 


1S09.J 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR    WAR. 


171 


thousnnd,  and  Soult,  partly  from  the  clifTiculty  of  o-uard- 
\ng  his  prisoners,  partly  from  a  desire  to  abate  tlie 
hostility  of  tlie  Portuguese,  permitted  the  militia  and 
orderancas  to  return  to  their  iiomes,  after  taking  an 
oath  not  to  resume  their  arms  ;  to  some  of  the  poorest 
he  also  gave  money  and  clothes,  and  he  enrolled,  at 
their  own  request,  the  few  regular  troops  taken  in 
Chaves. 

'J'his  wise  and  fjenlle  proceeding  was  much  blamed 
by  some  of  his  oificers,  especially  by  thone  who  had 
served  under  .Tunot.*  They  desired  that  Chaves  might 
be  assaulted,  and  the  garrison  put  to  the  sword,  for 
they  were  embued  with  a  personal  hatred  of  the  Por- 
tuguese, and  being  averse  to  serve  in  the  present  ex- 
j.cdition,  endeavoured  as  it  would  appear,  to  thwart 
their  general,  yet  the  prudence  of  his  conduct  was  im- 
mediately visible  in  the  softened  feelings  of  the  country 
people,  and  the  scouting  parties  being  no  longer  mo- 
lested spread  themselves,  some  on  the  side  of  Bragan^a 
and  Villa  Real,  others  in  the  Entre  Minho  e  Douro.[ 
'J  he  former  reported  that  there  was  no  enemy  in  a  con- 
dition to  make  head  in  theTras  os  Monies,  but  the  lat- 
ter fell  in  with  the  advanced  guard  of  Freire's  army 
at  Ruivaens,  on  the  road  to  Braga. 

From  Chaves  Soult  could  operate  against  Oporto, 
either  by  the  Tras  os  Montes  or  the  Entre  Minho  e 
Douro,  the  latter  presented  the  strongest  position,  but 
the  road  was  shorter  and  more  practicable  for  guns, 
ihaii  that  by  the  valley  of  the  Tamega,  and  the  com- 
munication with  Tuy  could  be  sooner  recovered  ;  hence, 
when  the  scouts  brought  intelligence  that  a  Portuguese 
army  was  at  Bratra,  the  F'rench  general  decided  to  pe- 
netrate by  that  line.:j: 

'I'he  road  from  Chaves  to  Braga  entpred  a  deep  and 
dangerous  defile,  or  rather  a  succession  of  defiles, 
which  extended  from  Venda  Nova  to  Ruivaens,  and 
re-cominenced  after  passing  the  Cabado  river  ;  Freire's 
advanced  guards,  composed  of  ordenancas,  occupied 
those  places,  and  he  had  also  a  detachment  under  Eben 
on  the  road  of  Montalegre  ;  he  however  recalled  the 
latter  on  the  I'ith,  on  the  IGth  Franceschi  forced  the 
defile  of  Nova  ;  and  the  remainder  of  the  French  army 
being  formed  in  alternate  masses  of  cavalry  and  infan- 
try, began  to  pass  the  Sierra  de  ('abrera;  meanwhile 
Lorge's  dragoons  descending  the  Tamega,  ordered  ra- 
tions for  the  whole  army  along  the  road  to  Villa  Real, 
and  then,  suddenly  retracing  their  steps,  rejoined  the 
main  body. 

'I'he  17th,  Franceschi,  being  reinforced  with  some 
infantry,  won  the  bridge  of  Ruivaens,  and  entered  Sa- 
lamonde;  the  Portuguese,  covered  by  Eben's  detach- 
ment, which  had  arrived  at  St.  Joa  de  Campo,  then 
fell  back  on  the  Pico  de  Pugalados,  close  to  Braga,  and 
Franceschi  took  post  at  Carvalho  Este,  two  leagues  in 
front  of  that  city. 

Soult  now  expecting  to  reach  Braga  without  further 
opposition,  caused  his  artillery,  guarded  by  Laborde's 
division,  to  enter  the  pass  of  Venda  Nova  ;  but  the 
ordenancas,  reinforced  by  some  men  from  the  side  of 
Guimaraens,  immediately  re-assembled,  and  clustering 
on  the  mountains  to  the  left  of  the  column  of  march, 
attacked  it  with  great  fierceness  and  subtlety. 

'J'he  peasants  of  the  northern  provinces  of  Portugal, 
uidike  the  squalid  miserable  population  of  Lisbon  and 
Oporto,  are  robust,  handsome,  and  exceedingly  brave; 
their  natural  disposition  is  open  and  obliging,  and  they 
are.  w  hen  rightly  handled  as  soldiers,  docile,  intelligent, 
and  hardy.  They  are,  however,  vehement  in  their 
anger ;  and  being  now  excited  by  the  exhortations  and 
personal  example  of  their  priests,  they  came  rushing 
down  the  sides  of  the  hills,  and  many  of  them,  like 
men  deprived  of  reason,  broke  furiously  into  the  French 
battalions,  and  were  there  killed.     The  others,  finding 


•   Noble's  Campaign  de  Galice. 
\  Juurunl  of  Operalions,  MSS. 


\  Ibid. 


their  elTcrts  unavailing,  fled,  and  were  pursued  a  leao-ue 
\\\i  the  mountain  by  some  battalions  sent  out  against 
them;  yet  they  were  not  abashed,  and  making  a  cir- 
cuit behind  tlu^  hills,  fell  upon  the  rear  of  the  line  of 
march,  killed  fifty  of  the  stragglers,  and  ])lundered  the 
baggage.  Thus  galled,  the  French  slowly,  and  with 
much  trouble,  passed  the  long  defiles  of  Venda  Nova, 
Ruivaens,  and  Salamonde,  and  gathered  by  degrees  in 
front  of  Freire's  position.* 

That  general  was  no  more;  and  his  troops,  reeking 
from  the  slaughter  of  their  commander,  were  raging, 
like  savage  beasts,  at  one  moment  congregating  near 
the  prisons  to  murder  some  wretch  within,  at  another 
rushing  tumultuously  to  the  outposts,  with  a  design  to 
engage  the  enemy.  The  ordenanccs  of  the  distant 
districts  also  came  pouring  into  the  caniji,  dragging 
with  them  suspected  persons,  and  adding  to  the  general 
distraction.! 

The  unfortunate  Freire,  unable  to  establish  order  ia 
his  army,  had  resolved  to  retreat,  and  in  pursuance  of 
that  design,  recalled  Eben  on  the  14th,  giving  direc- 
tions to  the  ofiicers  at  the  different  outposts  in  front  of 
Braga  to  retire  at  the  approach  of  the  enemy.  This, 
and  his  endeavour  to  prevent  the  waste  of  ammunition, 
gave  effect  to  a  ))lan  which  had  been  long  preparid  by 
the  bishop's  faction  for  his  destruction.  In  passing 
through  Braga,  he  was  openly  reviled  in  the  streets  by 
some  of  tlie  urdtnancas ;  and  as  the  latter  plainly  dis- 
covered their  murderous  intention,  he  left  the  army ; 
he  was  however  seized  on  the  17th,  at  a  village  behind 
Braga,  and  brought  back  :  what  followed  is  thus  de- 
scribed by  baron  Eben,  in  his  official  report  to  sir  John 
Cradock  : 

"  I  did  not  reach  Braga  until  nine  o'clock  in  the 
morning  of  the  17th.  I  found  every  thing  in  the 
greatest  disorder ;  the  houses  shut,  the  peojile  flying 
in  all  directions,  and  pan  of  the  populace  armed  with 
guns  and  pikes.  Passing  through  the  streets,  I  was 
greeted  witli  loud  vivas,  'i'hough  the  people  knew  me, 
I  could  not  guess  the  meaning  of  this.  At  the  market- 
place, I  was  detained  by  the  rapidly  increasing  pop- 
ulace, who  took  the  reins  of  my  horse,  crying  out 
loudly,  that  they  were  ready  to  do  any  thing  to  defend 
the  city  ;  requesting  me  to  assist  them,  and  speaking 
in  the  lowest  terms  of  their  general.  I  promised  them 
to  do  all  in  my  power  to  aid  their  patriotic  zeal ;  but 
said  that  I  must  first  speak  ti  him.  Upon  this,  they 
suffered  me  to  proceed,  accompanied  by  about  a  hun- 
dred of  them  ;  but  I  had  not  got  far  on  my  way  to  his 
quarters,  when  I  saw  him  on  foot,  conducted  by  a  great 
armed  multitude,  who  suffered  no  one  to  pass,  and  on 
my  attempting  it,  threatened  to  fire.  I  was,  therefore, 
obliged  to  turn  my  horse,  and  this  the  people  applaud- 
ed. Two  men  had  hold  of  the  general's  arms,  his 
sword  was  taken  from  him,  and  the  people  abused  him 
most  vehemently.  On  my  way  back  to  the  market- 
place, they  wanted  to  shoot  me,  taking  me  for  general 
Freire;  but  I  was  saved  by  a  soldier  of  the  legion, 
who  explained  the  mistake.  When  I  reached  the 
market-place,  I  found  about  a  thousand  men  drawn  up  : 
I  communicated  to  them  my  determination  to  assist 
them  in  their  laudable  endeavour-  to  defend  theiiiselves, 
provided  they  would  first  permit  me  to  speak  to  the 
general,  for  whose  actions  I  promised  to  be  answerable 
as  long  as  I  should  be  with  him.  I  had  ordered  a 
house  to  be  got  ready  for  my  reception,  where  the  gen- 
eral arrived,  accompanied  as  before;  T  saluted  him 
with  n-spect,  at  which  they  plainly  discovered  their 
disapprobation.  I  rej)eatc(l  my  proposal,  but  they 
would  not  listen  to  it.  1  |)erceived  the  danger  of  the 
general,  and  prf)posed  to  take  him  to  my  quarteis.  My 
adjutant  offered  him  his  arm:  when  I  spoke  to  him,  he 
only  replied,  '  save  me  !' 


*  S.  Journal  of  Operations,  MSS. 

f  Eben's  Repo.  t,  MSS.     Sir  J.  Cradock'g  Papers. 


172 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  Ml. 


"  At  the  entrance  of  nr.y  house,  I  was  surrounded  hy  | 
thousands,  and  hrard  the  loud  cry  of  '  kill !  kill !'  I  ; 
row  took  hold  of  him,  and  attempted  to  force  my  way 
into  the  house,  and  a  gentleman  slightly  wounded  him  , 
with  the  point  of  his  sword,  under  my  arm.     lie  col-  ^ 
lected  all  his  strength,  rushed  through   them,  and  hid  i 
himself  behind  the  door  of  the  house.    The  people  sur-  | 
rounded  me,  and  forced  me  from  the  house.     To  draw  , 
the  attention  of  the  people  from  the  general,  I  ordered 
the  drummers  to  beat  the  alarm,  and   formed  the  orde- 
nnncas  in  ranks  ;  hut  they  kept  a  constant  fire  upon  j 
my  hrusc,  where  the  general  still  was.     As  a  last  at- 
tempt to  save  him,  I  now  proposed  that  he  should  be 
conducted  to  prison,  in  order  to  take  a  legal  trial  ;  this 
was  agreed  to,  and  he  was  conducted  there  in  safety. 
I  now  hoped  that  I  had  succeeded,  as  the  people  de- 
manded to  be  led  against  the  enemy,   now  rapidly  ad- 
vancing, in  number  about  two  thousand.  I  again  formed 
them,  and  advanced  with  them  ;  but  soon  after,  I  heard 
the  firing  again,  and  was  informed  that  the  people  had 
put  the  general  to  death  with  pikes  and  guns.     I  was 
now  proclaimed  general." 

When  this  murder  was  perpetrated,  the  people  seem- 
ed satisfied,  and  Eben  announcing  the  approach  of  a 
British  force  from  Oporto,  sent  orders  to  the  outposts 
to  stand  fast,  as  he  intended  to  fight;  but  another  tu- 
mult arose,  when  it  was  discovered  that  an  officer  of 
Freire's  staff,  one  Vil'.aboas,  was  in  Eben's  quarters. 
Several  thousand  ordenancas  instantly  gathered  about 
the  house,  and  the  unhappy  man  was  haled  forth  and 
stabbed  to  death  at  the  door,  the  mob  all  the  time 
shouting  and  firing  volleys  in  at  the  windows.*  Yet, 
when  their  fury  was  somewhat  abated,  they  obliged 
their  new  general  to  come  out  and  show  that  he  had  not 
been  wounded,  and  expressed  great  affection  for  him. 
In  the  course  of  the  night  the  legion  marched  in 
from  Pico  de  Pugalados,  aiid  the  following  morning  a 
reinforcement  of  six  thousand  ordenancas  came  up  in 
one  mass.  Fifty  thousand  dollars  also  arrived  in  the 
camp  from  Oporto;  for  the  Portuguese,  like  the  Span- 
iards, commonly  reversed  the  order  of  military  arrange- 
ments, leaving  their  weapons  in  store,  and  brinaring 
their  encumbrances  to  the  field  of  battle.  In  the  even- 
ing the  corregidor  and  two  officers  of  rank,  together 
with  many  persons  of  a  meaner  class,  were  brought  to 
tlie  town  as  prisoners  and  put  in  jail,  the  armed  mob 
being  with  ditriculty  restrained  from  slaying  them  on 
the  way  thither.  In  this  distracted  manner  they  were 
proceeding  when  Franceschi  arrived  at  Carvalho  on 
the  I7th,  and,  surely,  if  that  hold  and  enterprising  sol- 
dier could  have' obtained  a  glimpse  of  what  was  pass- 
ing, or  known  the  real  state  of  affairs,  he  would  have 
broke  into  the  midst  of  them  with  his  cavalry;  for, 
of  the  twenty-five  thousand  men  composing  the  whole 
of  the  Portuguese  force,  eighteen  thousand  were  only- 
armed  witii  pikes,  the  remainder  had  wasted  the  great- 
est part  of  their  ammunition,  and  the  powder  in  store 
was  not  made  u])  in  cartridges. f  Hut  Braga,  situated 
in  a  deep  hollow,  was  hidden  from  him,  and  the  rocky 
and  wooded  hills  surrounding  it  were  occupied  by  what 
appeared  a  formidable  nmltitude  ;  hence  F>anceschi, 
although  reinforced  by  a  britrade  of  infantry,  was  satis- 
fied by  feints  and  slight  skirmishes  to  alarm  his  op- 
ponents, and  to  keep  them  in  play  until  the  other  divi- 
sions of  the  French  army  could  arrive. 

While  these  events  were  passing  at  Braga,  Silveira 
again  collected  a  considerable  force  of  militia  and  or- 
denancas in  the  Tras  os  Montes,  and  captain  Arents- 
child,  one  of  the  olTicers  sent  by  sir  John  Cradock  to 
aid  the  bishop,  also  rallied  a  number  of  fugitives  at 
Guimaraens  and  Arnarante.  In  O|)orto,  however,  the 
multitude,  obeying  no  command,  were  more  intent  upon 
murder  than  upon  defence. 

•   F.ljpirs  Report.  MS. 

t  Cradocl  »  I'aper^,  .\1SS.     S.  Journal  of  Operations,  MSS. 


Eben's  posts  extended  from  Falperra,  on  the  route 
of  Guimaraens  to  the  Ponte  Porto,  on  the  Cavado 
river;  but  his  principal  force  was  stationed  on  a  lofty 
rido-e  called  the  Monte  Adauf  %  which,  at  the  distance 
of  six  or  seven  miles  from  Braga,  crossed  the  road  to 
Chaves.  The  left,  or  western,  end,  overhai.ging  the 
river  Cavado,  covered  the  detachment  guarding  the 
Ponte  Porto.  The  right  was  wooded  and  masked  by 
the  head  of  a  deep  ravine,  but  beyond  this  wood  the 
ridge,  takinsf  a  curved  and  forward  direction,  was  called 
the  Monte  Vallonga,  and  a  second  mass  of  men  was 
posted  there,  but  separated  from  those  on  the  Monte 
Adaufe  by  an  interval  of  two  miles,  and  by  the  ravine 
and  wood  before  mentioned.  A  third  body,  being  push- 
ed still  more  in  advance,  crowned  an  isolated  hill, 
flanking  the  Chaves  road,  being  intended  to  take  the 
French  in  rear  when  the  latter  should  attack  the  Monte 
Adaufe. 

Behind  the  Monte  Vallonsfa,  and  separated  from  it 
by  a  valley  three  miles  wide,  the  r^dge  of  Falperra 
was  guarded  by  detachments  from  Guimaraens  and 
from  Braga. 

The  road  to  Braga,  leading  directly  over  the  centre 
of  the  Monte  Adaufe,  was  flanked  on  the  left  by  a 
ridge  shooting  perpendicularly  out  from  that  mountain, 
and  ending  in  a  lofty  mass  of  rocks  which  overhangs 
Carvalho  Este.  But  the  Portuguese  neglected  to  oc- 
cupy either  these  rocks  or  the  connecting  ridge,  and 
Franceschi  seized  the  former  on  the  17th. 

The  18lh,  Soult  arrived  in  person,  and,  wishing  to 
prevent  a  battle,  released  twenty  prisoners,  and  sent 
them  in  with  a  proclamation  couched  in  conciliatory 
language,  and  offering  a  capitulation  ;  the  trumpeter 
who  accompanied  them  was  however  detained,  and  the 
prisoners  were  immediately  slain.  The  next  day  Eben 
brought  up  all  his  reserves  to  the  Adauf  •,  and  the 
Portuguese  on  the  isolated  hill  in  front  of  .Monte  Val- 
longa took  possession  of  Lanhoza,  a  village  half-way 
between  that  hill  and  the  rocky,  height  occupied  by 
Franceschi  on  the  17th. 

Two  divisions  of  French  infantry  being  now  up, 
Soult  caused  one  of  them  and  the  cavalry  to  attack 
Lanhoza,  from  whence  the  Portuiruese  were  immedi- 
ately driven,  and,  being-  followed  closely,  lost  their  own 
hill  also.  The  other  French  division  took  post,  part 
in  Carvalho,  part  on  the  rocky  headland,  and  six  guns 
were  carried  to  the  latter  during  the  night ;  in  this 
position  the  French  columns  were  close  to  the  centre 
of  the  Portuguese,  and  could,  by  a  slight  movement  in 
advance,  separate  Eben's  wings.  The  rest  of  the  ar- 
my was  at  hand,  and  a  general  attack  was  arranged 
for  the  next  morning. 

BATTLE    OF    BRAGA. 

The  20th,  at  nine  o'clock,  the  French  were  in  mo- 
tion :  Franceschi  and  Mermet,  leaving  a  detachment 
on  the  hill  they  had  carried  the  night  before,  endeav- 
oured to  turn  the  right  of  the  people  on  the  Monte 
Vallonga. 

Laborde,  supported  hy  la  Houssaye's  dragoons,  ad- 
vanced against  the  centre  by  the  ridge  connecting  Car- 
valho with  the  Monte  Adauf  .* 

Heudelet,  with  a  part  of  his  division  and  a  squadron 
of  cavalrv,  att;icked  F^ben's  left,  wjfh  'he  view  of  seis- 
ing tlie  Ponte  Porto. 

The  Portuguese  opened  a  straggling  fire  of  muskf^try 
and  artillery  in  the  centre,  but  after  a  ^cw  rounds,  the 
burstinfj  of  a  gun  created  a  confusion,  from  wbioli  La- 
borde's  rapidly-advancincr  masses  gave  them  no  time 
to  recover. f  By  ten  o'clock  the  whole  of  the  centre 
was  flying  in  disorder  down  a  narrow  wooded  valley 
leading  from  the  Adauf '  to  Braga;  the  French  fol- 
lowed hard,  and  having  discovered  one  of  their  men, 
who  had  been  a  prisoner,  mutilated  in  a  dreadful  man- 


*  S.  Journal  of  Operations,  MSS.    f  Cben't  Report,  MS. 


1.809.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


173 


ner,  and  still  alive,  they  gave  no  quarter.  Braga  was 
abandoned,  and  the  victorious  infantry  passing  through, 
took  post  on  the  other  side,  while  the  cavalry  contin- 
ued the  havoc  for  some  distance  on  the  road  to  Oporto  ; 
yet,  so  savage  was  the  temper  of  the  fugitives  that, 
in  passing  through  Braga,  they  stopped  to  murder  the 
corregidor  and  other  prisoners  in  the  jail,  then  casting 
the  mangled  bodies  into  the  street,  continued  their 
Might.*  Meanwhile  the  centre  was  forced,  and  Heu- 
delet,  breaking  over  the  left  of  the  Monte  Adaufe,  de- 
scended upon  Ponte  Porto,  and  after  a  sharp  skirmish, 
carried  that  bridge  and  the  village  on  the  other  side  of 
the  Cavado, 

Franceschi  and  Mermet  found  considerable  difficulty 
in  asc'  nding  the  rugged  sides  of  the  Monte  Vallonga, 
but  having,  at  last,  attained  the  crest,  the  Avhole  of 
their  enemies  fled,  and  the  two  generals  crossed  the 
valley  to  gain  the  road  of  Guimaraens,  and  cut  off  that 
line  of  retreat ;  but  they  fell  in  with  the  three  thousand 
Portuguese  posted  above  Falperra,  and  these  men, 
seeing  the  cavalry  approach,  drew  up  with  their  backs 
to  seme  high  recks,  and  opened  a  fire  of  artillery. 
Franceschi  immediately  placed  his  horsemen  on  either 
flank,  a  brigade  of  infantry  against  the  front,  and,  as  at 
Verim,  making  all  charge  together,  strewed  the  ground 
t\ith  the  dead.  Nevertheless,  the  Portuguese  fought 
valiantly  at  this  point,  and  Franceschi  acknowledged 
it.  The  vanquished  lost  all  their  artillery  and  above 
four  thousand  men,  of  which  four  hundred  only  were 
made  prisoners.  Some  of  the  fugitives  crossing  the 
Cavado  river,  made  for  the  Ponte  de  Lima,  others  re- 
tired to  Oporto,  but  the  greatest  number  took  the  road 
of  Guimaraens,  during  the  fight  at  Falperra.  Eben 
appears,  by  his  own  ofiicial  report,  to  have  been  at 
Braga  when  the  action  commenced,  and  to  have  fled 
among  the  first,  for  he  makes  no  mention  of  the  fight 
at  Falperra,  nor  of  the  skirmish  at  Ponte  Porto,  and 
his  narrative  bears  every  mark  of  inaccuracy. f 

Braga  was  at  first  abandoned  by  the  inhabitants, 
they  returned  however  the  next  day,  and  when  the 
French  outposts  were  established,  general  Lorge,  cross- 
ing the  Cavado,  entered  Baoellos ;  he  was  well  re- 
ceived by  the  corregidor,  for  which  the  latter  vv-as  a 
few  days  afterwards  hanged  by  the  Portuguese  general, 
Botilho,  who  commanded  between  the  Lima  and  the 
Minho.  At  Braga  provisions  were  found,  and  a  large 
store  of  powder,  which  was  immediately  made  up  in 
cartridges  for  the  use  of  the  French  ;  the  gun-carriages 
and  ammunition-waggons,  which  had  been  very  much 
damaged,  were  again  repaired,  and  an  hospital  was 
eslablished  for  eight  hundred  sick  and  wounded : 
hence  it  may  be  judged,  that  the  loss  sustained  in  ac- 
tion since  the  I5th,  was  not  less  than  six  hundred 
men. 

The  French  general  having  thus  broken  through  the 
second  Portuguese  line  of  defence  could  either  march 
directly  upon  Oporto,  or  recover  his  communication 
with  Tuy.  He  resolved  upon  the  former,  1.  because 
he  knew  through  his  spies  and  by  intercepted  letters 
that  Tuy,  although  besieged,  was  in  no  distress;  that 
its  guns  overpowered  those  of  the  Portuguese  fortress 
of  Valencia  on  the  opposite  bank  of  the  Minho,  and 
that  the  garrison  made  successful  sallies.  2.  Because 
information  reached  him  that  sixty  thousand  men, 
troops  of  the  line,  militia,  and  ordenanca,  were  assem- 
bled in  the  intrenched  camp  covering  Oporto,  and  his 
seouts  reported  also  that  the  Portuguese  were  in  force 
at  Guimaraens,  and  had  broken  the  bridges  along  the 
whole  course  of  the  Ave.  It  was  essential  to  crush 
these  large  bodies  before  they  could  acquire  any  for- 
midable consistency ;  wherefore  Soult  put  his  army 
again  in  march,  leaving  Heudelet'a  division  at  Braga 

*  S.  Journal  of  Operations,  MSS. 
t  Sir  J.  Cra^ock-s  Paptis.  MS. 


to  protect  his  hospitals  against  Botilh'  Meanwhile 
Silveira  struck  a  great  blow,  for  being  reinforced  from 
the  side  of  I'eira  he  remounted  the  Tamega,  invested 
Chaves  on  the  day  of  battle  at  Eraga,  and  the  28th 
forced  the  garrison,  consisting  of  one  hundred  fighlinor 
men  and  twelve  hundred  sick,  to  capitulate,  afier  which 
he  took  post  at  Amarante,  while  Soult,  ignorant  of  the 
event,  continued  his  march  against  Oporto  in  three 
columns. 

The  first,  composed  of  Franceschi's  and  Mermet's 
divisions,  marched  by  the  road  of  Guimaraens  and 
San  Justo,  with  orders  to  force  the  passage  of  the 
Upper  Ave,  and  scour  the  country  towards  Pombeiro. 
The  second,  consisting  of  Merle's,  Laborde's  and  La 
Houssaye's  divisions,  was  commanded  by  Soult  in 
person,  and  moved  upon  Barca  de  Trcfa,  the  third, 
under  general  Lorge,  quitting  Bacellos,  made  way  by 
the  Ponte  d'Ave. 

The  passage  of  the  Ave  was  fiercely  disputed,  and 
the  left  column  was  fought  with  in  front  of  Guima- 
raens, and  at  Pombeiro,  and  again  at  Puente  Netrrellos. 
The  last  combat  was  rough,  and  the  French  general 
Jardon  was  killed.  The  march  of  the  centre  column 
was  arrested  at  Barca  de  Trofa,  by  the  cutting  of  the 
bridge,  but  the  marshal,  observing  the  numbers  of  the 
enemy,  ascended  the  right  bank,  and  forced  the  pas- 
sage at  San  Justo;  not  however  without  the  help  of 
Franceschi,  who  came  down  the  opposite  side  of  the 
river,  after  the  fig-tit  at  Ponte  Negrellos. 

When  the  left  and  centre  had  thus  crossed,  colonel 
Lallemand  was  detached  with  a  regiment  of  dragoons 
to  assist  Lorge,  who  was  still  held  in  check  at  the 
Ponte  Ave;  Lallemand  was  at  first  beaten  back,  but, 
being  reinforced  with  some  infantry,  finally  succeeded, 
when  the  Portuguese,  enraged  at  their  defeat,  brutally 
murdered  their  commander,  general  Vallonga,  and  dis- 
persed. The  whole  French  ariny  was  now  in  commu- 
nication on  the  left  bank  of  the  Ave,  the  way  to  Oporto 
was  opened,  and,  on  the  2Tth,  the  troops  were  finally 
concentrated  in  front  of  the  entrenchments  covering 
that  city. 

The  action  of  Monterey,  the  taking  of  Chaves,  and 
the  defeat  at  Braga,  had  so  damped  the  bishop's  ardour 
that  he  w.as,  at  one  lime,  inclined  to  abandon  the  de- 
fence of  Oporto  ;  but  this  idea  was  relinquished  when 
he  considered  the  multitudes  he  had  drawn  together, 
and  that  the  English  army  was  stronger  than  it  had 
been  at  any  previous  period  since  Cradock's  arrival ; 
Beresford,  also,  was  at  the  head  of  a  considerable  na- 
tive force  behind  the  Mondego,  and,  with  the  hope  of 
their  support,  he  resolved  to  stand  the  brunt.  He  had 
collected,  in  the  entrenched  camp,  little  short  of  forty 
thousand  men,  and  ainong  them  were  many  reo-ular 
troops,  of  which  two  thousand  had  lately  arrived  under 
the  command  of  general  Vittoria.  This  oflicer  had 
been  sent  by  Beresford  to  aid  Silveira,  but  when 
Chaves  surrendered,  he  entered  Oporto.  I'he  hopes  of 
the  people,  also,  were  high,  for  they  could  not  believe 
that  the  French  were  a  match  for  them ;  the  preceding 
defeats  were  attributed,  each  to  its  particular  case  cf 
treason,  and  the  murder  of  innocent  persons  followed 
as  an  expiation.  No  man  but  the  bishop  durst  thwart 
the  slightest  caprice  of  the  mob,  and  he  was  little  dis- 
posed to  do  so,  while  Raymundo,  and  others  of  his 
stamp,  fomented  their  fury,  and  directed  it  to  gratify 
personal  enmities.  Thus,  the  defeat  of  Braga  being 
known  in  Oporto,  caused  a  tumult  on  the  22d,  in  which 
Louis  D'Ohvera,  a  man  of  high  rank,  who  had  been 
cast  into  prison,  was,  with  fourteen  other  persons,  hal- 
ed forth,  and  despatched  with  many  stabs  ;  the  bodies 
were  then  mutilated,  and  dragged  in  triumph  through 
the  streets. 

The  entrenchments  extending,  as  I  have  said,  from 
the  Douro  to  the  coast,  were  complete,  and  armed  with 
two  hundred   guns.     They  consisted   of  a  number  of 


174 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR, 


[Book  VII. 


forts  of  diffprent  sizps,  placed  on  the  top  of  a  succes- 
sion of  rounded  hills,  an''  where  the  hills  failed,  the 
deforces  were  continued  by  earthen  ramparts,  loophol- 
ed  houses,  ditches,  and  felled  trees.  Oporto  itself  is 
built  in  a  hollow,  and  a  bridge  of  boats,  nearly  three 
Inindred  yards  in  length,  formed  the  only  communica- 
tion between  the  city  and  the  suburb  of  Villa  Nova; 
this  bridire  was  completely  commanded  by  fifty  guns, 
planted  on  the  bluff  and  criggy  heiglits  that  overhung 
the  river  above  Villa  Nova,  and  overlooked,  not  only 
the  city,  but  a  great  part  of  the  entrenched  camp  be- 
yond it.  "Within  the  lines,  tents  were  pitched  for  even 
greater  numbers  than  were  assembled,  and  the  people 
running  to  arms,  manned  their  works  with  great  noise 
and  tumult,  when  the  French  columns,  gathering  like 
heavy  thunder  clouds,  settled  in  front  of  the  camp. 

The  duke  c{  Dahnatia  arrived  on  the  27th.  While 
at  Hrnga  lie  had  written  to  the  bishop,  calling  on  him 
to  calm  the  popular  effervescence  ;  now,  beholding  the 
extended  works  in  his  front,  and  reading  their  weak- 
ness even  in  the  multitudes  that  guarded  them,  he 
renewed  his  call  upon  the  prelate,  to  spare  this  great 
and  commercial  city  the  horrors  of  a  storm.  A  prisoner, 
employed  to  carry  this  summons,  would  have  been 
killed,  but  that  it  was  pretended  I;e  came  with  an  offer 
from  Soult  to  surrender  his  army;  and  notwithstand- 
ing this  ingenious  device,  and  that  the  bishop  com- 
menced a  negotiation,  which  was  prolonged  until  even- 
ing, the  firing  from  the  entrenchments  was  constant 
and  general  during  the  whole  of  the  28th. 

'I  he  parley  being  finally  broken  off,  S'oult  made  dis- 
positions for  a  general  action  on  the  29th.  To  facili- 
tate this,  he  caused  Merle's  division  to  approach  the 
left  of  the  entrenchments  in  the  evening  of  the  28th, 
intending  thereby  to  divert  attention  from  the  true  point 
of  attack  ;  a  prodigious  fire  was  immediately  opened 
from  the  works,  but  Merle,  having  pushed  close  up, 
got  into  some  hnllow  roads  and  enclosures,  where  he 
maintained  his  fooling.  At  another  part  of  the  line, 
ho\vever,  some  of  the  Portugupse  pretending  a  wish 
to  surrender,  general  Foy,  with  a  single  companion, 
imprudently  approached  them,  when  the  latter  was 
killed,  and  Foy  himself  made  prisoner,  and  carried  into 
the  town.  He  was  mistaken  forLoison,  and  the  people 
called  out  to  kill  "  Mniictfi,''''  but  with  great  presence 
of  mind  he  held  up  his  hands,  and  the  crowd,  con- 
vinced of  their  error,  suffered  him  to  be  cast  into  the 
jail. 

The  bishop,  having  brought  affairs  to  this  awful  cri- 
sis, had  not  Resolution  to  brave  the  danger  himself. 
Leaving  generals  Lima  and  Pareiras  to  command  the 
army,  ht^,  with  an  escort  of  troops,  quitted  the  city, 
and,  crossing  \\\rt  river,  took  his  station  in  the  Sarea 
convent,  built  on  the  top  of  the  rugged  hill  which 
overhung  the  suburb  of  Villa  Nova,  from  whence  he 
beheld  in  saft  ty  the  horrors  of  the  next  day.  The 
bells  in  Oporto  continued  to  ring  all  night,  and  about 
twelve  o'clfik  a  violent  thnmler  storm  arising,  the 
sound  of  the  winds  was  mistaken  in  the  camp  for  the 
approach  of  enemies;  at  once  the  whole  line  blazed 
with  a  fire  of  musketry,  the  roar  of  two  hundred  pieces 
of  artillery  was  heard  above  the  noise  of  the  tempest, 
and  the  Portuguese  calling  to  one  another  with  loud 
cries,  were  agitated  at  once  with  fury  and  with  terror. 
The  morning,  however,  broke  serenely,  and  a  little 
befori'  seven  o'clock  the  sound  of  trumpets  and  drums, 
and  the  glitter  of  arms,  gave  notice  that  the  French 
army  was  in  motion  for  the  attack. 

nATTLE    AND    STORMING    OF    OPOnTO.* 

The  feint  made  the  evening  before  against  the  left, 
which  was  the  weakest  nirt  of  the  line,  had  perfectly 
succeeded,  the  Portuguese  generals  placed  their  prin- 

*  S.  Journal  of  OpfMtioDs,  MS. 


cipal  masses  on  that  side;  but  the  duke  of  Dalmatia 
was  intent  upon  the  strongest  points  of  the  works, 
being  resolved  to  force  his  way  through  the  town,  and 
seize  the  bridge  during  the  fight,  that  he  might  secure 
the  passage  of  the  river.  His  army  was  divided  into 
three  columns;  of  which  the  first,  under  Merle,  attack- 
ed the  left  of  the  Portuguese  centre  ;  the  second,  under 
Franceschi  and  Laborde,  assailed  their  extreme  right ; 
the  third,  composed  of  Mermet's  division,  sustained 
by  a  brigade  of  dragoons,  was  in  the  centre,  tieneral 
Lorge  was  appointed  to  cut  off  a  body  of  ordenan(^a, 
who  were  posted  with  soine  guns,  in  front  of  the  Por- 
tuguese left,  but  beyond  the  works  on  the  road  of 
Villa  de  Conde. 

The  battle  was  commenced  by  the  wings ;  for  Mer- 
met's division  was  withheld,  until  the  enemy's  generals, 
believing  the  whole  of  the  attack   was  developed,  had 
weakened  their  centre  to  strengthen  their  flanks.  Then 
the  French  reserves,  rushing  violently  forwards,  broke 
through  the  entrenchments,  and  took  the  two  principal 
forts,  entering  by  the  embrasures,   and   killing  or  dis- 
persing all   within  them.     Soult  instantly  rallied   his 
tiocps,  and  sent  two  battalions  to  take  the  Portuguese 
left  wing  in  the  rear,  while  two  other  battalions  were 
ordered  to  march  straight  into  the  town,  and  make  for 
the  bridge.     The  Portuguese  army,  thus  cut  in  two, 
was  soon  beaten  on  all  points.    Laborde  carried  in  suc- 
cession a  number  of  forts,  took  fifty  pieces  of  artillery, 
■  and  reaching  the  eige  of  the   city,  halted   until  Fran- 
I  ceschi,  who  was  engaged  still  mere  to  the  left,  could 
'join  him.    By  this  movement  a  large  body  of  the  Por- 
1  tuguese  were  driven  off  from  the  town,  and  forced  back 
\  to  the  Douro,  being  followed  by  a  brigade  under  gen- 
'  eral  Arnaud. 

I  Merle,  seeing  that  the  success  of  the  centre  was 
complete,  brought  up  his  left  flank,  cameo  all  the  fcrts 
to  his  right  in  succession,  killed  a  great  number  of  the 
defenders,  and  drove  the  rest  towards  the  sea.  These 
last  dividing,  fled  for  refuge,  one  part  to  the  fort  of  St. 
.Toa,  the  other  towards  the  mouth  of  the  Douro,  where, 
\  maddened  by  terror,  as  the  French  came  pouring  down 
upon  them,  they  strove,  some  to  swim  across,  others 
to  get  over  in  small  boats  ;  their  general,  Lima,  called 
out  against  this  hopeless  attempt,  but  they  turned  and 
murdered  him,  within  musket-shot  of  the  approaching 
enemy,  and  then,  renewing  the  attempt  to  cross,  near- 
ly the  whole  perished.  The  victory  was  now  certain, 
for  Lorge  had  dispersed  the  people  on  the  side  of  Villa 
de  Conde,  and  general  Arnniid  hemming  in  those  above 
the  town  prevented  them  from  plungiiig  into  the  river 
also,  as  in  their  desperate  mood  they  were  going  to  do. 
'  Nevertheless  the  battle  continued  within  Opr)rlo,  for 
the  two  battalions  sent  from  the  centre  having  burst 
the  barricades  at  the  entrance  of  the  streets,  pe n-^rated, 
fighting,  to  the  bridge,  and  here  all  the  horrid  circum- 
stances of  war  seemed  to  be  accumulated,  and  the  ca- 
lamities of  an  age  compressed  into  one  doleful  hour. 
More  than  four  thousand  persons,  old  and  young,  and 
of  both  sexes,  were  seen  pressing  forward  with  wild 
tumult,  some  alr^iady  on  the  bridge,  others  striving  to 
gain  it,  all  in  a  state  of  phrenzy.  The  batteries  on  the 
opposite  bank  openi.'d  tlioir  fire  when  the  l-'rem-h  ap- 
peared, and  at  that  moment  a  troop  of  Portuguese  cav- 
alry flying  from  the  fight  came  down  one  of  the 
streets,  and  remorseless  in  their  fears,  bore,  at  full  gal- 
lop, into  the  midst  of  the  miserable  helpless  crowd, 
trampling  a  bloody  pathway  to  the  river.  Suddenly 
j  the  nearest  boats,  unable  to  sustain  the  increasing 
j  weight,  sunk  and  the  foremost  wretches  still  timibling 
!  into  the  river,  as  lh(>y  were  pressed  from  behind,  peri'^h- 
ed,  until  the  heaped  bodies  rising  at)ove  the  surface  of 
the  waters,  filled  all  the  space  left  by  the  sinking  of 
the  vessels. 
I  The  first  of  the  French  that  arrived,  amazed  at  this 
[fearful  spectacle,    forgot  the  battle,  and   hastened  to 


1809.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


175 


save  those  who  still  stnig'gled  for  life — and  while  some 
were  thus  nobly  employed,  others  by  the  help  of  planks, 
gettin(T  on  to  the  firmer  parts  of  the  bridge,  crossed  the 
river  and  carried  the  batteries  on  the  heijjhts  of  Villa 
Nova.  The  passarre  was  thus  secured,  but  this  terrible 
destruction  did  not  complete  the  measure  of  the  city's 
calamities;  two  hundred  men,  who  occupied  the  bish- 
op's palace,  fired  I'rom  the  windows  and  maintained 
Lhat  post  until  the  French,  gathering  round  them  in 
strength,  burst  the  doors,  and  put  all  to  the  sword. 
F^very  street  and  house  then  rung  with  the  noise  of 
the  combatants  and  the  shrieks  of  distress  ;  for  the 
French  soldiers,  exasperated  by  long  hardships,  and 
prone  like  all  soldiers  to  ferocity  and  violence  during 
an  assault,  became  frantic  with  fury,  when  in  one  of 
the  principal  sfjuares,  they  found  several  of  their  com- 
rades who  liad  been  made  prisoners,  fastened  upright, 
and  living,  but  with  their  eyes  burst,  their  tongues 
torn  out,  their  other  members  mutilated  and  gashed. 
Those  that  beheld  the  sight  spared  none  who  fell  in 
their  way.  It  was  in  vain  that  Soult  strove  to  stop  the 
slaughter;  it  was  in  vain  that  hundreds  of  officers  and 
soldiers  opposed,  at  the  risk  of  their  lives,  the  venge- 
ance of  their  comrades,  and  by  their  generous  exer- 
tions rescued  vast  numbers  that  would  otherwise  have 
fallen  victims  to  the  anger  and  brutality  of  the  moment. 
The  frighiful  scene  of  rape,  pillage,  and  murder,  closed 
not  for  many  hours,  and  what  with  those  who  fell  in 
battle,  those  who  were  drowned,  and  those  sacrificed 
to  revenge,  it  is  said  lhat  ten  thousand  Portuguese  died 
on  that  unhappy  day  !*  The  loss  of  the  French  did  not 
exceed  five  hundred  men. 


CHAPTER  III. 

Operations  of  t!ie  first  nnrl  fourth  corps. — Gen(»ral  state  of  the 
Fieiirh  army — Description  of  the  valley  of  the  Tagiis — Inert- 
ness of  niarshcil  Victor — A!but|iierque  and  Cartoajil  dispute 
— The  l;itt(r  advances  in  La  Mancha — General  Sfebastiaiii 
wins  the  battle  of  Ciudad  Real — Marshal  Victor  forces  the 
passasfe  of  the  Tagus,  and  drives  Cuesta's  army  from  all  its 
positions — F'rench  cavalry  rhecked  at  Miajiidas — Victorcross- 
(S  the  (iundiana  at  Medtllin — Albuqutrque  joins  Cuesta's 
ar.iiy — Battle  of  Medtllin — Spaniards  totally  (tefeated — Vic- 
tor ortlered,  b)'  the  kins:,  to  invade  Portu°:rd — 0|)ens  a  secret 
coniniuni'-atinn  with  some  j)ersrins  in  Hadaios — The  peasants 
of  Albuera  discover  the  plot,  which  fails — Operations  of  gen- 
eral La])isse — He  drives  back  sir  R.  Wilson's  posts,  and 
makes  a  slii^ht  attempt  to  take  Ciudad  Rodrigo — Marches 
suddenly  t  iwards  the  Tagus,  and  forces  the  bridg^e  of  Alcan- 
tara— Joins  Victor  at  Merida — General  insurrection  along- 
the  I'oit'ignese  frontier — The  central  junta  remove  Car- 
toaj  d  from  the  command,  and  increase  Cuesta'*  authority, 
whose  army  is  ivin'orced — Joseph  d'scontenteil  with  Lapis- 
se's  movement — Orders  Victor  to  retake  the  bridj>e  of  Al- 
cantara. 

The  dire  slaufrhter  at  Oporto  was  followed  up  by  a 
Tariety  of  iinportant  operations  ;  but  before  these  are 
treated  of,  it  is  essential  to  narrate  the  contempora- 
neous events  on  the  Tagus  and  the  Guadiana,  for  the 
war  was  \\ide  and  cotnplicatpd,  and  the  result  depend- 
ed more  «iion  the  general  combinations  than  upon  any 
particular  movements. 

OPERATIONS    OF    THE    FIRST    AND     FOURTH    CORPS. 

It  has  been  already  related  that  Marshal  Victor,  after 
making  a  futile  attempt  to  surprise  the  marquis  of  Pa- 
lacios,  had  retired  to  his  former  quarters  at  Toledo ; 
that  the  conde  de  Cartoajal,  who  succeeded  the  duke 
of  Infantado,  had  advanced  to  Ciudad  Real  with  about 
fourteen  thousand  men;  that  Cuesta  having  broken  the 
bridge  of  Almnraz,  (rnarded  the  line  of  the  Tagus  with 
fourteen  thousand  infantry  and  two  thousand  five  hun- 
dred cavalry.  The  4th  corps  remained  at  Talavcra 
and  Placentia,  but  held  the  bridge  of  Arzobispo  by  a 


•  S.  Journal  of  Operations,  MS. 


detachment.  The  remainder  of  the  French  army  was 
in  Catalonia,  at  Zaragcza,  or  on  the  communication  ; 
the  reserve  of  heavy  cavalry  had  been  suppressed,  and 
the  regiments  dispersed  among  the  corps  cJ^arniee  ;  the 
whole  army,  exclusive  of  the  king's  guards,  was  about 
two  hundred  and  seventy  thousand  men,  with  forty 
thousand  horses,  shewing  a  decrease  of  sixty-five  thou- 
sand men  since  the  I5th  of  November.*  But  this  in- 
cluded the  imperial  guards,  the  reserve  of  infantry,  and 
many  detachments  drafted  from  the  corps — in  all  forty 
thousand  men,  who  had  been  struck  efi' the  rolls  of  the 
army  in  Spain,  with  a  view  to  the  war  in  Germany. 
The  real  loss  of  the  French  by  sword,  sickness,  and 
captivity,  in  the  four  months  succeeding  Napoleon's 
arrival  in  the  Peninsula,  was  therefore  about  twenty- 
five  thousand — a  vast  number,  but  not  incredible,  when 
it  is  considered  that  two  sieges,  twelve  pitched  battles, 
and  innumerable  combats  had  taken  place  during  that 
period. 

Such  was  the  state  of  affairs  when  the  duke  of  Bel- 
luno,  having  received  orders  to  aid  Soult  in  the  inva- 
sion of  Portugal,  changed  places  with  the  fourth  corpS. 
Sebastiaui  was  then  opposed  to  Cartoajal,  and  Victor 
stood  against  Cuesta.  The  former  fixed  his  head-quar- 
ters at  Toledo,  the  latter  at  Talavera  de  la  Reyna,  the 
communication  between  them  being  kept  up  by  Mont- 
brun's  division  of  cavalry,  while  the  garrison  of  Ma- 
drid, composed  of  the  king's  guards,  and  Dessolle's 
division,  equally  supported  both.  But  to  understand 
the  connection  between  the  first,  second,  and  fourth 
corps,  and  Lapisse's  division,  it  is  necessarj'  to  have  a 
clear  idea  of  the  nature  of  the  country  on  both  sides  of 
the  Tagus. 

That  river,  after  passing  Toledo,  runs  through  a  deep 
and  long  valley,  walled  up  on  either  hand  by  lofty 
mountains.  Those  on  the  right  bank  are  always  capped 
with  snow,  and  rantring  nearly  parallel  with  the  course 
of  the  stream,  divide  the  valley  of  the  'I'agus  from  Old 
Castile  and  the  Salamanca  country  ;  the  highest  parts 
being  known  by  the  names  of  the  vSierra  de  Credos, 
Sierra  de  Bejar,  and  Sierra  de  Gata.  In  these  sierras 
the  Alberche,  the  Tietar,  and  the  Alagon,  take  their 
rise,  and  ploughing  the  valley  in  a  slanting  direction, 
fall  into  the  Tagus. 

The  principal  mountain  on  the  left  bank  is  called 
the  iMorra  de  (iuadalupe ;  it  extends  in  a  southwanl 
dire<"tion  from  the  river,  dividing  the  upper  part  of  La 
Mancha  from  Spanish  Estremadura. 

The  commimications  leading  from  the  Salamanca 
country  into  the  valley  of  the  Tagus  are  neither  many 
nor  good  ;  the  princi])al  passes  are — 

1st.  The  way  of  Horcajada,  an  old  Roman  road, 
which,  running  through  Pedrahita  and  Villa  Franca, 
crosses  the  Sierra  de  Credos  at  Puerto  de  Pico,  and 
then  descends  by  Montbeltran  to  Talavera. 

2d.  The  pass  of  Arenas,  leading  nearly  parallel  to, 
and  a  short  distance  from,  the  first. 

3d.  Thepass  of  Tornevecas,  leadingupon  Placentia, 

4th.  The  route  of  Bejar,  which,  crossing  the  Sierra 
de  Bejar  at  the  pass  of  Banos,  descends  likeiftise  upon 
Placentia, 

5th.  The  route  of  Payo  or  Gata,  which  crosses  th» 
Sierra  de  Gata  by  the  pass  of  Perales,  and  afterwards 
dividing,  sends  one  branch  to  Alcantara,  the  other  to 
Coria  and  Placentia,  Of  these  five  passes  the  two  last 
only  are,  generally  speaking,  practicable  for  artillery. 

The  royal  roads,  fnni  Toledo  and  Madrid  to  Badajos, 
unite  lu^ar  Talavera  and  follow  the  course  of  the  Tagu9 
by  the  right  bank  as  far  as  Naval  Moral,  but  then,  turn- 
ing to  the  left,  cross  the  river  at  thi!  bridge  of  Ahiiaraz. 
Now,  from  Toledo,  westward,  to  the  bridge  of  Alniarnz, 
a  distance  of  above  fifty  miles,  the  left  bank  of  the 
Tagus  is  so  crowded  by  the  ruggc^l  shoots  of  the  Sierra 
de  Guadalupe,  that  it  may  be  broadly  stated  as  inipas- 

*   Iiuperial  Muster-rolls  MSS, 


176 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  VH. 


sable  for  an  army,  and  this  peculiaritj'  of  orrrund  gives 
tlie  key  to  the  operations  on  both  sides.  For  Cuesta 
and  Cartoajal,  by  reason  of  tliis  impassable  Sierra  de 
Gundalupe,  bnd  no  direct  military  ccninuinication ;  but 
Victor  and  Sebastiani,  rccupyina  Toledo  and  Talavera, 
could  unite  on  either  line  of  operations  by  the  rryal 
roads  above  mentioned,  or  by  a  secondary  road  which 
runninor  near  Yebenes  cresses  the  Tajjns  by  a  stone 
bridge  near  Puebla  de  Montalvan,  half  way  between 
To'edo  and  IVJavera. 

The  rallying  point  of  the  French  was  Madrid,  and 
their  parallel  lines  of  defence  were  the  Tagus,  the 
Albf  rche,  and  the  Guadar.ima. 

The  base  of  Cartoajal's  operations  was  the  Sierra  de 
Morena. 

Cuesta's  first  line  was  the  Tagus,  and  his  second  the 
Guadiana.  from  whence  he  could  retreat  by  a  flank 
march  to  Badajos,  or  by  a  direct  one  to  the  defiles  of 
Monasterio  in  the  Sierra  Morena. 

The  two  Spanish  armies,  if  they  had  been  united, 
,would  not  have  furnished  more  than  twenty-six  thou- 
sand infantry  and  five  thousand  cavalry,  and  they  had 
no  reserve.  The  two  French  corps,  united,  would  have 
exceeded  thirty-five  thousand  fiirhting-men,  supported 
bv  the  reserve  under  the  king.  The  French,  therefore, 
had  the  advantage  of  numbers,  position,  and  discipline. 

Follouins  the  orders  of  Napoleon,  marshal  Victor 
should  have  been  at  Merida  before  the  middle  of  Febru- 
ary. In  that  position  he  would  have  confined  Cuesta 
to  the  Sierra  Sirrena,  and  with  his  twelve  regiments 
ef  cavalry  he  could  easily  have  kept  all  the  flat  coun- 
try, as  far  as  Badajos,  in  subjection.  That  fortress 
itself  had  no  means  of  resistance,  and,  certainly,  there 
was  no  Spanish  force  in  the  field  capable  of  impeding 
the  full  execution  of  the  emperor's  instructions,  which 
were  also  reiterated  by  the  king.  Nevertheless,  the 
duke  of  Belluno  remained  inert  at  this  critical  period, 
and  the  Spaniards,  attributing  his  inactivity  to  weak- 
ness, endeavoured  to  provoke  the  blow  so  unaccounta- 
bly withheld  ;  for  Cuesta  was  projecting  offensive 
movements  against  Victor,  and  the  duke  of  Albuquer- 
que was  extremely  anxious  to  attack  l^oledo  from  the 
Bide  of  La  Mancha.  Cartoajal  opposed  Albuquerque's 
plans,  but  offered  him  a  small  force  with  which  to  act 
independently.  The  duke  complained  to  the  junta  of 
Cartoajal's  proceedings,  and  Mr.  Frere,  whose  traces 
are  to  be  found  in  every  intrigue,  and  every  absurd 
j'roject  broached  at  this  period,  having  supported  Albu- 
querque's cemplaints,  Carto?jal  was  directed  by  the 
junta  to  foUiw  the  duke's  plans;  but  the  latter  was 
himself  ordered  to  join  Cuesta,  with  a  detachment  of 
fcur  or  five  thousand  men. 

ROUT  OF  CIUDAD  REAL. 

Cartoajal,  in  pursuance  of  his  instructions,  marched 
with  twelve  thousand  men,  and  twenty  guns,  towards 
Toledo;  his  advanced  guard  attacked  a  regiment  of 
Polish  lancers,  near  Consuegra,  but  the  latter  retired 
without  loss.  Hereupon,  Sebastiani,  with  about  ten 
thousand  men,  came  up  against  him,  and  the  leading 
divisions  encountering  at  Yebenes,  the  Spaniards  were 
pushed  back  to  (-iudad  l{eal,  where  they  halted,  leav- 
ing guards  on  the  river  in  front  of  that  town.  The 
French  immediately  forced  the  passage,  and  a  tumult- 
uary action  ensuing,  Cartoajal  was  totally  routed,  with 
the  loss  of  all  his  guns,  a  thousand  slain,  and  several 
thousand  prisoners;  the  vanquished  fled  bv  Almao-ro, 
and  the  French  cavalry  pursued  even  to  the  foot  of  the 
Sierra  Morena.  This  action,  fought  on  the  27th  of 
March,  and  commonly  called  the  battle  of  Ciudad  Real, 
was  not  followed  up  with  any  great  profit  to  the  vic- 
tors. Sebastiani  gathered  up  the  spoils,  sent  his  pris- 
oners to  the  rear,  and  held  his  troops  concentrated  on 
the  upper  Guadiana,  to  await  the  result  of  Victor's 
operations;  thus  enabling  the  Spanish  fugitives  to  rally 


at  Carolina,  where  they  were  reinforced  by  levies  from 
Grenada  and  Cordova. 

While  these  events  were  passing  in  La  Mancha, 
Estrtmadura  was  also  invaded,  for  the  king,  having 
received  a  despatch  from  Soult,  daud  Orense,  and 
giving  notice  that  the  second  corps  would  be  at  Oporto 
about  the  loth  cf  March,  had  reiterated  the  Ordei  for 
Lapisse  to  move  on  Abrantes,  and  for  the  duke  of  Bel- 
luno to  pass  the  Tagus  and  drive  Cuesta  beyond  the 
Guediana.  Marshal  Victor,  who  appears  to  have  been, 
for  some  reason  unknown,  averse  to  aidinsr  the  opera- 
tions of  the  second  corps  at  all,  remonstrated,  and  espe- 
cially urged  that  the  order  to  Lapisse  should  be  with- 
drawn, lest  his  division  should  arrive  too  scon,  and 
without  support,  atAhrantes;  but  this  time  the  king 
was  finn,  and,  on  the  11th  of  March,  the  duke  cf  Bel- 
luno, having  collected  five  days'  provisions,  made  the 
necessary  dispositions  to  pass  the  Tagus. 

The  amount  cf  the  Spanish  force  immediately  on  that 
river  was  about  sixteen  thousand  men,  and  (_'uesta  had 
also  several  detachments  and  irregular  barids  in  his 
rear,  which  may  be  calculated  at  eight  thousand  more.* 
The  duke  of  Belluno,  however,  esiimatr d  the  troops  in 
position  before  him  at  thirty  thousand,  a  great  error  foi 
so  experienced  a  commander  to  make.  On  the  other 
hand,  Cuesta  was  as  ill  informed  ;  for  this  was  the 
moment  when,  with  his  approbation,  colonel  d'Urban 
proposed  to  sir  John  Cradcck,  that  curiously  combined 
attack  against  Victor,  already  noticed,  in  which  the 
Spaniards  were  to  cross  the  Tagus.  and  sir  Robert  Wil- 
son was  to  come  down  upon  the  Tietar.  This,  also, 
was  the  period  that  Mr.  Frere,  apparently  ignorant  that 
there  were  at  least  twenty-five  thousand  fighting  men 
in  the  valley  of  the  Tagus,  without  reckoning  the  king's 
or  Sebastiani's  troops,  proposed,  that  the  twelve  thou- 
sand British  under  sir  John  Cradock,  should  march 
from  Lisbon  to  "drive  the  fourth  French  corps  from 
Toledo,"  and  "consequently,"  as  he  phrased  it,  "  from 
Madrid."  The  first  movement  of  marshal  Victoi 
awakened  Cuesta  from  these  dreams. 

The  bridsfes  of  Talavera  and  Arzobispo  were,  as  we 
have  seen,  held  by  the  French,  and  their  advanced  posts 
were  pushed  into  the  valley  of  the  Tagus,  as  far  as  the 
Barca  de  Bazagona. 

The  Spanish  position  extended  from  Garbin,  near 
the  bridge  of  Arzobispo,  to  the  bridge  of  Almaraz,  the 
centre  heing  at  Mcza  dThor,  a  position  of  surprising 
strength,  running  at  right  angles  from  the  'l"agus  to  the 
Guadalupe.  The  head-qnarters  and  reserves  were  at 
Deleytosa,  and  a  road,  cut  by  the  troops,  afforded  a 
communication  between  that  place  and  Meza  d'Ibor. 

On  the  right  bank  of  the  Tagus  there  was  easy  ac- 
cess to  the  bridges  of  Talavera,  Arzrbispo,  and  Alma- 
raz;  but  on  the  left  bank  no  read  existed,  by  which 
artillery  could  pass  the  mountains,  except  that  of  Alma- 
raz, which  was  crossed  at  the  distance  of  four  or  five 
miles  from  the  river  by  the  almost  impregnable  ridge 
of  Mirabete. 

The  duke  of  Belluno's  plan  was,  to  pass  the  Tagus 
at  the  bridges  of  Talavera  and  Arzobispo.  with  his  in- 
fantry and  part  of  his  cavalry,  and  to  operate  mi  the 
Sierra  de  Guadalupe  against  the  Spanish  right ;  while 
the  artiller}'  and  grand  pare,  protected  by  the  remainder 
of  the  cavalry,  were  to  be  united  opposite  Almaraz, 
having  with  them  a  raft  bridge  to  throw  across  at  that 
point.f  This  project  is  scarcely  to  be  reconciled  with 
the  estimate  miide  of  Cuesta's  force  ;  for  surely  nothing 
could  be  more  rash  than  to  expose  the  whole  of  the 
guns  and  field  stores  of  the  army,  with  no  other  guard 
than  some  cavalry  and  one  battalion  of  infantry,  close 
to  a  powerful  enemy,  who  possessed  a  good  pontoon 
train,  and  who  might,  consequently,  pass  the  river  at 
pleasure. 


*  Gfneral  Spnu  ie's  .'ournal  ol  Operatiotij,  MS. 
+  Journal  of  Opt  rati  -ns  of  the  I  irst  Corps,  N.S. 


I80D.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


177 


The  15th,  Laval's  division  of  German  infantry,  and 
I.asalle's  cavalry,  crossed  at  Talavera,  and,  turninpr  to 
the  ricrht,  worked  a  march  through  the  rocky  hills; 
the  infantry  to  Aldea  Nueva,  on  a  line  somewhat  short 
of  the  bridfje  of  Arzobispo  ;  the  cava'ry  hip^her  r.p  the 
mountain  towards  l']strella.  The  IGth,  wlien  those 
troops  had  advanced  a  few  miles  to  the  front,  tlie  head- 
quarters, and  the  other  divisions  of  infantry,  passed  the 
bridge  of  Arznhispo  ;  while  the  artillery  and  the  pares, 
accompanied  by  a  battalion  of  sfrenadiers,  and  the  es- 
corting cavalry,  moved  to  Almaraz,  with  orders  to 
watch,  on  the  17th  and  18th,  for  the  appearance  of  the 
army  on  the  heights  at  the  other  side,  and  then  to 
niove  down  to  the  point  before  indicated  for  launching 
the  raft  bridire. 

Alarmed  by  these  movements,  Cuesta  hastened  in 
person  (o  Mirahete,  and  directing  general  Henestrosa 
to  defend  the  bridge  of  Almaraz,  with  eight  thonsand 
men,  sent  a  detachment  to  reinforce  his  own  right  wing, 
which  was  posted  behind  the  Ibor,  a  small  river,  but 
at  this  season  running  with  a  full  torrent  from  the 
Guadalupe  to  the  Tagus. 

The  17th,  the  Spanish  advanced  guards  were  driven, 
with  some  loss,  across  the  Ibor.  They  attempted  to 
re-form  on  the  high  rocky  banks  of  that  river,  but  be- 
ing closely  followed,  retreated  to  the  camp  of  Meza 
d'Ibor,  the  great  natural  strength  of  wliich  was  in- 
creased by  some  field-vrorks.  Their  position  could 
only  be  attacked  in  front,  and  this  being  apparent  at 
the  first  glance,  Laval's  division  was  instantly  formed 
into  columns  of  attack,  which  pushed  rapidly  up  the 
naountain,  the  inequalities  of  ground  covering  them  in 
some  sort  from  the  effects  of  the  enemy's  artillery. 
As  they  arrived  necr  the  summit,  the  fire  of  musketry 
and  grape  became  murderous,  but  at  this  instant  the 
Spaniards,  who  should  have  displayed  all  their  vigour, 
liroke  and  fled  to  Campillo,  leaving  behind  them  bag- 
gage, magazines,  seven  guns,  and  a  thousand  prison- 
ers, bes^ides  eight  hundred  killed  and  wounded.  The 
French  had  only  seventy  killed,  and  five  hundred 
wounded  ;  and  while  this  action  was  taking  place  at 
Meza  d'lhor,  Villattt's  division,  being  higher  up  the 
f-'ierra,  to  the  left,  overthrew  a  smaller  body  of  Span- 
iards, at  Frenedoso,  making  three  hundred  prisoners, 
and  capturing  a  large  store  of  arms. 

The  18lh,  at  dry-break,  the  duke  of  Belluno,  who 
had  superintended  in  person  the  attack  at  Meza  d'Ibor, 
examined  from  that  high  ground  all  the  remaining  po- 
sition of  the  Spaniards.  Cuesta,  he  observed,  was  in 
full  retreat  to  Truxillo,  but  Henestrosa  was  still  posted 
in  front  of  Almaraz  ;  wherefore  Villatte's  division  was 
detached  after  Cuesta,  to  Deleytosa,  and  Laval's  Ger- 
mans were  led  against  Henestrosa,  and  the  latter, 
aware  of  his  danger  and  already  preparing  to  retire, 
was  driven  hastily  over  the  ridge  of  Mirahete. 

In  the  course  of  the  night,  the  raft  bridge  was  thrown 
across  the  Tagus  ;  the  next  day  the  French  dragoons 
passed  to  the  left  bank,  the  artillery  followed,  and  the 
cavalry  immediately  pushed  forward  to  Truxillo,  from 
which  town  Cuesta  had  already  fallen  back  to  Santa 
Cruz,  leaving  Henestrosa  to  cover  the  retreat.  The 
20th,  after  a  slight  skirmish,  the  latter  was  forced  over 
the  Mazarna,  and  the  whole  French  army,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  a  regiment  of  dragoons  (left  to  guard  the 
raft  bridge)  was  poured  along  the  road  to  Merida. 

The  advanced  guard,  consisting  of  a  regiment  of 

.  liglit  cavalry,   under  general    Bordesoult,  arrived   the 

.21st  in   font  cf  Miajadas,  where   tlie  road   dividing, 

sends  one  branch  to  Merida,  the  other  to  Me.iillin.    A 

party  of  Spanisii  horsemen  were  posted  near  the  town, 

they  appeared  in  great  alarm,  and  by  their  hesitating 

movements  invited  a  charge;  the  F'rcnch  incautiously 

galloped  forward,  and,  in  a  moment,  twelve  or  fourteen 

hundred  Spanish  cavalry,  placed  in  ambush,  came  up 

lit  speed  on  the  flar.ks.     General   Lasalle,  who  from  a 

13 


distance  had  observed  the  movements  of  both  sides, 
immediately  rode  forward  with  a  second  regiment,  and 
arrived  just  as  Bordesoult  had  extricated  himself  from 
a  great  peril,  by  his  own  valour,  but  with  the  loss  of 
seventy  killed  and  a  hundred  wounded. 

After  this  well-managed  combat,  Cuesta  retired  to 
Medellin  without  being  molested,  and  Victor  spreading 
his  cavalry  posts  on  the  different  routes  to  gain  intel- 
ligence and  to  collect  provisions,  established  his  own 
quarters  at  Truxillo,  a  town  of  some  trade,  and  advan- 
tageously situated  for  a  place  of  arms.*  It  had  been 
deserted  by  the  inhabitants  and  pillaged  by  the  first 
French  troops  that  entered,  but  it  still  offered  great  re- 
sources for  the  army,  and  there  was  an  ancient  citadel, 
capable  of  being  rendered  defensible,  whicii  was  imme- 
diately armed  with  the  Spanish  guns,  and  provisioned 
from  the  magazines  taken  at  Meza  d'Ibor.  Meanwhile, 
the  flooding  of  the  Tagus  and  the  rocky  nature  of  its 
bed,  injured  the  raft-bridge  near  Almaraz,  and  delayed 
the  passage  cf  the  artillery  and  stores;  wherefore  di- 
rections M'ere  given  to  have  a  boat-bridge  prepared, 
and  a  field-fort  constructed  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Ta- 
gus, to  be  armed  witli  three  guns,  and  garrisoned  with 
a  hundred  and  fifty  men  to  protect  the  bridge.  These 
arrangements  and  the  establishment  of  an  hospital,  for 
two  thousand  men,  at  Truxillo,  delayed  the  first  corps 
until  the  24th  of  March. 

The  light  cavalry  leinforced  by  twelve  hundred  vnl- 
iigeurs  being  posted  at  Miajadas,  had  covered  all  the 
roads  branching  from  that  central  point  with  their 
scouting  parties,  and  now  reported  that  a  few  of  Cues- 
ta's  people  had  retired  to  Medellin;  that  from  five  to 
six  thousand  men  were  thrown  into  the  Sierra  de 
Guadalupe  on  the  left  of  the  French  ;  that  four  '.hou- 
sand  infantry  and  two  thousand  cavalry  were  behind 
the  river  Garganza,  in  front  of  Medellin,  and  thai 
every  thing  else  was  over  the  Guadiana,  Thus  the 
line  of  retreat  chosen  by  Cuesta  uncovered  Merida, 
and,  consequently,  the  great  road  between  Badajos  and 
Seville  was  open  to  the  French.  But  Victor  was  not 
disposed  to  profit  from  this,  for  he  was  aware  that  Al- 
buquerque was  ccming  from  La  Mancha  to  Cuesta, 
and  believed  that  he  brought  nine  thousand  infantry 
and  two  thousand  cavalry;  he  therefore  feared  tlu-.l 
Cuesta's  intention  was  either  to  draw  him  into  a  diffi- 
cult country,  by  making  a  flank  march  to  join  Cartoa- 
jal  in  La  Mancha;  or  by  crossing  the  Guadiana  above 
Naval  Villar,  where  the  fords  are  always  practicable, 
to  rejoin  his  detachments  in  the  Sierra  de  Guadalupe, 
and  so  establish  a  new  base  of  operations  on  the  left 
flank  of  the  French  army.  This  reasoning  was  nas- 
placed  ;  neither  Cuesta  nor  his  army  were  capable  cf 
such  operations  ;  his  line  of  retreat  was  solely  directed 
by  a  desire  to  join  Albuquerque,  and  to  save  his  troops, 
by  taking  to  a  rugged  instead  of  an  open  country- 
The  duke  of  Belluno  lost  the  fruits  of  his  previous 
success,  by  thus  over-rating  his  adversary's  skill ;  in- 
stead of  following  Cuesta  with  a  resolution  to  break 
up  the  Spanish  army,  he,  after  leaving  a  brigade  at 
Truxillo  and  Almaraz,  to  protect  the  communications, 
was  contented  to  advance  a  few  leagues  on  the  road  to 
Medellin  with  his  main  body;  sending  his  light  cav- 
alry to  IMerida,  and  pushing  on  detachments  towards 
Badajos  and  Seville,  while  other  parties  explored  the 
roads  leading  into  the  G'uadalupe. 

The  •27th,  however,  lie  marched  in  person  to  Me- 
dellin, at  the  head  of  two  divisions  of  infantry,  and  a 
brigade  of  heavy  cavalry.  Eight  hundred  Spanish 
horse  posted  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Guadiana,  retired 
at  his  approach,  and  crossing  that  river,  halted  at  Don 
Benito,  where  they  were  reinforced  by  other  squadrons, 
but  no  infantry  were  to  be  discovered.  The  duke  of 
Belluno  then  passing  the  river  took  post  on  the  road 

*   Journal  of  Operations,  MSS. 


178 


NAPIEirS   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  VII. 


leaHino- toMinrrabril  and  Don  Benito,  and  the  situation 
of  Vlip  P^encii  army  In  the  evening  was  as  fellows  : 

The  main  body,  consisting  of  two  divisions  of  infan- 
try, and  one  incomplete  brigade  of  heavy  cavalry  in 
position  on  the  road  leading  from  Medellin  to  Don 
Benito  and  IMingabril. 

The  remainder  of  the  dragoons,  under  Latour  Mau- 
bourg,  at  Zoriia,  fifteen  miles  on  the  left,  watching  the 
Spaniards  in  the  Guadalupe. 

The  light  cavalry  at  iMerida,  eighteen  miles  to  the 
right,  having  patrolled  all  that  day  on  the  roads  to 
Eadajos,  Seville,  and  Medellin. 

Ruffin's  division  at  Miajadas  eighteen  miles  in  the 
rear. 

But  in  the  course  of  the  evening  intelligence  arrived 
that  Albuquerque  was  just  come  up  with  eight  thou- 
sand men ;  that  the  combined  troops,  amounting  to 
Iwentv-eight  thousand  infantry  and  seven  thousand 
cavalry,  were  in  position  on  the  table  land  of  Don 
Benito,  and  that  Cuesta,  aware  of  the  scattered  state 
of  the  P'rench  army,  was  preparing  to  attack  the  two 
divisions  on  their  march  the  next  day.  Upon  this, 
Victor,  notwithstanding  the  strength  of  the  Spanish 
army,  resolved  to  fight,  and  immediately  sent  orders  to 
Lasalle,  to  Ruflin,  and  to  Latour  Maubourg,  to  bring 
theirdivisions  down  to  Medellin;  the  latter  was  also  di- 
rected to  Ifave  a  detachment  at  Miajadas  to  protect  the 
route  of  Merida,  and  a  brigade  at  Zorita,  to  observe  the 
Spaniards  in  the  Sierra  de  Guadalupe. 

Cuesta's  numbers  were  greatly  exaggerated;  that 
general  blaming  every  body  but  himself,  for  his  failure 
on  the  TafTus,  had  fallen  back  to  Campanarios,  rallied 
all  his  scattered  detachments,  and  then  returned  to  Villa 
Nueva  de  Serena,  where  he  was  joined  on  the  27th  by 
Albuquerque,  who  brought  up,  not  a  great  body  of  in- 
fantry and  cavalry  as  supposed,  but  less  than  three 
thousand  infantry  and  a  few  hundred  horse.  This  re- 
inforcement, added  to  some  battalions  drawn  from 
Andalusia,  increased  Cuesta's  army  to  about  twenty- 
five  thousand  foot,  four  thousand  horse,  and  eighteen 
or  twenty  pieces  of  artillerj';  and  with  this  force,  he, 
fearing  for  the  safety  of  Badajos,  retraced  his  steps  and 
ru.^hed  headlong  to  destruction. 

Medellin,  possessing  a  fine  stone-bridge,  is  situated 
in  a  hollow  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Guadiana,  and  just 
beyond  the  town  is  a  vast  plain,  or  table  land,  the  edge 
of  which,  breaking  abruptly  down,  forms  the  bed  of  the 
river.  The  Ortigosa,  which  cuts  this  plain,  is  a  rapid 
torrent,  rushing  perpendicularly  on  to  the  Guadiana, 
and  havinor  steep  and  rugged  banks,  yet  in  parts  pass- 
■  able  for  artillery.  Two  roads  branch  out  from  Medel- 
lin, the  one  leading  to  Mingabril  on  the  right,  the  other 
to  Don  Benito  on  the  left,  those  places  being  about  five 
miles  apart. 

BATTLE  OF  MEDELLIN. 

The  French  army,  with  the  exception  of  the  troops 
left  to  cover  the  communications  and  those  at  Zorita, 
was  concentrated  in  the  town  at  ten  o'clock,  and  at  one, 
about  fourteen  thousand  infantry,  two  thousand  five 
hundred  cavalry,  and  forty-two  pieces  of  artillery,  went 
forth  to  fight.  'I'he  plain  on  the  side  of  Don  Benito 
was  bounded  by  a  high  ridge  of  land,  behind  which 
Cuesta  kept  the  Spanish  infantry  concealed,  showino- 
only  his  cavalry  and  some  guns  in  advance.  To  make 
him  display  his  lines  of  infantry  the  French  general 
sent  Lasalle's  light  cavalry,  with  a  battery  of  six  guns 
and  two  battalions  of  German  infantry,  towards  Don 
Benito,  while  Latour  Maubourg,  with  five  squadrons 
of  dragoons,  eight  jruns,  and  two  other  battalions,  keep- 
ing close  to  the  Ortigosa,  advanced  towards  a  point  of 
the  enemy's  ridge  called  the  IJetamosa.  'I'he  rest 
of  the  army  were  kept  in  reserve,  the  division  of  Vil- 
latte  and  the  rcmaindf  r  of  the  (lermans,  being,  one- 
half  on  the  road  of  Don  Benito,   the  other  half  on  the 


road  of  Mingabril.  Ruffin's  division  was  a  little  way 
in  rear,  and  a  battalion  was  left  to  guard  the  baggage 
at  the  bridge  of  Medellin. 

As  the  French  squadrcm  advanced,  the  artillery  on 
both  sides  opened,  and  tke  Spanish  cavalry  guards  in 
the  plain  retired  slowly  to  the  higher  ground.  Lasallo 
and  Latour  Maubourg  then  pressed  forward,  but  just  as 
the  latter,  who  had  the  shortest  distance  to  traverse, 
approached  the  enemy's  position,  the  whole  Spanish 
line  of  battle  was  suddenly  descried  in  full  march  over 
the  edge  of  the  ridge,  and  stretching  from  the  Oitigosa 
to  within  a  mile  of  the  Guadiana, — a  menacing  but 
glorious  apparition.  Cuesta,  Henestrosa,  and  the  duke 
del  Parque,  with  the  mass  of  cavalry,  were  on  the  left; 
Francisco  Frias,  with  the  main  body  of  infantry,  in  the 
centre;  Equia  and  Portazgo  on  the  right,  which  was 
prolonged  to  the  Guadiana  by  some  scattered  squadrons 
under  Albuquerque,  who  flanked  the  march  of  the  host 
as  it  descended  with  a  rapid  pace  into  the  plain. 

Cuesta's  plan  was  now  disclosed ;  his  line  over- 
lapped the  French  left,  and  he  was  hastening  to  cut 
their  army  off  from  Medellin,  but  his  order  of  battle 
was  on  a  front  of  three  miles,  and  he  had  no  reserve. 
The  duke  of  Belluno,  seeing  this,  instantly  brought  his 
centre  a  little  forward,  and  then,  reinforcing  Latour 
Maubourg  with  ten  guns  and  a  battalion  of  grenadiers, 
and  detaching  a  brigade  of  infantry  as  a  support,  or- 
dered him  to  fall  boldly  on  the  advancing  enemy;  at 
the  same  time  Lasalle,  who  was  giving  way  under  the 
pressure  of  his  antagonist,  was  directed  to  retire  to- 
wards ^ledellin,  always  refusing  his  left. 

The  Spaniards  marched  briskly  forward  into  the 
plain,  and  a  special  body  of  cavalry,  with  three  thou- 
sand infantry,  ruiming  out  from  their  left,  met  Latour 
Maubourg  in  front,  while  a  regiment  of  hussars  fell 
upon  the  French  columns  of  grenadiers  and  guns  in  his 
rear.  The  hussars  being  received  with  gra]ie,  a  pelt- 
ing fire  of  musketry,  and  a  charge  in  flank  by  some 
dragoons,  were  beaten  at  once;  but  tlio  Spanish  infan- 
try, closely  followed  by  the  rest  of  their  ov/n  cavalry, 
came  boldly  up  to  Latour  Maubourg's  horsem.en,  and 
with  a  rough  discharge,  forced  them  back  in  disorder. 
The  French,  however,  soon  rallied,  and  smasliing  the 
Spanish  ranks  with  artillery,  and  fighting  all  together, 
broke  in  and  overthrew  their  enemies,  man  and  horse. 
Cuesta  was  wounded  and  fell,  but,  being  quickly  re- 
mounted, escaped. 

While  this  was  passing  on  the  French  right,  Lasalle's 
cavalry,  continually  refusing  its  left,  was  broucrht  fight- 
ing close  up  to  the  main  body  of  the  French  infantry, 
which  was  now  disposed  on  a  new  front,  having  a  re- 
serve behind  the  centre.  Meanwhile  Latour  Mau- 
bourg's division  was  beinnf  re-formed  on  the  ridge  from 
whence  the  Spaniards  had  first  descended,  and  the 
whole  face  of  the  battle  was  cban<.''ed ;  for  the  Spanish 
left  being  put  to  fl  ght,  the  French  right  wing  over- 
lapped the  centre  of  their  antagonist,  and  the  long  at- 
tenuated line  of  the  latter  wavering,  disjointed,  and 
disclosing  wide  chasms,  was  still  advancing  without 
an  object. 

The  duke  of  Belluno,  aware  that  the  decisive  moment 
of  the  battle  had  arrived,  was  on  the  point  of  command* 
ing  a  general  attack,  when  his  attention  was  arrested 
by  the  appearance  of  a  column  coming  down  on  the 
rear  of  his  right  wing  from  the  side  of  Mingabril.  A 
brigade  from  the  reserve,  with  four  guns,  was  imme- 
diately sent  to  keep  this  body  in  clu  ok,  while  Lasalle's 
cavalry,  taking  ground  to  its  left,  umnasked  the  infan- 
try in  the  centre,  and  the  latter  advancing,  poured  a 
heavy  fire  into  the  Spanish  ranks;  Latour  Moubourg, 
sweeping  round  their  left  flaiik,  then  fell  on  the  rear, 
and,  at  the  same  moment,  Lasalle  also  galloped  in  upon 
the  dismayed  and  broken  bands.  A  horrible  carnage 
ensued,  for  the  French  soldiers,  while  their  strength 
would  permit,   continued   to  follow    and   strike,  uutil 


18090 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


179 


three-fifths  of  the  Spanish  army  wallowed  in  Wood. 
Six  o^uns  and  several  ihoussnd  prisoners  were  taken; 
General  Frias,  deeply  wounded,  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  victors;  and  so  utter  was  the  discomfiture,  that  fcr 
several  days  after,  Cnesta  could  not  rally  a  sin«rle  bat- 
talion of  infantry,  and  his  cavalry  was  only  saved  by 
the  speed  nf the  horses. 

Following'  g:eneral  Semele's  journal,  of  which,  how- 
ever, I  only  possess  an  unauthenticaled  copy,  the  French 
loss  (lid  not  exceed  three  hundred  men  ;  a  number  so 
utterly  disproportionate  to  that  of  the  vanquished  as  to 
be  scarcely  credible,  and  if  correct,  discovering  a  savage 
rig'our  in  the  pursuit  by  no  means  commendable;  for 
it  does  not  appear  tliat  any  previous  cruelties  were  per- 
petrate\J  by  the  Spaniards  to  irritate  the  French  sol- 
diers. The  riijht  to  slaucrhter  an  enemy  in  battle  can 
neither  be  disputed  nor  limited;  but  a  brave  soldier 
should  always  have  regard  to  the  character  of  bis 
country,  and  be  sparing  of  the  sword  towards  beaten 
men. 

The  main  body  of  the  French  army  passed  the  night 
ofthe-28th  near  the  field  of  battle;  but  Latour  Mau- 
bourcf  marched  with  the  dragoons  by  the  left  bank  of 
the  Gnadiana  to  Merida,  leaving  a  detachment  at  Torre 
Mexia  to  watch  the  roads  of  Almendralego  and  Villa 
Franca,  and  to  give  notice  if  the  remains  of  Cuesta's 
army  shonld  attempt  to  gain  Badajos,  in  which  case 
the  dragoons  had  orders  to  intercept  them  at  Loboa. 
The  29ih,  Villatte's  division  advanced  as  far  as  Villa 
Nueva  de  Serena,  and  the  light  cavalry  were  pushed 
on  to  Campanarins  ;  yet,  as  all  the  reports  agreed  that 
(^iiesta.  with  a  few  horsemen,  had  taken  refuge  in  the 
Sierra  iMorena,  and  that  the  remnants  of  his  army  were 
dispersed  and  wandering  throutrh  the  fields  and  along 
the  bye-roads,  without  any  power  of  reuniting,  the  duke 
of  Belluno  relinquished  the  pursuit.  Having  fixed  his 
liead-.^uarters  at  Merida,  and  occupied  that  place  and 
}>'edellin  with  his  infantry,  he  formed  with  his  cavalry 
a  belt  extending  from  Loboa  on  the  right  to  iMingabril 
en  the  left;  but  from  all  this  tract  of  country  the  peo- 
ple liad  fled,  and  even  the  great  towns  were  deserted, 
Merida.  situated  in  a  richly-cultivated  basin,  possessed 
a  fine  bridge  and  inany  magnificent  remains  of  anti- 
quity, Roman  and  Moorish;  amongst  others,  a  castle 
built  on  the  riglu  bank  of  the  river,  close  to  the  bridge, 
was  so  perfect  that,  in  eight  days,  it  was  rendered 
capable  of  resisting  any  sudden  assault;  six  guns  were 
mounted  on  the  walls,  an  hospital  for  a  thousand  men 
was  established  there,  and  a  garrison  of  three  hundred 
n'en,  with  two  months'  stores  and  provisions  for  eight 
hundred,  was  put  into  it. 

The  king  now  repeated  his  orders,  that  the  duke  of 
Belluno  should  enter  Portugal,  and  that  general  La- 
pisse  should  march  upon  Abrantes.  The  former  again 
remcnstratf^d,  on  the  ground  that  he  could  not  make 
such  a  movement  and  defend  his  communications  with 
Almaraz.  unless  the  division  of  Lapisse  was  permitted 
to  join  him  by  the  route  of  Alcantara.  Nevertheless 
as  Badajos,  although  more  capable  of  defence  than  it 
}iad  been  in  December,  when  the  fourth  corps  was  at 
Merida.  was  still  far  from  being  secure  ;  and  as  many 
of  the  richer  inhabitants,  disgusted  and  fatigued  with 
the  violence  of  the  mob  government,  were  more  in- 
clined to  betray  the  gates  to  the  French  than  to  risk  a 
siege;  Victor,  whose  battering  train  (composed  of  only 
twelve  pieces,  badly  housed  and  provided)  was  still  at 
Truxillo,  opened  a  secret  communication  with  the  mal- 
contents. The  parties  met  at  the  village  of  Albuera, 
and  everything  was  arranged  for  the  surrender,  wlien 
toe  peasants  giving  notice  to  the  junta  that  some  trea- 
son was  in  progress,  the  latter  arrested  all  the  persons 
supposed  to  be  implicated,  and  the  jiroject  was  baffled. 
The  duke  of  Belluno  then  resigned  all  further  thoughts 
of  Badajos,  and  contented  himself  with  sendinff  detach-  [ 
nientf  to  Alcantara  to  get  intelligence  of  general  Lapisse,  ! 


of  whose  proceedings  it  is  now  lime  to   give    seme 
account. 

OPERATIONS    OF    GENERAL     LAPISSE. 

This  general,  after  taking  Z  imora  in  January,  oc- 
cupied Ledesma  and  Salamanca,  where  he  was  joined 
bv  general  Maupetit's  brigade  of  cavalry  ;  sir  Robert 
Wilson's  legion  and  the  feeble  garrisons  in  Ciudad 
Rodrigo  and  Almeida  were  the  only  bcdii  s  in  his  front, 
and  universal  terror  prevailed  ;  yet  he,  although  at  the 
head  of  ten  thousand  men,  with  a  powerful  artillery, 
remained  inactive  from  .January  to  the  end  of  March, 
and  suffered  sir  Robert,  with  a  few  hundred  Portuguese, 
to  vex  his  outposts,  to  intercept  his  provisions,  to 
restrain  his  patroles,  and  even  to  disturb  his  infantry 
in  their  quarters.  This  conduct  brought  liim  into  con- 
tempt, and  enabled  Wilson  to  infuse  a  spirit  into  the 
people  which  they  were  far  from  feeling  when  the  ene- 
my first  appeared, 

Don  Carlos  d'Espana,  wMth  a  small  Spanish  force, 
being  after  a  time  placed  under  sir  Robert's  command, 
the  latter  detached  two  battalions  to  occupy  the  j)ass 
of  Ba  OS,  and  Lapisse  was  thus  deprived  of  any  direct 
communication  with  Victor,  In  this  situation  the 
French  general  remained  without  making  any  vigorous 
eff'ort,  either  to  clear  his  front,  or  to  get  intelligence  of 
the  duke  of  Dalmatia's  inarch  upon  Oporto,  until  the 
beginning  of  April,  when  he  advanced  towards  Bejar; 
but,  finding  the  passes  occupied,  turned  suddenly  to 
his  right,  dissipated  Wilson's  posts  on  the  Ecia,  and 
forced  the  legion,  then  commanded  by  colonel  Grant, 
to  take  refuge  under  the  guns  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo.  He 
summoned  that  town  to  surrender  on  the  6th,  and,  after 
a  slight  skirmish  close  to  the  walls,  took  a  position  be- 
tween the  Agueda  and  Ledesma,  This  event  was  fol- 
lowed by  a  general  insurrection,  from  Ciudad  Rodrigo 
to  Alcantara  and  from  Tamames  to  Bejar;  for  Lapisse, 
who  had  been  again  ordered  by  the  king  to  fulfil  the 
emperor's  instructions,  and  advance  to  Abrantes,  in- 
stead of  obeying,  suddenly  quitted  his  positions  on  the 
Agueda,  and,  without  regarding  his  connexion  with 
the  second  corps,  abandoned  Leon,  and  made  a  rapid 
march,  through  the  pass  of  Perales,  upon  Alcatitara, 
followed  closely  by  sir  Robert  Wilson,  don  Carlos 
d'Espaiia,  the  two  battalions  from  Bejar,  and  a  multi- 
tude of  peasanis,  both  Portuguese  and  Spanish, 

At  Alcantara,  a  corps  of  Spanish  insurgents  endeav- 
oured to  defend  the  passage  of  the  river,  but  the  French 
broke  through  the  entrenchments  on  the  bridge,  and, 
with  a  full  encounter  carried  the  town,  which  they  pil- 
laored  and  then  joined  the  first  corps  at  Merida  on  the 
19th  of  April,  I'liis  false  movement  greatly  injured 
the  French  cause.  From  that  moment  the  conquering 
impulse  given  by  Napoleon  was  at  an  end,  and  his 
armies,  ceasing  to  act  on  the  offensive,  became  station- 
ary or  retrograded,  while  the  British,  Spanish,  and 
Portuguese  once  more  assumed  the  lead.  The  duke 
of  Dalmatia,  abandoned  to  his  own  resources,  and  in 
total  ignorance  of  the  situation  of  the  corps  by  which 
his  movements  should  have  been  supported,  was  forced 
to  remain  in  Oporto ;  and  at  the  moment  w  hen  the 
French  combinations  were  thus  paralyzed,  the  arrival 
of  English  reinforcements  at  Lisbon  and  the  advance 
of  sir  John  ('radock  towards  Leiria,  gave  a  sudden 
and  violent  impetus  both  to  the  Spaniards  and  Portu- 
guese along  the  Beira  frontier.  The  insurrection,  no 
longer  kept  down  by  the  presence  of  an  internicdiate 
French  corps,  connecting  Victor's  and  Soult's  forces, 
was  thus  put  into  full  activity,  from  Alcantara  on  the 
Tagus,  to  Amarante  on  the  Tamega. 

During  this  time  Cuesta  was  gathering  another  host 
in  "he  Morena.  The  simultaneous  defeat  of  the  armies 
in  Estremadura  and  La  Mancha  had  at  first  produced 
the  greatest  dismay  in  Andalusia ;  yet  the  Spaniards, 
when  they  found   such  victories  as   Ciudad   Real  and 


180 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  VIT, 


Medellin  only  Ipadino;  to  a  staornant  inactivity  on  the 
part  of  the  French,  concluded  that  extreme  weakness 
was  t!ie  cause,  and  that  the  Austrian  war  had,  or  would, 
oblitre  N'.ipoleon  to  abandon  his  projects  af^ainst  the 
Peninsula.  This  idea  was  general,  and  upheld  the 
people's  spirit  and  the  central  junta's  authority,  which 
could  not  otherwise  have  been  maintained  after  such 
a  succession  of  follies  and  disasters. 

The  misfortunes  of  the  two  Spanish  (jenerals  had 
been  equal  ;  but  Cnrtoajal,  having  no  po])ular  influence, 
was  dismissed,  while  Cuesta  was  appointed  to  com- 
mand what  remained  of  both  armies;  and  the  junta, 
stimulated  for  a  moment  by  the  imminent  dangrer  in 
which  they  were  placed,  drew  tog^ether  all  the  scattered 
troops  and  levies  in  Andalusia,  to  reinforce  him.  'I'o 
cover  Seville,  Cuesta  took  post  in  the  defiles  of  Mo- 
nasterio,  and  was  there  joined  by  eitrht  hundred  horse 
and  two  thousand  three  hundred  infantry,  drafted  from 
the  garrison  of  Seville  ;  these  were  followed  by  thir- 
teen hundred  old  troops  from  Cadiz;  and  by  three 
thousand  five  hundred  Grenadian  levies  ;  and  finally, 
eight  thousand  foot,  and  two  thousand  five  hundred 
horsemen,  taken  from  the  army  of  La  Mancha,  contri- 
buted to  swell  his  numbers,  until,  in  the  latter  end  of 
April,  they  amounted  to  twenty-five  thousand  infantry, 
and  six  thousand  cavalry.  General  Venegas,  also, 
being  recalled  from  Valencia,  repaired  to  La  Carolina, 
and  proceeded  to  organize  another  army  of  La  Mancha. 
Meanwhile  .loseph,  justly  displeased  at  the  false  dis- 
position made  of  Lapisse's  division,  directed  that  Al- 
cantara should  be  immediately  re-occupied.  This  how- 
ever, could  not  be  done  without  an  action,  which  be- 
longs to  another  combination,  and  shall  be  noticed 
hereafter;  it  is  now  proper  to  return  to  the  operations 
on  the  Douro,  which  were  intimately  connected  with 
those  on  the  Guadiana. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

The  bishop  of  Oporto  flies  to  Lisbon,  and  joins  the  reg'ency — 
Huinanitv  of  marshal  Souit — The  Anti-Braganza  party  re- 
vives in  '.he  north  of  Portuoal — The  leaders  make  proposals 
to  Soul. —  He  enrourag^es   tliein — f'rror   arising   out   of  this 

firoceedinf^ — F^fTerts  of  Soult's  policy — Assassination  of  co- 
oiiel  Lameth — Execution  at  Arifana — Distribution  of  the 
French  troops — Frinceschi  opposed,  on  the  Vouga,  by  co- 
lontl  Trant — Loison  falls  back  behind  the  Sauza — Heudelet 
marches  to  t!ie  relief  of  Tuy — The  Spaniards,  aided  by  some 
F.nolish  friuales,  oblij^e  thirteen  hundred  F'rench  to  capitulate 
at  V'ij;o — Heudelet  returns  to  Bra°:a — The  insurrection  iii 
the  F.ntre  Minho  e  Douro  ceases — Silvfcira  menaces  Oporto 
— Laborde  reinforces  Loison,  and  drives  Silveira  over  the 
Tanief;;a — (iallant  conduct  and  death  of  colonel  Patrick  at 
Amaranle — Combats  at  Aniarante — French  repulsed — In- 
genious device  of  captain  Hrochard — The  biidge  of  Ania- 
rante carried  by  storm — Loison  advances  to  the  Douro — Is 
suddenly  checked — Observations. 

When  the  bishop  of  Oporto  beheld,  from  his  station 
at  Sarea,  the  final  overthrow  of  his  ambitious  schemes 
in  the  north  of  Portugal,  he  fled  to  Lisbon.  There  he 
reconciled  himself  to  the  regency,  became  a  member 
of  that  body,  was  soon  after  created  patriarch,  and,  as 
1  shall  have  occasion  to  shew,  used  his  great  influence 
in  the  most  mischievous  manner;  discovering,  on  every 
occasion,  the  untamed  violence  and  inherent  falseness 
of  his  disposition. 

The  fail  of  Oporto  enabled  marshal  Soult  to  esta- 
blish a  solid  base  of  operations,  and  to  commence  a 
regular  system  of  warfare.  The  immediate  fruit  of 
tiis  victory  was  the  capture  of  immense  magazines  of 
powder;  of  a  hundred  and  ninety-seven  piecc^s  of  ar- 
tillery, every  cun  of  which  had  been  used  in  the  action, 
and  of  thirty  English  v(!ssels,  wind-bound  in  the  river, 
loaded  wiili  wine  and  provisions  for  a  month,  which 
fell  into  his  hands.  Having  repressed  the  disorrlers 
itlendant  on  the  buttle,  he  adopted  the  same  concilia- 


tory policy  which  had  marked  his  conduct  at  Chaves 
and  Braga,  and  endeavoured  to  remedy,  as  far  as  it 
was  p'  ssible.  the  deplorable  results  of  the  soldiers' 
fury;  recovering  and  restoring  a  part  of  the  plunder, 
he  caused  the  inlnbitants  reniainii>g  in  the  town  to  be 
treated  with  respect,  and  invited,  by  proclamation,  r^ 
those  who  had  fled  to  return.  He  demanded  no  con- 
tribution, and  restraining  with  a  firm  hand  the  violence 
of  his  men,  contrived,  from  the  captured  public  pro- 
perty, to  support  the  army  and  even  to  succour  the 
poorest  and  most  distressed  of  the  population. 

But  his  ability  in  the  civil  and  political  administra- 
tion of  the  Entre  Minho  e  Douro  produced  an  effect 
which  he  was  not  prepared  for.  The  prince  regent's 
desertion  of  the  country  was  not  forgotten.  The  na« 
tional  feeling  was  as  adverse  to  Portugal  being  a  de- 
pendency on  the  Brazils,  as  it  was  to  the  usnrpatioa 
of  the  French,  and  the  comparison  between  Soult's 
government  and  the  horrible  anarchy  which  preceded 
it,  was  all  in  favour  of  the  former.  His  victories,  and 
the  evident  vigour  of  his  character,  contrasted  with 
the  apparent  supineness  of  the  English,  promised  per- 
manency for  the  French  power,  and  the  party,  firmerly 
noticed  as  being  inimical  to  the  house  of  Braoanza, 
revived.  The  leaders,  thinking  this  a  favourable  op- 
portunity to  execute  their  intention,  waited  upon  the 
duke  of  Dalmatia,  and  expressed  their  desire  for  a 
French  prince  and  an  independent  government.  They 
even  intimated  their  good  wishes  tov/ards  the  duke 
himself,  and  demanded  his  concurrence  and  protection, 
while,  in  the  name  of  the  pe  pie,  they  declared  that 
the  Braganza  dynasty  was  at  an  end. 

Although  unauthorized  by  the  emperor  to  accede  to 
this  proposition,  Soult  was  yet  unwilling  to  reject  a 
plan  from  which  he  could  draw  such  immediate  and 
important  military  advantages.  Napoleon  was  not  a 
man  to  be  lightl)'  dealt  with  on  such  an  eccasi<^n,  but 
the  marshal,  trusting  that  circumstances  would  justify 
him,  encouraged  the  design,  appointed  men  to  civil 
employments  and  raised  a  Portuguese  leg-ion  of  five 
battalions.  He  acted  with  so  much  dexterity  that  in 
fifteen  days,  the  cities  of  Oporto  and  Braga,  and  the 
towns  of  Bacellos,  Viana,  Villa  de  Conde,  Povoa  de 
Barcim,  Feira,  and  Ovar,  sent  addresses,  containing 
the  expression  of  their  sentiments,  and  bearing  the 
signatures  of  thirty  thousand  persons,  as  well  of  the 
nobles,  clergy,  and  inerrhants,  as  of  the  peo])le.  These 
addresses  were  burnt  when  the  French  retreated  from 
Oporto,  but  the  fact  that  such  a  project  was  in  agit  i- 
tion  has  never  been  denied  ;  the  regency  even  caused 
inquest  to  be  made  on  the  matter,  and  it  was  then  as- 
serted that  very  few  persons  were  found  to  be  impli- 
cated. That  many  of  the  signatures  were  forced  by 
the  leaders  may  readily  be  believed;  but  the  policy  of 
lessening  the  importance  of  the  afTair  is  also  evident, 
and  the  inquisitors,  if  willing,  could  not  have  probed 
it  to  the  bottom. 

This  transaction  formed  the  ground-work  of  a  tale, 
ofenerally  credited  even  by  his  own  oflicers,  that  Soult 
perfidiously  aimed  at  an  independent  crown.  The  cir- 
cumstances were  certainly  such  as  might  create  suspi- 
cion ;  but  that  the  conclusion  was  false,  is  shewn,  by 
the  mode  in  which  Napoleon  treated  both  the  rumour 
and  the  subject  of  it.*  Slighting  the  former,  he  yet 
made  known  to  his  lieutenant  that  it  had  reached  his 
ears,  adding  "/  remrmher  nofhin^s  l>"t  ,.^usterh'tz,'''''\ 
and  at  the  same  time  largely  incr(>ased  the  duke  of 
Dalmatia's  command.  On  the  otlu^r  hand,  the  policy 
of  Soult's  conduct  on  this  occasion,  and  the  great  in- 
fluence, if  not  the  numbers  of  the  Portuguese  malcon 
tents,  were  abundantly  proved  by  the  ameliorated  rela- 
tions between  the  army  and  the  peasantry.:^  The  fierce- 

*  Povipo's  Mfmoirts. 

f  So'ill  fU«t'ngui^hf  d  himself  in  that  battle. 

i  S.  Jtur.-!o  Ope  rations,  MSS. 


1809.1 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


181 


ness  of  the  latter  subsided  ;  and  even  the  priests 
abated  of  their  hostility  in  tlie  Entre  Minho  e  Douro. 
The  French  soldiers  were  no  longer  assassinated  in 
that  province ;  whereas,  previous  to  this  intrigue,  that 
cruel  species  of  warfare  had  been  carried  on  with  in- 
finite activity,  and  the  most  malignant  passions  called 
forth  on  both  sides. 

Among  other  instances  of  Portuguese  ferocity,  and 
of  the  truculent  violence  of  the  French  soldiers,  the 
death  of  colonel  Lametli  and  the  retaliation  which  fol- 
lowed, may  be  cited.  That  young  officer,  when  return- 
ing from  the  marshal's  quarters  to  his  own,  was  way- 
laid, near  the  village  of  Arrifana,  and  nmrdered  ;  his 
body  was  then  stripped,  and  mutilated  in  a  shocking 
manner.  This  assassination,  committed  within  the 
French  lines,  and  at  a  time  when  Soult  enforced  the 
strictest  discipline,  was  justifiable  neither  by  the  laws 
of  war  nor  by  those  of  humanity.  No  general  could 
neglect  to  punish  such  a  proceeding.  The  protection 
due  to  the  army,  and  even  the  welfare  of  the  Portu- 
guese within  the  F'rench  jurisdiction,  demanded  a  se- 
vere example  ;  for  the  violence  of  the  troops  had  hith- 
erto been  with  difficulty  restrained  by  their  comman- 
der, and  if,  at  such  a  moment,  he  had  appeared  indif- 
ferent to  their  individual  safety,  his  authority  would 
have  been  set  at  nought,  and  the  unmeasured  indiscri- 
minating  vengeance  of  an  insubordinate  army  ex- 
ecuted. 

Impressed  with  this  feeling,  and  afflicted  at  the  un- 
happy death  of  a  personal  friend,  Soult  directed  general 
'i'honiieres  to  march,  with  a  brigade  of  infantry,  to 
Arrifana,  and  punish  the  criminals.  Thomieres  was 
accompanied  by  a  Portuguese  civilian,  and,  after  a  ju- 
dicial inquiry,  shot  five  or  six  persons  whose  guilt  was 
said  to  have  been  proved  ;  but  it  is  certain  that  the 
principal  actor,  a  Portuguese  major  of  militia,  and  some 
of  his  accomplices,  escaped  across  the  Vouga  to  colo- 
nel Trant,  who,  disgusted  at  their  conduct,  sent  them 
to  marslia.  Beresford.  It  would  also  appear,  from  the 
statement  of  a  peasant,  that  Thomieres,  or  those  under 
him,  exceeded  Soult's  orders ;  for,  in  that  statement, 
attested  by  oath,  it  is  said  that  twenty-four  innocent 
persons  were  killed,  and  that  the  soldiers,  after  com- 
mitting many  atrocious  excesses,  burnt  the  village. 

These  details  have  been  related  partly  because  they 
throw  a  light  upon  the  direful  nature  of  this  contest, 
but  chiefly  because  the  transaction  has  been  adduced 
by  other  writers  as  proof  of  cruelty  in  Soult;  a  charge 
not  to  be  sustained  by  the  facts  of  this  care,  and  be- 
lied by  the  general  tenor  of  his  conduct,  which  even 
his  enemies,  while  they  attributed  it  to  an  insidious 
policy,  acknowledged,  at  the  time,  to  be  mild  and  hu- 
mane. And  now,  having  finished  this  digression,  in 
vhich  the  chronological  order  of  events  has  been  anti- 
cipated, I  shall  resume  the  narrative  of  military  opera- 
tions at  that  part  where  the  disorders  attendant  on  the 
battle  of  Oporto  having  been  repressed,  a  fresh  series 
of  combinations  were  commenced,  not  less  important 
than  those  which  brought  the  French  army  down  to 
the  Dcuro. 

The  heavy  blow  struck  on  the  29th  of  March  was 
followed  up  with  activity.  The  boat-bridge  was 
restored  during  the  night;  the  forts  of  Mazinho  and 
St.  Joa  de  Fez  surrendered  ;  Franceschi's  cavalry  cross- 
ed the  Douro,  and  taking  post  ten  miles  in  advance 
on  the  C'oiuibra  road,  pushed  patroles  as  far  as  the 
Vouga  river.  To  suppurt  this  cavalry,  general  Mer- 
met's  division  occupied  a  position  somewhat  beyond 
the  suburb  of  Villa  Nova;  Oporto  itself  was  held  by 
three  brigades  ;  the  dragoons  of  Lorge  were  sent  to 
Villa  da  Conde,  a  walled  town,  situated  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Ave;  and  general  Caulaincourt  was  directed  up 
the  Douro  to  Peiiafiel,  with  a  brigade  of  cavalry,  hav- 
ing orders  to  clear  the  valley  of  the  Tamega.  Another 
brigade  of  cavalry  was  posted  on  the  road  leading  to 


Barca  de  Trofa,  to  protect  the  rear  of  the  army,  and 
general  Heudelet  was  directed  to  forward  the  hospitals 
from  Braga  to  Oporto,  but  to  hold  his  troop  in  readi- 
ness to  open  the  communication  witli  Tu)'. 

These  dispositions  being  made,  vSoult  had  leisure  tc 
consider  his  general  position.  The  flight  of  the  bishop 
had  not  much  abated  the  hostilitv  of  the  people,  nor 
relieved  the  French  from  their  difficulties;  the  om- 
munication  with  the  Minho  was  still  intercepted  ;  the 
Tras  OS  Montes  was  again  in  a  state  of  insurrection  ; 
and  Silveira,  with  a  corps  of  eight  thousand  men,  not 
only  commanded  the  valley  of  the  Tamega,  but  had 
advanced,  after  retaking  Chaves,  into  the  p]ntre 
Minho  e  Douro  ;  posting  himself  between  the  Sierra  de 
Catalina  and  the  Douro.  Lisbon,  the  ultimate  object 
of  the  campaign,  was  two  hundred  miles  distant,  and 
covered  by  a  British  army,  whose  valour  was  to  be 
dreaded,  and  whose  numbers  were  daily  increasing.  A 
considerable  body  of  natives  were  with  Trant  upon 
the  Vouga,  and  Bercsford's  force  between  the  Tagus 
and  the  Mondego,  its  disorderly  and  weak  condition 
being  unknown,  appeared  formidable  at  a  distance. 
The  day  on  which  the  second  coips,  following  the 
emperor's  instructions,  should  have  reached  Lisbon 
was  overpassed  by  six  weeks,  the  line  of  correspon- 
dence wiiii  Victor  was  uncertain,  and  his  co-operation 
could  scarcely  be  calculated  upon.  Lapisse's  division 
was  yetunfelt  as  an  aiding  force,  nor  was  it  even  known 
to  Soult  that  he  still  remained  at  Salamanca  :  finally, 
the  three  thousand  men  expected  from  the  Astorga 
country,  under  the  conduct  of  the  marshal's  brother, 
had  not  yet  been  heard  of. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  duke  of  Dalmatia  had  con- 
quered a  large  and  rich  city;  he  had  gained  the  mili- 
tary command  of  a  very  fertile  country,  from  whence 
the  principal  supplies  of  the  British  army  and  of  Lis- 
bon were  derived  ;  he  had  obtained  a  secure  base  of 
operations  and  a  prominent  station  in  the  kingdom; 
and  if  the  people's  fierceness  was  not  yet  quelled,  they 
had  learned  to  dread  his  talents,  and  to  be  sensible  of 
their  own  inferiority  in  battle.  In  this  state  of  affairs, 
judging  that  the  most  important  objects  were  to  re- 
lieve the  garrison  of  Tuy  and  to  obtain  intelligence  of 
Lapisse's  division,  Soult  entrusted  the  first  to  Heudelet, 
and  the  second  to  Franceschi. 

The  last-named  general  had  occupied  Feira  and  Oli- 
veira,  and  spread  his  posts  along  the  Vouga  ;  but  the 
inhabitants  fled  to  the  other  side  of  that  river,  and  the. 
rich  valleys  beyond  were  protected  by  colonel  Trant. 
This  officer,  well  known  to  the  Portuguese  as  having 
commanded  their  troops  at  Roricja  and  Vimiero,  being 
at  Coimbra  when  intelligence  of  the  defeat  at  Braga  ar- 
rived, had  taken  the  command  of  all  the  armed  men  in 
that  town,  among  which  was  a  small  body  of  volun- 
teers, students  at  the  university.  The  general  dismay 
and  confusion  being  greatly  increased  by  the  subse- 
quent catastrophe  at  Oporto,  the  fugitives  from  that 
town  and  other  places,  accustomed  to  violence,  and  at- 
tributing every  misfortune  to  treachery  in  the  generals, 
flocked  to  Trant's  standard  ;  and  he,  as  a  foreigner, 
was  enabled  to  assume  an  authority  that  no  native  of 
rank  durst  either  have  accepted  or  refused  without  im- 
minent danger.  He  soon  advanced  with  eight  hundred 
men  to  Sardao  and  Aveiro,  where  Eben  and  general 
Vittoria  joined  him,  and  the  conde  de  Barbacena  brought 
him  some  cavalry.  But  as  the  people  regarded  these 
officers  with  suspicion  Trant  retained  the  command, 
and  his  force  was  daily  increased  by  the  arrival  of  or- 
denan<;a  and  even  regular  troops,  who  abandoned  Be- 
resford's  army  to  join  him. 

When  Franceschi  advanced,  Trant  sent  a  detach- 
ment by  Casianheira  to  occupy  the  bridge  of  the 
Vouga  ;  but  the  men,  seized  with  a  panic,  dispersed, 
and  this  was  followed  by  the  desertion  of  many  thou- 
sand ordenatica, — a  haj'py  circumsfdnce,  for  the  nam- 


182 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  VII. 


bftrs  iV  at  had  at  first  collectrd  behind  the  Vouga  ex- 
ceeded twelve  thousand  men,  and  tlieir  extreme  violence 
and  insubordinaticn  exciting  the  utmost  terror,  impeded 
the  measures  necessary  for  defence.  Trant,  finally, 
retained  about  three  thousand  men,  with  Mhich  impos- 
ing upon  the  I'rench,  he  preserved  a  fruitful  country 
from  their  incursions  ;  he  was  however  greatly  dis- 
tressed fcr  money,  because  the  bishop  of  Oporto,  in 
his  flight,  laid  hands  on  all  that  was  at  Coimbra  and 
carried  it  to  Lisbon. 

Franceschi,  although  reinforced  with  a  brigade  of 
infantry,  contented  himself  with  chasing  some  insur- 
gents that  infested  his  left  flank,  while  his  scouts,  sent 
forward  on  the  side  of  Viseu,  endeavoured  to  obtain 
information  of  Lapisse's  division  ;  but  that  general,  as 
we  have  seen,  was  still  beyond  the  Agueda  ;  and  while 
Franceschi  was  thus  employed  in  front  of  the  French 
army,  Caulaincourt's  cavalry  on  the  Tamega  was 
pressed  by  Silveira.  And  although  Loison  marched 
with  a  brigade  of  infantry  to  his  assistance  on  the  9th 
of  April,  Silveira  was  too  strong  for  both  ;  on  the  12th, 
advancing  from  Canavezes,  obliged  Loison,  after  a 
elight  action,  to  take  post  behind  the  Souza. 

Meanwhile,  Heudelet  was  hastening  towards  Tuy  to 
recover  the  artillery  and  dep  >ts,  from  which  the  army 
had  now  been  separated  forty  days.  He  was  joined 
nn  the  ()th  of  April,  at  Bacellos,  by  Lorge,  who  had 
taken  Villa  deConde  ar.d  cleared  the  coast  line.  The  7th 
they  marched  to  Ponte  de  Lima,  but  the  Portuguese 
resisted  the  passage  vigorously,  and  it  was  not  forced 
untH  the  8th.  The  10th  the  French  arrived  in  front  of 
Valenca,  on  the  Minho.  This  fortress  had  been  mal- 
treated by  the  fire  from  Tuy,  and  the  garrison,  amount- 
ing to  two  hundred  men,  having  only  two  days'  pro- 
visions left,  capitulated,  on  condition  of  being  allowed 
to  retire  to  their  homes,  and  before  the  French  could 
take  possession,  deserted  the  town.  The  garrison  in 
Tuy,  never  having  received  the  slightest  intelligence 
of  the  army  since  the  separation  at  Ribidavia,  marvelled 
that  the  fire  from  Valen(;'a  was  discontinued,  and  their 
surprise  was  extreme  when  they  beheld  the  French 
colours  flying  in  that  fort,  and  observed  French  videttes 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  Minho, 

La  Martiniere's  garrison,  by  the  arrival  of  stragglers 
and  a  baltulion  of  detachments  that  followed  the  army 
from  iSt.  Jiigo,  had  been  increased  to  three  thousand 
four  hundred  men ;  twelve  hundred  were  in  hospital, 
and  two-thirds  of  the  artillery-horses  had  been  eaten  in 
default  of  other  food;  the  Portuguese  had  passed  the 
Minho,  and,  in  conjunction  with  the  Spaniards,  attack- 
ed the  place  on  the  15th  of  March  ;  yet  the  French 
general,  by  frequent  sallies,  obliged  them  to  keep  up  a 
distant  blockade.  The  '22d  of  March,  the  defeat  at 
Uraga  being  known,  the  Portuguese  repassed  the  Min- 
ho, the  Spaniards  dispersed,  and  La  Martiniere  imme- 
diately sent  three  liuiidred  men  to  bring  off  the  garrison 
of  Vigo  ;  it  was  too  late,  that  place  was  taken,  and  the 
detachment  with  difiiculty  regained  Tuy. 

The  peasants  on  the  Arosa  Estuary  had,  as  1  have 
before  n(  liced,  risen,  the  27th  of  February,  while  Soult 
was  still  at  Orense;  they  were  headed,  at  first,  by 
general  Silva  and  by  the  count  de  Mezeda.  and,  finally, 
a  colonel  Uarrois,  sent  by  the  central  junta,  took  the 
command.  As  their  immbers  were  very  considerable, 
Uarrois  with  one  part  attacked  Tuy,  and  Silva  assisted 
by  the  Lively  and  Venus,  Urilish  frigates  on  that  sta- 
tion, invested  Vigo.  The  garrison  of  the  latter  place 
was  at  first  small,  but  the  paymaster-general  of  the 
second  corp«,  instead  of  proceeding  to  Tuy,  entered 
Vigo,  with  the  uiiiilary  chest  and  an  escort  of  eight 
hundred  men,  and  was  blockaded  there;  nevertheless, 
after  some  slight  attacks  had  been  repulsed,  the  French 
governor  negotiated  for  a  capitulation  on  the  2.3d  of 
March;  distrustful  however,  of  the  peasantry,  he  was 
Rtill  undecided  on  the  2uth,  and  meanwhile,  some  of 


Romana's  stragglers  coming  from  the  Val  des  Orres, 
collected  between  Tuy  and  Vigo;  and  Pablo  Murillo, 
a  regular  officer,  assembling  fifteen  hundred  retired 
soldiers,  joined  the  blockading  force.  His  troops  act- 
ing in  concert  with  captain  Mackinley,  of  the  Lively, 
obliged  the  garrison  to  surrender  on  terms.*  The  27th, 
thirteen  hundred  men  and  officers,  including  three  hun- 
dred sick,  marched  out  with  the  honours  of  war,  and, 
having  laid  down  their  arms  on  the  glacis,  were  em- 
barked for  an  English  port,  according  to  the  articles 
agreed  upon.  Four  hundred  and  fcrty-seven  horses, 
sixty-two  covered  waggons,  some  stores,  and  the  mil- 
itary chest,  containing  five  thousand  pounds,  fell  into 
the  victor's  hands.  'J'he  Spaniards  then  renewed  tlieir 
attack  on  Tuy ;  the  Portuguese  once  more  crossed  the 
Minho.  and  the  siege  continued  until  the  10th  of  April, 
when  the  place  was  relieved  by  Heudelet. 

The  depots  and  the  artillery  were  immediately  trans- 
ported across  the  river,  and  directed  upon  Oporto.  The 
following  day  general  Maucune,  with  a  division  of  the 
sixth  corps,  arrived  at  Tuy,  with  the  intention  of  car- 
rying off  the  garrison,  but  seeing  that  the  place  was 
relieved,  returned.  Heudelet,  after  taking  Viana,  and 
the  fort  of  Insoa,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Minho,  placed  a 
small  garrison  in  the  former,  and  blowing  up  the  works 
of  Valenca,  retired  to  Braga  and  Bacellos,  sending 
Lorge  again  to  Villa  de  Conde.  The  French  sick 
were  transported  in  boats  along  shore,  from  the  mouth 
of  the  Minho  to  Viana,  Villa  de  Conde,  and  thence  to 
Oporto,  and  while  these  transactions  were  taking  place 
on  the  Minho,  La  Houssaye,  with  a  brigade  of  dragoons 
and  one  of  infantry,  scoured  the  country  between  the 
Lima  and  the  Cavado,  and  so  protected  the  rear  of 
Heudelet. 

All  resistance  in  the  Entre  Minho  e  Douro  had  now 
ceased,  because  the  influence  of  the  Jlnll-Braganza 
party  was  exerted  in  favour  of  the  French  ;  but,  on  the 
Tras  OS  Monies  side,  Silveira  was  advancing,  and  be- 
ing joined  by  Botilho,  from  the  Lima,  boasted  that  he 
would  be  in  Oporto  the  15ih.  'J'his  unexpected  bold- 
ness was  explained  by  the  news  of  Chaves  having 
fallen,  w-hich  now,  for  the  first  time,  reached  Soult. 
He  then  perceived  that  while  Silveira  was  in  arms, 
the  tranquillity  of  the  Entre  Minho  e  Douro  could  only 
be  momentary,  and  therefore  directed  Labonle  with  a 
brigade  of  infantry,  to  join  Loison  and  attack  the  Por- 
tuguese general  by  Amarante,  while  La  Houssaye 
crossing  the  t'^avado,  should  push  through  Guimaraens 
for  the  same  point. 

The  15th,  Laborde  reached  Penafiel,  and  Silveira, 
hearing  of  La  Houssaye's  march,  retired  to  Villamea. 
'I'he  18th,  Laborde  drove  back  the  Portuguese  without 
difficulty,  and  their  retreat  soon  became  a  flight.  Sil 
veira  himself  passed  the  Tamega  at  Amarante,  and  was 
making  for  the  mountains,  without  a  thought  of  de- 
fending that  town,  when  colonel  Patrick,  a  British  of- 
ficer in  the  Portuguese  service,  encouraging  his  bat- 
talion, faced  about,  and  rallying  the  fugitives,  beat 
back  the  foremost  of  the  enemy.  'I  his  becoming  act 
obliged  Silveira  to  return,  and  while  Patrick  ih  fended 
the  approaches  to  the  bridge  on  tin?  right  bank  with 
obstinate  valour,  the  former  took  a  position,  on  the  left 
bank,  on  the  heights  overhanging  the  suburb  of  \'illa 
Real. 

The  19th,  La  Houssaye  arrived,  the  French  renewed 
their  attack  on  the  town,  and  Patrick  again  baffled 
their  efforts ;  but  when  that  gallant  man  being  mor 
tally  wounded,  was  carried  across  the  bridge,  the  de- 
fence slackened,  and  the  Portuguese  went  over  the 
Tamega :  the  passage  of  the  river  was,  however,  still 
to  be  effcctt^d.  The  bridges  of  Moiidin  and  (-avea 
above,  and  that  of  Canavezas  below  Amarante,  wer<9 
destroyed;  the  Tamega  was  in  full  flood,  with  a  deep 

*  Captain  Mackinlty's  Despatch. 


1S09.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


183 


rocky  bed  ;  the  bridge  in  front  of  the  French  was 
mined,  barred  with  three  rows  of  pallisades,  and  com- 
manded by  a  battery  of  ten  guns;  the  Portuguese 
were  in  position  on  the  heights  beyond,  and  could  from 
'hence  discern  all  that  passed  on  the  bridge,  and  rein- 
force their  advanced  guard  which  was  posted  in  the 
Siiburb. 

PASSAGE    OF    THE    TAMEGA,    AT    AMARANTE. 

Laborde  at  first  endeavoured  to  work  a  way  over  by 
the  flying  sap.  He  reached  the  barricade  the  20th  of 
April,  but  the  Portuguese  fire  was  so  deadly  that  he 
soon  relinquished  this  method  and  sought  to  construct 
a  bridge  rf  tressels  half  a  mile  below ;  which  failed, 
and  the  efforts  again«t  the  stone  bridge  were  renewed. 
The  27th,  the  centre  barricade  was  burned  by  captain 
Bruchard,  an  engineer,  who  then  devised  a  method  of 
forcing  a  passage  so  singularly  bold,  that  all  the  gen- 
erals and  especially  Foy,  were  opposed  to  it.  Never- 
theless it  was  transmitted  to  Oporto,  and  Soult  des- 
patched general  Hulot  to  examine  its  merits  on  the 
spot,  who  approved  of  it. 

It  appeared  that  the  Portuguese  mine  was  so  con- 
structed that  while  the  muzzle  of  a  loaded  musket  was 
in  the  chamber,  a  string-  tied  to  the  trigger  passed  over 
the  trenches  and  secured  the  greatest  precision  for  the 
exj  lesion.  Brochard  theref<ire  proceeded  in  the  follow- 
ing manner.  In  the  night  of  the  2d  of  May,  the  French 
troops  were  conveniently  disposed  as  near  the  head  of 
the  bridge  as  the  necessity  of  keeping  them  hidden 
would  permit;  at  eight  o'clock  although  the  moon 
shone  bright,  twenty  men  were  sent  a  little  below  the 
bridge  to  open  an  oblique  fire  against  the  .^ntrench- 
mci;ts,  and  this  being  replied  to  and  the  attention  of  the 
Portuguese  diverted  to  that  side,  a  sapper,  dressed  in 
dark  grey,  crawled  out,  pushing  with  his  head  a  barrel 
of  powder,  which  was  likewise  enveloped  in  grey 
cloth  to  deaden  the  sound,  along  that  side  of  the  bridge 
which  was  darkened  by  the  shadow  of  the  parapet; 
when  he  had  placed  his  barrel  against  the  entrench- 
ment covering  the  Portuguese  mine,  he  retired  in  the 
same  manner.  Tvvo  others  followed  in  succession,  and 
retired  without  being  discovered,  but  the  fourth,  after 
placing  his  barrel,  rose  to  run  back,  and  was  imme- 
diately shot  at  and  wounded.  The  fire  of  the  Portu- 
guese was  then  directed  on  the  bridge  itself,  but  as  the 
barrels  were  not  discovered,  it  soon  ceased,  and  a  fifth 
sapper  advancing  like  the  others,  attached  a  sausage 
seventy  yards  long  to  the  barrels.  At  two  o'clock  in 
the  morning  the  whole  was  completed,  the  French  kept 
very  quiet,  and  the  Portuguese  remained  tranquil  and 
unsuspicious. 

Brochard  had  calculated  that  the  effect  of  four  bar- 
rels exploding  together  would  destroy  the  Portuguese 
entrenchments,  and  burn  the  cord  attached  to  their 
mine.  The  event  proved  that  he  was  right,  for  a 
thick  fcg  arising  about  three  o'clock  in  the  morning, 
the  sausage  was  fired,  and  the  explosion  made  a  large 
breach.  Brochard,  with  his  sappers,  instantly  jumped 
en  the  bridge,  threw  water  into  the  mine,  cut  away  all 
obstacles,  and,  followed  by  a  column  of  grenadiers,  was 
at  the  other  side  before  the  smoke  cleared  away.  The 
grenadiers  being  supported  by  other  troops,  not  only 
tJie  suburb,  but  the  camp  on  the  height  behind  were 
tarried  without  a  check,  and  the  Portuguese  dispersing, 
fled  over  the  mountains.  The  execution  of  this  bold, 
ingenious,  and  successful  project,  cost  only  seven  or 
cioht  men  killed  ;  while  in  the  former  futile  attempts 
above  a  hundred  and  eighty  men,  besides  many  engi- 
neer and  artillery  officers,  had  fallen.  It  is,  however, 
a  singu'ar  fact,  that  there  was  a  practicable  ford  near 
thf^  bridge,  unguarded,  and  apparently  unknown  to  both 
sides. 

A  short  time  after  the  passage  of  the  Tamega,  Heu- 
delet,  marching  from  Bratra  bv  Cuimaraens,  entered 
Amarante ;  Laborde  occupied  the  position  abandoned 


by  Silveira,  and  sent  detachments  up  the  left  bank  of 
the  river  to  Mondin,  while  Loison  pursued  the  fugitives. 
The  Portuguese,  at  the  bridge  of  Canavesas,  hearing 
of  the  action,  destroyed  the  ammunition,  and  reiireid 
across  the  Douro.  Over  that  river  also  went  the  inhab- 
itants of  Mezamfrio  and  Villa  Real,  when  Loison,  on 
the  6th  of  May,  appeared  in  their  vicinity. 

This  being  made  known  to  Scult,  he  reinforced  Loi- 
son, and  directed  him  to  scour  the  right  bank  of  tha 
Douro  as  high  as  Przo  de  Ragca ;  to  complete  the  de- 
struction of  Silveira's  army,  and  with  a  view  to  the 
reduction  of  the  Tras  os  ]\Iontes,  to  patrole  towards 
Braganza,  on  which  side  Bessieres  had  been  asked  to 
co-operate.  That  marshal  was  however  gone  to  France, 
and  the  reply  of  his  successor  Kellerman  being  inter- 
cepted, it  appeared  that  he  was  unable  or  unwilling  to 
afford  any  aid. 

Laborde  was  now  recalled  to  Oporto,  with  two  regi- 
ments of  infantry,  another  regiment  and  a  brigade  of 
dragoons  were  left  to  guard  the  communications  with 
Amarante,  and  meanwhile  Loison,  meeting  with  resist- 
ance at  Pezo  de  Ragoa,  and  observing  a  considerable 
movement  on  the  opposite  bank  of  the  Douro,  became 
alarmed,  and  fell  back  to  IMezamfrio.  The  8th  he  re- 
turned to  Amarante,  but  his  march  was  harassed  by  the 
peasantry,  with  a  vigour  and  boldness  that  indicated 
the  vicinity  of  some  powerful  support,  and  in  truth  a 
new  actor  had  appeared  ;  the  whole  country  was  in 
commotion,  and  the  duke  of  Dalmatia  felt  himself  sud- 
denly pushed  backward  by  a  strong  and  eager  hand. 

OBSERVATIONS. SPANISH  OPERATIONS. 

1. — The  great  pervading  error  of  the  Spaniards  in 
this  campaign  was  the  notion  that  their  armies  were 
capable  of  taking  the  lead  in  offensive  movements,  and 
fighting  the  French  in  open  countries ;  whereas,  to 
avoid  general  actions  should  have  been  with  them  a 
vital  principle. 

2. — The  resolution  to  fight  the  French  having  been 
unfortunately  adopted,  the  second  great  error  was  the 
attaching  equal  importance  to  the  lines  of  operation  in 
La  Mancha  and  Estremadura;  the  one  should  have 
been  considered  only  as  an  accessory.  It  is  evident 
that  tlie  first  rank  belonged  to  La  Mancha,  because  il 
was  in  a  more  open  country;  because  it  more  imme- 
diately threatened  Madrid  ;  and  because  a  defeat  there 
endangered  Seville  more  than  a  defeat  in  I]stremadura 
would  have  done.  In  La  Mancha  the  beaten  Spanish 
army  must  have  fallen  back  upon  Seville,  in  Estrema- 
dura it  might  have  retired  upon  Badajos.  But  the  latter 
place  being  defensible,  and  to  the  Spaniards  of  infinite- 
ly less  importance  than  Madrid  was  to  their  opponents, 
the  lead  in  the  campaign  must  always  have  belonged 
to  the  army  of  La  iNlaucha,  which  could,  at  any  time, 
have  obliged  the  French  to  fight  a  battle  for  the  capi- 
tal. The  army  of  Estremadura  might,  therefore,  have 
been  safely  reduced  to  fifteen  thousand  men,  provided 
the  army  of  La  Mancha  had  been  increased  to  forty 
or  fifty  thousand,  and  it  would  appear  that,  with  a  very 
little  energy,  the  junta  could  have  provided  a  larger 
force.  It  is  true  that  they  would  have  been  beaten  just 
the  same,  but  that  is  only  an  argument  against  fighting 
great  battles,  wiiich  was,  certainly,  the  worst  possible 
plan  for  the  Spaniards  to  pursue. 

3. — The  third  great  error  was  the  inertness  of  Valen- 
cia and  Murcia,  or  rather  their  hostility,  for  they  were 
upon  the  verge  of  civil  war  with  the  supreme  junta. 
Those  provinces,  so  rich  and  populous,  had  been  un- 
molested for  eight  months;  they  had  suffered  notiiing 
from  Moncey's  irruption,  they  had  received  large  suc- 
cours from  the  English  government,  and  Valencia  iiad 
written  her  pretensions  to  patriotism  in  the  bloody  cha- 
racters of  assassination;  yet  were  it  not  fir  the  force 
under  Llamas,  which,  after  the  defeat  of  Tudela,  helped 
to  defend  Zarajroza,  Valencia  and  Murcia  might  have 
been  swallowed  up  by  the  ocean  without  any  sensible 


184 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[B.ioK  VII. 


effect  upon  (he  general  cause.  Those  countries  were 
nowever  ndmirahly  situated  to  serve  as  a  support  to 
Araffon,  Catalonia.  Andalusia,  and  La  Manclia,  and 
they  could,  at  this  time,  have  paralyzed  a  large  Frencli 
force,  hy  marchinpr  an  army  to  San  Clemenle.  It  \vas 
the  dread  of  their  doitipr  so  that  made  the  kinpr  restrain 
Sebastiani  from  piirsninnr  his  victory  b'  (^iudad  Real  ;* 
and  assuredly,  the  Valenoians  should  have  moved ;  for 
it  is  not  so  much  in  their  numbers  as  in  the  variety  of 
iheit  lines  of  operation  that  a  whole  people  find  their 
advantajje  in  opposinjj  rrsfular  armies.  This,  the  ob- 
servation of  that  profound  and  origii  al  writer,  jrrneral 
Lloyd,  was  confirmed  by  the  practice  of  Napoleon,  in 
Spain. 

FRENCH  OPERATIONS. 

1. — To  ^et  possession  of  Seville  and  Cadiz  was  cer- 
tainly as  sfreat  an  object  with  Napoleon  as  to  seize 
Lisbon,  but  the  truth  of  the  maxim  quoted  above  regru- 
iated  the  emperor's  preceedintrs.  If  Victor  had  been 
directed  at  once  upon  Andalusia,  the  Portuguese  and 
Valencians  could  have  carried  their  lines  of  operations 
upon  his  flanks  and  rear;  if  Badajos  and  Lisbon  had 
been  the  objects  of  his  march,  the  Andalusians  could 
have  fallen  on  his  left  flank  and  cut  his  communica- 
tions. Now  all  such  dangers  were  avoided  by  the 
m?rch  of  Soult  and  Lapisse;  their  direction  was  not 
only  concentric,  but  a  regular  prolongation  of  the  great 
line  of  communication  with  France.  Ney  protected 
the  rear  of  one,  Bessieres  the  rear  of  the  other,  and 
those  two  marshals,  also,  separated  and  cut  off  the 
Asturias  from  the  re^t  of  Spain  ;  thus,  all  that  was  for- 
midable was  confined  to  the  south  of  the  Tagus.  For 
tlie  same  reason  the  course  of  conquest  was  to  have 
proceeded  from  Portugal  to  Andalusia,  which  would 
then  have  been  assailed  both  in  front  and  flank,  W'hile 
the  fourth  corps  held  the  Valencians  in  check.  By  this 
plan  the  French  would  never  have  lost  their  central 
jiosition,  nor  exposed  their  grand  line  of  communica- 
tion to  a  serious  attack. 

2. — That  this  plan,  so  wisely  conceived  in  its  gene- 
lal  bearinor,  should  fail,  without  any  of  the  different 
corps  employed  having  suffered  a  defeat,  nay,  when 
they  were  victorious  in  all  quarters,  is  surprising,  hut 
not  inexplicable.  It  is  clear  that  Napoleon's  orders 
were  given  at  a  time  when  he  did  not  expect  that  a 
battle  would  have  been  fought  at  Coruna,  or  that  the 
second  corps  would  have  suffered  so  much  from  the 
severity  of  the  weather  and  the  lenL>'th  of  the  marches; 
neither  did  he  anticipate  the  resistance,  made  by  the 
Portuguese,  between  the  INIinho  and  the  Douro.  The 
last  error  was  a  consequence  of  the  first,  for  his  j>lans 
were  calculated  upon  the  supposition  tlint  the  rapiditj' 
ofSoult's  movements  would  forestal  all  defence ;  yet 
the  delay  cannot  be  charged  as  a  fault  to  that  marshal, 
his  enertry  was  conspicuous. 

.3. — Napoleon's  attention,  divided  between  Austria 
and  Spain,  must  have  been  somewhat  distracted  by  the 
multiplicity  of  his  affairs.  He  does  not  seem  to  have 
made  allowance  for  the  very  rugged  country  through 
which  Soult  had  to  march,  at  a  season  when  all  the 
rivers  and  streams  were  overflowing;  and  as  the  com- 
binations of  war  are  continually  changing,  the  delay 
thus  occasioned  rendered  Lapisse's  instructions  fiulty  ; 
for,  although  it  be  true,  that  if  the  latter  had  marched 
by  Guania  upon  Abrantes  while  Soult  advanced  to 
Lisbon  by  Coimhra  and  Victor  entered  the  Alemtejo, 
Portufral  would  have  been  conquered  without  difficulty  ; 
yet  the  combination  was  so  wide,  and  the  communica- 
tions so  uncertain,  that  unity  of  action  could  not  be  in- 
sured. Soult.  wenkened  by  the  fibstacles  he  encoun- 
tered, rcfjuired  reinforcements  after  the  taking  of  Oporto, 
and  if  Lapisse  attaching  himself  to  Souk's  instead  of 
Victor's    incursion,   had   then   marched    upon   Viseu, 


Pari.  Paper*,  1810. 


the  duke  of  Datmatia  would  have  been  enabled  to  win 
his  way  without  regard  to  the  co-operation  in  the 
Alemtejo. 

4. — The  first  error  of  the  French,  if  the  facts  are 
correctly  shewn,  must  therefore  he  attributed  to  Napo- 
leon, because  he  overlooked  the  probable  chances  of 
delay,  combined  the  operations  on  too  wide  a  scale, 
and  gave  Ciudad  Rodrigo  and  Abrantes,  instead  of 
Lamego  and  Visru,  for  the  direction  of  Lapisse's 
march.  I  sny,  if  the  facts  are  correctly  shewn,  for  it 
is  scarcely  discreet  to  censure  Napoleon's  military  dis- 
positions however  erroneous  they  may  nffcur  to  have 
been,  and  it  is  certain  that,  in  this  case,  his  errors,  if 
errors  they  were,  although  sufficient  to  embarrass  his 
lieutenants,  will  not  account  for  their  entire  failure. 
Above  sixty  thousand  men  were  put  in  motion  by  him, 
upon  good  military  principles,  for  the  subjugation  of 
Lisbon  ;  we  must  therefore  search  in  the  particular 
conduct  of  the  generals  for  the  reason  why  a  jimjeci 
of  Kapoleon''g,  to  be  ecrecufed  hy  xixly  thimsmni  Frer.ch 
veternns,  should  have  ended  as  idy  and  iiujfiduaUy  as 
if  it  had  been  concocted  hy  the  Spanish  junta. 

OBSERVATIONS    ON     THE      SEPARATE     OPERA  I  IONS    OF    LA- 
PISSE, VICTOR,  SOULT,  ROMANA,  SILVEIRA,  AND    CUESTA. 


I. — An  intercepted  letter  of  general  Maupetit,  shews 
the  small  pains  taken  by  Lapisse  to  communicate  witli 
Soult.  He  directs  that  even  so  many  as  three  hundred 
men  should  patrole  towards  Tras  os  Montes,  to  ohl;iin 
information  of  the  second  corps,  at  a  time  when  the 
object  was  so  important  that  his  whole  frrce  should 
have  moved  in  mass  rather  than  have  failed  of  intel- 
ligence. 

2. — The  manner  in  which  he  suffered  sir  Robert  Wil- 
son to  gather  strength  and  to  insult  his  outposts  was 
inexcusable.  He  m.ight  have  marched  straight  upon 
Ciudad  Rodrigo  and  Almeida,  and  dispersed  every 
thinof  in  his  front;  one  of  those  fortresses  would  pro- 
bably have  ftllen,  if  not  both,  and  from  thence  a  strong 
detachment  pushed  towards  Lamego,  would  not  only 
have  ascertained  the  situation  of  the  second  corps,  but 
would  have  greatly  aided  its  progress  by  threatening 
Oporto  and  Braga.  It  cannot  be  urgfed  that  Salamanca 
required  the  presence  of  a  large  force,  because,  in  thaf 
open  country,  the  people  were  at  the  mercy  of  Bes- 
sieres' cavalry,  and  so  sensible  were  the  local  junta  rf 
this,  that  both  Salamanca  and  Ledesma  refused  assist- 
ance from  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  when  it  was  offered,  and 
preferred  a  quiet  submission. 

3. — When,  at  last,  the  king's  reiterated  orders  obliged 
Lapisse  to  put  his  iroops  in  motion,  he  made  a  demon- 
stration against  Ciudad  Rodrisfo,  so  feeble  that  it  scarce- 
ly called  the  garrison  to  the  ramparts,  and  then  as  if 
all  chance  of  success  in  Portugal  was  at  an  end,  he 
broke  through  the  pass  of  Perales,  reached  Alcantara 
and  rejoined  the  first  corps,  a  m.ovement  equally  at  va- 
riance with  Napoleon's  orders  and  Avith  good  military 
discretion  ;  for  the  first  directed  liim  upon  Abrantes, 
and  the  second  would  have  carried  him  upon  Viseu. 
The  march  to  the  latter  place,  while  it  insunMl  a  junc- 
tion with  Soult,  would  not  have  prevented  an  after 
movement  upon  Abrantes  ;  the  obstacles  were  b)'  no 
means  so  great  as  those  which  awaited  him  on  tho 
march  to  Alcantara,  and  the  great  error  of  abandoning 
the  whole  country,  between  the  Tagus  and  the  Douro, 
to  the  insurgents,  would  have  been  avoided.  Here 
then  was  one  direct  cause  of  failure;  yet  the  error, 
although  great,  was  not  irreparable.  If  Soult  was 
abandoned  to  his  own  resources,  he  had  also  obtained 
a  firm  and  important  position  in  the  north,  while  Vic- 
tor, reinforced  hy  ten  thousand  men,  was  enabled  to 
operate  against  Lisbon  by  the  Aleintej  j,  mor(  effica- 
ciously than  before;  he,  hcwevcr,  seems  to  have  been 
less  disposed  than  Lapisse  to  execute  his  instructions. 


1809. 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR 


.85 


1. — The  inactivity  of  this  marshal,  after  the  rout  of 
Ucles  lias  heen  already  mentioned.  It  is  certain  that 
if  the  fourth  and  first  corps  had  been  well  handled, 
neither  Cuesta  nor  (Jartoajal  could  have  ventured 
beyond  the  defiles  of  the  Sierra  Morena,  much  less 
have  bearded  the  French  apnerals  and  established  a 
line  of  defence  alonir  the  Tao;us.  Fifty  thousand 
French  troops  should  in  two  montiis  have  done  some- 
thing more  than  maintain  fifty  miles  of  country  on  one 
fcide  of  Madrid. 

2. — Tlie  passanfe  of  the  Tajus  was  successful,  but 
can  hardly  be  called  a  skilful  operation,  unless  the 
duke  of  Belluno  calculated  upon  the  io^norance  of  his 
adversary.  Before  an  able  pfeneral  and  a  moveable 
arm}',  possessintj  a  pontoon  train,  it  would  have  scarce- 
ly answered  to  separate  the  troops  in  three  divisions 
in  an  extent  of  fifty  miles,  leaving  the  artillery  and 
pare  of  ammvmition,  protected  only  by  seme  cavalry 
and  one  battalion  of  infantry,  within  two  hours'  march 
of  the  enemy  for  three  days.  If  Cuesta  had  brought 
up  ail  his  detachments,  the  Meza  d'lbor  might  have 
been  effectually  manned,  and  ten  thousand  infantry  and 
all  the  .Spanish  cavalry  spared,  to  cross  the  Tagus  at 
Almaraz  on  the  17th;  in  this  case  Victor's  artillery 
would  probably  have  been  captured,  and  his  project 
certainly  baffied. 

3. — When  the  passnge  of  the  Tagus  was  effected, 
Victor,  not  only  permitted  Cuesta  to  escape,  but  ac- 
tually lost  all  traces  of  his  army;  an  evident  fault,  and 
not  to  be  excused  by  pleading  the  impediments  arisinor 
from  the  swelling  of  the  river,  the  necessity  of  secur- 
ing the  communications,  &c.  If  Cuesta's  power  was 
despised  before  the  passagre  of  the  river,  when  his 
army  was  whole  and  his  position  strong,  there  could 
be  no  reason  for  such  great  circumspection  after  his 
defeat,  a  circumspection,  too,  not  supported  by  skill, 
as  the  dispersed  state  of  the  French  army  the  evening 
before  the  battle  of  Medellin  proves. 

4. — That  Victor  was  enabled  to  fight  Cuesta,  on  tlie 
morning  of  the  28th,  with  any  prospect  of  success, 
must  be  attributed  rather  to  fortune  than  to  talent.  It 
was  a  fault  to  permit  the  Spaniards  to  retake  the  offen- 
eive  after  the  defeat  on  the  Tagus,  nor  can  the  first 
movement  of  the  duke  of  Belluno  in  the  action  be 
praised.  He  should  have  marched  into  the  plain  in  a 
compact  order  of  battle.  The  danger  of  sending  La- 
salle  and  Latour  Maubourg  to  such  a  distance  from 
the  main  body  I  shall  have  occasion  to  show  in  my  ob- 
servations on  Cuesta's  operations  ;  the  after-movements 
of  the  French  in  this  battle  were  well  and  rapidly 
combined  and  vigorously  executed,  and  the  success 
was  proportionate  to  the  ability  displayed. 

5. — The  battles  of  Medellin  and  Ciudad  Real,  which 
utterly  destroyed  the  Spanish  armies  and  laid  Seville 
and  Badajos  open  ;  those  battles,  in  which  blood  was 
spilt  like  water,  produced  no  result  to  the  victors,  for 
the  French  generals,  as  if  they  had  touched  a  torpedo, 
never  stretched  forth  their  hands  a  second  time,  Se- 
bastiani,  indeed,  wished  to  penetrate  the  Sierra  Morena, 
but  the  king,  fearful  of  the  V^alencians,  restrained  him. 
On  the  other  hand  Joseph  urged  Victor  to  invade  the 
Alemtejo,  and  the  latter  would  not  ob^-y,  even  when 
reinforced  by  Fiapisse's  division.  This  last  was  the 
great  and  fatal  error  of  the  whole  campaign,  for  nearly 
all  the  disposable  British  and  Portu'juese  troops  were 
thus  enabled  to  move  against  the  duke  of  Dalmatia, 
while  the  duke  of  Belluno  contrived  neither  to  fulfil 
the  instructions  of  Napoleon,  nor  the  orders  of  the 
king,  nor  yet  to  perform  any  useful  achievement  him- 
eelf. 

He  did  n(.t  assist  the  invasion  of  Portugal,  he  did 
not  maintain  Estreniadura,  he  did  not  take  Seville,  nor 
even  prevent  Cuesta  from  twice  renewing  the  offensive  ; 
vet  he  romained  in  an  unhealthy  situation  until  he  lost 


more  men,  by  sickness,  than  would  have  furnished 
three  such  battles  as  Medellin.  Two  months  so  un- 
prcfitably  wasted  by  a  general,  at  the  head  nf  thirty 
thousand  good  troops,  can  scarcely  be  cited.  The  duke 
of  Belluno's  reputation  has  been  too  hardly  earned  to 
attribute  this  inactivity  to  want  of  talent.  That  he 
was  averse  to  aid  the  operations  of  marshal  Soult  is 
evident,  and,  most  happily  for  Portugal,  it  was  so  ;  but, 
whether  this  aversion  arose  from  personal  jealousy, 
from  indisposition  to  obej'  the  king,  or  frf)m  a  mistaken 
view  of  affairs,  1  have  no  means  of  judging. 

CUESTA. 

1. — Cuesta's  peculiar  unfitness  for  the  lead  of  an 
army  has  been  remarked  more  than  once.  It  remains 
to  shew  that  his  proceedings,  on  this  occasion,  con- 
tinued to  justify  these  remarks. 

To  defend  a  river,  on  a  long  line,  is  generally  hope- 
less, and  especially  when  the  defenders  have  not  the 
means  of  passing  freely,  in  several  places,  to  the  op- 
posite bank.  Alexander,  Hannibal.  Caesar,  Gustavus, 
Turenne,  Napoleon,  Wellington,  and  hundreds  of  others 
have  shown  how  the  passage  cf  rivers  may  be  won. 
Eumenes,  who  prevented  Antigen  us  from  passing  tiie 
Coprates,  is.  perhaps,  the  only  example  of  a  general 
baffling  the  efforts  of  a  skilful  and  enterprising  enemy 
in  such  an  attempt. 

2. — The  defence  of  rivers  having  always  proved 
fruitless,  it  follows  that  no  general  should  calculate 
upon  success,  and  that  he  should  exert  the  greatest 
energy,  activity,  and  vigilance  to  avoid  a  heavy  dis- 
aster; that  all  his  lines  of  retreat  should  be  kepi  free 
and  open,  and  be  concentric;  and  that  to  bring  hislna- 
gazines  and  depots  close  up  to  the  army,  in  such  a  si- 
tuation, is  rashness  itself.  Now  Cuesta  v.-as  inactive, 
and,  disregarding  the  maxim  which  forbids  the  esta- 
blishment of  magazines  in  the  first  line  of  defence, 
brought  up  the  whole  of  his  to  Del-eytcsa  and  Truxilio. 
His  combinations  were  ill-arranged ;  he  abandoned 
Mirabete  without  an  effort;  his  dep  ts  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  enemy;  his  retreat  was  confused;  and 
eccentric,  inasmuch  as  part  of  his  army  retired  into 
the  Guadalupe,  v.hile  others  went  to  Merida  and  he 
himself  to  Medellin. 

3. — The  line  of  retreat  upon  Medellin  and  Campa- 
narios,  instead  of  Badajos  ;  being  determined  by  the 
necessity  of  uniting  with  Albuquerque,  cannot  be  blam- 
ed ;  the  immediate  return  to  Medellin  was  bold  and 
worthy  of  praise  but  its  merit  consisted  in  recovering 
the  offensive  immediately  after  a  defeat,  wherefore, 
Cuesta  should  not  have  halted  at  Medellin,  thus  giving 
the  lead  again  to  the  French  general ;  he  should  have 
continued  to  advance,  and  falling  upon  the  scattered 
divisions  of  the  French  army,  endeavoured  to  beat 
them  in  detail,  and  rally  his  own  detachments  in  the 
Sierra  de  Guadalupe,  'i'he  error  of  stopping  siiort  at 
Medellin  would  have  been  apparent,  if  \'ictcr,  placing 
a  rear-guard  to  amuse  the  Spanish  general,  biid  taken 
the  road  to  Seville  by  Almendralejos  and  Zafra. 

4. — Cuesta's  general  design  for  the  battle  of  Medel- 
lin was  well  imagined  ;  that  is,  it  was  right  to  hide 
his  army  behind  the  ridge,  and  to  defer  the  attack  un- 
til the  enemy  had  developed  his  force  and  order  cf 
battle  in  the  plain  ;  but  the  execution  was  on  the  low- 
est scale.  If,  instead  of  advancing  in  Oiie  long  and 
weak  line  without  a  reserve.  Cuesta  had  held  the  great- 
est part  of  his  troops  in  solid  columns,  and  thrust  them 
between  Lassalle  and  Latour  Maubourg's  divisions, 
which  were  pushed  out  like  horns  from  the  main  body 
of  the  Frencli,  those  generals  would  have  been  cut  olT, 
and  the  battle  commenced  by  dividing  the  French 
army  into  three  unconnected  masses,  while  the  Span- 
iards would  liave  been  compact,  well  in  hand,  and 
masters  of  the  general  movements.  Notiiing  co\ild 
then  have  saved  Victor,  except  hard  fighting,  wiiorca'J 
Cuesta's  dispositions  rendered  it  impossible  for  the 


18G 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  Vn. 


Spaniards  to  win  the  battle  by  courage,  or  to  escape 
the  pursuit  by  swiftness. 

5.  It  is  reniarkahle  that  the  Spanish  peneral  scorns 
never  to  have  thought  of  putting  Truxillo,  fiuadalupe, 
Merida,  Estrella,  or  IModellin  in  a  state  of  defence,  al- 
though most  if  not  all  of  those  places  had  some  castle 
or  walls  carahle  of  resisting  a  sudden  assault.  'I'here 
was  time  to  do  it,  for  ('uesla  remained  unmolested,  on 
the  Tagus.  from  January  to  the  middle  of  March,  and 
evfry  additional  point  of  sup[iort  thus  obtained  fur  an 
undiscip'ioed  army  would  have  diminished  the  advan- 
tages derived  by  the  Trench  from  their  superior  facility 
cf  movement;  the  places  themselves  might  have  hern 
garrisoned  by  the  citizens  and  peasantry,  and  a  week's, 
a  day's,  nay,  even  an  hour's,  delay  was  of  importance 
to  a  force  like  Cuesta's,  which,  from  its  inexperience, 
must  have  always  been  liable  to  confusion. 


1.  The  march  of  this  general  in  one  column,  uponTuy, 
was  made  under  the  impression  that  resistance  would 
not  be  offered  ;  otherwise,  it  is  probable  that  a  division 
of  infantry  and  a  brigade  of  cavalry  would  have  been 
setit  from  St.  Jago  or  Mellid  direct  upon  Orense,  to  in- 
sure the  passage  of  the  Minho ;  it  seems  to  have  been 
also  an  error  in  Ney,  arising',  probably,  from  the  same 
caiise,  not  to  have  kept  INIarchand's  division  of  the 
sixth  corps  at  Orense  until  the  second  corps  had  effect- 
ed an  entrance  into  Portugal. 

2.  Soult's  resolution  to  place  the  artillery  and  stores 
in  Tuy,  and  march  into  Portugal,  trusting  to  victory 
for  re-opening  the  communication,  would  increase  the 
reputation  of  any  general.  Three  times  before  he 
reached  Oporto  he  was  obliged  to  hall,  in  order  to 
fabricate  cartridges  for  the  infantry,  from  the  powder 
taken  in  battle,  and  his  whole  progress  from  Tuy  to 
that  city  was  energetic  and  able  in  the  extreme. 

3.  The  military  proceedings,  after  the  taking  of 
Oportc,  do  not  all  bear  the  same  stamp.  The  admin- 
istration of  the  civil  affairs  appears  to  have  engrossed 
the  marshal's  attention,  and  his  absence  from  the  im- 
mediate scpne  of  action  sensibly  affected  the  operations. 
Franceschi  shewed  too  much  respect  for  Trant's  corps ; 
Loison's  movements  were  timid  and  slow ;  even  La- 
borde's  genius  seems  to  have  been  asleep.  The  im- 
portance of  crushing  Silveira  was  obvious,  and  there 
IS  nothing  more  necessary  in  war  than  to  strike  with 
all  the  force  you  can  at  once;  but  here  Caulaincourt 
was  first  sent,  being  too  weak,  Loison  reinforced  him, 
l.aborde  reinforced  Loi?on,  and  all  were  scarcely  sufli- 
cient  at  last  to  do  that  which  half  would  have  done  at 
first.  But  the  whole  of  these  transactions  are  obscure. 
The  great  delay  that  took  place  before  the  bridge  of 
Amarante,  and  the  hesitation  and  frequent  recurrence 
for  orders  to  the  marshal,  indicate  want  of  zeal,  or  a 
desire  to  procrastinate,  in  opposition  to  Soult's  wishes. 
Judging  from  Mr.  Noble's  history  of  the  campaign,  this 
must  be  trnred  to  a  conspiracy  in  the  French  army, 
*hich  sliail  be  touched  upon  hereafter. 

4.  Tiie  resistance  made  by  the  Portuguese  peasantry 
was  infinitely  creditable  to  their  courage,  but  there 
cannot  be  a  stronger  proof  rf  the  inefficacy  of  a  like 
defence,  when  unsupported  by  good  troops.  No  coun- 
try is  more  favoumhle  to  snch  a  warfare  than  tlie 
northern  provinces  of  Portugal ;  the  people  were  brave, 
they  had  the  assistance  of  the  organized  forces  under 
Romana,  Silveira,  Eben,  and  the  bishop;  yetSoult,  in 
the  very  worst  season  of  the  year,  overcoming  all  re- 
sistance, penetrated  to  Oporto,  without  an  actual  loss, 
in  killed,  wounded,  and   prisoners  of  more  than  two 


thousand  five  hundred  men,  including  the  twelve  hun- 
dred sick,  captured  at  Chaves. 

ROMANA. 

1.  Romana  remained  at  Oimbra  and  Monterey,  un- 
molested, from  the  21st  of  Jaimary  to  the  (Uh  cf  March  ; 
he  had  tlierefore  time  to  reorganise  liis  forces,  and  he 
had.  in  fact,  ten  thousand  regular  troops  in  toleral)le 
order.  He  knew,  on  the  11th  or  12th,  that  Soult  was 
preparing  to  pass  the  Minho,  between  Tuy  and  Onardia. 
He  knew,  also,  that  the  peo]ile  of  Ribidavia  and  Orense 
were  in  arms ;  that  those  on  the  Arosa  were  preparing 
to  rise,  and  that,  consequently,  the  French  must,  were 
it  only  from  want  of  food,  break  out  cf  the  contracted 
position  they  occupied,  either  by  Ribidavia  and  Orense, 
or  by  crossing  the  Minho,  or  by  retreating  to  St.  Jago. 
With  these  guides,  the  path  of  the  Spanish  general 
was  as  plain  as  the  writing  on  the  wall ;  he  was  at  the 
head  often  thousand  regular  troops,  and  two  marches 
would  have  brought  him  to  Ribidavia;  in  front  of  that 
town  he  might  have  occupied  a  position  close  on  the 
left  flank  of  the  French,  tallied  all  the  insurgents  about 
him,  and  organized  a  formidable  warfare.  The  French 
durst  not  have  attempted  the  passage  of  the  Minho 
while  he  was  in  front  of  Ribidavia,  and  if  they  turned 
against  him,  the  place  was  fiivourable  for  battle,  the 
retreat  open  by  Orense  and  Monterey  ;  and  the  diffi- 
culty of  bringing  up  artillery  would  have  hampered  the 
pursuit.  On  the  other  hand,  if  Soult  had  retreated, 
that  alone  would  have  been  tantamount  to  a  victory, 
and  Romana  would  have  been  well  placed  to  follow, 
connecting  himself  with  the  English  vessels  of  war 
upon  that  coast  as  he  advanced. 

2.  So  far  from  contemplating  operations  of  this  na- 
ture, Romana  did  not  even  concentrate  his  force;  but 
keeping  it  extended,  in  small  parties,  along  fifteen 
miles  of  country,  indulged  himself  in  speculations 
about  his  enemy's  weakness,  and  the  prospect  of  their 
retreating  altogether  from  the  Peninsula.  He  was  only 
roused  from  his  reveries,  by  finding  his  divisi(Mis  beaten 
in  detail,  and  himself  forced  either  to  join  the  Portu- 
guese with  whom  he  was  quarrelling,  or  to  break  his 
promises  to  Silveira  and  fly  by  cross  roads  over  the 
mountain  on  his  right:  he  adopted  the  latter,  thus 
proving,  that  whatever  might  be  his  resources  for  rais- 
ing an  insurrection,  he  could  not  direct  one,  and  that 
he  was,  although  brave  and  active,  totally  destitute  of 
military  talent.  At  a  later  period  of  the  war,  the  duke 
of  Wellington,  after  a  long  and  fruitless  military  dis- 
cus;sion,  drily  observed,  that  either  Romana  or  himself 
had  mistaken  their  profession  ! 

SILVEIRA. 

1.  This  Portuguese  general's  first  operations  were 
as  ill  conducted  as  Romana's ;  his  posts  were  too  ex- 
tended, he  made  no  attempt  to  repair  the  works  of 
('haves,  none  to  aid  the  important  insurrection  of  Ri- 
bidavia; but  these  errors  cannot  be  fairly  charged  upon 
him,  as  his  oflicers  were  so  unruly,  that  they  lu;ld  a 
council  of  war  per  force,  where  thirty  voted  for  fight- 
ing at  Chaves,  and  twenty-nine  against  it;  the  casiinor 
voice  being  given  by  the  voter  calling  on  the  troops  to 
follow  him.  The  after-movement,  by  which  (^liaves 
was  rec.iptured,  whether  dt^vised  by  Silveira  himself, 
or  directed  by  Marshal  Beresford,  was  bold  and  skil- 
ful ;  but  the  advance  to  Penafiel,  while  La  Moussaye 
and  H(Midelet  could  from  Braga  pass  by  Guiinaraens, 
and  cut  him  off  from  Amarante.  was  as  rash  as  bis 
subsequent  flight  was  disgraceful :  yet,  thanks  to  the 
heroic  courage  of  colonel  Patrick,  Silveira's  reputation 
as  a  general  was  established  among  liis  countrymen, 
by  the  very  action  whicti  should  have  ruined  him  iu 
their  estimation. 


1009.  J 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


1B7 


BOOK    VIII. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Anarciiy  m  Portug^al — Sir  J.  Cradock  quits  the  command — Sir 
A.  W  t  Ik^iU  y  ail  ivts  at  Lisbon — ilijjpv  elitrt  of  liis  jirefence 
— Niiiiiiiiated  captain-fjeiieral — Hi«  niilitaiy  position  descrio- 
ed — RtS'jlves  to  march  against  Soult — Reaches  Coiiiibra — 
Conspiracy  in  the  French  arinv — D'Argenton's  proceedings 
-^Sir  A.  VV'elleslty's  situation  compared  with  that  of  sir  J. 
Cradock. 

It  will  be  rpmembered  that  the  narrative  of  sir  Jchn 
Cradock's  proreedinors  was  discontinued,  at  the  moment 
when  that  <reneral,  nothing  shaken  by  the  impcrttinities 
of  the  regency,  the  representations  of  marshal  Beres- 
ford,  or  the  advice  of  Mr.  Frere,  resolved  to  await  at 
Lumiar  for  the  arrival  of  the  promised  reinforcements 
from  England.  While  in  this  position,  he  made  ever)' 
exertion  1o  obtain  transport  for  the  supplies,  remounts 
for  the  cavalry,  and  draught  animals  lor  the  artillery; 
but  the  Portuguese  government  gave  him  no  assistance, 
and  an  attempt  to  prrcure  horses  and  mules  in  Morocco 
provir.g  unsuccessful,  the  armj'  was  so  scantily  fur- 
nished that,  other  reasons  failing,  this  alone  would 
have  prevented  any  advance  towards  the  frontier. 

The  singular  inactivity  of  Victor  surprised  Cradock, 
but  did  not  alter  his  resolution  ;  yet,  being  continually 
importuned  to  advance,  he,  when  assured  that  five 
thousand  men  of  the  promised  reinforcements  were  ac- 
tually off  the  rock  of  Lisbon,  held  a  council  of  war  on 
the  subject.*  All  the  generals  were  averse  to  marching 
on  Oporto,  except  Beresford,  and  he  admitted  that  its 
propriety  depended  on  \'ictor's  movements:  mean- 
while, that  marshal  approached  Badajos,  Lapisse  came 
down  upon  the  Agueda,  and  Soult,  having  stormed 
Oporto,  pushed  his  advanced  posts  to  the  Vouga.  A 
cry  of  treason  was  instantly  heard  throughout  Portugal, 
and  both  the  people  and  the  soldiers  evinced  a  spirit 
truly  alarming.  The  latter  disregarding  the  authority 
of  Beresford,  and  menacing  their  own  otilcers,  declared 
that  it  was  necessary  to  slay  a  thousand  traitors  in 
Lisbon;  and  the  regiments  in  Abrantes  even  abandoned 
that  post,  and  marched  to  join  Trant  upon  the  Vouga. 
But,  when  these  disorders  were  at  the  worst,  and  when 
a  vigorous  movement  of  Victor  and  Lapisse  would 
have  produced  fatal  consequences,  general  Hill  landed 
with  about  five  tliousand  men  and  three  hundred  artil- 
lery horses.  Cradock,  then,  resolved  to  advance,  moved 
thereto  chiefly  by  the  representations  of  Beresford,  who 
thought  such  a  measure  absolutely  necessary  to  restore 
confidence,  to  ensure  the  obedience  of  the  native  troops, 
and  to  enable  him  to  take  measures  for  the  safety  of 
Abrante3.|  Thus,  about  the  time  thatTuy  was  relieved  j 
by  the  French,  and  that  Silveira  was  attacked  at  Pe  a- 
fiel  by  I,aborde,  the  English  army  was  put  in  motion, 
part  upon  Caldas  and  Obidos,  part  upon  Rio  Mayor; 
the  campaign  was,  therefore,  actually  commenced  by 
Cradock,  \>  hen  that  general,  although  his  measures' 
had  been  all  approved  of  by  his  government,  was  sud- 
denly and  unexpectedly  required  to  surrender  his  com- 
mand to  sir  Arthur  Wellesley,  and  proceed  himself  to 
Gibraltar,  [ 

It  would  appear  that  this  arrangement  was  adopted 
after  a  struggle  in  the  cabinet,:}:  and,  certainly,  neither 
the  particular  choice  nor  the  general  principle  of  em- 


*    Sir  John  Cradock's  Correspondence,  MSS. 
}  Lord  Londonderry's  Narrative. 


t  lb. 


ploying  men  of  talent  without  regard  to  seniority  can 
be  censured  ;  nevertheless,  sir  John  Cradock  was  used 
unworthily.  A  general  of  his  rank  would  never  have 
accepted  a  command  on  such  terms,  and  it  was  neither 
just  nor  decent  to  expose  him  to  an  unmerited  mortifi- 
cation. 

Before  the  arrival  of  his  successor,  Cradock  had  as- 
sembled the  army  at  Leiria,  and  established  his  maga- 
zines at  Abrantes,  Santarem,  and  Peniche  ;  but  as  the 
admiral  fearing  the  ditTicult  navigation  at  that  season, 
would  not  send  victuallers  to  the  latter  place,  the 
inagazines  there  were  but  scantily  supplied.  Mean- 
while Lapisse  made  way  by  Alcantara  to  Merida,  the 
re-capture  of  Chaves  became  known,  and  the  insurrec- 
tion in  Beira  and  Tras  os  Montes  took  its  full  spring. 
Trant's  force  also  increased  on  the  Vouga,  and  Bores- 
ford,  who  had  succeeded  in  restoring  order  among  the 
Portuguese  battalions,  was  more  than  ever  urgent  for 
an  attack  upon  Soult;  nevertheless  Cradock,  unpro- 
vided with  a  due  proportion  of  cavalry,  unable  to  pro- 
cure provisions  or  forage,  and  fearful  for  the  safety  of 
Lisbon,  refused,  and  tlie  24th  of  April,  hearing  that  his 
successor  had  arrived,  resigned  the  command  and  re- 
paired to  Gibraltar. 

Sir  Arthur  Wellesley  landed  the  22d  of  April.  On 
the  24th  he  signified  to  the  British  ministers  that,  af- 
fairs being  in  the  condition  contemplated  by  them,  it 
was  his  intention  to  assume  the  command  of  the  army; 
a  circumstance  worthy  of  attention,  as  indicating  that 
the  defence  of  Portugal  was  even  then  considered  a 
secondary  object,  and  of  uncertain  promise.  The  de- 
liverance of  the  Peninsula  was  never  due  to  the  fore- 
sio-ht  and  perseverance  of  the  Enrrlish  ministers,  but  to 
the  firmness  and  skill  of  the  British  generals,  and  to 
the  courage  of  troops  whom  no  dangers  could  daunt 
and  no  hardships  dishearten,  while  they  remedied  the 
eternal  errors  of  the  cabinet. 

The  unexpected  arrival  of  a  man  known  only  as  a 
victorious  commander  created  the  greatest  enthusiasm 
in  Portugal.  The  regency  immediately  nominated  him 
marshal-general  of  their  troops;  the  people,  always 
fond  of  novelty,  hailed  his  presence  with  enthusiasm; 
and  all  those  persons,  whether  Portuguese  or  British, 
who  had  blamed  sir  John  Cradock's  prudent  caution, 
now  anticipating  a  change  of 'system,  spake  largely 
and  confidently  of  the  future  operations:  in  truth,  all 
classes  were  greatly  excited,  and  an  undefined  yet 
powerful  sentiment  that  something  great  would  soon 
be  achieved  pervaded  the  public  mind. 

Sir  Arthur's  plans  were,  however,  neither  hastily 
adopted  nor  recklessly  hurried  forward  ;  like  Cradock, 
he  felt  the  danger  of  removing  far  froin  Lisbon  while 
Victor  was  on  the  Alemtejo  frontier,  and  he  anxiously 
weighed  his  own  resources  against  those  at  the  enemy's 
disposal.  Not  that  he  wavered  between  offensive  and 
defensive  m.oveuients  ;  a  general  of  his  discernment 
could  not  fail  to  perceive  that,  if  the  French  were  act- 
ing upon  any  concerted  plan,  the  filse  march  of  La- 
pisse to  Merida  had  marred  their  combinations,  by 
placing  a  whole  nation,  with  all  its  fortresses  and  all 
its  forces,  whether  insurgents,  regular, troops,  or  aux- 
iliaries, between  the  armies  of  Victor  and  Soult;  and 
that  neither  concert  nor  communication  could  longer 
exist  between  those  marshals. 

Soult's  offensive  strength,  also,  was  evidently  ex- 


iSTd 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  Vin. 


hausled  :  he  iritrht  establish  himself  f.rmly  in  the  pro- 
vinces beyond  the  Douro,  but  he  could  not,  alone,  force 
his  way  to  Lisbon,  a  distance  of  two  hundred  miles,  in 
a  season  when  the  waters  were  full,  and  throujjh  a 
country  tang-led  with  rivers,  mountains,  and  defiles. 
He  could  not  hope,  with  twenty-four  thousand  men, 
to  heat  a  whole  people  in  arms,  assisted  by  an  auxiliary 
army  of  as  hijjh  reputation,  and  nearly  as  numerous  as 
his  own  ;  and,  moreover,  there  were  discontents  and  con- 
spiracy in  his  camp,  and  of  this  sir  Arthur  was  aware. 

Soult  alone,  then,  was  no  lono^er  formidable  to  the 
capital ;  but  that  which  weakened  him  increased  the 
offensive  power  of  Victor,  who  was  now  at  the  head 
of  thirty  thousand  men,  and  mifjht  march  straight  upon 
Lisbon,  and  through  an  open  country,  the  only  barrier 
being  theTagus,  a  river  fordable  in  almost  all  seasons. 
^'uch  a  movement,  or  even  a  semblance  of  it,  must 
perforce  draw  the  British  and  native  armies  to  that 
side,  and  then  Soult,  coming  down  to  the  Mondego, 
might,  from  thence,  connect  his  operations  with  Vic- 
tor's by  the  line  of  the  Zfzere,  or  advance  at  once  on 
Lisbon  as  occasion  offered. 

Now,  to  meet  the  exigencies  of  the  campaign,  the 
militarv  rc^sources  of  the  English  general  were, — 

1. — His  central  position. 

2. — 'I'he  British  and  German  troops,  about  twenty- 
six  thcusand  in  nuniber;  of  which  the  present  under 
arms,  including  sergeants,  amounted  to  twenty-two 
thousand,  with  three  thousand  seven  hundred  horses 
and  mules.  In  the  British  army  corporals  and  privates 
only  are  understood  in  the  present  under  arms,  but  in 
the  French  army  that  term  includes  all  military  per- 
sons. Officers,  non-comniissioned  officers,  soldiers  and 
druu^mers.  combatants  and  non-combatants,  a  distinc- 
tion to  be  borne  in  mind  when  comparing  the  forces  on 
each  side. 

3. — The  Portusfurse  troops  of  the  line;  of  which  there 
might  be  organised  and  armed  about  sixteen  thousand. 

Nearly  all  these  Iroojis  were  already  collected,  or 
capable  of  being  collected  in  a  short  time,  between  the 
Tagus  and  Mondego ;  and  beyond  the  latter  river, 
Trant  and  Silveira  commanded  separate  corps  ;  the  one 
upon  the  Vouga,  the  other  on  the  Tamega. 

4. — 'I  he  n.ilitia  and  the  orchnancas,  which  may  be 
denominated  the  insurgent  force. 

5. — The  fortresses  of  Almeida,  Ciudad  ■  Rodrigo, 
Elvas,  Abrant*  s,  Peniche,  and  Badajos. 

6. — The  Knglish  fit  et,  the  Portuguese  craft,  and  the 
free  use  of  the  coast  and  river  navigation  for  his  sup- 
plies. 

7. — The  assistance  of  Cuesta,  who  had  six  thousand 
cavalry  and  thirty  thousand  infantry,  of  which  twenty- 
five  thousand  were  actually  about  the  defiles  of  Mon- 
aslerio  in  front  of  A^ictor's  posts. 

Sir  Arthur  VVellesley's  moral  resources  were  the 
liigh  coura<ire  of  his  own  troops  ;  his  personal  popu- 
larity;  tiie  energy  of  an  excited  iieoplc ;  a  f;ivouraI)le 
moment ;  the  presentiment  of  victory,  and  a  mind 
equal  to  the  occasion. 

In  a  strategic  point  of  view,  to  fall  upon  Victor  was 
best,  because  lie  was  the  most  dangerous  neighbour  to 
Portugal  ;  becpuse  his  defeat  would  prove  most  detri- 
mental to  tlie  French,  most  advantageous  to  the  Span- 
iards; and  because  the  greatest  body  of  troops  could 
be  brought  to  bear  against  him.  On  the  other  hand, 
Soult  held  a  rich  province,  from  whence  the  chief  sup- 
ply of  cattle  for  tlie  army  w;:fi  dcrivd  ;  he  was  in  pos- 
fccflsirn  of  tiie  second  city  in  the  kingdom,  where  he 
was  forming  a  French  party;  the  feelings  of  the  re- 
gency and  the  |)eople  were  greatly  troubled  by  the  loss 
of  Oporto,  and  their  desire  to  regaui  it  was  strongly 
expressed. 

'I'o  attack  Victor,  it  was  indispensable  to  concert 
operations  with  ("uesta;  but  that  (jeneral  was  ill-dis- 
posed towards  the  British,  and  to  insure  his  co-opera- 


tion would  have  required  time,  which  could  be  better 
employed  in  expelling  Soult.  For  these  reasons,  sir 
Arthur  Wellesley  determined  to  aitack  the  last-named 
marshal  without  delay  ;  intending,  if  successful,  to  es- 
tablish a  good  system  of  defence  in  the  northern  pro- 
vinces, and  then,  in  conjunction  with  Cuesta.  to  tura 
his  arms  against  Victor,  imping  thus  to  r('liev(?  Gallicia 
more  effectually  than  by  following  the  French  into  tliat 
province. 

The  security  of  Lisbon  being  the  pivot  of  the  opera- 
tions against  Soult,  time  was  tlie  principal  object  to  be 
gained.  If  Victor  came  fiercely  on,  he  could  not  l:e 
stopped,  but  his  course  might  be  imi)ed(:d  ;  his  path 
could  not  be  blocked,  but  it  might  be  planted  with 
thorns.  To  effect  this,  eight  or  ten  thousand  Pnrtu- 
guese  troops  were  immediately  directed  upon  Abrantes 
and  Santarem,  where  two  British  battalions  and  two 
regiments  of  cavalry  just  disembarked,  also  marched 
and  were  there  joined  by  three  other  battalions  drafted 
from  the  army  at  Leiria. 

A  body  of  two  thousand  men,  composed  of  a  militia 
regiment,  and  the  Lusitanian  legion  which  remained 
near  Castello  Branco  after  Lapisse  had  crossed  the 
Tagus,  were  placed  under  the  command  of  colonel 
Mayne,  and  directed  to  take  post  at  the  bridge  of  Al- 
cantara, having  orders  to  defend  the  passage  of  the 
river,  and,  if  necessarj',  to  blow  up  the  structure.  At 
the  same  time,  the  flying  bridges  at  Villa  V'elha  and 
Abrantes  were  removed,  the  garrison  of  the  latter 
place  was  reinforced,  and  general  Mackenzie  was  ap- 
pointed to  command  all  the  troops,  whether  Portuguese 
or  British,  thus  distributed  along  the  right  hank  of  the 
Tagus.  These  precautions  appeared  sufficient,  espe- 
cially as  there  was  a  general  disposition  to  believe  the 
French  Aveaker  than  they  really  were;  Victor  could 
not,  by  a  mere  demonstration,  shake  this  line  of  de- 
fence;  and  if  he  forced  the  bridge  of  Alcantara,  and 
penetrated  by  the  sterile  and  difficult  route  formerly 
followed  b}'  Junot,  it  would  bring  him,  without  guns, 
upon  Abrantes;  but  Abrantes  was  already  capable  of  a 
short  resistance,  and  Mackenzie  would  have  had  time 
to  line  the  rugged  banks  of  the  Zezere. 

If,  however,  Victor  leaving  Badajos  and  Elvas  be- 
hind him,  should  pass  through  the  Alemtejo,  and  cross 
the  Tagus  between  Abrantes  and  Lisbon,  he  was  to  be 
feared  ;  but  Cuesta  had  promised  to  follow  closely  in 
the  French  general's  rear,  and  it  was  reasonable  to 
suppose  that  Mackenzie,  although  he  might  be  unable 
to  prevent  the  passage  of  the  river,  would  not  suffer 
hin:self  to  be  cut  off  from  the  capital,  where,  having 
the  assistance  of  the  fleet,  the  aid  of  the  citizcms.  and 
the  chance  of  reinforcements  from  England,  he  might 
defend  himself  until  the  army  could  return  from  the 
Douro.  Moreover,  Victor  was  eighteen  marches  from 
Lisbon;  it  was  only  by  accident  tliat  he  and  Soult 
could  act  in  concert,  and  the  allied  army,  havii;g  a  sure 
and  rapid  mode  of  correspondence  with  Cuesta,  was 
already  within  four  marches  of  Oporto. 

The  main  body  of  the  allies  m  as  now  directed  upon 
Coimbra;  four  of  the  best  Portuguese  battalions  were 
incorporated  in  the  British  brigades;  Beresford  retain- 
ed, under  his  personal  command,  about  six  tliousand 
native  troops  ;  Trant  remained  stcdfast  on  the  Vouga  ; 
Silveira  on  the  Tamega  ;  and  sir  Robert  Wilson,  (put- 
ting the  command  of  the  legion,  was  detached,  with  a 
small  Portuguese  force,  to  Mseu,  m  here,  hanging  upon 
Frariceschi's  left  flank,  he  also  communicated  with 
Silveira's  corps  by  the  way  of  Lamego. 

The  difficulty  of  bringing  up  forage  and  provisions, 
wliieli  hud  )iressed  so  sorely  on  sir  .lohn  (^radock,  was 
now  somow  hat  lessened.  'I'he  land  transport  was  in- 
deed still  scanty,  and  the  admiral,  dreading  the  long 
shore  navigation  for  large  vessels,  was  without  the 
small  craft  necessary  for  victualling  the  troops  by  the 
coast;  but  the  magazines  at  Caldas  were  partly  filled» 


1809.] 


N  A  TIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


189 


and  Uvpnty  large  country-boats  loaded  with  provisions, 
tlie  owners  being  induced  by  premiums  to  make  the 
nm,  had  got  safely  into  Peniche  and  the  Mondego. 
In  short,  the  obstacles  to  a  forward  movement,  althcugh 
great,  were  not  insurmountable. 

Sir  Arthur  Wellesley  reached  Coimbra  the  2d  of 
May.  His  army  was  concentrated  there  on  the  5th, 
in  number  about  twenty-five  thousand  sabres  and  bay- 
onets;  nine  thousand  were  Portuguese,  three  thou- 
sand Germans,  the  remainder  British.  The  duke  of 
Dalmatia  was  ignorant  that  the  allies  were  thus  as- 
sembled in  force  upon  the  Mondego  ;  but  many  French 
ofTicers  knew  it,  and  were  silent,  for  they  were  engaged 
in  a  plot  of  a  very  extraordinary  nature,  which  was 
probabl)''  a  part  of  the  conspiracy  alluded  to  in  the  first 
volume  of  this  work,  as  being  conducted  through  the 
medium  of  the  princess  of  Tour  and  Taxis. 

The  French  soldiers  were  impatient  of  their  toils, 
their  attachment  to  Napoleon  himself  was  unshaken, 
but  human  nature  shrinks  from  perpetual  contact  with 
death,  and  they  were  tired  of  war.  This  feeling  in- 
duced some  oflicers  of  high  rank,  serving  in  Spain,  to 
form  a  plan  for  changing  the  French  government ;  gen- 
erally speaking,  these  men  were  friendly  to  Napoleon 
personally,  but  they  were  republicans  in  their  politics, 
and  earnest  to  reduce  the  power  of  the  emperor.  Their 
project,  founded  upon  the  discontent  of  the  troops  in 
the  Peninsula,  was  to  make  a  truce  with  the  English 
army,  to  elect  a  chief,  and  march  into  France  with  the 
resolution  to  abate  the  pride  of  Napoleon,  or  to  pull 
him  from  his  throne.  These  conspirators  at  first  turn- 
ed their  eyes  upon  marshal  Ney,  but  finally  resolved 
to  choose  Gouvion  St.  Cyr  for  their  leader;  yet  it  was 
easier  to  resolve  than  to  execute.  Napoleon's  ascen- 
dancy, supported  by  the  love  and  admiration  of  mil- 
lions, M'as  not  to  be  shaken  by  the  conspiracy  of  a  few 
discontented  men  :  and,  althcugh  the  hopes  of  these 
last  were  not  entirely  relinquished  until  after  Massena's 
retreat  from  Portugal  in  ISIO,  long  before  that  period 
they  discovered  that  the  soldiers,  tired  as  they  were  of 
war,  were  faithful  to  their  great  monarch,  and  would 
have  slain  any  who  openly  stirred  against  him. 

The  foregoing  facts  are  stated  on  the  authority  of  a 
principal  mover  of  the  sedition ;  hut  many  minor  plots 
had  coteniporary  existence,  for  this  was  the  spring- 
time of  folly.  In  the  second  corps  conspirators  were 
numerous,  and  by  their  discourses  and  their  slow  sul- 
len exfcution  of  orders,  had  continually  thwarted  the 
operations  of  marshal  Soult,  yet  without  exciting  his 
suspicions;  as  he  penetrated  into  Portugal,  their  coun- 
teractions increased,  and,  by  the  time  he  arrived  at 
Oporto,  their  design  was  ripe  for  execution. 

In  the  middle  of  April,  John  Viana,  the  son  of  an 
Oporto  merchant,  had  appeared  at  marshal  Beresford's 
head-quarters,  with  proposals  from  the  French  malcon- 
tents ;  who  desired  to  have  an  English  officer  sent  to 
them,  to  arrange  the  execution  of  a  plan,  which  was 
to  be  commenced  by  seizing  their  general,  and  giving 
him  over  to  the  British  outposts  :  a  detestable  project, 
for  it  is  not  in  the  field,  and  with  a  foreign  enemy,  that 
soldiers  should  concert  the  overthrow  of  their  country's 
institutions.  It  would  be  idle  and  impertinent  in  a 
foreigner  to  say  how  much  and  how  long  men  shall 
bear  with  what  they  deem  an  oppressive  government, 
but  there  is  a  distinct  and  especial  loyalty  due  from  a 
soldier  to  his  general  in  the  field  ;  a  comj)act  of  honour, 
which  it  is  singularly  base  to  violate,  and  so  it  has  in 
all  ages  been  considered.  When  the  Argyraspides,  or 
silver-shields  of  the  Macedonians,  delivered  their  gen- 
eral, Eumenes,  in  bonds,  to  Antigonus,  the  latter,  al- 
though he  had  tempted  them  to  the  deed,  and  scrupled 
rot  to  slay  the  hero,  reproached  the  treacherous  sol- 
diers for  their  conduct,  and  with  the  approbatioTi  of  all 
men  destroyed  them  :  yet  Antigonus  was  not  a  foreign 
enemy,  but  cf  their  own  kin  and  blood. 


An  English  lieutenant-colonel  attached  to  the  Por- 
tuguese service  reluctantly  undertook  the  duty  of  meet- 
ing these  Frencli  conspi'^ators,  and  penetrated,  by  night, 
but  in  uniform,  behind  the  French  outposts,  by  tho  lake 
of  Aveiro,  or  Ovar.  He  had  previously  arranged  that 
one  of  the  malcontents  should  meet  him  on  the  wa- 
ter, the  boats  unknowingly  passed  each  other  in  ihe 
dark,  and  the  Englishman  returned  to  Aveiro,  where 
he  found  John  Viana,  in  company  with  the  F'rench  ad- 
jutant-major, D'Argenton.  'I'he  latter  confirmed  what 
Viana  had  declared  at  Thomar  ;  he  expressed  great  re- 
spect for  Soult,  yet  dwelt  upon  the  necessity  of  remov- 
ing him  before  an  appeal  could  be  made  to  the  soldiers  ; 
and  he  readily  agreed  to  wait,  in  person,  upon  Beres- 
ford,  saying  he  v/as  himself  too  strongly  supported  in 
the  French  army  to  be  afraid.  Marshal  Beresford  was 
then  at  Lisbon,  thither  D'Argenton  followed  and  hav- 
ing seen  him  and  sir  Arthur  Wellesley,  remained  five 
days  in  that  capital,  and  then  returned  to  Oporto. 
While  at  Lisbon,  he,  in  addition  to  his  former  reasons 
for  this  conspiracy,  stated  that  Soult  wished  to  make 
himself  king  of  Portugal ;  an  error  into  which  he  and 
many  others  naturally  fell,  from  circumstances  that  I 
have  already  noticed. 

When  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley  arrived  at  Coimbra, 
D'Argenton  appeared  again  at  the  English  headquar- 
ters ;  this  time,  however,  by  the  ord(  r  of  sir  Arthur, 
he  was  conducted  through  bye-paths,  and  returned  con- 
vinced, from  what  he  had  seen  and  heard,  that  although 
the  allies  were  in  force  on  the  Mondego,  many  days 
must  elapse  before  they  could  be  in  a  condition  to  attack 
Oporto.  During  his  absence,  he  had  been  denounced 
by  general  Lefebre,  who  was  falsely  imag-ined  to  be 
favourable  to  the  conspiracy  ;  being  arrested,  passports, 
signed  by  admiral  Berkeley,  which  this  unfortunate 
man,  contrary  to  Sir  A.  Wellesley's  urgent  recom- 
mendation, had  insisted  upon  having,  completely  pro- 
ved his  guilt,  and  Soult,  until  that  moment,  without 
suspicion,  beheld  with  amazement  the  abyss  that 
yawned  beneath  his  feet :  his  firmness,  however,  did 
not  desert  him.  He  offered  D'Argenton  pardon,  and 
even  reward;  if  he  would  disclose  the  names  of  the 
other  conspirators  and  relate  truly  what  he  had  seen 
of  the  English  and  Portuguese  armies  ;  the  prisoner, 
to  save  his  life,  readily  told  all  that  he  knew  of  the 
British,  but  Sir  A.  Wellesley's  foresight  had  rendered 
that  tale  useless,  and  with  respect  to  his  French  ac- 
complices D'Argenton  was  immoveable.  F^xaggerat- 
ing  the  importance  of  the  conspiracy,  he  even  defied 
the  marshal's  power,  and  advised  him,  as  the  safest 
course,  to  adopt  the  conspirators'  sentiments  ;  nor  was 
his  boldness  fatal  to  him  at  the  moment,  for  Soult, 
anxious  to  ascertain  the  extent  of  the  danger,  delayed 
executing  him,  and  he  effected  his  escape  during  the 
subsequent  operations. 

He  was  not  the  only  person  who  communicated  se- 
cretly with  the  British  general  ;  colonel  Donadieu  and 
colonel  Lafitte  were  engaged  in  the  conspiracy.  The 
latter  is  said  to  have  had  an  interview  with  sir  Arthur, 
between  the  outposts  of  the  two  armies,  and  from  the 
first  tho  malcontents  were  urtjpnt  that  the  movements 
of  the  allied  forces  should  be  so  resfulated  as  to  favour 
their  proceedings:  sir  Arthur  Wellesley,  however, 
having  little  dependence  upon  intrigue,  sternly  inti- 
mated that  his  operations  could  not  be  regulated  by 
their  plots,  and  hastened  his  military  measures. 

Under  the  impression  that  Silveira  was  successfullj 
defending  the  line  of  the  Tamega,  the  British  general 
at  first  resolved  to  reinforce  him  by  sending  lieresford's 
and  Wilson's  corps  across  the  Douro  at  Lamego,  by 
which  he  hoped  to  cut  Soult  off  from  Tras  os  Montes ; 
intending,  when  their  junction  was  effected,  to  march 
with  his  own  army  direct  upon  Oporto,  and  to  cross 
I  the  Douro  near  that  town,  by  the  aid  of  Beresford's 
I  corps,  which  would  then  be  on  the  riglt  bank.     This 


190 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  VIII. 


measure,  if  rxpciited,  woiilil,  including  Trant's,  Wil- 
son's, and  8i!veira's  people,  have  placed  a  mass  of 
thirty  thousand  troops,  regulars  and  irrefrulars,  between 
the  'i'ras  os  Monies  and  Scult,  and  the  latter  must  have 
foupht  a  battle  under  very  unfavourable  circumstances, 
or  have  fallen  back  on  the  Minho,  which  he  could 
scarcely  have  passed  at  that  season  while  pressed  by 
the  pursuinor  army.  But  the  plan  was  necessarily 
abandoned  when  intellifrence  arrived  that  the  bridtre  of 
Amaranle  was  forced,  and  that  Silvcira,  pursued  by  tlie 
enemv,  was  driven  over  the  Douro.  The  news  of  this 
disaster  onlv  reached  Coinibra  the  -Ith  of  May,  and,  on 
the  (>th,  a  part  of  the  army  was  already  in  motion  to 
execute  a  fresh  project,  adapted  to  the  change  of  af- 
fairs. As  this  eagerness  to  fall  on  Soult  may  appear 
to  justify  those  who  censured  sir  J.  Cradock's  caution, 
it  inav  here  be  well  to  shew  how  far  the  circumstances 
were  changed. 

When  Cradock  refused  to  advance,  the  Portuguese 
troops  were  insubordinate  and  disorganized  ;  they  were 
now  obedient  and  improved  in  discipline. 

Sir  John  Cradock  had  scarcely  any  cavalry  ;  four 
regiments  had  since  been  added. 

In  the  middle  of  April,  Cuesta  was  only  gathering 
the  wrecks  of  his  forces  after  Medellin ;  he  was  now 
at  the  head  of  thirty-five  thousand  men. 

The  intentions  of  the  British  government  had  been 
doubtful,  they  were  no  longer  so.  Sir  John  Cradock's 
influence  had  been  restricted,  the  new  general  came 
out  W'ith  enlarged  powers,  the  full  confidence  of  the 
ministers,  and  with  Portuguese  rank.  His  reputation, 
his  popularity,  and  the  disposition  of  mankind,  always 
prone  to  magnify  tlie  future,  whether  for  good  or  bad, 
combined  to  give  an  unusual  impulse  to  public  feeling, 
and  enabled  him  to  dictate  at  once  to  the  regency,  the 
diplomatists,  the  generals,  and  the  people  ;  to  disregard 
ail  petty  jealousies  and  intrigues,  and  to  calculate  upon 
resources  from  which  his  predecessor  was  debarred. 
Si'  Arthur  \\'ellesley,  habituated  to  the  command  of 
armies,  was  moreover  endowed  by  nature  with  a  lofty 
genius,  and  a  mind  capacious  of  warlike  affairs. 


CHAPTER  II. 

Campai<rn  on  the  Douro — Ri-lative  position  of  the  Frprch  and 
English  aiiiiii  s — Sir  Arthur  W'llKslty  niarclies  to  lie  Vou- 
g;i— SfO'ls  Bcrcsfor:!  to  the  Douro — A  division  under  gen- 
eral Hill  pTssfs  the  lake  otOvar — Atten)pt  to  surprise  ^  ran- 
r.eschi  faih — Couibat  of  Giijon — The  F'rench  re-cross  the 
Douro  and  destroy  the  brid-i;*'  at  Oport) — I'assag-e  of  the 
Douro — !?oult  rttrcats  upon  Ainarnnte — Boresl'ord  rejiches 
Aui!)rantf — Loison  retreals  from  that  town — Sir  Arthur 
niarcluK  upon  Bra^a — Desperate  situation  of  Soult — His 
eneriry — He  crosses  the  Sierra  Catalina — Rejoins  Lnison — 
Rearlii  s  Cnrvalho  d'Kste — FalK  hark  to  Si.lanionde — Darinc; 
action  of  i:iaj;ir  Dulinf^ — The  Frrnrh  pais  the  Ponte  A'ova 
and  the  S  Itidor,  and  retreat  by  iMontale^re — Soult  enters 
Oreusc — Objf  rvations. 

CAMPAIGN    ON    THE    DOURO. 

After  tlie  action  of  Amarante,  Laborde's  troops 
were  recalled  to  Oporto,  a  brigade  of  cavalry  and  a 
regiment  of  infantry  being  left  to  keep  tip  the  commu- 
nication with  F,oison.  General  Hmilho,  however,  soon 
reappeared  upon  tlie  Lima,  Lorge's  dragoons  were  de- 
tached to  watch  hiin,  and  meanwhile  Mermet's  division 
v»as  ptislied  towards  thn  Vouga.  Tlie  French  army 
was  thus  extended  in  detachments  from  that  river  to 
the  TaiTieg-',  occupying  two  sides  of  a  trianirle,  its 
flanks  prfS'  nted  to  the  enemy,  the  wings  separated  by  the 
Douro  and  v.ilbout  communication,  except  by  the  boat- 
bridge  of  Oporto.  It  require  d  three  days  to  unite  on  the 
centre,  and  five  days  to  concentrate  on  either  extremity. 

The  situation  of  the  allies  was  very  different; — sir 
Arthur  WelU sley  having  assembled  the  bulk  of  his 
tfoops  at  Ocimbra.  had  the  choice  of  two  lines  of  ope- 
ration ;  the  ore,  through  Vi'^eu  and  Lamego,  by  whii  h, 


in  four  or  five  marches,  he  could  turn  the  French  left 
and  cut  them  off  from  Tras  os  Montes  ;  the  other  lead- 
ing u])on  Oporto,  whereby,  in  two  marches,  he  could 
throw  himself  unexpectedly,  and  in  very  superior  num- 
bers, upon  the  enemy's  right,  with  a  prospect  of  crush- 
ing it  between  the  Vouga  and  the  Douro.  On  the  first 
of  these  two  lines,  which  were  separated  by  the  lofty 
ridges  of  the  Sierra  de  Caranmla,  the  march  could  be 
covered  by  Wilson's  corps,  at  Viseu,  and  by  Silveira's 
near  Lamego.  Along  the  second,  the  movement  could 
be  screened  by  Trant's  corps  on  the  Vouga. 

The  duke  of  Dalmatia's  dispositions  were  made  in 
ignorance  of  sir  Arthur  Wellesley's  position,  numbers, 
and  intentions.  He  was  not  even  aware  of  the  vicinity 
of  such  an  antagonist,  but  sensible  that  to  advance  di- 
rectly upon  Lisbon  was  beyond  his  own  strength,  he 
meditated  to  cross  the  Tamega,  and  then,  covered  by 
that  river  and  the  Douro,  to  follow  the  great  route  of 
BragauQa,  and  so  enter  the  Salamanca  country.*  It  was 
in  this  view  that  Loison  had  been  directed  to  get  pos- 
session of  Mezamfrio  and  Pezo  de  Kagoa,  INtermet'a 
advance  towards  the  Vouga  being  only  to  support  Fran- 
ceschi's  retreat,  when  the  army  should  commence  its 
movement  towards  the  'I'amega. 

The  9th  of  May,  D'Argenton  was  arrested,  the  film 
fell  from  Soult's  eyes,  and  all  the  perils  of  his  position 
broke  at  once  upon  his  view.  'IVeason  in  his  camp 
which  he  could  not  probe ;  a  powerful  enemy  close  in 
his  front;  tiie  insurgents  again  active  in  his  rear;  the 
French  troops  scattered  from  the  Vouga  to  the  Tamega, 
from  the  Douro  to  the  Lima,  and  commanded  by  offi- 
cers, whose  fidelity  was  necessarily  suspected,  while 
the  extent  of  the  conspiracy  was  unknown.  Appalling 
as  this  prospect  was,  the  duke  of  Dalmatia  did  not 
quail  at  the  sight.  The  general  oflicers  assured  him  of 
the  fidelity  of  the  troops,  he  ordered  Loison  to  keep 
Mezamfrio  and  Ragoa,  if  he  could,  but,  under  any  cir- 
cumstances, to  hold  Amarante  fast,  and  the  greatest 
part  of  the  guns  and  stores  at  Oporto  were  directed 
upon  the  Tamega ;  the  ammunition  that  could  not  be 
removed  was  destroyed,  and  Lorge  was  directed  to 
withdraw  the  garrison  of  Viana  and  make  for  Amarante ; 
D'Argenton  was  then  closely,  although  vainly,  pressed 
to  discover  his  accomplices,  and  all  the  arrangements 
necessary  for  a  movement  upon  tiie  Tras  os  Montes 
were  actively  followed  tip.  But  the  war  was  coming 
up  with  a  full  and  swift  ti<le;  Loison,  upon  whose 
vigour  the  success  of  the  operation  depended,  was  giv- 
ing way,  Wellesley  was  already  across  the  Vouga, 
and  Franceschi  was  struggling  in  his  grasp. 

The  English  general  had  resolved  to  operate  along 
both  the  routes  before  spoken  of,  but  the  greater  facility 
of  supplying  the  troops  by  the  coast-line,  and,  above 
all,  the  exposed  position  of  the  French  right  wing,  so 
near  the  allies  and  so  distant  from  succour,  induced 
him  to  make  the  priiici)val  attack  by  the  high  road 
leading  to  Oporto.  He  had  one  division  of  cavalry 
and  three  of  infantry,  exclusive  of  Beresford's  corps. 
The  first  division,  composed  of  two  brigades  of  infantry 
and  twelve  guns,  was  commanded  by  lieutenant-general 
Paget.  The  second,  of  three  brigades  of  infantry  and 
six  guns,  by  lieutenant-general  Slierbrooke.  'I'he  third, 
of  two  brigades  of  infantr)'  and  six  guns,  by  major- 
general  Hill.  The  cavalry  by  lieutenant-general  Payne. 
The  whole  amounted  to  about  fourteen  thousand  five 
hundred  infantry,  fifteen  hundred  cavalry,  and  twent  - 
four  guns,  of  which  six  were  only  three-pounders. 

The  6th  of  Mav.  Beresford,  with   six  thousand  Poi 
tuguese,  two  British   battalions,  five  companies  of  ri- 
flemen, and  a  squadron  <^f  heavy  cavalry,  marched  upon 
Lamego  by  the  road  of  V' iseu. 

The  7th,  the  light  cavalry  and  Paget's  division  ad- 
vanced towards  the  Vouga  by  the  Oporto  road,  but 
halted,  on  the  8th,  to  give  Beresford  time  to  reach  the 


*  S.  Journal  of  Operations,  MSS. 


1809.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


191 


ITpppr  Donro,  before  the  attark  on  the  French  right 
should  commence.  The  9th,  they  resumed  their  march 
for  the  bridge  of  Vouo-a ;  Hill's  division  took  the 
Aveiro  rnad,  and  the  \vhole  reached  the  line  of  the 
Voucra  river  that  evening;  but  Pao-.et's  division  was 
not  breiight  up  until  after  dark,  and  then  with  caution, 
to  prevent  the  enemy's  guard  from  seeiiiff  the  col- 
umns, fh^  intent  being  to  surprise  Franceschi  the  next 
morning. 

That  general,  with  all  his  cavalry,  a  regimv^'nt  of 
Mermet's  division,  and  six  guns,  occupied  a  village, 
eight  miles  beyond  Vouaa  bridge,  called  Albergaria 
Nova;  the  remainder  of  Mermet's  infantry  were  at 
Grijon,  one  march  in  the  rear,  and  on  the  main  rnad  to 
Oporto.  Franceschi  had  that  day  informed  fSoult,  that 
the  allied  forces  were  collecting  on  the  Mondego  and 
thatTrant's  posts  had  closed  upon  the  Vouga  ;  he  was, 
however,  far  from  suspecting  that  the  whole  army  was 
upon  the  hT^t  river,  although,  from  the  imprndent  con- 
versation of  ;!n  English  officer,  bearing  a  flag  of  truce, 
he  had  reason  to  expect  an  attack  of  some  kind. 

Sir  Arthur  Wellesley's  plan  was  partly  arranged 
upon  the  suggestion  of  the  field-officer  who  had  met 
D'Argenton.  He  had  observed,  during  his  intercurse 
with  the  conspirnlors,  that  the  lake  of  Ovar  was  un- 
guarded b}^  the  French,  although  it  extended  twenty 
miles  behind  their  outposts,  and  all  the  boats  were  at 
Aveiro,  v/hich  was  in  possession  of  the  allies.  On 
this  inforn:ation  it  was  decided  to  turn  the  enemy's 
right  hy  the  lake.  Accordingly,  genera!  Hill  embarked 
on  the  evening  of  the  9th,  with  one  brigade,  the  other 
being  to  f  I'ow  him  as  quickly  as  possible.  The  fisher- 
men looked  on  at  first  with  surprise,  but,  soon  com- 
prehending the  object,  vfduntarily  ruslied  in  crowds  to 
the  boats,  and  worked  with  such  a  will,  that  the  whole 
flotilla  arrived  at  Ovar  precisely  at  sunrise  on  the  10th, 
when  the  troops  immediately  disembarked.  Tliat  day, 
also,  Beresford,  having  rallied  \^'i!soIl's  corps  upon 
his  own.  reached  Pezo  de  Ragoa,  and  he  it  was,  that 
had  re|)ulsed  Loison  and  pursued  him  to  Amarante. 

Both  flanks  of  the  French  army  were  now  turned, 
and  at  the  same  moment  sir  7^rtluir,  with  the  main 
body,  fell  upon  Franceschi,  for  while  the  flotilla  was 
navigating  the  lake  of  Ovar,  the  attempt  to  surprise 
that  general  at  Albergaria  Nova,  was  in  progress. 
Sherhrooke's  division  was  not  yet  up;  but  general 
Cotton,  with  the  light  cavalry,  crossing  the  Vouga,  a 
little  after  midniLfht,  end-^avoured  to  turn  the  enemy's 
left,  and  get  behind  him  while  the  head  of  Paget's 
division,  marching  a  little  later,  passed  through  the 
defiles  of  Vouga,  directly  upon  Albero-aria.  Trant's 
corps  was  to  make  way  between  Paget's  division  and 
llie  lake  of  Aveiro. 

This  enterprisp,  so  well  conceived,  was  baflled  by 
petty  events,  such  as  always  abound  in  war.  Sir 
Arthur  Wellesley  did  not  perfectlj^  know  the  ground 
beyond  the  Vou<ja,  and  late  in  the  evening  of  the  9th, 
colonel  'IVant,  having  ascertained  that  an  impracticable 
raviuH,  extending  from  the  lake  to  Olivera  de  Azemiz, 
would  prevent  him  from  obeying  his  orders,  passed 
the  bridge  of  Vouo-a,  and  carried  his  own  guns  beyond 
the  defiles  ;  thinking  thus  to  leave  the  brid<re  clear  for 
the  British  artillery  and  Richard  Stewart's  brigade, 
which  had  been  charged  to  conduct  the  British  cannon  ; 
this  task  was  difficult;  several  carriages  broke  down, 
and  Trant's  corps  took  the  lead  of  Paget's  column,  the 
march  of  which  was  impeded  by  the  broken  gun-car- 
riages. IMeanwhile  the  cavalry  under  Cotton  were  mis- 
led by  the  guides,  and  came,  in  broad  daylight,  upon 
Franceschi,  who,  with  his  flank  resting  upon  a  wood 
garnished  with  infantry,  boldly  offered  a  battle  that 
Cotton  dared  not,  under  such  circumstances,  accept. 
Thus,  an  hour's  delay,  produced  by  a  few  trifling  ac- 
cidents, marred  a  combination  that  would  have  shorn 
Soult  of  a  third  of  his  infantry  and  all  his  light  cavalry  ; 


for  it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that,  when  Francesclii's 
horsemen  were  cut  ofl^,  and  general  Hill  at  Ovar,  Mer- 
met's division  could  have  escaped  across  the  Douro. 

When  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  came  up  to  Albergaria 
with  Paget's  infiintry,  Franceschi  was  still  in  position, 
skirmishing  with  Trant's  corps,  and  evidently  io-norant 
of  what  a  force  was  advancing  against  him;  bbt  beinnr 
immediately  attacked,  and  his  foot  dislodged  from  tl:e 
wood,  be  retreated  along  the  road  to  Olivrira  de  Aze- 
mis,  briskly  pursued  by  the  allied  infantry.  Never- 
theless, valiantly  extricating  himself  from  this  perilous 
situation,  he  reached  Oliveira  without  any  serious  loss, 
and  continuing  his  march  during  the  night  by  Feria, 
joined  Mermet  next  morning  at  Grijon. 

Franceschi,  in  the  course  of  the  lOlh,  could  see  the 
whole  cf  the  English  army,  including  the  troops  with 
Hill,  and  \i  may  create  surprise  that  he  sl.ould  pass  so 
near  the  latter  freneral  without  being  attacked  ;  but  Hill 
was  strictly  obedient  to  his  orders,  which  forbade  him 
to  act  on  the  enemy's  rear;  and  those  orders  were  wise 
and  prudent,  because  the  principle  of  operating  with 
small  bodies  on  the  flanks  and  rear  of  an  enemy  is 
vicious.  While  the  number  of  men  on  the  left  of  the 
Douro  was  unknown,  it  would  have  been  rash  to  inter- 
pose a  single  brigade  between  the  advanced  guard  and 
the  main  body  of  the  French  ;  the  object  of  Hill's  being 
sent  to  Ovar  was,  1.  that  the  line  of  march  might  be 
eased,  and  the  enemy's  attention  distracted  ;  2.  that  a 
division  of  fresh  soldiers  might  be  at  hand  to  follow  the 
pursuit,  so  as  to  arrive  on  the  bridge  of  Oporto  pell- 
mell  with  the  flying  enemy ;  and  it  was  the  soldierlike 
retreat  of  Franceschi  that  prevented  the  last  object  from 
being  attained. 

General  Pag-et's  division  and  the  cavalry  halted  the 
night  of  the  lOth  at  Oliveira;  Sherbroc  ke's  division 
passed  the  Vouga  later  in  the  day.  and  remained  in 
Albergaria  ;  the  next  morning  the  pursuit  was  renewed, 
and  the  men,  marching  strongly,  came  up  with  the 
enemy  about  eight  o'clock  in  the  morning. 

COMBAT  OF  GHIJON. 

The  French  were  posted  across  the  road  on  a  range 
of  steep  hills,  a  wood,  occupied  with  infantiy,  covered 
their  right  flank,  and   their  front  v.-as  protected    bj'  a 
village  and  broken  ground,  but  their  left  was  ill  placed. 
The  British  troops  came  up  briskly  in  one  column,  the 
head   of  which    was    instantly  and    sharply  engaged. 
The  Ifith  Portuguese  regiment,  then  quitting  the  lino 
of  march,  drove  the  enemy   rut  cf  the  wood  covering 
his  right,  and  at  the  same  time  the  Germans,  who  were 
in  the  rear,  bringing  their  left  shoulders  forvvard,  with- 
out any  halt  or  check,  turned   the  other  flank  of  the 
I  French  :  the  latter  immediately  abandoned  the  position, 
I  and,  being   pressed  in   the  rear  by  two  squadrons  of 
I  cavalry,  lost  a  few  killed   and  about  a  hundred  prison- 
I  ers.     The  heights  of  ('arvalho  gave  thetn  an  opportn- 
:  nity  to  turn   and   check   the  pursuing  squadrons,   yet, 
I  when  the  British   infantry,   with   an   impetuous  pace, 
1  again  drew  near,  they  fell  back,  and   thus  fighting  and 
]  retreating,  a   blow   and    a  race,   wore  the  day  <iway. 
i  During  this  combat.  Hill  was  to  have  marched  by  the 
I  coast-road   towards  Oporto,  to  intercept   the  enemy'? 
!  retreat,  but  by  some  error  in  the  transmission  of  orders 
!  that  general,  taking  the  route  of  Feria,  crossed  'I'rant's 
I  line  of  march,  and  tiie  time  thus  lost  could  not  be  re- 
i  gained. 

I  The  British  halted  at  dark.  The  French  passed  the 
Douro  in  the  night,  and  destroyed  the  bridge,  and  all 
the  heavy  artillery  and  baggage  still  in  Ojiorto  were 
immediately  sent  off  by  this  road  to  Amarante.  Mer- 
met. without  halting,  followed  the  same  route  as  far  as 
Vallonga  and  Baltar,  having  orders  to  secure  all  the 
boats  and  vigilantly  to  patrole  up  the  right  bank  of 
the  river,  and  Loison,  his  retreat  from  Pezo  do  Ragoa 
being  unknown,  was  again  warned  to  hold  the'l'amega 


192 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[EooK  VIII. 


as  he  valued  the  safety  of  the  army;  finally  Soult  hav- 
ing directed  all  the  craft  in  the  Douro  in  his  front  to 
be  secured,   and   havinji-  placed   guards  at  convenient 

Joints,  resolved  to  hold  Djiorto  during  the  12th,  that 
^urge's  dragoons  and  the  dilTerent  detachments  might 
have  time  to  concentrate  at  Amarante. 

The  duke  of  Dalmatia's  attention  was  now  princi- 
pally directed  to  the  river  in  its  course  belcn^  the  city, 
for  the  reports  of  his  cavalry  led  him  to  i)eli('ve  that 
Hill's  division  had  been  disembarked  at  Ovar  from  the 
ocean,  and  lie  expected  tliat  the  empty  vessels  would 
come  round  to  elVect  a  passage  at  the  mouth  of  tiie 
Douro.  Nevertheless,  thinking  that  Loison  still  held 
Mesamfrioand  Pezo  witli  six  thousand  men,  and  know- 
ing ihrit  three  brigades  occupied  intermediate  posts  be- 
tween Amarante  and  (3porto,  he  was  satisfied  that  his 
retreat  was  secured,  and  thought  there  was  no  rashness 
in  maintaining  his  position  for  another  day.  But  the 
conspirators  were  busy.  His  orders  were  neglected  or 
only  half  obeyed,  and  false  reports  of  their  execution 
made  to  him. 

In  this  state  of  affairs  the  heads  of  the  British  columns 
arrived  at  Villa  Nova,  and  before  eight  o'clock  in  the 
morning  of  the  IStli,  the  whole  army  was  concentrated 
there,  yet  hidden  from  Soult  by  the  height  upon  which 
the  convent  of  Sarea  stood.  The  Douro  rolled  between 
the  hostile  forces,  and  the  French  who  had  suffered 
nothing  from  the  previous  operations,  oould  in  two  days 
take  post  behind  the  Tamega,  from  whence  the  retreat 
upon  Rraganca  would  be  certain;  and  they  might,  in 
passing,  defeat  Beresford  ;  for  that  general's  force  was 
feeble  in  numbers,  in  infancy  as  to  organization,  and 
the  utmost  sir  Arthur  expected  from  it  was  that,  vexing 
the  French  line  of  march,  and  infesting  the  road  of 
Villa  Real,  it  would  oblige  Soult  to  take  the  less  ac- 
cessible route  ef  Chaves  and  retire  to  Gallicia  instead 
of  Leon.  This  however  could  not  happen  unless  the 
main  body  of  the  allies  followed  the  French  closely 
from  Oporto,  and  as  Soult  at  Salamanca  would  have 
been  more  formidable  than  ever,  the  ultimate  object  of 
the  campaign  and  the  immediate  safety  of  Beresford's 
corps,  alike  demanded,  that  the  Douro  should  be  quick- 
ly passed.  But  how  force  the  passage  of  a  river,  deep, 
ewift,  more  than  three  hundred  yards  wide,  and  with 
ten  thousand  veterans  guarding  the  opposite  bank  ! 
Alexander  the  Gre-dt  might  have  turned  from  il  with- 
out shame  I 

The  height  of  Sarea,  round  which  the  Douro  came 
with  a  sharp  elbow,  prevented  any  view  of  the  upper 
river  from  the  town,  and  the  duke  of  Dalmatia,  confi- 
dent tliat  all  above  the  city  was  secure,  took  his  station 
in  a  house  westward  of  Oportn,  whence  he  could  dis- 
cern the  whole  course  of  the  lower  river  to  its  mouth. 
Meanwhile,  from  the  summit  of  Sarea,  sir  A.  Welles- 
ley,  with  an  eag'o's  glance,  searched  all  the  opposite 
bank  and  the  city  and  country  beyond  it.  He  saw 
horses  and  baggage  moving  on  the  road  to  Vallonga, 
and  the  dust  of  columns  in  retreat,  but  no  large  body 
of  troops  near  the  rive.  ,  the  enemy's  guards  were  few 
and  distant  from  each  other;  his  patroles  neither  nume- 
rous nor  vigilant,  and  an  auspicious  negligence  seemed 
to  pervade  his  carup.  Suddenly  a  large  unfinished 
building,  called  the  Seminary,  caught  the  English 
general's  eye.  This  isolated  structure,  having  a  short 
easy  access  from  the  river,  was  surrounded  by  a  high 
wall,  which,  extending  to  the  water  on  either  side, 
enclosed  an  area  sufficient  fur  two  battalions  in  order 
of  bailie;  the  only  etrress  was  by  an  iron  gate  opening 
on  the  Vallonira  road,  and  the  building  itself  command- 
ed every  thing  in  its  vicinity,  except  one  mound,  which 
was  within  cannon-shot,  but  too  pointed  to  hold  a  gun. 
There  were  no  French  posts  near,  and  the  direct  line 
of  passage  from  the  hc^ighl  of  Sarea,  across  the  river 
to  the  building,  being  to  the  right  hand,  was  hidden 
iiom  the  troops  in  the  town.     Here,  then,  with  a  mar- 


vellous hardihood,  sir  Arthur  resolved,  if  he  could  find 
but  one  boat,  to  make  his  way,  in  the  face  of  a  veteran 
army  and  a  renowned  general. 

PASSAGE  OF  THE  DOURO. 

A  poor  barber,  evading  the  French  patroles,  had 
during  the  night  come  over  the  water  in  a  small  skiff. 
Colonel  Waters,  a  staff  olhcer,  a  quick  darinorman.  dis- 
covered this,  and  aided  by  the  barber,  and  by  the  prior 
of  Amarante,  who  gallantly  offered  his  services,  inmie- 
diately  passed  the  river,  and  in  half  an  hour  returned 
unperceived  with  three  large  barges.  Meanwhile  eio-h- 
teen  pieces  of  artillery  were  got  up  to  the  convent  of 
Sarea,  and  major-general  John  Murray  was  directed, 
with  the  German  brigade,  some  squadrons  of  the  14lh 
dragoons,  and  two  guns,  upon  the  Barca  de  Avintas, 
three  miles  above.  He  had  orders  to  seek  for  boats 
and  effect  a  passage  there  also  if  possible,  and  when 
Waters  returned,  some  of  the  English  troops  were 
pushed  towards  Murray  in  support,  while  others  cau- 
tiously approached  the  brink  of  the  river  u.rdcr  Sarea. 

It  was  now  ten  o'clock;  the  Fronch  were  still  tran- 
quil and  unsuspicious;  the  British  wondering  and  ex- 
pectant. Sir  Arthur  was  informed  that  one  boat  was 
brought  up  to  the  point  of  passage.  '•  Well,  let  the  men 
cross,''''  was  his  reply,  and  at  this  simple  order,  an 
off.cer  with  twenty-five  soldiers  of  the  BhitTs  embarked, 
and  in  a  quarter  of  an  hour  silently  placed  themselves 
in  the  midst  of  the  enemy's  army. 

The  Seminary  was  thus  gained,  all  was  quiet  in 
Oporto,  and  a  second  boat  followed  the  first;  no  hostile 
movement  was  seen,  no  sound  heard,  and  a  third  boat 
passed  higher  up  the  river,  but  scarcely  had  the  men 
from  this  last  set  foot  on  shore,  when  a  tumultuous 
noise  arose  in  the  city.  The  drums  beat  to  arms, 
shouts  arose  from  all  parts,  the  people  were  seen  vehe- 
mently gesticulating  and  making  signals  from  the 
houses,  confused  masses  of  French  troops,  hurrying 
forth  from  the  streets  by  the  higher  grounds,  threw 
out  swarms  of  skirmishers  that  came  furiously  down 
against  the  Seminary.  The  British  army  instantly 
crowded  to  the  bank  of  the  river;  Paget's  and  Hill's 
divisions  collected  at  the  point  of  passage  and  Sher- 
brooke's  division  where  the  boat  bridge  had  bt^en  cut 
away  from  Villa  Nova.  Paget  himself  had  passed  in 
the  third  boat,  and  having  mounted  the  roof  of  the 
Seminary  was  already  struck  down  with  a  dangerous 
wound.  Hill  took  his  place.  The  musketry  was  sharp, 
voluble,  and  enereasing  as  the  numbers  on  both  sides 
accumulated  ;  but  the  French  attack  was  eager  and 
constant,  their  fire  augmented  faster  than  that  of  the 
English,  and  their  artillery  also  began  to  play  upon 
the  building,  'i'he  British  guns  from  Sarea  command- 
ed indeed  the  whole  enclosure  round  the  Seminary,  and 
swept  the  left  of  the  wall  in  such  a  manner  as  to  con- 
fine the  P'rench  assault  to  the  side  of  the  iron  gate; 
but  Murray  did  not  appear,  and  the  stru£fgle  was  so 
violent,  and  the  monunt  so  critical,  that  sir  Arthur 
himself  was  only  prevented  from  crossing  by  the  ear- 
nest representations  of  those  about  him,  and  tlie  just 
confidence  he  had  in  general  Hill. 

At  this  period  some  citizens  pushed  over  to  Villa 
Nova  with  several  great  boats,  tSherbrooke's  people 
began  to  cross  in  large  bodies,  and  at  the  same  mo- 
ment, a  loud  shout  in  the  town,  and  the  waving  of 
handkerchiefs  frrmi  all  the  windows,  gave  notice  that 
the  enemy  had  abandoned  the  lower  part  vX  the  city  : 
Murray's  troops  were  now  seen  descending  the  right 
bank  from  Avintas,  three  battalions  were  in  the  Semi- 
nary, and  Hill,  advancing  to  the  enclosure  wall,  opened 
a  destructive  fire  upon  the  French  columns,  as  they 
passed,  in  haste  and  confusion,  by  the  Vallonga  road. 
Five  pieces  of  French  artillery  came  galloping  out  from 
the  town  on  the  left,  but  appalled  by  the  terrible  line  of 
musketry  to  be  pas.-ed,  the  drivers  suddenly  juilled  up, 


1809.1 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WxVR. 


193 


and  wliile  thus  hesitating,  a  volley  from  behind  stretch- 
ed mast  of  the  artillery-men  on  the  ground ;  the  rest 
dispersing  among  the  enclosures,  left  their  guns  on  the 
road.  This  volley  was  given  by  a  part  of  Sherbroo\e"s 
people,  who,  having  forced  their  way  through  the 
streets,  thus  came  upon  the  rear  ;  in  fine,  the  passage 
A'as  won,  and  the  allies  were  in  considerable  force  on 
the  French  side  of  the  river.  To  the  left,  general 
Sherbrooke,  with  the  brigade  of  guards,  ai.d  the  2Dth 
regiment,  *vas  in  the  town,  and  pressing  the  rear  of 
the  enemy,  who  were  quitting  it.  In  the  centre,  gen- 
eral Hill,  holding  the  Seminary  and  the  wall  of  the 
enclosure,  with  tiie  Buffs,  the  48th,  the  66th,  the  IClh 
Portuguese,  and  a  battalion  of  detachments,  sent  a 
damaging  fire  into  the  masses  as  they  passed  him,  and 
h:s  line  was  prolonged  on  the  right,  although  with  a 
considerable  interval,  by  general  Alurrays  Germans, 
and  two  squadrons  of  the  llth  dragoons.  The  remain- 
der of  the  army  kept  passing  the  river  at  diilerent 
p  jints,  and  the  artillery,  from  the  height  of  Sarea,  still 
Buirched  the  enemy's  columns  as  they  hurried  along  the 
liue  of  retreat. 

If  general  Murray  had  then  fallen  boldly  in  upon  the 
dlsoi'dered  crowds,  their  discomfiture  would  have  been 
complete  ;  but  he  suiiered  column  after  column  to  pass 
Iiim,  vv'itoout  even  a  cannon  shot,  and  seemed  fearful  lest 
they  should  turn  and  push  him  into  the  river.  Geneial 
(Jharies  Stewart  and  major  Hervey,  impatient  of  this 
timidity,  charged  with  tiie  two  squadrons  of  dragoons, 
and  riding  over  the  enemy's  rear-guard,  as  it  was  push- 
ing through  a  narrow  road  to  gain  an  open  space  be- 
yond, unhorsed  Laljordc;  and  wounded  Foy  ;  but  on  the 
English  side  Hervey  lost  an  arm,  and  his  gallant  horse- 
men, receiving  no  support  fruni  ^lurray,  had  to  light 
their  way  back  with  loss.  This  finished  the  action,  the 
French  continued  their  retreat,  and  the  British  remained 
on  the  ground  they  had  gained.  The  latter  lost  twenty 
killed,  a  general  and  ninety-rive  men  wounded  ;  the  for- 
mer had  about  five  hundred  men  killed  and  wounded, 
and  five  pieces  of  artillery  were  taken  in  the  fight ;  a 
considerable  quantity  of  ammunition,  and  filty  guns  (of 
which  the  carriages  had  been  burnt)  were  aberwards 
found  in  the  arsenal,  and  seven  hundred  men  were  cap- 
tured in  the  hospitals. 

Napoleon's  veterans  were  so  experienced,  so  inured 
to  warfare  that  no  troops  in  the  world  could  more  rea- 
dily recover  from  such  a  surprise,  and  before  they 
reached  Vallonga  their  colunms  were  again  in  order, 
with  a  regular  rear-guard  covering  the  retieat ;  a  small 
garrison  at  the  mouth  of  the  Douro  which  had  been 
cut  off",  being  guided  by  some  friendly  Portuguese,  also 
rejoined  the  army  in  the  night,  and  Soult,  believing  that 
Laison  was  at  Amarante,  thought  he  had  happily  es- 
caped the  danger. 

Sir  Arthur  \\''elle3ley  employed  the  remainder  of  the 
12th,  and  the  next  day,  in  bringing  over  the  rear-guard 
of  the  army,  the  baggage,  the  stores,  and  the  artillery. 
Murray's  Germans  indeed  pursued,  on  the  morning  of 
the  13th,  but  not  further  than  about  two  leagues  on  the 
road  of  Amarante,  and  this  delay  has  been  blamed  as  an 
error  in  sir  Arthur.  It  is  argued  that  an  enemy  once 
surprised  should  never  be  allowed  to  recover,  and  that 
Soult  should  have  been  followed  up,  even  while  a  single 
regiment  was  left  to  pursue.  The  reasons  for  haltuig 
were,  first,  that  a  part  of  the  army  was  still  on  the  lett  i 
bank  of  the  Dnurn  ; — secondly,  that  the  tniops  had  out- 
marched provisions,  baggage,  and  anununition,  and  hav- 
ing passed  over  above  eighty  miles  of  difficult  country 
in  four  days,  during  three  of  which  they  were  constantly 
fighting,  both  men  and  animals  required  rest  ;  thirdly, 
that  nothing  was  known  of  Beresford,  whose  contempo- 
rary operations  it  is  time  to  relate. 

The  moment  of  his  arrival  on  the  Douro  was  marked 
by  the  repulse  of  Loison's  division,  which  immediately 
fcl.    bach,  as    I    have    already  related,  to    Mezaml'rio, 
14 


but  followed  by  the  Portuguese  patroles  only,  for  Bere;*- 
ford  halted  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river,  because  the 
British  regiments  were  still  in  the  rear.  This  was  on 
the  10th.  Silveira,  who  was  at  Villa  Real,  had  orders 
to  fLcl  towards  Mezanifiio  for  the  enemy,  and  the  mar- 
shal's force  was  thus,  with  the  assistance  of  the  insur- 
gents, in  readiness  to  turn  Soult  from  the  route  of  Villa 
Real  to  Bragant.-a.  The  llth  Loison  continued  his  re- 
treat, and  Beresford  finding  him  so  timid,  folloAved  and 
skirmished  with  his  rear-guard  ;  at  the  same  time  Silveira 
advanced  from  Villa  Real.  On  the  12th,  the  French 
outposts  in  front  of  Amarante  were  driven  in,  and  the 
13th  Loison  abandoned  that  town,  and  took  the  route  of 
Guimaraens.  These  events  were  unknown  to  sir  Arthur 
Wellesley  on  the  evening  of  the  13th,  i)ut  he  heard  that 
Soult,  after  destroying  his  artillery  and  ammunition, 
nea;r  Penafiel,  had  jaassed  over  the  mountains  towards 
Braga,  and  judging  this  to  arise  from  Beresford 's  opera 
tions  on  the  Tamega,  he  reinforced  Murray  with  some 
cavalry,  ordering  him  to  proceed  by  Penafiel,  and  if 
Loison  still  lingered  near  Amarante,  to  open  a  commu- 
nication with  Beresfi)rd.  The  latter  was  at  the  same 
time  directed  to  ascend  the  Tamega,  and  intercept  the 
enemy  at  Chaves. 

Meanwhile,  the  main  body  of  the  army  marched  in 
two  columns  upon  the  Minho,  the  one  by  the  route  of 
Barca  de  Troffa  and  Braga.  the  other  by  the  Ponte 
d'Ave  and  Bacellos  ;  but.  on  the  evening  of  the  14th,  the 
movements  of  the  enemy  about  Braga  gave  certain  proofa 
that  not  A'alen^a  and  Tuy,  but  Chaves  or  Montalegre, 
would  be  the  point  of  his  retreat.  Hereupon,  the  left 
column  was  drawn  off  from  the  Bacellos  road  and  direct- 
ed upon  Braga.  and  Beresford  was  instructed  to  move 
by  Monterey,  upon  Villa  del  Rey,  if  Soult  should  take 
the  line  of  Montalegre.  The  l.oth,  sir  Arthur  reached 
Braga.  Murray  was  at  Guimaraens  on  his  right,  anj 
Beresford,  who  had  anticipated  his  orders,  was  near 
Chaves,  having  sent  Silveira  towards  Salanionde,  with 
instructions  to  occupy  the  passes  of  Ruivaens  and  Mel- 
gasso.  At  this  time,  however,  Soult  was  fifteen  miles  in 
advance  of  Braga,  having,  by  a  surprising  effort,  extri- 
cated himself  from  one  of  the  most  dangerous  situationa 
that  a  general  ever  escaped  from  ;  but  to  understand 
this,  it  is  necessary  to  describe  the  country  through  whicli 
his  retreat  was  effected. 

I  have  already  stated,  that  the  Sierra  de  Cabreira 
and  the  Sierra  de  Catalina,  line  the  right  bank  of  tha 
Tamega  ;  but,  in  approaching  the  Uouro,  the  latter 
slants  off  towards  Oporto,  leaving  a  rough  but  practica- 
ble slip  of  land,  through  which  the  road  leads  from 
Oporto  to  Amarante  :  hence,  the  French  in  retreating 
to  the  latter  town  had  the  Douro  on  their  right  hand 
and  the  Sierra  de  Catalina  on  their  left,  both  supposed 
impassable  ;  and  although  between  Amarante  and  Braga 
which  is  on  the  other  side  of  the  Catalina,  a  route  prac- 
ticable for  artillery  runs  through  Guimaraens,  it  waa 
necessary  to  reach  Amarante  to  fall  into  this  road.  Soult, 
therefore,  as  he  advanced  along  the  narrow  pass  between 
the  mountains  and  the  Douro,  rested  his  hopes  of  safe- 
ty entirely  upon  Loison's  holding  Amarante  ;  several 
days,  however,  had  elapsed  since  that  general  had 
communicated  with  the  army,  and  an  aide-de-camp 
was  sent,  on  the  morning  of  the  12th,  to  ascertain  hia 
exact  position.  Colonel  Tholose,  the  officer  employed, 
found  Loison  at  Amarante,  but  neither  his  remonstran- 
ces, nor  the  after-coming  intelligence,  that  Oporto  was 
evacuated  and  the  army  in  full  retreat  upon  the  Tame- 
ga, could  induce  that  general  to  remain  there  ;  as  we 
have  seen,  he  marched  towards  Guimaraens  on  the 
13th,  abandoning  the  bridge  of  Amarante,  without  a 
blow,  and  leaving  his  cimimander  and  two  thirds  of 
the  army  to  what  must  have  appeared  inevitable  de- 
struction. 

The  news  of  this  unexpected  calamity  reached  Soult 
at  one  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  13th,  just  after 


194 


NAPIER'S    PEXIXSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  VUl. 


he  had  passed  the  rupgccl  banks  of  the  Souza  river  ;  the 
weather  was  boisterous,  the  nit'ii  were  ratii,med,  voices 
were  heard  oalliiii?  for  a  capitiihition,  and  Uic  whole 
army  was  stricken  with  dismay  ;  then  it  ^^as  that  the 
dulce  of  Dalinatia  justified,  by  iiis  enero-y,  that  fortune 
which  had  raised  him  to  his  liii^h  rank  in  the  worid. 
Beinjr,  by  a  Spanish  pedlar,  intlirmed  of  a  jiath,  tliat, 
mounting  the  rijrht  bank  of  the  Souza,  led  over  the  Sierra 
de  Catalina  to  Guimaraens,  he,  on  the  instant,  silenced 
the  murmurs  of  the  treacherous  or  fearful  in  the  ranks, 
destroyed  the  artillery,  abandoned  the  military  chest  and 
baggage,  loaded  the  aniina!s  with  sick  men  and  musket 
ammunition,  and  repassing  the  Souza,  followed  his 
Spanish  guide  with  a  hardy  resolution.  The  rain  was 
falling  in  torrents,  and  the  path  was  such  as  might  be 
expected  in  those  wild  regions,  yet  the  troops  made 
good  their  passage  over  the  mountains  to  Pombeira,  and 
at  Guimaraens,  happily  fell  in  with  Loison.  During 
the  night  they  were  joined  by  Lorge's  (h'agoons  from 
Braga,  and  thus,  almost  beyond  hope,  the  whole  army 
was  concentrated. 

If  Souk's  energy  in  command  was  conspicuous  on 
this  occasion,  his  sagacity  and  judgment  were  not  less 
leniarkably  displayed  in  what  followed.  Most  genc- 
1  >,ls  would  have  moved  by  the  direct  route  upon  Gui- 
Dii^raens  to  Braga  ;  but  he,  with  a  long  reach  of  mind, 
calculated  from  the  slackness  of  pursuit  after  he  passed 
Vallonga,  that  the  bulk  of  the  English  army  must 
be  on  tiie  road  to  Braga,  and  would  be  there  before 
him  ;  or  that,  at  best,  he  should  be  obliged  to  retreat 
lighting,  and  must  sacrifice  the  guns  and  baggage  of 
Loison's  and  Lorge's  corps  in  the  face  of  an  enemy — a 
circumstance  tliat  might  operate  fatally  on  the  spirit 
of  his  soldiers,  and  would  certainly  give  opportunities 
to  the  malcontents ;  and  already  one  of  the  generals 
(apparently  Loison)  wa?  recommending  a  convention 
like  Cintra.'^  Wherefore,  with  a  firmness  worthy  of  the 
highest  admiration,  Soult  destroyed  all  the  guns  and 
the  greatest  part  of  the  baggage  and  annnuiiiiion  of 
lioison's  and  Lorge's  divisions  ;  then,  leaving  the  high 
road  to  Braga  on  his  left,  once  more  took  to  the  moun- 
tain paths,  making  for  the  heights  of  Carvalho  d'Este, 
where  he  arrived  late  in  the  evening  of  the  14th,  thus 
gaining  a  day's  march,  in  point  of  time.  The  morning 
of  the  loth  he  drew  up  his  troops  in  the  position  he 
had  occupied  two  months  before,  at  the  battle  of 
Braga,,  and  by  this  spectacle,  where  twenty  thousand 
men  were  collected  upon  the  theatre  of  a  former  victory, 
and  disposed  so  as  to  produce  the  greatest  effect,  he 
aroused  all  the  sinking  pride  of  the  French  soldiers.  It 
was  a  happy  reach  of  generalship,  an  inspiration  of  real 
genius ! 

He  now  re-organised  his  army,  taking  the  command 
of  the  rear-guard  himself,  and  giving  that  of  the  ad- 
vanced guard  to  general  Loison.  Noble,  the  French 
historian  of  this  campaign,  says,  "  the  whole  army  was 
astonished;"  as  if  it  were  not  a  stroke  of  consummate 
policy,  that  the  rear,  which  was  pursued  by  the  British, 
should  be  under  the  general-in-chief,  and  that  the  front, 
which  was  to  fight  its  way  through  the  native  forces. 
should  have  a  conmiander  whose  very  name  called  up  all 
the  revengeful  passions  of  the  I'ortuguese.  Manvta 
dared  not  surrender .'  and  thus  the  duke  of  Dalmatia 
dexterously  forced  those  to  act  with  most  zeal  who  were 
least  inclined  to  serve  him  ;  but  in  sooth,  such  was  his 
perilous  situation,  that  all  the  resources  of  his  mind  and  all 
the  energy  of  his  characUn-  were  needed  to  save  the  army. 

From  Carvalho  he  retired  to  Salamonde,  from  whence 
there  were  two  lines  of  retreat  ;  the  one  through  Rui- 
vaens  and  Venda  Nova,  by  which  the  army  had  march- 
ed when  coming  from  (Jhaves  two  months  Ijefore  ;  the 
other,  .shorter,  although  more  impracticable,  leading 
by  the  Ponte  Nova  and  Ponte  Miserella  into  the  road 


*  Noble's  Campagnc  de  Galice. 


running  from  Ruivaens  to  ^lonta^egre.  But  the  scouts 
brought  intelligence  that  the  bridge  of  Ruivaens,  on 
the  little  river  of  that  name,  was  broken,  and  defended 
by  twelve  hundred  Portuguese,  with  artillery,  and 
that  another  party  had  been,  since  the  morning,  destroy- 
mg  the  Ponte  Nova  on  the  Cavado  river.  'I'he  destruc- 
tion of  the  first  bridge  blocked  the  road  to  Chaves  ; 
the  second,  if  completed,  and  the  passage  well  defend 
ed,  would  have  cut  the  French  off  from  Montalcgre. 
The  night  was  setting  in,  the  soldiers  were  harassed, 
barefooted,  and  starving  ;  the  anmiunition  wa.s  injured 
by  the  rain,  which  had  never  ceased  since  the  13th, 
and  which  was  now  increasing  in  violence,  accom- 
panied with  storms  of  wind  ;  the  British  army  would 
certainly  fall  upou  the  rear  in  the  morning  ;  and  if  the 
Ponte  Nova,  where  the  guard  was  reported  to  be  weak, 
could  not  be  secured,  the  hour  of  surrender  was  surely 
arrived.  In  this  extremity,  Soult  sent  for  major  I)u- 
long,  an  officer  justly  reputed  for  one  of  the  most  dar- 
ing in  the  French  ranks.  Addressing  himself  to  this 
brave  man,  he  said,  "  I  have  chosen  you  from  the 
whole  army  to  seize  the  Ponte  Nova,  which  has  been 
cut  by  the  enemy.  Select  a  hundred  grenadiers  and 
twenty-live  hoi-semen,  endeavour  to  surprise  the  guards, 
and  secure  the  j^assage  of  the  bridge.  If  you  succeed, 
say  so,  but  send  no  other  report  ;  your  silence  will  suf- 
fice." Thus  exhorted  and  favoured  l;y  the  storm  Du- 
long  reached  the  bridge  unperceived  of  the  Portuguese, 
killed  the  centinel  before  any  alarm  was  given,  and 
then  followed  by  twelve  grenadiers,  began  crawling 
along  a  narrow  slip  of  masonry,  which  was  the  only 
part  undestroyed.  The  Cavado  river  was  flooded  and 
roaring  in  its  <leep  channel,  one  of  the  grenadiers  lell 
into  the  gulf,  but  the  noise  of  the  waters  was  louder 
than  his  cry,  and  Dulong  with  the  eleven  reaching  the 
other  side  surprised  the  nearest  post  ;  the  remainder 
of  his  men  advanced  at  the  same  moment  close  to  the 
biidge,  and  some  crossing  and  others  mounting  the 
heights,  shouting  and  tiring,  scared  the  poor  peasantry, 
who  imagined  the  whole  army  was  upon  them  ;  thus  the 
passage  was  gallantly  won. 

At  four  o'clock,  the  bridge  was  repaired  and  the  ad- 
vanced guards  of  the  French  commenced  crossing  ;  but 
the  column  of  march  was  long,  the  road  narrow  and 
rugged,  the  troops  filed  over  slowly,  and  beyond  the 
Ponte  Nova  there  was  a  second  obstacle  still  more  for- 
midable. For  the  pass  in  which  the  troops  were  mov- 
ing being  cut  in  the  side  of  a  mountain,  open  on  the 
left  for  several  miks.  at  last  came  upon  a  torrent  called 
the  Misarella,  which,  breaking  down  a  deep  ravine,  or 
rather  gulph,  was  only  to  be  crossed  by  a  bridge  con- 
structed with  a  single  lofty  arch,  called  Saltador,  or  the 
leaper,  and  so  narrow  that  only  three  persons  could 
pass  abreast.  Fortunately  for  the  French,  the  Saltador 
was  not  cut,  but  entrenched  and  defended  by  a  few 
hundred  Portuguese  peasants,  who  occupied  the  rocks 
on  the  farther  side,  and  here  the  good  soldier  Dulong 
again  saved  the  army  ;*  for,  when  a  first  and  second 
attempt  had  been  repulsetl,  he  carried  the  entrenchments 
by  a  third  effort,  and,  at  the  same  instant,  i'cW  deeply 
wounded.  The  head  of  the  column  then  poured  over,  and 
it  was  full  time,  for  the  English  guns  were  thundering  in 
the  rear,  and  the  Ponte  Nova  wii^  choked  with  dead. 

Sir  Arthur  Wellesley,  quitting  Braga  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  loth,  had  come,  about  four  o'clock,  upon 
Soult's  rear-guard,  which  remained  at  Salamonde  to 
cover  the  passage  of  the  army  over  the  bridges.  The 
right  was  strongly  protected  by  a  ravine,  the  left  occu- 
pied a  steep  hill,  and  a  .stout  battle  might  have  been 
made  ;  but  men  thus  circumstanced,  and  momentarily 
expecting  an  order  to  retreat,  will  seldom  stand  firmly  ; 
on  this  occasion,  when  some  light  troops  turned  the 
left,  and  general  Sherbrooke,  with  the  guards,  mount 

*  S.  Jourr.«    vf  Operations,  MS. 


1809.1 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


195 


ing  the  steep  hill,  attacked  the  front,  the  French  made 

but  one  discharge,  und  fled  in  confusion  to  the  Ponte 
Nova.  As  this  bridge  was  not  on  the  direct  line  of  re- 
treat., they  were  for  some  time  unperceived.  and  gaining 
ground  of  their  pursuers,  formed  a  rear-guard  ;  yet  being 
at  last  descried,  some  guns  were  brought  to  bear  on 
them,  and  then  man  and  horse,  crushed  together,  went 
over  into  the  gulph,  and  the  bridge,  and  tiie  rocks,  and 
the  defile  beyond  were  strewed  with  mangled  bodies. 
This  was  the  last  calamity  inflicted  by  the  sword  upon 
tlio  French  army  in  this  retreat ;  a  retreat  attended  by 
many  horrid  as  well  as  glorious  events ;  for  the  peasants 
in  tlieir  fury,  with  an  atrocious  cruelty,  tortured  and 
mutilated  every  sick  man  and  straggler  that  fell  into 
their  power,  and  on  the  other  liaud,  the  soldiers,  who 
held  together  in  their  turn,  shot  the  peasants,  while  the 
track  of  the  columns  might  be  discovered  from  afiir  by 
the  smoke  of  the  burning  houses. 

The  French  reached  Montalegre  on  the  17th,  being 
followed  only  by  colonel  Waters,  with  some  cavalry, 
who  picked  up  a  few  stragglers  at  Villella.  Sir  Arthur 
halted  that  day  at  Ruivaens,  which  seems  to  have  been 
an  error  in  principle,  because  there  appears  no  adequate 
cause  for  the  delay,  but  on  the  18th  he  renewed  the 
pursuit,  and  a  part  of  his  cavalry  passed  Montalegre, 
followed  by  the  guards ;  the  enemy  was,  however, 
drawn  up  ijehind  the  Salas  in  force,  and  no  action  took 
place.  Silveira,  indeed,  had  entered  JSIontalegre,  from 
the  side  of  Chaves,  before  the  British  came  up  from 
Ruivaens;  but  instead  of  pursuing,  he  put  his  men 
into  quarters;  and  a  Portuguese  officer  of  his  division, 
who  was  despatched  to  marshal  Peresford  with  orders 
to  move  from  Villa  Perdrices  upon  Villa  del  Rey, 
loitered  on  the  road  so  long,  that  all  chance  of  inter- 
cepting the  French  line  of  march  was  at  an  end  ;  for 
thjugh  Beresibrd,  on  the  19th.  sent  colonel  Talbot  with 
the  14.th  dragoons  as  far  as  (Jinjo,  Franceschi  turned  in 
force,  and  obliged  that  oliicer  to  retire,  and  the  pursuit 
terminated,  with  the  capture  of  a  few  stragglers  on  the 
Salas. 

Soult  himself  crossed  the  frontier  by  Allaritz  on  the 
18th,  and  on  the  19th  entered  Orense,  without  guns, 
stores,  ammunition,  or  baggage  ;  his  men  were  ex- 
hausted with  fatigue  and  misery,  the  greatest  part 
without  shoes,  many  without  accoutrements,  and  in 
some  instances  even  without  muskets.  lie  had  quitted 
Orense  seventy-six  days  before,  with  about  twenty-two 
thousand  mnn,  and  three  thousand  five  hundred  had  af- 
terwards joined  him  from  Tuy.  He  returned  with 
nineteen  thousand  five  hundred,  having  lost  by  the 
sword  and  sickness,  by  assassination  and  capture,  six 
thousand  good  soldiers ;  of  which  number  above  three 
thousand  were  taken  in  hospitals,*  and  about  a  thou- 
sand were  killed  by  the  Portuguese,  or  had  died  of  sick- 
ness, previous  to  the  retreat ;  the  remainder  were  ca{)- 
tured,  or  had  perished  within  the  last  eight  days.  He 
had  carried  tifty-eight  pieces  of  artillery  into  Portugal, 
and  he  returned  without  a  gun  ;  yet  wa.s  his  reputation 
as  a  stout  and  able  soldier  no  wise  diminished. 

OBSERVATIONS. 

The  duke  of  Dalmatia's  arrangements  being  con- 
tinually thwarted  by  the  conspirators,  his  mi.itary  skill 
f  cannot  be  fairly  judged  of ;  nevertheless,  the  errors  of 
the  campaign  may,  without  injustice,  be  j)ointed  out, 
leaving  to  others  the  task  of  tracing  them  to  their  true 
sources. 

1. — The  disposition  of  the  army,  on  both  sides  of  the 
Douro  and  upon  such  extended  lines,  when  no  certain 
advice  of  the  movements  and  strength  of  the  English 
force  had  been  received,  was  rash.  It  was,  doubtless, 
right,  that  to  clear  the  front  and  to  gather  information, 
Frejiceschi  should  advance  to  the  Vouga ;  but  he  re- 


•  Viz.  1800  left  in  Viaua  and  Braga ;  500  including  the 
wounded  taken  in  Oporto;  1300  taken  at  Chaves,  by  Silveiru. 


mained  too  long  in  the  same  position,  and  he  should 
have  felt  Trant's  furce  more  positively.  Had  the  latter 
ofTicer  (whose  boldness  in  maintaining  tlie  line  of  the 
Vouga  was  extremely  creditable)  been  beaten,  as  he 
easily  might  have  been,  the  anarchy  of  the  country 
would  have  increased  ;  and  as  Beresf(;rd's  troops  at 
Thomar  wanted  but  an  excuse  to  disperse,  the  Portu- 
guese and  British  preparations  must  have  been  greatly 
retarded. 

2. — That  Soult,  when  he  had  secured,  as  he  thought, 
all  the  boats  on  an  unfbrdable  river  three  hundred  yards 
wide,  should  think  himself  safe  from  an  attack  for  one 
day,  is  not  wonderful.  The  improbability  that  such  a 
barrier  could  be  forced  in  half  an  hour  might  have  ren- 
dered Fabius  careless!  yet  there  were  some  peculiar  cir- 
cumstances attending  the  surprise  of  the  Frencli  army 
which  indicate  great  negligence.  The  commanding  offi- 
cer of  one  regiment  reported,  as  early  as  six  o'clock,  that 
the  English  were  crossing  the  river  ;*  the  report  was 
certainly  premature,  because  no  man  passed  before  ten 
o'clock,  but  it  reached  Soult,  and  he  sent  general  Ques- 
nel,  the  governor  of  Oporto,  to  verify  the  fact.  Quesnel 
stated,  on  his  return,  and  truly,  that  it  was  an  error,  and 
Soult  took  no  further  precaution  ;  the  patroles  were  not 
increased,  no  staff-ofiicers  appear  to  have  been  cm]3loyed 
to  watch  the  river,  and  no  signals  were  established  ;  yet 
it  was  but  three  days  since  I)  Argenton's  conspiracy  had 
been  discovered,  and  the  extent  of  it  was  still  miknown. 
This  circumstance  alone  should  have  induced  the  duke 
of  Dalmatia  to  augment  the  number  of  his  guards 
and  posts  of  observation,  that  the  multiplicity  of  the 
reports  might  render  it  impossible  for  tlie  malcontents 
to  deceive  him.  The  surprise  at  Oporto  must,  therefore, 
be  considered  as  a  fault  in  the  general,  which  could  only 
be  atoned  for  by  the  high  resolution  and  commanding 
energy  with  which  he  saved  his  army  in  the  subsequent 
retreat. 

3. — When  general  Loison  suffered  marshal  Beres- 
ford  to  drive  him  from  Pezo  de  Ragca  and  Mezamfrio, 
he  committed  a  grave  military  error,  and  when  he 
abandoned  Amarante,  he  relinquished  all  claim  to 
military  reputation,  as  a  simple  statement  of  facts  will 
prove.  The  evening  of  the  12th  he  wrote  to  Soult  that 
one  reg'iment  had  easily  repulsed  the  whole  of  the 
enemy's  forces ;  yet  he,  although  at  the  head  of  six  thou- 
sand men,  cavalry,  infantry,  and  artillery,  that  night  and 
v.ithout  another  shot  being  fired,  abandoned  the  only 
passage  by  which,  as  far  as  he  knew,  the  rest  of  the 
army  could  escape  from  its  perilous  situation  with 
honour !  It  was  not  general  Loison's  fault  if  England 
did  not  triumph  a  second  time  for  the  capture  of  a 
French  marshal. 

MOVEMENTS  OF  THE  BRITISH  GENERAL. 

1. — If  sir  Arthur  Wellesley's  operations  be  looked 
at  as  a  whole,  it  is  impossible  to  deny  his  sagacity  in 
planning,  his  decision  and  celerity  in  execution.  When 
he  landed  at  Lisbon,  the  nation  was  dismayed  by  pre- 
vious defeats,  distracted  with  anarchy,  and  menaced  on 
two  sides  by  powerful  armies,  one  of  which  was  already 
in  possession  of  the  second  city  in  the  kingdom.  In 
twenty-eight  days  he  had  restored  public  confidence  ; 
provided  a  defence  against  one  adversary  ;  and  having 
marched  two  hundred  miles  through  a  rugged  country, 
and  forced  the  pa.ssage  of  a  great  river — caused  hi.s 
other  opponent  to  flee  over  the  frontier,  without  artillery 
or  baggage. 

2. — Such  being  the  result,  it  is  necessary  to  shov/ 
that  the  success  was  due,  not  to  the  caprice  of  fortune, 
but  to  the  talents  of  the  general,  that  he  was  quick  to 
see,  and  active  to  strike.  And  fir.st,  the  secrecy  and 
despatch  with  Avhich  the  army  was  collected  on  the 
Vouga  belongs  entirely  to  the  man;  for,  there  were 
many  obstacles  to  overcome,  and   DArgenton,  as  the 


Noble's  Campaguc  de  Galice. 


196 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  TUT. 


Bequel  provoj,  wcilrl,  by  nis  disclosures,  have  ruined 
sir  Artliur's  oouibiiiiUiou:?  if  the  latter  hud  not  provi- 
dently fjiven  him  a  false  view  of  afTliirs.  'J'he  subsc- 
«|ueiit  niareh  from  tlie  Voug-a  to  the  Douro  was,  in  it- 
iself,  no  mean  eli'.trt ;  for  it  must  be  recollected,  that 
this  rapid  advance  an'uint  an  eminent  commander  and 
a  veteran  arnjy  of  altove  twenty  thousand  men,  was 
made  with  a  hetero,2:ene()us  force,  of  which  only  six- 
teen thousand  men  were  approved  soldiers,  the  remain- 
der beintr  totally  unformed  by  discipline,  untried  in 
battle,  and,  only  tliree  weeks  before,  in  a  state  of  ojjen 
mutiny. 

3. — The  passage  of  the  Douro,  at  Oporto,  would,  at 
first  sight,  seem  a  rash  undertaking  ;  when  examined 
closely,  it  proves  to  be  an  example  of  consunuuate 
peneralship,  both  in  the  conception  and  the  execution. 
The  careless  watch  maintained  by  the  French  may  in- 
deed be  called  fortunate,  because  it  jiermitted  the  Eng- 
lish general  to  get  a  few  men  over  unperceived  ;  but  it 
was  not  twenty-live,  nor  twenty-five  hundred,  soldiers 
that  could  have  maintained  themselves,  if  heedlessly 
cast  on  the  other  side.  Sir  Arthur,  when  he  so  coolly 
said — "  let  iksin  pass,"  was  prepared  to  protect  them 
when  they  had  passed,  lie  did  not  give  that  ortler 
iintil  he  knew  that  Murray  had  found  boats  at  Avintas, 
to  ferry  over  a  considerable  number  of  troops,  and,  cou- 
secjuently,  that  that  general;  descending  the  Douro, 
could  cover  the  right  flank  of  the  Seminary,  while  the 
puns  planted  on  tlie  heights  of  Sarca  could  sweep  the 
loft  tiank,  and  search  all  the  ground  enclosed  by  the 
wall  round  the  building.  Had  only  general  Murray's 
troops  passed,  they  would  have  been  compromised ; 
if  the  whole  ariuy  had  made  the  attempt  at  Avintas,  its 
inarch  would  have  been  discovered  ;  but  in  the  double 
]):vs«:ige  all  was  secured  ;  the  men  in  the  Seminary  by 
the  guns,  by  the  strength  of  the  building,  and  by  Mur- 
ray's troops  ;  the  latter  by  the  surprise  on  the  town, 
which  drew  the  enemy's  attention  away  from  them. 
Hence,  it  was  only  necessary  to  throw  a  few  brave 
men  into  the  Seminary  unperceive<I,  and  the  success 
was  alni'xt  certain  ;  because,  while  that  building  was 
maintained,  the  troops  in  the  act  of  passing  could 
neither  be  prevented  nor  harmed  l)y  the  enemy.  To  at- 
tain gi-eat  objects  by  simple  means  is  the  highest  effort 
of  genius. 

4. — If  general  Murray  had  attacked  vigorously,  the 
ruin  of  the  French  army  would  have  ensued.  It  was 
an  opportiuiity  that  would  have  tempted  a  blind  man 
to  strike  ;  the  neglect  of  it  argued  want  of  military 
talent  ami  of  military  hardihood  ;  and  how  would  it 
liave  appeared  if  Loison  had  not  abandoned  Amarante  'i 
If  Soult,  elFet'ting  his  retreat  in  safety,  and  reaching 
Zamora  or  Salamanca  in  good  order,  liad  turned  on 
Ciudad  Ui)drigo,  he  would  have  found  full  occupation 
for  Sir  Ai-thur  Wellesley  in  the  north  ;  and  he  would 
have  opened  a  free  connuunication  with  the  duke  of 
BoUuno ;  the  latter  must  then  have;  marched  either 
against  Seville  or  Lisbon  ;  and  thus  the  boldness  and 
excellent  conduct  of  the  English  general,  producing  no 
ader[uate  results,  would  have  been  overlooked,  or,  per- 
liaps,  have  formed  a  subject  for  the  abuse  of  some  igno- 
rant, declamatory  writer. 

5. — Sir  Arthur  Wellesl(;y's  reasons  for  halting  at 
Oporto  the  13th.  liave  been  already  noticed,  but  they 
require  further  remarks.  Had  he  followed  Soult  head- 
long, there  is  no  doubt  that  the  latttsr  would  have  been 
overtaken  on  the  Souza  river,  and  destroyed  ;  l)ut  this 
chance,  arising  from  Loison's  wretclunl  movements, 
was  not  t)  1)0  foreseen.  II(;  knew  nothing  of  Drres- 
ford's  situation,  but  he  naturally  siippo.<(;d  that,  follow- 
ing his  instructions,  he  was  aljout  V^illa  Real  ;  and  that, 
consequently,  the  French  would,  from  Amarante,  cither 
move  by  Villa  Pouca  to  Chaves,  or  taking  the  road  to 
Guinmraen-!  anil  Braga,  make  for  the  Minho ;  hence, 
he  remained  where  lie  could  commaud  the  main  roads 


tc  tl  at  river,  in  order  to  intercept  Soult's  retreat  and 
force  liim  to  a  battle ;  whereas,  if  he  had  once  entered 
the  d'"file  formed  by  the  Douro  and  the  Sierra  de  Cata^ 
lina,   he  could   only   have  followed   his   enemy  in  one 
column  by  a  difficult  route,  a  process  promising  little 
advantiig-e.      Nevertheless,   seeing    that    he    detached 
general  Murray  by  that  route  at  last,  it  would  appear 
that  he  should  have  ordered   him  to  press  the  «'nemy 
closer   than   he   did ;    but   there   a   political   dilliculty 
occurred.     The  English  cabinet,  although  improvident 
in  its  preparations,  was  very  fearful  of  misfortune,  and 
the  general  dared  not  risk  the  sai'cty  of  a  single  brigade 
except  for  a  great  object,  lest  a  slight  disaster  should 
cause  the  army  to  be  recalled.     This  circumstance  often 
obliged  him  to  curb  his  naturally  enterprising  disposi- 
!  tion  ;    and    to  this   burthen  of  ministerial   incapacity, 
j  which  he  bore  even  to  the  battle  of  Salamanca,  may 
be  traced  that  over-caution   which  has  been  so  often 
,  censured  as  a  fault,  not  only  by  military  writers,  but  by 
I  Napoleon,  who,  judging  from  appearances,  erroneously 
i  supposed  it  to  be  a  characteristic  of  the  man,  and  often 
j  rebuked  his  generals  for  not  taking  advantage  thereof.* 
G. — The  marches  and  encounters,  i'rom  the   14th  to 
I  the  17th,  were  excellent  on  both  sides.     Like  the  wheel- 
ings and  buffetings  of  two  vultures  in  the  air,  the  gen- 
erals  contended,   the   one    for    safety,   the    other    for 
triumph  ;  but  there  was  evidently  a  failure  in  the  ope- 
rations of  marshal  Beresford.     Soult  did  not  reach  Sala- 
monde  until  the  evening  of  the  15th,  and  his  reivr-guard 
was  still  there  on  the  evening  of  the  IGth.     Bere^lbrd 
was  in  person  at  Chaves  on  the  Itith,  and  his  troops 
reached  that  place  early  on  the  morning  of  the  17th. 
'  Soult  passed  Montalegre  on  the  I8th,  but  from  Chaves 
1  to  that  place  is  only  one  march.     Again,  marshal  Beres- 
ford was  in  possession  of  Amarante  on  the  13th,  and 
as  there  was  an  excellent  map  of  the  province  in  exist- 
I  ence,  he   must   have   known   the   importance   of  Sala- 
I  nionde,   which  was   only  thirty-two  miles  from  Ama- 
I  raute,  and  that  there  was  a  road  to  it  through  Freixira 
j  and   Kefoyos  de  Basta,   and  another  through  Mondin 
I  and  Cavez,  both  shorter  than  that  by  Guimaraens  and 
Chaves.     It  is  true   that  Silveira  was  directed  to  oc- 
cupy Ruivaens  and  Melgasso  ;  but  he  either  disobeyed 
or  executed   his  orders  too  slowly,  and  Misarella  was 
totally  neglected.     Major  Warre,  an  officer  of  the  mar- 
shal's  staff,   endeavoured,  indeed,  to   break  down   the 
bridges  of  Ponte  Nova  and  Ruivaens,  and  it  was  by 
his  exertions  that  the  peasants  surprised  at  the  former, 
had  been  collected ;  but  he  had  onl}'  a  single  dragooa 
with  him,  and  was  without  powder  to  execute  this  im- 
portant task.     The  peasantry,  also  glad  to  be  rid  of  the 
French,  were  reluctant  to  stop  their  retreat,  and  still 
more  to  destroy  the  bridge  of  Misarella,  which  was  the 
key  of  all  the  communications,  and  all  the  great  mar- 
kets of  the  Entre  Minho  e  Douro,  and  therefore  sure 
to  be  built  up  again ;  in  which  case  the  people  knew 
well   that  their  labour  and  time  would  be  called  for 
Avithout  payment.     It  is  however  undoubted  that  Soult 
owed   his  safety,  firstly,  to  the  failure,  whatever  may 
have  been  the  cause,  in  Bercsford's  general  operations, 
and,  secondly,  to  the  j)articular  failure  in  breaking  ihnvn 
the  bridges  ;  and  it  is  jirobable,  from  what  he  did  do, 
that  major  Warre  would  have  ellectually  destroyed  them 
if   he   had    been   supplied   with    only   the   coumionest 
means.  ^ 

Silveira  is  accused  of  not  moving  either  in  the  direc- 
tion or  with  the  celerity  required  of  him  by  Bereslbrd, 
but  there  seems  to  have  been  a  misunderstanding  be- 
tween them,  and  some  allowa  ice  nnist  be  made  lor  the 
numercjus  mistakes  necessarily  arising  in  the  transmis- 
sion of  orders  by  oHicers  s])eaking  different  languages  ; 
and  for  the  difficulty  of  moving  troops  not  accustomed, 
and  i)erha2w  not  perfectly  willing  to  act  together. 

♦  King  Jo.-^eplv's  captured  Correspondence,  MS. 


1S09.J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR  WAR. 


197 


CHAPTER  III. 

Bomana  surprises  Villa  Fninc.i — Nev  advances  to  Lugo — 
liuinanii  retreats  to  the  Asturias — Keforms  the  g-overmnent 
there — Ncy  invades  the  Asturias  by  the  west — Bonnet  and 
Kellcruian  enter  that  province  by  tlie  east  and  by  the  south 
— General  ilahi  flies  to  the  valley  of  the  Syl — Eoniaua 
embarks  at  Gihon — Ballasteros  takes  St.  Andero — Defeat- 
ed by  Bonnet — Kellerman  returns  to  Valladolid — Ney 
marches  for  Coruna — Carrera  ilefeats  Maucnne  at  St.  Jago 
Compostella — Mahi  blockades  Lugo — It  is  relieved  by 
Souk — lioniana  rejoins  his  army  and  marches  to  Orense— 
L:ipisse  storms  the  bridge  of  Alcuntani — Cuesta  advances 
to  the  Guadiana — Lapisse  retires — Victor  concentrates  his 
army  at  Torreniocha — Etfect  of  the  war  in  Germany  upon 
tliaC  of  Spain — Sir  A.  Weliesley  encamps  at  Abrantes — 
Tlie  bridge  of  Alcantara  destroyed — Victor  crosses  the 
Tagus  at  Almaraz — Beresford  returns  to  the  north  of  Por- 
tugal— Ney  and  Soult  combine  operations — Soult  scours 
the  valley  of  the  Syl — Romana  cut  off  from  Castile  and 
tiirown  back  upon  Urense — Ney  advances  towards  Vigo — 
Combat  of  San  Payo — Misunderstanding  between  him  and 
Soult — Ney  retreats  to  Coruna — -.Soult  marches  to  Zamora 
— Fraiicesclii  falls  into  the  hands  of  the  Capuchino — His 
melancholy  fate — Ney  abanbons  Gallicia — View  of  aftairs 
in  Aragon — Battles  of  llaria  au<l  Belchite. 

The  duke  of  Dalmatia  halted  at  Orense  the  20th.  and 
on  the  21st  pat  his  troops  in  m'jtiou  upon  Lugo,  to  suc- 
cour general  Fournier.  of  the  Gth  corps,  who,  with  three 
battalions  of  infantry  and  a  regiment  of  dragoons,  was 
besieged  by  twelve  or  iil'teen  thousand  Spaniards,  under 
the  command  of  general  Mahi.*  But  to  explain  this  it 
is  necessary  to  resume  the  account  of  Romana's  opera- 
tions, after  his  det(:!at  at  Monterey  on  the  Gth  of  March. 

Having  reassembled  the  fugitives  at  Puebla  de  Seua- 
bria,  on  the  borders  of  Leon,  he  repaired  his  h>:ses  by 
fresh  levies,  and  Wii-s  soon  after  joined  by  three  thousand 
men  from  Castile,  and  thus,  unknown  to  Ney,  he  had,  as 
it  were,  gained  the  rear  of  the  sixth  corps.  Villa  Franca 
del  Bierzo  was,  at  this  time,  only  occupied  by  two  weak 
French  battalions,  and  as  their  nearest  support  was  at 
Lugo,  Romana  resolved  to  surprise  them.  Dividing  his 
forces,  he  sent  JNFendizabel  with  one  division  by  the  valley 
of  the  Syl  to  take  them  in  rear,  and  marched  himself  by 
the  route  of  Calcabellos  ;  in  this  manner  he  surrounded 
the  French,  who,  after  a  short  skirmish,  in  which  the 
Spaniards  lost  about  a  hundred  men,  surrendered,  and 
were  sent  into  the  Asturias. 

Romana  then  detached  a  part  of  his  forces  to  Orense 
and  Pont«  Vedra,  to  assist  Morillo  and  the  insurrection 
in  the  western  parts  of  (iallicia,  where,  with  the  aid 
of  the  English  ships  of  war,  and  notwitlistanding  the 
shameful  neglect  of  the  supreme  central  junta,  the 
patriots  were  proceeding  vigorously.  The  moveable 
columns  of  the  sixth  corps  daily  lost  a  number  of  men, 
Bome  in  open  battle,  and  a  still  greater  number  by  assas- 
sinations ;  these  last  were  however  rigorously  visited 
upon  the  districts  where  they  took  place,  and  thus,  in 
Gallicia,  as  in  every  other  part  of  Spain,  the  war  hourly 
assumed  a  more  horrid  character.  Referring  to  this 
period,  colonel  Barios  afterwards  told  JMr.  Frere  that  to 
repress  the  excesses  of  marshal  Ney's  troops,  he,  himself, 
had,  in  cold  blood,  caused  seven  hundred  French 
prisoners  to  be  drowned  in  the  Minho !  f  an  avowal 
recorded  by  Mr.  Frere,  without  animadversion,  but 
which,  hap{)ily  for  the  cause  of  humanity,  there  is  good 
reason  to  believe  was  as  liilse  as  it  would,  if  true,  have 
been  detestable. 

After  the  capture  of  Vigo,  the  Spanish  force  on  the 
coast  increased  rapidly.  Barios  departed  for  Seville, 
Martin  Carrera  assumed  the  command  of  the  troops  near 
Orense,  and  the  Conde  Norona  of  tho.se  near  Vigo  ; 
general  Maucune  returned  to  St.  Jago  from  Tuy,  and 
Ney,  apprised  of  the  loss  at  Villa  Franca,  advanced  to 
Lugo.  Romana  innnc-<liately  abandoned  Gallicia,  and 
entering  the  Asturia.s  by  the  pass  of  Cienfuegos,  marched 
along  the  line  of  the  Gallician  frontier,  until  he  reached 


S.  Journal  of  Operationb,  MS.        t  Tarl.  Papers,  1810. 


Navia  de  Suarna,  where  he  left  Mahi,  with  the  army,  to 

observe  Ney,  but  repaired,  himself,  to  Ovicdo,  to  redres-s 

the  crying  wrongs  of  the  Asturians. 

I      It  is  umiece.ssary  to  recapitulate  the  evil  doings  of  the 

'  Asturian  junta,  which  was  notoriously  corrupt  and  inca- 

I  ])able  ;  Romana,   after  a  short   inquiry,  dismissed  the 

members  in  virtue  of  his  supreme  authority,  and  appoint/- 

I  ed  new  men  ;  but  this  act  of  justice  gave  great  offence 

i  to   Jovellanos  and  others.     It   appeared   too   close   an 

approximation  to   Cuesta's  manner,  in  Leon,  the  year 

j  before,  and  as  the  central  government,  always  selhsh  and 

I  jealous,  abhorred  any  indication  of  vigour  or  probity  in 

a  general,  Romana  was  soon  afterwards  deprived  of  his 

command.      Meanwhile    he   was    resolutely   reforming 

abuses,  when  his  proceedings  were  suddenly  arrested  by 

an  unexpected  event. 

I  As  soon  as  Ney  understood  that  tlic  Spanish  army 
was  posted  on  the  Gallician  side  of  the  Asturian  fron- 
tier ;  and  that  Romana  was  likely  to  excite  the  energy 
of  the  Asturian  people ;  he  planned  a  combined  move- 
ment, to  surround  and  destroy,  not  only  Romana  and 
his  army,  but  also  the  Asturian  troops,  which  then 
amounted  to  abnut  fhteen  thousand  men,  including  the 
partida  of  Porlier,  commonly  culled  the  Marquisetto. 
This  force,  commanded  by  general  Ballasteros  and  gene- 
ral Vorster,  occupied  Infiesta,  on  the  eastern  side  of 
Oviedo,  and  C;istropol  on  the  coast.  Ney,  with  the 
consent  of  Joseph,  arranged  that  Kellerman,  who  was  at 
Astorga,  with  six  guns  and  eight  thousand  seven  hun- 
dred men,  composed  of  detachments,  drawn  together 
from  the  different  corps,  should  penetrate  the  Asturias 
from  the  south  east  l)y  the  pass  of  Pajares  ;  that  Bonnet, 
who  always  remained  at  the  town  of  St.  Andero,  should 
break  in,  from  the  north  eiust,  by  the  coast  road  ;  and 
that  the  sixth  corps  should  make  an  irruption  by  the 
Concejo  de  Ibas,  a  short  but  difficult  route  leading 
dir(;ctly  from  Lugo. 

When  the  period  for  these  combined  movements  was 
determined,  Ney,  appointing  general  Marchand  to  com- 
mand in  Gallicia  during  his  own  absence,  left  three 
battalions  under  Maucune  at  St.  Jago,  three  others  in 
garrison  at  Coruna  und'er  general  D'Armagnac,  one  at 
Ferrol,  and  tliree  with  a  regiment  of  cavalry  under 
Fournier  at  Lugo.  He  then  marched  himself,  with 
twelve  battalions  of  infantry  and  three  regiments  of 
cavalry,  against  jVIahi,  and  the  latter  in'.mediately 
abandoned  his  position  at  Navia  de  Suarna,  and  draw- 
ing oti"  by  his  left,  without  giving  notice  to  Romana, 
returned  to  Gallicia  and  again  entered  the  valley  of  the 
Syl.  Ney,  either  thinking  that  the  greatest  force  was 
near  Ovicdo,  or  that  it  was  more  impta'tant  to  capttire 
Romana  than  to  dispei'se  Mahi's  troops,  continued  his 
route  by  the  valley  of  the  Nareca  ;  and  with  such  dili- 
gence that  he  reached  Cornellana  and  Grado,  one 
march  from  Oviedo,  before  Romana  knew  of  his  ap- 
proach. The  Spanish  general,  thus  surprised,  made 
a  feeble  and  fruitless  endeavour  to  check  the  French 
at  the  bridge  of  Pehaflor,  after  which,  sending  the 
single  regiment  he  had  with  him  to  InOesta,  he  em- 
barked on  board  an  English  vessel  at  Gihon,  and  so 
escaped. 

The  18th,  Ney  entered  Oviedo,  where  he  was  joined 
by  Kellerman,  and  the  next  day  pursued  Romana  to 
Gihon  ;  Boimet,  likewise,  executed  his  part,  but  some- 
what later,  and  thus  Vorster,  being  umnolested  by  Ney, 
had  time  to  collect  his  corps  on  the  coast.  Meanwhile 
Ballasteros,  finding  that  Bonnet  had  passed  between 
him  and  Voistcr,  tjoldly  maiched  upon  St.  Andero  and 
retook  it,  making  the  garrison  and  sick  men  (in  a'l 
eleven  hnndred)  prisoners  :  the  Amelia  and  Staf.ra, 
British  frigates,  ai-rived  off  the  harbour  at  the  same 
moment,  and  captured  three  French  corvettes  and  two 
luggers,  on  board  of  which  some  staff-officers  were  eu 
deavouring  to  escape. 

Bonnet,  however,  followed  hard    npon    Ballasteroa, 


198 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


Book  YIH. 


and,  the  11th  of  June,  routed  hiin  so  completely  that 
be,  also,  was  forced  to  save  himself  on  board  an  Eng- 
lish vessel,  and  the  French  recovered  all  the  prisoners, 
and,  amongst  them,  the  men  taken  at  Yillu  Franca, 
by  Romana.  But,  befure  this,  Ney,  uneasy  for  his 
posts  in  Gallicia,  had  returned  to  Coriina  by  the  coast- 
road  through  Castropdl,  and  Keilerman,  after  several 
trifling  skirmishes  with  Yorster,  had  also  retired  to 
Yalladolid.  This  expcHlition  jiroved  that  Asturia  was 
V.ni  calculated  for  defence,  although,  with  the  aid  of 
English  ships,  it  might  become  extremely  troublesome  to 
the  French. 

While  Ney  was  in  Asturia,  Carrera,  advancing  from 
the  si<le  of  Orense,  appeared  in  front  of  St.  Jago  di 
Compostella  at  the  moment  that  colunel  DEsmenaid,  a 
B'aff-otScer  sent  by  the  raai-shal  to  give  notice  of  his 
return  to  Corufia,  arrived  with  an  escort  of  dragoons  in 
Maucune's  camp.  This  escort  was  magnified  by  the 
Spaniards  into  a  reinfurcement  of  eight  hundred  men  ; 
but  Carrera,  who  had  been  joined  by  Morillo,  command- 
ed eight  thousand,  and,  on  the  2od.  having  attacked 
Maucune.  at  a  place  called  "  Campo  dc  Edrelia,"  totally 
defeated  him,  with  a  loss  of  six  hundred  men  and  several 
g-uns.  The  S])aniards  did  not  pursue,  and  the  French 
retreated  in  confusion  to  Corufia.  Nor  was  this  the 
only  check  suffered  by  the  Gth  corps,  for  Mahi,  having 
united  a  great  body  of  pcfisants  to  his  aimy,  drove  back 
Fourniers  outposts,  and  closely  invested  him  in  Lugo  on 
the  19  th. 

Such  was  the  state  of  affairs  in  Gallicia  when  Soult 
arrived  at  Orense  ;  and  as  the  inhabitants  of  that  town, 
from  whom  he  gut  intelligence  of  these  events,  rather 
exaggerated  the  success  of  their  countrymen,  the  French 
marshal  immediately  sent  forward  an  advanced  guard  of 
Lis  stoutest  men  to  relieve  Lugo,  and  followed  himself, 
by  the  route  of  Monforte,  with  as  much  speed  as  the 
exhausted  state  of  his  troops  would  permit.*  The  22d, 
he  reached  Gutin,  and,  the  same  day,  his  van  being  des- 
cried on  the  mountains  above  Lugo,  Mahi  broke  up  his 
camp  and  fell  back  to  Mondenedo. 

The  23d,  Soult  entered  Lugo,  where  he  heard  of  the 
emperor's  first  successes  in  Austria,  and,  with  renewed 
(Miergy,  prepared  for  fresh  exertions  himself  The  30th, 
l,e  was  joined  by  Ney,  who,  uninformed  of  ]Mahi"s  posi- 
tion at  Mondenedo,  had  missed  a  favourable  opportunity 
of  revenging  the  loss  of  St.  Jago.  Meanwhile  Romana, 
disembarking  at  Ribadeo,  joined  Mahi  at  Mondenedo, 
and  immediately  marched  along  the  line  of  the  Astarian 
frontier,  until  he  anived  at  the  sources  of  the  Neyra  ; 
then,  crossing  the  royal  road,  a  little  above  Lugo,  plung- 
ed, once  more,  into  the  valky  of  the  Syl ;  and,  having 
{rained  Orense,  the  6th  of  June,  opened  a  communication 
Tilth  Carrera  at  St.  Jago,  and  with  the  insurgents  at 
Vigo.  This  movement  of  Koinana's  wivs  able,  energetic, 
and  worthy  of  every  praise. 

In  pursuance  of  an  order  from  the  emperor,  Soult  now 
Bent  eleven  hundred  men,  composed  of  dismounted  dra- 
goons and  skeletons  of  cavalry  regiments,  to  France  ; 
und,  having  partially  restored  the  artillery  and  equip- 
ments of  tlHj  second  corps,  from  the  arsenals  of  Corona 
and  Ferr.l,  he  in  concert  with  the  duke  of  Elch-ingen, 
arranged  a  fresh  plan  f  )r  the  destruction  of  Romana;  in 
the  execution  it  lailcd,  as  shall  be  hereafter  noticed,  but 
at  present,  it  is  necessary  to  return  to  the  campaign 
Bouth  of  tlie  'J'ugus. 


VICTOR  S    OPERATIONi?, 


% 


After  the  abortive  effort  to  gain  BadaJIb,  the  duke  of 
Belluno,  ic  obedience  to  the  king's  orders,  proceeded 
to  recover  ^\lcantara.t  His  rear  was  still  within  two 
marches  of  Merida  when  the  head  of  his  colunm,  un- 


*  S.  Journal  of  Operations,  MSS. 

t  Seinfi6's  Jouruivl  of  Ojjcrttlious,  MSS. 


dcr  Lapissc,  driving  back  some  cavalrj  posts,  entered 
the  town  of  Alcantara,  and  the  next  day  attempted  the 
passage  of  the  bridge.  The  Portuguese  force  consisted 
of  two  thousand  infantry,  fifty  cavalry,  and  six  guns,  and 
some  works  of  defence  were  constructed  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  river,  but  on  the  14th  of  May,  Lapi.sse, 
lining  the  rocks  on  the  left  bank,  skirmished  so  sharply 
that  the  militia  regiment  of  Idanha  gave  way.  Colonel 
Mayne  then  sprung  a  mine,  yet  the  explosion  did  little 
injury  to  the  bridge,  and  the  French  made  good  the  pas- 
sage ;  the  Portuguese,  who  had  suffereil  consideiably, 
retired  to  the  Puente  de  Segura,  and  Lapisse  immedi- 
ately sent  patroles  towards  Castello  Branco,  Salvatierra, 
and  Idanha  Nova. 

Intelligence  of  this  attack  having  reached  general 
Mackenzie,  he  directed  preparations  to  be  made  for 
destroying  the  boat-bridge  at  Abrantes,  and  marched, 
in  person,  by  Corti^ada  to  Sobreira  Formosa  ;  which 
movement,  aided  by  a  rumour  that  Soult  had  retreated 
from  Oporto,  afforded  an  excuse  to  Yictor  for  again 
abandoning  Alcantara,  and  resuming  his  former  camp. 
During  his  absence,  Cuesta,  true  to  the  promise  he  had 
given,  attacked  the  fort  of  Merida,  but,  on  the  return  of 
the  French  advanced  guard,  recrosscd  the  Guadiana,  and 
fell  back  to  Zafra.  having  firet  ravaged  all  the  Hat  coun- 
try, and  obliged  the  inhabitants  to  withdraw  into  the 
mountains. 

Some  time  before  this,  king  Joseph  had  received  a 
despatch  from  the  French  miinster  of  war,  giving  no- 
tice that  reinforcements  had  sailed  from  England,  and 
warning  him  to  lose  no  time  in  marching  against  Lis- 
bon, to  create  a  useful  divei-sion  in  favour  of  Soult.  It 
might  be  supposed  that  the  original  plan  of  the  em- 
peror would  then  have  been  acted  upon,  and  this  was 
the  first  thought  of  Joseph  himself ;  but  other  circum- 
stances created  doubt  and  hesitation  in  his  councils, 
and,  finally,  induced  him  to  abandon  all  thoughts  of 
Portugal.  It  appears  when  Napoleon  returned  to 
Paris,  he  imagined  that  hostilities  with  Austria,  although 
certain,  wo\]id  not  break  out  so  suddenly,  but  that  he 
should  have  time  to  organise  a  sufficient  army  in  Ger- 
many, without  drawing  his  veteran  troops  fi'om  Spain  ; 
hence,  he  still  left  the  imjjerial  guards  at  Yittoria,  and 
sending  the  prince  of  Neufchatel  to  command  the  troops 
on  the  Danube,  he  himself  remained  at  Paris,  to  super- 
intend the  preparations  for  opening  the  campaign.  The 
Austrians  were,  however,  not  inattentive  observers  of 
the  perfidy  which  accompanied  the  invasion  of  Spain, 
and,  aptly  taking  the  hint,  attacked  the  French  out- 
posts and  jjublished  their  own  declaration  of  war  at  the 
same  moment.  Berthier,  incapable  of  acting  a  princi- 
pal part,  was  surprised,  and  made  a  succession  of  false 
movements  that  would  have  been  fatal  to  the  French 
army,  if  the  emperor,  journeying  day  and  night,  had 
not  arrived  at  the  very  hour  when  his  lieutenant  was 
on  the  point  of  consummating  the  ruin  of  the  army. 
Then,  indeetl,  was  seen  the  supernatural  force  of  Ma- 
poleon's  genius  :  in  a  few  hours  he  changed  the  aspect 
of  affairs,  and  in  a  few  days,  maugre  their  immense 
number,  his  enemies,  baffled  and  fiying  in  all  directions, 
proclaimed  his  n;astery  in  an  art  which,  up  to  that  mo- 
ment, wiis  imperfect ;  for  never,  r.ince  troops  first  trod 
a  field  of  battle,  was  such  a  display  of  military  skill 
made  by  man.  But  previous  to  these  successes,  so 
threatening  had  been  the  aspect  of  affaii-s  in  Gei-many, 
that  the  imperial  guards  had  been  recalled  from  Yitto- 
ria, and  hurried  to  the  Danube  ;  the  great  reserve  ofii 
infantry  was,  as  we  have  seen,  stru(rk  off'  the  rolls  of 
the  army  in  Spain,  and  the  skeletons  of  the  ^burth 
squadrons  of  every  cavalry  regiment  were  ords  led  to 
return  to  their  depots  in  France  ;  even  the  fifth  corps, 
(under  Mortior,  then  on  its  way  to  Yalladolid  from 
j  Zaragoza,  Avas  directed  to  halt,  and  hold  itseli  in  readi- 
ness to  march  for  Germany.  Thus,  while  Victor  was 
'reluctant  to  move,  while  Ney  was  demanding  more 


1809. 


K  A  P I E  R '  S    P  E  X  I  N"  S  L  .  A  R    WAR, 


199 


troops  to  preserve  Gallicia.  and  while  the  fate  of  the 
peciiud  corps  was  unknown,  the  whole  army  was  ac- 
tually diniiiiishod  by  Ibrty  thousand  men,  and  fifteen 
thousand  more  were  paralysed  with  regard  to  offensive 
operations. 

These  things  had  rendered  Joseph  timid.  Madrid, 
it  was  argued  in  his  councils,  was  of  more  consequence 
than  Lisbon  ;  Soult  might  be  already  at  the  latter 
place ;  or,  if  not,  he  might  extricate  himself  from  his 
dillicullies,  for  the  capital  of  Spain  must  be  covered. 
In  pursuance  of  this  reasoning.  Sebastiani  was  forbid- 
den any  forward  movement ;  and  the  duke  of  Belluno, 
whose  army  was  daily  wasting  with  the  Guadiana 
♦ever,  took  a  position  at  Torre-Mocha,  a  central  point 
Detweeii  Truxillo,  Merida,  and  Alcantara.  His  cavalry 
posts  watched  all  the  passages  over  the  (jluadiana  and  the 
Tagus ;  and  his  communications  with  Madrid,  between 
the  Tietar  and  the  Tagus.  were  protected  by  twelve 
hundred  men,  detached  for  that  purpose  by  the  king.* 

But  one  timid  measure  in  war  generally  produces 
another.  The  neighbourhood  of  the  English  force  at 
Caslel  Branco  increased  the  energy  of  the  Spanish  in- 
gurgeiits,  who  infested  the  valley  of  the  Tagus,  and 
communicated  secretly  with  those  of  the  Sierra  de 
Guadalupe;  hence,  Victor,  alarmed  for  his  bridge  at 
Alniaraz,  sent  a  division  there  the  22d,  and,  as  from 
that  period,  until  the  lUth  of  June,  he  remained  quiet, 
his  campaign,  which  had  opened  so  brilliantly,  was 
aiHuilled.  He  had  neither  assisted  Soult,  nor  crushed 
Cujsta,  nor  taken  Badajos,  nor  Seville;  yet  he  had 
wasted  and  lost,  by  sickness,  more  men  than  would 
have  sulHced  to  reduce  both  Lisbon  and  Seville  ;  mean- 
while the  Spaniards  were  daily  recovering  strength  and 
con'idence,  and  sir  Arthur  \V'ellesley,  alter  defeating 
Soult,  had  full  leisure  to  return  to  the  'I'agns,  and  to 
combine  his  future  operations  with  the  Spanish  armies 
in  the  south. 

Jnibrmalion  that  Lapisse  had  forced  the  bridge  of 
Alcantara  reached  the  English  general  on  the  night  of 
the  ITth.  That  part  of  the  army  which  was  still  be- 
hind Salamonde  received  immediate  orders  to  retrace 
their  steps  to  Oporto  ;  and  when  the  retreat  of  Soult  by 
Orense  was  ascertained,  the  remainder  of  the  troops, 
including  three  Portuguese  brigades  under  Beresford, 
followed  the  same  route.  Colonel  Trant  was  appoint- 
ed military  governor  of  Oporto,  and  it  was  thought  suf- 
ficient to  leave  Silveira  with  some  regular  battalions 
and  militia  to  deiend  the  northern  provinces,  for  Soult's 
army  was  considered  a  crippled  force,  which  could  not 
for  a  long  time  appear  again  in  the  held  ;  a  conclusion 
drawn,  as  we  shall  see,  from  false  data,  and  without  due 
allowance  being  made  for  the  energy  of  that  chief. 

As  the  army  proceeded  southward,  the  narrow  scope 
of  Lapissc  ?>  nioveniL^nts  was  ascertained  ;  colonel  Mayne 
was  directed  again  to  take  post  at  Alcantara,  and  as  a 
reinforcement  of  five  thousand  men  had  landed  at  Lis- 
bon, the  rapidity  of  the  march  slackened.  Passing  by 
easy  journeys  through  Coimbra,  Thumar,  and  Punhete, 
the  troops  reached  Abrantes  the  7th  of  June,  and  en- 
camped on  the  left  bank  of  the  Tagus,  but  there  was 
sickness  and  a  great  mortality  in  the  ranks. 

From  the  moment  of  his  arrival  in  Portugal,  sir  Ar- 
thur Wellesley  had  looked  to  the  defeat  of  Victor  as 
the  principal,  and  the  operation  against  Soult  as  the 
secondary  object  of  the  campaign  ;!  and  the  English 
government,  acceding  to  his  views,  now  gave  him  a 
discretionary  power  to  enter  the  nearest  province  of 
Spain,  if  Portugal  should  not  thereby  be  endangered. 
In  his  correspondence  with  the  junta  and  with  Cuesta, 
he  had  therefore  strongly  urged  the  necessity  of  avoid- 
ing any  serious  collision  with  the  enemy  until  the 
British  troops  could  act  in  concert  with  the  Spanish 


•  Semc'l6's  .Journal  of  Operations,  MS. 

X  iSir  A.  Wellesley 'ti  i  vriospoudcucc,  Pari.  Papers,  1810. 


armies,  and  this  advice,  approved  of  by  the  junta,  was 
attended  to  by  Cuesta,  insomuch  that  he  did  not  seek 
a  battle ;  but  he  exposed  his  advanced  posts,  as  if  in  de- 
rision of  the  consul,  and,  disdainful  of  the  English  gen- 
eral's abilities,  expressed  his  belief  that  the  latter  had  no 
desire  to  act  heartily  ;  "  because,"  said  he,  "  the  system 
of  the  British  appears  to  be  never  to  expose  their  troops, 
owing  to  which,  they  never  gain  decisive  actions  by  land." 

Cuesta's  knowledge  of  the  enemy's  strength  and  posi- 
tions was  always  inaccurate,  and  his  judgment  false  ; 
hence  he  himself  not  only  never  gained  any  decisive 
action,  but  lost  every  army  entrusted  to  his  command. 
He  was  now  discontented  with  the  movement  against 
Soult ;  asserting  that  the  French  hold  of  Gallicia  would 
only  be  strengthened  thereby,  unless  that  favourite  folly 
of  all  Spanish  generals  were  adopted,  namely,  surround- 
ing the  enemy,  without  regarding  whether  the  troops  to 
be  surrounded  were  more  or  less  numerous  than  the  sur- 
rounders.  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley,  however,  affirmed  that 
if  Soult  was  first  driven  over  the  Minho,  a  combined  at- 
tack afterwards  made  upon  Victor  would  permanently 
deliver  Gallicia  ;  and  this  plan  being  followed,  Gallicia 
was  abandoned  by  the  French,  and  they  never  returned 
to  that  province  ! 

When  the  English  army  was  again  free  to  act, 
Cuesta  was  importunate  that  a  joint  offensive  operation 
against  Viotor  should  be  undertaken,  yet,  obstinately 
attached  to  his  own  opinions,  he  insisted  upon  tracing 
the  wdiole  plan  of  campaign.  His  views  were  however 
so  opposed  to  all  sound  military  principles,  that  sir 
Arthur,  although  anxious  to  conciliate  his  humour, 
could  scarcely  concede  the  smallest  point,  lest  a  vital 
catastrophe  should  follow.  Valuable  time  was  thus 
lost  in  idle  discussions  which  might  have  been  em- 
ployed in  useful  action,  seeing  that  the  return  of  the 
ISritish  army  from  the  Douro  had  falsified  Victor's  po- 
sition at  Torremocha.  That  marshal,  as  late  as  the 
10th  of  June,  had  only  one  division  guarding  the  bridge 
of  Almaraz,  and  it  was  difficult  for  him  to  ascertain  the 
movements  of  sir  Arthur  Wellesley,  covered,  as  they 
were,  by  the  Tagus,  the  insurgents,  and  Mackenzie's 
corps  of  observation  :  hence,  by  rapid  marches,  it  was 
possible  for  the  English  general,  while  Victor  was 
still  at  Torremocha,  to  reach  the  valley  of  the  I'agus, 
and  cutting  the  first  corps  off  from  Madrid,  to  place  it 
between  two  fires.  This  did  not  escape  the  penetration 
of  either  commander  ;*  but  sir  Arthur  was  forced  to  re- 
nounce the  attempt,  partly  because  of  the  sick  and 
harassed  condition  of  his  troops,  the  want  of  shoes  and 
money,  and  the  difficulty  of  getting  supplies ;  but 
chiefly  that  Cuesta's  army  was  scattered  over  the  open 
country,  between  the  defiles  of  Monasterio  and  the 
Guadiana,  and  as  he  refused  to  concentrate  or  retire, 
Victor  might  have  marched  against  and  crushed  him, 
and  yet  found  time  to  meet  the  British  on  the  Tietar.f 
Early  in  June,  however,  three  brigades  were  directed 
upon  Castello  Branco,  and  the  duke  of  Belluno,  imme- 
diately taking  the  alarm,  and  being  also  assured,  by 
despatches  from  Madrid,  of  Soult's  retreat,  resolved  to 
recross  the  Tagus ;  but,  previous  to  commencing  this 
movement,  he  resolved  to  secure  his  flank,  by  causing 
the  bridge  of  Alcantara  to  be  destroyed. 

Colonel  Mayne,  as  I  have  already  observed,  had 
been  again  entrusted  with  that  post,  and  unfortunately, 
his  first  orders  to  blow  up  the  bridge,  if  the  enemy  ad- 
vanced, were  not  rescinded,  although  the  return  of  the 
army  from  the  north  rendered  such  a  proceeding  un- 
necessary. Neither  did  Mayne  keep  his  instructions 
secret,  and  Victor  hearing  of  them,  sent  a  detachment 
to  the  bridge  with  no  other  view  than  to  induce  its  de- 
struction. He  succeeded.  That  noble  monument  of 
Trajan's  genius  was  ruined !     Yet  such  is  the  nature 


*  Senifl6's  Journal  of  Operations,  MS. 
t  Parliumcutiiry  Papers,  IblO. 


200 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    TVAR. 


[Book  YIII. 


of  war  that,  not  Ion?:  afterwards,  both  armies  found  its 
fall  injurious  to  their  interests,  and,  as  a  matter  of  taste 
and  of  miliiary  advantage,  sighed  alike  over  the  broken 
arches  of  Alcantara. 

Ilaviiiu:  completed  this  operation,  Victor  passed  the 
Tajrus,  at  Almaniz,  on  the  19th,  without  beinir  molested 
by  Cue.sta.  and,  removing"  his  boat-bridije,  proceeded  to 
take  post  at  Pla>encia.  ^Meanwhile  Beresford  returned 
to  tlie  defence  of  the  northern  provinces  of  Portua:aI, 
■which  8oult  was  again  menacinu:  ;  for  durin<?  the  forced 
inactivity  of  the  F5ritish,  at  Ahrantes,  the  cause  of 
which  I  .shall  explain  in  another  place,  chaiijfcs  in  the 
relative  positions  of  the  liostile  armies  were  takin?  place  ; 
and  it  is  important  that  these  chan<jes  should  be  well 
understood,  because  on  them  the  fate  of  the  succeeding 
campaiixn  hinged. 

When  Xey  and  Soult  met  at  Lugo,  they,  although 
Gtill  on  bad  terms,  agreed,  after  some  discussion,  that 
the  first  should  march  from  Coruna,  by  the  loute  of 
St.  Jago  and  Vigo,  against  Carrera  and  the  Conde  de 
Norona  ;  and  that  the  second,  entering  the  valley  of 
the  Syl,  should  attack  Romana,  and  drive  him  upon 
Orense,  at  which  place,  it  was  expected,  that  Ney, 
after  taking  or  blocking  Vigo,  would  be  able  to  reach 
him,  and  thus  the  whole  force  of  Gallicia  be  crushed 
at  once.  Soult  was  then  to  menace  the  Tras  os  Mon- 
ths, by  the  side  of  Bragan<;'a.  with  the  view  of  obligino- 
ftir  Arthur  Wellesley  to  remain  in  that  province,  while 
the  second  corps  opened  a  direct  communication  M'ith 
Madrid  and  with  the  first  corps.  This  being  arranged, 
Ney  return(Hl  to  Coruna  ;  and,  on  the  1st  of  June,  two 
divisions  of  infantry  and  a  brigade  of  dragoons,  of  the 
pecond  corps,  marched  upon  Monforte;  they  were  fol- 
lowed, the  next  day,  by  two  other  divisions  of  infantry, 
and,  at  the  same  time,  Franceschi,  who  was  on  the 
Fereira  rivtT,  supported  l)y  La  Houssaye's  dragoons, 
was  directed,  after  scouring  the  road  to  St.  Jago,  to 
foil  down  the  right  bank  of  the  Tambuga,  towards 
Orense. 

From  the  2d  to  the  9th.  the  main   body  halted  at 
Monforte,  to  get  up  stores  from  Lugo,  and  to  scour  the 
country  on  the  flanks,  for  Romana,  in  his  passage,  had 
again  raised  the  peasantry  of  all  the  valleys.     Loison 
■was  then  sent  with   a  division  to  the  Val  des  Orres, 
havimr  orders  to  feign  a  movement  towards  Villa  Franca  I 
and  Puente  Ferrada,  as  if  for  the  purpose  of  meeting  I 
a  French  column  in  that  direction.    The  10th,  he  parsed 
the  Syl,  and  took  post  at  the  Puente  de  Bibey,  and  the 
12th,  Franceschi,  reinforced  with  a  division  of  infantry, 
arrived  at  ^[onte  Furada  also  on  the  Syl,  and  sent  a 
detachment  to  Laronco,  to  connect  his  "division   with  | 
Loison 's.*   The  remainder  of  the  infantry  followed  this 
movement,  and  detachments  were  sent  up  the  course  of  I 
the  Syl,  and  towards  Dancos,  on  the  road  from  Villa  1 
Franca  to  Lugo.     Loison  then  forced  the  passage  of  the 
Puente  de   Bibey,  and    drove   the   insurgents   to   Pu-  j 
ebla   do  Tribes.     The   French   army  thus   cleared    all  ! 
the  valleys  opening  on  the  cour.s(!  of' the  Upper  Miiiho, ' 
and  Romana  was  confined  to  the  lower  part  of  that  \ 
river.  : 

The  1.3th,  Franceschi,  ascending  the  valley  of  the! 
Bibey.  took  post  at  Bollo  and  the  bridge  of  the  Her- 1 
mitagc,  and  pushed  his  patroles  to  Oudina  and  Mon- 1 
tcrey  on  one  side,  and  into  the  Sierra  de  i'orto  on  the  j 
other,  as  far  as  the  sources  f>f  the  Bibey.  with  a  view  1 
to  ascertain  the  exact  direction  which  Romana  would 
take  to  avoid  Loison.'s  column  ;  and  to  prevent  the  1 
Spani.sh  general  from  passing  tiie  left  of  the  French  ! 
army,  an(l  gaining  the  Asturias,  by  the  route  of  Pnebla  ' 
de  Senaijria.  Tliese  precautions  occupied  the  duke  of  ! 
Dalmatia  till  the  10th,  when,  being  assured  that  Ro- i 
inana  had  fallen  back  to  Monterey,  he  judged  that  he  ! 
would   attempt  the  same  march   towards   Puebla  de  1 


*  S.  Journal  of  J  3>?rations,  MSS. 


Senabria,  by  which  he  had  escaped  after  the  action  in 
the  ni'jnth  of  ^[arch  ;  the  French  army  was  therefo)'e 
directed  up  the  valley  of  the  Bibey.  upon  Viana.  where 
there  was  a  bridge,  and  where  many  of  the  mountain 
roads  united.  The  same  day  Franceschi  fell  in  with 
the  head  of  Romana's  army,  and  re]iulsed  it ;  and  the 
evening  of  the  20th  the  whole  of  the  French  troops 
■were  concentrated  near  Viana,  intending  to  give  battle 
to  the  Spaniards  the  next  morning ;  but  the  latter  re- 
treated precipitately  during  the  night,  and  many  of  tlie 
men  dispersed. 

Soult  continued  his  movement  by  the  left  until  he 
i  reached  the  great  road  running  from  Castile  to  Orense, 
and  from  thence,  having  sent  Heudelefs  division  to 
Villa  Vieja  to  threaten  the  Tras  os  Montes  frontier,  and 
Mermefs  division  and  Lorge's  dragoons  towards  La 
Cauda  to  observe  the  road  of  Puebla  de  Senabria,  he 
marched  himself,  with  an  advanced  guard,  to  La  Gu- 
dina,  leaving  Laborde  and  La  Iloussaye  in  reserve 
between  Gudina  and  Villa  Vieja.  These  divei-s  move- 
ments, through  the  rugged  passes  of  Gallicia,  led  to  a 
variety  of  slight  skirmishes,  the  most  important  of 
which  took  place  at  the  Puente  de  Bibey,  a  i)lace  of 
such  prodigious  strength  that  it  is  scarcely  conceivable 
how  men,  with  arms,  could  be  brought  to  abandon  such 
a  post. 

Romana's  situation  was  now^  nearly  hopeless,  but  he 
was  saved  by  a  misunderstanding  between  the  French 
mai-shals.  It  appears  that  Ney,  having  marched  from 
Coruna,  entered  St  Jago  with  about  ten  thousand 
men.  and  Carrera  fell  back  upon  Ponte  Vedra ;  the 
Condo  de  Nerona  joined  him  there  ■v\'ith  some  fresh 
troops,  and  assuming  the  command,  continued  the  re- 
treat to  the  Octavem  river,  behind  which  he  took  post, 
placing  liis  main  body  at  the  bridge  of  San  Payo,  and 
sending  detachments  to  guard  some  secondary  points. 
On  the  7th  of  June  the  French  came  up.  The  Span- 
iards had  thirteen  thousand  men,  two  eighteen-poundere, 
and  nine  field  pieces  ;  of  the  troops  only  seven  thou- 
sand were  arnied.  but  the  whole  of  the  artillery  was  in 
position  to  defend  the  passage  at  San  Payo,  and  the 
bridge  being  cut,  was  overlooked  by  a  battery  of  two 
eighteen-pounders.  Three  thousand  men  were  in  re- 
serve at  Redondela ;  and  at  Vigo,  about  sixty  strag- 
glers, from  Sir  John  Moore's  army,  were  landed,  and,  in 
conjunction  with  a  detachment  of  seamen  and  marincvs, 
occupied  the  forts.  Some  Spanish  gun-boats,  one  of 
which  was  manned  by  English  seamen,  under  captain 
Winter,  also  proceeded  up  the  river  to  the  bridge  of 
San  Payo. 

During  the  7th,  a  desultory  and  useless  fire  took  place 
on  both  sides,  and  on  the  8th.  the  French  ■were  re- 
pulsed in  two  feeble  attempts  to  force  a  passage  at  San 
Payo  and  at  Soto  Mayor,  the  loss  on  either  side  being 
about  a  hundred  men.  These  attacks  were  merely  to 
keep  the  Spaniards  employed  until  the  reports  of  the 
officers,  sent  by  Ney  to  ascertain  the  situation  and  pro- 
jects of  Soulfs  army,  were  received,  but  in  the  even- 
ing of  the  8th,  those  officers  returned  with  information, 
obtained  from  the  peasants,  that  the  second  corps  was 
retreating  upon  Castile.  I  have  been  as.sured  by  per- 
sons, then  on  marshal  Ney's  staff",  that  he,  amazed  at 
these  tidings,  rashly  concluded  that  Soult,  swayed  by 
personal  feelings,  wished  to  endanger  the  sixth  corps; 
hence,  filled  with  indignation,  he  immediately  retired 
to  Coruna,  while  Soult,  on  the  other  hand,  viewed  this 
retreat  as  a  breach  of  their  engagements,  and  an  unde^ 
hand  policy  to  oblige  him  to  remain  in  (gallicia.  Cer- 
tain it  is  that  by  these  ebullitions  of  temper,  both  Ro- 
mana and  Norona  were  saved  ;  for  there  was  nothing 
to  prevent  Ney  from  sending  a  cohmm  against  Orense, 
while  he  himself  kept  in  check  Norona,  on  the  Octa- 
vem ;  and,  however  spirited  the  conduct  of  the  Span- 
iards was  at  San  Payo,  it  would  be  ridiculous  to  ima- 
gine that  ten  thousand  of  the  best  soldiers  of  France, 


1809.J  NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR.  201 

led  by  an  officer  so  quick  and  resolute  as  Ney,  could  that  province  to  the  last ;  when  single  divisions  of  hia 
have  been  risistod  by  an  equal  num\)er  of  raw  troips  army,  at  two  different  periods,  traversed  the  country, 
and  peasants,  one-third  of  whom  were  without  arms,  from  Coruna  to  Tuy,  without  let  or  hindrance ;  and 
But  th(!  history  of  the  tjuarrel  between  these  marshals  when  the  Spaniards  could  not  prevent  him  from  over- 
is  involved  in  mystery,  the  clearing  of  which  must  be  running  the  Asturias  without  losing  his  hold  of  (auili- 
left  to  tlio-e  who  shall  write  the  memoirs  of  the  men  :  for  cia?  It  is  true,  Souit,  writing  to  Joseph,  affirmed  that 
the  puri)oses  of  this  histury  it  is  sufficient  to  know  that  tlie  Gallicians  would  wear  out  the  stn^ngest  army ;  that 
there  was  ill-blood,  and  that  therein  the  Gallicians  found  is,  if  a  wrong  system  was  pursued  by  the  French  ;  but 
safetj'.  I  he  pointed   out  the   right  method   of  subduing   them, 

Soult,  informed  of  Ney 's  retreat  and  of  sir  Arthur  namely,  in  pursuance  of  Napoleon's  views,  to  fortify 
"Wellesley's  arrival  on  the  Tagus,  ceased  to  pursue  some  principal  central  points,  from  whence  the  move- 
Komana,  and  marched  to  Zamora,  where  his  sick  had ;  able  columns  could  overrun  the  country  ;  and  this,  he 
been  before  sent,  and  where  his  brother,  general  rfouit, '  estimated,  would  only  require  fifty  thousand  pounds  and 
had  conducted  three  or  four  thousand  stiagglers  and  six  weeks'  labour.*  It  is  plain  the  real  causes  of  the 
convalescents.  Here,  also,  he  ret|ue»tid  the  king  to  I  deliverance  were — the  quarrels  between  the  marshals, 
send  the  artillery  and  st(jres  necessary  to  re-ecpiip  the  which  saved  Romaua  and  Norofia  from  destruction; 
second  corps  ;  and  here  he  proposed  to  give  his  harassed  and  the  movements  of  sir  Arthur  Welle^ley  on  the 
troops  some  rest,  for  they  had  now  b^en  for  eight  months  !  Tagus  ;  lor,  in  an  intercepted  letter  from  Soult  to  Jo- 
incessantly  marching  and  fighting,  and  men  and  officers  |  seph,  that  marshal  expressly  assigns  the  danger  hanging 
were  alike  dispirited  by  the  privations  they  had  endured, '  over  Madrid  and  the  first  corps  as  the  reason  of  his 
and  by  the  terrible  nature  of  a  war  in  which  the  most;  refusing  to  remain  in  Gallicia.  Now,  although  Soulfs 
horrid  scenes  were  daily  enacted.  !  views  were  undoubtedly  just,  and  his  march  provident, 

To  put  the  king  in  possession  of  his  views,  Soult  the  latter  necessarily  drew  after  it  the  evacuation  of 
sent  general  Franceschi  to  Madrid  ;  but  this  celebrated  Gallicia,  because  it  would  have  been  absurd  to  keep  the 
officer,  I'cfnsing  an  escort,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  sixth  corps  cooped  up  in  that  corner  of  the  Peninsula, 
Capuc'iino.*  Being  transferred  to  Seville,  the  central  deprived  of  communication,  and  estranged  from  the  gen- 
junta,  with  infamous  cruelty,  treated  him  as  if  he  had  eral  operations. 

been  a  criminal  instead  of  a  brave  soldier,  and  confined  The  movement  of  the  second  corps,  after  quitting 
him  in  a  dungeon  at  Cartliagena.  The  citizens  there,  Monlorte,  being  along  the  edge  of  the  Portuguese  fron- 
ashamed  of  their  government,  endeavoured  to  eifect  his  tier,  and  constantly  threatening  the  northern  provinces, 
escape ;  but  he  perished  in  confinement,  at  the  moment  drew  marshal  Beresford,  as  I  have  belbre  stated,  from 
when  his  liberation  was  certain.  When  his  young  wife,  the  south,  and  all  the  regular  Portuguese  forces  capa- 
a  daughter  of  count  Mathieu  Dumas,  heard  of  his  fate,  b!e  of  taking  the  field  were  immediately  collected  by 
she  refused  all  nourishment,  and,  in  a  tew  days,  by  her  |  him  round  Almeida.  The  duke  del  Parque  was  at 
death,  added  one  more  to  the  thousand  instances  of  the  Ciudad  Rodrigo  ;  and  as  that  part  of  Romana's  force, 
strength  of  woman's  aft'jctions.  which   had   been   cut   off  by  Soult's   movement  upon 

The  2.5th  of  June,  Soult  reached  Puebla  de  Senabria.   Gudina,  fell  back  upon   Ciudad  Rodrigo,  not  less  than 

The  2i5th,  he  marched  to  iMombuey.  t\venty-five  th<jusand  men,  Portuguese  and   Spaniards, 

The  2!)th  and  30th,  he  crossed  the  Esla,  by  the  were  iissembled,  or  a,ssembling,  round  those  two  ibrtresses. 
bridges  of  San  Pe'ayo  and  Castro  Gonzales.  '      I'he  change  of  situation  thus  brought  about  in  the 

The  2d  of  July,  he  entered  Zamora,  having  previously  armies  on  the  great  western  line  of  invasion  was  ren- 
rejeeted  a  pr')position  of  Ney's,  that  the  two  corps  dered  more  important  by  the  events  which  were  simul- 
should  jointly  maintain  Gallicia,  a  rejection  which  in-  taneously  taking  place  in  other  parts,  especially  in 
duced  the  duke  of  Elchingen  to  evacuate  that  province.    Aragon,  where  general  Blake,  Mhose  army  had  been 

To  effjct  this,  Ney  formed  a  camp  near  Betanzos ;  augmented  to  more  than  twenty  thousand  men,  infiated 
and,  on  the  22d  of  July,  withdrew  his  garrisons  from  with  his  success  at  Alcanitz,  had  advanced  to  Ixar  and 
Coruna  and  Ferrol,  having  previor^sly  destroyed  all  Samper.  Suchet,  himself,  remained  close  to  Zaragoza, 
the  stores  and  arsenals  and  disabled  the  land  defences,  but  kept  a  detachment,  under  general  Faber,  at  Lon- 
Nevertheless,  his  inlluence  was  still  so  powerful  that  gares  and  Villa  Muel,  near  the  mountains  on  the  side 
captain  Hotliam,  commanding  the  English  squadron,  of  Daroca.  Blake,  hoping  to  cut  off  this  detachment, 
ofi'  Coruna,  seeing  the  hostile  attitude  maintained  by  marched,  in  person,  through  Carinena,  and  sent  general 
the  inhabitants,  landed  his  seamen  on  the  2-1  th,  and  Arisaga,  with  a  column,  to  Bottorita,  and  the  latter 
spiked  the  guns  on  the  sea-line  ;  and,  in  like  manner,  captured  a  convoy  of  provisions  on  the  Huerba ;  but 
compelled  a  Spanish  garrison,  left  by  Ney  in  the  forts  Faber  retired  to  Plascencia,  on  the  Xalon. 
of  Ferrol,  to  surrender  on  the  2(Jth.  The  marshal,  how-  'I'he  14th  of  June,  the  advanced  guards  skirmished 
ever,  marched, unmolested,  by  the  high  road  to  Astorga,  to  Bottorita;  and  Blake,  endeavouring  to  surround  the 
where  he  arrived  on  the  30th,  having  brought  off  all  enemy,  pushed  a  detachment  to  Maria,  in  the  plain  of 
his  own  sick  and  those  of  the  second  corps  also,  who  had  Zaragoza. 
been  left  in  Lugo.     Thus  Gallacia  was  finally  delivered,  l      The  excitement  produced  in  that  city,  and  in  Aragon 

This  important  event  has  been  erroueously  attributed  generally,  by  this  march,  was  so  great  that  Suchet 
to  the  exertions  of  the  Spaniards.  Those  exertions  doubted  if  he  should  not  abandon  Zaragoza.  and  return 
were  creditable  to  the  Gallicians,  although  the  most  towards  Navarre ;  for  the  peasantry  had  assembled  on 
powerful  motive  of  action  wa.s  to  protect  their  personal  many  points  in  the  mountains  around,  and  it  required 
property  ;  and  when  the  French  withdrew,  this  same  great  vigilance  to  keep  down  the  spirit  of  insurrection 
motive  led  them  to  repair  their  losses  by  resisting  the  in  the  city  itself  The  importance  of  that  place,  how- 
payment  of  tithes  and  rents,  a  compensation  by  no  ever,  made  him  resolve  to  fight  a  battle,  tiu-  which  the 
means  relished  by  the  proprietors  or  the  church.  But  near  approach  of  Blake,  who  came  on  in  the  full  confi- 
it  is  certain  that  'their  efforts  were  only  secondary  causes  deuce  that  the  French  general  would  retreat,  furnished 
in  themselves,  and  chiefly  supported  by  the  aid  of  Eng-  an  opportunity  which  was  not  neglected. 
land,  whose  ships,  and  arms,  and  stores  were  constantly  i 

OD  the  coast.     How  can   the  operations  of  the  Span- j  battle  of  maria. 

iards  be  said  to  have  driven  the  sixth  corps  from  \  The  14th,  after  some  skirmishing,  the  Spanish  array 
(Pallida,  when  Ney  retained  every  important   post  in   was  concentrated  at  Bottorita. 


S.  Journal  of  Operations,  MS&.  1  *  Intercepted  Despatches,  Pari.  Papers,  1810. 


202 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  VUL 


Tlie  T5tli,  Blake  slowly  and  iiiiskiirully  fiirnicd  liis 
trcAjps  in  o:xhv  of  battle,  mnir  tiic  viila^i^o  of  Maria,  and 

i)erpL'iidicuIar  to  the  llucrba,  of  whicii  he  occupied 
)otli  banks.  'J'owards  two  o'clock  in  the  day,  he  ex- 
tended his  left  win^-  to  ovitthuik  the  right  of  the  French  ; 
but  Siichet,  who  had  just  then  been  rejoined  by  Faljer, 
and  by  a  bri;zade  from  'I'udi-la,  immediately  stop))cd 
this  evolution,  by  attacking  the  wing  witii  some  cavahw 
and  light  troops.    Tlie  Spaniards  tlien  fell  back  to  their 

•-  line  of  battle.  BlaUe  drew  men  from  his  right  to  rein- 
force his  centre  and  left,  and  wxs  immediately  engaged 
in  a  severe  conilict.  He  rejml.^ed  the  ibremost  of  the 
enemy's  columns,  but  so  violent  a  storm  arose  at  the 
moment,  that  neither  army  could  see  the  other,  although 
close  together,  and  the  action  ceasjd  for  a  time.  Blake's 
position  was  .so  ill  chosen,  that  he  was  surrounded  by 
ravines,  and  had  oi.ly  one  line  of  retreat,  by  the  bridge 
of  .Maria,  which  was  on  the  extr.Mnity  of  his  right  Hank.* 
Sachet,  will)  had  oiiserved  this  error,  when  the  storm 
cleared  off  a  little,  briskly  engaged  the  centre  and  left 
of  the  Spaniards,  and  forming  his  cavalry  and  two 
regiments  of  infantry  in  column,  by  one  vigorous  eifbrt 
broke  quite  through  the  S])anish  horse,  and  seized  the 
bridge  of  Maria.  Notwithstanding  this,  Blake,  who 
was  at  all  times  intrepid,  collected  the  infantry  of  his 
centre  and  left  wing  in  a  mass,  and  stood  for  the  vic- 
tory ;  but  the  French  troops  overthrew  his  with  a  great 
slaughter.  A  general,  twenty-five  guns,  and  many 
stands  of  colours  were  taken,  yet  few  prisoners,  for  the 
d  irkness  enabled  the  disj)erscd  Spaniards  to  escape  by 
the  ravines,  and  Blake  rallied  them  the  next  day  at 
Bottorita.  The  French  losr  nearly  a  thousand  men,  and 
general  ilarispe  was  wounded. 

During  the  action,  a  French  brigade  held  the  posi- 
tion of  Monte  Torrero,  without  mixing  in  the  fight,  lest 
the  citizens  of  Zaragoza,  being  released  from  their  pre- 
sence, should  I'ise  against  the  garrison  ;    but  after  the 

|victory,  this  brigade  marched  down  the  Ebro  to  cut  off 
Blake's  retreat ;  general  Laval,  who  commanded  it,  did 
not,  however,  execute  his  orders,  and  the  Spanish  army 
retired  on  the  night  of  the  IGth. 

The  ITtii,  the  rear  guard  suffered  some  loss  at  Tor- 
rccilla ;  and  on  the  18th,  the  two  armies  were  again  in 
presence  at  Belchite.  Blake,  reinforced  by  some  de- 
tachments, w-as  about  fourteen  thousand  strong  ;  but  he 
had  lost  the  greatest  part  of  his  artillery,  and  his  men 
were  dispirited.  Sachet,  on  the  contrary,  having  by 
the  success  at  Maria  awed  the  Aragonese,  was  able  to 
bring  t\yenty-tw(j  battalions  and  seven  s(piadrons,  or 
ahout  fifteen  thousand  men,  flushed  with  \ictory,  into 
action. 

B.^TTLE    OF    UEI.CHITE. 

The  Spaniards  were  drawn  up  on  a  range  of  hills 
half  enclosing  the  town  ;t  their  right,  resting  on  a  her- 
mitage and  some  buildings,  was  inaccessible  to  cavalry  ; 
the  left  was  also  well  covered  ;  and  behind  the  right,  a 
hill  with  a  building  on  it,  overtopping  all  the  position 
and  occu])ied  by  a  reserve,  served  as  a  rallying  point, ' 
bjcaa.se  there  was  an  easy  line  of  connnun'ication  be- 
tween it  and  the  left  wing.J  The  centre,  being  on 
rough  ground,  containing  the  town  of  Belchite,  which 
had  a  wall  and  gatt;s,  was  also  very  strong,  and  the 
whole  position  was  so  compact  that 'Blake,  after  com- 
pletely liiling  his  linii,  had  yet  a  considm-able  reserve  in 
Land.  His  (Kspositions  were  made  to  tight  bv  his  centre 
and  right,  his  left  being  rather  in  the  nature  of  an  ad- 
vanced post. 

A  French  battalion  commenced  the  action,  by  skir- 
mishing with  the  Spanish  centre,  but,  at  the  same  time, 
two  columns  of  attack  marclied,  the  one  against  the 
rii^ht,  the  other  against  the  h'ft.  The  latter,  whii'h  was 
the  principal  one,  preceded  by  a  lire  of  aitillery,  soon 
closwl  uj)on  the  Spanish  troops,  althougii  Blake's  guns 

*  Suchet'u  Memoirs.         t  lb.         J  BJako's  Despatch. 


opened  heavily  from  his  ccnt)»  and  right.  The  rapid 
attack  of  the  French,  and  the  .lecidental  explosion  of  an 
ammunition  wagon,  created  a  panic,  which,  commencing 
on  the  left,  sjiread  to  all  parts  of  the  line.  The  Spanish 
general  made  a  charge  of  cavalry  to  retrieve  the  day,  it 
was  however  easily  repulsed,  and  the  confusion  which 
followed  is  thus  described  by  himself  : — "  One  regiment 
tied  without  firing  a  shot,  it  was  followed  by  another, 
and  a  third,  all  flying  without  having  discharged  a  gun, 
and,  in  a  few  moments,  the  whole  position  was  aban- 
doned."— •'  Thus  we,  the  generals  and  oflicers,  were  left 
alone,  without  being  able  to  rally  a  body  which  could 
make  any  opposition  ;  and  I  had  the  mortification  to  see 
our  army  dispersed,  abandoning  all  its  baggage,  and 
throwing  away  its  arms,  and  even  its  clothes,  before  a 
single  corps  of  the  enemy  ;  nor  were  we  able  to  avail 
ourselves  of  the  defence  of  any  strong  place,  as  it  was 
impossible  to  collect  two  hundred  men  to  make  bead 
against  the  enemy." 

Blake,  although  a  bad  general,  was  a  man  of  real 
courage  :  stung  to  the  tjuick  by  this  disgrace,  he  re- 
proached his  troops  with  bitterness,  demanded  an  in- 
quiry into  his  own  conduct,  and,  with  a  strong  and 
sincere  feeling  of  honour,  restored  to  the  junta  the  estate 
which  had  been  conferred  upon  him  for  the  success  at 
Alcanitz. 

This  battle  and  the  pursuit,  in  which  Suchet  took 
about  four  thousand  prisoners,  and  all  the  artillery, 
ammunition,  and  baggage  of  the  Spaniards,  not  only 
made  him  master  of  the  operations  in  Aragon,  but  also 
rendered  the  filth  corps,  under  Mortier,  who  were  now 
at  Valladolid,  completely  disposable  for  offensive  opera- 
tions. Thus,  on  the  1st  of  July,  there  were,  exclu- 
sive of  Kellerman's  and  Bonnet's  divisions,  three  com- 
plete corps  d'annee,  furnishing  six  thousand  cavalry  and 
fifty  thousand  infantry,  collected  between  Astorga, 
Zamora,  and  Valladolid.  The  inroad  on  Portugal  had 
failed,  and  the  loss  of  Gallicia  followed;  but  Napo- 
leon's admirable  system  of  invasion  was  unbroken ; 
his  troops,  deprived  of  his  presiding  genius,  had  been 
stricken  severely  and  shrunk  from  further  aggression  ; 
they  had  been  too  widely  spread  for  a  secure  grasp, 
but  the  reaction  disclosed  all  the  innate  strength  of  his 
arrangements. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

State  of  the  British  army — Embarrassments  of  Sir  Arthur 
Wellesley — State  and  numbers  of  the  French  iinnies — 
State  and  numbers  of  the  Spanish  armies — Some  account 
of  tlie  pa i-tidas,  commonly  called  guerillas — Intrigues  of 
Mr.  Frere — Conduct  of  the  central  junta — Their  inhuman 
treatment  of  the  French  prisoners — Corruption  and  inoa- 

Sieity — State  of  the  I'ortuguese  army — Impolicy  of  tlio 
ritish  ^'overnment — E.\peditiou  of  Wak-hereu — E.xpcdi- 
tion  agamst  Italy. 

The  British  army  remained  in  the  camp  of  Abrantea 
until  the  latter  enti  of  June.  During  tliis  jieriod,  sir 
Arthur  Wellesley,  although  burning  to  enter  Spain,  was 
kept  back  by  a  variety  of  difficulties.  He  had  been 
reinforced  with  five  thousand  men  immediately  after  his 
return  from  the  Douro  ;  and.  in  the  preceding  opera- 
tions, the  killed  and  hurt  in  battle  had  not  exceeded 
three  hundred  men,  but  the  deaths  by  sickness  were  nu- 
merous. Four  thousand  in  ho.spital,  and  fifteen  hun- 
dred employed  in  escort  and  dej)6t  duties,  being  de- 
ducted, the  gro.ss  amount  of  the  j)resent  under  arms,  as 
late  even  as  the  25th  of  June,  did  not  exceed  twenty- 
two  thousand  men  ;  and  these  were,  at  any  moment, 
liable  to  be  seriously  diminished,  because  the  minis- 
ters, still  intent  upon  Cadiz,  had  authorized  Mr.  Frere, 
whenever  the  junta  should  consent  to  the  mea.sure,  to 
draw  a  garrison  for  that  town  fnun  sir  Arthur's  force. 
As  an  army,  therefore,  it  was  weak  in  eveiy  thing  but 
spirit  ;  the  conmiissariat  was  without  sullicient  means 
of  transport ;  the  soldiers  nearly  barefooted,  and  totally 


1809.1 


NAPIER'S    PENIXSULAIl    WAR. 


203 


without  pay;  the  military  chest  empty,  the  hospitals 
full. 

'I'h?  cost,  at  a  low  estimation,  was  about  two  hundred 
thousand  pounds  a  month ;  with  the  most  strenuous 
exertions,  a  hundred  and  sixty  thousand  pounds  only 
had  been  ])roeured  in  the  two  months  of  May  and  June, 
and  oi'  this,  thirteen  thousand  had  bsen  (-btiiined  as  a 
tenipora-y  loan  in  Oporto.  The  rate  of  exchunge  in 
Lisbon  was  high,  and  notwithstanding  the  increased 
value  given  to  the  government  paper  by  the  successes  on 
the  Douro,  this  rate  was  daily  rising  ;  the  Spanish  dollar 
Ma.s  at  hve  shillings,  while  .Spanish  gold  sunk  so  much 
in  value  that  the  commissary-general  sent  all  that  he 
received  fi'om  England,  or  could  collect  in  Lisbon,  to 
Cadiz,  and  other  parts,  to  truciv  for  dollars  ;*  but,  in  all 
places  of  conuueree,  the  exchange  was  rising  against 
England,  a  natural  consequence  of  her  enormous  and 
increasing  issues  of  paper.  Those  issues,  the  extrava- 
gant succours  given  to  Spain,  together  with  subsidies  to 
Austria,  made  it  impossible  to  supply  the  army  in  Por- 
tugal with  si)ecie,  otherwise  than  by  raising  cash,  in 
every  quarter  of  the  globe,  on  treasury-bills,  and  at  a 
most  enormous  loss  ;  an  evil  great  in  itself,  opening  a 
wide  door  to  fraud  and  villany,  and  rendered  the  war 
between  France  and  England  not  so  much  a  glorious 
contest  of  arms  as  a  struggle  between  public  credit  and 
military  force,  in  which  even  victory  was  sure  to  be  fatal 
to  the  former. 

The  want  of  money,  sickness,  Cuesta's  impracticable 
temper,  and  a  variety  of  minor  difficulties,  too  tedious  to 
mention,  kept  the  army  in  a  state  of  inactivity  until  the 
end  of  June  ;  but,  at  that  j)eriod,  the  retreat  of  the  first 
corps  I'rom  Torremocha,  and  the  consequent  advance  of 
Cuesta,  removed  one  obstacle  to  offensive  operations,  and 
sir  Arthur,  having  the  certainty  that  eight  thousand  ad- 
ditional troops  were  off  the  rock  of  Lisbon,  then  com- 
menced his  march  into  Spain  by  the  northern  banks  of 
the  Tagus  ;  meaning  to  unite  with  Cuesta  on  the  Tietar, 
and  to  arrange,  if  possible,  a  plan  of  operations  against 
Madrid. 

But,  before  I  embark  on  the  full  and  broad  stream 
into  which  the  surges  and  eddies  of  the  complicated  war- 
fare that  succeeded  Napoleon's  departure  from  the  Penin- 
sula settled,  1  must  give  a  general  view  of  the  state  oi 
affairs,  that  the  reader,  comprehending  exactly  what 
strength  each  party  brought  to  the  eucouuter,  may  judge 
more  truly  of  the  result. 

FRENCH    POWER. 

M;n.         HorSL-s. 
The  Frencli.  having  received  =orae  reinforcements  of 
con^c.  ii)ts,  amounted,  in  the  besinuing  of  July,  in- 

cluil  ng  tile  king's  guards,  to  aljout 275,000 

In  lios|ji;iil 61,0l)i)  I 

Siiaggiers  and  prisoners  borne  on  the  states  7,U00  J 

Total  under  arms  .     .     . 

The  military  governments,  lines  of  correspondence, 

garrisons,  and  detachments,  absorbed      .... 


Til  Araijon,  itnder  General  Sachet. 

Ill'  *  Art.    Cat. 
Third  corps,  Zaragoza,  Alcanitz,  kz ].5,22C     2,004 


68,000 


2u7,000   3C,UtJ0 
82,000     3,000 
J'resent  under  armx  with  the  corpt  d'annee  .    175,000  30,000 

The  actual  strength  and  situation  of  each  corps  d'armic 
was  as  follows  : — f 

Under  the  King,  covering  Madrid. 

Inf.  &  At.     Cav 

First  corps,  in  the  valley  of  the  Tagus 2(l,8Sl  4,200 

Fourth  corp-i.  La  Mancha 17,490  3,200 

1)  vision  of  Dessolles,  Madrid CSM 

King's  French  guards,  Madrid,  about 4.0iiO  1,500 


Total 4y,235  8,900 

In  Old  Cantilf,  under  Miirshal  Soult. 

Inf  A  Art.  C.iv. 

Second  corps,  Zamora,  Tora,  and  Salamanca  .     .     .  17,7ii7  2.SS.3 

F.fth  corp-i,  Valhidolid 10,1142  t>74 

Sixth  corps,  Astorga,  and  its  vicinity 14,91:5  1,440 

Total 4S,G62  5,208 


*  Pari.  Papers,  1810. 

t  Muster-roll  of  the  French  Army,  MSS, 


In  Catulonid,  vnder  Miirfihal  A  xxgereau. 

Inf   ,(:  Art.     C.v. 

Seventh  corps,  Vich,  Gerona,  and  Barcelona  .     .     .      311,593     2,500 

In  addition  to  these  corps  there  wore  twelve  hundred 
men  belonging  to  the  battering  train  ;  four  thousand 
infantry  under  l>onnet,at  St.  Andero  ;  and  two  thousand 
two  hundred  cavalry  under  Kellerman,  in  the  Valladuiid 
country. 

'J'he  fortresses  and  armed  places  in  possession  of  the 
French  army  were — St.  Sebastian,  Pampeluna,  Eiibao, 
Sanlona,  St.  Andero,  Burgos,  Leon,  Astorga,  on  the 
northern  line  ; 

Jacca,  Zaragoza,  Guadalaxara,  Toledo,  Segovia,  and 
Zamora,  on  the  central  line ; 

Figueras,  Rosas,  and  Barcelona,  on  the  southern 
line. 

It  needs  but  a  glance  at  these  di.^positions  and  num- 
bers to  understand  with  what  a  power  Napoleon  had 
fastened  upon  the  Peninsula,  during  his  six  weeks' 
campaign.  Much  had  been  lost  since  his  departure,  but 
his  army  still  pressed  the  Spaniards  down,  and.  like  a 
stone  cast  upon  a  brood  of  snakes,  was  immoveable  to 
their  writhings.  Nevertheless,  the  situation  of  Spain, 
at  this  epoch,  was  an  ameliorated  one  compared  to  that 
which,  four  months  before,  the  vehemence  of  Napo- 
leon's jiersonal  warfare  had  reduced  it  to.  'J'he  ele- 
ments of  resistance  were  again  accumulated  in  masses, 
and  the  hope,  or  rather  confidence,  of  success  was  again 
in  full  vigour  ;  for,  it  was  in  the  character  of  this  people, 
while  grovelling  on  the  earth,  to  su])pose  themselves 
standing  firm  ;  and,  when  creeping  in  the  gloom  of 
defeat,  to  imagine  they  were  soaring  in  the  full  blaze  of 
victory. 

The  momentary  cessation  of  offensive  operations  on 
the  part  of  the  French,  instead  of  being  traced  to  its  true 
sources,  the  personal  jealousies  of  the  marshals,  a]|d  the 
kings  want  of  vigour,  was,  as  usual,  attributed,  first — to 
I'ear  and  weakness,  secondly — to  the  pressure  of  the  Aus- 
trian war.  It  was  not  considered  that  the  want  of 
unity,  checking  the  course  of  conquest,  would  cease  when 
the  French  army  was  driven  to  the  defensive  ;  neither 
was  the  might  of  France  duly  weighed,  while  the  strength 
of  Austria  was  unduly  exalted.  'I'he  disasters  at  Ucles, 
at  Almaraz,  at  Zaragoza,  Rosas,  Cardadeu,  Vails,  at 
Ciudad  Real,  Medellin,  Braga,  and  Oporto,  and  in  the 
xVsturias.  were  all  forgotten,  the  French  had  been  repuls- 
ed from  Portugal,  and  they  had  not  taken  Seville  !  This, 
to  the  Spaniards,  was  sufficient  evidence  of  their  weak- 
ness ;  and,  when  the  P>encb  were  supposed  to  be  weak, 
the  others,  by  a  curious  reasoning  process,  always  came 
to  the  conclusion  that  they  were  themselves  strong. 
Hence,  the  f  )re-boasting  at  this  period  was  little  inferior 
to  what  it  had  been  after  the  battle  of  Baylen,  and  the 
statement  of  the  relative  numbers  was  alm.ost  as  absurd. 
'I'he  utmost  amount  of  the  French  force  was  not  calcu- 
lated higher  than  a  hundred  and  fifteen,  or  a  hundred  and 
twenty  thousand  men,  of  which  about  fifty  thousand 
were  supposed  to  be  on  the  French  side  of  the  Ebro, 
and  the  whole  only  waiting  for  au  excuse  to  abandon  the 
Peninsula. 

SPANISH    POWER. 

The  Spanish  armies,  on  paper,  were,  as  usual,  numer- 
ous ;  and  the  real  amount  of  the  regular  force  was  cer- 
tainly considerable,  although  very  inadequate  to  the 
exigencies  or  the  resources  of  the  country.  IJeforo  the 
battle  of  Belchite  had  broken  Blake's  strength,  there 
were,  organized  and  under  arms,  twelve  thou.sand 
cavalry,  and  about  one  hundred  and  twenty  thwu.sand 
infantry,  exclusive  of  irregultir  bands  and  armed  peas- 
antry, who  were  available  for  particular  defensive  ope- 
rations.    After  that  defeat  the  number  of  regular  forces, 


204 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  YILt. 


capable  of  takin;?  the  Sold  in  the  south-oaatorn  provinces, 
was  not  above  twenty  thousand  men.  of  which  about  t-'n 
thousand,  uiuk-r  Coupiufuy.  were  watchinjT  Barcelona, 
or,  again,  rallyin;;  under  IJIake ;  the  remainder  were  in 
Valencia,  where  Caro,  Romanas  brother,  had  taken  tiie 
coiumand. 

la  the  north-western  prn-inces  there  were  about 
twenty-tive  thousand  m:Mi.  o.' which  fifteen  tliousand  were 
ill  (iallicia;  some  thuisaiids  in  the  Asturias  under  Vors- 
ter  and  Ballasteros,  and  the  remainder  under  the  duke 
del  Paniuc,  wiio  was  directed  to  organize  a  new  army  iu 
the  neiglil)t>urhood  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo. 

In  Andahiriia,  or  covering  it,  there  were  about  seventy 
thousand  men.  Of  these  twenty-three  thousand  infantry, 
and  two  tliousand  five  hundred  cavah-y,  were  iissembled 
in  the  Murena,  near  St.  Elena  and  Carolina,  mider  the 
conmiand  of  general  \'enegas  ;  and  thirty-eight  thousand, 
including  seven  thousand  cavalry,  were  in  Estremadura. 
under  the  orders  of  Cuesta,  who  was  nominally  com- 
mander-in-chief of  both  armies. 

Tiie  troops,  thus  separated  into  three  grand  divisions, 
were  called  tiie  armies  of  the  rigitt,  the  centre,  the  left. 
'Jlie  fortresses  were  (jierona,  Hostalrich,  Lerida,  Mequi- 
n';fza.  Tarragona,  Tortosa,  Valencia,  Carthagena,  and 
Aiicant,  for  the  army  of  the  right ;  Cadiz  and  Badajos 
for  that  of  the  centre ;  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  Coruna,  and 
Ferrol,  for  the  army  of  the  left. 

The  Spanish  troops  were,  however,  far  from  being 
serviceable  in  proportion  to  their  numljers ;  most  of 
them  were  new  levies,  and  the  re.st  were  ill-trained.  The 
generals  had  lost  nothing  of  their  presumption,  learnt 
nothing  of  war,  and  their  mutual  jealousies  were  as  strong 
as  ever.  Cuesta,  still  hating  the  junta,  was  feared  and 
hated  by  that  body  in  return,  and  Venegas  was  placed 
at  the  head  of  the  Carolina  army  as  a  counterpoise  to 
him.  Romana.  also,  was  obnoxious  to  the  junta,  and  iu 
return,  with  more  reason,  the  junta  was  despised  and  dis- 
liked by  him.  In  Valencia  and  Murcia  generals  and 
juntas  appeared  alike  indin'jreut  to  the  puljlic  welfare, 
satis'ied  if  the  war  was  kept  from  their  own  doors.  In 
Catalonia  there  never  was  any  nnaiiiraity. 

Blake,  who  had  aban>loiK-d  Romana  in  Gallicia,  and 
who  was  still  at  enmity  with  Cuesta,  had  been,  for 
these  very  reasons,  invested  with  supreme  power  in 
Valencia,  Aragon,  and  Catidonia  ;  and  moreover,  there 
were  factions  and  bickerinjp5  among  the  inferior  officei-s 
in  the  armies  of  Venegas  and  Cuesta.  Albuquerque 
was  ambitious  of  commanding  in  chief,  and  Mr.  FiX're 
warmly  intrigued  in  iiis  cause,  for  that  gentleman  still 
laborired  under  the  delusion  that  he  was  appointed  to 
direct  the  military  instead  of  conducting  the  political 
service  in  the  Peninsida.  In  April,  he  had  proposed 
to  the  junta  that  a  force  of  live  thousand  cavalry  and 
Bome  infantry,  taken  fri;m  the  armies  of  Cuesta  and 
Venegas,  should,  under  the  command  of  the  duke  of 
Albuquerque,  commence  oilensive  operations  in  La 
Mancha  ;  this,  ho  said,  would,  "  ?/  the  enemy  rcfmed 
to  talce  notice  of  it,"  become  "  a  very  serious  and  per- 
haps a  decisive  movement  ;'*  and  he  wtis  so  earnest 
that,  without  communicating  upon  the  subject  with  sir 
Arthur  Wcliesley,  without  wniting  for  the  result  of  the 
opt;rations  against  Soult,  he  pretended  to  the  junta  that 
the  civoporatiuii  of  the  English  army  with  Cuesta  (that 
co-operati(»n  which  it  was  sir  Arthur's  most  anxious 
wish  to  bring  ai).iut)  could  only  be  ol)tained,  as  the 
price  of  the  Spani.sh  governments  acceding  to  his  own 

Eroposal.  The  plenipotentiary's  greatest  etfurts  were, 
owever,  directed  to  procure  the  appointment  of  Albu- 
querque to  the  command  of  an  army  ;  but  that  noble- 
man was  under  the  orders  of  Cuesta,  who  was  not 
willing  to  part  with  him.  and,  moreover,  Frere  wished 
to  displace  Venegas.  not  that  any  fault  Wiis  attributed 
to  the  latter,  but  merely  to  make  way  for  Albuquerque ; 


♦  I'i.  iftmentaiy  Papers,  1810. 


a  scheme  so  indecorous  that  both  the  junta  and  Cuesta 
peremptorily  rejected  it. 

Mr.  Frere  did  not  hesitate  to  attribute  this  rejection 
to  a  mean  jealousy  of  Albuquerque's  high  birth  and 
talents  ;*  yet  the  junta  had  sufficient  reason  for  their 
conduct,  not  only  on  this  occasion,  but  afterwards,  when 
they  refused  to  give  him  any  independent  command. 
'J'lie  duke,  although  a  brave  and  patriotic  and  even  an  able 
soldier,  was  the  dupe  of  a  woman  who  corresponded  with 
the  French  ;  the  junta,  in  the  fear  of  offending  him, 
forbore  to  punish  her,  at  first,  yet,  finally,  they  were 
obliged  to  shut  her  up.  and  they  could  not  entrust  him 
with  a  command  while  her  dangerous  influence  lasted. 
Hence,  Mr.  Freie's  intrigue  failed  to  serve  Albuquerque; 
and  his  military  project  for  La  Mancha  fell  to  the  ground 
when  sir  Arthur  Wellesley,  unable  to  perceive  its  ad- 
vantages, strongly  advised  the  junta,  not  to  weaken  but 
to  reinforce  Cuesta's  army ;  not  to  meddle  with  the 
French  either  in  La  Mancha  or  Estremadura,  but  to 
preserve  a  strict  defensive  in  all  quarters. 

The  supreme  juitta  was  itself  in  fear  of  the  old  junta 
of  Seville,  and  the  folly  and  arrogance  of  the  first  and 
its  neglect  of  the  public  weal  furnished  ample  grounds 
of  attack,  as  a  slight  sketch  of  its  administrative  proceed- 
ings will  suffice  to  prove.  The  king,  after  the  battles 
of  Medellin  and  Ciudad  Real,  had,  through  the  medium 
of  don  Joachim  Sotelo,  a  Spanish  minister  in  his  seivice, 
made  an  attempt  to  negotiate  for  the  submission  of  the 
junta,  which  was  spurned  at  by  the  latter  and  iu  suitable 
terms,  for  dignified  sentiments  and  lofty  expressions 
were  never  wanting  to  the  Spaniards ;  yet,  taken  with 
their  deeds,  they  were  but  as  a  strong  wind  and  shriv- 
elled leaves. 

The  junta  did  not  fail  to  make  the  nation  observe 
their  patriotism  upon  this  occasion,  and,  indeed,  took 
every  opportunity  to  praise  their  own  proceedings ; 
nevertheless,  men  were  not  wanting  in  Spain  most  anx- 
ious not  only  to  check  the  actual  abuses  of  power,  but  to 
la}'  bare  all  the  ancient  oppressions  of  the  country,  and 
recur  to  first  principles,  both  ibr  present  reform  and 
future  permanent  good  government  ;  in  short,  to  make 
public  avowal  of  the  misrule  \\  hich  had  led  to  their  mis- 
fortunes, and,  if  possible,  to  amend  it.  Knowing  that 
although  national  independence  may  co-exist  with 
tyranny,  it  is  necessarily  attached  to  civil  and  religious 
freedom, — they  desired  to  assemble  tie  cortes ;  to  give 
the  people  an  earnest  that  natiemal  independence  was 
worth  having,  and  to  convince  them  that  their  sufferings 
and  their  exertions  would  lead  to  a  sen.sible  good,  instead 
of  a  mere  dioice  between  an  old  and  a  new  despotism  ; 
this  party  was  powerful  enough  to  have  a  manilesto,  to 
their  purpose,  drawn  up  by  the  junta,  and  it  would  have 
been  published,  if  the  English  ministers  had  not  inter- 
posed ;  for,  as  I  have  before  said,  their  object  was  not 
Spain,  but  Napoleon, 

Mr.  Frere  vigonjusly  opposed  the  promulgation  of 
this  manifesto,  and  not  ambiguously  hinted  that  the 
displeasure  of  England,  and  the  wrath  of  the  partizans 
of  despotism  in  Spain,  would  be  vented  on  the  junta,  if 
any  such  approach  to  real  liiierty  was  niade.f  In  his 
despatches  to  his  cabinet  he  wrote  that,  from  his  knowl- 
edge of  the  members  of  the  junta,  he  k'lt  assured  they 
would  "  shrink  from  the  idea  (f  giving  permanent  effect 
to  the  measures  which  tlietj  held  out  ,•''  and  this  expres- 
sion he  meant  in  their  praise !  but  still  he  thought  it 
necessary  to  check  the  tendency  to  freed  cm  in  the  out- 
set, and  it  would  be  injustice  not  to  give  his  sentiments 
in  his  own  words ;  sentiments  w  Inch  were  at  this  time 
perfectly  agre<'able  to  his  immediate  superior,  Mr. 
Canning,  but  offering  a  curious  contrast  to  the  political 
liberality  which  that  politician  afterwards  thought  it 
his  interest  to  affect 


♦  Piirli:imeiit:irv  Papers,  1810. 

t  I'arliumcutary  rapeni,  printed  1810. 


1809.] 


NAPIER  S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


205 


Writing  ag  a  Spaniaa'd,  Mr.  Frere  thu3  addressed  don 
Martiu  Garay  : — 

"  If  we  have  indeed  passed  three  centuries  under  an 
arbitrary  government,  let  us  not  forget  that  it  is  a  price 
which  we  pay  for  having  conquered  and  peopled  the 
fairest  portion  of  the  globe;  that  the  integrity  of  this 
immense  power  rests  solely  on  these  two  words,  reli- 
gion and  the  king.  If  the  old  constitution  had  been 
lost  by  the  conquest  of  America,  our  first  object  should 
be  to  recover  it,  but  in  such  a  manner  as  not  to  lose 
what  has  cost  us  so  much  in  the  acquisition.  From 
this  consideration,  it  appears  to  me  that  we  ought  to 
avoid,  as  pol.tical  poison,  anij  annuncmtion  of  general 
■principles,  the  uppUcation  of  wliich  it  ivould  be  impossible 
to  limit  ir  qualtfij,  even  luhen  the  negroes  and  Indians 
should  quote  them  in  favour  of  themselves.  But  let  us 
allow  that  we  have  made  a  bad  exchange  in  bartering 
our  ancient  national  liberttj  for  the  g'orij  and  extension 
of  the  Spanish  nams.  Let  us  allow  that  the  nation  has 
been  deceived  for  three  centuries,  and  that  this  error 
should,  at  all  hazards,  be  immediately  done  away. 
Even  though  it  were  so,  it  does  not  appear  very  be- 
coming the  character  of  a  well  educated  person  to  pass 
censures  upon  the  conduct  of  his  forefathers,  or  to  com- 
plain of  what  he  has  lost  by  their  negligence  or  prodi- 
gality ;  and  still  less  so,  if  it  is  done  in  the  face  of  all  the 
world  :  and  what  shall  we  say  of  a  nation  who  would 
do  this  publicly,  and  after  mature  deliberation  ?"* 

The  manifesto  was  suppressed,  a  new  one  more  con- 
lonant  with  Mr.  Frere"s  notions  was  published,  and  a 
promise  to  convoke  the  Cortes  given,  but  without 
naming  any  specific  time  for  that  event.  The  junta, 
who.  as  Mr.  Frere  truly  stated,  were  not  at  all  dis- 
posed to  give  any  effect  to  free  institutions,  now  pro- 
ceeded to  prop  up  their  own  tottering  power  by  sever- 
ity :  they  had,  previous  to  the  manii'esto,  issued  a 
menacing  proclamation,  in  which  they  endeavoured  to 
confound  their  political  opponents  with  the  spies  and 
tools  of  the  French  ;  and  having  before  established  a 
tribunal  of  public  security,  they  caused  it  to  publish 
an  edict,  in  which  all  men,  who  endeavoured  to  raise  dis- 
trust of  the  junta,  or  who  tried  to  overturn  the  govern- 
m?nt,  by  popular  commotions,  or  other  means  that  had, 
by  the  junta,  been  reprobated,  were  declared  guilty  of 
high  treason,  undeserving  the  name  of  Spaniards  and 
sold  to  Napoleon  :  their  punishment  to  be  death,  and 
confiscation  of  property.  Any  person  propagating  ru- 
mours, tending  to  weaken  or  soften  the  hatred  of  the 
people  against  the  French,  was  instantly  to  be  arrested 
and  punished  without  remission  ;  lastly,  rewards  were 
oftered  for  secret  iufor.mation  upon  these  heads. 

This  decree  was  not  a  dead  letter.  Many  persons 
were  seized,  imprisoned,  and  executed,  without  trial, 
or  knowing  their  accusers.  But  the  deepest  stain  upon 
the  Spanish  character,  at  this  period,  was  the  treatment 
experienced  by  prisoners  of  war.  Thousands,  and 
amongst  them  part  of  Dupont's  troops,  who  were  only 
prisoners  by  a  breach  of  faith,  were  sent  to  the  Balearic 
Isles,  without  any  order  being  taken  for  their  subsist- 
ence, and  when  remonstrated  with,  the  junta  cast  seven 
thousand  ashore  on  the  little  desert  rock  of  Cabrera. 
At  Majorca,  numbers  had  been  massacred  by  the  inhab- 
itants, in  the  most  cowardly  and  brutal  manner,  but 
thase  left  on  Cabrera  suffered  miseries  that  can  scarcely 
be  described.  The  supply  of  food,  always  scanty, 
was  often  neglected  altogether  ;  there  was  but  one  spring 
on  the  rock,  which  dried  up  in  summer ;  clothes  were 
tever  given  to  them  except  by  the  English  seamen, 
who,  compassionating  their  sufferings,  often  assisted 
them,  in  passing  the  island.  Thus,  atilicted  with  hun- 
ger, thirst,  and  nakedness,  they  lived  like  wild  bea.s'ts 
while  they  could  live,  but  perished  in  such  numbers, 
that  less  than  two  thousand  remained  to  tell  the  tale 

♦  r.ipers  L'.id  bcfjre  Parliament,  lilO. 


of  this  inhumanity  ;  and  surely,  it  was  no  slight  disgrace 
that  the  English  government  failed  to  interfere  on  such 
an  occasion. 

But  what  were  the  efforts  made  for  the  defence  of 
the  country  by  this  barbarous  junta,  which,  having  been 
originally  assembled  to  discuss  the  form  of  establish- 
ing a  centml  government,  had,  unlawfully,  retained 
their  delegated  power,  and  used  it  so  s'hamefully? 
There  was  a  Spanish  fleet,  and  a  sufficient  number  of 
sailors  to  man  it,  in  Carthagena,  and  there  was  another 
fleet,  and  abundance  of  seamen,  in  Cadiz.  Lord  Col- 
liugwood,  and  others,  pressed  the  junta,  constantly  and 
earnestly,  to  fit  these  vessels  out,  and  to  make  use  of 
them,  or  at  least  to  place  them  beyond  the  reach  of  the 
enemy,  yet  his  remonstrances  were  unheeded ;  the 
sailors  were  rendered  mutinous  for  want  of  pay,  and 
even  of  subsistence,  and  the  government  would  neither 
fit  out  ships  themselves,  nor  suffer  the  English  seamen 
to  do  it  for  them.  At  the  period  when  the  marquis  of 
llomana  and  the  insurgents  iu  Gallicia  were  praying 
for  a  few  stands  of  arms  and  five  thousand  pounds  from 
sir  John  Cradock,  the  junta  possessed  many  millions  of 
money,  and  their  magazines,  iu  Cadiz,  were  bursting 
with  the  continually  increasing  quantity  of  stores  and 
arms  arriving  from  I'^ngland,-  but  which  were  left  to  rot  aa 
they  arrived,  while,  from  every  quarter  of  the  country  not 
yet  subdued,  the  demand  for  these  things  was  incessant* 

The  fleet  in  Cadiz  harbour  might  have  been  at  sea 
in  the  beginning  of  February.  In  a  week  it  might 
have  been  at  Vigo,  with  money  and  succours  of  all 
kinds  for  the  insurgents  in  Uallicia ;  after  which,  by 
skilful  operations  along  the  coast  from  Vigo  to  St. 
Sebastian,  it  might  have  occupied  an  enormous  French 
force  on  that  line  of  country  ;  instead  of  a  fleet,  the 
junta  sent  colonel  Barios,  an  obscure  person,  to  steal 
through  by-ways,  and  to  take  the  connnaud  of  men 
who  were  not  in  want  of  leaders.  In  the  same  manner, 
the  fleet  in  Carthagena  might  have  been  employed  on 
the  Cataloniau  and  French  coasts ;  but,  tiir  from  using 
their  means,  which  were  really  enormous,  with  energy 
and  judgement,  the  junta  carried  on  the  war  by  encou- 
raging virulent  publications  against  the  French,  and 
conlined  their  real  exerti(jns  to  the  assembling  of  the 
unfortunate  peasants  in  masses,  to  starve  for  a  while, 
and  then  to  be  cut  to  pieces  by  their  more  experienced 
opponents. 

The  system  of  false  reports,  also,  was  persevered  in 
without  any  relaxation  :  "  T/ie  French  were  beaten  on 
all  points  ;  the  marshals  were  slain  or  taken  ;  their  sol- 
diers were  deserting,  or  flying  in  terror  at  the  sight  of  a 
Spaniard  ;  Joseph  had  plundered  and  abandoned  Madrid  ; 
Zaragoza  had  not  fallen."  Castro,  the  envoy  to  the 
Portuguese  regency,  so  late  as  April,  anxiously  endea- 
voured to  persuade  that  government  and  the  English 
general,  that  Zaragoza  had  never  been  subdued,  and 
that  the  story  of  its  fall  was  a  French  falsehood.  In 
June,  ofQcial  letters  were  written  to  marshal  Beresford, 
from  the  neighbourhood  of  Lugo,  and  dated  the  very 
day  upon  which  Soult's  army  relieved  that  town,  not  to 
give  intelligence  of  the  event,  but  to  announce  the  utter 
defeat  of  that  marshal,  and  the  capture  of  Lugo  itself; 
the  amount  of  the  killed  and  wounded,  and  the  prisoners 
taken,  being  very  exactly  stated,  and  with  such  an  ap- 
pearance of  truth  as  to  deceive  Beresford,  notwithstand- 
ing his  previous  experience  of  the  people  he  had  to  deal 
with. 

But  the  proofs  of  corruption  and  incapacity  iu  the 
junta  are  innumerable,  and  not  conlined  to  the  records 
of  events  kept  by  British  officers.  Romana,  a  few 
months  later,  upon  the  question  of  appointing  a  regency, 
thus  describes  their  conduct :  "  He  himself,"  he  said, 
"  liad  doubted  if  the  central  junta  was  a  laiiful  govern- 
ment, and  this  doubt  was  general  in  the  provinces  through 

•  Lord  Colliugwood's  CoiTespondencc.    Gen.  Miller's  Mem. 


206 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  YIIL 


^ 


which  he  had  passed ;  yd  he  had,  to  preserve  the  nation 
from  anarchy,  not  only  yielded  olmLence  to  it,  but  lie  had, 
likewise,  for  ted  Ihe  provinces  of  Galltcia,  Leon, and  Astu- 
rias  to  do  tie  same ;  Oeiaiise  he  thought  that  an  illegal 
government  might  be  u-'ufal  if  d  deserved  the  coifuleucc 
of'  the  people,  and,  that  tuey  respected  ds  authonti/.  T'le 
central  junta,  however,  was  not  thus  situated ;  the  people, 
judging  of  measures  by  their  effects,  complained  that  the 
armies  were  weak,  the  government  wdhout  energy  ;  that 
tlwre  were  no  supplies;  that  the  promised  accounts  of  the 
public  expenditure  were  w.thhelil  ;  and  yet,  all  the  sums 
drawn  from  America,  all  the  succours  granted  by  Eng- 
land, tne  rents  of  the  crown,  and  the  voluntary  contribu- 
tions were  expeiuled.  The  public  employments  were  not 
giV2a  to  men  of  merit  and  true  lovers  of  their  country, 
iiome  of  tlte  members  of  the  junta  rendered  their  power 
subservient  to  their  own  advantage ;  others  conferred 
lucrative  appointments  on  their  relations  and  dependents. 
Kcclcsiasticid  officer  had  been  fdled  up  to  enable  individuals 
to  seize  those  rents  for  themselves  which  ought  to  be  ap- 
propriated for  the  public  service.  There  was  no  unity  to 
be  found  ;  many  of  the  junta  cared  only  for  the  interest 
of  their  particular  province,  as  if  they  were  not  members 
of  the  Spanish  monarchy ;  confirming  the  appointments 
of  the  local  juntas,  without  regard  to  fitness  ;  and  even 
assigning  recompenses  to  men  destitute  of  mildary  know- 
ledge, who  had  neither  seen  service  nor  performed  the  du- 
ties assigned  to  them." 

"  Tlte  junta,divided  into  sections,  undertook  to  manage 
offers  in  which  they  were  unversed,  and  which  tvere  alto- 
gctner  foreign  to  their  professions.  Horses,  taken  from 
tneir  owners  under  pretence  of  supplying  the  armies,  iccre 
left  to  die  of  hunger  in  the  sea-marslies :  and.finaUij, 
many  important  branches  of  administration  were  rn  the 
hands  cf  men,  suspcctel,  both  from  their  own  conduct  ami 
from  their  having  be:n  creatures  of  that  infamous  favour- 
ite who  was  the  aut'ior  of  the  general  miscri/." 

It  was  at  tliis  period  that  tlie  cdehratad' Partidas  first 
commenced  tlie  guerilla,  or  petty  warfare,  which  lias 
been  so  lau'J<'d,  as  \t'  that  liad  been  the  cause  of  Napo- 
leon's discoiniiture.  Those  bands  were  infinitely  nu- 
jneroiis,  because  every  rubber  tliat  feared  a  jail,  or 
that  could  break  frnm  one;  every  smuggler,*  whose 
trade  had  b.'en  interrupted ;  every  friar,  disliking  the 
trammels  of  his  convent ;  and  every  idler,  tliat  wished 
to  avoid  the  ranks  of  the  regular  army,  was  to  be  found 
either  as  chief  or  associate  in  tlie  partulm.  'J'he  French, 
a'.tijough  harissed  liy  the  constant  and  cruel  murders 
of  isolated  soldiers,  or  followers  of  the  army,  and  some- 
times by  the  lo>:s  of  convoys,  were  mwn-  "^tlnviirfpr]  in 
anxja'cat.  (iiijixL-ky  tlit:sii  .bauds  ;  but  the  necessitv  of 
pr.jviding  subsistence,  and  attaching  his  followers  to 
his  fortunes,  generally  obliged  the  guerilla  chief  to  rob 
his  countrymen  ;  and.  indeed,  one  of  the  principal  causes 
of  the  sadden  growth  of  this  system  was  the  hope  of 
intercepting  the  public  and  private  plate,  which,  under 
a  decree  of  Joseph,  was  bringing  in  from  all  parts  to  be 
coined  in  Madi-id  ;  foi*  that  m;)narch  was  obliged  to 
have  recourse  to  forced  loans,  and  the  jiroperty  of  t!ie 
proscribed  nol)les  and  suppressed  convents,  to  maintain 
even  tiie  appearance  of  a  court. 

This  dj-;eripti  )n  will  apply  to  the  ma=:s  of  the  parti- 
das;  yet__the.c  were  some  actuated  by  nobh-r  motives; 
by  revenge  ;  by  a  gallant  enterprising  spirit ;  or  bv  an 
honest  ambition,  thinking  to  serve  their  cor>ntry  betttu- 
than  by  joini:ig  the  regular  forces.  Among  the  princi- 
pal chiefs  may  be  jilaccd,  Renovales,  and  the  two 
Minas,  in  Navarre  an  1  Aragon ;  Porlior,  named  the 
mnripus-;lto,  and  L')nga,  in  tlie  Asturias  and  Biscay; 
Juan  Martin,  or  Kl  Empeinah,  who  vexed  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Madrid;  Julian  Sanchitz.  in  the  (lata  and 
Salamanca  country  ;  doctor  Rovera,  Perena.  and  some 
others,  in  Catidonia ;  Julian  Palaroa,  or  El  Medico,  be- 

Tlio  br.nds  formo'l  of  smnprffJers  wore  called  Q^nlrJos. 


ice  or  hi3 

isly  affectjy 
iiict,  that  ^ 


twcen  the  Moreno  and  Toledo  ;  the  curate  Merino,  El 
Frmcipe,  and  Saornil,  in  Castile ;  the  triar  Sapia,  in 
Soria,  and  Juan  Abril,  near  Segovia. 

But  these  men  were  of  very  dillerent  merit.  Reno- 
vales,  a  regular  officer,  raised  the  peasantry  of  the 
valleys  between  l^ampeluna  and  Zaragoza,  after  the 
fall  of  the  latter  city,  and  was  soon  subdued.  Juan 
Martin,  Rovera,  Julian  Sanchez,  and  the  student  Mina, 
discovered  military  talent,  and  Sanchez  was  certainly 
a  very  bold  and  honest  man  ;  but  Espoz  y  Miira,  the 
uncle  and  successor  of  the  student,  far  outstripped  his 
contempoi-aries  in  fame.  He  shed  the  blood  of  his  pris- 
oners freely,  yet  rather  from  false  principles,  and  under 
peculiar  circumstances,  than  from  any  real  ferocity,  his 
natural  disposition  being  manly  and  generous  ;  and,  al- 
though not  possessed  of  any  peculiar  military  genius, 
he  had  a  sound  judgment,  surprising  energy,  and  a 
constant  spirit.  By  birth  a  pi'asant,  he  despised  the 
higher  orders  of  his  own  country,  and  never  would 
sutfer  any  hidalgo,  or  gentleman,  to  join  his  band. 
From  1809,  until  the  end  of  the  war,  he  maintained 
himself  in  the  provinces  bordering  on  the  Ebro  ;  often 
defeated,  and  chased  from  place  to  place,  he  yet  grad- 
ually increased  his  forces,  until,  in  1812,  he  yet  was 
at  the  head  of  more  than  ten  thousand  men,  whom  he 
paid  regularly,  and  supplied  from  resources  chiefly 
created  by  himself;  one  of  which  was  remarkable: — 
He  established  a  treaty  with  the  French  generals,  by 
which  articles,  not  being  warlike  stores,  coming  from 
P^rance,  had  safe  conduct  from  his  partida,  on  paying  a 
duty,  which  Mina  appropriated  to  the  subsistence  of  his 
followers. 

That  the  guerilla  system  could  never  seriously 
the  progress  of  the  French,  is  proved  by  the  fa 
the  constant  aim  of  the  principal  chiefs  was  to  intro- 
duce the  customs  of  regular  troops  ;  and  their  success^ 
against  the  enemy  was  [)roportioniite  to  their  progress  in  I 
discipline  and  organization.     There  were  not  less  than 
filty  thousand  of  these  irregular  soldiers,  at  one  time,  in 
Spain  ;  and  so  severely  did  they  press  upon  the  country 
that  it  may  be  assumed  as  a  truth  that  if  the  English 
army  had  abandoned  the  contest,  one  of  the  surest  meang_^ 
by  which  the  French  could  have  gained  the  good  will  of 
the  nation  would  have  been  the  e.xtirpating  of  the  parti-  \ 
das.     Ne\ertheless,  a  great  and  un(inestionable  advan- 
tage was  derived  by  the  regular  armies,  and  especially 
by  the  British,  from  the  existence  of  these  bands  ;  the  | 
French  could  never  communicate  with  each  other,  nor  ' 
coinl)ine  their  movements,  except  by  the  slow  method  of 
sending  officers  with  strong  escorts  ;  whereas,  their  ad- 
versaries could  correspond  by  post,  and  even  by  tele- 
graph, an  advantage  equal  to  a  reinforcement  of  thirty 
thousand  men. 

rORTTGUESE    POWER. 

The  Portuguese  military  system  has  been  already 
explained.  The  ranks  of  the  regular  army,  and  of  the 
militia,  were  filling  ;  the  arms  and  equipments  were 
supplied  by  England  ;  and  means  were  taken  to  give 
etlect  to  the  authority  of  the  Capitaos  3Ior,  or  chiefs  of 
districts,  under  whom  the  ordcnancas  were  to  be  gath- 
ered for  the  defence  of  the  country.  The  people  hav- 
ing been  a  second  time  relieved  from  an  invasion,  by 
the  intervention  of  a  British  army,  were  disposed  to 
submit  implicitly  to  the  guidance  of  their  deliverers  ; 
but  the  effect  of  former  misgovernment  pervaded  every 
branch  of  administration,  ]);ilitical  and  munici})al,  and 
impc'ded  the  efforts  made  to  draw  forth  the  military  re- 
sources of  the  kingdom  ;  and  it  is  curious  that,  until 
the  end  of  the  war,  such  Wiis  the  reluctance  of  the  peo- 
ple to  become  soldiers,  that,  notwithstanding  their  un- 
doubted hatred  of  the  French,  their  natural  docility, 
and  the  visible  superiority  of  the  soldier's  condition 
over  that  of  the  peasant  or  artizan,  the  recruiting  was 
always  difticult ;  the  odious  spectacle  was   constantly 


1809.J 


NAPIER'S    TEXINSULAR   WAR. 


207 


exhibited,  of  men  marched  in  chains,  to  reinforce  armies, 
wliicli  were  figlitiui^  in  what  was  a  popuhir,  and  ought 
to  liave  been  a  sacred  cause. 

'J'he  actual  number  of  regular  troop-:,  armed  and  organ- 
ized, was  about  lit'teen  thousand,  but  notwithstanding  the 
courage  displayed  by  those  employed  in  the  late  ojicra- 
tions,  marshal  BeresFord  was  still  doubtful  of  their  mili- 
tary qualities,  and  reluctant  to  act  separately  from  the 
British  troops.  The  most  important  fortresses  in  a  con- 
dition for  d.'ti'uce  were  Elvas,  Alluuiu^rque,  and  Almeida, 
in  the  first  line;  Abrantes  and  Peniciie,  in  the  second  ; 
the  citadel,  and  forts  of  Lisbon,  Palmi'la,  and  Setuval,  in 
the  third.  But  there  were  many  other  walled  places,  ca- 
pable, if  armed,  of  standing  a  siege,  and  presenting  a  va- 
riety of  strong  points  for  the  irreguliw  foi'ce  of  the  coun- 
try to  assemble  u]ion  ;  and  hence  Portugal  offered,  not 
only'  great  resources  in  men,  bat  a  base  of  operations 
solid  m  itself;  central  with  respect  to  the  French  armies, 
and  enabling  the  English  general  to  act,  without  refei-ence 
to  the  Spanish  government  or  Spanish  connnanders  ;  an 
advantage  more  justly  appreciated  at  the  end  of  this  cam- 
paign than  at  the  commencement.  Such  were  the  rela- 
tive situations  of  the  contending  hosts  in  the  Peninsula; 
yet,  to  take  an  enlarged  view  of  affairs,  it  is  necessary  to 
look  beyond  the  actual  lield  of  battle ;  for  the  contest  in 
Spain,  no  longer  isolated,  was  become  an  integral  part 
of  the  great  European  struggle  against  France. 

Napuleon,  after  his  first  successes  near  Ratisbon,  en- 
tered Vienna,  and  attempted  to  carry  the  war  to  the  left 
bank  of  the  Dauulje  ;  but  a  severe  check,  received  at  the 
battle  of  l^^sling  en  the  21st  of  May,  so  shook  his  moral 
ascendancy  in  Europe,  that  he  deemed  it  necessary  to 
concentrate  all  the  disposable  strength  of  his  empire  for 
cue  gigantic  effort,  which  should  restore  the  terror  of  Ins 
name.  I'he  appearance  of  inactivity  assumed  by  him, 
while  thus  mightily  gathering  his  forces,  deceived  his 
enemies ;  and  as  their  hopas  rose,  their  boasts  became 
extravagant,  more  especially  in  England,  where,  to  ex- 
press a  doubt  of  his  immediate  overthrow,  was  regarded 
as  a  heinous  offence ;  and  where  the  government,  buoyed 
up  with  foolish  expectations,  thought  less  of  supportnig 
a  noble  and  effectual  warfare  in  Portugal  than  of  nour- 
ishing and  aiding  the  secondary  and  rather  degrading 
hostility  of  conspirators,  malcontents,  and  military  adven- 
turers in  (jrermany. 

While  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  was  waiting  impatiently 
on  the  Tagus  for  the  scanty  rcintoix-ements  afforded 
him,  two  other  armies  were  simultaneously  preparing 
to  act  against  the  extrenities  of  the  French  empire  ; 
the  one,  consisting  of  about  twelve  thousand  men, 
drawn  from  Sicily,  was  destined  to  invade  Italy,  the 
southern  pails  of  which  had  been  denuded  of  troops  to 
oppose  the  Austrians  on  the  Tagliamento."  'J'he  other 
was  assembled  on  the  coast  of  England,  where  above 
forty  thousand  of  the  finest  troops  the  nation  could 
boast  of,  and  a  fleet  of  power  to  overthrow  all  the  other 
navies  of  the  world  combined,  composed  an  armament 
intended  to  destroy  the  great  marine  establishment 
which  the  French  emperor  had  so  suddenly  and  so  por- 
tentously created  at  Antwerp.  So  vast  an  expedition 
had  never  before  left  the  British  shores,  neittier  any 
one  so  meanly  conceived,  so  improvidently  arranged, 
so  calamitously  conducted  ;  for  the  marine  and  land 
forces,  combined,  numbered  more  than  eighty  thousand 
fighting  men,  and  those  of  the  bravest,  yet  the  ol»ject 
in  view  was  comparatively  insignilicant,  and  even  that 
was  not  obtained.  Delivered  over  to  the  leading  of  a 
man,  whose  military  incapacity  has  caused  the  glo- 
rious title  of  Chatham  to  be  scorned,  this  ill-fated 
army,  with  spirit,  and  strength,  and  zeal  to  have  spread 
the  fame  of  England  to  the  extremities  of  the  earth, 
perished,  without  a  blow,  in  the  pestilent  marshes 
of  Walchereu  !     And  so  utterly  had  party  spirit  stifled 

*  Adjutant-gouei'al's  Returns. 


the  feeling  of  national  honour,  that  men  were  found  in 
Parliament  base  enough  to  rejirobate  the  convention  of 
Cintra,  to  sneer  at  sir  John  Moore's  operations,  and  yet 
to  declare  the  Walcheren  expedition  wise,  profitable,  anJ 
even  glorious. 

The  operation  against  Italy  was  less  unfortunate  rather 
than  more  ably  conducted,  and  it  was  equally  abortive. 
"What  with  slow  preparations,  the  voyage,  and  the  tak- 
ing of  the  petty  islands  of  Ischia  and  Procida,  thirteen 
Meeks  were  wasted,  although  during  that  peritd,  Murat, 
conscious  of  his  inability  to  resist,  was  only  restrained 
from  abandoning  Naples  by  the  firnmess  of  his  queen 
and  the  energy  of  Sallicetti,  the  minister  of  police.  Wc 
have  seen  that  it  was  the  wish  of  the  ministers  to  have 
the  troops  in  Sicily  employed  in  the  south  of  Spain,  bu* 
yielding  to  the  representations  of  sir  John  Stuart,  the} 
permitted  him  to  make  this  display  of  military  foolery  ; 
yet  it  is  not  with  the  bad  or  good  success  of  these  expe- 
ditions that  this  history  has  to  deal,  but  with  that  dire- 
ful ministerial  incapacity  which  suffered  two  men,  noto- 
riously unfitted  lor  war,  to  waste  and  dissipate  the 
military  strength  of  England  on  secondary  objei;ts,  while 
a  renowned  connnander,  j)!aced  at  the  most  important 
point,  was  left  without  an  adequate  force. 

For  the  first  time  since  the  commencement  of  the 
peninsular  Mar,  sixty  thousand  Spanish  troops,  well 
armed  and  clothed,  were  collected  in  a  nvass,  and  ia 
the  right  place,  communicating  with  a  Biitish  force; 
for  the  first  time  since  Napoleon  swayed  the  destiny  of 
France,  the  principal  army  of  that  country  had  met 
with  an  important  check  ;  the  great  conqueror's  fortune 
seemed  to  waver,  and  the  moment  had  arrived  whea 
the  British  government  was  called  to  display  all  its 
wisdom  and  energy.  The  duke  of  York  had  performed 
his  duty  ;  he  had  placed  above  ninety  thousand  superb 
soldiers,  all  di.s])osab!e  for  offensive  operations,  in  the 
hands  of  the  ministers;  but  the  latter  knew  not  their 
value,  and,  instead  of  concentrating  them  uj^m  one, 
scattered  them  upon  many  points.  Sir  Arthur  W^elles- 
ley  might  have  had  above  eighty  thousand  British 
troops  on  tJie  frontiers  of  Portugal,  and  he  was  a  gen- 
eral capable  of  wielding  them.  He  was  forced  to  com- 
mence a  campaign  upon  which  the  fate  of  the  Penin- 
sula, a  quick  ti'iumpb  or  a  long-protracted  agony  of 
twelve  millions  of  people  depended,  with  only  twenty- 
two  thousand  ;  while  sixty  thousand  fighting  men,  and 
ships  numerous  enough  to  darken  all  the  coasts  of  Spain, 
were  waiting,  in  Sicily  and  England,  fur  orders  which 
were  to  doom  them,  one  part  to  scorn,  and  the  other  to 
an  inglorious  and  miserable  fate.  Shall  the  deliverance 
of  the  Peninsula,  then,  be  attributed  to  the  firmness  and 
long-sighted  policy  of  ministers  wlio  gave  these  glariijg 
proofs  tif  imprt)vidence,  or  shall  the  glory  of  that  great 
exploit  lighten  round  the  head  of  him  who  so  manfully 
maintained  the  fierce  struggle,  under  all  the  burden  of 
their  fuily  'i 


CHAPTER  V. 

Campaign  of  Talavcra — Choice  of  operations — Sir  Arthur 
^Vcllesley  moves  iuto  Sp:un — Joseph  marcln.'s  against 
Venegas — Orders  Victor  to  return  to  Talavera — Cue.^ta  ar- 
rives at  Almaraz — Sir  Artliur  reaches  Plaseucia — Inter- 
view witli  Cuesta — Plan  of  operations  arranged — Sir  Ar- 
tliur, embarrassed  by  tiie  want  of  provisions,  detacfiea 
sir  Kobert  Wilson  up  tlie  Vera  de  I'lasencia,  passes  tlio 
Tietar,  and  unites  with  Cuesta  at  Oropesa — fc-Kirmisli  at 
Talavcra — Bad  conduct  of  the  Spanish  troops — Victor  takes 
post  behind  the  Alberche — Cuesta's  absurdity — Victor  re- 
tires from  the  Alberche — Sir  Arthur,  in  want  of  provis- 
ions, refuses  to  pass  that  river — Intritrues  of  Mr.  Irere — 
Tlie  junta  secretly  orders  Veuegiis  not  to  execute  las  part 
of  the  operation. 

CAMPAIGN    OF    TALAVERA. 

In  the  foregoing  chapters  the  real  state  of  affairs  \n 
the  Peninsula  has   been  described;    but  it  appeared 


208 


NAPIER'S    PEXTXSULAR    WAR 


[Book  VIH. 


with  a  somewhat  different  aspect  to  the  English  gen- 
era!, because  false  informations,  egreg'ious  boasts,  and 
hollow  promises,  such  as  had  been  empJoyed  to  mislead 
sir  John  Moore,  wore  renewed  at  this  period ;  and 
thj  allied  nations  were  influenced  by  a  riotous  rather 
th.m  a  reasonable  confidence  of  victory.  The  English 
newspapers  teemed  with  letters,  describing  the  enemy's 
misery  and  fears ;  nor  was  t!ie  camp  free  from  these 
inlhited  leelings.  Marshal  Beresford  was  so  cnnlulous 
of  French  weakness  as  publicly)'  to  announce  to  the 
junta  of  Badajos  that  Soulfs  force,  wandering  and 
harassed  by  continual  attacks,  was  reduced  to  eight  or 
ten  thousand  distressed  soldiers.  Nay.  sir  Arthur 
Wellesiey  himself,  swayed  by  the  pertinacity  of  the 
tal'.^-malcers,  the  unhesitating  assurances  of  the  junta, 
perhaps,  also,  a  little  excited  by  a  sense  of  his  own  great 
talents,  was  not  free  from  the  impression  that  the  hour 
of  complete  triumph  was  come. 

The  .Spanish  government  and  the  Spanish  generals 
were  impm'tunate  for  offensive  movements,  and  lavish 
in  their  promises  of  support ;  and  the  English  general 
was  a"  'ager ;  for  he  was  at  the  head  of  gallant  troops, 
his  fo^^  was  on  the  path  of  victory,  and  he  felt  that, 
if  the  duke  of  Belluno  was  not  quickly  disabled,  the 
British  army,  threatened  on  both  tiaiiks.  would,  as  in 
the  case  of  sir  John  CraJock,  be  obliged  to  remain  in 
some  d(!lensivs  position,  near  Lisbon,  until  it  became 
an  object  of  suspicion  and  hatred  to  the  Spanish  and 
Portuguese  people. 

There  were  three  linos  of  offensive  operations 
open  : — 

1.  To  cross  the  Tagus,join  Ciiesta's  army,  and,  mak- 
ing Elcas  and  Badajos  the  base  of  movements,  attack 
Victor  ill  front.  This  line  was  circuitous.  It  permitted 
the  enemy  to  cover  himself  by  the  Tagus,  and  the  opera- 
tions of  the  allies  would  have  been  cramped  by  the 
Sierra  de  Guadalupe  on  one  side,  and  the  mountains 
lying  between  Aibuquerque  and  Alcantara  on  the  other  ; 
strong  detaelunruts  must  also  have  been  left  to  cover 
the  roads  to  Lisbon,  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Tagus. 
Filially,  the  communication  between  the  duke  of  Bel- 
luno and  Souk  being  free,  Beresford's  corps  would  have 
heen  endangered. 

2.  To  adopt  Almeida  and  CiuJad  Rodrigo  as  the  base 
of  movements,  and  to  o/erate  in  conjunction  u\th  Beres- 
furd,  t:ie  duke  del  Parque,  and  Romana,  by  the  tine  of 
Siildmnnca,  w'ule  Cuestaand  Venegos  occupied  the  atten- 
tion of  the  first  and  fourlli  corps  on  the  Tagus.  The 
objections  to  this  line  were,  that  it  separated  the  British 
troops  from  tlie  most  elfiL-ient  and  most  numerous,  and 
obliged  ihem  to  act  with  the  weakest  and  most  irregu- 
lar of  the  Spanish  armies  ;  that  it  abandoned  Cuestato 
the  ruin  which  his  headstrong  humour  would  certainly 
provoke  ;  and  as  the  loss  of  Seville  or  of  Lisbt)n  would 
inevitaijly  follow,  the  instructions  of  the  English  min- 
isters, (wliich  enjoined  the  defence  of  the  latter  city  as 
paramount  to  every  ol)ject.  save  the  military  possession  I 
of  Cadiz,)  would  liavo.beeii  neglected.  , 

3.  To  march  upon  Flasjncia  and  A'maraz,  form  a 
junction  with  Cuesta,  and  advance  against  Madrid, 
while  Venegas  operated  in  the  same  view,  by  the  line 
of  La  Mancha.  The  obstacles  in  the  way  of  this  plan 
were — L  That  it  exposed  Cuesta  to  be  defeated  by 
A''ictor  before  the  junction  ;  and  after  the  junction,  the 
combinations  wou!d  still  be  dependent  upon  the  accu- 
racy of  V'enegas's  moveni'iits.  2.  That  sir  xVrthur 
Wellesley's  march,  with  refi;ri;nce  to  Soult's  troo])s, 
would  be  a  Hank  march  ;  an  unsafe  operation  at  all 
tim  »8,  but,  on  this  occasion,  when  the  troojis  must 
move  tlirough  the  long  and  narrow  valley  of  the  Tagus, 
peculiarly  dangerous.  Nevertheless,  this  line  was 
adopted,  nor  were  the  reasons  in  favour  of  it  di!Void  of 
force.  The  number  of  French  immediately  protecting 
Madrid  was  estimated  at  fifty  thousand  ;  but  confiden- 
tial officers,  sent  to  the  hcad-ijuarters  of  Cuesta  and 


Yenogas,  had  ascertained  ha!  their  strength  was  not 
overstated  at  thirty-eight  thojsand,  for  the  first,  and 
twenty-five  thousand  for  tne  second  ;  all  well  armed 
and  ecpiipped,  and  the  last  certainly  the  best  and  most 
efiicient  army  that  the  Spaniards  had  yet  brought  into 
the  field.  Now  the  English  force  in  Portugal  amount- 
ed to  thirty  thousand  men  exclusive  of  the  sick,  twenty- 
two  thousand  being  under  arms  on  the  frontier,  and 
eight  thousand  at  Lisbon  :  here,  then,  was  a  mass  of 
ninety  thousand  regular  troops  that  could  be  brought  to 
bear  on  fifty  thousand  ;  besides  which  there  were  sir 
Robert  Wilson's  legion,  about  a  thousand  strong,  and 
the  Spanish  partidus  of  the  Guadalupe  and  the  Sierra  de 
Kcjar. 

'J'he  ridge  of  mountains  which  separate  the  valley 
of  the  Tagus  from  Castile  and  Leon  l>eing,  as  has  been 
already  related,  iin})i'aclicable  for  artillery,  exce]it  at  the 
passes  of  Baoos  and  Perales,  it  was  sup]ios:  d  that  the 
twenty  thousand  men  under  Beresford  and  the  duke  del 
Parque  would  be  sufficient  to  block  those  liiics  of  march, 
and  that  Romana,  moving  by  the  Tras  os  Montes, 
might  join  the  duke  del  Parque  ;  thn  ^  thirty  thousand 
men,  su])ported  by  two  fortresses,  would  be  ready  to 
protect  the  flank  of  the  British  army  in  its  march  from 
Plasencia  towards  Madrid.  But  this  was  a  vain  calcu- 
lation, for  Romana  remained  ostentatiously  idle  at  Co- 
runa,  and  sir  Arthur  AVellesley,  never  having  seen  the 
Spanish  troops  in  action,  thought  too  well  of  them  ;  hav- 
ing had  no  experience  of  Spanish  promises,  he  trusted 
them  too  far,  and  at  the  same  time,  made  a  false  judg- 
ment of  the  force  and  position  of  his  adversaries.  I'he 
arrival  of  the  sixth  corps  at  Astorga  and  of  the  fifth  at 
Valhidolid  were  unknown  to  him ;  the  strength  of  the 
second  corps,  and,  perhaps,  the  activity  of  its  chief, 
were  also  underrated.  Instead  of  fifteen  or  twenty 
thousand  harassed  French  troops,  without  artillery, 
there  were  seventy  thousand  fighting  men  behind  the 
mountains  ! 

The  27tli  of  June,  the  English  army,  breaking  np 
from  the  camp  of  Abrantes.  and  being  organized  in  the 
following  manner,  marched  into  Spain  : — 


Artillfrp. 
SO  guns,  comuiandod  by  maj.-gen.  Howorth. 

Cavalry. 
Three  brigades,     3047  sabres,       commanded  by  It. -gen.  Payne. 

InfinitrT/. 
1st  rtiv.  of  4  brigades,   6023  bayonets,  com'd  by  It. -gen.  Sherbrooke. 
'id     do.        2        do.       S947      do.  do.        maj.-gen.  Jlill. 

8<1     do.       2        do.       .3T8fi      do.  do.        ni:ij.-gen.  Mnrkeniie. 

4tli   do.       2        do.       Sy.^ii      do.  do.        br.-gen.  Camjibell. 


Six  brigades, 


5  divs.      1.3  brigades,  19T10  sabre?  and  bayonets. 

—  —  12S7  Engineers,  artillery,  and  waggon-train. 

Grand  total 2J997  men,  and  30  pieces  of  artiUery. 

Besides  this  force,  the  40th  regiment,  so  long  detained 
at  Seville  by  Mr.  Frere,  had  arrived  in  Lisbon,  and  the 
troops  on  their  march  I'rom  that  city,  being  somewhat 
less  than  eight  thousand  bayonets,  were  organized  in 
three  brigades,  commanded  by  major-general  Lightfuot 
and  brigadier-generals  Robvrt  and  Catlin  Craufurd. 
But  the  leading  brigade,  under  Robert  Craui'urd,  only 
quitted  Lisbon  on  the  2Hth  of  June. 

The  army  moved  l)y  both  banks  of  the  Tagus;  one 
column  proceeding  through  Sobreira  Formosa,  the  other 
by  Villa  Vilha,  where  a  boat-bridge  was  tMablished. 
The  Lst  of  July  the  head-iiuarters  were  at  Castello 
Branco,  and  from  thence  the  ti\)Ops  continued  their 
route  in  one  column,  by  Moralejo  aiul  Coria  ;  a  flanking 
brigade,  under  general  Donkin.  being  directed  through 
Ceclaven  and  'J'orijoncillos,  to  explore  the  country  be- 
tween Zarza  Mayor  and  the  Tagus.  The  8th,  the  head- 
quarters were  established  at  Plasencia.  'J'he  10th,  the 
army  arrived  at  that  place,  and  was,  soon  after,  joined 
by  a  regiment  of  cavalry  and  two  battalions  of  infantry 
from  Lisbon. 


1809.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


209 


At  this  period  Cuesta  was  at  Alniaraz,  and  Victor, 
of  who.se  iuteniK.'diate  movements  it  is  time  to  take  no- 
tice, was  at  Talavera  de  la  Ileyna.  When  that  mar- 
shal had  retired  from  Torremoclia,  the  valley  of  tlic 
Tagus  was  exhausted  by  the  long  sojourn  of  the  fourth 
auil  fiftli  corps  ;*  but  the  valley  of  Plaseneia  was  ex- 
tremely fei-tile,  and  untouched,  and  the  duke  of  Beliuno, 
whose  troops,  weakened  by  the  tertian  sickness,  re- 
quired good  nourishment,  resolved  to  take  post  there, 
keeping  a  bridge  at  Bazagona,  on  the  Tietar,  by  which 
be  could,  in  two  marches,  fall  upon  Onesta,  if  he  ven- 
tured to  pass  the  Tagus  at  Alniaraz ;  at  Plaseneia  also, 
be  could  open  a  communication  with  the  second  and 
fifth  corps,  and  observe  closely  the  movements  of  the 
English  army  on  the  frontier  of  Portugal.  The  bridge 
at  Bazagona  had  been  fiuislied  on  the  21st  of  June,  and 
the  French  light  troops  were  scouring  the  country  to- 
wards Plaseneia,  when  the  king,  who  had  already 
withdrawn  a  division  of  infantry  and  a  large  part  of  l!ie 
cavalry  of  the  first  corps  to  reinforce  the  fourth,  ordered 
the  duke  of  BcUuno  to  retire  instantly  to  Talavera, 
leaving  rear  guards  on  the  'I'ietar  and  at  Almaraz. 
This  order,  which  arrived  the  22d  of  June,  was  the  re- 
sult of  that  indecision  which  none  but  truly  gi\at  men, 
or  fools,  are  free  from  ;  the  lirst,  because  they  can  see 
their  way  clearly  through  the  thousand  difficulties  that 
encumber  and  bewilder  the  mind  in  war ;  the  last,  be- 
cause they  see  ncjthing. 

On  the  present  occasion,  general  Sebastiani  had  re- 
ported that  Yenegas  was  reinfirced,  and  ready  to  pene-! 
irate  by  La  Manclia ;  and  tiie  king,  swayed  by  this 
false  information,  disturbed  by  the  march  of  Cuesta,! 
and  still  m  jre  by  Blake's  advance  against  Zaragozai 
(the  result  of  which  was  then  unknown),  became  so! 
alarmed  that  he  commaiuled  St.  Cyr  to  move  into  Ara-  ] 
goii,  repaired  himself  to  Toledo,  with  his  guards  ai.d ! 
reserve,  withdrew  the  light  cavalry  and  a  division  of ' 
infantry  from  Victor,  obliged  that  marshal  to  fall  back] 
on  Talavera  ;  and  even  conmianded  Morticr  to  bring  up  ! 
the  tifth  corps  from  Valladolid  to  Villa  Castin,  near| 
Avila,  although,  following  Napoleon's  orders,  it  should 
bave  gone  to  Salamanca. 

in  the  hope  of  meeting  Venegas,  Josejili  had  pene- 
trated as  far  as  the  Jabalon  river,  in  La  Mancha ;  and 
as  the  Spaniard,  fearful  of  the  tempest  approaching 
him,  immediately  took  shelter  in  the  Morena,  the  king, 
leaving  some  posts  of  the  4th  corps  at  Toledo,  restored 
the  light  cavalry  to  the  first  corps,  and,  with  his 
guards  and  reserve,  returned  to  Madrid.  But,  while  lie 
bad  been  pursuing  a  shadow,  Victor  was  exposed  to 
great  danger ;  for  the  Jabalon  is  six  hmg  marches  I'rcm 
Madrid,  and  hence,  for  ten  dtiys,  the  duke  of  Belluuo, 
with  only  two  divisions  of  inl■ant^y  and  two  thousand 
cavalry,  in  all  about  fourteen  thousand  men,  had  re- 
mained at  Talavera  without  any  support,  although  sixty 
thousand  men  were  marching  against  him  from  different 
points. 

Victor  did  not  suffer  as  he  might  have  done,  but  his 
numerical  weakness  was  certainly  the  safety  of  Cuesta. 
For  that  general,  having  followed  the  retreat  of  the  first 
corps  from  Torremocha,  crossed  the  Tagus,  at  Almaraz, 
on  the  2,']d  of  June,  and  pushed  an  advanced  guard  to- 
wards Oropesa.  He  had  thirty-eight  thousand  men, 
yet  he  remained  tranquil  while  (at  a  distance  of  only 
twelve  miles)  fourteen  thousand  French  made  a  flank 
movement  that  lasted  three  days ;  and  his  careless 
method  of  acting,  and  his  unskilful  dispositions,  were 
so  evident,  that  the  French  cavalry,  far  from  fi3aring, 
were  preparing  to  punish  him,  when  he  suddenly  took 
the  alarm,  and,  withdrawing  to  Almaraz,  occupied  him- 
self in  finishing  his  bridges  over  the  Tagus. 

'i'he  28th  of  June,  Victor  having  removed  his  hospi- 
tals and  depots  from  Arzobispo,  had  taken  a  position 


•  Suiiielfi'a  Jciun 


'OperatioiiH,  MSS. 


behind  the  Alberche,  keeping,  however,  three  batta!iori<» 
and  the  cavalry  at  Talavera,  with  advanced  posts  at 
Calera  and  (Jamonal ;  a  small  detachment  also  watched 
the  course  of  the  Tagus  from  the  mouth  of  the  Alberche 
to  that  of  the  Guadarama,  and  a  moveable  column  was 
sent  to  Escalona,  to  observe  the  Vera  de  Plaseneia,  and 
the  passes  leading  upon  Avila.  In  executing  this  rc^ 
trograde  movement,  Victor,  having  no  means  of  transr 
jiort,  burnt  ten  out  of  the  fifteen  pontoons  supporting 
his  bridge  over  the  Tietar,  and,  for  the  same  reason, 
he  threw  a  considerable  quantity  of  powder  and  shot 
into  the  river.*  His  troops  had  been  for  lour  days  ou 
quarter  rations,  and  were  suffering  from  sickness  and 
hunger,  and  as  the  Tag"S  was  fordable  in  several 
places,  the  danger  of  his  position  is  evident ;  the  British 
were,  however,  still  at  Abrantcs,  and  Cuesta  knew  not 
how  to  profit  by  this  opportunity  before  the  king  re- 
turned from  La  Mancha. 

Such  was  the  pf)sition  of  the  different  armies  when 
the  British  general  arrived  at  Plaseneia.  He  had  seen 
Soult's  letters,  found  upon  general  Franceschi,  and  thus 
ascertained  that  the  second  corps  was  at  Zamora,  and 
from  Franceschi  himself,  who  passed  as  a  prisoner,  at 
the  same  time,  he  learned  the  arrival  of  the  filth  corps 
at  Valladolid  ;  but  the  march  of  Ney's  corps  was  not 
suspected,  and  the  tenor  of  Soult's  letters  led  to  the 
notion  that  Gallicia  was  to  be  retained.  A  letter  of 
Victor's  to  Josepli,  dated  the  23d  of  June,  and  written 
in  the  most  desponding  language,  had  been  likewise 
intercepted  ;  and,  as  Soult's  correspondence  also  gave 
a  strong  picture  of  his  difficulties,  the  general  imjires- 
sion,  that  the  French  armies  were  not  only  weak  but 
utterly  dismayed,  was  rather  augmented  than  lessened 
by  this  information.  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley,  however, 
C(!uld  not  but  have  some  distrust,  when  he  knew  that 
tv^o  corps  were  beyond  the  mountains,  on  his  lelt,  and 
tiiough  far  from  suspecting  the  extent  of  his  danger, 
he  took  additional  precautions  to  protect  that  flank,  and 
renewed  his  instructions  to  Beresford  to  watch  the 
enemy's  movements,  and  to  look  carefully  to  the  defence 
of  the  Puerto  Ferala.  But  the  pass  of  Bafios  was  still 
to  be  guarded,  and  for  this  purpose  sir  Arthur  applied 
to  (juesta.f 

The  Spanish  general  M-as  at  first  unwilling  to  detach 
any  men  to  that  quarter,  yet  finally  agreed  that  two 
battalions  from  his  army  and  two  others  from  the  town 
of  Bejar,  at  the  other  side  of  the  pass,  should  unite  to 
defend  Banos,  and  that  the  duke  del  Parque  should 
also  send  a  detachment  to  the  pass  of  Peralos.  Al- 
though these  measures  appeared  sufficient  to  obviate 
danger  from  Soult's  corps,  weakened  as  it  was  sup- 
posed to  be,  they  were  evidently  futile  to  check  the 
real  force  under  that  marshal  ;  and  they  were  rendered 
absolutely  ridiculous  by  Cuesta,  who  sent  two  weak  bat- 
talions, of  three  hundred  men  each,  and  vtitli  only  twenty 
rounds  of  ammunition  per  man  :  and  this  was  only  a 
part  of  a  system  which  already  weighed  heavily  on  the 
English  general. 

The  loth,  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  had  proceeded  to 
Cuesta's  head-cjuarters,  near  the  Col  de  Mirabete,  to 
confer  with  him  on  their  future  operations.  Ever  since 
the  affair  of  Valdez,  in  1808,  the  junta  had  been  sorely 
afraid  of  Cuesta,  and,  suspecting  that  he  was  meditat- 
ing some  signal  vengeance,  they  endeavoured  to  raise 
up  rivals  to  his  power.  In  this  view  they  had  lavished 
honours  and  authority  upon  Blake,  and  when  the  de- 
feat at  Belchite  crushed  their  hopes  in  that  quarter, 
they  turned  their  eyes  upon  Venegas,  and  increased 
his  forces,  taking  care  to  give  him  the  best  troops. 
Si  ill  Cuesta's  force  was  formidable,  and  to  reduce  it 
was  the  object  both  of  Mr.  Frcre  and  the  junta:  the 
motive  of  the  first  being  to  elevate  the  duke  Albuquer- 

*  Scinel6's  Jounuil  of  Operations  First  Corp'^,  MSS. 
+  Sir  A.  Wcliubley's  CoiTLripondcnec,  l*;irl.  I'lipers,  print- 
ed iu  ISIO. 


210 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  YIII. 


que  ;  tliG  in'etition  of  the  others  being  merely  to  reduce 
the  power  of  Cuesta. 

But  whatever  mi:^ht  have  been  tlie  latter 's  ullimate 
intention  with  respect  to  the  junta,  it  is  certain  that  his 
natural  obstinacy  and  violence  were  f^reatly  increased 
by  a  knowledge  of  those  proceedings,  and  that  he  was 
ill-disposed  towards  the  English  general,  as  thinlcing 
him  a  party  concerned  in  the  intrigues.  When,  there- 
fore, sir  Arthur,  at  the  instigation  of  Mr.  Frore,  pro- 
posed that  a  draft  of  ten  thousand  Spanish  troops  s!iouId 
be  detaehe  1  towards  Avila  and  Segovia,  Cnesta  replied 
that  it  must  be  done  by  the  British,  and  absolutely  re- 
fused to  furnish  more  than  two  battalions  of  infantry 
and  a  few  cavalry  to  strengthen  sir  Robert  Wilson's 
partizan  corp^,  which  was  destined  to  act  on  the  enemy's 
right.*  Tills  determination  again  balfl.nl  Mr.  Frere's 
project  of  placing  the  duke  of  Albutrierque  at  tlie  head 
of  an  indepjndent  force,  and  oblig.'d  the  supreme  junta 
to  fall  upon  some  other  expedient  i'  ir  reducing  Cue^ta's 
power;  however  it  was  fortunate  that  the  o'd  Spaniard 
resisted  the  proposal,  because  the  ten  thousand  men 
would  have  g^mi  straiglit  into  the  midst  of  the  fifth 
corps,  which,  in  expectation  of  such  a  movement,  was 
then  at  Vd!a  Castin,  and,  having  been  rejoined  by  the 
detachment  of  colonel  Briclie,  from  Catalonia,  was 
eighteen  thoasanJ  strong,  and  supported  by  Kellerman's 
division  of  cavalry  at  Valladolid. 

The  discission  between  the  generals  lasted  two  days; 
but.  with  the  anprobatio!i  of  the  supreme  junta,  it  was 
finally  agreed  that  the  British  and  Spanish  armies, 
under  sir  Artliur  and  Cuesta.  sliould  march,  on  the 
18th,  against  Victor,  and  that  Venegas,  advancing,  at 
the  same  time,  through  La  Mancha,  should  leave 
Toledo  and  Aranjues  to  his  left,  and  push  for  Fuente 
Dueuos  and  V^illa  Mauriijue  on  the  Upper  Tagus.  If 
this  movement  should  draw  Sebastian!,  with  the  fourth 
corps,  to  that  side,  Venegas  was  to  keep  him  in  play 
while  the  allied  forces  defeated  Victor.  If  Sebi\stiani 
disregarded  it,  Venegas  was  to  cross  the  Tagus  and 
march  up  an  Madrid,  from  the  south-east,  while  sir 
Robert  Wilson,  reinforced  by  some  Spanish  battalions, 
menaced  that  capital  from  the  op])03ite  C|uarter. 

Previous  to  entering  Spain,  sir  Arthur  had  ascer- 
tained that  the  valleys  of  the  Alagon  and  the  Arago 
and  those  between  Bejar  and  Ciudad  Rodrigo  were 
fertile  and  capable  of  nourishing  his  army,  and  he  had 
sent  commissaries  to  all  these  points  to  purchase  mules. 
and  to  arrange  with  the  alcald  'S  of  the  different  districts 
for  the  supj)ly  of  the  troops.  He  had  obtained  the 
warmest  assurances,  from  the  supreme  junta,  that  every 
needful  article  should  be  fortheoming,  and  the  latter  had 
also  sent  the  intendant-genera!,  don  Lonzano  de  Torres. 
to  the  British  head-quarters,  with  full  powers  to  forward 
all  arrangements  for  the  supply  of  the  English  soldiers. 
Relying  U;)ou  these  preparations,  sir  Arthur  had  crossed 
the  frontier  with  few  means  of  transport  and  without 
magazines,  f^r  Portugal  could  not  furnish  what  was  re- 
quired, and,  moreover,  the  Portuguese  peasants  had  an 
insuperable  objection  to  quitting  their  own  country  ;  a 
matter  however  apparently  of  little  consequence,  l)ecause 
Mr.  Frere,  writing  oHicially  at  the  time,  described  the 
people  of  Estremadura  as  viewing  "  the  war  in  the  lip;ht 
of  a  crnsAcle.  and  carruins;  it  on  with  all  the  enthusiasm 
0/  sxizii  a  cause  ! 

From  Castello  Branco  to  Pla.sencia  is  but  seven  days' 
march,  yet  that  short  time  was  sufficient  to  prove  the 
bad  faith  of  the  junta,  and  the  illusion  under  which 
ilr.  Frere  laboured.  Neither  mules  fur  the  transport 
of  ammunition  and  provisions,  nor  the  promised  help 
of  the  authorities,  nor  aid  of  any  kind  could  be  pro- 
cured;  and  don  Lonzano  de  Torres,  although,  to  sir 
Arthur,  he  freiily  acknowledged  the  extent  of  the  evil, 
tlie  ill-will  of  the  inhabitant.s,  and  the  shameful  con- 
duct of  the  supreme  junta,  afterwards,  without  shame, 

•  Sir  A.  Weile:.^ej'8  Correspondence,  Pari.  Papers,  1810. 


asserted  that  the  British  troops  had  always  received  and 
consumed  doul)!e  rations,  and  were  in  want  of  nothing : 
an  as.seition  in  which  he  was  supported  by  don  Martin 
de  Garay,  the  Spani.sh  secretary  of  state ;  the  whole 
proceeding  being  a  concerted  plan,  to  afford  the  junta  a 
prete.xt  for  justifying  their  own  and  castin;r  a  slur  upon 
the  English  generars  conduct,  if  any  disasters  should 
happen. 

Sir  Arthur  Wellesley,  seriously  alarmed  for  the  sub- 
sistence of  his  army,  wrote,  ui)on  the  IGth,  to  Mr.  Frere 
and  to  general  O  Donoghue,  the  chief  of  Cucstas  staff; 
representing  to  both  the  distress  of  the  troops,  and  inti- 
mating his  resolution  not  to  proceed  bet/ond  the  Alberdte, 
unless  his  wants  were  immediately  supplied  ;  faithful, 
however,  to  his  agreement  with  Cuesta,  he  prepared  to 
put  his  force  in  motion  for  that  river.  It  was  known  at 
PlasL'iicia,  on  the  l.Tlh,  that  Ney  had  retreated  from 
Coruna;  but  it  was  believed  that  his  corps  had  beea 
recalled  to  France,  and  no  change  took  place  in  the  plan 
of  campaign.  It  was  not  suspected  that  the  sixth  corps 
had  then  been  sixteen  days  at  Astorara  I 

1'he  valley  of  the  Tagus,  into  which  the  army  was 
about  to  phinge,  is  inter.sected  by  several  rivers,  with 
rugged  banks  and  deep  channels  ;  but  their  courses 
being  very  little  out  of  the  parallel  of  the  'i'agus,  the 
Alberche  is  in  a  manner  enclosed  by  the  Tietar.  Now, 
sir  Robert  ^\''ilson,  having  a  detachment  of  four  thou- 
sand Portuguese  and  Spanish  troops,  had  ascended  the 
right  bank  of  the  latter  river,  and  gained  possession  of 
the  passes  of  Arena.s.  which  lead  upon  Avila,  and  of  the 
pass  of  San  Pedro  Bernardo,  which  leads  upon  JMadrid ; 
in  this  position  he  covered  the  Vera  de  Plasencia,  and 
threatened  Victor's  communications  with  the  capital. 
The  French  marshal  was  alarmed,  and  a  movement  of 
the  whole  army  in  the  same  direction  would  hav? 
obliged  him  to  abandon  the  Lower  Alberche  ;*  because, 
two  marches  effected  beyond  Arenas,  in  the  direction 
of  Escalona  and  Maqueda,  would  have  placed  sir  Arthur 
Wellesley  between  the  first  corps  and  Madrid.  But,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  line  of  country  was  too  rugged  for 
rapid  movements  with  a  large  Ijody  ;  and  it  was  neces- 
sary first  to  secure  a  junction  with  Cuesta,  because  Vic- 
tor, having  recovered  his  third  division  on  the  7th  of 
July,  was  again  at  the  head  of  twenty-five  thou.sand  men. 
With  such  a  force  he  could  not  be  trusted  near  the 
Spaniards,  and  the  British  general  therefore  resolved  to 
cross  the  Tietar,  at  the  Venta  de  Bazagona,  and  march 
by  Miajadas  upon  Oropcsa. 

The  IGtli,  two  companies  of  the  staff  corps,  with  a 
working  party  of  five  hundred  men,  marched  from  Pla- 
sencia to  Bazagona,  to  throw  a  bridge  over  the  Tietar. 
The  duke  of  Belluno  had  wasted  many  days  in  dragging 
up  fifteen  pontoons  from  the  Tagus,  to  form  his  bridge 
at  that  place,  and  when  he  retired  upon  Talavera,  he 
destroyed  the  greatest  part  of  the  equipage  ;t  but  the 
English  ofiicer  employed  on  this  occa.sion  pulled  down 
an  old  house  in  the  neighbourhood,  felled  some  pint^trees 
in  a  wood  three  miles  distant,  and,  uniting  intelligence 
with  labour,  contrived,  without  other  aid  than  a  few 
hatchets  and  saws,  in  one  day,  to  throw  a  solid  bijdge 
over  the  Tietar. 

The  18th,  the  army  crossed  that  river,  and  taking  the 
route  of  Miajadius,  reached  Talayucla. 

The  19th.  the  main  body  halted  at  Centinello  and  Oasa 
de  Somas.    The  advanced  posts  at  Venta  de  St.  Juliens. 

The  20th,  the  troops  reac^ied  Oropesa  ;  but  as  their 
marches  had  been  long,  and  conducted  through  a  difficult 
country,  they  halted  the  21st ;  on  which  day,  Cuesta, 
who  had  moved   from  Almaraz  by  Naval   Moral  and 
Arzobispo.  passed  Oropesa,  and  united  his  whole  force     \ 
at  Velada,  except  a  small  detachment,  which  marched     | 
along  the  south  bank  of  the  Tagus,  to  threaten  tho    j 
French  by  the  bridge  of  Talavera. 

*  SeiTiel6's  .loiirniil  of  Operotions,  MSS.  ! 

t  SemeU'fl  Journal  of  llie  First  Corps'  Operations,  MSS.      ( 


1809.J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


211 


The  duke  of  Belliino,  aware  of  these  movements,  had 
Biipnorted  his  posts  at  Talavera  with  a  division  of  in- 
fantry, whicli  was  (lisposi'd  in  successive  detachments 
behind  that  town,  but  his  situation  apjieared  critical, 
because  the  ciUies,  covered  by  the  Alberche,  might  still 
gain  a  march  and  reach  Escalona  before  him  ;  and  from 
thence  either  push  for  Madrid,  by  the  pass  of  Brunete, 
or,  takin:^  post  at  Maqaeda,  cut  him  off  from  the  capi- 
tal. His  sources  of  information  were  however  sure,  and 
he  contented  himself  with  sending;  a  regiment  of  huzzars 
to  Cazar  de  Escaiona,  to  \^■atch  the  Upper  Alberche,  and 
to  support  the  moveable  column  opposed  to  sir  Robert 
Wilson. 

The  21st,  the  allies  being  between  Oropesa  and  Ve- 
lada,  Victor  recalled  all  his  foragfing  parties,  altered  his 
line  of  retreat  from  the  Madrid  to  the  Toledo  road, 
removed  his  pare  from  St.  Ollalla  to  CevoUa,  and  con- 
centrated two  divisions  of  infantry  behind  the  Alberche. 

The  "i'id,  the  allies  moved  in  two  columns,  to  drive 
the  French  posts  froui  'J'alavera,  and  Cuesta.  marching 
by  the  high  road,  came  tirst  up  with  the  enemy's  rear- 
guard, near  the  village  of  Uamonal  ;  then  commenced 
a  display  of  ignorance,  timidity,  and  absurdity,  that  has 
seldom  been  ecpialled  in  war  ;  the  past  defeats  of  the 
Spanish  army  were  rendered  quite  explicable  ;  the  little 
fruit  derived  from  them  by  marshal  Victor  quite  inex- 
plicable, (ieneral  Latoui-  Manljourg,  with  two  thou- 
sand dragoons,  came  boldly  on  to  the  table-land  of 
Gamonal,  and  sustaining  a  cannonade,  not  only  checked 
the  head  of  the  Spaiiish  leading  column,  but  actually 
obliged  general  Z-iyas,  who  commanded  it,  to  display 
his  wh.)le  line,  consisting  of  fifteen  thousand  infantry 
and  three  thousand  cavalry  ;  nor  did  the  French  horse- 
men give  back  at  uli,  until  the  appeartmce  of  the  red 
uniforias  on  their  right  informed  tnem  that  it  was  time 
to  retire.  Then,  and  not  till  then,  Latour  Maubourg, 
suppoi'ted  by  some  infantry,  retreated  behind  the  Alber- 
che, and  without  loss,  although  manj'  batteries,  and  at 
least  six  thousand  Spanish  horse,  were  close  on  his 
rear  ;  the  latter  could  never  be  induced  to  make  even  a 
partial  charge,  however  favourable  the  opportunity,  and 
by  two  o'clock  the  whole  French  army  was  safely  con- 
centrated on  its  position.  Rulfin's  division  on  the  left 
touched  the  1"agus,  and  protected  the  bridge  over  the  Al- 
berche, which  was  more  inmiediately  defended  by  a  regi- 
ment of  infantry  and  fourteen  pieces  of  artillerj'.  Vil- 
latte's  and  Lapisse's  divisions,  drawn  up  in  successive 
lines,  oa  some  high  ground  that  overlooked  the  surround- 
ing country,  formed  the  right ;  the  heavy  cavalry  were 
in  second  line  near  the  bridge,  and  in  this  situation  Vic- 
tor resied  the  22d  and  23d. 

It  was  at  a'll  times  difficult  to  obtain  accurate  infor- 
mation from  the  Spaniards  by  gentle  means  ;  hence,  the 
French  were  usually  better  supplied  with  intelligence 
than  the  Briti.sh,  while  the  native  getierals  naver  kncM' 
anything  about  the  enemy,  until  they  felt  the  weight 
of  his  blows.  Up  to  this  period,  sir  Arthur's  best 
sources  of  information  had  been  llie  intercepted  letters 
of  the  French  ;  and  now,  although  the  latter  hat!  been 
in  the  same  positi(jn,  and  without  any  change  of  num- 
bers since  the  7th,  the  inhabitants  of  'J'alavera  could 
not,  or  would  not,  give  any  information  of  their  strength 
«  or  situation  ;  nor  could  any  reasonalile  calculation  be 
formed  of  either,  until  some  English  officers  crossed 
the  Tagus,  and,  from  the  mountains  on  the  left  bank 
of  that  river,  saw  the  French  position  in  reverse.  The 
general  outline  of  an  attack  was,  however,  agreed  upon 
for  the  next  morning,  but  the  details  were  unsettled, 
and  when  the  English  commander  came  to  arrange 
these  with  Cuesta,  the  latter  was  gone  to  bed  !  The 
British  troops  were  under  arms  at  three  o'clock  the 
next  morning,  Cuesta's  staff  were,  however,  not  aroused 
from  slumber  until  seven  o'clock,  and  the  old  man 
finally  objected  to  fiirht  that  day,  alleging,  among  other 
absurd  reasoas,  that  it  \vas  Sunday.     Thei-e  was  some- 


thing more  than  absurdity  in  these  proceedings.  Vic- 
tor, who  was  not  ignorant  of  the  weak  points  of  his 
own  position,  remained  tranquil  the  23d,  being  well 
assured  that  no  attack  would  take  place,  for  it  is  cer- 
tain that  he  had  a  correspondence  with  some  of  the 
Spanish  staff,  and  the  secret  discussions  between  sir 
Arthur  Wellesley  and  Cuesta,  at  which  only  one  staff 
officer  of  each  party  was  present,  became  known  to  the 
enemy  in  twentj--four  hours  after  ;  indeed,  Ctiesta  waa 
himself  suspected  of  treachery  by  many,  yet  apparently 
without  reason. 

In  the  course  of  the  23d,  the  Spanish  officer  com- 
manding the  advanced  posts,  reported  that  the  French 
guns  were  withdrawn,  and  that  it  was  evident  they 
meant  to  retreat  ;  Cuesta  then  became  willing  to  attack, 
and  proposed,  in  concert  with  sir  .Irthur  Wellesley,  to 
examine  V^ictor's  position,  when,  to  the  surprise  of  the 
English  commander,  the  Spaniard  arrived  in  a  coach, 
drawn  by  six  horses,  to  perform  this  duty,  and  as  the 
ine(|ualities  of  the  ground  obliged  him  to  descend  from 
his  vehicle,  he  cast  himself  at  the  foot  of  a  tree,  and  in 
a  few  moments  went  to  sleep ;  yet  he  was  always  ready 
to  censure  and  to  thwart  every  proposal  of  his  able 
coadjutor.  This  time,  however,  he  consented  to  fiill 
upon  the  enemy,  and  the  troops  were  in  motion  early  in 
the  morning  of  the  24th ;  but  the  duke  of  Bellnno  waa 
again  duly  informed  of  their  intention,  and  having  with* 
drawn  his  moveable  column  from  Escalona,  and  relin- 
quished the  road  to  Madrid,  retreated  during  the  night 
to  Torrijos.  Thus,  the  first  combination  of  the  allies 
failed  entirely,  and  each  hour  the  troops  of  the  enemy 
were  accumulating  round  them ;  for  Venegas,  who 
should  have  been  at  Fuente  Duenas,  higli  up  on  the 
Tagus,  had  not  even  passed  Damyel ;  the  king  was  col- 
lecting his  whole  strength  in  front,  between  Toledo  and 
Talavera,  and  Soult  wiis  fast  gathering  his  more  formid- 
able power  behind  the  mountains  of  j5ejar. 

'The  English  general  \vas  indeed  still  ignorant  of  Ihft 
danger  which  threatened  him  from  the  Salamanca  coun- 
try, or  he  would,  doubtless,  have  withdrawn  at  once  to 
Plasencia,  and  secured  his  communications  with  Lis- 
bon, and  with  Beresford's  troops  ;  and  other  powerful 
reasons  were  not  wanting  to  prevent  his  further  ad- 
vance. Before  he  quitted  Plasencia  he  had  completed 
contracts  with  the  alcaldes,  in  the  Vera  de  Plasencia, 
for  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  rations  of  forage 
and  provisions;  this,  together  with  what  he  had  before 
collected,  would  have  furnished  sujiplies  for  ten  or 
twelve  days,  a  sufficient  time  to  beat  Victor,  and  carry 
the  army  into  a  fresh  country  ;  but,  distrustful,  as  he 
had  reason  to  be,  of  the  Spaniards,  he  again  gave  notice 
to  Cuesta  and  the  junta,  that  beyond  the  Alberche 
he  would  not  move,  unless  his  wants  were  inmiediately 
supplied  ;  for,  hitherto  the  rations  contracted  for  had 
not  been  delivered,  and  his  representations  to  the  junta 
and  to  Cuesta  were,  by  both,  equally  disregarded ; 
there  were  no  means  of  transport  provided ;  the  troops 
were  already  on  less  than  half  allowance ;  absolute 
famine  approached,  and  when  the  general  demanded 
food  for  his  soldiers,  at  the  hands  of  those  whose  cause 
he  came  to  defend,  he  was  answered  with  false  excuses, 
and  insulted  by  false  statements.  Under  any  circum- 
stances this  would  have  forced  him  to  halt,  but  the 
advance  having  been  made  in  the  exercise  of  his  own 
discretion,  and  not  the  command  of  his  government, 
there  could  be  no  room  for  hesitation  ;  whercf(jre,  re- 
monstrating warmly,  but  manfully,  with  the  so  prime 
junta,  he  announced  his  resolution  to  go  no  farther,  nay, 
even  to  withdrau' from  Spain  altogether* 

It  is  evident  that  without  these  well-founded  reasons 
for  pausing,  ('uesta's  conduct,  and  the  state  of  his  army, 
offered  no  solid  ground  for  expecting  success  by  con- 
tinuing the  forward  luovement  ;   yet  the  faithless  and 


♦  Sir  A.  'Welle.sley's  Correspondence,  Pari.  Papers,  1810. 


212 


NATIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  YIII. 


perverse  conduct  of  the  snprenii*  junta,  altliouijh  hiilden 
as  yet  from  sir  Arthur  Wellcsley,  far  exceeiled  the 
measure  even  of  Cuesta's  obdurate  folly.  That  body, 
after  havnig  aj^reed  to  the  plan  upon  which  the  armies 
were  actiii;^,  coneluded,  in  the  fulness  of  their  ip:norance, 
that  the  combined  troops  in  the  valley  of  the  Taj^us 
would  be  sufficient  to  overthrow  Joscpli,  and,  therefore, 
secretly  ordered  Venegas  not  to  fulfil  his  part;  ari^uing 
to  themselves,  with  a  cunning  stupidity,  that  it  would 
be  a  master-stroke  of  policy  to  save  him  IVom  any  chance 
of  a  del'eat,  and  hojjing  thus  to  preserve  a  j)owerful 
force,  under  one  of  their  own  creatures,  to  maintain 
their  own  p  nver.  This  was  the  cause  why  the  army  of 
La  Maneha  had  failed  to  appear  on  the  Tagus :  and 
.thus,  the  welfare  of  millions  was  made  the  sport  of  men, 
who  yet  were  never  tired  of  praising  themselves,  and 
have  not  failed  to  find  admirers  elsjwhere. 

As  the  Spaniards  are  perfect  masters  of  the  art  of 
saying  every  thing  and  doing  nothing,  sir  Arthur's  re- 
monstrances drew  forth  many  official  statements,  plau- 
sible replies,  and  pompous  assertions,  after  their  man- 
ner, but  produced  no  amelioration  of  the  evds  com- 
plained of.  Mr.  Frere,  also,  thinking  it  necessary  to 
make  some  apology  for  himself,  asserted  that  the  evil 
was  deep  rooted,  and  that  he  had  had  neither  time  nor 
power  to  arrange  any  regular  plan  for  the  subsistence 
of  the  English  armies,  liut  all  the  evils  that  blighted 
the  Spanish  cause  were  deep  seated,  and  Mr.  Frere, 
who  could  not  arrange  a  plan  for  the  subsistence  of  the 
troops,  that  indis-pensable  preliminary  to  military  oper- 
ations, and  which  was  really  within  his  province, 
thought  himself  competent  to  direct  all  the  operations 
themselves  which  were  in  tlie  province  of  the  generals. 
He  had  found  leisure  to  meddle  in  all  the  intrigues  of 
the  day;  to  aim  at  making  and  unmaking  Spanish 
commanders;  to  insult  sir  John  Moore;  to  pester  sir 
John  (Jradock  with  warlike  advice ;  and  to  arrange  the 
plan  of  campaigning  for  sir  Arthur  Wellesley's  army, 
without  that  officer's  concurrence. 


CHAPTER  YL 

Cuesta  passes  the  Alberehe — Sir  Artlinr  Welleslcy  sends 
two  Knirlish  divisions  to  support  liini — Soult  is  aj>pointeJ 
to  coaini-.uid  tlie  second,  fiftli,  and  sixtli  corps — lie  pro- 
poses to  besice  Ciudad  llodriifo  and  threaten  Lisbon — 
lie  enters  Salamanca,  and  sends  general  Foy  to  Madiid  to 
concert  the  phm  ol'  operations — The  king  quits  Madrid — 
Unites  his  wriole  army — Crosses  the  Guadararna  river, 
and  attacks  Ouesta — Combat  of  Alcabon — Spaniards  fab 
back  in  confusion  to  the  Albcrclie — Cuesta  refuses  to  pass 
that  river — liis  dangerous  position— Tlie  French  advance 
— Cuesta  re-crosses  tiie  i'ietar— Sir  Arthur  Weilesley 
draws  uj)  the  combined  forces  on  the  position  of  Tahiver'a 
— The  kill;;  crosses  tlie  Tictar — Skirmish  at  Casa  de  Sa- 
linas— Combat  on  the  evening  of  tlie  :^7tli — Panic  in  the 
Sjvvuish  army — Combat  on  the  morning  of  the  28th — The 
kmir  holds  a  council  of  war — Jourdan  and  Victor  propose 
ditferent  plans — The  king  follows  that  of  Victor — Battle 
of  Talavera — The  French  re-cross  the  .\lbcrche — General 
Craufurd  arrives  in  the  English  camp — His  extraordinary 
march — Observations. 

The  English  giincral's  resolution  to  halt  at  Talavera 
made  little  impression  upon  Cuesta.  A  French  corps 
liad  retreated  before  him,  and  Madrid,  nay,  the  Pyre- 
nees themselves,  instantly  rose  on  the  view  of  the  san- 
guine Spaniard ;  he  was  resolved  to  be  the  first  in  the 
capital,  and  he  pushed  forward  in  jiursuit,  reckless 
alike  of  military  discipline  and  of  the  friendly  warnings 
of  sir  Arthur,  who  vainly  admonished  him  to  open  his 
conmiunications  as  (juickly  as  possible  with  Venegas, 
and  to  Ijeware  how  he  let  the  enemy  know  that  the 
Hritish  and  Spanish  armies  were  separated.  In  the 
fulness  of  his  arrogant  vanity,  Cuesta  crossed  the  Al- 
berehe on  the  2tth,  and  bi'ing  unable  to  ascertain  the 
exact  route  of  the  French,  pursued  them  by  the  road 


of  Toledo,  as  far  as  Cebolla,  and  by  the  road  of  Mad- 
rid, as  far  as  El  Bravo.  On  the  2.5th,  still  inflated  with 
pride,  he  caused  the  troops  at  Cebolla  to  move  on  to 
Torrijos,  and  marched  himself  to  St.  Ollalla,  as  if 
chasing  a  deer,  but  the  2Gth  he  discovered  that  he  had 
been  hunting  a  tiger.  Meanwhile  sir  Arthur  AVelles- 
ley,  foreseeing  the  consequence  of  this  imprudence,  had 
sent  general  Sherbrooke,  with  two  divisions  of  British 
infantry  and  all  the  cavalry,  across  the  Alberehe,  to 
Cazalegas,  where,  being  centrically  situated  with  respect 
to  'I'alavera,  St.  Ollalla,  and  Escalona,  lie  could  support 
the  Spaniards,  and,  at  tl;e  sanie  time,  hold  communica- 
tion with  sir  Robert  Wilson,  who  had  been  at  the  latter 
town  since  the  23d.  But  a  great  and  signal  crisis  was 
at  hand,  the  full  importance  of  which  cannot  be  v/ell 
understood  without  an  exact  knowledge  of  the  situa- 
tion and  proceedings  of  all  the  arnues  involved  in  this 
complicated  campaign. 

The  30th  of  June,  Soult,  when  at  Zamora,  bad  re- 
ceived a  despatch  from  the  emperor,  dated  near  Ratis- 
bon,  conferring  on  him  the  supreme  command  of  the 
second,  fifth,  and  sixth  corps,  with  orders  to  concen- 
trate them,  and  act  decisively  against  the  English. 
"  Wellesleij,"  said  Napoleon,  "  will  -probably  advance, 
bij  the  Tagus,  against  Madrid;  in  that  case,  ;;a.ss  the 
mou7itainji,  fall  on  his  fiank  and  rear,  and  crxish  hnn  ;" 
for,  at  that  distance,  and  without  other  information  than 
what  his  own  sagacity  supplied,  this  all-knowing  sol- 
dier foresaw  the  leading  operations  even  as  soon  and  as 
certainly  as  those  who  projected  them.  The  duke  of 
Dalmatia  inunediately  imparted  these  instructions  to  the 
king,  and,  at  the  same  time,  made  known  his  own  opin- 
ions and  designs  with  respect  to  the  probable  projc'cts  of 
the  allies.  He  was  ignorant  of  the  precise  object  and 
exact  position  of  sir  Arthur  Weilesley,  but,  judging  I'rnm 
the  cessation  of  hostility  in  the  north,  that  the  English 
were  in  march  with  the  design  of  joining  Cuesta,  and 
acting  by  the  line  of  the  Tagus,  he  proposed  to  concen- 
trate the  third  corps  at  Salamanca,  besiege  Ciudad 
Rodrigo,  and  menace  Lisbon,  which,  he  justly  observed, 
would  bring  the  English  army  back  to  the  northern 
provinces  of  Portugal  ;  and  if,  as  some  supposed,  the 
intention  of  sir  Arthur  was  to  unite,  at  Braganc^'a,  with 
Romana,  and  open  the  campaign  to  the  north  of  the 
Douro,  the  Fnmch  army  would  still  be  in  a  suitable 
position  to  oppose  them. 

In  pursuance  of  this  opinion,  Soult  ordered  Mortier 
to  approach  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  with  the  double  view  of 
preparing  for  the  siege  and  covering  the  quarters  of  re- 
freshment so  much  needed  by  the  second  corps  after  its 
fiitigues.  Ney  also  was  directed  to  march  with  the 
sixth  corps,  by  the  left  bank  of  the  Esla,  to  Zamora  ; 
but  the  spirit  of  discord  was  strong,  and  it  was  at  this 
moment  that  the  king,  alarmed  by  Sebastiani's  report, 
drew  the  fifth  corps  to  Villa  Castin,  while  marshal 
Ney,  holding  it  imprudent  to  uncover  Astorga  and 
Leon,  mortified,  also,  at  being  placed  under  the  orders 
of  another  marshal,  refused  to  move  to  Zamora.  Soult 
crossed  by  these  untoward  circumstances,  sent  the  di- 
vision of  light  cavalry,  under  his  brother,  and  one  of 
inlantry,  commanded  by  Ileudelet,  from  Zamora  and 
Toro  to  Salamanca,  with  orders  to  explore  the  course 
of  the  Tormes,  to  observe  Alba  and  Jx>desma,  and  es- 
pecially to  scour  the  roads  leading  upon  Ciudad  Rod-  i 
i-igo  and  Plascncia  :  these  troctps  relieved  a  division  of 
drago(jns  belonging  to  Kellernian,  who  was  still  charged 
with  the  general  government  of  the  province. 

The   loth  of  July,  the  march  of  the  British  upon 
Plascncia  became  known,  and  it  was  manifest  that  sir 
Arthur  had  no  design  to  act  north  of  l\w,  Douro  ;  where- 
fore the  duke  of  Dalmatia  resolved  to  ad\  ance,  with  the 
I  remainder  of  the   second    corps,  to   Salamanca  ;   and, 
partly  by  authority,  ])artly  by  address,  he  obliged  Ney 
I  to  put  the  sixth  corps  in  movement  lor  Zamora,  leaving 
I  Fouruicr's  JiagooLs  to  cover  Astorga  and  Lean.    Mean- 


1809.1 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR, 


213 


■while,  king  Joseph,  having  returned  from  his  fruitless 
excursion  against  Venegas,  was  at  first  incredulous  of 
the  advance  of  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  and  Cuesta,  but  he 
agreed  to  Soulfs  project  against  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  and 
ordered  Mortier  to  return  to  Valhxdulid,  where  that 
marshal  arrived,  with  his  first  division,  on  the  IGth  of 
July  :  his  second  division,  under  general  (jlazan,  halted, 
however,  at  Medina  del  Campo  and  Nava  del  Rev,  on 
the  route  from  Salamanca  to  Valladolid,  and  an  ad- 
vanced guard  was  sent  forward  to  Alba  de  Tormes. 

'L'he  13th  of  July,  Soult  being  assured  that  the  Brit- 
ish army  was  on  the  eastern  frontier  of  Portugal,  and 
that  considerable  reinforcements  had  been  disembarked 
at  Lisbon,  became  certain  that  sir  Arthur  meant  to 
operate  by  the  line  of  the  'I'agus,  and  therefore  again 
addressed  the  king  to  move  him  to  an  immediate  siege 
of  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  promising  to  have  the  three  cor[)s 
under  his  own  command  in  full  activity  in  fifteen  days, 
provided  his  demands  were  complied  with,  the  most  im- 
portant being — 1.  l'he  formation  of  a  battering  train  ; 
2.  The  concentration  of  an  immense  number  of  detach- 
ments, which  weakened  the  active  corps  ;  3.  A  reinforce- 
ment of  fifteen  or  twenty  thousand  conscripts,  drawn 
from  P^rance,  to  enable  the  old  troops,  employed  on  the 
line  of  communication,  to  join  the  corps  d'arinee.  The 
first  corps  should,  he  said,  continue  to  watch  the  Spanish 
army  of  Estremadura,  and  be  prepared  either  to  pre- 
Tent  it  from  uniting  with  the  English  to  disturb  the 
siege,  or  to  join  the  first,  second,  and  sixth  corps,  and 
give  battle,  if  that  should  become  necessary.*  The 
eiege  might  thus  be  pressed  vigorously,  Ciudad  would 
fall,  Almeida  would  be  next  invested,  and  the  communi- 
cations of  the  English  army,  with  Lisbon,  threatened. 

The  17th,  the  king  replied,  through  marshal  Jourdan, 
that  he  approved  of  the  plan,  but  had  not  means  to  meet 
Boveral  of  Soulfs  demands,  and  he  pro|X)Sed  that  the 
latter  should  reinforce  Kellerman  and  Bonnet,  with  ten 
thousand  men,  to  enable  them  to  seize  the  Asturias,  and 
thus  strengthen  the  communications  with  France.  This 
drew  from  the  duke  of  Dalmatia  the  following  remon- 
strance :— "  Under  present  circumstances  ice  cannot  avoid 
gome  sacrifice  of  territory.  Let  -0.9  prepare,  first,  by  con- 
centrating, on  a  few  points  capable  of  defence  and  cov- 
ering the  hospitals  and  depots  whidi.  may  be  on  the  ex- 
tremity of  oar  general  position.  This  will  not  be  so 
distressing  as  it  rnay  appear,  because  the  moment  we  have 
beaten  and  dispersed,  the  enemy's  masses  we  sliall  recover 
all  our  ground."  Then  reiterating  his  own  advice,  he 
concluded  thus  :• — ■"  I  conceive  it  impossible  to  finish  this 
war  by  detachments.  It  is  large  masses  only,  the  strong- 
est tluit  ijou  can  form,  that  will  succeed."  It  is  remark- 
able that  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  writing  at  this  time  says, 
'■  /  conceive  that  the  French  are  dangerous  only  when,  in 
large  masses."    ■ 

Meanwhile,  Heudelet's  division,  having  pushed  back 
the  advanced  guards  of  the  duke  del  Parque  upon  Ciu- 
dad Rodrigo.  ascertained  that  a  great  movement  of 
troops  was  taking  place  near  that  city,  and  that  sir 
Arthur  Wellesley,  advancing  quicker  than  was  expected, 
had  already  reached  Plasencia ;  wherefore,  on  the  18th, 
Soult  directed  Murtier  to  march  upon  Salamanca  with 
the  fifth  corps,  and.  at  the  same  time,  reinforced  Heude- 
let's division  with  Merle's  ;  the  latter's  place,  at  Zamora, 
being  supplied  by  a  division  of  the  sixth  corps,  the  re- 
mainder of  which  continued  on  the  Esia,  fronting  the 
1'ras  OS  Montes.  'I'hus,  n.»t  le«s  than  fifty  thousand  men 
were  at  or  close  to  Salamanca,  with  their  cavalry-posts 
pointing  to  the  passes  of  Baiios,  on  the  very  day  that 
eir  Arthur  Wellesley  crossed  the  Tietar  to  efiijct  his 
junction  with  Cuesta.  Yet,  neither  through  the  duke 
del    Parcjue,  nor    Beresford,  nor  the  guerillas,  nor  the 

Eeasantry,  did  intelligence  of  this  formidable  fact  reach 
imt 


■  S.  Journal  of  Operations,  MSS. 


Having  put  the  three  corps  in  motion,  Soult  des- 
patched general  Foy  to  Madrid,  with  information  of 
sir  Arthur's  march,  and  to  arrange  the  future  combina- 
tions of  the  two  armies.  "  It  is  prcbublc,"  he  said, 
"  that  the  concentration  of  my  army  at  Salamanca  will 
oblige  the  English  general  to-change  his  plan  ;  but,  if  he 
shall  already  have  advanced  on  the  read  to  Madrid,  we 
should  assemble  all  our  forces,  both  on  the  Tagus  and  on 
this  side,  fall  upon  him  altogether,  and  crnsh  him.  Thus, 
his  campaign  will  be  finished,  and  our  operations  mai/  go 
on  until  advantage."  Foy  arrived,  the  22d,  at  Miidrid  ; 
and,  a  few  hours  afterwards,  intelligence  reached  the 
king  that  the  allies  wei'e  at  Talavera,  in  fr(,nt  of  the 
first  corps,  and  that  sir  Robert  Wilson  (whose  strength 
was  much  exaggerated)  was  at  Escalona.  'l'he  die  was 
now  cast,  Joseph  din'cted  Soult  to  march  immediately 
upon  Plasencia  ;  then,  leaving  geneial  Belliard,  with 
only  three  thousand  men,  in  the  Retiro,  set  out  himself, 
with  his  guards  and  reserve,  by  the  road  of  INIostoles, 
to  join  Victor  at  Talavera.  The  23d,  being  at  Naval- 
Carneiro,  he  received  notice  that  the  first  corps  would 
retreat  that  night  to  Torrijos,  and,  in  two  days,  would 
be  behind  the  Guadarama  river  ;  whereupon,  turning  to 
the  left,  Joseph  descended  the  Guadaraina  to  Vtirgas, 
and  ettected  his  junction  with  the  duke  of  Belluno  on 
the  25th. 

During  this  time,  Sebastiani,  who  had  been  watching 
Venegas  near  Damyel,  deceived  that  general,  and,  re- 
turning to  Toledo  by  forced  marches,  left  three  thousand 
men  there,  with  the  design  of  obliging  him  to  cross  the 
Tagus,  at  Aranjues.  With  the  remainder  of  the  (burth 
coriis  Sebastiani  joined  the  king,  and  thus  nearly  fifty 
thousand  fighting  men  and  ninety  pieces  of  artillery 
were  concentrated,  on  the  morning  of  the  26th,  behind 
the  Guadarama,  and  within  a  few  miles  of  Cluesta's 
advanced  guard.  But,  on  the  side  of  the  allies,  the 
main  body  of  the  Spaniards  was  at  St.  Ollalia  :  Sher- 
brooke  with  two  divisions  and  the  cavalry,  at  Casalegas, 
and  the  rest  of  the  lOnglish  in  Talaveia.  So  that,  while 
the  French  were  concentrated  and  in  full  march  to  at- 
tack, the  allies  were  separated  in  ibur  nearly  eqiuil  and 
unconnected  parts,  of  which  three  were  enclcsed,  as  it 
were,  in  a  net,  between  the  Alberche  and  the  Tagus! 
On  such  an  occasion  Napoleon  would  have  been  swift 
and  deadly. 

In  retiring  upon  Toledo,  instead  of  Madrid,  the  duke 
of  Belluno  shewed  himself  an  able  commander.  To- 
ledo was  the  strategic  pivot  upon  which  every  move- 
ment turned  ;  it  was  the  central  point,  by  holding 
which  the  army  of  Venegas  was  separated  from  the 
allies  on  the  Alberche.  If  the  latter  advanced,  Soulfs 
operations  rendered  every  forward  step  a  stride  towards 
ruin  ;  if,  leaving  Venegas  to  his  fate,  they  retired,  ii; 
must  be  rapidly,  or  there  would  be  neither  wisdcmi  nor 
safety  in  the  measure.  The  king  knew  that  Foy  would 
reach  Soidt  the  24th,  and  as  that  marshal  had  alieady 
assembled  his  army  about  Salamanca,  which  was  only 
four  days'  march  from  I'lasencia,  he  might  be  in  the 
valley  of  the  Tagus  by  the  30tli  ;  hence,  to  insure  com- 
plete success,  the  royal  army  needed  only  to  keep  the 
allies  in  check  for  four  or  five  days.  1'his  was  the  iilaii 
that  Soult  had  recommended,  that  the  king  promised  to 
follow,  and  that  marshal  Jourdan  strenuously  support- 
ed. The  unskilful  proceedings  of  Cuesta  and  Venegas, 
the  preparation  of  the  allies,  the  distressed  state  of 
the  English  army,  actually  on  the  verge  of  famine, 
(a  circumstance  that  could  hardly  be  unknown  to  Vic- 
tor,) greatly  facilitated  the  execution  of  this  project, 
which  did  not  preclude  the  king  from  puuiOiing  the  fol- 
;  ly  of  the  Spanish  general,  whose  army,  scattered  and 
I  without  order,  discipline,  or  plan,  so  strongly  invitcJ  aa 
!  attack. 

I  I  have  said  that  Cuesta  was  following  a  tiger  :  h« 
\  had  some  faint  perception  of  his  danger  on  the  2.">th, 
1  and  he  gave  orders  to  retreat  ou  the  2Gth  ;  but  the 


214 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  Till. 


French,  sudileiily  passins:  the  Guadarama,  at  two  o'clock 
in  the  raornin;,'  of  that  day,  quickly  drove  the  Spanish 
cavalry  out  of  Ttn'i-ijos,  and  jjursued  them  to  Alcabon  ; 
Avhere  general  Z:iy;u<  liad  drawn  up  four  thousand  infant- 
ry, two  thousand  horsemen,  and  eight  guns,  on  a  plain, 
und  now  ofilred  battle. 

COMB.VT    OF    ALCABON. 

The  Spanish  right  rested  on  the  road  of  Domingo 
Perez,  and  the  left  on  the  chapel  of  the  same  name. 
The  French  cavalry,  under  Latour  Maubourg,  advanc- 
ed in  a  parallel  line  against  the  position  and  a  cannon- 
ade conuncnced  ;  but  at  that  moment,  the  head  of  the 
French  infantry  apjicared  in  sight,  the  Spaniards 
broke,  and  lied  in  disorder  towards  St.  Ollalla,  follow- 
ed, at  full  gallop,  by  the  horsemen,  who  pressed  them 
so  sorely  that  the  panic  would,  doubtless,  have  spread 
through  the  whole  army,  but  for  the  courage  of  Al- 
buquerque, who  coming  up  with  a  division  of  three 
thousand  fresh  cavalry,  held  the  enemy  in  play,  while 
Cuesta  retreated,  in  the  greatest  disorder,  towards  the 
Alberche. 

After  reaching  St.  Ollalla,  the  French  slackened 
their  efforts  ;  the  main  body  halted  there,  the  advanc- 
ed guards,  save  a  few  cavalry-posts,  did  not  pass  El 
Bravo,  and  no  attempt  was  made  to  jjrofit  from  the  un- 
connected position  of  the  allies — a  gross  and  pal|)able 
error;  for,  either  by  the  sword  or  dispersion,  the  Span- 
iards lost,  on  that  day,  not  less  than  four  thousand 
men,  and  such  was  their  fear  and  haste  that  it  required 
but  a  little  more  perseverance  in  the  pursuit  to  cause  a 
general  rout.  Albuquerque,  alone,  shewed  any  front  ; 
but  his  efforts  were  unavailing,  and  the  disorder  con- 
tinued to  increase  until  general  Sherbrooke  marching 
out  of  Cazalegas,  placed  his  divisions  between  tlie 
scared  troops  and  the  enemy.  Still  the  danger  was 
imminent ;  there  was  no  concert  between  the  comman- 
ders, the  ground  on  the  left  of  the  Alberche  was  un- 
favourable to  a  retiring  party,  and,  as  yet,  no  position 
upoti  which  the  combined  forces  could  retire  had  been 
agreed  upon  1  What,  then,  would  have  been  the  con- 
sequence if  the  whole  French  army  had  borne  down, 
compact  and  strong,  into  the  midst  of  the  disordered 
masses  ? 

Sir  Arthur  Wellesley,  who,  at  the  first  alarm,  had 
hastened  to  the  front,  seeing  the  confusion  beyond  the 
Alberche,  knew  that  a  battle  was  at  hand,  and,  being 
persuaded  that  in  a  strong  defensive  position  only 
could  the  Sjjaniards  be  brought  to  stand  a  shock,  ear- 
nestly endeavoured  to  pei'suade  Cuesta,  while  Sher- 
brooke's  people  could  yet  cover  the  movement,  to  with- 
draw to  Talavera,  where  there  was  ground  suited  for 
defence ;  but  Cuesta's  uncouth  nature  again  broke 
forth  ;  his  people  were  beaten,  dispirited,  fatigued, 
bewildered,  clustering  on  a  narrow  slip  of  low,  flat 
land,  between  the  Alberche,  the  'I'agus,  and  the  heights 
of  Salinas,  and  the  first  shot  fired  by  the  enemy  must 
have  been  tlie  signal  i)f  defeat ;  yet  it  was  in  vaui  that 
sir  Arthur  Wellesley  pointed  out  those  things,  and 
entreated  of  him  to  avoid  the  fall  of  the  rock  that 
trembled  over  his  head  ;  he  replied,  that  his  troops 
would  be  disheartened  by  any  further  retreat,  and  that 
he  would  fight  where  he  stood  :  in  this  muod  he  passed 
the  niglit. 

The  2Tth,  at  day-light,  the  British  general  renewed 
his  solicitations,  at  first,  fruitlessly,  but  when  the 
enemy's  cavalry  came  in  sight,  and  Sherbrooke  pre- 
pared to  retire,  Cuesta  sullenly  yielded,  yet,  turning 
to  his  stafl'  with  frantic  i)ride,  observed  that  '■'  He  /tad 
first  muiie  tlie  Knglisliirma  go  down  on  h/s  knees."  Sir 
Arthur  Wellesley,  by  virtue  of  his  genius,  now  assum- 
ed the  direction  of  both  armies.  Ceneral  Mackenzie's 
division  and  a  brigade  of  light  cavalry  were  left  on  the 
Alberche,  to  cover  the  retrograde  movement,  and  the 
rest  of  the  allied  ^.roops  were  soou  in  full  march  for  the 


position,  which  was  about  six  miles  in  :hc  rear.  Sir 
Robert  Wilson,  who  had  reached  Naval  Carneiro  on 
the  'inth,  and  opened  a  communication  with  Madrid, 
and  who  would  certainly  have  entered  that  capital  but 
for  the  approaching  battle,  was  also  recalled.  He  re- 
turned, on  the  28th,  to  Escalona,  and  hung  on  the  ene- 
my's rear,  but  did  not  attempt  to  join  the  army. 

Between  the  Alberche  and  the  town  of  1'alavera,  the 
country  was  fiat,  and  covered  with  olives  and  cork-tiees  ; 
but  nearly  ])arallel  to  the  Tagns.  and  at  a  distance  of 
about  two  or  three  miles,  a  chain  of  round  stec])  hills 
bounded  the  woody  plain.  Beyond  these  hills,  and  separat- 
ed from  them  by  a  deep  and  rugged  valley,  s(!niething 
less  than  half  a  mile  wide,  was  the  mountain-ridge, 
which  divides  the  bed  of  the  Alberche  from  that  of  the 
Tietar.  Hence,  a  line  drawn  perpendicularly  from  the 
Tagns  would  cross  the  first  chain  of  hills  at  the  distance 
of  two  miles,  and  at  two  miles  and  a  half  would  fall  on 
the  mountains. 

Sir  Arthur  Wellesley.  taking  the  town  of  Talavera, 
which  was  built  close  to  the  river,  as  his  fixed  point, 
placed  the  right  of  the  S]ianiards  there,  drawing  their 
army  up  in  two  lines,  with  the  left  resting  upon  a  mound, 
where  a  large  field-redoubt  was  constructed,  and  behind 
which  a  brigade  of  British  light  cavalry  was  posted  ;  all 
this  fiont  was  covered  by  a  convent,  by  ditches,  nmd 
walls,  breast-works,  and  felled  trees.  The  cavalry  was 
posted  behind  the  infantry ;  and  the  rear  was  sup- 
ported by  a  large  house  in  the  wood,  well  placed,  iu 
case  of  defeat,  to  cover  a  retreat  on  the  main  roads 
leading  from  Talaveru  to  Arzobispo  and  Oropesa.  In 
this  position  they  could  not  be  attacked  seriously,  nor 
their  disposition  be  even  seen,  and  thus,  one-half  of  the 
line  necessary  to  be  occupied  by  the  allies  was  render- 
ed nearly  unpregnable,  and  yet  held  by  the  worst 
troops. 

T\\b  front  of  battle  was  prolonged  by  the  British  in- 
fantry. CarapbelFs  division,  formed  in  two  lines,  touch- 
ed the  Spanish  left,  and  Sherbrooke"s  division  stood  next 
to  Campbell's,  but  arranged  on  one  line  only,  becauaC 
Mackenzie's  division,  destined  to  form  the  second  line, 
was  then  near  the  Alberche.  It  was  intended  tlaf 
Hill's  division  should  close  the  left  of  the  British,  hj 
taking  post  on  the  highest  hill,  in  the  chain  before  m(  n- 
tioned,  as  bounding  the  flat  and  woody  country  ;  bi't, 
from  simie  cause  unknown,  the  summit  of  this  height  wis 
not  immediately  occupied. 

The  whole  line  thus  displayed  was  two  miles  in  length, 
the  left  resting  on  the  valley  between  the  round  hills  ai(d 
the  mountain,  and  the  front  covered  by  a  water-court-e, 
which,  commencing  about  the  centre  of  the  line,  opened 
deeply  as  it  passed  the  left  and  became  a  wide  chasm  in 
the  valley.  Fart  of  the  British  cavalry  was  with  gen- 
eral Mackenzie,  part  in  the  ))lain  beyond  the  left,  and 
part  behind  the  great  redoubt,  at  the  junction  of  tlieallied 
troops.  The  British  and  (Germans  under  arms  that  day 
were  somewhat  above  nineteen  thousand  sabres  and 
bayonets,  with  thirty  guns.  The  Si)aniards,  alter  tlieir 
previous  defeat,  could  only  produce  from  thirty-three  to 
thirty-four  thousand  men,  but  they  had  seventy  guns. 
The  combined  army,  therefore,  ottered  battle  with  forty- 
four  thousand  infantry,  nearly  ten  thousand  cavalry,  and 
a  luuidred  pieces  of  artilery  ;  the  French  ciune  on  with 
eighty  guns,  and,  including  the  ki  ig's  guards,  nearly 
fifty  thousand  men,  of  which  seven  thousand  were  cav- 
alry. But  what  a  difference  in  the  quality  of  the  troo)!S ! 
The  French  were  all  hardy  veterans,  while  the  genuine 
soldiers  of  the  allied  army  did  not  exceed  uineteen  thou- 
sand. 

The  king  passed  the  night  of  the  26th  at  St.  Ollalla, 
l>ut  put  his  troojis  in  motion  before  day-light,  on  the 
2Tth.  Latour  Maubourg,  with  the  cavalry,  preceded 
the  column,  and  the  first  and  fourth  corps,  the  royal 
guards,  and  reserve,  followed  in  succession.  The  aj> 
pearauce  of   the  leading  aquudrous,   uear   Cazalegas, 


1809.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR, 


215 


hiSt:nel,  as  we  have  seen,  Cuesta's  decision,  and,  about 
one  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  the  first  corps  reached  the 
hei_,dits  of  Salinas,  from  whence  the  dust  of  the  allies, 
as  they  toi>k  up  thv'"  jiosi'ion,  could  be  perceived  ;  but 
neithtr  their  situation  nor  disposition  could  be  made 
out.  on  account  of  (he  forest,  which,  clothing  the  coun- 
try from  the  I'ai^us  UL'arly  to  the  foot  of  the  first  range 
of  hills,  ma>iked  all  their  evolulions.  Tiie  duke  of  Bel- 
lui:o,  huwjver,  being  well  acfjuaintcd  with  the  ground, 
ij:3tantly  guessed  their  true  i)osition,  and,  in  pursuance 
cf  his  advice,  the  king  directed  the  fourth  corps  against 
the  left  of  the  allies,  the  cavalry  against  the  centre, 
and  Victor  hinnelf,  with  the  first  corps,  against  the 
right:  the  guards  and  the  reserve  supported  the  fourth 
corps.* 

T.vo  good  routes,  .suitable  to  artillery,  led  from  the 
Alberche  to  the  position,  'i'he  one,  being  the  royal 
road  to  Talavera,  was  taken  by  the  fourth  corps  and 
the  reserve ;  the  other,  passing  through  a  place  called 
the  Casa  des  Salinas,  led  directly  upon  sir  Arthur  Wel- 
lesley's  extreme  left,  and  was  taken  by  the  first  corps  ; 
but  to  reach  this  Casa,  which  was  situated  near  the 
plain  in  front  i)f  the  British  left  wing,  it  was  necessary 
t-)  foi-d  the  Alberche,  and  to  march  for  a  mile  or  two 
through  the  woods.  A  dust,  which  was  observed  to 
rise  near  the  Casa  itself,  indicated  -the  presence  of 
troops  at  that  place,  and,  in  fact,  general  Mackenzie's 
division,  and  a  brigade  of  light  cavalry,  were  there 
posted,  the  infantry  in  the  forest,  the  cavalry  on  the 
plain  :  jet  no  patroles  had  been  sent  to  the  frout,  and 
kills  negligence  gave  rise  to  the 

COMBAT    OF    S.\LIXAS. 

About  three  o'clock,  I^apisso  and  Ruffin's  division 
having  crossed  the  Alberche,  marched  in  two  columns 
towards  the  Casa  de  Sal/iias,  and  their  light  infantry 
camj  so  suddenly  on  the  British  outposts  that  the  latter 
were  surprised,  and  sir  ^^.rthur  Wellesley,  who  was  in 
the  Casa,  nearly  fell  into  the  enemy's  hands.  'I'he 
French  columns  lullowed  briskly,  and  charged  so  hotly, 
that  the  English  brigades  were  separated,  and  being 
composed  principally  of  young  battalions,  got  into  con- 
fusion, one  part  tired  upon  another,  and  the  whole  were 
driven  into  the  plain.  But,  in  the  midst  of  this  disorder, 
the  forty-fifth,  a  stubborn  old  regiment,  and  some  com- 
panies of  the  fifth  battalion  of  the  sixtieth,  were  seen  in 
perfect  array,  and  when  sir  Arthur  rode  up  to  tlie  spot, 
the  fight  was  restored,  and  maintained  so  steadily,  that 
the  enemy  was  checked.  The  infantiy,  supported  by 
two  brigades  of  cavalry,  then  crossed  the  plain,  and  re- 
gained the  left  and  centre  of  the  position,  having  lost 
about  four  hundred  men.  General  Mackenzie,  with  one 
brigade,  inunediately  took  p.)st  in  .second  line  behind  the 
guards ;  the  other  was  commanded  by  colonel  Donkin, 
who  finding  the  hill  on  the  left  unoccupied,  drew  up 
there  without  orders,  and  so  accidentally  completed  the 
position.  The  cavalry  was  formed  in  culumn  behind  the 
left  of  the  line. 

Vict(jr,  animated  by  the  success  of  this  first  opera- 
tion, brought  up  Villatte's  division,  together  with  all 
thi'  artillery  and  liglit  cavalry,  to  the  Casa  de  Salinas, 
and  then,  issuing  from  the  forest,  rapidly  crossed  the 
plain,  advancing,  with  a  fine  military  display,  close  up 
ti)  the  left  of  the  position,  where  he  seized  an  isolated 
hill,  directly  in  front  of  colonel  Uonkin's  ground,  and 
immediately  opened  a  heavy  cannonade  ui)on  that  oOi- 
>  cer's  brigade.  Meanwhile,  the  fourth  corps  and  the 
reserve,  approaching  the  right  more  slowly,  and  being 
unable  to  di.scover  the  true  situation  of  Cuesta's  troops, 
sent  their  light  cavalry  forward  to  make  that  general 
shew  his  lines.  As  the  French  horsemen  rode  boldly 
up  to  the  front,  and  commenced  skirmishing  with  their  i 
pistols,  the  Spaniards  made  a  general  discharge  of| 
small  arms,  and  then,  as  if  deprived  of  all  sense,  ten  j 


*  Semel6'a  Jourual  of  Operations,  MSS. 


thousand  infantry,  and  all  the  artillery,  breaking  their 
ranks,  fied  to  the  rear  :  the  artillery-men  carried  off  their 
horses,  the  infantry  threw  away  their  arms,  the  adjutant- 
general  O'Donoghue  was  amongst  the  foremost  of  the 
fugitives,  and  even  Cuesta  himself  was  in  movement 
towards  the  rear.  The  panic  spread,  and  the  French 
would  fain  have  cliarged  home,  but  sir  Arthur  Welles- 
ley,  who  was  at  hand,  immediately  flanked  the  main 
road  with  some  English  squadrons,  and  the  ditches  on 
the  other  side  rendered  the  country  impracticable  ;  the 
fire  of  musketry  was  then  renewed  by  those  Spaniards 
who  remained,  the  enemy  lost  some  men,  and  finally 
retreated  in  di.sorder. 

The  greatest  |)art  of  Cuesta's  runaways  fled  as  far  aa 
Oropesa,  giving  out,  that  the  allies  were  totally  defeated 
and  the  French  army  in  hot  pursuit  ;  thus,  the  rear  be- 
came a  scene  of  incredible  disorder ;  the  commissaries 
went  off  with  their  animals  the  paymasters  carried  away 
their  money  chests,  the  baggage  was  scattered,  and  the 
alarm  spread  far  and  wide  ;  nor  is  it  to  be  concealed, 
that  some  English  officers  disgraced  their  uniform  on  this 
occasion.  Cuesta,  however,  having  recovered  from  his 
first  alarm,  sent  many  of  his  cavalry  regiments  to  head 
the  fugitives  and  drive  them  back,  and  a  part  of  the 
artillery,  and  some  thousands  of  the  infantry  were  thus 
recovered  during  the  night  ;  but.  in  the  next  day's  fight, 
the  Spanish  army  was  less  by  six  thousand  men  than  it 
should  have  been,  and  the  great  redoubt  in  the  centre 
was  silent  for  want  of  guns. 

COMBAT  ox  THE  EVENING  OF  THE  27tH. 

The  hill  on  the  left  of  the  British  army  was  the  key 
of  the  whole  position.  It  was  steep  and  rugged  on  the- 
side  towards  the  French,  and  it  was  rendered  more  inac- 
cessible by  the  ravine  at  the  bottom,  but  towards  the 
English  side  it  was  of  a  smoother  ascent.  Victor,  how- 
ever, observing  that  the  extreme  summit  was  unoccu- 
pied and  that  Donkin's  brigade  was  feeble,  conceived 
the  design  of  seizing  it  liy  a  sudden  assault.*  The  sun 
was  sinking,  and  the  twilight  and  the  confusion  among 
the  Spaniards  on  the  right,  appeared  so  favourable  to 
his  project,  that  without  communicating  with  the  king, 
he  immediately  directed  Rul^in's  division  to  attack, 
Villatte  to  follow  in  support,  and  Lapisse  to  fall  on  the 
German  legion,  so  as  to  create  a  diversion  for  Ruffin, 
but  without  engaging  seriously  himself.  Although  the 
as.sault  was  cpiick  and  vigorous,  colonel  Donkin  beat 
back  the  enemy  in  his  front,  but  his  force  Avas  too 
weak  to  defend  every  part,  and  many  of  the  French 
turning  his  left,  mounted  to  the  summit  behind  him. 
At  this  moment,  general  Hill  was  ordered  to  reinforce 
him,  and  it  was  not  yet  dark,  when  that  officer,  while 
giving  orders  to  the  colonel  of  the  48th  regiment,  was 
shot  at  by  some  troops  from  the  highest  point  ;  think- 
ing they  were  stragglers  from  his  own  ranks,  firing  at 
the  enemy,  he  rode  up  to  them,  followed  by  his  brigade- 
major,  Fordyce,  and  in  a  moment  found  himself  in  the 
midst  of  the  French.  Fordyce  was  killed,  and  Hill's 
horse  was  wounded  by  a  grenadier,  who  inmicdiately 
seized  the  bridle  ;  but  the  general,  spurring  the  animal 
hard,  broke  the  man's  hold,  and  gallojiing  down  the  de- 
scent met  the  29th  regiment,  and,  without  an  instant's 
delay,  led  them  up  with  such  a  fierce  charge,  that  the 
enemy  could  not  sustain  the  shock. 

The  summit  being  thus  recovered,  the  48th  regiment 
and  the  first  battalion  of  detachments  were  immediate- 
ly brought  forward,  and,  in  conjunction  with  the  29th 
and  colonel  Donkin's  brigade,  presented  a  formidable 
front  of  defence,  and  in  good  time  ;  for  the  troops  thus 
beaten  back  were  only  that  part  of  the  9th  French  regi- 
ment, which  formed 'the  advance  of  Ptuffin's  division; 
the  two  other  regiments  of  that  division  had  lost  their 
way  in  the  ravine,  and  hence  the  attack  had  not  ceased, 
but   only  subsided   for   a   time.     Lapisse   also  was   in 

*  Semel6's  Journal  of  Operations,  MSS. 


516 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  YIIT. 


motion.  anJ  soon  after  opened  liis  fire  against  the  Ger- 
man le^rion,  and  all  the  battalions  of  the  i)th,  being  re- 
formed in  one  ma^s,  again  advanced  np  the  face  of  the 
hill  with  redoubled  vigonr.  The  fighting  then  became 
vehement,  and,  in  the  darkness,  the  ojiposing  fltu^hes 
of  the  musketry  shewed  with  what  a  resolute  spirit  the 
struggle  was  maintaineil  ;  the  conitiatants  were  scarcely 
tweiitv  yards  asunder,  and  for  a  time  the  event  seemed 
doubtful  ;  but  soon  the  well  known  shout  of  the  British 
8i)ldier  was  heard,  rising  above  the  din  of  arms,  and 
the  enemy's  broken  troops  were  driven  once  more  into 
the  ravine  below  ;  Lapisse,  who  had  made  some  impres- 
sion on  the  German  legion,  immediately  abandoned  his 
fuse  attack,  and  the  fighting  of  the  2T"th  ceased.  The 
British  lost  about  eight  hundred  men,  and  the  French 
about  a  thousand  on  that  day. 

The  bivouac  fires  now  blazed  up  on  both  sides,  and  the 
French  and  British  soldiers  were  (|uiet ;  but,  about 
twelve  o'clock,  the  Spaniards  on  the  right  being  alarmed 
at  some  horse  in  their  front,  opened  a  prodigious  peal 
of  musketry  and  artillery,  which  continued  for  twenty 
minutes  without  any  object ;  and  during  the  remainder 
of  the  niglit,  the  whole  line  was  frequently  disturbed  by 
desultory  firing  from  the  allied  troops,  by  which  several 
men  and  officers  were  unfortunately  slain.  The  duke  of 
Belluno,  who  had  learned,  from  the  prisoners,  the  exact 
position  of  the  Spaniards,  until  then  unknown  to  the 
French  generals,  now  reported  his  on-n  failure  to  the 
king,  and  proposed  that  a  second  attempt  should  be  made 
in  the  morning,  at  daylight ;  marshal  Jourdan  opposed 
this,  as  being  a  partial  enterprize,  which  could  not  lead 
to  any  great  result;  yet  Victor  was  so  earnest  for  a 
trial,  and,  resting  his  repre.<entation  on  his  intimate 
knowledge  of  the  ground,  pressed  the  matter  so  home, 
that  he  won  Joseph's  assent,  and  immediately  made  dis- 
positions for  the  attack. 

The  guns  of  the  first  corps,  being  formed  in  one 
ma-ss,  on  the  height  corresponding  to  that  on  which  the 
English  left  M-as  posted,  were  enabled  to  command  the 
great  valley  on  their  own  right,  to  range  the  summit  of 
the  hill  in  their  front,  and  obliquely  to  search  the  whole 
of  the  British  line  to  the  left,  as  far  as  the  great  redoubt 
between  th(>  allied  armies. 

Ruffin's  division  was  placed  in  advance,  and  Yillatte's 
ill  rear,  of  the  artillery  ;  but  the  former  kept  one  regi- 
ment close  to  the  ravine. 

Lapisse  occupied  some  low  table-land,  opposite  to 
Sherbrooke's  division. 

Latour  Maubourg's  cavalry  formed  a  reserve  to  La- 
pisse ;  and  general  Beaumont's  cavalry  formed  a  reserve 
to  Ruffin. 

On  the  English  side,  general  Hill's  division  was 
concentrated  ;  the  cavalry  was  massed  behind  the  left ; 
the  pare  of  artillery  and  hospitals  established  under 
cover  of  the  hill,  between  the  cavalry  and  Hill's 
division. 

COMBAT  ON  THE  MORXIN'G  OF  THE  28tH. 

About  daybreak  Rufiin's  troops  were  drawn  up,  two 
regiments  ai>reast,  sujiported  by  a  thirti,  in  columns 
of  battalions,  and.  in  thi<  order,  went  forth  against  the 
letl  of  the  British  ;  a  ])art  moving  directly  against  the 
front,  and  a  part  by  the  valley  on  the  right,  thus  em- 
bracing two  sicR'S  of  the  hill.  'I'heir  march  was  rapid 
and  steady,  they  were  followed  by  Villattes  division, 
and  their  assault  was  preceded  by  a  burst  of  artillery, 
that  rattled  round  the  hi'iglit,  and  swept  away  the  Eng- 
lish ranks  by  whole  sections.  'I'he  sharp  chattering 
of  the  musketry  succeeded,  the  French  guns  were  then 
pointed  towards  the  British  centre  and  right,  the  gren- 
adiers instantly  closed  upon  general  Hill's  division, 
and  the  height  sparkled  with  fire.  The  inequalities 
of  the  ground  broke  the  compact  formation  of  the  troops 
on  both  sides,  and  small  bodies  were  seen  here  and 
there  struggling  lor  the  mastery  with  all  the  virulence 
of  a  single  combat ;  in  some  places  the  French  grena- 


diers were  overthrown  at  once,  in  others  they  would 
Uot  be  denied,  and  reached  the  summit,  but  the  re- 
serves were  always  ready  to  vindicate  their  ground, 
and  no  permanent  footing  was  obtained.  Still  the  con- 
flict was  maintained  with  singular  (obstinacy;  Hill 
himself  was  wounded,  and  his  men  were  falling  fast, 
yet  the  enemy  sulfered  more,  and  gave  back,  step  by 
step  at  first,  and  slowly,  to  cover  the  retreat  of  their 
wounded,  but,  finally,  unable  to  sustain  the  increasing 
fury  of  the  English,  and  having  lost  above  fifteen  hun-  . 
dred  men  in  the  space  of  forty  minutes,  the  v.hole  mass 
broke  away  in  disorder,  and  returned  to  their  own  po- 
sition, covered  by  the  renewed  ])Iay  of  their  powerful 
artillerj'. 

To  this  destructive  fire  no  adequate  answer  could 
be  made,  for  the  English  guns  were  few,  and  of  small 
calibre,  and  when  sir  Arthur  AVellesley  desired  a  rein- 
forcement from  Cuesta,  the  latter  sent  him  only  two 
pieces  ;  yet  even  those  were  serviceable,  and  the  S})an- 
ish  gunners  f(jught  them  gallantly.  The  principal  line 
of  the  enemy's  retreat  was  by  the  great  valley,  ar:d  a 
favourable  opportunity  for  a  charge  of  horse  occurred, 
but  unfortunately  the  English  cavalry.  Laving  retired 
during  the  night,  for  water  and  forage,  were  yet  too 
distant  to  be  of  service.  However,  these  repeated  ef- 
forts of  the  French  against  the  hill,  and  the  apjjearance 
of  some  of  their  light  troops  on  the  mountain,  beyond 
the  left,  taught  the  English  general  that  he  had  ccm- 
mitted  a  fault  in  not  prolonging  his  flank  across  the 
valley,  and  he  hastened  to  rectify  it.  For  this  pur- 
pose, he  brought  up  tlie  principal  mass  of  his  cavalry 
behind  his  left,  with  the  leading  squadrons  looking  into 
the  valley,  and  having  obtained,  from  Cuesta,  general 
i^>assecour's  division  of  infantry,  posted  it  on  the  m<HU> 
tain  itself,  in  observation  of  the  French  light  troops. 
Meanwhile,  the  duke  of  Albuquerque,  discontented  with 
Cuesta's  arrangements,  came,  with  his  division,  to  sir 
Artlmr  Wellesley.  who  placed  him  behind  the  British, 
thus  displaying  a  formidable  array  of  horsemen,  six  lines 
in  depth. 

Immediately  after  the  failure  of  Ruffin's  attack,  k'ng 
Josej)!),  having  in  person  examined  the  whole  position 
of  the  allies,  from  left  to  right,  demanded  of  Jourdan 
and  Victor  if  he  should  deliver  a  general  battle.  The 
former  replied  that  the  great  valley  and  the  mountain 
being  unoccupied,  on  the  'JTth,  sir  Arthur  Wi^lksley's 
attention  should  liave  been  drawn  to  the  right  by  a 
feint  on  the  Spaniards  ;*  that,  during  the  night,  the 
whole  army  should  have  been  silently  jjlaced  in  cnlumn, 
at  the  entrance  of  the  great  valley,  ready,  at  daybreak, 
to  furm  a  line  of  battle,  to  the  left,  on  a  new  front,  and 
so  have  attacked  the  hill  from  whence  Victor  had  be(  n 
twice  repulsed.  Such  a  movement,  he  said,  wculd 
have  obliged  the  allies  to  change  their  front  also,  and, 
during  this  operation,  they  might  have  been  assailed 
with  hopes  of  success.  But  this  project  could  not  now 
be  executed  ;  the  English,  aware  of  their  mi.'-take,  had 
secured  their  left  flank,  by  occupying  the  valley,  and 
the  mountain  and  their  front  A\ere  alike  inattackable. 
"  Hence,  the  only  prudent  line  was  to  take  up  a  positioa 
on  the  Alberche,  and  await  the  ejfect  of  Soult's  operations 
on  the  English  rear." 

Mar.shal  Victor  opposed  this  counsel ;  he  engaged  to 
carry  the  hill  on  the  English  left,  notwithstanding  his 
former  failures,  provided  tiie  fourth  corps  would  attack 
the  right  and  cerilre  at  the  same  moment ;  and  he  fin- 
ished his  argument  by  declaring  that,  if  such  a  combina- 
tion failed,  "  it  was  time  to  renounce  makmg  war." 

The  king  was  embaria.-^sed.  His  own  opinior  coin- 
cided with  Jourdan's ;  but  he  feared  that  Victoi  would 
cause  the  enqjeror  to  believe  a  great  opporlunit}  had 
been  hist;  and,  while  thus  wavering,  a  despatch  ar- 
rived from  Soult,  by  which  it  appeared  that  his  force 
could  Duly  reach   Plasencia  between  the  2d  and  oth 

•  Letter  from  Murshul  Jourdau,  M.SS. 


1809.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


21' 


of  August.  Now,  a  detachment  from  the  army  of 
Yeiieg;LS  hci]  already  appeared  near  Toledo,  that  gen- 
eral's advanced  guard  was  approaching  Aranjuez ;  and 
the  kinu'  wius  much  troubled  by  the  danger  thus  threat- 
ening Madrid,  because  all  thj  stores,  tlie  reserve  artil- 
lery, and  the  general  liospitals  of  the  whole  army  in 
Spain  were  deposited  there  ;  and,  moreover,  the  tolls 
re<'"ived  at  the  gates  of  that  town  formed  almost  the 
only  pecuniary  resource  of  his  court ;  so  narrowly  did 
Napoleon  reduce  the  expenditure  of  the  war.  These 
considerations  overpowered  his  jiulgmenl ;  adopting  the 
worse  and  rejecting  the  better  counsel,  he  resolved  to 
succour  the  capital,  but,  before  separating  the  army, 
determined  to  try  the  chance  of  a  battle.  Indecision  is 
a  cancer  in  war  :  Joseph  should  have  adhered  to  the 
plan  arranged  with  Soult ;  the  advantages  were  obvious, 
the  ultimate  success  sure,  and  the  loss  of  iMadrid  was 
nothing  in  the  scale,  because  it  could  only  be  tcm[)orary  ; 
but.  if  the  king  thought  otherwise,  he  should  have  de- 
cided to  tight  for  it  before  ;  that  is,  Ik;  should  have  drawn 
the  fifth  corps  to  him,  prepared  his  plan,  and  lallen,  with 
the  utmost  rapidity,  upon  Cuesta,  the  26th;  his  ad- 
vanced guard  should  have  been  on  the  Alberehe  that 
evening,  and.  before  12  o'clock  on  the  2Tth,  the  English 
army  would  have  been  without  the  aid  of  a  single  Span- 
ish soldier.  But,  after  neglecting  the  most  favourable 
opportunity,  when  his  army  was  full  of  ardour,  he  now, 
with  singular  inconsistenc}-,  resolved  to  give  battle,  when 
his  enemies  v.-ere  completely  prepared,  strongly  posted, 
and  in  the  pride  of  success,  and  when  the  confidence  of 
his  own  troops  was  shaken  by  the  partial  action  of  the 
mornin?. 

While  the  French  generals  were  engaged  in  council, 
the  men  on  both  sides  took  some  rest,  and  the  English 
wounded  were  carried  to  the  rear ;  but  the  soldiers 
were  suff.'ring  from  hunger  ;  tlie  regular  service  of  pro- 
visions had  ceased  for  several  days,  and  a  few  ounces 
of  wheat,  in  the  grain,  formed  the  whole  subsistence 
of  men  who  had  fought,  and  who  were  yet  to  fight,  so 
hardly.  The  Spanish  camp  was  full  of  confi\sion  and 
distrust.  Cuesta  inspired  terror,  but  no  confidence, 
and  Albuquerque,  whether  from  conviction  or  instigated 
by  momentary  anger,  just  as  the  French  were  coming 
on  to  the  final  attack,  sent  one  of  his  staff  to  inform 
the  Enslish  commander  that  Cuesta  was  betraying 
him.  'J'he  aid-de-camp,  charged  with  this  message, 
delivered  it  to  colonel  Dunkin.  and  that  officer  carried 
it  to  sir  Arthur  Weliesley.  'i'he  latter,  seated  on  the 
summit  of  the  hill  which  had  been  so  gallantly  con- 
tested, was  intently  watching  the  movements  of  the 
advancing  enemy ;  he  listened  to  this  somewhat  staVt- 
ling  message  without  so  much  as  turning  his  head,  and 
then  dryly  ansu-ering — "  Veri/  well,  iiou  mnit  return  to 
your  hrig:ade"  continued  his  survey  of  the  French. 
Donkin  retired,  filled  with  admiration  of  the  imperturb- 
able resolution  and  quick  penetration  of  the  man  ; 
and,  indeed,  sir  Arthur's  conduct  was,  throughout 
that  day,  such  as  became  a  general  upon  whose  vigi- 
lance and  intrepidity  the  tute  of  fifty  thousand  men  de- 
pended. 

BATTLE    OF    TALAVERA. 

The  dispositions  of  the  French  were  soon  completed. 
Ruflin's  division  on  the  extreme  right  was  destined  to 
cross  the  valley,  and,  moving  by  the  foot  of  the  mountain, 
to  turn  the  British  left. 

Viilatte's  orders  were  to  menace  the  contested  height 
with  one  briga<le,  and  to  guard  the  valley  with  another, 
which,  being  strengtheufd  by  a  battalion  of  grenadiers, 
connected  Ruffin's  movement  with  the  main  attack. 

Lapisse,  supported  by  Latour  .Maubourg's  dragoons, 
and  lay  the  king's  reserve,  was  instructed  to  pass  the 
ravine  in  front  of  the  English  centre,  and  to  fail,  with 
half  his  infantry,  u»  on  Sherbrooke's  division,  while  the 
Other  half,  couueci  ,g  its  attack  with  Viilatte's  brijjadc, 


mounted  the  hill,  and  made  a  third  effort  to  master  that 
important  point. 

Milhaud's  dragoons  were  left  oh  the  main  road,  op- 
posite Talavera,  to  keep  the  Spaniards  in  check  ;  but 
tlie  rest  of  the  heavy  citvalry  was  brought  into  the  cen- 
tre, behind  general  Sebastiani,  who,  with  the  fourth 
corps,  was  to  assail  the  right  of  the  British  army.  A 
part  of  the  French  light  cavalry  supported  Viilatte's 
brigade  in  the  valley,  and  a  part  remained  in  reserve. 

A  number  of  guns  were  distributed  among  the  divi- 
sions, but  the  principal  mass  remained  on  the  hill,  with 
the  reserve  of  light  cavalry  ;  where,  also,  the  duke  of 
Belluno  stationed  himself,  to  direct  the  movements  of 
the  first  corps. 

From  nine  o'clock  in  the  morning  until  mid-day,  the 
field  of  battle  offered  no  appearance  of  hostility ;  the 
weather  was  intensely  hot,  and  the  troops,  on  both  sides, 
descended  and  mingled,  without  fear  or  sus])icion,  to 
quench  their  thir.st  at  the  little  brook  which  divided  the 
positions ;  but,  at  one  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  the 
French  soldiers  were  seen  to  gather  round  their  eagles, 
and  the  rolling  of  drums  was  heard  along  the  whole  line. 
Half  an  hour  later,  the  king's  guards,  the  reserve,  and 
the  fourth  corps  were  descried,  near  the  centre  of  the 
king's  position,  marching  to  join  the  first  corps  ;  and, 
at  two  o'clock,  the  table-land  and  the  height  on  the 
French  right,  even  to  the  valley,  were  covered  with  the 
dark  and  lowering  masses.  At  this  moment  some  hun- 
dreds of  English  soldiers,  employed  to  carry  the  wounded 
t(*  the  lear,  returned  in  one  body,  and  were,  b}'  the 
French,  supposed  to  be  sir  Robert  Wilson's  corps  join- 
ing the  army  :  nevertheless,  the  duke  of  Belluno,  whose 
arrangements  were  now  com.pleted,  gave  the  signal  for 
battle,  and  eighty  pieces  of  artillery  immediately  sent  a 
tempest  of  bullets  before  the  liglit  troops,  who,  coining 
on  with  the  swiftness  and  violence  of  a  hail-storm,  were 
closely  followed  by  the  broad,  black  columns,  in  all  the 
majesty  of  Mar. 

Sir  Arthur  Weliesley,  from  the  summit  of  the  hill, 
had  a  clear  view  of  the  whole  field  of  battle ;  and  first 
he  saw  the  fourth  corps  rushing  forwards,  with  the 
usual  impetuosity  of  French  soldiers,  clearing  the  in- 
tersected ground  in  their  front,  and  falling  upon  Camp- 
bell's division  with  infijiite  fury  ;  but  that  general,  as- 
sisted by  Mackenzie's  brigade,  and  by  two  Spanish 
battalions,  withstO(;d  their  utmost  oflbrts.  The  Eng- 
lish regiments,  j)utting  the  French  skirmishers  aside, 
met  the  advancing  columns  with  loud  shouts,  and, 
breaking  in  on  their  front,  and  lapping  tlieir  flanks  with 
fire,  and  giving  no  respite,  pushed  them  back  with  a 
terrible  carnage.  Ten  guns  were  taken,  but  as  Camp- 
bell prudently  resolved  nut  to  break  his  line  by  a  pur- 
suit, the  French  instantly  rallied  on  their  supports,  and 
made  head  for  another  attack  ;  then  the  British  artil- 
lery and  musketry  played  vehemently  upon  their  masses, 
a  Spanish  cavalry  regiment  charged  their  flank,  and 
they  retired  in  disorder  :  thus  the  victory  was  secured  in 
that  quarter. 

But,  while  this  was  passing  on  the  right,  Tillatte's 
division,  preceded  by  the  grenadiers,  and  supported  by 
two  regiments  of  light  cavalry,  was  seen  advancing  up 
the  great  valley  against  the  left,  and,  beyond  Yillatte, 
Ruffiu  was  discovered  marching  towards  the  mountain. 
Sir  Arthur  Weliesley  immediately  ordered  Anson's 
brigade  of  cavalry,  com])osed  of  the  twenty-third  light 
dragoons  and  the  first  German  hussars,  to  charge  the 
head  of  these  columns ;  these  regiments,  coming  on  at 
a  canter,  and  increasing  their  speed  as  they  advanced, 
rode  headlong  against  the  enemy,  but,  in  a  few  mo- 
ments, came  upon  the  brink  of  a  hollow  deft,  which 
was  not  perceptible  at  a  distance.  'J'he  French,  throw- 
ing  themselves  into  squares,  opened  Iheir  fire ;  and 
colonel  Arentschild,  eonnnaiiding  the  hussars,  an  ofB- 
cer  whom  forty  y('ars'  experience  had  made  a  mivster 
iu  his  art,  promptly  reined  up  at  the  brink,  excIaiuiLug, 


218 


NAPIER'iS    x'ENINSULAR    WAR. 


LBooK  YUI 


in  his  broken  phrase,  "  ]  will  not  kill  my  young  77icns  .'" 
But  in  front  of  the  twenty-tliird,  the  chasm  was  more 
practicable,  the  Eii^liiili  Lilood  hot,  and  the  rcuiment 
plunged  down  without  a  check;  men  and  horses  roll- 
iht;  over  each  other  in  dreadi'al  confusion  ;  the  survivors 
Btill  untamed,  mounted  the  opposite  bank  by  twos  and 
threes,  and  colonel  Seymour  being-  severely  wounded, 
major  Froc-.erick  Ponsonby,  a  hardy  soldier,  rallied  all 


left  with  the  loss  of  ten  guns,  was  in  confusion ;  the 
troops  in  the  great  valley  on  the  right,  amazed  at  the 
furious  charge  of  the  twenty-third,  and  awed  by  the 
sight  of  four  disti.ict  lines  of  cavalry,  still  in  reserve,  re- 
mained stationary  ;  no  impression  had  been  made  on  the 
hill ;  Liijjisse  was  mortally  wounded,  his  division  gave 
way,  ami  the  whole  army  hnally  retired  to  I'.ie  position 
from  whence  it  had  descended  to  the  attack.  This  re- 
who  came  up,  and  passing  through  the  midst  of  Vil-  j  tiograde  movement  was  covered  by  skirmishers  and  au 
latte's  colunms,  which  poured  in  a  fire  f/om  each  side,   increasing  fire  of  artillery,  and  the  British,  exhausted  1 


fell  with  inexpressible  violence  upon  a  brigade  of 
French  cIiK'isurs  in  the  rear.  The  combat  was  fierce 
bat  sliort  ;  \^iutor  had  perceived  the  first  advance  of  the 


toil  and  want  of  food,  and  reduced  to  less  than  fourteen 
thousand  sabres  and  bayonets,  could  not  pursue.  The 
Spanish  army  was  incapable  of  any  evolution,  and  about 


English,  and  detached  his  Polish  lancers,  and  West-  j  six  o'clock  all  hostility  ceased,  each  army  holding  the 
phalian  light-horse,  to  the  support  of  Viilatte;  and  1  position  of  the  morning.  But  the  battle  was  scarcely 
thase  fresh  troops  coming  up  when  the  twenty-third,  I  over  when,  the  dry  grass  and  shrubs  taking  fire,  a  vol- 
already  overmatched.  C(juld  scai-cely  hold  up  against  the  ume  of  frames  passed  with  inconceivable  rapidity  across 
chas-;eurs,  entirely  broke  them.  Those  wlio  w^ere  not  a  part  of  the  field,  scorching,  in  its  course,  both  the  dead 
killed  or  taken,  made  for  Bassecour's  Spanish  division,   and  the  wounded. 

an  1  so  escaped,  leaving  behind  two  hundred  and  seven  On  the  British  side,  two  generals  (Mackenzie  and 
me!i  and  officers,  or  about  half  the  number  that  went  I  Langwoith),  thirty-one  officers  of  inferior  rank,  and  seven 


into  action 

Daring  this  time  the  hill,  the  key  of  the  position,  was 
again  at'.acked,  and  Lapisse,  crossing  the  ravine,  pressed 
liarJ  upon  the  English  centre ;  his  own  artillery,  aided 
by  the  great  battery  on  his  right,  opened  large  gaps  in 
Sherbrooke's  ranks,  and  the  French  columns  came  close 


hundred  and  sixty-seven  Serjeants  and  soldiers  wei-e  killed 
upon  the  spot ;  three  generals,  a  hundred  and  ninety- 
two  officers,  Three  thousand  seven  hundred  and  eighteen 
searjeants  and  privates  wounded.  Nine  officers,  six 
hundred  and  forty-three  Serjeants  and  soldiers  -were  miss- 
ing; thus  making  a  total  loss  of  six  thousand  two  hun- 


up  to  the  British  line  in  the  resolution  to  w^in  ;  but  they  i  dred  and  sixty-eight,  in  the  two  davs'  fighting,  of  which 


were  received  with  a  general  discharge  of  all  arms,  and 
so  vigorously  encountered,  that  they  gave  back  in  dis- 
order. Under  the  excitement  of  the  moment,  the  brigade 
of  Engli.sli  guards,  quitting  the  line,  followed  up  their 
success  with  inconsiderate  ardour,  when  the  enemy's 
supponting  columns,  and  their  dragoons  advanced,  the 
men  who  had  been  repulsed  turned  again,  and  the 
heavy  French  batteries  pounded  the  flank  and  front  of 
the  sfuards. 

'I'hus  maltreated,  the  latter  drew  back,  and,  at  the 
same  time,  the  German  legion,  being  sorely  jiressed, 
got  int)  confusion.     At  this  moment,  although  Hill's 


five  thousand  four  bundled  and  twenty-two  fell  on  the 
28th. 

The  French  suffered  more  severely  ;  nine  hundred  and 
fort^'-four,  including  two  generals,  were  killed  I*  sijc 
thousand  two  hundred  and  ninety-four  wounded,  one 
hundred  and  fifty-six  prisoners,  furnished  a  total  of  seven 
thousand  three  hundred  and  eighty-nine  men  and  officers, 
of  which  four  thousand  were  of  Victor's  corps,  ten  guns 
were  taken  by  geneial  Canijibell's  division,  and  seven 
were  left  in  the  woods  by  the  French.f 

_  The  Sjianiards  returned  above  twelve  hundred  men, 
killed  and  wounded,  but  the  correctness  of  the  report 
and  Campbell's  divisions,  on  the  extremities  of  the  i  was  vei-y  much  doubted  at  the  time, 
line,  held  fast,  the  centre  of  the  British  was  absolutely  I  The  2i)th,  at  day-break,  the  French  army  quitted  its 
broken,  and  the  fortune  of  the  day  seemed  to  incline  in  I  position,  and,  before  six  o'clock,  was  in  order  of  battle 
favour  of  the  French,  when,  suddenly,  colonel  Donellan  I  on  the  heights  of  Salinas,  behind  the  Alberche.  That 
with  the  forty-eighth  regiment,  was  seen  advancing  j  day,  also,  general  Robert  Craufurd  reached  the  English 
through  the  midst  of  the  disordered  masses.  At  first,  i  camp,  with  the  forty-third,  fifty-second,  and  ninety-fifth 
it  seemed  as  if  this  regiment  mu.st  be  carried  away  by   regiments,  and  immediately  took  charge  of  the  outposts, 


tne  retiring  crowds,  Ijut,  wheeling  back  by  companies 
it  lot  them  pas-i  through  the  intervals,  and  then,  re- 
suming its  proud  and  beautiful  line,  marched  against 
the  right  of  the  pursuing  crtluinns,  and  plied  them  with 
such  a  destructive  musketry,  and  closed  upon  them 
with  such  a  firm  and  regular  pace,  that  the  forward 
movement  of  the  French  was  cheeked.  The  guards 
and  the  (ierinans  immediately  rallied,  a  brigade  of  light 
cavalry  came  up  from  the  second  line  at  a  trot,  the  ar- 
tillery battered  the  enemy's  flanks  without  intermission, 
thy  French  wavered,  lost  their  advantage,  and  the  battle 
was  restored. 

In  all  actions  there  is  one  critical  and  decisive  mo- 
ment which  will  give  the  victory  to  tiie  general  who 
knows  how  to  seize  it.     When   the  guards  first  made 


These  troops,  alter  a  march  of  twenty  miles,  were  in 
bivouac  near  Malpartida  de  Plascncia,  when  the  alarm 
caused  by  the  Spanish  fugitives  spread  to  that  part. 
Craufurd,  fearing  that  the  army  was  pressed,  allowed 
the  men  to  rest  for  a  few  hours,  and  then  wiilidrawing 
about  fifty  of  the  weakest  from  the  ranks,  commenc- 
ed his  march  with  the  resolution  not  to  halt  until  he 
reached  the  field  of  battle.  As  the  brigade  advanced, 
crowds  of  tlu-  runaways  were  met  with,  and  although 
not  all  Spaniards,  all  propagating  the  vilest  falsehoods  : 
'•  the  anriy  icas  defeated,'' — "  Str  Arthur  Welleslcy  was 
kdled,'' — •'  the  Frenrk  were  only  a  few  miles  distant ;" 
nay,  some,  blinded  by  their  fears,  afiected  even 
to  point  out  the  enemy's  advanced  posts  on  the 
nearest   hills.     Indignant   at   this  shameful   scene,  the 


their  rash  cluirge,  sir  Arthur  Wellesiey,  foreseeing  the  I  troops  hastened,  rather  than  slackened,  the  impetu- 
issur^  of  it,  liad  ordered  the  forty-eiL:hth  down  from  the  I  osity  of  their  pace,  and  leaving  only  seventeen  strag* 
hill,  although  a  rough  battle  was  going  on  there,  and,  j  gkrs  behind,  in  twenty-six  hours  crossed  the  field  of 
at  the  same  time,  he  directed  Cotton's  liu-'ht  cavalry  to  |  battle  in  a  close  and  ccmipact  b(;dy  ;  having  in  that 
advance.  '1'he.se  dispositions  gained  the  day.  'J'hejtime  pa.ssed  over  sixty-two  English"  miles,  and  in  the 
French  relaxed  their  effirts  by  degrees,  the  fire  of  the  hottest  .season  of  the  year,  each  man  carrying  frimi 
English  grew  hotter,  and  their  loud  and  confident  fifty  to  sixty  jiounds  weliiht  upon  his  shoulders."  Had 
shouts— sure  augury  of  success — were  heard  along  the.  the  historian  (Jibbon  known  (if  such  a  march,  he  would 
whole  line.  j  have  spared  his  sneer  about  the  "  delicacy  of  modern 

In  the  hands  of  a  great  general,  Joseph's  guards  and   soldiers !" 

the  reserv(!,  which  were  yet  entire,  might  have  restored' . 

the   combat,  but  all    combination   was   at   an  end   on  I     .Marshal  Jourdan,  MSS. 

the  trench  side  ;  the  fourth  corps,  beaten  back  on  the!     t  Someli's  Journal  of  Operations  ofthc  First  Corps,  MSS. 


1809.] 


NAPIER'S    PEN  INSULAR  WAR, 


219 


onsEnvATioxs. 

1.  The  moral  courage  evince;!  Ijy  sir  Arthur  Wel- 
lesley.  when,  with  such  a  coadjutor  as  Cuesta,  lie  ac- 
cept.'(l  battle,  was  not  less  ieniarkal)Ie  than  the  judici- 
ous (I'.spusition  which,  finally,  rendered  him  master  of  the 
field.  Yet  it  is  doub'i'ul  if  he  could  have  niaiiit'iined 
liis  position  had  the  French  been  well  managed,  and 
their  strength  reserved  lor  the  jjrop -r  moment,  instead 
of  bsiiig  wasted  on  isolated  attacks  during  the  night  of 

;  the  "iTtii,  and  the  morning  of  the  2Hth. 

A  pitched  battk^  is  a  great  atfair.  A  good  general 
must  bring  all  the  moral,  as  well  iis  the  physical,  force 
of  his  army  into  play  at  the  same  time  if  he  means  to 
win,  and  all  may  be  too  little.  Marshal  Jourdans 
project  was  conceived  in  this  spirit,  and  worthy  of  his 
reputation ;  and  it  is  possible,  that  he  might  have 
placed  his  army,  unperceived,  on  the  flank  of  the 
English,  and  then  by  a  suddan  and  general  attack  have 
carried  the  key  of  his  position,  thus  commencing  his 
batile  well  :  but  sir  Arthur  ^Vellesley■s  resources  would 
uot  then  have  been  exhausted.  He  had  foreseen  such 
an  occurrence,  and  was  prepared,  by  a  change  of 
front,  to  keep  the  enemy  in  check  with  his  left  wing 
and  cavalry  ;  while  the  right,  marching  upcjn  the  posi- 
tion abandoned  by  the  French,  should  cut  the  latter 
off  from  the  Alberche.  In  this  movement  the  allies 
would  have  been  reinforced  by  Wilson's  corps,  which 
was  near  Cazalegas.  and  the  contending  armies  would 
then  have  exchanged  lines  of  operation.  The  French 
could,  however,  have  gained  nothing,  unless  tliey  won  a 
c  >mplete  victory,  while  the  allies  would,  even  though 
(l.^foated.  have  ensured  their  junction  with  Vcnegas.  I 
Madrid  and  'i'oledo  would  thus  have  fallen  to  thcni,  and 
bjfore  Soult  could  unite  with  Joseph,  a  new  iine  of 
operations,  through  the  fertile  country  of  La  Mancha, 
might  have  been  obtained.  But  these  matters  are  only 
speculative. 

2.  'i'he  distribution  of  the  French  troops  for  the 
great  attack  cannot  be  praised.  The  attempt  to  turn 
the  English  left  with  a  single  division  was  puerile. 
The  allied  cavalry  was  plainly  to  be  seen  in  the  val- 
ley ;  how,  then,  could  a  single  division  hope  to  develope 
its  attack  upon  the  hill,  when  five  thousand  horsemen 
were  hanging  upon  its  fiank  ?  and.  in  fact,  the  whole  of 
RulBn's,  and  the  half  of  Viilatte's  division,  were  par- 
alyzed by  the  charge  of  a  single  regiment.  To  have 
rendered  this  movement  formidable,  the  principal  part 
of  the  French  cavalry  should  have  preceded  the  nuirch 
of  the  infantry ;  but  the  great  error  was  fighting  at  all 
before  riouit  reached  Plasencia. 

3.  It  has  been  said,  that  to  complete  the  victory 
sir  Arthur  Wellesley  should  have  caused  the  Spaniards 
to  advance  ;  this  would,  more  probably,  have  led  to  a 
defeat.  Neither  Cuesta  nor  his  troops  were  capable 
of  an  orderly  movement.  The  infantry  of  the  first  and 
the  fourth  corps  were  still  above  twenty  thousand 
strong,  and,  although  a  repulsed,  by  no  means  a  discom- 
fited force  ;  the  cavalry,  the  king's  guards,  and  Des- 
solle's  division,  had  not  been  engaged  at  all,  and  were 
alone  snilicient  to  beat  the  Spaniards  ;  a  second  panic, 
such  as  tliat  of  the  2Tth,  would  have  led  to  the  most 
depi  )rab!e  c  jn>e'i'ianse3,  as  those,  who  know  with  what 
facility  French  soldiers  recover  from  a  repulse,  will 
readily  acknowledge. 

Tile  battle  of  'I'alavera  was  one  of  hard  honest  figlit- 
ing,  and  the  exceeding  gallantry  of  the  troops  honoured 
the  nations  to  which  they  belonged.  The  English 
owed  much  to  the  general's  dispositions  and  something 
to  fortune.  The  French  owed  nothing  to  their  com- 
mander ;  but  when  it  is  considered  that  only  the  reserve 
of  their  infantry  were  withheld  from  the  great  attack 
on  the  28th,  and  that,  consecpiently,  above  thirty  thou- 
sand men  were  closely  and  unsuccessfnily  engaged  for 
three  hours  with  sixteen  thousand  British,  it  must  be 
confessed  that  the  latter  proved  thetuselvcij  to  be  truly 


formidable  soldiers ;  yet  the  greatest  part  were  raw  men, 
so  lately  drafted  from  the  militia  regiments  that  many 
of  them  still  bore  the  number  of  their  former  regimeuta 
on  their  accoutrements. 


CHAPTER  VIL 

Tlie  kinrr  poes  to  IIlesc:is  with  the  fourth  corp.-'  and  reserve 
— Sir  K.  Wilson  advances  to  Escalona — N'lctor  retires  to 
Maquadii — Conduct  of  tlie  Spaniards  at  Talavcra — Cuesta'a 
crueitv — The  allied  pcnerals  hear  of  Soult'<  movement 
upon  l}anos — Bassecour's  division  marches  towanis  that 
point — Tlie  pass  of  Bauos  forced — Sir  A.  Wellesley 
marches  against  Soult — Proceedings  of  tliat  marshal — llo 
crosses  the  Bt^jar,  and  arrives  at  Plasencia  with  three 
corps  d'anjifie — Cuesta  abandons  the  British  hospitals,  at 
Tuhr.era,  to  the  enemy,  and  retreats  \ipoii  Oropesa — Dan- 
gerous position  of  the  allies — Sir  Arthur  crosses  the  Ta- 
gus  at  Arzobispo — Tiie  French  arrive  near  that  bridge — 
Cuesta  passes  the  Tagus — Coinuat  of  Arzobisj)0 — Soult's 
plans  overruled  by  the  king — Ney  defeats  sir  K.  WilsoQ 
at  Banos,  and  returns  to  France. 

The  French  rested  the  29th  at  Salinas  ;  but,  in  the 
night,  the  king  marched  with  the  4th  corps  and  the  re- 
serve to  St.  Ollalla,  from  whence  he  sent  a  division  to 
relieve  Toledo.  The  31st,  he  halted.  The  1st  of  Au- 
gust he  marched  to  Illescas.  a  central  position,  from 
whence  he  could  interpose  between  Yenegas  and  the 
capital.  The  duke  of  Belluno,  with  the  first  corps,  re- 
mained on  the  Alberche,  having  orders  to  fall  upon  the 
rear-guaid  of  the  allies,  when  the  latter  should  be  f(yrced 
to  retire,  in  consequence  of  Soult's  operations.  Mean- 
time, sir  Robert  Wilson,  who  during  the  action  was  near 
Cazalegas,  returned  to  Escalona,  and  Victor,  dis])Iaying 
an  unaccountaljle  dreaB  of  this  small  body,  which  he 
supposed  to  be  the  precursor  of  the  allied  army,  immedi- 
ately retired,  first  to  Maqueda,  and  then  to  Santa  Cruz 
del  Retamar  ;  he  was  even  proceeding  to  Mostoles,  when 
a  retrograde  movement  of  the  allies  recalled  him  to  the 
Alberche. 

The  British  army  was  so  weak,  and  had  suffered  so 
much,  that  the  29th  and  30th  were  passed,  by  sir  Arthur, 
in  establishing  his  hospitals  at  Talavcra,  and  in  fruitless 
endeavours  to  procure  provisions,  and  the  necessary  a^ 
sistaiice  to  prevent  the  wounded  men  from  perishing. 
Both  Cuesta  and  the  inhabitants  of  Talavera  possessed 
the  means,  but  would  not  render  the  slightest  aid,  nor 
would  they  even  assist  to  bury  the  dead  ;  the  corn  se- 
creted in  Taiavera  was  sufficient  ♦©  support  the  army  for 
a  month,  yet  the  starving  troops  were  kept  in  ignorance 
of  it.  although  the  inhabitants,  who  had  fled  across  the 
Tagus  with  their  portable  effects  at  the  beginning  of  the 
battle,  had  now  returned.  It  is  not  surprising  that,  iu 
such  circumstances,  men  sh(mld  endeavour  to  save  their 
property,  especially  provisions  ;  but  the  apathy  with 
which  they  beheld  the  wounded  men  dying  for  want  of 
aid,  and  those  who  were  sound,  sinking  from  hunger,  did 
in  no  wise  answer  Mr.  Frere's  description  of  them,  as  men 
who  "  Looked  upon  tlie  war  in  the  Itg/it  of  a  crusade,  and 
\  carried  it  on  with  all  the  enthusiasm  of  such  a  cause." 
i  This  conduct  left  uii  indelible  impression  on  the 
i  minds  of  the  English  soldiers.  From  that  period  to  the 
I  end  of  the  war  their  contemjit  and  dislike  of  the  Span- 
!  iards  were  never  effaced,  aiitl  long  afterwards,  Badajos 
j  and  St.  Sebastian  suOiuvd  for  the  churlish  bel;-aviuur 
of  the  people  of  Talavera.  The  principal  motive  of 
I  action  willi  the  Spaniards  was  always  personal^  ran- 
I  cour  :  hence,  those  troops  who  had  behaved  so  ill  m 
j  action,  and  the  inhabitants,  who  withheld  alike  their 
I  sympathy  and  their  aid  from  the  English  soldiers  to 
I  whose  bravery  thev  owed  the  existence  of  their  town, 
were  busily  engaged  after  the  battle,  in  beating  out  the 
brains  of  the  wounded  French  as  they  lay  upon  the 
field  ;  and  they  were  only  checked  by  Ihe  English  sol- 
diers, who,  iu  some  instances,  fired  upon  the  perpetrar 


220 


NAPIERS    r]:NIXSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  Yin. 


tors  of  this  horrible  iniquity.  Cuesla  also  cave  prrofs 
of  his  ferocious  character  ;  he,  who  luid  shown  himself 
aliiio  devoid  of  taknit  and  real  patri(jtism,  he  whcse 
indolence  and  iirnoninee  of  iiis  profession  liad  banisht  d 
all  ordiT  and  discipline  rnni  liis  army,  and  whose  stupid 
pride  had  all  but  caused  its  destruction,  now  a.-;sunied 
the  Roman  j>eneral.  and  proceeded  to  decimate  tlie  rejj^i- 
nu-nts  that  had  fled  iu  the  panic  on  the  27th.  Above 
fifty  men  he  slew  in  this  nuumer  ;  and  if  his  cruelty,  so 
contrary  to  reason  and  the  morals  of  the  ajje,  had  not 
been  mitigated  by  the  earnest  intercession  of  sir  Arthur 
Weilesley,  mure  men  would  have  been  destroyed  in  cold 
blood,  by  this  savage  old  man,  than  had  fallen  iu  the 
battle. 

Hitherto  the  allied  <renerals  had  thouirht  little  of  the 
duke  of  Dalnr.itias  movements,  and  their,  eyes  were 
still  fixed  on  Madrid  ;  but.  the  ."'Oth,  infurmation  was 
received  at  Taiavera.  th.it  twelve  thousand  rations  had 
been  ordered,  fur  the  2Sth,  at  Fuente  Duefia  by  that 
marshal,  and  twenty-four  thousand  at  Los  Santos,  a 
town  situated  between  Alba  de  Tormes  and  the  pass 
of  Banos.*  Cuesta,  conscious  of  the  defenceless  state 
of  the  latter  post,  suggested  that  sir  Robert  Wilson 
should  be  sent  there  ;  but  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  wished 
Wilson  to  remain  at  Escalona,  to  renew  his  intercourse 
with  Madiid,  and  proposed  that  a  Spanish  corps  should 
go  :  indeed,  he  still  sii.:;hted  the  idea  of  danger  from 
that  quarter,  and  hnpecl  that  the  result  of  the  battle 
■would  suHce  to  check  Souk's  march.  Cuesta  rejected 
this  proposal  at  the  moment,  and  again,  on  the  31st, 
when  sir  Arthur  renewed  his  application  ;  but,  on  the 
1st  of  August,  it  was  known  that  Soult  had  entered 
Bejar  ;  and,  on  the  2d,  general  Hassecour  was  detached 
by  Cuesta  to  defend  the  Puerto  de  Banos,  from  which 
he  was  absent  four  long  marches,  while  the  enemy  had 
been,  on  the  31st,  within  one  march. 

The  day  that  Bassecour  marched,  intelligence  arrived 
that  Soult  had  entered  Plasencia.  Banos  had  been 
abandoned  to  the  enemy  without  a  shot  ;  for  the  bat- 
tailous from  Bejar  had  dispersed,  and  those  sent  by 
Cuesta  had  been  withdrawn  to  Aiiuaraz  by  their  gen- 
eral the  marquis  de  la  Reyna.  who  also  proclaimed 
that  he  would  destroy  the  boat-bridge  at  that  place. 
Tiiis  news  rous(>d  Cuesla  ;  he  proposed  that  half  tlie  al- 
lied army  should  march  to  the  rear,  and  attack  Soult ;  I 
sir  Arthur  AVellesley  however  refused  to  divide  the  Eng-  j 
lish  army,  yet  oilered  to  go  or  stay  with  the  whole  ;  and, 
wiien  the  other  desired  him  to  choose,  he  answered  that 
he  would  go,  and  Cu^i^la  appeared  satisfied. 

On  the  night  of  tlu;  Zd  August,  letters  were  received 
from  Wilson,  announcing  the  appearance  of  the  French 
near  Noinbella,  whither  he,  unconscious  of  the  eS'ect 
produced  by  his  presence  at  Escalona,  had  reti-eated 
with  his  infantry,  sending  his  artillery  to  St.  Roman, 
near  Taiavera.  As  sir  Ai-thur  Wellesley  could  not 
suppose  that  sir  Robert  Wilson's  c()r[)S  aione  would 
cause  the  first  corps  to  retire,  he  naturally  concluded 
that  V^ictor's  design  was  t(j  cross  the  Alberehe  at  Esca- 
lona, crush  Wilson,  and  operate  a  conmiuuication  with 
Soult  by  the  valley  ot  the  Tietar.  As  such  a  move- 
ment, if  persisted  in,  wcjuld  neces-sarily  dislodge  Cuesta 
from  'I'a.iavera,  sir  Arthiu-,  before  he  commenced  his 
march,  obtained  the  Spaui-h  general's  promise  that  he 
would  collect  cars,  for  the  purpose  of  traus])orting  as 
many  of  the  English  wounded  as  were  in  a  condition  to 
be  moved,  from  Taiavera  to  some  more  suiiable  place. 
This  promise,  like  ail  the  others,  was  shamefully  violated, 
but  the  British  general  had  not  yet  learned  the  full 
extent  of  Cuesta's  bad  laith,  and  tiiinking  that  a  few 
days  would  suflice  to  drive  back  Soult,  marched,  on  the 
3d  of  August,  with  seventeen  thousand  men,  to  Oro- 
pcsa,  intending  to  unite  with  Bassecour's  division,  and 
to  fight  Soult,  whose  force  he  estimated  at  fifteeu  tliou- 
Baad.  I 

•Bir  A,  Wellesley's  CorrcBpcndence,  I'arl.  Papers,  1810.    I 


Meanwhile,  Soult  being,  by  the  return  of  general 
Foy,  on  the  2-Uh  of  July,  assured  of  the  king's  concur* 
rence  in  the  combined  movements  to  be  executed, 
ordered  Laborde,  Merle,  and  La  Houssaye  to  march 
from  Zuniora  and  Toro  upon  Salamanca  and  Ledesma, 
and  to  scour  the  banks  of  the  Tormes.*  The  sixth  coma 
was  also  directed  upon  the  same  place,  and,  the  2.ot!i, 
Soult  repaired  to  Salamanca  in  person,  intendmg  to 
unite  the  three  corps  there.  Hearing,  however,  of  Vic^ 
tor's  retrograde  movement  from  the  Ali)erche  to  the 
Guadarama,  he  desired  marshal  Mortier  to  march,  on 
the  28;h,  to  Plaseucia,  by  Fuente  Roble  and  Bejar,  and 
he  placed  La  Houssaye's  and  Lorge's  dragoons  under 
his  command  ;  the  remainder  of  the  second  coips  and 
the  light  cavalry  were  to  follow  when  the  sixth  corpa 
should  be  in  motion.  This  done,  Soult  wrote  to  the 
king,  saying,  "  I\lij  urgent  dcsne  is  that  your  majesty 
maij  not  fight  a  general  battle  before  ijoti  are  certain  of 
the  concentration  of  all  mi/  forces  near  Plasencia.  The 
most  important  results  will  he  cbtamed  if  your  majesty 
tcill  abstain  from  attacldng  until  the  moment  ichen  a 
knowledge  of  my  inarch  causes  the  enemy  to  retrace  his 
steps,  which  he  must  do,  or  he  is  lost." 

The  29th.  the  fifth  corps  was  at  Fuente  Ruble ;  but 
information  being  received  that  Beresford,  with  an  army, 
had  reached  Almeida  on  the  27th,  the  march  was  covered 
by  strong  dctaciiments  on  the  side  of  Ciudad  Rodiugo. 
The  long-expected  convoy  of  artillery  and  ammunition 
for  the  second  corps  had,  however,  arrived  in  Salamanca 
the  29th  ;  and  Nev  wrote,  from  Toro,  that  he  also  woulf* 
be  there  the  31st.  ' 

The  30th,  the  fifth  corps  drove  the  marquis  de  la 
Reyna  from  the  pass  of  Phinos,  and  took  post  at  Aldea 
Nueva  del  Camina  and  Herbas  ;  and  the  second  corps, 
quitting  Salamanca,  arrived,  the  same  day,  at  Siete 
Carrera. 

The  31st,  the  fifth  corps  entered  Plasencia  ;  the  second 
corps  reached  Fuente  la  Casa,  Fuente  Roble,  San  Es- 
tevan,  and  Los  Santos. 

Plasencia  was  full  of  convalescents,  detachments,  and 
non-combatants,  and  Avhen  the  French  arrived,  about 
two  thousand  men,  including  five  hundred  of  the  Lusita- 
nian  legion,  evacuated  the  town,  taking  the  road  to 
Moraleja  and  Zarza  Mayor  ;  yet  four  hundred  sick  men, 
following-  the  enemy's  accounts,  were  captured,  together 
with  a  few  stores.  During  these  rapid  marches,  the 
French  were  daily  harassed  by  the  Spanish  peasantry, 
the  villages  were  deserted,  the  cavalry  wandered  far  and 
near  to  procure  subsistence,  and  several  slight  skirmishes 
and  some  pillage  took  place. 

The  1st  of  August,  the  second  corps  passed  the  Col 
de  Banos,  and  the  head  of  the  column  entered  Plasen- 
cia, which  was,  like  other  places,  deserted  by  the 
greatest  part  of  the  inhabitants.  Vague  reports  that  a 
battle  had  been  fought  between  the  2Gth  and  29th  was 
the  only  intelligence  that  could  be  procured  of  the  situ- 
ation of  the  allies,  and  on  the  second,  the  advanced 
guard  of  the  army  marched  to  the  Venta  de  Bazagona, 
while  scouting  jiarties  were,  at  the  same  time,  directed 
towards  Coria,  to  acquire  news  of  marshal  Beresford, 
who  was  now  said  to  be  moving  along  the  Portuguese 
frontier. 

'I"he  3d  of  August,  the  fifth  corps  and  the  dragoons, 
passing  the  Tietar,  reached  Toril,  the  outposts  were 
pushed  to  Cazatejada  and  Sierra  de  Rt<iuemeda,  but 
the  second  c<u-[)s  remained  at  Plasencia,  awaiting  the 
arrival  of  the  sixth  corps,  the  head  of  which  was  now 
at  Banos.  Hence,  on  the  3d  of  August,  the  kuig  and 
.'-^ebastiani  being  at  lllescas  and  Valdemoro,  Victor  at 
Ma()ueda.  Cuesta  at  Taiavera,  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  at 
Oropesa,  and  Soult  on  the  'i'ietar,  the  narrow  valley  of 
the  'I'agus  was  crowded  iu  its  whole  length  by  the  con- 
tending trooi)s. 

The  allies  held  the  centre,  being  only  one  day's  march 


*  S.  Jourual  of  Opcrationa  iid  corps,  MS. 


1809.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


221 


asunder,  bat  tlieir  force,  when  concentrated,  was  not 
more  than  forty-seven  thousand  men.  The  Frencli  could 
not  unite  under  three  days,  but  their  combined  forces 
exceeded  ninety  thousand  men,  of  wliich  fifty-tlu'cje  tliou- 
saiid  were  under  Soult.  Tliis  singular  situation  was 
rendered  more  remarkable  by  the  ignorance  in  which 
all  parties  were  as  to  the  strength  and  movements  of 
their  adversaries.  Victor  and  the  king,  frightened  by 
Wilson's  partizan  corps  of  four  thousand  men,  were 
preparing  to  unite  at  Mostoles,  while  Cuesta,  eciually 
•larmed  at  Victor,  was  retiring  from  Talavera.  Sir 
Arthur  Wellesley  was  supposed,  by  Joseph,  to  be  at 
the  head  of  twenty-five  thousand  British  ;  and  the  for- 
jiuu",  calculating  on  Soult's  weakness,  was  marching  with 
t\iK,'uty-l.hree  thousand  Spanish  and  English,  to  engage 
fifty-tliree  thousand  French  ;  while  Soult,  unaljle  to  as- 
certain the  exact  situation  of  either  friends  or  enemies, 
liUle  suspected  that  the  prey  was  rushing  into  his  jaws. 
At  this  moment  the  fate  of  the  Peninsula  hung  by  a 
tiiread,  which  could  not  bear  tne  weight  for  twenty-four 
hours,  yet  fortune  so  ordained  that  no  irreparable  dis- 
aster ensued. 

At  five  o'clock  in  the  evening  of  the  3d,  it  was  known 
at  the  English  head-quarters  that  the  French  were  near 
Naval  Moral,  and  consequently,  between  the  allies  and 
the  brige  of  Almaraz. 

At  six  o'clock,  letters  from  Cuesta  advised  sir  Ar- 
ihiiv  that  the  king  was  again  advancing,  and  that,  from 
intercepted  despatches  addressed  to  Soult,  it  appeared 
that  the  latter  must  be  stronger  than  was  supposed  ; 
wherefore  Cuesta  said,  that  wishing  to  aid  the  English, 
be  would  ijuit  Talavera  that  evening  :  in  other  words, 
abandon  t!ie  Britisli  hospitals  ! 

To  this  unexpected  communication  sir  Arthur  replied 
that  the  king  was  still  some  marches  ofl',  and  that  Ve- 
negas  should  be  directed  to  occupy  him  on  the  Upper 
Tagus  ;  that  Soult's  strength  was  exceedingly  overrated, 
and  Victor's  movements  not  decided  enough  to  oblige 
the  Spanish  army  to  quit  Talavera ;  wherefore  he  re- 
quired that  Cuesta  should  at  least  wait  until  the  next 
niirruing,  to  cover  the  evacuation  of  the  English  hospi- 
tals. Bat,  before  this  communication  reached  Cuesta, 
he  was  in  full  march,  and,  at  day-break  on  the  4th,  the 
Spanish  army  was  descried  moving,  in  several  columns, 
down  the  valley  towards  Oropesa  ;  Bassecour's  division 
soon  after  joined  it  from  Centinello,  and  at  the  same 
tiniii,  the  cavalry  patroles  found  the  French  near  Naval 
Mural. 

Sir  Arthur  Wellesley  having,  by  this  time,  seen  the 
intercepted  letters  himself,  became  convinced  that  Soult's 
force  was  not  overrated  at  thirty  thousand  ;  and  the 
dulte  of  Ualmatia,  who  had  also  intercepted  some  Eng- 
lish letters,  learned  that,  on  the  first  of  August,  the  allies 
were  still  at  Talavera,  and  ill-informed  of  his  march. 
Thus,  the  one  general  perceived  his  danger  and  the  other 
bis  advantage  at  the  same  moment. 

Mortier  was  immediately  ordered  by  the  duke  of 
Dalmatia,  to  take  a  position  with  the  fifth  corps  at 
Cazatejada,  to  seize  the  boat-bridge  at  Almaraz,  if  it 
was  not  destroyed,  and  to  patrole  towards  Arzobispo ; 
the  second  corps  was,  likewise,  directed  upon  the 
same  place,  and  the  head  of  the  6th  entered  Plasencia. 
The  further  progress  of  the  allies  was  thus  barred  in 
front ;  the  Tagus  was  on  their  loft ;  impassable  moun- 
tains on  their  right ;  and  it  was  certain  that  Cuesta's 
retreat  would  immediately  bring  the  king  and  Victor 
down  upon  their  rear.  The  peril  of  this  situation  was 
apparent  to  every  soldier  in  the  British  ranks,  and  pro- 
duced a  general  inquietude.  No  man  felt  the  slightest 
confidence  in  the  Spaniards,  and  the  recollection  of  the 
stern  conflict  at  'I'alavera,  aided  by  a  sense  of  exhaus- 
tion from  long  abstinence,  depressed  the  spirits  of  men 
and  officers.  The  army  was  indeed  ready  to  fight, 
but  all  persons  felt  that  it  nmst  be  for  safety,  not  lor 
gl.ji-y. 


In  this  trying  moment,  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  abated 
nothing  of  his  usual  calmness  and  fortitude,  lie  knew 
not  indeed  the  full  extent  of  the  danger  ;  but,  assuming 
the  enemy  in  his  front  to  be  thirty  thousand  men,  and 
Victor  to  have  twenty-five  thousand  others  in  his  rear, 
he  judged  that  to  continue  the  (jfiijnsive  would  be  rsush, 
because  he  must  fight  and  beat  th(jse  two  marshals  sepa- 
rately within  three  days,  which,  with  starving  and  tired 
troops,  inferior  in  number,  was  scarcely  to  be  accom- 
j)lished.  'I'o  remain  where  he  was,  on  the  defensive, 
was  eijually  unpromising ;  because  the  road  from  Tala- 
vera to  Arzobispo  led  through  Calera,  in  the  rear  of 
Oropesa,  and  thus  Victor  could  intercept  the  only  line 
of  retreat ;  a  battle  must  then  be  fought,  in  an  un- 
favourable position,  against  the  united  forces  of  the 
enemy,  estinuited,  as  we  have  seen,  to  be  above  fifty 
thousand  men.  One  resource  remained  :  to  pass  the 
bridge  of  j\.rzobispo  immediately,  and  take  up  a  line 
of  defence  behind  th.at  river,  before  the  French  could 
seize  the  Col  de  Mirabete,  and  so  cut  off  the  road  to 
Truxillo  and  Merida— a  hard  alternative  ;  but  the  long 
cherished  error  relative  to  Soult's  weakness  had  dried 
up  the  springs  of  success,  and  left  the  campaign,  like  a 
withered  stem,  without  fruit  or  foliage. 

Cuesta  doggedly  opposed  this  project,  asserting  that 
Oropesa  was  a  position  suitalile  for  a  battle,  and  that  he 
woe.ld  fight  there.  Further  concession  to  his  humours 
would  have  been  folly,  and  sir  Arthur  sternly  declared 
that  he  would  move  forthwith,  leaving  the  Spanish 
general  to  do  that  which  should  seem  meet  to  him  : 
and,  assuredly,  this  decided  conduct  saved  the  Penin- 
sula, for  not  fifty,  but  ninety  thousand  enemies  were  at 
hand. 

It  was  DOW  six  o'clock  in  the  morning,  the  baggage 
and  amnuuiition  were  already  in  motion  for  the  bridge 
of  Arzobispo,  but  the  army,  which  had  been  reinforced 
by  a  troop  of  horse-artillery,  and  some  convalescents 
that  escaped  from  Plasencia,  remained  in  position  for 
several  hours,  to  cover  the  passage  of  stores  and  wound- 
ed men  from  Talavera,  who  had  just  arrived  at  Calera 
in  the  most  pitiable  condition.  About  noon,  the  road 
being  clear,  the  colunms  marched  to  the  bridge,  and, 
at  two  o'clock,  the  whole  army  was  in  position  at  the 
other  side,  the  immediate  danger  was  averted,  and  the 
combinations  of  the  enemy  were  baffled.  During  the 
passage,  several  herds  of  swine,  which,  following  the 
custom  of  the  country,  had  been  feeding  in  the  woods, 
under  charge  of  the  swineherds,  were  fallen  in  with, 
and  the  soldiers,  instigated  by  hunger,  broke  their 
ranks,  and  ran  in  upon  the  animals  as  in  a  charge, 
shooting,  stabbing,  and,  like  men  possessed,  cutting 
Oi'f  the  flesh  while  the  beasts  were  yet  alive  ;  nor  can 
this  conduct  be  much  censured  under  the  circumstancea 
of  the  moment,  although  it  was  a  severe  misfortune 
to  the  poor  peasants,  whose  property  was  thus  de- 
stroyed. 

From  Arzobispo,  the  army  moved  towards  Dcleytoza, 
and  general  Craufurd's  brigade,  having  six  pieces  of 
artillery  attached,  was  directed  to  gain  the  bridge 
of  Almaraz  by  a  forced  march,  lest  the  enemy,  dis- 
covering the  ford  below  that  place,  should  cross  the 
river,  and  seize  the  Puerto  de  Mirabete.  The  roads 
were  exceedingly  rugged,  and  the  guns  could  only  be 
dragged  up  the  Meza  d'lbor  by  the  force  of  men ; 
nevertheless,  Craufurd  reached  his  destination  on  the 
evening  of  the  5th,  and  the  head-quarters  were  estab- 
lished at  Deleytoza,  on  the  7th,  the  artillery  being  at 
Cam];)illo,  the  rear-guard  occupying  the  Meza  dlbor. 
The  sick  and  wounded  were  then  forwarded  to  Merida, 
but  the  paucity  of  transport  was  such,  that  sir  Arthur 
Wellesley  was  obliged  to  unload  both  anmnmition  and 
treasure  carts  for  the  conveyance  of  these  unfortunate 
men.  Meanwhile  Soult,  little  thinking  that  his  object 
was  already  fru  ;trated,  continued  his  march  on  the  5th, 
and  Morlicr  lOi;k  post  al  Na\al  Moral ;  the  advanced 


NAPIER'S    PEXIXSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  VIH. 


giuird  entercil  Pncbla  do  Naciada.  and  the  patrolcs, 
BcoiiriiiG:  the  road-;  to  Oroposa  and  the  hridue  of  Arzo- 
bisp.i,  fell  ill  with  and  were  chased  by  the  Spaiiisli 
cavalry  from  Arz;)hispo  ;  for  Cuosta  would  not  retire 
on  the  Ith.  and  was  in  the  act  of  pa-^siiie  the  bridLTC 
when  th;'  Fiench  came  in  view.  The  movements  were 
now  hurried  on  both  sidf'S.  Before  dark,  the  Spanish 
army  was  across  the  Tajrus,  with  the  excejition  of  a 
rear-j>-iiard,  which  remained  on  the  right  bank  that 
evening,  bat  it  was  driven  across  the  river,  nn  tlie 
niorniii','  of  the  6th.  by  the  fifth  corps,  which  after- 
wards took  p  )st  at  Valdeveja  and  I'liehla  do  Naciada. 
Ney  also  reached  Naval  .Nloral,  and  the  second  corps 
entered  Gordo. 

'I'lie  7th  Mortier  e\amined  the  Spani.sh  position,  and 
repo!-ted  that  (fiesta,  having  thrown  up  entrenchments. 
and  ])lac?d  twenty  guns  in  battery,  to  rake  the  bridge, 
wliich  was  also  barricadoed,  had  left  two  divisions  of 
infantry  and  one  of  cavalry  to  hold  the  post,  and  with- 
drawn the  rest  of  his  army  towards  Meza  d'Ibor.  Here- 
upon, Smlt  detached  his  light  cavalry  towards  Talavera, 
to  communicate  with  the  king,  and  brought  up  the 
second  corj^  to  Arzobispo.  Meanwhile,  the  diike  of 
Belluni)  having,  on  the  .")ih.  ascertained  the  retreat  of 
the  allies  from  Tidavera.  retraced  his  steps,  and  entered 
that  town  on  the  Gth  ;  thus  the  English  wounded,  left 
there,  fell  into  his  hands,  and  their  treatment  was  such 
as  might  be  exijccted  from  a  gallant  and  courteous  na- 
tion ;  between  the  British  soldiers  and  the  French,  there 
was  no  rancour,  and  the  generous  usages  of  a  civilized 
and  honourable  warfare  were  cherished. 

The  7th,  Victor  crossed  the  Tngus,  at  the  lirid'jfe  of 
Talavera,  and  puslied  his  advanced  guard  to  Aldea 
Naeva  de  Balbaroya,  on  the  left  bank,  within  a  few- 
leagues  of  the  Spaiiisli  p  ;sition,  which  Soult  was  pre- 
paring to  attack  in  front ;  for  he  had  observed  that,  at 
a  certain  point,  the  Spanish  horses,  when  brought  to 
drink,  came  far  into  the  stream  ;  and,  the  place  being 
sounded  in  the  night  of  the  7th.  a  deep  but  practicable 
ford  was  discovered,  about  half  a  mile  above  the 
brida-e. 

The  fifth  and  second  corps  and  a  division  of  the 
sixth  were  concentrate<l,  to  force  this  passage,  early  on 
the  m:)rning  of  the  8th  ;  but  Soult  being  just  then  in- 
formed of  Victor's  movement,  and.  ])erceiving  that  Al- 
buquerque had  withdrawn  the  Spanish  cavalry,  leaving 
only  a  rear  guard  in  the  works,  judged  that  the  allies 
were  retreating ;  wherefore,  without  relin(|uishing  the 
attack  at  Arzobispo,  ho  immediately  sent  the  division 
of  the  sixth  corps  back  to  Naval  Mor.il,  and,  at  the 
same  time,  transmitted  a  plan  of  the  ford  below  Alma- 
raz,  directed  Ney  to  cross  the  'I'agus  there,  sei.-je  the 
Puerto  de  Mirabete,  and  be  in  readiness  to  fall  upon 
the  allies,  as  they  came  out  from  tlie  defiles  between 
Deleytoza  and  Truxillo.  IMeanwhilo  the  heat  of  the 
day  had  induced  Alliuf;ner(|ue  to  .seek  shelter  for  his 
liorsemen  in  a  wood,  near  Azutan,  a  village  about  Ave 
miles  from  the  bri<lge  ;  and  the  Si)anish  infantry,  keei> 
ing  a  bad  guard,  were  sleeping  or  loitering  about  with- 
out care  or  thought,  when  .Mortier,  who  was  charged 
with  the  direction  of  the  attack,  taking  advantage  of 
their  want  of  vigilance,  connnciuced  the  passage  of  the 
river. 

COM  HAT    OF    AUZOBISPO. 

The  French  cavalry,  about  six  thousand  in  number, 
v/cre  secretly  assembled  near  the  ford,  and,  about  two 
o'clock  in  the  day,  general  (\iulaiiicourt's  brigade  sud- 
denly entered  the  stream.  The  Spaniards,  running  to 
their  arms,  numned  the  batteries,  and  opened  upon  the 
leading  .';()uadrons,  but  Morlier,  with  a  powerfd  con- 
centric fire  of  artillery,  immediately  overwheln.  id  the 
Spanish  gunners;  and  Caulaincourt,  having  ;Mched 
the  other,  side  of  the  river,  turned  to  his  righv  and, 
taiiuig  the  batferi'.s  in  rev;'rse,  cut  down  the  art   lery- 


men,  and  dispensed  the  infantry  who  attempted  to  form. 
The  duke  of  Albuquenpie,  who  had  mounted  at  the 
first  alarm,  now  came  down  with  all  his  hor.semen  in  one 
mass,  but  without  order,  upon  Caulaincourt,  and  the 
latter  was  in  imminent  danger,  when  the  rcfct  of  the 
French  cavalry,  passing  rajiidly,  joined  in  the  combat  ; 
one  brigade  of  infanti-y  followed  at  the  ford,  another 
burst  the  barriers  on  the  bridge  itself,  and,  by  this  time, 
the  Spanish  foot  wius  flying  to  the  mountains.  Albu- 
querque's cflbrt  was  thus  frustrated,  a  general  rout  en- 
sued, and  five  guns  and  about  four  hundred  prisoners 
wei'c  taken. 

Soult's  intention  being  to  follow  up  this  success,  he 
directed  that  the  first  corps  should  move,  in  two  col- 
unnis,  upon  Guadalupe  and  Deleytoza,  intending  to 
support  it  with  the  second  and  filth,  while  the  sixth 
corps  crossed  the  Almaraz,  and  seized  the  pass  of  ]\Iirar 
bete.  This  would  undoubtedly  have  completed  the 
ruin  of  the  Spanish  army,  and  forced  sir  Arthur  to  make 
a  rapid  and  disastrous  retreat ;  for  so  complete  was  the 
surprise  and  so  sudden  the  overthrow  that  some  of  the 
I'higlish  foragers  also  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy  ; 
and  that  Cuesta's  army  was  in  no  condition  to  have 
made  any  resistance,  if  the  pursuit  had  been  continued 
with  vi'^'our,  is  clear  from  the  following  facts  : — 

1.  When  he  withdrew  his  main  Ijody  from  the  bridge 
of  Arzobispo  to  Peralada  de  Garbin.  on  the  7th.  he  left 
fifteen  pieces  of  artillery  by  the  road-side,  without  a 
guard.     The  defeat  (jf  Albuquerque  placed  these  guna 
at  the  rciercy  of  the  enemy,  who  were,  however,  igno- 
rant of  their  situation,  until  a  trumpeter  attending  an 
English  flag  of  truce,  either  treacherously  or  foolishly, 
mentioned  it  in  the  French  camp,  from  whence  a  de- 
tachment of  cavalry  was  sent  to  fetch  them  off.     2.  The 
British   military  agent,  placed  at  the   Spanish   head- 
'  quarters,  was  kept  in  ignorance  of  the  action  ;  and  it 
!  was  only  by  the  arrival  of  the  duke  of  Albu(|uerqne,  at 
j  Deleytoza,  on  the  evening  of  the  91h,  that  sir  Arthur 
i  AVellesley   knew    the    bridge   was   lost.      lie   had    be- 
;  fore  advised  Cuesta  to  withdraw  behind  the  Ibor  river, 
!  and  even  now  contemplated  a  partial  attack  to  keep  the 
j  enemy  in  check  ;  but  when  he  repaiied  in  person  to  that 
I  general's  quarter,  on   the   10th,  he  found  the  country 
j  covered   with  fugitives  and  stragglers,  and   Cuesta  as 
j  helpless  and  yet  as  haughty  as  ever.     All  his  ammuni- 
tion and  guns  (forty  pieces)  were  at  the  right  bank  of 
I  the  Ibor,  and,  of  course,  at  the  foot  of  the  Meza,  and 
within  sight  and  cann(ui-shot  of  the  ene.tiy,  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Tagus ;  they  would  ha\e  been  taken  by  the 
first  French  patroles  that  approached,  but  that  sir  Ar- 
thur Wellesley  persuaded  the  Spanish  stall'-officers  to 
have  them  dragg-ed  up  the  hill,  in  the  course  of  the  10th, 
without  Cuesta's  knowledge. 

In  this  state  of  affairs,  the  impending  f\ite  of  the  Pe- 
ninsula was  again  averted  by  the  king,  who  recalled  the 
finst  corps  to  the  sup))ort  of  the  fourth,  then  ojiposed  to 
Venegas.  Marshal  Ney,  also,  was  unable  to  discover 
the  ford  below  the  bridge  of  Almaraz,  and,  by  the  11th, 
the  allies  had  re-cstal)lished  their  line  of  defence.  'Jlie 
head-quarters  of  the  Hrilish  were  at  Jaraicejo,  and  thos§ 
of  the  S])aniards  at  Deleytoza  ;  the  former,  guarding  the 
fort  of  Almaraz,  formed  the  left ;  the  latter,  occujiying 
the  Meza  d'Ibor  and  Campillo,  were  on  the  right.  'J"he 
12lh,  Cuesta  resigned,  (ieneral  Eguia  succeeded  to  the 
comnumd,  and  at  first  gave  hopes  of  a  better  co-o])eration, 
but  the  evil  was  in  the  character  of  the  people.  'I'he 
position  of  the  allies  was.  however,  compact  and  central ; 
the  reserves  could  easily  sup])ort  the  advanced  posts; 
the  communication  to  the  reiir  was  o])en,  and  if  delemled 
with  courage,  the  Meza  d'Ibor  was  imiiregnable  ;  and 
to  pass  the  Tagus  at  Almaraz.  in  itself  a  difficult  opera- 
lion,  would,  while  the  Mirabete  and  Meza  d'Ibor  were 
occulted,  have  been  dangerous  for  the  French,  as  lliey 
would  be  enclosed  in  the  narrow  space  betweeu  those 
ridy:cs  and  the  river. 


1809.1 


NAPIER'S    PEXIXSULAR    WAR. 


223 


The  duke  of  Da'matia,  thus  tlnvarted,  conceived  that 
sir  Arth'.ii-  Welles'ey  would  en  ioavour  to  repass  the 
'Pauns  Ijy  Alcantara,  and  so  rejoin  PJeresford  and  the 
five  thou '-and  Erilish  troops  under  Catlin  Craufiud  and 
Li^:htburn.  which  were,  by  this  time,  near  the  IVontier 
of  Portugal.  'J'o  prevent  this  he  resoveil  to  march  at 
onc2  upon  Coria,  with  the  second,  {il'ih,  and  sixth 
orp-',  threaten  both  Beresfbrd's  and  sir  Arthur's  con»- 
mnnication  with  Lisbon,  and,  at  the  same  time,  pre- 
pare for  the  siege  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo ;  but  marshal 
Ney  absolutely  refused  to  concur  in  this  operation,  lie 
observL-d  tliat  sir  Arthur  We!lesley  was  not  yet  in 
march  for  Alcantara  ;  that  it  was  exceedingly  danger- 
ous to  invad.'  Portugal  in  a  hasty  manner ;  and  tliat 
the  army  ould  not  be  fed  between  Coria,  Plasencia, 
an.I  the  Tagus  ;  finally,  that  Salamanca,  being  again 
in  possession  of  the  Sjoaniards,  it  was  moi-e  fitting  that 
the  sixth  corps  should  retake  that  town,  and  occupy 
the  line  of  the  Tormes  to  cover  Castile.  'J'his  reason- 
ing was  approved  by  Joseph,  who  dreaded  the  further 
fatigue  and  privations  that  would  attend  a  continuance 
of  the  operation::  during  the  excessive  heats,  and  in  a 
wasted  country  ;  and  he  was  strengthened  in  his  opin-« 
ion  by  the  receipt  of  a  despatch  from  the  emperor,  dated 
^  Schoenbrun,  the  29th  of  July,  in  which  any  further  of- 
P  fensive  operations  were  forbade,  until  the  reinforcements 
Avliich  the  recent  victoi-y  of  Wagrani  enabled  him  to 
send  should  arrive  in  Spain.  The  second  corps  wa.';, 
conseciuently,  directed  to  take  post  at  Plasencia ;  the 
fifth  corps  relieved  the  first  at  Talavera  ;  and  the  Eng- 
lish wounded  being-,  by  V^ictor,  given  over  to  marshal 
Mortier,  the  latter,  with  a  chivalrous  sense  of  honour, 
would  n:it  permit  his  own  soldiers,  although  suffering 
severe  privations  themselves,  to  receive  rations  until 
the  hospitals  were  first  supplied  ;  the  sixth  corps  was 
dirL*eted  upon  V'alladolid,  lor  Joseph  was  alarmed 
lest  a  fresh  insnrrectioti  excited  and  supported  by  the 
duke  del  Par<iue,  should  spread  over  the  whole  of  Leon 
and  Castile. 

Ney  marched  on  the  11th:  but,  to  his  surprise, 
found  that  sir  Robert  Wilson,  with  about  four  thousand 
men,  part  Spaniards,  part  Portuguese,  was  in  posses- 
sion of  the  puss  of  Baiios.  To  explain  tliis,  it  must  be 
oi)served,  that  when  the  British  army  mai-ched  fiom 
Talavera,  on  the  3d.  Wilson,  being  at  Nnmbella,  was 
put  in  communication  with  Cuesta.  He  had  sent  his 
artillery  to  the  army  on  the  3d,  and  on  the  4th.  finding 
that  the  Spaniards  had  abandoned  Talavera,  he  fell 
back  with  his  infantry  to  Vellada,  a  few  miles  north 
of  Talavera.  He  was  then  twenty-four  miles  from 
Arzobispo,  and,  as  Cuesta  did  not  quit  Oropesa  until 
the  5th,  a  junction  with  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  might 
have  been  effected  ;  but  it  was  impossible  to  know  this 
at  the  time,  and  Wilson,  vei-y  prudently,  crossing  the 
Tietar,  made  for  the  mountains,  trusting  to  his  activity 
and  local  knowledge  to  escape  the  enemy.  Villatte's 
division  j/ursued  him,  on  tlie  .5th,  to  Nombella ;  a  de- 
tachment from  the  garrison  of  Avila  was  watching  for 
him  in  tlie  passes  of  Arenas  and  Monboltran  ;  and  gen- 
eral Foy  waited  for  him  in  the  Vera  de  Plasencia. 
Nevertheless,  Ijaffling  his  opponents,  he  broke  through 
the?!'  circle  at  Viandar.  passed  the  Credos  at  a  ridge 
called  the  Sierra  de  Lanes,  and.  getting  into  the  valley 
of  the  Tormes,  reached  Bejar  :  from  thence,  thinking  to 
recover  his  communications  with  the  army,  he  marched 
towards  Plasencia.  by  the  pass  of  Batios,  and  thus,  on 
the  morning  of  the  12th,  met  with  Ney,  returning  to  the 
Salamanca  country. 

The  dust  of  the  French  column  being  seen  from  afar, 
and  a  retreat  to  Ciudad  Rodrigo  ojien.  it  is  not  easy  to 
comprehend  why  sir  Robert  Wilson  should  have  given 
battle  to  the  sixth  corps.  His  position,  although  diffi- 
cult of  approach,  and  strengthened  by  the  piling  of 
large  ston(«  in  the  narrowe^st  parts,  was  not  one  in 
which  he  could  hope  to  stop  a  whole  army  ;  and,  ac- 


cordingly, when  the  French,  overcoming  the  local  ob- 
stacles, got  close  upon  his  left,  the  fight  was  at  an  end  ; 
the  first  charge  broke  both  the  legion  and  the  S])anish 
auxiliaries,  and  the  whole  di.'-persed.  Ney  continued 
his  march,  and,  having  recovered  the  line  of  the  Tormes, 
resigned  the  command  of  the  sixth  C(;rps  to  general 
Marchand,  and  returnd  to  France.  But,  while  these 
things  happened  in  Esti'emadura,  La  Claudia  was  the 
theatre  of  more  important  operations. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

Vcnesras  advances  to  Aranjups — Skirmishes  there — Scha.s- 
tiuni  crosses  the  Tagus  at  Toledo— Venegas  eoiieentrntts 
liis  army — Buttle  of  Abiionaeid — Sir  Arthur  \\ellfwley 
contemplates  p:issing  the  Tagus  at  the  Puente  de  Cardinal, 
is  prevented  liy  the  ill-conduet  of  tlie  junta — His  troops 
distressed  for  provisions — He  resolves  to  retire  into  Por- 
tugal— False  cliarge  made  by  Cuesta  atrainst  the  British 
army  refuted — Eeresfovd's  proceedinsrs — Mi-.  Frere  super- 
seded by  ]^ord  Wellesley — The  Eiiglisli  army  abiiutious 
its  position  iit  Jaraceijo  and  marehes  towards  Portujral — 
Consternation  of  the  junta — Sir  A.  Wellesley  defends  his 
eouduct,  and  refuses  to  remnin  in  Spain — Takes  a  ])osition 
within  the  Ptirtuguese  frontier — Siekuess  in  the  army. 

Whex  the  duke  of  Belluno  retired  from  Salinas  to 
Marpieda,  the  king,  fearing  that  the  allies  were  moving 
up  the  right  bank  of  the  Alberche,  carried  his  reserve, 
in  the  niuht  of  the  3d,  to  Mostoles  ;  but  the  fourth  corps 
remained  at  lllescas,  and  sent  strong  patroles  to  Valde- 
moro.  Wilson,  however,  retired,  as  we  have  seen,  Irom 
Nombella,  on  the  4th  ;  and  the  king,  no  longer  expect- 
ing the  allies  in  that  quarter,  marched  in  the  night  to 
Valdemoro,  wdiere  he  was  joined  by  the  fourth  corps 
from  lllescas. 

The  5th,  the  duke  of  Belluno  returned  to  St.  Ollalla  ; 
and  the  king  marched  against  general  Venegas,  who.  ia 
pursuance  of  the  secret  orders  of  the  junta,  before  men- 
tioned, had  loitered  about  Daymiel  and  Tembleque  until 
the  27th  of  July.  It  was  the  29tli  before  Veiieaas 
reached  Ocana,  his  advanced  posts  being  at  Aranjuez, 
his  rear-guard  at  Yepes,  and  one  division,  under  Lacy, 
in  front  of  Toledo  ;  the  same  day,  one  of  the  partnlas, 
attending  the  army,  surjjrised  a  small  French  post  on 
the  other  side  of  the  'J'agus,  and  Lacy's  division  skir- 
mished with  the  garrison  of  'i'oiedo. 

'J'he  30th,  Venegas  heard  of  the  battle  of  Talavera, 
and  at  the  same  time  Lacy  reported  that  the  head  of  the 
enemy's  column  were  to  be  seen  on  the  road  beyond 
Toledo.  Hennipon  the  Spanish  commauder  reinibrced 
Lacy,  and  gave  him  Mora  as  a  point  of  retreat :  but,  on 
the  2d  of  August,  being  falsely  informed  by  Cuesta  that 
the  allied  troops  would  immediately  march  upon  Madrid, 
Venegas  recalled  his  divisions  from  Toledo,  pretending- 
to  concentrate  his  army  at  Aranjuez,  in  order  to  march 
also  upon  the  capital ;  yet  he  had  no  intention  of  doing 
so,  for  the  junta  did  not  desire  to  see  Cuesta.  at  the 
head  of  sixty  thousand  men,  in  that  city,  and,  previous 
to  the  battle  of  Talavera,  had  not  only  forbidden  him 
to  enter  Madrid,  but  appointed  another  man  governor. 
This  prohibition  would,  no  doubt,  have  been  disregarded 
by  Cuesta,  but  Venegas  w-as  obedient  to  their  secret 
instructions,  and  under  pretence  of  danger  to  his  flanks, 
if  he  inarched  on  the  capital,  remained  at  Aranjuez, 
where  his  flank  being  equally  expo.sed  to  an  enemy 
coming  from  Toledo,  he  yet  performed  no  service  to  the 
general  cause. 

1'he  3d.  he  pushed  an  advanced  guard  to  I'uente 
Largo,  and  leaving  six  hundred  iiilantry,  and  some 
cavalry,  near  Toledo,  concentrated  his  army  between 
Aranjuez  and  Ocana.  In  this  j)osition  he  KniaineJ 
until  the  5tli,  when  his  advanced  guard  was  driven  from 
the  Puente  Largo,  and  across  the  'I'agus  ;  his  line  of 
posts  on  that  river  was  then  attacked  by  the  Frciich 


224 


NAPIER'S    TEXI^-ULAR    WAR. 


[Book  VIH 


skirmish?i*s,  and,  und^r  cover  of  a  heavy  cannonade, 
his  position  was  examineJ  liy  tlio  enemy's  generals: 
but  whan  the  latter  found  that  all  the  bridges  above 
and  below  Araiijuea  w^-re  Ijrokon  down,  they  resolved 
to  pa?s  the  'I'agas  at  Tole  lo.  With  tJiis  intent  the 
French  a  'my  recrossed  the  Xarama  river,  and  marched 
in  the  direction  of  that  city  ;  but  Yenegas  still  keeping 
his  posts  af  Aranjnez,  foolishly  dispersed  his  other 
divisions  at  Tenibleqiie,  Oc.uia.  and  (jlnardia.  He  him- 
self was  desirous  of  dt^ll'ndiiis'  La  Mancha  ;  the  central 
junta,  with  ni  ire  pi'udonce,  wished  him  t.)  retreat  into 
the  Sierra  Mirena;  bit  Mr.  Frere  pro]Kised  that  his 
army  should  be  divided,  one  part  to  enter  the  Morena, 
and  the  oilier  to  march  liy  Cuenca,  u|)on  Aragou.  and  | 
so  to  menace  the  comninnicati(;ns  with  France  I  The  I 
admirable  absurdity  of  this  proposal  would  probably  | 
have  causnl  it  to  be  adopted,  if  Sebastiani's  movement' 
had  not  put  an  end  to  the  discussion.  That  general, 
crossing  the  Tagus  at  Toled  ».  and  at  a  ford  higher  up, 
dr.ive  the  Spanish  left  back  upon  the  (juazaiata,  on  the 
9th  of  August ;  on  the  10th,  Venegas  concentrated  his 
whole  army  at  Almon.acid,  and,  holding  a  council  of 
war,  res.tlvcd  to  attack  the  French  on  the  12th ;  the 
time  was  miscalculated,  Sebastiani  advanced  on  the  11th, 
and  commenced 

THE    BATTLE    OF    ALMOXACID. 

The  army  of  Venegas,  including  two  thousand  five 
hundred  cavalry,  was  somewliat  more  than  twenty-five 
thousand  strong,  with  forty  pieces  of  artillery.  It  v/as 
the  most  efiicient  Spanish  force  that  had  yet  taken  the 
field  ;  it  was  composed  of  the  best  regiments  in  Spain, 
well  arm'd  and  clothed,  and  the  generals  of  divisions 
were  neither  incapacitated  by  age,  nor  destitute  of  ex- 
perience, m'j.?t  of  them  having  been  employed  in  the 
previous  campaign.  The  village  of  Alinonacid  was  in 
the  centre  of  the  Spanish  position,  ami,  together  with 
B 'me  tabi(^-land  in  front  of  it,  was  occupied  by  two 
divisions  of  infantry  under  general  Castejon.  "J'he  left 
wing,  under  general  Lacy,  rested  on  a  hill  wiiich  covered 
the  main  road  to  Consuegra.  The  right  wing,  com- 
manded by  geireral  Vigodet,  was  drawn  up  on  some 
rising  ground  covering  the  road  to  Teaibleque.  A  re- 
serve, under  general  Giron,  and  the  greatest  j)art  of  the 
artillery,  were  p  -sted  behind  the  centre,  on  a  rugged  bill, 
crowned  by  an  old  castle.  The  cavalry  were  placed  at 
the  extremity  of  each  wing. 

General  Dossolles,  with  the  French  reserve,  was  still 
soma  hours'  march  behind,  but  Sebasliani.  after  ol> 
serving  the  dispositions  made  b}-  Venegas,  resolved  to 
attack  him  with  the  fourth  corps  only.  The  Polish 
division  immediately  marched  against  the  front.  La- 
val's Germans  turned  the  tiank  of  the  hill,  on  which  the 
Spanish  left  w:i.s  posted,  and  two  French  brigades  were 
directed  upon  the  centre.  After  a  sharp  fight,  the 
Spanish  left  was  put  to  tiight ;  Venegas,  however,  out- 
flanked the  victorious  troops  with  his  cavalry,  and 
charging  threw  them  into  disorder  ;  but  at  this  moment, 
the  head  of  Dessolles's  column  arrived,  and  enabled 
Sebastianis  reserves  to  restore  the  combat.  The  Span- 
ish cavalry,  shattered  by  musketiy,  and  by  the  fire  of 
four  pieces  of  artillery,  was  in  turn,  charged  by  a 
French  regiment  of  horse,  and  broken.  Venegas  ral- 
lied his  troops  again  on  the  castle-hill,  behind  the  vil- 
Lige;  but  the  kin;j  came  up  with  the  remainder  of  ihe 
reserve,  and  the  attack  was  renewed.  'J'he  Poles  and 
Germans  con;irmed  their  march  against  the  left  fiank 
of  the  Spaniards,  nine  fresh  battalions  fell  upon  their 
centre,  and  a  column  of  six  battalioas  forced  the  right  ; 
the  height  and  the  castle  were  thus  carried  at  the  first 
effort.  Venegas  attempted  to  cover  his  retreat,  by 
making  a  stand  in  the  i)lain  behind  ;  but  two  divisions 
of  dragoons  charged  his  troops  before  they  could  re- 
form, and  the  disorder  became  irremediable ;  the  Span- 
iards, throwing  away  their  arm^,  dispersed   in  every 


direction,  and  were  pursued  and  slaughtered  by  the 
horsemen  for  several  hours. 

Following  the  French  account,  three  thousand  of  the 
vanquished  were  slain,  and  fuur  thou^iand  taken  prison- 
ers;  and  all  the  guns,  baggage,  anmiunition,  and  car- 
riages fell  into  the  hands  of  the  victors,  whose  loss  did 
not  exceed  fifteen  hundred  men.  The  renniants  of  the 
defeated  army  took  shelter  in  the  Sierra  Morena ;  the 
head-quarters  of  the  fourth  corps  were  then  established 
at  Aranjuez.  those  of  the  first  at  'i'oledo,  and  the  king 
returned  in  triumph  to  the  capital. 

The  Anglo-Spanish  army,  however,  still  held  its  po- 
sition at  Deieytusa  and  Juraicejo,  and  sir  Arthur  Wel- 
lesley  was  not,  at  the  first,  without  hopes  to  maintain 
himself  there,  or  even  to  resunte  offiensive  operations  ; 
for  he  knew  that  Ney  had  returned  to  Salamanca,  and 
he  erroneously  believed  that  Mortier  connuanded  only 
a  part  of  the  first  corps,  and  that  the  remainder  were 
at  Toledo.*  On  the  other  hand,  his  own  strength  was 
about  seventeen  thousand  men  ;  Beresford  had  reached 
Moraleja,  with  from  twelve  to  I'ourteen  thousand  Portu- 
"■uese  ;  and  between  the  frontier  of  Poriuyal  and  Lis- 
bon there  were  at  least  five  thousand  British  troops,  com- 
posing the  brigades  of  Catlin  Craufurd  and  Light  burn. 
If  Soult  invaded  Portugal,  the  intention  of  the  English 
general  was  to  have  followed  him.  If  the  French  re- 
mained in  their  present  position,  he  meant  to  rucross  the 
Tagus,  and,  in  conjunction  with  Beresford's  troops,  to 
fall  upon  their  right  at  Plasencia.  For  his  own  front 
he  had  no  fear  ;  and  he  was  taking  measures  to  restore 
the  broken  arch  of  the  Cardinal's  bridge  over  the  Tagus, 
with  a  view  to  his  operation  against  Plasencia,  when 
the  misconduct  of  the  Spanish  government  and  its  gen- 
erals again  obliged  him  to  look  solely  to  the  preservation 
of  his  own  army. 

From  the  23d  of  July,  when  the  bad  faith  of  the 
junta,  the  apathy  of  the  people  in  Estremadura,  and 
the  wayward  folly  of  Cuesta  had  checked  the  forward 
movements  of  the  British,  the  privations  of  the  latter, 
which  had  commenced  at  Plasencia,  daily  increased.  It 
was  in  vain  that  sir  Artlmr,  remonstrating  with  Cuesta 
and  the  junta,  had  warned  them  of  the  consequences  ; 
it  was  in  vain  that  he  refused  to  paas  the  Alberche 
until  the  necessary  supplies  were  secured  ;  his  reason- 
ings, his  representations,  and  even  the  fact  of  his  having 
halted  at  Talavera,  were  alike  disregarded  by  men  who, 
judging  from  their  own  habits,  concluded  that  his 
actions  wouhl  also  be  at  variar.ce  with  his  professions. 
If  he  demanded  food  for  his  troops,  he  was  answered  by 
false  statements  of  what  had  been,  and  falser  promises 
of  what  would  be  d(jne  ;  the  glorious  services  rendered 
at  Talavera,  far  from  exciting  the  gratitude  or  calling 
forth  the  activity  of  the  Spanish  authorities,  seemed 
only  to  render  them  the  more  perverse.  The  soldiers 
in  the  ranks  were  weakened  by  hunger,  the  sick  were 
dying  for  want  of  necessary  succours,  the  commissa- 
ries were  without  the  means  of  transport  ;  and  when 
sir  Arthur  Wellcsley  applied  for  only  ninety  artillery 
horses  to  supply  the  ])lacc  of  those  killed  in  the  action, 
Cuesta  on  the  very  field  of  battle,  and  with  the  steam 
of  the  English  blood  still  reeking  in  his  nostrils,  refiwed 
this  recjuest ;  two  days  after,  he  abandoned  the  wounded 
men  to  an  enemy  that  he  and  his  countrymen  were 
hourly  describing  as  the  most  ferocious  and  dishonour- 
able of  mankind. 

The  retreat  of  the  allies  across  the  Tagus  increased 
the  sufferings  of  the  troops,  and  the  warmth  of  their 
general's  remonstrances  rose  in  proportion  to  the  ill- 
treatment  they  experienced  ;  but  the  replies,  nothing 
abating  in  falseness  as  to  fact,  now  became  insulting 
both  to  the  general  and  his  army  :  "  'I'lie  British  were 
not  onlij  well  but  over  supplied :" — "  thci/  robbed  the 
peasantry,  pillaged  the  villages,  intercepted  the  Spanish 

*  railiaincutiirj-  P;  pers,  1810. 


1809.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


22S 


convnya,  and  openly  fold  the  provisions  thus  shamefully 
acquired:^'' — '■'•  the  retreat  of  the  army  across  the  Tagus 
was  unnecessary ;  Soult  ought  to  have  been  destroyed  ; 
and  the  English  general  must  have  secret  motives  far  his 
conduct,  which  he  dare  not  avouch  .•" — and  other  calum- 
nies of  the  like  nature. 

Now,  from  tlie  20th  of  July  to  the  20th  of  August, 
although  the  Spaniards  were  orenerally  well  fed,  the 
Encrlish  soldiers  had  not  received  ten  full  rations. 
Half  a  pound  of  wheat  in  the  grain,  and,  twice  a  week, 
a  few  ounces  of  flour,  with  a  quarter  of  a  pound  of 
goat's  flesh,  formed  the  sole  subsistence  of  men  and 
ofl^icers  ;  and  this  scanty  supply  was  procured  with 
much  labour,  for  the  goats  were  to  be  caught  and  killed 
by  the  troops ;  it  was,  perhaps,  upon  this  additional 
hardship  that  the  accusation  of  selling  provisions  was 
founded,  for,  in  such  cases,  it  is  in  all  armies  the  cus- 
tom tliat  the  offal  belongs  to  the  men  who  slaughter 
the  animals;  but  the  famine  in  the  camp  was  plainly 
proved  by  this  very  fact;  for  a  goat's  offal  sold,  at  this 
time,  for  even  three  or  four  dollars,  or  about  double  the 
usual  price  of  the  whole  animal,  and  men  and  officers 
strove  to  outbid  each  other  for  the  wretched  food. 

It  has  been  said  that  the  British  soldiers  are  less  in- 
telligent in  providing  for  themselves,  and  less  a'de  to 
sustain  privations  of  food  than  the  soldiers  of  any  other 
nation.  This  is  one  of  many  vulgar  errors  which  have 
been  promulgated  respecting  them.  'I'hat  they  should 
b'3  constantly  victorious,  and  yet  inferior  to  all  other 
nitions  in  military  qualification,  does  not,  at  first  sight, 
aj)pear  a  ver}'  logical  conclusion  ;  but  the  truth  is,  that, 
with  the  evccption  of  the  Spanish  and  Portuguese, 
nvho  ar« ,  undoubtedly,  more  sober,  the  English  sol- 
diers possess  all  the  most  valuable  military  qualities 
in  as  high,  and  many  in  a  much  higher  degree  than 
any  other  nation.  They  are  as  rapid  and  as  intelligent 
as  the  ^'rench,  as  obedient  as  the  German,  as  enduring 
as  the  Russian,  and  more  robust  than  any;  and,  with 
respect  to  food,  this  is  sure,  that  no  man,  of  any  na- 
tion, with  less  than  two  pounds  of  solid  food,  of  some 
kind,  daily,  can  do  his  work  well  for  any  length  of 
time.  A  general  charge  of  pillaging  is  easily  inade 
and  hard  to  be  disproved,  yet  it  is  certain  that  the  Span- 
ish troops  themselves  did  not  only  pillage,  but  wantonly 
devastate  the  country,  and  that  without  any  excuse,  for, 
with  the  exception  of  the  three  days  succeeding  the 
defeat  of  Arzobispo,  their  rations  were  regular  and  suf- 
ficient. With  respect  to  the  interruption  of  their  con- 
voys, by  the  British  soldiers,  the  reverse  was  the  fact. 
The  Spanish  cavalry  intercepted  the  provisions  and  forage 
destined  for  the  English  army,  and  fired  upon  the  fora- 
gers, as  if  they  had  been  enemies. 

Before  the  middle  of  August  there  were,  in  the  six 
regiments  of  English  cavalry,  a  thousand  men  dis- 
mounted, and  the  horses  of  seven  hundred  others  were 
unserviceable;*  the  baggage  animals  died  in  greater 
numbers  ;  the  artillery  cattle  were  scarcely  able  to  drag 
the  guns,  and  one  third  of  the  reserve  ammunition  was 
given  over  to  the  Spaniards,  because  the  ammunition 
carts  were  required  for  the  conveyance  of  sick  men,  of 
whicl  the  number  daily  increased.  Marshal  Beresfcrd 
experienced  the  same  difliculties  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Ciudad  Rodrigo.  The  numerous  desertions  that  took 
place  in  the  Portuguese  army,  when  it  became  known 
that  the  troops  were  to  enter  Spain,  prevented  him  from 
taking  the  field  so  soon  as  he  had  expected  ;  but,  in  the. 
last  days  of  Jul}',  being  prepared  to  act,  he  crossed  the 
Portuguese  frontier,  and,  from  that  moment,  the  usual 
Texatious  system  of  the  Spaniards  commenced.  Ro- 
mana  still  continued  at  Coruiia ;  the  duke  del  Parque 
was  full  of  mighty  projects,  and  indignant  that  Beres- 
ford  would  not  blindly  adopt  his  recommendations. 
Both  generals  were  ignorant  of  the  real  strength  of  the 

*  Paillaiiientary  Papers,  ISIO. 

16 


French  :  but  the  Spaniard  was  confident,  and  insisted 
upon  oflTensive  movements,  while  Beresford,  a  general 
by  no  means  of  an  enterprising  disposition  when  in  the 
sole  command  of  an  army,  contented  himself  with 
taking  up  a  defensive  line  behind  the  Agueda.  In  this 
he  was  justified  ;  first,  by  his  instructions,  which  ob- 
liged him  to  look  to  the  pass  of  Perales  and  the.defence 
of  the  frontier  line;  secondly,  by  the  state  of  his  army, 
which  was  not  half  organized,  and  without  horsemen 
or  artillery;  thirdly,  by  the  conduct  of  the  Spanish 
authorities. 

The  Portuguese  troops  were  not  only  refused  provi- 
sions, but  those  which  had  been  collected  by  sir  Ar- 
thur Wellesley,  and  put  into  the  magazines  at  Ciudad 
Rodrigo,  with  a  view  to  operate  in  that  quarter,  were 
seized  by  the  cabildo,  as  security  for  a  debt  pretonded 
to  be  due  for  the  supply  of  sir  John  Moore's  army. 
The  claim  itself  was  of  doubtful  character,  for  Cradock 
had  before  offered  to  pay  it  if  the  cabildo  would  produce 
the  voucher  for  its  being  due,  a  preliminary  which  had 
not  been  complied  with.  There  was  also  an  English 
commissary  at  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  empowered  to  liquidate 
that  and  any  other  just  claim  upon  the  British  military 
chest;  but  the  cabildo,  like  all  Spaniards,  mistaking 
violence  for  energy,  preferred  this  display  of  petty 
power  to  the  interests  of  the  common  cause.  Mean- 
while, Soult  having  passed  the  Sierra  de  Credos,  by 
the  Bafios,  Beresford,  moving  in  a  parallel  direction, 
crossed  the  Sierra  de  Gata,  at  Perales;  reached  Mora- 
leja  about  the  12th  of  August,  and  having  rallied  the 
troops  and  convalescents  cut  off  from  Talavera,  marched 
to  Salvatierra,  where  lie  arrived  the  17th,  and  took  post 
behind  the  Elga,  covering  the  road  to  Abrantcs. 

Such  was  the  state  of  affairs  when  the  supreme  junta 
offered  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  the  rank  of  captain-general, 
and  sent  him  a  present  of  horses  ;  and  when  he,  accept- 
ing the  rank,  refused  the  pay  as  he  had  before  refused  that 
of  the  Portuguese  government,  they  pressed  him  to  re- 
new offensive  operations;  but,  acting  as  if  they  tliought 
the  honours  conferred  upon  the  general  would  amply 
compensate  for  the  sufl^erings  of  the  troops,  the  junia 
made  no  change  in  their  system.  Sir  Arthur  Welles- 
ley was,  however,  now  convinced  that  Spain  was  no 
longer  the  place  for  a  British  army.  He  relinquished 
the  notion  of  further  operations  in  that  country,  sent  his 
cavalry  to  the  neighbourhood  of  Caceres,  broke  down 
another  arch  of  the  Cardinal's  bridge,  to  prevent  tho 
enemy  from  troubling  him,  and,  through  the  British 
ambassador,  informed  the  junta  that  he  would  imme- 
diately retire  into  Portugal. 

This  information  created  the  wildest  consternation  ; 
for,  in  their  swollen  self-sufficiency,  the  members  cf  the 
government  had  hitherto  disregarded  all  warnings  upon 
this  subject,  and  now  acting  as,  in  the  like  case,  they 
had  acted,  the  year  before,  with  sir  John  Moorp,  they 
endeavoured  to  avert  the  consequences  of  their  own 
evil  doings  by  vehement  remonstrances  and  the  most 
absurd  statements  : — "  The  French  were  weak  and  the 
moment  most  propitious  for  driving  them  beyond  the  Py- 
renees .-"  "  the  uncalled-for  retreat  if  the  English  would 
ruin  the  cause:'''  and  so  forth.  But  they  had  to  deal 
with  a  general  as  firm  as  sir  John  Moore;  and,  in  the 
British  ambassador,  they  no  longer  found  an  instru- 
ment suited  to  their  purposes.  Lord  Wellesley,  a  man 
with  too  many  weaknesses  to  be  called  great,  but  of  an 
expanded  capacity,  and  a  genius  at  once  subtle  and 
imperious,  had  come  out  on  a  special  mission, — and 
Mr.  Frere,  whose  last  communication  with  the  junta 
had  been  to  recommend  another  military  project,  was 
happily  displaced  ;  yet,  even  in  his  private  capacity, 
he  made  an  effort  to  have  some  of  the  generals  super- 
seded ;  and  the  junta,  with  a  refined  irony,  truly  Span- 
ish, created  him  Mar/juis  <f  Union. 

At  Cadiz,  the  honours  paid  to  Lord  Wellesley  were 
extravagant   and   unbecoming,    and   his  journey   from 


226 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Rook  VIII. 


thtnce  to  Seville  was  a  srene  of  triumph,  biit  these  ' 
outward  demonstratirus  of  feeling  did  not  impose  upon 
him  heycTid  tlie  moment,  his  brotl'.er's  correspondence 
and  his  own  penptration  soon  enabled  him  to  make  a  \ 
just  estimate  of  the  junta's  protestations.     Disdaininnr 
their  intrioues,  and  fully  appreciating^  a  general's  rii>ht 
to  direct  the  operations  of  his  own  army,  he  seconded  | 
Rir  Arthur's  remonstrances  with  firmness,  and  wisely 
takingf  the  latler's  statements   as  a  cruide  and  basis  for 
his  own  views,  urired  them  upon  the  Spanish  govern- 
ment witji  l)ecomin(T  dignity. 

The  junta,  on  their  part,  always  protestintr  that  the 
welfare  of  the  British  army  was  the  principal  object  of 
their  care,  did  not  fail  to  prove,  very  clearly  upon  paper, 
that  the  troops,  ever  since  their  entry  into  Spain,  had 
been  amply  supplied  ;  and  tliat  no  measures  mitrht  be 
wanlinjT  to  satisfy  the  English  general,  they  invested 
don  Lorenzo  Calvo,  a  member  of  their  body,  with  full 
powers  to  draw  forth  and  apply  all  the  resources  of  the 
country  to  the  nourishment  of  both  armies.  This  oren- 
tleman's  promises  and  assurances,  relative  to  the  supply, 
were  more  full  and  formal  than  M.  de  Garay's,  and 
equally  false.  He  declared  that  provisions  and  forage, 
in  vast  quantities,  were  actually  being  delivered  into 
the  magazines  at  Truxillo,  when,  in  fact,  there  was  not 
even  an  effort  making  to  collect  any.  He  promised 
that  the  Krilish  should  be  served,  although  the  Spanish 
troops  should  thereby  suffer,  and,  at  the  very  time  of 
making  this  promise,  he  obliged  the  alcaldes  of  a  dis- 
tant town  to  send,  into  the  Spanish  camp,  provisions 
which  had  been  already  purchased  by  an  English  com- 
missary. Li  fine,  lord  Wellesley  had  arrived  too  late; 
all  the  mischief  that  petulance,  folly,  bad  faith,  vio- 
lence, and  ignorance  united,  could  inflict,  was  already 
accomplished,  and,  while  he  was  vainly  urging  a  vile, 
if  not  a  treacherous  government,  to  provide  sustenance 
for  the  soldiers,  sir  Arthur  withdrew  the  latter  from  a 
post  where  the  vultures,  in  their  prescience  of  death, 
were  alrt  ady  congregating. 

The  20ih,  the  main  body  of  the  British  armv  quitted 
Jaraicejo,  and  marched  by  Truxillo  upon  Merida.  The 
light  brigade,  under  Craufurd,  being  relieved  at  Alma- 
raz  by  the  Spaniards,  took  the  road  of  Caceras  to  Va- 
lencia de  Alcantara;  but  the  pass  of  Mirabete  bore 
ample  testimony  to  the  previous  sufforings  of  the  troops. 
Craufurd's  brigade,  which,  only  three  weeks  before, 
had  traversed  sixty  miles  in  a  single  march,  were  now 
with  difficulty,  and  after  many  halts,  able  to  reach  the 
summit  of  the  Mirabete,  although,  only  four  miles  from 
their  camp  ;  and  the  side  of  that  mountain  was  covered 
with  baggage,  and  the  carcases  of  many  hundred  ani- 
mals that  died  in  the  ascent. 

When  the  retreat  commenced,  the  junta,  with  the 
malevolence  of  anger  engendered  by  fear,  caluinniated 
the  man  to  whom,  only  ten  days  before,  they  had  ad- 
dressed the  most  fulsome  compliments,  and  to  whose 
courage  and  skill  they  owed  their  own  existence.  " // 
was  not  the  xrant  i^f  provixions,''''  they  said.  "  but  srmie 
other  motive  that  caused  the  Ens;IUh  general  to  retreat.'''' 
This  was  openly  and  insultingly  stated  by  Garay,  bv 
Eguia,  and  by  Calvo,  in  their  correspondence  with 
lord  Wellesley  and  sir  Arthur;  and  at  the  same  time 
the  junta  industriously  spread  a  report  that  the  true 
reason  was  their  own  firm  resistance  to  the  ungenerous 
demands  of  the  English  ministers,  who  had  required 
the  cession  of  Cadiz  and  the  island  of  Cuba,  as  the 
price  of  further  assistance.  But  the  only  firmness  they 
had  shewn  was  in  resistance  tc  ne  just  demands  of 
their  ally.  AtTalavera,  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  had  been 
forced  to  give  over  to  the  Spaniards  the  artillery  taken 
from  the  enemy;  at  Meza  d'Ibor,  he  had  sacrificed  a 
part  of  his  ammunition,  to  obtain  conveyance  for  the 
wounded  men  ;  and  to  effect  the  present  movement 
from  Jaraicejo,  without  leaving  his  sick  behind,  he  was 
obliged    lo  abandon  all   his  pare   cf  ammunition    and 


stores;  then,  however,  the  Spanish  generals,  who  had 
refused  the  slightest  aid  to  convey  the  sick  and  wound- 
ed men,  immediately  found  ample  means  to  carry  off 
all  these  stores  to  their  own  magazines.  In  this  man- 
ner, almost  bereft  of  br.iTgage  and  ammunition,  those 
soldiers,  who  had  withstood  the  fiercest  eff'orts  of  tho 
enemy,  were  driven,  as  it  were,  ignominiously  from 
the  country  they  had  protected  to  their  own  loss. 

The  24tb,  the  brad-quarters  being  at  Merida,  a  de- 
spatch froin  lord  Wellesley  was  received.  He  painted 
in  strong  colours  the  terror  of  the  junta,  the  distraction 
of  the  people,  the  universal  confusion  ;  and  with  a  natu- 
ral anxiety  to  mitigate  their  distress,  he  proposed  that 
the  British  army  should,  notwithstanding  the  past,  en- 
deavour to  cover  Andalusia,  by  taking,  in  conjunction 
with  the  Spanish  army,  a  defensive  post  behind  the 
Gnadiana,  in  such  manner  that  the  left  should  rest  on 
the  frontier  of  Portugal  :  to  facilitate  this  Jie  had,  he 
said,  presented  a  plan  to  the  junta  fir  the  future  supply 
of  provisions,  and  the  vicinity  of  the  frontier  and  of 
Seville  would,  he  hoped,  obviate  any  difficulty  on  that 
point.  But  he  rested  his  project  entirely  upon  political 
grounds,  and  it  is  worthy  of  observation,  that  he,  who 
for  many  years  had,  with  despotic  power,  controlled 
the  movements  of  immense  armies  in  India,  carefully 
avoided  any  appearance  of  meddling  with  the  general's 
province. 

"  1  am,"  said  he,  "  fully  sensible  not  otily  of  the  nj- 
delicacy,  but  of  the  inutility  of  attempting  to  offer  to 
you  any  opinion  of  mine  in  a  situation  where  your  own 
judo-ement  must  be  your  best  guide." — "  Viewing,  how 
ever,  so  nearly,  the  painful  consequences  of  your  im- 
mediate retn  at  irito  Portugal,  I  have  deemed  it  to  ha 
iny  duty  to  submit  it  to  your  consideration  the  possi- 
bility of  adopting  an  intermediate  plan."  Let  this 
proceeding  be  compared  v.ith  Mr.  Frere's  conduct  to 
sir  John  Moore  on  a  similar  occasion. 

On  the  receipt  of  this  despatch,  sir  Arthur  Wellesley 
halted  at  Merida  for  some  days,  he  was  able  in  that 
country  to  obtain  ]irovisions,  and  he  wished,  if  possi- 
ble, toallay  the  excitement  occasioned  by  his  retreat; 
but  he  refused  to  co-operate  again  with  the  Spaniards. 
"  Want,"  he  said,  "had  driven  him  to  separate  from 
them,  but  their  shameful  flight  at  Arzobispo  would 
alone  have  justified  him  for  doing  so.  'I'o  take  up  a 
defensive  position  behind  the  Guadiana  would  be  use- 
less, because  that  river  was  fordal)le,  and  the  ground 
behind  it  weak.  'I  he  line  of  the  Tagus.  occupied  at 
the  moment  by  Eguia,  was  so  strong,  that  if  the  Span- 
iards could  defend  any  thing  they  might  defend  that. 
His  advice  then  was  that  they  should  send  the  pontoon- 
brid<Te  to  Badajos,  and  remain  on  the  defensive  at 
Deleytoza  and  Almaraz.  But,  it  might  he  asked,  he 
said,  was  there  no  chance  of  renewing  the  ofltnsive? 
To  what  purpose  ■?  The  French  were  as  numerous,  if 
not  more  so,  than  the  allies;  and,  with  respect  to  the 
Spaniards  at  least,  superior  in  discipline  and  every 
military  quality.  To  advance  again  was  only  to  play 
the  saine  losing  game  as  before.  Bafios  and  Peralea 
must  be  guarded,  or  the  bands  in  Castile  would  again 
pour  through  upon  the  rear  of  the  allied  a/my  ;  but  who 
was  to  guard  these  passes  1  The  British  were  too  fevr 
to  detach,  and  the  Spaniards  could  not  be  trusted ;  and 
if  they  could,  Avila  and  the  Guadarama  passes  remain- 
ed, by  which  the  enemy  could  reinforce  the  army  in 
front, — for  there  were  no  Spanish  troojis  in  the  north 
of  Spain  capable  of  making  a  diversion." 

"  But  there  was  a  more  serious  consideration,  namely, 
the  constant  and  shameful  misbehaviour  of  the  Spanish 
troops  before  the  enemy.  We,  in  England,"  said  sir 
Arthur,  "  never  hear  of  their  defeats  and  flights,  but  I 
ha-'e  heard  Spanish  officers  telling  of  nineteen  or  twenty 
actions  of  the  description  of  that  at  the  bridge  of  Arzo- 
bispo. accounts  nf  which,  T  believe,  have  never  been 
published."  "  In  the  battle  of  Talavera,"  he  continued, 


1809.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


227 


«*in  which  the  Spanish  army,  with  very  triflinjj  excpp- 
tion,  was  nrt  encrajrcd — whole  corps  threw  away  their 
gnus,  and  ran  off,  when  they  were  neither  attacked  nor 
threatened  with  an  attack.  When  these  dastardly  sol- 
diers run  away  they  ])lunder  every  thintrthey  meet.  In 
their  flight  from  Talavera  they  plundered  the  basrgage 
of  tlie  British  army,  which  was,  at  thatmoment,  brave- 
1}'  eii!ja<jpd  in  their  cause." 

For  these  reasons  he  would  not,  he  said,  apfain  co-ope- 
rate with  the  Spaniards  ;  yet,  by  takin<j  post  on  the  Por- 
tuguese frontier,  he  would  hang  upon  the  enemy's  flank, 
find  thus,  tinless  the  latter  came  with  very  great  forces, 
prevent  him  from  crossing  the  Guadiana.  'Jliis  reason- 
ing was  conclusive,  but  ere  it  reached  Lord  Wellesley, 
the  latter  found  that  so  far  from  his  plans,  relative  to 
the  supply,  having  been  adopted,  he  could  not  even 
get  an  answer  from  the  junta;  that  miserable  br dy,  at 
one  moment  shrinking  with  fear,  at  the  next  b.irsting 
with  folly,  now  talked  of  the  enemy's  being  ?bout  to 
retire  to  the  Pyrenees,  or  even  to  the  interior  of  France  ! 
and  assuming  the  right  to  dispose  of  the  Portuguese 
army  as  well  as  of  their  own,  importunat^ly  pressed 
for  an  immediate,  combined,  offensive  operation,  by  the 
troops  of  the  three  nations,  to  harass  the  enemy  in  his 
retreat!  but,  at  the  same  time,  they  ordered  Eguia  to 
■withdraw  from  Deleytoza.  behind  the  Guadiana. 

The  31st,  Eguia  reached   La  Serena,  and  Venegas 
having  rallied  his  fugitives  in  the  Morena,  and  being 
reinforced     from    the    depots    in    Andalusia,    the    two 
armies  amounted  to  about  fifty  thousand  men,  of  which 
eight  or  ten  thousand  were  horse,  for,  as  I  have  before 
observed,  the  Spanish  cavalry  seldom  suffered  much. 
But  the  tide  of  popular  discontent  Avas  now  setting  full 
against  the  central  government.     The  members  of  the 
ar.cient  junta  of  Seville  worked   incessantly  for  their 
cverllirow.     Romana,  Castaiios,  Cuesta,  Albuquerque, 
all,  and  they  were  many,  who  had  suffered  dishonour 
&t  their  };ands,  were  against  them  ;  and  the  local  junta 
of  Estremadura  insisted  that  Albuquerque  should  com- 
mand in  that  province.     Thus   pressed,   the  supreme 
junta,  considering  Venegas  as  a  man  devoted  to  their 
wishes,  res(jlved  to  increase  his  forces.     For  this  pur- 
yo&e  ihey  gave  Albuquerque  the  command  in  Estrema- 
dura, y(  t  furnished   him  with   only   twelve   thousand 
men,  and  sent  the  remainder  of  Eguia's  army  to  Vene- 
gas ;  at  the  same  time,  they  made  a  last  effort  to  en- 
gage the  British  general  in  their  proceedings,  offering 
to  place  Albuquerque   under  his   orders,  provided  he 
would   undertake  an  offensive    movement.     By   these 
means,  lliey  maintained  their  tottering  power,  but  their 
plans,  being  founded  upon  vile  political  intri<i:ucs,  could 
in  no  wise  alter  sir  Arthur  Wellesley's  determination, 
which  was  the  result  of  enlarged  military  views.     He 
rr  fused   their  offers ;  and,   the  4th  of  September,  his 
head-quarters  were  established  at  Badajos.   Meanwhile, 
Homana    delivering  over    his  army  to    the    duke    del 
Parque,  repaired   to  Seville;  and   Venegas  again  ad- 
vanced into  La  Mancha.  but  at  the  approach  of  a  very 
inferior  fr^rce  of  the  enemy,  retired,  with  all  the  haste 
and  confusion  of  a  rout,  to  the  Morena.     The   English 
troops  were  then  distributed  in  Badajos,  Elvas,  Campo 
Mayor,  and  other  places,  on  both  banks  of  the  Guadi- 
ana ;  the  brigades  already   in    Portugal  were  brought 
up  to  the  army,  and   the  lost  ammvmition  and  equip- 
'  ments  were   replaced   from  the   magazines  at  Lisbon, 
Abianlrs,    and    Sanlarem ;     Beresford,    leaving    some 
light  troops  and  militia  on  the  frontier,  retired  to  Tho- 
mar,  and  this  eventful  campaign,  of  two  months,  ter- 
minated. 

'I"he  loss  of  the  army  was  considerable;  above  three 
thousand  five  hundred  men  had  been  killed,  or  had 
died  of  sickness,  or  fallen  into  the  enemy's  hands. 
Fifteen  hundred  horses  had  perished  from  want  of  food, 
exclusive  of  those  lost  in  battle;  the  spirits  of  the  sol- 
diers were  depressed,  an'  a  heart-burning  hatred  of  the 


Spaniards  was  engendered  by  the  treatment  all  had  en- 
dured. To  fill  the  cup,  the  pestilent  fever  of  the  Gua- 
diana, assailing  bodies  which  f.Uigue  and  bad  nourish- 
ment had  already  predisposed  to  disease,  made  fright- 
ful ravages  ;  dysentery,  that  scourge  of  armies,  raged, 
and,  in  a  short  time,  above  five  thousand  men  died  in 
the  hospitals. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

General  observations  on  the  campaign — Coniranson  between 
the  operations  of  sir  John  Mooie  and  sir  A.  Wtlltsley. 

OBSERVATIONS. 

During  this  short,  but  important  campaign,  the  ar- 
mies on  both  sides  acted  in  violation  of  the  maxim 
which  condemns  '■'■  double  external  lines  of  operaUnn,^^ 
but  the  results  vindicated  the  soundness  of  the  rule. 
Nothing  permanent  or  great,  nothing  proportionate  to 
the  number  of  the  troops,  the  vastness  of  the  combina- 
tions, or  the  reputation  of  the  commanders,  was  achiev- 
ed ;  yet,  neither  sir  Arthur  Wellesley,  nor  the  duke  of 
Dalmatia,  nor  marshal  .Jourdan  can  be  justly  censured, 
seeing  that  the  two  last  were  controlled  by  the  king,  and 
the  first  by  circumstances  of  a  peculiar  nature.  The 
French  marshals  were  thwarted  by  superior  authority; 
and  the  Eng-lish  general,  commanding  an  auxiliary 
force,  was  obliged  to  regulate  his  movem.enls,  not  by 
his  own  military  views,  but  by  the  actual  state  of  the 
Spaniards'  operations,  and  with  reference  to  the  poli- 
tics and  temper  of  that  people. 

La  Mancha  was  the  true  line  by  which  to  act  against 
Madrid  ;  but  the  British  army  was  on  the  frontier  of 
Portugal,  the  junta  refused  Cadiz  as  a  place  of  arms, 
and  without  Cadiz,  or  some  other  fortified  sea-p<irt, 
neither  prudence,  nor  his  instructions,  would  permit 
sir  Arthur  to  hazard  a  great  operation  on  that  side: 
hence  he  adopted,  not  what  was  most  fitting,  in  a  mil- 
itary sense,  but  what  was  least  objectionable  among 
the  few  plans  that  could  be  concerted  at  all  with  the 
Spanish  generals  and  government.  Now,  the  latter 
being  resolved  to  act  with  strong  armies,  both  in  Es- 
tremadura and  La  Mancha,  the  English  general  had 
but  to  remain  on  a  miserable  defensive  system  in  Por- 
tugal, or  to  unite  with  Cuesta  in  the  valley  of  the  Ta- 
gus.  His  territorial  line  of  operations  was  therefore  a 
matter  of  necessity,  and  any  fair  criticism  must  be 
founded  on  the  management  of  his  masses  after  it  was 
chosen.  That  he  did  not  greatly  err  in  his  conception 
of  the  campaign,  is  to  be  inferred  from  the  fact,  that 
Napoleon,  Soult,  Victor,  and  Jourdan,  simultaneously 
expected  him  upon  the  very  line  he  followed.  He  was 
thwarted  by  Cuesta  at  every  step,  Venegas  failed  to 
aid  him,  and  the  fatal  error  relative  to  Soult's  frees, 
under  which  he  laboured  throughout,  vitiated  all  his 
operations  ;  yet  he  shook  the  intrusive  monarch  rough- 
ly, in  the  midst  of  fifty  thousand  men. 

Let  the  project  be  judged,  not  by  what  did  happen, 
but  by  what  would  have  happened,  if  Cuesta  had  been 
active,  and  if  Venegas  had  performed  his  part  loyally. 
The  junction  of  the  British  and  Spanish  forces  was 
made  at  Naval  Moral,  on  the  22d  of  July.  The  duke 
of  Belluno,  with  twenty-one  thousand  men,  was  then 
in  position  behind  the  Alberche,  the  fourth  corps  near 
Madrilejos  in  La  Mancha,  and  Joseph  at  Madrid,  where 
general  Foy  had  just  arrived,  to  concert  Soult's  move- 
ment upon  Plasencia.  It  is  evident  that  the  king  and 
Sebasliani  could  not  reach  the  scene  of  action  before 
the  25th  or  26th  of  July,  nor  could  Soult  influence  the 
operations  before  the  1st  or  2d  of  August.  If,  then, 
the  allied  army,  being  sixty  thousand  strong,  with  a 
hundred  pieces  of  artillery,  had  attacked  Victor  on  the 
morning  of  the  23d,  it  is  to  be  presumed  that  the  latter 
would  have  been  beaten,,  and  obli-;ed  to  retreat,  either 


22h 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  VIII. 


npon  Mndrid  nr  Toledo;  hot  the  country  immediately  j 
in  his  rear  was  open,  and  ten  thousand  horsemen  could  i 
have  heen  launched  in  the  pursuit.    Sir  Robert  Wilson, 
also,  would   have  heen  on  Victor's  flank,  if,  neorlect- 1 
inof  a  junction  with    the   fourth    corps,    that    marshal 
had  taken  the  mad  to  Madrid ;  and   if  that  of  Toledo, 
the  first  and  fourth  corps  would  have  been  separated 
from   the   kit'o-,  who  did   not  reach   Varg^as  until   the 
eveninor  of  the  25th,  but  who  would  not,  in  this  case, 
have  been  able  to  advance  at  all  beyond  Naval  Car- 
neiro. 

Now,  admittino-  that,  by  superior  discipline  and  ex- 
perience, the  French  troops  had  effected  their  retreat  on 
either  line  without  any  serious  calamity,  what  would 
have  followed  ? 

1.  If  Victor  joined  the  king,  the  latter  could  only 
have  retired,  bv  Guadalaxara,  upon  the  third  corps,  or 
have  fTope  liy  the  Guadarama  towards  Soult. 

2.  If  Victor  joined  Sebasliani,  the  two  corps  must 
have  retreated  to  Guadalaxara,  and  the  kin<r  would 
have  joined  them  there,  or,  as  before  said,  have  pushed 
for  the  Guadnr.ima  to  join  Soult. 

No  doubt,  that  marshal,  havincj  so  powerful  an  army, 
would,  in  either  case,  have  restored  .Toseph  to  his  cap- 
ital, and  have  cut  off  sir  Arthur's  communication  with 
Porfu<Tal  bv  the  vallev  of  the  Taaus.  Nevertheless,  a 
•great  moral  impres'jion  would  have  been  produced  by 
the  temporary  loss  of  Madrid,  which  was,  moreover, 
the  ofenernl  depot  of  all  the  French  armies;  and,  mean- 
while. Venecras,  Cuesta,  and  sir  Arthur  VVellesley 
Would  have  been  \inited.  and  on  one  line  of  operations 
(that  of  La  Mancha).  which,  under  such  circumstances, 
would  have  forced  the  junta  to  consent  to  the  occupa- 
tion of  Cadiz.  In  this  view  it  must  be  admitted  that 
the  plan  was  conceived  with  o-enius. 

\'ictor's  position  on  the  Alberche  w^as,  however, 
stronjr;  he  commanded  twenty-five  thousand  veterans; 
and,  as  the  Spaniards  were  very  incapable  in  the  field, 
it  may  be  argued  that  a  greneral  movement  of  the  w-hole 
arrnv  to  Escalona.  and  from  thence  to  Maqueda,  would 
have  been  preferable  to  a  direct  attack  at  Salinas  ;  be- 
cause tlie  allies,  if  thus  suddenly  placed  in  the  midst 
of  the  French  corps,  mip^ht  have  beaten  them  in  detail, 
and  would  certainly  have  cut  the  kintr  off  from  the 
Guadarama,  and  forced  him  back  upon  the  Guadalax- 
ara. Rut.  witti  Cuesta  for  a  colleag-ue,  how  could  a 
general  undertake  an  operation  requiring  celerity  and 
the  nicest  calculation  1 

The  false  dealing-  of  the  junta  no  prudence  could 
guard  acrainst;  but  experience  proves  that,  without  ex- 
traordinary cfood  fortune,  some  accident  will  always 
happen  to  mar  the  combinations  of  armies  acting  upon 
♦'  clmthJe  externnl  h'nes.^^  And  so  it  was  with  respect 
to  Venegas  ;  for  that  general,  with  a  force  of  twenty- 
six  thousand  men,  suffered  himself  to  be  held  in  check 
for  five  days  by  three  thousand  French,  and  at  the  bat- 
tle ofAlmonacid  shewed,  that  he  knew  neither  when 
to  advance  nor  when  to  retreat. 

The  patience  with  which  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  bore 
the  fooMsh  insults  of  Cuesta,  and  the  undaunted  firm- 
ness with  which  he  soufifht  to  protect  the  Spanish  armj% 
require  no  illustration.  When  the  latter  fell  back  from 
St.  Oilalla  on  the  2fith,  it  was  impossible  for  the  Brit- 
ish to  retreat  with  honour;  and  there  is  notbintr  more 
memorable  in  the  history  of  this  war,  nothinsr  more 
creditable,  to  the  personal  character  of  the  English 
chief,  than  th.'  battle  of  Talavera,  considered  as  an  iso- 
lated event.  Nevertheless,  that  contest  proved  that 
the  allies  were  unable  to  attain  their  object;  for,  not- 
withstandingr  Victor's  ill-judged  partial  attacks  on  the 
night  of  the  27th  and  morning  of  the  28th.  and  not- 
withstanding the  final  repulse  of  the  French,  all  the 
advantages  of  the  movemi  nts,  as  a  whole,  were  with 
the  latter.  Thev  were,  on  the  .31st  of  July,  including 
•.he  garrism  of  Toledo,  still  above  forty  thousand  men, 


and  they  maintained  theii  central  position,  although  it 
was  n'  t  until  the  1st  of  August  that  Soxili's  approach 
caused  any  change  in  tiie  views  of  the  allied  generals  : 
and  this  brings  us  to  the  fundamental  error  of  sir  Ar- 
thur  Wellesley's  operations. 

That  so  able  a  commander  should  engage  himself 
in  the  narrow  vallev  of  the  Tagus  witii  twenty  thru 
sand  British  and  forty  thousand  Spanish  troops,  wii^ 
fifty  thousand  Frencli  were  waiting  for  him  at  the  fi  r- 
ther  end,  and  above  fifty  thousand  more  were  hanging 
on  his  flank  and  rear,  shews  that  the  greatest  masters 
of  the  art  may  err :  but  he  who  wars,  walks  in  a  misi 
through  which  the  keenest  eyes  cannot  always  discern 
the  right  path.  '■'■Speak  in  me  of  a  gerieral  who  has  made 
n'l  misfakes  in  war,''''  said  Turenne,  ^'and  ■you  speak  of  \ 
one  who  has  .ie!do}?i  made  Mwr."  I 

Sir  Arthur  Wellesley  thus  excused  his  error: —  j 
"  When  I  entered  Spain  I  had  reason  to  believe  that  I 
should  be  joined  by  a  Spanish  army  in  such  a  respecta-  i 
ble  state  of  discipline  and  e fllciency,  as  that  it  had  kept 
in  check,  during  nearly  three  months  after  a  defeat, 
a  French  army,  at  one  time  superior,  and  at  no  time 
much  inferior." 

"  I  had  likewise  reason  to  believe  that  the  French 
corps,  in  the  north  of  Spain,  were  fully  employed  ; 
and  although  I  had  heard  of  the  arrival  of  marshal 
Soult  at  Zamora,  on  the  29th  of  June,  with  a  view  to 
equip  the  remains  of  his  corps,!  did  not  think  it  pos- 
sible that  three  French  corps,  consisting  of  thirty-four 
thousand  men,  under  three  marshals,  could  have  been 
assembled  at  Salamanca  without  the  knowledge  of  the 
Governor  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  or  of  the  junta  of  Cas- 
tile ;  that  these  corps  could  have  been  moved  from 
their  stations  in  Gallicia,  the  Asturias,  and  Biscay, 
without  setting  free,  for  general  operations,  any  Span- 
ish troops  which  had  been  opposed  to  them,  or  without 
any  other  inconvenience  to  the  enemy  than  that  of  pro- 
tracting, to  a  later  period,  the  settlement  of  his  govern- 
ment in  those  provinces; — and  that  they  could  have 
penetrated  into  Estremadura,  without  a  shot  being  fired 
at  them  by  the  troops  deemed  sufficient  to  defend  the 
passes  by  the  Spanish  generals." 

Thus  it  was,  that  like  the  figures  in  a  phantasmago- 
ria, the  military  preparations  of  Spain,  however  mena- 
cing in  appearance,  were  invariably  found  to  be  vain 
and  illusory.  That  Sir  Arihur  Wellesley's  error  was 
not  fatal  is  to  be  attributed  to  three  causes  : — 

1.  The  reluctance  of  marshal  Ney  to  quit  Astor- 
ga  ; — 2.  The  march  of  the  filth  corps  upon  Villa  Cas 
tin  instead  of  Salamanca; — 3.  The  vehemence  with 
which  Victor  urged  the  battle  of  Talavera ;  in  short, 
jealousy  among  the  marshals,  and  the  undecided  tem- 
per of  the  king. 

If  Soult  had  not  been  thwarted,  he  would  have  con 
centrated  the  three  corps  near  Salamanca  before  the 
20th,  and  he  would  have  reached  Plasencia  before 
the  28th  of  July.  The  allies  must  then  have  forced 
their  way  into  La  Mancha,  or  been  crushed ;  but 
could  they  have  done  the  former  without  another  bat- 
tle 1  without  the  loss  of  all  the  wounded  men?  could 
they  have  done  it  at  all  ?  The  British,  including  Robert 
Craufurd's  brigade,  were  seventeen  thousand  fighting 
men  on  the  29th,  yet  wasted  with  fatigue  and  hunger. 
The  Spaniards  were  above  thirty  thousand  ;  but  in  them 
no  trust  could  be  placed  for  an  effort  requiring  fine  dis- 
cipline and  courage  of  the  highest  order.  Tlie  intru- 
sive king  was  at  the  head  of  fiirty  thousand  good  troops. 
Venegas,  at  once  ignorant  and  hampered  by  the  intrigues 
of  the  junta,  was  as  nought  in  the  operations,  while 
Soult's  step,  stealthy  when  the  situation  of  affairs  was 
obscure,  would  have  been  impetuous  when  a  light 
broke  on  the  field  of  battle  ;  it  is  scarcely  possible  to 
conceive  that  the  allii^s  could  have  forced  their  way  in 
front  before  that  marshal  would  have  fallen  oa  thi'ir 
rear. 


isoa.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


229 


FRENCH    OPERATIONS. 

Joseph  was  finally  successful  ;  yet  it  maybe  safely 
affirmed  that,  with  the  exception  of  uniting  his  three 
corps  behind  the  Guadarama,  on  the  evening  of  the 
25ih,  his  proceedings  were  an  almost  uninterrupted  se- 
ries of  errors.  He  would  not  suffer  Soull  to  besiege 
Ciudad  Rodrigo  with  seventy  thousand  men,  in  the  end 
of  July.  To  protect  Madrid  from  the  army  of  Venegas 
overbalanced,  in  his  mind,  the  advantages  of  this  bold 
and  grand  project,  which  would  inevitably  have  drawn 
sir  Arthur  Wellesley  from  the  Tagus,  and  which  inler- 
•iipting  all  military  communication  between  the  north- 
ern and  southern  provinces,  and  ensuring  possession  of 
Castile  and  Leon,  would,  by  its  success,  have  opened  a 
broad  way  to  Lisbon.  Cuestaand  Venegas,  meanwhile, 
would  have  marched  against  Madrid  !  Cuesta  and  Vene- 
gas, acting  on  external  lines,  and  whose  united  force 
did  not  exceed  sixty-five  thousand  men  !  The  king, 
holding  a  central  position,  with  fifty  thousand  French 
veterans,  was  alarmed  at  this  prospect,  and  rejecting 
Soult's  plan,  drew  Mortier,  with  the  fifth  corps,  to  Vil- 
la Castin.  Truly,  this  was  to  avoid  the  fruit-tree  from 
fear  of  a  nettle  at  its  stem  ! 

Sir  Arthur  Wellesley's  advance  toTalavera  was  the 
result  of  this  great  error,  but  he  having  thus  incautious- 
ly afforded  Soull  an  opportunity  of  striking  a  fatal  blow, 
a  fresh  combination  was  concerted.  The  king,  with 
equal  judgment  and  activity,  then  united  all  his  own 
forces  near  Toledo,  separated  Venegas  from  Cuesta, 
pushed  back  the  latter  upon  the  English  army,  and 
obliged  both  to  stand  on  the  defensive,  with  eyes  atten- 
tively directed  to  their  front,  when  the  real  point  of 
danger  was  in  the  rear.  This  indeed  was  skilful ;  but 
the  battle  of  Talavera  which  followed  was  a  palpable, 
an  enormous,  fault.  The  allies  could  neither  move  for- 
ward nor  backward,  without  being  infinitely  worse 
situated  for  success  than  in  that  strong  position,  which 
seemed  marked  out  by  fortune  herself  for  their  security. 
Until  the  3lsl,  the  operations  of  Venegas  were  not 
even  felt,  hence,  till  the  31sl,  the  French  position  on 
the  Alberche  might  have  been  maintained  without  dan- 
ger; and,  on  the  first  of  August,  the  head  of  Soult's 
column  was  at  Plasencia. 

Let  us  suppose  that  the  French  had  merely  made  de- 
monstrations on  the  '28th,  and  had  retired  behind  the 
Alberche  the  29th,  would  the  allies  have  dared  to  at- 
tack them  in  that  position?  The  conduct  of  the  Span- 
iards, on  the  evening  of  the  27th,  answers  the  question  ; 
ind  moreover,  Joseph,  with  an  army  compact,  active, 
and  experienced,  could,  with  ease,  have  baffled  any  ef- 
forts of  the  combined  forces  to  bring  him  to  action  ;  he 
might  have  covered  himself  by  the  Guadarama  river 
and  by  the  Tagus  in  succession,  and  the  farther  he  led 
his  opponents  from  Talavera,  without  uncovering  the 
line  of  La  Mancha,  the  more  certain  the  effect  of  Soult's 
operation  :  but  here  we  have  another  proof  that  double 
external  lines  are  essentially  vicious. 

The  combined  movement  of  the  French  was  desira- 
ble, from  the  greatness  of  the  object  to  be  gained,  and 
eafe,  from  the  powerful  force  on  each  point ;  and  the 
occasion  was  so  favourable  that,  notwithstanding  the  im- 
prudent heat  of  Victor,  the  reluctance  of  Ney,  and  the 
unsteady  temper  of  the  king,  the  fate  of  the  allies  was, 
up  to  the  evening  of  the  3d,  heavy  in  the  scale.  Nev- 
ertheless, as  the  central  position  held  by  the  allies,  cut 
the  line  of  correspondence  between  Joseph  and  Soult, 
the  king's  despatches  were  intercepted,  and  the  whole 
operation,  even  at  the  last  hour,  was  thus  baffled.  The 
first  element  of  success  in  war  is,  that  every  thing 
should  emanate  from  a  single  head  ;  and  it  would  have 
been  preferable  that  the  king,  drawing  the  second  and 
fifth  corps  to  him  by  the  pass  of  the  Guadarama,  or  by 
thai  of  Avila,  should,  with  the  eigiity  thousand  men 
thus  united,  have  fallen  upon  the  allies  in  front.  Such 
a  combination,  although  of  less  brilliant  promise  than 


the  one  adopted,  would  have  been  more  sure ;  and  the 
less  a  general  trusts  to  fortune  the  better  : — she  is  ca 
pricious  ! 

When  one  Spanish  army  was  surprised  at  Arzobis- 
po,  another  completely  beaten  at  Ahnonncid,  and  when 
Wilson's  Portuguese  corps  was  disjiersed  at  Baiios, 
the  junta  had  just  completed  the  measure  of  their  folly 
by  quarrelling  with  the  British  which  was  the  only  force 
left  that  could  protect  them.  The  French  were,  in 
truth,  therefore,  the  masters  of  the  Peninsula,  butthoy 
terminated  their  operations  at  the  very  moment  when, 
they  should  have  pursued  them  with  redoubled  activity 
because  the  general  aspect  of  affairs  and  the  particuhr 
circumstances  of  the  campaign  were  alike  favourable. 
For  Napoleon  was  victorious  in  Germany  ;  and  of  the 
British  expeditions  against  Italy  and  Holland,  the  for- 
mer had  scarcely  struggled  into  life, — the  latter  was 
already  corrupting  in  death.  Hence,  Jrse]ih  might 
have  been  assured  that  he  would  receive  reinforce- 
ments, but  that  none,  of  any  consequence,  could  reach 
his  adversaries;  and,  in  the  Peninsula,  there  was  noth- 
ing to  oppose  him.  Navarre,  Biscay,  Aragon,  and  the 
Castiles  were  subdued  ;  Gerona  closely  beleatruered, 
and  the  rest  of  Catalonia,  if  not  quiescent,  totally  una- 
ble to  succour  that  noble  city.  Valencia  was  inert; 
the  Asturias  still  trembling;  in  Gallicia  there  was 
nothing  but  confusion.  Romana,  commanding  fifteen 
thousand  infantry,  but  neither  cavalry  nor  artillery, 
was  then  at  Coruiia,  and  dareii  not  quit  the  mountains. 
The  duke  del  Parque  held  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  but  was 
in  no  condition  to  make  head  against  more  than  a 
French  division.  The  battle  ofAlmonacid  had  cleared 
La  Mancha  of  troops.  Estremadura  and  Andalusia 
were,  as  we  have  seen,  weak,  distracted,  and  incapa- 
ble of  solid  resistance.  There  remained  only  the  Entr- 
lish  and  Portuguese  armies,  the  one  being  at  Jara- 
ceijo,  the  other  at  Moraleja. 

The  line  of  resistance  may.  therefore,  be  said  to  have 
extended  from  the  Sierra  Morena  to  Coruna — weak 
from  its  length  ;  weaker,  that  the  allied  corps,  being 
separated  by  mountains,  by  rivers,  and  bv  vast  tracts 
of  country,  and  having  different  bases  of  operation, 
such  as  Lisbon,  Seville,  and  Ciudad  Rodricjo,  could 
not  act  in  concert,  except  offensively  ;  and  with  how 
little  effect  in  that  way  the  campaign  of  Talavera  had 
proved.  But  the  French  were  concentrated  in  a  nar- 
row space,  and,  having  only  Madrid  to  cover,  were  ad- 
vantageously situated  for  offensive  or  defensive  move- 
ments. The  allied  forces  were,  for  the  most  part,  im- 
perfectly oiganised,  and  would  not,  altogether,  have 
amounted  to  ninety  thousand  fighting  men.  The  French 
were  above  one  hundred  thousand,  dangerous  from  their 
discipline  and  experience,  more  dangerous  that  they  held 
a  central  position,  and  that  their  numbers  were  unknown 
to  their  opponents  ;  and,  moreover,  having,  in  four 
days,  gained  one  general  and  two  minor  battles,  their 
courage  was  hi^h  and  eager. 

At  this  period,  by  the  acknowledgement  of  the  Span- 
iards themselves,  the  fate  of  the  country  depended  en- 
tirely upon  the  British  troops,  and,  doubtless,  the  lat- 
ter were  soldiers  of  no  ordinary  stamp  ;  yet  there  is 
a  limit  to  human  power,  in  war  as  well  as  in  other 
matters.*  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley  was  at  the  head  of 
some  seventeen  thousand  men,  of  all  arms,  and  about 
five  thousand  were  between  Lisbon  and  Alcantara:  but 
the  whole  French  army  could,  in  two  days,  have  been 
concentrated  in  the  valley  of  the  Tagus.  Soult,  alonr, 
of  all  the  associated  generals,  appears  to  have  viewed 
this  crisis  with  the  eye  of  a  great  commamior.  Had 
he  been  permitted  to  follow  up  the  attaok  at  Arzobispo, 
on  the  8th  of  August,  what  could  the  seventeen  thou- 
sand starving  British  troops,  e.icumbered  with  the  ter- 


»  See  Calvo  Garay  aod    Lord  Welleslty'i  Correspondence, 
Pari.  Papers,  1810. 


230 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


"Book  VIII. 


ror-stricken  Spaniards,  have  effected  against  the  sev- 
enty thousand  French  that  would  have  stormed  their 
positions  on  three  sides  at  once]  Tlie  hardy,  endu- 
ring English  infantry  might,  indeed,  have  held  their 
ground  in  one  haltle,  but  could  they  have  fought  a 
second  1  Would  not  a  movement  of  the  first  ccrps  by 
Guadalupe,  would  not  famine  alone,  have  forced  the 
ten  or  twelve  thousand  men  remaining  (if,  indeed,  so 
many  were  left)  to  abandon  the  banks  of  the  Tagus, 
to  abandon,  also,  their  pares  of  ammunition  and  their 
vpunded  men.  and  to  retreat  towards  Portugal  ?  and  to 
retreat  also,  with  little  hope,  harassed,  as  they  would 
have  been,  by  six  thousand  horsemen,  for  Soult  had 
eighteen  regiments  of  cavalry. 

Let  it  be  supposed,  however,  that  the  strength  of  the 
Meza  d'lbor  and  the  Mirabete  had  baffled  all  the  ene- 
my's efforts,  and  that,  seeing  the  allies  fixed  in  those 
positions,  the  sixth  corps,  in  pursuance  of  Soult's  sec- 
ond proposal,  had  crossed  the  frontier  of  Portugal  : 
sir  Arthur  Wellesley,  contemplating  such  an  event, 
affirmed  that  he  meant  to  follow  them  in  any  move- 
ment they  might  make  against  Lisbon.*  There  were, 
however,  two  ways  of  following,  the  one  by  the  south 
and  the  other  by  the  north  bank  of  the  Tagus.  Now, 
if  he  designed  to  cross  the  Tagus  at  the  Cardinal's 
bridge,  and  so,  connecting  his  rigiit  with  Beresford,  to 
hang  on  the  enemy's  rear,  it  could  only  have  been 
while  he  was  ignorant  of  Venegas'  defeat,  and  when  he 
imagined  the  French  to  have  but  thirty  thousand  men 
in  the  valley  of  the  Tagus  ;  but  they  had  above  seven- 
ty thousand  ;  and,  witliout  endangering  Madrid,  they 
could  have  invaded  Portugal  with,  at  least,  fifty  thou- 
sand men  under  arms.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  he  de- 
signed to  move  by  the  south  side  of  the  Tagus,  the 
French  line  of  march  upon  Abrantes  and  Lisbon  was 
shorter  than  his  ;  and  Beresford,  who  only  reached 
Mora'eja  on  the  12th,  would  have  been  cut  off,  and 
thrown  back  upon  Almeida.  It  is  true  that  marshal 
Ney  alleged  the  difficulty  of  feeding  the  troops  in  the 
country  about  Plasencia  and  Coria,  and  the  prudence 
of  Soult's  project  might,  in  that  respect,  have  been 
somewhat  questionable.  But  the  duke  of  Elchingen 
was  averse  to  erni/  invasion  of  Portugal,  and,  to  an  un- 
willing: mind,  difficulties  enlarge  beyond  their  due  pro- 
portion ;  moreover,  his  talents  were  more  remarkable 
in  a  battle  than  in  the  dispositions  for  a  campaign,  and 
Soult's  opinion  must,  on  this  occasion,  be  allowed 
greater  v.'eight;  because  the  Vera  de  Plasencia  and  the 
valleys  of  the  Rejarand  the  Gata  mountains  were  ex- 
ceedingly fertile,  and  had  been  little  injured,  and  the 
object  was,  not  to  fix  a  base  of  operations,  but  to  ob- 
tain a  momentary  subsistence  until  a  richer  country 
could  be  opened. 

AdiTiitting,  however,  that  a  march  on  Lisbon  was  not 
feasible  at  that  moment,  there  could  have  been  no  well- 
founded  objection  to  the  siege  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo, 
which  Soult  again  proposed.  The  emperor's  instruc- 
tions were  indred  pleaded,  but  those  were  general,  and 
founded  on  the  past  errors  of  the  campaign,  which 
made  him  doubtful  of  the  future;  they  were  not  appli- 
cable to  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  the  moment,  and 
would  have  been  disregarded  by  a  general  with  a  lithe 
of  his  own  genius.  Fortunately  for  Spain,  the  intru- 
sive king  was  not  a  great  commander;  when  he  might 
liave  entered  the  temple  of  victory  with  banners  flying, 
te  stretched  himself  at  the  threshold  and  slept. 

The  departure  of  the  English  army  was  a  remark- 
able epoch  in  the  Peninsular  war.  The  policy  of  com- 
hining  operations  with  the  Spanish  armies,  and  of 
tilriking  directly  at  the  great  masses  of  the  French,  had 
been  fairly  acied  upon,  and  had  failed  ;  and  the  long 
cherished  delusion,  relative  to  Spanish  enthusiasm  and 
Spanish  efficiency,  was  at  last  dissipated.     The  trans- 

Parl.  Papers,  1810. 


actions  of  the  campaign  of  1809  form  a  series  of  prac- 
tical comments  upon  the  campaign  of  1808.  All  the 
objections  which  had  been  made  to  sir  John  Moore's 
conduct;  being  put  to  the  test  of  experience,  proved  il- 
lusory, while  the  soundness  of  that  general's  views 
were  confirmed  in  every  particular.  The  leading 
events  of  the  two  campaigns  bear  a  striking  resem- 
blance to  each  other. 

Both  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  and  sir  .John  Moore  ad- 
vanced from  Portugal  to  aid  the  Spatiish  armies.  The 
first  general  commanded  about  twenty  thousand,  the 
last  about  twenty-three  thousand  men;  but  there  was 
this  difference:  that,  in  1808,  Portugal  was  so  disor- 
ganised as  to  require  a  British  force  to  keep  down  an- 
archy; whereas,  in  1809,  Portugal  formed  a  good  base 
of  operations,  and  a  Portuguese  army  was  acting  in  co- 
operation with  the  British 

Sir  John  Moore  was  joined  by  six  thousand  men, 
under  Romana,  and  there  was  no  other  Spanish  army 
in  existence  to  aid  him. 

Sir  Arthur  Wellesley  was  joined  by  thirty-eight  thou- 
sand Spaniards,  under  Cuesta,  and  he  calculated  npon 
twenty-six  thousand,  under  Venegas  ;  while  from  twen- 
ty to  twenty-five  thousand  others  were  acting  in  Gal- 
licia  and  Leon. 

Sir  John  Moore  was  urgent  to  throw  himself  into 
the  heart  of  Spain,  to  aid  a  people  represented  as  a- 
bounding  in  courage  and  every  other  military  virtue. 
Judging  of  what  he  could  not  see  by  that  which  was 
within  his  view,  he  doubted  the  truth  of  these  repre- 
sentations, and  thinking  that  a  powerful  anuy,  com- 
manded by  a  man  of  the  greatest  military  genius,  was 
likely  to  prove  formidable,  he  was  unwilling  to  com- 
mit his  own  small  force  in  an  unequal  contest.  Nev- 
ertheless, feeling  that  some  practicable  demonstration 
of  the  difficulties  to  be  encountered  was  requited  by 
the  temper  of  the  times,  he  made  a  movement,  too  deli- 
cate and  dangerous  to  be  adopted,  unless  for  a  great 
political  as  well  as  military  purpose.  To  relieve  the 
southern  provinces,  and  to  convince  the  English  gov- 
ernment and  the  English  public  that  they  had  taken 
a  false  view  of  affairs,  were  the  objects  of  his  advance 
to  the  Carrion  river;  but,  although  he  carried  his  army 
forward  with  a  boldness  that  marked  the  consciousness 
of  superior  talents,  he  never  lost  sight  of  the  danger  he 
was  incurring  by  exposing  his  flank  to  the  French  em- 
peror. To  obviate  this  danger  as  much  as  possible,  he 
established  a  second  line  of  retreat  upon  Gallieia,and 
he  kept  a  watchful  eye  upon  the  cloud  gathering  at 
Madrid.  Arrived  in  front  of  Soult's  corps,  and  being 
upon  the  point  of  attacking  him,  the  expected  stem 
burst,  but,  by  a  rapid  march  to  Benevente,  Moore  saved 
himself  from  being  taken  in  flank  and  rear  and  des- 
troyed. Benevente  was,  however,  untenable  against 
the  forces  brought  up  by  Napoleon,  aiul  the  retreat  be- 
ing continued  to  Coruiia,  the  army,  after  a  battle,  em- 
barked. 

It  was  objected — 1.  That  Moore  should  have  gone 
to  Madrid  ; — 2.  That  he  should  have  fought  at  Astorga 
at  Villa  Franca,  and  at  Lugo,  instead  of  at  Coruna; — 
3.  That  he  overrated  the  strength  of  the  enemy,  and 
undervalued  the  strength  and  enthusiasm  of  the  Span- 
iards ;  and  that,  being  of  a  desponding  temper,  helosl 
the  opportunity  of  driving  the  French  beyond  the  Ebro 
for,  that  a  battle  gained  (and  it  was  assumed  that  i 
battle  must  have  been  gained  had  he  attacked)  woul^ 
have  assuredly  broken  the  enemy's  power,  and  called 
forth  all  the  energies  of  Spain. 

Sir  John  Moore  reasoned  that  the  Spanish  enthusi 
asm  was  not  great,  that  it  evaporated  in  boasting  and 
promises,  which  could  not  be  relied  upon;  that  the 
British  army  was  sc-nt  as  an  auxiliary,  not  as  a  princi- 
pal force,  and  that  the  native  armies  being  all  dispersed 
before  he  could  come  to  their  assistance,  the  enemy 
was  far  too   strong  to  contend   with  single-handed; 


1809.1 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


231 


wherefore,  it  was  prudent  to  re-einbark,  and  to  choose 
tome  other  base  of  operiitions,  to  be  conducted  upon 
sounder  views  of  the  actual  state  of  affairs,  or  to  give 
ap  the  contest  altoaether;  for  that  little  or  no  hope  of 
final  success  could  be  entertained,  unless  the  councils 
md  dispositions  of  the  Spaniards  changed  for  the  bet- 
•.er.  He  died  ;  and  the  English  ministers,  adopting  the 
'easoning  of  his  detractors,  once  more  sent  an  auxili- 
dTV  army  to  Spain,  although  the  system  still  existed 
wliich  he  had  denounced  as  incompatible  with  suc- 
cess. 

Sir  Arthur  Wellesley,  a  general  of  their  own  choice, 
and  assuredly  a  better  could  not  have  been  made,  was 
placed  at  the  head  of  this  army  ;  and,  after  giving  to 
Soult  a  heavy  blow  on  the  Douro,  he  also  advanced  to 
deliver  Spain.  Like  sir  John  Moore,  he  was  cramped 
for  the  want  of  money,  and,  like  Sir  John  Moore,  he 
was  pestered  with  false  representations,  and  a  variety 
of  plans,  founded  upon  short-sighted  views,  and   dis- 

C  laying  great  ignorance  of  the  art  of  war;  but,  finally, 
e  adopted,  and,  as  far  as  the  inveterate  nature  of  the 
people  he  had  to  deal  with  would  permit,  executed  a 
project,  which,  like  sir  John  Moore's,  had  for  its  object 
to  overpower  the  French  in  his  front,  and,  by  forcing 
them  to  concentrate,  relieve  the  distant  provinces; 
and  give  full  play  to  the  enthusiasm  of  the  Span- 
iards. 

When  sir  John  Moore  advanced,  there  were  no 
Spanish  armies  to  assist  him  ;  the  French  were  above 
three  liundred  and  twenty  thousand  strong,  and  of  these 
two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  were  disposable  to  move 
against  any  point;  moreover,  they  were  commanded  in 
person  by  Napoleon,  of  whom  it  has  been  said  by  the 
duke  of  Wellington,  that  his  presence,  a'one,  was 
equal  to  forty  thousand  good  troops. 

When  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  advanced,  the  French 
forces  in  the  Peninsula  did  not  exceed  two  hundred  and 
sixty  thousand  men,  of  which  only  one  hundred  thou- 
sand could  be  brought  to  bear  on  his  operations;  and 
he  was  assisted  b)'  sixty  thousand  Spaniards,  well 
armed,  and  tolerably  disciplined.  His  plans  were  cer- 
tainly laid  with  great  ability  upon  the  data  furnished  to 
him,  but  he  trusted  to  Spanish  promises  and  to  Spanish 
energy,  and  he  did  not  fail  to  repent  his  credulity.  He 
delivered  and  gained  that  battle  which  sir  John  Moore 
had  been  reproached  for  not  essaying  ;  but  it  was  found 
that  a  veteran  French  army,  even  of  inferior  numbers, 
was  not  to  be  destroyed,  or  even  much  dispirited,  by 
one  defeat ;  and  while  this  battle  was  fighting,  Soult, 
with  fifty  thousand  men,  came  down  upon  the  flank 
and  rear  of  the  English,  a  movement  precisely  similar 
to  that  which  Napoleon  had  made  from  Madrid  upon 
the  flank  and  rear  of  sir  John  Moore.  This  last  gene- 
ral saved  himself  by  crossing  the  Esla,  in  the  pres- 
ence of  the  French  patroles ;  and  in  like  manner,  sir 
Arthur  evaded  destruction  by  crossing  the  Tagus, 
within  view  of  the  enemy's  scouts;  so  closely  timed 
was  the  escape  of  both. 

When  sir  John  Moore  retreated,  the  Spanish  govern- 
ment, reproaching  him.  asserted  that  the  French  were 
on  t!ie  point  of  ruin,  and  Romana,  even  at  Astorga, 
continued  to  urge  offensive  operations. 

When  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  retired  from  Jaraceijo, 
the  junta  in  the  same  manner  asserted  that  the  French 
were  upon  the  point  of  retiring  from  Spain,  and  gene- 
sral   Eguia  proposed  oflTensive  operations. 

In  explaining  his  motives,  and  discussing  the  treat- 
ment he  had  met  with,  sir  John  Moore  wrote  thus  to 
his  own  government:  "T'Ae  British  were  sent  to  aid  the 
Spanish  armiefi,  but  they  are  not  equal  to  encounter  the 
French,  xvhn  have  at  least  tiirhty  thousand  men,  and 
we  have  nothing  to  expect  from  the  Spaniards,  who 
are  not  to  be  trusted  ;  they  are  apathetic,  lethargic, 
quicK  to  i)romise,  backward  to  act,  improvident,  insen- 
sible to  the  shame  of  flying  before  the  enemy,  they 


refuse  all  assistance,  and  I  am  obliged  to  leave  ammu- 
nition, stores  and  money,  behind.  The  Spanish  armies 
have  shewn  no  resolution,  the  people  no  enthusiasm 
nor  daring  spirit,  and  that  which  has  not  been  shown 
hitherto,  1  know  not  why  it  should  be  expected  to  bo 
displayed  hereafter."    Such.were  his  expressions. 

When  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  had  proved  the  Span- 
iards, he,  also,  writing  to  his  government,  says: — 
"  We  are  here  worse  off  than  in  a  hostile  country  ;  nev- 
er was  an  army  so  ill  used  ; — the  Spaniards  have  made 
all  sorts  of  promises; — we  had  absolutely  no  assis- 
tance from  the  Spanish  army;  on  the  contrary,  we  were 
obliged  to  lay  down  our  ammunition,  to  unload  the 
treasure,  and  to  employ  the  cars  in  the  removal  of  our 
sick  and  wounded.  The  common  dictates  of  humani- 
ty have  been  disregarded  by  them;  and  I  have  been 
obliged  to  leave  ammunition,  stores,  and  money  behind. 
Whatever  is  to  be  done  must  be  done  by  the  British  army, 
but  that  is  certainly  not  capable,  singly,  to  resist  a  French 
army  of  at  least  severity  thousand  men.'''' 

The  last  advice  given  to  the  government,  by  sir  John 
Moore,  was  against  sending  an  auxiliary  force  to  Spain. 
Sir  Arthur  Wellesley,  in  the  same  spirit,  withdrew  his 
troops;  and,  from  that  moment,  to  the  end  of  the  strug- 
gle, he  warred,  indeed,  for  Spain,  and  in  Spain,  but 
never  with  Spain.  "  I  have  fished  in  many  troubled 
waters,  but  Spanish  troubled  waters  I  will  never  try 
again,"  was  liis  expression,  when  speaking  of  this  cam- 
paign ;  and  he  kept  his  word.  That  country  became, 
indeed,  a  field,  on  which  the  French  and  English  ar- 
mies contended  for  the  destiny  of  Europe  ;  but  the  de- 
feats or  victories,  the  promises  or  the  performances  of 
the  Spaniards  scarcely  influenced  the  movements. 
Spain,  being  left  to  her  own  devices,  was  beaten  in 
every  encounter,  foiled  in  every  project,  yet  made  no 
change  in  her  policy  ;  and  while  Portugal  endeavoured 
to  raise  her  energy  on  a  level  with  that  of  her  ally, 
Spain  sought  to  drag  down  England  to  the  depth  of 
folly  and  weakness,  in  which  she  herself  was  plunged. 
The  one  would  not  sacrifice  an  atom  of  false  pride  to 
obtain  the  greatest  benefits  ;  the  other  submitted,  not 
with  abject  dependence,  but  with  a  magnanimous  hu- 
mility, to  every  mortification,  rather  than  be  conquered: 
and  the  eifects  of  their  different  modes  were  such  as 
might  be  expected.  Portugal,  although  assaulted  by 
an  infinitely  greater  number  of  enemies,  in  proportion 
to  her  strength,  overthrew  the  oppressors  the  moment 
thev  set  foot  upon  her  soil ;  while  in  Spain,  town  af- 
ter town  was  taken,  army  after  army  dispersed,  every 
battle  a  defeat,  and  every  defeat  sensibly  diminished 
the  heat  of  resistance. 

Napoleon  once  declared  that  a  nation  resolved  to  be 
free  could  not  be  conquered,  and  the  Spaniards  re-echo- 
ed the  sentiment  in  their  manifestos,  as  if  to  say  it  was- 
all  that  was  necessary.  But  Napoleon  contemplated 
a  nation,  like  the  Portuguese,  making  use  of  every 
means  of  defence,  whether  derived  from  themselves  or 
their  alliances;  not  a  people  puflTed  with  conceit,  and 
lavish  of  sounding  phrases,  such  as  "  perishing  under 
the  ruins  of  the  last  wall,"  yet  beaten  with  a  facility 
that  rendered  them  the  derision  of  the  world  ;  a  people 
unable  to  guide  themselves,  yet  arrogantly  rt  fusing  all 
advice.  Such  a  nation  is  ripe  for  destruction,  and 
such  a  nation  was  Spain. 

The  campaign  of  1809  finished  the  third  epoch  of  the 
war,  and  it  was  prolific  of  instruction.  The  jealousy 
of  the  French  marshals,  the  evils  of  disunion,  the  folly 
of  the  Spanish  government,  and  the  absurdity  of  the 
i  Spanish  character,  with  respect  to  public  affairs,  were 
'  placed  in  the  strongest  light;  while  the  vast  combina- 
tions, the  sanguinary  battles,  the  singular  changes  of 
fortune,  the  result  so  little  suitable  to  the  greatness  of 
the  eflJ'orts,  amply  demonstrated  the  difficulty  and  the 
uncertainty  of  military  affairs.  It  was  a  campaign  re- 
plete with  interest ;  a  great  lesson  from  which  a  great 


233 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  IX. 


commander  profited  :  sir  Aril  ur  Welleslcy  had  now 
experienced  the  weakness  of  his  friends  and  the  streno^th 
of  his  enemies,  and  he  felt  all  the  emptiness  of  public 
boasting.  Foreseeinof  that  if  the  contest  was  to  be  car- 
ried on,  it  must  be  in  Portiitral,  and  that  unless  he  him- 
eelf  could  support  th«  cause  of  the  Peninsula,  it  must 
fall,  his  manner  of  makincr  war  changed  ;  his  caution 
increased  tenfold,  yet,  abating  nothing  of  his  boldness, 
he  met  and  baffled  the  best  of  the  French  legions  in  the 
fulness  of  their  strength.    He  was  alike  unmoved  by  the 


intrigues  of  the  Portuguese  regency,  and  by  the  undis- 
guised hatred  of  the  Spanish  government;  and  when 
some  of  his  own  generals,  and  iwo  of  them  on  his  per- 
sonal stair,  denouncing  his  rashness  and  predicting-  the 
ruin  of  the  army,  caused  the  puny  energy  of  the  Eng- 
lish ministers  to  quail  as  the  crisis  approached,  he, 
with  gigantic  vigour,  pushed  aside  these  impediments, 
and,  steadily  holding  on  his  own  course,  proved  him- 
self a  sufficient  man,  whether  to  uphold  or  to  cojujuer 
kingdoms. 


BOOK    IX. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Inactivity  of  the  Asturians  and  Gallicians — Guerilla  system  in 
Navarre  and  Aragjon — The  Partidas  surround  the  third  corps 
— Blake  abandons  Aragon — Suchet's  operations  agiiinst  the 
Partidas — Combat  of  Treniendal — The  advantages  of  Suchet's 

fiosition — Troubles  at  Panipeluna — Suchet  ordered  by  Napo- 
eon  to  repair  there — Observations  on  the  Guerilla  system. 

When  Gallicia  was  delivered  by  the  campaign  of 
Talavera,  the  Asturias  became  the  head  of  a  new  line 
of  operation  threatening  the  enemy's  principal  commu- 
nication with  France.-  But  this  advantage  was  feebly 
used.  Kellerman's  division  at  Valladolid,  and  Bonet's 
at  San  Andero,  sufficed  to  hold  both  Asturians  and  Gal- 
licians in  check;  and  the  sanguinary  operations  in  the 
valley  of  the  Tagus,  were  collaterally,  as  well  as  direct- 
ly, unprofitable  to  the  allies.  In  other  parts,  the  war 
was  steadily  progressive  in  favour  of  the  French,  yet 
their  career  was  one  of  pains  and  difficulties. 

Hitherto  Biscay  had  been  tranquil,  and  Navarre  so 
submissive,  that  the  artillery  employed  against  Zara- 
goza,  was  conveyed  by  the  country  people,  without  an 
escort,  from  Pampeluna  to  Tudela.  But  when  the 
battle  of  Belchite  terminated  the  regular  warfare  in 
Aragon,  the  Guerilla  system  commenced  in  those  parts  ; 
and  as  the  chiefs  acquired  reputation  at  the  moment 
when  Blake  was  losing  credit  by  defeats,  the  dispersed 
soldiers  flocked  to  their  standards,  hopi'ng  tlius  to  cover 
past  disgrace,  and  to  live  with  a  greater  license;  be- 
cause the  regular  armies  suffered  under  the  restraints 
without  enjoying  the  benefits  of  discipline,  while  the 
irregulars  purveyed  for  themselves.  Thus,  Zaragoza 
being  surrounded  by  rugged  mountains,  every  range 
became  the  mother  of  a  Guerilla  brood;  nor  were  the 
regular  partizan  corps  less  numerous  than  the  Partidas. 

On  the  left  of  the  Ebro,  the  Catalonian  colonels, 
Baget,  Perena,  Pedroza,  and  the  chief  Theobaldo, 
brought  their  Migueletes  to  the  Sierra  de  Guara,  over- 
hanging Huesca  and  Barbastro,  In  this  position,  com- 
manding the  sources  of  the  Cinca  and  operating  on  both 
sides  of  that  river,  they  harassed  the  communication 
between  Zaragoza  and  the  French  out-posts,  and  main- 
tained an  intercourse  with  the  governor  of  Lerida,  who 
directed  the  movements  and  supplied  the  wants  of  all 
the  bands  in  Aragon. 

On  the  right  of  the  Ebro,  troops,  raised  in  the  dis- 
trict of  Molina,  were  united  to  the  corps  of  Gayan,  and 
that  officer,  entering  the  mountains  of  Montalvan,  the 
valley  of  the  Xiloca,  and  the  town  of  Daroca,  pushed 
his  advanced  guards  even  to  the  plain  of  Zaragoza,  and 
occupied  Nuestra  Senora  del  Agu'lar;  this  convent, 


situated  on  the  top  of  a  high  rock  near  Carinena,  he 
made  his  depnt  for  provisions  and  ammunition,  and 
surrounded  the  building  with  an  entrenched  camp. 

On  Gayan's  left,  general  Villa  Campa,  a  man  of 
talent  and  energy,  established  himself  at  Calatayud, 
with  the  regular  regiments  of  Soria  and  lia  Princessa, 
and  making  fresh  levies,  rapidly  formed  a  large  force, 
with  which  he  cut  the  direct  line  between  Zaragoza 
and  Madrid. 

Beyond  Villa  Campa's  positions  the  circle  of  war 
was  continued  by  other  bands,  which,  descending  from 
the  Moncayo  mountains,  infested  the  districts  of  Taran- 
zona  and  Borja,  and  intercepted  the  comnmnications 
between  Tudela  and  Zaragoza.  The  younger  Mina, 
called  the  student,  vexed  the  country  between  Tudela 
and  Pampeluna;  and  the  inhabitants  of  the  high  Pyre- 
nean  valleys  of  Roucal,  Salazar,  Anso,  a'd  Echo,  were 
also  in  arms,  under  Renovalles.  This  officer,  taken  at 
Zaragoza,  was,  by  the  French,  said  to  have  broken  his 
parole,  but  he  pleaded  a  previous  breach  of  the  capitu- 
lation, and  having  escaped  to  Lerida  passed  from 
thence,  with  some  regular  officers,  into  the  valleys, 
where  he  surprised  several  French  detachments.  His 
principal  post  was  at  the  convent  of  San  .Tuan  de  la 
Pena.  which  is  built  on  a  rock,  remarkable  in  Spanish 
history  as  a  place  of  refuge  maintained  with  success 
against  the  Moorish  conquerors;  the  bodies  of  twenty- 
two  kings  of  Aragon  rested  in  the  church,  and  the 
whole  rock  was  held  in  veneration  by  the  Aragonese, 
and  supposed  to  be  invulnerable.  From  this  post 
Saraza,  acting  under  Renovalles,  continually  menaced 
Jaca,  and  communicating  with  Baget,  Pedroza,  and 
Father  Theobaldo,  completed,  as  it  were,  the  invest- 
ment of  the  third  corps. 

All  these  bands,  amounting  to,  at  least,  twenty  thou- 
sand armed  men,  commenced  their  operations  at  once, 
cutting  off  isolated  men,  intercepting  convoys  and  cou- 
riers, and  attacking  the  weakest  parts  of  the  French 
army.  Meanwhile  Blake  having  rallied  his  fugitives 
at  Tortoza,  abandoned  Aragon,  and  proceeding  to  Tar- 
ragona, endeavoured  to  keep  the  war  alive  in  Cata- 
lonia. 

Suchet,  in  following  up  his  victory  at  Belchite,  had 
sent  detachments  as  far  as  Morella,  on  the  bordt  rs  of 
Valencia,  and  pushed  his  scouting  parties  close  up  to 
Tortoza.  Finding  the  di.spersion  of  Blake's  troops 
complete,  he  posted  Meusnier's  division  on  the  line  of 
the  Guadalupe,  with  orders  to  repair  the  castle  of  Al- 
canitz,  so  as  to  form  a  head  of  cantonments  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Ebro;  then  crossing  that  river  at  Caspe 
witli  the  rest  of  the  army,  he  made  demoustratiouf 


1809.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


233 


ajrainst  Meqiiinenza,  and  even  menaced  Lerida,  oblig- 
ingf  tlie  crovernor  to  draw  in  his  detachments,  and  dose 
the  ^ates.  Alter  this  he  continued  his  march  hy  Fran-a, 
rccrcssed  the  Cinca,  and  leavinnr  Habert's  division  to 
puard  that  line,  returned  himself  in  the  latter  end  of 
June  to  Zaracroza  by  the  road  of  Mcnzon. 

Having  thus  dispersed  the  regular  Spanish  forces 
and  ofiven  full  rfTect  to  his  victory,  the  French  general 
S'Tught  to  fix  himself  firmly  in  the  positions  he  had 
gained.  Sensible  that  arms  may  win  battles,  but  can- 
nut  render  conquest  permanent,  he  projected  a  system 
of  civil  admipcistration  which  mijjhl  enable  him  to  sup- 
port his  troops,  and  yet  offer  some  Sfcurity  of  property 
to  those  inhabitants  who  remained  tranquil.  But.  as 
it  was  impo-sible  for  the  people  to  trust  to  any  system, 
or  to  avoid  danorer,  while  the  mountains  swarmed  with 
the  Partidas,  Sucliet  resolved  to  pursue  the  latter  with- 
out relaxation,  and  to  put  down  all  resistance  in  Aragon 
before  he  attempted  to  enlarge  the  circle  of  his  con- 
quests; and  he  knew  that  while  he  thus  laid  a  solid 
base  for  further  operations,  he  should  also  form  an  army 
capable  of  executinjr  any  enterprize. 

Cornmencir.p^  on  the  side  of  Jaca,  he  dislodged  the 
Spaniards  from  their  positions  near  that  castle,  in  June, 
and  supplied  it  with  ten  months'  provisions.  After 
this  operation,  Almunia  and  Carineiia,  on  the  rijxht  of 
the  Ebro,  were  occupied  by  his  detachments,  and  hav- 
ing^ suddenly  drawn  together  four  battalions  and  a  hun- 
dred cuirassiers  at  the  latter  point,  he  surrounded 
Nuestra  Senora  del  Aguilar,  during  the  night  of  the 
19th,  destroyed  the  entrenched  camp,  and  sent  a  de- 
tachment in  pursuit  of  Gayan.  On  the  same  day, 
Pedrosa  was  repulsed  on  the  other  side  of  the  Ebro, 
near  Barba&tro,  and  general  Habert  also  defeated  Pe- 
rena.  The  troops  sent  in  pursuit  of  Gayan  dis])ersed 
his  corps  at  Uzed,  Daroca  was  occupied  by  the  French, 
and  the  vicinitv  of  Calatayud  and  the  mountains  of 
Moncayowere  then  scoured  hy  detachments  from  Zara- 
goza,  one  of  which  took  possession  of  the  district 
of  Cinco  Villas.  Meanwhile  Jaca  was  continually 
menaced  by  the  Spaniards  of  St.  Juan  de  la  Pena,  and 
Saraza,  descending  from  thence  by  the  valley  of  the 
Gallego,  on  the  23d  of  August,  surprised  and  slew  a 
detachment  of  seventy  men  close  to  Zaragoza.  On 
the  2fith,  however,  five  French  battalions  stormed  the 
sacred  rock,  and  penetrated  up  the  valleys  of  Anso 
and  Fcho  in  pursuit  of  Renovalles;  nevertheless,  that 
chief,  retiring  to  Roncal,  obtained  a  capitulation  for  the 
valley  without  surrendering  himself. 

These  operations  having,  in  a  certain  degree,  cleared 
Aragon  of  the  bands  on  the  side  of  Navarre  and  Cas- 
tile, the  French  general  turned  against  those  on  the 
side  of  Catalonia.  Baget,  Perena,  and  Pedrosa,  were 
chased  from  the  Sierra  de  Guarra,  but  rallied  between 
the  Cinra  and  the  Noguerra,  and  were  there  joined  hy 
Renovalles,  who  assumed  the  chief  command;  on  the 
23d  of  September,  however,  the  whole  were  routed  by 
general  Habert.  the  men  dispersed,  and  the  chiefs  took 
refuge  in  Lerida  and  Mequinenza.  Suchet  then  occu- 
pied Fras^a,  Candasnos,  and  Monzon,  established  a  fly- 
ing bridge  on  the  Cinca,  near  the  latter  town,  raised 
some  field-works  to  protect  it,  and  that  done,  resolved 
to  invade  the  districts  of  Venasques  and  Benevarres, 
the  subjection  of  which  would  have  secured  his  left 
flank,  and  opened  a  new  line  of  communication  vith 
France.  The  inhabitants,  having  notice  of  his  project, 
assembled  in  arms,  and  being  joined  by  the  dispersed 
soldiers  of  the  defeated  Partizans,  menaced  a  French 
regiment  posted  at  Graus.  ('olonel  La  Peyrolerie,  the 
commandant,  marched  the  17th  of  October,  by  Roda, 
to  meet  them,  but  having  reached  a  certain  distance  up 
the  valley,  was  surrounded,  yet  he  broke  through  in 
the  night,  and  regained  his  post.  During  his  absence' 
the  peasantry  of  the  vicinity  came  down  to  kill  his  sick 
men,  the  townsmen  of  Graus  opposed   ti-     barbarity, 


and  marshal  Suchet  aflrrms  that  such  humane  conduct 
was  not  rare  in  Aragonese  towns. 

While  this  was  passing  in  the  valley  of  Venasque, 
the  governor  of  Lerida  caused  Caspe,  Fraga,  and  ("an- 
dasnos  to  be  attacked,  and  some  sharp  fighting  tor  k 
place.  The  French  maintained  their  posts,  but  the 
whole  circle  of  iheir  cantonments  being  still  infested 
by  the  smaller  bands,  jietty  actions  were  fought  at 
Relchite,  and  on  the  side  cf  Molino,  at  Arnedo,  and  at 
Soria.  jVlina  still  intercepted  thecommunications  with 
Pampeluna;  and  Villa  Campa,  quitting  Calatayud, 
rallied  Gayan's  troops,  and  gathered  others  on  the 
rocky  mountain  of 'J'remendal,  wliere  a  large  convent 
and  church  once  more  furnished  a  citadel  for  an  en- 
trenched camp.  Against  this  place  colonel  Henriod 
marched  from  Daroca,  with  from  fifteen  hundred  to  two 
thousand  men  and  three  pieces  of  artillery,  and  driving 
back  some  advanced  posts  from  Ojos  Negros  and  Ori- 
guela,  came  in  front  of  the  main  position  at  eleven 
o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  25th  of  November. 

COMBAT    OF    TREMENDAL. 

The  Spaniards  were  en  a  mountain,  from  the  centre 
of  which  a  tongue  of  land  sheeting  out,  overhung  Ori- 
truela,  and  on  the  upper  part  of  this  tongue  stood  the 
fortified  convent  of  Tremendal.  To  the  right  and  left 
the  rocks  were  nearly  perpendicular,  and  Henriod,  see- 
ing that  Villa  Campa  was  too  strongly  posted  to  be 
beaten  by  an  open  attack,  skirmished  as  if  he  would 
turn  the  right  of  the  position  by  the  road  of  Albaracin. 
Villa  Campa  was  thus  induced  to  mass  his  forces  on 
that  side,  and  in  the  night,  the  fire  of  the  bivouacs  en- 
abled the  Spaniards  to  see  that  the  main  body  of  the 
French  troops  and  the  baggage  were  retiring,  while 
Henriod,  with  six  chosen  companies  and  two  pieces 
of  artillery,  coming  against  the  centre,  suddenly  drove 
the  Spanish  outposts  into  the  fortified  convent,  and 
opened  a  fire  with  his  guns,  as  if  to  cover  the  r'^treat. 
This  cannonade,  however,  soon  ceased,  and  VMlla 
Campa,  satisfied  that  the  French  had  retired,  was 
thrown  completely  otT  his  guard  ;  Henriod's  six  com- 
panies then  secretly  scaled  the  rocks  of  the  position, 
rushed  amongst  the  sleeping  Spaniards,  kiiled  and 
wounded  five  hundred,  and  put  the  whole  army  to 
flight.  Meanwhile,  on  the  other  side  of  the  Ebro,  a 
second  attempt  was  made  against  the  valley  of  Venas- 
que, which  being  successful,  that  district  was  disarmed. 

Petty  combats  still  continued  to  be  fought  in  other 
parts  of  Aragon,  but  the  obstinacy  of  the  Spaniards 
gradually  gave  way.  In  December,  Suchet,  (assisted 
by  general  Milhaud,  with  a  moveable  column  from 
Madrid.)  took  the  towns  of  Albaracin  and  Teruel,  the 
insurgent  junta  fled  to  Valencia,  and  thus  the  subjec- 
tion of  Aragon  was,  in  a  manner,  efl!ected  ;  for  the  in- 
terior was  disarmed  and  quieted,  and  the  Partidas, 
which  still  hung  upon  the  frontiers,  were  obliged  to 
recruit  and  be  supplied  from  other  provinces,  and  acted 
chiefly  on  the  defensive.  The  Aragonese  were  indeed 
so  vexed  by  the  smaller  bands,  now  dwindling  into 
mere  banditti,  that  a  smuggler  of  Barbastro  asked 
leave  to  raise  a  Spanish  corps,  with  which  he  chased 
and  suppressed  many  of  them. 

The  reinforcements  now  pouring  into  Spain  enabled 
the  French  general  to  prepare  for  extended  opeiations. 
The  original  Spanish  army  of  Aragon  was  reduced  to 
about  eight  thousand  men,  of  which,  a  part  were  wan- 
dering with  Villa  Campa,  a  part  were  in  Tortoza,  and 
the  rest  about  Lerida  and  Mequinenza ;  those  fortresses 
were,  in  fact,  the  only  obstacles  to  a  junction  of  the 
third  with  the  seventh  corps,  and  in  them  the  Spanish 
troops  who  still  kept  the  field  took  refuge,  when  closely 
pressed  by  the  invaders. 

The  policy  of  the  supreme  junta  was  always  to  form 
fresh  corps  upon  the  remnants  of  their  beaten  armies. 
Hence  Villa  Campa,  keeping  in  the  mountains  of  Al- 


234 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  IX 


baracin,  recruited  his  ranks,  and  still  infested  the  west- 
ern frontier  of  Araoron  :  Garcia  Novarro,  making  Tor- 
toza  his  base  o.  operations,  lined  the  banks  of  the  Al- 
pas,  and  menaced  Aleanitz ;  and  Perena,  trustincr  to 
the  ncishbciirhood  of  Lerida  for  support,  posted  him- 
self between  the  Nnoruera  an. I  tlie  Seg-re.  However, 
tiie  activity  of  the  French  gave  little  time  to  effect  any 
considerable  orsfariization. 

Suchet's  positions  formed  a  circle  round  Zaragoza. 
Tudela,  Jaca,  and  the  castle  of  Aljaferia  were  garri- 
STitd,  but  his  principal  forces  were  on  the  Guadalupe 
and  the  Cinca,  occupying  Aleanitz,  Caspe,  Fraga, 
Monzon,  Earbas'io,  Benevarres.  and  Venasque ;  of 
these,  ihe  first,  third,  and  fourth  were  places  of  strength, 
Slid,  whether  liis  f-itualicn  be  regarded  in  a  political,  or 
a  military  liglit,  it  was  become  most  important.  One 
year  had  suff.ced,  not  only  to  reduce  the  towns  and 
break  tiie  armies,  but  in  part  to  conciliate  the  feelings 
of  the  Aragf  nese — at  that  time,  confessedly  the  most 
energetic  portion  of  the  nation — and  to  place  the  third 
corps,  with  reference  to  the  general  operations  of  the 
war,  in  a  most  formidable  position. 

1.  The  fortified  castle  of  Alcaniiz  formed  a  head  of 
cantonments  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Ebro,  and  being 
situated  at  the  entrance  of  the  passes  leading  into  Va- 
lencia, furnished  a  base,  from  which  Sucbet  could  in- 
vade that  rich  province ;  and  by  which  also,  he  could 
place  the  Catalonian  army  between  two  fires,  whenever 
the  seventh  corps  should  again  advance  beyond  the 
Llobregat. 

2.  Caspe  secured  the  communication  between  the 
vings  of  the  third  corps,  while  Fraga,  with  its  wooden 
bridge  over  the  Cinca,  offered  the  means  of  passing  that 
uncertain  river  at  all  seasons. 

3.  Monzon.  a  regular  fortification,  in  some  measure 
balanced  Lerida;  and  its  flying  bridge  over  the  Cinca 
enabled  the  French  to  forage  all  the  country  between 
Lerida  and  \'enasques;  moreover,  a  co-operation  of  tlie 
garrison  of  Monzon,  the  troops  at  Barbastro,  and  those 
at  Benevarres,  could  always  curb  Perena. 

4.  The  possession  of  Venasqnes  permitted  Suchet 
to  communicate  with  the  moveable  columns,  (appointed 
to  guard  the  French  frontier.)  while  the  castle  of  Jaca 
rendered  the  third  corps  in  a  manner  independent  of 
Pampeluna  and  St.  Sebastian.  In  fine,  the  position  on 
the  C'iiica  and  the  Guadalupe,  menacing  alike  Catalo- 
nia and  Valencia,  connected  the  operations  of  the  third 
with  the  seventh  corps,  and  henceforward  we  shall 
find  these  two  armies  gradually  approximating  until 
they  formed  but  one  force,  acting  upon  a  distinct  sys- 
tem of  invasion  against  the  south. 

Suchet's  projects  were,  however,  retarded  by  insur- 
rectio.ts  in  Navarre,  which,  at  this  period,  assumed  a 
serious  aspect.  The  student  Alina,  far  from  being 
quelled  by  the  troo])s  sent  at  different  periods  in  chase 
of  him,  daily  increased  his  forces,  and,  by  hardy  and 
sudden  enterprizes,  kept  the  Navarrese  in  commotion. 
'I"he  duke  cf  Mahon.  one  of  Joseph's  Spanish  adherents, 
anpointed  viceroy  of  Navarre,  was  at  variance  with  the 
iTii'itary  authoritie>,  and  all  the  disorders  attendant  on 
a  divided  administration,  and  a  rapacious  system,  en- 
sued. General  D'Agoult,  the  governor  of  Pampeluna, 
was  accused  of  being  in  Mina's  pav,  and  his  suicide 
during  an  invesiigatiou  seems  to  confirm  the  suspicion, 
but  it  is  certain  that  the  whole  administration  of  Na- 
varre was  oppressive,  venal,  and  weak. 

To  avert  the  serious  danger  of  an  insunection  so 
close  to  France,  the  emperor  directed  Suchet  to  repair 
there  with  a  part  of  the  third  corps,  and  that  general 
Boon  restored  order  in  Pampeluna,  and  eventually  cap- 
tured Mina  iiimself;  yet  he  was  unable  to  suppress  the 
fysteiii  of  the  Partidas.  ^^  Espoz  y  Mina'''  took  his 
nephew's  place;  and  from  that  time  to  the  end  of  the 
war,  the  communications  of  the  French  were  troubled, 
and  considerable  losses  inflicted  upon  their  armies  by 


this  celebrated  m.an — undoubtedly  the  mo3t  conspicu- 
ous person  among  the  Partida  chiefs.  And  iiere  it 
may  be  observed  how  weak  and  .neff.cient  this  guerilla 
system  was  to  deliver  the  country,  and  that,  even  as 
an  auxiliary,  its  advantages  were  nearly  balanced  by 
the  evils. 

It  was  in  the  provinces  lying  between  France  and 
the  Ebro  that  it  commenced.  It  was  in  those  provinces 
that  it  could  effect  the  greatest  injury  to  the  French 
cause ;  and  it  was  precisely  in  those  provinces  that  it 
was  conducted  with  the  greatest  energy,  although  les» 
assisted  by  the  English  than  any  other  part  of  Spain: 
a  fact  leading  to  the  conclusion,  that  ready  and  copious 
succours  may  be  hurtful  to  a  people  situated  as  the 
Spaniards  were.  \A  hen  so  assisted,  men  are  apt  to 
rel}^  more  upon  their  allies  than  upon  their  own  exer- 
tions. But  however-this  may  be,  it  is  certain  that  the 
Partidas  of  Biscay,  Navarre,  Aragon,  and  Catalonia, 
although  they  amounted  at  one  time  to  above  thirty 
thousand  men,  accustomed  to  arms,  and  often  com- 
manded by  men  of  undoubted  enterprize  and  courage, 
never  occupied  half  their  own  number  of  French  at  one 
time;  never  absolutely  defeated  a  single  division; 
never  prevented  any  considerable  enter])rize;  never, 
Avith  the  exception  of  the  surprise  'of  Figueras,  to  be 
hereafter  spoken  oi,  performed  any  exploit  seriously 
atfecting  the  operations  of  a  single  "corps  d'armee." 

It  is  true,  that  if  a  whole  nation  will  but  persevera 
in  such  a  system,  it  must  in  lime  destroy  the  most  nu- 
merous armies.  But  no  people  will  thus  persevere,  the 
aged,  the  sick,  the  timid,  the  helpless,  are  all  hinderers 
of  the  bold  and  robust.  There  will,  also,  be  a  dirhcully 
to  procure  arms,  for  it  is  not  on  every  occasion  that  so 
rich  and  jiowerful  a  people  as  the  English,  will  be 
found  in  alliance  with  insurrection;  and  when  the  in- 
vaders follow  up  their  victories  by  a  prudent  conduct, 
as  was  the  case  with  Suchet  and  some  others  of  the 
French  generals,  the  result  is  certain.  The  desire  of 
ease  natural  to  mankind,  prevails  against  the  sugges- 
tions of  honour;  and  although  the  opportunity  of  cov- 
ering personal  ambition  with  the  garb  of  patriotism 
may  cause  many  attempts  to  throAv  off  the  yoke,  the 
bulk  of  the  invaded  people  will  gradually  become  sub- 
missive and  tranquil.  It  is  a  fact  that,  notwithstand- 
ing the  violent  measures  resorted  to  by  the  Partida 
chiefs  to  fill  their  r:~.nks,  Jeserters  from  the  French  and 
even  from  the  British  formed  one-third  of  their  bands. 

To  raise  a  whole  people  against  an  invader  may  be 
easy,  but  to  direct  the  energy  thus  aroused,  is  a  gigan- 
tic task,  and,  if  misdirected,  the  result  will  be  more 
injurious  than  advantageous.  That  it  was  misdirected 
in  Spain  was  the  opinion  of  many  able  men  of  all  sides, 
and  to  represent  it  otherwise,  is  to  make  history  give 
false  lessons  to  posterity.  Portugal  was  thrown  com- 
pletely into  the  hands  of  lord  Wellington,  but  that 
great  man,  instead  of  following  the  example  of  the  su- 
preme junta,  and  encouraging  independent  bands,  en- 
forced a  military  organization  upon  totally  different 
principles.  The  people  were,  indeed,  called  upon  and 
obliged  to  resist  the  enemy,  but  it  was  under  a  regular 
system,  by  which  all  classes  were  kept  in  just  bounds, 
and  the  whole  physical  and  moral  power  of  the  nation 
rendered  subservient  to  the  plan  of  the  generai-In-chief. 
To  act  differently  is  to  confess  weakness :  it  is  to  say 
that  the  government  being  unequal  to  the  direction  of 
affairs  permits  anarchy. 

'I'he  Partida  system  in  Spain,  was  the  offspring  of 
disorder,  and  disorder  in  war  is  weakness  accompanied 
by  ills  the  least  of  which  is  sufficient  to  produce  ruin. 
It  is  in  such  a  warfare,  that  habits  cf  unbridled  license, 
of  unprincipled  violence,  and  disrespect  for  the  rights 
of  property  are  quickly  contracted,  and  render  men  un- 
fit for  the  duties  of  citizens;  and  yet  it  has  with  sin- 
gular inconsistency  been  cited,  as  the  best  and  surest 
mode  of  resisting  an  enemy,  by  politicians,  who  hold 


ison.j 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


2C5 


rconlar  atmies  in  abhorronre,  althovicrh  a  liijrli  sense 
onioriour,  devotion  to  the  cause  of  the  country,  tem- 
perance, rrtrnlarity,  and  decent  manners  are  of  the  very 
essence  of  the  lattor's  discipline. 

Rcsrular  armies  have  seldom  failed  to  produce  preat 
men,  and  one  fjreat  man  is  sufficient  to  save  a  nation : 
but  when  every  person  is  permitted  to  make  war  in  the 
manner  most  agreeable  to  hin'self ; — for  one  that  comes 
forward  with  patriotic  intentions,  there  will  be  two  to 
act  from  personal  interest;  in  short,  there  will  be  more 
'robbers  than  g^enerals.  One  of  the  first  exploits  ri 
E^poz  y  Mina  was  to  slay  the  commander  of  a  neitrh- 
bourino;  band,  because,  under  the  mask  of  patriotism, 
he  was  plunderinnr  his  own  countrymen  :*  nay,  this 
the  most  fortunate  of  all  the  chiefs,  would  never  suffer 
any  other  Partida  than  his  own  to  be  in  his  district; 
he  also,  as  I  have  before  related,  made  a  species  of 
commercial  treaty  with  the  French,  and  strove  earnest- 
ly and  successfully  to  raise  his  band  to  the  dignity  of 
a  regular  force.  Nor  was  this  manner  ofconHdering 
the  guerilla  sj-stem  confined  to  the  one  side.  The  fol- 
lowing observations  of  St.  Cyr,  a  man  of  acknowledged 
talents,  show  that,  after  considerable  experience  ofth's 
mode  of  warfare,  he  also  felt  that  the  evil  was  greater 
than  the  benefit. 

"  Far  from  casting  general  blame  on  the  efforts  made 
bv  the  Catalans,  1  admired  them;  but,  as  they  often 
exceeded  the  bounds  of  reason,  their  heroism  was 
detrimental  to  their  cause.  IMany  times  it  caused  the 
destruction  of  whole  populations  without  necessity  and 
without  advantage. 

"  When  a  country  is  invaded  by  an  army  stronger 
than  that  which  defends  it,  it  is  beyond  question  that 
the  populn.ion  should  come  to  the  assistance  of  the 
troops,  and  lend  them  every  support;  but,  without  an 
absolute  necessity,  the  foriTier  should  not  bo  brought  on 
to  the  field  of  battle." — "  It  is  inhuman  to  place  their 
inexperience  in  opposition  to  hardened  veterans. 

"  Instead  oi cxciiperaling  the  people  of  Catalonia,  the 
leaders  should  have  endeavoured  to  calm  them,  and 
have  directed  their  ardour  so  as  to  second  the  army  on 
great  occasions.  But  they  excited  them  without  ces- 
sation, led  them  day  after  day  into  fire,  fatigued  them, 
harassed  them,  forced  them  to  abandon  their  habita- 
tions, to  embark  if  they  were  on  the  ccast,  if  inland  to 
take  to  the  mountains  and  perish  of  misery  within 
sight  of  their  own  homes,  thus  abandoned  to  the  mercy 
of  a  hungry  and  exasperated  soldiery.  The  people's 
ardour  \\as  exhausted  daily  in  partial  operations,  and 
hence,  on  great  occasions,  when  they  could  have  been 
eminently  useful,  they  were  not  to  be  had. 

"  Their  gocd  will  had  been  so  often  abused  by  the 
folly  of  their  leaders,  that  many  times  their  assistance 
was  called  for  in  vain.  The  peasantry,  of  whom  so 
much  had  been  demanded,  began  to  demand  in  tlicir 
turn.  They  insisted  that  the  soldiers  should  fight  always 
to  the  last  gasp,  were  angry  when  the  latter  retreated, 
and  robbed  and  ill-used  them  when  broken  by  defeat. 

"  They  had  been  so  excited,  so  exasperated  against 
the  French,  that  they  became  habitually  ferocious,  and 
their  ferocity  was  often  as  dangerous  to  their  own 
party,  as  to  the  enemy.  The  atrocities  coirmiitted 
against  their  own  chiefs  disgusted  the  most  patriotic, 
abated  their  zeal,  caused  the  middle  classes  to  desire 
peace  as  the  only  remedy  of  a  system  so  replete  with 
disorder.  Numbers  of  distinguished  men,  even  those 
who  had  vehemently  opposed  .loseph  at  first,  bejran  to 
abandon  Ferdinand ;  and  it  is  certain  that,  but  for  the 
expedition  to  Russia,  that  branch  of  the  Bourbons 
which  reigns  in  Spain,  would  never  have  remounted 
the  throne. 

"  The  cruelties  exercised  upon  the  French  military 
were  as  little  conformable  to  the  interest  of  the  Span- 
iards.    Those  men  were  but  the  slaves  of  their  duly, 


and  of  the  stat; ;  certain  of  death  a  little  sooner  or  a 
little  later,  they,  like  the  Spainards,  were  victims  of 
the  same  ambition.  The  soldier  naturally  becomes 
cruel  in  protraclrd  warfare;  but  the  treatment  expe- 
rienced from  the  Catalans  brought  out  this  disposition 
prematurely  ;  and  that  unhappy  ]M'r])le  were  themselves 
the  victims  of  a  cruelty,  which  either  of  their  own  will 
or  excited  by  others,  they  had  exercised  upon  those 
troops  that  fell  into  their  power;  and  this  without  any 
advantage  to  their  cause,  while  a  contrary  system 
would,  in  a  little  tin)e  have  broken  up  the  seventh 
corps, — seeing  that  the  Litter  vas  ccmposed  of  foreign- 
ers, naturally  inclined  to  desert.  Put  the  murders  of 
all  wounded,  and  sick,  aiid  helpless  men,  created  such 
horror,  that  '.he  desertion,  which  at  first  menaced  total 
destruction,  ceased  eiitirely." 

Such  were  St.  Cyr's  c])iniens;  and,  assuredly,  the 
struggle  in  Catalonia,  of  which  it  is  now  the  lime  to 
resume  the  relation,  was  not  the  least  successful  in 
Spain. 


CHAPTER  II. 

Continuation  of  the  operations  in  Catalonia — St  Cyr  sends 
Ltccl.i  to  the  Anipuidan;  he  returns  with  the  intilligfnce 
of  the  Austrian  uar-  Ol  V'erdier's  arrival  in  the  Anipuician, 
and  of  Aug^eieau's  appointment  to  the  roniniand  ot  tfie  stv- 
ti!th  roips — Aujcerfc'.u's  inflated  proclaniation — It  is  tora 
ciown  by  the  CataJLinians — He  rtniains  sick  at  Ptrp.ii;nan — 
St.  Cyr  continues  to  ooinniand — Refuses  to  obey  Joseph's  or- 
ders to  remove  into  Aragon — Press(  s  Verdier  to  roninitnce 
t!;e  sieffe  ofGerona — Reinforces  Verdier — Remains  himseh  at 
Virh^Constancv  oi  the  Spaniards — St.  Cyr  nianhes  from 
Vich,  defeats  tliree  Spanish  butlal'ons,  and  captures  a  con- 
voy— Storms  St.  Felieu  de  Quixols — Takes  a  position  to 
cover  Veidiei-'s  operations — Siege  of  Gerona — State  of  the 
contending;  parties — Assault  of  Monjouin  fails— Geneinl  Foil 
tanes  storms  Palanios — Wimplien  and  tlie  Milans  make  a 
vain  attempt  to  throw  succours  into  Gerona — Monjouic 
abandoned. 

OPERATIONS    IN    CATALONIA. 

The  narrative  of  the  Catalonian  afi'airs  was  broken 
off  at  the  moment,  when  St.  Cyr  having  established 
his  quarters  at  Vich.  received  intelligence  of  the  Aus- 
trian war,  and  that  Barcelona  had  been  relieved  by  the 
squadron  of  Admiral  Comaso.*  His  whole  attention 
was  then  directed  towards  Gerona;  and  with  a  view  to 
hastening  general  Reille's  preparation  for  the  siege  of 
that  place,  a  second  detachment,  under  Lecchi,  pro- 
ceeded to  Airipurdan.  During  this  tiirie  Ccupigny 
continued  alTaragona.  and  Blake  made  his  fata)  march 
into  Aragon;  but  those  troops  which,  under  Milans 
and  Wimphen,  had  composed  Reding's  left  wing,  were 
continually  skirmishing  with  the  French  posts  in  the 
valley  of  Vich,  and  the  Partizans,  especially  Glares 
and  the  doctor  Rovira,  molested  the  communications  in 
a  more  systematic  manner  than  before. 

Lecchi  returned  about  the  18th  of  May,  with  intelli- 
gence that  Napoleon  had  quitted  Paris  for  Germany, 
that  general  Verdier  had  replaced  Reille  in  the  Ain- 
purdan,  and  that  marshal  Augereau  had  reached  Per- 
pignan  in  his  way  to  supersede  St.  Cyr  himself  in  the 
command  of  the  seventh  corps.  The  latter  part  of  this 
information  gave  St.  Cyr  infinite  discontent.  In  his 
"Journal  of  Operations,"  he  asserts  that  his  successor 
earnestly  sought  for  the  appointment,  and  his  own  ob- 
servations on  the  occasion  are  sarcastic  and  contempt- 
uous of  his  rival. 

Augereau,  who  having  served  in  Catalonia  during 
the  war  of  the  revolution,  imagined,  that  he  had  then 
acquired  an  influence  which  might  be  revived  on  the 
present  occasion,  framed  a  proclamation  that  vied  with 
the  most  inflated  of  Spanish  manift'stocs  ;  hut  the  lat- 
ter, although  turgid,  were  in  unison  with  the  feelings 
of  the  people,  whereas,  Augereau's  address,  being  at 
utter  variance  with  those  feelings,  was  a  pure  folly. 


*  Extract  from  tlie  Life  of  Miua. 


«  See  pa;je  152. 


233 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


TBooK  rx. 


This  proclamation  he  sent  into  Catalonia,  escorted  by  ' 
a  battalion,  but  even  on  the  frontier,  the  Miarueletle 
colonel,  Porta,  defeated  the  escort,  and  tore  down  the 
few  copies  that  had  been  posted.  Au^erean,  afflicted 
with  the  ^out,  remained  at  Perpicjnan,  and  St.  Cyr 
continued  to  command,  but  reluctantly,  because  (as  he 
afhrms)  the  officers  and  soldiers  were  nesjlected,  and 
himself  exposed  to  various  indignities,  tlie  effects  of 
Napoleon's  ill-will.  The  most  serious  of  these  affronts 
was  pernutiinor  Verdier  to  correspond  directly  with  the 
minister  of  war  in  France,  and  the  publishing  of  his  re- 
ports in  preference  to  St.  Cyr's.  For  these  reasons, 
the  latter  says  he  contented  himself  with  a  simple  dir;- 
char^e  of  his  duty.  But,  after  the  conspiracy  in  the 
second  corps.  Napoleon  cannot  be  ju?'ly  blamed  for 
coldness  towards  an  ofTicer,  who,  however  free  him- 
self from  encourafjinnr  the  malcontents  in  the  French 
arm)',  was  certainly  desitrned  for  their  leader;  it  is 
rather  to  be  admired  that  the  emperor  discovered  so 
little  jealousy.  When  a  man  has  once  raised  himself 
to  the  hitrhest  power,  he  must  inevitably  crive  offence 
to  his  former  comrades,  for,  as  all  honours  and  rewards, 
flowing:  from  him,  are  taken  as  personal  favours,  so  all 
checks  and  slitrhts,  or  even  the  cessation  of  benefits, 
are  regarded  as  personal  injuries.  Where  the  sanction 
of  time  is  wantinar  to  identify  the  sovereicrn  with  the 
country,  the  discontented  easily  convince  themselves 
that  reventre  is  patriotism. 

While  St.  Cyr  was  preparing  for  the  siege  of  Gerona, 
Joseph,  as  we  have  seen,  directed  him  to  niarch  into 
Aragon.  to  repel  Blake's  movement  against  Suchet.* 
This  order  he  refused  to  obey,  and  with  reason  ;  for  it 
would  have  been  a  great  error  to  permit  Blake's  false 
movement  to  occupy  two  ''corps  d'armee,"  and  so  re- 
tard the  sieoe  of  (icrona.  to  the  infinite  detriment  of  the 
French  affairs  in  Catalonia.  Barcelona  was  never  safe 
while  Hostalrich  and  Gerona  were  in  the  Spaniard's 
possession.  St.  C\'r  was  well  aware  of  this,  but  the 
evils  of  a  divided  command  are  soon  felt.  He  who 
had  been  successful  in  all  his  operations,  was  urgent, 
for  many  reasons,  to  commence  the  siege  without  de- 
lay;  but  Verdier,  who  had  failed  at  Zaragoza,  was 
cautious  in  attacking  a  town  which  had  twice  baffled 
Duhesrae;  and  when  pressed  to  begin,  complained  that 
he  could  not.  after  placing  garrisons  in  Rosas  and 
Figueras,  bring  ten  thousand  men  before  Gerona, 
which,  seeing  the  great  extent  of  the  works,  were  in- 
sudicient. 

St.  Cyr,  disreofarding  the  works,  observed  that  the 
garrison  did  not  exceed  three  thousand  men,  that  it 
could  not  well  be  increased,  and  that  expedition  was 
of  more  consequence  than  numbers.  Nevertheless, 
considering  that  a  depot  of  provisions,  established  for 
the  service  of  the  siege  at  Figueras,  and  which  it  was 
unlikely  Napoleon  would  replenish,  must,  by  delay, 
be  exhausted,  as  well  as  the  supplies  wiiich  he  had 
himself  collected  at  Vich,  he  sent  all  his  own  cannon- 
iers,  sappers,  and  artillery  horses,  two  squadrons  of 
cavalry,  and  six  battalions  of  infantry  to  the  Ampurdan, 
and  having  thus  increased  the  number  of  troops  there 
to  eighteen  thousand  men,  again  urged  Verdier  to  be 
expedite. 

These  reinforcements  marched  the  23d  of  May,  and 
the  covering  army,  diminished  to  about  twelve  thou- 
sand men  under  arms,  continued  to  hold  the  valley  of 
Vich  until  the  middle  of  .lune.  During  this  time,  the 
Mignelettes  often  skirmished  with  the  advanced  posts, 
Dut  without  skill  or  profit;  and  the  inhabitants  of  the 
town,  always  remained  in  the  high  mountains  unsiiel- 
lered  and  starving,  yet  still  firm  of  resolution  not  to 
dwell  with  the  invaders.  This  may  he  altribiitf'd  partly 
to  fear,  but  more  to  that  susreptibiiity  to  grand  senti- 
ments, which  distinguishes  the  Spanish  peasants.    Al- 

»  See  pa-e  209. 


thouffh  little  remarkable  for  hardihood  in  the  field,  theii 
Moorish  blood  is  attested  by  their  fortitude;  men  and 
women  alike,  they  endure  calamity  with  a  singular 
and  unosteniatioiis  courage.  In  this  they  are  truly  ad- 
mirable. But  their  virtues  are  passive,  their  faults 
active,  and,  continually  instigated  by  a  peculiar  arro- 
gance, they  are  perpetually  projecting  enterprises  which 
they  have  not  sufficient  vigour  to  execute,  although  at 
all  times  they  are  confident  and  boasting  more  than  be- 
comes either  wise  or  brave  men. 

Early  in  June,  St.  Cyr.  having  consumed  nearly  all 
his  corn,  resolved  to  approach  Gerona,  and  secure  the 
harvest  which  was  almost  ripe  in  that  district ;  but, 
previous  to  quitting  ^'ich,  he  seni  his  sick  and  wound- 
ed men,  under  a  strong  escort,  to  Barcelona,  and  dis- 
posed his  reserves  in  sucti  a  manner  that  the  operation 
was  effected  without  loss.  The  army,  loaded  with  as 
much  grain  as  the  men  could  carry,  then  commenced 
crossing  the  mountains  which  separate  Vich  from  the 
districts  of  Gerona  and  Hostalrich.  In  two  days  it 
passed  by  Folgarolas,  San  Saturnino,  Santa  Hillario, 
and  Santa  Coloma  de  Fames;  the  head-quarters  were 
fixed  at  Caldas  de  Malavella  on  the  2()th,  the  Fort  of 
St.  Felieu  de  Quixols  was  stormed  on  the  21st,  and  the 
Spanish  privateers  driven  to  seek  another  harbour. 
The  French  then  occupied  a  half  circle,  extending  frora 
St.  Felieu  to  the  Ofia  river.  Intermediate  posts  were 
established  at  St.  Grace,  Vidreras,  Mallorquinas,  Rieu 
de  Arenas,  Santa  Coloma  de  Fames,  Castana,  and 
Bruiiola,  thus  cuttincr  off  the  communications  between 
Gerona  and  the  districts  occupied  by  Coupigny,  Wim- 
phen,  the  Milans,  and  (^laros. 

During  the  march  from  Vich,  the  French  defeated 
three  Spanish  battalions,  and  captured  a  convoy,  com- 
ing from  the  side  of  Martorel,  and  destined  for  Gerona. 
St.  Cyr  calls  them  the  forerunners  of  Blake's  army,  a 
curious  error,  for  Blake  was,  on  that  very  day,  being 
defeated  at  Beichite,  two  hundred  mijes  from  Santa 
Coloma.  Strictly  speaking,  there  was,  at  this  period, 
no  Cataionian  army,  the  few  troops  that  kept  the  field 
were  acting  independently.  Coupigny,  the  nominal 
commander-in-chief,  remained  at  Taragona,  where  he 
and  tiie  other  authorities,  more  occupied  with  personal 
quarrels  and  political  intrigues  th.m  with  military 
affairs,  were  thwarting  each  other.  Thus  the  Spanish 
and  French  operations  were  alike  weakened  by  inter- 
nal divisions. 

Verdier  was  slow,  cautious,  and  more  attentive  to 
the  facilities  afforded  for  resistance  that  to  the  number 
of  regular  soldiers  within  the  works ;  he,  or  rather 
Reille,  had  appeared  before  Gerona  on  the  6lh  of  May, 
but  it  was  not  till  the  4th  of  June  that,  reinforced  with 
Lecchi's  division,  he  completed  the  investment  of  the 
the  place  on  both  sides  of  the  Ter.  On  the  8th,  how- 
ever, ground  was  broken  ;  and  thus,  at  the  very  moment 
when  Blake,  with  the  main  body  of  the  army,  was  ad- 
vancing against  Zaragoza,  in  other  words,  seeking  to 
wrest  Aragon  from  the  French,  Catalonia  was  slipping 
from  his  own  hands. 

THIRD  SIEGE  OF  GEROVA. 

\\Tien  this  memorable  siege  commenced,  the  relative 
situations  of  the  contending  parties  were  as  follows  :— . 
Eighteen  thousand  French  held  the  Ampurdan,  and  in- 
vested tlie  place.  Of  tiiis  nun>ber  about  four  thousand 
were  in  Figueras,  Rosas,  and  th(>  smaller  posts  of  com- 
munication ;  and  it  is  remarkable  that  Verdier  found 
the  first-named  place,  notwithstandintj  its  great  impor- 
tance, dcxdtute  of  a  i^arrtmm,  when  he  arrived  there 
from  France.  A  fact  consistent  with  Lord  (Polling- 
wood's  description  of  tlie  Catalan  warfare^  but  irrecon- 
cilable with  the  enterprise  and  vigour  attributed  to  them 
by  others. 

St.  (^yr,  the  distribution  of  whose  forces  has  been 
already  noticed,  covered  the  siege  with  twelve  thou- 


1809.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


237 


sand  men,  and  Duhesme,  having  about  ten  thousand, 
includincr  sick,  continued  to  hold  Barcelona.*  Forty 
thousand  French  were,  therefore,  disposed  between  that 
fiiy  aF)d  Figueras ;  while,  on  the  Spanish  side,  there 
Wii3  no  preparation.  Blake  was  still  in  Aragon  ;  Cou- 
pigr.y,  with  six  thousand  of  the  worst  troops,  was  at 
laragona;  the  Milans  watched  Duhesme  ;  Wimphen, 
with  a  few  thousand,  held  the  country  about  the  Upper 
IJobregat;  Juan  Claros  and  Rovira  kept  the  mountains 
on  the  side  of  Olat  and  Ripo! ;  and,  in  the  higher  Cata- 
lonia, small  bands  of  Miguelettes  were  dispersed  under 
different  chiefs.  The  Somatenes,  however,  continuing 
their  own  system  of  warfare,  not  only  disregarded  the 
generals,  as  in  the  time  of  Reding,  but  f(;ll  upon  and 
robbed  the  regular  troops,  whenever  a  favourable  op- 
portunity occurred.  The  Spanish  privateers,  dislodged 
from  St.  Filieu,  now  resorted  to  Palamos-bay,  and  the 
English  fleet,  under  lord  Collingwood,  watched  inces- 
santly to  prevent  any  French  squadron,  or  even  single 
Tessels,  from  carrying  provisions  by  the  coast. 

From  Gerona,  the  governor  did  not  fail  to  call  loudly 
on  the  generals,  and  even  on  the  Supreme  CeniralJunla, 
for  succours,  but  his  cry  v^as  disregarded,  and  when 
the  siege  commenced,  his  garrison  did  not  exceed  three 

•thousand  regular  troops,  his  magazines  and  hospitals 
were  but  scantily  provided,  and  he  had  no  money. 
Alvarez  Mariano  was,  however,  of  a  lofty  spirit,  great 
fortitude,  and  in  no  manner  daunted. 

Tire  works  of  Gemna,  already  described,  were  little 

■Jchanged  since  the  first  siege;  there,  however,  as  in 
Zaragoza,  by  a  mixture  of  superstition,  patriotism,  and 
II  iiitary  regulations,  the  moral  as  well  as  physical 
ffirce  of  the  city  had  been  called  forth.  There,  like- 
wise, a  sickness,  common  at  a  particular  season  of  the 
year,  was  looked  for  to  thin  the  ranks  of  llie  besiegers, 
and  there  also  women  were  enrolled,  under  the  title  of 
the  company  of  Sta.  Barbara,  to  carry  off  the  wounded, 
and  to  wait  upon  the  hospitals,  arid  at  every  breath  of 
air,  says  St.  Cyr,  their  ribbons  were  seen  to  float 
amidst  the  bayonets  of  the  soldiers  !  To  evince  his 
cwn  resolution,  the  governor  forbad  the  mention  of  a 
capitulation  under  pain  of  death;  but  severe  punish- 
ments were  only  denounced,  not  inflicted.  Alvarez, 
master  of  his  actions,  and  cajiable  of  commanding  with- 
out phrenzy,  had  recourse  to  no  barbarous  methods  of 

'.'enfo'ijing  authority  ;  obstinate  his  defence  was,  and  full 
of  suffering  to  the  besieged,  yet  iree  from  thp  stain  of 
c-rjelty,  and  rich  in  honour. 

On  the  4i.h  of  June  the  siege  was  begun,  and,'  on  the 
12th,  one  mortar-battery,  erected  at  Casen  Rocca  on 
the  left  of  the  Ter,  and  two  breaching-batteries,  esta- 
blished against  Fort  Monjouic,  being  ready  to  play, 
the  town  was  summoned  in  form.  The  answer  was 
an  intimation  that  henceforth  all  flags  of  truce  would 
be  fired  upon,  which  was  the  only  proceeding  indica- 
tive of  the  barbarian  in  the  conduct  of  Alvarez. 

The  13lh  the  small  suburb  of  Pedreto  was  taken 
possession  of  by  the  French,  and  early  on  the  morning 
of  the   14th,  the  batteries  opened   against  Monjouic, 

-while  the  town  was  bombarded  from  tiie  Casen  Rocca. 
.The  17th  the  besieged  drove  the  enemy  from  Pedreto, 
but  were  finally  repulsed  with  the  loss  of  above  a 
hundred  men. 

The  19th  the  stone  towers  of  St.  Narcis  and  St. 
Louis,  forming  the  outworks  of  Monjouic,  being  as- 
saulted, the  besieged,  panic-stricken,  abandoned  them 
jnd  the  tower  of  St.  Daniel  also.  The  French  imme- 
•liately  erected  breaching-batteries,  four  hundred  yards 
from  the  northern  bastion  of  Monjouic.  Tempestuous 
weather  retarded  their  works,  but  they  made  a  practi- 
cable opening  by  the  4th  of  July,  and  with  a  strange 
temerity  resolved  to  give  the  assault,  although  the  flank 
fire  of  the  works  was  not  silenced,  nor  the  glacis  crown- 

•   Imprrial  Muster  Roll,  MSS. 


ed,  nor  the  covered  way  or  counterscarp  injured,  and 
that  a  half  moon,  in  a  perfect  slate,  covered  the  ap- 
proaches to  the  breach.  The  latter  was  proved  by  the 
engineers,  in  a  false  attack,  on  the  night  of  the  4th, 
and  the  resolution  to  assault  was  then  adopted,  yet  the 
storming-force  drawn  from  the  several  quarters  of  in- 
vestment was  only  assembled  in  the  trenches  on  the 
night  of  the  7th  ;  and  during  these  four  days  as  the 
batteries  ceased  to  play,  the  Spaniards  retrenched,  and 
barricadoed  the  opening. 

At  four  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  8th,  the  French 
column,  jumping  out  of  the  trenches,  rapidly  cleared 
the  space  between  them  and  the  fort,  descended  the 
ditch,  and  mounted  to  the  assault  with  great  resolu- 
tion ;  but  the  Spaniards  had  so  strengthened  the  de- 
fences that  no  impression  could  be  made,  and  the  as- 
sailants taken  in  flank  and  rear  by  the  fire  from  the 
half  moon,  the  covered  way,  and  the  eastern  bastion, 
were  driven  back.  Twice  they  renewed  the  attempt, 
but  their  assault  failed,  with  a  loss  of  a  thousand 
men  killed  and  wounded.  The  success  of  the  besieged 
was  however  mitigated  by  an  accidental  explosion, 
which  destroyed  the  garrison  of  the  small  fort  of  St. 
Juan,  situated  between  Monjouic  and  the  city. 

About  the  period  of  this  assault  which  was  given 
without  St.  Cyr's  knowledge,  the  latter  finding  that 
Claros  and  Rovira  interrupted  the  convoys  coming  from 
Figueras  to  Gerona,  withdrew  a  brigade  of  Souham's 
division  from  Santa  Coloma  de  Fames,  and  posted  it 
on  the  left  of  the  Ter,  at  Banolas.  The  troops  on  the 
side  of  Hostalrich  were  thus  reduced  to  about  eight 
thousand  men  under  arms,  although  an  effort  to  raise 
the  siege  was  to  be  expected  ;  for  letters  from  Alvarez, 
urgently  demanding  succours  of  Blake,  had  been  inter- 
cepted, and  the  latter,  after  his  defeat  in  Aragon,  was, 
as  I  have  said,  collecting  men  at  Taragona. 

Meanwhile,  to  secure  the  coast-line  from  Rosas  to 
Quixols  before  Blake  could  reach  the  scene  of  action, 
St.  Cyr  resolved  to  take  Palainos.  To  effect  this,  gen- 
eral Fontaines  marched  from  St.  Filieu,  on  the  5th  of 
July,  with  an  Italian  brigade,  six  guns,  and  some  squad- 
rons of  dragoons.  Twice  he  summoned  the  place, 
and  the  bearer  being  each  time  treated  with  scorn,  the 
troops  moved  on  to  the  attack  ;  but  in  passing  a  flat 
part  of  the  coast  near  Torre  Valenti,  they  were  cannon- 
aded by  six  gun-boats  so  sharply,  that  they  could  not 
keep  the  road  until  the  artillery  had  obliged  the  boats 
to  sheer  off. 

STORMING    OF     PALAMOS. 

This  town  having  a  good  roadstead,  and  being  only 
one  march  from  Gerona,  was  necessarily  a  place  of  im-  * 
portance;  and  the  works,  although  partly  ruined,  were 
so  far  repaired  by  the  Catalans  as  to  be  capable  of  some 
defence.  Twenty  guns  were  mounted,  and  the  town, 
built  on  a  narrow  rocky  peninsula,  had  but  one  front, 
the  approach  to  which  was  over  an  open  plain  completely 
commanded  from  the  left  by  some  very  rugged  hills, 
on  which  a  considerable  number  of  Somatenes  were  as- 
sembled, with  their  line  touching  upon  the  Avails  of  the 
town.  Fontanes  drove  the  Somatenes  from  this  posi- 
tion, and  a  third  time,  summoned  the  place  to  surren- 
der. The  bearer  was  killed,  and  the  Italians  immedi- 
ately stormed  the  works.  The  Spaniards  flying  towards 
the  shore  endeavoured  to  get  on  board  tiieir  vessels, 
but  the  latter  put  off  to  sea,  and  some  of  Fontanes' 
troops  having  turned  the  town  during  the  action,  inter- 
cepted the  fugitives,  and  put  all  to  the  sword. 

Scarcely  had  Palamos  fallen  when  Wimphen  and  the 
Milans,  arriving  near  Hostalrich,  began  to  harass  Sou- 
ham's  outposts  at  Santa  Coloma,  hoping  to  draw  St. 
Cyr's  attention  to  that  side,  while  a  re-inforcement  for 
the  garrison  of  Gerona  should  pass  through  the  left  of 
his  line  into  the  city.  The  French  General  was  not 
deceived,  but  fifteen  hundred  chosen  men,  under  the 


238 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  IX. 


eommand  of  ore  Marshal,  an  Englishman,  endeav- 
oured to  jyenetrate  secretly  through  the  enemy's  posts 
at  Llacroslera  ;  they  were  accompanied  by  an  aide-de- 
camp  of  Alvarez,  called  Rich,  apparently  an  English- 
man also,  and  they  succeeded  on  the  9th  in  passing 
general  Pino's  posts  unobserved.  Unfortunately  a 
straggler  was  taken,  and  St.  Cyr  being  thus  inform- 
ed of  the  march,  and  judging  that  the  attempt  to  break 
the  line  cf  investment  would  be  made  in  the  night  and 
by  the  road  of  Casa  de  Selva,  immediately  placed  one 
body  cf  mm  in  ambush  near  that  point,  and  sent  anoth- 
er in  pursuit  of  tfie  succouring  column. 

As  the  French  general  had  foreseen,  the  Spaniards 
continued  their  march  through  the  hills  at  dusk,  but  be- 
ing suddenly  fired  upon  by  the  ambuscade,  hastily  retir- 
ed, and  the  next  day  fell  in  with  the  other  troops,  and 
lost  a  thousand  men;  the  rest  dispersingr,  escaped  the 
enemy,  yet  were  ill  used  and  robbed  of  their  arms  by 
the  Somatenes.  St.  Cyr  says  that  Mr.  Marshal  hav- 
ing offered  to  capitulate,  fled  during  the  negotiation,  and 
thus  abandoned  his  men  ;  but  the  Spanish  general  Cou- 
pigny  atfirnied  that  the  men  abandoned  Marshal,  and 
refused  to  fight ;  tiiat  Rich  run  away  before  he  had  seen 
the  enemy,  and  th;it  both  he  and  the  troops  merited  se- 
vere punishment.  It  is  also  certain  that  Marshal's  flight 
was  to  Gerona,  where  he  afterwards  fell  fighting  gal- 
lantly. 

This  disappointment  was  sensibl}'  felt  by  Alvarez. 
Sickness  and  battle  had  already  reduced  his  garrison 
to  fifteen  hundred  men,  and  he  was  thus  debarred  the 
best  of-all  defences,  nam.ely,  frequent  sallies  as  the  ene- 
my neared  the  walls  ;  his  resolution  was  unshaken,  but 
he  did  not  fail  to  remonstrate  warmly  with  Conpigny, 
and  even  denounced  his  inactivity  to  the  Supreme. Jun- 
ta. Tiiat  general  excused  himself  on  the  gmund  of 
Blake's  alisence,  the  want  of  [)rovisicns,  and  the  dan- 
ger of  carrying  the  contagious  sickness  of  Taragona 
into  Gerona.  and  finally  adduced  colonel  Marshal's  un- 
fortunate attempt,  as  a  proof  that  due  exertion  had  been 
made.  Yet  he  could  not  deny  that  Gerona  had  been  in- 
vested two  months,  had  sustained  forty  daj's  of  open 
trenches,  a  bombardment  and  an  assault  without  any 
succour,  and  that  during  tiiat  time,  he  himself  remain- 
ed at  Taragona,  instead  of  being  at  Hostalrich  with  all 
the  troops  he  could  collect. 

From  the  prisoners  taken  the  French  ascertained  that 
neither  Goupiirny  nor  Blake  had  any  intrnlion  of  coming 
to  the  relief  of  Gerona,  until  sickness  and  famine,  which 
pressed  as  heavily  on  the  besiegers  as  on  the  besieg- 
ed, should  have  weakened  the  ranks  of  the  former;  and 
this  plan  receives  unqualified  praise  from  St.  Cyr,  wiio 
seems  to  l;ave  forgotten,  that  with  an  open  breach,  a 
town,  requiring  six  thousand  men  to  man  the  works  and 
havin<T  but  fift"en  hundred,  might  fail  at  anv  moment. 

After  the  failure  of  the  assault  at  Monjouic,  Verdier 
recommenced  his  approaches  in  due  foi'm,  opened  gal- 
leries for  a  mine,  and  interrupted  the  communication 
with  the  city  by  posting  men  in  the  ruins  of  the  little 
fort  of  St.  .luan  ;  his  operations  were,  however,  retarded 
by  Clares  and  I?ovira,  who  captured  a  convoy  of  pow- 
der close  to  the  French  frontier ;  and  to  prevent  a  recur- 
rence of  such  events,  the  brigade  from  Souham's  divi- 
sion was  pushed  from  Banolas  to  St.  Lorenzo  de  la 
Muja. 

The  2d  of  August,  the  fortified  convent  of  St.  Daniel, 
situated  in  the  vallej'  of  the  Galligan,  between  the  Con- 
stable fort  and  Monjouic,  was  taken  by  the  French,  who 
thus  entirely  intercepted  the  communication  between  the 
latter  place  and  the  city.  The  4th  of  August,  the  gla- 
cis of  Monjeui(;  being  crowned,  the  cnunttrscarp  blown 
in  and  the  flank  defences  ruined,  the  ditch  was  passed, 
and  the  half  moon  in  front  of  the  curtain  carried  by 
storm,  but  no  lodgement  was  effected.  Durincr  this  day, 
Alvarez  made  an  unsuccessful  effi)rt  to  retake  the  ruins 
of  St.  Juan,  and  at  the  same  time,  two  hundred  Span- 


iards who  had  come  from  the  sea-coast  with  provisions, 
and  penetrated  to  the  convent  of  St.  Daniel,  thinking  that 
their  countrymen  still  held  it,  were  made  prisoners. 

On  the  5th  the  engineers  having  ascertained  that  tho 
northern  bastion  being  hollow,  the  troops  wculd,  aftei 
storming  it,  be  obliged  to  descend  a  scarp  of  twelve  or 
fourteen  feet,  chang^ed  the  line  of  attack,  and  commen- 
ced new  approaches  against  the  eastern  bastion.  A 
second  practical  breach  was  soon  opened,  and  prepara- 
tions made  for  storming  on  the  I2th,  but  in  the  night 
of  the  11th,  the  gnrrison  blew  up  the  magazines,  sj)ik- 
ed  the  guns,  and,  without  loss,  regained  Gerona.  Thus 
the  fort  fell,  after  thirty-seven  days  of  open  trenches 
and  one  assault. 


CHAPTER  in. 

Claros  and  Rorira  attack  Bascara  and  spread  liismay  alono^  the 
French  frontier — T«o  Spaiiisli  officers  pass  the  Ter  anfl  en- 
ter Getona  with  succours — Alvart z  renioiistrates  with  the 
junta  of  Catalonia — Bad  conduct  of  tlie  latter — Blake  ad- 
vances to  the  aid  of  tlie  city — Pestilence  there — Afl'ects  the 
French  army — St.  Cyr's  firmness — Blake's  timid  operations 
— O  Donnel  fights  Souhani,  but  without  success — St.  C\r 
takes  a  position  of  battle — Garcia  Conde  forces  the  French 
lines  and  introduces  a  convov  into  Gerona — lUake  retnes— 
Siege  resumed— Garcia  Conde  comes  out  of  the  city — Ridi- 
culous error  of  the  French — Conde  forces  the  French  lines 
and  escapes — .Assault  on  Gerona  fails — Blake  advances  £. 
second  time — Sends  another  convov  under  the  conmiand 
of  O'Donne!  to  the  city — O'Donnd  with  the  head  of  the 
convov  succeeds,  the  remainder  is  cut  o(i  —  Blake's  incapa- 
city—  He  retires — St.  Cyrg;oes  to  Perpiofnan — Augereau  takes 
the  command  of  the  sieofe — O'DonntI  breaks  throug:h  tlie 
French  lines — Blake  advances  a  third  time — Is  beaten  by 
Souhani — Pino  takes  Hostalrich — Admiral  Martin  intfrcepts 
a  French  squadron — Captain  Hollowell  desfrovs  a  convoy  in 
Rosas-bay — Distress  in  Gerona — Alvarez  is  seized  with  dt  li- 
riuni,  and  the  city  surrenders— Obser\ations. 

Verdier,  elated  by  the  capture  of  Monjouic,  boasted, 
in  his  despatches,  of  the  difticulties  that  he  had  over- 
come, and  they  were  unquestionably  great,  fr.r  the  rocky 
nature  of  the  soil  had  obliged  him  to  raise  his  trenches 
instead  of  sinking  them,  and  his  approaches  had  been 
chiefly  carried  on  by  the  flying  sap.  But  he  likewise 
expressed  his  scorn  of  the  garrison,  held  their  future 
resistance  cheap,  and  asserted  that  fifteen  days  wnild 
sufllce  to  take  the  town,  in  which  he  was  justified 
neither  by  past  nor  succeeding  facts.  The  Spaniards, 
indignant  at  his  undeserved  contempt,  redoubled  tlieii 
exertions  and  falsified  all  his  predictions;  and  while 
these  events  were  passing  close  to  Gerona.  Claros  and 
Uovira,  at  the  head  of  two  thousand  five  hundred 
Mig-ueletes,  attacked  Bascara,  a  post  between  Figueras 
and  Gerona,  at  the  moment  when  a  convoy,  escorted 
by  a  battalion,  had  arrived  there  from  Belgarde.  The 
commandant  of  Figueras,  uniting  some  "  geiis  d^armes'^ 
and  convalescents  to  a  detachment  of  hi^  garrison,  suc- 
coured the  post  on  the  Gth,  but,  meanwhile,  the  escort 
of  the  convoy  had  fallen  back  on  France  and  spread 
such  terror,  that  Augereau  applied  to  St.  (.yr  for  three 
thousand  men  to  protect  the  frontier.  That  general 
refused  this  ill-timed  demand,  and,  in  his  Memoirs, 
takes  occasion  to  censure  the  system  of  moveable  col- 
umns, as  more  likely  to  create  than  to  suppress  insur- 
rections;  as  being  harassing  to  the  troops  ;  weakening 
to  the  main  force,  and  yet  ineffectual,  seeing  that  the 
peasantry  must  always  be  more  moveable  than  the 
columns,  and  better  informed  of  their  marches  and 
.strength.  There  is  great  force  in  these  observations, 
and  if  an  army  is  in  such  bad  moral  discipline  that  the 
ofllcers  commanding  the  columns  cannot  be  trusted,  it 
is  unanswerable.  It  must  also  be  conceded  that  this 
system,  at  all  times  retjuiring  a  nice  judgement,  great 
talents,  and  excellent  arrangement,  was  totally  inappli- 
cable to  the  situation  and  composition  of  the  seVenth 


1S09.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


239 


rorps.  Yet,  with  g^ood  officers  and  well  combined 
plans,  it  is  difFiciiIt  to  conceive  any  more  simple  or  ef- 
ficient mode  of  protectintT  the  flanks  and  rear  of  an  in- 
vadinfT  army,  than  that  of  moveable  colunms  supported 
by  small  fortified  posts;  and  it  is  sufficient  that  Napo- 
leon was  the  creator  of  this  system,  to  make  a  military 
man  doubtful  of  the  soundness  of  St.  Cyr's  objections. 
The  emperor's  views,  opinions,  and  actions,  will,  in 
defiance  of  all  attempts  to  lessen  them,  go  down,  with 
a  wonderful  authority,  to  posterity. 

A  few  days  after  the  affair  of  Bascara,  eipht  hundred 
volunteers,  commanded  by  two  officers,  named  Foxa 
and  Cantera.  quitted  Olot,  made  a  secret  march  through 
the  mcuntains,  arrived  in  the  eveninof  of  the  lOlh,  upcn 
the  Ter,  in  front  of  Ang^eles,  and  being  baffled  in  an 
attempt  to  pass  the  river  there,  descended  the  left  bank 
In  the  night,  pierced  the  line  of  investment,  and,  cross- 
ing at  a  ford  near  St.  Pons,  entered  Gerona  at  day- 
break. This  hardy  exploit  gave  fresh  courage  to  the 
garrison  ;  yt  t  the  enemy's  approaches  hourly  advanced, 
pestilence  wasted  the  besieged,  and  the  Spanish  sfener- 
als  outside  the  town  still  remained  inactive.  In  this 
conjuncture,  Alvrrez  and  his  council  were  not  wanting 
to  themselves;  while  defending  the  half  ruined  walls 
cf  Gercna  with  inflexible  constancy,  they  failed  not  to 
remonstrate  against  the  cold-blooded  neglect  of  these 
who  should  have  succoured  them.  The  supreme  junta 
of  Catalonia,  forwarded  their  cen:plaints  to  the  central 
junta  at  Seville,  with  a  remarkable  warmth  and  manli- 
ness of  expression. 

"The  generals  of  our  army,"  they  said,  "have  formed 
no  efficient  plan  for  the  relief  of  Gerona;  not  one  of  the 
three  lieutei:anl-generals  here  has  been  charged  to  con- 
duct an  expfdition  to  its  help;  ibey  say  that  they  act 
in  cr nfrrmity  to  a  plan  approved  by  your  Mfjtsty. 
Can  it  be  true  that  your  Majesty  approves  of  abandon- 
ing Gerona  to  her  own  feeble  resources?  If  so,  her 
destruction  is  inevitable;  and  should  this  calair^ity  be- 
fal,  will  the  other  places  of  Catalonia  ard  the  Penin- 
sula have  the  courage  to  imitate  her  fidelity,  when 
they  see  her  temples  and  houses  ruined,  her  heroic  de- 
fenders dead,  or  in  slavery?  And  if  such  calamities 
should  threaten  towns  in  other  provinces,  cught  they 
to  reckon  upon  Catalonian  assistance  when  this  most 
interesting  place  can  obtain  no  help  from  them  1 — Do 
you  not  see  the  consequences  of  this  melancholy  re- 
flection, which  is  sufficient  to  freeze  the  ardour,  to  deso- 
late the  hearts  of  the  most  zealous  defenders  of  cur 
just  cause  1  Let  this  bulwark  of  cur  frontier  be  taken, 
and  the  province  is  laid  open,  our  harvests,  treasures, 
children,  ourselves,  all  fall  to  the  enemy,  and  the 
country  has  no  longer  any  real  existence." 

In  answer  to  this  address,  money  was  promised,  a  de- 
cne  was  passed  to  lend  Catalonia  every  succour,  and 
Blake  received  orders  to  make  an  immediate  effort  to 
raise  the  siege.  But  how  little  did  the  language  of  the 
Spaniards  agree  with  their  actions!  Blake,  indeed,  as 
we  shall  find,  made  a  feeble  effort  to  save  the  heroic  and 
euffering  city ;  but  the  sujireme  central  junta  were 
tnly  intent  upcn  thwarting  and  insulting  the  English 
freneral  after  the  battle  of 'I'alavera ;  and  this  was  the 
moment  that  the  junta  of  Catalonia,  so  eloquent,  so 
patriotic  with  the  pen,  were  selling,  to  fi  reign  mer- 
chants, the  arms  supplied  by  England  for  the  defence 
of  the:ir  country ! 

Towards  the  end  of  August,  when  tlie  French  fire 
had  made  three  breaches  in  Gerona,  and  the  bombard- 
ment had  reduced  a  great  part  of  the  city  to  ashes, 
Blake  commenced  his  march  from  'I'aragona  with  a 
force  of  eight  or  ten  thousand  regulars.  Proceediiitr  by 
Martorcl.  El  Valles,  and  Granollers,  he  reached  Vich, 
and  fro..'  thence  crossed  the  mountains  to  St.  Hillario, 
where  he  was  joined  by  Wimphen  and  the  Milans. 
As  he  had  free  communication  with  Rovira  and  Clares, 
he  could  dircC  a  body  of  not  less  than  twenty  thousand 


men  against  the  circle  of  investment,  and  his  arrival 
created  considerable  alarm  among  the  French.  'J'he 
pestilence  which  wasted  the  besiegeel.  was  also  ainono 
the  besiegers,  and  the  hospitals  of  Fig-ueras  and  Per- 
pignan  contained  many  thousand  patients,  the  battal- 
ions in  the  field  could  scarcely  muster  a  third  of  their 
nominal  strength.  Even  the  generals  were  obliged  to 
rise  from  sick  beds  to  take  the  command  of  the  brig- 
ades; and  the  covering  army,  inferior  in  number  to  the 
Spanish  force,  was  extended  along  more  than  thirty 
miles  of  mountainous  wooded  country,  intersected  by 
rivers,  and  every  way  favourable  for  Blake's  op'jrations. 

Verdier  was  filled  with  apprehension,  lest  a  disas- 
trous action  should  oblige  him  to  raise  the  long-pro- 
tracted siege,  notwithstanding  his  fore-boasts  to  the 
contrary.  But  it  was  on  such  occasions  that  St.  Cyr's 
best  qualities  were  developed,  A  most  learned  and 
practised  soldier,  and  of  a  clear  m.ethodical  head,  h« 
was  firm  in  execution,  decided  and  prompt  in  council  ; 
and,  although,  apparently  wanting  in  those  original  and 
daring  views,  which  mark  the  man  of  superior  genius, 
seems  to  have  been  perfectly  fitted  for  struggling 
against  diffcullies.  So  f;ir  from  fearing  an  immediate 
battle,  he  ob-erved,  "that  it  was  to  be  desired,  because 
his  n;en  were  now  of  confirmed  courage,  and  Blake's 
inaction  was  rather  the  thing  to  be  dreaded  ;  for,  not- 
withstanding every  effort,  not  more  than  two  days'  pro- 
visions could  be  procured,  to  supply  the  troops  when 
together,  and  it  would  be  necessary  after  that  period 
to  scatter  them  again  in  such  a  manner,  that  scarcely 
two  thousand  would  be  disposable  at  any  given  point. 
The  Spaniards  had  already  commenced  skirniisliing  in 
force  on  the  side  of  Bruiiola,  and  as  Blake  expected 
no  reinforcements,  be  wemld  probably  act  immediately  ; 
hence  it  was  necessary  to  concentrate  as  many  men  as 
possible,  in  the  course  of  the  night  and  i.ext  day,  and 
deliver  battle;  and  there  were  still  ten  thousand  good 
troops  under  arms,  without  reckoning  those  that  might 
be  spared  from  the  investing  corps." 

On  the  ether  hand,  Blake,  with  an  army,  numerous 
indeed  hut  by  no  means  spirited,  was,  from  frequent 
defeat,  becrme  cautious  without  being  more  skilful. 
He  resolved  to  confine  his  efforts  to  the  throwing  sup- 
plies of  men  and  provisions  into  the  town;  forgetting 
that  the  busine'is  of  a  relieving  army  is  not  to  protract, 
but  to  raise  a  siege,  and  that  to  save  Gerona  was  to 
save  Catalonia.  He  had  collected  and  leaded  with 
flour,  about  two  thousand  beasts  of  burthen,  placed 
them  in  the  mountains,  en  the  side  of  Olot,  under  an 
escort  ef  four  thousand  infantry  and  five  hundred  cav- 
alry ;  and  Garcia  Conde,  an  ambitious  and  fiery  young 
m.an,  undertook  to  conduct  them  to  Gerona,  by  tiie  flat 
grotind  betMoen  the  Ter  and  the  Ofia,  precisely  opposite 
to  that  of  the  French  attack.  To  facilitate  this  attempt, 
Blake  caused  colonel  Henry  O'Dcnnel  to  fall  upon 
Souham's  posts,  near  Erunola,  on  the  evening  of  the 
.31st  of  August,  supporting  this  attack  with  another 
detachment  under  general  Logoyri.  At  the  same  time 
he  directed  colonel  Landen  to  collect  the  Miguclettes 
and  Somatenes  on  the  side  of  Palamos,  and  take  i)os- 
session  of"  A'.  S.  de  los  Jlvi^clos,''''  a  convent,  situated 
on  a  high  mountain  behind  Monjcuic.  Glares  and  Ro» 
vira  also  received  directions  to  attack  the  French  oa 
the  side  of  Casen  Rocca.  Thus  the  enemy  were  to  he 
assailed  in  every  quarter,  except  that  en  which  the 
convoy  was  to  pass. 

O'Donnel,  commencing  the  operations,  attacked  and 
carried  a  part  of  the  position  occupied  ny  one  of  Sou- 
ham's  battalions  at  Bruiiola,  but  the  latter,  with  an  im- 
petuous charge,  again  recovered  the  ground.  The 
Spanish  gen(>ral,  being  then  joined  by  Logoyri,  renewed 
the  skirmish,  but  could  make  no  further  impres.'ion  on 
the  enemy.  Meanwhile,  St.  Cyr,  having  transferred 
his  head-quarters  to  Fornels,  was  earnestly  advised  to 
concentrate  his  troops  on  the  left  cf  the  Tei,  partly, 


210 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  IX. 


that  it  was  thought  Blake  would  attempt  tn  penetrate 
on  that  side  ;  partly  t^hat,  beintj  so  close  to  the  Spanish 
army,  the  P'rench  divisions  might,  if  ordered  to  assem- 
ble on  their  actual  centre,  be  cut  otf  in  detail  during 
their  march.  He  however  argued  that  his  opponent 
must  be  exceedingly  timid,  or  he  would  have  attacked 
Souham  with  all  his  forces,  and  broken  the  covering 
line  at  once ;  wherefore,  seeing  that  such  an  opportu- 
nity was  neglected,  he  did  not  fear  to  concentrate 
his  own  troops  on  the  Oiia,  by  a  flank  march  close 
under  the  beard  of  his  unskilful  adversary. 

Souham's  division,  falling  back  in  the  night,  took 
post  the  1st  of  September,  on  the  heights  of  San  Dal- 
maz,  reacting-  to  Hostalnou,  and  at  eight  o'clock,  the 
head  of  Pino's  division  entered  this  line,  prolonging  it, 
by  the  left,  in  rear  of  the  village  of  Rieudellot.  At 
twelve  o'clock,  these  two  divisions  were  established 
in  position,  and  at  the  distance  of  four  miles  in  their 
Tear,  Vierdier  with  a  strong  detachment  of  the  besieg* 
ing  corps,  was  placed  in  reserve  on  the  main  road 
to  Gerona.  Lecchi  was  sick,  and  his  troops,  com- 
manded by  Millosewitz,  took  post  at  Salt,  guarding 
tiie  bridge  and  the  flat  ground  about  St.  Eugenio;  hav- 
ing also  instructions  to  cross  theTerand  march  ajjainst 
Rovira  and  Claros,  if  they  should  press  the  Westpha- 
iian  division  which  remained  at  San  Pons.    The  treneh- 

-es  under  Monjouic  were  guarded.  The  mortar  battery 
ofCasaRocca  was  disarmed,  and  the  Westphalians 
had  orders,  if  attacked,  to  retire  to  Sarria,  and  look  to 
the  security  of  the  pare  and  the  trenches. 

A  thick  fog  and  heavy  rain  interrupted  the  view,  and 
both  armies  remained  apparently  quiet  until  the  middle 
of  the  day,  when  the  weather  clearing,  St.  Cyr  rode  to 
examine  the  Spanish  positions ;  for  the  heads  of  Blake's 
columns  were  disposed  as  if  he  would  have  penetrated 
at  once,  by  Bruiiola,  Colnma  de  Fames,  Vidreias,  and 
Mallorquinas.  Scarcely  had  the  French  general  quitted 
Fornels,  when  Garcia  Conde,  who,  under  cover  of  the 
mist  had  been  moving  down  the  mountains,  crossed 
the  Ter  at  Amer,  and  descended  the  heights  of  Baiiolas 
with  his  convoy.     He  was  now   on*  the  flat  ground  ; 

■  having  two  thousand   men  under  Millosewitz,  placed, 

•as  I  have  said,  at  Salt  to  watch  the  garrison  and  the 
movements  of  Rovira  at  Glares,  and  consequently,  with 

•  their  rear  to  the  advancing  convoy. 

Verdier's  reserve,  the  nearest  support,  was  six  miles 

■distant,  and  separaied  from  Millosewitz  by  considerable 
heights,  and  the  Spanish  columns,  coming  into  the 
plain  without  meeting  a  single  French  post,  advanced 
unperceived  close  to  the  main  body,  and,  with  one 
charge,  put  the  whole  to  flight.  The  fugitives,  in  their 
panic,  at  first  took  the  direction  of  the  town,  but  beino- 
fired  upon,  turned  towards  the  heights  of  Palau,  made 
for  Fornels,  and  would  have  gone  straight  into  Blake's 
camp,  if  they  had  not  met  vSt.  Cyr  on  his  return  from 
viewing:  that  general's  positions.  Rallying  and  rein- 
forcing them  with  a  battalion  from  Pino's  division,  St. 
Cyr  instantly  directed  them  back  again  upon  Salt,  and 
at  the  same  time  sent  Verdier  orders  to  follow  Garcia 
Conde  with  the  reserve.  It  was  too  late,  the  latter  had 
already  entered  the  town,  and  Alvarez,  sallying  forth, 
destroyed  the  French  works  near  St.  IJgenio,  and 
thinking  the  siege  raise!,  had  immediately  sent  five 
hundred  sick  men  out  of  the  town,  into  the  convent  of 
St.  Daniel,  whif'h  place  had  been  abandoned  by  the 
French  two  days  before.  Verdier,  after  causing  some 
trifling  loss  to  Conde,  passed  the  bridge  of  Salt,  and 
marched  down  the  left  of  the  Ter  to  Sarria,  to  save  his 
pares,  which  were  threatened  by  Rovira  ani  (Maros; 
for  when  those  two  Partizans  skirmished  with  the 
W'estphalian  troops,  the  latter  retired  across  the  Ter, 
abandoning  their  camp  and  two  dismounted  mortars. 
Thus  the  place  was  succoured  for  a  moment,  but,  as 
Blake  made  no  further  movement,  Alvarez  was  little 
kenefitted  by  the  success.     The   provisions  received, 


did  not  amount  to  more  than  seven  or  eight  days'  con- 
sumption, and  the  reinforcement,  more  than  enough  to 
devour  this  food,  was  yet  insufficient  to  raise  the  siege 
by  sallies. 

While  Millosewitz's  troops  were  flying  on  the  one 
side  of  the  Ter,  the  reports  of  Claros  and  Rovira,  ex- 
aggerating their  success  on  the  other  side  of  that  river, 
had  caused  Alvarez  to  believe  that  Blake's  army  was 
victorious,  and  the  French  in  flight ;  hence,  he  refrained 
from  destroying  the  bridge  of  Salt,  and  Verdier,  as  we 
have  seen,  crossed  it  to  recover  his  camp  at  Sarria. 
But  for  this  error,  the  garrison,  reinforced  by  Conde's 
men,  might  have  filled  the  trenches,  razed  the  batteries, 
and  even  retaken  Monjouic  before  Verdier  could  have 
come  to  their  support. 

St.  Cyr  having  now  but  one  day's  provisions  left, 
resolved  to  seek  Blake,  and  deliver  battle;  but  the 
Spanish  general  retired  up  the  mountains,  when  he  saw 
the  French  advancing,  and  his  retreat  enabled  St.  Cyr 
again  to  disseminate  the  French  troops.  'IMius  ended 
the  first  eflTort  to  relieve  Gerona.  It  was  creditable  to 
Garcia  Conde,  but  so  contemptible,  \viih  nference  to 
the  means  at  Blake's  disposal,  that  Alvarez  believed 
himself  betrayed,  and,  trusting  thenceforth  only  to  his 
own  heroism,  permitted  Conde's  troops  to  go  back,  or 
to  remain  as  they  pleased  ;  exacting,  however,  from 
those  who  stopped,  an  oath  not  to  surrender.  Renew- 
ing the  edict  against  speaking  of  a  capitulation,  he  re- 
duced the  rations  of  the  garrison  first  to  one  half,  and 
afterwaids  to  a  fourth  of  the  full  allowance,  a  measure 
which  caused  some  desertions  to  the  enemy;  but  the 
great  body  of  the  soldiers  and  citizens  were  as  firm  as 
their  chief,  and  the  townsmen  freely  sharing  their  own 
scanty  food  with  the  garrison,  made  common  cause  in 
every  thing. 

Garcia  Conde's  success  must  be  attributed  partly  to 
the  mgligence  of  St.  Cyr's  subordinates  ;  but  the  ex- 
tended cantonments,  occupied  in  the  ev-ening  of  the 
31st,  gave  Blake,  as  the  French  general  himself  ac- 
knowledges, an  opport\inity  of  raising  the  siege  vv'ith- 
out  much  danger  or  difficulty.  Nor  were  St.  ('yr's 
dispositions  for  the  next  day  perfectly  combined  ;  it  is 
evident  that  giving  Blake  credit  for  sound  views,  ho 
was  himself  so  expectant  of  a  great  battle  that  he  for- 
got to  guard  against  minor  operations.  The  flat  coun- 
try between  the  left  of  the  Oiia  and  the  Ter  was  the 
natural  line  for  a  convoy  to  penetrate  to  the  town ; 
hence  it  was  a  fault  to  leave  two  thousand  men  in  that 
place,  with  their  front  to  the  garrison,  and  their  rear 
to  the  relieving  army,  when  the  latter  could  steal 
through  the  mountains  until  close  upon  theni.  Cavalry 
posts  at  least  should  have  been  established  at  the  dif- 
ferent inlets  to  the  hills,  and  beacons  raised  on  conve- 
nient eminences.  The  main  body  of  the  army  appears 
also  to  have  been  at  too  great  a  distance  from  the  town  ; 
the  firing  that  took  place  in  the  plain  of  Salt  was  dis- 
regarded by  Verdier's  reserve,  and  the  first  information 
of  the  attack  was  brought  to  Fornels  by  the  fugitives 
themselves. 

St.  Cyr  says  that  his  generals  of  division  were  neg- 
ligent, and  so  weakened  by  sickness  as  to  be  unable  to 
look  to  their  outposts;  that  he  had  recommended  to 
Verdier  the  raising  of  field-works  at  the  brid>.-e  of  Salt 
and  in  the  passes  of  the  hills,  and,  \\hen  hi.s  advice 
was  disregarded,  forbore,  from  the  peculiar  situation  in 
which  he  himself  was  placed  by  the  French  govern- 
ment, to  enforce  his  undoubted  authority.  St.  Cyr, 
however,  acknowledges  that  his  soldiers  answered 
honestly  to  every  call  he  made,  and  he  was  bound, 
while  he  retained  the  command,  to  enforce  every  mea- 
sure necessary  for  maintaining  their  honour.*  In  other 
respects,  his  prudence  and  vigilance  were  such  a?  be- 
seemed his  reputation.     It  was  not  so  with  Blake,  the 


•   St.  Cyr's  Jounril  o!"  0;;eralion3. 


1809.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WaR. 


241 


whole  ot  his  operations  proved  that  he  had  lost  confi- 
dence, and  was  incapable  of  any  great  enterprize.  He 
should  have  come  up  with  a  resolution  to  raise  the 
siegre  or  to  perish.  He  contented  himself  with  a  few 
slight  skirmishes,  and  the  introduction  of  a  small  con- 
voy of  provisions,  and  then  notwitlistanding  the  deep 
sufTerino'  of  tliis  noble  city,  turned  away,  with  a  cold 
look,  and  a  donation  that  mocked  its  wants. 

When  the  siege  was  resumed,  St.  Cyr  withdrew  the 
French  p^sts  from  Palau  and  Monte  Livio,  leaving  the 
way  apparently  open  on  that  side,  for  the  return  of  Gar- 
cia Conde,  who,  deceived  by  this  wile,  came  out  at 
daybreak  on  the  3d,  with  fifteen  hundred  men  and  the 
beasts  of  burthen.  He  halted  for  a  little  time,  just  be- 
yond the  gate,  to  examine  the  country  in  front  with 
his  glass,  and  as  every  thing  appeared  favourable,  his 
troops  were  beginning  to  move  forward,  when  the  noise 
of  drun)s  beating  to  arms  gave  notice  that  an  ambus- 
cade was  placed  behind  Palau.  St.  Cyr  had,  indeed, 
posted  a  brigade  there  in  the  hope  of  surprising  the 
Spaniards,  but  the  French  forgetting  the  ambush,  were 
performing  the  regular  service  of  the  camp  at  day-light, 
and  a  cry  of  astonishment  burst  from  the  Spanish  col- 
umn ns  it  hastily  retreated  again  into  the  town. 

Baffled  by  this  ridiculous  mistake,  and  concluding 
that  the  next  attempt  would  be  by  Castellar  and  La 
Bispal,  St.  Cyr  placed  Mazzuchelli's  brigade  (the  same 
that  had  been  behind  Palau)  in  the  valley  of  the  Ona 
in  such  a  manner  that  it  could  fall  upon  Conde's  rear 
when  the  latter  should  agsin  come  forth.  He  likewise 
put  a  battalion  on  the  hills  in  a  position  to  head  the 
Spanish  column,  and  drive  it  back  either  upon  Mazzu- 
chelli's brigade,  or  upon  La  Bispal,  wh(Te  he  also 
posted  three  battalions  and  a  squadron  of  Pino's  div- 
ision. 

The  4th,  one  thousand  infantry,  five  hundred  cavalry, 
and  eleven  hundred  mules  again  came  out  of  Gerona, 
and  ascending  the  heights  in  which  the  fort  of  the  Ca- 
puchin was  situated,  pushed  in  single  files  along  a  by- 
path, leading  to  Castellar  da  Selva.  Mazzuchelli  saw 
them  plainly,  but  did  not  attack,  waiting  for  the  fire 
of  the  battalion  ahead,  and  that  battalion  did  not  fire 
because  Mazzuchelli  did  not  attack,  and  it  was  sup- 
posed the  Spaniards  were  part  of  his  brigade.  Garcia 
Conde  quickly  perceived  their  double  error,  and  with 
great  readiness  filing  off  to  his  left,  turned  the  right  of 
the  battalion  in  his  front,  and  gained  Castellar  without 
hurt,  although  the  French  in  Monjouie  observing  all 
that  passed,  plied  their  guns  against  the  rear  of  his 
column.  Being  informed  by  the  peasants  at  Castellar, 
that  troops  were  also  waiting  for  him  at  La  Bispal, 
Conde  made  for  Caza  de  Selva,  and  general  Pino  hav- 
ing notice  of  his  approach,  directed  two  battalions  to 
seize  the  summit  of  a  ridge  which  crossed  the  Spanish 
line  cf  march  ;  these  battalions  took  a  wrong  direction, 
the  Spaniards  moved  steadily  on,  and  although  their 
rear  was  attacked  by  Pino's  personal  escort,  and  that 
fifty  men  and  some  mules  were  captured,  the  main 
body  escaped  with  honour. 

There  were  now  four  open  breaches  in  Gerona,  Maz- 
zuchelli's brigade  and  the  troops  at  La  Bispal  were 
added  to  the  investing  corps,  and  the  immediate  fall 
of  the  city  seemed  inevitable,  when  the  French  store 
of  powder  failed,  ten  days  elapsed  before  a  fresh  sup- 
ply could  be  obtained,  and  Alvarez  profited  of  this  ces- 
sation, to  retrench  and  barricade  the  breaches  in  the 
most  formidable  manner.  Verdier  had  retaken  the  con- 
vent of  St.  Daniel  in  the  valley  of  Galligan,  and  ob- 
Mged  the  five  hundred  sick  men  to  return  to  the  town 
on  the  4th  ;  but  Landen,  the  officer  sent  by  Blake,  on 
the  31st  of  August,  to  seize  the  convent  of  Madonna  de 
his  Jlngclci,  hud  fortified  that  building,  and  introduced 
3nr/dll  supplies  of  provisions.  Tliis  revived,  in  the  mind 
of  Alvariz,  a  plan  for  taking  possession  of  the  heights 
beyond  those  on  which  the  Capuchin  ap '  '"'onstable 
17 


forts  were  situated,  by  which,  in  conjunction  with  the 
post  at  Madona  de  los  Angeles,  and  with  the  assistance 
of  Blake's  army,  he  ho|)ed  to  maintain  an  open  com- 
munication with  the  country.  But  tiiis  bold  and  skil- 
ful conception  he  was  unable  to  effect ;  because  in  a 
sally  from  the  Capuchins  on  the  6th  with  eighteen  hun- 
dred men,  he  was  i)ealen  by  a  single  French  regiment, 
and  the  same  day  Mazzuchelli's  Italians  stormed  Ma- 
dona de  los  Angeles,  and  put  the  garrison  to  the  sword. 

During  these  events,  Verdier  marched  against  Clares 
and  Rovira  who  were  posted  at  St.  Gregorio,  near 
Amer,  but  was  repulsed  with  loss,  and  the  P'rencli  gen- 
eral Joba  was  killed.  Meanwhile  the  batteries  having 
recommenced  their  fire  on  the  13th,  Alvarez  made  a 
general  sally,  by  the  gates  of  San  Pedro,  beat  thw 
guards  from  the  trenches,  and  spiked  the  guns  in  ono 
of  the  breaching  batteries.  Tiie  18th,  Verdier  thinking 
the  breaches  practicable,  proposed  to  give  the  assault, 
and  required  assistance  from  St.  Cyr,  but  disputes  be- 
tween the  generals  of  the  covering  and  the  investing 
forces  were  rife ;  the  engineers  of  the  latter  declared 
the  breaches  practicable,  those  of  the  former  asserted 
that  they  were  not,  and  that  while  the  fort  of  Calvary, 
outside  the  walls,  although  in  ruins,  was  in  possession 
of  the  Spaniards,  no  assault  should  be  attempted. 

Either  from  negligence,  or  the  disputes  between  St. 
Cyr  and  Augereau,  above  five  thousand  convalescents 
capable  of  duty  were  retained  in  a  body  at  Perpignan, 
and  Verdier  could  not  produce  so  many  under  arms  for 
the  assault,  nor  even  for  this  number  were  there  officers 
to  lead,  so  wasting  was  the  sickness.  The  covering 
army  was  scarcely  better  off,  and  Blake  had  again 
taken  the  position  of  St.  Hilario.  Howbeit,  St.  Cyr, 
seeing  no  better  remedy,  consented  to  try  the  storm 
provided  Calvary  were  first  taken. 

Souham's  division  was  appointed  to  watch  Blak'^, 
Pino  was  directed  to  make  a  false  attack  on  the  oppo- 
site quarter  to  where  the  breaches  were  established, 
and,  on  the  19lh,  Verdier's  troops,  in  three  columns, 
advanced  rapidly  down  the  valley  of  Galligan  to  the 
assault;  but  the  fort  of  Calvary  had  not  been  taken, 
and  its  fire  swept  the  columns  of  attack  along  the 
whole  line  of  march.  Two  hundred  men  fell  before 
they  reached  the  walls,  and  just  as  the  summit  of  tha 
largest  breach  was  gained,  the  French  batteries,  which 
continued  to  play  on  the  Spanish  retrenchments, 
brought  down  a  large  mass  of  wall  upon  the  head  of 
the  attacking  column.  The  besieged  resisted  manfully, 
and  the  besiegers  were  completely  repulsed  from  all 
the  breaches  with  a  loss  of  six  hundred  men.  Ver- 
dier accused  his  soldiers  of  cowardice,  and  blamed  St. 
Cyr  for  refusing  to  bring  the  covering  troops  to  the  as- 
sault;* but  that  general  asserted  that  the  men  had  be- 
haved perfectly  well,  and  calling  a  Council  of  war,  pro- 
posed to  continue  the  opt  rations  with  as  much  vigour 
as  the  nature  of  the  case  would  permit.  His  spirit  was 
not  however  partaken  by  the  council,  and  the  siego 
was  turned  into  a  blockade. 

Blake  now  advanced  with  his  army,  and  from  the 
20th  to  the  25th,  made  as  if  he  would  raise  the  blocks 
aue,  yet  his  object  was  merely  to  introduce  anothei 
convoy,  and  St.  Cyr,  divining  his  intention  and  judg- 
ing that  he  would  make  the  attempt  on  the  26lli,  re- 
solved to  let  him  penetrate  the  covering  line,  and  then 
fall  on  him  before  he  could  reach  the  town.  In  tiiis 
view,  Souham's  division  was  placed  behind  Palau  and 
Pino's  division  at  C'asa  de  Selva,  and  Lecchi's  division 
of  the  investing  troops  was  directed  to  meet  the  Span- 
iards in  front,  while  the  two  former  came  down  upon 
their  rear. 

Blake  assembled  his  troops  on  the  side  of  Hostalrich, 
then  made  a  circuitous  route  to  La  Bispal,  and,  taking 
post  on  the  heights  of  St.  Sadurni,  detached  ten  tiiou- 


*   St.  C;r's  Journal  of  Operatioijg. 


243 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  IX. 


sand  men,  under  Wimphen,  to  protect  the  passage  of 
the  convoy,  of  which  Henry  O'Donnel  led  the  ad- 
vanced guard.  At  day-break,  on  the  2oth,  O'Donnel 
fell  upon  the  rear  of  the  French  troops  a*.  Castellar, 
broke  fhrounrh  them,  and  reached  the  fort  of  the  Con- 
stable with  the  head  of  the  convoy  ;  but  the  two  French 
battalions  which  he  had  driven  beforp  him,  rallying  on 
the  heights  of  San  Miguel  to  the  right  of  the  Spanish 
column,  returned  to  the  combat,  and  at  the  same  time 
St.  Cyr  in  person,  with  a  part  of  Souham's  division, 
came  upon  the  left  flank  of  the  convoj-,  and,  pressing 
it  strongly,  obliged  the  greater  part  to  retrograde.  Pi- 
no's  division,  then  running  up  from  Casa  de  Selva,  at- 
tacked the  rear-guard  under  VVimphen,  the  rout  was 
complete,  and  Blake  made  no  effort  to  save  the  dis- 
tressed troops.  O'Donnel  with  a  thousand  men  and 
about  two  hundred  mules  got  safely  into  the  town,  the 
remainder  of  the  convoy  was  taken,  the  Italians  gave 
no  quarter,  and  three  thousand  of  the  Spaniards  were 
slain. 

After  this  action,  some  troops  being  sent  towards 
Vidreras,  to  menace  Blake's  comm\jnicalions  with 
Hostalrich,  he  retired  by  the  side  of  St.  Fiiieu  de 
(iuixols,  and  Gerona  was  again  abandoned  to  hpr  suf- 
ferings, which  were  become  almost  insupportable. 
Without  money,  without  medicines,  without  food  ; 
pestilence  within  the  walls,  the  breaches  open.  "  If," 
said  Alvarez.  '*  tlie  captain-general  be  unable  to  make 
a  vigorous  effort,  the  whole  of  Catalonia  must  rise  to 
our  aid,  or  Gerona  will  soon  be  but  a  heap  of  carcases 
and  ruins,  the  memory  of  which  will  afflict  posterity  !" 

St,  Cyr  having  repaired  to  Perpignan  to  make  ar- 
rangements for  future  supply,  found  Augereau  in  a 
good  state  of  health,  and  obliged  him  to  assume  the 
command.  Then,  he  says,  every  thing  needful  was 
bestowed  with  a  free  hand  upon  the  seventh  corps,  be- 
cause he  himself  was  no  longer  in  the  way;  but  a  bet- 
ter reason  is  to  be  found  in  the  state  of  Napoleon's 
affairs.  Peace  had  been  concluded  with  Austria,  the 
English  expeditions  to  the  Scheldt  and  against  Naples 
had  failed,  and  all  the  resources  of  the  French  govern- 
ment becoming  disposable,  not  only  the  seventh,  but 
every  "  corps  d'armee"  in  Spain  was  reinforced. 

Augereau,  escorted  by  the  five  thousand  convales- 
cents from  Perpignan,  reached  the  camp  before  Gerona 
the  l'2ih  of  October.  In  the  course  of  the  following 
night,  O'Donnel,  issuing  from  the  town  on  the  side  of 
the  plain,  broke  through  the  guards,  fell  upon  Sou- 
ham's  quarters,  obliged  that  general  to  fly  in  his  shirt, 
and  finally  effected  a  jimction  with  Milans,  at  Santa 
Coloma  ;  thus  successfully  executing  as  daring  an  en- 
terprise as  any  performed  during  this  memorable  siege. 
Augereau,  however,  pressed  the  blockade,  and  thinking 
the  spirit  of  the  Spaniards  reduced,  offered  an  armistice 
for  a  month,  with  the  free  entry  of  provisions,  if  Ah'a- 
rez  would  promise  to  surrender  unless  relieved  before 
the  expiration  of  that  period.  Such,  however,  was  the 
steady  virtue  of  this  man  and  his  followers,  that,  not- 
withstanding the  grievous  famine,  the  offer  was  re- 
fused, 

Blake,  on  the  29th,  took  possession  once  more  of  the 
heights  of  Bruiiola,  but  Souham  with  an  inferior  force 
nut  him  to  flight,  and  this  enabled  Augereau  to  detach 
Pino  against  the  town  of  Hostalrich.  This  place  for- 
tified with  an  old  wall  and  towers,  was  defended  by 
two  thousand  men,  and  supported  by  the  fire  of  the 
castle;  it  was  however  carried  by  storm,  and  the  pro- 
visions and  stores  laid  up  there  captured,  although 
Blake,  with  his  army,  was  only  a  few  miles  off. 
Meanwhile  rear-admiral  Baudin,  with  a  French  squad- 
ron, consisting  of  three  ships  of  the  line,  two  frigates, 
and  sixteen  large  store-ships,  having  sailed  from  Tou- 
lon for  Barcelona,  about  the  20th,  was  intercepted  by 
admiral  Martin  on  the  2.3d,  who  burnt  several  nf  his 
smaller  vessels  and  drove  the  rest  on  shore  at  different 


places,  when  two  of  the  line  of  battle  ships  were  set 
on  fire  by  their  own  crews.  The  store-ships  and  some 
of  the  armed  vessels  took  refuge  at  Rosas,  put  up 
boarding  nettings,  and  protecting  their  flanks  by  Uosaa 
and  the  Trinity-fort,  presented  a  formidable  front,  hav- 
ing above  Iwent)'  guns  on  board  disposed  f  )r  defence, 
besides  the  shore  batteries.  But  on  the  3lst,  captaia 
Hallowell  appeared  in  the  bay  with  a  squadron,  and 
the  same  evening,  sending  his  boats  in,  destroyed  the 
whole  fleet,  in  despite  of  a  very  vigorous  resistance  which 
cost  the  British  seventy  men  killed  and  wounded. 

The  distress  of  Gerona  increased,  desertions  becane 
frequent,  and  ten  officers  having  failed  in  a  plot  to  ob- 
lige the  governor  to  capitulate,  went  over  in  a  body  to 
the  enemy.  During  November,  famine  and  sickness 
tormented  the  city,  and  the  French  were  inactive  for 
want  of  powder,  but  on  the  6th  of  December,  ammu- 
nition having  arrived,  the  suburbs  of  Marina,  that  of 
Girondella,  the  fort  of  Calvary,  and  all  the  other  towers 
beyond  the  walls,  were  carried  by  the  besiegers,  and 
Alvarez,  thus  confined  to  the  circuit  of  the  walls,  was 
cut  off  from  the  Capuchin  and  Constable  forts.  He 
had  been  ill  for  some  days,  but  rousing  himself  for  a 
last  effort,  made  a  general  sally  on  the  7th,  retook  the 
suburb  of  Girondella  and  the  redoul)ts,  and  opening 
away  to  the  outworks  of  the  Constable,  carried  off  the 
garrison  ;  the  next  day,  overcome  by  suffering  he  be- 
came delirious.  A  council  of  war  then  assembled, 
and  after  six  months  of  open  trenches,  Gerona  yielded 
on  the  lOlh.  The  garrison  marched  o>it  with  the  honours 
of  war,  the  troopa  were  to  be  exchanged  in  due  course, 
the  inhabitants  were  to  be  respected,  and  none  but  sol- 
diers were  to  be  considered  prisoners.  S\ich  was  the 
termination  of  a  defence  which  eclipsed  the  glory  of 
Zaragoza, 

French  and  Spanish  writers  alike,  affirm  luat  Auge- 
reau treated  Alvarez  with  a  rigour  and  contumely  tl  it 
excited  every  person's  indignation  ;  and  that,  in  viola- 
tion of  the  capitulation,  the  monks  were,  by  an  espe- 
cial order  of  Napoleon,  sent  to  France,  This  last  ac- 
cusation admits,  however,  of  dispute;  the  monks  had 
during  the  siege,  formed  themselves  into  a  regular 
corps,  named  the  Crusaders  ;  they  were  disciplined  and 
clothed  in  a  sort  of  uniform,  and  being  to  all  intenls  sol- 
diers, it  can  hardly  be  said,  that  to  constitute  them  pris- 
oners, was  a  violation,  although  it  was  undoubtedly  a 
harsh  interpretation  of  the  terms, 

Alvarez  died  at  Figueras  in  his  waj'  to  France;  but 
so  long  as  virtue  and  courage  are  esteemed  in  the  world, 
his  name  will  be  held  in  veneration  ;  and  if  Augereau 
forgot  what  was  due  to  this  gallant  Spaniard's  merit, 
posterity  will  not  forget  to  do  justice  to  both. 

OBSERVATIONS. 

1,  In  this  siege,  the  constancy  with  which  the  Ge- 
ronans  bore  the  most  terrible  sufferings  accounts  for  the 
protracted  resistance;  yet  constancy  alone  could  not 
have  enabled  them  to  defy  the  regular  progress  of  the 
engineer;  the  combinations  of  science  are  not  to  be  de- 
fied with  impunity;  but  the  French  combinations  were 
not  scientific,  and  this,  saving  the  right  of  Gerona  to 
the  glory  she  earned  so  hardly,  was  the  secret  of  th« 
defence. 

2.  General  St,  Cyr,  after  observing  that  the  attack 
on  Montjouic  was  ill  judged  and  worse  executed,  says, 
"The  principal  approaches  should  have  been  conduc- 
ted against  the  Marcadel,  because  the  soil  there,  was 
easy  to  work  in,  full  of  natural  hollows  and  clifts,  and 
the  defences  open  in  flank  and  rear  to  batteries  on  the 
Monte  Livio  and  the  Casen  Rocca;  but  on  the  side  of 
Montjouic,  the  approaches,  from  the  rocky  nature  of  the 
soil,  could  only  be  carried  forward  by  the  flying  sap, 
with  great  loss  and  difficulty."  If,  however,  the  Mar- 
cadel liad  fallen,  the  greatest  part  of  the  city  would  still 
have  been  covered  by  the  Ona,  and  Montjouic,  and  the 


1809  ] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


243 


forts  of  the  Constable  and  Capuchin,  (reg'ular  places 
complete  in  tiieinselves.)  would  have  remained  to  be 
taken,  unless  it  can  be  supposed,  that  a  governor,  who 
defended  the  feeble  walls  of  the  town  after  those  out- 
works fell,  would  have  surrendered  all,  because  a  lodge- 
ment was  made  in  an  isolated  quarter.  These  thino;s 
are,  however,  ordinarily  doubtful,  and  certainly,  it  must 
always  he  a  ffreat  matter  with  a  general,  to  raise  the 
moral  confidence  of  his  own  army,  and  to  sink  that  of 
his  adversary,  even  though  it  should  be  by  a  momenta- 
•y  and  illusive  success. 

3.  The  faulty  execution  of  the  attack  on  Montjouic  is 
ess  doubtful  than  the  choice  of  direction.  The  cessa- 
tion of  the  breaching  fire  for  four  days  previous  to  the 
assault,  and  the  disregard  of  the  rules  of  art  already  no- 
ticed, amply  account  for  failure;  and  it  is  to  be  ob- 
served, that  this  failure  caused  the  delay  of  a  whole 
month  in  the  progress  of  the  siege,  that  during  that 
month  disease  invaded  the  army,  and  the  soldiers,  as 
they  will  be  found  to  do  in  all  protracted  operations, 
became  careless  and  disinclined  to  the  labours  of 
the  trenches. 

4.  The  assault  on  the  body  of  the  place  was  not  bet- 
ter conducted  than  that  against  Montjouic  ;  and  consid- 
ering these  facts,  together  with  the  jealousy  and  dis- 

rutes  between  the  generals,  the  mixture  of  Germans, 
talians,  and  French  in  the  army,  and  the  maladminis- 
tration of  the  hospitals,  by  which  so  many  men  were 
lost,  and  so  many  more  kept  from  their  duty,  it  is  rath- 
er surprising  that  Gerona  was  taken  at  all. 

5.  The  foregoing  conclusions  in  no  wise  affect  the 
merits  of  the  besieged,  because  the  difficulties  and  er- 
rors of  their  adversaries  only  prolonged  their  misery. 
Thev  fought  bravely,  they  endured  unheard-of  suffer- 
inc-s  with  constancy,  and  their  refusal  to  accept  itie  ar- 
mistice offered  by  Augereau,  is  as  noble  and  affecting  an 
instance  of  virtue  as  any  that  history  has  recorded.  Yet 
how  mixed  are  good  and  evil  principles  in  man,  how 
dependent  upon  accidental  circumstances  is  the  devel- 
opment of  his  noble  or  base  qualities !  Alvarez,  so 
magnanimous,  so  firm,  so  brave,  so  patriotic  at  Gerona, 
was  the  same  Alvarez  who,  one  year  before,  surren- 
dered the  Barcelona  Monjouic  on  the  insolent  summons 
ofDuhesme!  At  that  perioc,  the  influence  of  a  base 
court  degraded  public  feeling,  and  what  was  weak  in 
his  character  came  to  the  surface,  but  in  times  more 
congenial  to  virtuous  sentiments,  all  the  nobility  of  the 
man's  nature  broke  forth. 

6.  When  the  siege  of  Gerona  is  contrasted  with  that 
of  Zaragrza,  it  may  shake  the  opinion  of  those  who  re- 
gard the  wild  hostility  of  the  multitude  as  superior  to 
the  regulated  warfare  of  soldiers.  The  number  of  en- 
emies that  came  against  the  latter  was  rather  less  than 
those  who  came  against  the  former  city  ;  the  regular 
garrison  of  Zar.igoza  was  above  thirty  thousand,  that  of 
Gerona  about  three  thousand.  The  armed  multitude, 
in  the  one,  amounted  to  at  least  twenty-five  thousand, 
in  the  other,  they  were  less  than  six  thousand.  Cruel- 
ty and  murder  marked  every  step  in  the  defence  of  Za- 
ragoza,  the  most  horrible  crimes  were  necessary  to  pro- 
long the  resistance,  above  forty  thousand  persons  per- 
ished miserably,  and  the  town  was  taken  within  three 
months.  In  Gerona  there  was  nothing  to  blush  for; 
the  fisrhting  was  more  successful,  the  actual  loss  inflic- 
ted upon  the  enemy  greater,  the  suflTering  within  the 
walls  neither  wantonly  produced  nor  useless;  the  peri- 
od of  its  resistance  doubled  that  of  Zaragoza,  and  every 
proceeding  tended  to  raise  instead  of  sinking  the  dig- 
nity of  human  nature.  There  was  less  of  brutal  rule, 
more  of  reason,  and  consequtntly  more  real  heroism, 
moie  success  at  the  moment,  and  a  better  example  giv- 
en to  excite  the  emulation  of  generous  men. 

7.  With  reference  to  the  general  posture  of  afTairs, 
the  fall  of  Gerona  was  a  reproach  to  the  Spanish  and 
English  cabinets.     The  latter  having  agents  in  Cata- 


lonia, and  such  a  man  as  lord  Collingwcod  in  the  Me- 
diterranean, to  refer  to,  were  yet  so  ignorant,  or  so  care- 
less of  what  was  essential  to  he  success  of  t!ie  war,  as 
to  let  Gerona  struggle  for  six  months,  when  half  the 
troops  employed  by  sir  .Tohn  Stuart  to  alarm  Naples, 
if  carried  to  the  coast  of  Catalonia,  and  landed  at  Pala- 
mos,  would  have  raised  the  siege.  It  was  not  neces- 
sary that  this  army  should  have  been  equipped  for  a 
campaign,  a  single  march  would  have  effected  the  ob- 
ject. An  ensfineer  and  a  few  thousand  pounds  would 
have  rendered  Palamos  a  formidable  post,  and  that 
place  being  occupied  by  English  troops,  and  suppor- 
ted by  a  fleet,  greater  means  than  the  French  could  have 
collected  in  180f),  would  not  have  reduced  Gerona. 
The  Catalans,  indeed,  were  not  more  tractable  nor  more 
disposed  than  others  to  act  cordially  with  their  allies; 
but  the  natural  sterilit}^  of  the  country,  the  condensed 
manufacturing  population,  the  number  of  strong  posts 
and  large  fortified  towns  in  their  possession,  and,  above 
all,  the  long  and  difficult  lines  of  communication  which 
the  French  must  have  guarded  for  the  passage  of  their 
convoys,  would  have  rendered  the  invaders'  task  most 
difficult, 

8,  From  the  commencement  of  the  Spanish  insurrec- 
tion, the  policy  of  the  Valencians  had  been  character- 
ised by  a  singular  indifference  to  the  calamities  that 
overwhelmed  the  other  parts  of  Spain,  Tlie  local  Jun- 
ta in  that  province,  not  content  with  asserting  their  own 
exclusive  authority,  imagined  that  it  was  prssible  to 
maintain  Valencia  independent,  even  though  the  rest  of 
the  Peninsula  should  be  conquered  ;  hence  the  siege  of 
Zaragoza  passed  unheeded,  and  the  sulfering  of  Gero- 
na made  no  impression  on  them,  W'it.h  a  reg-nlar  ar- 
my of  above  ten  thousand  men,  Uiore  than  thirty  thou- 
sand armed  irregulars,  and  a  large  fleet  at  (^arthagena, 
the  governors  of  this  rich  province,  so  admirably  situ- 
ated for  offensive  operations,  never  even  placed  the  for- 
tified towns  of  their  own  frontier  in  a  state  of  defence, 
and  carelessly  beheld  the  seventh  and  third  corps  grad- 
ually establishing,  at  the  distance  of  a  few  days'  march 
from  Valencia  itself,  two  solid  bases  for  further  inva- 
sion !  But  it  is  now  time  to  revert  to  the  operations  of 
the  "  Central  Supreme  Junta,''''  that  it  may  be  fully  un- 
derstoed  how  the  patriotism,  the  constancy,  the  lives, 
and  the  fortunes  of  the  Spanish  people,  were  sported 
with  by  those  who  had  so  unhappily  acquired  a  mo- 
mentary power  in  the  Peninsula. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Plot  at  Seville  against  the  Supreme  Junta  defeated  by  lord 
Wellesiey -Junta  propose  a  new  form  of  government — Oppos- 
ed bv  Romana — Junta  announces  the  convocation  of  the  na- 
tional Cortt  z,  but  endeavour  to  deceive  the  people — A  Spanish 
army  assembled  in  the  Morena  under  Eguia — Bassecour  sends 
cavah'v  to  reinforce  Del  Paripie,  who  concentrates  the  Span- 
ish arnij- of  the  left  at  Ciudad  Rodrigo — He  is  joined  by  the 
Gallician  divisions-Santocildes occupies  Astorga — French  en- 
deavour to  surprise  him,  but  are  repulsed — Ballastiros  quits 
the  Asturias,  and  maichin^hy  Astorga  attempts  to  storm  Za- 
mora — Ruters  Portugal — Del  Parque  demands  the  aid  of  the 
Portuguese  army — Sir  A,  Wellesiey  refuses,  giving  his  reason 
in  detail — Dei  i'arque's  operations — Rattle  of  Tamames — Del 
Parque  occupies  S:il>manca,  but  hearing  that  French  troops 
were  assembiingat  Valladolid  retires  to  B»jar. 

When  sir  Arthur  Wellesiey  retired  to  the  frontier 
of  Portugal,  the  calumnies  propagated  in  Andalusia, 
relative  to  the  cause  of  that  movement,  were  so  far 
successful  that  no  open  revolt  took  place;  but  the 
public  hatred  being  little  diminished,  a  design  was 
formed  to  establish  a  better  government,  as  a  prelimi- 
nary to  which,  measures  were  secretly  taken  to  seize 
the  members  of  the  Junta,  and  transport  them  to  Ma- 
nila.  The  old  Junta  of  Seville  being  the  chief  movers 
of  this  sedition,  no   good   could  be   expected  from  the 


244 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  IX. 


ehanofe,  othorwisp,  such  an  explosion,  although  sure  to 
be  attended  vviih  slaiiorliter  and  temporary  confusion, 
was  not  unlikely  to  prove  advantao-pous  to  the  nation 
at  large,  it  beintr  quite  obvious  that  some  violent  remedy 
was  wanting  to  purge  off  the  complicated  disorders  of 
the  state. 

"  Spoilt,''^  said  lord  W'ellesley,  "  has  f  roved  unlrue 
in  our  alliaiKC,  because  she  is  untrue  In  herst/f.''^ — "  Until 
tome  great  change  shall  be  effected  in  the  conduct  (f  the 
military  resources  of  Spain,  ai.d  in  the  state  (f  her  armies, 
no  British  army  can  attempt  safely  to  co-operate  with 
Spanish  troops  in  the  territories  of  Spain."' — '•'' No  alli- 
ance can  protect  her  from  the  results  (f  internal  disorders 
and  national  iifinnity.'''' 

This  evident  discontent  of  the  British  ambassador 
led  the  eons^pirators  to  impart  their  designs  to  him,  in 
the  hopes  of  assistance;  but  he  being  accredited  to  the 
existing  government,  apprised  it  of  the  danger,  con- 
cealing, however,  with  due  regard  to  humanity,  the 
names  of  those  engaged  in  the  plot.  The  Junta,  in 
great  alarm,  immediately  sought  to  mitigate  the  gene- 
ral hatred ;  but  still  averse  to  sacrificing  any  power, 
projected  a  counter  scheme.  They  had,  for  the  public 
good  according  to  some,  for  private  emolument  accord- 
ing to  others,  hitherto  permitted  trading,  under  licenses, 
with  the  towns  occupied  by  the  enemy.  This  regula- 
tion and  some  peculiarly-heavy  exactions  they  now 
rescinded,  and,  as  a  final  measure  of  conciliation,  ap- 
pointed, with  many  protestations  of  patriotisnj,  com- 
missioners to  prepare  a  scheme  of  government  which 
should  serve  until  the  fit  period  for  convoking  the 
Cortes  arrived. 

But  the  commissioners,  principallj'  chosen  from 
amongst  the  members  of  the  Junta,  soon  made  mani- 
fest the  real  designs  of  that  body.  They  proposed  that 
five  persons  should  form  a  supreme  executive  council, 
every  member  of  the  existing  Junta,  in  rotation,  to  have 
a  place ;  the  colonies  to  be  represented  as  an  integral 
part  of  the  empire  ;  and  the  council  so  composed,  to 
rule  until  the  (fortes  should  meet,  and  then  to  preside 
in  that  assembly.  Thus  under  the  pretence  of  resign- 
ing their  power,  by  a  simple  change  of  form,  the  pre- 
sent and  the  future  authority  of  the  Junta  were  to  be 
confirmed,  and  even  the  proposal,  in  favour  of  the  colo- 
nies, was,  following  the  opinion  of  lord  Wellesley,  a 
mere  expedient  to  obtain  a  momentary  popularity,  and 
entirely  unconnected  with  enlarged  or  liberal  views  of 
policy  and  government. 

This  project  was  foiled  by  Romana,  who,  being  of 
the  commission,  dissented  from  his  colleagues  ;  audit 
was  on  this  occasion  that  he  drew  up  that  accusatory 
paper,  quoted  in  another  part  of  this  history,  and  the 
bad  acts  therein  specified,  although  sufficiently  heinous, 
were  not  the  only  charges  made  at  this  period.  It  was 
objected  to  some  amongst  the  Junta,  that  having  as 
merchants,  contracted  for  supplying  the  army,  they  in 
their  public  capacity,  raised  the  price  to  be  paid  by  the 
treasury  for  the  articles ;  and  that  the  members  gene- 
rally were  venal  in  their  patronage,  difficult  of  access, 
and  insolent  of  demeanour. 

Romana  proposed  a  council  of  regency,  to  be  com- 
posed of  five  persons,  not  members  of  the  Junta.  This 
council  to  be  assisted  by  a  fresh  chosen  Junta,  also 
composed  of  five  members  and  a  procurator-general, 
and  to  be  styled  "  The  Permanent  Deputation  of  the 
Realm.''''  One  of  this  body  to  be  a  South  American, 
and  the  whole  to  represent  the  Cortes,  until  the  meet- 
ing of  that  assembly,  which,  he  thought,  could  not  be 
loo  soon.  His  plan,  introduced  by  misplaced  declara- 
tions in  fpvour  of  arbitrary  power,  and  terminated  by 
5thers  equally  strong  in  favour  of  civil  liberty,  was  not 
well  considered.  'I'he  '■*■  Permanent  Deputation,''''  being 
to  represent  the  Cortee,  it  was  obvious  that  it  must 
possess  the  right  of  controlling  the  Regency;  but  the 
numbtrs  and  dignity  of  both  being-  equal,  and  their 


'  interests  opposed,   it  was   as   obvious   that  a  strntrgla 
would  commence,  in  which  the  latter,  having  the  sole 
distribution  of  honours  and  emoluments,  could  not  fail 
:  to  conquer,  arid  no  Cortes  would  be  assembled. 
I      Some  time   before   this,   when   the  terror  caused  by 
I  sir  Arthur  Wellesley's  retreat  from  Spain,  was  fresh, 
I  Don  Martin  de  Garay  had  applied   to   lord  Wellesley 
I  for  advice,  as  to  the  best  form  of  government,  and  that 
,  nobleman  also  reconiinended  a  "  Council  of  Regency,^* 
and,  like  Romana.  proposed  a  second  council ;  but  with 
this  essential   difference,  that   the   latter  were  only  to 
arrange  the  details  for  electing  the  members  of  Cortes,  • 
a  proclamation  for  the  convocation  of  which  was  to  ba 
immediately  published,   together  with  a  list  of  griev- 
ances, "a  Bill  ff  Rights,"  founded  on  an  enlarged  con- 
ciliatory policy,  and  having  equal  regard  for  the  inter- 
ests of  the  colonies  as  for  those  cJ  the  mother  country. 
Garay  approved  of  this  advice  while  danger  menaced 
the  Junta;  but  when  the  arrangement  for  the  command 
of  the  armies  had  been  completed,  and  the  first  excite- 
ment had  subsided,  his  solicitude  for  the  improvement 
of  the  government  ceased.     It  must,  however,  be  ac- 
knowledged, that  lord  Wellesley  condemned  the  exist- 
ing system,  as  much  for  its  democratic  form  as  for  its 
inefficiency  ;   the   English   cabinet  never  forgot,   that 
they  were  the  champions  of  privilege,   nor,   that  the 
war  was  essentially,  less  for  the  defence  of  Spain,  than 
the  upholding  of  the  aristocratic  system  of  Europe. 

To  evade  Romana's  proposition,  the  Junta,  on  the 
28th  of  October,  announced  that  the  National  (fortes 
should  be  convoked  on  the  1st  of  January,  181*0,  and 
assembled  for  business  on  the  1st  of  March  following 
Having  thus,  in  some  measure,  met  the  public  wishes, 
they  joined  to  this  announcement  a  virulent  attack  on 
the  project  of  a  Regency,  affirming,  and  not  without 
some  foundation  as  regarded  Romana's  plan,  that  such 
a  governmer.t  would  disgust  the  colonies,  trample  on 
the  king's  rights,  and  would  never  assemble  the  Cortes  ; 
moreover  that  it  would  soon  be  corrupted  by  the  French. 
Then  enlarging  on  their  own  merits  in  a  turgid  decla- 
matory style,  they  defended  their  past  conduct  by  a 
tissue  of  misrepresentations,  which  deceived  nobody  ; 
for,  to  use  the  words  of  lord  Wellesley,  ^^  no  plan  had 
been  adojited  for  ar.y  efffictuul  redress  of  grievances,  cor^ 
rection  (f  abuses  or  relief  from  exactions,  and  the  admin- 
istration of  justice,  the  regulation  of  revenue,  finance, 
commerce,  the  security  of  persons  and  property,  and 
every  other  great  branch  of  government,  were  as  difutive 
as  the  military  establishnie7its,^^ 

However,  the  promise  of  assembling  the  Cortes 
sufficed  to  lull  the  public  wrath  ;  and  the  Junta  resolved 
to  recommence  offensive  military  operations,  which 
they  fondly  imagined  would,  at  once,  crush  the  enemy, 
and  firmly  establish  their  own  popularity  and  power. 
They  were  encouraged  by  a  false,  but  general  imjires?- 
sion  throughout  Andalusia,  that  Austria  had  broken  off 
negotiations  with  France;  and  in  September  and  Octo- 
ber fresh  levies,  raised  in  Estremadura  and  Andalusia, 
had  been  incorporated  with  the  remains  of  Cuesta's  old 
army;  the  whole  forming  a  body  of  more  than  sixty 
thousand  soldiers,  of  which  nearly  ten  thousand  were 
cavalry.  Nor  was  the  assembling  and  equipment  of 
this  force  a  matter  of  great  difficulty;  for,  owing  to  the 
feeble  resistance  made  against  the  invaders,  the  war 
had  hitherto  drawn  so  little  on  the  population,  that  the 
poorer  sort  never  evaded  a  call  for  personal  service; 
and  the  enormous  accumulation  of  English  stores  and 
money  at  Cadiz  and  Seville,  were  sufficient  for  every 
exigency. 

In  October  Eguia  advanced  with  this  army  a  shor' 
way  into  La  Mancha;  but  when  the  I'rench,  uiiwilling 
to  lose  the  resources  of  that  fertile  province,  made  a 
movement  towards  him,  he  regained  the  Sierra  Morena 
on  the  Ifith,  taking  post,  first  at  St.  Elena,  and  finally 
at  La  Caroli/ia.     The  first  ai'.d  fourth  ccrps  thtu  (ccu 


1809.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


245 


pied  the  whole  of  La  Mancha,  with  advanced  posts  at 
the  fool  of  the  moil nlaius  ;  tiie  second  and  fifth  corps 
were  established  in  the  valley  of  the  Tajrus  and  at  To- 
ledo; and  the  rirserve  at  Madrid.  Durintj  these  move- 
ments, Bassecour,  who  commanded  in  Estremadura, 
detached  eight  hundred  horsemen  to  reinforce  the  duke 
Del  Parque,  and  quartered  the  rest  of  his  forces  behind 
the  Guadiana.  Thus  in  the  latter  end  of  October,  there 
were  sixty  thousand  men,  under  Eg^uia,  covering  Se- 
ville by  the  line  of  La  iMancha;  ten  thousand  under 
Bassecour  on  the  line  of  Estremadura,  and  about  six 
thousand  employed  as  gf\inrds  to  the  Junta  and  in  the 
service  of  the  depots  behind  the  Morcna. 

In  the  north,  the  Spanish  army  of  the  left  was  con- 
centrated near  Ciudad  Rodrigo.  For  when  Beresford 
inarched  down  the  Portu^nese  frontier  to  the  Tagus, 
the  duke  Del  Parque,  reinforced  with  the  eijrht  hun- 
dred cavalry  from  Estremadura,  and  with  the  Gallician 
divisions  cf  Mondizabel  and  Carrera,  (amounting  to 
thirteen  thousand  men,  completely  equipped  from  Eng- 
lish stores,  brought  out  to  Coruna  in  July,)  made  a 
movement  into  the  rugged  country,  about  the  Sierra  de 
Francia,  and  sent  his  scouting  parties  as  far  as  Baiios. 
At  the  same  time  general  Saniocildes,  marching  from 
Lugo  with  two  thousand  men,  took  possession  of  As- 
torga.  and  menaced  the  rear  of  the  sixth  corps,  which 
after  fercinri  the  pass  of  Br.nos,  had  been  quartered  be- 
tween the  'i'ormes  and  the  Esla.*  In  this  situation,  a 
French  detachment  attempted  to  surprise  one  of  the 
gates  of  Astorga,  on  the  9lh  of  October,  and,  being  re- 
pulsed, returned  to  their  cantonments.  Soon  after- 
wards Ballasteros,  having  again  collected  about  eight 
thousand  men  in  the  Asturias,  armed  and  equipped 
♦■hern  from  English  stores,  and,  coming  down  to  Astor- 
ga, crossed  the  Esla,  and  attempted  to  storm  Zamora. 
Failing  in  this,  he  entered  Portugal  by  the  road  of  jNli- 
randa,  and  fiom  thence  proceeded  to  join  the  duke  Del 
Parque.  Thus  the  old  armies  of  Gallicia  and  the  As- 
turias being  broken  up,  those  provinces  were  ordered 
lo  raise  fresh  forces  ;  but  there  was  in  Gallicia  a  gen- 
eral disposition  to  resist  the  authority  of  the  central 
Junta. 

Del  Parque,  eager  to  act  against  the  sixth  corps,  had 
demanded,  in  September,  through  Perez  Castro,  the 
Spanish  envoy  at  Lisbon,  that  the  Portuguese  army 
sliould  join  him  ;  this  being  referred  to  sir  Arthur 
Wellesley,  he  gave  it  a  decided  negative,  grounding 
his  refusal  upon  reasons  which  I  shall  insert  at  large, 
as  giving  a  clear  and  interesting  view  of  the  military 
state  of  atTairs  at  this  period. 

"  The  enemy,"  he  said,  "  were  superior  to  the  allies, 
including  those  which  Beresford  might  bring  into  the 
field,  not  only  in  nuuibers,  but  (adverting  to  the  com- 
position of  the  Spanish  armies,  the  want  of  cavalry  in 
srme,  of  ariillery  in  others,  of  clothing,  ammunition, 
and  arms,  and  the  deficiency  of  discipline  in  all)  supe- 
rior in  eiTiciency  even  to  a  greater  degree  than  in  num- 
bers. These  circumstances,  and  the  absolute  deficiency 
in  means,  were  the  causes  why,  after  a  great  victory 
at  Talavera,  the  armies  had  been  obliged  to  recur  to 
the  defensive,  and  nothing  had  altered  for  the  better 
since. 

'*  But,  besides  these  considerations,  the  enemy 
enjoyed  peculiar  advantages  from  his  central  po- 
sition, which  enabled  him  to  frustrate  the  duke  Del 
Parque's  intended  operations.  He  could  march  a  part, 
or  the  whole  of  his  forces  to  any  quarter,  whereas  tlie 
operation  of  the  different  corps  of  the  allies  must  ne- 
cessarily be  isolated,  and  each  for  a  time  exposed  to 
defeat.  'J'hus  there  was  nothing  to  prevent  the  enemy 
from  throwin<r  himself  upon  the  duke  Del  Parque  and 
Beresford,  with  tlie  whole  corps  of  Ney,  which  was  at 
Salamanca,  of  Soult,  which  was  at  Plasencia,  and  with 
the  force  under  Kellernian,  which  was  near  Valladolid, 


See  page  224. 


in  which  case,  even  if  he,  sir  Arthur,  had  the  inclina- 
tion, he  had  not  the  means  of  marching  in  time  lo  save 
them  from  destruction. 

"  In  the  same  manner  the  British  army,  if  it  trek  an 
advanced  position,  would  be  liable  to  a  fatal  disaster; 
so  likewise  would  the  Spanish  army  cf  La  Mancha. 
It  followed,  then,  that  if  any  one  of  these  armies  made 
a  forward  movement,  the  whole  must  co-rperate,  or 
the  single  force  in  activity  would  be  ruined  ;  but  tho 
relative  efllciency  and  strength  cf  the  hostile  forces,  as 
laid  down  in  the  commencement  of  the  argument,  for- 
bad a  general  co-operation  with  any  hopes  cf  solid  suc- 
cess ;  and  the  only  consequence  that  could  follow 
would  be,  that,  after  a  battle  or  two,  some  brilliant  ac- 
tions performed  hy  a  part,  and  some  defeats  sustained 
by  others,  and  after  the  loss  of  many  valuable  oflScers 
and  soldiers,  the  allies  would  be  forced  again  to  resume 
those  defensive  positions,  which  they  ought  never  to 
have  quitted. 

''  Satisfied  that  this  was  the  only  just  view  cf  afTairs, 
he,  although  prepared  to  make  an  effort  to  prevent  Ciu- 
dad Rodrigo  from  falling  into  the  enen  y's  hands,  was 
resolved  not  to  give  the  duke  Del  Parque  any  assist- 
ance to  maintain  his  frrm.er  position,  and  he  advised 
the  Portuguese  government,  not  to  risk  Beresford's 
army  in  a  situation  which  could  only  lead  to  mischief. 
The  proposed  operation  of  the  duke  DpI  Parque  was 
not  the  mode  to  save  Ciudad  Rodrigo.  The  only  effec- 
tual one  was  to  post  himself  in  such  a  situation  as  that 
the  enemy  could  not  attack  and  defeat  him  without  a 
long  previous  preparation,  which  would  give  time  for 
aid  to  arrive,  and  a  march,  in  which  the  enemy  him- 
self might  be  exposed  to  defeat.  To  expose  those 
troops  to  defeat  which  were  ultimately  "o  co-operate  in 
defence  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  was  not  the  way  of  pre- 
venting the  success  of  an  attempt  of  that  fortress.  The 
best  wav  was  to  place  the  Spanish  force  in  such  a  post 
that  it  could  not  be  attacked  without  risk  to  the  er;emy, 
and  from  whei;ce  it  could  easily  co-operate  with  the 
other  corps,  wliich  must  be  put  in  motion,  if  Ciudad 
was  to  be  saved  ;  and  although  he  would  not  take  lipori 
himself  to  point  out  the  exact  position  which  the  duke 
Del  Parijue  ought  to  occupy,  he  was  certain  that,  in 
his  present  forward  one,  although  joined  by  Beresford, 
he  could  not  avoid  defeat.  Ciudad  Rcdrigo  would  be 
lost,  and  other  misfortunes  would  follow,  none  of  which 
could  occur  under  any  other  probable,  or  even  possible 
concurrence  of  circumstances.  In  fine,  that  he  had 
long  been  of  opinion  that  the  war  must  necessarily  be 
defensive  on  the  part  of  the  allies,  and  that  Poi-tugal  at 
least,  if  not  Spain,  ought  to  avail  herself  of  the  short 
period,  which  the  enemy  seemed  disposed  to  leave  her 
in  tranquillity,  to  organize,  and  equip,  and  discipline 
her  armies.  Those  objects  could  not  be  accomplished, 
unless  the  troops  were  kept  quiet,  and  yet  they  were 
much  more  important  to  all  parties,  than  any  desultory 
successful  operations  against  the  French  troops  about 
Salamanca;  but  any  success  was  doubtful,  and  certain 
to  be  temporarv,  because  the  enemy  would  immediately 
collect  in  numbers  sufficient  to  crush  the  allies,  who 
must  then  return,  having  failed  in  their  object,  lost  a 
number  of  men,  and,  what  was  worse,  time,  which 
would  have  been  more  usefully  employed  in  preparing 
for  a  great  and  well  combined  effort."* 

This  reasoning,  solid,  clear,  convincinEf,  made  no 
impression  upon  the  Spanish  Junta  or  their  general. 
Castro  replied  to  it,  by  demanding  a  positive  and  de- 
finitive answer,  as  to  when  the  Portuguese  army  wouM 
be  in  a  condition  to  co-operate  with  the  Spaniards  in 
the  Spanish  territories.  "  fV'hcn  theic  is  a  Spanish 
army  with  which  Ihc  I'orlus^tiese  can  co-apcrale  on  name 
dfjincd  plan,  trhich  all  parties  loill  hnvr  Ihc  means,  and 
trill  enu;a<re  In  curry  into  txccution,  as  far  as  anu  person 
can  en^a^e  to  carry  into  execution  a  military  uptraiionJ'^ 


•  Lt-Utr  iroiii  sir  A.  Wtllesley,  S»ptciiiber  23, 1809.    MS. 


246 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  IX. 


"  When  means  shall  he  pointed  out,  and  fixed,  for  the 
xib.iistence  of  the  Portuguese  troops  while  they  remain  in 
Spain,  so  that  they  may  not  itarve,  and  be  obliged  to  re- 
tire for  want  of  food,  as  was  the  case  ivhen  lately  in  that 
country.''^  "  JF^fji  decided  ai^swers  shall  be  given  upon 
those  points,  I  shall  be  enabled  tn  tell  the  governors  of  Por- 
tugal that  their  excellencies  have  an  army  ni  a  state  to  be 
sent  into  Spain.''"*  This  was  sir  Arthur's  reply,  which 
ended  the  negotiation,  and  the  duke  Del  Parque  com- 
menced operations  by  himseif. 

To  favour  the  junction  of  Ballasteros,  his  first  move- 
ment was  towards  Ledcsma.  General  Marchand  im- 
mediately drew  torrether,  at  Salamanca,  eleven  thou- 
sand men  and  fourteen  gfuns,  and  marched  to  meet  him. 
Thereupon,  the  duke,  without  having  effected  his  junc- 
tion, ftll  back  to  Tamames,  taking  post  half-way  up  a 
mountain  of  remarkable  strength  ;  where  he  awaited 
the  enemy,  with  a  thousand  cavalry  and  twenty  thou- 
sand infantry,  of  which  the  Gallicians  only  could  be 
accounted  experienced  soldiers. 

BATTLE    OF    TAMAMES. 

General  Losada  commanded  the  Spanish  right,  count 
Belvidere  the  reserve,  Martin  Carrera  the  left,  which 
being  on  the  most  accessible  part  of  the  mountain  was 
covered  and  flanked  by  the  cavalr}'.  Marchand,  desi- 
rous of  fighting  before  Ballasteros  could  arrive,  moved 
rapidly,  reached  the  foot  of  the  mountain  early  on  the 
18th,  and  immediately  fell  upon  Del  Parquc's  left. 
The  Spanish  cavalry  fled  rather  hastily,  the  French 
horsemen  followed  closely,  the  infantry  surprised  in 
the  midst  of  an  evolution,  were  thrown  into  disorder, 
and  the  artillery  was  taken.  Carrera,  Mendizabel, 
and  the  duke,  rallied  the  troops  on  the  higher  ground, 
reinforced  ihein  from  ihe  reserve,  and  coming  down 
with  a  fresh  impetus,  recovered  the  guns,  and  discom- 
fited the  French  with  the  loss  of  an  eagle,  one  cannon, 
and  several  hundred  men.  During  this  brilliant  com- 
bat on  the  left,  the  right  and  centre  were  felt  by  the 
French  skirmishers,  but  the  ground  was  too  strong  to 
make  any  impression.  Marchand,  seeing  his  men  re- 
pulsed in  all  quarters  with  loss,  and  fearing  to  be  en- 
closed by  Ballasteros  in  that  disordered  state,  retreated 
to  Salamanca. 

Del  Parque  did  not  venture  to  follow  up  his  victory 
until  the  21st.  when,  being  joined  by  Ballasteros,  he 
pushed  with  nearly  thirty  thousand  men  for  Ledcsma; 
crossed  theTormes  there  on  the  23d,  turned  Salamanca 
by  a  night  marcii,  and  early  in  the  morning  of  the  24th 
crowned  the  heights  of  San  Cristoval  in  rear  of  that 
city,  hoping  to  cut  off  Marchand's  retreat,  but  that 
general  had  timely  information,  and  was  already  at 
I'oro,  behind  the  Douro.  Meanwhile,  the  news  of  the 
defeat  at 'J'amames  reached  Madrid,  Dessolle's  division 
•was  detached  through  the  Puerto  Pico  to  reinforce  the 
sixth  corps,  and  Kellerman  was  directed  to  advance 
from  Valladolid,  and  take  the  command  of  the  whole. 

When  the  duke  Del  Parque  heard  of  this  reinforce- 
ment, he  fell  back,  not  to  Ciudad  Hodrigo,  but  by  the 
way  of  Alba  de  Tormes  to  Bejar,  which  latter  place  he 
reached  on  the  8th  of  November.  And  while  these 
events  were  taking  place  in  Castile,  the  central  Junta 
having  finally  concocted  iheir  schemes,  were  com- 
mencing an  enterprise  of  unparalleled  rashness  ou  the 
side  of  La  Mancha. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Areiiaga  takes  thr  coniniand  of  I'^uia's   army,  and  is  ordered 

to  advsinte  against  Mali-id — VoWy  of  the  supreme  junta 

Operations  in  La  Mancha — Combat  of  Dos  Barrios — Cavalry 

•   Sir  A.  Wflleslev's  Correspondence  wil)i  Don  M.  Forgas 
October  19.  1809.  MSS. 


combat  of  Ocana — Battle  of  Oca\.a — Destruction  of  the  Span- 
ish arraj. 

In  the  arrangement  of  warlike  affairs,  difficulties 
being  always  overlooked  by  the  Spaniards,  they  are 
carried  on  from  one  phantasy  to  another  so  swiftly, 
that  the  first  conception  of  an  enterprise  is  inmiediately 
followed  by  a  confident  anticipation  of  complete  suc- 
cess, which  continues  until  the  hour  of  battle,  and  then 
when  it  might  be  of  use,  generally  abandons  them. 
Now  the  central  Junta  having  to  deceive  the  people, 
affirmed  that  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  had  retreated  to  the 
frontiers  of  Portugal  at  the  very  moment  when  the 
French  might  have  been  driven  to  the  Pyrenees,  canie 
very  soon  to  believe  this  their  own  absurd  calumny, 
and  resolved  to  send  the  army  at  Carolina  headlong 
against  Madrid  :  nay,  such  was  their  pitch  of  confi- 
dence, that  forenaraing  the  civil  and  military  authori- 
ties, they  arranged  a  provisionary  system  for  the  i'utr.re 
administration  of  the  capital,  with  a  care,  that  ihey 
denied  to  the  army  which  was  to  put  them  in  pos- 
session. 

Eguia  was  considered  unfit  to  conduct  this  en- 
terprise, and  Albuquerque  was  distasteful  to  the 
Junta;  wherefore,  casting  their  eyes  upon  general 
Areizaga,  they  chose  him,  whose  only  recommendation 
was,  that,  at  the  petty  battle  of  Alcanitz,  Blake  had 
noticed  his  courage.  He  was  then  at  Lerida,  but 
reached  La  C-arolina  in  the  latter  end  of  October ;  and 
being  of  a  quick  lively  turn,  and  as  confident  as  the 
Junta  could  desire,  readily  undertook  to  drive  the 
French  from  Madrid. 

This  movement  was  to  commence  early  in  Novem- 
ber, and  at  first,  only  Villa  Campa,  with  the  bands 
from  Aragon,  were  to  assist.  But  when  Areizaga,  af- 
ter meeting  the  enemy,  began  to  lose  confidence,  the 
duke  of  Albuquerque,  successor  to  Bassecour  in  Es- 
tremadura,  received  instructions  to  cause  a  diversion, 
by  marching  on  Arzobispo  and  Talavera  de  la  Reyna. 
The  duke  Del  Parque,  coming  by  the  pass  of  Banos, 
was  to  join  him  there  ;  and  thus  nearly  ninety  thousand 
men  were  to  be  put  in  motion  against  Madrid,  precisely 
on  that  plan  which  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  had  just  de- 
nounced as  certain  to  prove  disastrous.  Indeed,  every 
chance  was  so  much  in  favour  of  the  French,  that 
taking  into  consideration  the  solid  reasons  for  remain- 
ing on  the  defensive,  Areizaga's  irruption  may  be  re- 
garded as  an  extreme  example  of  military  rashness, 
and  the  project  of  uniting  Del  Parque's  forces  with 
Albuquerque's,  at  Talavera,  was  also  certain  to  fail ; 
because,  the  enemy's  masses  were  already  in  posses- 
sion of  the  point  of  junction,  and  the  sixth  corps  could 
fall  on  Del  Parque's  rear. 

Partly  to  deceive  the  enemy,  partly  because  they 
would  never  admit  of  any  opposition  to  a  favourite 
scheme,  the  Junta  spread  a  report  that  the  British  army 
was  !o  co-operate,  and  permitted  Areizaga  to  march, 
undci  the  impression  that  it  was  so.  Nothing  could 
be  more  untrue.  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley  being  at  this 
period  at  Seville,  held  repeated  conversations  with  the 
Spanish  ministers  and  the  members  of  tlie  Junta,  and 
reiterating  all  his  former  objections  to  offensive  opera- 
tions, warned  his  auditors  that  the  project  in  question 
was  peculiarly  ill-judged,  and  would  end  in  the  de- 
struction of  their  army.  The  Spanish  ministers,  far 
from  attending  to  his  advice,  did  not  even  iffniatly  in- 
form  him  of  .dreizaga^s  march  until  the  I3lh  if  Novem- 
ber, the  very  day  before  the  fatal  termination  of  the 
campaign.  Yet,  on  the  lG//i  they  had  repeated  their  de- 
mand for  assistance,  and  with  a  vehemence,  deaf  to  rea- 
son, required  that  tlie  Hrilish  should  instantly  co-o.per- 
ate  with  Albuquerque  and  Del  Parque's  forces.  Sir 
Arthur,  firm  to  his  first  views,  never  gave  the  slightest 
hopes  that  his  army  would  so  act;  and  he  assured  the 
Junta  that  the  diversion  proposed  would  have  no  effect 
whatever. 


1809.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


247 


OPERATIONS    IN    LA    MANCHA. 

Areizanra.  after  publishing  an  address  lo  the  troops 
on  the  3d  of  November,  ccmmenced  his  march  from 
La  Carolina,  with  sixty  pieces  of  artillery,  and  from 
fifty  to  sixty  thousand  men,  of  which  about  eight  thou- 
sand were  cavalry.  Several  British  officers  and  pri- 
vate gentlrtnen,  and  the  Baron  Crossand,  an  Austrian 
military  agent,  attended  the  head-quarters,  which  was 
a  scene  of  gaiety  and  boasting ;  for  Arei7.aga,  never 
dreaming  of  misforlune,  gave  a  free  scope  to  his  social 
vivacity.  The  army  marched  by  the  roads  of  Manza- 
nares  ard  Damiel,"  with  scarcely  any  commissariat 
preparation,  and  without  any  military  equipment  save 
arms  ;  but  the  men  were  young,  robust,  full  of  life  and 
confidence,  and  being  without  impediments  of  any  kind, 
made  nearly  thirty  miles  each  day.  They  moved  how- 
ever in  a  straggling  manner,  quartering  and  feeding  as 
they  could  in  the  villages  on  their  mute,  and  with  so 
liltfe  proprietv.  that  the  peasantry  of  La  Mancha  uni- 
versally abandoned  their  dwellings,  and  carried  off 
their  effects. 

Although  the  Fret  ch  could  not  at  first  give  credit  to 
'.he  rumours  of  this  strange  incursion,  they  were  aware 
that  some  great  movement  was  in  agitation,  and  only 
uncertain  from  what  point  and  for  what  specific  object 
the  effort  would  be  made.  Jourdan  had  returned  to 
France.  Soult  was  major-general  of  the  French  armies, 
and  under  his  advice,  the  king,  who  was  inclined  to 
abandon  Madrid,  prepared  to  meet  the  coming  blow. 
But  the  army  was  principally  posted  towards  Talavera, 
for  the  false  reports  bad,  in  some  measure,  succeeded 
in  deceiving  the  French  as  to  the  approach  of  the  Eng- 
lish ;*  and  it  was  impossible  at  once  to  conceive  the 
full  insanity  of  the  Junta. 

The  second  corps,  commanded  by  general  Heudelet, 
beinc  withdrawn  from  Plasencia,  was,  on  the  5th, 
posted  at  Oropesa  and  Arzobispo,  with  an  advanced 
ffuard  at  Calzada,  and  scoutingf  parties  watching  Naval 
M"ral.  and  the  course  of  the  Tietar. 

The  fifth  corps,  under  Mortier,  was  concentrated  at 
Talavera. 

Of  the  fourth  corps,  half  a  division  garrisoned  Mad- 
rid in  the  absence  of  Dessolle's  troops  ;  tlie  other  half, 
under  general  Liger  Belair,  was  behind  the  Tajuna, 
guarding  the  eastern  approaches  to  the  capital.  The 
remaining  divisions,  commanded  by  Sebastiani,  were, 
the  one  at  Toledo,  the  other  with  Milhaud's  cavalry  at 
Ocana. 

The  first  corps,  about  twenty-one  thousand  strong, 
and  crmmanded  by  marshal  Victor,  was  at  Mora  and 
Yebenes,  a  day's  march  in  advance  of  Toledo,  but  the 
cavalry  of  this  corps  under  the  commard  of  Latrur 
Maubourg  occupied  Consuegrra  and  Madrilejos,  on  the 
road  to  the  Sierra  Morena.  The  whole  army,  including 
the  French  and  Spanish  guards,  was  above  eighty 
thousand  fighting  men,  without  reckoning  Dessolle's 
division,  v  liich  was  on  the  other  side  of  the  Guada- 
rama  m'  untains. 

In  the  night  of  the  6lh.  information  reached  the  king, 
that  six  thousand  Spanish  horsemen,  supported  by  two 
thousand  fort,  had  come  down  upon  ('onsuegra  from 
the  side  of  Hrrencia,  and  that  a  second  column,  like- 
wise composed  ofcavalrvand  infantry,  had  passed  the 
Puertn  de  Piche,  and  fallen  upon  the  outposts  at  Mad- 
lih'jos.f  All  tiie  prisoners  taken  in  the  skirmishes 
figreed  that  the  Spanish  army  was  above  fifty  thousand 
kroner,  find  the  duke  of  BeJluno  immediately  concen- 
trated th-s  first  corps  at  Yebenes,  but  kept  his  cavalry 
at  Mora,  by  which  he  covered  the  roads  leading  from 
(^onsueirra  and  Madrilejos  upon  Toledo.  On  the  8lh, 
there  were  no  Spaniards  in  front  of  the  first  corps,  yet 
officers  sent  towards  Ocana,  were  chased  back  by  cav- 
alry, hence  Sonlt  judged,  what  was  indeed  the  truth, 


S.  Journal  of  Of^crations,  RISS. 


t  Ibid. 


that  Areizaga  continuing  his  reckless  march,  had  pushed 
by  Tembleque  towards  Aranjuez,  leaving  the  first  corps 
on  his  left  flank.  The  division  of  the  fourth  corps  waa 
immediately  moved  from  Toledo  by  the  right  bank  of 
the  Tagus  to  Aranjuez,  from  whence  Sebastiani  car- 
ried it  to  Ocaiia,  thus  concentrating  about  eight  thou- 
sand infantry,  and  fifteen  hundred  cavalry  at  tiiat  ])oint 
on  the  9lh  ;  the  same  day  Victor  retired  with  the  first 
corps  to  Ajofrin. 

On  the  lOlh,  Gazan's  division  of  the  fifth  corps  was 
ordered  to  march  from  Talavera  to  Toledo,  and  the  first 
corps  which  had  reached  the  latter  town,  was  directed 
to  move  up  the  right  bank  of  the  Tagus  lo  Aranjuez  to 
support  Sebastiani,  who  holding  fast  at  Ocaiia,  sent 
six  squadrons  to  feel  for  the  enemy  towards  Guardia. 
Tlie  Spaniards  continuing  their  movement,  met  those 
squadrons  and  pursued  them  tow"ards  Ocaiia. 

COMBAT    OF    DOS    BARRIOS. 

Areizaga,  ignorant  of  what  was  passing  around  him, 
and  seeing  only  Scbastiani's  cavalry  on  the  table-land 
between  the  town  of  Dos  Barrios  and  Ocana,  concluded 
ttiat  thej'  were  unsupported,  and  directed  the  Spanish 
horse  to  charge  them  without  delay.  The  French  thus 
pressed,  drew  back  behind  the  infantry  which  was 
close  at  hand,  and  unexpectedly  opened  a  brisk  fire  on 
the  Spanish  squadrons  which  were  thrown  into  confu- 
sion, and  being  charged  in  that  state  by  the  whole  mass 
of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  were  beaten,  with  the  loss  of 
two  hundred  prisoners  and  two  pieces  of  cannon.  Arei- 
zaga's  main  body  was,  however,  coming  up,  Sebas- 
tiani fell  back  upon  Ocaiia,  and  the  next  morning  took 
up  a  position  on  some  heights  lining  the  left  banks  of 
the  Tagus  and  covering  Aranjuez ;  the  Spaniards  en- 
tered Dos  Barrios,  but  there  their  impetuous  movement 
ceased.  They  had  come  down  from  the  Morena  like  a 
stream  of  lava,  and  burst  into  La  Mancha  with  a  ra- 
pidity that  scarcely  gave  time  for  rumour  to  precede 
them.  This  swiftness  of  execution,  generally  so  val- 
uable in  war,  was  here  but  an  outbreak  of  folly.  With- 
out any  knowledge  of  the  French  numbers,  or  position, 
without  any  plan  of  action,  Areizaga  had  rushed  like  a 
maniac  into  the  midst  of  his  foes,  and  then  suddenly 
stood  still  trembling  and  bewildered. 

From  the  10th  to  the  13th  he  halted  at  Dos  Barrios, 
and  informed  his  government  of  Sebastiani's  stubborn 
resistance,  and  of  the  doubts  which  now  for  the  first 
tiiTie  assailed  his  own  mind.  It  was  then  the  Junta, 
changing  their  plans,  eagerly  demanded  the  assistance 
of  the  British  army,  and  commanded  the  dukes  of  Al- 
buquerque and  Del  Parque  to  unite  at  Talavera.  Al- 
buquerque commenced  his  movement  immediately,  and 
the  Junta  did  not  hesitate  to  assure  both  their  generals 
and  the  public,  that  sir  Arthur  was  also  coming  on. 
Wherefore  Areizaga,  thus  encouraged,  and  having 
had  time  to  recover  from  his  first  incertitude,  made  on 
the  14th  a  flank  march  by  his  right  to  Santa  Cruz  la 
Zarza,  intending  to  cross  the  I'agus  at  Villa  Maurique, 
turn  the  French  left,  and  penetrate  to  the  capital  by 
the  eastern  side  ;  but  during  his  delay  at  Dos  Barrios 
the  French  forces  had  been  concentrated  from  every 
quarter,  and  although  to  the  south  of  Ocaiia,  the  ground 
is  open  and  undulating;  on  the  north,  the  ramifications 
of  the  CuenQa  mountains,  leading  down  the  left  bank 
of  the  Tagus,  presented,  at  Santa  (/tuz,  ridges  which 
stretching  strong  and  rough  towards  Aranjuez,  affurd- 
ed  good  positions  for  Sebastiani  to  cover  that  place. 

Soult  was  awake  to  his  adversary's  projects,  yet 
could  not  believe  that  he  would  dare  such  a  movement 
unless  certain  of  support  from  the  British  army,  anu 
therefore  kept  the  different  corps  quiet  on  the  eleventh, 
waiting  for  Heudelet's  report  from  Oropesa.*  In  the 
night  it  arrived,  staling  that  rumours  of  a  combnied 
Spanish  and  English  army  being  on  the  march,  were 

*  S.  Journal  of  Operations,  MSS. 


248 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR, 


[Book  IX. 


rife,  but  that  the  scouts  cculd  not  discover  that  the  al- 
lied force  was  actually  within  several  inarches.  Soult, 
now  judginqr,  that  althoiigfh  the  runirurs  should  he 
true,  his  central  position  would  enahle  him  to  defeat 
Areizaof-^  and  return  hy  the  way  of  Toledo  in  time  to 
meet  the  allies  in  the  valley  of  the  Tatrus,  put  all  his 
masses  apain  into  activity.  The  first  corps  was  di- 
rected to  liasten  its  march  to  Aranjuez  ;  the  fifth  corps 
to  concentrate  at  Toledo;  the  second  corps  to  abandon 
Oropesa,  Calzada  and  Arzobispo,  and  replacing  the 
fifth  corps  at  Talavera,  to  be  in  readiness  to  close  upon 
the  main  body  of  the  army.  Finally,  information  being 
received  rf  the  duke  Del  Parque's  retreat  from  Sala- 
manca to  Bejar  and  of  the  re-occi!j)ation  of  Salamanca 
by  the  sixth  corps,  Dessolle's  division  was  recalled  to 
Aiadrid. 

During  the  12th,  while  the  first,  second,  and  fifth 
corps  were  in  march,  general  Liger  Relair's  brigade 
continued  to  watch  the  banks  of  the  Tajuna,  and  the 
fourth  corps  preserved  its  offensive  positions  on  the 
height  in  the  front  of  Aranjuez,  having  fifteen  hundred 
men  in  reserve  at  the  bridge  of  Bayona.  The  14th  the 
general  movement  was  completed.  Two  corps  were 
concentrated  at  Aranjuez  to  assail  the  Spaniards  in 
front;  one  at  Toledo  to  cross  the  Tagus  and  fall  upon 
their  left  flank,  and  the  king's  guards  at  Madrid  formed 
a  reserve  for  the  fourth  and  first  corps,  '["he  second 
corps  was  at  Talavera,  and  Dessolle's  division  was  in 
the  Guadarama  on  its  return  to  the  capital.  In  fine,  all 
was  prepared  for  the  attack  of  D^^s  Barrios,  when 
Areizaga's  flank  march  to  Santa  Cruz  la  Zarza  occa- 
sioned new  combinations. 

In  the  evening  of  the  15th,  it  was  known  that  the 
Spaniards  had  made  a  bridge  at  Villa  Maurique,  and 
passed  two  divisions  and  some  cavalry  over  the  Tagus. 
The  duke  of  Belluno  was  immediately  ordered  to  carry 
the  first  and  fourth  corps  (with  the  exception  of  a 
brigade  left  in  Aranjuez)  up  the  left  bank  of  the  Tagus, 
operating  so  as  to  fix  Areizaga,  and  force  him  to  de- 
liver bailie;  and,  with  a  view  of  tempting  the  Span- 
iard, by  an  appearance  of  timidity,  the  bridges  of  La 
Reyna  and  Aranjuez  were  broken  down. 

While  these  dispositions  were  making  on  the  French 
f^ide,  the  Spanish  general  commenced  a  second  bridge 
over  the  Tagus;  and  part  of  his  cavalry,  spreading  in 
small  detachments,  scoured  the  country,  and  skirmish- 
ed on  a  line  extending  from  Arganda  to  Aranjuez.  The 
Partidas  also,  being  aided  by  detachments  from  the  ar- 
my, obliged  the  French  garrison  to  retire  from  Guada- 
laxara  upon  Arganda,  and  occupied  the  former  town  on 
the  12th.  But,  in  the  night  of  the  l.Tth,  eight  French 
companies  and  some  troops  of  ligiit  cavalry,  by  a  sud- 
den march,  surprised  them,  killed  and  wounded  two  or 
three  hundred  men,  and  took  eighty  horses  and  a  piece 
of  artillery. 

The  HUh  the  infantry  of  the  first  and  fourth  corps 
was  at  IMorata  and  Bayona,  the  cavalry  at  Perales  and 
(^hinchon,  and,  during  this  time,  the  fifth  corps,  leaving 
a  brigade  of  foot  and  one  of  horse  at  Toledo,  marched 
by  Illescas  towards  Madrid,  to  act  as  a  reserve  to  the 
duke  of  Belluni. 

The  17th  Areizaga  continued  his  demonstrations  on 
the  side  of  the  Tajuna,  and  hastened  the  construction 
of  his  second  bridge;  but  on  the  approach  of  the  duke 
of  Belluno  with  the  first  corps,  he  stayed  the  work,  and 
withdrew  his  divisions  from  the  right  bank  of  the  Ta- 
gus, and  on  the  18th,  (the  cavalry  of  the  first  corps 
having  reached  Villarejo  de  Salvanes,)  he  destroyed 
his  bridges,  called  in  his  parties,  and  drew  up  for  bat- 
tle on  the  heights  of  Santa  Cruz  de  la  Zarza. 

Hitherto  the  continual  movements  of  the  Spanish  ar- 
my, and  the  unsettled  plans  of  the  Spanish  general,  ren- 
dered it  difl^cult  for  the  French  to  fix  afield  of  battle,  but 
now  Areizaga's  march  to  St.  Cruz  had  laid  his  line  of 
operations  bare.    The  French  masses  were  close  togeth- 


er, the  duke  of  Belluno  could  press  on  the  Spanish  frrnt 
«ith  the  first  corps,  and  the  king,  calling  the  fourth 
corps  from  Bayona,  could  throw  twenty-five  or  riiirty 
thousand  men  on  Areizaga's  rear,  by  the  road  of  Aranju- 
ez and  Ocaiia.  It  was  calculated  that  no  danger  could 
arise  from  this  double  line  of  operations,  because  a 
single  march  would  bring  both  the  king  and  Victor  uprn 
Areizaga,  and  if  the  latter  should  suddenly  assail  ei- 
ther, each  would  be  strong  enough  to  sustain  the  shock. 
Hence,  when  Soult  knew  that  the  Spaniards  were  cer- 
tainly encamped  at  Santa  Cruz,  he  caused  the  fifth 
corps,  then  in  march  for  Madrid,  to  move  during  the 
night  cf  the  17th  upon  Aranjuiez,  and  the  fourth  corps 
received  a  like  order.  The  king,  himself,  quitting  Ma- 
drid, arrived  there  on  the  evening  of  the  18th,  with  the 
Royal  French  Guards,  two  Spanish  battalions  of  the 
line,  and  a  brigade  of  Dessolle's  division  which  had 
just  arrived  ;  in  all  about  ten  thousand  men.  The  same 
day  the  duke  of  Belluno  concentrated  the  first  corps  at 
Villarejo  de  Salvanes,  intending  to  cross  the  Tagus  at 
Villa  Maurique,  and  attack  the  Spanish  position  on  the 
19th. 

A  pontoon  train,  previously  prepared  at  Madrid,  en- 
abled the  French  to  repair  the  broken  bridges,  near 
Aranjuez,  in  two  hours;  and  about  one  o'clock  on  the 
18th,  a  division  of  cavalry,  two  divisions  of  iufanlrv  of 
the  fourth  corps,  and  the  advanced  guard  of  the  fifth 
corps,  passed  the  Tagus,  part  at  the  bridge  of  La  \hy- 
na,  and  part  at  a  ford.  (Jeneral  Milhaud  with  the  lead- 
ing squadrons,  immediately  pursued  a  small  body  of 
Spanish  horsemen,  and  was  thus  led  to  the  table-land, 
between  Antignelaand  Ocaua,  where  he  suddenly  can;e 
upon  a  front  of  fifteen  hundred  cavalry  supported  by 
three  thousand  more  in  reserve.  Having  only  twelve 
hundred  dragoons,  he  prepared  to  retire,  hut  at  that  mo- 
ment general  Paris  arrived  with  another  brigade,  and 
was  immediately  followed  by  the  light  cavalry  of  the 
fifth  corps  ;  the  whole  making  a  reinforcement  of  about 
two  thousand  men.  \\  ith  these  troops  Sebastiani 
came  in  person,  and  took  the  command  at  the  instant 
when  the  Spaniards,  seeing  the  inferiority  of  the  French 
were  advancing  to  the  charge. 

CAVALRY  COMBAT  AT  OCANA. 

The  Spaniards  ca:rie  on  at  a  trot,  and  Sebastian!  di- 
rected Paris,  with  a  regiment  of  light  cavalr}'  and  the 
Polish  lancers,  to  turn  and  fall  upon  the  right  flank  cf 
the  approaching  squadrons,  which  being  executed  with 
great  vigour,  especially  by  the  PoU-s,  caused  conside- 
rable confusion,  which  the  Spanish  general  endeavour- 
ed to  remedy  by  closing  to  the  assailed  flank.  But  lo 
effect  this  he  formed  his  left  centre  in  one  vast  colunn, 
whereupon  Sebastiani  charged  headlong  into  th.e  midst 
of  it  with  his  reserve,  and  the  enormous  mass  yielding 
to  the  shock,  got  into  confusion,  and  finally  gave  way. 
Many  were  slain,  several  hundred  wounded,  and  eioh- 
ty  troopers  and  above  five  hundred  horses  were  taken. 
The  loss  of  the  French  bore  no  proportion  in  men,  but 
general  Paris  was  killed,  and  several  superior  ofllcers 
were  wounded. 

This  unexpected  encounter  with  such  a  force  of  cav- 
alry, led  Soult  to  believe  that  the  Sjiariish  general, 
aware  of  his  error,  was  endeavouring  to  recover  his  line 
of  operations.  The  examination  of  the  prisoners  con- 
firmed this  opinion,  and  in  the  night,  information  from 
the  duke  of  Belluno  and  the  reports  of  officers  sent  to- 
wards Villa  Maurique  arrived,  all  agreeing  that  only  a 
rear-guard  was  to  be  seen  at  Santa  C'ruz  de  la  Zarza. 
It  then  became  clear  that  the  Spaniards  were  on  the 
march,  and  that  a  battle  could  he  fought  the  next  day. 
In  fact  Areizaga  had  retraced  his  steps  by  a  flank  move- 
ment throufrh  Villa  Rubia  and  NobUjas,  with  the  in- 
tention of  falling  upon  the  king's  forces  as  they  opened 
out  from  Aranjuez.  He  arrived  on  the  morning  of  the 
19lh  at  Ocajiia,  but  judging  from  the  cavalry  action,  tbui 


180f).] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


249 


the.  French  couUi  attack  first,  drew  up  his  whole  army 
on  the  same  piain,  in  two  lines,  a  quarter  of  a  mile 
asunder. 

Ocr.fia  is  covered  on  the  north  hy  a  ravine,  which  com- 
mencinjT  apntly  half  a  mile  eastward  of  the  town,  runs 
deepenintr  and  with  a  curve,  to  the  west,  and  finally 
connects  itself  with  gullies  and  hollows,  Avhose  waters 
run  ( ff  to  the  Tafjus.  Behind  the  deepest  part  of  this 
ravine  the  Spanish  left  was  posted,  crossin<T  the  main 
raad  from  Aranjnez  to  Dos  Barrios  ;  one  flank  rested  on 
the  g-ullies,  the  other  on  OcaiHa.  'I'he  cei.lre  was  in 
front  of  the  town,  which  was  occupied  by  some  infan- 
try as  a  pi^st  of  reserve,  but  the  right  wing  stretched  in 
the  direction  of  Noblejas  along  the  edge  of  a  gentle 
ridge /?!/r6'7?/ of  the  shallow  part  of  the  ravine.  The 
cavalry  was  on  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  right  wing.  Be- 
hind the  army  there  was  an  immense  plain,  hut 
closed  in  and  fringed  towards  Noblejas  with  rich  olive 
woods,  wliich  were  occupied  by  infantry  to  protect  the 
passatre  of  the  Spanish  baggage,  still  filing  by  the  road 
from  Zarza.     Such  were  Areizaga's  dispositions. 

Jo>eph  passed  the  night  of  the  18th  in  reorganising 
his  forces.  The  whole  of  the  cavalry,  consisting  of 
nine  regiments,  was  given  to  Sebastiani.  Four  divi- 
sions of  infantry,  with  the  exception  of  one  regiment 
leflat  Aranjuez  to  guard  the  bridge,  were  placed  under 
therrommaiid  of  Marshal  Mortier,  who  v.  as  also  empow- 
ered, if  nect-ssary,  to  direct  the  movements  of  the  cav- 
alry. The  artillery  was  coinmanded  by  general  Senar- 
mont.  The  Royal  Guards  remained  with  the  king,  and 
marshal  Soult  directed  the  whole  of  the  movements. 

Before  day-break,  on  the  lOlh,  the  monarch  marched 
with  the  intentiiin  of  falling  upon  the  Spaniards  wher- 
ever he  could  meet  with  them.  At  Antiguela  bis  troops 
quitting  the  high  road,  turned  to  their  left,  gained  the 
table-land  of  Ocaiia,  somewhat  beyond  the  centre  of  the 
Spanish  position,  and  discovered  Areizaga's  army  in 
order  of  battle.  The  French  cavalry  instantly  forming 
to  the  front,  covered  the  advance  of  the  infantry,  which 
drew  up  in  successive  lines  as  the  divisions  arrived  on 
the  plain.  The  vSpanish  out-pnsts  fell  back,  and  were 
followed  by  the  P^rench  skirmishers,  who  spread  along 
the  hostile  front  and  opened  a  sharp  fire. 

About  forty-five  thousand  Spanish  infantry,  seven 
thousand  cavalry,  and  sixty  pieces  of  artillery  were  in 
line.  The  French  force  was  only  twenty-four  thousand 
infantry,  five  thousand  sabres  and  lances,  and  fifty  guns, 
including  the  battery  of  the  Royal  Guard.  But  Arei- 
znga's  position  was  miserably  defective.  The  whole 
of  his  left  wing",  fifteen  thousand  strong,  was  paralyz- 
ed by  the  ravine ;  it  could  neither  attack  nor  be  attack- 
ed ;  the  centre  was  scarcely  better  situated,  and  the 
extremity  of  his  right  wing  was  uncovered,  save  by  the 
horsemen,  who  were,  although  superior  in  number, 
quite  dispirited  by  the  action  of  the  preceding  evening. 
These  circunistances  dictated  the  order  of  the  attack. 

BATTLE  OF  OCANA. 

At  ten  o'clock,  Sebastiani's  cavalry  gaining  ground 
to  his  left,  turned  the  Spanish  right.  General  Leval, 
with  two  divisions  of  infantry  in  columns  of  regiments, 
eachhavinga  bavtalion  displayed  in  front,  followed  the 
cavalry,  and  drove  general  Zayas  from  the  olive-woods. 
General  (iirard,  with  his  division  arranged  in  the  same 
manner  followed  Leval  in  second  line,  and  general  Des- 
solles  menaced  the  centre  with  one  portion  of  his  troops, 
while  another  portion  lined  the  edge  of  the  ravine  to 
support  the  skirmishers  and  awe  the  Spanish  left  wing. 
The  king  remained  in  reserve  with  liis  gtiards.  Thus 
the  P'rench  order  of  battle  was  in  two  columns;  the 
principal  one  flanked  hy  the  cavalry,  directed  against 
and  turning  the  Spanish  right,  the  second  keeping  the 
Spanish  centre  in  check,  and  each  being  supported  by 
reserves. 

These  dispositions  w<re  completed  at  eleven  o'clock, 


at  which  hour,  Senarm.ont,  massing  thirty  pieces  of 
artillery,  opened  a  shattering  fire  on  Areizaga's  centre. 
Six  guns,  detached  to  the  rigiit,  played  at  the  same 
time  across  the  ravine  against  the  left,  and  six  others 
swept  down  the  de(  p  hollow,  to  clear  it  of  the  light 
troops.  The  Spaniards  were  undisciplined  and  badly 
commanded,  hut  discovered  no  appearance  of  fear; 
llieir  cries  were  loud  and  strong,  their  skirmishing  fiie 
brisk,  and,  from  the  centre  of  their  line,  sixteen  guns 
opened  with  a  murderous  effect  upon  Leval's  and  Gi- 
rard's  columns,  as  the  latter  were  pressing  en  towards 
the  right.  To  mitigate  the  fire  of  this  battery,  a  French 
battalion,  rushing  cut  at  full  speed,  seized  a  fm.all  emi- 
nence close  to  the  Spanish  guns,  and  a  counter  battery 
was  immediately  planted  there.  Then  the  Spaniards 
gave  back,  their  skirmishers  were  swept  out  of  the 
ravine  by  a  flanking  fire  of  grape,  and  Senarmont  im- 
mediately drawing  the  artillery  from  the  French  right, 
took  Ocafia  as  his  pivot,  and  prolonging  his  fire  to  the 
left,  raked  Areizaga's  right  wing  in  its  whole  length. 

During  this  cannonade,  Leval,  constantly  pressing 
forward,  obliged  the  Spaniards  to  change  their  front, 
by  \^•ith(lrawing  the  right  wing  behind  tlie  shallow  ]}art 
of  the  ravine,  which,  as  1  have  before  said,  was  in  its 
rear  when  the  action  commenced.  By  this  change,  the 
whole  army,  still  drawn  up  in  two  lines,  at  the  distance 
of  a  quarter  of  a  mile  asunder,  was  pressed  into  some- 
what of  a  convex  form  with  the  town  of  Ocaiia  in  the 
centre,  and  hence  Senarmont's  artillery  tore  their  ranks 
with  a  greater  destruciion  than  before.  Nevertheless, 
encouraged  by  observing  the  comparativel}^  feeble  body 
of  infantry  approaching  them,  the  Spaniards  suddenly  re- 
took the  offensive,  and  their  fire,  redoubling,  dismounted 
two  French  guns  ;  Mortier  himself  was  wounded  slight- 
ly, Leval  severely,  the  line  advanced,  and  the  leading 
French  divisions  wavered  and  gave  back. 

The  moment  was  critical,  and  the  duke  of  Treviso 
lost  no  time  in  exhortations  to  Leval's  troops,  hut,  like 
a  great  commander,  instantly  brought  up  Girard's  di- 
vision through  the  intervals  of  the  first  line,  and  dis- 
played a  front  of  fresh  troops,  keeping  one  regiment 
in  square  on  the  left  flank  ;  for  he  expected  that  Arei- 
zaga's powerful  cavalry,  which  still  remained  in  the 
plain,  would  charge  for  the  victory.  Girard's  fire  soon 
threw  the  Spanish  first  line  into  disorder,  and  mean- 
while, Dessolles,  who  had  gained  ground  by  an  ob- 
lique moveinent,  seeing  the  enemy's  right  thus  shaken, 
seized  Ocaiia  itself,  and  issued  forth  on  the  other  side. 
The  light  cavalry  of  the  king's  guard,  followed  by  the 
infantry,  then  poured  through  the  town,  and  on  the  ex- 
treme left,  Sebastiani,  with  a  rai)id  charge,  cut  off  six 
thousand  infantry,  and  obliged  them  to  se.rrender.  The 
Spanish  cavalry,  which  had  only  suffered  a  little  from 
the  cannonade,  and  had  never  made  an  effort  to  turn 
the  tide  of  battle,  now  drew  off  entirely,  and  the  second 
line  of  infantry  gave  ground  as  the  front  fell  back  upon 
it  in  confusion  ;  Areizaga,  confounded  and  bewildered, 
ordered  the  left  wing,  which  had  scarcely  fired  a  shot, 
to  retreat,  and  then  quilted  the  field  himself. 

For  half  an  hour  after  this,  the  superior  officers  who 
remained,  endeavoured  to  keep  the  troops  together  in 
the  plain,  and  strove  to  reach  the  main  road  leac'ing  to 
Dos  Barrios;  but  Girard  and  Dessolles'  divisions  be- 
ing connected  after  passing  Ocafia,  pressed  on  with 
steady  rapidity,  while  the  Polish  lancers  and  a  regi- 
ment of  chasseurs,  outflanking  the  Spar.ish  right,  con- 
tinually increased  the  confusion  :  finally,  Sebastiani, 
after  securing  his  prisoners,  came  up  again  like  a 
whirlwind,  and  charged  full  in  the  front  with  five  regi- 
nients  of  cavalry.  Then  the  whole  mass  broke,  and 
fled  each  man  for  himself  across  the  plain  ;  but,  on  the 
right  of  the  routed  multitude,  a  deep  ravine  leading 
from  Yepes  to  Dos  Barrios,  in  an  oblique  direction, 
continually  contracted  the  space,  and  the  pursuing  cav- 
alry arriving  first  at  Barrios,  headed  nearly  ten  thousand 


250 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


Book  IX. 


bewildered  men,  and  forced  them  to  surrender.  The 
remainder  turned  their  fnces  to  all  quarters,  and  such 
was  the  rout,  that  the  French  were  also  cblio-ed  to  dis- 
perse to  take  prisoners,  for,  to  iheir  credit,  no  rigforcus 
execution  was  inflicted,  and  hundreds,  merely  deprived 
of  their  arms,  were  desired,  in  raillery,  "  to  return  to 
their  homes,  and  abandrn  war  as  a  trade  ihf  y  were  un- 
fit for."  This  fatal  IxUtle  commenced  at  eleven  o'clock  ; 
before  two  thirty  p-eces  ot'  artillery,  a  hundred  and 
twenty  carriagrps,  twenty-five  stand  cf  colours,  three 
generals,  six  hundred  inferior  ollicers,  and  eighteen 
thousand  privates  were  taken,  aid  the  p\irsuit  was  still 
hot.  Seven  or  eipht  thousand  of  tlie  Spaniards  con- 
trived to  make  away  towards  the  mountain  ofTarancon, 
others  followed  the  various  routes  through  La  Mancha 
to  the  Sierra  Morena,  and  many  saved  themselves  in 
Valencia  and  Murcia. 

Meanwhile,  the  first  corps,  havinor  passed  theTagus 
by  a  ford,  re-established  the  bridge  at  Villa  Maurique 
before  ten  o'clcck  in  the  morning,  and  finding  Santa 
Cruz  de  la  Zarza  abandoned*,  followed  Areizaga's 
traces  ;  at  Villatobas,  the  light  cnralry  captured  twelve 
hundred  carriages,  and  a  little  farther  on,  took  a  thou- 
sand of  the  fup-jtives  who  were  making  for  Tarancon. 
The  duke  of  Belluno,  bpino-  thus  apprized  of  the  result 
of  the  battle,  halted  at  Villatobas,  but  sent  his  cavalry 
forward  to  La  Guardia,  where  they  joined  Sebastiani's 
horsemen,  and  the  whole  continuing  the  pursuit  to 
Lillo,  made  five  hundred  more  prisoners,  together  with 
three  hundred  horses.  This  finished  the  operations  of 
the  day,  only  eighteen  hundred  cannon-shot  had  been 
fired,  and  an  army  of  more  than  fifty  thousand  m.en  had 
been  ruined.  The  French  lost  seventeen  hundred  men, 
killed  and  wounded  ;  the  Spaniards  five  thousand,  and 
before  night-fall,  all  the  baggage  and  military  carriages, 
three  thousand  animals,  forty-five  pieces  of  artillery, 
thirty  thousand  muskets,  and  twenty-six  thousand  cap- 
tives were  in  the  hands  of  thi?  conquerors  !* 

Areizaga  reached  Tembleque  during  the  night,  and 
La  Carolina  the  third  day  after.  On  the  road,  he  met 
general  Benaz  with  a  thousand  dragoons  that  had  been 
detached  to  the  rear  before  the  battle  cr mmenced  ;  this 
body  he  directed  on  Madrilejos  to  cover  the  retreat  of 
the  fugitives,  but  so  strongly  did  the  panic  spread  ihat 
when  Scbastiani  approached  that  post  on  the  20th, 
Benaz's  men  fled,  without  seeing  an  enemy,  as  fearfully 
as  any  who  came  from  the  fight.  Even  so  late  as  the 
24th,  only  four  hundred  cavalry,  belonging  to  all  regi- 
ments, could  be  assembled  at  Manzanares ;  and  still 
fewer  at  La  Carolina.")" 


CHAPTER  VL 

King  Joseph's  return  to  Madrid — Del  Parqiie's  operations — 
Battle  o(  Alba  de  Tornies — Dispersion  of  the  Spanish  troops 
— Their  preat  sutTerings  and  patienre — Tlie  Supreme  Junta 
treat  sir  A.  VVeilr-sley's  rounsels  with  contempt — He  breaks 
up  from  the  Guadiana  and  moves  to  the  Mondego — Vindica- 
tion of  bis  ron'urt  (or  having  nniained  so  lonu  on  the  Gua- 
diana— French  remain  torpid  about  Madrid — Observations. 

Joseph  halted  at  Dos  Barrios,  the  night  of  the  battle, 
nnd  the  next  dav  directed  Sebastiani,  with  all  the  light 
cavalry  and  a  division  of  infantry,  upon  Madrilejos  and 
Consuerrra;  the  first  corps,  by  St.  Juan  de  Vilharta, 
upon  the  Sierra  Morena,  the  fifth  cor|)s,  by  Tembleque 
and  Mora,  upon  Toledo.  One  division  of  the  fourth 
corps  guarded  the  spoil  and  the  prisoners  at  Ocailia. 
A  second  division,  reinforced  with  a  brigade  of  cavalry, 
was  posted,  by  detachments,  from  Aranjuez  to  Con- 
Buegra.     The   monarch  himself,  with  his  guards  and 

*  S.  Journal  of  Operation?.  MSS.  Fetter  from  Lord  Wel- 
lin^^fon  to  I-ord  Liverpool.  Nov.  30.  18(0.    MSS. 

+  Letter  from  Lord  Wellington  to  Lord  Liverpool,  Nov.  30, 
1809.  MSS. 


DessoUes'  first  brigade,  returned  on  the  20th,  to  Ma« 
drid. 

Three  days  had  sufliced  to  dissipate  the  storm  on 
the  side  of  La  Manchn,  hut  the  duke  Del  Parqne  still 
menaced  the  sixth  corps  in  Castile,  and  the  reports 
from  'J'alavera  again  spoke  of  Albuquerque  and  the 
English  being  in  tnction.  The  second  brioade  of  Des- 
soles'  division  had  returned  from  Old  Castile  on  the 
lOth,  and  the  tincertaintj'  with  respect  to  the  British 
movements,  obliged  the  king  to  keep  all  bis  troops  in 
I'.and.  Nevertheless,  fearing  that,  if  Del  Parque  tr;\ined 
upon  the  sixth  corps,  he  might  raise  an  in.'-urrection  in 
Leon,  Gazan's  division  of  the  sixth  corps  was  sent, 
from  Toledo,  through  the  Puerto  Pico,  to  IMarchand's 
assistance,  and  Kellrrm.an  was  again  directed  to  take 
the  command  of  the  whole. 

During  these  events,  the  British  army  remained  tran- 
quil about  Padajcs  ;  but  Albuquerque,  ff;llcwing  his 
orders,  had  reachf  d  Peralada  de  Garbin,  and  seized  the 
bridge  of  Arzobispo,  in  expectation  cf  beingr  joined  by 
the  duke  Del  Parque.  That  general,  however,  who 
had  above  thirty  thousand  men,  thought,  when  Des- 
soUes' division  was  recalled  to  Madiid,  that  he  could 
crush  the  sixth  corps,  and,  therefore,  advanced  from 
Bt^jar  towards  Alba  de  Tormes  on  the  17tb,  two  days 
before  the  battle  of  Ocaila.  'i'luis,  when  Albuquerque 
expected  him  en  the  Tagus,  he  was  engaged  in  serious 
operations  beyond  the  Tormes,  and,  having  reached 
Alba  the  21st,  sent  a  division  to  take  possession  of 
Salamanca,  which  Marchand  had  again  abandoned. 
The  22d  he  marched  towards  Valladolid,  and  his  ad- 
vanced guard  and  cavalry  entered  Fresno  and  Carpio. 
Meanwhile  Kellerm.an,  collecting  all  the  trccps  of  his 
government,  and  being  joined  by  Marchand,  moved 
upon  Medina  del  Campo,  and  the  23d,  fell  with  a  body 
of  horse  upon  the  Spaniards  at  Fresno.  The  Spanish 
cavalry  fled  at  once,  but  the  infantry  stood  firm,  and 
repulsed  the  assailants. 

The  24th  the  duke  carried  his  whole  army  to  Fresno, 
intending  to  give  battle;  but  on  the  26ih  imperative 
orders  to  join  Albuquerque  having  reached  him,  he 
commenced  a  retrograde  movement.*  Kellerman,  with- 
out waiting  for  the  arrival  of  Gazan's  division,  instantly 
pursued,  and  his  advanced  guard  of  cavalry  overtook 
and  charged  the  Spanish  army  at  the  moment  when  a 
part  of  their  infantry  and  all  their  horse  had  passed  the 
bridge  of  Alba  de  Tormes;  being  repulsed,  the  F'reneh 
retired  upon  their  supports,  and  the  duke,  seeing  that 
an  action  was  inevitable,  brought  the  remainder  of  his 
troops,  with  the  exception  of  one  division,  back  to  the 
right  bank. 

BATTLE  OF  ALBA  DE  TORMES. 

Scarcely  was  the  line  formed,  when  Kellerman  came 
up  with  two  divisions  of  dragoons  and  some  artillery, 
and,  without  hesitating,  .sent  one  division  to  outflank 
the  Spanish  right,  and,  with  the  other,  charged  fiercely 
in  upon  the  front.  The  Spanish  horsemen,  flying  with- 
out a  blow,  rode  straight  over  the  bridge,  and  the  in- 
fantry of  the  right  being  thus  expo.sed,  were  broken 
and  sabred,  those  on  the  left  stood  fast  and  repulsed 
the  enemy.  'J'he  duke  rallied  his  cavalry  on  the  other 
side  of  the  river,  and  brought  them  back  to  the  fight, 
but  the  French  were  also  reinforced,  and  once  more  the 
Spanish  horse  fled  without  a  blow.  By  this  time  it 
was  dark,  and  the  infairtry  of  the  left  wing,  under  Men- 
dizabel  and  Carrera,  being  uidirokeu,  luade  good  their 
retreat  across  the  river,  yet  not  without  dilliculty,  and 
under  the  fire  oT  some  French  infantry,  which  arrived 
just  in  the  dusk.  During  the  night  the  duke  retreated 
upon  Tamames  unmolested,  but  at  day-break  when  a 
French  patrol  came  up  with  his  rear,  his  whole  army 
threw  away  their  arms  and  fled  outright.  Kellerman, 
having  meanwhile  entered  Salamanca,  did  not  pursue, 
yet  the  dispersion  was  complete. 

*  Lord  Wtlliujjton  to  Lord  Liverpool.    AiSS. 


180!>. 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


251 


After  this  ileft  .it,  Del  Parque  milled  his  army  in  the 
mountniii?  behind  Tamnmes,  and,  in  ten  orlwelve  days, 
aorain  collected  about  twenty  tliousand  men  ;  they  were 
however  without  artillery,  scarcely  any  had  preserved 
their  arais,  and  such  was  their  di.Uress  for  provisions, 
that  two  months  afterwards,  when  the  British  arrived 
on  the  northern  frontier,  the  peasantry  still  spoke  with 
horror  ol  tl^.e  sulTerinq;s  of  those  fanti'shed  soldiers. 
Many  actually  died  of  want,  and  every  viilaCTe  was 
filled  witli  sick.  Yet  the  mass  neither  dispersed  nor 
'murmured!  Spaniards,  though  hasty  in  revenfje  and 
feeble  in  battle,  are  patient,  to  the  last  degree,  in  suf- 
ferintj. 

'J'his  result  of  the  duke  Del  Parq\ie's  operation  had 
amply  justified  sir  Arthur  Wellesley's  advice  to  the 
Portu<Tuese  reo-euey.  In  like  manner  the  battle  of 
Oc  iia,  and  the  little  effect  produced  by  the  duke 
uf  Albuquerque's  advance  to  Arzohisno,  had  justified 
Ihat  wiiich  he  (jave  to  the  Central  Junta.  It  mi^ht 
therefore  be  imanfined  tiiat  the  latter  would  have  re- 
ceived his  after-counsels  with  deference;  but  the  course 
of  that  body  was  never  affected  by  either  reason  or  ex- 
perience. Just  before  the  rout  of  Alba  de  Tormes,  sir 
Arthur  Wellesley  proposed  that  ten  thousmd  men.  to 
be  taken  from  the  duke  Del  Parque,  should  reinfnrcc 
MiuquerqriP.  1hat  ihe.  lafier  miii;ht  mr/iniain  ihe  .sfrnin; 
positi'in  of  Meza  d'' Ibur.  and  cnver  E/tremndura  for  the 
win'er.*'  Meanwhile  Del  Parque's  force,  thus  reduced 
one- third,  could,  he  said,  be  more  easily  fed,  and  mi^ht 
kef^p  aloof  from  the  enemy  until  the  British  army  sliould 
arrive  on  the  northern  frontier  of  Portutjal,  a  movement 
long  projected,  and,  as  he  informed  them,  only  delayed 
to  pr  lied  Eslremadura  unlil  ihe  duke  Df^llbiirjuerrjiiehnd 
received  the  reinforcement.  The  only  reply  of  the  Junta 
was  an  order,  directincr  Ai'iuquerque  immediately  to  quit 
the  line  f  the  Tas^ns,  and  take  post  at  Llerena,  behind 
the  Gaadiana.  Tlius  abandoning  Estremadura  to  the 
enemy,  and  exposing  his  own  front  in  a  bad  position 
to  an  army  couiiug  from  Almarez.  and  his  right  flank 
and  rear  to  an  army  coming  from  La  IMancha. 

This  foolish  and  contemptuous  proceeding,  being 
followed  by  Del  Parque's  defeat,  which  endantjered 
Ciudad  Rodrigro.  sir  Arthur  at  once  commenced  his 
marcii  for  the  north.  He  knew  that  twenty  thousandi 
Spanish  infantry  and  six  thousand  mounted  cavalry 
were  again  collected  in  La  Carolina;  and  that  the 
troops  (eicrht  tliousand),  who  e-caped  from  Ocaiia,  on 
the  side  of  Tarancon,  were  at  Cuen^a,  under  general 
P^chevarria;  and  as  the  numbers  reassembled  in  the 
Moreua  were  (the  inactivity  of  the  French  after  the 
battle  of  Ocana  considered)  suflicient  to  defend  the 
T)asses  and  cover  Seville  for  the  moment,  there  was  no 
reason  why  the  British  army  should  remain  in  un- 
healthy positions  to  aid  people  who  would  not  aid 
themselves.  Albuquerque's  retrograde  movement  was 
probably  a  device  of  the  Junta  to  oblige  sir  Arthur  to 
undertake  the  defence  of  Estremadura,  but  it  only  has- 
tened his  departure.  It  did  not  comport  with  his  plans 
to  enirage  in  serious  operations  on  that  side,  yet  to  have 
retired  when  that  province  was  actually  attacked,  would 
have  been  disreputable,  wherefore,  seizing  this  unhap- 
pily favourable  moment  to  quitBadajos,  he  crossed  the 
Tagus,  and  marched  into  the  valley  of  the  Mondego, 
leaving  genera!  Hill,  with  a  mixed  force  of  ten  thou- 
sand men,  at  Abrantes. 

'I'he  CJuadiana  pestilence  had  been  so  fatal  that  many 
officers  blamed  him  for  stopping  so  long,  but  it  was  his 
last  hold  on  Spain,  and  the  safety  of  the  southern  pro- 
vinces was  involved  in  his  proceedings.  It  was  not 
his  battle  of  Talavera,  but  the  position  maintained  by 
him  on  the  frontier  of  Eslremadura,  which,  in  the  latter 
part  of  IRO!),  saved  Andalusia  from  subjection,  and  this 
is  easy  of  demonstration  ;  Joseph  having  rejected  Soult's 
project  against  Portugal,  dared  not  invade  Andalusia, 

*  Lord  Wellington  to  Lord  Liverpool,  Dec.  7.  1809,  MSS. 


by  Estremadura,  with  the  English  army  on  his  right 
fl.ink;  neither  could  he  hope  to  invade  it  by  the  way 
of  La  Mancha,  without  drawing  sir  Arthur  into  the 
contest.  But  .\ndalu-ia  was,  at  this  period,  the  last 
place  wh-re  the  intrusive  king  desired  to  meet  a  Brit- 
ish armv.  He  had  many  partisans  in  that  province, 
who  would  ner-essarily  be  overawed  if  the  course  of 
the  war  carried  sir  Arthur  beyond  the  Morena;  nor 
could  the  Junta,  in  that  case,  have  refused  Cadiz,  as  a 
place  of  arms,  to  their  ally.  Then  the  whole  force  of 
.Andalusia  and  Murcia  would  have  rallied  round  the 
English  army  behind  the  Morena;  and,  as  Areizaga 
had  sixty  thousand  men,  and  Albuquerque  ten  thou- 
sand, it  is  no  exatrgeration  to  assume  tliat  a  hundred 
thousand  conid  have  been  organized  for  defence,  and 
the  whf'le  of  the  troops,  in  the  south  of  Portugal,  would 
have  been  available  to  aid  in  the  protection  of  Estre- 
madura. Thus,  including  thirty  thousand  English, 
there  would  have  been  a  mass  of  at  least  one  hundred 
thousand  soldiers,  disposable  for  active  operations,  as- 
sembled in  the  Morena. 

From  La  Carolina  to  Madrid  is  only  ten  marches, 
and  while  posted  at  the  former,  the  allied  army  could 
have  protected  Lisbon  as  well  as  Seville,  because  a 
forward  movement  would  oblige  the  French  to  concen- 
trate round  the  Spanish  capital.  Andalusia  would  thu3 
have  become  the  principal  object  of  the  invaders;  but 
the  allied  armies,  holding  the  passes  of  the  .Morena, 
their  left  flank  protected  by  Estremadura  and  Portugal, 
their  right  by  Murcia  and  Valencia,  and  having  rich 
provinces  and  large  cities  behind  them,  and  a  free  com- 
munication with  the  sea,  and  abtindance  of  ports,  could 
have  fought  a  fair  field  for  Spain. 

It  was  a  perception  of  these  advantages  that  caused 
sir  John  Moore  to  regret  the  ministers  had  not  chosen 
the  southern  instead  of  the  northern  line  for  his  opera- 
tions.* Lord  Wellesley,  also,  impressed  with  the  im- 
portance of  Andalusia,  urged  his  brother  to  adopt  some 
plan  of  this  nature,  and  the  latter,  sensible  of  its  advan- 
tages, would  have  done  so,  but  for  the  impossibility  of 
dealing  with  the  Central  Junta.  Military  possession 
of  Cadiz  and  the  uncontrolled  command  of  a  Spanish 
force  were  the  only  conditions  upon  which  he  would 
undertake  the  defence  of  Andalusia,  conditions  they 
would  not  accede  to,  but  without  which,  he  could  not 
be  secured  against  the  caprices  of  men  whose  proceed- 
ings were  one  continued  struggle  against  reason.]"  This 
may  seem  inconsistent  with  a  former  assertion,  that 
Portugal  was  the  true  base  of  operations  for  the  Eng- 
lish, but  political  as  well  as  physical  resources,  and 
moral  considerations  weighed  in  that  argument. 

For  the  protection,  then,  of  Andalusia  and  Estrema- 
dura, during  a  dangerous  crisis  of  affairs,  sir  Arthur 
persisted,  at  such  an  enormous  sacrifice  of  men,  to  hold 
his  position  on  the  Guadiana,  yet  it  was  reluctantly, 
and  more  in  deference  to  his  brother's  wishes  than  his 
own  judgement,  that  he  remained  after  Areizaga's  army 
was  assembled.  Having  proved  the  Junta  by  expe- 
rience, he  was  more  clear-siglited,  as  to  their  perverse- 
ness,  than  lord  Wellesley,  who,  being  in  daily  inter- 
course with  the  members,  obliged  to  listen  to  their 
ready  eloquence  in  excuse  for  pa5t  errors,  and  more 
ready  promises  of  future  exertion,  clung  longer  to  the 
notions  that  Spain  could  be  put  in  the  right  jiatli,  and 
that  England  might  war  largely  in  conjunction  with 
the  united  nations  of  the  Peninsula,  instead  of  restrict- 
ing herself  to  the  comparatively  obscure  operation  of 
defending  l^isbon.  He  was  finally  undeceived,  and 
the  march  from  Badajos  for  ever  released  the  British 
general  from  a  vexatious  dependence  on  the  Spanish 
government. 

Meanwhile  the  French,  in  doubt  of  his  intentions, 
appeared  torpid.      Kellerman  remained  at  Salamanca, 

*   Sir  J.  Moore's  r.orrpspon'lence. 

t  Lord  Wclleslty  s  Conespoiidtiice,  Pari.  Papers,  1810. 


252 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  IX. 


watching  the  movements  of  the  duke  Del  Parque,  and 
Gazan  returned  to  Madrid.  Milhaud,  with  a  division 
of  liie  fourth  corps,  and  some  cavalry,  was  detached 
against  Echevarria,  but  on  iiis  arrival  at  Cuenc^a,  find- 
ing that  the  latter  had  retreated,  by  Toboado  to  Hellin 
in  Murcia,  ccmbined  his  operations  with  general  Su- 
chet,  and,  as  I  have  beibre  related,  assisted  to  reduce 
the  towns  of  Aiharacin  and  Teruel.  Other  movements 
there  were  none,  but,  as  the  Spani.'^h  regiments  of  the 
guard  had  fought  freely  against  their  countrymen,  and 
many  of  the  prisoners,  taken  at  Ooaira,  had  offered  to 
join  the  invaders' colours,  the  king  conceived  hopes  of 
raising  a  national  army.  French  writers  assert  that 
the  captives  at  Ocana  made  a  marked  distinction  be- 
tween Napoleon  and  Joseph.  They  were  willing  to 
serve  the  French  emperor,  but  not  the  intrusive  king  of 
Spjnn.  Spanish  authors  assujne  that  none  entered  the 
enemy's  ranks  save  by  coercion  and  to  escape  ;  and  that 
many  did  so  with  that  view,  and  were  successful,  must 
be  supposed,  or  the  numbers  said  to  have  reassembled 
in  the  Morena,  and  at  Cuen(,-a,  cannot  be  reconciled  with 
the  loss  sustained  in  the  action.  However  the  battles 
of  Ocaua  and  Alba  de  '['ormes  terminated  ihe  series  of 
offensive  operations,  which  the  Austrian  war,  and  the 
reappearance  of  a  British  army  in  the  Peninsula  had 
enabled  the  allies  to  adopt,  in  1809.  Those  operations 
had  bten  unsuccessful,  the  enemy  again  took  the  lead, 
and  the  fourth  epoch  of  the  war  commenced. 

OBSERVATIONS. 

1.  Although  certain  that  the  British  army  would  not 
co-operate  in  this  short  campaign,  the  Junta  openly  as- 
serted, that  it  would  join  Albuquerque  in  the  valley  of 
the  Tagus.  The  imjjrobability  of  Areizaga's  acting, 
without  such  assistance,  gave  currency  to  the  fiction, 
and  an  accredited  fiction  is,  in  war,  often  more  useful 
than  the  truth  ;  in  this,  therefore,  they  are  to  be  com- 
mended ;  but,  when  deceiving  their  own  general,  they 
permitted  Areizaga  to  act  under  the  impression  that  he 
would  be  so  assisted,  they  committed  not  an  error,  but 
an  enormous  crime.  Nor  was  the  general  much  less 
criminal  for  acting  upon  the  mere  assertion  that  other 
movements  were  combined  with  his,  v/hen  no  commu- 
nication, no  concerting  of  the  marches,  no  understand- 
ing with  t!ie  allied  commander,  as  to  their  mutual  re- 
sources and  intentions,  had  taken  i)lace. 

2.  A  rushing  wind,  a  blast  from  the  mountains,  tem- 
pestuous, momentary,  such  was  Areizaga's  movement 
on  Dos  Barrios,  and  assuredly  it  would  be  difficult  to 
find  its  parallel.  There  is  no  post  so  strong,  no  town  so 
g\iarded,  that,  b\'  a  fertunate  stroke,  may  not  be  carried  : 
but  who,  even  on  the  smallest  scale,  acts  on  this  prin- 
ciple, unless  aided  by  some  accidental  circumstance 
applicable  to  , the  moment'?  Areizaga  obeyed  the  or- 
ders of  his  government!  no  general  is  bound  to  obey 
orders  (at  least  without  remonstrance)  which  involve 
the  safety  of  his  army,  to  that  he  sb.ou'd  siurriiice  every- 
thing but  victory  ;  and  many  great  commanders  have 
sacrificed  even  victory,  rather  than  appear  to  under- 
value this  vital  principle. 

3.  At  Dos  Barrios  the  Spanish  general,  having  first 
met  with  opposition,  halted  for  three  days,  evidently 
without  a  plan,  and  ignorant  both  of  the  siiualion  of  the 
first  corps  on  his  left  flank,  and  of  the  real  force  in  iiis 
front,  yet  this  was  the  only  moment  in  which  he  could 
hope  fir  the  slightest  success.  If,  instead  of  a  feeble 
skirmish  of  cavalry,  he  had  borne  forward,  with  his 
whole  army,  en  tiie  llih,  Sebastiani  must  have  been 
over[)owerHil  and  driven  across  the  Tagus,  and  Areiza- 
ga, with  fifty  thousand  infantry  and  a  powerful  cavalry, 
wo'ild.  on  tiie  l-2i,h,  have  been  in  the  midst  of  the  sepa- 
rated French  corps,  for  their  movement  of  concentra- 
tion was  not  completely  effected  until  the  night  of  the 
14th.  But  such  a  stroke  was  not  for  an  undisciplined 
army,  and  this  was  another  reason  against  moving  from 


the  Morena  at  all.  seeing  that  the  calculated  chances 
were  all  against  Areizaga,  and  his  troops  not  such  as 
could  improve  accidental  advantages. 

4.  The  flank  march,  from  Dos  Barrios  to  Sanla  Crnz, 
although  intended  to  turn  the  French  left,  and  gain  Ma- 
drid, was  a  circuitous  route  of  at  least  a  hundred  miles, 
and,  as  there  were  three  rivers  to  cross,  namely,  the'l'a- 
gus,  theTajuua,  and  Henares,  only  great  rapidity  could 
give  a  chance  f)f  success  ;  yet  Areizaga  was  slow,  so 
late  as  the  15tli,  he  had  passed  the  Tagus  with  only 
two  divisions  of  infantry.  Meanwhile  the  French 
moving  on  the  inner  circle,  got  between  him  and  Ma- 
drid, and  the  moment  one  corps,  out  of  the  three  op- 
posed to  him,  ajijiroached,  he  recrossed  the  Tagus  and 
concentrated  again  on  the  strong  ground  of  Santa  Cruz 
de  la  Zarza.  The  king  by  the  way  of  Aranjuez  had, 
however,  already  cut  his  line  of  retreat,  and  then  Arei- 
zaga, who,  on  the  10th,  had  shrunk  from  an  action  with 
Sebastiani  when  the  latter  had  only  eight  thousand  men, 
sought  a  battle  on  the  same  giound  with  the  king, 
who  was  at  the  head  of  thirty  thousand,  the  first  corps 
being  also  in  full  march  upon  the  Spanisfi  traces  and 
distant  only  a  few  miles.  Mere  it  may  be  remarked 
that  Victor,  who  was  now  to  the  eastward  of  the  Spanr 
iards,  had  been  on  the  9ih  to  the  westward  at  Yevenes 
and  Mora,  having  moved  in  ten  days,  on  a  circle  cf  a 
hundred  and  fifty  miles,  completely  round  this  Spanish 
general,  who  pretended  to  treat  his  adversaries  as  if 
they  were  blind  men. 

5.  Baron  Crossand,  it  is  said,  urged  Areizaga  to  en- 
trench himself  in  the  mountains,  to  raise  the  peasantry, 
and  to  await  the  effect  of  Albuquerque's  and  Del  Par- 
que's  operations.  If  so,  his  military  ideas  do  not  seem 
of  a  higher  order  than  Areizaga's,  and  the  proposal  was 
hut  a  repetition  of  Mr.  Frere's  former  j)lan  for  Albu- 
querque ;  a  plan  founded  on  the  supposition,  that  the 
rich  plains  of  La  Mancha  were  rugged  mountains.  In 
taking  a  permanent  position  at  Santa  Cruz  or  Taran- 
con,  Areizaga  must  have  resigned  all  direct  communi- 
cation with  Andalusia,  and  opened  a  fresh  line  of  com- 
munication with  Valencia,  whi,9h  would  have  been  ex- 
posed to  the  third  corps  from  Aragon.  Yet  without 
examining  whether  either  the  Spanish  general  or  army 
were  capable  of  such  a  difficult  operation,  as  adopting 
an  accidental  line  of  operations,  the  advice,  if  given 
atall,  was  only  given  on  the  ISth,  and  on  the  lOih,  the 
first  corps,  the  fourth,  the  greatest  part  of  the  fifth,  the 
reserve  and  the  royal  guards,  forming  a  mass  of  more 
than  fifty  thousand  fighting  men,  would  have  taught 
Areizaga  that  men  and  not  mountains  decide  the  fate 
of  a  battle.  But  in  fact,  there  were  no  mountains  to 
hold  :  between  Zarza  and  the  borders  of  Valencia,  the 
whole  country  is  one  vast  plain,  and  on  the  ISth, 
there  was  only  the  alternative  of  fighting  the  weakest 
of  the  two  French  armies,  or  of  retreating  by  forced 
marches  through  La  Mancha.  The  former  was  chosen, 
Areizaga's  army  was  destroyed,  and  in  the  battle  he 
discovered  no  redeeming  quality.  His  position  was 
ill  chosen,  he  made  no  use  of  his  cavalry,  his  left  wing 
never  fired  a  shot,  and  when  the  men,  undismayed  by 
the  defeat  of  the  right,  demanded  to  be  led  into  action, 
he  commanded  a  retreat,  and  quitted  the  field  himself 
at  the  moment  when  his  presence  was  most  wanted. 

C.  The  combinations  of  the  French  were  methodi 
cal,  well  arranged,  effectual,  and  it  may  seem  mispla- 
ced, to  do  ought  but  cennmend  movements  so  eminent- 
ly successful;  yet  the  chances  of  war  are  manifold 
enough  to  justify  the  drawing  attention  to  some  pc  ints 
of  this  short  campaign.  Areizaga's  rush  from  the 
mountains  was  so  unexpected  and  rapid,  that  it  might 
well  make  his  adversaries  hesitate,  and  hence  perhaps 
the  reason  why  the  first  corps,  circled  round  the  Span- 
ish army,  and  was  singly  to  liave  attacked  the  latter 
in  front  at  Zarza,  on  the  19th,  whereas,  reinforced  with 
the  divisi  c  -.'  the  fourth  corps  from  Toledo,  it  might 


1809.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR, 


253 


have  fallpn  on  the  rear  and  flank  from  Mora  a  week  be- 
fore; that  this,  durini^  tlie  three  days  Areizap^a  remain- 
ed at  Dos  Barrios,  from  whence  Mora  is  only  four  hours 
march. 

7.  The  11th,  the  king  knew  the  English  army  had 
not  approached  the  valley  of  the  Tagus,  Areizaga  did 
not  quit  Dos  Barrios  until  the  13th,  and  he  remained 
at  Zarza  until  the  18th.  During  eight  days  therefore, 
the  Spanish  general  was  permitted  to  lead,  and  had  he 
been  a  man  of  real  enterprise  he  would  have  crushed 
the  troops  belween  Dos  Barrios  and  Aranjuez  on  the 
U)th  or  11th.  Indeed,  the  boldness  with  which  Sebas- 
tiaai  maintained  his  offensive  position  beyond  Aranjuez, 
fom  the  9lh  to  the  14th,  was  a  master-piece.  It  must, 
however,  be  acknowledged  that  Soult  could  not  at  once 
fix  a  general,  who  marched  fifty  thousand  men  about, 
like  a  patrole  of  cavalry,  without  the  slightest  regard 
to  his  adversary's  positions  or  his  own  line  of  opera- 
tions. 

8.  In  the  battle,  nothing  could  be  more  scientific  than 
the  mode  in  which  the  French  closed  upon  and  defeat- 
ed the  right  and  centre,  while  they  paralyzed  the  left 
of  the  Spaniards;  the  disparity  of  numbers  engaged, 
and  the  enormous  amount  of  prisoners,  artillery,  and 
other  trophies  of  victory  prove  it  to  have  been  a  fine  dis- 
play of  talent.  But  Andalusia  was  laid  prostrate  by 
this  sudden  destruction  of  her  troops !  why  then  was 
the  fruit  of  victory  neglected]  Did  the  king,  unable  to 
perceive  his  advantages,  control  the  higher  military  ge- 
nius of  his  advising  general?  or  was  he  distracted  by 
disputes  amongst  the  ditTerent  commanders'?  or,  did 
the  British  army  at  Badajos  alarm  him  ]  An  accurate 
knowledge  of  these  points  is  essential  in  estimating 
the  real  share  Spain  had  in  her  own  deliverance. 

9.  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley  absolutely  refused  to  co- 
operate in  this  short  and  violent  campaign.  He  remain- 
ed a  quiet  spectator  of  events  at  the  most  critical  period 
cf  the  war;  and  yet  on  paper  tha  Spanish  projects  pro- 
mised vi'ell.  Areizaga's  army  exceeded  fifty  thousand 
men,  Albuquerque's  ten  thousand,  and  thirty  thousand 
were  under  Del  Parque,  who,  at  Tamames  had  just 
overthrown  the  best  troops  in  the  French  army.  Villa 
Campa  aVso,  and  the  Partida  bands  on  the  side  of 
Cuenga  were  estimated  at  ten  thousand;  in  fine,  there  I 


were  a  hundred  thousand  Spanish  soldiers  ready.  The 
British  army  at  this  period,  although  much  reduced  b'<' 
sickness,  had  still  twenty  thousand  men  fit  to  bear 
arms,  and  the  l-'ortuguese  under  Beresford  were  neai 
thirty  thousand,  making  a  total  of  a  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  allies.  Thirty  thousand  t«  guard  the  passes 
of  the  Sierra  de  Gredos  and  watch  the  sixth  corps,  a 
hundred  and  twenty  thousand  to  attack  the  seventy 
thousand  French  covering  Madrid  !  Why,  then,  waa 
sir  Arthur  Wellesley,  who  only  four  months  before  so 
eagerly  undertook  a  like  enterprise  with  fcM'er  forces, 
now  absolutely  deaf  to  the  proposals  of  the  Junta? 
^'Because  moral  force  ?'.s  to  pfii/sical  force,  as  three  to  one 
in  rear.''''  He  had  proved  the  military  qualities  of 
Spaniards  and  French,  and  he  foresaw,  to  use  his  own 
expressions,  "  that  after  one  or  tivo  tiattlcs,  and  one  or 
two  hrillia'-it  actions  by  some,  and  defeats  sustained  by 
others,  all  would  have  to  retreat  a i^ain. ■''''*  yet  this  man, 
so  cautious,  so  sensible  of  the  enemy's  superiority,  waa 
laying  the  fotindation  of  measures  that  finally  carried 
him  triumphant  through  the  Peninsula.  False  then 
are  the  opinions  of  those,  who,  asserting  Napoleon 
might  have  been  driven  over  theEbroin  1808-9,  blame 
sir  .Tohn  Moore's  conduct.  Such  reasoners  would  as 
certainly  have  charged  the  ruin  of  Spain  on  sir  Arthur 
Wellesley,  if  at  this  period  the  chances  of  war  had  sent 
him  to  his  grave.  But  in  all  times  the  wise  and  brave 
man's  toil  has  been  the  sport  of  fools! 

Alba  deTormes  ended  the  great  military  transactions 
of  1809.  In  the  beginning,  Napoleon  broke  to  atoms 
and  dispersed  the  feeble  structure  of  the  Spanish  in- 
surrection, after  his  departure  the  invasion  stajjnated 
amidst  the  bickerings  of  his  lieutenants.  Sir  Arthur 
Wellesley  turned  the  war  back  upon  the  invaders  for 
a  moment,  but  the  jealousy  and  folly  of  his  ally  soon 
obliged  him  to  retire  to  Portugal.  The  Spaniards  then 
tried  their  single  strength,  and  were  trampled  u"der 
foot  at  Ocana,  and  notwithstanding  the  assistant  oi 
England,  the  oflcnsive  passed  entirely  from  their  haMs. 
In  the  next  book  we  shall  find  them  every  where  aci>ag 
on  the  defensive,  and  every  where  weak. 


Letter  to  lord  Liverpool   MS. 


BOOK   X. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Joseph  prepares  to  invade  Andalusia — Distracted  state  of  affairs 
in  that  province — Military  position  and  resources  described 
—  Invasion  of  Andalusia — Passes  of  the  Moreoa  forced  by  the 
French — Foolish  deceit  of  the  Supreme  Junta — Ttiniult  in 
Seviile — Supreme  Junta  dissolved — Junta  of  Seville  re-as- 
8enibles,  but  dispersed  immediately  after — The  P'rench  take 
Jaen — Sehastiani  enters  Grenada — Xing'  Joseph  enters  Cor- 
doba and  afterwards  inarches  aj^ainst  Seville — Albuquerque's 
march  to  Cadiz— Seville  surrenders — Insurrection  at  Malajja 
put  down  by  Sebastian! — Victor  invests  Cadiz — Faction  in 
that  citv — Morticr  marches  against  Badajus — The  \iscnnde 
de  Gand  flies  to  Ayamonte — Inhospitable  conduct  of  the 
bishop  of  Algarve. 

Napoleon,  victorious  in  Germany,  and  ready  to  turn 
his  undivided  strength  once  more  against  the  Peninsula, 
coinid'-iiiied  of  ihe  pa?t  inactivity  of  the  king,  and  Jc^eph 


prepared  to  commence  the  campaign  of  1810  with  vigour 
His  first  operations,  however,  indicated  great  infirmity 
of  purpose.  When  Del  Parque's  defeat  on  one  side 
and  Echevaria's  on  the  other  had  freed  his  flanks,  and 
while  the  British  army  Avas  still  at  Badajos,  he  sent 
the  fourth  corps  towards  Valencia,  but  inmiediately 
afterwards  re-called  it,  and  also  the  first  corps,  which, 
since  the  battle  of  Ocaiia,  had  been  at  Santa  (""ruz  de 
Mudela.  The  march  of  this  last  corps  through  La 
Mancha  had  been  marked  by  this  peculiarity,  that,  for 
the  first  lime  since  the  commencement  of  the  war,  the 
peasantry,  indignant  at  the  flight  of  the  soldiers,  guided 
the  pursuers  to  the  retreats  of  the  fugitives. 

Joseph's  vacillation  was  partly  occasioned  by  the 
insurrection  in  Navarre,  under  Rcnovalles  and  Mina; 
partly  bersuse  lord  V.'elliugtcn,   previous  to  quitting 


254 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  X. 


the  Giiadiana,  had  infcnupd  the  Junta  of  Badajos,  as  a 
matter  of  courtesy,  that  he  was  about  to  evacuate  their 
district,  and  liis  confidential  letter  being  published  in 
the  town  Gazette,  and  cstentatiously  copied  into  the 
Seville  papers,  made  Joseph  suspect  it  to  be  a  cloak  to 
some  ollensive  project.  However,  the  false  movements 
of  the  first  and  fourth  corps  distracted  the  Spaniards, 
and  emboldened  the  French  partizans,  who  were  ver}^ 
numerous  both  in  Valencia  and  Andalusia.  When  ihe 
troubles  in  Navarre  were  quieted  by  Suchet,  and  the 
distribution  of  the  British  army  in  the  valley  of  the 
Moiidego  known,  Joseph  seriously  prepared  for  the 
coruiuest  of  Andalusia.  This  enterprise,  less  difficult 
than  an  invasion  of  Portup;al,  promised  immediate  pecu- 
niary advantages,  which  was  no  sligiit  consideration 
to  a  sovereifrn  whose  ministers  were  reduced  to  want 
from  the  non-payment  of  their  salaries,  and  whose 
troops  were  thirteen  months  in  arrears  of  pay.  Napo- 
leon, a  rigid  stickler  for  the  Roman  maxim,  that  "war 
should  support  war,"  paid  only  the  corps  near  the 
frontiers  of  France,  and  rarely  recruited  the  military 
chest. 

Both  the  military  and  political  affairs  of  Andalusia 
were  now  at  the  lowest  ebb.  The  calm  produced  by 
the  promise  to  convoke  the  National  Cortes  had  been 
short-lived.  The  disaster  of  Ocana  revived  all  the 
passions  of  the  people,  and  afforded  the  old  Junta  of 
Seville,  the  council  of  Castile,  and  other  enem.ies 
of  the  Central  Junta,,  an  opportunity  to  pull  down  a 
governnsent  universally  obnoxious,  and  the  general  dis- 
content was  increased  by  the  measures  adopted  to  meet 
the  approaching  crisis.  The  marquis  of  Astorga  had 
been  succeeded  by  the  archbii^op  of  Laodicea,  under 
whose  presidency  the  Junta  published  a  manifesto,  as- 
suring the  people  that  there  was  no  danger, — that 
Areizaga  ciiuld  defend  the  Morena  against  the  whole 
power  of  France, — that  Albuquerque  would,  from  the 
side  of  Estremadura,  fall  upon  the  enemy's  rear, — and 
that  a  second  Baylen  might  be  expected.  But,  while 
thus  attempting  to  delude  the  public,  they  openly  sent 
property  to  C'adiz,  and  announced  that  they  would  trans- 
fer their  sittings  to  that  tow'n  on  the  1st  of  February. 
Meanwhile,  not  to  seem  inactive,  a  decree  was  issued 
for  a  levy  of  a  hundred  thousand  men.  and  for  a  forced 
loan  of  half  the  jewels,  plate,  and  money  belonging  to 
individuals;  sums  left  for  pious  purposes  were  also 
appropriated  to  the  service  of  the  state. 

To  weaken  their  adversaries,  the  Junta  offered  Ro- 
tnana  the  command  of  the  army  in  the  Morena  and  im- 
prisoned the  Conde  de  Montijo  and  Francisco  Palafox. 
The  marquis  of  Lazan,  accused  of  being  in  leaofue  with 
his  i)rother,  was  confined  in  Pensicola,  and  the  Conde 
de  Tilly,  detected  in  a  conspiracy  to  seize  the  public 
treasure  and  make  for  America,  was  thrown  into  a  dun- 
geon, where  it  is  believed  his  infamous  existence  ter- 
minated. The  celebrated  Padre  Gil  was  sent  on  a 
mission  to  Sicily.  While  on  liis  passage  he  told  an 
English  gentleman,  "  Tluy  have  sent  me  on  (his  embassy 
to  get  rid  af  niy  never  cea.-iinir  renunistrances  ;  and  I  have 
submitted  to  this  banishment  fur  fear  I  mii^ht  be  irot  rid 
of  in  aniithfr  ivay .'"  Romana  refused  to  serve,  and 
fclake,  recalled  from  ("ataloiiia.  was  appointed  to  com- 
mand the  troops  re-assembled  at  I, a  Carolina,  most  of 
the  other  generals  kept  aloof,  and  in  Gallicia  the  Conde 
de  Noronha,  resigning  his  command,  issued  a  mani- 
festo aga.iiist  the  Junta.  The  public  hatred  increased, 
and  the  paniz'.ns  of  Palafox  and  .Montijo,  certain  that 
the  people  would  i)e  against  the  government  under  any 
circumstances,  only  waited  for  a  favourable  moment  to 
commence  violence.  Andalusia  generally,  and  vSeville 
in  particular,  were  but  one  remove  from  anarchy,  when 
the  intrusive  monarch  reached  the  foot  of  the  Morena 
with  a  great  and  well  organized  army. 

The  military  preparation  of  the  Junta  was  in  har- 
mony  with   their   political   conduct.     The  decree  for 


levying  a  hundred  thousand  men,  issued  when  the 
enemy  was  but  a  few  marches  frcm  the  seat  of  govern- 
ment, was  followed  by  an  order  to  distribute  a  liundrt  d 
thousand  jjoinards,  as  if  assassination  W(  re  the  mode 
in  which  a  great  nation  could  or  ought  to  defend  itself, 
especially  when  the  regular  forces  at  the  disposal  of 
the  Junta,  were  still  numerous  enough,  if  well  directed, 
to  have  made  a  stout  resistance.  Areizaga  had  twenty- 
five  thousand  men  in  the  Morena;  Echevaria,  with 
eight  thousand,  was  close  by,  at  Hellin;  five  or  six 
thousand  were  spread  over  Andalusia,  anri  Albuquer- 
que had  fifteen  thousand  behind  the  Guadiana.  The 
troops  at  Carolina  were,  however,  dispirited  and  dis- 
organized. Blake  had  not  arrived,  and  Albuquerque, 
distracted  with  contradictory  orders  transmitted  almost 
daily  by  the  Junta,  could  contrive  no  reasonable  plan 
of  action,  until  the  movements  of  ihe  enemy  enabled 
him  to  disregard  all  instructions.  Thus,  airiidst  a 
whirlpool  of  passions,  intrigues,  and  absurdities,  An- 
dalusia, although  a  mighty  vessel,  and  containing  all 
the  means  of  safety,  was  destined  to  sink. 

This  great  province,  composed  of  four  kingdoms, 
namely,  Jaen  and  Cordoba  in  the  north,  Grenada  and 
Seville  in  the  south,  was  protected  on  the  riffht  by 
IMurcia  and  on  the  left  by  Portugal.  The  northern 
frontier  only  was  accessible  to  the  French,  who  could 
attack  it  either  by  La  Mancha  or  Estremadura;  but, 
between  those  provinces,  the  Toledo  and  Guadalupe 
mountains  forbad  all  military  communication  until  near 
the  Morena,  where,  abating  somewhat  of  their  surly 
grandeur,  they  leave  a  space  throush  which  troops 
could  move  from  one  province  to  the  other  in  a  direc- 
tion parallel  to  the  frontier  of  Andalusia. 

Towards  La  Mancha.  the  Morena  was  so  savage  that 
only  the  royal  road  to  Seville  was  practicable  for  artil- 
ler}'.  This  road  entering  the  hills,  a  little  in  advance  of 
Santa  Cruz  de  Mudela,  at  a  pass  of  wonderful  strength, 
called  the  Despenas  Perros,  led  by  La  Carolina  and 
Baylen  to  Andujar.  On  the  right,  indeed,  another  route 
passed  through  the  Puerto  del  Rey,  but  fell  into  the 
first  at  Navas  Toloza,  a  little  beyond  the  Despenas 
Perros,  and  there  were  other  passes  also,  but  all  fall- 
ing again  into  the  main  road,  before  reaching. La  Caro- 
lina, Santa  ('ruz  de  Mudela  was  therefore  a  position 
menacing  the  principal  passes  of  the  Morena  f^rom  La 
Mancha. 

To  the  eastward  of  Santa  Cruz  the  town  ofVilld 
Nueva  de  los  Infantes  presented  a  second  point  of  con- 
centration for  the  invaders.  From  thence  roads,  prac- 
ticable for  cavalry  and  infantry,  penetrated  thehillsby 
La  Venia  Quemada  and  the  Puerto  de  San  Estehan, 
conducting  to  Baeza,  Ubeda,  and  Jaen. 

In  like  manner,  on  the  westward  of  Santa  C^ruz,  roads 
or,  rather,  paths,  penetrated  into  the  kingdoms  of  Cor- 
doba. One,  entering  the  mountains,  by  Fuen  Calien- 
te,  led  upon  Montoro;  a  second,  called  the  La  Plata, 
passed  by  La  Conquisla  to  Adamuz,  and  it  is  just  be- 
)'ond  these  roads  that  the  ridges,  separating  La  .Man- 
cha from  Estremadura,  begin  to  soften  down,  permit- 
ting military  ingress  to  the  latter,  by  the  passes  of  Mo- 
chuello,  Almaden  de  Azogues,  and  Agudo. 

If  entering  Estremadura  by  these  passes  an  army 
should  then  invade  Andalusia,  the  Alorena  must  stili 
be  passed,  and  the  only  military  communications  be- 
tween those  provinces  were  by  three  great  roads,  name- 
ly, one  from  Medellin  and  Llerena  to  Guadalcanal ; 
another  from  Badajos  to  Seville,  by  the  defiles  of  Mo- 
naslerio  and  Ronquillo;  a  third  by  Xores  de  los  ('abal- 
leros,  Fregenal,and  Aracena.  From  Almaden,  there 
was  also  a  way,  through  Belalcazar,  to  Guadalcanal; 
but  all  these  routes,  except  that  of  Araceiia,  whether 
from  La  Mancha  or  Estremadura,  after  crossing  the 
mountains  led  into  the  valley  of  theG'uadalquivir,  a  river 
whose  waters,  drawn  from  a  multitude  of  sources,  at 
first  roll  westward,  washing  the  foot  of  the  Morena  «a 


1810.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


25*5 


far  as  the  city  of  Cordoba,  then,  bending  graduallj-  to- 
wards the  south,  flow  by  Sevilh;,  and  are  finally  lost 
in  the  Atlantic. 

To  defend  the  passage  of  the  Morena,  Arelzaga  posted 
his  right  in  tiie  defiles  of  San  Esteban  and  Montizon, 
covering  the  city  of  Jaen,  the  old  walls  of  which  were 
armed.  His  left  occupied  the  passes  of  Fuen  Caliente 
and  Mocliuello,  covering  Cordoba.  Hiscentre  was  es- 
tablislied  at  La  Carolina  and  in  the  defiles  of  the  Des- 
penas  Perros  and  Puerto  del  Rey,  which  was  entrench- 
ed, but  with  so  little  skill  and  labour  as  to  excite  the 
ridicule  rather  than  the  circumspection  of  the  enemy. 
And  here  it  may  be  well  to  notice  an  error  relative  to 
the  strength  of  mountain-defiles,  common  enough  even 
amongst  men  who,  with  some  experience,  have  taken 
a  contracted  view  of  their  profession. 

From  sucii  persons  it  is  usual  to  hear  of  narrow  pas- 
ses, in  whicli  the  greatest  multitudes  may  be  resisted. 
Now,  without,  slopping  to  prove  that  local  strength  is 
nothing,  if  the  flanks  can  be  turned  by  other  roads,  we 
may  be  cortain  that  there  are  few  positions  so  difficult 
as  to  render  superior  nu>nbersof  no  avail.  \\  here  one 
man  can  climb  another  can,  and  a  good  and  numerous 
infantry,  crowning  the  acclivities  on  the  right  and  left 
of  a  disputed  pass,  will  soon  oblige  the  defenders  to  re- 
treat, or  to  fight  upon  equal  terms.  If  this  takes  place 
at  any  point  of  an  extended  front  of  defiles,  such  as 
'hose  of  the  Sierra  Morena,  the  dangerous  consequen- 
ces to  the  whole  of  the  beaten  army  are  obvious.  Hence 
such  passes  should  oi.ly  be  considered  as  fixed  points, 
around  which  an  army  should  operate  freely  in  defence 
of  more  exposed  positions,  for  defiles  are  doors,  the  keys 
of  wnicli  are  on  the  sumniits  of  the  hills  around  them. 
A  bridge  is  a  defile,  yet  troops  are  posted,  not  in  the 
middle,  but  behind  a  bridge,  to  defend  the  passage.  By 
extending  tliis  principle,  we  shall  draw  the  greatest  ad- 
vantages from  the  strength  of  mountain-passes.  The 
practice  of  some  great  generals  may,  indeed,  be  quoted 
against  this  opinion  ;  nevertheless,  it  seems  more  conso- 
nant to  the  true  principles  of  war  to  place  detachments 
m  defiles,  and  keep  the  main  body  in  some  central 
point  beliind,  ready  to  fall  on  the  heads  of  the  enemy's 
columiis  as  they  issue  from  the  gorges  of  the  hills. 

Pierced  by  many  roads,  and  defended  by  feeble  dis- 
pirited troops,  the  Morena  presented  no  great  obstacle 
to  the  French  ;  but,  as  they  came  up  against  it  by  the 
way  of  La  Mancha  only,  there  were  means  to  render 
their  passage  difficult.  If  Albuquerque,  placing  his  ar- 
ni)'  eillier  at  Almaden  de  Azogues,  or  Agudo,  had  ope- 
rated against  their  right  flank,  he  must  have  been  beat- 
en, or  masked  by  a  strong  detachment,  before  Areiza- 
ga  could  have  been  safely  attacked. 

Nor  was  Andalusia  itself  deficient  of  interior  local 
resources  for  an  obstinate  defence.  Parallel  to  the  Mo- 
rena, and  at  the  distance  of  about  a  hundred  miles,  the 
Sierra  Nevada,  the  Apulxaras,  and  the  Sierra  Ronda, 
extend  from  the  borders  of  Murcia  to  Gibraltar,  cut- 
ting off  a  narrow  tract  of  country  along  the  coast  of 
the  Mediterranean,  while  the  intermediate  space  be- 
tween these  sierras  and  the  Morena  is  broken  by  less 
extensive  ridges,  forming  valleys  which,  gradually  des- 
ceufling  and  widening,  are  finally  lost  in  the  open  coun- 
try about  Seville.  Andalusia  may  therefore  be  consi- 
dered as  presenting  three  grand  divisions  of  country  : — 
1.  The  upper,  or  rugged,  between  the  Sierra  Morena 
and  the  Sierra  Nevada.  2.  The  lower,  or  open  coun- 
try, about  Seville.  3.  The  coast-tract  between  the  Ne- 
vada and  Ronda,  and  the  Mediterranean.  This  last 
is  studdeil,  in  its  whole  length,  with  sea-port  towns  and 
castles,  such  as  Malaga,  Velez-Malaga.  Motril,  Ardra, 
Marbella,  Estipona,  and  an  infinity  of  smaller  places. 

No  important  line  of  defence  is  offered  by  the  Gua- 
dalquivir. An  army,  after  passing  the  Mortma,  would 
follow  the  course  of  its  waters  to  gain  the  lower  parts 
of  Andalusia,  acd,  thus  descending,  the  advantage  of 


position  Avould  be  with  the  invaders.  But,  to  reach 
the  Mediterranean  roast,  not  only  the  ridges  of  the  Ne- 
vada or  Ronda  mu»t  be  crossed,  but  inosi  of  the  minor 
parallel  ridges  enclosing  the  valleys,  whose  waters  run 
towards  the  Atlantic.  Now  all  those  valleys  contain 
great  towns,  such  as  Jaen  and  Cordoba,  Ubeda,  Cire- 
nada,  and  Alcala  Real,  most  of  which,  f  rn.erly  forti- 
fied, and  still  retaining  their  ancient  walls,  were  ca})a- 
ble  of  defence ;  wherefore  the  enemy  could  nci  have 
approached  the  Mediterranean,  nor  Grenada,  nor  the 
lower  country  abciit  Seville,  without  first  taking  .Taen, 
or  Cordoba,  or  both.  The  difficulty  of  besieging  thos« 
places,  while  a  Spanish  army  was  stationed  at  Alcala 
Real,  or  Ecija,  while  the  mountains,  on  both  flanks  and 
in  the  rear,  were  filled  with  insurgents,  and  while  Al 
buquerque  himg  upon  the  rear  at  Aimada,  is  ajiparent 
Pompey's  sons,  actiiig  upon  this  system,  nearly  bafl?le,t 
Caesar,  although  that  mighty  man  had  frier.ds  in  ti,.i 
province,  and,  with  his  accustomed  celerity,  fell  ui.'.>i 
his  youthful  adversaries  before  their  arrangements  wcie 
matured. 

But  in  this,  the  third  year  of  the  war,  the  Junta  were 
unprovided  with  any  plan  of  defence  beyond  the  mere 
occupation  of  the  passes  in  the  Morena.  Those,  once 
forced,  Seville  was  open,  and,  from  that  great  city,  the 
French  could  penetrate  into  all  parts  and  their  commu- 
nication with  Madrid  became  of  secondary  importance, 
because  Andalusia  abounded  in  the  materials  of  war, 
and  Seville,  the  capital  of  the  province,  and,  from  its 
political  pr  siiion,  the  mosi  important  town  in  Spain, 
was  furnished  with  arsenals,  cannon-foundeiies,  and  all 
establishments  necessary  to  a  great  military  power. 

INVASION    OF    ANDALUSIA. 

The  number  of  fighting-men  destined  for  this  enter- 
prise was  about  sixty-five  thousand.  Marshal  .Soult 
directed  the  movements,  but  the  king  was  disposed  to 
take  a  more  prominent  part,  in  the  military  arrange- 
ments than  a  due  regard  for  his  own  interest  would  jus- 
tify. To  cover  Madrid,  and  to  watch  the  British  ar- 
my, the  second  corps  was  posted  between  Talavera  and 
Toledo,  with  strong  detachments  pushed  into  the  val- 
ley of  the  Tagus ;  two  thousand  men,  drawn  from  the 
reserve,  garrisoned  the  capital  ;  as  many  were  in  Tole- 
do, and  two  battalions  occupied  minor  posts,  such  as 
Arganda  and  Guadalaxara.  Gazan's  division  was  re- 
called from  Castile,  Milhaud's  from  Aragon  ;  the  first, 
fourth,  and  fifth  corps,  the  king's  guards,  and  the  re- 
serve, increased  by  some  reinforcements  from  F'rance, 
were  directed  upon  Andalusia. 

During  the  early  part  of  January,  1810,  the  troops, 
by  easy  marches,  gained  the  foot  of  the  Morena,  and 
there  ^lilhaud's  division,  coming  by  the  way  of  Be- 
nillo,  rejoined  the  fourth  corps.  A  variety  of  menacing 
demonstrations,  being  then  made  along  the  front  of  the 
Spanish  line  of  defence,  between  the  14lh  and  17th, 
caused  Areizaga  to  abandon  his  advanced  positions  and 
confine  himself  to  the  passes  of  the  Morena;  on  the 
18th,  the  king  arrived  in  person  at  Santa  Cruz  de  Mu- 
dela,  and  the  whole  army  was  collected  in  three  distinct 
masses. 

In  the  centre,  the  artillery,  the  king's  guards,  the  re- 
serve, and  the  fifth  corps,  under  marshal  Mcrtier,  wera 
established  at  Santa  Cruz  and  Elviso,  close  to  the 
mouths  of  the  Despenas  Perros  and  the  Puerto  del  Rey. 

On  the  left,  Sebastiani,  with  the  fourth  corps,  occu- 
pied Villa  Nueva  de  los  Infantes,  and  pre|>ared  to 
penetrate,  by  Ventn  Quemada  and  Puerto  San  Fsteban, 
into  the  kingdom  of  Jaen. 

On  the  right,  the  duke  of  Belluno,  placing  a  detach- 
ment in  Agudo,  to  watch  Albuquerque,  occupied  Al- 
maden de  Azogues,  with  the  first  corps,  pushed  an  ad- 
vanced guard  into  the  pass  of  Mochuelo,  and  sent  pa- 
trols  through  Benalcazar  and  Hinojosa  towards  (Juadal- 
canal.  By  these  dispositions,  Areizagi's  line  of  defence 


258 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  X. 


in  the  Morena,  and  Albuquerque's  line  cf  retreat  from 
EstiTmailura,  were  alike  threatened. 

On  the  -JOth,  Sebasiiani,  after  a  slight  skirmish, 
forced  the  dff.ies  of  Estehan,  makintr  a  number  of  pris- 
oners ;  and  when  the  Spaniards  rallied  jehind  the 
Gu;idalen,  one  of  the  tributary  torrents  of  the  Guadal- 
quivir, he  ncrain  defeated  them,  and  advancing  into  the 
niains  of  Ubeda,  secured  the  bridges  over  the  Guadal- 
quivir. 

In  the  centre  Dessolles  carried  the  Puerto  del  Rey 
vill'.out  firing  a  shot,  and  G-nzan's  division  crowning 
the  heights  right  and  left  of  the  Despenas  Perros, 
turned  all  the  Spanish  works  in  that  pass,  which  was 
ebandor.ed.  Mortier,  with  the  main  body  and  the  ar- 
lilierv.  then  poured  through,  reached  La  Carolina  in 
the  night,  and  the  next  day  took  possession  of  And  n  jar, 
having  passed  in  triumph  over  the  fatal  field  of  Ba}'- 
len ;  more  fatal  to  the  Spaniards  than  to  the  French, 
for  the  foolish  pride  engendered  by  that  victory,  was 
one  of  the  principal  causes  of  their  subsequent  losses. 
Meanwhile  the  duke  of  Belluno  pushed  detachments 
to  Montoro,  Adamuz,  and  Pozzohlarico,  and  his  patrols 
appeared  clo?e  to  Cordoba.  Kis  and  Sebastiani's 
flanking  parties  communicated  also  with  the  fifth  corps 
at  Andujar,  and  thus,  in  two  days,  by  skilful  combina- 
tions upon  an  extent  of  fifty  miles,  the  lofty  barrier  of 
the  .Morena  was  forced,  and  Andalusia  beheld  the 
French  masses  portentously  gathered  on  the  interior 
slopes  of  the  mountains. 

In  Seville  all  was  anarchy  :  Palafox  and  Montijo's 
partizans  were  secretly  preparing  to  strike,  and  the 
Ancient  Junta  openly  discovered  a  resolution  to  resume 
their  former  power.  The  timid,  and  those  who  had 
portable  property,  endeavoured  to  remove  to  Cadiz,  but 
the  populace  opposed  this,  and  the  peasantry  came  into 
the  city  so  fast  that  above  a  hundred  thousand  persons 
were  within  the  walls,  and  the  streets  were  crowded 
with  multitudes  that,  scarcely  knowing  what  to  expect 
or  wish,  only  wanted  a  signal  to  break  out  into  vio- 
lence. The  Central  Junta,  fearing  alike,  the  enemy, 
and  their  ov.-n  people,  prepared  to  fly,  yet  faithful  to 
their  systtrm  vf  delusion,  while  their  packages  were 
actually  embarking  for  Cadiz,  assured  the  people  that 
the  enemy  had  indeed  forced  the  pass  of  Almaden, 
leading  from  La  Mancha  into  Estremadura,  but  that  no 
danger  could  thence  arise;  because  the  duke  Del 
Parqr.e  was  in  full  march  to  join  Albuquerque,  and 
those  generals  when  united  being  stronger  than  the 
enerny  would  fall  upon  his  flank,  while  Areizaga  would 
co-operate  from  the  Morena  and  gain  a  great  victory  ! 

It  was  on  the  20th  of  January,  and  at  the  very  mo- 
ment when  the  Morena  was  being  forced  at  all  points, 
that  this  deluding  address  was  published,  and  it  was 
not  until  the  day  after  that  the  Junta  despatched  orders 
for  the  dr.ke  Del  Parqne  (who  was  then  in  the  moun- 
tains beyond  Ciudad  l?odrigo)  to  efTect  that  junction 
with  Albuquerque  from  which  such  great  things  were 
expected  !  Del  Parque  received  the  despatch  on  the 
21th,  and  prepared  to  obey.  Albuquerque,  alive  to  all 
the  danger  of^  the  crisis,  had  left  general  Contreras  at 
Medellin  with  four  thousand  five  hundred  men,  destined 
to  form  a  garrison  for  I'adajos,  and  marched  himself  on 
the  22d,  with  about  nine  thousand,  towards  Agudo, 
intending  to  fall  upon  the  flank  of  the  first  corps;  he 
had  scarcely  commenced  his  movement,  when  he  learn- 
ed that  Agudo  and  Alniaden  were  occupied,  and  that 
ttie  French  patrols  were  already  at  Benalcazar  and  Hi- 
'.->'osa,,  within  one  march  of  his  own  line  of  retreat 
bjii.n  Seville.  In  thi-:  conjuncture,  sending  Contreras 
to  Hadajos,  and  his  own  artillery  through  the  defile 
of  Monasterio,  he  marched  with  his  infantry  to  Gua- 
dalcanal. During  the  movement,  lie  continued  to  re- 
ceive contradictory  and  absurd  orders  from  the  Junta, 
some  of  which,  he  disregarded,  and  others  he  could  not 
obey  ;  wherefore,  conforming  to  circumstances,  when 


the  Morena  was  forced,  he  descended  into  the  basin 
of  Seville,  crossed  the  Guadalquivir  a  few  leagues  from 
that  city,  at  the  ferry  of  Cantillana,  reached  Carmona 
on  the  24th,  and  immediately  puslied  with  his  cavalry 
for  Ecija  to  observe  the  enemy's  progress.  Meanwhile 
the  storm,  so  long  impending  over  the  Central  Junta, 
burst  at  Seville. 

Early  on  the  24th  a  great  tumult  arose.  Mobs  tra- 
versing all  the  quarters  of  the  city,  called  out.  seine  for 
the  deposition  of  the  Junta,  others  for  the  heads  of  the 
members.  Francisco  Pahifox  and  Montijo  were  re- 
leased, and  the  junta  of  Seville  being  re-eslab  ished 
by  acclamation,  the  Central  Junta,  committed  to  their 
hands  the  defence  of  Andalusia,  and  endeavoured  them- 
selves to  reach  Cadiz,  each  as  he  could  ;  yet  witli  the 
full  intention  of  reuniting  and  resuming  tlieir  authority. 
On  the  road  however,  some  of  them  were  cast  into 
prison  by  the  people,  some  were  like  to  be  slain  at 
Xerez,  and  the  Junta  of  Seville  had  no  intention  that 
the  Central  Junta  should  ever  revive.  Saavcdra,  the 
President  cf  the  former,  by  judicious  measures  calmed 
the  tumult  in  the  city,  restored  l^oniaiia  to  the  com- 
mand cf  his  old  army,  which  was  new  under  the  duke 
Del  Parque,  made  some  other  popular  appointments, 
and  in  conjunction  with  his  colleagues  sent  a  formal 
preposition  to  the  Junta  at  Badajos,  inviting  them  to 
take  into  consideration  the  necessity  of  constituting  a 
Regency,  which  was  readily  acceded  to.  The  events 
of  war  crowding  on,  overlaid  their  schemes.  Three 
days  after  the  flight  of  the  Central  Junta,  treason  and 
faction  being  busy  amongst  the  members  of  the  Seville 
Junta,  they  also  disbanded,  some  remained  in  the  town, 
others,  amongst  them  Saavedra,  repaired  to  Cadiz 
The  tumults  were  then  renewed  with  greater  vi(dence, 
and  Romana  was  called  upon  to  assume  the  command 
and  defend  the  city,  but  he  evaded  this  dangerous 
honour,  and  proceeded  to  Badajos. 

Thus  abandoned  to  themselves,  the  people  of  Seville 
elected  a  military  junta,  and  discovered  the  same  dis- 
position, as  the  people  of  other  towns  in  tiie  Peninsula 
had  done  upon  like  occasions.  If  men  like  the  Tiog 
of  Zaragoza,  had  then  assumed  command,  they  might 
have  left  a  memorable  tale  and  a  ruined  city,  but  there 
were  none  so  firm,  or  so  ferocious,  and  finally,  a  feel- 
ing of  helplessness  producing  fear  in  all,  Seville  was 
ready  to  submit  to  the  invaders. 

When  the  jiassage  of  the  mountains  was  completely 
effected,  the  French  corps  again  received  their  artil 
lery,  the  centre  and  right  wing  remained  stationary, 
and  a  detachment  of  the  first  corps,  which  had  ap- 
proached Cordoba,  returned  to  Montcro.  Areizaga 
rallied  his  troops  at  Jaen,  but  Sebastiani  inarching  from 
Ubeda,  drove  him  upon  Alcala  Real,  and  Jaen  surren- 
dered with  forty-six  guns  mounted  on  the  walls.  The 
Spanish  general  then  made  one  more  stand,  and  being 
again  beaten,  all  iiis  artillery  was  captured,  and  liis 
army  dispersed.  Five  thousand  infantry  asid  some 
squadrons  of  cavalry  throwing  away  tlicir  arms,  es- 
caped to  Gibraltar,  while  Areizaga  himself,  with  a 
remnant  of  horse,  flying  into  the  kingdom  of  Murcia, 
was  there  superseded  by  Hlake.  Meanwhile,  Sebas- 
tiani having  inarched  upon  Grenada,  entered  it  the  28th 
of  January,  and  was  received  with  apparent  joy,  so  en- 
tirely  had  th^  government  of  the  (Central  Junta  extin- 
guished the  former  enthusiasm  of  the  people. 

The  capture  of  Jaen  having  secured  the  left  flank  of 
the  French,  the  king  with  the  centre  and  rioht,  moved 
on  Cordoba  the  27th,  and  there  also,  as  at  Jaen  and 
Grenada,  the  invaders  were  received  without  any  mark 
of  aversion,*  and  thus  the  upper  country  was  conquered. 

*  Dupont's  Proceedings  at  Coi(lo!)n,  as  relatfd  in  my  first 
volume,  have  been  cotiiineiiti d  upon  in  a  recent  pubhcation, 
entitled  '^^Qrinals  of  the  Peninsular  Campaigns." 

Upon  the  authority  of  gcncr;:l  I'oy,   tlje  au'lior  asserts  that 


1810.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


257 


But  the  projects  of  Joseph  were  not  confined  to  Anda- 
lusia; he  had  opened  a  secret  communication  with  Va- 
lencia, where  his  partisans  undertook  to  raise  a  commo- 
tion whenever  a  French  force  sliould  appear  before  tiiat 
city;  hence,  judging  tliat  no  serious  opposition  would 
be  made  in  Andalusia,  he  directed  Sebastiani  to  cross 
the  Sierra  Nevada,  and  seize  the  Grenadan  coast,  an 
operation  that  would  enable  liim  with  greater  facility 
to  act  agfainst  Valencia.  To  ensure  the  success  cf  the 
latter  enterprise,  he  wrote  from  Cordoba  to  Suchet, 
urging  him  to  make  a  combined  movemeiit  from  Aragon, 
and  promising  a  powerful  detachment  from  Andalusia, 
to  meet  him  under  tlie  walls  of  Valencia.* 

Dessolles,  with  the  reserve,  occupied  Cordoba  and 
Jacn,  and  the  first  and  fifth  corps,  followed  by  the 
king's  guards,  proceeded  without  delay  towards  Ecija, 
where  it  will  be  remembered,  Albuquerque's  cavalry 
had  /een  posted  since  the  nii;ht  of  the  24th.  As  the 
French  a[)proached,  the  duke  fell  back  upon  Carmona, 
from  whence  he  could  retreat  either  to  Seville,  or  Cadiz, 
'he  way  to  the  latter  being  through  LUrera.  But  from 
Kcija  there  was  a  road'  through  Moron  to  Ulrera. 
shorter  than  that  leading  through  Carmona,  and  along 
this  road  the  cavalry  of  the'  first  corps  was  pushed  on 
the  27th.  Albuquerque  despairing  for  Seville,  resolved 
to  make  for  Cadiz,  and  lest  the  enemy  should  reach 
Utrera  before  him,  gained  that  town  wiUi  great  expe- 
dition, and  thence  moving  through  Lebrija  and  Xeres, 
by  long  marches,  journeying  day  and  night,  reached 
Cadiz  on  the  3d  of  February.  Some  French  cavalry 
overtook  and  skiririisbed  v\ith  his  rear  at  Utrera,  hut  he 
was  not  pursued  further,  save  by  scouting  parties;  for 
the  king  had  altered  the  original  plan  of  operations,  and 
ordt'red  the  first  corps  which  was  then  pushing  for 
Cadiz,  to  change  its  direction  and  march  by  Carmona 
against  Seville,  and  the  30th,  the  advanced  guard  came 
on  that  city. 

Some  entrenchments  and  batteries  had  been  raised 
for  defence,  the  mob  still  governing,  fired  upon  the 
bearer  of  the  first  French  summons,  and  annc'unced  in 
lofty  terms  a  resolution  to  fight,  and  besides  the  popu- 

Cordoba  was  .-larkecl,  chIIs  it  "  a  g'raiui'ous  nlroci'y,"  and  "an 
inhuman  bu'cliery,''  and  no  doubt,  taking  for  fiction  the  stories 
ot  Agathorli-s,  Marius,  Svlla,  and  a  thousand  others,  grav»i_v 
atSirnis,  that,  capacity  and  cruelly  are  rarely  itniled;  that  Du- 
pont  was  a  fool,  and  thai  JVapoleon  did  not  poison  liirn  in  a 
dung-eon,  but  that  he  must  have  "  dragged  on  a  miserable  ex- 
istence exposed  to  universal  acorn  and  haired." 

Unfortunately  for  the  application  of  this  nursery  philosophy, 
Dupont,  altliou;;h  a  bad  officer,  was  a  man  of  ackncwUdgLd 
talents,  and  became  minister  of  war  at  the  restoration  of  tiie 
Bourbons,  a  period  fixed  b)'  the  author  of  "  Ihe  Annals,"  as 
the  era  of  good  government  in  France. 

I  rrjectcd  Foy's  authority,  I'st,  because  his  work,  unSnislicd 
and  posthumous,  discoveretl  more  of  the  orator  than  the  im- 
partial historian,  and  he  was  politically  opposed  to  Dupont. 
Secondly,  because  he  was  not  an  eye-witness,  and  his  rtlation 
at  variance  with  the  "  official  journal  of  Dupont' s  operations;" 
was  also  contradicted  1)3"  the  testimony  of  a  British  geiteral 
of  known  lalcn^s  and  accuracy,  who  ohtained  his  ivjhrmation 
on  the  spot  ajeiv  months  subsequent  to  Ihe  event. 

"  Slime  tnue  after  the  victory,  order  icns  restored,  pillage 
was  forbidden  under  pain  of  de^ih,  and  the  chosen  companies 
niaitila.hicd  (he  police." — Journal  of  Opt  rations. 

Cordoba  tats  not  pillaged,  being  one  of  the  few  places 
where  the  French  v>ere  well  received.— he.\.\.cT%  from  a  British 
general  to  colonel  Napier. 

On  (his  point,  therefore,  I  am  clear;  but  the  author  of  the 
"  Hmials.  '  after  contrasting  my  account  with  Foy's,  thus  pro- 
teeds,  "It  is  only  necessary  to  add,  that  the  preceding  statt - 
rotnt  is  given  by  colonel  Napier  without  any  quoialion  ofau- 
tlwrity." 

A  less  concise  writer  might  have  thought  it  right  to  add  that, 
BIX  months  previous  to  the  publication  of  the  Jlniials,  colonfl 
Ii'apier,  hearing  that  some  of  his  statements  ap|«ared  incon- 
chisive  to  the  autbor  of  that  work,  because  there  teas  no  quota- 
tion nfaulhorily,  transmitter!  tlirough  a  nMitu:il  frientl,an  assu- 
rance that  he  harl  authority  for  every  s'alement,  and  that  he 
*'ould  willingly  y(.rn?'s/i  Ihe  author  with  any  or  all  of  Ih'm  : 
0"  !i'.i.cp  iv:is  tt';en  of  this  ofltr. 

*    SuclKt'b  ».itll)  J1I8. 

18 


lace,  there  were  about  seven  thniisnrid  troops,  iwin- 
pcsed  partly  of  fugitives  from  the  Morena,  partly  ot 
the  original  garrison  ff  the  town.  JNevertheless,  the 
city,  after  some  negotiation,  surrendered  on  the  31st, 
with  all  its  stores,  founderies,  and  arsenals  com])lete, 
and  on  the  1st  of  February  the  king  entered  in  triumph. 
The  lower  country  was  thus  conquered,  and  tb^re  re- 
mained only  Cadiz,  and  the  coast  tract  lying  bf'weeii 
the  Mediterranean  and  the  Sierra  de  Nevada  to  sub- 
due. 

The  first  corps  was  immediately  sent  against  Cadiz, 
the  fifth  ajrainst  Estremadura  ;  and  Sebastiani,  having 
placed  fifteen  hundred  men  in  the  Alhanibra,  and  in- 
cor[)orated  among  his  troops,  a  Swiss  battalion,  com- 
posed cf  those  who  had  abandoned  the  French  service 
in  the  battle  of  Baylen,  seized  Antequera.  He  was* 
desirous  to  establish  himself  firmly  in  those  parts  be- 
fore he  crossed  the  Nevada,  but  his  measures  were 
precipitated  by  unexpected  events.  At  Malaga,  the  peo- 
ple having  iinprisoned  the  members  of  the  local  Junta, 
were  headed  by  a  Capuchin  friar,  who  resolved  to  fight 
the  French,  and  collected  avast  multitude  armed  in  all 
manners  above  Antequera  and  Alhama,  where  the  road 
from  Grenada  enters  the  hills. 

As  this  insurrection  was  spreading,  not  only  in  the 
mountains,  but  through  the  plains  of  Grenada,  Sebas- 
tiani resolved  to  fall  on  at  once,  lest  the  Grenadans 
having  Gibraltar  on  the  one  flank,  Murcia  on  the  other, 
and  in  their  own  country,  many  sea-ports  and  fortified 
towns,  .should  orf^i'.nize  a  regular  system  of  resistance. 
\^  herefore,  after  a  slight  skirmish  at  Alhama,  he  pen- 
etrated the  hills,  driving  the  insurgents  upon  Malaga, 
near  which  place  they  rallied,  and  an  engagrmcnt, 
with  the  advanced  guard  of  the  French,  under  general 
Milhaud,  taking  place,  about  five  hundred  Spaniards 
fell,  and  the  conquerors  entered  the  town  fighting.  A 
few  of  the  vanquished  took  refuge  on  board  some  Eng- 
lish ships  of  war,  the  rest  submitted,  and  more  than  u 
hundred  pieces  of  heavy,  and  about*  twenty  jiieccs  ot" 
field  artillery  with  ammunition,  stores,  and  a  quantity 
of  British  merchandize,  became  the  spoil  of  the  con- 
querors. Velez-Malaga  opened  its  gates  the  next  day, 
Mctril  was  occupied,  and  thus  the  insurrection  way 
quelled,  for  in  every  other  part,  both  troops  and  peas- 
antry, were  terrified  and  submissive  to  the  last  degree.  * 

Meanwhile,  Victor  followed  the  traces  of  Albuquer- 
que with  such  diligence,  as  to  reach  Chiclana  on  the 
4th,  and  it  is  generally  supposed,  that  he  might  have 
rendered  himself  master  of  Leon,  for  the  defensive 
works  at  Cadiz,  and  the  Isla  were  in  no  way  improv- 
ed, but  rather  deteriorated  since  the  period  of  Sir 
George  Smith's  negotiation.  The  bridge  of  Zuazo 
was  indeed  broken,  and  the  canal  of  Santa  Petri  a  great 
obstacle ;  but  Albuquerque's  troops  were  harassed, 
dispirted,  ill  clothed,  badly  armed,  and  in  every  way 
inefficient;  the  people  of  Cadiz  were  apathetic,  an*^ 
the  authorities,  as  usual,  occupied  with  intrigues  and 
private  interests.  In  this  state,  eight  thousand  Spanish 
soldiers  could  scarcely  have  defended  a  line  of  ten 
miles  against  twenty-five  thousand  French,  if  a  suffi- 
cient number  of  boats  could  have  been  collected  to  cross 
the  canal. 

V'enegns  was  governor  of  Cadiz,  but  when  it  was 
known  that  the  Cetitral  Junta  had  been  deposed  at  Se- 
ville, a  Municipal  Junta,  chiefly  composed  of  mer- 
chants, was  elected  by  general  ballot.  This  body,  as 
inflated  and  ambitious  of  power  as  any  that  had  pre- 
ceded it,  would  not  sufTer  the  fugitive  members  of  the 
Central  Junta  to  assume  any  authority  ;  and  the  latter, 
maugre  their  extreme  reluctance,  were  obliged  to  sub- 
mil,  but,  by  the  advice  of  Jovellanos,  they  appoin- 
ted a  Regencv,  composed  of  men  not  taJvon  from 
amongst  themselves.  Although  the  Municipal  Junta 
vehemently  opposed  this  proceeding,  at  first,  the  judi- 


*  Genert;!  C;aiipbeirs  Corresj)on:'.ence  from  Gibraltar   RISS. 


258 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  X. 


ciovis  ihipM-prition  of  Mr.  Bartholomew  Frere  induced 
t^em  to  a<  i|iiiepce ;  and  on  thp  29tli  of  January,  the 
bishop  of  Orense,  gfpneral  Castafios,  Antonio  de  Escafio, 
Saavodra,  and  Fernandez  de  Leon,  were  appointed 
Regents,  until  the  Cortes  could  he  assembled,  Leon 
was  afterwards  replaced  by  one  Lardizabal,  a  native  of 
New  vSpain. 

The  council  of  Castile,  which  had  been  reinstated 
before  the  fall  of  Seville,  now  chartred  the  deposed 
Junta,  and  truly,  with  usurpation — the  public  voice 
added  peculation  and  other  crimes;  and  the  Reo^ency, 
which  they  had  themselves  appointed,  seized  their  pa- 
pers, sequestered  their  effects,  threw  some  of  the  mem- 
bers into  prison,  and  banished  others  to  the  provinces: 
thus  completely  e.xtinguishincr  this  at  once  odious,  ridi- 
culous, and  unfortunate  oliofarchy.  Amongst  the  per- 
sons composing  it.  there  were  undoubtedly  some  of  un- 
sullied honour  and  fine  talents,  ready  and  eloquent  of 
speech,  and  dexterous  in  argument;  but  it  is  not  in 
Spain  only,  that  men  possessing  all  the  "  grace  and 
ornament"  of  words,  have  proved  to  be  mean  and  con- 
temptible statesmen. 

Albuquerque,  elected  president  of  the  Municipal 
Junta,  and  commander  of  the  forces,  endeavoured  to 
place  the  Isla  de  Leon  in  a  state  to  resist  a  sudden  at- 
tack, and  the  French,  deceived  as  to  its  real  strength,  af- 
ter an  ineffectual  summons,  proceeded  to  gird  the 
whole  bay  with  works.  Meanwhile,  Marshal  Mortier, 
leaving  a  brigade  of  the  fifth  corps  at  Seville,  pursued 
a  body  of  fcur  thousand  men,  that,  under  the  com- 
mand of  the  Visconde  de  Gand,  had  retired  from  that 
town  towards  the  Morena ;  they  evaded  him,  and 
fled  to  Ayamonte.  yet  were  like  to  be  destroyed,  be- 
cause the  bishop  of  Algarve,  from  national  jealousy, 
would  not  suf!er  them  to  pass  the  Portuguese  frontier.* 
Mortier,  however,  disregarding  these  fugitives,  passed 
the  Morena,  bv  Ronquillos  and  Monaslerio,  and  march- 
'ng  against  Badajos,  summoned  it  the  12th  of  February, 
but  Contreras'  detachment  had  arrived  there  on  the 
26th  of  January,  and  Mortier,  finding,  contrary  to  his 
expectation,  that  the  place  was  in  a  state  of  defence, 
retired  to  Merida. 

This  terminated  the  first  series  of  operations  in  the 
fourth  epoch  of  the  war;  operations  which,  in  three 
weeks,  had  put  the  French  in  possession  of  Andalusia 
and  Southern  Esttemadura,  with  the  exception  of 
Gibraltar  and  ('adiz  in  the  one,  and  of  Badajoz,  Oli- 
venza,  and  Albuquerque  in  the  other  province.  Yet, 
great  as  were  the  results  of  this  memorable  irruption, 
more  might  have  been  obtained,  and  the  capture  of 
Cadiz  would  have  been  a  fatal  blow  to  the  Peninsula. 

From  Andujar  to  Seville  is  only  a  hundred  miles, 
yet  the  French  took  ten  days  to  traverse  that  space ;  a 
tardiness  for  which  there  appears  no  adequate  cause. 
The  king,  apparently  elated  at  the  acclamations  and 
seeming  cordiality  with  which  the  towns,  and  even 
villages,  greeted  him,  moved  slowly.  He  imagined 
that  Seville  would  open  her  gates  at  once  ;  and  think- 
ing that  the  possession  of  that  town,  would  produce  the 
greatest  moral  effect,  in  Andalusia,  and  all  over  Spain, 
changed  the  first  judicious  plan  of  campaign,  and 
marched  thither  in  preference  to  Cadiz.  The  moral 
influence  of  Seville,  was  however  transferred,  along 
with  the  government,  to  (.adiz,  and  Joseph  was  deceiv- 
ed in  his  expectations  of  entering  the  former  city  as  he 
had  entered  Cordoba.  When  he  discovered  his  error 
there  was  still  time  to  repair  it  by  a  rapid  pursuit  of 
Albuquerque,  but  fearino  to  leave  a  city  with  a  hun- 
dred thousand  people  in  a  state  of  excitement  upon  his 
flank,  he  resolved  to  reduce  Seville,  and  met  indeed 
with  no  formidable  resistance,  yet  so  much  of  opposi- 
tion, as  left  him  only  the  alternative  of  storming  the 
towr   or  entering    by   negotiation.     The  first  his  hu- 

»  Mr.  Smart's  Corn  aocidcnce.     MSS. 


manity  forbad  ;  the  latter  co?t  him  time,  which  was 
worth  his  crown,  for  Albuquerque's  proceedings  were 
only  secondary  :  the  ephemeral  resistance  of  Seville 
was  the  primary  cause  of  the  safety  of  Cadiz. 

The  march  by  which  the  Spanish  duke  secured  the 
Islade  Leon,  is  only  to  be  reckoned  from  Carmona.  Pre- 
vious to  his  arrival  there,  his  movements  although  ju- 
dicious, were  more  the  result  of  necessity  than  of  skill. 
After  the  battle  of  Ocana,  he  expected  that  Andalusia 
would  be  invaded  ;  yet,  either  fettered  by  his  orders  or 
ill-informed  of  the  enemy's  movements,  his  march  up- 
on Agudo  was  too  late,  and  his  after-march  upon  Gua- 
dal-canal,  was  the  forced  result  of  his  position;  hs 
could  only  do  that,  or  abandon  Andalusia  and  retire  to 
Badajos. 

From  Guadalcanal,  he  advanced  towards  Cordoba  on 
the  23d,  and  he  might  have  thrown  himself  into  that 
town;  yet  the  prudence  of  taking  such  a  decided  jiart, 
was  dependent  upon  the  state  of  public  seitiment,  of 
which  he  must  have  been  a  good  judge.  Albuquerque, 
indeed,  imagined  that  the  French  were  already  in  pos- 
session of  the  place,  whereas  they  did  not  reach  it  un- 
til four  days  later;  yet  ihey  could  easily  have  entered 
it  on  the  24th,  and  as  he  believed  that  they  had  done 
so,  it  is  apparent  that  he  had  no  confidence  in  the  peo- 
ple's disposition;  in  this  view,  his  determination  to 
cross  the  Gaadalquivir,  and  take  post  at  Carmona,  was 
the  fittest  for  the  occasion.  It  was  at  Carinona  he 
first  appears  to  have  considered  Seville  a  lost  city  ;  and 
when  the  French  approached,  we  find  him  marching, 
with  a  surprising  energy,  towards  Cadiz,  yet  he  was 
again  late  in  deciding,  for  the  enemy's  cavalry,  moving 
by  the  shorter  road  to  Utrera,  overtook  his  rear-guard; 
and  the  infantry  would  assuredly  have  entered  the 
Island  of  Leon  with  him,  if  the  king  had  not  directed 
thein  upon  Seville.  The  ephemeral  resistance  of  that 
city  therefore  saved  Albuquerque,  and  he,  in  return, 
saved  Cadiz. 


CHAPTER  II. 

Opprations  in  Navarre,  Aragon,  bkJ  Valeiuia — rursuit  of  the 
student  Mina — Siirhet's  preparations — Hi*  incursion  atrainst 
Valencia — Ret\nns  to  Ara^on — Uitliculty  otAiie  war  in  Cat;i- 
lonia— Operations  of  the  seventh  corps — French  cietaci-.ni<  nH 
surprised  Ht  MolUt  and  San  Ferpf  tua — Augcreau  enters  L'ar- 

n  1  inr; Send^   Puhesnie    (o   France— Returns  to  Gerona — • 

()  l^otmtl  ralTus  tlie  Sjianish  army  near  Centellas — (^ornbat 
of\ii-|i — Sfianiards  make  vain  efloits  to  raise  the  blockade 
of  Hostahicli — Augercau  agsiin  advances  to  Rarct  lona — 
S«nds  two  divisions  to  Reus — Occupies  Manrtza  and  \  ilia 
Pranca — French  troops  defeated  at  Villa  Franca  and  Kspara- 
cryitra — Swariz  abandons  Manreza — Is  defeated  at  Savad«  I — 
Colonel  Vilhitte  communicates  with  the  third  coijis  by  Fiil- 
Cft — Severnlli  rt  treats  from  Reus  to  Villa  Franca — Is  har- 
assed on  the  march — Ausrereau's  iinskill'ul  conduct — Hostal- 
rii  h  falls— Gallant  exploit  of  the  governor,  Julian  Estrada- 
Cruelty  of  Augereau. 

Lord  Wellington's  plans  were  deeply  affected  by 
the  invasion  of  Andalusia.  But  befoie  treating  of  thft 
stupendous  campaign  he  was  now  meditating,  it  is  ne- 
cessary, once  more  to  revert  to  the  operations  in  the 
other  parts  of  the  Peninsula,  tracing  them  up  to  a  fixed 
point ;  because,  although  bearing  slro.igly  on  the  luaio 
action  of  the  war,  to  recur  to  them  chronolo<jically, 
would  totally  destroy  the  unity  of  narrative  indispens- 
able to  a  just  handling  of  the  subject. 

OPERATIONS  IN  NAVARRE,  ARAGON,  AND  VALENCIA. 

Suchet,  being  ordered  to  quell  the  disorders  in  Na- 
varre, repaired  to  Pampeluna,  having  previously  di- 
rected an  active  pursuit  of  the  student  Mina,  who, 
availing  himself  of  the  quarrel  between  the  ir.il itary 
governor  and  the  viceroy,  was  actually  master  of  the 
country  between  that  fortress  and  'I'udela,  and  was  then 
at  Sanguessa.    General  Marispc,  with  some  battalions, 


1810.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


259 


marched  Ptraig-ht  ngminsl  him  from  Zarajroza,  while 
(ietr.rhmpnts  froniTnd^-la  and  Pampeluiia  endeavoured 
to  surround  him  bj-  the  flanks,  and  a  fourth  body  niov- 
infr  into  the  valleys  of  Ainsa  and  Medianoz,  cut  him 
off  from  the  Cinca  river. 

Hprippe  quickly  reached  Sansfuessa,  but  the  column 
from  Famyieluna  beinor  retarded,  Mina,  with  surprising 
boldness,  crossed  its  line  of  march,  and  attacked  Ta- 
falia,  thus  cuttingr  the  g-reat  Frer.ch  line  of  communi- 
cation;*" the  crarrison,  however,  made  a  stronof  resist- 
ance, and  Mina  disappeared  the  next  day.  At  this  pe- 
riod, reinforcements  from  France  were  pourin^  into 
Navarre,  and  a  division,  under  Loison,  was  at  Lo- 
grrfio,  wlierefore  Harispe  havinfr.  in  concert  with  that 
-peneial  and  with  the  g-arrison  of  Pampeluna,  occupied 
Sanffuessa.  Sos,  Lodosa,  Puenta  de  Reyna,  and  all  the 
passatres  of  the  Aro-a.  Aragon.and  Ebro  rivers,  launched 
a  number  of  moveable  columns,  that  continually  pur- 
sued Mina.  until  chased  into  the  hig^her  parts  of  the 
Pyrenees,  cold  and  huntjer  oblig^ed  his  hand  to  disperse, 
'i  he  enterprising  chief  himself  escaped  with  seven  fol- 
lowers, and  when  the  French  were  trackintj  him  from 
house  to  iiouse,  he,  with  a  romantic  simplicity,  truly 
Spanish,  repaired  to  Olite,  that  he  might  see  Suchet 
pass  on  his  way  from  Zaragoza  to  Pampeluna. 

But  that  general,  while  seemingly  occupied  with  the 
affairs  of  Pampeluna,  was  secretly  preparing  guns  and 
materials,  for  a  methodical  war  of  invasion,  beyond  the 
frontiers  of  Aragon,  and  when  general  Reynier,  coming 
soon  afterwards  from  France,  with  troops  intended  to 
form  an  eighth  c  rps,  was  appointed  governor  of  Na- 
varre, Suchet  returned  to  Zaragoza.  During  his  ab- 
sence, although  some  petty  actions  had  taken  place, 
his  general  arrangements  were  not  disturbed,  and  the 
emperor  having  promised  to  increase  the  third  corps  to 
thirty  thousand  men,  with  the  intention  of  directing  it 
at  once  against  Valencia,  all  the  stores  befitting  such 
an  enterprise  were  collected  at  Terruel  in  the  course 
of  Jam.ary.  The  resistance  of  Gerona,  and  other  events 
in  (Catalonia  having,  however,  baffled  Napoleon's  cal- 
culations, this  first  destination  of  the  third  corps  was 
changed.  Suchet  was  ordered  to  besiege  Tortoza  or 
I.erida  ;  the  eighth  corps,  then  forming  at  Logroiiio, 
was  directed  to  cover  his  rear;  the  seventh  corps  to  ad- 
vance to  the  Lower  Ebro  and  support  the  siege.  But 
neither  was  this  arrangement  definitive;  fresh  orders 
sent  the  eighth  corps  towards  Castile,  and  just  at  this 
moment  Joseph's  letter  from  Cordoba,  calling  upon 
Suchet  to  march  against  Valencia,  arrived,  and  gave  a 
new  turn  to  the  affairs  of  the  French  in  Spain. 

A  decree  of  the  emperor,  dated  the  8th  of  .Fanuary, 
and  constituting  Aragon  a  particular  government,  ren- 
dered Suchet  independent  of  the  king's  orders,  civil  or 
military.  This  decree,  together  with  a  renewed  order 
to  commence  the  siege  of  Lerida,  had,  liowever,  been 
intercepted,  and  the  French  general,  doubtful  of  Napo- 
leon's real  views,  undertook  the  enterprise  against  Va- 
lencia;  but  wishing  first  to  intimidate  the  partisans 
hanging  on  the  borders  of  Aragon,  he  detached  Laval 
against  Villa  Caijipa,  who  was  defeated  on  the  side  of 
Cuenca,  and  his  troops  dispersed. 

Suchet  then  fortified  a  post  at  Terruel,  to  serve  as  a 
temporary  base  of  operations,  and  drew  together  at  that 
place  twelve  battalions  of  infantry,  a  regiment  of  cui- 
rassiers, several  squadrons  of  light  cavalry,  and  some 
field  artillery,  and,  at  the  same  time,  caused  six  battal- 
ions and  three  squadrons  of  cavalry  to  be  assembled  at 
Alcanitz,  under  general  Habert.  The  remainder  of  the 
third  cor|)s  was  distributed  on  the  line  of  the  Cinca, 
and  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Ebro.  The  castles  of  Za- 
ragoza, Alcanitz,  Monzon,  Venasque,  Jaca,  Tudela, 
and  other  towns,  were  placed  in  a  state  of  defence,  and 
four  thousand  men,  newly  arrived  from  France,  were 

*  Sachet's  Meraoirs. 


pushed  to  Daroca,  to  link  the  active  cohmms  to  those 
h^ft  in  Aragon.  These  arrangenienis  ('ccujiied  tho 
whole  of  February,  and,  on  the  1st  of  March,  a  dupli- 
cate of  the  order,  directing  Suchet  to  commence  the 
j  siege  of  Lerida,  reached  Terruel,  yet  as  Habert's 
column  having  marched  on  the  '27th,  by  the  road  of  Mo- 
rella,  was  already  committed  in  the  province  of  Valen- 
cia, the  operation  went  on. 

INCURSION    TO    VALENCIA. 

The  first  day,  brought  Suchet's  column,  in  presence 
of  the    Valencian   army,    for   Ventura   Caro,    captain- 
general  of  the  province,  was  in  march   to  attacl;  the 
I  French  at  Terruel,  and   his  advanced  guard  of  five  or 
six  thousand  regulars,  accompanied  by  armed  peasants, 
j  was  drawn  up  on  some  high  groui;d  behind  the  river 
Mingares,  the  bed  of  which  is  a  deep  ravine  so  sud- 
denly sunk,  as  not  to  be  perceived  until  close  upon  it. 
The  village  and  castle  of  Alventoza,  situated  somewhat 
!  in  advance  of  the  Spaniard's  centre,  were  occupied,  and 
I  commanded  a  bridge  over  the  river.   Their  right  rested 
j  on  the  village  and  bridge  of  Puenseca,  and  their  lel't  on 
I  the  village  of  Manzanera,  where  the  ground  was  rather 
more  practicable. 

Suchet,  judging  that  Caro  would  not  fight  so  far 
from  Valencia,  while  Habert'  column  was  turning  his 
right,  sent  a  division  before  daylight,  on  the  2d,  to  turn 
the  left  of  the  position,  and  cut  off  the  retreat;  never- 
theless, although  the  French,  after  a  skirmish,  crossed 
the  ravine,  the  Spaniards  retired  with  little  loss  upon 
vSegorbe,  and  Caro  fell  back  to  the  city  of  Valencift. 
Suchet  then  entered  Segorbe,  and  on  the  4th  was  at 
Murviedrok,  the  ancient  Saguntum,  four  leagues  from 
Valencia.  At  the  same  time,  Habert,  who  had  defeated 
a  small  corps  at  Morella,  arrived  at  Villa  Real  on  the 
sea  coast.  The  country  between  their  lines  of  march 
was  mountainous  and  impracticable,  but  after  passing 
Saguntum,  the  columns  united  in  the  Huerta,  or  garden 
of  Valencia,  the  richest  and  most  delightful  part  of 
Spain. 

Suchet  arrived  before  the  city  on  the  5th  of  March, 
and  seized  the  suburb  Seranos,  and  the  harbour  called 
the  Grao.  His  spies  at  first  confirmed  the  hopes  of  an 
insurrection  within  the  walls,  but  the  treason  was  de- 
tected, the  leader,  a  baron  Pozzo  Blanco,  publicly  ex- 
ecuted, and  the  archbishop  and  many  others  imprisoned  ; 
in  fine,  the  plan  had  failed,  the  populace  were  in  arms, 
and  there  was  no  movement  of  French  troops  on  the 
side  of  Murcia.  Five  days  the  French  general  remained 
before  the  city,  vainly  negotiating,  and  then,  intrigue 
failing,  and  his  army  being  inadequate  to  force  the  de- 
fences, he  resolved  to  retire.  In  the  night  of  the  10th 
he  commenced  his  retreat  in  one  column  by  Segorbe 
and  Terruel.  Meanwhile  the  Spanish  partisans  were 
gathering  on  his  rear.  Combats  had  already  taken 
place  at  Liria  and  Castellon  de  la  Plana,  and  general 
Villa  Campa,  who  had  re-assembled  his  dispersed 
troops,  captured  four  guns,  with  their  ammunition  and 
escort,  between  Terruel  and  Daroca;  cut  off  another 
detachment  of  a  hundred  men  left  at  Alventoza,  and 
having  invested  the  post  at  Terruel,  on  the  7ih,  by  a 
bold  and  ready  witted  attempt,  nearly  carried  the  castle. 
The  I2th,  however,  the  head  of  Suchet's  column  came 
j  in  sight.  Villa  Campa  retired,  and  the  17th  the  French 
general  reached  Zaragoza.  During  his  absence,  Pe- 
reiia  had  invested  Monzon,  and  when  the  garrison  of 
Fraga  marched  to  its  relief,  the  Spaniards  from  Lerida 
entered  the  latter  town,  and  destroyed  the  bridge  and 
French  entrenchments.  Mina,  also,  was  again  become 
formidable,  and,  although  several  columns  were  sent  m 
chase  of  him,  it  is  probable,  that  they  would  have  done 
no  more  than  disperse  his  band  for  the  moment,  but  for 
an  accident,  wiiich  threw  him  into  their  hands  a  { ria- 
oner. 

Surihet's  failure  at  Valencia  was  more  hurtful  to  the 


260 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[BookX. 


French  tlian  would  at  first  sio^ht  appeat.  It  happened 
at  the  moment  when  the  National  Corics,  so  long  de- 
sired, was  at  last  directed  to  assenihle  ;  and  as  it  seem- 
ed to  balance  the  niisfortnnes  of  Andalusia,  it  was  hail- 
ed by  the  Spaniards  as  the  commencement  of  a  better 
era.  The  principal  military  advantage  was  the  delay- 
ing of  the  sieges  of  Lerida  and  Mequinenzn,  wherebj' 
the  subjection  of  Catalonia  was  retarded  ;  and  although 
Suchct  labours,  and  successfully,  to  show  that  he  was 
drawn  into  this  enterprise  by  the  force  of  circumstances. 
Napoleon's  avowed  discontent  was  well  founded.  The 
operations  in  Catalonia  were  so  hampered  by  the  nature 
of  the  country,  that  it  was  only  at  certain  conjunctures 
any  progress  could  be  made,  and  one  of  the  most  favour- 
able of  those  coujunclu.bS,  was  lost,  for  want  of  the 
co-operation  of  the  third  corps;  but  to  understand  this, 
the  niili'tsry  topography  oi"Odtalonia  must  be  well  con- 
sidered. 

That  province  is  divided  in  Its  whole  length  by 
shoots  fr<..n  the  Pyrenees,  whirh,  with  some  interrup- 
tions, run  'o  the  Atlantic  shores;  for  the  sierras  sepa- 
rating V'ai.>ncia,  IMurcia,  and  Andalusia  from  the  cen- 
tral parts  of  Spain,  are  but  continnaiions  of  those  shoots. 
The  Ebro,  forcing  its  way  transveisely  through  the 
ridges,  pan^  Catalonia  from  Valei.oia,  and  the  hills, 
thus  broken  oy  the  river,  push  their  tocky  heads  south- 
ward to  tht  sea,  cutting  off  Tarngoiid  from  Tortoza, 
and  enclosin-^'  what  may  be  called  the  eastern  region  of 
(yatalonia,  which  contains  Rosas.  Gerona,  Hostalrich, 
\'ich,  BarceK  na,  Manreza,  Taragona,  Reus,  and  many 
more  towns.  The  torrents,  the  defiles,  and  other  mili- 
tary features  oi  this  region  have  been  before  described.* 
The  western  j  jrtion  of  (Catalonia  lying  beyond  the 
principal  spine,  's  hounded  partly  by  Aragon,  partly  by 
Valencia  ;  and.  ike  the  eastern  region,  it  is  an  assem- 
blage of  small  plains  and  rugged  valleys,  each,  the  bed 
of  a  river,  descending  towards  the  Ebro  from  the  Py- 
renees. It  contaitis  the  fortresses  of  Balaguer,  Lerida, 
Mequinenza,  Cervera,  and,  near  the  mouth  of  the  Ebro, 
Tortoza,  which,  however,  belongs  in  a  military  view 
rather  to  Valencia  than  Catalonia. 

Now  the,  mountain  ridge,  parting  the  eastern  from 
the  western  region  of  Catalonia,  could  only  be  passed 
by  certain  routes,  for  the  most  part  impracticable  for 
artillery,  and  those  practicable,  leading  upon  walled 
towns  at  both  sides  of  the  defiles.  Thus  Cervera  is 
situated  on  the  r  fincipa'  and  direct  line  from  Lerida  to 
Barcelona;  Balaguer,  Cardona,and  Montserrat,  on  an- 
other and  more  circuitous  road  to  the  same  city.  Be- 
tween Lerida  and  Taragona,  stands  Momblanch,  and 
between  Taragona,  and  Tortoza,  the  Fort  St.  Felippe 
blocks  the  Col  de  Balaguer.  All  these  places  were  in 
the  hands  of  the  Spaniards,  and  a  number  of  smaller 
fortresses,  or  castles,  such  as  l^rgel,  Berga,  and  Solso- 
na,  served  as  rallying  points,  where  the  warlike  Soma- 
tenes,  of  the  higher  valleys,  took  refuge  from  the  move- 
able columns,  and  from  whence,  supplied  with  arms 
and  aminunilion,  they  sallied,  to  harass  the  flanks  and 
rear   of  both  the  French  corps. 

In  the  eastern  region,  the  line  of  operations  for  the 
seventh  corps,  was  between  the  mountains  and  the  sea- 
coast,  and  parallel  with  both;  hence,  the  Spanish  ir- 
regular firces,  holding  all  the  communications,  and  the 
high  valleys  on  bolli  sides  of  the  great  dividing  spine, 
could  at  all  times  descend  upon  the  rear  and  flanks  of 
the  French,  while  the  regular  troops,  opposed  to  them 
on  a  narrow  front,  and  supported  by  the  fortresses  of 
Gerona,  Hostalrich,  and  Taragona,  could  advance  or 
retire  as  circumstances  dictated.  And  upon  this  prin- 
ciple, the  defence  of  Catalonia  was  conducted. 

Detachments  and  sometimes  the  main  body  of  the 
Spanish  army,  passing  by  the  mountains,  or  by  sea 
from  Taragona,  haiassed  the  Fiench  flanks,  and  when 

•  Book  I.  Chap,  VI. 


defeated,  retired  on  Vich,  Manrean.  Montserrat,  or  Cer- 
vera, and  finallv  to  'I'aragona.  f'rnn  this  last,  the  gene- 
rals communicated  with  'I'ortoza,  Valencia,  Gibraltar, 
the  Balearic  Isles,  and  even  Sicily,  and  drew  succrurs 
of  all  kinds  from  those  places,  and  meanwhile  the  bands 
in  the  mountains  continued  to  vex  the  F'rench  commu- 
nications ;  and  it  was  only  during  the  brief  period  of 
lassitude  in  the  Spanish  army,  following  any  great  de- 
feat, that  the  seventh  corps  could  chase  those  moun- 
taineers. Nor,  until  Gerona  and  Hostalrich  fell,  was  it 
easy  to  make  any  but  sudden  and  short  incursions  to- 
wards Taragona,  because  the  Miguelettes  from  the 
higher  valleys,  and  detachments  from  the  army  at  Fa- 
rajona,  again  passing  by  the  hills  or  by  sea.  joined  tho 
garrisons,  and  interrupted  the  communication,  and  thus 
obliged  the  French  to  retire,  because  the  country  beyond 
the  Llobregat  could  never  feed  them  long. 

But  when  Barcelona  could  not  be  succoured  by  sea, 
it  was  indispensable  to  conduct  convoys  by  land,  and 
to  insure  their  arrival,  the  whole  army  was  obliged  to 
make  frequent  movements  in  advance,  retiring  again 
when  the  object  was  effected  ;  this  being  often  renew- 
ed, offered  many  opportunities  for  cutting  off  minor  con- 
voys, detachments,  and  even  considerable  bodies  isola- 
ted by  the  momentary  absence  of  the  army.  Thus  du- 
ring the  siege  of  Gerona,  Blake  passed  through  the 
mountains  and  harassed  the  besiegers.  When  the  place 
fell,  he  retired  again  to  Taragona,  and  Augereau  took 
the  occasion  to  attack  the  Miguelettes.r.nd  Somatenes, 
in  the  high  valleys;  but  in  the  midst  of  this  operation 
admiral  Baudin's  squadron,  was  intercepted  by  admi- 
ral Martin,  and  the  insatiable  craving  of  Barcelona, 
obliged  Augereau  to  reassemble  his  army  and  conduct 
a  convoy  there  by  land  ;  yet  he  was  obliged  to  return 
immediately,  lest  he  shoiild  himself  consume  the  pro- 
visions he  brought  for  the  city.  This  retreat,  as  usual, 
drew  on  the  vSpaniards.  who  were  again  defeated,  and 
Augereau  once  more  advanced,  in  the  intention  of  co- 
operating with  the  third  corps,  w  hich,  he  suppcsed, 
would,  following  the  Emperor's  design,  be  before  Le- 
rida or  Tortoza.  But  at  this  time,  Suchet  was  on  the 
march  to  Valencia  ;  and  Henry  O'Donnel  who  had  suc- 
ceeded Blake  in  the  command,  recommenced  the  v.ar- 
fare  on  the  F'rench  communications,  and  forced  Auge- 
reau again  to  retire  to  Gerona,  at  the  moment  when  Su- 
chet, having  returned  to  Aragon,  was  ready  to  besiege 
Lerida.  Thus,  like  unruly  horses  in  a  chariot  drag- 
ging different  ways,  the  French  impeded  each  other's 
movements.  I  shall  now  briefly  narrate  the  events 
touched  upon  above. 

OPERATIONS  OF  THE  SEVENTH  CORPS. 

Gerona  having  fallen,  general  Souham  with  a  divis- 
ion, scoured  the  high  valleys,  beat  the  Migueletles  of 
Claros  and  Rovira,  at  Besalu,  Olot,  Ribas,  and  Cam- 
predon,  and  atRipoll  destroyed  a  matiufactory  forarms. 
Being  afterwards  reinforced  with  Pino's  division,  he 
marched  from  Olot,  by  the  road  of  P^steban  and  Man- 
lieu,  and  although  the  Somatenes  disputed  the  defiles 
near  the  last  point,  the  French  force^  the  passage,  and 
took  possession  of  Vich.  Meanwhile  Blake  having 
been  called  to  Andalusia,  the  Provincial  Junta  ct  Cata- 
lonia rejecting  the  duke  Del  Parijue,  took  upon  them- 
selves to  give  the  command  to  Henry  O'Donnel,  whose 
courage  during  the  siege  of  Gerona  had  gained  him  a 
high  reputation.  He  was  now  with  the  remains  of 
Blake's  army  at  Vich,  and  as  the  French  approached 
that  town  he  retired  to  the  pass  of  Col  de  Sespina,  from 
whence  lie  had  a  free  retreat  upon  Moya  and  Manresa. 
Souham's  advanced  guard,  pursued,  and  at  'I'ona  cap- 
tured some  baggage,  but  the  Spaniard  turned  on  find- 
ing his  rear  pressed,  and  when  tht  pursuers  mounted 
the  heights  of  Sespina,  charged  wiii>  a  shock,  that  sent 
them  headlong  down  again.  Souhaii.  rallied  the  beat- 
en troops  in  the  plain,  and  the  next  day  cfTerLd  battle, 


1810.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


261 


bul  O'Donnel  continued  his  retreat,  and  the  French 
general  returned  to  \'ich. 

Durino;  ttiese events,  Aucrereau,  leavino;  a  detachment 
in  Hostalrich  to  blockade  the  castle,  marched  to  Barce 
lona,  by  the  road  of  Cardedieu;  having  previously  or- 
dered Duhesme,  to  post  three  battalions  and  five  squad- 
rons of  cuirassiers,  with  some  guns,  near  the  junction,  of 
the  roads  of  Cardedieu  and  Manresa,  to  vi^atch  O'Donnel. 
Colonel  Query,  coiTimanding  this  detachment,  placed 
one  battalion  at  Granollers,  a  second  at  Santa  Perpetua, 
and  with  the  remainder  occupied  Alollet,  taking  no  mili- 
tary precautions,  wherefore  O'Donnel  who  had  been 
joi 'icd  by  Campo  Verde,  sent  him  to  fall  upon  the 
French  posts.  (Jampo  Verde,  passing-  by  Tarrassa  and 
Sabadel,  surprised  and  put  to  the  sword  or  captured  all 
the  troops  at  Santa  Perpetua  and  Mcllet;  those  at  Gra- 
nollers, threw  themselves  into  a  large  building,  and  de- 
fended it  for  three  days,  when  by  the  approach  of  Au- 
gereau  they  were  relieved.  The  marshal  finding  the 
streets  of  Mollct  strewed  with  French  carcasses,  order- 
ed up  the  divisi  >n  of  Souham  from  Vich,  but  passed  on 
himself  to  Barcelona;  and  when  there,  affecting  to  be 
convinced  how  oppressive  Duhesme's  conduct  had  been, 
sent  him  to  France  in  disgrace.  After  this  act  of  jus- 
tice or  of  personal  malice,  for  it  has  been  called  both 
names,  Angereau,  unable  to  procure  provisions  without 
exhausting  the  magazines  of  Barcelona,  resumed  his  for- 
mer position  at  Gerona,  and  Souham  returned  to  Vich. 

All  this  lime  the  blockade  of  Hostalrieh  continued  ; 
but  the  retreat  of  Augereau,  and  the  success  of  Campo 
Verde's  enterprise,  produced  extraordinary  joy  over  all 
Catalonia,  'ilie  prisoners  taken,  were  marched  from 
town  to  town,  the  action  everywhere  exaggerated,  the 
decree  for  enrolling  a  fifth  of  the  male  population  was 
enforced  with  vigour,  and  the  execution  entrusted  to 
the  Bnron  d'Erolles,  a  native  of  Talarn,  who  afterwards 
obtained  considerable  celebrity.  The  army,  in  which 
there  was  still  a  large  body  of  Swiss  troops,  was  thus 
reinforced,  the  confidence  of  the  people  increased  hour- 
ly, and  a  Local  Junta  was  established  at  Arenys  de 
Mar,  to  organise  the  Somatenes  on  the  coast,  and  to 
direct  the  application  of  succours  from  the  sea.  The 
Partisans,  also  reassembling  their  dispersed  bands  in 
the  higher  valleys,  again  vexed  the  Ampurdan,  and  in- 
commoded the  troops  blockading  the  citadel  of  Hos- 
talrieh. 

O'Donnel  himself,  moving  to  Manresa,  called  the 
Miguelettes  from  the  Lerida  side,  to  his  assistance; 
and  soon  formed  a  body  of  more  than  twelve  thousand 
fighting-men,  with  which  he  took  post  at  Moya,  in  the 
beginning  of  February,  and  harassed  the  French  in  front 
of  Vich.  while,  in  the  rear  of  that  town,  Kovira  occu- 
pied the  heights  above  Roda.  Souham,  seeing  the 
crests  ( f  the  hills  thus  swarming  with  enemies,  and, 
having  but  five  thousand  men  of  all  arms  to  oppose  to 
them,  demanded  reinforcements,  but  Augereau  paid 
little  attention  to  him,  and  O'Donnel,  descending  the 
mountain  of  Centellas,  on  the  20th,  entered  the  plains 
in  three  columns.  The  French  general  had  scarcely 
time  to  draw  up  his  troops  a  little  in  front  of  the  town, 
ere  he  was  attacked  with  a  vigour  hitherto  unusual 
with  the  Spaniards. 

COMBAT   OF  VICH. 

Rovira  commenced  the  action,  by  driving  the  enemy's 
posts,  on  the  side  of  Roda,  back  upon  the  town  ;  O'- 
Doimel,  then,  coming  close  up  on  the  front  of  the 
French  position,  opened  all  his  guns,  and,  throwing 
out  skirmishers  along  the  whole  of  the  adverse  line, 
filed  his  cavalry,  under  cover  of  their  fire,  to  the  right, 
intending  to  outflank  Souham's  left.  The  latter  gen- 
»^ral.  leaving  a  battalion  to  hold  Rovira  in  check,  en- 
couraafd  bis  own  infantry,  and  sent  his  dragoons  against 
the  Spanish  horsemen,  who,  at  the  first  charge,  were 
driven  back  incuufuiioa.     'fhe  Spanish  foot  then  fell 


in  on  the  French  centre,  but  failed  to  make  any  serious 
impression,  wherefore  O'Donnel,  whose  great  superi- 
ority of  numbers  enabled  him  to  keep  heavy  masses  in 
reserve,  endeavoured  to  turn  both  flanks  of  the  enemy 
at  the  Same  time.  Souham  was  now  hard  pressed,  his 
infantry  were  few,  his  reserves  all  engaged,  and  him- 
self severely  wounded  in  the  head.  O'Donnel,  who 
had  rallied  his  cavalry,  and  brought  up  his  Swiss  regi- 
ments, was  full  of  confidence,  and  in  person  fiercely  leil 
the  whole  mass  once  more  against  the  left.  At  this 
critical  period,  the  French  infaiitry,  far  from  wavering, 
firmly  closed  their  ranks,  and  sent  their  volleys  more 
rapidly  into  the  hostile  ranks,  while  the  cavalry,  sensi- 
ble that  the  fate  of  all  (for  there  was  no  retreat)  hung 
upon  the  issue  of  their  charge,  met  their  adversaries 
with  such  a  full  career  that  horse  and  man  went  down 
before  them,  and  the  Swiss,  being  separated  from  the 
rest,  surrendered.  Rovira  was  afterwards  driven  away 
from  the  rear,  and  the  S])anish  army  returned  to  the 
hills,  having  lost  a  full  fourth  of  its  own  numbers,  and 
killed  or  wounded  twelve  hiindred  of  the  enemy. 

O'Donnel's  advance,  had  been  the  signal,  fur  all  the 
irregular  bands  to  act  against  the  various  quarters  of 
the  French ;  they  were,  however,  v»iih  the  exception 
of  a  slight  succour  thrown  into  Hostalrieh,  unsuccessful, 
and,  being  closely  pursued  by  the  moveable  columns, 
dispersed.  Thus  the  higher  valleys  were  again  sub- 
dued, the  Junta  fled  from  Arenys  de  Mar,  Campo  Verd« 
returned  to  the  country  about  (^ervera,  and  O'Donnel, 
quitting  the  Uppf  r  Llobregat,  rHired  by  Taraza,  Mar- 
torel,  and  \'i]\-\  Franca  to  the  camp  of  Taragona,  leav- 
ing only  an  alvanced  guard  at  Ordal. 

It  was  at  this  moment,  when  Upper  Catalonia  was 
in  a  manner  abandoned  by  tlie  Spanish  general,  that 
the  emjieror  directed  the  seventh  corps  upon  the  Lower 
Ehro,  to  support  Suchet's  operations  against  Lerida 
and  Mequinenza.  Augereau,  therefore,  leaving  a  de- 
tachment under  Verdier,  in  the  Ampurdan,  and  two 
thousand  men  to  blockade  Hostalrieh,  ordered  his  bro- 
ther and  general  Mazzucchelli  (the  one  commanding 
Souham's,  and  the  other  Pino's  division)  to  march  upon 
Manreza,  while  he  himself,  with  the  Westphaliju  divi- 
sion, repaired  once  more  to  Barcelona,  and  from  thence 
directed  all  the  subsequent  movements. 

General  Augereau,  passing  by  Col  de  Sespina,  enter- 
ed Manreza,  the  Ibth  of  March,  and  there  joined  Maz- 
zucchelli ;  the  inhabitants  had  .ibandoned  the  place,  and 
general  Swartz  was  sent  with  a  brigade,  from  Moncada, 
to  take  possession,  while  the  two  divisions  continued 
their  movement,  by  Montserrat  upon  Molino  del  Rey. 
The  21st  they  advanced  to  Villa  Franca,  and  the  Span- 
iards retired  from  Ordal  towards  Taragona.  The 
French,  acting  under  orders  from  Barcelona,  left  a 
thousand  men  in  Villa  Franca,  and,  after  scouring  the 
country  on  the  right  and  left,  passed  the  Col  de  San 
Cristina,  and  established  their  quarters  about  Reus,  by 
which  the  Spanish  army  at  Tarragona  was  placed  be- 
tween them  and  the  troops  at  Villa  Franca. 

O'Donnel,  whose  energy  and  military  talents,  were 
superior  to  his  predecessors,  saw,  and  instantly  profited 
from  this  false  position.  By  his  orders,  general  Juan 
Caro  marched,  with  six  thousand  men,  against  the 
French  in  Villa  F'ranca,  and,  on  the  28th,  killed  many 
and  captured  the  rest,  together  with  some  artillery  and 
stores,  hut,  being  wounded  himself,  resigned  the  com- 
mand to  general  Gasca,  after  the  action.  Augereau, 
alarmed  for  Manreza,  then  detached  columns,  both  by 
Olesa  and  Montserrat,  to  reinforce  Swartz,  and  t!ie  first 
reached  its  destinations,  but  the  other,  twelve  luindred 
strong,  was  intercepted  by  Gasca,  and  totally  defeated 
at  Esparaguera  on  the  3d  of  April.  Campo  Verde  im- 
mediately came  down  from  the  side  of  Orvera,  took 
the  chief  command,  and  proceeded  against  Manreza, 
by  Montserrat,  while  Milans  de  Boch.  and  Kovira, 
hemmed  in  the  French   on   the  opposite  side,  and  the 


262 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  X. 


Somatenes  ^ihered  on  the  hills  to  aid  the  operations. 
Swartz  thus  riiCnacpd  evacuated  the  town  in  the  night, 
and  thinking  to  bafile  tlie  Spaniards,  by  takinjr  the  road 
of  Taraza  and  Sabadel,  was  followed  closely  by  Rovira 
and  Milans,  and  so  ))rpssed,' on  the  5th  of  April,  that 
with  great  difficulty  and  the  loss  of  all  his  baggage,  he 
reached  Barcelona. 

These  operations  having  insulated  the  French  divi- 
sions at  R(!us,  an  officer  was  despatched,  by  sea,  with 
orders  to  recal  them  to  Barcelona.  Meanwhile  count 
Severoli,  who  had  taken  the  command  of  them,  and 
■whose  first  instructions  were  to  co-operate  with  Suchet, 
feared  to  pass  the  mountains  between  Reus  and  the 
Ebro,  lest  he  should  expose  his  rear  to  an  attack  from 
Taragona,  and  perhaps  fail  of  meeting  the  third  corps 
at  last.  Keeping,  therefore,  on  the  defensive  at  Reus, 
lie  detached  colonel  V'illatte,  at  the  head  of  two  battal- 
ions and  some  cavalry,  across  the  hil!s,^by  Dos  Agnas 
and  Falcet,  to  open  a  communication  with  the  third 
corps,  a  part  of  which  had  just  seized  Mora  and  Flix, 
on  the  Lower  Ebro.  Villatte  having  accomplished 
his  object,  returned  with  great  celerity,  fighting  his 
way  through  the  Somatenes,  who  were  gathering  round 
the  defiles  in  his  rear,  and  regaining  Reus  just  as  Se- 
veroli, having  received  the  order  of  recal,  was  com- 
mencing his  march  for  Barcelona. 

In  the  night  of  the  6th,  this  movement  took  place, 
but  in  such  confusion,  that  from  Taragona,  O'Donnel 
perceived  the  disorder,  and  sending  a  detachment,  under 
colonel  Orry,  to  harass  the  French,  fcJlowed  himself 
with  the  rest  of  his  army.*  Nevertheless,  Severoli's 
rear  guard  covered  the  retreat  successfully,  until  a  posi- 
tion was  attained  near  Villa  Franca,  where  Orry,  press- 
ing on  too  closely,  was  wounded  and  taken,  and  his 
troops  rejoined  their  main  body.  When  these  divi- 
sions arrived,  Campo  Verde  fell  back  to  Cervera,  Se- 
veroli reached  Barcelona,  and  Augereau  retired  to 
Gerona,  having  lost  more  than  three  thousand  men,  by 
a  series  of  most  unskilful  movements;  the  situation  in 
which  he  had  voluntarily  placed  himself,  was  precisely 
such  as  a  great  general  would  rejoice  to  see  his  adver- 
sary choose. 

Barcelona,  the  centre  of  his  operations,  was  encircled 
by  mountains,  to  be  passed  only  at  certain  defiles;  now 
Reus  and  Manresa,  were  beyond  those  defiles,  and 
several  days  march  from  each  other.  Rovira  and 
Milans  being  about  San  Culgat,  cut  the  communica- 
tion between  Manresa  and  Barcelona;  O'Donnel  at 
Taragona.  was  nearer  to  the  defiles  of  Crislina,  than 
the  French  divisions  at  Reus  ;  and  his  own  communi- 
cation with  Campo  Verde  was  open  by  Vails,  Pla,  and 
Santa  Coloma  de  Querault;  and  with  Milans  and  Ro- 
vira, by  Villa  Franca,  San  Sadurni,  and  Igualada. 
Augereau  indeed,  had  placed  a  battalion  in  Villa 
Franca,  but  this  only  rendered  his  situation  worse;  for 
what  could  six  hundred  men  effect  in  a  mountainous 
country,  against  three  considerable  bodies  of  the  enemy  ] 
The  result  was  inevitable.  The  battalion,  at  Villa 
Franca,  was  put  to  the  sword,  Swartz  only  saved  a  rem- 
nant of  his  brigade  by  a  timely  flight,  and  the  divisions 
at  Reus  with  ditlitulty  made  good  their  retreat.  O'- 
Donnel, w  ho.  one  month  before,  had  retired  from  the 
battle  of  Vich,  broken  and  discomfited  by  only  five 
tiiousand  French,  now,  with  that  very  bealen  army, 
baffled  Augereau,  and  obliged  him,  al'hough  at  the 
head  of  more  than  twenty  thousand  men,  to  abandon 
Lower  Catalonia,  and  retire  to  Gerona  with  disgrace; 
a  surprising  change,  yet  one  in  which  fortune  had  no 
share. 

Augereau's  talents  for  handling  small  corps  in  a 
battle,  have  been  recorded  by  a  master  band.j-  There 
is  a  vast  difference  between  that  and  conducting  a  cam- 
paign.    But  the  truth  is,  that  Catalonia  had,  like  Ara- 

*  Varnni.     Kf'inn  ^rilita^e  degl'  Italiani  lu  laj'Hgnu. 
t  A'apoleuii'h  iMniuoirs. 


gon,  been  declared  a  particular  government,  and  Au- 
gereau, afflicted  with  gout,  remained  in  the  palace  of 
Barcelona,  affecting  the  state  cf  a  vicerny,  when  he 
should  have  been  at  the  head  of  his  troops  in  the  field. 
On  the  other  hand,  his  opponent,  a  hardy  resolute  man, 
excited  by  a  sudden  celebrity,  was  vigilant,  indefati- 
gable, and  eager;  he  merited  the  success  be  obtained, 
and,  with  better  and  more  experienced  troops,  that  suc- 
cess would  have  been  infinitely  greater.  Yet  if  the 
expedition  to  Valencia  had  not  taken  place,  O'Donnel, 
distracted  by  a  double  attack,  would  have  remained  at 
Taragona,  and  neither  the  action  of  Vich.  nor  the  dis- 
asters at  Mollet,  Villa  Franca,  and  Esparaguera,  would 
have  taken  place. 

Napoleon,  discontented,  as  he  well  mioht  be,  with 
these  operations,  sent  M'Donald,  duke  of  Tarentum,  to 
supersede  Augereau ;  meantime,  the  latter,  having 
reached  Gerona,  disposed  his  troops  in  the  mrst  com- 
modious manner  to  cover  the  blockade  of  Hostahich, 
giving  Severoli  the  command. 

FALL  OF  HOSTALRICH  CASTLE. 

This  citadel  had  been  invested  early  in  January. 
Situated  on  a  high  reck,  armed  with  forty  guns,  well 
garrisoned,  and  commanded  by  a  brave  man,  it  was 
nearly  impregnable,  and  the  French  at  first  endeavoured 
to  reduce  it  by  a  simple  blockade,  but  towards  the 
middle  of  February,  they  commenced  the  erection  of 
mortar  batteries.  Severoli  also  pressed  the  place  more 
vigorously  than  before,  and  although  O'Donnel,  collect- 
ing convoys  on  the  side  of  Vich  and  Mattaro,  caused 
the  blockading  troops  to  be  attacked  at  several  points 
by  theMignelettes,  every  attempt  to  introduce  supplies 
failed.  The  garrison  was  reduced  to  extremity  and 
honourable  terms  were  offered,  but  the  governor,  .Julian 
Estrada,  rejected  them,  and  prepared  to  break  tlirough 
the  enemy's  line;  an  exploit  always  expected  Irom  a 
good  garrison  in  Turenne's  days,  and,  as  Napoleon  has 
shewn  by  numerous  examples,  generally  successful.* 

O'Doimel,  who  could  always  communicate  with  the 
garrison,  being  aware  of  their  intention,  sent  some 
vessels  to  Arenys  de  Mar,  and  made  demonstrations 
from  thence,  and  from  the  side  of  St.  Celoni,  to  fa- 
vour the  enterprise;  and  in  the  night  of  the  12th, 
Estrada,  leavinghis  sick  behind,  came  forth  with  about 
fourteen  hundred  men.  He  first  made  as  if  for  St.  Ce- 
loni, afterwards  turning  to  his  right,  he  broke  through 
on  the  side  of  St,  Felieu  de  Buxalieu  and  pushed  for 
Vich  ;  but  the  French  closing  rapidly  from  the  right 
and  left,  pursued  so  closely,  that  Estrada  himself  was 
wounded,  and  taken,  together  with  about  three  hundred 
men,  many  were  killed,  the  rest  dispersed  in  the  moun- 
tains, and  eight  hundred  reached  Vich  in  safety  ;  this 
courageous  action  was  therefore  successful.  Thus, 
after  four  months  of  blockade  and  ten  weeks  of  bom- 
bardment, the  castle  fell,  the  line  of  communication 
with  Barcelona  was  completed,  and  the  errors  coiumit- 
ted  by  Duhesme  were  partly  remedied,  after  two  years 
of  field  operations,  mat  y  battles,  and  four  sieges. 

Two  small  islands,  called  Las  Med<is,  situated  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Ter.  and  affording  a  safe  anchorage, 
were  next  seized.  This  event  which  facilitated  the 
passage  of  the  French  vessels,  stealing  from  port  to 
port  w  ith  provisions,  or  despatches,  finished  A  ugereau's 
career.  It  had  been  the  very  reverse  of  St.  Cyr's. 
The  latter,  victorious  in  the  field,  was  humane  after- 
wards ;  but  Augereau,  endeavouring  to  frighten  those 
people  into  submission,  whom  he  had  failed  to  beat, 
erected  gibbets  along  the  high-roads,  upon  which  every 
man  taken  in  arms  was  hung  up  without  remorse,  which 
cruelty  produced  precisely  the  effect  tiiat  rniglit  be  ex- 
pected,■)"  The  Catalans  more  animated  by  their  sue* 
cesses,  than  daunted  by  this  barbarous  severity,  became 


*  Napoleon's  M<n\oir3. 

f  Victones  et  (AHUjuetcB  dee  Fraacaise 


NAPIER    S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


1810.] 

:ncredibly  savage  ii*  their  revenge,  and  thus  all  human 
fefling  lost,  both  parties  were  alike  steeped  in  blood 
and  loaded  with  crimes. 


263 


CHAPTER  III. 

Suchet  marc'ies  ao;ainst  Lerida — Description  of  that  fortress — 
Suclifrt  iiui'-ches  to  Tarega — O'Donnel  advances  fioni  Tara- 
goiM — Sucliet  ittaJins  to  Balagiiei-. — Combat  of  Wargalef — 
S'u'Xf.  of  Lerida — the  city  stormed — Suchet  drives  the  in- 
habitants into  the  rjtadel  and  thus  forces  it  to  surrender. 

While  Augereau  lost,  in  Barcelona,  the  fruits  of  his 
success  at  Gerona,  Suchet,  sensible  how  injurious  the 
expedition  to  Valencia  had  proved,  was  diligently 
repairing  that  error.  Reinforcements  from  France, 
had  raised  his  fighting  men  to  about  twenty-three  thou- 
sand, and  of  these,  he  drew  out  thirteen  thousand  to 
fcrm  the  siege  of  Lerida;  the  remainder,  were  re- 
quired to  maintain  the  forts  in  Aragon,  and  to  hold  in 
check  the  Partisans,  principally  in  the  higher  valleys 
of  the  Pyrenees.  Villa  Campa  however,  with  from 
three  to  four  thousand  men,  still  kept  about  the  lordship 
of  Molina,  and  the  mountains  of  Albaracin. 

Two  lilies  of  operation  were  open  to  Suchet.  the  one, 
short  and  direct,  by  the  high  road  leading  from  Zara- 
goza  through  Fraga  to  Lerida  ;  the  other  circuitous, 
over  the  Sierra  de  Alcubierre,  to  Monzon,  and  from 
thence  to  Lerida.  The  first  was  inconvenient,  because 
the  Spaniards,  when  they  took  Fraga,  destroyed  the 
brido'e  over  the  Cinca.  Moreover,  the  fortress  of  Me- 
quinenza,  the  Octogesa  of  Cscsar,  situated  at  the  con- 
fluence of  the  Segre  and  the  Ebro,  was  close  on  the 
right  flank,  and  might  seriously  incommode  the 
communications  with  Zaragoza,  whereas  the  second 
route,  although  longer,  was  safer,  and  less  exhausted 
of  forage  and  provisions. 

Monzon  was  already  a  considerable  military  estab- 
lishment, the  battering  train  consisting  of  forty  pieces, 
with  seven  hundred  rounds  of  ammunition  attached  to 
each,  was  directed  there,  and  placed  under  the  guard 
of  Habert's  division,  which  occupied  the  line  of  the 
Cinca.  Leval  leaving  general  Chlopi^^ki  with  a  brigade 
at  Daroca,  to  observe  Villa  Campa,  drew  nearer  to 
Zaragoza  with  the  rest  of  his  division.  Musnier  march- 
ed with  one  brigade  to  A'canitz,  and  was  there  joined 
by  his  second  brigade,  which  had  been  conducted  to 
that  point,  from  Terruel,  across  the  Sierra  de  Gudar. 
And  while  these  movements  were  executing,  the  castles 
of  Barbastro,  Huesca,  Ayerhe,  Zuera,  Pina,  Bujarola, 
and  other  points  on  the  left  of  the  Ebro,  were  occupied 
by  detachments. 

The  right  bank  of  that  river,  being  gnarded  by  Le- 
val's  division,  and  the  country  on  the  left  bank,  secur- 
ed by  a  number  of  fortified  posts,  there  remained  two 
divisions  of  infantry,  and  about  nine  hundred  cavalry, 
disposable  for  the  operations  against  Lerida.  On  the 
Spanish  side,  t^ampo  Verde  was  with  O'Donnel  at 
Manreza,  Garcia  Novaro  was  at  Taragona,  having 
small  detachments  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Ebro  to 
cover  Tortoza ;  Perenna  with  five  battalions  occupied 
Balaguer  on  the  Upper  Segre. 

Such  were  the  relative  situations  of  both  parties, 
when  general  Musnier  quitting  Alcanitz  towards  the 
end  of  March,  crossed  the  Guadalupe,  drove  Novarro's 
detachments  within  the  walls  of  Tortoza,  and  then  re- 
mounting the  Ebro,  seized  some  boats,  and  passing 
that  river  at  Mora  and  at  Flix,  communicated,  as  I  have 
before  related,  with  colonel  Villatte  of  the  seventh 
corps.  While  this  was  passing  on  the  Ebro,  general 
Habert  crossed  the  Cinca  in  two  coluiims,  one  of 
which  moved  straight  upon  Balaguer,  while  the  other 
passed  the  Segre  at  Camarasa.  Perenna,  fearing  to 
bp  aM.a'-ked  on  both  sides  of  that  river,  and  not  wishing 
to  defti.d  Balaguer,  retired   down  the  left  bank,  aud 


usinsf  the  Lerida  bridge,  remounted  the  right  bank  to 
Corbins,  where  he  took  post  behind  the  Noguerra,  at 
its  confluence  with  the  Segre. 

Suchet  himself  having  repaired  to  Monzon  the  10th 
of  April,  placed  a  detachment  at  Candasnos  to  cover 
his  establishments  from  the  garrison  of  Mequinenza,  0 

and  the  13th  advanced  with  a  brigade  of  infantry,  and 
all  his  cavalry,  by  Almacellas,  against  Lerida;  mean- 
while Habert,  descending  the  right  bank  of  the  Segre, 
forced  the  passage  of  the  Noguerra,  and  obliged 
Perenna  to  retire  within  the  place.  The  same  day  Mus- 
nier came  up  from  Flix,  and  the  town  being  thus  en- 
compassed, the  operations  of  the  seventh  and  third 
corps  were  connected.  Suchet's  line  of  operations 
from  Aragon,  was  short,  direct,  and  easy  to  supply, 
because  the  produce  of  that  province  was  greater  than 
the  consumption.  Augereau's  line  was  long  and  un- 
safe, and  the  produce  of  Catalonia  was  at  no  time  equal 
to  the  consumption. 

Lerida  contained  about  eighteen  thousand  inhabitants. 
Situated  upon  the  high  road  from  Zaragoza  to  Barce- 
lona, and  about  sixty-five  miles  from  each,  it  possessed 
a  stone  bridge  over  the  Segre,  and  was  only  a  short 
distance  from  the  Ebro,  and  the  Cinca  rivers;  its  stra- 
tegic importance  was  therefore  great,  and  the  more  so, 
that  it  in  a  manner  commanded  the  plain  of  Urgel, 
called  the  granary  of  Catalonia.  The  regular  governor 
was  named  Gonsalez,  but  Garcia  Conde  had  been  ap- 
pointed chief  commandant,  to  appease  his  discontent 
at  O'Donnel's  elevation  ;  and  the  troops  he  brought 
with  him  had  encreased  the  garrison  to  nine  thousand 
regulars,  besides  the  armed  inhabitants. 

The  river  Segre  covered  the  town  on  the  south  east, 
and  the  head  of  the  bridge  was  protected  on  the  left 
bank,  by  a  rampart  and  ditch  enclosing  a  square  stone 
building.  The  body  of  the  place  on  the  north  side, 
was  defended  by  a  wall,  without  either  ditch  or  cover- 
ed way,  but  strengthened  and  flanked  by  bastions,  and 
by  towers.  This  wall  on  the  east,  was  joined  to  a 
rocky  hill  more  than  two  hundred  and  fifty  feet  high, 
the  top  of  which  sustained  the  citadel,  which  was  an 
assemblage  of  huge  solid  edifices,  clustered  about  a 
castle  of  great  height,  and  surrounded  by  an  irregular 
work  flanked  by  good  bastions  with  ramparts  from 
forty  to  fifty  feet  high. 

The  descent  from  the  citadel  into  the  town,  was 
gentle,  and  the  works  were  there  strengthened  by 
ditches ;  on  the  other  parts,  the  walls  could  be  seen  to 
their  base  ;  yet  the  great  height  of  the  rock  rendered  it 
impossible  to  breach  them,  and  the  approaches  were 
nearly  inaccessible.  Between  the  citadel-rock  and  the 
river,  the  town  was  squeezed  out,  about  two  or  three 
hundred  yards,  and  the  salient  part  was  secured  by  an 
entrenchment,  and  by  two  bastions  called  the  Carmen 
and  the  Magdalen. 

To  the  westward  of  the  town,  at  the  distance  of  seven 
or  eight  hundred  yards,  the  hill,  on  which  Afranius 
and  Petreius  encamped  to  oppose  Caesar,  was  crowned, 
on  the  end  next  to  Leiida,  by  Fort  Garden,  which  was 
again  covered  by  a  large  horn-work  with  ditches  above 
twenty  feet  deep  ;  and  at  the  farthest  extremity  of  the 
Afranian  hill,  two  large  redoubts  called  the  Pilar  and 
San  Fernando,  secured  the  whole  of  the  flat  summit. 
All  the  works  of  Lerida  were  in  good  condition,  and 
armed  with  more  than  one  hundred  pieces  of  artillery, 
the  magazines  were  full,  and  the  people  enthusiastic. 
A  local  Junta  also  had  been  formed  to  excite  public 
feeling,  and  two  ofliicers  of  artillery  had  already  been 
murdered  and  their  heads  nailed  to  the  gates  of  the 
town. 

The  siege  was  to  be  a  joint  operation  by  the  third 
and  seventh  corps,  but  the  infonuatinn  derived  from 
colonel  Villatte,  and  the  appearance  of  Spanish  Parti- 
sans on  the  lower  Ebro,  led  Suchet  to  suspect  that  the 
seventh  corps  had  already  retired,  and  tliai  the  burthen 


204 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR, 


[Book  X. 


would  rest  on  him  alone,  wherefore  he  still  kept  his 
battering  train  at  Monzon,  intending  to  wait  until  O'- 
Donnel's  plans  should  be  clearly  indicated,  before  he 
commenced  the  siege.  Meanwhile,  he  established  a 
communication  across  the  Segre,  by  means  of  a  rope 
ferry,  one  league  above  Lerida,  and  after  closely  exam- 
ining the  defences,  prepared  materials  for  the  con- 
struction of  batteries.  Two  battalions  of  the  investino- 
troops  had  been  left  at  Monzon  and  Balaguer,  the  re- 
mainder were  thus  distributed.  On  the  left  bank  of 
the  Segre,  at  Alcoteletge,  four  thousand  men,  including 
the  cavalry,  which  was  composed  of  a  regiment  of 
cuirassiers  and  one  of  hussars,  were  stationed  as  a 
corps  of  observation ;  Harispe,  with  three  battalions, 
invested  the  bridge-head  of  Lerida.  By  this  disposi- 
tion, the  ferry-boat  was  protected,  and  all  danger  from 
the  sudden  rising  of  the  Segre  obviated,  because  the 
stone  bridge  of  Balaguer  furnished  a  certain  communi- 
cation. 'J"he  rest  of  the  troops  occupied  different  posi- 
tions, on  the  roads  to  Monzon,  Fraga,  and  (sorbins,  but 
as  the  number  was  insuffici-ent  to  complete  the  circle 
of  investment  round  Fort  Garden,  that  part  was  con- 
tinually scoured  by  patrols. 

Scarcely  were  these  arrangements  completed  when  a 
Spanish  otncer,  pretending  to  bear  projiositions  for  an 
exchange  of  prisoners,  was  stopped  on  the  left  bank  of 
the  Segre,  and  the  French  general  detained  him,  sus- 
pecting his  real  object  was  to  gain  information ;  for 
there  were  rumours,  that  O'Donnel  was  collecting 
troops  at  Momblanch,  that  Campo  Verde  was  at  Cer- 
vera,  and  that  the  Somalenes  of  the  high  valleys  were 
in  arms  on  the  upper  Segre.  Suchet  anxious  to  ascer- 
tain the  truth  of  these  reports,  reinforced  Harispe  with 
three  hundred  hussars  on  the  19th  of  April,  and  carried 
the  corps  of  observation  to  Balaguer.  The  governor 
of  Lerida  took  that  opportunity  to  make  a  sally,  but 
ivas  repulsed,  and  the  21st,  the  French  general,  to 
strengthen  his  position  at  Balaguer,  caused  the  bridge 
cf  Camarasa,  above  that  town,  to  be  broken,  and  then 
advanced  as  far  as  Tarrega,  forty  miles  on  the  road  to 
Barcelona,  to  obtain  intelligence;  for  he  was  still  un- 
certain of  Augereau's  movements,  and  like  every  other 
general,  French  or  English,  found  it  extremely  diffi- 
cult to  procure  authentic  information.  On  this  occa- 
sion, however,  by  a  happy  fortune,  he  ascertained  that 
O'Donnel,  with  two  divisions,  was  at  Momblanch, 
ready  to  descend  the  mountains  and  succour  Lerida ; 
wherefore  returning  by  one  forced  march  to  Balaguer, 
he  directed  Musnier  to  resume  his  former  position  at 
Alcoteletge. 

This  rapidity  was  well-timed,  for  O'Donnel  had 
passed  the  defiles  of  Momblanch,  with  eight  thousand 
chosen  infantry,  and  six  hundred  cavalry,  and  was  en- 
camped at  Vinaxa,  about  twenty-five  miles  from  Lerida, 
on  the  22(l.  when  a  note  from  Garcia  Conde,  sayino- 
that,  the  French  reserve  being  drawn  off,  the  investing 
force  was  weak,  reached  him.  Being  willing  to  seize 
the  favourable  moment,  he  immediately  pushed  for- 
ward, reached  Juneda,  fourteen  miles  from  Lerida,  by 
ten  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  23d,  and,  after  a  halt 
of  two  hours,  resumed  his  march  with  the  cavalry  and 
one  division  of  infantr}',  leaving  the  other  to  follow 
more  leisurely. 

COMBAT    OF    MARGALEF. 

Four  miles  from  Juneda,  stood  the  ruined  villao-e 
of  Margalef,  and  from  thence  to  Lerida  was  an  open 
country,  on  which  O'Donnel  could  perceive  no  cover- 
ing force;  hence,  trusting  implicitly  to  Conde's  infor- 
mation (already  falsified  by  Sachet's  activity),  the 
Spanish  general  descended  the  hills,  and  crossed  the 
plain  in  three  columns,  one  following  the  high  road 
and  the  other  two  marching  on  fhe  riyht  and  left.  The 
/♦pntre  outstripping  the  flankers,  soon  beat  b? -k  the 
advanced  posts  of  Harispe;  but  that  general,  iharged 


with  his  three  hundred  hussars,  upon  the  centre  Spanish 
column,  so  suddenly,  that  it  was  thrown  into  confusion, 
and  fled  towards  Margalef,  to  which  place,  the  flank 
columns  also  retreated,  yet  in  good  order.  During  this 
skirmish,  the  garrison  sallied  over  the  bridge,  but  as 
the  French  infantry  stood  firm,  the  besieged,  seeing  the 
rout  of  O'Donnel's  people,  returned  to  the  town. 

Meanwhile,  Musnier,  heviring  the  firing,  guessed  the 
real  statB  of  affairs,  and  marched  at  once  with  his  in- 
fantry and  four  hundred  cuirassiers, from  Alcoteletge 
across  the  plain  towards  Margalef,  hoping  to  ciii  fff 
the  Spaniards'  retreat.  O'Donnel  who  had  rallied  his 
troops,  was  already  in  line  of  battle,  having  the  artil- 
lery on  the  right  and  the  cavalry  on  the  left,  but  his 
second  division  was  still  in  tlie  rear.  The  French 
cuirassiers  and  a  battery  of  light  artillery,  came  up  at 
a  quick  pace,  a  cannonade  commenced,  and  the  Span- 
ish cavalry  rode  forward,  when  the  French  cuirassiers, 
commanded  by  general  Boussard,  charged  hotly,  and 
forced  them  back  on  the  line  of  battle  in  such  a  manner 
that  the  latter  wavered,  and  Boussard,  observing  the 
confusion,  came  with  a  rude  shock  upon  the  flank  of 
the  infantry.  The  Walloon  guards  made  a  vain  effort 
to  form  square,  but  the  confusion  was  extreme,  and 
finally  nearly  all  the  Spanish  infantry  threw  down  their 
arms  or  were  sabred.  The  cuirassiers,  elated  with 
their  success,  then  met  and  overthrew  a  Swiss  regi- 
ment, forming  the  advanced  guard  of  the  second  Span- 
ish division;  yet  the  main  body  of  the  latter  checked 
their  fury,  and  O'Donnel  retreated  in  good  order,  and 
without  further  loss  lo  the  defile  of  Momblanch.  This 
action,  although  not  discreditable  to  O'Donnel,  was 
very  unfortunate.  The  plain  was  strewed  with  car- 
casses; three  Spanish  guns,  one  general,  eight  colc^iels, 
and  above  five  thousand  men  were  captured  ;  and  the 
next  day  the  prisoners,  being  first  ostentatiously  march- 
ed under  the  walls  of  the  town,  were  shown  to  the 
Spanish  officer  who  had  been  detained  on  the  lyth, 
after  which  he  was  dismissed  by  the  road  of  Cervera, 
that  he  might  spread  the  news  of  the  defeat. 

Sucliel  wishing  to  profit  from  the  effect  of  this  vic- 
tory upon  the  besieged,  attempted  the  night  after  the 
battle,  to  storm  the  redoubts  of  San  Fernando  and  Pilar. 
He  was  successful  with  the  latter,  and  the  assailants 
descended  into  the  ditch  of  San  Fernando,  and  as  the 
Spaniards,  onlj'  fifty  in  number  and  unprovided  with 
hand  grenades,  could  not  drive  them  away,  a  parley 
ensued,  when  it  was  agreed  that  the  French  should 
retire  without  being  molested.  Thus  the  Pilar  was 
also  saved,  for  being  commanded  by  San  Fernando,  it 
was  necessarily  evacuated.  Previous  to  this  attempt, 
Suchet  had  summoned  the  city  to  surrender,  offering 
safe  conduct  for  commissioners  to  count  the  dead  on 
the  field  of  Margalef,  and  to  review  the  prisoners;  but 
Garcia  Conde  replied,  '■'■  that  Lerida  had  never  louked 
for  external  succour  in  her  defences." 

SIEGE    OF    LEllIDA. 

The  absolute  retreat  of  Angereau,  was  now  fully 
ascertained,  yet  the  victory  of  Margalef,  and  the  apa- 
thy of  the  V'alencians.  encouraged  Suchet  to  commcnre 
the  siege  in  form.  The  prisoners  were  sent  to  France 
by  the  way  of  Taca,  the  battering  train  was  brought  up 
from  Monzon,  and  all  the  other  necessary  preparalirns 
being  completed,  the  Spanish  out-posts  were  driven 
within  the  walls  between  the  2()th  and  2Tth.  'I'be  fol- 
lowing night,  under  the  direction  (if  general  Haxo, 
ground  was  broken  three  hundrtMl  yards  from  the  bas- 
tions of  the  (^armen  and  Magdalen ;  the  Spaniards 
threw  some  fire-balls,  and  opened  a  few  truns,  without 
interrupting  the  workmen,  and  when  day  broke,  the 
besiegers  were  well  covered  in  the  trenches. 

In  the  night  of  the  30ih  the  first  parallel  was  com- 
pleted. Breaching  and  counter  batteries  were  com- 
menced, six  sixtcen-pounders  were  destined  to  batter 


1810.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


265 


the  left  face  of  the  Carmen,  four  lonjT  twe've-pounders, 
to  ruin  the  defences  of  the  Maofdalpii,  and  four  mortars 
of  citrht  inches  to  throw  shells  into  the  citadel.  The 
weather  was  rainy  and  the  labour  hf-avy,  yet  the  works 
advanced  ra.pidly,  and  on  the  2d  of  May,  a  fourth  bat- 
tery, armed  with  two  mortars  aid  two  sixteen-pouiid- 
ers  was  raised  afjainst  the  Carmen.  Meanwhile  the 
Spanish  musqueteors,  incommoded  the  trenches  from 
the  left  bank  of  the  Segre,  which  obli<red  the  French  to 
contract  the  circle  of  investment  on  tiiat  side. 

In  the  evening  of  the  4th,  six  hundred  Spaniards,  sal- 
Ivinir  from  the  (barmen,  carried  the  fourth  battery  and- 
all  the  left  of  the  trenches,  while  another  body,  comincj 
from  the  Migdalen,  menaced  the  rioht  of  the  French 
works.  'I'he  French  oruards  held  the  latter  in  check, 
and  the  reserves  finally  drove  the  former  back  into  thi 
town;  but  after  this  attack,  a  ditch  and  rampart,! 
serve  as  a  jilace  of  arms,  was  carried  from  the  battery 
which  had  been  taken,  down  to  the  river;  and  as  the 
lio^ht  troops  still  continued  to  ply  the  trenches  from  the 
other  side  of  the  Seg^re,  jrround  was  broken  there,  close 
to  the  water,  and  a  battery  of  two  guns  was  construc- 
ted to  answer  six  Spanish  field-pieces,  posted  on  the 
bridge  itself.  The  parallel  of  the  main  attack  was  al- 
so extended  on  the  right,  embracing  a  part  of  the  north- 
ern front  of  the  citadel,  and  two  mortars  were  placed  at 
this  extremity. 

All  the  P>ench  batteries  opened  at  da3'-break  on  the 
7th,  the  mortars  played  into  the  town  and  citadel,  and 
four  Spanish  guns  were  dismounted  in  the  Carmen. 
Nevertheless,  the  counter  fire  silenced  three  Frerich 
batteries,  the  dismounted  guns  were  replaced,  and  three 
hundred  men,  stealing  out  at  dusk  by  the  Puerta  Nue- 
va,  fell  upon  the  right  of  the  parallels,  took  the  two 
mortars,  and  penetrated  as  far  as  the  approaches  against 
the  Magdalen.  This  sally  was  repulsed  by  the  French 
reserves,  but  they  suffered  from  the  Spanish  guns  in 
the  pursuit,  and  in  the  night  a  violent  storm,  with  rain, 
damaged  the  batteries  and  overflowed  the  trenches. 
From  the  8th  to  the  lllh  the  besiegers  laboured  at  their 
works,  and  opened  a  second  parallel  one  hundred  and 
fifty  yards  in  advance  of  the  first,  with  the  intention  of 
forming  fresh  batteries  ;  that  being  closer  under  the  cita- 
del-rock, would  be  less  exposed  to  its  plunging  fire. 
More  guns,  and  of  a  larger  size,  were  also  mounted; 
three  new  batteries  were  constructed,  and  marksmen 
were  planted  to  harass  the  Spanish  cannoneers. 

On  the  12th  the  fire  recommenced  from  eight  batte- 
ries, containing  fifteen  guns  and  nineteen  mortars.  The 
besieged  replied  at  first  sharply,  but  in  a  little  time 
stammered  in  their  answers,  the  French  artillery  took 
the  ascendent,  the  walls  of  the  Carmen  and  iNIagdalen 
crumbled  under  their  salvos,  and  a  portable  magazine 
blew  up  in  the  citadel.  Towards  evening  two  breaches 
in  the  Carmen,  and  one  in  the  Magdalen,  appeared 
practicable,  and  after  dark,  some  Swiss  deserters  com- 
ing out  through  the  openings,  brought  intelligence, 
that  the  streets  of  the  town  behind  the  breaches,  were 
retrenched  and  defended  by  batteries. 

Suchet's  hopes  of  an  early  termination  to  the  siege 
now  rose  high.  He  had  from  the  first  supposed,  that 
the  vehemence  of  the  citizens,  and  of  the  armed  peas- 
antry who  had  entered  the  place,  would  oblige  the 
governor  to  fight  the  town  to  the  last,  instead  of  reser- 
Ting  hiselForls  for  the  defence  of  the  citadel.  He  knew 
that  armed  mobs,  easily  excited,  are  as  easily  discour- 
aged, and  he  projected  to  carry  the  breaches  briskly, 
and  with  one  sweep,  to  force  all  the  inhabitants  into  the 
citadel,  being  well  assured  that  they  would  hamper, 
if  not  entirely  mar,  the  defence  of  that  formidable  for- 
tress; but  he  resolved  first  to  carry  the  forts  of  San 
Fernando  and  the  Pilar  and  the  horn-work  of  P'ort  Gar- 
den, lest  the  citizens,  flying  from  the  assault  of  the 
breaches,  should  take  refuge  on  that  side.  To  eft'ect 
this,  three  oolumns,  provid'^d  with  ladders  and  other 


necessary  implements,  simultaneously  mounted  the  hill 
of  Afranius  that  night;  one  marched  against  the  re- 
doubts-, and  the  others  were  ordered  to  storm  the  h(^rn- 
work  on  two  sides.  The  Pilar  was  carried  without 
diffriiity,  and  the  garrison  flying  towards  Fort  (harden, 
fell  in  with  the  second  French  column,  which  arrived 
with  the  fugitives  at  the  ditch  of  the  horn-work,  and 
being  there  joined  by  the  third  colunm,  which  had  ta- 
ken a  wrong  direction,  the  whole  mass  entered  the  place 
fighting.  The  Spaniards  saved  themselves  in  Fort  Gar- 
den, but  meanwhile  the  people  in  Fernando  resisted 
desperately,  and  that  redoubt  was  not  taken  until  two- 
thirds  of  the  defendants  were  put  to  the  sword.  Thus 
tf  e  P'rench  effected  their  object  with  the  loss  of  a  hun- 
■ed  men. 

During  this  operation  the  great  batteries  played  into 
.ne  citadel  only,  but,  at  day-break,  renewed  their  fire 
on  the  breaches  ;  steps  were  also  cut  in  the  parallel,  to 
facilitate  the  advance  of  the  troops  to  the  assault;  and 
all  the  materials,  necessary  to  effect  a  solid  lodgement 
on  the  walls,  were  conveyed  into  the  trenches.  These 
arrangements  being  completed  at  seven  o'clock  in  the 
evening  of  the  13th,  the  signal  was  made,  and  four 
storming  parties  jumped  out  of  tire  trenches  ;  two  iriade 
for  the  Carmen,  one  against  the  Magdalen,  and  one  mov- 
ed close  by  the  river,  and  the  Spaniards  being  at  tb.is 
moment  preparing  a  sally  to  retake  the  horn-work  of 
Fort  Garden,  did  so  little  expect  this  assault,  that  they 
suffered  the  French  to  mount  the  breaches  witiiout  op- 
position ;  but  then  rallying,  foimd  such  a  fire  of  mus- 
quetry  and  artillery  upon  the  heads  of  the  principal 
columns,  that  the  latter  staggered  and  would  have  yield- 
ed if  Habert  had  not  revived  their  courage,  and  led 
them  into  the  town,  at  the  very  moment  that  the  troops 
on  the  right  and  left  having  also  forced  their  way,  turn- 
ed all  the  retrenchments  in  the  streets.  On  the  other 
side  of  the  river,  general  Harispe  carried  the  bridge,  and 
Suchet  himself,  with  the  reserve,  followed  close  upon 
the  steps  of  the  storming-parties ;  the  Spaniards  were 
thus  overpowered,  and  the  regular  troops  commenced 
a  retreat  into  the  citadel. 

It  was  now  that  the  French  general  put  his  design 
into  execution.*  Harispe's  brigade  passing  the  bridge, 
made  for  the  gate  of  St.  Anthony,  looking  towards  Fort 
Garden,  and  thus  cut  off  all  egress  tiom  the  town  ;  this 
done,  the  French  columns  advanced  froin  every  side, 
in  a  concentric  direction,  upon  the  citadel,  and,  with 
shouts,  and  stabs,  and  musquetry,  drove  men.  women, 
and  children  before  them,  while  the  guns  of  the  castle 
sinote  friends  and  foes  alike.  Then  flying  up  the  as- 
cent, the  shrieking  and  terrified  crowds  rushed  into  the 
fortress  with  the  retiring  garrison,  and  crowded  on  the 
summit  of  the  rock;  but,  all  thai  night,  the  French 
shells  fell  amongst  the  hapless  multitude,  and,  at  day- 
light, the  fire  was  redoubled,  and  the  carnage  swelled, 
until  Garcia  Conde,  overpowered  by  the  cries  and  suf- 
ferings of  the  miserable  people,  hoisted  the  white  flag. 
At  twelve  o'clock,  the  horrible  scene  terminated.  The 
capitulation  that  followed  was  honourable  in  terms  to 
the  besieged,  but  Fort  Garden  being  included,  Suci^et 
became  master  of  Lerida,  with  its  immense  stores  and 
near  eight  thousand  prisoners,  for  the  whole  loss  of  the 
garrison  had  been  only  twelve  hundred  men. 

Thus  suddenly  was  this  powerful  fortress  reduced, 
by  a  proceeding,  politic  indeed,  but  scarcely  to  be  ad- 
mitted within  the  pale  of  civilized  warfare.  For,  thougli 
a  town,  taken  by  assault,  he  considered  the  lawful  prey 
of  a  licentious  soldiery,  this  remnant  of  barbarism,  dis- 
gracing the  military  profession,  does  not  warrant  the 
driving  of  unarmed  helpless  people,  into  a  situation, 
where  they  nmst  perish  from  the  fire  of  the  enemy,  un- 
less the  governor  fail  in  his  duly.  Suchet  justifies  it, 
on  the  ground,  that  he  thus  spared  a  great  etTusion  of 

*  Suchet'it  Memoiri. 


200 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  X. 


blood  wbich  must  necessarily  have  altended  a  protrac- 
ted sierre,  and  the  fact  is  true.  But  this  is  to  spare 
soldiers'  blood  at  the  expense  of  women's  and  children's, 
and,  had  Garcia  Conde's  nature  been  stern,  he,  too, 
mioht  have  pleaded  expediency,  and  the  victory  would 
have  fallen  to  him  who  could  longest  have  sustained 
the  sight  of  mangled  infants  and   despairing  motliers. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Reflertions  on  that  act — Lazan  enters  Alcanitz,  but  is  Hrivm 
out  b_v  trie  Freiicl'. — (^olone!  Petit  taken  with  a  convoy  bv  Vil- 
la Cani|)a,  and  assassinateil  after t'lc  action — Sitfj^e  of  iMequi- 
nenza — Fall  ofiliat.place — Moi<  lla  taken — Suchet  [■  rep  .res  to 
enter  Cat.ilonia — Strength  an  I  resources  of  that  province. 

When  Lerida  fell,  Conde  was  accused  of  treachery, 
but  tiiere  seems  no  foimdation  for  the  charge  ;  the  cause 
stated  by  Suchet  was  sufficient  for  the  effect;  yet  the 
defence  was  very  unskilful.  The  walls,  on  the  side  of 
tne  attack,  could  not  be  expected,  and  scarcely  did, 
offer  an  impediment  to  the  French  general  ;  hence  the 
citadel  should  have  been  the  better  prepared,  and,  as 
the  besiegers'  force,  the  corps  of  observation  being  de- 
ducted, did  not  exceed  the  garrison  in  number,  it  might 
have  baffled  Suchet's  utmost  efforts.  Engineers  re- 
quire that  the  relative  strength  of  besiegers  and 
besieged,  should  not  be  less  than  four  to  one ;  yei  here 
the  French  invested  a  force  equal  to  themselves,  and 
in  a  short  lime  reduced  a  great  fortress  in  the  midst  of 
succouring  armies ;  for  Lerida  had  communications, 
1.  With  the  armed  population  of  the  high  valleys;  2. 
With  O'DonneFs  corps  of  fourteen  thousand  ;  3.  With 
Cervera,  where  Campo  Verde  was  posted  with  four 
thousand  men ;  4.  With  Tortoza,  where  the  marquis 
of  Lazan,  now  released  from  his  imprisonment,  com- 
manded from  five  to  six  thousand  ;  5.  With  Valencia, 
in  which  province  there  was  a  disposable  army  of  fif- 
teen thousand  regular  and  more  than  thirty  thousand 
irregular  soldiers. 

It  is  evident  that,  if  all  these  forces  had  been  direc- 
ted with  skill  and  concert  upon  Lerida,  not  only  the 
siege  would  liave  been  raised,  but  the  very  safety  of 
the  third  corps  endangered  ;  and  it  was  to  obviate  this 
danger  that  Napoleon  directed  the  seventh  corps  to 
take  such  a  position  on  the  Lower  Ebro  as  would  keep 
both  O'Donnel  and  the  Valencians  in  check.  Auge- 
reau,  as  we  have  seen,  failed  to  do  this ;  and  St.  Cyr 
asserts  that  the  seventh  corps  could  never  safely  ven- 
ture to  pass  the  mountains,  and  enter  the  valley  of  the 
Ebro.  On  the  other  hand,  Suchet  affirms  that  Napo- 
leon's instructions  could  have  been  obeyed  without 
difficulty.  St.  Cyr  himself,  imder  somewhat  similar 
circumstances,  blockaded  Taragona  for  a  month  ;  Au- 
gereau,  who  had  more  troops  and  fewer  enemies,  might 
have  done  the  same,  and  yet  spared  six  thousand  men 
to  pass  tiie  mountains,  Suchet  would  then  have  been 
tranquil  with  respect  to  O'Donnel,  would  have  had  a 
covering-army  to  protect  the  siege,  and  the  succours, 
fed  from  the  resources  of  Aragon,  would  have  relieved 
Cjtalonia. 

Augereaii  has  been  justified,  on  the  ground,  that  the 
blockade  of  Hostalrich  would  have  been  raised  while 
he  was  on  the  Hbro.  The  danger  of  this  could  not 
have  escaped  the  emperor,  yet  his  military  judgement, 
tinerring  in  principle,  was  often  false  in  application, 
because  men  measure  difficulties  by  the  standard  of 
their  own  capacity,  and  Napoleon's  standard  only 
suited  the  heroic  proportions.  One  thing  is,  however, 
certain,  that  Catalonia  presented  the  most  extraordinary 
ditficiilties  to  the  invaders.  The  powerful  military  or- 
ganization of  the  Miguelettes  and  Somatenes, — the 
well-arranged  svstem  of  f)rtrcsses, — the  ruggedness 
and  sterility  of  the  country, — the  ingenuity  and  readi- 


ness of  a  manufacturing  population  thrown  out  of  work, 
and,  finally,  the  aid  of  an  English  fleet,  combined  to 
render  the  conquest  of  this  province  a  gigantic  task. 
Nevertheless,  the  French  made  progress,  each  step 
planted  slowly  indeed  and  with  pain,  but  firmly,  and 
insuring  the  power  of  making  another. 

Hostalrich  and  Lerida  fell  on  the  same  day.  The 
acquisition  of  the  fir^-t  consolidated  the  French  line  of 
communication  with  Barcelona;  and,  by  the  capture 
of  the  second,  Suchet  obtained  large  magazines,  stores 
of  powder,  ten  thousand  muskets,  the  command  of 
several  dangerous  rivers,  easy  access  to  the  higher 
valleys,  and  a  firm  footing  in  the  midst  of  the  Catalo- 
nian  strong-holds ;  and  he  had  taken  or  killed  fifteen 
thousand  Spanish  soldiers.  Yet  this  was  but  the  pre- 
lude to  greater  struggles.  The  Migueleltes  supplied 
O'Donnel  with  abundance  of  men,  and  neither  his 
courage  nor  his  abilities  were  at  fault.  Urgel,  Cardona, 
Bero-a,  Cervera,  Moquinenza,  Taragona,  San  Felippe 
Belaguer,  and  Tortoza,  tlie  link  of  connexion  between 
V' alencia  and  Catalonia,  were  still  to  be  subdued,  and, 
during  every  great  operation,  the  Partisans,  being  un- 
molested, recovered  strength.  Thus  during  the  siege 
of  Lerida,  the  marquis  of  Lazan  entered  the  town  of 
Alcanitz  with  five  thousand  men.  and  would  have  car- 
ried the  castle,  but  that  general  Laval  despatched  two 
thousand  men,  from  Zaragoza,  to  its  succour,  when  the 
Spaniards  after  a  skirmish  in  the  streets,  retired  ;  and, 
while  this  was  passing  at  Alcanitz,  Villa  Campa  in- 
tercepted four  hundred  men  conducting  a  convoy  of 
provisions  from  Calatayud  to  Zaragoza.  Colonel  Pe- 
tit, the  commander,  being  attacked  in  the  defile  of 
Frasno,  was  forced  to  abandon  his  convoy,  and,  under 
a  continued  fire,  to  fight  his  way  for  ten  miles,  until  his 
detachment,  reduced  to  one  hundred  and  eighty  wound- 
ed men,  passed  the  Xalon  river,  and,  at  the  village 
ofArandiza,  finally  repulsed  the  assailants.  The  re- 
mainder of  this  desperate  band  were  taken  or  killed, 
and  Petit  himself,  wounded,  a  prisoner,  and  silting  in 
the  midst  of  several  Spanish  officers,  was  basely  mur- 
dered the  evening  after  the  action.  Villa  Campa  put 
the  assassin  to  death,  but  at  the  same  time,  sutfered 
the  troops  to  burn  alive  an  old  man,  the  Alcade  of 
Frasno,  who  was  taken  among  the  French. 

This  action  happened  the  day  Lerida  fell,  and  the 
next  day,  Chlopiski,  following  Villa  Campa's  march 
from  Daroca,  reached  Frasno,  but  the  Spaniards  were 
no  longer  there  ;  Chlopiski,  then  dividing  his  forces, 
pursued  them,  by  the  routes  Calatayud  and  Xarava,  to 
Molina,  where  he  destroyed  a  manufiictory  for  arms, 
and  so  pressed  the  Spanish  general,  that  his  troops 
disbanded,  and  several  hundred  retired  to  their  homes. 
At  the  same  time,  an  attack,  made  from  the  side  of 
Navarre,  on  the  garrison  of  Ayerbe,  was  re])ulsed. 

These  petty  events,  while  they  evinced  the  perse- 
verance of  the  Spaniards,  proved  also  the  stability  of 
Suchet's  power  in  Aragon.  His  system  was  gradually 
sapping  the  spirit  of  resistance  in  that  province.  In 
Lerida  his  conduct  was  as  gentle  and  moderate  as  the 
nature  of  this  unjust  war  would  permit;  and,  however 
questionable  the  morality  of  tlie  proceeding  by  which 
he  reduced  the  citadel,  it  must  be  acknowledged  that 
his  situation  required  most  decided  measures,  for  the 
retreat  of  the  seventh  corps  set  free  not  only  O'Donnel's 
army,  but  Oampo  Verde's  and  all  the  irregular  bands. 
'I'he  Somatenes  of  the  iiigh  valleys  appeared  in  force, 
on  the  Upper  Segre,  the  very  day  of  tlie  assault ;  eight 
hundred  Miguelettes  attacked  Venasque  three  days  af- 
ter: and  Campo  V^erde,  marching  from  Cervera,  by 
Aramunt,  took  post  in  the  mountains  of  Lliniana,  above 
Talarn  and  Tremp,  where  great  bodies  of  the  Soma- 
tenes also  assembled. 

Their  plans  were  disconcerted  by  the  sudden  fall  of 
Lerida;  the  Miguelettes  were  repulsed  from  V'^nasque; 
the  Somatenes  defeated  at  Tremp  ;  and  general  llabert, 


18iO.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


2G7 


Tfi^rrhiiiLf  from  Bnlasrner,  cut  n(T  rampo  Vprde  from 
Cervera.  anri  forced  him  to  retreat  njion  Cnrdona.  If 
the  cit-^Hel  of  Lrridn  bnd  held  cut.  and  O'Doiinrl,  less 
hnsty,  hr.d  romhined  his  march,  at  a  later  period,  with 
these  Somatenes  and  with  Canipo  Verde,  the  third 
corps  criild  scarcely  have  escaped  a  disaster;  where- 
as, now  the  plain  of  Ilrofel  and  all  the  fertile  valleys 
opening  upon  Lerida  fell  to  the  French,  and  S'uchet, 
after  tal<inr]f  measures  to  secure  them,  turned  his  arms 
ap-ainst  Mequinenza.  This  r>1pce  situated  at  the  con- 
fluence of  ilio  Seg-re  and  the  Ebro.  just  where  the  latter 
boffins  to  be  naviarble,  was  the  key  to  further  oi'era- 
tions.  Tbe  French  orpneral  could  not  advance  in  force 
ap-ninst  Tortoza.  nor  avail  himself  ofthe  water-carriajre, 
until  Mequinen'za  should  fall  ;  and  such  was  his  ac- 
tivity thai  one  detachment,  sent  the  day  after  the  as- 
sault of  Lerida,  by  tbe  left  bank  rf  tlie  Sejrre,  was  al- 
ready bt'fore  the  place :  and  Musuier's  division,  descend- 
inor  the  rin-ht  bank  of  that  river,  drove  in  some  ofthe 
outposts  and  commenced  the  investment  on  the  20th 
of  May. 

Mequinenza,  huiH  on  an  elbow  of  land  formed  by  tbe 
meetincf  ofthe  SeoTe  and  Ebro,  was  fortified  by  an  old 
Moorislt  wall,  and  strengthened  by  modern  batteries, 
especially  on  the  Fracra  road,  the  only  route  by  which 
artillery  could  approach.  A  shoot  from  the  Sierra  de 
Alcuhierre  filled  the  space  between  the  two  rivers,  and 
narrowingf  as  they  closed,  ended  in  a  crao-g-y  rock, 
seven  hundred  feet  biorh  and  overhancrinCT  the  town, 
which  was  built  between  its  base  and  the  water.  This 
rock  was  crowned  by  a  castle,  with  a  rampart,  which 
beincr  inaccessible  on  two  sides  from  the  steepness,  and 
:oj'ered,  on  a  third,  by  the  town,  could  only  be  assailed, 
on  tbe  fourth,  alono-  a  hio-h  neck  of  land,  three  hundred 
yards  wide,  that  joined  the  rock  to  the  parent  hills: 
and  the  rampart  on  that  side,  was  hastioned,  lined  with 
masonry,  and  protected  by  a  ditch,  counterscarp,  and 
covered  way  with  palisades.  No  puns  could  be 
brought  against  the  castle,  until  tbe  country  people, 
employed  by  Suchet,  had  opened  a  way  from  Torriente, 
over  the  bills,  and  this  occupied  the  engineers  until  tbe 
1st  of  .Time,  and  meanwhile  tbe  brigfade,  which  had  de- 
feated Lazan  at  Alcanitz,  arrived  on  the  right  hank  of 
tbe  El)ro,  and  completed  the  investment.  The  30th 
of  Mav,  gfeneral  Rojrniat,  rominji  from  France,  with  a 
reinforcement  of  engineer-officers,  and  several  compa- 
nies of  sappers  and  miners,  also  reached  the  camp, 
when,  taking  the  direction  ofthe  works,  he  contracted 
the  circle  of  investn;ent,  and  commenced  active  opera- 
tions. 

SIEGE    OF    MEQUINENZA. 

The  Sjviniards  made  an  ineffecttial  sally  the  31st ; 
and,  the  i'd  of  June,  the  French  artillery,  consistingf  of 
eiprhteen  pieces,  of  which  six  were  twenty-four  pound- 
ers, bein<T  brought  over  the  hills,  the  advanced  posts 
of  the  Spaniards  were  driven  into  the  castle.  During 
the  night,  groimd  was  broken  two  hundred  yards  from 
tbe  place,  under  a  destructive  fire  of  j^rape,  and  while 
this  was  passino-  on  the  heipbt,  approaches  were  made 
against  the  town,  in  the  narrow  space  between  the 
Ebro  and  the  foot  rf  the  reck.  Stron{T  infantry  posts 
were  also  entrenched,  close  to  the  water,  on  the  right 
hank  of  that  river,  to  prevent  the  navigation,  but  of 
eleven  boats  freighted  with  inhabitants  and  their  prop- 
ertv,  nine  efTected  their  escape. 

In  tbe  night  ofthe  .^d  the  parallels  on  the  rock  were 
perfected,  the  breaehing-batteries  were  commenced, 
and  parapets  of  sand-bags  were  raised,  from  behind 
whieb  the  French  infantry  plied  the  embrasures  ofthe 
castle  with  musketry;  the  works  against  the  town 
were  also  advanced,  but  in  both  places,  the  nature  of 
the  ground  greatly  impeded  the  operations.  The 
trenches  above,  being  in  a  rocky  soil,  were  opened 
clii(  fly  by  blasting;  those  below  were  in  a  space  too  , 


i  narrow   for  batteries,   and,    moreover,   searched   by  a 
])!unging  fire,   bntii  from   the  castle,  and   from  a  gun 
mounted    on    a    high    tower  in   the    town  wall.     The 
i  troops  on  the  right  hank  ofthe  Ebro,  however,  opened 
I  their  musketry  with  such  efiect  on  the  wall,  that  the 
I  garrison  could  not  stop,  and  both   the  wall   and   tower 
j  were  then  escaladed  without  difficulty,  the  Spaniards 
jail   retiring   to  the  castle.     The  French  placed   a  bat- 
I  talicn  in  tbe  houses,  and  pi:t  those  next  the  reck  in  a 
state  of  defence;  and  although  the  garrison  ofthe  cas- 
tle rolled   down   large  stones  from  above,  they  killed 
more  ofthe  inhabitants  than  ofthe  enemy. 

Tbe  Gth  the  French  batteries  on  the  roclc,  three  in 
number,  were  completed  ;  and,  in  the  night,  forty 
grenadiers  carried  by  storm  a  small  outwork  called  tbe 
horse-shce.  The  7th,  Suchet,  who  had  b(  en  at  Zara- 
gcza,  arrived  in  the  camp  and,  on  the  8th,  sixteen 
pieces  of  artillery,  of  which  four  were  mortars,  opened 
on  the  castle.  The  Spaniards  answered  with  such  vig- 
our, that  three  P^'rench  gims  were  dismounted,  vet  the 
besiegers  acquired  the  superiority,  and  at  nine  o'clock 
in  theiTiorning,  the  p'ace  was  nearly  silenced,  and  the 
rampart  broken  in  two  places.  The  Spaniards  endeav- 
oured to  keep  up  tbe  defence  with  musketry,  while 
they  mounted  fresh  guns,  hut  the  interior  ofthe  castle 
was  so  severely  searched  by  tbe  bombardment,  that,  at 
ten  o'clock,  the  governor  capitulated.  Fourteen  hun- 
dred men  became  prisoners  of  war ;  forty-five  guns,  and 
large  stores  of  powder  and  of  cast  iron  were  captured, 
and  provisions  for  three  months  were  found  in  the  mag- 
azines. 

Two  hours  after  the  fall  of  Mequinenza,  general 
Mont-Marie,  commanding  the  troops  on  the  right  bank 
ofthe  Ebro,  marched,  against  Morella,  in  the  kingdom 
of  Valencia,  and  took  it  on  the  13th  of  June;  for  the 
Spaniards,  with  a  wonderful  negligence,  had  left  that 
important  fort,  commanding  one  cf  the  principal  en- 
trances into  the  kingdom  of  Valencia,  without  arir.s  or 
a  garrison.  When  it  was  lost,  general  O'Donoju,  with 
a  division  of  the  Valencian  army,  advanced  to  retake 
it,  but  Mont-Marie  defeated  him.  The  works  were 
then  repaired,  and  Morella  becam.e  a  strong  and  im- 
portant place  of  arms. 

By  these  rapid  and  successful  operations  Suchet 
secured,  L  A  fortified  frontier  against  the  regular 
armies  of  Catalonia  and  Valencia;  2.  Solid  bases  for 
offensive  operations,  and  free  entrance  to  those  prov- 
inces;  3.  The  command  of  several  fertile  tracts  of 
country  and  of  the  navigation  ofthe  Ebro;  4.  'J'he  co- 
operation of  the  seventh  corps,  which,  by  the  fall  of 
Lerida,  could  safely  engage  beyond  the  Llobregat. 
But,  to  effect  the  complete  subjugation  of  Catalonia,  it 
was  necessary  to  cut  off  its  comiriunications  by  land 
with  Valencia,  and  to  destroy  O'Donnel's  base.  The 
first  could  only  be  effected,  by  taking  Tortoza,  the 
second  by  capturing  Taragona.  Hence  the  immediate 
sieges  of  those  two  great  places,  the  one  by  the  third, 
and  the  other  by  the  seventh  corps,  were  ordered  by  the 
emperor. 

Suchet  was  ready  to  commence  his  part,  but  many 
and  great  obstacles  arose  :  the  difficulty  of  obtaining 
provisions,  in  the  eastern  region  of  Catalonia,  was  in- 
creased by  O'Donnel's  measures,  and  that  general,  still 
commanding  above  twenty  thousand  men,  was  neither 
Jaunted  by  past  defeats,  nor  insensible  to  the  advan- 
tages of  his  position.  His  harsh  manners  and  stern 
sway,  rendered  him  hateful  to  the  people;  but  he  was 
watchful  to  confirm  the  courage,  and  excite  tbe  enthu- 
siasm of  his  troops  by  conferring  rewards  and  honours 
on  the  field  of  battle,  and,  being  of  singular  intrepidity 
himself,  his  exhortations  had  more  eflVct,  Two  years 
of  incessant  warfare  had  also  formed  several  good  of- 
ficers, and  the  full  strength  and  importance  of  every 
position  and  town  w-ere,  by  dint  of  experience,  liecom- 
iiig  known.     \\  ilh  these  nelps  O'Doniiel  long  ]iri'venl- 


268 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


pBcoK  X. 


ed  the  siege  of  Tortoza,  and  found  full  employment  for 
the  enemy  during  the  remr.inder  of  the  year.  Never- 
theless, the  conquest  of  Catalonia  advanced,  and  the 
fortified  places  fell  one  after  another,  each  scrvin^j,  hy 
its  fall,  to  strenofthen  the  hold  of  the  French,  in  the 
same  proportion  that  it  had  before  impeded  their  pro- 
gress. 

The  foundations  of  military  power  were,  however, 
deeply  cast  in  Catalonia.  'J'here  the  greatest  efforts 
were  made  by  the  Spaniards,  and  ten  thousand  British 
soldiers,  hoverinor  on  the  coast,  ready  to  land  on  the 
rear  of  the  French,  or  to  join  the  Catalans  in  an  ac- 
tion, could  at  any  peri'  d  of  1809  and  1810,  have  para- 
lyzed the  operations  of  the  seventh  corps,  and  saved 
Ger.;na,  Hcstalrich,  Tort<  za,  Taragona,  and  even  Le- 
rida.  \\  hile  those  places  were  in  the  hands  of  the 
Spaniards  and  tht  ir  hopes  were  high,  English  troops 
from  Sicily  were  reducing  the  Ionian  islands  or  loi- 
tering on  the  coast  of  Italy  ;  but  when  all  the  for- 
tress«^s  of  Catalonia  had  fallen,  when  the  regular  armies 
were  nearly  destroyed,  and  when  the  people  were  worn 
out  with  sutferiiig,  a  British  army  which  could  have 
been  beneficially  employed  elsewhere,  appeared,  as  if  in 
scorn  of  common  sense,  on  the  eastern  coast  of  Spain. 
Notwithstanding  the  many  years  of  hostility  with 
France,  the  English  ministers  were  still  ignorant  of 
every  military  principle;  and  yet  too  arrogant  to  ask 
advice  of  prr  fessional  men;  for  it  was  not  until  after 
the  death  oi"  Mr.  Perceval,  and  when  the  decisive  vic- 
tory of  Salamanca  shewed  the  giant  in  his  full  propor- 
tions, that  even  Wellington  himself  was  permitted  the 
free  exercise  of  his  judgement,  although  he  was  more 
than  once  reniinded  hy  Mr.  Perceval,  whose  narrow 
views  continually  clegired  the  operalicns,  that  the 
whole  responsibility  cf  failure  would  rest  on  his  head. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Operations  in    Andalusia — Elorkarle   of  Cadiz — Desertions  in 
that  ( ity — Regency  formed  —  Albuquerque  sent  to  Englind 

—  Dies  there Rcgeurv  consf  ut  to  admit  British  troops 

General  Colm  Canijjbt  11  obtains  leave  to  put  a  garrison  in 
Ceuta,  and  to  destroy  the  Spanish  lines  at  San  Roque — 
General  William  Stewart  arrives  at  Cadiz — Seizfs  Matagor- 
da  Tempest  destroys   many  vesstls — Mr.  Henry  WtlKs- 

ley  and  general  Graham  arrive  at  Cadiz-— Apathy  of  tlie 
Spaniards— Gidlant  defence  of  Matagorda-— Heroic  conduct 
of  a  st-rgeant's  wife— -General  Campbell  sentis  a  detachment 
to  occupy  Tariia-'-French  prisoners  cut  the  cables  of  t!ie 
prison-hulks,  and   drift  during  a   tenipesf---General   Lacey's 

.    tsjiedition  to  the  Ronda-— His  bid  conduct— Returns  to  Cadiz 

—  Reilections  on  the  state  of  affairs. 

Suchet's  preparations  equally  menaced  Valencia, 
and  Catalofiia,  and  the  authorities  in  the  former  prov- 
ince, perceiving,  although  too  late,  that  an  exclusive 
and  selfish  policy  would  finally  bring  the  enemy  to 
their  own  doo-s,  resolved  to  co-operate  with  the  Cata- 
lonians,  while  the  Murcians,  now  under  the  direction 
of  Blake,  waged  war  on  the  side  of  Grenada,  and  made 
excursions  against  the  fourth  corps.  'I'he  acts  of  the 
Valencians  shall  be  treated  of  when  the  course  of  the 
history  leads  me  back  to  Catalonia,  those  of  the  Mur- 
cian  army  belong  to  the 

OPER.\TipNS  IN  ANDALUSIA. 

Darin?  the  month  of  February,  the  first  corps  was 
before  (.adiz,  the  fourth  in  Grenada,  Dessolles'  divi- 
sion at  (-ordoba,  Jaen,  and  Ubeda,  and  the  fifth  corps 
(with  the  exception  of  six  battalions  and  some  horse 
left  at  Seville)  in  Estremadura.  The  king,  accompa- 
nied by  marshal  Scult,  moved  with  his  guarls  nnri  h 
brigade  of  cavalry,  to  different  points,  and  received 
from  all  the  great  towns  assurances  of  their  adhesion 


to  his  cause.  But  as  the  rrcrssilirs  rf  the  army  de- 
manded immediate  and  heavy  contributions,  both  of 
money  and  provisions,  moveable  columns  were  em- 
ployed to  collect  them,  especially  for  the  fourth  corps, 
and  with  so  little  attention  to  discipline  as  soon  to 
verify  the  observations  of  St.  Cyr,  that  they  were 
better  calculated  to  create  than  to  suppres^s  insurrec- 
tions. The  people  exasperated  by  disorders,  and  vio- 
lence, and  at  the  same  time  excited  by  the  agents  of 
their  own  and  tiie  British  government,  suddenly  rose 
in  arms,  and  Andalusia,  like  other  parts  of  Spain,  be- 
came the  theatre  of  a  petty  and  harassing  warfare.* 

The  Grenadans  of  the  Alpujarras,  were  the  first  to 
resist,  and  this  insurrection  spreading  on  the  one  hand 
through  the  Sierra  de  Ronda,  and  on  the  other,  towards 
Murcia,  received  succours  fr^im  (iibraltar,  and  was 
aided  by  the  troops  and  armed  peasantry  under  the 
command  of  Blake.  The  communication  between  the 
first  and  fourth  corps  across  the  Sierra  de  Ronda,  was 
maintained  by  a  divisir  n  cf  the  former,  posted  ..t  Medina 
Sidonia,  and  by  some  infantry  and  hussars  of  the  latter 
quartered  in  the  town  of  Konda.  From  the  latter  place, 
the  insurgents,  principally  smugglers,  drove  the  French, 
while  at  the  other  extremity  Blake  marching  from  Al- 
meira.  took  Ardra  and  Motril,  and  at  the  same  time  the 
mountaineers  of  Jaen  and  Cordoba  interrupted  Dessol- 
les' communications  with  La  Mancha. 

These  movements  took  pl;:ce  in  the  beginning  of 
March,  and  the  king  and  Soult  being  then  in  the  city 
of  Grenada,  sent  one  column  across  the  mountain  hy 
Orgiva  to  fall  upon  the  flank  of  lilake  at  Motril,  while 
a  second  moving  by  Guadix  and  Ohanes  upon  Almeria, 
cut  off  his  retreat.  This  obliged  the  Murcians  to  dis- 
perse, and  at  the  same  time,  Dessolles  defeated  the  in- 
surgents on  the  side  of  Ubeda;  and  the  garrison  of 
Malaga,  consisting  of  three  battalions,  marched  to  re- 
store the  communications  with  the  first  corps.  Being 
joined  by  the  detachment  beaten  at  Ronda,  they  retook 
that  post  on  the  21st  of  March;  but  during  their  ab- 
sence the  people  from  the  Alpuxaras  entered  Malaga, 
killed  some  of  the  inhabitants  as  favourers  of  the  enemy, 
and  would  have  done  more,  but  that  another  column 
from  Grenada  came  down  on  them,  and  the  insurrec- 
tion was  thus  strangled  in  its  birth.  It  had,  however, 
sufiiced  to  prevent  the  march  of  the  troops  designed  to 
co-operate  with  Suchet  at  Valencia,  and  it  was  of  so 
threatening  a  character,  that  the  fifth  corps  was  recalled 
from  Estremadura,  and  all  the  French  troops  at  Madrid, 
consisting  of  the  garrison,  and  a  part  of  the  second 
corps,  were  directed  upon  Almagro  in  La  Mancha,  the 
capital  itself  being  left  in  charge  of  some  Spanish  bat- 
talions in  the  invader's  service. f  The  king  who  feared 
the  Valencian  and  Murcian  armies  would  invade  La 
Mancha,  repaired  thither,  and  after  a  time  returned  to 
Madrid.  'I'he  duke  of  Dalmatia  then  remained  chief 
commander  of  Andalusia,  and  proceeded  to  organize  a 
system  of  administration  so  efficacious,  that  neither  the 
efforts  of  the  Spanish  government,  nor  of  the  armv  in 
(^adiz,  nor  the  perpetual  incursions  of  Spanish  troops 
issuing  from  Portugal,  and  supported  by  British  corps 
on  that  frontier,  could  seriously  shake  his  hold,  but 
this  will  ho  better  shewn  hereafter;  at  present,  it  is 
more  convenient  to  notice 

THE    BLOCKADE    OF    CADIZ. 

Marshal  Victor  having  declined  an  assault  on  the 
Isla,  spread  his  army  round  the  margin  of  the  bay,  and 
commenced  works  of  contravallation  on  an  extent  of 
not  less  than  twenty-five  miles.  The  towns,  the  islands, 
castles,  harbours,  and  rivers,  he  thus  enclosed  are  toe 
numerous,  and  in  their  relative  bearings,  too  intricate 
for  minute  description;  yet,  looking  as  it  were  from 

»  King  .'oseph's  Correspondence,  captured  at  Victoria,  MS$. 
+  Mr.  Stuart's  Correspoudtnce.  MSS. 


1810.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


209 


tne  French  camps,  I  oiiall  endeavour  to  point  out  the 
loafiing  features. 

The  blockade  was  maintained  in  three  grand  divi- 
sions or  entrenched  positions,  namely,  Chiclana,  Puerto 
Real,  and  Santa  Maria.  The  first,  having  its  left  on 
the  sea-cnast  near  the  Torre  Bermeja,  was  from  thence 
carried  across  the  Almanza,  and  the  Chiclana  rivers,  to 
the  Zuraquc  ;  on  a  line  of  eight  miles,  traced  along  a 
rnnge  of  thickly  wooded  hills,  and  bordering  a  marsh 
from  one  to  three  miles  broad.  This  marsh,  traversed 
in  its  breadth  by  the  above-mentioned  rivers,  and  by  a 
i;i;n;ber  of  navigable  water-ccurses  or  creeks,  was  also 
cut  in  its  w  hole  length  by  the  Santi  Petri,  a  iiptural 
channel  connecting  the  upper  harbour  of  Cadiz  with 
the  rpen  sea.  The  Sanii  Petri,  nine  miles  long,  from 
two  to  three  hundred  yards  wide,  and  of  depth  to  float 
a  seventy-fnur,  received  the  waters  of  all  the  creeks 
crossing  the  marsh  and  was  the  first  Spanish  line  of 
defence.  In  the  centre,  the  bridge  of  Zuaro,  by  which 
the  only  road  to  Cadiz  passes,  was  broken  and  defend 
ed  by  botleries  on  both  sides.  On  the  right  hand,  the 
Caraccas,  or  Royal  Arsenal,  situated  on  an  island  just 
in  the  harbour  mouth  of  the  channel,  and  on  account 
of  the  marsh  inattackahle.  save  by  water  or  by  bom- 
bardment, was  covered  vi  ith  strong  batteries  and  served 
as  an  advanced  post.  On  the  left  hand  the  castle  of 
Santi  Petri,  also  built  on  an  island,  defended  the  sea 
mouth  of  the  channel. 

IJeyond  the  Santi  Petri  was  the  Isla  de  Leon,  in  form 
a  triangle,  the  base  of  which  rested  on  that  channel, 
the  right  side  en  the  harbour,  the  left  on  the  open  sea, 
and  the  apex  pointing  towards  Cadiz.  All  this  island 
was  a  salt-marsh,  except  one  high  and  strong  ridge  in 
the  centre,  about  four  miles  long,  upon  whirh  the  large 
town  of  La  I&la  stands,  and  which  being  witfcin  cannon 
{■hot  of  the  Santi  Petri,  offered  the  second  line  of  de- 
fence. 

From  the  apex,  called  the  Torre  Gardo,  a  low  and 
narrow  isthmus  about  five  miles  long,  connected  the 
island  with  the  rocks  upon  which  Cadiz  stood,  and 
across  the  centre  of  this  narrow  isthmus,  a  cut  called 
the  Cortadura,  defended  by  the  large  unfinished  fort  of 
Fernando,  offered  a  third  line  of  defence.  The  fourth 
ar.d  final  line,  was  the  land  front  of  the  city  itself,  reg- 
ularly and  completely  fortified. 

On  the  Chiclana  side  therefore,  the  hostile  forces 
were  only  separated  by  the  marsh;  and  although  the 
Spaniards  crmmanded  the  Santi  Petri,  the  French  hav- 
inor  their  chief  deprts  in  the  town  of  Chiclana,  could 
always  acquire  the  mastery  in  the  marsh  and  might 
force  the  passage  of  the  channel ;  because  the  Chiclana, 
Zuraque,  and  Almanza  creeks,  were  navigable  above 
ti;e  lines  cf  cuntravallation.  The  thick  woods  behind, 
aiforded  the  li.eans  of  constructing  an  armed  flotilla  ; 
and  such  was  'he  nature  of  the  ground  bordering  the 
Santi  Petri  itself,  on  both  sides,  that  off  the  high  road, 
it  could  only  be  approached  by  water,  or  by  narrow 
footpaths,  leading  between  the  salt-pans  of  the  marsh. 

The  central  French  or  Puerto  Real  division,  extend- 
ing from  the  Zuraque  on  the  left,  to  the  San  Pedro  a 
navigable  branch  of  the  Guadalete  on  the  right,  mea- 
sured about  seven  miles.  From  the  Zuraque  to  the 
t'jwn  of  Puerto  Real,  the  line  was  traced  along  a  ridge 
skirting  the  marsh,  so  as  to  form  with  the  position  of 
Chiclana  a  half  circle.  Puerto  Real  itself  was  en- 
trenched, but  a  tongue  of  land  four  miles  long  project- 
ed from  thence  perpendicularly  on  to  the  narrow  isth- 
mus of  Cadiz.  'I'his  tongue,  cloven  in  its  whole  length 
by  the  creek  or  canal  of  Troccadero,  separated  the  inner 
from  the  outward  harbour,  and  at  its  extreme  points 
stood  the  village  of 'I'roccadero,  and  the  fort  of  Mata- 
gorda, opposed  to  which  there  was  on  the  isthmus  of 
Cadiz  a  powerful  battery  called  the  Puntales.  From 
P'^itacforda  to  the  city  was  above  four  thousand  yards, 
bji  acr-ifs   ll.e  cl.aDi.o!   u<   Punlales  was  only  t\v(.lve| 


hundred  ;  it  was  therefore  the  nearest  point  to  Cadiz 
and  to  the  isthmus,  and  was  infinitely  the  most  im- 
portant post  of  offence.  From  thence  the  French  could 
search  the  upper  harbour  with  their  fire  and  throw 
shells  into  the  Caraccas  and  the  fort  of  Fernando, 
while  their  flotilla  safely  moored  in  the  Troccadero 
creek,  could  make  a  descent  upon  the  isthmus,  and 
thus  turn  the  Isla.  and  all  the  works  between  it  and 
the  city.  Nevertheless,  the  Spaniards  dismantled  and 
abandoned  Matagorda. 

The  third  or  Santa  Maria  division  of  blockade,  fol- 
lowed the  sweep  of  the  bay,  and  reckoning  from  the 
San  Pedro,  on  the  left,  to  the  castle  of  Santa  Catalina 
the  extrcm.e  point  of  the  outer  harbour,  on  the  right, 
was  about  five  miles.  The  town  of  Santa  Maria,  built 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Guadalete  in  the  centre  of  this  line, 
was  entrenched  and  the  ground  ahout  Santa  Catalina 
was  extremely  rugged. 

Besides  these  lines  of  blockade  which  were  con- 
nected by  a  covered  way,  concealed  by  thick  woods, 
and,  when  finished,  armed  with  three  hundred  guns, 
the  towns  of  Rota  and  San  Lucar  de  Barameda  were 
occupied.  The  first,  situated  on  a  cape  of  land  oppo- 
site to  Cadiz,  was  the  northern  point  of  the  great  bay 
or  roadstead,  the  sfcond  commanded  the  mouth  of  the 
Guadalquivir.  Behind  the  line  of  blockade,  Latonr 
Maubourg,  with  a  covering  division,  took  post  at  Me- 
dina Sidonia,  his  left  being  upon  the  Upper  Guadalete, 
and  his  advanced  posts  watching  the  passes  of  the 
Sierra  de  Konda.  Such  was  the  position  of  the  first 
corps.  I  shall  now  relate  the  progress  of  events  within 
the  blockaded  city. 

The  fall  of  the  Central  Junta,  the  appointmentof  the 
regency  and  the  proclamation  for  convoking  the  national 
Cortes  have  been  already  toiiched  upon.  Albuquerque, 
hailed  as  a  deliverer,  elected  governor,  commander  in 
chief,  and  president  of  the  .Junta,  appeared  to  have  un- 
limited power,  but  in  reality,  possessed  no  Authority, 
except  over  his  own  soldiers,  and  did  not  meddle  with 
administration.  The  regency  appointed  provisionally 
and  composed  of  men  without  personal  energy  or  local 
influence,  was  obliged  to  bend  and  truckle  to  the. Junta 
of  Cadiz  ;  and  that  imperious  body  without  honour, 
talents,  or  patriotism,  sought  only  to  obtain  the  com- 
mand of  the  public  revenue  for  dishonest  purposes,  and 
meanwhile  privately  trafficked  with  the  public  stores.* 

Albuquerque's  troops  were  in  a  deplorable  state;  the 
whole  iiad  been  long  without  pay,  and  the  greater  part 
were  without  arms,  accoutrements,  ammunition,  or 
clothes. I  When  he  demanded  supplies,  the  Junta  de- 
clared that  they  could  not  furnish  them  ;  but  the  duke 
affirming  this  to  be  untrue,  addressed  a  memorial  to  the 
Regency,  and  the  latter,  anxious  to  render  the  Junta 
odious,  yet  fearing  openly  to  attack  them,  persuaded 
Albuquerque  to  publish  his  memorial.  The  Junta  re- 
plied by  an  exposition,  false  as  to  facts,  base  and  ridic- 
ulous in  reasoning;  for  although  they  had  elected  the 
duke  president  of  their  own  body,  they  accused  him 
amongst  other  things,  with  retreating  from  Carmona 
too  quickly  ;  and  they  finished  with  a  menacinjj  intima- 
tion, that,  supported  by  the  populace  of  Cadiz,  they 
were  able  and  ready  to  wreak  their  vengeance  rn  all 
enemies.  Matters  being  thus  hn  ught  to  a  crisis,  both 
Albuquerque  and  the  Regency  gave  way.  and  the  former 
being  sent  ambassador  to  England,  it  was  thought  he 
meant  to  go  to  South  America,  but  he  died  in  London, 
some  months  after,  of  a  phrenzy  brought  on,  as  it  is 
said,  by  grief  and  passion  at  the  unworthy  treatment 
he  received.  He  was  judged  to  he  a  brave  and  gener- 
ous man,  but  weak  and  hasty,  and  easy  to  he  duped. 

The  misery  of  the  troops,  the  great  extent  of  the 
positions,  the  discontent  of  the  seamen,  the  venal  spirit 


Aibiiniierqne's  Manifesto. 

I  i\\i.u  Corifsfond(nce  of  Officers  from  Cadiz,  1810,  MSS 


270 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  X. 


of"  the  .Innta,  the  apathy  of  the  people,  the  feebleness 
of  the  RpCTency,  the  senrcity  of  provisions,  and  the  iiia- 
cliinations  of  the  French,  who  had  many  favonrers,  and 
those  amongst  the  men  in  power,  all  combined  to  place 
Cadiz  in  the  grreatest  jeopardy  ;  and  this  state  of  affairs 
would  have  led  to  a  surrender,  if  E norland  bad  not  aoain 
filled  the  Spanish  store-bouses,  and  if  the  Regency  had 
not  consented  to  receive  British  troops  into  the  city. 
'I'heir  entrance  saved  it,  and  at  the  same  time,  general 
Colin  Cainphell  (who  had  succeeded  sir  John  Cradoek 
as  (jovernor  of  Gibraltar)  performed  a  great  service  to 
his  country,  for,  by  perseverinor  negotiation,  he  obtained 
that  an  English  garrison  should  likewise  enter  Ceuta, 
and  that  the  Spanish  lines  of  San  Roque,  and  the  forts 
round  the  harbour  of  Algesiras  should  be  demolished. 
Both  iTieasures  were  very  essential  to  the  present  and 
permanent  interests  of  Encland,  and  the  last  especially 
so,  because  it  cleared  the  neighbourhood  of  the  fortress, 
and  gave  it  a  secure  harbour.  Gibraltar,  at  this  time, 
contained  a  mixed  and  disaffected  population  of  more 
than  twelve  thousand  persons,  and  merchandize  to  the 
value  of  two  millions  sterling,  which  could  have  been 
easily  destroyed  by  bombardment.  Ceuta,  which  was 
chiefly  garrisoned  by  condemned  troops,  and  filled  with 
palley-slaves,  and  its  works  miserably  neglected,  had 
only  six  days'  provisions,  was  at  the  mercy  of  the  first 
thousand  French  that  could  cross  the  streights;  and 
the  possession  of  it  would  have  availed  the  enemy  in 
many  ways,  especially  in  obtaining  provisions  from 
Barbary,  where  his  emissaries  were  exceedingly  active. 

General  William  Stewart  arrived  in  Cadiz,  on  the 
11th  of  February,  with  two  thousand  men,  a  thousand 
more  joined  him  from  (libraltar,  and  the  whole  were 
received  with  an  enthusiasm,  that  proved  sir  George 
Smith's  perception  to  have  been  just,  and  that  Mr. 
Frere's  unskilful  management  of  the  Central  Junta,  had 
alone  presented  a  similar  measure  the  year  before.  The 
ITth  a  Portuguese  regimtnit,  thirteen  hundred  strong, 
was  also  admitted  into  the  city,  Spanish  troops  came  in 
daily  in  small  bodies  ;  two  ships  of  war.  the  Euthalion 
and  Undaunted,  arrived  from  !\Iexico  with  six  millions 
of  dollars;  and  another  British  battalion,  a  detachment 
of  artillery,  and  more  native  troops  having  joined  the 
ffarrison,  the  whole  force  assembled  behind  the  Santi 
Petri,  was  not  less  than  four  thousand  Anglo-Portu- 
guese, and  fourteen  thousand  Spaniards. |  Yet  there 
was  little  of  enthusiasm  amongst  the  latter;  and  in  all 
this  time,  not  a  man  among  the  citizens  had  been  en- 
rolled or  armed,  or  had  volunteered,  either  to  labour  or 
to  fiirbt.  'I'lie  ships  recovered  at  Ferrol,  had  been 
transferred  to  Cadiz,  so  there  were  in  the  bay,  twenty- 
three  men  of  war,  of  which  four  of  the  line,  and  three 
frigates  were  British;  and  thus,  money,  troops,  and  a 
fleet,  in  fine,  all  things  necessary  to  render  Cadiz  for- 
midable, were  collected,  yet  to  little  purpose,  because 
procrastination,  jealousy,  ostentation,  and  a  thousand 
absurdities,  were  the  invariable  attendants  of  Spanish 
armies  and  governments. 

General  Stewart's  first  measure,  w'as  to  recover  Ma- 
tagorda, the  error  of  abandoning  which  was  to  be  at- 
tributed as  much  to  admiral  Purvis  as  to  the  Spaniards. 
In  the  iiigbt  of  the  2'2d,  a  detachment  consisting  of  fifty 
eeamen  and  marines,  twenty-five  artillery-men,  and 
sixty-seven  of  the  ninety-fourth  regiment,  the  whole 
under  the  command  of  captain  M'Lean,  pushed  across 
the  channel  during  a  storm,  and  taking  possession  of  the 
dismantled  fort,  before  morning  eflected  a  solid  lodge- 
ment, and  although  the  French  cannonaded  the  work 
with  field-artillery  all  the  next  day,  tiie  garrison,  sup- 
ported by  the  fire  of  Puntales,  was  immoveable. 

'I'he  remainder  of  F^ebruary  passed  without  any  event 
of  importance,  yet  the  people  suffered  from  the  want 
of  provisions,  especially  fresh  meat ;  and  from  the  7th 


*  CJeneral  CVmnhf  11"?  Corrpspon'ien'-p.  MSS. 

t  OlVuial  A'i'.r.it  o'O  jcr  "'..ii-  r  CmWi.  li^'O    MSS. 


to  the  10th  of  March,  a  continued  tempest,  beating  up- 
on the  coast,  drove  three  Spanish  and  one  Portuguese 
sail  of  the  line,  and  a  frigate  and  from  thirty  to  forty 
merchantmen,  on  shore,  between  San  Lucar  and  St. 
IMary's.  One  ship  of  the  line  was  taken,  the  others 
burnt  and  part  of  the  crews  brought  off  by  boats  from 
the  fleet ;  hut  many  men,  and  amongst  others  a  part  of 
the  fourth  English  regiment  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
enemy,  together  with  an  immense  booty. 

Early  in  March,  I\Ir.  Henry  Wellesley,  minister 
plenipotentiary,  arrived,  and  on  the  24th  of  that  month, 
general  Graham  coming  from  England  assumed  the 
chief  command  of  the  British,  and  immediately  caused 
an  exact  military  survey  of  the  Isla  to  be  n:ade.  It 
then  appeared,  that  the  force  hitherto  assigned  for  its 
defence,  was  quite  inadequate,  and  that  to  secure  it 
against  the  utmost  efforts  of  the  enemy,  twenty  thou- 
sand soldiers,  and  a  system  of  redoubts,  and  batteries, 
requiring  the  labour  of  four  thousand  men  for  three 
months,  were  absolutely  necessary.  Now,  the  Span- 
iards had  only  worked  beyond  the  Santi  Petri,  and  that 
without  judgement ;  their  batteries  in  the  marsh  were 
ill  placed,  their  entrenchments  on  the  tongue  of  land  at 
the  sea  mouth  of  that  channel,  were  of  contemjitible 
strength,  and  the  Caraccas  which  they  had  armed  with 
one  hundred  and  fifty  guns,  being  full  of  dry  timber 
could  be  easily  burned  by  carcasses.  The  interior  de- 
fences of  the  Isla  were  quite  neglected,  and  while  they 
had  abandoned  the  important  posts  of  Matagorda,  and 
the  Troccadero,  they  had  pushed  their  advanced  bat- 
teries, to  the  junction  of  the  Chiclana  road  with  the 
Royal-causeway,  in  the  marsh  ;  that  is  to  say,  one  mile 
and  a  half  bej'ond  the  bridge  of  Zuazo,  and  consequent- 
ly exposed,  without  support,  to  flank  attacks  both  by 
water  and  land. 

It  was  in  vain  that  the  English  engineers  presented 
plans,  and  offered  to  construct  the  works ;  the  Span- 
iards would  never  consent  to  pull  down  a  house,  or 
destroy  a  garden  ;  their  procrastination  paralysed  their 
allies,  and  would  have  lost  the  place,  had  the  F'rench 
been  prepared  to  press  it  vigorously.  They  were  in- 
different to  the  progress  of  the  enemy,  and  to  use  gen- 
eral Graham's  expression,  they  wished  the  F^nglish 
would  drive  away  the  French,  that  ihcy  might  gn  and 
eat  strawberries  at  Chiclana.  Nor  were  the  British 
works  (when  the  vSpaniards  would  permit  any  to  be 
constructed)  well  and  rapidly  completed,  for  the  Junta 
furnished  bad  materials,  there  was  a  paucity  of  engineer- 
officers,  and,  from  the  habitual  negligence  of  the  min- 
isterial dejiartments  at  home,  neither  the  proper  stores, 
nor  implements  had  been  sent  out.  Indeed,  an  exact 
history,  drawn  from  the  jirivate  journals  of  commanders 
of  British  expeditions,  during  the  war  with  France, 
would  show  an  incredible  carelessness  of  preparation 
on  the  part  of  the  different  cabinets.  The  generals 
were  always  expected  to  "  make  bricks  without  straw," 
and  thus  the  laurels  of  the  British  army  were  for  many 
years  blighted.  Even  in  Egypt,  the  success  of  the 
venerable  hero,  Abercrombie,  was  due,  more  to  his 
perseverance  and  unconquerable  energy  before  the 
descent,  than  to  his  daring  operations  afterwards. 

Additional  reinforcements  reached  Cadiz  the  .31st, 
and  both  sides  continued  to  labour,  but  the  allies  slowly 
and  without  harmony,  and,  the  supplies  being  inter- 
rupted, scarcity  increased  ;  many  persons  were  forced 
to  quit  Cadiz,  two  thousand  men  were  sent  to  Aya- 
monte  to  collect  provisions  on  the  Guadiana;  and  not- 
withstanding this,  so  strange  a  people  were  the  Junta, 
that  they  deceived  Mr.  Wellesley  by  assurances  that 
the  magazines  were  full,  and  thus  induced  him  to  suf- 
fer them  to  send  wheat  and  flour  away  from  the  city, 
which  was  actually  done,  at  the  very  time  they  were 
thus  pressed  by  want!* 

But  now  Matagorda,  which,  though  frequently  can- 

»  General  Ciahcm's  Corresnondtncc.  MSS. 


1810.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


271 


nonatlpd,  had  been  he'id  fiftv-fivedays,  impeded  the  com- 
plerioii  of  the  eneiTw,'s  works  at  the  Troccadern  point. 
This  small  fort,  of  a  square  form,  with  one  anrjle  pro- 
jectinrr  towards  the  land,  without  a  ditch,  and  without 
bonib-])roofs  sufficient  for  the  tjarrison,  was  little  cal- 
culated for  resistance  ;  and,  as  it  could  only  brin^  seven 
puns  to  hear,  a  Spanish  seventy-four  and  an  armed  flo- 
tilla were  moored  on  the  flanks,  to  co-operate  in  the 
defence.  The  French  had  however  raised  tjreat  bat- 
teries behind  some  houses  on  the  Troccadero,  and,  as 
tiaylitrht  broke,  on  the  2lst  of  April,  a  hissino-  shower 
of  heated  shot,  fallinfj  on  the  seventy-four,  and  in  the 
midst  of  the  flotilla,  oblitred  them  to  cut  their  cables 
and  take  slielter  under  the  works  of  Cadiz.  Then  the 
fire  of  forty-eicrht  guns  and  mortars,  of  the  largest  size, 
was  concentrated  upon  the  little  fort  of  Matagorda,  and 
tiie  feeble  parapet  disappeared  in  a  moment  before  this 
crashing  flight  of  metal.  The  naked  rampart  and  the 
undaunted  hearts  of  the  garrison  remained,  but  the 
troops  tell  fast,  the  enemy  shot  quick  and  close,  a  staff, 
bearing  the  Spanish  flag,  was  broken  six  times  in  an 
hour,  and  the  colours  were  at  last  fastened  to  the  angle 
of  the  work  itself,  while  the  men,  especially  the  sailors 
besought  the  otlicers  to  hoist  the  British  ensign,  at- 
tributing the  slaughter  to  their  fightincf  under  a  foreign 
flag.  Thirty  hours  this  tempest  lasted,  and  sixty-four 
men  out  of  one  hundred  and  forty  were  down,  when 
general  Graham,  findino'  a  diversion  he  had  projected 
impracticable,  sent  boats  to  carry  off'  the  survivors. 
The  bastion  was  then  blown  up,  under  the  direction 
of  major  Lefebre,  an  engineer  of  irreat  promise,  but  he 
also  ff  11,  the  last  man  whose  blood  wetted  the  ruins 
thus  abandoned.  Here  I  must  record  an  action  of  which 
it  is  difficult  to  say  whether  it  were  most  feminine  or 
heroic.  A  sergeant's  wife,  named  Retson,  was  in  a 
casemate  wi-th  the  wounded  men,  when  a  very  young 
drummer  was  ord(>red  to  fetch  water  from  the  well  of 
the  fort;  seeing  the  child  hesitate,  she  snaif^Jied  the 
vessel  from  hia  hand,  braved  the  terrible  cannonade 
herself,  and,  although  a  shot  cut  tlie  bucket-cord  from 
her  hand,  she  recovered  it.  and  fulfilled  her  mission.* 

After  the  evacuation  of  Matagorda,  the  war  languish- 
ed at  Cadiz;  but  Sehastiani's  cavalry  infested  the 
neiphbourhood  of  (Gibraltar,  and  he  himself  entered  the 
capital  of  Murcia.  on  the  2.3d,  when  Blake  retired  up- 
on Alicant  and  Carthagena.  Meanwhile  the  French 
covered  Matagorda  point  with  batteries  ;  but  they  W'e re 
pressed  for  provisions,  and  general  Campbell,  throwing 
a  detachment  into  Tarifa,  drove  their  foragfers  from  that 
vicinity,  which  abounds  with  cattle. f  The  Spaniards 
at  San  Roque  promised  to  reinforce  this  detachment, 
yet  by  their  tardiness  enabled  the  enemj'  to  return  with 
four  hundred  foot  and  some  cavalry,  and  although  the 
former  were  repulsed,  the  horse  foraged  the  country, 
ami  drove  off  several  herds  of  cattle  during  the  action. 
General  Campbell  then  increased  tlie  detachment  to 
five  hundred  men,  with  some  guns,  and  placed  the 
whole  un  ler  the  command  of  major  Brown  of  the  28th. 

In  May  tlie  French  prisoners,  cutting  the  cables  of 
two  hulks,  drifted  in  a  heavy  gale  to  the  French  side 
of  the  hay;  and  the  boats  sent  against  them  being  beat 
off,  by  throwing  cold  shot  from  the  decks,  above  fif- 
•eeii  hundred  men  saved  themselves  in  despite  of  the 
fire  from  the  boats  of  the  allied  fleet,  and  from  the  batter- 
ies, which  was  continued  after  the  vessels  had  ground- 
ed; altnougli  the  miserable  creatures,  thus  struggling 
for  life,  had  been  treated  with  horrible  crueltv,  and, 
h<"'r;g  al.  of  Dupont's  or  Vedel's  corps,  were  prisoners 
CT71V  by  d  dishonourable  breach  of  faith  !  Meanwhile, 
ivk  CiiJii,  'i.'sorder  was  daily  increasing.   The  Regency 

*  An  ■i.tcT€stin<r  account  of  this  noble-minded  woniin,  is  to 
Up  found  in  n  small  volume,  entitled,  "  Sketches  of  a  Soldier's 
Life,  in  Ireland  "  by  the  author  of  "  Tlie  Evenffd  Life  of  a 
Soldier."  This  last  work  was  erroneously  desig'niited,  in  the 
form'T  part  of  ttiis  work,  as  "  '/'he  L'fe  of  a  Sergeant." 

f  General  Campbell's  Correspoodeiice.  MSS. 


having  recalled  Cuesta  to  their  military  councils,  he 
published  an  attai  k  on  the  deposed  Central  .kinta,  and 
was  answered  so  as  to  convince  the  world,  that  the 
course  of  all  parties  had  been  equally  detrimental  to  the 
state.  Thus  fresh  trouble^  were  excited.  'I"he  English 
general  was  hampered  by  the  perverse  spirit  of  the  au- 
thorities, and  Ihe  Spanish  troops  were  daily  getting 
more  ineflicient  from  neglect,  when  the  departure  of 
Albuquerque  enahled  Blake  to  take  the  chief  command 
in  the  Isla,  and  his  presence  produced  some  ameliora- 
tion in  the  condition  and  discipline  of  the  troops.  At 
liis  instance,  also,  the  Municipal  Junta  consented,  al- 
though reluctantly,  that  the  British  engineers  should 
commence  a  regular  system  of  redoubts  for  the  defence 
of  the  Isla. 

English  reinforcem.ents  continued  to  arrive,  and  four 
thousand  .Spaniards,  from  Murcia,  joined  the  garrison, 
or  rather  army,  now  within  the  lines;  yet  such  was 
the  state  of  the  troops,  and  the  difliculty  of  arranging 
plans,  that  hitherto  the  taking  of  Matagorda  had  been 
the  only  check  given  to  the  enemy's  w^orks.  It  was, 
however,  necessary  to  do  something;  and,  after  some 
ill  judged  plans  of  the  Regency  had  been  rejected  by 
Graham,  general  Lacy  was  embarked,  with  three  thou- 
sand infantry  and  two  hundred  cavalry,  to  aid  the  arm- 
ed peasants,  or  Seranos,  of  the  Ronda.*  'I'hese  peo- 
ple had  been  excited  to  arms,  and  their  operations  suc- 
cessfully directed  by  captain  Cowley  and  Mr.  Mitchel, 
two  British  artillery-ofiicers,  sent  from  Gibraltar.  Gene- 
ral Campbell  also  offered  to  reinforce  Lacj',  from  Gi.b- 
raltar,  ifhe  would  attack  Malaga,  where  there  were 
twenty  thousand  males  fit  to  carry  arms,  and  the  French 
were  only  two  thousand,  and  cooped  in  the  citadel,  a 
Moorish  castle,  containing  but  twelve  guns,  and  depen- 
dent for  water  on  the  town,  which  was  itself  only  sup- 
plied by  aqueducts  from  without.  Lacy  rejected  this 
enterprise,  and  demanded  tliat  eight  hundred  men,  from 
Gibraltar,  should  make  a  diversion  to  the  eastward, 
while  he,  landing  at  Algesiras,  moved  on  Ronda,  th'ia 
being  assented  to,  the  English  armament  sailed  under 
the  command  of  general  Bowes. 

Lacy  made  good  his  movement  upon  Ronda  the  18lh 
of  .Tune;  but  the  French,  having  fortified  it,  were  too 
strong  at  that  point,  or,  rather.  Lacy,  a  aian  cif  no  en- 
terprise, durst  not  act,  and,  when  he  was  joined  by 
many  thousand  mountaineers,  he  arrested  their  leaders 
for  some  offence,  which  so  disgusted  the  men  that  they 
disbanded.  The  enemy,  alarmed  by  these  operations, 
which  were  seconded  from  the  side  of  Murcia,  and  by 
an  insurrection  at  Baeza,  put  vll  their  disposable  troops 
in  motion  ;  the  insurrection  at  Baeza  was  quickly  crush- 
ed, and  general  Rey,  marching  from  Seville,  against  La- 
cy, entirely  defeated  and  cut  him  off'  from  Gibraltar,  so 
that  he  was  forced  to  re-enibark  with  a  few  men  at  Esti- 
pona,  and  returned  to  Cadiz  in  .luiy.  Here  it  is  impos- 
sible not  to  reflect  on  the  little  use  made  cf  the  naval 
power,  and  the  misapplication  ofthe  military  strength  in 
the  southern  parts  of  Spain.  The  British,  Portuguese, 
and  Spanish  soldiers,  at  Cadiz,  were,  in  round  num- 
bers, .30,000,  the  British  in  Gibraltar  5000,  in  Sicily 
16,000,  forming  a  total  of  more  than  fifty  thousand  ef- 
fective troops,  aided  by  a  great  navy,  and  favourably 
placed  for  harassing  that  immense,  and,  with  the  ex 
ception  ofthe  Valencian  and  Murcian  coasts,  uninter- 
rupted French  line  of  operations,  which  extended  from 
the  south  of  Italy  to  Cadiz;  for,  even  from  tlie  bottom 
of  Calabria,  troops  and  stores  were  brought  to  Spain. 
Yet  a  Neapolitan  rabble,  under  Murat,  in  Calabria,  and 
from  fifteen  to  twenty  thousand  French  around  Cadiz, 
were  allowed  to  paralyze  this  mighty  power. 

It  is  true  that  vigilance,  temper,  and  arrangement, 
and  favourable  localities,  are  all  required,  in  the  com- 
bined operations  of  a  fleet  and  army,  and  troops  disem- 
barking, also  require  time  to  equip  for  service.     But 

«  General  Grahana's  De9i)atchcs.    MSS 


272 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


LBooK  X. 


Minorca  offpTpd  a  central  station,  and  a  place  of  arms 
'or  the  army,  and  a  spacious  port  for  the  fleet;  the 
roast  of  Catalonia  and  Valencia  is  so  pacific  and  safe, 
that  seldom  or  never  does  a  gale  blow  on  shore ;  the 
operations  would  always  have  been  short,  and  inde- 
pendent of  the  Spanish  authorities,  and  lord  Colling- 
woovj  was  fitted,  by  his  talents,  discretion,  zeal,  expe- 
rience, and  accurate  knowledge  of  those  coasts,  suc- 
cessfully to  direct  such  a  floating  armament.  Whai 
ccast-siege,  undertaken  by  the  seventh  or  third  corps, 
culd  have  been  successfully  prcseculrd,  if  the  garri- 
son had  been  suddenly  augmented  with  fifteen  or  twenty 
thousand  men  fron?  the  ocean]  After  one  or  two  suc- 
cessful descents,  the  very  appearance  of  a  ship  of  war 
would  have  checked  the  operations  of  a  siege,  and 
obliged  the  enemy  to  concentrate:  whereas,  the  slight 
expeditions  of  this  period,  were  generally  disconcerted 
by  the  presence  of  a  few  French  companies. 

In  July  the  British  force,  in  Cadiz,  was  increased  to 
eight  thousand  five  hundred  men,  and  Sir  Richard  Keats 
arrived  to  take  the  command  of  the  fleet.  The  enemy, 
intent  upon  completing  his  lines,  and  constructing  flo- 
tillas at  Chiclana,  Santa  Maiia,  and  San  Lucar  de  Ba- 
rameda,  made  no  attacks,  and  his  works  have  been 
much  censured,  as  ostentatiously  extended,  and  leading 
to  nothing.  I'his  is  however  a  rash  criticism;  for  the 
Chiclana  camp  was  necessary  to  blockade  the  Isla,  and, 
as  tlie  true  point  for  offensive  (jperatims,  was  at  the 
Troccadero,  the  lines  of  Puerto  Real  and  Santa  Maria, 
were  necessary  to  protect  'hat  position,  to  harass  the 
fleet,  to  deprive  the  citi/er.s  of  good  water,  which  in 
ordinary  times,  was  fetched  from  Puerto  Maria,  and 
finally  to  enable  the  flotilla,  constructing  at  San  Lucar, 
to  creep  round  the  coast.  The  chances  from  storms, 
as  experience  proved,  almost  repaid  the  labour,  and  it 
is  to  be  considered  that  Soult  contemplated  a  serious 
attack  upon  Cadiz,  not  with  a  single  corps,  generally 
weaker  than  the  blockaded  troops,  but,  when  time  should 
ripen,  with  a  powerful  army.  Events  in  other  parts 
of  the  Peninsula  first  impeded,  and  finally  frustrated 
this  intention,  yet  the  lines  were,  in  this  view,  not  un- 
necessary or  ostentatious. 

Neither  was  it  a  slight  political  advantage,  that  the 
duke  of  Dalmatia  should  hold  sway  in  Seville  for  the 
usurper's  government,  while  the  National  Cortes,  and 
the  Regency,  were  cooped  up  in  a  narrow  corner  of  the 
province.  Moreover,  the  preparations  at  Matagorda 
c.nusiantly  and  seriously  menaced  Cadiz,  and  a  British 
division  was  necessarily  kept  there,  for  the  English 
generals  were  wrll  assured,  that  otherwise,  some  fatal 
disaster  would  befall  the  Spaniards.  Now  if  a  single 
camp  of  observation  at  Chiclana  had  constituted  all  the 
French  works,  no  mischief  could  have  been  apprehen- 
ded, and  Graham's  division,  consisting  of  excellent  sol- 
diers, would  have  been  set  free,  instead  of  being  coop- 
ed up,  without  any  counterbalance  in  the  number  of  the 
French  troops  at  the  blockade;  for  the  latter  aided  in- 
directly, and  at  times  directly,  in  securing  the  submis- 
sion of  Andalusia,  and  if  not  at  Cadiz,  they  must  have 
been  covering  Seville  as  long  as  there  was  an  army  in 
the  Isla. 


CHAPTER  VL 

Cotitinnntvon  of  the  operations  In  An'lalusia — Dpsrription  of 
the  Spnnish  and  Fortuj.'iiesc  lines  of  position  south  otthe  Ta- 
gns — Situalion  of  tl'e  armies  in  Kftrf-madura — Complex  ope- 
rations in  that  province — Soult's  policy. 

While  the  blockade  of  Cadiz  proceeded,  Seville  was 
guarded  by  a  few  thousand  men  of  the  fifth  corps,  left 
by  Morli(r  when  he  advanced  against  Badajos  ;  wnd 
even  from  this  small  body  six  hundred  infantry,  under 
general  Remond,  and  two  hundred  cavalry,  were  sent 
to  attack  the  viscount  De  Gand,  who  was  sliU  at  Aya- 


monte,  vainly  demanding  a  refuge  in  Portugal.  The 
latier  had  fiur  thousand  troops,  but  drclining  an  en- 
gagement, pas'^ed  by  his  left  through  Gibraleon  into  the 
Sierra  de  Aroche,  bordering  on  the  CV  ndado  de  Nirhia, 
and  the  French  immediately  occupied  Moguer  and  Hu- 
elva,  towns  situated  at  the  mouths  of  the  Odiel  and  Tin- 
to  rivers,  from  whence  Cadiz  had  liitherto  drawn  sup- 
plies. Meanwhile  the  viscount  returning  to  Ayamonte, 
sidled  with  his  troops  to  Cadiz,  and  was  replaced  by 
general  Copons,  who  came  with  two  thousand  ri  ^n  to 
gather  provisions  on  the  lower  Guadiana,  and  in  tho 
Tinto  and  Odiel  districts. 

On  the  other  side  of  Seville,  Sebastian!  had  an  un- 
easy task.  The  vicinity  of  Gibraltar  and  of  the  Mur- 
cian  army,  the  continued  descents  on  the  coast,  and  the 
fierceness  of  the  Moorish  blood,  rendered  Grenada  tho 
most  disturbed  portion  of  Andalusia;  a  great  part  of 
that  fine  province,  visited  by  the  horrors  of  insunec- 
tional  war,  was  ravaged  and  laid  waste. 

In  the  northern  parts  of  Andalusia,  abrut  Jaen  and 
Cordoba,  Dessolles  reduced  the  strurple  to  a  trifling 
Guerilla  warfare;  but  it  was  difl'i  rent  in  La  Maiicna, 
where  the  Partidas  became  so  numerous  and  the  wai  so 
onerous,  that  one  of  Joseph's  ministers  writing  to  a 
friend,  described  that  province  as  peopled  with  beggars 
and  brigands.  It  remains  to  speak  of  Estremadura 
which  was  become  the  scene  of  various  complicat<d 
movements  and  combats,  producing  no  great  results,  in- 
deed, but  important  as  being  connected  wiih  and  bear- 
ing on  the  defence  of  Portugal. 

The  Spanish  and  Portuguese  line  of  frontier  south 
of  the  Tagus,  may  be  divided  into  three  parts. 

1.  From  the  Tagus  to  Badajos  on  the  Guaciiana.  2. 
From  Badajos  to  the  Morena.  3.  From  the  Morena 
to  the  sea.  Each  of  these  divisions  is  about  sixty 
miles.  Along  the  first,  two-thirds  of  which  is  moun- 
tainous and  one-third  undulating  plains  and  thick  woods, 
a  double  chain  of  fortresses  guard  the  respective  fron- 
tiers. Alcantara,  Valencia  de  Alcantara,  Albucpierque, 
and  Badajos  are  the  Spanish  ;  Montalvao,  Castello  de 
Vide,  Marvao,  Aronches,  Campo  Mayor,  and  Elvas, 
the  principal  Portuguese  places.  The  three  first  on 
either  side  are  in  the  mountains,  the  others  in  the  open 
country,  v.hich  spreads  from  the  Guadiana  to  Portale- 
gre,  a  central  point,  from  whence  roads  lead  to  all  the 
above-named  fortresses. 

From  Badajos  to  the  Morena,  form.s  the  scccnd  di- 
vision of  the  countr}^,  it  is  rugged  and  the  chain  of 
fortresses  continued.  On  tlic  Portuguese  side,  Juia- 
menha,  Mourao  and  Moura;  on  the  Spanish,  Olivenza 
(formerly  Portuguese),  Xeres  de  los  Cavallercs,  and 
Aroche. 

From  the  Morena  to  the  sea,  the  lower  Guadiana 
separates  the  two  kingdoms.  The  Spaiiish  side,  px- 
treniely  rugged,  contained  the  fortresses  ( f  San  Lucai 
de  Guadiana,  Lepe,  and  Ayamonte.  The  Portuguese 
frontier,  Serpa,  Mertola,  Al-contin,  and  Castro  Marin, 
and,allhough  the  greater  number  of  these  places  were 
dismantled,  the  walls  of  all  were  standing,  some  m 
good  repair,  and  those  of  Portugal  for  the  most  part 
giarrisoned  by  militia  and  ordenanza. 

When  Mortier  attempted  Ihidajos,  on  the  12th  of 
February,  Romana  was  near  Truxillo,  and  the  place 
was  so  ill  provided,  that  a  fortnight's  blockade  would 
have  reduced  it;*  hut  the  French  general,  who  had  only 
brought  up  eight  thousand  infantry  and  a  brigade  of 
cavalry,  could  not  invest  it  in  face  of  the  troops  as- 
sembling in  the  vicinity,  and  therefore  retired  to  Zafra, 
leaving  his  horsemen  near  Olivenza.  In  this  positicn 
he  remained  until  the  Iflth  of  February,  when  hi3  car. 
airy  was  surprised  at  Valverde,  and  the  corrinian-ier 
Beauregard  slain,  liomana  then  returned  to  Badajoa 
the  20th  ;  and  the  27ih,  Mortier  leaving  scn.t  .rooj.s  '.a 


Mr.  Stuart's  Corn  spun  Vnre.     !\i5."> 


1810.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


273 


Zafra,  marched  to  Merida,  to  connect  himself  with  the 
•second  corps,  wiiieh  had  arrived  at  Montijo,  on  the 
Guadiana. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  this  corps,  commanded 
by  general  INIermet,  occupied  the  valley  of  the  Tag^us 
in  its  whole  length  during  the  invasion  of  Andalusia, 
and  communicating  with  the  sixth  corps  through  the 
pass  of  Baiios,  formed  an  intermediate  reserve  be- 
tween Mortier  and  Kellerman.  The  latter  was  at  lie- 
jar,  and  Miranda  de  Castanar,  watching  the  duke  Del 
Parque,  in  the  early  part  of  January,  but  withdrew  to 
Salamanca,  when  the  British  army  arrived  in  the  val- 
ley of  the  Mondego.  The  duke  Del  Parque  then  left 
Martin  Carrera  with  a  weak  division  in  the  Sierra  de 
Gata,  marched,  with  thirteen  thousand  men,  through 
the  pass  of  Perales,  crossed  the  Tagus  at  Barca  de 
Alconete  on  the  10th  of  February,  and  on  the  12th,  the 
day  Mortier  summoned  Badajos,  was  in  position  with 
his  right  at  Albuquerque  and  his  left  on  the  Guadiana. 

When  Mermct,  v.  hose  advanced  guard  was  at  Pla- 
centia,  knew  of  this  movement,  he  first  detached  three 
thouwnd  men  across  the  Tagus,  by  Seradillo,  to  observe 
Del  Parque,  and  soon  afterwards  Soult's  brother,  with 
four  thousand  men  from  Talavera,  crossed  the  bridge 
of  Arzobispo,  advanced  by  Caccres,  surprised  some 
Spanish  troops  at  Villa  del  Rey  and  reaching  Moutijo, 
piisned  patrols  close  to  Badajos.  The  remainder  of 
llie  .'^eond  corps  arrived  at  Caceres  by  degrees  ;  gen- 
eral Keynier  took  the  command,  and,  as  I  have  said, 
was  joined  by  Mortier,  who  immediately  commenced 
defensive  works  at  Merida,  and  prepared  gabions  and 
facines  as  if  to  besiege  Badajos. 

These  demonstrations  attracted  the  notice  of  general 
Hill,  who  advanced  with  ten  thousand  men  from  Ab- 
rantes  to  Portalegre  ;  and  then  Romana,  findi,pg  him- 
self, by  the  junction  of  the  duke  Del  Parque's  Wmy,  at 
the  head  of  twenty-five  thousand  men,  resolved  to  act 
against  the  communications  of  the  French.  His  first 
division,  commanded  by  Charles  O'Donnel,  brother  to 
the  Catalan  general,  occupied  Albuquerque.  The 
second,  under  Mendizabel,  was  posted  near  Castello 
de  Vide.  The  third,  consisting  of  five  thousand  A.s- 
turians,  was  sent,  under  Ballasteros,  to  Olivenza,  and 
the  fourth  remained  at  Badajos.  The  fifth,  under  Con- 
treras,  was  detached  to  Monasterio,  with  orders  to 
interrupt  Mortier's  communication  with  Seville. 

Cnntreras  reached  Xeres  de  los  Cavalleros  the  1st 
of  March,  but  a  detachment  from  Zafra  soon  drove 
him  thence,  and  Romana  retired  to  Campo  Mayor  with 
three  divisions,  leaving  Ballasteros  with  the  fourth  at 
Olivenza.  On  the  other  hand,  Mortier,  uneasy  about 
Contreras'  movements,  repaired  to  Zafra,  leaving  the 
second  corps  at  Merida.  The  10th,  Romana  ad- 
vanced again  towards  Albuquerque,  and  having  push- 
ed a  detachment  beyond  the  Sal  or  river,  it  was  sur- 
prised by  general  Foy.  The  14th  O'Donnel  endeavour- 
ed to  surprise  Foy  in  return,  but  the  latter,  with  very 
inferior  numbers,  fjught  his  way  through  the  Puerto 
(}f  Trasquillon,  and  the  Spaniards  took  possession  of 
Caceres. 

At  this  period  the  insurrections  in  Grenada,  the 
movements  of  the  Murcian  army,  and  the  general  ex- 
citement of  Valencia,  in  consequence  of  Suchet's  re- 
treat, caused  Joseph  to  recal  Mortier  for  the  defence  of 
Andalusia;  wherefore  the  latter,  after  holding  a  coun- 
cil of  war  with  Reynier,  destroyed  the  works  at  Meri- 
da, on  the  l!Uh,and  retired  to  Seville,  leaving  Gazan's 
division  at  Monasterio.  Reynier  iiaving  sent  his  stores 
to  Truxillo  drove  the  Spaniards  out  of  Caceres  the 
20th,  and  followed  them  to  the  Salor,  but  afterwards 
took  post  at  Torremocha,  and  O'Donnel  returned  to 
Caceres. 

There  are  two  routes  leading  from  Merida  and  Bada- 
jos to  Seville:     1.  The  Royal  Causeway,  which  pas- 
ses the  Morena  by  Zafra,  Los  Santos,  Monasterio,  and 
19 


Ronquillo.  2.  A  shrrter,  but  more  difficult,  road, 
which,  running  westv/ard  of  the  causeway,  passes  the 
mountains  by  Xeres  de  los  Cavalleros,  Fregenal,  ap'^ 
Araceiia.  These  parallel  routes,  have  no  cross  coni 
munications  in  the  Morena,  but  on  the  Estremaduraa 
side,  a  road  runs  from  Xeres  de  los  Cavalleros  to  Zafra, 
and  on  the  Andalusian  side,  there  is  one  from  Aracefia 
to  Ronquillo.  Now  when  Mortier  retired,  Ballasteros 
marched  from  Olivenza  to  Xeres  de  los  (Cavalleros, 
and  being  joined  by  Contreras,  their  united  corps, 
amounting  to  ten  thousand  men,  gained  the  Royal 
Causeway  by  Zafra,  and,  on  the  evening  of  the  SLtth, 
coming  up  with  Gazan,  fought  an  undecided  action  ; 
the  next  day  it  was  renewed,  and  the  Spaniards  having 
the  worst,  Ballasteros  retired  to  Araceiia  and  Contreras 
10  the  high  mountains  above  Ronquiilo.  From  Araceiia 
Ballasteros  marched  to  Huerva,  within  a  few  leagues  of 
Seville,  but  Girard  drove  him  back  again  to  Araceiia,  yet 
again  entering  the  Condado  de  Neibla,  he  established 
himself  at  Zalamea  de  Real  on  the  Tinto  riv^r. 

Meanwhile,  Romana  detached  a  force  to  seize  Meri- 
da, and  cut  the  communication  of  the  fifth  corps  with 
Reynier;  but  that  general,  marching  with  eight  thou- 
sand men  from  Torremocha,  passed  through  to  Medellin 
before  the  Spaniards  arrived,  and  pushed  troops  the  2d 
of  April,  into  the  Morena,  intending  to  take  (yontreras 
in  rear,  while  Gazan  attacked  him  in  front;  and  this 
would  have  happened,  but  that  O'Donnel,  immediately 
threatened  Merida,  and  so  drew  Reynier  back.  Nev- 
ertheless, Contreras  was  attacked  by  Gazan,  at  Pe- 
droche,  and  so  completely  defeated,  that  he  regained 
Zafra  in  the  night  of  the  14th,  with  only  two  thousand 
men  ;  Ballasteros  also,  assailed  by  a  detachment  frcm 
Seville,  retired  to  Araceiia. 

The  20th,  Reynier  marched  to  Montijo,  and  O'Don- 
nel retired  from  Caceres,  but  his  rear  guard  was  de- 
feated at  La  Rocca  the  21st,  and  his  division  would 
have  been  lost,  if  Mendizabel,  and  Hill  also,  had  not 
come  to  his  aid,  whereupon  Reynier  declining  a  gener- 
al action,  retired  to  Merida.  The  insurrection  in  the 
Alpuxaras  was  now  quelled,  the  Valeneians  remained 
inactive,  Joseph  re-entered  Madrid,  Soult  assumed  the 
government  of  Andalusia,  and  Mortier  returned  to  Es- 
tremadura.  On  the  Spanish  side,  Contreras  was  dis- 
placed, and  Imas,  his  successor,  advanced  to  Ronquillo, 
in  Mortier's  rear;  Ballasteros  remained  at  Aroche: 
Hill  returned  to  Portalegre,  and  Romana  encamped,, 
with  fourteen  thousand  men,  near  Badajos,  where  a 
Spanish  plot  was  formed  to  assassinate  him.  It  was 
discovered,  but  the  villain  vi  ho  was  to  have  executed 
the  atrocious  deed  escaped.* 

Notwithstanding  Romana's  presence,  Reynier  and  the 
younger  Soult,  passed  the  Guadiana  below  Badajos,. 
with  only  four  hundred  cavalry,  and  closely  examin- 
ed the  works  of  that  fortress,  in  despite  rf  the  whole 
Spanish  army  ;  at  the  same  time,  Mortier's  advanced 
guards  arrived  on  the  Guadi.ina,  and  a  reinforcement 
of  four  thousand  men  joined  the  second  corps  from 
Toledo  ;  however  the  want  of  provisions  would  not 
permit  the  French  to  remain  concentrated,  and  Mortier 
returned  to  the  Morena,  to  watch  Imas.  The  14th  of 
May,  a  French  detachment  again  came  close  up  to 
Badajos,  then  took  the  road  to  Olivenza,  and  would 
have  cut  otT  Ballasteros,  if  Hill  had  not  by  a  sud- 
den march  to  Elvas,  arrested  its  movement.  Mean- 
while, Ballasteros  again  menaced  Seville,  and  was 
again  driven  back  upon  Aroche,  with  a  loss  of  three 
hundred  men. 

To  check  these  frequent  incursions,  the  French 
threatened  the  frontier  of  Portugal,  by  the  Lower  Gua- 
diana: sometimes  appearing  at  Gibraleon,  and  Villa 
Blanca,  sometimes  towards  Serpa,  the  possession  of 
which   would    have    lamed    Ballasteros'    movements 

*  Mr.  Stuart's  Corrfsroidence.     RISS. 


274 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  X. 


yet  the  advantaores  were  still  chequered.  A  Portu- 
guese flotilla  intercepted,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Guadiana, 
a  convoy  of  provisions  going  to  the  first  corps  ;  and 
O'Donnel  having  made  an  attempt,  during  Reynier's  ab- 
sence, to  surprise  Truxilio,  was  repulsed,  and  regained 
Albuquerque  with  great  difficulty.  It  would  be  per- 
plexing, to  trace  further  and  in  detail  all  the  move- 
ments, on  the  line  from  Badajos  to  Ayamonte,  yet 
two  circumstances  there  were,  of  historical  importance. 
In  the  beginning  of  July,  Lacy  being  in  the  Sierra 
de  Ronda,  Ballasteros  near  Aroche,  and  Copons  in 
the  Condado  Neibta,  the  French  marched  against 
Lacy,  leaving  Seville  garrisoned  solely  by  Spaniards 
in  Joseph's  service;  and  while  this  example  was  fur- 
nished by  the  enemy,  the  Portuguese  and  Spanish 
troops  on  the  frontier,  complaining,  the  one  of  inhos- 
pitality,  the  other  of  robbery  and  violence,  would,  but 
for  the  mediation  of  the  British  authorities,  have  com- 
menced a  regular  war,  and  their  mutual  jealousy  and 
hatred  was  extended  to  the  governments  on  both  sides. 
Hitherto,  Hill  had  not  meddled  in  the  Spanish  oper- 
ations, save,  when  Romana  was  hardly  pressed,  but  the 
latter's  demands  for  aid  were  continual,  and  most  of  his 
projects  were  ill  judged,  and  contrary  to  lord  Welling- 
ton's advice.  On  the  26ih  of  June  however,  Reynier 
passing  the  Guadiana,  foraged  all  the  country  about 
Campo  Mayor,  and  then  turned  by  Montijo  to  Merida; 
it  was  known  also  that  his  corps  belonged  to  the  army 
assembling  in  Castile  for  the  invasion  of  Portugal,  that 
he  had  collected  mules  and  other  means  of  transport  in 
Estremadura  ;  and  the  spies  asserted,  that  he  was  go- 
ing to  cross  the  Tagus.  Hill,  therefore,  gathered  his 
divisions  wejl  in  hand,  ready  to  move  as  Reynier 
moved,  to  cross  the  Tagus  if  he  crossed  it,  and  by  par- 
allel operations  to  guard  the  frontier  of  Beira.  The 
march  of  the  second  corps  was,  however,  postponed, 
and  the  after  operations  belonging  to  greater  combina- 
tions, will  be  treated  of  in  another  place. 

OBSERVATIONS. 

1.  Although,  apparently  complicated,  the  movements 
in  Estremadura  were  simple  in  principle.  The  valley 
of  the  Guadiana  as  far  as  Badajos,  is  separated  from 
the  valley  of  the  Tagus,  by  a  range  of  heights,  connect- 
ing the  Guadalupe  mountains  with  those  of  Albu- 
querque ;  and  the  country  between  those  hills  and  the 
Tagus,  containerl  fertile  valleys,  and  considerable 
towns,  such  as  Valencia  de  Alcantara  and  Caceres. 
To  profit  from  their  resources  was  an  object  to  both 
parties.  Iteynier,  whose  base  was  at  Truxilio,  could 
easily  make  incursions  as  far  as  Caceres,  but  beyond 
that  town,  the  Salor  presented  a  barrier,  from  behind 
which  the  Spaniards,  supported  by  the  fort  of  Albu- 
querque, could  observe  whether  the  incursion  was  made 
in  force,  and  act  accordingly  ;  hence  O'Donnel  s  fre- 
quent advances  and  retreats. 

2.  Reynier  could  not  operate  seriously,  unless  in 
unison  with  the  fifth  corps,  and  by  the  valley  of  the 
Guadiana,  and  Merida,  on  account  of  its  stone-bridge, 
was  the  key  of  his  movements.  But  Mortier's  base 
of  operations  being  in  Andalusia,  his  front  was  spread 
from  Zafra  to  Merida,  to  cover  his  line  of  retreat,  and 
1,0  draw  provisions  from  about  Lercna;  now  the  road 
of  Xeres  de  los  Cavalleros  was  always  open  to  the 
Spaniards,  and  the  frequent  advances  of  Ballasteros 
and  Contreras,  were  to  harass  Mortier's  line  of  commu- 
nication. Wherefore  the  clue  of  affairs  was  this  ;  Ro- 
mana, holding  Badajos,  and  being  supported  by  Hill, 
acted  on  both  flanks  of  the  French,  and  the  Portuguese 
frontier  furnished  a  retreat  from  every  part  of  his  lines 
of  operation  ;  but,  as  his  projects  were  generally  vague 
and  injudicious,  lord  Wellington  forbad  Hill  to  assist, 
except  for  definite  and  approved  objects. 

3.  To  stop  Romana's  movements,  Mortier  had  only 
to  unite  the  2d  and  5th  corps  and  give  battle,  or,  if  that 


was  refused,  to  besiege  Badajos,  which,  from  its  in- 
fluence, situation,  and  the  advantage  of  its  stone  bcidce 
was  the  key  to  the  Alemtpjo;  and  this  he  ardently  de-' 
sired.  Soult,  however,  would  not  permit  him  to  un- 
dertake any  decisive  operation  while  Andalusia  was 
exposed  to  sudden  insurrections  and  descents  from  Ca- 
diz ;  and  to  say  that  either  marshal  was  wrong  would 
be  rash,  because  two  great  interests  clashed.  Mortier 
and  Reynier  united,  could  have  furnished  twenty  thou- 
sand infantry,  fifty  guns,  and  more  than  three  thousand 
cavalry,  all  excellent  troops.  Romana  having  garri- 
soned Badajos,  Olivenza,  and  Albuquerque,  cfuld  not 
bring  more  than  fifteen  thousand  men  into  line,  and 
must  have  joined  Hill.  But  with  a  mixed  force  and 
divided  command,  the  latter  could  not  have  ventured  a 
battle  in  the  plain  country  beyond  Portalegre.  A  de- 
feat would  have  opened  Lisbon  to  the  victor,  and  lord 
Wellington  must  then  have  detached  largely  from  the 
north  ;  the  king  and  Soult  could  have  reinforced  Mor 
tier,  and  the  ultimate  consequences  are  not  to  be  as- 
sumed. 

On  the  other  hand,  Soult,  judging,  that  ere  future 
conquests  were  attempted,  the  great  province  of  Anda- 
lusia should  be  rendered  a  strong  hold,  and  indepen- 
dent of  extraneous  events,  bent  all  his  attention  to  that 
object.  An  exact  and  economical  arrangement  provided 
for  the  current  consumption  of  his  troops,  and  vast  re- 
serve magazines  were  filled  without  overwhelming  the 
people.  The  native  municipal  authorities,  recognized 
and  supported  in  matters  of  police  and  supply,  acted 
zealously,  yet  without  any  imputation  upon  their  pat- 
riotism ;  for  those  who  see  and  feel  the  miseries,  flow- 
ing from  disorderly  and  wasting  armies,  may  honestly 
assist  a  general  labouring  to  preserve  regularitj\  All 
this  could  not  be  the  work  of  a  day,  and  meanwhile  the 
marshals  under  Soult's  orders,  being  employed  only  in 
a  military  capacity,  desired  the  entire  controul  of  their 
own  corps,  and  to  be  engaged  in  great  field  operations, 
because,  thus  only  could  they  be  distinguished.  But 
the  duke  of  Dalmatia,  while  contributing  to  the  final 
subjugation  of  Spain,  by  concentrating  the  elements  of 
permanent  strength  in  Andalusia,  was  also  well  assured, 
that,  in  fixing  a  solid  foundation  for  future  military 
operations,  he  should  obtain  reputation  as  an  able  ad- 
ministrator and  pacificator  of  a  conquered  country 

4.  Soult's  views,  however,  clashed,  not  more  with 
those  of  the  generals,  than  with  the  wishes  of  the  kinnf, 
whose  poverty  forced  him  to  grasp  at  all  the  revenues 
of  Andalusia,  and  who  having  led  the  army,  in  person 
across  the  Morena,  claimed  both  as  monarch  and  con- 
queror. He  who  wields  the  sword  will  always  be 
first  served.  Soult,  guided  by  the  secret  orders  of  iVa- 
poleon,  resisted  the  king's  demands,  and  thus  excited 
the  monarch's  hatred  to  an  incredible  degree ;  never- 
theless, the  duke  of  Dalmatia  never  lost  the  emperor's 
confidence,  and  his  province,  reference  being  had  to  the 
nature  of  the  war,  was  admirably  well  governed.  The 
people  were  gradually  tranquillized  ;  the  military  re- 
sources of  the  country  drawn  forth,  and  considerable 
bodies  of  native  troops  raised,  and  even  successfully 
employed,  to  repress  the  efforts  of  the  Partisan  chiefs. 
The  arsenal  of  construction  at  Seville  was  put  into  full 
activity  ;  the  mines  of  Lead  at  Lenares  were  worked  ; 
the  copper  of  the  river  Tinto  gathered  for  the  sripply 
of  the  founderies,  and  every  provision  for  the  use  of  a 
large  army  collected  ;  privateers  also  were  fitted  out, 
a  commerce  was  commenced  with  neutral  nations  in  the 
ports  of  Grenada;  and  finally,  a  secret,  but  consider- 
able, traffic  carried  on  with  Lisbon  itself,  demonstrated 
the  administrative  talents  of  Soult.*  Andalusia  soon 
became  the  most  powerful  establishment  of  the  French 
in  Spain. 

5.  Both  marshals  appear  to  have  entertained  sound 

*  Mr.  Stuart's  Correspondence.  MSS. 


1810.J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR  WAR. 


275 


views,  and  the  advantapfps  of  either  plan  beintr  consid- 
ered, leads  to  the  reflection  that  they  mi^ht  have  been 
reconciled.  A  reinforcement  of  t\vent5'-five  thousand 
men  in  Estremadura,  durino^  the  months  of  June  and 
July,  would  have  left  scarcely  a  shadow  of  defence  for 
Portujjal ;  and  it  would  seem  that  Napoleon  had  an  eye 
to  this,  as  we  find  him  directing  Suchet,  in  July,  to  co- 
operate with  fifteen  thousand  men  in  Massena's  inva- 
sion, whenever  Tortoza  should  fall.  The  application 
of  this  reasoning  will,  however,  be  better  understood 
as  the  narrative  advances;  and  whether  Napoleon's 
recent  marriage  with  the  Austrian  princess  drew  him 
away  from  business,  or  that,  absorbed  by  the  other 
many  and  great  interests  of  his  empire,  he  neglected 
Spanish  alTairs  ;  or  whether  deceived  by  exaggerated 
accounts  of  successes,  he  thought  the  necessity  for 
more  troops  less  than  it  really  was,  I  have  not  been 
able  to  ascertain.  Neither  can  I  find  any  good  reason, 
why  the  king,  whose  arniy  Avas  increased  to  twenty 
thousand  men  before  the  end  of  June,  made  no  move- 
ment to  fiivour  the  attack  on  Portugal.  It  is,  however, 
scarcely  necessary  to  seek  any  other  cause,  than  the 
inevitable  errors,  that  mar  all  great  military  combina- 
tions not  directed  by  a  single  hand. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Situation  of  the  armies  north  of  theTagus — Operations  in  Old 
Castile  and  the  Asturias — Ney  menaces  Ciudad  Rodrigo — 
Loison  repulsed  from  Astorga — Kellerman  chases  Carrera 
from  the  (Jata  mountains — Obscurity  of  the  French  projects 
— Siege  of  Astorg;a — Maiii  driven  into  Gallicia — Spaniards 
defeated  at  Mombouey — Ney  concentrates  the  sixth  corps  at 
Salamanca — The  ninth  corps  and  the  imperial  guards  enter 
Spain — Massena  assumes  the  command  of  the  army  of  Por- 
tugal and  of  the  northern  provinces — Ney  commences  the 
first  siege  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo — Julian  Sanchez  breaks  out  of 
the  town — Massena  arrives  and  alters  the  plan  of  attack — 
Daring  action  of  three  French  soldiers — Place  surrenders — 
Andreas  Herrasti — His  fine  conduct — Reflections  upon  the 
Spanish  character. 

The  operations,  south  of  the  Tagus,  having  been 
described,  those  which  occurred,  north  of  that  river, 
shall  now  he  traced  ;  for  previous  to  the  invasion  of 
Portugal,  the  French  stretched  in  one  great  line  across 
the  Peninsula,  from  Cadiz  to  Gihon,  and  eagerly  dis- 
cussed the  remnants  of  the  Spanish  armies. 

It  will  be  remembered,  that  the  duke  Del  Parque 
left  Martin  Carrera  in  the  Gata  mountains,  to  interrupt 
the  communication,  between  the  Salamanca  country 
and  the  valley  of  the  Tagus.  Julian  Sanchez  also, 
issuing  from  time  to  time  out  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  cut 
off  the  French  foragers  in  the  open  country  between 
the  Ajjueda  and  the  Douro  ;  and  beyond  the  Douro,  the 
Gallician  army,  under  Garcia  (in  number  about  ten 
thousand),  occupied  Puebla  de  Senabria,  Puente  Fer- 
rada,  Villa  Franca,  and  Astorga,  menacing  the  right 
flank,  and  rear,  of  the  sixth  corps.  Mahy  was  orga- 
nising a  second  army  at  Lugo,  and  in  the  Asturias,  the 
captain-general  D'Arco  commanded  seven  thousand 
men,  three  thousand  of  which  were  posted  at  Cornel- 
lana,  under  general  Ponte.  Thus  an  irregular  line  of 
defence,  six  hundred  miles  long,  was  offered  to  the  in- 
vaders, but  without  depth  or  substance,  save  at  Bada- 
jos  and  (Mudad  Rodrigo,  behind  which  the  British  and 
Portuguese  troops  were  lying. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  French,  holding  the  in- 
terior line,  kept  their  masses  only  on  the  principal 
routes,  communicating  by  moveable  columns,  and  thus 
menaced  all  the  important  points  without  scattering 
their  forces.  The  influx  of  fresh  troops  from  France, 
continually  added  to  their  solidity,  especially  in  Old 
Castile,  where  Ney  had  resumed  the  command,  being 
supported  by  Kellerman  wi  :  the  force  of  his  govern- 


ment,  and  by  an   eighth   corps   under   the   duke   of 
Abrantes. 

The  invasion  of  Andalusia  was  the  signal  for  a  gen- 
eral movement  of  all  the  French  in  Spain;  and  while 
Victor  and  Mortier,  menaced  Cadiz  and  Badajos,  Ney 
summoned  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  and  Bonet,  entering  tho 
Asturias,  threatened  Gallicia  by  the  Concija  d'Ibas. 
At  the  same  time,  Loison,  with  eight  thousand  fresh 
men,  occupied  Leon  and  Medina  del  Campo,  and  the 
advanced  guard  of  the  eighth  corps  passed  Valladolid. 
Loison  gave  out  that  he  would  invade  Gallicia  by  Pue- 
bla de  Senabria,  and  on  the  15lh  of  February,  his 
cavalry  cut  to  pieces  five  hundred  vSpanish  troops  at 
Alcanizas,  but  he  finally  marched  against  Astorga,  and^ 
at  the  same  time,  Bonet  destroyed  Ponte's  force  at 
Potes  de  Sierra,  and  advanced  to  Nava  de  Suarna. 
These  movements  alarmed  the  Spaniards.  Garcia, 
menaced  at  once  by  Bonet  and  by  Loison,  and  fearing 
equally  for  Astorga  and  Lugo,  threw  two-thirds  of  his 
army  into  the  former,  and  carried  the  remainder  to 
Villa  Franca,  to  support  Mahi. 

Ney,  however,  made  only  a  feint  of  escalading  Ciu- 
dad Rodrigo,  and  Loison,  although  supported  by  the 
men  from  Leon,  who  advanced  to  Puente  Orbijo,  was 
repulsed  from  Astorga.  Junot  then  concentrated  the 
eight  corps  at  Benevente,  intending  to  besiege  Astorga 
in  form  ;  but  he  was  suddenly  called  towards  Madrid, 
lest  disorders  should  arise  in  the  capital  during  the 
king's  absence.  Mahi  and  Garcia  being  apprised  of 
this,  immediately  brought  up  the  new  levies  to  the 
edge  of  the  mountains,  thinking  to  relieve  the  Astu- 
riarrs  by  threatening  an  irruption  into  the  plains  of 
Leon ;  but  as  Loison  still  remained  at  Benevente,  they 
were  unable  to  eflfect  their  object,  and,  after  drawing 
off  five  thousand  men  from  Astorga,  retired  to  Villa 
Franca. 

Bonet  did  not  pass  Nava  de  Suarna,  and  when  gen- 
eral Arco  had  rallied  the  Asturian  fugitives  at  Louarca, 
Garcia,  leaving  Mahi  to  command  in  Gallicia,  marched 
himself  with  the  remnant  of  the  old  army  of  the  left, 
to  join  Romana  at  Badajos.  Meanwhile  Kellerman 
advanced  to  Alba  de  Tormes,  and  detachments  from  his 
and  Ney's  force  chased  Carrera  from  the  Gata  and  Be- 
jar  mountains,  driving  him  sometimes  over  the  Alagon, 
sometimes  into  Portugal.  It  is  unnecessary  to  trace 
all  these  movements,  because  the  French,  while  pre- 
paring for  greater  operations,  were  continually  spread- 
ing false  reports,  and  making  demonstrations  in  various 
directions  to  mislead  the  allies,  and  to  cover  their  own 
projects. 

Those  projects  were  at  first  obscure.  It  is  certain 
that  the  invasion  of  Portugal  by  the  northern  line,  was 
not  finally  arranged  until  a  later  period  ;  yet  it  seems 
probable,  that  while  Bonet  drew  the  attention  of  the 
Gallician  army  towards  I>ugo,  the  duke  of  Abrantes 
designed  to  penetrate  by  Puebla  Senabria  ;  not  as  Loi- 
son announced,  for  the  invasion  of  Gallicia,  but  to  turn 
the  Tras  os  Montes  and  descend  by  the  route  of  Chaves 
upon  Oporto,  while  Ney,  calling  the  second  corps  to 
the  aid  of  the  sixth,  should  invest  Ciudad  Rodrigo. 
Whatever  designs  might  have  been  contemplated,  they 
were  frustrated,  partly  by  the  insurrection  in  Grenada, 
and  the  failure  of  Suchet  against  Valencia,  partly  by 
disunion  amongst  the  generals,  for  here  also  Ney  and 
Junot  complained  reciprocally  ;  and  every  where  it  was 
plainly  seen  that  the  French  corps  d'armee,  however 
formidable  in  themselves,  would  not,  in  the  absence 
of  Napoleon,  act  cordially  in  the  general  system. 

When  the  commotions  in  the  south  subsided,  Junot 
returned  to  Old  Castile;  Loison  joined  the  sixth  corps 
on  the  Tormes;  Kellerman  retired  to  Valladolid;  de 
tachments,  placed  on  the  Douro,  maintained  the  com 
municalions  between  Ney  and  Jimot;  and  the  latter, 
having  drawn  a  reinforcement  from  Bonet,  invested  As- 
torga with  ten  thousand  infantry,  two  thousand  cavalry 


276 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  X. 


eighteen  field-guns,  six  twenty-four  pcunders.  and  two 
mortars.  His  rovrrin^  divisions  were  placed,  one  at 
Benevente.  to  watch  the  road  of  Momhuey.  one  near 
Puebia  de  Senabria,  and  one  at  Puente  Ferrada.  Mahi 
immediately  concentrated  the  Gallician  army  at  Villa 
Franca  and  Fonceabadon,  and  detached  fifteen  hundred 
men,  under  Echevarria,  to  Mon.buey  and  Puebia.  to 
harass  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  inv(  stiiifj  army;  yet 
his  force  was  weak,  the  Gallician  authorities  had  fre- 
quently assured  lord  Wellinffton  that  it  amounted  to 
twenty  thousand  well-erganized  troops ;  it  now  ap- 
peared that  only  eig:hl  thousand  were  in  the  field,  and 
those  ill  provided,  and  prone  to  desertion.* 

SIEGE    OF    ASTORGA. 

Santocildes,  the  governor,  was  an  officer  of  conrage; 
his  garrison  consisted  of  two  thousand  five  hundred  in- 
fantry, besides  cannoneers  and  armed  peasantry,  and 
the  Moorish  ramparts  had  been  strengthened  by  fresh 
works;  but  there  was  little  ammunition,  scarcely 
twenty  days'  rations,  and  nothing  outside  the  walls, 
capable  of  seriously  disturbing  the  enemy.  The  town 
stood  in  an  open  plain,  and  had  three  suburbs ;  Puerto 
de  Hierro  to  the  north,  St.  Andreas  to  the  east,  and 
Retebia  to  the  west.  On  the  two  last  .Tunot  made  false 
attacks,  and  conducted  his  real  approaches,  against  the 
front  between  Puerto  de  Hierro  and  Retebia. 

The  place  was  invested  the  22d,  and  Puerto  de 
Hierro  was  carried  by  storm,  two  sallies  were  repulsed, 
and  the  trenches  opened,  before  the  end  of  the  month. 
A  breach  was  then  commenced,  but  the  battering-guns 
soon  became  unserviceable,  and  the  line  of  approach 
was  flanked  by  the  houses  of  Retebia,  which  were  filled 
with  Spanish  infiiutry.  Nevertheless,  the  town  suf- 
fered from  shells,  the  wall  was  broken  on  the  20th  of 
April,  an  assault  was  ordered,  and  although  a  previous 
attack  on  Retebia  had  failed,  Santocildes  was  so  dis- 
tressed for  ammunition,  that  he  offered  to  capitulate. 

Junot  refused  the  terms  demanded,  and,  at  five  o'clock 
in  the  evening  of  the  ^Ist,  some  picked  troops  ran  up 
to  the  breach,  which  was  well  retrenched  and  stock- 
aded, and  defended  with  great  obstinacy,  while  the 
flank  fire  from  Retebia  stopped  the  supporting  columns. 
The  storniing-party,  thus  abandoned  to  its  own  exer- 
tions, was  held  at  bay  on  the  summit  of  the  breach  ; 
and  being  plied  on  both  flanks,  and  in  front,  with  shot 
from  the  houses  of  the  town,  and  in  rear  by  the  mus- 
ketry from  Retebia,  it  would  have  been  totally  destroy- 
ed, but  for  the  scarcity  of  ammunition,  which  paralyzed 
the  Spanish  defence.  Three  hundred  French  are  said 
to  have  fa'len  on  the  breach  itself,  but  the  remainder 
finally  effected  a  lodgement  in  the  ruins.  During  the 
night,  a  second  attack  on  Retebia  proving  successful, 
a  communication  was  opened  from  the  parallels  to  the 
lodgement,  and  strong  working-parties  were  sent  for- 
ward, who  cut  tlirough  the  stockade  into  the  town, 
when  the  governor  surrendered. 

Mahi,  wlio  had  advanced  to  the  edge  of  the  moun- 
tains, as  if  he  would  have  succoured  the  place,  hearing 
of  this  event,  retired  to  Bembibre,  where  his  rear  was 
overtaken  and  defeated  by  general  Clausel  on  the  24th. 
He  then  fell  back  to  Lugo,  and  recalled  his  detachment 
from  Mombuey  ;  but  the  French  from  Benevente  were 
already  in  that  quarter,  and,  on  the  25ih,  totally  de- 
feated Echevaria  at  Castro  Contrijo.  Meanwhile,  Ju- 
not placed  garrisons  in  Astorga  and  Leon,  and  restored 
Bcnet  his  division.  That  general,  who  had  retired  to 
Santander  during  the  siege,  then  re-occupied  Oviedo 
and  Gihon,  defeated  the  Asturians,  and  once  more  men- 
aced Gallicia  by  the  road  of  Concija,  and  by  that  of 
Sales;  several  slight  actions  ensued  ;  the  French  pen- 
etratf^d  no  farther,  and  the  Junta  of  Gallicia  reinforced 
the  Asturians  with  three  thousand  men. 

During  the  siege  of  Astorga,   the  sixth  corps  was 

•  Mr.  Stuurl*  Correspoudence.  MSS. 


concentrated  at  Salamanca;  a  strong  detachment  of 
Kellerman's  troops  seized  the  pass  of  Baiirs  ;  and  Mar 
tin  Carrera,  quitting  the  liills,  joined  the  English  ligh» 
division  near  Almeida.  In  fine,  the  great  r perations 
were  c(nimencing,  and  the  line  of  comniunicati'-n  witli 
France,  was  encumbered  with  the  advancing  reintorce- 
ments.  A  large  battering-train,  collected  from  Segovia, 
Burgos,  and  Pampeluna,  arrived  at  Salamanca,  general 
Martineau,  with  tin  thousand  men  for  the  eighth  corps, 
reachf  d  Valladolid  ;  general  Drouet  passed  the  Pyre- 
nees with  a  ninth  corps,  composed  of  the  fourth  battal- 
ions of  regiments  aire:  dy  in  Spain;  and  these  were 
followed  by  seventeen  thousand  of  the  imperial  guards, 
whose  presence  gave  force  to  the  rumour,  that  the  em- 
peror liimself  was  coming  to  take  the  chief  command. 
Fortunately  for  the  allies,  this  report,  although  rife 
amongst  all  parties,  and  credited  both  by  Joseph's  min- 
isters, and  the  French  ambassador  at  ^Iadrid,  prove.] 
groundless;  a  leader  for  the  projected  operations  was 
still  to  be  named.  1  have  been  informed  that  marshal 
Npy  resumed  the  command  of  the  sixth  corps,  under 
the  impression  that  he  v\as  to  conduct  the  enterprise 
against  Portugal ;  that  the  intrigues  of  marshal  Ber- 
ihier,  to  wliom  he  was  obnoxious,  frustrated  his  hopes ; 
that  Napoleon,  fatigued  with  the  disputes  of  his  lieu- 
tenants, had  resolved  to  repair  in  person  to  the  Penin- 
sula; that  his  marriage,  and  some  important  political 
affairs,  diverted  him  from  that  object,  and  that  Massena, 
prince  of  Esling,  was  finally  chosen;  partly  for  his 
great  name  in  arms,  partly  that  he  was  of  higher  rank 
than  the  other  marshals,  and  a  stranger  to  all  the  jeal- 
ousies and  disputes  in  the  Peninsula.  His  arrival  wa3 
known  in  May  amongst  the  allies,  and  lord  Wellington 
had  no  longer  to  dread  the  formidable  presence  of  the 
French  emperor. 

That  Massena's  base  of  operations  might  not  be  ex- 
posed to  the  interference  of  any  other  authority  in 
Spain,  the  four  military  governments  of  Salamanca, 
Yalladol'd,  Asturias.  and  St.  Andero  were  placed  under 
his  temporary  authority,  which  thus  became  absolute 
in  the  northern  provinces.  But  previous  to  taking  the 
command  of  the  troops,  he  repaired  to  Madrid,  to  con- 
fer with  the  king,  and  it  would  seem  that  some  hesi- 
tation as  to  the  line  of  invasion  still  prevailed  in  the 
French  councils;  because  in  the  imperial  muster-rolls, 
the  head-quarters  of  the  army  of  Portugal  are  marked 
as  being  at  Caceres  in  Estremadura,  and  the  imperial 
guards  are  returned  as  part  of  that  army,  yet  during  the 
month  of  April  only  ;  a  circumstance  strongly  indicating 
Napoleon's  intention  to  assume  the  command  himself. 
The  northern  line  was,  however,  definitively  adopted, 
and,  while  the  prince  of  Esling  was  still  in  the  capital 
the  eighth  corps  passed  the  Tormes,  and  Ney  com- 
menced the 

FIRST  SIEGE  OF  ClUDAD  RODRIGO. 

The  conduct  of  the  governor  of  this  fortress  had  in 
the  beginning  of  the  year  appeared  so  suspicious,  that 
lord  Wellington  demanded  his  removal.*  Doii  An- 
dreas Herrasti,  the  actual  governor,  was  a  veteran  of 
fifty  years'  service,  whose  silver  hairs,  dignified  coun- 
tenance, and  courteous  manners  excited  respect;  and 
whose  coupage,  talents,  and  honour  were  worthy  of  hia 
venerable  appearance.  His  garrison  amounted  to  six 
thousand  fighting  men,  besides  the  citizens;  and  the 
place,  built  on  a  height  overhanging  the  northern  bank 
of  the  Agueda  river,  was  amply  supplied  with  artillery 
and  stores  of  all  kinds.  The  works  were,  however,  weak, 
consisting  of  an  old  rampart,  nearly  circular,  about 
thirty  feet  in  height,  and  without  other  flanks  than  a 
few  projections  containing  some  light  guns:  a  second 
wall,  about  twelve  feet  high,  called  a  "fausse  braie,^* 
with  a  ditch  and  covered  way,  surrounded  the  first,  yet 
was  placed  so  low  on  the  hill,  aa  scarcely  to  cfi'er  any 

*  Lord  VVelling'toirs  Correspoodence.  MSS. 


1810.J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


277 


cover  to  the  upper  rampart.  There  were  no  bomb- 
pro(;,fs,  even  for  the  magazine,  and  Herrasti  was  forced 
to  place  his  powder  in  the  church,  which  he  secured  as 
he  migfht. 

Beyond  the  walls,  and  totally  severed  from  the 
town,  the  suburb  of  Francisco,  defended  by  an  earthen 
entrenchment,  and  strengthened  by  two  large  convents, 
formed  an  outwork  to  the  north-east  of  the  place.  The 
convent  of  Santa  Cruz  served  a  like  purpose  on  the 
north-west;  and  betrt'een  these  posts  there  was  a 
ridge  called  tlie  Jjitile  Teson,  which,  somewhat  inferior 
in  height  to  the  town,  was  only  a  hundred  and  fifty 
yards  from  the  body  of  the  place.  There  was  also  a 
Greater  Teson,  which,  rising  behind  the  lesser  at  the 
distance  of  six  hundred  yards  from  the  walls,  over- 
looked the  ramparts,  and  saw  into  the  bottom  of  the 
ditch. 

The  country  immediately  about  Ciudad  Rodrigo, 
although  wooded,  was  easy  for  troops;  especially  on 
the  left  bank  of  the  Agueda,  to  which  the  garrison  had 
access  by  a  stone  bridge  within  pistol-shot  of  the  castle- 
gate.  The  Ajueda  itselt,  rising  in  the  Sierra  de  Fran- 
cia,  and  running  into  the  Douro,  is  subject  to  great 
and  sudden  floods;  and  six  or  seven  miles  below  the 
town,  near  San  Felices,  the  channel  deepens  into  one 
continued  and  frightful  chasm,  many  hundred  feet  deep, 
and  overhung  with  huge  desolate  rocks. 

During  February  and  March,  the  French  departed  as 
lightly  as  they  had  advanced  against  Ciudad  Rodrigo; 
but,  on  the  25th  of  April,  a  camp  was  pitched  upon  a 
lofty  ridge  five  miles  eastward  of  the  city  ;  and,  in  a 
few  days,  a  second,  and  then  a  third,  arose:  and  these 
portentous  clouds  continued  to  gather  on  the  hills  un- 
til June,  when  fifty  thousand  fighting  men  came  down 
into  the  plain,  and  throwing  two  bridges  over  the  A- 
gueda,  begirt  the  fortress. 

This  multitude,  composed  ot  the  sixth  and  eighth 
corps,  and  a  reserve  of  cavalry,  was  led  by  Ney,  Junot, 
and  Montbrun.  The  sixth  corps  invested  the  place,  the 
eighth  occupied  San  ?^elices  Grande,  and  other  points, 
the  cavalry  swarrned  on  both  sides  of  the  river,  but  the 
battering  train  with  a  great  escort  was  still  two  days' 
march  in  the  rear,  for  the  rains  inundating  the  flat 
country  between  the  Agueda  and  the  Tormes,  rendered 
the  roads  impassable.  Tiie  bridges  were  established 
on  the  2d  and  7th  of  June,  the  one  above,  the  other  be- 
low the  town,  and  on  the  13th,  ground  was  broken  on 
the  Greater  Teson.  The  22nd,  the  artillery  arrived,  and 
preparations  were  made  to  contract  the  circle  of  invest- 
ment on  the  left  bank  of  the  Agueda,  which  had  hither- 
to been  but  slightly  watched.  That  night  Julian 
Sanchez,  with  two  hundred  horsemen,  passed  silently 
out  of  the  castle-gate,  and  crossing  the  river,  fell  upon 
the  nearest  French  posts,  pierced  their  line  in  a  moment, 
and  reached  the  English  light  division,  then  behind  the 
Azava,  six  miles  from  Ciudad  Rodrigo.  This  event 
induced  Ney  to  reinforce  his  troops  on  the  left  bank, 
and  a  movement,  to  be  hereafter  noticed,  was  directed 
against  creneral  Crawfurd  the  25th,  on  which  day,  also, 
the  French  batteries  opened. 

Noy's  plan  was  to  breach  the  body  of  the  place, 
without  attending  to  the  Spanish  fire,  and  salvos,  from 
forty-six  guns,  constantly  directed  on  one  point,  soon 
broke  the  old  masonry  of  the  ramparts ;  nevertheless 
the  besieged,  who  could  bring  twenty-four  guns  to 
*ear  on  the  Teson,  shot  so  well  that  three  magazines 
blew  up  at  once  in  the  trenches,  and  killed  above  a 
n\mdred  of  the  assailants.  On  the  27th  the  prince  of 
Esling  arriving  in  the  camp,  summoned  tlie  governor 
to  surrender,  and  Herrasti  answered  in  the  maimer  to 
be  expected  from  so  good  a  soldier.  The  fire  was  then 
resumed  until  the  first  of  Jul}',  when  Massena,  sensi- 
ble that  the  mode  of  attack  was  faulty,  directed  the 
engineers  to  raise  counter-baitC-ies,  to  push  their  paral- 
lels to  the  Lesser  Teson,  work  re^-ilarly  forward,  blow 


in  the  counterscarp,  and  pass  the  ditch  in  form.*  Mean- 
while, to  facilitate  the  progress  of  the  new  works,  the 
convent  of  Santa  Cruz,  on  the  right  flank,  was  carried 
after  a  fierce  resistance ;  and,  on  the  left,  the  suburb 
was  attacked,  taken,  and  retaken  by  a  sally,  in  which 
great  loss  was  inflicted  on  the  French.  Howbeit,  the 
latter  remained  masters  of  every  thing  beyond  the 
walls. 

During  the  cessation  of  fire,  consequent  upon  the 
change  in  the  French  dispositions,  Herrasti  removed 
the  ruins  from  the  foot  of  the  breach,  and  strengthened 
his  flank  defences.  On  the  9th  of  July,  the  besieger's 
batteries,  being  established  on  the  Lesser  Teson,  re- 
opened with  a  terrible  efl^sct.  In  twenty-four  hours,  the 
fire  of  the  Spanish  guns  was  nearly  silenced,  part  of  the 
town  was  in  flames,  a  reserve  magazine  exploded  on 
the  walls,  the  counterscarp  was  blown  in  by  a  mine, 
on  an  extent  of  thirty-six  feet,  the  ditch  was  filled  bv 
the  ruins,  and  abroad  way  made  into  the  place.  Three 
French  soldiers,  of  heroic  courage,  then  rushed  out  of 
the  ranks,  mounted  the  breach,  looked  into  the  town, 
and  having  thus,  in  broad  daylight,  proved  the  state 
of  affairs,  dischartred  their  muskets,  and,  with  match- 
less fortune,  retired  unhurt  to  their  comrades. 

The  columns  of  assault  immediately  assembled. 
The  troops,  animated  by  the  presence  of  Ney,  and  ex- 
cited by  the  example  of  tlie  three  men  who  had  so 
gallantly  proved  the  breach,  were  impatient  for  the. 
signal,  and  a  few  moments  would  have  sent  them 
raging  into  the  midst  of  the  city,  when  the  white  flag 
suddenly  waved  on  tlie  rampart,  and  the  venerable 
governor  was  seen  standing  alone  on  the  ruins,  and 
signifying,  by  his  gestures,  that  he  desired  to  capitu- 
late. He  had  stricken  manfully,  while  reason  war- 
ranted hope,  and  it  was  no  dishonour  to  his  silver 
hairs,  that  he  surrendered  when  resistance  could  only 
lead  to  massacre  and  devastation. 

Six  months  had  now  elapsed,  since  the  French  resu- 
ming the  plan  of  conquest  interrupted  by  the  Austrian 
war  and  by  the  operations  of  sir  Arthur  VVellesley  had 
retaken  the  offensive.  Battle  after  battle  they  had 
gained,  fortress  after  fortress,  they  had  taken,  and  sent 
the  Spanish  forces,  broken  and  scattered,  to  seek  for 
refuge  in  the  most  obscure  parts  :  solid  resistance  there 
was  none,  and  the  only  hope  of  deliverance  for  the  Pen- 
insula rested  upon  the  British  general.  How  he  realized 
that  hope  shall  be  related  in  the  next  book.  Mean- 
while, the  reader  should  bear  in  mind  that  the  multifa- 
rious actions  related  in  the  foregoing  chapters,  w-ere  con- 
temporaneous, and  that  he  has  been  led,  as  it  were 
round  the  margin  of  a  lake,  whose  turbulent  waters 
spread  on  every  side.  Tedious  to  read,  and  trifling 
many  of  the  circumstances  must  appear,  j'et,  as  a 
whole,  they  form  what  has  been  called  the  Spanish  mili- 
tary policy  ;  and  without  accurate  notions  on  that  head, 
it  would  be  impossible  to  appreciate  the  capacity  of  the 
man  who,  like  Milton's  phantom,  paved  a  broad  way 
through   their  chaotic  warfare. 

I  have  been  charged  with  incompetence  to  under- 
stand, and  most  unjustl}',  with  a  desire  to  underrate 
the  Spanish  resistance  ;  but  it  is  the  province  of  history 
to  record,  foolish  as  well  as  glorious  deeds,  that  poster- 
ity may  profit  from  all,  and  neither  will  I  mislead 
those  who  read  my  work,  nor  sacrifice  the  reputation 
of  my  country's  arms  to  shallow  declaination  upf)n  the 
unconquerable  spirit  of  independence.  To  expose  the, 
errors  is  not  to  undervalue  the  fortitude  of  a  noble 
people.  In  their  constancy,  in  the  unexampled  pa- 
tience, with  which  they  bore  the  ills  inflicted  alike  by  a 
ruthless  enemy,  and  by  their  own  sordil  govcrnnHMiis, 
the  Spaniards  were  trulv  noble  :  but  shall  I  say  that 
they  were  victorious  in  their  battles,  or  faithful  in  their 
compacts;  that  they  treated  their  prisoners  with  hu 


*  Intercepted  French  Correspondence,  MSS. 


2-'8 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XI. 


manity;  that  their  Juntns  were  honest  or  wise;  their! 
generals  skilful ;  their  soldiers  firm  ?      I  speak  but  the 
bare  truth,  when  I  assert,  that  they  were  incapcible  of 
defendinjT  their  own  cause  !     Every  action,  every  cor- 
respondence, every  proceeding  of  the  six  years  that  the  i 
war   lasted,  rise  up  in  support  of  this  fact;  and    to  | 
assume    that   an    insurrection   so    conducted    did,    or  1 
could  possibly  baffle  the   prodig-ious   power  of  Napo-  I 
leon  is  an  iiiusion.     Spain    baffle  him!     Her  efforts! 
were  amongst  iho  very  smallest  causes  of  his   failure. 
Portutral  has  far  greater  claims  to  that  glory.     Spain  j 
furnished  the  opportunity  ;  Inititwas  England,  Austria,  | 
Russia,  or  rather  fortune,  that  struck  down  iliat  won- 
derful man.     The  English,  more  powerful,  more  rich, 
more  profuse,  perhaps  more    brave   than   the  ancient 
Romans;  the  English,  with  a  fleet,  for  grandeur  and  j 
real  force,  never  matched  ;  with  a  general  equal  to  any  I 


emergency  ;  fought  as  if  for  their  own  existence.  The 
Austrians  brought  four  hundred  thousand  good  troops 
to  arrest  the  conqueror's  progress;  the  snows  of  Rus- 
sia destroyed  three  hundred  thousand  of  his  best 
soldiers  ;  and  finally,  when  he  had  lost  half  a  million 
of  veterans,  not  one  of  whom  died  on  Spanish  ground, 
Europe,  in  one  vast  combination,  could  only  tear  the 
Peninsula  from  him,  by  tearing  France  along  with  it. 
What  weakness,  then,  what  incredible  delusion  to  point 
to  Spain,  with  all  her  follies,  and  her  never-ending  de- 
feats as  a  proof  that  a  people  fighting  for  independence 
must  be  victorious.  She  was  invaded,  because  she  ad- 
hered to  the  great  European  aristocracy  ;  she  was  deliv- 
ered, because  England  enabled  that  aristocracy  to 
triumph,  for  a  moment,  over  the  principles  of  the 
French  revolution. 


BOOK  XI. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Lord  Wellington's  policy — Chans^e  of  administration  in  Eng- 
land— Duel  hetueen  lurd  Castlereaah  and  Mr.  Cannins: — 
Lord  Wellesley  joins  the  new  ministry — Debates  in  Parlia- 
ment— Factions  violence  on  both  sides — Lord  Wellington's 
sagacity  and  firmness  vindicated—  His  views  for  the  defence 
of  Portugal — Ministers  accede  to  his  demands — Grandeur  of 
Napoleon's  designs  against  the  Peninsula — Lord  Wellington 
enters  into  fresh  explanation  with  the  English  Ministers — 
Discusses  the  state  of  the  war — Similarity  of  his  views  with 
those  of  sir  John  Moore — His  reasons  for  not  advancing  into 
Spain  explained  and  vindicated. 

The  defence  of  Portugal,  was  not  the  result  of 
any  fortuitous  combination  of  circumstances,  nor  was 
lord  Wellintrton  moved  thereto,  by  any  hasty  ambi- 
tion to  magnify  his  own  reputation,  but  calmly  and 
deliberately,  farmed  his  resolution,  after  a  laborious 
and  cautious  estimate  of  the  difficulties  and  chances 
of  success.  Reverting  then  to  the  period,  when,  by 
retreating  upon  Badajos,  he  divorced  his  operations 
from  the  folly  of  Spain,  I  shall  succinctly  trace  his  mili- 
tary and  political  proceedings  up  to  the  moment,  when, 
confident  in  the  soundness  of  his  calculations,  he  com- 
menced bis  project,  unmoved  by  the  power  of  his 
enemy,  the  timidity  of  his  friends,  the  imprudence  of 
his  subordinates,  or  the  intrigues  of  dipcontented  men, 
who  secretlj%  and  with  malignant  perseverance,  la- 
boured to  thwart  his  measures  and  to  ruin  his  designs. 

After  the  retreat  from  Spain  in  1809,  he  repaired  to 
Seville,  partly  to  negotiate  with  the  (-entral  Junta, 
upon  matters  touching  the  war,  but  principally  to  con- 
fer with  his  brother,  ere  the  latter  quitted  the  Peninsu- 
la. Lnrd  Wellesley's  departure  was  caused  by  the 
state  of  politics  in  Kngland,  where  a  change  in  the 
administration  was  about  to  take  place;  a  change, 
sudden  indeed,  but  not  unexpected,  because  the  inepti- 
tude of  the  government,  was,  in  private,  acknowledged 
by  many  of  its  members,  and  the  failure  of  the  Walche- 
ren  expedition,  was  only  the  signal,  for  a  public 
avowal  of  jealousies  and  wretched  personal  intrigues, 
which  had  rendered  the  ('abiuet  of  St.  James's  the 
most  iiiellicient,  Spain  excepted,  of  any  in  Europe, 
ATr.  Canning,  the  principal  mover  of  those  intrigues, 
had  secretly  denounced  lord  Casllereagh  to  his  col- 
leagues, as  a  man  incapable  of  conducting  the  public 


affairs,  and  exacted  from  them  a  promise  to  dismiss 
him.*  Nevertheless,  he  permitted  that  nobleman,  ig- 
norant of  the  imputation  on  his  abilities,  to  plan,  and 
conduct  the  fitting  out,  of  the  most  powerful  armament 
that  ever  quitted  England. |  When  it  became  evident 
that  loss  and  ruin  waited  on  this  unhappy  expedition, 
Mr.  Canning  claimed  the  fulfilment  of  the  promise, 
and  the  intrigue  thus  becoming  known  to  lord  Castle- 
reagh,  was  by  him  characterised  as  "  a  breach  of  every 
principle  of  goodfaiih,  both  public  and  private.''^  'I'hia 
was  followed  by  a  duel !  and  by  the  dissolution  of  the 
administration.  Mr,  Perceval  and  lord  Liverpool  be- 
ing then  empowered  to  form  another  Cabinet,  after  a 
fruitless  negotiation  with  lord  Grey,  and  lord  Gren- 
ville,  assumed  the  lead  themselves,  and  offered  the 
department  of  foreign  affairs  to  lord  Wellesley. 

Contrary  to  the  general  expectation,  he  accepted  it. 
His  brother  had  opened  to  him  those  great  views  for 
the  defence  of  Portugal,  which  were  afterwards  so 
gloriously  realized  ;  hut  which  could  never  have  been 
undertaken  with  confidence  by  thai  general,  unless 
secure  of  some  powerful  friend  in  the  administration, 
embued  with  the  same  sentiments,  bound  by  common 
interest,  and  resolute,  to  support  him  when  the  crisis 
of  danger  arrived.  It  was  therefore  wise,  and  com- 
mendable, in  lord  W^ellesley,  to  sacrifice  something  of 
his  own  personal  pretensions,  to  be  enabled  to  forward 
projects,  promising  so  much  glory  to  the  country  and 
his  own  family,  and  the  first  proceedings  in  parliament 
justified  his  policy. 

Previous  to  the  change  in  the  Cabinet,  Sir  Arthur 
Wellesley  had  been  created  baron  Douro,  and  vis- 
count Wellington  ;  but  those  honours,  although  well 
deserved,  were  undoubtedly  conferred  as  much  from 
party  as  from  patriotic  feeling,  and  greatly  excited 
the  anger  of  the  op|)osition  members,  who  with  few 
exceptions,  assailed  the  general,  personally,  and  with 
an  acrimony  not  to  be  justified.  His  merits,  they  said, 
were  nought;  his  actions  silly,  presumptuous,  rash; 
his  campaign  one  deserving  not  reward,  but  punish- 
ment.:t     Yet  he  had  delivered  Pctugal,  cleared  Galli- 

*  Lord  Castlereagh'g  statement.      +  Mr.  Canning's  statement 
X  See  Parlian>entP-j  Debates. 


1810. ] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


279 


cia  and  Estremadura,  and  oblicred  one  hundred  thou- 
sand French  veterans  to  abandon  the  offensive  and 
concentrate  about  Madrid  ! 

Lord  (^rey  opposing^  his  own  crude  military  notions, 
to  the  practised  skill  of  sir  Arthur,  petulantly  censured 
the  latter's  dispositions  at  Talavera ;  others  denied 
that  he  was  successful  in  that  action :  and  some,  for- 
getlinuf  tiiat  they  were  amenable  to  history,  even  pro- 
posed to  leave  his  name  out  of  the  vote  of  thanks  to 
the  army  !  That  battle,  so  sternly  fought,  so  hardly 
won,  they  would  have  set  aside  with  respect  to  the 
commander  as  not  warranting  admission  to  a  peerage 
always  open  to  venal  orators;  and  the  passage  of  the 
Douro.  so  promptly,  so  daringly,  so  skilfully,  so  suc- 
cessfully executed,  that  it  seemed  rather  the  result 
of  inspiration  than  of  natural  judgement,  they  would 
have  cast  away  as  a  thing  of  no  worth  ! 

This  spirit  of  faction  was,  however,  not  confined  to 
one  side :  there  was  a  ministerial  person,  at  this  time, 
who  in  his  dread  ol' the  opposition,  wrote  to  lord  Wel- 
lington complaining  of  his  inaction,  and  calling  upon 
him  to  do  something  that  would  excite  a  public  sensa- 
tion ;  any  thing  provided  blood  were  spilt!  A  calm 
but  severe  rebuke,  and  the  cessation  of  all  friendly 
intercourse  with  the  writer,  discovered  the  general's 
abhorrence  of  this  detestable  policy.  When  such 
passions  were  abroad,  it  is  evident  that  lord  Welles- 
It^y's  accession  to  the  government,  was  essential  to  the 
succ>^ss  of  lord  Wellington's  projects. 

These  projects  delivered  the  Peninsula  and  changed 
the  fate  of  Europe,  and  every  step  made  towards  their 
accomplishment  merits  attention,  as  much  from  the 
intrinsic  interest  of  the  subject,  as  that  it  has  been 
commrn  to  attribute  his  success  to  good  fortune  and  to 
the  strenuous  support  he  received  from  the  Cabinet  at 
home.  Now  it  is  far  from  my  intention  to  deny  the 
great  influence  of  fortune  in  war,  or  that  the  duke  of 
Wellington  has  always  been  one  of  hei  peculiar  favour- 
ites ;  but  I  will  make  it  clearly  appear,  that  if  he  met 
with  gre?.t  success,  he  had  previously  anticipated  it, 
and  upon  solid  grounds  ;  that  the  Cabinet  did  not  so 
much  support  him  as  it  was  supported  by  him  ;  and 
finally,  that  his  prudence,  foresight,  and  firmness 
were  at  least  as  efficient  causes  as  any  others  that  can 
be  adduced. 

Immediately  after  the  retreat  from  Jaraceijo,  and 
while  the  ministers  were  yet  unchanged,  Lord  Castle- 
reagh,  brought  by  continual  reverses,  to  a  more  sober 
method  of  planning  military  affairs,  had  demanded  lord 
Wellington's  opinion  upon  the  expediency,  the  chance 
of  success,  and  the  expense  of  defending  Portugal.  This 
letter  reached  the  general  on  the  1-lth  of  September, 
1809;  but  the  subject  required  many  previous  inqui- 
ries and  a  careful  examination  of  the  country  ;  and  at 
that  pericd,  any  plan  for  the  defence  of  Portugal,  was 
necessarily  to  be  modified,  according  to  the  energy  or 
feebleness  of  the  Spaniards  in  Andalusia.  Hence  it 
was  not  until  after  his  return  from  Seville,  a  few  days 
previous  to  the  defeat  at  Ocana,  that  lord  Wellington 
replied  to  lord  Liverpool,  who,  during  the  interval,  had 
succeeded  lord  Castlereagh  in  the  war  department. 

Adverting  to  the  actual  state  of  the  French  troops  in 
the  Peninsula,  he  observed,  that  unless  the  Spanish 
armies  met  with  some  great  disaster,  the  former 
could  not  then  make  an  attack  upon  Portugal ,-  yet,  if 
events  should  enable  them  to  do  so,  that  the  forces  at 
that  moment  in  the  latter  might  defend  it.*  "  But  the 
peace  in  (Jermany,"  he  said,  "  might  enable  France 
to  reinforce  her  armies  in  Spain  largely,  when  the 
means  of  invading  Portugal  would  be  increased  ;  not 
only  in  proportion  to  the  additional  troops  then  poured 
in,  but  also  in  proportion  to   the  effect   which  such   a 


*  Lord  Wfclliiigton  to  lord  Liverpool.     Badajos,  14th  Nov. 
1809.    MSS. 


display  of  additional  strength  wcu  d  necessarily  have 
upon  the  spirit  of  the  Spaniards.  Even  in  that  case, 
until  Spain  should  have  been  conquered  and  rendered  sub- 
missive, the  French  would  find  it  difficult,  if  not  im- 
possible, to  obtain  possession  of  Portugal,  provided 
England  employed  her  armies  in  defenct  ,f  that  country 
aiid  that  the  Portuguese  military  service  leas  organised  In 
the  full  extent  of  which  it  was  capable.  But  the  number 
of  British  forces  employed  should  not  be  less  than 
thirty  thousand  effective  men,  although  the  Portuguese 
regular  force,  actually  enrolled,  consisted  of  thirty-nine 
thousand  infantry,  three  thousand  artillery,  and  three 
thousand  cavalry  ;  and  the  militia  amounted  to  forty- 
five  thousand,  exclusive  of  the  ordenangas." 

The  next  point  of  consideration  was  the  probable  ex- 
pense. "The  actual  yearly  cost  of  the  British  army  in 
Portugal,  exclusive  of  the  hire  of  transport-vessels,  was 
about  £1,800,000,  being  only  half  a  million  sterling 
more  than  they  would  cost  if  employed  in  England 
Hence  the  most  important  consideration  was  the  ex- 
pense of  renovating,  and  supporting  the  Portuguese  mil- 
itary and  civil  services.  The  British  government  had 
already  subsidised  the  Portuguese  Regency,  at  the  rate 
of  six  hundred  thousand  pounds  yearly,  being  the  ex- 
pense of  twenty  thousand  men,  which  the  latter  were 
bound  by  treaty  to  place  at  the  service  of  tlie  English 
commander-in-chief. 

"  But  this  was  far  from  sufficient  to  render  the  Por- 
tuguese army  efficient  for  the  impending  contest.  The 
revenue  of  Portugal  was  between  eight  and  niiie  mil- 
lions of  dollars,  the  expenses  between  fourteen  and  fif- 
teen millions,  leaving  a  deficiency  of  more  than  six 
millions  of  dollars.  Hence,  for  that  year,  the  most 
pressing  only  of  the  civil  and  military  demands  had 
been  paid,  and  the  public  debt  and  the  salaries  of  the 
public  servants  were  in  arrear.  The  advances  already 
made  by  Great  Britain  amounted  to  two  millions  of 
dollars;  there  remained  a  deficiency  of  four  millions 
of  dollars,  which,  after  a  careful  inquiry,  it  appeared 
could  not  be  made  good  by  Portugal ;  and  it  was  ob- 
vious that  thf.  administration  would,  when  distressed, 
gradually  appropriate  the  subsidy  to  support  the  civil 
authorities  to  the  detriment  of  the  military  service. 
Nay,  already  money  from  the  English  military  chest 
had  been  advanced  to  prevent  the  Portuguese  army 
from  disbanding  from  want  of  food. 

"  It  was  impossible  to  diminish  the  expenses  of  the 
Regency,  and  yet  the  French  invasion  and  the  emigra- 
tion to  the  Brazils  had  so  impoverished  the  country, 
that  it  was  impossible  to  raise  the  revenue  or  to  obtain 
money  by  loans.  The  people  were  unable  to  pay  the 
taxes  already  imposed,  and  the  customs,  which  formed 
the  principal  branch  of  Portuguese  revenue,  were  re- 
duced to  nothing  by  the  transfer  of  the  Brazilian  trade 
from  the  mother-country  to  Great  Britain.  This  trans- 
fer, so  profitable  to  the  latter,  was  ruinous  to  Portugal, 
and,  therefore,  justice  as  well  as  polic)'  required  that 
England  should  afford  pecuniary  assistance  to  the  Re- 
gency. 

"  Without  it,  nothing  could  be  expected  from  the 
Portuguese  army.  The  officers  of  that  army  had,  for 
many  years,  done  no  duty,  partly  that  their  country 
having  been,  with  some  trifling  exceptions,  at  peace 
nearly  half  a  century,  they  had  continued  in  the  same 
garrisons,  and  lived  with  their  families ;  and,  to  these 
advantages,  added  others  arising  from  abuses  in  the 
service.  Now  the  severe  but  necessary  discipline  in- 
troduced by  marshal  Beresford,  had  placed  the  Portu- 
guese officers  in  a  miserable  situation.  All  abuses  had 
been  extirpated,  additional  expenses  had  been  inflicted, 
and  the  regular  pay  was  not  only  insufllcient  to  support 
them  in  a  country  where  all  the  necessaries  of  life  were 
enormously  dear,  but  it  was  far  below  the  pay  of  the 
English,  Spanish,  and  French  officers,  with  whom,  or 
against  whom,  they  were  to  fight. 


280 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  Ti. 


"  If,  therefore,  the  war  was  to  be  carried  on.  it  was  ad- 
visable to  p^ratit  a  subsidy  of  one  hundred  and  thirty  thou- 
Band  pounds  yearly,  to  enable  ihe  Retrency  to  increase 
the  pay  of  the  Portufjuese  officers;  and  to  this  sum,  for 
the  reasons  before-mentioned,  should  be  added  a  further 
subsidy  of  three  hundred  thousand  pounds,  to  supply 
Ihe  actual  deficiency  in  the  Portuguese  revenues.  Or, 
if  the  Enorlish  cabinet  preferred  it,  they  might  take  ten 
thousand  more  Portuguese  troops  into  pay,  which 
could  be  done  at  an  expense  of  two  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  pounds.  With  such  assistance,  the  difficul- 
ties of  the  moment  might  be  overcome;  but,  without 
it,  he,  lord  Wellington,  fell  assured,  that  the  whole 
financial  and  military  system  of  the  Portuguese  would 
break  down  at  once  ;  all  the  expense,  hitherto  incurred, 
would  be  cast  away,  and  all  hopes  of  defending  the 
country  extinguished.  It  was  for  the  ministers  to  de- 
cide. 

"There  remained  two  other  points  to  consider — the 
re-embarkation  of  the  British  army,  in  the  event  of 
failure,  and  the  chances  of  the  Portuguese  nation  con- 
tinuing the  contest  alone.  As  to  the  first,  he  could 
carry  off  everything  safely,  except  the  horses  of  the 
cavalry  and  artillery  ;  those  could  not  be  carried  off, 
if  the  embarkation  took  place  after  a  lost  battle;  and, 
if  under  other  circumstances,  the  expense  of  horse- 
transports  would  be  more  than  the  worth  of  the  animals. 
As  to  the  second  point,  if  the  British  army  evacuated 
Portugal,  under  any  circumstances,  he  could  not  give 
hopes  that  the  contest  could  be  prolonged  effectually 
by  the  natives.  Although  I,"  he  said,  ^''  consider  ihe 
Portuguese  gnvermnent  and  army  as  ihe  principals  in 
ihe  contest  for  their  own  indepeiulcnce,  and  that  their  suc- 
cess Or  failure  must  depend  principally  upon  their  oivn 
exertions  and  the  bravery  of  their  arrny,  and  that  I  am 
sanguine  in  iny  expectations  ofhoth,  when  excited  by  the 
example  of  British  officers  and  troops  ;  I  have  no  hope 
<f  either,  if  his  Majesty  should  now  withdraw  the  army 
from  the  Peninsula,  or  if  if  should  be  obliged  to  evacuate 
if.  by  defeat.  There  is  no  doubt  that  ihe  immediate  con- 
sequences will  be  the  possession  of  Lisbon  by  ike  enemy, 
probably  without  a  contest  ;  and  other  consequences  will 
fillow,  affecting  ihe  state  of  the  tuar,  not  on.y  in  Portu- 
gal hut  Spain.  If,  therefore,  it  should  be  thought  ad- 
visable now  to  withdraw,  or  if,  eventually,  the  British 
army  should  be  obliged  to  withdraw  from  Portugal,  I 
would  recommend  a  consideration  of  the  means  of  car- 
rying away  such  of  the  Portuguese  military  ac  should 
be  desirous  of  emigrating,  rather  than  continue  by  ♦heir 
means,  the  contest  in  this  country." 

Peniche  and  Setuval  offered  secure  points  of  em- 
barkation in  the  event  of  failure,  but  neither  were  likely 
to  come  within  the  scope  of  the  operations,  and  lord 
Wellington's  opinion  as  to  the  facility  of  carrying  off 
the  army  from  Lisbon  was  founded  chiefly  upon  admi- 
ral Berkeley's  assurances  that  the  embarkation  would 
not  take  longer  than  four  hours,  during  which  time, 
even  though  the  left  bank  of  that  river  should  be  occu- 
pied by  the  enemy,  the  ships  of  war  could  sustain  the 
fire  and  at  the  same  time  sweep  with  their  own  guns 
all  the  ground  above  Passo  d'Arcos,  which,  from  the 
circumstance  of  its  having  no  surf,  was  thought  prefer- 
able to  St.  Julian's  for  an  embarkation.  But  the  ad- 
miral's views,  as  I  shall  have  occasion  to  observe  here- 
after, were  erroneous;  the  fleet  could  not  remain  in  the 
Tagus,  for  the  purpose  of  an  embarkation,  if  the  enemy 
were  in  possession  of  the  left  bank. 

Although  alarmed  at  the  number  of  men  demanded, 
a  number  which,  from  the  recent  loss  sustained  on  the 
Walcheren  expedition,  they  truly  observed,  would,  in 
cnse  of  disaster,  endanger  the  safety  of  England,  the 
ministers  assented  to  lord  Wellington's  proposals; 
they  undertook  to  pay  ten  thousand  additional  Portu- 
guese troops,  and  to  advance  money  for  the  increased 
Stipends  to  the  officers ;  and  being  now  pledged  to  an 


annual  subsidy  rf  nearly  one  million,  they  with  ju«<lice 
required   that  the   Portuguese  Regency,  under  pain  of 
the  subsidy  being  stopped,  should   keep  all   that  part       i 
of  the  military  establishment  which   remained    under 
their  own  direction  in  a  state  of  complete  eff.ciency. 

Thus  supported,  lord  Wellington  proceeded  with 
vigorous  intelligence  to  meet  the  impendii.g  contest. 
His  troops,  removed  from  the  Guadiana,  tck  healthy 
cantonments  on  the  north-eastern  frontier  of  Portugal. 
He  expected  a  reinforcement  of  five  thousnnd  infantry 
and  a  regiment  of  cavalry  from  England,  smaller  de- 
tachments had  already  reached  him,  and  the  army 
when  it  commenced  its  march  from  the  Guadiana  was 
numerically  thirty  thousand  strong;  but  those  actually 
under  arms  scarcely  amounted  to  twenty  thousand,  for 
nine  thousand  were  in  hospital,  and  many  in  the  rai.ks 
were  still  tottering  from  the  effects  of  past  illness. 

The  20th  of  .January,  the  head-quarters,  and  the  ar- 
tillery pare,  were  established  at  Viseu,  in  Upper  Bcira. 
The  cavalry  was  quartered,  by  single  regiments,  at 
Golegao,  Punhete,  Torres  Novas,  Celerico,  and  San- 
tarem.  General  Hill  was  left  with  five  thousand 
British,  and  a  like  number  of  Portuguese,  at  Abrantes; 
and  the  remainder  of  the  infantry  (one  regiment,  form- 
ing the  garrison  of  Lisbon,  excepted)  was  distributed 
along  the  valley  of  the  Mondego. 

The  plans  of  the  English  general  were,  at  first, 
grounded  upon  the  supposition,  that  the  French  would 
follow  the  right  or  northern  line,  in  preference  to  the 
centre  or  southern  line  of  operations,  against  the  Pe- 
ninsula, that  is,  attack  Portugal  from  the  side  if  Old 
Castile,  rather  than  Andalusia  from  ihe  side  ff  La  Man- 
cha.  In  this  he  was  mistaken.  The  movements  were 
again  directed  by  Napoleon,  his  views  were  as  usual 
gigantic,  and  not  Andalusia  alone,  but  every  part  of 
the  Peninsula,  was  destined  to  feel  the  weight  of  his 
arms.  Fresh  troops,  flushed  with  their  recent  German 
victories,  were  crowding  into  Spain,  reinforcing  the 
corps  to  their  right  and  left,  scouring  the  main  com- 
munications, and  following  the  footsteps  of  the  old 
bands,  as  the  latter  were  impelled  forward  in  the  career 
of  invasion.  Hence,  the  operations  against  Andalusia 
so  deeply  affected  the  defence  of  Portugal,  that,  on  the 
31st  of  January,  at  the  moment  Seville  was  ojiening 
her  gates,  lord  Wellington  demanded  fresh  instructions, 
reiterating  the  question,  whether  Portugal  should  be  de- 
fended at  all ;  but  at  the  same  time  transniitiiiig  one 
of  those  clear  and  powerful  statements,  whicli  he  in- 
variably drew  up  for  the  ministers'  information  pre- 
vious to  undertaking  any  great  enterprise  ;  statements, 
in  which,  showing  the  bearings  of  past  and  present 
events,  and  drawing  conclusions  as  to  the  future  with 
a  wonderful  accuracy,  he  has  given  irrefragable  proofs, 
that  envious  folly  has  attributed  to  fortune,  and  the  fa- 
vour of  the  cabinet,  successes,  which  were  the  result 
of  his  own  sagacity  and  unalterable  firmness. 

"The  enemy,"  he  said,  "aimed  at  conquering  the 
south  ;  he  would  no  doubt  obtain  Seville  with  all  its 
resources ;  and  the  defeat  and  dispersion  ci  the  Span- 
ish armies  would  be  the  consequences  of  any  action, 
in  which  either  their  imprudence  or  necessity,  or  even 
expediency,  might  engage  them.  The  armies  might, 
however,  be  lost  and  the  authorities  dispersed,  but  the 
war  of  Partisans  would  continue;  Cadiz  might  possi- 
bly hold  out,  and  the  Central  Junta  even  exist  witliin 
its  walls,  but  it  would  be  without  authority,  because 
the  French  would  possess  all  the  provinces.  This 
state  of  affairs  left  Portugal  untouclied  ;  yet  it  was 
chiefly  to  that  country  he  wished  to  draw  the  ministers 
attention. 

"They  already  knew  its  military  situation  and  re- 
sources. If  arms  could  be  supplied  to  the  militia,  a 
gross  force  of  ninety  thousand  men,  regularly  orga^ 
nized,  could  be  calculated  upon,  exclusive  of  the  armed 
population  and  of  the  British  army.     Much  had  been 


1810.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


281 


done  within  the  liist  nine  months,  for  the  enrolment, 
organization,  and  equipment  of  this  great  force ;  but 
m>ich  remnined  to  be  done,  and  with  very  insufficient 
means,  before  the  fifty  thousand  n  en,  coniposiug  the 
militia,  could  possibly  contend  with  the  enemy;  and 
although  this  should  be  effected,  the  whole  army  would 
still  want  that  confidence  in  themselves  and  in  their 
officers,  which  is  only  to  be  acquired  by  military  ex- 
perience. 

"  When  the  affairs  of  Spain  should,  as  before  sup- 
posed, be  brought  to  that  pass,  that  a  regular  resistance 
would  ceme,  no  pnssibt'/i'fi/  eri-ied  nf  the  contest  in  that 
country  being  reneioed  on  ftich  a  scale  as  to  affird  a 
chance  of  success,  although  the  possession  of  each  part 
might  be  precarious,  dependins  upon  the  strength  if  the 
French  force  holding  it,  and  that  the  tvh'.le  might  prove 
a  burtheii  rather  than  ap  advantage  to  the  Frc  ch  govern- 
ment. Thence  arose  this  question.  '  Will  the  continu- 
ation of  the  contest  in  Portugal,  afford  any  reasonable 
prospect  vi  advantage  against  the  common  enemy,  or 
of  benefit  to  the  allies]' 

"  It  was  impossible  to  calculate  upon  anv  certain 
grounds  the  degree  of  assistance  to  be  expected  from 
the  Portuguese  troops.  For  the  n  gulars  every  thing 
that  disci])line  could  effect  had  been  done,  and  they 
had  been  armed  and  equipped  as  far  as  the  means  of 
the  country  would  go.  The  militia  also  had  been  im- 
proved to  the  extent  which  the  expense  of  keeping 
them  embodied  would  permit.  The  Portuguese  had 
confidence  in  the  British  nation  and  army  ;  they  were 
loyal  to  their  Prince;  detested  the  French  govern- 
ment, and  were  individually  determined  to  do  every 
thing  for  the  cause.  Still  they  were  not  to  be  certainly 
calculated  upon  until  inured  to  war,  because  the  ma- 
jority of  their  officers  were  of  an  infrior  description 
and  inexperienced  in  military  affiirs."* 

Under  these  circumstances,  and  adverting  to  the  ap- 
proaching subjection  of  Spain,  he  demanded  to  know  ■ 
whether   '■'■the  enemy,    bending  the  greatest  part  of  his  \ 
force  against  Portugal,  that  country  should  be  defended,  j 
or  mea-mres  taken  to  evacuate  it,  carrying  off  all  persons, 
military  and  others,  for  whose  conveyance  means  could 
he  found.    But  under  any  circumstances,  (he  said)  the 
BrMsh  army  could  always  be  embarked  in  despite  of 
the  enemy." 

Such  being  the  view  taken  of  this  important  subject 
by  lord  \\  ellington,  it  may  seem  proper  here  to  notice  an 
argument  which,  with  equal  ignorance  and  malice,  has 
often  been  thru-t  forward  in  disparagement  of  sir  John 
Moore,  namely,  that  he  declared  Portugal  could  not  be 
defended,  whereas  lord  Wellington  did  defend  that 
country. f  The  former  general,  premising  that  he  was 
not  prepared  to  answer  a  question  of  such  magnitude, 
observed,  that  the  frontier  being,  although  rugged. 
open,  could  not  be  defended  against  a  superior  force; 
yet  that  Almeida.  Guarda,  Belmonte,  Baracal,  Celerico, 
and  Viseu,  might  be  occupied  as  temporary  positions 
to  check  the  advance  of  an  enemv,  and  cover  the  em- 
barkation of  stores,  <fcc.,  which  could  only  be  made  at 
Lisbon.  That  the  Portuguese  in  their  own  mountains 
would  be  of  much  use.  and  that  he  hoped  that  they 
could  alone  defend  the  Tras  os  Montes.  That,  if  the 
French  succeeded  in  Spain,  it  would  be  vain  to  resist 
them  in  Portugal,  "  because  the  latter  was  without  a  mil- 
itary force,^^  and  if  it  were  otherwise,  from  the  expe- 
rience of  RoriQa  and  Virniero,  no  reliance  was  to  be 
placed  on  their  troops.  This  opinion,  hastily  given, 
had  reference  only  to  the  state  of  affairs  existing  at  that 
vioment,  being  expressly  founded,  on  the  miserable  con- 
dition and  unpromising  chiirncter  of  the  Portuguese  mil- 
itary, Spain  also  being  supposed  conquered. 

Now  lord  Wellington,  after  two  campaigns  in  the 
country ;  after  the  termination  of  the  anarchy,  which 


»  Lord  Wfllinston  to  lord  Liverpool,  31st  Jan.,  1810.  MSS. 
■f  Mr.  James  Moore's  Piarralive. 


:  prevailed  during  sir  John  Cradcck's  time;  after  im- 
mense subsidies  had  been  granted  to  Poitugal,  her 
whole  military  force  reorganized,  and  her  regular  troops 
disciplined,  paid,  and  officered  by  England;  after  the 
war  in  Germany  had  cost  Napoleon  fifty  thousand  men, 
the  campaign  in  the  Peninsula  at  least  fifty  thousand 
m.ore ;  in  fine,  after  mature  consideration,  and  when 
Spain  was  still  fighting;  when  Andalusia,  Catalonia, 
\  Murcia,  Valencia,  Gallicia,  and  the  Aslurias,  were 
still  uninvaded  ;  when  Ciudad  Rodiigo  and  Badajcs, 
'  most  impr rtant  posts  with  reference  to  this  question, 
were  still  in  possession  of  the  Spaniards,  and  jirepared 
for  defence;  lord  Wellington,  I  sav,  came  to  the  con- 
clusion, that  Portugal  might  be  defended  against  the 
army  then  in  the  Peninsula,  provided  an  enormous  ad- 
ditional subsidy  and  a  powerful  auxiliary  army  were 
fvrnished  by  England,  and  that  one  earnest  and  devoted 
effort  teas  made  by  the  whole  Portuguese  nation.*  And 
when  Andalusia  fell,  he  warned  his  government,  that, 
although  success  could  only  be  expected  from  the  devotion 
and  ardour  of  the  Portuguese,  their  army  could  r,ot  even 
then  be  implicitly  trusted.]  Lisbon,  also,  he  considered 
as  the  only  secure  point  of  resistance,  and  he  occupied 
Viseu.  Guarda,  Almeida,  Belmonte,  and  Celerico,  as 
temporary  posts. 

But,  in  all  things  concerning  this  war,  there  was  be- 
tween those  generals,  a  remarkable  similarity  of  opin- 
ion and  plan  of  action. 

"  The  French,''"'  said  sir  John  Moore,  "  will  find  the 
Spaniards  troublesoine  subjects,  but  in  the  firs!  instance 
they  will  have  little  more  than  a  march  to  subdue  the 
country. ''''\. 

"  The  dtfeat  and  dispersion  rf  the  Spanish  armies  will 
6f,"  said  lord  Wellington,  "  the  probable  comequcnce 
of  any  action  in  ivhich  either  imprudence,  necessity,  or 
even  expediency,  may  lead  them  to  engage.  The  armies 
may  be  lost,  the  authorities  dispensed,  but  the  war  of  Par- 
tisans ivill  probably  continue.''^\\ 

And  when  the  edge  of  the  sword  was,  in  1810,  as  in 
1808,  descending  on  the  unguarded  front  of  Andalusia, 
lord  Wellington,  on  the  first  indication  of  Joseph's 
march,  designed  to  make  a  movement  similar  in  prin- 
ciple to  that  executed  by  sir  John  Moore  on  a  like  occa- 
sion ;  that  is,  by  an  irruption  into  Castile,  to  threaten 
the  enemy's  rear,  in  such  sort  that  he  should  be  ob- 
liged to  return  from  Andalusia  or  suffer  his  forces  in 
Castile  to  be  beaten.  Nor  was  he  at  first  deterred 
from  this  project,  by  the  knowledge,  that  fresh  troops 
were  entering  Spain.  The  Junta,  indeed,  assured  him 
that  only  eight  thousand  men  had  reinforced  the  French ; 
but,  although  circumstances  led  him  to  doubt  this  as- 
sertion, he  was  not  without  hopes  to  effect  his  purpose 
before  the  reinforcements,  whatever  they  miirht  be, 
could  come  into  line.  He  had  even  matured  his  plan, 
as  far  as  regarded  the  direction  of  the  march,  when 
other  considerations  obliged  him  to  relinquish  it,  and 
these  shall  be  here  examined,  because  French  and 
Spanish  writers  then,  and  since,  have  accused  him  of 
looking  on  with  indifference,  if  not  with  satisfaction, 
at  the  ruin  of  the  Central  Junta's  operation,  as  if  it 
only  depended  upon  him  to  render  them  successful. 

Why  he  refused  to  join  in  the  Spanish  projects  has 
been  already  explained.     He  abandoned  his  own, — 

1.  Because  the  five  thousand  men  promised  from 
England  had  not  arrived,  and  his  hospitals  being  full, 
he  could  not,  including  Hill's  division,  bring  more  than 
twenty  thousand  British  soldiers  into  the  field.  Hill's 
division,  however,  could  not  be  moved  without  leaving 
the  rear  of  the  army  exposed  to  the  French  in  tha 
south, — a  danger,  which  success  in  Castile,  by  recall- 
ing the  latter  from  Andalusia,  would  only  increase. 


»  Letter  to  lord  Liverpo  .1,  Nov.  14,  1809.   MSS. 

t   Ibid.  Jan.  31,  1810.   MSS. 

t    .\lr.  James  Moore's  Narrative. 

11  Letter  to  lord  Liverpool,  Jan.  31,  1810.    MSS 


282 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XI. 


2.  Tlie  Portuguese  had  suffered  cruelly  during  the 
winter  from  hunger  and  nakedness,  the  result  oi  the 
scarcity  of  money  before-mentioned.*  To  bring  them 
into  line,  was  to  risk  a  total  disorganization,  destruc- 
tive alike  of  present  and  future  advantages.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  French  in  Castile,  consisting  of  the 
Bixth  corps  and  the  troops  of  Kellerman's  government, 
lord  Wellington  knew  to  be  at  least  thirty  thousand 
strong,  of  which  twenty  thousand  were  in  one  mass; 
and,  although  the  rest  were  dispersed  from  Burgos  to 
Avila,  from  Zamora  to  Valladolid,  they  could  easily 
have  concentrated  in  time  to  fjive  battle,  and  would 
have  proved  too  powerful.  That  this  reasoning  was 
sound  shall  now  be  shewn. 

Morlier's  march  from  Seville  would  not  have  termi- 
nated at  Badajos,  if  the  British  force  at  Abrantes,  in- 
stead of  advancing  to  Portalegre,  had  been  employed 
in  Castile.  The  invasion  of  Andalusia,  was  only  part 
of  a  general  system  throughout  Spain;  and  when  the 
king  placed  himself  at  the  head  of  the  army,  to  force 
the  Morena,  Kellerman  marched  from  Salamanca  to 
Miranda  del  Castanar  and  Bejar,  with  the  sixth  corps, 
and  thus  secured  the  defiles  leading  into  the  valley  of 
the  Tagus ;  at  the  same  time,  the  second  corps  coming 
down  that  valley,  communicated  with  the  sixth  by  the 
pass  of  Banos,  and  with  the  fifth  by  Seradillo  and  Ca- 
ceres.  Hence,  without  losing  hold  of  Andalusia,  three 
torfs  (Tarmee,  namely,  the  sixth,  second,  and  fifth, 
amounting  to  fifty  thousand  men,  could,  on  an  emer- 
gency, be  brought  together  to  oppose  any  offensive 
movement  of  lord  Wellington's.  Nor  was  this  the 
whole  of  the  French  combinations;  in  rear  of  all  these 
forces,  Napoleon  was  crowding  the  Peninsula  with 
fresh  armies,  and  not  eight  thousand,  as  the  Central 
Junta  asserted,  but  one  hundred  thousand  men,  ren- 
dered disposable  by  the  peace  with  Austria  and  the 
evacuation  of  Walcheren,  were  crossing,  or  to  cross, 
the  western  Pyrenees. | 

Of  these,  the  first  detachments  reinforced  the  divi- 
sions in  the  field,  but  the  succeeding  troops  formed  an 
eighth  and  ninth  corps,  and  the  former,  under  the  com- 
mand of  tiie  duke  of  Abrantes,  advancing  gradually 
through  Old  Castile,  was  actually  in  the  plains  of  Val- 
ladolid, and  would,  in  conjunction  with  Kellerman, 
have  overwhelmed  the  British  army,  but  for  that  saga- 
cit}',  which  the  French  with  derisive  but  natural  anger, 
and  the  Spaniards,  with  ingratitude,  have  teraied, 
"  The  se/ftsh  cautiun  of  the  English  system.''^ 

Truly,  it  would  be  a  strange  thing,  to  us*  go  noble 
and  costly  a  machine,  as  a  British  army,  wiili  all  its 
national  reputation  to  support,  as  lightly  as  those 
Spanish  multit\ides,  collected  in  a  day,  dispersed  in  an 
hour,  reassembled  again  without  difficulty,  and  inca- 

fiable  of  attaining,   and,   consequently,   incapable  of 
osing,  any  military  reputation. 


CHAPTER  II. 

Greatness  of  Lord  Welhngton's  plans — Situation  of  the  belli- 
gerents Hescribetl—  State  of  the  French — Character  of  Jo- 
seph—Of  his  Ministers — Disputes  with  the  Marshals— Napo- 
leon's poh'cv — Military  governments — Alnienara  sent  to 
I'aris — C'lirious  (Jece|)tion  executed  by  the  marquis  of  Ro- 
niana,  Mr.  Stuart,  and  the  historian  Cabanes — Prodi'i-ious 
force  of  the  French  army — State  of  Spain — Inertness  of  Gal- 
licia — Secret  plan  of  the  Regency  for  encouraging  the  Ciuer- 
illas — Operations  of  those  bands — Injustice  and  absurdity  of 

the  Regency,  with    respect  to  South   America — Englarid 

State  of  parties — Factious  inju.stice  on  both  sides — Difficulty 

•  of    raising    money — Bullion    Committee — Wni.    Cobbett 

TiOrd  King — Mr.  Vansittart — F.xtravagance  of  the  Ministers 

State  of  Portugal  —  Parties  in  that  country — Intrigues  of  the 
Patriarch  and  the  Souza's — Mr.  Stuart  is  appointed  Plenipo- 


»  Lord  Wellington ■»  Corregpondence.  MSS. 
t  Rolls  of  the  h  rench  ariuy. 


tentiary — Tlis  firmness-  -Princess  Carlotta  clamis  the  Regen. 
cy  of  the  whole  Ptnins  i  a,  and  the  succession  to  the  throne 
of  Spain. 

The  greatness  of  the  French  reinforcements  having 
dispelled  the  idea  of  offensive  operations,  lord  Wel- 
lington turned  his  whole  attention  to  Portugal,  and 
notwithstanding  the  unfavourable  change  of  circum- 
stances, the  ministers  consented  that  he  should  undei- 
take  its  defence;  yet,  the  majority  yielded  to  the  in- 
fluence of  his  brother,  rather  than  to  their  own  convic- 
tion of  its  practicability,  and  threw  the  responsibility 
entirely  on  the  shoulders  of  the  general.  The  deep  de- 
signs, the  vast  combinations,  the  mighty  eflbrts  by 
which  he  worked  out  the  deliverance  of  that  country, 
were  beyond  the  compass  of  their  policy  ;  and  even 
now,  it  is  easier  to  admire  than  to  comprehend,  the 
moral  intrepidity  which  sustained  him  under  so  many 
difficulties,  and  the  sagacity  which  enabled  him  to 
overcome  them ;  for  he  had  an  enemy  with  a  sharp 
sword  to  fight,  the  follies  and  fears  of  several  weak 
cabinets  to  correct,  the  snares  of  unprincipled  poli^ 
ticians  to  guard  against,  and  finally  to  oppose  public 
opinion.  Failure  was  every  where  anticipated,  and 
there  were  but  few  who  even  thought  him  serious  in 
his  undertaking. 

But  having  now  brought  the  story  of  the  war  down 
to  that  period,  Avhen  England,  setting  Portugal  and 
Spain  as  it  were  aside,  undertook  the  contest  with 
France,  it  will  be  well  to  take  a  survey  of  the  respec- 
tive conditions  and  plans  of  the  belligerents ;  and  to 
show  how  great  the  preparations,  how  prodigious  the 
forces  on  both  sides,  and  with  what  a  power  each  was 
impelled  forward  to  the  shock. 

State  (if  the  P)-ench. — France  victorious,  and  in  a  state 
of  the  highest  prosperity,  could  with  ease,  furnish  the 
number  of  men,  required  to  maintain  the  struggle  in 
the  Peninsula  for  many  years.  The  utmost  strength 
of  the  Spaniards  had  been  proved,  and  it  was  evident 
that  if  the  French  could  crush  the  British  armies,  dis- 
order and  confusion  might  indeed  be  prolonged  ibr  a 
few  years,  yet  no  effectual  resistance  made,  and  as  in 
the  war  of  succession,  the  people  would  gradually  have 
accommodated  themselves  to  the  change  of  dynasty; 
especially  as  the  little  worth  of  Ferdinand  was  now 
fully  demonstrated  by  an  elTort  to  effect  his  release. 
For  when  baron  Kolli,  the  agent  employed  on  this  oc- 
casion, was  detected,  and  his  place  supplied  by  one 
of  the  French  police,  to  ascertain  the  intentions  of  the 
captive  king,  the  latter,  injluenced  by  personal  fears 
alone,  not  only  refused  to  make  the  attempt,  but  dis- 
honourably denounced  Kolli  to  the  French  government. 
The  only  real  obstacles  then  to  the  entire  conquest  of 
the  Peninsula  were  Cadiz  and  Portugal.  The  strength 
of  the  former  was  precarious,  and  the  enormous  forces 
assembled  to  subdue  the  latter  appeared  to  be  equal  to 
the  task.  Yet  in  war,  therf.  are  always  circumstances, 
which,  though  extraneous  to  the  military  movements, 
influence  them  as  much  as  the  wind  influences  the 
sailing  of  a  ship,  and  amongst  the  most  important  of 
these,  must  be  reckoned  the  conduct  of  the  intrusive 
king. 

Joseph  was  a  man  of  so  amiable  a  nature,  that  even 
the  Spaniards  never  accused  him  of  any  thing  worse 
than  being  too  convivial ;  but  it  is  evident  that  he  was 
unequal  to  his  task  and  mistook  his  true  situation, 
when,  resisting  Napoleon's  policy,  he  claimed  the 
treatment  of  an  independent  king.  He  should  have 
known  that  he  was  a  tool,  and  in  Spain,  could  only  bo 
a  tool  of  the  emperor's.  To  have  refused  a  crown, 
like  his  brother  Lucien,  would  have  been  heroic  firm 
ness,  but  like  his  brother  Louis,  first  to  accept,  and 
then  to  resist  the  hand  that  conferred  it,  was  a  folly 
that,  without  ameliorating  the  condition  of  the  Span- 
iards, threw  fatal  obstacles  in  Napoleon's  path.  Jo- 
seph's object  was  to  create  a  Spanish  party  for  him- 
self by  gentle   and   just   means,   but  the  scales   fell 


1810.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR  WAR. 


283 


from  the  hands  of  justice  when  the  French  first  en- 
tered the  Peninsula,  and  while  the  English  supported 
ISpain,  it  was  absurd  to  expect  even  a  sullen  sub- 
mission, much  less  attachment,  from  a  nation  so 
abused  ;  neither  was  it  possible  to  recast  public  feel- 
iiKJ-,  until  the  people  had  passed  through  the  furnace 
of  war.  The  French  soldiers  were  in  Spain  for  con- 
quest, and  without  them  the  intrusive  monarch  could 
not  keep  his  throne. 

Now  Joseph's  Spanish  ministers,  were  men  who 
joined  him  upon  principle,  and  who,  fir  from  shew- 
in"-  a  renegado  zeal  in  favour  of  the  French,  were  as 
ardently  attached  to  their  own  country,  as  any  of 
those  who  shouted  for  Ferdinand  VII.;  and  whenever 
Spanish  interests  clashed  (and  that  was  constantly) 
with  those  of  the  French  armies,  they  as  well  as  the 
king  invariably  supported  the  former ;  and  so  strenu- 
ously, thai  in  Paris  it  was  even  supposed  that  they 
intended  to  fall  on  the  emperor's  troops.  Thus  civil  con- 
tention weakened  the  military  operations,  and  obliged 
Napoleon  either  to  take  the  command  in  person,  or  to 
adopt  a  policy  which  however  defective,  will  per- 
haps be  found  to  have  been  the  best  adapted  to  the  ac- 
tual state  of  affairs. 

He  suffered,  or  as  some,  eager  to  lower  a  great  man's 
genius  to  their  own  level,  have  asserted,  he  fomented 
disputes  between  the  marshals  and  the  king;  but  the 
true  question  is,  could  he  prevent  those  disputes'? 
A  wise  policy,  does  not  consist  in  pushing  any  one 
])oint  to  the  utmost  perfection  of  which  it  may  be  sus- 
ceptible, but  in  regulating  and  balancing  opposing  in- 
terests, in  such  a  manner,  that  the  greatest  benefit  shall 
arise  from  th«  working  of  the  whole.  To  arrive  at  a 
sound  judgement  of  Napoleon's  measures,  therefore,  it 
would  be  ntcessary  to  weigh  all  the  various  interests 
of  his  political  position,  and  there  are  not  sulTicient 
materials  yet  before  the  world,  to  do  this  correctly; 
yet  we  may  be  certain,  that  his  situation  with  respect 
both  to  foreign  and  domestic  policy,  required  extraor- 
dinary management.  It  must  always  be  remembered, 
that,  he  was  not  merely  a  conqueror;  he  was  also  the 
founder,  of  a  political  structure  too  much  exposed  to 
storms  from  without,  to  bear  any  tampering  with  its  in- 
ternal supports.  If  money  be  the  sinew  of  war,  it  is 
also  the  vital  stream  of  peace,  and  there  is  nothing 
more  remarkable  in  Napoleon's  po'icy,  than  the  care 
with  which  he  handled  financial  matters,  avoiding  as 
he  would  the  plague,  that  fictitious  system  of  public 
credit,  so  fatuitously  cherished  in  England.  He  could 
not,  without  hurting  France,  transmit  large  quantities 
of  gold  to  Spain,  and  the  only  resource  If^fi  was  to 
make  " /Ae  war  maintain  the  war.'^  Now  Joseph's  de- 
sire of  popularity,  and  the  feelings  of  his  ministers, 
were  opposed  lo  this  system  ;  nor  were  the  proceeds 
of  the  contributions  always  applied  for  the  benefit  of 
the  troops.  This  demanded  a  remedy ;  yet  openly  to 
declare  the  king  of  no  consideration  would  have  been 
impolitic  in  the  highest  degn-e.  The  emperor  adont- 
ed  an  intermediate  course,  and  formed  what  were  call- 
ed '■^particular  miltlari/ governments,''^  such  as  Navarre, 
Aragon,  Catalonia,  and  Andalusia,  in  which  the  mar- 
shal, or  general,  named  governor,  posses-^ed  both  the 
civil  and  military  power;  in  short,  he  created  viceroys 
as  he  had  threatened  to  do  when  at  .Madrid,  and,  though 
many  disadvantages  attended  this  arrangement,  it  ap- 
pears to  have  been  wise  and  consistent  with  the  long 
reach  which  distinguishes  all  Napoleon's  measures. 

The  principal  disadvantages  were,  that  it  mortally 
offended  the  king,  by  thwarting  his  plans  for  establish- 
ing a  national  party  ;  that  many  of  the  governors  were 
wantonly  oppressive,  and  attentive  only  to  their  own 
situation,  without  regarding  the  general  objects  of  the 
war;  tiial  both  the  Spanish  ministers  and  the  people  re- 
garded it  as  a  step  towards  dismembering  Spain,  and  es- 
pecially with  respect  to  the  provinces  beyond  theEbro; 


and,  indeed,  the  annexing  those  parts  to  France,  if  not 
resolved  upon,  was  at  one  time  contemplated  by  the 
emperor.  On  the  othe;  hand,  experience  proved,  that 
Joseph  was  not  a  general  equal  to  the  times.  Napo- 
leon himself  admits,  that,  at  this  period,  the  marauding 
system  necessary  to  obtain  supplies,  joined  to  the 
Guerilla  warfare,  had  relaxed  the  discipline  of  the 
French  armies,  and  introduced  a  horrible  license,  while 
the  military  movements  were  feebly  pushed.*  Hence, 
perhaps,  the  only  effectual  means  to  obtain  the  resources 
of  Spain  for  the  troops,  with  least  devastation,  was  to 
make  the  success  of  each  "  corps  tfarmee,^''  and  the 
reputation  of  its  commander,  dependent  upon  the  wel- 
fare of  the  province  in  which  it  was  fighting.  And, 
although  some  of  the  governors,  had  neither  tlie  sense 
nor  the  justice  lo  fulfil  this  expectation,  others,  such  as 
Soult  and  Suchrt,  did  tranquillize  the  people,  and  yet 
provided  all  necessary  things  for  their  own  troops;  re- 
sults which  would  certainly  not  have  been  attained  un- 
der the  supreme  government  of  the  king,  because  he 
knew  little  of  war,  loved  pleasure,  was  of  an  easy, 
obliging  disposition,  and  had  a  court  to  form  and 
maintain. 

I  am  aware  that  the  first-named  generals,  especially 
Soult,  were  included  by  Joseph  amongst  those  who, 
by  oppressing  the  people,  extended  the  spirit  of  resist- 
ance ;  but  this  accusation  was  the  result  of  personal 
enmity,  and  facts,  derived  from  less  interested  quarters, 
as  well  as  the  final  results,  prove  that  those  officers 
had  a  longer  reach  in  their  policy  than  the  king  could 
understand. 

There  is  yet  another  view  in  which  the  mailer  may 
be  considered.  Napoleon  says  he  left  many  provinces 
of  Italy  under  the  fiarsh  government  of  Austria,  that 
the  spirit  of  jealousy,  common  to  the  small  slates  of  that 
country,  might  be  broken,  and  the  whole  rendered  ame- 
nable and  ready  lo  assimilate,  when  he  judged  the  time 
ripe  to  re-form  one  great  kingdom.  Now  the  same 
policy  may  be  traced  in  the  military  governments  of 
Spain.  The  marshal's  sway,  however  wisely  adapt- 
ed to  rircumstances,  being  still  the  offspring  of  war 
and  violence,  was,  of  necessity,  onerous  and  harsh  ; 
but  the  Peninsula  once  subdued,  this  system  would 
have  been  replaced  by  the  peaceful  government  of  the 
kinnr,  who  would  then  have  been  regarded  as  a  delive- 
rer. Something  of  this  nature  was  also  necessary  to 
sweep  away  the  peculiar  privileges  which  many  prov- 
inces possessed,  and  of  which  they  were  extremely 
tenacious  ;  and  the  iron  hand  of  war,  only,  could  intro- 
duce that  equality  which  was  the  principal  aim  and 
scope  of  the  constitution  of  Bayonne. 

Nevertheless,  the  first  effects  of  the  decree  estab- 
lishing this  system,  were  injurious  to  the  French 
cause.)"  Fresh  contributions  were  exacted  lo  supply 
the  deficiency  occasioned  by  the  cessation  of  succours 
from  I'' ranee ;  and,  to  avoid  these,  men,  who  would 
otherwise  have  submitted  tranquilly,  fled  from  the 
military  governments.  The  Partidas  also  suddenly 
and  greatly  increased,  and  a  fresh  difficulty  arose  about 
their  treatment  when  prisoners.  These  bodies  although 
regardless  of  the  laws  of  war  themselves,  claimed  all 
the  rights  of  soldiers  from  their  adversaries,  and  their 
claim"  was  supported  by  the  Spanish  government. 
Thus,  when  Soult.  as  major-general  for  the  king, 
proclaimed  that  military  execution  would  be  done  on 
the  bands  in  Andalusia,  as  assassins,  and  beyond  the 
pale  of  military  law,  the  Regency  answered,  by  a  re- 
taliatory declaration;  and  both  parties  had  strong 
grounds  for  what  they  did.  The  Junta,  because  the 
defence  of  the  country  now  rested  cbielly  on  the  Par- 
tidas. Joseph,  because  the  latter,  while  claiming  the 
usages  of  war,  did  not  act  upon  them,  and  were,  by  the 


*    Mtinoiies  de  St.  Udene. 

t  King  Joseph's  Conespondence.     MSS. 


284 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


tBooK  XI 


Junta,  enconragod  in  assassination.  Mina,  and,  in- 
deed, all  the  chiefs,  put  their  prisoners  to  death 
whenever  it  became  inconvenient  to  keep  them  ;  and 
Suraza  publiclj  announced  his  hope  of  beings  able 
to  capture  Madame  Suchet  when  she  was  pre(rnant, 
tlrat  he  might  destroy  the  mother  and  the  iiif.mt  to- 
gether !♦  And  such  thinirs  were  common  during  this 
terrible  war.  The  diiiiculties  occurring  in  argument 
were,  however,  overcome  in  practice;  the  question  of 
the  treatment  of  the  prisoners  was  generally  decided  by 
granting  no  quarter  on  either  side. 

Joseph,  incensed  at  the  edict  establishing  the  go- 
vcrnnieiits,  sent  the  marquis  of  Almenara  to  Paris,  to 
remonstrate  with  his  brotlier,  and  to  complain  of  the 
viohm'-e  and  the  injustice  "f  the  French  generals,  espe- 
cially Ney  and  Kellerman  ;  and  he  denounced  one  act  of 
the  latter,  which  betrayed  the  most  wanton  contempt 
of  justice  and  propriety;  namely,  the  seizure  of  the 
national  archives  at  Simancas,  by  which  infinite  con- 
fusion was  produced,  and  the  utmost  indignation  ex- 
cited, without  obtaitiing  the  slightest  benefit,  political 
or  military.  Another  object  of  Almenara's  mission 
was  to  ascertain  if  there  was  really  any  intention  of 
seizing  the  provinces  beyond  the  Ebro;  and  this  gave 
rise  to  a  curious  intrigue ;  for  his  correspondence,  be- 
ing intercepted,  was  brought  to  Mr.  Stuart,  the  Brit- 
ish envoy,  and  he,  in  concert  with  Komana,  and  Ca- 
bnnes  the  Spanish  historian,  simulating  the  style  and 
manner  of  Napoleon's  state-papers,  composed  a  coun- 
terfeit '■'■  senatus  consuUum''''  and  decree  for  annexing  the 
provinces  beyond  the  Ebro  to  PVance,  and  transmitted 
them  to  Joseph,  whose  discontent  and  fears  were 
thereby  greatly  increased.  Meanwhile,  his  distress  for 
money  was  so  extreme,  that  his  ministers  were  at  times 
actually  destitute  of  food. 

These  political  affairs  impeded  the  action  of  the 
armieL',  but  the  intrinsic  strength  of  the  latter  was  truly 
formidable;  for,  reckoning  the  king's  French  guards, 
the  force  in  the  Peninsula  was  not  less  than  three  hun- 
dred and  sevenly  thouMind  men,  and  tis:;hty  thousand 
hirses.  Of  these,  forty-eight  thousand  men  were  in 
lios()iial,  four  thousand  prisoners,  and  twenty-nine  thou- 
sand detached  ;  leaving  nearly  two  hundred  and  eigrhty 
thousand  lighting  men  actually  under  arms,  ready  ei- 
ther for  battle  or  siege :  and  moreover,  a  fresh  reserve, 
eighteen  thousand  strong,  was  in  march  to  enter  Spain. 
In  May,  this  prodigious  force  had  been  re-organized; 
and  in  July  was  thus  distributed  : — 


Governments  or  Armies  in  the  2d  Line. 


1    Calalonti 
>   Aragon     . 

3.  Navarre  . 

4.  Ris-ay 

6.  OKI  tiis-.il 


{ 


Total  Slretip;th. 

Duke  of  Taiento  rw,^? 
33,(107 


SPTPnlh  corps  .  . 
Tliiril  i',:>rps .  .  . 
Dr'tarhiiieiils    and    a'^ 

divisi  >n  uf  ihe  Iiii-  > 

penal  Guards    .  .  .  J 
rictachiiienis    .     .     .     Gen.  Caffarelli 
liivisi'Mis  of  ih 


Gen.  Suchel 
-Gen.  Reille 


•la  Liisiil',  Cdtn-rliivisiMis  of  the  im-'j 
prisi/ii    Biiriros,^      prrial  Guards  and  ^Gen.  Dorsenne 
Aran  la,anl8,>riaC     Cavalry     ...     .J 


6   Valla(i.)lid.&c. 
7.  Asiurias 


;ilry 
Dclaclimenls 
One  divisi.jn 


Gen.  Kellerman  , 
Gen.  Bonet .    . 


21,887 
6,570 
10,303 

6.474 

9,8."'8 


Total  f  jr  the  governmenls  .    .     1 13,7811 

.Armies  in  the  Isl  Line, 

Army  of  Ihe  South,  composrd  uf  the  first,  f.iurth,  and  fifth 
cjrps,  U';\l  r  thf  coninand  of  Soiili 72,709 

Army  of  the  f'enire,  C(mi[H!S(d  of  iho  Riyal  Guards,  iwo  divi- 
siiins  'f  i  ifiutrv,  and  two  of  cavalry,  under  the  pcrsxial  com- 
mand of  the  kins; 21,187 

Army  of  Portugal,  composed  of  a  reserve  of  cavalry  and  the 
sec  )nd,  sixth,  and  ei.yluh  corps,  under  the  command  of  Mas- 
sena 86,893 

The  ninth  corps,  commanded  by  general  Drouet,  distributed, 
tiv  divisions,  al  mz  the  great  line  of  coinniunicalion  from  Vit- 
viria  to  Valladolid 23,81.5 

A  division  undT  general   S'Tra.'i,  enipbyed  ac  a  moveable 

L  column  to  protect  the  i'ear  of  the  army  of  Portugal    ....    10,605 

218,272 


•  Suchet's  Mciiioin. 


Thus  the  plan  of  invasion  was  determined  in  three 
distinct  lines,  namely,  the  third  and  seventh  corps  on 
the  left;  the  army  of  the  south  in  the  centre;  the 
army  of  Portugal  on  the  right.  But  the  interior  circle 
was  still  held  by  the  F'rench,  and  their  lines  of  commu- 
nication were  crowded  with  troops. 

State  vf  Spain. — On  the  right,  the  armies  of  Valen- 
cia and  Catalonia,  were  opposed  to  the  third  and  se- 
venth corps;  and  their  utmost  efforts  could  only  retard, 
not  prevent  the  sieges  of  Taragona  and  Tortoza.  In 
the  centre,  the  Murcian  troops  and  those  asseuibled  at 
Cadiz,  were  only  formidable  by  the  assistance  of  the 
British  force  under  general  Graham,  On  the  left,  Ro- 
mana,  supported  by  the  frontier  fortresses,  maintain- 
ed a  partizan  warfare  from  Albuquerque  to  Ayamonte, 
but  looked  to  Hill  for  safety,  and  to  Portugal  for  ref- 
uge. In  the  north,  the  united  forces  of  Gallicia  and 
Asluria,  did  not  exceed  fifteen  thousand  men ;  and 
Mahi  declared  his  intention  of  retiring  to  Coniiia  if 
Bonet  advanced  beyond  the  frontiers.  Indeed,  the  Gal- 
licians  were  so  backward  to  join  the  armies,  that,  at  a 
later  period,  (^ontreras  was  used  to  send  through  the 
country  moveab'e  columns,  attended  by  an  execution- 
er, to  oblige  the  villages  to  furnish  iheir  quota  of  men.* 
Yet,  with  all  this  severity,  and  with  money  and  artns 
continually  furnished  by  England,  Gallicia  never  was 
of  any  signal  service  to  the  British  operations. 

But,  as  in  the  human  body  livid  spots  and  blotches 
appear  as  the  vital  strength  decays,  so,  in  Spain,  the 
Partidas  suddenly  and  surprisingly  increased  as  the 
regular  armies  disappeared.  Many  persons  joined  these 
bands,  as  a  refuge  from  starvation  ;  others  from  a  de- 
sire to  revenge  the  licentious  conduct  of  the  marauding 
French  columns:  and,  finally,  the  Regency,  desirous 
of  pushing  the  system  to  its  utmost  extent,  establish- 
ed secret  Guerilla  Juntas,  in  each  province,  enjoin- 
ing them,  diligently  to  collect  stores  and  provisions 
in  secure  places.  District  inspectors  and  paymasters 
selected  by  the  nearest  general  officer  in  command  of 
reirular  troops,  were  also  appointed,  as  superintend- 
ents of  details  relative  to  the  discipline  and  payment 
of  the  Partidas,  and  particular  tracts  were  charged 
with  the  supplies,  each  according  to  its  means. f  Last- 
ly, every  province  was  divided  into  three  parts,  each 
part,  following  its  population,  being  to  furnish  seven, 
eight,  or  nine  squadrons  of  this  irregular  force  ;  and  the 
whole,  whenever  circumstances  required  it,  to  unite  and 
act  in  mass. 

The  first  burst  of  these  bands,  occasioned  the  French 
considerable  loss,  impeded  their  communications,  and 
created  great  alarm.  It  was  a  second  insurrection  of 
the  whole  country.  The  Murcians,  in  concert  with 
the  peasants  of  Grenada  and  Jaen,  waged  war  in  the 
mountains  of  Andalusia.  Franqnisetto  and  Palarea 
beset  the  neighbourhood  of  Ciudad  Real  and  Toledo 
in  La  Mancha.  El  Principe,  Saornil,  Temprano,  and 
Juan  Abril,  keeping  the  circuit  of  the  Carpentino  moun- 
tains, from  the  Somosierra  to  Avila,  and  descending 
sometimes  on  the  side  of  New,  sometimes  on  the  side  of 
Old  Castile,  sometimes  in  Estremadura,  carried  off 
small  French  posts  even  close  to  the  capital,  and  slew 
the  governor  of  Segovia,  at  the  very  gates  of  that 
town.  On  the  other  side  of  Madrid,  Duran  with  two 
thousand  men,  and  the  Empecinado,  with  twelve  nnn- 
dred  cavalry  and  infantry,  kept  the  hills  above  Guada- 
laxara,  as  far  as  Cuenca,  and  ventured  sometimes  to 
give  battle  in  the  plain.  Espoz  y  Mina  was  formidable 
in  Navarre.  Longa  and  Campillo,  at  the  head  of  more 
than  two  thousand  men,  harassed  Biscay  and  the 
neighbf)urhood  of  Victoria,  and  the  chain  of  communica- 
tion, between  these  great  hands  and  the  Empecinado, 
was  maintained  by  Amor,  Merino,  and  the  Friar  Sapia; 

•  Memoirs  of  Contreras,  published  by  himgelf. 
t  Mr.  Stuarfi  Paperi,  MSS. 


1810.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULA  R  WAR 


285 


the  two  first  acting  about  Burfjos,  and  the  third  hnld- 
iiitr  the  niouiitains  above  Soria.  In  the  Asturias,  Es- 
caidron,  continually  hanging  upon  the  flanks  and  rear 
of  Bonet,  between  St.  Andero  and  Oviedo,  acted  in 
concert  with  Canipillo  on  one  side,  and  with  Porlier 
on  the  other,  and  this  last  chief,  sometimes  throwing 
himself  into  the  mountains  on  the  borders  of  Gallicia, 
and  sometimes  sailing  from  Coruiia,  constantly  trouh- 
J'^d  the  Asturias  by  bis  enterprises.  To  curb  these 
bands,  the  French  fortified  all  their  own  posts  of  com- 
munication and  correspondence,  and  slew  numbers  of 
the  Guerillas,  many  of  whom  were  robbers  that,  under 
pretence  of  acting  against  the  enemy,  merely  harassed 
their  own  countrymen  ;  few  were  i'eaily  formidable, 
though  all  were  vexatious.  Enough  has  been  said  up- 
on tliis  point. 

But,  while  reduced  to  this  irregular  warfare,  for  pre- 
venting the  entire  submission  of  Old  Spain,  the  Ke- 
pency,  with  inconceivable  folly  and  injustice,  were 
alienating  the  affections  of  their  colonies,  and  pro- 
voking civil  war,  as  if  the  terrible  struggle  in  the 
Peninsula  were  not  sufficient  for  the  ruin  of  their  coun- 
try. The  independence  of  Spain  was,  with  them,  of 
subordinate  interest  to  the  continuance  of  oppression  in 
South  America.  Money,  arms,  and  troops,  were  with- 
drawn from  the  Peninsula,  to  subdue  the  so-called 
rebellious  colonists  ;  nor  was  any  reflection  made  on  the 
inconsistency,  of  expecting  Napoleon's  innumerable 
hosts  to  be  beaten  close  to  their  own  doors,  by  Guerilla 
operations,  and  yet  attempting,  with  a  few  divisions  to 
crush  whole  nations,  acting  in  the  same  manner,  at 
three  thousand  miles  distance.  Such  being  the  state  of 
French  and  Spanish  affairs,  it  remains  to  examine  the 
coi'idition  of  England  and  Portugal,  as  affecting  the 
war  in  the  Peninsula. 

Eniiland. — The  contentions  of  party  were  vehement, 
and  the  ministers'  poli(^y  resolved  itself  into  three 
principal  points  :  1.  The  fostering  the  public  inclina- 
tion for  the  war  ;  2.  The  furnishing  money  for  the 
expenses  ;  3.  The  recruiting  of  the  armies.  The  last 
was  provided  for  by  an  act  passed  in  the  early  part 
of  1809,  which  offered  eleven  guineas  bounty  to  men 
jassing  from  the  militia  to  the  line,  and  ten  guin- 
eas bounty  to  recruits  for  the  militia  ;  this  was 
found  to  furnish  about  twenty-four  thousand  men  in 
the  year  ;  but  the  other  points  were  not  so  easily  dis- 
posed of.  The  opposition  in  parliam(;nt,  was  power- 
ful, eloquent,  and  not  very  scrupulous.  The  desperate 
shifts  which  formed  the  system  of  the  ministers,  were, 
inileed,  justl}'  attacked,  but  when  particulars,  touching 
the  contest  in  Portugal,  were  discussed,  faction  was 
apparent.  The  accuracy  of  Beresford's  report  of  the 
numbers  and  efficiency  of  the  native  forces,  was  most 
unjustly  questioned,  and  the  notion  of  sucrcessful  resis- 
tance assailed  by  arguments  and  by  ridicule,  until 
gloom  and  doubt  were  widely  spread  in  England,  and 
disaffection  wonderfully  encouraged  in  Portugal  ;  nor 
was  the  mischief  thus  caused,  one  of  the  smallest  dif- 
ficulties encountered  by  the  English  general. 

On  the  other  side,  the  ministers,  trusting  to  their 
majorities  in  parliament,  reasoned  feebly  and  ignorant- 
ly,  yet  wilfully,  and  like  men  expecting  that  fortune 
would  befriend  them,  they  knew  not  why  or  wherefore  ; 
ai;d  they  dealt  also  more  largely  than  their  adversaries 
in  misrepresentations  to  mislead  the  public  mind.  Ev- 
ery treasury  newspaper  teemed  with  accounts  of  bat- 
tles which  were  never  fought,  plans  which  were  never 
arranged,  places  taken  which  were  never  attacked,  and 
victories  gained,  where  no  armies  were.  The  plains 
of  the  Peninsula  could  scarcely  contain  the  innumera- 
ble forces  of  the  Spaniards  and  Portuguese  ;  cow?--'-'p, 
weakness,  treachery,  and  violence  were  the  only  attri- 
butes of  the  enemy  ;  if  a  battle  was  expected,  his  num- 
bers were  contemptible,  if  a  victory  was  gained,  his 
host   was  countless.     Members  of  parli;iment  rclited 


stories  of  the  enemy  which  had  n"  foundation  in  truth, 
and  nothing  that  consummate  art  of  intrigue  could  bring 
to  aid  party  s])irit,  and  to  stifle  reason,  was  neglected. 

But  the  great  and  ])ermanent  difficulty  was  to  raise 
money.  'I'he  country,  inundated  with  bank-notes,  was 
destitute  of  gold.  Napoleon's  continental  system  bur- 
thened  commerce,  the  exchanges  were  continually  ri- 
sing against  England,  and  all  the  evils  which  sooner 
or  later  are  the  inevitable  result  of  a  factitious  currency, 
were  too  perceptible  to  be  longer  disregarded  in  par- 
liament. A  committee  appointed  to  investigate  the 
matter,  made  early  in  the  session  of  1810,  a  report  in 
which  the  evils  of  the  existing  system,  and  the  causes 
of  the  depreciation  were  elaborately  treated,  and  tho 
necessity  of  returning  to  cash  payments  enforced  :  but 
the  authors  did  not  perceive,  or  at  least  did  not  touch 
upon  the  injustice,  and  t!ie  ruin,  attending  a  full  pay- 
ment in  coin  of  sterling  value,  of  debts  contracted  in  a 
depreciated  paper  currency.  The  celebrated  writer, 
William  Cobbett,  did  not  fail,  however,  to  point  out 
this  very  cle.irly,  and  subsequent  experience  has  con- 
firmed his  views.*  The  government  at  first  endeav- 
oured to  stave  off  the  bullion  question  ;  but  finding 
that  they  must  either  abandon  the  prosecution  of  the 
war  in  the  Peninsula,  or  deny  the  facts  adduced  by  the 
committee,  adopted  the  latter.  On  the  motion  of  Mr. 
Vansittart,  the  bouse  voted  in  substance  that  a  pound 
note  and  a  shilling  were  equal  in  vahie  to  a  golden 
guinea  of  full  weight,  although  light  guineas  were  then 
openly  sold  at  twenty-eight  shillings  each.  Lord 
King,  by  demanding  gold  from  those  of  his  tenants, 
whose  leases  were  drawn  before  the  depreciation  of 
bank-notes,  exposed  all  the  fraud  and  the  hollowness 
of  the  minister's  system  ;  and  the  vote  of  the  Com- 
mons, although  well  calculated  to  convince  the  minis- 
ter's opponents,  that  no  proposition  could  be  too  base, 
or  absurd,  to  meet  with  support  in  the  existing  parlia- 
ment, did  not  remove  the  difficulties  of  raising  money  ; 
hence  no  resource  remained,  but  that  of  the  desperate 
spendthrift,  who  never  inteiuling  to  pay,  cares  not  on 
what  terms  he  supplies  his  present  necessities.  The 
peculiar  circumstances  of  the  war.  had,  however,  givi  a 
England  a  monopoly  of  the  world's  commerce  by  s<  a, 
anid  the  ministers  affirming,  that  the  country  was  i'-  a 
state  of  unexampled  prosperity,  began  a  career  of  ex- 
pense, the  like  of  which  no  age  or  nation  had  ;ver 
seen  ;  yet  without  one  sound  or  reasonable  ground  for 
expecting  ultimate  success,  save  the  genius  of  iheir 
general,  which  they  but  half  appreciated,  and  Avhich 
the  first  bullet  might  have  extinguished  for  ever. 

Slate  of  Poriuiial. — In  this  country,  three  parties 
were  apparent.  That  of  the  people  ready  to  peril  body 
and  goods  for  independence.  That  of  the  Jidul^os, 
who  thought  to  profit  from  the  nation's  energy  w  thout 
any  diminution  of  ancient  abuses.  That  of  the  disnf' 
feded,  who  desired  the  success  of  the  French  ;  some 
as  thinking  that  an  ameliorated  government  mu  <t  fol- 
low, some  from  mere  baseness  of  nature.  This  party, 
looked  to  have  Alorna,  Pamplona,  and  Gomez  i''reire, 
as  chiefs  if  the  enemy  triumphed.  Those  noblemen, 
in  common  with  many  others,  had  entered  the  I'renoh 
service  in  Junot's  time,  under  the  authority  \'i  the 
prince  regent's  edict  to  that  effect;  Freire  morehon  cur- 
able than  his  companions,  refused  to  bear  arms  ag.imst 
his  country  ;  the  two  others  had  no  scruples,  and  I'am- 
plona  even  sketched  a  plan  of  invasion,  which  is  at 
this  day  in  the  military  arhcives  at  Par'-^. 

The  great  body  of  the  people,  dcsp  mg  both  iheii 
civil  governors  and  military  chiefs,  rel  d  on  the  Brit- 
ish general  and  army  ;  but  the  fidalgo  or  cast  <j\  no- 
bles, working  in  unison  with,  and  s  pported  by  the 
Regency,  were  a  powerful  body,  and  their  political 
proceedings  after  the  departure  of  sir  John  Ciadock, 

*   Paper  against  Gold. 


286 


NAPIER'S    P  E  N  I  ^  S  U  L  A  R   WAR. 


[Book  XI. 


demand  notice.  The  patriarch,  formerly  bishop  of 
Oporto,  the  marquis  de  Olhao  Conteiro  Mor,  and  the 
marquess  of  Das  Minas,  tlu'se  composed  the  reg^ency, 
and  they  and  every  other  member  of  the  g-overniiient, 
were  jealous  of  eacii  other,  exceedinjjly  afraid  of  their 
superiors  in  the  Brazils,  and  with  the  exception  of  the 
secretary,  Miiruel  Forjas,  unanimous  in  support  of 
abuses.  As  the  military  organization  carried  on  by 
Beresford,  was  only  a  restoration  of  the  ancient  insti- 
tutions of  the  country,  it  was  necessarily  hateful  to  the 
recrency,  and  to  the  fidalgos,  who  profited  by  its  de- 
generacy. The  opposition  of  these  people  joined  to 
unavoidable  difficulties  in  finance,  and  ofher  matters, 
retarded  the  progress  of  the  regular  army  towards  ef- 
ficiency durinor  1809,  and  rendered  the  eflorts  to  organ- 
ize the  militia,  and  ordenan(;a  nearly  nugatory.  Nev- 
ertheless, the  enertry  of  lord  Wellington  and  of  Beres- 
ford  and  the  comparatively  zealous  proceedings  of 
Forjas  proved  so  disagreeable  to  Das  Minas.  who  was 
in  bad  health,  that  he  resigned,  and  immediately  be- 
came a  centre,  round  which  all  discontented  persons, 
and  thev  were  neither  few  nor  inactive,  orathered.  As 
the  times  obliged  the  government,  to  permit  an  unusu- 
al freedom  of  discussion  in  Lisbon,  it  naturally  fol- 
lowed that  the  opinions  of  designing  persons  were 
most  obtruded,  and  those  opinions  being  repeated  in 
the  British  parliament,  were  printed  in  the  SInjUsh 
newspapers,  and  re-echoed  in  Lisbon.  Thus  a  picture 
of  affairs  was  painted  in  the  most  glaring  colours  of 
misrepresentati'Mi,  at  the  moment  when  the  safety  of 
the  country  depended  upon  the  devottd  submission  of 
the  people. 

After  Das  Minas'  resignation,  Mr.  Stuart  and  three 
Portuguese,  namely,  Antonio,  called  Principal  Souza, 
the  Conde  de  Redondo,  and  doctor  Noguiera,  were 
added  to  the  regency  by  an  intrigue  which  shall  be 
hereafter  noticed.  The  last  was  a  man  of  honest)', 
talent,  and  discretion,  but  Souza  daring,  restless,  irri- 
table, indefatigable,  and  a  consummate  intriguer,  cre- 
ated the  utmost  disorder.  Seeking  constantly  to  thwart 
the  proceedings  of  the  British  generals,  he  was  stren- 
uously assisted  by  the  patriarch,  whose  violence  and 
ambition  were  no  way  diminishpd,  and  whose  influ- 
ence amonofst  the  people  was  still  very  considerable. 
An  exceedintrly  powerful  cabal,  was  thus  formed, 
whose  object  was  to  obtain  the  supreme  direction  of 
the  civil  and  military  affairs,  and  to  control  both 
Wellintrton  and  Beresford.  The  Conde  Linharos, 
head  of  the  Souza  faiuily,  was  prime  minister  in  the 
Brazils  ;  the  Principal  was  in  the  regencv  at  Lisbon  ; 
the  chevalier  Souza  was  envoy  at  the  British  Court, 
and  a  fourth  of  the  family,  Dm  Pedro  de  Souza,  was 
in  a  like  situation  near  the  Spanish  resrency  ;  |daying 
into  each  others'  hands,  and  guided  by  the  subtle  Prin- 
cipal, they  concocted  very  dangerous  intrigues,  and 
their  proceedings,  as  might  be  expected,  were  at  first 
supported  with  a  high  hand  by  the  cabinet  of  Kio  Ja- 
neiro. Lord  Wellesley's  energetic  inteference  reduced 
the  latter,  indeed,  to  a  reasonable  disposition,  yet  the 
cabal  secretly  continued  their  machinations,  and  what 
they  d\irst  net  attempt  by  force,  they  sought  to  attain 
hv  artifice. 

Tn  the  latter  end  of  the  year  1809,  Mr.  Villiers  had, 
fortunately  for  the  cause,  been  rephiced  as  envoy,  by 
Mr.  Charles  Stuart,  and  this  gentleman  well  experi- 
enced in  the  affaii-s  of  the  Peninsula,  and  disdaining 
the  petty  jealousies  which  had  hitherto  marked  the 
intercourse  of  the  principal  political  agents  with  the 
generals,  immediately  applied  his  masculine  under- 
standing, and  resolute  tempter,  to  forward  the  views  of 
Jjord  Wellington.  It  is  undoubted  that  the  dangerous 
political  crisis  which  followed  his  arrival,  could  not 
have  been  sustained,  if  a  diplomatist  less  firm,  less 
able,  or  less  willing  to  support  the  plans  of  the  com- 
mander had  been  employed. 


To  resist  the  French  was  the  desire  of  two  of  tha 
three  parties  in  Portugal,  but  with  the  fidalgos,  it  was 
a  question  of  interest  more  than  of  patriotism.  Yet 
less  sagacious  than  ihe  clergy,  the  great  body  of  which, 
perceiving  at  once  that  they  must  stand  or  fall  with  the 
English  army  heartily  aided  the  cause,  the  fidalgos 
clung  rather  to  the  regenc}'.  Now  the  caballers  in 
that  body,  who  were  the  same  people  that  had  opposed 
sir  Hew  Dalrymple,  hoped  not  only  to  beat  the  enemy, 
but  to  establish  the  supremacy  of  the  northern  provin- 
ces (of  which  they  themselves  were  the  lords)  in 
the  administration  of  the  country,  and  would  therefore 
consent  to  no  operations  militating  against  this  design. 
Moreover  the  natural  indolence  of  the  people  being  fos- 
tered by  the  negligence  and  fears  of  the  regency  render 
ed  it  most  difficult  to  obtain  the  execution  of  any  work 
or  the  fulfilment  of  any  agreement  in  which  the  Portu- 
guese government  or  the  civil  authorities  were  concerned. 

Another  spring  of  political  action,  was  the  hatred 
and  jealousy  of  Spain  common  to  the  whole  Portu- 
guese nation.  It  created  difficulties  during  the  military 
operations,  but  it  had  a  visibly  advantageous  effect  up- 
on the  people,  in  their  intercourse  with  the  British. 
For  when  the  Spaniards  shewed  a  distrust  of  their  al- 
lies, the  Portuguese  were  more  minded  to  rely  implicit- 
ly on  the  l:ttt(-r.,  to  prove  that  they  had  no  feeling  in 
common  with  their  neighbours.  Yet  notwithstanding 
this  mutual  dislike,  the  j)rincess  Carlotta,  wife  to  the 
Prince  Regent,  and  sister  to  Ferdinand,  claimed  not 
only  the  succession  to  the  throne  of  Spain  in  the  event 
of  her  brother's  death  or  perpetual  captivity,  but  the 
immediate  government  of  the  whole  Peninsula  as  he- 
reditary Regent;  and  to  persuade  the  Spanish  tribu- 
nals to  acknowledge  her  claims,  was  the  object  of 
Pedro  Souza's  mission  to  Cadiz. 

Although  the  council  of  Castile,  always  ready  tc 
overthrow  the  Spanish  Rpgency,  readily  recognized 
Carlotta's  pretensions  in  virtue  of  the  decision  of  the 
secret  Cortes  of  1789  which  abolished  the  Salique  law 
of  Philip  the  Fifth,  the  regents  would  pay  no  attention 
to  them  ;  yet  Souza,  renewinj  his  intrigues  when  the 
C^ortes  assembled,  by  corruption  obtained  from  the  ma- 
jority of  the  members  a  secret  acknowledgement  of 
ihe  princess's  claim.  His  further  progress  was,  how- 
ever, promptly  arrested  by  lord  Wellington,  who  fore- 
saw" that  his  success  would  affect,  not  only  the  military 
operations  in  Portugal,  by  placing  them  under  the  con- 
trol of  the  Spanish  government,  but  the  policy  of 
England  afterwards,  if  power  over  the  whole  Peninsula 
was  suffered  thus  to  centre  in  one  family.  Moreover, 
although  at  first  he  thought  it  might  prove  beneficial  in 
the  event  of  the  Peninsula  being  conquered,  he  soon 
judged  it  a  scheme,  concocted  at  Rio  Janeiro,  to  em- 
barrass himself  and  Beresford  ;  for  it  was  at  first  kept 
secret  from  the  Bri'ish  Cabinet,  and  it  was  proposed 
that  the  princess  should  reside  at  Madeira,  where,  sur- 
rounded bv  the  contrivers  of  the  plan,  she  could  only 
have  acted  under  their  directions.  Thus  it  is  plain 
that  arrogance,  deceit,  negligence  in  business,  -^nd 
personal  intrigues,  were  common  to  the  Portuguese '»nd 
Spanish  governments;  and  why  they  did  not  pro(Uf« 
the  same  fatal  effects  in  the  one  as  in  the  other  couiiii^ 
will  be  shewn  in  the  succeeding  chapters. 


CHAPTER  III. 

Lord  Wellinsfton's  scheme  for  the  defence  of  Portugal — Vast- 
ness  of  his  designs — Number  of  his  troops — Description  of 
the  country — I'lan  of  defence  analysed — DilTirultv  of  supply- 
ing the  army — Resources  of  the  btltijerents  compared — 
Character  of  the  British  soldier. 

When   lord    Wellington   required    thirty   thousand 
British  troops   to  defend   Portugal,  he  considered   the 


1810.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


287 


number  lli^t  could  be  fed  and  managed  with  such  an 
inexperienced  stalFand  civil  administration  as  that  of 
the  En<rlish  army,  rather  than  what  was  necessary 
to  fight  the  enemy  ;  and  hence  it  was,  that  he  declared 
success  would  depend  upon  the  exertions  and  devotion 
of  the  native  forces.  Yet  knowing,  from  his  experi- 
ence in  Spain,  how  passions,  prejudices,  and  abuses 
would  meet  him  at  every  turn,  he  would  trust  neither 
the  simple  enthusiasm  of  the  people,  nor  the  free 
promises  of  their  governors,  and  insisted  that  his  own 
authority  as  marshal-general  «f  Portugal  should  be  in- 
dependent of  the  local  government,  and  absolute  over 
all  arrangements  concerning  the  English  and  Portu- 
guese forces,  whether  regulars,  militia,  or  "ordenan- 
Qas ;"  for  his  designs  were  vast,  and  such  as  could  on- 
ly be  effected  by  extraordinary  means. 

Armed  with  this  power,  and  with  the  influence  deri- 
ved from  the  money  supplied  by  England,  he  first 
called  upon  the  Regencjs  to  revive  and  enforce  the 
ancient  military  laws  of  the  realm,  by  which  all  men 
were  to  be  enrolled,  and  bear  arms.  That  effected,  he 
demanded  that  the  people  should  be  warned  and  com- 
manded to  destroy  their  mills,  to  remove  their  boats, 
break  down  their  bridges,  lay  waste  their  fields,  aban- 
don their  dwellings,  and  carry  off  their  property,  on 
whatever  line  the  invaders  should  penetrate:  and  that 
this  might  be  deliberately  and  effectually  performed,  he 
aesigned  at  the  head  of  all  the  allied  regular  forces,  to 
front  the  enemy,  in  such  sort,  that,  without  bringing  on 
a  decisive  battle,  the  latter  should  yet  be  obliged  to 
keep  constantly  in  a  mass;  while  the  whole  popula- 
tion, converted  into  soldiers,  and  closing  on  the  rear 
and  flanks,  should  cut  off  all  resources,  save  those 
carried  in  the  midst  of  the  troops. 

But  it  was  evident,  that  if  the  French  could  find,  or 
carry  supplies,  sufficient  to  maintain  themselves  until 
the  British  commander,  forced  back  upon  the  sea, 
f.hould  embark,  or  giving  battle  be  defeated,  the  whole 
of  this  system  must  necessarily  fall  to  pieces,  and  the 
miserable  ruined  people  submit  without  further  strug- 
gle. To  avoid  such  a  calamitous  termination,  it  was 
necessary  to  find  a  position,  covering  Lisbon,  where 
the  allied  forces  could  neither  be  turned  by  the  flanks, 
nor  forced  in  front  by  numbers,  nor  reduced  by  famine, 
and  from  which  a  free  communication  could  be  kept  up 
with  the  irregular  troops  closing  round  the  enemy. 
The  mountains  filling  the  tongue  of  land  upon  which 
Lisbon  is  situated,  furnished  this  key-stone  to  the  arch 
of  defence.  Accurate  plans  of  all  the  positions,  had 
been  made  under  the  directions  of  sir  Charles  Stuart 
in  1799,  and,  together  with  the  French  colonel  Vincent's 
minutes,  shewing  how  they  covered  Lisbon,  were  in 
lord  Wellington's  possession.  From  these  documents 
the  original  notion  of  the  celebrated  lines  of  Torres  Ve- 
dras  are  said  to  have  been  derived  ;  but  the  above- 
named  officers  only  contemplated  such  a  defence  as 
might  be  made  by  an  army  in  movement,  before  an 
equal  or  a  oreater  force.  It  was  lord  Wellington,  who 
first  conceived  the  design,  of  turning  those  vast  moun- 
tains into  one  stupendous  and  impregnable  citadel, 
wherein  to  deposit  the  independence  of  the  whole  Pen- 
insula. 

Hereafter  the  lines  shall  be  described  more  mi- 
nutely; at  present  it  must  suflice  to  observe,  that  in- 
trenchments,  inundations,  and  redoubts  secured  more 
than  five  hundred  square  miles  of  mountainous  country 
lying  between  the  Tagus  and  the  ocean.  Nor  was 
this  the  most  gigantic  part  of  the  English  general's  un- 
dertaking. He  was  a  f(jreigner,  ill  supported  by  his 
own  government,  and  holding  power  under  that  of  Por- 
tugal by  a  precarious  tenure,  and  he  was  vehemently 
opposed  by  the  local  authorities,  by  the  ministers,  and 
by  the  nobility  of  that  country ;  yet,  in  this  apparent- 
ly weak  position,  he  undertook  at  one  and  the  same 
•woe,  to  overcome  the  abuses  engendered  by  centuries 


of  misgovernment,  and  to  oblige  a  whole  people,  sunk  in 
sloth,  to  arise  in  arms,  to  devastate  their  own  lands, 
and  to  follow  him  to  battle  against  the  most  formidable 
power  of  modern  times. 

Notwithstanding  the  secret  opposition  of  the  Re- 
gency, and  of  the  JiJalgos,  the  ancient  military  laws 
were  revived  ;  and  so  effectually,  that  the  returns  for 
the  month  of  May  gave  a  gross  number  of  more  than 
four  hundred  and  thirty  thousand  men  in  arms,  of  which 
about  fifty  thousand  were  regular  troops,  fifty-five 
thousand  militia,  and  the  remainder  "  ordenan(;as  ;"  but 
this  multitude  was  necessarily  subject  to  many  deduc- 
tions. The  '•'■  capitanx  mor,''''  or  chiefs  of  districts, 
were  at  first  exceedingly  remiss  in  their  duty,  the  fidal- 
gos  evaded  service  by  the  connivance  of  the  govern- 
ment, and  the  total  number  of  "  ordenancas"  really 
assembled,  fell  far  short  of  the  returns,  and  all  were 
ill-armed.  This  also  was  the  case  with  the  militia, 
only  thirty-two  thousand  of  which  had  muskets  and 
bayonets ;  and  deserters  were  eo  numerous,  and  the 
native  authorities  connived  at  absence  under  fiilse  pre- 
tences, to  such  an  extent,  that  scarcely  twenty-six 
thousand  men  ever  remained  with  their  colours.  Of  the 
regular  troops  the  whole  were  in  good  condition  ;  thirty 
thousand  being  in  the  pay  of  England,  were  completely 
equipped,  clothed,  disciplined,  and  for  the  most  part 
commanded  by  British  officers ;  but,  deduction  being 
made  for  sick  men  and  recruits,  the  actual  number  vui- 
der  arms  did  not  exceed  twenty-four  thousand  infantry, 
three  thousand  five  hundred  cavalry,  and  three  thou- 
sand artillery.  Thus  the  disposable  native  force  was 
about  fifty-six  thousand  men,  one-half  of  which  were 
militia. 

At  this  period,  the  British  troops  employed  in  the 
Peninsula,  exclusive  of  the  garrison  of  Gibraltar, 
somewhat  exceeded  thirty-eight  thousand  men  of  all 
arms,  of  which  six  thousand  were  in  hospital  or  de- 
tached, and  above  seven  thousand  were  in  Cadix. 
The  latter  city  was  protected  by  an  allied  force  of  near- 
ly thirty  thousand  men,  while  the  army  on  whose  exer- 
tions the  fate  of  the  Peninsula  rested,  was  reduced  to 
twenty-five  thousand  British,  such  was  the  policy  of  the 
English  cabinet ;  for  this  was  the  ministers'  and  not 
the  general's  arrangement.  The  ordenanqas  being 
set  aside,  the  actual  force  at  the  disposition  of  lord 
Wellington,  cannot  be  estimated  higher  than  eighty 
thousand  men,  and  the  frontier  to  defend,  reckoning  from 
Braganza  to  Ayamonte,  four  hundred  miles  long.  The 
great  military  features,  and  the  arrangemeiits  inude  to 
take  advantage  of  them  in  conformity  with  the  gen- 
eral  plan  of  defence,  shall  now  be  described. 

The  Portuguese  land  frontier  presents  four  great  di- 
visions open  to  invasion  : — 

1.  The  northern  line  of  the  Entre  Minho  and  the 
Tras  OS  Monies,  extending  from  the  mouth  of  the  Miu- 
ho,  to  Miranda  on  the  Douro. 

2.  The  eastern  line  of  the  Tras  os  Monies  fol- 
lowing the  course  of  the  Douro  from  Miranda  to  Cas- 
tel  Rodrigo. 

3.  The  frontier  of  Beira  from  Castel  Rodrigo  to 
Rosaminhal  on  the  Tagus. 

4.  The  Al."mtpjo  and  the  Algarve  frontiers  stretch- 
ing in  one  line  from  the  Tagus  to  the  mouth  of  th« 
Guadiana. 

But  these  divisions  may  be  simplified  with  respect 
to  the  military  aspect  of  the  country  ;  for  Lisbon  taken 
as  the  centre,  and  the  distance  from  thence  to  Oporto  as 
the  radius,  a  sweep  of  the  compa:;  to  Rosaminhal  will 
trace  the  frontier  of  Beira  ;  and  the  space  lying  between 
this  arc,  the  Tagus,  and  the  sea-coast,  furnished  the  main 
body  of  the  defence.  The  southern  and  northern  |irov- 
inces  being  considered  as  the  wings,  were  rendered  sub- 
servient to  the  defence  of  the  whole  ;  but  each  had  a  sepa- 
rate system  for  itself,  based  on  the  one  general  |)rinci- 
ple,   that  the  country  should  be  wasted,  and  the  bes* 


288 


NAitil'S    PEx\  INSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  X.. 


troops  opposed  to  the  enemy  without  risking  a  decisive 
action,  while  the  iireorular  forces  closed  round  the 
flanks  and  rear  of  the  invaders. 

The  northern  and  southern  provinces  have  been  al- 
ready desc'.ilied,  Beira  remains  to  be  noticed.  Sepa- 
rated by  the  Douro  froin  the  Entre  Minho  and  Tras  os 
Monies,  it  cannot  well  he  invaded  on  that  line,  except 
one  or  both  of  tiiose  provinces  be  first  subdued  ;  hut 
from  Castel  Kodrigo  to  Rosaminhal,  that  is  from  the 
Douro  to  the  Tagus,  the  frontier  touches  upon  Spain, 
and  perhaps  the  clearest  method  to  describe  the  con- 
firmation of  the  country  will  be  to  enter  the  camp  of 
the  enemy. 

An  invading  army  then,  would  assemble  at  Cindad 
Rodrigo,  or  at  Coria,  or  at  both  those  places.  In  the  lat- 
ter case,  the  communications  could  be  maintained,  di- 
rectly over  the  Gata  mountains  by  the  pass  of  Perales,  or 
ciicuilously,  by  Placeniia  and  the  pass  of  Eanos  ;  and 
the  distance  being  by  Perales  not  more  than  two  march- 
es, the  corps  could  either  advance  simultaneously,  or 
unite  and  force  their  way  at  one  point  only.  In  this 
situation,  the  frontier  of  Beira  between  the  Douro  and 
the  Tagus,  would  offer  them  an  opening  of  ninety 
miles  against  which  to  operate.  But  in  the  centre,  the 
Sierra  de  Ksirella,  lifting  its  snowy  peaks  to  the  clouds 
and  stretching  out  its  gigantic  arms,  would  seem  to 
grasp  and  claim  the  whole  space;  the  summit  is  im- 
passable, and  streaming  down  on  cither  hand,  numerous 
rivers  cleaving  deeply,  amidst  ravines  and  bristled 
ridges,  continually  oppose  the  progress  of  an  army. 
Nevertheless,  the  invaders  could  penetrate  to  the  right 
and  left  of  this  mountain  in  the  following  directions  . — 

From  Ciudad  Rodrigo. — I.  By  the  valley  of  the 
Douro. — 2.  By  the  valley  of  the  Mondego. — 3.  By 
the  valley  of  the  Zezere. 

From  C.iria. —  1.  By  Castello  Branco  and  the  val- 
ley of  the  Tagus ;  and,  2.  By  the  mountains  of  So- 
brcira  Formosa. 

To  advance  by  the  valley  of  the  Douro,  would  be  a 
flank  movement  through  an  extremely  difficult  country, 
and  would  belong  rather  to  an  invasion  of  the  northern 
provinces  than  of  Beira,  because  a  fresh  base  must  be 
established  at  Lamego  or  Oporto,  before  the  move- 
ment could  be  prosecuted  against  Lisbon. 

To  gain  the  valley  of  the  Mondego  there  are  three 
routes.  The  first  passing  by  Almeida  and  Celerico, 
the  second  by  Traucoso  and  Viseu,  the  third  by  Al- 
fayates  and  Guarda  over  the  high  ridges  of  the  Estrella. 
To  gain  the  valley  of  the  Zezere,  the  march  is  by  Al- 
fayates,  Salnigal,  and  Belmonte,  and  whether  to  the 
Zezere  or  tlie  Mondego,  these  routes,  although  rugged, 
are  practicable  for  artillery;  but  between  Guarda  and 
Belmonte  souie  high  table-land  offers  a  position  where 
a  large  army  (fur  a  small  one  it  is  dangerous)  could 
seal  the  passage  on  either  side  of  the  mountain,  except 
by  the  Trancoso  road.  In  fact,  the  position  of  Guarda 
may  be  called  the  breast-plate  of  the  Estrella. 

On  the  side  of  Coria,  an  invading  army  must  first 
force  or  turn  the  passages  of  the  Elga  and  PonQul  riv- 
ers, to  reach  Castello  Mranco,  and  that  done,  proceed 
tc  Abrantes  by  the  valley  of  the  Tagus  or  over  the 
savage  mountain  of  Sohreira  Formosa.  But  the  lat- 
ter is  impracticable  for  heavy  artillery,  even  in  sum- 
mer, the  ways  broken  and  tormented  by  the  deep 
channels  of  the  winter  torrents,  the  country  desert, 
and  the  positions  if  defended,  nearly  impregnable. 
N(-r  is  the  valley  of  the  'I'agus  to  be  followed,  save  by 
light  corps,  for  the  villages  are  few,  the  ridges  not 
less  steep  than  those  of  Sohreira,  and  the  road  quite 
impracticable  for  artillery  of  any  calibre. 

Such,  and  so  difficult,  being  the  lines  of  invasion 
through  Beira,  it  would  seem  that  a  superior  enemy 
might  be  met  with  advantage  on  the  threshold  of  the 
kingdom;  but  it  is  not  so.  For,  first,  the  defending 
army  must   occupy  all  the  positions  on  tliis  line    of 


ninety  miles,  while  the  enemy,  posted  at  fJiudad  Ro- 
drigo and  Coria,  could,  in  two  marches,  unite  and  at- 
tack on  tlie  centre,  or  at  either  extremity,  with  an 
overwhelming  force.  Secondly,  the  weakness  of  the 
Beira  frontier  consists  in  this,  the  Tagus  along  its 
whole  course  is,  from  June  iili December,  fordab'e  as  low 
down  as  Salvatierra,  close  under  the  lines,  A  march 
through  the  Alemtejo  and  the  passage  of  the  river  at 
any  place  below  Abrantes  would,  therefore,  render  all 
the  frontier  positions  useless;  and  although  there  were 
no  enemy  on  the  borders  of  the  Alemtejo  itself,  the 
march  from  Ciudad  Rodrigo  by  Perales,  Coria,  and 
Alcantara,  and  thence  by  the  southern  hank  to  the  low- 
est  ford  in  the  river,  would  be  little  longer  than  the 
route  by  the  valley  of  the  Mondego  or  that  of  the 
Zezere.  For  these  reasons  the  frontier  of  Portugal 
must  he  always  yielded  to  superior  numbers. 

Both  the  conformation  of  the  country,  and  the  actual 
situation  of  the  French  corps,  led  lord  \^ellington  to 
expect,  that  the  principal  attacks  would  be  by  the  north 
of  Beira  and  by  the  Alemtejo,  while  an  intermediate 
connecting  corps  would  move  by  t^astello  15ranco  upon 
Abrantes,  and,  under  this  impression,  he  made  the  fol- 
lowing dispositions.  Elvas,  Almeida,  and  Valencia,  in 
the  first,  and  Peniche,  Abrantes,  and  Setuval,  in  the 
second  line  of  fortresses,  were  garrisoned  with  native 
troops,  part  regulars,  part  militia. 

General  Baccellar,  having  Silviera  and  the  British 
colonels,  Trant,  Miller,  and  .1.  Wilson,  under  his  or- 
ders, occupied  the  provinces  beyond  the  Douro,  with 
twenty-one  regiments  of  militia,  including  the  garrison 
of  Valenfja,  on  the  Minho. 

The  country  between  Penamacor  and  the  Tagus, 
that  is  to  say,  the  lines  of  the  Elga  and  the  Poncul, 
was  guarded  by  ten  regiments  of  militia,  a  regiment 
of  native  cavalry,  and  the  Lusitanian  legion.  In  the 
Alemtejo,  including  the  garrisons,  four  regiments  of 
militia  were  stationed,  and  three  regiments  held  the 
fortresses  of  the  Algarves.  There  remained  in  reserve, 
twelve  regiments  of  the  fifty  composing  the  whole  mi- 
litia force,  and  these  were  distributed  in  Estreir.adura 
on  both  sides  of  the  Tagus,  but  principally  about  Setu- 
val. The  regular  Portuguese  troops,  deducting  those  in 
garrison  at  Almeida,  Elvas  and  Cadiz,  were  at  Thomar 
and  Abrantes. 

The  British,  organised  in  five  divisions  of  infantrj- 
and  one  of  cavalry,  were  distributed  as  follows ; — 

Men. 

Ist  Division    ....    General  Spencer,  about 6(XX)    Vis'^u. 

2d  Divisi  )n,  incliidin!?')<^  i  un  ii      -ruviC  Aliranles  and 

the  13ih  Dragoons  '  S  ^'''"'''^^  "'"'  °^^i  Punalesre. 

3(1  Division    ....    General  Picton,       "     31)00    Celerico. 
4lh  Division   ....    General  Ci^le,  "     4000    Guarda. 

Li?hl  Division    .    .    .    Robert Crawfurd,     "     2K»    Pi:ih(l. 

C  Vallv  of  Mon- 
l     d.'SO. 


Tlie  Cavalry . 


3000^ 


General  Cotton, 

Total  .    .    .    23,4iX)  under  anna. 


Thus  the  wings  of  the  defence  were  composed  solely 
of  militia  and  ordenan(;a,  and  the  whole  of  the  regular 
force  was  in  the  centre.  The  Portuguese  at  Thomar, 
and  the  four  British  divisions  of  infantry  ported  at 
Viseu,  Guarda,  Pinhel,  and  Celerico,  formed  a  body  of 
thirty-eight  thousand  men,  the  greater  part  of  wliich 
could,  in  two  marches,  be  united  cither  at  Guarda  or 
between  that  position  and  the  Douro.  On  the  other 
side  Beresford  and  Hill  could,  in  as  short  a  period, 
unite  by  the  boat-bridge  of  Abrantes,  and  thus  thirty- 
two  thousand  men  would  he  concentrated  on  that  line. 
If  the  enemy  should  attempt  the  passage  of  the  Elga 
either  direct  from  Coria,  or  by  a  flank  movement  of  the 
second  corps  from  Estremadura,  across  the  Tagus, 
Beresford  could  succour  the  militia  by  moving  over 
the  Sohreira  Formosa  to  Castello  Branco,  while  liill 
(!ould  reach  that  place  much  quicker  than  general 
Reynicr,  in  consequence  of  an  arrangement  which 
merits  particular  attention 


1810.1 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


289 


It  has  been  already  said  that  the  march  from  Abran- 
tes  to  Castello  Uranco  is  over  difficult  mountains,  and 
to  have  repaired  the  roads  between  these  places  would 
have  been  more  useful  to  the  enemy  than  to  the  allies, 
as  facilitating  a  passafje  for  superior  numbers  to  pene- 
trate by  the  shortest  line  to  Lisbon.  But  lord  Wel- 
Jintrton,  after  throwint:  boat-bridg-es  over  the  Tao-us 
and  the  Zezere,  and  foitifying  Abrantes,  established 
between  the  latter  and  Castello  Branco  a  line  of  com- 
munication by  the  left  bank  of  the  Tagus,  through  Niza, 
to  the  pass  of  Vilha  Velha,  where,  by  a  flying  bridge, 
the  river  was  re-crossed,  and  from  thence  a  good 
road  led  to  Casiello  Branco.  Now  the  pass  of  Vilha 
Velha  is  prodigiously  strong  for  defence,  and  the  dis- 
tance from  Abrantes  to  Castello  Branco  being  nearly 
the  same  by  Niza  as  by  the  other  bank  of  the  river, 
the  march  of  troops  was  yet  much  accelerated,  for  the 
road  near  Vilha  Velha  being  reconstructed  by  the  engi- 
neers, was  excellent. 

Tims  all  the  obstacles  to  an  enemy's  march  by  the 
north  bank  were  preserved.  The  line  by  Vilha  Velha, 
enabled  Hill  to  pass  Irom  Portalegre,  or  Abrantes, 
to  Castello  Branco  by  a  flank  movement  in  less  time 
than  Reynier;  and  also  provided  a  lateral  communica- 
tion for  the  whole  army,  which  we  shall  hereafter  find 
of  vital  importance  in  the  combinations  of  the  Eriglish 
general ;  supplying  the  loss  of  the  road  by  Alcantara 
and  the  pass  of  Periles  which  otherwise  would 
have  been  adopted.  The  French,  also,  in  default  of  a 
direct  line  of  communication  between  Eslremadura 
and  the  (/iudad  Rodrigo  country,  were  finally  forced 
to  adopt  the  circuitfius  road  ofAlmarazand  the  pass 
of  BpiIos,  and  it  was  in  allusion  to  this  inconvenience 
t'tat  I  said  both  parties  sighed  OTSt  Jhe  ruins  of 
Alcantara. 

Notwithstanding  this  facility  of  movement  and  of 
CO- centration,  the  allies  could  not  deliver  a  declaliTt; 
battle  near  the  frontier,  because  the  enemy  could  unite 
an  overwhelming  force  in  the  Alemtejo,  before  the 
troops  from  the  north  could  reach  that  province,  and  a  i 
battle  lost  there,  would,  in  the  dry  season,  decide  the  j 
f  to  of  Lisbon.  To  have  concentrated  the  whole  army  I 
in  the  south,  would  have  been  to  resign  half  the  king.  I 
dom  and  all  its  resources  to  the  enemy;  but  to  save 
those  resources  for  himself,  or  to  destroy  them,  was 
the  verv  basis  of  lord  Wellington's  defence,  and  all  his 
dispositions  were  made  to  oblige  the  French  to  move  /n 
masses,  and  to  gain  time  himself  ^  time  to  secure  the 
harvests,  time  to  complete  his  lines,  time  to  perfect  the 
discipline  of  the  native  troops,  and  to  give  full  efiTect 
lo  the  arming  and  organization  of  the  ordenan(^a : 
ibove  all  things,  time  to  consolidate  that  moral  ascend- 
ancy over  the  public  mind  which  he  was  daily  ac- 
quiring. A  closer  examination  of  his  combinations 
will  shew,  that  they  were  well  adapted  to  effect  these 
objects. 

1.  The  enemy  dared  not  advance,  except  with  con- 
centrated masses,  because,  on  the  weakest  line  of  resis- 
tance, he  w-as  sure  to  encounter  above  twenty  thousand 
men. 

2.  If,  choosing  the  Alemtejo,  he  suddenly  dis- 
persed Romana's  troops  and  even  forced  back  Hill's, 
the  latter  passing  the  Tagus  at  Abrantes,  and  uniting 
with  Beresford,  could  dispute  the  passage  of  the  Ta- 
gus until  the  arrival  of  the  army  from  the  north;  and 
no  regular  and  sust  ined  attempt  could  be  made  on 
that  side  without  first  besieging  Badajos  or  Elvas  to 
form  a  place  of  arms. 

3.  A  principal  attack  on  the  central  line  could  not 
be  made  without  sufficient  notice  being  given  by  the 
collection  of  rnagrazines  at  Coria,  and  by  the  passnore 
c'^lhe  Elga  and  Pon^ul,  Beresford  and  Hill  could  then 
occufiy  me  Sobreira  Formosa.  But  an  invasion  on 
this  line,  save  by  a  light  corps  in  connexion  with  oth- 
er attacks,  was  not  to  he  expected  ;   for,  although   the 

20 


enemy  should  force  the  Sobreira,  and  reach  Abrantes 
he  could  not  besiege  the  latter,  in  default  of  heavy  ar- 
tillery. The  Zezere,  a  large  and  exceedingly  rapid 
river,  with  rugged  banks,  would  be  in  his  front,  tiie 
Tagus  on  his  left,  the  mountains  of  Sobreira  in  his  rear, 
and  the  troops  from  Guarda  and  the  valley  of  the  Mon- 
dego  would  have  time  to  fall  back. 

4.  An  attack  on  Guarda  could  always  be  resisted 
long  enough  to  gain  time  for  the  orderly  retreat  of  the 
troops  near  Almeida,  to  the  valley  of  the  Mondego, 
the  road  from  Belmonte  towards  Thomar  by  the  valley 
of  the  Zezere  was  purposely  broken  and  obstructed, 
and  that  from  Thomar  by  Espiual  to  the  Ponte  da 
Murcella  was  repaired  and  widened  ;  thus  the  inner 
and  shorter  line  was  rendered  easy  for  the  allies, 
while  the  outward  and  longer  line  was  rendered  difficult 
for  the  enemy,  and  to  secure  quick  reports  telegraphs 
were  established  from  Lisbon  to  Elvas,  to  Abrantes 
and  to  Almeida. 

The  space  between  Guarda  and  the  Douro.  an  ope- 
ning of  about  thirty  miles  leading  into  the  valley  of  the 
Mondego,  remains  to  be  examined.  Across  this  line 
of  invasion,  the  Agueda,  the  Coa,  and  the  Pinel,  run,  in 
almost  parallel  directions  from  the  Sierra  de  Franria 
and  Sierra  de  Estrella,  into  the  Douro,  all  having  this 
peculiarity,  that  as  they  approa'-h  the  Douro  their 
channels  invariably  deepen  into  profound  and  gloomy 
chasms  ;  and  there  are  few  bridfres.  But  the  princi- 
pal obstacles  were  the  fortresses  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo 
and  Almeida,  both  of  which  it  was  necessary  to  take 
before  an  invading  army  could  establish  a  solid  base 
of  invasion.  After  this  the  lines  of  the  Douro  and  of 
the  Mondego  would  be  open.  If  the  French  ailopted 
the  second,  they  could  reach  it  by  Guarda,  by  Alverca, 
and  by  Trancooo,  concentrating  at  Celerieo,  where 
they  would  have  to  choose  between  the  riifht  and  the 
left  bank.  In  the  latter  case,  they  must  march  be- 
tween the  Mondego  and  the  Estrella  mountains,  until 
they  reached  the  Alva,  a  river  falling  at  right  angles 
into  the  Mondego,  behind  which  they  woi;ld  find  the 
allied  army  in  a  position  of  surprising  strength.  If,  to 
nvoid  that,  they  marched  by  the  right  of  the  Mondego 
Mpon  Coimbra,  there  were  other  obstacles  to  he  here- 
afier  noticed  ;  but,  in  either  case,  the  allied  forces, 
having  interior  lines  nf  communication,  could,  as  long 
as  the  Belmonte  road  was  sealed,  concentrate  in  time 
behind  the  Alva,  or  in  front  of  Coimbra.  Hence  it 
was  on  the  side  of  the  Alemtejo  that  danger  was  most 
to  be  apprehended,  and  it  behoved  general  Hill  to 
watch  vigilantly  and  act  decisively  in  opposition  to 
general  Reynier.  For  the  latter  having  necessarily 
the  lead  in  the  movements,  might,  by  skilful  evolu- 
tions and  rapid  marches,  either  join  the  sixth  and 
eighth  corps  before  Hill  was  aware  of  his  design,  and 
thus  overwhelm  the  allied  divisions  on  the  Mondego; 
or  drawing  him  across  the  Tagus,  furnish  an  opportir- 
nity  for  a  corps  from  Andalusia  to  penetrate  by  the 
southern  bank  of  that  river. 

In  these  dispositions  the  English  general  had  regaril 
only  to  the  enemy's  actual  situation,  and  expecting 
the  invasion  to  be  in  summer,  but  in  the  winter  season 
the  rivers  and  torrents  being  full,  and  the  roads  deteri- 
orated, the  defence  would  have  been  ditferent;  finver 
troops  would  then  suffice  to  guard  the  Tagus  and  the 
Zezere,  the  Sobreira  Formosa  would  be  nearly  im- 
passable, a  greater  number  of  the  allied  troops  could 
be  collected  about  Guarda  and  a  more  stubborn  resist- 
ance made  on  the  northern  line. 

Every  probable  movement  being  thus  previously 
well  considered,  lord  Wellington  trusted  that  his  own 
military  quickness,  and  the  valour  of  the  British  sol- 
diers, could  baffle  anv  unforeseen  strokes  during  the 
retreat,  and  once  within  the  Lines,  (the  Portuguese 
people  and  the  government  doing  their  part)  he  looked 
confidently  to  the  final  result.     He  judged   tlial  in   a 


290 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XI. 


wasted  pountrj',  and  with  thirty  regiments  of  militia, 
n  the  mountains  on  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  enemy, 
the  latter  could  not  long  remain  before  the  Lines,  and 
his  retreat  would  be  equivalent  to  a  victory  for  the  al- 
lies. There  were  however  many  hazards.  The  Eng 
lish  commander,  sanguine  and  confident  as  he  wais. 
knew  well  how  many  counter-combinations  were  to  be 
expected  ;  in  fine,  how  much  fortune  was  to  be  dreaded 
in  a  contest  with  eighty  thousand  French  veterans 
having  a  competent  general  at  their  head.  Hence,  to 
secure  embarkation  in  the  event  of  disaster,  a  third  line 
of  entrenchments  was  prepared,  and  twenty-four  thou- 
sand tons  of  shipping  were  constantly  kept  in  the 
river  to  receive  the  British  forces;  measures  were  also 
taken  to  procure  a  like  quantity  for  the  reception  of 
the  Portuguese  troops,  and  such  of  the  citizens  as 
might  wish  to  emigrate.  It  only  remained  to  feed  the 
army.* 

In  the  Peninsula  generally,  the  supplies  were  at  all 
times  a  source  of  infinite  trouble  on  both  sides,  and 
this,  not  as  some  have  supposed,  because  Spain  is  in- 
capable of  supplying  large  armies  ;  there  was  through- 
out the  war  an  abundance  of  food  in  that  country,  but 
it  was  unevenly  distributed,  difficult  to  get  at,  and  the 
people  are  of  a  nature  to  render  it  impossible  to  depend 
upon  contracts  even  where  they  are  friendly  ;  some 
places  were  exhausted,  others  overflowing,  the  difficul- 
ty was  to  transport  provisions,  and  in  this  the  allies 
enjoyed  a  great  advantage;  their  convoys  could  pass 
unmolested,  whereas  the  French  always  required 
strong  guards  first  to  collect  food  and  then  to  bring 
it  up  to  their  armies.  In  Portugal  there  was  however 
a  real  deficiency,  even  for  the  consumption  of  the  peo- 
ple ;  after  a  time  scarcely  any  food  for  man  or  beast, 
(some  cattle  and  straw  from  the  northern  provinces 
excepted,)  was  to  be  obtained  in  that  country  :  nay, 
the  whole  nation  was  at  last  in  a  manner  fed  by  Eng- 
land. Every  part  of  the  world  accessible  to  ships  and 
money  was  rendered  subservient  to  the  cravingrs  of  this 
insatiable  war,  and  yet  it  was  often  a  doubtful  and  a 
painful  struggle  against  famine,  even  near  the  sea; 
but  at  a  distance  from  that  nurse  of  British  armies, 
che  means  of  transport  necessarily  regulated  the  ex- 
tent of  the  supply.  Now  wheel-carriage  was  scarce 
and  bad  in  Portugal,  and  for  the  most  part  the  roads 
forbade  its  use  ;  hence  the  only  resource,  for  the  con- 
veyance of  stores,  was  water-carriage,  to  a  certain  dis- 
tance, and  afterwards  beasts  of  burthen. 

Lisbon,  Abrantes,  and  Belem  Castle,  on  theTagus; 
Figueras  and  Raiva  de  Pena  Cova,  on  the  Mondego, 
and,  finally,  Oporto  and  Ijamego,  on  the  Douro,  were 
the  principal  depots  formed  by  Lord  Wellington,  and 
his  magazines  of  consumption  were  established  at 
Viseu,  Celerico,  Condeixa,  Leiria,  Thomar,  and  Al- 
meida. From  those  points  four  hundred  miserable 
bullock  cars  and  about  twelve  thousand  hired  mules, 
organized  in  brigades  of  sixty  each,  conveyed  the 
necessary  warlike  stores  and  provisions  to  the  armies  ; 
when  additional  succours  could  be  obtained,  it  was 
eagerly  seized,  but  this  was  the  ordinary  amount  of 
transport,  and  all  his  magazines  in  advance  of  Lisbon 
were  so  limited  and  arrantred  that  he  could  easily  car- 
ry them  oflT  or  destroy  them  before  the  enemy. 

With  such  moans  and  with  such  preparations  was 
the  defence  of  Portugal  undertaken,  and  it  must  be 
evident  to  the  most  superficial  observer,  that  amidst 
so  many  difficulties,  and  with  such  a  number  of  intri- 
cate combinations,  lord  Wellington's  situation  was  not 
one  in  which  a  general  could  sleep;  and  that,  due  al- 
lowance being  made  for  fortune,  it  is  puerile  to  attrib- 
ute the  success  to  aught  but  his  talents  and  steel-hard- 
ened resolution. 

In  the  foregoing  exposition  of  the  political  and  mili- 

*   Lord  Wellington's  Correspondence.     MSS. 


tary  force  of  the  powers  brought  into  hostile  con- 
tact, I  have  only  touched,  and  ightly,  upon  the 
points  of  most  importance,  designii.g  no  more  than  to 
indicate  the  sound  and  the  diseased  parts  of  each. 
The  unfavourable  circumstances  for  France  would  ap- 
pear to  be  the  absence  of  the  emperor — tiie  erroneous 
views  of  tiie  king, — the  rivalry  of  the  marshals, — the 
impediments  to  correspondence, — the  necessity  of  fre- 
quently dispersing  from  the  want  of  magazines. — the 
iniquity  of  the  cause,  and  the  disgust  of  the  French 
officers,  who  for  the  most  part,  spoiled  by  a  rapid 
course  of  victories  on  the  continent,  could  not  patient- 
ly endure  a  service,  replete  with  personal  dangers  over 
and  above  the  ordinary  mishaps  of  war,  and  promisi-ig 
little  ultimate  reward. 

For  the  English,  the  quicksands  were — the  memory 
of  former  failures  on  the  continent, — the  financial 
drain, — a  powerful  and  eloquent  opposition,  pressing  a 
cabinet,  so  timid  and  selfish  that  the  general  dared  not 
riak  a  single  brigade,  lest  an  accident  should  lead  to  a 
panic  amongst  the  ministers  which  all  lord  Wellesley's 
vigour  would  be  unable  to  stem,  the  intrigues  of  the 
Souza  party,  and  the  necessity  of  persuadinir  the  Por- 
tuguese to  devastate  their  country  for  the  sake  of  de- 
fending a  £uro/>ea;!  cause.  Finally,  the  babbling  of  the 
English  newspapers,  from  whose  columns  the  enemy 
constantly  drew  the  most  certain  information  of  the 
strength  and  situation  of  the  army.  On  the  other  side 
France  had  possession  of  nearly  all  the  fortified  towns 
of  the  Peninsula,  and,  while  her  enormous  army 
threatened  to  crush  every  opponent,  she  cffi^red  a  con- 
stitution, and  recalled  to  the  recoller-tion  of  the  people 
that  it  was  but  a  change  of  one  French  dynnsty  for 
another.  The  church  started  from  her  toucli,  but  the 
educated  classes  did  not  shrink  less  from  the  British 
government's  known  hostility  to  all  free  institutions. 
What,  then  remained  for  England  to  calculate  upon  ] 
The  extreme  hatred  of  the  people  to  the  invaders,  ari- 
sing from  the  excesses  and  oppressions  of  the  armies, 
the  chances  of  annther  continental  war, — the  complete 
dominion  of  the  ocenn  with  all  its  attendant  advanta- 
ges,— the  recruiting  through  the  militia,  whicli  was.  in 
fact,  a  conscription  with  two  links  in  the  chain  instead 
of  one  ;  lastly,  the  ardour  of  the  troops  to  measure 
themselves  with  the  conquerors  of  Europe,  and  to 
raise  a  rival  to  the  French  emperor.  And  here,  as 
general  Foy  has  been  at  some  pains  to  misrepresent 
the  character  of  the  British  soldiers,  I  will  set  down 
what  many  years'  experience  gives  me  the  right  to  say 
is  nearer  the  truth  than  his  dreams. 

That  the  British  infantry  soldier  is  mor<^  robust  than 
the  soldier  of  any  other  nation,  can  scarcely  be  doubt- 
ed by  those  who,  in  1815,  observed  his  powerful 
frame,  distinguished  amidst  the  united  armies  of  Eu- 
rope ;  and  notwithstanding  his  habitual  excess  in 
drinking,  he  sustains  fatigue  and  wet,  and  thf^  extremes 
of  cold  and  heat  with  incredible  vigour.  When  com- 
pletely disciplined,  and  three  years  are  required  to  ac- 
complish this,  his  port  is  lofty,  and  his  movements 
free;  the  whole  world  cannot  produce  a  nobler  speci- 
men of  military  bearing,  nor  is  the  mind  unworthy  of 
the  outward  man.  He  does  not,  indt  ed  possess  that 
presumptuous  vivacity  which  would  lead  him  to  dio 
late  to  his  commanders,  or  even  to  censure  real  errors, 
although  he  may  perceive  them  ;  but  he  is  observant, 
and  quick  to  comprehend  his  orders,  full  of  n^sources 
under  difficulties,  calm  and  resolute  in  danger,  and 
more  than  usually  obedient  and  careful  of  his  officers 
in  moments  of  imminent  peril. 

It  has  been  asserted  that  his  undeniable  firmness  in 
battle,  is  the  result  of  a  phlegmatic  constitution  unin- 
spired by  moral  feeling.  Never  was  a  more  stupifl 
calumny  uttered  !  Napoleon's  troops  fought  in  bright 
fields,  where  every  helmet  caught  some  beams  of  glo- 
ry, but  the  British    soldier  con-juered   utider  the  cold 


1810.J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


291 


shade  of  aristocrac)'' ;  no  honours  awaited  his  darincr, 
no  despatch  g9.ve  his  name  to  the  applauses  of  his 
c-'iniitryineii,  his  life  of  dantrer  and  hardship  was  un- 
cheeied  by  hope,  his  death  unnoticed.  Did  his  hear*, 
sink  therefore  !  Div'  he  not  endure  with  surpassing 
fortitude  the  sorest  ol  ills,  sustain  the  most  terrihle 
^assaults  in  battle  unmoved,  overthrow,  with  incred'.ble 
energy,  every  opponent,  and  at  all  times  prove  ihal, 
while  no  physical  military  qualification  was  wanting, 
the  fount  of  honour  was  also  full  and  fresh  within 
him  ! 

'1  he  result  of  a  hundred  battles  and  the  united  testi- 
mony of  impartial  writers  of  different  nations  have 
given  the  first  place  amongst  the  European  infantry,  to 
tlie  British;  but  in  a  comparison  between  the  troops 
of  France  and  England,  it  would  be  unjust  not  to  ad- 
mit that  the  cavalry  of  the  former  stands  higher  in  the 
estimation  of  the  world. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Character  of  Mig'uel  Alava — Portua^uese  government  demand 
more  En^'li^h  troop* — I,ord  We.llingtoii  refuses,  and  re- 
proaches the  Rej^enry — Tlie  factious  conduct  of  the  latter — 
Character  of  the  li^lit  division — General  Crawfui'd  passes 
the  Coa — His  activity  and  skiH'ul  arrangements— Is  joined  by 
Carrera — Skirmish  at  Barba  del  Fuerco — Carrera  invites 
]Vfy  to  desert — Romana  arrives  at  head-quarters — Lord 
Wellington  refuses  to  succour  Ciudad  Rodrigo — His  deci- 
sion vindicated — Crawfurd's  abilitv  and  obstinacy — He  main- 
tains his  position — Skirmish  at  Alameda — Captain  Kraiiken- 
berg"s  gallantry — Skirmish  at  Villa  de  Puerco — Colonel  Tal- 
bat  killed- — Gallantry  of  the  French  captain  Guache — Com- 
bat of  the  Coa — Comparison  between  general  Picton  and 
general  Crawfurd. 

■f  In  resuming  the  thread  of  military  events,  it  is  ne- 
cessary to  refer  back  to  the  commencement  of  the  year, 
because  the  British  operations  on  the  frontier  of  Beira 
were  connected,  although  not  conducted  in  actual  con- 
cert, with  those  of  the  Spaniards;  and  here  I  deem  it 
right  to  notice  the  conduct  of  Miguel  Alava,  that  brave, 
generous,  and  disinterested  Spaniard,  through  whom 
this  connexion  was  k-pt  up.  Attached  to  the  British 
head-quarters,  as  the  military  correspondent  of  the 
.Junta,  he  was  too  sagacious  not  to  perceive  the  neces- 
sity of  zealously  seconding  the  F]nglish  general.  But 
in  the  manner  of  doing  it,  he  never  forgot  the  dio-nity 
of  hLs  own  country,  and,  as  he  was  too  frank"  and 
honest  for  intrigues,  his  intercourse  was  always  hon- 
ourable to  himself  and  advantageous  to  both  nations. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  in  February,  Ney  threat- 
ened Ciudad  Rodrio-o  at  the  same  time  that  Mortier 
menaced  Badajos  and  that  Hill  advanced  from  Abrantes 
to  Portalegre.  Lord  Wellington  immediately  rein- 
forced the  line  between  Pinhel  and  Guarda,  and  sent 
the  light  division  across  the  Coa,  to  observe  the  ene- 
my's proceedings.  The  Portuguese  Regency  were 
alarmed,  and  demanded  more  British  troops;  but  lord 
Wellington  replied  that  the  numbers  already  fixed 
would  be  as  great  as  he  could  feed,  and  he  took  that 
occasion  to  point  out,  that  the  measures  agreed  upon, 
with  respect  to  the  native  forces,  were  neither  execu- 
ted with  vigour  nor  impartiality  ;  and  that  the  carriages 
and  other  assistance,  required  for  the  support  of  the 
British  soldiers  then  in  the  country  were  not  supplied. 
These  matters  he  urgently  advised  them  to  amend 
before  they  asked  for  more  troops ;  and,  at  the  same 
time,  as  the  Regency  in  the  hope  of  rendering  him  un- 
popular with  the  natives,  intitnated  a  wish  that  he  should 
take  the  punishment  of  the  otTenders  into  his  own 
hands,  he  informed  them  that,  although  he  advised  the 
adoption  of  severe  measures,  he  would  not  be  made 
the  despotic  punisher  of  the  people,  while  the  actual 
laws  were  sufficient  for  the  purpose. 


When  Ney  first  appeared  before  Ciudad  Rodrigo, 
and  the  second  corps  under  Merrnet  was  at  Placentia, 
Lord  Wellington  was  considerably  embarrassed  ;  the 
French  might  have  passed  from  Placentia  across  the 
Tagus  and  pushed  between  Hill  and  the  army  in  Beira, 
or  even  between  the  latter  and  liisbon,  seeing  that 
the  Portuguese  government  had  with  their  usual  apa- 
thy neolected  the  works  projected  for  opening  the  read 
from  Thomar  to  Espinai;  and  thus,  instead  of  being 
within  three  or  four  marches  of  the  Tagus,  Lord  Wel- 
lington was  nine  marches  distant.  He  was,  therefore, 
forced  to  keep  a  keen  watch  upon  the  motions  of  the 
second  corps,  and  to  have  his  own  troops  in  hand  to 
withdraw  from  the  frontier,  lest  the  French  should 
suddenly  cross  the  Tagus,  for  the  want  of  good  infor- 
mation was  now  and  for  a  long  time  after  severely  felt. 
This  was  in  February  ;  but  when  Del  Parque's  moAie- 
ment  from  Gata  to  Badajos  occujiied  the  attention  of 
Merm.et,*  and  that  Junot  commenced  the  siege  of 
Astorga,  the  repairs  of  the  road  to  Espinai  being  also 
in  a  forward  state,  his  situation  was  ditTerent :  the 
Portuguese  army  was  brought  up  to  ("ea  and  V'iseu, 
and  the  militia  in  the  northern  provinces  were  ordered 
to  concentrate  at  Braga  to  guard  the  Tras  os  Montes. 
Ciudad  Rodrigo  being  soon  after  seriously  menaced. 
Lord  W'ellington  sent  a  brigade  of  heavy  cavalry  to 
Belmonte,  and  transferred  his  own  quarters  to  Celerico; 
for  he  contemplated  a  sudden  incursion  into  Castile 
with  his  whole  army,  intending  to  strike  at  the  French 
magazines  in  Salamanca.  But  when  he  considered 
the  force  they  had  in  his  front,  which  could  be  also  re- 
inforced by  Kellerman's  and  Junot's  corps,  and  would 
therefore  be  strong  enough  to  defend  the  Tormes,  he 
relinquished  this  project,  and  confined  his  views  to 
the  succour  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  if  occasion  should  offer, 
without  detriment  to  the  general  plan  of  defending  Por- 
tugal in  the  lines.  The  conduct  of  both  the  British  and 
the  Portuguese  governments  cramped  his  exertions. 
The  resources  of  the  country  were  not  brought  forward, 
and  the  P^nglish  general  could  scarcely  maintain  his 
actual  position,  much  less  advance  ;  yet  the  Regency 
treated  his  remonstrances  lightly,  exactly  followin^j 
the  system  of  the  Spanish  Central  Junta  during  the 
campaign  of  Talavera. 

Indignant  at  their  conduct,  he  told  them  that  "theii 
proceedings  were  evasive  and  frivolous;  that  the  ar 
my  could  neither  move  foiward  nor  remain  without 
food  ;  that  the  time  was  one  which  would  not  admit  (f 
idle  or  hollow  proceedings,  or  partiality,  or  neglect  of 
public  or  private  interests  ;  that  the  resources  were  in  the 
country,  could  be  drawn  forth,  and  must  be  so  if  the 
assistance  of  England  was  desired  ;  finally,  that  pun- 
ishment sliould  follow  disobedience,  and,  to  be  effectu- 
al, must  begin  with  the  higher  classes."  Then,  issu- 
ing a  proclamation,  he  pointed  out  the  duties  and  the 
omission  of  both  magistrates  and  people,  and  by  this 
vigorous  interference  procured  some  immediate  relief 
for  his  troops. 

Meanwhile  general  Crawfurd  had  commenced  a  se- 
ries of  remarkable  operations  with  the  light  division. 
His  three  regiments  of  infantry  were  singularly  fitted 
for  any  difficult  service ;  they  had  been  for  several 
years  under  sir  John  Moore,  and,  being  carefully  dis- 
ciplined in  the  peculiar  school  of  that  great  man,  came 
to  the  field  with  such  a  knowledge  of  arms,  that,  in  >ix 
years  of  real  warfare,  no  weakness  could  be  detected  iii 
their  system. 

As  the  enemy's  posts  on  the  Agueda  rendered  it 
impossible  for  the  light  division  to  remain,  without 
cavalry,  beyond  the  Coa,  unless  some  support  was  at 
hand,  nearer  than  Guarda  or  Celerico;  Crawfurd  pro- 
posed that,  while  he  advanced  to  the  Agneda,  Cole, 
with  the  fourth  division,  should  take  up  the  line  of  the 


«   See  page  273. 


292 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XI 


Coa.  But  that  prnpral  would  not  qui',  his  o'.vn  posi- 
tion at  Guarfia;  and  lord  Wellinirion  approving^,  and  yet 
desirous  to  secure  the  line  of  the  Coa  with  a  view  to 
succour  (Mudad  Rodritjo,  hrouoht  up  the  third  division 
to  Pinhel ;  and  tlieii  reinforcinf/  Crawfurd  with  the  first 
German  hussars,  (four  hundred  excellent  and  experi- 
enced soldiers,)  and  with  a  superb  troop  of  horse-artil- 
lery, command  d  by  captain  Ross,  jrave  him  tlie  com- 
mand of  all  the  outposts,  and  ordered  Picton  and  Cole 
to  support  him,  if  called  upon. 

In  the  middle  of  March,  Crawfurd  lined  the  bank  of 
the  Agueda  with  his  hussars,  from  Escalhon  on  the 
left,  to  Navas  Frias  on  the  right,  a  distance  of  twenty- 
five  miles,  following  the  course  of  the  river.  The  in- 
fantry were  disposed  in  small  parties  in  the  villages  be- 
tween Almeida  and  the  Lower  Agueda ;  the  artillery 
was  at  Fort  t^onception,  and  two  battalions  of  Portu- 
guese cacadores  which  soon  afterwards  arrived,  were 
placed  in  reserve,  making  a  total  of  four  thousand  men, 
and  six  guns. 

The  PVench  at  this  period  were  extended  in  divis- 
ions from  San  Felices  to  Ledesma  and  Salamanca,  but 
as  they  did  not  occupy  the  pass  of  Perales,  Carrera's 
Spanish  division  being  at  Coria.  was  in  communication 
with  Crawfurd,  whose  line,  although  extended,  was 
very  advantageous.  For  from  Navas  Frias  to  the 
Douro,  tlie  Agueda  was  rendered  unfordable  by 
heavy  rain,  and  only  four  bridges  crossed  it  on  that 
whole  extent,  namely,  one  at  Navas  Frias  ;  one  at 
Villar,  about  a  league  below  the  first;  one  at  Ciudad 
Rodrigo;  and  one  at  San  Felices,  called  the  bridge  of 
Ba  ba  del  Puerco.  While  therefore,  the  hussars  kept 
a  good  watch  at  the  two  first  bridges  which  were 
distant,  the  troops  could  always  concentrate  under 
Almeida  before  the  enemv  could  reach  them  from  that 
side;  and  on  the  side  of  Barba  del  Puerco,  the  ravine 
was  so  profound  that  a  few  companies  of  the  ninety- 
fifth  were  considered  capable  of  opposing  any  num- 
bers. This  arrangement  sufficed  while  the  Agueda 
was  swollen  ;  but  that  river  was  capricious,  often  fall- 
ing many  leet  in  a  night  without  apparent  reason. 
When  it  was  fordable,  Crawfurd  always  withdrew 
his  outposts,  and  concentrated  his  division,  and  his 
situation  demanded  a  quickness  and  intelligence  in  the 
troops,  the  like  of  which  has  seldom  been  known. 
Seven  minutes  sulTiced  for  the  division  to  get  under 
arms  in  the  middle  of  the  night,  and  a  quarter  of  an 
hour,  night  or  day,  to  bring  it  in  order  of  battle  to  the 
alarm-posts,  with  the  baggage  loaded  and  assembled 
at  a  convenient  distance  in  the  rear.  And  this  not 
upon  a  concerted  signal,  or  as  a  trial,  but  at  all  times 
and  certain. 

The  19th,  general  Fere}',  a  bold  officer,  desiring  ei- 
ther to  create  a  fear  of  French  enterprise  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  campaign,  or  thinking  to  surprise 
the  division,  collected  six  hundred  grenadiers  close 
to  the  bridge  of  San  Felices;  and,  just  as  the  moon, 
rising  behind  him,  cast  long  shadows  from  the  rocks, 
and  ren  lered  the  bottnm  of  the  chasm  dark,  he  silently 
passed  the  bridge,  and,  with  incredible  speed,  ascend- 
ing the  opposite  side,  bayoneted  the  simtries,  and  fell 
upon  the  piquet  so  fiercely,  that  friends  and  enemies 
went  fighting  into  the  village  of  Barba  del  Puerco 
while  the  first  shout  was  still  echoing  in  the  gulf  below. 
So  sudden  was  the  attack,  and  so  great  the  confusion, 
that  the  British  companies  could  not  form,  but  each 
soldier  encountering  the  nearest  enemy,  fought  hand 
to  hand,  and  their  colonel  Sydney  Beckwitii,  con- 
spicuous by  hii  lofty  stature  and  daring  actions,  a  man 
capable  of  rallying  a  whole  army  in  flight,  urged  the 
contest  with  such  vig  ur  that,  in  a  quarter  of  an  hour, 
the  French  column  was  borne  back,  and  pushed  over 
the  edge  of  the  descent. 

Tiiis  skirmish  proved,  thnt,  while  the  Agueda  was 
swollen,  the  enemy  could  gain  nothing  by  slight   ope- 


rations; but  it  was  ditficnlt  f:  leep  in  advance  of  tho 
Coa,  because  the  want  of  money  had  reduced  the 
whole  army  to  straits,  and  Crawfurd,  notwithstanding/ 
his  prodigious  activity,  was  unable  to  feed  his  divis- 
ion, wherefore  giving  the  reins  to  his  fiery  temper,  lie 
seized  some  church-plate,  with  a  view  to  the  pur- 
chasing of  corn.  For  this  rash  act  he  was  rebuked, 
and  such  redress  granted  that  no  mischief  followed, 
and  fortunately  the  proceeding  itself  had  some  effect  in 
procuring  supplies,  as  it  convinced  the  priests  that  the 
distress  was  not  feigned. 

When  the  sixth  corps  again  approached  Ciudad 
Rodrigo  in  the  latter  end  of  April,  lord  Wellington, 
as  I  have  before  said,  moved  his  head-cjuarters  to 
Celerico,  and  Carrera  took  post  at  St.  Martin  Trebeja, 
occupying  the  pass  of  Perales;  but  being  there  me- 
naced by  Kellerman's  troops,  he  came  down,  in  May, 
from  the  hills  to  Ituero  on  the  Azava  river,  and  con- 
nected his  left  with  the  light  division,  which  was  then 
posted  at  Gallegos  Espeja  and  Barba  del  Puerco. 
Crawfurd  and  he  then  agreed  that,  if  attacked,  the 
British  should  concentrate  in  the  wood  behind  Espeja, 
and  if  unable  to  maintain  themselves  there,  should  unite 
with  the  Spaniards  at  Nava  d'Aver,  and  finally  reti-e  to 
Villa  Mayor,  a  village  covering  the  passage  of  the  Coa 
by  the  bridge  of  Seceira,  from  whence  there  was  u 
sure  retreat  to  Guarda. 

It  was  at  this  period  that  Massena's  arrival  in 
Spain  became  known  to  the  allie«*  the  deserters,  for 
the  first  time,  ceased  to  speak  of  the  emperor's  com- 
manding in  person,  and  all  agreed  that  serious  opera- 
tions would  soon  commence.  No  good  information 
could  be  obtained  ;  but,  as  the  river  continued  unford- 
a!)le,  Crawfurd  maintained  his  position,  until  the  end 
of  May,  wlien  certain  advice  of  the  march  of  the 
French  battering-train  was  received  through  Andre;iS 
Herrasti :  and  the  1st  of  .June,  Ney,  descending  upon 
Ciudad  Rodrigo,  threw  a  bridge  on  trestles,  over  the 
Agueda  at  the  convent  of  Caridad,  two  miles  above, 
and,  a  few  days  afterwards,  a  second  at  ('arboneras, 
four  miles  below  the  fortress.  This  concentration  cf 
the  French  troops  relieved  the  northern  provinces  of 
Portugal  from  danger,  sixteen  regiments  of  militia 
were  immediately  brought  down  from  Braganza  to  the 
Lower  Douro,  provisions  came  by  water  to  Lamego, 
the  army  was  enabled  to  subsist,  and  the  military  ho- 
rizon began  to  clear. 

The  8th,  four  thousand  French  cavalry  having  cross- 
ed the  Agueda,  Crawfurd  concentrated  his  forces  at 
Gallegos  and  Espeja,  and  the  Spaniards  occupied  the 
wood  behind  the  last-named  village,  and  it  was  at  this 
moment,  when  Spain  was  overwhelmed,  and  when  the 
eye  could  scarcely  command  the  interminable  lines  of 
French  in  his  immediate  front,  that  Martin  Carrera 
thought  fit  to  invite  marshal  Ney  to  desert ! 

Nothing  could  be  more  critical  than  Crawfurd's  po 
sition.  From  the  Agueda  to  the  Coa  the  whole  conn- 
try,  although  studded  with  woods  and  scooped  into 
hollows,  was  free  for  cavalry  and  artillery,  and  there 
were  at  least  six  thousand  horsemen  and  fifty  guns 
within  an  hour's  march  of  his  position.  His  right  was 
at  Espeja,  where  thick  woods  rendered  it  impossible 
to  discover  an  enemy  until  close  upon  the  village, 
while  wide  plains  behind,  almost  precluded  hope,  in  a 
retreat  before  the  multitude  of  French  cavalry  and 
artillery.  The  confluence  of  the  Azava  with  tht>  Ague- 
da offered  indeed  some  security  to  his  h^ft;  because 
the  channel  of  the  former  riv(^r  there  became  a  chasm, 
and  the  ground  rose  high  and  rugged  at  each  side  of 
the  bridge  of  Marialva,  two  mih^s  in  front  of  Galle- 
gos. Nevertheless,  the  bank  on  the  enemy's  side  was 
highest,  and,  to  obtain  a  good  prospect,  it  was  neces- 
sary to  keep  posts  beyond  the  Azava  ;  moreover  the 
bridge  of  Marialva  could  be  turned  by  a  fjrd,  below 
the  confluence  of  the  streams. 


1810.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


19Z 


The  lOth,  the  Atnjeda  became  fordable  in  all  parts, 
but,  as  the  enemy  occupied  himself  with  the  raising  of 
redoubts,  to  secure  his  bridgre  at  Carboneras,  and  with 
other  preparations  for  the  sieije  of  Rodrigo,  Crawfurd, 
trusting  to  his  own  admirable  arrangements,  and  to  the 
surprising  discipline  of  his  troops,  still  maintained  his 
dangerous  position.  He  thus  encouraged  the  garrison 
of  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  and  protect.?d  the  villages  in  the 
plain  between  the  Azava  and  the  Coa  from  the  enemy's 
foraging  parties. 

On  the  18th,  the  eighth  corps  was  seen  to  lake  post 
at  San  Felices,  and  other  points,  and  all  the  villages, 
from  the  Sierra  de  Francia  to  tht  Douro,  were  occu- 
pied by  the  French  army.  The  23d,  .Julian  Sanchez, 
breaking  out  of  Ciudad,  came  into  Gallegos.  The 
25th,  the  French  batteries  opened  against  the  fortress, 
their  cavalry  closed  upon  the  Azava,  and  Crawfurd 
withdrew  his  outjiosts  to  tne  left  bank.  The  2(3th, 
it  was  known  thai  I?errasti  had  lost  one  hundred  and 
fifty  killed,  and  five  hundred  wounded  ;  and,  the  2'Jth 
a  Spaniard,  passing  the  French  posts,  brought  Car- 
rera  a  note,  containing  these  words.-  '•' 0  venir  lucgn ! 
lueso  .'  hie  go !  a  secorrer  esta  plaza.'^  ("Oh!  come, 
now!  now!  now!  to  the  succour  of  this  place.")  On 
the  1st  of  July  the  gallant  old  man  repeated  his  '•'•  Lue- 
go,  hiego,  lucgo,  pur  ultimo  rez." 

Meanwhile,  lord  Wellington,  still  hoping  that  the 
enemy  by  detaching  troops,  would  furnish  an  oppor- 
tunity of  relieving  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  reinforced  Craw- 
furd with  the  14th  and  16th  light  dragoons,  and  trans- 
ferred his  own  quarters  to  Alverca,  a  village  half-way 
between  Alineiila  and  Celerico.  The  Spaniards  sup- 
posed he  would  attack,  and  Romana,  quilting  Bada- 
jos,  came  to  propose  a  combined  movement  for  carrying 
rtf  the  garrison.  This  was  a  trying  moment!  The 
English  general  had  come  from  the  Guadiana  with 
the  avowed  purpose  of  securing  Rodrigo ;  he  had, 
in  a  manner,  pledged  himself  to  make  it  a  point  in 
his  own  operations  ;  his  army  was  close  at  hand,  the 
garrison  brave  and  distressed,  the  governor  honour- 
ably fulfilling  his  part.  To  permit  such  a  place  to 
fnll  without  a  stroke  struck,  would  be  a  grievous 
disaster,  and  a  more  g-rievous  dishi^nour  to  the  Brit- 
ish arms;  the  troops  desired  the  enterprise  ;  the  Span- 
i-^rds  demanded  it,  as  a  proof  of  good  faith ;  the 
Portuguese  to  keep  the  war  away  from  their  own 
country  :  finally,  policy  seemed  to  call  for  this  effort. 
lest  the  world  might  deem  the  promised  defence  of 
Portugal  a  heartless  and  a  hollow  boast.  Never- 
theless, Romana  returned  without  his  object.  Lord 
Wellington  absolutely  refused  to  venture  even  a  brig- 
ade, and  thus  proved  himself  a  truly  great  commander, 
a;id  of  a  steadfast  mind. 

It  was  not  a  single  campaign  but  a  terrible  war 
that  he  had  undertaken.  If  he  lost  but  five  thou- 
sand men,  his  own  government  would  abandon  the 
contest;  if  he  lost  fifteen,  he  must  abandon  it  him- 
self. His  whole  disposable  force  did  not  exceed 
fifty-six  thousand  men,  of  these,  twelve  thousand 
were  with  Hill,  and  one-half  of  the  remainder  were 
untried  and  raw.  But  this  included  all,  even  to 
the  Portuguese  cavalrv  and  garrisons.  All  could  not, 
however,  be  brought  into  line,  because  Reynier,  act- 
ing in  concert  with  Massena,  had,  at  this  period, 
collected  boats,  and  made  demonstrations  to  pass  the 
Tasus  and  move  upon  Coria  ;  French  troops  were  also 
crossing  the  Morena,  in  march  towards  Estremadura, 
which  obliged  lord  Wellington  to  detach  eight  thou- 
sand Portuguese  to  Thomar,  as  a  reserve;  and  these 
and  Hill's  corps  being  deducted,  not  quite  twenty-five 
thousand  men  were  available  to  carry  off  the  garrison 
in  the  face  of  sixty  thousand  French  veterans.  This 
enterprise  would  also  have  taken  the  army  two  march- 
es from  Guarda,  and  Coria  was  scarcely  inort  distant 
from  that  place  :  hence,  a  division  must  have  been  left 


at  Guarda,  lest  Reynier,  deceiving  Hill,  should  reach 
it  first. 

Twenty  thousand  men  of  all  arms  remained,  and  there 
were  two  modes  of  using  them.  1.  In  an  open  advance 
and  battle.  2.  In  a  secret  movement  and  surprise.  To 
effect  the  last,  the  army  might  have  assembled  in  the 
night  upon  the  Azava,  and  filed  over  tiie  single  bridge 
of  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  with  a  view  of  capturino  the  bat- 
tering train,  by  a  sally,  or  of  bringing  i^ff  the  garriscn. 
But,  without  dwelling  on  the  fact  thnt  Massena's  infor- 
'mation  was  so  good  that  he  knew,  in  two  days  after  it 
occurred,  the  object  of  Romana's  visit,  such  a  move- 
ment could  scarcely  have  been  made  unobserved,  even 
in  the  early  part  of  the  siege,  and,  certainly,  not  to- 
wards the  end,  when  the  enemy  were  on  the  Azava. 

An  open  battle  a  madman  only  would  have  ventured 
The  army,  passing  over  a  plain,  in  the  face  of  nearly 
three  times  its  own  numbers,  must  have  exposed  its 
flanks  to  the  enemy's  bridges  on  the  Agiieda.  because 
the  fortress  was  situated  in  the  bottom  of  a  deep  bend 
of  the  ri  er,  and  the  French  were  on  the  convex 
side.  What  hope  then  for  twenty  thousand  mixed 
soldiers  cooped  up  between  two  rivers,  when  eight 
thousand  cavalry  and  eighty  guns  should  come  pour- 
ing over  the  bridges  on  their  flanks,  and  fifty  thou- 
sand infantry  would  have  followed  to  the  attack  ] — 
What  would  even  a  momentary  success  have  availed  1 
Five  thousand  undisciplined  men  brought  off  from 
Ciudad  Rodrigo,  would  have  ill  supplied  the  ten  or 
twelve  thousand  good  troops  lost  in  the  batile,  and  the 
temporary  relic  f  of  the  fortress  would  have  been  a  poor 
compensation  for  the  loss  of  Portugal.  For  what  was 
the  actual  state  of  affairs  in  that  country  T  The  militia 
deserting  in  crowds  to  the  harvest,  the  Regency  in  full 
opposition  to  the  general,  the  measures  for  laying 
waste  the  country  not  perfected,  and  the  public  mind 
desponding  !  The  enemy  would  soon  have  united  his 
wMiole  force  and  advanced  to  retrieve  his  honour,  and 
who  was  to  have  withstood  him  1 

Massena,  sagacious  and  well  understandino-  his 
business,  onlv  desired  thit  the  attempt  should  he 
made.  He  held  back  his  troops,  appeared  careless, 
and  in  his  proclamations  taunted  the  English  general, 
that  he  was  afraid  ! — that  the  sails  were  fljipping  on 
the  ships  prepared  to  carry  him  away — that  he  was 
a  man,  who,  insensible  to  military  honour,  permitted 
his  ally's  towns  to  fall  without  risking  a  shot  to  save 
them,  or  to  redeem  his  plighted  word  !  But  all  this 
subtlety  failed,  lord  Wellington  was  unmoved,  and  a- 
bided  his  own  time.  "  If  thou  art  a  great  general, 
Marius,  come  down  and  fight!  If  thou  art  a  great 
general.  Silo,  make  me  come  down  and  fight  !" 

Ciudad  Rodrigo  left  to  its  fate,  held  out  yet  a  little 
longer,  and  meanwhile  the  enemy  pushed  infantry  on 
to  the  Azava  ;  Carrera  retired  to  the  Dos  Casis  river  ; 
and  Crawfurd,  reinforced  with  the  sixteenth  and  four- 
teenth light  dragoons,  placed  his  cavalry  at  Gallegos, 
and  concentrated  his  infant  y  in  the  wood  of  Al.imeda, 
two  miles  in  rear,  from  whence  he  could  fall  back, 
either  to  the  bridge  of  Almeida  by  San  Pedro,  or  to 
the  bridge  of  Castello  Bom  by  V'illa  Formosa.  Ob- 
stinate however  not  to  relinquish  a  foot  of  ground  that 
he  could  keep  either  by  art  or  force,  he  disposed  iiis 
troops  in  single  ranks  on  the  rising  grounds,  in  the 
evening  of  the  2d  of  Julv,  and  then  sending  some 
horsemen  to  the  rear  to  raise  the  dust,  marched  the 
ranks  of  infantry  in  succession,  and  slowly,  within 
sight  of  the  enemy,  hopino-  that  the  latter  would  imag- 
ine the  whole  army  was  come  u|)  to  succour  Ciudad 
Rodrigo.  He  thus  g^uiunl  two  days,  but  on  the  4th  of 
July,  a  strong  body  of  the  enemy  a-senibled  at  Mari- 
alva,  and  a  squadron  of  horse,  crossing  tlie  ford  below 
the  bridge,  pushed  at  full  speed  towards  Gallegos  dri- 
ving back  the  picquets ;  the  enemy  then  passed  the 
river,  and  the  British  retired  skirniisliiuff  up;. a  Alamo 


294 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


LBocK  XL 


da,  leaving  two  puns,  a  troop  of  the  16th  and  a  troop 
of  German  hussars  to  cover  the  movement.  This  rear 
guard  was  scareoiy  drawn  up  on  a  hill  half-cannon 
shot  from  a  streamlet  with  marshy  banks,  which 
crossed  the  road  to  Alameda,  when  a  colunm  of  French 
horsemen  was  observed  coming  on  at  a  charging  pace, 
diminishing  its  front  as  it  approached  ihe  bridge,  but 
resolute  to  pass,  and  preserving  the  most  perfect  order, 
notwithstanding  some  well-directed  shots  from  the 
guns.  Captain  Krauchenberg,  of  the  hussars,  pro- 
posed to  cliarge  those  who  first  came  over,  but  the 
f]uglish  officer  did  not  conceive  his  orders  warranted 
it,  and  the  gallant  German  riding  full  speed  against 
the  head  of  the  advancing  columns  with  his  single 
troop,  killed  the  leading  officers,  overthrew  the  front 
ranks,  and  drove  the  whole  back.  Meanwhile  the 
enemy  crossed  the  stream  at  other  points,  and  a  squad- 
ron coming  close  up  to  Alameda  was  driven  oft"  by  a 
volley  from  Ihe  third  cagadores. 

This  skirmish  not  being  followed  up  by  the  enemy, 
Crawfurd  took  a  fresh  post  with  his  infantry  and  guns 
in  a  wood  near  Fort  Conception  ;  his  cavalry,  rein- 
forced by  Julian  Sanchez  and  Carrera's  divisions, 
were  disposed  higher  up  on  the  Duas  Casas,  and  the 
French  withdrew  behind  the  Azava,  leaving  only  a 
piquet  at  tJallegos.  Their  marauding  parties  how- 
^'er  entered  tiie  villages  of  Barquillo  and  Viila  de 
Puerco  for  three  nights  successively,  and  Crawfurd, 
thinking  to  cut  them  off.  formed  two  ambuscades,  one 
near  Villa  de  Puerco  with  six  squadrons,  another  of 
three  squadrons  near  Barquillo;  he  also  placed  his  ar- 
tillery, five  companies  of  the  ninety-fifth  and  the  third 
caQadores  in  reserve,  for  the  enemy  were  again  in  force 
at  Gallegos  and  even  in  advance  of  it. 

A  little  after  day-break,  on  the  11th,  two  French 
parlies  were  observed,  the  one  of  infantry  near  Villa 
de  Puerco,  the  other  of  cavalry  at  Barquillo,  and  the 
open  country  on  the  right,  would  have  enabled  the  six 
.'squadrons  to  get  between  the  infantry  in  Villa  de 
I'uerco  and  their  point  of  retreat ;  but  this  was  cir- 
cuitous, and  Crawfurd  preferred  pushing  straight 
through  a  stone  enclosure  as  the  shortest  road.  The 
enclosure  proved  difficult,  the  squadrons  were  separa- 
ted, and  the  French,  two  hundred  strong,  had  time  to 
draw  up  in  square  on  a  rather  steep  rise  of  land,  yet  so 
far  from  the  edge,  as  not  to  be  seen  until  the  ascent 
Avas  gained.  The  two  squadrons  which  first  arrived, 
galloped  in  upon  them,  and  the  charge  was  rough  and 
j)n>hed  home,  but  failed  ;  the  troopers  received  the  fire 
of  the  square  in  front  and  on  both  sides,  and  in  passing 
saw  and  heard  the  French  captain,  Guache,  and  his 
sergeant-major  exhorting  the  men  to  shoot  carefully. 
Scarcely  was  this  charge  over,  when  the  enemy's  cav- 
alry came  out  of  Bar(]uillos,  and  the  two  British  squad- 
rons having  re-formed,  rode  against  it,  and  made  twen- 
ty-nine men  and  two  officers  prisoners,  a  fewbeinralso 
■wounded.  Meanwhile  colonel  'I'albot  mounting  the 
hill  with  four  squadrons  of  the  fourteenth  dragoons, 
bore  gallantly  in  upon  captain  Guache;  but  the  lat- 
ter again  opened  such  a  fire,  that  T.ilbot  himself 
and  fiMirleen  men  went  down  close  to  the  bayonets, 
and  t!ie  stout  I'renchman  made  good  his  retreat. — 
('rawfurd  then  returned  lo  the  camp,  having  had  thirty 
two  troopers,  besides  the  colonel,  killed  or  wounded  in 
this  unfortunate  affair. 

That  day  Ciudad  Rodrigo  surrendered,  and  the 
Spanish  troops,  grieved  and  irritated,  separated  from 
the  liglit  flivision,  and  marching  by  the  pass  of  Perales, 
U'joined  Romana;  Crawfurd  then  assumed  a  fresh  po- 
sition, a  mile  and  a  half  from  Almeida,  and  demanded 
a  reinfii-ement  of  two  battalions.  Lord  Wellington 
replied  thai  he  would  give  him  two  divisions,  if  he 
could  hold  Ills  ground,  but  that  he  could  not  do  so,  and 
knowing  ihe  temper  of  the  man,  he  repeated  liis  for- 
mer orders  nut  toji^hi  beyond  the  Cua 


Or  l^e  21st,  the  enemy's  cavalry  again  advanced, 
Fort  Conception  was  blown  up,  and  Crawfurd  fell 
back  to  Almeida,  apparently  disposed  to  cross  the  Coa, 
but  nothing  was  further  from  his  thoughts.  Braving 
the  whole  French  army,  he  had  kept  with  a  weak  di- 
vision for  three  months,  within  two  hours'  rnarcl!  of  six- 
ty thousand  men,  appropriating  the  resources  of  the 
plains  entirely  to  himself;  and  this  exploit,  only  to  be 
appreciated  by  military  men,  did  not  satisfy  his  fever- 
ish thirst  of  distinction.  Hitherto  he  had  safely  af- 
fronted a  superior  power,  and  forgetting  that  his  stay 
beyond  the  Coa  was  a  matter  of  sufferance,  ni  t  real 
strength,  with  head-strong  ambition,  he  resolved,  in 
defiance  of  reason  and  of  the  reiterated  orders  of  his 
general,  to  fight  on  the  right  bank. 

The  British  force  under  arms  now  consisted  of  four 
thousand  infantry,  eleven  hundred  cavalry,  and  six 
guns,  and  his  position  one  mile  and  a  half  in  length, 
extended  in  an  oblique  line  towards  the  Coa.  The 
cavalry  piquets  were  upon  the  plain  in  his  front,  his 
right  was  on  some  broken  ground,  and  his  left  resting 
on  an  unfinished  tower,  eight  hundred  yards  from  Al- 
meida, was  defended  by  the  guns  of  that  fortress;  but 
his  back  was  on  the  edge  of  the  ravine  forming  the 
channel  of  the  Coa,  and  the  bridge  was  more  than  a 
mile  distant,  in  the  bottom  of  the  chasm. 

COMBAT  OF  THE  COA. 

A  stormy  night  ushered  in  the  24th  of  July.  The 
troops,  drenched  with  rain,  were  under  arms  before 
day-light,  expecting  to  retire,  when  a  few  pistol  shots 
in  front,  followed  by  an  order  for  the  cavalry  reserves 
and  the  guns  to  advance,  gave  notice  of  the  enemy's 
approach  ;  and  as  the  morning  cleared,  twenty-four 
thousand  French  infantry,  five  thousand  cavalry,  and 
thirty  pieces  of  artillery  were  observed  in  march  be- 
yond the  Turones.  The  British  line  was  immediate- 
ly contracted  and  brought  under  the  edge  of  the  ravine  ; 
but  meanwhile  Ney,  who  had  observed  Crawfurd's 
false  disposition;  came  down  with  the  stoop  of  an 
eagle.  Four  thousand  horsemen  and  a  powerful  ar- 
tillery swept  the  plain,  the  allied  cavalry  gave  back, 
and  Loison's  division  coining  up  at  a  charging  pace, 
made  towards  the  centre  and  left  of  the  position. 

While  the  French  were  thus  pouring  onward,  seve- 
ral ill-judged  changes  were  made  on  the  English  side  ; 
part  of  the  troops  were  advanced,  others  drawn  back, 
and  the  forty-third  regiment  most  unaccountably  placed 
within  an  enclosure  of  solid  masonry,  at  least  ten  feet 
high,  situated  on  the  left  of  the  road,  about  half-mus- 
ket shot  down  the  ravine  and  having  but  one  narrow 
outlet.  While  thus  imprisoned,  the  firing  in  front  re- 
doubled, the  cavalry,  the  artillery,  and  the  cac^adores 
successively  passed  by  in  retreat,  and  the  sharp  clang 
of  the  ninety-fifth  rifle  was  heard  along  the  edge  of 
the  plain  above.  A  few  moments  later,  and  the  forty- 
third  would  have  been  surrounded,  if  here,  as  in  every 
other  part  of  this  field,  the  quickness  and  knowledge 
of  the  battalion  officers  had  not  remedied  the  faults  of 
the  general.  One  minute  sulTiced  to  loosen  some  large 
stones,  a  powerful  efifort  burst  the  enclosure,  and  the 
regiment,  re-form(>d  in  column  of  companies,  was  the 
next  instant  up  with  the  riflemen.  There  was  no  room 
to  array  the  line,  no  time  for  any  thing  but  battle,  eve- 
ry captain  carried  off  his  company  as  an  inde|)endent 
body,  and  joining  as  be  could  with  the  ninety-fifih  or 
fifty-second,  the  whole  presented  a  mass  of  skirmish- 
ers, acting  in  small  parties  and  under  no  regular  com- 
mand, yet  each  confident  in  the  courage  and  discipline 
of  those  on  his  right  and  left;  and  all  regulating  their 
movements  by  a  common  discretion  and  keeping  to- 
gether with  surprising  vigour. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  descrilie  the  first  hurst  of  French 
soldiers,  it  is  well  known  with  what  gallantry  the  offi- 
cers lead,  with  what  veliemence  the  troops  follow,  auJ 


1810.1 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


295' 


with  what  a  gtorm  of  fire  they  waste  a  field  of  battle.  At  j 
this  moment,  with  the  advantacri;  of  ground  and  num- j 
bers,  they  were  breaking  over  the  edge  of  the  ravine, 
their  guns  ranged  along  the  summit,  played  hotly  with  ; 
grape,  and  their  hussars,  galloping  over  the  glacis  of  j 
Almeida,  poured  down  the  road,  sabring  e-very  thing  ' 
in  their  way.     Ncy,  desirous  that  Montbrun   should  , 
follow  this  movement  with  the  whole  of  the  French 
cavalr}',  and  so  cut  off  the  troops  from  the  bridge,  sent  | 
five  olficers  in  suc-cession  to  urge  him  on  ;  and,  indeed,  \ 
so   mixed    were  friends  and  enemies  at  the  moment,  | 
that  only  a  few  guns  of  the  fortress  durst  open,  and  no  | 
courage  could  have  availed  against  such  overwhelm-  \ 
ing  numbers.     But  Montbrun  enjoyed   an   independent , 
command,  and  as  the  attack  was  made  without   Mas- ; 
Sena's  knowledge,  he  would  not  stir.     Then  the  Brit- ( 
ish    regiments,    with  singular  intelligence  and  disci- 
pline, extricated  themselves  from  their  perilous  situa- 
tion.     Falling   back   slowlj',   and   yet   slopping   and 
fighting  whenever  opportunity  offered,  they  made  their 
way  through  a  rugged  country  tangled  with  vineyards, 
in  despite  of  their  enemies,  who  were   so  fierce  and 
eager,  that  even  the  horsemen  rode  in  amongst  the  en- 
closures, striking  at  the  soldiers  as  they  mounted  the 
walls  or  scrambled  over  the  rocks. 

As  the  retreatinor  troops  approached  the  river,  the}' 
came  upon  a  more  open  space ;  but  the  left  wing  being 
harder  pressed,  and  having  the  shortest  distance,  ar- 
rived while  the  bridge  was  still  crowded  and  some  of  j 
the  right  wing  distant.  Major  M'Leod  of  the  foity- 
third,  seeing  this,  rallied  four  companies  on  a  hill  just 
in  front  of  the  passage,  and  was  immediately  joined 
by  a  party  of  the  ninety-fifth ;  and  at  the  same  time, 
two  other  companies  were  posted  by  brigade-major 
Rowan,  on  another  hill  flanking  the  road.  These  posts 
were  maintained  until  the  enemy,  gathering  in  great 
numbers,  made  a  second  burst,  when  the  companies 
fell  back;  but  at  that  moment  the  right  wing  of  the 
fifty-second  was  seen  marching  towards  the  bridcre, 
which  was  still  crowded  with  the  passing  troops. 
M'Leod,  a  very  young  man,  but  with  a  natural  genius 
for  war,  immediately  turned  his  horse  round,  called  to 
the  troops  to  follow,  and,  takingr  off  his  cap,  rode  with 
a  shout  towards  the  enemy.  The  suddenness  of  the 
thing,  and  the  distinguished  action  of  the  man,  pro- 
duced the  effect  he  designed;  a  mob  of  soldiers  rushed 
after  him,  cheering  and  charjing  as  if  a  whole  army 
had  been  at  their  backs,  and  the  enemy's  skirmishers, 
astonished  at  this  unexpected  movement,  stopped  short,  i 
Before  they  could  recover  from  their  surprise,  the  fif- ' 
ty-second  crossed  the  river,  and  M'Leod,  following  at  i 
full  speed,  also  gained  the  other  side  without  a  dis-  j 
aster.  | 

As  the   regiments  passed  the  bridge,   they  planted  | 
themsel'  es  in  loose  order  on  the  side  of  the  mountain. 
The  artillery  drew  up  on  the  summit  and  the  cavalry  I 
were  disposed  in  parties  on  the  roads  to  the   right,  be- 
cause two  miles  hicrher  up  the  stream  there  were  fords,  I 
an  I  beyond  them  the  bridge  of  Castello  Bom;  and   it 
was  tnhp  apprehended  that,  while  the  sixth  corps  was 
in  front,  the  reserves,  and  a  division  of  the  eighth  corps, 
then  on  the  Agweda,  might   pass  at  those  places   and 
get  between  the  division  and  Celerico.     The  river  was 
however,  rising  fast  from  the  rains,  and  it  was  impos- 
sible to  retreat  farther.  | 

The  French  skirmishers,  swarming  on  the  right 
bank,  opened  a  biting  fire,  which  was  returned  as  bit 
terly ;  tlie  artillery  on  both  sides  plaved  across  the 
ravine,  the  sounds  were  repeated  by  numberless  echoes, 
and  the  smoke,  rising  slowly,  resolved  itself  into  an 
immense  arch,  spanning  the  whole  chasm,  and  spark- 
ling with  the  whirling  fuzes  of  the  flying  shells.  The 
enemy  gathered  fast  and  thickly,  his  columns  were 
discovered  fonning  behind  the  high  rocks,  and  a  dra- 
goon was  seen  to  try  the  depth  of  the  stream  above, . 


but  two  shots  from  the  fiftj'-second  killed  horse  and 
man,  and  the  carcasses,  floating  between  the  hostile 
bands,  showed  that  the  river  was  impassable.  The 
monotonous  tones  of  a  French  drum  were  then  heard. 
The  next  instant,  the  head  of  a  noble  column  darken- 
ed the  long  narrow  bridge,  a  drummer  and  an  officer 
in  a  splendid  uniform,  leaped  forward  together,  and  the 
whole  rushed  on  with  loud  cries.  The  depth  of  the 
ravine  at  first  deceived  the  English  soldiers'  aim,  and 
twc-thiTvis  of  the  passage  was  won,  ere  a  shot  had 
brought  down  an  enemy  ;  yet  a  few  paces  onwards  the 
iine  of  death  was  traced,  and  the  whole  of  the  leading 
French  section  fell  as  one  man !  Still  the  gallant  col- 
umn pressed  forward,  but  no  foot  could  pass  that  terri- 
ble line  ;  the  kiiled  and  wounded  rolled  together,  until 
the  heap  rose  nearly  even  with  the  parapet,  and  the 
living  mass  behind  melted  away  rather  than  traveback. 

The  shouts  of  the  British  now  rose  loudly,  but  they 
were  confidently  answered,  and,  in  half  an  hour,  a 
second  column  more  numerous  than  the  first,  again 
crowded  the  bridge.  This  time,  however,  the  range 
was  better  judged,  and  ere  half  the  distance  was  won, 
the  multitude  was  again  torn,  shattered,  dispersed  and 
slain ;  ten  or  twelve  men  only  succeeded  in  crossing, 
and  took  shelter  under  the  rocks  at  the  brink  of  the 
river.  The  skirmishing  was  then  renewed,  and  a  French 
surgeon  coming  down  to  the  very  foot  of  the  bridge, 
merely  waved  his  handkerchief  and  commenced  dres- 
sing the  wounded  under  the  hottest  fire  ;  nor  was  this 
touching  appeal  unheeded,  every  musket  turned  from 
him,  although  his  still  undaunted  countrymen  were  pre- 
paring for  a  third  attempt.  The  impossibility  of  for- 
cing the  passage  was,  however,  become  too  apparent, 
and  this  last  effort,  made  with  feebler  numbers  and  less 
energy,  failed  almost  as  soon  as  it  commenced. 

Nevertheless,  the  combat  was  unnecessarily  contin- 
ued. By  the  French  as  a  point  of  honour,  to  cover  the 
escape  of  those  who  had  passed  the  bridge.  By  the 
English,  from  ignorance  of  their  object.  One  of  the 
enemy's  guns  was  dismantled,  a  powder-magazine 
blew  up,  and  many  continued  to  fall  on  both  sides  un- 
til about  four  o'clock,  when  a  heavy  rain  causing  a 
momentary  cessation  of  fire,  the  men  amongst  the 
rocks  returned,  unmolested,  to  their  own  partv,  the 
fight  ceased,  and  Crawfurd  retired  behind  the  Pinhel 
river.  Forty-four  Portuguese,  two  hundred  and  seven- 
ty-two British,  including  twenty-eight  officers,  were 
killed,  wounded,  or  taken,  and  it  was  at  first  supposed 
that  lieutenant  Dawson  and  half  a  company  of  the. 
fifty-second,  which  had  been  posted  in  the  unfinished 
tower,  were  also  captured  ;  but  that  officer  kept  close 
until  the  evening,  and  then,  with  great  intelligence, 
passed  all  the  enemy's  posts,  and  crossing  the  Coa  at 
a  ford,  rejoined  his  regiment. 

In  this  action  the  French  lost  above  a  thousand  men, 
the  slaughter  at  the  bridge  was  fearful  to  behold  ;  but 
Massena  claimed  to  have  taken  two  pieces  of  artillery, 
and  it  was  true,  for  the  guns  intended  to  arm  the  unfin- 
ished tower,  near  Almeida,  were  lying  dismounted  at 
the  foot  of  the  building.  They,  however,  belonged  to 
the  garrison  of  Almeida,  not  to  the  light  division. 
That  they  were  not  mounted  and  the  tower  garrisoned, 
was  certainly  a  great  negligence  ;  the  enemy's  cavalry 
could  not  otherwise  have  fallen  so  dangerously  on  the 
left  of  the  position,  and  the  after-investment  of  Almei- 
da would  have  been  retarded.  In  other  respects,  the 
governor,  severely  censured  bv  Crawfurd,  at  the  tune, 
lor  not  opening  his  fire  sooner  and  more  vigorously, 
was  unblameable  ;  the  whole  affair  had  been  so  mis- 
managed by  the  general  himself,  that  friends  and  ene- 
mies were  mingled  together  fr'im  the  first,  and  the 
shots  from  the  fortress  would  have  killed   both. 

During  the  fight,  general  Picton  came  up  alone  from 
Pinhel,  Crawfurd  desired  the  support  of  the  third  di- 
vision, it  was  refused,  and  excited  by  soaae  previooa- 


296 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XI. 


disputes,  the  generals  separated  after  a  sharp  alterca- 
tion. Pictoii  was  decidedly  wrong,  because  Crawfiird's 
fiituation  was  one  of  extreme  danger  ;  he  could  not 
retire,  and  Massena  might  undoubtedly  liave  thrown 
his  reserves,  by  the  bridge  of  Castello  Bom,  upon  the 
right  flank  of  the  division,  and  destrfiyed  it  between 
the  Coa  and  the  Pinhel  rivers.  Picton  and  Crawfurd 
were,  however,  not  formed  by  nature  to  act  cordially 
together.  The  stern  countenance,  robust  frame,  satur- 
iiiiie  complexion,  caustic  speech,  and  austere  demea- 
nour of  the  first,  promised  little  sympathy  with  the 
short  thick  figure,  dark  flashing  eyes,  quick  move- 
ii  "nts,  and  fiery  temper  of  the  second  ;  nor,  did  they 
often  meet  without  a  quarrel.  Nevertheless,  they  had 
many  points  of  resemblance  in  their  characters  and 
fortunes.  Both  were  inclined  to  harshness,  and  rigid 
in  command  ;  both  prone  to  disobedience,  yet  exacting 
entire  submission  from  inferiors;  and  they  were  alike 
ambitious  and  craving  of  glory.  They  both  possessed 
decided  military  talents,  were  enterprising  and  intrepid, 
yet  neither  were  remarkable  for  skill  in  handling  troops 
under  fire.  I'his,  also,  they  had  in  common,  that  both, 
after  distinguished  services,  perished  in  arms,  fighting 
gallantly,  and  being  celebrated  as  generals  of  division 
M-hile  living,  have,  since  their  death,  been  injudicious- 
ly spoken  of,  as  rivalling  their  great  leader  in  war. 

That  they  were  oflicers  of  mark  and  pretension  is 
unquestionable,  and  Crawfurd  more.,  so  than  Picton, 
because  the  latter  never  had  a  separatee  command,  and 
his  opportunities  were  necessarily  more  circumscribed  ; 
but  to  compare  either  to  the  duke  of  Wellington  dis- 
plays ignorance  of  the  men  and  of  the  art  they  pro- 
fessed. If  they  had  even  comprehended  the  profound 
military  and  political  combinations  he  was  then  con- 
ducting, th?  one  would  have  carefully  avoided  fighting 
on  the  Coa,  and  the  other,  far  from  refusing,  would 
have  eagerly  proffered  his  support. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Slight  operations  in  Gallicia,  Castile,  the  Asturias,  Estremadu- 
ra,  anri  Andalusia — Reynier  passes  the  Tagus — Hill  makes  a 
parallel  movement — Romana  spreads  his  troops  over  Estre- 
madura — I>ord  Wellington  assembles  a  reserve  at  Thomar — 
Critiral  situation  of  Silveira — Captures  a  Swiss  battalion  at 
Fuebla  de  Senabria — Roniana's  troops  defeated  at  Benveni- 
ila — Lasiy  and  captain  Cockburne  land  troops  at  Mou:uer, 
but  are  forced  to  reimbark — Lord  Wellino;ton's  plan — How 
thwarted — Siege  of  Almeida — Allies  advance  to  Frexadas — 
The  niasrazine  of  Almeida  explodes — Treachery  of  Bareiros 
— Town  surrenders — The  allies  withdi'aw  behind  the  Mon- 
dego — Fort  of  Albuquerque  ruined  by  an  explosion — Revnier 
marches  on  Sabugal,  but  returns  to  Zarza  Mayor — Napoleon 
directs  Massena  to  advance — Dfscription  of  the  country — 
Erroneous  notions  of  lord  Wellington's  views  entertained  by 
both  armies. 

During  the  siege  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  an  expedition 
sailing  from  Corniia,  under  Porlier,  seized  Santona, 
and  dismantled  that  and  other  points  on  the  coast.  At 
the  same  time  Mahi,  coming  down  from  the  Gallician 
mountains,  menaced  Astorga,  and  a  detachment  of  his 
army  under  'I'oboado  Cil,  occupied  Puebia  de  Senabria, 
acting  in  concert  with  Silveira.  Mahi's  movements 
could  not  be  well  opposed  by  either  Kellerman  or  Ser- 
ras,  during  the  siege,  because  the  former  had  a  strong 
detachment  in  Bauos,  and  the  troops  of  the  latter  were 
spread  over  too  great  an  extent  of  ground  ;  but,  when 
the  place  fell,  the  eighth  corps,  being  detached  beyond 
the  Tormes,  to  gather  provisions,  enabled  Serras  to 
act  against  the  Gailicians.  The  latter  were  then  driv- 
en into  the  mountains,  and  Toboado  Gil,  removing  his 
stores  from  Puebia  Senabria,  drew  closer  to  Silveira, 
in  expectation  of  an  attack  ;  but  Serras,  only  placing  a 
Swiss  battalion  and  sixty  dragoons  at  Puebia,  fell  back 


to  Zamora,  and  the  eighth  corps  reoccupied  the  coun- 
try between  the  Tormes  and  the  Agueda. 

Meanwhile  Bonnet  defeated  the  vSpaniards  at  Sales, 
and  entered  Castropol,  on  the  frontier  of  G;;llicia,  but 
returned  to  Ovicdo,  on  hearing  of  the  expedition  to 
Santona.  The  Spaniards  then  re-embarke(l  for  Coru- 
na,  the  project  of  a  larger  armament,  to  be  directed 
against  Santander  itself,  was  adopted,  and  Mahi  afiiim- 
ed  that,  if  more  arms  and  ammunition  were  ser.t  to  him 
from  England,  he  would  clear  the  plains  of  Leon,  as 
far  as  the  Esla  river.  His  demands  were  complied 
with  ;  sir  Home  Popham  was  appointed  to  superintend 
the  naval  expeditions  against  the  coast  of  the  Astniias 
and  Biscay,  and  a  serious  interruption  of  the  French 
communications  was  planned,  hut  never  realized. 

General  Reynier  now  passed  the  Tagns  with  the 
second  corps,  but  it  appears  that  this  movement  should 
have  been  executed  in  June,  for  heats  were  collected 
at  Barca  de  Alconete,  in  the  middle  of  that  month; 
and  the  French  only  waited  for  a  detachment  from 
Andalusia,  when  Mendizabel,  taking  the  road  of  Zafra, 
attacked  that  detachment,  at  Los  Santos,  on  the  23d, 
and  Reynier  immediately  moved  to  its  succour,  with 
one  division  of  infantry  and  all  his  cavalry.  At  this 
period  the  insurrection  caused  by  Lascy's  expedition 
to  tlie  Ronda,  had  drawn  all  the  troops  of  the  fifth 
corps  from  vSeviile  to  that  side,  the  duke  of  Aremherg 
and  general  Remond  had  fallen  back  behind  the  river 
Tinto,  and  Copons  had  advanced  to  collect  ]>rovisions 
on  the  Odiel.  In  this  threatening  state  cf  affairs,  in- 
stead of  returning  to  Merida,  Reynier  endeavoured  to 
surprise  luias,  at  Xeres  de  los  Cavalleros,  and  failing 
in  that,  pushed  across  the  Morena  against  Ballasteros, 
and  the  latter  being  at  Cainpo  Frio,  beyond  Aracena, 
and,  ignorant  that  Imas  had  retreated,  could  only  save 
himself  by  a  hasty  flight  across  the  frontier  of  Portu- 
gal. Meanwhile,  Lascy  being  beaten  in  the  Ronda, 
the  fifth  corps  retired  to  Seville,  D'Aremberg  and 
Remond  re-occupied  Huelva  and  Moguer,  and  Reynier, 
going  back  to  Merida,  resumed  his  design  of  pass- 
ing the  Tagus.  His  boats  were  still  at  Alconete,  for 
the  Spaniards  had  neglected  this  opportunity  ef  de- 
stroying them  ;  hut,  as  it  was  necessary  to  cover  the 
operations  both  from  Hill's  division  which  was  con- 
centrated at  C'ampo  Mayor,  and  from  the  Portuguese 
troops  behind  the  Elga  river,  a  strong  rear  guard  was 
placed  on  the  Salor  to  watch  the  former,  and  the 
French  division  at  Banos  advanced  to  Coria  to  awe  the 
latter.  Reynier  then  quilting  Merida  the  lOth  of  .(uly, 
marched,  by  Truxillo  and  Caceres,  upon  A.lconete  and 
Almaraz,  and  effected  the  passage,  his  rear  guard  fol- 
lowing on  the  16th.  'i'his  cautious  operation  saved 
him  from  an  attack  meditated  by  Hill,  who  had  received 
orders  to  unite  with  Romana,  and  drive  the  second 
corps  back,  with  a  view  to  gather  the  harvest  for  the 
victualling  of  Badajos  and  the  other  frontier  fortresses. 
The  passage  of  the  Tagus  being  thus  effected  by  the 
French,  general  Hill  made  a  parallel  movement,  which, 
on  his  part,  only  required  thirty-six  hours  ;  and  mean- 
while, lord  Wellington  assembled  a  reserve  at  Tho- 
mar, under  the  coiumand  of  general  Leith,  consisting 
of  eight  thousand  Portiiguese  and  two  thousand  Brit- 
ish infantry,  just  arrived  from  l<]ngiand. 

Reynier  liaving  reached  Coria,  detached  a  force,  l)y 
Perales,  upon  Sabugal,  but  recalled  it  whtui  he  found 
that  Hill,  having  crossednhe  'I'agus  by  Vilha  Veiiia, 
was  at  Castello  Branco  on  the  21sl.  'l"he  tw-  g<  ner- 
als  then  faced  each  other.  Hill,  joined  by  a  strong 
body  of  Portuguese  cavalry,  under  general  Fane,  en- 
cam|)ed,  with  sixteen  thousand  men  and  eighteen  guns, 
at  Sarzedas,  just  in  front  of  the  Sobreira  Formosa;  his 
advanced  guard  was  in  Castello  Branco,  his  horse- 
men on  the  line  of  the  PoiiquI  ;  and  a  Briirnde  of  Por- 
tuguese infantry  was  posted  at  Fundao,  to  keep  up  the 
communication  with  Guarda,  and  to  cover  the  Estrada 


1?1C,] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


297 


Nova.  Beliina  Hill,  Leith  occupied  the  line  of  the 
Zezere,  and  tlius  twenty-six  thousand  men,  besides  the 
militia,  were  in  observation  between  the  Estrella  and 
the  Tajrus. 

Reynier  first  made  demonstrations  on  the  side  of 
Salvatierra,  but  being  repulsed  by  some  Portu£ruese 
cavalry,  divided  bis  forces  between  Penamacor  and 
Zarza  .Maynr;  he  also  established  a  post  of  one  hun- 
dred and  fifty  men  on  tlie  left  bank  of  the  Tagus.  near 
the  mouth  of  the  Rio  del  Monte;  and,  by  continual 
movements,  rendered  it  doulitful,  whether  he  meant 
to  repass  the  Taorus,  or  to  advance  upon  Sarzedas, 
or  to  join  Massena.  Meanwhile,  Ballasteros  return- 
ed to  Aracena;  Imas  to  Xeres  de  los  Cavalleros; 
O'Donnel  entered  Truxillo,  and  Carlos  d'Esjiaiia  cut 
off  the  French  post  on  the  Rio  del  Monte.  Romaiia 
was,  however,  soon  oblig^ed  to  concentrate  his  troops 
again,  for  Mortier  was  on  the  Guadalquivir,  with  a 
view  to  re-enter  Estremadura.  Such  was  the  situation 
of  the  armies  in  the  beginninnf  of  August;  but  Massena, 
when  assured  that  Reynier  had  crossed  the  Tajus,  di- 
rected the  sixth  corps  and  the  cavalry  upon  Almeida, 
■which  led,  as  we  have  seen,  to  the  combat  on  the  Coa, 
during  which,  L'>ison,  imaijiriing  the  governor  to  he  a 
native,  pressed  him  to  desert  the  cause  of  the  l-jnglish  : 
"  that  vile  people,  whose  object  was   to  enslave  the  Foriu- 

Lord  Wellington's  situation  was  now  critical. 
Ciudad  Rodrigo  furnished  the  French  with  a  place 
of  arms :  they  micrht  disregard  Almeida,  and  their 
lardy  investment  of  it,  viewed  in  conjunction  with 
the  great  magazines  collecting  at  Ciudad  Rodrigo, 
indicated  an  intention  of  so  doing.  Massena's  dis- 
positions were  such  as  rendered  his  true  designs  dif- 
ficult to  be  discovered.  The  sixth  corps  and  the  re- 
serve cavalry  were,  indeed,  around  Almeida,  but,  b}' 
telegraphic  intercourse  with  the  garrison,  it  was  known 
that  the  investment  was  not  real,  and  the  heads  of  the 
columns  pointed  towards  Celerico.  Loison's  advanced 
guard  was  in  Pinhel  the  day  after  Craw^furd's  action; 
the  second  corps,  divided  between  Zarza  Mayor  and 
Penamacor,  and  with  boats,  near  Alcantara,  on  the 
Tagus,  menaced  equally  the  line  of  that  river  and  the 
line  of  the  Zezere;  and  it  was  as  likely  that  Massena 
would  join  Reynier  as  that  Reynier  would  join  Massena. 
It  was  known  by  an  intercepted  letter,  that  Napoleon 
had  ordered  Reynier  to  inva<ie  by  the  line  of  Abrantes 
while  the  5lh  corps  entered  the  Alemtejo,  and  Massena 
acted  by  ihe  valley  of  the  Mondego  ;  but  as  Reynier 
was  by  the  same  letter  placed  under  Massena's  com- 
mand and  that  the  5th  corps  was  not  then  in  a  con- 
x^ition  to  move  against  the  Alemtejo,  no  certain  notion 
of  the  enemy's  intention  cnuld  be  formed.  The  eighth 
corps  and  the  division  of  Serras  and  Kellerman  being 
between  the  Tormes  and  the  Esla,  might  break  into 
the  northern  provinces  of  Portugal,  while  the  sixth  and 
second  corps  should  hold  the  allies  in  check,  and  this 
was  undoubtedly  the  surest  course;  because  the  taking 
of  Oporto  would  have  furnished  many  resources,  strick- 
en the  natives  with  terror,  dispersed  the  northern  mili- 
tia, opened  the  great  coast-road  to  Lisbon,  and  enabled 
Massena  to  avoid  all  the  difficult  country  about  the  Mon- 
dego. 'i'he  English  general  must  then  have  retired 
before  the  seco  .d  and  sixth  corps,  unless  he  attacked 
Ney  :  an  unpromising  measure,  because  of  the  enemy's 
strength  in  horse:  in  fine  although  Massena  was  dila- 
tory, he  had  one  hundred  and  sixteen  thousa::d  r-'en 
and  the  initial  operations  in  his  power,  and  lord  Wel- 
linQ'ton  was  obliged  to  wait  vipon   his  movements. 

The  actual  position  of  the  allies  was  too  extended  and 
loo  forward,  yet  to  retire  at  once  would  have  seemed 
timid  ;  hence  lord  Weirm<rton  remained  quiet  during 
the  25th,  26th,  and  27th  of  July,  although  the  enemy's 
posts  were  thickeninff  on  the  Pitibel  river.  The  28th, 
the  British  cavalry  advanced  to  Frexadas,  and   the  in- 


fantry withdrew  behind  the  Mondego,  except  the  fonrlh 
division,  which  remained  at  Guarda.  The  light  divis- 
ion occupied  Celerico;  the  other  divisions  were  posted 
at  Penhancos,  Carapichina,  and  Fornos  ;  the  Portu- 
guese troops  were  a  day's  march  behind.  The  sick 
and  wounded  men  were  transferred  daily  to  the  rear, 
and  the  line  of  retreat  kept  free  from  encundKance. 
The  enemy  then  made  a  demonstration  towards  St. 
.loa  de  Pesquera,  and  defeated  some  militia  at  Fosboa, 
on  the  Douro,  but  finally  retired  across  the  Coa,  and, 
after  a  few  skirmishes  with  the  garrison  on  the  3rd  of 
August,  left  the  communication  with  Almeida  again 
free.  At  the  same  time,  a  detachment  of  Reyider's  horse 
was  encovmlered  at  Atalaya,  near  Fundao,  and  ttiten 
by  the  Portuguese  cavalry  and  ordenauQa,  with  a  losa 
of  fifty  killed  or  taken,  after  which  the  French  with- 
drew from  Penamacor. 

On  the  side  of  Gallicia,  Kellerman  advanced  from 
Benevente  to  Castro  Contrijo,  and  detachments  from 
Serras's  division  penetrated  towards  Monterey,  order- 
ing provisions  for  ten  thousand  men  on  the  road  to 
Braganza.  Silveira  then  marched  on  Senabria,  de- 
feated a  few  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  there  on  the  sixth  ; 
invested  the  Swiss  on  the  7th  ;  and,  on  the  10th,  ob- 
liged them  to  capitulate  at  the  moment  when  Serras, 
who  had  foolishly  left  them  there  and  neglected  to  suc- 
cour them  in  time,  was  tardily  coming  to  their  relief. 
Five  hundred  men  and  an  eagle  were  taken,  and  Sil- 
veira, who  did  not  lose  a  man,  thought  of  giving  battle 
to  .Serras,  but  Beresford  alarmed  at  such  rashness  sent 
him  imperative  orders  to  retreat;  an  operation  he  per- 
formed by  abandoning  his  rear  guard,  which  was 
under  the  command  of  colonel  J.  Wilson,  and  which, 
being  closely  pressed,  was  saved  by  that  officer  under 
circumstances  of  such  difficulty  that  he  received  the 
public  thanks  of  the  marshal. 

This  advantage  in  the  north  was  balanced  by  a 
disaster  in  Estremadura.  The  Spanish  generals,  nev- 
er much  disposed  to  respect  lord  Wellington's  counsels, 
were  now  less  so  than  before,  from  the  discontent  en- 
o-endered  by  the  fall  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo.  He  had 
pressed  upon  Romana  the  policy  of  avoiding  battles; 
had  procured  permission  that  Campo  Mayor  should  be 
given  to  him  as  a  place  of  arms,  with  leave  to  retire 
into  Portugal  when  overmatched  by  the  enemy;  and 
he  had  shewn  him  that  Hill's  departure  greatly  aug- 
mented the  necessity  of  caution.  Nevertheless.  l{o- 
mana  joined  Ballasteros,  and.  as  their  united  force 
amounted  to  eighteen  thousand  in/antry  and  two 
thousand  cavalry  beside  Partidas,  the  English  gener- 
al immediately  "foresaw  that  they  would  olfer  battle, 
be  defeated,  and  lay  open  the  whole  frontier  of  the 
Alemtejo;  he,  therefore,  directed  Hill  to  send  Madden's 
briijade  of  Portuguese  cavalry  to  their  assistance. 

MaJden  reached  Campo  Mayor  tjie  14lh,  but  Ro- 
mana's  advanced  guard  under  Mendizabel  had  been 
defeated  on  the  11th  at  Benvenida,  and  having  lost  six 
hundred  men,  was  going  to  lay  down  its  arms,  when 
fortunately  (^arrera  arrived  with  the  Spanish  cavalry 
and  disengaged  it;  the  whole  then  retreated  across  the 
Morena  to"^  Monte  Molin  and  Fregenal,  but  the  French 
pursued  and  slew  or  took  four  hundred  more.*  The 
following  day  Mortier  entered  Zafra,  and  Romana 
retired  to  Almendralejos.  The  enemy  did  not,  how- 
ever, press  this  advantage,  because  Lascy  with  three 
thousand  men  from  Cadiz  convoyed  by  Captain  Cock- 
burn  of  the  British  navy,  had  landed  near  Moguer  and 
driven  the  duke  of  Areiuberg  towards  Seville,  whib 
Copons  drove  Reiriond  upon  Zalamea;  and  although 
the  French  soon  rallied  and  obliged  Lascy  to  re-embark, 
Mortier  was  withdrawn  towards  the  Morena,  and  Ro- 
mana again  advanced  to  Zafra.  This  affair  at  Moguei 
was  very  contemptible,  but  the  tumid  nature  of  Cock- 


Captain  Carrol's  dispatches. 


298 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[rooK  XI. 


burn's   despatches  on  the   occasion   obtained   for  it  a 
momentary  celebrity. 

It  would  appear  that  Massena  had  been  waiting  for 
Mortier's  movements  to  develope  bis  own  plans,  for 
on  the  day  that  the  latter  entered  Zafra,  the  sixth 
corps  formally  invested  Almeida,  and  lord  Wellington 
immediately  bringing  up  the  Portuguese,  recrossed  the 
Mondego ;  the  Erilish  being  at  Pinhel,  Frexadas, 
and  (iuaroa.  and  the  Portuguese  at  Celerico,  Govea, 
Meilio,  and  Trancoso.  In  this  situation,  expecting  a 
vigorous  defence  from  Almeida,  he  had  good  hopes  to 
delay  the  enemy  for  six  weeks  or  two  months,  when 
thfr  rains  setting  in  would  give  him  additional  advan- 
tages in  the  defence  of  the  country.  He  had  intended 
to  keep  the  light  division  on  the  Cabepa  Negro  over- 
hinging  the  bridge  of  the  Coa,  and  thus  secure  a  com- 
munication with  the  garrison,  or  force  the  French 
to  invest  the  place  with  their  whole  army.  Craw- 
ford's rashness  marred  this  plan,  and  he  himself 
was  so  dispirited  by  the  action  on  the  21th,  that 
the  commander-in-chief  did  not  think  it  prudent  to 
ronew  the  project.  Yet  Massena's  tardiness  and  the 
small  force  with  which  he  finally  invested  the  place, 
led  lord  Wellington  to  think  of  assembling  secretly  a 
large  and  chosen  body  of  men  behind  the  Cabega  Ne- 
gro, with  the  view  of  suddenly  forcing  the  bridge  and 
the  fords  and  taking  the  French  battering  train,  or  at 
least  bringing  off  tiie  garrison  ;  but  while  revolving 
this  great  stroke  in  his  mind,  an  unexpected  and  terri- 
ble disaster  broke  his  measures. 

SIEGE    OF    ALMEIDA. 

This  fortress,  although  regularly  constructed  with 
bIx  bastions,  ravelins,  an  excellent  ditch,  and  covered 
way,  was  extremely  defective.  The  ramparts  were 
too  high  for  the  glacis,  and  from  some  near  ground, 
on  the  side  of  the  attack,  the  bottom  of  the  ditch 
might  be  seen.  An  old  square  castle,  built  on  a 
mound  in  the  centre  of  the  town,  contained  three  bomb 
proofs,  the  doors  of  which  were  not  secure ;  and  with 
the  exception  of  some  damp  casements  in  one  bastion, 
tlitre  was  no  other  magazine  for  the  powder.  Colo- 
nel Cox  was  governor,  and  his  garrison  composed  of 
one  regular  and  two  militia  regiments,  a  body  of  artil- 
lery and  a  squadron  of  cavalry,  amounted  to  about  four 
thousand  men.* 

On  the  18th,  the  trenches  were  begun  under  cover 
of  a  false  attack,  and  in  the  morning  of  the  26lh  (the 
second  parallel  being  commenced)  sixty-five  pieces 
of  artillery  mounted  in  ten  batteries  opened  at  once. 
Many  houses  were  soon  in  flames  and  the  garrison 
was  unable  to  extinsruish  them;  the  counter  fire  was, 
howevi  r,  briskly  maintained,  and  little  military  dam- 
age was  sustained.  'I'owards  evening  the  cannonade 
slackened  on  hotl»  sides;  but  just  after  da'k  the 
ground  suddenly  trembled,  the  castle  bursting  into  a 
thousand  pieces,  gave  vent  to  a  column  of  smoke  and 
tire,  and  with  a  prodigious  noise  the  whole  town  sunk 
into  a  shapeless  ruin  !  Treason  or  accident  had  caus- 
ed the  magazines  to  explode,  and  the  devastation  was 
incredible.  The  ramparts  were  breached,  the  greatest 
part  of  ihe  guns  thrown    into   the  ditch,  five   hundred 

fipnple  were  struck  dead  on  the  instant,  and  only  six 
i')uses  left  standing;  the  stones  thrown  out  hurt  forty 
of  the  besiegers  in  the  trenches,  and  the  surviving 
garrison,  aghast  at  the  horrid  commotion,  disregarded 
all  exhorla'ions  to  rally.  Fearing  that  the  enemy 
would  take  the  opportunity  to  storm  the  ramparts,  the 
governor  beat  to  arms,  and,  running  to  the  walls,  with 
the  help  of  an  artillery  oflicer,  fired  off  the  few  guns 
that  remajned  ;  but  the  French  shells  fell  thickly  all  the 
night,  and  in  the  morning  of  the  27lh,  two  officers  ap- 
peared at  the  gates,  with  a  letter  from  Massena,  offer- 
ing terms. 

•  Colonel  Cox't  Narrative 


Cox,  sensible  that  further  resistance  was  impossi- 
ble, still  hoped  that  the  army  would  make  a  move- 
ment to  relieve  him,  if  he  could  impose  upon  the  ene- 
my for  two  or  three  days;  and  he  was  in  act  of  refu- 
sing the  prince  of  Esling's  offer,  when  a  mutiny,  headed 
openly  by  the  lieutenant-governor,  one  Bernardo  Costa, 
and  secretly  by  Jose  Bareiros,  the  chief  of  artillery, 
who  had  been  for  seme  time  in  secret  correspondence 
with  the  French,  oiiliged  him  to  yield.  'J'he  remain- 
der of  the  native  officers  disturbed  by  fear,  or  swayed 
by  the  influence  of  those  two,  were  more  willing  to 
follow  than  to  oppose  their  dishonourable  proceedings, 
and  Costa  expressed  his  resolution  to  hoist  the  white 
flag.  The  governor  seeing  no  remedy  by  force,  en- 
deavoured to  procrastinate,  and,  being  ignorant  of 
Bareiros'  treason,  seni  him  to  the  enemy  with  counter 
propositions,  Bareiros  immediately  infcrmed  Alassena 
of  the  true  state  of  garrison,  and  never  returned  ;  and 
the  final  result  was  a  surrender  upon  agreement  that 
the  militia  should  retire  to  their  homes,  and  the  regu- 
lars remain  prisoners  of  war. 

While  the  treaty  was  pending  and  even  after  the 
signature  of  the  articles,  in  the  night  of  the  27th,  the 
French  bombarded  the  place.  This  act,  unjustifiable, 
and  strange  because  Massena's  aide-de-camp,  colonel 
Pelet,  was  actually  within  the  walls  when  the  firing 
commenced,  was  excused,  on  the  ground  of  an  error 
in  the  transmission  of  orders  ;  it,  however,  lasted  during 
the  whole  night,  and  Cox  also  asserts  that  the  terms 
of  the  capitulation  with  respect  to  the  militia  were 
violated.*  Pelet  indignantly  denies  this,  affirming  that 
when  the  garrison  still  amounting  to  three  thousand  men 
perceived  the  Marquis  d'Alorna  amongst  the  French 
generals,  the  greatest  part  immediately  demanded  ser- 
vice, and  formed  a  brigade  under  general  Pamplona, ]■ 
and  the  truth  of  this  account  is  confirmed  by  two  facts, 
namely,  that  the  arganil  militia  were  sent  in  by  Massena 
the  next  day,  and  the  21th  Portuguese  regiment  did 
certainly  take  service  with  the  enemy  in  a  body.:}:  Yet, 
so  easily  are  men's  minds  moved  by  present  circum- 
stances, that  the  greater  number  deserted  again,  when 
they  afterwards  saw  the  allied  armies. 

Bareiros,  having  joined  the  enemy,  escaped  punish- 
ment, but  De  Costa,  being  tried,  was  afterwards  shot 
as  a  traitor,  by  the  orders  of  marshal  Beresford.  His 
cowardice  and  mutiny  merited  this  chastisement,  yet 
the  evidence  on  which  he  was  condemned  was  an  ex- 
planatory letter,  written  to  lord  Liverpool  by  Cox,  while 
a  prisoner  at  Verdun. 

The  explosion,  the  disappearance  of  the  steeple,  and 
cessation  of  fire,  proclaimed  the  misfortune  of  Almeida 
in  the  allied  camp,  but  the  surrender  was  first  ascer- 
tained by  lord  Wellington  on  the  2nth,  when,  with  a 
telescope,  he  observed  many  French  officers  on  the 
glacis  of  the  place.  The  army  then  withdrew  to  its 
former  position  behind  the  Monde<ro  ;  and  while  these 
things  were  passing  on  the  Coa,  the  powder  magazine 
in  Albuquerque,  being  struck  with  lightning,  also  ex- 
ploded and  killed  four  hundred  men.  Reynier,  after 
several  demonstrations  towards  Castello  Branco,  in 
one  of  which  he  lost  a  squadron  of  horse,  now  sudden- 
ly reached  Sabugal  the  1st  of  September;  and  as  the 
British  piquets  on  the  Pinhel  were  attacked  the  fol- 
lowing day  by  the  horsemen  of  the  sixtli  corps,  the 
enemy's  plans  seemed  to  be  ripe  for  execution.  Lord 
Wellington  therefore  transferred  his  quarters  to  Govea, 
withdrew  his  infantry  behind  (^elerico,  and  fixed  his 
cavalry  at  that  place  with  ])osts  of  observation  at 
Guarda  and  at  Trancoso.  Reynier,  however,  suddenly 
returned  to  Zarza  Mayor,  and,  throwing  a  bridge  over 
the  Tagus  at  Alcantara,  again  involved  the  Frenc 
projects  in  obscurity. 

•   Justification  of  Colonel  \V.  Cox. 

+   Note  byGrn.  Pelet.     Victniris  et  Conqiietes  dcs  Francais 

t  Mr.  Stuart's  Correspondt.ice.     MSS, 


1810.J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


299' 


Massena  experienced  considerable  difficulty  in  feed- 
mg  his  forces,  and  he  seemed  at  first,  either  disinclined 
to  commence  the  invasion  or  undecided  as  to  the  mode. 
'I'wo  niontlis  had  elapsed  since  the  surrender  of  Ciudad 
RodrifTo,  Almeida  had  only  resisted  for  ten  days,  the 
Frencii  aimy  was  still  behind  the  Coa.  and  it  would 
seem,  by  a  second  intercepted  letter,  dictated  by  Na- 
poleon, in  September,  that  he  expected  further  inaction  • 
"Lord  Wellinoton."  he  observed  to  Massena,  "has 
only  ei<Thteen  thousand  men,  Hill  has  only  six  thou- 
sand ;  and  it  would  be  ridiculous  to  suppose  that  twen- 
ty-five thousand  English  can  balance  sixty  thousand 
French,  if  the  latter  do  not  trifle,  but  fall  boldly 
on  after  hnvinor  tvell  observed  where  the  blow  may  be 
given.  You  have  twelve  thousand  cavalry,  and  four 
times  as  much  artillery  as  is  necessary  for  Portuo^al. 
Iieave  six  thousand  cavalry  and  a  proportion  of  o-uns 
between  Ciudad  Rodri^o,  Alcantara,  and  Salamanca, 
and  with  the  rest  commence  operations.  The  emperor 
is  loo  distant,  and  the  positions  of  the  enemy  change 
too  often,  to  direct  how  you  should  attack;  but  it 
is  certain  that  the  utmost  force  the  I*]nglish  can 
muster,  including  the  troops  at  Cadiz,  v.-ill  be  twen- 
ty-eight thousand  men."  This  letter  was  accurate  as 
to  the  numbers  of  the  English  army,  hut  Napoleon 
was  ignorant  how  strongly  lord  Wellington  was  thrust- 
ing Portugal  forward  in  the  press. 

Massena  had  commenced  the  invasion  before  these 
instructions  reached  him;  and  to  understand  his  ope- 
rations it  is  essential  to  have  a  clear  idea  of  the  coun- 
try in  which  they  were  conducted.  The  advanced  po- 
sitions of  the  allies  extended  from  Almeida  over  the 
Sierra  de  Estrella,  by  Guarda  to  Fundao,  Sarzedas, 
and  Castelio  Branco  ;  no  enemy  could  penetrate  that  line 
unless  by  force,  and  a  serious  attack  on  any  one  point 
was  to  be  the  signal  for  a  gradual  retreat  of  the  whole, 
in  coricontric  directions  towards  the  Lines.  But,  if 
(.Jijarda  were  evacuated,  the  enemy  while  menacing 
Celerico,  could  move  either  by  Belmonte  or  Covilhao 
and  separate  general  Htll  from  lord  Wellington,  the 
distance  between  those  generals  being  twice  as  great 
as  the  f  nemy's  perpendicular  line  of  march  would  be. 
']'o  balance  this  disadvantage,  the  road  from  Covilhao 
was  broken  up,  a  Portuguese  brigade  was  placed  in 
Fundao,  and  general  Leith's  corps  was  stationed  at 
Thomar,  between  two  entrenched  positions,  which 
formed  the  second  temporary  line  of  resistance.  'J'he 
first  of  those  positions  was  behind  the  Zezere,  extend- 
ing from  the  Barca  deCodies  to  the  confluence  of  that 
river  with  the  Tagus.  The  second  behind  the  Alva,  a 
fetrong  and  swift  stream  descending  from  the  Estrella 
and  falling  into  the  Mondfgo  some  miles  above  Coim- 
bra.  Both  were  strong,  the  rivers  depp  and  difficult 
of  access,  and  the  Sierra  de  Murcella  closely  hugs  the 
left  bank  of  the  Alva. 

During  the  spring  and  summer  the  Portuguese  mi- 
litia, now  forming  the  second  line  on  the  Z'?zere  under 
Leith,  had  been  kept  in  winter  quarters,  although  with 
danger  to  the  defence  of  the  country  ;  but  the  destitute 
BtatP,  with  respect  to  money,  in  which  the  English 
ministers  kept  lord  Wellington,  prevented  him  from 
being  able  to  bring  these  troops  into  the  field  until  the 
last  moment. 

Hill's  line  of  retreat  from  Sarzedas  to  the  Zezere, 
has  bepu  already  noticed,  and  from  that  river  to  the 
Alva,  there  was  a  military  road  constructed  through 
the  mountains  to  Espinhal.  But  the  country  from 
Celerico  to  the  Murcella.  a  distance  of  about  sixty 
miles,  is  one  long  di^file,  lying  between  the  Sierra  Es- 
treJIa  and  the  Mondego;  and  the  ridge  upon  which  (ce- 
lerico stands,  btnng  a  shoot  from  the  Estrella,  and  en- 
circled hy  a  sweep  of  the  Mondego,  closes  this  defile 
in  fr(jnt.  In  like  manner  the  Sierra  Murcella.  cov(?red 
by  the  Alva  river,  closes  it  in  the  rear,  and  the  inter- 
mediate parts  are  but  a  succession  of  smaller  streams 


and  lower  ridges.  The  principal  road  was  repaired 
and  joined  to  the  road  of  Espinhal,  and  a  branch  was 
also  carried  across  the  Mondego  to  (yoimbra.  Thus 
an  internal  communication  was  established  for  the 
junction  of  all  the  corps.  Nevertheless,  between  Ce- 
lerico and  the  Alva,  the  country  was  not  permanently 
tenable;  because,  from  Guarda  and  Covilhao,  there 
were  roads  over  the  Estrella  to  Gouvea,  Cea,  and  Gal- 
lices.  towns  in  rear  of  Celerico;  and  the  enemy  could 
also  turn  the  whole  tract  by  moving  through  Trancoso 
and  Viseu,  and  so  down  the  right  bank  of  the  Mondeo-o 
to  Coimbra. 

Lord  Wellington  keeping  the  head  of  his  army  one 
march  behind  Celerico,  in  observation  of  the  routes 
over  the  Estrella,  and  his  rear  close  to  the  Alva,  was 
master  of  this  line  of  retreat;  and  as  the  Mondego 
was  fordable  '":  summer  and  bridged  at  several  points, 
he  could  pass  it  by  a  flank  movement  in  a  few  hours. 
Now  the  right  bank  was  also  one  great  defile,  lying 
between  the  river  and  the  Sierra  de  Alcoba  or  t-aramii- 
la.  This  mountain  stretching  with  some  breaks  from 
the  Douro  to  Coimbra,  separates  the  valley  of  the 
Mondego  from  the  coast  line  ;  and  in  approaching  Coim- 
bra it  sends  out  a  lofty  transverse  shoot,  called  the 
Sierra  de  Bnsaco.  exactly  in  a  line  wiih  the  Sierra  de 
Murcella,  and  barring  the  way  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Mondego  in  the  same  maimer  that  the  latter  Sierra  bars 
it  on  the  left  bank.  Moreover  this  route  to  Coimbra 
was  the  worst  in  Portugal,  and  crossed  by  several 
deep  tributaries  of  the  Mondego,  the  most  considera- 
ble of  which  were  the  Criz  and  Dao.  7^he  Vouga, 
however,  opened  a  passage  through  the  Alcoba  near 
Viseu,  and  that  way  the  F'rench  could  gain  the  great 
road  from  Oporto,  and  so  continue  their  movement  upon 
Coimbra. 

Such  being  the  ground  on  both  sides  of  the  Monde- 
go, the  weakest  point  was  obviously  towards  the  Es- 
trella, and  lord  Wellington  kept  the  mass  of  his  forces 
there.  Massena  was  ill-acquainted  with  the  military 
features,  and  absolutely  ignorant  of  the  lines  of 'I'orres 
Vedras  ;  indeed,  so  secretly  and  circumspectly  had 
those  works  been  carried  on,  that  only  vague  ru 
mours  of  their  existence  reached  the  bulk  of  the  Eng- 
lish army.  Nay,  the  Portuguese  government  and  the 
British  gnvoy,  although  aware  defensive  works  were 
constructing,  knew  not  their  nature,  and  imagined, 
until  the  last  moment,  that  the  entrenchments  immedi- 
ately round  Lisbon  were  the  lines  !  Many  British  offi- 
cers laughed  at  the  notion  of  remaining  in  Portucral, 
and  the  major  part  supposed  the  campaign  on  the  fron- 
tier to  be  only  a  decent  cloak  to  cover  the  shame  of  an 
embarkation.  In  England  the  opposition  asserted  that 
lord  Wellington  would  einbark  ;  the  Portuguese  dread- 
ed it;  the  French  army  universally  believed  it;  and 
the  British  ministers  seem  to  have  entertained  the  same 
opinion,  for  at  this  time  an  officer  of  engineers  arrived 
at  Lisbon,  whose  instructions,  received  personally  from 
lord  Liverpool,  were  unknown  to  lord  Wellington,  and 
commenced  thus  : — "  Js  it  is  probable  that  the  army 
will  embark  in  September." 


CHAPTER  VI. 

Third  Invasion  of  Portugal — Napoleon's  prudence  in  n)ili)arj 
affairs  vindicated — Massena  conrentrates  his  cor(i3 — Orrupics 
Ouarila — Passes  the  Mondeg'o — Marches  on  Viseu — F.ord 
Wellins^ton  fails  back — Secures  Coimbra,  parses  to  the  right 
bank  of  the  Moudeiro,  and  is  joined  by  the  resfrve  from 
Tiiouiar — General  Hill  anticipates  his  orders,  and  by  a  forced 
march  reaches  the  Alva — The  allied  army  is  thus  interposed 
between  the  French  and  Coiuibra — Dariiig  action  of  colonel 
Tr.int — Contemporaneous  events  in  Kslrt-madnra,  and  the 
Condado  de  Niebla — Roniana  defeated — Gallantry  of  the 
Portuguese  cavalry  under  general  Maddeu — Dangerous  crisis 


rfOO 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  Xr. 


ofaffair; — Violenceofthe  Souza  faction — An  in  liscrett  letter 
from  an  f'ligl.sh  Oiriccr,  CTfatfcs  great  coiirusioii  at  Oportu — 
Lord  VVelliiijcton  rebukes  ttie  I'ortuguese  Re.g;etu\v  —  He  is 
forced  to  .litrr  his  |ihns,and  resolves  to  olier  buttle — Chooses 
the  position  of  Busaco. 

THIRD    INVASION    OF    PORTUGAL. 

Massena's  command  extended  from  the  banks  of 
the  Tagus  to  the  Day  of  Biscay,  from  Almeida  to 
Burgos;  and  the  number  of  liis  troops  present  undei 
arms  exceeiied  one  hundred  and  ten  thousand  men. 
From  these  liovvever  must  be  deducted  thirteen  thou- 
sand in  tl'.e  Asturias  and  province  of  Sanlander,  four 
llicusaiul  in  tiie  government  of  Valladolid,  eight  thou- 
sand under  Serras  at  Zamora  and  Benevente,  and  last- 
ly, the  reserve  of  Bayonne  under  general  Drouet, 
nineteen  thousand  strong,  which,  organized  as  a  ninth 
corps  entered  Spain  in  August,  anu  was  re|)laced  at 
Bayonne  by  a  fresh  reserve  under  general  (Jaffarelli. 
'rh'is.  the  active  army  of  inva^,ion  did  not  much  ex- 
ceed seventy  thousand ;  and  as  every  man,  combatant 
or  non-combatant,  is  borne  on  the  strength  of  a  French 
army,  not  more  than  fifty-five  thousand  infantry  and 
about  eight  thousand  horsemen  were  with  the  eagles. 
The  ninth  corps  had,  however,  orders  to  follow  the 
traces  of  the  ])rince  of  Esling,  and  the  void  thus  left 
at  Burgos  and  Valladolid  was  supplied  by  sixteen 
thousand  of  the  3'oung  oruard. 

This  arrangement  shows  how  absurdly  Napoleon 
lias  been  called  a  rash  warrior,  and  one  never  thinking 
of  retreat.  No  man  ever  made  bolder  marches,  but  no 
man  ever  secured  his  base  with  more  care.  Here,  he 
would  not  suffer  any  advance  to  fresh  conquests  until 
his  line  of  coiomunication  had  been  strengthened  with 
three  additional  fortresses, — namely,  Astorga,  Ciudad, 
and  Almeida;  and  while  he  employed  sixty-five  thou- 
sand men  in  the  invasion  of  Portugal,  he  kept  more 
than  eighty  thousand  in  reserve.  'I'hus,  even  the  total 
loss  of  the  army  destined  to  make  what  is  technically 
termed  "a  point''  upon  Lisbon,  would,  as  a  loere  mili- 
tary disaster,  have  scarcely  shaken  his  hold   of  Spain. 

Massena's  instructions  were  to  convert  (Jiudad  Hod- 
rigo  and  Almeida  into  places  of  arms  for  the  conquest 
of  Portuoral,  and  to  move  on  both  sides  of  the  I'agus 
against  Lisbon  in  the  beginning  of  September.  But 
either  thinkintj  his  force  too  weak  to  act  upon  two  lines 
at  the  same  time,  or  trusting  to  the  co-operation  of 
Souk's  army  from  Andalusia,  he  relinquished  the 
Alemtejo,  looking  only  to  the  northern  bank  of  the  Ta- 
gus;  and  hence,  as  the  experience  of  Junot's  march 
ill  1807,  warned  hiin  off  the  Sobreira  mountains,  his 
views  were  confined  to  the  three  roads  of  Belmonte, 
C.elerico,   and   Viseu. 

The  strength  of  the  positions  about  the  Alva  was 
known  to  him,  as  were  also  the  measures  taken  to  im- 
pede a  descent  from  (.'ovilhao  to  Espinhal ;  but  Alor- 
na,  PaiTiplona,  and  the  otiier  Portuguese  in  the  French 
camp,  with  a  singular  ignorance,  asserted  that  the  road 
by  Viseu  and  Coiinbra  was  easy,  and  that  no  impor- 
tant position  covered  the  latter  town.*  The  French 
general  thus  deceived  resolved  suddenly  to  assemble 
all  his  forces,  distribute  thirteen  days'  bread  to  the  sol- 
diers, and  pour  in  one  solid  mass  down  the  right  hank 
of  the  Mondego,  not  doublinir  to  reach  Coiinbra  before 
general  iiiU  could  join  lord  Wellington. 

In  pursuance  of  this  project  the  three  corps  Avere 
directed  to  concentrate  on  the  HJtb  of  September ; 
Heynier's  at  CJuarda,  Ney's,  and  the  heavy  cavalry,  at 
Macal  da  Chao,  and  Junot's  at  Pinliel,  By  this  dis- 
position all  three  roads  were  alike  menaced,  and  the 
allies  being  kept  in  suspense  as  to  the  ultimate  object, 
Massena  hoped  to  gain  one  march  ;  a  great  thing,  see- 
ing tkat  from  Coiinbra  he  was  not  more  than  a  hundred 
miles,    whereas   Hill's    distance   from  that  town  was 


»  Note  by  (M-ne,--!    Vtlet.     Vide  V'ictoiren  et  ConquptLs  dtg 
Fnuicais,  vo\.  xi. 


lonirer.  To  cover  the  real  object,  with  more  care,  and  to 
keep  Hill  as  long  as  possible  at  Sarzedas,  the  F'rench 
general  caused  Guarda  to  be  seized  on  the  12tb,  by  a 
detachment,  which  witlidrew  again  immediately,  as  if 
it  were  only  a  continuation  of  the  former  feints;  and 
meanwhile  Reynier,  having  first  ascertained  that  Mor- 
tier  was  at  Monasterio,  threatening  Estremadura,  sud- 
denly destroyed  the  boat-bridge  at  Alcantara,  and 
marched  towards  Sabugal. 

On  the  13th  the  allies  re-established  their  post  ? 
Gunrda;  on  the  iSth,  it  was  ag  in  driven  away  iy  a 
considerable  mass  of  the  enemy,  and  retired  up  the 
side  of  the  Estrella;  at  the  same  lime  the  cavalry  in 
front  of  Celerico  was  forced  back  in  the  centre,  and  the 
post  at  Trancoso  chased  towards  Mongualde  on  the 
left.  Lord  Wellington  then  felt  assured  that  the  inva- 
sion was  at  last  in  seri'uis  progress  ;  and  having  as- 
certained, beyond  a  doubt,  that  the  troops  in  Guarda 
were  of  Reynier's  corps,  despatched  his  final  orders  foi 
Hill  and  i>eith  to  concentrate  on  the  Alva. 

On  the  IGth,  Reynier  descended  from  Guarda  to  tha 
plains  bordering  the  Mondego,  and  being  there  joined 
by  the  sixth  corps  and  Monthrun's  horsemen,  the  whole 
passed  the  river,  and,  pushing  through  Celerico,  drove 
back  the  cavalry  posts  of  the  allies  to  the  village  of 
Cortipo  ;  but  there  the  first  German  hussars  turning, 
overthrew  the  leading  squadrons,  and  made  some  pris- 
oners. Near  Cortieo,  the  road  branched  ofT  to  the 
bridge  of  Fornos  and  to  Gouvea,  and  a  French  bri<rade 
took  the  latter  to  cover  the  march  of  the  main  body 
which  made  for  F'ornos.  This  feint  was  however 
closely  watched,  for  there  is  a  custoin.  peculiar  to  the 
British  army,  of  sending  mounted  officers,  singly  to 
observe  the  enemy's  motions;  and  such  is  their  habit, 
they  will  penetrate  through  the  midst  of  his  canton- 
ments, cross  the  line  of  his  movement,  and  hover,  just 
out  of  musket-shot,  for  whole  days,  on  the  skirts  of 
his  columns,  until  they  obtain  a  clear  notion  of  the 
numbers  and  the  true  direction  of  his  march.  Colonel 
Waters,  one  of  these  exploring  officers,  being  close  on 
the  left  of  Reynier's  troops  during  this  day,  reported 
their  movements,  and  in  the  evening,  leading  sonip  of 
the  German  cavalry  behind  the  enemy,  took  several 
prisoners  and  the  baggage  of  a  general. 

As  the  French  movements  were  now  decided,  lord 
Wellington  directed  the  first,  third,  and  fourth  divisions 
upon  the  Alva  ;  withdrew  his  heavy  cavalry  from  the 
front:  and  placed  the  light  division  at  St.  Romao,  in 
the  Estrella,  to  cover  the  head-quarters,  which  were 
transferred,  that  night,  to  Cea. 

The  17th,  the  whole  of  the  second  and  sixth  corps 
were  observed  to  pass  the  bridge  of  Fornos,  and  the 
advanced  guard  approached  Mongualde.  Buttlie  eighth 
corps  still  kept  the  road  leading  towards  Oporto,  for 
ten  thousand  militia  of  the  northern  provinces,  forming 
the  bricrades  of  Trant,  T.  Wilson,  and  Miller,  had  been 
collected  upon  the  Douro  to  harass  the  enemy's  right 
flank  and  rear;  and  Trant,  with  about  three  thousand, 
was  already  at  Moimenta  de  Beira,  in  the  defiles  lead- 
ing through  the  hills  to  I,amego,  The  country  be- 
tween the  (Joa  and  Coimbra,  on  both  sides  of  the 
Mondego,  had  b  en  before  laid  waste,  the  mil's  were 
destroyed,  the  ordrnaiK^a  were  in  arms,  and  the  help, 
less  population  hidden  amongst  the  highest  mountains. 

On  the  ISth,  the  French  advanced  guard  reached 
the  deserted  city  of  Viseu.  Pack's  Portuguese  brig- 
ade immediately  [lassed  the  Mondego  at  Fosdao,  and 
took  post  beyond  the  Criz  ;  and  general  Pakeiiham, 
with  a  brigade  of  the  first  division,  entered  Coimbra, 
to  protect  it  from  the  enemy's  scouting  parties.  On 
the  19th,  captain  Somers  Cocks,  a  very  gallant  and 
zealous  officer,  commanding  the  cavalry  post  which 
had  been  driven  from  Guarda,  came  down  from  the  Es- 
trella, and  followinsi  the  enemy  through  Celerico.  as- 
ceriained   that   neither  sick  men  nor  stores  were  left 


1810.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


301 


oehind  :  hence  it  was  evident  that  Massena,  relinqnish- 
injr  his  communications,  had  thrown  his  cavalry,  in- 
fantry, artillery,  pares,  baggage  and  hospital  waggons, 
in  one  mass,  upon  the  worst  road  in  Portugal. 

'I'he  allies  were  now  in  motion  to  cross  the  Monde- 
go,  when  a  false  report,  that  the  enemy  was  again  on 
the  left  bank,  arrested  the  general  movement.  The 
n^xt  day,  the  truth  being  known,  the  third,  fourth  and 
light  divisions,  and  the  British  cavalry  passed  the  river 
at  Pena  Cava,  Olivarez,  and  other  places;  the  light 
division  moved  to  Mortagao  in  support  of  Pack;  the 
third  and  fourth  entered  the  villages  between  the  Sierra 
de  Busaco  and  Mortagao,  and  the  horsemen  occupied 
a  plain  between  the  light  division  and  Pack's  brigade. 
But  the  eighth  corps  pointed  towards  the  valley  ot'  the 
Vouga,  and  it  was  still  doubtful  whether  Massena 
W)i:hl  not  that  way  gain  the  main  road  from  Oporto  to 
C'nimbra;  general  Spencer,  with  the  first  division, 
therefore,  marched  upon  Milheada,  and  Trant  was  di- 
rected to  join  him  by  a  march  through  San  Pedro  de 
Sul  to  Sardao.  Meanwhile  Leith  arrived  on  the  Alva, 
and  general  Hill  was  only  one  march  behind  ;  for  hav- 
ing discovered  Reynier's  movements  on  the  12th,  and 
at  the  same  time,  getting  intelligence  that  all  the 
French  boats  on  the  Tagus  had  been  destroyed  ;  he 
with  a  ready  decision,  anticipating  lord  Wellington's 
orders,  directed  his  artillery  by  Thomar,  and  putting 
his  troops  in  motion  that  evening,  reached  Espisnal 
on  the  20th.  There  he  was  joined  by  general  Lecor, 
who,  wiih  equal  vigour  and  judgement,  had  brought 
the  Portuguese  brigade,  by  long  marches,  from  Fundao. 
On  the  21st,  Hill  arrived  on  the  Alva,  and  pushed  his 
cavalry  in  observation  beyond  that  river.  Thus  the 
two  corps  of  the  allied  army  were  united  on  the  same 
(lay  that  the  main  body  of  the  enemy  entered  Viseu  ; 
and  although  the  French  horsemen  were  on  the  Criz, 
the  bridges  had  been  destroyed  by  Pack  ;  and  the 
project  of  surprising  Coinibra  was  baffled. 

Neither  had  Massena  failed  to  experience  other  evil 
cons«quences  from  his  false  movement.  He  had  been 
obliged  to  repair  the  road  from  day  to  day  for  his  ar- 
tillery, and  it  was  still  twenty  miles  from  Viseu  on  the 
19th.  Trant,  aware  of  this,  formed  the  hardy  project 
of  destroying  it.  Quitting  Mnimenta  de  Beira  in  the 
nirrht,  with  a  squadron  of  cavalry,  two  thousand  mi- 
litia, and  five  guns,  on  the  20th,  he  surprised  a  patrole 
of  ten  men,  from  whom  he  learnt  that  the  convoy  was 
at  hand,  and  that  Montbrun's  cavalry  was  close  in  the 
rear.  Nevertheless,  as  the  defiles  were  narrow,  he 
charged  the  head  of  the  escort,  and  took  a  hundred 
prisoners  and  some  baggage.  The  convoy  then  fell 
back,  and  Trant  followed,  the  ways  being  so  narrow 
that  Montbrun  cruld  never  come  up  to  the  front.  At 
this  time  a  resolute  attack  would  have  thrown  the 
French  into  utter  confusion,  but  the  militia  were  un- 
manageable ;  and  the  enemy,  having  at  last  rallied  a 
few  men,  and  repulsed  the  Portuguese  cavalry,  with 
a  loss  of  twelve  troopers,  the  whole  got  into  disorder, 
wherefore  Trant,  seeing  nothinnr  more  was  to  be  effer  U 
ed,  returned  to  Moimenta  de  Beira,  and  from  the  .ce 
marched  to  Lamego  with  his  prisoners.  The  French, 
ignorant  of  the  number  and  quality  of  their  assailants, 
still  fell  back,  and  did  not  finally  reach  Viseu  until  the 
23d,  by  which,  Massena  lost  two  most  important  days, 

W  bile  these  events  were  passing  in  the  valley  of 
M  Jndego,  a  small  expedition  from  Cadiz  again  landed 
at  Moguer,  to  aid  Copons  in  collecting  provisions  on 
the  Tinto.  It  was,  however,  quickly  obliged  to  reim- 
bark,  and  Copons  was  defeated  by  general  Romond, 
with  the  loss  of  three  hundred  men  on  the  15lh, 
Meanwhile,  Romana  attacked  the  French  posts  near 
Monasterio,  pushing  his  cavalry  towards  iSevillc,  where- 
upon Soult  sent  the  fifth  corps  against  him,  and  he  re- 
tired, but  was  beaten  at  Fnente  de  Canto  on  the  same 
day  tiiat  Copons  had  been  defeated  on  the  Tinto,    The 


pursuit  was  continued  to  Fiiente  :  e  laestre ;  and  the 
whole  army  was  like  to  disperse  in  iVight,  when  Mad- 
den's  Portuguese  cavalry  came  up,  and  charging  the 
pursuers  with  signal  gallantry,  overthrew,  the  leading 
squadrons,  recovered  some  prisoners,  and  gained  time 
for  the  Spaniaids  to  rally.  Nevertheless,  the  French 
entered  Zafra,  and  Romana  retreated,  by  Almendralejo 
and  Merida,  to  Montijo,  on  the  18th,  throwing  a  garri- 
son into  Olivenza,  and  three  battalions  into  Badajos. 
Being,  however,  sensible  tliat  the  latter  place  was  in 
no  condition  to  resist  a  serious  attack,  he  directed 
the  Junta  to  repair  to  Valencia  d'Alcantara,  and  took 
refuge  himself  at  Elvas, 

Lord  Wellington's  anticipations  were  thus  realized 
and  the  Alemtejo  laid  open.  Fortunately  for  the  allies, 
Sebastian!  was  at  this  moment  near  Carthagena  in  pur- 
suit of  the  Murcian  army  ;  a  fresh  insurrection  had 
broken  out  in  the  mountains  of  Grenada,  and  the  cas- 
tles of  Molril  and  Aliuunecar  were  taken.  Copf)ns 
also  advanced  to  the  Tinto,  and  all  these  calls  upon 
Soult  taking  place  at  one  time,  he  was  unable  to  bring 
quite  twelve  thousand  men  to  Zafra,  a  number  inade- 
quate to  the  invasion  of  the  Alerntejo ;  because  seve- 
ral British  regiments  withdrawn  from  Cadiz,  and 
others  cominir  from  England,  had  reached  Lisbon 
about  this  period,  and  formed  a  reserve  for  the  allies, 
of  more  than  five  thousand  good  troops.  Wherefore 
the  French  returned  to  Ronquillo,  the  Spaniards  again 
advanced  to  Xeres  de  los  (/avalieros,  and  Araceiia,  and 
this  dangerous  crisis  glided  gently  away.  To  under- 
stand its  importance,  it  is  necessary  to  shew  how  in- 
creasing political  embarrassments  had  thwarted  the 
original  plan  of  the   English  general. 

The  first  vexatious  interference  of  the  Souza  faction 
had  been  checked,  but  the  loss  of  Almeida  furnished 
a  favourable  opportunity  to  renew  their  clamorous  hos- 
tility to  the  military  proceedings.  Falsely  asserting, 
that  the  provisions  of  that  fortress  had  been  carried 
away  by  the  English  commissaries,  and  as  falsely 
pretending  that  lord  Wellington  had  promised  to  raise 
the  siege,  this  party  hypocritically  assumed,  that  his 
expressions  of  sorrow  for  its  fiiU  were  indications  of 
an  intention  to  remove  by  a  splendid  victory  the  public 
despondency.  They  vehemently  insisted,  also,  on  a 
defence  of  the  frontier,  inveighed  against  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  mills,  endeavoured  to  force  their  own  friends 
of  the  fidalgo  faction  on  to  the  staff  of  marshal  Beres- 
ford,  that  they  might  the  more  readily  embarrass  the 
operations  ;*  and  even  proposed  to  have  the  Heet  and 
transports  sent  away  from  the  Tagus!  Meanwhile, 
neglecting  or  delaying  the  measures  agreed  upon  for 
laying  waste  the  country,  they  protected  the  minor 
authorities  when  disobedient,  refrained  from  punishing 
delinquents,  and  took  every  occasion  to  mislead  the 
public  mind  at  the  very  moment  when  the  enemy  com- 
menced the  invasion.  Nor  was  there  wanting  either  ac- 
cident or  indiscretion  to  increase  the  growing  confusion. 
When  Almeida  fell,  an  officer  of  the  guards  writing  to 
a  friend  at  Oporto,  indiscreetly  asserted,  that  Massena 
was  advancing  in  front  with  a  hundred  thousand 
French  ;  and  that  eighty  thouand  more  were  moving 
in  rear  of  the  allies  upon  Lisbon.  This  letter  being 
made  public,  created  such  a  panic  amongst  the  English 
merchants,  that  one  and  all  they  applied  for  ships  to 
carry  their  families  and  property  away,  and  there  arose 
such  a  tumult  that  Trant  was  obliged  to  quit  his  com- 
mand for  the  purpose  of  suppressing  the  commotion. 
To  dry  this  source  of  mischief,  lord  Wellington  issued 
proclamations ;  and  i"  *he  orders  of  the  day,  declared 
that  he  would  not  secK  vo  ascertain  the  author  ol  this 
and  similar  letters,  being  assured  that  the  feelincrs  and 
sense  of  the  officers  would  prevent  any  repetition  of 
such  hurtful  conduct. 

•  Mr.  Stuart's  Tapers.     MSS, 


302 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[IJOOK  XI 


To  the  recrnncy  he  addressed  himself  in  a  more  pe- 
remptory and  severe  manner;  he  reproved  them  for 
the  false  colourincr  given  to  his  communications  ;  and 
informed  them  that  he  would  never  '•'■permit  public 
clamour  and  panic  to  induce  him  to  change,  in  the  small- 
est degree,  a  system  and  plan  of  operation  ivhich  he  had 
adopted  after  mature  consideration,  and  which  daily  ex- 
perience proved  to  be  the  only  oi\e  likely  to  produce  a  good 
end.^^  This  remonstrance  only  increased  the  virulence 
of  his  opponents;  and  such  was  their  conduct,  that, 
before  lord  Wp!lin<rton  reached  Busaco,  he  was  obliged 
to  tell  them  ^^  their  miserah'e  intrigues  must  cease  or  he 
would  advise  his  own  government  to  withdraw  the  Brit- 
ish armyJ*^ 

Meanwhile  their  proceedings  had  been  so  mis- 
chievously successful,  that  the  country  between  the 
Mondego,  the  Tagus,  and  the  Lines,  still  contained 
provisions  sufficient  for  the  French  during  the  ensuing 
winter  ;  and  the  people  were  alike  unprepared  to  ex- 
pect an  enemy  or  to  attempt  a  removal  of  their  prop- 
erty. 

Lord  Wellington  could  but  choose  then,  between 
stopping  the  invaders  on  the  Mondego,  or  wasting  the 
country  by  force  as  he  retreated.  But  what  an  act  the 
last !  His  hopes  depended  upon  the  degree  of  moral 
strength  he  was  enabled  to  call  forth  ;  and  he  would 
have  had  to  retire  with  a  mixed  force  before  a  power- 
ful army  and  an  eminent  commander,  his  rear  guard 
engaged,  and  his  advance  driving  inirierable  multitudes 
before  it  to  the  capital,  where  nothing  was  prepared  to 
save  them  from  famine ;  but  where  the  violent  and 
powerful  faction  in  the  regency  was  ready  to  misrep- 
resent every  proceeding,  and  inflame  the  people's 
minds:  and  this,  when  the  court  of  Rio  Janeiro  was 
discontented,  and  the  English  ministers,  as  I  shall 
have  occasion  to  shew,  panic-stricken  by  the  despond- 
ing letters  of  some  general  officers  about  the  comman- 
der in  chief !  It  was  evidently  necessary  to  fight, 
althou2-h  Massenahad  seventy  thousand  veterans,  and 
lord  Wellington  could  only  bring  about  fifty  thousand 
men  into  line,  more  than  half  of  which  were  untried 
soldiers. 

The  consequences  of  such  a  battle  were  not  how- 
ever to  be  estimated  by  the  result  on  the  field.  The 
French  general  might  indeed  gain  every  thing  by  a 
victory  ;  but  if  defeated,  his  powerful  cavalry  and  the 
superior  composition  and  experience  of  his  army  would 
prevent  it  from  being  very  injurious;  or  a  serious 
check  might  induce  him  to  turn  his  attention  from 
Coimbra  towards  Oporto,  contenting  himself  with  the 
capture  of  that  city,  and  the  reduction  of  the  northern 
provinces,  until  more  formidable  preparations  should 
enable  him  to  renew  his  first  design.  Nor  could  the 
time  thus  gained  by  the  allies  be  as  profitably  employ- 
ed in  the  defence.  The  French  could  be  reinforced  to 
any  amount,  whereas  the  English  general's  resources 
could  not  be  much  improved  ;  and  it  was  very  doubt- 
ful if  either  England  or  I^ortiigal  would  longer  endure 
the  war,  without  some  palpable  advantage  to  balance 
the  mi-icry  and  the  expense. 

Such  was  the  state  of  affairs,  when  the  allies  passed 
lo  the  right,  bank  of  the  Mondego  with  a  view  to  fitrht 
the  battle  thus  forced  upon  their  general.  While  the 
French  remained  concentrated  at  V'iseu,  the  first  divis- 
ion, under  Spenf-er,  was  held  at  Milheada  in  observa- 
lion  of  the  great  road  from  Oporto;  the  light  division 
at  Mortagao  watching  the  road  from  V^iseu;  and  the 
remainder  of  the  army  was  in  reserve  ready  to  movd 
to  either  s'de.  But  when  the  '""■■'^nch  advanced  guard 
had  repaired  the  bridges  ovt.  ..le  ('riz,  and  passed  that 
river,  lord  Wellington  recalled  the  first  aivision,  and 
fixed  upon  the  Sierra  de  Busaco  for  his  position  of 
battle. 

This  mountain,  about  eight  miles  in  l/»ngth,  abuts 
to  the  right  oi:  the   Mond"go,  and  on  the  !=  "    is  con- 


I  nected  with  the  Sierra  de  Caramula  by  a  hilly  rug- 
ged coimtry,  imperv'ous  to  the  march  of  an  army 
A  road  along  the  crest  of  Busaco  aftbrded  an  easy 
communication  ;  and  at  Pena  Cova,  just  beliind  the 
right  hand  extremity,  a  ford  in  the  Mondego  permitted 
the  troops  to  pass  in  a  few  hours  to  the  Murcella  ridge, 
behind  the  Alva,  'i'he  face  of  Busaco  was  steep, 
rough,  and  fit  for  defence.  The  artillery  of  the  al- 
lies fixed  on  certain  points,  could  play  along  the  front 
freely,  and  there  was  some  ground  on  the  summit  suit- 
able for  a  small  body  of  cavalry.  But  neither  guns 
nor  horsemen  of  the  enemy  had  a  fair  field,  their  in- 
fantry were  to  contend  with  every  difficulty,  and  the 
approach  to  the  position  was  also  unfavourable  to  an 
attacking  army. 

After  passing  the  Criz,  a  table-land  permitted  Mas- 
sena  to  march,  in  a  wide  order  of  battle,  to  Mortagao, 
but  then  a  succession  of  ascending  ridges  led  to  the 
Sierra  Busaco,  which  was  separated  from  the  last  by  a 
chasm,  so  profound,  that  the  naked  eye  could  hardly 
distinguish  the  movement  of  troops  in  the  bottom,  yet 
in  parts  so  narrow  that  twelve-pounders  could  range  to 
the  salient  points  on  the  opposide  side.  From  Morta- 
gao four  roads  conducted  to  Coimbra.  The  first,  un- 
frequented and  narrow,  crossed  the  Caramula  to  Boy- 
alva,  a  village  situated  on  the  western  slope  of  that 
siprra,  and  from  thence  led  to  Sardao  and  Milheada. 
Tlie  other  roads,  penetrating  through  the  rough  ground 
in  front,  passed  over  the  Sierra  de  Busaco ;  one  by  a 
large  convent  on  the  right  hand  of  the  highest  point 
of  the  ridge;  a  second  on  the  left  hand  of  this  culmin- 
ating point,  by  a  village  called  St.  Antonio  de  Canta- 
ra ;  and  a  third,  which  was  a  branch  from  the  second, 
followed  the  Mondego  to  Pena  Cova. 

When  this  formidable  position  was  chosen,  some 
officers  expressed  their  fears  that  Massena  would  not 
assail  it.  '■'But,  if  he  does,  I  shall  beat  him,''''  was  the 
reply  of  the  English  general.  He  was  well  assured 
that  the  prince  would  attack;  for  his  advanced  guard 
was  already  over  the  Criz,  the  second  and  sixth  corps 
were  in  mass  on  the  other  side  of  that  river  ;  and  it  was 
improbable  that  so  celebrated  a  commander  would,  at 
the  inere  sight  of  a  strong  position,  make  a  retrograde 
movement,  change  all  his  dispositions,  and  adopt  a 
new  line  of  operations  by  the  Vouga,  which  \vould  be 
exposed  also  to  the  militia  under  Baccellar.  Massena 
was,  indeed,  only  anxious  for  a  battle,  and,  being  still 
under  the  influence  of  Alorna's  and  Pamplona's  fal.-ie 
reports,  as  to  the  nature  of  the  country  in  his  front, 
never  doubled  that  the  allies  would  retire  before  him. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

General  Pack  destroys  the  briH^es  on  the  Cri/.  and  Dao — Re- 
markable panic  in  the  lijjlit  divisioii — The  second  and  sixth 
corps  arrive  in  front  of  Husaco — IMcy  and  Rei;nier  dfsire  to 
attack,  but  Massena  'It  lays — 'I'lie  eighth  corps  anrl  the  caval- 
ry arrive — Battle  of  Busaco — Massena  turns  the  risht  of  the 
allies — Lord  Wellinjton  falls  back,  and  orders  the  northern 
militia  to  close  on  the  Trench  rear — Cavalry  skirmish  on  the 
Mondea;o — Coimbra  evacuated,  drtadful  scene  tluTe--Dis. 
orders  in  the  army— l.f)nl  VVelling^tnn's  firmness  contrasled 
with  Massena's  indolence- — Observations. 

General  Pack,  on  the  22d,  destroyed  the  bridges 
over  the  Criz,  and  fell  back  upon  the  light  division  ; 
but,  the  23d,  the  enemy  re-established  the  communica- 
tions, passed  the  river,  and  obliged  the  British  horse 
to  q\iit  the  plain,  and  lake  to  the  hills  behind  Mortagao. 
Three  squadrons  of  light  and  one  regiment  of  h(!avy 
cavalry  were  retained  there  by  lord  Wellington  ;  but 
the  rest  he  sent  over  the  Sierra  de  Busaco  to  the  low 
country  about  Milheada,  whence  he  recalleil  Spencer, 
and  at  the  same  time  caused  the  third  and  fourth  di- 
visions to  take  their  ground  on  tie  position,  the  former 


1810.] 


NAPIEirS    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


303 


at  St.  Antonio  de  Cantara,  the  latter  at  the  convent. 
The  light  division  falling  back  only  a  league,  then 
encamped  in  a  pine  wood,  where  happened  one  of 
those  extraordinary  panics  that,  in  ancient  tin^.es,  were 
attributed  to  the  influence  of  a  hostile  god.  No  eneiny 
was  near  no  alarm  was  given,  yet  suddenly  the 
troops,  as  if  seized  with  a  phrenzy,  started  from 
sleep  and  dispersed  in  every  direction  :  nor  was  there 
any  possibility  of  allaying"  this  strange  terror,  until 
some  persons  called  out  that  the  enemy's  cavalry  were 
amongst  them,  when  the  soldiers  mechanically  run 
together  in  masses,  and  the  illusion  was  instantly  dissi- 
pated. 

The  24th,  the  enemy  skirmished  with  the  picquets 
in  front  of  Mortagao,  the  light  division,  retiring  four 
miles,  occupied  very  strong  ground,  and,  in  the  eve- 
ning, some  oi  ihs  enemy's  cavalry  approaching  too 
close,  were  charged  by  a  squadron  of  the  fourteenth 
dragoons,  and  overthrown,  with  the  loss  of  twenty  or 
thirty  men. 

Early  on  the  25th,  Crawfurd  moved  down  from  his 
strong  post  to  the  front,  and  appeared  somewhat  dispo- 
sed to  renew  the  scene  at  the  Coa.  The  enemy's  cav- 
alry were  gathering  in  front,  and  the  heads  of  three 
infantry  columns  were  plainly  descried  on  the  table- 
laud  al)ove  Mortagao,  coming  on  abreast,  and  with  a 
most  impetuous  pace?  while  heavy  clouds  of  dust,  ri- 
sing and  loading  the  atmosphere  for  miles  behind,  show- 
ed that  the  whole  French  army  had  passed  the  Criz,  and 
was  in  full  march  to  attack.  The  cavalry  skirmishers 
were  already  exchanging  pistol-shots,  when  lord  Wel- 
lington., arriving,  ordered  the  division  to  retire,  and, 
taking  the  personal  direction,  covered  the  retreat  with 
the  fifty-second  and  ninety-fifth,  the  cavalry,  and  Ross's 
troop  of  horse-artillery.  Nor  was  there  a  moment  to 
lose,  for  the  enemy,  with  incredible  rapidity,  brought 
up  both  infantry  and  guns,  and  fell  on  so  briskly,  that 
all  the  skill  oi"  the  general  and  the  readiness  of  the 
excellent  troops  composing  the  rear  guard,  could  scar'-e- 
Iv  prevent  the  division  from  being  dangerously  engaged. 
Ilowbeit,  a  series  of  rapid  and  beautiful  movements,  a 
sharp  cannonade,  and  an  hour's  march,  brought  every 
tiling  hack,  in  good  order,  to  the  great  position;  but. 
almost  at  the  same  moment,  the  opposite  ridge  was 
crowned  hv  the  masses  of  the  sixth  corps,  the  French  bat- 
teries opened  as  the  English  troops  mounted  the  steep 
ascent  on  which  the  convent  was  situated,  and  Rey- 
iiier,  taking  the  left  hand  route,  along  which  a  Portu- 
guese battalion  had  retired,  also  arrived  at  St.  Antonio 
de  Cantara,  in  front  of  the  third  division.  Before  three 
o'clock,  forty  thousand  French  infantry  were  embat- 
tled on  the  two  points,  and  the  sharp  musketry  of  the 
skirmishers  arose  from  the  dark-wooded  chasms  be- 
neath. 

Ney,  whose  military  glance  was  magical,  perceived 
in  an  instant  that  the  position,  a  crested  not  a  table 
mountain,  could  not  hide  any  strong  reserve,  that  it 
was  scarcely  half  occupied,  and  that  great  part  of  the 
allied  troops  wer.-  moving  from  one  place  to  another, 
with  that  sort  of  confusion  which  generally  attends* 
the  first  taking  up  of  unknown  ground.  He  therefore 
desired  to  make  an  early  and  powerful  attack;  but  the 
prince  of  Esling  was  at  Mortagao,  ten  miles  in  the  rear, 
and  an  aide-de-camp,  despatched  to  inform  him  of  the 
Svate  of  affairs,  after  attending  two  hours  for  an  audience, 
was  (as  I  have  been  informed)  told,  that  everything 
must  await  IMassena's  arrival.  Thus  a  most  favoura- 
ble o[)portunity  was  lost;  for  the  first  division  of 
the  allies,  although  close  at  hand,  was  not  upon  the 
ridge,  lieitb's  troops,  now  called  the  fifth  division, 
were  in  the  act  of  passing  the  Mondego,  and  flill  was 
still  behind  the  Alva.  Scarcely  twenty-five  thousand 
men  were  actually  in  line,  and  there  were  great  inter- 
vals between  the  divisions. 

Reynier  coincided  with  Ney,  and  they  wrote  in  co; 


cert  to  Massena,  on  the  26th,  intimating  their  joint 
desire  to  attack.  The  prince  of  Esling.  however,  did 
not  reach  the  field  until  twelve  o'clock.  He  brought 
with  him  the  eighth  corps,  with  which,  and  the  caval- 
ry, he  formed  a  reserve  connecting  the  sixth  and  second 
corps,  and  then  sending  out  his  skirmishers  along  the  • 
whole  front,  proceeded  carefully  to  examine  the  posi- 
tion from  left  to  right. 

But  the  situation  of  the  allies  was  now  greatly  chan- 
ged. Hill's  corps,  having  crossed  the  Mondego,  was 
posted  athwart  the  road  leading  over  the  Sierra  to  Pena 
Cova;  on  his  left  Leith  prolonged  the  line  of  defence, 
having  the  Lusitauian  legion  in  reserve  ;  Picion  with 
the  third  division,  supported  by  Champleniond"s  Portu- 
guese brigade,  was  next  to  Leith  ;  and  Spencer,  with 
the  fijst  division,  occupied  the  highest  part  of  the  ridge, 
being  between  Picton  and  the  convent.  The  fourth 
division  closed  the  extreme  left,  covering  a  path  lead- 
ing to  Milheada,  where  the  cavalry  held  the  flat  coun- 
try, one  heavy  regiment  only  being  kept  in  reserve 
on  the  summit  of  the  Sierra.  Pack's  brigade  and 
some  other  Portuguese  troops  formed  a  sort  of  ad- 
vanced guard  to  the  first  division,  being  posted  half 
way  down  the  mountain.  On  their  left,  the  light  di- 
vision, supported  by  a  German  brigade,  occupied  a 
tongue  of  land  jutting  out  nearly  half  a  mile  in  front 
of,  and  lower  than  the  convent,  the  space  between 
being  scooped  like  the  hollow  of  a  wave  before  it 
breaks.  Along  the  whole  of  the  front,  skirmishers  were 
thrown  out  on  the  mountain  side,  and  about  fifty  pie- 
ces of  artillery  were  disposed  upon  the  salient  points. 

Ney  was  averse  to  attack  after  the  delay  which 
had  taken  place,  but  Massena  resolved  to  attempt  car 
rying  the  position.  Reynier  thought  that  he  had  only 
to  deal  with  a  rear-guard  of  the  allies ;  and  the  prince, 
whether  partaking  of  this  error,  or  confident  in  the 
valour  of  his  army,  directed  the  second  and  sixth  corps 
to  fall  on  the  next  day,  each  to  its  own  front,  while 
the  eighth  corps,  the  cavalry,  and  the  artillery  remain-  i 
in  reserve.  To  facilitate  the  attack,  the  light  troops, 
dropping,  by  twos  and  threes,  into  the  lowest  part 
of  the  valley,  endeavoured,  in  the  evening,  to  steal  up 
the  wooded  dells  and  hollows,  and  to  establish  them- 
selves unseen  close  to  the  picquets  of  the  light  di- 
vision. Some  companies  of  rifle  corps  an  i  caQadores 
checked  this  proceeding,  but  similar  attempts  made 
with  more  or  less  success  at  different  points  of  the 
position,  seemed  to  indicate  a  night  attack,  and  exci- 
ted all  the  vigilance  of  the  troops.  Yet,  were  it  oth- 
erwise, none  but  veterans,  tired  of  war.  could  have 
slept,  for  the  weather  was  calm  and  fine,  and  the 
dirk  mountain  masses,  rising  on  either  side,  were 
crowned  with  innumerable  fires,  around  which  more 
than  a  hundred  thousand   brave  men  were  gathered. 

BATTLE    OF    BUSACO, 

Before  day-break  on  the  27th,  the  French  formed 
five  columns  of  attack;  three  under  Ney,  opposite  to 
the  convent,  and  two  under  Reynier,  at  St.  Antonio 
de  Cantara,  thpse  points  being  about  three  miles 
asunder.  Reynier's  troops  had  comparatively  easier 
ground  before  them,  and  were  in  the  midst  of  tne  pto 
quets  and  skirmishers  of  the  third  division  almost  as 
soon  as  they  could  be  perceived  to  be  in  movement. 
The  allies  resisted  vigorously,  and  six  guns  played 
along  the  ascent  with  grape,  but  in  less  than  half  an 
hour' the  French  were  close  upon  the  summit;  so 
swiftly  and  with  such  astonishing  power  and  resolu- 
tion did  they  scale  the  mountain,  overthrowing  ev- 
ery thing  that  opposed  their  progp'ss.  The  right  of 
the  third  division  was  forced  back;  the  eighth  Por- 
tuguese regiment  was  broken  to  pieces,  and  the 
hostile  masses  gained  the  highest  part  of  the  crest, 
just  between  the  third  and  the  fifth  divisions.  The 
leading  battalions  immedialcly  established  'heinselves 


304 


NAPIER'S    P  E  N  I  N  ^  J  L  A  R   WAR. 


[Book  XI. 


pmontTSt  the  crowning  rocks,  and  a  confused  masi 
wheeled  to  the  right,  intending  to  sweep  tiie  summit 
of  the  sierra;  but  at  that  moment  lord  Wellington 
caused  two  guns  to  open  with  grape  upon  their  flank, 
a  heavy  musketry  was  still  poured  into  their  front, 
and  in  a  little  time,  the  forty-fifth  and  the  eighty-eigtith 
regiments  charged  so  furiously  that  even  fresh  men 
could  not  have  withstood  them.  The  French,  quite 
spent  with  their  previous  efforts,  only  opened  a  strag- 
gling fire,  and  both  parties,  mingling  together,  went 
down  the  mountain  side  with  a  mighty  clamour  and 
confusion.  The  dead  and  dying  strewed  the  way  even 
to  the  bottom  of  the  valley. 

Meanwhile  the  French  who  first  gained  the  crest 
had  re-foriuod  their  ranks  with  the  right  resting  upon 
a  precipice  overhanging  the  reverse  side  of  the  Sierra  ; 
thus  the  position  was  in  fact  gained,  if  any  reserve  had 
been  at  hand,  fir  the  greatest  part  of  the  third  division, 
British  and  Portuguese,  were  fully  engaged,  and  a 
misty  cloud  capped  the  summit,  so  that  the  enemy, 
thus  ensconced  amongst  the  rocks,  could  not  be  seen, 
except  by  general  Leith.  That  officer  had  put  his  first 
brigade  in  motion  to  his  own  left  as  soon  as  he  per- 
ceived the  vigorous  impression  made  on  the  third  di- 
vision, and  he  was  now  coming  on  rapidly  ;  but  he 
had  two  miles  of  rugged  ground  to  pass  iu  a  narrow 
column  before  he  could  mingle  in  the  fight.  Keeping 
the  royals  in  reserve,  he  directed  the  thirty-eighth  to 
turn  the  right  of  the  French,  and  as  the  precipice 
prevented  this,  colonel  Cameron,  of  the  ninth,  who 
had  been  informed  by  a  st^ff-officer  of  the  critical  stale 
of  affairs,  formed  his  regiment  in  line  under  a  violent 
fire,  and.  without  returning  a  single  shot,  ran  in  upon 
and  drove  the  grenadiers  from  the  rocks  wiih  irresist- 
ible bravery,  plyingrthem  with  a  destructive  musketry 
as  lontr  as  they  could  be  reached  ;  and  yet  with  excel- 
lent discipline  refraining  from  pursuit,  lest  the  crest  of 
the  position  should  be  again  lost,  for  the  mountain  was 
so  rugged  that  it  was  impossible  to  judge  clearly  of 
the  general  state  of  the  action.  The  victory  was, 
hi>wever,  secure.  Hill's  corps  edged  in  towards  the 
scene  of  action  ;  Leilh's  second  brigade  joined  the 
first,  and  a  great  mass  of  fresh  troops  was  thus  concen- 
trated, while  Reynier  had  neither  reserves  nor  guns  to 
restore  the  fight. 

Ney's  attack  had  as  little  success.  From  the  abut- 
ment of  the  mountain  upon  which  the  light  division 
was  stationed,  the  lowest  parts  of  the  valley  could  be 
discerned.  'I'he  ascent  was  steeper  and  more  difficult 
than  where  l^rynier  had  attacked,  and  Crawfurd  in  a 
haf)py  mood  of  command,  had  made  masterly  disposi- 
tions. The  table-land  between  him  and  the  convent 
was  sufficiently  scooped  to  conceal  the  forty-third  and 
fifty-second  regiments,  drawn  up  in  line;  and  a  quarter 
of  a  mile  behind  them,  but  on  higher  ground  and 
close  to  the  convent,  a  brigade  of  German  infantry 
appeared  to  be  the  only  solid  line  of  resistance  on  this 
part  of  the  position.  In  front  of  the  two  British  regi- 
ments, some  rocks,  overhanging  the  descent,  furnished 
natural  embrasures,  in  which  the  gutt^of  the  division 
were  placed,  and  the  whole  face  of,  the  hill  was 
planted  with  the  skirmishers  of  the  rifle  corps  and  of 
the  two  Portuguese  cacadore  battalions. 

While  it  was  yet  dark,  a  stratrgling  tuusketry  was 
heard  in  the  deep  hollows  separating  the  armies,  and 
when  the  li?ht  broke,  three  divisions  of  the  sixth 
corps  were  observed  entering  the  woods  below  and 
throwing  forward  a  profusion  of  skirmishers ;  soon 
afterwards  ^tarchand's  division  emerging  from  the 
hollow,  «jok  the  main  road,  as  if  to  turn  the  right  of 
the  light  division,  Loison's  made  straight  up  the  face 
of  the  mountain  in  front,  and  the  third  remained  in 
reserve. 

General  Simon's  brigade,  which  led  Loison's  attack, 
ascended  with  a  wonderful  alacrity,   and  though   the 


ligl  t  roops  plied  it  unceasingly  with  musketry,  and 
the  .utillery  bullets  swept  throuph  it  frf)m  the  first  tc 
the  last  section,  its  order  was  never  disturbed,  nor  its 
sjieed  in  the  least  abated.  Ross's  guns  were  worked 
with  incredible  quickness,  yet  their  range  was  palpa- 
bly contracted  every  round,  and  the  enemy's  shot  came 
s'nging  up  in  a  sharper  key.  until  the  skirmishers, 
b.eathless  and  begrimed  with  powder,  rushed  over 
the  edge  of  the  ascent,  the  artillery  suddenly  drew 
bafk,  and  the  victorious  cries  of  the  French  were  heard 
within  a  few  yards  of  the  summit.  Crawfurd,  whc 
standing  alone  on  one  of  the  rocks,  had  been  intently 
watching  the  progress  of  this  attack,  then  turned,  and 
in  a  quick  shrill  tone  desired  the  two  recrinients  in 
reserve  to  charge !  the  next  moment  a  horrid  shoi:t 
sfnrtlea  the  French  column,  and  eighteen  hundred 
British  bayonets  went  sparkling  over  the  brow  of  the 
hill.  Yet  so  truly  brave  and  hardy  were  the  leaders  of 
the  eneiTiy,  that  each  man  of  the  first  section  raised  his 
musket,  and  two  officers  and  ten  soldiers  fell  before 
them.  Not  a  Frenchman  h.id  missed  his  mark  !  They 
could  dn  no  more!  The  head  of  their  column  was 
violently  overturned  and  driven  upon  tiie  rear,  both 
flanks  were  lapped  over  by  the  pjuglish  wings,  and 
three  terrible  discharges  at  five  yards'  distance  comple- 
ted the  rout.  In  a  few  minutes  a  loner  trail  of  car- 
casses and  broken  arms  indicated  the  line  of  retreat. 
The  main  body  of  the  British  stood  fast;  but  several 
companies  followed  the  pursuit  down  the  motintain, 
until  Ney  moving  forward  his  reserve,  and  opening  iiia 
ffuns  from  the  opposite  height  killed  some  men,  and 
thus  warned  the  rest  to  recover  their  own  ground. 
The  German  brigade  then  spread  over  the  hill,  and  the 
light  division  resumed  its  original  position. 

Loison  shewed  no  disposition  to  renew  the  attack, 
but  Marchand's  people,  who  had  followed  the  main 
road,  broke  into  several  masses,  gained  a  pine  wood 
half-way  up  the  mountain,  and  sent  a  cloud  of  their 
skirmishers  against  the  highest  part,  at  the  very  mo- 
ment that  Simon  was  defeated.  Such,  bow-ever,  was 
the  difficultv  of  ascending,  that  the  Portuguese  troops 
alone  held  the  enemy  in  check,  and  half  a  mile  higher 
up,  Spencer  shewed  a  line  of  the  royal  guards,  whii-li 
forbarie  any  hope  of  success.  From  the  salient  point 
of  land  occupied  by  the  liijht  division,  Crawfurd's 
artillery  also  took  the  main  body  of  the  PVench  in  the 
wood,  in  flank ;  and  Ney,  who  was  there  in  person, 
after  sustaining  this  murderous  fire  for  an  hour,  relin- 
quished the  attack.  The  desultory  fighting  of  the  liirht 
troops  then  ceased,  and  before  two  o'clock  Crawfurd 
havintj  assented  to  a  momentary  truce,  parties  of  brlh 
armies  were  mixed  amicably  together  searching  fot 
the  wounded  men. 

Towards  evening,  however,  a  French  company  hav- 
ing, with  signal  audacity,  seized  a  village  within  half- 
musket  shot  of  the  light  division,  refused  to  retire, 
which  so  incensed  Crawfurd  that,  turning  twelve  giin>^ 
on  the  village,  he  overwhelmed  it  with  bullets  for  half 
an  hour.  After  payiiiET  the  French  captain  this  distin- 
guished honour,  the  English  general  recovering  his 
temper,  sent  a  company  of  the  forty-third  down,  which 
cleared  the  village  in  a  fi'W  minutes.  Meanwhile  ar\ 
alTecting  incident,  contrasting  strongly  with  the  savafje 
character  of  the  preceding  events,  added  to  the  interest 
of  the  day.  A  poor  orphan  Portuguese  girl,  about 
seventeen  years  of  age,  and  very  handsome,  was  seen 
coming  down  the  mountain  and  drivin<j  an  ass,  loaded 
with  all  her  property,  throuf>b  the  midst  of  the  French 
army.  She  had  abandoned  her  dwelling  in  obedience 
to  the  proclamation,  and  now  passed  over  the  field  of 
battle  with  a  childish  simplicity,  totally  unconscious 
of  her  perilous  situation,  and  scarcely  understanding 
which  were  the  hostile  and  which  the  friendly  troops, 
fiir  no  man  on  either  side  was  so  brutal  as  to  molest 
her. 


1810.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


305 


In  this  battle  of  Busaco,  the  French  after  astonish- 
ing efforts  of  valour,  were  repulsed,  in  the  manner  to 
bcfexpected  fronn  the  strength  of  the  ground,  and  the 
goodness  of  the  soldiers  opposed  to  them  ;  and  their 
loss,  althouah  prodigiously  exaggerated  at  the  time, 
Avas  great.  General  Grain-d'orge  and  about  eight  hun- 
dred men  were  slain ;  generals  Foy  and  Merle  wound- 
ed ;  general  Simon  was  made  prisoner.  The  whole 
loss  sustained  may  be  estimated  at  four  thousand  five 
liuTidred  men,  while  that  of  the  allies  did  not  exceed 
thirteen  hundred,  because  the  musketry  and  artillery  of 
the  latter  were  brought  into  full  activity,  whereas  the 
French  sought  to  gain  the  day  by  resolution  and  auda- 
city rather  than  by  fire. 

Massena  now  judged  the  position  of  Busaco  impreg- 
nable, and  to  turn  it  by  the  Mondego  impossible,  as 
the  allies  could  pass  that  river  quicker  than  himself; 
but  a  peasant  informed  him  of  the  road  leading  from 
Mortasjao  over  the  Caramula  to  Boyalva,  and  he  re- 
solved' to  turn  lord  Wellington's  left.  To  cover  this 
movement  the  skirmishing  was  renewed  with  such 
vigour  on  the  28lh,  that  a  general  battle  was  for  some 
time  expected.  Yet  an  ostentatious  display  of  men, 
the  disappearance  of  baggage,  and  the  throwing  up  of 
entrenchments  on  the  hill  covering  the  roads  to  MiJta- 
gao  plainly  indicated  some  other  design.  Howbcit,  it 
was  not  until  evei^ing  when  the  enemy's  masses  in 
front  being  sensibly  diminished,  and  his  cavalry  de- 
scried winding  over  the  distant  mountains,  that  the 
project  became  quite  apparent.  Hill  then  crossed  the 
Mondego,  and  retired  by  Espinal  upon  Thomar,  while 
the  centrn  and  left  of  the  army  defiled  in  the  night  by 
the  other  roads  upon  Milheada.  In  this  manner  Busa- 
co was  evacuated  before  the  29th  ;  the  guns  followed 
the  convent  road,  and  the  light  division  furnished  the 
rear-guard  until  they  passed  Fornos,  where  the  open 
country  enabled  the  cavalry  to  relieve  them. 

Massena's  scouts  reached  Boyalva  in  the  evening 
of  the  28th,  and  it  has  been  erroneously  asserted,  that 
Tranl'vS  absence  from  Sardao  alone  enabled  the  French 
general  to  execute  his  design.  Trant  was  however  at 
Sardao,  four  miles  from  Boyalva,  before  one  o'clock 
on  the  28th  ;  but  having,  through  a  mistake  of  Bac- 
cellar's,  marched  from  Lamego,  by  the  circuitous  route 
of  Oporto,  instead  of  the  direct  road  through  San 
Pedro  do  Sul,  he  lost  men  from  fatigue  and  desertion, 
and  could  bring  only  fifteen  hundred  militia  into  line. 
Hence  his  absence  or  presence  could  have  produced 
no  effect  whatever,  even  though  he  had  as  lord  Wel- 
lington intended,  been  at  Boyalva  itself.  Accordingly, 
the  French  cavalry,  pushing  between  him  and  the 
British  horse,  on  the  29th  cut  off  one  of  his  patroles, 
and  the  next  morning  drove  him,  with  the  loss  of 
twenty  men,  behind  the  Vouga. 

When  Massena's  main  body  had  cleared  the  defiles 
of  Boyalva,  it  marched  upon  Coimbra,  and  the  allies, 
crossinir  the  Monderro  at  that  city,  commenced  the 
passage  of  the  defiles  leading  upon  Condeixa  and 
Pombal.  "^I'he  commissariat  stores,  which  had  been 
previously  removed  from  Raiva  de  Pena  Cova  to 
Fiijueras,  were  then  embarked  at  Peniche;  the  litj-ht 
division  and  the  cavalry  remained  on  therightbank  of  the 
Mondego;  and  Baccellar  was  directed  to  bring  down 
til  the  militia  of  the  northern  provinces  upon  the  Vouga. 
The  foolish  policy  of  the  native  government  now 
became  evid  'nt,  notwithstanding  the  proclamations, 
and  the  urgent,  and  even  menacing  remonstrances  of 
the  English  general,  the  Portuguese  Regency  had  not 
'/vasled  the  country  behind  the  Mondego.  During  the 
few  days  that  the  enemy  was  stopp'  d  at  Busaco,  only 
the  rich'-st  inhabitants  had  quitted  Coimbra,  when  the 
allied  army  relreat-d,  that  city  was  still  populous  ;  and 
when  the  approach  of  the  enemy  left  no  choice  but 
to  Hy  or  to  risk  the  punishment  of  death  and  infamy 
muiouiiced  in  the  proclamation,  so  direful  a  scene  of 
21 


distress  ensued  that  the  most  hardened  of  men  could 
not  behold  it  without  emotion.  Mothers,  with  children 
of  all  ages,  the  old,  the  sick,  the  bedridden,  and  even  lu- 
natics, went  or  were  carried  forth,  the  most  part,  with 
little  hope  and  less  help,  to  journey  for  days  in  company 
with  contending  armies.  Fortunately  for  tiiis  unliap|)y 
multitude,  the  weather  was  fine,  and  the  roads  firm, 
or  the  greatest  number  must  have  perished  in  the 
most  deplorable  manner.  And,  notwithstanding  all 
this  misery,  the  object  was  not  gained  :  the  people 
fled,  but  the  provisions  were  left,  and  the  mills  were 
but  partially  and   imperfectly  ruined. 

On  the  first  of  October,  the  outposts  were  attacked, 
and  driven  from  the  hills  bounding  the  plain  of  Coim- 
bra to  the  north.  The  French,  on  entering  this  plain, 
suffered  some  loss  from  a  cannonade,  and  the  British 
cavalry  was  drawn  up  in  line,  but  with  no  serious  in- 
tention of  fighting;  and  was  soon  after  withdrawn 
across  the  Mondego,  yet  somewhat  unskilfully,  for  the 
French  following  briskly,  cut  down  some  men  even  in 
the  middle  of  the  river,  and  were  only  prevented  from 
forcing  the  passage  by  a  strong  skirmish,  in  which 
fifty  or  sixty  men  fell. 

This  scrambling  affair  obliged  the  light  division  to 
march  hastily  through  the  city,  to  gain  the  defiles  of 
Condeixa,  which  commence  at  the  end  of  the  bridge; 
all  the  inhabitants  who  had  not  before  quitted  the  place 
then  rushed  out,  each  with  what  could  be  caught  up  in 
the  hand,  and  driving  before  them  a  number  of  animals 
loaded  with  sick  people  or  children.  At  the  entrance 
to  the  bridge,  the  press  was  so  great  thr.t  tlie  troops 
halted  for  a  few  moments,  just  under  the  prison  ;  tlio 
jailor  had  fled  with  the  keys  ;  the  prisoners,  crowding 
to  the  windows,  were  endeavouring  to  tear  down  the 
bars  with  their  hands,  and  even  with  their  teeth,  anrj 
bellowing  in  the  most  frantic  manner,  while  the  bitter 
lamentations  of  the  multitude  increased,  and  the  pistol 
shots  of  the  cavalry  engaged  at  the  ford  below,  were 
distinctly  heard. 

Captain  William  Campbell,  an  officer  of  Crawfurd's 
staff,  burst  the  prison-doors,  and  released  the  wretched 
inmates,  and  the  troops  forced  their  way  over  the 
bridge;  but  at  the  other  end,  the  up-hill  road,  passing 
between  high  rocks,  was  fo  crowded  that  no  effort, 
even  of  the  artillery,  could  make  way.  A  troop  cf 
French  dragoons  crossed  a  ford,  and  hovering  close 
upon  the  flank,  increased  the  confusion  ;  and  a  single 
regiment  of  foot  would  have  sufficed  to  destroy  tke 
division,  wedged  in,  as  it  was,  in  a  hollow  way,  and 
totally  incapable  of  advancing,  retreating,  or  breaking 
out  on  either  side.  At  last,  some  of  the  infantry 
opened  a  passage  to  the  right,  and,  by  great  exertions, 
the  road  was  cleared  for  the  guns  ;  but  it  was  not  until 
after  dusk  that  the  division  reached  Condeixa,  although 
the  distance  was  less  than  eight  uiiles.  Head-quarters 
were  that  night  at  Redinha,  and  the  next  day  at  Lciria. 

Hitherto  the  marches  had  been  easy,  the  weather 
fine,  and  provisions  abundant,  nevertheless,  ihe  usual 
disorders  of  a  retreat  had  already  commenced.  In 
Coimbra,  a  quantity  of  harness  and  intrenching  tools 
were  scattered  in  the  streets;  at  Leiria,  the  magazines 
were  plundered  by  the  troops  and  camp-followers;  at 
Condeixa,  a  magazine  of  tents,  shoes,  spirits,  and  s;ilt 
meat  was  destroyed,  or  abandoned  to  the  enemy  :  and, 
while  the  streets  were  flowing,  ancle  deep,  with  rum, 
the  light  division  and  Pack's  Portuguese  brigade,  at  the 
distance  of  a  quarter  of  a  mile,  were  obliged  to  slaugii 
ter  their  own  bullocks,  and  received  only  half  lationi 
of  liquor  ! 

Lord  Wellington  arrested  this  growing  disorder  with 
a  strong  hand.  Three  men,  taken  in  the  fact  at  Leiria, 
were  hanged  on  the  spot,  and  some  regiments,  whose 
discipline  was  more  tainted  than  others,  were  forbidden, 
to  enter  a  village.  This  vigorous  exercise  of  commkud, 
aided   by  the  fine  weather 'and  tiie  enemy's  inactivity, 


3oe 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XI. 


restored  order  amongst  the  allies,  while  Massena's  con- 
diict,  the  reverse  of  the  English  general's,  introduced 
the  confusion  of  a  retreat  in  the  pursuing  army.  In 
Coimbra,  the  French  general  permitted  such  waste 
that  in  a  few  days,  resources  were  dissipated  which 
under  good  arrangements,  would  have  supplied  his 
troops  for  two  mouths  ;  and,  during  this  licentious  de- 
lay the  advantage  gained  by  his  dangerous  flank  march 
to  Boyalva  was  lost. 

OBSERVATIONS. 

1.  "  attack  vigorously,  afler  having  observed  well 
where  to  strike.'"  This  simple,  but  profound  expression 
in  Napoleon's  letter  of  service,  forms  the  test  b}"^  which 
the  prince  of  Esling's  operations  should  be  judged. 

2.  The  design  of  turning  the  strong  ground  behind 
Celerico,  by  the  route  of  Viseu,  required  close  and 
rapid  movements;  yet  the  French  general  did  not  quit 
Viseu,  to  march  asrainst  Coimbra,  until  the  tenth  day 
after  passing  the  Pinhel.  This  was  not  a  "  a  vigorous 
attack.'" 

3.  Massena  should  have  brought  the  allies  to  action 
in  a  forward  position  ;  and  he  might  have  done  so 
either  when  Almeida  fell,  or  before  that  event,  because 
the  complement  of  mules  for  the  service  of  the  army 
not  being  then  full,  the  commissariat  was  dependent 
upon  the  country  carts,  and  when  the  first  retrograde 
movement  took  place  from  Alverca,  the  drivers  fled 
with  their  animals,  producing  infinite  confusion  in  the 
rear.  The  commissary-general  Kennedy  contrived, 
indeed,  to  procure  fifteen  hundred  additional  mules  ; 
but,  intermediately,  a  brisk  advance  of  the  enemy 
would  have  forced  the  English  genera!  to  fight,  or  re- 
tire more  hastily  than  would  have  beseemed  his  repu- 
tation, or  suited  his  political  position. 

4.  If  the  prince  of  Esliug  had  not  been  misled  by 
Alorna  and  Pamplona,  and  the  more  readily  that  the 
estates  of  the  latter  were  situated  about  Coimbra,  he 
would  have  judged  that  the  line  his  adversary  had 
studied  for  eight  months,  and  now  so  carefully  and 
jealously  guarded,  was  more  likely  to  aflford  advanta- 
ges, than  the  circuitous  route  by  Viseu,  which  was 
comparatively  neglected.  The  French  general,  ill  ac- 
quainted with  the  scene  of  action,  but  having  the 
stronger  and  more  moveable  army,  should  have  follow- 
ed closely. 

A  rapid  pursuit,  through  Celerico,  would  have 
brought  the  French  army  on  to  the  Alva  before  Hill 
or  even  Leith  could  have  joined  lord  Wellington.  The 
latter  must  then  have  fought  with  half  his  own  army, 
or  he  must  have  retreated  to  the  Lines.  If  he  offered 
battle  with  so  fi'.w  troops,  his  position  could  be  turned 
either  by  the  right  or  left ;  on  the  left,  by  the  slopes  of 
the  F^sirella;  on  the  right  by  crossing  the  Mondego, 
for  Busaco  was  too  extensive  to  be  occupied  before 
Hill  and  Leith  arrived.  Now,  the  road  bv  Viseu  being 
the  longest  and  least  practicable,  demanded  great  dili- 
gence to  compensate  for  the  difficulties  of  the  way  ; 
and  to  gain  Coimbra  and  force  the  allies  to  a  battle  be- 
fore Hill  arrived,  were  objects  more  readily  to  be  at- 
tained by  the  left  bank  of  the  Mondego.  The  point 
where  to  strike  was  therefore  not  "  well  considered,^'' 
and  it  is  clear  that  Massena  did  not  rightly  estimate 
the  greatness  of  his  enterprise. 

5.  When  the  rocks  of  Busaco  glittering  with  bayo- 
nets first  rose  on  the  prince  of  Esling's  view,  two 
fresh  questions  were  to  be  solved.  Was  he  to  attack 
or  to  turn  that  formidable  post?  Or,  availintr  himself 
of  his  nu!nerical  strength  and  central  situation,  was  he 
to  keep  the  allies  in  check,  seize  Oporto,  and  neglect 
Lisbon  until  better  combinations  could  be  made  ]  The 
last  question  has  been  already  discussed  ;  but,  contrarv 
to  the  gen'Tal  opinion,  the  attack  upon  Busaco  appears 
to  me  faulty  in  the  execution  rather  than  in  the  con- 
ception; and  the  inarch  by  wbi^h  that  position  was 


finally  turned,  a  violation  of  the  soundest  principles  of 
war.  In  a  purely  military  view,  the  English  general 
may  be  censured  for  not  punishing  his  adversary's 
rashness. 

With  respect  to  the  attack,  sixty  five  thousand  French 
veterans  had  no  reason  to  believe  that  fifty  thousand 
mixed  and  inexperienced  troops,  distributed  on  a  moun- 
tain more  than  eight  miles  long,  were  impregnabiy 
posted.  It  would  have  been  no  overweening  presump- 
tion in  the  French  general  to  expect,  that  three  corps 
well  disposed,  supported  by  a  numerous  artillery,  and 
led  on  the  first  day,  (as  Ney  desired,)  might  carry 
some  part  of  the  position,  and  it  is  an  error,  also,  to 
suppose  that  guns  could  not  have  been  used  :  the  light 
division  were  constantly  within  range,  and  thirty 
pieces  of  artillery  employed  on  that  point  would  have 
wonderfully  aidfd  the  attack  by  the  sixth  corps.  But 
when  a  general  in  chief  remains  ten  miles  from  a  field 
of  battle,  gives  his  adversary  two  days  to  settle  in  a 
position,  makes  his  attacks  without  connection,  and 
without  artillery,  and  brings  forward  no  re-erves,  suc- 
cess is  impossible  even  with  the  valiant  soldiers  Mas- 
sena commanded. 

6.  "  An  army  should  ahoays  be  in  condition  in  fight. ''^ 
"  A  general  should,  never  abandon  one  line  (f  cummw 

nicalion  without  establishing  another.^'' 

"  Flank  marches  within  reach  nf  an  enemy  are  rash 
and  injudicious,''^ 

These  maxims  of  Napoleon,  the  greatest  of  all 
generals,  have  been  illustrated  by  many  examples; 
Senef,  Kollin,  Rosbach,  the  valley  of  the  Brenta, 
Salamanca,  attest  their  value.  Now,  Massena  viola- 
ted all  three,  by  his  march  to  Boyalva,  and  some  pecu- 
liar circumstances,  or  desperate  crisis  of  aflTairs  should 
be  shewn,  to  warrant  such  a  departure  from  general 
principles.  Sir  Joshua  Reynolds,  treating  of  another 
art  says,  "  genius  begins  where  rules  end."  But  here 
genius  was  dormant,  and  rules  disregarded.  Massena 
was  not  driven  to  a  desperate  game.  The  conquest  of 
Oporto  was  open  to  him,  so  was  a  march  by  Viseu 
upon  the  V'ouga,  which,  though  demanding  time,  was 
safe  ;  in  going  by  Boyalva,  he  threw  his  whole  army 
into  a  single  and  narrow  defile,  within  ten  miles  of  an 
enemy  in  position  ;  and  that  also  (as  I  have  been  in- 
formed by  an  officer  of  marshal  Ney's  staff")  with 
much  disorder:  the  baggage  and  commissariat,  the 
wounded  and  sick,  the  artillery,  cavalry,  and  infantry, 
mixed  togfether :  discord  ragrinor  amongrst  the  generals, 
confusion  amongst  the  soldiers,  and  in  the  night  season 
when  every  difficulty  is  doubled.  His  "  crrwy  7vas  not, 
then,  in  a  condition  to  fight.''''  He  was  making  "  ajlanh 
mar.-h  within  reach  of  an  enemy  in  position,'''  and  he 
was  "  abandoning  his  line  of  cummunicalion  without 
having  established  another.''"' 

7.  Lord  Wellington  was  within  four  hours  march 
of  either  end  of  the  di  file,  through  which  the  French 
army  was  moving.  He  might  have  sent  the  first  di- 
vision and  the  cavalry  (forming  with  Portuguese 
regular  troops,  and  Trant's  militia,  a  mass  of  twelve 
or  fourteen  thousand  men)  to  Sardao,  to  head  the 
French  in  the  defile  ;  while  the  second,  third,  fourth, 
fifth,  and  light  divisions,  advancing  by  Mortagao,  as* 
sailed  their  rear.  That  he  did  not  do  so,  is  to  be  a> 
tributed  to  his  political  position.  His  mixed  and 
inexperienced  ariuy  was  not  easil}'  handled  ;  war  is 
full  of  mischances,  and  the  loss  of  a  single  brigade 
might  have  caused  the  English  government  to  abandon 
the  contest  altogether.  Nevertheless,  his  retreat  was 
more  critically  dangerous  than  such  an  attack  would 
have  been,  and  in  a  military  view  the  battle  of  Busaco 
should  not  have  been  fought:  it  was  extraneous  to  his 
original  plan,  it  was  forced  upon  him  by  events,  and 
was  in  fine  a  political  battle. 

8.  Massena's  march,  being  unopposed,  was  success- 
ful.    The  allied  army  could  not  cope  with  him  in  lh« 


1810.J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


307 


open  country  between  Busaco  and  the  sea,  whrre  his 
cavalry  would  have  had  a  fair  field  ;  hence  lord  Wel- 
liiitftoii,  reverting  to  his  original  plan,  retreated  by  the 
(^oimbra  and  Espinha.  roads.  But  the  prince  of 
Esling  was  at  Avelans  de  Cima  and  Milheada  on  the 
30th  ;  the  allied  cavalry  and  the  right  division  being 
still  on  the  right  bank  of  the  jMondego,  which  was 
fordable  in  many  places  below  Coimbra.  Had  the 
French  general,  directing  his  march  through  Tentugal, 
crossed  at  those  fords,  and  pushed  rapidly  on  to  Leiria, 
by  the  route  sir  Arthur  Wellesley  followed,  in  1803, 
against  Junot,  the  communication  with  Lisbon  would 
have  been  cut:  terror  and  confusion  would  then  have 
raged  in  the  capital,  the  patriarch's  faction  would  have 
triumphed,  and  a  dangerous  battle  must  have  been 
risked  before  the  Lines  could  be  reached. 

9.  When  the  allies  had  gained  Leiria,  and  secured 
their  line  of  retreat,  the  fate  of  Portugal  was  still  in 
the  French  general's  hands.  If  he  had  established  a 
fresh  base  at  Coimbra;  emploj'ed  the  ninth  corps  to 
seize  Oporto  ;  secured  his  line  of  communication  with 
that  city  and  with  Almeida  by  fortified  posts;  and  af- 
terwards, extending  his  position  by  the  left,  attacked 
Abmntes,  and  given  his  hand  to  a  corps  sent  by  Soult 
from  the  south,  not  only  would  the  campaign  have 
been  so  far  a  successful  one,  but  in  no  other  manner 
could  he  have  so  effectually  frustrated  his  adversary's 
political  and  military  projects.  Lord  Wellington 
dreaded  such  a  proceeding,  and  hailed  the  renewed 
advance  of  the  French  army,  which  like  the  rising  of 
a  heavy  cioud  discovered  a  clear  horizon  beneath. 

Even  at  Coimbra,  the  prince  was  unacquainted  wnth 
the  existence  of  the  Lines,  and  believed  that,  beyond 
Santarem.  the  country  was  open  for  the  usage  of  all 
arms.  It  is  strange  that,  when  Junot,  Loison,  Fo}',  and 
many  other  officers,  who  had  served  in  Portugal,  were 
present,  better  information  was  not  obtained  ;  but  every 
part  of  this  campaign  illustrated  Massena's  character, 
as  drawn  by  Napoleon  : — '•  Brave,  decided,  and  in- 
trepid ;  dull  in  conversation,  but  in  danger  acquiring 
clearness  and  force  of  thought;  ambitious,  filled  with' 
self-love,  neglectful!  of  discipline,  regardless  of  good 
adniini-^tration,  and,  consequently  disliked  by  the 
troops ;  his  dispositions  for  battle  bad,  but  his  temper 
pertinacious  to  the  last  degree ;  he  was  never  dis- 
couraged !" 

10.  It  appears  that  the  French  reached  Coimbra  at 
l!ie  moment  when  the  fcurteen  days'  bread,  carried  by 
the  soldiers,  was  exhausted,  and  it  is  worthy  of  con- 
sideration that  French  soldiers  are  accustomed  to 
carry  so  much  bread.  Other  nations,  especially  the 
English,  would  not  husband  it;  yet  it  was  a  practice 
of  the  ancient  Romans,  and  it  ought  to  be  the  practice 
of  all  armies.  It  requires  a  long  previous  discipline 
and  well-confirmed  military  habits;  but,  without  it, 
men  are  only  half  efficient,  especially  for  offensive 
warfire.  The  secret  of  making  perfect  soldiers  is  only 
to  be  found  in  national  custorns  and  institutions  ;  men 
should  come  to  the  ranks  fitted,  by  previous  habits,  for 
military  service,  instead  of  being  stretched  as  it  were 
upon  the  bed  of  Procrustes,  by  a  discipline  which  has 
no  resource  but  fear. 


CHAPTER  Vm. 

Massena  resumes  his  inarrh — The  militia  close  upon  his  rear — 
Cavalry  skiiruish  near  Leiria — Allies  retreat  upon  the  lines 
— Colonel  Trant  surprises  Coimbra — The  French  armv  con- 
tinues its  march — Cavalry  skirmish  at  Rio  Mayor— General 
Crawiurd  is  surprised  at  Aleniquer,  and  retreats  by  tlie  wrong 
road — Dan;j;erous  results  of  this  error — Description  ol"  the 
lines  of  Torres  Vedras — \Ia«stna  arrives  in  front  of  them — 
Romaiia  reinforces  lord  VVellinston  with  two  Spanish  divi- 
sions— Renrdrkable  works  executed  by  the  light  division  at 
AruJa — The  French  skirmish  at   Sobrii-r-General   Harvev 


wounded — General  St.  Croix  killed — Massena  fakes  a  per- 
manent porliion  in  front  of  the  Lines — He  is  harassed  on  the 
rear  and  lianks  by  the  British  cavahy  and  the  Portuguese 
militia. 

From  the  1st  until  the  3d,  the  French  army  was  in 
disorder.  The  4th,  Massena  resumed  his  march  by 
Condeixa  and  Leiria,  leaving  his  sick  and  wounded, 
with  a  slender  guard,  (in  all  about  four  thousand  seven 
hundred  men.)  at  Coimbra.  His  hospital  was  esta- 
blished at  the  convent  of  Santa  Clara,  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  river,  and  all  the  inhabitants,  who  were  averse 
or  unable  to  reach  the  Lines,  came  down  from  their 
hiding-places  in  the  mountains.  But  scarcely  had  the 
prince  left  the  city,  when  Trant,  Miller,  and  Wilson, 
with  nearly  ten  thousand  militia,  closed  upon  his  rear, 
occupying  the  sierras  on  both  sides  of  the  Mondego, 
and  cutting  otT  all  communication  with  Almeida. 

On  the  evening  of  the  4th,  the  French  drove  the 
English  picquets  from  Pombal,  and,  the  next  morning 
pushed  so  suddenly  upon  Leiria,  as  to  create  some 
confusion.  The  road  was  however  crossed  at  right 
angles,  by  a  succession  of  parallel  ravines,  and  captain 
Somers  Cocks  taking  advantage  of  one,  charged  the 
head  of  the  enernv.  and  checked  him  until  general 
Anson's  brigade  of  cavalry,  and  captain  Bull's  troop 
of  artillery,  arrived  to  his  support.  The  French  then, 
forming  three  columns,  endeavoured  to  bear  down  the. 
British  with  the  centre,  while  the  others  turned  the 
flanks.  The  ravines  were  difficult  to  pass  ;  Bull's  ar- 
tillery plaved  well  into  the  principal  body,  and  Anson, 
charging  as  it  emerged  from  every  defile,  slew  a  great 
number.  The  British  lost  three  officers  and  about 
fifty  men,  the  enemy  considerably  more,  and,  in  five 
hours,  he  did  not  gain  as  many  miles  of  ground,  al- 
though he  had  thiitv-six  squadrons  opposed  to  ten. 
During  this  delay,  Leiria  was  cleared,  and  the  army 
retreated  ;  the  right  by  Thomar  and  Santarem  ;  the 
centre  by  Batalha  and  Rio  Mayor:  the  left  by  Alc- 
baga  and  Obidos,  and  at  the  same  time  a  native  force, 
under  colonel  Blunt,  was  thrown  into  Peniche.  Mas- 
sena followed,  in  one  column,  by  the  way  of  Rio 
Mayor;  but,  meanwhile,  an  exploit,  as  darintr  and 
hardy  as  any  performed  by  a  Partizan  officer  during 
the  war,  convicted  him  of  bad  generalship,  and  shook 
his  plan  of  invasion  to  its  base. 

SURPRISE    OF    COIMBRA. 

Colonel  Trant  reached  Milheada,  intending  to  unite 
with  Miller  and  J.  Wilson,  the  latter  having  made  a 
forced  march  for  that  purpose,  but  they  were  still  dis- 
tant, his  own  arrival  was  unknown  at  Coimbra,  and  he 
resolved  to  attack  the  French  in  that  city  without  wait- 
ing for  assistance.  Havingp  surprised  a  small  p'^st  at 
Fornos  early  in  the  morning  of  the  7th,  he  sent  his 
cavalry,  at  full  gallop,  through  the  streets  of  Coimbra, 
with  orders  to  pass  the  bridge,  and  cut  off  all  commu- 
nication with  the  French  army,  of  whose  progress  he 
was  ignorant.  Meanwhile,  his  infantry  penetrated  at 
different  points  into  the  principal  parts  of  the  town, 
the  enemy,  astounded,  made  little  or  no  resistance,  and 
the  convent  of  Santa  Clara  surrendered  at  discretion  ; 
thus,  on  the  third  day  after  the  prince  of  Esling  had 
quitted  the  Mondego,  his  depots  and  hospitals,  and 
nearly  five  thousand  prisoners  wounded  and  unwound- 
ed,  amongst  which  there  was  a  company  of  the  ma- 
rines of  the  imperial  guards,  fell  into  the  hands  of  a 
small  militia  force  !  The  next  day.  Miller  and  Wilson, 
arriving,  spread  their  men  on  all  the  lines  of  commu- 
nication, and  picked  up  above  three  hundred  more 
prisoners,  while  Trant  conducted  his  to  Oporto. 

DusiniT  the  first  confusion,  the  Portuguese  committed 
some  violence  on  the  prisoners,  and  the  Abbe  du  Pradt 
and  other  French  writers  have  not  hesitated  to  accuse 
Trant  of  disgracing  his  country  and  liis  unif  rin  by 
encouraging  this  conduct,  whereas,  his  exertions  re- 


308 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XI. 


pressed  if  ;  and  if  the  fact,  t1iat  not  more  than  ten  men 
lost  their  lives  under  such  critical  circumstances,  was 
not  sufi'icienl  refutation,  the  falsehood  is  placed  beyond 
dispute  in  a  letter  of  thanks,  written  to  colonel  Trant, 
by  the  French  oflicers  who  fell  into  his  hands. 

This  disaster  made  no  chanrre  in  Massena's  disposi- 
tions. He  continued  his  march,  and,  on  the  8lh,  his 
advanced  juard  drove  the  cavalry  piquets  out  of  Ifio 
Mayor,  (icneral  .Slade,  who  commanded  the  brigade, 
took  no  heed  of  this  ;  and  the  enemy,  pushing  rapidly 
on,  was  like  to  have  taken  the  battery  of  artillery  in 
Alcoentre  ;  a  good  deal  of  confusion  ensued,  but  the 
ro)'als  and  the  sixteenth  drove  the  P^-ench  out  of  the 
town,  sabred  many,  and  made  twelve  prisoners.  The 
next  day  the  skinnish  was  renewed  with  various  turns 
of  fortune,  and,  finally,  the  British  retreated. 

Meanwhile  the  allied  army  was  entering  the  Lines. 
The  first,  fourth,  and  fifth  divisions  in  the  centre  by 
Sobral,  the  third  division  on  the  left  by  Torres  Vedras, 
and  Hill's  corps  on  tlie  right  by  Alhandra.  The  light 
division  and  Pack's  brigade  should  also  have  entered 
by  Aruda.  But  Crawfurd,  who  had  reached  Alem- 
quer  on  ihe  9tli,  was  still  there,  at  three  o'clock,  p.  m. 
on  the  10th  ;  and  the  weather  beino-  stormy,  the  men 
were  placed  under  cover,  and  no  indication  of  march- 
ing was  given  by  the  general.  He  knew  that  all  the 
cavalry  had  already  filed  into  the  lines,  yet  he  posted 
no  guards,  sent  no  patroles  forward,  and  took  no  pre- 
caution against  a  surprise,  although  the  town  situated 
in  a  deep  ravine  was  peculiarly  exposed  to  such  a 
disaster. 

Some  ofTicers,  uneasy  at  this  state  of  affairs,  anxious- 
ly watched  the  height  in  front,  and,  about  four  o'clock, 
observed  some  I'Vench  dragoons  on  the  summit,  which 
M-as  within  cannon  shot.  The  alarm  was  instantly 
given,  and  the  regiments  got  under  arms ;  but  the 
jirincipal  post  of  assembly  had  been  marked  on  an 
open  space,  very  much  exposed  to  an  enemy's  guns, 
and  from  whence  the  road  led  through  an  ancient  gate- 
way to  the  top  of  the  mountain  behind.  The  numbers 
of  French  increased  every  moment,  they  endeavoured 
to  create  a  belief  that  their  artillery  was  come  up,  and 
although  this  feint  was  easily  seen  through,  the  gene- 
ral desired  the  regiments  to  break  and  reform  on  the 
other  side  of  the  archway,  out  of  gun  range.  In  a  mo- 
ment all  was  disorder.  The  baggage  animals  were 
stiU  loading,  the  streets  were  crowded  with  the  follow- 
ers of  the  division,  and  the  whole  in  one  confused 
mass  rushed  or  were  driven  headlong  to  the  archway. 
Several  were  crushed,  and  with  worse  troops,  a  gene- 
ral panic  must  hav^  ensued  ;  but  the  greatest  number 
of  the  soldiers,  ashamed  of  the  order,  stood  firm  in 
their  ranks  until  the  first  confusion  had  abated. 

Nevertheless  the  mischief  was  sufficiently  great, 
and  the  enemy's  infantry  descending  the  heights,  en- 
deavoured some  to  turn  the  town  on  the  left,  while 
others  pushed  directly  through  the  streets  in  pursuit, 
and  thus  with  his  front  in  disorder,  and  his  rear  skir- 
mishing, and  night  falling,  Crawfurd  commenced  a 
retreat.  The  weather  was,  however,  so  boisterous 
that  the  fire  soon  ceased,  and  a  few  men  wounded  and 
the  loss  of  some  baggage  was  all  the  hurt  sustained  ; 
yet  so  uncertain  is  every  thing  in  war,  that  this  afl^air 
had  like  to  have  produced  the  most  terrible  results  in 
another  quarter. 

The  division,  instead  of  marching  by  Caregada  and 
Cadafaes,  followed  the  route  of  Sobral,  and  was 
obliged  in  the  dark  to  make  a  flank  mai-ch  of  several 
miles  along  the  f)ot  of  the  Lines  to  gain  Aruda,  which 
was  meanwhile  left  open  to  the  enemy.  In  this  state, 
the  cavalry  patroles  from  Villa  Franca,  meeting  some 
stragglers  and  followers  of  the  camp  near  Caregada, 
were  by  them  told  that  the  light  division  was  cut  off; 
a  report  confirmed  in  some  measure  by  the  unguarded 
«late  of  Aruda.  and  by  the  presence  of  the  enemy's 


scouts  on  that  side.  This  information  alarmed  generaS 
Hill  for  the  safety^of  the.  second  line,  and  the  more  sc 
that  the  weakest  part  was  in  the  vicinity  of  Aruda  ; 
he  therefore  made  a  retrograde  movement  lowanis  Al- 
verca  with  a  view  to  watch  the  valley  of  Calandrix,  or 
to  gain  the  pass  of  Bu(-ellas  according  to  circum- 
stances. Hence,  when  the  enemy  was  in  full  march 
agaii  rt  the  Lines,  the  front  from  Alhandra  to  the  forts 
above  Sobral,  a  distance  of  eisfht  or  nine  miles,  wa8 
quite  disgarnished  of  troops.  The  true  state  of  affairs 
was,  however,  quickly  ascertained,  and  Hill  regained 
Alhandra  before  day-light  on  the  lllh. 

During  this  time  the  second  and  the  eighth  corps 
passed  Alemqner,  the  former  marching  upon  Villa 
Franca,  the  latter  upon  Sobral.  Reynier's  movementa 
on  the  French  left  were  languid,  he  did  not  discover 
the  unguarded  state  of  Alhandra,  and  his  picqucts 
did  not  enter  Villa  Franca  until  late  the  next  day. 
But  on  the  right  general  Clausel,  one  of  the  most 
distinguished  olficers  in  the  French  army,  coming  up- 
on Sobral,  in  the  dusk,  with  the  head  of  the  eighth 
corps  dislodged  the  troops  of  the  first  division,  occu- 
pied the  ridge  on  which  the  town  is  built,  and  in  the 
night  threw  up  some  enfrenchiiieiits  close  under  tho 
centre  of  the  allies'  position. 

It  is  however  time  to  give  a  more  detailed  descrip- 
tion of  those  celebrated  works,  improperly  called 

THE  LINES  OF  TORRES  VEDRAS. 

It  has  been  already  said,  that  they  consisted  of  three 
distinct  ranges  of  defence.* 

The  first,  extending  from  Alhandra  on  the  Tagns  to 
the  mouth  of  the  Zizandre  on  t!ie  sea-coast,  was, 
following  the  inflections  of  the  hills,  twenty-nine  miles 
long. 

The  second,  traced  at  a  distance  varying  from  six  to 
ten  miles  in  rear  of  the  first,  stretched  from  Quintella 
on  the  Tagus  to  the  mouth  of  the  St.  Lorenza,  being 
twenty-four  miles  in  length. 

The  third,  intended  to  cover  a  forced  embarkation, 
extended  from  Passo  d'Arcos  on  the  'i'agns  to  tho 
tower  of  .Tunquera  on  the  coast.  Here  an  outer  line, 
constructed  on  an  opening  of  three  thousand  yards, 
enclosed  an  entrenched  camp  designed  to  cover  the 
embarkation  with  fewer  troops,  should  the  operation 
be  delayed  by  bad  weather;  within  this  second  camp. 
Fort  St.  Julian's  (whose  high  ramparts  and  deep 
ditches  defied  an  escalade)  was  armed  and  strengthened 
to  enable  a  rear-guard  to  protect  both  itself  and  the 
army. 

The  nearest  part  of  the  second  line  was  twenty-four 
miles  from  these  works  at  Passo  d'Arcos.  and  some 
parts  of  the  first  line  were  two  long  marches  distant;  but 
the  principal  routes  led  through  I/isbon,  where  mea- 
sures were  taken  to  retard  the  enemy  and  give  time 
for  the  embarkation. 

Of  these  stupendous  Lines,  the  second,  whether 
regarded  for  its  strength  or  importance,  was  undoubt- 
edly the  principal;  the  others  were  only  appendages, 
the  one  as  a  final  place  of  refuge,  the  other  as  an  ad- 
vanced work  to  stem  the  first  viohnice  of  the  enemy, 
and  to  enable  the  army  to  take  up  its  ground  on  the 
second  line  without  hurry  or  pressure.  Massena  hav- 
ing, however,  wasted  the  summer  season  on  the  fron- 
tiers, the  first  line  acquired  such  strength,  both  from 
labour  and  from  the  fall  of  rain,  that  lord  Wellington 
resolved  to  abide  his  opponent's  charge  there. 

The  ground  presented  to  the  French  being,  as  it 
were,  divided  into  five  parts  or  positions,  shall  be 
described  in  succession  from  right  to  left. 

1 .  /Vom  Jllhandra  io  the  head  of  (he  valley  of  Calan' 
Jrix.     This  distance,  of  about  five  miles,  was  a  con- 

*  Meiiiomnla  of  the  lines,  A,r..,  by  Col.  J.  T.  Jones,  Roval 
Engiueers,  printed  for  private  circulation. 


1810.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


309 


tinuons  and  lofty  rid^p,  defended  by  thirteen  redoubts,  | 
and  for  two  miles  rendered  inaccessible  by  a  scarp 
fifteen  to  twenty  feel  hiofh,  executed  along;  the  brow. 
It  was  (Tuarded  by  the  British  and  Portuguese  divis- 
ions under  oeneral  tl ill,  and  flanked  from  the  Tagus  by  a 
strnno  flotilla  of  gun  boat<;,  manned  by  British  seamen. 

2.  From  the  head  nf  the  vale  of  Calanchix  to  the  Pe 
de  Mnnte.  This  position,  also  five  miles  in  length, 
c.insisted  of  two  salient  mountains  forming  the  valley 
of  Aruda,  that  town  being  exactly  in  the  mouth  of 
the  pass.  Only  three  feeble  redoubts,  totally  incapa- 
ble of  stopping  an  enemy  for  an  instant,  were  con- 
structed here,  and  the  defence  of  the  ground  was 
entrusted  to  general  Cr.iwfurd  and    the  light  division. 

3.  The  Mnnte  As,raca.  This  lofty  mountain  over- 
lopped  the  adjacent  country  in  such  a  manner,  that 
from  its  summit  the  whole  of  the  first  line  could  be 
disJnctly  observpd.  The  right  was  separated  from 
the  Aruda  position,  by  a  deep  ravine  which  led  to 
nothing;  the  left  overlooked  the  village  and  valley  of 
Zibreira;  the  centre  overhung  the  town  of  f?obral. 
'I'iie  summit  of  this  mountain  was  crowned  by  an 
iinmense  redoubt,  mounting  twenty-five  guns,  and 
having  three  smaller  works,  containing  nineteen  guns, 
clustered  around  it.  The  garrisons,  amounting  to  two 
thousand  men,  were  supplied  by  Pack's  brigade ; 
and  on  the  reverse  of  the  position,  which  might  be 
about  four  miles  in  length,  the  fifth  division,  under 
general  Leilh,  was  posted  in  reserve. 

4.  tVam  the  valley  of  Zibreira  to  Torres  Vedrn^. 
This  position,  seven  miles  long,  was  at  first  without 
works  ;  because  it  was  only  when  the  rains  had  set 
in,  that  the  resolution  to  defend  the  first  line  perma- 
nently, was  adrpted.  But  the  ground  being  rough 
and  well  defined,  the  valley  in  front,  deep,  and  water- 
ed by  the  Zizandre,  now  become  a  considerable  river, 
it  presented  a  fine  field  of  battle  for  a  small  army. 
The  first  and  fourth,  and  a  sixth  division  formed  of 
troops  just  arrived  from  p]ngland  and  from  Cadiz, 
were  there  posted,  under  the  immediate  command  of 
lord  Wellington  himself,  whose  head -quarters  were 
fixed  at  Pero  Negro,  near  the  Secorra,  a  rock,  on  which 
a  telegraph  was  erected,  communicating  with  every 
part  of  the  Lines. 

5.  From  the  Keith's  nf  Torres  Vedras  to  the  mouth 
of  the  Zizandre.  The  right  flank  of  this  position  and 
the  pass  in  front  of  the  town  of  Torres  Vedras  were 
secured,  fi.rst,  by  one  great  redoubt,  mounting  forty 
guns;  secondly,  by  several  smaller  forts,  judiciously 
planted  so  as  to  command  all  the  approaches.  From 
these  works  to  the  sea  a  range  of  moderate  heights 
were  crowned  with  small  forts ;  but  the  chief  defence 
there,  after  the  rains  had  set  in,  was  to  be  found  in 
the  Zizandre,  which  was  not  only  unfordable,  but 
overflowed  its  banks,  and  formed  an  impassable  marsh. 
A  paved  road,  parallel  to  the  foot  of  the  hills,  ran 
along  the  whole  front;  that  is,  from  Torres  Vedras, 
by  Runa  Sobral  and  Aruda,  to  Alhandra.  This  was 
the  nature  of  the/Vsi  line  of  defence  ;  the  second  was 
slil!  more  formidable. 

1.  From  the  mouth  of  the  St.  Loiirenga  to  Mafra.  In 
this  distance  of  seven  miles,  there  was  a  range  of 
hills  naiurally  steep,  artificially  scarped,  and  covered 
l)V  a  deep,  and  in  many  parts  impracticable  ravine. 
The  salient  points  were  secured  by  forts,  which  flanked 
and  conmianded  the  few  accessible  points;  but  as  this 
line  was  extensive,  a  secondary  post  was  f(;rtified  a  few 
miles  in  the  rear,  to  secure  a  road  leading  from  Ereceira 
lo  C intra. 

2.  Un  the  right  of  the  above  line  the  Tapada.  or  royal 
park  (f  Mnfrn.  Here  there  was  some  open  ground  for 
an  attack.  Yet  it  was  strong,  and,  together  with  the 
pass  of  Mafra,  was  defended  by  a  system  of  fourteen 
redoubts,  constructed  with  great  labour  and  care,  well 
Considered  with   respect  to  th-"  natural  disposition  of  | 


the  ground,  and,  in  some  degree,  connected  with  the 
secondary  post  spoken  of  above  :  in  front,  the  Sierra 
de  Chypre,  covered  with  redoubts,  obstructed  all  aji- 
proaches  to  Mafra  itself. 

3.  From  the  Tapnda  to  the  pass  of  Bxiccllcs.  In  \\\\n 
space  of  ten  or  twelve  miles,  which  formed  the  middle 
of  the  second  line,  the  country  is  choked  by  the  Monte 
Chique,  the  Cabeca,  or  head  of  which  is  in  the  centre 
of,  and  overtopping  all  the  other,  mountain  masses. 
A  road,  conducted  along  a  chain  of  hills,  high  and 
salient,  hut  less  bold  than  any  other  parts  of  the  line, 
connected  Mafra  with  the  Cabega,  and  was  secured 
by  a  number  of  forts.  The  country  in  front  was 
extremely  diflicult,  and  a  second  and  stronger  range 
of  heights,  parallel  to  and  behind  the  first,  offered  a 
good  fighting  position,  which  could  only  be  approached 
with  artillery  by  the  connecting  road  in  front;  and  to 
reach  that,  either  the  Sierra  de  Chypre,  on  the  left,  or 
the  pass  of  the  Cabeca  de  Monte  Chique,  on  the  right, 
must  have  been  carried.  Now  the  works  covering  the 
latter  consisted  of  a  cluster  of  redoubts  constructed  oa 
the  inferior  rocky  heads  in  advance  of  the  Cabcga, 
and  completely  commanding  all  the  approaches,  and 
both  from  their  artificial  and  natural  strength,  nearly  im- 
pregnable to  open  force.  The  Cabega  and  its  inmiedi- 
diate  flanks  were  considered  secure  in  their  natural 
precipitous  streng-th  ;  and,  in  like  manner,  the  ridges 
connecting  the  Cabec^a  with  the  pass  of  Bncellas, 
being  impregnable,  were  left  untriuched,  save  the 
blocking  of  one  bad  mule  road  that  led  over  them. 

4.  From  Bncellas  to  the  low  ground  about  the  Tagtts. 
The  pass  of  Bncellas  was  difficult,  and  strongly  defend- 
ed by  redoubts  on  each  side.  A  ridge,  or  rather  a 
collection  of  impassable  rocks,  called  the  Sierra  de 
Serves,  stretched  to  the  right  for  two  miles  without  a 
break,  and  then  died  away  by  gradual  slopes  in  the 
low  ground  about  the  Tagus.  These  declivities  and 
the  flat  banks  of  the  river  offered  an  opening  two 
miles  and  a  half  wide,  which  was  laboriously  and 
carefully  strengtheiied  by  redoubts,  water-cuts,  and 
retrenchments,  and  connected  by  a  system  of  forts 
with  the  heights  of  Alhandra;  but  it  was  the  weakest 
part  of  the  whole  line  in  itself,  and  the  most  danger- 
ous from  its  proximity  to  the  valleys  of  Calandrix  and 
Aruda. 

There  were  five  roads  practicable  for  artillery  pier- 
cing the  frst  line  of  defence,  namely,  two  at  Torres 
Vedras,  two  at  Sobral,  and  one  at  Alhandra;  but  as 
two  of  these  united  again  at  the  Cabe<7a,  there  were, 
in  fact,  only  four  points  of  passage  through  the  second 
line,  that  is  to  say,  at  Mafra,  Monte  ('hiqae,  Bncellas, 
and  (Juintella  in  the  flat  ground.  The  aim  and  scope 
of  all  the  works  was  to  bar  those  passes  and  to  strength- 
en the  favourable  fighting  positions  between  them,  with- 
out impeding  the  moveinents  of  the  army-  Those 
were  attained,  and  it  is  certain  that  the  loss  nfthefrst 
line  would  not  have  been  injurious,  save  in  reputation, 
because  the  retreat  was  secure  upon  the  second  and 
stronger  line;  and  the  guns  of  the  first  were  all  of  in- 
ferior calibre,  mounted  on  common  truck  carriages,  and 
consequently  immoveable  and  useless  to  the  enemy. 

The  movements  of  the  allies  were  free  and  unfetter- 
ed by  the  works.  The  movements  of  the  French  army 
were  impeded  and  cramped  by  the  great  Monte  Junta, 
which,  rising  opposite  the  centre  of  the  first  line,  sent 
forth  a  spur  called  the  Sierra  de  Baragueda  in  a  slant- 
ing direction,  so  close  up  to  the  heights  of  Torres 
Vedras  that  the  narrow  pass  of  Runa  alone  separated 
them.  As  this  pass  vv-as  conmianded  by  heavy  re- 
doubts, Massena  was  of  necessity  obliged  to  dispose 
his  forces  on  one  or  other  side  of  the  Baragueda, 
and  he  could  not  transfer  his  army  to  either  without 
danger;  because  the  sierra,  although  not  impassable, 
was'difficult;  and  the  movement,  which  would  require 
time  and   arrangement,  could    aiway-    be    overlooked 


310 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XI 


from  the  Monte  Agracja,  whence,  in  a  few  hours,  the 
allied  forces  could  pour  down  upon  the  head,  flank,  or 
rear  of  the  French  while  in  march.  And  this  could  he 
done  with  the  utmost  rapidity,  because  communica- 
tions had  been  cut  by  the  engineers  to  all  important 
points  of  the  Lines,  and  a  system  of  signals  was  estab- 
lished, by  which  orders  were  transmitted  from  the 
centre  to  the  extremities  in  a  few  minutes. 

Thus  much  I  have  thought  fit  to  say  respecting  the 
Lines;  too  little  for  the  professional  reader,  too  much, 
perhaps,  for  a  general  history.  But  I  was  desirous  to 
notice,  somewhat  in  detail,  works,  more  in  keeping 
with  ancient  than  modern  military  labours  ;  partly  that 
a  just  idea  might  be  formed  of  the  talents  of  the  Brit- 
ish engineers  who  constructed  thiMii,  and  partly  to 
show  that  lord  Wellington's  measures  of  defence  were 
not,  as  some  French  military  writers  have  supposed, 
dependent  upon  the  first  line.  Had  that  been  stormed, 
the  standard  of  Portuguese  independence  could  still 
have  been  securely  planted  amidst  the  rocks  of  the 
second  position. 

To  occupy  fifty  miles  of  fortification,  to  man  one 
hundred  and  fifty  forts,  and  to  work  six  hundred  pieces 
of  artillery,  required  a  number  of  men;  but  a  great 
fleet  in  the  Tagus,  a  superb  body  of  marines  sent  out 
from  England,  the  civic  guards  of  Lisbon,  the  Portu- 
guese heavy  artillery  corps,  and  the  militia  and  orde- 
rian(,'a  of  Estremadura  furnished,  altogether,  a  powerful 
reserve.  The  native  artillery  and  the  militia  supplied 
all  the  garrisons  of  the  forts  on  the  second,  and  most 
of  those  on  the  first  line.  The  British  marines  occu- 
pied the  third  line  ;  the  navy  manned  the  gun-boats  on 
the  river,  and  aided,  in  various  ways,  the  operation  in 
the  field.  The  recruits  from  the  dep  ts,  and  all  the 
men  on  furlough,  being  called  in,  rendered  the  Portu- 
guese army  stronger  than  it  had  yet  been  ;  and  the 
British  army,  reinforced,  as  I  have  said,  both  from 
Cadiz  and  England,  and  remarkably  healthy,  present- 
ed such  a  front  as  a  general  would  desire  to  see  in  a 
dangerous  crisis. 

It  was,  however,  necessary  not  only  to  have  strength, 
but  the  appearance  of  strength  ;  and  lord  Wellington 
had  so  dealt  with  Romana  that,  without  much  aiten- 
tion  to  the  wishes  of  his  own  government,  the  latter 
joined  the  allies  with  two  divisions.  Yet  the  English 
general  did  not  act  thus,  until  he  was  assured  that 
Massena's  force  was  insufficient  to  drive  the  British 
from  Lisbon.  He  felt  that  it  would  have  been  dis- 
lionest  to  draw  Rf)mana's  troops  into  a  corntir,  where 
they  could  not  (from  want  of  shipping)  have  escaped 
in  the  event  of  failure.  The  first  division  of  Spaniards, 
led  by  Romana  himself,  crossed  the  Tagus  at  Aldea 
CJallega  the  IDtli,  and  the  21th  was  posted  at  Enxara 
de  los  Cavalleros,  just  behind  the  Monte  Agra(;a  ;  the 
other  followed  in  a  few  days  ;  and  thus  before  the  end 
of  October,  not  less  than  one  hundred  and  thirty  thou- 
sand fighting  men  received  rations  within  the  Lines; 
more  than  seventy  thousand  being  regular  troops,  com- 
pletely disposable  and  unfettered  by  the  works. 

Meanwhile,  Mendizibel,  with  the  remainder  of  the 
Spanish  army,  reinforced  by  Madden's  Portuguese 
dragoons,  advanced  towards  Zafra.  Ballasteros,  at  the 
same  time  moved  upon  Araeena ;  and  Mortier,  igno- 
rant of  Fiomana's  absence,  retired  across  the  Morena 
on  the  8th,  to  be  near  Soult  who  was  then  seriously 
menacing  Cadiz.  Thus  fortune  combined,  with  the 
dispositions  of  tlie  English  general,  to  widen  the  dis- 
tance, and  to  diversify  the  objects  of  the  French  armies, 
at  the  moment  when  the  allies  were  concentrating  the 
greatest  force  on  the  most  important  point. 

Massena,  surprised  at  tlie  extent  and  strength  of 
works,  the  existence  of  which  had  only  become  known 
to  him  five  days  before  he  came  upon  them,  em))loy(Hl 
beveral  days  to  examine  their  nature.  The  heights  of 
Alhandra  he  judged  inattackable  ;  but  the  valleys  of 


Calandrix  and  Aruda  attracted  his  attention.  Through 
the  former  he  could  turn  Hill's  position,  and  come  at 
once  upon  the  weakest  part  of  the  second  line;  yet  the 
abattis  and  redoubts  erected,  and  hourly  strengthening, 
gave  liim  little  encouragement  to  attack  there  ;  the 
nature  of  the  ground  about  Aruda  also  was  such  that 
he  could  not  ascertain  what  number  of  troops  guarded 
it,  although  he  made  several  demonstrations,  and  fre- 
quently skirmished  with  the  light  division,  to  oblige 
Crawfurd  to  shew  his  fr.rce. 

That  general,  by  making  the  town  of  Aruda  an  ad- 
vanced post,  had  rendered  it  impossible  to  discover  his 
true  situation  without  a  serious  aiTair;  and,  in  an  in- 
credible short  space  of  time,  the  division  with  prodi- 
gious labour,  had  secured  the  position  in  a  manner 
really  worthy  of  admiration.  For  across  the  ravine  on 
the  left,  a  loose  stone  wall,  sixteen  feet  thick  and  forty 
feet  high,  was  raised  ;  and  across  the  great  valley  of 
Aruda,  a  double  line  of  abattis  was  drawn;  not  com- 
posed, as  is  usual,  of  the  limbs  of  trees,  but  of  full- 
grown  oaks  and  chestnuts,  dug  up  with  all  their  roots 
and  branches,  dragged,  by  main  force,  for  several 
hundred  yards,  and  then  reset  and  crossed,  so  that  no 
human  strength  could  break  through.  Breast-works, 
at  convenient  distances,  to  defend  this  line  cf  trees, 
were  then  cast  up;  and  along  the  summits  of  the 
mountain,  for  a  space  of  nearly  three  miles,  including 
the  salient  points,  other  stone  walls,  six  feet  high  and 
four  in  thickness,  with  banqaettes,  were  built;  so  that 
a  good  defence  could  easily  have  been  made  against 
the  attacks  of  twenty  thousand  men. 

The  next  points  that  drew  Massena's  attention  were 
the  Monte  Agra^a  and  the  vale  of  the  Upper  Zizandre, 
where,  from  the  recent  period  at  which  lord  Welling- 
ton had  resolved  to  offer  battle  on  the  first  line,  no  out- 
works had  been  constructed  ;  neither  the  valley  of 
Zibreira,  nor  the  hills  above  Runa,  had  been  fortified. 
Here  it  was  possible  to  join  battle  on  inore  equal  terms, 
but  the  position  of  the  allies  was  still  very  formidable; 
the  flanks  and  rear  were  protected  by  great  forts,  and 
not  only  was  a  powerful  mass  of  troops  permanently 
posted  there,  but  six  battalions,  drawn  from  Hill's 
corps,  and  placed  at  Bucellas,  could,  in  a  very  short 
time,  have  come  into  action. 

Beyond  Runa,  the  Baragueda  ridge  and  the  forts  of 
Torres  V'edras  forbad  any  flank  movement  by  the 
French  general ;  and  it  only  remained  for  him  to  dis- 
pose his  troops  in  such  a  manner  between  Villa  Franca 
and  Sobral  that,  while  the  heads  of  the  columns  men- 
aced the  weakest  points  of  the  Lines,  a  few  hours 
would  suffice  to  concentrate  the  whole  army  at  any 
part  between  the  Tagus  and  the  Baragu(-da  ridge.  The 
second  corps,  still  holding  the  hills  opposite  Alhandra, 
extended  its  right  along  some  open  ground  as  far  as 
Aruda  ;  and  being  covered,  at  that  point,  by  a  force  of 
cavalry,  was  connected  with  the  eighth  corps,  the  head 
of  which  was  pushed  forward  on  Sobral,  occupying 
the  lower  ridges  of  the  Baragueda,  and  lining  the  banks 
of  the  Zizandre  as  far  as  Duas  Portas  on  the  road  to 
Rima :  the  outposts  of  each  army  being  there  nearly 
in  contact. 

Massena  did  not  bring  the  sixth  corps  beyond  Otta, 
and  his  dispositions  were  not  made  without  several 
skirmishes,  (jspecially  near  Sobral,  on  the  morning  of 
the  1 1th,  where,  attempting  to  dislodge  the  seventy- 
first  regiment  from  a  field-work,  his  troops  were  re- 
pulsed, pursued,  and  driven  from  their  own  retrench- 
ments, which  were  iield  until  evening  ;  and  only 
evacuated  beca\ise  the  whole  of  the  eighth  corps  was 
advancing  for  the  purpose  of  permanently  establishing 
its  position.  Tlie  loss  of  the  allies  in  these  petty  af- 
fairs amounted  to  one  hundred  and  fifty,  of  which,  the 
greatest  part  fell  at  Sobral  ;  that  of  the  enemy  was 
estimated  higher.  The  English  general  Harvey  was 
wounded,  and  at  Villa  Franca  the  fire  of  the  gun-boata 


1810.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


311 


killed  the  French  gjeneral  St.  Croix,  a  young  man  of 
sig'nal  ability  and  promise. 

The  war  was  now  reduced  to  a  species  of  blockade. 
Massena's  object  was  to  feed  his  army  until  reinforce- 
ments reached  it ;  lord  Wellinotoii's  to  starve  the 
French  before  succour  could  arrive.  The  former  spread 
his  moveable  columns  in  the  rear  to  seek  for  provisions, 
and  commenced  forming  magazines  at  Santarem,  where 
liis  principal  depot  was  established  ;  but  the  latter 
drew  down  all  the  militia  and  ordenan(;a  of  the  nonh 
on  Massena's  rear,  putting  thern  in  communication 
will,  ihe  rrarrison  of  Peniche  on  one  side,  and  on  the 
other  with  the  militia  of  Lower  Beira.  Carlos  d'Espaiia 
albO,  crossing  the  Tagus  acted  between  Castello  Bran- 
co  and  Abrautes.  Thus  the  French  were  completely 
enclosed  without  any  weakening  of  the  regular  army. 

To  aid  the  communication  between  Peniche  and  the 
militia  of  the  North,  Obidos  surrounded  by  old  walls 
had  been  put  in  a  state  of  defence;  but  the  Portuguese 
government  having  neglected  to  furnish  it  with  pro- 
visions, it  had  been  evacuated.  Nevertheless,  major 
Fenwick  again  occupied  it  temporarily  with  three 
hundred  militia,  and  being  supported  by  a  Spanish  bat- 
talion and  by  a  strong  detachment  of  British  cavalry 
posted  at  Ranialhal,  hemmed  in  the  French  on  that 
side  ;  and  a  moveable  column,  under  colonel  Waters, 
issuing  from  Torres  Vedras,  made  incursions  against 
the  enemy's  marauding  detachments,  capturing  many 
piisoners,  and  part  of  a  considerable  convoy  which 
was  passing  the  Baragaeda.  The  French  were  thus 
continually  harassed,  yet  their  detachments  scoured 
the  whole  country,  even  beyond  Leiria,  and  obtained 
provisions  in  considerable  quantities. 

Meanwhile,  the  main  bodies  of  the  hostile  forces 
remained  quiet,  although  Massena's  right  was  greatly 
exposed.  Lord  Wellington  had  four  British  divisions 
and  Komana's  corps,  forming  a  mass  of  twenty-five 
thousand  men,  close  round  Sobral ;  and,  by  directing 
the  greatest  part  of  his  cavalry  and  the  six  battalions 
at  Bucellas,  upon  Aruda,  he  could  have  assembled  from 
eight  to  ten  thousand  men  there  also ;  these  last  ad- 
vancing a  short  distance  into  the  plain,  could,  in  con- 
junction with  Hill,  have  kept  the  second  corps  in 
check,  while  the  twenty-five  thousand,  pouring  down 
at  daylight  from  the  Monte  Agrat^a,  from  the  valley  of 
Zibreira,  and  from  the  side  of  Runa,  could  have  en- 
veloped and  crushed  the  head  of  the  eighth  corps  long 
before  the  sixth  could  have  reached  the  scene  of  action. 
But  war  is  a  '"•irious  and  complicated  web  !  and  while 
the  p'lrely  military  part  was  thus  happily  situated  and 
strong,  the  political  part  was  one  of  weakness  and 
alarm.  Scarcely  could  the  English  general  maintain  a 
defensive  attitude,  struggling  as  he  was  against  the  in- 
trigues and  follies  of  men  who  have,  nevertheless,  been 
praised  for  their  "  earnest  and  manly  co-operation."* 


CHAPTER  IX. 

State  of  Lisbon — Einba-go  on  the  vessels  in  the  river — Factious 
conduct  of  the  Patriarch — The  desponding;  letters  from  the 
army — T!ase  pnllcv  of  ministers — Alarm  of  lord  Liverpool  — 
[,ord  Wellington  displays  the  o;reatest  firniness,  vigour,  and 
dignity,  of  mind — He  rebukes  the  I-'ortuguese  Regency,  and 
exposes  the  duplicity  and  presumption  of  the  Patriarch's  fac- 
tion—  \  iolsnce  of  this  faijtion— f 'urious  revelation  made  by 
baron  then  and  the  editor  of  the  Braziliense — Lord  Welles- 
ley  awes  the  Court  of  Rio  Janeiro — Strengthens  the  authorily 
of  lord  Wellington  and  Mr.  Stuart — The  PVcnch  seize  the 
isl.in  Is  in  the  liver— Foolish  conduct  of  the  governor  of  Se- 
tuval — (J^neral  Vnne  sent  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Tagus — 
Lord  Wellington's  embarrassments  become  more  serious-- 
The  heights  of  Alniada  fortified — Violent  altercation  of  the 
Regency  upon  this  subject — The  Patriarch  insults  Mr.  Stuart 
and  nearly  ruins  the  common  cause. 


The  presence  of  the  enemy,  in  the  heart  of  the 
country,  embarrassed  the  finances,  and  the  Regency 
applied  to  England  for  an  additional  subsidy.  Mr. 
Stuart,  seeing  the  extreme  distress,  took  upon  himself 
to  direct  the  house  of  Sampayo  to  furnish  provisions 
to  the  troops  on  the  credit  of  the  first  subsidy  ;  he  also 
made  the  greatest  exertions  to  feed  the  fugitive  inhabi- 
tants, forty  thousand  of  whom  arrived  befire  the  13th 
of  October,  and  others  were  hourly  coming  in,  desti- 
tute and  starving.*  Corn,  to  be  purchased  at  any 
price,  was  sought  for  in  all  countries;  from  Ireland, 
America,  and  Egypt;  and  one  thousand  tons  of  gov- 
ernment shipping  were  lent  to  merchants  to  fetch 
grain  from  Algiers.  One  commission  of  citizens  was 
formed  to  facilitate  the  obtaining  cattle  and  corn  from 
the  northern  provinces ;  another  to  regulate  the  trans- 
port of  provisions  to  the  army,  and  to  push  a  trade 
wiih  Spain  through  the  Alemtejo.  Small  craft  were 
sent  up  the  Tagus  to  carry  off  both  the  inhabitants  and 
their  stock,  from  the  islands  and  from  the  left  bank  ; 
and  post-vessels  were  established  along  the  coast  to 
Oporto.  Bullion  and  jewels  were  put  on  board  the 
men  of  war;  a  proclamation  was  issued,  calling  upon 
the  people  to  be  tranfjuil,  and  a  strong  police  was  estab- 
lished to  enforce  this  object.  Finally,  to  supply  the 
deficiency  of  tonnage  created  by  the  sending  off  the 
transports  in  search  of  corn,  an  embargo  was  laid  upon 
the  port  of  Lisbon  ;  it  was  strongly  protested  against 
by  the  Americans,  but  an  imperious  necessity  ruled. 

Aii  these  measures  were  vehemently  opposed  by  the 
Patriarch  and  his  faction  ;  and  that  nothing  might  be 
wanting  to  shew  how  entirely  the  fate  of  the  Peninsula 
depended,  in  that  hour,  upon  lord  Wellinoton's  firm- 
ness, the  fears  of  the  British  cabinet,  which  had  been 
increasing  as  the  crisis  approached,  vrere  now  plainly 
disc  osed.  Their  private  letters  contained  hints  at  va- 
riance with  their  public  despatches.  They  evidently 
wished  their  general  to  abandon  the  country,  but  threw 
the  responsibility  upon  him  ;  they  were  unable  to  com- 
prehend his  genius  ;  they  thoug-ht  him  rash,  and  were 
themselves  unequal  to  the  crisis.  They  had  not  the 
manliness  either  to  resign  the  contest  or  to  carry  it  on 
with  vigour,  and  cast  their  base  policy  with  a  view 
only  to  their  own  escape  in  case  of  failure.  During 
the  retreat  from  the  north,  affairs  seemed  so  gloomy  to 
the  eyes  of  some  officers  of  rank,  that  their  correspon- 
dence bore  evidence  of  their  feelings ;  the  letters  of 
general  Spencer  and  general  Charles  Stewart  appeared 
so  desponding  to  lord  Liverpool,  that  he  transmitted 
them  to  Lord  Wellino-ton,  and  by  earnestly  demanding 
an  opinion  upon  their  contents,  showed  how  deeply 
they  had  disturbed  his  own  mind. 

Thus  beset  on  every  side,  the  English  general  rose 
like  a  giant.  Without  noticing  either  the  arguments  or 
the  forebodings  in  these  letters,  he  took  a  calm  histo- 
rical review  of  the  circumstances  which  had  induced 
him  to  defend  Portugal,  and  which  he  had  before  ex- 
plained to  the  very  minister  he  was  addressing;  then 
shewing  that,  up  to  that  period  his  opinions  had  been 
in  every  instance  justified  by  the  results,  he  assumed 
that  it  was  reasonable  to  confide  in  his  judgement  for 
the  future.  Having  thus  vindicated  his  prudence  and 
foresight,  he  traced  out  the  probable  course  of  coming 
events,  discussing  both  his  own  and  the  enemy's  do- 
signs,  and  that  with  such  sagacity  that  the  subsequent 
course  of  the  war  never  belied  his  anticipations.  This 
remarkable  letter  exists,  and,  were  all  other  records  of 
lord  Wellington's  .genius  to  be  lost,  it  would  alono 
suflice  to  vindicate  his  great  reputation  to  posterity. 

Having  with  conscious  superiority  replied  to  his 
own  government,  he,  with  a  fierceness  rendered  ne'>'>8- 
sary  by  the  crisis,  turned  upon  the  patriarch  and  his 
coadjutors.  Reproaching  them  for  their  unpatTiotic, 
foolish,  and  deceitful  conduct,  he  told  them  plainly  that 


*  See  Annals  of  the  Peuiusular  War,  Vol.  IL  p.  331.  ( 


•  Mr.  Stuart's  Papers.     MSS. 


312 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XT. 


they  were  unfaithful  servants  of  their  country  and  their 
prince  ;  and  threatened  to  withdraw  the  British  army 
altogether,  if  me  practices  of  which  he  complained 
were  not  amended. 

"  The  kiiitr  of  England  and  the  prince  reg-ent  of 
Portugal  iiad,"  he  saul,  "entrusted  him  with  the  con- 
duct of  the  military  operations,  and  he  would  not  suf- 
fer any  person  to  interfere.  He  knew  what  to  do,  and 
he  would  not  alter  his  plans  to  meet  the  senseless  sug- 
gestions of  the  Regency.  Let  the  latter  look  to  their 
own  duties!  Let  them  provide  food  for  the  army  and 
the  people,  and  keep  the  capital  tranquil."  '•  With 
principal  Souza,"  he  said,  "  it  was  not  possible  to 
act,  and,  if  that  person  continued  in  power,  the  country 
would  be  lost.  Either  the  principal  or  hinij^elf  must 
quit  their  employments;  if  himself,  he  would  take 
care  that  the  world  should  know  the  reasons  ;  mean- 
while he  would  address  the  prince  upon  the  conduct 
of  the  Regency. 

"  He  had  hoped,"  he  resumed  in  another  letter, 
"  that  the  Portuguese  government  was  satisfied  with 
his  acts,  and  that  instead  of  endeavouring  to  render  all 
defence  useless  by  disturbing  the  minds  of  the  popu- 
lace at  Lisbon,  they  would  have  adopted  measures  to 
secure  the  tranquillity  of  that  capital.  But,  like  other 
weak  individuals,  they  added  duplicity  to  weakness, 
and  their  past  expressions  of  approbation  and  gratitude 
he  supposed  were  intended  to  convey  censure.  All  he 
asked  from  them  was  to  preserve  tranquillity,  to  pro- 
vide food  for  their  own  troops  while  employed  in  the 
Lines,  and  to  be  prepared,  in  case  of  disaster,  to  save 
those  persons  and  their  families  who  were  obnoxious 
to  the  enemy."  "  I  have,"  he  said,  "  little  doubt  of 
final  success,  but  /  have  fought  a  sufficient  number  of 
battles  to  know,  that  the  result  of  any  is  not  certain,  even 
tvi/h  the  best  arrangenientsy 

These  reproaches  were  neither  too  severe  nor  ill- 
limed,  for  the  war  had  been  hanging  in  even  balance, 
and  the  weight  of  interested  folly  thus  thrown  in  by 
the  Regency,  was  becjinning  to  sink  the  scale.  Yet  to 
shew  the  justice  of  lord  Wellintrton's  complaints,  it  is 
necessary  to  resume  the  thread  of  those  intrigues  which 
have  been  before  touched  upon.  Instead  of  performing 
their  own  duties,  the  government  assumed,  that  the 
struggle  could  be  maintained  on  the  frontier,  and  when 
they  should  have  been  removing  the  people  and  the 
provisions  from  the  line  of  retreat,  they  were  discuss- 
ing the  expediency  of  military  operations  which  were 
quite  impracticable.  When  convinced  of  their  error 
by  facts,  they  threw  the  burthen  of  driving  the  country 
upon  the  general,  although  they  knew  that  he  was 
ignorant  even  of  the  names  and  places  of  abode  of 
those  officers  and  matristrates  who  were  to  execute  it, 
and  that  there  was  but  one  Portuguese  agent  at  head- 
quarters to  give  assistance  in  translating  the  necessary 
orders. 

When  this  was  remarked  to  them,  they  issued  the 
orders  themselves,  but  made  the  execution  referable  to 
the  general,  without  his  knowledge,  and  well  knowing 
that  he  had  no  means  of  communicating  with  the 
country  people,  and  this  at  the  very  moment  of  the 
enemy's  advance.  The  battle  of  Busaco,  by  delaying 
the  French  army,  had  ahme  enaliled  the  orders,  even 
to  reach  the  persons  to  whom  they  were  addressed. 
Bnt  it  was  the  object  of  the  Regency,  by  nourishing 
and  soothing  the  national  indolence,  to  tlirow  the 
odium  of  harsh  and  rigorous  measures  upon  the  British 
authorities.  Lord  Wellington,  however,  while  he  re- 
proached them  for  this  conduct,  never  shrunk  from  the 
odium  ;  he  avowed,  in  his  proclamations,  that  he  was 
th(;  author  of  the  plan  for  wasting  the  country,  and  he 
vas  willing  the  Regency  should  shelter  themselves 
nnder  his  name,  but  he  was  not  willing  to  lose  the  fruit 
of  his  responsibility,  nor  content  that  those  whose 
courage  did  shrink  from  the  trial,  "should  seek  popu- 


larity with  the  populace  at  the  expense  of  the  best  in- 
terests of  the  country." 

After  the  disputes  which  followed  the  fall  of  Almei- 
da, the  English  government  convinced  that  a  more 
secure  and  powerful  grasp  must  be  taken  of  Portuirni, 
permitted  their  envoy,  Mr.  Stuart,  to  have  a  seat  in  the 
Regency,  and  influenred  by  lord  Wellington,  insisted 
that  the  subsidy  should  be  placed  under  the  control  of 
the  British  instead  of  the  native  authorities.  Lord 
Wellesley  also  gave  assurances  that  if  the  army  was 
forced  to  quit  Lisbon,  the  Portuguese  troo})s  should  be 
carried  to  Oporto,  and  the  war  recommenced  in  that 
quarter;  but  Mr.  Stuart  very  prudently  reserved  this 
information  until  the  necessity  should  arrive,  well 
knowing  that  the  Patriarch  and  Souza,  who  had  al- 
ready proposed  to  go  there  themselves,  would  eagerly 
seize  the  occasion  to  urge  the  evacuation  of  Lisbon. 
The  2d  of  October,  Mr.  Stuart  took  his  seat,  and  to- 
gether with  doctor  Noguera,  the  Conde  de  Redondo, 
and  the  marquis  Olhao  (the  former  of  whom  was  de- 
cidedly averse  to  the  Souzas'  faction,  and  the  two  lat- 
ter moderate  in  their  conduct)  proceeded  to  control  the 
intrigues  and  violence  of  the  Patriarch  and  principal 
Souza.  It  was  full  time,  for  both  were  formally  pro- 
testing against  the  destruction  of  the  mills  in  Beira, 
and  vigorously  opposing  every  measure  proposed  by 
lord  Wellington. 

They  were  deeply  offended  by  the  suppression  of 
the  Lusitanian  legion,  which  about  this  time  w-as 
incorporated  with  the  regular  forces  ;  they  had  openly 
declared  that  the  Portuguese  troops  should  not  ictreat 
from  the  frontiers ;  and  that  if  the  enemy  obliged  the 
British  army  to  embark,  not  a  native,  whether  soldier 
or  citizen,  should  go  with  it.  When  the  allies,  not- 
withstanding this,  fell  back  to  the  Lines,  Souza  pro- 
posed that  the  Regency  should  fly  to  the  Algarves,  which 
being  indignantly  protested  against  by  Mr.  Stuar^ 
Souza  threatened  to  quit  the  government.  The  dis» 
pute  was  then  referred  to  lord  Wellington,  and,  on  tho 
Gth  of  October,  drew  from  him  those  severe  expressior  3 
of  which  an  abstract  has  been  given  above.  When 
the  army  approached  the  lines  Souza  proposed  that  the 
Portuguese  troops  should  remain  outside  while  the 
British  took  shelter  within  !  a  notion  so  preposterous 
as  almost  to  justify  marshal  Beresford's  observation 
that  he  knew  not  whether  the  proposer  were  more  fool, 
rogue,  or  madman. 

The  restless  Principal  however  pursued  his  designs 
with  activity,  and,  in  conjunction,  with  his  brothers 
and  the  Patriarch,  established  a  regular  and  system- 
atic opposition  to  lord  Wellington's  plans  of  defence. 
Factious  in  council,  they  were  also  clamorous  out  of 
doors,  where  many  echoed  thoir  sentiments,  from 
anger  at  some  wanton  ravages,  that  in  despite  of  the 
general's  utmost  efforts,  had  marked  the  retreat.  Th^y 
courted  the  mob  of  Lisbon  servilely  and  grossly ; 
and  Antonio  Souza  getting  the  superintendence  of  the 
succours  for  the  fugitive  population,  became  the  avowed 
patron  of  all  persons  preferring  complaints.  He  tnok 
pains  to  stimulate  and  exasperate  the  public  griefs, 
and  to  exagrjrerate  the  causes  of  them,  frequently 
hinting  that  the  Portuguese  people  and  not  the  British 
army  had  formerly  driven  out  the  French.  All  these 
calumnies  being  echoed  by  the  numerous  friends 
and  partisans  of  the  caballers,  and  by  the  fidalgos, 
who  endeavoured  to  spread  discontent  as  widely  as 
possible,  there  wanted  but  slight  encouragnment  from 
the  Brazils,  to  form  a  national  party,  and  openly  attaciC 
the  conduct  of  the  wur. 

To  obtain  this  encouragement,  Raymundo,  the  oiJ 
tool  of  the  partv  in  the  Oporto  violences,  was  sent  to 
the  court  of  Rio  Janeiro,  to  excite  the  prince  reofent 
against  lord  Wellington-,  and  the  Patriarch  himself 
wrote  to  the  prince  of  vVales  and  to  the  duke  of  Sus- 
sex, thinking  to  incense  them  also  against  the  English 


1810.J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


313 


general.  But  the  extent  and  nature  of  the  intrigues 
may  be  estimated  from  a  revelation  made  at  the  time 
by  baron  Eben,  and  by  the  editor  of  a  Lisbon  newspa- 
per, called  the  Braziliense. 

Those  persons  abandoninar  the  faction,  asserted  that 
the  Patriarch,  the  Souzas,  and  (while  he  remained  in 
Portugal)  the  ex-plenipntentiary,  Mr.  Villiers,  were 
pprsnnally  opposed  to  lord  Wellington,  marshal  Beres- 
ford,  and  Mr.  de  Forjas,  and  were  then  seeking  to 
remove  them  from  their  siUiaiions,  and  to  get  the  duke 
of  Brunswick  appointed  generalissimo  in  place  of 
Beresford.  This  part  of  the  project  was  very  natural- 
ly aided  by  the  Princess  of  Wales  ;  and  the  caballers 
in  London  had  also  sounded  the  Duke  of  Sussex,  but 
he  repulsed  them  at  the  outset.  Part  of  their  plan 
was  to  engage  a  newspaper  to  be  their  organ  in  London 
as  the  "  Braziliense'''  was  in  Lisbon ;  and  in  their 
correspondence  they  designated  lord  Wellington  b}"^  the 
name  of  Jlheroju,  lord  Wellesley  Lama,  Beresford 
Ferus;em,  Mr.  Stuart  Lnbre,  the  Patriarch  Saxe,  Anto- 
nio Souza  Lamberti,  colonel  Bunbury  and  Mr.  Peel, 
the  under-spcretaries  of  stale,  Thin  and  Byfhin,  sir 
Robert  Wilson  De  Camp,  lord  Liverpool  Husband,  Mr. 
Villiers  Fatut,  Mr.  Casamajor  Parvenu,  and  so  on  of 
many  others.  After  Mr.  Villiers' departure  the  intrigue 
was  continued  by  the  Patriarch  and  the  Souzas,  but  upon 
a  ditferent  plan;  for,  overborne  by  Mr.  Stuart"s  vigour 
in  the  council,  they  agreed  to  refrain  from  openly 
opposing  either  him  or  Forjas,  but  resolved  to  write 
down  what  either  might  utter,  and  transmit,  that  which 
suited  their  purpose,  to  the  ('onde  de  Liuhares  and  the 
chevalier  Souza,  who  undertook  to  represent  the  in- 
formation so  received,  after  their  own  fashion,  to  the 
cabinets  of  St.  James'  and  Rio  Janeiro. 

Mr.  Stuart  having  thus  obtained  their  secret,  was 
resolute  to  suppress  their  intrigues  ;  hut  first  endeav- 
oured to  put  them  from  their  misrhievous  designs, 
by  the  very  humorous  expedient  of  writing  a  letter 
to  Domingo  Souza,  in  his  own  cypher,  warning  him 
and  his  coadjutors  not  to  proceed,  as  their  party  was 
insecure,  while  Mr.  Stuart,  lord  Wellington,  Beres- 
ford, and  Forjas  being  united  and  resolved  to  crush  all 
opposition,  might  be  made  friends  but  would  prove 
dangerous  enemies  !  This  had  apparently  some  effect 
at  first,  but  Principal  Souza  would  not  take  any  hint,  and 
the  violent  temper  of  the  Patriarch  soon  broke  forth 
again.  He  made  open  display  of  his  hostility  to  the 
English  general ;  and  it  is  worthy  of  observation,  that, 
while  thus  thwarting  every  measure  necessary  to  resist 
the  enemy,  his  faction  did  not  hesitate  to  exercise  the 
most  odious  injustice  and  cruelty  against  those  whom 
tbpy  denominated  well-wishers  to  the  French,  provided 
they  were  not  of  the  Fidalgo  faction.  By  a  decree  of 
the  prince  regent's,  dated  the  20th  of  ^larch,  1809, 
private  denunciations  in  cases  of  disaffection,  were 
permitted,  the  informer's  name  to  be  kept  secret;  and 
in  September  1810,  this  infamous  system,  although 
strenuously  opposed  by  Mr.  Stuart,  was  acted  upon, 
and  many  persons  suddenly  sent  to  the  islands,  and 
others  thrown  into  dungeons.  Some  might  have  been 
guilty  ;  and  the  government  pretended  that  a  traitorous 
correspondence  with  the  enemy  was  carried  on 
through  a  London  house,  which  they  indicated  ;  but  it 
does  not  appear  that  a  direct  crime  was  brought  home 
to  any,  and  it  is  certain  that  many  innocent  persons 
were  oppressed. 

All  these  things  shewing  that  vigorous  measures 
were  necessary  to  prevent  the  ruin  of  the  general 
cause,  lord  Wellesley  dealt  so  with  the  Brazilian 
court,  that  every  intrigue  there  was  soon  crushed, 
lord  Wellington's  power  in  Portugal  was  confirmed, 
and  his  proceedings  approved  of.  Authority  was  also 
given  him  to  dismiss  or  to  retain  Antonio  Souz?.  and 
even  to  remove  lord  Strangford,  the  British  envoy 
at   Rio   Janeiro,   who   had   been    the  contriver  of  the 


obnoxious  cliange  in  the  members  of  the  Regency, 
and  whose  proceedings  generally  were  in  unison  with 
the  malcontents  and  mischievously  opposed  to  lord 
W"ellington's  and  Mr.  Stuart's  policy  in  Portugal. 
The  subsidies  were  placed  under  lord  Wellington's 
and  Mr.  Stuart's  control,  and  admiral  Berkeley  was 
appointed  to  a  seat  in  the  Regency;  in  fine^  Portugal 
was  reduced  to  the  condition  of  a  vassa.  state ;  a 
policy  which  could  never  have  been  attempted,  how- 
ever necessary,  if  the  people  at  large  had  not  been 
willing  to  acquiesce.  But  firm  in  their  attachment  to 
independence  and  abhorring  the  invaders,  they  submit- 
ted cheerfully  to  this  temporary  assumption  of  com- 
mand ;  and  fully  justified  the  sagacity  of  the  man 
who  thus  dared  to  grasp  at  the  whole  power  of 
Portugal  with  one  hand,  while  he  kept  the  power  of 
France  at  bay  with  the  other. 

Although  so  strongly  armed,  lord  Wellington  re- 
moved no  person,  but  with  equal  prudence  and  mod- 
eration reserved  the  exercise  of  this  great  authority 
until  further  provocation  should  render  it  absolutely 
necessary.  This  remedy  for  the  disorders  above  re- 
lated was  however  not  perfected  for  a  long  time,  nor 
until  after  a  most  alarirting  crisis  of  affairs  had  been 
brought  on  by  the  conduct  of  the  Lisbon  cabal,  of 
which  notice  shall  be  taken  hereafter. 

From  the  strength  of  the  Lines,  it  was  plain  that  offen- 
sive operations  were  more  to  be  dreaded  on  the  left, 
than  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Tagus.  In  the  Alemtejo, 
the  enemy  could  more  easily  subsist,  inore  effectually 
operate  to  the  injury  of  Lisbon,  and  more  securely 
retreat  upon  his  own  resources.  Lord  Wellington  had 
therefore  repeatedly  urged  the  Regency  to  oblige  the 
inhabitants  to  carry  off  their  herds  and  grain  from 
that  side,  and  from  the  numerous  islands  in  the  river, 
and  above  all  things  to  destroy  or  remove  every  boat. 
To  effect  this  a  commission  had  been  appointed  ;  but 
so  many  delays  and  obstacles  were  interposed  by  the 
Patriarch  and  his  coadjutors,  that  the  commissioners 
did  not  leave  Lisbon  until  the  enemy  was  close  upon 
the  river,  both  banks  being  still  stocked  witK  cattle 
and  corn,  and  what  was  worse,  forty  large  boats  being 
on  the  right  side.  This  enabled  the  French  to  seize 
the  islands  especially  Lizirias,  where  they  obtained 
abundance  of  provisions  ;  and  while  the  Regency  thus 
provided  for  the  enemy,  they  left  the  fortresses  of 
Palmella.  St.  Felippe  de  Setuval,  and  Abrantes  with 
ernpty  magazmes. 

Lord  Wellington  thinking  that  the  nrdenanca  on 
the  left  bank,  of  whom  five  hundred  were,  contrary  to 
his  wishes,  armed  with  English  muskets  and  fur- 
nished with  two  ])ieces  of  artillery,  would  be  suffi- 
cient to  repel  any  plundering  parties  attempting  to  cross 
the  Tagus,  was  unwilling  to  spare  men  from  the  Lines  : 
he  wanted  numbers  there,  and  he  also  judged  that  the 
ordenancja  would,  if  once  assisted  by  a  regular  force, 
leave  the  war  to  their  allies.  Meanwhile  Antnnio 
Souza  was  continually  urging  the  planting  of  ambus- 
cades, and  other  like  frivolities,  upon  the  left  bank  of 
the  Tagus,  and  as  his  opinions  were  spread  abroad  by 
his  party,  the  governor  of  Setuval  adopted  the  idea, 
and  suddenly  advanced  with  his  garrison  to  Salvatierra 
on  the  river  side. 

This  ridiculous  movement  attracted  the  enemy's  at- 
tention, and  lord  Wellington  fearing  they  would  pass 
over  a  detachment,  disperse  the  Portuguese  troops,  and 
seize  Setuval  before  it  could  be  succoured,  perempto- 
rily ordered  the  governor  to  return  to  that  fortress. 
This  retrograde  movement  caused  the  dispersion  of  the 
ordenanca,  and  consternation  reigned  in  the  Alemtejo  j 
the  supply  of  gnin  coming  from  Spain  was  st..ij|)ed, 
the  chain  of  communications  broken,  and,  the  alarm 
spreading  to  Lisbon,  there  was  no  remedy  but  to  send 
general  Fane,  with  some  guns  and  Portuguese  cavalry, 
that  could  be  ill  spared  from   the   Lines,  to  that  side. 


314 


NAPIER'S    PENIx\SULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XI. 


Fane  immediately  destroyed  all  the  boats  he  could 
find,  hastened  the  removal  of  provisions  and  patrolling 
tlie  banks  of  tlie  river  as  high  as  the  mouth  of  the 
Zezere,  kept  a  strict  watch  upon  the  enemy's  move- 
ments. 

Other  embarrassments  were  however  continually 
arising.  The  number  of  prisoners  in  Lisbon  had  ac- 
cumulated so  as  to  become  a  serious  inconvenience  ; 
fur  the  Admiralty,  pretending  to  be  alarmed  at  r.  fever 
generated  by  the  infamous  treatment  the  prisoners  re- 
ceived at  the  hands  of  the  Portuiruese  government, 
refused  permission  to  have  them  transported  to  Eng- 
land, in  vessels  of  war,  and  other  ships  could  not  be 
h?.d.  Thus  the  rights  of  humanity,  and  the  good  of 
the  service,  wt-re  alike  disregarded,  for  had  there  been 
real  danger,  lord  Wellington  would  not  have  con- 
tinually ur<ied  the  measure.  About  this  time  also 
admiral  Berkeley,  whose  elaborate  report  the  year  be- 
fore, stati'd  that,  although  the  enemy  should  seize  the 
heights  of  Almada,  he  could  not  injure  the  fleet  in 
the  river,  admitted  that  he  was  in  error ;  and  the  en- 
gineers were  directed  to  construct  secondary  lines  on 
that  side. 

Another  formidable  evil,  arising  from  ihe  conduct  of 
the  Regency,  was  the  state  of  the  Portuguese  army. 
The  troops  were  so  ill  supplied  that  more  than  once 
they  would  have  disbanded,  had  they  not  been  relieved 
from  the  Briiish  magazines.  Ten  thousand  soldiers 
of  the  line  deserted  between  April  and  December,  and 
of  the  militia  two  thirds  were  absent  from  their  co- 
lours; for,  as  no  remonstrance  could  induce  the  Re- 
gency to  put  the  laws  in  force  against  the  delinquents, 
that  which  was  at  first  the  effect  of  want  became  a 
habit ;  so  that  even  when  regularly  fed  from  the  Brit- 
ish stores  within  the  Lines,  the  desertion  was  alarm- 
ingly great. 

Notwithstanding  the  mischiefs  thus  daily  growing 
up,  neither  the  Patriarch  nor  the  Principal  ceased  their 
opposition.  The  order  to  fortify  the  heights  of  Alma- 
da caused  a  violent  altercation  in  the  Regency,  lord 
Wellington,  greatly  incensed,  denounced  them  to  the 
Prince  Regent,  and  his  letter  produced  such  aparox3fsm 
of  anffor  in  the  Patriarch,  that  he  personally  insulted 
Mr.  Stuart,  and  vented  his  passion  in  the  most  inde- 
c-c'.'nt  language  against  the  general.  Soon  after  this, 
the  deplorable  state  of  the  finances  obliged  the  govern- 
ment to  resort  to  the  dangerous  expedient  of  requisi- 
tions in  kind  for  the  feeding  of  tlie  troops  :  and  in  that 
critical  moment  the  Patriarch,  whose  influence  was, 
from  various  causes,  very  great,  took  occasion  to  de- 
clare that  '•  he  would  not  suffer  burthens  to  be  laid 
upon  the  people  which  were  evidently  for  no  other 
purpose  than  to  nourish  the  war  in  the  heart  of  the 
kingdom  y 

But  it  was  his  and  his  coadjutors'  criminal  conduct 
that  really  nourished  the  war,  for  there  were  ample 
means  to  have  carried  off  in  time,  ten-fold  the  quantity 
of  provisions  left  for  the  enemy.  Massena  could  not 
then  have  remained  a  week  before  the  Lines,  and  his 
retreat  would  have  been  attended  with  famine  and  dis- 
aster, if  the  measures  previously  agreed  to  by  the 
Regr»ncy  had  been  duly  executed.  Whereas  now,  the 
country  about  Thomar,  Torres  Novas,  GoUegao,  and 
Santarem  was  absolutely  untouched  ;  the  inhabitants 
remained,  the  mills,  but  little  injured,  were  quickly 
repaired,  and  lord  Wellington  had  the  deep  mortifica- 
tion to  find,  that  his  well  considered  design  was  frus- 
trated by  the  very  persons  from  whom  he  had  a  right  to 
expect  the  most  zealous  support.  There  was,  indeed, 
every  reason  to  believe  that  the  prince  of  Esliiig  would 
be  enabled  to  maintain  his  positions  until  an  over- 
whelminnr  force  should  arrive  from  Spain  to  aid  him. 
"  Tl  is  keart-hrenkini;,'"  was  the  bitter  reflection  of  the 
iJritish  general,  "  to  contemplate  the  chance  of  failure 
from  such  obstinacy  andfollyy 


CHAPTER  X. 

Massena's  pertinacity — He  collects  boats  on  the  Tagus,  and 
estabiislics  a  depot  al  Santarem — Sends  general  Fo)'  to  Paris 
— Casts  a  bridge  over  the  Zezere — Abandons  his  position  in 
front  of  the  Lines — Is  followed  by  lord  Wellington — Exploit 
of  serjoant  Baxter — Massena  assumes  the  position  of  Santa- 
rem— Lord  Wellington  sends  general  Hill  across  the  Tagui 
—  Prepares  to  attack  the  P^reiich — Abandons  tliis  design,  and 
assumes  a  peri\ianent  position — Policy  of  the  hostile  general* 
exposed — General  Gardaiine  arrives  at  Cardigos  with  a  con- 
voy, but  retreats  again — The  French  marauders  spread  to 
the  Mondego — Lord  Wellington  demands  reinforcements — 
Beresford  takes  the  command  on  the  left  of  the  Tagus — 
Operations  of  the  militia  in  Beira — General  Droutt  enters 
Portugal  with  the  ninth  corps— Joins  Massena  at  Fspiiihal^ 
Occupies  Leiria — Claparede  defeats  Silveira  and  takes  La- 
niego — Returns  to  the  Mondego — Seizes  Guarda  and  Covil- 
hoa — Foy  returns  from  France — The  duke  of  Al)rantes 
wounded  in  a  skirmish  at  Rio  Mayor — General  Pam|)lona  or- 
ganizes a  secret  communication  with  Lisbon — Observations. 

The  increasing  strength  of  the  works,  and  the  report 
of  British  deserters  (unhappily  very  numerous  at  this 
period,)  soon  convinced  Massena  that  it  was  impracti- 
cable to  force  the  Lines  without  great  reinforcements. 
His  army  suffered  from  sickness,  from  the  irregular 
forces  in  the  rear,  and  from  the  vengeance  of  individu- 
als, driven  to  despair  by  the  excesses  which  many 
French  soldiers,  taking  advantage  of  the  times,  com- 
mitted in  their  foraging  courses.  Nevertheless,  with 
an  obstinate  pertinacity,  only  to  be  appreciated  by  those 
who  have  long  made  war,  the  French  general  main- 
tained his  forward  position,  until  the  country  for  many 
leagues  behind  him  was  a  desert;  and  then,  reluctant- 
ly yielding  to  necessity,  he  sought  for  a  fresh  camp  in 
which  to  make  head  against  the  allies,  while  his  fora- 
gers searched  more  distant  countries  for  food. 

Early  in  October  artillery  oflicers  had  been  directed 
to  collect  boats  for  crossing  both  the  Tagus  and  the 
Zezere.  Montbrun's  cavalry,  stretching  along  the  right 
bank  of  the  former,  gathered  provisions,  and  stored 
them  at  Santarem  ;  and  both  there  and  at  Barquina  (a 
creek  in  the  Tagus,  below  the  mouth  of  the  Zezere,) 
rafts  were  formed  and  boats  constructed  with  wheels, 
to  move  from  one  place  to  another,  but,  from  the  ex- 
treme paucity  of  materials  and  tools,  the  progress  was 
necessarily  slow.  Meanwhile,  Fane,  reinforced  by 
some  infantry,  watched  them  closely  from  the  left 
bank;  Carlos  d'Espatla  came  down  from  Castello 
Branco  to  Abrantes  ;  Trant  acted  sharply  on  the  side 
of  Ourem,and  Wils.m's  Portuguese  militia  so  infested 
the  country  from  Espinhal  to  the  Zezere,  that  Loison's 
division  was  detached  upon  Thomar  to  hold  him  in 
check. 

Towards  the  end  of  October,  however,  all  the  hos- 
pitals, stores,  and  other  incumbrances  of  the  French 
army  were  removed  to  Santarem;  and,  on  the  31st, 
two  thousand  men  forded  the  Zezere  above  Punhete  to 
cover  the  construction  of  a  bridge.  From  this  body, 
four  hundred  infantry  and  two  hundred  dragoons,  under 
general  Foy,  moved  against  Abrantes,  and,  after  skir- 
mishing with  the  garrison,  made  towards  Sobreira 
Formosa,  when  the  allies'  bridge  at  Villa  Velha  waa 
foolishly  burnt ;  but  Foy,  with  a  smaller  escort,  imme- 
diately pushed  for  Pena  Macor,  and  the  8th  had  gained 
Ciudad  Rodrigo,  on  bis  way  to  France,  having  under- 
taken to  carry  information  of  the  state  of  affairs  to 
Napoleon  ;  a  task  which  he  performed  with  singular 
rapidity,  courage,  and  address.  The  remainder  of  his 
escort  retiring  down  the  Zezere,  were  attacked  by  Wil- 
son, and  suffered  some  loss. 

The  bridge  on  the  Zezere  was  destroyed  by  floods, 
the  6th  of  November,  but  the  enemy  having  entrench- 
ed the  height  over  Punhete,  restored  it,  and  cast  a 
second  at  Martinchel,  higher  up  the  river.  Massena 
then  commenced  his  retrograde  march,  but  with  great 
caution,  because  his  position  was  overlooked  from  the 


1810. 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


315 


Monte  Agra^a,  and  the  defile  of  Alemquer  being  in  the 
rear  of  the  eighth  corps,  it  was  an  operation  of  some 
danger  to  withdraw  from  before  the  Lines.  To  cover 
the  movement  from  the  knowledge  of  the  Partizans  in 
the  rear,  Monlbrun's  cavalry  marrhed  upon  Leiria,  and 
his  delachnienls  scoured  the  roads  to  Pombal,  on  the 
one  side,  and  towards  the  Zezere,  on  the  other.  Mean- 
while the  sixth  corps  marched  from  Otta  and  Alem- 
quer to  Thomar,  and  Loison  removed  to  Golegao  with 
his  division,  reinforced  by  a  brigade  of  dragoons. 

ThQse  dispositions  being  made,  general  Clausel 
withdrew  from  Sobral  during  the  night  of  the  14lh, 
and  the  whole  of  the  eighth  corps  passed  the  defile  in 
the  morning  of  the  15th,  under  the  protection  of  some 
cavalry,  left  in  front  of  Aruda,  and  of  a  strong  rear- 
guard on  the  height  covering  Alemquer.  The  second 
corps  then  retreated  from  Alhandra  by  the  royal  cause- 
way upon  Santarem,  while  the  eighth  corps  marched 
by  Alcoentre  upon  Alcanhede  and  Torres  Novas. 

This  movement  was  not  interrupted  by  Lord  Wel- 
lington. The  morning  of  the  15th  proved  foggy,  and 
it  was  some  hours  after  day-break  ere  he  perceived  the 
void  space  in  his  front  which  disclosed  the  ability  of 
the  French  general's  o])erations.  Fane  had  reported 
on  the  14th  that  boats  were  collecting  at  Santarem,  and 
information  arrived  at  the  same  time  that  rcinforcemenis 
for  Masseaa  were  on  the  march  from  Ciudad  Rodrigo. 
The  enemy's  intention  was  not  clearly  developed.  It 
might  be  a  retreat  to  Spain;  it  might  be  to  pass  round 
the  Monte  .Junta,  and  so  push  the  head  of  his  army  on 
Torres  Vedras,  while  the  allies  were  following  the 
rear.  Lord  Wellington,  therefore,  kept  the  principal 
part  of  the  army  stationary,  but  directed  the  second 
and  light  divisions  to  follow  the  enemy,  the  former 
along  tlie  causeway  to  Villa  Franca,  the  latter  to  Alem- 
quer; at  the  same  time  he  called  up  liis  cavalry,  and 
requested  admiral  Berkeley  to  send  all  the  boats  of  the 
fleet  up  the  Tagus,  to  enable  the  allies  to  pass  rapidly 
to  the  other  bank,  if  necessary. 

Early  on  the  lOth  the  enemy  was  tracked,  marching 
in  two  columns,  the  one  upon  Rio  Mayor,  the  other 
upon  Santarem.  Having  passed  Alcoentre,  it  was  clear 
that  he  had  no  views  on  Torres  Vedras ;  but  whether 
he  was  in  retreat  to  cross  the  Zezere  by  the  bridges  at 
Punhete  and  Martinchel,  or  making  for  the  Mondego, 
•was  still  uncertain.  In  either  case,  it  was  important 
to  strike  a  blow  at  the  rear,  before  the  reinforcements 
and  convoy,  said  to  be  on  the  road  from  Ciudad  Kodri- 
gV.  could  be  met  with.  The  first  division  was  imme- 
diately brought  up  to  Alemquer,  the  fifth  entered  So- 
bral,  the  light  division  and  cavalry  marched  in  pursuit, 
and  four  hundred  prisoners  were  made,  principally 
marauders.  A  remarkable  exploit  was  performed  by 
one  Baxter,  a  sergeant  of  the  sixteenth  dragoons.  This 
man,  having  only  five  troopers  with  him,  came  sud- 
denly upon  a  piquet  of  fifty  men,  who  were  cooking, 
but  instantly  running  to  their  arms,  killed  one  of  the 
dragoons  ;  nevertheless  Baxter  broke  in  amongst  them 
so  strongly,  that  with  the  assistance  of  some  country- 
men, he  made  forty-two  captives.* 

The  17th,  the  eighth  corps  marched  upon  Alcanhede 
and  Pernes,  and  the  head  of  the  second  cor[)S  reached 
Santarem,  when  Fane,  deceived  by  some  false  move- 
ments, reported  that  they  were  in  full  retreat,  and  the 
troops  at  Santarem  only  a  rear-guard.  This  informa- 
tion seeming  to  be  confirmed  by  the  state  of  the  im- 
mense plains  skirting  the  Tagus,  which  were  left 
covered  with  straw-ricks,  it  was  concluded  that  Mas- 
sena  intended  to  pass  the  Zezere,  over  which  it  was 
known  that  he  had  cast  a  second  bridge.  Hill  was 
immediately  ordered  to  cross  the  Tagus  with  the 
second  division  and  thirteenth  dragoons,  and  move  \ip- 

*  Private  Journal  of  the  Hon.  Captain  Soniers  Cocks,  16th 
Dragoons. 


on  Abrantes,  either  to  succoi  r  that  fortress  or  to  head 
the  march  of  the  French.  Meanwhile,  the  fourth, 
fifth,  and  sixth  divisions  were  directed  upon  Alemquer, 
the  first  division  and  Pack's  brigades  upon  (^artaxo, 
and  the  light  division  reached  El  Valle  on  the  Itio 
Mayor.  At  this  village  there  was  a  considerable  rear- 
guard formed,  and  as  general  (^rawfurd  had  not  pro- 
fited from  the  lesson  on  the  Coa,  an  unequal  engage- 
ment would  have  ensued,  but  for  tiie  opportune  arrival 
of  the  commander-in-chief.  In  the  eveniu<r  the  enemy 
joined  their  main  body  on  the  heights  of  Santarem. 

Hitherto,  lord  Wellington,  regarding  the  sec\irity  of 
the  Lines  with  a  jealous  eye,  had  acted  very  caulimis- 
ly.  On  the  15th  and  IGth,  while  the  French  were  still 
hampered  by  the  defiles,  his  pursuit  was  even  slack, 
although  it  would  in  no  degree  have  risked  the  safety 
of  the  Lines,  or  of  the  pursuing  troops,  to  have  push- 
ed the  first,  second,  and  light  divisions  and  Pack's 
brigade  vigorously  against  the  enemy's  rear.  On  the 
18th,  however,  when  Hill  had  passed  the  'J'agus  at 
Villada,  and  Fane  was  opposite  to  Abrantes,  the 
English  general,  whether  deceived  by  false  reports, 
or  elated  at  this  retrograde  movement,  this  proof  of  his 
own  superior  sagacity,  prepared,  with  a  small  force,  to 
assail  what  he  then  thought  the  rear  guard  of  an  army 
in  full  retreat.  But  the  French  general  had  no  inten- 
tion of  falling  back  any  farther,  his  great  qualities 
were  roused  by  the  difficulty  of  his  situation,  he  had 
carried  off  his  army  with  admirable  arrangement,  and 
his  new  position  was  chosen  v/ith  equal  sagacity  and 
resolution. 

Santarem  is  situated  on  a  mountain,  which,  rising 
almost  precipitously  from  the  Tagus,  extends  about 
three  miles  inland.  In  front,  a  secondary  range  of 
hills  formed  an  outwork,  covered  by  the  Rio  Mayor, 
which  is  composed  of  two  streams,  running  side  by 
side  to  within  a  mile  of  the  Tagus,  where  they  unite 
and  flow  in  a  direction  parallel  with  that  river  for 
many  miles;  the  ground  between  being  an  immense 
flat,  called  the  plain  of  Santarem.  In  advancing  by 
the  roval  road  from  Lisbon,  the  allies  a^^cended  the 
Rio  Mayor,  until  they  reached  the  Ponte  Seca,  a 
raised  causeway,  eight  hundred  yards  long,  leading 
to  the  foot  of  the  French  position.  On  the  right 
hand  of  this  causeway  as  far  as  the  Tagus,  a  flat 
sedgy  marsh,  not  impassable,  but  difficult  from  deep 
water-cuts,  covered  the  French  left.  On  the  left,  the 
two  streams  of  the  Rio  Mayor  overflowing,  presented 
a  vast  impassable  sheet  of  water  and  marsh,  covering 
the  French  right,  and,  in  the  centre,  the  causeway 
offered  only  a  narrow  line  of  approach,  barred  at  the 
enemy's  end,  by  an  abattis,  and  by  a  gentle  eminence, 
with  a  battery  looking  down  the  whole  length.  To 
force  this  dangerous  passage  was  only  a  preliminary 
step,  the  secondary  rantje  of  hills  was  then  to  be 
carried  before  the  great  height  of  Santarem  could  be 
reached  ;  finally,  the  town,  with  its  old  walls,  offered 
a  fourth  point  of  resistance. 

In  this  formidable  position,  the  second  corps  covered 
the  rich  plain  of  Golegao,  which  was  occupied  by 
Loison's  division  of  the  sixth  corps,  placed  there  to 
watch  the  Tagus,  and  keep  up  the  chain  of  communi- 
cation with  Punhete.  On  Heynier's  right,  in  a  rugged 
country,  which  separated  Santarem  from  the  Monte 
Junta  and  the  Sierra  de  Alcoberte,  the  eight  corps  was 
posted  ;  not  in  a  continuous  line  with  the  second,  but 
having  the  right  pushed  forward  to  Alcanhete,  the 
centre  at  Pernes,  and  the  left  thrown  back  to  'I'orres 
Novas,  where  Massena's  head-quarters  were  fixed. 
On  the  right  of  Alcanhete,  the  cavalry  were  disposed 
as  far  as  L<iria,  and  the  sixth  corps  was  at  Thomar,  in 
reserve,  having  previously  obliged  Wilson's  militia 
to  retire  from  the  Zezere  upon  Espiuhal. 

Massena  thus  enclosed  an  immense  tract  of  fertile 
country,   the   plain   of  Golegao    supplied    him    with 


k 


316 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XI. 


maize  and  vecrelables,  and  the  Sierra  de  Alcoberte 
with  cattle.  He  presented  a  formidable  head  to  tlie 
eIMos  at  Santarem  ;  conimaifded  the  ro;ui,  by  Leiria, 
lo  l-oimbra,  with  the  eitrhth  corps  and  the  cavalry  ; 
that  from  Tliomar,  by  Ourem,  to  Coimbra,  wilh  the 
sixth  corps ;  and,  by  his  bridorps  over  the  Zezere, 
opened  a  line  of  operations  towards  the  Spanish  fron- 
tier, either  through  Castello  Branco,  or  by  the  Estrada 
Nova  and  Belmonte.  He  also  preserved  the  power 
of  offensive  operations,  by  crossing  the  Tagus  on 
his  left,  or  of  turning  the  Monte  Junta  by  his  right, 
and  thus  paralyzing  a  great  part  of  the  allied  force, 
appeared,  even  in  retreating,  to  take  the  offensive. 

His  first  dispositions  were,  however,  faulty  in  detail. 
Between  Santarem  and  the  nearest  division  of  the 
eiglilh  corps  there  was  a  distance  of  ten  or  twelve 
miles,  where  the  British  general  might  penetr  e,  turn 
the  right  of  the  second  corps,  and  cut  it  off  liom  the 
rest  of  the  army.  Heynier,  fearing  such  an  attempt,  hur- 
lied  off  his  baggage  and  hospitals  to  Golegao,  des- 
patched a  regiment  up  the  Rio  Mayor  to  watch  two 
bridges  on  his  right,  by  which  he  expected  the  allies 
to  penetrate  between  him  and  the  eighth  corps,  and  then 
calling  upon  Junot  for  succour,  and  upon  Massena 
for  orders,  proceeded  to  strengthen  his  own  position. 
It  was  this  march  of  Reynier's  baggage,  that  led  Fane 
to  think  the  enemy  was  retreating  to  the  Zezere,  which, 
corresponding  with  lord  Wellington's  high-raised  ex- 
pectations, induced  him  to  make  dispositions,  not  for 
a  general  attack,  by  separating  the  second  corps  from 
the  rest  of  the  army  ;  but.  as  I  have  before  said,  for 
assaulting  Santnrem  in  front  with  a  small  force,  tliink- 
ing  he  had  only  to  deal  with  a  rear  guard. 

On  t!ie  19th,  the  light  division  entering  the  plain 
between  the  Rio  Mayor  and  the  Tagus  advanced 
against  the  hoi<rhts  by  the  sedijy  marsh.  The  first 
division  under  Spencer,  was  destined  to  attack  the 
causeway,  and  Pack's  Portuguese  brigade  and  the 
cavalry  were  ordered  to  cross  the  Rio  Mayor  at  the 
bridges  of  Saliero  and  Subajeira,  to  turn  the  right 
of  the  French.  The  columns  were  formed  for  the 
attack,  and  the  skirmishers  of  the  light  division  were 
exchanging  shots  with  the  enemy  in  the  sedgy  marsh, 
when  it  was  found  that  the  guns  belonging  to  Pack's 
brigade  had  not  arrived,  wherefore  lord  Wellington, 
not  quite  satisfied  with  the  appearance  of  his  adver- 
sary's force,  after  three  hours'  demonstrations,  ordered 
the  troops  lo  retire  to  their  former  ground.  It  was, 
indeed,  become  evident,  that  the  French  were  deter- 
mined to  maintain  the  position.  Every  advantageous 
spot  of  ground  was  fully  occupied,  the  most  advanced 
centinels  boldly  returned  the  fire  of  the  skirmishers, 
large  bodies  of  reserve  were  descried,  some  in  arms, 
others  cooking;  the  strokes  of  the  hatchet,  and  the 
fall  of  trees,  resounded  from  the  woods  clothing  the 
hills,  and  the  commencement  of  a  triple  line  of  abattis, 
and  the  fresh  earth  of  entrenchments  were  discernible 
in  many  places. 

On  the  20th  the  demonstrations  were  renewed  ; 
but,  as  the  enemy's  intention  to  fight  was  no  longer 
doubtful,  they  soon  ceased,  and  orders  were  sent'to 
general  Hil  to  halt  at  (^hamusca,  on  the  left  bank  of 
the  Tagus.  General  Crawfurd.  however,  still  thought 
it  was  but  a  rear-guard  at  Santarem,  his  eager  spirit 
was  chafed,  he  seized  a  musket,  and,  followed  only  by 
a  Serjeant,  advanced  in  the  night  along  the  cansew-ay'; 
thus  commencing  a  personal  skirmish  with  the  French 
picquets,  from  whose  fire  he  escaped  by  miracle, 
convinced  at  last  that  the  enemy  were  not  yet  in  flight. 

Meanwhile  Clausel  brouirht  his  division  from  Al- 
canhete  close  up  to  Santarem,  and  Massena  carefully 
exap^*"'"or  the  dispositions  of  the  allies  >atisfied  himself, 
that  no  great  movement  was  in  agitation  ;  wherefore, 
recalling  the  bagjrage  of  the  second  corps,  he  directed 
Clausel  lo  advance  towards  Rio  Mayor ;  a  feint  which 


instantly  obliged  lord  Wellington  to  withdraw  the  first 
division  and  Pack's  brigade  to  Cartaxo,  the  light  divis- 
ion being  also  held  in  readiness  to  retreat.  In  truth, 
Massena  was  only  to  be  ass.iiled  by  holding  the  second 
corps  in  check  at  the  Ponte  Seca,  while  a  powerful 
mass  of  troops  penetrated  in  the  direction  of  'I'remes 
and  Pernes  ;  but  heavy  rains  rendered  all  the  roads 
impracticable,  and  as  the  position  of  Santarem  was 
maintained  for  several  months,  and  many  writers  have 
rashi}' censured  the  conduct  of  both  generals,  it  may 
be  well  to  shew  here  that  they  acted  wisely  and  like 
great  captains. 

It  has  been  already  seen  how.  without  any  ex- 
treme dissemination  of  his  force,  the  French  general 
contrived  to  menace  a  variety  of  points  and  tiuis  to 
command  two  distinct  lines  of  retreat;  but  there 
were  other  circumstances  that  equally  weighed  with 
him.  He  expected  mometitarily  to  be  (fined  by  the 
ninth  corps,  which  had  been  added  to  his  command, 
and  by  a  variety  of  detachments  ;  his  position  toucliing 
upon  Leiria  and  upon  the  Zezere,  enabled  him  to  give 
his  hand  lo  these  nnnforcements  and  convoys,  either 
by  the  line  of  the  Mondego  or  that  of  Belmonte  and  the 
Estrada  Nova  ;  at  the  same  time  he  was  ready  lo  com- 
municate with  any  troops  coming  from  Andalusia  to 
his  assistance.  He  was  undoubtedly  open  to  a  dan- 
gerous attack,  between  Santarem  and  Alcanhete;  but 
he  judged  that  his  adversary  would  not  venture  on 
such  a  decisive  operation,  retjuiring  rapid  well-timed 
movements,  with  an  army  com|iosed  of  three  different 
nations,  and  unpractised  in  great  evolutions.  In  this, 
guided  by  his  long  experience  of  war,  he  calculated 
upon  moral  considerations  with  confidence,  and  he 
that  does  not  understand  this  part  of  war  is  but  half 
a  general. 

Like  a  great  commander,  he  calculated  likewise 
upon  the  military  and  political  effect,  tiiat  his  men- 
acing attitude  would  have.  While  he  maintained 
Santarem,  he  appeared,  as  it  were,  to  besiege  Lisbon; 
he  prolonged  the  sufferings  of  that  city  ;  and  it  has 
been  estimated  that  forty  thousand  persons  died  from 
privations  within  the  Lines  during  the  winter  of 
1810:  moreover  he  encouraged  the  disaffected,  and 
shook  the  power  which  the  English  had  assumed  in 
Portugal,  thus  rendering  their  final  success  so  doubt- 
ful in  appearance,  that  few  men  had  sagacity  enouirli 
to  judge  rightly  upon  the  subject.  At  this  period 
also,  as  the  illness  of  George  the  Third,  by  revivinor 
the  question  of  a  Regency  in  England,  had  greatl^' 
strengthened  the  opposition  in  parliament,  it  was  most 
important  that  the  arguments  of  the  latter  against  the 
war  should  seem  to  be  enforced  by  the  position  of  the 
French  army.  It  is  plain  therefore  that,  while  any  ibod 
was  to  be  obtained,  there  were  abundant  reasons  to  jus- 
tify Massena  in  holding  h.is  ground  ;  and  it  nirist  be  ad- 
milted  that,  if  he  committed  great  err  rs  in  the  .-arly  part 
of  his  campaign,  in  the  latter  part  he  proved  iiimself 
a  daring,  able,  and  most  pertinacious  commander. 

On  the  side  of  the  British  general,  such  were  the 
political  difficulties,  that  a  battle  was  equally  to  be 
desired  and  dreaded.  Desirable,  because  a  victory 
would  have  silenced  his  opponents  both  in  England 
and  Portugal,  and  placed  him  in  a  situation  to  dictate 
the  measures  of  war  to  the  ministers  instead  of  having 
to  struggle  incessantly  against  their  fears.  Desirable, 
to  relieve  the  misery  of  ihe  Portuguese  people,  who 
were  in  a  state  of  horrible  suffering;  but,  above  all 
things  desirable,  lest  a  second  and  a  third  army,  now 
gathering  in  Castile  and  in  Andalusia,  should  reach 
Massena,  and  again  shut  up  the  allies  in    their   works. 

Dreaded,  because  a  defeat  or  even  a  repulse  would 
have  been  tantamount  to  the  ruin  of  the  cause:  '"or  it 
was  at  this  period  that  the  disputes  in  the  Regency, 
relative  to  the  Lines,  at  Almada,  were  most  violent, 
and  the  slightest  dioaeler  would  have  placed  the  Pa  . 


1810.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


317 


triarch  at  the  head  of  a  national  party.  Dreaded,  be- 
CJinse  of  the  discussions  relative  to  the  appointment  of 
a  Reo-cncy  in  England,  seeing  that  any  serious  military 
check  would  have  caused  the  opposition  to  triumph, 
and  the  troops  to  be  withdrawn  from  Portugal.  So 
powerful,  indeed,  were  the  opposition,  and  so  much 
did  the  ministers  dread  their  cry  for  economy,  that 
forgetting  the  safety  of  the  army  in  their  keen  love 
of  place,  they  had  actually  ordered  lord  Wellington 
to  send  home  the  transports  to  save  expense !  In 
fine,  Mr.  Percival  with  that  narrow  cunning  that 
distinguished  his  public  career,  was,  to  use  an  ex- 
pression attributed  to  him,  *■*■  Siarvinq;  the  war  in 
Portugal,''^  in  despite  of  lord  Wellesley's  indigna- 
tion and  of  lord  Wellington's  remonstrances.  In  this 
balanced  state  it  was  essential  that  a  battle,  upon 
which  so  many  great  interests  hung,  should  not  be 
fought,  except  on  terms  of  advantage.  Now  those 
terms  were  not  to  be  had.  Lord  Wellington,  who 
had  received  some  reinforcements  from  Halifax  and 
England,  had  indeed  more  than  seventy  thousand 
fighting  men  under  arms,  and  the  enemy  at  this  time 
was  not  more  than  fifty  thousand  :  nevertheless,  if  we 
analyze  the  composition  and  situation  of  both,  it  will 
be  found  that  the  latter,  from  the  advantage  of  posi- 
tion, could  actually  bring  more  soldiers  into  the  fight. 

In  the  Portuguese  army,  since  the  mrnth  of  April, 
the  deaths  had  been  four  thousand,  the  disbanded  four 
thousand,  the  deserters  ten  thousand,  the  recruits  thirty 
thousand  ;*  the  numbers  were  therefore  increased,  but 
the  eflicienc)'  for  grand  evolutions  rather  decreased  ; 
and  every  department  under  Beresford,  was  at  its  last 
gasp  from  the  negligence  of  the  government,  whicli 
neither  paid  the  troops  nor  provided  them  with  food. 
The  Spanish  auxiliaries  also,  ill-governed  and  turbu- 
lent, were  at  open  discord  with  the  Portuguese;  and 
tiieir  general  was  neither  able  in  war  himself  nor 
amenable  to  those  who  were. 

While  the  heights  of  Almada  were  naked,  the  left 
bank  of  the  Tagus  required  twelve  thousand  men  ; 
and  two  British  divisions  were  kept  in  the  Lines,  be- 
cause the  French  at  Alcanhete  were  nearer  to  Torres 
Vedras  than  the  allies  were  at  Cartaxo.  During  an 
attack  on  Pernes,  Reynier  might  break  out  from  Santa- 
rem,  and  ten  thousand  men  were  therefore  necessary  to 
liold  hin»  in  check  ;  thus  the  disposable  troops,  com- 
prehending soldiers  of  three  nations,  and  many  re- 
cruits, would  have  fallen  short  of  forty-five  thousand, 
while  Massena  could  bring  nearly  all  his  force  together 
on  one  point ;  because  a  few  men  would  have  sufficed 
to  watch  the  British  division  on  the  left  of  the  Tagus 
and  at  Santarem. 

Lord  Wellington's  experience  in  the  movement  of 
great  armies  was  not  at  this  period  equal  to  his  adver- 
sary's, and  the  attack  was  to  be  made  in  a  difficult 
country,  with  deep  roads,  where  the  Alvielly,  the  Al- 
monda,  and  other  rivers,  greatly  swelled  by  incessant 
rain,  furnished  a  succession  of  defensive  lines  to  the 
enemy,  and  in  case  of  defeat  the  means  of  carrying  off 
two-thirds  of  his  army.  Victory  might  crown  the  at- 
tempt, but  the  stakes  were  unequal.  If  Massena  lost 
even  a  third  of  his  force,  the  ninth  corps  could  have 
replaced  it.  If  lord  Wellington  fai'ed,  the  Lines  were 
pone,  and  with  them  the  whole  Peninsula.  He  judged 
It  better  to  remain  on  the  defensive,  to  strengthen  the 
Lines,  and  to  get  the  works  at  Almada  sufficiently  for- 
ward ;  meanwhile  to  perfect  the  discipline  of  the  Por- 
tuguese troops,  improve  the  organization  of  the  militia 
in  rear  of  the  enemy,  and  above  all  to  quiet  the  troubles 
and  remedy  the  evils  occasioned  by  the  Patriarch's 
faction.  Amongst  these  evils  the  destitute  state  of  the 
fortresses,  especially  Abrantes,  was  prominent.  Lord 
Wellington  at  one  moment  seriously  thought  of  with- 


»  Mr.  Stuarts  I  a 


pe.18. 


MSS. 


drawing  the  garrison  from  then^a  t:  prevent  he  men 
from  starving. 

In  this  view,  the  light  division,  supported  by  a  brig- 
ade of  cavalry,  occupied  Valle  and  the  heights  over- 
looking the  marsh  and  inundation;  the  bridge  at  the 
English  end  of  the  causeway  was  mined,  and  a  sugar- 
loaf  hill,  looking  straight  down  the  approach,  was 
crowned  with  embrasures  for  artillery  and  laced  ir 
front  with  a  zigzag  covered  way,  capable  of  containing 
five  hundred  infantry  :  the  causeway  being  thus  block- 
ed, the  French  could  not,  while  the  inundation  kept 
up,  make  any  sudden  irruption  from  Santarem. 

On  the  left  of  the  light  division,  posts  were  extended 
along  the  inundation  to  Malhorquija ;  thence,  by  a 
range  of  heights  to  Rio  Mayor;  and  behind  the  latter 
place,  Anson's  cavalry  was  stationed  in  observation  of 
the  roads  leading  from  Pernes  and  Alcanhede.  In  rear 
of  Anson,  a  position  was  entrenched  at  Alcoentre,  and 
occupied  by  a  division  ot  infantry.  Thus  all  the  routes 
leading  upon  the  Lines  between  the  Tagus  and  the 
Monte  Junta,  were  secured  by  what  are  technically 
called  heads  of  cantonments,  under  cover  of  which, 
the  other  divisions  were  disposed  in  succession.  The 
first  and  the  head-quarters  were  at  Cartaxo,  a  few  miles 
in  the  rear  of  Valle,  the  remainder  at  Alemquer  and 
Sobral.  Torres  Vedras  was,  however,  always  occu- 
pied in  force,  lest  the  enemy  should  make  a  sudden 
march  round  the  Monte  Junta. 

Massena,  satisfied  that  his  front  was  safe,  continued 
to  build  boats,  fortified  a  post  at  Tancos,  on  the  Tagus, 
and  expected,  with  impatience,  the  arrival  of  a  convoy 
■escorted  by  five  thousand  men,  with  which  general 
Gardanne  was  coming  from  Ciudad  Rodrigo.  This 
reinforcernent,  consisting  of  detachments  and  convales- 
cents left  in  Castile  when  the  army  entered  Portugal, 
had  marched  by  Belmonte  and  the  Estrada  Nova,  and 
the  27th,  was  at  Cardijos,  within  a  few  leagues  of  the 
French  bridges  on  the  Zezere.  The  advance  of  a 
cavalry  patrol  on  either  side  would  have  opened  'h.- 
communications,  and  secured  the  junction;  but,  at  mat 
moment,  Gardanne,  harassed  by  the  ordenanpa,  and 
deceived  by  a  false  rumour  that  general  Hill  was  in 
Abrantes,  ready  to  move  against  him,  suddenly  retreat- 
ed upon  wSabugal,  with  such  haste  and  blindness,  that 
he  sacrificed  a  part  of  his  convoy,  and  lost  many  men. 

Notwithstanding  this  event,  Massena,  expecting  to 
be  joined  by  the  ninth  corps,  greatly  strengthened  his 
position  at  Santarem,  which  enabled  him  to  draw  the 
bulk  of  his  forces  to  his  right,  and  to  continue  his 
marauding  excursions  in  the  most  daring  manner. 
General  P'erey,  with  a  strong  detachment  of  the  sixth 
corps,  crossing  the  Zezere,  foraged  the  country  as  far 
as  Castelio  Branco  without  difficulty,  and  returned 
without  loss  ;  Junot  occupied  Leiria  and  Ourem  with 
detachments  of  the  eighth  corps ;  and  on  the  9th  of 
December  a  battalion  endeavoured  to  surprise  Coimbra  : 
Trant,  however,  bafiied  that  project.  Meanwhile, 
Drouet  avowed  a  design  to  invade  the  Tras  os  Monies, 
but  the  22d  of  December  occupied  the  line  of  the  Coa 
with  the  ninth  corps,  while  Massena's  patroles  appear- 
ed again  on  the  Mondego  above  (Coimbra,  making  in- 
quiries about  the  fords:  all  the  spies  likewise  reported 
that  a  great  reunion  of  forces  from  the  south  was  to 
take  place  near  Madrid. 

These  things  gave  reason  to  fear,  either  that  Massena 
intended  to  file  behind  the  Mondego  and  seize  Oporto; 
or  that  the  reinforcements  coming  to  him  were  so  large 
that  he  meant  to  establish  bridges  over  the  Monde^-'o, 
and  occupy  the  northern  country  without  quitting  his 
present  position.  It  was  known  that  a  tenth  corps  was 
forming  at  Burgos,  and  the  head  of  the  fifth  corps  was 
again  in  Estremadura;  the  French  boats  at  Punhete 
and  Barquiiia  were  numerous  and  large;  and  in  all 
parts  there  was  evidence  of  great  forces  assembling  for 
a  n  ighty  cfTorl  en  both  sides  of  the  Tagus. 


318 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XI. 


It  was  calculatpd  tbnl,  before  the  end  of  January, 
more  than  furty  thousand  fresh  troops  would  co-operate 
with  Massena,  and  preparations  were  made  according- 
ly. An  outward  line  of  defence,  from  Aldea  Gallega 
to  Setuval,  was  already  in  a  forward  state;  Abranles, 
Palmelln,  and  St.  Felippo  de  Setuval  had  been  at  last 
provisioned  ;  and  a  chain  of  forts  parallel  to  the  Tagus 
were  constructing  on  the  hills  lining  the  left  bank  from 
Alinada  to  Traffaria.  Labourers  had  also  been  con- 
tinually employed  in  strengthening  the  works  of  Al- 
handra,  Aruda,  and  Monte  Agrac^a,  which  were  now 
nearly  impregnable,  soldiers  only  being  wanting  to 
defy  the  utmost  force  that  could  be  brought  against 
them.  To  procure  these,  lord  Wellington  wrote  earn- 
estly to  lord  Liverpool  on  the  29th  of  December,  de- 
monstrating the  absolute  necessity  of  reinforcing  the 
army,  wherefore  five  thousand  British  troops  were  or- 
dered to  embark  for  Lisbon,  and  three  regiments  were 
drafted  from  Sicily. 

Sickness  having  ol)liged  general  Hill  to  go  home  in 
December,  but,  it  being  known  that  Soult  was  collect- 
ing a  disposable  force  behind  the  Morena,  the  troops 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  Tagus  were  augmented,  and 
marshal  Beresford  assumed  the  command,  for  the 
Portuguese  army  was  now  generally  incorporated  with 
the  British  divisions.  His  force,  composed  of  eighteen 
guns,  two  divisions  of  infantry,  and  five  regiments  of 
cavalry,  Portuguese  and  British,  was  about  fourteen 
thousand  men,  exclusive  of  Carlos  d'Espana's  brigade, 
which,  being  at  Abrantes,  was  also  under  his  orders. 

To  prevent  the  passage  of  the  Tagus  ;  to  intercept 
all  communication  between  Massena  and  Soult;  to  join 
the  main  body  of  the  army,  by  Vellada  if  in  retreat, 
and  by  Abrantes  if  in  advance;  were  the  instructions 
given  to  Beresford.  He  fixed  bis  quarters  at  Chamusca, 
disposed  his  troops  along  the  Tagus,  from  Almeyrim 
by  Chamusca,  as  high  as  the  mouth  of  the  Zezcre, 
established  signals  between  his  different  quarters,  and 
scouring  the  roads  leading  towards  Spanish  Estremadu- 
ra,  established  a  sure  and  rapid  intercourse  with  Elvas 
and  the  other  frontier  fortresses.  He  also  organized 
good  sources  of  intelligence  at  Golegao,  at  Santarem, 
and  at  Thomar,  and,  in  addition  to  these  general  pre- 
cautions, erected  batteries  opposite  t)ie  mouth  of  the 
Zezere ;  but  against  the  advice  of  the  engineers,  he 
placed  them  at  too  great  distance  from  the  river,  and 
in  ottior  respects  unsuitably,  and  offering  nothing 
threatening  to  the  enemy:  the  French  craft  dropped 
down  frequentlv  towards  Santarem,  without  hindrance, 
until  colonel  Colborne,  of  the  sixty— ixth  regiment, 
milored  a  guard-boat  close  to  the  mouth  of  the  Zezere, 
and  disposed  fires  in  such  a  manner  on  the  banks 
of  the  'I'agus  that  notbinn  could  pass  without  bein<r 
observed. 

Meanwhile  on  the  side  of  Santarem,  as  all  the 
country  between  Alcanhete  and  the  Ponte  Seca  con- 
tinued impracticable  from  the  rain,  liie  main  bodies  of 
botli  armies  were,  of  necessity,  tranquil.  Anson's 
cavalry,  however,  acting  in  concert  with  major  Fen- 
wick,  who  came  down  from  Obidos  towards  Rio 
Mayor,  harassed  the  enemy's  foraging  parties  ;  and 
In  the  Upper  Beira  several  actions  of  iint)ortance  had 
taken  place  with  the  militia,  which  it  is  time  to  notice 
as  forming  an  essential  part  of  lord  Wellington's  com- 
binations. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  ninth  corps,  being 
ordered  to  scour  Biscay  and  Upper  Castile  in  its  pro- 
gress tov/ards  the  frontier  of  i'ortugal,  was  so  lonnr 
delayed  that,  inste^ad  of  keeping  the  communications 
of  Maspetia  free,  and  securing  his  base,  Drouet  lost  all 
connexion  with  the  army  of  Portugal.  Meanwhile  the 
Partidas  of  Leon  and  Salamanca  (rnve  such  employ- 
ment to  Serras'  division  that  the  Tras  os  Monies  were 
unmolested,  and  Silveira,  falling  down  to  the  Lower 
Douro,  appp?-.-?',  on  liie  29lh  of  October,  before  Al- 


meida. Its  former  garrison  had  entered  the  French 
service,  yet  immediately  deserted  to  their  countr3'men, 
and  Silveira  then  blockaded  the  place  closely,  and 
made  an  attempt  to  surprise  a  French  post  at  Sail 
Felices,  but  failed. 

In  November,  however,  the  head  of  the  ninth  corps 
reached  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  bringing  a  large  convoy  o.' 
provisions,  collected  in  Castile,  for  Massena.  Lorff 
Wellington,  anxious  to  prevent  this  from  reaching  its 
destination,  directed  Silveira  to  intercept  it  if  possible, 
and  ordered  Miller  on  the  16th  to  Viseu,  in  su|)port. 
On  the  13th,  general  Gardanne,  with  four  thousand 
infantry  and  three  squadrons  of  cavalry,  raised  the 
blockade  of  Almeida,  took  possession  of  Pinhel,  and 
supported  by  the  ninth  corps,  conducted  the  convoy 
towards  Sabugal  and  PenaiTiacor.  The  IGth,  he  was 
between  Valverde  and  Pereiro  Gavillos,  but  Silveira 
falling  upon  him  killed  some  of  his  men,  took  many 
prisoners,  and  then  retiring  to  Trancoso  on  the  17th, 
united  with  Miller,  who  took  post  at  Guarda.  Never- 
theless, Gardanne  pursued  his  march,  but  finally,  as 
we  have  seen,  retreated  from  Cardigos  in  a  panic. 

Drouet  had  not  yet  received  the  orders  to  put  him- 
self under  Massena's  command,  but,  at  the  representa- 
tion of  Foy,  moved  forward  into  Portugal,  and  to  hide 
his  object,  spread  the  report,  already  noticed,  of  his 
intention  to  penetrate  the  'i'ras  os  Montes.  The  17lh 
December,  he  passed  the  Coa  with  fourteen  thousand 
infantry  and  two  thousand  cavalry,  and  crossing  the 
Mondego  the  18th,  encamped  near  Gouvea,  the  22d. 
Thence  the  cavalry  and  one  division  under  general 
Claparede,  marched  against  Silveira,  and  after  a 
skirmish  occupied  Trancoso;  while  Drouet  with 
eleven  battalions,  and  the  troops  under  Gardanne, 
which  he  had  rallied,  made  for  the  Alva  and  reached 
Ponte  Murcella  the  24th. 

Hitherto  lord  Wellington's  communications  with 
Baccellar,  had  been  carried  on.  throuirh  Trant  on  the 
side  of  Coimbra,  and  through  Wilson  on  that  of  Espin- 
hal  and  Abrantes.  But  this  sudden  advance  of  the 
ninth  corps  obliged  Wilson  to  cross  the  Mondego  to 
avoid  being  enclosed;  and  Drouet  effecting  his  junc- 
tion with  Massena  bv  Espinhal,  established  his  di- 
vision at  Leiria,  and  spreading  towards  the  sea  cut  off 
all  communication  between  the  allies  and  the  northern 
provinces.  On  the  2d  of  January,  however,  Trant  in- 
tercepted a  letter  from  Drouet  to  Claparede.  giving  an 
account  of  his  own  arrival,  and  of  the  State  of  Mas- 
sena's army  ;  intimating,  also,  that  a  great  operation 
was  in  contemplation,  and  that  the  fifth  corps  was 
daily  exppcted  in  the  Alemtejo;  he  directed  Claparede 
to  seize  Guarda,  to  forage  the  neiohhouring  villages,  to 
watch  the  road  of  Belmonte,  and  if  Silveira  should  be 
troublesome,  to  defeat  him. 

Silveira,  an  insufficient  man,  naturally  vain,  and  in- 
flated with  hir.  former  successes,  had  already  attacked 
Claparede,  and  was  defeated  with  the  loss  of  two 
hundred  men  at  Ponte  Abad,  on  the  side  of  'I'rancoso, 
and  Bac'-ellar,  alarmed  for  the  safely  of  Oporto,  re- 
called Miller  and  Wilson.  The  first  immediately 
moved  upon  Visen,  and  the  last  who  had  already  re- 
passed the  Mondego  and  taken  a  hundred  stragglers 
of  Drouet's  division,  marched  hastily  towards  the 
same  point.  Meanwhile,  Silveira  had  again  provoked 
Claparede,  who  pressed  him  so  closely,  from  the  lOlh 
to  the  13th  of  January,  that  he  drove  him  with  loss 
over  the  Douro  at  Fezo  de  Ragoa,  seized  Lainego,  and 
menaced  Oporto  before  any  troops  could  concentrate 
to  oppose  him.  However,  when  Barcellar  brouirbt  up 
his  reserve  to  the  Pavia,  and  Miller's  and  VVilson's 
corps  reached  Castro  d'Airo,  Claparede  returned  to 
Moimenta  de  Beira,  closely  followed  by  Wilson. 
Meanwhile,  the  a/rivf.!  of  the  ninth  corps  having  re- 
lieved the  French  troops  in  Leon,  the  latter  again 
menaced  Tras  os   Ivionies,  which  obliged   Silveira  to 


1810.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


319 


inarch  to  Brao;anza,  and  as  Miller  died  at  Viseu,  only 
Wilson  and  Trant  continued  to  harass  the  enemy's 
parties. 

(/lapnrede  taking  post  at  Guarda,  according  to  his 
instructions,  seized  Covilhao,  while  Foy,  who  in  re- 
turning from  France  had  collected  about  three  thousand 
infantry  and  cavalry,  convalescents,  was  marchingf  by 
the  road  of  Belmonte.  Foy  had  escaped  innumerable 
perils.  At  Pancorbo  he  was  fain  to  fly  from  the  Parti- 
das,  with  the  loss  of  his  despatches  and  half  his 
escort;  and  now  at  Enxabarda  enterinjr  the  Estrada 
Nova,  notwithstanding'  Claparede's  vicinity,  he  was 
liarassed  by  colonel  Grant  with  a  corps  of  ordenanga 
from  the  Lower  Beira,  and  although  he  suffered  nothing 
by  the  sword,  three  hundred  of  his  men  died  on  the 
mountain  from  cold.  On  the  2d  of  February  he  reach- 
ed Sant  :rem,  where  affairs  were  coming  to  a  crisis. 

During  December  and  January,  the  country  being 
always  more  or  less  flooded,  tiie  armies  had  continued 
in  observation ;  but  Massena's  positions  were  much 
strengthened,  his  outposts  were  reinforced,  and  his 
marauding  excursions  extended  in  proportion  to  his 
increasing  necessities.  The  weak  point  on  either  side 
was  towards  Rio  Mayor,  any  movement  there  created 
great  jealous}',  especially  as  the  season  advanced  and 
the  roads  became  firmer.  Hence,  on  the  19th  of 
January  (some  reinforcements  having  landed  at  Lisbon 
a  few  days  before)  a  fear  lest  the  allies  should  he  con- 
centrating at  Alcoentre,  had  induced  Junot  to  drive  the 
outposts  from  Rio  Mayor  to  probe  the  state  of  affairs, 
and  a  general  attack  was  expected  ;  but  after  a  skir- 
mish, he  ret\irned  with  a  wound,  which  disabled  him 
for  the  rest  nf  the  campaign. 

Early  in  February,  a  column  of  six  thousand  French 
again  scouring  all  the  country  beyond  the  Zezere,  got 
much  concealed  food  near  Pedragoa,  while  .other  de- 
tachments arriving  on  the  Mondego  below  Coimbra, 
carried  off  four  hundred  oxen  and  two  thousand  sheep 
intended  for  the  allies.  These  excursions  gave  rise  to 
horrible  excesses,  which  broke  down  the  discipline  of 
the  French  army,  and  were  not  always  executed  with 
impunity  :  the  British  cavalry  at  various  times  redeem- 
ed many  cattle,  and  brought  in  a  considerable  number 
of  prisoners,  amongst  them  an  aide-de-camp  of  general 
(^lausel's. 

Meanwhile,  Massena  organized  a  secret  commu- 
nication with  Lisbon,  through  the  Portuguese  general 
Pamplona,  who  effected  it  by  the  help  of  the  fidalgos 
in  that  capital  :  their  agents,  under  the  pretence  of 
selling  sugar  to  the  inhabitants  of  Thomar  and  Torres 
Novas,  passed  by  the  road  of  Caldas  and  thence 
through  the  mountains  of  Pedragoa.  Lord  Welling- 
ton, on  the  other  hand,  was  understood  to  have  gained 
a  French  officer  of  rank,  and  it  is  certain  that  both 
generals  had  excellent  inform.ition. 

In  this  manntr  hostilities  were  carried  on,  each 
commander  impatiently  waiting  for  reinforcements 
which  should  enable  him  to  act  offensively.  How 
both  were  disappointed,  and  how  other  events  hitherto 
unnoticed,  bore  upon  ihe  plans  of  each,  must  be  the 
Bubject  of  another  book. 

OBSERVATIONS. 

1.  "  TVrir  is  not  a  conjectural  art.''''     Massena   for- 
getting this,  assumed  that  the  allies   would  not  make 
a  stand    in  front  of  Li:^bon,  and  that  the  militia  would 
not  venture  to  attack   Coimbra;  but  the  battle  of  Bu-I 
saco    and    the    capture    of  his    hospitals    evinced    the; 
soundness  of  the   maxim.     Again,  he  conjectured  that  j 
the    English   would    re-embark   if  pressed  ;   the  Lines 
put  an  end  to  that  dream  :  yet  once   awake,   he   made  j 
war   like  a  great  man,   proving  more  formidable  with  | 
reduced    means   and   in   difficulties,   than   he  had  been 
when  opportunity  was  rife  and  his  numbers  untouched. 
His  stay  at  Santarem   shews   what   thirty   thousand 


additional  men  actingr  on  the  left  hank  of  tlie  Taguq 
could  have  done.  Had  they  arrived  on  the  heights  of 
Almada  before  admiral  Berkeley's  error  was  discover- 
ed, the  supply  of  provisions,  from  Alemiej"  and  from 
Spain,  would  then  have  been  transferred  f^rom  Lisbon 
to  the  French  armies ;  the  fleet  would  have  been  driv- 
en from  the  Tagus,  and  the  misery  of  the  inh  'bitants, 
the  fears  of  the  British  cabinet,  the  machinations  of 
the  Patriarch,  and  the  little  chance  of  final  success, 
would  probably  have  induced  the  British  general  to 
embark. 

2.  li  has  been  observed,  that  Massena,  in  the  first 
week  might  have  easily  passed  the  Tagus,  secured  the 
resources  of  the  Alemtejo,  and  driven  the  Batish  fleet 
out  of  the  port.  This  was  not  so  practicable  as  i* 
might  at  first  sight  appear.  The  rains  were  heavy; 
the  fords  impassable  ;  the  French  had  not  boats  sufii- 
cient  for  a  bridge  ;  a  weak  detachment  would  have 
been  useless,  a  strong  detachment  would  have  been 
dangerous  :  to  collect  boats,  cast  a  bridge,  and  raise 
the  entrenchments  necessary  to  defend  it,  in  the  face 
of  the  allied  forces,  would  have  been  neither  a  safe 
nor  sure  operation  ;  moreover,  Massena  would  then  have 
relinquished  the  certain  aid  of  the  ninth  for  the  un- 
certain  assistance  of  the   fifth  corps. 

3.  Lord  Wellington  conjecturing  the  French  to  be 
in  full  retreat,  had  like  to  have  received  a  severe  check 
at  Santarem  ;  he  recovered  himself  in  time,  and  with 
this  exception,  it  would  be  difficult  to  support  essential 
objections  to  his  operations  ;  yet,  many  have  been 
urged,  as  that,  he  might  have  straightened  the  enemy's 
quarters  more  effectually  at  Santarem  ;  that  Hill's 
corps,  passing  through  Abrantes,  could  have  destroyed 
the  bridges  at  Punhete,  and  lining  the  Zezere,  have  cut 
off  Massena's  reinforcements,  and  obliged  hiin  to 
abandon  his  positions  or  even  to  capitulate.  This  last 
idea,  advanced  at  the  time  by  colonel  Squires,  an 
enirineer  of  great  zeal  and  ability,  perfectly  acquainted 
with  the  localities,  merits  examination. 

As  a  simple  operation  it  was  feasible,  but  the 
results  were  not  so  certain;  the  Lines  of  Almada 
being  unfinished,  the  rashness  of  leaving  the  Tagus 
unguarded,  before  an  enemy  who  possessed  eio-hty 
large  boats,  exclusive  of  those  forming  the  bridges 
on  the  Zezere,  is  apparent;  Hill's  corps  must  then 
have  been  replaced,  and  the  army  before  Santarem 
would  have  been  so  weak  as  to  invite  a  concentrated 
attack,  to  the  great  danger  of  the  Torres  Vedras  Lines. 
Nor  was  the  forcing  of  the  French  works  at  Punhete 
a  matter  of  certainty;  the  ground  was  strong,  there 
were  two  bridges  over  the  Zezere,  and  the  sixth 
corps,  being  within  a  short  march,  might,  by  passing 
at  Martinchel,  have   taken  Hill  in  flank. 

4.  The  same  officer,  at  a  later  period,  miscalcu- 
lating tlie  enemy's  numbers  at  thirty  thousand  men, 
and  the  allies  at  more  than  seventy  thousand  regulars, 
proposed  that  Beresford  should  cross  the  'I'agus  at 
Azingha,  behind  the  Almonda,  and  march  upon  Go- 
legao,  while  lord  Wellington,  concentrating  at  Rio 
Mayor,  pushed  upon  Torres  Novas.  It  was  no  com- 
mon head  that  conceived  this  project,  by  which  sev 
enty  thousand  men  would,  in  a  single  march,  hav«» 
been  placed  in  the  midst  of  the  enemy's  extendea 
quarters;  but  the  hand  of  Napoleon  could  scarcely 
have  launched  such  a  ihunder-bolt.  Massena  had 
still  fifty  thousand  fighting-inen  ;  the  boats  from 
Abrantes  must  have  been  brought  down,  to  pass  the 
Tagus ;  the  concentration  of  troops  at  Rio  Ma)'or 
would  scarcely  have  escaped  the  enemy's  notice,  an 
exact  concert,  in  point  of  time,  was  essential.  But 
the  eighth  corps  could  have  held  the  allies  in  check 
on  the  Alviella,  while  Reynier,  from  Santarem,  and 
Ney,  from  Thomar,  crushed  Beresford  between  the 
Almonda  and  the  Tagus  :  moreover  the  roads  about 
Treraes    were    nearly    impassable   from    rain    during 


SzO 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  Xll 


December,  and  in  Janu^iry.  Soult,  of  whosn  oporations  which  duly  classes  the  value  of  every  feasible  op- 
T  shall  speak  in  the  next  book,  was  menacing  the  eraticn,  is  tiie  best  quality  of  a  general,  and  lord 
Alenilejo.  Any  disaster  happeniMg  to  the  allies  would  Wellington  possessed  it  in  a  remarkable  degree;  to 
have  relieved  the  enemy's  difficulties,  when  nothing  it,  his  genius  and  his  courage  were  both  subservient  ; 
else  could.  A  campaign  is  like  other  works  of  art ;  without  it  he  might  have  performed  many  brilliant 
accessaries,  however  splendid,  must  be  rejected  when  !  exploits  in  the  Peninsula,  but  he  could  never  have 
not  conducive  to   the   main   object.     That  judgement,  i  conducted  the  war  to  a  successful  end. 


BOOK  XII. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Genprnl  sketch  of  the  state  of  the  war — Lord  Welling-toti  ob- 
je'Us  to  usniitime  operations — Expetiition  to  Fuenijirdla — 
iMinof  operiitions  in  Andakisia — I\afion;il  Cortez  assemble  in 
tie  Isle  (le  Le  m — its  proceedino;' — New  regeriry  chosen — 
Fiirtijiis  desrriije.l — V'iulence  of  all  parties — Unju-st  treat- 
ment of  the  colonies. 

In  the  preceding  boo't,  Spanish  affairs  have  been 
little  noticed,  although  lord  Wellington's  combina- 
tions were  deeply  affected  by  them.  The  general 
position  of  the  allies,  extending  from  Coruna  to  Cadiz, 
presented  a  great  crescent,  in  the  convex  of  which  the 
French  armies  were  operating;  and  it  was  clear  that, 
when  checked  at  Lisbon,  the  most  important  point, 
their  wings  could  reinforce  the  centre  ;  unless  the  allied 
forces,  at  the  horns  of  the  crescent,  acted  vigorously 
on  a  system  which  the  harbvTurs  and  fortresses,  at 
either  extremity,  pointed  out  as  suitable  to  those  who 
P'  ssessed  the  absolute  conrimand  of  the  sea.  A  Brit- 
ish army  and  fleet  were  therefore  established  at  Cadiz, 
and  a  squadron  of  frigates  at  Coruna,  and  how  far  this 
warfire  relieved  the  pressure  on  lord  Wellington  I 
shall  now  show. 

The  Caliician  troops,  under  Mahi,  usually  hang- 
ing on  the  borders  of  Leon,,  were  ahvays  reported  to 
b^'  above  twenty  thousand  men,  when  arms  or  stores 
were  demanded  from  England,  but  there  were  never 
more  than  ten  or  twelve  thousand  in  line;  and.  al- 
though Serras'  division,  of  only  eight  thousand,  was 
spread  over  the  plains,  from  Benevente  to  the  Agueda, 
during  Massena's  advance,  no  streke  of  importance 
yas  effected  against  it.  The  arrival  of  the  ninth  corps, 
in  October,  put  an  end  to  all  hopes  from  the  Galiicians 
in  that  quarter,  allhough  the  Pnrtidas  often  surprised 
both  posts  and  convoys.  Behind  Mahi  there  was, 
however,  a  second  army,  from  four  to  six  thousand 
strong,  embodied  to  defend  the  coast  line  towards  the 
Asturias;  and,  in  the  latter  province,  about  eight 
thousand  men,  including  the  irregular  bands  of  Por- 
lier  and  other  chiefs,  constantly  watched  Bonct's 
movements. 

That  general  frequently  mastered  the  Asturias, 
but  could  never  maintain  "himself  there ;  because  the 
country  is  a  long  defile,  lying  between  the  great 
mountains  ind  the  sea,  and  being  crosscid  by  a  suc- 
cession of  parallel  ridges  and  rivers,  is  admirably 
calculated  for  partizan  warfare  in  connexion  with  a 
fleet.  If  he  penetrated  towards  Gallieia,  British  and 
Spanish  fngates,  from  Coruaa,  landing  troops  at  the 
ports  of  Gilion,  Santander,  or  Santoiia,  could  always 
form  a  junction  with  the  great  bands  of  Longa,  Mina, 
end  Amor,  and  excite  insurrections  on  his  rear.  In  this 
luanne;   Porlicr,  as  before  related,  forced  him  to  with- 


draw from  Castropol,  after  he  had  deflated  Teneral 
Ponte  at  Sales,  about  the  period  cf  Altiifida  being 
invested.  The  advantages  of  such  operations  being 
evident,  the  British  government  sent  sir  Home  Poj)- 
ham  to  direct  the  naval,  and  general  Walker  the 
military  affairs  at  Coruna.  Preparations  were  then 
made  to  embark  a  considerable  force,  under  Renovales, 
to  renew  the  attack  at  Santona  and  Santander ;  the 
Partidas  of  the  interior  were  to  move  at  the  same 
time;  a  battalion  of  marines  Wr.s  assembled,  in  Eng- 
land, to  garrison  Santona,  when  taken,  and  Mahi 
promised  to  co-operate  by  an  incursion.  Serras,  how- 
ever, threatened  the  frontier  of  Gallieia,  Mahi  re- 
mained in  suspense,  and  this,  together  with  the  usual 
procrastination  of  the  Spaniards,  and  the  late  arrival 
of  sir  Home  Popham,  delayed  the  expedition  until 
October,  although  Porlier,  Escadron,  and  other  chiefs 
had  commenced  an  isolated  attack  in  the  beginning 
of  September.*  Finally,  Serras  returned  to  Zamora, 
Mahi  sent  a  division  into  Leon,  and  Bonet,  aware 
of  the  preparations  at  Coruiia,  first  concentrated  at 
Oviedo,  and  then  fell  back  towards  Santander,  leaving 
a  post  at  Gihon. 

On  the  IGth  of  October  Renovales  sailed,  but  with 
only  thirteen  hundred  men  ;  accompanied,  however, 
by  general  Walker  who  carried  ten  thousand  stand 
of  arms  and  ammunition.  The  I9th,  entering  the 
harbour  of  Gihon,  they  captured  some  French  vessels, 
and  Porlier,  coming  up  on  the  land  side,  took  some 
treasure  and  eighty  prisoners.  The  next  day.  Reno- 
vales proceeded  to  Santona,  but  tempests  injpeded  his 
landing,  and  he  returned  to  Coruna  the  second  of  No- 
vember, with  only  eight  hundred  and  fifty  men  :  a 
frigate  and  a  brig  had  foundered,  with  the  remainder 
of  his  troops,  in  a  dreadful  gale,  which  destroyed  all 
the  Spanish  naval  force  along  the  coast,  twelve  vessels 
being  wrecked  even  in  the  harbour  of  Coruna.  Mean- 
while, Mahi,  leaving  Tohoado  Gil's  division  to  watch 
Serras,  entered  the  Asturias  with  the  rest  of  the  Gal- 
iicians, and  being  jf:ined  first  by  the  troops  of  that 
province,  and  soon  after  by  Renovales,  was  very 
snjierior  to  the  French  ;  yet  he  effected  nothing,  and 
Bonet  maintained  his  line  from  Gihon,  through  Oviedo, 
to  the  borders  of  Leon. 

In  this  manner  hostilities  wore  feebly  on  ;  the 
Junta  of  the  Asturias  continued,  as  from  the  lirst, 
distinguished  by  their  venality  and  indifference  to 
the  j)ublic  good,  their  province  was  in  a  miserable 
and  exhausted  state  ;  and  the  powers  of  the  British 
naval  officers  on  the  coast  not  being  defined,  occa- 
sioned some  dispute  between  them  and  general 
Walker,    and   gave   opportunity    to    tJic  Junta  to   in- 

»  Mr.  Slurls  Tap'TS.     MSS. 


1310.] 


NAPIER'S    ihNINSULAR    WAR. 


321 


terfere  impropprly  with  the  distribution  of  the  EnjTlish 
stores.*  Gallicia  was  comparatively  rich,  but  its 
Junta  culpably  inactive  in  the  discharge  of  duties  and 
oppressive  in  government,  disgusted  the  whole  prov- 
ince, and  a  general  desire  to  end  their  power  was 
prevalent.  In  the  course  of  the  winter  a  combination 
of  the  clergy  was  formed  to  oppose  both  the  Local 
Junta  and  the  General  Cortes,  and  assumed  so  threat- 
ening an  aspect,  that  Mahi,  who  was  then  on  the 
coast,  applied  to  be  taken  in  an  English  vessel  to 
Coruiia,  to  ensure  his  personal  safety.  One  Acuna 
was  soon  after  arrested  at  Ponferrada,  the  discontent 
spread,  and  the  army  was  more  employed  to  over- 
awe these  factions  than  to  oppose  the  enemy.  Little 
advantage,  therefore,  was  derived  from  the  Spanish 
operations  in  tlie  north  ;  and  general  Walker,  despair- 
ing to  effect  any  thing  useful,  desired  either  that  a 
British  force  should  iie  placed  at  his  disposal  or  that 
he  might  join  the  army  in  Portugal. 

'I'hese  expeditions  from  Coruna  naturally  increased 
the  audacity  of  the  inland  partidas,  who  could  only 
become  really  dangerous,  by  having  a  sea-port  where 
they  could  receive  supplies  and  reinforcements ;  or 
embarking  save  themselves  in  extremity,  and  change 
the  theatre  of  operations.  To  prevent  this,  the  empe- 
ror employed  considerable  numbers  of  men  i.i  the 
military  governments  touching  on  the  Bay  of  Biscay, 
and  had  directed,  as  we  have  seen,  the  "  corps  cP  armee,'''' 
in  their  progress  towards  Portugal,  to  scour  all  the 
disturbed  countries  to  the  right  and  left.  The  ninth 
corps  had  been  thus  employed  during  the  months  of 
August  and  September,  but  when  it  passed  onward, 
tlie  partidas  resumed  their  activity.  Mina,  Longa, 
(^ampiilo,  and  Amor,  frequently  united  about  Villar 
(-aya  and  Espinosa  in  numbers  sufficient  to  attack 
large  French  detachments  with  success  ;  and  to  aid 
tlipm,  general  W^alker  repeatedly  recommended  the 
taldng  possession  of  Santona  with  a  corps  of  British 
troops.  That  town,  having  the  best  winter  harbour 
along  the  coast,  and  being  built  on  a  mountain  prom- 
ontory joined  to  the  main  by  a  narrow  sandy  neck, 
could  liave  been  made  very  strong.  It  v.'ould  have 
cut  off  Bonet's  communication  with  France  by  sea, 
have  given  the  British  squadron  a  secure  post  from 
whence  to  vex  the  French  coasts,  and  it  offered  a 
point  of  connexion  with  the  partidas  of  the  Kioja, 
Biscay,  and  Navarre. 

Lord  Liverpool,  swayed  by  these  considerations, 
desired  to  employ  a  corps-  "'f  four  tli'Misand  m<  n  to 
secure  it ;  but,  having  first  demanded  lord  Welling-- 
toa's  opinion,  the  latter  ''  earnestly  recommended  that 
no  such  maritime  operations  should  be  undertaken. 
For,"  said  he,  "  unless  a  very  large  force  was  sent,  it 
would  scarcely  be  able  to  effect  a  landing,  and  main- 
tain the  situation  of  which  it  might  take  possession. 
I'hen  that  large  force  would  be  unable  to  move  or 
effect  any  object  at  all  adequate  to  the  expence,  or  to 
the  expectations  which  would  be  formed  from  its 
strength,  owing  to  the  want  of  those  equipments  and 
supplies  in  which  an  army  landed  from  its  ships 
must  be  deficient.  It  was  vain  to  hope  for  any  as- 
sistance, even  in  this  way,  much  less  military  as- 
sistance from  the  Spaniards;  the  first  thing  thfty 
would  require  uniformly  would  be  money  ;  then  arms, 
ammunition,  clothing  of  all  descriptions,  provisions, 
forage,  horses,  means  of  transport,  and  every  thing 
which  the  expedition  would  have  a  right  to  require 
from  them  ;  and,  after  all,  this  extrmirdinary  and  per- 
verse peaple  to'juld  scarcely  allow  the  commander  of  the 
expedition  to  have  a  voice  in  the  plan  of  operations,  to 
be  followed  when  the  whole  should  be  ready  to  undertake 
any,  if  indeed  they  ever  should  be  ready.^''^ 


I 


*  Abstract  of  General  Walker's  Aliliturv  Reports  iVoiii  Gul- 
lirm.     MSS. 
t  Letter  to  Lord  Liverpool,  7th  May,  131L     MSS. 

22 


Napoleon  now  caused  Caffarelli's  reserve  to  enter 
Spain,  ordered  Santona  to  be  fortified,  directed  other 
reinforcements  from  France  upon  tlie  northern  provin- 
ces, and  finally  sent  marshal  Bessieres  to  command 
the  young  guard,  the  third  and  fourth  governments, 
and  that  of  the  Asturiis,  including  Bonet's  division, 
the  whole  forming  a  distinct  force,  called  the  army  of 
the  north,  which  on  the  1st  of  January,  1811,  exceeded 
seventy  thousand,  fifty-nine  thousand  men  and  eight 
thousand  horses  being  present  under  arms  ;  and  Bes- 
sieres, who  had  received  unusual  powers,  was  espe- 
cially ordered  to  support  and  furnish  all  necessary 
assistance  to  the  army  of  Portugal.  This  was  thi 
state  of  the  northern  parts  of  Spain. 

In  the  middle  parts,  the  army  of  the  centre,  or  that 
immediately  under  the  king,  at  first  about  twenty 
thousand,  was,  before  the  end  of  the  year,  carried  up 
to  twenty-seven  thousand,  exclusive  of  French  and 
Spanish  gtiards  and  juramentados,  or  native  troops, 
who  had  taken  the  oath  of  allegiance:  with  this 
power  he  protected  his  court,  watched  the  movem-ents 
of  the  Valencians,  and  chased  the  Guerillas  of  the  in- 
terior. 

The  summer  and  autumn  of  1810  were,  however, 
for  reasons  before-mentioned,  a  period  of  great  activ- 
ity with  these  irregulars  ;  numerous  petty  actions  were 
constantly  fought  around  the  capital,  many  sma'l 
French  posts,  and  numbers  of  isolated  men  and  offi- 
cers, were  cut  off,  and  few  despatches  reached  their 
destinations  without  a  considerable  escort.  To  reme- 
dy this,  the  lines  of  correspondence  were  maintained 
by  small  fortified  posts  which  run  from  Madrid  ; 
through  Guadarama  and  Segovia  to  the  provinces  of 
V'alladolid  and  Salamanca;  through  Buitrago  and  So- 
mosierra  to  the  army  of  the  north  ;  through  Guadalaxara 
and  Calatayud  to  the  army  of  Aragon  ;  througli  La 
Mancha  to  the  army  of  the  south  :  and  by  the  valley 
of  the  Tagus,  Arzobispo,  and  Truxillo,  to  the  fifth 
corps  during  its  incursions  into  Estremadura  ;  a  brig- 
ade of  cavalry,  was  also  generally  stationed  at  Truxillo. 

As  the  warfare  of  the  Partidas  was  merely  a  suc- 
cession of  surprises  and  massacres,  little  instruction, 
and  no  pleasure,  can  be  derived  from  the  details;  but 
in  the  course  of  the  summer  and  autumn,  not  les:i 
than  twelve  considerable,  and  an  infinite  number  of  tri- 
fling affairs,  took  place  between  the  moveable  columns 
and  these  bands  :  the  latter  were  however  almost  always 
beaten,  and  at  the  close  of  the  year,  only  the  Empe- 
cin;Hlr>.  Duran,  Sanchez,  Longa,  C^ampillo,  Poriier, 
and  Mina  retaimd  any  great  reputation ;  and  the  coiir.- 
try  people  were  so  harassed,  that  counter  Partidas,  in 
many  places  assisted  the  French. 

The  situation  of  the  army  of  the  centre  enabled 
the  king  to  aid  Massena,  either  by  an  advance  upon 
the  p]lga,  or  by  reinforcing,  or,  at  least,  supporting 
the  fifth  corps  in  Estremadura.  But  Joseph,  troubled 
by  the  Partidas,  and  having  many  convoys  to  protect, 
was  also  averse  to  join  any  of  the  marshals,  with 
all  of  whom,  except  Massena,  he  was  on  ill  term«; 
neitlier  were  his  relations  with  Napoleon  such  as  to 
induce  him  to  take  an  interest  in  any  military  opera- 
tions, save  those  which  affected  the  immediate  securiiy 
of  his  court.  His  poverty  M'as  extreme;  he  was  sur- 
rounded by  French  and  Spanish  intriguers;  his  plan 
of  organizing  a  national  parly  was  thwarted  by  hi3 
brother's  regulations  ;  plots  were  formed,  or  supposed 
to  be  formed,  against  his  person  ;  and,  in  this  uneasy 
posture,  the  secondary  part  he  was  forced  to  sustain, 
combined  with  his  natural  gentleness,  which  shrunk 
from  the  terrible  scenes  of  bloodshed  and  devastation 
continually  before  his  eyes,  rendered  his  situation  so 
irksome,  that  he  resolved  to  vacate  the  throne  and 
retire  to  France,  a  resolution  wliirh  he  soon  after- 
wards partially  executed.  Such  being  the  course  of 
affairs  in  the  northern  and  central  provinces,  it  reaaains 


322 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XII. 


to  trace  the  more  important  military  operations  at  the 
southern  horn  of  the  crescent,  where  the  allies  were 
most  favcurably  situated  to  press  the  left  flank  of  the 
invaders. 

Sebastiani  was  peculiarly  exposed  to  a  harassing 
warfare,  because  of  the  city  of  Grenada  and  otlier 
towns  in  the  interior,  which  he  was  obliged  to  hold 
at  the  same  time  with  those  on  the  coast,  although 
the  two  districts  were  completely  separated  by  the 
mountains.  Hence  a  large  body  of  troops  were  neces- 
sarily kept  in  the  strip  of  country  bordering  the  Med- 
iterranean, although  they  were  menaced,  on  the  one 
flank,  by  Gibraltar  and  the  Spanish  troops  at  San 
Roque;  on  the  other  by  the  Murcian  army;  and  in 
front,  by  continual  descents  from  the  sea  ;  while,  from 
the  shallowness  and  length  of  their  position,  they 
were  unable  to  concentrate  in  time  to  avoid  being  cut 
off  in  detail.  Now  the  Murcian  army,  nominally 
twenty  thousand,  was  based  upon  the  cities  of  Murcia 
and  Carthagena,  and  menaced  alike  the  coast-line  and 
that  of  Grenada  by  the  route  of  Baza  and  Guadix; 
and  any  movement  towards  the  latter,  was  sure  to 
■attract  the  French,  while  troops  landing  from  Cadiz  or 
Gibraltar  fell  upon  their  disseminated  posts  along  the 
coast. 

To  meet  this  system,  Sebastiani,  keeping  his  re- 
serves about  Grenada,  where  he  had  entrenched  a 
permanent  camp,  made  sudden  incursions,  sometimes 
against  the  Murcians,  sometimes  against  the  Spanish 
forces  on  the  side  of  Gibraltar ;  but  that  fortress 
afforded  a  refuge  to  the  patriots  on  one  side,  and 
Carthagena,  surrounded  by  arid  lands,  where,  for  two 
marches,  no  water  is  to  be  found,  always  offered  a 
sure  retreat  on  the  other.  Meanwhile  the  French 
general  endeavoured  to  gain  the  important  castles  on 
the  coast,  and  to  put  them  into  a  state  of  defence ; 
Estipona  and  Marbella  were  defended,  and  the  lat- 
ter sustained  many  attacks,  nor  was  it  finally  re- 
duced until  the  9th  of  December,  when  the  garrison, 
of  one  hundred  men,  took  refuge  on  board  the  Topaze 
frigate.  But  Sebastiani's  hold  of  these  towns,  and 
even  the  security  of  the  French  troops  along  the  coast, 
depended  upon  the  communications  across  the  moun- 
tains with  Grenada,  Chiclana,  and  Seville;  and  to 
impede  these,  general  Campbell  sent  British  officers 
into  the  Ronda,  who  successfully  directed  the  wild 
mountaineers  of  that  district,  until  their  operations 
were  marred  by  Lascy's   misconduct. 

The  various  movements  and  insurrections  in  Grenada 
during  the  summer  of  1810  have  been  already  noted  ; 
and,  in  October,  general  Campbell  and  admiral  Pen- 
rose, conjointly  with  the  governor  of  Ceuta,  renewed 
the  design  of  surprising  Malaga,  where  were  many 
privateers  and  a  flotilla  of  gunboats,  supposed  to  be 
destined  against  the  islands  near  Ceuta.  The  French 
depot  for  the  siege  of  Marbella  was  at  Fuengirola, 
which  is  only  thirty  miles  from  Malaga,  and  it  was 
judged  that  an  attack  there  would  draw  the  troops 
from  the  latter  place;  and  the  more  surely,  as  general 
Valdemoro,  commanding  the  Spanish  force  at  San 
Roque,  engaged  to  co-operate,  on  the  side  of  Ronda. 

EXPEDITION    OF    FUENGIROLA. 

On  the  13th  of  October,  captain  Hope,  in  the  To- 
paze, sailed  from  Ceuta,  with  a  division  of  gun-boats 
and  a  convoy,  containing  a  brigade  of  twelve-pound- 
ers, sixty-five  gunners,  a  battalion  of  the  eighty-ninth 
regiment,  a  detachment  of  foreign  deserters,  and  the 
Spanish  imperial  regiment  of  Toledo ;  in  all  fifteen 
hundred  men,  including  Serjeants.*  Lord  Blayney, 
commanding  this  force,  was  directed  to  make  a  false 
attack  on  Fuengirola,  and  should  the  enemy  come  out 
from  Malaga,  he  was  to  sail  against  that  place.  A 
landing  was  effected   the  same  day,    and    Sebastiani 


♦  General  C.  Campbell's  Corre»;»i4ice,  MSS. 


instantly  marched,  leaving  only  three  hundred  mei\  in 
Malaga  :  lord  Blayney  was  as  instantly  apprised  of  the 
success  of  tiie  demonstration,  yet  he  remained  two 
days  cannonading  the  castle  with  twelve-pounders, 
although  the  heavier  metal  of  the  gun-boats  and  of 
the  frigate,  had  before  failed  to  make  any  impression 
on  the  walls ;  and  during  this  time  his  dispositions 
betrayed  the  utmost  contempt  of  military  rules.  On 
the  second  day,  while  he  was  on  board  a  gun-boat 
himself,  the  garrison,  which  did  not  exceed  t.vo  hun- 
dred men,  having  first  descried  Sebastiani's  column, 
made  a  sally,  took  the  battery,  and  drove  the  British 
part  of  the  investing  force  headlong  towards  the  boats. 
Lord  Blayney  landed,  rallied  his  men,  and  re-took  the 
artillery;  but  at  this  moment  two  squadrons  of  French 
cavalry  came  up,  and  his  lordship,  mistaking  them 
for  Spaniards,  ordered  the  firing  to  cease.  He  was 
immediately  made  prisoner;  his  troops  again  fled  to 
the  beach,  and  would  have  been  sabred  but  for  the 
opportune  arrival  of  the  Rodney  with  the  eighty- 
second  regiment,  the  flank  companies  of  which  were 
immediately  disembarked  and  first  checked  the  enemy. 
The  Spanish  regiment,  untouched  by  the  panic,  re- 
gained the  ships  regularly  and  without  loss;  of  the 
British  two  officers  and  thirty  men  were  killed  or 
wounded,  and  one  general,  seven  inferior  officers,  and 
nearly  two  hundred  Serjeants  and  privates  taken. 
Thus  an  expedition,  well  contrived  and  adequate  to 
its  object,  was  ruined  by  misconduct,  and  terminated 
in  disaster  and  disgrace. 

Scarcely  was  this  affair  finished,  when  Valdemoro 
and  the  Marquis  of  Portasgo  appeared  in  the  Ronda; 
an  insurrection  commenced  at  Velez  Malaga  and  in  the 
neighbouring  villages  ;  and  Blake,  who  had  returned 
from  Cadiz  to  the  army  in  Murcia,  advanced,  with 
eight  thousand  men,  towards  Cullar  on  the  side  of 
Baza.  General  Campbell  immediately  furnished  mon- 
ey to  Portasgo,  and  embarked  a  thousand  stand  of 
arms  for  the  people  of  Velez  Malaga.*  An  English 
frigate  was  also  sent  to  cruise  along  the  coast.  Se- 
bastiani, however,  being  relieved  from  the  fear  of  a 
descent,  soon  quelled  this  insurrection;  and  then  send- 
ing Milhaud  on  before  with  some  cavalry,  follow(>d 
himself  with  reinforcements  for  general  Rey,  who 
was  opposed  to  Blake.  The  latter,  retiring  behind 
the  Almanzora  river,  was  overtaken  by  Milhaud,  and 
defeated  on  the  4th  of  November,  when  his  army 
dispersed  :  at  the  same  time,  a  contagious  fever, 
breaking  out  at  Carthagena,  spread  along  the  coast  to 
Gibraltar  and  Cadiz,  and  the  Spanish  operations  on 
the  side  of  Murcia  ceased. 

In  the  kingdom  of  Seville,  the  war  turned  chiefl,y 
upon  the  blockade  of  the  Isla,  and  the  movements  of 
the  Spanish  armies  in  Estremadura.  Provisions  for 
Cadiz  were  principally  drawn  from  the  Condado  de 
Neibla,  and  it  has  been  seen  that  Copons,  aided  by 
descents  from  the  ocean,  endeavoured  to  secure  this 
important  resource  ;  but  neither  his  efforts,  nor  the 
descents,  would  have  availed,  if  Ballasteros  had  not 
co-operated  by  constantly  menacing  Seville  from  Ar- 
acena  and  the  Aroche  mountains.  Neither  could  Bal- 
lasteros have  maintained  the  war  there,  were  it  not  ("or 
the  supp  rt  of  Bsdajos  and  Olivenza  ;  under  cover  of 
which,  Romana's  army  protected  his  line  of  opera 
tion.  and  sent  military  supplies  and  reinforcements. 
On  ttie  possession  of  Hadajos,  therefore,  the  supply  of 
Cadiz  chiefly  depended. 

Seville  was  the  French  point  of  defence  ;  Cadiz, 
Estremadura  and  the  Condado  de  Neibla  their  points 
of  offence.  The  want  of  provisions,  the  desire  to  cut 
off  the  vSpanish  convoys,  or  the  sndden  irruption  of 
troops  from  Cadiz,  thrratening  their  posts  at  Moguer 
and  ITeulvn,  always  drew  them  toward  the  coast;  the 
enterprises  of  Ballasteros  brought  them  towards  Ara* 


*  (jcntral  CaiiiplK;ll's  Correspoudence.  MSS. 


1810.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


323 


ceiia,  and,  in  like  manner,  the  advance  of  Romana  to- 
wards the  Moreiia  hroiitrht  them  to  Estremadura.  But 
Kcinana  had  wasted  the  greater  part  of  the  latter  pro- 
vince, and  as  the  fifth  corps  alone  was  disposable, 
either  for  offensive  movements,  or  for  the  defence  of 
the  country  around  Seville,  Soult  contented  himself 
with  such  advantaires  as  could  be  gained  by  sudden 
strokes ;  frequently,  however,  crossing  the  mountains 
to  prevent  the  Spaniards  from  permanently  establishing 
themselves  on  the  frontier  of  Andalusia. 

In  October,  Romana,  as  we  have  seen,  entered  the 
Lines  of 'I'orres  Vedras,  and  Mendizabal,  who  remained 
with  two  divisions,  finding  that  Mortier,  unconscious 
of  Romana's  absence,  had  retired  across  the  mountains, 
occupied  Merida.  He  wished  to  establish  himself  in 
the  yet  unwasted  country  about  Llerena,  but  the  ap- 
pearance of  a  moveable  column  on  the  frontier  of  La 
Mancha,  sent  him  back  to  Badajos,  and,  on  the  20th  of 
Novemher,  he  united  witii  Ballasteros.  The  F'rench 
then  fortified  Gibraleon  and  other  posts  in  the  Condado 
de  Neibla,  while  Girard's  division  reappeared  at  Gua- 
dalcanal, and  being  joined  by  the  column  from  La 
Mancha,  foraged  the  country  towards  Llerena.  Men- 
dizahel  then  took  post  at  Zafra  with  nine  thousand  in- 
fantry and  two  thousand  cavalry,  including  Madden's 
Portuguese  brigade,  hut  meanwhile,  Copons,  who  had 
four  tiiousand  men,  was  totally  defeated  at  Castillejos 
by  D'Aremberg,  and  retired  to  Puebla  de  Gusman. 

At  Cadiz,  no  change  or  military  event  had  occurred 
after  the  affair  of  Matagorda,  save  the  expeditions 
against  Moguer,  already  noticed,  and  a  slight  attempt 
of  the  Spaniards  against  the  Chiclana  works  in  Sep- 
tember ;  but  all  men's  hopes  and  expectations  had 
been  wonderfully  raised  by  political  events  which  it 
was  fondly  hoped  would  secure  both  independence  and 
a  good  constitution  to  Spain.  After  two  years  of  in- 
trigues and  delay,  the  National  Cortes  assembled,  and 
the  long  suppressed  voice  of  the  people  was  at  last  to 
be  heard.  Nevertheless,  as  the  members  of  the  Cortes 
could  not  be  duly  and  legally  chosen  in  the  provinces 
possessed  by  the  enemy ;  and  as  some  members  were 
captured  by  the  French  on  their  journey  to  Cadiz, 
many  persons  unknown,  even  by  name,  to  their  sup- 
posed constituents,  were  chosen  ;  and  a  new  principle 
of  election  was  also  adopted  ;  for  all  persons  twenty- 
five  years  old,  not  holding  office  or  pension  under  the 
government,  nor  inoaparilated  by  crime,  nor  by  debts 
to  the  state,  nor  by  bodily  infirmity,  were  eligible  to 
sit  if  chosen,  which  had  never  before  been  the  rule. 
A  supplement  of  sixty-eight  members  was  likewise 
provided  to  supply  accidental  vacancies;  and  it  was 
atrreed  that  twenty-six  persons  then  in  Spain,  natives 
of  the  colonies,  should   represent  those  dependencies. 

Towards  the  latter  end  of  September  this  great 
assembly  met,  and  immediately  took  the  title  of  Majes- 
ty ;  it  afterwards  declared  the  press  free  in  respect  of 
political,  but  not  of  religious  matters,  abolished  some 
of  the  provincial  juntas,  re-appointed  captains-general, 
and  proceeded  to  fonn  a  constitution  worded  in  the 
very  spirit  of  democracy.  These  things,  aided  by  a 
Vehement  elocpience,  drew  much  attention  to  the  pro- 
ceedings of  the  Cortes,  and  a  fresh  impulse  seemed 
given  to  the  war :  but  men  brought  up  under  despot- 
ism do  not  readily  attain  the  fashions  of  liberty. 

'I'hf  Provincial  Junta,  the  Central  Junta,  the  Junta 
of  Cadiz,  the  Regency,  had  all  been,  in  succession, 
violent  and  tyrannical  in  act,  while  claiming  only  to 
be  popular  leaders,  and  this  spirit  did  not  desert  the 
Cortes.  Abstract  principles  of  liberty  were  freely 
promulgated,  yet  tyrannical  and  partial  proceedings 
were  of  common  occurrence;  and  the  reformations, 
by  outstripping  the  feelings  and  understandings  of  the 
nation,  weakened  tlie  main  springs  of  its  resistance  to 
the  Fren(  h.  It  was  not  fnr  freedom,  but  from  national 
pride  and  from  religious  influence,  that  the  people  struck. 


Liberty  had  no  attraction  for  the  nobles,  nor  for  tha 
monastics,  nor  even  for  the  merchants  ;  and  the  Cortes, 
in  suppressing  old  establishments  and  violating  old 
forms  and  customs,  wounded  powerful  interests,  cre- 
ated active  enemies,  and  shocked  those  very  prejudices 
which  hud  produced  resistance  to  Napoleon. 

In  the  administration  of  the  armies,  in  the  conduct 
of  the  war,  in  the  execution  of  the  laws,  and  the  treat- 
ment of  the  colonies,  there  was  as  much  of  vanity, 
of  intrigue,  procrastination,  negligence,  folly,  and  vi- 
olence as  before.  Hence  the  people  were  soon  discon- 
tented ;  and  when  the  power  of  the  religious  orders 
was  openly  attacked  by  a  proposition  to  abolish  the 
inquisition,  the  clergy  became  active  enemies  of  the 
Cortes.  The  great  cause  of  feudal  privileges  being 
once  given  up,  the  natural  tendency  of  the  Cortes 
was  towards  the  enemy.  A  broad  line  of  distinction 
was  thus  drawn  between  the  objects  of  the  Spanish 
and  English  governments  in  the  prosecution  of  the 
war;  and,  ere  the  contest  was  finished,  there  was  a 
schism  between  the  British  cabinet  and  the  Spanish 
government,  which  would  inevitably  have  thrown  the 
latter  into  Napoleon's  hands,  if  fortune  had  not,  at  the 
moment,  betrayed  him  into  Russia. 

The  Regency,  jealous  of  the  Cortes,  and  little 
pleased  with  the  inferior  title  of  highness  accorded 
them,  were  far  from  partaking  of  the  republican  spirit; 
and  so  anxious  to  check  any  tendency  towards  inno- 
vation, that  early  in  the  year  they  had  invited  the  duke 
of  Orleans  to  command  the  provinces  bordering  on 
France,  permitted  him  to  issue  proclamations,  and 
received  him  at  Cadiz  with  the  honours  of  a  royal 
prince;  intending  to  oppose  his  authority  to  that  of 
the  Local  Juntas,  at  the  moment,  and  finally,  to  that 
of  the  Cortes.  He  had  touched  at  Taragona  and  had 
been  well  received,  but  at  Cadiz  the  people  regarded 
him  with  indifference.  Mr.  Wellesley  opposed  his 
stay  because  lord  Wellington  judged  that  his  recep- 
tion in  Spain  would  tend  to  render  the  Spanish  war 
popular  in  the  South  of  France,  and  the  English  min- 
isters wishing  to  prevent  any  future  embarrassments 
from  his  intrigues  in  Spain,  sent  him  a  verbal  invita- 
tion to  reside  in  England.  This  he  did  not  accept, 
but  the  Cortes  aware  of  the  cause  of  his  arrival,  ob- 
liged him  to  quit  Spain,  and  soon  after  displacing  the 
Regency  of  Five,  appointed  Joachim  Blake,  Gabriel 
Cisgar,  and  Pedro  Agar  in  their  stead.  During  the 
absence  of  the  two  first,  substitutes  were  provided, 
but  one  of  them  (Palacios)  making  some  difficulty 
about  taking  the  oath,  was  immediately  declared  to 
have  forfeited  the  confidence  of  the  nation  ;  so  per- 
emptorily did  the  Cortes  proceed. 

Nevertheless,  the  new  regents,  not  more  pleased 
with  the  democratic  spirit  than  their  predecessors,  and 
yet  wishing  to  retain  the  power  in  their  own  hands, 
refused  to  listen  to  the  princess  of  Brazils'  claim,  and 
thus  factions  sprang  up  on  every  side  ;  for  the  repub- 
licans were  not  paramount  in  the  (fortes  at  first,  and 
the  majority  of  that  assembly  were  so  suhtilely  de^dt 
with  by  Pedro  Souza,  that  they  privately  admitted 
Carlotta's  claims  both  to  the  succession  and  the  imme- 
diate control  of  the  whole  Peninsula. 

Don  Manuel  Lapena  being  declared  captain-general 
of  Andalusia,  and  commander  of  the  forces  in  the  Isla, 
was  subservient  to  the  views  of  the  Cortes  ;  but  the 
new  Regency,  anxious  to  have  a  counterbalancing 
force,  and  being  instigated  also  by  persons  from 
Badajos,  enemies  to  Romana,  removed  that  officer 
in  December,  and  ordered  his  divisions  to  separate 
from  the  British  army  and  come  to  Cadiz.  The  con- 
duct of  those  divisions  had,  indeed,  given  little  satis- 
faction either  to  the  British  or  Portuguese,  but  num- 
bers were  so  absolutely  necessary  to  lord  Wellina-ton, 
that  colonel  O'Neal  was  sent  to  remonstrate  with  the 
Regency;  and,   by   shewing  that  the  fall  of  Estrema- 


324 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR     VAR. 


[Book  XIT. 


dura,  and  the  total  loss  of  communication  with  the 
interior  of  Spain  would  ensue,  obtained  a  momentary 
respite.* 

In  matters  relating  to  the  war  against  the  French, 
or  to  the  administration  of  the  country,  the  Spanish 
leaders  were  iricapahle  of  acting  cordially  on  any 
mature  plan;  hut  with  respect  to  the  colonies,  all 
parties  agreed  to  push  violence,  injustice,  cruelty,  and 
iinpolicy  to  their  utmost  hounds.  To  please  the  Brit- 
ish government,  the  first  Regency  had  published,  in 
May,  a  decree,  permitting  the  South  Americans  to 
export  their  own  products,  under  certain  conditions. 
This  legalizing  of  a  tr,ide,  which  could  not  be  suppress- 
ed, and  which  was  but  a  decent  return  to  England 
for  h(>r  assistance,  gave  offence  to  the  Municipal  Junta 
of  Cadiz;  and  its  resentment  was  so  much  dreaded 
that  the  Regency,  in  June,  disowned  their  own  decree 
of  the  previous  month  and  even  punished  the  printers, 
as  having  given  birth  to  a  forged  instrument.  Exas- 
perated at  this  treatment,  the  colonies,  who  had  resist- 
ed all  the  intrigues  of  the  French,  with  a  firumess 
and  singleness  of  purpose  very  displeasing  to  the 
government  in  Old  Spain,  openly  discovered  their  dis- 
content, and  then  the  authorities  in  the  Mother  Country, 
throwing  off  the  mask  of  liberality  and  patriotism, 
exposed  their  own  secret  views.  "  It  is  not  enough 
that  Americans  should  be  Spanish  subjects  now,  but 
that  in  all  cases  they  should  belong  to  Spain,"  was  the 
proclamation  of  the  Regency,  in  answer  to  a  declaration 
from  the  Caraccas,  avowing  attachment  to  the  cause 
of  Ferdinand  :  meaning  that,  if  Spain  should  pass 
under  the  power  of  the  usurper  America  must  follow, 
as  having  no  right  to  decide  in  any  case  for  herself. 

When  the  Cortes  met,  America  expected  more  jus- 
tice; she  had  contributed  ninety  millions  of  dollars 
lor  the  support  of  the  war,  and  many  of  her  sons  had 
served  zealously  in  person;  she  had  also  been  declared 
an  integral  part  of  the  empire  by  the  Central  Junta, 
and  her  deputies  were  now  permitted  to  sit  in  the 
Great  National  Assembly.  She  was  however  soon 
made  to  understand,  that  the  first  of  these  privi- 
leges meant  eternal  slavery,  and  that  the  second  was  a 
mere  form.  "The  Americans  complain  of  having 
been  tyrannized  over  for  three  hundred  years !  they 
shall  now  suffer  for  three  thousand  years,"  and  '*  I 
know  not  to  what  class  of  beasts  the  Americans  be- 
long :"  such  were  the  expressions  heard  and  applaud- 
ed in  the  Cortes,  when  the  rights  of  the  colonists  were 
agitated  in  tliat  assembly.  Better  to  lose  Spain  to 
Joseph,  if  Ameriea  be  retained,  than  to  sa^b  Spain  if 
America  be  sejjarated  froui  her,  was  a  feeling  deeply 
rooted  in  every  Spanish  heart,  a  sentiment  covertly 
expressed  in  many  public  documents,  and  openly 
acted  upon;  for,  when  repeated  insults,  treachery,  and 
continued  violence,  had  driven  the  colonists  to  defend 
their  rights  in  arms,  the  money  and  stores,  sup|)lied  by 
England  f  r  the  support  of  the  war  against  the  French, 
were  applied  to  the  fitting  out  of  expeditions  against 
America.  Thus  the  convocation  of  the  National 
Cortes,  far  from  improving  the  posture  of  affairs,  dried 
up  the  chief  sources  of  revenue,  weakened  the  army  in 
the  field,  offended  many  powerful  bodies  in  the  slate, 
involved  the  nation  in  a  colonial  war,  and  struck  at 
the  root  of  the  alliance  with  England. 


CHAPTER  II. 

Poiilt  asiiinips  the  direction  of  the  blockade  of  Cadiz — His  flo- 
tilla—  Kilters  the  Trocradero  canal — Villaiitrov?,  or  camion 
imrtars,  eiiijiloyed  by  the  French — Inactivity  of  the  Sn:iii- 
iards — iVapoleon  dirtrts   Soult   to  aid    Massena — Has  some 

Mr.  Stuarfi  Papers.     MSS. 


notion  of  evacuating;  Andalusia — Soult's  first  expedition  lo 
Estieinaduni — Carries  the  tiii  'jje  of  ^l<•rida — litsitges  Oli- 
veiizii — Hallasteios  defcatt-d  at  Castellejos — i-'lies  into  I'l^lu- 
gal — Roniaiia's  divisions  march  from  Cartaxo  to  the  succour 
of  Olivfnza — That  place  surrenders — Roiiiana  dies — Hiscliur- 
actiT — Lord  VV<  Hiiigton's  counsels  neglected  by  the  Spmisli 
ffcnerals — I'irst  ^il■>;e  of  Badiijos — Meiulizalici  ai  ri\  es— File* 
the  Spanish  army  into  Hadajts — JNlakes  a  grand  sallv — Is  dri- 
ven back  with  loss — I'itches  iiiscamp  roiiiul  San  Cl^ristoval  — 
Battle  of  the  Gebora — Continuation  of  the  blockade  of  Cai.iz 
—  Expedition  of  the  allies  under  g^jnerai  Lapena — Uattle  of 
Barosa — tactions  in  Caiiiz. 

While  the  Spaniards  in  the  Isla  were  occupied 
with  the  debates  of  the  Cortes,  the  French  worka 
were  laboured  with  care.  The  chain  of  forts  was 
perfected,  each  being  complete  in  itself  with  ditch 
and  palisades  and  a  week's  provisions  ;  the  batteries 
at  the  Trocadero  were  powerful,  and  the  flotillas  at 
San  Lucar  de  Barameda,  Santa  Maria,  Puerto  Real, 
and  Chiclana,  were  ready  for  action.  Soult  repaired 
in  person  to  San  Lucar,  and  in  the  last  night  of  Oc- 
tober, thirty  pinnaces  and  gun-boats  slipping  out  of 
the  Guadalquivir  eluded  the  allied  fleet,  passed 
along  the  coast  to  Rota,  and  from  thence,  aided  by 
shore  batteries,  fought  their  way  to  Santa  Maria  and 
the  San  Pedro.  But,  to  avoid  the  fire  of  the  fleet 
and  forts  in  doubling  Matagorda,  the  duke  of  Dal- 
malia,  remembering  what  he  had  formerly  effected 
at  Campo  Saucos  on  the  Minho,  transported  his  flo- 
tilla on  rollers,  overland  ;  in  November,  one  hundred 
and  thirty  armed  vessels  and  transports  were  assem- 
bled in  the  Trocadero  canal.  This  success  was,  how- 
ever, alloyed  by  the  death  of  genera!  Senarmont,  an 
artillery  officer  of  the  highest  reputation. 

At  the  Trocadero  point  there  were  immense  batte- 
ries, and  some  notable  pieces  of  ordnance  called  can- 
non-mortars, or  Villantroys,  after  the  inventor.  These 
huge  engines  were  cast  in  Seville,  and,  being  placed 
in  slings,  threw  shells  with  such  prodigious  force  as 
to  range  over  Cadiz,  a  distance  of  more  than  five 
thousand  yards.  But  to  obtain  this  flight  the  shells 
were  partly  filled  with  lead,  and  their  charge  of 
powder  was  two  small  for  an  effective  explosion. 
Nevertheless,  they  produced  some  alarnti  in  the  city, 
and  were  troublesome  to  the  shipping.  But  Soult's 
real  design  was  first  to  ruin,  by  a  superior  fire,  theo})po- 
site  fort  (  fthe  Puntales,  then  pass  the  straits  with  his 
flotilla,  and  establish  his  army  between  the  Isla  and 
the  city  ;  nor  was  this  plan  chimerical,  for  on  the  side 
of  the  besieged  there  was  i!e)ther  conei^rt  nor  industry. 

'j'^io  drafts,  made,  in  ALunist  and  September,  liy 
lord  W  tlliiigton,  had  reduced  Graham's  force  to  five 
thousand  men,  and  in  October  the  fever  broke  out 
in  Cadiz;  but  as  Soult's  preparations  became  formida- 
ble, reinforcements  were  drawn  from  Gibraltar  and  Siei- 
ly,  and,  at  the  end  of  the  year,  seven  thousand  British, 
(iermans.  and  Portuguese,  were  still  behind  the  Santi 
Petri.  Hence  Graham  felt  confident,  1.  That,  with 
due  preparation,  he  could  maintain  the  Puntales  even 
though  its  fire  should  be  silenced.  2.  That  Soult 
must  establish  a  stronger  flotilla  than  the  allies,  or 
his  communication  with  Matagorda  could  not  be  main- 
tained. 3.  That  the  intercourse  between  the  army 
in  Isla  and  the  garrison  of  Cadiz  could  not  be  in- 
terrupted, unless  the  great  redoubt  of  the  Cortadura 
was  lost. 

To  ensure  the  superiority  of  naval  means,  admiral 
Keats  drew  all  the  armed  craft  from  Gibraltar.  To 
secure  the  land  defence,  general  Graham  perseveringlv 
urged  the  Regency  to  adopt  certain  plans,  and  he  was 
warmly  seconded  by  sir  Henry  Wellesley,  but  neither 
their  entreaties,  nor  the  imminence  of  the  danger,  could 
overcome  the  apathy  of  the  Spaniards.*  'I'lioir  army, 
reinforced  by  a  small  body  from  C'eutn,  was  wanting 
in  discipline,  clothing,  and  equipments,  and  only  six- 

•  Graham's  T  %t  a/  '  es,  MSS. 


1810.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


323 


teen  thousand  men  of  all  arms  were  effective  on  a 
iimsler-roll  of  twenty-three  thousand.  The  labour  of 
tlie  British  troops,  far  from  bein^  assisted,  was  vex- 
atiously  impeded  ;  it  was  the  end  of  December,  and 
after  many  sharp  altercations,  ere  Graham  could  even 
obtain  leave  to  put  the  interior  line  of  the  Cortadura 
in  a  state  of  defence  ;  althouoh,  by  a  sudden  disem- 
b.ukation,  the  enemy  mijjht  enter  it  from  tne  rear,  and 
cut  olT  the  army  of  the  Isla  from  the  city.  But  wliile 
the  duke  of  Dalmatia  was  collecting  means  of  attack, 
tlie  events  in  Poitugal  prevented  the  execution  of 
his  design. 

When  Massena  had  passed  the  frontier,  his  com- 
munications with  France  became  so  uncertain,  that 
the  emperor's  principal  source  of  information  was 
throuoh  ilie  Eno-lish  newspapers.  Foy  brought  the 
first  exact  intelligence  of  tlie  posture  of  affairs.  It 
was  then  that  the  army  of  the  north  was  directed  to 
support  the  army  of  Portugal  ;  that  the  ninth  corps 
was  made  a  component  part  of  the  latter;  that  the 
prince  of  Esling  was  enjoined  to  hold  fast  between 
Saiitarem  and  the  Zezen^ ;  to  besiege  Abrantes ;  and 
to  expect  the  duke  of  Dalmatia,  who  had  been  al- 
ready several  times  commanded  to  move  through  the 
Alemtejo,  to  his  assistance.*  The  emperor  seems 
even  to  have  contemplated  the  evacuation  of  Anda- 
lusia and  the  concentration  of  the  whole  army  of  the 
south  on  the  Tagus,  a  project  that  would  have 
strengthened  rather  than  weakened  the  Freirch  in  the 
Peninsula,  because  it  was  more  important  to  crush  the 
regular  warfare  in  Portugal,  than  to  hold  any  particu- 
lar province. 

Massena's  instructions  reached  him  in  due  time, 
Soult's  were  intercepted  bv  the  Guerillas,  and  the 
duplicates  did  not  arrive  before  the  end  of  December  ; 
a  delay  affording  proof,  that  thirty  thousand  men 
would  scarcely  have  compensated  for  the  uncertainty 
of  the  French  communications.  Postponing  his  de- 
sistn  against  Cadiz,  the  Duke  of  Dalmatia  then  re- 
paired to  Seville,  carrying;  with  him  Latour  Mau- 
bourg's  cavalry  and  five  thousand  infantry  from  the 
first  corps.  His  instructions  neither  prescribed  a  line 
of  movement  nor  enjoined  any  specific  operation  ; 
the  prince  of  E;ling  was  to  communicate  his  plan, 
to  which  Soult's  was  to  be  subordinate.  But  no  certain 
intelligence  even  of  Massena's  early  proceedings  had 
reached  Seville,  and  such  were  the  precautions  of  lord 
Wellinorton,  such  the  activity  of  the  Partidas,  that 
from  the  time  Soult  quitted  Cadiz,  until  his  operation 
terminated,  no  communication  could  be  effected  be- 
tween the  two  marshals,  and  each  acted  in  perfect 
ignorance  of  the  plans  and  situation  of  the  other. 

The  duke  of  Dalmatia  considering  that  Sebastiani 
had  his  hands  full  ;  and  that  the  blockade  of  Cadiz, 
and  the  protection  of  Seville  on  the  side  of  Neibla 
and  of  Aracena,  would  not  permit  the  drawing  off 
more  than  twenty  thousand  men  from  Andalusia; 
represented  to  the  emperor  that  with  such  a  force,  he 
durst  not  penetrate  the  Alemtejo,  leaving  Oiivenza  and 
Badajos,  and  Ballasteros,  (who  would  certainly  join 
Mendiznbel)  on  his  rear;  and  that  Romana  alone, 
wiihout  reckoningr  British  troops,  could  bring  ten 
thousand  men  against  his  front ;  hence  he  demanded 
leave  to  besiege  those  places,  and  Napoleon  consent- 
ed, f  Meanwhile,  order  was  taken  to  secure  Andalu- 
sia during  the  operations.  DessoUes'  division  had 
been  recalled  to  form  the  army  of  the  centre,  and  gen- 
eral Gndinot  took  his  place  at  Cordoba;  a  colunm  of 
observation  was  posted  under  general  Digeon  at  Ecija  ; 
Seville  entrenched  on  the  side  ol  Neibla,  was  given 
over  to  general  Daricau ;  and  a  'ctachment  under 
Remond  was  posted  at  Gibraleon.  '1 .  ",  expeditionary 
army,  consisting  of  sixteen   thousai. '   infantry,   artil- 


•  The  Kind's  Correspondence,  capturer!  at  Vittoria. 

*  Marnfial  Soult's  Corregpondeuce.     MSS. 


lery,  sappers  and  miners,  and  about  four  tliousnnd  cav- 
alry and  fifty-four  guns,  was  assembled  on  the  2d 
January.  An  equipage  of  siege,  a  light  pontoon  train, 
and  seventeen  hundred  carts,  for  stores  and  provisions, 
were  also  prepared  :  and  Soult's  administration  was 
now  so  efficient,  that  he  ordered  a  levy  of  live  thousand 
young  Spaniards,  called  "  escopeteros'''  (fuzilc'rs)  to 
maintain  the  police  of  the  province.* 

soult's  first  expedition  to  estremauura. 

Mortier  moving  from  Guadalcanal,  entered  Zafra 
on  the  5th  .January,  Mendizabel  retired  to  Merida, 
and  Ballasteros,  in  consequence  of  orders  fVom  the 
Regency,  passed  over  the  mountains  to  P^rejenal. 
But  winter  tempests  raged,  the  French  convoy  which 
moved  on  Araceaa,  overwhelmed  by  storms,  was  de- 
tained at  the  foot  of  the  mountains,  and  to  protect 
it,  Gazan  marching  from  Zafra,  drove  Ballasteros  out 
of  Frejenal.  Meanwhile,  the  Spanish  leaders,  as  well 
those  in  Estremadura,  as  in  Cadiz,  were  quite  igno- 
rant of  Soult's  intentions,  some  asserting  that  he  was 
going  to  pass  the  Tagus  at  Almaraz,  others,  that  his 
object  was  only  to  crush  Ballasteros.  Lord  Welling- 
ton alone  divined  the  truth,  and  it  was  he  who  first 
gave  .Mendizabal  notice,  that  the  French  were  assem- 
bling at  Seville  at  all,  so  destitute  of  intelligence  and 
of  military  knowledge  were  the  Spaniards.  Now  when 
the  French  were  breaking  into  Estremadura,  terror 
and  confusion  spread  far  and  wide ;  Badajos  was  ill 
provisioned,  Albuquerque  in  ruins,  Oiivenza  nearly 
dismantled  ;  and,  in  the  midst  of  this  disorder,  Bal- 
lasteros was  drawn  off  towards  the  Condada  de  Nei- 
bla by  the  Regency,  who  thus  deprived  Estremadura 
of  half  its  defenders   at  the   moment  of  invasion. 

Lord  Wellington  had  advised  that  the  troops  should 
be  concentrated,  the  bridges  over  the  Guadiana  mined 
for  destruction,  and  the  passage  of  that  river  disputed 
to  gain  time;  but  these  things  being  neglected,  an 
advanced  guard  of  cavalry  alone  carried  the  bridge  of 
Merida  on  the  6th.  Soult  then  turned  upon  Oiivenza 
with  the  infantry,  and  while  Latour  Maubourg's  dra- 
jroons  held  Mendizabal  in  check  on  the  side  of  Bada- 
jos, Bridie's  light  horsemen  collected  cattle  on  the 
side  of  Estremailura.  Gazan's  division,  still  posted 
near  Frejenal,  protected  the  march  of  the  artillery  and 
convoy,  and  La  Houssaye's  brigade,  belonging  to  the 
army  of  the  centre,  quitting  Truxillo,  marched  against 
the  Partidas  and  scoured  the  banks  of  the  Tagus  from 
Arzobispo  to  Alcantara. 

FIRST    SIEGE    OF    OLIVENZA. 

This  place,  although  regularly  fortified  with  nine 
bastions,  a  covered  way,  and  some  unfinished  rave- 
lins, was  incapable  of  a  good  defence.  With  an  old 
breach  slightly  repaired,  very  few  guns  mounted,  and 
commanding  no  passage  of  the  Guadiana,  it  was  of 
little  importance  to  the  French;  yet,  as  containing 
four  thousand  troops,  it  was  of  some  consequence  to 
reduce  it.  Lord  Wellington  had  pressed  Romana  to 
destroy  the  defences  entirely,  or  to  supply  it  with  the 
means  of  resistance,  and  the  marquis  decided  on  the 
former;  but  Mendizabel  slighting  his  orders,  had 
thrown  his  best  division  into  the  place. 

It  was  invested  the  11th;  an  abandoned  outwork, 
three  hundred  and  forty  yards  south  of  the  town, 
was  taken  possession  of  the  first  night,  and  breach- 
ing batteries  of  eight  guns,  and  counter  batteries  of 
six  guns  were  then  marked  out.  The  trenches  were 
opened  on  the  west,  and  approaches  carried  on  by 
the  flying  sap  against  the  old  breach;  but  the  rains 
were  heavy  and  continual,  ihe  scarcity  of  entrench- 
ing-tools  great,  and  it  was  not  until  the  18lh,  when 
the  head  of  the  convoy  had  passed  the  mountains,  thai 
the  works  could  be  properly  advanced. 

*  King  Joseph's  Coneiipondence.     MSts. 


326 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  Ml. 


On  the  19th  the  covered  way  was  crowned,  and 
the  20lh  the  breaching  batteries  opened  tlieir  fire ; 
two  mortars  also  tlirew  shells  into  the  town,  and  a 
globe  of  compression  was  prepared  to  blow  in  the 
counterscarp.  In  the  evening,  Mendizabel  skirmished 
unsuccessfully  with  Latour  Maubourg's  horsemen,  and, 
on  the  -1st,  the  mine  was  completed  and  preparations 
made  for  the  passaire  of  the  ditch.  The  Spanish  gen- 
eral, unable  from  the  absence  of  Hallasteros'  division 
to  relieve  Olivenza,  now  demanded  succour  from  Ro- 
mana,  who  sent  Carlos  D'Espana's  brigade  from 
Abrantes  the  IBih,  and  general  V'irues,  with  his  own 
Spanish  division,  from  Cartaxo  on  the  20th.  The 
21st,  the  governor  of  Olivenza  was  informed  of  this, 
and  replied  that  he  would  maintain  the  place  to  the 
last  moment;  but  the  next  day  he  capitulated,  having 
still  provisions,  ammunition,  eighteen  guns,  and  four 
thousand  one  hundred  effective  soldiers.  The  26th 
Soult  marched  acrainst  Badajos. 

Meanwhile  Ballasteros  advanced  upon  Neibla,  but 
being  followed  by  Gazan,  was  overtaken  at  Casiiliejos 
on  the  28th,  and,  after  a  sharp  battle,  driven  with  the 
loss  of  fifteen  hundred  prisoners  besides  killed  and 
wounded  over  the  Guadiana;  the  Spanish  artillery 
was  saved  in  the  castle  of  Paymigo,  and  the  infant- 
ry took  refuge  at  Alcontin  and  Mertola.  Ballasteros' 
force  was  thus  in  a  few  days  reduced  by  three  thousand 
men,  and,  that  nothing  might  be  left  to  alarm  the 
French  in  that  quarter,  the  Regency  re-called  Copon's 
force  to  Cadiz.  In  this  manner  a  fortress  was  taken, 
and  twelve  thousand  men,  who,  well  employed,  might 
have  frustrated  the  French  designs  against  Badajos, 
were  all  dispersed,  withdrawn,  or  made  prisoners  in 
twenty  days  after  the  commencement  of  Soult's  expe- 
dition. 

For  many  months  previous  to  these  events  lord 
Wellington  had  striven  to  teach  the  Spanish  com- 
mander that  there  was  but  one  sa/e  mode  of  proceed- 
ing in  Estremadura,  and  Romana  "had  just  yielded  to 
his  counsels  when  the  sudden  arrival  of  the  French 
threw  every  thing  into  confusion.  The  defence  of  the 
Guadiana,  the  dismantling  of  Olivenza,  the  concentra- 
tion of  the  forces  were  all  neglected.  Romana,  how- 
ever, had  sent  his  divisions  towards  the  frontier;  they 
reached  Montemor  the  22d  ;  the  23d  they  received 
Mendizahel's  orders  to  halt  as  Olivenza  had  surren- 
dered ;  the  21th  Romana  died  of  an  aneurism  in  the 
heart.  He  was  a  worthy  man  and  of  quick  parts,  al- 
though deficient  in  military  talent.  His  death  was  a 
great  loss,  yet  his  influence  was  on  the  wane ;  he  had 
many  enemies,  and  his  authority  was  chiefly  sustained 
by  the  attachment  of  his  troops,  and  by  his  riches, 
for  his  estates  heingr  in  the  Balearic  Isles,  his  revenues 
did  not  sufl^er  by  the  war. 

Mendizabal  now  commanded  in  Estremadura.  He 
ha<l  received  Romana's  orders  to  adopt  lord  Welling- 
ton's pi m  ;  which  was  to  concentrate  all  the  Spanish 
troops,  amounting  to  at  least  ten  thousand  men,  on  the 
frontier,  and,  before  the  enemy  appeared  on  the  right 
hank  of  the  Guadiana,  to  occupy  a  certain  position  of 
great  natural  strength  close  to  Badajos;  the  right 
touching  the  fort  of  St.  Christoval,  the  front  covered 
by  the  Gebora  river  and  by  the  Guadiana.  the  fortress  of 
(^ampo  Mayor  immediately  in  the  rear  of  the  left,  and 
Elvas  behind  the  centre.  When  Mendizabal  should  be 
entrenched  on  this  position,  and  a  strrmg  garrison  in 
Badajos,  the  English  general  thourrht  Soult  could  not 
invest  or  even  slruifrhien  the  communications  of  the 
tiiwn ;  knowing  well  the  people  he  dealt  with,  he  pro- 
J)helically  observed,  '■  wilk  soldiers  of  any  other  nntinn 
tiicc*!'  is  rcrtnin,  but  no  calculation  ran  be  made  of  any 
upcrnliim  in  which  Spnnink  troops  are  enixasxedJ''' 

When  Olivenza  fell,  a  smaH  garrison  was  in  Albu- 
querque, an'ther  in  Valencia  d'Alc  mtira ;  Carlos 
d'Espafia   was  in   Campo  Mayor,    and   Viruea,    with 


Romana's  divisions,  was  at  Montemor.  When  Soult 
diove  back  the  out-posts  of  Badajos  on  the  26th,  Men- 
dizabal shut  himself  up  with  six  thousand  men  in 
that  fortress;  but,  although  a  siege  had  been  expected 
for  a  year,  the  place  was  unprovisioned.  It  was,  how- 
ever, still  possible  to  execute  the  English  general's 
plan,  yet  no  Spaniard  moved,  and,  on  the  27th,  La- 
tour  Maubourg,  crossing  the  Guadiana  at  Merida, 
forded  the  Gebora,  and  cut  off  the  communications  with 
Campo  Mayor  and  Elvas. 

FRENCH    SIEGE    OF    BADAJOS. 

This  city  stands  on  a  tongue  of  land  at  the  con- 
fluence of  the  Guadiana  with  the  Rivillas.  The  first 
is  a  noble  river  five  hundred  yards  broad,  the  second 
a  trifling  stream.  A  rock,  one  hundred  feet  high, 
and  crowned  by  an  old  castle,  overhangs  the  me-et- 
ing  of  the  waters  ;  and  the  town,  spreading  out  like 
a  fan  as  the  land  opens  between  the  rivers,  is  pro- 
tected by  eight  regular  curtains  and  bastions,  from 
twenty-three  to  thirty  feet  in  height,  with  good  coun- 
terscarps, covered  way,  and  glacis.  On  the  left  bank 
of  the  Guadiana  the  out-works  were,  1.  the  Lunette  of 
San  Roque,  covering  a  dam  and  sluice  on  the  Riviilas. 
by  which  an  inundation  could  be  commanded  ;  2.  an 
isolated  redoubt,  called  the  Picurina,  situated  beyond 
the  Rivillas,  and  four  hundred  yards  from  the  town; 
3.  the  Pardaleras,  a  defective  crown-work,  central 
between  the  Lower  Guadiana  and  the  Rivillas,  and 
two  hundred  yards  from  the  ramparts. 

On  the  right  bank  of  the  Guadiana  a  hill,  crowned 
by  a  regular  fort  three  hundred  feet  square,  called  San 
Christoval,  overlooked  the  interior  of  the  castle;  and  a 
quarter  of  a  mile  farther  down  the  stream,  the  bridge, 
six  hundred  yards  in  length,  was  protected  by  a 
bridge-head,  slightly  connected  with  San  Christoval, 
but  commanded  on  every  side. 

Soult  constructed  a  ferry  on  the  Guadiana,  above 
the  confluence  of  the  Gebora,  and  three  attacks  were 
opened  against  the  town  the  28th,  two  on  the  side  of 
Picurina  and  one  on  that  of  the  Pardaleras.  The 
29th  and  30th  slight  sallies  were  repulsed,  but  tem- 
pestuous weather  spoiled  the  works.  Gazan's  division 
was  distant,  the  infantry  before  the  place  were  few, 
and,  on  the  30th,  the  garrison  making  a  vigorous  sally 
from  the  Pardaleras,  killed  or  wounded  sixty  men  and 
cleared  the  trenches.*  Meanwhile  some  Spanish 
cavalry,  gliding  round  the  left  of  the  French,  sabred 
several  engineers  and  sappers,  and  then  retired. 

In  the  night  of  the  2d  of  February  a  violent  tempest 
flooded  the  Rivillas,  carried  away  the  French  bridges, 
drowned  men  and  horses,  damaged  the  dep'ls,  and 
reduced  the  besiegers  to  the  greatest  distress.]"  Tiie 
cavalry  employed  in  the  investment  could  no  longer 
forage  ;  scarcity  was  felt  in  the  camp  ;  the  convoys 
could  only  arrive  by  detachments;  the  rigour  of  win- 
ter bivouacs  caused  sickness ;  and,  on  the  3d,  the 
Spaniards,  making  a  second  sally  from  Pardaleras, 
killed  or  wounded  eighty  men  and  ruined  a  part  of  the 
parallel.  The  same  day  Gazan  arrived  in  camp,  but 
the  French  cavalry  being  withdrawn  from  the  light 
bank  of  the  Guadiana,  in  consequence  of  rigorous 
weather,  the  communication  was  re-established  with 
Elvas,  and  Mendizabal  called  the  divisions  in  Portu- 
gal to  his  assisfaiioe.:):  Virues  immediately  marched 
upon  Elvas,  Carlo  d'Espana,  and  Madden  united  at 
C'ampo  Mayor,  and  Julian  Sanchez  brought  down  his 
Pariida  from  Upper  Estremadura. || 

In  the  night  of  the  5th.  Mendizabal  repaired  to  Elvas 
in  person,  passed  th*^  Caya  the  next  day,  and  being 
joined   on   the  road  oy  the  troops  from  Campo  Mayor, 


*  Conquete  de  I  Andalusie,  par  Edouard  Lapene. 
f  Siej;e  de  Hada-  ^s,  par  le  Col.  I.aniare. 
t   l.ord  Welling^ton's  Corrfspondence.     MSS. 
i  Mr.  Stuarfg  Paper*.     MSS. 


1811. J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


327 


pushed  the  few  French  horsemen  still  on  the  right  of 
the  Guadiana  over  the  Gebora.  The  Portuguese  brig- 
ade crossed  that  river  in  pursuit,  and  captured  some 
baggatre ;  but  the  infantry  entered  Badajos,  for  Men- 
dizabal  arrain  neglecting  lord  Wellington's  counsel, 
drsigtsed  not  to  take;  up  a  position  behind  the  Gebora, 
but  to  raise  the  siege  by  a  sally  ;  yet  he  delayed  this 
until  the  next  day,  thus  risking  to  have  his  whole 
army  shut  up  in  an  ill-provided  fortress ;  for  Latour 
Maubourg,  seeing  that  Madden  was  unsupported,  turned 
and  drove  him  back  over  the  Gebora  with  loss. 

Badajos  now  contained  sixteen  thousand  men,  and, 
early  on  the  7th,  Carrera  and  Carlos  d'Espaiia,  at 
the  head  of  five  thousand  infantry  and  three  hundred 
cavalry,  breaking  out  at  the  Picurina  side,  with  one 
burst  carried  the  trenches  and  the  batteries  ;  ihe  sol- 
diers fought  with  surprising  ardour,  but  the  entire  want 
of  arrangement  on  the  part  of  the  generals  (unworthy 
to  command  the  brave  men  under  them)  ruined  all. 
They  had  not  even  provided  the  means  to  spike  the 
guns;  and  when  Morlier  brought  his  reserves  against 
the  front  and  flink  of  the  attack,  the  whole  driven 
back  in  disorder,  re-entered  the  city,  having  eighty-five 
officers  and  near  six  hundred  soldiers  killed  and 
wounded  ;  the  enemy  also  lost  several  engineers  and 
four  hundred  men. 

While  this  action  took  place  on  the  left  bank,  Latour 
Maubourg  occupied  the  ground  between  the  Gebora 
and  the  Caya,  and  again  cut  off  the  communication 
with  Elvas  and  Campo  Mayor;  but  his  forces  were 
too  weak  to  niaintain  themselves  there,  and  Mendiza- 
bal,  leavingr  the  defence  of  the  town  entirely  to  the 
governor,  Rafael  Menacho,  pitched  his  own  camp 
round  San  Christoval.  Some  days  previous  to  this, 
the  French  had  bombarded  Badajos,  a  proceeding  only 
mischievous  to  themselves;  for  the  inhabitants,  terri- 
fied by  the  shells,  fled  in  great  numbers  while  the  com- 
munication was  open,  but  left  their  provisions,  which 
enabled  Menacho  to  feed  his  garrison  without  difficulty. 

Soult  observing  the  numbers,  and  awake  to  all  the 
real  resources  of  the  Spanish  succouring  army,  feared 
lest  delay  should  produce  a  change  of  conimanders, 
or  of  system,  and  resolved  to  bring  matters  to  a  crisis. 
On  the  11th  he  stormed  the  Pardaleras  ;  on  the  12th, 
he  sent  fifteen  hundred  cavalry  across  the  Guadiana  to 
Montijo;  and,  on  the  14th,  he  threw  shells  into  the 
camp  about  Christoval,  which  obliged  Mendizabal  to 
remove  from  the  heights  in  front  of  that  fort.  Mean- 
while, intelligence  that  Castar'ios  was  appointed  cap- 
tain-general of  the  Estremadura  created  the  greatest 
anger  amongst  Romana's  soldiers  :  they  had  long  con- 
sideied  themselves  independent  of  the  central  govern- 
ment, and  in  this  mood,  although  the  position  behind 
the  Gebora,  recommended  by  lord  Wellington,  was  at 
last  occupied,  little  attention  was  paid  to  military 
discipline.  The  English  general  had  expressly  ad- 
vised Mendizal)al  to  increase  the  great  natural  strength 
of  this  position  with  entrenchments;  for  his  design 
was  that  the  Spaniards,  whom  he  thought  quite  une- 
qual to  open  field-operations,  should  have  an  impreg- 
nable post,  whence  the}'  could  safely  aid  in  the  de- 
fence of  the  town,  and  yet  ;^reserve  a  free  communica- 
tion with  the  Alemtejo,  until  ihe  arrival  of  his  own 
reinforcements  (which  he  expected  in  the  latter  end  of 
Janunry)  should  enable  him  to  raise  the  siege.*  Men- 
dizabai,  with  that  arrosrance  which  is  peculiar  to  his 
nation,  rejected  this  counsel,  and  hung  twelve  days  on 
the  heiolits  of  (christoval  in  a  torpid  state;  and  when 
driven  thence,  by  the  French  shells,  he  merely  de- 
stroyed a  small  bridge  over  the  Gebora,  neither  casting 
up  entrenchments,  nor  keeping  a  guard  in  his  front, 
nor  disposing  his  men  with  care.  Soult  observing 
these  things,  suddenly  leaped   upon  him. 


Lord  WeUington  to  Lord  Liverpool.'   MSS. 


BATTLE    OF    THE    GEBORA. 

The  Guadiana  and  the  Gebora  rivers  covered  the 
Spanish  position,  but  this  did  not  deter  the  duke  of 
Dalmatia  from  attempting  to  pass  both  and  surprise 
the  camp.  And  first  to  deprive  Mendizabal  of  the 
aid  of  San  Christoval,  and  to  create  a  diversion,  th« 
French  mortar-batteries  again  threw  shells  on  the 
17lh;  yet  the  swell  of  the  rivers  would  not  permit  the 
main  operation  to  be  commenced  before  the  evening  of 
the  18th  :  but  on  that  day  the  cavalry  drew  down  the 
right  bank  of  the  Guadiana  from  Montijo,  and  the  artille- 
ry and  infantry  crossed  at  the  French  ferry,  four  miles 
above  the  confluence  of  the  Gebora.  These  combina- 
tions were  so  exactly  executed,  that,  at  daybreak,  on 
the  19th,  six  thousand  infantry  and  three  thousand  cav- 
alry were  in  order  of  battle  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Guadiana. 

The  Gebora  was  still  to  be  forded,  and,  behind  it, 
the  Spaniards  had  ten  thousand  infantry,  a  considerable 
artillery,  and  fifteen  hundred  cavalry,  besides  many 
armed  followers  of  the  camp  ;  the  whole  number  not 
being  less  than  fifteen  thousand.  But  a  thick  mist 
covered  the  country,  no  Spanish  posts  were  in  ad- 
vance, and  Soult,  riding  through  the  French  ranks, 
and  exhorting  the  soldiers  to  fight  manfully,  commenced 
the  passage  of  the  Gebora.  His  cavalry  forded  five 
miles  up  the  stream,  and  his  infantry  passed  in  two 
columns,  on  the  right  and  left  of  the  ruined  bridge  ; 
a  few  shots,  near  the  latter,  first  alarmed  the  Span- 
iards, and,  as  the  instant  clamour  amongst  the  multi- 
tude indicated  that  the  surprise  was  complete,  Mortier, 
who  directed  the  movements,  rapidly  formed  the  line  of 
battle. 

At  eight  o'clock  the  fog  cleared  away,  and  the  first 
beams  of  the  sun  and  the  certainty  of  victory  flashed 
together  on  the  French  soldiers.  Their  horsemen 
were  already  around  the  Spanish  left,  infantry,  cav- 
alry, and  guns,  heaped  together  in  the  centre,  were 
waving  to  and  fro  in  disorder,  and  the  right  having 
fallen  away  from  San  Christoval  was  unsupported,  lu 
a  few  moments,  general  Girard  placed  three  battalions 
between  the  Spanish  army  and  that  fort,  the  artillery 
roared  and  the  French  bore  forward,  as  one  man,  to  the 
attack.  Six  battalions  pressed  the  centre,  Girard 
moved  against  the  right,  Latour  Maubourg's  cavalry 
charged  the  left.  Thus  surrounded,  Mendizabel's 
troops  instinctively  crowded  on  the  centre,  and  for 
some  time  resisted  by  their  inert  weight.  But  the 
French  infantry  soon  closed  on  the  mass  with  a  de- 
stroying musketry,  the  horsemen  rode  in  with  loose 
bridles,  and  the  Spaniards  were  shaken,  divided  and 
slaughtered.  Their  cavalry  fled  outright,  and  even 
Madden's  Portuguese,  disregarding  alike  his  exhorta- 
tions and  example,  shamefully  turned  their  backs.  At 
ten  o'clock  the  fight  was  over ;  Virues  was  taken, 
Mendizabel  and  Carrera  escaped  with  difficulty  ;  Es- 
pana  alone  made  good  his  retreat  to  Campo  Mayor 
with  two  thousand  men.  A  few  reached  Elvas,  three 
thousand  got  into  Badajos,  by  the  bridge,  and  nine  hun- 
dred bodies  strewed  the  field.  Eight  thousand,  in- 
cluding armed  followers,  were  made  prisoners,  and 
guns,  colours,  muskets,  ammunition,  baggage,  all  fell 
into  the  enemy's  hands.  It  was  a  disastrous  and  a 
shameful  defeat.  In  the  depth  of  winter,  Soult,  with 
a  small  force,  had  passed  two  difficult  rivers,  carried  a 
strong  position,  and  annihilated  an  army  wliicii  had 
been  two  years  in  constant  service.  Mendizabel,  in- 
stead of  destroying  the  bridge  over  the  Gebora,  should 
have  cast  others,  that  he  might  freely  issue  to  attack 
the  French  while  crossing  the  Guadiana;  he  should 
have  opposed  them  agiiin  in  passing  the  Gebora ;  or 
he  might  have  passed  through  Badajos,  and  fallen  on 
the  troops  in  the  trenches,  with  his  whole  army,  while 
Soult  was  still  entangled  between  the  rivers. 


328 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR, 


[Book  XII. 


In  the  evening  alter  the  action  (he  French  cast  up 
entrenchments,  posting  three  battalions  and  the  heavy 
cavalry  on  the  iinportant  position  they  had  gained,  and 
the  next  day  the  works  of  llie  siege  were  renewed  with 
greater  activity  ;  yet  the  difficulty  of  Soult's  under- 
taking v/as  rendered  apparent  hy  his  victories.  The 
continual  rains,  interrupting  the  arrival  of  his  convoys, 
obliged  him  to  employ  a  number  of  men  at  a  great  dis- 
tance to  gather  provisions  ;  nearly  two  thousand  French 
iiad  been  killed  or  wounded  in  the  two  sieges  and  in 
this  battle,  many  also  were  sick,  and  Badajos  was 
still  powerful.  The  body  of  the  place  was  entire, 
the  crarrison  nine  thousand  strong,  was,  by  the  flight 
of  the  inhabitants,  well  provided  with  food  ;  and  there 
was  no  want  of  other  stores  :  the  governor  was  res- 
olute and  confident ;  the  season  rigorous  for  the  be- 
siegers ;  no  communication  had  been  yet  opened  with 
Massena;  and  lord  Wellington,  in  momentary  expect- 
ation that  his  reinforcements  would  arrive,  was  impa- 
tient to  bring  on  a  crisis.  Meanwhile,  the  duke  of 
Dalmatia's  power,  in  Andalusia,  was  menaced  in  the 
most  serious  manner. 

CONTINUATION    OF    THE    BLOCKADE    OF    CADIZ. 

When  general  Graham  was  aware  of  Soult's  de- 
parture, and  knew,  also,  that  the  fifth  corps  had  quitted 
Seville,  he  undertook,  in  concert  with  the  Spaniards, 
to  drive  Victor  out  of  his  lines.*  A  force,  sailing 
from  Cadiz  the  29th  of  January,  was  to  have  been 
joined,  in  rear  of  the  enemy,  by  the  troops  from  Tarifa 
under  major  Brown,  and  by  three  thousand  Spaniards, 
from  Algesiras  and  San  Roque  under  general  Be- 
guines ;  contrary  winds  detained  both  the  troops  and 
the  vessels  carrying  counter  orders  to  Boguines  and 
Brown,  who  advanced,  the  f.rst  to  Medina,  the  other 
to  Casa  Vieja.  Victor,  having  notice  of  this  project. 
at  first  kept  close,  but  afterwards  sent  troops  to  retake 
Medina  and  Casa  Vieja;  and,  in  the  course  of  Febru- 
ary, twelve  thousand  men,  drawn  from  the  northern 
povernments,  were  directed  upon  Andalusia,  to  rein- 
force the  different  corps.  The  first  corps  was  thus 
increased  to  twenty  thousand  men,  of  which  fifteen 
thousand  were  before  Cadiz,  and  the  remainder  at  San 
Lucar,  Medina  Sidonia,  and  other  quarters.  Neverthe- 
less, on  the  21st  of  February,  ten  thousand  infantry 
and  near  six  hundred  cavalry,  of  the  allies,  were 
again  embarked  at  Cadiz,  being  to  land  at  Tarifa,  and 
march  upon  the  rear  of  the  enemy's  camp  at  Chiclana. 
(leneral  Zayas  commanding  the  Spanish  forces  left  in 
the  Isla  was  directed  to  cast  a  bridge  over  the  San  Petri 
near  the  sea  mouth  ;  15allasteros,  with  the  reinains  of 
his  army  was  to  menace  Seville;  the  Partizans  were 
to  act  against  the  fourth  corps  ;  insurrections  were  ex- 
pected in  all  quarters,  and  many  took  place  in  Sebas- 
tiani's  district. 

The  British  troops  passed  their  port  in  a  gale,  the 
22d,  but,  landing  at  Algesiras,  marched  to  Tarifa  the 
next  day,  when  they  were  joined  by  the  twenty-eighth, 
and  the  flank  companies  of  the  ninth  and  eighty-second 
regiments.  Thus  somewhat  more  than  four  thousand 
effective  troops  (including  two  companies  of  the  twen- 
tieth Portuguese  and  one  iuindred  and  eighty  German 
hussars)  were  assembled  under  general  Graham;  a'l 
good  and  hardy  troops,  and  himself  a  daring  old  man 
and  of  a  ready  temper  for  battle. 

(General  La  Peiia  arrived  on  the  27th,  with  seven 
thousand  Spaniards,  and  Graham,  for  the  sake  of 
unanimity,  ceded  the  chief  command,  although  it  was 
contrary  to  his  instructions.  The  next  day,  the  whole 
moved  forward  about  twelve  miles,  and  passed  the 
mountain  ridges  that,  descending  from  Ronda  to  the 
^a,  separate  the  plains  of  San  Roque  from  those  of 
Medina  and  (chiclana.  Bering  now  within  four  leagues 
of  the  enemy's   posts,  the  troops   were  re-organized, 

*  Oflicial  Abstract  of  Military  Reports.     MSS. 


The  vanguard  was  given  to  Lardizabal ;  the  centre  to 
the  prince  of  Angiona;  the  reserve,  composed  of  two 
Spanish  regiments  and  the  British  were  confided  to  Gra- 
ham ;  and  the  cavalry  of  both  nations,  formed  in  ono 
body,  was  commanded  by  colonel  Whillinghain,  then 
in  the  Spanish  service. 

The  French  covering  division,  under  general  Cas- 
sagne,  consisted  of  three  battalions  and  a  regiment  of 
horse  placed  at  Medina,  with  outposts  at  V'ejer  de  la 
Frontera  and  Casa  Viejas.  Before  La  Pciia's  arrival, 
the  irregulars  had  attacked  (!asa  Viejas,  and  gen- 
eral Beguines  had  even  taken  Medina;  but  Cassagne, 
reinforced  by  a  battalion  of  inftinlry  from  Arcos,  retook 
and  entrenched  it  the  29th;  and  the  signal  of  action 
being  thus  given,  the  French  generals  in  the  higher 
provinces,  perceiving  that  the  people  were  ready  for 
commotion,  gathered  in  their  respective  forces  at  Se- 
ville, Ecija,  and  Cordoba,  following  the  orders  left  by 
Soult.  In  Grenada  the  insurgents  were  especially 
active,  and  Sebastiani,  doubtful  if  the  storm  would 
not  break  on  his  head,  concentrated  a  column  at  Es- 
tipona,  which  was  a  good  covering  point  to  the  coast 
line,  and  one  whence  he  could  easily  gain  Ronda.* 
Victor  manned  his  works  at  Rota,  Santa  Maria,  Puer- 
to Real,  and  the  Trocadero  viith  a  mixed  force,  of 
refugee  French,  juramentados,  and  reirtilar  troops;  but 
he  asseinbled  eleven  thousand  good  soldiers  near  Chi- 
clana, between  tlie  roads  of  Conil  and  Medina,  to 
await  the  unfolding  of  the  allies'  project. 

At  first,  La  Pena's  march  pointed  to  Medina  Sido- 
nia ;  his  vanguard  stormed  Casa  Viejas  on  the  2d  of 
March,  and  the  troops  from  Algesiras,  amounting  to 
sixteen  hundred  infantry  besides  several  hundreds  of 
irregular  cavalry,  coming  in,  encreased  his  force  to 
twelve  thousand  infantry,  eight  hundred  horsemen,  and 
twenty-four  guns.  The  3d  he  resumed  his  march,  hut 
hearing  that  Medina  Sidonia  was  entrenched,  turned 
towards  the  coast,  and  drove  the  French  fr*^  Vejer 
de  la  Frontera.  'J'he  following  evening  he  continued 
his  movement,  and  at  nine  o'clock  on  the  morning  of 
the  5lh,  after  a  skirmish,  in  which  his  advanced  guard 
of  cavalry  was  routed  by  a  French  squadron,  he  reach- 
ed the  Cerro  de  Puerco,  called  by  the  English  the 
heights  of  Barosa  ;  being  then  only  four  miles  from 
the  sea  mouth  of  the  Santi  Petri. 

The  hill  of  Barosa  is  a  low  ridge  creeping  in  from 
the  coast  about  one  mile  and  a  half,  and  overlooking 
a  high  broken  plain  of  small  extent.  This  plain  was 
bounded  on  one  side  hy  the  coast  cliffs  ;  on  the  other 
by  the  forest  of  Chiclana,  and  in  front  by  a  pi^e-wood, 
beyond  which  rose  a  long  narrow  height  called  the 
Bermeja,  which  filled  the  space  between  the  Almanza 
creek  and  the  sea;  and  which  could  be  reached  by 
moving  either  through  the  pine-wood  in  front  or  by  tho 
beach  under  the  cliffs. 

At  Tarifa.  Graham  judging  that  Victor  would  surely 
come  out  of  his  lines  to  fight,  had  obtained  from  La 
Peiia  a  promise  to  make  short  marches ;  to  keep  the 
troops  fresh  for  battle  ;  and  not  to  approach  the  enemy 
except  in  a  concentrated  mass.  Nevertheless,  the 
day's  march  from  (Jasa  Vieja,  being  made  through  tad 
roads,  with  ignorant  guide'^  nad  occupied  fifteen  hours, 
and  the  night  march  to  Barosa  had  been  still  more 
fatiguing.  The  troops  came  up  in  a  straggling  man- 
ner, and  ere  they  had  all  arrived,  La  Pena,  as  if  in  con- 
tempt of  his  colleague,  without  either  disclosing  his 
own  plans,  or  communicating  by  signal  or  otherwise 
with  Zayas,  sent  the  vanguard,  reinforced  by  a  .squad- 
ron and  three  guns,  straight  against  the  mouth  of  the 
Santi  Petri.  Zayas  had  cast  his  bridge  there  on  the 
2d,  and  commenced  an  entrenchment,  but,  in  the  fol- 
lowing niorht,  being  surprised  by  the  French,  was 
driven  again  into  the  Isla;  hence  this  movement  of  the 

*  Intcrcpptpd  Letter  of  Gtntral  Werlc  to  Sebastiani,  AU 
hania,  March  12. 


1811.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


329 


vanfiuard  was  exceedingly  dangerous:  Lardizabal, 
however,  after  a  sharp  skirmish,  in  which  he  lost 
nearly  tb.ree  hundred  men,  forced  the  enemy's  posts 
between  the  Almanza  creek  and  the  sea,  and  effect- 
ed a  junction  with  Zayas. 

(iraliam  was  now  extremely  desirous  of  holding 
the  Barosa  height  in  force,  as  the  key  both  to  offen-  ] 
sive  and  defensive  movements ;  and  he  argued  that 
no  general  in  his  senses  would  lend  his  flank  to  an 
enemy,  by  attacking  the  Bernieja  while  Barosa  was 
thus  occupied.  Lascy,  the  chief  of  the  Spanish 
stalT  opposed  this  reasoning,  and  La  Pcna,  without 
ceremony,  comnsanded  Graham  to  march  the  British 
troops  through  the  wood  to  Bermeja.  '  With  great 
temjier  he  obeyed  this  uncourteous  order,  leaving  the  j 
flank  companies  of  the  ninth  and  eighty-second,  under 
major  Brown,  as  a  guard  for  the  baggage  ;  he  marched, 
however,  in  the  full  persuasion  that  La  Pifia  would 
remain  with  Anglona's  division  and  the  cavalry  at  Ba- 
rosa, and  the  more  so,  as  a  Spanish  detachment  was 
still  on  the  side  of  Medina.  But  scarcely  had  the 
British  entered  the  wood,  when  La  Peira,  without  any 
notice,  carried  off  the  corps  of  battle,  directed  the  cav- 
alry to  follow  by  the  sea-road,  and  repaired  himself  to 
Santi  Petri,  leaving  Barosa  crowded  wMth  bagsrage, 
and  protected  only  by  a  rear-guard  of  four  guns  and  five 
battalions. 

During  these  movements,  Victor  had  remained  close 
in  the  forest  of  Chiclana,  and  as  the  patrols  of  the 
allied  cavalry  reported  that  they  could  pee  no  enemy, 
Graham's  march  being  only  of  two  miles,  seemed 
secure.  The  F^rench  marshal  was,  however,  keenly 
watching  the  allies'  progress.  Having  recalled  bis 
infantry  from  Medina  Sidonia  as  soon  as  La  Peha 
had  reached  Barosa,  he  momentarily  expected  their 
arrival ;  and  he  felt  so  sure  of  success,  that  his  caval- 
ry then  at  Medina  and  Arcos  were  directed  upon  Vejer 
and  other  places,  to  cut  off  the  fugitives  afier  the  bat- 
tle. 'I'he  duke  of  Belluno  had  in  hand  fourteen  pieces 
of  artillery  and  nine  thousand  excellent  t'oops,  of  the 
divisions  of  Laval,  Ruthn,  and  Villatte.  From  these 
lie  drew  three  grenadier  battalions  as  reserves,  and 
attached  two  of  them  and  three  squadrons  of  cavalry 
to  the  division  of  Ruffin,  which  formed  his  left  wing; 
the  other  he  joined  to  the  division  of  Laval,  which  form- 
ed his  centre.  Villatte's  troops,  about  two  thousand 
five  hundred  in  number,  after  retiring  from  Bermeja, 
were  posted  close  to  a  bridge  on  the  Almanza  creek, 
to  cover  the  works  of  the  camp,  and  to  watch  the 
Spanish  forces  at  Santi  Petri  and  Bermeja. 

BATTLE    OF    BAROSA. 

When  Victor  observed  that  Graham's  corps'  was  in 
the  wood,  that  a  strong  body  of  Spaniards  was  on  the 
Bermeja,  a  third  body,  with  all  the  baggage,  at  Barosa, 
and  a  fourth  slill  in  march  from  Vejer,  he  took  Villatte's 
division  as  his  pivot,  and  came  with  a  rapid  pace  into 
the  plain,  and  began  the  battle.  Laval  was  directed 
against  the  English,  but  Victor  himself,  with  Ruifin's 
brigade,  ascending  the  reverse  side  of  Barosa,  cut  off 
the  Spanish  detachment  on  the  road  to  Medina,  drove 
tne  whole  of  the  rear-guard  off  the  height  towards  the 
sea,  dispersed  the  baggage  and  followers  of  the  army 
in  all  directions,  and  took  three  Spanish  guns. 

Major  Brown  seeing  the  general  confusion,  and 
being  unable  to  stem  the  torrent,  slowly  retired  into 
the  plain,  and  sending  notice  of  this  attack  to  Graham, 
demanded  orders.  'I'hai  general,  being  then  near  Ber- 
meja, answered,  that  he  was  to  fight;  and  instantly 
lacing  about  himself,  regained  the  plain  with  the 
greatest  celerity,  expecting  to  find  La  Pefia,  v.ith  the 
corps  of  battle  and  the  cavalry,  on  the  height.  But 
when  the  view  opened,  he  beheld  Ruflin's  brigade 
flanked  by  the  chosen  battalions,  near  the  top  of  Baro- 
sa at  the  one  side,  the  Spanish  rear-guard  and  baggage 


flying  in  confusion  on  the  other,  the  French  cavalry 
between  the  summit  and  the  sea,  and  Laval  close  on 
his  own  left  flank ;  but  La  Prfiia  be  could  see  no 
where.  In  this  desperate  situation,  he  felt  that  to  re- 
treat upon  Bermeja,  and  thus  bring  the  enemy,  pell-. 
mell  with  the  allies  on  to  thai  narrow  ridge,  must  be 
disastrovis,  wherefore,  without  a  moment's  hesitation, 
he  resolved  to  attack,  although  the  key  of  the  field  of 
battle  was  already  in  the  enemy's  possession. 

Ten  guns,  under  major  Duncan,  instantly  opened  a 
terrific  fire  against  Laval's  column,  while  colonel  An- 
drew Barnard,  with  the  riflemen  and  the  Portuguese 
companies  running  vehemently  out  on  the  left,  com- 
menced the  fisrht :  the  remainder  of  the  British  troops, 
without  any  attention  to  regiments  or  brigades,  so  sud- 
den was  the  affair,  formed  two  masses,  one  of  which 
under  general  Diikes  marched  hastily  against  Ruffin, 
and  the  other  under  colonel  Wheately  aorainst  Laval. 
Duncan's  guns  ravaged  the  French  ranks,  Laval's  ar- 
tillery replied  vigorously,  Ruffin's  batteries  took 
Wheately's  column  in  flank,  and  the  infantry  on  both 
sides  pressed  forward  eagerly,  and  with  a  pealing 
musketry.  When  near  together,  a  fierce,  rapid,  pro- 
longed charge  of  the  British  overthrew  the  first  line 
of  the  French,  and,  notwithstanding  its  extreme  valour, 
drove  it  in  confusion,  over  a  narrow  dip  of  ground 
upon  the  second,  which  was  almost  immediately  bro- 
ken in  the  same  manner,  and  only  the  chosen  battalion, 
hitherto  posted  on  the  right,  remained  to  cover  the 
retreat. 

Meanwhile  Brown  had  marched  headlong  against 
Ruffin.  Nearly  half  of  his  detachment  went  down 
under  the  enemy's  first  fire;  yet  he  maintained  the 
fight  until  Diikes'  column,  which  had  crossed  a  deep 
hollow  and  never  stopped  even  to  reform  the  regi- 
ments, came  up,  with  little  order  indeed,  but  in  a  fierce 
mocd,  and  then  the  whole  ran  up  towards  the  summit; 
there  was  no  slackness  on  any  side,  and  at  the  very 
edge  of  the  ascent  their  gallant  opponents  met  them. 
A  dreadful,  and  for  some  time  a  doubtf\il,  fight  ensued  < 
but  Ruffin  and  Chaudron  Rousseau,  commanding  the 
chosen  grenadiers,  both  fell  mortally  wounded,  the 
English  bore  strongly  onward,  and  their  incessant 
slaughtering  fire  forced  the  French  from  the  hill  with 
the  loss  of  three  guns  and  many  brave  soldiers. 

The  discomfited  divisions,  retiring  concentrically, 
soon  met,  and  with  infinite  spirit  endeavoured  to  re- 
form and  renew  the  action.  The  play  of  Duncan's 
guns,  close,  rapid,  and  nuirderous,  rendered  the  attempt 
vain.  Victor  quitted  the  field  of  battle,  and  the  British 
having  been  twenty-four  hours  under  arms,  without 
food,  were  too  exhausted  to  pursue. 

While  these  terrible  combats  of  infantry  were  fight- 
ing, La  Peiia  looked  idly  on,  neither  sending  his  cav- 
alr)',  nor  his  horse-artillery,  nor  any  part  of  his  army, 
to  the  assistance  of  his  ally  ;  nor  yet  menacing  the 
right  of  the  enemy,  which  was  close  to  him  and  weak. 
The  Spanish  Walloon  guards,  the  regiment  of  Ciudad 
Real,  and  some  Guerilla  cavalry,  indeed  turned  with- 
out orders,  coming  up  just  as  the  action  ceased;  and 
it  was  expected  that  colonel  Whittingham,  an  Eng- 
lishman commanding  a  powerful  body  of  horse,  would 
have  done  as  much  ;  but  no  stroke  in  aid  of  the  British 
was  struck  by  a  Spanish  sabre  that  day,  although  the 
French  cavalry  did  not  exceed  two  h\indred  and  fifty 
men,  and  it  is  evident  that  the  eight  hundred  under 
Whittinsham  might,  by  sweeping  round  the  left  of 
Ruflin's  division,  have  rendered  the  defeat  ruinous.  So 
certain,  indeed,  was  this,  that  colonel  Frederick  Pon- 
soiiby,  drawing  off  the  hundred  and  eighty  German 
hussars  belonging  to  the  English  army,  reached  the 
field  of  battle,  and  charoing  the  French  squadrons  just 
as  their  retre^iing  divisions  met,  overthrew  them,  took 
two  guns,  and  even  attempted,  though  vainly,  to  sabr* 
Rousseau's  chosen  battalions. 


S30 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WaR. 


[Book  XIT. 


Such  was  ihefiprht  of  Barosa.  Short,  for  it  lasted  only 
one  hour  and  a  half,  but  most  violent  and  bloody;  for 
fifty  officers,  sixty  Serjeants,  and  above  eleven  hundred 
Britisii  soldiers,  and  more  than  two  thousand  French- 
men were  killed  and  wounded  ;  six  g;uns,  an  cajrle,  two 
generals  (both  mortally  wounded,)  to^elher  with  four 
hundred  (-ther  prisoners,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  victors. 

Aft(^r  the  action,  Graham  remained  some  hours  on 
the  heiirht,  still  hopinfj  tiiat  La  Peiia  would  awake  to 
the  prospect  of  success  and  glory,  which  the  extreme 
valour  oi  tlie  British  had  opened.  Four  thousand  men 
and  a  powerTul  artillery  had  come  over  the  Santi  Petri, 
and  thus  the  Spanish  general  was  at  the  head  of  twelve 
thousand  infantry  and  eight  hundred  cavalry,  all  fresh 
troops;  while  before  him  were  only  the  remains  of  the 
French  line  of  battle  retreating  in  the  greatest  disorder 
upon  Chiclana.  But  all  military  feeling  was  extinct 
in  La  Peiia,  and  as  Graham  could  no  longer  endure 
such  command,  the  morning  of  the  Gth  saw  the  British 
filing  over  tlie  bridge  into  the  Isla. 

On  the  French  side,  Cassagne's  reserve  came  up 
from  Medina,  and  a  council  of  war  being  held  in  the 
night  of  the  5th,  V"ictor,  although  of  a  desponding 
nature,  proposed  another  attack,  but  the  suggestion 
being  ill  received,  nothing  was  done.  On  the  Gth, 
Admiral  Keats,  landing  his  seamen  and  marines,  dis- 
mantled, with  exception  of  Catalina,  every  fort  frorti 
Rota  to  Santa  Maria,  and  even  obtained  momentary 
possession  of  the  latter  place.  This  caused  such  con- 
fusion and  alarm  in  the  French  camp,  that  the  duke  of 
Belluno,  leaving  garrisons  at  the  great  points  of  his 
lines,  and  a  rear  guard  at  Chiclana,  retreated  behind 
the  San  Pedro,  where  he  expected  to  be  immedialelv 
attacked.*  If  La  Peiia  had  even  then  pushed  to  Chi- 
clana, Graham  and  Keats  were  willing  to  make  a 
simultaneous  attack  upon  the  Trocadero :  yet  the  Gth 
and  7tl  passed,  without  even  a  Spanish  patrole  follow- 
ing the  French.  On  the  8th  Victor  returned  to  Chi- 
clana, whereupon  La  Peiia  recrossed  the  Santi  Petri, 
and  destroyed  the  bridge;  and  his  detachment  on  the 
side  of  Medina  being  thus  cut  off  from  the  Isla,  was 
eoon  afterwards  obliged  to  retire  to  Algesiras. 

All  the  passages  in  this  extraordinary  battle  were 
60  broadly  marked,  that  observations  would  be  useless. 
'I'he  contemptible  feebleness  of  La  Pefi^  furnished  a 
surprising  contrast  to  the  heroic  vigoui  >f  Graham, 
whose  attack  was  an  inspiration  rather  than  a  resolu- 
tion, so  wise,  so  sudden  was  the  decision,  so  swift,  so 
conclusive  was  the  execution.  The  original  plan  of 
the  enterprise  having  been  however  rather  rashly  cen- 
sured, some  remarks  on  that  head  may  be  useful. 
•'Sebastiani,"  it  is  said,  "  might,  by  moving  on  the 
rear  of  the  allies,  have  crushed  them,  and  they  had  no 
right  to  calculate  upon  his  inactivity."  This  is  a  shal- 
low criticism.  Graham,  weighing  the  natural  dislike 
of  one  general  to  serve  under  another,  judged,  that 
Sebastiani,  harassed  by  insurrections  in  Grenada, 
would  not  hastily  abandon  his  own  district,  menaced 
as  it  was  by  insurrection,  to  succour  Victor,  before  it 
was  clear  where  the  blow  was  to  be  struck.  The 
distance  from  Tarifa  to  ('hiclana  was  about  fifty  miles, 
whereas,  from  Sebasliani's  nearest  post  to  Chiclana 
was  above  a  hundred,  and  the  real  object  of  the 
allies  could  not  be  known  until  they  nod  passed  the 
mountains  separating  Tarifa  from  Medina.  (Combi- 
ning these  moral  and  physical  considerations,  Graham 
had  reason  to  expect  several  days  of  free  action;  and 
thus  inneed  it  happened,  and  with  a  worthy  colleague 
ho  would  have  raised  the  blockade :  more  than  that 
could  scarcely  have  been  hoped,  as  the  French  forces 
would  have  concentrated  either  before  ('adiz  or  about 
Seville  or  Fcija;  and  they  had  still  fifty  thousand 
men  in  Andalusia. 


•  Olaciui  Abstracts  of  Militar/  ReporU.    MSS. 


Victor's  attack  on  the  5lh,  was  well-judged,  well 
timed,  and  vigorous;  with  a  few  thousand  more  troops 
he,  alone,  would  have  crushed  the  allies.  The  uncon* 
querable  spirit  of  the  English  prevented  this  disaster, 
but  if  Graham  or  his  troops  had  given  way,  or  even 
hesitated,  the  whole  army  must  have  been  driven  like 
sheep  into  an  inclosure  ;  the  Almaiiza  creek  on  one 
side,  the  sea  on  the  other,  the  San  Petri  to  bar  their 
flight,  and  the  enemy  hanging  on  their  rear  in  all  the 
fierceness  of  victory.  Indeed,  such  was  La  Pena's 
misconduct,  that  the  French,  although  defeated,  gained 
their  main  point :  the  blockade  was  renewed,  and  it  i.s 
remarkable  that,  during  the  action,  a  French  detach- 
ment passed  near  the  bridge  of  Zuazo  without  dilfi- 
culty,  and  brought  back  prisoners;  thus  proving  that 
with  a  few  more  troops  Victor  might  have  seized  the 
Isla.  Meanwhile  Ballasteros,  who  had  gone  against 
Seville,  was  chased,  in  a  miserable  condition,  to  the 
Aroche  hills,  by  Daricau. 

In  Cadiz  violent  disputes  arose.  La  Peiia,  in  an 
address  to  the  Cortes,  claimed  the  victory  for  himself. 
He  affirmed  that  all  the  previous  arrangements  were 
made  with  the  knowledge  and  approbation  of  the 
fjuglish  general,  and  the  latter's  retreat  into  the  Isla 
he  indicated  as  the  real  cause  of  failure:  Lascy  and 
general  Cruz-Murgeon  also  published  inaccurate  ac- 
counts of  the  action,  and  even  had  deceptive  plans 
engraved  to  uphold  their  statements.  Graham,  stung 
by  these  unworthy  proceedings,  exposed  the  conduC  of 
La  Peiia  in  a  letter  to  the  British  envoy  ;  refused  with 
disdain  the  title  of  grandee  of  the  first  class  voted  to 
him  by  the  Cortes;  and  when  Lascy  used  some  ex- 
pressions relative  to  the  action  personally  oflensive,  ho 
enforced  an  apology  with  his  sword.  But  having 
thus  shewn  himself  superior  to  his  opponents  at  all 
points,  the  gallant  old  man  soon  afterwards  relinquish- 
ed his  command  to  general  Cooke,  and  joined  lord 
Wellington's  army. 


CHAPTER  III. 

Sieg:e  of  Badajos  continued — Inias  surrenders — His  cowardice 
and  treachery — Albuquerque  and  Valencia  de  Alcantara  taken 
by  the  French — Soult  returns  to  Andalusia — Relative  state 
of  the  armies  at  Santarem— H^etreat  of  the  French — Masse- 
na's  able  movement — Skirmish  at  I'ombal — Combat  of  Re- 
dinha — Massena  halts  at  Condeixa — Montbrun  endeavours  to 
seize  Coimbra — l]afTled  by  colonel  Trant — Con  feixa  burnt 
by  the  French — Combat  of  Casal  Nova — General  Cole  turn* 
the  French  flank  at  Panella — Combat  of  Fez  d'Aronce— 
Massena  retires  behind  the  Alva. 

While  discord  prevailed  at  Cadiz,  nearly  the  whole 
of  Andalusia  was  disturbed  by  insurrections  of  the 
peasantry,  nevertheless,  such  was  Soult's  resolution, 
the  siege  of  Badajos  continued.  Early  in  March,  the 
second  parallel  being  completed  and  the  Pardaleras 
taken  into  the  works,  the  approaches  were  carried  by 
sap  to  the  covered  way,  and  mines  were  j)repared  to 
blow  in  the  counterscarp.  However  Rafael  Menacho, 
the  governor,  was  in  no  manner  dismayed  ;  his  sallies 
were  frequent  and  vigorous,  his  activity  and  courage 
inspired  his  troops  with  confidence,  lie  had  begun  to 
retrench  in  the  streets  nehind  the  part  attacked,  the  fire 
of  the  besiegers  was  inferior  to  that  of  the  besieged, 
and  every  thing  seemed  to  promise  fivovirably,  when 
on  the  evening  of  the  '2d,  during  a  sally,  in  which  the 
nearest  French  batteries  were  carried,  the  guns  s|)iked, 
and  trenches  partly  ruined,  Menacho  was  killed,  and 
the  command  fell  to  Imas,  a  man  so  unworthy  that  a 
worse  could  not  any  where  be  found.  The  spirit  of 
the  garrison  then  died  away,  the  besiegers'  works  ad- 
vanced rapidly,  the  ditch  was  passed,  a  lodgement  was 
made  on  one  of  the  ravelins,  the  rampart  was  breached, 
and  the  iiro  of  the  besieged  being  nearly  extinguished. 


1811. J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR, 


331 


on  the  lOtl.  of  March  the  place  was  summoned  in  a 
peremptory  manner. 

At  this  time  the  jrreat  crisis  of  the  campaicrn  liavinjr 
piissed,  a  strona-  body  of  British  and  Portusfiiese  troops 
were  ready  to  raise  tiie  siege  of  Badajos.  In  three 
different  ways,  by  telecrraph,  by  a  letter,  and  by  a  con- 
fideniia!  incsseng-er,  the  orovernor  was  informed,  that 
Massena  was  in  full  retreat  and  that  the  relievin<r  army 
was  actually  in  march.  The  breach  was  still  imprac- 
ticable, provisions  were  plentiful,  the  garrison  above 
eight  thousand  strong,  tlie  French  army  reduced,  by 
sickness,  by  de'achments  and  the  previous  operations, 
to  less  llian  fourteen  thousand  men.*  Imas  read  the 
letter,  and  instantly  surrendered,  handing  over  at  the 
same  moment  the  intelligence  thiis  obtained  to  the 
enemy.  He  aho  demanded  that  his  grenadiers  should 
march  out  of  the  breach  ;  it  was  granted,  and  he  was 
obliged  to  enlarge  the  opening  himself  ere  they  could 
do  so  !  Yet  this  man  so  covered  with  opprobrium,  and 
who  had  secured  his  own  liberty  while  consigning  his 
fellow  soldiers  to  a  prison,  and  his  own  character  to 
infamy,  was  never  purdshed  by  the  Spanish  rulers  : 
lord  Wellington's  indignant  remonstrances  forced  them, 
indeed,  to  bring  him  to  trial,  but  they  made  the  process 
last  during  the  whole  war. 

When  the  place  fell,  Mortier  marched  against  Campo 
Mayor,  and  Latour  Maubourg  seizing  Albuquerque  and 
Valencia  d'Alcantara,  made  six  hundred  prisoners,  but 
Soult  alarmed  by  the  efiects  of  the  battle  of  Barosa. 
returned  to  Andalusia.  He  had,  in  fifty  days,  mastered 
four  fortresses  and  invested  a  fifth  ;  he  had  killed  or 
disperspd  ten  thousand  men,  and  taken  twenty  thousand 
with  a  force  which,  at  no  time,  exceeded  the  number 
of  his  prisoners.  Yet  great  and  daring  and  successt^ul 
as  his  o;eralions  had  been,  the  principal  object  of  his 
expedition  was  frustrated,  for  Massena  was  in  retreat! 
lord  Wellington'.^  combinations  had  palsied  the  hand 
of  the  conqueror ! 

While  the  siege  of  Badajos  was  proceeding,  no 
change  took  place  in  the  main  positions  of  either 
army  at  Santarem.  The  French  general  had  been 
encouraged  to  mainiain  his  ground  by  the  state  of  the 
Portuguese  army,  which  tie  hoped  would  break  up  the 
alliance ;  for  such  had  been  the  conduct  of  the  Regency, 
that  the  native  troops  were  starving  in  tlieir  own 
country,  while  the  British  were  well  fed,  and  the  de- 
serters from  the  former,  without  knowing  the  cause, 
had  a  storv,  as  true  as  it  was  pitiable,  to  tell  of  their 
miseries.  The  English  general,  certain  that  the  French, 
who  were  grcitly  reduci^d  bv  sickness,  must  soon  quit 
their  ground  if  he  could  relieve  Badajos,  only  waited 
for  his  reinforcements  to  spnd  Beresford  with  f  lurteen 
thousand  men  against  Soult;  butthehattlR  of  the  Gebora 
ruined  this  plan  and  changed  his  situation.  The  arri- 
val of  the  reinforcements  could  not  then  enable  him  to 
detach  a  s;.(hcient  number  of  men  to  relieve  Badajos, 
and  it  was  no  longer  a  question  of  starving  Massena, 
bat  of  beating  him  before  Soult  could  take  Barlajos 
and  the  two  armies  be  joined.  Wherefore  he  resolved 
to  post  ten  thousand  men  before  the  hill  of  Santarem 
to  hold  Reynier  in  check  ;  to  make  Beresford  cross  the 
Tagns  at  Abrantes,  and  fall  on  Massena's  rear  ;  and 
meanwhile  moving  himself  with  the  Tt'St  of  the  army 
by  Rio  Mayor  and  Tremes,  to  force  back  the  French 
centre  and  right,  and  cutting  off  their  left,  to  drive  it 
into  the  Tagns,  But  notliing  could  be  attempted  until 
the  troops  from  England  arrived,  and  day  after  day 
pissed  in  vain  expectation  of  their  coming.  Being 
embarked  in  January,  they  would  have  reached  Lisbon 
before  the  end  of  that  month,  if  sir  J''>seph  Yorke,  the 
admiral,  had  taken  advantage  of  a  favotirable  wind, 
which  blew  when  the  troops  were  first  put  on  board  ; 
he  however  neglected  this  opportunilj',  contrary  gales 

*  Lord  Wellington's  Despatch. 


followed,  and   the   ordinary   voyage   of  ten   days  was 
prolonged  for  six  weeks. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  French  general's  situation 
was  becoming  very  perilous.  To  besiege  Abrantes  was 
above  his  means,  and  although  that  fortress  was  an 
important  strategic  print  for  the  allies  who  had  a 
moveable  bridge,  it  would  not  have  been  so  for  the 
French.  Massena  could  only  choose  then,  to  force  the 
passage  of  the  Tagns  alone,  or  to  wait  until  Soult 
appeared  on  the  left  bank,  or  to  retreat.  For  some  time 
he  seemed  inclined  to  the  first,  shewing  great  jealousy 
of  the  works  opposite  the  mouth  of  the  Zezere,  and, 
carrying  his  boats  on  wheel-carriages  along  the  banks 
of  the  Tagus,  as  if  to  alarm  Beresford  and  oblige  him 
to  concentrate  to  his  left:  yet  that  general  relaxed 
nothing  of  his  vigilance,  neither  spy  nor  ofTiccr  passed 
his  lines  of  observation,  and  Massena  knew,  generally, 
that  Soult  was  before  Badajos,  but  nothing  more. 
However,  time  wore  away,  sickness  wasted  the  army, 
food  became  daily  scarcer,  the  organization  of  the 
troops  was  seriously  loosened,  the  leading  generals 
were  at  variance,  and  the  conspiracy  to  put  St.  Cyr  at 
the  head  of  the  army  in  Spain  was  by  ro  means  re- 
linquished. 

Under  these  accumulating  difficulties  even  Masse- 
na's obstinacy  gave  way  ;  he  promised  to  retreat  when 
he  had  no  more  provisions  left  than  would  serve  big 
army  l'"or  the  march.  A  tardy  resolution,  yet  adopted 
at  the  moment,  when  to  maintain  his  position  was 
more  important  than  ever,  as  ten  days  longer  at  Santa- 
rem would  have  insured  the  co-operation  of  Soult. 
General  Pelet  says,  that  the  latter  marshal,  by  engaging 
in  the  siege  of  Badajos  and  Olivenza,  instead  of  coming 
directly  down  upon  the  Tagus,  was  the  cause  of  Mas- 
sena's failure.  This  can  hardly  be  sustained.  Before 
those  sieges  and  the  battle  of  the  Gebora,  Mendizal.al 
could  have  assembled  tw^enty  thousand  men  on  Soult's 
rear,  and  there  was  a  large  body  of  militia  on  the 
Pon(;ul  and  the  Elga;  Beresford  had  fourteen  thousand 
British  and  Portuguese  regulars,  besides  ordenanga  ; 
and  the  infinite  number  of  boats  at  lord  Wellington's 
command  would  have  enabled  him  to  throw  troops 
upon  the  left  bank  of  the  Tagus,  with  a  celerity  that 
would  have  baffled  any  effort  of  Messena  to  assist  the 
duke  of  DaliTiiitia.  Now,  if  the  latter  had  been  de- 
feated, with  what  argument  could  he  have  defended 
his  reputation  as  a  general,  after  having  left  three  or 
four  garrisoned  fortresses  and  thirty-five  thousand  men 
upon  his  flank  and  rear;  to  say  nothing  of  the  results 
threatened  by  the  battle  of  Barosa.  The  true  cause  of 
Massena's  failure  was  the  insufhciency  of  his  means 
to  oppose  the  English  general's  combinations.  The 
French  army  reduced  by  sickness  to  forty  thousand 
fighting  men,  exclusive  of  Drouel's  troops  at  Leiria, 
would  have  been  unable  to  mainiain  its  extended  posi- 
tion against  the  attack  meditated  by  lord  Wellington  ; 
and  when  Massena,  through  the  means  of  the  fidalgos, 
knew  that  the  English  reinforcements  were  come,  he 
prepared  to  retreat.  Those  troops  landed  the  2d  of 
March,  and,  the  6th,  the  French  had  evacuated  the 
position  of  Santarem. 

At  this  time  Napoleon  direct?d  the  armies  of  Spain  to 
be  remodelled.*  The  king's  force  was  diminished,  the 
army  of  the  south  increased  ;  general  Drouet  was  or- 
dered to  march  with  eleven  thousand  men  to  the  fifth 
corps,  which  he  was  appointed  to  command,  in  place 
of  Mortier;  the  remainder  of  the  ninth  corps  was  to 
compose  two  divisions,  under  the  command  of  Clansel 
and  Foy,  and  to  be  incorporated  with  the  army  of  Por- 
tugal. Marmont  was  appointed  to  relieve  Ney  in  the 
command  of  the  sixth  corps;  Loison  was  removed  to 
the  second  corps ;  Bessic-es  was  ordered  to  post  six 
thousand  men  at  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  to  watch  the  fron- 


•  VSu*»pr-Rolls  of  the  French  ArniT- 


332 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XII. 


tiers  of  Portu/ral  and  support  Claparede.  Of  the  im- 
perial guards  ;  seveti  thousand  were  to  assemble  at 
Zamorn,  to  hold  the  Gallieiaus  in  check,  and  the  remain- 
der at  V'alladolid,  with  strong  parties  of  Crivalry  in  the 
space  between  those  places,  that  intelligence  of  what 
was  passing  in  Portngfdl  might  be  dail}' received.  Thus 
Massena  was  enabled  to  adopt  any  operation  that  miffht 
seem  good  to  him,  without  reference  to  his  original 
base;  but  the  order  for  the  execution  of  these  measures 
did  not  reach  the  armies  until  a  later  period. 

RETREAT  OF  THE  FRENCH  FROM  SANTAREM. 

Sevrral  lines  of  operation  were  open  to  the  prince 
of  F] sling.  1.  He  could  pass  the  Tagus,  between 
Punhete  and  Abrantes,  by  boats,  or  by  fords  which 
wtir  often  practicable  after  a  week  of  dry  weather. 
2.  He  conki  retire,  by  the  Sobreira  Formosa,  upon 
Castello  ]}ranco,  and  open  a  cominunication  with  the 
king  by  Placentia,  and  with  the  duke  of  Dalmatia  by 
Alcantara.  3.  He  could  march,  by  the  Estrada  Nova 
and  Belmonte,to  .Sabugal,  and  afterwards  act  according 
to  circumstances.  4.  He  could  gain  the  Mondego,  and 
ascend  the  left  bank  of  that  river  towards  Guarda  and 
Almeida  ;  or,  crossinir  it,  march  upon  Oporto  tlirough 
an  untouched  country.  Of  these  four  plans,  the  first 
was  perilous,  and  the  weather  too  unsettled  to  be  sure 
of  the  fords.  The  second  and  ihirii  were  difficult,  from 
the  rugfgpilness  of  the  Sobreira,  and  exposed,  because 
the  allies  could  break  out  by  Abrantes  upnn  the  flank 
of  the  army  while  in  retreat.  Massena  decided  on  the 
last,  although  his  actual  position  being  to  the  left  of 
the  line  of  retreat,  he  was  necessarily  forced  to  make  a 
flank  movement,  with  more  than  ten  thousand  sick 
men  and  all  his  stores,  under  the  beard  of  an  adversary, 
before  he  could  begin  his  retreat.  Yet  this  he  executed, 
and  in  a  manner  befitting  a  great  commander. 

Commencing  his  preparations  by  destroying  mu- 
nition, and  all  guns  that  could  not  be  horsed,  he  passed 
his  sick  and  bag-trage,  by  degrees,  upon  Thomar.  keep- 
ing only  his  fighting-men  in  the  front,  and  at  the  same 
time  indicating  an  intention  of  passing  the  Zezere.  But 
when  the  impediments  of  the  army  had  gained  two 
marches,  Ney  suddenly  assembled  the  sixth  corps 
and  the  cavalry  on  the  Lys,  near  Leiria,  as  if  with 
the  intention  of  advancing  against  Torres  Vedras,  a 
movement  that  necessarily  kept  lord  Wellington  in 
suspense.  Meanwhile,  the  second  and  eighth  corps, 
quitting  Santarem,  Tremes  and  Aicanhete.  in  the  night 
of  the  5th,  fell  back  by  Pernes,  upon  Torres  Novas 
and  Thomar,  destroyinn-  the  hridges  on  the  Alviella 
behind  them.  The  next  morning  the  boats  were  burnt 
at  Punhete.  and  Loison  retreated  by  the  road  of  E spi- 
nal to  cover  the  flank  of  the  main  line  of  retreat, 
while  the  remainder  of  the  armv,  by  rapid  concentric 
marches,  made  for  a  position  in  front  of  Pombal.  The 
line  of  movement  to  the  Mondeao  was  thus  secured, 
and  four  days  gained  ;  for  lord  VVellinorton,  although 
aware  that  a  retreat  was  in  pronrress  of  execution,  was 
quite  unal)Ie  to  take  any  decided  step,  lest  he  should 
open  the  Lines  to  his  adversary.  Nevertheless  he 
had  caused  Reresford  to  close  to  his  right  on  the  5th, 
and  at  davlin-ht,  on  the  6th,  discoverinnr  iJie  empty 
camps  of  Santarem,  followed  the  eneiny  closely  with 
his  own  army. 

Thomar  seemed  to  be  the  French  point  of  concen- 
tration;  but  as  th'-ir  boats  were  still  maintained  at 
Punhete,  general  William  Stewart  crossed  the  Tagus, 
at  Abrantes,  with  the  greatest  part,  of  F^eresford's 
corps,  while  the  first,  fourth,  and  sixth  divisions,  and 
two  brigades  of  cavalry,  marched  to  (iolegao ;  the 
light  division  also  reached  Pernes.  where  the  bridvre 
was  rapidly  repaired  by  ca|)tain  Tod,  of  the  rnyal 
staff-corps.  The  7th,  as  the  enemy  had  burnt  his  boats 
on  the  Zezere,  the  Abrantes  bridge  was  brought  down 
to  that  river,  and  Stewart,  crossing,  moved  to  Thomar, 


on  which  place  the  divisions  at  Goletrao  were  likewis'^ 
directed.  But  the  retreat  being  now  decidedly  pro. 
nounced  for  the  Mondego,  the  troops  at  Thomar  were 
ordered  to  halt,  while  the  light  division,  German  hus- 
sars, and  royal  dragoons  followed  the  eighth  corps, 
and  took  two  hundred  prisoners. 

'I'his  day's  march  disclosed  a  horrible  calamity. 
A  large  house,  situated  in  an  obscure  part  of  the 
mountains,  was  discovered,  filled  with  starving  per- 
sons. Above  thirty  women  and  children  had  sunk  ; 
and,  silting  by  the  bodies,  were  fifteen  or  sixteen 
survivors,  of  whom  one  only  was  a  man.  but  all  so 
enfeebled  as  to  he  unable  to  eat  the  little  feod  we  had 
to  offer  them.  The  youngest  had  fallen  first,  all  the 
children  were  dead.  None  were  emaciated,  but  the 
muscles  of  the  face  were  invariably  drawn  transvefj-.e- 
l}-,  giving  an  appearance  of  laughing,  and  presenliuij 
the  most  ghastly  sight  imaginable.  The  man  seemed 
most  eager  for  lif",  the  women  appeared  patient  and 
resigned  ;  and.  even  in  this  distress,  had  co/ered  and 
arranged  the  bodies  of  those  who  first  died,  with  de- 
cency and  care. 

While  one  part  of  the  army  was  thus  in  pursuit,  the 
third  and  fifth  divisions  moved  from  the  Lines,  upon 
Leiria,  the  Abrantes'  boats  fell  down  the  river  to  Tan- 
cos,  where  a  bridge  was  fixed,  and  the  second  and 
fourth  divisions,  and  some  cavalry,  were  ihen  directed 
to  return  from  Thomar  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Tagus, 
to  relieve  Badajos.  Beresford.  who  had  remained  with 
a  part  of  his  corps  near  Barca.  likewise  sent  a  biii^ade 
of  cavalry  to  Portaiegre  for  that  purpose. 

Lord  Wellington,  misled  partly  by  a  letter  of  gen- 
eral Trant's,  partly  by  information  obtained  in  San- 
tarem. and  partly  by  Massena's  feigned  movement,  at 
firsi  thought  the  retreat  would  be  by  the  Puente  d^e 
Mnrcella;  but  on  the  8th  he  was  convinced  it  was  di- 
rected towards  Cfiiiubra.  and  on  the  9th,  the  enemy, 
instead  of  continuing  his  retreat,  concentrated  the  sixth 
and  eighth  corps  and  Monibrun's  cavalry  on  a  table 
land,  in  front  of  Pombal,  where  the  light  division 
skirmished  with  his  advanced  posts,  and  the  German 
horse  charged  his  cavalry  with  success,  taking  some 
prisoners.  Here,  finding  the  French  disposed  to  ac 
cept  battle,  the  English  general  was  compelled  to  altei 
his  plans.  To  fight  with  advantnge,  it  was  necessary 
to  bring  up,  from  Thomar,  the  troops  destined  to 
relieve  Badajos.  Not  to  fight,  was  to  give  up  t^ 
the  enemy  Coimbra,  and  the  untouched  country  behind, 
as  far  as  Oporto  :  Massena  would  thus  retire  with  the 
advantages  of  a  conqueror.  In  this  stale  of  affairs, 
intelligence  received  from  Badajos,  described  that 
place  as  being  in  a  sufficient  state  to  hold  out  for  a 
month.     This  decided  the  question. 

'I'he  fourth  division  and  the  heavy  cavalry,  already 
on  the  march  for  the  Alemtejo.  were  countermanded  ; 
general  Nightingale,  with  a  brigade  of  the  first  divis- 
ion and  some  horse,  was  directed  by  the  road  of  Es- 
pinal,  to  observe  the  second  corps ;  and  the  rest  of  the 
army  was  concentrically  directed  upon  Pombal.  How 
dangerous  a  captain  Massena  could  be,  was  here  proved. 
His  first  movement  began  the  4th,  it  was  tlie  11th  be- 
fore a  sutTicient  number  of  troops  could  he  ass  nibled 
tf)  fight  him  at  Pombal,  and,  during  these  seven  days, 
he  had  executed  one  of  the  most  difficult  operations  in 
war,  gained  three  or  four  march  s,  and  completely 
organized  his  system  of  retreat.  Had  any  rain  fallen 
on  the  first  day.  the  allies  could  not  have  followed  him 
with  artillery,  such  was  the  state  of  the  roads,  and  he 
having  before  sent  off  or  destroyed  all  his  guns  ex- 
cept a  few  light  pieces  would  thus  have  had  anothei 
great  advantage. 

SKIRMISH    AT    POMBAL. 

Pack's  brigade  and  the  cavalry,  the  first,  third, 
fourth,  fiftn,  sixth,  and  light  divisions,  and  the   Portu- 


1811.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


333 


^unsp  troops,  which  were  attached,  like  the  Latin 
auxiliaries  of  the  Roman  legion,  to  each  British  di- 
vision, were  assembling  in  front  of  the  enemy  on  the 
iOth  ;  when  Massena,  who  had  sent  his  baggage  over 
the  Soiire  river  in  the  night  by  the  bridge  of  Pombal, 
suddenly  retired  through  that  town.  He  was  closely 
ibllowed  by  the  light  division,  the  streets  were  still 
encumbered,  and  Ney  drawing  up  a  rear-guard  on  a 
neight  bebind  the  town,  threw  a  detachment  into  the 
old  castle  of  Pombal.  He  had,  however,  waited  too 
long.  The  French  army  was  moving  in  some  confu- 
sion and  in  a  very  extended  column  of  march,  by  a 
narrow  dehle,  between  the  mountains  and  the  Soure 
river,  which  was  fordable,  and  the  British  divisions 
were  in  rapid  motion  along  the  left  bank,  with  the  de- 
sign of  crossing  lower  down,  and  cutting  Massena's 
line  of  retreat.  The  fall  of  night  prevented  iliis  ope- 
ration, but  a  sharp  skirmish  took  place  at  Pombal, 
where  the  ninet3'-fifth  and  the  third  cacadores  of  the 
light  division,  after  some  changes  of  fortune,  drove 
the  French  from  the  castle  and  town  with  such  vigour, 
tiiat  they  could  not  destroy  the  bridge,  although  it  was 
mined.  About  forty  of  the  allies  were  hurt,  and  the 
loss  of  the  enemy  was  somewhat  greater. 

In  the  night  Massena  continued  his  retreat,  which 
now  assumed  a  regular  and  concentrated  form.  The 
baggage  and  sick,  protected  by  the  reserve  cavalry, 
marched  first ;  tliey  were  followed  by  the  eighth  corps, 
while  the  sixth,  with  some  light  cavalry,  and  the  best 
horsed  of  the  artillery,  were  destined  to  stem  the  pur- 
suit. Ney  had  been  ordered  to  detach  Marcognet's 
brigade  on  the  10th,  from  the  Lys,  to  seize  Coimbra;  but 
some  delay  having  taken  place,  Montbrun  was  now 
Appointed  for  that  service,  which  was  very  important;  J 
for  lord  Wellington's  immediate  object  was  to  save  j 
Coimbra,  and  he  designed,  by  skilful,  rather  than 
daring,  operations,  to  oblige  Massena  to  quit  the  Por- 
tuguese territory.  The  moral  effect  of  such  an  event, 
he  judged,  would  be  sufficient  for  the  general  cause; 
but  as  his  reinforcements  were  still  distant,  he  was 
obliged  to  keep  the  fourth  division  and  the  heavy  cav- 
nlrjK  from  the  relief  of  Badajos,  and  was  therefore  wil- 
ling to  strike  a  sudden  stroke  also,  if  a  fair  occasion 
offered.  Howbeit  the  country  was  full  of  strong  po- 
sitions, the  roads  hollow  and  confined  by  mountains  on 
eilher  hand  ;  every  village  a  defile ;  the  weather  was 
moderate,  and  favourable  to  the  enemy,  and  Ney,  with 
a  wonderfully  happy  mixture  of  courage,  readiness, 
and  skill,  illustrated  ever)'  league  of  ground  by  some 
signal  combination  of  war. 

I)sy-break,  on  the  l'2lh,  saw  both  armies  in  move- 
ment, and  eight  miles  of  march,  and  some  slight  skir- 
mishing, brought  the  head  of  the  British  into  a  hollow 
way,  leading  to  a  high  table-land  on  which  Ney  had 
disposed  five  thousand  infantry,  a  few  squadrons  of  cav- 
alry, and  some  light  gun^;.  His  centre  was  opposite 
the  hollow  road,  his  wings  were  covered  by  wooded 
heigiits,  which  he  occupied  with  light  troops ;  his 
right  rested  on  the  ravine  of  the  vSoure ;  his  left  on  the 
Redinha,  which  circling  round  his  rear  fell  into  the 
Soure.  Behind  him  the  village  of  Redinha,  situated 
in  a  hollow,  covered  a  narrow  bridge  and  a  long  and 
dangerous  defile ;  and,  beyond  the  stream,  some  very 
rugged  heights,  commanding  a  view  of  the  position 
in  front  of  the  village,  were  occupied  by  a  division  of 
infantry,  a  regiment  of  cavalry,  and  a  battery  of  heavy 
guns,  all  so  skilfully  disposed  as  to  give  the  appear- 
ance of  a  very  considerable  force. 

COMBAT    OF    REDINHA. 

After  examining  the  enemy's  position  for  a  short 
time,  lord  Wellington  directed  the  light  division,  now 
commanded  by  sir  William  Erskine,  to  attack  the 
wooded  slopes  covering  Ney's  right,  and  in  less  than 
an  hour  these  orders  were  executed.     The  fifty-secoad, 


the  ninety-fifth,  and  the  ca(;adores,  assisted  by  a  com- 
pany of  the  forty-third,  carried  the  ascent  and  cleared 
the  woods,  and  their  skirmishers  even  advanced  on  to 
the  open  plain ;  but  the  French  battalions,  supported 
by  four  guns,  immediately  opened  a  heavy  rolling  fire, 
and  at  the  same  moment,  colonel  Ferriere,  of  the  third 
French  hussars,  charged  and  took  fourteen  prisoners. 
This  officer,  duriiig  the  whole  campaign,  never  failed 
to  break  in  upon  the  skirmishers  in  the  most  critical 
moments,  sometimes  with  a  squadron,  sometimes  with 
only  a  few  men  ;  he  was  always  sure  to  he  found  in 
the  right  place,  and  was  continually  proving  how  much 
may  be  done,  even  in  the  most  rugged  mountains,  by  a 
small  body  of  good  cavalry. 

Erskine's  line,  consisting  of  five  battalions  of  infant- 
ry and  six  guns,  being  formed  in  such  a  manner  that 
it  outflanked  the  French  right,  tending  towards  the 
ford  of  the  Redinha,  was  now  reinforced  with  two 
regiments  of  dragoons,  and  meanwhile  Picton  seized 
the  wooded  heights  protecting  the  French  left.  Thus 
Ney's  position  was  laid  bare.  Nevertheless,  that 
marshal  observing  that  lord  Wellington,  deceived  as 
to  his  real  numbers  was  bringing  the  mass  of  the  allied 
troops  into  line,  far  from  retreating,  even  charged  Pic- 
ton's  skirmishers,  and  continued  to  hold  his  ground 
with  an  astonishing  confidence  if  we  consider  his  po- 
sition;  for  the  third  division  was  nearer  to  the  village 
and  bridge  than  his  right,  and  there  were  already  cav- 
alry and  guns  enough  on  the  plain  to  overwhelm  him. 
In  this  posture  both  sides  remained  for  about  an  hour, 
when  three  shots  were  fired  from  the  British  centre  ag 
a  signal  for  a  forward  movement,  and  suddenly  a  most 
splendid  spectacle  of  war  was  exhibited.  The  woods 
seemed  alive  with  troops,  and  in  a  few  moments  thirty 
thousand  men,  forming  three  gorgeous  lines  of  battle, 
were  stretched  across  the  plain,  bending  on  a  gentle 
curve,  and  moving  majestically  onwards,  while  horse- 
men and  guns,  springing  forward  simultaneously  from 
the  centre  and  from  the  left  wing,  charged  under  a 
general  volley  from  the  PVench  battalions  .  the  latter 
were  instantly  hidden  by  the  smoke,  and  when  that 
cleared  away  no  enemy  was  to  be  seen  ! 

Ney  keenly  watching  the  progress  of  this  grand 
formation,  had  opposed  Picton's  foremost  skirmishers 
with  his  left,  and,  at  the  same  moment,  withdrew  the 
rest  of  his  people  with  such  rapidity,  that  he  gained 
the  village  ere  the  cavalry  could  touch  him  :  the  ut- 
most efforts  of  Picton's  skirmishers  and  of  the  horse- 
artiller}'  scarcely  enabled  them  to  gall  the  hindinost  of 
the  French  witli  their  fire.  Oie  ^^owitzer  was,  indeed, 
dismounted  close  to  the  bridge,  but  the  village  of  Re- 
dinha was  in  flames  behind  it,  and  the  marshal  wishing 
to  confirm  the  courage  of  his  soldiers  at  the  commence- 
ment of  the  retreat,  in  person  superintended  the  carry- 
ing it  off,  which  he  effected;  yet  with  the  loss  of  fif- 
teen or  twenty  men,  and  with  great  danger  to  himself, 
for  the  British  guns  were  thundering  on  his  rear,  and 
the  light  troops  of  the  third  division,  chasing  like 
heated  blood  hounds,  passed  the  river  almost  at  the 
same  time  with  the  French.  The  reserves  of  the  latter 
then  cannonaded  the  bridge  from  the  heights  heyond, 
but  a  fresh  disposition  of  attack  being  made  by  lord 
Wellington,  while  the  third  division  continued  to  press 
the  left,  Ney  fell  back  upon  the  main  body  which  was 
at  Condeixa,  ten  miles  in  the  rear. 

The  British  had  twelve  officers  and  two  hundred 
men  killed  and  wounded  in  this  combat,  and  the  enemy 
lost  as  many  ;  but  he  might  have  been  utterly  destroyed  ; 
for  there  is  no  doubt,  that  the  duke  of  Elchingen  re- 
mained a  quarter  of  an  hour  too  lonff  upon  his  first 
position,  and  that,  deceived  by  the  skilful  arrangement 
of  his  reserve,  lord  Wellington  paid  him  too  much 
respect.  Nevertheless  the  extraordinary  facility  and 
precision  with  which  the  English  general  handled  so 
large  a  force,  was  a  warning  to  the  French  commaadcr. 


334 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XIl. 


and  produced  a  palpable  effect  upon  the  after  ope- 
rations. 

On  tlie  13th,  the  allies  renewed  the  pursuit,  and 
before  ten  o'clock  discovered  the  French  army,  the 
second  corps,  which  was  at  Espinhal,  excepted,  in 
order  of  battle.  The  crisis  of  Massena's  retreat  had 
arrived,  the  defiles  of  Condeixa,  leading^  upon  Coim- 
bra,  were  behind  him  ;  those  of  Miranda  de  Corvo, 
leading  to  the  Puente  de  Murcella,  were  on  his  left; 
and  in  the  fork  of  tliese  too  roads  Ney  was  seated  on 
a  stronjT  range  of  heights  covered  by  a  marsh,  his  po- 
sition beirifT  only  to  be  approached  by  the  highway 
leading  through  a  deep  hollow  against  his  right.  Trees 
were  felled  to  obstruct  the  passage,  a  palisado  was 
conslriictid  across  the  hollow,  and  breast-works  were 
thrown  up  on  each  side.  Massena  here  intended  to 
slop  the  pursuit,  while  Montbrun  seiied  Coimbra.  His 
design  was  to  pass  the  Mondego,  and  either  capture 
Oporto  or  inaintain  a  position  between  the  Douro  and 
the  Mondego,  until  the  operations  of  Soult  should 
draw  the  British  away,  or  until  the  advance  of  Bes- 
sieres  with  the  army  of  the  north,  should  enable  him- 
self again  to  act  offensively. 

Hitherto  the  French  general  had  appeared  the  abler 
tactician,  but  now  his  adversary  assumed  the  superiori- 
ty. When  at  Thomar,  lord  Wellington,  in  expecta- 
tion that  Massena  would  cross  the  Mondego,  had 
directed  Baccellar  to  look  to  the  security  of  Oporto, 
intending  himself  to  follow  the  French  with  the  utmost 
rapidity.  He  had  also  ordered  Trant  and  Wilson  to 
abandon  the  Mondego  and  Vouga  rivers,  the  moment 
the  fords  should  become  passable  and  retire  across  the 
Douro.  They  were  also  to  break  up  the  roads  as  they 
retreated,  to  remove  all  boats  and  means  of  transport, 
and  to  defend  that  river  to  extremity,  that  the  army 
might  have  time  to  close  upon  the  enemy's  rear. 

Wilson  had  been  in  observation  of  the  Ponte  Mur- 
cella road,  but  hearing  that  the  enemy  were  menacing 
an  attack  on  Coimbra,  he  crossed  the  Mondego  at 
Pena  Cova,  and  thus,  passing  between  the  French 
parties,  effected  a  junction  with  Trant.  Then  in  pur- 
suance of  the  orders  above  mentioned,  both  fell  back, 
Wilson  upon  Busaco,  and  Trant  towards  the  V^ouga. 
But  the  latter  who  had  destroyed  an  arch  of  tlie  bridge 
at  Coimbra,  and  placed  guards  at  the  fords  as  far  down 
as  Figue.'is,  soon  returned  with  a  part  of  his  f  )rce, 
for  the  sound  of  guns  had  reached  his  outposts,  the 
river  was  rising,  and  he  felt  assured  that  the  allied 
army  was  close  upon  the  heels  of  the  enemy. 

As  early  eis  the  evening  of  the  11th,  the  P>ench  ap- 
peared at  the  suburb  of  Santa  Clara,  and  a  small  party 
of  their  dragoons  actually  forded  the  Mondego  at  Pe- 
reiras  that  day.  On  the  12th,  some  French  officers 
examined  the  bridge  of  Coimbra,  but  a  cannon-shot 
from  the  other  side  wounded  one  of  them,  and  a  general 
skirmish  took  place  along  the  banks  of  the  river,  during 
which  a  party  attempting  to  feel  their  way  along  the 
bridge,  were  scattered  by  a  round  of  grape.  The  fords 
were,  however,  actually  practicable  for  cavalry,  and 
there  were  not  more  than  two  or  three  hundred  militia 
and  a  few  guns  at  the  bridge,  for  Baccellar  had  obliged 
Trant  again  to  withdraw  the  greatest  part  of  his  force 
on  the  1 1th;  nevertheless  the  latter  opposed  the  enemy 
with  the  remainder,  and  it  would  appear  that  the  French 
imagined  the  reinforcement,  which  reached  Lisbon  the 
2d  of  March,  had  been  sent  by  sea  to  the  Mondego  and 
was  in  (,V)imbra,  This  was  an  error.  Coimbra  was 
saved  by  the  same  man  and  the  same  militia  that  had 
captured  it  during  the  advance.* 

Montbrun  sent  his  report  to  Massena  early  on  the 
1.3th,  and  llie  latter  Uk>  readily  crediting  his  opinion  of 
Trant's  strength,  relinquished  the  idea  of  passing  the 
Mondego,  and  determined  to  retire  by  the  Puente  de 

•  Carnpaguc  dts  Francais  en  rortiigfal. 


Murcella.  To  ensure  the  power  of  changing  his  front, 
and  to  secure  his  communication  with  Heynier  and 
Loison,  he  had  carried  Claiisel's  division  to  Fonte 
Coberta,  a  village  about  five  miles  on  his  left,  situated 
at  the  point  where  the  Anciao  road  falls  into  that  lead- 
ing to  Murcella.  There  Loison  re-joined  him,  and 
being  thus  pivoted  on  the  Anciao  Sierra,  and  covering 
the  line  of  coinmunication  with  the  second  corps,  while 
Ney  held  Condeixa,  he  considered  his  position  secure. 
The  baggage  was,  however,  observed  filing  off  by  tho 
Murcella  road  when  the  allies  first  came  upon  Ney, 
and  lord  Wellington  instantly  comprehending  the  state 
of  affairs,  as  instantly  detached  the  third  division  by  a 
very  difficult  path  over  the  Sierra  de  Anciao  to  turn  tho 
enemy's  left. 

For  some  time  all  appeared  quiet  in  the  French  lines. 
Massena,  in  repairing  to  Fonte  Coberta,  had  left  Ney 
orders,  it  is  said,  to  set  fire  to  Condeixa  at  a  certain 
hour,  when  all  the  divisions  were  simultaneously  to 
concentrate  at  Casal  Nova,  in  a  second  position,  per- 
pendicular to  the  first,  and  covering  the  road  to  Puente 
Murcella.  Towards  three  o'clock,  however,  Picton 
was  descried  winding  round  the  bluff  end  of  a  moun- 
tain, about  eight  miles  distant,  and  as  he  was  already 
beyond  the  French  left,  instant  confusion  pervaded 
their  camp;  a  thick  smoke  arose  from  Condeixa,  the 
columns  were  seen  hurr3'ing  towards  Casal  Nova,  and 
the  British  immediately  pushed  forward.  The  felled 
trees  and  other  obstacles  impeded  their  advance  at 
first,  and  a  number  of  fires,  simultaneously  kindled, 
covered  the  retreating  troops  with  smoke,  while  the 
flames  of  Condeixa  stopped  the  artillery  ;  hence  the 
skirmishers  and  some  cavalry  only  could  close  with 
the  rear  of  the  enemy,  but  so  rapidly,  as  to  penetrate 
between  the  division  at  Fonte  Coberta  and  the  rest  of 
the  French,  and  it  is  affirmed  that  the  prince  of  Esling, 
who  WAS  on  the  road,  only  escaped  capture  by  taking 
the  feathers  out  of  his  hat  and  riding  through  some  of 
the  light  troops. 

Condeixa  being  thus  evacuated,  the  British  cavalry 
pushed  towards  Coimbra,  opened  the  communication 
with  Trant,  and  cutting  off  Montbrun,  took  soma  of 
his  horsemen.  The  rest  of  the  army  kindled  tlieir 
fires,  and  the  light  division  planted  piquets  close  up  to 
the  enemv,  but  the  nisjht  was  dark,  and  about  ten 
o'clock,  the  French  divisions,  whose  presence  at  FoiUe 
Coberta  was  unknown  to  lord  Wellintrton,  stole  out, 
and  passing  close  along  the  front  of  the  British  posts, 
made  for  Miranda  de  Corvo.  The  noise  of  their 
march  being  heard,  was  imagined  to  be  the  moving  of 
the  French  baggage  to  the  rear,  and  was  so  reported  to 
sir  William  Erskine,  whereupon  that  officer,  conclud- 
ing that  their  army  was  in  full  retreat,  without  any 
further  inquiry,  put  the  light  division  in  march  at  day- 
light on  the  Hth. 

COxMBAT    OF    CASAL    NOVA. 

The  morning  was  so  obscured  that  nothing  could  be 
descried  at  the  distance  of  a  huiulred  feet,  but  the 
sound  of  a  great  multitude  was  heard  on  the  hills  in 
front,  and  it  bein<i  evident  that  the  French  were  there 
in  force,  many  officers  represented  the  rashness  of  thus 
advanciniT  without  orders  and  in  such  a  fog;  neverthe* 
less  ErskiiK',  with  an  astounding  negligence,  sent  the 
fiflv-secon<l  forward  in  a  simple  column  of  sections, 
without  a  vanguard  or  other  precaution,  and  even  before 
the  piquets  had  come  in  from  their  posts.  As  the  road 
dipped  suddenly,  descending  into  a  valley,  the  regi- 
ment was  immediately  lost  in  the  mist,  which  was  so 
thick,  that  the  troops,  unconsciously  passing  the  ene- 
my's out-posts,  had  like  to  have  captured  Ney  himself, 
whose  bivouac  was  close  to  the  piquets.  The  riflemen 
followed  in  a  few  moments,  and  the  rest  of  the  division 
was  about  to  plunge  into  the  same  gulf,  when  the  rat/- 
tling  of  musketry  and  the  booming  of  round  shot  wera 


1811.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


035 


heard,  and  the  vajiour  slowly  rising,  discovered  the 
jlfty-second  on  the  slopes  of  the  opposite  mountain, 
engaged,  wiihout  support,  in  the  midst  of  the  enemy's 
army. 

At  this  moment  lord  Wellington  arrived.  His  design 
had  been  to  turn  the  left  of  the  French,  for  their  front 
position  was  very  strong;  and  behind  it  they  occupied 
the  mountain  ridges,  in  succession,  to  the  Deuca  river 
and  the  defiles  of  Miranda  de  Corvo.  There  was, 
however,  a  road  leading  from  Condeixa  to  Espinhal, 
and  the  fourth  division  was  already  in  march  by  it  for 
Panella,  iiavinnr  orders,  to  communicate  with  Niirhtin- 
gale,  to  attack  Revnier,  and  to  gain  the  sources  of  the 
Dema  and  Ceira  rivers.  Between  the  fourth  division 
and  Casal  Nova  the  third  division  was  more  directly 
turning  the  enemy's  left  flank;  and  meanwhile  the 
main  body  was  coming  up  to  the  front,  hut  as  it  march- 
ed in  one  column,  it  required  time  to  reach  the  field. 
Howbeit  Erskine's  error  forced  on  this  action,  and  the 
whole  of  the  light  division  were  pushed  forward  to 
succour  the  fifty-second. 

The  enemy's  ground  was  so  extensive,  and  his  skir- 
mishers so  thick  and  so  easily  supported,  that,  in  a  little 
time,  the  division  was  necessarily  stretched  out  in  one 
thin  thread,  and  closely  engaged  in  every  part,  without 
any  reserve ;  nor  could  it  even  thus  present  an  equal 
front,  until  Picton  sent  the  riflemen,  of  the  sixtieth,  to 
prolong  the  line.  Nevertheless,  the  fight  was  vigor- 
ously maintained  amidst  the  numerous  stone  enclosures 
on  the  mountain  side,  some  advantages  were  even 
gained,  and  the  right  of  the  enemy  was  partially  turn- 
ed ;  yet  the  main  position  could  not  be  shaken,  until 
Picton  near,  and  Cole  further  off,  had  turned  it  by  the 
left.  'J'hen,  the  first,  fifth,  and  sixth  divisions,  the 
heavy  cavalry,  and  the  artillery,  came  up  on  the  centre, 
and  Ney  commenced  his  retreat,  covering  his  rear  with 
guns  and  light  troops,  and  retiring  from  ridge  to  ridge 
with  admirable  precision,  and.  for  a  long  time,  without 
confusion  and  with  very  littleloss.  Towards  the  middle 
of  the  day,  however,  the  British  guns  and  the  skir- 
mishers got  within  range  of  his  masses,  and  the  retreat 
became  more  rapid  and  less  orderly  ;  j-^et  he  finally 
gained  the  strong  pass  of  Miranda  de  Corvo,  whi>-h 
had  been  secured  by  the  main  body  of  the  French. 
Here  Montbrun  rejoined  the  army.  He  had  summoned 
Coimbra  on  the  I'.ith  at  noon,  and,  without  wailing  for 
an  answer,  passed  over  the  mountain  and  gained  the 
riglit  bank  of  the  Deuca  by  a  very  diflicait  march. 

The  loss  of  the  light  division  this  day  was  eleven 
officers  agd  a  hundred  and  fit'ty  men  ;  that  of  the  enemy 
was  greater,  and  about  a  hundred  prisoners  were  taken. 

During  the  action  of  the  14lh,  Reynier,  seeing  the 
approach  of  the  fourth  division,  hastily  abandoned 
Panella,  whereupon  Cole  having  effected  a  junction 
with  Nightingale,  passed  the  Deuca,  and  ^lassena 
fearing  lest  they  should  gain  his  rear,  set  fire  to  the 
town  of  Miranda,  and  passed  the  Ceira  that  night. 
His  whole  army  was  now  compressed  and  crowded  in 
one  narrow  line,  between  the  higher  sierras  and  the 
Mondego,  and  to  lighten  the  march,  he  destroyed  a 
g'reater  quantity  of  amnmnition  and  baggage.  His 
encumbrances  were,  however,  si  ill  so  heavy,  and  the 
confusion  in  his  armv  so  great,  that  he  directed  Xey  to 
cover  the  passage  with  a  few  battalions,  charging  him 
not  to  risk  an  action  ;  but  Ney,  little  regarding  his 
orders,  kept,  on  the  left  bank,  ten  or  twelve  battalions, 
a  brigade  of  cavalry,  and  some  guns,  which  produced  the 

COMBAT    OF    FOZ    d'aRONCE. 

The  French  ritrht  rested  on  some  wooded  and  rugged 
ground,  and  their  left  upon  the  village  of  Foz  d'Aronce, 
and  the  15th,  the  weather  was  so  obscure  that  the  al- 
lies could  not  reach  the  Ceira,  before  four  o'clock  in 
the  evening;  wherefore  the  troops,  as  they  came  up, 
proceeded  to  kindle  fires  for  the  night,  thinking  that 


as  Ney's  position  was  strong,  nothing  would  be  done. 
But  lord  \\'ellington,  having  cast  a  rapid  g!an^-e  over 
it,  directed  the  light  division,  and  Pack's  brigade,  to 
hold  the  right  in  play,  ordered  the  third  division 
against  the  left,  and  at  the  same  moment  the  horse- 
artillery,  galloping  forward  to  a  rising  ground,  opened 
with  a  great  and  sudden  effect.  Ney's  left  wing  being 
surprised  and  overthrown  by  the  first  charge  of  the 
third  division,  dispersed  in  a  panic,  and  fled  in  such 
confusion  towards  the  river,  that  some,  missing  the 
fords,  rushed  itito  the  deeps  and  weie  drowned,  and 
others  crowding  on  the  bridge  were  crushed  to  death. 
On  the  right  the  ground  was  so  rugged  and  close  that 
the  action  res  dved  itself  into  a  skirmish,  and  thus  Ney 
was  enabled  to  use  some  battalions  to  check  the  pur- 
suit of  his  left,  but  meanwhile  darkness  came  on  and 
the  F^rench  troops  in  their  disorder  fired  on  each  other. 
Only  four  oflicers  and  sixty  men  fell  on  the  side  of  the 
British.  The  enemy's  loss  was  not  less  than  five 
hundred,  of  which  one-half  were  drowned,  and  an  eagle 
was  afterwards  found  in  the  bed  of  the  river  when  the 
waters  su!)sided.  In  the  night  Massena  retired  be- 
hind the  Alva;  yet  \ey,  notwithstanding  this  disas- 
trous combat,  maintained  the  left  bank  of  the  Ceira, 
until  every  encumbrance  had  passed,  and  then  blowing 
up  seventy  feet  of  the  bridge,  sent  his  corps  on,  reinain- 
ing  himself,  with  a  weak  rear-fruard,  on  the  right  bank. 

Thus  terminated  the  first  part  of  the  retreat  from 
Santarem,  during  which  the  French  commander,  if  we 
except  his  errors  with  regard  to  Coimbra,  displayed 
infinite  ability,  but  withal  a  harsh  and  ruthless  spirit. 
I  pass  over  the  destruction  of  Redinha,  Condeixa,  Mi- 
randa de  Corvo,  and  many  villages  on  the  route;  the 
burning  of  those  towns  covered  the  retrograde  move- 
ments of  the  army,  and  something  must  be  attributed  to 
the  disorder,  which  usually  attends  a  forced  retreat :  but 
the  town  of  liciria,  and  the  convent  of  Alcoba^a, 
were  given  to  the  flames  by  express  orders  from  the 
French  head-quarters;*  and,  although  the  laws  of  war 
rigorously  interpreted,  authorize  such  examples  when 
the  inhabitants  take  arms,  it  can  only  be  justly  done, 
for  the  purpose  of  overawing  the  people,  and  not  from 
a  spirit  of  vengeance  when  abandoning  the  country. 
But  everj'  horror  that  could  make  war  hideous  attended 
this  dreadful  march  !  Distress,  conflagrations,  death, 
in  all  modes  !  from  wounds,  from  fatigue,  from  water, 
from  the  flames,  from  starvation  !  On  every  side  un- 
limited violence,  unlimited  vengeance!  I  myself  saw 
a  peasant  hounding  on  his  dog,  to  devour  the  dead 
and  dying,  and  the  spirit  of  cruelty  once  unchained 
smote  even  the  brute  creation.  On  the  15th  the  French 
general,  to  diminish  the  encumbrances  of  his  march, 
had  ordered  a  number  of  beasts  of  burthen  to  be  de- 
stroyed ;  the  inhuman  fellow,  charged  with  the  execu- 
tion, hamstringed  five  hundred  asses  and  left  them  to 
starve,  and  thus  they  were  found  by  the  British  army 
on  that  day.  The  mute  but  deep  expressi  n  of  pain 
and  grief,  visible  in  these  poor  creatures'  looks,  wonder- 
fully roused  the  fury  of  the  soldiers,  and  so  little  weight 
has  reason  with  the  multitude,  when  opposed  by  a  mo- 
mentary sensation,  that  no  quarter  would  have  been 
given  to  any  prisoner  at  that  moment.  A  humane  feel- 
ing would  thus  have  led  to  direct  cruelty.  This  shows 
how  dangerou-i  it  is  in  war  to  listen  to  the  passions  at 
all,  since  the  most  praiseworthy  could  be  thus  pervert- 
ed by  an  acc'dental    combination  of  circumstances. 

The  French  have,  however,  been  accused  of  many 
crimes,  which  they  did  not  and  could  not  commit  : 
such  as  the  driving  of  all  women  above  ten  years  of 
age  into  their  camp  at  Redinha,  near  which  there  were 
neither  men  nor  women  to  be  driven. |  The  country 
was  a  desert !     They  have  also  been  charged  by  the 

♦  Lord  Wellindton's  Despatches, 
f  Souther,  reiiinsular  War,  Vol.  Ill 


336 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XIT. 


same  writer  with  the  mutilating  John  the  First's  body 
in  the  convent  of  Batalha,  durinor  Massetia's  retreat; 
but  the  bodv  of  that  monarch  had  been  wantonly  pull- 
ed to  pieces,  and  carried  off  by  British  oincers,  during 
the  retreat  of  the  allies  ! 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Allifs  hah  for  provisioiis — State  of  the  ranipaisrn— ras«as:e  of 
the  Ceii-a — lassiige  of  trie  Alv;i — Masstna  reti.ts  to  Cdf-ri- 
co — Resolves  to  march  upon  Coria — Is  preventfd  b}'  Key, 
who  is  (!ei)rived  of  his  coininaiid  and  sent  to  France — .Mas- 
sena  absnions  Celerico  and  takes  post  at  Guarda — The  aMies 
oblisce  the  French  to  quit  that  position,  and  Massena  takes 
a  new  one  liehintl  the  Coa — Combat  of  Sabiigal — Trant 
crosses  the  Coa  and  cuts  the  communication  btlween  Al- 
meida an!  Ciu'iad  Rodri;^o — His  dang-er — He  is  rebased  by 
the  Hriiish  cavaby  and  artillery — Massena  abandons  Por- 
tug^al. 

Ox  the  10th  the  allies  lialted,  partly  because  the 
Ceira  was  swollen  and  unfordable,  partly  from  the 
extreme  exhaustion  of  the  troops  who  had  suffered 
far  greater  privations  than  the  enemy.  The  latter, 
following  his  custom,  carried  fifteen  days'  bread  ;  the 
allies  depended  upon  a  commissariat,  wliich  broke 
down  under  the  difficulties,  not  from  any  deficiency  in 
Mr.  Kennedy,  the  chief  of  the  department,  who  was 
distinguished  alike  for  zeal,  probity,  and  talent;  but 
from  the  ill  coniluct  of  the  Portuguese  government, 
who,  deaf  to  the  repeated  representations  of  lord  Wel- 
lington and  Beresfcird,  would  neither  feed  the  Portr- 
guese  troops  regularly  while  at  Santarem,  nor  fill  their 
magazines,  nor  collect  the  means  of  transport  for  the 
march.  Hence,  after  passing  Pombal,  the  greater  part 
of  the  native  force  had  been  unable  to  continue  the 
pursuit,  and  the  brigades  under  general  Pack  and  colonel 
Ashworlh,  which  did  keep  up  and  engaged  daily  with 
the  enemy,  were  actually  four  days  without  food  of 
any  sort.  Numbers  died  of  inanition  on  the  reads,  and 
to  save  the  whole  from  destruction,  the  British  supplies 
were  shared  with  them.  The  commissary-general's 
means  were  thus  overlaid,  the  whole  army  suffered, 
and  necessity  obliged  lord  Wellington  t'l  halt.  Nev- 
ertheless he  had  saved  (^oirnbra,  forced  the  enemy  into 
a  narrow,  intricate,  and  ravanred  country,  and,  with  an 
i'.l'r-rior  force,  turned  him  out  of  every  strong  position; 
and  this,  by  a  series  of  movements,  based  on  the  sound- 
est principles  of  war.  Noiing  the  skill  and  tenacit}' 
with  ^^^.ich  I\I;)^setia  and  Ni'y  clung  to  every  leacrue  of 
ground  and  every  ridge  defensible  against  superior 
numbers,  he  had  seized  the  higher  slopes  of  the  moun- 
tains by  Picton's  flank  march  on  the  13th,  and  again 
by  Cole's  on  the  1 1th  ;  and  thus,  continually  menacing 
the  passes  in  rear  of  the  French,  obliged  them  to  aban- 
don positions  which  could  scarcely  have  boon  forced. 
This  method  of  turning  the  strength  of  the  country  to 
profit  is  the  true  key  to  mountain  warfare ;  he  who  re- 
ceives battle  in  the  hills  has  always  the  advantage,  and 
he  who  first  seizes  the  important  points  chooses  his 
own  field  of  battle. 

In  saying  an  inferior  force,  I  advert  to  the  state  of 
the  Portuguese  army  and  to  Badajos ;  for  when  lord 
Wellington  had  saved  Coimbra,  and  seen  that  the 
French  would  not  accept  a  general  battle,  except  on 
very  advantageous  terms,  he  detached  a  brigade  of 
cavalry,  some  guns,  and  a  division  of  native  infantry, 
'rom  Condeixa,  to  the  Alemfejo.  And  again  in  the 
'igrht  of  the  13th,  having  received  intelligence  that 
Badajos  had  surrendered,  and  feeling  all  the  import- 
ance of  this  event,  he  had  detached  the  fourth  division 
to  the  Alemtejo.  for  he  desirrned  that  Beresford  should 
immediately  retake  the  lost  fortress.  Tlius  lord  Wel- 
lington had  less  than  twenty-five  thousand  men  in 
band  during  the  subsequent  operations,  but,  as  the  road 


of  Espinbal  was  the  shortest  line  to  the  Tagus,  gen- 
eral Cole,  as  we  have  seen,  moved  into  it  by  Panella, 
thus  threatening  Massena's  flank  and  rear  at  the  same 
moment  that  he  gained  a  march  towards  his  ultimate 
destination.  Meanwhile,  Trant  and  Wilson,  with  the 
militia,  moving  up  the  right  bank  of  the  Mon.dcgo,  par- 
allel to  the  enemy's  line  cf  retreat,  forbad  his  foragers 
to  pass  that  river,  and  were  at  hand  either  to  interfere 
between  him  and  Oporto,  or  to  act  ag;unst  his  flank  and 
rear. 

Such  were  the  dispositions  of  the  English  treneral  ; 
but  the  military  horizon  was  still  clouded.  Intelligence 
came  from  the  north  that  Bessieres,  after  providing  for 
his  government,  had  been  able  to  draw  together,  at 
Zamora,  about  seven  thousand  men,  and  menaced  an 
invasion  of  Gallicia,  and,  although  Malii  had  an  army 
of  sixteen  thousand  men,  lord  Wellington  anticipated 
no  resistance.  In  the  south,  affairs  were  even  more 
gloomy.  The  battle  of  Barosa,  the  disputes  which 
followed,  and  the  conduct  of  Imas  and  .M^ndizabal, 
proved  that,  from  Spain,  no  useful  co-cpcniiion  was 
ever  to  be  expected.  Mortier.  also,  had  inve-iled  Cainpo 
Mayor,  and  it  was  hardly  expected  to  hr)ld  cut  uniil 
Beresford  arrived.  The  Spaniards,  to  whom  it  had 
been  delivered,  under  an  engagement  of  honour,  er>- 
tercd  into  by  Romana,  to  keep  it  against  the  enemy, 
had  dislo)'^ '.lly  neglected  and  abandoned  it  at  the  very 
moment  when  Badajos  fell,  hence  two  hundred  Portu- 
guese militia,  thrown  in  at  the  moment,  had  to  defend 
this  fortress,  which  required  a  garrison  of  five  thousand 
regulars.  Nor  was  the  enemy,  immediately  in  the 
British  front,  the  last  to  be  considered. 

Ney  withdrew  from  the  Ceira  in  the  evening  of  the 
16th,  and  on  the  17th  the  light  division  forded  that 
river  with  great  difficulty,  while  the  rest  of  the  army 
passed  over  a  trestle  bridge,  made  in  the  night  by  the 
staff-corps.  The  French  were,  however,  again  in  po  i- 
tion  immediately  behind  the  Alva,  and  on  the  Sierra 
de  Moita,  and  they  had  destroyed  the  Poiite  Murcella 
and  the  bridge  near  Pombeira  ;  the  second  corps  had 
moved  towards  the  upper  part  of  the  river,  and  Masse- 
na had  spread  his  foraging  parties  to  a  considerabl  i 
distance,  designing  to  halt  for  several  days.  He  w&s 
disturbed  sooner  than  he  expected  ;  for  the  1st.  3d,  and 
5th  British  divisions  being  directed  on  the  18th  by  the 
Sierra  de  Guiteria,  made  way  over  that  rugged  moun- 
tain with  a  wonderful  perseverance  and  strength,  and 
thus  menaced  the  French  left,  while  the  Gth  and  the 
light  divisions  cannonaded  their  right  on  the  Lower 
Alva.  • 

As  the  upper  course  of  the  river,  now  threatened  by 
lord  Wellington's  right,  was  parallel  to  the  French 
line  of  retreat,  Massena  recalled  the  second  corps,  and, 
quitting  the  Lower  Alva  also,  concentrated  on  the 
Sierra  de  Moita,  lest  the  divisions,  movin<r  up  the 
river,  should  cross,  and  fiill  on  his  trooj<s  while  separa- 
ted and  in  march.  It  then  behoved  the  allies  to  con- 
centrate also,  lest  the  heads  of  their  columns  should 
be  crushed  by  the  enemy's  masses.  The  Alva  was 
deep,  wide,  and  rapid,  yet  the  staff-corps  succeeded  in 
forming  a  most  ingenious  raft-bridge,  and  the  liirht  di- 
vision immediately  passed  between  Ponte  Murcella  and 
Pombeira,  and  at  the  same  time  the  right  wing  of  the 
army  entered  Arganil,  while  Trant  and  Wilson  closed 
on  the  other  side  of  the  Monderjo.  Massena  then  re- 
commenced his  retreat  with  great  rapidity,  and  being 
desirous  to  gain  Celerico  and  the  defiles  leading  upon 
Guarda  betimes,  again  destroyed  baggage  and  ammu- 
nition, and  abandoned  even  his  more  distant  foraging- 
parties,  who  were  thus  intercepted  and  taken,  to  the 
number  of  eight  hundred,  in  returning  to  the  Alva  ;  for 
lord  Wellington,  seeing  the  success  of  his  combina- 
tions, had  immediately  direct"d  all  his  columns  u|)on 
Moita,  and  the  whole  army  was  assembled  there  on 
the  19th.     The  pursuit  was  renewed  the  20th,  through 


811.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


337 


Penhancos,  but  only  with  the  lio^ht  division  and  the 
.•avalry  ;  the  communication  was,  however,  again 
opened  with  Wilson  and  Trant  who  had  reached  the 
bridge  of  Fornos,  and  with  .Silvrira,  who  was  about 
Trancoso.  The  third  and  sixth  divisions  followed  in 
reserve,  but  the  remainder  of  the  army  halted  at  Moita, 
until  provisions,  sent  by  sea  from  Lisbon  to  the  Mon- 
dego,  could  come  up  to  them.  The  French  having 
reached  Celerico  the  21st,  with  two  corps  and  the 
cavalry,  immediately  opened  the  communication  with 
Almeida,  by  posting  detachments  of  horse  on  the  Pin- 
hel ;  and  at  the  same  time  Reynier,  who  had  retired 
through  Govea,  occupied  Guarda  with  the  second 
corps. 

Massena  had  now  regained  his  original  base  of  opera- 
tions, and  his  retreat  may  be  said  to  have  terminated  ; 
yet  he  was  far  from  wishing  to  re-enter  Spain,  where 
he  could  only  appear  as  a  baffled  general,  and  shorn  of 
half  his  authority,  because  Bessicres  commanded  the 
northern  provinces,  which,  at  the  commencement  of 
tiie  invasion,  had  been  under  himself.  Hence,  anxious 
to  hold  on  to  Portugal,  and  that  his  previous  retreat 
might  appear  only  a  change  of  position,  he  formed  the 
design  of  throwing  all  his  sick  men  and  other  incum- 
brances into  Almeida,  then,  passing  the  Estrel'a  at 
Guarda,  to  make  a  countermarch,  through  Sabuga!  and 
Pena  Macor,  to  the  Elga,  and  so  establish  a  communi- 
cation across  the  Tagus  with  Soult,  and  by  the  valley 
of  the  Tagus  with  the  king. 

But  now  the  factions  in  his  arm}'  had  risen  to  such 
a  height  that  he  could  no  longer  command  the  obedi- 
ence of  his  lieutenants;  Monthrun,  Junot,  Drouet, 
Reynier,  and  Ney  were  all  at  variance  with  each  other 
and  \\  ith  him.  The  first  had.  in  the  beginning  of  the 
retreat,  been  requested  to  secure  Coimbra,  instead  of 
which  he  quitted  Portugal,  carrying  with  him  Clapa- 
rede's  division.  Marcognel's  brigade  was  then  ordered 
fnr  that  operation,  but  it  did  not  move,  and  finall}', 
Montbrun  undertook  it,  and  failed  as  we  have  seen  in 
default  of  vigour.  Junot  was  disabled  by  his  wound, 
but  his  faction  did  not  the  less  shew  their  discontent. 
Reynier's  dislike  to  the  prince  was  so  strong,  that  the 
olticers  carrying  flags  of  truce,  from  his  corps,  never 
failed  to  speak  of  it  to  the  British,  and  Ney,  more 
fierce  than  all  of  them,  defied  Massena's  authority. 
To  Ney  the  dangerous  delay  at  Pombal,  the  tardiness 
of  Marcognel's  brigade,  and,  finally,  the  too-sudden 
evacuation  of  the  position  at  Condeixa,  have  been  at- 
tributed :  and  it  is  alleged  by  his  censurers  that,  far 
from  being  ordered  to  set  fire  to  that  town  on  the  13th, 
•■IS  the  signal  for  a  preconcerted  retreat,  he  had  pro- 
mised Massena  to  maintain  the  position  for  twenty-four 
hours  longer.*  The  personal  risk  of  the  latter,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  hasty  change  of  position,  would  seem 
to  confirm  this  ;  but  it  is  certain  that,  when  Picton 
was  observed  passing  the  Sierra  de  Anciao  by  a  road 
before  unknown  to  the  French,  and  by  which  the 
second  corps  could  have  been  separated  from  the  army, 
and  the  passes  of  Miranda  de  Corvo  seized,  Ney  would 
have  been  frantic  to  have  delayed  his  movement. 

At  Miranda,  the  long  gatherinor  anger  broke  out  in  a 
violent  altercation  between  the  prince  and  the  marshal, 
and  atCelerco,  Ney,  wishing  tu  fall  back  on  Almeida, 
lo  shorten  the  term  of  the  retreat,  absolutely  refused 
to  concur  in  the  projected  march  to  Coria,  and  even 
moved  his  troops  in  a  contrary  direction.  Massena,  a 
man  not  to  be  opposed  with  impunity,  then  deprived 
him  of  hiscomniand,and  gave  the  sixth  corps  to  Loison. 
Each  marshal  sent  confidential  officers  to  Paris  to 
justity  their  conduct  to  the  emperor,  and  from  both  of 
those  officers  I  have  derived  information,  but  as  each 
thinks  that  the  conduct  of  his  general  was  approved 


•  Generil  Pelet's  Notes.     See  Vol.  xxi.  Victoi'rcs   <'t  Coii- 
qin'.t  ,.T  (Ji  s  I'rai.vf  ais. 

23 


by  Napoleon,  their  opinions  are  irreconcilable  upon 
many  points ;  1  have,  therefore,  set  down  in  the  narra- 
tive the  leading  sentiments  of  each,  without  drawiiijr 
any  other  conclusions  than  those  deducible  from  the 
acknowledged  princi))les  of  art  and  from  unquestioned 
facts.  Thus  judging,  it  appears  that  Massena's  general 
views  were  as  superior  to  Ney's  as  the  latter's  readi- 
ness and  genius  in  the  handling  of  troops  in  action 
were  superior  to  the  prince's.  Yet  the  duke  cf  El- 
chingen  often  played  too  near  the  flame,  whereas 
nothing  could  be  grander  than  the  conceptions  of  Mas- 
sena:  nor  was  the  project  now  meditated  by  him  the 
least  important. 

From  Guarda  to  Zarza  Mayor  and  Coria  was  only 
two  days  march  longer  than  to  Ciudad  Kodrigo,  but 
the  army  of  Portugal  must  have  gone  to  the  latter 
place  a  beaten  army,  seeking  for  refuge  and  succour  in 
its  fortresses  and  reserves,  and  being  separated  from 
the  central  line  of  invasion  :  whereas,  by  gaining 
Coria,  a  great  movement  of  war,  wiping  out  the  notion 
of  a  forced  retreat,  would  have  been  accomplished.  A 
close  and  concentric  direction  would  thus  have  been 
given  to  the  armies  of  the  south,  of  the  centre,  and  cf 
Portugal ;  and  then  a  powerful  demonstration  against 
Lisbon  would  inevitahly  have  brought  lord  Wellington 
back  to  the  Tagus.  Thus  the  conquests  of  the  cam- 
paign, namely,  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  Almeida,  Badajos, 
and  Olivenza,  would  have  been  preserved,  and  mean- 
while the  army  of  the  north  could  have  protected 
Castile  and  menaced  the  frontier  of  Portugal.  Mas- 
sena, having  maturely  considered  this  plan,  gave  or- 
ders, on  the  23d,  for  the  execution,  but  Ney,  as  wh 
have  seen,  thwarted  him.  Meanwhile  the  English 
horse  and  the  militia,  hovering  round  Celerico,  made 
in  different  skirmishes  a  hundred  prisoners  and  killed 
as  many  more,  and  the  French  cavalry  posts  withdrew 
from  the  Pinhel.  The  sixth  corps  then  took  a  posi- 
tion at  Guarda;  the  second  corps  at  Belmonte ;  the 
eighth  corps  and  the  cavalry  in  the  eastern  valleys  of 
the  Eslrella. 

Ney's  insubordination  had  rendered  null  the  plan  of 
marching  upon  the  Elga;  but  Massena  expected  still 
to  maintain  himself  at  Guarda  with  the  aid  of  tho 
army  of  the  south,  and  to  ho'd  open  the  communica- 
tions with  the  king  and  with  Soult.  His  foragers  had 
gathered  provisions  in  the  western  valleys  of  the 
Estrella,  and  he  calculated  upon  being  able  to  keep  his 
position  for  eight  days  with  his  own  force  alone.  And 
independent  of  the  general  advantage,  it  was  essentiat 
to  hold  Guarda  for  some  time,  because  Drouet  had 
permitted  Julian  Sanchez  to  cut  off  a  large  convoy 
destined  for  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  and  had  left  Almeida 
with  only  ten  days'  provisions.  Lord  Wellington';* 
ready  boldness,  however,  disarranged  all  the  prince's 
calculations. 

The  troops  had  come  up  from  Moita  on  the  28th, 
and  with  them  the  reinforcements,  which  were  or- 
ganized as  a  seventh  division.  The  light  division  and 
the  cavalry  then  passed  the  Mondego  at  Celerico,  and 
driving  the  French  out  of  Frexadas,  occupied  the  vil- 
lages beyond  that  place  :  at  the  same  time,  the  mililiij 
took  post  on  the  Pinhel  river,  cuttiuff  the  communica- 
tion with  Aim*  ida,  while  the  third  division  was  estab- 
lished at  Porca  de  Misarella,  half  way  up  the  moun- 
tain, to  secure  the  bridges  over  the  higher  Mondego. 
Early  on  29lh  the  third,  sixth,  and  light  divisions,  and 
two  regiments  of  light  cavalry,  disposed  in  fivecolumn.% 
of  attack  on  a  half  circle  round  the  foot  of  the  CJuarda 
mountain,  ascended  by  as  manv  paths,  all  leading  upon 
the  town  of  Guarda,  and  outflanking  both  the  right 
and  left  of  the  enemy.  They  were  supported  on  onu 
wing  hy  the  militia,  on  the  other  by  the  fifth  division, 
and  in  the  centre  by  the  first  and  seventh  divi^ions. 
A  battle  was  expected,  but  the  absence  of  Ney  was  at 
once  felt  by  both  armies ;  the  appearance  of  the  allied 


338 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XII. 


columns  for  iho  first  lime  threw  the  French  into  the 
greatest  confusion,   and,   without   firing   a    shot,   this 

freat  and  nearly  impregnable  position  was  abandoned. 
lad  the  pursuit  been  as  vigorous  as  the  attack,  it  is 
not  easy  to  see  how  the  second  corps  couhJ  have  re- 
joined Niassena  ;  Reynier,  however,  quilted  Belmonte 
in  tltc  night,  and  recovered  his  communication  with  a 
loss  of  only  three  hundred  prisoners,  although  the 
horse-artillery  and  cavalry  had  been  launched  against 
him  at  daylight  on  the  30th,  and  much  more  could  have 
been  done,  if  general  Slade  had  pushed  his  cavalry  for- 
ward with  tlie  celerity  and  vigour  the  occasion  reqiiired. 
On  the  1st  of  April,  the  allied  army  descended 
the  mountains,  and  reached  the   Coa;  but  the  French 

feneral,  still  anxious  to  maintain  at  once  his  hold  of 
'ortugal  and  the  power  of  operating  either  on  the 
side  cf  Coria  or  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo  and  Almeida,  was 
in  position  on  the  right  bank  of  that  river.  The  sixth 
corps  was  at  Rovina,  with  detachments  guarding  the 
bridge  of  Seceiras  and  the  ford  of  Atalayon,  and  the 
communication  with  Almeida  was  maintained  by  a 
brigade  of  the  ninth  corps,  which  was  posted  near  the 
ford  of  Junca.  The  second  corps  was  on  the  hills 
behind  Sabugal,  stretching  towards  Alfayates,  and 
Jiaving  strong  detachments  at  the  bridge  of  Sabugal 
and  the  ford  of  Rapoulha  de  Coa.  The  eighth  corps 
was  at  Alfayates  ;  and  a  post  was  established  at  Rendo 
to  maintain  the  communication  between  the  second  and 
the  sixth  corps.  In  this  situation,  the  French  army 
was  disposed  on  two  sides  of  a  triangle,  the  apex  of 
which  was  at  Sabugal,  and  both  fronts  were  covered 
by  the  Coa,  because  Sabugal  was  situated  in  a  sharp 
bend  of  the  stream.  By  holding  Alfayatrs,  Massena 
commanded  the  passes  leading  through  St.  Martin 
Tiebeja  to  Coria ;  and  in  the  French  camp  a  notion 
prevailed,  the  allied  divisions  were  scattered  and  might 
be  beaten  in  detail  by  a  sudden  attack  ;  the  disputes 
amongst  the  generals  prevented  this  enterprise,  which 
was  founded  on  false  information,  from  being  at- 
tempted. 

During  the  first  two  days  of  April  lord  Wellington 
occupied  a  line  parallel  to  the  enemy's  right,  which 
could  not  be  attacked   because   the   Coa,   which   is  in 
itself  a  considerable  river,  runs  along  its  whole  course 
in  a  rugged  channel,  which  continually  deepens  as  the  | 
stream  flows.     Trant  and   Wilson    were,  however,  di- 
rected to  pass  below  Almeida,  and  penetrate  between  | 
th>n  fortress  and   Ciudad   Rodrigo,  thus  menacing  the  I 
enemy's   right,   flank,   and    rear,   and    meanwhile  lord  j 
Wellington,  leaving  the  sixth  division  opposite  Nev's ! 
corps  at  Rovina.  and  a  battalion  of  the   seventh   corps  j 
at  the  bridge  of  Seceiras   to  cover  the   left  flank  and  I 
rear  of  the  allies,  prepared  with    the  remainder  of  the; 
army  to  turn  and  attack  the  left  of  the  French  position. ! 
For  this  purpose  at  daylight  on  the  3d  general  Slade's  j 
cavalry  was  directed   to  cross  the  Upper   (^oa,  where! 
the  bed  was  most  practicable,  the  light  division  ordered  ' 
to  ford   the  river  a  little  bi-low,  the  third  division  still  j 
lower,  and   the  fifth    division,    with    the    artillery,    to 
force  the  bridnre  of  Sabugal;  bat  the  first  and  seventh 
civisions,  with  the  exception  of  the  battalion  at  Secei- 1 
ras,  were   held    in  reserve.      Thus  ten  thousand   men 
being  pivoted    upon   the  fifth  division  at  Sabugal  were  I 
destined  to  turn  Reynier's  left,   to   separate   him    from 
the  eighth  corps,  and  to  surround  and  crush  him  before  I 
the  sixth  corps  could  come  from  Rovina  to  his  succour,  j 
One  of  those  accidents  which  arc  frequent  in  war  marred  1 
this  well-concerted  plan. 


COMBAT    OF    SABUGAL. 


The  morning  was  so  foggy,  that  the  troops  could 
not  gain  their  respective  posts  of  attack  with  that 
Bimultaneous  regularity  which  is  so  essential  to  suc- 
cess, and  in  the  light  division  no  measures  were  taken 
by   sir  William  Erskine  to  put  the  columns  in  a  right 


direction,  the  brigades  were  not  even  held  together; 
he  carried  otT  the  cavalry  without  communicating  with 
colonel  Bcckvvith,  and  this  othcer,  who  commanded 
the  first  brigade,  being  without  any  instructions,  halted 
at  a  ford  in  expectation  of  further  orders.  While  thu.i 
waiting  a  staff  officer  rode  up,  and  somewhat  hastily 
asked,  why  he  did  not  attack]  The  thing  appeared 
rash,  but  with  an  enemy  in  his  front,  he  could  make 
no  reply,  wherefore  passing  the  river,  which  was  deep 
and  rapid,  he  mounted  a  very  steep  wooded  hill  on  the 
other  side.  Four  companies  of  the  ninety-fifth  led  up 
in  skirmishing  order,  followed  by  the  forty-third  regi- 
ment, and  meanwhile  the  cacadores  and  the  other 
britrade  having  passed  the  river,  were  moving  inde- 
perTdently  to  the  right,  but  upon  the  true  point  of  di- 
rection, and  they  were  now  distant.  _  A  dark  heavy 
rain  rendered  it  impossible  for  some  time  to  distinguish 
friends  or  foes,  and  the  attack  was  made  too  soon,  for 
owing  to  the  obscurity,  none  of  the  divisions  of  the 
army  had  yet  reached  their  respective  posts.  It  was 
made  also  in  a  partial,  scattered,  and  dangerous  man- 
ner, and  on  the  wrong  point ;  for  Reynier's  whole 
corps  was  directly  in  front,  and  Beckwiih,  having  only 
one  bayonet  regiment  and  four  companies  of  riflemen, 
was  advancing  agninst  more  than  twelve  thousand 
infantry,  supported  by  cavalry  and  artillery. 

Scarcely  had  the  riflemen  reached  the  top  of  the 
hill,  when  a  compact  and  strong  body  of  French 
drove  them  back  upon  the  forty-third,  the  weather 
cleared  at  the  instant,  and  Beckwith  at  once  saw  and  felt 
all  the  danger,  but  his  heart  was  too  big  to  quail  at  it. 
With  one  fierce  charge  he  beat  back  the  enemy,  gained 
and  kept  the  summit  of  the  hill,  although  two  French 
howitzers  poured  showers  of  grape  into  his  ranks, 
and  a  fresh  force  came  against  his  front,  while  consid- 
erable bodies  advanced  on  either  flank.  Fortunately 
Reynier,  little  expecting  to  be  assailed,  had,  for  the 
convenience  of  water,  placed  his  main  body  in  the 
low  ground  behind  the  height  on  which  the  action 
commenced.  His  renewed  attack  was,  therefore,  up 
hill,  yet  his  musketry,  heavy  from  the  beginning,  soon 
increased  to  a  storm,  and  his  men  sprung  up  the  ac- 
clivity with  such  violence  and  clamour,  that  it  was 
evident  nothing  but  the  most  desperate  fighting  could 
save  the  British  from  destruction. 

Captain  Hopkins,  commanding  a  flank  company  of 
the  forty-third,  running  out  to  the  right,  with  admira- 
ble presence  of  mind  seized  a  small  eminence,  close 
to  the  French  guns  and  commanding  the  ascent  up 
which  the  French  troops  who  had  turned  the  right 
flank  were  approaching.  His  fire  was  so  sharp  that 
the  assailants  were  thrown  into  confusion  ;  they  ral- 
lied, but  were  again  disordered  by  the  volleys  of  this 
company,  and  when  a  third  time  tliey  endeavoured  to 
form  a  head  of  attack,  Hopkins  with  a  sudden  charge 
increased  their  disorder,  and  at  the  same  moment 
the  two  battalions  of  the  fifty-second  regiment,  which 
had  been  attracted  by  the  fire,  entered  the  line.  Mean- 
while the  centre  and  left  of  the  forty-third  were  furi- 
ously engaged,  and  wonderfully  excited  ;  for  Beckwith 
wounded  in  the  head,  and  with  the  blood  streaming  dowo 
his  face,  rode  amongst  the  foremost  of  the  skirmishers, 
directing  all  with  ability,  and  praising  the  men,  in  a 
loud  clieerful  tone.  The  musket  bullets  flew  thicker 
and  closer  every  instant,  and  the  fight  became  very 
dangerous ;  but  the  French  fell  fiist,  an<l  a  second 
charge  again  cleared  the  hill.  One  howitzer  was  15*- 
ken  by  the  43d  and  the  skirmishers  were  even  dcsc?i.d- 
ing  towards  the  enemy's  ground  below,  when  small 
bodies  of  cavalry  came  galloping  in  from  all  parts, 
and  obliged  them  to  take  refuge  with  the  main  body, 
which  instantly  reformed  its  line  behind  a  low  stone 
wall.  In  this  state  of  aflairs,  a  French  S(]uadron  of 
dr;igoons  having  Riirmounted  the  ascent,  rode  with  in* 
credible  daring  up  to  the  wall  and  were  in  the  act  of 


1811.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


339 


firinff  over  it  with  pistols,  when  a  rollinjr  volley  laid 
nearly  the  whole  of  them  lifeless  on  the  frrnuiuJ.  By 
this  time  however  a  \c"'  strong  column  of  infmtry 
l);iviniT  rushed  up  the  facc  of  the  hill,  endeavoured  to 
hreiik  in  and  ret.ilre  the  howitzer,  which  was  on  the 
edge  of  the  descent  and  only  fifty  yards  from  the  wall ; 
but  no  man  could  reach  it  and  live,  so  deadly  was 
the  forty-third's  fire.  Meanwhile  two  English  g-iins 
came  into  action,  and  the  5'2d  charging  violently  upon 
•he  flank  of  the  enemy's  infantry,  again  vindicated  the 
possession  of  the  height;  nevertheless  fresh  s.'juadrons 
of  cavalry  which  had  followed  the  infantry  in  the  last 
attack,  seeing  the  52d  men  scattered  by  their  charge, 
flew  upon  them  with  great  briskness,  and  caused 
some  disorder  amongst  the  foremost  skirmishers,  but 
they  were  soon  repulsed. 

Rpynier,  convinced  at  last  that  he  had  acted  un- 
skiirnlly  in  sending  up  his  troops  piece-meal,  now  put 
all  his  reserves,  amounting  to  nearly  six  thousand  in- 
fantry with  artillery  and  cavalry,  in  motion,  and  out- 
flanking the  division  on  its  left,  appeared  resolute  to 
storm  the  contested  height.  But  at  this  critical  pe- 
riod, the  fifth  division  passed  the  bridge  of  Sabugal, 
the  British  cavalry  appeared  on  the  hills  beyond  the 
enemy's  left,  and  general  Colville  with  the  leading 
brigade  of  the  third  division  issuing  out  of  the  woods 
on  lieynier's  right,  opened  a  fire  on  that  flank,  which 
instantly  decided  the  fate  of  the  day.  The  French 
general  fearing  to  be  surrounded  then  hastily  retreated 
upon  Rendo,  where  the  sixth  corps,  which  had  been 
put  in  march  when  the  first  shots  were  heard,  met  liim, 
and  together  they  fell  back  upon  Alfayates,  pursued  by 
the  English  cavalry.  The  loss  of  the  allies  in  this 
bloody  encounter,  which  did  not  last  quite  an  hour, 
was  nearly  two  hundred  killed  and  wounded,  that  of 
the  enemy  was  enormous:  three  hundred  dead  bodies 
were  heaped  together  on  the  hill,  the  greatest  part 
round  the  captured  howitzer,  and  more  than  twelve 
hundred  were  wounded  !  so  unwisely  had  Reynier 
handled  his  ma-ises  and  so  true  and  constant  was  the 
English  fire.  The  principal  causes  of  this  dispropor- 
tion were,  first,  the  heavy  rain  which  gave  the  French 
only  a  partial  view  of  the  British,  and  secondly,  the 
thick  wood  which  ending  near  the  top  of  the  hill,  left 
only  an  open  and  exposed  space  for  the  enemy  to 
mount  after  the  first  attack  ,•  yet  it  was  no  exaggeration 
in  lord  Wellington  to  say,  "that  this  was  one  of  the 
most  glorious  actions  that  British  troops  were  ever 
engiiied  in."* 

'I  he  next  day,  the  light  division  took  the  route  of 
Valdespiiia,  to  feel  for  the  enemy  on  the  side  of  the 
passes  leading  upon  (^oria  ;  Massena  was,  however, 
in  full  retreat  fir  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  and  on  the  5th 
crosseil  the  frontier  of  Portugal,  when  the  vigour  of 
tlie  French  discipline  on  sudden  occasions  was  sur- 
prisingly manifested.  Those  men  who  had  for  months 
been  living  by  rapine,  whose  retreat  had  been  one  con- 
tinned  course  of  violence  and  devastation,  having  now 
passed  an  imai_rinary  line  of  frontier,  became  the  most 
orderly  of  soldiers;  not  the  slightest  rudeness  was 
offered  to  any  Spaniard,  and  every  thing  demanded  was 
6crn))ulously  paid  for,  although  bread  was  sold  at  two 
shillings  a  pound  !  Massena  himself  also,  fierce  and 
t('rril)le  as  he  was  in  Portugal,  always  treated  the 
Spaniards  with  gentleness  and  moderation. 

While  these  events  were  passing  at  Sabtigal,  Trant 
after  parsing  the  Lower  Coa  with  four  thousand  mili- 
tia, had  taken  ]30st  two  miles  from  Almeida.  But  the 
river  suddenly  flooded  behind  him,  all  the  bridges  had 
been  broken  by  Massena,  and  near  fort  Conception, 
there  was  a  brigade  of  the  ninth  corps,  which  had 
been  employed  to  cover  the  march  of  the  battering 
train  from   Almeida  to  Ciudad    Rodri^-o.     In  this  dan- 


gerous situation,  Trant  constructed  a  temporary  hridg;e 
with  great  difficulty  and  was  going  to  retire  on  the  Gth, 
when  he  received  a  letter  from  the  British  head-quar- 
ters, desiring  liirn  to  be  vigilant  in  cutting  the  commu- 
nication with  Almeida,  and  fearless,  because  the  nex* 
morning  a  British  force  would  be  up  to  his  assistance. 
Marching  then  to  Val  de  Mnla,  he  boldly  interposed 
between  the  fortress  and  the  brigade  of  the  ninth 
corps;  hui  the  promised  succours  did  not  appear,  and 
the  still  advancing  French  were  within  half  a  mile  of 
his  position !  His  destruction  appeared  inevitable, 
when  suddenly  two  cannon  shots  were  heard  to  the 
southward,  the  enemy's  troops  formed  squares  in  re- 
treat, and  in  a  few  moments  six  squadrons  of  British 
cavalry  and  captain  Bull's  troop  of  Imrse  artillery, 
came  sweeping  up  the  plain  in  their  rear.  Military 
order  and  coolness,  marked  the  French  retreat  across 
the  'J'urones,  yet  the  cannon  shots  ploughed  with  a 
fearful  effect  through  their  dense  masses,  and  the 
horsemen  continually  flanked  their  line  of  niarcli  :  they 
however  gained  the  rough  ground,  and  finally  escaped 
over  the  Agueda  by  Barba  del  Puerco,  but  with  the 
loss  of  three  hundred  men  killed,  wounded,  and  prison- 
ers. Trant  was  thus  saved  as  it  were  by  a  miracle  ; 
for  some  unexpected  accident  having  prevented  the 
English  infantry  from  marching  in  the  inorning,  accor- 
ding to  lord  Wellington's  promise,  he  had  pushed  on 
this  cavalry,  which  would  have  been  useless  an  hour 
later. 

The  prince  of  EsHng  had  reached  Ciudad  Rodrigo 
two  days  before  this  event,  and  lord  Wellington  now 
stood  victorious  on  the  confines  of  Portugal,  having 
executed  what  to  others  appeared  incredibly  rash  and 
vain  even  to  attempt. 


*  Official  Despatch. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Estimate  of  the  F'rench  loss — Anecdote,  of  Colonel  Waters- 
Lord  Weiling'ton's  great  conceptions  explained — H'.nv  im- 
peded— Artairs  in  the  south  of  Spain—  Formation  of  tlie 
fourth  and  fifth  Spanish  armies — Sieg;e  of  Canipo  Mayor — 
Place  tails — Kxcellsnt  con;iuct  of  Mijor  Tallaia — BeresforH 
surprises  Moiitbrun — Combat  of  Cavalry — Canipo  Mayor 
recovered — Beresford  takes  cantonments  round  Elvas  -His 
difficulties — Reflections  upon  his  proceedings — He  throws  a 
bridge  near  Jernmenha  and  passes  the  Guadiana — Outpost 
of  cavalry  cut  od'  by  tlie  French — Castauos  arrives  at  i'lvas — 
Arrangements  relative  to  the  chief  comnian;!  —  l^eresford 
advances  against  Latour  Maubourg,  who  returns  to  Llerena — 
Genera!  Cole  takes  Olivenza— Cavalry-skirmish  near  Usagrc 
— Lord  Wellington  arrives  at  Elvas,  examines  Barlajos — 
Skirmish  there — Arranges  the  operations — Political  difiicul- 
ties — Lord  VVt'Hino;ton  returns  to  the  Agueda — Operations 
in  the  north^Skirniishes  on  tlie  Agueda — Massena  advances 
to  Ciudad  Rodrigo — Lord  Wellington  reaches  the  ainiy — 
Retires  behind  the  Dos  Casas — Combat  of  Fuentes  Onoro — 
Battle  of  Fuentes  Onoro — Evacuation  of  Ahneida. 

Massena  entered  Portugal  with  sixty-five  thousand 
men,  his  reinforcements  while  at  Santareiri  were  about 
ten  thousand,  and  he  repassed  the  frontier  with  fiirty- 
five  thousand  ;  hence  the  invasion  of  Portugal  cost  hini 
about  thirty  thousand  men,  of  which  fourteen  thousand 
might  have  fallen  by  the  sword  or  been  taken.  Not 
more  than  six  thousand  were  lost  during  the  retreat ; 
but  had  lord  Wellington,  unrestrained  by  political  con- 
siderations, attacked  him  vigorously  at  Redinha,  Con- 
deixa,  Casal  Nova,  and  Miranda  de  Corvo,  half  liie 
French  army  would  have  been  lost.  It  is  unquestion- 
able that  a  retreating  army  should  fight  as  little  as 
possible. 

When  the  French  reached  the  Agueda,  their  cavalry 
detachinents,  heavy  artillery,  and  convalescents,  aoain 
augmented  the  army  to  more  than  fifty  thousand  men, 
but  the  fatigues  of  the  retreat  and  the  want  of  iinivls- 
ions,  would   not  suffer  them  to   shew   a  front  to  the 


340 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  Xll. 


lilies;  wherpforp,  -fiwinnr  two  hundrod  thousand  ra- 
tions from  Ciudad,  they  fell  back  to  Salamanca,  and 
lord  Wellinirton  invested  Almeida.  The  liirht  division 
occupied  Gallegos  and  Espeja,  the  rest  of  ihe  army 
were  disposed  in  villages  on  both  sides  of  the  Coa, 
and  the  head  quarters  were  transferred  to  Villa  For- 
mosa. Here  colonel  Waters,  who  had  been  taken 
near  Belmonte  during  th.e  retreat,  rejoined  the  army. 
Confident  in  his  own  resources,  he  had  refused  his 
parole,  and,  when  carried  to  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  rashly 
mentioned  his  intention  of  escaping  to  the  Spaniard 
in  whose  house  he  was  lodged.  This  man  betrayed 
him,  but  a  servant,  detesting  his  master's  treachery, 
secretly  offered  his  aid;  Waters  only  desired  him  to 
get  the  rowels  of  his  spurs  sharpened,  and  when  the 
French  army  was  near  Salamanci,  he  being  in  the 
custody  of  gejis  (Tarmet,  wailed  until  their  chief,  who 
rode  the  only  good  horse  in  the  party,  had  aliijhtpd, 
then  givinor  the  spur  to  his  own  benst,  (jalloped  off! 
an  act  of  incredible  resolution  and  hardihood,  for  he 
was  on  a  large  plain,  and  before  him,  and  for  miles 
behind  him.  the  road  was  covered  with  the  French 
columns.  His  hat  fell  off,  and,  thus  distinguished,  he 
ode  along  the  flank  of  the  troops,  some  encouratjing 
him,  others  firing  at  him,  and  the  o-e/is  d''armts,  sword 
n  hand,  close  at  bis  heels  ;  nevertheless  he  broke  at 
'jU  speed,  between  two  columns,  gained  a  wooded 
•oiow.  and,  having  baffled  his  pursuers,  evaded  the 
ear  of  the  enemy's  army.  The  third  day  he  reached 
lead-quarters,  where  lord  Wellinnrion  had  caused  his 
Dajgage  to  be  brought,  observing  tiiat  he  would  not 
be  lonir  absent ! 

Massena,  having  occupied  Salamanca,  and   commu- 
nicated with   Bessieres,  sent  a  convoy  to  Ciudad   Ro- 
dn^o,  and  lord  Wellington  was  unable  to  prevent  its 
entrance.     He    had    sent   the    mililia  to  their  homes, 
disposed   his   army   between  the  Coa  and  the  Agueda, 
and  blockaded  Almeida  ;  he  also  caused  two  temporary 
bridires  to  be  laid   (where   the  road  from  Cinco  Villas; 
to  Pinhel  across  the  Coa)   to  secure  a  retreat  for  the  I 
troops  on   that  side,  if  pressed,  which    might  easily' 
happen;  for  the  Portuguese  army  was  in  a  dreadful  j 
state,  and  the  continued   misconduct  of  the  Regency, ' 
and  the  absolute  want  of  money,    gave  little   hope   of  j 
amelioration.     It  was  therefore  impossible  to  take  a  I 
position  beyond  the  Agueda.  I 

The   depots  were   now  re-established  at  Lamego  on  i 
the  Dourn,   and   at  Raiva  on  the  Mondeijo,  and  maga-  \ 
zines  of  consumption  were  formed  at  Celerico,  from 
whence  the  mule-brigades  brought  up  the  provisions  by 
the  way  of  Castello  Bom.     Measures  were  also  taken 
at  Guarda,  Pena  .Macor,  and  Castello  Branco,   to  form 
commissariat  establishments  which  were  to  be  supplied 
from  Abrantes  ;  but  the  transport  of  stores  was  difficult, 
and  this  consideration,  comliined  wiih   the  cipricious 
nature  of  ibe  Agueda  and  Coa,  rende-cd   it  dangerous 
to   blockade  both   Ciudad   Rodrigo  and  Almeida;   see-' 
ing  that  ih"  troops  woald  have  those  rivers  behind  them, 
while  the  position  itself  would  be  weak  and  extended. 
The    blockade  of    Almeida    was  undertaken  because, 
from    intercepted    letters    and    other    sources,    it    was 
known  to  have  provisions  only  for  a  fortnight,  but  lord 
Wellington   was  prepared  to  relinquish  it  if  pressed, ! 
because  it  formed  no  part  of  the  plan  which  he  con- 
templated. 

The  success  in  Portugal  had  given  stability  to  the 
E.iiilish  ini'iisters,  and  it  would  appear  that  they  were; 
satisfied,  and  at  first  meant  to  limit  theit  future  efforts' 
to  the  defence  of  tha'  country,  for  lord  Liverpool  now 
required  the  return  of  many  battalions.  But  offensive 
warfare  in  Spain,  occupied  the  general's  thoughts,  and 
two  lines  of  operation  had  presented  themselves  to 
his   mind.*      1.   Under  the  supposition  that  it  would 


•  Lord  Welliu^toulo  Ljrd  LiverpD  »1,  Ma;r  7th,  1810.  MSS. 


be  long  ere  Massena  could  again  make  any  s;»!;.',ii9 
attempt  on  Portugal,  to  remain  on  the  defensiv*-  lit 
Beira,  and  march  ajainst  the  army  of  the  South  to 
raise  the  siege  of  Cadix.  2.  If  Almeida  fell  to  the 
blockade,  to  besiege  (Ciudad  Rodrigo;  if  Almeida  did 
not  so  fall,  to  besiege  both  together;  if  they  were 
taken,  to  march  at  once  into  the  heart  of  S-'pain.  and 
open  a  communication  with  Valencia  and  with  the  army 
of  Sicily.  This  great  and  lofty  conception  would 
have  delivered  Andalusia  as  certainly  as  any  dire-jt 
operation  ;  for  thus  Madrid,  the  great  dep  t  of  the 
French,  would  have  been  taken,  the  northern  and 
southern  armies  cut  asunder,  and  the  English  bape 
momentarily  fixed  on  the  Mediterranean  coast ;  thea 
the  whole  of  the  Spanish  and  British  force  could  have 
been  concentrated,  and  one  or  two  great  battles  mxx^l 
have  decided  the  fate  of  Spain. 

Filled  with  this  grand  project  lord  Wellington  de- 
manded reinforcements  from  F]ngland,  and  leave  to 
carry  his  designs  into  execution,  if  occasion  offered  : 
yet  he  checked  his  secret  aspirations,  when  reflecting 
upon  the  national  pride  and  perverseness  of  the 
Spaniards,  on  their  uncertain  proceedings,  and  the 
great  difficulty,  if  not  impossibility,  of  ensuring  any 
reasonable  concert  and  assistance.  When  to  this  he 
added  the  bad  disposition  of  the  Portuguese  Regency, 
and  the  timid  temper  of  the  English  ministers,  so 
many  jarring  elements  were  presented  that  he  could 
make  no  fixed  combinations.  Nevertheless,  maturing 
the  leading  points  of  action  in  his  own  mind,  he  re- 
solved to  keep  them  in  view,  adapting  his  proceedings 
to  circumstances  as  they  should  arise. 

His  projects  were  however  necessarily  conditional, 
because  if  Napoleon  reinforced  his  armies  again,  new 
combinations  would  be  created  ;  and  before  any  oth<T 
measure,  it  was  essential  to  recapture  Badajos.  The 
loss  of  that  place  had  affected  the  safety  of  (,'adiz,  and 
it  interfered  with  the  execution  of  both  the  above  men- 
tioned plans,  and  with  the  sa'ety  of  Portugal,  by 
enabling  the  enemy  to  besienfe  Elvas.  So  deeply  and 
sagaciously,  however,  had  the  English  general  probed 
the  nature  of  the  contest,  that  we  shall  find  his  after 
operations  strictly  conformable  to  these  his  first  concep- 
tions, and  always  successful. 

.Judging  now  that  Massena  would  be  unable  to  in- 
terrupt the  blockade  of  Almeida  lord  Wellington  left 
the  command  of  the  northern  army  to  general  Spenc  r, 
and  departed  for  the  Alemtejo,  where  Beresford  was 
operating:  but,  as  this  was  one  of  the  most  critical 
periods  of  the  war,  it  is  essential  to  have  a  clear  notion 
of  the  true  state  of  affairs  in  the  South,  at  the  moment 
when  Beresford  commenced  his  memorable  catnpnign. 

Soult  returned  to  Andalusia  immediately  after  t!:e 
fall  of  Badajos,  leaving  Mortier  to  besiege  Campo 
Mayor.  His  arrival  at  Seville  and  the  fame  of  his 
successes  restored  tranquillity  in  that  province,  and 
confidence  amongst  the  troops.  Both  had  been  so  grie- 
vously shaken  by  the  battle  of  Barosa,  that  t!ie  works 
of  Arcos,  Lucar,  Medina,  and  Alcalade  Gazules,  in- 
tended to  defend  the  rear  of  the  first  corps,  had  been 
stopped,  and  the  utmost  despondency  prevailed.* 
However  discontent  and  gloom  also  prevailed  in  Ca- 
diz.j"  The  government  had  for  some  days  pretended 
to  make  a  fresh  effort  against  Victor,  hut  as  the  fall 
of  Badajos  menaced  the  city  with  famine,  Zayas  was 
finally  detached  with  six  thousand  infantry  and  four 
hundred  cavalry  to  Huelva.  His  object  was  to  gather 
provisions  in  the  Coiida  de  Neibla,  where  Ballasteros 
had,  on  the  10th  of  March,  surprised  and  dispersed 
Remond's  detachment.  The  P'rench  were  however 
soon  reinforced,  Zayas  was  checked  by  D'Aremberg, 

*  Intercepted  Letter  from  Chief  of  Eugineers,  Garbc,  March 

2.^th. 

+  OlTicial  Abstract  of  Military  Ilcjiorts,  fioui  Cu  lii,  1811 
MSS. 


1811J 


NAPIKR'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


34 


and,  as  many  of  his  men  deserted  to  Ballasteros,  he 
withdrew  the  rest.  Blake  then  assumed  the  command, 
Ballasteros  and  Copoiis  were  placed  under  his  orders, 
and  the  united  corps,  amounting  to  eleven  thousand 
infantry  and  twelve  hundred  cavalry,  were  called  the 
fourth  army.  Meanwhile  Mendizahal  rallying  the 
fucjitives  from  the  battle  of  the  Gebora,  at  Villa  Vi- 
ciosn,  reorganized  a  weak  corps,  called  i\\ii  fifth  army. 
During  these  proceedings,  Mortier  had  occupied 
Albuquerque  and  Valencia  d' Alcantara,  and  carried 
on  the  siege  of  Campo  Mayor,  This  fortress  being 
commanded,  at  four  hundred  yards  distance,  by  a  hill, 
on  which  there  was  an  abandoned  horn-work,  would 
have  fallen  at  onc^,  but  for  the  courage  and  talents  of 
major  Tallaia,  a  Portuguese  engineer.  With  only  two 
luindr?d  men,  and  five  mounted  guns,  he  made  such 
skilful  dispositions,  that  the  French  opened  regular 
trenches,  haltered  the  wall  in  breach  with  six  guns, 
bombarded  the  palace  with  eleven  mortars,  and  pushed 
a  sap  to  the  crest  of  the  glacis.  At  the  end  of  five 
days  a  breach  was  made,  but  Tallaia,  although  ill 
seconded  by  the  garrison,  repulsed  one  partial  assault, 
and,  bping  summoned  for  the  second  time,  demanded 
and  obtained  twenty-four  hours  to  wait  for  succour. 
None  arrived,  and  this  brave  man  surrendered  the  21st 
uf  March.  Mortier  then  returned  to  the  Guadiana. 
leaving  Latour  Maubourg  to  dismantle  the  works  and 
renove  the  artillery  and  stores  to  Badajos. 

Such  was  the  posture  of  affairs  when  Beresford, 
who  had  quitted  the  northern  army  after  the  combat 
of  Foz  d'Aronce,  arrived  at  Portalagre  with  twenty 
thousand  infantry,  two  thousand  cavalry,  and  eighteen 
guns.  His  instructions  were  to  relieve  Campo  Mayor, 
and  to  besiege  Olivenza  and  Badajos.  The  first  had 
already  surrendered,  but  the  marshal,  being  within  two 
marches  of  it,  judged  that  he  might  surprise  the  be- 
sieging corps,  and,  with  this  view,  put  his  troops  in 
motion. 

COMBAT    OF    CAMPO    MAYOR. 

In  the  morninsT  of  the  25th  the  advanced  guard  of 
cavalry,  supported  at  some  distance  by  a  detachment 
of  infantry  under  colonel  Colborne,  came  suddenly 
upon  Campo  Mayor.  Latour  Maubourg  was  marching 
out  in  confusion,  with  nearly  nine  hundred  cavalry, 
three  battalions  of  infanti-y,  some  horse  artillery  and 
the  battering  train  of  sixteen  guns.  The  P^nglish 
cavalry  under  general  Lonfc;  immediately  turned  the 
town  by  the  left,  and  the  French  retreated  by  the  Ba- 
dajos road.  The  allies  following  alonsj  some  gentle 
slopes,  then  formed  a  half  circle  round  their  enemy, 
who  was  now  on  a  fine  plain,  and  colonel  Colborne, 
although  still  at  a  considerable  distance,  was  coming 
up  at  a  running  pace,  followed  by  the  rest  of  the  second 
division.  In  this  state  of  affairs,  the  French  infantry 
halted  in  square,  with  their  cavalry  both  before  and 
behind  them.  General  Long,  who  had  brought  up  the 
thirteenth  dragoons,  and  some  Portuguese  squadrons, 
the  heavy  cavalry  being  in  reserve,  then  ordered  the 
farmer  to  attack. 

Colonel  Head  immediately  led  the  thirteenth  for- 
ward, the  French  hussars  as  readily  rode  out  from  their 
infantry  and  with  loose  reins  the  two  bodies  came 
fiercely  together.  Many  men  were  dismounted  by  the 
shock,  but  the  combatants  pierced  clear  through  on 
both  sides,  then  re-formed  and  again  charged  in  the 
same  fearful  manner !  The  fighting  now  became  despe- 
rate, until  Head's  troopers  riding  closely  together, 
overthrew  horse  and  man,  and  finally  forced  the  enemy 
to  fly.  The  French  square  fired  upon  the  victorious 
squadrons,  but  the  latter  without  flinching,  galloped 
past  the  long  line  of  the  convoy,  hewed  down  the 
gunners,  aivl  being  joined  by  the  Portuguese,  the 
hussars  sti  1  fi<jhiing  here  and  there  in  email  bodies, 
continued  the  pursuit.     They  thought  with  reason  that 


the  heavy  dragoons,  the  artillery,  and  the  infantry, 
some  of  which  were  close  up,  would  be  sufficient  to 
dispose  of  whatever  part  of  the  enemy's  force  was 
thus  passed.  But  marshal  Beresford  would  not  suffer 
the  heavy  dragoons  to  charge  ;  he  would  not  suffer 
more  than  two  guns  to  be  brought  up  when  he  might 
have  had  six;  he  would  not  suffer  those  two  guns  to 
fire  more  than  a  few  rounds  ;  and  the  French  marching 
steadily  onward,  recovered  their  battering  train,  and 
effected  their  retreat  in  safety  !  Meanwhile  the  thir- 
teenth and  the  Portuguese,  having  pusiied  on  even 
to  the  bridife  of  Badajos,  were  repulsed  by  the  guns 
of  that  fortress,  and  being  followed  by  Mortier  in 
person,  and  met  by  the  retiring  square,  and  by  all  of 
the  beaten  cavalry  who  could  find  refuge  with  it,  lost 
some  prisoners.  Of  the  allies  one  hundred  men  were 
killed  or  hurt,  and  above  seventy  taken.  Of  the  enemy 
about  three  hundred  suffered,  one  howitzer  was  cap- 
tured, and  the  French  colonel  Chamorin  was  slain  in 
single  combat  by  a  trooper  of  the  thirteenth. 

To  frofit  from  sudden  opportunities,  a  general  must 
be  condantly  loith  his  advanced  i^wird  in  an  offensive 
movement.  When  this  combat  commenced,  Beresford 
was  with  the  main  body,  and  baron  Trip,  a  staff-officer, 
deceived  by  appearancfS,  informed  him,  that  the  thir- 
teenth had  been  cut  off.  Hence  the  marshal,  anxious 
to  save  his  cavalrv,  which  he  knew  could  not  be  rein- 
forced, would  not  follow  up  the  first  blow,  observing 
that  the  loss  of  one  regiment  was  enough.  But  the 
retriment  was  not  lost,  the  country  was  open  and 
plain,  the  enemy's  force  and  the  exact  posture  of  af- 
fairs easy  to  be  discerned  ;  and  although  the  thirteenth 
were  severely  reprimanded,  for  having  pursued  so 
eagerly  without  orders,  the  unsparing  admiration  of 
the  whole  army  consoled  them. 

Campo  Mayor  was  thus  recovered  so  suddenly,  that 
the  French  left  eight  thousand  rations  of  bread  in  the 
marrazines  ;  and  they  also  evacuated  Albuquerque  and 
Valencia  d'Alcantara,  being  infinitely  dismayed  by  the 
appearance  of  so  powerful  an  army  in  the  south  :  indeed, 
so  secretly  and  promptly  had  lord  Wellington  assem- 
bled it,  that  its  existence  was  only  known  to  the  enemy 
by  the  blow  at  Campo  Mayor.  But,  to  profit  from 
such  able  dispositions,  it  was  necessary  to  be  as  rapid 
in  execution,  giving  the  enemy  no  time  to  recover  from 
his  first  surprise  ;  and  this  was  the  more  essential, 
because  the  breach  of  Badajos  was  not  closed,  nor  the 
trenches  obliterated,  nor  the  exhausted  magazines  and 
stores  replenished.  Soult  had  carried  away  six  bat- 
talions and  a  regiment  of  cavalry,  four  hundred  men 
had  been  thrown  into  Olivenza,  three  thousand  into 
Badajos;  and  thus,  including  the  los^ses  sustained  du- 
riiig  the  operations,  Mortier's  numbers  were  reduced 
to  less  than  ten  thousand  men.  He  could  therefore 
not  have  maintained  the  line  of  the  Guadiana  and  col- 
lected provisions  also.  Beresford  should  have  in- 
stantly marched  upon  Merida,  driven  back  the  fifth 
corns,  and  opened  a  Oesh  communication  by  Jerumen- 
h a  "with  Elvas;  the  fall  of  Badajos  would  then  have 
been  inevitable.  The  confusion  occasioned  by  the  sud- 
den appearance  of  the  army  at  Campo  Mayor  and  the 
moral  impression  produced  by  the  charge  of  the  thir- 
teenth dragoons,  guaranteed  the  success  of  this  march  ; 
the  English  general  might  even  have  passed  the  river 
at  MerFda  before  Mortier  could  have  ascertained  his 
object. 

Beresford,  neglecting  this  happy  opportunity,  put 
his  troops  into  quarters  round  Klvas,  induced  tben-to 
by  the  faticrue  and  wants  of  the  soldiers,  esjiecially 
those  of  the  fourth  division,  who  had  been  marching 
incessantly  since  the  Gth  of  the  month,  and  were  bare- 
footed and  exhausted. 

He  had  been  instructed,  by  lord  Wellington,  to  throw 
a  bridge  over  the  Guadiana  at  Jerumenha,  to  push 
back  the  fifth  corps,  and  to  invest  Olivenza  and  Dada* 


342 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XII. 


jos.  The  Portuguese  fjovernment  were  to  have  provi- 
ded some  of  the  means  for  these  operations,  and  a 
report  had  been  made,  to  the  effect,  that  all  things 
necessary,  thai  is  to  say,  that  provisions,  shoes,  batter- 
intr-prnns,  ammunition,  and  transport  wore  actually 
collected  ;  that  the  Guadiana  abounded  in  serviceable 
craft;  that  twenlv  lar^e  boats,  formerly  helontjinir  to 
Cuesta,  which  had  been  brought  away  from  Badajos 
before  the  sieire,  were  at  Elvas;  and  that  all  other  ne- 
cessaries would  be  sent  from  Lisbon.  It  now  appeared 
that  no  mafr;izin<^s  of  provisions  or  stores  were  prepared  ; 
that  very  little  transp-^rt  was  provided  ;  that  only  five  of 
Cuesta's  boats  bad  been  brouprht  from  Badajos;  that 
there  was  no  serviceable  craft  on  the  river,  and  that 
some  small  pontoons,  sent  from  Lisbon,  were  unfit  to 
bear  the  force  of  the  current,  or  to  sustain  the  passage 
of  guns.  Tho  countrv,  also,  was  so  deficient  in  provis- 
ions, that  the  garrison  stores  of  Elvas  were  taken  to 
feed   the  army. 

All  these  circumstances  combined  to  point  out  Me- 
rida  as  the  true  line  of  operations  ;  moreover,  plenty  of 
food  was  to  be  had  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Guadiana, 
and  the  measures  necessary  to  remedy  the  evil  state 
of  affairs  on  the  right  bnnk,  did  not  require  the  pres- 
ence of  an  army  to  protect  them.  The  great  distress 
of  the  fourth  division  for  shoes,  alone  otfered  any 
serious  obstacle;  but,  under  the  circumstances,  it 
would  not  have  been  too  much  to  expect  a  momentary 
pffort  from  such  an  excellent  division,  and  it  might 
williout  danger  even  have  been  left  behind. 

Marshal  Beresford  preferred  hailing  until  he  could 
procure  the  means  of  passing  at  .Terumenha,  an  error 
that  may  be  considered  as  the  principal  cause  of  those 
long  and  bloody  operations  which  afterwards  detained 
lord  Wellington  more  than  a  year  on  the  frontiers  of 
Portugal.  For,  during  Beresford's  delay,  general  Phil- 
iipon,  one  of  the  ablest  governors  that  ever  defended 
a  fortress,  levelled  the  trenches,  restored  the  glacis, 
and  stopped  the  breach  ;  and  Latour  Maul)our2',  who 
nad  succeeded  Mortier  in  command  of  the  troops, 
covered  the  country  with  foraging  parties,  and  filled 
the  magazines. 

Captain  Squire,  of  the  engineers,  undertook  to  bridge 
the  Guadiana  under  .Terumenha.  He  fixed  trestle- 
piers  on  each  side  in  the  shallows,  and  connected  them 
with  the  five  Spanish  boats  and  a  squadron  of  cavalry 
was  secretly  passed  over,  by  a  ford,  to  protect  the 
workmen  from  surprise.  The  3d  of  April,  the  bridge 
was  finished,  and  the  troops  assembled  during  the 
night  in  the  woods  near  .Terumenha,  intending  to  cross 
at  daylight,  but  the  river  suddenly  swelling,  swept 
away  the  trestles,  rendered  the  ford  impassalile,  and 
stopped  the  ojicrations.  No  more  materials  could  be 
immediately  procured,  the  Spanish  boats  were  therefore 
converted  into  flying  bridgrps  for  the  cavalry  and  artil- 
lery, and  Squire  constructed  a  slight  narrow  bridge  tor 
infantry  with  the  pontoons  and  with  casks  taken  from 
the  neighbouriiKjf  villages.  To  cover  this  operation  a 
battalion  was  added  to  the  squadron  already  on  the  left 
bank,  and  the  army  commenced  passing  the  5ih  of 
April ;  but  it  was  late  in  the  night  of  the  Gth,  ere  the 
wliole  had  crossed  and  taken  up  ihr'ir  position,  which 
was  on  a  strong  range  of  hills,  covered  by  a  swampy 
rivulet. 

During  this  time,  Tiatour  Maubourg  was  so  entirely 
occupied  in  sennring  and  provisioning  Badajos,  tirat 
his  foragers  were  extended  fifty  miles  lo  the  rear,  and  lie 
took  no  notice  whatever  of  Beresford's  proceedings. 
This  error  savoured  rather  of  the  Spanish  than  of  the 
French  nunhorl  of  making  war;  fi^r  it  is  evident  that 
a  moveable  column  of  five    thousand    infantry,    with 

§uns  and  cavalry,  could,  notwilhslanding  the  guns  of 
erumenha,  have  easily  cut  off  the  small  detachment 
cf  the  Hritish  on  the  left  bank,  and  thus  have  com- 
pletely frustrated  the  operations.     The  allied  troops, 


being  so  numerous,  should  have  bein  carried  over 
in  the  boats,  and  entrenched  on  the  other  side  in 
sufficient  force  to  resist  any  attack  before  the  construc- 
tion of  the  bridge  was  attempted.  It  is  not  eas}'  to  say 
which  gen<^ral  acted  with  the  most  imprudence  ;  Latour 
Maubourg  in  neglecting,  or  Beresford  in  unnecessarily 
tempting  fortune. 

When  the  British  were  in  possession  of  the  left  bank, 
the  French  general  awaking,  collected  three  thousand 
infantry,  five  hundred  cavalry,  and  four  guns  at  Oli- 
venza,  whence  he  inarched,  at  daylight  on  the  7ih,  to 
oppose  a  passage  which  had  been  complet^'d  the  day 
before.  He,  however,  surprised  a  squadron  of  the 
thirteenth,  which  was  in  front,  and  then  came  so  cIos« 
up  to  the  main  body  as  to  exchange  shots  ;  yet  he  waj 
permitted  to  retire  unmolested,  in  the  face  of  more 
than  twenty  thousand  men  ! 

During  these  proceedings,  the  fifth  Spanish  army  le- 
occupied  Valencia  d'Alcantara  and  Albuquerque,  and 
pushed  cavalry  posts  to  La  Rocca  and  Montijo,  Balias- 
teros  entered  Fregenal,  and  Oastafios,  who  was  ap- 
pointed to  command  in  Gallicia  as  well  as  Estremadu- 
ra,  arrived  at  Elvas.  'I'his  general  was  in  friendly 
intercourse  with  Beresford,  but  had  a  prudje  against 
Blake.  At  first,  he  pretended  to  the  chief  authority, 
as  the  elder  captain-general  ;  Blake  demanded  a  like 
power  over  Beresford,  who  was  not  disposed  to  admit 
the  claim.  Now  Castanos,  having  little  liking  for  a 
command  under  such  difficult  circumstances,  and  being 
desirous  to  thwart  Blake,  and  fearful  lest  Beresford 
should,  under  these  circumstances,  refuse  to  pass  the 
Guadiana,  arranged,  that  he  who  brought  the  greatest 
force  in  the  field  should  be  generalissimo.  Thus  the 
inferior  officer  commanded  in  chief. 

To  cover  his  bridges,  which  he  reconstructed  in  a 
more  substantial  manner,  Beresford  dirpcted  extensive 
entrenchments  to  be  executed  by  the  militia  from  Elvas, 
and  then  leaving  a  strong  detachment  for  t.ieir  protec- 
tion, advanced  with  the  remainder  of  the  army.  Latour 
Maubourg  retired  upon  Albuera,  and  the  allies,  who 
had  been  joined  by  Madden's  cavalry,  summoned 
Olivenza  on  the  9th.  Beresford  apparently  expected 
no  defence  ;  for  it  was  not  until  after  the  governor  had 
rejected  the  summons  that  he  sent  major  Dickson  to 
Elvas  to  prepare  a  battery  train  for  the  siege.  Mean- 
while the  army  encamped  round  the  place,  the  com- 
munication with  Ballasteros  was  opened,  and  Castanoa 
advancing  with  the  fifth  army  to  Merida  pushed  his 
cavalry  to  Almendralejos.  'I'he  French  then  fell  back 
to  lilerena,  and  Beresford,  leaving  general  Cole  with 
the  fourth  division  and  Madden's  cavalry  to  besiege 
Olivenza,  tfiok  post  himself  at  Albuera  on  the  lllh. 
In  this  position  he  communicated  by  his  left  with 
('astaiios,  and  by  spreading  his  horsemen  in  front  cut 
off  all  comrfiunication  with  Badajos.  'J'he  army  now 
lived  on  the  resources  of  the  country,  and  a  biigado 
was  sent  to  Talavera  Real  to  collect  supplies. 

The  14th,  six  twenty-four  po\inders  reached  Oliven- 
za, and,  being  placed  in  a  battery  constructed  on  an 
abandoned  horn-work  formerly  noticed,  played  with 
such  success,  that  the  breach  became  practicable  before 
the  morning  of  the  15th.  Some  riflemen  posted  in  the 
vineyards  kept  down  the  fire  of  the  place,  and  the  gar- 
rison, consisting  of  three  hundred  and  eighty  men, 
with  fifteen  guns,  surrendered  at  discretion. 

(>ole  was  immediately  directed  upon  '/afra  by  the 
road  of  Almendral.  Beresford,  who  had  recalled  the 
brigade  from  Talavera,  was  already  in  motion  for  the 
same  place  by  the  royal  causeway.  His  object  was  to 
drive  Latour  Maubourg  over  the  Morena,  and  cut  off 
general  Maransin.  The  latter  general,  who  had  been 
in  pursuit  of  Ballasteros  ever  since  the  retreat  of 
Zayas,  and  had  defeated  him  at  Fregenal  on  the  l'2th 
was  following  up  his  victory  towards  Salvatierra.  The 
allies  were  therefore  close  upon   him,  but  an   alcalti) 


1811.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


•?43 


pave  Iiim  notice  of  their  approach,  and  he  retreated  in 
safety.  Meanwliile  two  French  reo;iinents  of  cavalry, 
advancinor  from  Llerena  to  collect  contributions,  reach- 
ed Los  Santos,  between  which  place  and  Usafjre  they 
were  charcred  bv  the  thirteenth  dranroons,  and  followed 
for  six  miles  so  vigorously  that  one  hundred  and  fifty 
were  killed  or  taken,  without  the  loss  of  a  man  on  the 
part  of  the  pursuers. 

On  the  IGth  (jeneral  Cole  arrived  from  Olivenza,  and 
the  whole  army  being  thus  concentrated  about  Zafra, 
Latour  M;mbourg  retired  on  the  18th  to  Guadalcanal; 
the  Spanish  cavalry  then  occupied  Llerena,  and  the 
resources  of  Estremadura  were  wholly  at  the  service 
oi"  the  allies.  During  these  operations,  general  Charles 
Alten,  coming  from  Lisbon  with  a  brigade  of  German 
light  Inf  iiitry.  reached  Olivenza,  and  lord  Wellington 
also  arrived  at  Elvas,  where  Beresford,  after  drawing 
his  infantry  nearer  to  Badajos,  went  to  meet  him.  The 
presence  of  the  general-in-chief  was  very  agreeable  to 
the  troops  ;  they  had  seen,  with  surprise,  great  masses 
put  in  motion  without  any  adequate  results,  and  thought 
the  operations  had  been  slow,  without  being  prudent. 
The  whole  army  was  over  the  Guadiana  on  the  7th, 
and,  including  the  vSpaniards  from  Montijo,  Beresford 
commanded  at  least  twenty-five  thousand  men,  whereas 
Latour  Maubourg  never  had  more  than  ten  thousand, 
many  of  whom  were  dispersed  foraging,  far  and  wide  : 
yet  the  French  general,  wiihout  displaying  much  skill, 
had  maintaiupd  himself  in  Estremadura  for  ten  days  ; 
and  during  tliis  time,  no  corps  being  employed  to  con- 
strain the  garrison  of  Badajos,  the  governor  continued 
to  bring  in  timber  and  other  materials  for  the  defence, 
at  his  pleasure. 

Lord  VV'ellington  arrived  the  21st.  The  22d,  he 
forded  the  Guadiana  just  below  the  mouth  of  the 
Ca3'a  with  Madden's  cavalry  and  Allen's  Germans, 
and  pushed  close  up  to  Badajos.  A  convoy,  escorted 
by  some  infmtry  and  cavalry,  was  coming  in  frorri  the 
country,  and  an  effort  was  made  to  cut  it  off ;  but  the 
governor  sallied,  the  allies  lost  a  hundred  men,  and 
the  convoy  reached  the  town. 

Lord  Wellington,  now  considering  that  Soult  would 
certainly  endeavour  to  disturb  the  siege  with  a  consi- 
derable force,  demanded  the  assent  of  the  Spanish 
generals  to  the  following  plan  of  combined  operations, 
before  he  would  commence  the  inv(  stment  of  the  place. 
1.  That  Blake,  marching  up  from  Ayamonte,  should 
take  post  at  Xeres  de  los  Cavalleros.  2.  That  Ballas- 
teros  should  occupy  Burquillo  on  his  left.  3.  That 
the  cavalry  of  the  fifth  army,  stationed  at  Llerena, 
should  observe  the  road  of  Guadalcanal,  and  commu- 
nicate through  Zafra,  by  the  right,  Avith  Ballasteros. 
These  dispositions  were  to  watch  the  passes  of  the 
Morena.  4.  That  CastaiTos  should  furnish  three  bat- 
talions for  the  siege,  and  keep  the  rest  of  his  corps  at 
Merida,  to  support  the  Spanish  cavalry.  5.  That  the 
British  army  should  be  in  second  line,  and,  in  the  event 
of  a  battle,  Albuera,  centrically  situated  with  respect 
to  the  roads  leading  from  Andalusia  to  Badajos,  should 
be  the  point  of  concentration  for  all  the  allied  forces. 

Tlie  whole  of  the  train  and  stores,  for  the  attack  on 
Bad  jos,  being  taken  from  the  ramparls  and  magazines 
')f  Elvas,  the  utmost  prudence  was  n.-quired  to  secure 
the  safety  of  the  guns,  lest  that  fortress,  half  dis- 
mantled, should  be  exposed  to  a  siege.  Wlieref/re  as 
the  Guadiana,  by  rising  ten  feet,  had  again  carried 
away  the  bridcres  at  Jerumenha,  on  'he  21th  lord  Wel- 
lington directed  the  line  of  communication  with  Por- 
tugal to  be  established  by  Merida,  until  more  settled 
weather  should  admit  of  fresh  arrangements,  IIow- 
beit,  political  difiTiculties  intervening  obliged  him  to 
delay  the  siege.  The  troops  under  Mendizabal  had 
committed  many  excesses  in  Portugal ;  the  disputes 
between  them  and  the  inhabitar  ts  were  pushed  so  far, 
that   the  Spanish  general   had   pillaged    the  town  of 


Fernando,  and  the  Portuguese  government,  in  reprisal, 
meant  to  seize  Olivenza,  which  had  formerly  belonged 
to  them.  The  Spanish  Regency  indeed  publicly  disa- 
vowed iMendizabal's  conduct,  and  Mr.  Stuart's  strenu- 
ous representations  deterred  the  Portuguese  from 
plunging  the  two  countries  into  a  war  :  but  this  affair, 
joined  to  the  natural  slowness  and  arroganr-e  of  the 
Spaniards,  prevented  both  Castaiios  and  Blake  from 
giving  an  immediate  assent  to  the  English  general's 
plans.  Meanwhile,  intelligence  reached  the  latter  that 
Massena  was  in  force  on  the  Agueda  ;  wherefore,  re- 
luctantly directing  Beresford  to  postpone  ii;n  siege  un- 
til the  Spanish  generals  should  give  in  thei)  assent,  or 
until  the  fall  of  Almeida  should  enable  a  B  »'ish  rein- 
forcement to  arrive,  he  ordered  the  milit.v-  of  the 
northern  provinces  again  to  take  the  field,  i<nd  re- 
paired with  the  utmost  speed  to  thj  Coa. 

OPERATIONS    IN    THL    NORTH. 

During  his  absence,  the  block  ide  of  Almeida  had 
been  closely  pressed,  while  the  army  was  so  disposed 
as  to  cut  off  all  communication.  The  allied  forces 
were,  however,  distressed  for  provisions,  and  great 
part  of  their  corn  came  from  the  side  of  Ledesrna, 
being  smuggled  by  the  peasants  through  the  French 
posts,  and  passed  over  the  Agueda  by  ropes,  which 
were  easily  hidden  amongst  the  deep  chasms  of  that 
river,  near  its  confluence  with  the  Douro. 

Massena  was  intent  upon  relieving  the  place.  Hia 
retreat  upon  Salamanca  had  been  to  restore  the  or- 
ganization and  equipments  of  his  army,  which  he 
could  not  do  at  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  without  consuming 
the  stores  of  that  fortress.  His  cantonments  extended 
from  San  Felices  by  Ledesrna  to  Toro,  his  cavalry  was 
in  bad  condition,  and  his  artillery  nearly  unhorsed. 
But  from  Bessieres  he  expected,  with  reason,  aid,  both 
of  men  and  provisions,  and  in  that  expectation  was 
prepared  to  renew  the  campaign  immediately.  Dis- 
cord, that  bane  of  military  operations,  interfered.  Bes- 
sieres had  neglected  and  continued  to  neg"'.ect  the  army 
of  Portugal.  Symptoms  of  hostilitiea  with  Russia 
were  so  apparent,  even  at  this  period,  that  he  looked 
rather  to  that  quarter  thaii  to  what  wat  passing  before 
him,  and  his  opinion  that  a  war  in  the  north  was  in- 
evitable was  so  openly  expressed  as  to  reach  the 
English  army.  Meanwhile,  Massena  vainly  demanded 
the  aid,  which  was  necessary  to  save  the  only  acquisi- 
tion of  his  campaign.  A  convoy  of  provisions  had, 
however,  entered  Ciudad  Rodrigo  on  the  I3th  of  April, 
and  on  the  16th  a  reinforcement  and  a  second  convoy 
also  succeeded  in  gaining  that  fortress,  although  gene- 
ral Spencer  crossed  the  Agueda,  with  eight  thousand 
men,  to  intercept  them  ;  a  rear-guard  of  two  hundred 
men  was  indeed,  overtaken,  and  surrounded  by  the 
cavalry  in  an  open  plain,  but  it  was  not  prevented  from 
reaching  the  place. 

Towards  the  end  of  the  month,  the  new  organiza- 
tion, decreed  by  Napoleon,  was  put  in  execution.  Two 
divisions  of  the  ninth  corps  joined  Massena;  and 
Drouet  was  preparing  to  march  with  the  remaining 
eleven  thousand  inf\intry  and  cavalry,  to  reinforce  and 
take  the  command  of  the  fifth  corps,  when  Massena, 
having  collected  all  his  own  detachments,  and  received 
a  promise  of  assistance  from  Bessieres,  prevailed  upon 
him  to  defer  his  march  until  an  effort  had  been  made 
to  relieve  Almeida.  With  this  view  the  French  army 
was  put  in  motion  towards  the  frontier  of  Portugal. 
The  light  division  immediately  resumed  its  former 
positions,  the  left  at  Gallegos  and  Marialva,  the  righl 
at  Espeja  ;  the  cavalry  were  dispersed,  partly  towards 
the  sources  of  the  Azava,  and  partly  behind  Gallegos. 
While  in  this  situation,  colonel  O'.Meara  and  eighty 
men  of  the  Irish  brigade  were  taken  by  .Lilian  Sanchea., 
the  affair  having  been,  it  was  said,  preconcerted,  lo 
enable  the  former  to  quit  the  Frencti  service. 


344 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XII. 


On  the  23d,  two  thousand  French  infantry  and  a 
Squadron  of  cavalry  iiiarcliing  out  of  Ciudad  Rodrijro, 
made  a  sudden  effort  to  seize  the  bridge  of  Marialva, 
but  the  passage  was  bravely  maintained  by  captain 
Dobbs,  with  one  company  of  the  fifty-second  and  some 
riflemen.  On  the  25th,  Massena  reached  (Hudad  Ro- 
drigo,  and  the  27th,  his  advanced  guards  felt  all  the 
line  of  the  division  from  Espeja  to  Marialva.  I>ord 
Wellington  arrived  on  the  28th,  and  immediately  con- 
centrated the  main  body  of  the  allies  behind  the  Dos 
Casas  river.  The  Azava  being  swollen  and  difficult 
to  ford,  the  enemy  continued  to  feel  the  line  of  the 
outposts,  until  the  2d  of  May,  when  the  waters  having 
subsided  the  whole  French  army  was  observed  coming 
out  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo.  The  light  division,  after  a 
slight  skirmish  of  horse  at  Gal  legos,  then  commenced 
a  retrograde  movement,  from  that  place  and  from  Es- 
peja, upon  Fuentes  Onoro.  The  country  inmiediatel}' 
in  rear  of  those  villages  was  wooded  as  far  as  the  Dos 
Casas,  but  an  open  plain  between  the  two  lines  of 
march  offered  the  enemy's  powerful  cavalry  an  oppor- 
tunity of  cutting  off"  the  retreat.  The  French  appeared 
regardless  of  this  advantage,  and  the  division  remained 
in  the  woods  bordering  the  right  and  left  of  the  plain 
until  the  middle  of  the  night,  when  the  march  was  re- 
newed, and  the  Dos  Casas  was  crossed  at  Fuentes  Onoro. 

This  beautiful  village  had  escaped  all  injury  du- 
ring the  previous  warfare,  although  occupied  alternate- 
ly, for  above  a  year,  by  both  sides.  Every  family  in 
it  was  well  known  to  the  light  division,  and  it  was 
therefore  a  subject  of  deep  regret,  to  find,  that  the 
preceding  troops  had  pillaged  it,  leaving  only  the 
shells  of  houses  where,  three  days  before,  a  friendly 
population  had  been  living  in  comfort.  This  wanton 
act  was  so  warmly  felt  by  the  whole  army,  that  eight 
thousand  dollars  were  afterwards  collected  by  general 
subscription  for  the  poor  inhabitants,  but  the  injury 
sunk  deeper  than  the  atonement. 

Lord  Wellington  had  determined  not  to  risk  much 
to  maintain  his  blockade,  and  he  was  well  aware  that 
Massena,  reinforced  by  the  army  of  the  north  and  by 
the  ninth  corps,  could  bring  down  superior  numbers; 
for  so  culpably  negligent  had  the  Portuguese  govern- 
ment been,  that  their  troops  were  actually  starving. 
'I'be  infantry  had  quitted  their  colours,  or  had  fallen 
fiick,  from  extenuation,  by  thousands,  the  cavalry  were 
rendered  useless,  and  it  was  even  feared  that  the  whole 
would  disband.  Nevertheless,  when  the  moment  of 
trial  arrived,  the  English  general  trusting  to  the  valour 
of  his  soldiers,  and  the  ascendancy  over  the  enemy 
which  they  had  acquired  during  the  pursuit  from  I^'an- 
larem,  would  not  retreat,  although  his  arm}',  reduced  to 
thirty-two  thousand  infantry,  twelve  hundred  cavalry 
in  bad  condition,  and  forty-two  guns,  was  unable,  see- 
ing the  superiority  of  the  French  horse,  to  oppose  the 
enemy's  march  in  the  plain. 

.  The  allies  occupied  a  fine  table-land,  lying  between 
the  Turones  and  the  Dos  Casas.  The  left  was  at  Fort 
Conception,  the  centre  opposite  to  the  village  of  Ala- 
meda, the  rinfht  at  Fuentes  Onoro,  the  whole  distance 
being  five  miles.  The  Dos  Casas,  flowing  in  a  deep 
ravine,  protected  the  front  of  this  line,  and  the  French 

tjencrai  could  not,  with  any  prudence,  venture  to  march, 
)y  his  own  right,  against  Almeida,  lest  the  allies, 
crossing  the  ravine  at  the  villages  at  Alameda  and 
Fuentes  Onoro,  should  fall  on  his  flank,  and  drive 
him  into  the  Agueda.  Hence,  to  cover  the  blockade, 
which  was  maintained  by  Pack's  brigade  and  an  Eng- 
lish regiment,  it  was  sufllicient  to  leave  the  fifth  divis- 
ion near  Fort  Conception,  and  the  sixth  division 
opposite  Alameda.  Tlve  first  and  third  were  then  con- 
centrated on  a  gentle  rise,  about  a  cannon  shot  behind 
Fuentes  Onoro,  where  the  steppe  of  land,  which  the 
army  occupied,  turned  back,  and  ended  on  the  Turones, 
becoming  rocky  and  difficult  as  it  approached  that  river. 


FIRST    COMBAT    OF    FUENTES    ONORO. 

The  French  came  up  in  three  columns  abreast. 
The  cavalry,  the  sixth  cirps,  and  Drouel's  division 
appeared  at  Fuentes  Onoro,  but  the  eighth  and  second 
corps  moving  against  Alameda  and  P'ort  Conception, 
seemed  to  menace  the  left  of  the  position,  wherefore, 
the  light  division,  after  passing  the  Dos  Casas,  rein- 
forced the  sixth  division.  General  Loison  however, 
without  wailing  for  Massena's  orders,  fell  upon  P^uentea 
Onoro,  which  was  occupied  by  five  battalions  of  chosen 
troops,  detached  from  the  first  and  third  divisions. 

Most  of  the  houses  in  this  village  were  quite  in  the 
bottom  of  the  ravine,  and  an  old  chapel  and  some  build- 
ings on  a  craggy  eminence,  overhung  one  end.  The 
low  parts  were  vigorously  defended,  yet  the  violence 
of  the  attack  was  so  great,  and  the  cannonade  so  heavy, 
that  the  British  abandoned  the  streets,  and  could 
scarcely  maintain  the  upper  ground  al  out  the  chapel. 
Colonel  Williams,  the  commanding  officer,  fell  badly 
wounded,  and  the  fight  was  becoming  very  dangerous, 
when  the  twenty-fourth,  the  seventy-first,  ard  the  sev- 
rnty-ninth  regiments,  marching  down  from  the  main 
position,  charged  so  roughly,  that  the  French  were 
forced  back,  and,  after  a  severe  contest,  driven  over 
the  stream  of  the  Dos  Casas.  During  the  night  the 
detachments  were  withdrawn  ;  but  the  twenty-fourth, 
the  seventy-first,  and  seventy-ninth  regiments  were 
left  in  the  village,  where  two  hundred  and  sixty  of  the 
allies  and  somewhat  more  of  the  French  had  fallen. 

On  the  4th  Massena  arrived,  and,  being  joined  by 
Bessieres  with  twelve  hundred  cavalry  and  a  battery 
of  the  imperial  guard,  examined  all  the  line,  and  made 
dispositions  for  the  next  day.  llis  design  was  to  hold 
the  left  of  the  allies  in  check  with  the  second  corpi, 
and  to  turn  the  right  with  the  remainder  of  the  army. 
Forty  thousand  French  infantry,  and  five  thousand 
horse,  with  thirty  pieces  of  artillery,  were  under  arm:?, 
and  they  had  shewn  in  the  action  of  the  3d  that  their 
courage  was  not  abated  ;  it  was,  therefore,  a  very 
audacious  resolution  in  the  English  general  to  receive 
battle  on  such  dangerous  ground.  Ilis  position,  as  tar 
as  Fuentes  Onoro,  was  indeed  strong  and  free  for  the 
use  of  all  arms,  and  it  covered  his  communication  by 
the  bridge  of  Castello  Bom  ;  but,  on  his  right  flank 
the  plain  was  continued  in  a  second  steppe  to  Nava 
d'Aver,  where  a  considerable  hill  overlooking  all  the 
country,  commanded  the  roads  leading  to  the  bridges 
of  Seceiras  and  Sabugal.  The  enemy  ciuld,  therefore, 
by  a  direct  march  from  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  place  his  army 
at  once  in  line  of  battle  upon  the  right  flank  of  thn 
allies,  and  attack  them  while  entangled  between  the 
Drs  Casas,  the  Turones,  the  Coa,  and  the  fortress  of 
Almeida;  the  bridge  of  Castello  Bom  alone  would  have 
been  open  for  retreat.  To  prevent  this  str(ike,  and  to 
cover  his  communications  with  Sabugal  and  Seceiras, 
lord  Wellington,  yielding  to  general  Spencer's  earnest 
suggestions,  stretched  his  right  wing  out  i^  Nava 
d'Aver,  the  hill  of  which  he  caused  Julian  Sanci.^i  to 
occupy,  supporting  him  by  the  seventh  division,  under 
general  Houston.  Thus  the  line  of  battle  was  above 
seven  miles  in  length,  besides  the  circuit  of  blockade. 
The  Dos  Casas,  i[;deed,  still  covered  the  front;  but 
above  Fuentes  Onoro,  the  ravine  became  gradually 
obliterated,  resolving  itself  into  a  swampy  wood,  which 
extended  to  Poqo  Velho,  a  village  half  way  between 
Fuentes  and  Nava  d'Aver.  The  left  wing  of  the 
seventh  division  occupied  this  wood  and  the  village 
of  Poco  Velho,  but  the  right  wing  was  refused. 

BATTLE    OF    FUENTES    ONORO. 

It  was  Massena's  intention  to  have  made  h>s  dijf- 
positions  in  the  night,  in  such  a  maimer  as  to  com- 
mence the  attack  at  day-break  on  the  5th;  but  a  delay 
of  two  hours  occurring,  the  whole  of  his  lucvemenU 


18I1.J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


345 


were  plainly  descried.  The  eighth  corps  withdrawn 
from  Alameda,  and  supported  by  all  the  French  caval- 
ry, was  seon  marching  above  the  village  of  Po(,'o  Vel- 
iio,  and  at  the  same  lime  the  sixth  corps  and  Drouet's 
division  took  ground  to  their  own  left,  yet  still  keeping 
a  division  in  front  of  Fuentes.  At  this  sight  the  light 
division  and  tlie  English  liorse  hastened  to  the  support 
of  general  Houston,  while  the  first  and  third  divisions 
made  a  movement  parallel  to  that  of  the  sixth  corps. 
'I'he  latter,  however,  drove  the  left  wing  of  the  seventh 
division,  consisting  of  Portuguese  and  British,  from 
the  village  of  Poq-o  V'elho  with  loss,  and  was  gaining 
ground  in  the  wood  also,  when  the  riflemen  of  the  liffht 
division  arriving  at  that  point,  restored  the  fight.  The 
French  cavalry,  then  passing  Pogo  Velho,  commenced 
forming  in  order  of  battle  on  the  plain,  between  the  wood 
and  the  hill  of  Nava  d'Aver.  Julian  Sanchez  immedi- 
Etely  retired  across  the  Turones,  partly  in  fear,  but  more 
in  anger,  at  the  death  of  his  lieutenant,  who,  having  fool- 
ishly ridden  close  up  to  the  enemy,  making  many  vio- 
lent gestures,  was  mistaken  for 'a  French  officer,  and 
shot  by  a  soldier  of  the  guards,  before  the  action  com- 
menced. 

Montbrun  occupied  himself  with  this  weak  partida 
for  an  hour,  but  when  the  Guerilla  chief  had  entirely 
fallen  back,  he  turned  the  right  of  the  seventh  divis- 
ion, and  charged  the  British  cavdhy,  which  had  moved 
up  to  Us  support.  The  combat  wa^  very  unequal,  for, 
by  an  abuse  too  common,  so  many  men  had  been  drawn 
from  the  ranks  as  orderlies  to  general  officers,  and  for 
other  purposes,  that  not  more  than  a  thousand  English 
troopers  were  in  the  field.  The  French  therefore  with 
one  shock  drove  in  all  the  cavalry  outguards,  and  cut- 
ting oft' captain  Ramsay's  battery,  came  sweeping  in 
upon  the  reserves  of  horse  and  upon  the  seventh  divis- 
ion. But  their  leading  squadrons  approaching  in  a 
disorderly  maimer,  were  partially  checked  by  the  Brit- 
i  h,  and  at  the  same  time  a  great  commotion  was 
observei^  in  their  main  body.  Men  and  horses  there 
closed  with  confusion  and  tumult  towards  one  point. 
a  thick  dust  arose,  and  loud  cries,  and  the  sparkling  of 
blades  and  the  flashing  of  pistols,  indicated  some  ex- 
traordinary occurrence.  Suddenly  the  multitude  be- 
came violently  agitated,  an  English  shout  pealed  high 
and  clear,  the  mass  was  rent  asunder,  and  Norman 
Kamsay  burst  forth  at  the  head  of  his  battery,  his 
horses  breathing  fire,  stretched  like  greyhounds  along 
the  plain,  the  guns  bounded  behind  them  like  things 
of  no  weight,  and  the  mounted  gunners  followed  in 
close  career.  Captain  Brotherton  of  the  14lh  dragoons, 
seeing  this,  instantly  rode  forth  with  a  squadron,  and 
overturned  the  head  of  the  pursuing  troops,  and  gen- 
eral Charles  Stewart  joining  in  the  charge,  took  the 
French  general  Lamotte,  fighting  hand  to  hand,  'i'he 
enemy,  liowever,  came  in  strongly,  and  the  British 
cavalry  retired  behind  the  light  division,  which  was 
immediately  thrown  into  squares,  but  ere  the  seventh 
division,  which  was  more  advanced,  could  do  the  same, 
the  horsemen  were  upon  them,  and  some  were  cut 
down.  Nevertheless  the  men  stood  firm,  and  the 
Chasseurs  Brilanniques  ranging  behind  a  loose  stone 
M'all,  pourtrd  in  such  a  fire  that  their  foes  recoiled  and 
8i:emed  bewildered. 

But  while  these  brilliant  actions  were  passing  at 
this  point,  the  French  were  making  progress  in  the 
wood  of  Pozzo  Velho,  and  as  the  English  divisions 
were  separated,  and  the  right  wing  turned,  it  was 
abundantly  evident  that  !be  battle  would  soon  be  lost, 
if  the  original  concentrated  positiori  above  Fuentes 
Onoro  was  not  quickly  reg.iined.  Lord  Wellington, 
therefore,  ordered  the  seventh  division  to  cross  the 
Turones  and  move  down  the  left  bank  to  Frenada — the 
light  division  to  retire  over  the  plain  and  the  cavalry 
to  cover  the  rear.  He  also  withdrew  the  first  and  third 
divisions,  placing  them  and  the  Portuguese,  in  line,  on 


the  steppe  before  descrihed  as  running  perpendicular  to 
the  ravine  of  Fuentes  Onoro. 

General  Crawfurd,  who  had  resumed  the  command 
of  the  light  division,  first  covered  the  ])assage  of  the 
seventh  division  over  the  Turones,  and  then  retired 
slowly  over  the  plain  in  squares,  having  the  British 
cavalry  principally  on  his  right  flank.  He  was  follow- 
ed by  the  enemy's  horse,  which  continually  outflanked 
him,  and  near  the  wood  surprised  and  sabred  an  ad- 
vanced post  c*  the  guards,  making  colonel  Hill  and 
fourteen  men  prisoners,  but  then  continuing  their  charge 
against  the  forty-second  regiment,  the  French  were 
repulsed.  Many  times  Montbrun  made  as  if  he  would 
storm  the  light  division  squares,  and  although  the 
latter  were  too  formidable  to  be  meddled  with,  there 
was  not,  during  the  war,  a  more  dangerous  hour  for 
England.  The  v/hole  of  that  vast  plain  as  far  as  the 
Turones  was  covered  with  a  confused  multitude,  amidst 
which  the  squares  appeared  but  as  specks,  for  there 
was  a  oreat  concourse,  composed  of  commissariat  fol- 
lowers of  the  camp,  servants,  baggage,  led  horses,  and 
peasants  attracted  by  curiosity,  and  fiiially,  the  broken 
piquets  and  parties  coining  out  of  the  woods.  The 
seventh  division  was  separated  from  the  army  by  the 
Turones,  five  thousand  French  cavalry,  with  fifteen 
pieces  of  artillery,  were  close  at  hand  impatient  to 
charge,  the  infantry  of  the  eighth  corps  was  in  order 
of  battle  behind  the  horsemen,  and  the  wood  was  filled 
with  the  skirmishers  of  the  sixth  corps.  If  the  latter 
body,  pivoting  upon  Fuentes,  had  issued  forth,  while 
Drouet's  divisions  fell  on  that  village  ;  if  the  eighth 
corps  had  attacked  the  light  division,  while  the  whole 
of  the  cavalry  made  a  general  charge,  the  loose  multi- 
tude encumbering  the  plain  would  have  been  driven 
violently  in  upon  the  first  division,  in  such  a  manner 
as  to  have  intercepted  the  latter's  fire  and  broken  its 
ranks. 

No  such  effort  was  made.  Morrtbrun's  horsemen 
merely  hovered  about  Crawfurd's  squares,  the  plain 
was  soon  cleared,  the  cavalry  took  post  behind  the 
centre,  and  the  light  division  formed  a  reserve  to  the 
right  of  the  first  division,  sending  the  riflemen  amongst 
the  rocks  to  connect  it  with  the  seventh  division, 
which  had  arrived  at  Frenada  and  was  there  joined  by 
Julian  Sanchez. 

At  sight  of  this  new  front,  so  deeply  lined  with 
troops,  tlie  French  stopped  short,  and  commenced  a 
heavy  cannonade,  which  did  great  execution  from  the 
closeness  of  the  allied  masses  ;  but  twelve  British 
guns  replied  with  vigour  and  the  violence  of  the  ene- 
my's fire  abated.  Their  cavalry  then  drew  out  of 
range  and  a  body  of  infantry  attempting  to  glide  down 
the  ravine  of  the  Turones  was  repulsed  by  the  rifle- 
men and  the  light  companies  of  the  guards. 

All  this  time  a  fierce  battle  was  going  on  at  Fuentes 
Onoro.  Massena  had  directed  Drouet  to  car  y  this 
village  at  the  very  moment  when  Montbrun's  cavalry 
should  turn  the  right  wing;  it  was,  however,  two 
hours  later  ere  the  attack  commenced.  The  three 
British  regiments  made  a  desperate  resistance,  but 
overmatched  in  number,  and  little  accustomed  to  the 
desultory  fighting  of  light  troops,  were  pierced  and 
divided.  Two  companies  of  the  seventy-ninth  were 
taken,  colonel  Cameron  was  mortally  wounded,  and 
the  lower  part  of  the  town  was  carried  ;  th€'  upper 
part  was,  however,  stiffly  held,  and  the  rolling  of  the 
musketry  was  incessant. 

Had  the  att\ck  been  made  earlier,  and  the  whole 
of  Drouet's  division  thrown  frankly  into  the  fight, 
while  the  sixth  corps  moving  through  the  wood  closely 
turned  the  villagre,  the  passage  must  have  been  forced 
and  the  left  of  the  new  position  outflanked  ;  but  now 
lord  Wellington  having  all  his  reserves  in  hand,  detach- 
ed  considerable  masses  to  the  support  of  the  regiments 
in  Fuentes.     The  French  continued  also  to  reinforce 


346 


NAPIEk   fe    PENINSULA  it   WAR. 


[Book  XII. 


their  trnops,  the  whole  of  the  sixth  corps  and  a  part  of 
Drouet's  division  were  finally  engaged,  and  several 
turns  of  fortune  occurred.  At  one  time  the  fighting 
was  on  the  hanks  of  the  stream  and  amongst  the  lower 
bouses ;  at  anotlier  upon  the  rugged  heights  and  round 
the  chaprl,  and  some  of  tlie  enemy's  skirmishers  even 
penetrated  completely  through  towards  the  main  posi- 
tion ;  hut  the  village  was  never  entirely  abandoned  by 
the  defenders,  and,  in  a  charge  of  the  seventy-first,  sev- 
enty-ninth, and  cighty-eiiihth  regiments,  led  by  colonel 
M'Kinncn  against  a  heavy  mass  which  had  gained  the 
chapel  eminence,  a  great  number  of  the  French  fell. 
In  this  manner  the  fight  lasted  until  evening,  when  the 
lower  part  of  the  town  was  abandoned  by  both  parties. 
The  British  maintained  the  chapel  and  crags,  the 
French  retired  a  cannon  shot  from  the  stream. 

After  the  action  a  brigade  of  the  light  division  re- 
lieved the  regiments  in  the  village,  a  slight  demonstra- 
tion by  the  second  corps  near  Fort  Conception,  was 
riiecked  by  a  battalion  of  the  Lusitanian  legion,  and 
both  armies  remained  in  observation.  Fifteen  hundred 
men  and  olHcers,  of  which  three  hundred  were  prison- 
ers, constituted  the  loss  of  the  allies.  That  of  the 
enemy  was  estimated  at  the  time  to  be  near  five  thou- 
sand, but  this  exaggerated  calculation  was  founded 
upon  the  erroneous  supposition  that  four  hundred  dead, 
were,  lying  about  Fuentes  Onoro.  All  armies  make 
rash  estimates  on  such  occasions.  Having  had  charge 
to  bury  the  carcasses  at  that  point,  I  can  affirm  that, 
immediately  about  the  village,  not  more  than  one 
hundred  and  thirty  bodies  were  to  be  found,  one-third 
of  which  were  British. 

DurinfT  the  battle,  the  French  convoy  for  the  supply 
of  Almeida  was  kept  atGallegos,  in  readiness  to  move, 
and  lord  Wellington  now  sent  Julian  Sanchez  from 
Frenada,  to  menace  it,  and  to  disturb  the  communica- 
tion with  Ciudad  Rodrigo.  This  produced  no  effect, 
and  a  more  decisive  battle  being  expected  on  the  6th, 
the  light  division  made  breast-works  amongst  the  crags 
of  Fuentes  Onoro.  Lord  Wellington  also'  entrenched 
that  part  of  the  position,  which  was  immediately  be- 
hind this  village,  so  that  the  carrying  of  it  would 
bave  scarcely  benefited  the  enemy.  Fuentes  Onoro, 
strictly  speaking,  was  not  tenable.  There  was  a 
wooded  t(Migue  of  land  on  the  British  right,  that  over- 
looked, at  half-cannon  shot,  all  the  upper  as  well  as 
the  lower  part  of  the  village  both  in  flank  and  rear, 
)'et  was  too  distant  from  the  position  to  be  occupied  by 
the  allies  :  bad  Ney  been  at  the  bead  of  the  sixth 
corps,  he  would  bave  quickly  crowned  this  ridge,  and 
then  Fuentes  could  only  have  been  maintained  by  sub- 
mitting to  a  bnlchery. 

On  the  Gth  the  enemy  sent  his  wounded  to  the 
rear,  making  no  demonstration  of  attack,  and  as  the 
7th  passed  in  a  like  inaction,  the  British  entrench- 
ments were  perfected.  The  8th  Massena  withdrew 
bis  main  body  to  the  woods  leading  upon  Espeja  and 
Gallegos,  but  still  maintained  posts  at  Alameda  and 
Fuentes.  On  the  10th,  without  being  in  any  manner 
molested,  he  retired  across  the  Aguecfa,  the  sixth  and 
eiirblh  corps,  and  the  cavalry,  passing  at  Ciudad  Ro- 
drigo, the  second  corps  at  the  bridge  of  Barba  del 
I*uerco.  Bessieres  then  carried  off  the'imperial  guards, 
Massena  was  recalled  to  France,  and  Marmont  as- 
sumed  the  command  of  the  army  of  Portuo-al. 

Both  sides  claimed  the  victory.  'I'he  French,  be- 
cause they  won  the  passage  at  Pot^o  Velho,  cleared 
the  wood,  turned  our  right  flank,  obliged  the  cavalry  to 
retire,  and  forced  lord  Wellington  to  relinquish  three 
miles  of  ground,  and  to  change  bis  front.  Tiie  English, 
because  the  village  of  Fuentes  so  often  attacked,  was 
successfully  defended,  and  because  the  principal  object 
(the  covering  the  l)lockade  of  Almeida)  was  attained. 

(Certain  it  is,  that  Massena  at  first  gained  great  ad- 
vantages.    Napoleon    would  have   made   them  fatal  ! 


but  it  is  also  certain  that,  with  an  overwhelming 
cavalry,  on  ground  particularly  suitable  to  that  arm, 
the  prince  of  Esling  having,  as  it  were,  indicated  all 
the  errors  of  the  English  general's  position,  stopped 
short  at  the  very  moment  when  he  should  liave  sprunnr 
forward.  By  some  this  has  been  attributed  to  extreme 
negligence,  by  others  to  disgust  at  being  superseded  by 
Marmont,  but  the  true  reason  seems  to  be,  that  dis- 
cord in  his  army  had  arisen  to  actual  insubordination. 
The  imperial  guards  would  not  charge  at  his  order — 
Junot  did  not  second  him  cordially — Loison  disre- 
garded )iis  instructions — Drouet  sought  to  spare  his 
own  divisions  in  the  fight,  and  Reynier  ren\ained  per- 
fectly inactive.  Thus  the  machinery  of  battle  was 
shaken,  and  would  not  work. 

General  Pelet  censures  lord  Wellington  for  not  seni- 
ing  his  cavalry  against  Reynier  after  the  se^^ond  posi- 
tion was  taken  up.  He  asserts  that  any  danger,  on 
that  side,  would  have  forced  the  French  to  retreat. 
This  criticism  is,  however,  unsustainable,  being  based 
on  tlie  notion  that  the  allies  had  fifty  thousand  men  in 
the  field,  whereas,  including  iSanchez'  Partida,  they  had 
not  thirty-five  thousand.  It  may  be,  with  more  justice, 
objected  to  Massena  that  he  did  not  launch  some  of  his 
numerous  horsemen,  by  the  bridge  of  Seceiras,  or  Sabu- 
gal,  against  Guarda  and  Celerico,  to  destroy  the  maga- 
zinps,  cut  the  communication,  and  capture  the  mules  and 
other  means  of  transport  belonging  to  the  allied  army. 
The  vice  of  the  English  general's  position  would  then 
have  been  clearly  exposed,  for,  although  the  second 
regiment  of  German  hussars  was  on  the  march  from 
Lisbon,  it  had  not  passed  ("oimbra  at  this  period,  and 
could  not  have  protected  the  depots.  But  it  can  never 
be  too  often  repeated  that  war,  however  adorned  by 
splendid  strokes  of  skill,  is  commonly  a  series  of  errors 
and  accidents.  All  the  operations,  on  both  sides,  for 
six  weeks,  furnished  illustrations  of  this  truth. 

Ney's  opposition  had  prevented  Massena's  march 
upon  Coria,  which  would  have  secured  Badajos  and 
Campo  Mayor,  and,  probably,  added  Elvas  to  them. 
Latour  Maubourg's  tardiness  had  like  to  have  cost 
Mortier  a  rear  guard  and  a  battering-train.  Beresford's 
blunder  at  Campo  Mayor,  and  his  refusing  of  the  line 
of  Merida,  enalded  the  French  to  sectire  Bndr.jos.  At 
Sabugal,  the  petulance  of  a  staff-officer  marred  an  ad- 
mirable combination,  and  produced  a  dangerous  combat. 
Drouet's  negligence  placed  Almeida  at  the  mercy  of 
the  allies,  and  a  mistaken  notion  of  Massena's  suffer- 
ings during  the  retreat,  induced  lord  Wellington  to  un- 
dertake two  great  operations  at  the  same  time,  which 
were  above  his  strength.  In  the  battle  of  Fuentes 
Onoro,  more  errors  than  skill  were  observable  on  both 
sides,  and  the  train  of  accidents  did  not  slop  there. 
The  prize  contended  for  was  still  to  present  another 
example  of  the  uncertainty  of  war. 

EVACUATION    OF    ALMEIDA. 

General  Brennier,  made  prisoner  at  Vimiero,  but 
afterwards  exchanged,  was  governor  of  this  fortress. 
During  the  battle  of  Fuentes  Onoro,  his  garrison, 
consisting  of  fifteen  hundred  men,  skirmished  boldly 
with  the  blockading  force,  and  loud  explosions,  sup- 
posed to  be  signals  of  communication  with  the  rtdieving 
array,  were  frequent  in  the  place.  When  all  hopes 
of  succour  had  vanished,  a  soldier,  named  Tillet,  con- 
trived, with  extraordinary  courage  and  presence  of 
mind,  to  penetrate,  although  in  uniform,  through  the 
posts  of  blockade.  He  carried  an  order  for  Brennier 
to  evacuate  the  fortress. 

Meanwhile  Massena,  by  crossing  the  Agueda,  aban- 
doned Almeida  to  its  fate,  and  the  British  general 
])laced  the  light  division  in  its  old  position  on  the 
Azava  with  cavalry-posts  on  the  Lower  Agueda.  He 
also  desired  sir  W'illiam  Erskine  to  semi  the  fourth 
rejriinent  to  Barba  del  Puerco,  and  he  directed  genera] 


1811.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


S47 


Alexander  Campbell  to  continue  the  blockade  with 
the  sixili  division  and  with  general  Pack's  brigade. 
But  Campbell's  disposilions  were  either  negligently 
made,  or  negligently  executed,  and  Erskine  never 
transmitted  the  orders  to  the  fourth  regiment,  and  it 
was  under  these  circumstances  that  Brennier,  undis- 
mayed by  the  retreat  of  the  French  army,  resolved, 
like  Julian  Estrada,  at  Hostalricb,  to  force  bis  way 
through  the  blockading  troops.  An  open  country  and 
a  double  line  of  posts  greatly  enhanced  the  ditliculty, 
yet  Brennier  was  resolute  not  only  to  cut  bis  own 
passacje  but  to  render  the  fortress  useless  to  the  allies. 
To  efi'ect  this,  he  ruined  all  tlie  principal  bastions,  and 
kept  up  a  constant  fire  of  his  artillery  in  a  siirgular 
manner;  for  always  he  fired  several  guns  at  one  mo- 
ment with  very  heavy  charges,  placing  one  across  the 
muzzle  of  another,  so  that,  while  some  shots  flew 
towards  the  besiegers  and  a  loud  explosion  was  heard, 
others  destifiyed  pieces  without  attracting  notice. 

At  midnight  of  the  10th,  all  being  ready,  he  sprung 
his  mines,  sallied  forth  in  a  compact  column,  broke 
through  tiie  picquets,  and  passed  between  the  quarters 
of  the  reserves,  with  a  nicety  that  proved  at  once  his 
talent  of  observation  and  liis  coolness.  General  Pack 
following,  with  a  few  men  collected  on  the  instant, 
plied  him  with  a  constant  fire,  yet  nothing  could  shake 
or  retard  his  column,  which  in  silence,  and  without 
returning  a  shot,  gained  the  rough  country  leading 
upon  Barba  del  Puerco.  Here  it  halted  for  a  moment, 
just  as  daylight  broke,  and  Pack,  who  was  at  hand, 
hearing  that  some  English  dragoons  were  in  a  village, 
a  short  distance  to  the  right,  sent  an  officer  to  bring 
tliem  out  upon  the  French  flank,  thus  occasioning  a 
slight  skirmish  and  consequently  delay.  'J'he  troops 
of  blockade  bad  paid  little  attention  at  first  to  the 
explosion  of  the  mines,  thinking  them  a  repetition  of 
Brennier's  previous  practice,  but  Pack's  fire  having 
roused  them,  the  thirty-sixth  regiment  was  now  close  at 
band  9."d  the  fourth,  also,  having  heard  the  firing  at 
Valde  Mula,  was  rapidly  gaining  the  right  flank  of  the 
enemy.  Brennier,  having  driven  oil"  the  cavalry,  was 
again  in  march,  but  the  British  regiments,  throwing  otf 
their  knapsacks,  followed  at  such  a  pace,  that  they 
overtook  the  rear  of  his  column  in  the  act  of  descend- 
ing the  deep  chasm  of  Barba  del  Puerco.  Many  were 
killed  and  wounded,  and  three  hundred  were  taken; 
but  the  pursuers  having  rashly  passed  the  bri<lge  in 
pursuit,  the  second  corps,  which  was  in  order  of  battle, 
awaiting  Brennier's  approach,  rejnilsed  t'lem  with  a 
loss  of  thirty  or  forty  men.  Had  sir  William  Erskine 
given  the  fourth  regiment  its  orders,  the  Frencii  column 
would  have  been  lost. 

Lord  Wellington,  stung  by  this  event,  and  irritated 
by  several  previous  examples  of  undisciplined  valour, 
issued  a  remonstrance  to  the  army.  It  was  strong, 
and  the  following  remarks  are  as  apfilicable  to  some 
writers  as  to  soldiers. — "  The  nffLcers  af  the  army  may 
depend  upon  it  that  the  enemy  to  whom  they  are  opposed 
t?  7iot  les.i  prudent  than  powerful.  IVutwilhstunding 
ichiit  has  been  printed  in  gazettes  and  neiuspapers,  we 
h.Lct  never  seen  small  bodies,  unsupported,  successfully 
opposed  to  large ;  nor  has  the  experience  of  any  oj/'icer 
realized  the  stories  ivhich  all  hare  read  of  whole  armies 
being  driven  by  a  handful  of  light  iitfantry  and  dra- 
goons y 


CHAPTER  V!. 

Lord  Wrllinj^ton  quits  the  army  of  Deira — Marshal  Hfresford's 
opt-ratioii> — Colonel  Colborne  beats  up  the  French  quiiiit  is  i 
in  t'".streriiadura,  ant!  intercepts  their  convoys — h  irst  I'.nghsh  I 
sietre  of  Badajos — Captaiii  Sciuire  breaks  f;ronn;i  l)f  fore  San  i 
Cristoval — His  works  overwhelmed  hy  the  French  fire — ! 
Soult  advances  to  relieve  the   place — liercsford    raises  the  , 


siege — Holds  a  conference  with  the  Spanish  generals,  and 
resolves  to  fighl — Coiond  Colborne  rejoins  the  tiiniy,  v\liirh 
takes  a  posili(jn  at  Allniera — Allied  cavalry  driven  in  by  the 
Fif  ncli — General  liluke  joins  Beresfcrd — General  Cole  ar- 
rives on  the  frontier — liattie  of  Albuera. 

When  Manrc^nt  had  thus  recovered  the  garrison  of 
Almeida,  be  withdrew  the  greatest  part  of  liis  arm.y 
towards  Salamanca.  Lord  Wellington  tlien  leaving* 
the  first,  fifth,  sixth,  and  light  divisions,  on  the  Azava, 
under  general  S|  encer,  directed  the  third  and  seventh 
divisions  and  the  second  German  hussars  upon  Bada- 
jos. On  the  15lb,  bearii'g  that  Soult,  althiaigb  bither- 
erto  reported,  by  Beresford,  to  be  entirely  r  n  the  defen- 
sive, was  actually  marching  into  Estremadura,  he  set 
out  himself  for  that  province;  but,  ere  be  could  arrive, 
a  great  and  bloody  battle  had  terminatf  d  the  opera- 
tions. 

While  awaiting  the  Spanish  generals'  accession  to 
lord  Wellington's  plan,  Beresf;rd  had  fixed  his  head- 
quarters at  Almendralejos  ;  hut  Latour  Maubourg  re- 
mained at  Guadalcanal,  whence  his  parties  foraged  the 
most  fertile  tracts  between  the  armies.  Penne  Villa- 
mur  was,  therefore,  reii;forced  with  five  s(]uadrons  ; 
and  colonel  John  (yolborne  was  detached  with  a  brig- 
ade of  the  second  division,  two  Spanish  guns,  and  two 
squadrons  of  cavalry,  to  ciirb  the  French  inroads,  and 
to  raise  the  confidence  of  the  people.  Colborne,  a  man 
of  singular  talent  for  war,  by  rapid  marches  and  sud- 
den changes  of  direction,  in  concert  with  Vilbimur, 
created  great  confusion  amongst  the  enemy's  parties. 
He  intercepted  several  convoys,  and  obliged  the  b'rench 
troops  to  quit  Fuente  Ovejuna.  La  Graiijn,  Azuaga, 
and  most  of  the  other  frontier  towns;  and  he  imposed 
upon  Latour  Maubourg  with  so  much  address,  that  tlie 
latter,  imagining  a  great  force  was  at  hand,  abandoned 
Guadalcanal  also  and  fell  back  to  Constantino. 

Having  cleared  the  country  on  that  side,  Colborne 
attempted  to  surprise  the  fortified  post  of  Benelcazar, 
and,  by  a  hardy  attempt,  was  like  to  have  carried  it. 
Riding  on  to  the  drawbridge  with  a  few  otTicers  in  the 
grey  of  the  mornino-,  he  summoned  the  commandant 
to  surrender,  as  the  only  means  of  saving  himself  from 
the  Spanish  army  which  was  close  at  hand  and  would 
give  no  quarter.  The  Frer.ch  officer,  although  amazed 
at  the  appearance  of  the  party,  was  however  too 
resolute  to  yield,  and  Colborne,  quick  to  perceive  the 
attempt  had  failed,  galloped  oft' under  a  few  straggling 
shot.  After  this,  taking  to  the  mountains,  he  rejoined 
the  arnj'  without  any  loss.  During  his  absence,  the 
S])aiiish  generals  had  acceded  to  lord  Wellington's  prop- 
osition ;  Blake  was  in  march  for  Xeres  Caballeros,  and 
Ballasteros  was  at  Burgillos.  The  waters  of  the 
(iuadiana  had  also  subsided,  the  bridge  under  .lerumen- 
ha  was  restored,  and  the  preparations  completed  for  tlie 

FIRST    ENGLISH    SIEGE    OF    BADAJOS. 

The  5th  of  May,  general  William  Stewart  invested 
the  place,  on  ihe  left  bank  of  the  Guadiana,  with  two 
squadrons  of  horse,  six  field-pieces,  and  three  brigade? 
of  infantry,  and  the  formation  of  the  dep  t  of  the  siege 
was  commenced  i)y  the  engineers  and  artillery. 

On  the  7th  the  remainder  of  the  inf^mtry.  reinforced 
by  two  thousand  Spaniards  under  Carlos  d'Espaiia,  en- 
camped in  the  woods  near  the  fortress ;  Madden's 
Portuguese  remained  in  observation  near  Merida,  and 
a  troop  of  horse-artillery  arriving  from  Lisbon  was 
attached  to  the  English  cavalry,  which  was  still  .ear 
Los  Santos  and  Zafra.  The  flying  bridge  was  at  first 
brought  up  from  Jerumenha,  and  re-established  ncai 
the  mouth  of  the  Caya,  but  was  again  drawn  over, 
because  the  right  bank  of  the  Guadiana  being  still 
open,  some  French  horse  bad  come  down  the  river. 

'I'he  8th  general  Lundey  invested  Christoval  on  the 
right  bank,  with  a  brigade  of  the  second  division,  four 
light  Spanish  guns,  the  seventeenth  Portuguese  infant- 


348 


NAPIER'S    PEN1.NS[!LAR    WAR. 


[Book  XII. 


try,  and  two  squadrons  of  horse  dratted  from  the 
garrison  of  Elvas.  Those  troop?  did  not  arrive  sinnul- 
taneously  at  the  point  of  assembly,  which  dehiyed  the 
operation,  and  sixty  French  dragoons  moving^  under  the 
fire  of  the  place  maintained  a  sharp  skirmish  beyond  the 
walls. 

Thus  the  first  serious  sieoe  undertaken  by  the  Brit- 
ish army  in  the  Peninsula  was  commenced,  and,  to  the 
discredit  of  the  Enirlish  government,  no  army  was 
ever  so  ill  provided  wiih  the  means  of  prosecuting 
such  an  enterprise.  Th  ■  engineer  officers  were  exceed- 
ingly zealous,  and.  notwithstanding  some  defects  in 
the  constitution  and  customs  of  their  corps,  tending 
rather  to  make  regimental  than  practical  scientific  ofli- 
cers,  many  of  them  were  very  well  versed  in  the  theo- 
ry of  their  business.  But  the  ablest  trembled  when 
reflecting  on  their  titter  destitution  of  all  that  belonged 
to  real  service.  Without  a  corps  of  sappers  and  mi- 
ners, without  a  single  private  who  knew  how  to  carry 
on  an  approach  under  firi^  they  were  compelled  to 
attack  fortresses  defended  by  the  most  warlike,  prac- 
tised, and  scientific  troops  of  the  age:  the  best  officers 
and  the  finest  soldiers  were  obliged  to  sacrifice  them- 
selves in  a  lamentable  manner,  to  compensate  for  the 
negligence  and  incapa'-ity  of  a  government,  always 
ready  to  plunge  the  nation  into  war,  without  the  slight- 
est care  of  what  was  necessary  to  obtain  success. 
The>  sieges  carried  on  by  the  British  in  Spain  were  a 
succession  of  butchr'ries.  because  the  commonest  ina- 
terials  and  th<^  means  necessary  for  their  art  were  de- 
nied to  the  engineers. 

Colonel  Fletcher's  plan  was  to  breach  the  castle  of 
Badajos,  while  batteries  established  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  Guadiana  should  take  the  defence  in  reverse, 
and  false  attarks  against  the  Pardaleras  and  Picurina 
were  also  to  be  commenced  bv  re-npening  the  French 
trenches.  It  was,  however,  necessarv  to  reduce  the  fort 
of  Christoval  ere  the  batteries  for  ruining  the  defences 
of  the  cast'e  could  he  erected.  In  double  operations, 
whether  of  the  field  or  of  siege,  it  is  essential  to  move 
with  an  exact  concert,  lest  the  enemy  should  crush  each 
in  detail;  but  neither  in  the  investment  nor  in  the 
attack  was  this  maxim  regarded.  Captain  Squire, 
although  ill  provided  with  tools,  was  directed  to  com- 
mence a  battery  against  Christoval  on  the  night  of  the 
Rth,  under  a  bright  moon,  and  at  the  distance  of  only 
four  hundred  yards  from  the  rampart.  Exposed  to 
a  destructive  fire  of  musketry  from  the  fort,  and  of 
shot  and  shells  froin  the  town,  he  continued  to  work, 
with  great  loss,  until  the  10th,  when  the  enemy, 
making  a  furious  sally,  carrie:!  his  battery  ;  the  French 
were,  indeed,  immediately  driven  back,  but  the  allies 
pursuing  too  hotly,  were  taken  in  front  and  flank  with 
grape,  and  lost  four  hundred  men. ,  Thus  five  engineers 
and  seven  hundred  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  line 
were  already  on  the  long  and  bloody  list  of  victims 
offered  to  this  Moloch,  and  only  one  small  battery 
against  a  small  outwork  was  completed  !  On  the  11th 
it  opened,  and  before  sunset  the  fire  of  the  enemy  had 
disabled  four  of  its  five  g-uns,  and  killed  many  more  of 
the  besiegers.  Nor  could  any  other  result  be  expect- 
ed, seein?  that  this  sinirle  work  was  exp'Sed  to  the 
undivided  fire  of  the  fortress,  for  the  approaches  ngainsl 
the  castle  were  not  yet  commenced,  and  two  distant 
batteries  on  the  false  attacks  scarcely  attracted  the 
notice  of  the  enemy. 

To  check  future  sallies,  a  second  battery  was  erect- 
ed against  the  bridge-head,  but  this  was  also  over- 
matched, and  meanwhile  Beresford,  having  received 
intelligence  that  the  French  army  was  again  in  inove- 
meni.  aTcsted  the  progress  of  all  the  works.  On  the 
12th.  believing  this  information  preioature.  he  resumed 
the  labour,  directing  the  trenches  to  be  opened  against 
the  castle.  The  intelligence  was,  however,  true,  and 
being  confirmed  at  twelve  o'clock  in  the  night,  the 


working  parties  were  again  drawn  off,  and  measures 
taken  to  raise  the  siege. 

soult's  second  expedition  to  estremadura. 

The  duke  of  Dalmatia  resolved  to  succour  Badajos 
the  moment  he  heard  of  Beresford's  being  in  Estrema- 
dura, and  the  tardiness  of  the  latter  had  not  only  given 
the  garrison  time  to  organize  a  defence,  but  had  per- 
mitted the  French  generil  to  tranquillise  his  province 
and  arrange  a  system  of  resistance  to  the  allied  army 
in  the  Isla.  With  that  view,  Soult  had  commenced 
additional  fortifications  at  Seville,  and  renewed  the 
construction  of  those  which  had  been  suspended  in 
other  places  by  the  battle  of  Barosa.  H(!  thus  deceivet" 
Beresford,  who  believed  that,  far  from  thinking  to  re- 
lieve Badajos,  he  was  trembling  for  his  own  province. 
Nothing  could  be  more  fallacious.  There  were  seventy 
thousand  fighting  men  in  Andalusia,  and  Drouet,  who 
had  quitted  Massena  immediately  after  the  battle  of 
Fuentes  Onoro,  was  likewise  in  march  for  that  prov- 
ince by  the  wav  of  Avila  and  Toledo,  bringing  with 
him  eleven  thousand  men. 

All  things  being  ready,  Soult  quitted  Seville  the 
10th,  with  three  thousand  heavy  dragoons,  thirty  guns, 
and  two  strong  brigades  of  infantry  under  the  command 
of  general  Werle  and  general  (Jodinot,  This  force, 
which  was  composed  of  troops  drawn  from  the  first  and 
fiurth  corps  asid  from  the  reserve  of  Dessolles,  entered 
Olalla  the  lllh,  and  was  there  joined  by  general  Ma- 
ransin  ;  but  Godinot  marched  by  Constantino  to  rein- 
force the  fifth  corps,  which  was  falling  back  froia 
Guadalcanal  in  consequence  of  Colborne's  operation^. 
The  13th  the  junction  was  effected  with  Lalour  Mau- 
bourg,  who  assumed  the  command  of  the  heavy  caval- 
ry, while  Girard  taking  that  of  the  fifth  corps,  advanced 
to  Los  Santos,  The  14th  the  French  head-quarters 
reached  Villa  Franca.  Being  then  within  thirty  miles  of 
Badajos,  Soult  caused  his  heaviest  guns  to  fire  salvos 
during  the  night,  to  give  notice  of  his  approach  to  the 
garrison,  but  the  expedient  failed  of  success,  and  the 
15th,  in  the  evening,  his  army  was  concentrated  at 
Santa  Marta. 

Beresford,  as  I  have  before  said,  remained  in  a  state 
of  uncertainty  until  the  night  of  the  I'^th,  when  he 
commenced  raising  the  siege,  contrary  to  the  earnest 
representations  of  the  engineers,  who  promised  to  pnl 
him  in  possession  of  the  place  in  three  davs,  if  he  would 
persevere.  This  promise  was  ill-founded,  and.  if  it 
had  been  otherwise,  Soult  would  have  surprised  him 
in  the  trenches :  his  firmness,  therefore,  saved  the 
army,  and  his  arrangements  for  carrying  off  the  stores 
were  admirably  executed.  The  artillery  and  the  plat- 
forms were  removed  in  the  night  of  the  13th,  and,  at 
twelve  o'clock,  on  the  15th,  all  the  guns  and  stores  on 
the  left  bank,  having  been  passed  over  the  Guadiana, 
the  gabions  and  fascines  were  burnt,  and  the  flying- 
bridge  removed.  These  transactions  were  completely 
masked  by  the  fourth  division,  which,  with  the  Span- 
iards, continued  to  maintain  the  investment;  it  was 
not  until  the  rear  guard  was  ready  to  draw  off,  that  the 
French,  in  a  sally,  after  severely  handling  the  pio<)uet3 
of  Harvey's  Portuguese  brigade,  learned  that  the 
siege  was  raised,  but  of  the  cause  they  were  still  ig- 
norant. 

Beresford  held  a  conference  with  the  Spanish  gen- 
erals at  Valverde,  on  the  13th,  when  it  was  agreed  tc 
receive  battle  at  the  village  of  Albuera.  Ballasteros' 
and  Blake's  corps  having  already  formed  a  junction  at 
Haracotta,  were  then  falling  back  upon  Almendral,  and 
Blake  engaged  to  bring  thiMii  into  line  at  Albuera, 
before  twelve  o'clock,  on  the  15th.  Meanwhile,  as 
l^adajos  was  the  centre  of  an  arc,  sweei^'^g  through 
Valverde,  AUiuera,  and  Talavera  Real,  it  was  arranged 
that  Blake's  army  should  watch  the  mads  on  the  right, 
the  British  and  the  fifth  Spanish  army  those  leading 


1811.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


349 


opon  the  centre :  and  that  Madden's  Portuguese  cav- 
nlvy  should  ohserve  those  on  the  left,  conductinfr 
tlirouorh  'I'alavera  Real.  The  main  body  of  the  British 
being  in  the  woods  near  Valverde,  could  reach  Alhue- 
ra  by  a  h;ilf  msrch,  and  no  part  of  the  arc  was  more 
than  four  leagues  from  Badajos,  but  the  enemy  being,  on 
the  14th,  still  at  Los  Santos,  was  eight  leagues  distant 
from  Alhuera  ;  hence,  Beresford,  thinking  that  he  could 
not  be  forestalled  on- any  point,  of  importance  to  the 
a'lies,  continued  to  keep  the  fourth  division  in  the 
trenches.  Colhorne's  moveable  column  joined  the 
army  on  the  14th,  Maddrn  then  retired  to  Talavera 
Re.il,  and  Blake's  army  reached  Almendral.  Mean- 
while the  allied  cavalry,  under  general  Long,  had  fallen 
back  before  the  enemy  from  Zafra  and  Los  Santos,  to 
Santa  Marta,  and  was  there  joined  by  the  dragoons  of 
the  fiurth  army. 

In  the  morning  of  the  15th,  the  British  occupied  the 
left  of  tlie  position  of  Alhuera,  which  was  a  ridge 
about  four  miles  long,  having  the  Aroya  Val  de  Se- 
villa  in  rear  and  the  Alhuera  river  in  front.  The  right 
of  the  army  was  prolonged  towards  Almendral,  the 
left  towards  Badajos,  and  the  accent  from  the  river  was 
easy,  the  ground  being  in  all  part?  practicable  for 
cavalry  and  artillery.  Somewhat  in  advance  of  the 
centre  were  the  bridge  and  village  of  Alhuera,  tlie 
former  commanded  by  a  battery,  the  latter  occupied  by 
Allen's  brigade.  The  second  division,  under  general 
William  Stewart,  was  drawn  up  in  one  !ine,  the  right 
on  a  commanding  hill  over  which  the  Valverde  road 
passed  ;  the  left  on  the  road  of  Badajos,  beyond  which 
the  order  of  battle  was  continued  in  two  lines,  by  the 
Portuguese  troops  under  general  Hamilton  and  colonel 
(Collins. 

The  right  of  the  position,  which  was  stronger,  and 
hiijber,  and  broader  than  any  other  part,  was  left  open 
for  Blake's  army,  because  Beresford,  thinking  the  hill 
on  the  Valverde  road  to  be  the  key  of  the  position,  as 
prote.cting  his  only  line  of  retreat,  was  desirous  to 
se:ure  it  with  the  best  troop'.  The  fourth  division 
and  the  infantry  of  the  fifth  army  were  still  before 
Badajos.  General  Cole  had  orders  to  send  the  seven- 
teenth Portuguese  regiment  to  Elvas,  and  to  throw  a 
battilion  of  Spaniards  into  Olivenza;  to  bring  his 
second  brigade,  which  was  before  Christoval,  over  the 
Ouadiana,  by  a  ford  above  Badajos,  if  practicable, 
and  to  be  in  readiness  to  march  at  the  first  notice. 

In  this  posture  of  affairs,  about  three  o'clock  in 
the  evening  of  the  15lh,  while  Beresf  rd  was  at  some 
distance  on  the  left,  the  whole  mass  of  the  allied 
cavalrv,  closely  followed  by  the  French  light  horse- 
men, came  in  from  Santa  Marta,  and  as  no  infantry 
were  posted  beyond  the  Albaera  to  support  them,  they 
passed  that  river.  Thus  the  wooded  heights  on  the 
right  bank  were  abandoned  to  the  enemy,  and  his  force 
and  dispositions  being  thereby  effectually  concealeil, 
the  strenath  of  the  allies'  position  was  already  sapped. 
Beresford  immediately  formed  a  temporar)'^  right  wing 
with  the  cavalry  and  artillery,  stretching  his  picquets 
along  the  road  to  Almendral,  and  sending  officers  to 
hasten  Blake's  movements  ;  but  that  general,  who  had 
only  a  few  miles  of  good  road  to  march,  and  who  had 
promised  to  be  in  line  at  noon,  did  not  reach  the 
ground  before  eleven  at  night,  and  his  rear  was  not 
there  before  three  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  IGth  ; 
meanwhile,  as  tlie  enemy  was  evidently  in  force  on  the 
Alhuera  road.  Cole  and  Madden  were  ordered  up.  The 
elders  failed  to  reach  the  latter,  but,  at  six  o'clock  in 
the  morning,  the  former  arrived  on  the  position  with 
the  infantry  of  the  fifth  army,  two  squadrons  of  Portu- 
guese cavalry,  and  two  brigades  of  the  fourth  division  ; 
the  third  brigade,  under  colonel  Kemmis,  being  unable 
to  cross  the  Guadiana,  above  Badajos,  was  in  march 
by  Jerumenha.  The  Spanish  troops  immediately  join- 
ed [ilake  on  the  ndd,  the  t.vo  brigades  of  lae  fourth 


division,  were  drawn  up  in  columns  behind  the  second 
division,  and  the  Portuguese  squadrons  reinforced  colo* 
nel  Otway,  whose  horsemen,  of  the  same  nation,  were 
pushed  forward  in  front  of  the  left  wing.  The  mass 
of  the  cavalry  was  concentrated  behind  the  centre,  and 
Beresford,  dissatisfied  with  general  Long,  ordered 
general  Lumley  to  assume  the  chief  command. 

The  position  was  now  occupied  by  thirty  thousand 
infantry,  above  two  thousand  cavalry,  and  thirty-eight 
pieces  of  artillery,  of  which  eighteen  were  nine-pound- 
ers ;  but,  the  brigade  of  the  fourth  division  being  stiU 
absent,  the  British  infantry,  the  pith  and  strength  of 
battle,  did  not  exceed  seven  thousand,  and  already 
Blake's  arrogance  was  shaking  Beresford's  authority. 
The  French  had  fifty  guns,  and  above  four  thousand 
veteran  cavalry,  hut  only  nineteen  thousand  chosen  in- 
fantry ;  yet  being  of  one  nation,  obedient  to  one  disci- 
pline, and  animated  by  one  spirit,  their  excellent  com- 
position amply  compensated  for  the  inferiority  of  num- 
bers, and  their  general's  talent  was  immeasurably 
greater  than  his  adversary's. 

Soult  examined  Beresford's  position,  without  hin- 
drance, on  the  evening  of  the  15th,  and  having  heard 
that  the  fourth  division  was  left  before  Badajos,  and 
that  Blake  would  not  arrive  before  the  17th,  he  resolved 
to  attack  the  next  morning,  for  he  had  detected  all  the 
weakness  of  the  English  general's  position  of  battle. 

The  hill  in  the  centre,  commanding  the  Valverde 
road,  was  undoubtedly  the  key  of  the  position  if  ar> 
attack  was  made  parallel  to  the  front.  But  the  heights 
on  the  rifrht  presented  a  rough  sort  of  broken  table- 
land, tending  backwards  towards  the  Valverde  road, 
and  looking  into  the  rear  of  the  line  of  battle  ;  hence 
it  was  evident  that,  if  a  mass  of  troops  could  be 
placed  there,  they  must  be  beaten,  or  the  right  wing 
of  the  allied  army  would  be  rolled  up  on  the  centre 
and  pushed  into  the  narrow  valley  of  the  Aroya  :  the 
Valverde  road  could  then  be  seized,  the  retreat  cut, 
and  the  powerful  cavalry  of  the  French  would  com- 
plete the  victory.  Now  the  right  of  the  allies  and  the 
left  of  the  French  approximated  to  each  other,  being 
only  divided  by  a  hill,  about  cannon-shot  distance  from 
either  but  separated  from  the  allies  by  the  Alhuera,  and 
from  the  French  by  a  rivulet  called  the  Feria.  This 
height,  neglected  by  Beresford,  was  ably  made  use  of 
by  Soult.  During  the  nipht  he  placed  behind  it,  the 
artillery  under  general  Ruty,  the  fifth  corps  under 
Girard,  and  the  heavy  dragoons  under  Latour  Mau- 
bourg.  He  thus  concentrated  fifteen  thousand  men  and 
forty  guns  within  ten  minutes'  march  of  Beresford's 
right  wing,  and  yet  that  general  could  neither  see  a 
man  nor  draw  a  sound  conclusion  as  to  the  real  plan 
of  attack. 

The  liffht  cavalry,  the  brigades  of  Godinot  and 
Werle,  and  ten  guns,  still  remained  at  the  French 
marshal's  disposal.  These  he  formed  in  the  woods, 
extending  along  the  banks  of  the  Feria  towards  its 
confluence  with  the  Alhuera.  Werle  was  to  keep  in 
reserve;  but  Godinot  was  to  attack  the  village  and 
bridge,  and  to  bear  strongly  against  the  centre  of  the 
position,  with  a  view  to  attract  Beresford's  attention,  to 
separate  his  wings,  and  to  double  up  bis  right  at  the 
moment  when  the  principal  attack  should  be  developed. 

BATTLE  OK  ALBUERA. 

During  the  night,  Blake  and  Cole,  as  we  have  seen, 
arrived  with  above  sixteen  thousand  men,  but  so  de- 
fective was  the  occupation  of  the  ground,  that  Soult 
had  no  change  to  make  in  his  plans  from  this  circum- 
stance, and,  a  little  before  nine  o'clock  in  the  morning, 
Godinot's  division  issued  from  the  woods  in  one  heavy 
column  of  attack,  i)receded  by  ten  guns.  He  was 
flanked  by  the  right  cavalry,  and  followed  by  Werle's 
division  of  reserve,  and,  making  straight  towards  the 
bridge,  commenced  a  s'larp  cannonade,  attempting  to 


350 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XII. 


force  the  passage;  at  the  same  time  Briche,  with  two 
regiments  of  hussars,  drew  further  down  the  river  to 
observe  colonel  Otway's  horse. 

Dickson's  ^uns  posted  on  the  rising  ground  above 
the  village  answered  the  fire  of  the  French,  and 
ploughed  through  their  columns,  which  were  crowd- 
ing without  judgement  towards  the  bridge,  although 
the  stream  was  passable  above  and  helow.  Beresford 
observing  that  Werle's  division  did  not  follow  closely, 
was  soon  convinced  that  the  principal  effort  would  be 
on  the  right,  and  he,  therefore,  ordered  Blake  to  form 
a  part  of  the  first  and  all  the  second  line  of  the  Span- 
ish army,  on  the  broad  part  of  the  hills,  at  right  angles 
to  their  actual  front.  Then  drawing  the  Portuguese 
infantry  of  the  left  wing  to  the  centre,  he  sent  one 
brigade  down  to  support  Alten,  and  directed  general 
Hainiltnn  to  hold  the  remainder  in  columns  of  batta- 
lions, reidy  to  move  to  any  part  of  the  field.  The 
thirteenth  dragoons  were  posted  near  the  edge  of  the 
river,  above  the  brid<re,  and,  meanwhile,  the  second 
division  marched  to  support  Blake.  The  horse-artille- 
ry, the  heavy  dragoons,  and  the  fourth  division  also 
took  ground  to  the  rijht.  and  were  posted,  the  cavalry 
and  guns  on  a  small  plain  behind  the  Aroya,  and  the 
fourth  division  in  an  oblique  line  about  half  musket 
shot  behind  them.  This  done,  Beresford  galloped  to 
Blake,  for  that  general  had  refused  to  change  his  front, 
and,  with  greU  heat,  told  colonel  Hardinge,  ihe  bearer 
of  the  order,  that  the  real  attack  was  at  the  village  and 
bridge.  Beresford  had  sent  again  to  entreat  that  he 
would  obey,  but  this  messao;^  was  as  fruitless  as  the 
former,  and.  when  the  marshal  arrived,  nothing  had 
been  done.  The  enemy's  columns  were,  however,  now 
beginningr  to  appear  on  the  right,  and  Blake  yielding 
to  this  evidence,  proceeded  to  make  the  evolution,  yet 
with  such  pedantic  slowness,  that  Beresford,  impatient 
of  his  folly,  took  the  direction  in  person. 

Great  was  the  confusicr  and  the  delay  thus  oc- 
casioned, and  ere  the  troops  were  completely  formed 
the  French  were  amongrst  ^hem.  For  scarcely  had 
Godinot  e.igfaged  Alton's  brigade,  when  Werle,  leaving 
only  a  battalion  of  o-renadiers  and  some  squadrons  to 
watch  the  thirleeiuh  draooons  and  to  connect  the  at- 
tacks, countermnrched  with  the  remainder  of  his  di- 
vision, and  rapidly  gained  the  rear  of  the  fifth  corps  as 
it  was  mounting  the  hills  on  the  right  of  the  allies. 
At  the  same  time  the  mass  of  lijht  cavalry  suddenly 
quitted  Godinct's  column,  and  crossing  the  river  AJ- 
buera  above  the  bridge,  ascended  the  left  h:ink  at  a 
ga'lop,  and,  sweeping  round  the  rear  of  the  fifth  corps, 
joined  Laiour  Maubourir,  who  was  already  in  face  of 
Luniley's  squadrons,  'i'hus  half  an  hour  had  sufficed 
to  render  Beresford's  position  nearly  desperate.  Two- 
thirds  of  the  French  were  in  a  compact  order  of  battle 
on  a  line  perpendicular  to  his  right,  and  his  armv,  dis- 
ordered and  composed  of  different  nations,  was  still  in 
the  difficult  act  of  changring  its  front.  It  was  in  vain 
that  ho  endeavoured  to  keep  the  Spani^.h  line  suTicifnt- 
ly  in  advanf^e  to  rrive  room  on  the  summit  of  the  hill 
for  the  second  division  to  support  it ;  the  French  guns 
opened,  their  infan'ry  threw  out  a  heavy  muskctrv  fire, 
and  their  cavalry,  outflanking  the  front,  and  menacing 
to  charge  h^re  and  there,  put  t!ie  Spaniards  in  disorder 
at  all  points,  thf-y  fell  fast,  and  they  gave  back.  Soult, 
thinkin?  the  whole  army  was  yieldintr,  then  pushed 
forward  his  columns,  his  reserves  mounted  the  hill  be- 
hind him,  am!  general  Ruly  placed  all  the  batteries  in 
position. 

Al  this  critical  moment  general  William  Stewart  ar- 
rived at  the  foot  of  the  he-ight,  with  colonel  Colborne's 
briirade,  which  formed  the  head,  and  was  the  most  ad- 
vanf'ed  jart  of  the  second  division.  'J'he  colonel,  s(>einj 
the  confusion  above,  desired  to  form  in  order  of  bat- 
tle previous  to  mounting  Ihe  accent,  but  Stewart, 
whose  boilin^j  courage  overlaid  his  judgre'cnt,  led  up,  i 


without  hesitation,  in  column  of  companies,  and  hav- 
ing passed  the  Spanish  right,  attempted  to  open  out 
his  line  in  succession  as  the  battalions  arrived  at  the 
summit.  Being  under  a  destructive  fire  the  foremost 
troops  charged,  but  a  heavy  rain  prevented  any  object 
from  being  distinctly  seen,  and  four  regiments  of  hus- 
sars and  lancers,  which  had  turned  the  right  flank  in 
the  obscurity,  came  galloping  in  upon  the  rear  of  the 
line  at  the  instant  of  its  developement,  and  slew  or 
took  two-thirds  of  the  brigade.  One  battalion  only 
(the  thirty-first)  being  still  in  column,  escaped  tho 
storm  and  maintained  its  ground,  while  the  Fiench 
horsemen,  riding  violently  over  every  thing  else,  pen- 
etrated to  all  parts,  and  captured  six  guns.  In  the 
tumult,  a  lancer  fell  upon  Beresford  ;  the  marshal, 
a  man  of  great  strength,  putting  his  spear  aside 
cast  him  from  his  saddle,  and  a  shift  of  wind  blowing 
aside  the  mist  and  smoke,  the  mischief  was  perceived 
from  the  plains  by  general  Lumley,  who  sent  four 
squadrons  out  upon  the  lancers  and  cut  many  of  them 
off.  Penne  Villemur's  cavalry  were  also  directed  to 
charge,  and  galloped  forward,  but  when  within  a  few 
yards  wheeled  round  and  fled. 

During  this  first  unhappy  effort  of  the  second  divis- 
ion, so  great  was  the  disorder,  that  the  Spanish  line 
continued  to  fire  without  cessation,  although  the  Biit- 
ish  were  before  them.  Beresford,  finding  his  exhorta- 
tions to  advance,  fruitless,  seized  an  ensign  and  bore 
him  and  his  colours,  by  main  force,  to  the  front,  j'et 
the  troops  would  not  follow,  and  the  man  went  back 
aofnin  on  being  released.  In  this  crisis,  the  wi^ather, 
which  had  ruined  Colborne's  brigade,  also  prevented 
Soult  from  seeing  the  whole  extent  of  the  field  of  hat- 
tie,  and  he  still  kept  his  heavj' columns  together.  His 
cavalry,  indeed,  began  to  hem  in  that  of  the  allies, 
but  the  fire  of  the  horse-artillery  enabled  Lumley, 
covered  as  he  was  by  the  bed  of  the  Aroya  and  sup- 
ported by  the  fourth  division,  to  check  them  on  the 
plain,  Colborne  still  remained  on  the  height  with  the 
thirty-first  regiment,  the  British  artillery,  under  major 
Jiilius  Harlman,  was  coming  fast  into  action,  ar,d 
William  Stewart,  who  had  escaped  the  charge  of  the 
lancers,  was  again  moimting  the  hill  with  general 
Houghton's  brigade,  which  he  brounrdt  on  with  the 
same  vehemence,  but,  instructed  by  his  previous  mis- 
fortune, in  a  juster  order  of  battle.  The  weathei 
now  cleared,  and  a  dreadful  fire  poured  into  the  thick- 
est of  the  French  columns  convinced  Soult  that  the 
dav  was  yet  to  be  won. 

Houghton's  regiments  reached  the  height  under  a 
very  heavy  cannonade,  and  the  twenty-ninth  regiment 
was  charged  on  the  flank  by  the  lancers,  but  major 
Way,  wheelinof  back  two  companies,  foiled  their  attack 
with  a  sharp  fire.  The  remaining  brig-de  of  the  second 
division  then  came  up  on  the  left,  and  the  Spanish 
corps  of  Zayas  and  Ballasteros  at  last  moved  forward. 
Hartman's  artillery  was  now  in  full  play,  and  the  ene- 
iny's  infantry  recoiled,  hut  soon  recovering,  renewed 
the  fight  with  jreater  violence  than  before.  The  can- 
non on  both  sides  di^charorcd  showers  of  grape  at  half 
rann-p,  the  peals  of  musketry  were  incessant,  and  often 
within  pistol-shot,  b\it  the  close  formation  of  the  French 
embarrassed  th;=ir  battle,  and  the  British  line  m  ou  li 
not  yield  them  one  inch  of  ground,  nor  a  momen*  of 
lime  to  open  their  ranks.  Tlieir  fighting  was,  how(  ver, 
fierce  and  dangerous.  Stewart  was  twice  wounded, 
colonel  Duckworth,  of  the  forty-eighth,  was  slain,  and 
the  gallant  Houghton,  who  had  r''ceived  many  wounds 
without  shrinkincT,  fell  and  died  in  the  act  of  cheering 
his  men.  Still  the  struggle  continued  with  unabated 
fury.  Colonel  Intrlis,  twentv-two  officers,  and  mor.'. 
than  four  hundred  men.  out  of  five  hundred  and  seventy 
that  had  mounted  the  bill,  fi'U  in  the  fifty-seventh  alone, 
and  the  other  regiments  were  scarcely  better  off;  not 
one-ihird  were  standing  in  any,  their  ammunition  failed, 


I811.J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


351 


and  as  the  Enerlish  fire  slackeripd.  the  enemy  establish- 
ed a  column  in  advance  upon  the  rig'lit  flank.  The 
play  of  the  artillery  indeed  checked  them  a  moment, 
but  in  this  dreadful  crisis  Beresford  wavered  !  Destruc- 
tion stared  him  in  the  face,  his  personal  resources  were 
exhausted,  and  the  unhappy  thoujrht  of  a  retreat  rose 
in  his  a<jitated  mind.  He  had  before  brought  Hamil- 
ton's Portuguese  into  a  situation  to  cover  a  retrograde 
movement,  and  he  now  sent  orders  to  general  Alten  to 
abandon  the  bridge  and  village  of  Albuera,  and  to 
asseiiible  with  the  Portuguese  artillery,  in  such  a  posi- 
tion as  would  cover  a  retreat  by  the  Valverde  road. 
l^nt  while  the  marshal  was  thus  preparing  to  resign 
the  contest,  colonel  Hardinge  boldly  ordered  general 
Cole  to  advance  with  the  fourth  division,  and  then 
riding  to  that  brigade  of  the  second  division  which  was 
under  the  command  of  colonel  Abercrombie,  and  which 
had  been  only  slightly  engager!,  directed  him  also  to 
push  forward  into  the  fight.  The  die  being  thus  cast, 
IJeresford  acquiesced.  Alten  received  orders  to  retake 
the  villaire.  and  this  terrible  battle  was  continued. 

The  fourth  division  was  comjiosed  of  two  brigades, 
the  one  of  Portuguese  under  general  Harvey,  the  other 
commanded  by  sir  William  Myers,  consisted  of  the 
seventh  and  twenty-third  regiments,  and  was  called 
the  fuzileer  brigade.  Harvey's  Portuguese  being  im- 
mediately pushed  in  between  Lumley's  dragoons  and 
the  hill,  were  charged  by  some  French  cavalry,  whom 
they  beat  otf,  and  meanwhile  general  Cole  led  the  fu- 
zileers  up  the  contested  height.  At  this  time  six 
guns  were  in  the  enemy's  possession,  the  whole  of 
Werle's  reserves  were  coming  fcrward  to  reinforce 
the  front  column  of  the  French,  the  remnant  of  Hough- 
ton's brigade  could  no  lonrrer  maintain  its  ground,  the 
field  was  heaped  with  carcasses,  the  lancers  were  riding 
furiously  about  the  captured  artillery  on  the  upper 
parts  of  the  hill,  and  behind  all,  Hamilton's  Portu- 
guese and  Alten's  Germans,  withdrawing  from  the 
bridge,  seemed  to  be  in  full  retreat.  Cole's  fuzileers, 
flanked  by  a  battalion  of  the  Lusitanian  legion  under 
colonel  Hawkshawe,  soon  mounted  the  hill,  drove  off 
the  lancers,  recovered  five  of  the  captured  guns  and 
one  colour,  and  ajipeared  on  the  right  of  Houghton's 
brigade  precisely  as  Abercrombie  passed  it  on  the 
left. 

Such  a  gallant  line,  issuing  from  the  midst  of  the 
smoke,  and  rapidly  separating  itself  from  the  confused 
and  brr.ken  iimltitude,  startled  the  enemy's  heavy 
masses,  which  were  increasing  and  pressing  onwards 
as  to  an  assured  victory:  they  wavered,  hesitated,  and 
then  vomiting  forth  a  storm  of  fire,  hastily  endeavoured 
to  enlarffe  tlipir  front,  while  a  fearful  discharge  of  grape 
frrm  all  their  artillery  whistled  through  the  British 
ranks.  IMyers  was  killed.  Cole,  the  three  colonels, 
Ellis,  f^kikeney.  and  Hawkshawe,  fell  wounrled,  and 
the  fuzileer  baitalions,  struck  by  the  iron  tempest, 
reeled,  and  staggere<l  like  sinking  ships.  But  sudden- 
ly and  sternly  recovering,  they  closed  on  their  terrible 
enemies,  and  then  was  seen  with  what  a  streng'th  and 
majesty  the  British  soldier  fights.  In  vain  did  Soult, 
by  voice  and  gesture,  animate  his  Frenchmen ;  in 
vain  did  the  hardiest  veterans,  extricating  themselves 
from  the  crowded  columns,  sacrifice  their  lives  to  gain 
time  for  the  mass  to  open  out  on  such  a  fair  field  ; 
in  vain  did  the  mass  itself  bear  up,  and  fiercely  stri- 
ving, fire  indiscriminately  upon  friends  and  foes  while 
the  horsemen  hovering  on  the  flank  threatened  to  charge 
the  advancing  line.  Nothing  could  stop  that  astonish- 
ing infantry.  No  sudden  burst  of  undisciplined  val- 
our, no  nervous  enthusiasm,  weakened  the  stability 
of  their  order,  their  flashing  eyes  were  bent  on  the 
dark  columns  in  their  front,  their  measured  tread  shook 
the  rrround,  their  dreadful  volleys  swept  away  the  head 
of  every  formation,  their  deafening  shouts  overpowered 
the  dissonant  cries   that  broke  from   all   parts   of  tlie 


tumultuous  crowd,  as  slowly  and  with  a  horrid  cat 
uage,  it  was  pushed  by  the  incessant  vigour  of  the 
attack  to  the  farthest  edge  of  the  height.  There,  the 
French  reserve,  mixing  with  the  struggling  multitude, 
endeavoured  to  sustain  the  fight,  but  the  effort  only 
increased  the  irremediable  confusion,  the  mighty  mass 
gave  way  and  like  a  loosened  cliff  went  headlong 
down  the  steep.  The  rain  flowed  after  in  streams 
discoloured  with  blood,  and  fifteen  hundred  unwounded 
men,  the  remnant  of  six  thousand  unconf|uerahle  Brit- 
ish soldiers,  stood  triumphant  on  the  fatal  hill ! 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Continuation  of  the  bittle  of  Albuera — Dreadfi:!  state  of  1  -c« 
armies — Soult  retreats  to  Solano — General  Hamilton  lesunirs 
the  investment  of  Badajos — Lorfl  Wellington  reaches  the 
field  of  battle — Thinl  and  seventh  divisions  arrive — Beresford 
follows  Sonlt — The  latter  abandons  the  castle  of  Vill:dl>a 
and  retreats  to  Lerena — Cavalry  action  atUsagie — T?erts!"ora 
quits  the  army — (Jeneral  Hill  reassunies  the  command  of  the  ** 
second  division,  and  Lord  Wcllinjjton  renews  the  siege  of 
Badajos — Observations. 

While  the  fuzileers  were  striving  on  the  height, 
the  cavalry  and  Harvey's  brigade  continually  advanced, 
and  Latour  Maubourg's  dragoons,  battered  by  Lefebre's 
ofuns,  retired  before  them,  yet  still  throatrning  the 
fuzileers  with  their  right,  while  with  their  left  they 
prevented  Lumley's  horsemen  from  fallinjr  m  the  de- 
feated infantry.  Beresford,  seeing  that  colf^nel  Har- 
dinge's  decision  had  brought  on  the  critical  moment 
of  the  battle,  then  endeavoured  to  secure  a  favourable 
result.  Alten's  Germans  were  ordered  to  retake  the 
village,  which  they  effected  with  some  loss.  Blake's 
first  line,  which  had  not  been  at  all  engaged,  was 
directed  to  support  them,  and  Hamilton's  and  Collins's 
Portuguese,  forming  a  mass  of  ten  thousand  fresh 
men,  were  brought  up  to  support  the  attack  of  the 
fuzileers  and  Abf-rcrombie's  brigade;  and  at  the  same 
lime  the  Spanish  divisions  of  Zayas,  Ballastoros,  aed 
Espaiia  advanced.  Nevertheless,  so  rapid  was  the 
execution  of  the  fuzileers,  that  the  enemy's  infantry 
were  never  attained  by  these  reserves,  which  yet  suf- 
fered severely  ;  for  general  Ruty  got  the  French  guns 
all  together,  and  worked  them  with  prodigious  activity, 
while  the  fifth  corps  still  made  head;  and  v^'hen  the 
day  was  irrevocably  lost,  he  regained  the  other  side  of 
the  Albuera,  and  protected  the  passage  of  the  broken 
infantry. 

Beresford,  being  too  hardly  handled  to  pursue, 
firmed  a  fresh  line  with  his  Portugue-e,  parallel  to 
the  hill  from  whence  Soult  had  advance  1  to  the  attack 
in  the  morning,  and  where  the  French  troops  were 
now  rallying  with  their  usual  celerity.  Meanwhile 
the  fight  continued  at  the  bridge,  but  Godinot"s  divis- 
ion and  the  connecting  battalion  of  grenadiers  on  that 
side  were  soon  afterwards  withdrawn,  and  the  action 
terminated  before  three  o'clock. 

The  serious  fighting  had  endured  only  four  hours, 
and  in  that  space  of  time,  nearly  seven  thousand  of 
the  allies  and  above  eight  thousand  of  their  adversa 
ries  were  struck  down.  Three  French  generals  were 
wounded,  two  slain,  and  eight  hundred  soldiers  sc 
badly  hurt  as  to  be  left  on  the  field.  On  Heresford's 
side  only  two  thousand  Spaniards,  and  six  hundred 
Germans  and  Portuguese,  were  killed  or  wounded, 
and  hence  it  is  olain  with  what  a  resolution  the  pure 
British  fought,  for  they  had  only  fiftpcn  hundred  men 
left  standing!  The  laurel  is  nobly  won  when  the 
exhausted  victor  reels  as  he  places  it  on  his  bleeding 
front. 

The  trophies  of  the  French  were  five  hundrod  un- 
woundi  '   prisoners,  a  howitzer,  and  several  stand  ol" 


353 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XII. 


colours.  The  British  had  nothing  of  tliat  kind  to  boast 
of,  but  the  horrid  piles  of  carcasses  within  their  lines 
told,  with  dreadful  eloquence,  who  were  the  conquer- 
ors; and  all  the  nijrht  the  rain  poured  down,  and  the 
river  and  the  hills  and  the  woods  on  each  side,  resound- 
ed with  the  dismal  clajnour  and  groans  of  dying  men. 
Beresford,  obliged  to  place  iiis  Portuguese  in  the  front 
line,  was  opprt^ssed  with  the  number  of  his  wounded  ; 
thev  far  exceeded  that  of  the  sound  amonsrst  the  Hritish 
soldiers,  and  when  the  latter's  jiicquets  were  established, 
few  men  remained  to  help  the  sntlerers.  In  this  cruel 
eiluati  n  he  sent  colonel  Hardinge  to  demand  assistance 
from  151ake;  but  wrath  and  mortified  pride  were  pre- 
dominant in  that  general's  breast,  and  he  refused,  sa3'ing, 
it  was  customary  with  allied  armies,  for  each  to  take 
care  of  its  own  men. 

Morning  came,  and  both  sides  remained  in  their 
respective  situations,  the  wounded  still  covering  the 
field  of  battle,  the  hostile  lines  still  menacing  and 
dangerous.  The  greater  mul'itude  had  fallen  on  the 
French  part,  but  the  best  soldiers  on  that  of  the  allies, 
and  the  dark  masses  of  Soult's  powerful  cavalry  and 
artillery,  as  tlie}^  covered  all  his  front,  seemed  alone 
able  t'l  contend  again  for  the  victory  :  the  rigfht  of  the 
French  also  appeared  to  threaten  the  Badajos  road, 
and  Beresford,  in  jloom  and  doubt,  awaited  another 
atta  k.  On  the  I7th,  however,  the  third  brigade  of  the 
fourth  division  came  up  by  a  forced  march  from  Jeru- 
menha,  and  enabled  the  second  division  to  retake  their 
former  ground  between  the  Valverde  and  the  Badajos 
roads.     On  the  18lh,  Soult  retreated. 

He  left  to  the  generosity  of  the  Eng-lish  general 
several  hundred  men  too  deeply  wounded  to  be  re- 
moved, but  all  that  could  travel  he  had,  in  the  night 
of  the  17th,  sent  towards  Seville,  by  the  royal  road, 
through  Santa  Marta,  Los  Santos,  and  Monasterio. 
Prolectinj  his  movements  with  all  his  horsemen  and 
six  battalions  of  infantry,  he  filed  the  army,  in  the 
mnrning.  to  its  right,  and  gained  the  road  of  Solano. 
When  this  flank  march  was  completed,  Latour  Mau- 
luiurg  covered  the  rear  with  the  heavy  dracroons,  and 
Bricho  protected  the  march  of  the  wounded  men  by 
the  royal  road. 

The  duke  of  Dalmatin  remained  the  l!Hh  at  Solano. 
His  iritentiou  was  to  hold  a  position  in  Estremadura 
until  he  could  receive  reinforcements  from  Andalusia  ; 
for  he  judged  truly  that,  nlthoufrb  Beresford  was  in  no 
condition  to  hurt  Badajos,  lord  Wellington  would  come 
down,  and  that  fresh  combats  would  be  required  to 
save  that  fortress.  On  the  14th  he  had  commenced 
repairinar  the  castle  of  Villalba,  a  large  structure  be- 
tween Almendralejos  and  Santa  Maria,  and  he  now 
continu^d  this  work,  designing  to  form  a  head  of  can- 
tonments, that  liie  allies  would  be  unable  to  take  before 
ih'"  French  armv  could  be  reinforced. 

When  Beresford  di -covered  the  enemy's  retreat,  be 
despatcbi'd  irn'>ral  Hamilton  to  make  a  show  of  re-in- 
vestinsr  Badajos,  which  was  effected  at  day-break  the 
the  inth,  but  on  the  left  bank  only.  Meanwhile  the 
allied  cavalry,  stipported  by  Alten's  Germans,  fol- 
lowed the  French  line  of  rf.treat.  Sonlt  then  trans- 
ferred bis  head-qmrfers  to  Fuent  ■  del  Maestre,  and  the 
Spanish  cavalry,  cutting  off  some  of  bi^  men,  menaced 
Villalba.  Lord  Wellington  reached  the  field  of  battle 
ih'^  same  day,  and,  aft  r  exaniininj  the  state  of  afl!'air<, 
desired  the  marshal  to  follow  the  enemy  cautiously  ; 
♦.hen  returninnr  to  Elvas  himself,  he  directed  the  third 
and  seventh  divi-ions,  which  were  already  at  (^ampo 
Miyor,  to  complete  the  re-investment  of  Badajos  on 
»hfi  'ight  bank. 

MeanwhiVe  Beresford  advanced  by  the  Solano  road  to 
Almendralejos,  where  he  found  some  more  wounded 
men.  His  further  progress  was  not  opposed.  The 
number  of  officers  who  had  fallen  in  the  French  army, 
tojjether  with  the  privations  endured,  had  produced  de- 


spondence and  discontent;  the  garrison  at  Villalba  was 
not  disposed  to  maintain  the  castle,  and  under  these 
circumstances,  the  duke  of  Daln;atia  evacuated  it,  and 
continued  his  own  retreat  in  the  direction  of  Llerena, 
where  he  assumed  a  position  on  the  2.3d.  and  placed 
his  cavalry  near  Usagre.  Tliis  abandonment  of  tbo 
royal  road  to  Seville  was  a  well-considered  movement. 
'I'he  country  through  which  Soult  passed  being  moro 
fruitful  and  open,  he  could  draw  greater  advantatre 
from  his  superior  cavalry,  the  mountains  behind  him 
were  so  strong  he  had  nothing  to  fear  from  an  attack, 
and  by  Belalcazar  and  Almaden,  he  could  maintain  a 
communication  with  La  Mancha,  from  whence  he  ex- 
pected Drouet's  division.  The  road  of  Guadalcanal^ 
was  in  his  rear,  by  which  he  could  draw  reinforce- 
ments from  Cordoba  and  from  the  fourth  corps,  and 
meanwhile  the  allies  durst  not  venture  to  expose  their 
left  flank  by  marching  on   Monasterio. 

From  Llerena,  a  detachment  was  sent  to  drive  away 
a  Spanish  Partida  corps  which  had  cut  Lis  communi- 
cations with  Guadalcanal,  and  at  the  same  time  Latour 
Maubourg  was  directed  to  scour  the  c(  uatry  beyond 
Usagre  ;  this  led  to  an  action.  'I'lic  town,  built  upon 
a  bill,  and  covered  towards  Los  Santos  by  a  river  with 
steep  and  rugged  banks,  had  only  the  one  outlet  by  the 
bridge  on  that  side,  and  when  Latour  Maubourg  ap- 
proached, Lumley  retired  across  the  river.  The  French 
light  cavalry  then  marched  along  the  right  bank,  with 
the  intention  of  crossing  lower  down  and  thus  cover- 
ing the  passage  of  the  heavy  horsemen  ;  but  before 
they  could  effect  this  object,  general  Bron  rashly  pass- 
ed the  river  with  two  regiments  of  dragoons,  and  drew 
up  in  line  just  beyond  the  bridge.  Lumley  was,  bow- 
ever,  lying  close  behind  a  rising  ground,  and  when  the 
French  regiments  had  advanced  a  sufficient  distance, 
Lefebre's  guns  opened  on  them,  and  the  third,  and 
fourth  dragoon  guards,  charged  them  in  front  while 
Madden's  Portuguese  fell  on  their  flank.  Th^y  were 
overthrown  at  the  first  shock,  and  fled  towards  the 
bridge,  which  being  choked  with  the  remainder  of  the 
cavalry  advancing  to  their  support,  the  fugitives  turned 
to  the  right  and  left,  and  endeavoured  to  save  them- 
selves amongst  some  gardens  situated  on  the  hanks  of 
the  river;  they  were  however,  pursued  and  sabred  un 
til  the  French  on  the  opposite  side,  seeing  ih^r  dis 
tress,  checked  the  attack  by  a  fire  of  carbines  and 
artillery.  Some  wounded  prisoners  w'ere  taken,  but 
a  Guerilla  party  which  had  not  joined  in  the  attack 
suddenly  massacred  them.  However  above  foily 
killed  in  fair  fight,  and  more  than  a  hundred  woued- 
ed,  attested  the  viijour  of  Lumley's  condurt  in  this 
affair,  which  terminated  Beresfcrd's  operations,  for 
the  miserable  state  to  which  the  Resency  had  redu- 
ced the  Portuguese  army  imperatively  called  for  the 
marshal's  presence  elsewhere.*  General  Hill,  who 
had  returned  to  Portun^al,  then  re-assunjcd  the  com- 
mand of  the  second  division,  amidst  the  eager  rejoj- 
cinjTs  of  the  troops,  and  lord  Wellington  directed  the 
renewed  siege  of  Badajos  in  person. 

OBSERVATIONS. 

No  general  ever  gained  a  great  battle  with  so  little 
increase  of  military  reputation  as  marshal  Beresford. 
His  personal  intrepidity  and  strength,  qtialities  so  at- 
tractive for  the  mu'titude,  were  conspicuously  display- 
ed, yet  the  breath  of  his  own  army  withered  bis  laurels, 
and  ills  triumph  was  disputed  by  the  very  soldiers  who 
followed  his  car.  Their  censures  have  been  riMtt^rated, 
without  chancre  and  wiliiout  abatement,  even  to  this 
hour;  and  a  close  examination  of  his  operations,  while 
it  detects  many  ill-founded  objections,  and  otiiers  tainted 
with  malice,  leaves  little  doubt  that  the  general  feeling 
was  right. 

•  Madden's  Memoir,  Military  Calendar. 


1811.J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


353 


Wlien  he  had  pisse'l  the  Guadiana  and  driven  the 
fiftli  corps  upon  Guadalcanal,  the  delay  that  intervened, 
before  he  invested  Badajos,  was  unjustly  attributed  to 
him  :  it  was  lord  Wellinuton's  order,  resulting  I'rom 
the  tardiness  of  tlie  Spanish  fjenerals,  that  paralyzed 
his  operations.  But  when  the  time  for  action  arrived, 
the  want  of  concert  in  the  investment,  and  the  ill-ma- 
tured attack  on  San  Cristoval  belonged  to.  Beresford's 
arrangements  ;  and  he  is  especially  responsible  in  repu- 
tation for  the  latter,  because  captain  Squire  earnestly 
warned  him  of  the  inevitable  result,  and  his  words  were 
unheeded. 

During  the  progress  of  the  siege,  either  the  want  of 
correct  intelligence,  or  a  blunted  judgement,  misled  the 
marshal.  It  was  remarhed  that,  at  all  times,  he  too 
readily  believed  the  idle  tales  of  distress  and  difficul- 
ties in  the  French  armies,  with  which  the  spies  gene- 
rally, and  the  deserters  always,  interlarded  their  infor- 
mation :  thus  he  was  incredulous  of  Soult's  enterprise, 
and  that  ofGcer  was  actually  over  the  Morcna  before 
the  orders  were  given  to  commence  the  main  attack  of 
the  castle  of  Badajos.  However,  the  firmness  with 
which  Beresford  resisted  the  importunities  of  the  en- 
gineers to  continue  the  siege,  and  the  quick  and  orderly 
removal  of  the  stores  and  battering-train,  were  alike 
remarkable  and  praiseworthy.  It  would  have  been 
happy  if  he  had  shewn  as  much  magnanimity  in  what 
followed. 

When  he  met  Blake  and  Castanos  at  Valverde,  the 
alternative  of  fighting  or  retiring  behind  the  (iuadiana 
was  the  subject  of  consideration.  The  Spanish  gene- 
rals were  both  in  favour  of  giving  battle.  Blake,  who 
could  not  retire  the  way  he  had  arrived,  without  dan- 
ger of  having  his  march  intercepted,  was  particularly 
earnest  to  tight,  affirming  that  his  troo]is,  who  were 
already  in  a  miserable  state,  would  disperse  entirely 
if  they  were  obliged  to  enter  Portugal.  Castanos  was 
of  the  same  opinion.  Beresford  also  argued  that  it 
was  unwise  to  relinquish  tlie  hope  of  taking  Badajos, 
and  ungenerous  to  desert  the  people  of  Estremadnra ; 
that  a  retreat  would  endanger  I^lva?;,  lay  open  the 
Alemtejo,  and  encourage  the  enemy  to  push  his  in(>ur- 
sions  further,  which  he  could  safely  do.  having  such  a 
fortress  as  Badajos,  with  its  bridgeover  the  Guadiana, 
in  his  rear.  A  battle  mnst  then  be  Ibught  in  the  Alem- 
tejo with  fewer  troops,  and  after  a  dispiriting  retreat ;  j 
there  was  also  a  greater  scareity  of  fiod  in  the  Porfn.- 
guese  than  in  the  Spanish  province,  and  finally,  as  the  ' 
weather  was  menacing,  the  Guadiana  might  again  rise ' 
before  the  stores  were  carried  over,  when  the  latter' 
must  be  abandoned,  or  tlie  army  endangered  to  protect  i 
their  passage.  I 

But  these  plausible  reasons  were  but  a  mask.     The ! 
true  cause  why  the   English  general  adopte(]   Blake's  i 
proposals  was  the  impatient  temper  of  the  British  troops,  j 
None  of  them  had  been  engaged  in  tlie  late  battles  under  | 
lord   Wellin^^ton.      At    Busaco  the   regiments   of   the  | 
fourth   division   were   idle   spectators   on    the  left,  as  | 
those  of  the  second  division  were  on  the  right,  while ' 
the  action  was   in  the  centre.     During   Massena's  re-! 
treat  they  ha<l  not  been  employed  under  fire,  and  the  j 
combats  of  Sabugal  and  Fuentes  Onoro  had  been  fought , 
without  them.     Thus  a  burninii:  thirst  for  battle  was  i 
general,  arid  Beresford  had  not  the  art  either  of  concil-  j 
iating  or  of  exacting  the  confidence  of  his  troops.     It  i 
is  certain  that  if  he  had  retreated,  a  vc^ry  violent  and 
unjust  clamour  would   have  been  raised  against  him,  i 
and  this  was  so  strongly  and   unceremoniously  repre- 
sented to  him,  by  an  oificer  on  his  own  staff,'ll)at  he 
gave  way.     These  are  what  may  be  termed   the  moral 
obritacles  of  war.     Such  men  as  lord  Wellington  or  sir 
John  Moore  can  stride  over  them,  but  to  second-rate 
minds  they  are  insuperable.     Practice  and  study  may 
make  a  good  general  as  far  as  the  handling  of  troops 
a. id  tlie  d.-'.>i;^ning  of  a  campaign,  but  that  ascendancy  of  j 
2i 


spirit  which  leads  the  wise,  and  controls  the  insolence  of 
folly,  is  a  rare  gift  of  nature. 

Beresford  yielded  with  an  unhappy  flexibility  to  the 
clamour  of  the  army  and  the  representations  of  Blake, 
for  it  is  unquestionable  that  the  resolution  to  fight  was 
unwarrantable  on  any  sound  military  principle.  We 
may  pass  over  the  argument  fijunded  upon  tlie  taking 
of  Badajos,  because  neither  the  measures  nor  the  means 
of  the  English  general  promised  the  slightest  cliance 
of  success ;  the  siege  would  have  died  away  of  itself 
in  default  of  resources  to  carry  it  on.  The  true  ques- 
tion to  consider  was,  not  whether  Estremadnra  should 
be  deserted  or  Badajos  abandoned,  but  whether  lord 
Wellington's  combinations  and  liis  great  and  well  con- 
sidered design  for  the  deliverance  of  the  Peninsula, 
should  be  ruined  and  defeated  at  a  blow.  To  say  tliat 
the  Alemtejo  could  not  have  been  defended  until  the 
commander-in-chief  arrived  from  tbe  north  with  rein- 
forcements was  mere  trifling.  Soult,  with  twenty  or 
even  thirty  thousand  men,  dared  not  have  attempted  the 
siege  of  Elvas  in  the  face  of  twenty-four  thousand  men 
such  as  Beresford  commanded.  The  result  of  the  batr 
tie  of  Fuentes  Onoro  was  known  in  the  English  and  iu 
the  French  camps,  before  Beresford  broke  up  from  Ba- 
dajos, lience  he  was  certain  that  additional  troops 
would  soon  be  brought  down  to  the  Guadiana  ;  indeed, 
the  third  and  seventh  divisions  were  actually  at  Campo 
Mayor  the  23d  of  May.  'J'he  danger  to  the  Alemtejo 
was,  therefore,  slight,  and  the  necessity  of  a  battle  being 
by  no  means  apparent,  it  remains  to  analyze  the  chances 
of  success. 

Soult's  numbers  were  not  accurately  known,  but  it 
was  ascertained  that  he  had  not  less  than  twenty  thou- 
sand veteran  troops  ;  he  had  also  a  great  superiority  of 
cavalry  and  artillery,  and  the  country  was  peculiarly 
suitable  for  these  arms.  The  martial  character  of  the 
man  was  also  known.  Now  the  allies  could  bring  into 
the  field  more  of  infantry  by  ten  thousand  than  the 
French,  but  they  were  of  various  tongues,  and  the 
Spanish  part,  ill  armed,  starving,  and  worn  out  with 
fatigue,  had  been  repeatedly  and  recently  defeated  by 
the  very  troops  they  were  gtiing  to  engage.  The 
French  were  compact,  swift  of  movement,  inured  to 
war,  used  to  act  together,  and  under  the  command  of 
one  able  and  experienced  general.  The  allied  army 
was  unwieldy,  eacli  nation  mistrusting  the  other,  and  the 
whole  without  unity  of  spirit,  or  of  discijiline,  or  of  com- 
mand. On  what,  then,  could  marshal  Beresford  found 
his  hopes  of  success  ?  The  British  troops.  The  latter 
were  therefore  to  be  freely  used.  But  was  it  a  time  to 
risk  the  total  destruction  of  two  superb  divisions  and  to 
encounter  a  certain  and  heavy  loss  of  men,  whose  value 
he  knew  so  well  when  he  calculated  upon  them  alone  for 
victory  in  such  circumstances  ? 

To  resolve  on  battle  was,  however,  easier  than  to 
prepare  for  it  with  skill.  Albuera,  we  have  seen,  M'an 
the  point  of  concentration.  Colonel  Colborne's  brigade 
did  not  arrive  until  the  14th,  and  there  was  no  certainty 
that  it  could  arrive  before  the  enemy  did.  Blake  did 
not  arrive  until  three  in  the  morning  of  the  16th.  'J'lie 
fourth  division  not  until  six  o'clock.  Kemmis  with 
three  fine  British  regiments,  and  Madden 's  cavalry,  did 
not  come  at  all.  These  facts  prove  that  the  whole  ])!an 
was  faulty,  it  was  mere  accident  that  a  sufficient  force 
to  give  battle  was  concentrated.  Beresford  was  too 
lale,  and  the  keeping  up  the  investment  of  Badajos,  al- 
though laudable  in  one  sense,  was  a  great  ei'ror ;  it 
was  only  an  accessory,  and  yet  the  success  of  the  prin- 
cipal object  was  made  subservient  to  it.  ]f  Soult,  in- 
steiid  of  passing  by  Villa  Franca,  in  his  advance,  had 
pushed  straight  on  from  Los  Santos  to  Albuera,  he 
would  have  arrived  the  ir)tli,  when  l^>eresford  had  not 
much  more  than  half  his  force  in  position;  the  point 
of  concentration  would  tlien  have  been  lost,  and  the  al- 
lies scattered  in  all  directions.     If  the  French  had  cvcu 


354 


NAPIER'S    PEXINSULAE    WAR. 


[Book  XII. 


continued  (heir  march  by  Solano  instead  of  turning 
upon  Albuera.  they  must  inevitably  have  communicated 
with  Uadajcis,  unless  Bercsfbrd  had  fought  without 
waiting  for  i^iakc,  and  without  Kemniis's  brigade. 
Why,  then,  did  the  Frencli  marshal  turn  nut  of  the 
way  to  seek  a  battle,  in  preference  to  attaining  his  ob- 
ject without  one?  and  why  did  he  neglect  to  operate 
by  his  right  or  left  until  the  unwieldy  allied  army 
should  separate  or  get  into  confusion,  as  it  inevitably 
would  have  done?  Because  the  J^nglish  general's 
dispositions  were  so  faulty  that  no  worse  error  could 
well  be  expected  from  hiin,  and  Soult  had  every  reason 
to  hope  for  a  great  and  decided  victory  ;  a  victory 
which  would  have  more  than  counterbalanced  Masse- 
na's  failure.  He  knew  that  only  oiie-iialf  of  the  allied 
force  was  at  Albuera  on  tlie  Loth,  and  when  he  ex- 
amined the  ground,  every  thing  promised  the  most  com- 
plete success. 

ilarshal  Berasford  had  fixed  upon  and  studied  his 
own  field  of  battle  above  a  month  before  the  action 
took  place,  and  yet  occupied  it  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
render  defeat  almost  certain  ;  his  infantry  were  not 
held  in  hand,  and  his  inferiority  in  gmis  and  cavalry 
was  not  compensated  for  by  entrenchments.  But 
were  any  other  proufs  of  error  wanting,  this  fact  would 
suffice,  he  had  a  greater  strength  of  infantry  on  a  field 
of  battle  scarcely  three  miles  long,  ten  thousand  of  his 
troops  never  fired  a  shot,  and  three  times  the  day  was 
lost  and  won,  the  allies  being  always  fewest  in  number 
at  the  decisive  point.  It  is  true  that  Blake's  conduct 
was  very  perplexing  ;  it  is  true  that  general  AYilliam 
Stewart's  error  cost  one  brigade,  and  thus  annihilated 
the  command  of  colonel  Colborne,  a  man  capable  of 
turning  the  fate  of  a  battle  even  with  fewer  troops 
than  those  swept  away  from  him  by  the  French  cav- 
alry :  but  the  neglect  of  the  hill  beyond  the  Albuera, 
fronting  the  right  of  the  position,  was  Beresford's  own 
error  and  a  most  serious  one  ;  so  also  were  the  success- 
ive attacks  of  the  brigades,  and  the  hesitation  about  the 
fourth  divison.  And  where  are  we  to  look  for  that 
promptness  in  critical  moments  which  marks  the  great 
commands?  It  was  colonel  Hardinge  that  gave  the 
fourth  division  and  Abercrombie's  brigade,  orders  to 
advance,  and  it  was  their  astounding  valour  in  attack, 
and  the  astonishing  firmness  of  Houghton's  brigade 
in  defence  that  saved  the  day.  The  person  of  the 
general-in-chief  was  indeed  seen  every  where,  a  gallant 
soldier  !  but  the  mind  of  the  great  commander  was  seen 
no  where.  ' 

Beresford  remained  master  of  the  field  of  battle,  but 
he  could  not  take  Badajos,  that  prize  was  the  result  of 
many  great  efforts,  and  many  deep  conil)inations  by  a 
far  greater  man  ;  neither  did  he  clear  Estremadura,  for 
Soult  maintained  positions  from  Ll.Tcna  to  Usagre. 
What  then  did  he  gain  ?  The  power  of  simulating  a 
renewal  of  the  siege,  and  holding  his  own  cantonments 
on  the  Icfr  bank  of  the  Guadiana  ;  I  say  simulating,  for, 
if  the  third  and  seventh  divisions  had  not  arrived  from 
Beira,  even  the  investment  could  not  have  been  com- 
pleted. These  illusive  advantages  he  purchased  at  the 
price  of  seven  thousand  men.  With  a  smaller  loss  lord 
Wellington  had  fought  two  general  and  several  minor 
actions,  had  baffled  Massena  and  turned  seventy  thou- 
sand men  out  of  Portwgal ! 

Such  being  the  fruit  of  victory,  what  would  have 
been  tlie  result  of  defeat  ?  There  was  no  retri!at, 
save  by  the  temporary  bridge  of  Jerumenha,  and 
had  the  hill  on  the  rigiit  been  carried  in  the  battle, 
the  Valverd^  road  would  have  been  in  Sonlt's  posses- 
sion, and  the  line  of  retreat  cut ;  had  it  even  hwA\ 
otherwise,  Beresford,  with  four  thousand  victorious 
French  cavalry  at  his  heels,  could  never  have  passed 
the  river.  Back,  then,  must  have  come  the  army 
from  the  north,  the  Lines  of  Lisbon  would  liave  been 
oacc    more    occupied— a   French    force    fixed    on   the 


south  of  the  Tagus — Spain  ruined — Portugal  laid  pros- 
trate— England  in  dismay.  Could  even  the  genius  of 
loi-d  Wellington  have  recovered  such  a  state  of  afiiiirs  ? 
And  yet,  with  these  results,  the  terrible  balance  hung 
for  two  hours,  and  twice  trembling  to  the  sinister  side, 
only  yielded  at  last  to  the  superlative  vigour  of  the 
f'lzileers.  The  battle  should  never  have  been  fought. 
'J^he  siege  of  Badajos  could  not  have  been  renev.'ed  with- 
out reinforcements,  and,  with  them,  it  could  have  been 
renewed  without  an  action,  or  at  least  without  risking 
an  unequal  one. 

But  would  even  the  bravery  of  British  soldiers  have 
saved  the  day,  at  Albuera,  if  the  French  general  had 
not  also  committed  great  errors  ?  His  jilan  of  attack 
and  his  execution  of  it,  up  to  the  moment  when  the 
Spanish  line  fell  bapk  in  disorder,  cannot  be  too  nmch 
admired  ;  after  that,  the  great  error  of  fighting  in  deiise 
columns  being  persisted  in  beyond  reason,  lost  the  fairest 
field  ever  offered  to  the  arms  of  France.  Had  the  fifth 
corps  opened  out  while  there  was  time  to  do  so,  that  is, 
between  the  falling  back  of  the  Spaniards  and  the  ad- 
vance of  Houghton's  brigade,  what  on  earth  could  have 
saved  Beresford  from  a  total  defeat  ?  •  The  fire  of  the 
enemy's  columns  alone  destroyed  two-thirds  of  his 
British  troops  ;  the  fire  of  their  line^  would  have  swept 
away  all ! 

It  has  been  said  that  Latour  Maubourg  and  Godinot 
did  not  second  Soult  with  sufficient  vigour,  the  latter 
certainly  did  not  display  any  great  energy,  but  the 
village  was  maintained  by  Alten's  Germans,  who  were 
good  and  hardy  troops,  and  well  backed  up  by  a  great 
body  of  Portuguese.  Latour  Maubourg 's  movements 
seem  to  have  been  objected  to  without  reason.  He 
took  six  guns,  sabred  many  Spaniards,  and  overthrew 
a  whole  brigade  of  the  British,  without  ceasing  to  keep 
in  check  their  cavalry.  He  was,  undoubtedly,  greatly 
superior  in  numbers,  but  general  Lumley  handled  the 
allied  squadrons  with  skill  and  courage,  and  drew  all 
the  advantage  possible  from  his  situation,  and,  in  the 
choice  of  that  situation,  no  one  can  deny  alnlity  to 
marshal  Beresford.  The  rising  ground  behind  the 
horsemen,  the  bed  of  the  Aroya  in  their  front,  the 
aid  of  the  horse-artillery,  and  the  support  of  the 
fourth  division,  were  all  circumstances  of  strength  so 
well  combined  that  nothing  could  be  better,  and  they 
dictated  Latour  Maubourg's  proceeding-s,  which  seem 
consonant  to  true  principles.  If  he  had  charged  in  mass, 
under  the  fire  of  Lefebre's  guns,  he  must  have  been 
thrown  into  confusion  in  passing  the  bed  of  the  Aroya 
at  the  moment  when  the  fourth  division,  advancing 
along  the  slopes,  would  have  opened  a  musketry  on 
his  right  flank ;  Lumley  could  then  have  charged,  or 
retired  up  the  hill,  according  to  circumstances.  In 
this  case,  great  loss  might  have  been  sustained,  and 
nothing  very  decisive  could  have  accrued  to  the  advan- 
tage of  the  French,  because  no  number  of  cavalry,  if 
unsustained  by  infantry  and  artillery,-  can  make  a 
serious  impression  against  the  three  arms  united.  It 
was  therefore  another  error  in  Soult  not  to  have  joined 
some  guns  and  infantry  to  his  cavalry,  when  he  per- 
ceived that  his  enemy  had  done  so  on  the  other  i)art. 
Ten  guns  and  half  the  infantry,  uselessly  slaughtered  in 
colunms  on  the  height  above,  woidd  have  turned  the 
scale  of  battle  below,  for  it  is  certain  that  when  the 
fuzilcers  came  up  the  hill,  Houghton's  brigade  v,as  quite 
exhausted,  and  the  few  men  standing  were  without  am- 
munition ;  but  if  a  French  battery  and  a  body  of  in- 
fantry had  been  joined  to  the  French  cavalry,  the  fuzi- 
lcers could  not  have  moved. 

On  the  other  hand,  seeing  that  he  was  not  so 
strengthened,  a  repulse  might  have  been  fatal,  not  only 
to  liimself.  hut  to  the  French  infantry  on  the  hill,  as 
their  left  wttuld  have  been  open  to  the  enterprises  of  the 
allied  cavalry.  If  Latour  Maubourg  had  stretched 
away  to  his  own  left,  he  would,  in  like  mauuc",  have 


1810.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR  WAR. 


355 


exposed  the  flank  of  Soull  5  infantry,  and  his  move- 
ments would  have  heen  eccentric,  and  contrary  to  sound 
priiu-ipJes  ;  and.  (in  tiie  event  of  a  disaster  to  tlie  corps 
on  tiie  bill,  as  really  happened,)  destructive  to  the 
safety  of  the  retreating  army.  By  keeping  in  mass 
on  the  plain,  and  detaching  squadrons  from  time  to 
time,  as  favourable  opportunities  offered  for  partial 
cliarges,  he  gained,  as  we  have  seen,  great  advantages 
during  the  action,  and  kept  his  troopers  well  in  hand 
for  the  decisive  moment ;  tinaJy,  he  covered  the  retreat 
of  the  beaten  infantry.  Still  it  may  be  admitted  that, 
witli  such  superior  numbers,  he  should  have  more  closely 
pres,se(l  Lumley. 

When  Suult  had  regained  the  hills  at  the  other  side 
of  the  Albuera,  the  battle  ceased,  each  side  being,  as 
we  have  seen,  so  hardly  handled  that  neither  oHlred  to 
renew  the  fig-ht.  Here  was  the  greatest  failure  of  the 
French  commander  ;  he  had  lost  eight  thousand  men, 
but  he  had  still  fifteen  thousand  under  arms,  his  artil- 
lery and  his  cavalry  being,  comparatively,  untouched. 
On  the  side  of  the  allies,  only  eighteen  hundred  Brit- 
ish inlautry  were  left  standing,  and  the  troops  were 
saliL-ring  greatly  from  famine  ;  the  Spaniards  had  been 
feeding  on  horse-fiesh,  and  were  so  attenuated  by 
continual  fatigue  and  misery,  that,  for  several  days 
previous  to  the  battle,  they  had  deserted  in  considerable 
num))ers  even  to  the  French,  hoping  thus  to  get  food  : 
thiise  circumstances  should  be  borne  in  mind,  when 
reflecting  on  their  conduct  in  the  battle  ;  under  such 
a  commander  as  Blake,  and  while  enduring  such 
licavy  privations,  it  was  a  groat  effort  of  resolution, 
and  honourable  to  them  that  they  fought  at  all.  Their 
resistance,   leeble   when    compared    to    the    desperate 


valour  of  the  British,  was  by  no  means  weak  in  itself 
or  inlirm  ;  nor  is  it  to  be  wondered  at  that  men  so  ex- 
hausted and  so  ill  managed  should  have  been  deaf  to 
the  call  of  Beresford,  a  strange  general,  whose  exhor- 
tations they  probably  did  not  understand.  When  the 
fortune  of  the  day  changed  they  followed  the  fuzileera 
with  alacrity,  and  at  no  period  "did  they  give  way  with 
dishonour. 

Nevertheless,  all  circumstances  considered,  they  were 
not  and  could  not  be  equal  to  a  second  des'perate 
struggle;  a  renewed  attack  on  the  17th  would  have 
certainly  ended  in  favour  of  the  French,  and  so  con- 
scious was  Beresford  of  this,  that,  on  the  evening  of 
the  16th,  he  wrote  to  lord  Wellington,  avowing  that  he 
anticipated  a  certain  and  ruinous  defeat  the  next  day. 
The  resolution  with  which  he  maintained  the  position 
notwithstanding,  was  the  strongest  indication  of  mili- 
tary talent  he  gave  during  the  whole  of  his  operations; 
had  Soult  only  persisted  in  holding  his  position  with 
equal  pertinacity,  Beresford  must  have  retired.  It  was 
a  great  and  decided  mistake  of  the  French  marshal  not 
to  have  done  so.  There  is  nothing  more  essential  in 
war  than  a  confident  front;  a  general  should  never 
acknowledge  himself  vanquished,  for  the  front  line  of  an 
army  always  looks  formidable,  and  the  adversary  can 
seldom  see  the  real  state  of  what  is  behind.  The  im- 
portance of  this  maxim  is  finely  indicated  in  Livy,  where 
he  relates  that,  after  a  drawn  battle,  a  god  called  out 
in  the  night,  the  Etruscans  had  lost  one  man  more  than 
the  Romans !  Hereupon  the  former  retired,  and  the 
latter,  remaining  on  the  field,  gathered  all  the  fruits  of  a 
real  victory. 


BOOK    XIII. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Lord  Wellintrton's  sieges  vindicated — Operations  in  Spain — 
fci  ate  of  Gallioia — Ciiani^fe  of  commanders — Bonefs  opera- 
tions in  tiie  Asturias — Activity  of  the  I'artidas — their  sys- 
tem of  operations — Mina  captures  a  large  convoy  at  ArJa- 
baii— Bessieres  contracts  his  position — Bonet  abandons 
the  Abturias — Santocildes  advances  into  Leon — French 
dismautle  Astorga — Skirniisli  ou  the  Orbigo — General  in- 
t■t^^cieIlcy  of  tlie  Gallicians  and  Asturiaiis — Operations  in 
the  eastern  proviiice»— State  of  Aragou — State  of  Cata- 
lonia— State  of  Valencia — Sachet  marclies  against  Tortoza 
— Fails  to  buru  tlie  boat-bridge  there — il'Doiiald  remains 
at  (ieroiia — The  Valeucians  and  Catalouiaus  combine  ope- 
rations against  Sachet — O'Douuel  enters  Tortoza- — Makes 
a  sally  and  is  repulsed — The  Valencians  defeated  near 
Dldecona — Operations  of  the  seventh  cori)S — M'Donald 
reforms  the  discipline  of  the  troops — Marclies  with  a  con- 
voy to  Barcelona — iielurns  to  Gerona  and  dismantles  the 
out-works  of  that  place — O'Dounel's  plans — M'Uonald 
marches  witli  a  second  convoy — Keaches  Barcelona  and 
returns  to  Gerona — Marches  with  a  third  convoy — Forces 
the  pass  of  Ordal — liuters  Ecus  and  opens  the  communi- 
cations with  Suchet. 

Wnir.E  marshal  Beresford  followed  Soult  towards 
Llorena  lonl  Wellington  recommenced  the  siege  of 
Badajos,  but  the  relation  of  that  operation  must  be 
delayed  until  the  transactions  which  occurred  in  Spain, 
during  Massena's  invasion  of  Portugal,  have  been 
noticed,  for  it  is  not  by  following  one  stream  of  action 
that  a  just  idea  of  this  war  can  be  olitained.  Many 
of  lord  Wellington's  proceedings  might  be  called  rash, 


and  others  timid,  and  slow,  if  taken  separately ;  yet, 
\'s^ien  viewed  as  parts  of  a  great  plan  for  delivering  the 
whole  Peninsula,  they  will  be  found  discreet  or  daring, 
as  the  circumstances  warranted  ;  nor  is  there  any  por- 
tion of  his  campaigns  that  requires  this  wide-based  con- 
sideration, more  than  his  early  sieges;  which,  being 
instituted  contrary  to  the  rules  of  art,  and  unsuccessful, 
or,  when  successful,  attended  with  a  mournful  slaughter, 
have  given  occasion  for  questioning  his  great  military 
qualities,  which  were,  however,  then  most  signally  dis- 
played. 

OPERATIONS    IN    SPAIN. 

In  the  northern  provinces  the  events  were  of  little 
interest.  Gallicia,  after  the  failure  of  Renovales'  ex- 
pedition and  the  shipwreck  that  followid,  became 
torpid  ;  the  junta  disregarded  general  Walker's  exhor- 
tations, and,  although  he  furnished  vast  supplies,  the 
army,  nominally  twenty  thousand  strong,  mustered 
only  six  thousand  in  the  field  :  there  was  no  cavalry, 
and  the  infantry  kept  close  in  the  mountains  about 
Villa  Franca,  while  a  weak  French  division  occupied 
the  rich  plains  of  Leon.*  General  Mahi  having  refused 
to  combine  his  operations  with  those  of  the  Anglo-Por- 
tuguese army,  was  thought  to  be  disafiected,  and  at 
the  desire  of  the  British  authorities  had  been  removed 


*  Officiat  abstract  of  general  "Walker's  despatches. 


356 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XIH. 


to  ma^e  way  for  Wv^  duke  of  Albuquerqup ;  he  v:as, 
however,  iniinediately  appointed  to  tlie  coininand  of 
Murcia,  bv  JJIake  in  defiance  of  the  remonstrances 
of  Mr.  Wellesley,  for  Blake  disregarded  the  English 
inSuence.* 

When  Albuquerque  died,  Gallicia  foil  to  Castanos, : 
and  while  that  officer  was  co-opcratinp;  with  BereslVa-d 
in  Estreniadura,  Santivcildes  assiuned  the  command. 
[Meanwhile  Caffiirelii's  reserve  having  joined  the  army 
of  the  north,  Santona  was  fortified,  and  Bessieres,  as  I 
Lave  before  observed,  ajsenibled  seven  thousand  men  at 
Zamora  to  invade  Gallicia. 

In  the  Asturias.  Bouet.  although  harassed,  on  the 
Bide  of  Potes,  by  the  guerillas  from  the  mountains 
of  Liebafia,  and  on  the  coast  liy  the  English  frigates, 
remained  at  Oviedo,  and  maintained  his  communica- 
tions by  the  left  with  the  troops  in  Ia'ou.  In  Novem- 
ber 18 LO  he  defeated  a  considerable  body  of  insurgents, 
and  in  February  1811  the  Spanish  general  St.  Pol 
retired  before  him  with  the  regular  forces,  from  the 
Xalon  to  the  Navia;  but  this  retreat  caused  such  dis- 
content in  Gallicia  that  St.  Pol  advanced  again  on  the 
19th  March,  and  Wius  again  driven  back.f  Bonet 
then  dispersed  the  Partidas,  and  was  ready  to  aid  Bes- 
sieres' invasion  of  Gallicia ;  and  although  the  arrival 
of  the  allied  forces  on  the  Coa  in  pursuit  of  ^lassena 
stopped  that  enterprise,  he  made  an  incursion  along 
the  coast,  seized  the  Spanish  stores  of  English  arms 
and  clothing,  and  then  returned  to  Oviedo.  The  war 
was,  indeed,  so  little  formidable  to  the  French,  that 
in  May  Santander  was  evacuated,  and  all  the  cavalry 
in  Castile  and  Leon  joined  Massena  fur  the  battle  of 
Fuentes  Onoro,  and  yet  the  Gallician  and  Asturian 
regular  armies  gained  no  advantage  during  their  ab- 
sence. 

The  Partidas,  who  had  re-assembled  after  their  de- 
feat by  B(jnet,  were  more  active.  Porlier,  Campillo, 
Longa,  Amor,  and  Merino  cut  otf  small  Frcncli  parties 
in  the  Montana,  in  the  Rioja,  in  Biscay,  and  in  the 
Baston  de  Laredt) ;  they  were  not,  indeed,  dangerous 
in  action,  nor  was  it  very  difficult  to  destroy  them  by 
combined  movements,  but  these  combinations  were 
hard  to  effect,  from  the  little  accord  amongst  the  French 
generals,  and  thus  they  eusily  maintained  their  posts 
at  Espinosa  de  Monteres,  Medina,  and  Yillarcayo. 
Campillo  was  the  most  powerful  after  Porlier. J  His 
principal  haunts  were  in  the  valleys  of  Mena  and  Ca- 
ranza ;  but  he  was  in  conimunicatinn  with  Barbara, 
Honejas,  and  Curillas,  petty  chiefs  of  Biscay,  with 
whom  he  concertecl  attacks  upon  couriers  and  weak 
detachments :  and  he  sometimes  divided  his  band 
into  small  parties,  with  which  he  overran  the  valleys 
of  Gurieso,  Soba,  Carrado,  and  Jorrando,  [lartly  to 
raise  contributions,  partly  to  gather  recruits,  whom  he 
forced  to  join  him.  His  Jhief  aim  was,  however,  to 
intercept  the  despatches  going  from  Bilbao  to  Santan- 
der, and  for  this  purpose  he  u.sed  to  infest  Lieudo 
between  Ovira  and  Laredo,  which  he  was  enabled  the 
more  safely  to  do,  because  general  Barthelemy,  the 
governor  of  the  Montana,  was  forced  to  watch  more 
earnestly  towards  the  hilly  district  of  Liebana,  be- 
tween Leon  and  the  Asturias.  This  district  was  Por- 
lier's  stronghold,  and  that  chief,  under  whom  Campillo 
himself  would  at  times  act,  used  to  cross  the  Deba 
and  penetrate  into  the  valleys  of  Cabuerniego,  Rio 
Nauza,  Cieza,  and  15uelna.  and  he  obliged  the  people 
to  Hy  to  the  mountains  with  their  efl'ects  whenever  the 
French  approached  :  nevertheless,  the  mass  were  tired 
of  this  guerilla  system  and  tractable  enough,  except  in 
Liebana. 


*  Official  abstract  of  Mr.  Wellcsley'8  despatclie.s,  MSS. 
t  Mr.  Stuart's  Papers,  MSS. 

X  IiittMfaptet     letter  of  general  Barthelemy  to  general 
Drouet,  18iU.     MsiS. 


To  beat  Campillo  once  or  twice  v.ould  have  been 
sufficient  to  ruin  liiin,  but  to  ruin  Porlier  required  great 
combinations.  It  was  ncces.-^iry  to  .seize  Espinosti,  not 
that  of  Monteres,  but  a  village  in  the  mountains  of 
Liebana,  from  w  hence  the  valleys  all  projected  as  from  a 
point,  and  whence  the  troops  could  conse(iuenfly  act  to- 
wards Potes  with  success.  General  Barthelemy  pro- 
posed this  plan  to  Drouet,  then  with  the  9th  corps  on 
the  Up])er  i)ouro,  whom  lie  desired  to  co-operate  from 
the  side  of  Leon,  while  Bonet  did  the  same  from  the 
side  of  the  Asturias  :  but  though  partially  adopted,  the 
execution  was  not  effectually  followed  up,  the  districts 
of  Liebana  and  Santander  continued  to  be  disturbed, 
and  the  chain  of  Partidas  was  prolonged  through  Bis- 
cay and  the  Rioja,  to  Navarre. 

In  this  last  province  Mina  had  on  the  22d  of  May  de- 
feated at  the  Puerto  de  Arlaban,  near  Vittoria,  twelve 
hundred  men  who  were  escorting  a  convoy  of  prisoners 
and  treasure  to  France  ;  his  success  was  complete,  but 
alloyed  i>y  the  death  of  two  hundred  of  the  prisoners, 
unfortunately  killed  during  the  tumult ;  and  it  was 
stained  by  the  murder  of  six  Spanish  ladies,  who,  for 
beiug  attached  to  French  officers,  were  in  cold  blood 
executed  after  the  figlit.*  Massena,  who.se  baggage 
was  captured,  was  to  have  travelled  with  this  escort, 
but  disliking  the  maimer  of  the  march,  he  remained  in 
Vittoria  until  a  better  opportunity,  and  so  escaped. 

These   partizan    operations,  combinex]  with    the   de- 
scents on  the  coast,  the  aspect  of  the  war  in  P^strema- 
dura,  and   the  unprotected  state  of  Castile,  which  was 
now  menaced    by   Santo-cildes.   were    rendered    more 
important  by  another  event  to   be  noticed   hereafter  : 
Bessieres   therefore  resolved   to   contract   his  position 
in  the  north  ;  and  first  causing  Reille  and  Caftarelli  to 
scour  Bi.seay  and  the  Rioja,  he  ordered  Bonet  to  abandon 
the  Asturias.     On  the  I4tli  of  June  that  general,  having 
dismajitied   the  coast-batteries,  sent  his  sick  and   bag- 
gage  by  sea   to   St.  Ander  and  marched   into   Leon, 
where  Santo-cildes,  who  had  now  ii;crea.scd  the  (ialli- 
cian  field  army  to  thirteen  thousand  mi'ii,  was  menacing 
Astorga,  which  place  the  French  evacuated  after  blow- 
I  iniT   up   some   of  the  works.     Serras  and  Bonet  then 
I  united    on    the   Esia,  and   being   supported    by   three 
j  thousand  men  from  Rio  Seco,  skirmished  at  the  Ponte 
de  Orvigo  on  the  23d,  but  had  the  worst,  and  general 
I  Valletaux  was  killed  on  their  side  :  and  as  lonl  Wel- 
I  lington's   0[)erations    in    Estreniadura   soon   drew   the 
I  French  armies  towards  that  quarter  Santo-cildes  held 
I  his  ground  at  Astorga  until  Augu.st.     Meanwhile  two 
:  thousand  French  were  thrown  into  Santona,  and  gener- 
'  al  Rdgnet  coming,  from  the  side  of  Burgos,  with  a  di- 
I  vision   of  the  young  guard,  made  a  fruitless  incursion 
I  against  the  Partidas  of  Liebana. 
I      This  system   of  warfare    was  necessarily  harassing 
i  to  the  French  divisions   actually  engaged,  but  it  was 
I  evident  that  neither  the  Asturias  nor  Gallicia  could  be 
I  reckoned  as  good  auxiliaries  to  lord  AVellington.     Gal- 
'  licia  with  its  lordly  junta,  regular  army,  fortified  towns, 
I  rugged  fastnesses,  nimierous  population,  and   constant 
j  sui)plies   from   England,    was   of    less    weight    in    the 
;  contest  than  five  thousand  Portuguese  militia  conducted 
I  by   Traiit   and    Wilson.      'J'he   irregular   warfare   was 
now  also  begiiniing  to   produce  its  usual  eifects  ;  the 
tree   though    grafted   in  patriotism  bore  strange  fruit. 
In  Biscay,  which  had  been  longest  accustomed  to  the 
presence   of  the  invaders,  the  armed   peasantry   were 
often  found  fighting  in  the  ranks  of  the  enemy,  and  on 
one  occasion  did  of  themselves  attack  the  boats  of  the 
Amelia  frigate  to  save  French  military  stores  !     Turn- 
ing now  to  the  other  line  of  invasion,  we  sliall  find  the 
contest  fiercer,   indeed,  and   more    honourable   to   the 
Spaniards,  but  the  result  still   more   unfavourable   to 
their  cause. 

♦  Mr.  Stuart's  Papers,  MSS. 


1811. 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


357 


OPERATIONS  IN'  THE  EASTERN  PROVINCES. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  Sachet,  after  the  fall  of 
Mcquiiieiiza,  was  ordered  to  besiege  Tortoza  while  Mac- 
douald  marched  against  Taragona.  Massena  was  then 
concentrating  his  army  for  the  invasion  of  Portugal,  and 
it  wius  the  emperor's  intention  that  Suchet  should,  after 
taking  Tortoza,  march  with  half  of  the  thiid  corps  to 
support  the  prince  of  Esling.  But  the  reduction  of  Tor- 
toza proved  a  m^re  tedious  task  than  Najjoleon  antici- 
gitod,  and  as  the  course  of  events  had  now  given  the 
rench  armies  of  Catalonia  and  Ai-agon  a  common 
object,  it  will  be  well  to  c)mpare  their  situation  and  re- 
sources with  those  of  their  advei-sarj'. 

Suehi't  was  completely  master  of  Aragon,  and  not 
more  by  the  force  of  his  arms,  than  by  the  influence  of 
his  administration  ;  the  province  was  i'ertile,  and  so  tran- 
((uil  in  the  interior,  that  his  magazines  were  all  filled, 
and  his  convoys  travelled  under  the  care  of  Spanish  com- 
missaries and  conductors.  Miiia  was  however  in  Na- 
varre on  his  rear,  and  he  communicated  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  Ebro  with  the  Partidas  in  the  mountains  of  Mon- 
cayo  and  Aibaracin  ;  and  these  last  were  occasionally 
backed  by  the  Empecinado,  Duran.  and  others  whose 
strong-holds  were  in  the  Guadalaxara.  and  who  from 
thence  infested  Cuen(^a  and  the  vicinity  of  Madrid. 
Fi-om  Albaracin,  Villa  Campa  continued  the  cliain  of 
partizan  warfare  and  connected  it  with  the  Yalencian 
army,  which  had  also  a  line  of  operation  towards  Cuen^a. 
Mina.  who  communicated  with  the  English  vessels  in 
the  bay  of  Biscay,  received  his  supplies  from  Corufia  ; 
and  the  others,  in  like  manner,  corresponded  with  Valen- 
cia, from  whence  the  English  consul  Tapper  succoured 
them  with  arms,  money,  and  ammunition.  Thus  a  line 
was  drawn  quite  across  the  Peni  sula  which  it  was  in 
vain  for  the  enemy  to  break,  as  the  retreat  was  secure 
at  both  ends,  and  the  excitement  to  renewed  efforts  con- 
stant. 

On  the  other  flank  of  Sachet's  position  the  high 
valleys  of  the  Pyrenees  were  swarming  with  small 
bands,  forming  a  link  between  Mina  and  a  divisinn  of 
the  Oatalonian  army  stationed  about  the  Sen  d'Urgel. 
which  w;is  a  fortified  castle,  closing  the  passage  leading 
fi-om  the  plain  of  that  name  to  the  Cerdafia  :  this  division 
in  conjunctiow  with  Rovira,  and  other  partizans,  ex- 
tended the  irregular  warfare  on  the  side  of  Olot  and 
Castelfollit  to  the  Ampurdan  ;  and  the  whole  depended 
upon  Taragona,  which  itself  was  supported  by  the 
English  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean.  Aragon  may 
theref  )re  be  considered  as  an  invested  fortress,  which 
the  Spaniards  thought  to  reduce  by  famine,  by  assault, 
and  by  excitiu?  the  population  against  the  garrison  ; 
but  Suchet  baffled  them  ;  he  had  made  such  judicious 
arrangements  that  iiis  convoys  were  secure  in  the  inte- 
rior, and  all  the  important  points  on  the  frontier  circle 
were  fortified,  and  connected,  with  Zaragoza,  by  chains 
of  minor  ports  radiating  from  that  common  centre. 
Ijerida.  Mequinenza.  and  the  plain  of  Urgel  in  Cata- 
l.jnia.  the  fort  of  Morella  in  Valencia,  were  his ;  and  by 
fortifying  Teruel  and  Alcanitz  ha  had  secured  the  chief 
passages  leading  through  the  mountains  to  the  latter 
kingdom  :  he  could  thus,  at  will,  invade  either  Catalo- 
uiaor  Valencia,  and  from  Mequinenza  he  could,  by 
water,  tran^jiort  the  stores  necessary  to  l)esiegc  Tortoza. 
Nor  ware  these  advantages  the  result  of  aught  but  his 
uncommnn  talents  for  war,  a  consideration  which  ren- 
dered thorn  doubly  formidable. 

The  sit\iation  of  the  French  in  Catalonia  was  differ- 
ent. Maed!)nald,  who  had  assumed  the  command  at 
the  moment  when  Napoleon  wislied  him  to  co-ope- 
rate with  Suchet.  was  inexperienced  in  the  peculiar 
warfare  of  the  province,  and  unprepared  to  execute  any 
extended  plan  of  operations.  11  is  troops  were  about 
Gerona  and  Hostalrich,^which  were  in  fact  the  bounds 
of  the  French  conquest  at  this  period ;  for  Baroe.'\)na 


was  a  military  point  beyond  their  field  system,  and 
only  to  be  maintained  by  expeditions  ;  and  the  country 
was  so  exhausted  of  provisions  in  the  interior,  that  the 
army  itself  could  only  be  fed  by  land-convoys  from 
France,  or  by  such  coasters  as,  eluding  the  vigilance 
of  the  English  cruizers,  could  reach  Rosas,  St.  Filien, 
and  Palanios.  Barcelona  like  the  horse-leech  contin- 
ually cried  for  more,  and  as  the  inhabitiints  as  M-ell  as 
the  garri.son  depended  on  the  convoys,  the  latter  were 
enormous,  reference  being  had  to  the  limited  means  of 
the  French  general,  and  the  difficulty  of  moving  ;  for 
although  the  distance  between  Hostalrich  and  J5arce- 
lona  was  only  forty  miles,  the  road,  as  far  as  Granol- 
lers.  was  a  succession  of  defiles,  and  crossed  by  several 
rivers,  of  which  the  Congosta  and  the  Tordera  were  con- 
siderable obstacles ;  and  the  nature  of  the  soil  was 
clayey  and  heavy,  especially  in  the  defiles  of  the  Trenta 
Pasos. 

These  things  rendered  it  difficult  for  Maedonald  to 
operate  in  resrular  warfare  from  his  base  of  Gerona, 
and  as  the  stores  for  the  siege  of  'J'aragona  were  to  come 
from  France,  until  they  arrived  he  could  only  make 
sudden  incursions  with  light  baggage,  trusting  to  the 
resources  still  to  be  found  in  the  open  country,  or  to  be 
gathered  in  the  mountains  by  detachments  which  would 
have  to  fight  for  every  morsel.  This  then  was  the 
condition  of  the  French  armies,  that  starting  from  sepa- 
rate bases,  they  had  to  operate  on  lines  meeting  at  Tor- 
toza. It  remains  to  shew  the  situation  of  the  Catalaa 
general. 

After  the  battle  of  ^largalef.  Henry  O'Donnel  re- 
united his  scattered  forces,  and  being  of  a  stern  un- 
yielding disposition,  not  only  repressed  the  discontent 
occasioned  by  that  defeat,  but  forced  the  reluctant  Mi- 
guelettes  to  swell  his  ranks  and  to  submit  to  discipline. 
Being  assisted  with  money  and  arms  by  the  British 
ao'ents,  and  having  free  communication  by  sea  with 
Gibraltar,  Cadiz,  and  Minorca,  he  was  soon  enabled  to 
reorganize  his  army,  to  collect  vast  magazines  at  Tara- 
gona, and  to  strengthen  that  place  by  new  works.  In 
July  his  force  again  amounted  to  twenty-two  thousand 
men  exclusive  of  the  Partidas.  and  of  the  Somatenes,  who 
were  useful  to  aid  in  a  pursuit,  to  break  up  roads,  and  to 
cut  ofi"  straggling  soldiers.  Of  this  number  one  division 
under  Carapo  Verde,  was,  as  I  have  before  said,  in 
the  higher  valleys,  having  a  detachment  at  Olot,  and 
being  supported  by  the  fortified  castles  of  Sen  d'Urgel, 
Cardona.  Solsona,  and  Berga.  A  second  division  was 
on  the  Llobregat,  watching  the  garrison  of  Barcelona, 
and  having  detachments  in  Montserrat,  Igualada,  and 
Manresa  to  connnunicate  with  Canqio  Verde.  The 
third  division,  the  reserve  and  the  cavalry  were  on  the 
hills  about  Taragona,  and  that  place  and  Tortoza  had 
large  garrisons. 

By  this  disposition,  O'Donnel  occupied  Falcet,  the 
Col  de  Balaguer.  and  the  Col  del  Alba,  which  were 
the  passages  leading  to  Tortoza  ;  the  Col  de  Ribas 
and  Momblanch,  which  commanded  the  roads  to  Lori- 
da  ;  San  Coloma  de  Queralt  and  Igualada,  through 
which  his  connection  with  Campo  Verde  was  main- 
tained ;  and  thus  the  two  French  armies  were  separa- 
ted not  only '  by  tlie  great  spinal  ridges  descending 
from  the  Pyrenees,  but  by  the  position  of  the  Span- 
iards, who  held  all  the  passes,  and  could  at  will  con- 
centrate and  attack  either  Sachet  or  Maedonald. *  But 
the  Catalonian  system  was  r.ow  also  connected  with 
Valencii^.  where, "  exclu.-'ivo  of  Irrtgu'ars,  there  were 
about  fifteen  th(;usand  m?n  undei  genera'  J^assecour. 
That  officer  I-ad  in  June  oc^ui-'ed  Ci'ept^^v  yoA  having 
many  qu^rro's  \--\i\'  Wa  offi-ero  b"  co,'Id  Co  non'uxg, 
and  was  dtiveii  tr>m  thence  bv  fxor^ps  roM  V<»d-''l: 
he  retui-ned  to  Vale*'Ci£^.  but  the  dit-puted  vOPtL-m*-^ 


*  General  Doyle's  ev.rrt.^Do.idv  nee.  A^Sfc>.    Oo.ouM  Gi; 
do.  MSS. 


358 


NAPIERS    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XIII. 


and  extended  to  the  junta  or  congrcs-s  of  Valencia,  three 
members  of  wliich  wore  by  the  jjeiieral  imprisoned.* 
Nevertheless,  as  all  parties  were  now  sensible  that  V'aleu- 
cia  should  be  defendi'd  at  Tortoza.  liass'cour  prepared 
to  march  to  its  suec;)ur  by  the  coast  road  where  he  liad 
several  fortified  posts.  Thus,  while  Suchet  and  Mao- 
danald  were  coml)ining  to  crush  O'Donnel,  the  latter 
was  combining  with  Ba«seeour,  to  press  upon  Sachet; 
and  there  was  always  the  English  maritime  force  at 
hand  to  aid  the  attacks  or  to  facilitate  the  escape  of  the 
Spaniards. 

In  the  above  exposition  I  have  called  the  native  ar- 
mies by  the  names  of  their  provinces,  but  in  Decem- 
ber 1810  the  whole  military  force  being  reorganized  by 
the  regency  the  armies  were  designated  by  numbers. 
Thus  the  Oatalonian  forces,  formerly  called  the  army  of 
the  right,  was  now  called  the  first  army.  The  Valen- 
cians,  together  with  Villa  Campa"s  division,  and  the 
partidas  of  the  Empecinado  and  Duran,  were  called  the 
second  armi/.  The  Murcian  force  was  called  the  third 
arm  I/.  The  troops  at  Cadiz,  at  Algesiras,  and  in  the 
Condc  Niebla  were  called  the  fourth  army.  The  rem- 
nants of  Romana's  old  Gallician  division  which  had 
escaped  the  slaughter  on  the  Gebora  formed  the  ffth 
army.  The  new-raised  troops  of  Gallicia  and  those  of 
the  Astnrias  were  called  the  si.cth  army.  And  the  par- 
tidas  of  the  north,  that  is  to  say,  Mina's,  Longa's,  Cam- 
pillo's,  Porlier's,  and  other  smaller  bands,  formed  the 
seventh  army. 

Such  was  the  state  of  affairs  when  Napoleon's  or- 
der to  basiege  Tortoza  arrived.  Suchet  was  ready  to 
execute  it.  More  than  fifty  battering  guns  selected 
from  those  at  Lerida  were  already  equipped,  and  his 
depots  were  established  at  Mequinenza,  Caspe,  and  Al- 
canitz.  All  the  fortified  posts  were  provisioned  ;  twelve 
thousand  men  under  general  IMusnier,  intended  for  the 
security  of  Aragon,  were  disposed  at  Huesca  and  other 
minor  points  on  the  left  bank  of  the  P^bro,  and  at 
Daroca,  Terue!,  and  Calatayud  on  the  right  bank  ;  and 
while  these  arrangements  were  being  executed,  the 
troops  destined  for  the  siege  had  assembled  at  Lerida 
and  Alcanitz,  under  generals  Habert  and  Laval,  their 
provisions  being  drawn  from  the  newly  conquered  dis- 
trict of  Urgel. 

From  Mequinenza,  which  was  the  principal  depot, 
there  was  water-carriage,  but  as  the  Ebro  was  crossed 
at  several  points  by  rocky  bars,  some  of  which  were 
only  passable  in  full  water,  the  comnmnication  was  too 
uncertain  to  depend  upon,  and  Suchet  therefore  set 
■workmen  to  reopen  an  old  road  thirty  miles  in  length, 
■which  had  been  made  by  the  duke  of  Orleans  during 
the  war  of  the  succession.  This  road  pierced  the 
mountains  on  the  right  bank  of  the  El)i'o,  passed 
through  Batea  and  other  places  to  Mora,  and  from 
thenet!  by  Pinel  to  'I'ortoza,  running  through  a  celebra- 
ted defile  called  indifferently  the  Trindieras  and  the 
Passage  of  Arm^.  When  those  preliminary  arrange- 
ments were  made  general  Ilabert  assembled  his  divis- 
ion at  Peli)uig  near  Lerida.  and  after  making  a  feint 
as  if  to  go  towards  Barcelona,  suddenly  turned  to  his 
right,  and  penetrating  through  the  district  of  Garriga, 
reached  Garcia  on  the  left  baidv  of  the  Lower  Ebro 
the  ^t\\  of  duly.  Laval  at  the  same  time  cjuitted  Alca- 
nitz, made  a  feint  towards  Valencia  Ijy  .Mondla,  and  then 
turning  to  his  left,  came  so  unexpectedly  upon  Tortoza 
by  the  right  bank  of  the  Ebro,  that  he  sur|)rised  some 
of  the  out])osts  on  the  2d,  and  then  encamped  before 
the  bridge-head.  ']'he  4th  he  extended  his  line  to  .\m- 
posta,  seized  the  ferry-boat  of  the  great  road  from  Bar- 
celona to  Valencia,  and  posted  Boussard's  cuirassiers, 
with  a  battalion  of  infantry  and  six  guns,  at  Uldecona, 
on  the  Oeaia  river,  to  observe  Bassecour's  Valcnciana. 


•  Oflieial  Abstrncts  of  Mr.  Wellcsley's  Despatches,  MSS. 
Mx.  Btuait'ti  Taper:),  MSS. 


Durhig  these  operations  Suchet  fixed  his  own  quar- 
ters at  Mora,  and  as  the  new  road  was  not  finished,  he 
occupied  Miravet,  Pinel,  and  the  'J'rincheras,  on  its 
intended  line ;  and  having  placed  flying  bridges,  with 
covering  works,  on  the  Ebro.  at  Mora  and  Xerta, 
made  those  places  his  depot  of  siege.  He  likewise  sei/5- 
ed  the  craft  on  the  river,  established  posts  at  Rapita, 
near  the  mouth  of  the  Ebro,  and  made  a  fruitless  at- 
tempt to  burn  the  boat-bridge  of  Tortoza,  with  fire-ves- 
sels. Following  Napoleon's  order,  Maedonald  should 
at  this  time  have  been  before  Taragona  ;  but  on  the 
9th,  Suchet  learned,  from  a  spy,  that  the  seventh  corps 
was  still  at  Gerona,  and  he  thus  found  himself  exposed 
alone  to  the  combined  efforts  of  the  Catalans  and  Valen- 
cians.  This  made  him  repent  of  having  moved  from 
Aragon  so  soon,  yet  thinking  it  would  be  bad  to  retire, 
he  resolved  to  blockade  Tortoza;  hoping  to  resist  both 
O'Donnel  and  Bassecour  until  Maedonald  could  ad- 
vance. 

The  Spaniards  who  knew  his  situation,  sallied  on  the 
right  bank  the  6th  and  8th,  and  on  the  10th  his  outposts 
on  the  left  bank  were  driven  in  at  Tivisa  by  a  division 
from  Falcet,  which,  the  next  day,  fell  on  his  works  at 
Mora,  but  was  repulsed;  and  the  12th,  general  Paris 
pushed  back  the  Spanish  line,  while  Habert  took  post 
in  force  at  Tivisa,  by  which  he  covered  the  roads  to 
Xerta  and  Mora.  O'Donoghue,  who  commanded  Basse- 
cour's advanced  guard,  now  menaced  Morella,  but  gen- 
eral Monimarie  being  detached  to  its  succour,  drove 
him  away. 

The  30th,  O'Donnel  having  brought  up  fresh  troops 
to  Falcct,  made  a  feint  with  ten  thousand  men  against 
Tivisa,  and  then  suddenly  entered  Tortoza,  from  whence 
at  mid-day,  on  the  3d  of  August,  he  passed  the  bridge 
and  fell  with  the  bayonet  on  Laval's  entrenchments. 
The  French  gave  way  at  first,  but  soon  rallied,  and  the 
Spaniards  fearing  for  their  communications  regained  the 
town  in  disorder,  having  lost  two  hundred  prisoners  be- 
sides killed  and  wounded. 

This  operation  had  been  concerted  with  general 
Caro,  who  having  superseded  O'Donoghue,  was  now 
marching  with  the  Valencians  by  the  coast-road  to- 
wards Uldecona  :  Suchet  therefore,  judging  that  the  in- 
tention of  the  Spaniards  was  to  force  him  away  from 
the  Lower  Ebro,  before  Maedonald  could  pass  the  Llo- 
bregat,  resolved  first  to  strike  a  sudden  blow  at  the 
Valencians,  and  then  turn  upon  the  Catalans.  In  this 
view  he  contracted  his  (juarters  on  the  Ebro,  and  united 
at  Uldecona,  on  the  13th,  eleven  battalions  with  eight 
hundred  horsemen.  Caro  was  then  in  a  strong  posi- 
tion covering  the  two  great  routes  to  Valencia,  but 
when  the  French,  after  driving  in  his  advanced  guard 
from  Vinaros,  came  up,  his  Valencians  would  not  stand 
a  battle,  and  being  followed  beyond  Peniscola  separ- 
ated and  retreated  in  disorder  by  difli.'rent  roads.  Where- 
upon Suchet  returned  to  Mora,  and  there  found  an 
officer  of  Macdonald's  army,  who  brt)ught  information 
that  the  seventh  corps  was  at  last  in  the  plains  of 
Reus,  and  its  communications  with  the  third  corps 
open. 

OI'ERATIONS    OF    THE    SEVENTH    CORPS. 

When  Maedonald  succeeded  Augereau  he  found  the 
troops  in  a  state  of  insubordination,  accustomed  to 
plunder,  and  excited  to  ferocity  by  the  cruelty  of  the 
Catalans,  and  by  the  conduct  of  his  predecessor  ;  they 
were  without  magazines  or  regular  subsistence,  and^ 
lived  by  exactions  :*  hence  the  jH'ople,  driven  to  despcv 
ration,  were  more  like  wild  beasts  than  men,  and  the 
war  was  repulsive  to  him  in  all  its  features,  it  was 
one  of  shifts  and  devices,  and  he  better  understood 
methodical  movements ;  it  was  one  of  plunder,  and 
ho   was  a  severe  disciplinarian ;   it  was   full   of  cru- 

•  Vacani.    Vlctoires  ct  Couqufitc^  dea  Fransoia. 


1810.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


359 


elty  oil  all  sides,  and  he  was  of  a  humane  and  just  t  the  command  of  the  Ampurdan,  marchrd  on  the  8th  of 
disposition.  Being  resolved  to  introduce  regular  habits,  I  Augrist  with  a  third  convoy  for  Barcelona,  resolved  at 
Macdonaid  severely  rebuked  the  troops  for  their  bad  dis- j  last  to  co-operate  with  Suchct.  Instructed  Ijy  expe- 
cipliiie  and  cruelty,  and  endeavoured  to  soothe  the  Cat-  rience,  he,  however,  moved  this  time  with  less  furmality, 
alaus,  but  neither  could  be  brought  to  soften  in  their  i  and  having  reached  Barcelona  the  11th,  deposited  bus 
enmity;  the  mutual  injuries  sustained,  were  too  horri- 1  convoy,  appointed  Maurice  Mathieu  governor  of  that 
ble  and  too  recent  to  be  f(jrgiven.  The  soldiers,  drawn '  city,  and  on  the  l.oth  forced  the  pass  of  Ordal,  and 
from  diiL-rent  countries,  andtherefore  not  bound  by  any  !  reached  Villa  Franca  with  about  sixteen  thousand  men 
common  national  feeling,  were  irritated  against  a  gene- J  under  arms.  O'Donnel,  still  smarting  from  the  affair  at 
ral,  who  made  them  pay  for  wanton  clamages,  and  pun- !  Tortoza,  retired  before  him  to  Taragona  without  fight- 
ished  them  fur  plundering  ;  and  the  Catalans  attributing  |  ing,  but  directed  Campo  Verde  to  leave  a  body  of 
his  conduct  to  fear,  because  he  could  not  entirely  re- 1  troops  under  general  Martinez  in  the  mountains  about 


strain  the  violence  of  his  men,  still  fled  from  the  villages, 
and  stili  massacred  his  stragglers  with  unrelenting  bar- 
barit;.* 

While  establishing  his  system  it  was  impossible  for 
Macdonald  to  take  the  field,  because,  without  mag- 
azines, no  army  can  be  kept  in  due  discipline  ; 
wherefore  he  remained  about  Gerona,  drawing  with 
great  labour  and  pains  his  provisions  from  France,  and 
storing  up  ihe  overplus  ibr  his  future  operations.  On 
the  iUth  of  June  however  the  wants  of  Barcelona  be- 
came so  serious,  that  leaving  his  baggage  under  a  strong 
guard  at  Gerona,  and  his  recruits  and  cavalry  at  Figue- 
ras,  he  marched  with  ten  thousand  men  and  a  convoy,  to 
its  relief,  by  the  way  of  the  Trenta  Pasos,  Cardedieu, 
and  Granollers.  The  road  was  heavy,  the  defiles  nar- 
row, the  rivers  swelled,  and  the  manner  of  march  rather 
too  pompous  for  the  nature  of  the  war,  for  Macdonald 
t:)ok  post  in  order  of  battle  on  each  side  of  the  defiles, 
while  the  eiigineei'S  repaired  the  ways  :  in  every  thing 
adhered  to  hi.s  resolution  of  restoring  a  sound  system  ; 
but  while  imitating  the  Juo'urthine  Metellus.  he  forgot 
that  he  had  not  Romans,  but  a  mixed  and  ferocious 
multitude  under  his  command,  and  he  lost  more  by 
wasting  of  time,  than  he  gained  by  enforcing  an  irksome 
discipline.  Thus  when  he  had  reached  Barcelona,  his 
own  provisions  were  expended,  his  convoy  furnished  only 
a  slender  supply  for  the  city,  and  the  next  day  he  was 
forced  to  return  with  the  empty  carts  in  all  haste  to 
Gerona,  Avliere  he  resumed  his  former  plan  of  action, 
and  demolished  the  forts  beyond  that  city. 

In  July  he  collected  another  convoy  and  prepared  to 


Olot,  and  to  move  himself  through  Montserrat  to  the 
district  of  Garriga,  which  lies  between  Lerida  and  Tor- 
toza ;  meanwhile  the  seventh  corps  passed  by  Braffia 
and  Vails  into  the  plain  of  Reus,  and  as  we  have  seen 
opened  the  communication  with  Suchet,  but  to  how  little 
purpose  shall  be  shewn  in  the  next  chapter. 


CHAPTER  II. 

O'Donnel  withdraws  his  troops  from  Faleet  and  Burrounda 
the  seventh  corps — M'Donald  retires  to  Lerida — Arranges 
a  new  plan  with  Suehet — Kavages  the  phiins  of  Urpel  and 
the  higher  valleys — The  people  become  desperate — O'Don- 
nel cuts  the  French  communication  with  the  Ampurdan — 
Makes  a  forced  inarch  towards  Gerona — Surprises  Swarta 
at  Ahi.*pal — Takes  Filieu  und  Palamos — Is  wounded  and 
returns  to  Taraorona — Campo  Verde  marches  to  the  Cer- 
dana — M'Donald  enters  Soisona — Campo  Verde  returna — 
Combat  of  Cardona — The  French  retreat  to  Guisona,  and 
the  seventh  corps  returns  to  Gerona- — M'Donald  marches 
with  a  fourth  convoy  to  Barcelona — Makes  new  roads — 
Advances  to  Eeus — The  Spaniards  harass  his  flanks — He 
forages  the  Garrijra  district  and  joins  the  third  corps — 
Operations  of  Suchet — General  Laval  dies — Operations  of 
the  Partidas — Plan  of  the  secret  junta  to  starve  Aragon  — 
General  Chlopiski  defeats  Villa  Campa — Suchet's  difficul- 
ties— He  assembles  the  notables  of  Aragon  and  reorgan- 
izes tliat  province — He  defeats  and  takes  general  Navarro 
at  Faleet — Bassecour's  operations — He  is  defeated  at  UI- 
decoua. 


As  the  Spanish  general  knew  that  the  French  could 

at  Reus  find  provisions  for  only  a  few  days,  he  withdrew 

march  in"  the  same  order  as  before,  Yor  his  intent  was   his  division  from  Faleet,  and  while  Campo  Verde,  coni- 


to  form  magazines  in  Barcelona  sufficient  for  that  city 
and  his  own  supply,  during  the  siege  of  Taragona  ; 
but  meanwhile  Suchet  was  unable  to  commence  the 
Biege  of  'i'ortoza,  in  default  of  the  co-operation  of  the 
seventh  corps ;  and  Henry  O'Donnel  having  gained 
time  to  re-organize  his  army  and  to  re-establish  his 
authority  was  now  ready  to  interrupt  the  French  mar- 
shal's march,  proposing,  if  he  failed,  to  raise  a  fresh 
insurrection  in  the  Ampurdan,  and  thus  give  further 
occupation  on  that  side.  lie  had  transferred  a  part  of 
his  forci^  to  Caldas,  Santa  Coloma,  and  Brunolas, 
taking  nearly  the  same  positions  that  Blake  had  occu- 
pied during  the  siege  of  Gerona ;  but  the  French 
detachments  soon  obliged  him  to  concentrate  again 
behiiul  the  defiles  of  the  Congosta.  where  he  hoped  to 


ing  into  the  Garriga,  occupied  the  passes  behind  them, 
and  other  troops  were  placed  in  the  defiles  between  Ya\\s 
and  Villafranca,  he  held  the  main  body  of  his  army  con- 
centrated at  'J  aragona,  ready  to  fall  upon  Macdonald 
whenever  he  should  move.  This  done,  he  became  ex- 
tremely elated,  for  like  all  Spaniards,  he  imagined  that 
to  surround  an  enemy  was  the  perfection  of  military 
operations.  Macdonald  cared  little  for  the  vicinity  of 
the  Catalan  troops,  but  he  had  not  yet  formed  sufficient 
magazines  at  Barcelona  to  commence  the  siege  of  Tara- 
gona, nor  could  he,  as  O'Donnel  had  foreseen,  procure 
more  than  a  few  days'  supply  about  Reus,  he  thereforo 
relinquished  all  idea  of  a  siege,  and  proposed  to  aid 
Suchet  in  the  operation  against  Tortoza,  if  the  latter 
would  feed  the  seventh  corps ;    and   pending  Suchet's 


stop  the  passage  of  the  convoy  ;  Macdonald,  however,  i  decision,  he  resolved  to  remove  to  Lerida. 
entered  Hostah-ich  on  the  IGth,  forced  the  Trenta  |  The  2.5th  of  August,  leaving  seven  hundred  sick  men 
Pusos  on  the  ITth,  and  altbiugh  his  troops  had  only  j  in  Reus,  he  made  a  feint  against  the  Col  de  Bala- 
fiftv  rounds  of  ammunition  he  drove  tliree  thousand  gtier,  but  soon  changing  his  direction,  marched  upon 
men  from  the  pass  of  Garriga  on  the  18th,  reached  |  Momblanch  and  the  Col  de  Ribas :  his  rear-guard,  com- 
B.ircelona  that  night,  delivered  his  convoy,  and  return-  i  posed  of  Italian  troops,  being  overtaken  near  Alcover, 
ed  immediately.  offered  battle  at  the  bridge  of  Goy,  but  this  the  Spaniards 

Tiie  French  soldiers  now  became  sickly  from  the  declined,  and  they  also  neglected  to  secure  the  heights 
hard-hips  of  a  march  rendered  oppressive  by  the  j  on  each  side,  which  the  Italians  immediately  turned  to 
severity  of  their  discipline,  and  many  also  deserted  ;t  i  account,  and  so  made  their  way  to  Pixamo.xons.  Ihcy 
yet  others  who  had  before  gone  off,  'returned  to  their  \  were  pursued  immediate'y,  and  Sarsfield,  coming  from 
colours,  reinforcements  arrived  from  France,  and  the :  the  Ix'rida  side,  disputed  the  pa.ssage  ot  Pixamoxons; 
emperor "s  orders  to  take  the  field  were  bi  coming  so  t  but  Macdonald,  keeping  the  troops  from  1  aragona  In 
pressing,  that  Macdonald,  giving  Baraguay  d'llilliers   check  with   a   rear-guard,  again  sent   his   Italians  up 

I  the   hills  on   the   flanks,  while   he   jmshed   his  trench 

*  Vacani.  t  Ibid.  I  troops  against  the  front  of  the  enemy^  and  so  succeeded ; 


3G0 


NAPIER'S    PEXIXSULAll    WAR, 


[Book  Xm. 


for  the  Italians  qnicldy  carried  the  heights,  the  rear- 
guard was  wry  slightly  pressed,  tiie  front  was  unop- 
posed, and  in  two  hours,  the  army  readied  MonibhuR-li, 
whence,  ai'Lr  a  short  halt,  it  descended  into  the  plains 
of  Urgel. 

Suchet,  being  informc<l  of  this  march,  came  from 
Mora  to  confer  witli  Macdonald,  and  they  agreed  that 
the  seventh  corps  should  liave  for  its  subsistence  tiie 
magazines  of  Monzon  and  the  plains  of  Urgel,  wliich 
had  not  yet  delivered  its  contributions.  In  return  Mac- 
donald lent  the  Neapolitan  division  to  guard  Suchet  s 
convoys  down  the  Ebro,  and  promised  that  the  divisions 
of  Severo'i  and  riouham  should  cover  the  operations  of 
the  third  corps,  during  the  siege  of  Tortoza,  by  drawing 
the  attention  of  the  Catalan  general/  to  the  side  of  Car- 
dona. 

'J'he  seventh  corps  was  now  quai'tered  about  Tarega, 
Cervera,   Guisona,   and  Agramuut,  and    SeveroJi   was 
detached  with  four  thousand  men  over  the  Segre  to  en- 
force the  requisitions    about  Talarn.     He  drove  four 
^ondred  Swis^s  from  the  bridge  of  'i'remp.  and  executed 
his  mission,  but  with  such  violence  that  the  people, 
becoming  furious,  assassinated  the  stragglers,  and  laid 
BO  many  successful  schemes  of  murder,  that  IMacdonald  \ 
was  forced   reluctantly  to   renew   the   executions   and  | 
barnings  of  his  predecessors.*     Indeed,  to  feed  an  army  I 
forcibly  when  all  things  are  paid  for,  will,  in  a  poor  and  i 
mountainous  country,  create  soreness,  because  the  things 
taJien  cannot  easily  be  replaced  ;  but  with  requisitions  j 
severity  is  absolutely  necessary.     In  rich  plains  the  in- 
habitants can  afford  to  supply  the  troops,  and  will  do  so 
to  avoid  being  plundered ;    but   mountaineers   having 
scarcely  any  thing  besides  food,  and  little  of  that,  are 
immediately  rendered  desjjerate,  and  must  be  treated  as 
enemies  or  left  in  quiet. 

While   Severoli  was  ravaguig  Tremp   and  Talarn,  j 
general    Eugenio    marched   with    another    Italian  de-  j 
tachment   towards    Castelibllit,   which   had    a    French  | 
garrison,  and   Macdonald   removed   his   own   quarters  1 
to    Cervera.     Meanwhile   O'Donnel,   having    replaced  | 
his  division  at  Falcet  to  observe  Suchet,  .distributed 
bis  other  forces  on  the  line  of  connnunication  through 
ban   Coloma  de  Querault,   Igualada,  Montserrat,  and 
Cardona  ;  he  thus  cut  off  all  connection  between  Mac- 
donald and  the  Ampurdan,  and  enabled  Campo  Yerde 
closely  to  follow  the  operations  of  the  seventh  corps, 
and  that  general,  seeing  the  French  array  separated,  fell 
lirst  upon  the  head-quarters  at  Cervera,  but  being  un- 
successful, marched  against   Eugenio,  and  was  by  him 
also  repulsed  near  CastelfoUit.     Eugenio,  distinguished 
alike  by  his  valour  and   ferocity,  then   returned   with 
his  booty  to  Agramunt,  and  afterwards  invading  Pons, 
spoiled  and  ravaged  all  that  district  with-ut  hindrance. 
'I'he  provisions    obtained   were  heaped    up   in   Lerida 
and  I>al  igiier  ;  but  wiiile  Macdonald  was  thus  acting 
in  the  plain  of  Urgel,  O'Uonnel  formed  and  executed 
the  most  skilful  plan  which  had  yet  graced  the  Spanish 
arms. 

We  have  seen  that  Baraguay  d'Hilliei-s  was  left 
with  eighteen  or  twenty  thousand  men  in  the  Ampur- 
dan, but  these  troops  were  necessarily  scattered  : 
Bcven  hundred  were  at  Palamos,  San  Filieu,  and  other 
small  ports  along  the  coast ;  twelve  hundred,  under 
general  Swartz,  were  quartered  in  Abispal,  one  short 
march  from  Gerona,  and  two  hundred  were  at  Calonje, 
connecting  Abispal  with  Palamos ;  the  rest  were  in 
Pigueras.  Rosiis,  Olot,  Castelibllit,  Gerona,  and  IIos- 
talrich,  and  several  thousand  were  in  hospital.  O'Don- 
jiel,  having  exact  knowledge  of  all  this,  left  a  small 
t,iM-rison  in  'I'aragona,  placed  the  baron  d'Errolles  at 
Montserrat,  colonel  Georget  at  Iguala<la,  and  01)ispo  at 
Martorel,  while  with  six  thousand  infantry  and  four 
uuodred    cavalry   he    marched     himself    tV"ough   the 


mountains,  by  San  Culgat  to  IMattaro  on  the  sea-coast ; 
then  cro.'ssing  the  Tordera  below  Hostalrich,  he  moved 
rapidly  by  Vidreras  to  Llagostera  which  he  reached 
the  12th  of  September.  His  arrival  was  unknown  to 
Macdonald,  or  Maurice  Mathieu,  or  Baraguay  d'Hil- 
liers,  for  though  many  reports  of  his  intentions  were 
afloat,  most  of  them  spread  by  him.self,  no  person  di- 
vined his  real  object ;  by  some  he  was  .said  to  be  gone 
against  a  French  corps,  which,  from  the  .side  of  Navarre, 
had  entered  the  Cerdana  ;  by  others  that  he  was  concen- 
trating at  Manresa,  and  many  concluded  that  he  was 
still  in  Taragona. 

Having  thus  happily  attained  his  fii-st  object,  O'Don- 
nel jiroceeded  in  his  plan  with  a  vigour  of  execution 
equal  to  the  conception.  Leaving  Campo  Yerde  with 
a  reserve  in  the  valley  of  Aro,  he  sent  detachnK  nts  to 
fall  on  Calonje  and  the  posts  along  the  coa.st,  the  ope- 
rations there  being  seconded  by  two  English  frigates  ; 
and  while  this  was  in  progress,  O'Donnel  hiuLself  on 
the  14th  marched  violently  down  from  Casa  de  Silva 
upon  Abispal.  Swartz,  always  unfortunate,  had  his 
infantry  and  some  cavalry  under  arms  in  an  entrenched 
camp,  and  accepted  battle  ;  but  after  losing  two  hundred 
men  and  seeing  no  retreat,  yielded,  and  all  the  French 
troops  along  the  coast  were  likewise  forced  to  surren- 
der. The  prisoners  and  spoil  were  immediately  em- 
barked on  board  the  English  vessels  and  sent  to 
Taragona. 

Until  this  moment  Baraguay  d'Hilliers  was  quite 
ignorant  of  O'Donnel's  arrival,  and  the  whole  Am- 
pi.irdan  was  thrown  into  confusion  ;  for  the  Somatenes, 
rising  in  all  parts,  cut  off  the  communications  with 
IMacdouald,  whose  posts  on  the  side  of  Calaf  and 
Cervei'a  were  at  the  same  time  harassed  by  Errolles 
and  Obispo ;  nevertheless,  although  a  rumour  of 
Swartz's  disaster  reached  him,  Macdonald  would  not 
credit  it.  and  continued  in  the  plain  of  Urgel.  Bara- 
guay d'llilliers  was  therefore  unable  to  do  more  than 
protect  his  own  convoys  frcm  France,  and  would  have 
been  in  a  dangerous  position  if  0  Donnel's  activity  had 
continued  ;  but  that  general  having  been  severely 
wounded,  the  Spanish  effirts  relaxed,  and  Napoleon, 
whose  eyes  were  every  where,  sent  general  Conroux, 
in  the  latter  end  of  October,  with  a  convoy  and  rein- 
forcement of  troops  from  Perpignan  to  Gerona.  O'Don- 
nel, troubled  by  his  wound,  then  embarked  ;  and  Cam- 
po Verde,  who  succeeded  to  the  command,  iiniiH  diately 
sent  a  part  of  the  army  to  Taragona,  left  Ilovira,  and 
Ciaros,  and  Manso,  to  nourish  the  insurrection  in  the 
Ampurdan,  and  took  post  himself  at  iSlanresa,  from 
then'-e  he  at  first  menaced  Macdonald's  posts  at  Calaf; 
but  h.is  real  object  was  to  break  up  that  road,  which 
he  effected,  and  then  passed  suddenly  through  Berga 
and  CardoPia  to  Puigcerda,  and  drove  the  French  de- 
tachment, which  had  come  from  Navarre  to  ravish  the 
fertile  district  of  Cerdana,  under  the  guns  of  Fort 
Louis. 

This  excursion  attracted  Macdonald's  attention,  he 
was  now  fully  apprized  of  Swartz's  misfortune,  and  he 
hoped  to  repair  it  by  crushing  Campo  Yerde,  taking 
Cardona.  and  dispersing  the  local  junta  of  U])per  Cata- 
lonia, which  had  a.ssenibled  in  Solsona  ;  wherefore  on 
the  18th.  he  put  his  troops  in  motion,  and  the  19th, 
passing  the  mountains  of  Portellas,  entered  Solsona; 
but  the  junta  and  the  inhabitants  escaped  to  Cardona 
and  Berja,  and  up  the  valleys  of  Oleana  and  Urgel. 
Macdonald  immediately  sent  columns  in  all  directions 
to  collect  provisions  and  to  chase  the  Spanish  detach- 
ments, and  this  ol>liged  Campo  Verde  to  abandon  the 
Cerdana,  which  was  immediately  foraged  by  the  troops 
from  Fort  Louis.  It  only  remained  to  seize  Cardona, 
and  on  the'ilst  the  French  marched  against  that  place; 
liut  Campo  Verde,  by  a  rapid  movement,  arrived  ijcfore 
them,  and  was  in  order  of  battle  with  a  considcmble 
force  when  MaCdonald  came  up. 


1810.J 


NAPIER-S    PENIXSULAR    WAR. 


3C1 


COMBAT    OF    CARDONA. 

This  town  stands  at  the  foot  of  a  rugged  hill,  which 
isjdiueJ  by  ^  hogs-back  ridge  to  the  great  mountain 
tpine,  dividi  .g  Eastern  from  Western  Catalonia.  The 
Oardona  river  washed  the  walls,  a  castle  of  strength 
crowned  the  height  above,  and  though  the  works  of 
the  ])!ace  were  weak,  the  Spanish  army,  covering  all 
the  side  of  the  hill  betweeu  the  town  and  the  castle,  pre- 
sented such  ail  imposing  spectacle,  that  the  French  gen- 
eral resolved  to  avoid  a  serious  action.  But  the  French 
and  Italians  marched  in  separate  colunms,  and  the 
latter  undt  r  Eugenio,  who  arrived  first,  attacked  con- 
trary to  orders  ;  yet  he  soon  found  his  hands  too  full, 
and  thus,  against  his  will,  Macdnuald  was  obliged  also 
to  engage  to  bring  Eugenio  off.  Yet  neither  was  he 
able  to  resist  Campo  Verde,  who  drove  all  down  the 
mountain,  and  followed  them  briskly  as  they  retreated 
to  Holsona. 

Macdnnald  lost  many  men  in  this  fight,  and  on  the 
2Cth  returned  to  Guisona.  It  was  now  more  than 
two  mouths  since  he  had  left  the  Ampurdan,  and 
during  that  time  he  had  struck  no  useful  blow  against 
the  Spaniards,  nor  had  he,  in  any  serious  maimer, 
aided  Sachet's  operations  ;  for  the  Catalans  continually 
liarassed  that  general'.s  convoys,  from  the  leit  of  the 
Ebro,  while  the  seventh  corps,  besides  suffering  se- 
verely from  assassinations,  had  been  repulsed  at  Car- 
dona,  had  excited  the  people  of  the  plain  of  Urgel  to 
a  sUite  of  rabid  insurrection,  and  had  lost  its  own  com- 
munications with  the  Ampurdan.  In  that  district  the 
brigade  of  Swartz  had  been  destroyed,  the  ports  of 
FilicLi  anil  Palamos  taken,  and  the  Catalans  were  every 
wh'^re  become  more  piwerl'nl  and  elated  than  before; 
Barcelona  also  was  again  in  distress,  and  a  convoy  from 
Perpignan  destined  for  its  relief  dared  not  pass  Ilos- 
talrich.  Macdonald  therefore  resolved  to  return  to 
Gci-ona  by  the  road  of  Manreza,  Moya,  and  ClranoUers, 
and  having  communicated  his  intention  to  Suchet,  and 
placed  his  bag'^age  in  Lerida,  commenced  his  march  the 
4th  of  November. 

Campo  Vei'de  getting  intelligence  of  this  design, 
took  post  to  fight  near  Calaf,  yet  when  the  French 
approached,  his  heart  faileil,  and  he  permitted  them  to 
pass.  The  French  general  therefore  reached  Manreza 
the  7th,  and  immediately  despatched  parties  towards 
Vich  and  other  places  to  mislead  the  Spaniards,  while 
with  his  main  body  he  marched  by  Aloya  and  the 
Gai'iga  pass  to  GranoUers,  wliere  he  expected  to  meet 
Baraguay  d'flilliers  with  the  convoy  from  Barcelona  ; 
but  being  disajip'iinted  in  this,  he  returned  by  the  Tren- 
ta  Pasos  to  Gerona  the  lOth,  and  sent  his  convalescents 
to  Figueras. 

The  vicinity  of  Gerona  was  now  quite  exhausted, 
and  fresh  ciMivoys  from  France  were  required  to  feed 
the  troops,  while  the  posts  in  the  Ampurdan  were  re- 
established and  the  district  re-organized.  Macdonald's 
muster-rolls  presented  a  force  of  fifty -one  thousand  men, 
of  which  ten  thousand  were  in  hospital,  six  thousand 
in  Barcelona,  and  several  thousand  distributed  along 
the  coast  and  on  the  lines  of  conniiunication,  leaving 
somewhat  more  than  thirty  thousand  dispensable  for 
field-operations.  Of  this  number  fourteen  thousand 
were  placed  under  Baraguay  d'Hilliers  to  maintain  the 
Ampurdan,  and  when  the  convoys  arrived  from  France 
the  French  marshal  marched  with  the  remaining  six- 
teen thou-;and,  fur  the  fourth  time,  to  the  succcjur  of 
Barcelona.  Mis  divisions  were  commanded  by  Sou- 
ham  and  Pino,  for  Severoli  had  been  recalled  to  Italy 
to  organize  fresh  reinforcements ;  but  following  his 
former  plan,  this  march  also  was  made  in  one  solid 
body,  and  as  the  defiles  had  been  cut  up  by  the  Span- 
iards, and  the  bridge  over  the  Tordera  broken,  Mac- 
donald set  his  troops  to  labour,  and  in  six  hours 
opened  fresh  ways  over  the  hills  on  the  right  and  left 


of  the  Trenta  Pasos,  and  so,  without  opposition,  reached 
the  more  open  country  aljout  GranoUers  and  MoncaJa. 
The  Spaniards  then  retired  by  their  own  left  to  'I'arasa 
and  Caldas,  but  Macdonald  c(jntinued  to  move  on  in  a 
solid  body  upon  Barcelona ;  for  as  he  was  resolved  not 
to  expose  himself  to  a  dangerous  attack,  so  he  avoided 
all  enterprise.  Thus,  on  the  2M,  he  would  not  permit 
Pino  to  improve  a  favourable  ojsportunity  of  crushing 
the  Catalaiis  in  his  front,  and  on  the  24th.  after  deliver- 
ing his  convoy  and  sending  the  carts  back  to  Belgarde, 
instead  of  pursuing  Campo  Verde  to  Tarasa,  as  all  the 
generals  advised,  he  marched  towards  the  Llobregat  ;* 
and  as  Souham  and  Pino  remained  discontented  at 
■Barcelona,  their  divisions  were  given  to  Frere  and  Fou- 
tanes. 

Macdonald  moved,  on  the  2Tth,  towards  Taragona, 
but  without  any  design   to  undertake  the   siege ;   for 
I  though  the  road  by  Ordal  and  Villa  Franca  was  broad 
and  good,  he  carried  no  artillery   or  wheel-carriages ; 
the  Spaniards,  seeing  this,  judged  he  would  again  go  to 
Lerida,  and  posted  their  main  body  al)0ut  Montserrat 
land    Igualada;    but    he  disregarded    them,   and   after 
i  beating  Sarsficld   from  Arbos  and  Vendril,  turned  to- 
;  wards  the  pass  of  Massarbones,  which  leads  through 
I  the  range  of  hills   separating  Villa  Franca  from   the 
[  district  of  Vails.     The   Catalans  had   lu-oken  up  both 
that  and  the  pass  of  Christina  leading  to  the  Gaya, 
yet  the  French  general  again  made  new  waj-s,  and  on 
the  30th  spread  his  troops  over   the  Paneda  or  plain 
of  Taragona  :  thus  showing  of  how  little  use  it  is  to  de- 
stroy roads  as  a  defence,  unless  men  are  also  prepared  to 
fight. 

Instead  of  occupying  Reus  as  before,  Macdonald  now 
took  a  position  about  Momblanch,  having  his  rear 
towards  Lerida,  but  leaving  all  the  passes  leading  from 
Taragona  to  the  Ebro  open  for  the  Spaniards  ;  so  that 
Suchet  derived  no  benefit  from  the  presence  of  the 
seventh  corps,  nor  could  the  latter  feed  itself,  nor  yet 
in  any  manner  hinder  the  Catalans  from  succouring 
Tortoza.  For  Campo  Verde,  coming  from  Montserrat 
and  Igualada,  was  encamped  above  the  defiles  between 
the  French  position  and  Taragona,  principally  at  Lilla, 
on  the  road  from  Vails ;  and  O'Donnel,  who  still  di- 
rected the  general  movements,  although  his  wound 
would  not  suffer  him  to  ap})ear  in  the  field,  sent  parties 
into  the  Gariga  behind  Macdonald's  right  flank  to  inter- 
rupt his  foraging  parties,  and  to  harass  Suchet's  com- 
nuniications  by  the  Ebro. 

From  the  strong  heights  at  Lilla,  the  Catalans 
defied  the  French  soldiei's,  calling  upon  them  to  come 
up  and  fi,£;ht,  and  they  would  have  done  so  if  Macdon- 
ald would  have  suffered  them,  but  after  ten  days  of  in- 
activity he  divided  his  ti'oops  into  many  columns,  and 
in  concert  with  Abbe's  brigade  of  the  third  corps, 
which  marched  from  Xerta,  endeavoured  to  inclose 
and  destroy  the  detachments  in  the  Gariga ;  the  Span- 
iards, however,  disappeared  in  the  mountains,  and  the 
French  army  only  gained  some  mules  and  four  thou- 
sand sheep  and  oxen.  With  this  spoil  they  united 
again  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Ebro,  and  were  inunedi- 
ately  disposed  on  a  line  extending  from  Vinebre,  which 
is  opposite  to  Flix,  to  Masos,  which  is  opposite  to 
Mora,  and  from  thence  to  Garcia  and  Gniestar.  Su- 
chet was  thus  enal)led  to  concentrate  his  troops  about 
Tortoza,  and  the  siege  of  that  place  was  immediately 
commenced. 

The  operations  of  the  third  corjis  during  the  five 
months  it  had  been  dependent  upon  the  slow  movenieuta 
of  the  seventh  corps  shall  now  be  related. 

Suchet,  by  resigning  the  plain  of  Urgel  and  tlio  maga- 
zines at  Monzon,  for  Macdonald's  subsistence,  in  Sep- 
tember, had  deprived  himself  of  all  the  resources  of 
the  left  bank  of  the  Vihvo  from  Mequineuza  to  Tortoza, 


♦  Vacani. 


562 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XIIL 


and  the  country  about  the  latter  place  was  barren  ; ' 
hence  he  was  obliged  to  send  for  his  provisions  to 
Zuro.goza,  Teniel,  and  other  places  more  than  one 
hundred  miles  troni  his  camp ;  and  meaiiwiiile  the 
ditiicalty  ol'  jiettiiiif  his  batteriiiir  train  and  ammunition 
down  th.'  river  from  Mequinenza  was  increasfd  because 
of  tlie  numerous  bars  and  weirs  which  impeded  the 
iiaviaation  when  the  waters  were  low:  moreover  Mac-i 
donald,  by  .q^oino;  to  (,/ardona,  exposed  the  convoys  to 
attacks  from -the  left  bank,  by  the  Spanish  troops i 
which  being  stationed  between  Taragona,  Momblanch, 
and  Faicet,  Wi're  always  on  the  watch.  Considering 
thestj  things  Suchet  had,  while  the  seventh  corps  was 
vet  ai  Lerida,  and  the  waters  accidentally  high,  employ- 
ed the  Neapolitan  brigade  of  the  seventh  corjjs  to 
escort  twenty-six  pieces  of  artillery  down  the  river. 
This  convoy  reached  Xerta  the  .Oth  of  September,  and 
the  Neapolitans  were  then  sent  to  Guardia ;  general 
Habart  was  placed  at  Tivisa ;  Mas  de  Mora  was 
occupied  by  a  reserve,  and  the  Spaniards  again  took 
post  at  Falcet.  At  this  time  general  Laval  died,  and 
his  division  was  given  to  general  llarispe,  a  person  dis- 
tinguished throughout  the  war  by  his  ability,  courage, 
and  humanity. 

Meanwhile  the  Valeneian  army  had  again  concen- 
trated to  disturb  the  blockade  of  Tortoza,  wherefore 
Suchet  strengthened  Boussard's  detachment  at  Uldeco- 
na,  and  gave  the  command  to  general  Musnier,  who 
was  replaced  at  Zara^oza  by  general  Paris.  At  the 
same  lime  colonel  Kliski  v.'as  sent  to  command  the 
detachments  on  the  side  of  Monlalvan,  Teruel,  Daroca, 
and  Calatayud,  where  a  partizan  warfare  was  continued 
with  undiminished  activity  by  Villa  Campa,  who  had 
contrived  to  open  secret  connnuuications,  and  to  excite 
some  commotions,  even  in  Zaragoza.  On  the  7th  of 
August  he  had  beaten  a  French  Ibraging  detachment 
near  Cuevas.  and  recaptured  six  thousand  sheep,  and  at 
Andorra  had  taken  both  convoy  and  escort.  On  the 
sidj  of  Navarre,  also,  Mina  coming  down  into  the  Cinco 
Villas,  destroyed  some  detachments,  and  impeded  the 
foraging  parlies.  Thus  the  third  corps  also  began  to 
Buffl-r  privations,  and  no  j^rogress  was  made  towards  the 
conquest  of  Catalonia. 

In  September,  however,  Villa  Campa,  having  in- 
creased his  forces,  advanced  so  near  Suchet  that  gen- 
eral Habert  attacked  and  drove  him  over  the  frontier  in 
dispersion,  and  recaptured  all  the  sheep  befoi'e  lost, 
and  Suchet  then  brought  down  the  remainder  of  the 
battering  train,  and  the  stores  for  the  siege  ;  but  as  the 
waters  of  the  Ebi"0  were  low,  the  new  road  was  used 
for  the  convoys,  which  thus  came  slowly  and  with 
many  interruptions  and  considerable  loss ;  esjiecially 
on  the  17 ill  of  SeiUember,  when  a  whole  Neapol- 
itan batiali'ju  suiFcred  itself  to  be  taken  without  firing 
a  shot. 

In  this  manner  affairs  dragged  on  mitil  the  28th 
of  October;  but  then  Macdonald  (O'Donnel  having 
meanwhile  capture(i  Swartz  and  raised  the  Ampurdan) 
retm'ned  to  Ocrona,  whereby  Suchet's  hopes  ».f  com- 
mencing the  siege  were  again  batiied.  And.  as  it  was 
at  this  moment  tlftit  the  assembling  of  the  cortes 
gave  a  new  vigour  to  the  resistance  in  Spain  and  the 
regency's  plan  of  sending  .^ecret  juntas,  to  organize  and 
r-gulate  the  proceedings  of  the  jjartidas,  was  put  in 
execution,  the  activity  of  those  bands  became  propor- 
tioned to  the  hopes  excited,  and  the  supplies  and 
promises  thus  conveyed  to  tlu-m.  One  of  liiose  secret 
junUxs,  compised  of  clergy  and  juililary  men,  having 
property  or  influence  in  Aragon,  endcavouri'd  to  renew 
the  insunei;tion  formerly  excited  by  Blake  in  that 
province,  and  for  this  purjiose  sent  theii-  emissaries 
mto  all  quarters,  and  combined  their  operations  with 
Mina.  Tliey  also  diligently  followed  a  plan  of  se- 
cretly drawing  oIF  the  provisions  from  Arairon,  with  a 
view  to  starve  the  Erjuch,aud  general  Carbejal,  one 


of  the  junta,  joining  Villa  Campa,  assumed  the  su- 
preme  command  on  that  side  ;  while  captain  Codring- 
ton.  at  the  desire  of  Bassecour,  carried  a  Valeneian  de- 
tachment by  sea  to  Peniscola  to  fall  on  the  left  flaid<  of 
Suchet,  if  he  should  attempt  to  penetrate  by  the  coast 
road  to  Valencia.  Thus,  at  the  moment  when  Macdon- 
ald  returned  to  the  Ampurdan,  the  Aragonese  became 
unquiet,  the  partidas  from  Navarre  and  the  district  of 
Montahan  and  Calatayud,  closed  in  on  Suchet's  com- 
munications, the  Valencians  came  up  on  the  one  side, 
towards  Uldecona,  and  on  the  other  Garcia  Navarro 
moving  from  Taragona  with  a  division  again  assumed 
the  position  of  Falcet. 

To  check  this  tide  of  hostility  the  French  general 
resolved  first  to  cru.sh  the  insurrection  project,  and  for 
this  purpose  detached  seven  battalions  and  four  hun- 
dred cavalry  against  Carbajal.  Chlopiski,  who  com- 
manded them,  defeated  the  Spaniards  the  21st  at  Al- 
ventoza  on  the  route  to  Valencia,  taking  some  guns 
and  ammunition.  Nevertheless  Villa  Campa  rallied  his 
men  in  a  few  daj's  on  the  mountain  of  Fuente  Santa, 
where  he  was  joined  by  Carbajal,  and  having  received 
fresh  succotu's  renewed  the  project  of  raising  the  Ara- 
gonese. But  Chlopiski  again  defeated  him  the  12th 
of  November,  and  the  Spaniards  fled  in  confusion  to- 
wards the  river  Libras,  where  the  bridge  bieaking 
many  were  drowned.  The  French  lost  more  than  a 
hundred  men  in  this  sharp  attack,  and  Chlopiski  then 
returned  to  the  blockade,  leaving  Kliski  with  twelve 
hundred  men  to  watch  Villa  Campa's  further  move- 
ments. 

The  Ebro  having  now  risen  sufficiently,  the  remain- 
der of  the  battering  train  and  stores  were  embarked  at 
Mequinenza,  and  on  the  M  dropt  down  the  stream ; 
but  the  craft  outstripped  the  escort,  and  the  convoy  be- 
ing assailed  from  the  left  bank,  lost  two  boats  ;  the 
others  grounded  on  the  right  bank,  and  were  there  de- 
fended by  the  cannoneers,  until  the  escort  came  up  on 
the  one  side,  and  on  the  other,  general  Abbe,  who  had 
been  sent  from  Guardia  to  their  succour.  The  waters, 
however,  suddenly  subsided,  and  the  convoy  was  still 
in  danger  until  Suchet  reinforced  Abbe,  who  was  thus 
enabled  to  keep  the  Spaniards  at  bay,  while  Ilabert, 
with  fifteen  hundred  men.  made  a  diversion  by  attacking 
the  camp  at  Falcet.  On  the  7th  the  waters  again  rose 
and  the  boats  with  little  loss  reached  Xerta  on  the  9lh, 
and  thus  all  things  were  ready  to  commence  the  siege, 
but  the  seventh  corps  still  kept  aloof. 

Suchet  was  now  exceedingly  perplexed  ;  for  the  pro- 
visions he  had  with  so  much  pains  collected,  from  the 
most  distant  parts  of  Aragon,  were  rapidly  wasting  ; 
forage  was  every  day  becoming  scarcer,  and  the  plain 
of  Urgel  was  by  agreement  given  over  to  the  seve;ith 
corps,  which  thus  became  a  burthen  instead  of  an  aid 
to  the  third  corps.  The  latter  had  been,  since  the  be- 
ginning of  the  year,  ordered  to  supply  itself  entirely 
from  the  resources  of  Aragon  without  any  helj)  from 
France  ;  and  the  difficulty  of  so  doing  may  be  judged 
of  by  the  fiict,  that  in  six  months  they  had  consumed 
above  a  hundred  and  twenty  thousand  sheep  and  twelve 
hundred  bullocks. 

To  obviate  the  embarra.ssments  thus  accumulating, 
the  French  general  called  the  notables  and  heads  of  the 
clergy  in  Aragon  to  his  head-fiiiarters,  and  with  their 
assistance  reorganized  the  whole  system  of  internal 
administration,  in  such  a  manner,  that,  giving  his  con- 
fidence to  the  natives,  removing  many  alisurd  restric- 
tions of  their  industry  and  trade,  and  h'aving  the  mu- 
nicipal power  and  police  entirely  in  their  hands,  he 
drew  forth  the  resources  of  the  provinces  in  greater 
abundance  than  before.  And  yet  with  le.ss  discontent, 
being  well  served  and  obeyed,  both  in  matters  of  ad- 
ministration and  police,  by  the  Aragonese,  whose  feel- 
ings' he  was  careful  to  soothe,  shewing  himself  in  all 
things  au  able  governor,  as  well  as  a  great  cummander 


1810.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


3C3 


Macdnnald   was  now  in   march   from  Barcelona  to-  [ 
■wards  Tarag-t)na,  and  Sachet  to  aid  this  operation  at- 1 
tackv'd  the  Spanish  troops  at  Falcet.     (General  Hubert  j 
fell  on  tlieir  camp  in  front  the  19th,  and  to  cut  off  the 
retreat,  two  detacliments  were  ordered  to  turn  it  by  the 
ri.L,^ht    anil    left  :    but   Ilabert's  assault  was  so    brisk, 
that  before  the  flanldn.sj  corps  could  take  their  staiionsj 
the  Catalans  tied,  leaving  their  general  Garcia  Navar- j 
ro  and  three  hundred  men  in  the  hands  of  the  victors.  \ 
But  while  Sachet  obtained  this  success  on  the  side  of  | 
Falcet,  the  Valencian  general   Bassecour,  thinking  that  j 
tiie  main   body  of  tiie  French  wouid   l)e  detained  by  | 
Naviirro  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Ebro,  formed  the  de-| 
sign  of  surprising  general   Musnier  at  Uldecona.     To! 
aid  this  operation,  a  tiotilla  from  the  harbour  of  Penis- i 
cola,  attacked   Rapita,  and  other  small  posts  occu])ied 
by  the  French,  on  the  coast  lietween  the  Cenia  and  the 
Ebro;  and  at  the  same  time  th;  governor  of  Tortoza 
menaced  Amposta  and  the  stations  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Ebro. 

Bassecour  moved  against  Uldecona  in  three  columns, 
one  of  which,  following  the  coast-road  towards  Alca- 
nar,  turned  the  French  left,  while  another  passing  be- 
hind the  mountains  took  post  at  Las  V'entallas,  iu  rear 
of  Musnier's  position,  to  cut  him  off  from  'I'ortoza.  The 
mam  body  went  straight  against  his  front,  and  in  the 
night  of  the  2()lh  the  Spanish  cavalry  fell  upon  the 
French  camp  outside  the  town  ;  but  the  guards,  undis- 
mayed, opened  a  tire  which  checked  the  attack,  until 
the  troops  came  out  of  the  town  and  formed  iu  order 
of  battle. 

At  daylight  the  Spanish  army  was  perceived  cover- 
ing the  hills  in  front  ;  and  those  iu  rear  also,  for  the 
detachment  at  Ventallas  was  in  sight  ;  the  French  were 
thus  surrounded  and  the  action  immediately  commen- 
ced ;*  but  the  Valencians  were  defeated  with  the  loss 
of  sixteen  hundred  men,  and  the  detachment  in  the 
rear  seeing  the  result  made  off  to  the  mountains  agani. 
Bassecour  then  withdrew  in  some  order  l)ehind  the  Ce- 
tia,  where  in  the  night  Musnier  surprised  him,  and  at 
the  same  time  sent  the  cuirassiers  by  the  route  of  \"i- 
naros  to  cut  off  his  retreat,  which  was  made  with  such 
haste  and  disorder  that  the  French  cavalry  falling  in 
with  the  fugitives  near  Benicarlo,  killed  or  took  nine 
hundred.  Bassecour  saved  hiniseif  in  Peniscola,  and 
thither  also  the  flotilla,  having  failed  at  Rapita,  re- 
turued.f 

Sachet  having  thus  cleared  his  rear,  sent  his  prisoners 
to  France  by  Jaca.  and  directed  a  convoy  of  provisions, 
newly  collected  at  Mequinenza,  to  fall  down  the  Ebro  to 
the  magazines  at  Mora  :  fearing  however  that  the  cur- 
rent might  again  carry  the  boats  faster  than  the  escort, 
he  directed  the  latter  to  proceed  first,  and  sent  general 
Abbe  to  Fiix  to  meet  the  ves.sels.  The  Spaniards  in 
the  Garriga  observing  this  disposition,  placed  an  ambus- 
cade near  Mef|uin 'nza,aud  attacked  the  craft  before  they 
could  come  up  with  the  esc-^rt  ;  the  boats  were  then  run 
a/i!iure  on  the  right  side,  and  seventy  men  from  Mecpii- 
nenza  carnj  down  the  left  bank  to  their  aid,  which  saved 
the  convoy,  but  the  succouring  detachment  was  cut  to 
pieces.  Soon  after  this  the  seventh  corps  having  scoured 
the  Garriga  took  post  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Ebro,  and 
enabled  the  third  corps  to  commence  the  long  delayed 
siege. 


CHAPTER  m. 

Tortoza — Its  governor  feeble — The  Spaniards  outride  dis- 
putiiii^  iiiid  ne!=flis;ent— Ciiptaiu  Faiic  limils  atl'alainos — I.^ 
taken — O'Doiiiief  resiirus  and  is  succeeded  by  Campo 
Verde — Descriptioa  of  Tortoza — It  is  invested — A  divi.s- 

*  Sachet's  Memoirs. 

t  Olfici'il  Ab:itr.ict  of  Mr.  WcUesley'a  Despatch,  MSS. 


ion  of  the  seventh  corps  placec  under  Snchet's  command 
—Siege  of  Tortoza — The  place  nej^otiates— Sucliet's  dar- 
intr  conduct — The  governor  surrenders — Suclict's  activity 
—  Ilabert  takes  the  fort  of  Balaguer — M'Doui.ld  moves  to 
Ecus — Sarsficld  defeats  and  kills  Ugeiiio--M'Donald 
marclies  to  Lerida — Suchct  goes  to  Zaragoza — The  confi- 
dence of  the  (Jatalans  re,vives — Tlic  maniier  in  wliich  the 
beilifrerents  obtained  provisiojis  explained — The  Catalans 
attack  Ferillo,  and  C;unpo  Verde  endeavours  to  siii-prise 
Monjuic,  but  is  defeated  with  great  loss— Napoleon 
chanires  tlie  organization  of  t!ie  tliird  and  sevcntli  eoi-pa 
— The  former  iiecouiea  the  army  of  Aragou — The  latter 
tlie  army  of  Catalonia. 

Tortoza,  with  a  population  often  thousand  souls  and 
a  garrison  of  from  eight  to  nine  thousand  regular  troops, 
was  justly  considered  the  principal  bulwark  of  both 
Catalonia  and  Valencia,  but  it  was  under  the  command 
of  general  Lilli,  Conde  d'Alacha,  a  feeble  man,  whose 
only  claim  was,  that  he  had  shown  less  incapacity  than 
others  before  the  battle  of  Tudela  in  1808.  However, 
so  confident  were  the  Spaniards  in  the  strength  of  the 
place  that  the  French  attack  wits  consid(?rably  ad- 
vanced ere  any  interruption  was  contemplated,  and  had 
any  well  considered  project  for  its  relief  been  framed,  it 
could  not  have  beeji  executed,  because  jealousy  and 
discoi-d  raged  amongst  the  Spanish  chiefs.  Campo 
Verde  was  anxious  to  succeed  O'Donnel  in  command  of 
the  Catalonian  army,  Bassecour  held  unceasing  dis- 
pute with  his  own  officers,  and  with  the  members  of 
the  junta  or  congress  of  Valencia  ;  and  Villa  Campa 
repelled  the  interference  both  of  Carbajal  and  Basse- 
cour. 

At  this  critical  time  therefore  every  thing  was  stag- 
nant, except  the  English  vessels  which  blockaded  Rosas, 
Barcelona,  and  the  mouths  of  the  Ebro,  or  from  certain 
head-lands  observed  and  pounced  upon  the  enemy's 
convoys  creeping  along  from  port  to  port  :  they  had 
thrown  provisions,  ammunition,  and  stores  of  all  kinds 
into  Taragona  and  Tortoza,  and  were  generally  suc- 
cessful, yet  at  times  met  with  disasters.  Thus  captain 
Rogers  of  the  Kent,  having  with  him  the  Ajax,  (Jam- 
brian.  Sparrow-hawk,  and  Minstrel,  disembarked  six 
hundred  men  and  two  field  pieces  under  captain  Fane  at 
Palamos,  where  they  destroyed  a  convoy  intended  for 
Barcelona  ;  but  as  the  seamen  were  re-embarking  in  % 
disorderly  manner,  the  French  fell  upon  them  and  took 
or  killed  two  hundred,  captain  Fane  being  amongst  the 
prisoners. 

The  Catalan  army  was  thirty  thousand  strong, 
including  garrisons,  and  in  a  better  state  than  it  had 
hitherto  been  ;*  the  Valencians,  although  discouraged 
by  the  defeat  at  Uldecona,  were  still  numerous,  and 
all  things  tended  to  confirm  the  Spaniards  in  the  confi- 
dent expectation  that  whether  succoured  or  unsuccoured 
the  place  would  not  fall.  But  OT)onnel,  who  had 
been  created  Conde  de'  Bispal,  was  so  disabled  by 
wounds,  that  he  resigned  the  command  soon  after  the 
siege  commenced,  and  Campo  Verde  was  by  the  voice 
of  the  people  raised  in  his  stead  ;  for  it  v/as  their 
nature  always  to  believe  that  the  man  who  made  most 
noise  was  tlie  fittest  person  to  head  them,  and  in  this 
instance,  as  iu  most  others,  they  were  greatly  mis- 
taken, 

Tortoza.  situated  on  the  left  of  the  Ebro,  communi- 
cated with  the  right  bank  by  a  bridge  of  boats,  which 
was  the  only  Spanish  bridge  on  that  river,  from  Ziira- 
goza  to  the  sea  ;  and  below  and  above  the  place  there 
was  a  plain,  but  so  narrowed  by  the  juttings  of  the 
mountains  at  the  point  where  the  town  was  built,  that 
while  part  of  the  houses  stood  close  to  the  water  on 
flat  ground,  the  other  part  stood  on  the  bluff  rocky 
points  shot  from  the  hills  above,  and  thus  appeared 
to  tie  the  mountains,  the  river,  and  the  plains  to- 
gether.! 

*  Official  Abstract  of  Mr.  Wellesley'a  Despatches,  MS8. 
t  Vacaui.    Kofjjuut.    Sachet. 


364 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    AVAR, 


[Book  XIIL 


Five  of  these  shoots  were  taken  into  the  defence, 
either  by  the  ramparts  or  by  outworks.  That  on  the 
8L»ul.h  of  the  town  was  crowned  by  the  fort  of  Orleans, 
and  on  the  nortli  another  was  occupied  by  a  fort  caik'd 
the  Tenaxas.  'I'o  the  east  a  horn-work  was  raised  on  a 
third  shoot,  which  bein<;-  prokiuf^ed.  and  risinji'  sudik'uly 
a,^ain  between  the  suburl^s  and  the  city,  furnished  tlie 
site  of  u  ca,stle  or  citadel  :  the  other  two,  and  the  deep 
ravines  between  them  were  defended  by  the  ramparts 
of  the  place,  which  were  extremely  irregular,  and 
strong  from  their  situation,  rather  than  their  construc- 
tion. 

'I'here  were  four  fronts. 

1.  I'iie  northern  defl'iidin^  the  suburb.  Although  this 
front  was  built  on  the  plain,  it  w:is  so  imbedded  be- 
tween the  Ebro,  tlie  horn-xyork,  tlie  citadel,  and  the 
Tenaxas.  that  it  couhl  not  even  be  approached  without 
first  taking  the  latter  fort. 

2.  T.ie  enMcrn.  Extendi  it  g  from  the  Iwrn-icork  to  the 
bastion  of  Sun  Pico.  Here  the  deep  ravines  and  the 
rocky  nature  of  the  ground,  which  was  also  overlooked 
by  tlie  citadel  and  iianked  by  the  horn-work,  rendered 
any  attack  very  difficult. 

3.  D'le  south  eastern.  From  the  bastion  of  San  Pico 
to  the  bastion  of  Santa  Cruz.  This  front,  protected  by 
a  de.^p  narrow  ravine,  wis  again  covered  by  the  fort 
of  O.leans,  which  was  itself  covered  by  a  second  ra- 
vine. 

4.  Tiie  southern.  From  the  Santa  Cruz  to  the  Ebro. 
The  ground  of  apprimch  here  was  flat,  the  soil  easy  to 
work  in,  and  the  fort  of  Orleans  nut  sufficiently  ad- 
vanced to  tiank  it  with  any  dangerous  effect;  whcre- 
lore  against  this  front  Suchet  resolved  to  conduct  his 
attack. 

The  Rocquetta,  a  rising  ground  opposite  the  bridge- 
head on  the  right  bank  of  the  Ebro,  was  fortified  and 
occupied  by  three  regiments,  but  the  other  troops  were 
collected  at  Xerta  ;  and  the  15th,  before  day-break, 
Suchet  crossed  ihe  Ebro  by  his  own  bridge  at  that 
point,  with  eight  battalions,  the  sappers,  and  two  squad- 
rons (;f  hussars.  He  marched  between  the  mountains 
and  the  river  upon  the  foi-t  of  Tenaxa-s,  while  general 
Haberl,  wi'.h  two  regiments  and  three  humlred  hussars, 
moved  from  the  side  of  Perillo,  and  attacked  a  detach- 
m;!nt  of  the  garrison  which  was  encamped  on  the  Col 
d  Alba  eiustward  of  the  city.  Whan  Suchet's  column 
arrived  in  sigiit  of  the  works,  the  head  took  ground,  but 
the  rear,  under  general  JIarispe,  filed  off  to  the  left, 
across  the  rugged  shoots  from  the  hills,  and  swept  round 
the  place,  leaving  in  every  ravine  and  on  every  ridge  a 
detachment,  until  the  half  circle  ended  on  the  Ebro, 
below  Tortoza.  The  investment  was  then  perfected 
on  the  left  bank  by  the  troops  from  Roccjuetta  ;  and 
during  this  movement  Habert,  having  scizt_d  the  Col 
d'Alba,  entered  the  line  of  investments,  driving  before 
him  six  hundred  men.  who  hardly  escaped  bi-ing  cut 
off  In  J  m  the  place  by  the  nuirch  of  Harispe.*  The  com- 
munication acros.^  the  water  was  then  established  by 
three,  and  afterwards  by  four  flying  bridges,  placed 
above  and  below  the  town;  a  matter  of  some  dilliculty 
and  importance,  because  all  the  artillery  and  stores  hatl 
come  from  Rocfjuetta,  across  the  water,  which  was 
there  two  hundred  yards  wide,  and  in  certain  winds  very 
rough. 

The  camps  of  investnumt  were  now  secured,  and 
meanwhile  Macdonald,  sending  the  greatest  part  of 
his  cavairy,  for  which  he  could  find  no  forage,  back  to 
Lerida  by  the  road  of  Laidecaiis,  marched,  from  Mius 
dc  Mora,  across  the  hills  to  Perillo,  to  cover  the  siege. 
His  patrokw  discovered  a  Spanish  division  in  a  po- 
sition resting  upon  the  fort  of  Felipe  de  Balaguer, 
yet  he  would  not  attack  them,  and  thinking  he  could 


•  Si 


Otiiciul  extract  of  ilr,  Wellesloy's  despatches, 


I  not  remain  for  want  of  provisions,  returned  on  the  19th 
I  to  Gniestar  ;  but  this  retrograde  movement  was  like  to 
!  have  exposed   the  investing  troojjs  to  a  disaster,  for  aa 
I  the   seventh  corps  retired,  a  second   Spanish   division 
[coming  from  Reus  reinforced  the  first.     However,  Mao 
i  douald,  seeing  this,  placed  Frere's  division  of  six  thou- 
sand  infantry  and  a  regimi^it  of  cavalry  at  Suchet's 
1  disposal,  on  condition  that  the  latter  should  feed  them, 
1  which  he  could  well  do.     These  troops  were  immedi- 
]  ately  stationed  behind  tli^  investing  force,  on  the  road 
of  Amposta,  by  which  the  Spaniards  fiom   Taragona 
could  most  easily  approach  ;  and  the  remainder  of  the 
seventh  corps  encamped  at  Gniestar.  a  strong  position 
covering  the  siege  on   the  side  of  p^alcet,  only  fifteen 
miles  distant  from  Tortoza.     In  this  situation  it  could 
be  more  easily  fed  from  Lei'ida,  and  could  with  greater 
facility  send  detachments  up  the  Ebro,  to  protect  the 
convoy  of  the  third  corps  coming  from  Mequiuenza. 

The  Catalan  army  was  now  divided,  pait  being 
kept  on  the  Llobregat,  under  general  Caro,  part  under 
general  Yranzo  at  Momblanch,  and  part,  under  Canipo 
Verde,  on  the  hills  watching  Frere's  covering  divis- 
ion.* O'Honnel  had  before  directed  two  convoys 
upon  Tortoza,  but  the  rapidity  with  which  the  invest- 
ment had  been  effected  prevented  them  from  entering 
the  place  ;  and  while  he  was  endeavouring  to  arrange 
with  Bassecour  and  Campo  ^'erde  a  general  plan  of 
succour,  his  wounds  forced  him  to  embark  for  Valencia, 
when  the  command,  of  right,  belonged  to  Yranzo,  but 
the  people,  as  I  have  before  said,  insisted  upon  having 
Campo  Verde. 

SIEGE    OF    TORTOZA. 

The  half  bastion  of  San  Pedro,  which  was  *ituatcd 
in  the  plain,  and  close  to  the  river,  was  the  first  object 
of  the  French  attack,  and  to  prevent  the  fire  of  Fort 
Orleans  from  inconmioding  the  trenches,  the  line  of  ap- 
proach was  traced  in  a  slanting  direction,  refusing  the 
right,  and  pushing  forward  the  left  ;  and  to  protect  its 
fianks  on  the  one  side.  Fort  Oilcans  was  masked  by  a 
false  attack,  while,  on  the  other  side  of  the  Ebro,  trenches 
were  opened  against  the  bridge-head,  and  brought  down 
close  to  the  water. 

The  19th  the  posts  of  the  besieged  were  all  driven 
in,  and  an  unfinished  Siianish  work,  commenced  on  the 
heights  in  advance  of  Fort  Orleans,  was  taken  posses- 
sion of.  In  the  night,  a  flying  sap  was  commenced 
upon  an  extent  of  three  hundred  and  sixty  yards,  and 
at  a  distance  of  only  one  hundred  and  sixty  Ircra  the 
fort  ;  but  in  the  following  night,  the  true  attack  was 
undertaken  in  the  jilaiii,  during  a  storm  of  wind  which, 
together  with  the  negligence  of  the  Spaniards,  who  had 
placed  no  guards  in  the  front  of  their  covered  way,  ena- 
bled the  besiegers  to  begin  this  work  at  only  one  hun- 
dred and  fifty  yards  from  the  half  bastion  of  San  I'edro. 
This  parallel  was  above  five  hundred  yards  long,  extend- 
ing fn nil  the  false  attack  against  Fort  Orleans,  down  to 
the  bank  of  the  river;  two  communications  were  also 
begun,  and  on  the  left  bank  ground  was  broken  against 
the  bridge-head. 

The  'ilst.  at  day-break,  the  Spaniards,  perceiving  the 

works,  commenced  a  heavy  fire,  and  soon  after  made  a 

sally  ;  but  they  were  overwhelmed   by  musketry  from 

tlie'fal.se  attack  of  Fort  Orleans,  and  from  the  trenches 

i  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Ebro. 

In  the  night  of  the  21st.  the  communication  in  the 
I  plain  was  extended  \f>  fourteen  hundred  yards,  nine  bat- 
teries were  commenced,  and  bags  of  earth  were  placed 
!  along  the  edge  of  the  trenchi's,  whence  chosen  men  shot 
i  down  the;  Spanish  artillery  men. 

On  the  23d,  a  night  sally,  made  from  the  bridge-head, 
was  repulsed  ;  and  on  the  24th,  the  second  parallel  of 
the  true  attack  was  commenced. 


*  "Wiinpheu's  Memoir. 


1810.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


365 


la  the  night  of  the  25th,  at  eleven  o'cloclv  and  at 
one  o'clock,  separate  .^allies  were  made,  but  b;jlh  w.'re 
repuli^ed,  and  the  works  were  advanced  to  within 
twenty-five  yards  of  the  palisades ;  a  tenth  battery 
was  also  commenced,  and  when  day  broke  the  Spanish 
gunners  quailed  under  the  aim  of  the  chosen  marks- 
ni.in. 

In  the  night  of  the  2fith,  the  besieged  fell  upon  the 
'  h;>ad  of  the  sap,  which  they  overturned,  and  killed  the 
sappers,  but  were  finally  repulsed  by  the  reserve,  and 
the  approach  was  immediately  pushed  forward  to  the 
placj  of  arms.  Thus,  on  the  seventh  night  of  open 
irenches,  the  besiegers  were  lodged  in  the  covered 
way,  before  a  shot  had  been  fired  from  either  breaching 
or  counter-batteries  ;  a  remarkabL'  instance  of  activity 
and  b;j!dness,  and  a  signal  proof  that  the  defence  was  ill- 
conducted. 

The  night  of  the  27th,  the  works  were  enlarged  as 
much  as  the  fire  of  the  place  which  was  untouched 
would  permit;  but  the  Spaniards  seeing  the  besiegers' 
batteries  ready  to  open,  made  a  general  sally  through  the 
eastern  gates,  against  the  false  attack  at  Fort  Orleans  ; 
and  through  the  southern  gates  against  the  works  in  the 
p!ain.  General  Haboi  t  drove  them  back  with  slaughter 
from  the  firmer  point,  but  at  the  latter  they  beat  the 
French  from  the  covered  way.  and  arriving  at  the  second  I 
parallel,  burnt  the  gabions  and  did  much  damage  ere  the  i 
reserves  cuuld  repulse  them.  j 

The  night  of  the  28th,  the  batteries  were  armed  with 
forty-five  pieces,  of  which  seventeen  were  placed  on  the 
right  bank,  to  take  the  Spanish  works  at  the  main 
attack  in  reverse  and  to  break  th.^  bridge.  At  day-break 
all  these  guns  opened,  and  with  success,  against  the 
demi-bastion,  on  the  leit  bank  of  the  river,  but  the  fire 
from  the  castle,  the  bridge-head,  the  horn-work,  and  the 
t]uay,  overpowered  the  French  guns  on  the  right  bank, 
and  although  the  bridge  was  injured,  it  was  not  rendered 
impassable. 

On  the  30th,  the  Spanish  fire  was  in  turn  overpow- 
ered by  the  besiegers,  the  bridge  was  then  broken,  and 
in  the  following  night  an  attempt  was  made  to  pass  the 
ditch  at  the  true  attack  ;  but  two  guns  which  were  still 
untouched  and  flanked  the  point  of  attack,  defeated  this 
cif  irt. 

In  the  morning  of  the  31  st,  the  Spaniards  abandoned 
the  bridge-head,  and  the  French  Ijatteries  on  the  right 
b^nk  dismounted  the  two  gun-;  which  had  defended  the 
half  bastion  of  San  Pedro.  The  besiegers  then  effected 
t!ie  pa=5sage  of  the  ditch  without  difficulty,  and  attached 
the  miner  to  the  scarp. 

In  the  night  of  the  31st,  the  miner  worked  into  the 
wall,  and  the  batteries  opened  a  l)reach  in  the  curtain, 
where  a  lodgement  was  established  in  pre])aration  for  an 
a-tsault.  At  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning  the  besieged, 
alarmed  at  the  progress  of  the  attack,  displayed  the 
white  flag.  The  negotiations  fur  a  surrender  were,  how- 
ever, prolonged  until  evening  by  the  governor,  with- 
out any  result,  and  the  miner  resumed  his  work  in  the 
night. 

At  seven  o'clock  on  the  1st  of  January,  two  practi- 
cable breaches  beside  that  in  the  curtain  were  opened 
by  the  artillery,  and  the  mine  was  ready  to  explode, 
when  three  white  flags  were  seen  to  wave  from  differ- 
ent parts  of  the  fortress  ;  nevertheless  the  disposition 
of  the  garrison  was  mistrusted,  and  Suehet  demanded 
a.s  a  preliminary  the  immediate  possession  of  one  of 
the  fort-, — a  necessary  precaution,  for  disputes  arose 
among  the  besieged,  and  general  Liili  intimated  to 
Sachet,  that  his  own  authority  was  scarcely  recog- 
nised. 

In  this  critical  moment,  the  PVench  general  gave 
proof  that  his  talents  were  not  those  of  a  mere  soldier, 
for  suddenly  riding  up  to  the  gates  with  a  considerable 
staff,  and  escorted  only  by  a  company  of  grrenadie'^, 
he  ini'jrmL'd  lIjp  Spanish  oiiQcer  on  guard,  that  hostili- 


ties had  ceased,  and  then,  leaving  his  grenadiers  on  the 
spot,  desired  to  be  conducted  to  the  governor  who  was 
in  the  citadel.  Lilli,  still  wavering,  was  upon  the 
point  of  renewing  the  defence,  in  compliance  with  the 
desires  of  the  officers  about  him,  when  the  French 
general  thus  came  suddenly  into  his  presence,  and, 
although  the  appearance  of  the  Spanish  guards  was 
threatening,  assumed  an  imperious  tone,  spoke  largely 
of  the  impatience  of  the  French  army,  and  even  me- 
naced the  garrison  with  military  execution  if  any  further 
delay  occurred  :  during  this  extraordinary  scene  general 
Habert  brought  in  the  grenadiers  from  the  gate,  and  the 
governor  then  signing  a  short  capitulation,  gave  over 
the  citadel  to  the  French. 

When  this  event  was  known  in  the  city,  the  Spanish 
troops  assembled,  and  Alacha,  in  the  presence  of  Su- 
ehet, ordered  them  to  lay  down  their  arms.  Four  hun- 
dred French  and  about  tburteen  hundred  Spaniards  had 
fallen  during  the  siege ;  and  many  thousand  prisoners, 
nine  standards,  one  hundred  pieces  of  artillery,  one 
thousand  muskets,  and  immense  magazines,  enhanced 
the  value  of  the  conquest,  which  by  some  was  attributed 
to  general  Lilli's  treachery,  by  others  to  his  imbecility, 
and  it  would  seem  that  there  Mas  reason  for  both 
charges. 

The  fall  of  Tortnza,  besides  opening  the  western 
passage  into  Catalonia,  and  cutting  oft'  the  communi- 
cation between  that  province  and  Valencia,  reduced  the 
Spanish  army  to  twenty  thousand  men,  including  the 
garrisons  of  the  towns  which  still  remained  in  their 
possession.  Campo  Verde  immediately  retired  from 
Falcet  to  Morablanch,  and  Suehet,  always  prompt  to 
make  one  success  the  prelude  to  another,  endeavoured 
in  the  first  moment  of  consternation  and  surprise  to 
get  possession  of  the  forts  of  Peniscola  and  oi'  Felipe  de 
Balaguer  :  nor  was  he  deceived  with  respect  to  the  last, 
for  that  place,  in  which  were  five  guns  and  a  hundred 
men,  was  taken  on  the  9th  by  Habert ;  but  at  Penis- 
cola  his  summons  was  disregarded  and  his  detachment 
returned. 

Meanwhile  Macuonald,  leaving  the  Neapolitan  brig- 
ade still  on  the  Ebro,  passed  by  Falcet  to  Reus,  where 
he  encamped  the  11th,  as  if  to  invest  Taragona ;  but 
without  any  real  intention  to  do  so,  for  his  cavalry  and 
field  artillery  were  left  at  Lerida  and  1'ortoza,  and  his 
actual  force  did  not  exceed  twelve  thousand  men. 
Campo  Verde,  who  had  retreated  before  him,  then 
posted  Sarsfield  with  six  thousand  men  at  Vails,  from 
whence  he  made  incursions  against  Macdonald's  foragers, 
and  also  surprised  at  'J'arega.  on  the  other  side  of  the 
mountains,  a  regiment  of  Italian  dragoons,  which  would 
have  been  destroyed  but  for  the  succour  of  a  neighbour- 
ing post. 

On  the  14th  Macdonald  having  marched  towards 
Vails,  Sarsfield  retired  to  Pia,  and  was  pursued  by 
general  Eugenio  with  two  thousand  Italian  infantry. 
This  officer  being  of  a  headstrong  intractable  disposi- 
tion, pushed  into  the  plain  of  Pla,  contrary  to  his  or- 
ders, and  was  nearing  that  town,  when  a  strong  body 
of  cavalry  poured  out  of  it ;  and  on  each  side  the  Span- 
ish infantry  were  seen  descending  the  hill  in  order  of 
battle.  Eugenio,  instead  of  retiring,  attacked  the  first 
that  entered  the  plain,  but  he  fell  mortally  wounded,  and 
his  men  retreated  lighting ;  meanwhile  tlie  firing  being 
heard  at  Valls,  Palombini  marched  to  his  assistance,  but 
was  himself  beaten  and  thrown  into  confusion,  and  Sars- 
field, at  the  head  of  the  Spanish  horse,  was  preparing  to 
complete  the  victory,  when  the  French  colonel  Uelort, 
bringing  up  some  sipiadrons,  charged  with  great  fury, 
and  so  brought  off  the  Italians  :  yet  Delort  himself  was 
desperately  wounded,  and  the  whole  loss  was  not  less 
than  six  hundred  men.* 

*  ■Vaeani.    Victoires  et  Conquctes.    General  Doyle's  dd- 

sp/.tchea,  M.SS. 


366 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XIII. 


1 


Macdonald  would  not  suffer  his  main  body  to  stir,  and 
Vacaui  ussltIs  that  it  was  only  by  entreaty  that  Falom- 
bini  obtained  penuisjion  to  succour  Eugenio,  which  wius 
certainly  a  great  error,  for  so  hot  and  eager  was  .Sars- 
fieid  in  the  pursuit,  that  he  was  cane  within  two  miles 
of  Vails,  and  being  on  open  ground,  might  have  been 
crushed  in  turn.  He,  however,  returned  unmolested  to 
the  pass  of  tiie  Cabra,  leaving  his  cavalry  as  before  in 
Pla.  whence  through  bye-rt.ads  they  connnunicated  wilh 
Taragona. 

A  lew  days  after  this  fight  Sarsf;eld  came  out  again 
in  order  of  liattle,  and  at  the  same  time  Canif)0  Verde 
appeared  with  a  divisiijn  on  the  hills  in  reai'  of  ValLs. 
Macdunald  was  thus  suirouuded,  but  Pulombini's 
brigade  suOJced  to  send  Cainjio  Verde  back  to  Tarii- 
gona,  and  .Sarsfield  refused  battle ;  then  the  French 
marshal,  who  had  resolved  to  go  to  Lerida,  but  wished 
to  move  without  fightnig,  broke  up  from  Valls  in  the 
night,  and,  with  great  order  and  silence,  pas.sed  by  the 
road  of  Fuencalde,  between  the  defiles  of  Cabra  and 
Ribas,  and  though  both  were  occupied  by  the  Span- 
iards, they  did  not  discover  his  movements  until  the 
next  day.  From  thence,  lie  marched  by  Momblanch, 
upon  Lerida,  where  he  arrived  the  19th,  and  three  days 
afterwards  spread  his  troops  over  the  plains  of  Urgel, 
to  collect  provisions,  money,  and  transport,  and  to  watch 
the  defiles  of  the  mountains. 

On  the  other  hand  the  Catalan  general,  who  had  re- 
ceived stores  and  arms  both  from  England  and  Cadiz, 
I'enowed  tiie  equipment  of  his  troops,  and  called  out  all 
the  Miguelettes  and  Soniatenes,  of  the  hills  round  the 
plain  of  Urgel,  to  replace  the  loss  sustained  by  the 
fall  of  'L'ortoza.  'i'hese  new  levies  were  united  at  Santa 
Colonia  de  Querault  under  Sarsfield,  while  the  regular 
army  assembled  at  Igualada  and  Villafranca,  by  which 
the  Spaniards,  holding  a  close  and  concentrated  position 
themselves,  cut  oft"  Macdonald  equally  from  Barcelona 
and  the  Ampiirdan  ;  and  this  latter  district  wiiii  continu- 
ally haras.sed  by  Errolles,  itovira,  and  the  brigade  of 
Martinez,  which  still  kept  the  mountains  behind  Olot, 
Vich,  and  the  Cerdafia. 

Meanwhile  Suchet  being  called  by  the  exigences  of 
his  government  to  Zuragoza,  carried  one  division  there, 
aud  distributed  another  under  Mu-nier  at  'i'eruel,  Mo- 
lina, Aleanitz,  and  Morella  :  he  also  withdrew  his  troops 
from  Ca.nbril,  which  Habert  had  sur[irised  on  t^ie  7th 
of  Febiuary,  but  he  left  that  general  with  a  division,  in 
conuirand  i)f  'I'ortoza,  having  two  thousand  men  at  I'e- 
rillo  10  connect  the  city  v.ith  San  Felipe  de  Ba'aguer. 
Tims  all  things  seemed  to  favour  the  Spanish  side,  and 
give  imporianee  to  their  success  against  Eugenio  ;  for 
tliey  did  not  fail  to  attribute  both  Suchet's  and  Mac- 
donald's  retreats,  to  fear  oi.'casioned  by  the  skirmish  with 
that  general ;  and  with  some  shew  of  reason  as  regarded 
the  laltei-,  seeing  that  his  night  march  had  all  the  ap- 
pearance of  a  fiight. 

Macdonald,  while  gathering  provisions  at  Lerida, 
and  stores  and  guns  at  Tortoza,  also  repaired  the  works 
of  Balaguer  near  Lerida,  to  serve  as  a  pivot  for  tlse 
troops  employed  to  forage  the  country  watered  by  the 
Noguera,  Cinca,  and  L'gre  rivers.  However,  Sarsfiekl 
ami  Campo  Verde  kept  about  Cervera  aud  Calaf, 
watching  fur  an  opportunity  to  fall  on  the  French  de- 
tachments, and  meanwhile  the  organization  of  the  pro- 
vince went  on. 

It  may  appear  extraordinary  that  the  war  could  have 
been  continued  by  either  side  under  such  difticulties, 
but  the  resources  were  still  great.  A  patriotic  junta 
liiid  been  forra.'d  in  Catalonia  to  procin-c;  provisions, 
and  although  the  Engli.sh  orders  in  council  interfered 
with  the  trade  of  neutral  vessels  bringing  grain,  bread 
could  be  bought  at  the  rate  of  12  lbs.  to  the  dollar, 
■while  with  lord  Wellington's  army  in  Castile  it  ofteo 
cost  half  a  dollar  a  poinid.  AVhen  tht  French  foraging 
parties  came  o'.it  fr. mi  Barcelona,  thei.-  march  could  be 


always  traced  by  the  swarms  of  boats  loaded  with 
people  and  provisions,  which  shooting  out  from  the 
coast-towns,  woidd  hover,  for  a  while,  under  the  pro- 
tection of  the  English  vessels,  and  then  return  when 
the  danger  was  over  :  and  the  enemy  did  never  meddle 
with  these  boats  lest  they  should  remove  the  cover  to 
their  own  supplies.  Suchet  however  armed  Rapita,  and 
other  small  places,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Ebro,  with  a 
view  to  aObrd  shelter  to  certain  craft,  which  he  kept  to 
watch  for  provision-vessels,  sailing  from  A^alencia  for 
Taragona,  and  to  aid  French  vessels  engaged  in  a  like 
course  coming  from  France. 

To  feed  Barcelona,  Maurice  Mathieu  at  times  occu- 
pied  the  head-lands  from   St.   Filieu  to  Blanes,  with 
troops,  and   thus,  small   convoys  crept  along  shore ;  a 
fieet   loaded  with  provisions  and   powder,  escorted  by 
three  frigates,  entered  it  in  February,  and  a  continual 
stream  of  supply  was  also  kept  up  by  sailmg  boats  and 
other  small  vessels,  which  could  not  be  easily  detected 
amidst  the  numerous  craft  belonging  to  the  people  along 
the  coast.     And  besides  these  channels,  as  the  claims 
of  hunger  are  paramount  to  all  others,  it  was  necessary, 
for   the  sake  of  the   inhabitants,  to  permit   provision 
!  sometimes  to  reach   Barcelona  by  land  ;   the  Spanish 
I  generals  winked  at  it,  and  M  ilans  and  Lacy  have  even 
j  been  charged  with  permitting  corn  to  pass  into  that 
I  city  for  private  profit,  as  well  as  from  consideration  for 
j  the  citizens.     By  these,  and  like  expedients,  the  war  was 
sustained, 

I      No  important  event  occurred  after  the  skirmish  ia 
which  Eugenio  fell,  until  the   3d  of  March,  when  the 
Spaniards  having  observed  that  the  garrison  of  Torto- 
za was  weakened    by  the   detachment   at    Perillo,  en- 
deavoured to  cut  the  latter  off,  intending  if  successful 
to   assault   Tortoza   itself.*     At   the   same   time   they 
also  attacked  the  fort  of  San  Filippe,  but  failed,  and 
'  the   French  at  Perillo  effected    their  retreat  although 
,  with   considerable    loss.     This    attempt   was    however 
j  followed  by  a  more  important  effort.     On  the  19th  of 
'  AL^rch,   Campo  Verde   having   assembled  eight   thou- 
sand men  at  Molinos  del  Rev,  fom-  thousand  at  (Juisols, 
I  and  three  thousand  at  Igualada.  ]ire]iared  to  surprise  the 
!  city  and  forts  of  Barcelona,  for  he  had,  as  he  thought, 
corrupted  the  town-major  of  iMonjuic.     Trusting  to  this 
I  treason,  he  first  sent  eight  hundred  chosen  grenadiers  in 
I  the  night  by  the  hills  of  Ho.spitalette,  to  enter  that  place, 
and   they  descended  into  the  ditch   in  exjK'ctation   of 
having  the  gate  opened  ;  but  Maurice  Mathieu,  apprized 
I  of  the  plan,  had  prepared  every  thing  to  receive  this 
unfortunate   column,    which    was    in   an    instant   over- 
whelmed with  fire. 

Napoleciu  now  changed  the  system  of  the  war.     All 
that  part  of  Catalonia  west  of  the  Upper  Llobregat, 
'and  from  Igualada  by  Ordal  to  the  .«( a,  including  the 
I  district  of  Tortoza.  was  placed  under  Suchet's  govern- 
ment, and  seventeen    thousand  of  Macilcnald's   trocips 
j  were  united   to  the  third   corps,  which  was  thus  aug- 
mented to  forty-two  thousand  men,  and  took  the  title 
of  the  ''Armiiof  Aragon"     It  was  destined  to  besiege 
Taragoiux,  while  Macdonald,  whose  force  was  thus  re- 
I  duced  to  twenty-seven  thousand  under  arms,  iiu-Iuding 
fifteen  thoussmd  in  garrison  and  in  the  Ampurdan,  was 
i  restricted  to  the  upper  part  of  Catalonia.     His  orders 
were    to   attack    Cardona,    Berga,   Sen    d'Urgel,   and 
i\l()nt,serrat,  and  to  v.ar  down  Martinez,  IVIanso,  Rovira, 
!  and  other  chiefs,  who  kept  in  the  mountains  between 
Olot  and  the  Cerdafia  :  and  a  division  of  five  thousand 
,  men,   chiefly   composed   of  national   guards,   was   also 
'Ordered  to  assemble  at  Mont  Louis,  for  the  purpose  of 
j  acting  in  the  Cerdafia,  and  on  the  rear  of  the  jiartizans 
■  in  the  high  vallejs.     By  the.se  means  the  line  of  ope- 
j  rations  for  the  invasion  of  Catalonia  was  altered  from 
I  France  to  Aragon,  the  difficulties  were  lessened,  the 

:     *  Officiul  Abstract  of  Mr.  ■Wellesley's  Despatches,  MSS. 


1811. 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


367 


seventh  corps  reduced  in  numbei-s,  became,  instead  of 
the  principal,  tlic  secondary'  arniy  ;  and  ilacdonald's  for- 
mal method  was  thus  exchanged  for  the  lively  vigorous 
talent  of  Souchet.  But  the  delay  already  caused  in  the 
siege  of  I'drtoza,  could  never  be  compensated ;  Suchet 
had  been  kept  on  the  Ebro,  when  he  should  have  beeu 
on  the  (juadaiaviar,  and  this  enabled  the  Murcians  to 
keep  the  fourth  corps  in  Grenada,  when  it  should  have 
been  on  the  I'agus  aiding  Masseua. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

?uc^iet  prepares  tobesiei^e  Taragonn — The  power  of  the  Par- 
tidas  described — Their  actionn — Tliey  are  dispersed  on  the 
frontier  of  Aragon — The  Valenciaus  fortify  Saguntum — 
Are  defeated  a  second  time  at  Uldecoiia — Suchet  comes 
to  Lerida — M'Donald  passes  with  an  escort  from  them 
to  Biiroeloua — His  troops  burn  Manresa — Sarsfield  liar- 
asses  liis  march — Napoleon  divides  the  invasion  of  Cata-  i 
Ionia  into  two  parts — Siukintr  state  of  the  province — Ro- 
vira  surprises  Fort  Fernaudo  de  Figueras — Operations 
which  follow  that  event. 

"When  the  troops  of  the  seventh  corps  were  incorpo- 
rated with  the  army  of  Aragon,  the  preparations  for  the 
siege  of  Taragona  were  pushed  forward  with  Suchet's 
usual  activity  ;  but  previous  to  touching  upon  that  sub- 
ject it  is  necessary  to  notice  the  guerilla  warfare  which 
Villa  (Jampa.  and  others,  had  carried  on  against  Aragon 
during  the  siege  of  Tortoza.  This  warfare  was  stimu- 
lated by  the  app-iintment  of  the  secret  juntas,  and  by  the 
supplies  which  England  furnished,  especially  along  the 
northern  coast,  from  Corufia  to  Bilbao,  where  experi- 
ence had  also  produced  a  better  application  of  them  than 
heretofore.  The  movements  of  the  English  srpiadrons,  in 
that  sea,  being  from  the  same  cause  better  combined  with 
the  operations  of  the  Partidas,  rendered  the  latter  more 
formidable,  and  they  became  more  harassing  to  the  ene- 
my as  they  acquired  something  of  the  consistency  of  regu- 
lar troops  in  their  organization,  although  irregular  in  their 
mode  of  operations  :  for  it  must  not  be  supposed,  that 
because  the  guerilla  system  was  in  itself  unequal  to  the 
deliverance  of  the  cotuitry,  and  was  necessarily  accom- 
panied with  great  evils,  that  as  an  auxiliary  it  was  alto- 
gether useless.  The  interru])tion  of  the  French  corres- 
pondence was,  as  I  have  alre-ady  said,  tantamount  to  a 
diminution  on  their  side  of  thirty  thousand  regular  troops, 
without  reckoning  those  who  were  necessarily  employed 
to  watch  and  pursue  the  Partidas ;  this  estimate  may 
even  be  cmsidered  too  low,  and  it  is  certain  that  the 
moral  elTect  produced  over  Europe  by  the  struggle  thus 
maintained,  was  very  considerable. 

Nevertheless  the  same  number  of  men  under  a  good 
diseipliiie  would  have  been  more  efficacious,  less 
onerous  to  the  country  people,  and  less  subversive  of 
social  order.  When  the  regular  army  is  completed, 
all  that  remains  in  a  country  may  be  turned  to  advan- 
tage as  irregulars,  yet  they  are  to  be  valued  as  their 
degree  of  organization  approaches  that  of  tiie  regular 
troops :  thus  militia  are  better  than  armed  bodies  of 
peasantry,  and  these  la.st,  if  directed  by  regular  offi- 
cers, better  than  sudden  insurrections  of  villagers.  But 
the  Spanish  armies  were  never  completed,  never  well 
organized  ;  and  when  they  were  dispersetl,  which  hap- 
pened nearly  as  often  as  they  took  the  held,  the  war 
must  have  ceased  in  Spain,  had  it  not  been  kept  alive 
by  the  Partidas,  and  it  is  there  we  find  their  moral 
value.  Again,  when  the  British  armies  kept  the  field, 
the  Partidas  harasse;!  the  enemy's  communicutions, 
and  this  constituted  their  military  value ;  yet  it  is  cer- 
tain that  they  never  much  exceeded  thirty  thousand  in 
number ;  and  they  could  not  have  long  existed  in  any 
nuiflbers  without  the  supplies  of  England,  unless  a 
spirit  of  order  and  providence,  very  different  from  any 


thing  witnessed  during  the  war,  had  arisen  in  Spain. 
How  absurd  then  to  reverse  the  order  of  the  resourcea 
possessed  by  an  invaded  country,  to  confotnid  the  moral 
with  the  military  means,  to  place  the  irregular  resistance 
of  the  peasants  first,  and  that  of  the  soldiers  last  in  the 
scale  of  physical  defence. 

That  many  of  the  Partida  chiefs  became  less  active, 
after  they  received  regular  rank,  is  undeniable  ;  but 
this  was  not  so  much  a  consequence  of  the  change  of 
denomination,  as  of  the  invetet;^lte  abuses  which  op- 
pressed the  vigour  of  the  regular  armies,  and  by  which 
the  Partidas  were  necessarily  affc'cted  when  they  be- 
came a  constituent  part  of  those  armies  ;  many  persons 
of  weight  have  indeed  ascribed  entirely  to  this  cause, 
the  aclinowledged  diminution  of  their  general  activity 
at  one  period.  It  seems,  however,  more  probable  that 
a  life  of  toil  and  danger,  repeated  defeats,  the  scarcity 
of  plunder,  and  the  discontent  of  the  people  at  the  ex- 
actions of  the  chiefs,  had  in  reality  abated  the  desire 
to  continue  the  struggle  ;  inactivity  was  rather  the  sign 
of  subjection  than  the  result  of  an  injudicious  interier- 
ence  by  the  government.  But  it  is  time  to  support  this 
reasoning  by  facts. 

During  the  siege  of  Tortoza,  the  concentration  of  the 
third  and  seventh  corps  exposed  Aragon  and  Catalonia, 
to  desultory  enterprises  at  a  moment  when  the  Parti- 
das, rendered  more  numerous  and  powerful  by  the 
secret  juntas,  were  also  more  ardent,  from  the  asseraljly 
of  the  Cortes,  by  which  the  people's  importance  in 
the  struggle  seemed  at  last  to  be  acknowledged.  Hence 
no  better  test  of  their  real  influence  on  the  general 
operations  can  be  found  than  their  exploits  during  that 
period,  when  two  Frencii  armies  were  fixed  as  it  were 
to  one  spot,  the  supplies  from  France  nearly  cut  off  by 
natural  difficulties,  the  district  immediately  around 
'l'ort(iza  completely  sterile,  Catalonia  generally  ex- 
hausted, and  a  project  to  create  a  fictitious  scarcity  in 
the  fertile  parts  oi'  Aragon  diligently  and  in  some  sort 
successfully  pursued  by  the  secret  juntas.  The  num- 
ber of  French  foraging  parties,  and  the  distances  to 
which  they  were  sent  were  then  greatly  increased,  and 
the  facility  of  cutting  th.em  off'  proportionably  aug- 
mented. Nov/  the  se^•eral  operations  of  Villa  Campa 
during  the  blockade  have  been  already  related,  but, 
although  sometimes  successful,  the  results  were  mostly 
adverse  to  the  Spaniards ;  and  when  that  chief,  after 
the  siege  was  actually  commenced,  came  down,  on  the 
19th  December  1810,  towards  the  side  of  Daroca,  his 
cavalry  was  surprised  by  colonel  Kliski,  who  captured 
or  killed  one  hundred  and  fifty  in  the  village  of  Blancas. 
The  Spanish  chief  then  retired,  but  being  soon  after 
joined  by  the  Empecinado  from  Cuen(;a,  he  retuined  in 
January  to  the  frontier  of  Aragon,  and  took  post  be- 
tween Molina  and  Albaracin. 

At  this  period  'J'ortoza  had  surrendered,  and  Mus- 
nier's  division  was  spread  along  the  western  part  of 
Aragon,  wherefore  Suchet  immediately  detached  gene- 
ral Paris  with  one  column  from  Zaragoza,  and  general 
Abbe  with  another  from  Teruel,  to  chase  these  two 
Partidas.  Paris  fell  in  Avith  the  Empecinado  near 
Molina,  and  the  latter  then  joined  Villa  Canipa.  but 
the  French  general  forced  both  from  their  mountain 
position  neai'  Frias,  where  he  Avas  joined  by  Abbe  ; 
and  they  continued  the  pursuit  for  several  days,  but 
finding  that  the  fugitives  took  ditFerent  routes,  again 
separated  ;  Paris  followed  \'il!a  Campa,  and  Ai)b6 
pursued  the  Empecinado  through  dien^a,  from  whence 
Carbajal  and  the  secret  junta  immediately  fii;d.  Paris 
failing  to  overtake  Villa  Campa,  entered  Ileleta,  Co 
beta,  and  Paralejos,  all  three  containing  numnfirctorics 
for  arms,  which  he  destroyed,  and  then  returned  ;  and 
the  whole  expedition  lasted  only  twelve  days,  yet  the 
smaller  Partidas,  in  Aragon,  had  taken  advantage  of  it 
to  :'ut  off"  a  detachment  of  fifty  men  near  Fuentes  :  and 
thii  was  followed  up  on  the  side  of  Navarre  by  Minu, 


3G3 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XUL 


who  entered  the  Cinco  Villas  in  April,  and  cut  to  pieces 
one  hundred  and  lifly  gcn-s  d'armes  near  riudava.  How- 
ever Chlopiski  pursiuxl  him  also  so  closely,  that  he 
obliu'ed  liis  bu.id  to  dispi-rse  near  Coseda  in  Navarre. 

Diu'ing  this  time  the  Valencians  had  been  pkmged  in 
disputes,  Ba^socour  was  displaced,  and  Conpijziiy  ap- 
pointed in  his  stead.  The  notables,  indeed,  raised  a  sum 
ol"  money  ibr  recruits,  but  Coupiuny  would  not  take  ihe 
command,  because  the  Murciau  army  was  not  also  given 
to  him ;  and  that  army,  although  numerous,  was  in  a 
very  neglected  state,  and  unable  to  undertake  any  ser- 
vice. However,  when  Tortoza  fell,  the  Valencians  were 
frightened,  and  set  about  tlieir  own  defence.  They  re- 
paired and  garrisoned  the  fort  of  Oropesa,  and  some 
smaller  posts  on  the  coast,  along  which  runs  the  only  ar- 
tiller^'-road  to  their  capital  :  they  commenced  fortifying 
Murvii'dro,  or  rather  tlie  rock  of  Saguntum  overhanging 
it.  and  tliey  sent  lifleen  hundred  men  into  the  hills  about 
Cantavieja.  These  last  were  dispersed  on  tlie  5th  of 
April,  by  a  column  from  Teruel  ;  and  on  the  11th  ano- 
ther body  having  attempted  to  surpiise  Uldecona,  which 
was  weakly  guai'ded,  were  also  defeated  and  sabred  by 
the  French  cavalry. 

These  dili'erent  events,  especially  the  destruction  of 
the  gun-manufactories,  repressed  the  activity  of  the 
partizans,  and  riuchet  was  enabled  to  go  to  Lerida,  in 
the  latter  end  of  March,  to  receive  the  soldiers  to  be 
drafted  from  the  seventh  corps  :  Macdoiiald  himself 
c :)uld  not.  however,  regain  Barcelona  without  an  escort, 
and  hence  seven  thousand  men  marched  with  him  on 
tiie  29th  of  the  m mtli,  not  by  Igualada,  which  was 
occupied  in  force  by  Sarstield,  but  by  the  circuitous 
way  of  Manresa  ;  for  neither  IMacdonald  nor  Suchet 
wished  to  engage  in  desultory  actions  with  the  forces 
destined  for  the  siege.  Nevertheless  Sarsheld,  getting 
intelligence  of  the  march,  passed  by  Calaf  with  his 
own  and  Eroles'  troops,  and  waited  on  Macdonald's 
flanks  and  rear  near  the  Cardenera  river,  while  a  de- 
tachment barricading  the  bridge  of  Mam-esa,  opposed 
him  in  front.  'I'his  bridge  was  indeed  carried,  but  the 
town  being  abandoned,  the  Italian  soldiers  wantonly 
get  fire  to  it  in  the  night  :  an  act  which  was  immedi- 
ately revenged,  for  the  flames  being  seen  to  a  great 
distance,  so  enraged  the  Catalans,  tluit  in  the  morning 
all  the  armed  men  in  the  district,  whether  regulars, 
Migueletles,  or  Somatenes,  were  assembled  on  the 
neighbouring  hil.s,  and  fell  with  infinite  fury  upon 
Macdonald's  rear,  as  it  passed  out  from  the  ruins  of  the 
burning  city.  'I'he  head  of  the  French  column  was 
then  pushing  for  the  bridge  of  V'iilamara,  over  the 
Llobregat,  whieh  was  two  leagues  distant  ;  and  as  the 
country  between  the  rivers  was  one  vast  mountain, 
Sarsfield,  seejiig  tliat  the  French  rear  stood  firm  to 
receive  the  attack  of  the  Somatenes,  while  the  front 
still  advanced,  thought  to  place  his  division  between, 
by  moving  along  tiie  heights  which  skirted  the  road. 
Alacdonald,  however,  concentrated  his  troops, ,  gained 
the  second  bridge,  and  passed  the  Llobregat,  but  with 
great  dilticulty  and  with  the  loss  of  four  hundred  men, 
for  his  march  was  continually  under  Sarstield's  tire, 
and  some  of  his  troops  were  even  cut  off  from  the 
bridge,  and  obliged  to  cross  by  a  ford  higher  up. 
During  the  night,  however,  he  collected  his  scattered 
men,  an  1  moved  upon  Sabadel,  whence  he  pushed  on 
alone  for  Barcelona,  and  on  the  3d  of  April,  Harispe, 
who  command.'d  the  es.:ort,  recommencd  the  march, 
and  passing  by  Vilia  Franca,  Christina,  Cabra,  and 
Momblanch,  returned  to  Lerida  on  the  lOth. 

The  invasion  of  Catalonia  was  now  divided  into  three 
parts,  each  assigned  to  a  distinct  army. 

1.  Sachet,  with  that  of  Aragon,  was  to  take  Tara- 
gona  and  subdue  the  lower  part  of  the  province. 

2.  Macdonald,  with  that  part  of  the  seventh  corps 
called  the  active  army  of  Catalonia,  was  to  break  the 
long  Spanish  line  extending  from  Taragona,  through 


Montserrat  to  the  Cerdana,  and   the  high  mountains 
about  (Jlot. 

3.  Baraguay  d'Hilliei-s,  having  his  head-quarters  at 
'  Gerona,   was  to  hold  the  Am])urdan  with  the  troops 
before  assigned  to  his  charge,  and  to  co-operate,  as  occa- 
sion might  offer,  with  jNlacdonald,  under  whose  orders 
:  he  still  remained  ;  and  the  division  of  five  thousand  men 
i  before  mentioned  as  having  been  collected  near  Mont 
I  Louis,  at  the  entrance  of  the  French  Cerdaiia,  was  to 
1  act  on  the  rear  of  the  Spaniards  in  the  mountains,  while 
I  the  others  attackcid  them  in  front.     Nor  did  the  suc- 
j  cess  ajipear  doubtful,  for  the  hopes  and  means  of  the 
province  were  both  sinking.     The  great  losses  of  men 
!  sustained  at  Tortoza  and  in  the  diflerent  combats  ;  tlie 
i  reputation  of  Suchet ;  the  failure  of  the  attempts  to  sur- 
[  prise   Barcelona,  Pcrillo,  and  ."t^an  Filipe  de  Balaguer ; 
j  the  incapacity  of  Campo  Verde,  which  was  now  gener- 
!  ally  felt,  and  the  consequent  desertion  of  the  Miguel- 
I  ettes,  would  probably  have  rendered  certain  the  P^'ench 
plans,  if  at  the  very  moment  of  execution  ihey  had  not 
been  mari'ed  by  Rovira,  who  surprised  the  great  fortresa 
of  Figueras,  the  key  of  tlie  J'yieiiees  on  that  side  of 
Catalonia.     'J'his,  the  boldest  and  most  important  stroke 
made  by  a  Partida  chief,  during  the  whole  war,  mcrita 
a  particular  detail. 

SURPRISE    OF    FERNANDO    DE    FIGUERAS. 

The  governor  of  the  place,  general  Guillot,  enforced 
no  military  discipline,  his  guards  were  weak,  he  per- 
mitted the  soldiers  to  use  the  palisades  for  fuel,  and 
often  detached  the  greatest  part  of  the  garrison  to  make 
incursions  to  a  distance  from  the  place;  in  all  things 
disregarding-  the  rules  of  service.*  The  town,  which  is 
situated  below  the  hill,  upon  which  the  great  fortress  of 
Fernando  stands,  was  momentarily  occupied  by  the 
Italian  general  Peyri,  with  about  six  hundred  men,  who 
were  destined  to  join  Macdonald,  and  who  trusting  to 
the  strength  of  the  fortress  above,  were  in  no  n:anner 
on  their  guard.  And  the  garrison  above  were  still  more 
negligent ;  for  Guillot  liad  on  the  9th  of  April  sent  out 
his  best  men  to  disperse  some  Somatenes  assembled  in  the 
neighbouring  hills,  and  this  detachment  having  return- 
ed at  night  fatigued,  and  being  to  go  out  again  the  next 
day,  slept  while  the  gates  were  confided  to  convales- 
•ceiits,  or  men  unfit  for  duty  :  thus  the  ramparts  were 
entirely  unguarded.  Now  there  were  in  the  fort  two 
('atalan  brothers  named  Palopos,  and  a  man  called 
Juan,  employed  as  under-storekeepers,  who  being  gained 
by  Ri.)\ira  had,  such  was  the  negligence  of  discipline, 
obtained  from  the  head  of  tb.eir  department  the  keys  of 
the  magazines,  and  also  that  of  a  postern  under  one  of 
the  gates. 

Rovira,  having  arranged  his  plan,  came  down  from 
the  mountain  of  St.  Lorcns  de  Muga  in  the  night  of  the 
9th,  and  secretly  reached  the  covered  way  with  seven 
hundred  chosen  men  of  his  own  partida.  General  Mar- 
tinez followed  in  support'  with  about  three  thousand 
Miguelettes,  and  the  Catalan  brothers,  luiving  previ- 
ously arranged  the  signals,  opened  the  postern,  and  ad- 
mitted Rovira,  who  immediately  disarmed  the  guard  and 
set  wide  the  gates  for  the  resei-ve  ;  and  although  some 
shots  were  fired,  which  alarmed  the  garrison,  Martinez 
came  up  so  quickly  that  no  effectual  resistance  could  be 
made,  'i'hirty  or  forty  men  were  killed  or  wounded,  the 
magazines  were  seized,  the  governor  and  sixteen  hundred 
soldiers  and  cainp-followers  were  taken  in  their  (piarters, 
and  thus  in  an  hour  Rovira  mastered  one  of  the  sti-ong- 
cst  fortresses  in  Europe  :  three  cannon-shot  were  then 
fired  as  a  signal  to  the  Soniatones  in  the  surrounding 
mountains,  that  the  place  was  taken,  and  that  they 
were  to   bring   in   provisions  as  rapidly  as  possible. 


*  Vacaul.  Official  abstnict  of  Mr.  Welk'slej's  despatches, 
MSS.  Ooneral  Camohfll's  MSS.  (;ener;ir]J.v  !-■'«  Mf.S. 
Ciipt.  C'uJ/iugton's  ^lss.     Mr.  Suuu-t'.-  ^l^wt■r^,  M.ijS. 


1811.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


369 


Meanwhile  general  Peyri  alarmed  by  the  noise  in  the 
fortress  and  guessing  at  the  cause,  had  collected  the 
troops,  baggage,  sick  men,  and  stores  in  the  town 
below,  and  sent  notice  to  Gerona,  but  he  made  no 
attempt  to  retake  the  place,  and  at  daylight  retired  to 
Bascara.  For  having  mounted  the  hills  during  the 
uight,  to  observe  how  matters  went,  he  thought  uotli- 
ing  could  be  done,  an  opinion  condemned  by  some  as 
a  great  error;  and  indeed  it^appears  probable  that 
during  the  contusion  of  the  first  surprise,  a  brisk 
attempt  by  six  hundred  fresh  men  might  have  recovered 
the  fortress.  At  Bascara  five  hundred  men  detached 
from  Gerona,  on  the  spur  of  the  occasion,  met  him 
with  orders  to  re-invest  the  place,  and  Baraguay  d'Hil- 
liers  promised  to  follow  with  all  his  forces  without 
any  delay.  Then  Feyri,  although  troubled  by  the 
fears  of  his  troops,  many  of  whom  were  only  national 
guards,  returned  to  Figueras,  and  driving  the  Spaniards 
out  of  the  town  took  post  in  front  of  the  ibrt  above  ; 
but  he  could  not  prevent  Martinez  from  receiving  some 
assistance  in  men  and  provisions  from  the  Somatenes. 
'I'he  news  of  Rovira's  exploit  spread  with  inconceivable 
rapidity  throughout  the  I'eniusula,  e.xlending  its  exhila- 
rating influence,  even  to  the  Anglo-Fortuguese  army, 
then  not  much  given  to  credit  or  admire  the  exploits 
of  the  Spaniards,  but  Baraguay  d'liilliers  with  great 
promptness  assembled  his  dispersed  troops,  and  on  the 
I3th  invested  the  fort  with  six  thousand  infantry  and 
five  hundred  cavalry  ;  and  this  so  quickly  that  the 
Spaniard  had  not  time,  or,  more  probably  neglected,  to 
remove  sixteen  thousand  muskets  which  were  in  the 
place. 

Martinez  remained  governor,  but  Rovira  was  again 
in  the  mountains,  and  all  Catalonia,  animated  by  the 
['romethean  touch  of  this  Partida  chief,  seemed  to  be 
moving  at  once  upon  Figueras.  Campo  Verde  came 
up  to  Vich,  intendnig  first  to  relieve  Figueras,  and  then 
in  concert  with  the  P]nglish  and  Spanish  vessels  to  j 
blockade  Rosas  by  land  and  sea.  Rovira  himself  col- 
lected a  convoy  of  provisions  near  Olot.  Captain  Bui- 
len  with  the  Cambrian  and  Volontaire  frigates,  taking 
advantage  of  the  French  troops  having  been  withdrawn 
from  (Jerona,  drove  out  the  small  garrison  from  San 
Fllieu  and  Palamos,  destroyed  the  batteries,  and  made 
sail  to  join  captain  Codrington  at  R  )Sas.  A  Spanish 
frigate,  with  a  fleet  of  coasting-vessels  loaded  wirii  sup- 
plies, anchored  at  Palamos;  and  P'rancisco  Milans,  after 
beating  a  small  French  detachnv  nt  near  Arens  de  Mar, 
invested  Hostidrich  ;  Juan  Claros  hovered  about  (jlero- 
na,  and  Erolcs  and  Manso  coming  from  Montserrat  re- 
duced Olot  and  CasielfoUit.  Sarsfield  however  remained 
in  the  Sue  d'Urgel,  and  directed  the  mountaineers  to  es- 
tablish themselves  at  Balaguer,  but  they  were  driven 
away  again  with  great  loss  by  a  detachment  from  the 
garrison  of  Lerida. 

On  the  3d  of  May,  Rovira  having  brought  his  con- 
voy up  to  Besahi,  (Jampo  V^erde,  who  had  arranged 
that  captain  Codrington  should  make  a  diversion  by  an 
attack  on  R)sas,  drew  Milans  from  liostairich,  and 
having  thus  united  eleven  thousand  men  marched  in 
Beveral  columns  from  Avionet  and  Villa  Fan  against 
tlie  town,  hoping  to  draw  Baraguay  d'liilliers  to  that 
side  ;  and  to  beat  him,  while  Rovira,  forcing  a  small 
camp  near  Llers,  at  the  o])posite  (piarter,  should  intro- 
duce the  convoy  and  its  est;ort  into  the  fortress.  'J'he 
circuit  of  investment  was  wid.%  and  very  difficult, 
and  theref.)re  slightly  furnished  of  men  ;  but  it  was 
strengtliened  by  some  works,  and  when  the  Spanish 
columns  first  advanced,  the  French  general  reinforced 
the  camp  near  Llers,  and  then  hastened  with  four 
thousand  men  against  Campo  Verde,  who  was  already 
in  the  valley  of  Figueras,  and  only  opposed  by  one 
battalion.  Baraguay  d'Hilliers  immediately  fell  on 
the  right  flank  of  the  Spaniards  and  defeated  them  ; 
Uie  [''i-eneh  cavalry,  which  had  been  before  driven  in 
25 


from  the  front,  rallied  and  completed  the  victory,  and 
the  Spaniards  retreated  wilh  a  loss  of  fifteen  hundre«l 
including  prisoners.  This  afiiiir  was  exceedingly  ill- 
managed  by  Campo  Verde,  who  was  so  sure  of  success 
that  he  kept  the  slieep  of  the  convoy  too  far  behind,  to 
enter,  although  the  way  was  open  lor  some  time,  hence 
the  succour  was  confined  to  a  few  artillery -men,  some  to- 
bacco, and  medicines.  Meanwhile  the  English  shij^ 
landed  some  men  at  Rosas,  but  neither  did  this  produce 
any  serious  effect,  and  the  attempt  to  relievo  Figueras 
having  thus  generally  failed,  that  place  was  left  to  its 
own  resources  which  were  few  ;  for  the  French  with  an 
unaccountable  negligence  had  always  kept  a  scanty  sup- 
ply of  i^rovisions  and  stores  there.  Martinez,  who  had 
now  above  four  thousand  men,  was  therefore  obliged  to 
practise  the  most  rigorous  economy  in  the  distribution 
of  food,  and  in  bearing  such  privations  the  peninsular 
race  are  unrivalled. 

Macdonald  was  so  concerned  for  the  loss  of  riguera.s, 
that,  setting  aside  all  his  own  plans,  he  earnestly  adjured 
Suchet  to  suspend  the  siege  of  Taragona,  and  restore 
him  the  troops  of  the  7th  corps  ;  Maurice  Mathieu  also 
wrote  from  Barcelona  in  a  like  strain,  thinking  that  the 
possession  of  Upper  Catalonia  depcinded  upon  one  pow- 
erful effort  to  recover  the  lost  fortress.  But  Suchet, 
who  had  no  immediate  interest  in  that  part  of  the  prov- 
ince, whose  hopes  of  obtaining  a  marshal's  staff  rested 
on  the  taking  of  Taragona,  and  whose  preparations 
were  all  made  for  that  siege,  Suchet,  I  say,  whose  judg- 
ment was  unclouded,  and  whose  military  talent  was  of  a 
high  order,  refused  to  move  a  step  towards  Figueras,  or 
even  to  delay,  for  one  moment,  his  march  against  Tara- 
gona. 

He  said  that  "  his  battalions  being  scattered,  in 
search  of  supplies,  he  could  not  reunite  them,  anu 
reach  Figueras  under  twenty-five  days ;  during  that 
time  the  enemy,  luiless  prevented  by  Baraguay  d'Hil- 
liers,  could  gather  in  provisions,  receive  reinforcements, 
and  secure  the  fortress.  A  simple  blockade  might 
be  established  by  the  nearest  troops,  and  to  accumulate 
great  numbers  on  such  a  sterile  spot  would  not  fo> 
ward  the  recapture,  but  would  create  infinite  difiicnl- 
ti(\?  with  respect  to  subsistence.  It  was  probable 
Napoleon  had  already  received  infoiniation  of  the 
disaster,  and  given  orders  for  the  remedy  ;  and  it  was 
by  no  means  reasonable  to  renounce  the  attack  on 
'I'aragona,  the  only  remaining  bulwark  of  Catalonia,  at 
the  very  moment  of  execution,  because  of  the  loss  of 
ii  fort  ;  it  was  in  Taragona,  the  greatest  jiart  of  the 
forces  of  Catalonia  would  be  shut  up,  and  it  was  only 
in  such  a  situation  that  they  could  be  made  prisoners  ; 
at  Lerida,  Meqninenza,  and  Tortoza,  eighteen  thousand 
men  and  eight  hundred  oflicers  had  been  captured,  and 
if  ten  or  twelve  thousand  more  could  be  taken  in 
Taragona.  the  strength  of  Catalonia  would  be  entirely 
broken.  If  the  Spaniards  failed  in  revictualling  Figue- 
ras, that  place,  l)y  occupying  their  attention,  would 
become  more  hurtful  fl[ian  useful  to  them  ;  because 
Campo  Verde  might,  and  most  probably  would,  march 
to  its  succour,  and  thus  weaken  Taragona,  which 
was  a  reason  for  hastening  rather  than  suspending  the 
investment  of  the  latter ;  wherefore  he  resolved,  not- 
withstanding the  separation  of  his  battalions  and  the 
incomplete  state  of  his  preparations,  to  move  down  im- 
UK^diately  and  commence  the  siege."  A  wise  determin- 
ation, and  alone  sufficient  to  justify  his  reputation  as  a 
general. 

Macdonald  was  now  fain  to  send  all  the  troops  he 
could  safely  draw  together,  to  reinforce  Baraguay 
d'Hilliers.  In  June,  when  a  defachment  from  Toulon, 
and  some  frontier  guards  had  :irrived  at  Figueras, 
the  united  forces  amounting  to  fifteen  thousand  men, 
he  took  the  command  in  person  and  established  a 
rigorous  blockade,  working  day  and  night,  to  con- 
struct works  of  circumvullation  and   contravallatiuu  j 


370 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XIII. 


his  linos  six  miles  in  length,  crowning  the  tops  of  the 
mountains  anJ  sinl<ing  into  the  deepest  valleys,  proved 
what  prodigious  hibours  even  small  armies  are  capable 
of.  Thus  with  ince5-«ant  wakefulness  Macdonald  recov- 
ered the  place  ;  but  this  was  at  a  late  period  in  the  year, 
and  when  Suchet's  operations  had  quite  changed  the 
aspect  of  affiiirs. 

When  Tortoza  fell,  that  general's  moveable  column 
traversing  the  borders  of  Castile,  the  eastern  district 
of  Valencia,  a  portion  of  Navarre,  and  all  the  lower 
province  of  Catalonia,  protected  the  collection  of  sup- 
plies, and  suppressed  the  smaller  bands  which  swarm- 
ed in  those  parts  ;  hence,  when  tie  siege  of  Taragona 
•was  confided  to  the  third  corps,  the  magazines,  at  Leri- 
da  and  Mora,  were  ah-eady  full  ;  ai  1  a  battering  train 
was  formed  at  Tortoza,  to  which  place  the  tools,  plat- 
forms, and  other  materials,  fabricated  at  Zaragoza,  were 
convej'ed.  Fifteen  hundred  draft  horses,  the  greatest 
part  of  the  artillery-men  and  engineers,  and  ten  bat- 
talions of  infantry  were  also  collected  in  that  town, 
uud  from  thence  shot  and  shells  were  continually  for- 
warded to  San  Felippe  de  Balaguer.  This  was  a  fine 
application  of  Cffisar"s  maxim,  that  war  should  maintain 
itself,  for  all  the  money,  the  guns,  provisions,  and  mate- 
rials, collected  for  this  siege,  were  the  fruits  of  former 
victories  ;  nothing  was  derived  from  France  but  the  men. 
It  is  curious,  however,  that  Suchet  so  little  understood 
the  nature  and  effects  of  the  English  system  of  finance, 
that  he  observes,  in  his  memoirs,  upon  the  ability 
with  which  the  ministers  made  Spain  pay  the  ex- 
pense of  this  war  by  never  permitting  English  gold 
to  go  to  the  Peninsula  ;  he  was  ignorant,  that  the 
paper  money  system  had  left  them  no  English  gold 
to  send. 

The  want  of  forage  in  the  district  of  Tortoza,  and 
the  advantage  of  the  carriage-road  by  the  Col  de  Bala- 
guer, induced  the  French  general  to  direct  his  artillery 
that  way  ;  but  his  provisions,  and  other  stores,  passed 
from  Mora  by  Falcet  and  Momblanch  to  Ileus,  in  which 
latter  town  he  proposed  to  establish  his  stores  for  the 
siege,  while  Mora,  the  chief  magazine,  was  supplied 
from  Zaragoza,  Caspe,  and  Mequinenza.  Divers  other 
arrangements,  of  which  I  shall  now  give  the  outline, 
contributed  to  the  security  of  the  communications,  and 
enabled  the  army  of  Aragon  to  undertake  the  great  en- 
terfirize  for  which  it  was  destined. 

1.  Detachments  of  gens-d'armes  and  of  the  frontier 
guards  of  France,  descending  the  high  valleys  of  Ar- 
agon, helped  to  maintain  tramiuiliity  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  EI)ro,  and  occupied  the  castles  of  Venasque  and 
Jaca,  which  had  been  taken  by  Suchet  in  his  previous 
campaign. 

2.  'I'hc  line  of  correspondence  from  France,  instead  of 
running  as  before  through  (iuipuscoa  and  Navarre  by 
Pampeluiia,  was  now  directed  by  ['an,  Oieron,  and  Jaca 
to  Zaragoza ;  and  in  the  latter  city,  and  in  the  towns 
around  it,  four  or  five  battalions,  and  a  proportion  of 
horsemen  and  artillery,  were  disposed,  to  watch  the  Par- 
tidas  from  Navarre  and  the  Moncayo  mountains. 

3.  Four  l)attalions  with  cavalry  and  guns,  Were  post- 
ed at  Daroca  under  general  Paris,  whose  command 
extended  from  thence  to  the  fort  of  Molino,  which  was 
armed  and  garrisoned. 

4.  (jfeneral  Abbe  was  placed  at  Teruel  with  five 
battalions,  three  hundred  cuirassiers,  and  two  pieces  of 
artillery,  to  watch  Villa  Campa,  and  the  Valencian 
army  which  was  again  in  the  field. 

5.  Alcanitz  and  Morella  were  occupied  by  fourteen 
hundred  men,  whereby  that  short  passage  though  the 
mountains  from  Aragon  to  Valencia  was  secured  ;  and 
from  thence  the  line  to  Caspe,  and  down  the  Ebro 
from  Mequinenza  to  Tortoza,  wus  protected  by  twelve 
hundred  men  ;  Tortoza  itself  was  garrisoned  by  two 
battalions,    the    forts    at    the     moutl    of    the    Ebro 


were  occupied,  and  four  hundred  men  were  placed  in 
Rapita. 

This  line  of  defence  from  right  to  left  was  fourteen 
days'  march,  but  the  number  of  fortified  posts  enabled 
the  troops  to  move  from  point  to  point,  without  much 
danger  ;  and  thus  the  army  of  the  great  and  rich  pro- 
vince of  Valencia,  the  division  of  Villa  Campa,  the 
Partidas  of  New  Castile  and  Navarre,  including  Mina 
and  the  Empecinado,  the  most  powerful  of  those  inde- 
pendent chiets,  were  all  set  at  nought  by  twelve  thou 
sand  French,  although  the  latter  had  to  delend  a  line 
of  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles.  Under  cover  of  this 
feeble  chain  of  defence,  Suchet  besieged  a  strong  city 
which  had  a  powerful  garrison,  an  open  harbour,  a 
commanding  squadron  of  ships,  and  a  free  communi- 
cation, by  sea,  with  Cadiz,  Valencia,  Gibraltar,  and  the 
Balearic  islands.  It  is  true  that  detachments  from  the 
army  of  the  centre,  acting  on  a  large  circuit  round 
Madrid,  sometimes  dispersed,  and  chased  the  Partidas 
that  threatened  Suchet's  line  of  defence,  but  at  this 
period,  from  circumstances  to  be  hereafter  mentioned, 
that  army  was  in  a  manner  paralysed. 

While  the  French  general's  posts  were  being  estab- 
lished, he  turned  his  attention  to  the  arrangements  for 
a  permanent  supply  of  food.  The  difficulty  of  procu- 
ring meat  was  become  great,  because  he  wisely  re- 
frained from  using  up  the  sheep  and  cattle  of  Aragon, 
lest  the  future  supply  of  his  army  should  be  anticipa- 
ted, and  the  minds  of  the  people  of  that  province 
alienated  by  the  destruction  of  their  breeding  flocks  ; 
to  avoid  this,  he  engaged  contractors  to  furnish  him 
from  France,  and  so  completely  had  he  pacified  the 
Aragonese,  through  whose  territories  the  flocks  were 
brought,  and  with  whose  money  they  were  paid  for, 
that  none  of  his  contracts  failed.  But  as  these  resour- 
ces were  not  immediately  available,  the  troops  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Ebro  made  incui-sions  after  cattle 
beyond  the  frontiers  of  Aragon  ;  and  when  Harispe 
returned  from  Barcelona,  eight  battalions  marched  up- 
on a  like  service  up  the  higher  valleys  of  the  Pyr- 
enees. 

It  was  in  this  state  of  affairs  that  Suchet  received 
intelligence  of  the  surprise  of  Figueras,  which  in- 
duced him  to  hasten  the  investment  of  Taragona. 
Meanwhile,  fearing  that  Mina  might  penetrate  to  the 
higher  valleys  of  Aragon,  and  in  conjunction  Avith  the 
partidas  of  Upper  Catalonia  cut  off  all  correspondence 
with  France,  he  detached  Chlopiski  with  four  liattal- 
ions  and  two  hundred  hussars  to  watch  the  movements 
of  that  chief  only,  and  demanded  of  the  emperor,  that 
some  troops  fi'om  Pampeluna  should  occupy  Saugucssa, 
while  others,  from  the  army  of  the  north,  should  relieve 
the  detachments  of  the  army  of  Aragon,  at  Soria  and 
Calatayud. 

The  battalions  sent  up  the  high  valleys  of  Catalonia 
returned  in  the  latter  end  of  April.  Suchet  then  re- 
viewed his  troops,  issued  a  month's  pay,  and  six  days' 
provisions  to  each  soldier,  loaded  many  carriages  and 
mules  with  flour,  and,  having  first  spread  a  report 
that  he  was  going  to  relieve  Figueras,  conmienced  his 
march  to  Taragona  by  the  way  of  Momblanch.  Some 
Miguelettes  entrenched  in  the  pass  of  Ribas,  were 
dispersed  by  Harispe's  division  on  the  1st  of  May,  and 
the  army  descended  tiio  hills  to  Alcover ;  but  four 
hundred  men  were  left  in  Momblanch,  where  a  post 
was  fortified,  to  protect  the  line  of  corannmication 
with  Ijorida,  and  to  prevent  the  Spanish  partizans  on 
that  flank,  from  troubling  the  communication  between 
Mora  and  Reus.  The  2d  head-quarters  were  fixed  at 
Reus,  and  the  3d  the  S])anish  outposts  were  driven 
over  the  Francoli ;  meanwhile  Ilabert,  sending  the  ar- 
tillery from  Tortoza  by  the  Col  de  Balaguer,  moved 
himself  with  a  large  convoy  from  Mora  by  Falcet  to 
Reus. 


1811.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR  WAR, 


371 


CHAPTER  V.  I 

Suchet's  skilful  eoiidxict — His  error  about  English  finance — 
Outline  of  his  iinanjiremeuts  for  the  siej^c  of  TarafJfona — He 
makes  French  contracts  for  the  supply  of  his  army — Fora-  j 
ges  the  liiy;h  valleys  and  the  frontiers  of  Castile  and  Va-  ' 
lencia — Marches  to  Taratrona — Description  of  that  place — ■ 
Canipo  Verde  enters  the  place — Suchet  invests  it — Con-  j 
veutiou  relative  to  the  sick  concluded  between  St.  Cyr  j 
\     and  Kcdiiii^  faithfully  observed — Sarstield  comes  to  Mora-  ^ 
blanch — Skirmish  with   the  Valencians  at  Amposta  and 
Rupita — Siege  of  Taragona — Rapita  and  Moinblanch  aban-  I 
doned  by  Suchet — Taragoua  reinforced  from  Valencia—  I 
The  Olivo  stormed— Canipo  Verde  quits  Taragona,  and 
Senens  de  Contreras  assumes  the  chief  command — Sars-  I 
field  enters  the  place  and  takes  charge  of  the  Fort  or  lower  ' 
town — French  break  ground  before  the  lower  town — The  I 
Francoli  stormed — Campo  Verde's  plans  to  succour  the  j 
place — General  Abb6  is  called  to  tiie  siege — Sarstield  quits  \ 
tlie  place — '^he  lower  town  is  stormed — Tlie  upper  town 
attacked  —  buchet's  difficulties   increase — Campo  Verde 
comes  to  the  succour  of  the  place,  but  retires  without 
effecting  any  thing — Colonel  Skerrett  arrives  in  tiie  liar- 
bour  wfth  a  British  force — Does  not  land — Gallant  conduct 
of  the  Italian  soldier  Biancliiui — The  upper  town  is  storm- 
ed with  dreadful  slaughter. 

In  Taragona,  although  a  siege  had  been  so  long  ex- 
pected, there  was  a  great  scarcity  of  money  and  ammu- 
nition, and  so  many  men  had,  as  Suchet  foresaw,  been 
drawn  off  to  succour  Figueras,  that  the  garrison,  com- 
manded by  colonel  Gonzalez,  was  not  more  than  six 
thousand,  including  twelve  hundred  armed  inhabitants 
and  the  seamen  of  the  port.  The  town  was  encumbered 
■with  defensive  works  of  all  kinds,  but  most  of  them  were 
ill-constructed,  irregular,  and  without  convenient  places 
for  making  sallies. 

Taragona  itself  was  built  upon  rocks,  steep  on  the 
north-east  and  south,  but  sinking  gently  on  the  south- 
west and  west  into  low  ground.  A  mole  formed  a  har- 
bour capable  of  receiving  ships  of  the  line,  and  beyond 
the  mole  there  was  a  roadstead.  The  upper  town  was 
surrounded  by  ancient  walls,  crowning  the  rocks,  and 
these  walls  were  inclosed  by  a  second  rampart  with 
irregular  bastions  which  ran  round  the  whole  city.  On 
the  east,  across  the  road  to  Barcelona,  there  was  a  chain 
of  redoubts  connected  by  curtains,  with  a  ditch  and  cov- 
ered way  ;  and  behind  this  line  there  was  a  rocky  space 
called  the  Milagro,  opening  between  the  body  of  the 
place  and  the  sea.  The  lower  town,  or  suburb,  was  separ 
rated  from  the  upper,  by  the  inner  ramparts  of  the  latter, 
and  was  protected  by  three  regular  and  some  irregular 
bastions  with  a  ditch  ;  a  square  work,  called  Fort  Royal, 
f  )rmed  a  species  of  citadel  within,  and  the  double  town 
presented  the  figm'e  of  an  irregular  oblong,  whose  length 
lying  parallel  to  the  sea,  was  about  twelve  hundred 
yards. 

On  the  east  beyond  the  walls,  a  newly  constructed  line 
of  defence  was  carried  along  the  coast  to  the  mouth  of 
the  Francoli,  where  it  ended  in  a  large  redoubt,  built  to 
secure  access  to  that  river  when  the  ancient  aqueducts 
which  furnished  the  city  with  water  should  be  cut  by 
the  French.  This  line  was  strengthened  by  a  second 
redoubt,  called  the  Prince,  half-way  between  that  near 
the  Francoli  and  the  town  ;  and  it  was  supported  by 
the  mole  which  being  armed  with  batteries,  and  nearly 
in  a  parallel  direction,  formed  as  it  were  a  second 
sea-line. 

The  approach  on  the  side  of  the  Francoli  river  was  of 
a  level  character,  and  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  Olivo,  a 
large  outwork  on  the  north,  crowning  a  rocky  table- 
land of  an  equal  height  with  the  upi)er  town,  but  divid- 
ed from  it  by  a  ravine  nearly  half  a  mile  wide,  across 
which  the  aqueducts  of  the  place  were  carried.  This 
Olivo  was  an  irregular  horn-work,  four  hundred  yards 
long,  with  a  ditch  twenty-four  feet  deep  and  forty  wide, 
but  till!  covered  way  was  not  completed,  and  the  gorge 
was  only  closed  by  a  loopholcd  wall  ;  neith(!r  was  this 
defence  quite  finished,  as  the  steepness  of  the  rock,  and 
the  fire  of  the  city  appeared  to  render  it  secure.    The 


bastion  on  the  left  of  the  Olivo,  was  cut  off  by  a  ditch 
and  a  rampart  from  the  body  of  the  work,  and  on  the 
right  also  within  the  rampart  there  was  a  small  redoubt 
of  refuge,  with  a  high  cavalier  or  bank,  on  which  three 
guns  were  placed  that  overlooked  all  the  country  round. 
The  ordinary  garrison  of  the  Olivo  was  from  twelve  to 
fifteen  hundred  men,  and  it  contained  fifty  out  of  three 
hundred  pieces  of  artillery  which  served  the  defence  of 
Taragona. 

The  nature  of  the  soil  combined  with  the  peculiarities 
of  the  works,  determined  Suchet's  line  of  attack.  On 
the  nfirth  and  ea<;t  .side  the  ground  was  rocky,  the  fronts 
of  defence  wide,  the  approaches  unfavourable  for  breach- 
ing batteries  ;  and  as  all  the  guns  and  stores  would  have 
to  be  dragged  over  the  hills  on  a  grexit  circuit,  unless  the 
Olivo  was  first  taken,  no  difficulty  could  be  avoided  in 
an  attack.  Wherefore,  on  the  side  of  the  lower  town 
the  French  resolved  to  approach,  although  the  artificial 
defences  were  there  accunuilated,  and  the  ground  between 
the  town  and  the  Francoli  river  taken  in  reverse  by  the 
Olivo,  which  rendered  it  necessary  first  to  reduce  that 
outwork.  But  this  part  was  chosen  by  the  French, 
because  the  soil  was  deep  and  easily  moved,  their  depots 
and  parks  close  at  hand,  the  ground-plot  of  the  works 
so  salient  that  they  could  be  easily  embraced  with  fire, 
and  because  the  attack  would,  it  was  supposed,  cut  off 
the  garrison  from  fresh  water,  yet  this  last  advantage 
was  not  realized. 

On  the  4th  of  May  the  French,  p'jssing  the  Francai" 
drove  in  the  outposts,  took  possession  of  two  small  dc 
tached  redoubts,  situated  on  the  northern  side,  called  tlw. 
forts  of  Loretto,  and  invested  the  place.  However  the 
Spanish  troops  supported  by  the  fire  of  the  Olivo  killed 
and  wounded  two  hundred  men,  and  the  next  day  a 
fruitless  attempt  was  made  to  retake  the  lost  ground ; 
at  the  same  time  the  fleet  under  captain  Codrington, 
consisting  of  three  English  ships  of  the  line  and  three 
frigates,  besides  sloops  and  Spanish  vessels  of  war,  can- 
nonaded the  French  right,  and  harassed  their  convoys, 
then  coming  by  the  coast-road  from  the  Col  de  Balaguer. 
The  investing  troops  whose  posts  were  very  close  to  the 
Olivo,  were  also  greatly  incommoded  by  the  heavy  fire 
from  that  outwork,  yet  the  line  was  maintained  and  per- 
fected. 

Habert's  division,  forming  the  right  wing,  extended 
from  the  sea  to  the  bridge  of  the  Francoli  ;  general 
Frere's  division  connected  Habert  with  Harispe's,  whose 
troops  occupied  the  ground  before  the  Olivo  ;  the 
Italian  division  prolonged  Harispe's  left  to  the  road  of 
Barcelona  which  runs  close  to  the  sea  on  the  east  side  of 
'J'aragona ;  three  regiments  were  placed  in  reserve 
higher  up  on  the  Francoli,  where  a  trestle  bridge  was 
cast,  and  the  park,  which  was  established  on  the  right  of 
that  river,  at  the  village  of  Canonja,  contained  sixty-six 
battering  guns  and  mortal's,  each  furnished  with  seven 
hundred  rounds.  There  were  also  thirty-six  field  pieces, 
two  thousand  artillery-men  to  serve  the  guns,  seven 
hundred  sappers  and  miners,  fourteen  hundred  cavalry, 
and  nearly  fifteen  thousand  infantry.  The  head-quarters 
were  fixed  at  the  village  of  Constanti,  a  strong  cov- 
ering position,  the  depot  at  Reus  was  secured  by  forti- 
fied convents,  and  the  works  at  Mora  were  defended 
by  several  battalions.  Other  troops,  placed  at  Falcet, 
guarded  the  communications,  which  were  farther  secur- 
ed by  the  escorts  belonging  to  the  convoys  ;  and  the 
French  had  cut  off  the  water  of  the  aqueducts  from  the 
Olivo,  but  this  Mater,  whdfee  source  was  ten  or  twelve 
miles  off,  was  also  necessary  to  the  besiegers  on  that 
sterile  land,  and  was  again  cut  off  by  the  Somatenes, 
which  obliged  the  French  to  guard  its  whole  course 
during  the  siege. 

Meanwhile  Campo  Yerde  after  his  defeat  at  Figue- 
ras had  sent  Sarsfield  and  Eroles  to  their  former  posts 
near  Vails,  Momblanch,  and  Igualada,  and  embarking 
at  Mattaro  himself,  with  four  thousand  men,  came  on 


372 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULA.;    WAR. 


[Book  Xni. 


the  lOtli  to  Tiirap^ona,  where  the  sudden  appearance  of 
the  French  had  produced  great  consternation.  Yet 
when  Canipo  Verde  arrived  with  this  reinforcement, 
rtnd  wlien  colonel  (irein,  the  Eni^lish  military  agent, 
Jirrived  on  the  ]r)lli  from  Cadiz,  in  the  Merope,  bring- 
ing  with  him  fifty  thousand  dollars  and  two  transports 
laden  with  arms  and  stores,  Spanish  apathy  again  pre- 
vailed, and  the  necessary  measures  of  defence  were  neg- 
lected. Beyond  the  walls,  liowcver,  the  French  post 
at  Momblanch  was  attacked  by  two  thousand  Migue- 
lettes,  and  the  Somatcnes  assembled  in  the  vicinity  of 
Reus. 

Suchet  detached  general  Frere  with  four  battalions 
to  relieve  the  former  place,  where  the  attack  had  failed ; 
the  commandant  of  Reus  also  dispersed  the  Somatenes, 
and  meanwhile  TIarispe  pushed  his  patroles  over  the 
Gaj'a  as  far  as  Torre  do  Barra,  where  he  found  some 
wounded  Spaniards.  The.se  men  were  within  the  pro- 
tection of  a  convention,  made  by  St.  Cyr  with  Reding, 
by  which  the  wounded  men  of  both  armies  were  to  be 
left  in  the  civil  hospitals  of  the  different  towns,  and  mu- 
tually taken  care  of,  without  being  made  prisoners ;  and 
it  is  remarkable  that  this  compact  was  scrupulously  ex- 
ecuted on  both  sides,  while  beyond  those  hospitals  the 
utmost  ferocity  and  a  total  disregard  of  civilized  usages 
prevailed. 

Sarsfield's  arrival  near  Momblanch  threatened  the 
communications  between  Reus  and  IMora,  and  at  the 
same  time  a  Valencian  colnmn,  acting  in  concert  with 
captain  Adam  of  the  Invincible,  attacked  the  posts  of 
Rapita  and  Amposta  :  the  former  was  abandoned  by  the 
garrison,  and  the  latter  was  sin-rounded  by  the  Valen- 
cians,  but  a  regiment  sent  from  Tortoza.  after  disengaging 
Amposta.  defeated  the  Yalencians  near  Rapita;  never- 
theless Suchet  unwilling  to  lessen  his  already  too  small 
force,  did  not  restore  the  latter  post. 

SIEQE    OF    TARAGONA. 

Tlie  French  general  having  resolved  to  attack  the 
lower  town,  commenced  his  operations  by  constructing 
a  fort  and  batteries,  on  the  right  of  the  Francoli,  near 
the  sea-shore,  with  a  view  to  keep  the  English  ships 
of  war  and  the  gun-boats  at  a  distance  from  his  pro 
jected  trenches.  ^J'liese  works  commenced  in  the  night 
of  the  7th,  were  successfully  continued  towards  the 
mouth  of  the  river  under  the  tire  of  the  vessels ;  a 
trench,  lined  with  musipieteers,  was  also  carried  from 
the  left  along  the  bank  of  the  river  to  the  bridge,  but 
the  Spaniards  continually  harassed  the  investing  troops 
both  from  within  and  fron  without,  and  made  some 
attem;»ts  against  the  camp ;  Therefore  the  brigade  of 
gx^neral  Salnie,  which  was  ch^.e  to  the  Olivo,  was  ob- 
liged to  entrench,  and  yet  lo.st  fifty  or  sixty  men  daily 
by  iho  enemy's  skirmishers. 

On  the  night  of  the  13th.  during  a  tempest,  the 
French  stormed  two  external  entrenchments  near  the 
Olivo,  and  then  turned  them  against  the  besieged  ;  the 
next  moi-ning  a  vigorous  attempt  to  retake  tliem  was 
repulsed  with  a  loss  of  one  hundred  men,  and  on  the 
Francoli  side,  a  sally  supported  by  the  shipping  failed 
in  consequence  of  tlie  cowardice  of  some  Spanish 
officers.  On  the  same  day,  besides  this  attack  on  the 
side  of  the  Francoli,  the  garrison  came  out  from  the 
Barcelona  gate,  and  six  hundred  S(Mnatencs  from  the 
Upper  (Jaya  f'll  on  the  patroles  of  the  Italian  division, 
whereupon  I'alombini  secured  the  country  on  the  15th 
as  far  as  Arljos. 

The  IBth  a  powerful  sortie  from  the  lower  town 
was  made'  by  Gonzalez,  who  passed  the  bridge,  and, 
aided  by  a  fire  from  the  place,  from  the  Olivo.  and 
from  the  fleet,  pressed  ITabert's  division  hard;  Suchet 
however  came  down  with  his  reserve,  pushed  between 
the  river  and  the  Olivo,  and  menaced  the  Spanish  line 
of  retreat,  which  obliged  Gonzalez  to  retire  with  .luss. 


On  the  20th  three  other  sallies  were  made  from  the 
Olivo,  and  from  the  upper  town,  on  the  Barcelona  side, 
but  they  were  all  in  like  manner  repulsed  ;  and  that  day 
Sarsfield  took  post  with  twelve  hundred  men  on  a  high 
and  rugged  ])lace  near  Alcover,  thus  menacing  the 
depot  at  Reus.  The  French  general  therefore  detached 
two  battalions  of  infantry  and  some  cavalry,  under 
general  Broussard,  to  dislodge  him,  which  was  effected 
with  the  loss  of  a  hundred  French ;  but  three  days 
later  he  appeared  before  Momblanch,  and  was  only 
driven  away  by  the  united  brigades  of  Frere  and 
Palombini,  who  marched  against  him.  Divers  at 
tempts  were  also  made  upon  the  line  of  Falcet,  espe- 
cially at  Grattallopes,  where  the  Spanish  colonel 
Yillamil.  having  attacked  Moro^iinski,  a  Pole,  the 
latter  defended  himself  successfully,  and  with  a  braviv 
ry  that  has  always  distinguished  the  people  of  that 
heroic  nation  ;  a  nation  whfise  glory  springs  like  an 
igms fatuas  from  the  corrujition  of  European  honour! 

These  repeated  attacks  having  warned  Suchet  how 
difficult  it  would  be  to  maintain,  with  his  weak  army, 
so  great  an  extent  of  communication,  he  abandoned  his 
post  at  Momblanch,  and  contented  himsi'lf  with  pre- 
serving the  lines  of  Falcet  and  of  Felippe  de  Balaguer  ; 
a  measure  the  more  necessary,  that  the  garrison  of 
Taragona  was  now  greatly  augmented  ;  for  on  the 
Itlth,  the  Blake  had  sailed  fur  Yalcncia  to  seek  rein- 
forcements, and  Carlos  ODunnel,  who  had  succeeded 
Bassecour,  gave  him  above  two  thousand  infantry  and 
two  hundred  cannoneers,  who  were  safely  landed  ut 
Taragona  on  the  22d,  two  thousand  stand  of  ai'ms 
being,  in  return,  delivered  by  captain  Codrington  to 
O'Donnel,  to  equip  fresh  levies.  Above  twelve  thou- 
sand men  were  thus  collected  in  the  fortress,  but  all  the 
richest  citizens  had  removed  with  their  liimilies  and  ef- 
fects to  Villa  Nueva  de  Sitjes,  and  the  people  were  dis- 

I  pirited. 

]  Suchet  broke  ground  before  the  Olivo  in  the  night  of 
the  21st,  and  carried  on  his  approaches  from  both  ends 
of  the  Spanish  entrenchments  which  he  hud  seized  on 
the  night  of  the  13th.  His  engineers  wish.ed  to  reach 
a  round  hill,  close  to  the  works,  on  which  they  pro- 
posed to  plant  their  first  breaching  battery,  and  they 
crowned  it  on  the  22d,  but  with  much  loss,  being 
obliged  to  carry  the  earth  for  the  work  up  the  hill  in 
ba.sketif,  and  they  were  continually  interrupted  by  sal- 
lies. Three  counter-batteries  were,  however,  completed 
and  armed  on  the  27th  with  thirteen  pieces,  of  which 
six  threw  shells  ;  but  to  effect  this,  the  soldiers  dragged 
the  artillery  over  the  rocks,  under  a  heavy  fire  of  grape, 
and  the  garrison  making  a  vigorous  sally,  killed  general 
Salme,  when  he  opposed  them  with  th(>  reserves.*  The 
moment  was  dangerous  to  the  French,  but  they  were 
finally  victorious,  and  the  fire  of  the  batteries  having 
opened  the  same  morning,  was  sustained  until  the  even- 
ing of  the  29th,  when  a  breach  being  formed,  the  assault 
was  ordered. 

STORMING    OF    THE    OLIVO. 

Upon  the  success  of  this  attack,  Suchet  thought, 
and  with  reason,  that  his  chance  of  taking  the  town 
would  depend,  seeing  that  his  army  was  too  feeble 
to  bear  any  serious  check.  Wherefore,  having  formed 
his  columns  of  assault,  he  personally  encouraged  them, 
and  at  the  same  time  directed  the  troops  along  the  ^ 
whole  line  of  investment  to  advance  simultaneously, 
and  menace  ev(n-y  part  of  the  town.  The  night  was 
dark,  and  the  Spaniards  were  unexp(!ctant  of  an  attack, 
because  none  of  their  guns  had  yet  been  silenced  ;  but 
the  French,  full  of  hope  and  resolution,  were  watching 
for  the  signal.  When  that  was  given,  the  troops  on 
the  Francoli,  and  those  on  the  Barcelona  side,  made  a 
sudden   discharge  of   musketry,  beat  all   their  drums, 

*  Suchet. 


1811.1 


NAPIER'S    PENIXSULAR    WAR. 


373 


and  with  loud  sho'its  approached  the  town  at  those  !  and  on  the  6th  the  besiegers  wore  within  twenty  yards 
opposite  quarters ;  the  rampart  of  the  place  was  in- 1  of  the  Francoli  fort,  which  liad  a  wet  ditch,  and 
stantly  covered  with  fire  from  within  and  from  without ;  was  of  reg-ular  construction.  Tlie  breaching  batteries, 
the  ships  in  the  offing  threw  up  rockets,  and  amidst  the  j  which  liad  been  armed  as  the  trenches  proceeded,  open- 
uoise  of  four  hundred  guns,  the  storming  columns  rushed  ,  ed  their  fire  against  it  on  tlie  7th.  'I'lie  fresh  masonry 
upon  the  Olivo.  i  crumbled  away  rapidly,  and  at  ten  o'clock  that  night, 

The  principal  force  made  for  the  breach;  but  a 'the  fort  being  entirely  destroyed,  three  hundred  chosen 
second  column,  turning  tlie  fort,  got  between  it  and  the  \  men  in  three  columns,  one  of  which  forded  the  Francoli 
town,  at  the  moment°when  fifteen  hundred  men,  sent  j  river,  attacked  the  ruins,  and  the  defenders  retired 
to  relieve  the  old  garrison,  were  entering  the  gates. !  fighting  towards  the  half-moon  of  the  Prince.  'J'he 
Somj  of  the  French  instintly  fell  on  their  rear,  which !  assaihmts  then  made  a  disorderly  attempt  to  enter 
hurrying  forward,  gave  an  opportunity  to  the  assailants  I  with  them,  but  were  quickly  repulsed  with  a  loss  of 

fifty  men,  yet  the  lodgement  was  under  a  heavy  fire 
secured  ;  and  the  next  night  a  battery  of  six  pieces 
was  constructed  there,  with  a  view  to  silence  the  guns 
of  the  Mole,  which,  together  with  that  of  the  place,  en- 
deavoured to  overwhelm  the  small  space,  thus  occupied, 
with  shot. 

In  the  nights  of  the  8th  and  9th,  under  terrible  dis- 
charges from  both  the  upper  and  lower  town,  the  second 
parallel  was  prolonged  to  fort  Francoli  on  the  riglit,  and 
on  the  left,  carried  to  within  seventy  yards  of  the  Kun's 
bastion. 

The  11th,  Sarsfield  making  a  sally,  killed  some  men, 
and  retarded  the  works;  but  before  the  15th,  three 
approaches  by  the  sap  were  conducted  against  the  Nun's 
bastion,  where  the  besiegers  crowned  the  glacis,  and 
against  the  half-moon  of  the  King  and  Prince.  Fresh 
batteries  were  also  constructed,  whose  fire  embraced  the 
whole  front  from  the  Prince  to  the  Nuns  bastion. 

On  the  morning  of  the  16th  fifty-four  guns  opened 
from  the  French  batteries,  and  the  Spaniards  placing 
sand  bags  along  the  parapets,  endeavoured  by  musketry 
to  kill  the  gunners,  who  were  much  exposed,  while  all 
the  cannon  of  the  place  which  could  be  directed  upon 
the  trenches  were  employed  to  crush  the  batteries. 
Towards  evening  this  lire  had  in  a  great  degree  mas- 
tered  that   of  the  besiegers,  destroyed   the  centre   of 


to  penetrate  with  them  before  the  gates  could  be  closed, 
and  thirty  sappers  with  hatchets  having  followed  closely, 
eudt.'avoured  to  break  the  door,  while  Papignay,  their 
olHcer,  attempted  to  climb  over  the  wall  ;  the  Spaniards 
killed  him  anil  most  of  the  sappers,  but  the  other  troops 
planted  their  ladders  to  the  righi  and  lel't,  and  cutting 
through  the  pointed  stakes  above,  entered  the  place  and 
opened  the  gate.* 

At  the  main  attack  the  French  boldly  assailed  the 
narri)w  breach,  but  the  ditch  was  fifteen  feet  deep, 
the  Spaniards  firm,  and  the  fire  heavy,  and  they  were 
giving  way,  when  the  historian,  Vacani,  followed  by 
some  of  his  countrymen,  (it  is  a  strange  error  to  think 
the  Italians  have  not  a  brave  spirit !)  cut  down  the 
paling  which  blocked  the  subterranean  passage  of 
the  aqueduct,  and  thus  got  into  the  ditch  and  after- 
wards into  the  fort.  Then  the  Spaniards  were  driven 
from  the  ramparts  on  all  sides,  back  to  the  little  works 
of  refuge,  before  noticed,  as  being  at  each  end  of  the 
Olivo,  from  whence  they  fired  both  musketry  and  guns ; 
but  the  French  and  Italian  reserves,  followed  by 
Uarispe  with  a  third  column,  now  entered  the  place, 
and  With  a  terrible  slaughter  ended  the  contest.  Twelve 
hundred  men  perished,  some  escaped,  a  thousand  were 
taken,  and  amongst  them  their  commander,  who  had  re- 
ceived tea  wounds. 


In  the  morning  three  thousand  Spaniards  came  out '  their  second  parallel,  and  silenced  a  battery  on  their 


of  I'aragona,  yet  retired  without  attacking,  and  Suchet 
demanded  a  suspension  of  arms  to  dispose  of  the  dead  ; 
this   was,  however,  treated  with  scorn,  and   the  heaps 


right ;  but  the  loss  and  damage  was  great  on  both 
sides,  for  two  consumption  magazines  exploded  in  the 
town,  and  the  Nun's  bastion  was  breached.     The  en- 


were  burned,  for  the  sterile  rocks  attbrded  no  earth  to '  gineers  also  oljserved  that  the  ditch  of  the  Prmce  was 
bury  them.  Campo  \Mn'de  now  gave  general  Senens  j  ""t  carried  round  to  the  sea,  and  hence  Suchet,  who 
de  Contreras  the  command  of  Taragona,  and  went  him- 1  feared  a  continuation  of  this  murderous  artillery  battle, 
self  to  the  field-army,  which  was  about  ten  thousand  [  resolved  to  storm  that  point  at  once,  hoping  to  enter  by 
strong,  including  some  new  levies  made  by  the  junta  of  j  the  defect  in  the  ditch. 

Catalonia.  ^t  nine  o'clock  two  columns,  supported  by  a  reserve, 

Suchet's  investment  having  been  precipitated  by  issued  from  the  trenches,  and,  after  a  short  resistance, 
the  fall  of  Figueras,  his  stores  were  not  all  collected '  entered  the  work,  both  by  the  gap  of  the  ditch  and  by 
until  the- 1st  of  June,  when  trenches  were  opened  [  escalade ;  the  garrison  fought  well,  and  were  put  to 
to  embrace  the  whole  of  the  lower  town,  including  the  i  the  sword,  a  few  only  escaping  along  the  quay.  These 
fort  of  Francoli  and  its  chain  of  connecting  works  ■  were  pursued  by  a  party  of  the  French,  who,  passmg  a. 
running  along  the  sea-shore ;  that  is  to  say,  1.  The  'litch  and  drawbridge  which  cut  off  the  road  from  the 
Nun^s  bastion  and  a  half-moon  called  the  King's,  which  l  bastion  of  San  Cai-los,  endeavoured  to  manitam  them- 
formed,  on  the  Spanish  right,  a  sort  of  hornwork  to  |  selves  there,  but  being  unsupported,  were  mostly  destroy- 
the  roval  fort  or  citadel,  'i.  The  bastion  of  San  Carlos :  ed.  The  lodgement  thus  made  was  immediately  secured 
and  a  half-moon  called  the  Prince's,  which  stood  on  the  |  and  included  in  the  trenches. 

left,  in  the  retiring  angle  where  the  sea-line  joined  the!  During  the  night  of  the  17th  the  old  batteries  were 
body  of  the  place,  and  served  as  a  counter-guard  to  the  repaired,  and  the  construction  of  a  new  one,  to  breach 
bastion  of  San  Carlos.     3.  The  sea-line  itself  and  the  the  bastion  of  San  Carlos,  was  begun  upon  the  haif- 


Francoli  fort. 

The  2d  of  June  the  besieged  made  a  fruitless  sally, 
and  in  the  night  of  tlie  3d  some  advanced  Spanish 
entrenchments  were  destroyed  by  the  French.  Sars- 
field then  entered  Taragona  with  a  detachment,  and 
U)(jk  the  command  of  what  was  called  the  Port,  which 


moon  of  the  Prince ;  the  saps  and  other  approaches 
were  also  pushed  forward,  a  lodgement  was  ettected  in 
the  covered  way  of  the  Nun's  bastion,  and  the  third 
parallel  was  commenced ;  but  on  the  right  of  the 
trenches,  in  advance  of  the  Prince,  the  workmen  came 
upon    water,    which   obliged    them    to   desist   at   that 


included  the  Mole,  the  works  leading  to  the  Francoli,   P<J"if. 

and  the  suburb  or  lower  town,  Contreras  still  remaining  i  '^'he  18th  the  third  parallel  was  completed  and  the 
governor  of  all,  although  reluctantly,  for  he  expected  no  (descent  of  the  ditch  at  the  Nun's  bastion  was  crinmenc- 
success.  led  by  an  under-ground  gallery;  yet  the  fire  from  the 

In  the  night  of  the  4th  the  approaches  were  carried   "PPer  town  plunged  into  the  trenches,  and  thirty-seven 
forward  by 'the  sap,  the  second  parallel  was  commenced,   shells,  thrown  very  exactly  into  the  lodgement  on  tlie 
'  counterscarp,  oliliged  the  besiegers  to  reiuKiuisli  their 

onerations  th^re  durina-  the  dav.     At  this  time  also  tho 


Suchet.    Yacaui. 


operations  there  during  the  day. 


374 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XIII. 


gun-boats  wLicli  liithcrto  had  been  of  little  service 
in  the  defence,  were  put  under  the  direction  of  the 
British  navy,  and  worked  with  more  effect ;  yet  it  does 
not  appear  that  the  enemy  ever  suffered  much  injury 
from  the  ve-!sels  of  war,  beyond  the  interruption 
sometimes  given  to  their  convoys  on  the  Col  de  Bala- 
guor  road. 

During  the  nights  of  the  19th  and  20th  all  the 
French  works  were  advanced,  and  the  morning  of  the 
21st  the  new  battery,  in  the  Prince,  being  ready, 
opened  its  tire  against  San  Carlos,  and  was  followed 
by  all  the  other  batteries.  The  explosion  of  an 
e.xpense  magazine  silenced  the  Prince's  battery  after  a 
few  rounds ;  the  damage  was,  however,  repaired,  and 
at  four  o'clock  in  the  evening,  nearly  all  the  Spanish 
guns  being  overcome  and  the  breaches  enlarged,  Suchet 
resolved  to  storm  the  lower  town.  But  previous  to 
describing  this  terrible  event,  it  is  necessary  to  notice 
the  proceedings  within  and  without  the  place,  that  a  just 
idea  of  the  actual  state  of  affairs  on  both  sides  may  be 
formed. 

Macdonald  had  continued  the  blockade  of  Figueras 
with  unceasing  vigilance ;  and  as  the  best  of  the 
Miguelettes  were  shut  up  there,  and  as  the  defeat 
of  Campo  Verde,  on  the  3d  of  May,  had  spread  con- 
sternation throughout  the  province,  the  operations  to 
relieve  it  were  confined  to  such  exertions  as  Rovira, 
Manso,  and  other  chiefs  could  call  forth.  In  like 
manner  Francisco  Milans  was  left  in  the  Hostalrich 
district,  and  by  his  local  popularity  amongst  the  people 
of  the  coast  between  Palamos  and  Barcelona,  was 
enabled  to  keep  up  an  irregular  force ;  but  his  object 
was  to  be  made  captain-general  of  the  province,  and 
his  desire  of  popularity,  or  some  other  motive,  led  him 
to  favour  the  towns  of  his  district  at  the  expense  of  the 
general  cause.  Mattaro  and  Villa  Nueva  de  Sitjes 
trafficked  in  corn  with  Barcelona,  and  one  of  their 
secret  convoys  was  detected  at  a  later  period  passing  the 
outposts  with  Milans'  written  authority.  He  put  the 
men  to  death  who  permitted  the  convoy  to  pass,  but  he 
did  not  succeed  in  removing  the  suspicion  of  corruption 
from  himself  This  traffic  was  very  advantageous  for 
the  French,  and  IMaurice  Mathieu  being  either  unwilling 
to  disturb  it,  or  that  having  recently  suffered  in  a  skir- 
mish at  Mattaro,  he  feared  to  risk  his  troops,  made  no 
movement  to  aid  the  siege  of  l^aragona,  which,  it  would 
appear,  he  might  have  doi^e,  by  taking  possession  of 
Villa  Nueva  de  Sitjes. 

Such  was  the  state  of  eastern  C^atalonia,  and  in 
the  western  parte,  the  infantry  of  Sarstield,  and  of 
Eroles,  who  had  come  down  to  the  vicinity  of  Vails, 
and  the  cavalry  under  Caro,  which  was  a  thousand 
strong,  formed,  with  the  new  levies  ordered  by  the 
junta,  an  army  of  seven  or  eight  thousand  men. 
This  force  might  have  done  much,  if  Campo  Verde, 
a  man  of  weak  character,  and  led  by  others,  had  not 
continually  changed  his  plans.  At  the  opening  of  the 
siege,  Sarsiield  had  acted,  as  we  have  seen,  with 
some  success  on  the  side  of  Momblanch  and  Reus ; 
but  when  he  was  sent  into  the  lower  town,  the  active 
army  being  reduced  to  Krok^'  division,  the  cavalry 
could  do  no  more  than  supply  small  detachments, 
to  watch  the  different  French  convoys  and  ])osts. 
Campo  Verda,  however,  fixed  his  quarters  at  Iguar 
lada,  sent  detachments  to  the  Gaya  and  Villa  Franca, 
and  holding  Villa  Nueva  de  Sitjes  as  his  post  of  com- 
munication with  the  fleet,  demanded  a.s.sistance  from 
Murcia  and  Valencia,  and  lornii'd  a  general  plan  for 
the  succour  of  the  i)lace.  But  in  Taragona  his  pro- 
ceedings were  viewed  with  dislike,  and  discord  and 
negligence  were  rendering  the  courage  of  the  garrison 
of  no  avail. 

We  have  seen  that  captain  Codrington  landed  two 
thousand  five  hundred  Valencians  on  the  22d  of  May  ; 
btaidea  that  rciulbrcemout,  vessels  loaded  with  powder 


and  other  stores,  and  additional  mortars  for  the  batte- 
ries, came  from  Carthagcna  and  from  Cadiz  in  the 
beginning  of  June.  From  Murcia  also  came  reinforce- 
ments ;  but  such  was  the  perversity  of  some  authorities, 
and  the  want  of  arrangement  in  all.  that  the  arras  of 
these  men  were  taken  away  from  them  before  they 
sailed  ;  and  yet  in  Taragona  there  were  already  two 
thousand  men  without  arms,  a  folly  attributed  by  some 
to  the  Spanish  authorities  of  Murcia,  by  others  to  colo- 
nel Roche,  the  English  military  agent.  Nor  did  the 
confusion  end  here  ;  for  captain  Codrington,  when  he 
sailed  from  Taragona  to  Peniscola  in  th«  latter  end  of 
May,  supplied  O'Donnel  with  arms  for  two  thousand 
recruits,  who  were  to  replace  the  Valencians  then  em- 
barked ;  and  a  few  days  afterwards  he  delivered  so 
many  more  at  the  city  of  Valencia,  that  Villa  Campa 
and  the  Empeciuado,  whose  troops,  after  their  dispersion 
in  April  by  Abbe  and  Paris,  had  remained  inactive, 
were  enabled  again  to  take  the  field.  I'hus  it  appears 
that,  while  men  were  sent  without  arms  from  A'^alencia 
to  Taragona,  arms  were  being  conveyed  from  the  latter 
place  to  V^alencia. 

The  troops  in  Taragona  had,  by  these  different 
reinforcements,  been  augmented  to  near  seventeen 
thousand  men ;  however,  that  number  was  never  avail- 
able at  one  time,  for  the  Murcians  were  sent  to  Mont- 
serrat  to  be  armed,  and  the  losses  during  the  opera- 
tions, including  those  caused  by  sickness,  had  reduced 
the  garrison  at  this  period  to  less  than  twelve  thou- 
sand.* Several  colonels  of  regiments,  and  many 
other  officers,  feigning  sickness,  or  with  open  cowardice 
running  away,  had  quitted  the  town,  leaving  their 
battalions  to  be  commanded  by  captains  ;  the  general 
of  artillery  was  incapable,  and  Contrcras  himself,  un- 
known to  the  inhabitants,  unacquainted  with  the  place 
or  its  resources,  was  vacillating  and  deceitful  to  those 
serving  under  him.  He  was  very  unwilling  to  under- 
take the  defence,  and  he  was  at  variance  with  Campo 
Verde  outside,  and  jealous  of  Sarsfield  inside.  In  the 
fleet  also  some  disagreement  occurred  between  captain 
Codrington  and  captain  Bullen,  and  the  commanders  of 
the  Diana  and  Prueba,  Spanish  ships  of  war,  were  ac- 
cused of  gross  misconduct. 

Carlos  O'Donnel  and  his  brother,  the  Conde  de 
Abispal,  at  the  desire  of  captain  Codrington,  had 
permitted  Miranda  to  embark  with  four  thousand  of 
the  best  Valencian  troops  for  Taragona,  there  to  join  in  a 
grand  sally  ;  but  they  exacted  from  Codrington  a  pledge 
to  bring  those  who  survived  back,  for  they  would  not 
suffer  this  their  second  aid  in  men  to  be  shut  up  m  the 
place  when  the  object  was  cfiected.  These  troops 
landed  the  Pith  at  Taragona,  yet  the  next  day,  at 
Campo  Verde's  order,  Miranda,  instead  of  making  a 
sally,  as  had  been  projected,  carried  them  off  by  the  sea 
to  Villa  Nueva  de  Sitjes,  and  from  tlienc*  maix-hed  to 
meet  a  detachment  of  horse  coming  from  Villa  Franca; 
and  on  the  15th  two  squadrons  of  cavalry  issuing  from 
Taragona  by  the  Barcelona  gate,  passed  the  French 
line  of  investment  without  difficulty,  and  also  joined 
Miranda,  who  then  marched  to  unite  with  Campo  Verde 
at  Igualada. 

This  movement  was  in  pursuance  of  a  grand  plan  to 
succour  the  place  ;  for  the  junta  of  (Jatalonia,  having 
quitted  'J'aragona  after  the  fall  of  the  Olivo,  repaired 
with  the  archives  to  Montscrrat,  and  as  usual,  made 
their  clamours  for  succour  ring  throughout  the  penin- 
sula:  they  had  received  jiromises  of  co-operation  from 
O'Donnel,  from  A'^illa  Cam{)a,  and  from  the  partizans, 
and  Campo  Verde  proposed  that  the  Erglish  ships  of 
war  should  keep  between  the  Col  de  Balaguer  and 
'i'arag(ma,  to  cannonade  the  French  convoys  on  that 
route;  that  a  detachment  should  take  post  at  Ordal,  to 
watch  the  garrison  of  Barcelona,  and  that  he  with  the 


*  Beport  of  Contreraa. 


1811.1 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


375 


remainder  of  his  forces,  which  including  Miranda's 
division  amounted  to  ten  thousand  infantry  and  a  thou- 
sand cavah-y.  should  talve  some  commanding  position 
near  Reus.  In  this  situation  he  designed  to  send  a  de- 
tachment towards  San  Filippe  de  Balaguer  to  commu- 
nicate with  the  fleet,  and,  avoiding  any  serious  action, 
to  operate  by  small  corps  against  the  French  line  of 
supply,  and  thus  oblige  them  to  raise  the  siege,  or  if 
they  came  out  of  their  lines  to  fight  them  in  strong  posi- 
tions. 

Contreras  treated  this  plan  with  contempt.  He  said 
it  would  cause  the  loss  both  of  the  place  and  the  ar- 
my ;  that  the  French  would  not  raise  the  siege  except 
for  a  general  battle,  and  that  within  their  lines  the  best 
mode  of  fighting  them  would  be  in  concert  with  the 
garrison ;  wherefore  he  desired  the  general-in-chief  to 
attack  them  in  conjunction  with  himself,  and  the  junta, 
who  were  at  variance  with  Campo  Verde,  backed  this 
proposal. 

Neither  of  these  plans,  however,  appears  sound  ;  for 
tht)ugh  it  is  certain,  that  if  the  generals  could  have  de- 
pended upon  their  troops,  such  was  the  reduced  state 
of  Sachet's  force,  and  so  extensive  was  his  line  of  in- 
vestment, that    it   would    have    been    easy  to    break  [ 
through  ;   yet  unless  the  French  were  put   entirely  to 
the    rout,   which   was    unlikely,   no    great    advantage  j 
would  have  followed,  because  the  communication  was ! 
already   open    by   sea.     On    the   other   hand,    Campo 
Verde's  pian  was  only  proposed  on  the  13th,  and  would 
have  been  too  slow  for  the  critical  nature  of  the  case. ; 
It  would  have  been  more  in  accord  with  that  great  max- 1 
im  of  war,  which  prescribes  the  attack  of  an  enemy  s  i 
wsakeit  point,  with  the  greatest  possible  numbers,  to  have  i 
marched  with  his  whole  force  upon  INIora,  or  upon  Reus, ; 
to  beat  the  troops  there  and  destroy  the  depots  ;  and  i 
then  seizing  some  strong  posts  on  the  hills  close  to  the 
besieger's    lines   to  have   entrenched   it   and    operated 
daily  and  hourly  against  their  rear.     If  Campo  Verde  i 
had  destroyed  either  of  these  depots  the  siege  must  have  | 
been  raised  ;  and  if  he  was  unable  to  beat  two  or  three  i 
thousand  infantry  at  those  places,  he  could  not   hope, 
even   with  the   assistance  of  the  garrison,  to   destroy 
sixteen  thousand  of  all  arms  in  the  entrenchments  be- . 
fore  Taragoua.     Suchet  did  not  fear  a  battle  on  the 
Francoli  river  ;   but  so  tender  was   he  of  the  depots, 
that  when  Campo  Verde  sent  an  oiBcer  to  raise  the  So- 
matenes  about  Mora,  he  called  Abbe  with  three  thou- 
sand infantry  from  Teruel,  and  that  general  who  was 
active  and  experienced  in  the  guerilla  warfare,  soon  dis- 
persed the   Spanish  levies,  and  took  their  chief  with 
n»any  other  prisoners,  after  which  he  joined  the  besieg- 
ing army. 

Suchet  required  this  reinforcement.  He  had  lost  a 
general,  two  hundred  inferior  officers,  and  above  two 
thousand  five  hundred  men  during  the  siege,  and  had 
not  more  than  twelve  thousand  infantry  fit  for  duty  ; 
but  colonel  Villamil,  a  partizan  of  Campo  Verde's, 
taking  advantage  of  Abbe's  absence,  marched  with  a 
thousand  men  to  attack  Mora,  and  being  beaten  on  the 
16th  was  succeeded  by  Eroles,  who  came  with  his 
whole  division  to  Falcet  on  the  20th,  and  captured  a 
convoy  of  loaded  mules,  driving  back  the  escort  with 
some  loss  to  Mora.  The  design  was  to  tempt  Suchet  to 
send  a  strong  detachment  in  pursuit  of  Eroles,  in  which 
Ciise  the  latter  was  by  a  rapid  march  to  rejoin  Campo 
Verde  near  Alcover,  when  the  whole  army  was  to  at- 
tack Suchet  thus  weakened.  However,  the  French  gen- 
eral would  not  turn  from  his  principal  object,  and  his 
magazines  at  Reus  were  still  so  full  that  the  loss  of  the 
convoy  did  not  seriously  affect  him. 

Such  was  the  situation  of  affairs  on  the  21st  of  June, 
when  the  order  to  assault  the  lower  town  was  given  to 
an  army,  small  in  number,  but  full  of  vigour,  and  confi- 
dent of  success  ;  while,  in  the  place  there  was  confusion, 
folly,  and  cowardice.     Contreras  indeed  acted  a  shame- 


ful part ;  for  during  captain  Codringtor/s  sbspnce, 
Sarsfield  had  concerted  with  the  navy,  that  in  .he  casa 
of  the  lower  town  being  stormed,  the  ships  should 
come  to  the  mole  and  the  garrison  would  retire  there, 
rather  than  to  the  upper  town ;  meanwhile  Campo 
Verde  recalled  him  to  the  active  army,  intending  that 
general  Velasco  should  replace  him  ;  but  at  three 
o'clock  on  the  21st,  the  breaches  being  then  open,  and 
the  assault  momentarily  expected,  Contreras  command- 
ed Sarsfield  instantly  to  embark,  falsely  averring  that 
such  was  the  peremptory  order  of  Campo  Verde.  Sars- 
field remonstrated  in  vain,  and  a  boat  from  the  Cambrian 
frigate  carried  him  and  his  personal  staff  and  his  effects 
on  board  that  vessel ;  thus  the  command  of  the  troops 
was  left  to  an  inefficient  subordinate  officer,  the  assault 
took  place  at  that  moment,  and  when  Velasco  arrived, 
he  found  only  the  dead  bodies  of  those  he  was  to  have 
commanded.  Contreras  then  assured  captain  Codring- 
ton  and  the  junta,  that  Sarsfield  had  acted  without  his 
consent,  and  had  in  fact  betrayed  his  post ! 

STORMING    OF    THE    LOWER   TOWN. 

This  calamitous  event  happened  in  the  evening  of  the 
21st.  Two  breaches  had  been  made  in  the  bastions, 
and  one  in  the  Fort  Royal  ;  they  were  not  wide,  and  a 
few  Spanish  guns  still  answered  the  French  fire  ; 
nevertheless  the  assault  was  ordered,  and  as  some  sup- 
pose, because  Suchet  had  secret  intelligence  of  Sars- 
field's  removal,  and  the  consequent  confusion  in  the 
garrison.* 

Fifteen  hundred  grenadiers,  destined  for  the  attack, 
were  assembled  under  Palombini  in  the  trenches ;  a 
second  column  was  formed  to  support  the  storming 
troops,  and  to  repel  any  sally  from  the  upper  town  ; 
and  while  the  arrangements  were  in  progress,  the 
French  guns  thundered  incessantly,  and  the  shouts  of 
the  infantry,  impatient  for  the  signal,  were  heard 
between  the  salvos,  redoubling  as  the  shattered  walla 
gave  way.  At  last  Harispe's  division  began  to  menace 
the  ramparts  on  the  side  of  Barcelona,  to  distract  the 
attention  of  the  Spaniards,  and  then  Suchet  exhorting 
the  soldiers  to  act  vigorously,  gave  the  signal  and  let 
them  loose  while  it  was  still  day.  In  an  instant  the 
breaches  were  crowned,  and  the  assailants  swarmed  on 
the  bastions,  the  ramparts,  and  the  fort  Royal  ;  the 
Spaniards,  without  a  leader,  were  thrown  into  con- 
fusion, and  falling  in  heaps  broke  and  fled  towards 
the  port,  towards  the  mole,  and  towards  the  upper 
town,  and  a  reserve  stationed  under  the  walls  of  the 
latter  was  overthrown  with  the  same  shock.  Then 
some  of  the  fugitives,  running  towards  the  mole,  were 
saved  by  the  English  launches,  others  escaped  into  the 
upper  town,  a  few  were  made  prisoners,  and  the  rest 
were  slaughtered. 

At  eiglit  o'clock  the  lower  town  was  in  the  posses- 
sion of  the  enemy.  Fifteen  hundred  bodies,  many  of 
whom  were  inhabitants,  lay  stretched  upon  the  place, 
and  the  mercantile  magazines  of  the  port  being  set  on 
fire,  the  flames  finished  what  the  sword  had  begun. 
When  the  carnage  ceased,  the  troops  were  rallied,  work- 
ing parties  were  set  to  labour  ;  and  ere  the  confusion  in 
the  upper  town  had  subsided,  the  besiegei-s  were  again 
hidden  in  their  trenches  and  burrowing  forward  to  the 
walls  of  the  upper  town. 

The  front  before  them  consisted  of  four  bastions 
with  curtains,  but  without  a  ditch.  'J'he  bastion  of 
St.  Paul  was  opposite  their  left,  that  of  St.  John 
opposite  their  centre,  that  of  Jesus  opi)Osite  their 
right  ;  but  the  bastion  of  Cervantes,  which  covered 
the  principal  landing  place  of  the  Milagro,  although 
on  the  same  front  of  defence,  was  somewhat  retired 
and  not  included  within  the  attack.     A  hollow  piece 


*  Kogniat.    Vacaui.    bucheU    Captain  Codriugton's  fa 
pers,  MtsiS. 


37  « 


NAPIER'S    PENIXSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XIII. 


} 


of  ground,  serving  as  a  trench,  had  enabled  the  French  '.  or  pretended  to  find,  some  obstacles  and  halted,  where- 
to establish  their  left  in  a  side  bastion  of  the  wall,  con- ;  upon  Canipo  Verde  instantly  relinquished  the  attack, 
necting  the  upper  with  the  lower  town  ;  and  their  right  j  and  marched  to  Veudril  before  the  Freuch  general 
was  strongly  protected  by  some  houses  lining  the  road, ;  could  reach  him. 

for  between  the  two  parts  of  the  city  there  were  four  |  'I'he  25th  he  again  promised  Contreras  to  make  a 
hundred  yards  of  open  garden-ground  interspersed  with  (  decisive  attack,  and  for  that  purpose  desired  that  three 
Angle  hous«.'s.  A  battery  was  constructed  to  play  upon  !  thousand  men  of  the  garrison  should  be  sent  to  Veu- 
tlie  landing  places  of  the  Milagro,  two  mortars  which  |  dril,  and  the  remainder  be  held  ready  to  cut  their  way 
were  on  the  hill  of  the  fort  Loretto,  concurred  in  this  j  through  the  enemy's  lines  during  the  action.  He  like- 
object,  and  the  light  troops  were  pushed  close  up  to  the  >  wise  assured  him  that  four  thousand  P^nglish  were 
wall  ,  bvt  at  daylight  the  ships  of  war  passed  the  port  j  coming  by  sea  to  aid  in  this  project,  and  it  is  probable 
delivering  their  broadsides  in  succession,  Contreras  then  I  some  great  effort  was  really  intended,  for  the  breaching 
ehowed  the  heads  of  columns  as  if  for  a  sally,  and  the  I  batteries  had  not  yet  opened  their  fire,  and  the  wall  of 
French   skirmishers   retired  ;    whereupon   the    Spanish  i  the   place  was  consequently  untouched  ;   ten  thousand 


general,  contented  with  having  thus  cleared  his  front,  re- 
entered the  place. 

•  The  men  saved  from  the  mole,  by  the  ships,  were 
DOW  relanded  in  the  upper  town,  and  the  second 
reinforcement  from  Murcia  arrived,  but  being  like  the 
first  detachment  without  arms  only  added  to  the  confu- 
sion and  dilliculties  of  the  governor.  Nevertheless  as 
the  loss  of  the  French  in  the  storming  was  about  six 
hundred,  and  that  of  the  Spaniards  not  more  than  two 
thousand,  the  besieged  had  still  nine  thousand  fight- 
ing men  ;  a  number  nearly  equal  to  the  whole  infantry 
of  Sachet's  army  ;  and  hence  Contreras,  far  fi'om  quail 


infantry  and  a  thousand  cavalry  under  Campo  Verde 
were  within  a  few  miles  of  the  French  camp  on  the 
Barcelona  side  ;  eight  thousand  men  accustomed  to  fire 
were  still  under  arms  within  the  walls  ;  and  on  the  26th 
colonel  Skerrett  appeared  in  the  roadstead,  not  with 
four  thousand,  but  with  twelve  hundred  British  soldiers, 
sent  from  Cadiz  and  from  Gibraltar  to  succour  Tara- 
gona. 

The  arrival  of  this  force,  the  increase  of  shipping  in 
the  roadstead,  and  the  promises  of  Campo  Verde, 
raised  the  spirits  of  the  garrison  from  the  depression 
occasioned   by  the   disappointment  of  the   27th  ;   and 


ing  beneath  the  blow,  would  not  even  receive  a  flag  of    they  were  still  more  elated  when   in  the  evening  colo- 
truce  by  which  the  French  general  offered  honourable   nel   Skerrett   and    his   staff,   accompanied    by   general 


conditions. 

Sachet's  position  was  becoming  more  embarrassing 
every  moment ;  he  had  now  delivered  four  assaults, 
his  force  was  diminished  nearly  one  fifth  of  its  original 
number,  and  the  men's  strength  was  spent  with  la- 
bouring on  his  prodigious  works  :  his  line  of  commu- 


Doyle,  captain  Codrington,  and  other  olficei"s  of  the 
navy,  disembarked,  and  proceeded  to  examine  the 
means  of  defence.  But  they  were  struck  with  con- 
sternation when  they  heard  that  the  British  commander, 
because  his  engineers  affirmed  that  the  wall  would 
give  way  after  a  few  salvos  from  the  breaching  batte- 


nication  with  Lerida  was  quite  intercepted  and  that  i  ries,  had  resolved  to  keep  his  troops  on  board  the 
with  Mora  interrupted,  and  he  had  lost  a  large  convoy  transports,  idle  spectators  of  the  garrison's  efforts,  to 
of  provisions  together  with  the  mules  tliat  carried  it.   defend  the  important  place  which  he  had  been  sent  to 


The  resolution  of  the  besieged  seemed  in  no  manner 
abated,  and  their  communication  with  the  sea,  although 
partially  under  the  French  fire,  was  still  free  ;  the  sea 
Itself   was  covered  with  ships   of   war,   overwhelming 


succour.* 

Contreras,  thus  disappointed  on  all  sides,  and  with- 
out dependence  on  Campo  Verde,  resolved,  if  the 
French  delayed  the  storm  until  the  29th,  to  make  way 


reinforcements  might  arrive  at  any  moment,  and  Cam-  [  by  a  sally  on  the  Barcelona  road,  and  so  join  the 
po  Verde  with  ten  thousand  men  was  daily  menacing  j  army  in  the  field  ;  meanwhile  to  stand  the  assault  if 
bis  rear.  The  Valencian  army.  Villa  Campa,  the  i  fortune  so  willed  it.  And  he  had  good  reason  for  his 
Einpecinado,  Duran  who  had  defeated  a  French  de- 1  resolution,  for  the  ground  in  front  of  the  walls  was 
tachment  near  Mirando  del  Ebro.  Mina  who  had  just  j  high  and  narrow  ;  and  although  there  was  neither 
then  taken  the  convoy  with  Massena's  baggage  at  the  ditch  nor  covered  waj',  a  thick  hedge  of  aloe  trees,  no 
Puerto  de  Arlaban,  in  fine  all  the  Partidas  of  the  j  small  obstacle  to  troops,  grew  at  the  foot  of  the  ram- 
raountains  of  Aliiaracin,  Moncayo,  and  Navarre,  were  !  part,  which  was  also  cut  off'  from  the  town,  and  from 
io  motion,  and  menacing  his  position  in  Aragon.  This  j  the  side  works,  by  an  internal  ditch  and  retrenchment, 
rendered  it  dangerous  for  him  to  call  to  his  aid  any  more  I  Behind  the  rampart  the  houses  of  the  great  street 
troops  from  the  right  of  the  Ebro,  and  yet  a  single  \  called  the  Kanibla,  were  prepared  for  defence,  furnish- 
check  might  introduce  despondency  amons-st  the  soldiers  !  ing  a  second  line  of  resistance  ;  and  although  the  cuts 
of  the  siege,  composed  as  they  were  of  different  nations. !  on  the  flanks  hindered  the  making  of  sallies  in  force, 
and  some  but  lately  come  under  his  command  ;  indeed  '  which  at  such  a  period  was  a  good  mode  of  defence, 
tlieir  labours  and  dangers  were  so  incessant  and  wearing,  i  the  reduced  state  of  the  French  army  gave  reason  to 
tl>at  it  is  no  small  proof  of  the  French  general's  talent,  |  believe  that  eight  thousand  brave  men  could  resist  it 
and  the  mc;n's  spirit,  that  the  confidence  of  both  was   effectually. 

Ktill  unshaken.  I      The  28th  a  general   plan   for  breaking  out  on  the 

On  the  2fth  the  crisis  seemed  at  hand,  intelligence  Barcelona  side,  the  operation  of  the  fleet,  and  a  corn- 
arrived  in  the  Frencli  camp,  that  the  Spanish  army  i  bined  attack  of  the  Spanish  army,  was  arranged  ;  and 
was  coming  down  the  Oaya  river  to  fight,  at  the  .same  '  Eroles  embarked  for  the  purpose  of  re-landing  at 
time  the  garrison  got  under  arms,  and  an  active  inter- 1  Taragona,  to  take  the  leading  of  the  troops  destined  to 
change  of  signals  took  place  between  the  town  and  the  sally  forth  on  the  29th.  'I'he  French  general  had 
fleet.  Sachet  immediatrly  placed  a  reserve  to  sustain  |  however  completed  his  batteries  on  the  night  of  the 
the  guards  of  his  trenches,  and  marched  with  a  part  of  |  27th,  and  in  the  morning  of  the  28th  they  ojiened  with 
his  army  to  meet  Campo  Verde.  That  general,  press- !  a  crashing  eft'ect.  One  magazine  blew  up  in  the 
e«l  by  the  remonstrances  of  Contreras  and  the  junta,  |  bastion  of  Cervantes  ;  all  the  guns  in  that  of  Sao 
had  at  last  relinciuished  his  own  |)Ian,  recalled  Eroles,    Paulo  were   dismounted  ;  the  wall   fell  away  in   huge 


and  united  his  army  at  Momblanch  on  the  22d,  and 
then  moving  by  Villardona,  had  descended  the  hills 
between  the  Oaya  and  the  Francoli  ;  he  was  now 
marching  in  two  columns  to  deliver  battle,  having 
directed  Contreras  to  make  a  sally  at  the  same  moment. 
Bat  Miranda,  who  coujuiau'  d  his  right  wing,  found, 


fragments  before  the  stroke  of  the  batteries,  and  from 
the  Olivo,  and  from  all  the  old  French  trenches,  the 
guns  and  mortars  showered  bullets  and  shells  into  the 
place.     This   fire   was    returned    from    many   Spanish 


•  Contreras'  Report. 


3811.1 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


377 


pieces,  still  in  trood  condition,  and  the  shoulders  of  the 
French  batteries  were  beaten  down  ;  yet  their  gainners, 
eager  for  th(!  last  act  of  the  siege,  stood  to  their  work 
Qiicovered.  tlie  musketry  rattled  round  the  ramparts,  the 
men  on  both  sides  crowded  to  the  frcjnt,  and  while 
opprobrious  words  and  mutual  defiance  passed  between 
them,  the  generals,  almost  within  hetiring  of  each 
other,  exhorted  the  soldiers  to  fight  with  the  vigour  that 
the  crisis  demanded. 

STORMING    OF    THE    UPl'KK    TOWN. 

At  five  o'clock  in  the  evening  the  French  fire  STidden- 
ly  ceased,  and  fifteen  huudi-ed  men  led  by  general  Habcrt 
passing  out  from  the  parallel,  went  at  fidl  speed  up 
against  the  breach  ;  twelve  hundred  under  general  Fiea- 
tier  f(jllowed  in  support,  general  Montnuuie  led  a  brig- 
atie  round  the  left,  to  the  bastion  of  Rosario,  with  a  view 
to  l)reak  the  gates  there  during  the  assault,  and  thus 
penetrating,  to  tui^  the  interior  defence  of  the  llambla.* 
JIarispe  took  post  on  the  Barcelona  road,  to  cut  otf  the 
retreat  of  the  garrison. 

The  colunms  of  attack  had  to  pass  over  an  open 
space  of  more  than  a  hundred  yards  before  they  could 
reach  the  foot  of  the  breach  ;  and  when  within  twenty 
yards  of  it,  the  hedge  of  aloes  obliged  them  to  tuin  to 
the  right  and  left,  under  a  terrible  fire  of  musketry  and 
of  grape,  which  the  Spaniards,  who  were  crowding  on 
the  breach  with  apparent  desperation,  poured  unceasing- 
ly upon  them.  'i"he  destructidu  was  great,  the  head  of 
the  French  coluinn  got  into  confusion,  gave  back,  and 
was  beginning  to  fly,  when  the  reserves  rushed  u|i.  and 
a  great  many  officers  coming  forward  in  a  body,  renew- 
ed the  attack.  A.t  that  moment  one  Bianchini,  an  Ital- 
ian soldier  who  had  obtained  leave  to  join  the  column 
iis  a  volunteer,  and  whose  white  clothes,  amidst  the 
blue  uniforms  of  the  French,  gave  him  a  supernatural 
ajipearance,  went  forth  alone  from  the  ranks,  and  glid- 
ing silently  and  sternly  up  the  breach,  notwithstand- 
ing many  wounds  reached  the  top,  and  there  fell  dead, 
'i'hen  the  multitude  bounded  forward  with  a  shout,  the 
first  line  of  the  Spaniards  tied,  and  the  ramparts  were 
darkened  by  the  following  masses  of  the  French. 

Meanwhile  Montmarie's  sappers  cut  away  the  pali- 
sades at  Rijsario,  and  his  light  troops  finding  a  ro})e 
hanging  from  tlie  wall,  mounted  by  it,  at  the  moment 
when  the  assailants  at  the  breach  broke  the  Sjianish 
reserves  with,  one  shock,  and  poured  into  the  town  like 
a  devastating  torrent.  At  the  Rambla  a  momentary 
stand  was  indeed  made,  but  the  impulse  of  victory  was 
too  strong  to  be  longer  resisted,  and  a  (h-eadful  scene 
of  slaughter  and  violence  ensued.  Citizens  and  sol- 
diers, maddened  with  fear,  rushed  out  in  crowds  by  the 
Barcelona  gate,  while  others,  throwing  themselves 
over  the  ram[)arts,  made  for  the  landing-places  within 
the  Milagro  ;  but  that  way  also  had  been  intercepted 
by  general  Rogniat  with  his  sappers,  and  then  numbers 
throwing  themselves  down  the  steep  rocks  were  dashed 
to  pieces,  while  they  who  gained  the  shore  were  still 
exposed  to  the  sword  of  the  enemy.  Those  that  went 
out  by  the  Barcelona  gate  were  met  by  Harispe's  men, 
and  some  being  killed,  the  rest,  three  thousand  in  num- 
ber, v/ere  made  prisoners.  But  within  the  town  all 
was  horror  ;  fire  had  been  set  to  many  houses,  Gonza- 
les, fighting  manfully,  was  killed,  Contreras.  wound- 
e<l  with  the  stroke  of  a  bayonet,  was  only  saved  by  a 
French  officer  ;  and  thoiigh  the  hospitals  were  I'espect- 
ed  by  the  soldiers,  in  every  other  part  their  fury  was 
unbounded.  When  the  assault  first  commenced,  the 
shi}>launches  had  C(jme  close  into  the  M  ilagro,  and  now 
saved  some  of  the  fugitives,  but  their  guns  swept  the 
open  space  beyond,  killing  firiends  and  enemies,  as,  mix- 
ed together,  they  rushed  to  the  shore  ;  and  the  French 
dragoons,  passing  through  the  flaming  streets  at  a  trot, 


'  Suchot.    Kogniat.    Vacaiii.    Codriugtou's  papers,  MSS. 


rode  upon  the  fugitives,  sabring  those  who  had  out- 
stripped the  infantry.  In  every  quarter  there  was  great 
rage  and  cruelty,  and  although  most  of  the  women  and 
children  had,  during  the  siege,  been  removed  from  Tara- 
gona  by  the  lilnglish  shipping,  and  that  the  richest  citi- 
zens had  all  gone  to  Sitjcs,  this  assault  was  memorable 
as  a  day  of  blood.  Only  seven  or  eight  hundred  misera- 
ble creatures,  principally  soldiers,  escaped  on  board  the 
vessels  ;  nine  thousand,  including  the  sick  and  wounded, 
were  made  prisoners  ;  more  than  five  thousand  persona 
were  slain,  and  a  great  part  of  the  city  was  reduced  to 
ashes. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

Sachet  marches  against  Oampo  Verde — Seizes  Villa  Nucva 
<le  Sitjes  and  makes  fifteen  hundred  prisoner.? — Cainpo 
Verde  retires  to  Igrualada — Suehet  trees  to  Bai'celona — A 
couueil  of  war  held  at  Cervera  by  Campo  Verde — It  is  re- 
solved to  abandou  the  province  as  a  hsst  country — Confu- 
sion ensues — Lacy  arrives  and  assumes  the  conimimd — 
Eroles  throws  himself  into  Montserrat — Suehet  sends  de- 
taclnnents  to  the  valley  of  Congosta  and  that  of  Vieli,  and 
opens  tlie  eonununication  with  M'Donaid  at  Figueras — 
Keturns  to  Ecus — Created  a  marsliul — Destroys  tU^  works 
of  the  lower  town  of  Turagoua — Takes  Montserrat — Ne- 
gotiates with  Cucsta  for  an  exchange  of  the  Freneli  pris- 
oners in  the  island  of  Cabrera — Stopped  by  the  interference 
of  Mr.  Wellesley — Mischief  occasioned  by  the  privateers 
— J^aey  reorganizes  the  province — Suehet  returns  to  Zara- 
goza,  and  chases  the  Partidas  from  the  frontier  of  Aragon 
— liabert  defeats  tlie  Valencians  at  Amposta — Tlie  Soma- 
tenes  harass  the  French  forts  near  Montserrat — Figuei'as 
surrenders  to  M'Donaid — Napoleon's  clemency — Observa- 
tions— Operations  in  Valencia  and  Murcia. 

SuciiET  had  lost  in  killed  and  wounded  during  the 
siege  between  four  and  five  thousand  men,  yet  scarcely 
had  the  necessary  orders  to  efface  the  trenches,  secure 
the  prisoners,  and  establish  order  in  the  ruined  city 
been  given,  than  the  Fi'cnch  genera]  was  again  in 
movement  to  disperse  Campo  Verde's  force.  In  the 
night  of  the  2nth  Frere's  division  marched  upon  Villa 
Franca,  Harispe's  upon  Villa  Nueva,  being  followed 
by  Suehet  himself  with  Abbe's  brigade  aiul  the  heavy 
cavalry.  Campo  Verde  then  abandoned  Vendril,  and 
Harispe's  column,  although  cann(Uiaded  by  the  English 
squadron,  reached  Villa  Nueva,  where  a  great  nmlti- 
tude,  military  and  others,  were  striving  to  embark  in 
the  vessels  off  the  port.  The  light  cavalry  sabred 
some  and  made  fifteen  hundred  prisoners,  including 
the  wounded  men  who  had  been  carried  there  from 
Taragona  during  the  siege;  and  Frere's  column  in  a 
like  manner  dispersed  the  Sjianish  rear-guard  at  Ven- 
dril and  Villa  Franca.  Campo  Verde  then  fled  with 
the  main  body  to  Igualada,  and  Suehet  pushed  on  with 
the  reserve  to  Barcelona,  where  he  arranged  witli  Mau- 
rice Mathieu  a  plan  to  prevent  the  Valencian  division 
from  re-embarking,  or  marching  to  aid  the  blockade  of 
Figueras. 

Distrust,  confusion,  and  discord  now  prevailed 
amongst  the  Catalans.  The  people  were  enraged 
against  Campo  Verde,  and  the  junta  sent  to  Cadiz  to 
demand  the  duke  of  Infantado  as  a  chief.  Milana, 
who  had  assembled  some  Miguelettes  and  Somatenes 
abo'it  Arens  de  Mar,  openly  proposed  himself,  and 
Sarsfield,  whose  division  was  the  only  one  in  any 
order,  was  at  variance  with  Eroles.  The  country 
people  desired  to  have  the  latter  made  captain-general, 
and  a  junta  of  general  officers  actually  appointed  him  ; 
yet  he  would  not  accept  it  while  Campo  A^erde  remain- 
ed, and  that  general  had  already  reached  Agranmnt, 
whence,  overwhelmed  with  his  misfortunes,  lio  meant 
to  fly  towards  Aragon.  He  was,  however,  |icrsuad(;d 
to  return  to  Cervera  and  call  a  council  of  war,  and 
then  it  was  proposed  to  abandon  Catalonia  as  a  lost 
country,  and  embark  the  army ;  and  thia  disgraceful 


378 


NAPIER  3     ?ENIXSULAE    WAR. 


[Book  XHI. 


resolution,  although  opposed  by  Sarsfiold,  Santa-Cruz, 
and  even  Camj^o  Verde  himself,  was  adopted  by  the 
council,  and  spread  universal  consternation.  The  junta 
remonstrated  loudly,  all  the  trooi)s  who  were  not  Cata- 
lans deserted,  making-  principally  lor  the  Segre  and 
Cinca  rivers,  in  hope  to  pass  tiirough  Aragon  into  New 
Castile,  ami  so  resrain  their  own  provinces  ;  every  place 
was  filled  with  grief  and  despair. 

In  tills  conjuncture  captain  Codrington  refused  to  em- 
bark any  Catalans,  but  he  liad  promised  to  take  back 
the  Valencians,  and  although  the  conditions  of  his  agree- 
ment had  been  grossly  violated  by  Campo  Verde  and 
Miranda,  he  performed'  his  contract ;  yet  even  this  was 
not  arranged  without  a  contest  between  him  and  Uoyle, 
on  the  one  side,  and  Miranda  and  Caro  on  the  other. 
Meanwhile  colonel  Green,  instead  of  remaining  at  the 
Spanish  head-quarters,  returned  to  Peniscola  with  all 
the  nn)ney  and  arms  under  his  control  ;  and  the  captain 
of  the  Prueba  frigate,  having  under  his  command  several 
Spanish  vessels  of  war,  loaded  with  wounded  men,  the 
archives  of  the  municipality,  ammunition,  stores,  and 
money,  all  belonging  to  Catalonia,  set  sail  for  Majorca 
under  such  suspicious  circumstances  that  captain  Cod- 
rington thought  it  necessary  to  send  a  ship  to  fetch  him 
back  by  force. 

In  the  midst  of  these  afHicting  scenes  Suchet  brought 
up  his  troops  to  Barcelona,  and  Maurice  Mathieu,  with 
a  part  of  his  garrison,  marching  upon  Mataro,  dispensed 
a  small  body  of  men  that  Eroles  had  collected  there ; 
but  the  Valencian  infantry,  to  the  number  of  two  thou- 
sand four  hundred,  escaped  to  Arens  de  Mar,  and  being 
received  on  board  the  English  vessels,  were  sent  back  to 
their  own  country.  The  cavalry,  unwilling  to  part  with 
their  horses,  would  not  embark,  and  menaced  their 
treneral,  Caro,  who  fled  from  their  fury  ;  nevertheless, 
Eroles  rallied  them,  and  having  gathered  some  stores 
and  money  from  the  smaller  depots,  marched  inland. 
Campo  Verde  then  embarked  privately  in  the  Diana 
to  avoid  the  vengeance  of  the  people,  and  general 
Lacy,  who  had  arrived  from  Cadiz,  took  the  command  ; 
yet  he  would  have  been  disregarded,  if  Eroles  had 
not  set  the  example  of  obedience.  Suchet,  however, 
moved  against  him,  and  first  scouring  the  valley  of 
the  Congosta  and  that  of  Vich,  spread  his  columns 
in  all  directions,  and  opened  a  connnunication  with 
Macdonald  at  Figueras.  Lacy,  thus  pressed,  collected 
the  cavalry  and  a  few  scattered  Catalonian  battalions 
remaining  about  Solsona,  Cardona,  Seu  d'Urgel,  and 
tdok  refuge  in  the  hills,  while  ]<]roIes  threw  himself  into 
Montserrat,  where  large  magazines  had  been  previously 
formed. 

Suchet,  unable  to  find  subsistence  in  the  valleys,  re- 
solved to  attack  this  cele!)rated  ])lace,  and  for  this  pur- 
pose leaving  Frere  and  Harispe  at  Vich  and  Moya, 
with  orders  to  move  ut  a  given  time  upon  Montserrat, 
returned  himself  with  the  reserve  to  Reus.  Here  he 
received  despatches  from  Napoleon,  who  had  created 
him  a  marshal,  and  had  sent  him  orders  to  take  Mont- 
serrat, to  destroy  the  wcn-ks  of  'J\iragona,  with  the 
exception  of  a  citadel,  and  finally  to  march  against 
Valencia,  lie  therenire  preserved  the  upper  town  of 
Taragona,  ruined  the  rest  of  the  works,  carried  the 
artillery  to  Tortoza,  and  niarehe<l  against  Montserrat  on 
the  2'2d  of  July  by  the  way  of  Momblanch  and  San 
Coloma  to  Igualada.  At  the  same  time  Jrarisi)e  and 
Frere  moved  by  Manresa,  and  Maurice  Mathieu  entered 
Esparaguera  with  a  part  of  the  garrison  of  Barcelona. 

TAKING    OF    MONTSERRAT. 

This  strong-hold  was  occupied  by  fourteen  or  fifteen 
hundred  Miguelettes  and  Somatenes,  inade(|uate  as 
it  proved  to  defend  it  against  a  great  l)ody  of  men  such 
as  Suchet  was  bringing  up.  JJut  Eroles  was  daily 
raising  recruits  and  adding  works  to  the  natural 
strength,  and  it  would  soon  have   been  impregnable; 


for  on  all  sides  the  approaches  were  through  the  midst 
of  steeps  and  precipices,  and  high  upon  a  natural  plat- 
form, opening  to  the  east,  and  overlooking  the  I^lobre- 
gat.  stood  the  convent  of  "  Nucstrn  Scnorn  de  Montser' 
rat,"  a  great  edifice,  and  once  full  of  riches,  but  the 
wary  monks  had  removed  their  valuables  to  Minorca 
early  in  the  Avar.  It  was  nov/  well  stored  and  armed, 
and  above  its  huge  peaks  of  stone  shot  up  in  the  clouds 
so  rude,  so  naked,  so  desolate,  that,  to  use  Suchet's 
expressive  simile,  "  It  was  like  the  skeleton  of  a  mouu- 
tain." 

There  were  three  ways  of  ascending  to  this  convent ; 
one  from  Igualada  which  winded  up  on  the  north,  from 
Casa  Mansana,  between  a  perpendicular  rock  and  a 
precipice ;  this  road  which  was  the  only  one  supposed 
practicable  for  an  attack,  was  defended  by  two  success- 
ive batteries,  and  by  a  retrenchment  immediately  in 
front  of  the  convent  itself.  'J'he  other  two  ways  were, 
a  foot-path  on  the  south  leading  <p  Colbato,  and  a 
narrow  road  crossing  the  Llobregat  and  running  by 
Monistrol  on  the  east,  but  both  so  crossed  and  barred 
by  precipices  as  to  be  nearly  inaccessible  to  troops. 

Suchet  disposed  one  brigade  at  Colbato  to  menace 
that  front,  and  to  intercept  the  retreat  of  the  Span- 
iards ;  he  then  occupied  the  roads  of  Igualada  and 
Monistrol  with  Harispe's  and  Frere's  divisions,  and 
directed  Abbe's  brigade  to  attack  from  the  convent 
by  the  northern  line.  The  24th  Abbe  drove  the  Span- 
iards from  Casa  Mansana,  and  the  25th  advanced  up  the 
mountain,  flanked  by  some  light  troops,  and  supported 
by  Suchet  in  person  with  the  Barcelona  troops,  but 
exposed  to  the  lire  of  the  Somatenes,  who  had  gathered 
round  the  peaks  above.  In  a  short  time  the  first 
Spanish  battery  opened  upon  the  head  of  the  column 
as  it  turned  an  angle,  but  more  light  troops  being  sent 
out,  they  climbed  the  rough  rocks,  and  getting  above 
the  battery  shot  down  upon  the  gunners,  while  the 
leading  companies  of  the  column  rushed  forward,  in 
front,  and  l*efore  a  second  discharge  could  be  made, 
reached  the  foot  of  the  battery  beneath  the  line  of  fire. 
'I'he  Spaniards  then  threw  down  large  stones  upon  the 
French  until  the  fire  of  the  light  troops  above  became 
so  galling  that  the  work  was  abandoned,  the  French 
however  followed  close,  and  the  men  above  continued 
clambering  along  with  that  energy  which  the  near 
prospect  of  success  inspires;  thus  the  Spaniards,  unable 
to  rally  in  time,  wci'e  overtaken  and  bayoneted  in  the 
second  battery,  and  the  road  was  opened. 

Abbe  now  re-formed  his  troops  and  marched  on 
to  assail  the  entrenchments  of  the  convent,  but  as  he 
advanced  a  sharp  nnisketry  was  heard  on  the  opposite 
quarter,  and  suddenly  the  Spanish  garrison  came  flying 
out  of  the  building  pursued  by  French  soldiers,  who 
M'ere  supposed  to  be  the  brigade  from  Colbato ;  they 
however  proved  to  be  the  light  troops  first  sent  out, 
to  keep  off'  the  Scjmatenes  from  the  light  flank  ;  for 
when  the  column  advanced  up  the  mountain,  these 
men,  about  three  hundred  in  number,  had  wandered  too 
far  to  the  right,  and  insensibly  gaining  ground  up  hill, 
had  seized  one  or  two  of  the  hermitages  Mith  which 
the  peaks  are  furnished  ;  then  growing  more  daring, 
they  pressed  on  unopprised,  until  they  gained  the 
rock  immediately  overhanging  the  convent  itself,  and 
perceiving  their  advantage,  with  that  intelligence 
which  belongs  only  to  veterans,  immediately  attacked 
the  S]ianish  reserves.  Their  connnandiiig  position, 
the  steep  rocks,  and  the  narrow  staircases,  conqjensated 
for  their  inferiority  of  numbers,  and  in  a  little  time 
they  gained  one  of  the  doors,  entered,  and  fought  the 
defenders  amongst  the  cloisters  and  galleries,  with 
various  turns  of  fortune,  until  the  fugitives  from  the 
batteries,  followed  by  Abbe,  arriveci,  and  then  the 
whole  garrison  gave  way  and  fied  down  the  eastern 
precipices  to  the  IJobregat,  where  from  their  knowl- 
edge of  the  country  they  ea.sih  avoided  Harispe's  men 


1811. 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAk    WAP. 


379 


The  lo?s  of  tliis  place,  which  by  Erolcs  and  others 
was  attributed  to  colonel  Green's  havinjt^  curried  off  the 
money  destined  for  stren2:thening  it,  was  deeply  felt 
from  it^  military  importance,  and  from  the  supersti- 
tious veneration  in  which  it  was  held  :  several  towns 
then  offered  their  submission,  many  villages  gave  up 
their  arms,  and  a  general  fear  of  .Suchet's  prowess 
began  to  spread  all  over  Sitain  ;  l)ut  the  Catalans,  a 
fierce  and  e  mstant  race,  were  not  yet  conquered.  The 
anarchy  attendant  upon  the  fall  of  Taragona  and  the 
after  movements  of  Suchet  liad  indeed  been  great  ; 
and  as  we  have  seen,  most  of  the  persons  who  might 
Lave  aided  to  restore  order,  acted  so  as  to  increase  the 
general  confusion,  and  their  bad  example  w-as  follow- 
ed by  the  authorities  in  other  provinces  who  were 
most  innnediately  connected  with  Catalonia :  thus 
Cuesta,  at  this  time  governor  of  the  Balearic  isles, 
Basseeour  who  was  at  Cuenea,  and  Palacios,  who 
bad  just  been  made  captain-general  of  Valencia,  did 
in  no  manner  comport  themselves  as  the  occasion 
required.  Cuesta  who  had  neglected  to  send  from 
Minorca  the  guns  wanted  in  Catalonia,  now  entered 
into  a  negotiation  to  exchange  the  prisoners  at  Cabre- 
ra against  those  of  'J'aragona,  a  praise-worthy  thing,  if, 
as  Suchet  asserts,  it  arose  from  humanity  ;  and  not 
an  ill-judged  measure  in  itself,  because  the  Catalonian 
soldiers  to  be  exchanged  were  the  best  in  Spain,  and 
the  French  prisoners  were  ruined  in  constitution  by 
their  hard  captivity.  But  at  this  period  of  distress  it 
was  impolitic,  and  viewed  with  suspicion  by  the 
Cataloniaus,  as  tending  to  increase  the  French  force. 
At  the  desire  of  xMr.  Wellesley  this  exchange  was, 
however,  peremptorily  forbidden  by  the  regency,  and 
Cuesta  relused  to  receive  any  more  prisoners  at  Cabre- 
ra, which  wiiile  those  already  there  were  so  tormented, 
was,  from  whatever  motive  arising,  a  meritorious  act, 
and  the  last  important  one  of  his  life,  for  he  soon  after 
died.  The  prisonei-s  remained,  therefore,  a  disgrace  to 
Spain  and  to  England  ;  for  if  lier  envoy  interfered  to 
prevent  their  release,  she  was  bound  to  insist,  that  thou- 
sands of  men,  wdiose  prolonged  caj^tivity  was  the  result 
of  her  interference,  should  not  be  exposed  upon  a  barren 
rock,  naked  as  they  were  born,  and  fighting  for  each 
other's  miserable  rations  to  prolong  an  existence  incon- 
ceivably wretched. 

'J'his  untoward  state  of  affairs  in  Catalonia  was 
aggravated  by  the  English.  Spanish,  and  French 
privateers,  who  taking  advantage  of  the  times,  plun- 
dered the  people  along  the  coast  in  concert ;  and  they 
were  all  engaged  in  the  smuggling  of  tobacco,  tiie 
monopoly  of  which  here  as  in  other  parts  of  Spain 
formed  the  principal  resource  of  the  revenue.  Yet 
there  were  many  considerable  resources  left  to  the 
Catalans.  The  chief  towns  had  fallen,  but  the  moun- 
tainous districts  were  not  sul>dued  and  scarcely  crossed 
by  the  French  lines  of  invasion.  The  Sumatenes  were 
numerous,  more  experienced,  and  still  ready  to  come 
forward,  under  a  good  general,  if  arms  were  provided 
for  tliem,  and  the  English  Sfpia<h-on  was  always  at 
hand  to  aid  them  ;  Admiral  Keats  brought  three  thou- 
sand nmskets  from  Cibraltar,  Sir  E.  Pellew,  who  had 
succeeded  to  the  command  of  the  Mediterranean  fleet, 
was  anxious  to  succour  the  province  to  the  full  extent 
of  his  means,  and  Minorca  was  a  great  depot  of  guns, 
stores,  and  even  men.  Lacy,  Eroles,  Rovira,  and  others, 
therefore,  raised  fresh  levies  ;  and  while  the  blockade 
of  Figueras  continued  to  keep  all  Macdunalds  army 
employed,  the  Spaniards  seized  the  opportunity  to  ope- 
rate partially  on  the  side  of  Besalu  and  Bispal,  and  even 
in  the  French *Cerdana,  which  being  unprotected,  was 
invad»il  by  Lacy. 

Suchet,  whose  posts  now  extended  from  Lerida  to 
Monlserrat  on  one  side,  and  on  the  other  t'vom  Taragona 
to  Mr(iuinenza,  foresaw  that  a  new  and  trouhkisome 
Catalouiau  war  was  preparing  ;  but  ho  was  obliged  lo 


return  to  Zaragor^a,  partly  to  prepare  for  tlu  invasion 
of  Valencia,  partly  to  restore  tranquillity  in  Aragon, 
which  had  been  disturbed  by  the  passag(!  of  the  sece- 
ders  fi'om  Campo  A^erde's  army.  The  Valencian  cav- 
alry als(\  when  Eroles  threw  himself  into  Montserrat, 
had  under  the  conduct  of  general  Gasca  endeavoured 
to  push  through  Aragon  towards  Navarre  ;  and  although 
they  were  intercei)ted  by  general  Reille,  and  followed 
closely  by  Chlopiski,  they  finally  reached  Valencia 
without  much  loss,  and  the  rest  of  the  fugitives  gained 
the  Moneayo  mountains  and  afterwards  joined  Mina. 
That  chief  was  then  in  a  very  low  state;  he  had  been 
defeated  on  the  14th  at  Sanguessa,  by  Chlopiski,  and 
Reiile,  who  using  the  reinforcements  then  pouring  into 
Spain,  had  pursued  and  defeated  him  again  at  Estella 
on  the  23d  of  July,  at  Sorlada  on  the  24th,  and  at 
Val  de  Baygory  on  the  25th  ;  yet  he  finally  escaped 
to  Motrico  en  the  Biscay  coast,  where  he  received 
fresh  arms  and  stores  from  the  l]nglish  vessels  ;  but 
he  was  again  defeated  by  Caffarelli,  and  finally  driven 
for  refuge  to  the  district  of  Leibana ;  here  the  sol- 
diers flying  from  'J'aragona  and  Figueras  joined  him, 
and  he  soon  reappeared  more  fierce  and  po^^■erful  than 
before. 

Meanwhile  Villa  Campa,  whose  division  had  been 
re-equipped  from  the  supplies  given  by  captain  Cod- 
rington.  concerted  his  operations  with  the  partida 
chiefs  Duran  and  Campillo  ;*  and  their  combined 
forces  being  eight  thousand  strong,  having  advanced 
from  different  quarters  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Ebro, 
invested  Calatayud,  and  sought  to  carry  off  grain, 
which  was  now  very  scarce.  This  delayed  the  inva- 
sion of  Valencia,  for  Suchet  would  not  undertake  it 
until  he  had  again  secured  the  frontier  of  Aragon,  and 
many  of  his  battalions  were  then  escorting  the  prison- 
ers to  France.  But  when  they  returned,  be  directed 
numerous  columns  against  the  partidas,  and  a(  the  same 
time  troops  belonging  to  the  army  of  the  centre  came 
down  by  the  way  of  Medina  Celi  ;  whereupon  the 
Spaniards  retired  to  their  fastnesses  in  the  mountains 
of  Soria  on  one  side,  and  in  those  of  Albaracin  on  the 
other. 

F'our  thousand  of  the  Valencian  army  had  mean- 
while marched  against  Rapita  and  Amposta,  for  the 
former  post  was  re-established  after  the  fall  of  Tarago- 
na, but  although  llabert,  marching  out  of  Tortoza  with 
seven  or  eight  hundred  men,  defeated  them  with  a  con- 
siderable loss,  the  embarrassments  of  the  third  corps 
were  not  removed  ;  for  while  these  successes  were 
obtained  on  the  right  of  the  p]bro  the  Catalans  began 
to  harass  the  posts  between  Lerida  and  Montserrat. 
On  the  9th  of  August  the  Somatenes  fell  on  some 
Italians  placed  in  Monistrol,  and  were  with  difficulty 
repulsed  ;  and  a  few  days  after,  a  convoy  coming  from 
Igualada  to  Montserrat,  was  attacked  by  fifteen  hundred 
insurgents,  and  was  unable  to  proceed  until  Palombini 
arrived  with  a  battalion  and  dislodged  the  Catalans,  but 
he  lost  more  than  a  hundred  of  his  own  men  in  the 
action.  Suchet  finding  from  these  events  that  he 
could  not  safely  withdraw  his  main  body  from  Catalo- 
nia until  the  fail  of  Figueras  should  let  loose  the  army 
of  the  upper  province,  sent  fresh  troops  to  Montserrat, 
and  ordered  Palombini  to  move  with  his  garrison  to 
aid  Mai-donald  in  the  blockade ;  that  place  had,  how- 
ever, surrendered  before  Palombini  had  parsed  Barce- 
lona. 

General  Martinez,  after  making  many  vain  efforts 
to  break  the  line  of  blockade,  and  having  used  every 
edible  substance,  prepared  on  the  ICth  of  August,  to 
make  a  final  ett'ort,  in  concert  with  liovira  who  came 
I  down  to  Llers.  An  officer  deserting  from  the  garrison 
betrayed  the  prtject ;  and  Rovira  was  beaten  in  the 
I  morning   before   the   garrison   sallied,  nevertheless,  in 


Mr.  Stuart's  Papers,  MSS. 


380 


XAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR, 


[Book  XIII. 


the  night  Martinez  cmlcavonrcd  to  cut  his  way  tlirough 
the  lines  on  the  side  of  Rosas,  but  was  driven  back 
with  a  loss  of  four  hundred  men.  'I'hree  days  after, 
the  place  wiis  jiiven  uj)  and  three  thousand  famished 
Dion  were  ni.icje  prisoners.  Thus  ended  the  fourth 
great  eff.irt  of  the  Catalnnians.  The  success  of  the 
French  was  not  without  alloy,  more  than  a  fourth  part 
of  the  bloekadin:^  tr  lops  had  died  of  a  pestilent  dis- 
temper ;  Macdonald  himself  was  too  ill  to  continue  in 
the  command,  and  the  remainder  of  his  army  was  so 
weakened,  that  no  further  active  operations  could  be 
inidertaken  ;  Suchet  was  still  oc;:upied  in  Aragon,  and 
Lacy  thus  (il)tained  time  and  means  to  reorganize  troops 
for  a  fifth  effort. 

'I'he  person-5  who  had  bsitraved  the  place  to  Rovira 
were  shot  by  >[acdonakl,  and  the  commandant  whose 
negligence  had  occasionciJ  tiiis  misfortune  was  con- 
demned to  death ;  but  Xapoleon,  who  has  been  so 
foully  misivpresented  as  a  sanguinary  tyrant.  Napo- 
leon, who  had  comnnited  the  sentence  of  Dupont,  now 
pardoned  general  Guillot ;  a  clemency  in  both  cases 
remarkable,  seeing  that  the  loss  of  an  army  by  one,  and 
of  a  great  fortress  by  the  other,  not  only  tended  directly 
and  powerfully  to  the  destruction  of  the  emperor's 
projects,  but  were  in  themselves  great  crimes ;  and 
it  is  to  be  doubted  if  any  other  sovereign  in  Europe 
would  have  displayed  sucli  a  merciful  greatness  of 
mind. 

OBSERVATIONS. 

1.  The  emperor  was  discontented  with  Macdonald's 
operations,  and  that  general  seems  to  have  mistaken 
both  the  nature  of  m>iuiitain  warfare  in  general,  and 
that  of  Catalduia  in  particular.  The  first  requires  a 
persevering  activity  in  seizing  such  commanding 
posts  on  the  flanks  or  rear  of  an  adversary  as  will 
oblige  him  to  fight  on  disadvantageous  terms  ;  and  as 
the  success  greatly  depends  upon  the  rapidity  and 
vigour  of  the  troops,  their  spirits  should  be  excited  by 
continual  enterprise,  and  nourished  by  commendation 
and  rewards.  Now  MacdonakI,  if  we  may  believe 
Vacani,  an  eye-witness,  did  neither  a'ain  the  confidence 
of  his  soldiers,  nor  cherish  tlieir  ardour;  and  while  he 
exacted  a  more  ri;i-id  discipline  than  the  composition 
of  his  troo{)s  and  the  nature  of  the  war  would  bear,  he 
let  pass  many  important  opportunities  of  crushing  his 
enemies  in  the  field.  His  intent  was  to  reduce  the 
ferocious  and  insubordinate  disposition  of  his  men, 
but  the  peculiar  state  of  feeling  with  respect  to  the 
war  on  both  sides,  did  not  permit  this,  and  hence 
his  marches  aj)peared  rather  as  processions  and  cere- 
monies than  warlike  oi)erations.  lie  won  no  town, 
struck  no  important  blow  in  the  field,  gave  no  turn  to 
the  public  feeling,  and  lost  a  most  important  fortress, 
which,  with  infinite  pains  and  trouble,  he  cuuld  scarcely 
regain. 

The  plans  of  all  the  French  generals  had  been  differ- 
ent. St.  {'yr  used  to  remain  (|uiet.  until  the  Spaniards 
gathered  in  such  numbers  that,  he  could  criisli  them  in 
general  battles ;  but  then  he  lost  all  the  fruit  of  his 
success  by  his  inactivity  afterwards.  Autrereau  nei- 
th(!r  fought  battles  nor  made  excursions  with  skill,  nor 
fulfilled  the  political  hopes  which  he  had  excited. 
Macdonald  was  in  constant  movement,  but  he  avoided 
battles;  although  in  every  previous  important  at- 
tack the  Catalans  had  l)een  Ix'aten.  whether  in  strong 
or  in  weak  positions.  Suchet  alone  combined  skill, 
activity,  and  re^iulution,  and  the  success  which  dis- 
tinguished !iis  operations  is  the  best  comment  upon 
the  proceedings  of  the  others.  It  is  in  vain  to  allege 
that  this  last  marshal  was  in  a  better  condition  lor 
offensive  operations,  and  that  the  emperor  rerjuired  of 
the  seventh  corps  exertions  which  the  extreme  want  of 
provisions  prevented  it  from  making.  Napoleon  might 
have   been  deceived  as  to  the  resources  at  first,  and 


have  thus  put  it  upon  enterprises  beyond  its  means  ; 
but  after  two  years'  experience,  after  receiving  the 
reports  of  all  the  generals  employed  there,  and  having 
tiie  most  exact  information  of  all  occurrences,  it  is 
impossible  to  imagine  that  so  consummate  a  captain 
would  have  urged  Macdonald  to  undertake  impractica- 
ble operations ;  and  the  latter  gave  no  convincing 
proof  that  his  own  views  were  sound.  Notwithstand- 
ing the  continual  complaints  of  8t.  Cyr,  and  other 
French  writers^  who  have  endeavoured  to  show  that 
Napoleon  was  the  only  man  who  did  not  understand 
the  nature  of  the  war  in  !Sj)ain,  and  that  the  French 
armies  were  continually  overmatched,  it  is  certain  that, 
after  Baylen,  the  latter  nevt^r  lost  a  great  battle  except 
to  the  English  ;  that  they  took  every  town  they  besieged, 
and  never  sullered  any  reverse  from  the  Spaniards 
which  cannot  lie  distinctly  traced  to  the  executive 
officers.  It  would  be  silly  to  doubt  the  general  merit 
of  a  man  who  in  so  many  wars,  and  for  many  years, 
has  maintained  the  noblest  reputation,  midst  innumer- 
able dangers,  and  many  great  political  changes  in  his 
own  country,  but  Macdonald's  military  talents  do  not 
seem  to  have  been  calculated  for  the  irregular  warfare 
of  Catalonia. 

2.  The  surprise  of  Figueras  has  been  designated  as 
a  misfortune  to  the  Spaniards,  because  it  shut  up  a 
large  body  of  their  best  Miguelettes,  who  fell  with  the 
place  ;  and  because  it  drew  oti"  Campo  Verde  from  'J\ira- 
gona  at  a  critical  period.  Let  us,  however,  contrast  the 
advantages,  and,  apart  from  the  vigour  and  enterprise 
displayed  in  the  execution,  no  mean  help  to  the  cause 
at  the  time,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  taking  of  that 
fortress  was  a  great  gain  to  the  Catalans  ;  for,  first,  it 
carried  away  MacdoMald  from  Barcelona,  and  thus  the 
fall  of  Montserrat  was  deferred,  and  great  danger  of 
failure  incurred  by  Suchet  at  Taragona  ;  a  failure 
infallible,  if  his  adversaries  had  behaved  with  either 
skill  or  courage.  Secondly,  it  employed  all  the  French 
army  of  Upper  Catalonia,  the  national  guards  of  the 
frontier,  and  even  troops  from  Toulon,  in  a  blockade, 
during  which  the  sword  and  sickness  destroyed  more 
than  four  thousand  men,  and  the  remainder  were  so 
weakened  as  to  be  incapable  of  field  service  for  a  long 
time ;  meanwhile  Lacy  reorganized  fresh  forces,  and 
revived  tlie  war,  which  he  could  never  have  done  if 
the  seventh  corps  had  been  disposable.  Thirdly, 
seeing  that  Campo  Verde  was  incapable  of  handling 
large  masses,  it  is  doubtful  if  he  could  have  resisted 
or  retarded  for  any  time  the  investment  of  Taragona  ; 
but  it  is  certain  that  the  blockade  of  Figueras  gave  an 
opportunity  to  Catalonia,  to  recover  the  loss  of  Tara- 
gona;  and  it  obliged  Sucliet,  instead  of  Macdonald, 
to  take  Montserrat,  which  disseminated  the  former 
force,  and  retarded  the  invusion  of  Valencia.  Where- 
fore Rovira's  daring,  in  the  surprise,  and  Martinez'  re.'JO- 
lution  in  the  maintaining  of  Figuei'as,  were  as  useful  as 
they  were  glorious. 

3.  The  usual  negligence,  and  slowness  of  the 
Spaniards,  was  aj)parent  during  this  campaign  ;  al- 
though resolution,  perseverance,  and  talent  were  evin- 
ced by  Suchet  m  all  his  operations,  the  success  was  in 
a  great  measure  due  to  the  faults  of  his  opponents,  and 
amongst  those  faults  colonel  Skerrett's  conduct  was 
prominent.  It  is  true  that  captain  Codrington  and 
others  agreed  in  the  resolution  not  to  land  ;  that  there 
was  a  heavy  surf,  and  that  the  engineers  predicted  on 
the  27th  that  the  wall  would  soon  be  beaten  down  ; 
but  the  (|uestion  should  have  been  viewed  in  another 
light  by  colonel  Skerrett.  Taragona  was  the  bulwark 
of  the  principality,  the  stay  and  hope  of  the  war.  It 
was  the  city  of  Sjiain  wliose  importance  was  next  to 
Cadiz,  and  before  its  walls  the  security  or  the  ruin  of 
Valencia  as  well  as  of  t'atalonia  was  to  be  found.  Of 
the  French  scarcx'ly  fourt<;en  thousand  infantry  were 
under    arms,    and    those    were    exhausted    with    toiL 


1811.1 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


381 


The  upper  town,  which  was  the  body  of  the  place, 
was  still  nnbreached  :  it  was  only  attacked  upon  one 
n-diTOw  front,  and  behind  it  the  Ramhia  offered  a 
second  and  a  more  powerful  defence.  There  were,  to 
use  the  governor's  expression,  within  the  walls  "  eight 
thousand  of  tJie  moxt  warlike  troops  in  Spain,"  and  there 
was  a  succouring  army  without,  equal  in  number  to  the 
whole  infantry  of  the  besiegers.  Under  these  circum- 
stances the  stoutest  assailants  might  have  been  repulsed, 
and  a  severe  repulse  would  have  been  fatal  to  the  French 
operations. 

Captain  Codrington  asserts  that  in  the  skirmishes  be- 
yond the  walls,  the  valour  of  the  garrison  was  e-ainent ; 
and  he  saw  a  poor  ragged  fellow  endeavouring,  such 
was  his  humanity  and  greatness  of  mind,  to  stifle  the 
burning  fuze  of  a  shell  with  sand,  that  some  women  and 
cliildren  might  have  time  to  escape.  Feeling  and  cour- 
age, the  springs  of  moral  force,  were  therefore  not 
wanting,  but  the  virtue  of  the  people  was  diminished, 
and  the  sjiirit  of  the  soldiery  overlaid,  by  the  bad  con- 
duct of  their  leaders.  The  rich  citizens  fled  early  to 
A'illa  Nueva,  and  they  were  followed  by  many  superior 
officers  of  regiments.  Contreras,  jealous  of  SarsReld, 
had  obliged  him,  as  we  have  seen,  to  quit  his  post  at  a 
critical  moment,  and  then  represented  it  to  the  garrison 
as  a  desertion ;  the  Valencians  were  carried  off  after 
being  one  day  in  the  ])lace,  and  the  Murcians  came 
without  arms;  and  all  this  confusion  and  mischief  were 
so  palpaljle  that  the  poor  Spanish  soldiers  could  antici- 
pate nothing  but  failure  if  left  to  themselves,  and  it  was 
precisely  for  this  reason  Ihat  the  British  should  have 
been  landed  to  restore  confidence.  And  is  there  nothing 
to  be  allowed  for  the  impetuous  fury  of  an  English 
column  breaking  out  of  the  place  at  the  moment  of  at- 
tack ?  Let  it  be  remembered,  also,  that  in  consequence 
of  the  arrival  of  a  seventy-four,  convoying  the  trans- 
ports, such  was  the  number  of  ships  of  war,  that  a 
thousand  seamen  and  marines  might  liave  been  added 
to  the  troops  ;  and  who  can  believe  that  three  or  four 
thousand  French  and  Italians,  the  utmost  that  could  be 
brought  to  bear  in  mass  on  one  point,  and  that  not  an 
easy  point,  for  the  breach  was  narrow  and  scarcely 
})racticable,  would  have  carried  the  place  against  eisrht 
thousand  Spaniards  and  two  thousand  British?  But 
tlien  the  surf  and  the  enemy's  shot  at  the  landing  place, 
and  the  opinion  of  general  Doyle  and  of  captain  Cod- 
rington and  of  the  engineers  !  'J'he  enemy's  shot  might 
have  inflicted  loss,  but  could  not,  especially  at  night. 
have  stopped  the  d!.=;embarkat!on  ;  and  the  opinion  of 
the  engineers,  was  a  just  report  of  the  stale  of  the  walls, 
but  in  no  manner  touched  the  mora!  considerations. 

XVhen  the  Roman  Pom|)ey  was  adjured  liy  his  friends 
Tiot  to  put  to  sea  during  a  violent  storm,  he  replied,  "  it 
T.s"  ner.ef^sary  to  mil — it  is  not  ne''essarii  to  live."  It  was 
also  necessary  to  save  'I'aragona !  Was  no  risk  to  be 
incurred  for  so  great  an  object?  Was  an  uncertain 
danger  to  be  weighed  against  such  a  loss  to  Spain? 
Was  the  British  intrepidity  to  be  set  at  nought  ?  Were 
British  soldiers  to  be  ([uiet  spectators,  while  Spaniards 
stood  up  in  a  fight  too  dangerous  for  them  to  meddle 
with?  Is  that  false  but  connnon  doctrine,  so  degrading 
to  soldiers,  that  brick-and-niortar  sentiment,  that  the 
courage  of  the  garrison  is  not  to  be  taken  into  account. 
to  be  implicitly  followed  ?  What  if  the  Spaniards  had 
been  successful  ?  The  result  was  most  painful !  Tara- 
gona  strongly  fortified,  having  at  different  periods  above 
fifteen  thousand  men  tlu^ns'n  into  it,  with  an  open  har- 
bour and  free  comnmnication  by  sea,  was  taken  by  less 
than  twenty  thousand  French  and  Italian  infantry,  in 
the  face  of  a  succouring  army,  a  British  brigade,  and  a 
British  fleet ! 

4.  The  cruelty  of  the  French  general  and  the  feroci- 
ty of  his  soldiers,  have  been  dwelt  upon  by  several 
writers,  but  Suchct  has  vindicated  his  own  conduct, 
and  it  is  therefore  u;in:;(re.-is;iry  here  to  enter  into  a  close 


investigation  of  facts  which  have  been  di.storted,  or  of 
reasoning  which  has  been  misapplied.  That  every  bar- 
barity, commonly  attendant  upon  the  storming  of  towns 
was  practised  may  be  supposed  ;  there  is  in  the  military 
institutions  of  Europe  nothing  calculated  to  arrest  such 
atrocities.  Soldiers  of  every  nation  look  upon  the  de- 
vastation of  a  town  taken  by  assault  as  their  right,  and 
it  would  be  unjust  to  hold  Suchet  responsible  for  the  vio- 
lence of  an  army  composed  of  men  from  different  coun- 
tries, exasperated  by  the  obstinacy  of  the  defence,  and 
by  a  cruel  warfare  ;  in  Spanish  towns  also  the  people 
generally  formed  a  part  of  the  garrison. 

OPP^RATIONS    IN    VALENCIA    AND    MURCIA. 

The  transactions  in  the  first  of  these  provinces  during 
the  siege  of  Taragona  have  been  already  sufficiently  no- 
ticed ;  and  those  in  Murcia  were  of  little  interest,  for 
the  defeat  of  Blake  at  Cullar  in  1810,  and  the  fever 
which  raged  at  Carthagena,  together  with  the  frequent 
change  of  commanders,  and  the  neglect  of  the  govern- 
ment had  completely  i-uined  the  Murcian  army,  llie 
number  of  men  was  indeed  considerable,  and  the  fourth 
French  corps,  weakened  by  drafts  for  the  expedition  to 
Estremadura,  and  menaced  by  the  Barossa  expedition, 
could  not  opjjose  more  than  five  or  six  thousand  men  ; 
yet  the  province  had  never  been  touched  by  an  enemy, 
and  the  circumstances  were  all  favourable  for  the  organ- 
ization and  frequent  trial  of  new  troops. 

In  February  L^ll  colonel  Roche,  the  military  agent, 
described  the  whole  army  as  "ready  to  disperse  on  the 
first  appearance  of  an  enemy,"  and  in  the  following 
June  he  says  that  "  after  being  left  to  themselves  for 
three  years,  the  Murcian  troops  were  absolutely  in  a 
worse  state  than  they  were  at  the  commencement  of 
the  revolution  ;  that  general  Freire,  although  at  the 
head  of  sixteen  thousand  infantry  and  three  thousand 
cavalry,  dared  not  attack  the  six  thousand  French  be- 
fore him,  lest  his  men  should  disperse,  and  they  thought 
as  little  of  the  general  as  he  did  of  them  ;  that  indo- 
lence, lassitude,  and  egotism  prevailed  in  all  parts; 
that  the  establishment  of  the  Cortes  had  proved  but  a 
slight  stimulus  to  the  enthusiasm,  which  was  fast  dying 
away,  and  that  the  most  agreeable  thing  in  the  world  at 
the  inoment  to  the  Spaniards,  would  be  to  remain  neu- 
ter, while  England  and  France  fought  the  battle  and 
paid  all  the  expense."  The  iMurcian  force  M-as  increased 
after  Mahi's  arrival  to  twenty-two  thousand  men,  but 
remained  inactive  until  August,  when  Blake  assumed 
the  command,  and  the  events  which  followed  will  be 
treated  of  hereafter. 

The  petty  warfare  in  the  south  of  Grenada  and  An- 
dalusia, deserves  little  notice,  for  during  Blake's  ab- 
sence in  Estremadura  with  the  fourth  army,  it  was  prin- 
cipally confined  to  the  Ronda,  where  the  Serranos  aided 
at  times  by  the  troops  from  Algesiras,  and  by  succours 
from  (Gibraltar,  were  always  in  arms;  yet  even  there 
the  extreme  arrogance  and  folly  of  the  Spanish  generals, 
so  vexed  the  Serranos,  that  they  were  hardly  prevented 
from  capitulating  in  ftjrm  with  the  French,  and  while 
Soult  continued  at  Llerena  after  the  battle  of  Albuera. 
The  Escopeteros  and  civil  guards  sufficed  to  ke(>p  the 
Partidas  in  check.  Thn^^  the  blockade  of  the  Isla  re- 
mained undisturbed  froiu  without,  and  Cadiz  itself,  the 
seat  of  all  intrigues  and  follies,  was  fed  by  English  fleets 
and  defended  bv  English  troops. 

The  narrative  of  tlie  circle  of  secondary  operations 
being  now  completed,  and  the  fate  of  Spain  proved  to 
depend  upon  the  British  general  alone,  it  will  be  proper 
in  the  next  book  to  take  a  view  of  political  affairs,  shew- 
ing how  strongly  they  bore  upon  lord  Wellington's  de- 
cisions ;  and  if  "such  an  interruption  of  the  military 
story  should  be  distiisteful  to  any  reader  I  would  have 
him  reflect,  that  war  is  not  so  much  a  series  of  battles, 
as  a  series  of  difficulties  in  the  preparations  to  fight 
tlu;m  wiUi  success. 


382 


TMAPIERS    I'ENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XIV. 


BOOK    XIV. 


CHAPTER  I. 

State  of  political  affairs — Situ;ition  of  kini^  Joseph — Hisdis- 
putos  with  Napoleou — He  rc:<i^ns  his  crown  aud  quits 
bpaiu — The  emperor  gruuts  him  new  terms  and  obliges 
hun  to  return — I'olitical  state  of  France  as  regards  the  war. 


POLmCVL    SITUATIO.V    OF    JOSEPH. 

After  the  conquest  of  Andalusia,  the  intrusive 
monarch  pursued  his  own  system  of  policy  with  more 
eagerness  than  before.  He  published  amnesties,  grant- 
ed honours  and  rewards  to  his  followers,  took  many  of 
the  opposite  party  into  his  service,  and  treated  the  peo- 
ple generally  with  mildness.*  But  he  was  guided 
principally  by  his  Spanish  ministers,  who  being  tainted 
•with  the  national  weakness  of  character  were,  espe- 
cially Orquijo,  continually  making  exaggerated  reports, 
intriguing  against  the  French  generals,  and  striving, 
sometimes  with,  and  sometimes  without  justice,  to  in- 
cense the  king  against  them.  This  course,  which  was 
almost  the  inevitable  consequence  of  his  situation,  ex- 
cited angry  feelings  in  the  military,  which,  joined  to  the 
natural  haughtiness  of  soldiers  in  command,  produced 
constant  disputes.  In  the  conquered  provinces,  Joseph's 
civil  agents  endeavoured  to  obtiiin  more  of  the  spoil 
than  comported  with  the  wants  of  the  armies,  and 
hence  bickering  between  the  French  olBcers  and  the 
Spanish  authorities  were  as  unceasing  as  they  were 
violent.  The  prefects,  royal  commissaries,  and  intend- 
ants  would  not  act  under  military  orders,  with  respect 
to  the  supplies,  nor  would  they  furnish  sums  for  the 
military  chests.  On  the  other  hand  the  generals  often 
seized  the  king's  revenue,  raised  extraordinary  and  for- 
ced contributions,  disregarded  legal  furms,  and  even 
threatened  to  arrest  the  royal  agents  when  they  refused 
compliance  with  their  wishes.  Neither  was  Joseph's 
own  conduct  always  free  frcun  violence,  for  in  the  latter 
part  of  1811  he  oblig'd  the  merchants  of  Madrid  to 
draw  bills,  for  two  millions  of  dollars,  on  their  corres- 
pondents in  London,  to  supply  liiin  with  a  forced 
loan.f 

He  was  always  complaining  to  the  emperor  that  the 
niggardly  allowances  from  France,  the  exactions  of  the 
generals,  and  the  misery  of  the  country  left  him  no 
means  of  existence  as  a  monarch  ;  and  during  the  great- 
est part  of  LSIO  and  the  beginning  of  1811.  Santa  Fe, 
Almeuara,  and  Onjuijo,  succeeding  each  other  as  am- 
bassadors at  i'aris,  were  in  angry  negotiations,  with 
Napoleon's  minister.:,  relating  to  this  subject,  and  to  a 
project  for  ceding  the  provinces  of  the  Kbro  in  ex- 
change for  Portugal. I  Against  this  project  Joseph 
protested,  on  the  grounds  that  it  was  contrary  to  the 
constitution  of  Bayonne,  that  it  would  alienate  the 
Spaniards,  was  degrading  to  himself,  and  unjust  as  a 
bargain  ;  seeing  that  Portugal  was  neither  so  rich,  so 
industrious,  so  pleasant,  nor  so  well  affected  to  him  as 
the  provinces  to  be  taki;n  away,  and  the  well-known 
hatred  between  the  Spaniards  and  Portuj.nicse  would 
never  allow  the  latter  to  t)e  quiet  subjects.|| 

To  these"  complaints,  Napoleon  answered  with  his 
usual   force  and   clearness   of  judgment.     He  insisted 


*  Joseph's  papers  captured  at  Vittoria,  MSS. 
+  Mr.  Stuart's  Papers,  MSS. 

X  Joj>*pirs  papers  (•;ipr\ired  at  Vittoria,  MSS. 


1  Ibid. 


that  the  cost  of  the  war  had  drained  the  French  exche- 
quer ;  that  he  had  employed  nearly  four  hundred  thou- 
sand men  for  the  king's  interest,  and  that  rather  than 
increase  the  expenses  he  would  withdraw  some  of  the 
troops.  He  reproached  Joseph  with  the  feebleness  of 
his  operations,  the  waste  and  luxury  of  his  court,  his 
ill-judged  schemes  of  conciliation,  his  extravagant  re- 
wards, his  too  great  generosity  to  the  opposite  party, 
and  his  raising,  contrary  to  the  opinion  of  the  marshals, 
a  Spanish  army  which  would  desert  on  the  first  re- 
verse.* The  constitution  of  Bayonne,  he  said,  was 
rendered  null  by  the  war ;  nevertheless,  he  had  not 
taken  a  single  village  from  Spahi,  and  he  had  no  wish 
to  seize  the  provinces  of  the  Ebro.  unless  the  state  of  the 
contest  obliged  him  to  do  so.  He  required,  indeed,  a 
guarantee  for  the  repayment  of  the  money  France  had 
expended  for  the  Spanish  crown,  yet  the  real  wishes  of 
the  people  were  to  be  ascertained  before  any  cession 
of  territory  could  take  place,  and  to  talk  of  Portugal 
before  it  was  conquered  was  folly.f  As  this  last  ob- 
servation was  Joseph's  own  argument,  an  explanation 
ensued,  when  it  appeared  that  Almenara,  thinking  the 
seizure  of  the  Ebro  provinces  a  settled  plan,  had,  of  hia 
own  accord,  asked  for  Portugal  as  an  indenmifica- 
tion ;  a  fact  that  marks  the  character  of  the  Spanish 
cabinet. 

Napoleon  also  assured  the  king  that  there  must  be  a 
great  deal  of  money  in  Spain,  for,  besides  the  sums  sent 
from  France,  the  plate  of  the  suppressed  convents,  and 
the  silver  received  by  the  Spaniards  from  America, 
there  were  the  subsidies  from  p]ngland,  and  the  enor- 
mous expenditure  of  her  troops.  Tlien,  the  seizure  and 
sale  of  national  domains,  aud  of  conliseated  colonial 
produce,  were  to  be  taken  into  calculation,  and  if  the 
king  wanted  more,  he  must  extract  it  from  the  country, 
or  go  without.  France  would  only  continue  her  sub- 
sidy (if  two  millions  of  francs  monthly.  The  emperor 
had  always  supported  his  wars  by  the  resources  of  the 
territory  in  which  it  was  carried  on,  and  the  king  might 
do  the  same. 

Joseph  replied  that  his  court  was  neither  luxurious 
nor  magnidcent ;  that  he  recomi)ensed  services  by  giv- 
ing bills  on  the  contingent  sales  of  national  domains, 
which  could  not  be  applied  to  the  wants  of  the  soldiers; 
that  he  could  scarcely  keep  the  public  servants  alive, 
and  that  his  own  expenses  were  not  greater  than  the 
splendour  of  the  crown  requireil.  'i'hat  many  of  the 
best  generals  approved  of  his  raising  a  Spanish  army  ; 
desertions  from  it  were  less  frequent  than  was  imagined, 
aud  were  daily  diminishing ;  and  these  native  troops 
served  to  garrison  towns  while  the  French  were  in  the 
field.  He  wished,  he  said,  to  obtain  large  loans  rather 
than  small  gifts  from  the  French  treasury,  and  desired 
that  the  conliseated  properly  of  the  Spanish  noblemen 
who  had  been  declared  traitors  in  1808,  should  be  paid 
to  him  ;  but  with  regard  to  harsh  measures,  the  peo- 
ple could  not  pay  the  contributions,  and  the  proceed- 
ings of  a  king  with  his  sutijects  should  not  be  like 
those  of  a  foreign  general. J  Lenity  was  necessary  to 
trancjuillize  the  provinces  subdued,  and  as  an  example 
to  those  which  resisted.  The  first  thing  was  to  concil- 
iate the  people's  affections.    The  plate  of  the  supprea- 


*  Joseph's  papers  captured  ut  Vittoria,  MSS. 
I  Ibid. 


t  Ibid. 


181].] 


KAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR, 


383 


8ed  convents  was  not  so  valuable  as  it  appeared  at  a 
distance,  the  greater  part  of  it  was  already  plundered 
by  the  guerillas,  or  by  the  French  troops.  The  French 
marshals  intercepted  his  revenues,  disregarded  liis 
orders,  insulted  his  government,  and  oppre-sed  the 
country.  He  was  degraded  as  a  monarch  and  would 
endure  it  no  longer.  He  had  been  appointed  to  the 
throne  of  Spain  without  his  own  consent,  and  although 
he  would  never  oppose  his  brother's  will,  he  Vv'ould  not 
live  a  degraded  king,  and  was  therefore  ready  to  resign 
unless  the  emperor  would  come  in  person  and  remedy 
the  present  evils.* 

Napoleon,  while  he  admitted  the  reasonableness  of 
some  of  the  king's  statements,  still  insisted,  and  with 
propriety  of  argument,  that  it  was  necessary  to  subdue 
the  people  before  they  could  be  conciliated.  Yet  to 
prevent  wanton  abuses  of  power,  he  fixed  the  exact 
sum  which  each  person,  from  the  general  governors 
down  to  the  lowest  subaltern,  was  to  receive,  and  he  or- 
dered every  person  violating  this  regulation  to  be  dis- 
missed upon  the  spot,  and  a  report  of  the  circumstance 
sent  to  Paris  within  twenty  hours  after.  Before  this, 
Bessieres.  aclcnowledged  by  all  to  be  a  just  and  mild 
man,  had  been  sent  to  remedy  the  mischief  said  to 
have  been  done  by  Kellerman,  and  others  in  the  north- 
ern provinces.  And  in  respect  of  conciliation,  the  em- 
peror remarked  that  he  had  himself,  at  first,  intended  to 
open  secret  negotiations  with  the  Cortes,  but  on  finding 
what  an  obscure  rabble  they  were,  he  had  desisted. 
He  therefore  recommended  Joseph  to  assemble  at  Ma- 
drid a  counter-cortes,  couii)osed  of  men  of  influence  and 
reputation,  wherein  (adverting  to  the  insane  insolence 
of  the  Spaniards  towards  their  colonies)  he  might  by 
the  discussion  of  really  liberal  institutions,  and  by  expo- 
sing the  bad  faith  with  which  the  English  encouraged 
the  Americans,  improve  public  opinion,  and  conciliate 
the  Spaniards  with  hopes  of  preserving  the  integrity 
of  the  empire,  so  rudely  shaken  by  the  revolt  of  the 
colonies. 

An  additional  subsidy  was  peremptorily  refused,  but 
the  emperor  finally  consented  to  furnish  Joseph  with 
half  a  million  of  fi'ancs  monthly,  for  the  particular 
support  of  his  court ;  and  it  is  worthy  of  notice,  as  illus- 
trating the  character  of  Napoleon,  that  in  the  course  of 
these  disputes,  Joseph's  friends  at  Paris  repeatedly 
advised  him  that  the  diplomatic  style  of  his  letters  in- 
censed and  hardened  the  emperor,  whereas  his  familiar 
style  as  a  brother  always  softened  and  disposed  him  to 
concede  what  was  demanded.  Joseph,  however,  could 
not  en<1ure  the  decree  for  establishing  the  military  gov- 
ernments, by  which  the  administration  was  placed  en- 
tirely in  the  hands  of  the  generals,  and  their  reports  upon 
the  civil  and  judicial  administration  referred  entirely  to 
the  emperor.  It  was  a  measure  a.ssailing  at  once  his 
pride,  his  power,  and  his  puise.  His  mind,  therefore, 
became  daily  more  embittered,  and  his  prefects  and 
commissaries,  emboldened  Vjy  his  opinions,  absolutely 
refused  to  act  under  the  French  marshals'  orders.  Many 
of  these  complaints,  founded  on  the  reports  of  his  Span- 
ish servants,  were  untrue  and  others  distorted.  We 
have  seen  how  the  habitual  exaggerations,  and  even 
downright  falsehoods  of  the  juntas  and  the  regency, 
thwarted  the  English  general's  operations,  and  the  king, 
as  well  as  the  French  generals,  must  have  encountered  a 
like  disposition  in  the  Spanish  ministers.  Nevertheless, 
the  natiue  of  the  war  rendt-red  it  impossible  but  that 
much  ground  of  complaint  should  exist. 

Joseph's  personal  sentiments,  abstractedly  viewed, 
■were  high-minded  and  benevolent  ;  but  they  sorted  ill 
with  his  situation  as  an  usurper.  He  had  neither  pa- 
tience nor  profundity  in  his  policy,  and  at  last  such 
•was  his  irritation,  that  having  drawn  up  a  private  but 
formal  renunciation  of  the  crown,  he  took  an  e.scort  of 

*  Joseph's  papers  captured  at  Vittoria,  MSS, 


five  thou.sand  men,  and  about  the  period  of  the  battle 
of  Fuentes  Onoro,  passed  out  of  Spain  and  reached 
Paris :  there  Ney,  Massena,  Junot,  St.  Cyr,  Kellerman, 
Augereau,  Loison,  and  Sebastiani,  were  also  assembled, 
and  all  discontented  with  the  war  and  with  each  other. 

By  this  rash  and  ill-timed  proceeding,  the  intrusive 
government  was  left  without  a  head,  and  the  army  of 
the  centre  was  rendered  nearly  useless  at  the  critical  mo 
ment  when  Soult,  engaged  in  the  Albuera  iipttratiims, 
had  a  right  to  expect  support  from  Madrid.  The  north- 
ern army  also  was  in  a  great  measure  paralysed,  and 
the  army  of  Portugal,  besides  having  just  failed  at  Fu- 
entes, was  in  all  the  disorganization  attendant  upon  the 
retreat  from  Santarem,  and  upon  a  change  of  comman- 
ders. This  was  the  principal  cause  why  Bessiereg 
abandoned  the  Asturias  and  concentrated  his  forces  in 
Leon  and  Castile  on  the  communications  with  France, 
for  it  behoved  the  French  generals  everywhere  to  hold 
their  troops  in  hand,  and  to  be  ou  the  defensive,  until 
the  empei'or's  resolution  in  this  extraordinary  conjunc- 
ture should  be  known. 

Napoleon,  astounded  at  this  precipitate  action  of  the 
king,  complained,  with  reason,  that  having  promi.sed  not 
to  quit  the  country  without  due  notice,  Joseph  had  failed 
to  him  both  as  a  monarch  and  as  a  general,  and  that  he 
should  at  least  have  better  chosen  his  time ;  for  if  he 
had  retired  in  January,  when  the  armies  were  all  inac- 
tive, the  evil  would  have  been  less,  as  the  emperor  might 
then  have  abandoned  Andalusia,  and  concentrated 
Soult's  and  Massena's  troops  on  the  Tagus ;  which 
would  have  been  in  accord  with  the  policy  fitting  for 
the  occasion.  But  now,  when  the  armies  had  suffered 
reverses,  when  they  were  widely  separated,  and  in  pur- 
suit of  different  objects,  the  mischief  was  great,  and  the 
king's  conduct  not  to  be  justified  ! 

Joseph  replied  that  he  had  taken  good  measures  to 
prevent  confusion  during  his  absence,  and  then  reiterat- 
ing his  complaints,  and  declaring  his  re.solution  to  retire 
into  obscurity,  he  finished  by  observing,  with  equal 
truth  and  simplicity  of  mind,  that  it  would  be  better 
for  the  emperor  that  he  should  do  so,  ina-much  as  in 
France  he  would  be  a  good  suliject,  but  in  Spain  a  bad 
king. 

j      The  emperor  had,  however,  too  powerful  an  intellect 
i  for  his   brother   to   contend  with.     Partly  by  reason, 
partly  by  authority,  partly  by  concession,  he  obliged 
'  him  to  return  again  in  July,  furnished  with  a  species  of 
private  treaty,  by  which  the  army  of  the  centre  was 
placed  entirely  at  his  disposal.     He  was  also  empow- 
ered to  punish  delinquents,  to  change  the  organization, 
and  to  remove  officers  who  were  ofiensive  to  him,  even 
the  chief  of  the  staff"  general  Belliard,  who  had  been 
i  represented  by  Orquijo  as  inimical  to  his  system.     And 
if  any  of  the  other  armies  should,  by  the  chances  of  war, 
arrive  within  the  district  of  the  centre  army,  they  also, 
j  while  there,  Avere   to  be  under  the  king ;   and   at  all 
times,   even    in   their   own    districts,   when    he   placed 
himself  at   their   head.     The   army  of  the  north   was 
to  remain  with   its   actual   organization  and  under  a 
marshal,  but  Joseph  had  liberty  to  change  Bessieres  for 
Jourdan. 

To  prevent  the  oppression  of  the  people,  especially 
in  the  north.  Napoleon  required  the  French  military 
authorities,  to  send  daily  reports  to  the  king  of  all 
requisitions  and  contributions  exacted.  And  he  advised 
his  brother  to  keep  a  Spanish  commissary  at  the  head- 
quarters of  each  army,  to  watch  over  Spanish  interests ; 
promising  that  whenever  a  province  should  have  the 
means  and  the  will  to  resist  the  incursions  of  the 
guerillas,  it  should  revert  entirely  to  the  government 
of  the  king,  and  be  subjected  to  no  charges,  save  those 
made  by  the  Spanish  civil  authorities  for  -eneral  pur- 
poses. The  armies  of  the  south  and  of  .Ar;!gon  were 
placed  in  a  like  situation  on  tlie  same  terms,  and 
meanwhile  Joseph  was  to  receive  a  quarter  ol  the  con- 


384 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XIV. 


tributions  from  each,  for  t!ie  support  of  bis  court  anrl  of 
tbu  centra]  army. 

Tbe  entire  coiumaiirl  of  tbe  forces  in  Spain  the  em- 
peror would  iwt  grant,  ol)serving  that  the  niarslial  di- 
recting from  Madrid,  as  major-general,  would  naturally 
claim  tbe  glory  as  well  as  tbe  responsibility  of  airanging 
the  operations ;  and  hence  the  other  marshals,  finding 
themselves  in  reality  under  his  instead  of  tbe  king's 
command,  would  obey  badly  or  not  at  all.  All  their 
reports  and  tbe  intelligence  necessary  to  tbe  understand- 
ing of  atfairs  were  therefore  to  be  addressed  directly  to 
Bertbier,  for  the  emperor's  information.  Finally  tbe 
half  million  of  francs  hitherto  given  monthly  to  the  king 
Wiis  to  be  increased  to  a  million  for  the  year  1811; 
and  it  was  expected  tliat  Joseph  would  immediately 
re.^igan'ze  tbe  army  of  the  centre,  restore  its  discipline. 
and  make  it,  what  it  had  not  yet  been,  of  weight  in  the 
contest. 

The  king  afterwards  obtained  some  further  conces- 
sions, the  most  important  of  which  related  to  the  em- 
ployment and  assembling  of  Spaniards  according  to 
his  own  directions  and  plans.  This  final  arrangement 
and  tbe  importance  given  to  Joseph's  return,  for  by  the 
emperor's  orders,  he  was  received  as  if  he  bad  only 
been  to  Paris  to  concert  a  great  plan,  produced  a  good 
efiect  for  a  short  time  ;  but  after  the  fall  of  Figueras, 
Napoleon,  fearing  to  trnst  Spaiiish  civilians,  extended 
tbe  plan,  hitherto  confined  to  Catalonia,  of  employing 
French  intendants  iu  all  tbe  provinces  on  the  leit  of  the 
Ebro.  Then  the  king's  jealousy  M'as  again  excited,  and 
the  old  bickerings  between  him  and  the  marshals  were 
revived. 

POLITICAL    SITUATION    OF    FRANCE. 

In  1811  the  emperor's  power  over  the  continent,  as 
far  as  the  frontier  of  Russia,  was,  in  fact,  absolute  ;  and 
in  France  internal  prosjicrity  was  enjoyed  with  ex- 
ternal glory.  But  tbe  emperor  of  Russia,  stimulated 
by  English  diplomacy  and  by  a  personal  discontent ; 
iu  dread  also  of  bis  nobles,  who  were  impatient  under 
the  losses  which  the  continental  system  inflicted  upon 
them,  was  plainly  in  opposition  to  the  ascendancy 
of  France,  and  Napoleon,  although  wishing  to  avoid 
a  rupture,  was  too  lung-sighted  not  to  perceive  that  it 
was  time  to  prepare  for  a  more  gigantic  contest  than 
any  he  had  hitherto  engaged  iu.  He  therefore  bus- 1 
banded  his  money  and  soldiers,  and  would  no  longer ' 
lavish  them  upcju  the  Spanish  war.  He  had  poured 
men,  indwd,  continually  into  that  country,  but  these 
were  generally  conscripts,  v,-hile  in  the  north  of  France 
he  was  forming  a  reserve  of  two  hundred  thousand  old 
soldiers;  but  with  that  art  that  it  was  dou'jtful  whtther 
they  were  intended  for  the  Peninsula  or  for  ulterior 
objects,  beuig  ready  for  either,  according  to  circmu- 
stances. 

Such  an  uncertain  state  of  affairs  prevented  liim 
from  taking  more  decided  steps,  in  person,  with  rela- 
tion to  Spain,  which  he  would  undoubtedly  ha\e  done 
if  the  war  there  had  been  the  only  great  matter  on  his 
hands,  and  therefore  the  aspect  of  FriMich  politics,  both 
in  Spain  a'.)d  'other  )ilaci-s,  was  favourable  to  hml 
Wellington's  views.  A  Russian  war,  sooner  or  later, 
was  one  of  'he  principal  chances  upon  which  he  rested 
his  hopes  of  final  success ;  yet  his  anticipations  were 
dashed  with  fear,  for  the  situation  of  the  Spanish  and 
Portuguese  governmeuts,  and  of  their  armies,  and  the 
condition  of  the  English  government,  were  by  no  means 
8u  favourable  to  his  plans,  as  shall  be  shewn  in  the  next 
chapter. 


CHAPTER   II. 

Political  state  of  Eujrland  with  reference  to  the  war — Retro- 


ftpective  view  of  atfairs — Enormuns  subaidies  prauted  to 
Spain — The  arrogance  and  rapuci'.y  of  the  jaiii.i>  onv.-ujr- 


aped  by  Mr.  Canning — His  stranjre  prooeedinsrs — Mr.  Stn- 
art'i*  abilities  and  true  judgrnient  of  atfairs  sliewn — He  pro- 
ceeds to  Vienna — Stute  of  politics  in  Germany — lie  ia 
recalled — The  misfortunes  of  the  Spaniards  principally 
owintj  to  Mr.  Caiminir's  incapacity- — The  evil  genius  of  the 
Peninsula — His  conduct  at  Lisbon — Lord  Wellesley's  pol- 
icy totally  ditFereut  from  Mr.  Canning's — Parties'  in  the 
es'.binet — Lord  VVellesley  and  Mr.  Perceval — Character  of 
the  latter — His  narrow  policv — I^etters  describing  the  im- 
becility of  the  cabinet  in  1810  and  ISll. 

POLITICAL     STATE     OF     ENGLAND     WITH     REFERENCE     TO 
THE    WAR. 

It  was  very  clear  that  merely  to  defend  Portugal, 
with  enoi'mous  loss  of  treasure  and  of  blood,  would  be  a 
ruinous  policy ;  and  that  to  redeem  the  Peninsula  the 
S)3aniards  must  be  brought  to  act  more  reasonably  than 
they  hail  hitherto  done.  But  this  the  national  character 
and  the  extreme  ignorance  of  public  business,  whether 
military  or  civil,  which  distinguished  the  generals  and 
statesmen,  rendered  a  very  difficult  task. 

Lord  Wellington,  finding  the  English  power  weak 
to  control,  and  its  influence  as  weak  to  sway,  the 
councils  of  Spain,  could  only  hcrio  by  industry,  pa- 
tience, and  the  glory  of  his  successes  in  Portugal,  to 
accpiire  that  personal  ascendancy,  which  would  enable 
him  to  direct  the  resources  of  the  whole  Peninsula  in 
a  vigorous  manner,  and  towards  a  common  object 
And  the  difficulty  of  attaining  that  ascendancy  can 
only  be  made  clear  by  a  review  of  the  intercourse 
between  the  British  government  and  the  Spanish  author- 
ities, from  the  first  bursting  out  of  the  insurrection,  to 
the  period  now  treated  of;  a  review  which  will  dis- 
close the  utter  unfitness  of  Mr.  Canning  to  conduct 
great  affairs.  Heaping  treasures,  stores,  arms,  and 
flattery,  upon  those  who  were  unable  to  bear  the  latter, 
or  use  the  former  beneficially,  he  neglected  all  those 
persons  who  were  capable  of  forwarding  the  cause ; 
and  neither  in  the  choice  of  his  agents,  nor  in  his 
instructions  to  them,  nor  in  his  estimation  of  the  value 
of  events,  did  he  discover  wisdom  or  diligence,  although 
he  covered  his  misconduct,  at  the  moment,  by  his  glitr 
tering  oratory. 

Soon  after  the  Spanish  deputies  had  first  applied 
for  the  assistance  of  England,  Mr.  Charles  Stuart, 
who  was  the  only  regular  diplomatist  sent  to  Spain,  car- 
ried, to  Corufia,  such  a  sum  as,  with  previous  subsidies, 
made  up  one  million  of  dollars  for  Gallicia  alone.  The 
deputies  from  Asturias  had  at  the  same  time  demanded 
five  millions  of  dollars,  and  one  was  paid  in  part  of 
their  demand  ;  but  when  this  was  known,  two  millions 
more  were  demanded  for  Gallicia,  vhith  were  not 
refused  ;  and  yet  the  first  point  in  Mr.  Caimlng's  in- 
structions to  Mr.  Stuart,  was,  to  cuter  uito  '•  no  political 
enfranxmenfs." 

Mr.  Dutf,  the  consul  for  Cadiz,  carried  out  a  million 
of  dollars  for  Andalusia,  the  junta  asked  for  three  or 
four  millions  more,  and  the  demands  of  Portugal, 
although  less  extravagant,  were  ^•ery  great.  Thus 
above  .sixteen  mi'lions  of  dollars  were  craved,  and 
more  than  four  millions,  including  the  gift  to  Portugal, 
had  been  sent  ;  the  remainder  was  not  denied  ;  and  the 
amount  of  arms,  and  other  stores  given,  may  be  esti- 
mated l)y  the  fact,  that  eightj'-two  pieces  of  artillery, 
ninety-six  thousand  muskets,  eight  hundred  thousand 
flints,  six  millions  and  a  half  of  ball-cartridges,  seven 
thousand  five  hundred  barrels  of  powder,  and  thirty 
thousand  swords  and  i)elts  had  been  sent  to  Corufia 
and  Cailiz ;  and  the  su])ply  to  the  Asturias  was  in 
proportion.  But  Mr.  (.'anning's  instructions  to  Mr. 
Duff  and  to  the  other  agents  were  still  the  same  as  to 
Mr.  Stuart,  '■  ///>•  MojcMij  Itad  no  desire  to  annex  any 
co7idittons  to  the  pecuniary  assistance  which  hefurnislied 
to  Spain." 

Mr.  Canning  observed  that  he  considered  the  amount 
of  money  as  nothing  !  but  acknowledged  that  specie 
Vi'as  at  this  time  .so  scarce  that  it  w;is  t  nly  by  a  direct 


1811.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


385 


and  secret  nnderstandinff  with  the  former  government 
ot  Spain,  under  the  connivance  of  France,  that  any 
considerable  amount  of  dollars  had  been  collected  in 
England.  And  "each  province  of  Spain,"  he  said, 
"  had  made  its  own  particular  application,  and  the 
whole  occasioned  a  call  for  specie  such  as  had  never 
before  been  made  upon  Eng-land  at  any  period  of  its 
existence.  There  was  a  rivalry  between  the  provinces 
with  reference  to  the  amount  of  sums  demanded  which 
rendered  the  greatest  caution  necessary."  And  the 
more  so,  that  "  the  deputies  were  incompetent  to  fur- 
nish either  information  or  advice  upon  the  state  of 
affairs  in  Spain;"  yet  Mr.  Duff  was  commanded, 
while  representing-  the^e  astounding  things  to  the  junta 
of  Seville,  " /»>  avoid  any  appearance  of  a  desire  to 
overrate  the  mxril  and  value  of  the  exertions  then  making 
hy  Great  Britian  in  favour  if  the  Spanish  nation,  or  to 
lay  the  grounds  fir  restraining  or  limiting  those  exertions 
V'ithin  any  other  bounds  than  tho^e  luhich  were  prescribed 
by  the  limits  of  the  actual  means  of  the  country.''''  In 
proofof  Mr.  Canning's  sincerity  upon  this  head,  he  after- 
wards sent  two  millions  of  dollars  by  Mr.  Frere,  while 
the  British  army  was  left  without  any  funds  at  all  ! 
Moreover  the  supplies,  so  recklessly  granted,  being 
iraiismitted  through  subordinates  and  irresponsible 
persons,  were  absurdly  and  unequally  distributed. 

This  obsequious  extravagance,  produced  the  utmost 
a-rogance  on  the  part  of  the  Spanish  leaders,  who 
treated  the  English  minister's  humble  policy  with  the 
insolence  it  courted.  When  Mr.  Stuart  reached  Mad- 
rid, after  the  establishment  of  the  supreme  junta,  that 
body,  raising  its  demands  upon  England,  in  proportion 
to  its  superior  i  nporlance,  required,  and  in  the  most 
peremptory  language,  additional  succours  so  enormous 
as  to  startle  even  the  prodigality  of  the  English 
gov(^rnment. 

Ten  millions  of  dollars  instantly,  five  hundred  thou- 
sand y:nrds  of  cloth,  four  million  yards  of  linen  for 
shirts  and  for  the  hospitals,  three  hundred  thousand 
pair  of  shoes,  thirty  thousand  pair  of  boots,  twelve 
million  of  cartidges,  two  hundred  thousand  nnuskfts, 
twelve  thousand  pair  of  pistols,  fifty  thousand  swords, 
one  hundred  thousand  ar^  bas  of  flour,  besides  salt  meat 
nnd  fish  !  These  were  their  demands  !  and  when  Mr. 
Stuart's  remonstrance  obliged  them  to  alter  the  insult- 
ing language  of  their  note,  they  insisted  the  more 
strenuously  upon  having  the  succours  ;  observing  that 
England  had  as  yet  only  done  enousjh  to  set  their  force 
afloat,  and  that  she  might  naturally  expect  demands  lik: 
the  present  to  follow  the  first.  They  desired  also  that 
the  money  should  be  furnished  at  once,  by  bills  on 
the  British  treasury,  and  at  the  same  time  required 
the  confiscation  of  Godoy's  property  in  the  English 
funds! 

Such  was  Mr.  Canning^'s  opening  policy,  and  the 
sequel  was  worthy  of  the  commencement.  His  pro- 
ceedintTS  with  respect  to  the  Erfnrth  proposals  for 
peace,  his  injudicious  choice  of  Mr.  Frere,  his  leaving 
of  Mr.  Stuart  without  instructions  for  three  months  at 
the  most  critical  period  of  the  insurrection,  and  his 
nianagement  of  aff;iirs  in  Portugal  and  at  Cadiz,  during 
sir , lob n  Cradock's  command,  have  been  already  no- 
ticed ;  and  that  he  was  not  misled  by  any  curious 
accordance  in  the  reports  of  his  agents,  is  certain,  for 
he  was  early  and  constantly  informed  of  the  real  state 
of  affairs  by  Mr.  Stuart.  That  gentleman  was  the 
accredited  diplomatist,  and  in  all  important  points,  his 
reports  were  very  exactly  corroborated  by  the  letters 
of  sir  .John  Moore,  and  by  the  running  course  of  events  ; 
yet  Mr.  Canninjr  neither  acted  upon  them  nor  publish- 
ed then.,  but  he  received  all  the  idle,  vaunting,  accounts 
of  the  subordinate  civil  and  military  agents,  with 
complacency,  and  published  them  v.ith  ostentation  ; 
thus  encouraging  the  misrepresentations  of  ignorant 
ni(?n,  increaring  the  arrogance  of  the  Spaniards,  de- 
26 


ceiving  the  English  nation,  and  as  far  as  he  was  ahln 
misleading  the  English  general. 

Mr.  Stuart  reached  Coruiia  in  .Tuly  1808,  and  on  tha 
22d  of  that  month  informed  Mr.  Canning  that  the 
reports  of  the  successes  in  the  south  were  not  to  he 
depended  upon,  seeing  that  they  increased  exactly  in 
proportion  to  the  difficulty  of  communicating  with  the 
alledged  scenes  of  action,  and  with  the  dearth  of 
events,  or  the  recurrence  of  disasters  in  the  northern 
parts.  He  also  assured  him,  that  the  numbeis  of  the 
Spanish  armies,  within  his  knowledge,  were  by  no 
means  so  great  as  they  were  represented. 

On  the  SGth  of  July  he  gave  a  detailed  history 
of  the  Gallician  insurrection,  by  which  he  plainly 
shewed  that  every  species  of  violence,  diso'rder,  in- 
trigue, and  deceit  were  to  be  expected  from  the  leading 
people  ;  that  the  junta's  object  was  to  separate  Gallicia 
from  Spain:  and  that  so  inappropriate  was  the  affected 
delicacy  of  abstaining  from  conditions,  while  furnish- 
ing succours  ;  that  the  junta  of  Gallicia  was  only  kept 
in  power,  by  the  countenance  of  England,  evinced  in 
her  lavish  supplies,  and  the  residence  of  her  envoy  at 
Coruiia.  The  interference  of  the  British  navol  officers 
to  quell  a  political  tumult  had  even  been  asked  for, 
and  had  been  successful  ;  and  Mr.  Stuart  himself  had 
been  intreated  to  meddle  in  the  appointments  of  the 
governing  members,  and  in  other  contests  for  power, 
which  were  daily  taking  place.  In  fine,  before  the  end 
of  August  the  system  of  folly,  peculation,  waste,  and 
improvidence  which  characterized  Spanish  proceedings, 
was  completely  detected  by  Mr.  Stuart,  and  laid  be- 
fore Mr.  Canning,  without  in  the  slightest  degree 
altering  the  latter's  egregious  system,  or  even  at- 
tracting his  notice ;  nay,  he  even  intimated  to  the 
ambitious  junta  of  Seville,  tiiat  England  would  wil- 
lingly acknowledge  its  supremacy,  if  tlie  consent  of 
the  other  provinces  could  he  obtained  ;  thus  holdinir 
jut  a  premium  for  the  continuation  of  that  anarchy, 
which  it  should  have  been  his  first  object  to  suppress. 

Mr.  Siuart  was  kept  in  a  corner  of  the  peninsula, 
whence  he  could  not  communicate  freely  with  any 
other  province,  and  where  his  presence  materially 
contributed  to  cherish  the  project  of  sej)arating  Gallicia  ; 
and  this  without  the  shadow  of  a  pretence,  because 
there  was  also  a  British  admiral  and  consul,  and  a 
military  mission  at  Coruiia,  all  capable  of  transmiliing 
the  necessary  local  intelligence.  Br.t  so  little  did  Mr. 
Canning  care  to  receive  his  envoy's  reports,  that  tlio 
packet,  conveying  his  despatches,  was  ordered  to 
touch  at  Gihon  to  receive  the  consul's  letters,  which 
caused  the  delay  of  a  week  when  every  moment  was 
big  with  important  events  ;  a  delay  not  to  be  remedied 
by  the  admiral  on  the  station,  because  he  had  not  even 
been  officially  informed  that  Mr.  Stuart  was  an  accredit- 
ed person  ! 

When  the  latter,  thinkincr  it  time  to  look  to  the  pul-  ^ 
lie  affairs,  on  his  own  responsibility,  proceeded  to  Mao- 
rid,  and  finally  to  Andalusia,  he  found  the  evils 
springing  from  Mr.  Canning's  inconsiderate  conduct 
every  where  prominent.  In  the  capital  the  supreme 
junta  had  regarded  England  as  a  bonded  debtor;  and 
the  influence  of  her  diplomatist  at  Seville  may  be 
estimated  from  the  following  note,  written  by  Mr. 
Stuart  to  Mr.  Frere,  upon  the  subject  o^  permitting 
B.'-ilish  troops  to  enter  (Jadiz. 

"  When  the  junta  refused  to  admit  general  Macken- 
zie's detachment,  you  tell  me  it  was  merely  fnun 
alarm  respectinnf  the  disposition  of  the  inhabitants  of 
Seville  and  Cadiz.  I  am  not  aware  of  the  feelings 
which  prevail  in  Seville,  but  with  respect  to  this  town, 
whatever  the  navy  or  the  English  travellers,  may 
assert  to  the  contrary,  I  am  perfectly  convinced  that 
there  exists  only  a  wish  to  rtceivo  them,  and  genera, 
regret  and  surprise  at  their  continuance  on  board." 

Nor    was   the   mischief   confined    to    Spain.      Mr. 


386 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XI\  . 


Frere,  appnrently  tirrd  of  the  presence  of  a  man 
whose  energy  and  talent  were  a  continued  reflection 
npon  his  own  in^i^ecile  diplomacy,  ordered  Mr.  Stuart, 
either  to  join  Onesta's  army  or  to  go  by  Trieste  to 
Vienna;  lie  chose  the  hitter,  becausR  there  was  not 
even  a  subordinate  political  agent  there,  although  this 
was  the  critical  period,  which  preceded  the  Austrian 
dechiration  of  war  against  France  in  1809.  He  was 
without  formal  powers  as  an  envoy,  but  his  knowledge 
of  the  affairs  of  Spain,  and  his  intimate  personal 
acquaintance  with  many  of  the  leading  statesmen  at 
Vienna,  enabled  him  at  once  to  send  home  the  most 
exact  information  of  the  proceedingrs,  the  wants,  the 
wishes,  and  intentions  of  the  Austrian  government,  in 
respect  to  the  impending  war. 

That  great  diversion  for  Spain,  which  with  infinite 
pains  had  been  brought  to  maturity  by  count  Siadion, 
Avas  on  the  point  of  being  abandoned  because  of  Mr. 
Cannino's  conduct.  Fie  hnd  sent  no  minister  to  Vien- 
na, and  while  he  was  lavishing  millions  upon  the  Span- 
lards,  without  conditions,  refused  in  the  most  haughty 
and  repulsive  terms,  the  prayers  of  Austria  for  a  sub- 
sidy or  even  a  loan,  without  which,  she  could  not  pass 
her  own  frontier.  And  when  Mr.  Stuart  suggested  the 
resource  of  borrowing  some  of  the  twenty-five  millions 
of  dollars  which  were  then  accuniulated  at  Cadiz,  it 
was  rejected  because  Mr.  Frere  said  it  would  alarm  the 
Spaniards.  Thus,  the  aid  of  a  great  empire  with  four 
hundred  thousand  good  troops,  was  in  a  manner  reject- 
t^.d  in  favour  of  a  few  miserable  self-conceited  juntas 
in  the  peninsula,  while  one  half  the  succours  which 
they  received  and  misused,  would  have  sent  the  whole 
Austrian  nation  headlong  upon  France;  for  all  their 
landwehr  was  in  arms,  and  where  the  emperor  had 
only  calculated  upon  one"  hundred  and  fifty  battalions 
three  hundred  had  come  forward,  voluntarily,  besides 
the  Hungarian  insurrection.  In  this  way  Mr.  Canning 
proved  his  narrow  capacity  for  business,  and  how  little 
he  knew  either  the  strength  of  France,  the  value  of 
Austria,  the  weakness  of  Spain,  or  the  true  interests  of 
England  at  the  moment;  although  he  had  not  scrupled 
by  his  petulant  answers  to  the  proposals  of  Erfurth  to 
confirm  a  war  which  he  was  so  incapable  of  conduct- 
ing. Instead  of  improvinj  the  great  occasion  thus 
oiTered,  he  angrily  recalled  Mr.  Stuart,  for  having  pro- 
ceeded to  V^ienna  without  his  permission.  In  his  eyes 
the  breach  of  form  was  of  much  higher  importance 
than  the  success  of  the  object.  Yet  it  is  capable  of 
proof,  that  had  Mr.  Stuart  remained,  the  Austrians 
would  have  been  slower  to  negotiate  after  the  battle  of 
Wagram  ;  and  the  Walcheren  expedition  would  have 
been  turned  towards  Germany,  where  a  great  north- 
ern confederation  was  then  ready  to  take  arms  against 
France.  The  Prussian  cabinet  in  defiance  of  the  king, 
or  rather  of  the  queen,  whose  fears  influenced  the 
king's  resolutions,  only  waited  for  these  troops,  to 
tt  declare  war;  and  there  was  every  reason  to  believe 
that  Russia  would  then  also  have  adopted  that  side. 
The  misfortunes  of  Moore's  campaign,  the  folly  and 
arrogr-ance  of  the  Spaniards,  the  loss  of  the  great 
IJritish  army  which  perished  in  Walcheren,  the  ex- 
hausting of  ['England  both  of  troops  and  specie,  when 
she  most  needed  both  ;  finally  the  throwing  of  Aus- 
tria entirely  into  the  hands  of  France,  may  thus  be 
distinctly  traced  to  Mr  Canning's  incapacity  as  a 
statesman. 

But  through  the  whole  of  the  Napoleonic  wars 
this  man  was  the  evil  genius  of  the  Peninsula  ;  for 
passing  over  the  misplaced  militiry  powers  which 
ne  gave  to  Mr.  Villiers'  legation  in  Portugal,  while 
he  neglected  the  political  affairs  in  that  country,  it 
was  he  who  sent  lord  Slranirford  to  Rio  Janeiro 
whence  all  manner  of  mischief  flowed.  And  when 
Mr.  Stuart  succeeded  Mr.  Villiers  at  Lisbon,  Mr. 
Canning  'insisted  upon  having  the  enormoas  mass   of 


intelligence,  received  from  different  parts  of  th»^  Penin 
sula,  translated  before  it  was  sent  home  ;  an  act  of 
undisguised  indolence,  which  retarded  the  real  business 
of  the  embassy,  prevented  important  infirmation  from 
being  transmitted  rapidly,  and  exposed  the  sf^rrets  of 
the  hour  to  the  activity  of  the  enemy's  emissaries  at 
Lisbon.  In  after  times  when  bv  a  notorious  abuse  of 
government  be  was  himself  sent  ainhassad'T  to  Lisbon, 
he  complained  that  there  were  no  archives  of  the  former 
embassies,  and  he  obliged  Mr.  Stuart,  then  minister  at 
the  Hague,  to  employ  several  hundred  soldiers,  as 
clerks,  to  copy  all  his  papers  relating  to  the  previous 
war;  these,  at  a  great  public  expense,  were  sent  to 
Lisbon  ;  and  there  they  were  to  be  seen  unex-unined 
and  unpacked  in  the  year  1826  !  And  while  this  folly 
was  passing,  the  interests  of  Europe  in  general  were 
neoflected,  and  the  particular  warfare  of  Portugal  seri- 
ously injured  by  another  display  of  official  importance 
still  more  culpable. 

It  had  been  arranged  that  a  Portuguese  auxiliary 
force  was  to  have  joined  the  duke  of  Wellington's 
army,  previous  to  the  battle  of  Waterloo  ;  and  to  have 
this  agreement  execntfd,  was  the  only  business  of  real 
importance  which  Mr.  Canning  had  to  transact  during 
his  embassy.  Marshal  Beresf^rd,  well  acquainted  with 
the  characters  of  the  members  of  the  Portuguese 
regency,  had  assembled  fifteen  thousand  men,  the 
flower  of  the  old  troops,  perfectly  equipped,  with  artil- 
lery, baggage,  and  all  things  needful  to  take  the  field; 
the  ships  were  ready,  the  men  willing  to  embark,  and 
the  marshal  informed  the  English  ambassador,  that  he 
had  only  to  give  the  order,  and  in  a  few  hours  the 
whole  would  be  on  board,  warning  him  at  the  same 
time,  that  in  no  other  way  could  the  thing  be  effected. 
But  as  this  summary  proceeding  did  not  give  Mr. 
Canning  an  opportunity  to  record  his  own  talents  for 
negotiation,  he  replied  that  it  must  be  done  by  diplo- 
macy ;  the  Souza  faction  eagerly  seized  the  opportunity 
of  displaying  their  talents  in  the  same  line,  and  being 
more  expert,  beat  Mr.  (^'anning  at  his  own  weapons, 
and  as  Beresford  had  foreseen  no  troops  were  embarked 
at  all.  Lord  Wellington  was  thus  deprived  of  im- 
portant reinforcements;  the  Portuguese  were  depiived 
of  the  advantage  of  supporting  their  army,  for  several 
years,  on  the  resources  of  France,  and  of  their  share 
of  the  contributions  from  that  country;  last  and  worst, 
those  veterans  of  the  Peninsular  war,  the  strength  of 
the  country,  were  sent  to  the  Brazils,  where  they  all 
perished  by  disease  or  by  the  sword  in  the  obscure 
wars  of  Don  Pedro!  If  such  errors  may  be  redeemed 
by  an  eloquence,  always  used  in  defence  of  public 
corruplif)n,  and  a  wit,  that  made  human  sufferings  its 
sport,  Mr.  Canning  was  an  English  statesman,  'ind 
wisdom  has  little  to  do  with  the  affairs  of  nations. 

W"hen  the  issue  of  the  Walcheren  expedition  caused 
a  change  of  ministry,  lord  Wellesley  obtained  the 
fireign  office.  Mr.  Henry  Wellesley  then  replaced 
Mr.  Frere  at  Cadiz,  and  he  and  Mr.  Stuart  received 
orders  to  make  conditions  to  demand  guarantees  for  the 
due  ap|)lication  of  the  British  succours  ;  those  succours 
were  more  sparingly  granted,  and  the  envoys  were 
directed  to  inti^rf^e  with  advice  and  remonstrances,  in 
all  the  proceedings  of  the  respective  governments  to 
which  they  were  accredited  :  Mr.  Stuart  was  even 
desired  to  meildle  with  the  internal  administration  of 
the  Portuguese  nation, — the  exertions  and  sacrifices  of 
Great  Britain,  far  from  being  kept  out  of  sight,  were 
magnified,  and  the  system  adopted  was  in  every  thing 
a  contrast  to  that  of  Mr.  C/anning. 

But  there  was  in  England  a  powerful,  and  as  recent 
events  have  proved,  a  most  unprincipled  parliamentary 
opposition,  and  there  were  two  parties  in  the  cabinet. 
The  one  headed  by  lord  Wellesley,  who  was  anxious 
to  push  the  war  vigorously  in  the  Peninsula,  without 
much  regard  to  the  ultimate  pressure  upon  the  people 


1811.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


S87 


of  liis  own  country  ;  the  other,  headed  by  Mr.  Perceval, 
Avho  sonaht  only  to  maintain  himself  in  power.  Nar- 
row, harsh,  factious,  and  illiberal,  in  every  thing 
relatinsx  to  public  matters,  this  man's  career  was  one 
of  unmixed  evil.  His  bigotry  taught  him  to  oppress 
Ireland,  biU  his  religion  did  not  deter  him  from  passing 
a  law  to  prevent  the  introduction  of  medicines  into 
France  during  a  pestilence.  He  lived  by  faction  ;  he 
had  neillier  the  wisdom  to  support,  nor  the  manliness 
to  put  an  end  to,  the  war  in  the  Peninsula,  and  his 
crooked,  contemptible  policy  was  shown,  by  withhold- 
ing what  was  necessary  to  sustain  the  contest,  and 
throwing  on  the  eeneral  the  responsibility  of  failure. 

With  all  the  fears  of  little  minds,  he  and  his  coad- 
jutors awaited  the  result  of  lord  Wellington's  opera- 
tions in  1810.  They  affected  to  dread  his  rashness, 
yet  could  give  no  reasonable  ground  for  their  alarm  ; 
and  their  private  letters  were  at  variance  with  their 
public  instructions,  that  they  might  be  prepared  for 
either  event.  They  deprived  him,  without  notice,  of 
his  command  over  the  troops  at  Cadiz:  they  gave 
Graham  power  to  furnish  pecuniary  succours  to  the 
Spaniards  at  that  place,  which  threw  another  difficulty 
in  the  way  of  obtaining  money  for  Portugal  ;  and 
wiien  W'ellington  complained  of  the  attention  paid 
to  the  unfounded  apprehension  of  some  superior  officers 
more  immediately  about  him,  he  was  plainly  told  that 
those  officers  were  better  generals  than  himself.  At 
the  same  time  he  was,  from  a  pitiful  economy,  ordered 
to  dismiss  the  transports  on  which  the  safety  of  the 
army  depended  in  the  event  of  failure. 

Between  these  factions  there  was  a  constant  strug- 
gle, and  lord  Wellington's  successes  in  the  field,  only 
furthered  the  views  of  Mr.  Perceval,  becsuse  they 
furnished  ground  for  asserting  that  due  support  had 
been  given  to  him.  Indeed  such  a  result  is  to  be 
always  apprehended  by  English  commanders.  The 
erghiest  movement  in  war  requires  a  great  effort,  and 
is  attended  with  many  vexations,  which  the  general  feels 
acutely  and  unceasingly  ;  but  the  politician,  believing 
in  no  difficulties  because  he  feels  none,  neglects  the 
supplies,  charges  disaster  on  the  general,  and  covers 
his  misdeeds  with  words.  The  inefficient  state  of  the 
cabinet  under  both  Mr.  Canning  and  Mr.  Perceval  may 
however  be  judged  of  by  the  following  extracts,  the 
writers  of  which  as  it  is  easy  to  perceive  were  in 
official  siluatiiins. 

"  I  hope  by  next  mail  will  be  sent,  something  more 
satisfactory  and  useful  than  we  have  yet  done  in  the 
WMy  of  instructions.  But  I  am  afraid  the  late  O.  P. 
ri"ts  have  occupied  all  the  thoughts  of  our  great  men 
here,  so  as  to  make  them,  or  at  least  some  of  them, 
forget  more  distant  hut  not  less  interesting  concerns."* 

"  With  respect  to  the  evils  you  allude  to  as  arising 
from  the  inefficiency  of  the  Portuguese  government, 
the  people  here  are  by  no  means  so  satisfied  of  their 
existence  (to  a  great  degree)  as  you  who  are  on  the 
spot.  Here  we  judge  only  of  the  results,  the  details 
we  read  over,  but  being  unable  to  remedy  forget  them 
the  next  day  ;  and  in  the  mean  lime  the  tools  you  have 
to  work  with  good  or  bad,  so  it  is  that  you  have  pro- 
duced results  so  far  beyond  the  most  sanguine  expecta- 
tions entertained  here  by  all  who  have  not  been  in 
Portugal  within  the  last  eight  months,  that  none  in- 
quire the  causes  which  prevented  iiiore  being  done  in  a 
shorter  time  ;  of  which  indeed  i\\c\e  seems  to  have 
been  a  great  probability,  if  the  government  could 
have  stepped  forward  at  an  earlier  period  with  one 
hand  in  their  pockets,  and  in  the  other  strong  energetic 
declarations  of  the  indispensable  necessity  of  a  change 
of  measures,  and  principles,  in  the  government."]- 

"  I  have  done  evcy  thing  in  my  power  to  get  people 
here  to  attend  to  their  real  interests  in  Portugal,  and  I 


»  A.     April.     1310. 


+  A.     April.     181 


have  clamoured  for  money  !  money  !  money!  in  every 
office  to  which  I  have  had  access,  'i'o  all  my  clamour 
and  all  my  arguments  I  have  invariably  received  the 
same  answer,  '  that  the  thujs^  is  impns.szhk.''  'Vhp  prince 
himself  certainly  ap])ears  to  be  a  In  hauteur  des  circnn- 
stances,  and  has  expressed  his  determination  to  make 
every  exertion  to  promote  the  good  cause  in  the  Penin- 
sula. Lord  Welleslpy  has  a  perfect  comprehension  of 
the  subject  in  its  fullest  extent,  and  is  fully  aware  of 
the  several  measures  which  Great  Britain  ought  and 
could  adopt.  But  such  is  the  state  of  parties  and  such 
the  condition  of  the  present  government,  that  I  really 
despair  of  witnessing  any  decided  and  ade(|uate  effect, 
on  our  part,  to  save  the  Peninsula.  The  present  feeling 
appears  to  be  that  we  have  done  mighty  things,  and  all 
that  is  in  our  power,  that  the  rest  must  he  left  to  all- 
bounteous  Providence,  and  that  if  we  do  not  succeed 
we  must  console  ourselves  by  the  reflection  that  Provi- 
dence has  not  been  so  propitious  to  us  as  we  deserved. 
This  feeling  you  must  allow  is  wonderfully  moral 
and  christian-like,  but  still  nothing  will  be  done  until  we 
have  a  more  vigorous  military  system  and  a  ministry 
capable  of  directing  the  resources  of  the  nation  to 
something  nobler  than  a  war  of  descents  and  em- 
barkations."* 

A  more  perfect  picture  of  an  imbecile  administration 
could  scarcely  be  exhibited,  and  it  was  not  wonderful, 
that  Lord  Wellington,  oppressed  with  the  folly  of  the 
peninsular  governments,  should  have  often  resolvtd  to 
relinquish  a  contest  that  was  one  of  constant  risks,  dif- 
ficulties, and  cares,  when  he  had  no  better  support  from 
England.  In  the  next  chapter  shall  be  shewn  the  ulti- 
mate effects  of  Canning's  policy  in  the  Spanish  and 
PortufTuese  affairs. 


CHAPTER  HL 

Political  state  of  Spain— Disputes  amongst  the  leaders — Sir  J. 
ISioore's  eaiij'  and  ju«t  perception  of  the  state  of  afi'air?  con- 
fiimed  by  Lord  Wellington's  expeiienre — Points  of  interest 
aflpftin^  Enjrland — The  reinforcement  of  the  military  force 
• — The  rlainis  of  the  princess  Carlotta — The  prevention  of  a 
war  with  Portug'al — The  question  of  the  colonies — Cisnero's 
conduct  at  Buenos  Ayres — Duke  of  Infantada  desnanded  by 
Mexico — Proceedinsrs  of  the  English  ministers — Governor 
of  Cura  oa — Lord  VVelleslfy  pioposes  a  mediation — Mr. 
Barlaxi's  stran2:e  assertion — Lord  AVeiling'ton's  judgment  on 
the  question — His  discernment,  sagacity,  and  wisdom  shewn. 

POLITICAL  STATE  OF   SPAIN. 

As  the  military  operations  were  by  the  defeat  of  the 
regular  armies,  broken  into  a  multitude  of  petty  and 
disconnected  actions,  so  the  political  affairs  were,  by 
the  species  of  anarchy  which  prevailed,  rendered  ex- 
ceedingly diversified  and  incongruous.  Notwithstand- 
ing the  restoration  of  the  captain-grenerals,  the  provin- 
cial juntas  remained  very  powerful;  and  while  nomi- 
nally responsible  to  the  Cortes  and  the  regency,  acted 
independently  of  either,  except  when  interested  views 
urged  them  to  a  seeming  obedience.  The  disputes  that 
arose  between  them  and  the  generals,  who  were,  for 
the  most  part,  the  creatures  of  the  regency,  or  of  the 
Cortes,  were  constant.  In  Gallicia,  in  the  Asturias,  in 
Catalonia,  in  Valencia,  and  in  Murcia,  disputes  wer» 
increasing.  Mahi,  Abadia,  Moscoso,  Canipo  Verde, 
Lacy,  Sarsfield,  Eroles,  Milans,  Bassecour,  Coupig- 
ny,  Castanos,  and  Blake,  were  always  in  controversy 
with  each  other  or  with  the  juntas.  Palacios  dismiss- 
ed from  the  regency  for  his  high  monarchical  opinions, 
was  made  captain-g(;neral  of  Valencia,  where  he  im- 
mediately joined  the  church-party  against  the  cortes. 
In  the  Condado  de  Niebla  the  junta  of  Seville  claimed 
superior  authority,  and    Ballesteros  of  his   own  mo- 


«   B.     September.     1811. 


388 


NAPIER'S    P  E  X  I  x\  S  U  L  A  R    WAR. 


[Book  XIV. 


tion  placel  the  country  under  martial  law.  The  junta, 
stranirply  enoui^li,  tlien  appealed  to  colonel  Austin  the 
British  governor  of  the  Algarves,  but  he  refused  to  in- 
terfere. 

Tiie  cortes  often  annulled  the  decrees  of  the  regen- 
cy, and  the  latter,  of  whomsoever  composed,  always 
hating-  and  fearinfj  tlie  cortes,  were  only  intent  upon  in- 
oreasiniT  their  own  power,  and  entirely  neglected  the 
general  cause  ;  their  conduct  was  at  once  haughty  and 
mean,  violent  and  intriguing,  and  it  was  impossible  ev- 
er to  satisfy  them.  Thus  confusion  was  every  where 
perpetuated,  and  it  is  proved  by  tlie  intercepted  papers 
of  .Toseph,  as  well  as  by  the  testimony  of  the  British 
oflicers,  and  diplomatists,  that  with  the  Spaniards,  the 
only  moral  resn\irce  left  for  keeping  up  the  war,  was 
their  personal  hatred  of  the  Frencli,  partially  called  in- 
to action  by  particular  oppression.  Sir  John  Moore. 
with  that  keen  and  sure  judgement  which  marked  all 
his  views,  had  early  described  Spain  as  being  "icilk- 
out  armies,  generals,  or  goveminevt.'''  And  in  1811,  af- 
ter three  years  of  war,  lord  Wellington  complained  that 
"  there  was  no  head  in  Sprtin,  neither  generals,  nor  offi- 
cers, nor  disciplined  troops,  and  no  cavalry  ;  that  the 
government  had  commenced  the  ivar  ivilhout  a  magazine 
or  mililary  resour-e  if  any  kind,  tviihinit  money  or  fi- 
nancial resource,  and  that  the  people  at  the  head  of  af- 
fairs, were  as  feeble  as  their  resources  were  small.''''*  But 
the  miserable  state  of  the  armies  and  the  unquenchable 
vanity  of  the  officers,  have  been  too  frequently  exposed 
to  need  further  illustration,  'l^hey  h  ited  and  ill-used 
the  peasantry,  while  their  own  want  of  discipline  and 
Rubordination  rendered  them  odious  to  their  country. 
The  poorer  people,  much  as  they  detested  the  French, 
almost  wished  for  the  establishment  of  Joseph,  and  all 
spirit  and  enthusiasm  had  long  been  exlinci. 

'I'iie  real  points  of  interest  affecting  England  in  her 
prosecution  of  the  contest  were,  therefore,  1.  the  im- 
provement and  the  better  guidance  of  the  military  pow- 
er;  2.  the  pre%'enting  a  war  between  Portugal  and 
Spain  ;  3,  the  pretensions  of  the  princess  CarloUa  of 
Portugal  ;  4.   tlie  dispute  with  the  American  colonies. 

With  respect  to  the  first,  lord  Wellington  had  made 
Btrenuous  efforts,  and  his  advice,  and  remonstrances, 
had  at  times  saved  the  armies  in  the  field  from  destruc- 
tion ;  some  partial  attempts  were  also  made  to  form 
troops  under  British  officers  in  the  Spanish  service,  but 
to  a  system  like  that  which  England  exercised  in  Por- 
tugal, the  leading  Spaniards  would  never  listen.  This 
was  one  result  of  ,Mr.  Canning's  impolitic  fostering  of 
the  Spanish  pride,  for  it  was  by  no  means  apparent 
that  the  people  would  have  objected  to  such  an  ar- 
ransrement,  if  it  had  been  prudeiUly  urged,  before  the 
republican  party  in  the  cortes,  and  the  popular  press, 
had  filled  their  minds  with  alarm  upon  the  subject. 
The  Catalans  openly  and  repeatedly  desired  to  liave 
an  English  general,  and  in  1812  colonel  Green  did  or- 
ganize a  small  corps  there,  while  Whittingliam  and 
Roche  formed  in  the  Balearic  isles  large  divisions; 
colonel  Cox  had  before  proposed  a  like  scheme  for  the 
north,  but  it  was  rejected  by  lord  Wellington,  and  I 
have  been  unable  to  trace  any  important  service  render- 
ed by  those  officers  with  their  divisions.  Their  repu- 
tation was  however  quite  eclipsed  by  one  Downie,  who 
had  passed  from  the  British  commissariat  into  the 
Spanish  service,  and  the  English  ministers,  taken  with 
his  boasting  manner,  sup])lied  him  with  uniforms  and 
equipments  for  a  body  of  cavalry,  called  the  Estrema- 
dura  Lenrion,  of  sucii  an  expensive  and  absurd  nature, 
as  to  induce  a  treneral  officer  to  exclaim  on  seeing  them 
that  "  he  bliish(?d  for  the  folly  of  his  government." 

When  the  British  ministers  found  themselves  unable 
to  deal  with  the  Spanish  regulars,  they  endeavoured  to 
prop  the  war  by  the  irregulars.     But  the  increase  of 

*  Letter  to  g^cneral  Duniouricz,  1811.     M53. 


this  force,  which  however  never  exceeded  thirty  thou* 
sand  men  in  arms,  gave  offence  to  liie  regular  officers, 
and  amidst  liiese  distractions,  the  soldiers,  ill-organ 
ized,  ill-ft-d,  and  quite  incapable  of  moving  in  the  field 
m  large  bodies,  lost  all  confidence  in  their  generals. 
The  latter,  as  in  the  case  of  Friere  with  the  Murcian 
army,  generally  expected  to  be  beaten  in  every  action, 
and  cared  very  little  aboe.t  it,  bi  cause  the  regency  wero 
sure  to  affirm  that  they  were  victorious ;  and  ano- 
ther of  those  wandering  starved  naked  bands,  which 
they  called  armies,  could  be  formed  from  new  levies  in 
a  month. 

The  chances  of  a  war  with  Portugal  were  by  no 
means  slight,  the  early  ravages  of  the  Spanish  insur- 
gent forces  when  Junot  was  in  Lisbon,  the  violence  of 
Romana's  soldiers,  and  the  burning  of  the  village  of 
San  Fernando,  togt^ther  with  the  disputes  between  the 
people  of  Algarves  and  the  Andalusians  had  revived 
all  the  national  hatred  on  both  sides.  The  two  gov- 
ernments indeed  entered  into  a  treaty  for  recruiting  in 
their  respective  territories  ;  but  it  was  wiih  the  utmost 
difficulty  that  the  united  exertions  of  Mr.  Stuart  and 
lord  Wellington  could  prevent  the  Portuguese  regency 
first,  and  afterwards  the  court  of  Brazils,  from  provo- 
king a  war  by  re-annexing  Oliven^a  to  Portugal,  when 
it  was  taken  from  the  French  by  marshal  Beresford. 
And  so  little  were  the  passions  of  these  people  subordi- 
nate to  their  policy  that  this  design  was  formed  at  the 
very  moment  when  the  princess  Carlotta  was,  strenu- 
ously, and  with  good  prospect  of  success,  pushing  her 
claim  to  the  regency  of  Spain. 

The  intrigues  of  this  princess  were  constant  sources 
of  evil  ;  she  laboured  against  the  influence  of  the  Brit- 
ish at  Cadiz,  and  her  agent  Pedro  Souza,  proffering 
gold  to  vulgar  baseness,  diamonds  to  delicate  conscien- 
ces, and  promises  to  all,  was  adroit  and  persevering. 
In  August  1810  a  paper  signed  by  only  one  member, 
but  with  an  intimation  that  it  contained  the  sentiments 
of  the  whole  cortes,  was  secretly  given  to  Mr.  Welles- 
ley,  as  a  guide  for  his  conduct.  It  purported  that  the 
impossibility  of  releasing  Ferdinand  and  his  br(thfr 
from  their  captivity  being  apparent,  the  princess  Car- 
lotta should  be  called  to  the  throne,  and  it  was  pro- 
posed to  marry  her  eldest  son,  Pedro,  to  the  princess 
of  Wales,  or  some  other  princess  of  the  House  of 
Brunswick,  that  a  "  sudden  and  mortal  blow  might  be 
given  to  the  French  empire."*  Mr.  Wellesley  was  also 
told  that  a  note,  of  the  same  tendency,  would  in  the 
first  session  of  the  cortes  be  transmitted  to  the  English 
legation.  This,  however,  did  not  h,\ppen,  chiefly 
because  Arguelles  openly  and  eloquently  expressed  his 
reasons  against  the  appointment  of  a  royal  person  as 
regent,  and  some  months  later  procured  a  decree,  ren- 
dering such  persons  ineligible,  to  pass  in  the  corles. 
This  seeined  to  quash  Carlotta's  intrigue,  nevertheless 
her  pretensions,  although  continually  overborne  by  the 
English  influence,  were  as  continually  renewed,  and 
often  on  the  point  of  being  publicly  admitted. 

The  assumption  that  it  was  hopeless  to  expect  Ferdi- 
nand's release  was  founded  partly  on  the  great  influ- 
ence which  it  was  known  Napoleon  had  acquir^^d  over 
his  mind,  and  partly  on  his  extreme  personal  timidity, 
which  rendered  any  attempt  to  release  him  hopeless. 
Otiierwise  there  were  at  Lisbon  one  Francisco  Sagas, 
and  his  brother,  daring  men,  who  were  only  deterred 
from  undertaking  the  enterprise  by  a  previous  experi- 
ment made  at  Bayonne,  where  they  had  for  an  hour 
implored  Ferdinand  to  escape,  all  things  being  ready, 
yet  in  vain,  because  Escoiquez  who  ruled  the  prince, 
and  was  as  timid  as  himself,  opposed  it.  To  prevent 
ill  effects  from  this  well-known  weakness,  the  cortes 
passed  a  decree  to  render  rmll  every  act  of  Ferdinand 
while  in  captivity. 


•  Mr.  Stuarfg  Papers,  MSS. 


1811.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


389 


The>e  intrirjups  of  Carlotta  were,  however,  nf  minor 
eonspquetice  compared  to  the  conduct  of  the  American 
colonies,  which  was  one  of  the  highest  interest  and 
importance.  The  causes  and  the  nature  of  their  revolt 
have  been  already  touched  upon,  and  the  violence  and 
injustice  of  the  juntas,  the  regency,  and  the  cortes,  with 
relation  to  them,  having  been  also  exposed  in  a  general 
way,  need  not  be  repeated  here.  When  the  .Spanish 
insurrection  first  commenced,  the  leading  men  of  Mexico 
sitrned  a  paper  which  was  sent  to  the  peninsula  in  No- 
vember 1S08,  urginsr  the  immediate  appointment  of  the 
duke  of  Iiifimtado  to  the  vice-royalty.  He  was  averse 
to  quilting  Spain,  but  his  wife  persuaded  him  to  con- 
sent, provided  the  centr«J  junta,  just  then  established, 
was  not  opposed  to  it.  Mr.  Stuart  foreseeing  great  ad- 
vantage from  this  appointiTient,  laboured  to  persuade 
Mr.  Frere  to  support  it;  but  the  latter,  always  narrow 
in  his  views,  refused,  because  Infantado  was  personal- 
ly disliked  in  England  !  and  this,  joined  to  the  duke's 
('wn  reluctance,  seemed  to  end  the  matter.  Meanwhile 
the  dislurbinces  in  the  colonies  went  on,  and  Carlotia 
of  Portugal,  urged  her  claim  to  be  regent,  and  ultimate- 
ly, queen  of  that  country,  as  well  as  of  Spain  ;  and 
her  interests  were  strongly  supported  there,  until  May 
1809,  when  Cisneros,  the  Spanish  viceroy,  arrived 
at  Monte  Video,  and  spoiled  her  schemes. 

The  cry  for  a  free  trade  with  PIngland,  was  then 
•aised  by  the  colonists,  and  Cisneros  assented,  but 
k./iJer  conditions,  presentitig  a  curious  contrast  to 
the  affected  generosity  of  Mr.  Canning,  and  afford- 
ing an  additional  proof  how  little  the  latter  knew 
the  temper  of  the  people  he  was  dealing  with. 
After  detailing  the  dangers  of  his  situation  from  the 
disposition  of  the  colonists  to  revolt,  and  the  impover- 
ishment of  the  royal  treasury  in  consequence  of  the 
disturbances  which  had  already  taken  place,  Cisneros 
observed  that  the  only  mode  of  relief  was  a  temporary 
permission  to  trade  with  England  for  the  sake  of  the 
duties.  Necessity,  he  said,  drove  him  to  this  measure; 
he  regretted  it,  and  directed  that  the  ordinary  laws 
relative  to  the  residence  of  foreigners,  most  rigorous  in 
themselves,  should  be  most  rigorously  executed;  and 
he  added  others  of  such  a  nature,  that  at  first  sight, 
they  appear  to  be  directed  against  some  common  ene- 
mv  of  mankind,  rather  than  against  the  subjects  and 
vessels  of  a  nation  which  was  then  supporting  the  nnoth- 
er-country  with  troops  and  treasure  in  the  most  prodigal 
manner.  Englishmen  were  not  to  be  suffered  to  pos- 
sess property,  to  have  a  residence,  to  keep  an  hotel, 
or  even  to  remain  on  shore  except  for  a  fixed  period. 
Any  property  already  acquired  by  them  was  to  be  con- 
fiscated, and  when  the  goods  by  which  he  hoped  to 
raise  his  revenue  were  landed,  the  owners  were  not  to 
be  permitted  to  have  them  carried  to  the  warehouses 
by  their  own  sailors  ! 

In  April  ISIO  the  disposition  to  revolt  spread  ;  the 
(^araccas  and  Porto  Rico  declared  for  independence, 
and  the  British  governor  of  Cura(;oa  expressed  his 
approval  of  their  proceedings.  This  naturally  gave 
great  jealousy  and  alarm  to  the  Spaniards,  who  looked 
upon  it  as  a  secret  continuation  of  Miranda's  affair. 
Lord  Liverpool,  indeed,  immediately  disavowed  the 
governor's  manifesto,  but  being  very  desirous  to  retain 
the  trade,  to  conciliate  the  Spaniards,  and  to  oblige  the 
colonists  to  acknowledge  Ferdinand  and  oppose  France, 
three  thin  ITS  incompatible,  his  policy  produced  no  good 
result.  Mexico  indeed  still  remained  obedient  in  out- 
ward appearance,  but  the  desire  to  have  Infantado 
existed,  and  a  strong  party  of  the  Mexicans  even 
purposed  raising  him  to  the  throne,  if  Napoleon's 
success  should  separate  the  two  countries;  but  the 
Spanish  regency,  with  characteristic  folly,  chose  this 
moment  to  appoint  Venegas,  who  was  the  avowed 
enemy  of  Infantado,  viceroy  of  Mexico,  and  thus  the 
revolt  was  forced  on  in  that  country  also. 


This  state  of  affairs  had  a  bad  eff;'Ct  upon  the  war 
in  Spain  in  many  ways.  The  vSpaniards,  thinking  to 
retain  the  colonies  by  violence,  sent  out  a  small  squajl- 
ron  at  first,  and  at  a  later  period  employed  the  succours 
received  from  England,  in  fitting  out  large  expeditions 
of  their  best  troops;  and  that,  when  the  enemy  were 
most  closely  pres'^ing  them  in  the  Peninsula.  The 
remonstrances  of  the  British  on  this  head  were  consid- 
ered as  indications  of  a  failliless  policy  ;  and  Carlotta 
also  wrote  to  Elio.  the  governor  of  Buenos  Avres,  and 
to  the  cones,  warning  both,  to  beware  of  tiie  English 
as  "a  people  capa-ble  of  any  baseness  where  their 
own  interests  were  concerned."  Hence  there  was  a 
prevalent  suspicion,  that  England  had  a  design  of 
connecting  itself  with  the  colonies  inch  pendentlv  of 
Spain,  which  greatly  diminished  the  English  influence 
at  Cadiz. 

By  this  dispute  with  America  the  supply  of  specie 
for  the  Peninsula  was  endangered,  which  involved  the 
very  existence  of  the  war;  all  things  therefore  condu- 
ced to  make  lord  Wellesley  desire  his  brother,  Mr. 
Wellesley,  to  offer  the  mediation  of  England,  and  to 
please  the  Spaniards  he  also  removed  the  governor 
of  Cura(;oa;  but  his  plans,  like  lord  Liverpool's,  were 
based  upon  the  desire  to  preserve  the  trade  with  the 
colonies,  and  this  feeling  perv.-.ded  and  vitiated  hia 
instructions  to  Mr.  Wellesley.  That  gentleman  was 
directed  to  enter  into  a  full  discussion  of  the  suliject, 
on  principles  founded  on  cordial  amity  and  good  faith; 
and  to  endeavour  to  convince  the  regency  that  the 
British  course  of  proceeding  had  hitherto  been  the  best 
for  all  parties.*  For  the  primary  object  being  to  keep 
France  from  forming  a  party  in  America,  the  revolted 
colonies  had  been  by  England  received  into  an  amicable 
intercourse  of  trade,  a  measure  not  inconsistent  with 
good  faith  to  Spain,  inasmuch  as  the  colonists  would 
otherwise  have  had  recourse  to  France,  whereas  now 
England  was  considered  by  them  as  a  safe  and  honour- 
able channel  of  reconciliation  with  the  mother-country. 
There  had  been,  it  was  said,  no  formal  recognition  'tf 
the  self  constituted  governments,  or  if  any  had  taken 
place  by  subordinate  officers  they  would  be  disavowed. 
Protection  and  mediation  had  indeed  been  offered,  but 
the  rights  of  Ferdinand  had  been  supported,  and  as 
war  between  Spain  and  America  would  only  injure  the 
Sfreat  cause,  a  mediatory  policy  was  pressed  upon  the 
latter. — The  blockade  of  Buenos  Ayres  and  the  Carac- 
cas  had  already  diverted  money  and  forces  from  Spain, 
and  driven  the  Americans  to  seek  for  French  officers 
to  assist  them.  The  trade  was  essential  to  enable 
England  to  continue  her  assistance  to  Spain,  and  al- 
though this  had  been  frequently  represented  to  the 
regency,  the  latter  had  sent  ships  (which  had  been 
fitted  out  in  English  ports  and  stored  at  the  expen.^e 
of  Great  Britain  for  the  war  with  France)  to  blockade 
the  colonies  and  to  cut  off  the  English  trade  ;  and  it 
was  done  also  at  a  moment,  when  the  resrency  was 
unable  to  transport  Blake's  army  from  Cadiz  to  the 
Condado  di  Niebla  without  the  assistance  of  British 
vessels.  "  It  was  difficult,"  Lord  Wellesley  said,  "to 
state  an  instance  in  which  the  prejudices  and  jealousy 
of  individuals  had  occasioned  so  much  confusion  of 
every  maxim  of  discretion  and  good  policy,  and  so  much 
danger  to  the  acknowledged  mutual  interests  of  two 
great  states  engaged  in  a  defensive  alliance  against  the 
assaults  of  a  foreign  foe:" — "Spain  could  not  expect 
England  to  concur  in  a  continuance  of  a  sysleni  by 
which,  at  her  own  expense,  her  trade  was  injured,  and 
by  which  Spain  was  making  efforts  not  against  the 
French  but  against  the  main  sources  of  her  own 
strength." 

After  these  instructions,  which  were  given  before 

*  LorH  Wr!  >»ley's  despatch  to  Mr.  H  Wtllciiey,  May, 
1811.     MSS 


590 


NAPIER'S    PExN  INSULA 


VAR. 


[Book  XIV. 


vhe  constitution  of  Spain  was  arranored  by  the  cortes, 
Mr.  VVelleslev  pressed  the  mediation  upon  Mr.  Bar- 
riaxi  the  Spanish  minister,  who  agreed  to  accept  it 
upon  condition,  that  Mexico,  whicii  had  not  yet  de- 
clared a  form  of  orovernnient,  should  be  excepted, — 
that  England  should  immediately  break  off  all  inter- 
course with  the  colonies,  and,  if  the  mediation  failed, 
should  assist  Spain  to  reconquer  them.  When  the 
injustice  and  bad  policy  of  this  proposition  was  ob- 
jected to,  Mr.  Bardaxi  maintained  that  it  was  just  and 
politic,  and  pressed  it  as  a  secret  article  ;  he  however 
finally  offered  to  accept  the  mediation,  if  Mr.  Welles- 
ley  would  only  pledge  England  to  break  off  the  inter- 
course of  trade.  This  was  refused,  and  the  negotia- 
tion continued,  but  as  Bardaxi  asserted,  that  lord 
Wellington  had  before  agreed  to  the  propriety  of 
England  going  to  war  with  the  colonies.  Mr.  Welles- 
ley  referred  to  the  latter,  and  that  extraordinary  man, 
while  actually  engaged  with  the  enemy,  under  most 
critical  circumstances,  was  thus  called  upon  to  discuss 
so  grave  and  extensive  a  subject.  But  it  was  on  such 
occasions  that  all  his  power  of  mind  was  displayed, 
and  his  manner  of  treating  this  question  proved,  that 
in  political,  and  even  in  commercial  affairs,  his  reach 
of  thought  and  enlarged  conceptions,  immeasurably 
surpassed  the  cabinet  he  served.  And  when  we  con- 
sider that  his  opinions,  stated  in  1811,  have  been  since 
verified  in  all  points  to  the  very  letter,  it  is  impossible 
not  to  be  filled  with  admiration  of  his  foresight  and 
judgment. 

"  He  denied  that  he  had  ever  given  grounds  for 
Bardaxi's  observation.  His  opinion  had  always  been 
that  Great  Britain  should  follow,  as  he  hoped  she  had, 
liberal  counsels  towards  Spain,  by  laying  aside,  at  least 
during  the  existence  of  the  war,  all  consideration  of 
merchants'  profits.  He  felt  certain  that  such  a  policy 
would  equally  suit  her  commercial  interests  and  her 
warlike  policy,  as  well  as  add  greatly  to  her  character. 
The  immediate  advantages  extorted  from  an  open  trade 
with  the  colonies  he  had  always  considered  ideal. 
Profit  was  undoubtedly  to  be  made  there,  and  eventual- 
ly the  commerce  would  be  very  great;  but  its  value 
must  arise  from  the  increasing  riches  of  the  colonies 
and  the  growth  of  luxury  there,  and  the  period  at 
which  this  would  happen  was  more  likely  to  be  checked 
than  forwarded  by  the  extravagant  speculations  of  Eng- 
lish traders.  Whatever  might  be  the  final  particular 
relations  established  between  Spain  and  her  colonies, 
the  seneral  result  must  be,  the  relaxation,  if  not  the 
annihilation,  of  their  colonial  commercial  system,  and 
Great  Britain  was  then  sure  to  be  the  greatest  gainer. 

"  In  expectation  of  this  ultimate  advantage,  her 
policy  ought  to  have  been  liberal  throughout,  that  is, 
the  colonies  themselves  should  have  been  checked,  and 
the  endeavours  of  traders  and  captains  of  ships  to 
separate  them  from  Spain  ought  to  have  been  repressed. 
England  should,  when  the  colonies  first  shewed  a 
disposition  to  revolt,  have  considered  not  only  what 
they  could  do  but  what  Great  Britain  could  assist  them 
to  effect.  His  knowledge  of  the  Spanish  government 
and  its  means  enabled  him  to  say  she  could  not  reduce 
even  one  of  the  weakest  of  her  colonies,  and  to  make 
the  attempt  would  be  a  gross  folly  and  misapplication 
of  means.  Nay  England  could  not,  in  justice  to  the 
great  object  in  the  Peninsula,  give  Spain  any  elTectual 
assistance;  for  it  was  but  two  true  that  distant  colo- 
nies could  always  separate  from  the  mother  country 
when  they  willed  it,  and  certainly  it  would  be  the 
highest  madness,  in  Spain,  to  attempt  at  that  time  to 
to  prevent  such  a  separaiion  by  force,  and  in  Entjland, 
to  assist,  or  even  to  encourage  her  in  such  an  attempt. 

'•The  conduct  of  the  latter  should  then  have  been  by 
her  influence  and  advice  to  have  prevented  the  disputes 
from  coming  to  extremiiy,  and  niiw  should  be  to  divert 
Spain  from  such  an  absurdity  as  having  recourse   to 


violence.  But  the  reception  of  the  deputies  from 
America  which  the  Spaniards  so  much  complained  of, 
was  useful  to  the  latter.  It  prevented  those  deputies 
from  going  to  P^rance,  and  if  they  had  gone,  the  fact, 
that  colonies  have  the  power  to  separate  if  they  have 
the  will,  would  have  been  at  once  verified. 

"  Great  Britain,  although  late,  had  at  last  nfftred 
that  mediation  which  he  wished  had  been  asked  for, 
and  it  remained  to  consider  on  what  terms  it  ought 
to  be  accepted.  It  would  have  been  better  if  Spain 
had  come  forward  with  an  explicit  declaration  of  what 
her  intentions  towards  the  colonies  in  respect  to  constitu- 
tion and  commerce  were.  England  could  then  have  had 
somettiing  intelligible  to  mediate  upon  ;  but  now  Spain 
only  desired  her  to  procure  the  submission  of  Buenos 
Ayres  and  the  Caraccas ;  and  if  she  failed  in  that 
impracticable  object  she  was  to  aid  Spain  in  forcing 
them  to  submission  !  and  he,  lord  Wellington,  was 
said  to  have  approved  of  this!  One  would  really,  he 
exclaimed,  believe  that  Mr.  Bardaxi  has  never  adverted 
to  the  means  and  resources  of  his  own  country,  to  the 
object  they  have  acquired  at  home,  nor  to  the  efforts 
making  by  England  in  the  Peninsula;  and  that  he 
imagines  I  have  considered  these  facts  as  little  as  he 
appears  to  have  done!  Great  Britain  cannot  agree  to 
that  condition  ! 

"  In  respect  to  constitution"  (alluding  to  the  acknowl- 
edgement of  the  civil  rights  of  the  Americans  by  the 
cortes)*  "  the  Spaniards  had  gone  a  great  way,  but  not 
so  far  as  some  of  her  colonies  would  require,  they 
would  probably  ask  her  to  have  separate  local  repre- 
sentative bodies  for  their  interior  concerns,  such  as  the 
English  colonial  assemblies,  yet  this  important  point 
had  not  been  considered  in  the  treaty  of  mediation,  and 
in  respect  of  commerce  the  Spanish  government  had 
said  nothing;  although  it  was  quite  certain  her  prohib- 
itory system  could  not  continue,  and  the  necessary 
consequence  of  the  actual  state  of  affairs  required  that 
in  the  treaty  of  mediation  the  colonies  should  be  put, 
with  respect  to  trade,  exactly  on  the  same  footing  as  the 
provinces  of  Old  Spain.  If  that  was  not  done  it  would 
be  useless  to  talk  to  the  colonists  of  equal  rights  and 
Interests  ;  they  would  feel  that  their  interests  were 
sacrificed  to  that  of  the  mother  country. 

'•  It  was  true  that  the  latter  would  lose  immediately, 
though  probably  not  eventually,  very  largely  in  reve 
nue  and  commercial  profit  by  such  a  concession.  This 
was  the  unavoidable  result  of  the  circumstances  of  the 
times,  she  had  therefore  a  fair  claim  to  participate  in 
the  advantages  the  colonies  would  enjoy  from  it.  To 
this  object  the  treaty  of  mediation  should  have  ad- 
verted. Spain  should  have  confidentially  declared  to 
Great  Britain  her  intended  course,  what  system  she 
would  follow,  what  duties  impose,  and  what  proportion 
she  would  demand  for  general  imperial  purposes.  Up- 
on such  materials  England  might  have  worked  with  a 
prospect  of  permanently  maintaining  the  integrity  of 
the  Spanish  empire  on  just  and  fair  principles  ;  or  at  all 
events  have  allayed  the  present  disputes  and  so  re- 
moved the  difficulties  they  occasioned  in  the  Penin- 
sula, and  in  either  case  have  insured  her  own  real  inter- 
ests. Spain  had  however  taken  a  narrow  view  both 
of  her  own  and  the  relative  situation  of  others,  and 
if  she  dill  not  enlarge  if,  matters  would  s^row  worse  and 
worse.  It  would  be  useless  for  England  to  interfere,  and 
after  a  long  contest  which  would  only  tend  to  waken  the 
mother  country  and  deprive  her  of  the  resources  which 
she  would  otherwise  fnd  in  the  colonies  for  hf  war  with 
France,  the  business  would  end  in  the  separation  of  the 
colonies  from  Spain.^^ 

The  mediation  was,  however,  after  many  discussions, 
finally  accepted  by  the  cortes,  Mex'co  only  being 
excepted,  and  an  English   commission  of  mediation 

•   See  page  323. 


1811.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSL.   VR    WAR. 


391 


of  which  Mr.  Sfunrt  was  the  head,  was  even  appointed 
in  September  1811,  but  from  various  causes  it  never 
proceeded  beyond  Cadiz.  The  Spaniards  continued 
to  send  out  expeditions,  Mr,  Wellesley's  remonstrances 
were  unheeded,  and  although  the  regency  afterwards 
oftered  to  open  the  trade  under  certain  duties,  in  return 
for  a  subsidy,  nothing  was  concluded. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Politiral  stnte  of  Portugal — Mr.  V'ilHers'  mission  expensive  and 
iii«fTici«-iit — Mr.  Stuart  sucreeds  him — F'iiids  every  thing  in 
coM(u?ion — His  ellbits  to  ie«tore  order  successful  at  first — 
Curtes  piop>se.>l  by  lord  Wellesley — Opposed  by  tlie  regen- 
cy, by  Mr.  Stuart,  and  by  lord  VVelHiigton — Observations 
thereon — Changes  in  the  regenc}' — Its  partial  and  weak  con- 
duct—  Lord  Straiigford's  proceedings  at  Rio  Janeiro  only 
productive  of  mischief — Mr.  Stuart's  efforts  op[)OSed,  and 
successfully  by  the  Souza  faction — Lord  Wellington  thinks 
of  abandoning  the  contest — Writes  to  the  prince  regent  of 
Portugal — The  regency  continues  to  embarra^-s  the  English 
general — Eriect  of  their  conduct  upon  the  army — Miserable 
state  of  the  country — Tlie  British  cabinet  grants  a  fresh  sub- 
sidy to  T'ortugal — Lord  Wellington  complains  that  he  is  sup- 
jjiied  with  onlv  one-sixth  of  the  money  necessary  to  carry  on 
the  contest — iVlinor  follies  of  the  regency — The  cause  of 
Massena's  harshness  to  the  people  of  Portugal  e.xplained — 
Case  of  Mascarhenas — His  execution  a  foul  murder — Lord 
Wellingt'jn  reduced  to  the  greatest  difficulties — He  and  Mr. 
Stuart  devist,  apian  to  supply  the  army  bv  trading  in  grain- 
Lord  tVeliiiigton"s  embarrassments  increase-— Reasons  ivhy 
he  does  not  abandon  Portugal — His  plan  of  campaign. 

POLITfCAL    STATE    OF    PORTUGAL. 

The  power  and  crafty  projects  of  the  Souzas,  their 
Influence  over  their  weak-minded  prince,  their  cabal  to 
place  the  prince  of  Brunswick  at  the  head  of  the  Por- 
luiiuese  army,  the  personal  violence  of  the  Patriarch, 
the  resignation  of  Das  Minas,  and  the  disputes  with 
lord  W'ellington,  have  been  already  touched, upon  ;  but 
the  extent  of  the  difficulties  engendered  by  those  things, 
cannot  be  understood  without  a  more  detailed  exposi- 
tion. 

Mr.  Villiers's  mission,  like  all  those  emanating  from 
Mr.  Cannitio-,  had  been  expensive  in  style,  tainted  by 
intrigues,  useless  in  business,  and  productive  of  disor- 
ders. When  Mr.  Stuart  arrived,  he  found  every  thing, 
except  the  army  under  Beresford,  in  a  state  of  disor- 
ganizatirm  ;  and  the  influence  of  England  was  decreas- 
ing, because  of  the  vacillating  system  hitherto  pursued 
by  the  British  government.  As  early  as  1808  lord 
WeIl.:.fTton  had  advised  the  ministers  not  only  to 
adopt  Portugal  as  the  base  of  operations  in  the  Penin- 
sula, but  to  assume  in  reality  the  whole  administration 
of  that  country;  to  draw  forth  all  its  resources,  both 
of  men  and  money,  and  to  make  up  any  deficiency, 
by  the  power  of  England.  -This  advice  had  been 
neglected,  and  an  entirely  different  policy  pursued, 
which,   in  execution,   was   also   feeble  and  uncertain. 

Tlie  Portuguese  constitution,  like  most  of  those 
springing  from  the  feudal  system,  was  excellent  in 
tiieory,  as  far  as  regarded  the  defence  of  the  kingdom  : 
but  it  was  overwhelmed  with  abuses  in  practice;  and 
it  was  a  favourite  maxim  with  the  authorities  that  it 
did  not  become  a  paternal  government  to  punish  neg- 
lect in  the  subordinates.  When  court  intrigues  were 
to  be  eflected,  or  poor  men  to  be  oppressed,  there  was 
no  want  of  vigour  or  of  severity  ;  but  in  all  that  re- 
par-ied  the  administration  of  affairs,  it  was  considered 
Bufticient  to  give  orders  without  looking  to  their  execu- 
tion, and  no  animadversion,  much  less  punishment, 
followed  disobedience.  The  character  of  the  govern- 
nienf  was  extreme  weakness;  the  taxes,  partially 
levied,  produced  only  half  their  just  amouiit ;  the 
payments  from  the  treasury  were  in  arrears;  the  army 
was    neglected   in  all   things    dependent  on  the  civil 


administration,  and  a  bad  navy  was  kept  up,  at  an 
expense  of  a  quarter  of  a  million,  to  meet  a  war  witn 
Algiers.  This  last  questjon  was,  however,  a  knifw 
with  a  double  edge,  for  in  peace,  a  tribute  paid  in 
coin,  drained  the  treasury  already  too  empty,  and  in 
war  the  fleet  did  nothing;  meanwhile  the  feeding  of 
Cadiz  was  rendered  precarious  by  it ;  und  of  Lisbon 
also,  for  the  whole  produce  of  Portugal  was  only 
equal  to  four  months'  consumption.  In  commercial 
affairs,  the  usual  peninsular  jealousy  was  displayed  ; 
the  imports  of  British  goods  were  prohibited  to  the 
advantage  of  smugglers  only,  while  the  government 
which  thus  neglected  its  own  resources  to  the  injury 
of  both  countries,  clamoured  for  subsidies.  Finally, 
the  power  of  tiie  Souzas  was  so  great,  and  the  regency 
was  so  entirely  subservient  to  tiiem,  that  although  Mr. 
Stuart  had  been  assured  by  Mr.  Canning,  that  a  note 
forbidding  Domingo  Souza  to  meddle  with  affairs  at 
Lisbon,  had  been  procured  from  the  Brazils,  all  repre- 
sentations, to  the  regency,  were  met  by  references  to 
that  nobleman,  who  was  in  London,  and  the  business  of 
the  mission  was  thus  paralysed. 

In  march  1809  the  i3ritish  government  had  taken  ten 
thousand  Portuguese  troops  into  pay.  In  May  they 
were  increased  to  twenty  thousand,  and  in  June  to 
thirty  thousand.  The  cost  of  these  forces,  and  the 
increased  pay  to  Portuguese  ofiicers,  added  to  the 
subsidy,  amoimted  to  two  millions  sterling;  but  this 
subsidy  partly  from  negligence,  partly  from  the  ex- 
haustion of  England  in  consequence  of  Mr.  Canning's 
prodigal  donations  to  Spain,  was  in  arrears.  However, 
as  this  mode  of  proceeding  was  perfectly  in  unison 
with  their  own  method,  the  regency  did  not  much 
regard  it,  but  thej"^  were  ea^er  to  obtain  a  loan  from 
England,  in  the  disposal  of  which  they  would  have 
been  quite  uncontrolled,  and  for  this  very  reason  lord 
Wellington  strenuously  opposed  it.  In  revenge,  the 
regenc)',  by  a  wilful  misunderstanding  of  the  debases 
of  parliament,  and  by  the  distortion  of  facts,  endeav- 
oured to  throw  a  doubt  upon  the  sincerity  of  England, 
and  this,  with  the  encouragement  given  to  all  Portu- 
guese malcontents  by  the  Whigs,  whose  clamour,  jusl, 
as  applied  to  the  ministers,  was  unjustly  extended 
to  the  generals,  greatly  increased  the  disorder  of  the 
times. 

In  this  state  of  afll'airs  Mr.  Canning  being  happily 
removed  from  office,  lord  Wellesley,  who  succeeded 
him,  changed  the  instructions  of  the  diplomatic  agents 
in  the  Peninsula.  They  were  now  directed  to  make 
conditions  with  respect  to  the  succours,  and  in  Portu- 
gal they  were  vigorously  to  interfere  in  all  civil 
changes,  augmentations  of  revenue,  and  military  re- 
sources ;  and  even  to  demand  monthly  reports  of  the 
condition  of  the  army,  and  the  expenditures  of  the 
subsidy.  Lord  Wellesley  also,  thinking  that  the  exam- 
ple of  a  cortes  in  Spain,  might  create  a  desire  for  a 
more  temperate  government  in  Portugal,  was  prepared 
to  forward  such  a  change,  provided  old  forms  were 
preserved,  and  that  all  appeared  to  flow  from  tlie 
prince  regent,  whose  consent  he  undertook  to  secuia. 
Resistance  to  the  enemy,  he  said,  would  be  in  propor- 
tion to  the  attachment  of  the  people,  and  hence  it  was 
advisable  to  make  timely  concessions,  giving  however 
no  more  than  was  absolutely  necessary. 

The  regency  was  strongly  opposed  to  this  notion 
of  a  cortes,  and  Mr.  Stuart  and  lord  Wellington 
affirmed,  and  truly,  that  the  docility  of  the  people,  and 
their  hatred  of  the  French,  were  motives  powerful 
enough  without  any  othe.'  stimulus,  to  urge  them  lo 
action.  Thus  the  project  fell  to  the  ground,  and  the 
time  wa-s  perhaps  inconvenient  to  effect  a  revolution  of 
this  nature,  which  the  people  themselves  certainly  did 
not  contemplate,  and  which,  as  Spain  bad  sb<;wn,  w^s 
not  a  certain  help  to  the  war.  Lord  Wellington,  who 
only  considered  what  would  conduce  to  the  success  of 


392 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Booir  XIV. 


the  war,  was  therefore  consistent  upon  this  occasion, 
but  it  is  curious  to  observe  the  course  of  the  Enoflish 
cabinet.  The  enforcement  in  France  of  a  military 
conscription,  authorized  by  the  laws,  was  an  unheard- 
of  oppression  on  the  part  of  Napoleon  ;  but  in  Portu- 
gal a  conscription,  enforced  by  foreiffiiers,  was  a  wise 
and  vigorous  measure;  and  lord  Wellesley  admitting 
that  the  Portuijuese  government  had  been  harsh  and 
cppiessive,  as  well  as  weak  and  capricious,  was  con- 
tent to  withhold  a  better  system  from  the  people, 
expressly  because  they  loved  their  country  and  were 
obedient  subjects  ;  for  he  would  have  readily  granted 
t  to  them  if  they  had  been  unruly  and  of  doubtful 
patriotism. 

Mr.  Smart  in  concert  with  lord  Wellington  diligent- 
y  endeavoured  to  remedy  the  evils  of  the  hour,  but 
"whenever  he  complained  of  any  particular  disorder,  he 
was,  by  the  regency,  offered  arbitrary  power  to  punish, 
which  being  only  an  expedient  to  render  the  British 
odious  to  the  people  he  refused.  The  intrigues  of  the 
P'idalgos  then  became  apparent,  and  the  first  regency 
was  broken  up  in  1810.  The  marquis  of  Das  Minas 
retired  from  it  under  the  pretext  of  ill  health,  but  really 
because  he  found  himself  too  weak  to  support  Mr.  De 
Mello,  a  Fidalgo  officer,  who  was  thrust  forward  to 
oppose  the  legal  authority  of  marshal  Beresford.  Mr. 
Cypriano  Freire  was  then  made  minister  of  finance, 
and  of  foreign  affairs,  and  Mr.  Forjas  secretary-at-war, 
with  a  vote  in  the  regency  on  matters  of  war.  But  the 
former  soon  after  Mr.  Stuart's  arrival  resigned  his  situ- 
ation in  consequence  of  some  disgust,  and  the  Conde 
Redondo,  having  undertaken  the  office,  commenced, 
with  the  advice  of  Mr.  Stuart,  a  better  arrangement 
of  the  taxes,  especially  the  "  c?ec?mff"  or  income  tax, 
which  was  neither  impartially  nor  strictly  enforced  on 
the  rich  towns,  nor  on  the  powerful  people  of  the 
Fidalgo  faction.  The  clergy  also  evaded  the  imposts, 
and  the  British  merchants,  although  profiting  enormous- 
ly from  the  war,  sought  exemption  under  the  factory 
privileges,  not  only  from  the  taxes,  which  in  certain 
cases  they  could  legally  do,  but  from  the  billets,  and 
from  those  recruiting  laws  affecting  their  servants, 
which  they  could  not  justly  demand,  and  which  all 
other  classes  in  the  community  were  liable  to. 

The  working  of  the  Souzas,  in  the  Brazils,  where 
the  minister  of  finance  wished  to  have  the  regulation 
of  the  Portuguese  treasury  under  his  control,  soon 
changed  this  arrangement.  Freire's  resignation  was 
not  accepted,  Redondo  was  excluded  from  the  govern- 
ment, and  l''orjas,  who  was  the  mo«t  efficient  member 
of  the  government,  was  deprived  of  his  functions.  The 
remaining  members  then  proposed  to  fill  up  Das  Minas' 
vacancy  themselves,  but  this  was  resisted  by  lord  Wel- 
lington, on  the  ground,  that,  without  the  prince's  order, 
the  proceeding  would  be  illegal,  and  involve  the  re- 
gency in  an  indefensible  quarrel  at  the  Brazils.  The 
order  for  removing  Redondo,  and  cram|)ing  the  utility 
of  Forjas,  he,  in  concert  with  Mr.  Stuart,  withstood  ; 
and  this,  for  the  moment,  prevented  a  change,  which 
would  have  impeded  the  ameliorations  begun.  Such, 
however,  was  the  disorder  in  the  finances,  that  Mr. 
Stuart  proposed,  as  tli."  least  difficult  mode  of  arrang- 
ing them,  to  take  the  whole  direction  himself,  England 
becoming  answerable  for  the  exnenditure  of  the  coun- 
try ;  lord  Wellington  thought  this  could  not  be  done, 
without  assuming,  at  the  same  tirnr;,  the  whole  govern- 
ment of  the  country,  which  he  had  previously  proposed 
to  the  British  cabinet,  but  whidi  it  was  now  too  late 
to  attempt,  and  Mr.  Stuart's  project  fell  to  the  ground. 

Anotb(;r  spring  of  mischief  soon  bubbled  up,  lord 
Strangford,  whose  diplomatic  dexterity  evinced  by  his 
Bruton-street  despatch,  had  been  rewarded  by  the  situ- 
Rlion  of  minister  at  the  Brazils,  was  there  bestirring 
himself.  It  had  been  the  policy  of  Mr.  Stuart  and  the 
English  general,  to  keep  the  regency  permanent,  and 


to  support  the  secretariats  as  they  were  placed  in  the 
hands  of  Mr.  de  Forjas  and  the  (/onde  de  Redondo;  for 
these  men  had  been  found  by  e\perience,  to  be  lietler 
qualified  to  co-operate  with  the  British  authorities  than 
any  other  persons,  and  hence  lord  Wellington  had  re- 
sisted the  prince's  orders  for  Cypriano  F^reire's  resimip- 
tion  of  office,  and  had  continued  the  functions  of  Forjae 
and  Redondo,  until  his  own  remonstrances  could  rc-jch 
the  Brazils.  In  this  state  of  affairs  lord  Strangford  in- 
formed Mr.  Stuart  that  he  had  persuaded  the  prince  tc 
accede  to  the  following  propositions.  1.  'Phat  the 
British  plenipotentiary  at  Lisbon,  the  count  Redondo, 
doctor  Nogueras,  and  the  principal  Souza,  should  be 
added  to  the  old  regency.  2.  That  admiral  Berkeley 
should  be  naval  commander-in-chief.  3.  That  all  trai- 
torous correspondence  should  be  prevented,  and  that 
measures  should  be  taken  to  limit  the  exuberant  power 
assumed  by  subordinates.  This  last  article  was  di- 
rected against  Forjas,  and  the  whole  went  to  establish 
the  preponderance  of  the  Souza  faction.  The  only 
useful  part  was  the  appointment  of  Mr.  Stuart  to  the 
regency,  but  this  was  arranged  before  it  was  known 
that  Mr.  Villiers  had  been  recalled,  and  conse(|uetitIy 
had  the  same  object  of  favouring  the  Souzas  in  view. 

Mr.  Stuart  and  lord  Wellington  strongly  objected  to 
this  change,  although  they  submitted  to  it  as  not  wish- 
ing to  appear  regardless  of  the  prince  regent's  rights. 
Mr.  Stuart,  however,  reflecting  that  a  government  com- 
posed of  men  having  different  views  and  feelings,  and 
without  any  casting  vote,  the  number  being  even,  could 
not  go  on  usefully,  was  at  first  averse  to  join  the  re- 
gency, but  was  finally  persuaded  to  do  so  by  lord  Wel- 
lington, who  justly  considered  that  his  presence  there 
would  give  the  only  chance  of  success. 

Doctor  Nogueras'  a|)pointment  was  described,  by 
lord  Strangford,  as  a  tribute  to  democracy,  the  object 
being  to  counteract  the  power  of  those  very  secretariats 
which  lord  Wellington  and  Mr.  Stuart  were  labouring 
to  preserve.  But  lord  Strangford  prided  himseli  chiefly 
upon  the  appointment  of  the  ])rincipal  Souza,  who,  he 
said,  had  been  recommended  to  him  by  Mr.  Villiers, 
an  avowal  ef  great  import,  as  shewing  at  once  the 
spirit  of  the  new  arrangement:  for  this  Souza  had,  in 
a  subordinate  situation,  hitherto  opposed  every  pro- 
ceeding of  the  British  in  Portugal  ;  he  was  the  avowed 
enemy  of  Beresford,  the  contriver  of  all  confusion,  and 
the  most  mischievous  person  in  Portugal;  and  his  ab- 
sence from  that  country  was  so  desirable,  that  iritima- 
tions  to  that  '^frot  had  been  formally  given  to  him,  by 
lord  Wellesley,  through  Mr.  Stuart.  This  fictions 
person  was  now,  however,  armed  with  additifjnal 
power,  to  thwart  the  English  authorities  in  Portugal, 
and  thus  lord  Strangford's  diplomacy  tended,  in  effect, 
to  ruin  that  cause  which  he  had  been  sent  to  the  Bra- 
zils to  support. 

In  relating  these  proceedings  I  have,  foUov.ing  his 
own  letter,  announcing  the  change,  described  lord 
Strangford  as  acting  voluntarily;  but  in  a  subsequent 
fkispatch  he  affirmed,  that  it  was  under  Mr.  Canning's 
instructions,  he  had  pressed  for  this  incorporating  of 
the  British  minister  in  the  regency,  and  that  Nogueras' 
appointment  s])rang  entirely  from  the  prince  regent's 
own  will,  which  he  did  not  choose  to  oppose.  In  like 
manner,  when  lord  Wellesley  was  inicnl  upon  asscio- 
bliug  a  cortes,  lord  Strangf  ird  called  it  "  n  i^reat  and  es- 
sential  measure  strnns^ly  and  wi'selt/  iir<j;ed  by  Ihe  jrnveriv- 
menf,^^  and  yet  afterwards  acknowledged  that  he  legr- 
lected  to  press  it,  because  he  thought  it  "  useless  and  even 
hurtful,''^  which  inconsistency  renders  it  dithcult  to  de- 
termine on  whom  these  affairs  rested.  As  affecting  Mr 
Canning's  policy,  however,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  if  he 
originally  arranged  this  change,  his  object  was  to  put  Mr. 
Villiers  in  the  regency,  not  with  any  view  to  the  more 
complete  controul  of  Portugal  for  Ihe  purposes  of  war, 
but,  as  the  instructions  to  sir  John  Cradock  prove,  to  ea- 


1811.] 


N  A  P I  E  li '  S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


393 


•nre  a  preponderance  to  the  diplomatic  department  over 
ihe  military  in  that  counlr}'. 

I'he  ]niiicipal  reforms,  in  the  administration,  which 
had  been  sougiit  for  by  lord  Wellington,  were  a  better 
arrar.jement  oi  the  financial  sjstetn — the  execntion  of 
Ihe  laws  without  fiivour  to  the  fidalf^os — the  suppres- 
sion of  the  '■'■  junta  de  viveres.^^  a  nejrli^ent  and  fraudu- 
lent board,  f)r  which  he  wished  to  establish  a  I'orlii- 
guese  commissariat — the  due  supply  of  provisions  and 
8*ores,  for  the  national  troops  and  fortresses — the  con- 
solidation of  the  arsenal  department  under  one  head — 
the  formation  of  a  military  chest,  distinct  from  the 
treasury,  which  was  always  diverlinfr  tlie  funds  to 
other  purposes — the  enforcintr  of  the  regulations  about 
the  means  of  transport — ihe  repairs  of  the  roads  and 
(jridges — the  reformation  of  the  hospitals — the  succour- 
ing of  the  starvinor  people,  and  the  revival  of  agricul- 
ture in  the  parts  desolated  by  the  war. 

These  things  he  had  hoped  to  accomplish  ;  but  from 
the  moment  the  change  effected  by  lord  Strancrford  took 
place,  unceasing  acrimonious  disputes  ensued  between 
ihe  British  commander  and  the  Portuguese  govern- 
ment, and  no  species  of  falsehooil  or  intrigue,  not  even 
persona!  insult,  and  the  writing  cf  anonymous  threat- 
ening letters,  were  spared  by  the  Souza  faction.  In 
the  beginning  of  1811  tl  ey  had  orcfanized  an  anti-Eng- 
lich  party,  and  a  plot  was  laid  to  force  the  British  out 
of  the  country,  which  would  have  succeeded  if  less 
vigilance  had  been  used  by  Mr.  Stuart,  or  less  vigour 
of  control  by  lord  Wellington.  This  plot  however  re- 
quired that  the  patriarch  should  go  to  the  northern  pro- 
vinces, a  journey  which  the  envoy  always  dexterously 
prevented. 

The  first  complaint  of  the  British  authorities,  accom- 
panied with  a  dem^md  for  the  removal  of  the  ])rincipal 
Souza,  reached  the  Brazils  in  February  1811.  and  Das 
Minas  died  about  the  same  time;  bvit  so  stronirly  was 
the  faction  supported  at  Rio  Janeiro,  that  in  May,  the 
riuce  regent  expressed  his  entire  approval  of  the 
Sonzas'  proceedings  and  his  higrh  displeasure  with 
Forjas  and  Mr.  Stuart.  His  minister,  the  Conde  de 
Linhares,  wrote,  that  the  capture  of  Massena  with  his 
whole  army,  which  he  expected  to  hear  of  each  day, 
would  not  make  amends  for  the  destruction  of  the  coun- 
try during  the  retreat  of  the  allies;  and  in  an  official 
note  to  lord  Strangford,  he  declared,  that  the  prince 
regent  could  not  permit  Mr.  Stuart  to  vote  in  matters 
concerning  the  internal  government  of  the  kingdom, 
because  he  was  influenced  by,  and  consulted  persons 
suspected  of  disafTection,  which  expression  lord  Strang- 
ford said  referred  solely  to  Forjas. 

The  prince  himself  also  wrote  to  lord  Wellington, 
accusing  Mr.  Stuart  of  acting  separately  from  the  com- 
mander-in-chief, and  of  being  the  cause  of  all  the  fac- 
tions which  had  sprung  up,  arid  he  declared  that  he 
would  not  remove  Souza,  unless  Mr.  Stuart  was  re- 
called. He  desired  that  Forjas,  who  he  affirmed  to  be 
the  real  author  of  the  opposition  complained  of  by  the 
British,  should  be  sent  to  the  Brazils,  to  answer  for 
his  conduct;  and  finally  he  announced  his  intention  to 
write  in  a  like  strain  to  the  kin<r  of  England.  To  this 
lord  Wellington  answered  that  finding  his  conduct  dis- 
approved and  Souza's  applauded,  he  proposed  to  quit 
Portugal.  Forjas  immediately  sent  in  his  resisjnation, 
admiral  Berkeley  proposed  to  do  the  same,  and  Mr. 
Stuart  withdrew  from  the  council  until  the  pleasure  of 
his  own  cabinet  should  be  made  known  :  the  war  was 
then  on  the  point  of  finishino-,  but  the  crisis  was  not 
perceived  by  the  public,  because  the  resolutior.  of  the 
English  general  was  kept  secret,  lo  avoid  di^tt'.rbing 
the  public  mind,  and  in  the  hopes  of  submission  on  the 
part  of  the  prince. 

Meanwhile  other  embarrassments  were  superadded, 
of  a  nature  to  leave  the  English  general  little  hope  of 
being  able  to  continue  the  contest,  should  he  even  defeat 


the  intrigues  at  Rio  Janeiro ;  for  besides  the  quarrel 
with  the  Souza  faction,  in  which  he  and  Mr.  Stuart 
supported  Forjas,  Nngueira,  and  Redondo,  against 
their  enemies  in  the  Brazils,  these  very  persons,  al- 
though the  best  that  could  be  found,  and  men  of  un- 
doubted ability,  influenced  partly  by  national  habits, 
partly  by  fears  of  ultimate  consequences,  continually 
harassed  him  in  the  execution  of  the  details  belongii.g 
to  their  ofiices.  No  delinquent  was  ever  punished,  no 
fortress  ever  stored  in  due  time  and  quantity,  the  suf- 
fering people  were  uncared  for,  disorders  were  unre- 
pressed.  the  troops  were  starved,  and  the  favouring  of 
the  fidalgos  constant.  The  '■'•junta  de  vn'e?-es"  was 
supported,  the  formation  of  a  military  chest,  and  com- 
missariat, delayed  ;  many  wild  and  foolish  schemes 
daily  broached  ;  and  the  natural  weakness  of  the  gov- 
ernment was,  by  instability,  increased,  because  the 
prince  regent  had  early  in  1811  intimated  an  intention 
of  immediately  returning  to  Europe. 

I  have  said  that  it  was  a  favourite  maxim  with  the 
regency  that  a  paternal  go.vernment  should  not  punish 
delinquents  in  the  public  service,  and  they  added  to 
this  another  still  more  absurd,  namely,  that  the  Portu- 
guese troops  could  thrive  under  privations  of  food, 
which  would  kill  men  of  another  nation  ;  with  these 
two  follies  they  excused  neglect,  whenever  the  repeti- 
tion, that  there  had  been  no  neglect,  became  fatiguing 
to  them.  Besides  this,  collisions  between  the  British 
commissariat  and  the  '^  junta  de  viveres'''  were  frequent 
and  very  hurtful,  because  the  former,  able  to  outbid,  and 
more  in  fear  of  failure,  overbought  the  latter ;  this  con- 
tracted the  already  too  small  sphere  of  their  activity, 
and  lord  Wellington  was  prevented  feeding  the  whole 
Portuguese  army  himself  by  a  curious  obstacle.  Ilis 
principal  dependance  for  the  support  of  his  own  troops 
was  upon  the  Spanish  muleteers  attached  to  the  army, 
they  were  the  very  life  and  sustenance  of  the  war,  and 
their  patience,  hardiness,  and  fidelity  to  the  British 
were  remarkable  ;  but  they  so  abhorred  the  Portuguese 
people  that  they  would  not  cairy  provisions  for  their 
soldiers,  and  lord  Wellington  only  obtained  their  ser- 
vices, for  those  brigades  which  were  attached  to  the 
English  divisions,  by  making  them  think  the  food  was 
entirely  for  ihe  latter.  Upon  such  nice  managetpent 
even  in  apparently  trifling  matters  did  this  war  depend. 
And  yet  it  is  not  uncommon  for  politicians,  versed  only 
in  the  classic  puerilities  of  public  schools,  and  the 
tricks  of  parliamentary  faction,  to  hold  the  rugged  ex- 
perience of  Wellington's  camp  as  nothing  in  the  for- 
mation of  a  statesman. 

The  efl.'ects  of  these  complicated  affairs  were  soon 
and  severely  felt.  Abrantes  had  like  to  have  been 
abandoned  from  want,  at  the  time  Massena  held  Santa- 
rem,  and  the  Portuguese  troops  were  starved  during 
that  general's  retreat ;  Bere^fo^d's  operations  in  the 
Alemtejo  were  impeded,  and  his  hospitals  were  left 
without  succour  ;  at  Fuentes  Onoro  ammunition  failed 
and  the  Portuguese  artillery  were  forced  to  supply 
themselves  by  picking  up  the  enemy's  bullets;  the 
cavalry  of  that  nation  were  quite  ruined,  and  out  of 
more  than  forty  thousand  regular  troops,  formed  by 
Beresford,  only  nineteen  thousand  were  to  be  found 
under  arms  after  the  battle  of  Albuera,  the  rest  had 
deserted  or  died  from  extreme  want. 

When  Massena  retreated  the  provincial  organization 
of  the  country  was  restored,  and  to  encourage  the  peo- 
ple to  sow  the  devastated  districts  before  the  season 
passed,  Mr.  Stuart  had  furnished  seed  corn  on  the 
credit  of  the  coming  subsidy  ;  aii  amnesty  for  deserters 
was  also  published,  the  feudal  imposts  for  the  year 
were  remitted,  and  fairs  were  established  to  supply 
tools  of  husbandry;  but  notwithstanding  these  efforta 
such  was  the  distress,  that  at  Caldas  eighty  persons 
died  daily,  and  at  Figueras  where  twelve  thousand 
people,  chiefly  from  Portuguese  Estremadura,  had  taken 


394 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[EooK  XIV. 


refuge,  the  daily  deaths  were  above  a  hundred,  and  the 
whole  would  have  perished  but  for  the  active  benevo- 
lence of  major  Von  Linstow,  an  officer  of  general 
Trant's  staff.  Meanuliile  the  country  was  so  overrun 
with  robbers  that  the  detached  officers  could  not  travel 
in  safely  upon  the  service  of  the  army,  and  Welling- 
ton was  fearful  of  being  obliged  to  employ  his  troops 
against  them.  British  officers  were  daily  insulted  at 
Lisbon,  and  even  assassinated  while  on  duty  with 
impunity  ;  the  whole  army  was  disgusted,  the  letters 
to  l-'ngland  were  engendering  in  that  country  a  general 
dis'ike  to  the  war,  and  the  British  soldiers,  when  not 
wit  1  their  regiments,  committed  a  thousand  outrages 
on   the  line  of  operations. 

As  a  climax  to  tiiese  scenes  of  misery  and  misrhief, 
the  harvest  which  had  failed  in  Portugal,  failed  also  in 
England  ;  and  no  corn  was  to  be  got  from  the  Baltic 
because  there  was  no  specie  to  pay  for  it,  and  bills 
were  refused.  Hence  the  famine  spread  in  a  ter- 
rible manner  until  Mr.  Stuart  obtained  leave  to  license 
fifty  American  vessels  with  corn,  whose  cargoes  were 
paid  for  out  of  funds  provided  partly  by  the  charity  of 
the  people  of  England,  and  partly  by  a  parliamentary 
grant  which  passed  when  Massena  retreated. 

In  this  crisis  the  British  cabinet  granted  an  additional 
subsidy  to  Portugal,  but  from  the  scarcity  of  specie, 
the  greatest  part  of  it  was  paid  in  kind,  and  the  distress 
of  the  regency  for  money  was  scarcely  lessened  ;  for 
these  supplies  merely  stood  in  the  place  of  the  plunder 
which  had  hitherto  prevailed  in  the  country.  Thus 
Mr.  Canniny:'s  prodigality,  Mr.  Vansiti.arl's  paper  sys- 
tem, and  Mr.  Perceval's  economy,  all  combined  to 
press  upon  the  British  general,  and  to  use  his  own 
words,  he  was  supplied  with  only  one-sixth  part  of  the 
nnney  necessary  to  keep  the  grreat  machine  going 
which  had  been  set  in  motion.  Mr.  Perceval  however, 
in  answer  to  his  remonstrances,  employed  a  secretary 
of  the  Treasury  to  prove  :n  a  laboured  paper,  founded 
entirely  upon  false  data,  that  the  army  had  been  over- 
supplied,  a!id  must  have  money  to  spare.  But  that 
minister,  whose  speeches  breathed  nothing  but  the 
final  destriictinn  of  France,  designed  lo  confine  the 
efforts  of  England  to  the  defence  of  Portugal  alone, 
without  any  regard  to  the  rest  of  the  Peninsula. 

Amongst  the  other  follies  of  the  Portuguese  res^ency 
was  a  resolution  to  issue  proclamations,  filled  with 
bombastic  adulation  of  themselves,  vulgar  abuse  of 
the  French,  and  altogether  unsuited  to  the  object  of 
raising  the  public  feeling,  which  flagged  \mder  their 
system.  To  the  English  general's  remouiitrances  on 
this  head,  Forjas  replied,  that  praise  of  themselves  and 
abuse  of  the  French  was  the  national  custom,  and 
could  not  be  dispensed  with  !  a  circumstance  which 
certain  English  writers  who  have  implicitly  fo'.lowed 
the  accounts  of  the  Portuguese  authors,  such  as  Accur- 
sio  de  iVeves,  and  men  of  his  stamp,  relative  to  French 
enormities,  would  do  well  to  consider.  And  here  it  is 
rijht  to  observe,  that  so  many  complaints  were  made 
of  the  cruelty  committed  by  Massena's  army  while  at 
Sanlarem,  that  lord  Wellington  had  some  thouijhts  of 
reprisals;  but  having  first  caused  strict  inquiry  to  be 
made,  it  was  discovered  that  in  most  cases,  the  orde- 
nanca,  after  having  submitted  to  the  French,  and 
received  their  protection,  took  advantage  of  it  to  de- 
stroy the  straoglerS  and  small  detachments,  and  the 
cruelly  cotnplained  of  was  only  the  infliction  of  legiti- 
mate punishment  for  such  conduct:*  the  projected 
retaliation  was  therefore  changed  for  an  injunction  to 
the  iirclenancas  to  cease  from  such  a  warfare. 

The  character  of  the  regency  was,  however,  most 
openly  shown  in  their  proceedings  connected  wiih  the 
convention  of  Cinlra.  All  the  advantages  which  that 
treaty  ensured  to  Portugal,  they  complacently  reaped. 


«  Mr.  Stuart's  Papers,  MSS. 


but  overlooked  or  annulled  those  points  in  which  iha 
character  of  England  was  concerned.  In  violation  of 
the  convention,  and  in  despite  of  the  remonstrances  of 
lord  Wellington  and  Mr  Stuart,  they  casl  the  French 
residents  at  Lisbon  into  loathsome  dungeons,  without 
any  cause  of  complaint;  and  in  tiie  affair  of  Masoar- 
heiias  their  conduct  was  distinguished  alike  by  wanton 
cruelty  and  useless  treachery.  This  youth,  when  only 
fifteen,  had  with  many  others  entered  the  P^rcnch  ser- 
vice in  Junot's  time,  under  the  permission  of  his  own 
prince  ;  and  he  and  the  Conde  de  Sabugal,  were  taken  by 
the  peasantry  in  1810  endeavouring  to  pass  from  Masse- 
na's army  into  Spain,  Sabugal  in  uniform,  Mascarhenas 
in  disguise.  They  were  both  tried  as  traitors.  The 
first,  a  general  officer,  and  with  powerful  friends 
amongst  the  Fidaljros,  was  acquitted,  as  indeed  was 
only  just;  but  he  was  then  appointed  to  a  situation 
under  the  regency,  which  was  disgraceful,  as  arising 
from  faction  :  Mascarheiias  was  a  boy,  and  had  no 
powerful  friends,  and  he  was  condemned  to  death. 
Lord  Wellington  and  Mr.  vSluart  represented  the  injus- 
tice of  this  sentence,  and  they  desired  that  if  humanity 
was  unheeded  the  government  would  put  him  to  death 
as  a  spy,  for  being  in  disguise,  and  so  prevent  the  dan- 
ger of  reprisals,  already  threatened  by  Massena.  The 
young  man's  mother  and  sisters,  grovelling  in  the  dust, 
implored  the  regency  to  spare  him,  but  to  shew  their 
hatred  of  lord  Wellington  and  Mr.  Stuart,  for  the  dis- 
putes with  the  regency  were  then  highest,  the  govern- 
ment told  the  miserable  women,  thai  it  was  the 
British  general  and  minister  who  demanded  his  death, 
and  they  were  sent,  with  this  brutal  falsehood,  to  weep 
and  to  ask  grace  from  persons  who  had  no  power  to 
grant  it.  Mascarhefias  was  publicly  executed  as  a 
traitor,  for  entering  the  French  service  under  the  au- 
thority of  his  native  prince,  while  Sabufjal  was  acquit- 
ted, and  even  rewarded,  although  precisely  in  the  satna 
circumstances,  when  the  excuse  of  the  disguise  had 
been  rejected. 

In  1810  one  Corea,  calling  himself  an  aide-de-camp 
of  Massena,  was  likewise  seized  in  disguise  within 
the  British  lines,  and,  having  given  useful  information, 
was  by  lord  Wellington  confined  in  St.  .lulians,  to  pro- 
tect him  from  the  Portuijuese  government.  After  a 
time  he  became  deranged,  and  was  released,  where- 
upon the  regency,  rather  than  keep  him,  desired  that 
he  might  be  sent  as  a  prisoner  of  war  to  England; 
thus  for  convenience  admitting  the  very  principle 
which  they  had  rejected  when  only  honour  and  human- 
ity were  concerned.  A  process  against  the  marquis 
d'Alorna  had  also  been  commenced,  but  his  family 
being  powerful  it  was  soon  dropped,  and  yet  the  gov- 
ernment refused  madame  d'Alorna  leave  to  join  her 
husband,  thus  shewing  themselves  spiteful  and  con- 
temptible as  well  as  cowardly  and  bloody.  Even  the 
court  of  Brazil  was  shocked.  The  prince  rebuked  ihe 
regency  severely  for  the  death  of  Mascarhefias,  re- 
versed the  sentences  on  some  others,  and  banished 
Sabugal  to  Terceira. 

This  was  the  political  state  of  Portugal. 

Lord  Liverpool's  intimation,  that  neither  corn  nor 
specie  could  be  had  from  E norland,  threw  lord  Wel- 
lington on  his  own  resources  for  feeding  his  troops. 
He  had  before  created  a  paper  money  by  means  of  com- 
missariat bills,  which,  being  paid  regularly  at  certair. 
periods,  passed  current  with  tiie  people  when  the  na- 
tional bonds  called  "  Apf)locies"  were  at  an  enormous 
discount.  He  now  in  concert  with  Mr.  Stuart,  entered 
into  commerce  to  supply  his  necessities.  For  having 
ascertained  that  grain  in  different  parts  of  the  world, 
especially  in  South  America,  could  be  bought  by  bills, 
cheaper  than  it  sold  f  )r  hard  cash  in  Lisbon  ;  and  that 
in  Egypt,  although  only  to  be  boucrht  with  specie,  it 
was  at  a  reduced  price;  they  employed  mercantile 
agents  to  purchase  it  for  the  army  account,  and  aftei 


1811.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


35)5 


fillinor  ihr*  n)ao;azinps  sold  the  overplus  lo  the  i:ihal)it- 
ants.     Tliis  transaction  was.  however,  <rreatly  impeded  ] 
by  the  disputes  wit!)  North  America,  which  were  now 
rapidly   hasteninor   to   a  rupture;  the  American   ships  : 
whicti    frequented  the  Tatrus  bein^  prevented    by  the  ; 
non-inipoTiation  act   from   brinrrincr  back  merchandize,  ; 
were  forced  to  demand  coin,  which  helped  to  drain  the 
country  of  specie.  I 

As  Sir.  Stuart  could   obtain  no   assistance  from  the 
f]n<Tlish   merchants  of  Lisbon,  to  aid    him   in  a  traffic 
which  !':t<-rfered  with  their  profits,  he  wrote  circular 
letters  to  the  consuls  in  the  Mediterranean,  and  in  the  , 
Portuijuese   islands,  and   to  the    EnsfHsh   minister  at 
Washiejton,  desirinsf  them  to  neij'tiate  treasury  bills; 
to  increase  the   sliipments  of  corn   to  Lisbon,  and  pay 
with  new  bills,  to  be  invested  in  such  articles  of  Brit- 
ish manufacture  as  the  non-importation   law  still  per- 
mitted to  oro   to  America.     By    this  complicated    pro- 
cess he  contrived   to   keep   sometliinir   in   the  military 
chest;    and    this    commerce,    which    lord    Wellington  ■ 
truly  observed,  was  not  what  oun-ht   to  have  occupied 
his  time   •ad  attention,  saved  the  army,  and  th"  people,  ' 
when  the  proceedings  of  Mr.  Perceval  would  have  de-  : 
stroyed  both.     Yet  it  was  aft'Twards  cavilled   at  and  ' 
censured  by  the  ministers,  on  the  representations  of  the 
merchants  who  found  th'ir  exorbitant  gains  interrupted 
by  it. 

Pressed  by  such  accumulated  difficulties,  and  not 
supported  in  England  as  he  deserved,  tlie  general,  who 
had  more  than  once  intimated  his  resolution  to  with- 
draw fro. a  the  Peninsula,  now  seriously  thought  of 
executing  it.  Yet  when  he  considered,  that  the  cause 
was  one  even  of  more  interest  to  England  than  to  the 
Peninstila ;  that  the  embarrassments  of  the  French 
niinfht  he  even  sireatpr  than  his  own,  and  that  Napoleon 
himself,  j'gantic  as  his  exertions  had  been,  and  were 
likely  to  he,  was  scarcely  aware  of  the  difficulty  of 
conquering  the  Peninsula  while  an  English  army  held 
Portugal ;  when  he  considered  also,  that  !i  jhl  was 
breaking  in  the  north  of  Europe,  that  the  chances  of 
war  are  many,  even  in  the  worst  of  times,  and  above  ' 
all,  when  his  mental  eye  caught  the  beams  of  his  own  ; 
coming  slory,  he  quelled  his  rising  indignation,  and 
fptempered  his  migtity  energies  to  bear  the  buffet  of  , 
the  tempest.  i 

But  he  could  not  remove   the  obstacles  that  choked  ; 
his  path,  nor  could  he  stand  still,  lest  the  around  should  [ 
open  beneath  his  f^et.     If  he  moved  in  the  north,  Mar- 
mont's  army  and  the  army  under  Bessieres  were  ready  , 
1 1  oppose  him,  and   he   must  take  Ciudad  Rodrigo  or ; 
blockade  it  before  he  could  even  advance  against  them,  ; 
To  take  that  place    required  a  battering-train,   to  be  ; 
brought  up   through   a   mountainous   country  from  La- ' 
rnetro,  and  there  was  no  covering  position  for  the  army  ; 
during  the  siege.     To  blockade  and   pass  it,  would  so 
weaken  his   forces,  already  inferior  to  the  enemy,  that 
he  could  do  nothinof  effectual  ;  meanwhile  Soult  would 
have  a'_nin  advanced   from  Llerena,  and   perhaps  have, 
ad  led  Elvas  to  his  former  conquests. 

To  act  on  the  defensive  in  Beira,  and  follow  up  the  , 
blow  atrainst  Soult,  by  invading  Andalusia,  in  concert 
with  the  Murcians  and  the  corps  of  Blake.  Beguines,  | 
and  Graham,  while  Joseph's  absence  paralysed  the 
army  of  the  centre;  while  the  army  of  Portugal  was 
bidnfj  reorganized  in  Castile  ;  and  while  Suchet  was 
still  engaged  with  Taragona,  would  have  been  an  ope- , 
ration  suitable  to  lord  VVellingt  n's  fame  and  to  the 
circumstances  of  the  moment.  But  then  Badajos  must 
have  been  blockaded  with  a  corps  powerful  enouirh  to 
have  defied  the  army  of  the  centre,  and  the  conrluct  of 
the  Portunruese  government  had  so  reduced  the  allied 
forces,  that  this  would  not  have  left  a  sufficient  army 
to  (rncotinier  Soult.  Hence,  after  the  battle  of  Albiie- 
ra.  the  only  thincr  to  be  done,  was  to  renew  the  sieje 
of  Badajos,  which,  besides  its  local  interest,  contained  | 


the  enemy's  bridge,  equipage  and  battering  train  ;  bat 
which,  on  common  military  calculations,  duild  scarce- 
ly be  expected  to  fall  before  Soult  and  Marmont would 
succour  it:  yet  ii  was  only  by  the  takinof  ol'  that  town 
that  PortU'j-al  itself  could  be  secured  beyond  the  pre- 
cincts of  Lisbon,  and  a  base  for  further  operations  ob- 
tained. 

According  to  the  regular  rules  of  art.  Soult  should 
have  been  driven  over  the  mountains  befi;ra  the  siege 
was  begun,  but  there  was  no  time  to  do  this,  and  Mar- 
rnont  was  equally  to  be  dreaded  on  the  other  side; 
wherefore  lord  Weliington  could  only  try,  as  it  were, 
to  snatch  away  the  fortress  from  between  them,  and 
he  who,  knowino  his  real  situation,  censures  him  for 
the  attempt,  is  neither  a  general  nor  a  statesman.  The 
question  was,  whether  the  attempt  should  be  ma<le  or 
tiie  contest  in  the  Peninsula  be  resigned.  It  failed, 
indeed,  and  the  Peninsula  was  not  lost,  but  no  argu- 
ment can  be  thence  derived,  because  it  was  the  at- 
tempt, rather  than  the  success,  which  was  necessary 
to  keep  the  war  alive;  moreover  the  French  did  not 
push  their  advantages  as  fir  as  they  might  have  done, 
and  the  unforeseen  circum.stance  of  a  large  sum  of 
money  being  brought  to  Lisbon,  by  private  specula- 
tion, at  the  moment  of  failure,  enabled  the  English 
general  to  support  the  crisis. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Second  EriGrlish  siege  of  Badajos — Means  of  >he  al'ips  vpry 
i!,-:uitv — Idace  invested — San  Christjval  a-<=aultecl — Tiie  al- 
lies repulsed — Second  assauU  fads  likewise — Tiie  siege 
tuinrid  inlj  a  blockade — Observations. 


SECOND    ENGLISH    SIEGE    OF    BADAJOS. 

There  is  no  operation  in  war  so  certain  as  a  modern 
siege,  provided  the  rules  of  art  are  strictly  followed, 
but,  unlike  the  ancient  sieges  in  that  particular,  it  is 
also  difFe-ent  in  this;  that  no  operation  is  less  open  to 
irregular  daring,  beciuse  the  course  of  the  engineer 
can  neither  he  hurried  nor  delayed  without  danger. 
Lord  Wellington  knew  that  a  siege  of  Badajos,  in  form, 
required  longer  time,  and  better  means,  than  were  al 
his  disposal,  but  he  was  f  reed  lo  incur  danger  and 
loss  of  reputation,  which  is  loss  of  strength,  or  to 
adopt  some  compendious  mode  of  taking  that  place. 
The  time  that  he  could  command,  and  lime  is  in  all 
sieges  the  greatest  point,  was  precisely  that  which  the 
French  required  to  bring  up  a  force  sufficient  to  dis- 
turb the  operation ;  and  this  depended  on  the  move- 
ments of  the  armv  of  Portugal,  whose  march  from 
Salamanca  to  Badajos,  by  the  pass  of  Banos,  or  even 
through  that  of  Gata,  could  not  be  stopped  by  general 
Spencer,  because  the  mouths  of  those  defi'es  were 
commanded  by  Marmont's  positions.  It  was  possible 
also  at  that  season,  for  an  army  to  pass  the  Tagus 
by  fords  near  Alcantara,  and  hence  more  than  twenty 
days  of  free  action  against  the  place  were  not  to  be 
calculated  upon. 

Now  the  carriages  of  the  battering  guns  used  in 
Bere.-ford's  siege  were  so  much  damaged,  that  the 
artillery  officerslasked  eleven  days  to  repair  thei.i ;  and 
the  scanty  means  of  transport  for  stores  was  much 
diminished  by  carrying  the  wounded  from  Albuera  to 
the  different  hos[dialsT  Thus  more  than  fifteen  days 
of  open  trenches,  and  nine  days  of  fire  could  not  be 
expected  With  good  gims,  plentiful  stores,  and  a 
<lorps  of  regular  sappers  and  miners,  this  time  would 
probably  have  sufficed  ;  but  none  of  these  things  were 
in  the  camp,  and  it  was  a  keen  jest  of  Picton  to  say, 
that  "lord  Wellington  sued  Badajos  in  forma  pau- 
peris." 

The  guns,  some  of  thera  cast  in  Philip  the  Second's 


996 


NAPIER'S    P  E  x\  I  N  S  U  L  A  R   WAR. 


[Book  XIV. 


reign,  were  of  snfi  brass,  and  false  in  their  bore  ;  the 
shot  were  of  dilTereiit  sizes,  and  the  larijest  too  small  ; 
the  Portu<Tuese  oriiiuiers  were  inexperienced,  there 
were  but  few  Briu.-.h  artillery-inen,  few  enjrineers,  no 
sappers  or  miners,  and  no  time  to  teach  the  troops  of 
the  line  how  to  make  fascines  and  gabions.  Retrnlar 
and  sure  approaches  a<iainst  the  body  of  the  place, 
by  the  Pardaleras  and  the  Picnrina  onlworks,  could 
not  be  attempted  ;  but  it  was  judged  that  Beresford's 
lines  of  attack  on  the  castle  and  Fort  Christoval,  niijiht 
be  successfully  renewed,  avoidintr  the  errors  of  that 
peneial ;  that  is  to  say,  by  pushing^  the  double  attacks 
simultaneously,  and  with  more  powerful  means.  San 
(/hrisloval  might  thus  be  taken,  and  batteries  from 
thence  could  sweep  the  interior  of  the  castle,  which 
was  meanwhile  to  be  breached.  Son;etiiinfr  also  was 
ho|red  from  the  inhabitanis,  and  something  from  the 
effect  of  Scult's  retreat  after  Albuera. 

This  determination  once  taken,  every  thing  was  put 
in  motion  with  the  greatest  energy.  Major  Dickscm, 
an  artillery  officer  whose  talents  were  very  conspicu- 
ous during  the  wiiole  war,  had  with  unexpected  rapid- 
ity, prepared  a  battering  train  of  thirty  twenty-four- 
pounders,  four  sixteen-pounders,  and  twelve  eight  and 
ten-inch  howitzers  made  to  serve  as  mortars  by  taking 
off  the  wheels  and  placing  them  on  trucks.  Six  iron 
Portugue?-e  ship-guns  were  forwarded  from  Salvatierra, 
making  altogether  fifty-two  pieces,  a  considerable  con- 
voy (jf  engineer's  stores  had  already  arrived  from  Alca- 
cer  do  Sal,  and  a  company  of  British  artijlery  marched 
from  Lisbon  o  be  mixed  with  the  Portuguese,  making 
a  total  of  six  hundred  gunners.  The  regular  engineer- 
officers  present,  were  only  twenty-one  in  number;  but 
eleven  volunteers  from  the  line  were  joined  as  assistant- 
engineers,  and  a  draft  of  three  hundred  intelligent  men 
from  the  line,  including  twenty-five  artificers  of  the 
staff  corps,  strengthened  the  force  immediately  under 
their  command. 

Hamilton's  Portuguese  division  was  already  before 
the  town,  and  on  the  24th  of  May,  at  the  close  of 
evening,  general  Houston's  division,  increased  to  five 
thousand  men,  by  the  addition  of  the  seventeenth  Por- 
t'lguese  regiment,  and  the  Tavira  and  Lagos  militia, 
invested  San  Christoval.  The  flying  bridtre  was  then 
laid  down  on  the  Guadiana,  and  on  the  27th  Picton's 
division,  arriving  from  Campo  Mayor,  crossed  tlie 
river,  by  the  ford  above  the  town,  and  joined  Hamilton, 
their  united  force  being  about  ten  thousand  men. 
General  Hill  commanded  tlie  covering  army  which, 
including  the  Spaniards,  was  spread  from  Merida  to 
Albuera.  The  cavalry  was  pushed  forward  in  ob- 
servation of  Soult,  and  a  few  days  afier,  intelligence 
having  arrived  that  Drouet's  division  was  on  the  point 
of  effecting  a  junction  with  that  marshal,  two  regi- 
ments of  cavalry  and  two  brigades  of  infantry,  which 
had  been  quartered  at  Coria,  as  posts  of  communica- 
tion with  Spencer,  were  called  up  to  reinforce  the 
covering  army. 

While  the  allies  were  engagfed  at  Albuera,  Phillipon, 
the  governor  of  Badajos,  had  levelled  their  trenches, 
repaired  his  own  damafres,  and  obtained  a  small  sup- 
ply of  wine  and  vegetables  from  the  people  of  Estre- 
inadura,  who  were  still  awed  by  the  presence  of 
Soult'i-.  army;  and  within  the  place  all  was  fjiiiet,  fr)r 
the  citizens  did  not  now  exci  ed  five  thousand  souls. 
He  had  also  mounted  more  guns,  and  when  the  place 
was  invested,  parties  of  the  townsmen  mixed  with 
soldiers,  were  observed  working  to  improve  the  de- 
fences; wherefore,  as  any  retrenchments  made  in  the 
castle,  behind  the  intencled  points  of  attack,  would 
have  frustrated  the  besiegers'  object  by  prolonging  the 
siege,  lord  Wellington  had  a  lar<ie  telescope  placed  in 
the  tower  of  La  Lyppe,  near  Elvas,  by  wliich  the 
interior  of  the  castle  could  be  plainly  looked  into,  and 
tU  preparations  discovered. 


In  the  night  of  the  2f)th,  ground  was  broken  for  a 
false  attack  against  the  Pardaleras,  and  the  following 
night  sixteen  hundred  workmen,  with  a  covering  party 
of  twelve  hundred,  sank  a  parallel  against  the  castle, 
on  an  extent  of  eleven  hundred  yards,  v.ithoiit  being 
discovered  by  the  enemy,  who  did  not  fire  until  after 
daylight.  The  same  night  twelve  hundred  workmen, 
covered  by  eight  hundred  men  under  arms,  opened  a 
parallel  four  hundred  and  fifty  yards  from  San  Chris- 
toval, and  seven  hundred  yards  from  the  bridge-head. 
On  this  line  one  breaching,  and  two  counter  batteries, 
were  raised  against  the  fort  and  against  the  briilge- 
head,  to  prevent  a  sally  from  that  point;  and  a  fourth 
battery  was  also  commenced  to  search  the  defences  of 
the  castle,  but  the  workmen  were  discovered,  and  a 
heavy  fire  struck  down   many  of  them. 

On  the  31st  the  attack  against  the  castle,  the  soil 
being  very  soft,  was  pushed  forward  without  much 
interruption,  and  rapidly;  but  the  Christoval  attack, 
being  carried  on  in  a  rocky  soil,  and  the  earth  brought 
up  from  the  rear,  proceeded  slowly,  ami  with  consid- 
erable  loss.  This  day  the  British  artillery  company 
came  up  on  mules  from  Esiremos.  and  the  engineer 
hastened  the  works.  The  direction  of  the  parallel 
against  the  castle  was  such,  that  the  right  gradually 
approached  the  point  of  attack  by  which  the  lieaviest 
fire  of  the  ])lace  was  avoided  ;  yet,  so  great  was  the 
desire  to  save  time,  that  l)efore  the  suitable  point  of 
distance  was  attained,  a  battery  of  fourteen  twenty- 
four-pounders  with  six  large  howitzers  was  marked 
out. 

On  the  Christoval  side,  the  batteries  were  not  finisfi- 
ed  before  the  night  of  the  Isl  of  June,  for  the  soil  was 
so  rocky,  that  the  miner  was  employed  to  level  the 
ground  for  the  platforms;  and  the  garrison  having 
mortars  of  sixteen  and  eighteen  inches  diametci 
mounted  on  the  castle,  sent  every  shell  amongst  th* 
workmen.  These  hug-e  missiles  would  have  ruined 
the  batteries  on  that  side  altogether,  if  the  latter  had 
not  been  on  the  edge  of  a  ridge,  from  whence  most  of 
the  shells  rolled  off  before  bursting,  yet  so  dilficull  is  il 
to  judge  rightly  in  war,  that  Phillipon  slopped  this 
fire,  thinking  it  was  thrown  away  !*  The  progress 
of  the  works  was  also  delayed  by  the  bringing  of  earth 
from  a  distance,  and  woolpacks  purchased  at  Elvas, 
were  found  to  be  an  excellent  substitute. 

In  the  night  of  the  2d,  the  batteries  on  both  sideis 
were  completed,  and  armed  with  forty-three  pieces  of 
different  sizes,  of  which  twenty  were  pointed  against 
the  castle;  the  next  day  the  fire  of  the  besiegers 
o[)ened,  but  the  windage  caused  by  the  smallin  ss  of 
the  shot,  rendered  il  very  ineffectual  at  first,  and  five 
pieces  became  unserviceable.  However,  before  eve- 
ning the  practice  was  steadier,  the  fire  of  the  fort  vvas 
nearly  silenced,  and  the  covering  of  masonry  fell  from 
the  castle-wall,  discovering  a  perpendicular  bank  of 
clay. 

in  the  night  of  the  .^d  the  parallel  against  the  castle 
was  prolonged,  and  a  fresh  battery  for  seven  guns  traced 
out  at  six  hundred  and  fifty  yards  from  the  breach. 
On  the  4th  the  garrison's  fire  was  increased  by  several 
additional  guns,  and  six  more  pieces  of  the  besiegers 
were  disabled,  principally  by  their  own  fire.  Mean- 
while the  batteries  told  but  slightly  against  the  bank 
of  clay. 

At  Christoval,  the  fort  was  much  injured,  and  some 
damage  was  done  to  the  castle,  from  one  of  the  batte- 
ries on  that  side ;  but  the  guns  were  so  soft  and  bad 
that  the  rate  of  firing  was  of  necessity  greatly  reduced 
in  all  the  batteries.  In  the  night  the  new  battery  wa.s 
armed,  all  the  damaged  works  were  repaired,  and  the 
next  day  the  enemy  having  brought  a  gun  in  Christo- 
val to  plunge  into  the  trenches  on   the  castle  side,  the 

•  Frt.ich  Rt'jjisler  of  the  Siege,  MSS. 


IBIl.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


3'Jr 


parallel  there  was  deepened  and  traverses  were  con- 
slriicted  to  protect  ihe  troops. 

F^ifteen  pieces  still  played  against  the  castle,  but  the 
hank  of  clay,  although  falling  away  in  flakes,  always 
remained  perpendicular.  One  damaged  gun  was  re- 
paired on  the  Christoval  side,  but  two  more  had 
become  unserviceable. 

In  the  niffht  the  parallel  against  the  castle  was 
fi'j-ain  extended,  a  fresh  battery  was  traced  out,  at  only 
five  iiundred  and  twenty  yards  from  the  breach,  to 
receive  the  Portuguese  iron  guns,  which  had  arrived  at 
I']|vas  ;  and  on  the  Christoval  side  some  new  batteries 
were  opened  and  some  old  ones  were  abandoned. 
During  this  night  the  garrison  beian  to  entrench  them- 
6e'ves  behind  the  castle  breach,  before  morning  their 
labourers  were  well  covered,  and  two  additional  pieces, 
from  (Christoval,  were  made  to  plunge  into  the  trenches 
with  great  effect.  On  the  other  h.md  the  fire  of  the 
hp^iecrers  had  broken  the  clay  bank,  which  look  such 
a  slope  as  to  appear  nearly  practicable,  and  the  stray 
shells  and  shots  set  fire  to  the  houses  nearest  the  cas- 
tle, hut  three  more  guns  were  disabled. 

On  the  6th  there  were  two  breaches  in  Christoval, 
and  the  principal  one  being  found  practicable,  a  com- 
pany of  g-renadiers  with  twelve  ladders  were  directed 
to  assault  it,  while  a  second  company  turned  the  fort 
by  the  east  to  divert  the  enemy's  attention.  Three 
Iiundred  men  from  the  trenches  were  at  the  same  time 
pushed  forward  by  the  west  side  to  cut  the  communi- 
cation between  the  fort  and  the  bri  Ige-head  ;  and  a 
detachment,  with  a  six-pounder,  moved  into  the  valley 
of  the  Gebora,  to  prevent  any  passage  of  the  Guadiana 
by  boats. 

FIRST    ASSAULT    OF    CHRISTOVAL. 

The  storming  party,  commanded  by  IMajor  M'Intosh, 
of  the  85th  regiment,  was  preceded  by  a  forlorn  hope 
aiider  Mr,  Dyas,  of  the  51st,  and  this  gallant  gentle- 
man, guided  by  the  engineer  Forster,  a  young  man  of 
uncommon  bravery,  reached  the  glacis  about  m.idnight, 
and  descended  the  ditch  without  being  discovered, 
'i'he  French  had,  however,  cleared  all  the  rnl>bish 
aw.iy,  the  breach  had  still  seven  feet  of  perpendicular 
wall,  many  obstacles,  such  as  carts  chained  toj^ether 
and  pointed  beams  of  wood,  were  placed  above  it,  and 
hircre  shells  were  ranged  along  the  ramparts  to  roll 
down  upon  the  assailants.  The  forlorn  hope  finding 
the  opening  impracticable,  was  retiring  with  little  loss, 
when  the  main  body,  which  had  been  exposed  to  a 
fliink  fire,  from  the  town  as  well  as  a  direct  fire  from 
t!ie  fort,  came  leaping  into  the  dit.-h  with  ladders,  and 
another  effort  was  made  to  escalade  at  different  points, 
the  ladders  were  too  short,  and  tho  garrison,  consisting 
of  only  seventy-five  men.  besides  the  cannoneers,  mad- 
so  stout  a  resistance,  and  the  confusion  and  mischief 
occasioned  by  the  bursting  of  the  shells  was  so  great, 
that  the  assailants  aofain  retired  with  the  loss  of  more 
than  one  hundred  men. 

Bad  success  always  produces  disputes,  and  the  cau- 
ses of  this  failure  were  attributed  by  some  to  the 
breach  being  impracticable  from  the  first ;  by  others  to 
the  confusion  which  arose  after  the  main  body  had 
entered.  French  writers  affirm  that  the  breach  was 
certainly  practicable  on  the  night  of  the  5lh,  but  re- 
paired on  the  6lh  ;  that  as  the  besiegers  did  not  attack 
until  midnight,  the  workmen  had  time  to  clear  the 
ruins  away  and  to  raise  fresh  obstacles;  and  the  bra- 
very of  the  soldiers,  who  were  provided  with  three 
muskets  each,  did  the  rest.*  But  it  is  also  evident, 
that  whether  from  inexperience,  accident,  or  other  cau- 
ses, the  combinations  for  the  assault  were  not  very 
well  calculated  ;  the  storming  party  was  too  weak,  the 
ladders  tew  and  short,  and  the  breach  not  su'nciently 

*   Laniarrt's  Siejjes. 


scoured  by  the  fire  of  the  batteries.  The  attack  itself 
was  also  irregular  and  ill-combined,  for  the  leading 
troops  were  certainly  repulsed  before  the  main  body 
had  descended  the  ditch.  The  intrepidity  of  the  assail- 
ants was  admitted  by  all  sides,  yet  it  is  a  great  point 
in  such  attacks  that  the  eupporls  should  form  almost 
one  body  with  the  leaders,  because  the  sense  of  power 
derived  from  numbers,  is  a  strong  incentive  to  valour, 
and  obstacles  which  would  be  insurmountable  to  a  few, 
seem  to  vanish  before  a  multitude.  It  is  also  to  be  rec- 
ollected that  this  was  a  case  where  not  loss  of  men,  but 
time  was  to  be  considered. 

During  this  night  the  iron  guns  were  placed  in  bat- 
tery against  the  castle,  but  two  more  of  the  brass 
pieces  became  unserviceable,  and  the  followitig  day 
three  others  were  disabled.  However,  the  bank  of 
clay  at  the  castle  at  last  offered  a  practicable  slope,  and 
during  the  night  captain  Patton  of  the  engineers  exam- 
ined it  closely;  he  was  wounded  mortally  in  returning, 
yet  lived  to  make  his  report  that  it  was  practicable. 
Nevertheless  the  garrison  continued,  as  they  had  done 
every  night  at  both  breaches,  to  clear  away  the  ruins, 
and  with  bales  of  wool  and  other  materials  to  form 
defences  behind  the  opening.  They  ranged  also  a 
number  of  huge  shells  and  barrels  of  powder,  with 
matches  fastened  to  them,  along  the  ramparts,  and 
placed  chosen  men  to  defend  the  breach,  each  man  be- 
ing supplied  with  four  muskets. 

In  this  order  they  fearlessly  awaited  another  attack, 
which  was  soon  made.  For  intelligence  now  arrived 
that  Drouet's  corps  was  close  to  Llerena,  and  that 
Mirmont  was  on  the  move  from  Salamanca,  and  hence 
lord  VVellington,  seeing  that  his  prey  was  likely  to  es- 
cape, as  a  last  effort  resolved  to  assault  Christoval 
again.  But  this  time  four  hundred  British,  Portu 
guese,  and  French  men  of  the  chasseurs  Britanniques, 
carrying  sixteen  long  ladders,  were  destined  for  tho 
attack;  the  supports  were  better  closed  up  ;  the  appoint 
ed  hour  was  nine  instead  of  twelve,  and  a  greater  num 
her  of  detachments  thin  before  were  distributed  to  the 
right  and  left  to  distract  the  enemy's  attention,  to  cut 
off  his  communication  with  the  town,  and  to  be  ready 
to  improve  any  success  which  might  be  obtained.  On 
the  other  side  Phillipon  increased  the  garrison  of  the 
fort  to  two  hundred  men. 

SECOND  ASSAULT  OF  CHRISTOVAL. 

The  storming  party  was  commanded  by  majoi 
M'Geechy  ;  the  forlorn  hope,  again  led  by  the  gal- 
lant Dyas,  was  accompanied  by  Mr.  Hunt,  an  engineer 
officer,  and  a  little  after  nine  o'clock  the  leading  troops 
bounding  forward,  were  immediately  followed  by  the 
support,  amidst  a  shattering  fire  of  musketry  which 
killed  major  M'Geechy,  Mr.  Hunt,  and  many  men  upon 
the  glacis.  The  troops  with  loud  shouts  jumped  into 
the  ditch,  but  the  P^rench  scoffingly  called  to  them  to 
come  on,  and  at  the  same  time  rolled  the  barrels  of 
powder  and  shells  down,  while  the  musketry  made 
fearful  and  rapid  havoc.  In  a  little  time  the  two  leading 
columns  united  at  the  main  breach,  the  supports  also 
came  u[i,  confusion  arose  about  the  ladders,  of  which 
only  a  few  could  be  reared,  and  the  enemy  standing  on 
the  ramparts,  bayoneted  the  foremost  of  the  assailants, 
overturned  the  ladders,  and  again  poured  their  destruc- 
tive fire  upon  the  crowd  below.  When  a  hundred  and 
forty  men  had  fallen  the  order  to  retire  was  given. 

An  assault  on  the  castle  breach  might  still  have  been 
tried,  but  the  troops  could  not  have  formed  between  the 
top,  and  the  retrenchments  behind  the  breach,  until 
Chiistoval  was  taken,  and  the  guns  from  thence  used 
to  clear  the  interior  of  the  castle  ;  hence  the  siege  was 
of  necessity  raised,  because  to  take  Christoval,  required 
several  days  more,  and  Soult  was  now  ready  to  advance. 
The  stores  were  removed  on  the  10th,  and  the  attack 
was  turned  into  a  blockade. 


398 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XIV, 


OBSERVATIONS. 

1.  The  allies  lost,  during  this  unfortunate  siege, 
nearly  four  hiiiidred  men  and  officers,  and  the  whole  of 
their  proceedings  were  against  rules.  The  working 
pariies  were  loo  weak,  the  guns  and  stores  too  few,  and 
the  points  of  attack,  chosen,  not  the  best;  the  defences 
were  untouched  by  counter-batteries,  and  the  breaching 
batteries  were  at  too  great  a  distance  for  the  bad  guns 
employed  ;  howitzers  mounted  on  trucks,  were  but  a 
poor  substitute  for  mortars,  and  the  sap  was  not  prac- 
tised ;  lastly,  the  assaults  were  made  before  the  glacis 
had  been  crowned,  and  a  musketry  fire  established 
against  the  breach. 

2.  That  a  siege  so  conducted  should  fail  against  such 
a  brave  and  intelligent  garrison  is  not  strange;  but  it 
is  most  strange  and  culpable  that  a  government,  which 
had  been  so  long  engaged  in  war  as  the  British,  should 
have  lef't  the  engineer  department,  with  respect  to  or- 
ganization and  equipment,  in  such  a  state  as  to  make 
it,  in  despite  of  the  officers'  experience,  bravery,  and 
zeal,  a  very  inefficient  arm  of  war.  The  skill  displayed 
belonged  to  particular  persons,  rather  than  to  the  corps 
at  large;  and  the  very  tools  with  which  they  worked, 
especially  these  sent  from  the  store-keeper's  department 
were  so  shamefully  bad  that  the  work  required  could 
scarcely  be  performed;  the  captured  French  cutting 
tools  were  eagerly  sought  for  by  the  engineers  as  being 
infinitely  belter  than  the  British  ;  when  the  soldiers' 
lives  and  the  honour  of  England's  arms  were  at  stake, 
the  English  cutlery  was  found  worse  than  the  French. 

3.  The  neglect  of  rules,  above  noticed,  was  for  the 
most  part  a  mritter  of  absolute  necessity  ;  yet  censure 
might  attach  to  the  gen.<^ra!,  inasmuch  as  he  could 
have  previously  sent  to  England  for  a  battering 
train.  But  then  the  conduct  of  the  Portuguese  and 
British  ffovermiients  when  lord  Wellington  was  in  tlie 
lines,  left  him  so  Utile  hope  of  besieging  any  place  on 
the  frontier,  that  he  was  hourly  in  fear  of  being  obliged 
to  embark  :  moreover  the  badness  of  the  Portuguese 
guns  was  not  known,  and  the  space  of  time  that 
elapsed  between  the  fall  of  Badajos  and  this  siege, 
was  insufficient  to  procure  artillery  from  England  ; 
neither  would  the  Portuguese  have  furnished  the 
means  of  carriage.  It  may  however  at  all  times  be 
taken  as  a  maxim,  that  the  difficulties  of  war  are  so 
innumerable  that  no  head  was  ever  yet  strong  enough 
to  fore-calculate  them  all. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

General  Spencer's  operations  in  Beira — Pack  blows  up  Ahnf  i- 
da — Marmoiit  :i)Mi<:hes  by  the  passes  to  the  Ta^us,  an  I  Spen- 
cer marches  to  the  Alemtejo — Souit  and  Maniiont  advance 
to  succour  Cachijos — The  sie<je  is  raised,  and  the  allies  pass 
the  Cluaitiana — Lord  Wtlli:)^ton's  position  on  the  Cava  de- 
scribed— Skirmish  of  cavalry  in  which  the  British  are  defeat- 
ed— Critical  period  of  the  war — French  marslials  censured 
for  not  ^ivinjT  battle — Lord  Wellington's  firmness — Inacti- 
vity of  the  Spaniards — Blake  moves  to  the  Condado  de 
Niebia — He  attacks  the  castle  of  Niebla — The  French  ar- 
mies retire  from  Badajos,  and  Soult  marches  to  An^ialusia — 
Succours  the  cattle  of  Niebia — Blake  flies  to  Ayamonte — 
Sails  for  Cadiz,  leaving  Ballesteros  in  the  Condado — French 
move  against  him — He  embarks  his  infantry  and  sends  his 
cavalry  throu<;h  Portuf^nl  to  F^'t^e^ladu^a — Blake  lands  at 
AInieria  and  joins  the  l\Iurcian  armv — Goes  to  Valencia,  and 
durino;'  his  absence  Soult  attacks  his  army — Rout  of  Baza — 
Soult  returns  to  Andalusia — His  actions  eulogised. 

It  will  be  remembered,  that  Soult  instead  of  retiring 
'Into  Andalusia,  took  a  flank  position  at  Llerena,  and 
avraited  the  arrival  of  Drouet's  division,  which  had 
been  detached  from  Massena's  army.  At  Llerena,  al- 
though  closely  watched    by    general   Hill,  t!ie  French 


marshal,  with  an  army,  oppressed  by  its  losses  and 
rendered  unruly  by  want,  maintained  an  altitude  of 
offence  until  assured  of  Drouet's  approach,  when  ha 
again  advanced  to  Los  Santos,  near  which  place  a 
slight  cavalry  skirmish  took  place  to  the  disadvantage 
of  the  French. 

On  the  14th,  Drouel,  whose  march  had  been  very 
rapid,  arrived,  and  then  Soult,  who  knew  that  lord 
Wellington  expected  large  reinforcements,  and  was 
desirous  to  forestal  them,  advanced  to  Fuenle  del 
Maestro,  whereupon  Hill  took  measures  to  concentrate 
the  coverinff  army  on  the  position  of  Albuera.*  Mean- 
while Marmonl,  who  had  reorganized  the  army  of  Por- 
tugal, in  six  divisions  of  infantry  and  five  brigades  of 
cavalry,  received  Napoleon's  orders  to  co-operate  with 
Soult;  and  in  this  view  had  sent  Reynier  with  two 
divisions  by  the  pass  of  Baiios,  while  himself  with  a 
considerable  force  of  infantry  and  cavalry  and  ten  guns 
escorted  a  convoy  to  Ciudad  Rodrigo.  General  Spen- 
cer, with  the  first,  fifth,  sixth,  and  light  divisions,  and 
one  brigade  of  cavalry,  was  then  behind  the  Agueda; 
and  Pack's  Portuguese  brigade  was  above  Almeida, 
which  had  been  again  placed  in  a  condition  to  resist 
an  irregular  assault.  Spencer's  orders  were  to  make 
his  marches  correspond  with  those  of  the  enemy,  if  the 
latter  should  point  towards  the  Tagus;  but  if  the  French 
attacked,  he  was  to  take  the  line  of  the  Coa,  and  to 
blow  up  Almeida  if  the  movements  went  to  isolate  that 
fortress.  On  ihe  morninj  of  the  6th,  Marmont,  having 
introduced  his  convoy,  marched  out  of  Rodrigo  in  two 
columns,  one  moving  upon  Gallegos,  the  other  upon 
Espeja.  The  ligrht  division  fell  back  before  the  latter, 
and  Slade's  cavalry  before  the  former;  but  in  this  re- 
trograde movement,  the  latter  gave  its  flank  obliquely 
to  the  line  of  the  enemy's  advance,  which  soon  closed 
upon,  and  cannonaded  it,  with  eight  pieces  of  artillery. 
Unfortunately  the  British  rear-guard  got  jammed  in 
between  the  French  and  a  piece  of  marshy  ground,  and 
in  this  situation  the  whole  must  have  been  destroyed, 
if  captain  Purvis,  with  a  squadron  of  the  fourth  dra- 
goons, had  not  charged  the  enemy  while  the  other 
troopers,  with  strong  horses  and  a  knowledge  of  the 
firmest  parts,  got  through  the  marsh.  Purvis  then 
passed  also,  and  the  French  horses  could  not  follow. 
Thus  the  retreat  w^as  effected  with  a  loss  of  only  twenty 
men.  After  the  action  an  officer  calling  himself  Mont- 
brun's  aid-du-camp  deserted  to  the  allies. 

General  Spencer,  more  distinguislied  for  great  per- 
sonal intrepidity  than  for  quickness  of  military  concep- 
tion, was  now  undecided  as  to  his  measures ;  and  liie 
army  was  by  no  means  in  a  safe  situation,  for  ine  coun- 
try was  covered  with  baggage,  the  movements  of  the 
divisions  were  wide,  and  without  concert,  and  general 
Pack  who  had  the  charge  of  Almeida  too  hastily  blew 
it  up.  In  this  uncertainly  the  adjutant-general  Paken- 
ham  pointed  out  that  the  P>ench  did  not  advance  as  if 
to  give  battle,  that  their  numbers  were  evidently  small, 
their  movements  more  ostentatious  than  vigorous,  and 
probably  intended  to  cover  a  flank  movement  by  the 
passes  leading  to  the  Tagus  :  he  therefore  urjed  Spen- 
cer either  to  take  up  a  position  of  battle  which  would 
make  the  enemy  discover  his  real  n\imbers  and  inter* 
lions,  or  retire  at  once  bc^hind  the  Coa,  with  a  View  tt 
march  to  lord  Wellington's  assistance.  These  argu 
ments  were  supported  by  colonel  Waters^  who,  having 
closely  watched  the  infantry  coining  out  of  Ciudad 
Rodrigo,  observed  that  they  were  too  clean  and  M-ell 
dressed  to  have  corne  off  a  long  march,  and  must  Chere- 
fore  be  a  part  of  the  garrison.  He  had  also  ascertained 
that  a  large  body  was  actually  in  movement  towards 
the  passes. 

Spencer  yielding  to  these  representations  marched 
in  the  evening  by  Alfayates  to  Soito,  and  the  next  day 

*  Intercepted  despatch  frcn  Soult  to  Marmonl. 


IPII. 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


399 


behind  Jhe  Coa.  Here  certain  intpnijrence,  tlinl  Mar- 
mont  was  in  the  passes,  reached  him,  and  hecontinuf'd 
his  march  to  the  Alenilejo  by  Peiiamacor,  but  detached 
one  division  and  his  cavalry  to  Coria,  as  flankers,  while 
he  passed  with  the  main  holy  by  Castello  Branco, 
Vilha  Velha,  Niza,  and  Portaletjre.  The  season  was 
burninjjand  the  maiches  long,  yet  so  hardened  by  con- 
stant service  were  the  liojht  division,  and  so  well  or^ra- 
nized  by  general  Craufurd,  that,  although  covering 
from  eighteen  to  eight-and-twenty  miles  daily,  they 
did  not  leave  a  single  straggler  behind.  The  flanking 
troops,  who  had  been  rather  unnecessarily  exposed  at 
Coria,  then  followed,  and  Marmont  having  imposed 
upon  Spencer  and  Pack  by  his  demonstration  in  front 
of  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  filed  off  by  the  pass  otT  Perales, 
while  Reynier  moved  by  the  passes  of  Cejar  and 
Banos,  and  the  whole  were  by  forced  marches  soon 
united  at  the  bridge  of  Almaraz.  Here  a  pontoon 
bridnre  expected  from  Madrid  had  not  arrived,  and  the 
passage  of  the  Tagus  was  made  with  only  one  ferry- 
boat which  caused  a  delay  of  four  days,  which  would 
have  proved  fatal  to  Badajos,  if  the  battering  guns  em- 
ployed in  that  siege  had  been  really  effective. 

When  the  river  was  crossed,  the  French  army  march- 
ed in  two  columns  with  the  greatest  rapidity  upon 
Merida  and  Medellin,  where  they  arrived  the  18th, 
and  opened  their  communications  with  Soult. 

On  the  other  side,  lord  Wellington  had  been  atten- 
tively watching  these  movements;  he  had  never  in- 
tended to  press  Badajos  beyond  the  10th,  because  he 
knew  that  when  reinforced  with  Drouet's  division, 
vSoult  alone  would  be  strong  enough  to  raise  the  siege, 
and  hence  the  hurried  assaults ;  but  he  was  resolved  to 
fight  Soult,  and  although  he  raised  the  siege  on  the 
ibth.  yet,  by  a  deciphered  intercepted  letter,  that  Phil- 
lipon's  provisions  would  be  exhausted  on  the  20th,  he 
contii.ued  the  blockade  of  the  place,  in  hopes  that  some 
such  accident  of  war  as  the  delay  at  Almaraz  might 
i.apede  Marmont.  It  may  be  here  asked,  why,  as  he 
knew  a  few  days  would  suffice  to  reduce  Badajos,  he 
did  not  retrench  his  whole  army  and  persist  in  the 
siege]  The  answer  is  that  Elvas  being  out  of  repair, 
and  exhausted  both  of  provisions  and  ammunition,  by 
the  sieg»^  of  Badajos,  the  enemy  would  immediately 
have  takf n  that  fortress. 

When  Soult's  advanced  guard  had  reached  Los  San- 
tos, the  coverincr  army,  consisting  of  the  second  and 
f<urlh  divisions  and  Blake's  Spaniards  was  concen- 
trated at  Albuera,  Hamilton's  Portuguese  were  also 
directed  there  from  Badajos;  meanwhile  the  tliird  and 
seventh  divisions  maintained  the  blockade,  and  Wel- 
lington expecting  a  battle  repaired  in  person  to  Albue- 
ra, but,  usilike  Beresford,  he  h;id  that  position  entrench- 
ed, and  did  not  forget  to  occupy  the  hill  on  the  right. 

On  the  14th,  it  v/as  known  that  Marmont  was  at 
Truxillo,  and  that  in  four  days  he  could  unite  with 
Soult,  wherefore  the  blockade  was  also  raised  with  a 
view  to  repass  the  Guadiana,  yet  Wellington  still  lin- 
gered at  Albuera  hoping  to  fall  on  Soult  separately, 
but  the  cautious  manner  in  which  the  latter  moved, 
continually  refusing  his  left  and  edging  with  his  right, 
towards  Alinendralejos,  soon  extinguished  this  chance  ; 
on  the  17th,  the  blockade  having  been  raised  the  day 
befoie,  the  allies  repassed  the  Guadiana  in  two  columns. 
The  British  and  Portuguese  moved  by  the  pontoon 
bridge  near  Badajos,  the  Spaniards  crossed  at  Jeru- 
mrnha; — this  movement,  not  an  easy  one,  was  exe- 
cuted without  any  loss  of  men  or  stores,  and  without 
accident,  save  that  general  W'illiam  Stewart  by  some 
error,  took  the  same  line  as  Blake,  and  at  night  fell  in 
with  the  Spaniards,  who  thought  his  division  French 
and  were  like  to  have  fired. 

The  19lh  the  united  French  armies  entered  Badajos, 
which  was  thus  succoured  after  two  most  honourable 
defences,  and  at  a  moment  when  Phillipon,  despairing 


of  aid  and  without  provisions,  was  preparing  his  means 
of  breaking  out  and  escaping. 

The  31st  Godinot's  division  which  had  marched  by 
Valverde  took  possession  of  Olivenza;  the  2"3d  he 
pushed  a  detachment  under  the  guns  of  Jerumenha, 
and  the  same  day  the  whole  of  the  Fre-ich  cavalry 
crossed  the  Guadiana  in  two  columns,  advancing  to- 
wards Villa  Viciosa  and  Elvas  on  one  side,  and  Campo 
Mayor  on  the  other. 

Lord  Wellington  being  now  joined  by  the  head  of 
Spencer's  corps,  had  placed  his  army  on  both  sides 
of  the  Caya,  with  cavalry  posts  towards  the  mouth  cf 
that  river  and  on  the  Guadiana  in  front  of  Elvas.  His 
rifrht  wing  was  extended  behind  the  Caya  to  the  lower 
bridge  on  that  river,  and  his  left  wing  had  a  field  of 
battle  on  some  high  ground  resting  on  the  Gebora,  a 
little  beyond  Campo  Mayor,  which  fortress  was  occu- 
pied, and  the  open  space  between  it  and  the  hltjh 
ground  strongly  entrenched.  On  this  side  also  cavalry 
were  posted  in  observation  beyond  the  Gebora  and 
about  Albuquerque,  the  whole  position  forming  an  ir- 
regular arch  embracing  the  bridge  of  Badajos.  The 
wood  and  town  of  Aronches  were  behind  the  centre  of 
the  position  and  the  l*tle  fortified  place  of  Ouguella 
was  behind  the  left;  but  the  right  wing  vv-as  much 
more  numerous  than  the  left,  and  the  Monte  Rpguingo, 
a  wooded  ridge  between  Campo  Mayor  and  the  Caya, 
was  occupied  by  the  light  division,  whose  position 
could  not  be  recognized  by  the  enemy. 

If  the  French  attacked  "the  left  of  the  allies,  a  short 
movement  would  have  sufficed  to  bring  the  bulk  of  the 
troops  into  action  on  the  menaced  point,  because  the 
whole  extent  of  country  occupied  did  not  exceed  ten 
or  twelve  miles  :  the  communications  also  were  good, 
and  from  Campo  Mayor  open  plains,  reaching  to  Bada- 
jos, exposed  the  French  movements  which  could  be 
distinguished  both  from  Elvas,  from  Campo  Mayor, 
and  from  the  many  atalayas  or  watch-lowers  on  that 
frontier. 

The  chief  m.erit  of  this  position  was  the  difficulty  of 
recognizing  it  from  the  enemy's  side,  and  to  protect 
the  rear,  the  first  division  was  retained  at  Portilegre : 
from  thence  it  could  intercept  the  enemy  at  Marvao  or 
Castello  de  Vide  if  he  should  attempt  to  turn  the  allies 
by  Albuquerque;  and  was  ready  to  oppose  Soult  if  he 
should  move  between  Elvas  and  Extremes;  but  the 
march  from  Portalegre  was  too  long  to  hope  fov  the 
assistance  of  this  division  in  a  battle  near  P'lvas  or 
Campo  Mayor. 

The  French  cavalry,  as  I  have  said,  passed  the 
Guadiana  on  the  21st,  both  by  the  bridge  of  Badajos 
and  by  two  fords,  where  the  road  of  Olivenza  crosses 
that  river,  below  the  confluence  of  the  Caya.  The 
right  column  after  driving  back  the  outposts  of  the 
allies,  was  opposed  by  the  heavy  dragoons,  and  b 
Madden's  Portuguese,  and  retired  without  seeing  the 
position  on  the  Campo  Mayor  side ;  but  the  horseuien 
of  the  left  column,  while  patrolling  towards  Villa 
Viciosa  and  Elvas,  cut  off  a  squadron  of  the  eleventh 
dragoons,  and  the  second  German  hussars  which  were 
on  the  Guadiana  escaped  to  Filvas  with  difficulty  and 
loss.  The  cause  of  this  misfortune  in  which  nearly  X 
hundred  and  fifty  men  were  killed  or  taken  is  not  verj 
clear,  for  the  French  aver  that  colonel  Lallemand,  by 
a  feigned  retreat  drew  the  cavalry  into  an  ambuscade, 
and  the  rumours  in  the  English  camp  were  various 
and  discordant. 

After  this  action  the  French  troops  were  quartered 
alonff  the  Guadiana  and  above  and  below  Badajos 
from'Xeres  de  los  Cavalheiros  to  Montijo,  and  pro- 
ceeded to  collect  provisions  for  themselves  and  for 
the  fortress,  hence,  with  the  exception  of  a  vair 
attempt  on  the  2Glh  to  cut  off  the  cavalry  detachments 
on  tht  side  of  Albuquerque,  no  farthet  operations  took 
place, 


400 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XIV. 


All  lliintrs  harl  'sppm'^d  to  tend  to  a  great  and  decisive    what  witli  desertion,  famine,  and  sickness,  that  flour- 


1 


ballle,  and,  although  ihe  crisis  glided  awaj'  without 
any  event  of  importance,  this  was  one  of  the  most 
critical  periods  of  the  war.  Fi  r  Marmont  hrought 
down,  including  a  detachment  of  the  army  of  the 
centre,  thirty-one  thousand  infantry,  four  thousand  five 
hundred  cavalry,  and  fifty  four  guns;  Soult  about 
twenty-five  thousand  infantry,  three  thousand  cavalry, 
and  thirty-six  guns; — to  effect  this,  Andalusia  and 
Castile  had  been  nearly  stripped  of  troops.  Bessieres 
had    abandoned     the    .Asturias,    united     with    general 


ishing  army  which  had  mustered  more  than  forty 
thousand  good  soldiers  in  line,  at  the  time  of  Mas- 
sena's  invasion,  could  now  scarcely  produce  four- 
teen thousand  for  a  battle  on  which  the  fate  of  viieir 
country  depended.  The  British  troops,  although  large 
reinforcements  had  come  out,  and  more  were  arrivii\g, 
had  so  many  sick  and  wounded,  that  scarcely  twenty- 
eitrht  thousand  sabres  and  bayonets  were  in  the  field. 
The  enemy  had  therefore  a  superiority,  of  one  fourth 
in  artillery  and  infantry,  and  the  strength  of  his  caval- 


Mayer,  who  had  succeedid  Serras  in  Leon,  was  ,  ry  was  double  that  of  the  British 
scarcely  able,  as  we  have  seen,  to  keep  the  Gallicians  j  To  accept  battle  in  such  circumstances,  military 
in  check  on  the  Orbijo,  the  chief  armies  of  the  Penin-  I  considerations  only  being  had  in  view,  would  have 
sular  were  in  presence,  a  great  battle  seemed  to  be  the  ]  been  rash  in  the  extreme,  but  the  Portuguese  govern- 
interesl  of  the  French,  and  it  was  in  their  option  to  '  ment  besides  throwing  the  subsistence  of  the  troops 
fight  or  not.  Their  success  at  Badajos,  and  the  sur-  '  upon  Elvas,  had  utterly  neglected  that  place,  and  Jeru- 
prise  of  the  cavalry  on  the  Caya  had  made  ample  nienha.  Campo  Mayor,  and  Ouguella,  Aronches  and 
amends  for  their  losses  at  Los  Santos  and  Usagre,  and  Santa  Olay,  which  were  the  fortresses  covering  this 
Badajos    was    succoured,    and   the    allied    frontier;   neither  had  they  drawn  fortii  any  means  of 

transport  from  the  country.  The  siege  <f  Badajos 
had  been  entirely  furnished  from  F]lvas  ;  but  all  the 
carls  and  animals  of  burthen  tli;iT  could  he  found  in 
the  vicinity,  or  as  far  as  the  British  detachments  could 
go ;  and  all  the  commissariat  means  to  boot,  were 
scarcely  sufficient  to  convey  the  ammunition,  the  stores, 
and  the  subsistence  of  the  native  troops,  day  by  day, 
from  Elvas  to  the  camp;  there  was  consequently  no 
possibility  of  replacing  these  things  from  the  British 
magazines  at  Abraut^s  and  Lisbon. 

When  the  allies  crossed  the  Guadiana  in  retreat, 
Elvas  had  only  ten  thousand  rounds  of  shot  left,  and 
not  a  fortnight's  provisions  in  store,  even- for  her  own 
garrison  ;  her  works  were  mouldering  in  many  places, 
from  want  of  care,  houses  and  enclosures  encumbered 
her  glacis,  most  of  her  guns  were  rendered  unservicea- 
ble by  the  fire  at  Badajos,  the  remainder  were  very 
bad,  and  her  garrison  was  composed  of  untried  sol- 
diers and  militia.  Jerumenha  was  not  belter  looked 
to;  Olaya,  Campo  Mayor,  and  Ouguella  had  nothing 
but  their  walls.     It  would  appear  then,  that  if  Soult 


now,  wli 

army  in  a  manner  driven  into  Portugal,  Albuera  seemed 
to  be  a  victory.     The  general  result  of  the  Estrema- 
dura  campaign  had  been  favojpable  to  them,  and  the 
political  sta'e  of  their  aflfairs  seemed   to  require  some 
dazzling  action  to  impose  upon  the  peninsulars.    Their 
arm}'  was  powerful,  and  as  they  were  especially  strong 
in  cavalry,   and   on    favourable  ground    for  that  arm, 
there  could  scarcely  be  a  better  opportunity  fiir  a  blow, 
which  would,  if  successful,  have  revenged   Massena's 
disasters,  and  sent  lord   Wellington  back  to  Lisbon, 
perhaps  from  the  Peninsula  altogether ;  if  unsuccessful 
not  involvtnnr  any  very  serious  consequences,  because  : 
from  their  strength  of  horse  and  artillery,  and  nearness  . 
to  Badajos,  a  fatal  defeat  was  not  to  be  expected.     But  j 
the  allied   army   was  thought  to   be  stronger  by  the  j 
whole  aiTiount  of  the  Spanish  troops,   than  it    really 
was;   the  position  very  difficult  to  be  examined  was 
confidently  held  by  lord  Wellington,  and  no  battle  took 
place. 

Napoleon's  estimation  of  the  weioht  of  moral  over 
physical    force   in   war  was    here  finely    exemplified 


Both  the  French  armies  were  conscious  of  recentdcfeats,  [had  been  aware  of  this  slate  of  affairs,  he  might  under 


Busaco,  Sahugal,  Fuentes,  and  the  horrid  field  of 
Albuera.  wi^re  fresh  in  their  memory;  the  fierce  blood 
there  spilled,  siill  reeked  in  their  nostrils,  and  if  Caesar 
after  a  partial  check  at  Dyrracchiaum  held  it  unsafe  to 
fight  a  pitched  battle  with  recently  defeated  soldiers, 
however  experienced  or  brave,  Soult  may  well  be 
excused,  seeing  that  he  knew  there  were  divisions  on 
the  Caya,  as  good  in  all  points,  and  more  experienced, 
than  those  he  had  fought  with  on  the  banks  of  the 
Albuera.  The  stern  nature  of  the  British  soldier  had 
been  often  before  proved  b}'  him,  and  he  could  now 
draw  no  hope  from  the  unskilfulness  of  the  general. 
Lord  Wellington's  resolution  to  accept  battle  on  the 
banks  of  the  Caya,  was  nevertheless,  one  of  as  un- 
mixed greatness,  as  the  crisis  was  one  of  unmixed 
danger  to  the  cause  he  supported.  For  the  Portuguese 
government,  following  up  the  system  which  I  have 
already  described,  had  reduced  their  troops  to  the 
lowest  degree  of  misery,  and  the  fortresses  were,  at 
times,  only  not  abandoned  to  the  enemy.  The  British 
government  had  taken  the  native  troops  into  pay,  but 
it  had  not  undertaken  to  feed  them  ;  yet  such  was  the 
suffering  of  tliose  brave  men  that  VVellinglon,  after 
re|)eate(lly  refusing  to  asJst  them  from  the  English 
stores,  unable  longer  to  endure  the  sight  of  their  mis- 
fortunes, and  to  prevent  them  from  disbanding,  at  last 
i>d  tiie  six  brigades,  or  three-fourths  of  the  whole 
army,  tne  i';nglish  commissariat  charging  the  expense 
to  the  subsidy.  He  iiopwl  that  the  government  would 
then  supply  the  remnant,  but  they  starved  it  likewise, 
and  during  ihe^siege  of  Badajos  these  troops  were 
of  necessity  thrown  for  subsistence  upon  the  mag- 
azines   of   Elvas,  which    were    thus   exhausted;  and 


cover  of  the  Guadiana,  have  collected  his  army  belo'.v 
the  confluence  of  the  Caya,  and  then  by  means  of  the 
pontoon  train  from  Badajos,  and  by  the  fords  at  which 
his  cavalry  did  pass,  have  crossed  the  Guadiana, 
overpowered  the  right  of  the  allies,  and  suddenly 
investing  Elvas,  have  covered  his  army  wiih  lines, 
which  would  have  ensured  the  fall  of  th,it  place  ;  un- 
less the  English  general,  anticipating  such  anatt,em|)t, 
had,  with  very  inferior  numbers,  defeated  him  betwet^i 
the  Caya  and  Elvas.  But  this,  in  a  perfectly  open 
country,  offering  no  advantages  to  the  weaker  army, 
would- not  have  been  easy.  Soult  also,  by  marching 
on  the  side  of  Estremos.  could  have  turned  the  right, 
and  menaced  the  communications  of  the  allies  with 
Abrantes,  which  would  have  obliged  him  to  retreat  and 
abandon  Elvas  or  fiirht  to  disadvantage.  The  position 
on  the  Caya  was  theref(>re  taken  up  solely  with  refi-r- 
ence  to  the  state  of  political  allairs.  li  was  intended 
to  impose  upon  the  enemy,  and  it  did  so;  Elvas  and 
Jerumenha  must  otherwise  have*  fallen. 

While  a  front  of  batt'e  was  thus  presented,  the  rear 
was  cleared  of  all  the  hospitals  and  heavy  bigg-age; 
workmen  were  da)'^  and  night  einpl  jyed  to  restore  the 
fortifications  of  the  strong  places,  and  guns,  ammu- 
nition, and  provisions  were  brought  up  from  Abrantes, 
by  nteans  of  the  animals  and  carts  before  employed 
in  the  siege  of  Badajos.  Until  all  this  was  effected 
Portugal  was  on  the  brink  of  perdition,  but  the  true 
peninsular  character  was  now  displayed,  and  in  a 
maimer  that  proclaims  most  forcibly  the  dilficulties 
overcome  by  the  l']uglish  general,  difficulties  which 
have  been  little  appreciated  in  his  own  country.  The 
danger   of  Elvas    had   aroused    all    the    bustle  of  th» 


1811.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


401 


Portuguese  governmpnt,  and  the  regency  were  at  first  I 
frightened  at  the  consequences  of  their  own  conduct;  i 
Dut  wiien    they    found   their   own    tardy    efforts  were  | 
forestalled  by   the  dilio-ence  of  lord   Wellington,  they 
with   prodigious  efTroiilery  asserted,  that  he  had   ex- 
h;;usted  Elvas  for  the  supply  of  the  British  troops,  and 
that  th>,'y  iiad  replenished  it ! 

Hi=5  imperturbable  firmness  at  this  crisis  was  won- 
derful, and  the  more  admirable,  because  Mr.  Perceval's 
polic},  prevailing  in  the  cabinet,  had  left  him  without 
a  halfpenny  in  the  military  chest,  and  almost  without 
a  ho])o  of  support  in  his  own  country;  yet  his  daring 
was  not  a  wild  cast  of  the  net  for  fortune  ;  it  was 
supported  by  great  circumspection,  and  a  penetration 
and  activity  that  let  no  advantages  escape.  He  had 
thrown  a  wide  glance  over  the  Peninsula,  knew  his 
true  situation,  liad  pointed  out  to  the  Spaniards  how  to 
push  their  war  to  advantage,  while  the  French  were 
thus  concentrated  in  Estremadura,  and  at  this  period 
had  a  right  to  expect  assistance  from  them ;  for  Soult 
and  Marmont  were  united  at  Badajos,  the  army  of  the 
north  and  the  army  of  the  centre  were  paralysed  by 
the  flight  of  the  king,  and  this  was  the  moment,  when 
Figueras  having  been  surprised  by  Rovira,  and  Tara- 
gi,:ia  besieged  b}'  Snchet,  the  French  armies  of  '^/ata- 
ionia  and  Aragon  were  entirely  occupied  with  those 
places.  Thus,  nearly  the  whole  of  the  Peninsula  was 
open  to  the  enterprizes  of  the  Spaniards.  They  could 
have  collected,  of  Murcians  and  V'alencians  only, 
above  forty  thousand  regulars,  besides  p.irtizans,  with 
wiiich  they  might  have  marched  against  Madrid, 
while  the  Gallicians  operated  in  Castile,  and  the  Astu- 
riiii  army  supported  the  enterprizes  of  the  northern 
))2rti(las. 

This  favourable  occasion  was  not  seized.  Julian 
Sanciiex,  nideed,  cut  off  a  convoy,  menaced  Salamanca, 
and  blockaded  Ciudad  Rodrigo ;  Santucildes  came 
down  to  Astorga,  and  as  I  have  before  observed,  Mina 
and  the  northern  chiefs  harassed  the  French  communi- 
cations ;  some  stir  also  was  mcde  by  the  guerillas  near 
Madrid,  and  Suchet  was  harassed,  but  the  commotion 
soon  subsided  ;  and  a  detachment  from  Madrid  having 
surprised  a  congregation  of  partidas  at  Peneranda, 
killed  many  and  recovered  a  large  convoy  which  they 
had  taken  ;  and  in  this  complicated  war,  which  being 
spread  like  a  spider's  web  over  the  whole  Peninsula, 
any  drag  upon  one  part  would  have  made  the  whole 
quiver  to  the  most  distant  extremities,  the  regular 
armies  eflfected  nothing.  Nor  did  any  general  insur- 
rection of  the  ppople  take  place  in  the  rear  of  the 
French,  who  retained  all  their  fortified  posts,  while 
their  civil  administrations  continued  to  rule  in  the 
great  towns  as  tranquilly  as  if  there  was  no  war! 

Lord  Wellington's  princip  il  measure  for  dissipating 
the  storm  in  his  front  had  rested  upon  Blake.  That 
general  had  wished  him  to  fight  beyond  the  Guadiana, 
and  was  not  well  pleased  at  being  refused  ;  wherefore 
Vn  English  general,  instead  of  taking  ten  or  twelve 
thousand  Spaniards,  and  an  uneasy  colleague,  into  the 
line  of  baiile  at  Campo  Mayor,  where  he  knew  by  ex- 
perience that  they  would  quarrel  with  the  Portuguese, 
and  by  their  slowness,  insubordination,  and  folly, 
woil.l  rather  weaken  than  strengthen  himself,  delivered 
to  Blake  the  pontoons  used  at  Badajos,  and  concerted 
with  hi:n  a  movement  down  the  right  bank  of  the  Gua- 
diana. He  was  to  recross  t!iat  river  at  Mert.jla,  and  to 
fall  uoon  Sevi'le.  which  wis  but  slightly  guarded  by  a 
mixed  force  ~f  French  and  Spaniards  in  Joseph's  ser- 
vice; and  this  blow,  apparent]'/  easy  of  execution, 
would  have  destroyed  all  the  arsenals  and  magazines, 
which  supported  the  blockade  of  Cadiz.  Lord  Wel- 
lington had  therefore  good  reason  to  expect  the  rai- 
sing of  that  siege,  as  well  as  the  dispersion  of  the 
French  army  in  its  front.  He  likewise  urged  the 
rcT  n."v  at  Cddii  to  push  forward  "eneral  Beguiaes 
•^7 


from  San  Roque,  against  Seville,  while  the  insurgents 
in  the  Ronda  pressed  the  few  troops,  lofi  in  Grenada,  ou 
one  side,  and  Freire,  with  the  Murcian  army,  pressed 
them  on  the  other. 

Blake  marched  the  18th,  recrossed  the  river  at 
Mertfda  the  2'2d,  remained  inactive  at  Castillegos  until 
the  30th,  and  sent  his  heavy  artillery  to  Ayamonte  by 
water  ;  then  instead  of  movinji  direct  with  his  whole 
force  upon  Seville,  he  detached  only  a  small  body,  and 
with  a  kind  of  infatuation  wasted  two  successive  days 
in  assaulting  the  castle  of  Niebla  ;  a  contemptiljle  work 
garrisoned  by  three  hundred  Swiss,  who  had  in  tlie 
early  part  of  the  war  abandoned  the  Spanish  service. 
Being  without  artillery  he  could  not  succeed,  and 
meanwhile  Soult,  hearing  of  his  march,  ordered  Oii- 
venza  to  be  blown  up,  and  taking  some  cavalry,  and 
Godinot's  division  which  formed  the  left  of  his  army, 
passed  the  Morena  b)'  Santa  Ollalla  and  moved  rapidly 
upon  Seville.  From  Monasterio  he  sent  a  det;;chment 
to  relieve  the  castle  of  Niebla  ;  and  at  the  same  time, 
general  Conroux,  vvhose  division  was  at  Xeres  de  los 
Cavalheiro,  crossed  the  mountains  by  the  Aracena 
road,  and  endeavoured  to  cut  off  Blake  'from  Aya- 
inonte. 

Thus  far,  notwithstanding  the  failure  at  Niebla,  the 
English  general's  project  was  crowned  with  success. 
The  great  army  in  his  front  was  broken  up,  Soult  was 
gone,  Marmont  was  preparing  to  retire,  and  Portugal 
was  safe.  Blake's  cavalry  under  Penne  Villemur,  and 
some  infantry  under  Ballesteros,  had  also,  during  tiie 
attack  on  Niebla,  appeared  in  front  of  Seville  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Guadalq\iivir,  and  a  slight  insur- 
rection took  place  at  Carmona  on  the  left  bank.  The 
Serranos,  always  in  arms,  were  assisted  by  Beguines 
with  three  thousand  men,  and  blockaded  the  town  of 
Ronda  :  and  Freire  advancing  with  his  Murcians  be- 
yond Lorca,  menaced  general  Laval,  who  had  succeed- 
ed Sebastiani  in  command  of  the  fourth  corps.  In  this 
crisis,  general  Darlcau,  unable  to  keep  the  field,  shut 
him.self  up  in  a  great  convent,  which  Soult  had,  in  an- 
ticipation of  such  a  crisis,  fortified  in  the  Triana  suburb, 
before  his  invasion  of  Estremadura.  But  the  Spanish 
troops  of  Joseph,  shewed  no  disposition  to  quit  him, 
the  people  of  Seville  remained  tranquil,  and  Blake's 
incapacity  ruined  the  whole  combination. 

Souh  approached  on  the  6th  of  July,  Ballesteros  and 
Villemur  immediately  retired,  and  the  insurrection  at 
Carmona  ceased,  Blake,  hearing  of  Conroux's  march, 
precipitately  fled  from  Niebla,  and  only  escaped  in:o 
Portugal  by  the  assistance  of  a  bridge  laid  for  him  at 
San  Lucar  de  Guadiana  by  colonel  Austin.  He  then 
resolved  to  embark  some  of  his  forces  and  sail  to 
attack  San  Lucar  de  Barameda  ;  but  scarcely  had  a 
few  men  got  on  board,  when  the  French  advanced  guard 
appeared,  and  he  again  fled  in  disorder  to  Ayamonte, 
and  got  into  the  island  of  Canelas.  where  fortunately  a 
Spanish  frigate  and  three  hundred  transports  had  un- 
expectedly arrived.  While  Ballesteros  with  thecaval- 
ry  and  three  thousand  infantry,  protected  the  embarka- 
tion, by  taking  a  position  on  the  Rio  Piedra,  Blake  go* 
on  board  with  great  confusion,  and  sailed  to  Cadiz,  tor 
the  French  had  reinforced  San  Lucar  de  Barameda,  and 
entered  Ayamonte.  The  PorUiguese  militia,  of  iha 
Algarves,  were  then  called  out ;  and  Ballesteros  after 
losing  some  men  on  the  Piedra,  took  post  on  the  moun 
tains  of  Aroches  on  his  left,  until  the  French  retired, 
when  be  came  back  with  his  infiintry  and  entrenched 
himself  in  (,'anelas.  On  this  island  he  remained  until 
August,  and  then  embarked  under  the  protection  of  tha 
Portuguese  rnilitia  at  Villa  Real,  while  his  cavalrj 
marched  up  the  Guadiana  to  rejoin  Castanos,  who  with 
a  few  troops  still  remained  in  Estremadura,  A  small 
battalion  left  in  the  castle  of  Pavmago  was  soon  alter 
unsuc'essfully  attacked  by  the  French,  and  this  finish(»d 
the  long  ^artizan  warfare'  of  the  Condado  do  Niebla. 


402 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XIV. 


Tnere  wns  now  nolliing'  tn  provent  the  Froiifh  from 
flfjain  pressinor  the  allies  on  the  Caya.  except  the  timid 
operations  of  Freire  on  the  side  of  Grenada,  and  these 
Soult  was  in  march  to  repress.  With  indelatig-ahle 
activity  he  had  recalled  the  troops  of  the  fonrth  corps, 
from  Estremadura,  to  supply  the  place  of  the  detach- 
ments which  he  had  already  sent,  from  Seville,  Cadiz, 
Grenada,  and  Malaira,  to  quell  the  insurrection  in  the 
Honda;  and  while  he  thus  prepared  the  moans  of  at- 
tackinor  Freire,  Beguines  was  driven  hack  to  San  Roque, 
and  the  Serranos  as  I  have  before  observed,  disn^usted 
with  the  Spanish  general's  ill  conduct,  were  upon  the 
point  of  capitulatinfT  with  the  French.  Durincr  these 
events  in  the  Ronda,  Godinot  returnf  d.from  the  pursuit 
of  Blake,  to  Jaen,  whence  on  the  7th  of  Augfust,  he 
was  directed  to  march  against  Pozalgon  and  Baza, 
where  the  Murcian  army  was  posted.  Meanwhile 
Blake,  re-landincr  his  troops  at  Almeria,  joined  Freire  ; 
his  intention  was  to  have  commenced  active  operations 
against  Grenada,  but  thinkinof  it  necessary  to  go  first 
to  Valencia  where  Palacio  was  making  mischief,  he 
left  the  army,  which  was  above  twenty-seven  thousand 
strong,  under  Freire,  and  before  he  could  return  it  was 
utterly  dispersed. 

ROUT  OF    BAZA. 

General  Quadra,  who  commanded  the  right  wing  of 
the  Murcians,  was  at  Pozal^on,  and  it  is  said,  had  or- 
ders to  rejoin  Freire,  but  disobeyed.  The  centre  and 
left  under  Freire  himself,  were  at  Venta  de  Babul  in 
front  of  Baza.  The  8th,  Soul  I,  at  the  head  of  a  mixed 
force  of  French  and  Spanish  troops  in  Joseph's  service, 
drove  back  tlie  advanced  guards  from  Gnadix.  The  9th 
he  appeared  in  front  of  Bahul,  where  he  discerned  the 
Spanish  army  on  strong  ground,  their  front  being 
covered  by  a  deep  ravine.  As  his  object  was  to  cutoff 
the  retreat  upon  I^orca,  and  the  city  of  Murcia,  he  only 
shewed  a  few  troops  at  first,  and  skirmished  slightly, 
to  draw  Freire's  attention,  while  Godinot  attacked  his 
right  at  Pozalcon  and  got  in  his  rear.  God'not  wasted 
lime.  His  advanced  guard,  alone,  had  defeated  Quad- 
ra with  great  loss,  but  instead  of  entering  Baza,  he 
baited  for  the  night  near  it ;  and  during  the  darkness, 
the  Spaniards,  who  had  no  other  line  of  retreat,  and 
were  no.w  falling  back  in  confusion  before  Soult,  passed 
through  that  place,  and  made  for  Lorca  and  Caravalha. 
Soult's  cavalry,  however,  soon  cut  this  line,  and  the 
fugitives  took  to  the  by-roads,  followed  and  severely 
harassed  by  the  French  horse. 

At  this  time  the  whole  province  was  in  a  defenceless 
state,  but  the  people  generally  took  arms  to  protect  the 
city  of  Murcia.  That  place  was  entrenched,  and  the 
French  marshal,  whose  troops  were  few,  and  fotigued 
by  constant  marching,  not  thinking  fit  to  persevere, 
especially  as  the  yellow  fever  was  raging  at  Cartha- 
pena,  returned  to  Grenada,  whence  he  sent  detachments 
to  disperse  some  insurgents  who  had  gathered  under 
the  Conde  de  Montijo  in  the  Alpuxaras.  Thus  Grenada 
was  entirely  quieted. 

Here  it  is  iinpossible  to  refrain  from  admiring  Soult's 
vigour  and  ability.  We  see  him  in  the  latter  end  of 
1810,  with  a  Rinall  force  and  in  the  depth  of  winter, 
taking  Olivenza,  Badajos,  Albuquerque,  Valencia 
d'Alcantara,  and  Campo  Mayor;  defeating  a  great 
army,  and  capturing  above  twenty  thousand  men. 
Again  when  unexpectedly  assailed  by  Beresford  in  the 
north,  by  the  Murcians  in  the  east,  by  Ballesteros  in 
the  west,  and  by  Lapena  and  Graham  in  the  south,  he 
found  means  to  repel  three  of  them,  to  persevere  in  the 
blockade  of  Cadiz,  and  to  keep  Seville  tranquil,  while 
he  marched  against  the  fourth.  At  Albuera  he  lost 
one  of  the  fiercest  battles  upon  human  record,  and  that 
at  a  moment  when  the  king  by  al)andoning  his  throne 
had  doubled  every  eiriharrassmcnt ;  nevertheless,  hold- 
ing last  to  Estremadura,  he  still  maintained  the  st'  g- 


gle,  and  again  taking  the  offensive  *>l.liged  the  allie« 
to  repass  the  Guadiana.  If  he  did  not  then  pusli  his 
fortune  to  the  utuiosl,  it  must  be  considered  that  bis 
command  was  divided,  that  his  troops  were  still  im- 
pressed with  the  recollection  of  Albuera,  and  thai  'he 
genius  of  his  adversary  had  worked  out  new  troubles 
for  him  in  Andalusia.  With  how  much  resolution  and 
activity  he  repressed  those  troubles  I  have  just  shewn; 
but  above  all  things  be  is  to  be  commended  for  the 
prudent  vigour  of  his  administration,  which,  in  despite 
of  the  opposition  of  Joseph's  Spanish  counsellors,  had 
impressed  the  Andalusians  with  such  a  notion  of  his 
power  and  resources,  that  no  revolt  of  any  real  cons« 
quence  took  place,  and  none  of  his  civic  guards  o 
"  Escopeteros"  failed  him  in  the  hour  of  need. 

Let  any  man  observe  the  wide  extent  of  country  hf 
had  1,0  maintain  ;  the  frontiers  fringed  as  it  were  witl 
hostile  armies,  the  interior  suffering  under  war  requisi- 
tions, the  people  secretly  hating  the  French,  a  constant 
insurrection  in  the  Ronda,  and  a  national  government 
and  a  powerful  army  in  the  Isla  de  lieon.  Innumera- 
ble English  and  Spanish  agents  prodigal  of  money, 
and  of  arms,  continually  instigating  the  people  of  Anda- 
lusia to  revolt;  the  coast  covered  with  hostile  vessels, 
Gibraltar  sheltering  beaten  armies  on  one  side,  Cadiz 
on  another,  Portugal  on  a  third,  Murcia  on  a  fourth; 
the  communication  with  France  ditHcult,  two  battles 
lost,  few  reinforcements,  and  all  the  material  means  to 
be  created  in  the  country.  Let  any  man,  I  say,  con- 
sider this,  and  he  will  be  convinced  that  it  was  no 
common  genius  that  could  remain  unshaken  amidst 
such  difficulties;  yet  Soult  not  only  sustained  himself, 
but  contemplated  the  most  gigantic  offensive  enter- 
prises, and  was  at  all  times  an  adversary  to  be  dreaded. 
What  though  his  skill  in  actual  combat  was  not  so 
remarkable  as  in  some  of  his  contemporaries;  who  can 
deny  him  firmness,  activity',  vigour,  foresight,  grand 
perception,  and  admirable  arrangement?  It  is  this 
combination  of  high  qualities  that  forms  a  great  cau- 
tain. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

State  of  the  war  in  Spain — Marniont  ordered  to  take  a  central 
position  in  the  vallKV  of  the  Tagus — Constructs  forts  at 
Alinaraz — French  affairs  assume  a  favourable  aspfct — fjord 
WeHin^;ton's  'lifficulties  aurjnietit — Remonstrances  sent  to 
the  IJrazds — System  of  intelligence  described — Lord  Wel- 
lington serretly  prepares  to  besiege  Ciudad  Rodrigo — 
Marches  into  Beira,  leaving  Hill  in  the  Aiemtejo — French 
cavalry  take  a  convoy  of  wine,  get  drunk  and  lose  it  again — 
General  Dorsenne  invades  Galiiciu — Is  stopped  !)<•  the  arrival 
of  the  allies  on  the  Agueda — fJlockade  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo — 
Carlos  Espana  commences  the  formation  of  a  new  Spanish 
army— Preparations  for  the  siege — Hill  sends  a  brigade  to 
Castello  Branco. 

While  Soult  was  clearing  the  eastern  frontier  of 
Andalusia,  Marmont  retired  gradually  from  Badajos 
and  quartered  his  troops  in  the  valley  of  the  Tairus, 
with  exception  of  one  division  which  he  left,  at  Trux- 
illo.  At  the  same  time  the  fifth  corps  retired  to  Zafra, 
and  thus  lord  Wellington  found  himself  relieved  from 
the  presence  of  the  French,  at  the  very  moment  when 
he  had  most  reason  to  fear  their  efforts.  He  had  by 
this  time  secured  the  fortresses  on  the  frontier,  his 
troops  were  beginning  to  suffer  fVom  the  terrible  pesti- 
lence of  the  Guailiana,  this  was  sufficient  to  prevent 
him  from  renewing  the  siege  of  Badajos,  if  Marmont's 
position  had  not  forbid  that  measure,  he  therefore  re- 
solved to  adopt  a  new  system  of  operations.  But  to 
judge  of  the  motives  which  influenced  his  conduct  we 
must  again  cast  a  hasty  glance  over  the  general  state 
of  the  Peninsula,  whicli  was  hourly  changing. 

In  Oatalonia  Sucliet  had  stormeil  Taragona,  seized 
Montserrat,  and  dispersiu!  the  Catalan  army.  A  divi- 
sion of  the  army  of  the  eentre  had  chased  the  Partidait 


Ifill.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


403 


from  Guadalaxara  and  Cneni^a,  and  re-established  the 
coniiTiiinicatioiis  wiih  Ara<ion.  Valencia  aiu!  Murcia 
were  in  fear  and  confusion,  both  from  interna!  intri<Tue 
and  from  the  double  disasters  on  each  side  of  their 
frontier,  at  Baza  and  Taragona. 

'i'he  French  emperor  was  pouringf  reinforcements 
into  Spain  by  the  northern  line;  these  troops  as  usual 
scoured  the  country  to  put  down  the  Guerillas  on  each 
side  of  their  march,  and  nearly  forty  thousand  fresh 
men,  mostly  old  soldiers  from  the  army  of  the  reserve, 
were  come,  or  coming  into  the  north  of  Spain.  The 
ynung  li'iard  which  was  at  Burgos,  under  g-eneral  Dor- 
senne,  was  increased  to  seventeen  thousand  men  ;  and 
and  as  no  efforts,  except  those  already  noticed,  were 
made  by  the  Spaniards,  to  shake  the  French  hold  of 
the  country  while  Soult  and  Marmont  were  on  the 
Guadiana,  the  French  grenerais  were  enabled  to  plan 
extensive  measures  of  further  conquest :  and  the  more 
readily,  because  the  kino^  was  now  on  his  return  from 
Paris,  in  apparent  harmony  with  his  brother,  and  the 
powers  and  duties  of  all  parties  were  defined. 

Snchet  urged  by  Napoleon  to  hasten  his  preparations 
for  the  invasion  of  Valencia,  was  resolved  to  be  under 
the  walls  of  that  city  in  the  middle  of  September,  and 
Soult  was  secretly  planning  a  gigantic  enterprise,  cal- 
culated to  change  the  whole  aspect  of  the  war.  In  the 
north  when  the  king,  who  re-entered  Madrid  the  14th, 
had  passed  Valladolid,  the  imperial  guards  entered 
Leon;  thirteen  thousand  men  of  the  army  of  the  north 
were  concentrated  at  Benevente  on  the  i7lh,  and  San- 
tocildes  retired  into  the  mountains.  Bessieres  then 
sent  a  large  convoy  to  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  but  following 
the  treaty  between  .Joseph  and  Napoleon,  returned  him- 
self to  Fran.^c,  and  general  Dnrsenne  taking  the  com- 
mand of  the  army  of  the  north,  prepared  to  invade 
Gallicia. 

Meanwhile  Marmont  was  directed  to  resign  the 
whole  of  Castile  and  Leon,  to  the  protection  of  the 
army  of  the  north,  and  to  withdraw  all  his  posts  and 
dep'its,  with  the  exceptioh  of  the  garrison  of  Ciudad 
Rodrigo,  which  was  to  be  changed  at  a  more  conve- 
nient time.  His  line  of  communication  was  to  be  with 
Madrid,  and  that  city  was  to  be  his  chief  depot  and 
base;  he  was  to  take  positions  in  the  valley  of  the 
Tagus.  and  at  Truxillo  ;  to  fortify  either  Alcantara  or 
Almaraz,  and  to  secure  the  communication  across  the 
river. 

Tiiiis  posted,  the  emperor  judged  that  Marmont  could 
more  effectually  arrest  the  progress  of  the  allies  than 
in  any  other.  The  invasion  of  Andalusia,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  raising  the  siege  of  Cadiz,  was,  he  said,  the 
only  object  the  allies  had  at  the  moment,  but  it  could 
always  be  frustrated  by  Marmont's  moving  against 
their  flank;  and  with  respect  to  the  north,  the  allies 
having  no  object  on  that  side,  would  be  unlikely  to 
make  any  serious  attempt,  because  they  must  in  time 
be  overmatched,  as  the  French  fell  back  upon  their 
resources.  Marmont  could  also  act  against  their  right 
flank,  as  he  could  do  against  their  left  flank,  if  they 
marched  upon  Andalusia;  and  while  stationary  he  pro- 
tected Madrid,  and  gave  power  and  activity  to  the 
ting's  administration. 

In  pursuance  of  these  instructions,  Marmont,  who 
had  remained  in  Estremadura,  to  cover  Soult's  opera- 
tions against  Blake  and  the  Murcians,  now  proceeded 
lo  occupy  Talavera,  and  other  posts  in  the  valley  of 
the  Tagus;  and  he  placed  a  division  at  Truxillo,  the 
castle  of  which  place,  as  well  as  that  of  Medellin,  was 
repaired.  Another  division  occupied  Placentia,  with 
po<ts  in  the  passes  of  Bejar  and  Banos ;  Girard's  divi- 
sion of  the  fifth  corp^,  remained  at  Zafra,  to  serve  as  a 
point  of  connexion  between  Marmont  and  Soult,  and 
to  su[)port  Badajos,  which  bv  a  wise  provision  of  Na- 
poleon's, was  now  garrisoned  with  detachments  from 
the  thre*  armie?   of  the  centre,  of  Portugal  and  of  the 


south.  This  gave  each  general  a  direct  interest  ia 
mr.-.Ing  to  its  succour,  and  in  the  same  policy  Ciudad 
Rodrigo  was  to  he  wholly  garrisoned  by  the  army  of 
the  north,  that  Marmont  might  have  no  temptation  to 
neglect  the  army  of  the  south,  under  pretence  of  euc- 
couring  C'iudad. 

To  restore  and  maintain  Alcantara  was  beyond  the 
means  of  the  duke  of  llagusa;  he  therefore  repaired 
the  bridge  of  Almaraz,  and  constructed  two  strong 
forts,  one  at  each  side,  to  protect  it,  and  to  serve  as  an 
intermediate  field  depot;  a  third  and  more  considerable 
fort  was  also  built  on  the  high  ridge  of  Mirabele,  to 
insure  a  passage  over  the  hills  from  Almaraz  to  Trux- 
illo. A  free  intercourse  with  the  army  of  the  south 
was  thus  secured  on  one  side,  and  on  the  other,  the 
passes  of  Baiios  and  Bejar,  and  the  Roman  road  cf 
Puerto  Pico,  which  had  been  restored  in  1810,  served 
for  communication  with  the  army  of  the  north. 

The  French  affairs  had  now  assumed  a  very  favour- 
able aspect.  There  was  indeed  a  want  of  money,  but 
the  generals  were  obeyed  with  scrupulous  attention  by 
the  people  of  Spain,  not  only  within  the  distrifts  occu- 
pied by  them,  but  even  in  those  villages  where  the 
guerillas  were  posted.  This  obedience  lord  Welling- 
ton attributed  entirely  to  fear,  and  hoped  as  the  exac- 
tions were  heavy,  that  the  people  would  at  last  fight 
or  fly  from  their  habitations  on  the  approach  of  a 
French  soldier;  but  this  did  not  happen  generally,  and 
to  me  it  appears,  that  the  obedience  was  rather  a  symp- 
tom of  the  subjection  of  the  nation,  and  that  with  a 
judicious  mixture  of  mildness  and  severity  perfect 
submission  would  have  followed  if  England  had  not 
kept  the  war  alive. 

On  the  other  hand  the  weakness  and  anarchy  of  the 
Spaniards  were  daily  increasing,  and  the  disputes, 
between  the  British  general  and  the  Portuguese  gov- 
ernment, arrived  to  such  a  height,  that  lord  Wellington, 
having  drawn  up  powerful  and  clear  statements  of  his 
grievous  situation,  sent  one  to  the  Brazils  and  the 
other  to  his  own  government,  with  a  positive  intimation 
that  if  an  entirely  new  system  was  not  immediately 
adopted  he  would  no  longer  attempt  to  carry  on  the 
contest.  Lord  Wellesley,  taking  his  stand  upon  this 
ground,  made  strenuous  exertions  in  both  countries  to 
prevent  the  ruin  of  the  cause;  but  lord  W^ellington, 
while  expecting  the  benefit  of  his  brother's  interference, 
had  to  contend  with  the  most  surprising  difficulties, 
and  to  seek  in  his  own  personal  resources  for  tho 
means  of  even  defending  Portugal.  He  had  sent 
marshal  Beresford  to  Lisbon,  immediately  after  Al- 
buera,  to  superintend  the  reorganization  and  restoration 
of  the  Portuguese  forces,  and  Beresford  had  sent  Mr. 
De  Lemos,  an  officer  of  his  own  staff,  to  the  Brazils, 
to  represent  the  inconveniences  arising  from  the  inter- 
ference of  the  regency  in  the  military  affairs.  On  the 
other  hand  the  Souzas  sent  one  Vasconcellos,  who  had 
been  about  the  British  head-quarters  as  their  spy,  to 
Rio  Janeiro,  and  thus  the  political  intrigues  became 
more  complicated  than  ever. 

But  with  respect  to  the  war  Wellington  had  pene- 
trated Napoleon's  object,  when  he  saw  Marmont's 
position  in  the  valley  of  the  Tagus;  he  felt  the  full 
force  of  the  emperor's  military  reasoning,  yet  he  did 
not  despair,  if  he  could  overcome  the  political  obsta- 
cles, to  gain  some  advantage.  He  had  now  a  powi  rful 
and  experienced  British  force  under  his  command,  the 
different  departments  and  the  staff  of  tho  army  were 
every  day  becoming  more  skilful  and  ready,  am!  he 
had  also  seen  enough  of  his  adversaries  to  estimate 
their  powers.  The  king  he  knew  to  be  no  general, 
and  discontented  witli  the  marshals ;  Soult  he  had 
found  able  and  vast  in  his  plans,  but  too  cautious  in 
their  execution  ;  Marmont  with  considerable  vigour, 
had  already  shown  some  rashness  in  the  manner  he 
had  pushed   Reynier's  division  forward,  after  passing 


404 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XIV. 


tlie  Tns^iis,  and  it  was,  thprrfore,  easy  tn  conceive  thai 
no  very  strict  concerl  would  be  maintained  in  their 
combined  operations. 

Lord  Welliiitrtnn  had  a'so  established  some  good 
nhannt'ls  of  information.  He  had  a  number  of  spies 
amongst  the  Spaniards  who  were  living  within  the 
Frencli  lines;  a  British  officer  in  disgiiise,  constantly 
visited  the  French  armies  in  the  field  ;  a  Spanish  state- 
counsellor,  livin<r  at  the  head-quarters  of  the  first 
corps,  gave  inlellirrence  from  that  side,  and  a  guitar- 
player  of  celebrity,  named  Fuentes,  repeatedly  making 
his  way  to  Madrid,  brought  advice  from  thence.  Mr. 
Stuart,  under  cover  of  vessels  li/ensed  to  fetch  corn 
for  France  kept  c/i'jsse  marges  constantly  plying  along 
the  Biscay  coast,  by  whi  h  he  not  only  acquired  direct 
information,  hut  ficilitated  the  transmission  of  intelli- 
gence from  the  land  spies,  amonirst  whom  the  most 
remarkable  was  a  cobbler,  living  in  a  little  hutch  at  the 
end  of  the  bridge  of  Irun.  This  man  while  plying  his 
trade,  continued  for  years,  without  being  suspected, 
to  count  every  French  soldier,  that  passed  in  or  out  of 
Spnin  by  that  pass  ige,  and  transmitted  their  numbers 
by  the  cknsse  marees  to  Lisbon. 

With  the  exception  of  the  state  spy  at  Victor's  head- 
quarters, who  being  a  double  traitor  was  infamous,  all 
the  persons  thus  employed  were  very  meritorious. 
']'he  greater  number,  and  the  cleverest  also,  were 
Spanish  gpntlemen,  alcaldes,  or  poor  men,  who  dis- 
daining rewards  and  disregarding  danger,  acted  from  a 
pure  spirit  of  patriotism,  and  are  to  be  lauded  alike  for 
their  boldness,  their  talent,  and  their  virtue.  Many 
are  dead.  Fuentes  was  drowned  in  passing  a  river,  on 
one  of  his  expeditions;  and  the  alcalde  of  Caceres, 
a  man,  of  the  clearest  courage  and  patriotism,  who 
expended  his  own  property  in  tlie  cause,  and  spurned 
at  reniunerai.ion,  was  on  Ferdinand's  restoration  cast 
into  a  dunjeon,  where  he  perished;  a  victim  to  the 
unbounded  ingratitiide  and  baseness  of  the  monarch  he 
h^d  served  so  well  ! 

With  such  means  lord  Wellington  did  not  despair 
of  baflling  the  deep  policy  of  the  emperor  in  the  field. 
He  thought  that  the  saying  of  Henry  the  Fourth  of 
France,  that  "  lar^e  armies  would  starve  and  small 
ones  be  bealen  in  Spatn,^^  was  still  applicable.  He 
fell  that  a  solid  possession  of  Portugal  and  her 
resources,  which,  through  his  brother's  aid,  he  hoped 
to  have,  would  enable  him  either  to  strike  partial  blows 
against  the  French,  or  oblige  them  to  concentrate  in 
large  masses,  which,  confident  in  his  own  martial 
genius  he  fdt  he  could  hold  in  check,  while  the  Span- 
iards ruined  the  small,  posts,  and  disorganized  the  civil 
administrations  in  their  rear.  Hitherto,  indeed,  the 
Spaniards  had  not  made  any  such  efforts  except  by 
the  partidas,  which  were  insufficient;  but  time,  his 
own  retuonslrances,  and  the  palpable  advantages  of 
'he  system,  he  trusted  would  yet  teach  them  what 
to  do. 

Having  deeply  meditated  upon  these  matters  and 
received  his  reinforcements  from  England,  he  resolved 
to  leave  Hill  with  ten  thousand  infantry,  a  division  of 
cavalry,  and  four  brisrades  of  artillery,  about  Portalegre, 
Villa  Viciosa,  and  Estremos.  From  these  rich  towns 
which  were  beyond  the  influence  of  the  Guadiana 
fever,  the  troops  could  rapidly  concentrate  either  for 
an  advance  or  retreat;  and  the  latter  was  secured  upon 
AhMotes,  or  upon  the  communications  with  Beira,  by 
Niza.  and  Vilha  Veiha,  where  a  permanent  boat-bridge 
had  now  been  established.  The  front  was  protected 
by  Elvas.  .lerumenha,  Campo  Mayor,  and  Onguella; 
and  (yaslafi  IS  also  remained  in  Kslremadura  with  the 
fifth  army,  wiiich  by  the  return  a*"  the  cavalry  from 
Ayamonte  and  the  formation  of  Downie's  legion  now 
amounted  to  about  a  thousand  infantry  and  nine  hun- 
Ired  horse.  This  force  placed  on  the  side  of  Montijo, 
lad  Albuquerque  and  Valencia  dc   Alcantara  as  posts 


of  support,  and  a  retreat  either  by  the  fords  of  the 
'I'agus  near  the  bridge  of  Alcanta'-a,  or  upon  Portugal 
by  Marvio  and  Castello  de  Vide.  Hill's  position  was 
thus  so  well  covered,  that  he  could  not  be  surprised, 
nor  even  pressed  except  by  a  very  strong  army  ;  and 
he  was  always  on  the  watch  as  we  shall  hereafter  find, 
to  make  incursions  a<rainst  the  division  of  the  fifth 
corps,  which  remained  in  Estremadura.  The  rest  of 
the  armv  was  then  placed  in  quarters  of  refreshment 
at  Castello  de  Vide,  Marvio  and  other  places  near  the 
Ta<jus.  partly  to  avoid  the  (iuadiana  fever,  partly  to 
meet  Marmnnt's  movement  to  that  river. 

When  this  disposition  was  made,  the  English  fjen- 
eral  arranged  his  other  measures  of  offence.  The 
conduct  of  the  Portuguese  government  and  the  new 
positions  of  the  French  armies  had,  as  Napoleon  had 
foreseen,  left  him  no  means  of  undertaking  any  sus- 
tained operation ;  but,  as  he  was  ignorant  of  the  great 
strength  of  the  army  of  the  north,  he  hoped  to  find 
an  opportunity  of  taking  Ciudad  Rodrigo  before  Mar- 
mont  could  come  to  its  assistance.  For  this  pur|)oso 
he  had  caused  a  fine  train  of  battering  jjuns,  and  mor- 
tars, together  with  a  reinforcement  of  British  artillery- 
men, which  had  arrived  at  Lisbon  from  England,  to 
be  shipped  in  large  vessels,  and  then  with  somo 
ostentation  made  them  sail  as  it  were  for  Cadiz  ;  at 
sea  they  were  however  shifted  on  board  small  crafty 
and  while  the  original  vessels  actually  arrived  at 
Cadiz  and  Gibraltar,  the  guns  were  secretly  brought 
first  to  Oporto  and  then  in  boats  to  Lamego.  During 
this  process,  several  engineer,  artillery,  and  commisa- 
riat  otl^cers,  were  sent  to  meet  and  transport  these  guns, 
and  the  necessary  stores  for  a  siege,  to  Villaponte  near 
Celerico  ;  and  as  one  of  the  principal  ma-^azines  of 
the  army  was  at  Lainego,  and  a  cons'aut  intercourse 
was  kept  up  between  it  and  Celerico,  another  great 
depot,  the  arrival,  and  passage  of  the  guns  and  stores 
to  their  destinatinn  was  not  likely  to  attract  the  atten- 
tion of  the  French  spies. 

Other  combinations  were  al'^o  employed,  both  to 
deceive  the  enemy  and  to  prepare  the  means  for  a  sud- 
den attack,  before  the  troops  commenced  their  march 
for  Beira  ;  but  the  hiding  of  such  extensive  prepara- 
tions from  the  French  would  have  been  scarcely  possi- 
ble, if  the  personal  hatred  borne  to  the  invaders  by  the 
peninsulars,  combined  with  the  latier's  peculiar  subtle- 
ty of  character,  had  not  prevented  an\'  information 
spreading  abroad,  beyond  the  fact  that  artillery  had 
arrived  at  Oporto,  'i'he  operation  of  bringing  sixtv- 
eight  huge  guns,  with  proportionate  stores,  across 
nearly  fifty  miles  of  mountain,  was  however  one  of  no 
mean  magnitude;  five  thousand  draft  bullocks  were 
required  for  the  train  alone,  and  above  a  thousand 
militia  were  for  several  weeks  employed  merely  to 
repair  the  road. 

The  allies  broke  up  from  the  Caya  the  21st  of  July, 
and  they  had  received  considerable  reinforcement-!, 
especially  in  cavalry,  but  they  were  sickly  and  required 
a  change  of  cantonments;  hence  when  an  intercepted 
despatch  gave  reason  to  believe  that  Ciudad  Rodrigo 
was  in  want  of  provisions,  Wellington  suddenly  cross- 
ed the  Tagus  at  Vilha  Velha,  and  marched  in  the  bo- 
ginning  of  August  by  Castello  Branco  and  Penamacor 
towards  Rodrigo,  hoping  to  surprise  it  in  a  starving 
state,  hut  giving  out  that  his  movement  was  for  the 
sake  of  healthy  quarters.  His  movement  was  unmo- 
lested save  by  some  French  dragoons,  from  the  side 
of  Placentia,  who  captunnl  a  convoy  of  seventy  mules 
loaded  with  wine  near  Pedrogoa,  and  getiing  drunk 
with  their  booty  attacked  some  Portuguese  iiifuilry, 
who  repulsed  them  and  recovered  the  mules;*  but 
there  were  other  ostensible  objects  besides  the  obvious 
one  of  removing  from  the  well-known  pestilence  of  the 


*  General  llarvoy's  Jouriia 


1811.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


405 


Guadiana,  which  contributed  to  blind  the  French  as  to 
the  secret  motives  of  the  English  general.  We  have 
seen  that  Dorsenne  was  menacing  Gallicia,  and  that 
Souk  was  in  full  operation  against  the  Murcians  ;  it 
was  supposed  that  lie  intended  to  invade  Murcia  itself, 
and  therefore  the  march  of  the  allies  had  the  double 
object,  of  saving  Gallicia,  by  menacing  the  rear  of  the 
invading  army;  and  of  relieving  Murcia  by  forcing 
Mannont  to  look  after  Ciudad  R(jdrigo,  and  thus  draw 
him  awa}  from  the  support  of  Soult,  who  would  not, 
it  was  sujiposed,  then  quit  Andalusia. 

Gallicia  was  meanwhile  in  great  danger,  for  the  Par- 
tiilas  of  tiie  north  had  been  vigorously  repressed  by 
('afTarelli  and  Reille,  which  enabled  Dorsenne  to  col- 
lect about  twenty  thousand  men  on  the  Esla.  Abadia, 
who  had  succeeded  Santocildes,  was  posted  with  about 
seven  thousand  disciplined  men  behind  this  river,  and 
he  had  a  reserve  of  fifteen  hundred  at  Foncebadon  ;  but 
he  could  make  no  head,  for  to  this  number  the  Gailician 
army  had  again  dwindled,  and  these  were  starving.* 
The  25lh  the  French,  having  passed  the  river  in  four 
columns,  made  a  concentric  march  upon  Astorga. 
Abadia,  whose  rear-guard  sustained  a  sharp  conflict 
near  La  Baneza,  retreated,  precisely  by  the  same  line 
as  sir  .lohn  Moore  had  done  in  1809,  and  with  about 
the  same  relative  proportion  of  force ;  but  as  he  only 
took  the  Foncebadon  read  and  did  not  use  the  same 
diligence  and  skill  as  that  general,  the  enemy  fore- 
stalling him  by  Manzanal  and  I}eu:ibibre,  cut  him  off 
from  Villa  Franca  del  Rierzo,  and  from  the  road  to 
Lugo,  and  on  tiie  27th  drove  him  into  the  Val  des  Oi- 
res.  During  ibis  operation  the  division  of  the  army 
of  the  north,  which  Bessieres  had  sent  with  the  convoy 
to  Cindad  Rodrigo,  entered  that  place  and  relumed  to 
Salamanca. 

'['he  Spanish  general  having  thus  lost  his  line  of 
coirimunication  with  Lugo,  and  the  (eAV  stores  he  pos- 
sessed at  Villa  Franca,  took  post  at  Domingo  Flores 
in  the  Val  des  Orres,  where  he  entered  a  strong  coun- 
try, and,  under  the  worst  circumstances,  could  retire 
upon  Portugal  and  save  his  troops  if  not  his  province. j" 
But  his  army  which  was  in  the  utmost  distress  before, 
for  shoes  and  clothing,  was  now  ready  to  disband  from 
misery,  and  the  coiisteniation  in  Gallicia  v/as  excessive. 
That  province  torn  by  factifjn,  stood  helpless  before 
the  invader,  who  could,  and  would,  have  taken  both 
Coruiia  and  P^errol,  but  for  the  sudden  arrival  of  the 
allies  on  the  Coa,  which  obliged  him,  for  his  own 
safety,  to  return  to  the  plains.  Souham,  also,  who 
was  coming  from  Burgos,  by  forced  marches,  to  sup- 
port Dorsenne,  halted  at  Rio  Seco,  and  Abadia  did  not 
fail  to  ascribe  all  this  to  the  loss  he  had  inflicted,  but 
his  vanity  was  laughed  at. 

To  have  thus  saved  Gallicia  was  a  great  thing. 
That  kingdom  was  the  base  of  all  the  operations  against 
the  line  of  comm.unica'ion  with  France  ;  from  thence 
went  forth,  those  British  squadrons  which  nourished 
tlie  guerilla  warfare  in  Biscay,  in  the  Montaiia,  in  Na- 
varre, in  the  Rioja,  and  the  Asturias;  it  was  the  chief 
resource  for  the  supply  of  cattle  to  the  allied^army,  it 
was  the  outwork  of  Portugal,  and  honestly  and  vigor- 
ously gf)verned,  would  have  been  more  important  than 
Gatalonia.  But  like  the  rest  of  Spain  it  was  always 
weak  from  disorders,  and,  if  the  allies  had  remained  in 
Alemlejo,  there  was  nothing  to  prevent  Dorsenne  from 
conquering  it;  for  though  he  should  not  have  taken 
Ferrol  and  Coruua,  the  points  of  St.  .lago,  Lugo,  Villa 
Franca,  and  Orense  would  have  given  him  an  entire 
command  of  the  interior,  and  the  Spaniards  holding  the 
ports  only  would  not  have  been  able  to  dislodge  him. 

Lord  Wellington  arrived   upon   the  Coa  about  the 


*  General  Walker's  Correspondence.  MSS.    Abadia'g  ditto, 

MSS. 

f  Sir  H.  Douglas's  Correspondence,  MSS, 


8th  of  August,  intending,  as  I  have  said,  first  a  close 
blockade  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  and  finally  a  siige;  it 
was  however  soon  known  that  the  l"'rt!M»li  had  (^n  the 
6lh  supplied  the  place  for  two  months,  and  the  first 
part  of  the  design  was  therefore  reliiuinished.  The 
troops  were  then  quartered  near  the  sources  of  the  Coa 
and  Agueda,  close  to  the  line  of  communication  be- 
tween Marmont  and  Dorsenne,  and  in  a  country  where 
there  was  slill  some  corn.  If  the  enemy  advanced  id 
superior  numbers,  the  army  could  retire  through  -i 
strong  country  to  a  position  of  battle  near  Sabuga', 
whence  the  commimication  with  Hill  vvns  direct.  Nor 
was  the  rest  of  Beira  left  unprotected,  because  the 
French  would  have  exposed  their  left  flank,  by  any  ad- 
vance in  the  direction  of  Almeida,  and  the  allies  could, 
by  Guarda,  send  detachments  to  the  valley  of  the  Mon- 
dego  in  time  to  secure  the  magazines  at  Celericn.  The 
line  of  supply  from  Lamego  along  which  the  battering- 
train  was  now  moving,  was  however  rather  exposed. 

While  the  army  was  in  this  position,  the  preparations 
for  the  siege  went  on  briskly,  vmtil  Wellington  learned, 
contrary  to  his  former  belief,  that  the  disposable  force 
of  the  army  of  the  north,  was  above  twenty  thousand 
good  troops  ;  and  consequently,  that  Ciudad  Rodrigo 
could  not  be  attacked  in  face  of  that  corps,  and  of  Mar- 
mont's  army.  Then  changing  his  plan,  be  resolved  to 
blockade  the  place,  and  wait  for  some  opportunity  to 
strike  a  sudden  blow,  either  against  the  fortress,  or 
against  the  enemy's  troops  ;  for  it  was  the  f  undaiion 
of  his  hopes,  that  as  the  PVench  could  not  long  remain 
in  masses,  for  want  of  provisions,  and  that  he  could 
check  iliGce  masses  on  the  frontier  of  Portntral.  so  he 
could  always  force  them  to  concentrate,  or  suffer  the 
loss  of  some  important  post.  But  it  is  worthy  of  ob- 
servation, that  his  plans  were  based  on  calc.ilalions 
which  did  not  comprise  the  Gailician  army.  He  had 
no  expectation  that  it  would  act  at  all,  or  if  it  did,  that 
it  would  act  effectually.  It  had  no  cavalry,  and  the 
infantry  being  uiidisciplinsd  dared  not  enter  the  plains 
in  face  of  ihe  enemy's  horseinen ;  yet  this  was  in 
August  1811,  and  Gallicia  had  not  seen  the  face  of  an 
enemy  since  .Tune  1809  I 

Early  in  September,  Marmont,  pushing  a  detachment 
from  Placencia  through  the  passes,  surprised  a  British 
cavalry  piquet,  at  St.  Martin  de  Trebejo,  and  opened 
his  communications  with  Dorsenne.  Nevertheless 
lord  Wellington  formed  the  blockade.  His  head- 
quarters were  fixed  at  Guinaldo,  the  fifth  division  wa3 
placed  at  Perales,  in  observation  of  Marmont,  and  the 
first  division,  now  commanded  by  general  (iraham,  oc- 
cupied Penamacor.  A  battery  of  artillery,  was  with- 
drawn from  Hill,  and  three  brigades  of  that  general's 
corps,  reinforced  bj'  a  Portuguese  regiment,  passed  the 
Tagus,  and  were  placed  on  the  Pon(;ul,  in  advance  of 
Caslello  Branco,  to  protect  the  magazines  on  that  line 
of  communication.  Meanwhile  the  battering-train  was 
collected  at  Villa  de  Ponte,  the  troops  were  employed 
to  prepare  gabions  and  fascines,  and  the  engineers  in- 
structed two  hundred  men  of  the  line,  in  the  duties  of 
sappers.  'I'he  bridge  over  the  Coa  at  Ainu  ida  which 
had  been  broken  by  Massena,  was  permanently  repair- 
ed, and  the  works  of  Almeida  itself,  were  ordered  to 
be  once  more  restored  to  form  a  place  of  arms  for  the 
battering-train  and  stores;  Carlos  d'Kspafia  came  also 
to  Leon  to  form  a  new  army  under  the  protection  of 
the  allies,  but  he  was  without  olTicers.  arms,  money,  or 
stores,  and  his  force  was  a  mere  name. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

The  garrison  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo  make  some  surrpssful  excur- 
sions—Morillo  operates  agriiinst  the  Frenrli  in  Kstienmdura, 
is  defeated  and  driven  to  Albuquerque— Civil  alisiirj  of  For- 
tugal— Bad  conduct  of  the  regencjr— They  /niagme  the  war 


4oe 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XIV 


to  be  decidet^,  and  endeavour  to  drive  lord  Wellington  away  ■ 
from  Portug^al — In.ii>ations  that  Napoleon  would  assume  the  ' 
command   in   the   Peninsula  observed   by  lord  VVellinston —  , 
He  experts  a  combine;]  attack  on  Lisbon   by  sea  and  land —  ' 
Marmont  and  Dorsenne  cidltct  convoys  and  unite  at  Tauia- 
nies — Advance  to  succour  Ciudad  Rodiijjo — Combat  of  Kl- 
bodon — Allies  retire  to  Guinaido — To  Al.lea   Ionic — Com- 
bat ol"Aldea  Fonte — The  allies  retire  to  Soita — The  French  j 
retire — Observations.  I 

During  the  first  arranfjements,  for  the  blockade  of 
Ciudad  Hodrioo.  the  garrison  made  some  exiuirsions 
to  beat  up  the  quarters  of  the  British  cavalry,  and  to 
foranre  the  villagrps  ;  and  some  lancers  from  Salamanca 
drove  Julian  Sanchez  from  Ledesma.  Meanwhile  in 
Kstremadun,  Morillo  chased  the  enemy  from  Caceres, 
and  advancinfj  to  IMonlanches.  menaced  Truxillo,  but  \ 
being  beateti  there  by  general  Foy,  he  returned  to  Mon- 
tijo,  where  some  French  cavalry,  arriving  from  Zafra, 
again  defeateii  him  and  drove  him  to  Albuquerque. 
Other  military  operations,  worth  relating,  there  were 
none,  but  the  civil  transactions  in  Portugal  were  very 
important.  i 

Mr.  Stuart's  exertions  had  produced  some   improve- 
ment  in  the  Portuguese  revenue  ;  the  ranks  of  the  in- 
fantry were  again  filling  by  the  return  of  deserters,  and 
by  fresh  recruits,  which,  with  the  reinforcements  from 
England  had  raised    tiie  actual   number   of   the  allied 
army  tn  upwards  of  eighty  thousand  men,  fifty-six  thou- 
sand of  which  were  British  ;  the  number  under  arms  did 
not  however  exceed  twenty-four  thousand    Portuguese 
and  thirty-three  thousand  IBritish,  of  whom  five   thou- 
sand were  cavalry,  with  about  ninety  pieces  of  artillery. 
The    previous   operations    in    Alemtejo    had   produced 
sickness,  which  was  increasing,  and  twenty-two  thou-  j 
sand  men  were  in   hospital  ;  and  hence.   Hill's  corps 
being  deducted,  lord  Wellington  could  not  bring  to  the  ] 
blockade  of  (-iudad  above   forty-four  thousand    of  all  i 
arms,    including    Sanchez's   Partida.       But  Marmont,  \ 
ulone,  could  in  a  few  days  bring  as  many  to  its  succour,  | 
r.nd  Dorsenne  always  had  from  twenty    to  twenty-five  ; 
thousand  men  in  hand  ;  because  the    French  reinforce- 
•nents  had  relieved  tlie  old  garrisons  in   the   north   and  : 
the  latter  had  joined  the  army  in  the  field.  j 

At  this  time  the  British  military  chest  was  quite  j 
bankrupt,  even  the  muleteers,  upon  whose  fidelity  and  j 
efficiency  the  war  absolutely  depended,  were  six  j 
months  in  arrears  for  wages;  and  the  disputes  with} 
tiie  Portuouese  government  were  more  acrimonious 
than  ever.  The  regency  had  proposed  a  new  system  | 
of  military  regulations,  calculated  to  throw  the  burthen  I 
of  feeding  the  native  troops  entirely  upon  the  British} 
commissariat,  without  any  reform  of  abuses,  and  lord 
Wellington  had  rejected  it,  hence  renewed  violence;  i 
and  as  J5ere^ford  bad  fallen  sick  at  Cintra,  Mr.  Stuart  ; 
deprived  of  his  supjiort  on  military  questions,  and  him- 
self no  longer  a  member  of  the  regency,  was  unable  to 
restrain  the  triumphant  faction  of  the  Souzas.  The  i 
prince  regenl's  return  to  Portugal  was  prevented  by  • 
troubles  in  the  Brazils,  and  the  regency  expecting  a  ! 
long  hold  of  power,  and  foolislily  im;igining  that  the  ! 
war  was  no  longer  doubtful,  were,  after  the  custom  of: 
all  people  who  employ  powerful  auxiliaries,  devising  j 
how  to  gel  rid  of  thi'.  British  army.  With  this  view  ! 
they  obji'cted  to  or  neglected  every  necessary  measure,  i 
and  made  many  absurd  demands,  such  as  that  the  1 
British  gensral  should  pay  the  expenses  of  the  Porta-  | 
guese  post  office  ;  and  at  the  same  time  they  preferred  i 
various  vexatious,  and  unfounded  charges  against  Brit-  j 
ish  officers,  while  gross  coirui)tion,  and  oppression  of  I 
the  poorer  people,  marked  the  conduct  of  their  own  I 
magistrates.  ! 

But  the  fite  of  Portugal,  which  to  these  people  ap-  ! 
peared  fixed,  was  in  th(;   eyes   of  the    English   general  j 
more  doiil)tful  than  ever.      Intercepted  letters  gave  rea- 
feoiis  to  believe  that  the  emperor  was  coming  to  Spain. 
And  ibis  notion  was  confinned  by  the  assembling  of 


an  army  of  reserve  in  France,  and  by  the  formation  of 
great  magazines  at  Burgos,  and  other  places,  to  supply 
which,  and  to  obtain  money,  the  French  generals  were 
exacting  the  fourth  of  the  harvest,  and  selling  the  over- 
plus of  corn  again  even  by  retail.  Minute  reports  of 
the  state  of  these  magazines  were  demanded  by  Napo- 
leon ;  reinforcements,  especially  of  the  imperial  guards, 
were  pouring  into  Spain,  and  Wellington  judging  that 
the  emperor  must  either  drive  the  British  from  the 
Peninsula,  or  lower  his  tone  with  the  world,  thought 
that  he  would  invade  Portugal  from  the  side  of  Rod- 
rigo,  the  valley  of  the  Tagus,  and  Alemtejo  at  the 
same  time  ;  and  that  he  would  risk  his  fleet  in  a  com- 
bined attack  upon  Lisbon  by  sea  and  land. 

Whether  Napoleon  really  meant  this  ;  or  whether  he 
only  spread  the  report  with  a  view  lo  restrain  the 
allies  from  any  offensive  operations  during  the  summer, 
and  to  mislead  the  English  cabinet  as  to  the  real  state 
of  his  negotiations  with  Russia,  intending  if  the  latter 
proved  favourable  to  turn  his  whole  force  against  the 
Peninsula,  does  not  very  clearly  appear ;  yet  it  is  cer- 
tain that  every  thing  in  Spain  at  this  time  indicated 
his  approach.  Lord  Wellington's  opinion  that  the 
emperor  was  bound  to  drive  the  British  army  away  or 
lose  his  influence  in  the  world  does  not  however  seem 
quite  just;  because  the  mighty  expedition  to  Moscow, 
proved  that  Napoleon  did  not  want  force  to  conquer 
Spain  ;  and  success  in  Russia  would  have  enabled  him  i 
to  prolong  the  war  in  the  Peninsula  as  a  drain  on  the 
English  resources  for  many  years  ;  which  was  so  obvi- 
ous a  policy,  that  the  rest  of  Europe  could  not  from 
thence  draw  conclusions  unfavourable  to  his  influence. 

Under  the  notion  that  Napoleon's  coming  was  prob- 
able, the  English  general,  with  characteristic  prudence, 
turned  his  own  attention  to  the  security  of  bis  ancient 
refuge  within  the  lines,  and  therefore  urgently  desired 
the  government  to  put  the  fortresses  in  order,  repair  the 
roads,  and  restore  the  bridges  broken  during  Massena's 
invasion.  An  increased  number  of  workmen  were  also 
put  to  the  lines,  for  the  engineers  had  never  ceased  to 
improve  those  on  the  northern  bank  of  the  Tagus,  and 
on  the  southern  bank  the  double  lines  of  Almada  had 
been  continued  on  a  gigantic  scale.  The  defensive 
canal  tiiere  was  planned  to  float  ships  of  three  hundred 
tons,  and  to  serve  as  a  passage  from  the  Tagus  to  Set- 
uval  by  joining  the  navigation  of  the  Sadao  and  Mara- 
teca  rivers  ;  thus  conducing  to  objects  of  general 
utility  as  well  as  the  military  defence;  as  it  will  be 
found  that  lord  Wellington  did  at  all  times  sustain, 
not  only  the  political,  and  financial,  and  military  affairs, 
but  also  the  agricultural,  the  commercial,  and  charitable 
interests  of  Portugal.  'I'he  batteries  at  the  mouth  of 
the  Tagus  were  likewise  put  into  complete  order,  they 
were  provided  with  furnaces  for  heating  shot,  and 
captain  Holloway  of  the  engineers,  at  a  trifling  expense 
constructed  four  jetties  at  St.  .Julian's,  in  such  an  inge- 
nious manner,  that  they  withstood  the  most  tempestu- 
ous gales  and  secured  the  embarkation  of  the  army  in 
any  season.*  Finally  the  militia  were  again  called 
out,  a  measure  of  greater  import,  in  the  actual  slate  oi 
affairs,  than  would  at  first  appear;  for  the  expense 
was  a  very  heavy  drain  upon  the  finances,  and  the 
number  of  hands  thus  taken  away  from  agriculture 
was  a  serious  evil. 

Had  all  these  preparations  been  duly  executed,  lord 
Wellington  would  not  have  feared  even  Napoleon; 
but  all  that  depended  upon  the  Portuguese  government, 
if  that  can  be  called  government  which  was  but  a  fac- 
tion, was,  as  usual,  entirely  neglected.  The  regency 
refused  to  publish  any  proclamation  to  display  the 
danger,  or  to  call  upon  the  people  to  prepare  for  future 
efforts  ;  and  although  the  ancient  laws  of  Portugal 
provided    the    most   ample   means    for   meeting   such 


*  Colonel  Jones's  History  of  the  Peninsular  War 


1811.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


407 


emerp^encit'S,  the  bridges  over  the  Ceira,  the  Alva  and 
other  rivers,  on  the  line  of  retreat,  were  left  unrepaired. 
The  roads  were  therefore  impassahie,  and  as  the  rainy 
seasow  was  coming  on,  the  safety  of  the  army  would 
have  been  seriously  endancrered  if  it  had  heen  obliared 
to  retire  before  the  emperor.  The  regency  pleaded 
want  of  money,  hut  tiiis  also  could  be  traced  to  their 
own  neglitrence  in  the  collection  of  taxes,  for  which 
there  was  no  solid  reason  ;  because,  witii  ihe  exception 
of  the  devastated  districts,  the  people  were  actually 
rif  iier  than  they  had  ever  been,  not  indeed  in  goods, 
b.it  in  hard  cash,  derived  from  the  enormous  sums  ex- 
P'-nded  bv  the  British  army.  To  add  to  these  embar- 
rassiTietits  the  secret  correspondents  of  the  army  on 
tht"  side  of  Salamanca  suddenly  ceased  their  commu- 
nicaiiinis,  and  it  was  at  first,  teared  they  had  paid  with 
their  lives  for  the  culpable  indiscretion  of  the  Portu- 
guese governmi  nt ;  for  the  latier  had  published,  in  the 
Lisbon  Gazette,  all  the  secret  information  sent  to  Sil- 
veira,  which  being  copied  into  the  English  newspapers, 
drew  the  enemy's  attention.  Fortunately  this  alarm 
proved  false,  but  a  sense  of  the  other  diiriculties  was 
greatly  aggravated  to  the  English  general,  by  compari- 
son of  his  situation  with  that  of  the  enemy;  neither 
neressily  nor  remuneration,  could  procure  for  him  due 
assistance  from  the  Portuguese  people,  while  the  French 
generals  had  merely  to  issue  their  orders  to  the  Span- 
iards through  the  prelects  of  the  provinces,  and  all 
means  of  transport  or  other  succour,  possible  to  be 
obtained,  were  sure  to  be  provided  on  the  day  and  at 
the  place  indicated.* 

In  the  midst  of  these  cares  lord  Wellington  was 
suddenly  called  into  military  action  by  the  approach 
of  the  enemy.  Ciudad  Rodrigo  having  been  blockaded 
for  six  weeks  wanted  food,  and  Marinont,  who  had 
received  a  reinforcement  of  eleven  thousand  men  from 
France,  and  had  now  fifty  thousand,  present  under 
arms,  in  the  valley  of  the  Tagus,  being  in  pain  for  the 
garrison,  had  concerted  with  Dorsenne  a  great  com- 
bined operation  for  its  succour.  In  this  view  Truxillo 
had  been  occupied  by  a  part  of  the  fifth  corps,  and 
Girard  with  the  remainder  had  advanced  to  Merida, 
while  Foy,  reinforced  by  a  strong  division  of  the  arnay 
of  the  centre,  occupied  Placentia.  Marmont  hinnself 
quitting  Talavera  had  passed  the  mountains  and  col- 
lected a  large  convoy  at  Bejar ;  at  the  same  time  Dor- 
senne reinforced  by  eight  thousand  men  under  Souham 
had  collected  another  convoy  at  Salamanca,  and  leaving 
Bonnet's  division,  which  now  included  Mayer's  troops, 
at  Astorga,  to  watch  the  Gallicians,  came  down  to 
Tamames.  They  met  on  the  21st,  their  united  armies 
presenting  a  mass  of  sixty  thousand  men,  of  which 
six  thousand  were  cavalry  :  and  they  had  a  hundred 
pieces  of  artillery. 

The  English  general,  who  had  expected  this  move- 
ment, immediately  concentrated  his  scattered  troops. 
He  could  not  fight  beyond  the  Agueda,  but  he  did  not 
think  fit  to  retreat  until  he  had  seen  their  whole  army, 
lest  a  detachment  should  relieve  the  place  to  his  dis- 
honour. Hence  to  make  the  enemy  display  his  force, 
he  established  himself  in  the  following  positions  near 
the  fortri'ss. 

The  third  division,  reinforced  by  three  squadrons  of 
German  aiui  British  cavalry,  formed  his  centre.  It 
was  pnsled  on  the  heights  of  Elbodon  and  Pastores,  on 
the  left  of  tlie  Agueda,  and  within  three  miles  of  Ciu- 
dad, commanding  a  complete  prospect  of  the  plains 
round  that  place. 

The  right  wiufj  composed  of  the  light  division,  some 
sqiiadrons  of  cavalry,  and  six  guns,  was  posted  beyond 
the  Affueda,  and  behind  the  Vadillo,  a  river  rising  in 
the  Peiia  dc  Francia,  and  flowing  in  a  rnggred  channel 
to  the  Agueda,  wliich  it  joins  about  three   miles  above 

•  Welhngton's  Correspondence  with  lord  Liverpool  MSS. 


Rodrigo;  from  this  line   an   enemy  coming  from   the 
eastern  passes  of  the  hills  could  be  discerned. 

The  left  wing,  composed  of  the  sixth  division  and 
Anson's  brigade  of  cavalry,  the  whole  under  general 
Graham,  was  placed  at  Espeja,  on  the  lower  Azava, 
with  advanced  posts  at  Carpio  and  Marialva,  From 
thence  to  Ciudad  Rodrigo  was  about  eight  miles  over  a 
plain,  and  on  Graham's  left,  Julian  Sanchez's  Partida, 
nominally  commanded  by  Carlos  d'Espaiia,  was  spread 
along  the  lower  Agueda  in  observation.  The  heads  of' 
the  columns  were  therefore  presented  on  three  points 
to  the  fortress  ;  namely,  at  the  ford  of  the  Vadillo;  and 
the  heights  of  Pastores  and  Espeja.  The  communica- 
tion between  the  left  and  centre  was  kept  up  by  two 
brigades  of  heavy  cavalry,  posted  on  the  Upper  Aza- 
va, and  supported  at  Campillo  by  Pack's  Portugueso 
brigade.  But  the  left  of  the  army  was  very  distant 
from  Guinaldo,  which  was  the  pivot  of  operations,  and 
to  obviate  the  danger  of  making  a  flank  march  in 
retreat,  should  the  enemy  advance,  the  seventh  di- 
vision was  placed  in  reserve  at  Alamedillo,  and  the 
first  division  at  Nava  d'Aver.  Thus  the  allied  army 
was  spread  out  on  the  different  roads  which  led,  like 
the  slicks  of  a  fan,  to  one  point  on  the  Coa. 

The  fifth  division  remained  at  St.  Payo  watching 
the  passes  from  Estremadura,  lest  Foy  should  from 
that  direction  fall  on  the  rear  of  the  right  wing;  and 
as  Marrnonl's  movement  affected  the  line  of  communi- 
cation along  the  eastern  frontier,  general  Hill  first  sent 
Hamilton's  Portuguese  towards  Albuquerque,  to  sup- 
port the  Spanish  cavalry,  which  was  menaced  by  the 
fifth  corps,  and  then  brought  the  remainder  of  his 
troops  nearer  to  the  Tagus,  in  readiness  to  take  the 
place  of  his  third  brigade,  which  now  marched  from 
the  PonQul  to  Penamacor. 

Wellington's  position  before  Rodrigo  was  very  exten- 
sive, and  therefore  very  weak.  The  Agueda,  although 
fordable  in  many  places  during  fine  weather,  was  liable 
to  sudden  freshes,  and  was  on  both  sides  lined  with 
high  ridges.  The  heights,  occupied  by  the  troops,  on 
the  left  bank,  were  about  three  miles  wide,  ending 
rather  abruptly  above  Pastores  and  Eldobon,  and  they 
were  flanked  by  the  great  plains  and  woods,  which 
extend  from  Ciudad  to  the  bed  of  the  Coa.  The  po- 
sition of  Eldobon  itself,  which  was  held  by  the  centre 
of  the  army,  was,  therefore,  not  tenable  against  an 
enemy  commanding  these  plains  ;  and  as  the  wings 
were  distant  their  lines  of  retreat  were  liable  to  be  cut, 
if  the  centre  should  be  briskly  pushed  hack  beyond 
Guinaldo.  But,  at  the  latter  place,  three  field  redoubts 
had  been  constructed,  on  the  high  land,  with  a  view  to 
impose  upon  the  enemy,  and  so  gain  time  to  assenablo 
and  feel  Marmonl's  disposition  for  a  battle,  because  a 
letreat  behind  the  Coa  was  t)be  avoided  if  possible. 

On  the  23d  tlie  French  advanced  from  Tamaines, 
and  encamped  behind  the  hills  to  the  north-east  of  Ciu- 
dad Rodrigo.  Then  a  strong  detachment  enlere-d  the 
plain,  and  having  communicated  with  the  garrison,  and 
examined  the  position  of  the  light  division  on  the  Va- 
dillo returned. 

The  24th,  six  thousand  cavalry,  with  four  divisions 
of  infantry,  crossed  the  hills  in  two  columns,  and  plac- 
ing some  troops  in  observation  on  the  Vadillo,  intro- 
duced the  convoy.  On  this  day  the  fourth  division  of 
the  allies,  was  brought  up  to  the  position  of  Guinaldo, 
and  the  redoubts  were  completed,  yet  no  other  change 
was  made,  for  it  was  thought  the  French  would  noi 
advance  further.  But  the  25th,  soon  after  daybreak, 
fourteen  squadrons  of  the  imperial  guards  drove  the 
outposts  of  the  left  win?  from  Carpio  across  the  Azava, 
and  the  lancers  of  Berg'  crossed  thai  river  in  pursuit. 
they  were  however  flanked  by  some  infantry  in  a  wood, 
and  then  charged  and  beaten  by  two  S(iuadrons  of  the 
fourteenth,  and  sixteenth,  dragoons,  who  reoccupied 
the  post  d   C  i-pio. 


408 


NAPIER'S    PENINC 


AR    WAR. 


[Book  XIV, 


Duringr  the  skirmish,  fourteen  battalions  of  infantry, 
thirty  squadrons  of  cavalry,  and  twelve  guns,  the  wliole 
under  Monlhriin,  passed  the  Ajrueda  hy  the  bridge  of 
Rodrigo  and  the  fords  above;  it,  and  niaiched  towards 
Guinaldo,  The  road  soon  divided,  one  branch  turning 
the  Elbodon  heights  on  the  right  hand,  the  other  lead- 
ing nearer  to  the  Agueda,  and  passing  through  the 
villages  of  Paslores,  La  Encina,  and  Elbodon;  and  as 
the  point  of  divarication  was  covered  hy  a  gentle  ridge, 
it  was  for  sonu;  time  doubtful  which  branch  the  Freneh 
would  follow.  In  a  short  time  this  doubt  v.as  derided. 
Their  cavalry  poured  along  the  right-hand  road  leading 
directly  to  Guinaldo,  the  small  advanced  posts  which 
the  allied  squadrons  had  on  the  plain  were  rapidly 
driven  in,  and  the  enemy's  horsemen  without  waiting 
for  their  infantry  commenced  the 

COMBAT    OF    ELBODON. 

Tlie  position  of  the  third  division  was  completely 
turned  by  this  movement,  and  the  action  began  very 
disadvantageously,  for  the  seventy-fourth  and  sixtieth 
regiments,  being  at  Pastores,  on  the  right,  were  too 
distant  to  he  called  in.  and  Picton  being  with  three 
other  regiments,  at  Elbodon,  could  not  take  any  imme- 
diate part  in  the  fight.  Hence,  as  the  French  force 
was  considerable,  Wellington  sent  to  Guinaldo  for  a 
brigade  of  the  fourth  division,  and  meanwhile  directed 
general  Colville  to  draw  up  the  seventy-seventh  and 
fifth  British  regiments,  the  twenty-first  Portuguese, 
and  two  brigades  of  artillery  of  the  same  nation,  on  the 
hill  over  which  the  road  to  Guinaldo  passed,  support- 
ing their  flanks  with  Allen's  three  squadrons.  The 
height,  thus  occupied  by  the  allies,  was  convex  towards 
the  enemy,  and  covered  in  front  and  on  both  flanks,  by 
deep  ravines,  but  it  was  too  extensive  for  their  num- 
bers ;  and  before  Picton  could  bring  in  the  troops  from 
the  village  of  Elbodon,  the  crisis  of  tlio  combat  passed. 
'I'he  Portuguese  guns  had  sent  their  shot  amongst  the 
thickest  of  Monlbrun's  horsemen  in  the  plain,  but  the 
latter  passed  the  front  ravine  in  half  squadrons,  and 
with  amazing  vigour  riding  up  the  rough  height,  on 
tliree  sides,  fell  vehemently  upon  the  allies.  xSeither 
liie  loose  fire  of  the  infantry,  nor  of  the  artillery,  could 
BtTp  them,  hut  they  were  checked  by  the  fine  fighting 
of  the  cavalry,  who  charged  the  heads  of  the  ascend- 
ing masses,  not  once  but  twenty  times,  and  always 
with  a  good  will,  thus  maintaining  the  upper  ground 
for  above  an  hour. 

It  was  astonishing  to  see  so  few  troopers  hearing  up 
against  that  surging  multitude,  even  favoured  as  the 
former  were  by  the  sleep  rocky  nature  of  the  ground  ; 
but  Montbrun  obstinate  to  win  soon  brought  up  his 
nrlillery,  and  his  horsemen  gaining  ground  in  the  cen- 
tre, cut  down  some  of  the  gunners  and  captured  the 
guns;  and  one  of  the  British  squadrons  by  charging 
too  far  got  entangled  in  the  intricacy  of  the  ravines. 
The  danger  was  then  imminent,  when  suddenly  the 
fifth  regiment,  led  by  major  Ridge,  a  daring  spirit, 
darted  into  the  midst  of  the  French  cavalry,  and  retook 
the  artillery,  which  again  opened  its  fire ;  and  nearly 
at  the  same  time  the  seventy-seventh,  supported  by  the 
twenty-first  Portuguese,  repulsed  the  enemy  on  the 
left.  However,  this  charging  of  a  weak  line  of  infan- 
try against  a  powerful  cavalry,  could  only  check  the 
foe  at  that  particular  point.  Monlhrun  still  pressed 
onwards  with  fresh  masses,  against  the  left  flank  of 
the  allies,  while  other  squadrons  penetrated  between 
the  right  flank  and  the  village  of  Elbodon.  From  the 
enclosures  and  vineyards  of  that  village,  Picton  was 
at  this  time  with  didiculty  and  some  confusion  extrica- 
ting his  regiments;  the  expected  brigade  of  the  fourth 
division  was  not  yet  in  sight,  and  the  French  infantry 
was  rapidly  approaching :  the  position  was  no  lonnrcr 
tenable,  and  lord  Wellington  directed  both  Picinn  and 
Uolville  to  fall  back  and  unite  in  the  plain  behind. 


Colville  forming  his  baltalinns  in  two  squares  imme» 
diately  descended  from  the  hill,  but  Picion  hud  a  con- 
siderable distance  to  move,  and  at  this  moment,  the 
allied  squadrons,  fearinfj  to  be  surrounded  by  the 
French,  wh.o  had  completely  turned  iheir  right,  oral- 
loped  away,  and  took  refuse  with  the  Portuguese  Hgi- 
ment,  which  was  farthest  in  retreat.  Then  the  »:lh 
and  seventy-seventh,  two  weak  battalions  formed  in 
one  square,  were  quite  exposed,  and  in  an  instan.  the 
whole  of  the  French  cavalry  came  thundering  down 
upon  them.  But  how  vain,  how  fruitless  to  niaich  tiie 
sword  with  the  m.usket !  To  send  the  charging  horse- 
man against  the  steadfast  veteran  !  The  mullituilinon? 
squadrons,  rending  the  skies  with  their  shouts,  and 
closing  upon  the  glowing  squares,  like  the  fillintr 
edges  of  a  burning  crater,  were  as  instantly  rejefHed, 
scorched,  and  scattered  abroad  ;  and  the  rolling  peal 
of  musketry  had  scarcely  ceased  to  echo  in  tlip  bills, 
when  bayonets  glittered  at  the  edjxe  of  the  smoke,  atul 
with  firm  and  even  step,  the  British  regiments  came 
forth  like  the  holy  men  from  the  Assyrian's  furnace. 

Picion  now  eflected  his  junction  and  the  whole  re- 
tired over  the  plain  to  the  position  al  Guinaldo,  which 
was  about  six  miles  distant.  The  Freiu'b,  although 
fearing  to  renew  the  close  attack,  followed,  and  plied 
the  troops  with  s^hot  and  shell,  until  about  four  o'clock 
in  the  evening,  when  the  entrenched  camp  was  gained. 
Here  the  fourth  division  presented  afresh  front.  Pack's 
brigade  came  up  from  Campillo,  and  the  heavy  cavalry 
from  the  Upper  Azava,  being  also  brought  into  line, 
the  action  ceased.  By  this  retrograde  movement  of 
the  lefl  and  centre  of  the  third  division,  the  seventy- 
fourth  and  the  sixtieth  regiments,  posted  al  Pastores, 
were  cut  off;  they  however  crossed  the  Agneda  by  a 
ford,  and  moving  up  the  right  bank  h.appily  reached 
Guinaldo  in  the  uiglit,  after  a  march  of  fifteen  hours, 
in  the  course  of  which  they  captured  a  French  cavalry 
patrol. 

During  the  reireat  from  Elbodon,  the  left  wing  of 
the  army  was  ordered  to  fall  back  on  the  first  division, 
at  Nava  d'Aver,  but  to  keep  posts  in  observation  on 
the  Azava.  Carlos  d'Espara  retired  with  Sanchez's 
infantry  behind  the  Coa,  and  the  guerilla  chief  him- 
self passed  with  his  cavalry  into  the  Freiu;h  rear. 
'I'he  seventh  division  was  wilbdrawn  from  Allemadilla 
to  Albergaria,  and  the  head-quarters  baggage  moved 
to  Casilla  de  Flores.  The  light  division  should  have 
marched  to  Guinaldo;  general  Craiifurd  received  the 
order  at  two  o'clock,  he  plainly  heard  the  cannonade, 
and  might  easily  have  reached  Guinaldo  before  mid- 
night, but  he  only  marched  to  Cespedosa,  one  league 
from  the  Vadillo,  which  river  was  immediately  passed 
by  fifteen  hundred  French.  The  position  at  Guiiialdo 
was  therefore  occupied  by  only  fourteen  thonsaiul  men, 
of  which  about  two  thousand  six  hundred  were  cavalry. 
'I'he  left  of  the  army,  concentrated  at  Nava  d'Aver, 
under  Graham,  was  ten  miles  distaiit;  the  lifjhl  divi- 
sion being  at  Cespedosa  and  debarred  the  direct  route 
by  the  ford  of  Oarros,  was  sixteen  miles  disiant,  and 
the  fifth  division,  posted  al  Payo  in  the  mountains,  was 
twelve  miles  disiant.  Meanwhile  iMarmonl  brought 
up  a  second  division  of  infantry,  and  in  the  course  of 
the  night,  and  Uk;  following  day,  unit' d  sixty  thousand 
men  in  front  of  Guinaldo.  The  situation  of  the  Eng- 
lish general  was  become  most  critical,  yet  he  would 
not  abandon  the  light  division,  which  did  not  arrive 
until  after  three  o'clock  in  the  evening.  Marmonl's 
fortune  was  fixed  in  that  hour!  He  knew  iu)lliing  of 
the  allies'  true  situation,  and  having  detached  a  strong 
column  by  the  valley  of  the  Azava  to  menace  their  lel\, 
contented  himself  with  making  an  ostentations  display 
of  the  imperial  guards  in  the  plain,  instead  ofatlackinnr 
an  adversary  who  was  too  weak  to  fight,  and  laughing 
to  see  hiia  so  employed,  soon  changed  tlie  stale  of 
affairs. 


1811.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


409 


In  the  nitrht,  Wellington  by  a  skilful  concontrio 
movement  from  Guinaldo,  Nava  d'Aver,  Perales.  and 
Payo,  united  the  whole  army  on  new  gfround,  between 
t!ie  Coa  and  the  sources  of  the  Afrueda,  twelve  miles 
behind  Guinaldo;  and  it  is  a  curious  fact  that  Marmnnt 
had  so  litlie  knowledtje  of  his  own  advantagres,  that 
instead  of  harassinjr  tlie  allies  in  this  difficult  move- 
ment, he  also  retired  durinor  the  nicrin,  and  was  actually 
in  march  to  the  rear,  when  the  scouts  of  the  column, 
uhich  had  marched  by  the  valley  of  Azava,  brougrht 
word  th  it  the  allies  were  in  retreat,  and  their  divisions 
still  wid(-ly  separated.  Dorsenne  then  insisted  that 
Marmont  should  wheel  round  and  pursue,  but  lord 
Wellino^ton  was  already  in  a  strong  position  behind 
the  strca'ii  of  the  Villa  Maior. 

The  fifth  division,  cominij  up  from  Paj'o,  was  now 
on  the  right  at  Aldea  Velha,  the  fourth  and  li'fht 
divisions,  with  Victor  Alten's  cavalry,  and  the  heavy 
dn^oons,  under  sir  Stapleton  Cotton,  were  in  the 
centre  in  front  of  Alfayales;  the  convent  of  Sacaparte 
was  on  their  left,  and  the  line  wns  prolonffed  to  Rebu- 
lon  bv  Pack's  and  M'Mahon's  Portuguese  brio^ades; 
the  sixth  divi-iin  with  Anson's  cavalry  closed  the  line 
at  Bismiila.  The  cavalry  picquets  were  pushed  beyond 
the  Villa  .Maior  in  front  of  Aldea  Ponte,  in  the  centre, 
and  towards  Furcalhos  )n  the  riiiht;  and  the  third  and 
seventh  divisions  were  in  reserve  behind  Alfayates. 
This  position  was  extensive,  but  the  days  were  short, 
serious  dispositions  were  required  for  a  general  attack, 
and  the  allirs  could  not  be  turned,  because  they  covered 
all  the  practicable  roads  leading  to  the  bridges  and 
fords  of  the  Coa. 

COMBAT    OF    ALDEA    DE    PONTE. 

The  French,  moving  by  the  roads  of  Furcalhos  and 
of  Aldea  de  I'onte.  were  checked  by  the  picquets  of 
the  light  division  on  the  former;  but  on  the  latter  their 
horsemen  drove  the  cavalry  posts  from  the  hills,  and 
across  the  stream  of  the  Villa  Maior,  and  about  ten 
o'cloik  took  possession  of  Aldea  de  Ponte. 

At  twelve  o'clock  the  head  of  the  infantry  came  up 
Rod  immediately  attacked  general  Pakenham,  then 
commanding  a  brigade  of  the  fourth  division,  which 
was  posted  on  the  opposite  heights.  Lord  Wellington 
arrived  at  the  same  moment,  and  directed  the  seventh 
fiizileers  to  chartje  in  line,  and  he  supported  them  on 
each  flank  with  a  Portuguese  renrimcnt  in  column.  The 
French  who  had  advanced  well  up  the  hill,  were 
driven  back,  and  thtiugh  they  afterwards  attempted 
to  turn  the  brigade  by  a  wood,  which  was  distant 
about  musket-shot  from  the  riuht,  while  their  cavalry 
advanced  to  the  foot  of  the  hills,  the  artillery  sufficed 
to  baffle  the  effort.  Then  the  lOnglish  general  takinu 
the  offensive,  directed  the  twenty-third  fuzileers  and 
Portuguese  caradores  to  turn  the  French  left,  and 
seize  the  opposite  hills,  w-hich  finished  the  action, 
and  Aldea  de  Ponte  was  again  occupied  by  the  allies. 
\VellinfTton.  who  had  been  much  exposed  to  the  fire, 
rode  to  another  part  of  the  position,  but  scarcely  had 
he  departed  when  the  French  from  the  Forcalhos  road 
joined  th''Se  near  Aldea  de  Ponte,  and  at  five  o'clock 
renewing  the  attack  retook  the  village.  Pakenham, 
with  his  fuzileers,  immediately  recovered  it,  but  the 
French  were  very  numerous,  the  country  rutrged,  and 
80  wooded,  that  he  could  not  tell  what  was  passing  on 
the  flanks,  wherefore,  knowing  that  the  chosen  ground 
of  battle  was  behind  the  Coa,  he  abandoned  Aldea  de 
Ponte  and  regained  his  original  post. 

In  the  night  the  allies  retreated,  and  on  the  morning 
of  the  28th  occupied  a  new  and  very  strong  posiiion  in 
hui.t  of  the  Coa,  the  ri^ht  resting  on  the  Sierra  de 
Mesas,  the  centre  covered  by  the  village  of  Soita,  the 
left  at  Rendo  upon  the  Coa.  The  whole  army  thus 
enclosed,  as  it  were  in  a  deep  loop  of  the  Coa  river 
could  only  be  attacked  on  a  narrow  front,  and  Mar- 


mont, who  had  brought  up  but  a  few  lays  provisions 
and  could  gather  none  in  that  country,  retired  the  same 
day.  This  terminated  the  operatiors.  The  French 
placed  a  fresh  garrison  in  Ciudad  Rodrigo  ;  Dorsenne 
marched  to  Salamanca;  a  strong  division  was  posted 
at  Alba  de 'I'ormes  to  communicate  with  Marmont,  and 
the  latter  resumed  his  old  position  in  the  valley  of  the 
Tagus.  At  the  same  time  I'\)y,  who  had  advanced 
with  his  two  divisions  as  far  as  Zarzn  Mayor,  in  the 
direction  of  Castello  Branco,  returned  to  Placentia  ; 
Girard  also,  being  threatened  by  Hamilton's  Portu- 
guese division,  which  Hill  had  sent  to  check  his 
advance,  left  two  thousand  men  of  the  fifth  corps  at 
Merida,  and  retired  to  Zafra;  and  when  tii^se  move- 
ments were  known,  the  light  division  reinforced  by 
some  cavalry  resumed  the  nominal  blockade  of  Ciu- 
dad Rodrigo,  in  concert  with  Julian  Sanchez.  The 
rest  of  the  army  was  cantoned  on  both  sides  of  tiie 
Coa,  and  head-quarters  were  fixed  at  Frenada. 

Nearly  a  month  had  been  employed  by  the  French 
in  the  preparation  and  execution  of  this  great  operation, 
which  terminated  so  feebly  and  so  abruptly,  because  the 
generals  were  as  usual  at  variance.*  They  had  vict- 
ualled Ciudad  Rodrigro,  but  th<°y  had  lost  the  favoura- 
ble o])portunity  of  invading  Gallicia.  Nothing  had 
been  gained  in  the  field,  time  was  lost,  and  the  Eng- 
lish general's  plans  were  forwarded. 

OBSEPwVATIONS. 

1.  Lord  Wellington's  position  behind  the  Soita  ha3 
been  noticed  by  two  recent  authors.  The  one  condemns 
the  imprudence  of  ofiering  batt'e  on  ground  whence 
there  was  no  retreat;  the  other  intimates  that  it  was 
assumed  in  contempt  of  the  adversary's  prowess. "(" 
This  last  appears  a  mere  shift  to  evade  what  w'as  not 
understood,  for  if  lord  Wellintrton  had  despised  Mar- 
mont, he  would  have  finifrht  him  beyond  the  Agueda.iJ: 
But  sixty  thousand  French  soldiers  were  never  to  be 
despised,  neither  was  Wellington  a  man  to  put  an  army 
in  jeopardy  fr.Tm  any  overweening  confidence  ;  and  it  is 
not  difficult  to  show  that  his  position  was  chosen 
well,  without  imprudence,  and  without  presumption. 

The  space  between  the  Sierra  de  Mesas  and  the  Coa 
was  less  ihan  six  miles,  and  the  part  open  to  attack 
was  very  much  reduced  by  the  ruwcred  bed  of  a  torrent 
which  covered  t-he  left.  Forty  thousand  men  were 
quite  able  to  defend  this  line,  which  was  scarcely  more 
than  one-third  of  their  full  front;  and  as  the  roads  were 
bad,  the  country  hilly  and  much  broken  with  woods  and 
ravines,  the  superiority  of  the  enemy's  hnrse  and  guns 
would  have  availed  him  little.  Lord  Wellington  had 
a  right  to  be  bold  against  an  adversary  who  had  not 
molested  him  at  Guinaldo,  and  it  is  always  of  impor- 
tance to  show  a  menacing  front.  It  was  also  certain 
that  great  combinations  must  have  been  made  by 
Marmont,  before  he  could  fight  a  general  battle  on 
such  ground;  it  was  equally  certain  that  he  could  only 
have  a  few  days'  provisions  with  his  army,  and  tir.;t 
the  neighbourhood  could  not  supply  him.  It  was, 
therefore,  reasonable  to  expect  that  he  would  retire 
rather  than  fight,  and  he  did  so. 

Let  us  however,  take  the  other  side,  and  suppose 
that  Marmont  was  prepared  and  resolute  to  bring  on  a 
great  battle.  The  position  behind  Soita  would  still 
have  been  good.  The  French  were  indeed  too  strong 
to  be  fought  with  on  a  plain,  yet  not  strong  enough  to 
warrant  a  retreat  indicating  fear;  hence  the  allies  had 
retired  slowly  for  three  days,  each  day  engaged,  and 
the  enemy's  powerful  horse  and  artillery  was  always 
close  upon  their  rear.  Now  the  bed  of  the  Coa,  which 
was  extremely  rugged,  furnished  only  a  few  points  fol 


*   Virtoires  et  Conqueles  des  Francois. 

+   Lonrlonrlerry  s  Narrativ. 

I  Annals  of  the  Peninsular  Cainpaigna. 


410 


NAPIIR'S    PENINSULAR    WAR, 


'Book  XIV. 


<^rossing,  jf  which  the  principal  were,  the  ford  of 
Serraleira  behind  the  riirht  of  iho  allies;  the  ford  of 
Rapoulha  de  Coa  behind  their  left ;  and  the  brido^e  of 
Sahugal  behind  their  centre.  The  ways  to  those 
points  were  narrow,  and  tlie  passage  of  the  river,  with 
all  the  baorratre,  could  not  have  been  easily  effected  in 
fee  of  an  enemy  without  some  loss  and  perhaps 
dishonour:  and  had  lord  Wellington  been  unable  to 
hold  his  position  in  a  battle,  the  difficulty  of  passing 
the  river  would  not  have  been  much  increased,  because 
his  incumbrances  would  all  have  been  at  the  other 
side,  and  there  was  a  second  range  of  heights  lialf-a- 
niile  in  front  of  Sahugal  favourable  for  a  rear-guard. 
The  position  of  Soita  appears  therefore  to  have  been 
chosen  \vi:h  good  judgment  in  regard  to  the  immedi- 
ate oi)jecl  of  opposing  the  enemy  ;  but  it  is  certain 
that  the  battering  train,  then  between  Pinhel  and  Villa 
Ponle,  was  completely  exposed  to  the  enemy.  Mar- 
mont,  however,  had  not  sufficiently  considered  his 
enterprize,  and  knew  not  where  or  how  to  strike. 

2.  The  position  of  Aldea  Ponte,  was  equally  well 
chosen.  Had  the  allies  retreated  at  once  from  Guinal- 
do,  to  Soita,  baggage  and  stores  would  have  been  lost, 
md  the  retrograde  movement  have  had  the  appearance 
of  a  flight ;  the  road  from  Payo  would  have  been 
uncovered,  and  the  junction  of  the  fifth  division  endan- 
gered. But  in  the  position  taken  up,  the  points  of 
^unction  of  all  the  roads  were  occupied  and  as  each 
point  was  strong  in  itself,  it  was  not  difficult  for  a 
i^iiick  sighted  general,  perfectly  acquainted  with  the 
country,  and  having  excellent  troops,  to  check  the 
heads  of  the  enemy's  columns,  until  the  baggage  had 
gained  a  sufficient  offing,  and  the  fifth  division  had 
taken  its  place  in  line. 

3.  The  position  at  Guinaldo  was  very  different 
"rom  the  others.  The  previous  entrenching  of  it  proved 
lord  Wellington's  foresight,  and  he  remained  there 
thirty-six  hours,  that  is,  from  rnid-day  of  the  25ih  until 
mid-night  of  ihe  2Gth,  which  proved  his  firmness.  It  is 
said  that  sir  George  Murray  advised  him  to  abandon  it 
in  the  night  of  the  25lli,  and  that  arrangements  were 
actually  made  in  that  view,  yet  anxious  for  the  safety  of 
the  light  division  lie  would  not  stir.  'J^he  object  was 
certainly  one  of  importance  sufficient  to  justify  the 
resolution,  but  the  resolution  itself  was  one  of  those 
daring  strokes  of  genius  which  the  ordinary  rules  of 
art  were  never  made  to  conlroul.  The  position  was 
contracted,  of  no  great-  natural  strength  in  front,  and 
easily  to  he  turned  ;  the  entrenchments  constructed  were 
;  nly  a  few  breast  works  and  two  weak  field  redoubts, 
jpen  in  rear,  and  without  palisades  ;  not  more  than 
fourteen  thousand  British  and  Portuiruese  troops  were 
111  line,  and  sixty  thousand  French  veterans  with  a 
hundred  pieces  of  artillery  were  before  them  !  When 
Marmont  heard  of  the  escape  of  the  light  division,  and 
discovered  the  deceit,  he  prophetically  exclaimed,  al- 
.uding  to  Napoleon's  fortune,  '■'■And  Wellington'' s  star, 
U  aliO  is  hriirht  /  " 

4.  The  positions  of  Aldea  Ponte  and  Soita  are 
.0  bft  commended,  that  at  Guinaldo  to  be  admired 
rather  than  imitated,  but  the  preceding  operations 
are  censurable.  The  country  immediately  beyond 
Ciudad  Rodiigo  offered  no  covering  position  for  a 
siege  or  blockade;  and  the  sudden  floods,  to  which 
the  Agueda  is  subject,  rendered  the  communications 
with  the  left  bank  precarious.  Nor  though  bridges 
had  been  secured,  could  Wellington  have  ventured  to 
encamp  round  the  place  with  lines  of  contravallation 
and  circumvallation,  on  both  sides  of  the  river;  be- 
cause Marinont's  army  would  then  have  advanced 
from  Placencia  to  Castello  Branco,  have  seized  the 
P'ssage  over  the  Tagus  at  Vilha  Vellia,  and  in  concert 
with  the  fifth  corps  endangered  the  safety  of  Mill. 
This  would  have  oblifjed  the  allies  to  quit  their 
entrenched  camp,  and  Dorsenne  cojld  thea  have  re- 


victualled  the  place.  It  was  therefore  necessary  to 
hold  a  strong  central  position  witii  respect  to  Marmont 
and  Dorsenne,  to  keej)  both  in  check  while  S'  parale, 
and  to  oppose  them  whih;  united.  This  ]>osilian  was 
on  the  C'oa,  and  as  Salamanca  or  liejar,  the  nearest 
points  where  convoys  could  be  collected  for  (ciudad 
Rodrigo,  were  from  fifty  to  sixty  miles  distant,  lord 
Wellington's  object  namely  the  forcing  the  French  to 
assemble  in  large  bodies  without  any  adequate  result, 
could  be,  and  was  obtained  by  a  distant  as  well  as 
by  a  close  investment. 

So  far  all  was  well  calculated,  but  when  Marmont 
and  Dorsenne  arrived  with  sixty  thousand  men  at 
Ciudad  Rodrioro,  the  aspect  of  affairs  entirely  changed, 
and  as  the  English  general  could  not  dispute  the 
entrance  of  the  convoy,  he  should  have  concentrated 
his  army  at  once  behind  Guinaldo.  Instead  of  doing 
this  he  kept  it  extended  on  a  line  of  many  miles  and 
the  right  wing  separated  from  the  centre  by  a  difficult 
river.  In  his  despatch,  he  sa}'S,  that,  from  some  un- 
certainty in  his  estimate  of  the  enemy's  numbers,  it 
was  necessary  to  ascertain  their  exact  strength  by 
actual  observation  ;  but  this  is  rather  an  excuse  than  a 
valid  reason,  because,  for  this  object,  which  could  be 
obtained  by  other  means,  lie  risked  the  loss  of  his 
whole  army,  and  violated  two  vital  rules  of  war  which 
forbid — 

1.  The  parcelling  of  an  army  before  a  concentrated 
enemy. 

2.  The  fixing  of  your  own  point  of  concentration 
within  the  enemy's  reach. 

Now  lord  Wellington's  position  on  the  24th  and 
25lh  extended  from  the  ford  of  the  Vadillo  on  the 
right  of  the  Agueda,  to  Marialva  on  the  Azava;  the 
distance  either  from  the  Vadillo,  or  Marialva,  to  Gui- 
naldo, was  as  great  as  that  from  Ciudad  to  Guinaldo, 
and  by  worse  roads;  and  the  distance  from  Ciudad  to 
Elbodon  was  as  nothing,  compared  to  the  distance  of 
the  wings  from  the  same  place.  Wherefore  when 
Montbrun  attacked,  at  Elbodon,  the  allies'  wings  were 
cut  oft",  and  the  escape  of  the  third  and  light  divisions, 
and  of  the  troops  at  Pastores,  w;is  a  matter  of  fortune 
and  gallantry,  rather  than  of  generalshi])  ;  that  is,  in 
the  enlarged  sense  of  the  last  word,  for  it  cannot  be 
denied  that  the  actual  movements  of  the  troops  were 
conducted  with  consummate  skill. 

But  what  if  Marmont,  instead  of  being  drawn  by 
circumstances  into  a  series  of  ill-combined,  and  partial 
attacks,  had  previously  made  dispositions  for  a  great 
battle?  He  certainly  knew,  through  the  garrison,  the 
real  situation  of  the  allies,  and  he  also  knew  of  the 
camp  at  Guinaldo,  which  being  on  their  line  of  retreat 
was  the  important  point.  If  he  had  issued  from  the 
fortress  before  daybreak  on  the  25th  with  the  whole 
or  even  half  of  his  forces,  he  could  have  reached 
Campillo  in  two  hours  with  one  column,  while  aiiotlier 
fell  on  the  position  at  Pastores  and  Elbodon;  the 
third  division,  thus  attacked,  would  have  been  en- 
veloped and  captured,  or  broken  and  driven  over  the 
Agueda,  by  the  ford  of  Zamara,  and  would  have  been 
irretrievably  separated  from  Guinaldo.  And  if  this 
division  had  even  reacbcMl  Guinaldo,  ihe  French  army 
would  have  arrived  with  it  in  such  overwhelming 
numbers,  that  the  fourth  division  could  not  have  re- 
stored the  battle ;  meanwhile  a  few  thousand  men 
thrown  across  the  ford  of  Caros  near  Robleda  would 
have  sufficed  to  keep  the  light  division  at  bay,  because 
the  channel  of  the  Robleda  torrent,  over  which  their 
retreat  lay,  was  a  very  deep  and  rugged  ravint!.  The 
centre  being  broken  the  French  could,  at  choice,  have 
either  surrounded  the  light  division,  or  directed  the 
mass  of  their  forces  against  the  reserves,  and  then  ths 
left  wing  under  Graham  would  have  had  to  retreat 
from  the  Azava  over  the  plains  towards  Almeida. 

It  may  be  said  that  all  the  French  were  not  up  on 


1611.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


411 


the  25th.  hut  thoy  minrht  have  hren  so,  and  as  lord 
WellintTton  was  resolved  to  see  their  i.umher  lie  would 
have  hoeii  in  the  snme  position  the  2Glh.  It  is  however 
wufficiml  to  remark  thai  the  allies  exclusive  of  the 
fifth  division,  which  was  at  Payo,  did  not  exceed 
thirty-five  thousand  men  of  all  arms  ;  that  they  were 
on  an  irregrular  line  of  at  least  twenty  miles,  and 
mostly  in  an  open  country  ;  that  at  no  point  were  the 
troops  inore  than  eight,  and  at  the  principal  point, 
namely  Pastores,  only  three,  miles,  from  a  fortress 
front  wht  nee  sixty  thousand  infantry  and  six  thou- 
sai:d  cavrtlry,  with  one  hundred  and  twenty  guns 
were  ready  to  issue.  F'inally  the  point  of  concentra- 
tion at  Guinaldo  was  only  twelve  n)iles  from  that 
fortress.  'I'he  allies  escaped  hecause  their  adversary 
was  hlind  !  Jjord  Wellinnrton's  conduct  at  Guinaldo 
was  ahove  rules,  but  at  Elbodon  it  was  against  rules, 
which  is  just  the  difference  between  genius  and  error. 
4.  In  these  operations  Marmont  gave  proof  that  as  a 
general  he  was  rather  shining  than  great.  He  was  in 
error  throughout.  Before  he  commenced  his  march  he 
had  desir.'d  Girard  to  advance  on  the  side  of  the  Alem- 
tejo,  assuring  him  that  the  whole  of  the  allied  army, 
and  even  the  Spanish  troops  under  Castanos.  had 
crossed  the  Tagus  to  operate  against  Rodrigo  ;  but  in 
fact  only  one  brigade  ol  Hill's  corps  had  moved,  and 
Girard  would  have  been  destroyed,  if,  fortunately  ibr 
him,  ihe  allies  had  not  intercepted  the   original  and 


duplicate   of  the  letter  containing   this   fa'.se  inform- 
ation. 

5.  When  Marmont  brought  his  convoy  into  Ciudad, 
it  would  appear  he  had  no  intention  of  fighting,  but 
tempted  by  the  false  position  of  the  allies,  and  angry 
at  the  repulse  of  his  cavalry  on  the  Lower  Azava,  he 
turned  his  scouting  troops  into  columns  of  attack. 
And  yet  lie  permitted  his  adversary  to  thr  'W  dust  in 
his  eyes  for  thirt)'-six  hours  at  Guina]df>;  and  at  Aldea 
Ponte  his  attack  was  a  useless  waste  of  men,  because 
there  was  no  local  advantage  offered,  and  he  did  lot 
intend  a  great  battle. 

6.  The  loss  incurred  in  the  different  combats  \vs3 
not  frreat.  About  three  thousand  men  and  officers  IVU 
on  the  part  of  the  allies,  and  on  that  of  the  French 
rather  more,  because  of  the  fire  of  the  squares  and 
artillery  at  Elbodon.  But  the  movements  during  the 
three  days  were  full  of  interest,  and  instruction,  and 
diversified  also  by  brilliant  examples  of  heroism. 
Rido-e's  daring  charge  has  been  already  noticed,  and  it 
was  in  one  of  the  cavalry  encounters,  that  a  French 
officer  in  the  act  of  striking  at  the  gallant  Felton 
Harvey  of  the  fourteenth  dragoons,  perceived  that  he 
had  only  o.ie  arm,  and  with  a  rapid  movement  brought 
down  his  sword  into  a  salute  and  passed  on  !  .Such  was 
the  state  of  the  war  on  the  frontier  of  Portugal  ;  in 
the  next  book  will  be  found  the  contemporary  events 
in  Spain. 


BOOK  XV. 


CHAPTER  I. 

State  of  the  war  in  Spain — Northern  provinces — State  of  Gal- 
licia  — Attfiiipt  to  introduce  Ensjlish  officers  into  the  Spanish 
servile — Tj  afficked  for  by  the  Spanish  g-overnnient — Repelit  d 
bv  the  Spanish  military — The  English  u;overnuitnt  encourage 
tlie  Paiti  las — Lord  Wellinsrton  sends  the  chiefs  presents — 
His  after  opinion  of  them — Sir  H.  Douglas  succeeds  oeneral 
Walker — Miserable  stute  of  Gallicia  described — Disputes 
between  the  civil  and  militivv — Anomalous  proceedings  of 
the  English  government — Gross  abuses  in  the  Spanish  army 
— Expedition  against  America  fitted  out  in  Gallicia  with  the 
English  supplies  inten*led  for  the  defence  of  the  province — 
Sir  H.  D)Ui;Ias's  policy  towards  the  Partidas  criticised — 
Events  in  the  Aslurias — Santander  surprised  by  Porlier — 
PLeilie  and  CafTarelli  scour  Biscay  and  the  Ri  ija — Bonet  in- 
vades tfie  Asturias — Defeats  .\loscoso,  Paul  F^odosa,  and 
MendiiMhel,  and  occupies  Oviedo — In  Gallicia  the  people 
prefer  the  French  to  their  own  armies — In  Estremadura, 
Droiiet  joins  (Virard  and  menaces  Hill — These  movements 
parts  of  a  great  plan  to  be  conducted  by  Napoleon  in  person. 

STATE    OF    THE    WAR    IN    SPAIN. 

Korfhern  Provinces.  The  invasion  of  Gallicia,  which 
had  been  arrested  by  the  arrival  of  the  allies  on  the 
Coa,  would  have  been  a  most  serious  calamity.  Abadia, 
a  weak  man,  with  troops,  distressed  for  provisions 
and  clothing,  was  on  bad  terms  with  the  chief  of  his 
stiff  Moscosa.  whom  he  feared,  and  on  worse  terms  with 
the  junta.  'I'he  great  road  to  (/oruna  was  open,  and 
althnu'/h  general  Walker,  seeing  the  danger,  advised 
that  Ferrol,  which  was  indefensible,  should  be  disman- 
tled, and  the  gnus,  amounting  to  fifteen  hundred,  with 
the  limlter  and  vessels  of  war  in  the  harbour,  transfer- 
red to  Goruiia,  neither  that  nor  any  other  useful 
measure  was  executed. 


Before  this,  overtures  had  been  made  to  the  Spanisti 
government,  to  take  Spanish  troops  into  British  pay 
after  the  manner  of  the  Portuguese  ;  but  the  regency 
remembering  the  prodigality  of  Canning  demanded 
three  millions  ye.irly.  besides  arms  and  clothing, 
without  which  they  said  the  Spaniards  could  make  no 
efficient  exertions!  To  introduce  British  officers  into 
the  service  on  any  other  terms  was  not  possible, 
because  the  Spanish  military  were  indignant  alRvhat 
they  termed  the  degradation  of  such  a  proposal.  The 
Perceval  faction  finding  it  thus,  and  wanting  great-» 
ness  of  mind  to  support  Wellington,  on  a  scale  com- 
mensurate with  his  talents,  then  turned  their  attention 
to  the  encouragement  of  the  Partidas,  as  being  less 
expensive,  and  affording  an  example  to  the  continental 
nations  of  popular  and  protracted  resistance  to  France. 

Sir  Howard  Douglas,  who  succeeded  general  Walk- 
er as  military  agent,  (these  officers  must  not  be  con- 
founded with  the  military  agents  originally  sent  out, 
and  whose  mischievo\is  proceedings  I  have  had  occa- 
sion to  notice.)  was  directed  to  encourage  those  bodies 
by  increased  supplies,  and  to  combine  their  movements 
better  with  each  other  and  with  the  British  squadron 
in  the  Bay  of  Biscay.  Lord  Wellington  at  the  desire 
of  government,  sent  to  the  guerilla  chiefs,  military  pre- 
sents, with  a  letter  acknowledging  the  importance  of 
their  services,  and  this  was  not  mere  compliment,  for 
he  had  indeed  derived  great  advantages  from  their 
exertions,  and  thought  he  had  derived  more,  because 
he  only  knew  of  their  exploits  by  hearsay.*  When 
he   afterwards   advanced   into   Spain   and    saw    them 


*  Sir  H.  Douglas's  CorresjionJtnLe,  MSS. 


412 


-'•aPier's  peninsular  war. 


[Book  XV. 


clopelvi  he  was  forcnd  ti  acknowledgfe  that  the  frucril- 
las,  allhoutrli  active  and  williiij,  and  allhoup^h  their 
operations  in  general  occasioned  the  utmost  annoyance 
to  the  enemy,  were  so  little  (lisciplined  that  they  could 
do  nothintr  against  the  French  troops  iinles*  the  latter 
were  very  inferior  in  nunihers.  If  the  French  took 
post  in  a  h  nse  or  church  of  which  they  only  barrica- 
doed  the  entrance,  both  regular  troops  and  sfnerillas 
were  so  ill  equipped  as  military  bodies,  that  their 
er.eaiy  could  remain  in  security  until  relieved.  In  like 
manner  Na[)oleon  reprimanding  his  jjpnerals  tor  sufTer- 
injT  the  Parlidas  to  train  any  head,  observed,  that  when 
cut  otf  from  communication  with  the  English  ships 
they  were  a  nullity  ! 

Douglas  arrived  just  as  Dorsenne's  retreat  enabled 
Abadia  to  resume  his  position  on  the  frontier,  but  the 
ariTiy  was  in  a  miserable  state  ;*  the  wet  season  was 
settinijin  upon  men,  destitute  of  even  the  necessaries 
of  life,  althouorh  the  province  aboimded  in  cattle  and 
goods,  which  could  be  easily  procured,  because  m^ney, 
althou<»h  plei;tiful,  was  g;enerally  hoarded,  and  com- 
modities were  therefore  cheap,  and  could  be  obtained 
in  lieu  of  taxes  at  the  market-price.  An  extraordinary 
increase  of  the  customs,  arisinir  from  the  trade  of  Sant- 
ander  and  FSilbao  beinsr  transferred  to  CoruTia  by  the 
war,  also  effered  a  valuable  resource;  the  harbour  was 
filled  with  colonial  goods,  and  as  the  appetites  of  men 
generally  stifle  [latriotism,  and  baffle  power,  a  licensed 
commerce  was  carried  on  with  the  enemy's  ports  in 
Jjiscay  ;  yet  without  judgment  as  related  to  the  war, 
for  the  return  was  iron,  to  re-export  to  the  colonies, 
whereas  by  an  internal  traffic  of  the  same  kind,  clothes 
and  grain  for  the  troops  miijht  have  been  had  from  Cas- 
tile and  Leon,  But  confusion  and  corruption  every 
where  prevailed,  the  exigences  of  the  war  were  always 
the  last  things  cared  for,  and  the  starving  soldiers  com- 
mitted a  thousand  excesses  with  impunity,  for  where 
there  is  no  food  or  pay,  there  can  be  no  discipline. 

The  people  were  oppressed  with  imposts,  legal  and 
illegal,  and  yet  the  defiAlcalion  in  the  revenue  was 
great,  and  the  monopoly  of  tobacco  the  principal  finan- 
cial resource,  was  injured  by  the  smuggling  arising 
from  the  unsettled  nature  of  the  limes.  'I'he  annua! 
charge  on  the  province  was  about  £1,300.000,  the  ac- 
tual receipts  were  less  than  £.300.000,  and  the  junta 
endeavour(>d  to  supply  the  deficiency  by  an  extraordi- 
nary contribution  from  all  properly,  save  thalofday- 
labr)urers,  which  they  expected  would  produce  sixty 
millions  of  reals  (,-£750,000).  But  a  corru|)t  and  vex- 
atious collection  of  this  tax  tormented  the  people  with- 
out filling  the  treasury;  the  clergy,  and  the  richer 
classes,  were,  as  in  Portugal,  favoured,  and  it  yielded, 
in  six  months,  less  than  a  seventh  part. 

From  this  state  of  affairs  two  inferences  may  be 
safely  drawn: — 1.  That  Entjland  and  not  Gallicia  had 
hitherto  su[)portcd  the  war  here,  as  in  other  parts  of 
the  l\Miinsiila.  2.  That  as  England  had  in  1803-9 
paid  to  Gallicia  three  millions  of  hard  dollars,  and 
given  other  succours  sudicient  for  double  the  number 
of  troops  employed,  the  deficiency  of  the  revenue  had 
been  amply  corui)ensated,  and  the  causes  of  distress 
must  be  sought  for  in  the  proceedings  of  the  authori- 
lies,  and  in  the  anomalous  nature  of  the  war  itself. 
The  successive  juntas,  apprehensive  of  offending  the 
people,  were  alw^.ys  inert  in  the  civil  administration, 
and  either  too  corrupt,  or  too  incapable,  to  apply  the 
succours  from  Englarul,  justly  or  wisely.  The  junta 
of  this  period  was,  like  its  predecessors,  factious  and 
intriguing;  it  was  hostile  to  the  junta  of  licon,  un- 
friendly to  that  of  Aslurias,  jealous  and  contemptuous 
of  the  military  leaders ;  in  return  these  last  abhorred 
the  junta,  and  were  tormented  with  factions  of  their 
own.     The  regular  ofilicers  hated  the  guerillas,  and  en- 

•  Sir  H.  Doui;Ia!i's  C'orrtspoiidcrs?,  MSS. 


deavoured  to  get  the  controul  of  the  succours  granted 
by  England,  to  the  latter;  and  as  they  necessarily  lived 
by  plundering  their  own  countrymen,  they  strenuously 
oppos(xl  the  arming  of  the  peasants,  partly  from  fear 
lest  the  latter  should  resist  this  license,  partly  because 
the  republican,  and  anti-English  spirit,  which  was 
growing  up  in  the  cortes  had  also  reached  this  quarter. 

The  clergy  clung  to  the  peasantry,  Avith  whom  tliey 
had  great  influence,  but  the  army,  which  had  imhified 
liberal  words,  rather  than  priru-iph^s,  w;;s  inimical  to 
th^m.  A  press  had  been  (St-.iblished  at  head-quaciers, 
from  whence  issued  political  papers  either  original,  or 
repeated  from  the  libels  at  Cadiz,  in  which,  the  Por- 
tuguese were  called  slav(>s,  for  submitting  to  British 
influence;  and  it  was  openly  avowed  that  the  rr(^n(  h 
yoke  was  preferable  to  that  of  England;  the  guerilla 
system,  and  the  arming  of  th(^  people  were  also  attack- 
ed, and  these  writings  were  met  by  other  political 
papers  from  the  civil  press  at  Cloru^a  and  St.  .Taoo. 
The  fri^quent  changes  of  commanders  rendered  all  the 
evils  more  prominent;  for  the  local  government  had 
legal  power  ta  meddle  with  the  military  arrangements, 
and  every  change  of  commander  produced  a  new  diffi- 
culty. Thus  the  junta  refused  to  acknowledge  Abadia 
as  their  president  during  the  absence  of  Castaiios,  he 
in  return  complained  alike  of  their  neglect  and  of  their 
interference;  and  when  they  proposed  to  establish  a 
general  depU  at  Lugo  he  marched  a  part  of  his  army 
there  to  prevent  it.  ;, 

But  the  occult  source  of  most  of  these  difficulties  is 
to  be  found  in  the  inconsistent  attempts  of  the  British 
cabinet,  to  uphold,  national  independence  with  internal 
slavery,  against  foreign  aggression,  with  an  amelio- 
rated government.  The  clergy  who  led  the  mass  of 
the  people,  clung  to  the  English,  because  they  sup- 
ported aristocracy  and  church  domination;  and  they 
were  also  strongly  for  the  Partidas,  because  these  were 
commanded  by  men  who  sprung  directly  from  the 
church  itself,  or  from  people  who  were  attached  to  the 
church,  while  the  regular  armies  beintj  officered  by  the 
friends  of  the  cortes,  disliked  the  Partidas,  both  as  in- 
terlopers and  as  political  enemies.  The  English  minis- 
ters, hatintr  Napoleon,  not  because  he  was  the  cneniy 
of  Eajrlafid,  but  because  he  was  the  champion  of  equal- 
ity, cared  not  for  Spain,  unless  her  people  were  en- 
slavc^d.  They  were  willing  enough  to  use  a  liberal 
cortes  to  defeat  Napoleon,  but  they  also  desired  to  put 
down  that  cortes,  by  tlie  aid  of  the  clergy,  and  of  the 
bigoted  part  of  the  people:  nevertheless  as  liberty  will 
always  have  more  charms  than  slavery,  they  would 
have  missed  of  both  objects,  if  the  exigences  of  the 
continental  system  had  not  induced  the  emperor  to  go 
to  Moscow,  where  the  snow  destroyed  him;  and  if  the 
very  advocates  of  liberty  in  Spain  had  not  in  their 
madness,  resolved  to  oppress  the  Americans.  The 
cortes,  by  discovering  a  rabid  love  of  power  in  prac- 
tice, rendered  their  democratic  doctrines  suspected, 
and  lost  jiartizans ;  but  lord  W(dIiiigton,  in  support  of 
aristocracy,  used  the  greatest  prudence  in  policy,  and 
in  his  actions  was  considi^rate  and  just. 

In  tiie  first  conference  held  at  Coruna,  after  sir 
Howard  Douglas's  arrival,  the  junta,  as  the  usual  pre- 
liminary, demanded  more  money  from  Kngland  ;  but 
he  advised,  instead,  a  better  management  of  their  own 
resources,  and  pointed  out  the  military  measures  requi- 
site to  render  the  army  etficient.  He  reccnumended 
the  aflojnion  of  the  line  of  retreat  upon  Orense,  rather 
than  upon  Lugo  and  Corufia  ;  and  he  endeavoured  to 
establish  a  [XTmanent  depot  in  the  island  of  Arosa,  on 
the  Vigo  coast,  as  a  secure  resource  in  the  event  of  de- 
feat;  lie  also  furnished  the  soldiers  with  shoes  and 
great  coats,  the  hospitals  with  blankets,  and  completed 
the  fire-locks  of  the  army  to  twenty-fi>e  thousand. 
There  were  however  abuses,  which  he  could  not  reme- 
dy, and  which  would  seem  ra*'ier  to  belong  tj  the  armj 


1311.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


(13 


of  an  Asiatic  dpspot,  than  to  an  Europpan  force  fight- 
ing for  ifidependencp.  Innumerable  baggage  animals 
devoured  all  the  forage,  and  the  personal  servants 
and  cooks,  who  from  custom  never  did  duty,  were 
above  five  thousand  !  a  sixth  part  of  the  whole  force  ! 
When  the  sick  men  were  deducted,  scarcely  sixteen 
thousand  infantry  and  three  squadrons  ^f  cavalry  re- 
mained for  service.  Then  there  was  so  little  organi- 
zation or  arrangement  that,  although  young,  robust, 
pati<-nt,  and  docile  to  the  greatest  degree,  the  troops 
could  scarcely  be  moved,  even  from  one  quarter  to  an- 
other, as  a  military  body;  and  the  generals,  unable  to 
feed  thpm  on  the  frontier,  more  than  once,  menaced, 
nnd  in  December  did  actually  retire  to  Lugo,  leaving 
the  province  open  to  invasion. 

Abadia  at  first  exerted  himself  with  activity,  and 
appeared  to  enter  loyally  into  the  ameliorations  pro- 
posed. He  gave  the  command  of  the  troops  to  Por- 
ta'sgo,  repaired  to  Coruila  himself,  and  organized  the 
province  in  seven  military  governments,  under  as  many 
chiefs,  one  for  each  division  of  the  army.  Every  gov- 
ernment was  to  raise  a  reserve,  and  to  supp'y  and 
clothe  the  corresponding  division  on  the  frontier.  But 
in  a  little  time  this  activity  relaxed  ;  he  entered  into 
various  intrigues,  displayed  jealousy,  both  of  the  pea- 
santry and  the  Knglish,  and  no  real  improvement  took 
place,  save  in  that  select  part  of  the  army,  which  the 
Cadiz  rearency  had  destined  for  South  America,  and 
had  ordered  him  to  equip  from  the  English  stores. 
This  was  done  at  the  very  moment  when  a  French 
army  on  the  frontier  was  again  preparing  to  invade 
(iallicia,  and  sir  Howard  Douglas  vehemently  opposed 
the  disloyal  proceeding;  the  junta  also  were  really 
averse  to  it,  and  Abadia  pretended  to  be  so;  hut  he 
had  a  personal  interest  in  the  colonics  and  secretly 
forwarded  the  preparations.  The  regencj'^,  to  evade 
Mr.  Wellesley's  reproaches,  promised  to  suspend  the 
pml)nrkation  of  these  troops,  but  the  expedition  sailed 
from  Vigo,  and  the  organization  of  another,  three  times 
its  strength,  including  all  the  best  artillery  in  the  pro- 
vince, was  immediately  commenced,  and  also  sailed 
a  few  months  later.  This  then  was  the  state  of  Galli- 
cia  in  the  latter  end  of  1811.  She  was  without  maga- 
zines, hospitals,  or  system,  whether  civil  or  rnilitary, 
and  torrj  by  faction,  her  people  were  oppressed,  her 
povernors  foolish,  her  generals  bad  :  she  had  no 
cavalry,  and  the  infmiry  were  starving,  although  the 
j)rovince  easily  supplied  cattle  for  the  allies  in  Portu- 
gal. As  a  natural  consequence,  those  famished  soldiers 
were  too  undisciplined  to  descend  into  the  plains  of 
Leon,  and  were  consequently  of  light  weight  in  the 
general  contest. 

Under  these  circumstances,  sir  Howard  Douglas  had 
nothing  to  work  upon,  save  the  Guerilla  leaders,  whose 
activity  he  very  considerably  increased.  His  policy 
was  to  augment  the  number  of  chiefs,  but  to  keep  the 
force  of  each  low,  lest,  growing  proud  of  their  com- 
mand, they  should  consider  themselves  generals,  and 
become  useless,  as  indeed  had  already  happened  to 
Cainpillo,  Longa,  and  Porlier,  when  they  were  made 
a  p.-irt  of  the  seventh  army.  Neverthele-'S  the  advan- 
tage of  this  policy  may  be  doubted,  for  of  all  the  nume- 
rous bands  in  the  north,  seven  only  were  not  supported 
eiiti'ely  by  robbery.  Mina,  Pastor,  Salazar,  Pmto, 
Amor,  and  the  curate,  whose  united  forces  did  not  ex- 
ceed ten  thousand  men.  were  sustained  by  regular 
taxes,  customs,  convent  revenues,  and  donations  ;*  Lon- 

?a  supported  his  from  the  produce  of  the  salt-mines  of 
'aza,  but  all  the  rest  were  bandits,  whose  extinction 
was  one  of  the  advantages  expected  from  the  formation 
of  the  seventh  army. 

It  is  now  convenient  to  resume  the  narrative  of  mili- 
tary events. 


*   Mr.  Stuart's  Papers,  MSS. 


In  the  Asturias.  previous  tc  Mendizahal's  arrival, 
and  when  Bonet  had  marched  to  the  Orbijo,  Porlier 
surprised  Santander,  and  plundered  some  houses;  but 
being  followed  by  general  Caucault,  a  very  active 
ofricer,  he  retired  again  to  his  strong-hold  of  Liebana. 
'I'he  British  cruizers,  in  concert  with  whom  he  acted, 
then  destroyed  several  coast-batteries,  and  the  Iris 
frigate  having  arms  on  board,  came  to  the  Bay  of 
Biscay  for  the  purpose  of  arranging  an  intercourse 
with  the  Partidas  of  that  province.  But  this  was  the 
period  when  Reille  and  (raffarelli,  were,  as  I  have  be- 
fore noticed,  chasing  IVlina  and  Longa,  whom  they 
drove  from  the  coast,  into  the  mountains  of  Leon,  and 
thus  marred  the  object  of  the  Iris.  Nevertheless,  when 
Mina  was  reinforced  by  the  V^alencians  and  other  fugi- 
tives from  Catalonia,  he  returned  fo  Navarre,  and 
there  performed  very  considerable  exploits,  which,  as 
belonging  to  other  combinations  of  the  war,  will  be 
hereafter  noticed. 

While  Caffarelli  and  Reille  thus  scoured  the  line  of 
communication,  Dorsenne  having  the  invasion  of  Gal- 
licia  in  view,  relieved  Bonet  on  the  Esia,  and  sent  him 
early  in  November,  with  eight  thousand  men  to  re-cc- 
cupy  the  Asturias  as  a  preliminar)'  measure.  The  Gal- 
licians  foreseeing  this,  had  detached  JIoscoso  with 
three  thousand  five  hundred  men  to  reinforce  San  Pol, 
who  was  at  Pagares,  below  the  passes  leading  from 
Leon  ;  and  on  the  other  hand  Mendizabal  uniting  the 
bands  of  Porlier  and  other  chiefs,  concentrated  five 
thousand  men  to  the  eastward  on  the  Xalon.  Eleven 
thousand  men  were  therefore  ready  to  oppose  the  en- 
trance of  Bonet,  but  with  the  usual  improvidence  of 
the  Spaniards,  the  passes  of  Cubillas  and  Ventana,  to 
the  westward  of  Pagares  were  left  unguarded.  By 
these  roads,  Bon^t,  an  excellent  officer,  turned  Mos- 
cosco,  and  drove  him  down  the  Lena  with  loss  and 
disgrace;  then  turning  upon  Mendizahal,  he  chased 
him  also  in  disorder  from  Lanes  into  the  Liebana. 

All  the  civil  authorities  immediately  fled  to  Castro- 
pol,  the  Spanish  magazines  f 1 11  into  the  hands  of  the 
French,  and  Bonet  havino-  resumed  his  old  positions  at 
Oviedo,  Gihon,  and  Grade,  fortified  several  posts  in 
the  passes  leading  to  Leon,  raised  contributions,  and 
effectually  ruined  all  the  military  resources  of  tlie 
Asturias.  The  organization  of  the  seventh  army  was 
thus  for  the  time  crushed,  and  in  Gallicia  great  mis- 
chief ensued.  For  the  return  of  Mescosco's  division 
and  the  want  of  provisions  in  the  Bierzo.  which  had 
obliged  Abadia  to  retire  to  Lugo,  while  Dorsenne  was 
menacing  the  frontier,  had  thrown  that  kingdom  into  a 
ferment,  which  was  increased  by  the  imposition  of  the 
new  contributions.  The  people  became  exceedingly 
exasperated  and  so  unfavourably  disposed,  that  it  was 
common  to  hear  them  say,  "  the  exactions  of  a  French 
army  were  a  relief  in  comparison  to  the  depredations 
of  the  Spanish  troops."* 

During  these  transactions  in  the  north,  Dronel  had 
joined  Girard  at  Merida,  and  menaced  the  allies  in  the 
Alemtejo,  hoping  t'.ius  to  draw  Wellington  from  the 
Coa;  but  the  demonstration  was  too  feeble,  and  the 
English  general  thought  it  sufficient  to  reinforce  Hill 
with  his  own  brigade  from  Castello  Branco.  These 
movements  were  undoubtedly  part  of  a  grand  plan  for 
invading  Portugal,  if  the  emperor  could  have  arranged 
his  affairs  peaceably  with  Russia.  For  to  move  once 
more  against  Lisbon,  by  Massena's  route,  was  not 
promising,  unless  the  northern  provinces  of  Portugal 
Avere  likewise  invaded,  which  required  the  preliminary 
occupation  of  Gallicia.  at  least  of  the  interior.  In  the 
south  also,  it  was  advisable  to  invade  Alemtejo,  simul- 
taneously with  Beira  ;  and  the  occupation  of  Valencia 
and  Murcia  was  necessary  to  protect  Andalusia  during 
the   operation.     The   plan  was  vast,  dangerous,  and 

«   Sir  II    Doiiglrti.'!  Correspondence,  MSS. 


414 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XV. 


ready  for  execiitinn  ;  for  though  the  wet  season  had  sst 
iri,  an  a!t;!ck  on  the  norihorn  parts  of  Porlugal,  and  the 
invasion  of  Gallicia,  were  openly  talked  of  in  Dor- 
senne's  armv.  Caffarelli  was  to  join  in  the  expedition, 
and  Month  ion's  reserve,  wiiich  was  to  replace  CafTa- 
relli's  on  the  line  of  communication,  was  already  six 
thousand  strontr.  Ney  or  Oudinot  were  spoken  of  to 
command  llic  whole,  and  a  stronir  division  was  already 
in  march  to  reinforce  liie  army  of  the  south,  arranoe- 
ments  which  could  have  reference  only  to  Napoleon's 
arrival ;  hut  the  Russian  war  soon  baulked  the  project, 
and  W'cllinolon's  operations,  to  he  hereafter  noticed, 
obliored  Dorsonne  to  relinquish  the  invasion  of  Galii(.ia, 
and  caused  Bonet  once  more  to  abandon  the  Asturias. 
Thus,  with  Various  turns  of  fortune,  the  war  was 
managed  in  the«northern  provinces,  and  no  great  suc- 
cess attended  the  French  arms,  because  the  English 
general  was  always  at  hand  to  remedy  the  faults  of  the 
Spaniards.  It  was  not  so  on  the  eastern  line  of  inva- 
sion. There  Suchet,  meeting  with  no  opponent  capa- 
ble of  resisting  him,  had  continued  his  career  of  vic- 
tory, and  the  insulficiency  of  the  Spaniards  to  save 
their  own  country  was  made  manifest ;  but  these  things 
shall  be  clearly  shewn  in  the  next  chapter,  which  will 
treat  of  the  conquest  of  Valencia. 


CHAPTER  11. 

Conquest  of  Valencia — Suchet's  preparations  described — Na- 
poleon's system  eiulneiitiy  inethodiral — State  of  Valencia — 
Suihet  invades  that  province — Blake  concentrates  his  force 
to  tijiht — His  advanced  guard  put  to  flight  by  the  F'rench 
cavalry — He  retires  to  the  city  of  Valencia — Siege  of  Sagun- 
tuin — The  P'rench  repulsed  in  an  assault — Faloinbini  defeats 
Obispo  near  Segorbe — Harispe  defeats  C.O'Donnel  at  Bene- 
guazil — Oropesa  taken — The  French  batteries  open  against 
Saguntuni — Second  assault  repulsed — Suchet's  enibarrass- 
nients — Operations  in  his  rear  in  Catalonia — Medas  islands 
taken — Lary  proposes  to  form  a  general  depot  at  Palanios — 
Discouraged  hv  sir  K.  Pellew — The  Spaniards  blow  up  the 
works  of  Beroa,  and  fix  their  chief  depot  at  Busa — -Descrip- 
tion of  tiiat  place — Lacy  surprises  the  French  in  the  to'.vn  of 
lafnalada — Eroles  takes  a  convoy  near  Jorbas — The  French 
quit  the  castle  of  Igualada  and  join  the  garrison  of  Montser- 
rat — That  plice  abaiiHoned — F.roles  takes  Cervera  and  Bel- 
puig — Beats  the  French  national  guarrls  inCerdana — Ijivades 
and  ravagts  the  French  frontier — Returns  by  Ripol  and  takes 
post  in  the  pass  of  Garriga — \rdans  occupies  Mataro — Sars- 
field  embarks  and  sails  to  the  coast  of  the  Ampurdan — These 
measures  prevent  the  march  of  the  French  convoy  to  Barce- 
lona— State  of  Arauon — The  F.nipecinado  and  Diiran  invade 
it  on  one  side — Mina  invades  it  on  the  other — Calatavud 
taken — Severoli's  division  reinforc'cs  Musnier,  and  the  i'ar- 
ti  las  are  pursued  to  Daroca  and  Molino — Mina  enters  the 
Cinco  Villas — Defeats  eleven  hundred  Italians  at  Avcrbc — 
Carries  his  prisoners  to  Motrico  in  Biscay — Ma/zuchdii  de- 
feats the  F.nipecinado  at  Cubiliejos — Blake  calls  in  all  hi« 
troops  and  prepares  for  a  battle — Suchet's  position  described 
— Blake's  dispositions — Battle  of  Saguntuni — Observations. 

CONQUEST  OF  VALENCIA. 

In  August  and  the  beginning  of  September,  Suchet, 
while  preparing  for  this  great  enterprise,  had  dispersed 
the  bands  of  Villa  (/ampa  and  the  other  chiefs,  who 
during  the  siege  of  Taragona  vexed  Aragon.  He  had 
C3nt  his  feeble  soldiers  to  France,  receiving  conscripts 
in  their  places,  and  although  the  harvest  was  very  bad, 
formed  large  magazines  in  Morella  and  Tortoza.  Eight 
thousand  men  had  been  left  in  Catalonia  under  general 
Fr»!re.  another  eight  thousand  were  placed  under  general 
Musnier,  to  protect  Aragon,  and  twentv-four  thousand 
of  all  arms  remained  for  the  invasion  of  Valencia,  but 
this  force  Suchet  thought  inadequate,  and  demanded  a 
r''inf'ircement  from  the  army  of  reserve,  then  in  Navarre. 
Napoleon,  whose  system,  of  war,  whatever  has  been 
Baid  to  the  contrary,  was  eminently  methodical,  refused. 
He  loved  better  to  try  a  hold  push,  at  a  distant  point, 
with  a  few  mfu,  thar  I    make  an  overwhelminnr  attack 


if  he  thereby  weakened  his  communications;  he  judged 
couracre  and  enterprise  fittest  for  the  attack,  prudence 
and  force  for  the  support.  And  yet  he  designed  to  aid 
Suchet's  operations  vigorously  when  the  decisive  blow 
could  be  struck.  Then  not  only  the  divisions  of  the 
reserve  were  to  march,  but  combined  movements,  of 
deiachments  from  nearly  all  the  armies  in  the  Penin- 
sula, were  arranged  ;  and  we  shall  find,  that  if  Wel- 
lington, h)' menacing  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  saved  Gallicia, 
the  French  armj"  of  the  north,  in  return,  by  menacing 
Gallicia,  fixed  the  allies  on  the  Agueda,  and  so  pro- 
tected Suchet's  invasion  of  Valencia. 

Three  roads  led  to  the  Guadalaviar,  one  from  Tortoza 
by  the  sea-coast,  one  by  Teruel  and  Segorbe,  and  one 
by  ?.Iorelia  and  San  Mateo.  That  from  Tortoza,  and 
that  by  Teruel,  were  carriage-roads,  but  the  first  only 
was  fit  for  heavy  artillery,  and  it  was  blocked,  partial- 
ly by  the  fortress  of  Peniscola,  and  completed  by  the 
fort  of  Oropesa.  Wherefore  though  the  infantry  and 
cavalry  could  move  on  a  bye-road  to  the  right,  the 
convoys  and  the  guns,  which  were  at  Tortoza,  could 
not  pass  until  Oropesa  was  reduced.  Nevertheless  the 
French  general,  well  knowing  the  value  of  boldness  in 
war,  resolved  to  mask  Peniscola,  to  avoid  Oropesa,  to 
send  his  field  artillery  by  Teruel,  and  uniting  his 
troops  near  Saguntum,  to  offer  battle  to  Blake  ;  and  if 
the  latter  declined  it,  to  reduce  Oropesa  and  Saguntum, 
trusting  for  subsistence  to  the  "  huerta'''  or  garden  of 
Valencia,  until  the  arrival  of  his  convoys. 

He  had,  however,  organized  his  system  of  supply 
with  care.  From  Morella  and  Tortoza,  brigades  of 
mules,  after  the  manner  adopted  in  the  British  army, 
were  to  carry  provisions  to  the  troops,  and  sheep  and 
cattle  were  delivered  to  each  regiment  for  its  subsist- 
ence in  advance.  This  last  plan,  which  sir  John 
Moore  liad  also  projected  in  his  campaign,  Suchet 
found  advantageous ;  and  I  am  persuaded  that  the 
principle  should  be  extended,  so  that  all  things  re- 
quisite for  the  subsistfince,  and  fighting  of  troops 
should  be  organized  retrimentally,  and  the  persons 
employed  wear  the  uniform  of  their  different  corps. 
Jealousies  between  the  functionaries,  of  different 
branches  of  the  service,  would  then  be  unknown,  and 
the  character  of  all  the  subordinate  persons,  being 
under  the  guardianship  of  the  battalions  to  which  they 
belonged,  would  be  equally  praiseworthy,  which  can- 
not now  be  said. 

While  Suchet  was  thus  gathering  his  strentrth,  Va- 
lencia was  a  prey  to  disorder.  About  the  period  of  the 
siege  of  Taragona.  Palacios,  notwithstanding  his  high 
monarchical  principles,  which  caused  him  to  be  dis- 
missed from  the  regency,  had  been  appointed  captain- 
general  of  Valencia,  Murcia,  and  Aragon;  and  he 
immediately  raised  a  strong  party  amongst  the  friars 
and  other  opponents  of  the  cortes.  When  after  the 
dispersion  of  the  Murcian  army  at  Baza,  Blake  had 
rallied  the  fugitives,  and  in  vir  ue  of  his  power  as 
regent,  assumed  the  chief  command  at  \'alencia,  I'ala- 
cios'  faction  opposed  him,  and  endeavoured  to  draw 
the  soldiers  and  the  populace  to  their  side,  by  propo- 
sing to  inundate  the  plain  of  Murviedro,  and  to  defend 
the  strong  country  in  advance.*  Blake,  however, 
resolved  to  act  on  the  flanks  of  the  French  army  bj 
detachments,  and,  in  this  view,  sent  C  O'Donnel, 
with  the  divisions  of  Oliispo  and  Villa  Campa,  to 
Albaracin,  supporting  them  with  four  thousand  men  at 
Seg  irbe  and  Liria.  He  charged  Mahy,  who  com- 
manded five  thousand  infiintry,  and  seven  hundred 
cavalry  of  the  Murcian  army,  to  surprise  the  French 
detachment  of  the  army  of  the  centre,  posted  at 
Cuenca.  He  detached  Bassecour  with  tvvo  thousand 
men  to  Requena,  and  the  same  time,  directed  Duraa 
and  the  Empecinado,   to  unite,  and  invade  Aragon  : 


Captain  Codrington's  papers,  MSS. 


1811.] 


NAPIER'S    PExMNSriAR   WAR. 


415 


and  it  was  to  aid  in  this  expedition  that  Mina  quitted 
the  mountains  of  Leon. 

Blake  had,  exclusive  of  Mahy's  and  Bassecour's 
divisions,  ahnut  twenty  thousand  infantry,  and  two 
thousand  cavalry.  Tiiree  thousand  five  hundred  men 
were  placed  in  Saguntum,  which  was  provisioned  for 
three  numlhs;  two  hundred  were  in  Oropesa,  and 
fifteen  hundred  in  Peniscola  ;  and  there  were  so  many 
Partidas,  that  the  whole  country  seemed  to  be  in  arms, 
but  the  assembling  of  these  people  being  very  uncer- 
tain, Blake  could  not  depend  upon  having  a  permanent 
partizan  force,  of  more  than  eight  thousand.*  The 
Valencian  army  contained  the  Albuera  divisions,  St. 
Juan's,  Miranda's,  and  Villa  Campa's  veterans  ;|  it  was 
therefore,  not  only  numerous,  hut  the  best  that  Spain 
had  yet  produred  ;  and  Valencia  itself  was  exceedingly 
rich  in  all  things  necessary  for  its  supply;:}:  but  there 
was  no  real  power,  the  building,  thontrh  fair  enough 
outside,  had  the  dry  rot  within.  The  French  had 
many  secret  friends,  faction  was  as  usual  at  work,  the 
populace  were  not  favourable  to  Blake,  and  that  general 
Iiad  rather  collected  than  oro^anized  his  forces,  and 
was  quite  incapable  of  leading  them.  He  was  un- 
popular both  at  Cadiz  and  Valencia,  and  the  refjency 
of  which  he  formed  a  part  was  tottering.  The  Cortes 
had  quashed  Mahy's  command  of  the  Murcian  army, 
V  fid  even  recalled  Blake  himself;  but  the  order,  which 
did  not  reach  him  until  he  was  engaged  with  Sucher, 
was  not  obeyed.  Meanwhile  that  part  of  the  Murcian 
army,  which  should  have  formed  a  reserve,  after 
Mahy's  division  had  marched  for  Cuenca,  fell  into  the 
greatest  disorder:  above  eight  thousand  men  deserted 
in  a  few  weeks,  and  those  who  remained  were  exceed- 
ingly dispirited.  Thus  all  the  interest  became  concen- 
trated in  the  city  of  Valencia ;  which  was  in  fact  the 
key  of  all  the  eastern  coast  because  Carthajena  re- 
quired an  army  to  defend  it,  and  could  only  be  fed 
from  Valencia,  and  Alicant  was  then  quite  defenceless. 

It  was  in  this  state  of  affairs,  that  Suchet  com- 
menced the  invasion.  His  army  was  divided  into 
three  columns,  and,  on  the  IStii  of  September  one 
moved  by  the  coast-road,  one  by  Morella  and  San 
Mateo,  and  one  by  Ternel,  where  an  intermediate 
magazine  was  established  ;l|  but  this  latter  column 
instead  of  proceeding  directly  to  Segorbe,  turned  off 
to  its  left,  and  passed  over  the  Sierra  de  Gudar  to 
Castellon  de  la  Plana,  where  the  whole  three  were 
united  rm  the  20th. §  The  main  column,  commanded 
by  Suchet  in  person,  had  masked  Peniscola  on  the 
15th,  and  invested  Oropesa  by  a  detachment  on  the 
19th  ;  but  as  the  road  ran  directly  under  the  fire  of  the 
last  place,  the  main  body  moved  by  the  ru^'ged  route 
of  C.ibanes  to  Villa  Franca,  leaving  the  battering- 
train  still  at  Tortoza. 

During  these  operations  Blake  appeared  inclined  to 
fight,  for  he  brought  Zayas  up  in  front  of  Murvicdro, 
and  called  in  01)ispo  ;^  Mahy,  who  had  done  nothing 
on  the  side  of  Cuenca,  was  also  in  march  to  join  him ; 
but  all  these  divisions  marched  slowly,  and  with 
confusion  ;  and  a  siiijht  skirmish  at  Almansora,  on  the 
Mingares,  where  a  few  French  dragoons  put  a  great 
body  of  Spanish  infantry  to  fiifjht,  made  Blake  doubt 
the  firmness  of  his  troops.  He  therefore  left  O'Donnel 
with  four  thousand  men  on  the  side  of  the  Seoforbe, 
and  then  retired  himself  with  fifteen  thousand  behind 
the  Guadalaviar.**  Valencia  was  thus  thrown  into 
great  confusion,  but  Bassecour's  division  was  at  hand, 
and  Suchet  fearing  to  attack  so  large  an  army  in  an 
entrenched  camp  (which  had  cost  two  years  to  con- 
struct), while  his  own  communication  with  Tortoza 
wat  intercepted,  merely  dispersed  the  armed  peasants 


»  Roche,  MSS.  Tupper,  MSS.  +  Mr.  Wtllcsley,  MSS. 

t  Dovle,  MSS.  II  Suchet.  {  Vacani. 

1  Roche  MSS.  »*  Tupper,  MSS. 


which  had  assembled  on  his  flank,  and   then  turned 
against  Murviedro. 

SIEGE    OF    SAGUNTUM. 

This  celebrated  place,  situated  about  four  leagues 
from  Valencia,  was  a  rocky  mountain,  covered  wiih 
the  ruins  of  the  ancient  city,  and  the  remains  of 
Moorish  towers  and  walls,  which  being  connected 
by  modern  works,  formed  four  distinct  posts  covering 
the  whole  summit  of  the  rock  :  but  in  consequence 
of  the  usual  Spanish  procnstination  the  heavy  guns 
prepared  to  arm  it  were  not  yet  mounted,  and  only 
seventeen  pieces  of  inferior  size  were  available  for 
defence.  The  modern  town  of  Murv'edro,  situated 
at  the  foot  of  the  rock,  was  covered  by  the  river  Palan- 
cia,  and  by  a  canal,  and  occupied  by  some  Spanish 
picquets  ;  but  the  23d  Habert,  having  passed  the  water, 
invested  the  rock  on  the  east,  while  Harispe  invested 
it  on  the  west  and  south,  and  a  third  division  drove 
the  Spanish  posts  from  Murviedro  and  entrenched 
itself  in  the  houses.  The  rest  of  the  army  was  dis- 
posed in  villages,  on  the  hills  to  the  north  west,  and 
patroles  were  pushed  towards  Valencia.  Thus  the 
rock  of  Saguntum  was  invested,  but  it  was  inaccessible 
to  the  engineer,  save  on  the  west,  where  the  ascent, 
although  practicable,  was  very  rough  and  difficult.  It 
would  have  been  impregnable,  if  the  Spaniards  had 
mounted  their  large  guns;  for  the  French  were  ob!ig"d 
to  bring  earth  from  a  distance,  to  form  the  batteries 
and  parallels,  and  to  set  the  miner  to  level  the  ap- 
proaches, and  their  parapets  were  too  thin  to  withstand 
heavy  shot. 

The  first  point  of  resistance  was  an  ancient  tnwer 
called  San  Pedro,  and  immediately  above  it  was  the 
fort  of  San  Fernando,  which  could  not  be  attacked 
until  San  Pedro  fell,  and,  from  i's  height,  then  only 
by  the  miner.  But  near  the  eastern  extremity  or  he 
rock,  there  were  two  ancient  breaches  which  the 
Spaniards  were  still  engaged  repairing,  and  had  only 
stopped  with  timber;  a  large  tank  offered  cover  for 
the  assembling  of  troops  close  to  these  breaches,  and 
Suchet  resolved  to  try  an  escalade.  To  effect  this, 
three  columns  were  assembled  before  daybreak  on  the 
2Sth  in  the  tank,  a  strong  reserve  was  held  in  support, 
and  a  false  attack  was  directed  against  the  San  Pedro 
to  distract  the  attention  of  the  besieged  :  but  in  the 
previous  part  of  the  night,  the  Spaniards  having 
sallied  were  repulsed,  and  the  action  having  excited 
both  sides,  a  French  soldier  fired  from  the  tank  before 
the  appointed  time,  whereupon  the  columns  rushing 
forward,  in  disorder,  planted  their  ladders,  and  would 
have  carried  the  place  by  noise,  but  the  garrison  thrust 
the  ladders  from  the  walls,  and  drove  the  stormers 
back,  with  the  loss  of  three  hundred  men.  After  this 
check,  as  the  artillery  was  still  at  Tortoza,  Suchet 
ordered  a  part  of  his  army  to  attack  Oropesa,  em- 
ployed another  part  in  making  a  road,  for  the  guns, 
to  reach  the  battery  raised  against  the  tower  of  San 
Pedro,  and  then  turned  his  own  attention  to  the  move- 
ments of  Blake. 

That  general  following  his  first  plan  of  action 
against  the  French  flanks,  had  daring  the  investment 
oif  Saguntum,  sent  C.  O'Donnel  with  Villa  Campa's 
division  and  St.  Joan's  cavalry,  id  Betera,  and  Bene- 
guazil,  and  Obispo's  division  to  Segorbe;  thus  form- 
ing a  half  circle  round  the  French  army,  and  cutting 
its  communication  with  Teruel,  near  whifh  place 
Mahy  had  by  this  time  arrived.  Suchet  however 
caused  Palombini  to  attack  Obispo,  whose  whole 
division  dispersed  after  a  skirmish  with  the  advanced 
guard,  and  the  Italians  then  returned  to  the  siege. 
The  next  night  Harispe  marched  against  O'Donnel,  who 
was  well  posted  at  Benegua/.il  behind  a  canal,  having 
his  centre  protected  by  "a  chapel  and  some  liouses  ; 
nevertheless  the  Spaniards  were  bt.aten  with  loss  a» 


416 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XV. 


the  first  shock,  and  fled  in  disorder  over  the  Giindala- 
viar.  DnriiifT  these  events  IMako  remained  an  idle 
spectator  of  the  defeat  of  his  division,  althoun^h  he  had 
a  larcre  body  of  troops  in  hand,  and  was  within  a  feu- 
miles  of  the  field  of  battle. 

The  French  train  now  advanced  from  Tortoza,  and 
four  pieces  were  placed  in  battery  agjainst  Oropesa. 
On  the  lOih  Siicliet  took  the  direction  of  the  attnck 
in  person,  and  the  fort  situated  upon  an  isolated  rock, 
was  breached  in  a  few  iiours;  but  the  E^arrison  of  the 
King's  Tower  (a  separate  work  placed  on  a  small  pro- 
niont -ry,  and  commandinnr  ihe  harbour)  refused  to  sur- 
render, and  was  carried  otf,  on  the  llih,  under  the 
F'rench  fire,  by  the  Magnificent.  The  French  general 
having  thus  with  a  loss  of  only  thirty  men  opened  the 
road  for  his  artillery,  returned  to  Saguntum  and  pushed 
the  siege  of  that  place;  but  the  difficulties  were  very 
great,  the  formation  of  the  road  to  the  batteries  was 
iiselfawork  of  pain,  and  although  his  indefatigable 
troops  had  formed  a  breaching  battery  on  the  12th, 
wiiile  seven  small  mortars  and  howitzers,  placed  on 
the  risfht  and  left,  had  nearly  silenced  the  Spanish 
fire,  the  muskets  of  the  besiegers  alone  brought  down 
from  fifieen  to  twenty  men. 

On  the  17th  the  breaching  battery  being  armed, 
opened  i;.s  fire  against  the  tower,  and  the  new  masonry 
crumbled  away  at  once;  yet  the  ancient  work  resisted 
the  guns  like  a  rock.  On  the  18th  the  fire  recom- 
menced, when  the  wall  gave  way  to  the  stroke  of  the 
guns,  and  the  assault  was  ordered  ;  but  from  the  height 
of  the  tower,  which  overlooked  the  works  at  a  short 
distance,  the  preparations  were  early  discovered,  the 
Spaniards  cnliecting  on  the  breach  repaired  it  with 
sai;d-bags,  and  regardless  of  the  French  fire,  with  hnni 
cries  provoked  the  attack.  At  five  o'clock,  four  hun- 
dred men  rushed  forward  as  swiftly  as  the  steepness 
of  the  ascent  would  permit.  Soon,  however,  the  head 
cf  the  column  was  checked,  the  rear  began  to  fire,  the 
whole  got  into  confusion,  and  when  one-half  had  fallen 
without  malwng  the  slightest  impression  on  the  defend- 
ers, the  attempt  was  abandoned.  After  this  signal 
ftiiure  the  French  erected  a  second  battery  of  six 
pieces,  one  hundred  and  forty  yards  from  the  tower, 
and  endeavoured  to  push  the  approach  close  to  the 
foot  of  the  breach,  yet  t!ie  plunfTinij  fire  of  the  besieged 
baffled  them  ;  meanwfiile  Andriani  the  governor,  having 
communication  by  sisnal  with  the  ships  in  the  Grao, 
was  encouraged  to  continue  his  gallant  defence,  and 
was  informed  that  he  was  already  promoted  for  what 
he  had  done.  Hut  to  understand  Suchet's  embarrass- 
ments, from  the  protracted  resistance  of  Saguntum,  we 
must  take  a  view  of  Lacy's  contemporary  operations 
in  Catalonia,  and  the  proceedings  of  the  Partidas 
against  the  French  communications  and  posts  in  Ara- 
gon. 

CATALONIA. 

It  will  be  recollected  that  the  blockade  of  Fiaueiras 
produced  sickness  in  M'Donald's  army,  and  that  the 
return  of  Suchet  to  Aratron,  and  the  parcelling  of  his 
troops  on  the  lines,  from  Lerida  to  Montserrat,  Tortoza, 
and  Taragona,  had  completely  extinguished  the  French 
powei  in  the  field;  because  the  divisions  of  the  army 
of  Aragon  which  still  remained  in  Lower  Catalonia, 
being  destined  for  the  enlerprize  against  Valencia, 
could  not  be  employed  in  harassing  expeditions.  Lacy 
was  therefore  enabled,  notwithstanding  the  troubles 
which  followed  the  fall  of  'I'aragona,  to  reorganize 
about  eight  thousand  men  in  two  divisions,  the  one 
under  E roles,  the  other  under  Sarsfield  ;  the  junta  also 
cilled  out  the  tercios  of  reserve,  and  arms  and  ammu- 
nition being  supplied  by  the  English  navy.  Lacy  was 
soon  in  a  condition  to  act  ofiTensively.  Thus  the  tak- 
ing of  Montserrat  was  very  injurious  to  the  French,  for 
il  is  generally  supposed  that  Friere's  division,  if  held 


together  in  the  field,  would  have  pievented  this  rear- 
tion  in  the  principality.  Lacy  at  first  suggested  to  the 
iJritisli  navy  the  recapture  of  the  Medas  Islands,  and 
it  was  eflected  in  the  latter  end  of  \uirust,  by  the  Un- 
daunted, Lavinia,  and  Blossom,  aid(-d  by  a  small  party 
of  Spaniards,  the  whole  under  the  comuiand  of  captain 
Thomas.  The  enterprise  itself  was  one  of  more  labour 
than  diingrer,  and  the  Spanish  allies  were  of  little  use, 
but  the  naval  officers  to  whose  exertions  the  success 
was  entirely  due,  '-^  ere  indignant  at  finding  that  colonel 
Green,  who  served  as  a  volunteer,  endeavoured  to  raise 
his  own  reputation  with  the  Catalans  by  injuriiio-  the 
character  of  those  under  whom  he  served. 

Immediately  after  the  fall  of  Montserra*,  Lacy  and 
the  junta  had  proposed  the  fortifying  of  Palamos  o? 
Blanes,  to  be  held  as  a  marine  depot  and  stn^ng-hold, 
in  common  with  the  British  navy,  but  with  a  strange 
folly  expected  that  sir  E.  Pellew,  who  had  no  troops, 
would  defend  them  from  the  enemy  while  establishing 
this  post.  Finding  this  scheme  received  cr.ldly  by  the 
admiral,  they  turned  their  attention  inlni^d.  and  blow- 
insj  up  the  works  of  Bergn.  fixed  upnn  the  position  of 
Busa,  as  a  place  of  strength  and  rrf.ig.-.  'i'his  remark- 
able rock  which  is  situated  between  the  Gardener  and 
Bindasaes  rivers  and  about  twenty  miles  from  Cardona 
could  be  reached  b)'  one  road  onlj',  and  that  a  very 
rugcred  one.*  The  rock  itself,  fourteen  miles  in  cir- 
cumference, healthy  and  full  of  springs,  is  fertile,  and 
produces  abundance  of  forage,  and  fuel.  It  is  cut  off 
from  the  rest  of  the  world  by  frightful  precipices,  and 
could  neither  be  forced,  nor  starved  into  a  surrender. 
Busa,  C/ardona,  Solsona,  and  Seu  d'Urgel  were  there- 
fore guarded  by  the  tercios  of  reserve,  and  Lacy  soon 
commenced  offensive  excursions  with  the  regular  army, 
against  the  long  lines  of  the  French  communication. 

In  September  while  the  Somatenes  interrupted  the 
passage  of  the  convoys  to  Montserrat,  Eroles  made  an 
unsuccessful  attack  on  tlie  fort  of  Moncada  near  Bar- 
celona:  Lacy  who  had  returned  from  an  incursion  in 
the  French  Cerdafia  where  he  had  gathered  some  booty, 
then  united  Eroles  and  Sarsfield's  troops,  and  surprised 
the  town  of  Igualada,  where  he  killed  two  hundred 
French,  but  not  daring  to  attack  the  castle  retired  to 
Calaf.  and  from  thence  again  detached  Eroles  to  Jorbas, 
to  atiack  a  French  convoy  coming  to  Igualada.  Eroles 
beat  the  escort,  and  captured  the  convoj-,  and  then  l!ie 
French  quitted  the  fortified  convent  of  Igualada,  and 
joined  the  garrison  of  .Montserrat,  when  the  whole, 
fearful  of  being  invested  and  so  starved,  abandoned 
that  important  point,  and  marched  through  Barcelona 
to  Taragona;  the  Spaniards  immediately  occupied 
Montserra%  and  recovered  a  large  store  of  clothing 
and  cavalry  equipments,  which  had  been  hidden  in  a 
vault  and  were  undiscovered  by  the  enemy.  Eroles, 
pursuing  his  success,  forced  the  garrisons  of  Belpuig, 
and  Cervera,  about  five  hundred  in  all,  to  surrender, 
and  thus  the  whole  line  of  communication,  between 
Leriila  and  Barcelona,  fell  into  the  power  of  the  Cata- 
lonians.  'i'he  confidence  of  the  people  then  revived; 
Sarsfield  occupied  Granollers,  and  the  passes  leading 
into  the  valley  of  Vich  ;  Manso  and  Rovira  menaced 
the  Ampurdan;  and  Eroles  suddenly  passing  by  Seu 
d'Urgel  into  the  Cerda  a,  defeated,  at  Pui^cerda,  ^me 
national  guards  commanded  b}'  general  (iarean,  wlio 
had  been  sent  there  after  Lacy's  invasion.  He  after- 
wards raised  large  contributions  on  the  frontier,  burnt 
a  French  town,  and  returning  with  his  spoil  by  the 
way  of  ffibas,  and  Hipol,  took  post  in  the  pass  of  (Jar- 
riga,  while  Milans  occupied  Mat:iro,  and  both  watched 
to  intercept  a  convoy  which  M'Donald  was  preparing 
for  Barcelona. 

Sarsfield  at  the  same  time  embarked  his  division  and 
sailed  to  the  coast  of  the  Ampurdan,  but  the  wealhei 

•   Memoir  upon  Busa,  by  Capt.  Zeupfinning,  MSS. 


1811.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR  WAR. 


417 


would  not  permit  him  to  land.  Nevertlieless  the  atten- 
tion of  the  Frencli  general  was  distracted,  and  the  con- 
voy did  not  move.  Lacy  then  recalled  Sarsfield,  and 
projected  the  surprise  ot  Barcelona  itself,  but  after 
pultiiio-  his  troops  in  march,  feared  the  execution  and 
relinquished  the  attem|)t.  Meanwhile  one  swarm  of  the 
smaller  Fartidas  menaced  tlie  French  communication 
between  Mequinenza  and  Tortoza,  and  another  swarm 
settled  on  the  plains  above  Lerida. 

The  stiite  of  AraQ:on  was  equally  alarming.  Duran 
and  the  Emi)ecinado  had  received  Blake's  orders  to 
unite  near  (Juen^a,  for  the  pur})0se  of  invading  Aragon  ; 
but  the  secret  junta  of  the  district  were  averse  to  the 
plan,  and  the  troops  of  the  latter  chief  refused  to  move, 
and  even  came  to  blows  with  the  junta's  people.  In 
this  confusion  general  d'Armanac,  who  had  retired  from 
Cuen^a,  returned,  and  dispersed  the  whole.  The  Em- 
pecinado  however  collected  them  again,  and  having 
joined  Duran,  their  united  powers  being  about  six 
tiiousand  infantry  and  two  thousand  five  hundred  horse, 
mLtved  against  Calatayud  ;  Mina  also  acting  in  concert 
with  them,  quitted  the  mouniains  of  L(;u)n  and  entered 
Navarre  with  about  five  thousand  men,  and  some  minor 
partisans  were  already  acting  against  diflerent  parts  of 
Aragon.  The  whole  were  in  want  of  clothing  and 
ammunition,  but  Mr.  Tupper,  the  consul  at  Valencia, 
having  safe  means  of  comuiuuication  with  the  interior, 
supplied  them. 

General  Musuier's  force  was  so  scattered  that  lie  could  I 
not  tight  either  of  the  large  Fartidas,  without  exposing  | 
SJine  important  point  to  the  other,  and  the  2'jth  of 
September  the  Empecinado  took  possession  of  the  pass 
of  Fiasno.  while  Duran  invested  the  fortified  convent  of 
Calatayud.  This  place  was  garrisoned  by  some  French 
and  Italian  troops,  who  ditiered  upon  the  def(?nce,  and 
when  the  explosion  of  two  mines  had  killed  a  number 
of  them  they  surrendered.  Musnier  collected  some  men 
to  succour  the  place,  but  unable  to  f(ir(;e  the  pass  of 
Frasno,  retired  ;  yet  being  reinforced  on  the  5th,  he 
again  advanced,  and  a  column  sent  from  Navarre  by 
general  Reille  also  came  up  ;  whereupon  the  Spaniards 
disap])eared  until  the  French  retired,  and  then  reoccu- 
pied  Calatayud.  They  were  now  in  full  communication 
with  Mina  and  a  general  plan  of  invasion  was  discussed, 
but  as  Duran  and  Mina  could  not  accord  each  acted 
Beparately. 

Severoli's   division  eight  thousand  strong,  and  just 
arrived  ft-om  Italy,  then  reinforced  Musnier,  and  on  the 
Uth  driving  the  Spaniards  from  (Jalatayud  pursued  them 
on  the  roads  to  Molino,  Daroca,  and   -Medinaceli.     On 
the  other  side  of  the   Ebro   however  Mina   fell  on  the 
post  of  Exca  in  the  (Jinco  Villas  ;  the  garrison  liroke 
through  his  investment  in  the  night,  but  he  ])ursued  ificm 
almost  to  the  gates  of  Zaragosa,  and  then  turning  off 
towards  Ayerbe,  attacked  that  post  and  menaced  the ' 
communication  by  Jaca.    The  conmiandant  of  Zaragosa  i 
had  sent  an  Italian   battalion  to  look  after  the  Hying 
garrison  of  Exca,  which  was  found  at  Zuera,  and   the  | 
united    forces   amounting   to   eleven    hundred   infantry  i 
and  sixty  cavalry  followed  Mina  aud  came  u))  with  him  j 
at  Ayerbe  ;  the  guerilla  chief  instantly  turned  with  a  j 
}»art  of  liis  troops,  and  the  Italians  retreated  towards  ■ 
iluesca,  but  having  to  cross  a  plain  were  all  killed  or  I 
taken.  j 

Reille  and  Mu.smer  hearing  of  this  mii^fortune  spread  ! 
their  columns  in  all  directions  to  intercept  Mina,  but  he  I 
evaded  their  toils,  and  although  shar])ly  chaseil  and  scve- ; 
ral  times  engaged,  reached  Motrico  on  the  Biscay  coast  j 
with  his  prisoners.  The  Iris  frigate  wiiich  was  then  j 
harassing  the  enemy's  coast  line  took  some  of  them  ofl'  I 
hiii  hands,  and  the  remainder  three  hundred  in  number,  I 
were  sent  to  Corunna  by  the  Asturian  mountains,  but ; 
only  thirty-six  arrived,  the  rest  were  shot  by  the  escort,  j 
und'T  pretence  that  they  miuh  a  u  use  njar  a  French 

pos.  1  ! 

28 


AVhile  these  events  were  passing  on  the  left  :>f  the 
Ebro,  Mazzuchelli's  brigade  followed  the  Empecinadu, 
and  having  defeated  him  in  a  sharp  action,  at  Cubiliejos 
de  la  Sierra,  brought  off  the  garrison  of  Molino  and 
dismantled  that  fort  ;  but  the  smaller  Partidivs  infestwl 
the  road  between  Tortoza  and  Oropesa,  and  in  this  diis- 
turbed  state  of  affairs  reports  were  rife  that  an  I'higlish 
force  was  to  disembark  at  Feniscola.  Blake  also  scut 
Obispo's  division  against  Teruel,  which  was  thus  men- 
aced on  all  sides,  for  Maliy  was  still  in  those  parts. 
Thus  the  partizan  warfare  seemed  interminable,  and 
Suchet's  situation  would  really  have  been  very  danger- 
ous, if  he  had  been  opposed  by  a  man  of  ability.  Ho 
had  an  inferior  force  and  was  cooped  up  between  the 
enemy's  fortresses  ;  his  communications  were  all  inter- 
rupted ;  he  had  just  met  with  two  signal  failures  at  Sur 
guntum,  and  he  was  menaced  by  a  formidable  army 
which  was  entirely  master  of  its  operations.  Blake  how- 
ever soon  relieved  him  of  his  difficulties. 

Palacios  with  the  junta  had  retired  to  Alcira,  and  in 
concert  with  the  friars  of  his  faction  had  issued  a  mani- 
festo, intended  to  raise  a  popular  commotion  to  favour 
his  own  restoration  to  the  command,  but  Blake  was  now 
become  popular  ;  the  Valencians  elated  by  the  successful 
resistance  of  Saguntum,  called  for  a  battle,  and  the 
Spanish  general  urged  partly  by  his  courage,  the  only 
military  qualification  he  possessed,  partly  that  he  found 
his  operations  on  the  French  rear  had  not  disturbed  the 
siege,  acceded  to  their  desire.  j\Iahy  and  Ba.ssecour"e 
divisions  had  arrived  at  Valencia,  Obispo  was  called  in 
to  Betera,  eight  thousand  irregulars  were  thrown  u})on 
the  P^ench  communications,  and  the  whole  Spanish  army 
amounting  to  about  twenty-two  thousand  infantry,  two 
thousand  good  cavalry,  and  thirty-six  guns,  made  reudy 
for  battle. 

Previous  to  this,  Sachet,  although  expecting  such  an 
event,  had  detached  several  parties  to  scour  the  road 
of  Tortoza,  and  had  directed  Falombini"s  division  to 
attack  Obispo  and  relieve  Teruel.  Obispo  skirmished 
at  Xerica  on  the  21st,  and  then  rapidly  marched  upon 
Liria  with  a  view  to  assist  in  the  approaching  battle  ; 
but  Blake,  who  might  liave  attacked  while  Falombini 
was  absent,  took  little  heed  of  the  opp<.'rtunity,  and 
Suchet.  now  aware  of  his  adversary's  object,  instantly 
recalled  the  Italians  who  arrived  the  very  morning  of  the 
action. 

The  ground  between  Mnrviodro  and  Valencia  was  a 
low  fiat^  interspersed  here  and  there  with  rugged  isolated 
hills  ;  it  was  also  intersected  by  ravines,  torrents,  and 
water-cuts,  and  thickly  studded  with  olive-trees  ;  but 
near  Saguntum  it  became  straitened  by  the  mountain 
and  the  sea,  so  as  to  leave  an  opening  of  not  more  than 
three  miles,  behind  which  it  again  spread  out.  In  this 
narrow  part  Suclict  resolved  to  receive  the  attack,  with- 
out relinquishing  the  siege  of  Saguntum  ;  and  he  left  a 
strong  detachment  in  the  trenches  with  orders  to  open 
the  five  of  a  new  battery,  the  moment  the  Spanish  army 
aj))  leared. 

His  left,  consisting  of  Habert's  division,  and  some 
Sf[uadrons  of  dragoons,  was  refused,  to  avoid  the  fire  of 
some  vessels  of  war  and  gun-boats  which  flanked  Blake's 
march.  'J'he  centre  under  Ilarispe,  was  extended  to  the 
foot  of  the  mountains,  so  that  he  offred  an  obli(|ue  front, 
crossing  the  iirxin  road  from  Valencia  to  Jlurviedro. 
Palombini's  division  and  the  dragoons,  were  placed  in 
second  line  behind  the  centre,  and  behind  them  the  cui- 
rassiers were  held  in  n.-serve. 

This  narrow  front  was  favourable  for  an  action  in 
the  plain,  but  the  right  flank  of  the  French,  and  the 
troops  left  to  carry  on  the  siege,  were  liable  to  Iw 
turned  by  the  pa.ss  of  Espiritus.  through  which,  the 
roads  In.m  Betera  led  fo  (iilel,  directly  upon  the  line 
of  retreat.  To  prevent  such  an  attempt  Suchet  jjosted 
Chlopiski  with  a  strong  detacliment  of  infantry  and 
the  itaUan  dra-oons  iu  the  pass,  and  placed  Uie  Nea- 


418 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR  WAR. 


[Book  XV 


politan  brigade  of  resen^e  at  Gilet:  in  this  situation, 
although  his  fighting  troops  did  not  exceed  seventeen 
thousand  men,  and  those  cooped  up  between  two  for- 
tresses, hemmed  in  by  the  mountain  on  one  side,  the 
sea  on  tlie  other,  and  with  onl\'  one  narrow  line  of 
retreat,  the  French  general  did  not  hesitate  to  engage 
a  very  numerous  army.  He  trusted  to  his  superiority 
in  moral  resources,  and  what  would  have  been  madness 
in  other  circumstances,  was  here  a  proof  of  skilful 
daring. 

Clake  having  issued  a  fine  address  to  his  soldiers  on 
the  'i'ltli  of  October  advanced  to  fight.  His  right  wing 
under  Zayas  composed  of  the  Albuera  division?,  marched 
by  a  road  leading  u\)on  the  village  of  Puzzol,  and  Blake 
followed  in  person,  with  a  weak  reserve,  commanded  by 
general  A'^ela.sco. 

'J"he  centre  under  Lardizabal  supported  by  the  cavalry 
of  Ix)y  and  Caro,  moved  by  the  main  road. 

The  left,  consisting  of  ]\Iiranda's  and  Villa  Campa's 
infantry,  and  of  St.  Juan's  cavalry,  and  supported  by 
Mahy's  division  which  came  from  the  side  of  Betera, 
moved  against  the  deule  of  Espiritus.  Obispo,  also 
coming  from  Betera,  acted  as  a  flanking  corps,  and 
entering  the  mountains  by  Naquera,  menaced  the  right 
of  Chlopiski,  but  he  was  met  by  a  brigade  under  gen- 
eral Robert. 

The  Spaniards  moved  on  rapidly  and  in  good  order, 
driving  the  French  outposts  over  a  ravine  called  the 
Piccador,  which  covered  Snchet's  front.  Zayas  and  l 
Ijardizabal  immediately  passed  this  obstacle  as  did 
also  Caro  and  Loy,  and  the  first  took  possession  I 
of  Puzzol  while  the  flotilla  ranged  along  the  coast  | 
and  protected  his  right  flank.  Blake  with  Velas- 
co's  reserve  linltcd  at  KI  Puig,  an  isolated  hill  on  the 
sea-coa.st  behind  the  Piccador,  but  Lardizabal  and  the 
cavalry  forming  an  oblique  line,  in  order  to  face  the 
French  front,  occupied  the  ground  between  Puzzol  and 
the  Piccador.  Tims  the  Spanish  order  of  battle  was 
cut  in  two  by  the  ravine,  for  on  the  hither  side  of  it 
St.  Juan.  .Miranda,  and  Villa  Canipa  were  drawn  up, 
and  Mahy  took  possession  of  a  height  called  the  Ger- 
raanels,  which  was  opposite  the  mouth  of  St.  Es- 
piritus. 

By  this  disposition  the  Spani.sh  line,  extending  fron 
Puzzol  to  the  Germanels,  was  not  less  than  six 
miles,  and  the  division  of  Obispo  was  separated  from 
the  left  by  about  the  same  distance.  Blake's  order 
of  battle  was  therefore  feeble,  and  he  was  without 
any  efhcicnt  reserve,  for  Velasco  was  distant  and  weak 
and  Mahy's  was  actually  in  the  line.  The  French  or- 
der of  battle  covering  less  than  three  milis  was  com- 
pressed and  strong,  the  reserves  were  well  placed  and 
close  at  hand  ;  and  Chlopiski's  division,  although  a 
league  distant  from  the  main  l)ody,  was  firmly  posted, 
and  able  to  take  a  direct  part  in  the  battle,  while  the 
interval  between  him  and  Suchet  was  closed  by  impas- 
sable heights. 

BATTLE    OF    SAGUNTUM. 

The  fight  was  commenced  by  Villa  Campa,  who  was 
advancing  again.st  the  pass  of  Espiritus,  when  the 
Italian  dragoons  galloping  out  overthrew  his  advanced 
guard,  and  put  his  division  into  confusion.  Chlopiski 
seeing  this,  moved  do\vn  with  the  infantry,  drove  Mahy 
from  the  Germanels,  and  then  detached  a,  regiment  to 
the  succour  of  the  centre,  where  a  brisk  battle  was 
going  on  to  the  disadvantage  of  Suchet. 

'J'liat  general  had  not  judged  his  ground  well  at  first, 
and  when  the  Spaniards  had  crossed  the  Piccador,  he 
too  late  perceived  that  an  is()Iat<'d  height  in  advance  of 
llarispe's  division,  could  command  all  that  part  of  the 
field.  Prompt  hotvever  to  remedy  his  error,  he  ordered 
the  infantry  to  advance,  aud  gallo])ed  forward  himself 
with  an  escort  of  hussars  to  seize  the  hill  ;  the  enemy 
wa.-'  already  in  popscssioD,  and  then-  guns  opened  from 


the  summit,  but  the  head  of  ITarispe's  infantiy  then  at- 
tacked, and  after  a  sharp  fight,  in  which  general  Paris 
and  several  superior  officers  were  wounded,  gained  the 
height. 

At  this  time  Obispo's  guns  were  heard  on  the  hilla 
far  to  the  right,  and  Zayas  passing  through  Puzzol 
endeavoured  to  turn  the  French  left,  and  as  the  day  was 
fine,  and  the  field  (jf  battle  distinctly  seen  by  the  soldiers 
in  Saguntum,  they  crowded  on  the  rami^arts,  regard- 
less of  the  besiegers'  fire,  and  uttering  loud  cries  of 
Victory  I  Victory  !  by  their  gestures  seemed  to  encour- 
age their  countrymen  to  press  forward.  The  critical 
moment  of  the  battle  was  evidently  ap]iroacliing.  Su- 
chet ordered  Palomljini's  Italians,  and  the  dragoons, 
to  support  Harisi)e,  and  although  wounded  himself  gal- 
loped to  the  cuirassiers  and  brought  them  into  action. 
Meanwhile  the  French  hussars  had  pursued  the  Span- 
iards from  the  height  to  the  Piccador,  where  how- 
ever the  latter  rallied  upon  their  second  line  and  again 
advanced  ;  and  it  was  in  vain  that  the  French  artillery 
poured  grape-shot  into  their  ranks,  their  march  was 
not  checked.  Loy  and  (faro's  horsemen  overthrew  the 
French  hussars  in  a  moment,  and  in  the  same  charge 
sabred  the  French  gunners  and  captured  their  battery. 
The  crisis  would  have  been  i'aTal,  if  Harispe's  infantry 
had  not  stood  firm  while  Palombini's  division  march- 
ing on  the  left  under  cover  of  a  small  rise  of  ground, 
suddenly  opened  a  fire  vq.on  the  flank  of  the  Span- 
ish cavalry,  which  was  still  in  pursuit  of  the  hussars. 
These  last  immediately  turned,  and  the  Spaniards  thus 
placed  between  two  fires,  and  thinking  the  flight  of 
the  hussars  had  been  feigned,  to  draw  tlu'm  into  an 
ambus(  ade,  hesitated ;  the  next  m.oment  a  tremen- 
dous charge  of  the  cuirassiers  put  every  thing  into  con- 
fusion. Caro  was  wour.ded  and  taken,  Loy  fled  with 
the  remainder  of  the  cavalry  over  the  Piccador,  the 
French  guns  were  recovered,  the  Spanish  artillery  was 
taken,  and  Lardizabal's  infantry  being  quite  broken, 
laid  down  their  arms,  or  throwing  them  away,  saved 
themselves  as  they  could.  Harispe's  division  imme- 
diately joined  Chlopiski's,  and  both  together  pursued 
the  beaten  troops. 

This  great,  and  nearly  simultaneous  success  in  the 
centre,  and  on  the  right,  having  cut  the  Sjianish  line 
in  two,  Zayas'  position  become  exceedingly  dangerous. 
Suchet  was  on  his  flank,  Habcrt  advancing  against  his 
front,  and  Blake  had  no  reserve  in  hand  to  restore  the 
battle,  for  the  few  troops  and  guns  under  Vela.sco 
remained  inactive  at  El  Puig.  However  such  had 
been  the  vigour  of  the  action  in  the  centre,  and  so 
inferior  were  Sachet's  numbers,  that  it  reciuired  two 
hours  to  secure  his  prisoners  and  to  rally  I'alombini's 
division  for  another  effort.  Meanwhile  Zayas,  whose 
left  flank  was  covered  in  some  measure  by  the  water- 
cuts,  fought  stoutly,  maintained  the  village  of  Puzzol 
for  a  long  time,  and  when  fairly  driven  out,  although 
he  was  charged  .several  times,  by  some  squadrons  at- 
tached to  Habert's  division,  effected  his  retreat  acro.sa 
the  Piccador,  and  gained  El  Puig.  Suchet  had  how- 
ever re-formed  his  troops,  and  Zayas  now  attacked  in 
front  and  flank,  fled  along  the  sea-coast  to  the  Grao 
of  Valencia,  leaving  his  artillery  and  eight  hundred 
prisoners. 

During  this  time,  Chlopiski  and  Harispe  had  pur- 
sued Mahy,  Miranda.  Villa  (\impa,  and  Lardizabal, 
as  far  as  the  torrent  of  Caraixit,  where  many  prisoners 
were  made  ;  but  the  rest  being  joined  by  Obispo, 
rallied  behind  the  torrent,  and  the  French  cavalry 
having  outstripped  their  infantry,  were  ui.ablc  to  pi-e- 
vent  the  Spaniards  from  reaching  the  line  of  the  Gua- 
dalaviar.  The  victors  had  about  a  thousand  killed 
and  wounded,  and  the  Spaniards  had  not  more,  but 
two  generals,  five  thousand  pioneers,  and  twelve  guna 
were  taken  ;  and  Blaise's  inability  to  oppose  Suchet 
in  the  field,  being  made  manilest   by  this   baitle,  the 


1811.] 


NAPIER'S    PEXIXSULAR  AA^AR. 


419 


troops  engao-od  wore  totally  dispirited,  and  the  effect  I  forcemonts  then  mar(!hin!r  throutrh  ISTavarre.  to  different 

miciied  even  to  Saguntuni,  for  the  garrison  surrendered  j  parts  of  Spain,  rendered  tiie  time  chosen  for  these  at>- 

that  night.  j  tempts  peculiarly  unfavourable.     Eut  the  chief  ohjectiou 

OBSERVATio.N's.  ^''^^'  ^^'^t  BIuIyc  had   lost  the  favourable  occasion  of 

I  protracting  the  war  about  Saguntum  ;  and  tlie  opera- 
1.  In  this  campaign  the  main  object  on  both  sides  i  tions  against  A'alencia  were  sure  to  be  brought  to  a 
was  Valencia.  That  city  could  not  be  invested  until  j  crisis,  before  the  affair  of  Aragon  could  have  been 
Sagunlum  v,-as  taken,  and  the  Spanish  army  defeated  ; '  sufficiently  embarra-ssing,  to  recall  the  French  general, 
hence  to  protect  Saguntum  without  endangering  his  j  The  true  way  of  using  the  large  guerilla  forces,  was  to 
army,  wa.s  the  problem  for  Biake  to  solve,  and  it  was  i  bring  them  down  close  upon  the  rear  of  Suchefs  army, 
not  very  difficult.  He  had  at  least  twenty-five  thou- 1  especially  on  the  side  of  Teruel,  where  he  had  niaga- 
sand  troops,  besides  the  garrisons  of  Peuiscola,  Orope-   zines ;    which   could  have   been    done    safely,    because 


sa,  and  Segorbe,  and  he  could  either  command  or 
influence  the  movements  of  nearly  twenty  thousand 
irregulars  ;  his  line  of  operations  was  direct,  and  secure, 
and  he  had  a  fleet  to  assist  him.  and  several  secure 
harboui-s.     On  the  other  hand  the  French  general  could 


these  Partidas  had  an  open  retreat,  and  if  followed 
would  have  effected  their  object,  of  weakening  and  dis- 
tressing the  army  before  Vak'ncia.  This  would  have 
been  quite  a  different  operation  from  that  which  I5!ake 
adopted,  when  he  posted  Obispo  and  ODonnell  at  Eena- 


not  bring  twenty  thousand  men  into  action,  and  his  line  i  guazil  and  Segorbe  ;  because  these  generals'  lines  of 
of  operation,  w^'hich  was  long,  and  difficult,  was  inter- 1  operations,  springing  fi-om  the  Guadalaviar,  were  within 
cepted  by  the  Spanish  fortresses.  It  was  for  Blake  '  the  power  of  the  French  ;  and  this  error  alone  proves 
therefore  to  choose  the  nature  of  his  defence :  he  could  ;  that  Blake  was  entirely  ignorant  of  the  princijiles  of 
fight,  or  he  could  protract  the  war.  j  strategy. 

2.  If  he  had  resolved  to  fight,  he  should  have  taken  |  7.  Urged  by  the  cries  of  the  Yalencian  population, 
post  at  Castellon  de  la  Plana,  keeping  a  coi'Ids  of  ob-J  the  Spanish  general  delivered  the  battle  of  the  25th 
servation  at  Segorbe.  and  strong  detachments  towards  :  which  was  another  great  error,  and  an  error  exaggera- 
Villa  Franca,  and  Cabaiies,  holding  his  army  in  readi- j  ted  by  the  mode  of'execution.  He  who  had  so  Diuch 
ness  to  fall  on  the  heads  of  Suchet's  columns,  as  they  i  experience,  who  had  now  commanded  in  four  or  five 
came  out  of  the  mountains.  But  experience  had,  or  '  pitched  battles,  was  still  so  ignorant  of  his  art,  that 
should  have,  taught  Blake,  that  a  battle  in  the  open  !  with  twice  as  many  men  as  his  adversary,  and  with  the 
field  between  the  French  and  Spanish  troops,  whatever :  choice  of  time  and  place,  he  made  three  simultaneous 
might  be  the  apparent  ativantage,  was  uncertain ;  and :  attacks,  on  an  extended  front,  without  any  connection 
this  last  and  bt^st  army  of  the  country  ought  not  to  |  or  support ;  and  he  had  no  reserves  to  restore  the  fight 
have  been  risked.  He  should  therefore  have  resolved  or  to  cover  his  retreat.  A  wide  sweep  of  the  net 
upon  protracting  the  war,  and  have  merely  held  that  j  without  regard  to  the  strength  or  fierceness  of  his  prey, 
position  to  check  the  heads  of  the  French  columns,  |  was  Blake's  only  notion,  and  the  result  was  his  own  de- 
v/ithout  engaging  in  a  pitched  battle.  i  struction. 

*  3.  From  Castellon  de  la  Plana  and  Segorbe,  the '  8.  Suchefs  operations,  especially  his  advance  against 
army  might  have  been  withdrawn,  and  concentrated  at  Saguntuni,  leaving  Oropesa  behind  him,  were  able  and 
Murviedro.  in  one  march,  and  Blake  should  have  pre- 1  rapid.  He  saw  the  errors  of  his  adversary,  and  made 
pared  an  intrenched  camp  in  the  hills  close  to  Sagun- ,  them  fatal.  To  fight  in  front  of  Saguntnm  was  no  fault ; 
turn,  placing  a  corps  of  observation  in  the  plain  j  the  French  general  acted  with  a  just  confidence  in  his 
behind  that  fortre&s.  These  hills  were  rugged,  very  |  own  genius,  and  the  valour  of  his  troops.  He  gained 
difficult  of  access,  and  the  numerous  water-cuts  and  '  that  fortress  by  the  battle,  but  he  acknowledged  that 
the  power  of  forming  inundations  in  the  place,  were  so  i  such  were  the  difTiculties  of  the  siege,  the  place  could 
favourable  for  defence,  that  it  would  have  been  nearly  j  only  have  been  taken  by  a  blockade,  which  would  have 
impossible  for  the  French  to  have  dislodged  him  ;  nur  j  required  two  months. 
could  they  have  invested  Saguutum  while  he  remained  i 
irr  this  camp. 

4.  In  such  a  strong  position,  with  his  retreat  secure 
npon  the  Guadalaviar,  the  Spanish  general  would 
have  covered  the  fertile  plains  from  the  French  fura- 
gers,  and  would  have  held  the't  army  at  bay  while 
the  irregulars  operated  upon  their  communication.  He 
might  then  have  safely  detached  a  division  to  his  left, 
to  assist  the  Partidas,  or  to  his  right,  by  sea,  to  land  at 
Peniscola.  His  forces  would  soon  have  been  increased 
and  the  invasion  would  have  been  frustrated. 

5.  Instead  of  following  this  simple  principle  of  de- 
fensive warfare  consecrated  since  the  days  of  Fabius, 
Biake  abandoned  Saguntnm.  and  from  behind  the  Gua- 
dalaviar, sent  unconnected  detachments  on  a  half  circle 
round  the  French  army,  which  being  concentrated,  and 
nearer  to  each  detachment  than  the  latter  was  to  its  own 

'  ba.se  at  Valencia,  could  and  did,  as  we  have  seen,  defeat 
them  all  in  detail. 

6.  Blake,  like  all  the  Spanish  generals,  indulged 
vast  military  conceptions  far  beyond  his  means,  and, 
from  want  of  knowledge,  generally  in  violation  of 
strategic  principles.  Thus  his  project  of  cutting  the 
commuijication  with  Madrid,  invading  Aragon,  and 
connecting  ilina's  operations  between  Zaragoza  and 
the  Pyrenees,  with  Lacy's  in   Catalonia,  was  gigantic 


CHAPTER  III. 

Snchet  resolves  to  invest  the  city  of  Valeueia — Blake  reverts 
to  his  former  system  of  acting  on  the  Frencli  rear — Napo- 
leon orders  general  lieille  to  reinforce  t^ucliet  with  two  divi- 
sions-— Laey  disarms  tlie  Catalan  Soniatenes — Tlieir  ardour 
diminishes — Tlie  French  destroy  several  bands,  blockade 
the  Medas  islands,  and  occupy  Mataro — Several  towns  .if- 
fected  to  the  French  interest- — Bad  conduct  of  the  priva- 
teers— Lacy  encourages  assassination — Suchet  advances  to 
tlie  Guadalaviar— Spanish  defences  described— The  French 
force  tlie  passage  of  the  river— Buttle  of  Valenci.i — M:i!;i 
flies  to  Alcira — Suchet  invests  the  Spanish  camp — Blake 
attempts  to  break  out,  is  repulsed — The  camp  abandoned 
— Tlic  city  is  bombarcled — Commotion  within  the  walls — 
Blake  surrenders  with  his  whole  army — Suchet  created 
duke  of  Alhufera— Shameful  conduct  of  the  junta  of  tiio 
province — Montbrun  arrives  with  three  divisions— Sum- 
mons Alicaiit,  and  returns  to  Toledo— Villa  Campa  marclica 
from  Carthagena  to  Albaracin— Gandia  and  Denia  taken 
by  the  French— Thev  besiege  Feniscola— Lacy  luenaoea 
Tarairona — Defeats  aFreiich  battalion  at  Villa  Seca— -Battlo 
of  Altafiilla— Sietre  of  Feniscola— The  French  army  at 
Valencia  weakened  by  draughts— Suchet's  conquests  cease 
■ — Observations. 


...    ,     _     ^  ^,  Saguntum  having  fitllcn,  Suchet  conceived  the  plan 

in  design,  but  without' any  chance  of  success.  The '  of  enclosimr  and  capturing  the  whole  of  Blake  s  force, 
division  of  Scveroli  being"  added  to  Musnier's,  had  j  together  with  the  city  of  Valencia,  round  which  it  was 
secured  Aragon  ;  and  if  it  hud  not  been  so,  the  rein- '  eucampcd  ;  and  he  was  not  deterred  from  this  project 


4?0 


NAPIERS    PEXIXSULAR  WAR. 


[Book  XV. 


by  the  dosnltory  operations  of  the  Partidas  in  Araai'on, 
nor  by  the  stats  of  (/Utalc-nia.  Blake  however,  revert- 
in.;,^  to  iiis  foniior  cy?t  'm,  caileJ  up  to  Valeneia  all  the 
garrisons  ami  (1od6;s  of  Miircia.  and  directed  the  conde 
de  iMdntijo,  wiio  had  bjeii  expelled  by  ."^oult  from  Grc- 
iiada,  to  join  Daran.  He  likwise  ordered  Freiro  to 
move  upon  Cuen  a.  with  the  Mureian  army,  to  suppoi-t 
jVIontijo,  Dnran.  and  the  Partida  chief-;,  who  remained 
near  Ara'jfon  after  the  defeat  of  the  iMiipecinado.  But 
the  innumerable  small  bands,  or  rather  armed  peasants, 
immediately  ab  )Ut  Valencia,  he  made  no  use  of,  neither 
harassing  the  French  nor  in  any  manner  accustoming 
thes'j  people  to  action. 

In  Aragon  his  affairs  turned  out  ill.  Mazuchelli 
entirely  d^'featod  J)uran  in  a  hard  fight,  near  Almunia, 
on  the  7th  of  November  :  on  the  2od  Campillo  was  de- 
feated at  Auatlou.  and  a  Partida  having  appeared  at 
Fenarova,  near  Morella.  the  people  rose  against  it. 
Finally  Napoleon,  seeing  that  the  contest  in  Valencia 
wa.s  coming  to  a  crisis,  ordered  general  Reille  to  reinforce 
Suchet  not  only  with  Beverolis  Italians,  but  with  his 
own  French  division,  in  all  fifteen  thousand  good  troops. 

Meanwhile  in  Catalonia  Lacy's  activity  had  greatly 
diminished.  He  had,  including  the  Tercios,  above  six- 
teen thousand  troops,  of  which  about  twelve  thousand 
were  arm.xl,  and  in  conjunction  with  the  junta  he  had 
classed  the  whole  population  in  reserves  ;  b;it  he  was 
jealous  of  the  people,  who  were  generally  of  the  church 
party,  and.  as  he  had  before  done  in  the  Rrinda.  deprived 
them  of  their  arms,  although  they  had  purchased  them, 
in  obedience  to  his  own  proclamation.  Jle  also  discoun- 
tenanced ius  much  as  poasible  the  popular  insurrection, 
and  he  was  not  without  plausible  reasons  for  this, 
aithoiyjh  hs  could  nut  justify  the  fiiithle.-s  and  oppressive 
m)de  of  execution. 

He  complained  that  the  Somatenes  always  lost  their 
arms  and  annnunilion,  that  they  were  turbulent,  expen- 
sive, and  b:id  soldiers,  and  that  his  object  was  to  incor- 
j)orate  them  by  jttst  degrees  with  the  regular  army,  where 
they  could  bo  of  service ;  but  then  he  made  no  good  use 
of  the  latter  himself,  and  hencs  he  impeded  the  irregulai-s 
without  hei])ing  the  regular  warfare.  His  conduct  dis- 
gusted the  (Jatalonians.  'I'hat  jieople  had  always  pos- 
sessed a  certain  freedv;m  and  loved  it  ;  but  they  had  bei'ii 
treated  despotically  and  unjustly,  by  all  the  ditferent 
conniianders  who  had  been  i)laced  at  their  head,  since 
the  connuji'.coment  of  the  war  ;  and  now,  finding  that 
Lacy  was  even  worse  tlian  his  predecessors,  their  ardour 
sensibly  dimiuislied  ;  many  went  over  to  the  Frem-h.  and 
this  feeling  of  discouragement  was  increiused  by  some 
unfortunate  events. 

llenriod  governor  of  Lerida  had  on  the  'i.Tth  of  Oc- 
tober surprised  and  destroyed,  in  Balaguer,  a  swarm 
of  Parlidius  which  had  s.ntled  on  the  plain  of  Urgel, 
and  the  ParLizans  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Kbro  had 
been  defeated  l)y  the  escort  of  one  of  the  convoys.  ^I'he 
French  also  entrtMiched  a  post  before  the  Medas  Islands, 
in  Noveml)or,  which  prevented  all  conmuuiication  Ijy 
hind,  and  in  the  sauic  month  Maurice  Mathieu  sur- 
prised Mattaro.  The  war  had  also  now  fatigued  so 
many  persons,  that  several  towns  were  ready  to  re- 
ceive the  enemy  as  friends.  Villa  Nueva  de  Hitjes  and 
other  places  were  in  constant  communication  with 
liarc 'lona  ;  and  the  people  of  Cadaques  openly  refused 
to  pay  their  contributions  to  Lacy,  declaring  that  they 
had  already  paid  the  French  and  meant  to  side  with 
the  strongist.  One  Ouinart,  a  member  of  the  junta, 
was  detected  corre.ijwnding  with  the  enemy  ;  counter 
guerilhis,  or  rather  freebooting  bands,  made  their  aj)- 
pearance  near  Berga  ;  privateers  of  all  nations  infested 
the  coast,  and  these  pirates  of  the  ocean,  the  disgrace 
of  civilized  warfare,  generally  agreed  not  to  molest 
eaol;  cth^r,  ':  it  robbed  all  defenceless  flags  without 
distinction.  Then  the  continued  bickerings  between 
~'arsQeld,   Eroles,  and    ililans,  uud   of  all  three   with 


[  Lacy,  who  was,  besides,  on  bad  terms  with  captain 
I  Codrington,  greatly  aflected  the  patriotic  ardour  of  the 
people,  and  relieved  the  French  armies  from  the  alarm 
which  the  first  operations  had  created. 

In  Catalonia  the  generals  in  chief  were  never  natives, 
nor  identified  in  f,vling  with  the  natives.  Lacy  was 
unfitted  for  ojxjn  warfare,  and  had  recourse  to  the  in- 
famous methods  of  assassination.  Campo  Verde  had 
given  some  countenance  to  this  horrible  syslem,  but 
Lacy  and  his  coadjutors  liave  been  accused  of  instigat- 
ing the  murder  of  French  officers  in  their  quarters,  the 
poisoning  of  wells,  the  drugging  of  wines  and  flour, 
and  the  firing  of  powder-magazines,  regardless  of  the 
st^fety  even  of  the  Spaniards  who  might  be  within 
rea(;h  of  the  explosion  ;  and  if  any  man  shall  doubt  the 
truth  of  this  allegation,  let  him  read  "  The  History  of 
ihc  Conspiracies  against  the  French  Armies  in  Catalonia." 
That  work,  printed  in  1813  at  Barcelona,  contains  the 
official  reports  of  the  military  police,  upon  the  differ- 
ent attempts,  many  successful,  to  destroy  the  French 
troops  ;  and  when  due  allowance  for  an  enem.ys  tale  and 
for  the  habitual  falsifications  of  police  agents  is  made, 
ample  proof  will  remain  that  Lacys  warfare  was  one  of 
assassination. 

The  facility  which  the  great  size  of  Barcelona  afiford- 
ed  for  these  attempts,  together  with  its  continual  crav- 
ings and  large  garrison,  induced  Napoleon  to  think  of 
dismantling  the  walls  of  the  city,  preserving  only  the 
forts.  This  simple  military  precaution  has  been  noted 
by  some  writers  a.s  an  indication  that  he  even  then 
secretly  despaired  of  final  success  in  the  Peninsula ;  but 
the  weakness  of  this  remark  will  appear  evident,  if  we 
Consider,  that  he  had  just  augmerited  his  immense  army, 
that  his  generals  were  invading  Va'encia,  and  menacing 
(rallicia,  after  having  relieved  Badajos  and  Cindaid 
Rodrigo  ;  and  that  he  was  himsi'lf  preparing  to  lead 
four  hundred  thousand  men  to  tlie  most  distant  ex- 
tremity of  Europe.  However  the  place  was  not  dis- 
mantled, and  Maurice  Mathieu  contrived  both  to  main- 
tain the  city  in  obedience  and  to  take  an  important  part 
in  the  field  operations. 

It  was  under  these  circumstances  that  Suchet  ad- 
vanced to  the  Guadalaviar,  although  his  losses  and  the 
escorts  f(;r  his  numerous  prisoners  had  diminished  hi.s 
force  to  eiahteen  thousand  men,  while  lUake's  army, 
including  Freires  division,  was  above  twenty-five  tlu-u- 
sand,  of  which  near  three  thousand  weie  cavalry.  He 
fir.st  summoned  the  city,  to  ascertain  the  public  spirit  j 
he  was  answered  in  lofty  terms,  yet  he  knew  by  his 
secret  communications,  that  the  enthusiasm  of  the  peo- 
ple was  not  very  strong ;  and  on  the  ?A  of  November 
he  seized  the  Grao  and  the  suburb  of  Serranos,  on  the 
left  of  the  Guadalaviar.  Blake  had  brokon  two,  out  of 
five,  stone  bridges  on  the  river,  had  occupied  some  houses 
and  convents  which  covered  tlicm  on  the  left  bank,  and 
protected  tliose  bridges  which  remained  whole  with 
regular  works.  Suchet  immediately  carried  the  con- 
vents which  covered  the  broken  bridges  in  the  Serranos, 
and  fortified  his  position  there  and  at  the  (jrao,  and  thus 
blocked  the  Spaniards  on  that  side  with  a  small  force, 
while  he  i)repared  to  pass  the  river  higher  up  with  the 
remainder  of  his  army. 

'I'he  Spanish  defences  on  the  right  bank  consisted  of 
three  posts. 

1.  The  city  itself  which  was  surrounded  by  a  circular  \ 
wall  thirty  feet  in  height,  and  ten  in  thickness  with  u  ' 
roiul  along  the  summit,  the  platforms  of  the  bastions 
being   supjiorted    from    within    by    timber   scafVolding. 
There  was  also  a  wet  ditch  and  a  covered   way  with 
earthen  works  in  front  of  the  gates. 

2.  An  entrenched  (;amp  of  an  irregular  form  five 
miles  in  extent.  It  enck-sed  the  city  and  the  three 
suburbs  of  (Quarto,  San  Vincente,  and  Ru/afa.  The 
slope  of  this  work  was  so  steep  as  to  rer|uirc  scaling 
ladderd,  and  there  was  a  ditch  in  trout  twelve  feet  deep. 


1811.] 


NAPIER'S    TENIXSULAR  WAR. 


421 


3.  The  lines,  m  hich  extended  along  the  banks  of  tl:e 
river  to  the  sea  at  one  side,  and  to  the  villages  of  Quarte 
and  Manisses  on  the  other. 

The  whole  line,  ineluding  the  city  and  the  camp,  M'as 
about  eight  miles;  the  ground  was  broken  with  deep 
and  wide  canals  of  irrigation,  which  brauchi'd  off  from 
the  river  just  above  the  village  of  Quarte,  and  the  Span- 
ish cavalry  was  posted  at  Aldaya  behind  the  left  wing 
to  observe  the  oi)en  country.  Suchet  could  not  venture 
to  force  the  passage  of  the  river  until  Reille  had  joined 
hiui,  and  therefore  contented  himself  with  sending  par- 
ties over  to  skirmish,  while  he  increased  his  secret  com- 
munications in  the  city,  and  emi)Ioyed  detachments  to 
ecour  the  country  in  his  rear.  In  this  manner,  nearly 
two  mouths  passed ;  the  French  waited  for  reinforce- 
ments, and  Blake  hoped  that  while  he  thus  occupied  his 
enemy  a  general  insurrection  would  save  Valencia.  But 
in  December,  Reille,  having  given  over  the  charge  of 
Navarre  and  Aragon  to  general  Caffarelii,  marched  to  Te- 
ruel  wliere  Severoii  with  his  Italians  had  already'  arrived. 

The  vicinity  of  Freire,  and  Montijo,  who  now  ap- 
peared near  Ouem^a.  obliged  Reille  to  halt  at  Teruel 
until  general  D'Armanae  with  a  detachment  of  the  army 
of  the  centre,  had  driven  those  Spanish  generals  away, 
but  then  he  advanced  to  Segorbe,  and  as  Freire  did  nut 
rejoin  Blake,  and  iis  the  latter  was  ignorant  of  Reille's 
arrival,  Suchet  resolved  to  force  the  passage  of  the  Uua- 
daiaviar  instantly. 

On  the  25th,  the  Neapolitan  division  being  placed 
in  the  camp  at  the  Serraaos,  to  hold  the  Spaniards  in 
check,  Habert  took  post  at  the  Grao,  and  Falombini's 
division  was  placed  opposite  the  village  of  Mislat;i, 
which  was  about  half  way  between  Valencia  and  the 
village  of  Quarte.  Reille  at  the  same  time  made  a 
forced  march  by  Liria  and  Beuaguazil,  and  three 
bridges  being  thrown  in  the  night,  above  the  sources 
of  tue  canals,  0]jposite  Ribaroya,  the  rest  of  the  army 
crossed  the  (iuadaiaviar  with  all  diligence  on  the  26th 
and  fi)rmod  in  order  of  battle  on  the  other  side.  It  was 
then  eight  o'clock  and  iieille  had  not  arrived,  but  Sa- 
chet, whose  plan  was  to  drive  all  Blake's  army  within 
tlie  eutrenclied  camp,  fearing  that  the  Sjianish  general 
v/ould  evade  the  danger,  if  he  saw  the  French  divisions 
in  march,  resolved  to  push  at  once  with  Ilarispe's  in- 
fantry and  the  cavalry  to  the  Albufera  or  salt-lake,  be- 
yond Valencia,  and  so  cut  off  Blake's  retreat  to  the 
Xucar  river.  Robert's  brigade  therefore  halted  to  | 
secure  the  bridges,  until  Reille  should  come  up,  and 
while  the  troops,  left  on  the  other  bank  of  the  Guada- 
laviar,  attacked  all  the  Spanish  river  line  of  entrench- 
ments, Suchet  marched  towards  the  lake  as  rapidly  as 
the  thick  woods  would  permit. 

The  French  hussars  soon  fell  in  with  the  Spanish 
cavalry  at  Aldaya  and  were  defeated,  but  this  charge 
was  stopped  by  the  tire  of  the  infantry,  and  the  re- 
mainder of  the  French  horsemen  coming  up  overthrew 
the  Spaniards.  During  this  time  Blake  instead  of 
falling  on  Suchet  with  his  reserve,  was  occupied  with 
the  defence  of  the  river,  especially  at  the  village  of 
Mislata,  where  a  false  attack,  to  cover  the  passage  at 
Ribaroya,  had  first  given  him  the  alarm.  Palombini, 
who  was  at  this  point,  had  piv^sed  over  some  skirraish- 
en  and  then  throwing  two  bridges,  attacked  the  en- 
trenchments ;  but  his  troops  were  repulsed  by  Zayaa. 
and  driven  back  on  the  river  in  disorder  ;  they  rallied 
and  had  efl'ected  the  passage  of  the  canals,  when  a 
Spanish  reserve  coming  up  restored  the  fight,  and  the 
French  were  finally  driven  quite  over  the  river.  At 
that  moment  Reille's  division,  save  one  brigade  which 
could  not  arrive  in  time,  crossed  at  Ribaroya,  and  in 
concert  with  Robert,  attacked  Mahy  in  the  villages  of 
Manisses  and  Quarte,  which  had  been  fortified  care- 
fully in  front,  but  were  quite  neglected  on  the  rear,  and 
on  the  side  of  Aldaya.  Suchet,  who  had  Ijeen  some- 
what delayed  at  Aldaya  by  the  aspect  of  affairs  at  Mis- 


lata, then  continued  his  march  to  the  lake,  while  Reille 
meeting  with  a  feeble  resistance  at  Manisses  and  Quarto, 
carried  both  at  one  sweep,  and  turned  Mislata  wiicre 
he  united  with  I'alombini.  Blake  and  Zayas  retired 
towards  the  city,  but  Mahy  driven  from  Quar'tc  Umk  the 
road  to  Alcira,  on  the  Xucar,  and  thus  passing  behind 
Suchet's  division,  was  entirely  cut  off  from  N'alencia. 

All  the  Spanish  army,  on  the  upper  Guadahiviar,  was 
now  entirely  beaten  with  the  loss  of  its  artillery  and 
baggage,  and  below  the  city,  Habert  was  likewise  vie- 
torious.  He  had  first  opened  a  cannonade  against  the 
Spanish  gun-boats  near  the  Grao,  and  tliis  flotilla, 
although  in  sight  of  an  Phiglish  seventy-four  and  a 
frigate,  and  closely  supported  by  the  l\ipil!on  sloop, 
fled  without  returning  a  shot;  the  French  then  passed 
the  water,  and  carried  the  entrenchment,  which  con- 
sisted of  a  feeble  breast-work,  defended  by  the  irregu- 
lars who  had  only  two  guns.  When  the  passage  was 
effected  Habert  fixed  his  right,  as  a  pivot,  on  the  river, 
and  sweeping  round  with  his  left,  drove  tlie  Spaniards 
towards  the  camp ;  but  before  he  could  connect  his 
flank  with  Ilarispe's  troops,  who  were  on  the  lake,  Obis- 
po's division,  flying  from  Suchet's  cavalry,  passed  over 
the  rice  grounds  between  the  lake  and  the  sea,  and  so 
escaped  to  Cullera.  The  remainder  of  Blake's  army 
about  eighteen  thousand  of  all  kinds  retired  to  the  camp 
and  were  closely  invested  during  the  ni^ht. 

Three  detachments  of  French  dragoons,  each  man 
having  an  infantry  soldier  behind  him,  were  then  sent 
by  different  roads  of  Alcira,  Cullera,  and  Cuen(,-a,  the 
two  first  in  pursuit  of  Mahy  and  Obispo,  the  latter  to 
observe  Freire.  Mahy  was  found  in  a  position  at  Al- 
cira, and  Blake  had  already  sent  him  orders  to  main- 
tain the  line  of  the  Xucar  ;  but  he  had  lost  his  artillery, 
his  troops  were  disheartened,  and  at  the  first  shot  he  fled, 
although  the  ground  was  strong  and  he  had  three 
thousand  men  while  the  French  were  not  above  a  thou- 
sand. Obispo  likewise  abandoned  Cullera  and  endeav- 
oured to  rejoin  ]\lahy,  when  a  very  heavy  and  unusual 
fall  of  snow  not  only  pievented  their  junction,  but  offered 
a  fine  advantage  to  the  French.  For  the  British  consul 
thinking  the  Xucar  would  be  defended,  hatl  landed 
large  stores  of  provisions  and  ammunition  at  Denia 
and  was  endeavouring  to  re-embark  them,  when  the 
storm  drove  the  ships  of  war  off  the  coast,  and  for  three 
days  fifty  cavalry  could  have  captured  Denia  and  all  the 
stores. 

In  this  battle  which  cost  the  French  less  than  five 
hundred  men,  Zayas  alone  displayed  his  usual  vigour 
and  spirit,  and  while  retiring  upon  the  city,  he  repeat- 
edly proposed  to  Blake  to  retreat  by  the  road  Mahy 
had  followed,  which  would  have  saved  the  army  ;  yet 
the  other  was  silent,  for  he  was  in  every  way  incapable 
as  an  officer.  With  twenty-th.ree  thousand  infantry,  a 
powerful  cavalry,  and  a  wide  river  in  his  front — with 
the  command  of  several  bridges  by  which  he  could 
have  operated  on  either  side  ;  with  strong  entrench- 
ments, a  secure  camp — with  a  fortified  city  in  the 
centre,  where  his  reserves  could  have  reached  the  most 
distant  point  of  the  scene  of  operation,  in  less  than 
two  hours — with  all  these  advantages  he  Itad  permitted 
Suchet  whose  force,  seeing  that  one  of  Reille's  brig- 
ades had  not  arrived,  scarcely  exceeded  his  own.  to  force 
the  passage  of  the  river,  to  beat  him  at  all  points, 
and  to  enclose  him,  by  a  march,  which  spread  the 
French  tnxjps  on  a  circuit  of  more  than  filteen  miles 
or  five  hours'  march  ;  and  he  now  rejected  the  only 
means  of  saving  his  army.  But  Suchet's  oi)eration3 
which  indeed  were  of  the  nature  of  a  surprise,  proves 
that  he  must  have  had  a  suprem*  contemi)t  for  his 
adversary's  talents,  and  the  country  people  partook 
of  the  sentiment ;  the  French  parties  which  spread  over 
the  country  for  provisions,  as  far  as  Xativa,  were  every 
where  well  received,  and  Blake  complained  that  Valeu- 
cia  contained  a  bad  people. 


422 


NAPIER'S    PEXINSULAR  WAR. 


[Book  XV. 


The  2(1  of  December,  the  Spanish  general,  finding 
his  error,  attempted  ut  the  head  of  ten  thousand  men  to 
break  out  by  tlie  left  bank  of  the  (juadalaviar  ;  but  his 
arrang-ements  were  unskilful,  and  when  his  advanced 
guard  of  five  thousand  men  had  made  way,  it  was 
abandoned,  and  the  main  column  returned  to  llie  city. 
'I'he  next  day  many  deserters  went  over  to  the  French, 
and  Reille's  absent  brigade  now  arrived  and  reinforced 
the  posts  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river.  Sachet  fortiiied 
his  camp  on  the  right  bank,  and  having  in  the  night  of 
the  30th  repulsed  two  thiHisand  Spaniards  who  made  a 
sally,  commenced  regular  ajjproaches  against  the  camp 
aud  city. 

8IEGK    OF    VALENCIA. 

It  was  impossible  for  Blake  to  remain  long  in  the 
camp  ;  the  city  contained  one  hundred  and  fifty  thou- 
sand souls  besides  the  troops,  and  there  was  no  means  of 
provisioning  them,  because  Suchefs  investment  was 
complete.  Sixty  heavy  guns  with  their  pares  of  amnui- 
nition  which  had  reiiched  Saguntnm,  were  transported 
across  the  river  Guadalaviar  to  batter  the  works  ;  and 
as  the  suburb  of  San  Vincente  and  the  Olivet  offered 
two  projecting  points  of  the  entrenched  camp,  which 
possessed  but  feeble  means  of  defence,  the  trenches 
were  opened  against  them  in  the  night  of  the  1st  of 
January. 

The  fire  killed  colonel  Henri,  the  chief  engineer,  but 
in  the  night  of  the  .")th  the  Spaniards  abandoned  the 
camp  and  took  refuge  in  the  city  ;  the  French,  per- 
ceiving the  movement,  escaladed  the  works,  and  seized 
two  of  the  suburbs  so  suddenly,  that  they  captured 
eighty  pieces  of  artillery  and  established  themselves 
within  twenty  yards  of  the  town  wall,  when  their 
mortar  batteries  opened  upon  the  place.  In  the  even- 
ing, Suchet  sent  a  summons  to  Blake,  who  replied, 
that  he  would  have  accepted  certain  terms  the  day 
before,  but  that  the  bombardment  had  convinced  him. 
that  he  might  now  depend  upon  both  the  citizens  aud 
the  troo]is. 

This  answer  satisfied  Suchet.  He  was  convinced 
the  place  would  not  make  any  defence,  and  he  con- 
tinued to  throw  shells  until  the  8th  ;  after  which  he 
made  an  attack  upon  the  suburb  of  Qnarte,  but  the 
Spaniards  still  held  out  and  he  was  defeated.  How- 
ever, the  bombardment  killed  many  persons,  and  set 
lire  to  the  houses  in  several  (luarters  ;  and  as  there 
were  no  cellars  or  caves,  as  at  Zaragoza,  the  chief 
citizens  begged  Blake  to  cai)itnlate.  AVhile  he  was 
debating  with  thein.  a  friar  bearing  a  flag,  which  he 
called  the  Standard  of  the  Faith,  came  up  with  a  mob, 
and  insist^'d  upon  fighting  to  the  last,  and  when  a 
picipiet  of  soldiers  was  sent  against  him.  he  routed  it 
and  shot  the  oificer  ;  nevertheless  his  party  was  soon 
dispersed.  Finally,  when  a  convtuit  of  liominicans  close 
to  the  walls  w.is  taken,  and  five  batteries  ready  to  oi)en, 
Blake  demanded  leave  to  retire  to  Alicant  with  arms, 
baggage,  and  four  guns. 

These  terms  were  refused,  but  a  capitulation  guar- 
anteeing property,  and  oblivion  of  the  past,  and  pro- 
viding that  the  unfortunate  prisoners  in  the  island  of 
Cabrera  should  be  exchanged  against  an  cfjual  number 
of  Blake's  army,  was  negotiated  and  ratified  on  the  'Jlh. 
Then  Blake  complaining  bitterly  of  the  people,  gave  up 
the  city.  Above  eighteen  diousand  regular  troops,  with 
eighty  stand  of  colours,  two  thousand  horses,  three 
hundred  and  ninety  guns,  forty  thousand  muskets  and 
enormous  stores  of  powder  were  taken  ;  and  it  is  not  one 
of  the  least  remarkable  features  of  this  extraordinary 
war,  that  inteiligence  of  the  fall  of  so  great  a  city  took  a 
week  to  reach  Madrid,  and  it  was  not  known  iu  Cadiz 
until  one  month  after  ! 

On  the  14th  of  January,  Suchet  made  his  triumphal 
entry  into  Valencia,  having  completed  a  series  of  cam- 
paigns   in    which    the    feebleucsa   of   his    adversaries 


somewhat  diminished  his  glory,  but  in  which  his  own 

activity  and  skill  were  not  the  less  conspicuous.     Napo- 
leon created  him  duke  of  Albult-ra,  and  his  civil  a^lmin- 
istration  was  strictly  in  unison  with  his  conduct  in  the 
field,  that  is  to  say  vigorous  and  prudent.     He  arrested 
all  dangerous   persons,  especially   the   friars,  and  sent 
them  to  France,  and  he  rigorously  deprived  the  people 
of  their  military  resource-  ;  but  he  proportioned  Ins  de- 
mands to  their  real  ability,  kept  his  troojjs  in  perfect 
j  discipline,  was  carefid  not  to  offend  the  citizens  by  vio- 
'lating  their  customs,  or  shocking  their  religious  preju- 
]  dices,  and  endeavoured,  as  much  as  possible,  to  govern 
I  through  the  native  authorities.     The  archbishop  and 
1  many  of  the  clergy  aided  him,  aud  the  submission  of  tlie 
I  people  was  secured. 

I  The  errors  of  the  Spaniards  contributed  as  much  to 
this  object,  as  the  prudent  vigilance  of  Suchet ;  for 
although  the  city  was  lost,  the  kingdom  of  Valencia 
might  have  recovered  from  the  blow,  under  the  gui- 
dance of  able  men.  The  convents  and  churches  were 
full  of  riches,  the  towns  and  villages  abounded  in 
resources,  the  line  of  the  Xucar  was  very  strong,  aud 
several  fortified  places  and  good  harbours  remained 
unsubdued ;  the  Fartidas  in  the  hills  were  still  numer- 
ous, the  people  were  willing  to  fight,  and  the  British 
agents  and  the  British  fleets  were  ready  to  aid,  and 
to  supply  arms  and  stores.  The  junta  however  dis- 
solved itself,  the  magistrates  fled  from  their  posts,  the 
populace  were  left  without  chiefs  ;  and  when  the  consul, 
'J'upper,  proposed  to  establish  a  commission  of  govern- 
ment, having  at  its  head  the  padre  Rico,  the  author  of 
Valencia's  first  defence  against  Moncey,  and  the  most 
able  and  energetic  man  in  those  parts,  Mahy  evaded  the 
proposition  ;  he  would  not  give  Rico  power,  and  shew^ed 
every  disposition  to  impede  useful  exertion.  Then  the 
leading  people  either  openly  submitted  or  secretly 
entered  into  connection  with  the  French,  who  were 
thus  enabled  tranquilly  to  secure  the  resources  of  the 
country ;  and  as  the  regency  at  Cadiz  reiiised  the 
stipulated  exchange  of  prisoners,  the  Spanish  army  was 
sent  to  France,  and  the  li<3rrors  of  the  Cabrera  were 
prolonged. 

During  the  siege  of  Valencia,  Freire,  with  his 
Murcians,  including  a  body  of  cavalry,  had  abandoned 
the  passes  of  the  Contreras  district  and  retired  across 
the  Xucar  to  Alnianza ;  Mahy  occupied  Alcoy,  and 
Villa  Campa  had  marched  to  Carthagena.  Suchet 
wished  to  leave  them  undisturbed  until  he  was  ready 
to  attack  Alicant  itself.  But  to  ensure  the  fall  of 
Valencia,  Napoleon  had  directed  Soult  to  hold  ten 
thousand  men  in  the  Despenas  Peros,  ready  to  march 
if  necessary  to  Suchefs  assistance ;  and  at  the  same 
time  Marmont  was  ordered  to  detach  Montbrun  with 
two  divisions  of  infantry  and  one  of  ca\alry,  ft'om  the 
valley  of  the  Tagus,  to  co-operate  with  the  army  of 
Aragon.  These  last-named  troops  should  have  inter- 
posed between  Valencia  and  Alicant  before  the  battle 
of  the  26th,  but  they  were  delayed,  and  only  reached 
Almanza  on  the  9th,  the  very  day  Valencia  surrendered. 
Freire  retreated  before  them,  and  Mahy,  who  was 
preparing  to  advance  again  to  Alcira,  took  shelter  in 
Alicant.  Montbrun  knew  that  Valencia  had  fallen, 
and  was  advised  by  Suchet  to  return  immediately,  but 
ambitious  to  share  in  the  glory  of  the  hour  he  marched 
against  Alicant,  and  throwing  a  few  shells  summoned 
it  to  surrender.  'J'he  municipal  authorities,  the  gov- 
ernor and  many  of  the  leading  people,  were  disposed 
to  yield,  yet  Montbrun  did  not  jiress  them,  and  when 
he  retired  the  place  was,  as  Suchet  had  foreseen,  [)ut 
into  a  state  of  defence.  The  consul,  Tii[)])er,  and 
Roche  the  military  agent,  by  distributing  clothes  and 
food  to  the  naked  famishing  soldiers,  restored  their 
courage,  drew  many  more  to  Alicant,  and  stojiped  the 
desertion,  which  was  so  great  that  in  one  month 
I  Freire 's  division  aloue  had  lost  two   thousand    meaik 


1811.1 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR  AVAR. 


423 


^lontbrun's  attempt  therefore,  hurt  the  French  inter- 
ests, and  his  troops  on  tlieir  return  to  Toledo  wasted  and 
pillaged  the  country  through  which  they  passed  in  a 
shameful  manner. 

Villa  Canipa  now  abandoned  Carthagena  and  re- 
turned to  the  mountains  of  Albarazin :  and  Suchet, 
embarrassed  by  the  failure  at  Alicant,  and  dreading  the 
fever  at  Cartliagena,  posted  Harispe's  division  on  the 
Xucar,  to  guard  against  the  pestilence  rather  tlian  to 
watch  the  enemy.  Yet  he  seized  Gandia  and  Denia, 
which  last  was  strangely  neglected  bi»th  by  the  Span- 
iards and  by  the  British  squadron  after  the  stores  were 
removed  ;  for  the  castle  had  sixty  guns  mounted,  and 
many  vessels  were  in  the  port  ;  and  as  a  jiost  it  was  im- 
portant, and  might  easily  have  been  secured  until  a 
Spanish  garrison  could  be  thrown  in.  When  these 
points  were  secured,  Suchet  detached  a  brigade  on  the 
side  of  Cabrillas  to  preserve  the  communication  with 
(juen9a,  and  then  directed  Musnier's  division  to  form 
the  siege  of  Peniscola  ;  but  at  the  moment  of  investing 
tliat  place,  intelligence  arrived  that  'i'araguna,  the  garri- 
.son  of  whicli,  contrary  to  orders,  had  consumed  the 
reserve-provisions,  was  menaced  by  Lacy ;  wherefore 
Severoli's  division  moved  from  Valencia  to  replace  Mus- 
nier,  and  the  latter  marched  to  T^rtoza  in  aid  of  Tara- 
gona.  Previous  to  Musnier's  arrival,  Lafosse,  governor 
of  Turtoza,  had  advanced  with  some  cavalry  and  a  bat- 
talion of  infitntry  to  the  fort  of  Balaguer,  to  observe 
Lacy,  and  being  falsely  told  that  the  Spaniards  were  in 
retreat,  entered  Cambril  the  19th,  and  from  thence 
pushed  on  with  his  cavalry  to  Taragona.  Lacy  was 
Dearer  than  he  imagined. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  Catalan  army  was 
posted  in  the  valley  of  the  Congosta  and  at  Mattai'O,  to 
intercept  the  French  convoy  to  Barcelona.  In  Decem- 
ber, Maurice  Mathieu  .seized  Mattaro,  while  Dacaen, 
who  had  received  some  reinforcements,  brought  down 
the  long  expected  convoy,  and  the  Spaniards  being 
thus  placed  between  two  fires,  after  a  slight  action, 
opened  the  road.  When  Pacacn  returned  to  Gerona, 
they  resumed  their  position,  but  Lacy,  after  proposing 
several  new  projects,  which  he  generally  reliiuiuished  at 
the  moment  of  execution,  at  last  decided  to  fall  on 
Taragona,  and  afterwards  to  invade  Aragon.  With 
this  view,  he  drew  off  Kroles'  division  and  some  caval- 
ry, in  all  about  six  thousand  men,  from  the  Congosta, 
and  took  post  about  the  Ibth  of  January,  at  Reus. 
Tne  stores  from  Cadiz  were  landed  from  the  English 
vessels  at  Cape  Salou ;  captain  Codrington  repaired  to 
the  Spanish  (juarters  on  the  19th  to  concert  a  combined 
operation  with  the  ileet,  and  it  was  at  this  moment  the 
scouts  brought  word  that  Laiusse  had  entered  Taragona 
with  the  cavalry,  and  that  the  French  infantry,  about 
eight  hundred  in  numljer,  were  at  Villa  Seca,  ignorant 
of  the  vicinity  of  the  Spanish  army. 

Lacy  immediately  put  his  troops  in  motion,  and 
cajjtain  Codrington  would  have  returned  to  his  ship, 
but  a  patrol  of  French  dragoons  chased  him  back, 
ami  another  patrol  pu.shing  to  Salon  made  two  captains 
and  a  lieutenant  of  the  sf[uadron  prisoners,  and  brought 
them  to  Villa  Seca.  By  this  time,  however.  Lacy  had 
fallen  upon  the  French  infantry  in  front,  and  Eroles 
'turning  both  their  flanks,  and  closing  upon  their  rear, 
killeil  or  wounded  two  hundred,  when  the  remainder 
surrendered. 
!^  The  naval  officers,  thus  freed,  immediately  regained 
''  their  ships,  and  the  squadron  was  that  night  before 
Taragona ;  but  a  gale  of  wind  off  shore  im})eded  its 
fire,  the  Spaniards  did  not  appear  on  the  land-side,  and 
the  next  day  the  increasing  gale  obliged  the  ships  to 
anciior  to  the  eastward.  Lacy  had  meanwhile  ai)an- 
doned  the  project  against  Taragona,  and  after  sending 
bis  prisoners  to  Busa,  went  off  himself  towards  Mont- 
serrat,  leaving  Eroles'  division,  reinforced  by  a  con- 
BidiiTublb  body  of  armed  uissisautry,  in  a  position  at  Ata- 


fulla,  behind  the  Gaya.  Here  the  bridge  in  front  being 
broken,  and  the  position  strong,  Eroles,  who  had  been 
also  proinised  the  aid  of  Sarsfield's  division,  awaited  the 
attack  of  three  thousand  men  who  were  coming  from 
Barcelona.  He  was  however  ignorant  that  Dacaen, 
finding  the  ways  from  Gerona  oi)en,  because  SarsfielJ 
had  moved  to  the  side  of  V  ich,  had  sent  general  La- 
marque  with  five  thousand  men  to  Barcelona,  and  that 
Maurice  Mathieu  was  tims  in  march  not  with  three  but 
eight  thousand  good  troops. 

BATTLE    OF    ALTAFULLA. 

The  French  generals,  anxious  to  surprise  Eroles,  took 
pains  to  conceal  their  numbers,  and  while  Maurice 
Mathieu  appeared  in  front,  Lamarque  was  turning  the 
left  flank.  They  marched  all  night,  and  at  daybreak  on 
the  24th,  having  forded  the  river,  made  a  well  combined 
and  vigorous  attack,  by  which  the  Spaniards  were  de- 
feated with  a  loss  of  more  than  one  thousand  killed  and 
wounded.  The  total  dispersion  of  the  beaten  troops 
bafBed  pursuit,  and  the  French  in  returning  to  Barcelo- 
na suffered  from  the  fire  of  the  British  squadron,  but 
Eroles  complained  that  Sarsfield  had  kept  away  with  a 
settled  design  to  sacrifice  him. 

While  this  was  passing  in  Lower  Catalonia,  Dacaen 
secured  the  higher  country  about  Clot,  and  then  de- 
scending into  the  valley  of  Vich  defeated  Sarsfield  at 
Centellas,  and  that  general  himself  was  taken,  but  res- 
cued by  one  of  his  soldiers.  From  Centellas,  Dacaea 
marched  by  Caldas  and  Sabadel  upon  Barcelona,  where 
he  arrived  the  27th  January,  meanwhile  Musnier  re-vio- 
tualled  'I'aragona.  'J'hus  the  Catalans  were  again  reduced 
to  great  straits,  for  the  French  knowing  that  they  were 
soon  to  be  reinforced,  occupied  all  the  sea-coast,  made 
new  roads  out  of  reach  of  fire  from  the  ships,  established 
fresh  posts  at  Moncado,  Mattaro,  Palamos,  and  Cadar 
ques,  placed  detachments  in  the  higher  valleys,  and 
obliged  their  enemies  to  resort  once  more  to  an  irregular 
warfare  ;  which  was  however  but  a  feeble  resource,  be- 
cause from  Lacy's  policy  the  people  were  now  generally 
disarmed  and  discontented. 

Milans,  Manso,  liiroles,  Sarsfield  and  Rovira,  indeed, 
although  continually  quarrelling,  kept  the  field  ;  and 
being  still  sup})!ied  with  arms  and  stores  which  the 
British  navy  contrived  to  land,  and  send  into  the  interior, 
sustained  the  war  as  partizans  until  new  combinationa 
were  produced  by  the  eflbrts  of  England  ;  but  Lacy's 
intrigues  and  unpopularity  increased,  a  general  gloom 
prevailed,  and  the  foundations  of  strength  in  the  princi- 
pality were  shaken.  The  patriots  indeed  still  possessed 
the  mountains,  but  the  French  hv-ld  all  the  towns,  all  the 
ports,  and  most  of  the  lines  of  Cdunmniication  ;  and  their 
moveable  columns  without  difficulty  gathered  the  har- 
vests of  the  valleys,  and  chased  the  most  daring  of  the 
partizans.  Meanwhile  Suchet,  seeing  that  Taragona 
was  secure,  renewed  his  operations. 

SIEGE    OF    PENISCO[,A. 

This  fortress,  crowning  the  summit  of  a  lofty  rock  in 
the  sea,  was  nearly  impregnable  ;  and  the  only  comnm- 
nication  with  the  shore,  was  by  a  neck  of  land  sixty 
yards  wide  and  two  hundred  and  fifty  long.  In  the 
middle  of  the  town  there  was  a  strong  ca>stle,  well  fur- 
nished with  guns  and  provisions,  and  some  British  sliif»3 
of  war  were  at  hand  to  aid  the  defence  ;  the  rock  yield- 
ed copious  springs  of  water,  anti  dix'p  marshes  covered 
th'j  approach  to  the  neck  of  land,  which  being  covered 
by  the  waves  in  heavy  gales,  had  also  an  artificial  cut 
defended  by  batteries  and  flunked  by  gun-boats.  Garcia 
Navarro,  who  had  been  taken  during  the  siege  of 
'I'ortoza,  btil  had  escaped  from  Fi'ance,  was  nciw  gov- 
ei-nor  of  Peniscola,  and  his  garrison  was  sulficieutly 
numerous. 


424 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR  WAR. 


[Book  XY 


On  the  20th  cTonnd  was  broken,  and  mortar-batteries 
being  established  twelve  hundred  yards  from  the  fort, 
opened  their  fire  on  the  28th. 

In  the  night  of  the  31st  a  parallel  five  hundred  yards 
long  was  built  of  fascines  and  gabions,  and  batteries  were 
commenced  on  either  flank. 

In  tiie  night  of  the  second  of  February  the  approaches 
■were  pushed  beyond  the  first  parallel,  and  the  oreach- 
ing  batteries  being  finished  and  armed  were  going  to 
open  when  a  privateer  captured  a  dispatch  ti'om  the 
governor,  who  ( omplained  in  it  that  the  English  wish- 
ed to  take  the  command  of  the  place,  and  declared 
hia  resolution  rather  to  surrender  than  suffer  them 
to  do  so.  On  this  hint  Suchet  opened  negotiations 
which  terminated  in  the  capitulation  of  the  fortress, 
the  troops  being  allowed  to  go  where  they  pleased. 
The  French  found  sixty  guns  mounted,  and  the  easy 
reduction  of  such  a  strong  place,  which  secured  their 
line  of  conmiunication,  produced  a  general  disposition 
in  the  Valencians  to  submit  to  fortune.  Such  is  Su- 
chet's  account  of  this  aifair,  but  the  colour  which  he 
thought  it  necessary  to  give  to  a  transaction,  full  of 
shame  and  dishonour,  to  Navarro,  can  only  be  consid- 
ered as  part  of  the  price  paid  for  Peniscola.  The 
tme  causes  of  its  fall  were  treachery  and  cowardice. 
The  garrison  were  from  the  first  desponding  and  divid- 
ed in  opinion,  and  the  British  naval  ollicers  did  but 
stimulate  the  troops  and  general  to  do  their  duty  to  their 
country. 

After  this  capture,  six  thousand  Poles  quitted  Su- 
chet, for  Napoleon  required  all  the  troops  of  that 
nation  for  his  Russian  expedition.  These  veterans 
marched  by  Jaca,  taking  with  them  the  prisoners  of 
Blake's  army,  at  the  same  time  Reille's  two  French 
divisions  were  ordered  to  form  a  separate  cor][is  of  ob- 
Bervation  on  the  Lower  Ebro,  and  Palombini's  Italian 
division  was  sent  towards  Soria  and  Calatayud  to 
oppose  Montijo,  Villa  Campa,  and  Bassecour,  who 
were  still  in  joint  operation  on  that  side.  But  Reille 
soon  marched  towards  Aragon,  and  Severoli's  division 
took  his  place  on  the  Lower  Ebro  ;  for  the  Partidas  of 
Duran,  Empecinado,  and  those  numerous  bands  from 
the  Asturias  and  La  Montana  composing  the  seventh 
ai-my,  harassed  Navarre  and  Aragon  and  were  too  pow- 
erful for  Caifarelli.  ISlina's  also  re-entered  Aragun  in 
January,  surprised  Huesoa,  and  being  attacked  during 
hia  retreat  at  Lumbiar  repulsed  the  enemy  and  cai-ried 
off  his  prisoners. 

Sachet's  field  force  in  Valencia  was  thus  reduced  by 
twenty  thousand  men,  he  had  only  fifteen  thousand  left 
and  consequently  could  not  push  the  invasion  on  the 
«ide  of  Murcia.  The  approaching  departure  of  Napo- 
leon from  Paris  also  altered  the  situation  of  the  French 
armies  in  the  Peninsula.  The  king  was  again  appuinted 
the  emperor's  lieutenant,  and  he  extended  the  right  wing 
of  Suchefs  army  to  Cuent^a,  and  concentrated  the  army 
of  the  centre  at  Madrid  ;  thus  Valencia  was  made,  as  it 
were,  a  mere  head  of  cantoinnents,  in  front  of  which 
fresh  Spanish  armies  soon  assembled,  and  Alicant  then 
became  an  object  of  interest  to  the  English  government. 
Suchet,  who  had  neglected  the  wound  he  received  at  the 
battle  of  Saguntum,  now  full  into  a  dangerous  disorder, 
and  that  fierce  flame  of  war  which  seemed  destined  to 
lick  up  all  the  remains  of  the  Spanish  power,  was  sud- 
deuly  extinguished. 

OBSERVATIONS. 

1.  ITie  events  which  led  to  the  capitulation  of  Valen- 
cia, were  but  a  continuation  of  those  faults  which  had 
before  ruined  the  Spanish  cause  in  every  part  of  the 
I'eninsula,  namely  the  neglect  of  all  the  good  military 
usages,  and  the  mania  for  fighting  great  battles  with  bad 
troops. 
.    2.  Blake  needed  not  to  have  fought  a  serious  action 


during  any  part  of  the  campaign.  He  might  have  sn<5- 
coured  Saguntum  without  a  dangerous  battle,  and 
might  have  retreated  in  safety  behind  the  Guadalaviar  ; 
he  might  have  delended  that  river  without  risking  his 
whole  army,  and  then  have  retreated  bi-hind  the  Xucar. 
He  should  never  have  shut  up  his  army  in  Valencia, 
but  having  .done  so,  he  should  never  have  capitulated. 
Eighteen  thousand  men,  well  c(jnducted,  could  al- 
ways have  broken  through  the  thin  circle  of  invest- 
ment, drawn  by  Suchet,  especially  as  the  Spaniards 
had  the  power  of  oi)erating  on  both  banks  of  the  ri\er. 
But  the  campaign  was  one  huge  error  throughout,  and 
was  pithily  summed  up  in  one  sentence  by  the  duke  of 
Wellington.  Being  accused  by  the  regency  ai,  Cadiz 
of  having  causc^d  the  catastrophe,  by  permitting  the 
army  of  the  north  and  that  of  l*ortugal  to  send  rein- 
forcements to  Suchet,  he  replied  thus — "The  misfor- 
tunes of  Valencia  are  to  be  attributed  to  Blake's  igno- 
rance of  his  profession,  and  to  Mahi's  cowardice  and 
treachery !" 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Operations  in  Andalusia  and  Estreniadnra — Description  of 
tsoult's  position — Events  in  E.streniaduni — Ba];c^lel•os  ar- 
rives at  Algesiras — Advances  to  Ale;da  de  Gazulcs — Is 
driven  back — SouJt  designs  to  besiege  Tarifa — Concludes 
a  convention  with  tlie  emperor  of  Aiorocco — It  is  frustrut- 
ed  by  England — Ballesteros  cooped  up  under  the  guns  of 
Gibralter  by  Seniei6  and  Godiuot — Colonel  Slierrett  sails 
for  Tarifa — Tlie  French  march  against  Tarifa — Are  stopped 
in  tlie  pass  of  La  Pena  by  the  tire  of  tiic  British  slnps — • 
Tliey  retire  from  San  Koque — General  Gotlinot  slioots 
himself — General  Hill  surprises  General  Girard  at  Aroyo 
Molino,  and  returns  to  the  Alemtcjo — French  reinforced 
in  Estremadura — Their  movements  cliecked  by  insubordi- 
nation amongst  the  troops — Hill  again  advances — Endeav- 
ours to  surprise  the  Frencii  at  Merida — Fine  conduct  of 
c-.iptuin  Ncveux — Ilill  marches  to  Almendralcjos  to  tight 
Drouet — Tlie  latter  retires^Phillipoii  sends  a  party  from 
Badajos  to  forage  tlie  banks  of  the  Guadiana — Colonel 
Abercrombie  deieats  a  squadron  of  cavalry  at  Fueiite  del 
Macbtro — Iliil  returns  to  the  Alemti^jo. 

OPERATIONS    IN    ANDALUSIA    AND    ESTREMADURA. 

The  affairs  of  these  provinces  were  so  intimately 
connected,  that  they  cannot  be  treated  separately, 
wherefore,  taking  Soults  position  at  Seville  as  the 
centre  of  a  vast  system,  I  will  show  how,  from  thence, 
he  dealt  his  powerful  blows  around,  and  struggled,  even 
as  a  consuming  fire,  which  none  could  smother  though 
many  tried. 

Seville  the  base  of  his  movements,  and  the  store- 
house of  his  army,  was  fortified  wiLh  temporary  citadels, 
which,  the  people  being  generally  submissive,  were  teiv- 
able  against  desultory  attacks.  From  this  point  he 
maintained  his  line  of  connnunication,  with  the  army  of 
Portugal,  through  Estremadura,  and  with  Madrid 
through  La  Mancha ;  and  from  this  jioint  he  sustained 
the  most  diversified  operations  on  all  parts  of  a  circle, 
which  embraced  the  Condado  de  JS'iebla,  Grenada,  Cor- 
doba, and  h^stremadura. 

The  Xiebla,  which  furnished  large  supplies,  was  the 
most  vulnerable  point,  because  from  thence  the  allies 
might  intercept  the  navigation  of  the  river  tjuadakjuivir, 
and  so  raise  the  blockade  of  Cadiz  ;  and  the  frontier  of 
Portugal  would  cover  the  assembly  of  th(!  troojis  until 
the  moment  of  attack.  Moreover,  expeditions  from  Ca- 
diz to  the  mouth  of  the  Guadiana  were  as  we  have  seen 
frequent.  Nevertheless,  when  Blake  and  Ballesteros 
had  been  driven  from  Ayamonte,  in  July  and  August, 
the  French  were  niiusters  of  the  Condado  with  the  excep- 
tion of  the  castle  of  Paymago,  wherefore  Soult,  dreading 
the  autumnal  pestil(>nce,  did  not  keep  more  than  twelve 
hundred  men  on  that  side. 

The   blockade  of  the  Isla  was  always  maintained 


1811] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR  WAR. 


4215 


by  YictdV.  whose  pos'tion  formed  an  irregular  crescent, 
extending  Crom  Sun  Lucar  de  Barameda,  on  the  right, 
to  Conil  on  the  left,  and  running  through  Xeres, 
Arcos,  .Medina,  Sidoi;ia.  and  Chiclana.  But  that  mar- 
shal while  thus  posted  was  in  a  manner  blockad.  d 
bimselt.  In  the  Isia,  including  the  Anglo-Portuguese 
division,  there  were  never  less  than  sixtdi  thousand 
troops,  who,  having  the  command  of  the  sea,  could  at 
81:7  moment  land  on  the  flanks  of  the  French.  The 
Partidas,  although  neither  numerous  nor  powerful, 
often  impeded  the  intercourse  with  Seville ;  the  Ser- 
ranos  of  the  Ronda  and  the  regular  forces  at  AI- 
geziras  issuing,  as  it  were,  from  the  fortress  of 
Uibraltar,  cut  the  communication  with  Grenada ;  and 
as  Tarifa  was  still  held  by  the  allies,  for  general 
Campbell  would  never  relintiuish  that  important  point, 
the  fresh  supplies  of  cattle,  drawn  from  the  great  plain 
'jailed  the  Campifia  de  Tarifa,  were  straitened.  Mean- 
while the  expeditions  to  Estremadura  and  Murcia, 
the  battles  of  Barosa  and  Albuera,  and  the  rout  of 
Baza,  had  employed  all  the  disposable  part  of  the 
army  of  the  south ;  hence  Victor's  corps,  scarcely 
strong  enough  to  preserve  its  own  forlihed  position, 
could  make  no  progress  in  the  attack  of  the  Isia. 
This  weakness  of  the  French  army  being  well  knov,-n  in 
Cadiz,  the  safety  of  that  city  wivj  no  longer  doubtful,  a 
part  of  the  British  garrison  therefore  joined  lord  ^Vell- 
ington  s  army,  and  Blake  as  we  have  seen  carried  his 
Aibuera  soldiers  (o  Valencia. 

In  Grenada  the  fourth  corps,  which,  after  the  depart- 
uro  of  Sebastiaui,  was  commanded  by  general  Laval, 
ha  1  two  distinct  tasks  to  fuifd.  The  one  to  defend  the 
east^L-'m  frontier  from  the  Murcian  army ;  the  otlier  to 
maintain  the  coast  line,  beyond  the  Alpuxaras,  against 
the  eff  jrts  of  the  Partidas  of  those  mountains,  against 
the  Serranos  of  the  Ronda,  and  against  the  expedition- 
ary armies  from  Cadiz  and  from  Algeziras.  However, 
the  defeat  at  Baza,  and  the  calling  off  of  ]Mahi,  Freire 
and  Montijo  to  aid  the  Valencian  operations,  secured 
;he  Grenadian  frontier  ;  and  Martin  Carera.  who  was 
left  there  with  a  small  forc;^,  having  pushed  his  jjartizan 
excursions  rashly,  was  killed  in  a  skirmish  at  Lorca 
about  the  period  when  Valencia  surrendered. 

Cordoba  was  generally  occupied  by  a  division  of  five 
or  si.x  thousand  men,  who  w-cre  ready  to  operate  on  the 
side  of  Estremadura,  or  on  that  of  Murcia,  and  mean- 
while chased  the  Partidas,  who  were  more  numerous 
there  than  in  other  parts,  and  were  also  connected  with 
those  of  La  Maucha. 

Estremadura  was  the  most  difficult  field  of  operation. 
There  Badajos,  an  advanced  point,  was  to  be  supplied 
ami  defended  from  the  most  formidable  army  in  the  Pe- 
niiLsula ;  there  the  communications  with  Madrid,  and 
with  the  army  of  Purtugal,  were  to  be  maintained  by  the 
way  of  'J'ruxiilo  ;  and  there  the  lifth  French  corps,  com- 
manded by  Drouet,  had  to  collect  its  subsistence  from  a 
ravaged  country ;  to  preserve  its  communications  over 
the  Sierra  .\Iorena  with  Seville  ;  to  protect  the  march  of 
monthly  convoys  to  Badajos;  to  observe  the  corps  of 
general  Hill,  and  to  opposi;  the  enterprises  of  2ilorillo's 
Spanish  army,  which  wtus  becoming  numerous  and  bold. 

Neither  the  Spanish  nor  British  divisions  could  pre- 
vent Drouet  from  sending  convoys  to  Badajos,  because 
of  the  want  of  bridges  on  the  Guadiana,  below  the  for- 
tress, but  Morillo  incommoded  his  foraging  parties;  for 
being  posted  at  Valencia  de  Alcantara,  and  having  his 
retreat  upon  Portugal  always  secure,  he  vexed  the  coun- 
try about  Caceres,  and  even  jiushed  his  incursions  to 
Truxillo.  The  French  general,  therefore,  kept  a  strong 
detachment  beyond  the  Guadiana,  but  this  exposed  his 
troops  to  Hill's  enterprises;  and  that  bold  and  vigilant 
commander  having  ten  thousand  excellent  troops,  and 
being  well  instructed  by  Wellington,  was  a  very  dan- 
gcrou-s  neighbour. 

Marmout's  position  iu  the  vallcv  of  the  Tagus ;  the 


construction  of  the  forts  and  bridge  at  Almaraz,  whieh 
enabled  him  to  keep  a  divisi(ni  at  'I'ruxillo,  and  conni;ct- 
ed  him  with  the  army  of  the  south,  tended  indeed  to 
hold  Hill  in  check,  and  strengthened  the  French  posi- 
tion in  Estren)adura ;  nevertheless,  Drouet  genoially 
remained  near  Zafra  with  his  main  body,  because  from 
thence  he  could  more  easily  make  his  rct'ieat  good  to  the 
Morena,  or  advance  to  i\lerida  and  Badajos  as  occasion 
required. 

Such  was  the  state  of  military  affairs  on  the  different 
parts  of  the  circle  round  Seville,  at  the  period  when 
Suchet  invaded  Valencia,  and  Wellington  blockaded 
Ciudad  Rodrigo ;  and  to  support  his  extensive  opera- 
tions, the  duke  of  Dalmatia,  if  his  share  of  the  reinforce- 
ments which  entered  Spain  in  July  and  August  had 
ji lined  him,  would  have  had  about  a  hundred  thou- 
sand troops,  of  which  ninety  thousand  men  and  four- 
teen thousand  horses  were  French.  But  the  reinforce- 
ments were  detained  in  the  different  gov(>rnments,  and 
the  actual  ftumber  of  French  present  with  the  eagles 
was  not  more  than  sixty-seven  thousand. 

The  first  corps  contained  twenty  thousand  ;  the 
fourth  and  fifth  about  eleven  thousand  each  :  the  garri- 
son of  Badajos  was  five  thousand  ;  twenty  thousand 
formed  a  disposable  reserve,  and  the  rest  of  <he  force 
consisted  of  "  Escopeteros  "  and  civic  guards,  wJio  were 
chiefly  employed  in  the  garrisons  and  police.  Upon 
pressing  occasions  Soult  could  therefore  take  the  field  at 
any  point,  with  tvventy-fonr  or  twenty-five  thousand  men, 
and  in  Estremadura,  on  very  pressing  occasions,  with 
even  a  greater  number  of  excellent  troops  well  and 
powerfully  organized.  The  manner  in  which  this  great 
ai-my  was  paralysed  in  the  latter  part  of  1811,  shall  uow 
he  shown. 

In  October  Drouet  was  in  the  Morena,  and  Girard  at 
Merida,  watching  Morillo,  who  was  in  Caceres,  when 
Soult,  who  had  just  returned  to  Seville  after  his  Murcian 
expedition,  sent  three  thousand  men  to  Fregenal,  seem- 
ingly to  menace  the  Alemttjo.  General  Hill  therefore 
recalled  his  brigades  from  the  right  bank  of  the  Tagus, 
and  concentrated  his  whole  corps  behind  the  Campo 
Maior  on  tbe  Uth. 

The  11th  Girard  and  Drouet  advanced,  the  Span- 
ish cavalry  retired  from  Caceres,  the  French  drove  Mo- 
rillo to  Caza  de  Cantellana,  and  everything  indicated  a 
serious  attack  ;  but  at  this  moment  Soult's  attention 
was  attracted  by  the  appearance  of  Ballcstercs  in  the 
Ronda,  and  he  recalled  the  force  from  Fregenal.  Drou- 
et, who  had  reached  iSIerida,  then  retired  to  Zafra, 
leaving  Girard  with  a  division  and  some  cavalry  near 
Caceres. 

Ballesteros  had  disembarked  at  Algeziras  on  the  11th 
of  September,  and  immediately  marched  with  his  own 
and  Beguine's  troops,  in  all  four  thousand  men,  to  Xi- 
mena,  raising  fresh  levies  and  collecting  the  Serranos  of 
the  Ronda  as  he  advanced.  On  the  18th  he  had  endeav- 
oured to  succour  the  castle  of  Alcala  de  Gazules.  where 
Beguines  had  a  garrison,  but  a  French  detachment  from 
(Chiclana  had  already  reduced  that  post,  and  after  some 
skirmishing  both  sides  fell  back,  the  one  to  Chiclana,  the 
other  to  Ximena. 

At  this  time  six  thousand  French  were  collected  at 
Ubrique,  intending  to  occupy  the  sea-coast,  from  Alg:e- 
ziras  to  Conil,  in  furtherance  of  a  great  project  which 
Soult  was  then  meditating,  and  by  which  he  hoped  to 
effect,  not  only  the  entire"  subjection  of  Andalusia,  but 
the  destruction  of  the  British  power  in  the  Peninsula. 
But  this  design,  which  shall  hereafter  be  explained 
more  fully,  required  several  preliminary  operations, 
amongst  the  most  important  of  whii  h  was  the  cajrture 
of  Tarifa,  for  that  place,  situated  in  the  narrowest  part 
of  the  straits,  furnished  either  a  protection,  or  a  danger- 
ous point  of  offence,  to  the  Mediterranean  trade,  fol- 
lowing the  relations  of  its  possessor  with  England.  It 
affected,  as  we   have  seen,  the  supplies  of  the  French 


426 


NAP.'^.S'S    PENINSULAR  WAR. 


[Book  XV. 


before  the  Isla;  it  was  from  its  nearness,  and  frcni  the 
run  of  the  cm-rent,  tlie  most  convenient  and  cudtomary 
point,  for  iratlin<r  willi  jM(jrocco  ;  it  menaced  the  secu- 
rity of  Ceuta.  and  it  in)sse.Nsed,  from  ancient  recollections, 
a  species  of  feudal  superiority  over  the  smaller  towns 
and  ports  aloiii;'  the  coast,  which  would  have  given  the 
French,  if  they  hail  taken  it,  a  moral  iutluence  of  some 
conseiiuence. 

Soult  iiad  in  August  despatched  a  confidential  oflicer 
^  from  Conil  to  ihe  African  coast  to  negotiate  with  the 
•  Barbaric  emperor,  and  the  latter  had  ag'rced  to  a  con- 
vention, by  which  he  en^'aged  to  exclude  British  agents 
from  his  court ;  and  to  permit  vessels  of  all  nations  to 
use  the  Monrish  Hag  to  cover  their  cargoes  while  carry- 
ing to  the  French  those  supplies  hillicrto  sent  to  the 
allies,  provided  .Soult  wo.ild  occupy  Taritii  as  a  depot. 
Tais  impjrlant  convention  was  on  the  point  of  being 
raiitied,  when  the  opportune  arrival  of  some  unusually 
m.ignificeut  presents  from  England,  turned  the  scale 
against  the  French :  their  agent  was  then  dismissed,  the 
lOngiish  supplies  were  increased,  and  Mr.  Stuart  entered 
into  a  treaty  for  tiie  purchase  ox  horses  to  remount  the 
allied  cavalry. 

Although  foiled  in  this  attempt,  Soult,  calculating 
on  the  cajiricious  nature  of  barbarians,  resolved  to  fuUil 
his  part  by  the  capture  of  Tarila ;  hence  it  was,  that 
when  Ballesteros  appeared  at  Ximena,  he  arrested  the 
movement  of  Drouet  against  the  Alemtejo,  and  sent 
trviops  Irom  Seville  by  Ubrique  against  the  Spanish  gen- 
eral, whose  position  besides  being  extremely  inconvenient 
to  the  iirst  and  fuurlh  corps,  was  likely  to  affect  the 
taking  of  Tarifa.  Ballesterus,  if  reinforced,  might  also 
have  become  very  dangerous  to  the  blockade  of  Cadiz, 
by  intercepting  the  supplies  from  the  Campina  de 
Tarifa,  and  stiil  more  by  menacing  Victor's  comnnmica- 
tions  with  Seville,  along  the  Guadalquivir.  A  demon- 
etration  by  the  allies  in  the  Isla  de  Leon  arrested  the 
march  of  these  French  troops  for  a  moment,  but  on 
the  14:th  eight  thousand  men  under  generals  Godinot 
and  Semele  advanced  upon  St.  Roque  and  Algeziras. 
The  inhabitants  of  those  places  immediately  fled  to  the 
green  island,  and  Ballesteros  took  rei'uge  under  Gibral- 
tar, where  his  flanks  were  covered  by  the  gun-boats  of 
the  place.  The  garrison  was  too  weak  to  assist  him  w'ith 
men,  and  thus  cooped  up,  he  lived  »upon  the  resources 
of  the  i)iace,  while  eiforls  were  therefore  made  to  draw 
otf  the  French  by  harassing  their  ilanlcs.  'J'he  naval 
means  were  not  sufficient  to  remove  his  whole  army 
to  another  quarter,  but  seven  hundred  were  transported 
to  Manilba,  where  the  Serranos  and  some  Partidas  had 
assembled  on  the  left  of  the  French,  and  at  the  same  time 
twelve  hundred  British  troops  with  four  guns  under  colo- 
nel Skeirelt,  and  two  thousand  Spaniards,  tinder  Co- 
pons,  sailed  Irum  Cadiz  to  'I  arifa  to  act  upon  the  French 
right. 

Copons  was  driven  back  by  a  gale  of  wind,  but 
Skerrett  arrived  the  ITth.  The  next  day  Godinot  sent 
a  detachment  against  him,  but  the  sea-road  by  wliich 
it  marched  was  so  swept  with  the  guns  of  thci'l'uscan 
frigate,  aided  by  the  boats  of  the  Stately,  that  the 
French  after  losing  some  men  returned.  Then  (iodinot 
and  Semele  l)eing  in  dispute,  and  without  provisions,  riv 
treated  ;  they  were  followed  by  Ballesteros'  cavalry  as 
far  a.s  Ximena,  where  the  two  generals  f;e[)arated  in 
great  ange.i-,  and  (Jodinot  having  reached  Seville  shot 
himself.  This  failure  in  the  south  unsettled  Soult's 
plans,  and  was  followed  by  a  heavier  disaster  in  Estre- 
madura. 

SURPRISE    OP    AROYO    MOI-INO. 

When  Drouet  liad  retired  to  Zufra,  Hill  received 
or'"1ei'a  from  Wellington  to  drive  (iirard  away  from 
(Jaceres.  that  Morillo  mi^ht  forage  that  country.  For 
tliis  purpose  he  assembled  his  corps  at  Al))u<|ucr(|ue  on 
the  2Jd.  and  Morillo  bixiught  the  lifth  Spanish  army  to 


I  AHseda  on  the  Salor.  Girard  wis  then  at  Caceres 
I  with  an  advanced  guard  at  Aroyo  de  Puerco,  but  on  the 
j  24:th  liiil  occupied  Aliseda  and  Casa  de  Cantillana, 
j  and  the  Spanish  cavalry  drove  the  French  from  Aroyo 
I  de  Puerco.  The  2Gtli  at  day-break  Hill  entered  Mai- 
i  partida  de  Cacercs,  and  his  cavalry  ])uslKd  hack  that 
I  of  the  enenjy.  Girard  then  abandoned  Caceres,  but 
I  the  weather  was  wet  and  stormy,  and  Hill,  having  no 
certain  knowledge  of  the  enemy's  movements,  haltc^i  for 
the  night  at  Alalpartida. 

On  the  morning  of  the  27th  the  Spaniards  entered 
Caceres;  the  enemy  was  tracked  to  'I'orre  Mocha  on 
the  road  to  Merida ;  and  the  British  general,  hoping  to 
intercept  their  line  of  march,  pui-sued  by  a  cross  road, 
through  Aldea  de  Cano  and  Casa  de  Don  Antonio. 
During  this  movement  intelligence  was  received  that 
the  French  general  had  halted  at  Aroyo  Molino,  leaving 
a  rear-guard  at  Albala,  on  the  main  road  to  Caceres, 
which  proved  that  he  was  ignorant  of  the  new  direction 
taken  by  the  allies,  and  only  looked  to  a  pursuit  from 
Caceres.  Hill  innnediately  seized  the  advantage,  and 
by  a  forced  march  reached  Alcuesca  in  the  night,  being 
then  within  a  league  of  Aroyo  de  Molinos. 

This  village  was  situated  in  a  plain,  and  behind  it  a 
sierra  or  ridge  of  rocks,  rose  in  the  form  of  a  crescent, 
about  two  miles  wide  on  the  chord.  One  road  led 
directly  from  Alcuesca  upon  Aroyo,  another  entered  it 
from  the  leit,  and  three  led  from  it  to  the  right.  'J'he 
most  distant  of  the  last  was  the  Truxillo  road,  which 
rounded  the  extremity  of  the  sierra ;  the  nearest  was 
the  Merida  road,  and  between  them  was  that  of  Me- 
dellin. 

During  the  night,  though  the  weather  was  dreadful, 
no  fires  were  permitted  in  the  allied  camp ;  and  at  two 
o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  28th,  the  troops  moved 
to  a  low  ridge,  half  a  mile  from  Aroyo,  under  cover  of 
which  they  formed  three  bodies  ;  the  infantry  on  the 
wings  and  the  cavalry  in  the  centre.  The  leit  column 
then  marched  straight  upon  the  village,  the  right  march- 
ed towards  the  extreme  jjoint  of  the  sicri'a,  where  the 
rviad  to  'J'ruxillo  turned  the  horn  of  the  crescent ;  the 
cavalry  kept  its  due  ])lace  between  both. 

One  brigade  of  Girard 's  division,  having  marched  at 
four  o'clock  by  the  road  of  Medeilin,  was  already  safe, 
but  Dombrouskis  brigade  and  the  cavalry  of  Briche 
were  still  in  the  place;  the  horses  of  the  rear-guard, 
unbridled,  were  tied  to  the  olive-trees,  and  the  infantry 
were  only  gathering  to  form  on  the  Medeilin  road  out- 
side the  village.  Girard  himself  was  in  his  quailers, 
waiting  for  his  horse,  when  two  British  officers  gal- 
loped down  the  street,  and  in  an  instant  all  was  confu- 
sion ;  the  cavalry  bridled  their  horses,  and  the  infantry 
ran  to  their  alarming  posts.  But  a'thick  mist  rolled 
down  the  craggy  mountain,  a  terrifying  shout,  drown- 
ing even  the  clatter  of  the  elements,  arose  on  the  blast, 
and  with  the  driving  storm  came  the  seventy-Iirst  and 
ninety-second  regiments,  charging  down  the  street. 
'I'hen  the  French  rear-guard  of  cav;jlry,  fighting  and 
struggling  hard,  were  driven  to  the  end  of  the  village, 
and  the  infantry,  hastily  forming  their  s(|uares,  covered 
the  main  body  of  the  horsemen  which  gathered  on  their 
left. 

'I'he  seventy-first  immediately  lined  the  garden-walls, 
and  opened  a  galling  fire  on  the  nearest  j'Uiare,  wdiile 
the  ninety-second  filing  out  of  the  streets  foinied  upon 
the  French  right;  the  fiftieth  regiment  closely  follow- 
ing, secured  the  prisoners  in  the  village,  and  the  rest 
of  th(i  column,  headed  by  the  Spani.sh  cavalry,  skirted 
the  outside  of  the  houses,  and  endeavoured  to  intercept 
the  line  of  retreat.  The  guns  .soon  o])ened  on  the 
French  stpiares,  the  thirteenth  dragoons  captured  their 
artillery,  the  ninth  drag(){>ns  and  German  hus,^ar3 
charged  their  cavalry  and  entirely  dijpersed  it  with 
great  loss;  but  (Jirard,  an  intre]nd  oUici-r,  although 
wounded,  still  kept  his  uifantry  togethe'.',  and  coutiuued 


1811.1 


NAPIER'S    PEXIXSULAR  WAR. 


427 


his  retreat  by  the  Truxillo  road.  The  right  colanin  of 
the  allies  was  however  ahvady  in  posaeasion  of  that  line, 
the  eavalry  and  artillery  were  close  upon  the  French 
flank,  and  the  left  column,  having-  re-formed,  was  again 
coming  up  fast ;  Girard's  men  were  falling  by  litties, 
and  his  situation  was  desperate,  yet  he  would  not  sur- 
'•endor,  but  giving  the  word  to  disperse,  endeavoured  to 
escape  by  scaling  tlie  almost  inaccessible  rocks  of  the 
sierra.  Mis  ])ursuers,  not  less  obstinate,  innnediately 
divide(L  The  Spaniards  ascended  the;  hil's  at  an  easier 
part  beyond  his  left,  the  thirty-ninth  regiment  and 
Asliworih's  Portuguese  turned  the  mountain  by  the 
Truxillo  road  ;  the  twenty-eighth  and  thirty-fourth,  led 
by  general  Howard,  followed  him  step  by  step  up  the 
rocks,  and  prisoners  w-ere  taken  every  moment,  until  the 
pursuers,  heavily  loaded,  were  unable  to  continue  the 
trial  of  sp'^ed  with  men  who  had  thrown  away  their 
arms  and  i)acks.  Girard,  Dombrouski,  and  13riche, 
escaped  at  first  to  San  Hernando,  and  Zurita,  in  the 
(;fuadalupe  mountains,  after  Avhieh,  crossing  the  Guadi- 
ana  at  Oreliano  on  the  9th  of  November,  they  rejoined 
Drouet  with  about  six  hundred  men,  the  remains  of  three 
thousand.  They  were  said  to  be  the  finest  troops  then 
in  Spain,  and  indeed  their  resolution  not  to  surrender  in 
such  an  appalling  situation  was  no  mean  proof  of  their 
excellence. 

The  trophies  of  this  action  were  the  capture  of  twelve 
or  thirteen  hundred  prisoners,  including  general  P>ron, 
and  the  prince  of  Aremberg  ;  all  the  French  artillery, 
baggage,  and  commissariat,  together  with  a  contribu- 
tion just  rai.sed ;  and  during  the  fight,  a  Portuguese 
brigade,  being  united  to  Penne  Villamur's  cavalry  was 
sent  to  i\Ierida,  where  some  stores  were  found.  The 
loss  of  the  allies  was  not  more  than  seventy  killed  and 
wounded,  but  one  officer,  lieutenant  Strenowitz,  was 
taken.  He  was  distinguished  by  his  courage  and  suc- 
cessful enterprises,  but  he  was  an  Austrian,  who  having 
abandoned  the  French  army  in  Spain  to  join  Julian 
Sanchez'  Partida,  was  liable  to  death  by  the  laws  of 
war  ;  having  been  however  originally  forced  into  the 
French  service  he  was,  in  reality,  no  deserter.  General 
Hill,  anxious  to  save  him,  applied  frankly  to  general 
Drouet,  and  such  was  the  latter "s  good  temper,  that 
while  smarting  under  this  disaster  he  released  his  pris- 
oner. 

Girard  was  only  deprived  of  his  division,  which  was 
given  to  general  Barois,  y^t  in  a  military  point  of  view 
his  offence  was  unpardonable.  He  knew  two  or  three 
days  beioro,  that  general  Hill  was  near  him  ;  he  knew 
that  there  was  a  good  road  from  Mai]iartida  to  Alcuesca, 
because  he  hi.d  himself  passed  it  ccniing  from  Caceres  ; 
and  yet  he  halted  at  Aroyo  de  Molino  without  nec('ssity, 
and  without  sending  out  even  a  patrol  upon  his  flank, 
thus  sacriiicing  two  thousand  brave  men.  Napoleon's 
clemeiicy  was  therefore  great,  and  yet  not  misplaced,  for 
Gn-ard,  afterwards,  repaid  it  by  his  devotion  at  the 
battle  of  Lutzcn  when  the  emperor's  star  was  on  the 
wane.  On  the  other  hand  general  Hill  neglected  no 
pi'eeaution,  kit  no  advantage  escape  :  and  to  good  ar- 
rangements added  celerity  of  movement,  with  the  utmost 
liniiness  and  vig(nir  of  execution.  His  troops  seconded 
him  as  he  merited  ;  and  here  was  made  manifest  the 
advantage  of  possessing  the  friendship  of  a  people  so 
strongly  iiiHueaced  by  the  instincts  of  revenge  as  the 
Peninsulars  ;  for,  during  the  night  of  the  27th,  every 
Spaniai'd  in  Aroyo,  as  well  as  in  Alcuesca,  knew  that 
the  allies  were  at  hand,  and  not  one  was  found  so  base  or 
80  indiscreet  as  to  betray  the  fact. 

This  blow  being  struck,  Hill  returned  to  his  old 
quarters,  ;ind  the  Spanish  troops  fell  back  behind  the 
Salor,  but  the  report  of  (Tiraril's  disaster  set  all  tne 
l''rench  corps  in  motit.ii.  Drouet  nvoccupied  C'aceres 
with  a  thousand  men  ;  Foy  passed  the  Tagus  at  Alma- 
rez  on  the  lf)th  of  November,  and  moved  to  Truxillo; 
a  convoy  entered  Badajos  from  Zalra  on  the  l".^th,  a| 


I  second  on  the  20th,  and  Sonlt,  while  collecting  troops 
;  in  Seville,  directed  Phillipon  to  plant  all  the   ground 
under  the   guns  at   Badajos  with  potatoes  and   corn. 
Every  thing  s(!emed  to  iiulicate  a  powerful  attack  upon 
I  Hill,  when   a  serious   disturbance   among   the    Polish 
troops,  at  Ron(|uillo,  obliged  Soult  to  detach  men  from 
;  Seville  to  quell  it.     When  ihat  was  effected,  a  division 
i  of    four    thousand    entered    Est  rem-  dura,   and    Drouet, 
j  whose  corps  was  thus  rai.sed  to  fourteen  thousand  infant- 
I  ry  and  three  thousand  cavalry,  on  the  fifth  of  December 
;  advanced  to  Almendralejos,  and  the  18th  hit;  advanced 
!  guard  occupied  Merida.*     At  the  samo  time  Mainiont 
I  coneentrateil  part  of  liis  army  at  Toledo,  from  whence 
i  Montbrun,  as  we  have  seen,  was  directed  to  aul  Suchet 
'  at  Valencia,  and   Soult  with  the  same  view  sent  lea 
I  thousand  men  to  the  Desjienos  Peros. 
I      Drouet's  movements  were,  however,  again  stopped  by 
I  some  insuljordination  in  the  lif'th  corps.     And  as  it  was 
now  known  that  Soult's  principal  object  was  to  destroy 
1  Ballestenis,  and  take  'I'arifa,  Hill  again  advanced,  partly 
i  to   protect   Morillo   from    Drouet,  partly   to   save   the 
!  resources  of  Estreniadura,  jiartly  to  make  a  diversion  in 
I  favour  of  Ballesteros  and  Tarifa,  and  in  sonie  sort  also 
I  for  Valencia.     With  this  view  he  entered  Estreniadura 
!  by  Albuquerque  on  the  27th  of  December,  and  having 
[  received  information  that  the  French,  untaught  by  their 
former  misfortunes  were  not  vigilant,  he  made  a  forced 
j  march   in   liopes   to   surprise   them.     On   the  28th  he 
I  passed  Villar  del  Rey  and  San  Vincente  and  reached 
j  Nava  de  Membrillos,  wdiere  he  fell  in  with  three  hun- 
I  dred    French   infantry,  and   a   few   hussars,  part  of  a 
I  foraging  party,  the  remainder  of  wdiich  was  at  a  village 
j  two   leagues  distant.     A   patrole  gave  an  alarm,  the 
j  French  retreated  towards  Merida,  and  were  closely  fol- 
lowed by  four  hundred  of  the  allied  cavalry,  who  had 
orders  to  make  every  effort  to  stop  their  march  ;  but  to 
use  the  words  of  general  Hill,  ••  the  intrepid   and  ad- 
mirable  manner   in   which    the  enemy  retreated,   the 
infantry  formed  in  square,  and  favoured  as  he  was  by 
the  nature  of  the  country  of  which  he  knew  how  to  take 
the  fullest  advantage,  prevented  the  cavalry  alone  from 
elfecting  any  thing  against  him."     Captain  Neveux,  the 
able  oiiicer  wdio  commanded  on  this  occasion,  reached 
Merida   with   a   loss   of  only   forty  men,  all   killed  or 
wounded  by  the  fire  of  the  artillery  ;  but  the  French  at 
-Merida  immediately  abandoned  their  unfinished  works, 
and  evacuated  that  town  in  the  night,  leaving  behind 
some  bread  and  a  (juautity  of  wdieat. 

From  Merida,  Hill  intending  to  fight  Drouet,  marched 
on  the  1st  of  January  to  Almendralejos,  where  he  cap- 
tured another  field  store  ;  but  the  French  general,  whose 
troops  were  scattered,  fell  back  towards  Zaira ;  the 
weather  was  so  bad,  and  the  roads  so  deep,  that  general 
Hill  with  the  main  body  halted  while  colonel  Abercrom- 
bie  with  a  detachment  of  Portuguese  and  German 
cavalry  followed  the  enemy's  rear-guard.  Meanwhile 
Phillipon,  who  never  lost  an  advantage,  sent,  either  the 
detachment  wdiich  had  escorted  the  convoy  to  Badajos, 
or  some  Polish  troops  with  whom  he  was  discontented, 
down  the  Portuguese  frontier  on  the  right  of  the  (jua- 
diana,  by  Moura,  Mourao,  and  Serpe,  with  orders  to 
drive  the  herds  of  cattle  from  those  places  into  the  Sierra 
Morena. 

Abercrombie  reached  Fuente  del  Maestro,  on  the 
evening  of  the  M,  where,  meeting  with  a  stout  scjuad- 
ron  of  the  enemy,  a  stiff'  charge  took  place,  and  the 
French  out-numbered  aiid  flanked  on  both  sides  were 
t)V(!rthrown  with  a  loss  of  thirty  men.  But  Drouet  was 
now  in  full  retreat  for  Monaslerio,  and  Morillo,  moving 
upon  Medellin,  took  post  at  San  Benito.  'J'hus  the 
allies  remained  masters  of  Estreniadura  until  the  Eith 
(jf  Januarv,  wlmi  Mannonfs  divisiens  moved  by  the 
valley  of  the  Tagus   towards   the  eastern    frontier   of 

*  Mr.  Stuart's  Papers,  MSS. 


428 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR  WAR. 


[Book  XV. 


Portugal ;  Tlill  llion  rctiinKid  to  Portale.i^e  and  sent  a 
division  over  the  Tu^us  to  Castollo  IJranco.  Droiict 
immediately  returned  to  Llereiia  iuid  his  eavalry  sup- 
ported by  a  delachiiient  of  inliuitry  marched  against 
Morillo,  but  (hat  .t>vt:eral,  instead  of  t'a'Hnu'  back  wliea 
Hill  did,  li:id  made  a  sadden  incursion  to  L;i  Maneha, 
and  \v:uj  then  attacking  the  castle  of  Almagro.  There, 
however,  he  was  so  ci-*m;)l( te!y  deflated  i)y  general 
Treillard  that,  flying  to  llorcajo  in  the  Guadaloupe 
mountains,  althouuh  he  reached  it  on  tiie  IBth,  his 
fugitives  were  still  coming  in  on  tlie  21st,  and  his 
army  remained  for  a  long  time  in  the  greatest  dis- 
order. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Soult  resolves  to  besiege  Tarita — Ijiillesteros  is  driven  asec- 
ciiil  lime  under  tiie  ^i'lins  (if  Gibraltur — Laval  invests  Tu- 
rifa — Sietre  of  Tariff — The  assault  repuUed — Siege  is 
raiseil — The  true  liistury  of  this  siege  exposed — Colonel 
Skerrctt  not  the  autiior  of  the  success. 

"While  the  events,  recorded  in  the  foregoing  chap- 
ter, were  p:issing  in  p]stremadura,  the  south  of  Anda- 
lusia was  the  scene  of  more  important  operations. 
Soult,  })ersisting  in  his  design  against  Tarifa,  had  given 
orders  to  assemble  a  battering  train,  and  directed 
general  Laval  with  a  strong  division  of  the  4th  corps 
tx)  move  from  Antecjud'a  upon  San  Roque.  Skerrett 
was  then  menacing  tiic  communications  of  g(nieral 
Semele  on  the  side  of  Vejer  de  Frontera,  and  Balles- 
teros  had  obtained  some  success  against  that  general 
at  Bornos  on  the  oth  of  November  ;  but  Skerrett  find- 
ing that  Copons  instead  of  four  thousand  had  only 
brought  seven  hundred  men,  returned  to  Tarifa  on  the 
approach  of  some  Frencli  from  Conil. 

S^mole,  being  thus  reinforced,  obliged  Ballesteros,  on 
the  27th,  again  to  take  refuge  undei-  the  walls  of  (jJibral- 
tar,  which  ho  reached  just  in  time  to  avoid  a  collision 
witii  Lival's  colunni  from  Antequera.  Semele's  troops 
did  not  fallow  very  close,  and  a  combined  attack  upon 
Laval  by  the  divisions  of  Baliesleros,  vSkerrett,  and  Co- 
pons, was  [)rojected.  The  two  latter  witli  a  part  of  the 
troi)ps  under  Ballesteros,  were  actually  eml)arked  on  the 
29th  of  November  for  iha  i)urpose  of  iandmg  at  Manil- 
ba,  in  pursuance  of  this  scliemc,  when  Semele's  column 
came  in  sight,  and  Slvcrrett  and  (Jopons  instantly  returned 
to  Tarifa. 

Ballesteros  remained  at  (jil)ral(ar,  a  heavy  burthen 
upon  that  fortress,  and  his  own  trooj)s  withi/ut  shelUrr 
from  the  winter  rain,  whe.efore  general  Campbell  pro- 
posed to  send  them,  in  British  vess;ds,  to  renew  the 
attempt  agaiiist  Malaga,  which  had  formerly  failed 
under  Lord  HIayney.  On  tiie  12t,h  of  January,  at  the 
very  moment  of  embarking,  the  French  retired  from 
before  Gibraitai",  by  the  Puert(j  de  Oj-ii,  a  grand  pass 
connecting  the  plains  of  Cibraitar  and  the  vall(;ys  of 
tlie  Guadaranipie,  with  the  great  and  rich  plain  called 
the  Canipina  de  Tariia  ;  and  with  the  gorge  of  Los  I'e- 
dragosos,  which  is  the  eastern  entrance  to  the  i)astures 
called  the  Vega  de  Tarifa.  Tiiis  movement  was 
preparatory  to  the  siege  of  Tarifa ;  and  as  the  batt<.'r- 
ing  train  was  already  within  live  leagues  of  that  place, 
Skerrett  proposed  to  seize  it  by  a  cond)ined  operation 
from  Cadiz.  Tarifa,  Gibraltar,  and  L'  s  Barios,  where 
Ballesteros  had  now  taken  post.  This  cond)ination 
was  however  on  too  widj  a  scale  to  be  adopted  in  all 
its  parts ;  Ballesteros  indeed  li'll  on  the  enemy  by 
surprise  at  the  pass  of  OJen.  and  Skerrett  and  Coyjons 
received  ord-rs  from  general  Campbell  to  take  advan- 
tiinge  of  this  diversion  ;  but  the  lormer,  seeing  that  his 
own  plan  waji  not  adopted  to  its  full  e.\tent,  would  not 
Btir,  and  the  Spaniards  after  a  skirmish  of  si.x  hours 
retired.  1/ival  then  left  fifteen  hundred  men  to  ob- 
servtt  Ballesteros,  and  placing  a  detachment  ut  Vejca 


to  cover  his  right  flank,  threaded  Los  Pedragosos  and 
advanced  against  Tarifa. 

This  town  was  scarcely  expected  by  the  French  to 
make  any  resistance.  It  was  encircled  with  towers, 
which  weie  connected  by  an  ancient  archery  wall, 
irregular  in  form  without  a  ditch,  and  so  thin  as  to 
offer  no  resistance  even  to  field  artillery.  I'o  the 
north  and  east,  some  high  ridges  flanked,  and  seemtn] 
entirely  to  c(mimand  the  weak  ramp'art ;  but  th(i 
English  engineer  had  observed  that  the  nearest  ridgv:^ 
forhied,  at  half  jiistol-shot,  a  natural  glacis,  the  plane 
of  which,  one  point  e.xcejited,  intersected  the  crest 
of  the  parapet  with  great  nicety ;  and  to  this  advan- 
tiige  was  added  a  greater  number  of  to\vcrs,  better 
flanks,  and  more  powerful  resoui'ces  for  an  interior 
defence.  He  judged  therefore  that  the  seemingly 
favourable  nature  of  the  ridges  combined  with  other 
circumstances,  would  scarcely  lidl  to  tempt  the  enemy 
to  commence  their  trenches  on  that  side.  With  a 
view  to  render  the  delusion  unavoidable,  he  strength- 
ened the  western  front  of  the  place,  rendered  the 
access  to  it  uneasy,  by  demcjlishiiig  the  main  walls  and 
removing  the  flooring  of  an  isolated  suburb  on  the 
north  west ;  and  an  out-work,  of  a  convent  which 
was  situated  about  a  hundred  yards  from  that  place, 
and  to  the  east  of  the  suburb.  This  done,  he  yirepared 
an  internal  defence,  which  rendered  the  storming  of  the 
breach  the  smallest  difficulty  to  be  encountered  ;  but 
to  appreciate  his  design  the  local  peculiarities  must  be 
described. 

Taril'a  was  cloven  in  two  by  the  bed  of  a  periodical 
torrent  which  entering  at  the  east,  passed  out  at  the 
opposite  point.  This  stream  was  barred,  at  its  entrance, 
by  a  tower  with  a  portcullis,  in  front  of  which  palisades 
were  jjlanted  across  the  bed  of  the  water.  The  houses 
within  the  walls  were  strongly  built  and  occupied 
inclined  planes  rising  from  each  side  of  the  torrent,  and 
at  the  exit  of  the  latter  there  were  two  massive  struc- 
tures, forming  part  of  the  walls  called  the  tower  and 
castle  of  the  Gusmans,  both  of  which  looked  up  the 
hollow  formed  by  the  meeting  of  the  inclined  planes  at 
the  stream.  From  these  structures,  first  a  sandy  neck 
of  land,  and  then  a  causeway,  the  whole  being  about 
six  hundred  yards  long,  joined  the  town  to  an  island,  or 
rather  promontory,  about  two  thousand  yards  in  circum- 
ference, Avith  perpendicular  sides,  which  forbade  any 
entrance  save  by  the  causeway  ;  and  at  the  island  end 
of  the  latter  there  was  an  unfinished  entrenchment  and 
battery. 

On  the  connecting  neck  of  land  were  some  sand 
hills,  the  highest  of  which,  called  the  Catalina,  was 
seaqied  and  crowned  with  a  slight  field  work,  con- 
taining a  twelve -pounder.  This  hill  covered  the 
causeway,  and  in  conjunction  with  the  tower  of  the 
Gusmans,  which  was  armed  with  a  ship  eighteen- 
poundcr,  flanked  tlie  western  front,  and  commanded 
all  the  ground  between  the  walls  and  the  island.  The 
gun  in  the  tower  of  the  (iusmans  also  shot  clear  over 
the  town  on  to  the  slope  where  the  French  batteries 
were  expected  to  be  raised  ;  and  in  addition  to  these 
posts,  the  Stately  ship  of  the  line,  the  Druid  frigate, 
and  several  gun  and  mortar-beats  were  anchored  in 
the  most  favourable  situation  lor  flanking  the  eneniy'.s 
approaches. 

Reverting  then  to  the  head  of  the  defence,  it  will 
be  seen,  that  while  the  ridges  on  the  eastern  fronts, 
and  the  hollow  bed  of  the  torrent,  which  ollered  cover 
for  troops  moving  to  the  assault,  deceitfully  tempted 
the  enemy  to  that  leidc  ;  the  flanking  fire  of  the  con- 
vent, tlie  ruins  oi  the  suburb,  the  hill  of  the  Catalina, 
and  the  appearance  of  the  shipping  deterred  them 
even  from  examining  the  western  side,  and  as  it  were, 
forcil)ly  urged  them  towards  the  eastern  ridge  where 
the  English  engineer  wished  to  find  them.  There  ho 
bad  even  marked  their  ground,  and  indicated  the  situ- 


1811.1 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR  WAR. 


429 


ation  of  the  breach  ;  that  is  to  say,  close  to  the  entrance 
cf  the  torrent,  whore  the  hollow  meeting  of  the 
inclined  planes  rendered  the  inner  depth  of  the  walls 
fur  greater  than  the  outer  depth  ;  where  he  had  looi> 
holed  the  hjuses.  opened  communications  to  the  rear, 
barricaded  the  struts,  and  accumulated  obstacles. 
The  enemy  after  forcing  the  breach  would  thus  have 
been  confined  between  the  hous.'S  on  the  inclin.id 
planes,  exposed  on  each  side  to  the  musketry  from  the 
loop-holes  and  windows,  and  in  front  to  the  fire  of  the 
tuwer  of  the  Gusnians.  which  looked  up  the  bed  of 
the  torrent.  Thus  disputing  every  inch  of  ground, 
tlie  garrison  could  at  worst  have  reached  the  castle  and 
tower  of  the  Gusraans,  which  being  high  and  massive 
were  fitted  for  rear-guards  to  cover  the  evacuation  of 
the  place,  and  were  provided  with  ladders  for  the 
troops  to  descend  and  retreat  to  the  island  under  cover 
of  the  Cataliua. 

The  artillery  available  for  the  defence  appeared  very 
powerful,   for   besides   that   of  the  shipping,   and   the 
guns  in  the  Catalina,  there  were  in  the  island  twelve 
pieces  comprising  four  twenty-four  pounders,  and  two 
ten-inch  mortars  ;  and  in  the  town  there  were  six  lield- 
pieces  and  four  coehorns  on  the  east  front.    An  eighteen- 
pounder  was  on  the  Gusmans,  a  howitzer  on  the  port- 
cullis tower,  and  two  field-pieces  were  kept  behind  the 
town,  in  reserve  for  sallies ;   but  most  of  the  artillery 
in   the  island   was   mounted   after   the   investment,  so 
that  two  twenty-four  pounders  and  two  mortars  only, 
could   take   part   in   the   defence   of    the   town  ;    and ! 
as  the  walls  and  towers  of  the  latter  were  too  weak  I 
and   narrow  to  sustain   heavy  guns,  only  three   field- 1 
pieces  and  the  coehorns  did  in  fact  reply  to  the  enemy's  I 
tire. 

SIEGE    OF    TARIFA. 

The  garrison,  including  six  hundred  Spanish  infantry ' 
and  one  hundred  horse  of  that  nation,  amounted  to  two  | 
thousand  five  hundred  men,  and  was  posted  in  the  follow- 
ing manner.     Seven  hundred  were  in   the  island,  one 
hundred  in  the  Catalina,  two  hundred  in  the  convent, 
and  fifteen  hundred  in  the  town.  I 

On  the  19th  of  December  the  enemy  having  driven  in  | 
the  advanced  posts,  were  encountered  with  a  sharp  skir- 
mish, and  designedly  led  towards  the  eastern  iront. 

The  20th  the  place  was  invested,  but  on  the  'ilst  a  i 
pievjuet  of  French  troops  having  incautiously  advanced  ! 
towards  the  western  front,  captain  Wren  of  the  eleventh  j 
suddenly  descended  from  the  Catalina  and  carried 
them  off.  In  the  night  the  enemy  approached  close  to  | 
the  walls,  but  the  next  rarjrning  captain  Wren  again 
came  down  from  the  Catalina,  and,  at  the  same  time, 
the  troops  sallied  from  the  convent,  with  a  view  to 
discover  the  position  of  the  French  advanced  posts. 
Bo  daring  was  this  sally  that  Mr.  Welsteud  of  the 
eighty-second  actually  pushed  into  one  of  their  camps 
and  captured  a  field-piece  there  ;  and  although  ho  was 
unable  to  bring  it  off,  in  face  of  the  French  reserves, 
the  latter  were  drawn  by  the  skirmish  under  the  fire 
of  the  ships,  of  the  island,  and  of  the  town,  whereby  they 
suffered  severely  and  could  with  difficulty  recover  the 
captured  piece  of  artillery  from  under  the  guns  of  the 
north-east  tower. 
r  In  the  night  of  the  22d  the  anticipations  of  the  British 
engineer  were  realized.  The  enemy  broke  ground  in 
two  places,  five  hundred  yards  from  the  eastern  front, 
and  assiduously  pushed  forward  their  ajiproachcs  until 
the  2Gth ;  but  always  under  a  destructive  fire,  to  which 
they  replied  with  musketry,  and  with  their  wall-pieces, 
wliich  killed  several  men,  and  would  have  been  very 
dangerous,  but  for  the  sand-bags  which  captain  Nicolas, 
the  chief  engineer  at  Cadiz,  had  copiously  supplied. 
This  advantage  was  however  counterbalanced  by  the 
absence  of  th^  ships  which  w  ;re  all  driven  away  in  a 
gale  .>n  tii.;  2JJ. 


On  the  27th  the  French  battering-train  arrived,  and 
on  the  29th  the  sixteen-pounders  opened  against  the 
town,  and  the  howitzers  against  the  island.  These  last 
did  little  duniage  beyond  dismounting  the  gun  in  the 
tower  of  the  Gusmans,  which  was  however  quickly  re- 
established ;  but  the  sixteen-pounders  brouglit  the  old 
wall  down  in  such  flakes,  that  in  a  few  hours  a  wide 
breach  was  effected,  a  little  to  the  left  of  the  portcullis 
tower,  looking  from  the  camp. 

The  place  was  now  exposed  both  to  assault  and 
escalade,  but  behind  the  breach  the  depth  to  the  street 
was  above  fourteen  feet,  the  space  below  was  covered 
with  iron  window-gratings,  having  every  second  ba" 
turned  up,  the  houses  there,  and  behind  all  points  liablt 
to  escalade,  were  completely  prepared  and  garrisoned, 
and  the  troops  were  dispersed  all  round  the  ramparts, 
e;ich  regiment  having  its  own  (juarter  assigned.  The 
Spanish  and  forty-seventh  British  regiment  guarded 
the  breach,  and  on  their  right  some  rifiemen  prolonged 
the  line.  The  eighty-seventh  regiment  occupied  the 
portcullis  tower  and  extended  along  the  rampart  to  the 
left. 

In  the  night  of  the  29th  the  enemy  fired  salvos  of  grape 
on  the  breach,  l)ut  the  besieged  cleared  the  foot  of  it 
between  the  discharges. 

The  30th  the  breaching  fire  was  renewed,  the  wall 
was  broken  for  sixty  feet,  and  the  whole  breach  offered 
an  easy  ascent,  yet  the  besieged  again  cleared  away  the 
rubbish,  and  in  the  night  were  fast  augmenting  the 
defences  behind,  when  a  heavy  rain  filled  the  bed  of  the 
river,  and  the  torrent  bringing  down,  froni  the  French 
camp,  planks,  fascines,  gabions,  and  dead  bodies,  broke 
the  palisades  with  a  shock,  bent  the  portcullis  back- 
ward, and  with  the  surge  of  the  waters  eve'",  injiu-ed  the 
defences  behind  the  breach  :  a  new  passage  was  thu3 
opened  in  the  wall,  yet  such  was  the  vigour  of  the 
besieged,  that  the  damage  was  repaired  before  the  morn- 
ing, and  the  troops  calmly  and  confidently  awaited. 

THE    ASSAUI,T. 

The  waters  subsided  in  the  night  as  quickly  as  they 
had  risen,  but  at  daylight  a  living  stream  of  Frencli 
grenadiers  glided  swiftly  down  the  bed  of  the  river, 
and  as  if  assured  of  victory,  arrived,  without  shout  or 
tumult,  within  a  few  yards  of  the  walls,  when,  instead 
of  quitting  the  hollow,  to  reach  the  breach,  they,  like 
the  torrent  of  the  night,  continued  their  rapid  course 
and  dashed  against  the  portcullis.  The  British  soldiers, 
who  had  hitherto  been  silent  and  observant,  as  if  at  a 
spectacle  which  they  were  expected  to  applaud,  now 
arose,  and  with  a  crashing  volley  smote  the  head  of  the 
French  column !  The  leading  officer,  covered  with 
wounds,  fell  against  the  portcullis  and  gave  up  his 
sword  through  the  bars  to  colonel  Gough  ;  the  French 
drummer,  a  gallant  boy,  who  was  beating  the  charge, 
dropped  lifeless  by  his  officer's  side,  and  the  dead  and 
wounded  filled  the  hollow.  The  remainder  of  the 
assailants  then  breaking  out  to  the  right  and  left, 
spread  along  the  slopes  of  ground  under  the  ramparts 
and  opened  a  quick  irregular  musketry.  At  the  same 
time,  a  number  of  men  coming  out  of  the  trenches,  lea[)- 
ed  into  pits  digged  in  front,  and  shot  fixst  at  the  garri- 
son, but  no  escalade  or  diversion  at  the  other  [loints  was 
made,  and  the  storuiing  column  was  dreadfully  shattered. 
For  the  ramparts  streamed  forth  fire,  and  from  the 
north-eastern  tower  a  field-piece,  held  in  reserve  express- 
ly for  the  occasion,  sent,  at  pistol-shot  distance,  a 
tvn-npest  of  grape  wiiistling  through  the  French  masses, 
which  were  swept  away  in  such  a  dreadful  manner, 
that  they  could  no  longer  endure  the  destruction,  but 
plunging  once  more  into  the  hollow  returned  to  their 
camp,  while  a  shout  of  victory,  mingled  with  the  sound 
of  musical  instruments,  passed  round  the  wall  of  the 
town. 


430 


NAPIERS    PENINSULAR  TVAR. 


[Book  XY 


In  this  combat  the  allies  lost  five  olTiccrs  and  thirty- 
one  men,  but  the  French  dead  covered  all  the  slopes  in 
front  of  the  rampart,  and  choked  the  bed  of  the  river, 
and  ten  wounded  officers,  of  whom  only  one  survived, 
were  brought  in  by  the  l)reueh.  Skerrett,  compa^sion- 
ating  thiir  su.TeriuLrs  and  admirin,":  their  bravery,  per- 
mitted Laval  to  fetch  off  tiie  remainder  :  and  the  opera- 
tions of  the  siege  were  then  suspended,  fur  both  sides 
suffered  severely  from  the  weather.  The  rain  partially 
ruined  the  P^-ench  batteries,  interrupted  their  commu- 
nications, and  stopped  their  supplies ;  on  the  other 
hand  the  torrent,  again  swelling,  broke  the  stockades 
of  the  allies  and  injured  their  entrenchments,  and  some 
v&ssels,  coming  from  Gibraltar  with  ammunition,  were 
wrecked  on  the  coast.  Nevertheless  a  fresh  assault 
was  hourly  expected  until  the  night  of  the  4th,  when, 
several  cannon-shots  being  heard  in  the  French  camp, 
without  any  bullets  reaching  the  town,  it  was  judged 
that  the  enemy  v/ere  destroying  the  guns  previous  to 
retreating.  Soon  afterwards  large  fires  were  observed, 
and  at  daylight  the  troops  issuing  out  of  the  convent, 
drove  the  *nemy  from  the  batteries,  and  commenced  a 
skirmish  with  the  rear-guard ;  but  a  heavy  storm  im- 
peded the  action ;  the  French  conducted  their  retreat 
skilfully,  and  the  British,  after  making  a  few  prisoners, 
relinquished  the  pursuit.  Nevertheless  Laval's  mis- 
fortunes did  not  end  here.  The  privations  his  troops 
had  endured  in  the  trenches  produced  sickness  ;  many 
men  deserted,  and  it  was  computed,  at  the  time,  that  the 
expedition  cost  the  French  not  le.=:s  than  a  thousand  men, 
while  the  whole  loss  of  the  allies  did  not  exceed  one 
hundred  and  fifty.* 

Such  is  the  simple  tale  of  Tarifa,  but  the  true  history 
of  its  defence  cannot  there  he  found.  To  hide  the  errors 
of  the  dead  is  not  always  a  virtue,  and  when  it  involves 
injustice  to  the  living  it  becomes  a  crime ;  colonel 
Skerrett  has  obtained  the  credit,  but  he  was  not  the 
author  of  the  success  at  Tarifa.  f  Je,  and  lord  Proby, 
the  second  in  command,  were  from  the  first  impressed 
with  a  notion,  that  the  place  could  not  be  defended  and 
ought  to  be  abandoned  ;  all  their  proceedings  tended  to 
that  end,  and  they  would  even  have  abandoned  the 
island.  At  colonel  Skerrett's  express  desire  general 
Cooke  had  recalled  him  on  the  18th,  that  is  to  say, 
the  day  before  the  siege  commenced  ;  and  during  its 
progress  he  neither  evinced  hopes  of  final  success,  nor 
made  exertions  to  obtain  it ;  in  some  instanc<\s  he  even 
took  measures  tending  directly  towards  failure.  To 
whom  then  was  England  indebted  for  this  .splciKrul 
achievement  ?  The  merit  of  the  ciMiception  is  und-jubt- 
edly  due  to  general  Campbell,  the  lieutenant-governor 
of  Gibraltar.  He  first  occupied  Tarifa,  and  he  also 
engaged  the  Spaniards  to  admit  an  English  garrison 
into  Ceuta,  that  the  navigation  of  the  straits  and  the 
coasting  trade  might  be  secured  ;  for  he  was  the  only 
authority  in  the  south  of  the  Peninsula  who  appeared  to 
understand  the  true  value  of  those  points.  Finally,  it 
was  his  imperious  and  even  menacing  orders,  which  pre- 
vented colonel  Skerrett  from  abandoning  Tarifa  before 
the  siege  commenced. 

General  Canipbe'l's  resolution  is  the  more  to  bo  ad- 
mired, because  Tarila  was,  strictly  sjieaking,  not  witiiin 
his  command,  which  did  not  extend  beyond  the  walls 
of  his  own  f  irtrcss  ;  and  he  had  also  to  contend  against 
general  Cooke,  wlio  claimed  the  controul  of  a  garrison 
which  was  chieily  composed  of  troops  from  Cadiz. 
He  acted  also  contrary  to  the  opinion  of  lord  Welling- 
ton, who,  always  averse  to  any  serious  co-operation 
with  the  Spaniards,  as  well  knowing  the  latter  would 
inevitably  fail,  and  throw  the  burthen  on  the  F»ritish  in 
the  hour  of  need,  was  in  this  instance  more  strongly 
influenced,  because  the  reports  of  general  (Jooke,  fouiicl- 
ed  on  eolojiel  Skerrett's  and  lord  Proby's  represeuta- 

*  Gciier.il  CfiTiipb'.li's  Corresiiondcncc,  MSS 


tions,  reprobated  the  defence  of  Tarifa.  Thus  misin- 
formed of  the  real  resources,  and  having  no  local  know- 
ledge of  the  place,  lord  Wellington  judged,  that  the 
island  only  could  be  held — tliat  Skerrett's  detachment 
was  not  wanting  for  that  purpose — and  that  without 
the  island  the  enemy  could  not  keep  pos.session  of 
Tarifa.  AV'ere  they  even  to  take  both,  he  thought  they 
could  not  retain  them,  while  Uallesteros  was  in  strength 
and  succoured  from  Gihialtar,  unkss  they  also  kept  a 
strong  force  in  those  parts ;  finally,  that  the  defence  of 
the  island  was  the  least  costly  and  the  most  certain. 
However,  with  that  prudence,  which  always  marked  his 
proceedings,  although  he  gave  lus  opinion,  he  would  not 
interfere  from  a  distance,  in  a  matter  which  could  only 
be  accurately  judged  of  on  the  spot. 

But  the  island  had  not  a  single  house,  and  was  de- 
fenceless ;  the  rain  alone,  without  reckcming  the  effects 
of  the  enemy's  shells,  would  have  gone  near  to  force 
the  troops  away;  and  as  the  .^hipping  could  not  alway.s 
remain  in  tlie  roadstead,  the  building  of  casemates  and 
barracks,  and  storehouses  for  provisions  and  ammuni- 
tion, would  have  been  more  expensive  than  the  defence 
of  the  town.  I'arifa  was  thereibre  an  out-work  to  the 
island,  and  one  so  capable  of  a  good  defence  that  a 
much  more  powerful  attack  had  been  expected,  and  a 
more  powerful  resistance  prepared  by  the  English 
engineer ;  a  defence  not  resting  on  the  valour  of  thy 
troops  alone,  but  upon  a  skilful  calculation  of  all  the 
real  resources,  and  all  the  chances. 

That  the  value  of  the  oljject  was  worth  the  risk  may 
be  gathered  from  this,  that  Soult,  three  months  after  the 
siege,  thus  expressed  himself,  "  The  taking  of  Tarifa 
will  be  more  hurti'ul  to  the  English  and  to  the  defeudej-s 
of  Cadiz,  than  tlie  taking  of  Alicant  or  even  Badajos, 
where  I  cannot  go  without  first  securing  my  left  and 
taking  Tarifa.''*  And,  besides  the  advantages  alrea«iy 
noticed  as  belonging  to  the  possession  of  this  place,  it 
was  close  to  Ceuta  where  there  were  a  lew  Briiisu 
soldiers,  but  many  French  prisoners,  and  above  two 
thousand  discontented  Spanish  troo])S  and  galley-slavc«  ; 
('euta.  which  was  so  neglected  by  the  Sj)anish  regency 
that  a  French  general,  a  prisoner,  did  not  hesitate  to 
propose  to  the  governor  to  give  it  up  to  Soult  as  Ins 
only  means  of  avoiding  starvation.!  Neither  would 
Soult  have  failed  to  strengthen  himself  at  Tarifa  in  de- 
spite of  Ballesteros,  v.-ere  it  only  to  command  the  su]> 
plies  of  the  Campifia,  and  those  from  Barljary  which 
cijuld  but  be  brought  to  that  port  or  to  Conil :  the  latter 
was  however  seldom  frequented  by  the  Moors,  because 
the  run  was  long  and  precarious,  whereius  a  favourable 
current  always  brought  their  craft  well  to  Tarifa. 
Swarms  of  the  French  gun-boats  would  therefore  soon 
have  given  Soult  the  command  of  the  coasting  trade,  if 
not  ot  the  entire  straits. 

"J'arifa  then  was  worth  the  efforts  made  for  its  de- 
fence ;  and  setting  a-^ide  the  courage  and  devotion  of 
the  troops,  without  which  nothing  could  have  been 
effected,  the  merit  chiefiy  appertains  to  sir  Charles 
Smith,  the  captain  of  en.uineers.  That  officer's  vigour 
and  capacity  overmatched  the  enemy's  strength  with- 
out, and  the  weakness  and  cajolement  of  those  who  did 
not  wish  to  defend  it  v,  ithin.  Skerrett  could  not  mea- 
sure a  talent  above  his  own  mark,  and  though  he  yield- 
ed to  Smith's  energy,  he  did  so  with  avowed  reluct- 
ance, and  dashed  it  with  some  wild  actions,  for  which 
it  is  difficult  to  assign  a  motive ;  because  he  was  not  a 
dull  man,  and  he  was  a  brave  man,  as  his  death  at 
Bergem-op-Zoon  proved.  But  his  military  capacity 
was  naught,  and  his  mind  did  not  easily  catch  am)ther'3 
enthusiasm.  Tarifa  was  the  commentary  upon  Tarar 
gona. 

During  the  siege,  the  engineer's  works  in  front  were 


*  Intercepted  despatchea,  17tli  April, 
t  Gc0.  Oiiiiipbfrirs  paptrs,  Ml6S. 


1812. 


1 


1812.] 


NAPIER'S    PEXIX3ULAR   WAR. 


431 


constnntly  impeded  by  colonel  Skcrrett  ;  he  would  rail 
off  the  labourers  to  pr.'piiro  ]30sts  of  retreat,  and  Smith's 
desire  to  open  the  ntrth-gate,  (which  had  been  built 
up,)  that  the  troops  min'ht  have  egress  in  case  of  esca- 
lade, was  opposed  by  him,  although  there  was  no  other 
point  for  the  garrison  to  sally,  save  by  the  sea-gate 
which  was  near  the  castle.  On  th.e  '29th  of  Decemb;'r  a 
shell,  fired  from  the  eighteen-pounder  in  the  towt'r  of 
the  Gusmans,  having  barsted  too  soon,  killed  or  wound- 
ed one  (if  the  inhabitants,  and  a  deputation  of  the  citi- 
zens came  to  complain  of  the  accident ;  colonel  Skerrett, 
although  the  breach  was  then  open,  immediately  ordered 
that  gun.  and  a  thirty-two-pound  carronade,  which  at 
four  hundred  yards  looked  into  the  Fiench  batteries,  to 
be  dismounted  and  spiked  !  and  it  was  done  !  To  crown 
this  absurd  conduct,  he  assigned  the  charge  of  the  breach 
entirely  to  the  Spanish  troops,  and  if  Smith  had  not 
insisted  upon  posting  the  forty-seventh  British  regiment 
along-side  of  them,  this  alone  would  have  ruined  the  de- 
fence ;  because  hunger,  nakedness,  and  neglect,  had 
broken  the  spirit  of  these  pojr  men,  and  during  the  com- 
bat general  Copons  alone  displayed  the  qualities  of  a 
gallant  soldier. 

To  the  British  engineer,  therefore,  the  praise  of  this 
S]ilendid  action  is  chiefly  due ;  because  he  saw  from 
tfie  first  all  the  resources  of  the  place,  and  with  equal 
firmness  and  talent  developed  them,  notwithstanding 
the  opposition  of  his  superiors ;  because  at  the  same 
time  he,  by  skilful  impositions,  induced  the  enemy 
(whose  attack  should  have  embraced  the  suburbs  and 
the  north-west  salient  angle  of  the  place)  to  open  his 
trenches  on  the  east,  \\'here  the  besieged,  under  the 
appearance  of  weakness,  had  concentrated  all  their 
strength ;  finally,  because  he  repres.sed  despondency 
where  he  failed  to  infuse  confidence.  'J'he  second  in 
merit  was  c:i])tain  Mitchell,  of  the  artillery  ;  because 
in  the  management  of  that  arm  for  the  delence  of  the 
town,  Jiis  talent  and  enterprise  were  conspicuous,  espe- 
cially (hu-ing  I  he  a.ssault  ;  nor  can  the  result  of  this  last 
event  be  taken  as  the  just  measure  of  either  oiiicer's 


merits,  seeing  that  a  prolonged  siege  and  a  more  .skilful 
and  powerful  attack  was  e.xpected.  In  the  enemy's 
camp  v.'as  found  the  French  engineer "s  sketch  for  a  re- 
newed operation  by  a  cautious  and  extensive  system 
of  mines  and  breaches  ;  but  nothing  was  thert;  laid  down 
that  had  not  been  already  anticipated,  and  jjrovided 
against  by  his  British  oppVmcnts.  If  tlicn  the  delence 
of  '['arifa  was  a  great  and  splendid  (xjiloit,  and  none 
can  doubt  that  it  was,  those  who  conceived,  planned, 
and  executed  it  should  have  all  the  glory.  Amongst 
those  persons  colonel  Skerrett  has  no  right  "to  be  placed  ; 
yet,  such  are  the  errors  of  power,  that  he  was  highly 
applauded  for  what  he  did  not  do,  and  general  Campbell 
was  severely  rebuked  by  lord  Liverpool  for  having  risked 
his  Majesty's  troops ! 

The  French  displayed  courage  but  no  skill.  For 
two  days  their  heavy  howitzers  had  been  directed 
vaguely  against  the  interior  of  the  town,  and  the  dis- 
tant island,  whither  the  unfortunate  people  fled  from 
their  shattered  and  burning  houses.  A  ])ortion  of  the 
shells  thus  thrown  away  in  cruelty  would  have  levelled 
the  north-east  tower  with  the  ground,  and  the  French 
were  aware  of  its  importance  ;  but  tlu-oughout  the  siege 
their  operations  were  uuistered  by  the  superior  ability 
of  the  engineer  and  artillery  officers  opposed  to  them. 

In  the  expectation  that  a  more  powerful  attack  would 
be  made  in  the  spring,  general  Campbell  directed  case- 
mates and  splinter  proofs  to  be  made  in  the  island,  but 
Skerrett's  troops  were  recalled  to  Cadiz,  which  now 
contained  nearly  eight  thousand  British,  exclusive  of 
fifteen  hundred  of  these  destined  for  Carthagena  and 
Alicant.  This  arrangement  was  however  soon  changed, 
because  the  events  of  the  war  put  Carthagena  out  of 
the  French  line  of  operations,  and  the  pestilence  there 
caused  the  removal  of  the  British  troops.  Neither 
was  Tarifa  again  attacked ;  lord  Wellington  had  pre- 
dicted that  it  would  not,  and  on  sure  grounds,  for  he 
was  then  contemplating  a  series  of  operations,  which 
were  calculated  to  change  the  state  of  the  war,  aud 
which  shall  be  set  forth  in  the  next  book. 


BOOK    XVI. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Fo'ltJ.'Ml  situation  of  kin?  Joseph — Political  state  of  Spain 
— l-'olitic;il  state  of  Portugal — Military  operations — Julian 
Sanchez  captures  the  governor  of  Ciudad  Rodrij^o — Gen- 
eral Tliiebiult  introduces  a  convoy  aud  a  new  g-overnor 
into  that  fortress — Ditticulty  of  military  operatious  on  tiie 
Airucda — Tiie  allied  army,  being  pressed  for  provisions, 
tiikes  wide  eantonmonts,  and  preparations  are  secretly 
made  for  the  siege  of  (>iudad  Rodrigo. 

Up  to  this  period,  the  invasion,  although  diversified 
by  occasional  disasters  on  the  part  of  the  invaders,  had 
been  progressive.  The  tide,  sometimes  flowing,  some- 
times ebbing,  had  still  gained  upon  the  land,  and 
■wherever  the  Spaniards  had  arrested  its  progress,  it 
was  Knirland  that  urged  their  labour  and  renovated 
their  tired  strengh ;  no  firm  barrier,  no  solid  dike,  had 
been  opposed  to  its  ravages,  save  Vjy  the  British  gen- 
eral in  Portugal,  and  even  there  the-  foundation  of  his 
■work,  sapped  by  the  trickling  waters  of  folly  and  in- 
trigue, was  sliding  away.  By  what  ^  surprising  effort 
of  courage  and  judgment  he  secured  lu  sli-iV   now  be 


shown;  and  as  the  field  operations,  in  this  war,  were 
always  influenced  more  by  political  considerations  than 
by  military  princijiles,  it  will  be  necessary  first  to  place 
the  general's  situation  with  respect  to  the  former  in  its 
true  light. 

Political  situation  of  king  Joseph.  France,  abounding 
in  riches  and  power,  was  absolute  mistress  of  l^jurope 
from  the  Pyi-enees  to  the  Vistula  :  but  Napoleon,  reso- 
lute to  perfect  his  continental  system  for  tlie  exclusion 
;  of  British  goods,  now  found  I'limself,  in  the  pursuit 
!  of  that  object,  hastening  rapidly  to  a  new  war,  and  one 
!  so  vast,  that  even  his  force  was  strained  to  mp<?t  it. 
j  The  Peninsula  already  felt  relief  from  this  cause.  The 
I  dread  of  his  arrival  ceased  to  influence  the  operations 
I  of  the  alli(M]  army  in  Portugal,  many  able  French  olli- 
I  cers  were  recalled,  and  as  it  was  known  that  the  im- 
I  perial  guards,  and  the  Polish  trof)ps,  were  to  Avithdraw 
j  from  Spain,  the  scale  of  offensive  projects  was  iieces- 
'  sarily  contracted.  Conscripts  and  young  soldiers  iu- 
i  stead  of  veterans,  and  in  diminished  numbers,  were 
1  now  to  be  expected  ;  aud  in  the  French  army  there  waa 


432 


N  A  P I E  R  •  S    P  E  -N  -  N^  S  U  r.  A  R  WAR. 


[Book  XYI. 


a  ^enoral,  and  oppressive  sense,  of  the  enormous  exer- 
tion vvliich  would  be  reiniired  to  brina^  two  sncli  mi;;'hly 
wars  to  a  ha;)])y  conclusion.  On  tlie  other  hand,  the 
Peninsulars  were  cheered  by  seeing  so  powerful  a 
monarch,  as  the  czar,  rise  in  opposition  to  Napoleon, 
and  the  Englbli  general  f.iund  the  jirincipal  basis  of 
his  calculations  realized  by  this  diversion.  He  had 
never  yet  been  strong  enough  to  meet  eighty  thousand 
French  troops  in  battie,  oven  under  a  common  general ; 
but  his  hopes  rose  when  he  saw  the  great  warrior  of 
the  age,  not  only  turning  himself  from  the  contest,  but 
withdrawing  fi-oni  it  a  reserve  of  four  hundred  thousand 
veterans,  whor-e  inight  the  whole  world  seemed  hardly 
able  to  withstand. 

The  most  innnediate  ef^'ct,  however,  which  the  ap- 
proaching contest  with  Russia  pnxhiced  in  the  Penin- 
sula, was  the  necessity  of  restoring  Jose])h  to  his 
former  power  over  the  French  armies.  While  the 
emperor  wiu;  absent  from  Paris,  the  supreme  controul 
of  the  operations  could  only  be  placed  in  the  hands  of 
the  monarch  of  Spain  ;  yot  this  was  only  to  reproduce 
there,  and  with  greater  virulence,  the  former  jealousies 
and  disputes.  Joseph's  Spanish  policy  remained  un- 
changed ;  the  pride  of  the  French  generals  was  at  least 
equal  to  his,  preie.xts  for  disputes  were  never  wanting 
on  either  side,  and  the  mischievous  nature  of  those 
disputes  may  be  gathered  from  one  example.  In  No- 
vember the  king  being  pressed  for  money,  sold  the 
magazines  of  corn  collected  near  'J'oledo,  for  the  army 
of  Portugal,  a::id  without  which  the  latter  could  not 
exist ;  Marmont,  regardless  of  the  political  scandal,  im- 
mediately sent  troo-)s  to  recover  the  magazines  by  force, 
and  desired  the  purchasers  to  reclaim  their  money  from 
the  monarch. 

Politiail.  stale  of  .Syw/n.  All  the  intrigues  and  cor- 
ruptions and  citnfiicting  interests  before  described  had 
iucreas('(l  in  violence.  The  negotiations  for  the  media- 
tion of  I'Jigiand  with  the  colonies,  wei-e  not  ended ; 
Carlotta  still  pressed  her  claims  ;  and  the  division 
betvveen  the  liberals  and  serviles,  as  they  were  called, 
became  daily  wider.  Cadiz  was  in  1811  the  very  focus 
of  all  disorder.  The  government  was  alike  weak  and 
(lishoiicst,  and  used  many  pitiful  arts  to  extract  money 
from  England.  No  subterfuge  was  too  mean.  AVhen 
Blake  wius  going  with  the  fourth  army  to  Estreinadura 
previ.ius  to  the  biittle  of  Albuera,  the  minister  Bardaxi 
entreated  the  British  envoy  to  grant  a  loan,  or  a  gift, 
with;)'!!  which,  he  asserted,  Blake  could  not  move. 
Mr.  We'iesley  refused,  beeau-^e  a  large  debt  v.-as  already 
due  to  the  legation,  and  the  next  morning  a  Spanish 
ship  of  war  from  America  landed  a  million  and  a  half 
of  dollars  ! 

In  .July,  notwithstanding  the  victory  of  Albuera,  the 
regency  vva?  held  in  universal  contemjit.,  both  it  and  the 
cortes  were  with.iut  in'lueiice,  and  their  conduct  merited 
it.  For  although  vast  sums  were  continually  received, 
and  every  service  was  famished,  the  treasury  was  de- 
clared empty,  and  there  was  no  probability  of  any  fur- 
ther remittances  from  Amei'ica.  'I'he  teinper  of  the 
public  was  soured  towards  l^aigland.  the  press  openly 
assailed  the  British  character,  and  all  things  so  evidently 
tended  towards  anarchy,  that  Mr.  WelJesley  declared 
"  Spanish  affairs  to  be  tlien  worse  than  they  had  been  at 
any  previous  period  of  tli(.'  war." 

The  cnrtes,  at  first  swayed  by  pric-st.';  and  lawyers, 
who  cherished  the  inquisition  and  were  opposed  to  all 
free  institutions,  was  now  chiefly  led  by  a  liberal  cr 
rather  democratic  party,  averse  to  the  13ritish  influence ; 
hence,  in  August  a  new  constitution,  quite  opposed  to 
the  aristocratic  principle,  was  promulgatixl.  With  the 
oxceikiiicics  and  defects  of  that  instrument  the  present 
History  has  indeed  little  concern,  but  the  results  were 
ncit  in  a  .cord  with  the  .spirit  of  the  contrivance,  and  the 
cviLs  affecting  th(!  war  were  rather  increased  by  it ;  the 
democratic  bai-is  of  the  now  cou.stitution  excit.d  ma:iv 


I  and  bitter  enemies,  and  the  time  and  attention,  which 
j  should  have  been  bestowed  upon  the  amelioration  of  the 
j  so'diers'  condition,  was  occupied  in  factions,  disputes, 
1  and  corrupt  intrigues. 

That  many  sound  abstract  principles  of  government 
!  were  cleaily  and  vigorously  laid  down   in   the  scheme 
!  of  this  constitution,  cannot  be  denied,  the  complicated 
j  oppressions  of  the  feudal  system  Mere  swept  away  with 
I  a  bold  and  just  hand  ;  but  of  what  avail,  as  regarded 
j  the  war,  was  the  enunciation  of  principles  which  were 
I  never  attempted  to  be  rcnluced  to  practice?     What  cn- 
!  couragement  was  it  to  the  soldier,  to  be  told  he  was 
a  free   man,  fighting  for  a  constitution  as  well   as  for 
national   independence,  when   he   saw  the   authors   of 
that   constitution,   corruptly   revelling    in    the    wealth 
which  should  have  clothed,  and  armed,  and   fed  him  ? 
What  was  nominal  equality  to  him,  when  he  saw  inca- 
pacity rewarded,  crimes  and  treachery  unpunished   in 
the  rich,  the  poor  and  patriotic  oppressed?    He  laughed 
to  scorn  those  who  could  find  time  to  foi'm  the  constitu- 
tion of  a  great  empire,  but  could  not  find  time  or  hon- 
es! v  to  feed,  or  clothe,  or  arm  the  men  who  \\ere  to  do- 
fend  it ! 

'Jlie  enemies  of  democracy  soon  spread  many  grie- 
vous reports  of  misfortunes  and  treachei'v,  some  true, 
some  false  ;  and  at  the  most  critical  period  of  the  war 
in  Valencia,  they  endeavoured  to  raise  a  po])ular  com- 
motion to  sweep  away  the  cortes.  The  monks  and  fii- 
ars,  furious  at  the  suppression  of  the  inquisition,  were 
the  chief  plotters  every  where  ;  and  the  proceedings 
of  Palacios,  in  concert  with  them,  were  only  part  of  a 
church  project,  commenced  all  over  Spain  to  resist  the 
cortes.  In  October,  Bardizabal,  the  other  deposed 
regent,  published  at  Alicant,  a  manifesto,  in  which  he 
aceu.sed  the  cortes  and  the  Cadiz  writers  of  jacobinism, 
maintained  the  doctrine  of  passive  obedience,  and  as- 
serted, that  the  regents  only  took  the  oath  to  the  cortes, 
because  they  could  not  count  on  the  army  or  the  people 
at  C!!adiz ;  otherwise  they  would  cause  the  king's  au- 
thority to  be  respected  in  their  persons  as  his  only 
legitimate  representatives.  This  manifesto  was  declared 
treasonable,  and  a  vessel  was  despatched  to  bring  liie 
offender  to  Cadiz  ;  but  the  following  day  it  was  dis- 
covered that  the  old  council  of  Castile  had  also  drawn 
up  a  manifesto  similar  in  principle,  and  the  persons 
sent  by  the  cortes  to  seize  the  paper  were  told  that  it 
was  destroyed.  'J'he  protest  (if  three  members  against 
it  was  however  found,  and  five  lawyers  were  selected 
from  the  cortes  to  try  the  guilty  councillors  and  I^ar- 
dizabal. 

In  November  the  public  cry  for  a  new  regency  became 
general,  and  it  v,-as  backed  by  the  English  plenipoten- 
tiary. Nevertheless  the  mutter  was  deferred  upon 
divers  pretexts,  and  meanwhile  the  democratic  party 
gained  strength  in  the  cortes,  and  the  anti-IJritish  it-el- 
ing  appeared  more  widely  diffused  than  it  really  was ; 
because  some  time  elapsed  before  the  church  and  aris- 
tocratic parly  discovered  that  the  secret  policy  of  Eng- 
land was  the  same  as  their  own.  It  was  so,  however, 
even  to  the  upholding  of  the  iiuiuisition,  which  it  was 
ridiculously  asserted  had  become  objectionable  only  in 
name  ;  as  if,  while  the  frame-work  of  tyraimy  existed, 
there  coidd  ever  be  wanting  the  will  to  fill  it  up  Ncv 
cessity  alone  induced  the  British  cabinet  to  put  on  a 
smooth  countenance  towards  the  cortes.  In  this  state 
of  affairs,  the  negotiation  for  the  colonial  mediation, 
was  used  by  the  Spaniards  merely  as  a  ground  for  de- 
manding loans,  subsidi(>s,  and  succours  in  kind,  which 
they  used  in  fitting  out  new  expeditions  against  the 
revolted  colonists  ;  the  complaints  of  the  Briti.sh  le- 
gation on  this  point  were  quite  disregarded.  At  this 
time  also  I^apena-was  ac(|uitted  of  misconduct  at  Barosa, 
and  would  have  been  immediately  re-em])loyed,  if  the 
English  minister  had  not  threatened  to  (|ult  Cadiz,  and 
ad^^3v'd  general  Cuoke  to  do  the  samt. 


1811.1 


KAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


433 


>rr.  "Wellesley  seeing  the  most  fatal  consequences 
to  T})e  war  must  ensue,  if  a  stop  w;is  not  put  to  the 
naiscondiict  of  the  regency,  had  sent  Mr.  Vaughan,  the 
secretary  of  legation,  to  acquaint  the  British  calji- 
net  vith  the  faetd,  and  to  solicit  a  more  firm  and  decid- 
ed course  of  policy.  Above  all  things  he  d&sired  to 
have  the  subsidies  settled  by  treaty,  that  the  people  of 
Spain  might  really  know  what  England  had  done  and 
was  still  doing  for  them  ;  for  on  every  occasion,  arms, 
clothing,  annnunition,  loans,  provisions,  guns,  stores, 
and  even  workmen  and  funds,  to  form  founderies,  were 
demanded  and  obtained  by  the  Spanish  government, 
and  then  wasted  or  embezzled,  without  the  people  bene- 
Bting,  or  even  knowing  of  the  generosity,  or  rather 
extravagance,  with  which  they  were  supplied  ;  while  the 
receivers  and  wasters  were  heaping  calumnies  ou  the 
donors. 

'I'he  regency  question  was  at  last  seriously  discussed 
in  the  cortes,  and  the  deputy,  Capmauy,  who,  if  we  may 
bjlieve  the  partizans  of  Joseph,  was  anti-English  in  his 
heart,  argued  the  necessity  of  this  change  on  the  ground 
of  pleasing  the  British.*  This  excited  great  discontent, 
as  he  probably  intended,  and  many  deputies  declared  at 
first  that  they  would  not  be  dictated  to  by  any  foreign 
power ;  but  the  departure  of  Mr.  Vaughan  alarmed 
them,  and  a  commission,  formed  to  improve  the  modi 
of  governing,  was  hastening  the  decision  of  the  question, 
when  Blake's  disaster  at  Valencia  completed  the 
work.  (Jarlotta's  agent  was  active  in  her  behalf,  but 
the  eloquent  and  honest  Arguelles  was  opposed  to  hun ; 
and  the  cortes,  although  they  recognized  her  claim  to 
the  succession,  denied  her  the  regency,  because  of  a  pre- 
vious decree,  which  excluded  all  royal  personages  from 
that  ofQce. 

On  the  21st  of  January,  1812,  after  a  secret  discus- 
sion of  twenty-four  hours,  a  new  regency,  to  consist  of 
five  members,  of  which  two  were  Americans,  was  pro- 
claimed. The  men  chosen  were  the  duke  of  Infantadn, 
thsn  in  England,  Henry  O'Donnel,  admiral  Villarvicen- 
cio,  Joachim  de  Mosquera,  and  Jgnacios  de  Ribas  ;  and 
each  was  to  Lave  the  presidencji  by  rotation  for  sLc 
nunths. 

Tney  commenced  beneficially.  O'Donnel  was  friendly 
to  the  British  alliance,  and  proposed  a  military  least, 
to  restore  harmony  between  the  English  and  Spanish 
officers  ;  he  nrade  many  changes  in  the  department  of 
war,  and  finances  ;  consulted  the  British  generals,  and 
disbanding  several  bad  regiments,  incorporated  the  men 
with  other  battalions  ;  he  also  reduced  many  inefficient 
and  malignant  coionels,  and  striking  off  from  the  pay 
Hits  all  unemployed  and  absant  oliicei-s,  it  was  found 
that  they  were  five  thousand  in  number!  Ballesteros 
was  appointed  captain-general  of  Andalusia,  and  re- 
ciiived  the  command  of  the  fourth  army,  whose  head- 
quarters were  prudently  removed  to  Algeziras ;  the 
troops  were  there  increased,  by  drafts  from  Cadiz,  to  ten 
or  twelve  thousand  men,  and  a  new  army  was  set  on 
fj')t  in  Murcia.  Finally,  to  check  trading  with  the 
French,  a  general  blockade  of  all  the'coast  in  their  pos- 
sjssion,  from  Rosas  to  St.  Sebastian,  was  deciareil. 

Bat  it  was  soon  discovered  that  the  secret  object 
was  to  obtain  a  loan  from  England,  and  as  this  did 
n  )t  succeed,  and  nothing  good  was  ever  permanent  in 
'  Spanish  afi'airs,  the  old  disjiutes  again  broke  out.  The 
democratic  spirit  gained  strength  i:i  the  cortes ;  the 
anti-English  party  augmented ;  the  press  abounded 
in  libels  impugning  the  good  faith  of  the  British  nation, 
especially  with  respect  to  Ceuta ;  for  which,  however, 
there  was  some  plausible  ground  of  suspicion,  because 
the  acciuisition  of  that  fortress  had  actually  been  pro- 
P'jsed  to  lord  Liverpool.  The  new  regency,  also  as  vio- 
lent as  their  predecessors  with  respect  to  America, 
disregarded  the  mediatiou,  and  having  secretly  organ- 

*  Josep'j';)  p  in?r-  "intnrcd  at  Vittoria. 
'I'J 


ized  in  Gallicia  an  expedition  against  thg  colonies,  sup- 
plied it  with  artillery  furnishi'd  from  England  for  tiie 
French  war,  and  then,  under  another  pretence,  demand- 
ed money  of  the  British  minister  to  forward  this  ini(jui- 
tous  folly. 

Political  .■itate  of  Portugal. — In  October  all  the  evils 
before  described  still  existed,  and  were  aggravated. 
The  old  disputes  remained  unsettled,  the  return  of  thb 
royal  family  was  put  off.  and  the  reforms  in  the  mili- 
tary system,  which  Bcresford  had  repaired  to  Iwisbon 
to  effect,  were  either  thwarted  or  retarded  by  the  ro 
gency.  Mr.  Stuart  imleed  forced  the  government  to 
repair  the  bridges  and  roads  in  Beira,  to  throw  some 
provisions  into  the  fortresses  ;  and  in  despite  of  Ro- 
dondo,  the  minister  of  finance,  who,  for  the  first  time, 
now  opjiosed  the  British  inlluence,  he  made  the  regency 
substitute  a  military  chest  and  commissariat,  instead 
of  the  •'  Junta  de  Viveres."  But  Forjius  and  Redondo 
then  disputed  for  the  custody  of  the  new  chest ;  and 
when  Mr.  Stuart  explained  to  the  one,  that,  as  the  in- 
tent was  to  se))arate  the  money  of  the  army  from  that 
of  the  civil  departments,  his  claims  were  incompatible 
with  such  an  object ;  and  to  the  other  that  the  conduct 
of  his  own  department  was  already  more  than  he  could 
manage,  both  were  ofTended  ;  and  this  new  source  of 
disorder  was  only  partiallj-  closed  by  withholding  tha 
subsidy  until  they  yielded. 

Great  malversations  in  the  revemie  were  also  dLs- 
covered  ;  and  a  plan,  to  enforce  an  im])aitial  exaction 
of  the  "decima,"  which  was  drawn  up  by  Nogueira, 
at  the  desire  of  Wellington,  was  so  ill  received  by 
those  whose  illegal  exemptions  it  attacked,  that  tho 
Souzas  immediately  placed  themselves  at  the  head  of 
the  objectors  out  of  doors.  Nogueira  then  modified  it, 
but  the  Souzas  still  opposed,  and  as  Wellington,  judg- 
ing the  modification  to  be  an  evasion  of  the  principle, 
would  not  recede  from  the  first  plan,  a  permanent  dis- 
pute and  a  permanent  evil,  were  thus  established  by 
that  pernicious  faction.  In  fine,  not  the  Souzas  only, 
but  the  whole  regency  in  their  folly  now  imagined  that 
the  war  was  virtually  decided  in  their  favour,  and  were 
intent  upon  driving  the  British  away  by  disgusting  tho 
general. 

A  new  quarrel  also  aro.se  in  the  Brazils.  Lord  Wel- 
linirton  had  been  created  conde  de  Vimiero,  Beresford 
conde  de  Trancoso,  Silveira  conde  dAmurante ;  and 
other  minor  rewards,  of  a  like  nature,  had  been  con- 
ferred on  .subordinate  officers.  These  honours  had 
however  been  delayed  in  a  marked  manner,  and  lord 
Strangfbrd,  who  appears  to  have  been  ruled  entirely 
l>y  the  Souza  faction,  and  was  therefore  opposed  to 
Forjas.  charged,  or  as  he  termed  it,  reported  a  charge, 
made  against  the  latter,  at  the  Brazils,  for  having  cul- 
pably delayed  the  official  return  of  the  officers  who 
were  thus  to  be  rewarded.  Against  this  accusation, 
which  had  no  foundation  in  fact,  seeing  that  the  report 
had  been  made,  and  that  Forjas  was  not  the  ])ersun  to 
whose  department  it  belonged.  Lord  Wellington  and 
Mr.  Stuart  protested,  because  of  the  injustice  ;  and  bt;- 
cause  it  was  made  in  pursuance  of  a  design  to  remove 
Forjas  from  the  government.  The  Engli.sh  general 
was  however  thus  placed  in  a  strange  position,  for 
while  his  letters  to  Forjas  were  menacing  rebukes  to 
him,  and  his  coadjutors,  for  their  neglect  of  public 
affairs  ;  and  while  his  formal  complaints  of  the  conduct 
of  the  regency  were  transmitted  to  the  Brazils,  he  wan 
also  obliged  to  send  other  letters  in  sujiport  of  the  Tcrv 
persons  whom  he  wa-s  ju.<tly  rebuking  for  misconduef. 

In  the  midst  of  these  embarrassments,  an  accidental 
event  was  like  to  have  brought  the  question  of  the 
British  remaining  in  Portugal  to  a  very  sudden  deci- 
sion. AVhile  Mas.=;ena  was  before  the  lines,  one  d'Am- 
blemont  Jiad  ajipeared  in  North  America,  and  given  to 
Oriis,  the  Spanish  minister,  a  plan  for  burning  the 
British  lliet  in  the  'J'agus,  which  he  pretended  to  have 


434 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XVI. 


received  ordors  from  tlie  French  government  to  execute.  Bod:^.  the  allied  army  was  extensively  cantoned  oc 
This  plan  being  trunsuiitted  to  the  Brazils,  many  persons  both  sides  of  the  Coa.  Ciudad  Rodrigo  was  distantly 
named  by  d'Ainblemont  as  implicated  were,  in  conse- 1  observed  by  the  British,  and  so  closely  by  Julian  Sau- 
qaence  arrested  at  Lisbon  and  sent  to  Rio  Janeiro,  al- ^  cliez,  that  on  the  loth  he  carried  oil'  more  than  two 
though  Mr.  Stuart  had  ascertained  the  wliole  affair '  hundred  oxen  from  under  the  guns  of  the  place,  and  ai 
to  be  a  forgery.  The  attention  paid  to  this  man  by  I  the  same  time  captured  general  Renaud,  the  governor, 
Onis  and  by  the  court  of  Rio  Janeiro,  induced  him  to  I  who  had  imprudently  ventured  out  with  a  weak  escort, 
make  farther  trial  of  their  credulity,  and  he  then  brought  At  this  time  Marmont  had  one  division  in  Placentia, 
forward  a  corre^-^pondence  between  the  jjrineipal  autho-'^and  the  rest  of  his  infantry  between  that  [jjaee  and 
rities  of  Mexico  and  the  French  government ;  he  even  Madrid  ;  but  his  cavalry  was  at  Peneranda,  on  tlie  Sala- 
produced  letters  from  the  French  ministers,  directing  manca  side  of  the  mountains,  and  his  line  of  communi- 
intrigues  to  be  commenced  at  Lisbon,  aud  tlie  French  cation  was  organized  on  the  old  Roman  road  of  the 
interest  there  to  be  jilaced  in  the  lindsof  the  Porta- i  Puerto   de   Pico,  which   had    been   repaired  after  the 


guese  intendant  of  police. 

Mr.  Stuart  lamenting  the  ruin  of  many  innocent  per- 
sons, whom  this  forging  villain  was  thus  dooming, 
prayed  L  )rd  Wellesley  to  interfere  ;  but  meanwhile  the 
court  of  Rio  Janeiro,  falling  headlong  into  the  snare, 
sent  orders  to  arrest  more  victims  ;  and  amongst  others, 
without  assigning  any  cause,  aud  without  any  communi- 
cation with  the  English  general,  the  regency  seized  one 
Borel,  a  clerk  in  the  department  of  the  13ritish  pay- 
master-general. This  act  being  at  once  contrary  to 
treaty,  hostile  to  the  alliance,  and  insulting  in  manner, 


battle  of  Talavera.  'I'he  army  of  the  north  sti'etched 
from  the  Tormes  to  Astorga,  the  walls  of  wliich  place, 
as  well  as  those  of  Zamora,  and  other  towns  in  I^eon, 
were  being  restored,  that  the  flat  country  might  be  held 
with  a  lew  troops  against  the  Gallician  army.  It  was 
this  scattering'  of  the  enemy  which  had  enabled  lord 
Wellington  to  send  Hill  against  Girard  at  Aroyo  de 
^VLolino ;  but  when  the  reinforcements  from  P'rance 
reached  the  army  of  Portugal,  the  army  of  the  north 
was  again  concentrated,  and  would  have  invaded  Gal- 
licia  while  Bonet  atiacked  the  Asturias,  if  Julian  San- 


raised  lord  Wellington's  indignation  to  such  a  pitch,  cliez's  exploit  had  not  rendered  it  necessary  first  to  re- 
that  he  formally  notified  to  the  Portuguese  government  I  victual  Ciudad  Rodrigo. 

his  resolution,  unless  good  reasons  were  assigned  andi  With  this  view  a  large  convoy  was  collected  at  Sala- 
Batisfaction  made  for  the  outrage,  to  order  all  persons  manca,  in  October,  by  general-  Thiebault,  who  spread 
attached  to  the  British  to  place  themselves  in  security  a  report  that  a  force  was  to  assemble  towards  'J'amames, 
under  the  protection  of  the  army,  as  if  in  a  hostile  coun-  and  that  the  convoy  was  for  its  support.  'J'his  report 
try,  until  the  further  pleasure  of  the  British  prince  re-  did  not  deceive  lord  Wellington  ;  but  he  believed  that 
gent  should  be  made  known.  the  whole  army  of  the  north  and  one  division  of  the 

The  political  storm  which  had  been  so  long  gather-  j  army  of  Portugal  would  be  employed  in  the  operation, 
ing  then  seemed  ready  to  break,  but  suddenly  the  and  therefore  made  arrangements  to  pass  tl'.c  Agueda 
horizon  cleared.  liOrd  Wellington's  letter  to  the  [  and  attack  them  on  the  march.  The  heavy  rains,  how 
prince  backed  up  by  lord  Wellesley's  vigorous  diplo-  ever,  rendered  the  fords  of  that  river  impi'acticablc ; 
roacy,  had  at  last  alarmed  the  court  of  Rio  Janeiro,  and   'J'hiebault  seized   the  occasion,  introduced  the  convoy, 


in  the  very  crisis  of  Borel's  case  came  letters,  in  which 
the  prince  regent  admitted,  and  approved  of  all  the 
ameliorations  and  changes  proposed  by  the  English 
general  :  and  the  contradiction  given  by  Mr.  Stuart  to 
the  calum  lies  of  the  Souza  faction,  was  taken  as  the 
ground  for  a  complete  and  formal  retraction,  by  Lin- 
hares,  of  his  former  insinuations,  and  insulting  note 
relative  to  tl.at  gentleman's  condiict.  Prini.-ipal  Souza 
was  however  not  dismissed,  nor  was  Forjas'  resigna- 
tion noAced,  but  the  prince  declared  that  he  would 
overlook  that  minister's  disobedience,  and  retain  him  in 
ofBce ;  thus  proving  that  fear,  not  conviction,  or  justice, 
for  Foja">  had  not  been  disobedient,  was  the  true  cause 
of  this  seeming  return  to  friendly  relations  with  the 
British. 

Mr.  Stuart  considering  the  submission  of  the  prince 
to  be  a  mere  nominal  concession  of  power  which  was 
yet  to  be  ripened  into  real  authority,  looked  for  further 
di!Iiculti*:s,  and  he  was  not  mistaken  ;  meanwhile  he 
made  it  a  point  of  honour  to  defend  Fojas,  and  No- 
gueira,  from  the  secret  vengeance  of  the  opposite  fac- 


and  leaving  a  new  governor,  returned  on  the  2i\  of  No- 
vember before  the  waters  had  subsided.  One  brigade 
of  the  light  division  was  at  this  time  on  the  Vadillo,  but 
it  was  too  weak  to  meddle  with  the  French,  and  it  was 
impossible  to  reinforce  it  while  the  Agueda  was  over- 
flowed ;  for  such  is  the  nature  of  that  rivci"  that  all 
military  operations  on  its  banks  are  uncertain.  It  is 
very  diilicult  for  an  army  to  pass  it  at  any  time  in 
winter,  because  of  the  narrow  roads,  the  depth  of  the 
fords,  and  the  ruggedness  of  the  banks  :  it  will  suddenly 
rise  i'rora  rains  falling  on  the  hills,  without  any  pi'evions 
indication  in  the  plains,  and  then  the  violence  and  depth 
of  its  stream  will  sweep  away  any  temporary  l>ridge, 
and  render  it  impossible  to  pass,  excejit  by  the  stone 
bridge  of  Ciuilad  Rodrigo,  which  was  at  this  time  in  the 
enemy's  jiossession. 

Early  in  November,  Bonet,  having  reoccupied  tli« 
Asturias,  Dorsenne  marched  a  body  of  troops  towards 
the  hills  above  Ciudad,  as  if  to  conduct  another  con- 
voy ;  but  tlie  allied  troops  being  immediately  con- 
centrated, jiassed  the  Agueda  at  the  ford  of  Zamara, 


tion.  The  present  sul:)mission  of  the  court  however  ]  whereupon  the  French  retired,  and  their'  rear  was 
gave  the  British  an  imposing  influence,  which  rendered  ]  harassed  by  Carlos  d'Espafia  and  Julian  Sanchez, 
the  Souzas'  opposition  nugatory  for  the  moment.  Borel  who  captured  some  provisions  and  money  contributions 
was  released  and  excuses  were  made  for  his  arrest ; '  they  had  raised.  But  now  the  provisions  in  the 
the  formation  of  a  military  chest  was  pushed  with  j  country  between  the  Coa  and  the  Agueda  Mere  all  oou- 
vigour  ;  the  paper  money  was  raised  in  value;  the  i  sunied,  and  the  continued  negligence  of  the  Portuguese 
revenue  was  somewhat  increased,  and  Beresford  was  i  government,  with  respect  to  the  means  of  transport, 
enabled  to  make  progress  in  the  restoration  of  the '  rendered  it  impossible  to  bring  up  the  field  magazines 
army.  The  prince  had  however  directed  the  regency  i  from  the  points  of  water-carriage  to  the  army.  I.,ord 
to  revive  his  claim  to  Olivenza  immediately  ;  and  it  j  Wellington  was,  therefore,  contrary  to  all  military  rules, 
was  with  difficulty  that  lord  Wellington  could  stifle  i  obliged  to  separate  his  divisions  in  face  of  the  enemy, 
this  absurd  proceeding  ;  neither  did  the  forced  harmony  i  and  to  spread  the  troops,  especially  the  cavahy,  even  to 
last,  for  the  old  abuses  affecting  the  civil  administration  !  the  Mondego  and  the  valley  of  the  Douro,  or  see  them 
of  the  army  rather  increased,  as  will  Vjc;  shewn  in  the  '  starved. 

narration  of  military  operations  which  are  now  to  be  I      To  criver  this  dangerous  proceeding  he  kept  a  con- 

trnt'''J  of.  I  siderahle  body  of  men  beyond  the  Coa,  and  the  state 

P.  •.  ill  be  remembered   that  after  the  aclion  of  El   of  all  the  rivers-and  roadb  at  that  reason,  together  with 


181  l.j 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR  WAR. 


435 


the  distance  of  the  enemy  in  some  measure  protected  i  preciatinj?  the  advantaj^es  whicli  an  inviided  people 
Lim;  fretieral  Hill's  second  expedition  into  Estrema- 1  possess  in  their  numerous  lines  of  operation,  thcu 
dura  was  then  also  drawing  the  attention  of  the  French  i  counselled  the  Spaniards,  and  forced   the   Portuguese, 


I 


towards  that  quarter ;  finally  Marmont  bcinji;-  ab(nit  to 
detach  \['nilbrun  towards  Valencia,  had  withdrawn 
Foy's  division  from  Placentia,  and  concentrated  the 
greatest  part  of  his  army  at  Toledo  ;  all  which  rendered 
the  scattering  of  the  allies  less  dangerous,  and  in  fact 
no  evil  consequences  endued.  This  war  of  positi(.)ns  had 
therefore  turned  entirely  to  the  advantage  of  the  allies, 
h)rd  Wellington  by  taking  post  near  Ciudad  Rodrigo 
while  Hill  moved  round  Badajos,  had  in  a  manner  par- 
alysed thi-ee  powerful  armies.  For  Soult  harassed  by 
llill  in  Estremadura,  and  by  Ballesteros  and  SUerrett  in 
Andalusia,  ii:uled  in  l)oth  quarters,  and  although  Mar- 
mont in  conjunction  with  Dorsenne,  had  succoured  Ciu- 
dad R  idrigo,  the  latter  general's  invasion  of  Gallicia 
had  been  stopped  short,  and  his  enterprises  confined  to 
the  reoccupation  of  the  Asturias. 

Meanwhile  the  works  of  Almeida  were  so  far  re- 
stored as  to  secure  it  from  a  sudden  attack,  and  in  No- 
vember when  the  army  by  crossing  the  Agueda  had 
occupied  the  attention  of  the  French,  the  battering  train 
and  siege  stores  were  brought  to  that  fortress,  without 
exciting  the  enemy's  attention,  because  they  appeared 
to  be  only  the  armament  for  the  new  works  ;  a  trestle 
bridge  to  throw  over  the  .Agueda  was  also  secretly  pre- 
pared in  the  arsenal  of  Almeida  by  major  Sturgeon  of 
the  staff  corps,  an  officer  whose  brilliant  talents,  scien- 
tific resources,  and  unmitigated  activity  continually 
attracted  the  attention  of  the  whole  army.  Thus  the 
preparation  for  the  attack  of  Ciudad  advanced  while  the 
English  general  seemed  to  be  only  intent  upon  defending 
h''s  ov.n  position. 


CHAPTER  11. 

Review  r>f  the  different  changes  of  the  war — Enormous  efTorts 
of  Napoleon — Lord  Welhagton's  situation  described — His 
ere:it  [liaus  explained — His  tirmne.-^s  and  resolution  under 
(tifiioulties — Distressed  state  of  his  arm}- — Tiic  prudence 
and  ability  of  lord  Fitzroy  Somerset — Dissemination  of  tlie 
Kreneii  army — Lord  Wellington  seizes  tlie  opportunity  to 
besiege  Ciudad  Kodrjgo. 

TIavixg  now  brought  the  story  of  the  war  to  that 
period  when,  after  many  changes  of  fortune,  the  chan- 
cos  had  become  more  e(jual,  and  the  fate  of  the  Penin- 
S'.ii.i,  thrown  as  it  w'ere  between  the  contending  powers, 
became  a  ])rize  for  the  readiest  and  boldest  warrior,  I 
would,  ere  it  is  shown  how  Wellington  seized  it,  recal 
to  the  reader's  recollection  the  previous  vicissitudes  of 
the  contest.  I  would  have  him  remember  how,  when 
the  first,  or  insurrectional  epoch  of  the  war  had  termi- 
nated succe-ssfully  for  the  Spaniards,  Napoleon  vehe- 
ni-'ntly  broke  and  dispersed  their  armies,  and  drove 
the  British  auxiliaries  to  embark  at  Coruna.  How  the 
war  with  Austria,  and  the  inactivity  of  Joseph,  rendered 
the  emperor's  victories  unavailing,  and  rcnived  the  con- 
fidonce  of  the  Spaniards.  How  sir  Arthur  Wellesley, 
victorious  on  the  Douro,  then  marched  into  Spain,  and, 
although  the  concentrated  forces  of  the  enemy,  and 
the  ill  conduct  of  the  Spanish  government,  forced  him 
to  retreat  again  to  Portugal  as  sir  John  Moore,  from  the 
Bame  causes,  had  been  obliged  to  retreat  to  the  ocean, 
he  had  by  his  advance  relieved  Gallicia,  as  Moore  had 
by  a  like  operation  before  saved  Andalusia,  which  con- 
cluded the  third  epoch. 

How  tlie  peninsulars,  owing  to  the  exertions  of  their 


to  adopt  a  defensive  war  ;  and  with  the  more  reason 
that  England,  abounding  beyond  all  nations  in  military 
resources,  and  invincible  as  a  naval  power,  could  form 
with  her  ships  a  secure  exterior  floating  base  or  line  of 
depots  round  the  Peninsula,  anch was  ready  to  employ 
her  armies  as  well  as  her  sfiuadrons  in  the  struggle. 
How  the  Spaniards,  unheeding  these  admonitions, 
sought  great  battles,  and  in  a  few  months  lost  the  As- 
turias. Andalusia,  Estremadura,  Aragon,  and  tfie  best 
fortresses  of  Catalonia,  and  were  again  laid  prostrate 
and  helpless  before  the  enemy. 

How  the  victorious  French  armies  then  moved  on- 
wards, in  swelling  pride,  until  dashed  against  the  rocks 
of  Lisbon  they  receded,  broken  and  refluent,  and  the 
English  general  once  more  stood  a  conqueror  on  the 
frontier  of  Spain  ;  and  had  he  then  retaken  Badajos 
and  Rodrigo  he  would  have  gloriously  finished  the 
fourth  or  defensive  epoch  of  the  war.  But  being  baf- 
fled, partly  by  skill,  partly  by  fortune  ;  factiously  op- 
posed by  the  Portuguese  regency,  thwarted  by  the 
Spanish  government,  only  half  supported  by  his  own 
cabinet,  and  pestered  by  the  follies  of  all  three,  he  was 
reduced  to  a  seeming  inactivity  ;  and  meanwhile  the 
French  added  Taragona  and  the  rich  kingdom  of  Valen- 
cia to  their  conquests. 

These  things  I  would  have  the  reader  reflect  upon, 
because  tliey  are  the  ])roots  of  what  it  is  the  main  ob- 
ject of  this  history  to  inculcate,  namely  that  English 
steel,  English  gold,  English  genius,  Engljsh  influence, 
ibught  and  won  the  battle  of  Spanish  independence  ; 
and  this  not  as  a  matter  of  boast,  althongh  it  was  very 
glorious  !  but  as  a  useful  lesson  of  experience.  On  the 
other  hand  also  we  must  wonder  at  the  prodigious 
strength  of  France  under  Napoleon,  that  strength 
which  could  at  once  fight  England  and  Austria,  aim  at 
the  conquest  of  the  Peninsula,  and  the  reduction  of 
Russia  at  the  same  moment  of  time,  and  all  with  good 
hope  of  success. 

Let  it  not  be  said  that  the  emperor's  efforts  in  the 
war  of  Spain  were  feeble,  for  if  the  insurrectional 
epoch,  which  was  unexpected  and  accidental,  be  set 
aside,  the  grandeur  of  his  efforts  will  be  found  answ^er- 
able  to  his  gigantic  reputation.  In  1809  the  French 
army  was  indeed  gradually  decreased  by  losses  and 
drafts  for  the  Austrian  war,  from  three  hundred  and 
thirty-five  thousand,  which  Napoleon  had  led  into  the 
country,  to  two  hundred  and  twenty-six  thousand.  But 
in  1810  it  was  again  raised  to  three  hundred  and  sixty- 
nine  thousand,  and  fluctuated  between  that  number  and 
three  hundred  and  thirty  thousand  until  August  1811, 
when  it  was  again  raised  to  three  hundred  and  seventy- 
two  thousand  men  witli  fifty-two  thousand  horses. 
And  yet  there  are  writers  who  assert  that  Na])oleon 
neglected  the  war  in  Spain  !  But  so  great  is  the  nat- 
ural strength  of  that  country,  that  had  the  firnmess  of 
the  nation  in  battle  and  its  wisdom  in  council,  been 
commensurate  with  its  constancy  in  resistance,  even  this 
power,  backed  by  the  four  hundred  thousand  men  who 
marched  to  Russia,  would  scarcely  have  been  sufi^icient 
to  subdue  it ;  whereas,  weak  in  fight  and  steeped  in  fol- 
ly, the  Spaniards  must  have  been  trampled  in  the  dust, 
but  for  the  man  whose  great  combinations  I  am  now 
about  to  relate. 

The  nicety,  the  quickness,  the  prudence,  and  the 
audacity  of  Wellington's  operations,  cannot  however 
be  justly  estimated  without  an  exact  knowledge  of  his 
political,  local,  and  moral  position.     His  political  difti- 


allies,  still  possessed  a  country,  extending  from  the  i  culties  have  been  already  described,  and  his  mt  ral 
Asturias,  through  Gallicia,  I'ortugal,  Andalusia,  Mur- 1  situation  was  simply,  that  of  a  man,  who  felt,  lliat  all 
cia,  Valencia,  and  Catalonia,  and  including  every  im- 1  depended  upon  himself ;  that  he  must  by  some  rapid 
portant  harbour  and  fortress  except  Santander,  Santona,  I  and  unexjx'cted  stroke  efli'ct  in  the  field  what  his  bro 
Barcelona,  and   St.  Sebastian.     How  \\'ellington   ap-|ther  could  not  eriect  in  the  cabinet,  while   the  power 


436 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XVI. 


of  the  Perooval  fad  ion  was  prevalent  in  England.  But 
to  under.stanti  hi.s  local  or  military  position,  the  cont'ur- 
m:^tion  of  tliL'  country  ami  the  lines  of  conniiunication 
must  be  careliilly  ('(Uisidered. 

The  princ  pal  Fionch  magazines  were  at  Yalladolid, 
and  their  aihanecd  troops  were  on  the  Tonnes,  from 
■whence  to  llu  jV.gucda,  where  they  held  the  important 
point  of  Ciudad  ivodr.go,  was  four  long  marches  through 
a  wild  forest  country. 

The  allies'  line  of  communication  from  the  Agueda  to 
L:.-sbon,  was  supplied  by  water  to  Raiva  on  the  Alondego, 
after  which  the  land  carriage  was  at  least  a  hundred 
fliiiles,  through  wild  mountains,  or  devastated  valleys  ;  it 
icijuired  iiueen  days  to  bring  up  a  convoy  from  Lisbon 
to  the  army. 

'J'he  line  of  comnmmoation  with  Oporto  on  the  left 
flank,  run  through  eighty  miles  of  very  rugged  country, 
before  it  reached  the  tirst  point  of  water  carriage  on  the 
l^ouro. 

The  line  of  communication  with  Hill's  army  on  the 
right  flank,  running  also  through  a  country  full  of 
strong  passes  and  natural  obstacles,  offered  no  resources 
for  an  army,  save  what  were  fiu'iiished  by  the  allies' 
Held  magaziiirs,  which  were  supplied  from  Abrantes,  the 
tirst  navigable  point  on  the  Tagus.  On  this  line  the 
Ijoat-bridge  of  N'iUa  Velha  was  a  remarkable  feature,  as 
farnishing  the  only  military  passage  over  the  Tagus  be- 
tween A  uraiites  and  xi.lmaraz. 

The  country  between  the  Coa  and  the  Agueda  could 
not  supply  the  troops  who  occupied  it  ;  and  the  nature 
of  tlie  last,  river,  and  the  want  of  a  covering  position 
beyond,  rendered  it  a  matter  of  the  utmost  danger  and 
diiiieiilty  to  besiege  or  even  invest  Ciudad  Rodrigo. 
The  dis.idvantage  which  the  French  suffL'red  in  being  so 
dislant  from  that  fortress  was  thus  balanced. 

These  consxlerations  had  prevented  the  English 
general  from  attacking  Ciudad  Rodrigo  in  May  ;  he 
had  then  no  battering  train,  and  Almeida  and  her  guns 
were  rendered  a  heap  of  ruins  by  the  exploit  of  tJre- 
nier.  Badajos  was  at  that  period  his  object,  because 
Beresford  was  actually  be4ei:ing  it,  and  the  recent 
battle  of  Fuentcs  Onoro,  the  disputes  of  the  French 
generals,  the  disorganization  of  .Massena's  army,  and 
as  proved  by  that  battle,  the  inelliciency  of  the  army 
of  tlie  north,  rendered  it  improbable  that  a  serious  in- 
vasion of  Portugal  would  be  resuint^'d  on  that  side. 
And  as  the  lines  of  comnmnication  with  the  Mondego 
and  the  ]),juro,  were  not  then  completely  re-established, 
and  the  intermediate  magazines  small,  no  incursion  of 
the  enemy  could  have  done  much  mischief ;  and  Spen- 
cer's corps  was  sufficiently  strong  to  cover  the  line  to 
Villa  Velha. 

Affairs  however  soon  changed.  The  skill  of  Phil- 
lipon,  the  diligence  of  Marmont,  and  the  generalship 
of  Soult,  in  remaining  at  Llerena  after  his  rejiulse  at 
Albuera,  had  rescued  Badajos.  Lord  Wellington's 
boldness  in  remaining  on  the  (Jaya  prevented  further 
raisciiief,  but  the  conduct  of  the  Portuguese  govern- 
ment, combined  with  the  position  which  Napoleon  had 
caused  Marmont  to  take  in  the  valley  of  the  Tagus, 
effectually  precluded  a  renewal  of  that  siege  ;  and  then 
the  fallacious  hope  of  linding  Ciudad  unprovided, 
brought  lord  Wellington  back  to  the  Coa.  This  baffled 
the  enemy's  ]irojecls,  yet  the  position  of  the  army  of  the 
north,  and  that  of  Portugal,  the  one  in  front,  the  other 
on  the  tlank,  prevented  the  English  general  from  under- 
taking any  important  operations  in  the  field.  For  if  he 
had  advanced  on  Salamanca,  besides  the  natural  dilli- 
'lulties  of  the  country,  his  comniuiiications  with  Hill, 
and  even  with  Abrantes  and  Lisbon,  would  have  been 
cut  by  Marmont ;  and  if  he  turned  against  Marmont  on 
the  Tagus,  Soult  and  Dorsenue  would  have  closed  upon 
his  flanks. 

This  state  of  affairs  not  being  well  considered,  had 
iiiduced  some  able  oihccib,  at  the  time  of  the  Eibodou 


operation,  to  cen.sure  the  line  of  retreat  to  Sabuffal, 
because  it  uncovered  the  line  of  Celerico.  and  exposed  to 
capture  the  battering  train  then  at  Villa  Ponte ;  but 
war  is  always  a  choice  of  difficulties,  and  it  was  better 
to  risk  guns,  of  whose  vicinity  the  enemy  was  not  aware, 
than  to  give  up  the  communication  with  Hill  which  was 
threatened  by  the  advance  of  Foy's  two  divisions  ou 
Zarza  Maior. 

As  the  French  armies  were  reinforced  after  the  alliea 
came  to  Beira,  Dorsenne  and  Marmont  became  each 
e(jual  to  AVellington  in  the  field,  and  together  infinitely 
too'  strong.  Soult  was  then  master  of  Andalusia,  and 
had  a  moveable  reserve  of  twenty  thousand  men ;  the 
army  of  Suchet  daily  gained  ground  in  Valencia,  the 
Asturias  were  re-occupied  by  Bonet,  and  the  army  of 
the  centre  was  reorgawized.  Hence,  to  commence  the 
siege  of  either  Ciudad  or  Badajos,  in  form,  was  hope- 
less, and  when  the  rumour  of  Napoleon's  arrival  be- 
came rife,  the  English  general,  whose  embarrassments 
were  hourly  inciwising,  looked  once  more  to  the  lines 
of  Torres  Vedras  as  a  refuge.  But  when  the  certainty 
of  the  Russian  war  removed  this  fear,  the  aspect  of 
affairs  again  changed,  and  the  capture  of  Ciudad  Rod- 
rigo became  possible.  For,  first,  there  wjis  a  good 
battering  train  in  Almeida,  and  the  w<jrks  of  that  place 
were  restored;  secondly,  the  line  of  communication 
with  Oporto  was  comjjletely  organized,  and  shortened 
by  improving  the  navigation  of  the  Douro  ;  thirdly, 
Ciudad  itself  was  very  weakly  garrisoned  and  the 
ignorance  of  the  French  as  to  the  state  of  the  allies' 
preparations  gave  ho}ie  of  a  surprise.  It  was  how- 
ever, only  by  a  surprise  that  success  could  be  expect- 
ed, and  it  was  not  the  least  of  lord  AVellingtou's  merits 
that  he  so  well  concealed  his  preparations,  and  for  so 
long  a  period.  No  other  operation,  promising  any  suc- 
cess, was  open  ;  and  yet  the  general  could  no  longer 
remain  niactive,  because  around  hiin  the  whole  fabric 
of  the  war  was  falling  to  pieces  I'rom  the  folly  of  the 
governments  he  was  serving.  If  he  could  not  efii-ct  a 
blow  against  the  French  while  Napoleon  was  engaged 
in  the  Russian  war,  it  was  clear  that  the  Peninsula 
would  be  lost. 

Now  the  surprise  of  a  fortress,  with  a  garrison  of 
only  seventeen  fmndred  men,  .seems  a  small  matter  in 
such  grave  circumstances,  but  in  reality  it  was  of  the 
very  greatest  importance,  because  it  was  the  first  step 
in  a  plan  which  saved  the  Peninsula  when  nothing  else 
could  have  saved  it.  Lord  Wellington  kiK'w  that  the 
valley  of  the  Tagus  could  not  long  support  both  the 
army  of  Portugal,  and  the  army  of  the  centre  ;  he  knew 
by  intercepted  letters  that  Marmont  and  the  king  were 
already  at  open  war  upon  the  subject,  and  he  judged, 
that  if  he  could  surprise  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  the  army  of 
Portugal  would  be  obliged,  for  the  sake  of  prtivisions, 
and  to  protect  Leon,  then  weakened  by  the  di^parture 
of  the  imperial  guards,  to  concentrate  in  that  province. 
I  This  was  the  first  step. 

j      The   French  kept   magazines  in   reserve  for  sudden 
I  expeditions,  feeding  meanwhile  as  they  could  upon  the 
!  country,  and  therefore  their  distress  for  provisions  never 
i  obstructed    their   moving    upon    important    occasions. 
i  Nevertheless  lord  Wellington  thought  the  tempestuous 
season  would  render  it  very  difficult  for  Marmont,  w'hen 
i  thus   forced    into   Leon,  to  move  with   great   masses ;  j 
j  wherefi;re   he  proposed,  when   Rodrigo   fell,  to  march  i 
by  Vilha  Velha  to  Estremadura,  and  suddenly  besiege 
Badajds  also,  the  f)reparations  to  be  previously  made 
in  Elvas,  unde.r  the  protection  of  Hill's  corps,  and  un- 
known to  the  enemy.     This  was  the  second  step,  and 
in  this  surprise  also  he  hojjed  to  be  successful,  because 
of  the  jealousies  of  the  marshals,  the  wet  season,  and 
his  own  combinations,  which   would    impede    the  con- 
,  centration  of  the  French  armies,  and  prevent  them  from 
keeping  together  if  they  did  unite.     He  had  liopes  like- 
wise  that   as   Ballesleros'  corps   was  now   augmented, 


1811. 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR, 


437 


it  would  vex  Soulfs  posts  on  the  coast,  while  Hill  and 
Morillo  hariussed  him  oa  the  Guadiana  ;  and  if  IJadajos 
loll,  the  En<ilish  general  was  resolved  to  leave  a  force 
to  cover  the  captured  place  against  the  army  of  the 
centre,  and  tluni  light  Soult  in  Andalusia.  For  he 
judged  that  JNlarmont  could  not  for  want  of  provisions, 
pass  beyond  the  Guadiana,  nor  follow  him  belbre  the 
harvest  was  rii)e ;  neither  did  he  fear  him  in  Beira,  be- 
cause the  torrents  would  be  full,  the  country  a  desert, 
and  the  militia,  aided  by  a  small  regular  corps,  and 
covered  by  Almeida  and  (^iudud  Rodrigo,  would,  he 
thought,  be  sulFiLient  to  pievent  any  serious  inipres- 
bIou  being  made  on  Portugal  during  the  invasion  of 
Andalusia. 

This  was  lord  Wellington's  plan,  and  his  firmness 
and  resolution  in  conceiving  it  were  the  more  signal 
because  his  own  troops  were  not  in  good  plight.  The 
army  had  indeed  received  reinforcements,  but  the  in- 
fantry had  served  at  Walcheren,  and  exposure  to  night 
uir,  or  even  slight  hardship,  threw  them  by  hundreds 
into  the  hospital,  while  the  new  regiments  of  cavalry, 
inexperienced,  and  not  acclimated,  were  found,  men 
and  horses,  (|uite  unlit  for  duty,  and  were  sent  to  the 
rear.  The  pay  of  the  army  was  three  months  in  arrear, 
and  the  supplies,  brought  up  with  difficulty,  were  very 
scanty  ;  lialf  and  (piarter  rations  were  often  served,  and 
sometimes  the  troops  were  without  any  bread  for  three 
days  consecutively,  and  their  clothing  was  so  patched, 
that  scarcely  a  regiment  could  be  known  by  its  uniform. 
Chopped  straw,  the  only  forage,  was  so  scarce  that  the 
regimental  animals  were  dying  of  hunger  ;  corn  was 
rarely  distributed  save  to  the  generals  and  staff,  and 
even  the  horses  of  the  artillery  and  of  the  old  cavali-y 
suffered  ;  nay,  the  very  mules  of  the  commissariat  \ver(^ 
pinched  by  the  scarcity,  and  the  muleteers  were  eight 
months  in  arrears  of  pay.  The  cantonments  on  the 
(Joa  and  Agueda  were  unhealthy  from  the  continued 
rains,  above  twenty  thousand  men  were  in  hospital  ; 
and  deduction  made  for  other  drains,  only  fifty-four 
thousand  of  both  nations,  including  garrisons  and  posts 
of  communication,  were  under  arms.  To  finish  the 
picture,  the  sulky  apathy  produced  in  the  Portuguese 
regency  by  the  prince  regent's  letter,  was  now  becom- 
ing more  hurtful  than  the  former  active  opposition. 

But  even  these  distresses  so  threatening  to  the  gene- 
ral cause,  Wellington  turned  to  the  advantage  of  his 
present  designs;  for  the  enemy  were  aware  of  the 
misery  in  tlie  army,  and  in  their  imagination  magni- 
fied it ;  and  as  the  allied  troops  were  scattered,  for 
relief,  from  the  Gata  mountains  to  the  Douro,  and  from 
the  Agueda  to  the  .Mondego,  at  th?  very  moment  when 
the  battering  train  entered  Almeida,  both  armies  con- 
cluded, that  these  guns  were  only  to  arm  that  fortress, 
as  a  cover  to  the  extended  country  quarters  which  ne- 
cessity had  forced  the  British  general  to  adopt.  No 
person,  not  even  the  engineers  employed  in  the  prepa- 
rations, knew  more  than  that  a  siege  or  the  simulation 
of  a  siege  was  in  contemplation  ;  but  when  it  was  to 
be  attempted,  or  that  it  would  be  attempted  at  all, 
none  knew  ;  even  the  quarter-master  general  Murray, 
was  permitted  to  go  home  on  leave,  with  the  full 
persuasion  that  no  operation  could  take  place  before 
spring. 

In  the  new  cantonmentg,  however,  abundance  of 
provisions,  and  dry  weatiier  (for  in  Beira  the  first  rains 
generally  subside  during  December,)  stopped  the  sick- 
ness, and  restored  about  three  thousand  men  to  the 
ranks  ;  and  it  would  be  a  great  error  to  suppose,  that 
the  privations  had  in  any  manner  weakened  the  moral 
courage  of  the  troops.  The  old  regiments  had  become 
incredibly  hardy  and  experienced  in  all  things  neces- 
sary to  sustain  their  strength  and  efficacy ;  the  staff 
of  the  army  was  well  practised,  and  lord  Fitzroy  Som- 


erset, the  military  secretary,  had  established  such  an 
intercourse  between  the  head-((uarters  and  the  com- 
manders of  battalions,  that  the  latter  had,  so  to  speak, 
direct  communication  with  the  general-in-chief  upon 
all  the  business  of  their  regiments;  a  privilege  which 
increased  the  enthusiasm  and  zeal  of  all  in  a  very  sur- 
prising manner.  For  the  battalions  being  generally 
under  very  young  men,  the  di^tinctioIls  of  rank  weie 
not  very  rigidly  enforced,  and  the  merits  of  I'ach  olli- 
cer  were  consetjuently  better  known,  and  more  earnestly 
supported  when  promotion  and  honours  were  to  be  ob- 
tained. By  this  method  lord  Fitzroy  acquired  an 
exact  knowledge  of  the  true  moral  state  of  each  regi- 
ment, rendered  his  own  office  at  once  powerful  and 
gracious  to  the  army,  and  yet,  such  was  his  discretion 
and  judgment,  did  in  no  manner  weaken  the  military 
hierarchy  ;  thus  also  all  the  daring  young  men  were  ex- 
cited, and  being  unacquainted  with  the  political  dilficul- 
ties  of  their  general,  anticipattd  noble  triumphs,  which 
were  happily  realized. 

The  favourable  moment  for  action  so  long  watched 
for  by  Wellington  came  at  last.  An  imperial  decree 
had  remodelled  the  French  armies,  'i'liat  of  Aragon 
was  directed  to  give  up  four  divisions  to  form  a  new 
corps,  under  Reille,  called  thft  "wmy  c>f  the  Ebro," 
whose  h(^ad-qnarters  were  at  Lerida.  'I'he  army  of 
the  south  was  recomposed  in  six  divisions  of  infantry 
and  three  of  cavalry,  besides  the  garrison  of  Badajos, 
and  marshal  Victor  returned  to  France,  discontented, 
for  he  was  one  of  those  whose  reputation  had  been 
abated  by  this  war.  His  divisions  were  given  to  gen- 
erals Conroux,  Barrels,  Villatte,  Laval,  Drouet,  l>ari- 
cau,  Peyremont,  Bigeon,  and  the  younger  Soult,  Phil- 
lipon  continuing  governor  of  Badajos.  The  reserve  of 
Monthion  was  broken  up,  and  the  army  of  the  north, 
destined  to  maintain  the  great  communications  with 
France  and  to  reduce  the  Partidas,  on  that  line,  was 
ordered  to  occupy  the  districts  round  St.  Ander,  Se- 
bastian, Burgos,  and  Pampeluna,  and  to  communicate 
by  the  left  with  the  new  army  of  the  Ebro  :  it  was 
also  exceedingly  reduced  in  numbers,  for  the  imperial 
guards,  seventeen  thousand  strong,  were  retpiired  for 
the  Russian  war,  and  marched  in  l)eceniber  for  France. 
And  besides  these  troops,  the  Polish  battalions,  the 
skeletons  of  the  cavalry  regiments,  and  several  thou- 
sand choice  men,  destined  to  fill  the  ranks  of  the  old 
guard,  were  drafted  ;  so  that  not  less  than  forty  thousand 
of  the  very  best  soldiers  were  withdrawn,  and  the 
maimed  aiul  worn-out  men  being  sent  back  to  France  at 
the  same  time,  the  iorce  in  the  Peninsula  was  diminished 
by  sixty  thousand. 

The  head-quarters  of  the  army  of  the  north  arrived 
at  Burgos  in  January,  and  a  division  was  immediately 
sent  to  drive  Mendizabel  from  the  Montana  de  St.  An- 
der ;  but  as  this  arrangement  weakened  the  grand  line 
of  communication  with  France,  Marmont  was  ordered 
to  abandon  the  valley  of  the  Tagus  and  fix  his  head- 
quarters at  Valladolid  or  Salamanca,  t.'iudad  Kodrii;rL 
the  sixth  and  seventh  governments,  and  the  Asturias, 
were  also  placed  under  his  authority,  by  which  Sou- 
ham  and  Bonet's  division,  forming  together  about 
eighteen  thousand  men,  were  added  to  his  army  ;  but 
the  former  general  returned  to  France.  These  divisions, 
however,  being  pressed  by  want,  were  extended  from 
the  Asturias  U)  'i'oledo,  while  Montbrun  was  near  Va- 
lencia, and  meanwhile  Soult's  attention  was  distracted 
by  Tarifa,  and  by  Hill's  jjursuit  of  Drouet.  Thus  the 
French  armies,  every  where  occiqiied.  were  spread 
over  an  immense  tract  of  country ;  Marmont  deceived 
by  the  seemingly  careless  winter  altitude  of  the  allies, 
left  Ciudad  Rodrigo  unprotected  within  their  reach,  and 
Wellington  jumped  with  both  feet  upon  the  devoitd 
fortress. 


438 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    AVAR. 


[Bo;r  XVI. 


CHAPTER    III.  I  port,  tlio   Endish   general   had  previously  con-structed 

eight  liuiulreci  carts  drawn  by  horses,  and  these  were 
Means  collected  for  the  sieore  of  Ciudad  Eodrigo— Miijor  |  „„^v  jjjg    j.y,.pst    dependence  for    bringing  up  aniniiuii- 

5::^tI^^rCol.;;;eitr;:?:t:^n:t;i'l^,:;Li;;-;  ;    y^t   so  many  dOays  were  anticipated  fron,  the 

The  scarcity  of  tnuisport  baulks  lord  WcHington's  calou-  •.  nTegiiUinty  of  the  -native  carters  and  muleteers,  and  the 


-Observationci. 


lutious — M:iriuont  collects    troops— Plan  of"  the    attack  |  chances  of  weather,  that  ho  calculated  upon   an  opera- 
chanjred— Two  breaches  are  made  and  the  city  is  ritormcd   tion  of  twenty-four  days,  and  yet  hoped  to  steal  it  from 

his  adversaries  ;  sure,  even  if  he  failed,  that  the  clash 
of  his  arms  would  again  draw  their  scattered  troops  to 
tliat  quarter,  as  tinkling  bells  draw  swarming  bees  to 
an  empty  hive. 

'I'lie  8th  of  January  the  light  division  and  Pack's 


SIEGE    OF    CIUDAD    RODRIGO. 


The  troops  disposable  for  the  attack  of  Ciudad 
Rodrigo  were  about  thirty-five  thousand,  including  cav- 
alry ;    the  materials  for   the  siege  were  established  at  i  Portutruc^e   forded   the   Agueda   near    Caridad,   three 


Gallegos,  Villa  del  Ciervo,  and   Espeja,  on  the  left  of 
the  Agueda,  and  the  aninmnition  was  at  Almeiila.   From  ! 
those  places,  the  hired  carts  and  mules  were  to  bring! 
up  the  stores  to  thp  pare,  and  seventy  pieces  of  ord-  [ 
nance  had  been  collected  at  Villa  de  Ponte.     But  from  j 


miles  above  the  fortress,  and  making  a  circuit,  took 
post  beyond  the  great  Teson,  where  they  remained 
quiet  during  the  day,  and  as  there  was  no  regular  in- 
vestment, the  enemy  believed  not  that  the  siege  was 
i  commenced.  But  in  the  evening  the  troops  stood  to 
the  scarcity  of  transports  only  thirty-eight  guns  could  i  their  arms,  and  colonel  Colborne  commanding  the  fifty- 
be  brought  to  the  trenches,  and  these  would  have  want-  j  second,  having  assembled  two  companies  "^from  each 
ed  their  due  supply  of  ammunition,  if  eight  thousand  •  of  the  British  reaiments  of  the  light  division,  stormed 
shot  had  not  been  found  amidst  the  ruins  of  Almeida.  |  the  redoubt  of  Francisco.  This  he  did  with  so  much 
On  the  1st  of  January  the  bridge  was  commenced  at  |  fuj-y,  that  the  assailants  appeared  to  be  at  one  and  the 
ilarialva.  near  the  confluence  of  the  Azava  with  the ;  sa,;,e  time,  in  the  ditch,  mounting  the  parapets,  fight- 


"Agueda,  about  six  miles  below  Ciudad,  and  piles  were 
driven  into  the  bed  of  the  river,  above  and  below,  to 
■which  the  trestles  were  tied  to  render  the  whole  firm. 
The  fortress  was  to  have  been  invested  on  the  6th,  but 
the  native  carters  were  two  days  moving  over  ten  miles 
of  tiat  and  excellent  road,  with  empty  carts  ;  the  opera- 
tion was  thus  delayed,  and  it  was  dangerous  to  find  fault 
with  these  people,  because  they  deserted  on  the  slightest 
ottence.  Meanwhile,  the  place  being  closely  examined, 
it  was  found  that  the  French,  in  addition  to  the  old 
works,  had  fortified  two  convents,  which  flanked  and 
strengthened  the  bad  Spanish  entrenchments  round  the 
suburbs.  They  had  also  constructed  an  enclosed  and 
palisadoed  redoubt  upon  the  greater  Teson  ;  and  this  re- 


ing  on  the  top  of  the  rampart,  and  forcing  the  gorge 
of  the  redoubt,  where  the  explosion  of  one  of  the  French 
shells  had  burst  the  gate  open. 

Of  the  defenders  a  few  were  killed,  not  many,  and 
the  remainder,  about  forty  in  number,  were  nuule  pri- 
soners. The  post  being  thus  taken  with  the  loss  of  only 
twenty-four  men  and  officers,  working  parties  wore  set 
to  labour  on  the  right  of  it,  because  the  fort  itself  was 
instantly  covered  with  shot  and  shells  from  the  town. 
This  tempest  continued  through  the  night,  but  at  day- 
break the  parallel,  six  hundred  yards  in  length,  was  sunk 
three  feet  deep,  and  four  wide,  the  comnmnication  over 
the  Teson  to  the  rear  v.'as  completed,  and  the  progress 
of  the  siege  was  thus  hastened  several  days  by  this  well- 


doubt,  called  Francisco,  was  supported  by  two  guns  and  I  manasred "assault 

u  howitzer  placed  on  the  flat  roof  of  the  convent  of  that  |      The  9th  the  first  division  took  the  trenches  in  hand. 

"^"|t!-      .  I  The  place  was  encircled  bv  posts  to  prevent  any  external 

The  soil  around  was  exceedingly  rocky,  except  on  the   communication,  and  at  night  twelve  hundred  ^vorkmen 

Tesou  itself,  and  though  the  body  of  the  place  was  there  ,  commenced  three  counter-batteries,  for  eleven  guns  each, 


better  covered  by  the  outworks,  and  could  bring  most 
lire  to  bear  on  the  trenches,  it  was  more  assailable  ac- 
cording to  the  English  general's  views  ;  because  elsewhere 
the  slope  of  the  ground  was  such  that  batteries  must 
have  been  erected  on  the  very  edge  of  the  counterscarp 
before  they  could  see  low  enough  to  breach.  'J'his  would 
have  been  a  tedious  process,  whereas  the  smaller  Teson 
furnished  the  means  of  striking  over  the  crest  of  the  gla- 
cis at  once,  and  a  deep  gully  near  the  latter  oifered  cover 
for  the  miners.  It  was  therefore  resolvitd  to  storm  fort  I 
Francisco,  form  a  lodgement  there,  and  opening  the  fii-st 
parallel  along  the  greater  Te3(ni,  to  place  thirty-three 
pieces  in  counter-batteries  with  which  to  ruin  the  de- 
fences, and  drive  the  besieged  from  the  convent  of  Fran- 
cisco ;  then  working  forward  by  the  sap  to  construct 
breach! ng-batteries  on  the  lesser  Teson,  and  blow  in  the 
counterscarp,  while  seven  guns,  by  battering  a  weak 
turret  on  the  left,  opened  a  .second  bieach,  with  a  view 
to  turn  any  retrene.liment  behind  the  principal  breach. 

The  first,  third,  fourth,  and  light  divisions,  and  I'ack's 
Portuguese,  were  destined  for  the  siege,  but  as  the 
country  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Agueda  was  destitute 
of  fuel  and  cover,  these  troops  were  still  to  keep  their 
quarters  on  the  left  bank  ;  and  although  there  was  a 


under  a  heavy  fire  of  shells  and  grape.  Before  day-light 
the  labourers  were  under  cover,  and  a  ditch  was  also 
sunk  in  the  front  to  provide  earth ;  for  the  batteries 
were  made  eighteen  feet  thick  at  top,  to  resist  the  very 
powerful  artillery  of  the  place. 

On  the  10th  the  fourth  division  relieved  the  trenches, 
and  a  thousand  men  laboured,  but  in  great  peril,  for  the 
besieged  had  a  superabundance  of  ammunition,  and  did 
not  spare  it.  In  the  night  the  communication  from  the 
parallel  to  the  batteries  was  opened,  and  on  the  11th 
the  third  division  undertook  the  siege. 

This  day  the  magazines  in  the  batteries  More  exca- 
vated, and  the  approaches  widened,  but  the  enemy's  fire 
was  destructive,  and  the  shells  came  so  fast  into  the 
ditch  in  front  of  the  batteries,  that  the  troof)s  were  with- 
drawn, and  the  earth  was  raised  from  the  inside.  Great 
damage  was  also  sustained  from  salvos  of  .shells,  with 
long  fuzes,  whose  simultaneous  explosion  cut  away  the 
jiarapets  in  a  strange  manner,  and  in  the  night  the 
French  brought  a  howitzer  to  the  garden  of  the  con- 
vent of  Francisco,  with  which  they  killed  many  men 
and  wounded  others. 

On  the  12th  the  light  division  resumed  the  work, 
and  the  riflemen  takina:  advantage  of  a  thick  fosr,  cov-j 


very  severe   frost  and   fall  of  snow,  yet  one  division,   ored  themselves  in   pits,   which   they  digged    in   front' 

carrying  a  day's  provisions  ready  cooked,  was  to  ford '  of  the  trenches,  and  from  thence  picked  off  the  enemy's 

the  river  eviiry  twcuity-four  hours,  either  above  or  below  j  gunners  ;  but  in  the  night  the  weather  was  so  cold,  and 


the  town,  and    thus   alternately  carry  on    the  works, 
Meanwhile,  to  cover  the  siege,  Julian  Sanchez  and  Car- 
los d'Espana  were  posted  on  the  Torraes  in  observation 
of  the  enemy. 
'I'o  obviate  the  difficulty  of  obtaining  country  trans- 


thc  besieged  shot  so  b  iskly,  that  little  progress  was 
made. 

'J'he  13th,  the^rst  division  being  on  duty,  the  same 
causes  impeded  the  labourers,  and  now  also  the  scar- 
city   of  transport  baulked    the    general's    operations. 


18]  i.j 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WA 


439 


One  tliinl  only,  of  the  native  carts,  expected,  had  ar- 
rived, ;ui(l  the  drivers  of  those  ])ret;ent  were  very  indo- 
lent ;  mtii'h  of  the  twenty-four  pound  ammunition  was 
still  at  Villa  de  Ponte,  and  intelligence  arrived  that 
Marinont  was  collecting  his  forces  to  succour  the  place. 
Welling'tiin  tiierefore  changing  his  tii"st  plan,  resolved 
to  open  a  breach  with  his  counter-l)atteries,  which  were 
not  quite  six  hundred  yards  from  the  curtain,  and  then 
tostoim  the  place  without  blowing  in  the  counter-scarp  ; 
.-  in  other  words,  to  overstep  the  rules  of  science,  and 
sacrifice  life  rather  than  tinftt,  for  such  was  the  capri- 
cious nature  of  the  Agueda  that  in  one  night  a  flood 
might  enable  a  small  French  force  to  relieve  the  place. 

The  whole  army  was  immediately  brought  up  from 
the  distant  quarters,  and  posted  in  the  villages  on  the 
Coa,  ready  to  crr;ss  the  Ao'ueda  and  give  battle  ;  and  it 
was  at  this  time,  that  Hill,  who  was  then  at  Merida, 
returned  to  P^rtalegre,  and  sent  a  division  across  the 
Tagus,  lest  .^larmont,  in  despair  of  uniting  his  force  in 
the  noi'th,  in  time  to  save  Cindad,  should  act  against  the 
line  of  coamiunication  by  Castello  Branco  and  Vilha 
A'elha. 

In  the  night  of  the  13th  the  batteries  were  armed 
with  twenty-eight  guns,  the  second  parallel  and  the 
iipproaches  were  continued  by  the  flying  sap,  and  the 
Ranta  Cruz  convent  was  surprised  by  the  Germans  of 
the  first  diviiiion,  which  secured  the  right  flank  of  the 
trenches. 

The  14th  the  enemy,  who  had  observed  that  the  men 
in  the  trenches  always  went  off  in  a  disorderly  manner 
on  the  approach  of  the  relief,  made  a  sally  and  over- 
turned the  gabions  of  the  sap  ;  they  even  penetrated 
to  the  parallel,  and  were  upon  the  point  of  entering  the 
batteries,  when  a  few  of  the  workmen  getting  together, 
checked  them  until  a  suiiport  arrived,  and  thus  the 
guns  were  saved.  This  affair,  together  with  the  death 
of  the  engineer  on  duty,  and  the  heavy  fire  from 
the  town,  delayed  the  opening  of  the  breaching-bat- 
teries,  but  at  half-past  four  in  the  evening,  twenty-live 
heavy  guns  battered  the  ''fausse  braije  "  and  rampart, 
and  two  pieces  were  directed  against  the  convent  of 
Francisco.  Then  was  beheld  a  spectacle  at  once  fear- 
ful and  sub'ii.ie.  The  enemy  replied  to  the  assailants' 
fire  with  more  than  fifty  pieces,  the  bellowing  of  eighty 
large  guns  sliook  the  ground  far  and  wide,  the  smoke 
rested  in  heavy  volumes  upon  the  batllements  of  the 
place,  or  curled  in  light  wreaths  about  the  numerous 
spires,  the  shells,  hissing  through  the  air,  seemed  fiyry 
serpents  leaping  from  tlie  darkness,  the  walls  crashed 
to  the  stroke  of  the  bullet,  and  the  distant  mountains, 
faintly  returning  the  sound,  appeared  to  moan  over  the 
falling  city.  And  when  night  put  an  end  to  this  tur- 
moil, the  quick  clatter  of  musketry  was  heard  like 
the  pattering  of  hail  after  a  peal  of  thunder,  for  the  fcn-- 
tieth  regiment  assaulted  and  carried  the  convent  of  Fran- 
cisco, and  established  itself  in  the  suburb  on  the  left  of 
tlie  attack. 

The  next  day  the  ramparts  were  again  battered,  and 
fell  so  fast  that  it  was  judged  expedient  to  commence 
the  small  br^-ach  at  the  turret,  and  in  the  night  of  the 
15th  five  more  guns  were  mounted.  The  IGth  at  day- 
light the  besiegers'  batteries  recommenced,  but  at  eight 
o'clock  a  thick  fog  obliged  them  to  desist,  nevertheless 
the  small  breach  had  been  opened,  and  the  place  was 
now  sunuuoned,  but  M'ithout  effect.  At  night  the 
parallel  on  the  lower  Teson  was  extended,  and  a  sharp 
nuisketry  was  directed  from  thence  against  the  great 
breach.  The  breaching-battery  as  originally  projected 
wa-s  also  commenced,  and  the  riflemen  of  the  light  divis- 
ion, hidden  in  the  pits,  continued  to  pick  off  the  enemy's 
gunners. 

The  17th  the  fire  on  both  sides  was  very  heavy  and 
the  wall  of  the  place  was  beaten  down  in  large  cantles  ; 
but  several  of  the  besiegers'  guns  were  dismounted, 
their  batteries  injured,  and  many  of  their  men  killed  ; 


general  Borthwick  the  commandant  of  artillery  wai 
wounded  and  the  sap  was  entirely  ruined.  Even  tlio 
riflemen  in  the  pits  were  at  first  overpowered  with 
grape,  yet  towards  evening  they  recovered  the  upper 
hand,  and  the  French  could  only  fire  from  the  more  dis- 
tant embrasures.  In  the  night  the  battery,  intendi^d  for 
the  lesser  breach,  was  armed,  and  that  on  the  lower  Te- 
son raised  so  as  to  afii.rd  cover  in  the  day-time. 

_  On  the  18th  the  besiegers'  fire  wasri\sumcd  with  great 
violence.  The  turret  was  shaken  at  the  small  breach, 
the  large  breach  became  practicable  in  the  middle,  and 
the  enemy  commenced  retrenching  it.  The  sap  how- 
ever could  make  no  progress,  the  superintending  engi 
neer  was  badly  wounded,  and  a  twenty-four  pounder 
having  bursted  in  the  batteries,  killed  several  men.  Ic 
the  night  the  battery  on  the  lower  Teson  was  improved, 
and  a  field-piece  and  howitzer  being  placed  there,  kept 
up  a  constant  fire  on  the  great  breach  to  destroy  the 
French  retrenchments. 

On  the  19th  both  breaches  became  practicable,  major 
Sturgeon  closely  examined  the  place,  and  a  plan  of  at- 
tack was  formed  on  his  report ;  the  assault  was  then  or- 
dered, and  the  battering  guns  were  turned  against  the 
artillery  of  the  ramparts. 

ASSAULT    OF    CIUDAD    RODRIGO. 

This  operption  which  was  confined  to  the  third  and 
light  divisions,  and  Pack's  Portuguese,  was  organized  i» 
four  parts. 

1.  TItc  rigid  attack.  The  light  company  of  tho 
eighty-third  and  the  second  cacadores  which  were 
posted  in  the  houses  beyond  the  bridge  on  the  Agueda, 
were  directed  to  cross  that  river  and  escalade  an  out- 
work in  front  of  the  castle,  where  there  was  no  ditch, 
but  where  two  guns  commanded  the  junction  of  the 
counterscarp  with  the  body  of  the  place.  'I'he  fifth 
and  ninety-fourth  regiments  posted  behind  the  convent 
of  Santa  Cruz  and  having  the  se»^nty-seventh  in  re- 
serve, were  to  enter  the  ditch  at  the  extremity  of  the 
counterscarp  ;  then  to  escalade  the  "fausse  braye,"  and 
scour  it  on  the  left  as  far  as  the  great  breach. 

2.  The  centre  attack  or  assault  of  the  great  breach. 
One  hundred  and  eiglity  men  protected  by  the  fire  of 
the  eighty-third  regiment,  and  carrying  hay-bags  to 
throw  into  the  ditch,  were  to  move  out  of  the  second 
parallel  and  to  be  followed  by  a  storming  party,  which 
was  again  to  be  supported  by  general  Mackinnon's  brig- 
ade ol'  the  third  division. 

3.  Left  attack.  The  light  division,  posted  behind  the 
convent  of  Francisco,  was  to  send  three  companies  of 
the  ninety-fifth  to  scour  the  "fau^se  braye"  to  the  right, 
and  so  connect  the  leit  and  centre  attacks.  At  the  same 
time  a  storming  party  preceded  by  the  third  ca^adores 
carrying  hay-sacks,  and  followed  by  Vandeleur's  and 
Andrew  Barnard's  brigades,  was  to  make  for  the  small 
breach,  and  when  the  "fausse  braye"  was  carried  to 
detach  to  their  right,  to  assist  the  main  assault,  and  to 
the  let\  to  force  a  passage  at  the  Salamanca  gate. 

4.  The  false  attack.  This  was  an  escalaae  ;o  be  made 
-by  Pack's  Portuguese  on  the  St.  Jago  gate  at  the  oppo- 
site side  of  the  town. 

The  right  attack  was  commanded  by  colonel  OTooIe 
of  the  ca(;adores. 

Five  hundred  volunteers  commanded  by  major  MaiH 
ners  of  the  seventy-f(mrth  with  a  forlorn  hope  under 
Mr.  Mackie  of  the  eighty-eighth,  composed  the  storm- 
ing party  of  the  third  division. 

Three  hundred  volunteers  led  by  major  Georga 
Napier  of  the  fifty-second  with  a  forlorn  hope  of 
twenty-five  men  under  Mr.  (iurwood,  of  the  sajne 
regiment,  compo.sed  the  storming  party  of  the  light 
division. 

All  the  troops  reached  their  different  posts  without 
I  seeming  to  attract  the  attention  of  the  enemy,  but 
!  before  the  signal  was  given,  and  while  lord  \fVelliag- 


440 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR, 


[Book  X  Vl. 


ton,  who  in  person  had  been  pohitiiin;  out  the  lesser 
breach  to  major  Napier,  w;vs  still  at  the  convent  of 
Francisco,  tiie  attack  on  the  right  comincuced,  and 
■was  instantly  taken  up  along  the  whole  line.  'J'hen 
the  space  between  Ihe  army  and  the  ditch  was  covered 
with  soldiers  and  ravaged  by  a  tempest  of  grajie  from 
the  ramparts.  The  storming  parties  of  the  third  di- 
vision jumped  out  of  the  parallel  when  the  first  shout 
arose,  l»ut  so  rapid  had  been  the  movements  on  their 
right,  that  before  they  could  reach  the  ditch,  Ridge, 
Dunkin,  and  Canipbe'l  with  the  fifth,  seventy-seventh. 
and  ninety-fourth  regiments,  had  already  scoured  the 
"fau.f'ie  hmi/e,"  and  \ver(>  yiushing  up  the  great  breach, 
amidst  the  bursting  of  shells,  the  whistling  of  grape 
and  nnis'a'ts,  and  the  shrill  cries  of  the  French  who 
were  driven  fighting  behind  the  retrenchments.  There 
however,  they  rallied,  and  aided  by  the  musketry  from 
the  houses,  made  hard  battle  for  their  post ;  none 
would  go  back  on  either  side,  and  yet  the  British 
could  not  get  forward,  and  men  and  officers,  falling  in 
heaps,  choked  up  the  passage,  which  from  minute  to 
minute  was  raked  with  grape,  from  two  guns,  flanking 
the  top  of  the  breacli  at  the  distance  of  a  few 
yards  ;  thus  striving  and  trampling  alike  upon  the  dead 
and  the  wounded,  these  brave  men  maintained  the 
combat. 

Meanwhile  the  stormers  of  tlie  light  division,  who 
had  three  hundred  yards  of  ground  to  clear,  would 
not  wait  for  the  hay-bags,  but  with  extraordinary  I 
swiftness  running  to  the  crest  of  the  glacis,  jumped 
down  the  scarp,  a  depth  of  eleven  feet,  and  rushed  up 
the  "/au?se  brni/e"  under  a  smashing  discharge  of 
grape  and  musketry.  'I'he  bottom  of  the  ditch  was 
dark  and  intricate,  and  the  forlorn  hope  took  too  much 
U)  their  left ;  but  the  storming  party  went  straight  to 
the  breach,  which  was  so  contracted  that  a  gun  placed 
lengthwise  across  the  top  nearly  blocked  np  the 
opening.  Here  tb'^  forlorn  hope  rejoined  the  stormers, 
but  when  two-thirds  of  the  ascent  were  gained,  the 
leading  men,  crushed  together  by  the  narrowness  of 
the  place,  staggered  under  the  weight  of  the  enemy's 
fire ;  and  such  is  the  instinct  of  self-defence,  that 
although  no  man  had  been  allowed  to  load,  every 
musket  in  the  crowd  was  snapped.  The  conmiander, 
major  Napier,  was  at  this  moment  stricken  to  the  earth 
by  a  grape  shot  which  shattered  his  arm,  but  he  called 
on  his  men  to  trust  to  their  bayonets,  and  all  the 
officers  simultaneously  sprang  to  the  front,  when  the 
charge  was  renewed  with  a  furious  shout,  and  the 
entrance  was  gained.  The  supporting  regiments  com- 
ing up  in  sections,  abreast,  then  reached  the  ram- 
part, the  fifty-second  wheeled  to  the  left,  the  forty- 
third  to  the  right,  and  the  place  was  won.  During 
this  contest  which  lasted  only  a  few  minutes,  after 
the  " f ansae  brni/e"  was  passed,  the  fighting  had  con- 
tinued at  the  great  breach  with  unabated  violence,  but 
when  the  forty-third,  and  the  stormers  of  the  light 
division  came  pouring  down  upon  the  right  flank  of 
the  French,  the  latter  bent  before  the  storm  ;  at  the 
Rime  moment,  the  explosion  of  three  wall  magazines 
destroyed  many  persons,  and  the  third  division  with  a 
mighty  effort  broke  through  the  entrenchments.  The 
garrison  indeed  still  fought  fn-  a  moment  in  the 
etreets,  but  finally  fled  to  the  castle,  where  Mr.  Gur- 
wood  who  though  wounded,  had  been  amongst  the 
foremost  at  the  lesser  breach,  received  the  governor's 
sword. 

The  allies  now  plunged  into  the  streets  from  all 
quarters,  for  O'Toolo's  attack  was  also  successful, 
and  at  the  other  side  of  the  town  Pack's  Portuguese, 
meeting  no  resistance,  had  entered  the  place,  and  the 
reserves  also  came  in.  'J'hen  throwing  oft"  the  re- 
Btraints  of  discipline  the  troops  committed  frightful 
excT'iaes.  The  town  was  fired  in  three  or  four  places, 
the    soldiers    menaced    their    officers,  and    shot  each 


other  ;  many  were  killed  in  the  market-place,  intoxi- 
cation soon  increased  the  tunnilt,  disorder  every  where 
prevailed,  and  at  last,  the  fm-y  rising  to  an  absolute 
madness,  a  fire  was  wilfully  lighted  in  the  middle  of 
the  great  magazine,  when  the  town  and  all  in  it  would 
have  been  blown  to  atoms,  but  for  the  energetic  courage 
of  some  officers  and  a  few  soldiers  who  still  preserved 
their  senses. 

Three  hundred  French  had  fallen,  fifteen  hundred 
were  made  ]irisoners,  and  besides  the  immense  stores 
of  ammunition,  above  oi^liundred  and  fifty  jncces  of 
artillery  including  the  nattering'traiu  of  Marmont's 
army,  were  captured  in  the  jilace.  'J'he  whole  loss  of 
the  allies  was  about  twelve  hundred  soldiers  and 
ninety  officers,  and  of  these  above  six  hundred  and 
fifty  men  and  sixty  officers  had  been  slain  or  hurt  at 
the  breaches.  General  Crawfurd  and  general  Mac- 
kinnon,  the  former  a  man  of  great  ability,  were  killed, 
and  with  them  died  many  gallant  men,  amongst  others, 
a  captain  of  the  forty-fifth,  of  whom  it  has  been  felici- 
tously said,  that  "  three  generals  and  seventy  other  officers 
had  fallen,  but  the  soldiers  fresh  from  the  strife  only 
talked  of  Ilardyman.'*  (General  Vandalenr,  colonel 
Colborne,  and  a  crowd  of  inferior  rank  were  wounded, 
and  unha]>pily  the  slaughter  did  not  end  with  the 
battle,  for  the  next  day  as  the  prisoners  and  their 
escort  were  marching  out  by  the  breach,  an  accidental 
explosion  took  place  and  numbers  of  both  were  blown 
into  the  air. 

To  recompense  an  exploit  so  boldly  undertalcen  and 
so  gloriously  finished,  lord  AVellington  was  created 
duke  of  (Jiudad  Rodrigo  by  the  Spaniards,  earl  of 
Wellington  by  the  English,  and  Marquis  of  Torrea 
Vedras  by  the  Portuguese  ;  but  it  is  to  be  remarked, 
that  the  prince  regent  of  Portugal  had  previous  to  that 
period  displayed  great  ingratitude  in  the  confierring  of 
honours  upon  the  British  officers. 

OBSERVATIONS.  !'• 

1.  ITie  duration  of  this  siege  was  twelve  days,  or 
half  the  time  originally  calculated  upon  by  the  English 
general,  and  yet  the  inexperience  both  of  the  engineer 
and  soldier,  and  the  very  heavy  fire  of  the  j)lace,  had 
caused  the  works  to  be  more  slowly  executed  than 
might  have  been  expected ;  the  cold  also  had  impeded 
the  labourers,  and  yet  with  a  less  severe  frost  the 
trenches  would  have  been  overflowed,  because  in  open 
weather  the  water  rises  every  where  to  within  six  inches 
of  the  surface.  But  the  worst  obstacle  was  caused  by 
the  disgraceful  badness  of  the  cutting-tools  furnished 
from  the  storekeeper-general "s  office  in  England,  the 
profits  of  the  contractor  seemed  to  be  the  only  thing 
respected  ;  the  engineers  eagerly  sought  for  French  ini- 
plements,  because  those  provided  by  England  were 
useless. 

2.  The  audacious  manner  in  which  Wellington 
stormed  the  redoubt  of  Francisco,  and  broke  groinid  on 
the  first  night  of  the  investment  ;  the  more  audacious 
manner  in  which  he  assaulted  the  j)lacc  before  the  fire 
of  the  defence  had  been  in  any  manner  lessened,  and 
before  the  counterscarp  had  been  Idown  in ;  were  the 
true  causes  of  th(^  sudden  fall  of  the  place.  Both  the 
nnlitary  and  political  state  of  affairs  warranted  this  ne- 
glect of  rules.  The  final  success  depended  more  upon  the 
courage  of  the  troops  than  the;  skill  of  the  engineer  ;  and 
when  the  general  terminated  his  order  for  the  assault, 
with  this  sentence,  "  Ciudad  Rodrigo  invst  be  stormed 
this  evening,"  he  knew  well  that  it  would  be  nobly 
understood.  Yet  the  French  fought  bravely  on  the 
breach,  and  by  their  side  many  British  deserters,  despe- 
rate men,  were  bayoneted. 

3.  The  great  breach  was  cut  off  from  the  town 
by  a  perpendicular  descent  of  sixteen   feet,  and   the 

*  Captain  Cooke's  Memoirs,  vol.  i. 


1812.1 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


441 


bottom  was  planted  with  sharp  spikes,  and  strewn  with 
live  shells;  tlie  houses  behind  were  all  loop-holed,  and 
garnished  with  musketeers,  and  on  the  flanks  tlu'ie  were 
cuts,  not,  indted,  very  deep  or  wide,  and  the  French  had 
left  ihe  temporary  bridges  over  them,  but  behind  were 
parapets  so  po>verfuJly  def.-nded  that  it  was  said  the 
tliird  division  could  never  have  carried  them,  had  not 
the  light  division  taken  the  enemy  in  flank  :  an  assertion 
perhaps  easier  made  than  proved. 

4.  The  rapid  progress  oi'  the  allies  on  this  occasion 
has  been  contrasted  with  the  slow  proceedings  of 
Massena  in  Is  10.  and  the  defence  of  Herrasti  has  been 
compaivvl  with  that  of  Bariie.  But  Massena  was  not 
pressed  for  time,  and  he  would  have  been  blamabie  to 
iiate  spared  labour  at  the  expense  of  blood  :  Herrasti 
also  had  a  garrison  of  six  thoe.sand  men,  whereas  Barrie 
had  less  than  two  thousand,  of  wliieh  only  seventeen 
hundred  were  able  to  bear  arms,  and  he  had  additional 
works  to  guard.  Nevertheless,  his  neglect  of  the  lesser 
breach  w;is  a  great  error ;  it  was  so  narrow  and  high 
that  a  vei'y  slight  addition  to  its  defences  would  have 
rendered  it  quite  impracticable;  and  as  the  deserters 
told  him  in  the  morning  of  the  19th  that  the  light 
division  was  come  up,  out  of  its  turn,  he  must  have  ex- 
pected the  assault  and  had  time  to  prepare  for  it. 
Moreover,  the  small  breach  was  flanked  at  a  very  short 
distance  by  a  demi-bastion  with  a  parupet,  'which, 
though  little  injured,  was  abandoned  when  the  head  of 
the  stornrl ng  party  had  toi'ced  their  way  on  to  the  ram- 
part. But  the  true  way  of  defending  Ciiidad  was  by 
external  operations,  and  it  was  not  until  it  fell  tha't 
the  error  of  Mannont  at  Elbodon  could  be  judged  in  its 
full  extent.  Neither  can  that  marshal  be  in  any  manner 
justitied  for  havnig  left  so  few  men  in  Ciudad  Rodrigo  ; 
it  is  certain  that  with  a  garrison  of  five  thousand  the 
place  would  not  have  been  taken,  for  when  there  are 
trough  of  men  the  engineer's  art  cannot  be  overcome 
by  mere  courage. 

.5.  'J'he  excesses  committed  by  the  allied  troops  were 
very  disgraceful.  The  bpanish  people  were  allies  and 
friends,  unarmed  and  heli)less,  ami  all  these  claims 
were  disregarded.  "  'j'he  soldiers  v.-ere  not  to  be  c(jn- 
trouk-d."  Tlut  excuse  will,  however,  scarcely  suffice 
here,  because  colonel  Macleod,  of  the  forty -third,  a 
young  man  of  a  most  energetic  spirit,  placed  guaids  at 
the  breach,  and  did  constrain  his  regiment  to  keep  its 
ranics  for  a  long  time  after  the  disorders  commenced  ; 
but  as  no  previous  general  measures  had  been  taken,  and 
IK)  organized  efforts  made  by  higher  authorities,  the 
men  were  finally  carried  away  in  the  increasing  tu- 
mult.* 


CHAPTER  lY. 

E.xecution  of  the  French  p:u-tizans  iind  Enslisli  deserters 
found  in  (_;iud;id  Kodrigo — The  works  are  repaired — Mar- 
moiit  collects  his  arm y  at  Sahunanea — Bonet  abandons  tlie 
Asturias — Souliam  advances  to  Matilla — Hill  arrives  at 
Castello  Branco — The  Freneii  army  liarassed  by  winter 
marches  and  by  the  I'artidas — Maiiiiout  attain  spreads  his 
divisions — Airueda  overtiows,  and  all  counaiuiication  with 
Ciudad  Kodri^o  is  cut  olf — Lord  Welliugton  prepares  to 
besiege  Badajos — Frelimiuary  measurcs^lnipeded  by  bad 
•weatlier — JJitiiciilties  and  euibarrassineuts  arise-^Thc 
allied  aruiv  m:ireh(;,s  in  an  uniuilitary  manner  towards 
tfie  Aleailejo — Lord  Wellington  proposes  some  financial 
measures — Gives  un  Uiudad  to  the  Spaniard.^ — Tlie  fifth 
division  is  letl  in  Beira— Carhjs  d'Espa^-na  and  general 
Victor  Alten  are  posted  on  the  Yeite.-,— The  Portuiruesc 
militia  niiircli  tor  the  Coa— I^ord  VVellinfrton  reaches 
Elva.s— He  is  beset  with  difiieulties— Falls  sick,  but  re- 
covera  rapidly. 

Is  Ciudad  Rodrigo.  papers  were  found  by  which  it 
appeared,  that  many  of  the  inhabitants  were  emis.sa- 


Captain  Cooke's  Memoirs,  voL  L  p.  122. 


rios  of  the  enemy  :  all  tliese  people  Carlos  d'Espafia 
slew  without  mercy,  but  of  the  English  deserters,  who 
were  taken,  some  were  executed,  some  pardoned,  and 
the  rigour  of  the  Spanish  generals  was  thought  to  be 
overstrained. 

When  order  had  been  restored  workmen  were  set  to 
repair  the  breaches  and  to  level  the  trenches,  and  ar- 
rangements were  made  to  provision  the  jilace  quickly, 
for  Marmonfs  army  was  !.  ithering  at  Valladolid  ;  that 
general  was  however  still  ignorant  that  Ciudad  had 
fallen.  In  the  latter  end  of  December,  rumour,  antici- 
pating the  fact,  had  indeed  ,'<poken  of  an  English  bridge 
on  the  Agueda,  and  the  exjiedition  to  Alicant  was 
countevmanded  ;  yet  the  report  died  away,  and  Mont- 
brun  re-commenced  his  march.  But  though  the  bridge 
was  cast  on  the  1st  and  the  siege  commenced  on  the  8th, 
on  the  12th  nothing  was  known  at  Salamanca. 

^On  the  11th  Mannont  arrived  at  Valladolid  ;  on  the 
15th  he  for  the  first  time  lieard  of  the  siege.  His  army 
was  immediately  ordered  to  concentrate  at  Salamanca, 
Bonet  quitted  the  Asturias,  Monlbrun  hastened  back 
from  Valencia,  Dorsenne  sent  a  detachment  to  aid,  and 
on  the  25th  six  divisions  of  infantry  and  one  of  cavalry 
being  al)Out  forty-five  thousand  in  all,  were  assem 
bled  at  Salamanca,  from  whence  to  Ciudad,  was  foiu 
marches. 

On  the  23d  Souham  had  advanced  to  Matilla  to  as- 
certain the  fate  of  the  fortress,  but  meanwhile  five 
thousand  of  Hill's  troops  had  reached  Castello  Branco, 
and  the  allies  were  therefore  strong  enough  to  fight 
beyond  the  Agueda.  Hence  if  the  siege  h.ad  even 
lasted  twenty-four  days,  the  place  might  still  have  been 
taken. 

The  26th  Marntont  knew  that  the  fortress  was  lost, 
and  unalile  to  comprehend  his  adversary's  success,  re- 
tired to  Valladolid.  His  divisions  were  thus  hara-ssed 
by  ruinous  marches  in  winter ;  for  Montbrun  had 
already  reached  Arevalo  on  his  return  from  Valencia, 
and  Bonet  in  repassing  the  Asturian  mountains,  had 
sufiered  much  from  cold  and  fatigue,  and  more  from  the 
attacks  of  Porlier  v/ho  harassed  him  without  cessation. 
Sir  Howard  Douglas  immediately  sent  money  and 
arms  to  the  Asturians,  on  one  flank,  and  on  the  other 
flank,  Morillo  who  had  remained  at  Horcajo  in  great 
peril  after  his  flight  from  Ahnagro,  took  the  opportu- 
nity to  escape  by  Truxillo;  meanwhile  Saornils  band 
cut  off  a  French  detachment  at  Medina  del  Campo, 
other  losses  were  sustained  from  the  Partidas  on  the 
Tietar,  and  the  operations  of  those  in  the  Rioja,  Na- 
varre, and  New  Castile  were  renewed.  The  regular 
Spanish  troops  were  likewise  put  in  movement.  Aba- 
dia  and  Cabrera,  advancing  from  (JJallicia,  menaced 
Astorga  and  La  Baneza,  but  the  arrival  of  Bonet  at 
Benevente,  soon  obliged  them  to  retire  again  to  Fuebla 
de  Senabria  and  Villa  Franca  ;  and  Silveira  who  had 
marched  across  the  frontier  of  Tras  os  Montes  to  aid 
them,  also  fell  back  to  Portugal. 

Marmonfs  operations  were  here  again  ill  judged. 
He  should  have  taken  post  at  Tamames,  or  St.  .Martin 
de  Ri%  and  placed  strong  advanced  guards  at  'I'ene- 
bron  and  St.  Espiritus,  in  the  hills  innnediately  above 
Ciudad.  His  troops  could  have  been  concentrated  at 
those  places  the  28th,  and  on  that  day  such  a  heavy  rain 
set  in,  that  the  trestle  bridge  at  Marialva  could  not 
stand,  and  the  river  rose  two  feet  over  the  stone  bridge 
at  the  town.  The  allies  were  then  on  the  left  bank,  the 
communication  with  the  town  was  entirely  cut  off",  the 
repair  of  the  breaches  was  scarcely  coniplete.  and  Ciuditd 
being  entirely  exposed  for  several  days  might  have  been 
re-taken.  But  the  greatest  warriors  are  the  very  slaves 
of  fortune ! 

'J'he  English  g^^neral's  eyes  were  now  turned  to- 
wards Badajos,  which  he  was  df«irous  to  invest  in  the 
second  week  of  March  ;  because  then  the  flooding  of 
the  rivers  iu  Beira,  would  enable  him  to  carry  nearly 


442 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    T\   AR. 


[Book  XYI. 


all  his  forces  to  the  Alemtejo,  withont  risk,  and  the 
Kline  mills  would  impede  the  junction  of  the  eiiemy's 
force  in  lOstreniadura.  Gre.m  forage  was  to  be  had  iu 
the  lust  pi-ovinee  considerably  earlier  than  on  the  A,i;ue- 
da,  and  tlie  success  of  the  contemplated  campaign  in 
Andalusia  depended  upon  the  operations  taking  place 
betorc  tiie  harvest  upon  the  ground  should  ripen,  which 
was  tlse  enemy 's  resource,  and  would  happen  much  ear- 
lier there  than  in  Leon. 

Preliminary  measures  were  already  in  progress.  In 
Deecmbv-r  a  pontoon  bridge  escorted  by  military  artifi- 
cers and  some  Portusuese  seamen,  had  been  ordered 
irom  Lisbon  to  Abrantes,  where  draft  bullocks  were 
collected  to  draw  it  to  Elvas.  After  the  fall  of  Ciudad 
stores  and  tools  were  sent  from  Lisbon  to  Setuval,  and 
tlience  in  boats  to  Aleacer  do  Sal  ;  and  a  company  of 
the  military  artificers,  then  at  t.'adiz,  were  disembarked 
at  Ayamonte  to  proceed  to  Elvas,  where  an  engineer 
cTicer  secretly  superintended  the  preparations  for  the 
fiiege.  ^Meanwhile  the  repairs  of  Ciudad  went  on,  two 
new  red  .ubts  were  traced  out  upon  the  'J  esons,  the  old 
one  was  enlarged,  and  the  suburbs  were  strengthened, 
but  the  heavy  storms  before  mentioned,  imijeded  these 
works,  and  hiiving  entirely  stopped  all  communication 
bv  sea  and  land,  delayed  for  many  days  the  preparations 
fJr  the  ulterior  operations.  When  the  weather  cleared 
they  were  renewed,  yet  other  obstacles  were  not 
wanting. 

The  draft  bullocks,  sinking  from  want,  were  unable 
to  *-ag  the  whole  battering  train  by  the  way  of  V'ilha 
Velha,  and  only  sixteen "  twenty-four  pounders,  and 
twenty  sjoare  carriages  could  be  moved  on  that  line. 
To  supply  the  deficiency  sixteen  twenty-four  pounders 
then  in  vessels  in  the  Tagus,  were  ordered  up  to  Ab- 
rantes, and  Admiral  Berkeley  was  applied  to  for  twenty 
ship-guns.  He  had  n^ie  of  that  calibre  and  oflered 
eighteen  pounders,  which  were  accepted  :  but  when 
major  Dickson,  who  superintended  the  arrangements 
for  the  artillery  service,  arrived  at  Lisbon,  he  found 
that  these  were  Russian  pieces  whose  bore  was  too 
large  for  EnQ-Jish  shot,  and  the  admiral  refused  to  give 
pruns  from  his  own  ship,  the  BarHeur,  iu  their  place. 
This  apparei.Jy  capricious  proceeding  produced  both 
difiiculty  and  delay,  because  the  artillery-men  were  in 
con-;eque!ice  obliired  to  cull  the  Portuguese  shot  in  the 
arsenal  to  obtain  a  suihcient  supply.  However  the 
energy  of  major  Dickson  overcame  every  obstacle,  and 
in  the  beginning  of  March  the  battering  guns  tifly-two 
in  number,  the  pontoons  from  Abrantes,  and  most  of 
the  stores  from  Ak-acer  do  Sal,  were  parked  at  El- 
vas, where  also  gabions  and  fascines  were  piled  iu  great 
numbers. 

Marmont  having  lost  his  emissaries  at  Ciudad  Rod- 
rigo.  and  being  unable  to  measure  !ns  adversary's  tal- 
ent and  energy,  had  during  these  transactions  again 
spread  iiis  troops  that  he  might  the  more  easily  feed 
them.  Three  divisions  of  infantry  and  p;irt  of  the  cav- 
alry returned  to  Talavera  and  'i'oledi>.  .Souham  occu- 
pied the  country  from  Z"un(;ra  and  'J'oro  to  the  banks 
of  the  Tonnes;  and  Bimet  after  driving  thejjalli- 
cians  back  to  Senabriaand  Villa  Franca  remained  about 
Beaevente  and  Astorga.  'i'hc  army  of  Portugal  ap- 
peared to  dread  no  further  operations  on  the  part  of  the 
allies,  yet  from  some  secret  misgiving,  JNIarmont 
caused  g(>neral  Foy  to  march  through  the  (juada- 
lupe,  by  the  pa.ss  of  St.  Vincente,  to  ascertain  whether 
an  army  could  march  by  that  line  from  the  Tagus  to  the 
Guadiana. 

This  scattering  of  the  French  relieved  lord  Wel- 
lington from  a  serious  embarrassment.  'J'he  constant 
difficulty  of  land  transport,  had  prevented  him  from 
bringing  up  the  clothing  of  the  army,  and  he  was  now- 
obliged  to  send  the  regiments  to  tiiose  points  on  the 
Mondego,  the  Dnuro,  and  the  Tagus,  where  the  cloth- 
ing had  arrived  by  boats ;    hence  the  march  to  the 


Alemtejo  was  necessarily  long  and  unmilitary,  and 
would  have  been  too  dangerous  to  attempt,  if  Marmont 
had  kept  his  troops  together  on  the  Tormes,  with  ad- 
vanced posts  ))ushcd  towards  Ciudad  llodrigo.  1'he 
weather  was  now,  however,  extremely  favourable  to  the 
allies,  and  the  new  Portuguese  commissariat  supplied 
the  troops  on  this  march  well,  and  withont  any  of 
those  exactions  and  oppressions  which  had  always  be- 
fore marked  the  movements  of  the  native  troops ;  nev- 
ertheless, the  scarcity  was  so  great  that  rations  of 
cassava  root  were  served  to  the  Portuguese  instead  of 
bread. 

The  talents  of  lord  Wellington  always  rose  with  his 
difficulties,  but  the  want  of  specie  crippled  every 
operation.  A  movement  into  Spain,  such  as  that  now 
intended  against  Andalusia,  could  not  be  effected 
without  magazines,  when  there  was  no  harvest  on  th« 
ground,  exce]Jt  by  paying  ready  money ;  because  it 
was  certain  that  the  Spaniards,  however  favourably 
disposed,  would  never  diminish  their  own  secret  re- 
sources for  mere  promises  of  payment.  'J'he  English 
general  and  Mr.  Stuart,  therefore,  endeavoured  to  get 
British  bank  notes  accepted  as  cash,  by  the  great 
merchants  of  Lisbon  and  Uporto  ;  and  lord  Wellington 
reflecting  that,  from  the  enormous  sums  spent  in 
Portugal,  many  persons  must  needs  have  secret  hoards 
which  they  would  be  glad  to  invest,  if  they  could  do  it 
safely,  asked  for  English  exchequer-bills  to  negotiate 
in  the  same  manner ;  intending  to  pay  the  interest 
punctually  and  faithfully,  however  inconvenient  it 
might  prove  at  the  moment.  'J'his  plan  could  not  be 
adopted  with  Portuguese  paper,  because  the  finances 
were  faithlessly  managed  by  the  regency ;  but  some 
futile  arguments  against  the  proposition  were  advanced 
by  lord  Liverpool,  and  money  became  so  scarce  that 
we  shall  find,  even  iu  the  midst  of  victory,  the  war  was 
more  than  once  like  to  stop  altogether  from  absc lute  ina- 
bility to  proceed. 

On  the  5th  of  March,  the  army  being  well  on  the 
way  to  the  Alemtejo,  lord  Wellington,  who  had  main- 
tained his  head-quarters  on  the  Coa  to  the  last  moment, 
that  the  enemy  might  not  be  awakened  to  his  real 
designs,  gave  up  Ciudad  Rodrigo  to  Castanos.  He 
also  in  person,  and  on  the  spot,  explained  to  Vives,  tlie 
governor,  the  plan  and  intention  of  the  new  works ;  he 
supplied  him  with  money  to  complete  them;  furnished 
him  with  six  weeks  provision  remaining  from  the  field 
stores  of  the  British  troops,  and  gave  him  the  reserved 
store  at  St.  Joa  de  Pesqueira,  on  the  Douro,  from 
whence  Carlos  d'Espana  undertook  to  transport  them  to 
the  fortress. 

As  Marmont  was  at  this  time  in  Salamanca,  and 
still  ignorant  of  the  allies'  march,  general  Victor 
Alten's  brigade  of  cavalry  was  posted  on  the  Yeltes, 
to  screen  the  allies'  movements  as  long  as  possible, 
and  he  was  instructed  if  Marmont  advanced  to  retire 
on  Bcira,  and  cover  the  magazines  at  Castello  Branco, 
by  disputing  all  the  rivers  and  defiles  with  the  ene- 
my's advanced  jjarties.  At  the  same  time  Silveira  was 
directed  to  fall  back  upon  the  Douro  to  cover  Oporto ; 
the  militia,  under  Trant  and  J.  A\'ilson,  were  ordered 
to  concentrate  about  Guarda;  and  those  of  Beira  to 
unite  about  Castello  Branco  uuder  colonel  Lecor ;  the 
orders  of  all  being  the  same,  namely,  to  dispute  the 
passage  of  the  rivers  and  defiles.  Trant  was  to  defend 
those  of  the  Estrella,  and  Lecor  tho.se  of  Castello 
Branco,  on  which  town  A'ictor  Alten's  cavalry  was 
finally  to  retire  if  pressed.  With  these  iorces,  and  the 
Spaniards  under  Sanchez  and  Espana,  and  with  the 
two  fortresses,  for  Almeida  was  now  capable  of  de- 
fence. Marmont's  efforts  were  not  much  to  be  dreaded 
in  that  kiason,  after  he  had  lost  his  battering  train  in 
Ciudad. 

These  things  arranged,  AVellington  set  off  for  Elvaa, 
which  he  reached   the   ilth,  and  prepared  to  invest 


1812.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR, 


443 


Badajo=?.  alU)0iV2^h  neither  the  troops  nor  the  stores  were 
al!  arriveil  ;  but  even  this  was  ten  days  hiter  than  he  had 
desi^-jieJ,  and  tin-ew  his  operatiiMis  into  the  violent  equi- 
noctial rains.  Ijy  which  the  difficulties  were  ausrmenU'd 
tw^)-f■o!d.  This  was  one  of  the  evils  produced  by  the  in- 
credibly vexatious  conduct  of  the  Portuj;-uose  reirency. 
There  was  no  want  of  transport  in  the  country,  but  as 
the  government  would  not  oblige  the  magistrates  to  do 
their  duty,  the  latter  either  refused  to  procure  carts  for 
the  army,  or  obliged  the  poorer  classes  to  supply  ihem, 
from  which  oppression  the  pea.sants  naturally  endeavour- 
ed to  escape  by  flight.  Thus,  all  the  arrangements  for 
tlie  investment  of  Badajos  on  the  Cth  of  March  had  been 
made,  but  the  rich  town  of  Evora,  v.hich  had  not  seen 
the  face  of  an  enemy  for  more  than  three  years,  refused 
to  supply  any  carriages  at  all,  and  the  operation  was 
necessarily  put  otf  till  the  17th. 

But  it  was  in  vain  that  Wellington  tlireatened  and 
remonstrated,  in  vain  that  he  employed  his  time  and 
wasted  his  mental  powers  in  devising  new  laws,  or 
remedies  lor  bad  ones ;  it  was  in  vain  that  Mr.  Stuart 
exerted  himself,  with  equal  vigour,  to  give  ent-rgy  to  this 
extraordinary  government;  for  whether  in  matters  of 
small  or  vital  importance,  insolent  anger  and  falsehood, 
disgraceful  subterfuges  and  stolid  indifference,  upon  the 
part  of  all  civil  functionaries,  from  the  highest  to  the 
lowest,  met  them  at  every  turn.  The  responsibility  even 
in  small  matters  became  too  great  for  subordinate  offi- 
cers ;  and  the  English  general  was  forced  to  arrange  the 
most  trilling  details  of  the  service  himself;  thus  the  iron- 
sfcrength  of  his  body  and  mind  was  strained,  until  all  men 
wondered  how  they  held,  and  in  truth  he  did  fall  sick, 
but  recovered  after  a  few  days.  The  critical  nature  of 
the  war  may  be  here  judged  of,  for  no  man  could  have 
tuken  his  place  at  such  a  moment,  no  man,  however 
daring  or  skilful,  would  have  voluntarily  plunged  into 
difficulties  which  were  like  to  drive  Wellington  from  the 
contest. 


CHAPTER  V. 

The  allies  cross  the  Guadinna — Berr>sford  invests  B;idnjos — 
(-ronurals  Gruliiun  and  Hill  eoinniand  tiio  covering  army— 
Urouct  retires  to  llornnches  in  the  IJereua — T iiird  English 
siege  of  B:idujos — SidJy  of  the  trarrison  repulsed — W'orlts 
impeded  by  tlie  rain — Tlie  besiegetl  rake  ti  e  trcn.-he.s  from 
the  riglit  bank  of  the  Guudiana — The  tit'th  division  is  ealled 
up  to  the  sietrc — Tiie  river  rises  and  eai'ries  away  the  bridire, 
and  tlie  sieire  is  upon  the  point  of  being  raised — Two  fly- 
iufx  bridges  are  establisiied — Tiie  fiftii  division  invest  St. 
Cr.stoval  and  the  bridge-he;id — T'lie  I'icuriaa  is  stoiined 
— The  batteries  open  against  the  San  Ko(iue  imd  the  boily 
of  the  place — Tiie  covering  army  drive  general  Droiiet 
from  tiie  Serena  into  the  Morena  on  tlie  side  of  Coxlova — 
ilaniiont  eolieets  liU  forces  in  Leon — Tlie  Spanish  officers 
aud  tlie  rortU(;iiese  troverument  ni'Lclect  the  supplies  of 
(.^indad  Kodrijro  and  Abneidu — Soult  advances  from  Cor- 
dova towards  ]j!ereiia — Tiie  fifth  division  is  broiiirht  over 
the  Guadina — The  works  of  the  sicire  are  pressed — .\n  :\t- 
temfit  to  blow  up  the  dam  of  tlie  inundation  fails — The 
two  breaches  become  practicable — Sotiltetfects  his  junction 
with  Drouet  and  advances  to  the  ^uccour  of  the  pi  ice — 
Graham  and  Hill  fall  back — The  bridge  of  Merida  is  de- 
stroyed— Tie  lissault  is  ordered,  but  countaruinn  'el — A 
tiiird  breach  is  formed — The  fortress  is  stormed  with  a 
dreadful  slaugliter,  and  the  city  is  sacked  by  the  allies. 

The  loth  the  pontoons  were  laid  over  tlie  Gnadiana, 
about  fniir  miles  from  Elvas.  at  a  place  whtTe  the  cur- 
rent was  didl,  two  lariie  Sjianish  boats  were  arranged  as 
flying  bridges;  and  the  Kith,  Beresford,  who  had  again 
joined  the  army,  crossed  the  river,  drove  in  the  encimy's 
posts,  and  invested  Badajos  with  the  third,  fourth,  and 
light  divisions,  and  a-brigade  of  Hamilton's  Portuguese  ; 
in  all  fifteen  thousand  men. 

Soult  was  then  before  the  Isla,  Drouct's  division,  of 


five  thousand  men,  was  at  Yillafranca,  .tnd  Darricau, 
with  ti  like  force,  was  at  Zalamea  do  Serena,  near 
Medellin ;  wherefore  general  (Jraham,  passimr  the 
Gnadiana  with  the  first,  sixth,  and  seventh  divisiona 
of  infantry,  and  two  brigades  of  cavalry,  directed  his 
march  by  Valverde  and  Santa  Ahirtha  "upcMi  Lh'rena, 
while  Hill  moved  from  Albuquerciue  by  Merida  upon 
Almendralejos.  These  covering  corps  were  together 
thirty  thousand  strong,  nearly  five  thousand,  including 
the  heavy  Germans  who  were  at  Estrcmos,  being  cavai- 
'  ry  ;  and  ;is  the  fifth  division  was  now  on  the  march  from 
Beira,  the  whole  army  presented  about  fifty-cme  thou- 
sand sabres  and  bayonets,  of  which  twenty  thousand 
were  Portuguese,  (.'astafios  had  rejjaircd  "to  (jallicia, 
but  the  fifth  Spanish  army,  under  Morillo  and  Penne 

■  Villemur,   being   about  four    thousand   strong,  passed 
i  down  the  Portuguese  frontier  to  the  Lower  Gnadiana, 

intending  to  fall  on  Seville  when  Soult  should  advauc« 
to  the  succour  of  Badajos. 

As  the  allies  advanced,  Drouet  marched  by  his  right 
to  Llornaches,  in  the  direction  of  La  Serena  ai;d  Medel- 
lin, with  a  view  to  keep  open  the  ccmmunication  with 
i  Marmont  by  Truxillo.     Hill  then  halted  at  Almendrale- 
'jos,  and  Graham  took  post  at   Zafra,  placing   Slade's 
i  cavalry  at  Villafranca ;    but  Marmont  had  moved  his 
j  sixth  division  from  Talavera  towards  Castile,  through 
i  the  Puerto  de  Pico,  on  the  9th.  and  the  four  divisions 
i  and  cavalry  quartered  at  Toledo  had  recrossed  the  Tagus 
I  aud  marched  over  the  Guadarama,  the  whole  pointing 
!  for  Valladolid.     Thus  it  was  already  manifest  that  the 
army  of  Portugal  would  not  act  in  conjunction  with 

■  that  of  the  south. 

i 

j  THIRD    ENGLISH    SIEGE    OF    BADAJOS. 

I  This  fortress  has  before  been  described.  The  garri- 
son, composed  of  French,  He.-sian.  and  Spanish  troops, 
was  now  near  five  thousand  strong,  including  sick. 
Phillipon  had  since  the  last  siege  made  himself  felt  in 
all  directions,  for  he  had  continually  scoured  the  vicinity 
of  the  place,  destroyed  many  small  bands,  carried  off 
cattle,  almost  from  under  the  guns  of  Elvas  and  Campo 
]\rayor,  and  his  spies  extended  their  researches  from 
Ciudad  Rodrigo  to  Lisbon,  aud  from  Lisbon  to  Aya- 
monte. 

He  had  also  greatly  improved   the  defences  of  the 

place.      An    interior   retrenchment   was   made   in   the 

castle,  and  many  more  guns  were  there  mounted ;  the 

i  rear  of  fort   Cristoval  was  also  better  secured,  and  a 

'  covered   communication    from   the   fort    it.^elf,   to    the 

I  work  at  the  bridge-head,  was  nearly  completed.     Two 

j  ravelins  had  been  constructed  on  the  south  side  of  the 

town,   and    a    third    was    commenced,   together    with 

counterguards  for  the  bastions ;   but  the  eastern  front 

I  next  the  castle,  which  was  m  other  respects  the  weak- 

I  est  point,  was  without  any  outward  protection  save  the 

'  stream  of  the  Rivillas.     A  "  cundte"  or  second  ditch 

Iliad  been  dug  at  the  bottom  of  the  great  ditch,  which 

was  also  in  some  jiarts  filled   with  water ;   the  gorge 

'  of  the  Pardaleras  was  enclosed,  and  that  outwork  wiis 

I  connected   with   the   body  of  the  jilace,  from  whence 

I  powerful   batteries  lo(>ked  into  it.     The  three  western 

I  fronts  were  mined,  and   on   the  east,  the  arch  of  the 

I  bridge  behind  the  San   Rocjue,  was  built  up  to  form 

)  an  inundation,  two  linndred  yards  wide,  which  greatly 

;  contracted   the   space   by   which   the   place   could    be 

I  approached  with  troops.     All  the  inhr.bitants  had  been 

i  obliged,  on  pain  of  being  expelled,  to  lay  up   food  for 

i  three  months,  and  two  convoys  with  provisions  and  am- 

I  munition  had  entered  the  place  on  the  lOth  and  IGth 

,  of  February,  but  J'hillipon's  stores  of  powder  were  still 

inadequate 'to  his  wants,  and  he  was  very  scantily  sup- 

1  plied  with  shells. 

'      As  the  former  system  of  attack  against  Cristoval  and 
jthe  icastle,   was    now  impracticable,  lord   Wellington 


'444 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XYI. 


desired  to  asfuiil  one  of  th?  western  fronts  wliir.h  would 
bai'o  bo3ii  a  scieiiiiiif  opi.'rat.iuii ;  but  the  eujj^iru'or  re|)ix'- 
sei  teil  that  he  had  lu'ltliof  mortars  nor  iniuers.  iioi' 
eiK>u<^-h  of  ff\m^,  nor  the  means  of  briug'iu;^-  up  sullicient 
stores  for  sucli  an  attack.  Indeed,  tlie  want  of  tiaas- 
p'.irt  liad  ajrain  (jbli'^-ed  tlie  allies  to  draw  the  stores 
irom  Klvas,  to  the  manifest  harvard  of  that  fortress,  and 
henoe,  here,  as  at  Ciudad  ilodriji'o,  time  was  neeessarily 
paid  for,  by  tlie  loss  of  Jife;  or  rather  the  erimcs  of  poli- 
ticians were  atoned  for  by  the  blood  of  the  soldiers. 

The  plan  flnaUy  tixed  upon,  was  to  attaek  the  bastion 
of  Trinidad,  because,  the  eounter:^uard  there  being  un- 
finished, that  baslion  could  be  battered  from  the  hill  on 
which  the  Pieurina  stood.  'J'hi'  first  paiallel  was  there- 
fore to  embrace  the  Pieurina,  the  San  lioque,  and  the 
eastern  front,  in  such  a  manuor  th-.it  the  counter  batteries 
there  erected,  mi^ht  rake  and  destroy  all  the  deiences 
of  the  southern  fioiits  which  bore  against  the  Pieurina 
hill.  The  Pieurina  itself  was  to  be  battered  and 
stormed,  anil  from  thono  the 'I'rinidad  and  Santa  Maria 
bastions,  were  to  be  broached  ;  after  this  all  the  guns 
were  to  be  turned  against  the  connecting  cuitain,  which 
was  kn<nvri  to  be  of  weak  masonry,  tliat  a  third  breach 
might  be  rnaJj,  and  a  storining  party  employed  to  turn 
any  retrenchments  behind  tiie  breaches  in  the  bastions, 
lu  this  way  the  inundation  could  be  avoided,  and 
although  a  French  deserter  declared,  and  truly,  that  the 
ditch  was  there  eighteen  feet  deep,  such  was  tlie  geue- 
rals  confidence  in  his  troops,  and  in  his  own  resources 
for  aiding  their  efforts,  that  he  resolved  to  storm  the 
p'.aee  without  blowing  in  thj  counterscarp. 

Tlie  battering  train,  directed  by  major  Dickson,  con- 
sisted of  fi.'ty-two  pieces.  Tnis  inrludel  sixteen  twenty- 
four-p'jund  liowirzers,  for  throwing  Shraimel  sliells,  but 
this  species  of  missile,  much  talked  of  in  t'le  army  at  the 
time,  was  little  prized  by  lord  Wellington,  who  had 
early  detected  its  insufficiency,  save  as  a  common  shell ; 
and  partly  to  avoid  expense,  partly  from  a  dislike  to 
injure  the  inhabitants,  neither  in  t^iis,  nor  in  any  fjrmer 
siege,  did  he  use  mortars.  Here  indeed  he  could  not 
have  brought  them  up,  f.)r  besides  the  neglect  of  the 
Portuguese  governniJiru,  the  peasantry  and  even  the 
ordenan;,\i  (;mr)loyed  t(j  move  the  batt^'ring  train  from 
Alcacer  do  Sal,  although  well  paid,  deserted. 

Of  nine  hundred  gunners  present,  three  hundred  were 
British,  the  rest  Portuguese,  and  thvre  were  one  hundred 
and  filty  sapp,jrs  volunteers  tVom  tlie  third  division,  who 
were  iiidoed  rather  unskilful,  but  of  signal  bravery. 
The  engineer's  pare  was  established  behind  the  lieights 
of  St.  Michael,  and  the  direetion  of  the  siege  was  given 
to  general  Picton.  General  Jvempt,  general  Colville, 
and  general  Bowes  alternately  conniiaiided  in  the 
trenches. 

In  the  night  of  the  ITth,  eighteen  hundred  men, 
protected  by  a  guard  of  two  thousand,  broke  grouiul 
one  hundred  and  sixty  yards  from  tlie  J'iciirina.  A 
temiiest  stifled  the  sound  of  their  pickaxes,  and  though 
the  work  was  commenced  late,  a  conimunieatioii,  four 
thousand  feet  in  length,  was  formed,  and  a  parallel  of 
six  hundred  yards  three  feet  deep,  and  three  kvt  six 
inches  wide,  was  opened.  However,  when  the  day 
broke  the  Pieurina  was  reinforced,  and  a  sharp  musketry 
interspersed  with  discharges  from  some  field-iHeces, 
aided  by  heavy  guns  from  the  body  uf  the  place,  was 
directed  on  the  trenches. 

In  the  night  of  the  18tli  two  batteries  were  traced 
out,  the  parallel  was  prolonged  both  on  the  right  and 
left,  and  the  }irevious  w(jrks  were  improved.  On  the 
other  hand  the  garrison  raised  the  parapets  of  the  Pieu- 
rina, and  having  lined  the  top  of  the  cuvert'd  way  with 
sand-bags,  planted  musketeers  there,  to  gall  tlie  men 
in  the  trenrhes,  who  replied  in  a  like  manner. 

The  19tli  l(vd  Wellington,  having  -secret  intelligence 
that  a  sally  we,s  interdcd,  ordered  the  guards  to  be  re- 
inforced.    Ntv'ijrili.-ss,  at  oue  o'clock   some  cavalry 


came  out  by  the  Talavera  gate,  and  thirteen  hundred 
infantry  under  general  Vielland,  the  second  in  com- 
mand, filed  unobserved  into  the  communication  be- 
tween the;  Pieurina  and  the  San  Ro(|ue  ;  a  hundred  men 
were  prepared  to  sally  from  the  I'icurina  itself,  and  all 
tlit>se  triiops  juiii|)iiig  out  at  once,  drove  the  workmen 
before  them,  and  began  to  demolish  the  jmrallel.  Pre- 
vious to  this  outbreak,  the  French  cavalry  forming  two 
parlies  had  commenced  a  sham  fight  on  the  right  of 
the  parallel,  and  the  smaller  party  pretending  to  fly, 
and  answering  Portuguese,  to  the  challenge  of  the 
l)icquets,  were  allowed  to  pass.  Elated  by  the  sncc(!ss 
of  their  stratagem,  they  then  galloped  to  the  engi- 
mser's  pare,  which  was  a  thousand  yards  in  the  rear  of 
the  trenches,  and  tlic^re  cut  down  some  men,  not  many, 
for  succour  soon  caiiii',  and  meanwhile  the  troops  at  the 
paralk^l  having  rallied  upon  the  relief  which  had  just 
arrived,  beat  the  enemy's  infantry  back  even  to  the 
castle. 

In  this  hot  fight  the  besieged  lost  above  three  hundred 
men  and  oHicers,  the  besiegers  only  one  hundred  and 
fifty  ;  but  colonel  Fletcher,  the  chief  engineer,  was  badly 
wounded,  and  several  hundred  entrenching  tools  were 
carried  off"  for  Pliilli^ion  had  promised  a  liigh  piice  for 
each  ;  yet  this  turned  out  ill,  because  the  soldiers,  instead 
of  pursuing  briskly,  dispersed  to  gather  tlie  tools.  After 
the  action  a  s(piadron  of  dragoons  and  six  field-piece.i 
wei-e  placed  as  a  reserve-guard  behind  St.  Michael,  and 
a  signal  jiost  was  established  on  the  Sierra  de  Venta  to 
give  notice  of  the  enemy's  motions. 

'J'he  weather  coiitiiuied  wet  and  boisterous,  and  the 
labour  of  the  works  was  very  harassing,  l)ut  in  the  night 
of  the  19th  the  parallel  was  o])ened  in  its  whole  length, 
and  the  20th  it  was  enlarged  ;  yet  a  local  obstacle  and 

I  the   flooding   of  the   trenches,   rendered    the    progress 

I  slow. 

I      In  the  night  of  the  2flth  the  parallel  was  extended 

I  to  the  left,  across  the  Seville  r(<ad,  and  three  counter- 
batteries  were  commenced  ;  but  they  were  traced  in  rear 
of  the  parallel,  partly  because  the  ground  was  too  soft 
in  front  to  admit  of  the  guns  moving ;  partly  for  safety, 
because  the  batteries  were  within  three  hundred  yards 
of  the  San  Roque,  and  as  the  parallel,  eighteen  hundred 
yards  long,  was  only  guarded  by  fourteen  hundred  men, 
a  few  bold  soldiers  might  by  a  sudden  rush  have  suc- 
ceeded in  spiking  the  guns  if  they  had  been  jilaced  in 
front  of  the  trench.  A  slight  sally  was  this  day  repulsed, 
and  a  shoulder  was  given  to  the  right  of  the  parallel  to 
cover  that  flank. 

The  21st  the  enemy  placed  two  field-pieces  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Uuadiana,  designing  to  rake  the 
trenches,  but  the  shoulder,  made  the  night  before,  baffled 
the  design,  and  the  riflemen's  fire  soon  sent  the  guns 
away.  Indications  of  a  similar  design  against  the  left 
flank,  from  the  I'ardaleras  hill,  were  also  observed,  and 
a  guard  of  three  hundred  men  with  two  guns,  was  j^osted 
on  tliat  side  in  some  broken  ground. 

In  the  night  another  battery  against  the  Ran  Roque 
was  commenced,  and  the  battery  against  the  Pieurina 
was  finished  ;  but  heavy  rain  again  retarded  the  works, 
and  the  besiegei'S  having  failed  in  an  attempt  to  drain 
the  lower  parts  of  the  parallel,  liy  cuts,  made  an  artificial 
bottom  of  sand-bags.  On  the  other  hand  the  •besieged, 
thinking  the  curtain  adjoining  the  castle  was  the  true 
object  of  attack,  tlirc^w  up  an  earthen  entreiichnumt  in 
front,  and  commenctHl  clearing  away  the  houses  behind  it, 
A  coveied  communication  from  the  Trinidad  gate  to  the 
San  liixpie,  intended  to  take  this  supposed  attaek  in 
rever.se,  was  also  commenced  ;  but  the  labour  of  digging 
being  too  gii'at,  it  was  c(Uii[)letcd  by  hanging  up  brown 
cloth,  which  appeared  to  be  earth,  and  by  this  ingenious 
expedient,  the  garrison  passed  unseen  between  those 
points.* 


*  La  Marre's  Siege  of  Jiadujos. 


1812.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULA    ;     V AU. 


445 


Vauban's  waxim,  that  a   perfect  investment  is  the 
first  requisite  in  a  siege,  had  been  neglected  at  Bada- 
jos  to  spare  labour,  but  the  great  master's  art  was  soon 
vuidicated   by  his   eounti-ymeii.     I'iiillipon  finding  the 
right  banlv  of  the  (Juadiana  free,  made  a  battery  in  the 
niglit  for  three  tield-pieees,  wliich  at  day-liglit  raided 
the  trenehes,  and  the  sliots  pitehiiig  into  the  parallel, 
swept  it  in  the  most  destructive  manner  for  the. whole 
day  ;    there  was  no  remedy,  and  the  loss  would   have 
becui  still  greater  but  for  the  soft  nature  of  the  ground,  I 
which  prevented   the  touch  and  bound  of  the  bullets. ' 
Oi'ders  were  innnediately  sent  to  the  fifth  division,  then  j 
at  Oampo  Mayor,  to  invest  the  place  on  that  side,  but 
these  troojis  were  distant  and  misfortunes  accunuilated.  1 
In  the  evening  heavy  rain  filled  the  trenches,  the  flood 
of  the  Guadiana  ran  the  fixed  bridge  under  water,  sanJi ! 
twelve  of  the  pontoons,  and  broke  the  tackle   of  the ' 
flying  bridges  ;    the  i)rovisions  of  the  army  could  not 
then  be  brought  over,  and   the  guns  and  ammunition 
being  still  on  the  right  bank,  the  siege  was  upon  the  j 
point  of  being  raised.     In  a  few  days,   however,  the  | 
I'iver  subsided,  some  Portuguese  craft  were  brought  up  I 
to  form  another  flying-bridge,  the  pontoons  saved  were  ' 
employed  as  row-boats,  and  in  this  manner  the  communi- 
cation was  secured,  for  tlie  rest  of  the  siege,  without  any 
accident. 

The  23d  the  besieged  continued  to  work  at  the 
entrenchments  covering  the  front  next  the  castle,  and 
the  besiegers  were  fixing  their  platforms,  when  at  three 
o'clock  the  rain  again  filled  the  trenches,  the  earth, 
being  completely  saturated  with  water,  fell  away,  the 
works  every  where  crumbled,  anil  the  attack  was  entire- 
ly suspended. 

The  24th  the  fifth  division  invested  the  place  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Guadiana,  the  weather  was  fine,  and 
tiie  batteries  were  armed  with  ten  t\4'enty-lours,  eleven 
eigliteens,  and  seven  five-and-a-half-inch  howitzers. 
The  next  day,  at  eleven  o'clock,  those  pieces  opened, 
but  they  were  so  vigorously  answeied,  that  one 
howitzer  was  dismounted  and  several  artillery  and 
engineer  officers  were  killed.  Nevertheless  the  Han 
Itofjue  was  silenced,  and  the  garrison  of  the  Picurina 
was  so  galled  by  the  marksmen  in  the  trenches,  that 
no  man  dared  look  over  the  j  arapet  ;  hence,  as  the 
external  appearance  of  that  fort  did  not  indicate  much 
strength,  general  Kempt  was  charged  to  assauit  it  in  the 
night. 

'I'he  outward  seeming  of  the  Picurina  was  however 
fallacious,  the  fort  was  very  strong  ;  the  fronts  were 
well  covered  by  the  glacis,  the  flanks  were  deep,  and 
the  rampart,  fourteen  feet  perpendicular  from  the  bot- 
tom of  the  ditch,  was  guarded  v/ith  thick  slanting 
pales  above  ;  and  from  tlience  to  the  top  there  were 
sixteen  feet  of  an  earthen  slojje.  A  few  palings  had, 
indeed,  been  knocked  off  at  the  covered-way,  and  the 
parapet  was  slightly  damaged  on  that  side,  but  this 
injury  was  repaired  with  sand-bags,  and  the  ditch  was 
profound,  narrow  at  the  bottom,  and  flanked  by  four 
splinter-proof  casemates.  Seven  guns  were  mounted 
on  the  works,  the  entrance  to  which  by  the  rear  was 
proU?cte;^ith  three  rows  of  thick  paling,  the  garrison 
was  aijove  two  hundred  strong,  and  every  man  had 
two  muskets.  The  top  of  the  rampart  was  garnished 
with  loaded  shells  to  push  over,  a  retrenched  guard- 
house formed  a  second  internal  defence,  and  finally,  some 
buiall  mines  and  a  loop-holed  gallery,  under  the  c(;unter- 
ecarp,  intended  to  take  the  assailants  in  rear,  were  begun 
but  not  finished. 

Five  hundred  men  of  the  third  division  being  assem- 
bled for  the  attack,  general  Kempt  ordered  two  hun- 
dred, under  major  lludd  of  the  seventy-seventh,  tt)  turn 
the  fi;rt  on  the  left ;  an  equal  force,  under  major  Shaw 
of  the  seventy-fourth,  to  turn  the  fort  by  the  rigiit ; 
and  one  hundred  from  each  of  these  bodies  wcM-e  di- 
rected to  enl.;;-  llie  connnuiiication  with  San  llotiue  and 


intercept  any  succours  coming  'rem  the  town.  The 
flanking  columns  were  to  make  a  joint  attack  on  the  fort, 
and  the  hundred  men  remaining,  were  placed  under  cap- 
tain Powis  of  the  eighty-third,  to  form  a  reserve.  The 
engineers,  llolloway,  Stanway,  and  Gijjs,  with  twenty- 
four  sappers  bearing  hatchets  and  ladders,  guided  these 
columns,  and  fifty  men  of  the  light  division,  likewise  pro- 
vided with  axes,  were  to  move  out  of  the  trenches  at  the 
moment  of  attack. 

ASSAULT    OF    PICURINA. 

The  night  was  fint;,  the  arrangements  clearly  and 
skilfully  made,  and  about  nine  o'clock  the  two  flank- 
ing bodies  moved  forward.  I'he  distance  was  short, 
and  the  troops  quickly  closed  on  the  fort,  which,  black 
and  silent  before,  now  seemed  one  mass  of  fire ;  then  the 
assailants  running  up  to  the  palisades  in  the  rear,  with 
undaunted  courage  endeavoured  to  break  through,  and 
when  the  destructive  musketry  of  the  French,  jind  the 
thickness  of  the  pales,  rendered  their  efforts  nugatory, 
they  turned  against  the  faces  of  the  work  and  strove  to 
break  in  there  ;  but  the  depth  of  the  ditch  and  the 
slanting  .stakes  at  the  top  of  the  brick-work  again  baf 
fled  them. 

At  this  time,  the  enemy  shooting  fast,  and  danger- 
ously, the  crisis  appeared  imminent,  and  Kempt  sent 
the  reserve  headlong  against  the  front ;  thus  the  fight 
was  eontimied  strongly,  the  carnuge  became  terrible, 
and  a  battalion  coming  out  from  the  town^to  the  suc- 
cour of  the  fort,  was  encountered  and  beaten  by  the 
part}'  on  the  conmiunication.  The  guns  of  Badajos 
and  of  the  castle  now  opened,  the  guard  of  the  trenches 
replied  with  musketry,  rcjckets  were  thrown  up  by  the 
besieged,  and  the  shrill  sound  of  alarm  bells,  mixing 
with  the  shouts  of  the  comliatants,  increased  the 
tumult.  Still  the  Picurina  sent  out  streams  of  fire,  by 
the  liglit  of  which,  dark  figures  were  seen  furiously 
struggling  on  the  ramparts  ;  for  Pow's  first  escaladed 
the  place  in  front  where  the  artillery  had  beaten  down 
the  pales,  and  the  other  assailants  had  thrown  their 
ladders  on  the  flanks  in  the  manner  of  bridges,  from 
the  brink  of  the  ditch  to  the  slanting  stakes,  and  all 
were  fighting  hand  to  hand  with  the  enemy.  Mean- 
while the  axe-men  of  the  light  division,  compassing 
the -fort  like  prowling  wolves,  discovered  the  gate, 
and  hewing  it  dov/n,  broke  in  by  the  rear.  Neverthe- 
less the  struggle  continued.  Powis,  Holloway,  Gip3, 
and  Gates,  of  the  eighty-eighth,  fell  wounded  on  or 
beyond  the  rampart;  Nixon  of  the  fifty-second  wa3 
shot  two  yards  within  the  gate  ;  Shaw,  Rudd,  and 
nearly  all  the  other  oflicers  had  fallen  outside  ;  and  it 
was  not  until  half  the  garrison  were  killed,  that  Gas- 
per Thiei'y,  tl:e  conmuindant,  and  eighty-six  men,  sur- 
rendered, while  some,  n',)t  many,  rushing  out  of  the 
gate,  endeavoured  to  cross  the  inundation  and  were 
drowned. 

The  French  governor  hoped  to  have  delayed  the 
siege  five  or  six  days  by  the  resistance  of  Picurina, 
and  liad  the  assault  been  a  day  later,  this  would  havg 
happened  ;  for  the  loop-holed  gallery  in  the  counter- 
scarp, and  the  mines,  would  then  have  been  com])letcd, 
and  the  body  of  the  work  was  too  well  covered  by  the 
glacis  to  be  quickly  ruined  by  fire.  His  calculations 
were  baffled  by  this  heroic  assault,  which  lasted  an 
hour,  and  cost  four  officers  and  fiity  men  killed,  fifteen 
officers  and  two  hundred  and  fifty  men  wounded  ;  and 
so  vehement  was  the  fight  throughout,  that  the;  garri- 
son either  forgot,  or  had  not  lime  to  i-oll  ow.v  the 
shells  and  combustibles  arranged  on  the  ramparts. 
Philli])on  did  not  conceal  the  danger  accruing  to  13a- 
diijos  from  the  loss  of  the  Picurina,  but  he  stinudated 
his  soldiers'  courage,  by  calling  to  their  recollection, 
how  infinitely  worse  than  death  it  was,  to  be  the  ni- 
rnnte  of  an  Kmrlish  hulk!  an  ayipeal  which  must  have 
be>  II   di.'.'plv  lelt,   f>,r    the   annals  of  civilized   nations. 


446 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XVI. 


furnisli  nothing  more  inlmman  towards  captives  of  war, 
than  the  prison-ships  of  lui^Iand. 

AVhc'i  tin;  Picinina  was  taken,  three  battalions  of  re- 
serve advanced  to  secure  it,  and  tlu)Uj;li  a  jrreat  tui'mnil 
and  firing  from  llie  town  continued  until  midnight,  a 
lodgement  in  tlie  works,  and  a  communicatidn  with  the 
fii'st  parallel,  were  established,  and  the  second  parallel 
was  commenced.  However  at  day-light  the  redoubt 
was  so  overv.hehned  with  fire,  from  the  town,  that  no 
troops  couid  remain  in  it.  and  the  lodgement  was  entirely 
destroyed.  In  the  evening  the  sappei-s  elfeeted  another 
lodgement  on  the  tlanlcs,  the  second  j)arallel  was  then 
opened  in  its  whole  lengih.  and  the  next  d.iy  the  ccmnter- 
batteries  on  the  right  of  the  Picurina  exchanged  a  vig- 
orous fire  with  the  town  ;  but  one  of  the  besiegers'  guns 
was  dismounted,  and  the  Portuguese  gunners,  from  inex- 
perience, produced  less  elTect  on  ihe  defences  than  was 
expected. 

In  tlu!  night  of  the  27th  a  new  communication  from 
the  first  parallel  to  the  Picurina  was  made,  and  three 
breaching  batteries  were  traced  out.  The  first,  to  con- 
tain twelve  twenty-four  pounders,  occupied  the  space 
between  the  Picurina  and  the  inundation,  and  was  to 
breach  the  right  face  of  the  Trinidad  bastion.  The 
second,  to  contain  eight  eigh'tcen  [)ounders,  was  on  the 
site  of  the  Picurina,  and  was  to  breach  the  left  flank 
of  the  Santa  ]\Iaria  bastion.  The  third,  constructed  on 
the  prolonged  line  of  the  front  to  be  attacked,  contain- 
ed three_  Shrapnel  howitzers,  to  succour  the  ditch  and 
prevent  tl*  garrison  working  in  it;  for  Philiipon  had 
now  discovered  the  true  line  of  attack,  and  hiid  set 
strong  parties  in  the  night,  to  raise  the  counter-guard  of 
the  Trinidad  and  the  imperlect  ravelin  covering  the 
menaced  fiont. 

At  day-break  these  works  being  well  furnished  with 
gabions  and  sand-bags,  were  lined  with  musketeers, 
who  severely  galled  the  workmen  employed  on  the 
breaching  batteries,  and  the  artillery  practice  was  also 
brisk  on  both  sides.  Two  of  the  besiegers"  guns  were 
dismounted  ;  the  gabions  placed  in  front  of  the  batteries 
to  protect  the  workmen  were  knocked  over,  an<l  the 
musketry  then  became  so  destructive  that  the  men  were 
withdrawn  and  threw  up  earth  from  the  inside. 

In  the  night  of  the  27th  t!ie  second  parallel  was 
extended  to  the  right,  with  the  view  of  raising  batteries, 
to  ruin  the  San  Roque,  to  destroy  the  dam  which  held 
up  the  inundation,  and  to  breach  the  curtain  behind  ; 
but  the  Talavcra  road  proved  so  hard,  and  the  moon 
shone  so  brightly,  that  the  labourers  were  quite  exposed 
and  the  work  was  relinqui'^hed. 

Ou  the  28th  the  screen  of  gal.)Ions  before  the  batte- 
ries wa-^  restored,  and  the  workmen  resumed  their 
labours  outside,;  the  parallel  was  then  improved,  and 
the  besieged  withdrew  tiieir  guns  from  San  Roque; 
but  their  marksmen  still  shot  from  thence  with  great 
exactness,  and  the  plunging  fire  from  the  cattle  dis- 
mounted two  howitzei's  in  one  of  the  counter-batteries 
which  was  therefore  dismantled.  The  enemy  had  also 
during  the  atrht  observed  the  tracing  string,  which 
marked  the  ^R'ction  of  the  .sap  in  front  of  San  Roque, 
and  a  darin^R'llow  creeping  out  just  before  the  work- 
men arriveclIWrought  it  in  the  line  of  the  castle  fire, 
whereby  some  loss  was  sustained  ere  the  false  direction 
was  discovered. 

In  the  night  the  dismantled  howitzer  battery  was  re- 
armed, with  twenty-four  pounders,  to  play  on  the  San 
Ro(|ue,  and  a  new  breaching  Itattery  was  traced  uut  on 
the  site  of  the  I'icurina,  against  the  flank  of  the  Santa 
Maria  bastion.  The  second  parallel  was  al.so  carried  by 
the  sap  across  the  'I'alavera  road,  and  a  trench  was 
digged.  f)r  riflemen,  in  front  of  the  batteries. 

The  29lh  a  slight  sally,  made  on  the  right  bank  of 
the  river,  was  repulsed  by  the  Portuguese,  but  the  sap 
at  the  San  Roque  was  ruined  by  the  enemy's  fire,  and 
the  besiejjed  continued  to  raise  the  countoguard  and 


ravelin  of  the  Trinidad  and  to  strengthen  the  front  at- 
tacked. On  the  other  hand  the  besiegers  dmuig  the 
night  carried  the  sap  over  the  Talavera  road,  and  armed 
two  breaching  batteries,  with  eighteen  pounders,  which 
the  next  day  opened  against  the  flank  of  Santa  Maria  ; 
but  they  made  little  impression,  and  the  explosion 
of  an  expense  magazine  killed  many  men  and  hurt 
others. 

While  the  siege  was  thus  proceeding  Soult  having 
little  fear  for  the  town,  but  expecting  a  great  battle, 
was  carefully  organizing  a  powerful  force  to  unite  with 
iJrouet  and  IJaricau.  'J'hose  generals  had  endeavoured 
to  hold  the  district  of  I^a  Serena  with  the  view  of  keep- 
ing open  the  conmiunication  with  Marmont  by  Medellic 
and  Truxillo  ;  but  (jlraham  and  Hill  marched  against 
their  flanks  and  forced  them  into  the  Morcna  by  the 
(.%jrdova  roads  ;  and  on  the  other  side  of  the  country 
Morillo  and  Penne  Villemur,  were  lying  close  on  the 
lower  Guadiana  waiting  their  opportunity  to  fall  on  Se- 
ville when  Soult  should  advance.  Nor  were  there  want- 
ing other  combinati(jns  to  embarrass  and  delay  the 
French  marshal  ;  for  in  February,  general  Monies  being 
detached,  by  Pallesteros.  from  San  Roque,  had  defeated 
Miiransin  on  the  Guadajore  river,  driving  him  from  Car- 
tama  into  Malaga.  Alter  this  the  whole  of  the  Spanish 
army  v\as  assembled  in  the  Ronda  hills,  with  a  view  to 
fall  on  Seville  by  th.-  left  of  the  Guadiana  while  Morillo 
assailed  it  on  the  right  of  that  river.  This  had  obliged 
Soult  to  send  trooi)s  towards  Malaga,  and  fatally  delayed 
his  march  to  Estrtmadura. 

Meanwhile  Marmont  was  concentrating  his  army  in 
the  Salamanca  country,  and  it  was  rumoured  that  he 
meant  to  attack  Giudad  Rodrigo.  Lord  Wellington 
was  somewhat  disturbed  by  this  information  ;  he  knew 
indeed  that  the  flotdiug  of  the  rivers  in  the  north, 
would  prevent  a  blockade,  and  he  was  also  assured 
that  iVIarmont  had  not  yet  obtained  a  battering  train. 
But  the  Spanish  generals  and  engineers  had  neglected 
the  new  w.jrks  and  repairs  of  Giudad  Rodrigo ;  even 
the  provisions  at  St.  Joa  de  Pestjuicra  had  not  been 
brought  up  ;  the  fortress  had  only  thirty  days'  supply. 
Ahneida  was  in  as  bad  a  state,  and  the  <;rand  project  of 
invading  Andalusia  was  likely  to  be  baulked  by  these 
embarra.«sments. 

On  the  HOth  Soult's  advance  from  Conlova  being  de- 
cided, the  fifth  division  was  brought  over  the  Guadi- 
ana as  a  reserve  to  the  covering  army  ;  but  Power's 
Portuguese  brigade,  with  some  cavalry,  of  the  .same 
nation,  still  maintained  the  investment  on  the  right  bank, 
the  siege  was  urged  forward  very  rajiidly,  forty-eij^ht 
pieces  of  artillery  were  in  constant  play,  and  the  sap 
against  San  Roque  advanced.  The  enemy  was  equally 
active,  his  fire  was  very  destructive,  and  his  pr(wit'.ss  in 
raising  the  ravelin  and  counter-guard  of  the;  front  attack- 
ed was  very  visible. 

The  1st  of  April  the  sap  was  puslied  close  to  the 
San  Roque.  the  Trinidad  bastion  crumbled  under  the 
stroke  of  the  bullet,  and  the  Hank  of  the  Santa  Maria, 
which  was  cascmated  and  had  hitherto  resisted  the 
batteries,  also  began  to  yield.  The  2d  the  face  of  the 
Trinidad  was  very  much  broken,  but  at  the  i|^ita  Maria 
the  casemates  benig  laid  open,  the  bullets  \\xre  lost  in 
their  cavities,  and  the  garrison  commenced  a  retrench- 
ment to  cut  off  the  whole  of  the  attacked  front,  from 
the  town. 

In  the  night  a  new  battery  against  the  San  Roque 
was  armed,  and  two  officers  with  some  sappers  gliding 
behind  that  out-work,  gagged  the  sentinel,  placed  pow- 
der barrels  and  a  match  against  the  dam  of  the  inun- 
dation, and  retired  undisccA'cred,  but  the  explosion  did 
not  destroy  the  dam,  and  the  inundation  remaineti.  Nor 
did  the  saj)  make  progress,  because  of  the  French  nnis- 
keteers  ;  for  though  the  marksmen  set  agai'.ist  them 
slew  nvany  they  were  reinforced  by  means  of  a  raft 
with  parapets,  which  crossed  the  inundation,  and  men 


1812.] 


XATIER-S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


447 


also  passed  by  the  cloth  communication  from  the  Trini- 
dad gate. 

Oil  the  3d  some  gun^  were  turned  against  tlie  cur- 
tain behind  the  rian  Koque,  but  the  masonry  proved 
hard,  ammunition  was  scarce,  and  as  a  breacli  there 
would  have  bL^eu  useless,  while  the  inundation  remained, 
the  fir  J  w;is  soon  discontinued.  The  two  breaches 
in  the  bastion  were  now  greatly  enlarged  and  the  be- 
sieged assiduously  laboured  at  the  retrenchments  behind 
them,  and  converted  the  nearest  houses  and  garden 
■walls  inlo  a  third  line  of  defence.  All  the  houses 
behind  the  front  next  tlie  castle  were  also  thrown  down, 
and  a  battery  of  five  guns,  intended  to  flank  the 
ditch  and  breach  of  the  Trinidad,  was  commenced 
on  the  castle  hill,  but  outside  the  wall ;  the  besieg- 
ers therefore  traced  out  a  counter-battery,  of  fourteen 
Shrapuell  howitzers,  to  play  upon  that  point  during  the 
assiiult. 

The  crisis  of  the  siege  was  now  approaching  rapidly. 
The  brtiaches  were  nearly  practicable,  Soult,  having 
effected  a  jimction  with  Drouet  and  Daricau,  was  ad- 
vancing ;  and  as  the  allies  were  not  in  sufficient  force  to 
assault  the  place  and  give  battle  at  the  same  time,  it 
was  resolved  to  leave  two  divisions  in  the  trenches,  and 
to  fight  at  Aibuera  with  the  remainder,  (jrraham  thei-e- 
fore  fell  back  towards  that  place,  and  Hill  having  de- 
stroyed the  bridge  at  .Merida,  marched  from  the  upper 
Guadiana  to  'I'alavera  Real. 

I'ime  being  now,  as  in  war  it  always  is,  a  great  object, 
the  anxiety  on  both  sides  redoubled  ;  but  Souit  was  still 
at  Llerena,  when  on  the  morning  of  the  5th  the  breaches 
were  declared  practicable,  and  the  assault  ordered  for 
that  evening.  Leith's  division  was  even  recalled  to  the 
camp  to  assist,  when  a  careful  personal  examination  of 
the  enemy's  retrenchments  caused  some  doubts  in  lord 
Wellington's  mind,  and  he  delayed  the  storm,  until  a 
third  breach,  as  originally  projected,  should  be  ibrm- 
ed  in  the  curtain  between  the  bastions  of  Tiinidad 
and  Maria.  Tliis  could  not,  however,  be  commenced 
before  morning,  and  during  the  night  the  enemy's 
workmen  laboured  assiduously  at  their  retrenchments, 
regardless  of  the  showers  of  grape  with  which  the  be- 
siegers' ba'teries  scoured  the  ditch  and  the  breach. 
But  the  (ith,  the  besiegers'  guns  being  all  turned  against 
the  curtain,  the  bad  masonry  crumbled  rapidly  away, 
in  two  h  uirs  a  yawning  breach  appeared,  and  Wel- 
lington, having  again  examuied  the  points  of  attack 
in  person,  renewed  the  order  for  the  assault.  Then  the 
soldiers  eagerly  made  themselves  ready  for  a  coinliat, 
so  fiercely  fought,  so  terrilily  won,  so  dreadful  in  all  its 
circumstances,  that  posterity  can  scarcely  be  expected  to 
credit  the  tale ;  but  many  are  still  alive  who  know  that 
it  is  true. 

The  British  general  was  so  sensible  of  Phillipon's 
firmness  and  of  the  courage  of  his  garrison,  that  he 
spared  them  the  affront  of  a  summons,  yet  seeing  the 
breach  striingly  entrenched,  and  the  enemy's  flank  fire 
still  powerful,  he  would  not  in  this  dread  crisis,  trust  his 
fortune  to  a  single  effort.  Eigliteen  thousand  daring 
soldiers  burned  for  the  signal  of  attack,  and  as  he  was 
unwilling  to  lose  the  service  of  any,  to  each  division  he 
gave  a  task  such  as  few  generals  would  have  the  hardi- 
hood even  to  contemplate. 

On  the  right  Pictous  division  was  to  file  out  of  the 
trenches,  to  cross  the  Rivillas  river,  and  to  scale  the 
castle  walls,  which  were  from  eighteen  to  twenty-four 
feet  in  height,  furnished  with  all  means  of  destruction, 
jind  so  narrow  at  top,  that  the  defenders  could  easily 
reach  and  as  easily  overturn  the  ladders. 

On  the  left,  Leith's  division  was  to  make  a  false  at- 
tack on  the  Pardaleras.  and  a  real  assault  on  the  dis- 
tant bastiim  of  tian  Vincente,  where  the  glacis  was 
rained,  the  ditch  doe]),  the  scarp  thirty  feet  high,  and 
the  parapet  garnished  with  bold  troops  well  provided  ; 
for  Phillipon,  following  his  old-  plan,  had  three  loaded 


maskets  placed  beside  each  man,  that  the  first  fire  might 
be  quick  and  deadly. 

In  the  centre,  the  fourth  and  light  divisions  under 
general  Colville,  and  colonel  Andrew  J  Barnard,  were  to 
march  against  the  breaches.  They  were  fiunislied  like 
the  third  and  fifth  divisions  with  ladders  and  axes,  and 
were  preceded  by  storming  parties  of  five  hundred  men 
each  with  their  respective  forlorn  hopes.  The  light  di- 
vision was  to  assault  the  bastion  of  Santa  Maria  ;  the 
fourth  division  to  assault  the  Trinidad,  and  the  curtain  ; 
and  the  columns  were  divided  into  storming  and  firing 
parties,  the  former  to  enter  the  ditch,  the  latter  to  keep 
the  crest  of  the  glacis.    ' 

Besides  these  attacks,  major  Wilson  of  the  forty-eighth 
was  to  storm  the  San  Roque  with  the  guards  of  the 
trenches,  and  on  the  other  side  of  the  Guadiana,  general 
Power  was  to  make  a  feint  on  the  bridge-head. 

At  first  only  one  brigade,  of  the  third  division,  was 
to  have  attacked  the  castle,  but  just  before  the  h(mr 
fixed  upon,  a  sergeant  of  sappers  having  deserted  from 
the  enemy,  informed  AVellington  that  there  was  but  one 
communication  from  the  castle  to  the  town,  wliereupoa 
he  oi'dered  the  whole  division  to  advance  together. 

This  was  the  outline  of  the  plan,  but  many  nice 
arrangements  filled  it  up,  and  some  were  iollowed, 
some  disregarded,  for  it  is  seldom  that  all  things  are 
strictly  attended  to  in  a  desjx'rate  fight.  Nor  were 
the  enemy  idle,  for  while  it  was  yet  twilight  some 
French  cavalry  issued  from  the  Pardaleras,  escorting 
an  officer  who  endeavoured  to  look  into  the  trenches, 
with  a  view  to  ascertain  if  an  assault  was  intendt^  ; 
but  the  picquet  on  that  side  jumped  up,  and  firing  as 
it  run,  drove  him  and  his  escort  back  into  the  works. 
'J'hen  the  darkness  fell  and  the  troops  gnly  awaited 
the  siu'nal. 


ASSAULT    OF    BADAJOS. 


The  night  was  tft-y  but  clouded,  the  air  thick  with 
watery  exhalations  from  the  rivei's,  the  ranq  arts  and 
the  trenches  unusually  still  ;  yet  a  low  nnu'inur  per- 
vaded the  latter,  and  in  the  former,  lights  were  seen  to 
flit  here  and  there,  while  the  deep  voices  of  the  senti- 
nels at  times  proclaimed,  that  all  was  well  in  I'adajos. 
The  French,  confiding  in  Phillipon's  direful  skill, 
watched,  from  their  lofty  station,  the  ap)>roach  of  ene- 
mies, whom  they  had  twice  before  battled,  and  now 
hoped  to  drive  a  third  time  blasted  and  ruined  from  the 
walls;  the  British,  standing  in  deep  c(.'lumns,  were  as 
eager  to  meet  that  fiery  destruction  as  the  others  were 
to  pour  it  down  ;  and  b  ith  wi're  alike  terrible  for  their 
strength,  their  discipline,  and  the  passions  awakened  in 
their  resolute  hearts. 

Former  failures  there  were  to  avenge,  and  on  either 
side,  such  leaders  as  left  no  excuse  for  v.eakness  in 
the  hour  of  trial  ;  and  the  possession  of  Badajos  was 
become  a  point  of  hoi»our,  persor.al  with  the  soldiers 
of  each  nation.  .But  the  strong  desire  for  glory  wiis, 
in  the  Bri1  ish,  dashed  with  a  hatred  of  the  citizens  on 
an  old  grudge,  and  recent  toil  and  hardship,  \\  ith  much 
spilling  of  blood,  had  made  many  incredibly  savage  ; 
for  these  things  render  the  noble-minded,  indeed,  averse 
to  cruelty,  but  harden  the  vulgar  spirit.  Numbers 
also,  like  Ca:sar's  centurion  wlio  could  not  forget  the 
plunder  of  Avaricum,  were  heated  with  the  recollec- 
tion of  Ciudad  Rodrigo.  and  thirsted  for  spoil.  Thus 
every  spirit  found  a  cause  of  excitement,  the  wondrous 
power  of  discipline  bound  the  whole  togethei-  as  with 
a  i)and  of  iron,  and,  in  the  pride  of  arms,  none  doubted 
their  might,  to  bear  down  every  obstacle  that  man  coukl 
oppose  to  their  furv. 

At  ten  o'clock,  the  castle,  the  San  Roque,  the 
breaches,  the  J^ardaleras,  the  distant  l)asti.'n  of  Saa 
Vincwite,  and  the  bridge-head  on  the  other  side  of  the 
(iuadiana,  were  to  have  been  sinndtaneously  a.ssailcd, 
and  it  wua  hoped  that  the  strength  of  the  enemy  would 


448 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR, 


[Book  XVL 


SLrivel  wilhin  tliat  fiery  girdle.  But  many  are  the 
aisappoiiituuMits  of  war.  An  uiiforesccii  uccidciit  de- 
layv;d  tile  attack  of  tlie  fifili  division  ;  and  a  li^lited 
carca.ss,  thrown  from  the  castle,  failing;  clo.se  to  where 
the  men  of  the  third  division  were  drawn  n]).  discover- 
ed their  array,  and  oblig-ed  them  to  anticipate  the  sig- 
nal by  half  an  hour.  Then,  every  thing  being  sudden 
\y  disturbi'd.  the  double  olumns  of  the  fourth  and 
Lght  divisions  also  moved  silently  and  swiftly  against 
llie  breaches,  and  the  guard  of  the  trt-nchcs  rushing  for- 
ward with  a  shout,  encompassed  the  San  lloque  with 
fire  and  broke  in  so  violently  that  scarcely  any  resistance 
was  made. 

But  a  sudden  blaze  of  light  and  the  rattling  of  mus- 
ketry indicated  the  comni-'ncemcnt  of  a  most  vehement 
comuat  at  the  castle.  There  general  Kcm])t,  for  Picton 
hurt  by  a  I'all,  in  the  camp,  and  e.\i)ecting  no  change  in 
the  hour,  was  not  present,  there  general  Kempt.  I  say, 
led  the  third  division  ;  he  had  passed  the  llivillas,  in 
single  tiles  by  a  narrow  bridge,  undor  a  terrible  musket- 
ry, and  tlien  reforming,  and  running  u])  the  rugged  hill, 
bad  reached  the  foot  of  the  castle  when  he  fell  severely 
wounded,  and  being  carried  buck  to  the  trenches  met 
Picton  who  hastened  forward  to  take  the  command. 
Meanwhile  his  troops  .spreading  along  the  front  reared 
their  heavy  ladders,  some  against  the  lofty  castle,  some 
against  the  adjoining  front  on  the  left,  and  with  incredi- 
ble CDurage  ascended  amidst  showers  of  heavy  stones, 
logs  of  wood,  and  bursting  shells  rolled  off  the  parajjet, 
while  from  the  Hanks  the  enemy  plied  his  musketry  with 
a  feaiful  i-apidity.  and  in  front,  with  pikes  and  bayonets, 
stabbed  the  leading  assailants  or  jjushed  the  ladders 
from  the  walls  ;  and  all  this  attended  with  deatening 
shouts,  and  the  crash  of  breaking  ladders,  and  the 
shrieks  of  'crushed  soldiers  answering  to  the  .sullen 
stroke  of  the  lalling  weights. 

Still,  swarming  round  the  remaining  ladders,  these 
undaunted  veterans  strove  who  shf)uld  iirst,  climb,  until 
ail  being  overturned,  the  French  .shouted  victory,  and 
the  British,  baitied,  but  untamed,  fell  back  a  ll.'w  paces, 
and  tojk  shelter  uiuL'r  the  rugged  edge  of  the  hill. 
Jlere  when  the  broken  ranks  were  somewhat  re-formed 
the  heroic'  colonel  Ridge,  springing  forward,  called, 
with  a  stentorian  voice,  on  his  m.'n  to  follow,  and, 
seizing  a  ladder,  once  more  raised  it  against  the  castle, 
yet  to  tiie  ri.;lit  of  the  former  attack,  where  the  wall 
was  lower,  and  an  embi'asure  offered  some  facility.  A 
second  ladder  was  soon  placed  alongside  of  the  first, 
by  the  greii.idier  officer  Caiich,  and  the  ne.xt  instant  he 
and  R!d-ge  were  on  the  rampart,  the  shouting  troo])s 
pres.sed  ai'ter  them,  the  garrison  amazed,  and  in  a  man- 
njr  surpriso'd,' were  driven  fighting  through  the  double 
gate  in.o  the  town,  aad  the;  castle  wa^  won.  A  rein- 
forcement, sent  from  the  French  reserve',  then  came  up, 
a  sharp  action  followed,  l)olh  sides  fired  through  the 
gate,  and  th;;  enemy  retired,  but  Ridge  fell,  and  no  man 
died  that  night  with  more  glory- — yQt  many  died,  and 
there  was  much  glory. 

During  these  events,  the  tumult  at  the  breaches  was 
such  as  if  the  very  earth  had  been  rent  asunder  and  its 
central'^lres  were  Imrslin'jj-  upv.'ards  uncontrolled.  The 
two  divisions  had  reached  the  glacis,  just  as  the  fir'ng 
at  the  ca.st!e  had  conimmced,  and  the  flash  of  a  single 
musket  discharged  Irc^m  the  covered  way  as  a  signal 
shewed  them  that  the  French  were  ready  ;  yA  no  stir 
was  heard,  and  darkness  covered  the  breaches.  Some 
hay  packs  were  then  thrown,  some  laddi'rs  were  placed, 
and  the  IWrlorn  hopes  and  storming  parties  of  the  light 
division,  about  five  hundred  in  all,  had  descended  into 
the  ditch  without  opposition,  when  a  bright  flame  shoot- 
ing upwards  displayed  all  the  terrors  of  the  scene.  The 
ramparts  crowded  with  dark  figures  and  glittering  arms, 
were  seen  on  the  one  side,  and  on  the  other,  the  red 
columns  of  the   British,  deep  and  broad,  were  coming 


'  on  like  streams  of  burning  lava ;  it  was  the  touch  of  the 
j  magicians  wand,  for  a  crash  of  thunder  followed,  and 
,  with  incredible  vit.OMce  the  storming  parties  were  dashed 
I  to  pieces  by  the  explosion  of  hundreds  of  shells  and 
I  powder-barrels. 

For  an  instant  the  light  division  stood  on  the  brink  of 
the  ditch,  amazed  at  the  terrific  sight,  then,  with  a  shout 
that  matched  even  the  sound  of  the  exj)losion,  flew  down 
the  ladders,  or  disdaining  their  aid,  leapi'd,  reckless  of 
the  depth,  into  the  gulf  Lelow  ;  and  nearly  at  the  same 
moment,  amidst  a  blaze  of  musketry  that  dazzled  the 
eyes,  the  fourth  division  came  running  in  and  descended 
with  a  like  fury.  'I'here  were  however  only  five  ladders 
for  Ijoth  cohiinns,  which  were  close  together,  and  a  deep 
cut  made  in  the  bottom  of  the  ditch,  as  far  as  the  coun- 
ter-guard of  the  Trinidad,  was  filled  with  water  from 
the  inundation  ;  into  this  watery  snare  the  head  of  the 
fourth  division  fell,  and  it  is  said  that  above  a  hundred 
of  the  fuzileers,  the  men  of  Albuera,  were  there  smo- 
thered. Those  who  followed,  checked  nut,  but  as  if 
such  a  disaster  had  been  expected,  turned  to  the  left, 
and  thus  came  upon  the  face  of  the  unfinished  ravelin, 
which,  being  rough  and  broken,  was  niisiaken  for  the 
breach,  and  instantly  covered  with  men  ;  yet  a  wide 
and  deep  chasm  was  still  between  them  and  the  ram- 
parts from  whence  came  a  deadly  fire  wasting  their 
ranks.  'J'hus  baffled,  they  also  commenced  a  rapid  dis- 
charge of  musketry,  and  disorder  ensued  ;  for  the  men 
of  tlie  light  division,  whose  conducting  engineer  had 
been  disabled  early,  and  whose  flank  was  confined 
by  an  unfinished  ditch  intended  to  cut  off"  the  btis- 
tiou  of  Santa  Maria,  rushed  towards  the  breaches  of 
the  curtain  and  the  Trinidad,  which  were  indeed  before 
them,  but  which  the  fourth  division  were  destined  to 
storm. 

1      Great  was   the   confusion,  for  now  the   ravelin  was 
'  quite  crowded  with  men  of   both  divisions,  and  while 
I  some  continued   to  fire,  others  jumped  down  and  ran 
j  towards   the   breach,   many   also   j)assed   between    the 
I  ravelin  and  the  counter-guard  of  tlie  Trinidad,  the  two 
I  divisions  got   mixed,  and   the   reserves,  which   should 
I  have  remained  at  the  quarries,  also  came  ])ouring  in, 
I  until  the  ditch  was  i|uite  filled,  the  re^ir  ttill  crowding 
forward,  and   all    cheering  vehemently.     'I'he   enemy's 
shouts  also,   were  loud  and  terrible,  and  the  bursting 
of  shells  and  of  grenades,  the  roaring  of  the  guns  fruui 
the  flanks,  answered  by  the  iron   howitzers   Ir^m   the 
battery  of  the  parallel,  the  heavy  roll  and  horrid  explo- 
sion of  the  ])nwder-barre!?,  the  whizzing  flight  of  the 
blazing  splinters,  the  loud  exhortations  of  the  officers, 
and  the  continual  clatter  of  the  muskets,  made  a  mad- 
dening dm. 

Now  a  multitude  bounded  up  the  great  breach  as  if 
driven  by  a  whirlwind,  but  across  the  top  glittered  a 
range  of  sword-bladei,  sliarp-jjointed,  keen-edged  on 
both  sides,  and  firmly  fixed  in  ponderous  beams,  which 
were  chained  together  and  set  deep  in  the  ruins  ;  and 
for  ten  feet  in  fri)nt,  the  ascent  was  covered  with  loose 
planks,  studded  with  sharp  iron  points,  on  which  the  feet 
of  the  foremost  being  set  the  planks  moved,  and  the 
unhappy  s  ildiers,  falling  forward  on  the  spikes,  rolled 
down  upon  the  ranks  behind.  Then  tlie  Frenchmen, 
shouting  at  the  success  of  their  stratagem,  and  leaping 
forward,  plied  their  shot  with  terrible  rapidity,  for  every 
niiin  had  several  muskets;  and  each  musket  in  addition 
to  ils  ordinary  charge  contained  a,  small  cylinder  of  wood 
stuck  full  of  leaden  slugs,  which  scattered  like  hail  whcD 
they  were  discharged. 

Again  the  assailants  rushed  up  the  breaches,  and 
again  the  sword-blades,  immovable  and  impassible, 
stopped  their  charge,  and  the  hissing  shells  and  thun- 
dering powdcr-bari'cls  exploded  unceasingly.  Hun- 
dreds of  men  had  fallen,  and  hundreds  more  were 
drojjping,  but  still  the  heroic  oCicers  culled  aloud  for 


1812.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


4i9 


new  trials,  and  sometimes  followed  by  many,  some- 
limes  by  a  few,  ascended  the  ruins;  and  so  furious 
were  tiie  men  themselves,  that  in  one  of  these  charges, 
the  rear  strove  to  push  the  foremost  on  to  the  sword- 
blades,  willinir  even  to  make  a  bridge  of  their  writhing 
bodies,  but  the  others  frustrated  the  attempt  by  drop- 
ping down  ;  and  men  fell  so  fast  from  the  shot,  that  it 
was  hard  to  know  who  went  down  voluntarily,  who 
wer(!  stricken,  and  many  stooped  unhurt  that  never 
rose  again.  Vain  also  would  it  have  been  to  break 
through  the  sword-blades,  for  the  trench  and  parapet 
behind  the  breach  were  finished,  and  the  assailants, 
crowded  into  even  a  narrower  space  than  the  ditch 
was,  would  sliii  have  been  separated  from  their  ene- 
mies, and  the  slaughter  would  have  continued. 

At  the  beginning  of  this  dreadful  conflict,  colonel 
Andrew  Barnard  had  with  prodigious  efforts  separated 
his  division  from  the  other,  and  preserved  some  degree 
of  militjry  array;  but  now  the  tumult  was  such,  that 
no  command  could  be  heard  distinctly,  except  by  those 
close  at  hand,  and  the  mutilated  carcasses  heaped  on 
each  other,  and  the  wounded,  struggling  to  avoid  being 
trampled  upon,  broke  the  formations;  order  was  im- 
possible !  Yet  officers  of  all  stations,  followed  more 
or  less  numerously  by  the  men,  were  seen  to  start  out, 
as  if  struck  by  a  sudden  madness,  and  rush  inla  the 
breach,  which  yawning  and  glittering  with  steel,  seemed 
like  the  mouth  of  some  huge  dragon  belching  forth 
smoke  and  flame.  In  one  of  these  attempts,  colonel 
Macleod  of  the  fortv-ihird,  a  young  man,  whose  feeble 
body  would  have  been  quite  unfit  for  war,  if  it  had  not 
been  sustained  by  an  unconquerable  spiiit,  was  killed. 
Wherever  his  voice  was  heard,  there  his  soldiers 
gathered,  and  with  such  a  strong  resolution  did  he  lead 
them  up  the  fatal  ruins,  that  when  one  behind  him,  in 
frilling,  plunged  a  bayonet  into  his  back,  he  complain- 
ed iiot,  and  continuing  his  course  was  shot  dead 
within  a  yard  of  the  sword-blades.  But  there  was  no 
want  of  gallant  leaders,  or  desperate  followers. 

Two  hours  spent  in  these  vain  efforts  convinced  the 
eildiers  that  the  breach  of  the  Trinidad  was  impreg- 
nab.j  and  as  the  opening  in  the  curtain,  although 
less  strong,  was  retired,  and  the  approach  to  it  im- 
p:'ded  by  deep  holes,  and  cuts  made?  in  the  ditch,  the 
troops  did  not  much  notice  it  after  the  partial  failure 
of  one  attack  which  had  been  made  early.  Gathering 
in  dark  groups  and  leaning  on  their  muskets,  they 
looked  up  with  sullen  desperation  at  the  Trinidad, 
while  the  enemy  stepping  out  on  the  ramparts,  and 
aiming  their  shots  by  the  light  of  the  fire-balls  which 
they  threw  over,  asked  as  their  victims  fell,  "  fVhi/ 
they  did  not  come  into  Badajos  ?" 

in  this  dreadful  situation,  while  the  dead  were 
lying  in  heaps  and  others  continually  falling,  the 
wounded  crawling  about  to  get  some  shelter  from  the 
merciless  fire  above,  and  withal  a  sickening  stench 
frc-m  the  burnt  flesh  of  the  slain,  captain  Nicholas,  of 
the  engineers,  was  observed  by  Mr,  Shaw,*  of  the 
forty-third,  making  incredible  efforts  to  force  iiis  way 
with  a  few  men  into  the  Santa  Maria  bastion.  Shaw 
having  collected  about  fifty  soldiers  of  all  regiments 
joined  him,  and  although  there  was  a  deep  cut  along 
ttie  foot  of  this  breach  also,  it  was  instantly  passed, 
and  these  two  young  officers  at  the  head  of  their  gal- 
lant band,  rushed  up  the  slope  of  the  ruins  ;  but  when 
they  had  gained  two-thirds  of  the  ascent,  a  concentra- 
ted fire  of  musketry  and  grape,  dashed  nearly  the 
whole  dead  to  the  earth  !  Nicholas  was  mortally 
wounded,  and  the  intre])id  Shaw  stood  alone !  After 
this  no  further  effort  was  made  at  any  point,  and  the 
troops  remained  passive,  but  unflinching,  beneath  the 
enemy's  shot,  which  streamed  without  intermission; 
fo-,  of  the  riflemen  on  the  glacis,  many  leaping  early 

•   T\ow  lieutenant-colornl  Shaw  Kennedj'. 

30 


into  the  ditch  had  joined  in  the  assault,  and  the  rest, 
raked  by  a  cross  fire  of  grape  from  the  distant  bas- 
tions, bafiled  in  their  aim  by  the  smoke  and  flames 
from  the  explosions,  and  too  f(!vv  in  number,  had  en- 
tirely failed  to  quell  the  French  musketry. 

About  midnight,  when  two  thousand  brave  men  had 
fallen,  Wellington,  who  was  on  a  height  close  to  the 
quarries,  sent  orders  for  the  remainder  to  retire  and  re- 
form for  a  second  assa\ilt;  for  he  had  just  then  heard 
that  the  castle  was  taken,  and  thinking  that  the  enemy 
would  still  hold  out  in  the  town,  was  resolved  to 
assail  the  breaches  again.  This  retreat  froir.  the  dilcli 
was,  however,  not  effected  without  further  carnage 
and  confusion,  for  the  FVench  fire  never  slackened, 
and  a  cry  arose  that  the  enemy  were  making  a  sally 
from  the  distant  flanks,  which  caused  a  rush  towards* 
the  ladders;  then  the  groans  and  lamentations  of  tho 
wounded  who  could  not  move,  and  expected  to  be  slain, 
increased,  many  officers  who  had  not  heard  of  the 
order,  endeavoured  to  stop  the  soldiers  from  going 
back,  and  some  would  even  have  removed  the  ladders 
but  were  unable  to  break  the  crowd. 

All  this  time  the  third  division  was  lying  close  in 
the  castle,  and  either  from  a  fear  of  risking  the  loss  of 
a  point  which  ensured  the  capture  of  the  place,  or  that 
the  egress  was  too  difficult,  made  no  attempt  to  drive 
away  the  enemy  from  the  breaches.  On  the  other  side 
however  the  fifth  division  had  commenced  the  falsH 
attack  on  the  Pardaleras,  and  on  the  right  of  the  Gna- 
diana,  the  Portuguese  were  sharjil}'  engaged  at  tliH 
bridge;  thus  the  town  was  girdled  with  fire,  for  general 
Walker's  brigade  having  passed  on  during  the  feint  on 
the  Pardaleras,  was  escalading  the  distant  bastion  of 
San  Vincente.  His  troops  had  advanced  along  tho 
banks  of  the  river,  and  reached  the  French  guard- 
house, at  the  barrier-gate,  undiscovered,  for  the  ripple 
of  the  waters  smothered  the  sound  of  their  footsteps; 
but  just  then  the  explosion  at  the  broaches  look  place, 
the  moon  shone  out,  and  the  French  sentinels,  discov- 
ering the  columns,  firtd.  The  British  troops  immedi- 
ately springing  forward  under  a  sharp  musketry  began 
to  hew  down  the  wooden  barrier  at  the  covered  way, 
while  the  Portuguese,  being  panic-stricken,  threw 
down  the  scaling  ladders.  Nevertheless  the  others 
snatched  them  up  again,  and  forcing  the  barrier,  jumped 
into  the  dilch  ;  but  the  guiding  engineer  oflTicer  was 
killed,  and  there  was  a  cunette,  which  embarrassed 
the  column,  and  when  the  foremost  men  succeeded  iu 
rearing  the  ladders,  the  latter  were  found  too  short, 
for  the  walls  were  generally  above  thirty  feet  high. 
Meanwhile  the  fire  of  the  French  was  deadly,  a  small 
mine  was  sprung  beneath  the  soldiers'  feet,  beams  of 
wood  and  live  shells  were  rolled  over  on  their  heads, 
showers  of  grape  from  the  flank  swept  the  ditch,  and 
man  after  man  dropped  dead  from  the  ladders. 

Fortunately  some  of  the  defenders  having  been 
called  away  "to  aid  in  recovering  the  castle,  the  ram- 
parts were  not  entirely  manned,  and  the  assailants, 
having  discovered  a  corner  of  the  bastion  where  the 
scarp  was  only  twenty  feet  high,  placed  three  ladders 
there  under  an  embrasure  which  had  no  gun  and  was 
only  stopped  with  a  gabion.  Some  men  got  up,  but 
with  difficulty,  for  the  ladders  were  still  too  short,  and 
the  first  man  who  gained  the  top  was  pushed  up  by 
his  comrades  and  then  drew  others  after  him,  until 
many  had  gained  the  summit ;  and  though  the  French 
shot  heavily  against  t-hem,  from  both  flanks  and  from 
a  house  in  front,  they  thickened  and  could  not  be  driv- 
en back  ;  half  the  fourth  regiment  entered  the  town 
itself  to  dislodge  the  enemy  from  the  heuses,  while 
the  others  pushecl  along  the  rampart  towards  the  breach, 
and  by  dint  of  hard  fighting  successively  won  three 
bastions. 

In  the  last  of  these  combats  general  Walker  leap- 
ing f.rward,  sword  in  hand,  at  the  moment  when  one 


450 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XVI. 


oflhe  pnemy's  cannnneprs  wa?  (lischargingr  a  p^iin,  fell 
covered  with  so  many  wounds  tliat  it  was  wonderful 
how  he  could  survive,  and  some  of  the  soldiers  imme- 
diately after  perceiving-  a  liijhled  match  on  the  ground, 
cried  out  a  mine!  At  thai  word,  such  is  the  power  of 
imaginaiion,  those  troops  whom  neither  the  stronw 
barrier,  nor  the  deep  ditch,  nor  the  high  walls,  nor  the 
deadly  fire  of  the  enemy  could  stop,  stan-g?red  b:ick 
appalled  by  a  chimera  of  their  own  raising,  and  in  this 
disorder  a  ?Vench  reserve,  under  general  Viellnnde, 
drove  on  them  with  a  firm  and  ready  charge,  and  pitch- 
innr  some  men  over  the  walls,  and  killing  others  out- 
right, again  cleansed  the  ramparts  even  to  the  San 
Vincente.  There  however  Leith  had  placed  colonel 
Nugent  with  a  battalion  of  the  thirty-ciglith  as  a  reserve, 
and  when  the  French  came  up,  shouting  and  slaying 
all  before  them,  this  battalion,  about  two  hundred  stong, 
arose,  and  with  one  close  volley  destroyed  them. 

Then  the  panic  ceased,  the  soldiers  rallied,  and  in 
compact  order  once  more  chargpd  along  the  walls 
towards  the  breaches,  but  the  French,  althouijh  turned 
on  both  flanks  and  abandoned  by  fortune,  did  not  yet 
yield  ;  and  meanwhile  the  detachment  of  the  fourth 
regiment  which  had  entered  the  town  when  the  San 
Vincente  was  first  carried,  was  strongly  situated,  for 
the  streets  were,  empty  and  brilliantly  illuminated,  and 
no  person  was  seen ;  yet  a  low  buzz  and  whisper  were 
heard  around,  lattices  were  now  and  then  gently  opened, 
and  from  time  to  time  shots  were  fired  from  under- 
neath the  doors  of  the  houses  by  the  Spaniards. 
However,  the  troops  w-ilh  bugles  sounding,  advanced 
towards  the  great  square  of  the  town,  and  in  their 
progress  captured  several  mules  going  with  ammuni- 
tion to  the  breaches;  but  the  square  itself  was  as 
empty  and  silent  as  the  streets,  and  the  houses  as 
bright  with  lamps;  a  terrible  enchantment  seemed  to 
be  in  operation,  for  they  saw  nothing  but  light,  and 
heard  onlv  the  low  whispers  close  around  them,  while 
the  tumult  at  the  breaches  was  like  the  crashing  thunder. 

There,  indeed,  the  fight  was  still  plainly  raging,  and 
hence,  quitting  the  square,  they  attempted  to  take  the 
garrison  in  reverse,  by  attacking  the  ramparts  from 
the  town-side,  but  they  were  received  with  a  rolling 
musketry,  driven  back  with  loss,  and  resumed  their 
movemetit  through  the  streets.  At  last  the  breaches 
were  abandoned  by  the  French,  other  parties  entered 
the  place,  desultory  combats  took  place  in  various 
parts,  and  finally  general  Viellande,  and  Phillipon  who 
was  wounded,  seeing  all  ruined,  passed  the  bridge 
with  a  few  hundred  soldiers,  and  entered  San  Cristo- 
val,  where  they  all  surrendered  early  the  next  morning 
upon  summons  to  lord  Fitzroy  Somerset,  who  had 
with  great  readiness  pushed  through  the  town  to  the 
draw-bridge  ere  they  had  time  to  organize  further 
resistance.  But  even  in  tlie  moment  of  ruin  the  night 
before,  the  noble  governor  had  sent  some  horsemen  out 
from  the  fort  to  carry  the  iiows  to  Soult's  army,  and  they 
reached  him  in  time  to  prevent  a  greater  misfortune. 

Now  commenced  that  wild  and  desperate  wicked- 
ness, which  tarnished  the  lustre  of  the  soldier's  hero- 
ism. All  indeed  were  not  alike,  for  hundreds  risked 
and  many  lost  their  lives  in  striving  to  stop  the 
violence,  but  the  madness  generally  prevailed,  and  as 
the  worst  men  were  leaders  here,  all  the  dreadful  pas- 
sions of  human  nature  were  displayed.  Shameless 
npacily,  brutal  intemperance,  savage  lust,  cruelty,  and 
murder,  shrieks  and  piteous  lamentations,  groans, 
»«houts,  imprecations,  the  hissing  of  fires  bursting  from 
the  houses,  the  crashing  of  doors  and  windows,  and 
the  reports  of  muskets  used  in  violence,  resounded  for 
two  days  and  nights  in  the  streets  of  Hadajos  !  on  the 
third,  when  the  city  was  sacked,  when  the  soldiers 
were  exhausted  by  their  own  exce«ses,  the  tumult 
rather  subsidod  than  was  quelled.  Tiie  wounded  rnen 
wore  then  looked  to,  the  dead  disposed  of! 


Five  thousand  men  and  officers  fell  during  thij 
siege,  and  of  these,  including  seven  hundred  Fortu 
guese,  three  thousand  five  hundred  had  been  stricken 
in  the  assault,  sixty  officers  and  more  than  sever, 
hundred  men  being  slain  on  the  spot.  The  five  gen- 
erals, Kempt,  Harvey,  Bowes,  Colville,  and  Picton 
were  wounded,  the  first  three  severely;  about  six 
hundred  men  and  oficers  fell  in  the  escalade  of  San 
Vincente,  as  many  at  the  castle,  and  more  than  two 
thousand  at  the  breaches,  each  division  tin  re  losing 
twelve  hundred  !  And  how  deadly  the  strife  was,  at 
that  point,  may  be  gathered  from  this,  the  forty-third 
and  fifty-second  regiments,  of  the  light  division,  alone 
lost  more  men  than  the  seven  regiments  of  the  third 
division  engaged  at  the  castle! 

Let  any  man  picture  to  himself  this  frightful  car. 
nage  taking  place  in  a  space  of  less  than  a  hundred 
square  yards.  Let  him  consider  that  the  slain  died  not 
all  suddenly,  nor  by  one  manner  of  death;  that  some 
perished  by  steel,  some  by  shot,  some  by  water,  that 
some  were  crushed  and  mangled  by  heavy  weights, 
some  trampled  upon,  some  dashed  to  atoms^hy  the 
fiery  explosions ;  that  lor  hours  this  destruction  was 
endured  without  shrinking,  and  that  the  town  was  won 
at  last,  let  any  man  consider  this  and  he  must  admit 
that  a  British  army  bears  with  it  an  awful  power. 
And  false  would  it  be  to  say  that  the  French  were 
feeble  men,  for  the  garrison  stood  and  f"ught  manfully 
and  with  good  discipline  behaving  worthily.  Shame 
there  was  none  on  any  side.  Yet  who  shall  do  justice 
to  the  bravery  of  the  soldiers?  the  noble  emulation  of 
the  officers  1  Who  shall  measure  out  the  glory  of 
Ridge,  of  Macleod,  of  Nicholas,  or  of  O'Hare,  of  the 
ninety-fifth,  who  perished  on  the  breach,  at  the  head 
of  the  stormers,  and  with  him  nearly  all  the  volun- 
teers for  that  desperate  service  ]  Who  shall  describe 
the  springing  valonr  of  that  Portuguese  grenadier  who 
was  killed  the  foremost  man  at  the  Sania  Maria?  or 
the  martial  fury  of  that  desperate  soldier  of  the  ninety- 
fifth,  who,  in  his  resolution  to  win,  thrust  hiinseif 
beneath  the  chained  sword-blades,  and  there  sufTered 
the  enemy  to  dash  his  head  to  pieces  with  the  ends  of 
their  muskets  ■?  Vvho  can  sufficiently  honour  the  in- 
trepidity of  Walker,  of  Shaw,  of  Canch,  or  the  reso- 
lution of  Ferguson  of  the  forty-third,  who  having  in 
former  assaults  received  two  deep  wounds,  was  here, 
with  his  hurts  still  open,  leading  the  stormers  of  his 
regiment,  the  third  time  a  volunteer,  and  the  third  time 
wounded  !  Nor  would  I  be  understood  to  select  these 
as  pre-eminent,  many  and  signal  were  the  other  exam- 
ples of  unbounded  devotion,  some  known,  some  that 
will  never  be  known  ;  for  in  such  a  tumult  much 
passed  unobserved,  and  often  the  observers  fell  them- 
selves ere  they  could  bear  testimony  to  what  they 
saw ;  but  no  age,  no  nation  ever  sent  forth  braver 
troops  to  battle  than  those  w'ho  stormed  Badajos. 

When  the  extent  of  the  night's  havoc  was  made 
known  to  lord  Wellington,  the  firmness  of  his  nature 
gave  way  for  a  moment,  and  the  pride  of  conquest 
yielded  to  a  passionate  burst  of  grief  for  the  loss  of 
his  gallant  soldiers. 


CHAPTER  VL 

The  state  o(  CiudaH  Ro{lri<5o  and  Almeiila  obliares  lord  Wel- 
iii);:ton  to  rpliiiquish  his  desitrn  of  invadinp:  Aiulalusia — 
Souifs  operations  dcsrribi^d — lie  reaches  Villa  Franca — 
Hears  of  the  fall  of  Badajos  ami  retires — IVime-Villemiii 
and  Morillo  move  from  the  JViebIa  against  Seville — Halles- 
teros  having  defeated  Maransin  at  Cartania,  comes  from  the 
Ronda  against  Seville — A  French  convoy  is  stopped  in  the 
Morena,  and  the  whole  of  Andalusia  is  \n  cot'ip.iotinn — Se- 
ville is  saved  by  the  s(il)lle1y  of  a  S()ai.iard  ir  i!ir  Fr(  nrh 
inti  rest — l?alli'-tcros  retires — Assaults  Znhara  -.ud  is  repuls- 
ed—Sends  a  division  ajjaiiist  Oisuna,  which  is  also  repulsce! 


1812.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


451 


by  the  Escopcteros — Drives  general  Rey  (Vom  Allora  fo 
IVJaligii — S.Aill  marches  from  Llerena  towards  Seville,  and 
general  Coiiroux  biinijs  a  brigade  up  Ircm  the  Guadaltte  to 
attack  halksteros — Sir  S.  Cotton  defeats  general  I'eyrev- 
iJlont's  cavalry  near  Usagre — Soult  concentrates  his  army 
near  Seville  to  fight  the  allies — Lord  Wellington  marches  to 
Beira — Marmoiit's  operations — Pie  marches  against  Ciudad 
Rodrigo — Carlos  d'Kspana  retires  tovvartis  Aliiieuia  and 
Victor  Alten  towards  Fenaniacor — The  1- rench  appear  before 
Almfida — General  Trant  arrives  on  the  Cabe^a  JVegio  — 
The  French  retire  and  Trant  unites  with  J.  VVilsjn  at 
Guar.la — Marniont  acUancesto  Sabugal — Victor  Alttn  aban- 
dons Fenaniacor  and  Castello  Branco,  and  crosses  the  Tagus 
— The  Portuguese  general  Lecor  opposes  the  enfiny  with 
skill  and  courage — Marniont  drives  Trant  from  Guar.la 
and  defeats  his  militia  on  the  IMondego — Lord  Wellington 
crossi  s  the  Tagus  and  enters  Castello  Cranco — Marmont's 
position  peiilous — Lord  Wellington  advances  to  attack  him 
— He  retreats  over  the  Agueda — The  allied  army  is  S'pread 
lu  wide  caiitouments,  and  the  fortresses  are  victualled. 

The  English  grencral  having-  now  achieved  the  sec- 
ond part  of  his  project,  was  desirous  to  fi^ht  a  great 
battle  in  Andalusia,  whicli  would  have  been  ll)e  crown 
of  this  extraordinary  winter  campaign  ;  but  the  miscon- 
duct of  others  wtmld  not  suffer  liim  to  dc  this.  At 
(Ciudad  Rodrigo,  the  Spanish  engineers  had  entirely 
ceased  the  repairs  of  the  works  ;  Carlos  d'Espaila  be- 
sides neglectmg  to  provision  that  place,  had  by  his 
oppressive  conduct  alarmed  all  the  people  of  the  vicin- 
ity, and  created  a  dangerous  spirit  of  discontent  in 
the  garrison  ;  Almeida  was  insecure,  and  Marmont's 
army  was  already  between  the  Agueda  and  the  Coa. 

It  was  essential  to  place  those  fortresses  in  safety, 
ere  the  mnrch  intc  Andalusia  couid  take  place  ;  but 
the  English  general  knowing  that  the  danger  in  Beira 
was  not  very  imminent,  lingered  a  few  days,  hoping 
lliat  Soult,  in  his  anger  at  the  loss  of  Badajos,  would 
risk  a  blow  on  tjiis  side  of  the  Morena ;  and  he  was 
certain,  that  the  French  general  could  not  stop  more 
■ihan  a  few  d.iys,  because  of  the  secondary  armies 
whose  operations  were  then  in  pi  ogress. 

Soult  was  indeed  dieply  affected  by  the  loss  of 
Badajos,  but  he  was  surrounded  by  enemies  and  the 
sontest  was  too' unequal.  He  had  quilted  Seville  the 
1st  of  Ayiril  with  twelve  regiments  of  infantry,  two  of 
cavalry,  and  one  battery  of  artillery.  His  march  was 
by  Lora  del  Rio  and  Constantino  upon  Llerena  ;  and, 
to  impose  upon  the  allies,  general  Gazan  moved  by  the 
road  of  Monasterio  with  the  remainder  of  the  artillery 
and  the  baggage,  escorted  by  Barois'  division  of  in- 
fantry, and  some  cavalry.  But  this  column  turned 
into  the  cross  roads,  at  Santa  de  Guillena,  and  so 
reached  (Joustantino,  whence  they  followed  the  main 
body,  and  thus  the  v.hole  army  was  concentrated  at 
Llerena  on  the  6tii.  This  circuitous  march  had  been 
determined  by  the  situation  of  Drouet  and  Daricau, 
who  having  been  before  driven  into  the  mountains  b}' 
the  Cordova  roads,  could  noi  rally  upon  the  side  of 
Monasterio  ;  now  however  they  advanced  to  Fuentes 
de  Ovejuiia,  and  the  allies  fell  back  to  Albuera  and 
'J'alavera  Real. 

On  the  7lh  the  French  reached  Villafranca  and  their 
cavalry  entered  Villalba  and  Fuente  del  Maestro. 
The  !-)th  they  were  in  march  to  fight,  when  the  horse- 
men sent  by  Phillipon  from  Badajos,  duri.ig  the  assault, 
brought  the  n(!ws  of  its  fall  ;  at  the  same  moment  their 
general  was  apprized,  by  his  spies,  that  Marmont  by 
whom  he  expected  to  be  joined  was  in  the  north  and 
could  not  assist  him.  He  immediately  fell  back  to 
Llerena,  lor  the  allies  could  then  bring  forty-five  thou- 
sand men  into  action,  and  the  French  army  though 
strongly  constituted  and  the  best  troops  in  Spain  did 
flot  exceed  twenty-four  thousand. 

Sonlt  had  now  little  time  to  deliberate,  for  Penne 
Villemur  and  Morillo,  issuing  out  of  Portugal  with 
four  thousand  men,  had  crossed  the  Lower  Guadiana, 

and   seized   San   Lucar  dc  Mayor  on   the  4th.     This 

^  * 


place  was  ten  miles  from  Seville,  which  was  only 
garrisoned  by  a  Spanish  Swiss  bisttalion  in  .Joseph's 
service,  aided  by  "  Escape! ems'''  and  by  the  sick  and 
convalescent  men  ;  the  commandant  Riguoux  had  tlien^- 
fore,  after  a  skirmish,  shut  himself  up  in  fortified 
convents.  The  Gth  the  Spaniards  had  occupied  ths 
heights  in  front  of  the  Triana  bridge,  and  the  7th 
attacked  the  French  enlrenchmen's,  hoping  to  raise  a 
popular  commotion.  But  a  worse  danger  was  gather- 
ing on  the  other  side,  for  Ballesteros,  vil'icr  the  defeat 
of  Maransin,  at  Cartama,  had  advanced  with  eh^ver 
thousand  men  intending  to  fall  on  Seville  from  the  lef 
of  the  Guadalquivir. 

To  distract  the  attention  of  the  French,  and  to  kee{ 
Laval  from  detaching  the  troops  to  Seville,  the  Span- 
ish general  had  sent  Copons  with  four  thousand  mei 
by  Itar  to  .Tunqnera,  which  is  on  the  Malaga  side  of 
theRonda;  nuanwhile  he  himself  entered  Los  I^arioj 
with  the  rest  of  his  army  and  thus  threatened  at  oner 
Grenada  and  the  lines  of  (.hiclana.  At  the  same  time 
all  the  similar  partidas  of  the  Ronda  were  let  loose 
in  different  directions,  to  cut  the  communications,  to 
seize  the  small  French  magazines,  and  to  collect  the 
Spanish  soldiers,  who,  at  ditlerent  periods,  had  quitted 
their  colours  and  retired  to  ihsir  homes. 

Copons  remained  at  Junquera,  but  Ballesteros  with 
thrre  divisions  commanded  by  Cruz  Murgeon,  the 
marquis  de  Las  Cuevas,  and  the  prince  of  Anglona. 
marcht^d  to  Utrera  as  soon  as  Sonlt  had  departed  from 
Seville;  thus  the  communication  of  that  city  with 
Cadiz  on  one  side,  and  with  Malaga  and  Grenada  on 
the  other,  was  cut  off.  The  situation  of  the  French 
was  very  critical,  and  they  wanted  amnmnilion,  be- 
cause a  large  convoy,  coming  from  Madrid  with  an 
escort  of  twelve  hundred  men,  was  stopjied  in  the 
Morena  by  the  Partidas  from  the  Ronda  and  from 
Murcia. 

On  the  6lh  the  Spanish  cavalry  was  within  a  few 
miles  of  Seville,  when  false  information  adroitly  given 
by  a  Spaniard  in  the  French  interest,  led  Ballesteros 
to  believe  that  Soult  was  close  at  hand,  whereupon 
he  immediately  returned  to  the  Ronda;  the  next  day 
Penne  Villemur  having  received  notice  from  lord  Wel- 
lington that  the  French  would  soon  return,  also  retired 
to  Gibraleon. 

Ballesteros  soon  discovered  the  deceit,  when,  instead 
of  returning  to  Seville,  he  on  the  9th  assaulted  the 
small  castle  of  Zahara  in  the  hills,  and  being  repulsed 
with  considerable  loss,  n>ade  a  circuit  north  of  F?onda, 
by  Albodonales,  Alcala  de  Pruna,  to  Casarbonela, 
where  he  was  rejoined  by  Copons.  The  division  of 
Cuevas  then  marched  against  Ossuna,  which  being 
only  garrisoned  by  "  Eacapeferns,"  was  expected  to 
fall  at  once  ;  but  after  two  days  combat  and  the  loss 
of  two  hundred  killed  and  w'ounded,  the  three  thousand 
patriots  retired,  baffled  by  a  hundred  and  fifty  of  their 
own  countrymen  fighting  for  the  invaders. 

When  Cuevas  returned,  Ballesteros  marched  in  three 
columns,  by  roads  leading  from  (Casarbonela  and  Ante- 
quera,  to  attack  general  Rey,  who  was  posted  with 
eighteen  hundred  men  near  Allora.  on  the  Guadaljore 
river.  The  centre  column  was  first  engaged  without 
any  advantage,  but  when  Rey  saw  the  flank  columns 
coming  on,  he  retired  behind  the  Guadalmediiia  river, 
close  to  Malaga,  having  lost  a  colonel  and  two  hundred 
men  in  passing  the  Guadaljore. 

After  this  action  Ballesteros  returned  to  the  Ronda, 
for  Soult  was  now  truly  at  hand,  and  his  horsemen 
were  already  in  the  plains.  He  Iiad  sent  Digeon's 
cavalry  on  the  9th  to  Cordoba,  to  chase  the  Partidas, 
and  had  ordered  Drouet's  division  to  take  post  at 
Fuentes  Ovejuiia;  then  directing  Peyreymont's  cav- 
alry upon  Usagre,  he  h.ad  come  himself  by  forced 
marches  to  Seville,  which  he  reached  the  11th,  hoping 
to  surprise  the  Spaniards,  but  li'f  e'r^'^gem,  which 


452 


NAPIER'S    PENINS  FILAR    WAR. 


[Book  XVI. 


had  saved  Seville  on  the  6th  also  saved  Ballesteros, 
for  general  Conroux  was  coming  up  on  the  other  side 
from  the  Guadalete  and  the  Spaniards  would  have 
been  enclosed  but  for  their  timely  retreat.  And  scarce- 
ly had  Sniilt  quilted  Llerena  when  the  French  met  with 
a  disaster  near  Usaorre,  which  though  a  strong  position 
had  always  proved  a  very  dangerous  advanced  post 
on  botli  sides. 

Sir  Stapleton  Cotton,  while  following  the  trail  of 
the  enemy  on  the  evening  of  the  lOtli,  had  received 
intelligence  that  Peyreymont's  cavalry  was  between 
Villa  Garcia  and  Usagre,  and  he  immediately  con- 
ceived hopes  of  cutting  it  off.  To  effect  this  Anson's 
brigade,  then  commanded  by  colonel  Frederic  Pon- 
sonby,  moved  during  the  night  from  Villa  Franca 
upon  Usagre,  and  at  the  same  time  Le  Marchant's 
brigade  marched  from  Los  Santos  upon  Benvenida  to 
intercept  the  retreat  on  Llerena.  Ponsonhy's  advanced 
guard  having  commenced  the  action  too  soon,  the 
Frencli  fell  back,  before  Le  Marchant  could  intercept 
them,  but  as  some  heights,  skirting  the  Llerena  road, 
prevented  them  from  seeing  that  general,  they  again 
drew  up  in  order  of  battle  behind  the  junction  of  the 
Benvenida  road. 

The  hostile  bodies  were  nearly  equal  in  numbers, 
about  nineteen  hundred  sabres  on  each  side,  but  sir 
w'^tapleton  snon  derided  the  action  ;  for  ably  seizing 
the  accidental  advantage  of  ground  he  kept  the  enemy's 
attention  entraged  by  skirmishing  with  Ponsonhy's 
squadrons,  while  Le  Marchant  secretly  passing  at  the 
back  of  the  heights,  sent  the  fifth  dragoon  guards 
acriinst  their  flank,  and  the  next  moment  Ponsonby 
rliarged  their  front.  Thus  assailed  the  French  gave 
way  in  disorder,  and  being  pursued  for  four  miles  left 
several  officers  and  a  hundred  and  twenty-eight  men 
prisoners,  and  many  were  killed  in  the  field.  The 
loss  of  the  British  was  only  fifly-six  men  and  officers, 
of  which   forty-five  were  of  the  fifth  dragoon  guards. 

The  beaten  troops  found  refuge  with  Drouet's  infan- 
try which  had  not  yet  left  Llerena;  hut  after  this  ac- 
tion, that  Qfeneral  fell  back  with  all  his  troops  behind 
the  Guadalquivir,  for  Soult  was  then  preparing  to  fight 
the  allies  at  Seville. 

The  duke  of  Dalmatia  was  well  aware  of  Welling- 
ton's inlentiiin  to  invade  Andalusia.  He  knew  exactly 
the  amount  and  disposition  of  his  forces,  and  was  re- 
solved to  meet  him  coming  out  of  the  Morena,  with  all 
the  French  army  united  ;  neither  did  he  doubt  the  final 
issue,  althousfh  the  failure  of  the  last  harvest  and  the 
non-arrival  of  convoys  since  February  had  lessened  his 
resources.  Wellington's  plan  was  however  deferred. 
lie  had  levelled  his  trenches,  and  brought  two  Portu- 
guese regiments  of  infantry  from  Abrantes  and  Elvas 
to  form  a  temporary  garrison  of  Badajos,  until  some 
Spaniards,  who  had  been  landed  at  Ayamonte  in  March, 
could  arrive  ;  then  (jiving  over  the  charge  of  the  repairs 
to  general  Hill,  who  remained  with  two  divisions  of 
infantry  and  three  brigades  nf  cavalry  in  Estremadura, 
he  marched  himself  upon  Beira,  which  Marmonl  was 
now  ravaging  with  great  cruelty. 

That  marshal  had  been  anxious  to  unite  with  Soult 
in  P]slremadura,  but  the  emperors  orders  were  impera- 
tive, that  he  should  make  a  diversion  for  Badajos  by 
an  irruption  into  Portugal.  On  the  11th  of  March  he 
ascertained  that  none  of  Wellinsfton's  divisions  were 
left  on  the  Agueda,  and  on  the  27lh  he  was  ready  to 
move.  Bonet,  reinforced  by  Carier's  brigade,  was 
then  on  the  Orbijo,  in  observation  of  the  Gallicians; 
Ferrier's  division  \vas  at  Valladolid,  and  Foy's  in  the 
valley  of  the  Tagus;  but  the  other  five  divisions  of  in- 
fantrjs  and  one  of  cavalry,  had  passed  the  mountains 
and  concentrated  on  the  Tormes,  carrying  with  them 
Iitreen  days  provisions,  scaling  ladders,  and  the  mate- 
rials for  a  bridge.  Both  Almeida  and  Ciudaii  Rndri<ro 
were  therefore  in   mar.'fest   peril,  and  Almeida  which 


contained  the  allies'  battering  train  was  still  very  in- 
completely fortified.  Hence  on  the  first  rumour  of 
Marmont's  movement,  lord  Wellington  had  thrown  in 
two  militia  regiments,  with  a  strong  detachment  of 
British  artillery-men;  the  garrison  was  therefore  three 
thousand  six  liundred  strong,  and  the  governor,  colonel 
Le  Mesurier,  laboured  hard  to  complete  the  defei.ces. 

Of  the  northern  militia,  which  iiad  been  called  oiil 
before  the  allies  quitted  the  Coa,  six  thousand  infantry 
and  three  hundred  cavalry  were  under  Silveira,  three 
thousand  ini"antry  under 'I'rant,  the  same  number  under 
.lohn  Wilson,  and  two  thousand  five  hundred  under 
Lecor.  But  the  law  was,  that  persons  liable  to  servo 
should  be  enrolled  by  classes  in  rotation,  and  thereforH 
the  present  men,  with  the  exception  of  Silveira's,  v.errt 
raw  peasants  totally  unskilled  in  the  use  of  arms.  All 
these  officers  save  Lecor,  whose  post  was  at  Castello 
Branco,  had  been  for  some  time  in  movement,  and 
Trant  and  Wilson  were  on  the  22d  at  Lamego,  whf  re 
general  Bacellar,  who  commanded  the  province,  fixed 
his  head-quarters.  Silveira  hail  the  same  destination, 
but  his  march  was  slow,  and  his  object  rather  to  draw 
the  wonder  of  his  countrymen;  for  in  his  unquenchable 
vanity  he  always  affected  to  act  as  an  independent 
general. 

When  Trant  was  assured  that  Marmont's  direction 
would  be  on  Ciudad,  and  not  Oporto,  he  advanced  from 
Lamego  followed  by  Wilson,  intending  to  take  post 
on  the  Lov.'cr  Coa.  While  in  march  he  received  Le 
Mesurier's  despatches,  which  induced  him  to  make  a 
forced  march  with  one  brigade  to  the  Caheci-a  Negro 
mountain,  behind  the  bridge  of  Almeida.  His  design 
was  to  break  down  the  restored  part  of  that  structure, 
and  so  prevent  the  enemy  from  penetrating  to  Pinhel, 
where  there  was  a  magazine;  and  his  march  was  well- 
timed,  for  two  Frencli  divisions  were  then  drivinjr 
Carlos  d'Espana  over  the  plain  beyoi.d  the  Coa.  It 
appeared  that  Marmont  having  come  close  to  Ciudad 
riodrigo  on  the  30th,  the  Spaniards  and  Victor  Alien 
fell  back  from  the  Yeltes  before  him;  and  the  latter, 
who  had  six  hundred  excellent  German  cavalry,  imme- 
diately crossed  the  Agueda,  and  neither  comprehendiiig 
the  spirit  of  lord  Wellington's  orders,  nor  the  real  situ- 
ation of  affairs,  retreated  at  once  to  Castello  Branco, 
four  long  marches  from  Ciudad,  thus  leaving  all  the 
country  open  to  the  enemy's  marauding  parties.  Car- 
los d'Espafia,  who  had  eight  hundred  infantry,  also 
retreated  across  the  plain  of  the  Cima  de  Coa  to  Fort 
Conception,  but  on  the  3d  the  French,  having  laid 
their  bridge  at  the  ford  of  Caridad,  passed  the  Agueda 
and  drove  him  from  thence,  and  he  reached  the  Ca- 
be^a  Negro  in  retreat  with  only  two  hundred  men,  at 
the  very  moment  Trant  arrived. 

The  latter  seeing  no  I'rench  cavalry  on  the  plain, 
and,  being  desirous  of  concerting  his  operations  with 
Le  Mesurier,  immediately  threw  some  skirmishers 
into  the  vineyards  on  the  right  of  the  road  beyond  the 
bridge,  then  escorted  by  some  guides  whom  he  had 
dressed  in  red  uniform,  he  galloped  to  the  glacis  of 
the  fortress,  communicated  with  the  governor,  received 
from  him  a  troop  of  English  cavalry  which  happened 
to  be  in  the  place  and  returned  at  dusk.  The  Cabe(^a 
Negro  was  immediately  covered  with  bivouac  fires, 
and  in  the  evening  Le  Mesurier  sallied  from  the 
fortress,  and  drove  back  the  enemy's  light  troops. 
Two  divisions  of  infantry  had  come  against  Almeida, 
with  orders  to  storm  it,  but  these  vigorous  actions 
disturbed  them;  the  attempt  was  not  made,  and  the 
general  commanding  excused  himself  to  Marmont,  on 
the  ground  that  the  sudden  appearance  of  Trant,  indi- 
cated the  vicinity  of  British  troops.  In  this  false 
notion  he  marched  the  next  morning  up  the  Coa 
towards  Alfayates,  where  Marmont  met  him  with  two 
other  divisions,  and  eight  squadrons  of  cavalry,  having 
left  one  division  to  blockade  Ciudad. 


1812.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


453 


Trant  now  sent  back  tVie  horsemen  to  Le  Mesurier 
and  marched  to  Giiarda  to  cover  the  magazines  and 
hospital  at  Celerico.  Here  he  was  joined  by  Wilson, 
and  here  he  outrht  also  to  have  been  joined  by  Silvei- 
ra  ;  but  tiiat  froneral  instead  of  crossintj  the  Doiiro  on 
the  5ih,  and  marchinor  up  to  Guarda,  only  crossed  it  on 
the  14lh,  and  then  halted  at  Lamego.  Thus,  instead 
of  twelve  thousand  infantry,  and  four  hundred  cavalry, 
who  had  seen  some  service,  there  were  scarcely  six 
thousand  raw  peasants,  in  a  position,  strong,  if  the 
occiipyinir  force  had  been  numerous  enoush  to  hold 
the  riiiije  of  Porcas  and  other  heig^hts  behind  it,  but  a 
very  dan<ierous  post  for  a  small  force,  because  it  could 
be  turned  by  the  right  and  left,  and  the  line  of  retreat 
to  the  ]\Ionde(To  was  not  favourable.  Neither  had 
Trant  any  horsemen  to  scout,  for  Bacellar,  a  weak  old 
man,  who  had  never  seen  an  enemy,  was  now  at  Celer- 
ico, and  retained  the  only  squadron  of  dragoons  in  the 
vicinity  for  his  own  guard. 

This  po>t  Trant  anri  Wilson  held,  with  six  thousand 
militia  and  six  fruns,  from  the  9th  to  the  14th,  keepintj 
the  enemy's  marauders  in  check;  and  thej'  were  also 
prepared  to  move  by  the  high  ridge  of  the  Estrella  to 
Ahrunles,  if  the  French  should  menace  that  fortress, 
which  was  not  unlikely.  For  Marmont  had  pushed 
forward  on  Sabugal.and  Victor  Alton,  abandoning  Cas- 
tello  Branco,  while  the  French  were  still  at  Memoa, 
fifi)'  miles  distant  from  him.  had  crossed  the  Tagus  at 
Viliia  V^elha,  and  it  is  said  had  even  some  thoughts  of 
burning  the  bridgi^  The  Fretich  parlies  then  traversed 
the  lower  Beira  in  every  direction,  plundering  and 
murdering  in  such  a  shameful  manner,  that  the  whole 
population  fled  before  them.  However,  general  Lecor, 
a  good  soldier,  stood  fast  with  the  militia  at  Castello 
Branco;  he  checked  the  French  cavalry  detachments, 
removed  the  hospitals  and  some  of  the  stores,  and 
when  menaced  by  a  strong  force  of  infantry  on  the 
l"3th,  destroyed  the  rest  of  the  magazines,  and  fell 
buck  to  Sarnadas,  only  one  short  march  on  the  road  to 
Vilha  Velha;  and  the  next  day  when  the  French 
retired,  he  followed  and  harassed  iheir  rear. 

Marmont's  divisions  being  now  spread  over  the 
country  in  search  of  supplies,  Trant  formed  the  very 
daring  design  of  surprising  the  F^rench  marshal  him- 
self in  his  quarters  at  Sabugal.  Bacellar's  procras- 
tinations fortunately  delayed  the  execution  of  this 
project,  which  was  undoubtedly  too  hazardous  an  en- 
terprise to  undertake  with  such  troops  ;  for  the  distance 
was  twenty  miles,  and  it  was  a  keen  observation  of 
lord  We  linglon's.  when  Trant  adverted  to  the  magni- 
t\ide  of  the  object,  to  say  that,  " /n  luar  nothing  is  so 
bad  as  failure  and  dtfeat.''^  This  would  undoubtedly 
have,  been  the  case  here ;  for  in  the  night  of  the 
1 3th,  that  on  which  Trant  would  have  made  the  at- 
tempt, Marmont  havinjT  fuiTOed  the  design  of  surprising 
Trant,  had  led  two  brigades  of  infantry  and  four  hun- 
dred cavalry  up  the  mountain.*  He  cut  off  the  out- 
posts, and  was  actually  entering  the  streets  at  day- 
break, with  his  horsemen,  when  the  alarm  was  beaten  at 
'I'rant's  (piarters  by  one  drummer;  this  being  taken  up 
at  hazard,  by  all  the  other  drummers  in  different  parts  of 
the  town,  caused  the  French  marshal  to  fall  back  at  the 
moment,  when  a  brisk  charge  would  have  placed  every 
Ihin?  at  his  mercy,  for  the  beating  of  the  first  drum 
was  accidental,  and  no  troops  were  under  arms.j" 

The  militia  immediately  took  post  outside  Guarda, 
but  they  had  only  one  day's  provisions,  and  the  French 
cavalry  could  turn  their  flank  and  gain  (^elerico  in  their 
rear,  while  the  infantry  attacked  their  front;  the  guns 
were  therefore  moved  off  under  cover  of  the  town, 
and  the  regiments,  withdrawing  in  succession,  retreated 
over  three  or  four  miles  of  open  ground  and  in  good 


»  Marmont's  Official  Kej  ort».  MSS. 
^  General  Trant's  papers,  MSS, 


order,  although  the  enemy's  cavalry  hovered  close  on 
the  flank,  and  the  infantry  followed  at  a  short  distance. 
Further  on,  however,  there  was  a  wooded  declivity, 
leading  to  the  Mondego,  and  here,  while  the  head  of 
the  troops  was  passing  the  river  below,  forty  dragoons, 
sent  up  by  Bacellar,  the  evening  before,  were  pressed 
hy  the  French,  and  galloped  through  the  rear-truard  of 
eight  hundred  infantry;  these  last  seeing  the  enemy 
dismount  to  fire  their  carabines,  and  finding  that  the 
wet  had  damaged  their  own  powder,  fled  also,  and  the 
French  followed  with  hue  and  cry. 

All  the  officers  behaved  firmly,  and  the  Mondego  was 
finally  passed,  yet  in  confusion  and  with  the  loss  of 
two  hundred  prisoners;  and  iMarmoni  might  now  iiave 
crossed  the  river,  on  the  flank  of  the  niiliiia,  and 
galloped  into  Celerico  where  thf-re  was  nothing  to 
defend  the  magazines;  instead  of  wliich  he  halted 
and  permitted  the  disorderly  rabble  to  gain  that  piace. 
Such  however  was  his  compassion,  that  when  he  found 
they  were  really  nothing  but  poor  undisciplined  peas- 
ants he  would  not  suffer  his  cavalry  to  cut  them  down 
and  no  man  was  killed  during  the  whole  action,  al- 
though the  French  horsemen  were  actually  in  the  midst 
of  the  fugitives.  Bacellar  havino-  destroyed  a  quanti- 
ty of  powder  at  Celerico  retreated  with  Tram's  people 
the  next  day  towards  Lamego ;  Wilson  remained  at 
Celerico,  and  when  the  eneniy  had  diiven  in  his  out- 
posts, he  ordered  the  magazines  to  be  destroyed,  but 
the  order  was  only  partly  executed  when  the  FVench 
retired,  and  on  the  17th  the  militia  reoccupied  Guarda. 

This  short  campaifrn  of  the  militia  I  have  treated  at 
length,  because  it  produced  an  undue  effect  at  the 
lime,  and  because  it  shews  how  trifling  accidents  will 
mar  the  greatest  combinations  ;  for  here  the  English 
general's  extensive  arrangements  for  the  protection  of 
Beira  were  utterly  disconcerted  hy  the  slow  advance 
of  Silveira  on  the  one  side,  and  the  rapid  retreat  of 
general  Allen  on  the  other.  Again,  the  French  deceived 
by  some  red  uniforms  and  by  some  bivouac  fires,  on 
the  Cabeca  Negro,  had  relinquished  the  attack  of 
Almeida  to  run  after  a  few  thousand  undiscijdined 
militia  men,  who  were  yet  saved  by  the  accidental 
beating  of  a  drum  ;  and  it  is  curious  to  find  a  marshal 
of  France  personally  acting  as  a  par'izan,  and  yet 
effecting  nolhing  against  these  miserable  troops. 

'J'he  disaster  on  the  IMondego  spread  consternation 
as  far  as  Coimbra,  and  the  most  alarming  reports 
reached  lord  Wellington,  whose  operations  it  is  now 
time  to  notice.  When  Scull's  retreat  from  Llerena 
was  ascertained,  the  allied  army  had  marched  towards 
the  Tagus,  and  on  the  llih  lord  Wellington,  hearing 
of  Allen's  retreat,  sent  him  orders  to  recross  that 
river  without  delay  and  return  to  Castello  Branco. 
The  16th  the  advanced  guard  of  the  army  also  reached 
that  town,  and  the  same  day  a  mililia  officer  flying 
from  Coimbra  in  the  general  panic,  came  to  head- 
quarters and  reported  that  the  enemy  was  master  of 
that  town  ;  hut  the  next  hour,  brou<;ht  general  Wil- 
son's report  from  Guarda,  and  the  unfortunate  wretch 
whose  fears  iiad  led  him  to  give  the  false  information, 
was  tried  and  shot  by  order  of  Beresford. 

At  this  time  the  French  army,  in  number  about 
twenty-eight  thousand,  was  concentrated,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  Brenuier's  division  which  remained  near 
Ciudad  Rodrigo,  between  Sabi:.jral  and  the  ridge  of 
hills  overlooking  Penamacor.  Marmont  was  inclined 
to  fiffht,  for  he  had  heard  of  a  convoy  of  provisions 
which  lord  Wellington  had  some  days  before  sent  by 
the  way  of  Almeida  to  Ciudad,  and  intended  to  cut  it 
off;  but  the  convoy  having  reacbod  Almeida  was  safe, 
and  the  French  general's  own  position  was  very  crit- 
ical. Almeida  and  the  militia  at  Guarda  were  on  his 
right  flank,  ('iudad  Kodrigo  was  on  bis  rear,  and  im- 
mediately behind  him  the  Coa  and  the  Atrueda  rivers 
were  both  swelled  by  heavy  rains  which  fell  from  the 


454 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XVI. 


13th  to  the  19lh,  nnd  the  flood  had  broken  the  bridtre 
near  Caridad.  There  rrmained  only  the  Piiente  de 
^'illar  on  the  Upper  Agueda  for  retreat,  and  the  roads 
leading  to  it  were  bad  and  narrow  ;  the  march  from 
thence  to  Tamames  was  also  circuitous  and  exposed 
to  the  attack  of  the  allies,  who  could  move  on  the 
chord  throiiirh  Ciudad  Rodrigo.  Marmont's  retreat 
must  therefore  have  been  effected  through  the  pass  of 
Perales  upon  Coria,  and  the  English  general  conceiv- 
ing good  hopes  of  falling  on  him  before  he  could  cross 
the  Coa,  moved  forward  to  Pedrogoa  ;  but  the  rear  of 
the  army  was  not  yet  across  the  Tagus,  and  a  sufficient 
body  of  troops  for  the  attack  could  not  be  collected 
before  the  21st.  On  that  day,  however,  the  Agueda 
liaving  subsided,  the  French  restored  their  bridge,  the 
last  of  their  divisions  crossed  it  on  the  24th,  and  Mar- 
mont  thus  terminated  his  operations  without  loss. 
After  this  he  again  spread  his  troops  over  the  plains  of 
Leon,  where  some  of  his  smaller  posts  had  indeed 
been  iiarassed  by  Julian  Sanchez,  but  where  the  Galli- 
cian  army  had  done  nothing. 

The  Portuguese  militia  were  immediately  disbanded, 
and  the  English  general  made  the  greatest  exertions  to 
revictual  Almeida  and  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  intending  when 
that  was  efiected  to  leave  Picton  with  a  corps  upon  the 
Agueda,  and  march  himself  against  Andalusia,  fol- 
lowing his  original  design.  The  first  division,  which 
had  only  r;'ached  Caslello  Branco,  returned  to  Castello 
«ie  Vide,  and  as  Foy's  division  had  meanwhile  reoccu- 
pied  Truxillo,  Hill  advanced  to  observe  him,  and  the 
fifth  Spanish  army  returned  to  Estremadura.  But  the 
difficully  of  supplying  the  fortresses  was  very  great. 
'I'he  incursion  of  iMarmont  had  destroyed  all  the  interme- 
diate magazines,  and  dispersed  the  means  of  transport 
on  the  lines  of  communication  ;  the  Portuguese  govern- 
ment would  not  remedy  the  inconvenience  either  there, 
or  on  the  other  froiuier,  and  Elvas  and  Badajos  were 
Kuffering  from  the  same  cause  as  Ciudad  and  Almeida. 

Li  this  dilemma  lord  Wellington  adopted,  from  ne- 
cessity, a  very  unmilitary  and  dangerous  remedy.  For 
having  declared  to  the  members  of  the  Portuguese 
government,  that  on  their  heads  he  would  throw  the 
responsibility  of  losing  Badajos  and  Elvas,  if  they 
did  not  immediately  victual  both,  a  threat  which  had 
its  due  effect,  he  employed  the  whole  of  the  carriages 
and  mules  attached  to  the  army  to  bring  up  stores  to 
Almeida  and  Ciudad  Rodrigo;  meanwhile  he  quartered 
his  troops  near  the  points  of  water-carriage,  that  is  to 
say,  on  the  Mondego,  the  Douro,  and  the  'I'agus. 
Thus  the  army  was  spread  from  the  Morena  to  the 
Tagus,  from  tlie  Tagus  to  the  Douro,  from  the  Douro  to 
the  Mondego,  on  a  line  little  less  than  four  hundred 
miles  long,  and  in  the  face  of  three  hostile  armies,  the 
farthest  of  which  was  but  a  few  marches  from  the  out- 
posts. It  was  however  scarcely  possible  for  the 
r  rench  to  assemble  again  in  masses,  before  the  ripen- 
ing of  the  coming  harvest;  and  on  the  other  hand, 
even  the  above  measure  was  insufficient  to  gain  time  ; 
the  expedition  against  Andalusia  was  therefore  aban- 
doned, and  the  fifth  great  epoch  of  the  war  terminated. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Generfil  oh«prvation?i — The  ranipai^n  considfretl — The  justice 
of  Napoleon's  views  vintiicatcil,  and  Marmont's  operations 
censured  as  the  cause  of  tlie  French  misfortunes — The  ope- 
rations of  the  army  of  the  centre  and  of  the  south  examined 
— Lord  'WeHin'jton's  onerations  eulogized  —  Kxtraordinary 
adventures  of  ca|)lain  Colquhon  OpMnt  -The  operations  of 
the  sieo:e  of  liadajos  examined — Lord  Wellington's  conduct 
vindicated. 

GENERAL    OBSERVATIONS. 

In  this  campaign  the   French  forces  were  too  much 
scattered,  and  ihey  occupied  the  countries  bordering 


on  Portugal  rather  as  a  actiquered  territory  than  as  a 
field  of  operations.  The  movements  of  the  armies  of 
the  north,  of  the  centre,  and  of  Portugal,  might  have 
been  so  combined  as  to  present  a  hundred  thousand 
men  on  a  field  of  battle;  yet  Wellington  captured'two 
great  fortresses  within  gun-shot  as  it  were  of  them  all, 
and  was  never  disturbed  by  the  approach  of  even 
thirty  thousand  men.  This  arose  partly  t'rom  the  want 
of  union,  partly  from  the  orders  of  the  emperor,  whose 
plans  the  generals  either  did  not  or  would  not  under- 
stand in  tiieir  true  spirit,  and  therefore  execiiteil  with- 
out vigour;  and  yet  the  French  writers  have  generally 
endeavoured  to  fasten  the  failures  on  Napoleon,  as  if 
he  only  was  mistaken  about  the  war  in  Spain  !  It  is 
easy  to  spurn  the  dead  lion  ! 

'i'he  expedition  of  Montbrun  to  Alicant  has  been 
fixed  upon  as  the  chief  cause  of  the  fall  of  tJiudad 
Rodrigo.  Napoleon  however  did  not  desire  that  Mont- 
brun's  march  should  be  held  in  abeyance  for  a  week, 
upon  the  strength  of  some  vague  rumours  relative  to 
the  allies'  proceedings,  and  yet  be  finally  sent  at  pre- 
cisely the  wrong  period  ;  neither  did  he  contemplate 
that  general's  idle  display  at  Alicant  after  the  city  of 
Valencia  had  fallen.  But  ill-executed  and  hurtful  as 
this  expedition  doubtless  was,  in  various  ways,  the 
loss  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo  cannot  be  directly  traced  to  it. 
Montbrun  was  at  Almanza  the  9th  of  January  and  the 
19th  Ciudad  was  stormed  ;  now,  if  he  liad  not  been  at 
Almanza  he  would  have  been  at  Toledo,  that  is,  eigiit 
marches  from  Salamanca;  and  as  the  commencement 
of  the  siege  was  not  known  until  the  15th,  even  at 
V^alladolid,  he  could  not  have  been  on  the  Tormes 
before  the  25th,  which  would  have  been  five  days  too 
late.  The  emperor  wished  to  strengthen  Suchet  at  the 
crisis  of  the  Valencian  operations,  and  his  intent  was 
that  Montbrun  should  have  reached  that  city  in  I)e- 
ceiTibcr,  but  the  latter  did  not  arrive  tielore  the  middle 
of  January  ;  liad  he  been  only  a  week  earlier,  that  is, 
had  he  marched  at  once  from  Toledo,  Mahy  could  n'  t 
have  escaped,  Alicant  would  then  have  fallen,  and  if 
Blake  had  made  an  ob.stinate  defence  at  Valencia  the 
value  of  such  a  reinforcement  would  have  been  ac- 
knowledged. 

At  this  period  Valencia  was  the  most  important 
point  in  the  Peninsula,  and  there  was  no  apparent 
reason  why  Ciudad  should  be  in  any  immediale  dan- 
ger; the  emperor  could  not  calculate  upon  the  errors 
of  his  own  generals.  It  is  futile  therefore  to  affirm 
that  Montbrun's  detachment  was  made  on  a  false 
principle  ;  it  was  on  the  contrary  conceived  in  perfect 
accord  with  the  maxim  of  concentrating  on  the  i;iiport- 
anl  point  at  the  decisive  moment;  errors,  extraneous 
to  the  original  design,  alone  brought  it  within  the 
principle  of  disseinination. 

The  loss  of  ('iiidad  Rodrigo  may  be  directly  traced 
to  the  duke  of  Hagusa's  want  of  vigilance,  to  the 
scanty  garrison  which  he  kept  in  the  place,  to  the 
Russian  war  which  obliged  the  emperor  to  weaken  the 
army  of  the  north;  finally,  to  the  extrava<Tance  of 
the  army  of  the  centre.  Marmont  expressly  asserts 
that  at  Madrid  three  thousand  men  devoured  and 
wasted  daily  the  rations  of  tweiity-l^\o  thousand,  and 
the  stores  thus  consumed  would  have  enabled  the 
army  of  Poit.igal  to  ko(»p  concentrated,  in  which  case 
Wellington  could  not  have  taken  Ciudad  ;  and  if  the 
army  of  the  centre  had  been  efficient,  Hill  would  have 
incurred  great  danger  and  Soult's  power  been  vastly 
augmented. 

It  is  not  Napoleon's  skill  only,  that  has  been  assail- 
ed by  these  writers.  Lord  Wellington  also  is  blanied 
for  not  crushing  Souham's  division  at  TamauK  s  be- 
tween the  2.3d  and  the  2()th  of  January  ;  although 
Souham,  a  good  general,  never  entered  Tamames, 
except  with  cavalry  scouts,  and  kept  his  main  body 
at  Maiilla,  whence  one  foiced  march  would  have  placed 


1812.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR, 


435 


him  boliind  the  Tormes  in  safety  I  In  sucli  a  shallow 
inanner  have  the  important  operations  of  this  period 
l)een  treated.  Nor  will  the  causes  commonly  assjo-ned 
for  the  tall  of  Badnjos  better  bear  examination. 

"  Marm<mt  I'nsfcnil  iif  joining  Suii/l  in  Exiremadura, 
fi)lhnccd  a  phnnlom  in  Beira.''''  '■''It  wash's  vanily  and 
jealousy  (f  the  duke  of  Dalmatia  that  lost  Badajos.'''' 
biich  are  the  assertions  of  both  French  and  Enirlish 
writers  ;  nevertheless  tlie  duke  of  Ragusa  never  anti- 
cipated any  success  from  his  movement  into  Beira, 
and  far  from  avoiding  Soult,  earnestly  desired  to  co- 
operate with  him;  moreover  this  invasion  of  Beira, 
which  has  been  regarded  as  a  folly,  was  the  conception 
of  Napoleon,  the  greatest  of  all  captains!  and  it  is  not 
difficult  to  shew  that  the  emperor's  design  was,  not- 
withstanding the  ill  result,  capacious  and  solid. 

Let  us  supi)oso  that  Marmont  had  aided  Soult,  and 
that  the  army  of  the  centre  iiad  also  sent  men.  If  they 
had  iTiade  any  error  in  their  combinations  the  English 
general  would  have  defeated  them  separately;  if  they 
had  effected  their  junction,  he  would  have  retreated, 
and  Badajos  would  have  been  succoured.  But  then 
eighty  thousand  French  would  have  been  assembled 
h}'  long  marches  in  the  winter  rains,  to  the  great  detri- 
ment of  their  affairs  elsewhere,  and  unless  they  came 
prepared  to  take  Elvas,  without  any  adequate  object; 
for  lord  Wellington  could,  after  the  fall  of  Ciudad 
Rodrigo,  have  repeated  this  operation  as  often  as  he 
pleased,  which,  besides  the  opening  thus  made  for  in- 
surrection in  Spain,  would  have  stamped  a  character 
of  weakness  on  the  French  arms,  extremely  injurious, 
sinf'e  character  is  half  the  strength  of  an  army. 

The  emperor  judged  better;  he  disliked  such  timid 
operations,  he  desired  that  his  powerful  armies  should 
throw  the  allies  on  the  defensive  and  he  indicated  the 
means  of  doing  so.  Wellington,  he  said,  expecting 
ai  effort  to  retake  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  had  called  Hill 
across  the  "^I'agus,  and  to  prevent  that  movement  Soult 
was  directed  to  send  twenty  thousand  men  against  the 
Alemtejo.  The  fiill  of  Ciudad  had  thus  by  oblifring 
the  allies  to  defend  it,  given  the  French  th.eir  choice 
of  ground  for  a  battle,  and  at  a  distance  from  the  sea; 
it  was  for  Marmont  to  avail  himself  of  the  occasion, 
not  by  marching  to  aid  Soult,  who  had  eighty  thousand 
excellent  troops,  and  at  tlie  worst  could  be  only  drive'! 
from  Andalusia  upon  Valencia  or  Madrid;  whereas  if 
the  armv  of  Portugal  or  a  part  of  it  should  be  defeated 
on  the  Guadiana  the  blow  would  be  felt  in  every  part 
of  Spain.  Marmont's  business  was,  he  said,  first  to 
strengthen  his  own  position  at  Salamanca,  as  a  base 
of  operat'ons.  and  then  to  keep  the  allies  constantlv 
engatjed  on  the  Agneda  until  he  was  prepared  to  fight 
a  general  battle.  Meanwhile  Soult  should  either  take 
the  fortresses  of  the  Alemtejo,  or  draw  off  Hill's  corps 
from  Wellington,  who  would  then  be  very  inferior  to 
Marmont  and  yet  Mill  himself  would  be  unequal  to 
fight  Soult. 

"Fix  your  quarters,"  said  the  emperor,  "  at  vSala- 
manca,  work  day  and  night  to  fortify  that  place — orga- 
nize a  new  battering  train — form  magazines — send 
strong  advanced  guards  to  menace  Ciudad  and  Almeida 
— harass  the  allies'  outposts,  even  daily — threaten  the 
frontier  of  Portugal  in  all  directions,  and  send  parties 
to  ravage  the  nearest  villages — repair  the  ways  to  Al- 
7i"ida  and  Oporto,  and  keep  the  bulk  of  your  army  at 
Toro  Zamora,  Benevente.  and  Avila,  which  are  fertile 
districts,  and  from  whence,  in  four  days,  you  can  con- 
centrate the  whole  upon  Salamanca.  You  will  thus 
keep  the  allies  in  check  on  the  Agueda,  and  your  troops 
will  repose,  while  you  prepare  for  great  operations. 
You  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  south.  Announce 
the  aiiproach  of  your  new  battering  train,  and  if  Wel- 
lington marches  to  invest  Badajos  with  a  few  divisions, 
Soult  will  be  able  to  relieve  it;  but  if  Wellington  goes 
with  all  his  forces,  unite  your  army,  march  straight 


upon  Almeida,  push  parties  to  Coimhra,  overrun  thi 
country  in  various  directions,  and  be  assured  lie  will 
return.  Twenty-four  hours  after  the  receipt  of  tn:^ 
letter  you  should  be  on  your  way  to  Salamanca,  and 
your  advanced  guards  should  be  in  march  towards 
Ciudad  Rodrigo  and  Almeida." 

Now,  if  Marmont  had  thus  conceived  the  war  him- 
self, he  could  have  conimenced  operations  before  the 
end  of  January  ;  but  this  letter,  written  the  15lli  of 
I'ebruary,  reached  him  in  the  latter  end  of  that  month, 
and  found  him  desponding  and  fearful  even  in  defence. 
Vacillating  between  his  own  wishes  and  the  emperor's 
orders,  he  did  nothing;  but  had  he,  as  liis  despatch 
recommended,  commenced  his  operations  in  twenty- 
four  hours,  his  advanced  posts  would  have  been  near 
Ciudad  early  in  March,  that  is  at  the  moment  wheit 
the  allies  were,  as  I  have  before  shewn,  disseminated 
all  over  Portugal,  and  when  only  the  fifth  division  was 
upon  the  Coa  to  oppose  him.  The  works  of  Almeida 
were  then  quite  indefensible,  and  the  movement  upon 
Badajos  must  have  necessarily  been  suspended.  Thus 
the  winter  season  would  have  passed  away  uselessly 
tor  the  allies  unless  Wellington  turned  to  attack  Mar- 
mont, which  was  a  difficult  operation  in  itself,  and 
would  have  been  dangerous  to  the  Alemtejo,  while 
Soult  held  Badajos,  for  that  marshal,  as  we  have  seen, 
had  received  orders  to  attack  Hill  with  twenty  thou- 
sand men.  Here  then  the  errors  were  of  execution, 
not  of  design,  and  the  first  part  of  the  emperor's  com- 
binations was  evidently  just  and  solid.  It  remains  to 
test  the  second  i)art  which  was  to  have  been  executed 
if  lord  Wellington  invested  Badajos. 

It  must  be  remembered,  that  Marmont  was  so  to 
hold  his  army,  that  he  could  concentrate  in  four  days ; 
that  he  was  to  make  an  incursion  into  Beira  the  moment 
Wellington  crossed  the  Tagus;  that  Oporto  was  to  brj 
menaced,  Almeida  to  be  attacked,  Coimbra  to  be  oc- 
cupied. These  operations  would  undoubtedly  have 
brought  the  allies  back  again  at  the  commencement  of 
the  siege,  because  the  fall  of  Badajos  could  not  be  ex- 
pected under  three  weeks,  which  would  have  been  too 
long  to  leave  Beira  and  the  fortresses  at  the  mercy  of 
the  invader.  Now  Marmont  did  not  reach  the  Agueda 
before  the  3lst  Marcli,  when  the  siege  of  Badajos 
was  approaching  its  conclusion  ;  he  did  not  storm  Al- 
meida, nor  attack  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  nor  enter  Coirnbra, 
nor  menace  Oporto;  and  yet  his  operation,  feebly  as  it 
was  executed,  obliged  lord  Wellington  to  relinquish 
his  meditated  attack  on  Andalusia,  and  return  to  the 
assistance  of  Beira.  Again  therefore  the  error  was  in 
the  execution.  And  here  we  may  observe  how  inferior 
in  hardihood  the  French  general  was  to  his  adversary 
Wellington  wiih  eighteen  thousand  men  had  escaladed 
Badajos,  a  powerful  fortress  and  defended  by  an  excel- 
lent governor  with  five  thousand  French  veterans; 
Marmont  with  twenty-eight  thousand  men  would  not 
attempt  to  storm  Ciudad,  although  its  breaches  were 
scarcely  healed,  and  its  garrison  disaffected.  Nor  did 
he  even  assail  Almeida,  which  hardly  meriting  the 
name  of  a  fortress,  was  only  occupied  by  three  thoii- 
sand  militia,  scarcely  able  to  handle  their  arms;  and 
yet  if  he  had  captured  Almeida,  as  he  could  scarcely 
have  failed  to  do  vi'ith  due  vigour,  he  would  have  found 
a  battering  train  with  which  to  take  Ciudad  Rodrigo, 
and  thus  have  again  balanced  the  campaign. 

The  duke  of  liagusa  was  averse  to  serving  in  tha 
Peninsula,  ho  wished  to  be  employed  in  tin;  Russian 
expedition,  and  he  had  written  to  the  emperor  to  desire 
his  recal,  or  that  the  whole  of  the  northt  rn  district, 
from  Sebastian  to  Salamanca,  including  Madrid,  should 
be  placed  under  his  orders.  Uidess  that  were  done, 
he  said  he  could  only  calculate  the  operatinna  of  hia 
own  troops.  'I'he  other  generals  would  make  difTicul- 
ties,  would  move  slowly,  and  the  king's  co-Tl  was  tri 
open  hostility  to   the  French  interest.     The  army  of 


•<5a 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XVI. 


the  north  had  in  rflirinfr  from  Leon  scrnpulonsly  car- 
ried away  every  ih'war  that  could  be  useful  to  him,  in 
ihe  way  of  bridge,  or  bntterintr  equipajjes,  or  of  ammu- 
nition or  provisions,  allhougii  he  was  in  want  of  all 
these  things. 

Then  he  painted  all  the  jealousies  and  disputes  in 
l}^  French  armies,  and  affirmed  that  his  own  force, 
care  beinor  had  for  the  posts  of  communication,  and  the 
watching  of  the  army  of  Gallicia,  would  not  furnish 
•more  than  thirty-four  thousand  men  for  the  field  ;  a 
calculation  coniradicied  by  the  imperial  muster-rolls, 
which  on  the  1st  of  March  bore  sixty  thousand  fight- 
ing men  present  with  the  eagles.  He  also  rated  the 
allies  at  sixty  thousand,  well  provided  with  every 
thing  and  ready  to  attack  him,  whereas  the  returns  of 
that  army  gave  only  fifty-two  thousand  men  including 
Hill's  corps;  about  thirty-five  thousand  only  could 
have  passed  the  Agueda,  and  their  penury  of  means 
had,  as  we  have  seen,  prevented  them  from  even  hold- 
ing together,  on  the  northern  frontier.  In  like  manner  he 
assumed  that  two  of  the  allied  divisions  were  left  upon 
the  Agueda,  when  the  army  marched  against  Badajos, 
whereas  no  more  than  six  hundred  cavalry  remained 
there.  All  these  things  prove  thai  Marmont,  either  from 
dislike  to  the  war,  or  natural  want  of  vigour,  was  not 
equal  to  his  task,  and  it  is  obvious  that  a  diversion, 
begun  so  late,  and  followed  up  with  so  little  energy, 
could  have  had  little  effect  upon  the  siege  of  Badajos; 
it  would  have  been  far  better  to  have  followed  his  own 
first  design  of  detaching  three  divisions  to  aid  Soult, 
and  retained  the  other  two  to  menace  Ciudad  Rodrigo. 

It  is  fitting  now  to  test  the  operations  of  the  armies 
of  the  south,  and  of  the  centre.  The  latter  is  easily 
disposed  of.  The  secret  of  its  inactivity  is  to  be  found 
in  Marmonl's  letter.  Every  thing  at  ^iadrid  was  con- 
fusion and  intrigue,  waste  and  want  of  discipline;  in 
fine,  the  anion  of  a  court  and  an  arm)',  had  destroyed 
the  latter.  Not  so  at  Seville.  There  the  hand  of  an 
able  ge^ieral,  an  indefatigable  administrator  were  visi- 
ble, and  the  unravelling  the  intricate  combinations, 
which  produced  such  an  apparent  want  of  vigour  in 
the  operations  of  the  duke  of  Dahnatia,  will  form  at 
once  the  apology  for  that  general,  and  the  justeulo-; 
gium  of  lord  Wellington. 

First  it  must  be  held  in  mind  that  the  army  of  the 
Bouth,  so  powerful  in  appearance,  did  not  furnish  a 
proportionate  number  of  men  for  field-service,  because 
the  reinforcements,  althoutrh  borne  on  the  rolls,  were 
for  the  most  part  retained  in  the  northern  governments. 
Soult  had  sixty-seven  thousand  French  and  six  thou- 
sand "  Escopeteros"  present  under  arms  in  .September ; 
but  then  followed  the  surprise  of  Girard  at  Aroyo  de 
Molinos,  the  vigorous  demonstrations  of  Hill  in  De- 
cember, the  fiiilure  of  Godinot  at  Gibraltar,  the  check 
sustained  by  Semeleat  Bornos,  and  the  siege  of  Tarifa, 
which  diminished  the  number  of  men,  and  occasioned 
fresh  arrangements  on  the  diiTerent  points  of  llie  circle. 
Tlie  harvest  of  1811  had  failed  in  Andalusia,  as  in  all 
otlicr  parts,  and  the  inhabitants  were  reduced  to  feed 
on  herbs:  the  soldiers  had  only  half  rations  of  bread, 
and  neither  reinforcements  of  men,  nor  convoys  of 
money,  nor  ammunition,  nor  clothes,  had  come  either 
from  France  or  from  Madrid  for  a  long  period. 

It  was  under  these  circumstances  that  Soult  received 
the  order  to  send  twenty  thousand  men  against  the 
Alemtejo,  But  the  whole  of  the  Polish  troops,  and 
the  skeletons  of  rejriments,  and  the  picked  men  for  the 
imperial  guards,  in  all  fifteen  thousand,  after  beinor 
collected  at  the  Despenas  Peros,  while  Suchet  was 
before  Valencia,  had  now  marched  to  Talavera  de  la 
Reyna  on  the  way  to  France ;  at  that  moment  also 
Ballesteros  appeared,  with  the  fourth  Spanish  army, 
twelve  thousand  strong,  in  the  Ronda,  and  his  detach- 
ments defeated  Maransin  at  Cartai~ia,  which  of  neces- 
ti\y  occasioned  another  change  in  the  Frea<:b  disposi- 


tions. IMoreover  the  very  success  of  Suchet  had  at 
this  time  increased  Soult's  difficulties,  because  all  the 
fugitives  from  Valeufia  gathered  on  the  remains  of  the 
Murcian  army  ;  and  fifteen  thousand  men,  including  the 
garrisons  of  Carthagcna  and  Alicant,  wen^  airain  as. 
sembled  on  the  frontier  of  (irennda,  where,  during  the 
expedition  to  Estremadura,  the  French  had  only  three 
battalions  and  some  cavalry. 

Thus  the  army  of  the  south  was,  if  the  garrison  of 
Badajos  be  excluded,  reduced  to  forty-eight  thousand 
French  sabres  and  bayonets  present  with  the  eagles, 
and  this  at  the  very  moment  wlien  its  enemies  were 
a-.igmented  by  twenty-five  thousand  fresh  men.  Soult 
had  indeed  besides  this  force  five  thousand  artillery- 
men and  other  attendant  troops,  and  six  thousand  "  AV 
C'lpeteros'''  were  capable  of  taking  the  field,  while 
thirty  thousand  civic  guards  held  his  fortified  posts. 
Nevertheless  he  was  forced  to  reduce  all  the  garrisons, 
and  even  the  camp  before  the  Isla  to  the  lowest  num- 
bers, consistent  with  safety,  ere  he  could  bring  twenty- 
four  thousand  French  into  the  field  for  the  succour  of 
Badajos,  and  even  then  as  we  have  seen,  he  was  upon 
the  point  of  losing  Seville.  These  things  prevented 
him  from  coming  against  the  Alemtejo  in  .March,  when 
his  presence  with  an  army  would  have  delayed  the 
commencement  of  the  siege  until  a  battle  had  been 
fought ;  but  he  was  the  less  fearful  for  the  fortress 
because  ^larmont  on  the  2'2d  of  February  and  Foy  on 
the  28th  had  announced,  that  if  Badajos  should  he 
menaced,  three  divisions  of  the  army  of  Portugal, 
then  in  the  valley  of  the  Tagus,  would  enter  Estrema- 
dura ;  and  these  divisions  uniting  with  Daricau's  and 
Drouet's  troops  would  have  formed  an  army  of  thirty 
thousand  men,  and  consequenly  would  have  sufficed 
to  delay  the  operations  of  the  allies.  But  Marmont, 
having  subsequently  received  the  emperor's  orders  to 
move  into  Beira,  passed  the  Gredos  mountains  instead 
of  the  Tagus  river,  and  thus  unintentionally  deceived 
Soult;  and  whether  his  letters  were  intercepted,  or 
carelessly  delayed,  it  was  not  until  the  8th  of  April, 
that  the  duke  of  Dalmatia  was  assured  of  his  depar- 
ture for  Salamanca. 

On  the  other  band  lord  Wellington's  operations  were 
so  rapidly  pushed  forward,  that  Soult  cannot  be  cen- 
sured for  f  ilse  calculations.  No  general  could  suspect 
that  such  an  outwork  as  the  Picurina.  would  be  taken 
by  storm  without  being  first  battered  ;  still  less  that 
Badajos,  with  its  lofty  walls,  its  brave  garrison,  and 
its  celebrated  governor,  would  in  like  manner  be  car- 
ried before  the  counterscarp  was  blown  in,  and  the  fire 
of  the  defences  ruined.  In  fine,  no  man  accustomed 
to  war  could  have  divined  the  surpassing  resolution 
and  surpassing  fortune  also,  of  the  British  general 
and  his  troops;  neither  is  it  impertinent  to  observe 
here,  that  as  the  French  never  use  iron  ordnance  in  a 
siege,  their  calculations  were  necessarily  formed  upon 
the  effect  of  brass  artillery,  which  is  comparatively 
weak  and  slow:  with  brass  guns  the  breaches  would 
have  been  made  three  days  later. 

The  fall  of  Badajos  may  therefore  be  traced  partly 
to  the  Russian  war,  which  drew  fifteen  thousand  men 
from  the  army  of  the  south,  partly  to  ihe  irresolution 
of  Marmont,  who  did  neither  execute  the  emperor's 
plan  nor  his  own  ;  finally,  to  the  too  great  extent  of 
country  occupied,  whereby  lime  and  numbers  were 
swallowed.  And  here  the  question  arises,  if  Soult, 
acting  upon  the  principles  laid  down  in  bis  letter  to 
Joseph,  just  before  the  battle  of  Talavera,  should  not 
have  operated  against  the  allies  in  great  masses,  relin- 
quishing possession  of  Grenada,  Malaga,  in  fine  of 
every  thing,  save  Seville  and  ihe  camp  before  the  Isla. 
If  beaten,  he  would  have  lost  Andalusia  and  fallen 
back  on  Suchet,  but  then  the  head  of  the  P' ranch 
invasion,  might  have  been  more  formidable  at  Valeiu-.ia 
than  at  Seville,  and  Marmont  could  have  renewed  th« 


1812.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


457 


battle.  And  such  a  chequered  sjnme,  lord  Wellino-- 
ton's  political  situation  lunh  in  Enaland  and  Portugal 
beinor  considered,  would  have  gone  near  to  deride  the 
question  of  liie  British  troops  remaining  in  the  latter 
country.  This  however  is  a  grave  and  difficult  mailer 
to  resolve. 

In  whatever  light  this  campaign  is  viewed  the  talent 
of  the  English  general  is  conspicuous.  That  fortune 
aided  liini  is  true,  but  it  was  in  the  manner  she  favours 
the  pilot,  who  watching  every  chaufjing  wind,  every 
shifting  current,  makes  all  subservient  to  his  purpose. 
Ascertaining  with  great  pains  the  exact  situation  of 
each  adversary,  he  had  sagaciously  met  their  different 
modes  of  warfare,  and  with  a  nice  i:and  had  adapted 
his  measures  lo  the  successive  exigences  ni'  the  mo- 
ment, 'i'he  army  of  the  centre,  where  disorder  was 
paramount,  he  disregarded  ;  Marmnnt  whose  tempera- 
ment was  hasty  he  deceived  by  affected  slowness;  and 
Soull  he  forestalled  by  quickness.  Twice  he  induced 
the  duke  of  Ragusa  to  send  his  divisions  into  distant 
quarters,  when  they  should  have  been  concentrated, 
and  each  time  he  gained  a  great  advantage;  once 
when  he  took  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  and  again  when,  using 
a  like  opportunity,  to  obviate  the  difficulties  presented 
by  the  conduct  of  the  Portuguese  government,  he 
sjiread  his  own  troop?  over  the  country,  in  an  uii- 
military  manner,  that  he  might  feed  and  clothe  them  on 
their  march  to  ihe  Alemtejo.  This  he  could  not  have 
done  if  the  French  had  been  concentrated  ;  neither 
could  he  have  so  well  concealed  that  march  from  the 
enemy. 

In  Estremadura,  he  kept  his  force  compact  and 
strong  to  meet  Soult,  from  whose  wartare  he  expected 
a  powerful  opposition,  hard  indeed  to  resist,  yet  not 
likely  to  abound  in  sudden  strokes,  and  therefore 
furnishing  more  crrlain  ground  for  calculation  as  to 
time  ;  and  then  he  used  that  time  so  wonderfully  at  the 
siege,  that  even  his  enemies  declared  it  inromprehensi- 
hle,  and  he  who  had  hitherto  been  censured  for  over 
caution  was  now  dreaded  as  over  daring!  This  daring 
was,  however,  in  no  manner  allied  to  rashness,  his 
precautions  umltiplied  as  his  enterprises  augmented. 
I'lie  divisions  of  the  army  of  Portugal,  quartered  in  the 
valley  of  the  H^agus,  could  by  moving  into  Estrema- 
dura  in  March  have  delayed  if  not  prevented  the  siege  ; 
lord  Wellingion  had  therefore  with  forecast  of  such  an 
event,  designed  that  Hill  should,  when  the  allies  enter- 
ed the  Alemtejo,  make  a  forced  march  to  surprise  the 
bridge  and  forts  at  Almaraz,  which  would  have  obliged 
the  French  divisions  to  make  a  long  circuit  by  the 
bridges  of  Arzobispo  and  Talavera  to  reach  the  scene 
of  action  in  Estremadura. 

This  brdd  and  skilful  stroke  was  baulked  by  the 
never-ceasing  misconduct  of  the  Portuguese  govern- 
ment, with  respect  to  means  of  transport;  for  the 
battering-guns  intended  for  HilTs  enterprise  were  thus 
prevented  passing  Evora.  Nevertheless  the  siege 
was  commenced,  because  it  was  ascertained  that  Mar- 
mont  was  still  ignorant  of  the  allies'  march,  and  had 
ni'ide  no  change  in  his  extended  quarters,  indicating  a 
design  to  aid  Soull;  Hill  also  soon  drove  Drouet  back 
towards  the  Mnrena,  and  by  occupying  Merida,  inter- 
cepted the  line  of  communication  with  Almaraz,  which 
answered  the  same  purpose.  But  the  best  testimony 
lo  the  skill  of  the  operation  is  to  he  found  in  the 
enemy's  jjapers.  "•  So  calculated,"  said  Soult,  '•  was 
this  affair  (the  siege  of  Eadajos)  that  it  is  to  be  sup- 
posed lord  Wellington  had  intercepted  some  despatch- 
es which  explained  to  him  the  system  of  operations 
and  the  irresolution  of  Marmont."* 

Nor  when  the  duke  of  Ragusa  was  ravaging  Beira, 
and  both  Almeida  and  Ciudad  appeared  in  the  utmost 
danger,  did  lord  Wellington's  delay  in   Estremadura 

•  Intercepted  (l6«patch  ol"  iiiatshdl  Soult,  1812.     MSS, 


arise  from  any  imprudence  ;  he  had  good  grounds  for 
believing,  that  the  French  would  not  attempt  the  latter 
place,  and  that  the  loss  of  a  few  days  would  not  prove 
injurious.  For  when  the  first  intelligence  that  thu 
army  of  Portugal  was  concentrating  on  ih"  Tormes 
reached  him,  he  sent  captain  Colquhoun  Grant,  a  cele- 
brated scouting  officer,  to  watch  Marmonfs  proceed- 
ings. That  gentleman  in  whom  the  utuu)st  daring  was 
so  mixed  with  subtlety  of  genius,  and  botii  so  tempered 
by  discretion,  that  it  is  bard  to  say  which  quality 
predominated,  very  rapidly  executed  his  mission  ;  and 
the  interesting  nature  of  his  adventures  on  this  occti- 
sion  will  jierhaps  excuse  a  digression  concerning  them 

Attended  by  Leon,  a  Spanish  peasant  of  great  fidel 
ity  and  quickness  of  apprehension,  who  had  been  his 
companion  on  many  former  occasions  of  the  same 
nature,  Grant  arrived  in  the  Salamancan  district,  and 
passing  the  ^J  orines  in  the  night,  remained  in  uniform, 
for  he  never  assumed  any  disguise,  three  days  in  the 
midst  of  the  French  camp.  He  thus  oblained  exact 
information  of  Marmont's  object,  and  more  especially  of 
his  preparations  of  provisions  and  scaling  ladders, 
notes  of  which  he  sent  to  lord  Wellinoion  from  day  lo 
day  by  Spanish  agents.  However,  on  the  third  night, 
some  peasants  brought  him  a  general  order,  addressed 
to  the  French  regiments,  and  saying,  that  the  notorious 
Grant  being  within  the  circle  of  their  cantonments, 
llie  soldiers  were  to  use  their  utmost  exertions  to  secure 
him,  for  which  purpose  also  guards  were  placed  as  it 
were  in  a  circle  round  the  army. 

Nothing  daunted  by  this  news,  Grant  consulted 
with  the  peasants,  and  the  next  morning,  before  day- 
light, entered  the  village  of  Hueria,  which  is  close  to 
a  ford  on  the  Tormes,  and  about  six  miles  from  Sala- 
manca. Here  there  was  a  Frencli  battalion,  and  on 
the  opposite  side  of  the  river  cavalry  videties  were 
posted,  two  of  which  constantly  patrolled  back  and 
forward,  for  the  space  of  three  hundred  yards,  meeting 
always  at  the  ford.  When  day  broke  the  French 
battalion  assembled  on  its  alarm-jiost,  and  al  that  mo- 
ment Grant  was  secretly  brought  with  his  horse  behind 
the  gable  of  a  house,  which  hid  him  from  the  infantry, 
and  was  opposite  to  the  ford.  The  peasants  standing' 
on  some  loose  stones  and  spreading  their  large  cloaks, 
covered  him  from  the  cavalry  videties,  and  thus  he 
calmly  wailed  until  the  latter  were  separated  the  full 
extent  of  lht;ir  beat;  then  putting  spurs  to  his  horse  he 
dashed  through  the  ford  between  them,  and  receiving 
their  fire  without  damage,  reached  a  wood,  not  vey 
distant,  where  the  pursuit  was  bafiled,  and  where  he 
was  soon  rejoined  by  Leon,  who  in  his  native  dress 
met  with  no  iuterrupiion. 

Grant  had  already  ascertained  that  the  means  of 
storming  Ciudad  Rodrigo  were  prepared,  and  that  the 
French  officers  openly  talked  of  doing  so,  but  he  de- 
sired still  further  to  test  this  project,  and  to  discover 
if  the  march  of  the  eneiuy  might  not  finally  be  directed 
by  the  pass  of  Perales,  towards  the  Tagus ;  he  wished 
also  to  ascertain  nmre  correctly  their  real  numbers,  and 
therefore  placed  himself  on  a  wooded  hill,  near  'J'ama- 
mes,  where  the  road  branches  off  to  the  passes,  and  lo 
(Ciudad  Rodrigo.  Here  lying  perdue,  until  the  whole 
French  army  had  passed  by  in  march,  he  noted  every 
battalion  and  gun,  and  finding  that  all  were  directed 
towards  Ciudad,  entered  Tamames  after  they  had 
passed,  and  discovered  that  they  had  left  the  greatest 
part  of  their  scaling-ladders  behind,  which  clearly 
proved  that  the  intention  of  storming  Ciudad  Rodrigo 
was  not  real.  This  it  was  which  allayed  Wellington's 
fears  for  that  fortress. 

When  Marmont  afterwards  passed  the  Coa,  in  this 
expedition.  Grant  preceded  him  with  intent  to  discover 
if  his  further  march  would  be  by  Guarda  upon  Coim- 
bra,  or  by  Sabugal  upon  Castello  Branco;  for  to  reach 
the  latter  it  was  necessary  to  descend  from  a  very  high 


458 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR, 


[Book  XVI. 


ridgp,  or  rnthpr  succession  of  r'uloros,  b}'  a  pass,  at  the 
lower  mnuili  of  wliicii  stands  Peiiamacor.  Upon  one 
of  llie  iiilVrior  riclfros  in  the  pass,  this  persevering 
olFicer  placed  himself,  thinkino;  that  the  dwarf  oaks, 
with  whieh  the  iiills  were  covered,  would  effectually 
Beciire  liim  fio:n  discovery;  but  from  the  higher  ridgo 
above,  the  French  delected  all  his  movements  with 
their  {flasses,  in  a  few  moments  Leon,  whose  lynx- 
eyes  were  alwaj's  on  the  watch,  called  out  '■'■the 
J-'renc/i!  the  French!''''  and  pointed  to  the  rear,  whence 
Boirie  drai^oons  c;ime  i;allopin<T  up.  Grant  and  liis  fol- 
lower, instantly  darted  into  the  wood  for  a  little  space, 
and  then  sudderdy  wheeling,  rode  oflT  in  a  different 
direction;  yet  at  every  turn  new  enemies  appeared, 
aid  at  last  the  hunted  men  dismounted  and  fled  on  foot 
.nrough  the  thickest  of  th(>  low  oaks;  but  again  they 
were  met  by  infantry,  wlio  had  l)een  detached  in  small 
parlies  down  the  sides  of  the  pass,  and  were  directed 
in  their  chase  by  the  waving  of  the  French  officers' 
hats  on  the  ridge  above.  At  last  Leon  fell  exhausted. 
and  the  barbarians  who  first  carne  up,  killed  him  in 
despite  of  his  companion's  entreaties. 

(•rant  himself  they  carried,  without  injury,  to  Mar- 
niont,  who  receiving  iiiin  with  apparent  kindness,  in- 
vited hiiii  to  dinner.  The  conversation  turned  upon 
the  prisoner's  exploits,  and  the  French  marshal  aflirm- 
ed  that  he  had  been  for  a  long  time  on  the  watch,  that 
he  knew  all  his  haunts,  and  his  disguises,  and  had  dis- 
covered that,  only  the  nigiit  before,  he  had  slept  in  the 
French  bead-quarters,  with  other  adventures,  which 
had  not  happened,  for  this  (Jrant  never  used  any  dis- 
guise ;  but  there  was  another  Grant,  a  man  also  very 
remarkable  in  his  way,  who  used  to  remain  for  months 
in  the  French  quarters,  using  all  manner  of  disguises; 
hence  the  similarity  of  names  caused  the  actions  of 
both  to  be  attributed  to  one,  which  is  the  only  pallia- 
tive for  Marmoiit's  subsequent  conduct. 

Treatiuir  his  prisoner  as  I  have  said,  with  great  ap- 
parent kindness,  the  French  general  exacted  from  him 
an  especial  parole,  that  he  would  not  consent  to  be  re- 
leased by  the  Partidas,  while  on  his  journey  through 
Spain  to  France,  which  secured  his  captive,  although 
lord  W(dlington  ofTereJ  two  thousand  dollars  to  any 
guerilla  chief  who  should  rescue  him.  The  exaction 
of  such  a  parole,  however  harsh,  was  in  itself  a  tacit 
compliment  to  the  man  ;  but  Marmont,  also,  sent  a 
letter,  with  the  escort,  to  the  governor  of  Bayonne,  in 
which,  still  laboiiiing  under  the  error  that  there  was 
only  one  Grant,  ho  designated  his  captive  as  a  danger- 
ous spy,  who  bad  done  infinite  mischief  to  the  French 
army,  and  whom  he  had  only  not  executed  on  the  spot, 
out  of  respect  to  something  resembling  an  uniform 
which  be  wore  at  the  time  of  his  ca])ture.  He  there- 
fore desired,  that  at  P<ayonne,  he  should  be  placed  in 
irons  and  sent  up  to  Paris. 

This   proceeding  was   too  little  in   accord  with  the 
honour  of  the  French  army  to  be  supported,  and  before 
the  Spanish  frontier  was  passed.  Grant,  it  matters  not 
how,  was  made  acquainted  with  the  contents   of  the 
letter.      Now    the   custom    at    Bayonne,    in   ordinary 
cases,  was  for  the  prisoner  to  wait  on  the  authorities, 
and  receive  a  passport  to  travel  to  Verdun,  and  all  this 
was  duly  accomplished  ;  meanwhile  the  delivering  of 
the  f.ilal  letter  being,  by  certain  means,  delayed.  Grant,  ] 
with  a  wonderful  readiness  and  boldness,  resolved  not  I 
to  escape  towards  the  Pyrenees,  thinking  that  he  would  i 
naturally  be  pursued  in  that  direction.     He  judged  that ! 
if  the  nrovernor  of  Bayonne  could  not  recapture  him  at ' 
once,  he  would  for  his  own  security  suppress  the  letter 
in  hopes  the   matter  would    be   no   further  thought  of;  ! 
judgiiifr,  I  say,  in  this  acute  manner,  he  on  the  instant : 
inquired  at  the  hotels,  if  any  French  officer  was  going  I 
to  Paris,  and  finding  that  general  Soubam,  then  on  his 
return  from  Spain,  was  so  bent,   he   boldly  introduced 
himself,  and  asked  permission  lo  join  his  party.     The  \ 


other  readily  assented  ;  and  while  tlius  travelling,  the 
general,  unacquainted  with  Marmont's  inteiiiious,  often 
rallied  his  companion  about  his  adventures,  little  tbink- 
ing  that  he  was  then  himself  an  instrument  in  forward- 
ing the  most  dangerous  and  skilful  of  them  all. 

In  passing  through  Orleans,  Grant,  by  a  species  of 
intuition,  discovered  an  English  agent,  and  from  him 
received  a  recommendation  to  another  sr-cret  a;fent  in 
Paris,  whose  assistance  would  be  necessary  to  his  final 
escape;  for  he  looked  upon  Marmoni's  double  dealing, 
and  the  expressed  design  to  lake  away  his  lite,  as  equi- 
valent to  a  discharge  of  his  parole,  which  was  more- 
over only  given  with  respect  to  Spain.  When  he 
arrived  at  Paris  he  took  leave  of  Souham,  opened  an 
intercourse  wiih  the  Parisian  agent,  from  whom  he 
obtained  money,  and  by  his  advice,  avoided  appearing 
before  the  police,  to  have  his  passport  examined.  He 
took  a  lodging  in  a  very  public  street,  frequented  ihe 
coflee-houses,  and  even  visited  the  theatres  without 
fear,  because  the  secret  agent,  who  had  been  long 
established  and  was  intimately  connected  with  the 
police,  had  ascertained  that  no  inquiry  about  his  escape 
had  been  set  on  foot. 

In  this  manner  he  passed  several  weeks,  at  the  end 
of  which,  the  arient  informed  hinn  that  a  passport  was 
ready  for  one  Jonathan  Buck,  an  American,  wiio  had 
died  suddenly,  on  Ihe  very  day  it  was  to  fiave  been 
claimed.  Seizing  this  occasion.  Grant  boldly  demand- 
ed the  passport,  with  which  he  instantly  de|)arted  for 
the  mouth  of  the  Loire,  because  certain  reasons,  not 
necessary  lo  mention,  led  him  to  expect  more  assist- 
ance there  than  at  any  other  port.  However,  new 
diiricullies  awaited  him  and  were  overcome  by  fresh 
exertions  of  his  surprising  talents,  which  fortune 
seemed  to  delight  in  aiding. 

He  first  took  a  passage  for  America  in  a  ship  of  that 
nation,  but  its  departure  being  unexpectedly  delayed, 
he  frankly  explained  his  true  situation  to  the  captain, 
who  desired  iiiin  to  assume  the  character  of  a  discon- 
tented seaman,  and  giving  him  a  sailor's  dress  and 
forty  dollars,  sent  him  to  lodge  the  money  in  the  Amer- 
ican consul's  hands  as  a  pledge,  that  he  would  prose- 
cute the  captain  for  ill  usage  when  he  reached  tiie 
United  States;  this  being  the  custom  on  such  occa- 
sions the  consul  gave  him  a  certificate  which  enabled 
him  to  pass  from  port  to  port  as  a  discharged  sailor 
seeking  a  ship. 

Thus  provided,  after  waiting  some  days,  Grant  pre- 
vailed upon  a  boatman,  by  a  promise  of  ten  Napoleons, 
to  row  him  in  the  night  towards  a  small  island,  where, 
by  usage,  the  English  vessels  watered  unmolested, 
and  in  return  permitted  the  i'ew  inhabitants  to  fish  and 
traffic  without  interruption.  In  the  night  the  boat 
sailed,  the  masts  of  tlu;  British  ships  were  dimly  seen 
on  the  other  side  of  the  island,  and  the  termination  of 
his  toils  appeared  at  hand,  when  the  boatman,  either 
from  fear  or  malice,  suddenly  put  about  and  returned 
to  port.  In  such  a  situation,  some  men  would  have 
striven  in  desperation  to  force  fortune,  and  so  iiave 
perished  ;  the  spirits  of  others  would  have  sunk  in  de- 
spair, for  the  money  which  he  had  promised  was  all 
that  remained  of  iiis  stock,  and  the  boatman,  notwith- 
standing bis  breach  of  contract,  demanded  the  whole; 
but  with  inexpressible  coolness  and  resolution,  (Jrant 
gave  him  oik^  Napoleon  instead  of  ten,  and  a  rH)uke 
for  bis  misconduct.  The  other  having  threattned  a 
reference  to  the  police,  soon  found  that  he  was  no 
match  in  subtlety  for  liis  opponent,  who  told  him 
plainly  that  he  would  then  denounce  him  as  aiding  the 
escape  of  a  prisoner  of  war,  and  would  adduce  the 
great  price  of  his  boat  as  a  proof  of  iiis  guilt ! 

This  menace  was  loo  formidable  to  be  resisted,  and 
Grant  in  a  few  days  engaged  an  old  fislierman,  who 
faithfully  performed  his  bargain;  but  now  there  were 
no  English  vessels  near  the  island  ;  iiowever  the  fisher- 


1S12.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR     WAR. 


4  59 


mnn  rast  liis  npts  and  caiicjlit  some  fish,  with  which  h': 
ti:i;l(?d  towards  the  southward,  whore  he  had  heard 
thern  was  an  Entrljsh  ship  of  war.  In  a  few  honrs 
they  obtained  a  jrlinipse  of  her,  and  were  steering  that 
uay,  vviien  a  sliot  from  a  coast-lialtery  brouirlu  theni 
t*".,  and  a  boat  with  soldiers  put  off  to  board  tliem  ;  tlie 
fisherman  was  steadfrtst  and  true;  iie  called  Grant  his 
son,  and  the  soldiers  by  whom  they  expected  to  be  ar- 
rested were  only  sent  to  warn  them  not  to  pass  the 
battery,  because  the  Eno-lisii  vessel  they  were  in  search 
of  was  on  the  coast.  The  old  man,  who  had  expected 
this,  bribed  the  soldiers  with  his  fish,  assnrinir  iheni 
he  must  ;jo  with  his  son  or  they  wo\ild  starve,  and  tiiat 
l<e  was  so  well  acquainted  with  the  coast  he  could 
alwavs  escape  the  enemy.  His  prayers  and  presents 
prevH'hid,  he  was  desired  to  wait  under  the  battery  till 
iiiijht,  and  then  depart;  but  under  pretence  of  arramr- 
innr  his  escape  from  the  ICnjlish  vessel,  he  made  the 
soldiers  j.oint  out  her  bcarinirs  so  exactly,  that  when 
the  darkness  came,  he  ran  her  straiirlit  on  board,  and 
the  intrepid  officer  stood  in  safety  on  the  quarter-deck. 

After  this  (jraiu  reached  Enoland  and  obtained  per- 
mission to  clioose  a  Frenc  h  officer  of  equal  rank  with 
himself,  to  send  to  France,  that  no  doiii)t  mitrht  remain 
about  the  propriety  of  his  escape;  and  (jreat  was  his 
astonishment  to  find,  in  the  first  prison  he  visited,  the 
old  fisherman  and  his  real  son,  who  had  meanwhile 
been  captured  notwilhsianding  a  protection  friven  to 
them  for  their  services.  Grant,  whose  generosity  and 
benevf.lence  were  as  remarkable  as  the  qualities  of 
his  understanding,  soon  obtained  their  release,  and 
having  sent  them  with  a  sum  of  money  to  France 
returned  himself  to  the  Peninsula,  and  within  four 
months  from  the  date  of  his  first  capture  was  again  on 
the  Tormes,  watching  Marmonl's  army  !  Other  strange 
incidents  of  his  life  I  could  mention,  were  it  not  more 
fitlinnr  t.o  quit  a  digression,  already  too  wide ;  yet  I  was 
unwilling  to  pass  an  occasion  of  noticing  one  adven- 
ture of  this  generous  and  spirited,  and  yet  gentie- 
rninded  man,  who  having  served  his  country  nobly 
and  ably  in  every  climate,  died,  not  long  since,  ex- 
hausted by  the  continual  hardships  he  had   endured. 

Having  now  shewn  the  prmlence  of  lord  VVellinirton 
with  res[)ecl  to  the  campaign  generally,  it  remains  to 
consider  the  siege  of  Badajos,  which  has  so  often  been 
adduced  in  evidence,  that  not  skill  but  fortune  plumed 
liis  ambitions  wing;  a  proceeding  indeed  most  conso- 
nant to  the  nature  of  man ;  for  it  is  hard  to  avow 
inferiority,  hv  attributing  an  action  so  stnpendous  to 
superior  wenius  alone.  A  critical  scientific  examina- 
tion would  be  mis])laced  in  a  general  history,  hut  to 
notice  some  of  the  leading  points  which  involve  the 
general  conception  will  not  be  irrelevant.  The  choice 
of  the  ii-To  of  attack  has  been  justified  by  the  fiiiglish 
engineers,  as  that  requiring  least  expenditure  of  means 
and  tinu;;  but  this  has  by  the  French  engineer  been 
denied.  Colonel  Lainarre  affirms  that  the  front  next 
the  castle  was  the  one  least  susceptible  of  defence  ; 
h"ca\)se  it  had  neither  ravelin  nor  ditch  to  protect  it, 
had  fewer  flanks,  and  ofifcred  no  facility  of  retrenching 
behind  it ;  a  view  which  is  confirmed  by  Phillipon, 
v-iio  being  the  best  judge  of  his  own  weak  points,  did 
for  many  days  imagine  that  tliis  front  was  the  true 
object  of  the  allies'  approaches.  But  Lamarre  advan- 
ces a  far  more  interesting  question,  when  he  affirms 
that  the  English  general  miglu  have  carried  Badajos 
by  esealade  and  storm,  on  the  first  night  of  the  siegis 
with  less  difficulty  than  he  experienced  on  the  7th  of 
April.  On  that  night,  he  says,  the  defimces  were  not 
Fo  complete,  that  the  garrison  was  less  prepared,  and 
the  surprise  would  have  availed  somewhat;  whereas  at 
the  second  period  the  breaches  were  tlie  strongest  part 
of  the  tov/n,  and  as  no  other  advantage  iiad  been 
gained  by  the  besiegers,  the  chances  wore  in  favour  of 
tlie  fir^.t  period. 


This  reasoning  appears  sound,  yet  the  fact  is  onn 
which  belongs,  not  to  the  rules  hut  the  secrets  of  the 
art,  and  they  are  only  in  the  keeping  of  great  captains. 
'I'hat  the  breaches  were  impregnable  has  indecnl  been 
denied  by  the  English  enirineers.  ('olf)nel  .Jones 
affirms  that  the  centre  breach  had  not  the  slitrhtest 
interior  retrenchment,  and  thai  the  sword-blades  in  the 
Trinidad,  might  have  been  overturned  by  the  rush  of  a 
dense  mass  of  troops.  'Iliis  opinion  is  quite  at  vari- 
ance with  that  of  the  officers  and  men  engaged  ;  it  is 
certain  also  that  all  the  breaches  were  protected  by  the 
sword-blades,  and  if  the  centre  breach  was  not  re- 
trenched, it  was  rendered  very  difficult  of  approach  by 
the  deep  holes  digged  in  front,  and  it  was  more 
powerfully  swept  by  flank-fire  than  the  othrrs  were. 
It  is  also  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  no  dense  rush  was 
made  at  the  great  breach.  Engineers  intent  upon  their 
own  art  sometimes  calculate  on  men  as  they  do  on 
blocks  of  stone  or  limber,  nevertheless  where  the 
hnllet  strikes  the  man  will  fall.  'J'he  sword-blades 
were  fitted  into  ponderous  beams,  and  these  last  chain- 
ed together,  were  let  deep  into  the  ground  ;  how  then 
was  it  possible  for  men  to  drag  or  push  them  from 
their  pi  ices,  when  behind  them  stood  resolute  men, 
whose  fire  swept  the  foremost  ranks  away  ?  This  fire 
could  not  be  returned  by  the  soldiers  engaged  in  re- 
moving the  obstacles,  nor  by  those  in  rear,  because, 
from  the  slope  of  the  breach,  they  could  only  see  liieir 
own  comrades  of  the  front  r.^nks ;  and  then  the  dead 
bodies,  and  the  struggling  wounded  men,  and  still 
more  the  spiked  planks,  rendered  a  simultaneous  ex- 
ertion impossible.    The  breaches  were  impregn.ible  ! 

And  why  was  all  this  striving  in  blood  against  in- 
surmountable ditTicullies  1  Why  were  men  sent  thus 
to  slaughter,  when  the  application  of  a  just  science 
would  have  rendered  the  operation  comparatively  easy? 
Because  the  English  miniitcrs,  so  ready  to  plunge 
into  war,  were  quite  ignorant  of  its  exigencies  ;  be- 
cause the  English  people  are  warlike  without  being 
military,  and  under  the  pretence  of  maintaining  a 
liberty  which  they  do  not  possess,  oppose  in  peace  all 
useful  martial  establishments.  Expatiating  in  their 
schools  and  colleges,  upon  Roman  discipline  and  Ro- 
man valour,  they  are  heedless  of  Roman  institutions; 
they  desire  like  that  ancient  republic,  to  be  free  at 
home  and  conquerors  abroad,  but  start  at  perfi'cting 
thidr  military  system,  as  a  thing  incompatible  with  a 
constitution,  which  they  yet  suflfer  to  be  violated  by 
every  minister  who  trembles  at  the  exposure  of  corrup- 
tion. In  the  beginning  of  each  war,  Englatul  has  to 
seek  in  blood  for  the  knowledge  necessary  to  insure 
success,  and  like  the  fiend's  proaress  towards  E<len, 
her  conquering  course  is  through  chaos  followed  by 
death  ! 

But  it  is  not  in  the  details  of  this  siege  we  must  look 
for  Wellington's  merits.  'I'he  apportioning  of  the 
number  of  guns,  the  quantity  of  ammunition,  the 
anaount  of  transport,  the  tracing  of  the  works,  and  Ihe 
choice  of  the  points  of  attack,  are  matters  within  the 
province  of  the  engineer;  the  value  and  importance  of 
the  place  to  be  attacked  in  refi'rence  to  other  objects  of 
the  campaign,  the  time  that  can  be  spared  to  effect  its 
reduction,  the  arrangements  necessary  to  elude  or  to 
resist  the  succouring  army,  the  calculation  of  the 
resources,  from  whence  the  means  of  attack  arc  to  be 
drawn,  these  are  in  the  province  of  the  general.  With 
him  also  rests  the  choice  of  shortening  the  scientific 
process,  arid  the  judging  of  how  much  or  how  little 
ought  to  be  risked,  how  much  trusted  to  the  valour 
and  discipline  of  his  army,  how  much  to  liis  own 
genius  for  seizing  accidents,  whether  of  ground,  of 

i  time,  or  of  conjunction  to  accelerate  the  gain  of  his 

j  object. 

I      Now  all  armies  come  to  the  siege  of  a  town  with 

I  great  advantages;  for  first  the  besieged  cai.not  but  be 


-ICO 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XVI. 


less  confident  than  the  assailants ;  tliey  are  a  few 
against  a  manVi  and  heinfr  on  the  defensive,  are  also 
an  excised  |)ortion  of  their  own  army,  and  without 
news,  which  damps  the  fiery  spirit.  They  are  ohii^ed 
to  await  their  adversary's  time  and  attack,  iheir  losses 
seem  more  nuinero'is,  in  proportion  to  their  forces, 
because  they  are  more  concentrated,  and  then  the 
wounded  are  not  safe  even  in  the  liospitals.  No 
troops  can  hope  to  maintain  a  fortress  eventually, 
without  the  aid  of  a  succouring  army  ;  their  ultimate 
prospect  is  death  or  captivity.  Tlie  besiegers  on  the 
contrary  have;  a  certain  retreat,  know  the  real  state  of 
HH'airs,  feel  more  assured  of  their  object,  have  hope  of 
profit,  and  a  secure  retreat  if  they  fail,  while  the  be- 
Pieged  fainily  look  for  succour,  and  scarcely  expect 
life.  'I'o  this  may  be  addeil  that  the  inhabitants  are 
generally  secret  enemies  of  the  garrison  as  the  cause 
of  their  own  suflTerings. 

The  number  of  guns  and  quantity  of  ammunition,  in 
a  fortress,  are  daily  diminished  ;  the  besiegers'  mr-ans, 
origrinally  calculated  to  overpower  the  other,  may  be 
increased.  Time  and  materials  are  therefore  against 
the  besieged,  and  the  scientific  foundation  of  the  de- 
fence depends  on  the  attack  which  may  be  varied, 
while  the  other  is  fixed.  Finally  the  firmness  and  skill 
of  the  defence  n-enerally  depends  upon  the  governor, 
who  may  be  killed,  whereas  many  ofFicers  amongst  the 
besiegers  are  capable  of  conducting  the  attack  ;  and 
the  general,  besides  being  personally  less  exposed,  is 
likely,  as  the  chief  of  an  army,  to  be  a  man  of  more 
spirit  and  capacity  than  a  simple  governor.  It  follows 
then  that  fortresses  must  fill  if  the  besiegers  sit  down 
before  them  according  to  the  rules  of  art;  and  when 
no  succouring  army  is  nioh,  the  time,  necessary  to  re- 
duce any  place,  may  be  calculated  with  great  exact- 
nfess.  When  these  rules  cannot  be  attended  to,  when 
every  thing  is  irregular  and  doubtful,  when  the  general 
IS  hurried  on  to  the  attempt,  be  it  easy  or  diificult,  by 
the  force  of  circumstances,  we  must  measure  him  by 
the  greatness  of  the  exigency,  and  the  energy  with 
which  he  acts. 

This  is  the  liofht  in  which  to  view  the  siejre  of  Ba- 
dajos.  Wellington's  object  was  great,  his  difliculties 
foreseen,  his  success  complete.  A  few  hours'  delay, 
an  accident,  a  turn  of  fortune,  and  he  would  again 
have  been  foiled!  aye!  but  this  is  war,  always  dan- 
gerous and  iincerlain,  an  ever-rolling  wheel  and  armed 
with  scythes.  Was  the  object  worth  the  risk — did  its 
pain  compensate  the  loss  of  men — was  it  boldly,  great- 
ly acquired?  These  are  the  true  questions  and  they 
may  be  answered  thus.  Siichet  had  subjugated  Aragon 
by  his  mildness.  Catalonia  and  N'alencia  by  his  vigour. 
In  Andalusia,  Soult  had  tranquillized  the  mass  of  the 
people,  and  his  genius,  solid  and  vast,  was  laying  the 
deep  fiiundation  of  a  kingdom  close  to  Portugal.  He 
was  forming  such  great  estublishmf  nts,  and  contriving 
such  plans,  as  would,  if  permitted  to  become  ripe, 
have  enabled  him  to  hold  the  Peninsula,  alone,  should 
the  French  armies  fiil  in  all  other  parts.  In  the  centre 
of  Spain  the  kinir,  true  to  his  plan  of  raising  a  Spanish 
party,  wa^-  likely  to  rally  round   him   all   those  of  the 


patriots  whom  discontent,  or  weakness  of  mind,  or 
corru|)lion,  might  induce  to  seek  a  plausible  excuse, 
for  joining  the  invaders;  and  on  the  northern  line  the 
French  armies,  still  powerful,  were  strengthening  their 
hold  of  ihe  country  by  fortifying  all  the  important 
points  of  Leon  and  Old  (^asiile.  Aleanwhile  the  great 
army,  which  the  emperor  was  carrying  to  Russia,  mi<iht 
or  might  not  be  successful,  but  in  either  case,  it  was  the 
only  moment  when  an  offensive  war,  against  his  army 
in  Spain,  could  have  been  carried  on  with  success. 

But  how  could  any  extensive  offensive  operation 
have  been  attempted  while  Badajos  remained  in  rho 
enemy's  possession  ]  If  Wellington  had  advanced  in 
the  north,  Soult  making  Badajos  his  base  would  have 
threatened  Lisbon  ;  if  Wellington  marched  against 
the  French  centre,  the  same  thing  would  have  hapjun- 
ed,  and  the  army  of  the  north  would  also  have  acied 
on  the  left  flank  of  the  allies  or  have  retaken  Ciudad 
Rodrigo.  If  an  attempt  had  been  made  against  Soult, 
it  must  have  been  by  the  Lower  Guadiana,  when  the 
French  army  of  Portugal  coming  down  to  Badajos, 
could  have  either  operated  against  the  rear  of  the 
allies,  or  against  Lisbon. 

Badajos  was  therefore  the  key  to  all  offensive  opera- 
tions by  the  allies,  and  to  take  it  was  an  indispensable 
preliminary.  Yet  how  take  it?  By  regular  or  by  ir- 
regular operations?  For  the  first  a  certain  time  was 
required,  which  from  the  experience  of  former  sieoes 
it  was  not  to  be  expected  that  the  enemy  would  allow. 
What  then  would  have  been  the  result,  if  thus,  year 
after  year,  the  allies  showed  they  were  unable  even  to 
give  battle  to  their  enemies,  much  less  to  chase  them 
from  the  Peninsula.  How  was  it  to  be  expected  that 
England  would  bear  the  expense  of  a  protracted  war- 
fare, affording  no  hope  of  final  success.  How  were 
the  opposition  clamours  to  be  replied  to  in  Parliament  ? 
How  were  the  secret  hopes  of  the  continental  govern- 
ments to  be  upheld  if  The  military  power  of  England, 
Portugal,  and  Spain  united  was  unable  to  meet  even  a 
portion  of  the  S(>con(lary  armies  of  Najioleon,  while 
with  four  hundred  thousand  men  he  stalked,  a  gigantic 
conqueror,  over  the  wastes  of  Russia?  To  strike 
irretiularly  then  was  Wellington's  only  resource.  To 
strike  without  regard  to  rules,  trusting  to  the  courage 
of  his  men  and  to  fortune  to  bear  him  through  the 
trial  triumphant.  Was  such  a  crisis  to  be  neglected 
by  a  general  who  had  undertaken  on  his  own  judge- 
ment to  fight  the  battle  of  the  Peninsula.  Was  he  to 
give  force  to  the  light  declamation  of  the  hour,  when 
general  ofiicers  in  England  were  heard  to  say  thai 
every  defeat  of  the  French  was  a  snare  to  decoy  the 
British  further  into  Spain  !  was  he,  at  such  a  moment, 
to  place  the  probable  loss  of  a  few  thousand  men, 
more  or  less,  in  opposition  to  such  a  conjuncture,  and 
by  declining  the  cliance  offered,  shew  thai  he  despaired 
of  success  himself?  What  if  he  failed?  he  would  not 
have  been,  save  the  loss  of  a  few  men,  worse  off  than 
if  he  had  not  attacked.  In  either  case,  he  would  have 
been  a  baffled  general  with  a  sinking  cause.  But  what 
if  he  succeeded  ?  The  horizon  was  bright  with  the 
coming  glory  of  England  ! 


1812.] 


NAPIER'S  PENINSULAR  WAR 


BOOK    XVII. 


CHAPTER  I. 

H'jmmary  of  the  political  state  of  afFairs — LorJ  \Velles!ey  re- 
signs— Mr.  Perceval  killed — New  aciir.inistration — Story 
of  the  war  resumed — Wellington's  precautionary  measures 
described — He  relinquishes  the  design  of  invading  Anda- 
lusia and  resolves  to  operate  in  the  norlh — Reasons  why — 
Surprise  of  Almaraz  by  general  Hill — I'alse  alarm  given 
.>v  sir  William  Erskine  prevents  Hill  from  taking  the  fort 
of  Mirahete — Wellington's  discontent — Difficult  moral  po- 
sition of  English  generals. 

Grkat  and  surprising^  as  the  winter  campaip-n  had 
b-^en,  its  inaportance  was  not  understood,  and  there- 
fore not  duly  appreciated  by  the  English  ministers. 
Hut  theTrench  generals  saw  with  anxiety  that  lord 
^Ve!lin2"ton,  hgving  snapped  the  heavy  links  of  the 
ch;;in  which  hound  him  to  Lisbon,  had  acquired  new 
l)as<'S  of  operation  on  the  Guadiana,  the  Agueda,  and 
the  Uouro,  that  he  could  now  choose  his  own  field  of 
li'.tlle,  and  Spain  would  feel  the  tread  of  his  conquer- 
inT  soldiers,  'i'hose  soldi^-rs,  with  the  con!irlerice  in- 
Sjiir'd  by  repeated  successes,  only  demanded  to  be 
l»d  f  irvvardjbut  their  general  had  still  to  encounter  po- 
litical obstacles,  nised  by  the  gnvernments  he  served. 

In  Spain,  the  leadinor  men,  neglecting  the  war  at 
hurJ,  were  entirely  occupied  with  intrigues,  with 
the  pernicious  project  of  reducing  their  revolted  colo- j 
nius,  or  with  tlieir  new  cnnstituiion.  In  Portugal,  I 
and  in  the  Brazils,  a  jealous  opposition  to  the  gene-  > 
ra!  on  the  part  of  the  native  authorities  had  kept 
pace  with  the  military  successes.  In  England  the 
cabinet,  swayed  by  Air.  Perceval's  narrow  policy, 
was  still  vacillating  between  its  desire  to  conquer 
and  its  fear  of  the  expense.  There  also  the  Whio-s, 
preedy  of  office  and  dexterous  in  parliamentary  poli- 
tics, deafened  the  country  with  their  clamours,  while 
the  people,  deceived  by  both  parties  as  to  the  nature 
of  tbe  war,  and  wondering  how  tlie  F'rench  slmuld 
keep  the  field  at  all,  were,  in  common  with  the  minis- 
ters, still  doubtful,  if  their  commander  was  truly  a 
preat  man  or  an  impostor. 

'I'he  struggle  in  the  British  cabinet  having  ended 
with  the  resignation  of  lord  Wellesley,  the  conse- 
quent predominance  of  the  Perceval  faction,  left  small 
Inpes  of  a  successful  termination  to  the  contest  in 
th  i   Peninsul.'..      W.-l.inj^lon   bail,  ho\v»:v<jr,  c  .rei'ully 


abstained  from  political  intrigues,  anrt  !si»  tt  fher's 
retirement,  although  a  subject  of  regret,  oid  iio»  afTecl 
his  own  personal  position;  he  was  ttie  ^t'neral  of 
England,  untrammelled,  undegraded  by  faotious  ties, 
and  resprnsible  to  his  country  only  for  his  actions. 
The  ministers  might,  he  said,  rejinquisii  or  continue 
the  war,  they  mioht  supply  his  wants,  or  defraud 
the  hopes  of  the  nation  by  their  timorous  economy  : 
his  efforts  must  be  proportioned  to  his  means;  if  the 
latter  were  great,  so  would  be  his  actions;  under  any 
circumstances  he  would  do  his  best,  yet  he  was  well 
assured  tlie  people  of  England  would  not  endure  to 
forec;o  triumph  at  the  call  of  a  niggard  parsimony. 
It  was  in  this  temper  that  he  had  undertaken  the 
siege  of  Badajrs,  in  this  temper  he  had  stormed 
it,  and  meanwhile  political  affairs  in  England  wera 
brought  to  a  crisis. 

Lord  Wellesley  had  made  no  secret  of  Mr.  Per- 
ceval's niismanag'ement  of  tlie  war,  and  the  public 
mind  being  unsettled,  the  Whies  were  invited  by  the 
Prince  lieoent,  his  year  of  restrictions  having  now 
expired,  to  join  a  new  administration.  But  the  heads 
of  that  faction  would  not  share  with  Mr.  Perceval, 
and  he,  master  of  the  secrets  relating  to  the  detesta- 
ble pers'^cution  of  the  Princoss  of  Wales,  was  too 
powerful  to  t)e  removed.  However,  on  the  11th  of 
May,  Perceval  was  killed  in  the  house  of  Commons, 
and  this  act,  which  was  a  horrible  crime,  but  politi- 
cally no  misfortune  either  to  En'/land  or  the  Penin- 
sula, produced  ether  negociaiicns,  upon  a  more  en- 
larged scheme  with  regard  both  to  parties  and  to  the 
system  of  government.  Personal  feelings  again  pre- 
vailed. Lord  Liverpool  would  not  unite  with  lord 
W^ellesley,  the  Grey  and  Granville  faction  would  not 
serve  their  countrj'^  without  havinfr  the  disposal  of 
all  the  household  offices,  and  lord  INIoira,  judging  a 
discourtesy  to  the  Prince  Regent  too  high  a  price  to 
pay  for  their  adhesion,  refused  that  condition.  The 
materials  of  a  new  cabinet  were  therefore  drawn  from 
the  dregs  of  the  Tory  faction,  and  lord  Liverpool 
became  prime  minister. 

It  was  unfortunate  that  a  man  of  lord  Wellesley's 
vio-orotis  talent  should  have  been  rejected  for  lord 
Liverpool;  !)ut  this  remnant  of  a  party  beinj  too  weak 
to  domineer,  proved  less  mischievous  with  respect  to 
the  Peninsula  than  my  of  the pr.ceding  governments. 


4G2 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XVIT. 


There  wns  no  dirrct  personal  interest  opposed  to 
lord  Wclliiisrton's  wishes,  and  the  military  policy  of 
the  cabinet  yielding  by  degrees  to  the  attraction  of 
his  ascemliiitj-  r^pnias,  was  finally  absorbed  in  its 
meridian  splendour.  Many  practical  iinprovements 
had  also  been  g-rowing  up  in  the  official  departments, 
pspeci;'.lly  in  that  of  war  and  colonii  s,  wh^-re  colonel 
liunbury,  the  undcr-secretary,  a  man  experienced  in 
the  wants  of  an  army  on  service,  had  reformed  the 
incredible^  disorders  which  pervaded  that  department 
duriuL^  the  first  years  of  the  contest.  The  result  of 
the  ])'  liiical  crisis  was  therefore  comparatively  favour- 
able to  the  war  in  the  Peninsula,  the  story  of  which 
shall  now  be  resumed. 

It  has  been  shewn  how  the  danofer  of  Gallicia,  and 
the  nejrlio^ence  of  the  Portuguese  and  Spanish  author- 
ities with  reference  to  Almeida  and  Ciudad  Rodriffo, 
stopped  the  invasion  of  Andalusia,  and  brought  the 
allies  back  to  Boira.  But  if  Wellington,  pursuing 
his  first  plan,  had  overthrown  Soult  on  the  banks  of 
the  Cinadalquivir  and  destroyed  the  French  arsenal 
at  Seville,  bis  campaign  would  have  ranked  amongst 
the  most  hardy  and  glorious  that  ever  graced  a  gene- 
ral; and  it  is  no  slight  proof  of  the  uncertainty  of  war, 
that  combinations,  so  extensive  and  judicious,  should 
have  been  marred  by  the  negligence  cf  a  few  secon- 
dary authorities,  at  points  distant  from  the  immediate 
scenes  of  action.  The  English  general  had  indeed 
under-estimated  the  force  opposed  to  him,  both  in  the 
north  and  south;  but  the  bravery  of  the  allied  troops, 
aided  by  the  moral  power  of  their  recent  successes, 
would  have  borne  that  error,  and  in  all  other  particu- 
lars his  profound  military  judgment  \\as  manifest. 

Yet  to  obtain  a  true  notion  of  his  views,  the  vari- 
ous operations  which  he  had  foreseen  and  provided 
against  must  be  considered,  inasmuch  as  thry  sh-w  the 
actual  resources  of  the  allies,  the  dirllculty  cf  bringing 
them  to  bear  with  due  concert,  and  the  propriety  of 
looking  to  the  general  state  of  the  war,  previous  to 
each  of  Wellington's  grreat  movements.  F'or  his  cal- 
culations were  constantly  dependent  upon  the  ill- 
judged  operations  of  men,  over  whom  he  had  lit- 
tle influence,  and  his  successes,  sudden,  acciJenbal, 
snatened  irom  the  midst  of  conflicting  political  ci.'- 
cmnstances,  were  as  gems  brought  up  from  the  tur- 
bulence of  a  whirlpool. 

Castrfics  was  captain-general  of  Gallicia,  as  well 
as  cf  Estremaduro,  and  when  Ciudad  Rodrigo  fell, 
lord  Wellington,  expecting  from  his  fiiendly  terling 
soine  efTrcient  aid,  had  counselled  him  upon  all  the 
probable  movements  of  the  enemy  during  the  siege 
of  Badajns. 

First.  He  supposed  RIarmnnt  might  march  into 
Estrem.idura,  either  with  or  without  the  divisions  of 
Souham  and  Bonnet.  In  either  case,  he  advised  that 
Abadia  sh'^uld  enter  Leon,  and,  according  to  his 
means,  attack  Astorga,  Benavente,  Zamora,  and  the 
other  posts  fortilied  by  the  enemy  in  th-it  kingdom; 
and  that  Carlf)s  d'Espaiia,  Sanchez,  Snornil,  in  fine 
all  the  partidas  iti  (/astile  and  the  Aslurias,  and  even 
Mendizabel,  who  was  then  in  the  JVIontana  St.  Ander, 
should  come  to  Ahadia's  assistance.  He  promised 
also  that  the  regular  Portuguese  cavalry,  under  Sil- 
veira  and  Bacellar,  should  pass  tin;  Spanish  frontier. 
'J'hus  a  force  of  not  less  than  twenty-five  thousand 
men  would  have  been  put  in  motion  on  the  rear  of 
Marmont,  j  nd  a  most  powerful  diversion  effected  in 
aid  of  the  jii.-ge  I'f  Bad.iji'S  and  the  invasion  of  An- 
dalusia. 

The  nf^xt  operation  considered,  was  that  of  an  in- 
vasion of  Gallicia,  by  five  divisions  of  the  army  of 
I'ortug.l,  the  three  other  ilivisions,  and  the  cavalry, 
then  in  the  \alliy  of  the  'I'agus  and  about  Bej.ir,  be- 
ing left  to  contend,  in  concwt  with  Soult,  for  Badajr)s. 
Tu  Ik  lu  \badia  tj  meet  sncli  an  attack,  Bacellar  and 


Silveira  had  orders  to  harass  the  It  ft  flank  and  rear 
of  the  French,  with  btrlh  infantry  and  cavalry,  -an 
much  as  the  nature  of  the  case  would  adir.it,  reg::rd 
being  had  to  the  safety  of  their  raw  rriilitia,  and  to 
their  connection  with  the  right  flank  of  the  Cia!iici:;n 
army,  whose  n^treat  was  to  be  by  Orense. 

Thirdly.  The  French  might  invade  Portugal  north 
of  the  Douro.  Abadia  was  then  to  harass  iheir  right 
flank  and  rear,  while  the  Portuguese  opposed  them 
in  front;  and  whether  they  fell  on  Gallicia  or  Portu- 
gal, or  Estremadura,  Carlos  d'Esjiana,  and  the  par- 
tidas, and  Mendizabel,  would  have  an  open  field  in 
Leon  and  Castile. 

Lastly.  The  operation  which  really  happened  wr.s 
considered,  and  to  meet  it  lord  W'ellington's  arrange- 
ments were,  as  we  have  seen,  calculated  to  cover  the 
masazines  on  the  Douro,  and  the  Mondego,  and  to 
force  the  enemy  to  take  the  barren  difHcult  line 
of  country,  through  Lower  Beira,  towards  Castelo 
Braneo,  while  Abadia  and  the  Guerilla  chiefs  entertd 
Castile  and  Leon  on  his  rear.  Carlos  d'EspaHa  had 
also  been  ordered  to  break  down  the  bridges  on  the 
Ycltes,  and  the  Huebra,  in  front  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo, 
and  that  of  Barba  de  Puerco  on  the  Agueda  to  the 
left  of  that  fortress.  Marmont  would  thus  have  been 
delayed  two  days,  and  the  magayines  both  at  Castelo 
Braneo  and  Celoricn  saved  by  the  near  approach  of 
the  allied  army. 

Espafia  did  none  of  these  things,  neither  did  Aba- 
dia nor  Mendizabel  operate  in  a  manner  to  he  felt  by 
the  enemy,  and  their  remissness,  added  to  tb.e  othi  r 
faults  noticed  in  former  observations,  entirely  marn  d 
Wellington's  defensive  plan  in  the  uortli,  and  brought 
him  back  to  fight  Marmont.  And  whfn  th.at  general 
had  passed  the  Agueda  in  retreat,  the  allied  army 
wanting  the  provisions  which  had  been  so  fcolishiy 
sacrificed  at  Castelo  Braneo.  was  unable  to  follow  ; 
the  distant  magazines  on  the  Douro  and  the  Mondego 
were  its  only  resource;  then  also  it  was  found  that 
Ciudad  and  Almdda  were  in  want,  and  before  those 
places  could  be  furnished,  and  the  intermedi.te  maga- 
zines on  the  lines  of  connnunication  restored,  it  was 
too  late  to  march  against  Andalusia.  For  the  harvest 
which  ripens  the  beginning  of  June  in  that  province, 
and  a  fortnight  later  in  Estremadura,  wci:ld  hrve 
enabled  the  army  of  Portugal  to  follow  the  alii.  3 
raareli  by  march. 

Now  Marmont,  as  Napoleon  repeatedly  told  him, 
had  only  to  watch  lord  Wellington's  movements, 
and  a  temporary  absence  tVoin  Castile  would  have 
cost  liiri  nothing  of  any  consequence,  bpcause  the 
army  of  the  north  would  have  protected  the  great 
communication  with  France.  The  advantage  s  of 
greater  means,  and  better  arran^^Rmmts  for  supply, 
on  which  Wellington  bad  calculated,  would  thus 
have  been  lost,  and  moreover,  the  discontented  state 
of  the  garrison  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  and  the  approarh 
of  a  new  battering  train  from  France,  rendered  it 
dangerous  to  move  far  from  that  fortress.  'J'he  inva- 
sion of  And^iiusia,  judicious  in  April,  would  in  the 
latter  end  of  May  have  been  a  false  movement;  and 
tlie  more  so  that  Castafios  having,  like  bis  predecis- 
sors,  failed  to  bring  forward  tlie  Gallician  army,  it 
was  again  made  jiainfully  evident,  that  in  critical 
circumstances  no  aid  could  be  obtained  from  that 
quarter. 

Such  being  the  impediments  to  an  invasion  of  An- 
dalusia, it  behoved  the  English  general  to  adopt  some 
other  scheme  of  offence  more  suitable  to  the  altered 
state  of  alTairs.  He  considered  that  as  the  barv- st 
in  Leon  and  Castile,  that  is  to  say,  in  the  districts 
north  of  the  firedos  and  Gata  mountains,  was  much 
later  than  in  Estremadura  and  Andalusia,  he  should 
be  enabled  to  preserve  his  commissariat  advantages 
over  the  French  in  the  field  for  a  longer  period  in  tjie 


1819.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULA  n    WAR. 


463 


north  than  in  tho  south.  And  if  he  could  strik-^  a 
decisive  blow  ag;iinsl  Marnioiit,  he  would  rolievf  An- 
dilusia  as  securely  as  by  a  direct  attuck,  b  cause 
IVI'drii  would  then  fall,  and  Soult,  beinir  thus  cut 
oft"  from  liis  communications  with  France,  would  far 
t'j  be  h-^'maied  in  on  all.  sides.  Wherefore'  to  make 
til!'  duke  of  Ragusa  tlcrht  a  great  battle,  to  calculate 
the  chances,  and  prepare  the  means  of  success,  l)e- 
came    the   immediate    objects   of  lord    Wellingtoii's 

tllOUC;htS. 

The  French  general  might  be  forced  to  fight  by  a 
vigoieus  advance  into  (Castile,  but  a  happy  result 
depended  upon  the  relative  skill  of  the  generals,  and 
the  number  and  goodness  of  the  troops.  IMarnmni's 
reputation  was  o-reat,  yet  hitherto  the  essays  had  been 
in  favour  of  the  Ensrlishman's  talents.  The  British 
infanti-y  was  excellent,  the  cavalry  well  horsed,  and 
more  numerous  than  it  had  ever  been.  The  French 
cavilry  had  been  greatly  reduced  by  drafts  made  for 
the  Russian  contest,  by  the  separation  of  the  army 
of  the  north  from  that  of  Portugal,  and  by  frequent 
and  harassing  marches.  Marmont  could  indeed  be 
reinforced  with  horsemen  from  the  army  of  the  centre, 
and  from  the  army  of  the  north,  but  his  own  cavalry 
was  weak,  and  his  artillery  badly  horsed,  whereas 
the  allies'  guns  were  well  and  powerfully  equipped. 
Ever}'  man  in  the  British  army  expected  victory,  and 
this  was  the  time  to  seek  it.  because,  without  pitched 
battles  the  French  could  never  be  dispossessed  of 
Spain,  and  they  were  now  comparatively  weaker 
than  they  had  yet  been,  or  were  expected  to  be;  for 
such  was  the  influence  of  Napoleon's  stupendous 
genius,  that  his  complete  success  in  Russia,  and 
return  to  the  Peninsula  with  overwhelming  forces, 
was  net  doubted  even  by  the  British  commander. 
The  time,  therefore,  being  propitious,  and  the  chances 
favourable,  it  remained  only  to  combine  the  jirimary 
and  srcondary  operations  in  such  a  manner,  that  the 
Frencii  army  of  Portugal,  should  find  itself  isolated 
for  so  leng  as  would  enable  the  allies  to  force  it 
singly  into  a  general  action.  If  the  combinations 
filed  to  obtain  that  great  result,  the  march  of  the 
French  succouring  corps,  would  nevertheless  relieve 
various  part  of  Spain,  giving  fresh  opportunities  to 
the  S:)a-;iards  to  raise  new  obstacles,  and  it  is  never 
to  be  lost  sigi'.t  of,  that  this  principle  was  always 
the  basi  of  Wellington's  plans.  Ever,  while  he 
could  !•  -are  his  final  retreat  into  the  strong  holds 
of  Port  :  T-il  without  a  defeat,  oifensive  operations, 
beyond  J=e  frontiers,  could  not  tail  tohurtthe  Ercnch. 

To  eii'j.-t  the  isolating  of  Marmont's  army,  the 
first  cotidition  was  to  be  as  early  in  the  field  as  the 
rainy  season  would  permit,  and  bef:)re  the  coming 
harvest  enabled  the  other  French  armies  to  move  in 
largo  bodies.  But  Marmont  could  avail  himself, 
Fuccessively,  of  the  lines  of  the  Tormes  and  the 
D.)aro  to  protract  the  campaign  until  the  ripening 
of  the  harvest  enabled  reinforcoin'-nts  to  join  him, 
and  'I'^nc?  the  security  of  the  allies'  flanks  and  rear 
during  the  operations,  and  of  their  retreat,  if  ovnr- 
])owar3d,  was  to  be  previously  looked  to.  Soult, 
burning  to  revenge  the  loss  of  Badojos,  might  attack 
Hill  with  suparior  numbers,  or  detach  a  force  acrot-'s 
the  Tnrrsis,  which,  in  conjunction  with  tl'e  army  of 
the  centre,  now  directed  by  Jourdan,  could  advance 
upon  Portugal  by  the  valley  of  the  Tagus,  ami  so 
turn  the  right  flank  of  the  allied  army  in  Castile. 
JJoats  and  magazines  supplied  from  Toledo  and 
IMa'rid,  were  already  being  collected  at  the  fort  of 
Lugar  Niieva,  near  Almarnz,  and  from  hence,  as 
from  a  place  of  arms,  tlie  French  could  move  upon 
Coria,  Placencia,  and  Castelo  Branco,  menacing 
Ahrante.s,  ('elorico,  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  and  Almeida, 
while  detachments  from  the  army  of  the  north  rein- 
forced the  ar>_""  of  Portugil.     But  to  obviate  this 


last   d::nger  Wellington   had   /jlt'iiuf-d   oiio  of  those 
enterpribCF,  whicli   as   they  are   succoiajliil,  iirirci 
pally  because  of  their  exceeding  boL'nci^s,  src  be 
held  with  astonishment  when  achieved,  and  are  at- 
tributed to  madness  when  they  fail. 

SURPRISE    OF    ALKARAZ. 

For  a  clear  understanding  of  this  event,  tbc  reader 
must  call  to  mind,  1st,  that  the  left  bank  of  the 
Tagus,  from  Toledo  to  Almaraz,  is  lined  with  rug- 
ged mountains,  the  ways  through  Which,  imprac- 
ticable for  an  army,  are  diliicult  even  Icr  small  diyt- 
sions;  2d,  that  from  .'Vlmaraz  to  the  frontier  of  Por- 
tugal, the  banks,  although  more  open,  were  still 
diliicult,  and  the  Tagus  was  only  to  be  croesed  at 
certain  points,  to  which  bad  roads  leading  through 
the  mountains  descended.  But  from  Ahnaraz  to 
Alcantara,  all  the  bridges  had  been  long  ruined, 
and  those  of  Arzobispo  and  Talavera,  situated  be- 
tween Almaraz  and  Toledo,  were  of  little  value, 
because  of  the  ruggedness  of  the  mounts  ins  above 
spoken  of.  Soult's  pontoon  equipage  had  been  cap- 
tured in  Badajos,  and  the  only  means  of  crossing 
the  Tagus,  possessed  by  the  French,  from  Toledo  to 
the  frontier  of  Portugal,  was  a  boat-bridge  laid  down 
at  Almaraz  by  Marmont,  and  to  secure  wiiich  hs 
had  constructed  three  strong  forts  and  a  bridge-heed 

The  first  of  tliese  forts,  called  Ragusa,  was  a 
magazine,  containing  many  stores  and  provisions, 
and  it  was,  although  not  finished, exceedingly  strong, 
having  a  loopholed  stone  toAver,  tvv-enty-five  feet  high 
within,  and  being  flanked  without  by  a  field-work 
near  the  bridge. 

On  the  letl  bank  of  the  Tagus  the  bridge  had  a 
fortified  head  of  masonry,  which  was  again  flanked 
by  a  redoubt,  ."ailed  Fort  Napoleon,  placed  on  a 
height  a  little  in  advance.  This  redoubt,  though 
imperfectly  constructed,  inasmuch  as  a  wide  berm, 
in  the  middle  of  the  scarp,  offered  a  landing  place 
to  troops  escalading  the  rampart,  was  yet  stroijg 
because  it  contained  a  second  inter'or  defence  or 
retrenchment,  with  a  loopholod  stone  tower,  a  ditch, 
draw-bridge,  and  palisades. 

These  two  forts,  and  the  bridge-head,  were  armed 
with  eighteen  guns,  and  they  were  garriscuied  by 
above  a  thousand  men,  v/hich  seemed  sulilcient  lo 
insure  the  commend  of  the  river;  but  the  mountairs 
on  the  left  bank  still  precluded  the  passage  of  en 
army  towards  Lower  E.-ftremadnra ,  save  by  the  royai 
road  to  TruxiUo,  which  road,  at  the  distan'^e  of  five 
miles  from  the  river,  passed  over  the  rugged  Mir.a- 
bete  ridge,  and  to  secure  the  sum,mit  of  the  moun- 
tain the  French  had  dra,wn  another  line  of  works, 
across  the  throat  of  the  pass.  This  line  coj'.sisted 
of  a  large  fortified  house,  connected  by  emaller  posts, 
with  the  ancient  watch-tower  of  Mirabete,  which 
itself  contained  eight  guns,  and  was  surrounded  by 
a  rampart  twelve  feet  high. 

If  all  these  works  and  a  road,  wh'ch  ]\Iarmor.t, 
folhnving  the  traces  of  an  ancient  RoniuU  way,  was 
now  opening  across  the  Grodos  mountaiiis  h;>d  been 
finished,  the  communication  of  the  Frencli,  although 
circuitous,  v/ould  have  been  very  good  and  secure. 
Indeed  Wellington  fearing  the  accomplish.ment,  in- 
tended to  have  surprised  the  French  at  Almaraz 
previous  to  the  siege  of  Badajos,  when  the  redoubta 
were  far  from  complete,  but  the  Portuguese  govern- 
ment neglected  to  fiirnish  the  means  of  trnnsportinj» 
the  prt'llery  from  Lisbon,  and  ho  was  balfl"d.  (Gene- 
ral Hill  was  now  ordered  to  attempt  it  with  a  force 
of  six  thousand  men,  including  four  hundred  cavalry 
two  field  brigades  of  artillery,  a  pontoon  Cfpiipage, 
and  a  battering  train  of  six  iron  twenty-four  pound 
howitzers. 


4L'l 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[B  OK  X\U. 


Tlie  enterpr.'sp,  at  all  times  difficult,  was  become 
Olio  of  extreme  delicacy.  When  tiie  army  was  round 
Badajos,  only  the  resistance  of  the  forts  themselves 
was  to  be  looked  fir;  now  Foy  s  division  of  the 
army  of  Portugal  had  returned  to  the  valley  of  the 
Taj,'Uj,  and  was  in  no  manner  fettered,  and  d'Ar- 
inagnac,  with  troops  from  tiie  army  of  the  centre, 
oocu,)ied  Talavera.  Drouet  also  was,  with  eight  or 
nine  tliousand  men  of  the  army  of  tiie  south,  at 
limoJDsa  de  Cordoba,  his  cavalry  was  en  the  road 
to  Mecielltn,  he  was  nearer  to  Merida  than  Hill  was 
to  Almaruz,  he  might  intercept  the  hitter's  retreat, 
and  the  king's  orders  were  imperative  tliat  he  should 
hang  upon  the  English  army  in  Estremadura.  Sfult 
could  also  detach  a  corps  from  Seville  by  St.  Ollala 
to  fall  upon  sir  William  Erskine,  who  wns  posted 
wit!)  the  cavalry  and  the  remainder  i)i'  Hill's  infan- 
try, near  Almendralejo.  However  lord  Wellington 
piacsd  general  Graham  near  Porialegre,  with  the 
first  and  sixth  divisions,  and  Cotton's  cavalry,  all  of 
wiiich  had  crossed  the  Tagus  for  the  occasion,  and 
thus  including  Erskine's  corps,  above  twenty  thou- 
sand men  were  ready  to  protect  Hill's  enterprise. 

Drouet  by  a  rapid  march  might  still  interpose 
between  Hill  and  Erskine,  and  beat  them  in  detail 
before  Graham  could  support  them,  wherefore  the 
English  general  made  many  other  arrangements  to 
deceive  t!ie  enemy.  First,  he  cliose  the  moment  of 
action  when  Sojit  having  sent  detachments  in  vari- 
ous directions,  to  restore  his  communications  in 
Andalusia,  had  marched  himself  with  a  division  to 
Cadiz,  and  was  consequently  unfavourably  placed 
for  a  sudden  movement.  Secondly,  by  rumours  ad- 
roitly spread,  and  by  demonstrations  with  the  Portu- 
guese militia  of  the  Alemlejo,  he  caused  the  French 
to  believe  that  ten  thousand  men  were  moving  down 
the  Guadiana,  towards  the  Nicbla,  preparatory  to 
the  invasion  of  Andalusia,  a  notion  upheld  by  the 
assembling  of  so  many  troops  under  Graham,  by  the 
pushing  of  cavalry  parties  towards  the  Morena,  and 
by  rsstDring  t!ie  bridga  at  Merida,  with  the  avowed 
intention  of  sending  Hill's  battering  and  pontoon 
tnin,  which  had  been  formed  at  Elvas,  to  Almen- 
dralijo.  Finally,  miny  exploring  officers,  taking 
ths  roads  leading  to  the  province  of  Cordoba,  made 
nstsniatious  inquiries  about  the  French  posts  at 
IJBhhazar  and  other  places,  and  thus  every  thing 
psemed  to  point  at  Andalusia. 

The  restoration  of  the  bridge  at  Merida  proving 
unexpectedly  dltiicult,  cort  a  fortniglit's  labour,  for 
two  arches  Iiavlng  been  destroyed  the  opening  was 
above  sixty  feet  wide,  and  large  timber  was  scarce. 
Hill's  mareh  v/as  thus  dangerously  delayed,  but  on 
tii3  12th  of  May,  the  repairs  being  effected  and  all 
els3  being  ready,  he  quitted  Almendralejo,  passed 
the  Guadiana,  at  Merida,  with  near  six  thousand 
m-^n  and  twelve  (ield-pieees,  and  joined  his  pontoons 
and  b^tte^ing-traln.  These  last  had  come  by  tlie 
way  of  Montljo,  and  formed  a  considerable  convoy, 
nearly  fifty  country  carts,  besides  the  guns  and  lim- 
ber carriages,  being  employed  to  convey  t!ie  pon- 
to;ns,  the  ladders,  and  the  ammunition  for  the  how- 
itze  s. 

Tlie  13th  the  armament  reached  the  Bnrdalo  river 
en  the  rfiad  tn  Truxillo;  the  14th  it  was  at  Villa 
Mesias;  the  loth  at  Truxillo.  Meanwliil'^,  to  mis- 
lead tli3  enemy  on  the  r'ght  bank  of  tiie  Tagus  the 
guerillas  of  the  Guadalupe  mountains  made  demon- 
strations at  different  points  between  Almaraz  and 
Arzobispo,  as  if  they  were  seeking  a  place  to  cast  a 
bridge  that  Hill  might  join  lord  Wellington.  Gone- 
rs).! Foy  was  deceived  by  these  operations,  and  thougli 
hie  spies  at  Truxillo  had  early  inflirmod  him  of  the 
paesuge  jf  the  Guadiana  by  tlie  allies,  they  Ijd  liim 


to  believe  that  Hill  had  fiuiecn  thousand  men,  and 
tl  at  two  brigal^eB  ol'  cavalry  were  li:'llcwing  in  his 
rear;  one  report  even  stated  tI.Et  thirty  tlicuscnd 
men  ha<l  entered  Truxillo,  whcrecs  tlicre  were  less 
than  slj:  thousf.nd  of  all  arms 

Hill  having  reached  Jafaiccjo  early  on  the  ]6tli, 
formed  his  troops  in  three  columns,  and  made  a 
night  march,  intending  to  attack  by  suprise  atd  at 
the  same  moment,  the  tower  of  Mirabete,  the  forti- 
fied house  in  the  i  ats,  and  the  forts  at  the  bridge  cf 
Almaraz.  The  left  column,  directed  against  the 
tower,  was  ccmmanded  by  general  Chowne.  1  he 
centre  column,  with  the  crogocns  and  the  artillery, 
moved  by  the  royal  road,  under  the  ctn.n.tnd  if 
general  Long.  1  he  right  column,  ccmpcbed  of  the 
oCtb,  71st,  and  G2d  regiments,  under  the  direct  on 
of  Hill  in  person,  was  intended  to  penetrate  by  tl  u 
narrow  and  difficult  way  of  La  Cueva,  .id  Rcn.an 
Gordo,  against  the  forts  at  the  bridge.  1  ut  the  day 
broke  before  any  of  the  columns  reached  t)  eir  dcfcti- 
nation,  and  all  hopes  of  a  surj^rlse  were  extlrguith 
ed.  This  untoward  beglrn';  g  v.  rs  uravo  cable  on 
the  part  of  the  right  and  centre  column,  because  of 
the  bad  roads;  but  it  would  appear  that  some  negli- 
gence had  retarded  general  Chowne's  column,  i.nd 
that  the  castle  of  3Iirabete  might  have  been  carried 
by  assault  before  daylight. 

The  difficulty,  great  before,  was  rxw  much  in 
creased.  An  attentive  examination  of  the  French 
defences  convinced  Hill  that  to  reduce  the  works  in 
the  pass,  he  must  incur  more  loss  than  v^as  justifia- 
ble, and  finish  in  such  plight  that  he  cculd  net  after- 
wards carry  the  forts  at  the  bridge,  whlcli  wen;  tl.'O 
chief  objects  of  his  expedition.  Yet  it  v.as  only 
through  the  pass  of  31irabete  that  the  artillery  cculd 
move  against  the  bridge.  In  th's  dilerrnia,  alter 
losing  the  17th  and  part  of  the  IFth  in  fruitless  ft 
tempts  to  discover  some  opening  through  v.  Ijich  to 
reach  the  valley  of  Almaraz  with  his  guns,  he  re- 
solved to  leave  them  on  the  Sierra  with  tiie  centre  co- 
lumn, and  to  make  a  false  attack  upcn  the  tov/er  v.-lth 
general  Chowne's  troops  while  he  himself,  witli  the 
right  column,  secretly  penetrated  by  the  scarcely 
practicable  line  of  La  Cueva  and  Rcnian  Gordo  to 
the  bridge,  intent,  with  infantry  rlore,  to  storm 
works  vrhich  were  defended  by  eigliteen  pieces  cf 
artillery  and  powerful  garrisons  I 

This  resolution  v.as  even  more  harry,  an(1  bold, 
than  it  appears  without  a  refisrence  to  th.e  geren;j 
state  of  alTairs.  Hill's  march  had  been  cne  of  secrec-y, 
amidst  various  divisions  of  tlie  enemy;  he  wrs  fi.'iir 
days'  journey  distant  from  Merida,  which  was  h's 
first  point  of  retreat ;  he  expected  that  Drcu  ;:t  would 
b5  reinforced,  and  advance  tov/ards  Mec'ellln,  ar.d 
hence,  whether  defeated  or  victorious  at  Almaraz, 
that  his  own  retreat  would  be  very  darg'ercus;  ex- 
ceedingly so  if  defeated,  because  his  tiro  Prlt  fch 
troops  cculd  not  be  repulsed  with  a  small  loss,  ard 
he  should  have  to  fall  back  through  a  difficult  coun- 
try, with  his  best  soldiers  dispirited  by  failure,  rnd 
burthened  with  numbers  of  wounded  men.  Then 
harassed  on  one  side  by  Drouet,  jiursued  by  Foy  and 
D'Armngnac  on  the  other,  he  v.ould  have  been  ex- 
posed to  the  grcat'^st  misfortunes  :  every  sinnderous 
tongue  would  have  been  let  loose  on  the  rashness  of 
attacking  impregnable  forts,  and  a  military  career, 
hitherto  so  glorious,  might  liavo  terminated  in  shame. 
Hut  general  Hill  being  totally  devoid  of  interested 
ambition,  was  necessarily  unshaken  by  such  fears. 

The  troo])s  remained  concealed  in  their  position 
until  the  evening  of  the  IFth,  and  then  the  general, 
reinforcing  his  own  column  with  the  6th  Portuguese 
regiment,  a  comnary  of  the  6f'th  rifle's,  and  ff^e 
artlllery-mon  of  the  contrie  column ,  commnrcod  the 


1S12.J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


4r.f) 


de^cfiU  of  the  valley.  His  design  was  to  storm 
Fort  Napoleon  bsfore  dayliglit,  aiid  the  march  was 
.ess  than  six  miles,  but  his  utmost  efforts  could  only 
bring  tlie  iiead  of  the  troops  to  the  fort,  a  little  be- 
fore daylight;  the  rear  was  still  distant,  and  it  was 
doubtful  if  the  scaling-ladders,  whicli  had  been  cut 
in  halves  to  thread  the  short  narrow  turns  in  the 
precipitous  descent,  would  serve  for  an  assault. 
Kortuuatjly  some  small  hills  concealed  the  head  of 
the  column  from  the  enemy,  and  at  that  moment 
general  Chowne  commenced  the  false  attack  on  the 
castle  of  Mirabete.  Pillars  of  wiiitc  smoke  rose  on 
the  lofty  brow  of  the  Sierra,  the  heavy  sound  of  ar- 
tillery came  rolling  over  the  valley,  and  the  garrison 
of  Fort  Napoleon,  crowding  on  the  ramparts,  were 
anxiously  gazing  at  these  portentous  signs  of  war, 
when,  quick  and  loud,  a  British  shout  broke  on  their 
e;irs,  and  the  gallant  5!tth  regiment,  aided  by  a  wing 
oftiie  71st,  came  bounding  over  the  nearest  hills. 

The  French  were  surprised  to  see  an  enemy  so 
close  while  the  Mirabete  was  still  defended,  yet 
they  were  not  unprepared,  for  a  patrole  of  English 
cavalry  had  been  seen  from  the  fort  on  the  17th  in 
the  pass  of  Roman  Gordo;  and  in  the  evening  of  the 
ISth  a  woman  of  that  village  had  carried  very  exact 
information  of  Hill's  numbers  and  intentions  to  Lu- 
gar  Nueva  This  intelligence  had  caused  the  com- 
mandant Anbert  to  march  in  the  night  with  rein- 
forcements to  Fort  Napoleon,  which  was  there- 
fire  defended  by  six  companies,  including  the  ?i9th 
French  and  the  voltigeurs  of  a  foreign  regiment 
Tiiese  troops  were  ready  to  fight,  and  when  the  first 
shout  was  heard,  turning  their  heads,  they,  with  a 
heavy  fire  of  musketry  and  artillery,  smote  the  as- 
fjilants  in  front,  while  the  guns  of  Fort  Ragusa 
took  them  in  flank  from  the  opposite  side  of  the 
river;  in  a  few  moments,  however,  a  rise  of  ground, 
at  the  distance  of  only  twenty  yards  from  the  ram- 
parts, covered  the  British  from  the  front  fire,  and 
giQ-'ral  Howard,  in  person,  leading  the  foremost 
troops  into  the  ditch,  commenced  the  escylade.  The 
great  br.?adth  of  the  berm  kept  off  the  ends  of  the 
s'lortened  ladders  from  the  parapet,  but  the  soldiers 
who  first  ascended,  jumped  on  to  the  berm  itself, 
and  drawing  up  the  ladders  planted  them  there,  and 
thus,  with  a  second  escalade,  forced  their  way  over 
the  rampart;  then,  closely  fighting,  friends  and  ene- 
mies went  together  into  the  retrenchment  round  the 
etoue  tower.  Colonel  Aubert  was  wounded  and  ta- 
ken, the  tower  was  not  defended,  and  the  garrison 
fled  towords  t!ic  bridge-head,  but  the  victorious  troops 
would  not  be  shaken  off,  and  entered  that  work  also 
in  one  confused  mass  with  the  fugitives,  who  con- 
tinued their  flight  over  the  bridge  itself.  Still  the 
British  soldiers  pushed  their  hea'Uong  charge,  slay- 
ing the  hindmost,  and  they  would  have  passed  the 
river  if  some  of  the  boats  had  not  been  destroyed  by 
etray  shots  from  the  forts,  which  were  now  sharply 
cannonading  each  other,  for  the  artillery-men  had 
turned  the  guns  of  Napoleon  on  I'^ort  Ragusa. 

.Many  of  the  French  leaped  into  the  v/ater  and 
were  drowned,  but  the  greatest  part  were  made  pri- 
Boners,  and  to  the  amazement  of  the  conquerors,  the 
panic  spread  to  the  otlier  side  of  the  river;  the  gar- 
T'son  of  Fort  Ragusa,  although  jierfectly  safe,  aban- 
done^l  that  fort  also  an  1  fled  with  the  others  along 
liie  road  to  Naval  Moral.  Some  grenadiers  of  the 
92d  immediately  swam  over  and  brought  back  seve- 
ral boats,  with  which  the  bridge  was  restored,  and 
Fort  Ragusa  was  gained.  The  towers  and  other 
works  were  then  des  roved,  the  stores,  ammunition, 
provisions,  and  boats  were  burned  in  the  course  of 
the  day,  and  in  the  night  the  troops  returned  to  the 
Klcrni  above,  carrying  wH.h  them  the  colours  of  the 


foreign  regiment,  and  more  than  two  hundred  and 
fil'ty  prisoners,  including  a  commandant  and  si.\teeii 
other  olHcers.  The  whole  loss  on  the  part  of  the 
British  was  about  one  hundred  and  ciglity  men,  anu 
one  officer  of  artillery  was  killed  by  iiis  own  mine, 
placed  for  the  destruction  of  the  tower;  but  the  onlj 
officer  slain  in  the  actual  assault  was  captain  Cand- 
ler, a  brave  man,  who  fell  while  leading  the  grena 
diers  of  the  50th  on  to  the  rampart  of  Fort  Na 
poleon. 

This  daring  attack  was  executed  with  a  decisioL, 
similar  to  that  with  which    it    had    been    plannei 
The  first  intention  of  general  Hill  was,  to  have  d" 
rected  a  part  of  his  cokimn  against  the  bridge-head 
and  so  to  have  assailed   both  works  together;    bu 
when  the  difficulties  of  the  road  marred  this  project 
he  attacked  the  nearest  work  with  the  leading  troops 
leaving  the  rear  to  follow  as  it  could.     This  rapiditj 
was  an  essential  cause  of  the  success,  for  Foy  hear 
ing  on  the  17th  that  the  allies  were  at  Truxillo,  liau 
ordered  D'Armagnac  to  reinforce  I.ugar  Nueva  with 
a  battalion,  which  being  at  Naval  Moral  the  l&tli, 
might  have  entered  Fort  Ragusa  early  in  the  morn- 
ing of  the  19th  ;  but  instead  of  marching  before  day 
break,  this  battalion  did  not  move  until  eleven  o'clock 
and  meeting  the  fugitives  on  the  road,  caught  the 
panic  and  returned. 

The  works  of  Mirabete  being  now  cut  off' from  the 
right  bank  of  the  Tagus,  general  Hill  was  preparing 
to  reduce  them  with  his  heavy  artillery,  when  a  re- 
port from  sir  William  Erskine,  caused  him,  in  con- 
formity with  his  instructions,  to  commence  a  retreat 
on  Merida,  leaving  Mirabete  blockaded  by  the  gue- 
rillas of  the  neighbourhood.  It  ap[)Pared  that  Soult, 
being  at  Chiclana,  heard  of  the  allies'  march  the  19th, 
and  then  only  desired  Drouet  to  make  a  diversion  in 
Estremadura  without  losing  his  communication  with 
Andalusia;  for  he  did  not  perceive  the  true  object  of 
the  enterprise,  and  thinking  he  had  to  check  a  move- 
ment, which  the  king  told  him  was  made  for  the 
purpose  of  reinforcing  Wellington  in  tlie  north,  re- 
solved to  enforce  Hill's  stsy  in  Estremadura.  In 
this  view  he  recalled  his  own  detachments  from  the 
Niebla,  where  they  had  just  dispersed  a  body  of 
Spaniard;!  at  Castilh^os,  and  then  forming  a  large  di- 
vision at  Seville,  he  purposed  to  strengthen  Drouet, 
and  enable  him  to  fight  a  battle.  But  that  general, 
anticipating  his  orders,  had  pushed  an  advance  guard 
of  four  thousand  men  to  Doni  Benito  the  17th,  and 
his  cavalry  patroles  passing  the  Guadiana  on  the  ]8th 
had  scoured  the  roads  to  Mir.jadas  and  JTerida,  while 
I^allemand's  dragoons  drove  back  the  British  outposts 
from  Ribera,  on  the  side  of  Zafra. 

Confhsed  by  these  demonstrations,  sir  William 
Erskine  immediately  reported  to  Graham,  and  to 
Hill,  that  Soult  himself  was  in  Estremadura  w'tli 
his  whole  army,  whereupon  Graham  came  up  to  Ba- 
dajos,  and  Hill,  ff^arful  of  being  cut  off',  retired,  as  I 
have  said,  from  Mirabete  on  the  21st.  and  on  the  26th 
reached  3Ierida  unmolested.  Drouet  then  with(!rew 
his  advanced  guards,  and  Graham  returned  to  Cas- 
tello  de  Vide.  Notwithstanding  this  error,  Well'ng- 
ton's  precautions  succeeded,  for  if  Drouet  had  been 
aware  of  Hill's  real  object,  instead  of  makiiig  demon- 
strations with  a  part  of  his  force,  he  would  with  the 
whole  of  his  troops,  more  than  ten  thousand,  have 
marched  rapidly  from  Medellin  to  fall  on  the  allies  aa 
they  issued  out  of  the  passes  of  Truxillo,  and  before 
Firskine  or  Graham  could  come  to  their  aid  ;  whereas 
acting  on  th.e  supposition  that  the  intcnt'on  wcs  to 
cross  the  Taffus,  his  demonstrations  merclv  hastened 
Iho  retreat  and  saved  Mirabete,  To  meet  Hill  in 
the  right  [jlace  would,  however,  havp  required  very 
i.ic3  arrangements  and  great  activ'ty,  as  iio  could 


466 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XVII. 


have  made  his  retreat  by  the  road  of  Caceres  as  well 
as  by  that  of  Merida. 

Lord  \Vellington  was  greatly  displeased  that  this 
false  alarm,  given  by  Erskinn,  should  have  rendered 
the  success  incom,)lete ;  yet  he  avoided  any  public 
expression  of  discontent,  lest  the  enemy,  who  had 
no  apparent  interest  in  preserving  the  post  of  Mira- 
bete,  should  be  led  to  keep  it,  and  so  embarrass  the 
allies  when  their  operations  required  a  restoration 
of  the  bridge  ofAlmaraz.  To  the  ministers,  how- 
ever, lie  complained,  that  his  generals,  stout  in  ac- 
tion, personaJly,  as  tiie  poorest  soldiers,  were  com- 
monly so  overwhelmed  with  the  fear  of  responsibility 
when  left  to  themselves,  tliat  the  sliglitest  move- 
ment of  t!ie  enemy  deprived  them  of  tiieir  judgment, 
and  they  spread  unnecessary  alarm  far  and  wide. 
But  instead  of  expressing  his  surprise,  he  should 
rather  liave  reflected  on  the  cause  of  this  weakness. 
Every  British  oflicer  of  rank  knew,  that  without 
pow3rful  interest,  his  future  prospects,  and  his  rep- 
utation for  past  services,  would  have  withered  to- 
gether under  the  first  blight  of  misfortune;  that  a 
selfish  government  would  instantly  offer  him  up,  a 
victim  to  a  misjudging  public  and  a  ribald  press,  with 
wfiom  success  is  t!ie  only  criterion  of  merit.  Eng- 
lish generals  are  and  must  be  prodigal  of  their  blood 
to  gain  a  reputation,  but  they  are  necessarily  timid 
in  command,  when  a  single  failure,  even  without  a 
fault,  consigns  them  to  an  old  age  of  shame  and  mis- 
ery. It  is,  however,  undeniable  that  sir  William 
Erskine  was  not  an  able  officer. 

On  the  other  side  the  king  was  equally  discontent- 
ed with  Soult,  whose  refusal  to  reinforce  Drouet  he 
thought  had  caused  the  loss  of  Almaraz,  and  he  af- 
firmed, that  if  Hill  had  been  more  enterprising  the 
arsenal  of  Madrid  might  have  fallen  as  well  as  the 
depot  of  Almaraz,  for  he  thought  that  general  had 
brought  up  his  whole  corps  instead  of  a  division 
only  six   thousand  strong. 


CHAPTER  II. 

PiDfjrcss  of  tho  war  in  different  parts  of  Spain — State  of 
Gullicin — French  jjreraulions  and  successes  against  the  Par- 
tiJas  of  the  north — Mannont's  arrangements  in  Castile — 
Maritime  expedition  suggested  by  sir  Howard  Douglas — 
He  stimulates  the  activity  of  the  northern  Partidas — 
The  curate  Merino  defeats  some  French  near  Aranda  de 
Duero — His  cruelly  to  the  pri-oner? — Mina's  activity — 
Harasses  the  enemy  in  Arragon — Is  surprised  at  Robres 
by  general  Pannetier — Escapes  with  ilifTicuIfy — Re-appears 
in  the  Ri'>j;i — Gains  the  defiles  of  NavasTolosa — Captures 
two  great  convoys — Is  chased  by  general  Abbe  and  nearly 
crushed,  whereby  the  Partidas  in  the  north  are  discouraged 
— ^ThosB  in  other  parts  become  more  enterprising — The 
course  of  the  Ebro  from  Tudela  to  Tortoza  'so  infested  by 
them  that  the  army  of  the  Ebro  is  formed  by  drafts  from 
Siichet's  fjrces  and  placed  under  general  Reille  to  repress 
them — Operations  of  Palomliini  against  the  Partidas — He 
moves  lowards  Madrid — Returns  to  the  Ebro — Is  ordered  to 
join  tht!  king's  army — OpiTations  in  Arragon  and  Catilonia 
— The  Catalonians  arc  cut  olf  from  the  coast  line — Eroles 
raises  a  new  division  in  Talarn — Advances  into  Arragon — 
Defeats  general  Bourke  at  Rhoda — Is  driven  into  Catalo- 
nia bv  Sr^veroli — Decaen  di'feats  SarzfieM  and  goes  to  Le- 
rida — Lary  concentrates  in  the  mountains  of  Olot — De- 
scends upon  Mattaro — Flies  from  thence  disgracefully — La- 
marque  defeats  Sarzfieid — Lacy's  bad  conduct — MLs<^rable 
state  of  Catalonia.         i 

While  the  Anglo-British  army  was  thus  cleans- 
ing and  strengthening  its  position  on  the  frontier  of 
Portugal,  tlie  progress  of  the  war  in  other  parts  had 
not  been  so  favourAle  to  the  common  cause.  It  has 
already  brtj;i  sli3\vn  that  Gallicia,  in  the  latter  part 


of  1811,  suffered  from  discord,  poverty,  and  ill-suc- 
cess in  the  field;  that  an  extraordinary  contribution 
imposed  upon  the  province,  had  been  resisted  by  all 
classes,  and  especially  at  Coruila  the  seat  of  govern- 
ment; finally  tiiat  tlie  army  torn  by  faction  was  be- 
come hateful  to  the  people.  In  tliis  state  of  afi'airs, 
Castanos  having,  at  the  desire  of  lord  Wellington 
assumed  the  command,  removed  the  seat  of  gover.-t- 
ment  to  St.  Jago,  leaving  the  troops  in  the  Bierzo 
under  the  marquis  of  Portazgo. 

Prudent  conduct  and  the  personal  influence  of  the 
new  captain-general  soothed  the  bitterness  of  fac- 
tion, and  stopped,  or  at  least  checked  for  the  mo- 
ment, many  of  the  growing  evils  in  Gallicia,  and 
the  regency  at  Cadiz  assigned  an  army  of  sixty  tiiou- 
sand  men  for  that  province.  But  the  revenues  were 
insufficient  even  to  put  the  few  troops  already  under 
arms  in  motion,  and  Castanos,  although  desirous  to 
menance  Astorga  while  Marmont  was  on  the  Agu- 
eda,  could  not,  out  of  twenty-two  thousand  men, 
bring  even  one  division  into  the  field.  Neverthe- 
less, so  strange  a  people  are  the  Spaniards,  that  a 
second  expedition  agaii:st  the  colonies,  having  with 
it  all  the  field-artillery  just  supplied  by  England, 
would  have  sailed  from  Vigo  but  for  the  prompt  in- 
terference of  sir  Howard  Douglas. 

When  Castanos  saw  the  penury  of  his  army,  he  as 
usual  looked  to  England  for  succour,  at  the  same 
time,  however,  he  and  the  Junta  made  unusual  exer- 
tions to  equip  their  troops,  and  the  condition  of  the 
soldiers  was  generally  ameliorated.  But  it  was  up- 
on the  efforts  of  the  partidas  that  tlie  British  agent 
chiefly  relied.  His  system,  with  respect  to  those 
bodies,  had  been  before  described,  and  it  is  certain 
that  under  it,  greater  activity,  more  perfect  combi- 
nation, more  useful  and  better  timed  exertions,  had 
marked  their  conduct,  and  their  efforts  directed  to 
the  proper  objects,  were  kept  in  some  subordination 
to  the  operations  of  the  allies.  This  was,  however, 
so  distasteful  to  the  regular  officers,  and  to  the  pre- 
dominant faction,  always  fearful  of  the  priestly  ii.flu- 
ence  over  the  allies,  that  sir  Howard  was  ofl'ered  the 
command  of  six  thousand  troops  to  detach  him  from 
the  guerilla  system  ;  and  tlie  partidas  of  the  north- 
ern provinces  would  now  have  been  entirely  sup- 
pressed, from  mere  jealousy,  by  the  general  govern- 
ment, if  lord  Wellington  and  sir  H.  Wejlcsley  had 
not  strenuously  supported  the  views  of  Douglas, 
which  were  based  on  the  following  state  of  af- 
fairs. 

The  French  line  of  communication  extending  from 
Salamanca  to  Irun,  was  never  safe  while  tiie  Galli- 
cian  and  Asturian  forces,  the  English  squadrons,  and 
the  partidas  .n  the  Montaila,  in  Biscay,  in  the  Rio- 
ja,  and  in  the  mountains  of  Burgos  and  Leon,  me- 
naced it  from  both  sides.  The  occupation  of  the 
Asturias,  the  constant  presence  of  a  division  in  the 
MontaiTa,  the  employment  of  a  corps  to  threatf^n  Gal- 
licia, and  the  great  strength  of  the  army  of  the  north 
were  all  necessary  consequences  of  this  weakness 
But  though  the  line  of  communicntion  was  thus  la 
boriously  maintained,  the  lines  of  correspondence,  in 
this  oeculiar  war  of  paramount  importance-,  were,  in 
despite  of  numerous  fortified  posts,  very  insecure, 
and  Napoleon  was  always  stimulating  his  gonerals 
to  take  advantage  of  each  period  of  inactivity  on  the 
part  of  the  British  army,  to  put  down  the  partidas. 
He  observed,  that  without  English  succours  they 
could  not  remain  in  arms,  that  the  secret  of  their 
strength  was  to  be  found  on  the  coast,  and  that  all 
the  points  which  favoured  any  intercour.se  with  ves- 
sels should  be  fortified.  And  at  this  time  so  anxious 
was  he  for  the  security  of  his  correspondence,  that 
he  desired,  if  necessrry,  the  whole  army  of  the  north 


1819.1 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR    WAR. 


4«7 


e!ioui<l  be  employed  merely  to  scour  the  lines  of  com- i 
njunication. 

In  accordance  with  these  views,  Santona,  the 
most  important  point  on  the  coast,  had  been  render- 
ed a  strong-  post  in  the  summer  of  1811,  and  then 
Castro,  Portagaletc  at  the  mouth  of  the  Bilbao  river, 
Derinco,  Le-;quito,  and  Guetaria,  were  by  degrees 
JorLiried.  This  completed  the  line  eastward  from 
Sautander  to  St.  Sebastian,  and  all  churches,  con- 
vents, and  strong  houses,  situated  near  the  mouths 
of  the  creeks,  and  rivers  between  those  places  were 
entrenched.  The  partidas  being  thus  constantly  in- 
tercepted while  attenjpting  to  reach  the  coast,  were 
nearly  effaced  in  the  latter  end  of  1811,  and  a  con- 
siderable part  of  the  army  of  the  north  was,  in  con- 
sequence, rendered  disposable  for  the  aid  of  the 
army  of  Portugal  But  when  Bonet,  because  of  the 
siege  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  evacuated  the  Asturias,  the 
French  troops  in  the  Montana  were  again  exposed 
to  t!ie  enterprises  of  the  seventh  army,  which  had 
been  immediately  succoured  by  Douglas,  and  which, 
including  guerillas,  was  said  to  be  twenty-three 
thousand  strong.  Wherefore  Napoleon  had  so  early 
as  March  directed  that  the  Asturias  should  be  re-oc- 
cupied, and  one  of  Bonet's  brigades,  attached  to  the 
army  of  the  north,  rejoined  him  in  consequence  ;  but 
the  pass  of  Pajares  baing  choked  with  snow,  Bonet, 
who  was  then  on  the  Urbijo,  neglected  this  order 
until  the  approach  offiner  weather. 

In  May,  Marmont  having  returned  from  Portugal, 
the  emperor's  order  was  reiterated,  and  the  French 
troops  on  the  Orbijo,  being  augmented  to  fifteen  thou- 
sand, drew  the  attention  of  the  Gallicians  to  that 
quarter,  while  Bonet,  passing  the  mountains  of  Leon, 
with  eight  thousand  men,  re-occupied  Oviedo,  Gra- 
do,  and  Gilion,  and  established  small  posts  communi- 
cating through  the  town  of  Leon,  v/ith  the  army  of 
Portugal.  Thus  a  new  military  line  was  established 
which  interrupted  the  Gallicians'  communications 
v/ith  the  partidas,  the  chain  of  sea-port  defences  was 
continued  to  Gihon,  a  constant  intercourse  with 
France  was  maintained,  and  those  convoys  came 
safely  by  water  which  otherwise  would  have  had  to 
travel  by  land  escorted  by  many  trooi)s  and  in  con- 
stant djnger. 

Meanwhile  Marmont,  having  distributed  his  divis- 
ion in  various  parts  of  Leon,  was  harassed  by  the 
partidas,  especially  Porlier's,  yet  he  proceeded  dili- 
gently with  the  fortifying  of  Toro  and  Zamora,  on 
t'i3  Douro,  and  converted  three  large  convents  at 
Salamanca  into  so  many  forts  capable  of  sustaining  a 
rj^ular  siege  ;  the  works  of  Astorga  and  Leon  were 
l.kewise  improved,  and  strong  posts  were  established 
at  Benavents,  La  Baneza,Castro-Contrigo,and  inter- 
mediate points.  The  defensive  lines  of  the  Tormes 
and  the  Douro  were  thus  strengthened  against  the 
IJr'.tish  general,  and  as  four  thousand  men  sufficed  to 
k?.ep  the  Gallician  forces  of  the  Bierzo  and  Puebla 
Senabria  in  check,  the  vast  and  fertile  plains  of 
T  eon,  called  the  Tierras  de  Campos,  were  secured 
for  the  French,  and  their  detachments  chased  the 
bands  fr  ;in  the  open  country. 

Sir  Howard  Douglas  observing  the  success  of  the 
en?my  in  cutting  off  the  partidas  from  the  coast,  and 
the  advantage  they  derived  from  the  water  commu- 
nication; considering  also  that,  if  lord  Wellington 
should  make  any  progress  in  the  coming  campaign, 
nev/  lines  of  communication  with  the  sea  would  be 
desirable,  proposed  that  a  powerful  squadron  with  a 
battalion  of  marines  and  a  battery  of  artillery,  should 
bs  secretly  prepared  lor  a  littoral  warfare  on  the  Bis- 
cay coast.  This  suggestion  was  npproved  of,  and 
sir  Home  Po!)ham  was  sent  from  England,  in  May, 
with  an  armament,  well  provided  with  scaling  lad- 


ders, arms,  clothing,  and  ammunition  for  the  parti- 
das, and  all  means  to  effect  sudden  discmbarKations 
But  tlie  ministers  were  never  able  to  see  the  war  in 
its  true  point  of  view,  tliey  were  always  desponding, 
or  elated  and  sanguine,  beyond  what  reason  warrant- 
ed in  eitlier  case.  Popiiam  was  ordered  not  only  to 
infest  the  coast,  but,  if  jiossible,  to  seize  some  point, 
and  hold  it  permanently  as  an  entrance  into  Biscay, 
by  wliich  the  French  positions  might  be  turned  if 
as  in  1»(j8,  they  were  forced  to  adojit  the  line  of  the 
Ebro  !  Now  at  this  period  three  hundred  thousand 
French  soldiers  were  in  the  Peninsula,  one  hundreu 
and  twenty  thousand  were  in  tlie  northern  provinces, 
and,  witliout  reckoning  the  army  of  the  centre  which 
could  also  be  turned  in  that  direction,  nearly  fifty 
thousand  were  expressly  appropriated  to  the  protec- 
tion of  this  very  line  of  communication,  on  which  a 
thousand  marines  were  to  be  permanently  establish- 
ed, in  expectation  of  the  enemy  being  driven  over 
the  Ebro  by  a  campaign  which  was  not  yet  com- 
menced ! 

While  Marmont  was  in  Beira,  the  activity  of  the 
seventh  army,  and  of  the  partidas,  in  the  Montana, 
was  revived  by  the  supplies  which  sir  Howard  Doug- 
las, taking  the  opportunity  of  Bonet's  absence,  had 
transmitted  to  them  through  the  Asturian  ports. 
The  ferocity  of  the  leaders  was  remarkable.  Mina'a 
conduct  was  said  to  be  very  revolting  ;  and  on  the 
16th  of  April  the  curatd*  Merino  coming  from  the 
mountains  of  Espinosa,  to  the  forests  between  Aran- 
da  de  Duero,  and  Hontorica  Yaldearados,  took  sev- 
eral hundred  prisoners  and  hanged  Sixty  of  them,  in 
retaliation  for  three  members  of  the  local  junta,  who 
had  been  put  to  death  by  the  French  ;  he  executed 
tlie  others  also  in  the  proportion  often  for  each  of  his 
own  soldiers  who  had  been  shot  by  the  enemy.  The 
ignorance  and  the  excited  passions  of  tlie  guerilla 
chiefs,  may  be  pleaded  in  mitigation  of  their  pro- 
ceedings, but  to  the  disgrace  of  England,  these  in- 
famous executions  by  Merino  were  recorded  with 
complacency  in  the  newspapers,  and  met  with  no 
public  disapprobation. 

There  are  occasions  when  retaliation,  applied  to 
men  of  rank,  may  stop  the  progress  of  barbarity,  yet 
the  necessity  should  be  clearly  shewn,  and  the  exer- 
cise restricted  to  such  narrow  limits  that  no  reason- 
able ground  should  be  laid  for   counter-retaliat-on. 

Here,  sixty  innocent  persons  were  deliberately 
butchered  to  revenge  the  death  of  three,  and  no  proof 
offered  that  even  those  three  were  slain  contrary  to 
the  laws  of  war;  and  though  it  is  not  to  be  doubted 
that  the  French  committed  many  atrocities,  some  in 
wantonness,  some  in  revenge,  such  savage  deeds  as 
the  curate's  are  inexcusable.  What  would  have 
been  said  if  Washington  had  hanged  twenty  English 
gentlemen,  of  family,  in  return  for  tlie  deatli  of  cap- 
tain Handy  ;  or  if  sir  Henry  Clinton  had  caused  twen- 
ty American  officers  to  die  for  the  execution  of  An- 
dre'! Like  atrocities  are,  however,  the  inevitable 
consequence  of  a  guerilla  system  not  subordinate 
to  the  regular  government  of  armies,  and  ultimately 
they  recoil  upon  the  helpless  people  of  the  country, 
who  cannot  fly  from  their  enemies.  When  the 
French  occupied  a  district,  famine  often  ensued,  be- 
cause, to  avoid  distant  forages,  they  collected  large 
stores  of  provisions  from  a  small  extent  of  country, 
and  thus  the  guerilla  system,  while  it  harassed  the 
French  without  starving  them,  both  harassed  and 
starved  the  people.  And  many  of  the  chiefs  of  bands, 
besides  their  robberies,  when  they  dared  not  other- 
wise revenge  affronts  or  private  feuds,  would  slay 
some  prisoners  or  .stragglers, so  as  to  draw  down  the 
vengeS  ?e  of  the  French  on  an  obnoxious  village  or 
distri.        This    in    -eturn  produced  associations  of 


463 


NAPIER'S    P  E  x\  1  N  S  U  L  A  R    WAR. 


[Book  XVII 


the  p"'^n1:>  for  self-ilefonce  in  many  places,  by  whicli 
the  en^niy  protited. 

Soon  atler  tliis  exploit  a  large  convoy  having 
marched  from  IJurgos  towards  France,  ^lerino  en- 
deavoured to  intcrce[)t  it,  and  Mendizabcl,  who,  not- 
withstandng  his  defeat  by  Bonet,  had  again  gatlier- 
ed  twalve  iiiindrcd  cavalry,  came  from  the  Liebana 
and  occupied  tlio  hoiglits  above  Burgos.  The  Frencii 
immodiately  placed  their  baggage  and  followers  in 
t!ie  castle  and  recalled  the  convoy,  wliereupon  the 
Spaniards,  dispersing  in  bands,  destroyed  the  forti- 
fiid  posts  of  correspondence  at  Sasarnon  and  Gamo- 
iial,  and  then  returned  to  the  Liebana.  But  Bonet 
had  now  reoccupied  the  Asturias,  the  remnant  of 
the  Spanish  force,  in  that  quarter,  Add  to  Mendiza- 
bil,  and  the  whole  shifted  as  they  could  in  the  hills. 
^Meanwhile  Mina  displayed  great  energy.  In  Feb- 
ruary he  repulsed  an  attack  near  Lodosa,  and  having 
conveyed  the  prisoners  taken  at  Huesca  to  the  coast, 
returned  to  Aragon  and  maintained  a  distant  block- 
ade of  Zaragoza  itself.  In  March  he  advanced  with 
a  d^tacliment  to  Pina,  and  captured  one  of  Suchet's 
convoys  going  to  Mequinenza  ;  but  having  retired, 
with  his  booty,  to  Robres,  a  village  on  the  eastern 
elopes  of  the  Sierra  de  Alcubierre,  he  was  there  be- 
trayed to  general  Pannetier,  who,  with  a  brigade  of 
the  army  of  the  l']bro,  rame  so  suddenly  upon  him 
that,  he  escaped  death  with  great  difllculty. 

ir?  reippeared  in  the  Rioja,  and  although  hotly 
chased  by  troops  from  the  arny  of  thf  north,  escaped 
without  mu?,h  loss,  and,  having  live  lliousand  men, 
seT^tly  gained  the  defiles  of  Navas  Toiosa,  behind 
Vittoria,  where,  on  the  7th  ul  April,  he  defeated 
with  great  loss  a  Polish  regimeiit.  which  was  escort- 
ing the  enormous  convoy  that  had  escaped  the  curate 
and  Mendizabjl  at  Burgos.  The  booty  consisted  of 
treasure,  Spanish  prisoners,  baggage,  followers  of 
the  army,  and  officers  retiring  to  France.  All  the 
Spanish  prisoners,  four  hundred  in  number,  were  re- 
leased and  joined  Mina,  and  it  is  said  that  one  mil- 
lion of  francs  fell  into  his  Iiands  besides  the  equipa- 
ges, arms,  stores,  and  a  quantity  of  church  plate. 

On  the  '^Sth  he  captured  another  convoy  going 
♦Vom  Valencia  to  France,  but  general  Abbe,  who 
had  been  recently  made  governor  of  Navarre,  now 
lirected  comb.ned  movements  from  Pampeluna,  .lac- 
v.a,  and  Sanguesa,  against  him.  And  so  vigorously 
did  this  gi:ieri:l,  who  I  have  heard  Mina  declare  to  be 
the  most  formidable  of  all  his  opponents,  urge  on  the 
operations,  that  after  a  series  of  actions  on  the  25th, 
26th,  and  2^th  of  May,  tlie  Spanisli  chief,  in  bad 
pliglit,  and  with  the  utmost  difficulty,  escaped  by 
l/os  Arcos  to  Guirdia,  in  the  Rioja.  Marshal  Vic- 
tor seized  this  opportunity  to  pass  into  France,  with 
t.lie  remains  of  tiie  convoy  shattered  on  the  7th,  and 
ull  tlie  bands  in  the  north  were  discouraged.  How- 
ever, Wellington's  successes,  and  the  confusion  at- 
tending upon  tiie  departure  of  so  many  Frencli  troops 
/or  the  Rnijsian  war,  gave  a  powerful  stimulus  to  tlie 
oartizan  cliicfs  in  otlier  directions.  Tiic  Empocina- 
Aci,  ranging  the  mountains  of  Cuenca  and  (iuadalax- 
*ra,  pushed  his  parties  close  to  Madrid  ;  Duran  en- 
tered Sor'a.  r:nd  raised  a  contribution  in  tiie  lower 
town  ;  Villa  (Jamna,  Bassecour  and  I\Iontijo,  coming 
from  the  mountains  of  Albarracin,  occupied  3Iolino 
and  Oreiiflla,  and  invested  Daroca  ;  the  ('atalonian 
Gayan,  taking  post  in  tlie  vicinity  of  Belchite,  made 
excursions  to  the  v?ry  gates  of  Zaragoza  ;  tlie  Frayle, 
I;au;iting  the  mountains  of  Alcaniz  and  the  Sierra 
de  Gudar.  interrupted  Suchet's  lines  of  communica- 
tion by  Mor^lla  and  Teruel,  and  along  the  right  bnnk 
of  the  Ebr-o  towards  Tortoza.  Fin.nlly,  Gay  and  i'\Ii- 
ralles  infested  tlie  Garrigi  on  tlie  left  bank. 

It  was  to  repress  t!i-;s3  bands  that  the  army  of  the 


Ebro,  containing  twenty  thousand  men,  of  whom 
more  tlian  sixteen  thoutand  were  under  arms,  was 
formed  by  drafts  from  Sucliet's  army,  and  given  to 
general  Reille.  That  commander  immediately  rc- 
jiaired  to  Lerida,  occupied  Upper  Aragon  with  hia 
own  division,  placed  Severoli's  division  betwctui  Le- 
rida and  Zaragoza,  and  general  Frcre's  between  Li>- 
rida,  Barcelona,  and  Taragona ;  but  his  fourth  divis- 
ion, under  Palombini,  marched  direct  from  Valencia 
towards  the  districts  of  Soria  and  Calatayud,  to  form 
the  link  of  communication  between  Suchet  and  C"af- 
farolli.  The  latter  now  commanded  tlie  army  of  the 
north,  but  the  imperial  guards,  witii  the  exception 
of  one  division,  had  quitted  Spain,  and  hence,  includ- 
ing the  government's  and  the  reserve  of  Monthion, 
this  army  was  reduced  to  forty-eight  thousand  under 
arms.  The  reserve  at  Bayonne  was  thereibre  in- 
creased to  five  thousand  men,  and  Palombini  wsiS 
destined  finally  to  reinforce  Cafiarelli,  and  even  to 
march,  if  required,  to  tlie  aid  of  Marmont  in  1  ecn. 
However,  the  events  of  the  war  soon  caused  Reille 
to  repair  to  Navarre,  and  broke  up  the  army  of  the 
Ebro,  wherefore  it  will  be  clearer  to  trace  the  oper- 
ations of  these  divisions  successfully  and  separately, 
and  in  the  order  of  the  provinces  towards  which  they 
were  at  first  directed. 

Palombini  having  left  a  brigade  at  the  entrenched 
bridge  of  Teruel,  relieved  Daroca  on  the  2i;d  of  Feb- 
ruary, and  then  deceiving  Villa  Campa,  IMont'jo, 
and  Bassecour.  who  were  waiting  about  the  passes 
of  Toralva  to  fall  on  his  rear-guard,  turned  them 
by  the  Xiloca.  and  reached  Calatayud.  This  efiect- 
ed,  he  fortified  the  convent  of  La  Peila,  whicli,  as 
its  name  signifies,  was  a  rocky  eminence,  command- 
ing that  city  and  forming  a  part  of  it.  But  on  the 
4th  of  March,  having  [)laced  his  baggage  and  artil- 
lery in  this  post,  under  a  guard  of  three  hundred 
men,  he  dispersed  his  troops  to  scour  the  country 
and  to  collect  provisions,  and  the  pallidas,  seeii  g 
this,  recommenced  operations.  Villa  Campa  cut  oif 
two  companies  at  Campillo  on  the  8th,  and  made  a 
fruitless  attempt  to  destroy  the  Italian  colonel  Pisa 
at  Ateca.  Five  hundred  men  were  sent  again^t 
him,  but  he  drew  them  towards  tbe  mountains  ef 
Albarracin.  and  destroyed  them  at  Pozonlionda  on 
the  28th  ;  then  marching  another  way,  he  drove  tie 
Italians  from  their  posts  of  communication  ss  far  ;  a 
the  town  of  Albarracin  on  the  road  to  Teruel,  nor 
did  he  regain  the  mountains  until  Palombini  cjiine 
up  on  his  rear  and  killed  some  of  his  men.  Tl  e 
Italian  general  then  changing  his  plan,  concentrated 
his  division  on  the  plains  of  Hused,  where  he  sufi'er- 
ed  some  privations,  but  remained  unmolei^ted  until 
the  14th  of  April,  when  he  again  marched  to  co- 
operate with  Suchet  in  a  comhined  attempt  to  de- 
stroy Villa  Campa.  The  Spanish  chief  evaded  both 
by  passing  over  to  the  southern  slopes  of  the  Albar- 
racin mountains,  and  before  the  Italians  could  return 
to  Hused,  Gayan,  in  concert  with  the  alcalde  of 
t^alatayud,  had  exploded  a  plot  against  the  convent 
of  La  Pefia. 

Some  of  the  Italian  officers,  including  the  com- 
mandant, having  rashly  accepted  an  invitation  to  a 
feast,  were  sitting  at  table,  when  Gayan  appeared 
on  a  neighbouring  height ;  the  guests  were  immedi- 
ately seized,  and  many  armed  citizens  ran  up  to 
surprise  the  convent,  and  sixty  soldiers  were  made 
prisoners,  or  killed  in  the  tumult  below;  but  the 
historian,  Vacani,  who  had  declined  to  attend  the 
feast,  made  a  vigorous  defence,  and  on  the  1st  of 
May  general  St.  Pcd  and  colonel  Schiazzetti,  com 
ing  from  Hused,  and  Daroca,  raised  the  siego, 
Schiazzotti  marcheil  in  pursuit,  and  ns  his  advanced 
guard  was  surprised  at  31oc!iales  by  a  deceit  of  the 


1S120 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


469 


alcalde,  In  slew  the  latter,  whereupon  the  Spaniards 
killed  the  officers  taken  at  the  teast  of  Calatayud. 

Gay  an  soon  baliieJ  his  pursuers,  and  then  moved 
by  MyJina  Celi  and  Soria  to  Navarre,  thinking  to 
surprise  a  money  convoy  going  to  IJurgos  for  the 
army  of  Portugal,  but  being  followed  on  one  side  by 
a  detachment  from  Ilused,  and  met  on  the  other  by 
Catiarelli,  he  was  driven  again  to  the  hills  above 
Diroca.  Here  he  renewed  his  operations  in  con- 
cert with  Villa  Campa  and  the  Empccinado,  who 
came  up  to  Medina  Celi,  while  Duran  descended 
from  the  Moncayo  iiills,  and  tliis  menacing  union  of 
bands  induced  lleille,  in  May,  to  detach  general 
Paris,  with  a  French  regiment  and  a  troop  of  hus- 
sars, to  the  aid  of  Palombini.  Paris  moved  by 
Calatayud,  v.'hile  Palombini  briskly  interposing  be- 
tween Duran  and  Villa  Campa,  drove  tlie  one  to- 
wards Albarracin  and  tlie  other  towards  Soria;  and 
in  June,  after  various  marches,  the  two  French 
g'enerals  uniting,  dislodged  the  Empecinado  from 
Siguenza,  chasing  him  so  sharply  that  his  band 
dispersed  and  iled  to  the  Somosierra. 

During  these  operations,  Mina  was  pressed  by 
Abbe,  but  Duran  entering  Tudela  by  surprise,  de- 
stroyed the  artill3ry  pare,  and  carried  oft'a  battering 
train  of  six  guns.  Palombini  was  only  a  few  march- 
es from  Madrid,  and  the  king,  alarmed  by  lord  Wel- 
lington's preparations  for  opening  the  campaign, 
ordered  him  to  join  the  army  of  the  centre ;  but 
*hese  orders  were  intercepted,  and  the  Italian  gene- 
ral retraced  his  st2ps,  to  pursue  Duran.  He  soon 
recovered  the  guns  taken  at  Tudela,  and  drove  the 
Spanish  chief  through  the  Rioja  into  the  mountains 
beyond  the  sources  of  the  Duero;  then  collecting 
boats,  he  would  have  passed  the  Ebro,  for  Caffarclli 
was  on  the  Arga,  with  a  division  of  the  army  of  the 
north,  and  a  brigade  liad  been  sent  by  Reille  to  the 
Aragon  river  with  the  view  of  destroying  Mina. 
This  chief,  already  defeated  by  Abbe,  was  in  great 
danger,  when  a  duplicate  of  the  king's  orders  having 
reached  Palombini,  he  immediately  recommenced 
his  march  for  the  capital,  which  saved  Mina.  Caf- 
firelli  returned  to  Vittoria,  and  the  Italians  reach- 
ing Madrid  the  21st  of  July,  became  a  part  of  the 
army  of  the  centre,  having  marched  one  hundred 
and  lifty  miles  in  seven  days  without  a  halt.  Re- 
turning now  to  the  other  divisions  of  the  army  of 
the  Ebro,  it  is  to  be  observed,  that  their  movements 
being  chiefly  directed  against  the  Catalans,  belong 
to  the  relation  of  that  warfare. 

OPERATIONS    IN    ARAGON    AND    CATALONIA. 

After  the  battle  of  Altafulla,  the  fall  of  Peniscola, 
and  the  arrival  of  Reille's  first  division  on  the  Ebro, 
Decaen,  who  had  succeeded  Macdonald  in  Upper 
(Catalonia,  spread  his  troops  along  the  coast,  v/itli  a 
view  to  cut  off  the  communication  between  the  Bri- 
tish navy  and  the  interior,  where  the  Catalan  army 
still  held  certain  positions. 

Lamarque,  with  a  division  of  five  thousand  men, 
first  seized  and  fortified  Mataro,  and  then  driving 
M'.laus  from  Hlanes,  occupied  the  intermediate  space, 
w^ih  detachments  from  Barcelona  fortified  Monca- 
da  Mongit,  and  Molino  del  Rey,  thus  securing  the 
plain  of  Barcelona  on  every  side. 

The  line  from  Blanes  to  Cadagues,  including  Ca- 
rets, St.  Fi'ieu,  Palamos,  and.  other  ports,  was 
strengthened,  and  placed  under  general  Bearman. 

General  Clement  was  posted  in  the  vicinity  of 
Gerom,,  to  guard  the  interior  French  line  of  march 
from  Hostalrich  to  Figueras. 

Tortoza,  Mequinenza,  and  Taragona  were  garri- 
soned by  detachments  from  Severoli's  division,  which 
wa.s  quartered  between  Zaragoza  and  Lerida,  and  in 


communication  with  Bourkc's  and  Panneticr's  bri- 
gades of  tlie  first  division  of  the  army  of  reserve. 

General  Frere's  division  was  on  tlic  communica- 
tion between  Aragon  and  Catalonia,  and  tliere  waa 
a  division  under  general  Q,uesnel,  composed  jmrtly 
of  national  guards,  in  the  Cerdafia.  Finally  there 
was  a  movable  reserve,  of  six  or  eight  tiioussna 
men,  with  which  Decaen  himself  marclied  from 
place  to  place  as  occasion  required  ;  but  the  supreme 
command  of  Valencia,  Aragon,  and;Cataloaia  was 
with  Suchet. 

The  Catalans  still  possessed  the  strong  hoids  of 
Cardona,  Busa,  Sceu  d'Urgel,  and  the  Medas  islands, 
and  they  had  ten  thousand  men  in  tiie  field.  Lacy 
was  at  Cardona  with  Sarzfield's  division,  and  some 
irregular  forces;  colonel  Green  was  organizing  an 
experimental  corps  at  Montserrat,  near  which  place 
Erolles  was  also  quartered  ;  Rovira  continued  about 
tlie  mountains  of  Olot ;  Juan  Claros,  who  occupietl 
Arenis  de  Mar  when  the  French  were  not  there,  was 
now  about  the  mountains  of  Hostalrich;  Milans, 
Manso,  and  the  brigand  Gros,  being  driven  from 
the  coast  line,  kept  the  hills  near  Maiireza  ;  Gay 
and  Miralles  were  on  the  Ebro.  But  the  communi- 
cation with  the  coast  being  cut  off,  all  these  chiefs 
were  in  want  of  provisions  and  stores,  and  the 
French  were  forming  new  roads  along  the  sea  line, 
beyond  the  reach  of  the  English  ship  guns. 

Lacy  thus  debarred  of  all  access  to  the  coast, 
feeding  his  troops  with  difficulty,  and  having  a 
great  number  of  prisoners  and  deserters  to  maintain 
in  Cardona,  and  Busa,  because  Coupigny  refused  to 
receive  them  in  the  Balearic  isles.  Lacy,  I  say,  dis- 
puting with  the  junta,  and  the  generals,  and  abhor- 
red by  the  people,  in  his  spleen  desired  cajitain  Cod- 
rington  to  cannonade  all  the  sea-coatt  towns  in  the 
possession  of  the  French,  sayiiig  he  would  give  the 
inhabitants  timely  notice;  but  he  did  not  do  so,  and 
when  Codrington  reluctantly  opened  his  broadsides 
upon  Mataro,  many  of  the  people  were  slain.  The 
Catalans  complained  loudly  of  tliis  cruel,  injudicious 
operation,  and  hating  Lacy,  affected  Erolles  more 
than  ever,  and  the  former  sent  him  with  a  few  men 
to  his  native  districi  of  Talarn,  ostensibly  to  raise 
recruits,  and  make  a  diversion  in  Aragon,  but  really 
to  deprive  him  of  his  division  and  reduce  his  power. 

The  distress  in  the  Catalan  army  now  became  so 
great,  that  Sarzfield  was  about  to  force  jiis  way  to 
the  coast,  and  embark  his  division  to  commence  a 
littoral  warfare,  when  Erolles  having  quickly  raised 
and  armed  a  new  division  entered  Aragon,  where- 
upon Sarzfield  followed  him.  The  baron  having 
entered  the  valley  of  Venasque,  advanced  to  Graus, 
menacing  all  the  district  between  Fraga  and  Hues- 
ca ;  but  those  places  were  occupied  by  detachments 
from  Bourke's  brigade  of  the  army  of  the  Ebro,  and 
at  this  moment  Severoli  arrived  from  \alencia, 
whereupon  the  Spaniards,  instead  of  falling  back 
upon  Venasque,  retired  up  tlie  valley  of  the  Isabe- 
na,  to  son»e  heights  above  Roda,  a  village  on  the 
confines  of  Aragon. 

Erolles  had  not  more  than  a  thousand  regular  in- 
fantry, three  guns,  and  two  hundred  cavalry,  for  i:e 
had  left  five  hundred  in  the  valley  of  ^'onasque,  ana 
Bourke  knowing  this,  and  encouraged  by  the  vicin 
ity  of  Severf)li,  followed    hastily    from    Beiinvarre 
with  about  two  thousand  men  of  all  arms,  tliinking 
Erolles  would  nor.  stand   before  him.     But  the  lai 
ter^s  position  besides  being  very  steep  and  rough  in 
front,  was  secured  on  both  flanks  by  precijjices,  be- 
yond which,  on  the    hills,  all    the    partidas  of  the 
vicinity  were  gathered;  he  expected  aid  also  from 
Sarzfield,  and  was  obliged  to  abide  a  battle  or  lose 
the    detachment   left    in   the    valley    of   V(uiasque. 


470 


NAPIER'S   PEN    NSULAR  WAR. 


[Book  X^  11 


Eourke  keeping  two  battalions  in  reserve  attacked 
with  the  thi'-d.  bu*  ho  met  with  a  stubborn  opposi- 
tion, and  after  a  long  skirmish,  in  which  he  lost  a 
hundred  and  tifiy  mpn,  and  E'^oHes  a  hundred,  was 
beaten,  and  being,  wounded  himself,  retreated  to 
Monza,  in  great  confusion.  This  combat  was  very 
honorable  to  Erolles,  but  it  was  exposed  to  doubt 
and  ridicule,  at  the  time,  by  the  extravagance  of  his 
jmblic  despatch:  for  h^  attirmed,  that  his  soldiers 
iinding  their  muskets  too  hot,  had  made  use  of 
Btones,  and  in  this  mixed  mode  of  action  had  de- 
btroyed  a  thousand  of  the  enemy  ! 

Severoli  now  advanced,  and  Erolles  being  still 
unsupported  by  Sarzlield,  retired  to  Talarn,  where- 
upon the  Italian  general  returned  to  Aragon.  Mean- 
wiiile  Lacy,  who  had  increased  his  forces,  approach- 
ed Cervera,  while  Sarzlield,  accused  by  Erolles  of 
having  treacherously  abandoned  him,  joined  with 
Gay  and  Miralles,  occupying  the  hills  about  Tara- 
gona,and  straitening  that  place  for  provisions.  Mi- 
lans  and  Manso  also  uniting,  captured  a  convoy  at 
Arenis  de  Mar.  and  the  English  squadron  inter- 
cepted several  vessels  going  to  Barcelona. 

Decaan  observing  this  fresh  commotion  came  down 
from  Gerona  with  his  reserve.  He  relieved  Tara- 
gona  on  the  2Sth  of  April,  and  then  marched  with 
tiirea  thousand  men  upon  Lerida,  but  on  the  way, 
hearing  chat  Sarzfield  was  at  Fuentes  RubiKO,  near 
Villa  Franca,  he  took  the  road  of  Braffin  and  Santa 
Coloma  instead  of  xMomblanch,and  suddenly  turning 
to  hitj  right  defeated  the  Spanish  general,  and  then 
continued  his  march  by  Cervera  towards  Lerida. 
Lacy  in  great  alarm  immediately  abandoned  Lower 
f.'atalonia  and  concentrated  Manso's.Milans',  Green's, 
and  Sarztield's  divisions,  in  the  mountains  of  Olot, 
and  as  they  were  reduced  in  numbers  he  reinforced 
them  with  select  Somatenes,  called  the  Companies 
of  Preferencia.  After  a  time  however  seeing  that 
Dacaen  remained  near  Lerida,  he  marched  rapidly 
against  the  convent  of  Mataro,  with  five  thousand 
men  and  with  good  hope,  for  the  garrison  consisted 
of  only  five  hundred,  the  works  were  not  strong  and 
captain  Codrinjton,  who  had  anchored  ofF.Motaro  at 
Lacy's  desire,  lent  some  ship  guns;  but  his  sailors 
were  forced  to  drag  them  to  the  point  of  attack, 
bpcaus3  Lacy  and  Green  had,  in  breach  of  their 
promise,  neglected  to  provide  means  of  transport. 

The  wall  of  the  convent  gave  way  in  a  few  hours, 
but  on  the  5th,  Lacy,  hearing  that  Decaen  was  com- 
ing to  succour  the  place,  broke  up  the  siege  and 
buried  the  English  guns  without  having  any  com- 
munication with  captain  Codrington.  The  French 
found  these  guns  and  carried  them  into  the  convent, 
yet  Lacy,  to  cover  his  misconduct,  said  in  the  offi- 
cial gazette,  that  they  were  safi^ly  re-embarked. 

After  this  disreputable  transaction,  Manso,  who 
alone  had  behaved  well,  retired  witii  Milans  toVich, 
Lacy  went  to  Cardona,  the  French  sent  a  large  con- 
voy into  Barc-ilona,  and  the  men  of  Erolles'  ancient 
division  were,  to  his  great  discontent,  turned  over 
to  Sarztisld,  who  took  post  near  Molina  del  Rey,  and 
remained  there  until  the  .')th  of  .June,  when  a  de- 
tachment from  Barcelona  drove  him  to  the  Campo 
(\p  Taragona.  On  the  14th  of  the  sume  month, 
Milans  was  defeated  near  Vich  by  a  detachment 
from  the  Ampurdan,  and  being  chased  ibr  several 
days,  suffered  considerably.  Lamarque  followed 
Srirzfield  into  the  Campo  and  defeated  him  again  on 
tiie  24th,  naar  Villa  Nueva  de  Sitjes,  and  this  time 
the  Spanish  general  was  wounded,  yet  made  his 
way  by  Santa  Coloma  do  Querault  and  Calaf  to 
C/'ardona,  where  he  rejoined  Lacy.  Lamarque  then 
joined  Decaen  in  the  plains  of  Lerida,  where  all  the 
French  movable  forces  were  now  asuejrbled    with 


a  view  to  gather  the  harvest;  a  vital  object  to  both 
parties,  but  it  was  attained  by  the  French. 

This  v;ith  Lacy's  flight  from  Mattaro,  the  several 
defeats  of  Milans,  and  Sarzfield,  and  the  discontent 
of  Erolles,  disturbed  the  whole  principality:  and 
the  general  disquietude  was  augmented  by  the  in- 
crease of  all  the  frauds  and  oppressions,  which  both 
the  civil  and  military  authorities  under  Lacy,  prac- 
tised with  impunity.  Every  where  there  was  a 
disinclination  to  serve  in  the  regular  army.  The 
Somatene  argued,  that  while  he  should  be  an  ill- 
used  soldier,  under  a  bad  general,  his  family  would 
either  become  the  victims  of  French  revenge  or 
starve,  because  the  pay  of  the  regular  troops  was 
too  scanty,  were  it  even  fairly  issued,  for  his  own 
subsistence;  whereas,  remaining  at  home,  and  keep- 
ing his  arms,  he  could  nourish  his  family  by  his  la- 
bour, defend  it  from  straggling  plunderers,  and  at 
the  same  time  always  be  ready  to  join  the  troops  on 
great  occasions.  In  some  districts  the  people,  see- 
ing that  the  army  could  not  protect  them,  reliiscd  to 
supply  the  partidas  with  food,  unless  upon  contract 
not  to  molest  the  French  in  their  vicinity.  The 
spirit  of  resistance  would  have  entirely  failed,  if 
lord  Wellington's  successes  at  Ciucad  and  Badajos, 
and  the  rumour  that  au  English  army  was  coming 
to  Catalonia,  had  not  sustained  the  hopes  of  the 
people, 

Meanwhile  the  partidas  in  the  north,  being  aided 
by  Popham's  expedition,  obliged  Reille  to  remove 
to  Navarre,  that  Caffarelli  might  turn  his  whole 
attention  to  the  side  of  Biscay,  and  the  Montana. 
Decaen  then  received  charge  of  the  Lower  as  well 
as  of  the  Upper  Catalonia,  which  weakened  his 
position;  and  at  the  same  time  some  confusion  was 
produced  by  the  arrival  of  French  prefects  and  coun- 
cillors of  state,  to  organize  a  civil  administration. 
This  measure,  ostensibly  to  restrain  military  licen- 
tiousness, had  probably  the  ultimate  object  of  pre- 
paring Catalonia  for  an  union  with  France,  because 
the  Catalans,  who  have  ])eculiar  customs  and  a  dia- 
lect of  their  own,  scarcely  call  themselves  Spaniards. 
Although  these  events  embarrassed  the  French  army, 
the  progress  of  the  invasion  was  visible  in  the  altered 
feelings  of  the  poople,  whose  enthusiasm  was  stilled 
by  the  folly  and  corruption,  with  which  their  leaders 
aided  the  active  hostility  of  the  French. 

The  troops  were  reduced  in  number,  distressed  for 
provisions,  and  the  soldiers  deserted  to  the  enemy, 
a  thing  till  then  unheard  of  in  Catalonia,  nay,  the 
junta  having  come  down  to  the  coast  were  like  to 
have  been  delivered  up  to  the  French,  as  a  peace 
offering.  The  latter  passed,  even  singly,  from  one 
part  to  the  other,  and  the  people  of  the  sen -coast 
towns  readily  trafficked  with  the  garrison  of  Barce- 
lona, when  neither  money  nor  tlireats  could  prevail 
on  them  to  supply  the  British  squadron.  Claros  and 
Milans  were  ciiargod  with  conniving  at  this  traffic, 
and  of  exacting  money  for  the  landing  of  corn,  when 
their  own  peoj)le  and  soldiers  were  starving.  But 
to  such  a  degree  was  patriotism  overlaid  by  the  love 
of  gain,  that  the  colonial  produce,  seized  in  Barce- 
lona, and  other  parts,  was  sold,  by  the  enemy,  t'6 
French  merchants,  and  the  latter  undertook  hotli  to 
carry  it  off,  and  pay  with  provisions  on  the  spot, 
which  they  successfirlly  executed  by  means  of  Sjian- 
ish  vessels,  corruptly  licensed  for  the  occasion  by 
Catalan  authorities. 

Meanwhile  the  people  generally  accused  the  junta 
of  extreme  indolence,  and  I-acy,  of  treaclicry  and 
tyranny,  because  of  his  arbitrary  conduct  in  all 
things,  but  especially  thnt  after  proclaiming  a  gene- 
ral rising,  he  had  disarmed  the  Somatenes,  and  sup- 
pressed the  independent,  bands.     He  had  quarreled 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


471 


with  ihe  Kritish  naval  officers,  was  the  avowed  ene- 
my of  Erolles,  the  secret  calumniator  of  Sarzfield, 
and  willial  a  man  of  no  courage  or  enterprise  in  the 
Held.  Nor  wns  the  story  of  his  previous  life  calcu- 
lated to  check  the  bad  opinion  generally  entertained 
of  him.  It  was  said  that,  being  originally  a  Span- 
ish officer,  he  was  banished,  for  an  intrigue,  to  the 
'Janaries,  from  whence  lie  deserted  to  tlie  French, 
and  again  deserted  to  his  own  countrymen,  when 
he  war  of  independence  broke  out. 

Under  t'.~.is  man,  the  frauds,  which  characterize 
the  civil  departments  of  all  armies  in  the  field,  be- 
came destructive,  and  the  extent  of  the  mischief 
may  be  gathered  from  a  single  fact.  Notwithstand- 
ing the  enormous  supplies  granted  by  England,  the 
Catalans  paid  nearly  three  millions  sterling  for  the 
expense  of  the  war,  besides  contributions  in  kind, 
and  yet  their  soldiers  were  always  distressed  for 
clothing,  food,  arms,  and  ammunition. 

This  amount  of  specie  might  excite  doubt,  were 
it  not  that  here,  as  in  Portugal,  the  quantity  of  coin 
accumulated  from  the  expenditure  of  the  armies  and 
navies  was  immense.  But  gold  is  not  always  the 
eynonyme  of  power  in  war,  or  of  happiness  in 
peace.  Nothing  could  be  more  wretched  than  Ca- 
talonia. Individually  the  people  were  exposed  to 
all  the  licentiousness  of  war,  collectively  to  the 
robberies,  and  revenge,  of  both  friends  and  enemies. 
When  they  attempted  to  supply  the  British  vessels, 
the  French  menaced  them  with  death;  when  they 
yielded  to  such  threats,  the  English  ships  menaced 
them  with  bombardment,  and  plunder.  All  the 
roads  were  infested  with  brigands,  and  in  the  hills 
large  bands  of  people,  whose  families  and  property 
had  bean  destroyed,  watched  for  straggling  French- 
men and  small  escorts,  not  to  make  war  but  to  live 
on  the  booty ;  when  this  resource  failed  they  plun- 
dered their  own  countrymen.  While  the  land  was 
thus  harassed,  the  sea  swarmed  with  privateers  of 
all  nations,  differing  from  pirates  only  in  name ;  and 
that  no  link  in  the  chain  of  infamy  might  be  want- 
ing, the  merchants  of  Gibraltar  forced  their  smug- 
gling trade  at  the  ports,  with  a  shameless  disregard 
for  the  rights  of  the  Spanish  government.  Catalo- 
nia seemed  like  some  huge  carcass,  on  which  all 
manner  of  ravenous  beasts,  all  obscene  birds,  and 
all  reptiles  had  gathered  to  feed 


CHAPTER  III. 

Oper'itions  in  Valencia  and  Murcia — Suchet's  able  govern- 
ment of  Valencia — O'Donel  organizes  a  new  army  in 
Murcia — Origin  of  the  Sicilian  expedition  to  Spain — S»'- 
cret  inirijvies  against  Napoleon  in  Italv  and  other  parts — 
Lord  William  Bentinck  profioses  to  invade  Ilaly — Lord 
Wellmgton  opposes  it — The  Russian  admiral  TchtchagofT 
projects  a  descent  upon  Italy — Vacillating  conduct  of  the 
English  ministers  productive  of  great  mischii  f — Lord  Wil- 
liam Bentinck  sweejis  the  money-markets  to  the  injury  of 
lor)  W^cllington's  operationii — Sir  John  Moore's  plan  for 
Sicily  rejected — His  ability  atui  f)resight  proved  by  the 
uliimatB  result — Evil  t-flects  of  bud  government  shewn  by 
examples. 

OPERATIONS    IN    VALENCIA    AND    MURCIA. 

SucHET  having  recovered  his  health  was  again  at 
the  head  of  the  troops,  but  the  king's  military  au- 
thority was  so  irksome  to  him,  that  he  despatched 
an  officer  to  represent  the  inconvenience  of  it  to  the 
emperor,  previous  to  that  monarch's  departure  for 
Russia.  The  answer  in  some  degree  restored  liis 
independence;  he  was  desired  to  hod  his  troops 
concentrated,  and  move  them  in  the    nanner  most 


conducive  to  the  interests  of  his  own  command. 
Hence,  when  Joseph,  designing  to  !ict  against  lord 
Wellington  in  Estremadura,  demanded  the  aid  of 
one  division,  Suchet  replied  that  he  must  then  evac- 
uate Valencia;  and  as  the  natural  line  of  retreat  for 
the  French  armies  would,  during  the  contemplated 
operations,  be  by  the  eastern  provinces,  it  would  bo 
better  to  abandon  Andalusia  first!  an  answer  calcu- 
lated to  convince  Josepii  that  his  authority  in  the 
field  was  still  but  a  name. 

Suchet,  from  a  natural  disposition  towards  order, 
and  because  his  revenue  from  the  fishery  of  the 
Albufera  depended  upon  the  tranquillity  of  the  pro- 
vince, took  infinite  jjains  to  confirm  his  jtower;  and 
his  mode  of  proceeding,  at  once  prudent  and  firm, 
was  wonderfully  successful.  Valencia,  although  one 
of  the  smallest  provinces  in  Spain,  and  not  naturally 
fertile,  was,  fi-om  the  industry  of  the  inhabitants, 
one  of  the  richest.  Combining  manufactures  witii 
agriculture,  it  possessed  great  resources,  but  they 
had  been  injured  by  the  war,  without  having  been 
applied  to  its  exigencies ;  and  the  people  expected 
that  a  bloody  vengeance  would  be  taken  for  Calvo's 
murder  of  the  French  residents  at  the  commence- 
ment of  the  contest.  Their  fears  were  soon  allay- 
ed:  discipline  was  strictly  preserved,  a»id  Suchet, 
having  suppressed  the  taxes  imposed  by  the  Spanish 
government,  substituted  others,  which,  being  more 
equal,  were  less  onerous.  To  protect  the  people 
from  oppression  in  the  collection,  he  published  i|i 
every  corner  his  demands,  authorising  resistance  to 
contributions  which  were  not  named  in  his  list  and 
demanded  by  the  proper  officers ;  and  he  employed 
the  native  authorities,  as  he  had  done  in  Aragon. 
Thus,  all  impolitic  restrictions  upon  the  industry 
and  traffic  of  the  country  being  removed,  the  peopla 
found  the  government  of  the  invaders  less  oppressive 
than  their  own. 

Napoleon,  in  expectation  of  Suchet's  conquest, 
had  however  imposed  a  war  contribution,  as  a  pun- 
ishment for  the  death  of  the  French  residents,  so 
heavy,  that  his  lieutenant  imagined  Valencia  would 
be  quite  unable  to  raise  the  sum;  j^et  the  emperor, 
who  had  calculated  the  Valencians'  means  by  a, 
comparison  with  those  of  Aragon,  would  not  rescind 
the  order.  And  so  exact  was  his  judgment,  that 
Suchet,  by  accepting  part  payment,  in  kind,  and 
giving  a  discount  for  prompt  liquidation,  satisfied 
this  impost  in  one  year,  without  much  difficulty, 
and  the  current  expenses  of  the  army  were  provided 
for  besides;  yet  neither  did  the  people  sufier  as  in 
other  provinces,  nor  was  their  industry  so  crampeo, 
nor  their  property  so  injured,  as  under  their  own 
government.  Valencia  therefore  remained  tranquil, 
and,  by  contrast,  the  mischief  of  negligence  and 
disorder  was  made  manifest. 

The  advantages  derived  from  the  conquest  went 
even  extecded  to  the  province  of  Aragon,  and  to  the 
court  of  Joseph,  for  the  contributions  were  diminisl- 
ed  in  the  former,  and  large  sums  were  remitted  to 
the  latter  to  meet  Napoleon's  grant  of  onc-fillh  cf 
the  war  contributions  in  favour  of  the  intrusive  go- 
vernrnent.  This  prosperous  state  of  French  afl'aiia 
in  Valencia  was  established  also  in  the  face  of  an 
enemy  daily  increasing  in  strength.  For  the  re- 
gent, Abispal  had  given  Blake's  command  to  hiB 
own  brother  Joseph  O'Donel,  who  collecting  the  re- 
mains of  the  armies  of  Murcia  and  Valencia,  hod 
raised  new  levies,  and  during  Suchet's  illncts  form- 
ed a  fresh  armv  of  twelve  or  fourteen  thousand  men 
in  the  neighbo'urhood  of  Aliccnt.  In  the  Balearic 
Isles  also  Roche  and  Whittingham's  divisions  \vf^» 
declared  ready  to  take  the  iv-U,  and  fifteen  hundred 
British  troous,  commanded  by  general  Ross,  arrived' 


472 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XVIl 


at  Carthagena.  To  avoid  the  fever  there,  these  last 
remained  on  sliipboard,  and  were  thus  more  menac- 
ing to  the  enemy  tlian  on  shore,  because  they  seem- 
ed to  be  only  awaiting  the  arrival  of  a  new  army, 
which  the  French  knew  to  be  coming  from  Sicily  to 
the  eastern  coast  of  Spain.  And  as  the  descent  of 
this  army  was  the  commencement  of  a  remarkable 
•episode  in  the  history  of  the  Peninsular  War,  it  is 
proper  to  give  an  exact  account  of  its  origin  and 
progress. 

Sir  John  Stuart  had  been  succeeded,  in  Sicily,  by 
lord  William  IJentinck,  a  man  of  resolution,  capa- 
city, and  spirit,  just  in  his  actions,  and  abhorring 
oppression,  but  of  a  sanguine,  impetuous  disposition. 
JJeing  resolved  to  ameliorate  the  condition  of  the 
Sicilian  people,  after  surmounting  many  difficulties, 
he  removed  the  queen  from  power,  vested  the  direc- 
tion of  affairs  in  the  crown-prince,  obtained  from 
the  barons  a  renunciation  of  their  feudal  privileges, 
and  caused  a  representative  constitution  to  be  pro- 
claimed. Believing  then  that  the  court  was  sub- 
missive because  it  was  silent;  that  the  barons  would 
adhere  to  his  system,  because  it  gave  them  the  use- 
ful power  of  legislation,  in  lieu  of  feudal  privileges 
alloyed  by  ruinous  expenses  and  the  degradation  of 
courtiers;  because  it  gave  them  the  dignity  of  inde- 
j>endence  at  the  cost  only  of  maintaining  the  rights 
of  the  people  and  restoring  the  honour  of  their  coun- 
try:— believing  thus,  he  judged  that  the  large  Bri- 
tish force  hitherto  kept  in  Sicily,  as  much  to  overawe 
tlie  court  as  to  oppose  the  enemy,  might  be  dispensed 
with;  and  that  the  expected  improvement  of  the 
Sicilian  army,  and  the  attachment  of  the  people  to 
the  new  political  system,  would  permit  ten  thousand 
men  to  be  employed  in  aid  of  lord  Wellington,  or  in 
Italy.  In  January,  therefore,  he  wrote  of  these  pro- 
jects to  the  English  ministers,  and  sent  his  brother 
to  lord  Wellington  to  consult  upon  the  best  mode 
of  acting. 

Such  an  opportune  offer  to  create  a  diversion  on 
the  left  flank  of  the  French  armies  was  eagerly  ac- 
cepted by  Wellington,  who  immediately  sent  en- 
gineers, artificers,  and  a  battering  train  complete, 
to  aid  the  expected  expedition.  But  lord  William 
Bentinck  was  soon  made  sensible,  that  in  large  com- 
munities working  constitutions  are  the  offspring, 
and  not  the  generators,  of  national  feelings  and  hab- 
itH.  They  cannot  be  built  like  cities  in  the  desert. 
nor  cast,  as  breakwaters,  into  the  sea  of  public  cor- 
niption,  but  gradually,  and  as  the  insect-rocks  come 
tip  from  the  depths  of  the  ocean,  they  must  arise,  if 
they  are  to  bear  tiie  storms  of  human  passions. 

The  Sicilian  court  opposed  lord  William  with 
falsehood  and  intrigue  :  the  constitution  was  secretly 
thwarted  by  the  barons;  the  Neapolitan  army,  a 
hody  composed  of  foreigners  of  all  nations,  was  dili- 
gently augmented,  with  a  view  to  overawe  both  the 
English  and  the  people;  the  revenues  and  the  sub- 
sidy were  alike  misapplied,  and  the  native  Sicilian 
army,  despised  and  neglected,  was  incapable  of  ser- 
vice. Finally,  instead  of  going  to  Spain  himself, 
with  ten  thousand  good  troops,  lord  William  could 
only  send  a  subordinate  general  with  six  thousand — 
British,  Germans,  Calabrese,  Swiss,  and  Sicilians; 
the  British  and  Germans  only,  being  either  morally 
or  militarily  well  organized.  To  these,  however, 
Roche's  and  Whittingham's  levies,  represented  to 
he  twelve  or  fourteen  thousand  strong,  were  added, 
the  Spanish  government  having  placed  them  at  the 
disposition  of  general  Maitland,  the  commander  of 
the  expedition.  Thus,  in  May,  twenty  thousand 
rnen  were  supposed  ready  for  a  descent  on  Catalonia, 
to  which  quarter  lord  Wellington  recommeuded  they 
«hould  proceed. 


But  now  other  objects  were  presented  to  lord  Wil- 
liam Bentinck's  sanguine  mind.  The  Austrian  go- 
vernment, while  treating  with  Napoleon,  wa^-  se- 
cretly encouraging  insurrections  in  Italy,  Croatia, 
Dalmatia,  the  \  enetlan  states,  the  Tyrol  and  fiwitz- 
erland.  English,  as  well  as  Austrian  agents,  wer(» 
active  to  organize  a  vast  conspiracy  against  the 
French  emperor,  and  there  was  a  desire,  especially 
on  the  part  of  England,  to  create  a  kingdom  lor  one 
of  the  Austrian  arclidukes.  Murat  was  d.sconteiited 
with  France,  the  .Montenegrins  were  in  arms  en  tlie 
Adriatic  coast,  and  the  prospect  of  a  descent  u^cn 
Italy  in  unison  with  tiie  wisiies  of  tiie  people,  ap- 
peared so  promising  to  lord  William  Bentinck,  that 
supposing  himself  to  have  a  discretionary  power,  he 
stopped  the  expedition  to  Catalonia,  reig^uning  thus. 

"  In  Spain,  only  six  thousand  middlir.g-  troops  can 
be  employed  on  a  secondary  operation,  and  for  a 
limited  period,  whereas  twelve  thousand  I'ritish  sol- 
diers, and  six  thousand  men  composing  tlie  JSeapo- 
litan  army  of  Sicily,  can  land  in  Italy,  a  grand 
theatre,  where  success  will  most  efficaciously  assist 
Spain.  The  obnoxious  Neapolitan  force  beingf  thus 
removed,  the  native  Sicilian  army  can  be  organized 
and  the  new  constitution  established  with  more  cer- 
tainty." The  time,  also,  he  thought  critical  for 
Italy,  not  so  for  Spain,  which  would  suffer  but  a  tem- 
porary deprivation,  seeing  that  failure  in  Italy  would 
not  preclude  after  aid  to  Spain. 

Impressed  with  these  notions,  which,  it  must  be 
confessed,  were  both  plausible  and  grand,  he  per- 
mitted the  expedition,  already  embarked,  to  sail  lor 
Palma  in  Sardinia,  and  Mahon  in  Minorca,  yet  mere- 
ly as  a  blind,  because,  from  those  places,  he  could 
easily  direct  the  troops  against  Ital}',  and  mean- 
while they  menaced  the  French  in  Spain.  But  the 
conception  of  vast  and  daring  enterprises,  even  the 
execution  of  them  up  to  a  certain  point,  is  not  very 
uncommon;  they  fail  only  by  a  little  !  tliat  little  is 
however,  the  essence  of  genius,  tlie  phial  of  wit, 
wiiich,  held  to  Orlando's  nostril,  clianged  him  from 
a  frantic  giant  to  a  perfect  commander. 

It  was  in  the  consideration  of  such  nice  points  of 
military  policy  that  lord  Wellington's  solid  judge- 
ment was  always  advantageously  disjilayed.  Neith- 
er the  greatness  of  this  project  nor  the  apparent 
facility  of  execution  weighed  with  him.  He  thought 
tlie  recovery  of  Italy  by  the  power  of  the  British 
arms  would  be  a  glorious,  and  might  be  a  feasible 
exploit,  but  it  was  only  in  prospect;  Sjiain  was  the 
better  field,  the  war  in  the  Peninsula  existed,  years 
had  been  devoted  to  the  establishment  of  a  solid 
base  there,  and  experience  had  proved  that  the 
chance  of  victory  was  not  imaginary.  England 
could  not  support  two  armies.  The  [rinciple  of 
concentration  of  power  on  an  important  point  was 
as  applicable  here  as  on  a  field  of  battle,  and  al- 
though Italy  might  be  the  more  vital  point,  it  would 
be  advisable  to  continue  the  war  already  established 
in  Spain:  nay  it  would  be  bettor  to  give  up  S|)ain, 
and  direct  the  whole  power  of  England  against  Italy 
rather  than  undertake  double  operations,  on  such  an 
extensive  scale,  at  a  moment  when  the  means  neces- 
sary to  sustain  one  were  so  scanty. 

The  ministers,  apparently  convinced  by  this  rca 
soning,  forbade  lord  William  Bentinck  to  proceed, 
and  they  expressed  their  discontent  at  his  conduct 
nevertheless  their  former  instructions  had  unques 
tionably  conferred  on  him  a  discretionary  power  tc 
act  in  Italy,  and  so  completely  had  he  been  misled 
by  their  previous  despatches,  that  besides  delaying 
the  expedition  to  Spain,  he  had  i)laced  twelve  hun- 
dred men  under  admiral  Fremantlo,  to  assist  the 
Montenegrins.     And  he  was  actually  entangled  '■ 


812.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


473 


a  ni'gritiatioii  with  the  Russian  admiral,  Greig-,  re- 
.ative  to  tlie  march  of  a  Russian  army;  a  march 
pbnne>-l,  as  it  would  appear,  without  the  knowledge 
of  the  Russian  court,  and  which,  from  the  wihlness 
of  its  conception  and  the  mischief  it  would  probably 
have  eiiet'ted,  deserves  notice. 

Whih?  tlis  l{u;:sian  war  was  still  uncertain,  ad- 
miral Tchti-hagoif,  who  commauded  sixty  thousand 
men  on  flie  Danube,  propoted  to  marcli  with  them, 
througii  Bosnia  and  the  ancient  Epirus,to  the  mouths 
of  the  Cattaro,  and,  there  embarking,  to  commence 
tiie  impending  contest  with  France  in  Italy.  He 
was,  however,  without  resources,  and  expecting  to 
arPMre  in  a  starving  and  miserable  condition  on  the 
Adriatic,  demanded,  through  admiral  Greig,  then 
coinmanding  a  cquadron  in  the  Mediterranean,  that 
lord  William  Bentinck  should  be  ready  to  supply 
him  with  fresh  arms,  ammunition,  and  provisions, 
and  to  aid  him  with  an  auxiliary  force.  That  no- 
bleman saw  at  a  glance  the  absurdity  of  this  scheme, 
but  he  was  falsely  informed  that  TchtchagoiT,  trust- 
ing to  his  good  will,  had  already  commenced  the 
marcii ;  and  thus  he  had  only  to  choose  between 
aiding  an  ally,  whose  force,  if  it  arrived  at  all,  and 
was  supplied  by  Enghnd,  would  help  his  own  pro- 
ject, or  permit  it,  to  avoid  perishing,  to  ravage 
Italy,  and  so  change  the  people  of  that  country  from 
eecret  friends  into  deadly  enemies.  It  would  be 
foreign  to  this  history  to  consider  what  etFect  the 
absence  of  Tchtchagolf's  army  during  the  Russian 
campaign  would  have  liad  upon  Napoleon's  opera- 
tions, but  this  was  the  very  force  whose  march  to 
the  Beresina  afterwards  obliged  the  emperor  to  aban- 
don Smolensko,  and  continue  the  retreat  to  Warsaw. 

It  was  in  the  midst  of  these  aflairs,  that  the  Eng- 
lish minister's  imperative  orders  to  look  only  to  the 
coast  of  .Spain  arrived.  The  negotiation  witli  the 
Russians  was  immediately  stopped,  the  project  of 
landing  in  Italy  was  relinquisiied,  and  the  expedi- 
tion, already  sent  to  the  Adriatic,  was  recalled. 
Meanwhile  the  descent  on  Catalonia  had  heen  de- 
layed, and  as  a  knowledge  of  its  destination  had 
reached  Suchet  through  the  French  minister  of  war, 
and  through  the  rumours  rite  amongst  tlie  Spaniards, 
all  his  preparations  to  meet  it  were  matured.  Nor 
was  this  the  only  mischief  produced  by  the  English 
minister's  want  of  clear  views  and  decided  system 
of  policy.  Lord  William  Bentinck  had  been  em- 
powered to  raise  money  on  bills  for  his  own  exi- 
g^-ncies,  and  being  desirous  to  form  a  military  chest 
for  liis  project  in  Italy,  he  had  invaded  lord  Wel- 
lington's money  markets.  With  infinite  trouble  and 
ditliculty  that  general  had  just  opened  a  source  of 
supply  at  the  rate  of  five  shillings  and  four-pence, 
to  five  shillings  and  eight-pence  the  dollar,  when 
lord  William  Bentinck's  agents  otfisring  six  shillings 
and  eight-pence,  swept  four  mUlions  from  the  mar- 
kets, and  thus,  as  shall  be  hereafter  shewn,  seriously 
embarrassed  lord  Wellington's  operations  in  tlie  field. 

'I'his  D'^happy  commencement  of  the  Sicilian  ex- 
pedition led  to  other  errors,  and  its  arrival  on  the 
coast  of  Spain  did  not  'take  place,  until  after  the 
campaign  in  Castile  had  commenced  ;  but  as  its  pro- 
ceedings connected  the  warfare  of  Valencia  imme- 
diately with  that  of  Catalonia,  and  the  whole  with 
lord  Wellington's  operations,  they  cannot  be  proper- 
ly treated  of  in  this  place.  It  is,  however,  worthy 
of  observation,  how  an  illiberal  and  factious  policy, 
inevitably  recoils  upon  its  authors. 

In  1807,  sir  .John  Moore,  with  that  sagacity  and 
manliness  which  distinguished  his  career  tlirough 
life,  had  infi)rmed  the  ministers,  that  no  hope  of  a 
successful  attack  on  tlie  French  in  Italy  could  be 
entertained  while  the  Britisli  army  upheld  the  ty- 


rannical system  of  the  d'ssclute  and  treacherous 
Neapolitan  court  in  Sicily.  And  as  no  ciiange  fcr 
the  better  could  be  expected  while  the  queen  was 
allowed  to  govern,  he  proposed,  tliat  the  I^ritish 
cabinet  should  eitlicr  relinquish  Sicily,  or,  assum- 
ing the  entire  control  of  the  island,  seize  the  queen 
and  send  her  to  her  native  Austria.  This  he  judged 
to  be  the  first  step  necessary  to  render  tlie  large 
British  army  in  Sicily  available  for  the  field,  be- 
cause the  Sicilian  people  could  then  be  justly  go- 
verned, and  thus  only  cculd  the  organization  of  an 
effective  native  force  attached  to  England,  and  fitted 
to  ofi'er  freedom  to  Italy,  be  eflected. 

He  spoke  not  of  constitutions  but  of  justice  to  the 
people,  and  hence  his  proposal  was  rejected  cs  a 
matter  of  Jacobinism.  Mr.  Drummond,  the  Eng- 
lish plenipotentiary,  even  betrayed  it  to  the  queen, 
a  woman  not  without  magnanimity,  yet  so  capable 
of  bloody  deeds,  that,  in  1810,  she  secretly  proposed 
to  Napolean  the  perpetration  of  a  second  Sicilian 
vespers  upon  the  English.  The  emperor,  detesting 
such  guilt,  only  answered  by  throwing  her  agent 
into  prison,  yet  the  traces  of  the  conspiracy  were 
detected  by  the  British  autliorities  in  1611  :  and  in 
1812  lord  Williain  Bentinck  was  forced  to  seize  the 
government,  in  the  manner  before  recommended  by 
Moore,  and  did  finally  expel  the  queen  by  force. 
But  because  these  measures  were  not  resorted  to  in 
time,  he  was  now,  with  an  army  of  from  twenty-five 
to  thirty  thousand  men,  sixteen  thousand  of  which 
were  British,  only  able  to  detach  a  mixed  force  of 
six  thousand  to  aid  lord  Wellington.  And  at  the 
same  time  the  oppression  of  Irelsnd  required  tluit 
sixty  thousand  fine  soldiers  should  remain  idle  at 
home,  v/hile  France,  with  a  Russian  war  on  hand, 
was  able  to  overmatch  the  allies  in  Spain.  I'ad 
government  is  a  scourge  with  a  double  thong! 


CHAPTER  IV 

Operations  in  Andalusia  and  Estremadiira — Atlvanlago  oi 
lord  Wiliinirtoii's  posilion  shewn — Soiilt's  plans  vast  but 
well-considered — Ho  designs  to  besiese  Tarita,  Alieant, 
and  Carthagena,  and  march  upon  Lisbon — Restores  the 
French  interest  at  the  court  of  Morocco — English  embassy 
to  the  Moorish  emperor  tails — Soult  bombards  Cadiz,  and 
menaces  a  serious  attack — B;dlesteros,  his  rash  conduct — 
He  is  defeated  at  Bornos — f'.ireet  of  his  defeat  upon  tlie 
allies  in  Estreniadura — Foy  succours  the  fort  of  Mirabete 
— Hill  is  reinforced — Drouet  falls  back  to  Aznijua — Fol- 
lowed by  Hill — General  Slade  defeated  by  Lallemaride  in 
a  cavalry  combat  at  Ma<(iiiilla — Exploit  of  cornet  Streno- 
wiiz — General  Barrois  marches  to  reinforce  Drouet  by  the 
road  of  St  Ollala— Hill  falls  back  to  Albuera— His  dis- 
interested conduct. 

OPERATIONS  IN  ANDALUSIA  AND  ESTREMADURA. 

A  SHOUT  time  previous  to  Hill's  enterprise  against 
Almaraz,  Soult,  after  driving  Ballosteros  from  tlie 
Ronda,  and  restoring  the  communication  with  Gre- 
nada, sent  three  thousand  men  into  the  Niebia ; 
partly  to  interrupt  the  march  of  some  Spaniards 
coming  from  Cadiz  to  garrison  Badrjos,  partly  to 
menace  Penne  Villemur  an''  Morillo,  who  still  lin- 
gered on  the  Odiel  against  the  wishes  of  Welling- 
ton. The  French  arguments  were  more  efiectual. 
Those  generals  immediately  filed  along  tlie  frontier 
of  Portugal  towards  Fslremadura  :  they  were  liastily 
followod  by  the  Sjianish  troops  sent  from  Cadiz,  and 
the  militia  of  the  Algarves  were  called  out  to  defend 
the  Portuguese  frontier.  Soult  then  remained  on 
the  defensive,  for  he  expected  the  advance  of  lord 
Wellington,  which  the  approach  of  eo  many  troops 


474 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  \\  A  R. 


[Book  XVII. 


the  seeming  reluctance  of  tlie  Spaniards  to  quit 
the  Niebla,  the  landing  of  fresh  men  from  Cadiz  at 
Ayamonte,  and  the  false  rumours  purpossly  set  afloat 
by  the  British  general  seemed  to  render  certain. 
Nor  did  t!i3  surprise  of  Almaraz,  which  he  thought 
to  hs  aimed  at  the  army  of  the  south  and  not  against 
the  army  of  Portugal,  alter  his  views. 

The  great  advantage  which  lord  Wellington  had 
gained  by  the  fall  of  fciudad  Rodrigo  and  Badajos 
was  now  very  clearly  illustrated ;  for,  as  he  couH  at 
will  advance  either  against  the  north  or  the  south  or 
the  centre,  the  French  generals  in  each  quarter  ex- 
pected him,  and  they  were  anxious  that  the  others 
BJiould  regulate  their  movements  accordingly.  None 
would  help  the  other,  and  tiie  secret  plans  of  all  were 
paralysed  until  it  was  seen  on  which  side  the  thun- 
derbolt would  fall.  This  was  of  most  com^quence 
in  the  south,  for  Soult's  plans  were  vast,  dangerous, 
and  ripe  for  execution. 

After  the  tall  of  Badajos  he  judged  it  unwise  to 
persevere  in  pushing  a  head  of  troops  into  Estrema- 
dara,  while  his  rear  and  flanks  were  exposed  to  at- 
tacks from  Cadiz,  Gibraltar,  and  Murcia;  but  it  was 
essential,  he  thought,  to  crush  Ballesteros  before  his 
forces  should  be  increased,  and  this  was  not  to  be 
effected  while  that  general  could  flee  to  Gibraltar  on 
the  one  side  and  Tarifa  on  the  other.  Whereupon 
Soult  had  resolved  first  to  reduce  Tarifa  with  a  view 
to  the  ruin  of  Ballesteros,  and  then  to  lay  siege  to 
Cartliagena  and  Alicant,  and  he  only  awaited  the  de- 
V3lo;)ment  of  Wellington's  menacing  demonstrations 
against  Andalusia  to  commence  his  own  operations. 
Great  and  dithcult  his  plan  was,  yet  profoundly  cal- 
culated to  effect  his  main  object,  which  was  to  es- 
tablish his  base  so  firmly  in  Andalusia  that,  maugre 
the  forces  in  Cadiz  and  the  Isla,  he  might  safely  en- 
ter upon  and  follow  up  regular  oflensive  operations 
in  Estremadura  and  against  Portugal,  instead  of  the 
partial  uncertain  expeditions  hitherto  adopted.  In 
fine,  he  designed  to  make  lord  Wellington  feel  that 
there  was  a  powerfiil  army  within  a  few  marches  of 
Lisbon- 
Thinking  that  Carthagena  and  Tarifa,  and  even 
Alicant  must  fall,  with  the  aid  of  Suchet  which  he 
expected,  or  that  the  siege  of  the  first  would  bring 
d.jv/n  Hill's  corps,  and  all  the  disposable  Spanish 
troops  to  save  it,  he  desired  that  the  army  of  Portu- 
gal and  the  army  of  the  centre  should  operate  so  as 
to  keep  lord  Wellinsfton  north  of  the  TagujI.  He 
could  then  by  himself  carry  on  the  sieges  he  obntem- 
pluted,  and  yet  leave  a  force  under  Drouet  on  the 
edge  of  Estremadura,  strong  enough  to  oblige  Hill 
to  operate  in  the  direction  of  Carthagena  instead  of 
Seville.  And  if  tliis  should  happen  as  he  expected, 
he  proposed  suddenly  to  concentrate  all  his  finely  or- 
jranized  and  experienced  troops,  force  on  a  general 
ttle,  and,  if  victorious,  the  preparations  being 
made  before  hand,  to  follow  up  the  blow  by  a  rapid 
urirch  upon  Portugal,  and  so  enter  Lisbon;  or  by 
bringing  Wellington  in  all  haste  lo  the  defence  of 
that  capital,  confine  the  war,  whiFe  Napoleon  was  in 
Russia,  to  a  corner  of  the  Peninsula. 

This  great  proj^jct  was  strictly  in  the  spirit  of  the 
emperor's  instructions.  For  that  consummate  com- 
rainder  had  desired  h's  lieutenants  to  make  lord 
Wellington  feel  that  his  enemies  were  not  passively 
defensive.  He  had  urged  them  to  press  the  allies 
close  on  each  flank,  and  he  had  endeavoured  to  make 
Marmont  un<lerstand  tliat,  ..Itl.c^gh  there  was  no  ob- 
ject to  be  attained  by  entering  the  north-east  of  Por- 
tugal and  fight'ng  a  general  battle  on  ground  favour- 
able to  lord  Wellington,  it  was  contrary  to  all  mili- 
tary principles, to  w  ithdraw  several  I'ays'  march  from 
tho  allies'  outposts,  and  by  such  a  timid  defensive 


system,  to  give  the  English  general  the  power  of 
choosing  when  and  where  to  strike.  Now  the  losa 
of  Badajos,  and  the  difficulty  of  maintaining  a  defen- 
sive war  against  the  increasing  forces  of  the  allies 
in  the  south  of  Andalusia,  rendered  it  extremely 
onerous  for  Soult  to  press  Wellington's  flank  in  Es- 
tremadura; and  it  was  therefore  a  profound  modifica- 
tion of  tlie  emperor's  views,  to  urge  the  king  and 
Marmont  to  active  operation  in  the  north,  while  he 
besieged  Tarifa  and  Carthagena,  keeping  his  army 
in  mass  ready  for  a  sudden  stroke  in  the  field,  if  for- 
tune brought  the  occasion,  and  if  otherwise,  sure  of 
fixing  a  solid  base  for  future  operations  against  Por- 
tugal. 

The  duke  of  Dalmatia  wished  to  have  commenced 
his  operations  by  the  siege  of  Tarifa  in  May,  when 
Wellington's  return  to  Beira  had  relieved  him  from 
the  fear  of  an  immediate  invasion  of  Andalusia  ;  but 
the  failure  of  the  harvest  in  1811,  and  the  continual 
movements  during  the  winter,  had  so  reduced  his 
magazines,  both  of  provisions  and  ammunition,  that 
he  could  not  undertake  the  operation  until  the  new 
harvest  was  ripe,  and  fresh  convoys  had  replenished 
his  exhausted  stores.  His  soldiers  were  already  on 
short  allowance,  and  famine  raged  amongst  the  peo- 
ple of  the  country.  ^Meanwhile  his  agents  in  Moroc- 
co had  so  firmly  re-established  the  French  interests 
there  that  the  emperor  refused  all  supplies  to  the 
British,  and  even  fitted  out  a  squadron  to  insure  obe- 
dience to  his  orders.  To  counteract  this  mischief, 
the  Gibraltar  merchant,  \  iali,  who  had  been  em- 
ployed in  the  early  part  of  the  war  by  sir  Hew  Dal- 
rymple,  was  sent  by  sir  Henry  Wellesley  with  a 
mission  to  the  court  of  Fez,  which  failed,  and  it  was 
said,  from  the  intrigues  of  the  notorious  Charmilly, 
who  was  then  at  Tangier,  and  being  connected  by 
marriage  with  the  English  consul  there,  unsuspect- 
ed :  indeed,  from  a  mean  hatred  to  sir  John  Moore, 
there  were  not  wanting  persons  in  power  who  en- 
deavoured still  to  uphold  this  man. 

So  far  every  thing  promised  well  for  Soult's  plans, 
and  he  earnestly  demanded  that  all  his  detachments, 
and  sufficient  reinforcements,  together  with  artillery, 
officers,  money,  and  convoys  of  ammunition  should 
be  sent  to  him  for  the  siege  of  Carthagena.  Pend- 
ing their  arrival,  to  divert  the  attention  of  the  al- 
lies, he  repaired  to  Port  St.  Mary  where  tlie  French 
had,  from  the  circumstances  of  the  war  in  Estrema- 
dura, been  a  long  time  inactive.  He  brouglit  down 
with  him  a  number  of  the  Villantroy  mortars,  and 
having  collected  about  thirty  gun-boats  in  the  Tro- 
cadero  canal,  commenced  a  serious  bombardment  of 
Cadiz  on  the  16th  of  May.  While  thus  engaged,  a 
sudden  landing  from  English  vessels  was  efiected  on 
the  Grenada  coast,  Almeria  was  abandoned  by  the 
French,  the  people  rose  along  the  sea  line,  and  gen- 
eral Frere,  advancing  from  Murcia,  entrenched  him- 
self in  the  position  of  Venta  de  Bahul,  on  tl;e  east- 
ern frontier  of  Grenada.  He  was  indeed  surprised 
and  beaten  with  loss  and  the  insurrect'^n  on  tho 
coast  was  soon  quelled,  but  tjiese  things  delayed  the 
march  of  the  reinforcements  intended  for  Drouet; 
meanwhile  Hill  suprised  Almaraz,  and  Ballesteros, 
wliose  forces  had  subsisted  during  the  winter  and 
spring  upon  the  stores  of  Gibraltar,  advanced  against 
Conroux's  division  then  in  observation  at  Bornos  on 
the  Gundalete. 

Tliis  Spanish  general  caused  equal  anxiety  to 
Soult  and  to  Wellington,  because  his  ])roceeding8 
involved  one  of  tiiose  intricate  knots  by  which  tlie 
important  parts  of  both  their  operations  were  fast- 
ened. Lord  Wellington  judged,  that,  while  a  large 
and  increasing  corps  which  could  be  aided  by  a  dis- 
embarkation of  five  or  six  thousand  men  Irjin  the 


1=!]2.J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


475 


lila  de  Loon,  menace:!  the  blockade  of  Cadiz  and  I 
the  comaianications  bstvveen  Seville  and  Grenada, 
Soult  must  ki33p  a  considerable  body  in  observation, 
anvl,  consiquontly,  Hill  would  be  a  match  for  the 
French  in  Cstremadura.  But  the  etiicai'y  of  this 
diversion  defended  upon  avoiding  battles,  seeing  j 
that  if  Ballesteros'  army  was  crushed,  the  French,  i 
reinfireed  in  Estremadura,  could  drive  Hill  over  i 
the  Tagus,  which  would  inevitably  bring  Well.ng- 
ton  himself  to  his  succour.  Soult  was  for  the  same 
reason  as  earnest  to  bring  the  Spanish  general  to 
action,  as  Wellington  was  to  prevent  a  battle,  and 
Ballesteros,  a  man  of  infinite  arrogance,  despised 
both.  Having  obtained  money  and  supplies  from 
Gibraltar  to  replace  the  expenditure  of  his  former 
excursion  against  Seville,  he  marched  with  eiglit 
thousand  men  against  Conroux,  and  that  French- 
man, aware  of  his  intention,  induced  him,  by  an  ap- 
pearance of  fear,  to  attack  an  entrenched  camp  in  a 
disorderly  manner.  On  the  1st  of  .Tune  the  battle 
took  place,  and  Conroux  issuing  fortli  unexpectedly 
killed  or  took  fifteen  hundred  Spaniards,  and  drove 
the  rest  to  the  hills,  from  whence  they  retreated  to 
"San  Roque.  How  this  victory  was  felt  in  Estrema- 
dura shall  now  be  shewn. 

The  loss  of  Almaraz  nad  put  all  the  French  corps 
in  movement.  A  division  of  Marmont's  army  cross- 
ed the  Gredos  mountains,  to  replace  Foy  in  the  val- 
ley of  the  Tagus,  and  the  latter  general  passing  that 
river  by  the  bridge  of  Arzobispo,  moved  through  the 
mountains  of  Guadalupe,  and  succoured  the  garrison 
c«f  Mirabete  on  the  26th  of  May.  When  he  retired 
the  partidas  ofthe  Guadalupe  renewed  the  blockade, 
and  Hill,  now  strongly  reinforced  by  lord  Welling- 
ton, advanced  to  Zafra,  whereupon  Drouet,  unable 
tc  meet  him,  fell  back  to  Azagua.  Hill,  wishing  to 
protect  the  gathering  of  the  harvest,  then  detach- 
ed Penne  Villemur's  horsemen  from  Llerena  on  the 
right  flank,  and  general  Slade  with  the  third  dra- 
goon guards  and  the  royals,  from  Llera  on  the  left 
flank;  General  Lallemande,  having  a  like  object, 
came  forward  with  two  regiments  of  French  dra- 
goons, on  the  side  of  Valencia  de  lis  Torres,  where- 
upon Hill,  hoping  to  cut  him  off,  placed  Slade's  dra- 
goons in  a  wood  with  directions  to  await  further  or- 
ders. Slade  hearing  that  Lallemand  was  so  near, 
and  no  wise  superior  to  himself  in  numbers,  forgot 
his  orders,  advanced  and  drove  the  French  cavalry 
with  loss  beyond  the  defile  of  Maquilla,  a  distance  of 
eight  miles;  and  through  the  pass  also  the  British 
rashly  galloped  in  pursuit,  the  general  riding  in  the 
foremost  rnnks,*and  the  supports  joining  tumultuous 
ly  in  the  charge. 

But  in  the  plain  b-^yond  stood  Lallemand  with  his 
reserves  well  in  hnnd.  He  broke  the  disorderiy 
English  mass  thus  rushing  on  him,  killed  or  wound- 
el  forty-eight  men,  pursued  the  rest  for  six  miles, 
recov3fed  all  his  own  prisoners,  and  took  more  than 
a  hundred,  incluling  two  officers,  from  his  adversa- 
ry; and  the  like  bitter  results  will  genernlly  attend 
what  is  called  "dashing''''  in  war,  which  in  other 
word<!  meaus  courage  without  prudence.  Two  days 
after  this  event  the  Austrian  Strenowitz,  whose  ex- 
ploits have  been  before  noticed,  marched  with  fifty 
men  of  the  same  regiments,  to  fetch  oft'  some  of  the 
English  prisoners  wlio  had  been  left  by  tlie  p'rench 
under  a  slender  guard  in  the  village  of  Maquilla. 
Eighty  of  the  enemy  met  him  on  the  march,  yet  by 
fine  management  he  overthrew  him,  and  losing  only 
one  man  himself,  killed  many  French,  executed  his 
mission,  and  returned  with  an  officer  and  twenty 
other  prisoners. 

Sueh  wns  the  state  of  affairs,  when  the  defeat  of 
Ballesteros  at    Bornos,  enabled   Soult   to   reinforce 


Drouet,  with  Barois's  (livieion  of  infantry  and  two 
divisions  of  cavalry  ;  they  marched  acro&s  the  Mo- 
rena,  but  for  reasons,  to  be  hereafter  mciitioned,  by 
the  royal  road  of  St.  Ollala,  a  line  of  direction  wliich 
obliged  Drouet  to  make  a  fiank  march  by  his  left  to- 
wards Llerena  to  form  his  junction  with  tliem  It 
was  effected  on  the  Itth,  and  the  allies  then  fell 
back  gradually  towards  Albuera,  where,  being  joined 
by  four  Portuguese  regiments  from  Badajo£,  and  by 
the  fifth  Spanish  army.  Hill  formed  a  line  of  battle 
furnishing  twenty  thousand  infantry,  two  thoutand 
five  hundred  cavalry,  and  twenty-lour  guns. 

Drouet  had  only  twenty-one  thousand  men,  of 
which  three  thousand  were  cavalry,  with  eighteen 
pieces  of  artillery  ;  the  allies  were  therefore  the  most 
numerous,  but  the  French  army  was  better  compos- 
ed, and  battle  seemed  inevitable,  for  both  generala 
had  discretionary  orders.  However  the  French  cav- 
alry did  not  advance  further  tlian  Almendralejo,  and 
Hill,  who  had  shewn  himself  so  daring  at  Aroyo  3Io- 
lino  and  Almaraz,  now,  with  an  uncommon  mastery 
of  ambition,  refrained  from  an  action  wh.ch  prom- 
ised him  unbounded  fame,  simply  because  he  was 
uncertain  whether  the  state  of  lord  Wellington's  op- 
erations in  Castile,  then  in  full  progress,  would  war 
rant  one.  His  recent  exploits  had  been  so  splendid 
that  a  great  battle  gained  at  this  time  would,  with 
the  assistance  of  envious  malice,  have  placed  his 
reputation  on  a  level  with  Wellington's.  Yet  he 
was  habituated  to  command,  and  his  adversary's  tal- 
ents were  moderate ;  his  forbearance  nmst  therefore 
be  taken  as  a  proof  of  the  purest  patriotism. 

Early  in  July  the  French  cavalry  entered  Almen- 
dralejo and  Santa  iVIarta,  cut  oft'  two  hundred  Span- 
ish horsemen,  and  surprised  a  small  British  cavalry 
post;  Hill,  who  had  then  received  fresh  instructions, 
and  was  eager  to  fight,  quickly  drove  them  with  losa 
from  both  places.  Drouet  immediately  concentrated 
his  forces  and  retired  to  La  Granja,  and  was  follov/- 
ed  by  the  allies,  but  the  account  of  the  transactions 
in  Andalusia  and  Estren^adura  must  be  here  closed, 
because  those  which  followed  belong  to  tlie  general 
combinations.  And  as  the  causes  of  these  last  move- 
ments, and  their  eflccts  upon  the  general  cami;aign, 
are  of  an  intricate  nature,  to  avoid  confusion  the  ex- 
planation of  them  is  reserved  for  another  place, 
meanwhile  I  will  endeavour  to  describe  that  political 
chaos,  amidst  which  Wellington's  army  appeared  as 
the  ark  amongst  the  meeting  clouds  and  rising  wa- 
ters ofthe  deluge. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Political  situation  of  Franrr — Secret  policy  of  the  European 
rnurts — Causes  of  tfie  Russian  war — I\a[)oleon's  fjraiiileur 
and  power — Srcne  on  the  Niemen — Desin^ri  attril)uted  ti» 
Napo'eoti  of  concentrating  the  Frencfi  armies  behind  the 
Ehro — No  traces  of  such  an  intention  to  be  discovered — 
His  proposals  for  peace  considered — Pohtical  state  of  Eng- 
hind — ElTects  of  the  continental  system — Evtravafjaiice, 
harshness,  and  improvident  conduct  of  the  Enuh^-h  minis- 
ters— Dispute  with  Anieriia — Political  slate  of  Spain  — 
Intri[»ues  of  Carlotia — New  scheme  of  mediniion  with  the 
colonies — Mr.  Sydeniiam's  opinion  of  it — New  constitu- 
tion adopted — Succession  to  the  crown  fixed — Abolition  of 
the  Inquisition  ag^itated — Discontent  of  the  clergy  and  al)- 
so'ute-mnnarchy-men — Neplect  of  the  military  nlliiirs — 
Daiifrerous  state  of  the  country — Plot  to  deliver  up  Centa 
— Foreijrn  j:oliey  of  Spain — Nec;otiations  of  IJardaxi  at 
Stockholm — Fresh  English  subsidy — Plan  of  enlistinR 
Spanish  soldiers  in  British  repfiments  fails — The  councillor 
of  state  Sohral  i^ff'rs  to  carry  off  Ferdinand  from  Valeiifay, 
but  Ferdinand    ejects  his  offer — Joseph  talks  of  asscnibliug 


476 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


[Book  XVI 


a  corles  at  Matlrkl,  but  serrcllv  negotiates  with  that  in  the 
Isla. 

POLITICAL    SITUATION    OF    FRANCE. 

The  unniat.clicd  power  of  Napoleon's  genius  was 
now  beiiij  displayed  in  a  wonderful  manner.  Jlis 
interest,  liis  inclination,  and  his  expectation  were 
alike  opposed  to  a  war  with  Russia,  but  Alexander 
ftnd  hinisslf,  each  hoping  that  a  monacing  disj)lay 
of  strength  would  reduce  the  other  to  negotiation, 
advanced,  step  by  step,  until  blows  could  no  longer 
bo  avoided.  Naj)oleon,  a  man  capable  of  sincere 
friendship,  had  relied  too  much  and  too  long  on  the 
existence  of  a  like  feeling  in  the  Russian  emperor; 
and  misled,  perhaps,  by  tlie  sentiment  of  his  own 
energy,  did  not  sutliciently  allow  for  the  daring  in- 
trigues of  a  court,  where  secret  combinations  of  the 
nobles  formed  the  real  governing  power. 

That  t!ie  cabinet  of  Petersburgh  should  be,  more 
than  ord.narily, subject  to  such  combinations  at  this 
period,  was  tlie  necessary  consequence  of  tlie  great- 
ness of  the  interests  involved  in  the  treaties  of 
Tilsit  and  Erfurth  ;  the  contiiiental  system  had  so 
deeply  injured  the  fortunes  of  the  Russian  noblemen, 
that  their  sovereign's  authority  in  support  of  it  was 
as  nothing.  During  tlie  Austrian  war  of  18U9, 
when  Alexander  was  yet  warm  from  TS'apoleon's 
society  at  Erfurth,  the  aid  given  to  France  was  a 
mockery,  and  a  desire  to  join  a  northern  confedera- 
tion against  Napoleon  was  even  then  scarcely  con- 
cealed at  St.  Petarsburgh,  whore  the  French  am- 
bassador was  coldly  treated.  The  royal  family  of 
Prussia  were,  it  is  true,  at  the  same  time,  mortified 
by  a  reception  which  inclined  ihem  to  side  with 
France,  against  the  wishes  of  their  people  and  their 
ministers;  but  in  Russia,  Romanzow  alone  was 
averse  to  choose  that  moment  to  derlare  against 
Napoleon.  And  this  was  so  certain  that  Austria, 
anticipating  the  explosion,  was  only  undecided 
whether  the  king  of  Prussia  shouli  be  punished  or 
the  people  rewarded,  whether  she  herself  should 
befriend  or  plunder  the  Prussian  monarchy. 

At  that  time  also,  the  Russian  naval  commander, 
in  the  Adriatic,  being  ordered  to  sail  to  Ancona  for 
the  purpose  of  convoying  3Iarmont's  troops  from 
D.ilmatia  to  Italy,  rePjsed,  on  tlie  plea  that  his  ships 
were  not  sea-worthy  ;  yet  secretly  he  informed  the 
governor  of  Trieste  that  they  would  be  in  excel- 
lent order  to  assist  an  Austrian  corps  against  the 
Frencli !  Admiral  Tchtchagoff's  strange  project  of 
marching  upon  Italy  from  Bucliarest  has  been  al- 
ready noticed,  and  it  is  remarkable  that  this  expe- 
dition w;is  to  be  conducted  ujion  popular  principles, 
the  interests  of  tlie  Sicilian  court  being  to  be  made 
subservient  to  the  wislies  of  the  people.  At  a  later 
period,  in  1812,  admiral  Grieg  proposed  to  place  an 
auxiliary  Russian  army  under  either  Wellington  or 
lord  WiHiaiii  Beiitinck,  and  it  was  accepted;  but 
when  the  Russian  ambassador  in  I^ondon  was  ap- 
plied to  upon  the  subject,  he  unequivocally  declared 
that  the  emperor  knew  nothing  of  the  matter! 

With  a  court  so  situated,  angry  negotiations  once 
commenced  rendered  war  ineviti'.ble,  and  tiie  more 
especitilly  tliat  tlie  Russian  cabinet,  which  had  long 
determine'  on  hostilities, though  undecide  1  as  to  the 
time  of  drawing  the  sword,  w:is  v  ell  aware  of  the 
secret  designs  and  proceedings  of  Au>tria  in  Itsilv, 
and  of  Murat's  discontent.  The  Hol'^anders  wf4e 
known  to  desire  independence,  and  the  rieep  hatred 
which  the  people  of  Prussia  bore  to  the  French  was 
a  matter  of  notoriety.  Bernadotte,  who  very  early 
had  resolved  to  cast  down  the  ladder  by  which  he 
roBG,  was  the  secret  adviser  of  these  practices 
agaiuEt  Napoleon's  power  in  Italy,  and  he  was  also 


in  cpTimunication  with  the  Spaniards.  Thus  Na- 
poleon, having  a  war  in  Spain  \\  hich  required  three 
huniirod  thousand  men  to  keep  in  a  balanced  state, 
was  Ibrcedjhy  resistless  circumstances,  into  another 
and  more  formidable  contett  in  the  ci^tant  north, 
when  the  whole  of  Europe  was  prepared  to  riso 
upon  his  lines  of  communication,  and  when  his  ex- 
tensive sea-frontier  was  exposed  to  the  all-poweriul 
navy  of  Great  Britain. 

A  conqueror's  march  to  Moscow,  amidst  such  dan- 
gers, was  a  design  more  vast,  more  hardy,  more  as- 
tounding than  ever  before  entered  the  iniag'nntion 
of  man;  yet  it  was  achieved,  and  solely  by  the  force 
of  his  genius.  For  having  organized  two  luindrcd 
thousand  French  soldiers,  as  a  prctorian  guard,  Lo 
stepped  resolutely  into  the  heart  of  Germany,  and 
monarchs  ond  nations  bent  submissively  before  him  ; 
secret  hostility  ceased,  and,  with  the  exception  of 
Bernadotte,  the  crowned  and  anointed  plotters  quit- 
ted their  work  to  follow  his  chariot-wheels.  Dres- 
den saw  the  ancient  story  of  the  King  of  Kings 
renewed  in  his  person;  and  the  two  hundred  thou- 
sand French  soldiers  arrived  on  the  Niemcn  in  ccm- 
pany  with  two  hundred  thousand  allies.  Gn  that 
river  four  hundred  thousand  troops,  I  have  seen  the 
imperial  returns,  were  assembled  by  this  wonderful 
man,  all  discijjlined  warriors,  and,  notwithstanding 
their  ditierent  national  feelings,  all  prcud  of  the 
unmatched  genius  of  their  leader.  Yet,  even  in 
that  hour  of  dizzy  elevation.  Napoleon,  deefdy  sen- 
sible of  the  inherent  weakness  of  a  throne  unhal- 
lowed by  time,  described  by  one  emphatic  phrase 
the  delicacy  of  his  political  situation.  During  the 
passage  of  the  Niemen,  twelve  thousand  cuirassiers, 
wiiose  burnished  armour  flashed  in  the  sun  while 
their  cries  of  salutation  pealed  in  unison  with  the 
thunder  of  the  horses'  feet,  were  passing  like  a 
foaming  torrent  towards  the  river,  when  >>'apcleon 
turned  and  thus  addressed  Gouvion  St.  Cyr,  whose 
republican  principles  were  well  knosv^^ 

"  No  monarch  ever  had  such  an  army  V 

"  No,  sire." 

''  The  French  are  a  fine  people ;  they  deserve 
more  liberty,  and  they  shall  have  it;  but,  St.  Cyr, 
no  liberty  of  the  press!  That  army,  mighty  as  it 
is,  could  not  resist  the  songs  of  Paris!" 

Such,  then,  was  the  nature  of  Napoleon's  power 
that  success  alone  could  sustain  it;  success  which 
depended  as  much  upon  others'  exertions  as  upon 
his  own  stupendous  genius,  for  Russia  was  iar  dis- 
tant from  Spain.  It  is  said,  I  know  not  upon  what 
authority,  that  he  at  one  moment,  had  resclved  to 
concentrate  all  the  French  troops  in  the  Penir.'uhi 
behind  the  Ebro  during  this  expedition  to  Russia, 
but  tiie  capture  of  Blake  s  force  at  Valencia  changed 
his  views.  Of  this  design  there  are  no  traces  in 
the  movements  of  his  armies,  nor  in  the  ciiptured 
papers  of  the  king,  and  there  ore  some  indications 
of  a  contrary  design ;  for  at  that  period  several 
foreign  agents  were  detected  examining  the  ''nes 
of  Torres  \'edras,  and  on  a  Frenclimaii,  who  .-.  lUed 
himself  when  arrested  in  the  Brazils,  were  foniid 
papers  proving  a  mission  for  the  same  object.  Nei- 
ther is  it  easy  to  discern  the  advantage  of  thus 
crowding  three  hundred  thousand  men  on  a  narrrw 
slip  of  ground,  where  they  must  have  been  le<l  from 
p'rance,  already  ovorburthened  with  the  expenses 
of  the  Russ'an  war;  and  tliis  when  they  were  nu- 
merous enough,  if  rightly  iiandled,  to  have  main- 
tained themselves  on  the  resources  of  Sjjain,  and 
near  the  Portuguese  frontier,  for  a  year  at  least. 

To  have  given  up  all  the  Peninsula,  west  of  the 
Ebro,  would  have  been  productive  c("  no  benefit, 
save  what  initrbl  he  /e  accrued  from   the  jealous| 


8I2.J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


477 


which  the  Spaniards  already  displayed  towards 
thair  allies  ;  hut  if  that  jealousy,  as  was  probable, 
had  forced  the  British  general  away,  he  could  have 
carried  his  army  to  Italy,  or  have  formed  in  Ger- 
many the  nucleus  of  a  great  northern  confederation 
on  the  emperor's  rear.  Portugal  was,  therefore,  in 
truth,  the  point  of  all  Europe  in  which  the  British 
strength  was  least  dangerous  to  Napoleon  during 
the  invasion  of  Russia;  moreover,  an  immediate 
war  with  tliat  empire  was  not  a  certain  event  pre- 
vious to  the  capture  of  Valencia.  Napoleon  was 
undoubtedly  anxious  to  avoid  it  while  the  Spanish 
Ci5nt3st  continued  ;  yet,  with  a  far-reaching  Euro- 
pean policy,  in  wliich  his  Englisli  adversaries  were 
deficient,  lie  foresaw  and  desired  to  check  the  grow- 
ing strength  of  that  fearful  and  wicked  power  which 
now  menaces  tlie  civilized  world. 

The  proposal  for  peace  which  he  made  to  England 
before  his  departure  for  the  Niemen  is  another  cir- 
cumstance where  his  object  seems  to  have  been 
misrepresented.  It  was  called  a  device  to  reconcile 
the  French  to  the  Russian  war  ;  but  they  were  as 
eager  for  that  war  as  he  could  wish  them  to  be,  and 
it  is  more  probable  that  it  sprung  from  a  secret 
misgiving,  a  prophetic  sentiment  of  the  consequent 
power  of  Russia,  lifted,  as  she  then  would  be,  to- 
wards universal  tyranny,  by  the  very  arm  which  he 
Isad  raised  to  restram  her.  The  ostensible  ground 
of  his  quarrel  with  the  emperor  Alexander  was  the 
continental  system  ;  yet,  in  this  proposal  for  peace, 
he  otFsred  to  acknowledge  the  house  of  Braganza  in 
Portugal,  the  house  of  Bourbon  in  Sicily,  and  to 
withdraw  his  army  from  the  Peninsula,  if  England 
would  join  him  in  guaranteeing  the  crown  of  Spain 
to  Joseph,  together  with  a  constitution  to  be  ar- 
ranged by  a  national  Cortes.  This  was  a  virtual 
renunciation  of  the  continental  system  for  the  sake 
of  peace  with  England  ;  and  a  proposal  which  obvi- 
ated the  charge  of  aiming  at  universal  dominion, 
seeing  that  Anstria,  Spain,  Portugal,  and  England 
would  have  retained  their  full  strength,  and  the 
limits  of  his  empire  would  have  been  fixed.  The 
o'.T'.c  was  made  also  at  a  time  when  the  emperor  was 
C3rtainly  more  powerful  than  he  had  ever  yet  been, 
wh^n  Portugal  was,  by  the  avowal  of  Wellington 
himself,  far  from  secure,  and  Spain  quite  exhausted. 
At  peace  with  England,  Napoleon  could  easily  have 
restored  the  Polish  nation,  and  Russia  would  have 
b3en  repressed.  Now,  Poland  has  fallen,  and  Rus- 
sia stalks  in  the  plenitude  of  her  barbarous  tyranny. 

Political  state  of  Eixgland. — The  new  administra- 
tion, despised  by  the  country,  was  not  the  less  pow- 
ertiil  in  parliament;  its  domestic  proceedings  were 
therefore  characterized  by  all  the  corruption  and 
tyranny  of  Mr.  Pitt's  system,  without  his  redeem- 
ing genius.  The  press  was  persecuted  with  malig- 
nant ferocity,  and  the  government  sougiit  to  corrupt 
all  that  it  could  not  trample  upon.  Repeated  suc- 
cesses liad  rendered  the  particular  contest  in  the 
Peninsula  popular  with  the  ardent  spirits  of  the 
nation,  and  war-prices  passed  for  glory  with  the 
merchants,  land-owners,  and  tradesmen  ;  but  as  the 
price  of  food  augmented  faster  than  the  price  of 
labour,  the  poorer  people  suffered  ;  they  rejoiced, 
indeed,  at  their  country's  triumphs,  because  the 
sound  of  victory  is  always  pleasing  to  warlike  ears, 
but  they  were  discontented.  Meanwliile  all  think- 
ing men,  who  were  not  biassed  by  factions,  or  daz- 
zled by  military  splendour,  perceived  in  the  enor- 
mous expenses  incurred  to  repress  the  democratic 
principle,  and  in  the  consequent  transfer  of  property, 
the  sure  foundation  of  future  reaction  and  revolution. 
The  distresses  of  the  working  classes  had  alrpa''y 
pro  It  cei    p-rti  il    ir,su:T.;.-tions,  and   tlio   nat'on   at 


large  was  beginning  to  perceive  that  the  governing 
powers,  whether  representative  or  executive,  were 
rapacious  usurpers  of  the  people's  rights  ;  a  percep- 
tion quickened  by  malignant  prosecutions,  by  tlie 
insolent  extravagance  witli  which  the  public  money 
was  lavished  on  the  family  of  Mr.  Perceval,  and  by 
the  general  profusion  at  liome,  while  lord  Wellesley 
declared  that  the  war  languished  for  want  of  suste- 
nance  abroad. 

Napoleon's  continental  system,  although  in  the 
nature  of  a  sumptuary  law,  wliich  the  desires  of 
men  will  never  suffer  to  exist  long  in  vigour,  was 
yet  so  efficient,  tiiat  the  British  government  was 
forced  to  encourage  and  protect  illicit  trading,  to 
the  great  detriment  of  mercantile  morality.  The 
island  of  Heligoland  was  the  chief  point  of  deposit 
for  this  commerce,  and  either  by  trading  energy,  or 
by  the  connivance  of  continental  governments,  the 
emperor's  system  was  continually  baffled  ;  neverthe- 
less its  efiects  will  not  quickly  pass  away;  it  pressed 
sorely  upon  the  manufacturers  at  the  time,  and  by 
giving  rise  to  rival  establishments  on  the  continent, 
has  awakened  in  Germany  a  commercial  spirit  by 
no  means  favourable  to  England's  manufacturing 
superiority. 

But  ultimate  consequences  were  never  considered 
by  the  British  ministers  ;  the  immediate  object  was 
to  procure  money,  and  by  virtually  making  bank- 
notes a  legal  tender,  they  secured  unlimited  means 
at  home,  through  the  medium  of  loans  and  taxes, 
which  the  corruption  of  the  parliament  insured  to 
them,  and  which,  by  a  reaction,  insured  the  corrup- 
tion of  the  parliament.  This  resource  failed  abroad. 
They  could,  and  did,  send  to  all  the  allies  of  Eng- 
land, enormous  supplies  in  kind,  because  to  do  so, 
was,  in  the  way  of  contracts,  an  essential  part  of 
the  system  of  corruption  at  home  ;  a  system  aptly 
described,  as  bribing  one-half  of  the  nation  with 
the  money  of  the  otiier  half,  in  order  to  misgovern 
both.  Specie  was  however  only  to  be  had  in  com- 
paratively small  quantities,  and  at  a  premium  so 
exorbitant,  that  even  the  most  reckless  politician 
trembled  for  tlie  ultimate  consequences. 

The  foreign  policy  of  the  government  was  very 
simple,  namely,  to  bribe  all  powers  to  war  down 
France.  Hence  to  Russia  every  thing,  save  specie, 
was  granted ;  and  hence  also,  amicable  relations 
with  Sweden  were  immediately  re-established,  and 
the  more  readily  that  this  power  had  lent  herself  to 
the  violation  of  the  continental  system  by  permit- 
ting the  entry  of  British  goods  at  Stralsund  ;  but 
wherever  wisdom,  or  skill,  was  required,  the  Eng- 
lish minister's  resources  failed  altogether.  With 
respect  to  Sicily,  Spain,  and  Portugal,  this  truth 
was  notorious  ;  and  to  preserve  the  political  support 
of  the  trading  interests  at  home,  a  degrading  and 
deceitful  policy,  quite  opposed  to  the  spirit  of  lord 
Wellington's  counsels,  was  followed  in  regard  to  the 
revolted  Spanish  colonies. 

The  short-sighted  injustice  of  the  system  was 
however  most  glaring  with  regard  to  the  United 
States  of  America.  Mutual  complaints,  the  dregs 
of  the  war  of  independence,  had  long  characterized 
the  intercourse  between  the  Britisli  and  American 
governments,  and  these  discontents  were  turned  into 
extreme  hatred  by  the  progress  of  tlie  war  with 
France.  The  British  government  in  18G6  pro- 
claimed, contrary  to  the  law  of  nations,  a  blockade 
of  the  French  coast,  which  could  not  be  enforced 
Napoleon,  in  return,  issued  the  celebrated  decrees 
of  Berlin  and  Milan,  which  produced  the  no  less 
celebrated  orders  in  council.  The  commerce  of  all 
neutrals  was  thus  extinguished  by  tlie  arrogance  of 
the  lK'Il:g)rjr.t3  ;  but  the  htter  very  soon  finding 


478 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XVII. 


that  their  mutual  convenience  required  gome  relax- 
ation of  mutual  violonce,  granted  licences  to  each 
other's  ships  and  by  this  scandalous  evasion  of  their 
own  policy  caused  the  whole  of  the  evil  to  fall  upon 
the  neutral,  who  was  yet  called  the  friend  of  both 
parties. 

The  Americans,  unwilling  to  go  to  war  with  two 
6uch  powerful  states,  were  yet  resolved  not  to  sub- 
mit to  the  tyranny  of  either  ;  but  the  injustice  of 
the  English  government  was  the  most  direct  and 
extended  in  its  operations,  and  it  was  rendered 
intinite.y  more  bitter  by  the  violence  used  towards 
the  seamen  of  the  United  States :  not  less  than  six 
thousand  jailors,  it  was  said,  were  taken  from  mer- 
cliant  vessels  on  the  high  seas,  and  forced  to  serve 
in  the  British  men-of-war.  Wherefore,  after  lirst 
passing  retaliatory,  or  rather  warning  acts,  called 
the  non-intercourse,  non-importation,  and  embargo 
acts,  the  Americans  finally  declared  war,  at  the 
moment  when  the  British  government,  alarmed  at 
the  consequences  of  their  own  injustice,  had  just 
rescinded  the  orders  in  council. 

The  immediate  effects  of  these  proceedings  on 
the  contest  in  the  Peninsula,  shall  be  noticed  in 
another  place,  but  the  ultimate  effects  on  England's 
prosperity  have  not  yet  been  unfolded.  The  struggle 
prematurely  told  the  secret  of  American  strength, 
ami  it  has  drawn  the  attention  of  the  world  to  a 
people,  who,  notwithstanding  the  curse  of  black 
slavery  which  clings  to  them,  adding  the  most  hor- 
rible ferocity  to  the  peculiar  baseness  of  their  mer- 
cantile spirit,  and  rendering  their  republican  vanity 
ridiculous,  do  in  their  general  government  uphold 
civil  institutions,  which  have  startled  the  crazy 
despotisms  of  Europe. 

Political  state  of  Spain. — Bad  government  is  more 
hurtful  than  direct  war;  the  ravages  of  the  last  are 
soon  repaired,  and  the  public  mind  is  often  purified 
and  advanced  by  the  trial  of  adversity,  but  the  evils 
springing  from  the  former,  seem  interminable.  In 
the  Isla  de  Leon  the  unseemly  currents  of  folly,  al- 
though less  raging  than  before,  continued  to  break 
open  new  channels  and  yet  abandoned  none  of  the 
old.  The  intrigues  of  the  princess  Carlotta  were 
unremitted,  and  though  the  danger  of  provt)king  the 
populace  of  Cadiz,  restrained  and  frightened  her 
advocates  in  the  cortes,  she  opposed  the  English 
diplomacy,  with  reiterated,  and  not  quite  unfounded 
accusations,  that  the  revolt  of  the  colonies  was  being 
perfidiously  fostered  by  Great  Britain: — a  charge 
well  calculated  to  lower  the  influence  of  England, 
rspecially  in  regard  to  the  scheme  of  mediation, 
which  being  revived  in  April  by  lord  Castlereagh, 
was  received  by  the  Spaniards  with  out.vard  cold- 
ness, and  a  secret  resolution  to  reject  it  akogethcr  ; 
nor  were  they  in  any  want  of  reasons  to  justify 
the'r  proceedings. 

This  mediation  had  been  commenced  by  lord  Wel- 
lesl;y,  when  the  quarrel  between  the  mother  coun- 
try and  the  colonies  was  yet  capable  of  adjustment; 
it  was  now  renewed  when  it  could  not  succeed. 
English  commiss'oners  were  appointed  to  carry  it 
into  execution  ;  the  duke  of  Infantado  was  to  join 
them  on  the  part  of  Spain,  and  at  first  Mr.  Stunrt 
was  to  have  formed  part  of  the  commission,  Mr. 
Sydenham  being  to  succeed  him  at  Lisbon,  but  final- 
ly he  remained  in  Portugal  and  Mr.  Sydenham  was 
attached  to  the  commission,  whose  composition  he 
thus  described. 

"  I  do  not  understand  a  word  of  the  Spanish  lan- 
guage, I  am  unacquainted  with  the  Spanish  ciiarac- 
ter,  I  know  very  little  of  Old  Spain,  and  I  am  quite 
ignorant  of  the  state  of  the  colonies,  yet  I  am  part 
of  a  comm'p'^'on   cmiiT^sed  of  imii  of  di;]"_'rent  pro- 


fessions, views,  habits,  feelings,  and  opinions.  The 
mediation  proposed  is  at  leabt  a  year  too  late,  it  has 
been  forced  upon  the  government  of  Cld  Spain,  I 
have  no  confidence  in  the  ministers  who  employ  n;e, 
and  I  am  fully  persuaded  that  they  have  not  tl.e 
slightest  confidence  in  me." 

The  first  essential  object  was  to  have  Bardaxi'a 
secret  article,  which  required  England  to  join  Old 
Spain  if  the  mediation  failed,  withdrawn;  but  aa 
this  could  not  be  done  without  the  consent  of  the 
cortes,  the  publicity  thus  given  would  have  ruined 
the  credit  of  the  mediation  with  the  colonists.  >.or 
would  the  distrust  of  the  latter  have  been  unfound- 
ed, for  though  lord  Wellesley  had  ofiered  the  gua- 
rantee of  Great  Britain  to  any  arrangement  made 
under  her  mediation,  his  successors  would  not  do  so! 

"They  empower  us,"  said  Mr.  Sydenham,  "to 
negotiate  and  sign  a  treaty,  but  will  not  guarantee 
the  execution  of  it!  My  opinion  is,  that  tlie  formal 
signature  of  a  treaty  by  plenipotentiaries  is  in  itself 
a  solemn  guarantee,  if  there  is  good  faith  and  fair 
dealing  in  the  transaction;  and  I  believe  that  this 
opinion  will  be  confirmed  by  the  authority  cf  every 
writer  on  the  law-  of  nations.  But  this  is  certainly 
not  the  doctrine  of  our  present  ministers,  they  make 
a  broad  distinction  between  the  ratification  of  a 
treaty  and  the  intention  of  seeing  it  duly  observed." 

The  failure  of  such  a  sciieme  was  inevitable. 
The  Spaniards  wanted  the  commissioners  to  go  first 
to  the  Caraccas,  where  the  revolt  being  full  blown, 
nothing  could  be  effected;  the  British  government 
insisted  that  they  should  go  tq  Mexico,  where  the 
dispute  had  not  yet  been  pushed  to  extremities. 
After  much  useless  diplomacy,  which,  continued 
until  the  end  of  the  year,  the  negotiation,  as  Mr. 
Sydeniiam  had  predicted,  proved  abortive. 

In  March  the  new  constitution  of  Sj)ain  had  been 
solemnly  adopted,  and  a  decree  settling  the  succes- 
sion of  the  crown  was  promulgated.  The  infant 
Francisco  de  Paula,  the  queen  of  Etruria,  and  their 
respective  descendants  were  excluded  from  the  suc- 
cession, which  was  to  fall  first  to  the  princess  Car- 
lotta if  the  infant  don  Carlos  failed  of  heirs,  then  to 
the  hereditary  princess  ef  the  Two  Sicilies,  and  so 
on,  the  empress  of  France  and  her  descendants  be- 
ing especially  excluded.  This  exhibition  of  popu- 
lar power,  under  tiie  pretext  of  batHing  >i'apoleon's 
schemes,  struck  at  the  principle  of  legitimacy.  And 
when  the  extraordinary  cortes  decided  that  the  or- 
dinary cortes,  which  ought  to  assemble  every  year, 
should  not  be  convoked  until  October  l^lo,  and  thus 
secured  to  itself  a  tenure  of  power  for  two  years 
instead  of  one,  the  discontent  increased  both  at 
Cadiz  and  in  the  provinces,  and  a  close  connection 
was  kept  up  between  the  malcontents  and  the  Portu- 
guese government,  which  was  then  the  strong  hold 
of  arbitrary  power  in  the  Peninsula. 

The  local  junta  of  Estremadura  adopted  Carlotta's 
claims,  in  their  whole  extent,  and  communicated  on 
the  subject,  at  first  secretly  with  the  Portuguese 
regency,  and  then  more  ojienly  with  Mr.  Stuart 
Their  sclieme  was  to  remove  all  tlie  acting  provin- 
cial authorities,  and  to  replace  them  with  persons 
acknowledging  Carlotta's  sovereignty  ;  they  even 
declared  tliat  they  would  abide  by  the  new  consti- 
tution, only  so  far  as  it  acknowledged  what  they 
called  legitimate  power,  in  other  words,  tiie  princess 
was  to  be  sole  regent.  Nevertheless  this  party  was 
not  influenced  by  Carlotta's  intrigues,  flir  they  would 
not  join  her  agents  in  any  outcry  against  the  Bri- 
tish ;  they  acted  upon  the  simple  principle  of  oppos- 
ing the  encroachments  of  democracy,  and  they  de- 
sired to  know  how  England  would  view  their  pro- 
ceedings.    The  otiicr  provinces   received  the  new 


1612.] 


NAPIER-'S    PENINSULAR  WAR. 


479 


constitution  coldly,  and  the  Biscayens  angrily  re- 
jected It  as  opi)osed  to  their  ancient  privileges.  In 
this  state  of  public  feeling,  the  abolition  of  the  In- 
quisition, a  design  now  openly  agitated,  oflered  a 
point  around  which  all  the  clergy,  and  all  that  the 
clergy  could  influence,  gathered  against  the  cortes, 
wiiich  was  also  weakened  by  its  own  factions  ;  yet 
the  republicans  gained  strength,  and  they  were 
encouraged  by  the  new  constitution  established  in 
Sicily,  which  also  alarmed  their  opponents,  and  the 
fear  and  distrust  extended  to  the  government  of 
Portugal. 

However,  amidst  all  the  varying  subjects  of  in- 
terest the  insane  project  of  reducing  the  colonies  by 
force,  remained  a  favourite  vvitli  all  parties;  nor 
was  it  in  relation  to  the  colonics  only,  that  these 
men,  who  were  demanding  aid  from  other  nations, 
in  the  names  of  freedom,  justice,  and  humanity, 
proved  themselves  to  be  devoid  of  those  attributes 
themselves.  "The  humane  object  of  the  abolition 
of  the  slave-trade  has  been  frustrated,"  said  lord 
Castlereagh,  "  because  not  only  Spanish  subjects 
but  Spanish  public  officers  and  governors,  in  various 
parts  of  the  Spanish  colonies,  are  instrumental  to, 
and  accomplices  in  the  crimes  of  the  contraband 
slave-traders  of  Great  Britain  and  America,  furnish- 
ing them  with  flags,  papers,  and  solemn  documents 
to  entitle  them  to  the  privileges  of  Spanish  cruisers, 
and  to  represent  their  property  as  Spanish." 

With  respect  to  the  war  in  Spain  itself,  all  man- 
ner of  mischief  was  abroad.  The  regular  cavalry 
had  been  entirely  destroyed,  and  when,  with  the 
secret  permission  of  their  ov;n  government,  some 
distinguished  Austrian  officers,  protfered  their  ser- 
vices to  the  regency,  to  restore  that  arm,  they  were 
repelled.  Nearly  all  the  field  artillery  had  been 
lost  in  action,  fhe  arsenals  at  Cadiz  were  quite  ex- 
hausted, and  most  of  the  heavy  guns  on  the  works 
of  the  Isla  were  rendered  unserviceable  by  constant 
and  useless  firing  ;  the  stores  of  shot  were  diininish- 
ed  in  an  alarming  manner,  no  sums  were  appro- 
priated to  the  support  of  the  founderies,  and  when 
the  British  artillery  officers  made  formal  represen- 
tations of  this  dangerous  state  of  afiairs,  it  only  pro- 
duced a  demand  of  money  from  England  to  put  the 
founderies  into  activity.  To  crown  the  whole,  Aba- 
dia,  recalled  from  Gallicia,  at  the  express  desire 
of  sir  Henry  Wellesley,  because  of  his  laad  conduct, 
was  now  made  minister  of  war. 

In  Ceuta,  notwithstanding  the  presence  of  a  small 
British  force,  the  Spanish  garrison,  the  galley  slaves, 
and  the  prisoners  of  war  who  were  allowed  to  range 
at  large,  joined  in  a  plan  for  delivering  that  place 
to  the  Moors;  not  from  a  treacherous  disposition  in 
the  two  first,  but  to  save  themselves  from  starving, 
a  catastrophe  which  was  only  staved  off  by  frequent 
assistance  from  the  magazines  of  Gibraltar.  Ceuta 
might  have  been  easily  acquired  by  Engl-and  at  this 
period,  in  exchange  for  the  debt  due  by  Spain,  and 
general  Campbell  urged  it  to  lord  Liverpool,  but  he 
rejected  the  proposal,  fearing  to  awaken  popular 
jealousy.  The  notion,  however,  came  originally 
from  the  people  themselves,  and  that  jealousy  which 
lord  Liverpool  feared,  was  already  in  full  activity, 
being  only  another  name  for  the  democratic  spirit 
rising  in  opposition  to  the  aristocratic  principle 
u;)cn  which  England  aflx)rded  her  assistance  to  the 
Peninsula. 

The  foreign  policy  of  Spain  was  not  less  absurd 
than  their  home  policy,  but  it  was  necessarily  con- 
tracted. Castro,  the  envoy  at  Lisbon,  who  was 
agreeable  both  to  the  Portuguese  and  British  author- 
ities, was  removed,  and  Bardaxi,  who  was  opposed 
tc  both,  substituted.     This  "ardaxi  had  been  just 


before  sent  on  a  special  mission  to  Stockholm,  to 
arrange  a  treaty  with  that  court,  and  he  was  refer- 
red to  Russia  for  his  answer,  so  completely  tubser- 
vient  was  Bernadotte  to  the  czar.  One  j:oint  how- 
ever was  characteristically  discussed  by  tljO  Swedich 
prince  and  the  Spanish  envoy.  Bardaxi  demanded 
assistance  in-  troops,  and  Bernadotte  in  reply  asked 
for  a  subsidy,  which  was  promised  without  hesita- 
tion, but  security  for  the  payment  being  desired, 
the  negotiation  instantly  dropped !  A  treaty  of 
alliance  was  however  concluded  between  Spain  and 
Russia  in  July,  and  wliile  Bardaxi  was  thus  pre- 
tending to  subsidize  Sweden,  the  unceasing  solici- 
tations of  his  own  government  had  extorted  trcm 
England  a  grant  of  one  million  of  money,  together 
with  arms  and  clothing  for  one  hundred  thousand 
men,  in  return  for  which  five  thousand  Spaniards 
were  to  be  enlisted  for  the  British  ranks. 

To  raise  Spanish  corps  had  long  been  a  favourite 
project  with  many  English  officers  ;  general  Graham 
had  deigned  to  offer  his  services,  and  great  ad- 
vantages were  anticipated  by  those  who  £'Lill  be- 
lieved in  Spanish  heroism.  Joseph  was  even  dis- 
auieted,  for  the  Catalans  had  formally  demanded 
such  assistance,  and  a  like  feeling  wjs  now  ex- 
pressed in  other  places ;  yet  when  it  came  to  the 
proof  only  two  or  three  hundred  starving  Spaniards 
of  the  poorest  condition  enlisted  ;  they  were  recruited 
principally  by  tlie  light  division,  were  taught  with 
care  and  placed  with  Erglich  comrades,  yet  the  ex- 
periment failed,  they  did  not  iiiake  gcod  soldiers. 
rUeanwhile  the  regency  demanded  and  ohtained  from 
England,  arms,  clothing,  and  equipments  for  ten 
thousand  cavalry,  though  they  had  scarce  five  hun- 
dred regular  horsemen  to  arm  at  the  time,  and  had 
just  rejected  the  aid  of  the  Austrian  officers  in  the 
organization  of  new  corps.  Thus  the  supplies  grant- 
ed by  Great  Britain  continued  to  be  embeziled  or 
wasted  ;  and  with  the  exception  of  a  trifling  amelio- 
ration in  the  state  of  Carlos  d'Espafios'  cor{  s  efiect- 
ed  by  the  direct  interposition  of  Wellington,  no 
public  benefit  seemed  likelj'^at  first  to  accrue  from 
the  subsidy,  for  every  branch  of  administration  in 
Spain,  whether  civil  or  military,  fore  gn  cr  (Vmecaic, 
was  cankered  to  the  core.  The  public  mischirf  was 
become  portentous. 

Ferdinand  living  in  tranquillity  at  Yalenc^py  wns 
so  averse  to  encounter  any  dangers  for  the  recovery 
of  his  throne,  that  he  rejected  all  ofiers  of  assitt- 
aHce  to  escape.  Kolli  and  the  brot];-ers  Sagp.s  had 
been  alike  disregarded.  The  councillor  Scbral,  who 
while  in  secret  correspondence  with  the  alles,  had 
so  long  lived  at  Victor's  head-quarters,  and  had  tra- 
velled with  that  marshal  to  I'rance,  new  prcpc-seJ 
to  carry  the  prince  off",  and  he  also  was  b;  filed  es 
his  predecessors  had  been.  Ferdinand  would  listen 
to  no  proposal  save  through  Escoiquez,  ^^l•o  lived  rt 
some  distance,  and  Sobral,  who  judged  this  man  ore 
not  to  be  trusted,  immediately  made  his  way  to 
Lisbon,  fearful  of  being  betrayed  by  the  prince  tc 
whose  succcur  he  had  ccme. 

Meanw'hile  Joseph  was  advancing  towards  the 
political  conquest  of  the  country,  and  spoke  with 
ostentation,  of  assembling  a  cortes  in  hiscwn  inter- 
ests ;  but  this  was  to  cover  a  secret  interc  urse  with 
the  cortes  in  the  Isla  de  I  eon  where  his  partizarg 
called  "  Afranccsados"  were  increasirg:  for  many 
of  the  democratic  party,  seeing  that  the  gulf  which 
separated  them  from  the  clergy,  and  from  England, 
could  never  be  closed,  and  that  the  bad  .^y^tem  of 
government  deprived  them  of  the  people's  support, 
were  willing  to  treat  with  the  intrusive  mcnarch 
as  one  whose  principles  were  more  in  unison  witti 
their  own.     Joseph  secretly  offered  to  adopt  th©  new 


480 


N  \  P I  E  R  S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XV  it. 


constitution,  with  somr^  moJificiitions,  and  as  many 
t/t"  tlie  cortcs  wera  inclined  to  accept  liis  teni:s,  tlie 
British  policy  was  on  tiie  eve  oi  suli'erin^  a  s;gnal 
defeat,  when  Wellington's  iioa  arm  again  fixed  the 
destiny  of  the  Pcninslua. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

Political  state  of  Portugtd — Internal  ronilition  not  improvod 
— Goveniiiieiit  weak — Lord  Siraiigford's  conduct  con- 
demned— liurd  Welleslcy  resolves  to  recall  him  and  send 
lord  liouv.iine  to  Rio  Jan''iro — Reasons  whv  this  did  not 
trtke  place — Lord  Strani^ford's  career  ciiecked  l>y  the  fear 
of  beitii^  removed — Lord  Wellington  obtains  full  powers 
from  the  Br.izils — Lord  Casllerea^li's  vijTorous  interference 
— De.itli  of  Linhares  at  Rio  Janeiro — Domingo  Souza  suc- 
ceeds hini  as  chief  minister,  but  remains  in  London — Lord 
Wellington's  moderation  towards  the  Portuguese  regency 
— His  embarrassing  situation  described — His  o[>in:on  of 
the  Spanish  and  Portuguese  public  men — His  g  eat  dili- 
gence and  foresight  aided  by  the  industry  and  vigour  of 
Mr.  Stuart  supports  the  war — His  administrative  views 
and  plans  descrihe>l — 0[)posed  by  the  regency — He  desires 
the  prince  regent's  return  to  Portugal  without  his  wife — 
Carlotta  prepares  to  come  without  the  prince — Is  stopped 
—Mr.  Stuart  proj)oses  a  military  government,  but  lord 
Wellington  will  not  consent — Great  desertion  from  the 
Portuguese  army  in  consequence  of  their  distressed  state, 
from  the  negligence  of  the  government — Severe  examples 
do  not  chei-k  it — The  character  of  the  Portuguese  troops 
declines — Dilfi<u!ty  of  procuring  specie — Wellington's  re- 
sources imp  iired  by  the  shameful  cupidity  of  English  mer- 
chants at  Lisbon  and  Oporto — Proposal  for  a  Portuguese 
bank  made  by  Domingo  Souza,  Mr.  Vansitiart,  and  Mr. 
Villiers — Lord  Wellington  ridicules  it — He  permits  a  con- 
traband trade  to  be  carried  on  with  Lisbon  by  Soult  lor 
the  sake  of  the  resources  it  furnishes. 

POLITICAL    STATE    OF    PORTUGAL. 

The  intsrnal  condition  of  this  country  was  not 
iinproved.  The  government,  composed  of  civilians, 
was  unabh,  as  well  as  unwilling  to  stimulate  the 
branches  of  administration  connected  with  military 
aS'airs,  and  the  complaints  of  the  army,  reaching 
the  Brazils,  drew  reprimands  from  the  prince  ;  but 
instead  of  meeting  the  evil  with  suitable  laws,  he 
only  increased  Bsresford's  authority,  which  was  al- 
ready sufficiently  great.  Thus  while  the  foreigner's 
power  augment-HJ,  the  native  authorities  were  de- 
graded in  the  eyes  of  the  people;  and  as  their  in- 
fluence to  do  good  dwindled,  their  ill-will  increased, 
and  their  power  of  mischief  was  not  lessened,  be- 
CTUse  they  still  formed  the  intermediate  link  be- 
tween the  military  commander  and  the  subordinate 
authorities.  Monce  what  with  the  passive  patrio- 
tism of  tlie  people,  the  abuses  of  the  government, 
and  the  double  doiling  at  the  Brazils,  the  extraor- 
dinary energy  of  lord  Wellington  and  Mr.  Stuart 
was  counterbalanced. 

The  latter  had  forcsncn  that  the  regent's  conces- 
sions at  the  time  of  Borel's  arrest  would  produce 
but  a  momentary  effect  in  Portugal,  nnd  all  the  in- 
trigues at  Rio  Janeiro  revived  when  lord  Wellef^loy, 
3isgnsted  with  Perceval's  incapacity,  had  quitted 
the  British  cabinet.  But  previous  to  that  event, 
Mr.  Sydenham,  whose  mission  to  Portugal  has  been 
noticed,  had  so  strongly  represented  the  evil  effects 
of  lird  Strangford's  conduct,  that  lord  Welleplny 
would  have  immediately  dismissed  him,  if  ]\Ir  Sy- 
denham, who  wns  offered  the  sitn-ition,  had  not  ro- 
fii.-;ed  to  profit  from  the  effects  of  his  own  report. 
It  was  then  judged  proper  to  send  lord  Louvaine 
with  the  rank  of  ambnssador,  and  he  was  to  touch 
ftt  Lisbon  and  consult  v/itli  lord  V/oIlingrori  wli3t!.e,- 


to  press  the  prince's  return  to  Portugal,  or  insibt 
upon  a  change  in  the  regency;  ineaiiwiiile  a  coii- 
ridential  agent,  despatched  direct  to  Ko  Janeiro, 
was  to  keep  lord  Strangford  in  tlie  strict  line  of  hie 
instructions  until  the  ambassador  art>tved. 

But  lord  Louvaine  was  on  bad  terms  with  his 
uncle,  the  duke  of  Nortiiuniberland,  a  zealous  friend 
to  lord  Strangford  ;  and  for  a  government,  conducted 
on  tlie  principle  of  corruj)tion,  the  discontent  of  a 
nobleman,  possessing  powerful  parliamentary  influ- 
ence, was  necessarily  of  more  coiit^cquence  than  the 
success  of  the  war  in  the  Peninsula.  Im'C  a  tit  suc- 
cessor to  lord  Strangford  could  be  found,  the  prince 
regent  of  Portugal  acceded  to  lord  Wellington's  de- 
mands, and  it  was  then  judged  expedient  to  await 
the  effect  of  tliis  change  of  policy.  Meanwhile  the 
dissensions,  which  led  to  the  change  of  ministry, 
arose,  and  occupied  the  attention  of  the  English  ca- 
binet to  the  exclusion  of  all  other  afi'airs.  '1  bus  lord 
Strangford's  career  was  for  some  time  uncontrolled, 
yet  after  several  severe  rebukes  from  lord  Welling- 
ton and  Mr.  Stuart,  it  wus  at  la^t  arrested,  by  a 
conviction  that  his  tenure  of  place  depended  upon 
their  will. 

However,  prior  to  this  salutary  check  on  the  Bra- 
zilian intrigues,  lord  Wellesley  had  so  far  intimi- 
dated the  prince  regent  of  Portugal,  that  besides  as- 
senting to  the  reforms,  lie  despatched  Mr.  De  Lemoa 
from  Rio  Janeiro,  furnished  with  authority  for  Bc- 
resford  to  act  despotically  in  all  things  connected 
with  the  administration  of  the  army.  Moreover 
lord  Wellington  was  empowered  to  dismiss  Princi- 
pal Souza  from  the  regency;  and  lord  Castlereagh, 
following  up  his  predecessor's  policy  on  this  hexd, 
insisted  that  all  the  obnoxious  members  of  the  re- 
gency should  be  set  aside  and  others  appointed. 
And  these  blows  at  the  power  of  the  Souza  faction, 
v/ere  accompanied  by  the  death  of  Linhares,  the 
head  of  the  family,  an  event  which  paralyzed  the 
court  of  Rio  Janeiro  for  a  considerable  time;  never-  « 
theless  the  Souzas  were  still  so  strong,  that  Domin- 
go Souza,  now  count  of  Funchal,  was  appointed 
prime  minister,  althougii  ho  retained  his  situation 
as  ambassador  to  the  English  court,  and  continued 
to  reside  in  London. 

Lord  Wellington,  whose  long  experience  of  Indian 
intrigues  rendered  him  the  fittest  person  possible  to 
deal  with  the  exactions  and  political  cunning  of  a 
people  who  so  much  resemble  Asiatics,  new  opposed 
the  removal  of  the  obnoxious  members  frcm  the  re- 
gency. He  would  not  even  dismiss  the  Principal 
Souza;  for  with  a  refined  policy  he  argued,  that  the 
opposition  to  his  measures  arose,  as  much  from  the 
national,  as  from  the  individual  character  of  the 
Portuguese  authorities,  several  of  whom  were  tincer 
the  displeasure  of  their  own  court,  and  consequent- 
ly dependant  upon  the  British  power,  for  .*ui)port 
against  their  enemies.  'J'iiere  were  amongst  them 
also,  persons  of  great  ability,  and  hence  no  benefi- 
cial change  could  be  expected,  because  the  influeiice 
already  gained  would  be  lost  witli  new  men.  The 
latter  would  have  the  same  faults,  with  less  talent, 
and  less  dependance  on  the  British  power,  and  the 
dismissed  ministers  would  become  active  enemies. 
The  ])atriarch  would  go  to  Oporto,  where  his  power 
to  do  mischief  would  bo  greatly  increased,  and  Prin- 
cipal Souza  would  then  be  made  patriarch.  It  was 
indeed  very  desirable  to  drive  this  man,  whose  ab- 
surdity was  so  great  as  to  create  a  suspicion  of  in-  " 
sanity,  from  the  regency,  but  he  could  neither  be 
persuaded,  nor  forced,  to  quit  Portugal.  His  dis- 
missal had  been  extorted  from  the  prince  by  the 
power  of  thh  British  government,  he  would  tber<-f.':re 
maintain   his  st!cr>et  ii,r!ii(uice  ov't  the  fi\   I  <;d:i;iu. 


1812. 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAh    WAR. 


481 


istration,  he  would  bs  considered  a  martyr  to  for- 
eign influence,  which  would  increase  his  popularity, 
and  his  power  would  be  augmented  by  the  sanctity 
of  his  cliaracter  as  patriarch.  Very  little  advan- 
tage could  then  be  derived  from  a  change,  and  any 
reform  would  be  attributed  to  the  English  influence, 
against  which  the  numerous  interests,  involved  in 
the  preservation  of  abuses,  would  instantly  combine 
with  active  enmity. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  government  of  Portugal 
had  never  yet  laid  the  nature  of  the  war  fairly  be- 
fore the  people.  The  latter  had  been  deceived,  flat- 
tered, cajoled,  their  prowess  in  the  field  extolled 
beyond  reason,  and  the  enemy  spoken  of  contemp- 
tuously ;  but  the  resources  of  the  nation,  which 
essentially  consisted  neither  in  its  armies,  nor  in 
its  revenue,  nor  in  its  boasting,  but  in  the  sacri- 
ficing of  all  interests  to  the  prosecution  of  the  con- 
test, had  never  been  vigorously  used  to  meet  the 
emergencies  of  the  war.  The  regency  had  neither 
appealed  to  the  patriotism  of  the  population,  nor  yet 
enforced  sacrifices,  by  measures,  which  were  abso- 
lutely necessary,  because,  as  the  English  general 
honestly  observed,  no  people  would  ever  voluntarily 
bear  such  enormous,  though  necessary  bur'hoiis; 
Btrong  laws  and  heavy  penalties  could  alone  insure 
obedience  The  Portuguese  government  relied  upon 
England  and  her  subsides,  and  resisted  all  measures 
which  could  render  their  natural  resources  more 
available.  Their  subordinates  on  the  same  principle 
executed  corruptly  and  vexatiously,  or  evaded,  the 
military  regulations,  and  the  chief  supporters  of  all 
this  mischief  were  the  Principal  and  his  faction. 

Thus  dragged  by  opposing  forces,  and  environed 
w.th  difliculties,  Wellington  took  a  middle  course. 
That  is,  he  strove  by  reproaches  and  by  redoubled 
activity,  to  stimulate  the  patriotism  of  the  authori- 
ties; he  desired  the  British  ministers  at  liisbon, 
and  at  Rio  Janeiro,  to  paint  the  dangerous  state  of 
Portugal  in  vivid  colours,  and  to  urge  the  prince  re- 
gent in  the  strongest  manner,  to  enforce  the  reform 
of  those  gross  abuses,  which  in  the  taxes,  in  the 
customs,  in  the  general  expenditure,  and  in  the 
execution  of  orders  by  the  inferior  magistrates,  were 
withering  the  strength  of  the  nation.  At  the  same 
time,  amidst  the  turmoil  of  his  duties  in  the  field, 
sometimes  actually  ft-om  the  field  of  battle  itself, 
he  tra,nsmitted  memoirs  upon  the  nature  of  these 
different  evils,  and  the  remedies  for  them  ;  memoirs 
which  will  attest  to  the  latest  posterity  the  great- 
ness and  vigour  of  his  capacity. 

These  efforts,  aided  by  the  suspension  of  the  sub- 
sidy, produced  partial  reforms,  yet  the  natural  wcak- 
n3ss  of  character  and  obstinacy  of  the  prince  regent, 
were  insurmountable  obstacles  to  any  general  or 
permanent  cure;  the  first  defect  rendered  him  the 
tool  of  the  court  intriguers,  and  the  second  was  to 
be  wanly  denlt  with,  lest  some  dogged  conduct 
should  oblisr^  Wellington  to  put  his  often  repeated 
threat,  of  aoandoning  the  country,  into  execution. 
The  success  of  the  contest  was  in  fact  of  more  im- 
portance to  England,  than  to  Portugal,  and  this 
onrult  knot  could  neither  be  untied  nor  cut;  the 
dili'-ulty  could  with  appliances  be  lessened,  but 
mi.fht  not  be  swept  away;  hence  the  British  gene- 
ra! involed  in  ceasaless  disputes,  and  sufi'ering  hour- 
1}  mortifications,  the  least  of  whirh  would  have 
broken  tlie  spirit  of  an  ordinary  man,  had  to  strug- 
gle as  he  could  to  victory. 

Viewing  the  contest  as  one  of  life  or  denth  to 
Portugal,  he  desired  to  m^.ke  the  whole  political 
economy  of  the  state  a  simide  provision  for  the  war, 
and  when  tliwarted,  his  rsproaches  were  as  bitter 
fts  ihay  were  jus^  'leverthclnss,  t!ie  Uisn  to  whom 
3:^ 


they  were  addressed,  were  not  devoid  of  merit.  In 
after  times,  while  complaining  that  he  could  find  in> 
persons  of  talent  in  Spain,  he  admitted  that  amongst 
the  Portuguese,  Redondo  possessed  both  probity  and 
ability,  that  ISogueira  was  a  statesman  of  capacity 
equal  to  the  discussion  of  great  questions,  and  that 
no  sovereign  in  Europe  had  a  better  public  servar.t 
than  Forjas.  Even  the  restless  Principal  disinter- 
estedly prosecuted  measures,  for  forcing  the  clergy 
to  pay  their  just  share  of  the  imposts.  But  great- 
ness of  mind,  on  great  occasions,  is  a  rare  quality 
Most  of  the  Portuguese  considered  the  sacrifices  (.o- 
manded,  a  sharper  ill  than  submission,  and  it  was 
impossible  to  unite  entire  obedience  to  the  will  cf 
the  British  authorities,  with  an  energetic,  original 
spirit,  in  the  native  government.  'J  he  Souza  fac- 
tion was  always  violent  and  foolish ,  the  milder 
opposition  of  the  three  gentlemen,  above  mentioned, 
was  excusable.  Lord  Wellington,  a  foreigner,  was 
serving  his  own  country,  pleasing  his  own  govern- 
ment, and  forwarding  his  own  fortune  ;  final  succcks 
was  sure  to  send  him  to  England,  resplendert  with 
glory,  and  beyond  the  reach  of  Portuguese  ill-will 
The  native  authorities  had  no  such  prcspects.  Their 
exertions  brought  little  of  personal  fame,  they  were 
disliked  by  their  own  prince,  hated  by  his  favourites, 
and  they  fisared  to  excite  the  enmity  of  tlie  people 
by  a  vigour,  which,  being  unpleasing  to  their  sove- 
reign, would  inevitably  draw  evil  upon  thenjselves  ; 
from  the  French,  if  the  invasion  succeeded,  from 
their  own  court,  if  the  independence  of  the  country 
should  be  ultimately  obtained. 

But  thus  much  conceded,  for  the  sake  of  justici', 
it  is  yet  to  be  affirmed,  with  truth,  that  the  conduct 
of  the  Portuguese  and  Brazilian  govcriirner.ts  v.rs 
always  unwise,  often  base.  Notwithttanding  tha 
prince's  concessiors,  it  was  scarcely  possible  to  re- 
medy any  abuses.  The  Lisbon  government  subsi'- 
tuting  evasive  for  active  opposition,  baffled  Wel- 
lington and  Stuart,  by  proposing  inadequate  laws, 
or  by  suffering  the  execution  of  eC'ectual  mcaiurefj 
to  be  neglected  with  impunity;  and  the  treaty  cf 
commerce  with  England  always  supplied  them  a 
source  of  dispute,  partly  from  its  natural  difiicultier, 
partly  from  their  own  bad  faith.  The  general'a 
labours  were  thus  multiplied,  not  abated,  by  his  new 
powers,  and  in  measuring  these  labours,  it  is  to  bo 
noted,  so  entirely  did  Portugal  depend  upcn  Erg- 
land,  that  Wellington  instead  of  dravv'ing  provieirrs 
for  his  army  from  the  country,  in  a  manner  fisd  tlio 
whole  nation,  and  was  often  forced  to  keep  the  army 
magazines  low,  that  the  people  might  live.  Thij  is 
proved  by  the  importation  of  rice,  flour,  beef,  and 
pork  from  America,  which  increased,  each  year  of 
the  war,  in  a  surprising  manner,  the  price  keej)ing 
pace  with  the  quantity,  while  the  importation  of 
dried  fish,  the  ordinary  food  of  the  Portuguese,  de- 
creased. 

In  1808  the  supply  of  flour  and  wheat,  from  New 
York,  was  sixty  thousand  barrels.  In  1811  six  hui  - 
dred  thousand  ;  in  18K^,  between  seven  and  eight 
hundred  thousand.  Ireland,  England,  Egypt,  Par- 
bary,  Sicily,  the  Brazils,  parts  of  Spain,  and  even 
France,  also  contributed  to  the  consumi't'or,  which 
greatly  exceeded  the  natural  means  of  Portugal  ; 
English  treasure  therefore,  either  directly  or  indi 
rcctly,  furnished  the  nation  as  well  as  the  armies. 

The  peace  revenue  of  Portgual,  includirg  the 
Brazils,  the  colonies,  and  the  islands,  even  in  tho 
most  flourishing  periods,  had  never  exceeded  thirty- 
six  millions  ofcruzada  novas;  but  in  1811,  although 
Portugal  alone  raised  twenty-five  millions,  this  suiri, 
added  to  t!ie  Ikltish  eul)sidy,  fell  v<;ry  sliort  of  the 
actual  expenditure;  yet  economy  was  opposed  ^j 


482 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XVII 


the  loca.1  government,  the  prince  was  continually ' 
creating  useless  offices  for  his  favourites,  and  cncour-  j 
aging  law-suits  and  appeals  to  Rio  Janeiro.  The 
troops  and- fortresses  were  neglected,  although  the 
military  branches  of  expense  amounted  to  more  than 
three-fourths  of  the  whole  receipts  ;  and  though  Mr. 
8tuart  engaged  that  England,  either  by  treaty  or 
tribute,  would  keep  the  Algerines  quiet,  he  could 
not  obtain  tlie  suppression  of  the  Portuguese  navy, 
wliich  always  fled  from  the  barbarians.  It  was  not 
until  the  middle  of  the  year  1813,  when  admiral 
Berkeley,  whose  proceedings  had  at  times  produced 
considerable  inconvenience,  was  recalled,  that  Mr. 
8tuart,  with  tlie  aid  of  admiral  Martin,  who  suc- 
ceeded Berkeley,  without  a  seat  in  the  regency, 
effected  this  naval  reform. 

The  government,  rather  than  adopt  the  measures 
suggested  by  Wellington,  such  as  keeping  up  the 
credit  of  the  paper-money,  by  regular  payments 
of  the  interest,  the  fair  and  general  collection  of  the 
"  Decima,^^  and  the  repression  of  abuses  in  the  cus- 
tom-house, in  the  arsenal,  n'ul  in  the  militia,  always 
more  costly  than  the  line,  projected  the  issuing  of 
fresh  paper,  and  endeavoured,  by  unworthy  stock- 
jobbing schemes,  to  evade  instead  of  meeting  the 
difficulties  of  the  times.  To  check  their  folly  the 
general  withheld  the  subsidy,  and  refused  to  receive 
their  depreciated  paper  into  the  military  chest;  but 
neither  did  this  vigorous  proceeding  produce  more 
than  a  momentary  return  to  honesty,  and  meanwhile, 
the  working  people  were  so  cruelly  oppressed  that 
they  would  not  labour  for  the  public,  except  under 
the  direction  of  British  officers.  Force  alone  could 
overcome  their  repugnance,  and  force  was  employ- 
ed, not  to  forward  the  defence  of  the  country,  but 
to  meet  particular  interests  and  to  support  abuses. 
Such  also  was  the  general  baseness  of  the  Fidalgos, 
lliat  even  the  charitable  aid  of  money,  received  from 
England,  was  shamefully  and  greedily  claimed  by 
the  rich,  who  insisted,  that  it  was  a  donation  to  all, 
and  to  be  equally  divided. 

Confusion  and  injustice  prevailed  every  where, 
and  Wellington's  energies  were  squandered  on  vexa- 
tious details;  at  one  time  he  was  remonstrating 
against  the  oppression  of  the  working  people,  and 
devising  remedies  for  local  abuses,  at  another  super- 
intending the  application  of  the  English  charities, 
and  arranging  tl;e  measures  necessary  to  revive 
agriculture  in  tlie  devastated  districts;  at  all  times 
endeavouring  to  reform  the  general  administration, 
and  in  no  case  was  he  supported.  Never  during  the 
war  did  he  fin-d  an  appeal  to  the  patriotism  of  the 
Portuguese  government  answered  frankly  ;  never  did 
•he  propose  a  measure  which  was  accepted  without 
difficulties.  This  opposition  was  at  times  carried 
to  such  a  ridiculous  extent,  that  when  some  Portu- 
guese nobles  in  the  French  service  took  refuge  with 
the  curate  Merino,  and  desired  from  their  own  go- 
vernment, a  promise  of  safety,  to  which  they  were 
really  entitled,  the  regency  refused  to  give  that  as- 
Burance ;  nor  would  they  publish  an  amnesty,  which 
the  English  general  desired  for  the  sake  of  justice 
and  from  policy  also,  because  valuable  information 
as  to  the  French  army,  could  have  been  thus  obtain- 
ed. The  authorities  would  neither  say  yes  !  nor  no  ! 
and  when  general  Pamplona  applied  to  Wellington 
j)crsonally  for  some  assurance,  the  latter  could  only 
answer,  that  in  like  cases  Mascarhefias  had  been 
nanged  and  Subugal  rewarded  ! 

To  force  a  change  in  the  whole  spirit  and  action 
of  the  government,  seemed  to  some  the  only  remedy 
fur  tV<^  distemperature  of  the  time;  but  this  might 
have  produced  anarchy,  and  would  have  given  coun- 
ler.anco  u    the  democratic  Bpr".    contrary  to  the  i 


general  policy  of  the  British  government.  Wei 
lington  therefore  desired  ratiier  to  liave  tiie  prince 
regent  at  Lisbon,  or  the  Azores,  wlience  his  au- 
thority might,  under  the  influence  of  E^.ghmd,  be 
more  directly  used  to  enforce  salutary  regulations  ; 
he,  however,  considered  it  essential  that  (^arietta, 
whose  intrigues  were  incessant,  should  not  be  with 
him,  and,  she  on  the  other  hand,  laboured  to  come 
back  without  tlie  prince,  who  was  prevented  from 
moving,  by  continued  disturbances  in  the  Brazils. 
Mr.  Stuart,  tlien  despairing  of  good,  proposed  tlie 
establishment  of  a  military  government  at  once,  but 
Wellington  would  not  agree,  although  the  mischief 
afloat  clogged  every  wheel  of  the  military  machine. 

A  law  of  king  Sebastian,  which  obliged  all  gen- 
tlemen holding  land  to  take  arms,  was  now  revived; 
but  desertion,  which  had  commenced  with  the  first 
appointment  of  British  officers,  increased;  and  so 
many  persons  sailed  away  in  British  vessels  of  warj 
to  evade  military  service  in  their  own  country,  that 
an  edict  was  published  to  prevent  the  practice. 
Beresford  checked  the  desertion  for  a  moment,  by 
condemning  deserters  to  hard  labour,  and  ofieriiig 
rewards  to  the  country  people  to  deliver  them  up  ; 
yet  griping  want  renewed  the  evil  at  the  commence- 
ment of  the  campaign,  and  the  terrible  severity  of 
condemning  nineteen  at  once  to  death,  did  not  re- 
press it.  The  cavalry,  which  had  been  at  all  times 
very  inefficient,  was  now  nearly  ruined,  the  men 
were  become  faint-hearted,  the  breed  of  horses  al- 
most extinct,  and  shamefol  peculations  amongst  the 
officers  increased  the  mischief:  one  guilty  colonel 
was  broke  and  his  uniform  stripped  from  his  shoul- 
ders in  the  public  square  at  Lisbon.  However  these 
examples  produced  fear  and  astonishment  rather 
than  correction,  the  misery  of  the  troops  continued, 
and  the  army,  although  by  the  csre  of  Bereslbrd  it 
was  again  augmented  to  more  than  thirty  thousand 
men  under  arms,  declined  in  moral  character  and 
spirit. 

To  govern  armies  in  the  field,  is  at  all  t'mes  a 
great  and  difiicult  matter;  and  in  this  contest  the 
operations  were  so  intimately  connected  with  the 
civil  administration  of  Portugal,  Spain,  and  the 
Brazils,  and  the  contest,  being  one  of  principles,  so 
afl^ected  the  policy  of  every  nation  of  the  civilized 
world,  that  unprecedented  difficulties  sprui'g  up  in 
the  way  of  the  general,  and  the  ordinary  frauds  and 
embarrassments  of  war  were  greatly  augmented. 
Napoleon's  continental  system  joined  to  his  finan- 
cial measures,  wliich  were  quite  opposed  to  debt 
and  paper  money,  increased  the  pernicious  effects 
of  the  English  bank  restriction  ;  specie  was  abund- 
ant in  France,  but  had  nearly  disappeared  from 
England  ;  it  was  only  to  be  obtained  from  abroad, 
and  at  an  incredible  expense.  The  fev/  markets  left 
for  Britisli  manufactures,  and  colonial  ])roduce,  did 
not  always  make  returns  in  the  articles  necessary 
for  the  war;  and  gold,  absolutely  indispensable  in 
certain  quantities,  was  only  supplied,  and  this  en- 
tirely from  the  incapacity  of  the  English  minister? 
in  the  proportion  of  one-sixth  of  what  was  required, 
by  an  army  which  professed  to  pay  for  every  thing. 
Hence  continual  efforts,  on  the  part  of  the  govern- 
ment, to  force  markets;  hence  a  depreciation  of 
value  both  in  goods  and  bills  ;  hence  also  a  contin- 
ual struggle,  on  the  part  of  the  general,  to  sustain 
a  contest,  dependant  on  the  fluctuation  of  such  a 
I)recarious  system.  Dependant  also  it  wrs  upon  the 
prudence  of  three  governments,  one  of  which  had 
jr.st  pushed  its  colonics  to  rebellion,  when  the 
French  armies  were  in  possession  of  four-fifths  ■.)( 
the  motlier  country;  another  was  liourly  raising  up 
obetaclce  to  its  own  defence,  though  the  enemy  had 


J  012.1 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


483 


just  been  driven  from  the  capital ;  and  the  third  was 
lorcing  a  war  with  America,  its  greatest  and  surest 
market,  when  by  commerce  alone  it  could  hope  to 
PUKtain  the  struggle  in  the  Peninsula. 

Tiie  failure  of  tlie  preceding  year's  harvest  all 
over  Europe,  had  rendered  the  supply  of  Portugal 
very  ditVicult.  Little  grain  was  to  be  obtained  in 
any  country  of  the  north  of  Europe  accessible  to  the 
Ikitish,  and  the  necessity  of  paying  in  hard  money, 
rondered  even  that  slight  resource  null.  Sicily  and 
Malta  were  thrown  for  subsistence  upon  Africa, 
where  colonial  produce  was  indeed  available  for 
commcrco.  yet  the  quantity  of  grain  to  be  had 
there,  was  small,  and  the  capricious  nature  of  the 
barbarians  rendered  the  intercourse  precarious.  In 
December  1811,  there  was  only  two  months'  con- 
sumption of  corn  in  Portugal  for  the  population, 
altliough  the  magazines  of  the  army  contained  more 
than  three.  To  America,  therefore,  it  was  neces- 
sary to  look.  Now,  in  1810,  Mr.  Stuart  had  given 
treasury  bills  to  the  house  of  Sampayo  for  the  pur- 
chase of  American  corn  ;  but  the  disputes  between 
England  and  tlie  United  States,  the  depreciation  of 
English  bills  from  the  quantity  in  the  market,  to- 
gether with  the  expiration  of  the  American  bank 
charter,  had  prevented  Sampayo  from  completing 
his  commission  ;  nevertheless,  although  the  increas- 
ing bitterness  of  the  disputes  with  America  dis- 
couraged a  renew-al  of  this  plan,  some  more  bills 
were  now  given  to  the  English  minister  at  Wash- 
ington, with  directions  to  purchase  corn,  and  con- 
sign it  to  Sampayo,  to  resell  in  Portugal  as  before, 
for  the  benefit  of  the  military  chest.  Other  bills 
wei  i  also  sent  to  the  Brazils,  to  purchase  rice  ;  and 
a.l  the  consuls  in  the  Mediterranean  were  desired  to 
encourage  the  exportation  of  grain  and  the  impor- 
tation of  colonial  produce.  In  this  manner,  despite 
of  the  English  ministers'  incapacity,  lord  Welling- 
ton found  resources  to  feed  the  population,  to  recover 
some  of  the  specie  expended  by  the  army,  and  to 
maintain  the  war.  But  as  the  year  advanced,  the 
Non-intercourse-Act  of  Congress,  which  had  caused 
a  serious  drain  of  specie  from  Portugal,  was  followed 
by  an  embargo  for  ninety  days  ;  and  then  famine, 
which  already  afflicted  parts  of  Spain,  menaced 
Portugnl. 

!\Ir.  Stuart  knew  of  this  embargo  before  the  spec- 
ulators did,  and  sent  his  agents  orders  to  buy  u» 
with  hard  cash,  at  a  certain  price,  a  quantity  of 
grain  which  had  lately  arrived  at  Gibraltar.  He 
could  only  forestall  the  speculators  by  a  few  days, 
the  cost  soon  rose  beyond  his  means  in  specie,  yet 
the  new  harvest  being  nearly  ripe,  this  prompt  effort 
sufficed  for  the  occasion,  and  happily  so,  for  the 
American  declaration  of  war  followed,  and  J%neri- 
can  privateers  were  to  take  the  place  of  American 
flour-ships.  But  as  ruin  seemed  to  approach,  Stu- 
art's energy  redoubled.  His  agents,  seeking  for 
grain  in  all  parts  of  the  world,  discovered  that  in 
the  Brazils  a  sufficient  quantity  might  be  obtained 
in  exchange  for  English  manufactures,  to  secure 
Portugal  from  absolute  famine;  and  to  protect  this 
traffic,  and  to  preserve  that  with  the  United  States, 
he  persuaded  the  regency  to  declare  the  neutrality 
oi' Portugal,  and  to  interdict  the  sale  of  prizes  with- 
in its  waters.  He  also,  at  Wellington's  desire,  be- 
sought tiic  English  admiralty  to  reinforce  the  squa- 
dron in  theTagus,and  to  keep  cruisers  at  particular 
stations.  P'inally  he  pressed  the  financial  refotms 
in  Portugal  with  the  utmost  vigour  and  with  some 
BucC'isH.  His  efforts  were,  however,  strangely  coun- 
teracted f.-o-n  quarters  least  expected.  Tlie  English 
consul  in  tlie  Western  Isles,  with  incredible  i)re- 
eumpt'on,  publicly  excited  the  islanders  to  war  with 


America,  when  Mr.  Stuart's  cfTorts  were  directed  to 
prevent  such  a  calamity;  the  admiralty  neglecting 
to  station  cruisers  in  the  proper  places,  left  the 
American  privateers  free  to  range  alcrg  the  Portu- 
guese and  African  coast;  and  the  oipidity  of  T-'iig- 
lieh  merchants  broke  down  the  credit  of  the  Engiith 
commissariat  paper-money,  which  was  the  ciiief 
medium  of  exchange  on  the  immediate  theatre  of 
war. 

This  paper  had  arisen  from  a  simple  military 
regulation.  Lord  Wellington,  on  first  assuming  tl  e 
command  in  18(9,  tbund  that  all  persons  gave  their 
own  vouchers  in  payment  for  provisions,  whereupon 
he  proclaimed  that  none  save  commissaries  should 
thus  act ;  and  that  all  local  accounts  should  be  paid 
within  one  month,  in  ready  money,  if  it  was  in  the 
chest,  if  not,  with  bills  on  the  commissary-general. 
These  bills  soon  became  numerous,  because  of  the 
scarcity  of  specie,  yet  their  value  did  not  sink, 
because  they  enabled  those  who  had  really  furnii-h- 
ed  supplies,  to  prove  their  debts  without  the  trouble 
of  following  the  head-quarters;  and  they  had  zn 
advantage  over  receipts,  inasmuch  as  they  distinct- 
ly pointed  out  the  person  who  was  to  pay  ;  they 
were  also  in  accord  with  the  customs  of  the  coun- 
try, for  the  people  were  used  to  receive  governmer.t 
bills.  The  possessors  were  paid  in  rotation,  when- 
ever there  was  money;  the  small  holders,  who  were 
the  real  furnishers  of  the  army,  first,  the  speculators 
last;  a  regulation  by  which  justice  and  the  credit 
of  the  paper  were  alike  consulted. 

In  1812,  this  paper  sunk  twenty  per  cent.,  frrm 
the  sordid  practices  of  English  mercantile  houses, 
whose  agents  secretly  depreciated  its  credit  and 
then  purchased  it;  and  in  this  dishonesty  they  were 
aided  by  some  of  the  commissariat,  notwithstanding 
the  vigilant  probity  of  the  chief  commissary.  Sums, 
as  low  as  ten  pence,  payable  in  Lisbon,  I  have  my- 
self seen  in  the  hands  of  poor  country  people  on  the 
frontiers.  By  these  infamous  proceedings  the  poorer 
dealers  were  ruined  or  forced  to  raise  their  prices, 
which  hurt  their  sales  and  contracted  the  markets 
to  the  detriment  of  ^le  soldiers;  and  there  was 
much  danger,  that  the  people  generally,  would  thus 
discover  the  mode  of  getting  cash  for  bills  by  sub- 
mitting to  high  discounts,  which  would  soon  have 
rendered  the  contest  too  costly  to  continue.  Put 
the  resources  of  lord  Wellington  and  INIr.  Stuart 
were  not  exhausted.  They  contrived  to  preserve 
the  neutrality  of  Portugal,  and  by  means  of  licenses 
continued  to  have  importations  of  American  flour, 
until  the  end  of  the  war  ;  a  very  fine  stroke  of  policy, 
for  this  flour  was  paid  for  with  English  goods,  and 
resold  at  a  considerable  profit  for  specie  which  went 
to  the  military  chest.  They  were  less  successful  in 
supporting  the  credit  of  the  Portuguese  governm,ent 
paper;  bad  faith,  and  the  necessities  of  the  native 
commissariat,  which  now  caused  an  extraordinary 
issue,  combined  to  lower  its  credit. 

The  conde  de  Funchal,  Mr.  Villiers,  and  Mr. 
Vansittart  proposed  a  bank,  and  other  schemes,  such 
as  a  loan  of  one  million  and  a  half  from  tiie  Englisii 
treasury,  which  shall  be  treated  more  at  length  in 
another  place.  But  lord  Wellington  ridiculing  the 
fallacy  of  a  government,  with  revenues  unequal  to  \i? 
expenditure,  borrowing  from  a  government  wl)ich 
was  unable  to  find  specie  sufficient  to  sustain  tha 
war,  remarked,  that  the  money  could  not  be  realised 
in  the  Portuguese  treasury,  or  it  must  be  realised 
at  the  expense  of  a  military  chest,  whose  hollow 
sound  already  mocked  the  soldiers'  shout  of  victory. 
Again  therefore  he  demanded  the  reform  of  abuses, 
and  offered  to  take  all  the  responsibility  and  odium 
upon  himself,  certain  that  the  exig-encew  of  the  war 


481 


NAPIER'S  p::ninsular  war. 


[Book  XV HI. 


couid  he  fcluis  mot,  and  the  most  vexatious  imposts 
upon  the  pocr  aliulishcd  ;  neither  did  lie  fail  to  point 
out  in  (Jetail  tlie  grcunds  of  tliis  conviction.  His 
reasoniiiji-  made  as  little  impression  upon  Funchal, 
as  it  had  done  upon  Linhares;  money  was  no  where 
to  be  had,  and  the  general,  alter  beings  forced  to 
become  a  trader  himself,  now  tolerated,  liir  the  sake 
of  the   resources   it   furnished,   a  contraband   com- 


merce, which  he  discovered  Soult  to  have  estab- 
lislied  with  English  merchants  at  Lisbon,  exchajig 
ing  the  quicksilver  of  Almaden  for  colonial  produce; 
and  he  was  still  to  find  in  his  own  personal  re- 
sources, the  means  of  beating  the  enemy,  in  despite 
of  the  matchless  lollies  of  the  governments  he  serv- 
ed. He  did  so,  but  complained  that  it  was  a  hard 
task. 


BOOK    XVIII. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Numbers  of  the  French  in  the  Peninsula  shewn — Joseph 
rominnndiT-in-chief — Hi-;  dissensions  with  the  French  gene- 
rals— His  plans — Opposed  by  Soult,  who  recommends  dif- 
ferent operations  and  refuses  to  obey  the  king — Lord  Wel- 
liii2;ton's  plans  described — His  numbers — Colonel  Sturgeon 
skilfully  repairs  the  bridge  of  Alcantara — The  advantage 
of  this  measure — The  navigation  of  the  Tiigua  and  the 
Douro  improved  and  extended — Rash  conduct  of  a  com- 
missary on  the  Douro — Remarkable  letter  of  lord  Welling- 
ton to  lord  Liverpool — Arrangementsfor  securing  the  allies' 
fl:inks  ami  operating  against  the  enemy's  flanks  described 
— Mirmont's  plans — His  military  character — He  restores 
discipline  to  thi;  army  of  Portugal — His  n\eafures  for  that 
])nr[iose  anil  tbe  state  of  the  French  army  described  and 
coni[)ared  with  the  state  of  the  British  army  and  Welling- 
ton's measures. 

In  the  foregoing  book,  the  political  state  of  the 
balligerents,  and  those  great  chains,  which  bound 
ihc  war  in  the  Peninsula  to  the  policy  of  the  Amer- 
ican as  well  as  to  the  European  nations,  have  been 
shewn;  the  minor  events  of  the  war  have  also  been 
narrated,  and  the  point  where  the  decisive  struggle 
v/as  to  be  in^de  has  been  indicated  ;  thus  nought 
rsmains  to  tell,  save  the  particular  preparations  of 
each  adverse  general  ere  the  noble  armies  were' 
dashed  together  in  the  shock  of  battle. 

Nearly  three  hundred  thousand  French  still  tram- 
pl.:;d  upon  Spain,  above  two  hundred  and  forty  thou- 
sand were  with  the  eagles,  and  so  successful  had  the 
idan  of  raising  native  soldiers  proved,  that  forty 
thousand  Spaniards  well  organized  marched  under 
the  king's  banners. 

In  M^y  the  distribution  of  this  immense  army, 
'vhich  however  according  to  the  French  custom  in- 
•bided  officers  and  persons  of  all  kinds  attached  to 
r.he  forces,  was  as  follows  : — 

Seventy-six  timusand,  of  which  sixty  thousand 
v?re  witli  the  eagles,  composed  the  armies  of  Cata- 
tonia and  Aragon,  under  Suchet,  and  they  occupied 
Valencia,  and  tlio  provinces  whose  name  they  bore. 

Forty-nine  thousand  men,  of  which  thirty-eight 

•':nusnnd  were  with  the  eagles,  composed  the  army 

■f  the  north,  under  Caffarelli,  and  were  distributed 

n  the  ffrand  line  of  communication,  from  St.  Sobas- 

■  'in  to  Burgos  ;  but  of  tliis  army,  two  divisions  of  in- 

■  "itry  and  one  of  cavalry  witli  artillery,  were  des- 
•.  -ted  to  reinforce  Marmont. 

Ninet^in  thousand,  of  which  sevent^^n  thousand 
\'^rc  with  the  eagles,  composed  the  army  of  tlie  cen- 
'  ■■■',  occupying  a  variety  of  jjosts  in  a  circle  round 
'■.le  cap'.tui,  and  having  a  division  in  La  Ma.ncha. 


Sixty-three  thousand,  of  which  fifly-six  thousand 
were  with  the  eagles,  composed  tlie  army  of  the 
south,  under  Soult,  occupying  Andalusia  and  a  part 
of  Estremadura  ;  but  some  of  tliese  troops  were  de- 
tained in  distant  governments  by  other  generals. 

The  army  of  Portugal,  under  JMarmont,  consisted 
of  seventy  thousand  men,  fifty-two  thousand  being 
with  the  eagles,  and  a  reinforcement  of  twelve  thou- 
sand men  were  in  march  to  join  this  army  from 
France.  Marmont  occupied  Leon,  part  of  Old  Cas- 
tile, and  the  Asturias,  having  his  front  upon  tlie 
Tormes,  and  a  division  watching  Gallicia. 

The  numerous  Spanish  jt(ra?;!C/;/«(/os  were  princi- 
pally employed  in  Andalusia  and  v.'ith  the  army  of 
the  centre,  and  the  experience  of  (Jcai~ia,  of  Baci;jos, 
and  many  other  places,  proved  that  lor  the  intrusive 
monarch,  they  fought  with  more  vigour  than  their 
countrymen  did  against  him. 

In  March  .Toseph  had  been  appointed  commander- 
in-chief  of  all  the  French  armies,  but  the  generals, 
as  usual,  resisted  his  authority.  Lcrsenne  denied 
it  altogether, Caffarelli,  who  succeeded  Dorsenne, dis- 
puted even  his  civil  power  in  the  governments  of  the 
north,  Suchet  evaded  his  orders,  Marmont  neglected 
them,  and  Soult  firmly  opposed  his  injudicious  mili- 
tary plans.  The  king  was  distressed  for  money,  and 
he  complained  that  Marmont's  army  had  consumed 
or  plundered  in  three  months,  the  whole  resources  cf 
the  province  of  Toledo  and  the  district  of  Talavera, 
whereby  Madrid  end  the  army  of  the  centre  were 
famished.  Marmont  retorted  by  complaints  of  the 
wasteful  extravagance  of  the  king's  military  admin- 
istrtttion  in  the  capital.  Thus  dissensions  were  gen- 
erated when  the  most  absolute  union  was  required. 

Afler  the  fall  of  Badajos  Joseph  judged  that  the 
allies  would  soon  move,  either  against  Marmont  in 
Castile,  against  himself  by  the  valley  of  the  Tagiis, 
or  against  Soult  in  Andalusia.  In  the  first  case  he 
designed  to  aid  Marmont,  with  the  divisions  of  the 
north,  with  the  army  of  the  centre,  and  with  fifteen 
tliousand  men  to  be  drawn  from  tlie  army  of  the 
soutli.  In  the  second  case  to  draw  the  army  of  Por- 
tugal and  a  portion  of  the  army  of  the  south  into  tlie 
valley  of  the  Tagus,  while  the  divisions  from  the 
army  of  the  north  entered  Leon.  In  the  third  case, 
the  half  of  Marmont's  army,  reinforced  by  a  division 
of  the  army  of  the  centre,  was  to  pass  the  Tngus  at 
Arzobispo  and  follow  the  allies.  But  the  army  of 
the  centre  was  not  ready  to  take  the  field,  and  Wcl 
lington  knew  it;  Marmont's  coniid;)  nt  was  jus*, 
waste  and  confusion  prevailed  at  .'Nhidrid.  and  there 
was  so  little  mil'.tary  vigrar  that  the   Enipccinado. 


1812.1 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


485 


with  other  particla  chiefs,  pushed  their  excursions  to 
the  very  gates  of  that  capital. 

Joseph  liiially  ordered  Suchet  to  reinforce  the 
army  of  the  centre,  and  then  calling  up  the  Italian 
division  of  Palonibini  from  the  army  of  the  Kbro,  di- 
rected Soult  to  keep  Droiiet,  with  onc-tliird  of  the 
army  of  the  south,  so  far  advanced  in  Estremadura 
as  to  have  direct  communication  with  general  Triel- 
hard  in  the  valley  of  the  Tagus  ;  and  he  especially 
ordered  that  Drouet  should  pass  that  river  if  Hill 
passed  it  It  was  necessary,  he  said,  to  follow  the 
English  army,  and  fight  it  with  advantage  of  num- 
b.Jrs,  to  do  which  required  a  strict  co-operation  of 
tlie  three  armies,  Drouet's  corps  being  tiie  pivot. 
Meanwhile  Marmont  and  Soult  being  each  convinced 
that  the  English  general  would  invade  their  separate 
provinces,  desired  that  the  king  would  so  view  the 
coming  contest,  and  oblige  the  other  to  regulate  his 
movements  thereby.  The  former  complained,  that 
having  to  observe  the  Gallicians,  and  occupy  the 
Asturias,  his  forces  were  disseminated,  and  he  asked 
fjr  reinforcements  to  chase  the  partidas,  who  impe- 
ded the  gathering  of  provisions  in  Castile  and  Leon. 
But  t'v?  king,  who  over-rated  the  importance  of 
Madrid,  designed  rather  to  draw  more  troops  round 
tiie  capital;  and  he  entirely  disapproved  of  Soult  be- 
s'egi'ig  Tarifa  and  Carthagena,  arguing  that  if  Drou- 
et was  not  ready  to  pass  the  Tagus,  the  whole  of 
tlie  allies  could  unite  on  the  right  bank,  and  pene- 
trate without  opposition  to  the  capital,  or  that  lord 
Wellington  would  concentrate  to  overwhelm  Mar- 
mo'it. 

The  duke  of  Dalmatia  would  not  suffer  Drouet  to 
etir,  and  Joseph,  wliose  jealously  had  been  excited 
by  the  marshal's  power  in  Andalusia,  threatened  to 
deprive  liim  of  h's  command.  The  inflexible  duke 
replied  that  the  king  had  already  virtually  done  so 
by  sending  orders  direct  to  Drouet;  that  he  was 
ready  to  resign,  but  he  would  not  commit  a  gross 
m'litary  error.  Drouet  could  scarcely  arrive  in 
time  to  help  Marmont,  and  would  be  too  v/eak  for 
the  protection  of  Madrid,  but  his  absence  would  ruin 
Andalusia,  because  the  allies,  whose  force  in  Estre- 
madura was  very  considerable,  could  in  five  marches 
reach  Seville  and  take  it  on  the  sixth ;  then  commu- 
nicating with  the  fleets  at  Cadiz,  they  would  change 
their  line  of  operations  without  loss,  and  unite  with 
thirty  thousand  other  troops,  British  and  Spanish, 
who  were  at  Gibraltar,  in  the  Isla,  in  the  Niebla, 
on  the  side  of  ?('Iurcia,  and  under  Ballesteros  in  th^e 
Ronda.  A  new  army  might  also  come  from  the 
oc^an,  and  Drouet,  once  beyond  the  Tagus,  could  not 
r;tarn  to  Andalusia  in  less  than  twelve  days;  Mar- 
mont could  scarcely  come  there  in  a  month  ;  the 
fir-^e  under  his  own  immediate  command  was  sprend 
all  over  Andalusia  ;  if  collected  it  would  not  furnish 
thirty  tliousand  sabres  and  bayonets,  exclusive  of 
Drouet,  and  the  evacuation  of  the  province  would  be 
unavoidable. 

The  French  misfortunes,  he  said,  had  invariably 
arls?n  from  not  acting  in  large  masses,  and  the  army 
of  Portugil,  by  spreading  too  much  to  its  right, 
would  ruin  this  campaign  as  it  had  ruined  the  pre- 
ceding one.  "  Marmont  should  leave  one  or  two  di- 
visions on  the  Tormes,  and  place  the  rest  of  his  army 
in  position,  on  both  sides  of  the  pass  of  Bnnos,  tlie 
l?ft  near  Placentia,  and  the  right,  extending  towards 
Soinosierra,  wiiich  could  be  occupied  by  a  detacli- 
ment.  Lord  Wellington  could  not  then  advance  by 
the  valhy  of  the  Tagus  without  lending  his  lefl 
flank  ;  nor  to  the  Tormes  without  lending  his  riirlit 
ftanK.  Neither  could  he  attack  Marmont  with  efter*, 
because  the  latter  could  easily  concentrate,  and  ac- 
cording to  the  nature  of  the  a'.tack  secure  his  retreat 


by  the  valley  of  the  Tagus,  or  by  the  province  of 
Avila,  while  the  two  divisions  on  the  ^J'ormes,  rein- 
forced by  two  otiiers  from  tiie  army  of  tiie  nnrtii, 
would  act  on  tlie  allies"  flank."  For  these  rciisons 
Soult  would  not  permit  Drouet  to  quit  Estrcmatlury , 
yet  he  promised  to  reinforce  him,  and  so  to  press 
Hill  that  (Tfaliam,  whom  he  supposed  still  at  Portal- 
egre,  should  be  obliged  to  bring  up  the  fir&J;  tmd  sixtii 
divisions.  In  fine  lie  promised  tiiat  a  powerful  body 
of  the  allies  should  be  forced  to  remain  in  Eftrcma- 
dura,  or  Hill  would  be  defeated  and  Badpjos  invest- 
ed. This  dispute  raged  during  May  and  tlie  begin- 
ning of  June,  and  meanwhile  the  English  ger.eral, 
well  acquainted  from  the  intercepted  letters  with 
these  dissensions,  made  his  arrangements  so  as  to 
confirm  each  general  in  his  own  peculiar  views. 

Soult  was  the  more  easily  deceived,  because  he 
had  obtained  a  Gibraltar  newspaper,  in  which,  so 
negligent  was  the  Portuguese  government,  lord  Wel- 
lington's secret  despatclies  to  Forgas  containing  an 
account  of  his  airmy  and  of  his  first  designs  against 
the  south  were  printed,  and  it  must  be  remembered 
that  the  plan  of  invading  Andalusia  was  only  relin- 
quished about  the  middle  of  May.  Hill's  exploit  r.t 
Almaraz  menaced  the  north  and  soutli  alike,  but  that 
general  had  adroitly  spread  a  report,  that  his  object 
was  to  gain  time  for  the  invasion  of  Andalusia,  and 
all  Wellington's  demonstrations  were  calculsted  to 
aid  this  artifice  and  impose  upon  Soult.  Graham 
indeed  returned  to  Beira  with  the  first  and  sixtli  di- 
visions and  Cotton's  cavalry  ;  but  as  Hill  was  at  the 
same  time  reinforced,  and  Graham's  march  sudden 
and  secret,  the  enemy  were  again  deceived  in  all 
quarters.  For  Marmont  and  the  king,  reckoning 
the  number  of  divisions,  thought  tlie  bulk  of  the  al- 
lies was  in  the  north,  and  did  not  discover  that  Hill's 
corps  bad  been  nearly  doubled  in  numbers  though 
his  division  seemed  the  same,  while  Soult,  not  im- 
mediately aware  of  Graham's  departure,  found  Hill 
more  than  a  match  for  Drouet,  and  still  expected  the 
allies  in  Andalusia. 

Drouet  willing  rather  to  obey  the  king  than  Scult, 
drew  towards  Medellin  in  June,  but  Scult,  as  \vf 
have  seen,  sent  the  reinforcements  from  Seville,  by 
the  road  of  Monasterio,  and  thus  obliged  him  to  come 
back.  Then  followed  those  movements  and  coun- 
ter-movements in  Estremadura,  ■which  have  been  al- 
ready related,  each  side  being  desirous  of  keeping  a 
great  number  of  their  adversaries  in  that  province. 
Soult's  judgment  was  thus  made  manifest,  for  Drouet 
could  only  have  crossed  the  Tagus  with  peril  to  An- 
dalusia, whereas,  without  endangering  that  prov- 
ince, he  now  made  such  a  powerful  diversion  for 
3Iarmont,  that  Wellington's  army  in  the  nortli  was 
reduced  below  the  army  of  Portugal,  and  much  be- 
low what  the  latter  could  be  raised  to,  by  detach- 
ments from  tlie  armies  of  the  north  and  of  the  centre. 
However  in  the  beginning  of  June,  wiiile  the  French 
generals  were  still  disputing,  lord  Wellington's  dis- 
positions were  completed,  he  had  established  at  last 
an  extensive  system  of  gaining  intelligence  all  over 
Spain,  and  as  his  campaign  was  one  which  posterity 
will  delight  to  study,  it  is  fitting  to  shew  very  ex- 
actly the  foundation  on  which  the  operations  rested. 

His  political  and  military  reasons  for  seeking  a 
battle  have  boon  before  shewn,  but  this  design  was 
always  conditional  ;  he  would  fight  on  advantage, 
but  he  would  risk  nothing  beyond  the  usuf.l  cliancea 
of  combat.  While  Portugal  was  his,  every  move- 
ment which  obliged  the  enemy  to  concentrate  was 
an  advantage,  and  his  operations  were  ever  in  sub- 
servience to  this  vital  condition.  His  whole  mrco 
amounted  to  nearly  ninety  tliousand  men,  ot  whicli 
about  six  tliousand  were  in  Cadiz,  but  the  Walcho 


4S6 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Boor  XVIII; 


ren  expedition  was  still  to  bo  atoned  for :  the  sick 
were  so  num3rous  amongst  the  regiments  which  had 
eervea  there,  that  only  thirty-two  thousand  or  a  lit- 
tle more  than  half  of  the  British  soldiers,  were  un- 
der arms.  This  number,  with  twenty-four  thousand 
Portuguese,  made  titly-six  thousand  sabres  and  bay- 
onets in  the  rield  ;  and  it  is  to  be  remembered  tliat 
now  and  at  all  times  the  Portuguese  infantry  were 
mixed  with  the  British  either  by  brigades  or  regi- 
ments ;  wherefore  in  speaking  of  English  divisions 
ia  battle  tlie  Portuguese  battalions  are  always  in- 
cluded, and  it  is  to  their  praise,  that  their  fighting 
was  such  as  to  justify  the  use  of  the  general  term. 

The  troops  were  organized  in  the  following  man- 
ner. 

Two  thousand  cavalry  and  fifteen  thousand  infan- 
try, with  twenty-four  guns,  were  under  Hill,  who 
had  also  tlie  aid  of  four  garrison  Portuguese  regi- 
ments, and  of  the  fifth  Spanish  armj.  Twelve  hun- 
dred Portuguese  cavalry  were  in  the  Tras  Os  Montes 
under  general  D'Urban,  and  about  three  thousand 
five  hundred  British  cavalry  and  thirty-six  thousand 
infantry,  with  fifty-four  guns,  were  under  Welling- 
ton's immediate  command,  which  was  now  enlarged 
by  three  thousand  five  hundred  Spaniards,  infantry 
and  cavalry,  under  Carlos  D'Espana  and  Julian 
Sanchez. 

The  bridge  of  Almaraz  had  been  destroyed  to 
lengthen  the  Frej«;h  lateral  communications,  and 
Wellington  now  OKiered  the  bridge  of  Alcantara  to 
be  repaired  to  shorten  his  own.  The  breach  in  that 
stupendous  structure  was  ninety  feet  wide,  and  one 
hundred  and  fifty  feet  above  the  water  line.  Yet  the 
fertile  genius  of  colonel  Sturgeon  furnished  the 
means  of  passing  this  chasm,  with  heavy  artillery, 
and  without  the  enemy  being  aware  of  the  prepara- 
tions made  until  the  moment  of  execution.  In  the 
arsenal  of  Elvas  he  secretly  prepared  a  network  of 
strong  ropes,  after  a  fashion  which  permitted  it  to 
be  carried  in  parts,  and  with  the  beams,  planking, 
and  other  materials,  it  was  transported  to  Alcantara 
on  seventeen  carriages.  Straining  beams  were  then 
fixe!  in  the  masonry,  on  each  side  of  the  broken 
arch,  cables  were  stretched  across  the  chasm,  the 
tiet-work  was  drawn  over,  tarpaulin  blinds  were 
placed  at  each  side,  and  the  heaviest  guns  passed  in 
safity.  This  remarkable  feat  produced  a  new,  and 
short,  internal  line  of  communication,  along  good 
roads,  while  the  enemy,  by  the  destruction  of  the 
bridge  at  Almaraz,  was  thrown  upon  a  long  external 
line,  and  very  bad  roads. 

Hill's  corps  was  thus  suddenly  brought  a  fort- 
nigiit's  march  nearer  to  Wellington  than  Drouet  was 
to  Marmont,  if  both  marched  as  armies  with  artille- 
ry ;  but  there  was  still  a  heavy  drag  upon  the  Eng- 
lish general's  operations.  He  had  drawn  so  largely 
upon  Portugal  for  m^^ans  of  transport,  that  agricul- 
ture was  s?nously  embarrassed,  and  yet  his  subsis- 
tence was  no',  lecured  for  more  than  a  few  marches 
beyond  the  Agueda.  To  remedy  this  he  set  sailors 
and  workm3n  to  remove  obstructions  in  the  Douro 
and  t!ie  Tagus  ;  the  latter,  which  in  Pliilip  the  Sec- 
ond's time  had  been  navigable  from  Toledo  to  Lis- 
bon, was  opened  to  Malpica,  not  far  from  Alcantara, 
and  tlie  Douro  was  opened  aa  high  as  Barca  dc  Al- 
ba, below  which  it  ceases  to  be  a  Spanish  river. 
The  whole  land  transport  of  the  interior  of  Portugal 
was  thus  relieved  ;  the  magazines  were  brouglit  up 
the  Tagus,  close  to  the  new  line  of  communication  by 
Alcantara,  ou  one  sidn  ;  on  the  other,  tiie  country  ves- 
Bels  conveyed  provisions  to  the  mouth  of  tiio  Douro, 
and  that  river  then  served  to  witliin  a  short  distance 
of  Almeida,  Ciu  lad  Rodrigo,  and  Salamunca.  Still 
danger  was  to  je  apprehended  from  the  American 


privateers  along  the  coast,  which  the  Admiralty  no- 
glected  ;  and  the  navigation  of  the  Douro  was  sud- 
denly suspended  by  the  overheated  zeal  of  a  commis- 
sary, who  being  thwarted  by  the  delays  of  tlie  boat- 
men, issued,  of  his  own  authority,  an  edict,  estab- 
lishing regulations,  and  pronouncing  pains  and  pen- 
alties upon  all  those  who  did  not  conform  to  them. 
The  river  was  immediately  abandoned  by  tlie  craft, 
and  the  government  endeavoured  by  a  formal  protest 
to  give  political  importance  to  this  afiair,  which  was 
peculiarly  vexatious,  inasmuch  as  the  bontiiic-n  were 
already  so  averse  to  passing  the  old  points  of  navi- 
gation, that  very  severe  measures  were  necessary  to 
oblige  them  to  do  so. 

When  this  matter  was  arranged,  Wellington  had 
still  tc  dread  that  if  his  operations  led  him  far  into 
Spain,  the  subsistence  of  his  army  would  be  inse- 
cure ;  for  there  were  many  objects  of  absolute  neces- 
sity, especially  meat,  which  could  not  be  procured 
except  with  ready  money,  and  not  only  was  he  un- 
furnished with  specie,  but  his  hopes  of  obtaining  it 
were  nearly  extinguished,  by  the  sweep  lord  Wil- 
liam Bentinck  had  made  in  the  Mediterranean  mo- 
ney market:  moreover  the  English  minister^  chose 
this  period  of  difficulty  to  interfere,  and  in  an  igno- 
rant and  injurious  manner,  with  his  mode  of  issu- 
ing bills  to  supply  his  necessities.  Ilis  resolution 
to  advance  could  not  be  shaken,  yet  before  crossing 
the  Agueda,  having' described  his  plan  of  campaign 
to  lord  Liverpool,  he  finished  in  these  remarkable 
words. 

"  I  am  not  insensible  to  losses  and  risks,  nor  am  I 
blind  to  the  disadvantages  under  which  I  undertake 
this  operation.  My  friends  in  Castile,  and  I  believe 
no  officer  ever  had  better,  assure  me  that  we  shall 
not  want  provisions  even  before  the  harvest  will  be 
reaped  ;  that  there  exists  concealed  granaries  which 
shall  be  opened  to  us,  and  that  if  we  can  pay  fcr  a 
part,  credit  will  be  given  to  us  for  the  remainder, 
and  they  have  long  given  me  hopes  that  we  should 
be  able  to  borrow  money  in  Castile  upon  British  se- 
curities. In  case  we  should  be  able  to  maintain 
ourselves  in  Castile,  the  general  action  and  its  re- 
sults being  delayed  by  the  enemy's  manoeuvres, 
which  I  think  not  improbable,  I  have  in  contempla- 
tion other  rest  urces  for  drawing  supplies  from  the 
country,  and  I  shall  have  at  all  events  our  own  mEO"- 
azines  at  Almeida  and  Ciudad  Rodrigo.  Bnt  with 
all  these  prospects  I  cannot  rcjlect  without  shnddcrvg 
upon  the  probability  that  tee  shall  be  disfrcsfcd ;  nor 
npon  the  consequences  which  may  rcstilf  from  our 
toanliiis^  money  iii  the  interior  of  Spain." 

In  the  contemplated  operations  lord  Wellington 
did  not  fail  to  look  both  to  his  own  and  his  enemy's 
flanks.  His  right  was  secured  by  the  destruction  of 
tlie  forts,  the  stores,  and  boats  at  Almaraz  ;  for  the 
valley  of  the  Tagus  was  exhausted  of  provisions,  and 
full  of  cross  rivers  which  required  a  prntcon  train  to 
pass  if  the  French  should  menace  Portugal  seriously 
in  that  line  ;  moreover  he  caused  the  fortress  of 
Mpnte  Santos,  which  covered  the  Portuguese  fron 
tier  between  the  Tagus  and  Ciudad  Rof'rigo,  to  be 
put  in  a  state  of  defence,  and  tlie  vestorat'on  of  Al- 
cantara gave  Hill  the  power  of  quickly  interfering. 
On  the  other  side  if  Marmont,  strengthened  by  (^af- 
farelli's  division,  should  operate  strongly  against  the 
allies'  left,  a  retreat  was  open  either  upon  Ciudad 
Rodrigo,  or  across  the  mountains  into  the  valley  of 
tlie  Tagus.  Such  were  his  arrangements  for  his 
own  interior  line  of  operations,  and  to  menace  Ins 
enemy's  flanks  his  measures  embraced  tlie  whole 
Peninsula. 

1st.  He  directed  Silveira  and  D'Urban,  who  were 
on  the  frontier  of  Tras  os  Montes,  to  file  along  the 


1812.1 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAlv. 


4«7 


Douro,  menace  the  enemy's  right  flank  and  rear,  and 
form  a  link  of  connection  witli  the  Gallician  army, 
with  which  Castauos  promised  to  besiege  Astorga, 
as  soon  as  the  Anglo-Portuguese  should  appear  on 
the  Tormes.  Meanwhile  sir  Home  Popham's  expe- 
dition was  to  commence  its  operations,  in  concert 
With  the  seventh  tSpanish  army,  on  the  coast  of  Bis- 
cay, and  so  draw  Cafl'arelli's  divisions  from  the  suc- 
cour of  Marmont. 

2nil.  To  hinder  Suchet  from  reinforcing  the  king, 
or  making  a  movement  towards  Andalusia,  the  Sici- 
lian expedit. ..n  was  to  menace  Catalonia  and  Valen- 
cia, in  concer.  :vith  the  Murcian  army. 

8rd.  To  pre\  ;nt  Soult  overwhelming  Hill,  Wel- 
lington trusted,  1st.  to  the  garrison  of  Gibraltar,  and 
to  tiie  Anglo-Portuguese  and  Spanish  troops,  in  the 
Isla  de  Leon  ;  2nd.  to  insurrections  in  the  kingdom  of 
Cordoba,  where  Echevaria  going  from  Cadiz,  by  the 
way  of  Ayamonte,  with  three  hundred  officers,  was 
to  organize  tlie  partidas  of  that  district,  as  ^lendiza- 
bsl  liad  done  those  of  the  nortliern  parts  ;  !3rd.  to  Bal- 
Issteros's  army ;  but  he  ever  dreaded  the  rashness  of 
this  general,  who  might  be  crushed  in  a  moment, 
which  would  have  endangered  Hill  and  rendered  any 
success  in  the  north  nugatory. 

It  was  this  fear  of  Ballesteros's  rashness  that 
caused  Wellington  to  keep  so  strong  a  corps  in  Es- 
tremadura,  and  hence  Soult's  resolution  to  prevent 
Drouet  from  quitting  Estremadura,  even  though 
Hill  should  cross  the  Tagus,  was  wise  and  military. 
For  though  Drouet  would  undoubtedly  have  given 
.he  king  and  IVIarmont  a  vast  superiority  in  Castile, 
Jie  general  advantage  would  have  remained  with 
Wellington.  Hill  could  at  any  time  have  misled 
Drouet  by  crossing  the  bridge  of  Alcantara,  and  re- 
turning again,  when  Drouet  had  passed  the  bridge 
of  Toledo  or  Arzobispc.  The  French  general's 
march  would  then  have  led  to  nothing,  for  either 
Hill  could  have  joined  Wellington,  by  a  shorter  line, 
and  Soult,  wanting  numbers,  could  not  have  taken 
advantage  of  his  absence  from  Estremadura  ;  or  Wel- 
lington could  have  retired  within  tiie  Portuguese 
frontier,  rendering  Drouet's  movement  to  Castile  a 
pure  loss  ;  or  reinforcing  Hill  by  the  bridge  of  Al- 
cantara, he  could  have  gained  a  fortnight's  march 
and  overwhelmed  Soult  in  Andalusia  The  great 
error  of  the  king's  plan  was  tliat  it  depended  upon 
exact  co-operation  amongst  persons  who,  jealous  of 
each  other,  were  far  from  obedient  to  himself,  and 
whose  marches  it  was  scarcely  possible  to  time 
j'lstly,  because  the  armies  were  separated  by  a  great 
extent  of  country  and  their  lines  of  communication 
were  external,  long,  and  difficult,  while  their  enemy 
was  acting  on  internal,  short,  and  easy  lines.  More- 
over the  French  correspondence,  continually  inter- 
cepted by  the  partidas,  was  brought  to  Wellington, 
and  the  knowe:lge  thus  gained  by  one  side  and  lost 
by  the  other  caused  the  timely  reinforcing  of  Hill  in 
Estremadura,  and  the  keeping  of  Palombini's  Ital- 
ian division  from  3Iadrid  for  tliree  weeks  ;  an  event 
which  in  the  sequel  proved  of  vital  consequencfe,  in- 
asmuch as  it  prevented  the  army  of  the  centre  mov- 
ing until  after  the  crises  of  the  campaign  had  passed. 

Hill's  exploit  at  Almaraz,  and  the  disorderly  state 
of  the  army  of  the  centre,  having  in  a  manner  isola- 
t;^-d  thu  army  of  Portugal,  tlie  importance  of  Gallicia 
aud  the  Asturias,  with  respect  to  the  projected  oper- 
ations of  lord  Wellington  was  greatly  increased. 
For  the  Gillicians  could  either  act  in  Castile  upon 
tlie  rear  of  Marmont,  and  so  weaken  the  line  of  de- 
fence on  the  Douro;  or,  marching  tlirough  the  As- 
turias, spread  insurrection  along  the  coast  to  the 
RIonta  fia  de  Santander,  and  there  join  the  seventh 
army.     Hence  the  necessity  of  keeping  Bonet  in  the 


Asturias,  and  watching  the  Gallician  passes,  was 
become  imperative,  and  Marmont,  following  Napo- 
leon's instructions,  had  fortitied  the  dilicrent  posts 
in  Castile,  but  his  army  was  too  widely  spread,  and, 
as  Soult  observed,  was  extended  to  its  right  iustead 
of  concentrating  on  tiie  leit  near  Bafios. 

The  duke  of  Ragusa  had  resolved  to  adopt  the 
Tormes  and  Douro,  as  his  lines  of  defence,  and  never 
doubting  that  he  was  the  object  of  attack,  watched 
the  augmentation  of  Wellington's  forces  and  maga- 
zines with  the  utmost  anxiety.  He  had  collected 
considerable  magazines  himself;  and  the  king  had 
formed  others  for  him  at  Talavera  and  Segovia,  yet 
he  did  not  approach  the  Agueda,  but  continued  to 
occupy  a  vast  extent  of  country  tor  the  convenience 
of  feeding  them  until  June.  When  he  heard  of  tho 
restoration  of  the  bridge  of  Alcantara,  and  of  maga- 
zines being  formed  at  Caceres,  he  observed  that  the 
latter  would  be  on  the  left  of  the  Guadiana  if  Anda- 
lusia were  the  object ;  and  although  not  well  placed 
for  an  army  acting  against  liimself,  were  admirably 
placed  for  an  army  which,  having  fought  in  Castile, 
should  afterwards  operate  against  Rladrid,  because 
they  could  be  transported  at  once  to  the  right  of  tho 
Tagus  by  Alcantara,  and  could  be  secured  by  remov- 
ing the  temporary  restorations.  Wherefore,  judging 
that  Hill  would  immediately  rejoin  Wellington,  to 
aid  in  the  battle,  that,  with  a  prophetic  feeling  ho 
observed,  would  be  fought  near  the  Tormes,  he  de- 
sired Caffarelli  to  put  the  divisions  of  the  army  of 
the  north  in  movement;  and  he  prayed  the  king  to 
have  guns,  and  a  pontoon  train  sent  from  Madrid 
that  Drouet  might  pass  at  Almaraz  and  join  him  by 
the  Puerto  Pico. 

Joseph  immediately  renewed  his  orders  to  Soult, 
and  to  Caffarelli,  but  he  only  sent  two  small  boats 
to  Almaraz;  and  Marmont,  seeing  the  allied  army 
suddenly  concentrated  on  the  Agueda,  recalled  Foy 
from  the  valley  of  the  Tagus,  and  Bonet  from  tho 
Asturias.  His  tirst  design  was  to  assemble  the 
army  at  Medina  del  Campo,  Valladolid,  Valdesillas, 
Toro,  Zamora,  and  Salamanca,  leaving  two  battal- 
ions and  a  brigade  of  dragoons  at  Benavente  to  ob- 
serve the  Gallicians.  Thus  the  bulk  of  tlie  troops 
would  line  the  Duero,  while  two  divisions  formed  an 
advanced  guard,  on  the  Tormes,  and  the  whole  could 
be  concentrated  in  five  days.  His  ultimate  object 
was  to  hold  the  Tormes  until  Wellington's  whole 
army  was  on  that  river,  then  to  assemble  his  own 
troops  on  the  Duero,  and  act  so  as  to  favour  the  de- 
fence of  the  forts  at  Salamanca  until  reinforcements 
from  the  north  should  enable  him  to  drive  the  allies 
again  within  the  Portuguese  frontier;  and  he  warned 
Caffarelli  that  the  forts  could  not  hold  out  more  than 
fifteen  days  after  they  should  be  abandoned  by  the 
trench  army. 

Marmont  was  a  man  to  be  feared.  He  possessed 
quickness  of  apprehension  and  courage,  moral  and 
physical,  scientific  acquirements,  experience  of  war, 
and  great  facility  in  the  moving  of  troops  ;  he  was 
strong  of  body,  in  the  flower  of  life,  eager  for  glory, 
and  although  neither  a  great  nor  a  fortunate  com- 
mander, such  a  one  as  might  bear  the  test  of  fire. 
His  army  was  weak  in  cavalry  but  admirably  organ- 
ized, for  he  had  laboured  witii  successful  diligence 
to  restore  tliat  discipline  wliich  had  been  so  much 
shaken  by  tlie  misfortunes  of  IMassona's  campaign, 
and  by  the  unceasing  operations  from  the  battle  of 
Fuentes  Onoro  to  the  lasl  lotrent  from  Beira.  Upon 
this  subject  a  digression  must  be  all(<wed,  because  it 
has  been  often  afiirmed,  t'.at  tlie  bad  conduct  of  the 
French  in  the  Peninsula,  was  encouraged  by  their  • 
leaders,  was  unmatched  in  wickedness,  and  jieciilmr 
to  the  nation.     Such  assertions  springing  from  mor- 


488 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XVIIl. 


«id  nal.ional  antipathies  it  is  the  duty  of  the  histori- 
an to  correct.  All  troops  will  behave  ill,  when  ill- 
governed,  but  the  b?st  commanders  cannot  at  times 
prevent  the  perpetration  of  tlie  most  frigiitful  mis- 
chief; and  this  truth,  so  important  to  the  welfare  of 
nations,  may  be  proved  with  respect  tp  tiis  Peninsu- 
lar war,  by  the  avowal  of  tlie  generals  "on  either  side, 
and  by  their  endeavours  to  arrest  the  evils  which 
t.hey  deplored.  When  Dorsenne  returned  from  his 
expedition  against  Gallicia,  in  the  latter  end  of 
J811,  he  reproached  his  soldiers  in  the  following 
terms.  "  The  fields  have  been  devastated  and  houses 
have  been  burned  ;  these  excesses  are  unwortliy  of 
the  French  soldier,  they  pierce  the  hearts  of  the 
most  devo  ed  and  friendly  of  the  Spaniards,  they  are 
revolting  to  honest  men,  and  embarrass  the  provis- 
ioning of  the  army.  Tlie  general-in-chief  sees  them 
with  sorrow,  and  orders  ;  that  besides  a  permanent 
court-martial,  there  shall  be  at  the  head-quarters  of 
each  division,  of  every  arm,  a  military  commission, 
which  shall  try  the  following  crimes,  and  on  convic- 
tion, sentence  to  death,  without  appeal ;  execution 
to  be  done  on  the  spot,  in  presence  of  the  troops. 

"  1st.  (Quitting  a  post  to  pillage.  2nd.  Desertion 
oJ"  all  kinds.  3rd.  Disobedience  in  face  of  the  ene- 
.ny.  4th.  Insubordination  of  all  kinds.  5th,  Ma- 
rauding of  all  kinds.     6th.  Pillage  of  all  kinds. 

*'  All  pei'sons,  milllari/  or  others,  shall  be  consid- 
ered as  pillagers,  who  quit  their  posts  or  their  ranks 
to  enter  houses,  (S-c.  or  who  use  violence  to  obtain  from 
the  inhabitants  more  than  they  are  legally  entitled  to. 

"  All  persons  shall  be  considered  deserters  who  shall 
bejound  without  a  passport  beyond  the  advanced  posts, 
and  frequent  patroles  day  and  night  shall  be  sent  to 
arrest  all  persons  beyond  the  outposts. 

"  Before  Ike  enemy  when  in  camp  or  cantonments, 
roll-calls  shall  lake  place  every  hour,  and  all  persons 
absent  without  leave  twice  running  shall  be  couidcd 
deserters  and  judged  as  such.  The  servants  and  sut- 
lers of  the  camp  are  amenable  to  this  as  well  as  the 
soldier." 

This  order  Marmont,  after  reproaching  his  troops 
for  like  excesses,  renewed  with  the  following  addi- 
tions. 

"  Considering  that  the  disorders  of  the  army  have 
arrived  at  the  highest  degree,  and  require  the  most  vig- 
orous measures  of  repression,  it  is  ordered, 

"  1st.  ..'2//  non-commissioned  officers  and  soldiers 
fiuid  a  quarter  (fa  league  from  their  qitarters,  camp, 
or  post  without  leave,  shall  be  judged  pillagers  and 
tried  bq  the  military  commission. 

"  2ad.  The  gens  d'armes  shall  examine  the  baggage 
of  all  sutlers  and  followers,  and  shall  seize  all  effects 
tXdt  appear  to  be  pillaged,  and  shall  hum  what  will 
burn,  and  bring  the  gold  and  silver  to  the  paymaster- 
ffeieral  under  a  ' proces  verbal,''  and  all  persons  whose 
efects  have  been  seized  as  pillage  to  the  amount  of  one 
hiiL'lred  livres  shall  be  sent  to  the  military  commission, 
a'ld  on  conviction  suffer  death. 

•'  3d.  All  officers  who  shall  not  take  proper  mca- 
v.ires  to  repress  disorders  under  their  command  shall 
be  sent  in  arrest  to  head-quarters  there  to  be  judged." 

Then  appointing  the  number  of  baggage  animals 
to  each  company,  upon  a  scale  which  coincides  in  a 
remarkable  manner  with  the  allowances  in  the  Brit- 
ish army,  Marmont  directed  the  overplus  to  be  seized 
and  delivered,  under  a  legal  process,  to  the  nearest 
villages,  ordering  the  provost-general  to  look  to  the 
exeeution  each  day,  and  report  thereon.  Finally,  he 
clothed  the  provost-general  with  all  the  powers  of 
the  military  commissions;  and  proof  was  soon  given 
that  his  orders  were  not  mere  tlireats,  for  two  cap- 
tains were  arrested  for  trial,  and  a  soldier  of  the 
iwenty-flixth  regiment  was  condemned  to  death  by 


one  of  the  provisional  commissions  for  stealing  church 
vessels. 

Such  was  the  conduct  of  the  French,  and  touching 
the  conduct  of  tlie  English,  lord  Wellington,  in  the 
same  month,  wrote  thus  to  lord  Liverjuol. 

"  The  outrages  committed  by  the  British  soldiers, 
belonging  to  this  army,  have  leconie  so  ci.vrmovs,  (n.d 
they  have  produced  an  ejject  on  the  viihds  <f  the  peo- 
ple of  the  country,  so  injuriovs  to  the  cuiiit,  ai.d  like- 
ly to  be  so  dai'gerous  to  the  army  itself,  that  I  request 
your  lordship's  early  attention  to  the  svbject.  I  am 
sensible  that  the  best  measures  to  le  a<'  ^ted  oil  this 
subject  are  those  of  prevention,  and  lb  letc  there  are 
few  officers  who  have  paid  more  attend  m  to  the  suljecl 
than  I  have  done,  and  I  have  teen  so  far  succcsffvl, 
as  that  few  outrages  are  committed  by  the  soldiers  wl.o 
are  with  their  regimeids,  after  the  rcgttnehts  have  Lccn 
a  short  lime  in  this  country." 

"  But  in  the  extended  system  on  which  we  are  act- 
ing, stnall  detachments  of  soldiers  vnisl  be  marched 
long  distances,  through  the  country,  either  as  escols, 
or  returning  from,  being  escorts  to  prisoners,  or  ccnao  g 
from  hospitals,  <S  c.  and  notwithstanding  that  these  de- 
tachments are  never  allowed  to  inarch,  cicejihg  vi.- 
der  the  command  of  an  ojjicer  or  more,  in  proportion 
to  its  size,  and  that  every  precaution  is  taken  to  pro- 
vide for  the  regularity  of  their  subsistence,  there  is  ro 
instance  of  the  march  of  one  of  these  detachtnei.ts  that 
outrages  of  every  description  are  not  committed,  ai.d  1 
am  sorry  to  say  with  ijnpunity." 

"  The  guard-roo7ns  are  therefore  crowded  with 
prisoners,  and  the  ojfenccs  of  which  they  have  l<tn 
guilty  remain  unpunished,  to  the  destruction  rf  the  dis 
cipline  if  the  army,  and  to  the  injury  rf  the  rcpvlaticn 
of  the  country  for  justice.  I  have  thought  it  proper  lo 
lay  these  circumstances  before  your  lonithip.  1  am 
about  to  inove  the  aiiny  further  forward  into  Spain, 
and  I  assure  your  lordship,  that  I  have  r.ot  a  friend 
in  that  country,  who  has  not  written  to  me  in  dread  if 
the  consequences,  which  must  result  to  the  army  and 
to  the  cause,  from  a  continuance  of  these  disgraceful 
irregularities,  which  I  declare  I  have  it  not  in  my 
power  to  prevent." 

To  this  sliould  have  been  added,  the  insubordina- 
tion, and  tlie  evil  passions,  awakened  by  the  un- 
checked plunder  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo  and  Paf^pjos. 
But  long  had  the  English  general  ccmplaircd  of  the 
bad  discipline  of  his  army,  and  the  fcllowirg  extracts 
from  a  letter  dated  a  few  months  later,  shew  tiiat  iiis 
distrust  at  the  present  time  was  not  ill-fcunded.  Af- 
ter observing  that  the  constitutions  of  the  eoldicrs 
were  so  much  shaken  from  disorders  acquired  by 
their  service  at  Walcheren,  or  by  their  own  irreg- 
ularities, that  a  British  army  was  almost  a  moving 
hospital,  more  than  one-third  or  about  twenty  thrn- 
snnd  men  being  sick,  or  attending  upon  the  sick,  he 
thus  describes  their  conduct. 

"  The  disorders  which  these  soldiers  have  are  of  a 
very  trijling  description,  they  are  considered  to  render 
them  incapable  of  serving  with  their  regiments,  but 
they  certainlq  do  not  incapacitate  them  from  contmit- 
ling  outrages  of  all  descriptions  on  their  passage 
through  the  country,  and  in  the  last  moTr7nc?;ts  if  the 
hospitals  the  soldiers  have  vol  only  plundered  the  in- 
habitants of  their  property,  but  the  hospital  stores 
which  moved  with  the  hosj.itals,  and  have  sold  the 
plunder.  And  all  these  oidrages  arc  committed  with 
impunitif,  no  proof  can  be  brought  on  oath  l.efurc  a 
court-martial  that  any  individual  has  committed  an 
outrage,  and  the  soldiers  (f  the  army  are  becoming 
little  better  than  a  band  of  robbers."  "  /  have  carri- 
ed the  establishment  and  authority  of  the  provost- 
marshal  as  far  as  either  will  go ;  there  are  at  this 
moment  not  less  than  one  provost-marshal  and  nine* 


1812.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR 


489 


(een  assistant  provost-marshals^  attached  to  the  several 
divisiuns  oj' cavalry  and  iiijantry  and  to  the  hospital 
stations,  to  preserve  order,  but  this  establishment  is  not 
sufficient,  and  I  have  not  the  means  oJ" increasing'  iV." 

Tlie  principal  remedies  he  proposed,  were  the. ad- 
mitting l3ss  rigorous  proof  of  guilt,  before  courts 
martial;  the  forming  a  military  police,  «7/cA  as  the 
French,  and  other  armies  possessed;  the  enforcing 
more  attention  on  the  part  of  the  officers  to  their  du- 
ties ;  the  increasing  tlie  pay  and  responsibility  of  the 
non-commissioned  officers,  and  the  throwing  upon 
them  the  chief  care  of  the  discipline.  But  in  treat- 
ing this  part  of  the  subject  he  broached  an  opinion 
which  can  scarcely  be  sustained  even  by  his  authori- 
ty. Asduming,  somewhat  unjustly,  that  the  officers 
of  his  army  were,  from  consciousness  of  like  demer- 
it, generally  too  lenient  in  their  sentences  on  each 
other  for  neglect  of  duty,  he  says,  "  I  am  inclined  to 
entertain  the  opinion  that  in  the  British  army  duties 
of  inspection  and  control  over  the  conduct  and  habits 
of  the  soldiers,  the  performance  of  which  by  some- 
body is  the  only  effectual  check  to  disorder  and  all 
its  consequences,  are  imposed  upon  the  subaltern  of- 
ficers of  regiments,  which  duties  British  officers,  be- 
ing of  the  class  of  gent.'emen  in  society,  and  being 
required  to  appear  as  such,  have  never  performed, 
and  which  they  will  never  jerfurm.  It  is  very  neces- 
sary, however,  that  the  duties  should  be  performed 
by  somebody,  and  for  this  reason,  and  having  ob- 
served the  advantage  derived  in  the  guards,  from  the 
respectable  body  of  non-commissioned  officers  in 
those  regiments,  who  perform  all  the  duties  required 
from  subalterns  in  the  marching  regiments,  I  had 
suggested  to  your  lordship  the  expediency  of  increas- 
ing the  pay  of  the  non-commissioned  officers  in  the 
army." 

Now  it  is  a  strange  assumption,  that  a  gentleman 
necessarily  neglects  his  duty  to  his  country.  When 
well  taught,  which  was  not  always  the  case,  gentle- 
men by  birth  generally  performed  their  duties  in  the 

minsula  more  conscientiously  than  others,  and  the 
experience  of  every  commanding  officer  will  bear  out 
the  assertion.  If  the  non-commissioned  officers  could 
do  oil  the  duties  of  subaltern  officers,  why  should  the 
country  bear  the  useless  expense  of  the  latter  !  But 
in  truth  the  system  of  the  guards  produced  rather  a 
medium  goodness,  than  a  superior  excellence;  the 
system  of  sir  .lohn  Moore,  founded  upon  the  princi- 
ple, that  the  officers  should  thorouglily  know,  and  be 
responsible  for  the  discipline  of  their  soldiers,  better 
bore  the  t^st  of  experience.  All  the  British  regi- 
ments of  the  light  division  were  formed  in  the  camps 
of  .Shorn-Clilf  by  that  most  accomplished  command- 
er; very  many  of  the  other  acknowledged  good  regi- 
ments of  the  arrny  had  been  instructed  by  him  in 
Sicily  ;  and  wherever  an  officer,  formed  under  3Ioore, 
obtained  a  regiment,  whether  British  or  Portuguese, 
that  regiment  was  distinguished  in  this  war  for  its 
discipline  and  enduring  qualities  ;  courage  was  com- 
mon to  all. 


CHAPTER  IT. 

Campaign  of  1812 — Wellin^rfon  ndvanrps  to  the  Tormes — 
Marnioiit  rotiip.s — The  allies  l)psii'2:p  llie  forts  of  Salaiiian- 
ca — General  asfieet  of  aff.iirs  ehanii^e.s  iind  beromes;  [jloomy 
— The  kiiia;  coneentrates  th  •  army  of  thecentr.' — Marrnoiit 
returns  to  the  Torrnes  and  eannonades  the  allies  on  the  po- 
sition of  San  Christoval — Various  skirmishes — Adventure 
of  Mr.  Mackay — Marmont  retires  to  Motite  Ruliia — Crosses 
the  Tormes  with  a  part  of  his  arniv — Fine  conduct  of  gen- 
eral Bock's  German  cavalry — Graham  crosses  the  Tormes 
and  Marmont  retires  acain  to  Monte  Kuhia — Ohservntions 
oa  this  movemeut — Assault  on  San  Vincente  fails — Heroii. 


death  of  general  Bowes — Siege  suspended  for  want  of  ant- 
niuniuoM — It  is  renewed — Cajetano  is  stornieil — San  Vir> 
ceiite  being  on  lire  surrenders — .Marmont  retires  to  the  Du- 
ero  foilowi'd  by  Welhngton — The  French  rear-guard  suf- 
fers some  loss  between  Rueda  and  Tordesillas — Positions 
of  the  armies  des.  ribed — Stale  of  affairs  in  oilier  parts  ile- 
scribed — Procrastination  of  the  Gallician  arni\— General 
Bonet  abandons  the  Aslurias — Coincidence  of  \Vellington's 
and  Napoleon's  views  upon  that  subject — Sir  Home  Pop. 
ham  arrives  with  his  squadron  on  the  coast  of  Biscay — His 

operations — Powerful  effect  of  tliem  upon  the  cumpaigi 

Wellington  and  Marmont  alike  cautious  of  Jiriiiging  on  a 
battle — e.vlreme  diliiculty  and  distress  of  Wellington's  sit- 
uation. 

CAMPAIGN    OF    1812. 

On  the  13th  of  .Tune,  the  periodic  rains  having 
ceased,  and  the  field  magazines  being  completed, 
Wellington  passed  the  Agneda  and  marched  toward 
the  Tormes  in  four  columns,  one  of  which  was  com- 
posed of  the  Spanish  troops.  The  16th  he  readied 
the  Valmusa  stream,  within  six  miles  of  Salamanca, 
and  drove  a  French  detacliinent  across  the  Tormes. 
All  the  bridges,  save  that  of  Salamanca,  which 
was  defended  by  the  forts,  had  been  destroyeci, 
and  there  was  a  garrison  in  the  castle  of  Alba  de 
Tormes,  but  the  17th  the  allies  passed  the  river 
above  and  below  the  town,  by  the  deep  lords  of  San- 
ta Marta  and  Los  Cantos,  and  general  Henry  Clin- 
ton invested  the  forts  the  same  day  with  tiie  sixth 
division.  Marmont,  with  two  divisions  and  some 
cavalry,  retired  to  Fuente  el  Sauco,  on  the  road  of 
Toro,  followed  by  an  advanced  guard  of  the  allies  ; 
Salamanca  instantly  became  a  scene  of  rejoicing,  the 
houses  were  illuminated,  and  the  people,  shouting, 
singing,  and  weeping  for  joy,  gave  Wellington  their 
welcome  while  his  army  took  a  position  on  the  moun- 
tain of  San  Christoval  about  five  miles  in  advance 

SIEGE    OF    THE    FORTS    AT    SALAMANCA. 

Four  eighteen-pounders  had  follov/ed  the  army 
from  Almeida,  tliree  twenty-four  pound  howitzers 
were  furnished  by  the  field  artillery,  and  the  batter- 
ing train  used  by  Hill  at  Almaraz,  had  passed  the 
bridge  of  Alcantara  the  11th.  These  were  the 
means  of  offence,  but  the  strength  of  the  forts  had 
been  under-rated  ;  they  contained  eight  hundred  men, 
and  it  was  said  that  thirteen  convents  and  twenty- 
two  colleges  had  been  destroyed  in  their  construc- 
tion. San  Vincente,  so  called  from  the  large  con- 
vent it  enclosed,  was  the  key-fort.  Situated  on  a 
perpendicular  cliff  overhanging  the  Tormes,  and  ir- 
regular in  form,  but  well  flanked,  it  was  seiiarated 
by  a  deep  ravine  from  the  other  forts,  which  were 
called  St.  Cajetano  and  La  Merced.  These  were  also 
on  high  ground,  smaller  than  San  Vincente,  and  of 
a  square  form,  hut  with  bomb-proofs  and  deep  ditches, 
having  perpendicular  scarps  and  counterscarps. 

In  the  night  of  the  17th  colonel  Burgoyne,  the  en- 
gineer directing  the  siege,  commenced  a  battery  for 
eight  guns  at  the  distance  of  two  hundred  and  fifty 
yards  from  the  main  wall  of  Vincente,  and  as  the 
ruins  of  the  destroyed  convents  rendered  it  impossi- 
ble to  excav.te,  earth  was  brought  from  a  distance  : 
but  the  moon  was  up,  the  night  short,  the  enemy's 
fire  of  musquetry  heavy,  the  workmen  of  the  sixth 
division  were  inexperienced,  and  at  daybreak  the 
battery  was  still  imperfect.  Meanwhile  an  attempt 
had  been  made  to  attach  the  miner  s-ecretly  to  the 
counterscarp,  and,  when  the  vigilance  of  a  trained 
dog  baffled  this  design,  the  enemy's  i)icquet  was 
driven  in,  and  the  attempt  openly  made,  yet  it  was 
rendered  vain  by  a  plunging  fire  from  the  top  of  the 
convent. 

"  On  the  leth,  eiglit  hundred  Germans,  placed   in 
the    ruins,  mastered  all  the  enemy's  tire  sa  o  that 


490 


NAPIER'S  PENINSULAR  WAR. 


[BooE  XVIII. 


from  loop-holes,  and  colonel  3Iay,  who  directed  the 
artillery  s3rvice,  then  placed  two  field  pieces  on  a 
neighb)uring  convent,  called  San  Bernardo,  over- 
looking the  fort ;  however  these  guns  could  not  si- 
lence tlie  Fr?ach  artillery. 

In  the  night  tlie  first  battery  was  armed,  covering 
for  two  liild-p;eces  as  a  counter-battery  was  raised  a 
littli  tJ  its  right,  and  a  second  breacliing  battery  for 
two  howitzers  was  constructed  on  the  Cajetano  side 
of  the  ravine. 

At  daybreak  on  the  19th  seven  guns  opened,  and 
at  nine  o'clock  the  wall  of  the  convent  was  cut  away 
to  the  level  of  the  counterscarp.  The  second  breach- 
ing battery,  which  saw  lower  down'  the  scarp,  then 
commenced  its  fire  ;  but  the  iron  howitzers  proved 
unmeet  battering  ordnance,  and  the  enemy's  mus- 
ketry being  entirely  directed  on  this  point,  because 
t!ie  first  battery,  to  save  ammunition,  had  ceased 
firing,  brought  down  a  captain  and  more  than  twenty 
gunners.  The  howitzers  did  not  injure  the  wall, 
ammunition  was  scarce,  and  as  the  enemy  could  ea- 
sily cut  oti'tha  breach  in  the  night,  the  tire  ceased. 

The  2Jth  at  mid-day  colonel  Dickson  arrived  with 
the  iron  howitzers  from  Elvas,  and  the  second  bat- 
tery being  then  reinforced  with  additional  pieces, 
revived  its  fire  against  a  re-entering  angle  of  the 
convent  a  little  beyond  the  former  breach.  The 
wall  Jiere  was  soon  broken  through,  and  in  an  instant 
a  huge  cantle  of  the  convent  with  its  roof  went  to 
the  ground,  crushing  many  of  tlie  garrison  and  lay- 
ing bare  the  inside  of  the  building :  carcasses  were 
immediately  thrown  into  the  opening  to  burn  the 
convent,  but  the  enemy  undauntedly  maintained  their 
grouml  and  extinguished  the  flames.  A  lieutenant 
and  fifteen  gunners  were  lost  this  day  on  the  side  of 
the  besiegers,  and  the  ammunition  being  nearly  gone 
the  attack  was  suspended  until  fresh  stores  could 
come  up  from  Almeida. 

During  the  progress  of  this  siege,  the  general  as- 
pect of  alfiirs  had  materially  changed  on  both  sides. 
Lord  Wellington  had  been  deceived  as  to  the  strength 
of  the  forts,  and  intercepted  returns  of  the  armies  of 
the  south  and  of  Portugal  now  shewed  to  him,  that 
they  also  were  far  stronger  than  he  had  expected  ;  at 
the  same  time  he  heard  of  Ballesteros's  defeat  at 
Birnos,  and  of  Slade's  unfortunate  cavalry  action  of 
Llera.  He  had  calculated  that  Bonet  would  not 
quit  the  Asturias,  and  that  general  was  in  full  march 
for  Leon,  Catfarelli  also  was  prejjaring  to  reinlbrce 
Marmont,  and  thus  the  brilliant  prospect  of  the  cam- 
paign was  suddenly  clouded.  But  on  the  other  hand, 
B.m3t  had  unexpectedly  relinquished  the  Asturias 
after  six  days'  occupation  ;  three  thousand  Galiicians 
were  in  that  province  and  in  communication  with 
the  seventh  army,  and  the  maritime  expedition  un- 
der Popham  had  sailed  for  the  coast  of  Biscny. 

Neitiier  was  the  king's  situation  agreeable.  The 
partidas  intercepted  his  despatches  so  surely,  that  it 
was  the  19th  ere  Marmont's  letter  announcing  Wel- 
lington's advance,  and  saying  that  Hill  also  was  in 
march  for  thi  north,  reached  Madrid.  Soult  detained 
Drouet,  Suchet  refused  to  send  more  than  one  bri- 
gude  towards  Ma'lrid,  and  Caffarelli,  disturbed  that 
Pilombini  should  march  upon  the  capital  instead  of 
Burgos,  kept  back  the  divisions  promised  to  Mar- 
inont.  Something  was,  however,  gained  in  vigour, 
for  the  king,  no  longer  de|)ending  upon  the  assist- 
ance of  the  distant  armies,  gave  orders  to  blow  up 
Mirab'ite  and  abandon  La  Mancha  on  one  side,  and 
the  forts  of  Somosierra  and  Buitrago  on  tlie  other, 
with  a  view  to  unite  the  army  of  tlie  centre. 

A  detachment  of  eight  hundred  men  under  colonel 
Noizet,  employed  to  destroy  Buitrago,  was  attacked 
on  his  return  by  the  Einpccinado  with  three  thou- 


sand, but  Noizet.  an  able  officer,  defeated  him  and 
reached  Madrid  with  little  loss.  Palomb'ni's  march 
v/as  then  hastened,  and  imperative  orders  directed 
Soult  to  send  ten  thousand  men  to  Toledo.  The 
garrison  of  Segovia  was  reinforced  to  preserve  one 
of  the  communications  with  Marmont,  that  marshal 
was  informed  of  Hill's  true  position,  and  the  king 
advised  him  to  give  battle  to  Wellington,  for  he  sup- 
posed the  latter  to  have  only  eighteen  thousand 
English  troops,  but  he  had  twenty-four  tliousand, 
and  had  yet  left  Hill  so  strong  that  he  desired  him 
to  fight  Drouet  if  occasion  required. 

Meanwhile  Marmont,  who  had  remained  in  person 
at  Fuente  cl  Sauco,  united  there,  on  the  2f  th,  four 
divisions  of  infantry  and  a  brigade  of  cavalry,  fur- 
nishing about  twenty-five  thousand  men  of  all  arms, 
with  which  he  marched  to  the  succour  of  the  forts. 
His  approach  over  an  open  country  was  descried  at 
a  considerable  distance,  and  a  brigade  of  the  fifth 
division  was  immediately  called  off  from  the  siege, 
the  battering  train  was  sent  across  the  Tormes,  and 
the  army,  which  was  in  bivouac  on  the  Salamanca 
sfde  of  St.  Cliristoval,  formed  in  order  of  battle  on 
the  top.  This  position  of  Christoval  was  about  four 
miles  long,  and  rather  concave,  the  ascent  in  front 
steep,  and  tangled  with  hollow  roads  and  stone  en- 
closures, belonging  to  the  villages,  but  the  summit 
was  broad,  even,  and  covered  with  ripe  corn  ;  tho 
riglit  was  flanked  by  the  Upper  Tormes,  and  the  left 
dipped  into  the  country  bordering  the  Lower  Tormes, 
for  in  passing  Salamanca,  that  river  makes  a  sweep 
round  the  back  of  the  position.  The  infantry,  the 
heavy  cavalry,  and  the  guns  crowned  the  summit  of 
the  mountain,  but  the  light  cavalry  fell  back  from 
the  front  to  the  low  country  on  the  left,  where  there 
was  a  small  stream  and  a  marshy  flat.  The  villages 
of  Villares  and  Monte  Rubio  were  behind  the  left  of 
the  position;  the  village  of  Cabrerizos  marked  the 
extreme  right,  though  the  hill  still  trended  up  the 
river.  The  villages  of  Christoval,  Castillanos,  and 
Moresco,  were  nearly  in  a  line  along  the  foot  of  the 
heights  in  front,  the  last  was  somewhat  within  the 
allies'  ground,  and  nothing  could  be  stronger  than 
the  position,  which  completely  commanded  all  the 
country  for  many  miles  ;  but  the  heat  was  excessive 
and  there  was  neither  shade,  nor  fuel  to  cook  with 
nor  water  nearer  than  the  Tormes. 

About  five  o'clock  in  the  evening  the  enemy's 
horsemen  approached,  pointing  towards  the  left  of 
the  position,  as  if  to  turn  it  by  the  Lower  Tormes, 
whereupon  the  British  light  cavalry  made  a  short 
forward  movement  and  a  partial  charge  took  place ; 
but  the  French  opened  six  guns,  and  tlie  British  re- 
tired to  their  own  ground  near  Monte  Rubio  and 
Villares.  The  light  division,  which  was  held  in 
reserve,  immediately  closed  towards  the  left  of  the 
position  until  tlie  French  cavalry  halted,  and  then 
returned  to  the  centre.  3Ioanwhile  the  main  body 
of  the  enemy  bore,  in  one  dark  volume,  against  the 
right,  and  halting  at  the  very  foot  of  the  position, 
sent  a  flight  of  shells  on  to  the  lofty  summit;  nor  did 
this  fire  cease  until  after  dark,  when  the  French 
general,  after  driving  back  all  the^utpcsts,  obtained 
possession  of  Moresco,  and  established  himself  be- 
hind that  village  and  Castellanos  within  gun-shot  of 
the  allies. 

The  English  general  slept  that  night  on  the 
ground  amongst  the  troops,  and  at  the  first  streak  of 
light  the  armies  were  a<rain  under  arms.  Neverthe- 
less, though  some  einrnals  were  interchanged  between 
Marmont  and  the  forts,  both  sides  were  quiet  until 
towards  evening,  when  Wellington  detached  the  six- 
ty-eighth regiment,  from  the  line  to  drive  the  French 
fiom  Moresco.    Tnis  attack  made  with  vigour, sue- 


1812  J 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


491 


ceetieci,  but  the  troops  beinfj  recalled  just  as  day- I 
light  tailed,  a  body  of  French  cominfr  unperceivod 
t'lroii  (■'i  the  ftanding  corn,  broke  into  the  village  as  j 
the  Bfitisli  were  collecting  their  posta  from  the  dif- 
ferent avenins,  and  did  considerable  execution.  In 
the  skirmish  an  olficer  of  the  sixty-cightii,  named 
Mackay,  being  suddenly  surrounded,  refused  to  sur- 
render, and,  Singly  righting  against  a  multitude,  re- 
ceii'^ed  more  wounds  than  the  human  frame  was 
thought  capable  of  sustaining,  yet  he  still  lives  to 
shew  iiis  honourable  scars. 

On  the  22:1,  three  divisions  and  a  brigade  of  caval- 
ry joined  !>Iarmont,  who  having  now  nearly  forty 
thousand  men  in  hand,  extended  his  left  and  seized  a 
part  of  the  height  in  advance  of  the  allies'  right  wing, 
from  whence  he  could  discern  the  whole  of  their  or- 
der of  battle  and  attack  their  right  on  even  terms. 
However  general  Graham  advancing  with  the  sev- 
enth division  dislodged  this  Frencii  detachment  with 
a  sharp  skirmish  before  it  could  be  formidably  rein- 
forced, and  that  night  Alarmont  withdrew  from  his 
dangerous  position  to  some  heights  about  six  miles 
in  his  rear. 

It  was  thought  that  the  French  general's  tempes- 
tuous advance  to  Moresco  with  such  an  inferior  force 
on  the  evening  of  the  2i}th,  should  have  been  his  ruin. 
Lord  Vr.dlington  saw  clearly  enough  the  false  posi- 
tion of  his  enemy,  but  he  argued  that  if  Marmont 
came  up  to  fight,  it  was  better  to  defend  a  very 
Btrong  position  than  to  descend  and  combat  in  the 
plain,  seeing  that  the  inferiority  of  force  was  not 
such  as  to  insure  the  result  of  the  battle  being  deci- 
sive of  the  campaign  ;  and  in  case  of  fb.ilure  a  retreat 
across  the  Tormes  would  have  been  very  difficult. 
To  this  may  be  added,  that  during  the  first  evening- 
there  WIS  soTue  confusion  amongst  the  allies  before 
the  troops  of  the  different  nations  could  form  their  or- 
der of  bittle  Moreover,  as  the  descent  of  the  moun- 
tain towards  the  enemy  was  by  no  means  easy,  be- 
cause of  the  walls  and  avenues,  and  the  two  villages 
which  covered  the  French  front,  it  is  probable  that 
Marmont,  who  had  plenty  of  guns,  and  whose  troops 
were  in  perfect  order  and  extremely  ready  of  move- 
ment, could  have  evaded  the  action  until  night. 
This  rep.soning,  however,  will  not  hold  good  on  the 
21.st.  The  allies,  whoso  infantry  was  a  third  more 
and  their  cavalry  three  times  as  numerous  and  much 
better  mounted  than  the  French,  might  have  poured 
down  by  all  the  roads  passing  over  the  position  at 
d-^ybreak  ;  then  Marmont,  turned  on  both  flanks  and 
followed  vehemently,  could  never  have  made  his  re- 
treat to  the  Douro  through  the  open  country  ;  but  on 
the  221,  when  the  French  general  had  received  his 
other  divisions,  the  chances  were  no  longer  the  same. 

Marniont's  new  position  was  skilfully  chosen  ;  one 
fl  vnk  rested  on  Cabeza  Vellosa,  the  other  at  Huerta, 
t!ie  centre  was  at  Aldea  Rubia.  He  thus  refused  his 
r'ght  and  abandoned  the  road  of  Toro  to  the  allies, 
b.it  he  cove  IT  1  the  road  of  Tordesillas,  and  command- 
ed the  fort  of  Huerta  with  his  left,  and  he  could  in  a 
moment  pass  the  Tormes,  and  operate  by  the  left 
bank  tr  communicate  with  the  forts.  Wellington 
made  corresponding  dispositions,  closing  up  his  left 
towards  Moresco,  and  pushing  the  light  division 
along  the  salient  part  of  his  position  to  Aldea  Len- 
gaa,  where  it  overhung  a  ford,  which  was  however 
scarcely  practicable  at  this  period.  General  Graham 
with  two  divisions  was  placed  at  the  fords  of  Santa 
Marta,  and  the  heavy  German  cavalry  under  gi^neral 
Bock  crotJsed  the  Tormes  to  watch  the  ford  of  Huer- 
ta. By  tills  disposition  the  allies  covered  Salaman- 
ca, and  co\ild  operate  on  either  side  of  t!ie  Tormes 
on  a  shorter  line  than  the  French  could  operate. 

The  S-'jd,  the  two  armies  again  remained  tranquil, 


but  at  break  of  day  on  the  24th  some  dropping  pistol- 
shuts,  and  now  and  then  a  shout,  came  liiintly  from 
the  mist  which  covered  tlie  lower  ground  beyond  the 
river  ;  the  lieavy  sound  of  the  artillery  succeeded, 
and  the  hissing  of  the  bullets  as  they  cut  tiircugh 
tlie  thickened  atmosphere,"  plainly  told  that  the 
French  were  over  the  Tormes.  After  a  time  the 
fog  cleared  up,  and  tlie  German  horsemen  were  Heen 
in  close  and  beautiful  order  retiring  bei'ore  twelve 
thousand  French  infantry,  who  in  battle  array  were 
marching  steadily  onwards.  At  intervals,  twenty 
guns,  ranged  in  front,  would  start  forwards  and  send 
their  bullets  whistling  and  tearing  uj)  the  ground 
beneath  the  Germans,  while  scattered  parties  .of 
light  cavalry,  scouting  out,  capped  all  tlie  hills  in 
succession,  and  peering  abroad,  gave  signals  to  the 
main  body.  Wellington  immediately  sent  Graham 
across  the  river  by  the  fords  of  Santa  Marta  with 
the  first  and  seventh  divisions  and  Le  Marchant's 
brigade  of  English  cavalry;  then  concentrating  the 
rest  of  the  army  between  Cabrerizos  and  IMoresco,  he 
awaited  the  progress  of  Marmont's  operation. 

Bock  continued  his  retreat  in  the  same  fine  and 
equable  order,  regardless  alike  of  the  cannonade 
and  of  the  light  horsemen  on  his  flanks,  until  the 
enemy's  scouts  had  gained  a  height  above  Calvarisa 
Abaxo,  from  whence,  at  the  distance  of  three  miles, 
they  for  the  first  time,  perceived  Graham's  twelve 
thousand  men,  and  eighteen  guns,  ranged  on  an  or- 
der of  battle,  perpendicular  to  the  Tormes.  From 
the  same  point  also  Wellington's  heavy  columns 
were  to  be  seen,  clustering  on  the  height  above  the 
fords  of  Santa  Marta,  and  the  light  division  was 
descried  at  Aldea  Lengua,  ready  either  to  advance 
against  the  French  troops  left  on  the  position  of 
Aldea  Rubia,  or  to  pass  the  river  to  the  aid  of  Gra- 
ham. This  apparition  made  the  French  general 
aware  of  his  error,  whereupon  hastily  facing  about, 
and  repassing  the  Tormes,  he  resumed  his  former 
ground. 

Wellington's  defensive  dispositions  on  this  occa- 
sion were  very  skilful,  but  it  would  appear  that 
unwilling  to  stir  before  the  forts  fell,  he  had  again 
refused  the  advantage  of  the  moment  ;  for  it  is  not 
to  be  supposed  that  he  misjudged  the  occasion,  since 
the  whole  theatre  of  operation  was  distinctly  seen 
from  St.  Christoval,  and  he  had  passed  many  hours 
in  earnest  observation  ;  his  faculties  were  indeed  so 
fresh  and  vigorous,  that  after  the  day's  work  he 
v/rote  a  detailed  memoir  upon  the  proposal  for  es- 
tablishing a  bank  in  Portugal,  treating  that  and 
other  financial  schemes  in  all  their  bearings,  with 
a  master  hand.  Against  the  weight  of  his  author- 
ity, therefore,  any  criticism  must  be  advanced. 

Marmont  had  the  easiest  passage  over  the  Tormes 
namely,  that  by  the  ford  of  Huerta  ;  the  allies  had 
the  greatest  number  of  passages  and  the  shortest 
line  of  operations.  Hence  if  Graham  had  been  or- 
dered vigorously  to  attack  the  French  troops  on  the 
left  baTik,  they  must  have  been  driven  upon  the 
single  ford  of  Huerta,  if  not  reinforced  fr(>m  the 
heights  of  Aldea  Rubia.  But  the  allies  rould  also 
have  been  reinforced  by  the  fords  of  Santa  3Iarta 
and  those  of  Cabrerizos,  and  even  by  that  of  Aldea 
Lengua,  although  it  was  not  good  at  this  early 
season.  A  partial  victory  would  then  have  been 
achieved,  or  a  general  battle  would  have  been  brought 
on,  when  the  French  troops  would  have  been  dis- 
advantagenusly  cooped  up  in  the  loop  of  the  Tormes, 
and  without  means  of  escaping  if  defeated.  Again, 
it  is  not  easy  to  see  how  the  Frencli  general  could 
have  avoided  a  serious  defeat  if  Wellington  had 
moved  with  all  the  troops  on  the  right  bank,  against 
the  divisions  left  on  tlie  hill  of  Aldea  Ruba  ;  for 


492 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Bock  XVIII. 


thf*  French  army  would  then  have  been  separated , 
one  part  on  the  hither,  one  on  the  lurther  bank  of 
the  Tormes.  It  v.'as  said  at  the  time  tliat  Marmont 
hoped  to  draw  the  whole  of"  the  allies  acrots  the 
river,  when  he  would  have  seized  tlie  position  of 
Christoviil,  raised  the  sie^e  and  maintained  the  line 
of  the  Tormcp.  It  may  liovvever  be  doubted  that  he 
expected  Wellington  to  commit  so  gross  an  error.  It 
16  more  ikely  t!iat  iiolJing  his  own  army  to  be  tlie 
quickest  of  movement,  his  object  was  to  separate  the 
allies'  force  in  the  hopes  of  gaining  some  partial 
advantage  to  enable  him  to  communicate  with  his 
fortp,  whicli  were  nov/  in  great  danger. 

When  the  French  retired  to  the  heights  at  Aldea 
Rubia  on  the  night  of  the  2.'.'d,  the  heavy  guns  had 
been  already  brought  to  the  right  of  the  Tormes, 
and  a  third  battery,  to  breach  San  Cajetano,  was 
armed  with  four  pieces,  but  the  line  of  fire  being 
oblique,  the  practice,  at  four  hundred  and  fifty  yards, 
only  beat  down  the  parapet  and  knocked  away  the 
palisades.  Time  was  however  of  vital  importance, 
the  escalade  of  that  fort  and  La  Merced  was  ordered, 
and  the  attack  commenced  at  ten  o'clock,  but  in 
half  an  hour  failed  with  a  loss  of  one  hundred  and 
twenty  men  and  ofncers.  The  wounded  were  brought 
o.T  the  next  day  under  truce,  and  the  enemy  had  all 
the  credit  of  tlie  fight,  yet  the  death  of  general 
Bowes  must  ev=;r  be  admired.  That  gallant  man, 
whose  rank  might  have  excused  his  leading  so  small 
a  force,  being  wounded  early,  was  having  his  hurt 
dressed  when  he  heard  that  the  troops  were  yield- 
ing, and  returning  to  the  combat  fell. 

The  siege  was  now  perforce  suspended  for  want 
of  ammunition,  and  the  guns  were  sent  across  the 
river,  but  were  immediately  brought  back  in  con- 
sequence of  Marmont  having  crossed  to  the  left  bank. 
Certain  works  were  meanwhile  puslied  forward  to 
cut  off  the  communication  between  the  forts  and 
otherwise  to  straiten  them,  and  the  miner  was  at- 
tached to  the  cliff  on  which  La  Merced  stood.  The 
final  success  was  not  however  influenced  by  these 
operations,  and  they  need  no  further  notice. 

The  26tii,  ammunition  arrived  from  Almeida,  the 
second  and  third  batteries  were  rearmed,  the  field- 
pieces  were  again  placed  in  the  convent  of  San 
Bernardo,  and  the  iron  howitzers,  throwing  hot 
shot,  set  the  convent  of  San  Yincente  on  fire  in  se- 
veral places.  The  garrison  again  extinguished  the 
flames,  and  this  balanced  combat  continued  during 
the  night,  but  on  the  morning  of  the  27th,  the  fire 
of  both  batteries  being  redoubled,  the  convent  of 
San  Vincente  was  in  a  blaze,  the  breach  of  San 
Cajetano  was  improved,  a  fresh  storming  party  as- 
sembled, and  the  white  flag  waved  from  (^njr^tano. 
A  negotiation  ensued,  but  lord  Wellington,  judging 
it  an  artifice  to  gain  time,  gave  orders  for  the  as- 
sault;  then  the  forts  fell,  for  San  Csijetano  scarcely 
fired  a  shot,  and  the  flames  raged  so  violently  at 
San  Vincente  tliat  no  opposition  could  be  made. 

Seven  hundred  prisoners,  thirty  pieces  of  artillery, 
provisions,  arms,  and  rlotiiing,  and  a  secure  passage 
over  tlie  Tormes,  were  the  immediate  fruits  of  tliis 
capture,  wliich  w:i3  not  tlie  less  prized,  that  the 
breaches  were  found  to  be  more  formidable  than 
those  at  Cin  lad  llodrigo.  The  sue  ess  of  a  storm 
would  have  been  very  doubtful  if  the  ."-orrison  could 
have  gained  time  to  extinguish  the  flames  in  the 
convent  of  San  Vincente,  and  as  it  was  the  allies 
had  nin'^ty  killed  ;  tlieir  whole  loss  since  the  passage 
of  the  Tormes  was  nearly  five  hundred  men  and 
oflficers,  of  whicli  one  hundred  and  sixty  men  with 
fifty  horses,  fell  outside  Salamanca,  the  rest  in  the 
siege. 

Mannont  had  allotted  fiflejri  days  as  the  t-rm  of 


resistance  for  these  forts,  but  from  the  facility  with 
which  San  Vincente  caugiit  fire,  five  would  have 
been  too  many  if  ammunition  had  not  failed.  Hie 
calculation  was  therefore  false.  lie  would  however 
have  fought  on  the  2Md,  when  his  force  was  united, 
liad  he  not  on  the  22d  received  intelligence  from 
CafTarelli,  tliat  a  powerful  body  of  infiintry,  with 
twenty-two  guns,  and  all  the  cavalry  of  the  nortii, 
were  actually  in  march  to  join  him.  It  was  this 
which  induced  him  to  occupy  the  heights  of  Villa 
Rubia,  on  that  day.  to  avoid  a  premature  action, 
but  on  tiie  evening  of  the  20th  the  signals,  from  the 
forts,  having  indicated  that  they  could  still  hold  out 
three  days,  Marmont,  from  fi-osh  intelligence,  no 
longer  expected  Cafiarelli's  troops,  and  resolved  to 
give  battle  on  the  2bth.  The  fall  of  the  forts,  which 
was  made  known  to  him  on  the  evening  of  the  27  th, 
changed  this  determination,  the  reasons  for  fighting 
on  such  disadvantageous  ground  no  longer  existed, 
and  hence,  withdrawing  his  garrison  from  the  castle 
of  Alba  de  Tormes,  he  retreated  during  the  night 
towards  the  Duero,  by  the  roads  cf  Tordesillas  and 
Toro. 

Wellington  ordered  the  works  both  at  Alba  and 
the  forts  of  Salamanca  to  be  destroyed,  and  liollcwing 
the  enemy  by  easy  marches,  encamped  on  the  Gua- 
rena  the  3Gth.  The  next  day  he  reached  the  Tra- 
bancos,  his  advanced  guard  being  at  Nava  del  Rey. 
On  the  2d,  he  passed  the  Zaj)ardicl  in  two  columns, 
the  right  marching  by  Medina  del  Campo.  the  left 
following  the  advanced  guard  towards  Rueda.  From 
this  place  the  French  rear  guard  was  cannonaded 
and  driven  upon  the  main  body,  which  was  filing 
over  the  bridge  of  Tordesillas.  Seme  were  killed 
and  some  made  prisoners,  not  many,  but  there  was 
great  confusion,  and  a  heavy  disaster  v.culd  have 
befallen  the  French  if  the  English  general  l.'ad  rot 
been  deceived  by  false  infl  rniotion,  that  they  had 
broken  the  bridge  tlie  night  before.  For  as  he  knew 
by  intercepted  letters  that  Jlarmont  intended  to  tak 
a  position  near  Tordesillas,  this  report  made  hin. 
suppose  the  enemy  was  already  over  the  Duero,  and 
hence  he  had  spread  his  troops,  and  was  net  in  sufii- 
cient  force  to  attack  during  the  passage  cf  the  river. 

Marmont,  who  had  fijrtified  pests  at  Zr.mora  and 
Toro,  rnd  had  broken  the  bridges  at  those  I'laces  and 
at  Puente  Duero  and  Tudela,  preserving  cnly  that  of 
Tordesillas,  now  took  a  position  on  the  right  of  the 
Duero.  His  left  was  at  Simancas  on  the  Pisuerga, 
which  was  unfordable,  and  the  bridges  at  th.at  place 
and  Valladolid  were  commanded  by  fortified  pests. 
His  centre  was  at  Tordesillas,  and  very  numerous, 
ar.d  his  right  was  on  some  heights  opposite  to  Polios. 
Wellington  indeed  caused  the  third  division  to  seize 
the  ford  at  the  last  place,  which  gave  him  a  com- 
mand of  the  river,  because  there  was  a  plain  between 
it  and  the  enemy's  heights,  but  the  ford  itself  waa 
difficult  and  insuflicient  for  passing  the  whole  army. 
Head-quarters  were  therefore  fixed  at  Ruec'o,  and  tl  e 
forces  were  disposed  in  a  comi)uct  form,  tiie  head 
placed  in  opposition  to  the  ford  of  Pclhs  and  the 
bridge  of  Tordesillas,  the  rear  occupying  Medina  del 
Campo  and  other  j)oints  on  the  Zapardiel  and  Tra- 
bancos  rivers,  ready  to  ojjpose  tlie  enemy  if  he  should 
break  out  from  the  Valladolid  side.  3Iarmont's  line 
of delonce,  measured  from  Valladolid  to  Zamora,  waa 
sixty  miles,  from  Simancas  to  Toro  abovp  thirty, 
but  the  actual  line  of  occupation  was  not  above 
tweh'e  ;  the  bend  of  the  river  gave  him  the  chord, 
the  allies  the  arc,'and  the  fords  were  few  and  ditii- 
cult.  The  advantage  was  therefore  on  the  side  of 
the  enemy  :  but  to  understand  the  true  position  of 
the  contending  generals  it  is  necessary  to  know  the 
secondary  coincident  oiications. 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


493 


While  th3  armies  were  in  presence  at  Salamanca, 
Silvelra  had  fil«d  up  the  Duero,  to  the  Esla  river, 
insnacing  the  French  communications  with  Bcna- 
V3nt'3.  D'Urban's  horsemen  liad  passed  the  Duero 
below  Zaraora  on  the  25tii,  and  cut  off  all  intercourse 
between  the  French  army  and  that  place;  but  when 
Marmont  i'ell  back  from  Aldea  Rubia,  D'Urban  re- 
crossad  the  Duero  at  Fre^sno  de  la  Ribera  to  avoid 
being  crushed,  yet  immediately  afterwards  advanced 
beyond  Toro  to  Castromonte,  behind  the  right  wing 
of  the  enemy's  new  position.  It  was  part  of  Wel- 
lington's plan,  that  Castanos,  after  establishing  the 
siege  of  Astorga,  should  come  down  by  Benavente 
with  the  remainder  of  his  army  and  place  himself  in 
communication  with  Silveira.  This  operation,  with- 
out disarranging  the  siege  of  Astorga,  would  have 
placed  twelve  or  fifteen  tiiousand  men,  infantry,  cav- 
alry, and  artillery,  behind  the  Esla  and  with  secure 
lines  of  retreat ;  consequently  able  to  check  all  the 
enemy's  foraging  parties,  and  reduce  him  to  live 
upon  his  fixed  magazines,  which  were  scanty.  The 
usual    Spanish  procrastination  defeated  this  plan. 

Castanos,  by  the  help  of  the  succours  received 
from  England,  had  assembled  fifteen  thousand  men 
at  Ponteferada,  under  the  command  of  Santocildes, 
but  he  pretended  that  he  had  no  battering  guns  un- 
til sir  Howard  Douglas  actually  pointed  them  out 
in  the  arsenal  of  Ferrol  and  shewed  him  how  to  con- 
vey them  to  the  frontier.  Then  Santocildes  moved, 
though  slowly,  and  when  Bonet's  retreat  from  the 
Asturias  was  known,  eleven  thousand  men  invested 
Astorga  and  four  thousand  others  marched  to  Bena- 
vente, but  not  until  Marmont  had  called  his  detach- 
ment in  from  that  place.  The  Spanish  battering 
train  only  reached  Gilla  Franca  del  Bierzo  on  the 
1st  of  July.  However  the  guerilla  chief  Marquinez 
appeared  about  Palencia,  and  the  other  partidas  of 
Castile  acting  on  a  line  from  Leon  to  Segovia,  inter- 
cepted Marmont's  correspondence  with  the  king. 
Thus  the  immense  tract  called  the  Cnriipo  de  Ticrras 
was  secured  for  the  subsistence  of  the  Gall'.cian 
army  ;  and  to  the  surprise  of  the  allies,  who  had  so 
often  heard  of  the  enemy's  terrible  devastations,  that 
they  expected  to  find  Castile  a  desert,  those  vast 
plains  and  undulating  hills  were  covered  with  ripe 
corn  or  fruitful  vines,  and  the  villages  bore  few 
marks  of  the  ravages  of  war. 

While  the  main  body  of  the  Gallicians  was  still 
at  Ponte  Fcrrada,  a  separate  division  had  passed 
along  the  coast  road  into  the  Asturias,  and  in  con- 
c^ert  with  part  of  the  seventh  army  had  harassed 
Bonet's  retreat  from  that  kingdom  ;  the  French  gen- 
eral indeed  forced  his  way  by  the  eastern  passes,  and 
taking  post  the  3Cth  of  June  at  Rsynosa  and  Aguilar 
del  Campo,  chased  the  neighbouring  bands  away, 
but  this  movement  was  one  of  the  great  errors  of  the 
campaign.  Napoleon  and  Wellington  felt  alike  the 
importance  of  holding  the  Asturias  at  this  period. 
The  one  had  ordered  tliat  they  should  be  retained, 
the  other  had  calculated  that  such  would  be  the  case, 
and  the  judgment  of  both  was  quickly  made  manifest. 
For  the  Gallicians,  who  would  not  have  dared  to 
quit  the  Bierzo  if  Bonet  had  menaced  their  province 
by  Lugo,  or  by  the  shore  line  invested  Astorga  the 
moment  he  quitted  the  Asturias.  And  the  partidas 
of  the  north,  who  had  beon  completely  depressr-d  by 
Mina's  defeat,  recovering  courage,  now  moved  to- 
wards the  coast,  where  Popham's  expedition,  wliich 
had  sailed  on  the  18th  of  June  from  Coruna,  soon 
appeared,  a  formidable  spectacle,  for  there  were  five 
sail  of  the  line  with  many  frigates  and  brigs,  in  all 
twenty  ships  of  war. 

The  port  of  Lesquito  was  immediately  attacked 
on  the  sea-board  by  this  squadron,  on  the  land  side 


by  the  Pastor,  and  when  captain  Bouverie  got  a 
gun  up  to  breach  tiie  convent  the  Spanish  chief  as- 
saulted but  was  repulsed  ;  however  tiie  garrison,  two 
hundred  and  fifty  strong,  surrendered  to  the  squadron 
the  22A,  and  on  the  two  following  days  Bermeo  and 
Plencia  fell.  The  partidas  failed  to  appear  at  Guc- 
taria,  but  Castro  and  Portagalete  in  the  Bilbao  river 
were  attacked  the  tith  of  July  in  concert  with  Lon- 
ga,  and  though  the  latter  was  rebufi'ed  at  Bilbao  the 
squadron  took  Castro.  Tlie  enemy  recovered  some 
of  their  posts  on  the  Ifth,  and  on  the  19th,  the  at 
tempt  on  Guetaria  being  renewed,  Mina  and  the  Pas 
tor  came  down  to  co-operate,  but  a  French  column 
beat  those  chiefs  and  drove  the  British  seamen  to 
their  vessels  with  the  loss  of  thirty  men  and  two  guns 

It  was  the  opinion  of  general  Carrol,  who  accom- 
panied this  expedition,  that  the  plan  of  operations 
was  ill-arranged,  but  the  local  successes  merit  no  at* 
tention,  the  great  object  of  distracting  the  enemy 
was  obtained.  Caff'arelli  heard  at  one  and  the  same 
time  that  Palombini's  division  had  been  called  to 
Madrid,  that  Bonct  had  abandoned  the  Asturias, 
that  a  Gallician  division  had  entered  that  province, 
that  a  powerful  English  fleet  containing  troops  waa 
on  the  coast  and  acting  in  concert  with  all  the  par- 
tidas of  the  north,  tiiat  tlie  seventh  army  was  mcna 
cing  Burgos,  and  that  the  whole  country  was  in 
commotion.  Trembling  for  his  own  districts  he  in- 
stantly arrested  the  march  of  the  divisions  destined 
for  Marmont  ;  and  although  the  king,  who  saw  very 
clearly  the  real  object  of  the  maritime  expedition, 
reiterated  the  orders  to  march  upon  Segovia  or  Cuel- 
lar,  with  a  view  to  reinforce  either  the  army  of  the 
centre  or  the  army  of  Portugal,  Caffarelli  delayed 
obedience  until  the  13th  of  July,  and  then  sent  but 
eighteen  hundred  cavalry  with  twenty  guns. 

Thus  Bonet's  movement  which  only  brought  a  re- 
inforcement of  six  thousand  infantry  to  JMarmont, 
kept  away  Caffarelli's  reserves,  v/hich  were  twelve 
thousand  of  all  arms,  uncovered  tl'p  whole  of  the 
great  French  line  of  communication,  and  caused  the 
siege  of  Astorga  to  be  commenced.  And  while  Bcn- 
et  was  in  mnrch  by  Palencia  and  Valladolid  to  the 
position  of  Tordesillas,  the  king  heard  of  Marmont'a 
retreat  from  the  Tormes,  and  that  an  English  col- 
umn menaced  Arevalo  ;  wherefore  not  being  ready 
to  move  with  tlie  army  of  the  centre,  and  fen  ring  for 
Avila,  he  withdre\V  the  garrison  from  that  place,  and 
thus  lost  his  direct  line  of  correspondence  with  the 
army  of  Portugal,  because  Segovia  was  environed  by 
the  partidas.  In  this  state  of  afiairs  neither  Wcl 
lington  nor  Marmont  had  reason  to  fight  upon  the 
Duero.  The  latter  because  his  position  was  so 
strong  he  could  safely  wait  for  Bonet's  and  Caflarel- 
li's  troops,  and  meanwhile  the  king  could  operate 
against  the  allies'  communications.  The  former  be- 
cause he  could  not  attack  the  French  except  at  great 
disadvantage,  for  the  fords  of  Duero  were  little 
known,  and  that  of  Polios  was  very  deep.  To  pass 
the  river  there  and  form  within  gun-shct  of  the  ene- 
my's loft  without  other  combinations,  promised  noth- 
ing but  defeat,  and  the  staff"  officers,  sent  to  examine 
the  course  of  the  river,  reported  that  the  advantage 
of  ground  was  entirely  on  the  enemy's  side,  except 
at  Castro  Nuiio,  halfway  between  Polios  and  Toro. 

While  the  enemy  commanded  the  bridge  at  Tor- 
desillas  no  attempt  to  force  the  passage  of  the  river 
could  be  safe,  seeing  that  Marmont  might  fall  on  the 
allies'  front  and  rear  if  the  operation  was  within  ins 
reach  ;  and  if  beyond  his  reach,  that  is  to  say  near 
Zamora,  he  could  cut  their  communication  with 
Ciudad  Rodrigo  and  yet  preserve  his  own  with  Caf- 
farelli and  with  the  king.  Wellington  tliprofbrc  re- 
solved to  wait  until  the  fords  should  become  lower 


'i94 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XVIII. 


or  the  comb'nscl  operations  of  the  Gallicians  and  : 
partidas  should  oblige  tlie  enemy  either  to  detach; 
man  or  to  dislodge  altogether  for  want  of  provisions. ! 
In  this  view  he  urged  Santoc ikies  to  press  the  siege  | 
of  Astorga  vigorously,  and  to  send  every  man  he  i 
could  s;)art;  down  the  Esla  ;  and  an  intercepted  letter  j 
gave  hopes  that  Astorga  would  surrender  on  the  7th, ' 
yet  this  seems  to  have  been  a  device  to  keep  the  i 
Gallicians  in  tliat  quarter,  for  it  was  in  no  danger,  i 
Santocildes  expecting  its  fall  would  not  detach  men,i 
but  the  vicinity  of  D'Urban's  cavalry,  which  re- 
mained at  Castromonte,  so  incommoded  the  French 
right  that  Foy  marched  to  drive  them  beyond  the 
Esla.  (rsnsral  Packenliam,  however,  crossed  the 
ford  of  Polios  with  some  of  the  third  division,  which 
quickly  brouglit  Foy  back,  and  Marmont  then  en- 
deavoured to  augment  the  number  and  etiiciency  of 
his  cavalry  by  taking  a  thousand  horses  from  the  in- 
fantry officers  and  the  sutlers. 

On  the  8th,  Bonet  arrived,  and  the  French  marshal 
immediately  extending  his  right  to  Toro,  commen- 
ced repairing  the  bridge  there.  Wellington,  in  like 
manner,  stretched  his  left  to  the  Guarena,  yet  kept 
his  centre  still  on  the  Trabancos,  and  his  right  at 
Rueda,  with  posts  near  Tordesillas  and  the  ford  of 
Polios.  In  this  situation  the  armies  remained  for 
some  days.  Generals  Graham  and  Picton  went  to 
England  in  bad  health,  and  the  principal  powder 
magazine  at  Salamanca  exploded  with  hurt  to  many, 
but  no  other  events  worth  recording  occurred.  The 
weather  was  very  tine,  the  country  rich,  and  the 
troops  received  their  rations  regularly  ;  wine  was  so 
plentiful  that  it  was  hard  to  keep  the  soldiers  sober  ; 
the  cavas  of  Rueda,  either  natural  or  cut  in  the  rock 
below  the  surface  of  the  eartli,  were  so  immense  and 
so  well  stocked,  that  the  durnkards  of  the  two  armies 
failed  to  make  any  very  sensible  diminution  in  the 
quant'ty.  Many  men  of  both  sides  perished  in  that 
labyrinth,  and  on  both  sides,  also,  the  soldiers  pass- 
ing the  Duero  in  groups,  held  amicable  intercourse, 
conversing  of  tiie  battles  that  were  yet  to  be  fought ; 
the  camijs  on  the  banks  of  the  Ducro  seemed  at  times 
to  belong  to  one  army,  so  difficult  is  it  to  make  brave 
men  hate  each  other. 

To  the  officers  of  the  allies  all  looked  prosperous, 
their  only  anxiety  was  to  receive  the  signal  of  bat- 
tle, tiieir  only  discontent  that  it  was  delayed,  and 
many  amongst  them  murmured  that  the  French  had 
been  permitted  to  retreat  from  Christoval.  Had 
Wellington  been  finally  forced  back  to  Portugal  his 
reputation  would  have  been  grievously  assailed  by 
his  own  peo;)lc,  for  the  majority,  peering  through 
their  misty  politics,  saw  Paris  in  dim  perspective, 
and  overlooked  the  enormous  French  armies  that 
were  close  at  hand.  Jleanwliile  their  general's 
mind  was  filled  with  care  and  mortification,  and  all 
cross  and  evil  circumstances  seemed  to  combine 
against  him. 

The  mediation  for  the  Spanish  colonies  had  just 
failed  at  Cadiz,  under  such  circumstances  as  left  no 
doubt  that  the  I'inglish  influence  was  powerless  and 
the  French  influonr^e  visibly  increasing  in  the  Cor- 
tez.  Soult  harl  twenty-seven  gun-boats  in  the  Tro- 
cadero  canal,  sliells  were  cast  day  and  night  into 
the  city,  and  ttie  people  were  alarmed  ;  two  thousand 
French  had  marched  from  Santa  Mary,  ap[)arently 
to  reinforce  Drount  in'Estremadura  ;  Echevaria  had 
eiFectcd  nothing  in  the  kingdom  of  Cordoba,  and  a 
French  division  was  assembling  at  Bornos  to  attack 
Ballesterop,  whoso  rashness,  invit'iig  destruction, 
miglit  alone  put  an  end  to  the  cam[)aign  in  Leon 
and  bring  Wellington  back  to  the  Tagus.  In  the 
north  of  Spain,  also,  affairs  appeared  equi'lly  gloo- 
my, AliuaV  d  'ffts  rn  1  ''•'■■  inflirwi .e  n;.(in  the  oth- 


er partidas,  were  positively  known,  but  the  efTecl 
of  Pophanvs  operations  was  unknown,  or  at  least 
doubtful.  Bonet's  division  had  certainly  arrived, 
and  the  Gallicians,  who  had  done  nothing  at  Astor« 
ga,  were  already  in  want  of  ammunition.  In  Cas- 
tile the  activity  of  the  partidas  instead  of  increasing 
had  diminished  after  Wellington  crossed  the  Tormes, 
and  the  chiefs  seemed  inclined  to  leave  tlie  burthen 
of  the  war  entirely  to  their  allies.  Nor  was  this 
feeling  confined  to  them.  It  had  been  arranged, 
that  new  corps,  especially  of  cavalry,  should  be 
raised,  as  the  enemy  receded  in  this  cami.aign,  and 
the  necessary  clothing  and  equipments  supplied  by 
England,  were  placed  at  the  disposal  of  lord  Wel- 
lington, who,  to  avoid  the  burthern  of  carriage,  had 
directed  them  to  Coruha  ;  yet  now,  when  Leon  and 
the  Asturias  were  in  a  manner  recovered,  no  man 
would  serve  voluntarily.  There  was  great  enthusi- 
asm, in  words,  there  had  always  been  so,  but  the 
fighting  men  were  not  increased,  and  even  the  J7ira- 
meiitados,  many  of  whom  deserted  at  this  time  from 
the  king,  well  clothed  and  soldier-like  men,  refiised 
to  enter  the  English  ranks. 

Now  also  came  the  news  that  lord  William  Ben* 
tinck's  plans  were  altered,  and  the  intercepted  de- 
spatches shewed  that  the  king  had  again  ordered 
Drouet  to  pass  the  Tagus,  but  Soult's  resistance  to 
this  order  was  not  known.  Wellington  therefore 
at  the  same  moment  saw  Marmont's  army  increase, 
I  heard  that  the  king's  army,  reinforced  by  Drouet, 
was  on  the  point  of  taking  the  field  ;  that  the  troopa 
from  Sicily,  upon  whose  operations  he  depended  to 
keep  all  the  army  of  Aragon  in  the  eastern  part  of 
Spain,  and  even  to  turn  the  king's  attention  that 
way,  were  to  be  sent  to  Italy  ;  and  that  two  millions 
of  dollars,  which  he  hoped  to  have  obtained  at  Gib- 
raltar, had  been  swept  oil' by  lord  William  Bentinck 
for  this  Italian  expedition,  which  thus  at  once  de- 
prived him  of  men  and  money  !  The  latter  was  the 
most  serious  blow  ;  the  promised  remittnnces  from 
England  had  not  arrived,  and  as  the  insufiiciency  of 
land-carriage  rendered  it  nearly  impossible  to  feed 
the  army  even  on  the  Duero,  to  venture  further  into 
Spain  without  money  would  be  akin  to  madness. 
From  Gallicia,  where  no  credit  was  given,  came  the 
supjdy  of  meat ;  a  stoppage  there  would  have  made 
the  war  itself  stop,  and  no  greater  error  had  been 
committed  by  the  enemy,  than  delaying  to  conquer 
Gallicia,  which  could  many  times  have  been  done. 

To  meet  the  increasing  exigences  for  money,  the 
English  general  had,  for  one  resource,  obtained  a 
credit  of  half  a  million  from  the  treasury  to  answer 
certain  certificates,  or  notes  of  hand,  which  hia 
Spanish  correspondents  promised  to  get  caslied  ;  but 
of  this  resource  he  was  now  suddenly  deprived  by 
tlie  English  ministers,  who  objected  to  tlie  irregular 
form  of  the  certificates,  because  he,  with  his  usual 
sagacity,  had  adapted  them  to  the  habits  rf  the  peo- 
ple he  was  to  deal  with.  Meanwhile  his  troops 
were  four,  his  staff  six,  Iiis  muleteers  nearly  twelve 
months  in  arrears  of  pay,  and  he  was  in  debt  every 
where  and  for  every  thing.  The  Portuguese  gov- 
ernment had  become  very  clamorous  for  the  subsidy  ; 
Mr.  Stuart  acknowledged  that  their  distress  was 
very  great,  and  the  desertion  from  the  Portuguese 
army,  which  augmented  in  an  alarming  manner,  and 
seemed  rather  to  be  increased  tlian  repressed  by  se- 
verity, sufficiently  proved  their  misery.  The  per- 
sonal resources  of  Wellington  alone  enabled  the 
army  to  maintain  its  forward  position,  for  he  had, 
to  a  certain  extent,  carried  his  commercial  specula 
tions  into  Gallicia,  as  well  as  Portugal  ;  and  he  had 
persuaded  the  Spanish  authorities  in  Cnstile  to  give 
up  a  part  of  their  revenue  in  kind  to  the  army,  re 


1812.1 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


495 


ceiving'  bills  on  the  British  embassy  at  Cadiz  in  re- 
turn. But  the  situation  of  atlairs  may  be  best  learn- 
ed from  the  moutlis  of  the  generals. 

"  The  arrears  of  the  army  are  certainly  getting  to 
an  alarming  pitch,  and  if  it  is  sutfered  to  increase 
we  cannot  go  on  :  we  have  only  here  two  brigades  of 
infantry  i'ad  by  our  own  commissariat,  and  we  are 
now  roduced  to  one  of  them  iiaving  barely  bread  for 
this  day,  and  the  commissary  has  not  a  fartliing  of 
money.     I  know  not  how  we  shall  get  on  !  " 

Such  were  Baresford's  words  on  the  8th  of  July, 
and  on  tiie  15th,  Wellington  wrote  even  more  for- 
cibly. 

"  I  have  never,"  said  he,  "  been  in  such  distress 
as  at  present,  and  some  serious  misfortune  must  hap- 
pen, if  the  government  do  not  attend  seriously  to  the 
subject,  and  supply  us  regularly  with  money.  The 
arrears  and  distresses  of  the  Portuguese  govern- 
ment are  a  joke  to  ours,  and  if  cur  credit  was  not 
better  than  theirs,  we  should  certainly  starve.  As 
it  is,  if  we  don't  find  means  to  pay  our  bills  for 
butcher's  meat  there  will  be  an  end  to  the  war  at 
once."' 

Thus  stript  as  it  were  to  the  skin,  the  English 
general  thought  once  more  to  hide  his  nakedness  in 
the  mountains  of  Portugal,  v/hen  Marmont,  proud  of 
his  own  unripened  skill,  and,  perhaps,  from  the  ex- 
perience of  San  Christoval,  undervaluing  his  adver- 
sary's tactics,  desirous  also,  it  was  said,  to  gain  a 
victory  without  the  presence  of  a  king',,  M^nxiont, 
pushed  on  by  fate,  madly  broke  the  chain  which  re- 
strained his  enemy's  strength. 


CHAPTER  Til. 

Bonet  arrives  in  the  French  camp — Marmonl  passes  the  Du- 
ero — (Ifim'i^tof  Caslrcjon — Allies  retire  across  the  Gua- 
rena — CJoinhat  on  that  river — Observations  on  the  move' 
meni-; — Marmont  turns  Wellington's  flank — Retreat  to 
San  Christoval — Marmont  passes  the  Tonnes — Battle  of 
Salamanca — Anecdote  of  Mrs.  Dalbiac. 

Whkn  Wellington  found  by  the  intercepted  letters 
that  the  king's  orders  for  Drouet  to  cross  the  Tasrus, 
were  reiterated  and  imperative,  he  directed  Hill  to 
detach  troops  in  the  same  proportion.  And  as  this 
reinforcement,  coming  by  the  way  of  Alcantara, 
could  reach  the  Duero  as  soon  as  Drouet  could  reach 
Madrid,  he  hoped  still  to  maintain  the  Tormes,  if 
not  the  Duero,  notwithstanding  the  king's  power; 
fir  some  money,  long  expected  from  England,  had  at 
last  arrived  in  Oporto,  and  he  thought  the  Galli- 
cians,  maugre  their  inertness,  must  soon  be  felt  by 
the  enemy.  Mareover,  the  harvest  on  the  ground, 
however  abundant,  could  not  long  feed  the  Fnmch 
multitudes  if  Drouet  and  the  king  should  together 
join  Marmont.  Nevertheless,  fearing  the  action  of 
Joseph's  cavalry,  he  ordered  D'Urban's  horsemen  to 
join  the  army  on  the  Duero.  But  to  understand  the 
remarkable  movements  which  were  now  about  to 
commence,  the  reader  must  bear  in  mind,  that  the 
French  anny,  from  its  peculiar  organization,  could, 
while  the  ground  harvest  lasted,  operate  without 
any  regard  to  lines  of  communication  ;  it  had  sup- 
ports on  all  sides  and  procured  its  food  every  where, 
for  the  troops  were  taught  to  reap  the  standing  corn, 
and  grind  it  themselves  if  their  cavalry  could  not 
eeize  flour  in  the  villages.  This  organization  ap- 
proaching the  ancient  Roman  military  perfection, 
gave  them  great  advantages;  in  the  field  it  ba filed 
the  irregular,  and  threw  the  regular  force  of  the  al- 
lies entirely  upon  the  defensive  ;  because  when  the 
flanks  were  turned,  a  retreat  only  could  save  the 


communications,  and  the  French  offered  no  point  f  r 
retaliation  in  kind.  Wherefore,  with  a  toioe  com- 
posed of  four  dilferent  nations,  Wellington  v.rs  to 
execute  the  most  difficult  evolutions  in  an  open  coun- 
try, his  chances  of  success  being  to  arise  only  ficm 
the  casual  errors  of  his  adversary,  who  was  an  able 
general,  who  knew  the  country  perl'ectly,  and  was  at 
the  head  of  an  army,  brave,  excellently  disciplined, 
and  of  one  nation.  The  game  would  have  been  quite 
unequal  if  the  English  general  had  not  been  bo 
strong  in  cavalry. 

FRENCH  PASSAGE  OF  THE  PUERO 

In  the  course  of  the  15th  and  16th,  Marmont,  wno 
had  previously  made  several  deceptive  movements, 
concentrated  iiis  beautiful  and  gallant  army  between 
Toro  and  the  Hornija  river  ;  and  intercej  ted  letters, 
the  reports  of  deserters,  and  the  talk  of  peasunts,  had 
for  several  days  assigned  the  former  place  as  hia 
point  of  passage.  On  the  morning  of  the  I6th,  the 
English  exploring  officers,  passing  the  Duero  near 
Tordesillas,  found  only  the  garrison  there,  and  in  the 
evening  the  reports  stated  that  two  Frencli  divis- 
ions had  already  passed  the  repaired  bridge  of  Toro. 
Wellington  united  his  centre  and  left  at  Canizol  on 
the  Guarena  during  the  night,  intending  to  attack 
those  who  had  passed  at  Toro  ;  but  as  he  had  still 
some  doubts  of  the  enemy's  real  object,  he  caused  sir 
Stapleton  Cotton  to  halt  on  tiie  Trabanccs  with  the 
right  wing,  composed  of  the  fourth  and  ligiit  divis 
ions  and  Anson's  cavalry.  Meanwhile  JMErmcnt,  re- 
calling his  troops  from  the  left  bank  of  the  Duero,  re- 
turned to  Tordesillas  and  Polios,  passed  that  river  at 
those  points  and  occupied  Nava  del  Key,  where  his 
whole  army  was  concentrated  in  the  evening  of  the 
17th,  some  of  his  divisions  having  njarched  above 
forty  miles,  and  some  above  fifty  miles,  without  a 
halt.  The  English  cavalry  posts  being  thus  driven 
over  the  Trabancos,  advice  of  the  enemy's  movement 
was  sent  to  lord  Wellington,  but  he  was  then  near 
Toro,  it  was  midnight  ere  it  reached  him,  and  the 
troops  under  Cotton  remained  near  Castrejon  behind 
the  Trabancos  during  the  night  of  the  Hth,  without 
orders,  exposed,  in  a  bad  position,  to  the  attack  of 
the  whole  French  army.  Wellington  hastened  to 
their  aid  in  person,  and  he  ordered  Bock's,  Le  IMar- 
chant's,  and  Alton's  brigades  of  cavalry  to  follow 
him  to  Alaejos,  and  the  fifth  division  to  take  post 
at  Torrecilla  de  la  Orden,  six  miles  in  rear  of  Cas- 
trejon. 

At  daybreak  Cotton's  outposts  were  again  driven 
in  by  the  enemy,  and  the  bulk  of  his  cavalry  with  a 
troop  of  horse  artillery  immediately  formed  in  front 
of  the  two  infantry  divisions,  whicli  were  drawn  up, 
the  fourth  division  on  the  left,  the  light  division  en 
the  right,  but  at  a  considerable  distance  from  each 
other  and  sej)arated  by  a  wide  ravine.  The  country 
was  open  and  hilly,  like  tlie  downs  of  England,  with 
here  and  there  water-gulleys,  dry  hollovrs,  and  held 
naked  heads  of  land,  and  beliind  the  most  prominent 
of  these  last,  on  tlie  other  side  of  tiie  Trabancos,  laj 
the  whole  French  army.  Cotton,  however,  seeing 
only  horsemen,  pushed  his  cavalry  again  towards  the 
river,  advancing  cautiously  by  his  right  along  some 
high  table-land,  and  liis  troops  were  soon  lost  to  the 
view  of  the  infantry,  for  the  morning  fog  was  thick 
on  tlie  stream,  and  at  first  nothing  could  be  descried 
beyond.  But  very  soon  the  deep  tones  of  artillery 
shook  the  ground,  the  sharp  ring  of  musketry  was 
iieard  in  the  mist,  and  tiie  forty-third  regin;ent  waa 
hastily  brought  tlirough  Casfrejon  to  supjiort  the 
advancing  cavalry  ;  for  besides  the  ravine  which 
separated  the  fourth  from  the  liglit  division^  there 
was  another  ravine  with  a  marshy  bottom,  between 


496 


KAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


[Book  XVIII. 


the  cavalry  and  infantry,  and  the  village  of  Cas- 
trejon  was  the  only  g^ood  point  of  passage. 

'J'he  cannonade  now  becnme  heavy,  and  the  spec- 
tacle 6nrprisin<Tly  beautiful,  for  the  lighter  Fmoke 
and  mist,  curlinj  up  in  fantastic  pillars,  formed  a 
hu'^c  and  glittering  dome  tinged  of  many  colours 
by  the  rising  sun  ;  and  through  the  grosser  vapour 
balow,  the  restless  horsemen  were  seen  or  lost  as 
the  fume  thickened  from  the  rapid  play  of  the  artil- 
lery, while  tlie  bluff  head  of  land,  beyond  the  Tra- 
banccs,  covered  with  French  troops,  appeared,  by 
an  optical  deception,  close  at  hand,  dilated  to  tlie 
size  of  a  mountain,  and  crowned  wMth  gigantic  sol- 
diers, who  were  continually  breaking  olf  and  sliding 
down  into  the  fight.  Suddenly  a  dismounted  caval- 
ry officer  stalked  from  the  midst  of  the  smoke  to- 
wards tlie  line  of  infantry  ;  his  gait  w-as  peculiarly 
rigid,  and  he  appeared  to  hold  a  bloody  handker- 
chief to  his  heart,  but  that  which  seemed  a  cloth, 
was  a  broad  and  draadful  wound  ;  a  bullet  had  en- 
tirely effaced  the  flesh  from  his  left  shoulder  and 
from  his  breast,  and  had  carried  away  part  of  his 
ribs,  his  heart  was  bared,  and  its  movement  plainly 
discerned.  It  was  a  piteous  and  )'et  a  noble  sight, 
for  his  countenance  thoug'h  ghastly  was  firm,  his 
step  scarcsly  indicated  weakness,  and  his  voice  never 
faltered.  Tiiis  unyielding  man's  name  was  Wil- 
liams; he  died  a  short  dista.nce  from  the  field  of 
battle,  and  it  was  said,  in  the  arms  of  his  son,  a 
youth  of  fourteen,  who  had  followed  his  father  to 
the  Peninsula  in  hopes  of  obtaining  a  commission, 
for  they  were  not  in  affluent  circumstances. 

General  Cotton  maintained  this  exposed  position 
with  skill  and  resolution,  from  daylight  until  seven 
o'clock,  at  vhich  time  V/ellington  arrived,  in  com- 
pany with  Beresford,  and  proceeded  to  examine  the 
enemy's  movements.  The  time  was  critical,  and 
the  two  English  generals  were  like  to  have  been 
sl-iin  togethsr  by  a  body  of  French  cavalry,  not  very 
numerous,  whicii,  breaking  away  from  the  multitude 
on  the  head  of  land  beyond  the  Trabancos,  came 
pulloping  at  full  speed  across  the  valley.  It  was 
for  a  moffient  thought  they  were  deserting,  but  with 
headlong  course  they  mounted  the  table-land  on 
which  Cotton's  left  wing  was  posted,  and  drove  a 
whole  line  of  British  cavalry  skirmishers  back  in 
confusion.  The  reserves  indeed  soon  came  up  from 
Alaejos,  and  these  furious  swordsmen  being  scatter- 
ed in  all  direct'ons  were  in  turn  driven  away  or  cut 
down,  but  meanwhile  thirty  or  forty,  led  by  a  noble 
officer,  had  brought  up  their  right  shoulders,  and 
came  over  the  edge  of  the  table-land  above  the  hollow 
which  sepnrated  the  British  wings  at  the  instant 
when  Wellington  and  Beresford  arrived  on  the  same 
slope.  There  were  some  infantry  picquets  in  the 
bottom,  and  higher  up,  near  the  French,  were  two 
guns  cover:;d  by  a  squndron  of  light  cavalry,  which 
was  disposed  in  perfect  order.  When  the  French 
officer  saw  this  squadron,  he  reined  in  his  horse 
with  difficulty,  and  his  troopers  gathered  in  a  con- 
fused body  round  him  as  if  to  retreat.  They  seemed 
lost  men,  for  the  British  instantly  charged,  but  with 
a  shout  the  gnllant  fellows  soused  down  upon  the 
squadron,  and  the  latter  turninT,  galloped  through 
the  guns  ;  then  the  whole  mass,  friends  and  enemies, 
vfut  like  a  wliirlwind  to  the  bottom,  carrying  away 
■ord  Wellington,  and  the  other  generals,  who  with 
drawi.  swords  and  some  difficulty,  got  clear  of  the 
tumult.  The  French  horsemen  were  now  quite  ex- 
hausted, and  ai  reserve  squadron  of  heavy  dragoons 
coming  in  cut  most  of  them  to  pieces;  yet  their 
invincible  leader,  assaulted  by  three  enemies  at 
once,  struck  one  dead  from  his  horse,  and  with  sur- 
prising  exertions  saved    himself  from  the  others, 


though  they  rode  hewing  at  him  on  each  s.de  for  a 
quarter  of  a  mile. 

While  this  charge  was  being  executed,  Marmont, 
who  had  ascertained  that  a  part  only  of  Welling- 
ton's army  was  belbre  him,  crossed  the  Trabancos 
in  two  columns,  and  passing  by  Alaejcs,  turned  the 
left  of  the  allies,  marching  straight  upon  the  Gna- 
rena.  The  British  retired  by  Torecilla  de  la  (Jrden, 
the  fifth  division  being  in  one  column  on  the  left, 
the  fourth  division  on  the  right  as  they  retreated, 
and  the  light  division  on  an  intermediate  line  and 
nearer  to  the  enemy.  The  cavalry  were  on  the 
flanks  and  rear,  the  air  was  extremely  sultry,  the 
dust  rose  in  clouds,  and  the  close  order  of  the  troops 
rendered  it  very  oppressive,  but  the  military  spec- 
tacle was  exceedinrfly  strange  and  grand.  For  then 
were  seen  the  hostile  columns  of  infantry,  only  half 
musket-shot  from  each  other,  marching  impetuously 
towards  a  common  goal,  the  officers  on  each  side 
pointing  forwards  with  their  swords,  or  touching 
their  caps,  and  waving  their  hands  in  courtesy, 
while  the  German  cavaliy,  huge  n;en,  en  huge 
horses,  rode  between  in  a  close  coni  pet  body  as  if 
to  prevent  a  collision.  At  times  tl  e  h  ud  tones  of 
command,  to  hasten  the  m-rr-h,  v.  ere  heard  passing 
from  the  front  to  the  retr,  aii  i.i  w  !.nd  then  the 
rushing  sound  of  bullets  came  sweeping  ever  the 
columns,  whose  violent  pace  was  continually  accel- 
erated. 

Thus  m.oving  for  ten  miles,  yet  keeping  the  most 
perfect  order,  both  parties  approached  the  Guarena, 
and  the  enemy  seeing  that  the  light  division,  al- 
though more  in  their  power  than  the  others,  were 
yet  outstripping  them  in  the  march,  increased  the 
fire  of  their  guns  and  menaced  an  attack  with  in- 
fantry. But  the  German  cavalry  instantly  drew 
close  round,  the  column  plunged  suddenly  into  a 
hollow  dip  of  ground  on  the  left,  which  chered  the 
means  of  baffling  tlie  enemy's  aim,  and  ten  minutes 
after  the  head  of  the  division  was  in  the  stream  of 
the  Guarena  between  Osmo  and  Castrillo.  The  fiflh 
division  entered  the  river  at  the  same  time  but  high- 
er up  on  the  left,  and  the  fourth  division  passed  it 
on  the  right.  The  soldiers  of  the  light  division, 
tormented  with  thirst,  yet  long  used  to  their  ene- 
my's mode  of  warfare,  drunk  as  they  marched,  and 
the  soldiers  of  the  fifth  division  stopped  In  the  river 
for  only  a  few  moments,  but  on  tlie  instant  forty 
French  guns  gathered  on  the  heights  cLcve  sent  a 
tempest  of  bullets  amongst  them.  So  nicely  timed 
was  the  operation. 

The  Guarena,  flowing  from  four  d'st'nct  sources, 
which  are  united  belov.'  Castrillo,  otiered  a  very 
strong  line  of  defence,  and  Mcrmont,  hcpirg  to 
carry  it  in  the  first  confusion  of  the  pnssage,  snd  so 
seize  the  tablp-Iond  of  Vallesa,  had  brought  up  nil 
his  artillery  to  the  front ;  and  to  distract  tl  e  allies' 
attention  he  had  directed  Clausel  to  push  the  head 
of  the  right  column  over  the  river  at  Castrillo,  at 
tl.'e  snme  time.  But  Wellington  expecting  him  at 
Vallesa  from  the  first,  had  ordered  the  other  divi- 
sions of  his  army,  originally  assembled  at  CanizEl, 
to  cross  one  of  the  upper  branrhes  of  the  river  ;  and 
I  they  reached  the  table-land  of  Vallesa,  before  ftJar- 
I  mont's  infantry,  oppressed  by  the  extreme  heat  and 
rapidity  of  the  march,  could  muster  in  strergth  to 
attempt  the  passage  of  the  other  branch.  Clausel, 
however,  sent  Carier's  brigade  of  cavalry  across  the 
Guarena  at  Castrillo  and  supported  it  with  a  column 
of  infantry  ;  and  tl'.e  fourth  division  had  just  gained 
the  heights  above  Canizal,  after  passing  the  stream, 
when  Carier's  horsemen  entered  the  valley  on  their 
left,  and  the  infantry  in  one  column  menaced  their 
front.     The  sedgy  banks  of  the  river  would   have 


1812.1 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


497 


been  difficult  to  force  in  face  of  an  enemy,  but  Victor 
Alten,  tiiough  a  very  bold  man  in  action,  was  slow 
to  seize  an  advantage,  and  suffered  the  French  ca- 
valry to  cross  and  form  in  considerable  numbers  with- 
out opposition  ;  lie  assailed  them  too  late  and  by 
successive  squadrons  instead  of  by  regiments,  and 
the  result  was  unfavourable  at  first.  The  fourteenth 
and  the  German  hussars  were  hard-pressed,  the  third 
dragoons  came  up  in  support,  but  they  were  imme- 
diately driven  back  again  by  the  fire  of  some  French 
infantry,  the  fight  waxed  liot  with  the  others,  and 
many  fell,  but  finally  general  Carier  was  wounded 
and  taken,  and  the  French  retired.  During  this 
cavalry  action  the  twenty-seventh  and  fortieth  re- 
giments coming  down  the  hill,  broke  the  enemy's 
infantry  with  an  impetuous  bayonet  charge,  and 
Alten's  horsemen  being  then  disengaged  sabred  some 
of  the  fugitives. 

This  combat  cost  the  French,  who  had  advanced 
too  far  without  support,  a  general  and  five  hundred 
Boldierrf  ;  but  Marmont,  though  bafilad  at  Vallesa  and 
baaten  at  Castrillo,  concentrated  his  army  at  the  lat- 
ter place  in  such  a  manner  as  to  hold  both  banks  of 
the  Guarena.  Whereupon  Wellington  recalled  his 
troops  from  Vallesa  ;  and  as  the  whole  loss  of  the 
allies  during  the  previous  operations  was  not  more 
than  six  hundred,  nor  that  of  the  French  more  than 
eight  hundred,  and  that  bot'i  sides  were  highly  exci- 
ted, the  day  still  young,  and  the  positions,  although 
strong,  open,  and  within  cannon  shot,  a  battle  was 
expected.  Mannont's  troops  had,  however,  been 
marching  for  two  days  and  nights  incessantly,  and 
Wellington's  plan  did  not  admit  of  fighting  unless 
forced  to  it  in  defence,  or  under  such  circumstances 
as  would  enable  him  to  crush  his  opponent,  and  yet 
keep  the  field  afterwards  against  the  king. 

IJy  this  series  of  signal  operations,  the  French 
general  had  passed  a  great  river,  taken  the  initiato- 
ry movement,  surprised  the  right  wing  of  the  allies, 
and  pushed  it  back  above  ton  miles.  Yet  these  ad- 
vantages are  to  be  traced  to  the  peculiarities  of  the 
English  general's. situation,  which  have  been  already 
nriticed,  and  Wellington's  tactical  skill  was  manifest- 
ed by  the  extricating  of  his  troops  from  their  dan- 
gerous position  at  Castrejon  without  loss  and  with- 
out being  forced  to  fight  a  battle.  He  however  ap- 
pears to  have  erred  in  extending  his  troops  to  the 
right  when  he  first  reached  the  Duero,  for  seeing 
that  Marmont  could  a,t  pleasure  pass  that  river  and 
turn  his  flanks,  he  should  have  remained  concentra- 
ted on  the  Guarena  and  only  pushed  cavalry  posts  to 
the  line  of  the  Duero  above  Toro.  Neither  should 
he  have  risked  his  right  wing  so  far  from  his  main 
body  from  the  evening  of  the  16th  to  the  morning  of 
the  l^th.  He  could  scarcely  have  brought  it  off 
without  severe  loss  if  Marmont  had  been  stronger  in 
cavalry,  aa.!  instead  of  pushing  forwards  at  once  to 
Guarena  had  attacked  him  on  the  march.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  security  of  the  French  general's 
movements  from  the  Trabancos  to  the  Guarena,  de- 
pended entirely  on  their  rapidity  ;  for  as  his  columns 
crossed  the  o])en  country  on  a  line  parallel  to  the 
narch  of  the  allies,  a  simple  wheel  by  comjianies  to 
tho  right  would  have  formed  the  latter  in  order  of 
hitth  on  his  flank,  while  the  four  divisions  already 
on  the  Guarena  could  have  met  tliem  in  front. 

15ut  it  was  on  the  ]6t!i  that  the  I'>ench  general 
failed  in  the  most  glaring  manner.  His  intent  was, 
by  menacing  the  communication  with  .Salamanca 
and  Cludad  Rodrigo,  to  force  the  allies  back,  and 
strike  some  decisive  blow  dtiring  their  retreat. 
Now  on  the  evening  of  the  16th,  he  had  passed  tlie 
Duero  at  Toro,  gained  a  day's  marc'i,  and  was  then 
actually  n'^arer  to  Salnman  a  than  the  allies  wcr3  ; 
33 


and  had  he  persisted  in  his  movement  Wellington 
must  have  fought  him  to  disadvantage  or  have  given 
up  Salamanca  and  passed  the  Tormes  at  Huerta  to 
regain  the  communication  with  Ciudad  Itodr'go, 
This  advantage  Marmont  relinquished,  to  make  a 
forced  march  of  eighty  miles  in  forty-e'ght,  hourr, 
and  to  risk  the  execution  of  a  variety  of  nice  and 
difficult  evolutions,  in  which  he  lost  above  a  thousand 
men  by  the  sword  or  by  fatigue,  and  finally  found  his 
adversary  on  the  I8th  still  facing  him  in  tlie  very 
position  which  he  had  turned  on  the  evening  of  the 
16th  ! 

On  the  19th,  the  armies  maintained  their  respec- 
tive ground  in  quiet  until  the  evening,  wiicn  Mar- 
mont concentrated  his  troops  in  one  mass  on  his  left 
near  the  village  of  Tarazcna,  and  Wellington  fear- 
ing for  his  right,  again  passed  the  second  branch  of 
the  Guarena  at  Vallesa  and  El  Olmo,  and  took  post 
on  the  table-land  above  those  villages.  The  light 
division,  being  in  front,  advanced  to  the  ec'ge  of  the 
table-land,  overlooking  the  enemy's  main  body, 
which  was  at  rest  round  the  bivouac  fires  ;  yet  the 
picquets  would  have  been  quietly  posted  if  sir  Sta- 
pleton  Cotton,  coming  up  at  tlie  moment,  had  not  or- 
dered captain  Ross  to  turn  his  battery  of  six-pound- 
ers upon  a  group  of  French  off.cers.  At  the  first 
shot  the  enemy  seemed  surprised,  at  the  second  their 
gunners  run  to  their  pieces,  and  in  a  few  momenta 
a  reply  from  tv/elve  eight-pounders  shewed  the  folly 
of  provoking  a  useless  combat.  An  artillery  officer 
was  wounded  in  the  head,  several  of  the  British  sol- 
diers fell  in  different  parts  of  the  line,  one  shot  swept 
away  a  whole  section  of  Portuguese,  and  finally  the 
division  was  obliged  to  withdraw  several  liundred 
yards  in  a  mortifying  manner  to  avoid  a  great  and 
unnecessary  effusion  of  blood. 

The  allies  being  now  formed  in  two  lines  on  the 
table-land  of  Vallesa,  offered  a  fair  though  not  an  ea- 
sy field  to  the  enemy  ;  Wellington  expected  a  battla 
the  next  day,  because  the  range  of  heights  which  he 
occupied  trended  backwards  to  the  Tormes  on  thfi 
shortest  line,  as  he  had  thrown  a  Spanish  garrison 
into  the  castle  of  Alba  de  Tormes,  he  thought  Mar- 
mont could  not  turn  his  right,  or  if  he  attempted  it, 
that  he  would  be  shouldered  off  the  Tormes  at  tht) 
ford  of  Huerta.  He  was  mistaken.  The  French 
general  was  more  perfectly  acquainted  with  the 
ground  and  proved  that  he  could  move  an  army  with 
wonderful  facility. 

On  the  !20th  at  day-break,  instead  of  crossing  ti.e 
Guarena  to  dispute  the  high  land  of  Vallesa,  Mar- 
mont marched  rapidly  in  several  columns,  covered  by 
a  powerful  rear  guard,  up  the  river  to  Canta  la  Pie- 
dra,  and  crossed  tlie  stream  there,  though  tlie  banks 
were  difficult,  before  any  disposition  could  be  made 
to  oppose  him.  He  thus  turned  the  right  flank  of 
the  allies  and  gained  a  new  ranjre  of  hills  trending 
towards  the  Tormes  and  parallel  to  those  leading 
from  Vallesa.  Wellington  immediately  made  a  cor- 
responding movement.  Then  commenced  an  evolu- 
tion similar  to  that  of  the  ]8th,„but  on  a  greater 
scale  both  as  to  numbers  and  length  of  way.  The 
allies  moving  in  two  lines  of  battle  within  muskct- 
shot  of  the  French,  endeavoured  to  gain  upon  ami 
cross  their  march  at  Cantalpino  ;  the  guns  on  both 
sides  again  exchanged  their  rough  salutations  as  the 
accidents  of  ground  favoured  their  play,  and  again 
the  officers,  like  gallant  gentlemen  who  bore  no  mal- 
ice and  knew  no  fear,  made  tlieir  military  recogni- 
tions, while  the  horsemen  on  each  side  wntcheil 
with  eager  eyes  for  an  opening  to  charge  ;  but  ino 
l''rench  general  moving  his  army  as  one  man  along 
tlie  crest  of  tlie  heights,  preserved  the  lead  he  had 
taken  and  made  no  mistake. 


498 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Bock  XVIII. 


At  Cantnlpino  it  became  evident  that  the  allies  I 
were  outflanked,  and  all  this  time  Marniont  had  so  | 
ekilfiilly  ni:inagf='d  his  troops  that  he  furnislied  no 
opportunity  oven  for  a  partial  attack.  Wellington 
therefore  f^ll  otF  a  little  and  made  towards  the 
heights  of  Cabe^a  Vellosa  and  Aldea  Rubia,  intend- 
ing to  halt  tlicre  while  the  sixth  division  and  Al- 
len's cavalry,  forcing  their  march,  seized  Aldea  Len- 
gua  and  secured  the  position  of  Christoval.  But  he 
made  no  effort  to  seize  the  ford  of  Iluerta,  for  his 
own  march  had  been  long  and  the  F'rench  had  passed 
over  nearly  twice  as  much  ground,  wherefore  he 
thought  tiiey  would  not  attempt  to  reach  the  Tormes 
that  day.  However  when  night  approached,  al- 
though his  second  line  had  got  possession  of  the 
heiglits  of  Vellosa,  his  first  line  was  heaped  up 
without  much  order  in  the  low  ground  between  that 
place  and  Horn illos  ;  the  French  army  crowned  all 
the  summit  of  the  opposite  hills,  and  their  fires 
stretching  in  a  half  circle  from  Yillaruela  to  Babila 
Fuente,  shewed  that  they  commanded  the  ford  of 
Huerta.  They  could  even  have  attacked  the  allies 
with  great  advantage  had  there  been  light  for  the 
battle.  The  English  general  immediately  ordered 
the  bivouac  fires  to  be  made,  but  filed  the  troops  off 
in  succession  with  the  greatest  celerity  towards  A'^el- 
losa  and  Aldea  Rubia,  and  during  the  movement  the 
Portugu^^se  cavalry,  coming  in  from  the  front,  were 
mistaken  for  French,  and  lost  some  men  by  cannon- 
ehot  ere  they  ware  recognised. 

Wellington  was  deeply  disquieted  at  the  unex- 
pected result  of  this  day's  operations,  which  had 
bean  entirely  to  the  advantage  of  the  French  gener- 
al. Marmout  had  shewn  himself  perfectly  acquaint- 
ed with  the  country,  had  outflanked  and  outmarched 
the  allies,  had  gained  the  command  of  the  Tonnes, 
and  as  his  junction  with  the  king's  army  was  thus 
eeojred,  he  might  fight  or  wait  for  reinforcements,  or 
continue  his  operations  as  it  seemed  good  to  himself. 
But  t!ie  scope  of  Wellington's  campaign  was  hourly 
being  more  restricted.  His  reasons  for  avoiding  a 
battle  except  at  advantage  were  stronger  than  before, 
bccausT  Caffarelli's  cavalry  was  known  to  be  in 
march,  and  the  army  of  the  centre  was  on  the  point  of 
taking  the  field  ;  hence,  though  he  should  fight  and 
gain  a  victory,  unless  it  was  decisive,  his  object 
would  not  be  advanced.  That  object  was  to  deliver 
the  Peninsula,  which  could  only  be  done  by  a  long 
course  of  solid  operations  incompatible  with  sudden 
and  rash  strokes  unauthorized  by  any  thftig  but  hope ; 
wherefore  yielding  to  the  force  of  circumstances,  he 
prepared  to  return  to  Portugal  and  abide  his  time; 
yet  witli  a  bitter  spirit,  which  was  not  soothed  by  the 
recollection,  that  he  had  refused  the  opportunity  of 
fighting  to  advantage  exactly  one  month  before,  and 
upon  the  very  hills  he  now  occupied.  Nevertheless 
that  steadfast  temper  which  then  prevented  him 
from  seizing  an  adventitious  chance,  would  not  now 
Jet  him  yield  to  fortune  more  than  she  could  ravish 
from  iiim  ;  ho  still  hoped  to  give  the  lion's  stroke, 
and  resolved  to  cover  Salamanca  and  the  communi- 
cation with  Ciudad  Rodrigo  to  the  last  moment  A 
letter  stating  his  inability  to  hold  his  ground  was, 
however,  sent  to  Castanos,  but  it  was  intercepted  by 
Marmont,  who  exultingly  pushed  forwards  without 
regard  to  the  king's  movements;  and  it  is  curious 
that  Joseph  afterwards  imagined  this  to  have  been 
a  subtlety  of  Wellington's  to  draw  the  French  gen- 
eral into  a  premature  battle. 

On  the  2l6t,  while  the  allies  occupied  the  old  po- 
■ition  of  Christoval,  the  French  threw  a  gnrrison 
into  Al!)a  de  Tormes,  from  wiience  the  S[)aniards 
bad  been  withdrawn  by  Carlos  D'Fspana,  without 
the  knowledge  of  the   Engl'sh  general.     Marmont 


then  passed  the  Tormes,  by  the  fords  between  A,lba 
and  Huerta,  and  moving  U[)  tiie  valley  of  .Machechu- 
co,  encamped  behind  Calvariza  Ariba  at  the  ei!ge  of 
a  forest  v/hich  extended  from  the  river  to  that  |dace. 
Wellington  also  passed  tl:e  Tormes  in  the  course  of 
the  evening  by  the  bridges  and  by  the  fords  of  fSanta 
Marta  and  Aldea  I^engua  ;  but  the  third  division  and 
D'Urban's  cavalry  remained  on  the  right  bank,  and 
entrenched  themselves  at  Cabrerizos,  lest  the  i'rench. 
who  had  loft  a  division  on  the  heights  of  B;:bila  Fu- 
ente,  should  recross  the  Tormes  in  the  night  and 
overwhelm  them. 

It  was  late  when  the  I'ght  division  descended  the 
rough  side  of  the  Aldea  Lengua  mountain  to  cross 
the  river,  and  the  night  came  suddenly  down  with 
more  than  common  darkness,  for  a  storm,  that  com 
mon  precursor  of  a  battle  in  the  Peninsula,  was  at 
hand.  Torrents  of  rain  deepened  the  ford,t!ie  water 
foamed  and  dashed  with  increasing  violence,  the 
thunder  was  frequent  and  deafening,  and  the  light- 
ning passed  in  sheets  of  fire  close  over  the  column, 
or  played  upon  the  points  of  the  bayonets.  One  flash 
falling  amongst  the  fifth  dragoon  guards,  near  Santa 
Marta,  killed  many  men  and  horses,  while  hundreds 
of  frightened  animals,  breaking  loose  frc  m  their 
piquet  ropes  and  galloping  wildly  about,  were  sup- 
posed to  be  the  enemy's  cavalry  charging  in  the 
darkness,  and  indeed  some  of  their  patroles  were  at 
hand  ;  but  to  a  military  eye  there  was  nothing  more 
imposing  than  the  close  and  beautiful  order  in  which 
the  soldier-s  of  that  noble  light  division,  were  ^een  by 
the  fiery  gleams  to  step  from  the  river  to  the  bank 
and  pursue  their  march  amidst  this  astounding  tur- 
moil, defying  alike  the  storm  and  the  enemy. 

The  position  now  taken  by  the  allies  v/as  nearly 
the  same  as  that  occupied  by  general  Graham  a 
month  before,  when  the  forts  of  Salamanca  w.ere  in- 
vested. The  left  wing  rested  in  the  low  ground  on 
the  Tormes  near  Santa  Marta,  having  a  cavalry  post 
in  ft-ont  towards  Calvariza  de  Abaxo.  The  right 
wing  extended  along  a  range  of  heights  which  ended 
also  in  low  ground,  near  the  village  of  Arapiles,  and 
this  line  being  perpendicular  to  the  course  of  the 
Tormes  from  Huerta  and  Salamanca,  and  j>arallcl  to 
its  course  from  Alba  to  Huerta,  covered  Salamanca. 
But  the  enemy,  extending  his  left  along  the  ei]go  of 
the  forest,  still  menaced  the  line  of  communication 
with  Ciudad  Rodrigo  ;  and  in  the  night  advice  cam.e 
that  general  Chauvel,  with  near  two  thousand  of 
Caffarelli's  horsemen  and  twenty  guns,  had  actually 
reached  Polios  on  the  20th,  and  would  join  31armont 
the  22nd  or  2l^rd.  Hence  Wellington,  feeling  that 
he  must  now  perforce  retreat  to  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  and 
fearing  that  the  French  cavalry  thus  reinforced 
would  hamper  his  movements,  determined,  unless 
the  enemy  attacked  him  or  committed  some  flagrant 
fault,  to  retire  before  Chauvel's  horsemen  could  ar- 
rive. 

At  day-break  on  the  22nd,  Marmont,  who  had  call- 
ed the  troops  at  Babila  Fuente  over  the  7"ormes  by 
the  ford  of  Encina,  brought  Bonet's  and  ]\Iaucune'3 
divisions  up  from  the  forest  and  took  possession  of 
the  ridge  of  Calvariza  de  Ariba  ;  he  also  occupied  in 
advance  of  it  a  wooded  height  on  which  was  an  old 
chapel  called  Nuestra  Senora  de  la  Pena.  But  at  a 
little  distance  from  his  left  and  from  the  English 
right,  stood  a  pair  of  solitary  hills,  ca.led  the  7\ro 
Arapilpn,  about,  half  cannon-shot  from  each  other; 
steep  and  savagely  rugged  they  were,  and  the  pos- 
session of  them  would  have  enabled  the  French  gen- 
eral to  form  his  army  across  Wellington's  riglit,  and 
thus  bring  on  a  battle  with  every  disadvantage  to 
the  allies,  confined,  as  the  latter  would  have  boon, 
between  the  French  army  and  the  Tormes      These 


1812.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


499 


hills  were  neglected  by  the  English  general  until  a 
vtiiif  oihccr,  who  had  obssrved  the  enemy's  detach- 
HKints  stealing  towards  them,  first  informed  Beres- 
fjrd,  and  afterwards  Wellington,  of  the  fact.  The 
foroiar  thought  it  was  of  no  consequence,  but  the  lat- 
ter :nira3diat^ly  sent  the  seventh  Ca^adores  to  seize 
the  mo3t  distant  of  tlie  roc]cs,and  then  a  combat  oc- 
curred Similar  to  that  wliich  happened  between  C<e- 
car  and  Afranius  at  Lerida  ;  for  the  French  steing 
the  allies'  detachment  approaching,  broke  their  own 
ranks,  and  running  without  order  to  the  encounter 
(raine  i  the  first  Arapiles  and  kept  it,  but  were  re- 
pulsed in  an  endeavour  to  seize  the  second.  This 
skirmish  was  followed  by  one  at  Nutstra  Senora  de 
la  Pena,  which  was  also  assailed  by  a  detachment  of 
the  seventh  division,  and  so  far  successfully,  that  half 
that  height  was  gained,  yet  the  enemy  kept  the  oth- 
er half,  and  Victor  Alten,  flanking  the  attack  with 
%  squadron  of  German  hussars,  lost  some  men  and 
was  himself  wounded  by  a  musket-shot. 

The  result  of  the  dispute  for  the  Arapiles  render- 
ed a  retreat  difficult  to  the  allies  during  day-light, 
for  though  the  rock  gained  by  the  English  was  a 
fortress  in  the  way  of  the  French  army,  Marmont, 
by  extending  fiis  left,  and  by  gathering  a  force  be- 
hind his  own  Arapiles,  could  still  frame  a  dangerous 
battle  and  pounce  upon  the  allies  during  their  move- 
ment. Wherefore  Wellington  immediately  extend- 
ed his  right  into  the  low  ground,  placing  the  light 
companies  of  the  guards  in  the  village  of  Arapiles, 
and  the  fjurth  division,  with  exception  of  the  twen- 
ty-seventh regiment,  which  remained  at  the  rock,  on 
a  gentle  ridge  behind  them.  The  fifth  and  sixth 
divisions  he  gathered  in  one  mass  upon  the  internal 
slope  of  the  English  Arapiles,  where,  from  the  hol- 
low nature  of  the  ground,  they  were  quite  hidden 
from  the  enemy ;  and  during  these  movements  a 
eharp  cannonade  was  exchanged  from  the  tops  of 
those  frowning  hills,  on  whose  crowning  rocks  the 
two  generals  sat  like  ravenous  vultures  watching  for 
their  quarry. 

McinnonL's  project  was  not  yet  developed ;  his 
troops  coming  from  Babila  Fuente  were  still  in  the 
forest  and  some  miles  off;  he  had  only  two  divisions 
close  up,  and  the  occupation  of  Calvariza  Ariba  and 
Nuestra  Senora  de  la  Pena  was  a  daring  defensive 
msasuro  to  cover  the  formation  of  his  army.  The 
o  ;cupation  of  the  Arapiles  was,  however,  a  start  for- 
ward, for  an  advantage  to  be  afterwards  turned  to 
profit,  and  seemed  to  fix  the  operations  on  the  left  of 
the  Torm3s.  Wellington,  therefore,  brought  up  the 
first  and  the  light  divisions  to  confront  the  enemy's 
troops  on  the  height  of  Calvariza  Ariba,  and  then 
calling  the  third  division  and  D'Urban's  cavalry 
over  the  river,  by  the  fords  of  Santa  3Iarta,  he  post- 
ed them  in  a  wood  near  Aldea  Tejada,  entirely  re- 
fused to  the  enemy  and  unseen  by  him,  yet  in  a  sit- 
uation to  secure  the  main  road  to  Ciudad  Rodrigo. 
Thust!ie  position  of  the  allies  was  suddenly  reversed, 
thi  left  rested  on  the  English  Arapiles,  the  right  on 
Aldea  Tejada  ;  that  which  was  the  rear  became  the 
front,  and  the  interval  between  the  third  and  the 
fourth  division  was  occupied  by  Bradford's  Portu- 
guese infantry,  by  the  Spaniards,  and  by  the  British 
cavalry. 

This  ground  had  several  breaks  and  hollows,  so 
thai  few  of  these  troops  could  be  viewed  by  the  en- 
emy, and  thore  which  were,  seemed,  both  from  their 
movement  and  from  their  position,  to  be  pointing  to 
the  Ciudad- Rodrigo  road  as  in  retreat.  The  commis- 
B'lriat  and  baggage  had  also  been  ordered  to  the  rear, 
the  dust  of  their  march  was  plainly  to  be  seen  many 
mil  ;s  o.T,  and  hence  there  was  nothing  in  the  rela- 
tive position  of  the  armies,  save  their  proximity,  to 


indicate  an  approaching  battle.  Such  a  state  of 
affairs  could  not  last  long.  About  twelve  o'clock 
Marmont,  fearing  that  the  important  bearing  of  tlic 
French  Arapiles  on  Wellington's  retreat  would  in- 
duce the  latter  to  drive  him  thence,  hastily  brought 
up  Foy's  and  Ferey's  divisions  in  support,  placing 
the  first,  with  some  guns,  on  a  wooded  height  Le 
tween  the  Arapiles  and  Nuestra  Senora  de  la  Pena, 
the  second,  and  Boyer"s  dragoons,  behind  Foy  on  the 
ridge  of  Calvariza  de  Ariba.  Nor  was  this  fear  ill- 
founded,  for  the  English  general,  thinking  that  he 
could  not  safely  retreat  in  dayligiit  without  possess- 
ing both  Arapiles,  had  actually  issued  orders  for  the 
seventh  division  to  attack  the  French,  but  perceiv- 
ing the  approach  of  more  troops,  gave  counter-orders 
lest  he  should  bring  on  the  battle  disadvantageously. 
He  judged  it  better  to  wait  for  new  events,  being 
certain  that  at  night  he  could  make  his  retreat  good, 
and  wishing  rather  that  Marmont  should  attack  him 
in  his  now  strong  position. 

The  French  troops  coming  from  Babila  Fuente 
had  not  yet  reached  the  edge  of  the  forest,  when 
Marmont,  seeing  that  the  allies  would  not  attack, 
and  fearing  that  they  would,  retreat  before  his  own 
dispositions  were  completed,  ordered  Thomieres' di- 
vision, covered  by  fifty  guns  and  supported  by  the 
light  cavalry,  to  menace  the  Ciudad  Rodrigo  road. 
He  also  hastened  the  march  of  his  other  divisions, 
designing,  when  Wellington  should  move  in  opposi- 
tion to  Thomieres,  to  fall  upon  him,  by  the  village 
of  Arapiles,  with  six  divisions  of  infantry  and  Be- 
yer's dragoons,  which  last,  he  now  put  in  march  to 
take  fresh  ground  on  the  left  of  the  Arapiles  rocks, 
leaving  only  one  regiment  of  cavalry,  to  guard  Foy's 
right  flank  at  Calvariza. 

In  these  new  circumstances,  the  positions  of  the 
two  armies  embraced  an  oval  basin  formed  by  differ- 
ent ranges  of  hills,  that'rose  like  an  amphitheatre  of 
which  the  Arapiles  rocks  might  be  considered  the 
door-posts.  This  basin  was  about  a  mile  broad  from 
north  to  south,  and  more  than  two  miles  long  from 
east  to  west.  The  northern  and  western  half  formed 
the  allies'  position,  which  extended  from  the  Eng- 
lish Arapiles  on  the  left  to  Aldea  Tejada  en  the 
right.  The  eastern  heights  were  held  by  the  French 
I'ight,  and  their  left,  consisting  of  Thomieres'  divi- 
sion with  the  artillery  and  light  cavalry,  was  now 
moving  along  the  southern  side  of  the  basin  ;  but 
the  march  was  wide  and  loose,  there  was  a  long 
space  betv/een  Thomieres'  and  tlie  divisions,  which, 
coming  from  the  edge  of  the  forest  were  destined  to 
form  the  centre,  and  there  was  a  longer  space  be- 
tween him  and  the  divisions  about  the  Arapiles. 
Nevertheless,  the  mass  of  artillery  placed  on  his 
right  flank  was  very  imposing,  and  opened  its  fire 
grandly,  taking  ground  to  the  left  by  guns,  in  suc- 
cession, as  the  infantry  moved  on  ;  and  these  last 
marched  eagerly,  continually  contracting  their  dis- 
tance from  the  allies,  and  bringing  up  their  left 
shoulders  as  if  to  envelope  Wellington's  position  and 
embrace  it  with  fire.  At  this  time  also,  Bonet's 
troops,  one  regiment  of  which  held  the  French  Ara- 
piles, carried  the  village  of  that  name,  and,  although 
soon  driven  from  the  greatest  part  of  it  again,  main- 
tained a  fierce  struggle. 

Marmont's  first  arrangements  had  occupied  seve- 
ral hours,  yet  as  they  gave  no  positive  indication  of 
his  designs,  Wellington,  ceasing  to  watch  him,  had 
retired  from  the  Arapiles.  But  nt  three  o'clock,  a 
report  reached  him  that  the  French  left  was  in  mo- 
tion and  pointing  towards  the  ('iudad  Rodrigo  road  ; 
then  starting  up  he  repaired  to  the  high  ground,  and 
observed  their  movements  for  s-^me  time  with  a  stern 
contentment,  for  their  LjII  wing  was  entirely  separa- 


500 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[  Book  XVIII. 


ted  from  the  contre.  The  fau  t  was  flagrant,  and  he 
fixed  it  witii  t!ie. stroke  of  a  thundcr-bclt.  A  few 
orders  issued  from  his  lips  like  tlie  incantations  of  a 
wizard,  and  suddenly  tlie  dark  mass  of  troops  which 
covered  tlic  English  Arapilcs,  was  seemingly  pos- 
sessed by  soma  mighty  sjjirit,  and  rushing  violjntly 
down  tlio  interior  slope  of  the  mountain,  entered  the 
great  basin  amidst  a  storm  of  bullets  which  seemed 
to  shear  away  the  whole  surface  of  the  earth  over 
which  the  soldiers  moved.  The  fifth  division  in- 
stantly formed  on  the  right  of  the  fourth,  connecting 
the  latter  with  Bradford's  Portuguese,  who  hastened 
forward  at  the  same  time  from  the  right  of  the  army, 
and  the  heavy  cavalry  galloping  up  on  the  right  of 
Bradford,  closed  this  front  of  battle.  The  sixth  and 
eeventii  divisions  flanked  on  the  right  by  Anson's 
light  cavalry,  whicli  had  now  moved  from  the  Ara- 
piles,  were  ranged  at  half  cannon-shot  in  a  second 
line,  which  was  prolonged  by  the  Spaniards  in  the 
direction  of  the  third  division  ;  and  this  last,  reinforc- 
ed by  two  squadrons  of  the  fourteenth  dragoons,  and 
by  D'Urban's  Portuguese  horsemen,  formed  the  ex- 
treme right  of  tlie  army.  Behind  all,  on  the  highest 
ground,  the  first  and  light  divisions  and  Pack's  Portu- 
guese were  disposed  in  heavy  masses  as  a  reserve. 

When  this  grand  disposition  was  completed,  the 
third  division  and  its  attendant  horsemen,  the  whole 
formed  in  four  columns  and  flanked  on  the  lefl  by 
twelve  guns,  received  orders  to  cross  the  enemy's 
line  of  march.  The  remainder  of  the  first  line,  in- 
cluding the  main  body  of  the  cavalry,  was  directed 
to  advance  whenever  the  attack  of  the  third  division 
should  be  developed  ;  and  as  the  fourth  division  must 
in  this  forward  movement  necessarily  lend  its  flank 
to  the  enemy's  troops  stationed  on  the  French  Ara- 
. piles.  Pack's  brigade  was  commanded  to  assail  that 
rock  the  moment  the  lefl  of  the  British  line  should 
pass  it.  Thus,  after  long  coiling  and  winding,  the 
prmies  came  together,  and  drawing  up  their  huge 
trains  like  angry  serpents  mingled  in  deadly  strife. 

BATTLE    OF    SALAMANCA. 

Marmont,  from  the  top  of  the  French  Arapiles, 
saw  the  country  beneath  him  suddenly  covered  with 
enemies  at  a  moment  when  he  was  in  the  act  of  mak- 
ing a  complicated  evolution,  and  when,  by  the  rash 
advance  of  his  left,  his  troops  were  separated  into 
three  parts,  each  at  too  great  a  distance  to  assist  the 
other,  and  those  nearest  the  enemy  neither  strong 
enough  to  hold  their  ground,  nor  aware  of  what  they 
had  to  encounter.  The  third  division  was,  howev- 
er, still  hidden  from  him  by  the  western  heights, 
find  he  hoped  that  the  tempest  of  bullets  under  which 
the  British  line  was  moving  in  the  basin  beneath, 
would  check  it  until  he  could  bring  up  his  reserve 
divisions*  and  by  the  village  of  Arapiles  fall  on 
what  was  now  the  lefl  of  the  allies'  position.  But 
even  this,  his  only  resource  for  saving  the  battle, 
was  weak,  for  on  that  point  there  were  still  the  first 
and  light  divisions  and  Pack's  brigade,  forming  a 
mass  of  twelve  thousand  troojis  with  thirty  pieces 
of  art'llery  ;  the  village  itself  was  well  disputed;  and 
the  English  Arapihs  rock  stood  out  as  a  strong  bas- 
tion of  defence.  However,  the  French  general,  no- 
thing daunted,  despatched  officer  after  oflicer,  some 
to  hasten  up  the  troops  from  the  forest,  others  to  stop 
the  progress  of  his  If^ft  wing,  and  with  a  sanguine 
expectation  still  looked  for  the  victory  until  he 
B-iw  Paksnham  with  tiie  third  division  shoot  like  a 
meteor  a-^ross  Thoinieres'  path  ;  then  pride  and  hope 
alike  died  within  him,  and  desperately  he  was  hur- 
rying in  person  to  that  fntnl  point,  when  an  explod- 
ing sliell  stretched  iiini  on  the  earth  with  a  broken 
arm  and  two  deep  wounds  in  his  side.     Confusion 


ensued,  and  the  troops,  distracted  by  ill-judged  or 
ders  and  counter-orders,  knew  not  where  to  mov>2, 
who  to  fight,  or  who  to  avoid. 

It  was  about  five  o'clock  when  Pakcnhom  fell  up- 
on Thoinieres,  and  it  was  at  the  instant  when  tliat 
general,  tiie  head  of  whose  column  had  gained  an 
open  isolated  hill  at  the  extremity  of  the  southern 
range  of  heights,  expected  to  see  the  allies  in  full 
retreat  towards  the  Ciudad  Rodrigo  road,  closely 
ibllowed  by  Marmont  from  the  Arapiles.  The  coun* 
ter-stroke  was  terrible  I  Two  tatteries  of  artillery 
placed  on  the  summit  of  the  western  heights  sudden- 
ly took  his  troo{)s  in  flank,  and  Pakenham's  massive 
columns  supi)orted  by  cavalry,  were  coming  on  full 
in  his  front,  wliile  two-thirds  of  his  own  division, 
lengthened  out  and  unconnected,  were  still  behind 
in  a  wood  where  they  could  hear,  but  could  net  see 
the  storm  which  was  now  bursting.  From  the  chief 
to  the  lowest  soldier,  all  felt  that  they  were  lost,  and 
in  an  instant  Pakenham,  the  most  frank  and  gal 
lant  of  men,  commenced  the  battle. 

The  British  columns  formed  lines  as  they  march- 
ed, and  the  French  gunners  staiuling  u])  manfully 
for  the  honour  of  their  country,  ser.t  ehowcrs  of  grape 
into  the  advancing  masses,  while  a  crowd  of  light 
troops  poured  in  a  fire  of  musketry,  under  cover  of 
which  the  main  body  endeavoured  to  display  a  front. 
But  bearing  onwards  through  the  skirmishers  with 
the  might  of  a  giant,  Pakenham  broke  the  half-form- 
ed lines  into  fragments,  and  sent  the  whole  in  confu 
sion  upon  the  advancing  supports  ,  ^ne  only  oflicer, 
with  unyielding  spirit,  remained  by  the  artillery  ; 
standing  alone  he  fired  the  last  gun  at  the  distance 
of  a  few  yards,  but  whether  he  lived  or  there  died 
could  not  be  seen  for  the  smoke.  Some  squadrons  of 
light  cavalry  fell  on  the  right  of  the  third  divition, 
but  the  fifth  regiment  repulsed  them,  and  then  D'l'r- 
ban's  Portuguese  horsemen,  reinforced  by  two  sqiuul- 
roiis  of  the  fourteenth  dragoons  under  Felton  Hr.r- 
vey,  gained  the  enemy's  fhnik.  The  Oporto  regi 
ment,  led  by  the  English  major  Watson,  instantly 
charged  the  French  infantry,  yet  vainly,  Watson  fcJl 
deeply  wounded  and  his  men  retired. 

Pakenham  continued  his  tempestuous  course 
against  the  remainder  of  Thomieres' troops,  vi  hich 
were  now  arrayed  on  the  wooded  heights  behind  tl  e 
first  hill,  yet  imperfectly,  and  oflerlng  two  fronts,  the 
one  opposed  to  the  third  division  and  its  attendant 
horsemen,  the  other  to  the  fifth  division,  to  Brad- 
ford's brigade  and  the  main  body  cf  cavalry  and  ar- 
tillerj',  all  of  which  were  now  moving  in  one  great 
line  across  the  basin.  3Ieanwhile  Eonct's  trorjis 
having  failed  at  the  village  of  Arapilcs  were  sharply 
engaged  with  the  fourth  division,  Maucune  kei>t  his 
menacing  position  behind  the  French  Arapiles,  and 
as  Clauzel's  division  had  come  up  from  the  forest, 
the  connection  of  the  centre  and  lefl  was  in  seme 
measure  restored  ;  two  divisions  were  however  still 
in  the  rear,  and  Beyer's  dragoons  were  in  march  from 
Calvariza  Ariba.  Thomieres  had  been  killed,  and 
Bonet,  who  succeeded  ?vIarmont,  had  been  disabled, 
hence  more  confusion  ;  but  the  command  of  the  army 
devolved  on  Clauzel,  and  he  was  of  a  capacity  to  sus- 
tain this  terrible  crisis. 

The  fourth  and  fitlh  divisions,  and  Bradford's  bri- 
gade, were  now  hotly  engaged  and  steadily  gaining 
ground  ;  the  heavy  cavalry,  Anson's  light  dragoons 
and  Ihill's  troop  of  artillery  were  advancing  at  a  trot 
on  Pakenham's  left  ;  and  on  that  general's  right 
D'Urban's  horsemen  overlapped  the  enemy.  Thus 
in  less  than  half  an  hour,  and  before  an  order  of  bat- 
tle hnd  even  been  formed  by  the  I'Vench,  their  com- 
mander-in-chief and  two  other  generals  iiud  fiilleii. 
and  the  left  of  their  army  was  turned,  thrown  into 

2 


1812.J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR 


501 


confusion  and  enveloped.  Clauzel's  division  had  in- 
deed joined  Tiioniicres',  and  a  front  had  been  spread 
on  the  southern  lieights,  but  it  was  loose  and  unfit 
to  resist  ;  for  the  troo])s  were,  some  in  double  lines, 
some  in  columns,  some  in  squares  ;  a  powerful  sun 
shone  full  in  their  eyes,  the  light  soil,  stirred  up  by 
the  trampling  of  men  and  horses,  and  driven  forward 
by  a  breeze,  which  arose  in  the  west  at  the  moment 
of  attack,  came  full  upon  them  mingled  with  smoke 
in  such  stifling  clouds,  that  scarcely  able  to  breathe 
and  quite  unable  to  see,  tiieir  lire  was  given  at 
random. 

In  this  situation,  wliile  Pakenham,  bearing  on- 
ward witii  a  conquering  violence,  was  closing  on 
tlieir  flank  and  the  fifch  division  advancing  with  a 
storm  of  tire  on  their  front,  tlie  interval  between  the 
two  attacks  was  suddenly  filled  with  a  whirling  cloud 
of  dust,  which  moving  swiftly  forward  carried  within 
ha  womb  the  trampling  sound  of  a  charging  multi- 
tude. As  it  passed  the  left  of  the  third  division  Le 
Alarchant's  heavy  horsemen  flanked  by  Anson's  light 
cavalry,  broke  forth  from  it  at  fliU  speed,  and  the 
next  instant  twelve  hundred  French  infantry,  though 
formed  in  several  lines,  were  trampled  down  with  a 
terrible  clamour  and  disturbance.  Bewildered  and 
blinded,  they  cast  away  their  arms  and  run  through 
the  openings  of  the  British  squadrons  stooping  and 
demanding  quarter,  while  the  dragoons,  big  men  and 
on  big  horsas,  rode  onwards  smiting  with  their  long 
glittering  swords  in  uncontrollable  power,  and  the 
tiiird  division  followed  at  speed,  shouting  as  the 
French  masses  fall  in  succession  before  this  dreadful 
ci  large. 

Nor  were  these  valiant  swordsmpn  yet  exhausted. 
Their  own  general,  Le  Marchant,  and  many  oflicers 
had  fallen,  but  Cotton  and  all  his  staff  was  at  their 
bead,  and  w;th  ranks  confused,  and  blended  together 
in  one  mass,  still  galloping  forward  they  sustained 
from  a  fresh  column  an  irregular  stream  of  fire  which 
emptied  a  hundred  saddles  ;  yet  with  fine  courage, 
and  downright  force,  the  survivors  broke  through 
this  the  third  and  strongest  body  of  men  that  had 
encountered  them,  and  lord  Edward  Somerset,  con- 
tinuing his  course  at  the  head  of  one  squadron,  with 
a  happy  perseverance  captured  five  guns.  The 
French  left  was  entirely  broken,  more  than  two 
thousand  prisoners  were  taken,  the  French  light 
horsemen  abandoned  thot  part  of  the  field,  and  Tho- 
mieres'  division  no  longer  existed  as  a  military  body. 
Anson's  cavalry,  which  had  passed  quite  over  the 
hill  and  had  suffered  little  in  the  charge,  was  now 
joiner!  by  D'Urban's  troopers,  and  took  the  place  of 
Le  Marcliant's  exhausted  men  ;  the  heavy  German 
dragoons  followed  in  reserve,  and  with  the  third  and 
fif\h  divisions  and  the  guns,  formed  one  formidable 
line,  two  miles  in  advance  of  where  Pakenham  had 
first  attacked  ;  and  that  impetuous  officer  with  un- 
mitigated strength  still  pressed  forward  spreading 
terror  and  disorder  on  the  enemy's  left. 

While  these  signal  events,  which  occupied  about 
forty  minutes,  were  passing  on  the  allies"  right,  a 
terrible  battle  raged  in  the  centre.  For  when  the 
first  shock  of  the  third  division  had  been  observed 
from  the  Arapiles,  the  fourth  division,  moving  in  a 
line  with  the  fifth,  had  passed  the  village  of  that 
name  under  a  prodigious  cannonade,  and  vigorously 
driving  Bonet's  troops  backwards,  step  by  step,  to 
the  southern  and  eastern  heights,  obliged  them  to 
mingle  with  Ulauzel's  and  with  Thomieres'  broken 
remains.  When  the  combattants  had  passed  the 
French  Arapiles,  which  was  about  the  time  of  Le 
Marchant's  charge.  Pack's  Portuguese  assailed  that 
rock,  and  the  front  of  battle  was  thus  completely  de- 
fined, because  Foy's  division  was  now  exchanging  a 


distant  cannonade  with  liie  h/st  and  light  divisions. 
However  Bonet's  troops,  notwithstanding  Marmoiit's 
fall,  and  the  loss  of  their  own  general,  fought  strong- 
ly, and  Clauzel  made  a  surprising  efibrt,  beyond  all 
men's  expectations,  to  restore  the  battle.  Already 
a  great  change  was  visible.  Ferey's  division  drawn 
oil' from  the  height  of  Calvaraza  Arlba  arrived  in  the 
centre  behind  Bonet's  men  ;  the  light  cavalry,  Bo- 
yer's  dragoons,  and  two  divisions  cf  infantry,  from 
the  forest,  were  also  united  there,  and  on  this  nsass 
of  fresh  men,  Clauzel  rallied  the  remnants  of  his  own 
and  Thomieres'  division.  Thus  by  an  able  move- 
ment, Sarrut's,  Brennier's,  and  t'erey's  unbroken 
troops,  supported  by  the  whole  of  the  cavalry,  were 
so  disposed  as  to  cover  the  line  of  retreat  to  Alba  de 
Tormes,  while  JMaucune's  division  was  Etill  in  mass 
behind  the  French  Arajjiles,  and  Foy's  remained 
untouched  on  the  right. 

But  Clauzel,  not  content  with  having  brought  the 
separated  part  of  his  army  together  and  in  a  condi- 
tion to  effect  a  retreat,  attempted  to  stern  the  tide 
of  victory  in  the  very  fulness  of  its  strength  and 
roughness  His  hopes  were  founded  on  a  misibrtune 
which  had  befallen  general  Pack  ;  for  that  oflicer  as- 
cending the  French  Arapiles  in  one  heavy  column, 
had  driven  back  the  enemy's  skirmishers  and  was 
within  thirty  yards  of  the  summit,  believing  himself 
victorious,  when  suddenly  the  French  reserves  leapt 
forward  from  the  rocks  upon  his  front,  and  upon  his 
left  flank.  The  hostile  masses  closed,  there  was  a 
thick  cloud  of  smoke,  a  shout,  a  stream  of  fire,  and 
the  side  of  the  hill  was  covered  to  the  very  boltcni 
with  the  dead,  the  wounded  and  the  flying  Portu- 
guese, who  were  scoffed  at  for  this  failure  without 
any  justice  ;  no  troops  could  have  withstood  that 
crash  upon  such  steep  ground,  and  the  propriety  of 
attacking  the  hill  at  all  seems  very  questionable. 
The  result  went  nigh  to  shake  the  whole  battle. 
For  the  fourth  division  had  just  then  reached  the 
southern  ridge  of  the  basin,  and  one  of  the  best  reg- 
iments in  the  service  was  actually  on  the  summit, 
when  twelve  hundred  fresh  adversaries,  arrayed  en 
the  reverse  slope,  charged  up  hill  ;  and  as  the  Brit- 
ish fire  was  straggling  and  ineffectual,  because  the 
soldiers  were  breathless  and  disordered  by  the  pre- 
vious fighting,  the  French,  who  came  up  resolutely 
and  without  firing,  won  the  crest.  I'hey  were  even 
pursuing  down  the  other  side  when  two  regiments 
placed  in  line  below,  checked  them  with  a  destruc- 
tive volley. 

This  vigorous  counter-blow  took  place  at  the  mo- 
ment when  Pack's  defeat  permitted  Maucune,  who 
was  no  longer  in  pain  for  the  Arapiles  hill,  to  men- 
ace the  left  flank  and  rear  of  the  fourth  division,  but 
the  left  wing  of  the  fortieth  regiment  immediately 
wheeled  about,  and  with  a  rough  charge  cleared  the 
rear.  ilVIaucune  would  not  engage  himself  more 
deeply  at  that  time,  but  general  Ferey's  troops 
pressed  vigorously  against  the  front  of  the  fourth 
division,  and  Brennier  did  the  same  by  the  first  line 
of  the  fifth  division,  Beyer's  dragoons  also  come  on 
rapidly,  and  the  allies  being  outflanked  and  over- 
matched lost  ground.  Fiercely  and  fast  the  French 
followed,  and  the  fight  once  more  raged  in  the  basin 
below.  General  Cole  had  before  this  fallen  deeply 
wounded,  and  Leith  had  the  same  fortune,  but  Bercs- 
ford  promptly  drew  Spry's  Portuguese  brigade  from 
the  second  line  of  the  fifth  division  and  thus  flanked 
the  advancing  columns  of  the  enemy  ;  yet  he  also 
fell  desperately  wounded,  and  Boyer's  dragoons  then 
came  freely  into  action  because  Anson's  cavalry  had 
been  checked  after  Le  Marchant's  charge  by  a  heavy 
fire  of  artillery. 

The  crisis  of  the  battle  had  now  arrived,  and  the 


502 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XVIII. 


▼ictory  (vas  for  the  jreneral  who  had  the  stronjjest 
reserves  in  hand.  NV'ellington,  wlio  was  seen  tliat 
day  at  every  point  of  the  iield  exactly  wiien  his  pre- 
sence was  most  required,  immediately  brought  up 
from  llie  second  line,  tiie  sixth  division,  and  its 
charge  was  rough,  strong  and  successful.  Never- 
tlieless  the  struggle  was  no  slight  one.  The  men  of 
general  Hulse's  brigade,  which  was  on  the  left,  went 
down  by  hundreds,  and  the  sixty-rir&t  and  eleventh 
regiments  won  their  way  desperately,  and  through 
such  a  fire,  as  British  soldiers  only,  can  sustain, 
'•'ioms  of  Boyer's  dragoons  also  breaking  in  between 
the  fiilh  and  sixth  divisions  slew  many  men,  and 
caused  some  disorder  in  the  fitty-third  ;  but  tliat 
brave  regiment  lost  no  ground,  nor  did  Clauzel's  im- 
petuous counter-attack  avail  at  any  point,  after  tiie 
first  burst,  against  tiie  steady  courage  of  the  allies. 
The  southern  ridge  was  regained,  the  French  gen- 
eral Menne  was  severely,  and  general  Fcrey,  mor- 
tally wounded,  Clauzel  himself  was  hurt,  and  the 
reserve  of  Boyer's  dragoons  coming  on  at  a  canter 
were  met  and  broken  by  the  fire  of  Hulse's  noble 
brigade.  Then  the  changing  current  of  the  fight 
once  more  set  for  the  British.  The  third  division 
continued  to  outflank  the  enemy's  left,  3Iaucune 
abandoned  the  French  Arapiles,  Foy  retired  from 
the  ridge  of  Calvariza^  and  the  allied  host  righting 
itself  as  a  gallant  ship  after  a  sudden  gust,  again 
bore  onwards  in  blood  and  gloom,  for  though  the  air, 
purified  by  the  storm  of  the  night  before,  was  pecu- 
liarly clear,  one  vast  cloud  of  smoke  and  dust  rolled 
along  the  basin,  and  within  it  was  the  battle  with 
all  its  sights  and  sounds  of  terror. 

When  the  English  general  had  thus  restored  the 
fight  in  the  centre,  he  directed  the  commander  of 
the  first  division  to  push  between  Foy  and  the  rest 
of  the  French  army,  which  would  have  rendered  it 
impossible  for  the  latter  to  rally  or  escape  ;  hut  this 
order  was  not  executed,  and  Foy's  and  Maucune's 
divisions  were  skilfully  used  by  Clauzel  to  protect 
the  retreat.  The  first,  posted  on  undulating  ground 
and  flanked  by  some  squadrons  of  dragoons,  covered 
the  roads  to  the  fords  of  Huerta  and  Encina  ;  the 
second,  reinforced  with  fifteen  guns,  was  placed  on 
a  steep  ridge  in  front  of  the  forest,  covering  the  road 
to  Alba  de  Tormes  ;  and  behind  tiiis  ridge,  the  rest 
of  the  army,  then  falling  back  in  disorder  before  the 
third,  fiftli,  and  sixth  divisions,  took  refuge.  Wel- 
lington imm^•!iately  sent  tiie  light  division,  formed 
in  two  lines  ami  flanked  by  some  squadrons  of  dra- 
goons, against  Foy  ;  and  he  supported  them  by  tiie 
first  division  in  columns,  flanked  on  the  right  by  two 
brigades  of  the  fourth  division  which  he  had  drawn 
ojf  from  the  centre  when  the  sixth  division  restored 
ths  fight.  The  seventh  division  and  tlie  Spaniards 
followed  in  reserve,  the  country  was  covered  with 
troops,  and  a  new  army  seemed  to  have  risen  out  of 
the  earth. 

Foy  tiirowing  out  a  cloud  of  skirmisliers  retired 
slowly  by  wings,  turning  and  firing  heavily  from 
every  rise  of  ground  upon  tlie  light  division,  which 
marched  steadily  f)rward  without  returning  a  shot, 
save  by  its  skirmishers;  for  tliree  miles  the  march 
was  under  this  musketry,  which  was  occasionally 
thickened  by  a  cannonade,  and  yet  very  few  men 
were  lost,  because  the  French  aim  was  baffled, 
partly  by  tlie  twilight,  partly  by  the  even  order  and 
rapid  gliding  of  tiie  lines.  But  the  Fnmfh  general 
Dcsgraviers  was  killed,  and  tlie  flanking  brigades 
from  tlie  fourth  division  having  now  penetrnted  be- 
tween Maucune  and  Foy,  it  seemed  dilficult  for  the 
latter  to  extricate  his  troops  from  the  action  ;  nev- 
ertheless he  did  it,  and  with  great  dexterity.  For 
having  inc.-eased  his  skirmishers  on  the  last  defen- 


sible ridge,  along  the  foot  of  which  run  a  marshy 
stream,  he  redoubled  his  fire  of  musketry,  and  made 
a  menacing  demonstration  with  his  horsemen  just 
as  the  darkness  fell  ;  the  Britisli  guns  ininiedialely 
opened  their  fire,  a  squadron  of  dragoons  galloped 
forwards  from  the  left,  the  inlantry,  crossing  the 
marshy  stream,  with  an  impetuous  pace  hastened  to 
tlie  summit  of  the  hill,  and  a  rough  shock  seemed  a', 
hand,  but  there  was  no  longer  an  enemy  ;  the  main 
body  of  the  French  had  gone  into  the  thick  forest  on 
their  own  left  during  the  firing,  and  the  skirmishers 
fled  swiftly  after,  covered  by  the  smoke  and  by  the 
darkness. 

Meanwhile  Maucune  maintained  a  noble  battle. 
He  was  outflanked  and  outnumbered,  but  the  satety 
of  the  French  army  depended  on  his  courage  ;  he 
knew  it,  and  Pakenham,  marking  his  bold  demean- 
our, advised  Clinton,  who  was  immediately  in  his 
front,  not  to  assail  him  until  the  tliird  division 
should  have  turned  his  left.  Nevertheless  the  sixth 
division  was  soon  plunged  afresh  into  action  under 
great  disadvantage,  for  after  being  kept  by  its  com 
mander  a  longtime  without  reason,  close  under  Mau- 
cune's batteries,  which  ploughed  heavily  through 
the  ranks,  it  was  suddenly  directed  by  a  staff  oflicer 
to  attack  the  hill.  Assisted  by  a  brigade  of  the 
fourth  division,  the  troops  then  rushed  up,  and  in  tlie 
darkness  of  the  night  the  fire  shewed  from  afar  how 
the  battle  went.  On  the  side  of  the  British  a  sheet 
of  flame  was  seen,  sometimes  advancing  with  an  even 
front,  sometimes  pricking  forth  in  sj^ear-heads,  now 
falling  back  in  waving  lines,  and  anon  darting  up 
wards  in  one  vast  pyramid,  the  apex  of  which  often 
approached,  yet  never  gained  the  actual  summit  of 
the  mountain  ;  but  the  French  musketry,  rai)id  as 
lightning,  sparkled  along  the  brow  of  the  height  with 
unvarying  fulness,  and  with  what  destructive  eflccts 
the  dark  gaps  and  changing  shapes  of  the  adverse  fire 
showed  too  plainly.  Yet  when  Pakenham  had  again 
turned  the  enemy's  left,  and  Foy's  division  had  glided 
into  tlie  forest,  Maucune's  task  was  completed,  the 
elfulgent  crest  of  the  ridge  became  black  and  silent 
and  the  whole  French  army  vanished  as  it  were  in 
the  darkness. 

Meanwhile  Wellington,  who  was  with  the  lead- 
ing regiment  of  the  light  division,  continued  to  ad- 
vance towards  the  ford  of  Huerta,  leaving  the  forest 
to  his  riglit,  for  he  thought  the  Spanish  garrison 
was  still  in  the  castle  of  Alba  de  Tormes,  and  that 
the  enemy  must  of  necessity  be  found  in  a  confused 
mass  at  tlie  fords.  It  was  tor  this  final  stroke  that 
he  had  so  skilfully  strengthened  his  left  wing,  nor 
was  he  diverted  from  his  aim  by  marching  through 
standing  corn,  where  no  enemy  could  have  preceded 
him  ;  nor  by  Foy's  retreat  into  the  forest,  because 
it  pointed  towards  the  fords  of  Encina  and  Conzalo, 
which  that  general  might  be  endeavoring  to  gain, 
and  the  right  wing  of  the  allies  would  find  him  there. 
A  squadron  of  French  dragoons  also  burst  hastily 
from  the  forest  in  fi'ont  of  the  advancing  troops,  soon 
after  dark,  and  firing  their  pistols  passed  at  full  gal- 
lop towards  the  ford  of  Huerta,  thus  indicating  great 
confusion  in, the  defeated  army,  and  confirming  the 
notion  that  its  retreat  was  in  tlint  direction.  Had 
the  castle  of  Alba  been  held,  the  French  could  not 
have  carried  ofl'  a  third  of  their  army,  nor  would 
they  have  been  in  much  better  jilight  if  Carlos  D'- 
Esjififia,  who  soon  discovered  his  error  in  withdraw- 
ing the  garrison,  had  informed  Wellington  of  the 
fact;  but  he  suppressed  it  and  sufl'ered  the  colonel 
who  had  only  obeyed  his  orders  to  be  censured  ;  the 
left  wing  therefore  continued  their  march  to  the  ford 
without  meeting  any  enemy,  and,  the  night  being 
lar  spent,  v/cre  there  halted;  the  right  wing,  ejc- 


1812.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


503 


naustfid  by  long  fighting,  had  ceased  to  pursue  after 
the  action  with  i\laucune,  and  thus  the  French 
gainea  Alba  unmolostod  ;  but  the  action  did  not  ter- 
minate witiiout  two  remarkable  accidents.  While 
ridinjT  close  behind  the  tbrty-third  regiment,  Wel- 
lington was  struck  in  the  thigh  by  a  spent  musket- 
ball,  which  passed  through  his  holster  ;  and  the  night 
picquots  had  just  been  set  at  Huerta,  when  sir  Staple- 
ton  Cotton,  wtio  had  gone  to  the  ford  and  returned  a 
different  road,  was  shot  througii  the  arm  by  a  Portu- 
guese sentinel  whose  challenge  he  had  disregarded. 
These  were  the  last  events  of  this  famous  battle,  in 
wliicli  the  skill  of  the  general  was  worthily  seconded 
by  troops  whose  ardour  may  be  appreciated  by  the 
following  anecdotes. 

Captain  Brotherton  of  the  fourteenth  dragoons, 
fighting  on  the  Ibth,  at  the  Guarena,  amongst  the 
foremost,  as  he  was  always  wont  to  do,  had  a  sword 
thrust  quit'?  through  his  side,  yet  on  the  22d,  he  was 
again  on  horseback,  and  being  denied  leave  to  remain 
in  that  condition  with  his  own  regiment,  secretly 
joined  Pack's  Portuguese  in  an  undress,  and  was 
again  hurt  in  the  unfortunate  charge  at  the  Arapiles. 
Such  were  the  officers.  A  man  of  the  forty -third, 
one  by  no  means  distinguished  above  his  comrades, 
was  shot  through  the  middle  of  the  thigh,  and  lost 
his  shoes  in  passing  the  marshy  stream  ;  but  refusing 
to  quit  the  fight,  he  limped  under  fire  in  rear  of  his 
re:^iment,  and  with  naked  feet,  and  streaming  of 
blood  from  his  wound,  he  marched  for  several  miles 
over  a  country  covered  with  sharp  stones.  Such 
were  the  soldiers,  and  the  devotion  of  woman  was 
not  wanting  to  the  illustration  of  this  great  day. 

The  wife  of  colonel  Dalbiac,  an  English  lady  of  a 
gontle  disposition  and  possessing  a  very  delicate 
frame,  harl  braved  the  dangers,  and  endured  the  pri- 
vations of  two  campaigns,  with  the  patient  fortitude 
which  bBlongs  only  to  her  sex  ;  and  in  this  battle, 
forgetful  of  evei-ything  but  that  strong  affection 
v/liich  had  so  long  supported  her,  she  rode  deep 
amidst  the  enemy's  fire,  trembling  yet  irresistibly 
impelled  forwards  by  feelings  more  imperious  than 
horror,  more  piercing  than  the  fear  of  death. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Clnuzel  pas'??!?  the  Tormes  at  Alba — Cavalry  combat  at  La 
Soma — Chaiivel's  cavalry  joins  the  French  aimy — The 
king  r  aehes  Blasco  Sancho — Retires  to  Espinar  on  hear- 
hig  of  the  battle — Kereives  letters  from  Clauzel  which  in- 
duce him  to  march  on  Segovia — Wellinatoii  drives  Clau- 
zel across  the  Diiero — Takes  Valladolid — Brings  Santocil- 
des  over  the  Duero — Marches  upon  Ciiellar — The  king 
abandons  Segovia  and  recrosses  the  Guadarama — State  of 
alFiiirs  ill  other  parts  of  Spain — General  Long  defeats  Lolle- 
mand  in  Estreniadura — C:ifrarelli  is  drawn  to  the  coast  by 
Popharn's  expedition — Wellington  leaves  Clinton  at  Cuel- 
lar,  ar.d  [asses  the  Guadarama — Cavalry  combat  at  Maja- 
dahonda — The  kintr  unites  his  army  at  Valdemoro — Mis- 
erable slate  of  the  French  convoy — Joseph  passes  the  Ta- 
gus;  hears  of  the  arrival  of  tie  Sicilian  expedition  at  Ali- 
raiU — Retreats  upon  Valencia  instead  of  Andalusia — Man- 
jtoint's  hnjade  juccour.--  the  garrison  of  Cuenca,  is  beaten 
at  Iltiel  by  Villa  Campa — Wellington  enters  Madrid — The 
lletiro  surren<Iers — EnifK-cmaJo  takes  (niaddaxara — Ex- 
traordinary journey  of  colonel  Fabvier — Na()oleon  hears  ol 
Marmont's  defeat — His  generous  conduct  towards  that 
marshal — Receives  the  king's  report  against  Soult — Plis 
niagnanitnity — Observations. 

During  the  few  hours  of  darkness  which  succeeded 
the  cessation  of  the  battle,  Clauzel  had  with  a  won- 
derful diligence,  pnssed  the  Tormes  by  the  narrow 
bridge  of  Alba,  and  the  fords  below  it,  and  at  day- 


light was  in  full  retreat  upon  Peneranda,  covered  by 
an  organized  rear-guard.  Wellington  clso,  having 
brought  up  the  Get  man  dragoons,  and  Anson's  cav- 
alry to  the  front,  crossed  the  river  with  his  left  wing 
at  daylight,  and  moving  up  the  stream,  canje  about 
ten  o'clock  upon  the  French  rear,  which  was  wind- 
ing without  much  order,  along  the  Almar,  a  small 
stream  at  the  foot  of  a  height  near  the  village  of  Le 
Serna.  He  launched  his  cavalry  against  them,  and 
the  French  squadrons,  fiying  from  Alison's  troopers, 
towards  their  own  left,  abandoned  three  battaliona 
of  infantry,  who  in  separate  columns  were  making 
up  a  hollow  slope  on  their  right,  hoping'  to  gain  tho 
crest  of  the  heights  before  tlie  cavalry  could  fall  on. 
The  two  foremost  did  reach  the  higher  ground,  and 
there  formed  squares,  general  Foy  being  in  the  one, 
and  general  Chemineau  in  the  other  ;  but  the  laet 
regiment  when  halt-way  up,  seeing  Bock's  dragoons 
galloping  hard  on,  faced  about,  and  being  still  in  col- 
umn, commenced  a  disorderly  fire.  The  two  squares 
already  formed  above,  also  plied  their  muskets  with 
far  greater  efl'ect  ;  and  as  the  Germans,  after  crossing 
the  Almar  stream,  had  to  pass  a  turn  of  narrow  road, 
and  tlien  to  clear  some  rough  ground  before  they 
could  range  their  squadrons  on  a  charging  front,  the 
troopers  fell  fast  under  the  fire.  By  two's,  by 
three's,  by  ten's,  by  twenties  they  fell,  but  the  rett 
keeping  together,  surmounted  the  difiiculties  of  tho 
ground,  and  hurtling  on  the  column,  went  clean 
through  it  ;  then  the  squares  above  retreated,  and 
several  hundred  prisoners  were  made  by  these  ablo 
and  daring  horsemen. 

This  charge  had  been  successful  even  to  wonder, 
the  joyous  victors,  standing  in  the  midst  of  their  cap 
fives  and  of  thousands  of  admiring  friends,  seemed 
invincible  ;  yet  those  who  witnessed  the  scene,  nay 
the  actors  themselves,  remained  with  the  conviction 
of  this  military  truth,  that  cavalry  are  not  a  )le  to 
cope  with  veteran  infantry  save  by  surprise.  The 
hill  of  La  Serna  offered  a  frightful  spectacle  «..'  the 
power  of  the  musket,  that  queen  of  weapons,  and  tho 
track  of  the  Germans  was  marked  by  their  huge  bod- 
ies. A  few  minutes  only  had  i;he  combat  lasted  and 
above  a  hundred  had  fallen  ;  fifty-one  were  killed 
outright ;  and  in  several  places  man  and  horse  had 
died  simultaneously,  and  so  suddenly,  that  falling  to 
gether  on  their  sides,  they  appeared  still  alive,  the 
horse's  legs  stretched  out  as  in  movement,  the  rider's 
feet  in  the  stirrup,  his  bridle  in  hand,  the  sword 
raised  to  strike,  and  the  large  hat  fastened  under  the 
chin,  giving  to  the  grim,  but  undistorted  counten- 
ance, a  supernatural  and  terrible  expression. 

When  the  French  main  body  found  their  rear- 
guard attacked,  they  turned  to  its  succour,  but  see- 
ing the  light  division  coming  up,  recommenced  tho 
retreat  and  were  followed  to  Nava  de  Sotroval. 
Near  that  place  Chauvel's  horsemen  joined  them 
from  the  Duero,  and  covered  the  rear  with  such  a 
resolute  countenance,  that  the  allied  cavalry,  redu- 
ced in  numbers,  and  fatigued  with  continual  fight- 
ing, did  not  choose  to  meddle  again.  Thus  Clauzel 
carried  his  army  clear  off  without  ftirther  loss,  and 
with  such  celerity,  tliat  his  head-quarters  were  tlint 
night  at  Flores  de  Avila,  forty  miles  from  the  field 
of  battle.  After  remaining  a  few  hours  there,  ho 
crossed  the  Zapardiel,  and  would  have  halted  tho 
34th,  but  the  allied  cavalry  entered  Cisln,  and  tho 
march  was  then  continued  to  Arevalo.  This  was  a 
wonderful  retreat,  and  the  line  was  chosen  with 
judgment,  for  Wellington  naturally  expected  the 
French  army  would  have  made  for  Tordesillaa  in- 
stead of  the  Adaja.  The  pursuit  was  however  somo- 
what  slack,  for  on  the  very  night  of  tho  action,  tha 
British  left  wing,  being  quite  fresh,  could  have  at^ 


504 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XVIII. 


eeudetl  tiie  Tormes  and  reached  the  Almar  before 
day-ligiit,  or,  passings  at  Huerta.  have  marclied  by 
Ventosa  to  Paneranda  ;  but  the  vigorous  following  of 
a  beaten  enemy,  was  never  a  prominent  characteris- 
tic of  lord  Wellington's  campaigns  in  the  Peninsula. 
The  2r)t!i,  the  allied  army  halted  on  the  Zapardiel 
and  Adaja  rivers,  to  let  tiie  commissariat,  which  had 
bsan  sent  to  the  rear  the  morning  of  the  battle,  come 
up.  -Msanwhile  the  king,  having  quitted  Madrid 
with  fourteen  thousand  men  on  tiie  2lst,  reached  the 
Adaja,  and  pushed  his  cavalry  towards  Fontiveros  ; 
he  was  at  Blasco  Sancho  on  the  24th,  within  a  few 
hours'  march  of  Arevalo,  and  consequently  able  to 
eifact  a  junction  with  Clauzel,  yet  he  did  not  hurry 
his  march,  for  he  knew  only  of  the  advance  upon 
Salamanca,  not  of  the  defeat,  and  having  sent  many 
messengers  to  inform  Marmont  of  his  approach,  con- 
cluded that  general  would  await  his  arrival.  The 
next  day  he  received  letters  from  the  duke  of  Ragu- 
Ba  and  Clauzel,  dated  Arevalo,  describing  the  battle, 
and  telling  him  that  the  defeated  army  must  pass  the 
Duero  immediately  to  save  the  depot  of  Valladolid, 
and  to  establish  new  communications  v/ith  the  army 
of  the  north.  Those  generals  promised,  however, 
to  halt  behind  that  river,  if  possible,  until  the  king 
could  receive  reinforcements  from  Suchet  and  Soult. 
.Toseph,  by  a  rapid  movement  upon  Arevalo,  could 
still  have  etfected  a  junction,  but  he  immediately 
made  a  forced  march  to  Espinar,  leaving  in  Blasco 
Sancho  two  officers  and  twenty-seven  troopers,  who 
were  surprised  and  made  prisoners  on  the  evening 
of  the  25th  by  a  corporal's  patrole  ;  Clauzel  at  the 
same  time  marched  upon  Valladolid,  by  Olmedo, 
thus  abandoning  Zamora,  Toro,  and  Tordesillas,  with 
their  garrisons,  to  the  allies.  Wellington  immedi- 
ately brought  Santocildes,  who  was  now  upon  the 
I5sla  with  eight  thousand  Gallicians,  to  the  right 
bank  of  the  Duero,  across  which  river  he  communi- 
cated by  Castro  Nuno  with  the  left  of  the  allies, 
which  was  then  upon  the  Zapardiel. 

The  27th,  the  British,  whose  march  had  become 
more  circumspect  from  the  vicinity  of  the  king's  ar- 
my, entered  Olmedo.  At  this  place,  general  Ferey 
had  died  of  his  wounds,  and  the  Spaniards  tearing  his 
bcvdy  from  the  grave  were  going  to  mutilate  it,  when 
the  soldiers  of  the  light  division  who  had  so  often 
fought  against  this  brave  man  rescued  his  corpse,  re- 
made his  grave,  and  heaped  rocks  upon  it  for  more 
fiocurity,  though  with  little  need  ;  for  the  Spaniards, 
with  whom  the  sentiment  of  honour  is  always  strong 
when  not  stifled  by  the  violence  of  their  passions, 
applauded  the  action. 

On  the  23th,  Clauzel,  finding  the  pursuit  had 
slackened,  sent  colonel  Fabvier  to  advise  the  king 
of  it,  and  then  sending  his  own  right  wing  across 
the  Duero,  by  the  ford  near  Boecillo,  to  cover  the 
evacuation  of  Valladolid,  marched  with  the  other 
wing  towards  the  bridge  of  Tudela  ;  he  remained 
howiver  still  on  the  left  bank,  in  the  hope  that  Fab- 
v'rer's  mission  would  bring  the  king  back.  Joseph, 
who  had  already  passed  the  Puerta  de  Guadarama, 
immediately  repassed  it  without  delay  and  made  a 
flink  movement  to  Sagovia,  wiiich  he  reached  the 
27th,  and  pushed  his  cavalry  to  Santa  Maria  de 
Nieva.  Here  he  remained  until  the  31st,  expecting 
Clauzel  would  join  him,  for  he  resolved  not  to  quit 
his  hold  of  the  passes  over  the  Guadarama,  nor  to 
abandon  his  communication  with  Valencia  or  Anda- 
lusia. But  Wellington  brought  Santorihh^s  over  the 
iJuero  to  the  Zapardiel,  and  crossing  tlie  Eresma  and 
Ciga  rivers  himself,  with  the  first  and  light  divisions 
and  the  cavalry,  had  obliged  Clauzel  to  retire  over 
the  Duero  in  the  niglit  of  the  29th  ;  and  tiie  next  day 
tlia  French  general,  whose  army  was  very  much  dis- 


couraged, fearing  that  Wellingtcn  would  gain  Aran- 
da  and  Lerma  while  the  Gallicians  seized  Duenaa 
and  Torquemada,  retreated  in  tliree  columns  by  the 
valleys  of  the  Arlanza,  the  Duero  and  the  Esquiva, 
towards  Burgos. 

The  English  general  entered  Valladolid  amidst 
the  rejoicings  of  the  people,  and  there  captured  sev- 
enteen pieces  of  artillery,  considerable  stores,  and 
eight  hundred  sick  and  wounded  men  ;  tiiree  hundred 
other  prisoners  were  taken  by  the  partida  chief, 
Marquinez,  and  a  large  French  convoy  intended  for 
Andalusia  returned  to  Burgos.  While  the  lelt  wing 
of  the  allies  pursued  the  enemy  up  the  Arlanza,  V»  ei- 
lington,  marching  with  the  rigiit  wing  againtt  the 
king,  reached  Cuellar  the  1st  of  August ;  on  tiie  same 
day  the  garrison  of  Tordesillas  surrendered  to  the 
Gallicians,  and  Joseph,  having  first  dismantled  the 
castle  of  Segovia  and  raised  a  contribution  of  money 
and  church  plate,  retreated  through  the  Puerta  de 
Guadarama,  leaving  a  rear-guard  of  cavalry  which 
escaped  by  the  Ildefonso  pass  on  the  approach  of  the 
allied  horsemen.  Thus  the  army  of  the  centre  was 
irrevocably  separated  from  the  army  of  Portugal,  the 
operations  against  the  latter  were  terminated,  and 
new  combinations  were  made  conformable  to  the 
altered  state  of  affairs  ;  but  to  understand  these  it  is 
necessary  to  look  at  the  transactions  in  other  parts 
of  the  Peninsula. 

In  Estremadura,  after  Drouet's  retreat  to  Azagua, 
Hill  placed  a  strong  division  at  Merida  ready  to 
cross  the  Tagus,  but  no  military  event  occurred  until 
the  24th  of  July,  when  general  Lallemand,  with  throo 
regiments  of  cavalry,  pushed  back  some  Portuguc^je 
horsemen  from  Ribera  to  Villa  Franca.  He  i^-as 
attacked  in  front  by  general  Long,  while  general 
Slade  menaced  his  left,  but  he  succeeded  in  repassing 
tiie  defile  of  Ribera  ;  Long  then  turned  him  by  both 
flanks,  and  aided  by  Lefebre's  horse  artillery,  drove 
him,  with  the  loss  of  fifty  men  and  many  horses, 
upon  Llera,  a  distance  of  twenty  miles.  Drouet,  de- 
sirous to  retaliate,  immediately  executed  a  flank 
march  towards  Merida,  and  Hill,  fearing  for  his  de- 
tachments there,  made  a  corresponding  movement, 
whereupon  the  French  general  returned  to  the  Sere- 
na ;  but  though  he  received  positive  orders  from 
Soult  to  give  battle,  no  action  followed,  and  the  af- 
fairs of  that  part  of  the  Peninsula  remained  balanced. 

In  Andalusia,  Balleeteros  surprised  colonel  Bean- 
vais,  at  Ossuna,  took  throe  hundred  prisoners,  and 
destroyed  tlie  French  depot  there.  After  tiiis  he 
moved  against  Malaga,  and  was  opposed  by  general 
Laval  in  front,  while  general  Villatte,  detached  from 
the  blockade  of  Cadiz,  cut  off"  his  retreat  to  San 
Roque.  The  road  to  Murcia  was  still  open  to  him, 
but  his  rashness,  though  of  less  consequence  since 
the  battle  of  Salamanca,  gave  Wellington  great  die- 
quietude  ;  and  the  more  so,  that  Joseph  O'Donel  had 
just  sustained  a  serious  defeat  near  Alicant.  This 
disaster,  which  shall  be  described  in  a  more  fitting 
place,  was,  however,  in  some  measure  counterbal- 
anced by  the  information,  that  the  revived  expedi- 
tion from  Sicily  had  reached  3I»jorca,  where  it  had 
been  reinforced  by  Whittingham's  division,  and  by 
the  stores  and  guns  sent  from  Portugal  to  Gibraltar. 
It  was  known  also,  that  in  the  northern  province'* 
Popham's  armament  had  drawn  all  CalFarelli's  troops 
to  the  coast,  and  although  the  littoral  warfare  v.as 
not  followed  up,  the  French  were  in  confusion,  and 
the  diversion  complete. 

In  Castile  the  siege  of  Astorga  still  lingered  ;  but 
the  division  of  Santocildes,  seven  thousand  strong, 
was  in  communication  with  Wellington,  Silveira's 
militia  were  on  the  Duero,  Clauzel  had  retreated  to 
Burgos,  and  the  king,  joined  by  two  thousand  mcji 


181*4.] 


NAPIER'S  PENINSULAR  WAR. 


505 


from  Sachet's  army,  could  concentrats  twenty  thou- 
sinil  to  dispute  tiie  passes  of  the  (iuadarama.  Hence 
Wellington,  having  nothing  immediate  to  fear  from 
Soult,  nor  from  the  army  of  Portugal,  nor  from  the 
army  of  the  north,  nor  from  Suchet,  menaced  as  that 
marshal  was  by  the  Sicilian  expedition,  resolved  to 
attack  the  king  in  preference  to  following  Clauzel 
The  latter  general  could  not  be  pursued  without  ex- 
posing Salamanca  and  the  Gallicians  to  Joseph,  who 
was  strong  in  cavalry  ;  but  the  monarch  could  be  as- 
sailed without  risking  much  in  other  quarters,  see- 
ing that  Clauzel  could  not  be  very  soon  ready  to  re- 
new the  campaign,  ami  it  was  expected  Castailos 
would  reduce  Astorga  in  a  few  days,  which  would 
give  eight  thousand  additional  men  to  the  field  army. 
Moreover,  a  strong  British  division  could  be  spared 
to  co-operate  with  Santocildes,  Silveira,  and  the 
partidas,  in  the  watching  of  the  beaten  army  of  Por- 
tugal, while  Wellington  gave  the  king  a  blow  in  the 
field,  or  forced  him  to  abandon  Madrid  ;  and  it  ap- 
peared probable  that  the  moral  effect  of  regaining 
the  capital  would  excite  the  S;)aniards'  energy  every 
where,  and  would  prevent  Soult  from  attacking 
Hill.  If  lie  did  attack  him,  the  allies,  by  choosing 
this  line  of  operations,  would  be  at  hand  to  give  suc- 
cour. 

These  reasons  being  weighed,  Wellington  posted 
general  Clinton  at  Cuellar  with  the  sixth  division, 
which  he  increased  to  eight  thousand  men,  by  the 
addition  of  some  sickly  regiments,  and  by  Anson's 
cavalry  ;  Santocildes  also  was  put  in  communica- 
tion With  him,  and  the  partidas  of  Marquinez,  Saor- 
nil,  and  El  Principe,  agreed  to  act  with  Anson  on  a 
prescribed  plan.  Tiius,  exclusive  of  Silveira's  mi- 
litia, and  of  the  Gallicians  about  Astorga,  eighteen 
thousand  men  were  left  on  the  Duero,  and  the  Eng- 
lish general  was  still  able  to  march  against  Joseph 
with  twenty-eight  thousand  old  troops,  exclusive  of 
Carlos  D'Espana's  Spaniards.  He  had  also  assu- 
rance from  lord  Castlereagh,  that  a  considerable  sura 
in  hard  money,  to  be  followed  by  other  remittances, 
had  been  sent  from  England  ;  a  circumstance  of  the 
utmost  importance,  because  grain  could  be  purchased 
in  Spain  at  one-third  the  cost  of  bringing  it  up  from 
Portugal. 

Meanwhile,  the  king,  who  had  regained  Madrid, 
expecting  to  hear  that  ten  thousand  of  the  army  of 
the  south  were  at  Toledo,  received  letters  from  Soult 
positively  refusing  to  send  that  detachment;  and 
from  Clauzel,  saying  that  the  army  of  Portugal  was 
in  full  retreat  to  Burgos.  This  retreat  he  regarded 
as  a  breach  of  fiith,  because  Clauzel  had  promised  to 
hold  the  line  of  the  Duero  if  Wellington  marched 
iinon  Madrid  ;  but  Joseph  was  unable  to  appreciate 
Wellington's  mUitary  combinations  ;  he  did  not  per- 
ceive, that,  taking  advantage  of  his  central  position, 
the  Engl'sh  general,  before  he  marched  against  UMad- 
rid,  had  forced  Clauzel  to  abandon  the  Duero  to  seek 
Bome  safe  and  distant  point  to  reorganize  his  army. 
Nor  was  the  kingr's  perception  of  his  own  situation 
much  clearer.  He  had  the  choice  of  several  lines  of 
operations,  that  is,  he  might  defend  the  passes  of 
the  Guidarama,  while  his  court  and  enormous  con- 
voys evacuated  .Madrid,  and  marched  eltlier  upon  Za- 
ragoza,  Valencia,  or  Andalusia  ;  or  he  niiglit  retire, 
army  and  convoy  togeiiier,  in  one  of  those  directions. 

Rejecting  the  defence  of  the  passes,  lest  the  allies 
should  then  march  by  their  right  to  the  Tagus,  and 
eo  intercept  his  communication  with  the  south,  he 
resolved  to  direct  his  march  towards  tiie  Morena  ; 
and  he  had,  from  Segovia,  sent  Soult  orders  to  evacu- 
ate Andalusia,  and  meet  him  on  tlie  frontier  of  La 
Manclia  :  but  to  avoid  the  disTrace  of  flying  bef  ire  a 
detachment,  he  occupied  the  Escurial  mountain,  and 


placed  his  army  across  the  roads  leading  from  the 
passes  of  the  Guadaroma  to  Madrid.  Wiiile  in  this 
position,  Wellington's  advanced  guard,  compos(!d  of 
D'Urban's  Portuguese,  a  troop  of  horse  artilleiy  and 
a  battalion  of  infantry,  passed  the  Guadarama,  and 
tlie  Kith,  the  wliole  army  was  over  the  mountains. 
Tiien  the  king,  retaining  only  eigiit  thousand  men  in 
position,  sent  the  rest  of  his  troops  to  protect  the 
march  of  his  court,  which  quitted  Madrid  the  same 
day,  with  two  or  three  thousand  carriages  of  difterent 
kinds,  and  nearly  twenty  thousand  persons,  of  all 
ages  and  sexes. 

The  11th,  D'Urban  drove  back  Trielhard's  cavalry 
posts,  and  entered  iMujadahonda,  whilst  some  German 
infantry.  Bock's  heavy  cavalry,  and  a  trooj)  of  horse 
artillery,  occupied  Las  Rozas,  about  a  mile  in  his 
rear.  In  tlie  evening,  Trielhard,  reinibrced  by 
Schiazzetti's  Italian  dragoons  and  the  lancers  of 
Berg,  returned  ;  whereupon  D'Urban  called  up  the 
horse  artillery,  and  would  have  charged  the  enemy's 
leading  squadrons,  but  the  Portuguese  cavalry  fled. 
The  artillery  olHcer,  thus  abandoned,  made  a  vigor- 
ous effort  to  save  his  guns  ;  yet,  tliree  of  them  being 
overturned  on  the  rough  ground,  were  taken,  and  the 
victorious  cavalry  passed  through  IMajadahonda  in 
pursuit.  The  German  dragoons,  although  surprised 
in  their  quarters,  mounted,  and  stopped  the  leading 
French  squadrons  until  Schiazzetti's  Italians  came 
up,  when  the  fight  was  like  to  end  badly  ;  but  Pon- 
sonby's  cavalry  and  the  seventh  divis  on  arrived, 
and  Trielhard  immediately  abandoned  JInjadahonda, 
leaving  the  captured  guns  behind  him,  yet  carrying 
away  prisoners  the  Portuguese  general  \  isccnde  do 
Barbacena,  the  colonel  of  the  German  cavalry,  and 
others  of  less  rank.  The  whole  loss  of  the  allies 
was  above  two  hundred  ;  and  when  the  inf'ntry  pass- 
ed through  Rozas,  a  few  hours  after  the  combat,  the 
German  dead  were  lying  thickly  in  the  streets,  many 
of  them  in  their  shirts  and  trousers,  and  thus  stretch- 
ed across  the  sills  of  the  doors  they  furnished  proof 
at  once  of  tlie  suddenness  of  the  action  and  of  their 
own  bravery.  Had  the  king  been  prepared  to  follow 
up  this  blow  with  his  whole  force,  the  allies  mutt 
liave  suffered  severely;  for  Wellington,  trusting  to 
the  advanced  guard,  had  not  kept  his  divisions  very 
close  together. 

After  this  combat  the  king  retired  to  A^aMemoro, 
where  he  met  his  convoy  from  3Iadrid  ;  and  when 
the  troops  of  the  tliree  different  nations  forming  his 
army  thus  came  together,  a  horrible  confusion  arose  ; 
the  convoy  was  plundered,  and  the  miserable  people 
who  followed  the  court,  were  made  a  prey  by  the  li- 
centious soldiers.  Marshal  Jourdan,  a  man  at  all 
times  distinguished  for  the  noblest  sentiments,  im- 
mediately threw  himself  into  the  midst  of  the  disor- 
derly troops,  and  aided  by  the  other  generals,  with 
great  personal  risk  arrested  the  mischief,  and  suc- 
ceeded in  making  the  multitude  file  over  tlie  bridge 
of  Aranjues.  The  procession  was,  however,  lugu- 
brious and  shocking  ;  for  tlie  military  line  of  march 
was  broken  by  crowds  of  weeping  women  and  chil- 
dren and  by  despairing  men,  and  courtiers  of  the 
highest  rank  were  to  be  seen  in  full  dress,  desperately 
struggling  with  savage  soldiers  lor  the  possc-sion  of 
even  the  animals  on  which  they  were  endeavouring  to 
save  their  families.  The  cavalry  of  the  allies  could 
have  driven  the  whole  before  tliem  into  the  Tagus, 
yet  lord  Wellington  did  not  molest  thern.  Either 
from  ignorance  of  their  situation,  or  w'hat  is  more 
probable,  compassionating  their  misery,  and  know- 
ing that  the  troops,  by  abandoning  the  convey,  could 
easily  escape  over  the  river,  he  would  not  strike 
where  the  blow  could  only  fall  on  Iiclpless  people, 
without  affecting  the  military  operations.     Perhaps, 


506 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    W  \R. 


[Book  A VIII. 


also,  h<!  thriught  it  wise  to  leave  Joseph  the  burthen 
of  hi«  court. 

On  the  evening  of  the  lJ?th,  the  whole  multitude 
was  over  the  Tagus,  the  garrisons  of  Aranjues  and 
Toledo  joined  the  army,  order  was  restored,  and  the 
king  received  letters  from  Soult  and  Suciiet.  The 
first  named  marshal  opposed  the  evacuation  of  Anda- 
us'.a  ;  the  second  gave  notice  that  the  Sicilian  expe- 
dition liad  landed  at  Alicant,  and  that  a  considerable 
army  was  forming  there.  Then,  irritated  by  Soult, 
and  alarmed  for  the  safety  of  Suchet,  the  king  relin- 
quislied  his  march  towards  the  iMorena,  and  com- 
menced his  retreat  to  Valencia.  The  15th,  the  ad- 
vanced guard  moved  with  the  sick  and  wounded,  who 
v/ere  heaped  on  country  cars,  and  the  main  body  of 
the  convoy  followed  under  charge  of  the  infantry, 
while  the  cavalry,  spreading  to  the  riglit  and  left, 
endeavoured  to  collect  provisions.  But  the  people, 
remembering  the  wanton  devastation  committed  a 
few  months  bsfore  by  ^lontbrun's  troops,  on  their  re- 
turn from  Alicant,  fled  with  their  property  ;  and  as 
it  was  the  hottest  time  of  the  year,  and  tiie  deserted 
country  was  sandy  and  without  shade,  this  march, 
of  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles,  to  Almanza,  was  one 
of  continual  suifering.  The  partida  chief,  Chaleco, 
hovered  constantly  on  the  flanks  and  rear,  killing, 
without  mercy,  all  persons,  civil  or  military,  who 
straggled  or  sunk  from  exhaustion  ;  and  while  this 
disastrous  journey  was  in  progress,  another  misfor- 
tune befel  the  French  on  the  side  of  Ilcquefia.  For 
the  hussars  and  infantry  belonging  to  Suchet's  army, 
having  left  Madrid  to  succour  Cuenca,  before  the 
king  returned  from  Segovia,  carried  oft"  the  garrison 
of  that  place  in  despite  of  the  Empecinado,  and 
made  for  Valencia;  but  Villa  Campa  crossing  their 
march  on  the  25th  of  August,  at  the  passage  of  a 
river,  near  Utiel,  took  all  their  baggage,  their  guns, 
and  three  hundred  men.  And  after  being  driven 
away  from  Cuenca,  the  Empecinado  invested  Guada- 
laxara,  where  the  enemy  had  left  a  garrison  of  seven 
hundred  men. 

Wellington,  seeing  tliat  the  king  had  crossed  the 
Tagus  in  retreat,  entered  Madrid  ;  a  very  memorable 
event,  were  it  only  for  the  affecting  circumstances 
attending  it.  He,  a  foreigner,  and  marching  at  the 
head  of  a  foreign  army,  was  met  and  welcomed  to 
the  capital  of  Spain  by  the  whole  remaining  popula- 
tion. The  multitude,  who  before  that  hour  had  never 
seen  him,  came  forth  to  hail  his  approach,  not  with 
feigaerl  enthusiasm,  not  with  acclamations  extorted 
by  the  fear  of  a  conqueror's  power,  nor  yet  excited 
by  the  natural  proneness  of  human  nature  to  laud  the 
successful,  for  there  was  no  tumultuous  exultation  ; 
famine  was  amongst  them,  and  long-endured  misery 
had  subdued  tlieir  spirits  ;  but  with  tears,  and  every 
other  sign  of  deep  emotion,  they  crowded  around  his 
horse,  hung  upon  his  stirrups,  touched  his  clothes, 
or  throwing  themselves  upon  the  earth,  blesseS  him 
aloud  as  the  friend  of  Spain.  His  triumph  was  as 
pure,  and  glorious,  as  it  was  uncommon,  and  he  felt 
it  to  be  so. 

Madrid  was,  however,  still  disturbed  by  the  pre- 
sence of  the  enemy.  The  Retiro  contained  enor- 
mous stores,  twenty  thousand  stand  of  arms,  more 
than  om  hundred  and  eighty  pieces  of  artillery,  and 
the  eagles  of  two  F'rench  regiments  ;  and  it  liad  a 
garrison  of  two  thousand  fighting  men,  besides  inva- 
lids and  follov^crs,  but  its  inherent  weakness  was 
Boon  made  manifest.  The  works  consisted  of  an  in- 
terior fort  called  La  China,  with  nn  exterior  entrcncli- 
ment ;  but  the  fort  was  too  small,  the  ontrenclmient 
too  Inrgr;,  and  the  latter  could  b^,  easily  deprived  of 
water.  In  the  lodgings  of  a  French  ofh'^or,  also, 
was  found  an  order,  directing  the  commandant  to  con- 


fine his  real  defence  to  the  fort ;  and  accordingly,  in 
the  night  of  the  12th,  being  menaced,  he  abandoned 
the  entrencliment,  and  the  next  day  accepted  honour- 
able terms,  because  La  China  was  so  contracted  and 
filled  witii  combustible  buildings,  that  his  fine  troops 
would,  with  only  a  little  firing,  have  been  smothered 
in  the  ruins  ;  yet  they  were  so  dissatisfied  that  many 
broke  their  arms,  and  their  commander  was  like  to 
have  fallen  a  victim  to  their  wrath.  Tiiey  were  im 
mediately  sent  to  Portugal,  and  French  writers  with 
too  much  truth  assert,  that  the  escort  basely  robbed 
and  murdered  many  of  the  prisoners.  This  disgrace- 
fiil  action  was  perpetrated,  either  at  Avila,  or  on  the 
frontier  of  Portugal  ;  wherefore,  the  British  troops, 
who  furnished  no  escorts  after  the  first  day's  march 
from  Madrid,  are  guiltless. 

Coincident  with  the  fall  of  the  Retiro  was  that  of 
Guadalaxara,  wliich  surrendered  to  the  Empecenado. 
This  mode  of  wasting  an  army,  and  its  resources, 
was  designated  by  Napoleon  as  the  most  glaring  and 
extraordinary  of  all  the  errors  committed  by  the  king 
and  by  Marmont.  And  surely  it  was  so.  For  in- 
cluding the  garrisons  of  Toro,  Tordesillas,  Zamora 
and  Astorga,  which  were  now  blockaded,  six  thou- 
sand men  had  been  delivered,  as  it  were,  bound,  to 
the  allies;  and  witli  them,  stores  and  equipments 
sufficient  for  a  new  army.  These  forts  had  been  de- 
signed by  the  emperor  to  resist  the  partidas,  but  his 
lieutenants  exposed  them  to  the  British  army,  and 
thus  the  positive  loss  of  men  fi'om  the  battle  of  Sala- 
manca was  doubled. 

Napoleon  had  notice  of  Marmont's  defeat  as  early 
as  the  2d  of  September,  a  week  before  the  great  bat- 
tle of  Borodino  ;  the  nev.'s  was  carried  by  colonel 
Fabvier,  who  made  the  journey  from  Valladclid  in 
one  course,  and  having  fought  on  the  22d  of  July  at 
the  Arapiles,  was  wounded  on  the  heights  of  Mos- 
kowa  the  7th  of  September  !  However,  the  duke  of 
Ragusa,  suflx-ring  alike  in  body  and  in  mind,  liad 
excused  himself  with  so  little  strength,  or  clearness, 
that  the  emperor,  contemptuously  remarking  that 
the  despatch  contained  more  complicate  stuffing  than 
a  clock,  desired  his  war  minister  to  demand,  why 
3Iarmont  had  delivered  battle  without  the  orders  of 
the  king]  why  he  had  not  made  h"s  operations  sub- 
servient to  the  general  plan  of  the  campaign  1  why 
he  broke  from  defensive  into  off'ensive  operations  be- 
fore the  army  of  the  centre  joined  him  ■?  why  he 
would  not  even  wait  two  days  for  Chauvel's  cavalry, 
which  he  knew  were  close  at  hand  I  "From  per- 
sonal vanity,"  said  the  emperor,  with  seeming  stern- 
ness, "  the  duke  of  Ragusa  has  sacrificed  th.e  inte- 
rests of  his  country,  and  the  good  of  my  service  ;  he 
is  guilty  of  the  crime  of  insubordination,  and  is  the 
author  of  all  this  misfortune." 

But  Napoleon's  wrath,  so  just,  and  apparently  so 
dangerous,  could  not,  even  in  its  fir^t  violence,  over- 
power his  early  friendship.  With  a  kindness,  the 
recollection  of  which  must  now  pierce  Mnrmcnt's 
inmost  soul,  twice,  in  th.e  same  letter,  ho  desired  thnt 
these  questions  might  not  even  be  put  to  his  unhappy 
lieutenant  until  his  wounds  were  cured  and  his  health 
re-established.  Nor  was  this  generous  i'(!cling  slinkcn 
by  the  arrival  of  the  king's  agent,  colonel  Drspre;^, 
who  reached  Moscow  the  1^'th  of  October,  just  after 
3Iurat  had  lost  a  battle  at  the  outposts,  and  when 
all  hopes  of  peace  with  Russia  were  at  an  end.  .To- 
Bcph's  despatches,  bitter  against  all  the  ijenernls, 
were  especially  so  against  ^larmont  nnd  Soult ;  the 
former  for  having  lost  the  battle,  the  latter  because 
of  his  resistance  to  the  royal  plan.  Tlie  recal  of  the 
duke  of  Dalmatia  was  demanded  imperativel3%  be- 
cause he  had  written  a  letter  to  the  enip(>rfir,  ex- 
tremely oflensive  to  the  king  ;  and  it  was  also  hinted. 


1812.1 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAK 


507 


that  Soult,  designed  to  make  himself  king  of  Anda- 
lusia. Idle  stories  of  tliat  marshal's  ambition  sseni 
always  to  have  been  resorted  to,  wiien  iiis  skilful 
plans  WJre  br^yond  the  military  judgment  of  ordinary 
generals  ;  but  Marmont  was  deeply  sunk  in  culpable 
misforcuiij,  and  the  king's  complaints  against  him 
were  not  unjust.  Napoleon  had,  however,  then  seen 
Wellington's  despatcli,  which  was  more  favourable 
to  tlie  duke  of  Ragusa,  than  Joseph's  report ;  for  tiie 
latter  was  founded  on  a  belief,  tliat  the  unfortunate 
general,  knowing  the  army  of  the  centre  was  close 
at  hand,  would  not  wait  for  it ;  whereas,  tlie  partidas 
had  intercepted  so  many  of  Joseph's  letters,  it  is 
doubtful  if  any  reached  Marmont  previous  to  the  bat- 
tle. It  was  in  vain,  therefore,  tliat  Desprez  pressed 
the  king's  discontent  on  the  emperor;  that  great 
man,  with  unerring  sagacity,  had  already  disentan- 
gled the  truth,  and  Desiirez  was  thus  roughly  inter- 
rogated as  to  the  conduct  of  his  mnster. 

Why  w^as  not  the  army  of  the  centre  in  the  field 
a  month  sooner  to  succour  Marmont  !  Why  was  tlie 
emperor's  example,  when,  in  a  like  case,  he  marched 
from  Madrid  against  sir  .John  Moore,  forgotten'! 
Why,  after  the  battle,  was  not  the  Duero  passed, 
and  the  beaten  troops  rallied  on  the  army  of  the  cen- 
tre !  Why  were  the  passes  of  the  Guadarama  so 
early  abandoned  ]  Why  was  the  Tagus  crossed  so 
soon]  Finally,  why  were  the  stores  and  gun-car- 
riages in  the  Retiro  not  burnt,  the  eagles  and  the 
garrison  carried  otf ! 

To  these  questions  the  king's  agent  could  only  re- 
ply by  excuses  which  must  have  made  the  energetic 
emperor  smile  ;  but  when,  following  his  instructions, 
Desprez  harped  upon  Soult's  demeanour,  his  designs 
in  Andalusia,  and  still  more  upon  the  letter  so  per- 
eonally  offensive  to  the  king,  and  which  shall  be 
noticed  hereafter,  Napoleon  replied  sharply,  that  lie 
could  not  enter  into  such  pitiful  disputes  while  he 
was  at  the  head  of  five  hundred  thousand  men,  and 
occupied  with  such  immense  operations.  With  re- 
spect to  Soult's  letter,  he  said  he  knew  his  brother's 
real  feelings,  but  those"  who  judged  Joseph  by  his 
language  coul  1  only  think  v/ith  Soult,  whose  suspi- 
cions were  natural,  and  partaken  by  the  other  gene- 
rals ;  wherefore,  he  would  not,  by  recalling  him,  de- 
prive the  armies  in  Spain  of  the  only  military  head 
they  possessed.  And  then,  in  ridicule  of  Soult's  sup- 
posed treachery,  he  observed,  that  the  king's  fears  on 
that  head  must  have  subsided,  ns  the  English  news- 
papers said  the  duke  of  Dalmatia  was  evacuating 
Andalusia,  and  he  would  of  course  unite  v/ith  Suchet 
an  1  with  the  army  of  the  centre  to  retake  the  offensive. 

The  emperor,  however,  admitted  all  the  evils  aris- 
ing from  these  disputes  between  the  generals  and  the 
king,  but  said  that  at  such  a  distance  he  could  not 
give  precise  orders  for  their  conduct.  He  had  fore- 
seen the  mischief,  he  observed,  and  regretted  more 
than  ever,  that  Joseph  had  disregarded  his  counsel 
not  to  returu  to  Spain  in  1811,  and  thus  saying,  he 
closed  the  conversation  ;  but  this  expression  about 
J'oseph  not  returning  to  Spain  is  very  remarkable. 
Napoleon  spoke  of  it  as  of  a  well  known  fact ;  yet 
Joseph's  letters  shew,  that  he  not  only  desired,  but 
repeatedly  offered  to  resign  the  crown  of  Spain  and 
live  a  private  man  in  France  !  Did  the  emperor 
mean  that  he  wished  his  brother  to  remain  a  crowned 
guest  at  I'aris"?  or  had  some  subtle  intriguers  misre- 
presented the  brothers  to  each  other  '  The  noblest 
buillings  are  often  defiled  in  secret  by  vile  and  creep- 
ing things. 

OBSERVATION8. 

Isl.  .Menace  rjour  euemi/\ijlanh\t,  prnfert  t/our  own, 
and  be  ready  to  concentrate  on  the  important  points : 


These  maxims  contain  the  whcle  spirit  cf  Napo- 
leon's instructions  to  his  generals,  after  Badajos  waa 
succoured,  in  iHll.  At  tliat  time  he  ordered  the 
army  of  l^ortugal  to  occupy  the  valley  of  the  Tagus 
and  the  passtis  of  the  Gredos  mountains,  in  which 
position  it  covered  IMadrid,  and  from  thence  it  couk 
readily  march  to  aid  either  the  army  of  the  south,  or 
the  army  of  the  north,  Dorsennc,  who  commanded 
the  latter,  could  bring  twenty-six  thousand  men  to 
Ciudad  Rodrigo,  and  Soult  could  bring  a  like  number 
to  Badajos,  but  Wellington  could  not  move  against 
one  or  the  other  without  having  Marmont  upon  his 
flank;  he  could  not  move  against  Marmont  without 
having  the  others  on  both  flanks,  and  he  could  not 
turn  his  opponent's  flanks,  save  from  the  ccean.  If, 
notwithstanding  this  combination,  he  took  Ciudad 
Rodrigo  and  Badajos,  it  was  by  surprise,  and  becr-.use 
the  French  did  not  concentrate  on  the  important 
points,  which  proved  indeed  his  superiority  to  the 
executive  general  opposed  to  him,  but  in  no  manner 
aflected  the  principle  of  Napoleon's  plan. 

Again,  when  the  preparations  for  the  Russian  war 
had  weakened  the  army  of  the  north,  the  emperor, 
giving  Marm.ont  two  additional  divisions,  ordered 
him  to  occupy  Castile,  not  as  a  defensive  pcsition, 
but  as  a  central  oflcnsive  one,  from  whence  he  could 
keep  the  Gallicians  in  check,  and  by  prompt  menacing 
movements,  prevent  Wellington  from  commencing 
serious  operations  elsewhere.  This  plan  also  had 
reference  to  the  maxim  respecting  flanks.  For  IVler- 
mont  was  forbidden  to  invade  Portugal  while  V^el- 
lington  was  on  the  frontier  of  Beira,  that  is,  when 
he  could  not  assail  him  in  flank  ;  and  he  was  directed 
to  guard  the  Asturias  carefully,  as  a  protection  to 
the  great  line  of  communication  with  France  ;  in 
May,  also,  he  was  rebuked  for  having  withdrawn 
Bonet  from  Oviedo,  and  for  delaying  to  reoccupy  the 
Asturias  when  the  incursion  against  Beira  termi- 
nated. But  neither  then,  nor  afterwards,  did  the 
duke  of  Ragusa  comprehend  the  spirit  of  the  empe- 
ror's views ;  and  that  extraoi-dinary  man,  whose 
piercing  sagacity  seized  every  chance  of  war,  was 
so  disquieted  by  his  lieutenant's  want  of  perception, 
that  all  the  pomp,  and  all  the  vast  political  and  mili- 
tary combinations  of  Dresden,  could  not  put  it  from 
his  thoughts. 

"  Twice,"  said  he,  "  has  the  duke  of  Ragusa  placed 
an  interval  of  tliirty  leagues  between  his  army  and 
the  enemy,  contrary  to  all  the  rules  of  war;  the 
English  general  goes  where  he  will,  the  French 
general  loses  the  initial  movements,  and  is  of  no 
weight  in  the  affairs  of  Sjiain.  Biscay  and  the  north 
are  exposed  by  the  evacuation  of  the  Asturias  ;  San- 
tona  and  St.  Sebastian  are  endangered,  and  tL'c  gue- 
rillas communicate  freely  with  the  coast.  If  the  duke 
of  Ragusa  has  not  kept  some  bridges  on  the  Agueda, 
he  cannot  know  what  Wellington  is  about,  and  he 
will  retire  before  light  cavalry  instead  of  operating 
so  as  to  make  the  English  general  concentrate  his 
whole  army.  The  false  direction  already  given  to 
affairs  by  marshal  Marmont,  makes  it  necessary  that 
Caffarelli  should  keep  a  strong  corps  always  on  hand  ; 
that  the  commander  of  the  reserve,  at  Bayonne, 
should  look  to  the  safety  of  St  Sebastian,  holding 
three  thousand  men  always  ready  to  march  ;  finally, 
tliat  the  provisional  battalions,  and  the  troops  from 
the  depots  of  the  interior,  should  immcdiatidy  rein- 
force the  reserve  at  P.ayonne,  be  encamped  on  the 
Pyrenees,  and  exercised  and  formed  for  service.  If 
.M(i.rmovl\i  over.iig-hfs  coutinuc,  these  troops  will  pre' 
veut  the  disasters  frovi  hcc<-mii'^-  atrcme,''^ 

Napoleon  was  supernaturally  gifted  in  warlike 
matters.  It  has  been  recorded  of  Caesar's  general- 
ship, that  he  foretold  the  cohorts  mixed  with  hia 


508 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Bq(pK  XVIII. 


cavalry  would  be  the  cause  of  victory  at  Pliarsalia. 
But  this  letter  was  written  by  the  I'raiich  enipercr 
on  tlie  2Sth  ol"  31ay,  belbre  the  allies  were  even  col- 
lected on  the  Afjueda,  and  when  a  hundred  tliousand 
French  troops  were  between  the  English  general 
and  Bayonne,  and  yet  its  prescience  was  vindicated 
at  Burgos  in  October  ! 

2nd.  To  fultil  the  conditions  of  the  emperor's  de- 
sign, Marniont  siiouhl  have  adopted  Soult's  recom- 
mendation ;  that  is,  leaving  one  or  two  divisions  on 
the  Torm-:'s,  he  should  have  encamped  near  Banos, 
and  pushed  troops  towards  the  upper  Agueda  to 
watch  t!ie  movements  of  the  allies.  CafFarelli's  di- 
visions could  then  have  joined  those  on  the  Tormes, 
and  tlms  Napoleon's  plan  for  1811  would  have  been 
exactly  renewed  ;  .Madrid  would  have  been  covered, 
a  jinii'tion  vith  the  king  would  have  been  secured, 
Wellington  could  scarcely  have  moved  beyond  the 
Agueda,  and  the  disaster  of  Salamanca  would  have 
been  avoided. 

The  duke  of  Ragusa,  apparently  because  he  would 
not  have  the  king  in  his  camp,  run  counter  both  to 
the  emperor  and  to  Soult.  1st.  He  kept  no  troops 
on  tlio  Agueda,  which  might  be  excused  on  the 
ground  that  the  feeding  of  them  there  was  beyond 
his  means  ;  but  then  he  did  not  concentrate  behind 
the  Tormes  to  sustain  his  forts,  neither  did  he  aban- 
don his  forts,  when  he  abandoned  Salamanca  ;  and 
thus  eight  hundred  men  were  sacrificed,  merely  to 
eecure  the  power  of  concentrating  behind  the  Duero. 
2ad.  He  adopted  a  line  of  operations  perpendicular 
to  the  allies'  front,  instead  of  lying  on  their  Hank  ; 
ha  abandoned  sixty  miles  of  country  between  the 
Tonnes  and  the  Agueda,  and  he  suifered  Wellington 
to  take  the  initial  movements  of  the  campaign.  I^rd. 
He  withdrew  Bonet's  division  from  the  Asturias, 
whereby  he  lost  Caffarelli's  support,  and  realized  the 
emperor's  fears  for  the  northern  provinces.  It  is  true 
that  he  gained  the  initial  power  by  passing  the  Du- 
ero on  the  I8th  ;  and,  had  he  deferred  the  passage 
until  the  king  was  over  the  Guadarama,  Wellington 
must  have  gone  back  upon  Portugal  with  some  shew 
of  dishonour,  if  not  great  loss.  But  if  Castanos, 
instead  of  remaining  with  fifteen  thousand  Galli- 
cians  before  Astorga,  a  weak  place,  with  a  garrison 
of  only  twelve  hundred  men,  had  blockaded  it  with 
three  or  four  thousand,  and  detached  Santocildes 
with  eleven  or  twelve  tliousand  down  the  Esla  to  co- 
operate with  Silveira  and  D'Uruan,  sixteen  tliousnnd 
men  would  have  been  acting  upon  Marmont's  right 
flank  in  .lune  ;  and  as  Bonet  did  not  join  until  the 
8th  of  July,  the  line  of  the  Duero  would  scarcely  have 
availed  thf*  French  g^nernl. 

3rd.  The  secret  of  Wellington's  success  is  to  be 
found  in  the  extent  of  country  occupied  by  the 
French  armies  and  the  imprsdi'ments  to  their  milita- 
ry communication.  Portugal  wps  an  impregnable 
central  position,  from  whence  the  English  gener- 
al could  rush  out  un-^xpectedly  against  any  point. 
This  strong  post  was,  however,  of  his  own  making, 
h^  had  chosen  it,  liad  fortified  it,  had  defended  it, 
he  knew  its  f.iU  value  and  possessed  quickness  and 
jadofnient  to  avail  himself  of  all  its  advantajes  ;  the 
battle  of  Salnuanca  was  accidental  in  itsflf,  but  the 
tree  was  planted  to  boar  eucli  fruit,  and  Welling- 
ton's profound  combinations  must  be  estimated  from 
the  general  result.  He  had  only  sixty  thousand 
disposable  troops,  and  abo\e  a  hundred  thousand 
French  were  especially  appcjinted  to  wntrh  and  con- 
troul  hirn,  yet  he  passed  the  frontier,  defeated  fortv- 
five  thonsmd  in  a  pitched  battle,  and  drove  twenty 
thousand  others  from  Madrid  in  the  greatest  confu- 
j;on,  without  risking  a  single  strategic  point  of  im- 
portance to  hie  own  operations.     Hit  campaign  up 


to  the  conquest  of  JIadrid  was  therefore  strictly  in 
accord  w'ith  the  rules  of  art,  although  liis  means  and 
resources  have  been  ^hewn  to  be  precarious,  shift- 
ing, and  uncertain.  Indeed,  the  want  of  money 
alone  would  have  prevented  him  from  following  up 
his  victory  if  he  had  not  persuaded  the  Spanish  au- 
tliorities  in  the  Salamanca  country  to  yieldhim  the 
revenues  of  the  government  in  kind  under  a  jironiise 
of  repayment  at  Cadiz.  No  general  was  ever  n;ore 
entitled  to  the  honours  of  victory. 

4th.  The  success  of  Wellington's  darirg  advance 
would  seem  to  indicate  a  fault  in  th.e  French  plan  cf 
invasion.  Tiie  army  of  the  south,  numercus,  of  ap- 
jjroved  valour,  and  perfectly  well  ccmmanded,  Wes 
yet  of  so  little  weight  in  this  campaign  as  to  j)rove 
that  Andalusia  was  a  point  pushed  beycnd  the  true 
line  of  operations.  Tlie  conquest  of  that  province 
in  1811  was  an  enterprise  of  the  king's,  en  which 
he  prided  himself,  yet  it  seems  never  to  have  been 
nmch  liked  by  Napoleon,  alth.ough  he  did  net  abt^c- 
lutely  condemn  it.  The  question  was  indeed  a  very 
grave  one.  While  the  English  general  held  Pcrtu- 
gal,  and  while  Cadiz  was  unsubdued,  Andalusia  wsd 
a  burthen  rather  than  a  gain.  It  wculd  have  an- 
swered better  either  to  have  established  ccmmuni- 
cations  with  France  by  the  southern  l^ne  of  inva- 
sion, which  wculd  have  brought  the  enterprise  with- 
in the  rules  of  a  methodical  war,  or  to  have  held  the 
province  partially  by  detachments,- 'keeping  the  hulk 
of  the  army  of  the  south  in  Estremadura,  and  ii^us 
have  strengthened  tl.e  northern  line  of  invasion. 
For  in  Estremadura,  Scult  would  have  covered  the 
capital  and  have  been  more  strictly  conjici.iec'  n  ith 
the  army  of  the  centre  ;  and  his  powerful  co-opera- 
tion with  Massena  in  1810  would  probably  .jve 
obliged  the  English  general  to  quit  Portugal.  Th*? 
same  result  could  doubtless  have  ^een  obtained  by 
reinforcing  the  army  of  the  south  with  thirty  or  forty 
thousand  men,  but  it  is  questionable  if  Stult  could 
have  fed  such  a  number  ,  and  in  favour  of  tl  e  inva- 
sion of  Andalusia  it  nsay  be  observed,  that  Seville 
was  the  great  arsenal  of  Spain,  that  a  formidable 
power  might  have  been  established  there  by  the 
English  without  abandoning  Portugal,  that  Cadiz 
would  have  compensated  for  the  loss  of  Lisbon,  svd 
finally  that  the  English  ministers  were  not  at  that 
time  determined  to  defend  Portugal. 

5th.  When  the  emperor  declared  that  Soult  pos- 
sessed the  only  military  head  in  the  Peninsula  he 
referred  to  a  proposition  made  by  that  marshal  which 
shall  be  noticed  in  the  next  chapter;  but  havirg  re 
gard  merely  to  the  disputes  between  the  duke  cf 
Dalmatia,  Marmont,  and  the  king,  Suchet's  talents 
not  being  in  question,  the  justice  of  the  remark  may 
be  demonstrated.  Napoleon  always  enforced  with 
precept  and  example  the  vital  military  principle  cf 
concentration  on  the  important  points  ;  tut  tlie  king 
and  the  marshals,  though  harping  ccntinurlly  upcn 
this  maxim,  desired  to  follow  it  out  each  in  his  own 
sphere.  Now  to  concentrate  on  a  wrcng  point  is  to 
hurt  yourself  with  your  own  sword,  and  as  each 
French  general  desired  to  be  strong,  the  rrmy  ct 
lar?e  was  scattered  instead  of  being  concentrated. 

The  fiilure  of  the  campaign  was,  by  the  king, 
attributed  to  Soult's  disobedience,  inasmuch  as  the 
passage  of  the  Tagus  by  Drouet  would  have  enabled 
the  army  of  the  centre  to  act  befijre  Palombini's  di- 
vision arrived.  But  it  has  been  shewn  that  Hill 
could  liave  brought  Wellington  an  equal  or  suj)erior 
reinforcement  in  less  t'me,  whereby  tlie  latter  could 
either  have  made  head  until  the  French  dispersed 
for  want  of  provisions,  or,  by  a  rapid  counter-move- 
ment, he  could  have  fallen  upon  An('a]u6ia.  And  if 
the  king  had  menaced  Cludad  RodrJgo,  in  return  it 


1812.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   W.vR. 


509 


would  have  been  no  diversion,  for  he  had  no  batter- 
injf  train,  still  less  could  he  have  revenged  hiniscli" 
by  marciiing  on  Lisbon,  because  Wellington  would 
have  overpowered  Hoult  and  established  a  new  base 
at  Cadiz  bafore  such  an  operation  could  become  dan- 
gtjrous  to  tlie  capital  of  Portugal.  Oporto  miglit 
indeed  ha/e  bien  taken,  yet  Joseph  would  have  hes- 
itated to  exchange  Madrid  for  that  city.  But  the 
ten  thousand  men  required  of  Soult  by  the  king,  on 
the  19th  of  Juno,  could  have  been  at  Madrid  before 
August,  and  thus  the  passes  of  the  Guadarama  could 
have  baen  defended  until  the  army  of  Portugal  was 
reorganized  !  Aye  !  but  Hill  could  then  have  enter- 
ed the  valley  of  the  Tagus,  or,  being  reinforced, 
could  have  invaded  Andalusia,  while  Wellington 
kiipt  the  king's  army  in  check.  It  would  appear, 
therefore,  that  Joseph's  plan  of  operations,  if  all  its 
combinations  had  been  exactly  executed,  might  have 
prevented  Wellington's  progress  on  some  points,  but 
to  eifect  this  the  French  must  have  been  concen- 
trated in  large  masses  from  distant  places  without 
striking  any  decisive  blow,  whicli  was  the  very  pith 
and  marrow  of  the  English  general's  policy.  Hence 
it  follows  that  Soult  made  the  true  and  .loseph  the 
false  application  of  the  principle  of  concentration. 

6th.  If  the  king  had  judged  his  position  truly  he 
would  have  early  merged  the  monarch  in  the  gene- 
ral, exchanged  the  palace  for  the  tent;  he  would 
have  held  only  the  Retiro  and  a  few  fortified  posts 
in  the  vicinity  of  Madrid,  he  would  have  organized 
a  good  pontoon  train  and  established  his  magazines 
in  Segovia,  Avila,  Toledo,  and  Talavera  ;  finally,  he 
would  have  kept  his  army  constantly  united  in  the 
field,  and  exercised  his  soldiers,  eitlier  by  opening 
giod  roads  through  the  mountains  or  in  chasing  the 
partidas,  while  Wellington  remained  quiet.  Thus 
acting,  he  would  have  been  always  ready  to  march 
north  or  south  to  succour  any  menaced  point.  By 
enforcing  good  order  and  discipline  in  his  own  army 
ha  would  also  have  given  a  useful  example,  and  he 
could  by  vigilance  and  activity  have  ensured  the 
preponderance  of  force  in  the  field  on  whichever  side 
h:3  marched.  He  would  thus  have  acquired  the  es- 
teem of  the  French  generals  and  obtained  their  will- 
ing obedience,  and  the  Spaniards  would  more  readi- 
ly have  submitted  to  a  warlike  monarch.  A  weak 
man  may  safely  wear  an  inherited  crown,  it  is  of 
g-ili  and  the  i)9opl8  support  it  ;  but  it  requires  the 
strength  of  a  warrior  to  bear  the  weight  of  an 
usurped  diadem,  it  is  of  iron. 

7th.  If  Marmont  and  the  king  were  at  fault  in  the 
general  plan  of  operations,  they  were  not  less  so  in 
tlie  particular  tactics  of  the  campaign. 

On  the  18th  of  July  the  army  of  Portugal  passed 
the  Douro  in  adva^nce.  On  the  oHth,  it  repassed  that 
river  in  retreat,  liaving,  in  twelve  days,  marched 
two  hundred  miles,  fought  three  combats  and  a  gen- 
eral battle.  One  field  marshal,  seven  generals, 
twelve  thousand  five  hundred  men  and  officers  had 
b'^Tn  killed,  wounded,  or  taken  ;  and  two  eagles,  be- 
sides those  taken  in  the  Retiro,  several  standards, 
tw^dve  guns,  and  eight  carriages,  exclusive  of  the 
artillery  and  stores  captured  at  Valladolid,  fell  into 
the  victors'  hands.  In  the  same  period,  the  allies 
inarched  one  hundred  and  sixty  miles,  and  liad  one 
field-marshal,  four  generals,  and  somewhat  less  than 
bix  thousand  officers  and  soldiers  killed  or  wounded. 
This  comparison  furnishes  the  proof  of  Welling- 
ton's sagacity  wlien  he  determined  not  to  fight  ex- 
cept at  great  advantage.  The  French  army  al- 
Jiough  surprised  in  the  midst  of  an  evolution  and 
'nstantly  swept  from  the  field,  killed  and  wounded 
a\x  thousand  of  the  allies  ;  the  eleventh  and  sixty- 
first  regiments  of  the  sixth  division  had  not  together 


more  than  one  hundred  and  sixty  men  and  officers  left 
standing  at  the  end  of  the  battle  :  twice  six  thousand 
then  would  have  fallen  in  a  more  equa.  contest,  the 
blow  would  have  been  less  decisive,  and  as  (Jhauvel's 
cavalry  and  the  king's  army  were  both  at  hand  a  re- 
treat into  Portugal  would  probably  hrvve  followed  a 
less  perfect  victory.  Who'rcfore  this  battle  ought 
not  and  would  not  have  been  fougiit  but  for  Mar- 
mont's  false  movement  on  the  22nd.  Yet  it  is  cer- 
tain that  if  Wellington  had  retired  witliout  fighting 
the  murmurs  of  his  army,  already  louder  than  was 
seemly,  would  have  been  heard  in  England,  and  if 
an  accidental  shot  had  terminated  his  career  all 
would  have  terminated.  The  cortez,  ripe  for  a 
Chang's,  would  have  accepted  the  intrusive  king, 
and  the  American  war,  just  declared  against  Eng- 
land, would  have  rendered  the  complicated  afiairs  of 
Portugal  so  extremely  embarrassed  that  no  new  man 
could  have  continued  the  contest.  Then  the  criea 
of  disappointed  politicians  would  have  been  raised. 
Wellington,  it  would  have  been  said,  Wellington, 
desponding,  and  distrusting  his  brave  troops,  dared 
not  venture  a  battle  on  even  terms,  hence  these  mis- 
fortunes !  His  name  would  have  been  made,  as  sir 
John  Moore's  was,  a  butt  for  the  malice  and  false- 
hood of  faction,  and  his  military  genius  would  have 
been  measured  by  the  ignorance  of  his  detractors. 

8th.  In  the  battle  Marmont  had  about  forty-two 
thousand  sabres  and  bayonets  ;  Wellington,  who  had 
received  some  detachments  on  the  19th,  had  abova 
forty-six  thousand,  but  the  excess  was  principal 
ly  Spanish.  The  French  had  seventy-four  guns 
the  allies,  including  a  Spanish  battery,  had  only  six 
ty  pieces.  Thus  Marmont,  over-matched  in  cavalry 
and  infantry,  was  superior  in  artillery,  and  the  fight 
would  have  been  most  bloody  if  the  generals  hai^ 
been  equal,  for  courage  and  strength  were  in  even 
balance  until  Wellington's  genius  struck  the  beam. 
Scarcely  can  a  fault  be  detected  in  his  conduct.  It 
might  indeed  be  asked  why  the  cavalry  reserves 
were  not,  after  Le  Marchant's  charge,  brought  up 
closer  to  sustain  the  fourth,  fifth,  and  sixth  divisions 
and  to  keep  off"  Boyer's  dragoons,  but  it  would  seem 
ill  to  cavil  at  an  action  which  was  described  at  the 
time  by  a  French  officer,  as  the  "  beating  of  forty 
thousand  men  in  forty  minutes.'''' 

9th.  The  battle  of  Salamanca,  remarkable  in  many 
points  of  view,  was  not  least  so  in  this,  that  it  was 
the  first  decided  victory  gained  by  the  allies  in  the 
Peninsula.  In  former  actions  the  French  had  been 
repulsed,  here  they  were  driven  headlong  as  it  were 
before  a  mighty  wind,  without  help  or  stay,  and  the 
results  were  proportionate.  Joseph's  secret  negoti- 
ations with  the  cortez  were  crushed,  his  partizana 
in  every  part  of  the  Peninsula  were  aba.hed,  and 
the  sinking  spirit  of  the  Catalans  was  revived,  the 
clamours  of  the  opposition  in  England  were  checked, 
the  provisional  government  of  France  was  dismay- 
ed, the  secret  plots  against  the  French  in  Germany 
were  resuscitated,  and  the  shock,  reaching  even  to 
Moscow,  heaved  and  shook  the  collossal  structure  of 
Napoleon's  power  to  its  very  base. 

Nevertheless  Salamanca  was  as  most  great  battlea 
are,  an  accident  ;  an  accident  seized  upon  with  as- 
tonishing vigour  and  quickness,  but  still  an  acci- 
dent. Even  its  i-esults  were  accidental,  for  the 
French  could  never  have  repassed  the  Tormes  as  an 
army  if  Carlos  D'Espafia  had  not  withdrawn  the 
garrison  from  Alba,  and  hidden  the  fact  from  Wei 
lingt<||;  and  this  circumstance  alone  would  proba- 
bly have  led  to  the  ruin  of  the  wbole  campaign,  but 
for  another  of  those  chances  v.hicli,  recurring  so  fre- 
quently in  war,  render  bad  generals  timid,  and  mhke 
great  generals  trust  their  fortune  under  the  most  ad« 


510 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XIX. 


verse  circumstances.  Tliis  is  easily  shewn.  Joseph 
was  at  Blasco  Sancho  on  the  24th.  and  notwithstand- 
ing his  numerous  cavalry,  the  army  of  Portugal 
passed  in  retreat  across  his  front  at  tlie  distance  of 
only  a  few  miles  without  his  knowledge  ;  he  thus 
niissed  one  opportunity  of  eifecting  his  junction  with 
Clauzel.  On  the  25ti»,  this  junction  could  still  have 
been  made  at  Arevalo,  and  Wellington,  as  if  to  mock 
the  king's  generalship,  halted  that  day  behind  the 
Zapardiel;  yet  Joseph  retreated  towards  Guadara- 
ma,  wrathful  that  Clauzel  made  no  eii'ort  to  join  him, 
and  forgetful  that  as  a  beaten  and  pursued  army  must 
march,  it  was  for  him  to  join  Clauzel.  But  the  true 
cause  of  these  errors  was  the  different  inclinations 
of  ^le  genera .s.  The  king  wished  to  draw  l^^iuzel 
to  Madrid,  Clauzel  desired  to  have  the  king  behind 
the  Duero,  and  if  he  had  succeeded  the  probable  re- 
sult may  be  thus  traced. 

Clauz-^l  during  the  lirst  confusion  wrote  that  only 
twenty  tiiousand  men  could  be  reorganized,  but  in 
this  number  he  did  not  include  the  stragglers  and 
marauders  who  always  take  advantage  of  a  defeat  to 
seek  their  own  interest;  a  reference  to  the  French 
loss  proves  that  there  were  nearly  thirty  thousand 
fighting  men  left,  and  in  fact  Clauzel  did  in  a  fort- 
night reorganize  twenty  thousand  infantry,  two  thou- 
sand cavalry  and  tifty  guns,  besides  gaining  a  know- 
ledge of  live  thousand  stragglers  and  marauders.  In 
fine,  no  soldiers  rally  quicker  after  a  defeat  than  the 
French,  and  hence,  as  Joseph  brought  to  Blasco  San- 
cho  thirty  guns  and  fourteen  thousand  men,  of  which 
above  two  thousand  were  horsemen,  forty  thousand 
infantry,  and  more  than  six  thousand  cavalry  with  a 
powerful  artillery,  might  then  have  baen  rallied  be- 
hind the  Duero,  exclusive  of  Caffarelli's  divisions. 
Nor  would  IMadrid  have  been  meanwiiile  exposed  to 
an  insurrection  nor  to  the  operation  of  a  weak  de- 
tachment from  Wellington's  army,  tor  the  two  thou- 


sand men  sent  by  Suchet  had  arrived  in  that  capital 
on  the  olth,  and  there  were  in  the  several  Ibrtitied 
points  of  the  vicinity  six  or  seven  thousand  otiier 
troops  who  could  have  been  united  at  tiie  Retire  to 
protect  that  depot  and  the  families  attached  to  the 
intrusive  court. 

Thus  Wellington,  without  committing  any  fault, 
would  have  found  a  more  powerful  army  than  Mar- 
mont's  again  on  the  Duero,  and  capable  of  renewing 
the  former  operations  with  the  advantage  of  tbrmer 
errors  as  warning  beacons.  But  his  own  army  would 
not  have  been  so  powerful  as  before,  for  the  reinforce- 
ments sent  from  England  did  not  even  suffice  to  re 
place  the  current  consumption  of  men,  and  neither 
tlie  fresh  soldiers  nor  the  old  Walcheren  regiments 
were  able  to  sustain  the  toil  of  the  recent  operations. 
Three  thousand  troops  had  joined  since  tlie  battle, 
yet  the  general  decrease,  including  the  killed  and 
wounded,  was  above  eight  thousand  men,  and  the 
number  of  sick  was  rapidly  augmenting  from  the  ex- 
t,reme  heat.  It  may,  therefore,  be  said  that  if  ftiar- 
mont  was  stricken  deeply  by  Wellington,  tlie  king 
poisoned  the  wound.  The  English  general  had  tore- 
calculated  all  these  superior  resources  of  the  ene- 
my, and  it  was  only  Marmont's  flagrant  fault,  on  the 
22nd,  that  could  have  wrung  the  battle  from  him  ;  yet 
he  fought  it  as  if  his  genius  disdained  such  trial  of 
its  strength.  I  saw  him  late  in  the  evening  of  that 
great  day,  when  the  advancing  flashes  of  cannon  and 
musketry,  stretching  as  far  as  the  eye  could  command, 
shewed  in  the  darkness  how  well  the  field  was  won  ; 
he  was  alone,  the  flush  of  victory  was  on  his  brow, 
and  his  eyes  were  eager  and  watchful,  but  his  voico 
was  calm  and  even  gentle.  More  than  the  rival  of 
IMarlborough,  since  he  had  defeated  greater  warriors 
than  Marlborough  ever  encountered,  with  a  prescient 
pride  he  seemed  only  to  accept  this  glory  as  aa 
earnest  of  greater  things. 


BOOK    XIX. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Stale  of  the  war— Eastern  operations — Liiry's  bad  conduct — 
Freiicli  army  of  tlie  Ebro  dissolved — Liicy's  serret  agents 
blow  up  liie  mnR;izines  in    Lerula — He  is  afraid   to  h.torm 
the  place — Caluriuiial<  s  Siirztieid — Siichet  roines  to  Reus — 
The  hrrmitiige  of  St.  Diinas  surreiulcreJ  to  Decaen  hy  colo- 
nel Green — Tiie  French  s^'Ueral  liurns  the  convent  of  Mont- 
serrel  and  tnarohes  to  Lniirla — General   Maitlaml  with   the 
AiiglD-Siciliati   army   a|i[)ears  off  Palimos — Sails  fur  Ali- 
canl — Keflections  on  this  event — Operations  in    Murcia — 
O'Donel  defeated  at  ('ast.illa — Mailland  lands  at  Aliranl — ' 
Siichet  concentrates  his  forces    al  Xativa — Entrenches  a, 
camp  there — Maitland  advaiK'es  to  Alcoy — His  difK'-ulties  | 
— Returns  to  Alicant — 'I'he  king's  army  arrives  at  Alman-I 
za — The    remnant    of    M;iU[)oiiii's    hri:;:ide    arrives     from 
Cuenca — Siichet  reorciipies  Alcoy — O'Donel  comes  up   to 
Yecia — Maitlaml  is  reinforced   from   .Sicily  and  entrenches 
a  cami)  under  the  walls  of  Ali'-ant, 

As  Wellington's  operations  had  now  deepW  affect- 
ed the  French  aflairs  in  the  distant  provinces,  it  is 
necessarry  again  to  revert  to  the  general  process  of 
the  war,  lott  tlie  true  bearings  of  his  military  policy 
should  b.i  overlooked.     The  battle  of  Salamanca,  by 


clearing  all  the  centre  of  Spain,  had  reduced  the  In- 
vasion to  its  original  lines  of  operation.  For  Palom- 
bini's  division  having  joined  the  army  of  the  centre, 
the  army  of  the  Ebro  was  broken  up  ;  Catl'arelli  iiad 
concentrated  tlie  scattered  troops  of  the  army  of  the 
north,  and  when  Clauzel  had  led  back  the  vanquished 
army  of  Portugal  to  Burgos,  the  whole  French  host 
was  divided  in  two  distinct  parts,  each  having  a 
separate  line  of  communication  with  France  and  a 
circuitous,  uncertain,  attenuated  line  of  correspon- 
dence with  each  other  by  Zaragoza  instead  of  a  sure 
and  short  one  by  Madrid.  But  Wellington  was  also 
forced  to  divide  his  army  in  two  parts,  and  though, 
by  the  advantage  of  his  central  j)Osition,  he  retained 
the  initial  power,  both  of  movement  and  concentra- 
tion, his  lines  of  communication  were  become  long 
and  weak,  because  the  enemy  was  powerful  at  either 
fl;ink,  Whcref)re  on  his  own  simple  strength  in  the 
centre  of  Spain  he  could  not  rely,  and  the  diversions 
he  had  projected  against  the  enemy's  rear  and  flanks 
became  more  important  than  ever.  To  these  we 
must  now  turn. 


1812.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


511 


EASTERN    OPERATIONS. 

It  will  be  recollected  that  the  narrative  ofCatalo- 
nian  ad'airs  ceased  at  the  moment  when  Decaen,  af- 
ter fortiiying  the  coast  line  and  opening  new.  roads 
beyond  the  roach  of  shot  from  the  English  ships,  was 
gathering  tiie  harvest  of  the  interior.  Lacy,  ineffi- 
cient in  tlie  field  and  universally  hated,  was  thus 
confined  to  the  mountain  chain  which  separates  the 
coast  territory  Irom  the  plains  of  Lerida  and  from 
the  Cerdana.  The  insurrectionary  spirit  of  the  Ca- 
talonians  was  indeed  only  upheld  by  Wellington's 
successes,  and  by  the  hope  of  English  succour  from 
Sicily  ;  for  liacy,  devoted  to  the  republican  party  in 
Spain,  had  now  baen  made  captain-general  as  well 
as  commander-in-chief,  and  sougiit  to  keep  down  the 
people,  who  were  generally  of  the  priestly  and  royal 
faction.  He  publicly  spoke  of  exciting  a  general  in- 
surrection, yet,  in  his  intercourse  with  the  English 
naval  officers,  avowed  his  wish  to  repress  the  patriot- 
ism of  the  Soraatenes ;  he  was  not  ashamed  to  boast 
of  his  assassination  plots,  and  received  with  honour 
a  man  who  had  murdered  the  aid-de-camp  of  Maurice 
Mathieu  ;  he  sowed  dissentions  amongst  his  gener- 
als, intrigued  against  all  of  them  in  turn,  and  when 
Eroles  and  3Ianso,  who  were  the  people's  favourites, 
raised  any  soldiers,  he  transferred  the  latter  as  soon 
as  they  were  organized  to  Sarzficld's  division,  at  the 
same  time  calumniating  that  general  to  dejjress  his 
influence.  He  quarrelled  incessantly  with  captain 
Codrington,  and  had  no  desire  to  see  an  English  force 
in  Catalonia  lest  a  general  insurrection  should  take 
place,  for  he  feared  that  the  multitude,  once  gath- 
ered and  armed,  would  drive  him  from  the  province 
and  declare  for  the  opponents  of  the  cortes.  And  in 
this  view,  the  constitution  itself,  although  emanating 
from  the  cortes,  was  long  withheld  from  the  Catalans 
lest  the  newly  declared  popular  rights  should  inter- 
fere with  tlie  arbitrary  power  of  the  chief. 

Such  was  the  state  of  the  province  when  intelli- 
gence that  the  Anglo-Sicilian  expedition  had  arrived 
at  Mn.hon,  excited  the  hopes  of  the  Spaniards  and 
t'le  fe;'.rs  of  the  Erench.  The  coast  then  became 
the  great  objsct  of  interest  to  both,  and  the  Catalans 
again  opened  a  communication  with  the  English 
fi^et  by  Villa  Nueva  de  Sitjas,  and  endeavoured  to 
collect  the  grain  of  the  Campo  de  Taragona.  Deca- 
en coming  to  meet  Suchet,  who  had  arrived  at  Reus 
with  two  thousand  men,  drove  the  Catalans  to  the 
hills  again;  yet  the  Lerida  district  was  thus  opened 
to  the  enterprises  of  Lacy,  because  it  was  at  this 
period  that  ReiUe  had  detached  general  Paris  from 
Zaragoza  to  the  aid  of  Palombini  ;  and  that  Severo- 
li's  division  was  broken  up  to  reinforce  the  garrisons 
of  Lerida,  Taragona,  Barcelona,  and  Zaragoza.  But 
the  army  of  the  Ebro  being  dissolved.  Lacy  resolved 
to  march  upon  Lerida,  where  he  had  engaged  certain 
Spaniards  in  the  French  service  to  explode  the  pow- 
der magazine  when  he  should  approach  ;  and  this 
odious  s:;heme,  which  necessarily  involved  the  de- 
struction of  hundreds  of  his  own  countrymen,  was 
vainly  opposed  by  Eroles  and  Sorzfield. 

On  the  12th  of  July,  Eroles'  division,  that  general 
being  absent,  was  incorporated  with  Rarzfield's  and 
other  troops  at  Guisona,  and  the  whole  journeying 
day  and  night  reached  Tremp  on  the  i:]th.  Lacy 
having  tlms  turned  Lerida,  would  have  resumed  the 
march  at  mid-day,  intending  to  attack  the  next 
morn'ng  at  dawn,  but  the  men  were  without  food 
and  exhausted  by  fitigue,  and  fifteen  hundred  had 
fallen  behind.  A  council  of  war  being  then  held, 
Sarzfield.  who  thought  the  plot  wild,  would  have  re- 
turnel,  observing  that  all  communication  with  the 
sea  was  abandoned,  and  the  harvests  of  the  Camps  de 


Taragona  and  Vails  being  left  to  be  gathered  by  the 
enemy,  the  loss  of  the  corn  would  seriously  atiect  the 
whole  principality.  Displeased  at  the  renK.nstranre, 
Lacy  immediately  sent  him  back  to  the  plain  of  Lr- 
gel  with  some  infantry  and  the  cavalry  to  keep  the 
garrison  of  Balaguer  in  check  ;  but  in  the  night  of 
the  16th,  when  Sarzfield  had  reached  the  bridge  of 
Alentorna  on  the  Segre,  fresh  orders  caused  him  to 
return  to  Limiana  on  the  Noguera.  Meanwhile 
Lacy  himself  had  advanced  by  Agen  towards  leri- 
da,  the  explosion  of  the  magazine  took  place,  many 
houses  were  thrown  down,  two  hundred  inhabitants 
and  one  hundred  and  fifty  soldiers  were  destroyed  , 
two  bastions  fell,  and  the  place  was  laid  o]  tn. 

Kenriod,  the  governor,  although  ignorant  of  the 
vicinity  of  the  Spaniards,  immediately  marred  the 
breaches,  the  garrison  of  Balaguer,  hearing  the  ex- 
jilosion,  marched  to  his  succour,  and  when  the  Ca- 
talan troops  appeared  the  citizens,  enraged  by  the 
destruction  of  their  habitations,  aided  the  P'rench  ; 
Lacy  then  fled  back  to  Tremp,  bearing  the  burthen 
of  a  crime  which  he  had  not  feared  to  ccnjmit,  but 
wanted  courage  to  turn  to  his  country's  advartage 
To  lessen  the  odium  thus  incurred,  he  irsidioutly 
attributed  the  failure  to  Sarzfield's  disobedience; 
and  as  that  general,  to  punish  the  people  of  Barbas- 
tro  for  siding  with  the  French  and  killing  twenty  of 
his  men,  had  raised  a  heavy  contribution  of  money 
and  corn  in  the  district,  he  became  so  hateful,  that 
some  time  after,  when  he  endeavoured  to  raite  sol- 
diers in  those  parts,  the  people  threw  boiling  water 
at  him  from  the  windows  as  he  passed. 

Before  this  event,  Suchet  had  returned  to  Valen- 
cia, and  Decaen  and  Maurice  Mathieu  marched 
against  colonel  Green,  who  was  entrenched  in  the 
hermitage  of  St.  Dinias,  one  of  the  highest  of  the 
peaked  rocks  overhanging  the  convent  of  Montserrat. 
Manso  immediately  raised  the  Somatei:es  to  aid 
Green,  and  as  the  latter  had  provisions,  the  inacces- 
sible strength  of  this  post  seemed  to  defy  capture  ; 
yet  he  surrendered  in  twenty-four  hours,  and  at  a  mo- 
ment Vs  hen  the  enen-y,  despairing  of  success,  were 
going  to  relinquish  the  attack.  He  excused  himself 
as  being  forced  by  his  own  people,  but  he  signed  the 
capitulation.  Decarn  then  set  fire  to  the  ccnvert 
of  Montserrat,  and  the  flames  teen  for  miles  around 
was  the  signal  that  the  warfare  on  that  holy  incur- 
tain  was  finished.  Afler  this  the  French  general 
marched  to  Lerida  to  gather  corn,  and  Lacy  again 
spread  his  troops  on  the  mountains. 

During  his  absence,  Eroles  had  secretly  been  pre- 
paring a  general  insurrection  to  break  cut  when  the 
British  army  should  arrive,  and  it  was  tuppcsed  that 
his  object  was  to  effect  a  change  in  the  governn)ent 
of  the  province;  for  though  lacy  himself  again 
spoke  of  embodying  the  Somatenes,  if  arms  were 
given  to  him  by  sir  Edward  Pellew,  there  was  really 
no  scarcity  of  arms,  the  demand  was  a  deceit  to  pre- 
vent the  muskets  from  being  given  to  the  people,  and 
there  was  no  levy.  Hence  the  discontent  increased 
and  a  general  desire  for  the  arrival  of  the  British 
troops  became  prevalent  ;  the  miserable  people  turn- 
ed anxiously  towards  any  quarter  for  aid,  and  this 
expression  of  conscious  helplessness  was  given  in 
evidence  by  the  Spanish  chiefs,  and  received  as 
proof  of  enthusiasm  by  the  English  naval  command- 
ers, who  were  more  sanguine  of  success  than  expe- 
rience would  warrant.  All  eyes  were,  however,  di- 
rected towards  the  oceau,  the  French  in  fear,  the 
Catalans  in  hope  ;  and  the  Brit'sh  armament  did 
appear  off  Palamos,  but  after  three  days,  spread  ita 
sails  agsin,  and  steered  for  Alicant,  leaving  the 
principality  stu;)ified  with  grief  and  disappointment. 

This  unexpected  event  was  the  natural  result  of 


512 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[BooE  XIX. 


previous  errors  on  all  siilcs,  errors  which  invariably 
aU.an;i  \varlik9  proceadings  when  not  directed  by  a 
superior  genius,  and  even  tlien,  not  always  to  be 
avoulad.  It  has  been  shewn  liow  ministerial  vacil- 
lation marred  lord  William  Bent. nek's  lirst  intention 
of  landing  in  person  With  ten  or  twelve  thousand 
men  on  the  Catalonian  cDast ;  and  how,  after  much 
dehay, general  Maitland  had  sailed  to  Palma  with  a 
division  of  six  tliousand  men,  Oalabrians,  Sicilians, 
and  others,  troops  of  no  likelihood  save  tliat  some 
threa  thousand  British  and  Germans  were  amongst 
thsm.  This  force  was  afterwards  joined  by  the 
transports  from  Portugal  having  engineers  and  ar- 
tillery officers  on  board,  and  that  honoured  battering 
train  wliich  had  shattered  the  gory  walls  of  Badajos. 
Wellington  had  graat  hopes  of  this  expedition  ;  he 
had  himself  sketched  the  general  pla.n  of  operations  ; 
and  his  own  campaign  had  been  conceived  in  tlie  ex- 
pectation, that  lord  William  Bentinck,  a  general  of 
high  rank  and  reputation,  with  ten  tliousand  good 
troops,  aided  wiili  at  least  as  many  Spanish  soldiers, 
disciplined  under  the  two  British  officers,  Whit- 
tingham  and  Roche,  would  have  early  fallen  on  Cat- 
alonia, to  the  destruction  of  Suchet's  plans.  And 
when  this  his  first  hope  was  quashed,  he  still  ex- 
pected that  a  force  would  be  disembarked  of  strength 
Buliicient,  in  conjunction  with  the  Catalan  army,  to 
take  Tarogona. 

Roche's  corps  was  most  advanced  in  discipline, 
but  the  Spanish  government  delayed  to  place  it  un- 
der general  Maitland,  and  hence  it  first  sailed  from 
the  islands  to  Murcia,  and  returned  without  or- 
ders, again  repaired  to  Murcia,  and  at  the  moment 
of  general  Maitland's  arrival  oif  Palamos,  was,  under 
the  command  of  .Tosepli  O'Donel,  involved  in  a  ter- 
rible catastrophe  alrea^ly  alluded  to,  and  hereafter  to 
be  particularly  narrated.  Whittingham's  levy  re- 
mained, but  when  inspected  by  the  quarter-master 
general  Donkin,  it  was  found  in  a  raw  state,  scarce- 
ly mustering  four  tliousand  efiiactive  men,  amongst 
which  were  many  French  deserters  from  the  island 
of  Cabera. 

The  sumptuous  clothing  and  equipments  of  Whit- 
tingham's and  Roche's  men,  their  pay  regularly  sup- 
plied from  the  British  subsidy,  and  very  much  ex- 
ceeding that  of  the  other  Spanish  corps,  excited  en- 
vy and  dislike;  there  was  no  public  inspection,  no 
check  upon  the  expenditure,  nor  upon  the  delivery  of 
the  stores,  and  Roche's  proceedings  on  this  last  head, 
whether  justly  or  unjustly  I  know,  not,  were  very 
generally  and  severely  censured.  Whittingham  ac- 
kn  jwledged  that  he  could  not  trust  his  people  near 
the  enemy  witliout  the  aid  of  British  troops,  and 
though  the  captain-general  Cnupigny  desired  their 
departure,  h's  opinion  was  against  a  descent  in  Cat- 
alonia. M.i'tland  hesitated,  but  sir  Edward  Pellew 
urge!  ti<iw  descent  so  very  strongly,  that  he  finally 
assented  and  readied  J^ahmos  with  nine  thousancl 
men  of  all  nations,  on  t'e  '-ilst  of  July,  yet  in  some 
confusion  as  to  the  transjiort  service,  which  the  stafi" 
officers  attributed  to  the  injudicious  meddling  of  the 
naval  chiefs. 

Maitland's  first  care  was  to  open  a  communication 
with  the  Spanish  commnnders.  Eroles  came  on 
board  at  once,  and  vehemently  and  unceasingly  uts- 
ed  an  immediate  disembarkation,  declaring  that  the 
fate  of  Catalonia  and  h's  own  existence  depended 
upon  it;  the  otiior  gen'^rals  shewed  less  eagerness, 
and  their  accounts  difiered  gretitly  with  respect  to 
the  relative  m;'ans  of  the  Catalans  and  the  French. 
Iiacy  estimated  the  enemy's  disposable  troops  at  fif- 
teen thousand,  and  liis  own  at  seven  thousand  infan- 
try and  three  hundred  cavalry  ;  and  oven  tiiat  num- 
ber he  said  he  could  with  diificulty  feed  or  provide 


with  ammunition.  Sarzficld  judged  the  French  to 
be,  exclusivf'  of  Sucliet's  movable  column,  e  gliteen 
thousand  infantry,  and  five  hundred  cavalry  ;  he 
tliought  it  rash  to  invest  Taragcna  with  a  less  force, 
and  that  a  free  and  constant  commuiiication  with 
the  fleet  was  absolutely  essential  to  any  operation. 
Kroles  rated  the  enemy  at  thirteen  thousand  inlantry 
and  five  hundred  cavalry,  including  Suchet's  col- 
umn ;  but  the  reports  of  the  deserters  gave  twenty- 
two  thousand  infantry,  exclusive  of  Suchet's  column 
and  of  the  garrisons  and  Miguelcttes  in  the  enemy's 
service. 

No  insurrection  of  the  Somatencs  had  yet  taken 
place,  nor  was  there  any  appearance  that  such  an 
event  would  happen,  as  the  French  were  descried 
conducting  convoys  along  the  shore,  with  small  es- 
corts, and  concentrating  their  troops  for  battle  with- 
out molestation.  The  engineers  demanded  from  six 
to  ten  days  to  reduce  Taragona  after  investment,  and 
Decaen  and  IMaurice  3Iathieu  were  tlien  near  IVIont 
serrat  with  seven  or  eight  tliousand  gcod  troops, 
which  number  could  be  doi:bled  in  a  few  days;  the 
Catalans  could  not  so  soon  unite  ai;f'  join  Maitland's 
force,  and  there  was  a  general,  altl  cuc'h  apparer.tly 
an  unjust  notion  abroad,  tli:;t  !  r,(  y  v.  as  a  Frenchman 
at  heart.  It  was  fearei  i.h-i  ,  I'.ui  the  Toulon  fleet 
might  come  out  and  burn  the  transports  at  their 
anchorage  during  the  siege,  and  thus  W'ellingtcn's 
battering  train  and  even  the  safety  of  the  army 
would  be  involved  in  an  enterprise  promising  little 
success.  A  full  council  of  war  was  unanimous  not 
to  land,  and  the  reluctence  of  the  people  to  rise, 
attributed,  by  captain  Codrington,  to  tlie  machina- 
tions of  traitors,  was  visible  ;  Maitland  also  was  Icr- 
tlier  swayed  by  tlie  generous  and  just  consideration, 
that  as  the  Soinatenes  had  not  voluntarily  taken 
arms,  it  would  be  cruel  to  excite  them  to  such  a 
step,  when  a  few  days  might  oblige  him  to  abandon 
them  to  the  vengeance  of  the  enemy.  Whereibre  as 
Palamos  appeared  too  strong  for  a  sudden  assrult, 
the  armament  sailed  towards  Valencia  with  irtcni 
to  attack  that  place,  after  a  project,  furnished  by  the 
quarter-master  general  Donkin,  and  in  unison  with 
lord  Wellington's  plan  of  operations;  but  Maitland, 
during  the  voyage,  changed  his  mind,  and  proceec'cd 
at  once  to  Alicant.  . 

The  Catalans  were  not  more  displeased  than  the 
British  naval  commanders,  at  seeing  the  principali- 
ty thus  shaken  oft';  yet  the  judgment  of  the  latter 
seems  to  have  been  swayed  partly  from  having  given 
stronger  hopes  of  assistance  to  the  former  tlirn  the 
circumstances  would  rigorously  warrant ;  partly  from 
that  confidence,  which  inspired  by  continual  Fuccess, 
is  strength  on  their  own  element,  but  ra.'hness  rn 
shore.  Captain  Codrington,  from  the  great  interest 
he  took  in  the  struggle,  was  peculiarly  disccntent- 
ed  ;  yet  his  own  description  ol'  the  state  of  (.'ata- 
lonia  at  tlie  time,  shows  that  iiis  luipes  rested  more 
on  some  vague  notions  of  the  Soniatenes'  enthusi- 
asm, than  upon  any  facts  which  a  general  ought  to 
calculate  upon.  lord  Wellington  indeed  said,  that 
he  could  sec  no  reason  why  the  plan  he  had  recom- 
mended, should  not  have  been  successful ;  an  obser- 
vation made,  however,  when  he  was  somewhat  exci- 
ted by  the  prospect  of  having  Siichet  on  his  own 
hands,  and  probably  under  some  erroneous  informa- 
tion. He  had  been  deceived  about  the  strength  of  the 
forts  at  Salimianca,altliough  close  to  them  ;  and  ns  he 
had  just  established  a  sure  channel  of  intelligence  in 
Catalonia,  it  was  probable  that  he  was  also  deceived 
with  respect  to  Taragona,  which  if  not  et'"ong  in  regu- 
lar works,  was  well  j)rovided,  and  commanded  by  a 
very  bold,  active  governor,  p.nd  oiT'ered  great  resour- 
ces in  the  facility  of  making  interior  retrenchmenta 


1812.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


513 


The  force  of  the  Catalans  lord  Weliinj^ton  knew 
principally  from  sir  Edward  Pellew,  wiio  had  de- 
rived his  information  chiefly  from  Eroles,  who  very 
much  exag-gorated  it,  and  lessened  the  enemy's  power 
in  proportion.  And  general  Maitland  conld  scarcely 
ne  called  a  commander-in-chief,  for  lord  William 
Bentinck  forbade  him  to  risk  the  loss  of  his  division 
lest  Sicily  itself  should  thereby  be  endangered;  and 
to  avoid  mischief  from  the  winter  season,  lie  was  in- 
structed to  quit  the  Spanish  coast  in  the  second  week 
of  September.  Lord  William  and  lord  Wellington 
were  therefore  not  agreed  in  the  object  to  be  at- 
tained. The  rirst  considered  the  diversion  on  the 
Spanish  coast,  as  secondary  to  the  wants  of  Sicily, 
whereas  Wellington  looked  only  to  the  great  inter- 
ests at  stake  in  the  Peninsula,  and  thought  Sicily  in 
no  danger  until  the  French  should  reinforce  their  ar- 
my in  Calabria.  He  desired  vigorous  combined  ef- 
forts of  the  military  and  naval  forces,  to  give  a  new 
aspect  to  the  war  in  Catalonia,  and  his  plan  was  that 
Taragona  should  be  attacked  ;  if  it  foil,  the  warfare 
hs  said  would  be  once  more  established  on  a  good 
base  in  Catalonia;  if  it  was  succoured  by  the  con- 
centration of  the  French  troops,  Valencia  would  ne- 
cessarily be  weak,  and  the  armament  would  then 
proceed  to  attack  that  place,  and  if  unsuccessful,  re- 
turn to  assail  Taragona  again. 

This  was  an  excellent  plan  no  doubt,  but  Napoleon 
never  lost  sight  of  that  great  principle  of  war,  so 
concisely  expressed  by  Sertorius  when  he  told  Pom- 
pey  that  a  good  general  should  look  behind  him  rath- 
er than  before.  The  emperor,  acting  o!i  the  proverb 
that  fortune  favours  the  brave,  often  urged  his  lieu- 
tenants to  dare  desperately  with  a  few  men  in  the 
front,  but  he  invariably  covered  their  communica- 
tions with  heavy  masses,  and  there  is  no  instance  of 
h's  plan  of  invasion  being  shaken  by  a  flank  or  rear 
attack,  except  where  his  instructions  were  neglect- 
el.  His  armies  made  what  are  called  points,  in 
war,  such  as  Massena's  invasion  of  Portugal,  Mon- 
cey's  attack  on  Valencia,  Dupont's  on  Andulasia  ; 
but  the  general  plan  of  operation  was  invariably  sup- 
ported by  heavy  masses  protecting  the  communica- 
tions. Had  his  instructions,  sent  from  Dresden, 
been  strictly  obeyed,  the  walls  of  Lerida  and  J'ar- 
ragona  would  have  been  destroyed,  and  only  the  cit- 
adels of  each  occupied  with  small  garrisons  easily 
provisioned  for  a  long  time.  The  field  army  would 
thus  have  been  increased  by  at  least  three  thousand 
men,  the  movable  columns  spared  many  harassing 
marches,  and  Catalonia  would  have  offered  little 
temptation  for  a  des-ccnt. 

But  notwithstanding  this  error  of  Suchet,  Mait- 
land's  troops  were  too  few,  and  too  ill-comp»sed  to 
venturB  the  investment  of  Taragona.  The  imperial 
must=3r-rolls  give  more  than  eighty  thousand  men, 
including  Reille's  divisions  at  Zaragosa,  for  the 
armies  of  Aragop  and  Catalonia,  and  twenty-seven 
thousand  of  the  first  and  thirty-seven  thousand  of  the 
second,  were  actually  under  arms  with  the  eagles  ; 
wherefore  to  say  that  Decaen  could  have  brought  at 
once  ten  thousand  men  to  the  succour  of  Tarag(«ia, 
an  1,  by  weakening  his  garrisons,  as  many  more  in  a 
very  short  time,  is  not  to  over-rate  his  power  ;  and 
this  without  counting  Paris'  brigade,  tiiree  thousand 
strong,  which  b'^longed  to  Reille's  division,  and  was 
disposable.  Suchet  had  just  before  come  to  Reus 
with  two  thousand  select  men  of  all  arms,  and  as 
O'Donel's  army  had  since  been  defeated  near  Ali- 
c'lnt,  lie  could  have  returned  with  a  still  greater 
ftr^e  to  oppose  Maitland. 

Now  the  English  fleet  was  descried  by  the  French 
off"  Palamos  on  the  evening  of  the  J^lst  of  July,  al- 
tlicugh  it  did  not  anchor  before  the  let  of  August ; 
34 


Decaen  and  Maurice  Mathieu  with  some  eight  thou- 
sand disposable  men  were  then  between  Montserrat 
and  Barcelona,  that  is  to  say,  only  two  marches 
from  Taragona  ;  Lamarque,  with  from  four  to  five 
thousand,  was  between  Palamos  and  Mataro,  five 
marches  from  Taragona;  Q,uesnel,  with  a  like  num- 
ber was  in  the  Cerdaua,  being  about  seven  marchoa 
oft";  Suchet  and  Paris  could  have  arrived  in  lesa 
than  eight  days,  and  from  the  garrisons,  and  minor 
posts,  smaller  succours  might  have  been  drawn; 
Tortoza  alone  could  have  furnished  two  thousand 
But  Lacy's  division  was  at  Vich,  Sarzfield's  at  V  ilia 
Franca,  Eroles'  divided  between  Montserrat  and  Ur- 
gel,  Milan's  in  the  Grao  D'Olot,  and  they  required 
five  days  even  to  assemble  ;  when  united,  they  could 
not  have  exceeded  seven  thousand  men,  and  with 
their  disputing,  captious  generals,  would  have  been 
unfit  to  act  vigorously  ;  nor  could  they  have  easily 
joined  the  allies  without  fighting  a  battle,  in  which 
their  defeat  would  have  been  certain. 

Sarzfield  judged  that  ten  days  at  least  were  neces- 
sary to  reduce  Taragona,  and  positively  affirmed  that 
the  army  must  be  entirely  fed  from  the  fleet,  as  the 
country  could  scarcely  supply  the  Catalonian  troops 
alone.  Thus  Maitland  would  have  had  to  land  hia 
men,  his  battering  train  and  stores,  and  to  form  hia 
investment  in  the  face  of  Decaen's  power,  or,  fol- 
lowing the  rules  of  war,  have  defeated  that  general 
first.  But  Decaen's  troops,  numerically  equal,  without 
reckoning  the  garrison  of  Taragona,  two  thousand 
strong,  were  in  composition  vastly  superior  to  the 
allies,  seeing  that  only  three  thousand  British  and 
German  troops  in  Maitland's  army,  were  to  be  at  all 
depended  upon  in  battle  ;  neither  does  it  appear  that 
the  platforms,  sand-bags,  fascines,  and  other  mate- 
rials, necessary  for  a  siege,  were  at  this  period  pre- 
pared and  on  board  the  vessels. 

It  is  true  Maitland  would,  if  he  had  been  able  to 
resist  Decaen  at  first,  which  seems  doubtful,  have 
effected  a  great  diversion,  and  Wellington's  object 
would  have  been  gained  if  a  re-embarkation  had 
been  secure  ;  but  the  naval  officers,  having  reference 
to  the  nature  of  the  coast,  declared  that  a  safe  re- 
embarkation  could  not  be  depended  upon.  The 
soundness  of  this  opinion  has  indeed  been  disputed 
by  many  seamen,  well  acquainted  with  the  coast, 
who  maintain,  that  even  in  winter,  the  Catalonian 
shore  is  remarkably  safe  and  tranquil ;  and  that  Cape 
Salou,  a  place  in  other  respects  admirably  adapted 
for  a  camp,  aflx)rds  a  certain  retreat,  and  facility  of 
re-embarking  on  one  or  other  of  its  sides  in  all 
weather.  However,  to  JNIaitland  the  coast  of  Cata- 
lonia was  represented  as  unsafe,  and  this  view  of  the 
question  is  also  supported  by  very  able  seamen  like- 
wise acquainted  with  that  sea. 

OPERATIONS     IN     MURCIA 

The  Anglo-Sicilian  armament  arrived  at  Alicanl 
at  a  critical  moment;  the  Spanish  cause  was  there 
going  to  ruin.  Joseph  O'Donel,  brother  to  the  re- 
gent, had  with  great  difficulty  organized  a  new  Mur- 
cian  army,  after  Blake's  surrender  at  Valencia,  and 
this  army,  based  upon  Alicant  and  Carthagena,  was 
independent  of  a  division  under  general  Frere,  which 
always  hung  about  Baza,  and  Lorca,  on  the  frontier 
of  Grenada,  and  communicated  through  the  Alpuxa- 
ras  with  the  sea-coast.  Both  Suchet  and  Soult  were 
paralyzed  in  some  degree  by  the  neighbourhood  of 
these  armies,  which,  holding  a  central  position,  were 
supported  by  fortresses,  sup{)lied  by  sea  fi-om  Gibral- 
tar to  Cadiz,  and  had  their  existence  guaranteed  by 
Wellington's  march  into  Spain,  by  his  victory  of 
Salamanca,  and  by  his  general  combinations.  For 
the  two  French  commanders  were  forced  to  watch 


514 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


LBooK  XIX. 


hia  movements,  and  to  support  at  the  same  time,  the 
one  a  blockade  of  the  Isla  de  Leon,  the  otlier  the 
fortresses  in  Catalonia:  hence  they  were  in  no  con- 
dition lo  ibilow  up  the  prolonged  operations  neces- 
sary to  destroy  these  Murcian  armies,  which  were, 
moreover,  supported  by  t!ie  arrival  ol'  general  Ross 
with  British  troops  at  Cartiiairena.  < 

O'Donel  liad  been  joined  by  Roche  in  July,  and 
Suchet,  after  detaching  Maupoint's  brigade  towards 
Madrid,  departed   himself  with   two  thousand  men 
for  Catalonia,  leaving  general  Harispe  with  not  more 
than  four  thousand  men  beyond  the  Xucar.     General 
Ross  immediately  advised  O'Donel  to  attack  him  ; 
and   to   distract   his   attention,   a  large   fleet,  with 
troops  on  board,  whicli   had  originally  sailed  from 
Cadiz  to  succour  Ballesteros  at  31alaga,  now  appear- 
ed oft'  the  Valencian  coast.     At  the  same  time,  Bas-  ] 
oecour  and  Villa  Campa,  being  free  to  act,  in  couse- ' 
quence  of  Palombini's  and  Maupoint's  departure  for 
Madrid,  came  down  from  their  haunts  in  the  moun- ' 
tains  of  Albaracyn,  upon  the  right  flank  and  rear  of  i 
the  French  positions.     Villa  Campa  penetrated  to 
Liria,  and  Bassecour  to  Cofrentes,  on  tiie  Xucar  ; 
but  ere  this  attack  could  take  place,  Suchet,  with  his 
usual  celerity,  returned  from  Reus.     At  tirst  he  de- 
tached men  against  Villa  Campa,  but  when  he  saw 
the  fleet,  fearing  it  was  the  .Sicilian  armament,  he, 
recalled   them   again,  and   sent   for   Paris'  brigade  ^ 
from  Zaragoza,  to  act  by  Teruel  against  Bassecour 
and  Villa  Campa.     Then  he  concentrated  his  own 
forces  at  Valencia,  but  a  storm  drove  the  fleet  oiF  the 
coast,  and  meanwhile  O'Donel's  operations  brought 
on  the  1 

FIRST    BATTLE    OF    CASTALLA. 

Harispe's  posts  were  established  at  Biar,  Castalla 
and  Onil  on  the  right ;  at  Ibi  and  Alcoy  on  the  lefl;. 
This  line  was  not  more  than  one  march  from  Ali- 
cant.  Colonel  Mesclop,  witii  a  regiment  of  infan- 
try and  some  cuirassiers  held  Ibi,  and  was  supported 
by  Harispe  himself  with  a  reserve  at  Alcoy.  Gene- 
ral Delort,  with  another  regiment  of  infantry,  was 
at  Castr.lla,  having  some  cuirassiers  at  Onil  on  his 
left,  and  a  regiment  of  dragoons,  with  three  compa- 
nies of  foot,  at  Biar,  on  his  right.  In  this  exposed 
Bi'cuation,the  Frenc'^  awaited  O'Donel,  who  directed 
his  principal  force,  consisting  of  six  thousand  infan- 
try, seven  hundred  cavalry,  and  eight  guns,  against 
Delort;  meanwhile  Roche,  with  three  thousand  men, 
was  to  move  through  the  mountains  of  Xixona,  so 
as  to  fall  upon  Ibi  simultaneously  with  the  attack  at 
Castalla,  O'Donel  hoped  thus  to  cut  the  French 
line,  and  during  these  operations,  Bassecour,  with 
two  thousand  men,  was  to  come  down  fram  Cofrentes 
to  Villena,  on  the  right  flank  of  Delort. 

Ro..:he,  who  marclied  in  the  night  of  the  19th,  re- 
mained during  the  20th  in  the  mountaijis,  but  the 
next  night  he  threaded  a  difficult  pass,  eight  miles 
long,  reached  Ibi  at  day-break  on  the  21st,  and  sent 
notice  of  his  arrival  to  O'Donel ;  and  when  tliat  gene- 
ral appeared  in  front  of  Delort,  the  latter  abandoned 
Castalla,  which  was  situated  in  the  same  vallny  as 
Ibi,  and  about  five  miles  distant  from  it.  But  he 
only  retired,  skirmishing,  to  a  strong  ridge  behind 
tliat  town,  which  also  extended  behind  Ibi  ;  this  se- 
cured his  communication  with  ^lesclop,  of  whom  he 
demanded  succour,  and  at  the  same  time  he  called 
in  his  own  cavalry  and  infantry  from  Onil  and  Biar. 
Mesclop,  leaving  some  infantry,  two  guns,  and  his 
cuirassiers,  to  defend  Ibi  and  a  small  fort  on  the  hill 
behind  it,  marched  at  once  towards  Delort,  and  thus 
Rochp,  finding  only  a  few  men  before  him,  got  pos- 
BCBsioa  of  the  town  after  a  sharp  skirmish,  yet  he 
eould  not  take  the  fort. 


At  first,  O'Donel.  who  ha)  advanced  beyond  Cas- 
talla, only  skirmished  wit.  and  cannciunied  tiie 
French  in  his  front,  for  he  had  detached  the  h-panish 
cavalry  to  operate  by  the  plains  of  Villena,  to  turn 
the  enemy's  right  and  communicate  with  Bassecour. 
While  expecting  the  eflects  of  this  movt^nient,  he 
was  astonished  to  see  the  French  dragoons  come 
trotting  throufrh  the  pass  of  Biar,  on  his  left  flank; 
they  were  followed  by  some  companies  of  infai.try, 
and  only  separated  from  him  by  a  stream  over  which 
was  a  narrow  bridge,  witliout  parapets,  and  at  the 
same  moment  the  cuirassiers  appeared  on  the  other 
side,  coming  from  Onil.  The  Spanish  cavalry  had 
made  no  eflbrt  to  interrupt  this  march  from  Biar,  nor 
to  follow  the  French  tlirough  the  deflle,  nor  any 
etfort  whatever.  In  this  difliculty,  O'Donel  turned 
two  guns  against  the  bridge,  and  supported  tiiem 
with  a  battalion  of  infantry  ;  but  the  Frencii  dra- 
goons, observing  this  battalion  to  be  unsteady,  braved 
the  fire  of  the  guns,  and  riding  furiously  over  the 
bridge,  seized  the  battery,  and  then  dashed  against 
and  broke  the  infantry.  Delort's  line  advanced  at 
the  same  moment,  the  cuirassiers  charged  into  the 
town  of  Castalla,  and  the  whole  Spanish  army  fled 
outright.  Several  hundred  sought  refuge  in  en  old 
castle,  and  there  surrendered  ;  and  of  the  others,  three 
thousand  were  killed,  wounded,  or  taken,  and  yet  the 
victors  had  scarcely  fifteen  hundred  men  engaged, 
and  did  not  lose  two  hundred.  O'Donel  attributed 
his  defeat  to  the  disobedience  and  inactivity  of  St. 
Estevan,  who  commanded  his  cavalry  ;  but  the  great 
fault  was,  the  placing  that  cavalry  beyond  the  defile 
of  Biar,  instead  of  keeping  it  in  hand  for  the  battle. 

This  part  of  the  action  being  over,  3Iesclcp,  who 
had  not  taken  any  share  in  it,  was  reinforced,  and 
returned  to  succour  Ibi,  to  w^hich  place,  also,  Harispe 
was  now  approaching,  from  Alcoy  ;  but  Roche,  ia- 
voured  by  tiie  strength  of  the  passes,  escaped,  and 
reached  Alicant  with  little  hurt,  wiiile  the  remains 
of  O'Donel's  divisions,  pursued  by  the  cavalry  on  the 
road  of  Jumilla,  fled  to  the  city  of  Murcia.  J^Esse- 
cour,  who  had  advanced  to  Almanza,  was  then  driven 
back  to  his  mountain-haunts,  where  Villa  Campa  re- 
joined him.  It  was  at  this  moment  that  Maitlaud'g 
armament  disembarked,  and  the  rem.nants  of  the 
Spanish  force  rallied.  The  king,  then  flying  from 
Madrid,  immediately  changed  the  direction  of  hia 
march  from  the  3Iorena  to  Valencia,  and  one  more 
proof  was  given,  that  it  was  England,  and  not  Spain, 
which  resisted  the  French  ;  for  Alicant  would  have 
fallen,  if  not  as  an  immediate  consequence  of  this 
defeat,  yet  surely,  when  the  king's  army  had  joined 
Suchet. 

That  general,  who  had  heard  of  the  battle  of  Sala- 
manca, the  evacuation  of  Madrid,  and  the  approach 
of  Joseph,  and  now  saw  a  fresh  army  springing  up 
in  his  front,  hastened  to  concentrate  his  disposable 
force  in  the  positions  of  San  Felippe  de  Xativa  and 
Moxente,  which  he  entrenched,  as?  well  as  the  road 
to  Almanza,  with  a  view  to  secure  his  junction  with 
the  king.  At  the  same  time  he  establislied  a  new 
bridge  and  bridge-head,  at  Alberique,  in  addition  to 
that  at  Alcira,  on  the  Xucar;  and  having  called  up 
Paris  from  Teruel,  and  3Iaupoint  from  Cuenca,  re- 
solved to  abide  a  battle,  which  the  slowness  and 
vacillation  of  his  adversaries  gave  him  full  time  to 
prepare  for. 

Maitland  arrived  the  7th,  and  though  his  force  was 
not  all  landed  before  the  11th,  the  French  were  still 
scattered  on  various  points,  and  a  vigorous  comman- 
der would  have  found  the  means  to  drive  them  over 
the  Xucar,  and  perhaps  from  Valencia  itself.  How- 
ever, the  British  general  had  scarcely  set  his  foot  on 
shore,  when  the  usual  Spanish  vexaticus  overwhelm 


1P12.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


515 


ed  him.  Thrse  principal  roads  led  towards  the  en- 
emy ;  0113  on  the  left  passed  through  Yecla  and  Fuen- 
ta  La  Higuera,  and  by  it  the  remnant  oi'  U'Donel's 
army  was  coming  up  from  Murcia;  anotiier  passed 
through  Elda,  8ax,  Villena,  and  Fuentc  de  La  Hi- 
guera,  and  the  third  through  Xixona,  Alcoy,  and 
Albayda.  Now  O'Donel,  whose  existence  as  a  gen- 
eral was  redeemed  by  the  appearance  of  3Iaitland, 
instantly  demanded  from  the  latter  a  pledge,  that  he 
would  draw  nothing,  either  by  purchase  or  requisi- 
tion, save  wine  and  straw,  from  any  of  tiiese  lines, 
nor  from  the  country  between  them.  The  English 
general  assented,  and  instantly  sunk  under  the  diffi- 
culties thus  created.  For  his  intention  was  to  have 
attacked  Harispe  at  Alcoy  and  Ibi  on  the  12th  or 
14th,  but  he  was  only  able  to  get  one  march  from 
Alicant  as  late  as  the  16th  ;  he  could  not  attack  be- 
fora  the  18th,  and  it  was  on  that  day  that  Suchet 
concentrated  his  army  at  Xativa.  The  delay  had 
be^n  a  necessary  consequence  of  the  agreement  with 
O'Donel. 

Maitland  was  without  any  habitude  of  command, 
his  commissariat  was  utterly  inefficient,  and  his  field- 
artillery  had  h'ien  so  shamefully  ill-prepared  in  Sicily 
that  it  was  nearly  useless.  He  had  hired  mules  at 
a  great  expense  for  the  transport  of  his  guns,  and 
of  provisions,  from  Alicant ;  but  the  owners  of  the 
mules  soon  declared  they  could  not  fulfil  their  con- 
tract, unless  they  were  fed  by  the  British  ;  and  this 
O'Donel's  restrictions  as  to  the  roads  prevented. 
Many  of  the  muleteers,  also,  after  receiving  their 
money,  deserted  with  both  mules  and  provisions  ; 
and  on  the  first  day's  march,  a  convoy,  with  six  days' 
supply,  was  attacked  by  an  armed  banditti,  called  a 
guerilla,  and  the  convoy  was  plundered  or  dispersed, 
and  lost. 

Maitland,  suffering  severely  from  illness,  was  dis- 
gusted at  these  things,  and  fearing  for  the  safety  of 
his  troops,  v/ould  have  retired  at  once,  and,  perhaps, 
have  re-embarked,  if  Suchet  had  not  gone  back  to 
Xativa;  then,  however,  he  advanced  to  Elda,  while 
Roche  entered  Alcoy  ;  yet  both  apparently  without 
an  object,  for  there  was  no  intention  of  fighting,  and 
the  next  day  Roche  retired  to  Xixona,  and  Maitland 
retreated  to  Alicant.  To  cover  this  retreat,  general 
D'jnkin  pushed  forward,  with  a  detachment  of  Span- 
ish and  English  cavalry,  through  Sax,  Ibi,  and  Al- 
coy, and  g'ving  out  that  an  advanced  guard  of  five 
thouGand  British  was  close  behind  him,  coasted  all 
the  French  line,  captured  a  convoy  at  Olleria,  and 
then  returned  through  Alcoy.  Suchet  kept  close 
himself,  in  the  camp  of  Xativa,  but  sent  Harispe  to 
meet  the  king,  who  was  now  near  Almanza,  and  on 
the  2r)th,  the  junction  of  the  two  armies  was  effect- 
ed ;  at  the  same  time,  Maupoint,  escaping  Villa 
Campa's  assault,  arrived  from  Cuenca  with  the  rem- 
nant of  his  brigade. 

When  the  king's  troops  arrived,  Suchet  pushed  his 
outposts  again  to  Villena  and  Alcoy,  but  apparently 
occupied  in  providing  for  Joseph's  army  and  court, 
he  neglected  to  press  the  allies,  which  he  might 
have  done,  to  their  serious  detriment.  Meanwhile, 
O'Donel,  who  had  drawn  off  Frere's  division  from 
Loi:,a,  came  up  to  Yecla,  with  five  or  six  thousand 
men,  and  Maitland,  reinforced  with  some  detach- 
ments from  Sicily,  commenced  fortifying  a  camp 
outside  Alicant;  but  his  health  was  quite  broken, 
and  he  earnestly  desired  to  resign,  being  filled  with 
anxiety  at  the  near  approach  of  Soult.  That  mar- 
shal had  abandoned  Andalusia,  and  his  manner  of 
do'ng  so  shall  be  set  forth  in  the  next  cliapter;  for 
it  was  a  grsat  event,  leading  to  great  results,  and 
worthy  of  deep  consideration  by  tliose  who  desire  to 
know  upon  what  the  fate  of  kingdoms  may  depend. 


CHAPTER  11. 

Operations  in  Andnhisia — The  king-  orders  Soult  to  abandon 
that  province — Sonit  ureses  the  king  to  join  him  wiiii  tiia 
other  armies — Joseph  reiterates  the  order  to  abandon  An- 
dakisia — Soult  sends  a  Utter  to  the  minister  of  war  ei- 
firessin;;  his  suspicions  that  Joseph  was  about  to  make  a 
separate  [leaee  with  the  allies — The  king  intercepts  thia 
letter,  and  sends  colonel  Des(ivez  to  JToscovv,  to  re|)rcsent 
Soult's  conduct  to  the  emperor — Napoleon's  magnanimity 
— Wellington  anxiously  watches  Soult's  movements — Or 
ders  Hill  to  fight  Drouet,  and  directs  general  Cooke  to 
attack  the  French  lines  in  front  of  the  Isla  de  Leon — Bal- 
lesteros,  pursued  by  Leval  and  Villalte,  skirmishes  at  Coin 
— Enters  Malaga — Soult's  preparations  to  ai)-nidon  Anda- 
lusia— Lines  before  the  Isla  de  Leon  abandoned — Soult 
marches  towards  Grenada — Colonel  Skerrit  and  Cruz  Mnr- 
geon  land  at  Huelva — Attack  the  French  rear-guard  at 
Seville — Drouet  marches  upon  Huescar — Soult,  moving  by 
the  mountains,  reaches  Heliin,  and  elVects  his  junction 
with  the  king  and  Suchet — Maitland  desires  to  nlurn  to 
Sicily — Wellington  prevents  him — Wellington's  general 
plans  considered — Stale  of  affairs  in  Castile — Clauzel  comes 
down  to  Valladolid  with  the  French  army — Santocildes 
retires  to  Torrelobaton,  and  Clinton  falls  back  to  Arevalo 
— Foy  marches  to  carry  off  the  French  garrisons  in  Iieon 
— Astorga  surrenders  before  liia  arrival — He  marches  to 
Zamora  and  drives  Silveira  into  Portugal — Menaces  Sala- 
manca— Is  recalled  bv  Clauzel — The  partidas  get  posses- 
sion of  the  French  posts  on  the  Biscay  coast — Take  the 
city  of  Bilbao — Reille  abandons  several  posts  in  Aragon— 
The  northern  provinces  become  ripe  for  insurrection. 

OPERATIONS    IN    ANDALUSIA. 

Suchet  found  resources  in  Valencia  to  support 
the  king's  court  and  army,  without  augmenting  the 
pressure  on  the  inhabitants,  and  a  counter-stroke 
could  have  been  made  ogainst  the  allies,  if  the  French 
commanders  had  been  of  one  mind,  and  had  looked 
well  to  the  state  of  affairs  ;  but  Joseph,  exasperated 
by  the  previous  opposition  of  the  generals,  and  trou- 
bled by  the  distresses  of  the  numerous  families  at- 
tached to  his  court,  was  only  intent  upon  recovering 
j\ladrid  as  soon  as  he  could  collect  troops  enough  to 
give  Vv^cllington  battle.  He  had  demanded  from  the 
French  minister  of  war,  money,  stores,  and  a  rein- 
forcement of  forty  thousand  men,  and  he  had  impera- 
tively commanded  Soult  to  abandon  Andalusia  ;  tiiat 
clear-sighted  commander  could  not,  however,  under- 
stand why  the  king,  who  had  given  him  no  accurate 
details  of  Marmont's  misfortunes,  or  of  his  own  ope- 
rations, should  yet  order  him  to  abandon,  at  once, 
all  the  results,  and  all  the  interests,  springing  from 
three  years'  possession  of  the  south  of  Spain.  He 
thought  it  a  great  question,  not  to  be  treated  lightly  ; 
and  as  his  vast  capacity  enabled  him  to  embrace  the 
whole  field  of  operations,  he  concluded  that  rumour 
had  exaggerated  the  catastrophe  at  Salamanca,  and 
that  the  abandoning  of  Andalusia  would  be  the  ruin 
of  the  French  cause. 

"  To  march  on  Madrid,"  he  said,  "  would  probably 
produce  another  pitched  battle,  which  should  be  care- 
fully avoided,  seeing  that  the  whole  frame-work  of 
the  French  invasion  was  disjointed,  and  no  resource 
would  remain  after  a  defeat.  On  the  other  hand, 
Andalusia,  which  had  hitherto  been  such  a  burthen 
to  the  invasion,  now  oftered  means  to  remedy  the 
present  disasters  ;  and  to  sacrifice  that  province,  with 
all  its  resources,  for  the  sake  of  regaining  the  capi- 
tal of  Spain,  appeared  a  folly.  It  was  purchasing  s. 
town  at  the  price  of  a  kingdom.  jMadrid  was  noth- 
ing in  the  emperor's  policy,  thougli  it  might  be 
something  for  a  king  of  Spain  ;  yet  Pliilip  the  Vth 
had  til  rice  lost  it,  and  preserved  his  throne.  Why 
then  should  Joseph  set  such  a  vain?  ufion  that  cityl 
The  battle  of  the  Araj)iles  was  merely  a  grand  duel, 
which  might  be  fought  agi'.ia,with  a  different  result. 


516 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XIX. 


but  to  abandon  Andalusia.  wi"th  all  its  stores  and 
establisliineuts,  to  raise  tbe  blockade  of  Cadiz,  to 
pacrinca  tliR  guns,  the  equipments,  tlie  hospitals  and 
the  magazines,  and  thus  render  null  the  labours  of 
three  .years,  would  be  to  make  the  battle  of  the 
Arapiles  a  prodigious  historical  event,  the  effect  of 
which  would  be  felt  all  over  Europe,  and  even  in  the 
new  world.  And  how  was  this  flight  from  Andalusia 
to  be  safely  ejected  ?  The  army  of  the  sc-uth  had 
been  able  to  hold  in  check  sixty  thousand  enemies, 
disposed  on  a  circuit  round  it ;  but  the  moment  it 
commenced  its  retreat  towards  Toledo,  tiiose  sixty 
thousand  men  would  unite  to  follow,  and  Wellington 
himself  would  be  found  on  the  Tagus,  in  its  front. 
On  that  line,  then,  the  army  of  the  south  could  not 
march,  and  a  retreat  through  Murcia  would  be  long 
and  difficult.  But  why  retreat  at  all  J  Where," 
exclaimed  this  able  warrior,  "  where  is  the  harm, 
though  the  allies  should  possess  the  centre  of  Spain  !" 

"Your  maJ3sty,"  he  continued,  "should  collect 
the  army  of  the  centre,  the  army  of  Aragon,  and  if 
possible,  the  army  of  Portugal,  and  you  should  march 
upon  Andalusia,  even  though,  to  do  so,  should  in- 
volve the  abandonment  of  Valencia.  If  the  army 
of  Portugal  conies  with  you,  one  hundred  and  twenty 
thousand  men  will  be  close  to  Portugal ;  if  it  cannot 
or  will  not  coni'^,  let  it  remain  ;  because,  while  Bur- 
gts  defends  itself,  that  army  can  keep  on  the  right 
of  t;ie  Ebro,  and  the  emperor  will  take  measures  for 
its  suecour.  Let  Wellington  then  occupy  Spain  from 
Burgos  to  the  Morena,  it  shall  be  my  care  to  provide 
magazines,  stores,  and  places  of  arms,  in  Andalusia  ; 
and  the  moment  eighty  thousand  French  are  assem- 
bled in  that  province,  the  theatre  of  war  is  changed  ! 
The  English  general  must  t>.ll  back  to  save  Lisbon, 
the  army  of  Portugal  may  follow  him  to  the  Tagus, 
the  line  of  communication  with  France  will  be  es- 
tablished by  the  eastern  coast,  the  final  result  of  the 
campaign  turns  in  our  favour,  and  a  decisive  battle 
may  b3  delivered,  witiiout  fear,  at  the  gates  of  Lis- 
bon. 3Iarch  then  with  the  army  of  the  centre  upon 
the  Despenas  Peros,  unite  all  our  forces  in  Andalu- 
sia, and  all  will  be  well  !  Abandon  that  province, 
anti  you  lose  Spain  !  you  will  retire  behind  the  Ebro, 
and  famine  will  drive  you  thence,  before  the  emperor 
can,  from  the  distant  Russia,  provide  a  remedy  ;  his 
affairs,  even  in  that  country,  will  suffer  by  the  blow, 
and  Am3rica,  dismayed  by  our  misfortunes,  will, 
perhaps,  make  peace  with  England." 

Neither  the  king's  genius  nor  his  passions,  would 
permit  him  to  understand  the  grandeur  and  vigour 
of  this  conception.  To  change  even  simple  lines  of 
operation,  suddenly,  is  at  all  times  a  nice  affair  ;  but 
thus  to  change  the  whole  theatre  of  operations,  and 
regain  the  initial  movements,  after  a  defeat,  be- 
longs only  to  master  spirits  in  war.  Now,  the  em- 
peror hud  recommended  a  concentration  of  force,  and 
Joseph  would  not  understand  this,  save  as  applied  to 
the  recovery  of  Madrid  ;  he  was  uneasy  for  the  fron- 
tiers of  France  ;  as  if  Wellington  could  possibly 
have  invaded  that  country  wliile  a  great  army  men- 
aced Lisbon  ;  in  fine,  he  could  see  notliing  but  his 
lost  capital  on  one  side,  and  a  disobedient  lieutenant 
on  the  other,  and  peremptorily  repeated  his  orders. 
Then  Soult,  knowing  that  his  plan  could  only  be 
effected  by  union  and  rapidity,  and  dreading  the  re- 
sponsibility of  further  delay,  took  imn^ediate  steps 
to  abandon  Andalusia  ;  but  mortified  by  this  blight- 
ing of  his  fruitful  genius,  and  stung  with  anger  at 
such  a  termination  to  all  his  political  and  military 
labours,  his  f^jlincTs  overmastered  his  judgment. 
Instead  of  tracing  tlie  king's  riffid  counteraction  of 
his  scheme  to  the  narrowness  of  the  monarch's  nill- 
tary  genius,  he  judged  it  part  of  a  design  to  secure 


his  own  fortune  at  the  expense  of  his  brother,  an 
action  quite  foreign  to  Joseph's  honest  and  passion- 
ate nature.  Wherefore,  making  known  this  opinion 
to  six  generals,  who  were  sworn  to  secrecy,  unless 
interrogated  by  the  emperor,  he  wrote  to  the  FrencI) 
minister  of  war,  expressing  his  doubts  of  the  king's 
loyalty  towards  the  emperor,  and  founding  them  on 
tiie  following  facts. 

Ist.  That  the  extent  of  Marmont's  defeat  had  been 
made  known  to  him  only  by  tlie  reports  of  the  ena 
my,  and  the  king,  after  remaining  for  twenty-three 
days,  without  sending  any  detailed  intbrmation  of 
the  operations  in  the  north  of  Spain,  although  the 
armies  were  actively  engaged,  had  peremptorily  or- 
dered him  to  abandon  Andalusia,  saying  it  was  the 
only  resource  remaining  for  the  French.  To  this 
opinion,  Soult  said  he  could  not  subscribe  ;  yet,  be- 
ing unable  absolutely  to  disobey  the  monarch,  he 
was  going  to  make  a  movement  which  must,  finally, 
lead  to  the  loss  of  all  the  French  conquests  in  Spain, 
seeing  that  it  would  tlien  be  impossible  to  remain 
permanently  on  the  Tagus,  or  even  in  the  Castiles. 

2nd.  This  operation,  ruinous  in  itself,  was  insist'^d 
upon  at  a  time,  when  the  newspapers  of  Cadiz  affirm- 
ed, that  Joseph's  ambassador  at  the  court  of  Peters- 
burgh  had  joined  the  Prussian  army  in  the  field  ; 
that  Joseph  himself  had  made  secret  overtures  to  tho 
government  in  the  Isla  de  Leon  ;  that  Bernadotte, 
his  brother-in-law,  had  made  a  treaty  with  England 
and  had  demanded  ofthe  cortes  a  guard  of  Spaniards,  a 
fact  confirmed  by  information  obtained  througli  an  o.- 
ficer  sent  with  a  flag  of  truce  to  the  English  admiral ; 
finally,  that  Aloreau  and  Bluchcr  were  at  Stockholm, 
and  tlie  aid-de-camp  ofthe  former  was  in  London. 

Reflecting  upon  all  these  circumstances,  he  feared 
that  the  object  of  the  king's  false  movements  niigh.t 
be,  to  force  the  French  army  over  the  Ebro,  in  the 
view  of  making  an  arrangement  for  Spain,  separata 
from  France ;  fears,  said  the  duke  of  Dalmatia, 
which  may  be  chimerical,  but  it  is  better,  in  such 
a  crisis,  to  be  too  fearful,  than  too  confident.  This 
letter  was  sent  by  sea,  and  the  vessel  having  touched 
at  Valencia  at  the  moment  of  Joseph's  arrival  there, 
the  despatch  was  opened,  and  it  was  then,  in  the 
first  burst  of  his  anger,  that  the  king  despatched 
Desprez  on  that  mission  to  Moscow,  the  result  of 
which  has  been  already  related. 

Soult's  proceedings,  though  most  offensive  to  the 
king,  and  founded  in  error,  because  Joseph's  letters, 
containing  the  information  required,  were  intercept- 
ed, not  withheld,  were  prompted  by  zeal  for  bis  mas- 
ter's service,  and  cannot  be  justly  condemned,  yet 
Joseph's  indignation  was  natural  and.  becoming. 
But  the  admiration  of  reflecting  men  must  ever  be 
excited  by  the  greatness  of  mind,  and  tlie  calm  saga- 
city, with  which  Napoleon  treated  this  thorny  affair. 
Neither  the  complaints  of  his  brother,  nor  the  hints 
of  his  minister  of  war  (for  the  duke  of  Feltre,  a  man 
of  mean  capacity,  and  of  an  intriguing  disposition, 
countenanced  Joseph's  expressed  suspicions  that  the 
duke  of  Dalmatia  designed  to  make  himself  king  of 
Andalusia)  could  disturb  the  temper  or  judgment  of 
the  emperor;  and  it  was  then,  struck  with  the  vigour 
ofthe  i)lan  for  concentrating  tho  army  in  Andalusia, 
he  called  Soult  the  only  military  head  in  Spain. 
Nor  was  Wellington  inattentive  to  that  general's 
movements  ;  he  knew  his  talents,  and  could  foresee 
and  appreciate  the  importance  of  tiie  project  he  had 
proposed.  Anxiously  he  watched  his  reluctant  mo- 
tions, and  while  apparently  enjoying  his  own  triumph 
amidst  the  fi^nsts  and  rejoicings  of  Madrid,  his  eye 
was  fixed  on  Seville;  the  halls  and  bull-fights  of  the 
cap'tal,  cloaked  both  the  skill  and  the  apprchensiona 
of  the  consummate  general. 


1812.J 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


517 


Before  ilie  allies  liad  crossed  the  Guadarama,  Hill 
nad  betn  directed  to  hold  his  army  in  hand,  close  to 
Drouet,  and  ready  to  move  into  tiie  valley  of  the 
Tagus,  if  that  general  should  hasten  to  the  succour 
of  the  king.  But  wlien  Joseph's  retreat  upon  Va- 
lencia was  known,  Hill  received  orders  to  fight 
Drouet,  and  even  to  follow  him  into  Andalusia;  at 
the  same  time  general  Cooke  was  directed  to  pre- 
pare an  attack,  even  though  it  should  be  an  open  as- 
eault,  on  tlie  French  lines  before  Cadiz,  while  Bal- 
Ijsteros  operated  on  the  flank  from  Gibraltar.  By 
these  means,  Wellington  hoped  to  keep  8oult  from 
Bending  any  succour  to  tlie  king,  and  even  to  force 
him  out  of  Andalusia  without  the  necessity  of  marcli- 
ing  tlier^  iiimself;  yet,  if  these  measures  failed,  he 
was  resolved  to  take  twenty  thousand  men  from 
Madrid  and,  uniting  with  Hill,  drive  the  French 
from  that  province. 

Previous  to  the  sending  of  these  instructions,  La- 
val and  Villatte  had  pursued  Ballestcros  to  INIalaga, 
wliich  place,  after  a  skirmish  at  Coin,  he  entered, 
and  was  in  such  danger  of  capture  that  the  maritime 
expedition,  already  noticed,  was  detached  from  Ca- 
diz, by  sea,  to  carry  him  otf.  However  the  news  of 
the  brittle  of  .Salamanca  liaving  arrested  the  French 
movements,  the  Spanish  general  regained  San  Roque 
and  the  fleet  went  on  to  Valencia.  Meanwhile  Soult, 
hoping  the  king  would  transfer  the  seat  of  war  to 
Andalusia,  had  caused  Drouet  to  shew  a  bold  front 
against  Hill,  extending  from  the  Serena  to  Monas- 
terio,  and  to  send  scouting  parties  towards  Merida  ; 
and  large  magazines  were  formed  at  Cordoba,  a  cen- 
tral point,  equally  suited  for  an  advance  by  Estre- 
madura,  a  march  to  La  ^lancha,  or  a  retreat  by 
Grenada.  Wherefore  Hill,  who  had  not  then  re- 
ceived his  orders  to  advance,  remained  on  the  defen- 
sive ;  nor  would  Wellington  stir  from  Madrid,  al- 
tliough  his  presence  was  urgently  called  for  on  the 
Duero,  until  he  was  satisfied  that  the  duke  of  Dal- 
niatia  meant  to  abandon  Andalusia.  The  king,  as 
we  have  seen,  finally  forced  this  measure  upon  the 
marshal ;  but  the  execution  required  very  extensive 
arrangements,  for  the  quarters  wei'e  distant,  the  con- 
voys immense,  the  enemies  numerous,  the  line  of 
march  wild,  and  the  journey  long.  And  it  was  most 
important  to  present  the  imposing  appearance  of  a 
great  and  regular  military  movement  and  not  the 
disgraceful  scene  of  a  confused  flight. 

Tlie  distant  minor  posts,  in  the  Condado  de  Niebla 
and  other  places,  were  first  called  in,  and  then  the 
lines  before  the  Isla  were  abandoned  ;  for  Soult,  in 
obedience  to  the  king's  first  order,  designed  to  move 
upon  lia  Mancha,  and  it  was  only  by  accident,  and 
indirectly,  that  he  heard  of  Joseph's  retreat  to  Va- 
lencia. At  the  same  time  he  discovered  that  Drou- 
et, who  had  received  direct  orders  from  the  king, 
was  going  to  Toledo,  and  it  was  not  without  diffi- 
culty, and  only  through  the  medium  of  his  brother, 
who  commanded  Drouet's  cavalry,  that  he  could  pre- 
vent tliat  destructive  isolated  movement.  Murcia 
then  became  the  line  of  retreat ;  but  every  thing  was 
hurried,  because  the  works  of  tlie  Isla  were  already 
broken  up  in  the  view  of  retreating  towards  La  Man- 
clia,  and  the  troops  were  in  march  for  Seville,  al- 
though tlie  safe  assembling  of  the  army  at  Grenada 
required  another  arrangement. 

Uii  the  25th  of  August,  a  thousand  guns,  stores  in 
proportion,  and  all  the  immense  works  of  Chiclana, 
St.  Maria,  nnd  t!ie  Trocadero,  were  destroyed.  Thus 
the  long  blockade  of  the  Isla  de  Leon  was  broken  up 
at  the  moment  when  the  bombardment  of  Cadiz  had 
become  very  serious,  when  the  opposition  to  English 
influence  was  taking  a  dangerous  direction,  when 
the  French  intrigues  were  nearly  ripe,  the  cortes 


becoming  alienated  from  the  ca-use  of  Ferdinand  and 
the  church  ;  finally,  when  the  executive  government 
was  weaker  than  ever,  because  the  count  of  Abispal, 
the  only  active  person  in  the  regency,  had  resigned, 
disgusted  that  his  brother  had  been  superseded  by 
Elio  and  censured  in  the  cortes  for  the  defeat  at 
Castalla.  'J'his  siege  or  rather  defence  of  Cadiz,  for 
it  was  never,  strictly  speaking,  besieged,  was  a  cu- 
rious episode  in  the  war.  Whether  the  Spaniards 
would  or  would  not  have  etTectually  defended  it  uith- 
out  the  aid  of  British  troops  is  a  matter  of  specula- 
tion ;  but  it  is  certain  that  notwithstanding  Gra- 
ham's glorious  action  at  Barrosa,  Cadiz  was  always 
a  heavy  burthen  upon  lord  Wellington  ;  the  forces 
there  employed  would  have  done  better  service  un- 
der his  immediate  command,  and  many  severe  finan 
cial  difliculties,  to  say  nothing  of  political  crostes 
would  have  been  spared. 

In  the  night  of  the  26th,  Soult,  quitting  Seville, 
commenced  his  march,  by  Ossuna  and  Antequera, 
towards  Grenada  ;  but  now  Wellington's  orders  had 
set  all  tlie  allied  troops  of  Andalusia  and  Estrema- 
dura  in  motion.  Hill  advanced  against  Drouet ; 
Ballesteros  moved  by  the  Honda  mountains  to  liang 
on  the  retiring  enemy's  flanks;  the  expedition  sent 
by  sea  to  succour  him  returned  from  Valencia  ;  colo- 
nel Skerrit  and  Cruz  Murgeon  disembarked  with  four 
thousand  English  and  Spanish  troops,  at  Huelva, 
and  marching  upon  St.  Lucar  JMayor,  drove  the  ene- 
my from  thence,  on  the  24th.  'J"he  27th,  they  fell 
upon  the  French  rear-gunrd  at  Seville,  and  the  sub- 
urb of  Triana,  the  bridge  and  the  sitreets  beyond 
were  soon  carried  by  the  English  guards  and  L'ovv- 
nie's  legion.  Two  hundred  prisoners,  several  guns, 
and  many  stores  were  taken,  but  Downie  himself 
was  wounded  and  made  prisoner  and  treated  very 
harshly,  because  the  populace  rising  in  aid  of  the 
allies  had  mutilated  the  French  soldiers  who  fell  in- 
to their  hands.  Scarcely  was  Seville  taken  when 
seven  thousand  French  infantry  came  up  from  Chi- 
clana, but  thinking  all  Hill's  troops  were  before  them, 
instead  of  attacking  Skerrit,  hastily  followed  their 
own  army,  leaving  the  allies  masters  of  the  city. 
But  this  attack,  though  successful,  was  isolated  and 
contrary  to  lord  Wellington's  desire.  A  dire.- 1  and 
vigorous  assault  upon  the  lines  of  Chiclana  by  the 
whole  of  the  Anglo-Spanish  garrison  was  his  plan, 
and  such  an  assault,  when  the  French  were  abandon- 
ing their  works  there,  would  have  been  a  far  heavier 
blow  to  Soult. 

The  commander  was  now  too  strong  to  be  meddled 
with.  He  issued  eight  days'  bread  to  his  army, 
marched  very  leisurely,  picked  up  on  his  route  the 
garrisons  and  troops  who  came  into  him  at  Anteque- 
ra, from  the  Ronda  and  from  the  coast ;  and  at  (Gre- 
nada he  halted  eleven  days  to  give  Drouet  time  to 
join  him,  for  the  latter  quitting  Estremac'ura  the 
25th,  by  the  Cordova  passes,  was  marching  by  .laen 
to  Huescar.  Ballesteros  had  harassed  the  inarch, 
but  the  French  general  had,  with  an  insignificant 
loss,  united  seventy-two  guns  and  forty-five  thou- 
sand soldiers  under  arms,  of  which  six  thousand  were 
cavalry.  He  was,  however,  still  in  the  midst  of  en- 
emies. On  his  left  flank  was  Hill,  on  his  right  flank 
was  Ballesteros,  ^Vellington  himself  might  come 
down  by  the  Dcsponas  Perros,  the  Murcians  were 
in  his  front,  Skerrit  and  Cruz  Murgeon  behind  nim, 
and  he  was  clogged  with  enormous  convoys;  his 
sick  and  maimed  men  alone  amounted  to  nearly  nine 
thousand  ;  his  Spanish  soldiers  were  deserting  daily, 
and  it  was  necessary  to  provide  for  several  hundreds 
of  Spanish  families  who  were  attached  to  the  French 
interests.  To  march  upon  the  city  of  Murcia  waa 
the  direct  and  the  best  route  for  Valencia,  but  tlie 


518 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


[Hook  XIX 


yellow  fever  raj^cJ  there  and  at  Cartliaj^ena  ;  more- 
over, Don  S.  IJracco,  tlio  Eiiglisli  consul  at  :Murcia, 
a  resolute  man,  (ioclared  iiis  resoliilirm  to  inundate 
the  country  it'  tiie  French  advanced.  Wlicretbre, 
again  issuing  cigiit  days'  bread,  Soult  marched  by 
the  mountain  ways  leading  tVoni  Huescar  to  Cehe- 
jin,  and  Calasparra,  and  tlien,  moving  by  Hollin, 
g'ained  Alnumza  on  the  great  road  to  iMadrid,  liis 
flan!<  being  covered  by  a  detachment  from  Suchet's 
army,  wliicli  skirmisiied  with  iMaitiand's  advanced 
posts  at  San  Vicente  close  to  Alicant.  At  Hellin 
he  met  the  advanced  guard  of  the  army  of  Aragon, 
and  on  the  ;kd  of  October,  the  military  junction  of 
all  the  French  forces  was  effected. 

Tlie  task  was  tlms  comi)leted,  and  in  a  manner 
worthy  of  so  great  a  commander.  For  it  must  be 
recollect:^'!,  that  besides  tiie  drawing  together  oftlie 
dilierent  divisions,  tiie  march  itself  was  tiiree  hun- 
dred miles,  great  part  through  mountain  roads,  and 
the  population  was  every  where  iiostile.  General 
Hill  had  menaced  him  with  twenty-five  thousand 
men,  including  .Morillo  and  Penne  Yillemur's  forces  ; 
Ballesteros,  reinforced  from  Cadiz  and  by  the  deser- 
ters, had  nearly  twenty  thousand  ;  there  were  four- 
teen thousand  soldiers  still  in  tlie  Isla  ;  Skerrit  and 
Cruz  3Iurgeon  liad  four  thousand,  and  the  partidas 
were  in  all  parts  numerous  :  yet  from  tlie  midst  of 
tiiese  multitudes  tlic  duke  of  Dalmatia  carried  oti' 
his  army,  Iiis  convoys,  and  his  sick,  without  any  dis- 
aster. In  this  manner  Andalusia,  which  had  once 
been  saved  by  the  indirect  influence  of  a  single 
march,  made  by  Moore  from  Salamanca,  was,  such 
is  the  complexity  of  war,  after  three  years'  subjec- 
tion, recovered  by  the  indirect  eflcct  of  a  single  bat- 
tle delivered  by  Wellington  close  to  tlie  same  city. 

During  these  transactions,  Maitland's  proceed- 
ings had  been  anxiously  watched  by  Wellington  ; 
for,  though  the  recovery  of  Andalusia  was,  both  po- 
litically and  militarily,  a  great  gain,  the  result,  he 
Raw,  must  necessarily  be  hurtful  to  tlio  ultimate  suc- 
cess of  his  campaign  by  bringing  together  such  pow- 
erful forces.  lie  still  tliought  that  regular  opera- 
tions would  no.t  so  effectually  occujjy  Sucliet  as  a 
littoral  warfare,  yet  he  was  contented  that  Maitland 
should  try  liis  own  plan,  and  he  advised  that  general 
to  march  by  the  coast  and  have  constant  communi- 
cation with  the  fleet,  referring  to  his  own  cam])aign 
against  Junot  in  18(i8  as  an  example  to  be  followed. 
Hut  tlie  coast  roads  were  difficult,  the  access  for  tlie 
fleat  uncertain  ;  and  though  the  same  obstacles,  and 
the  latter  perhaps  in  a  greater  degree,  had  occurred 
in  Portugal,  the  different  constitution  of  the  armies, 
and  still  more  of  the  generals,  was  an  insuperable 
bar  to  a  like  proceeding  in  Valencia. 

Gsmral  Miitland  only  desired  to  quit  his  com- 
mand, and  the  more  so  that  the  time  appointed  by 
lonl  William  Beiitlnck  for  the  return  of  tiie  troops  to 
Sicily  was  approaching.  The  moment  was  critical, 
but  Wellington  witiiout  hesitation  forbade  their  de- 
parture, and  even  asked  the  ministers  to  place  them 
under  his  own  command.  Meanwliile,  with  the  ut- 
most gentleness  and  delicacy,  he  showed  to  iVIait- 
land,  wlio  was  a  man  of  high  honour,  courage,  and 
feeling,  althougli  inexperienced  in  command,  and 
now  heavily  oppressed  with  illness,  that  his  situa- 
tion was  by  no  means  dangerous  ; — that  the  en- 
trenched camp  of  Alicant  might  be  safely  defended, 
— that  he  wns  comparatively  better  off  than  Wej- 
'.ington  himself  had  been  when  in  the  lines  of  Torres 
Vedras,  and  that  it  was  even  desirable  tiiat  the  ene- 
my should  attack  him  on  such  strong  ground,  be- 
cause the  Spaniards  when  joined  with  English  sol- 
diers in  a  secure  posit'on  wouhl  certainly  fight.  He 
also  desired  that  Carthagena  should  bo  well  looked 


to  by  general  Ross,  lest  Soult  sliould  turn  aside  to 
surprise  it.  Tlien  taking  advantage  of  I'^lio's  fear 
of  Soult,  lie  drew  hi  in  vvitli  tlie  army  tiiat  had  been 
O'Doncrs  towards  Madrid,  and  so  got  some  coiitroul 
over  his  operations. 

If  the  English  general  had  been  well  furnished 
with  money  at  this  time,  and  if  the  yellow  fever 
iiad  not  raged  in  31urcia,  it  is  probabJc  he  would 
have  followed  Joseph  rapidly,  and  rallying  all  tiic 
scattered  Spanisli  forces  and  tlie  Sicilian  armament 
on  his  own  army,  have  endeavoured  to  crush  tiie 
king  and  Suciiet  before  Soult  could  arrive;  or  he 
migiit  have  formed  a  junction  with  Hill  at  Despenas 
Perros,  and  so  iiave  fallen  on  Soult  himself  during 
his  march,  although  such  an  operation  would  have 
endangered  his  line  of  communication  on  tlie  J)uero. 
But  these  obstacles  induced  him  to  avoid  oi)cration8 
in  the  south,  wliich  would  have  involved  liim  in 
new  and  immense  combinations,  until  he  had  secur- 
ed his  northern  line  of  operations  by  the  capture  of 
Burgos,  meaning  then  with  his  whole  army  united 
to  attack  the  enemy  in  the  south. 

However  he  could  not  stir  from  Madrid  until  he 
was  certain  that  Soult  would  relinquish  Andalusia, 
and  this  was  not  made  clear  before  Cordoba  was 
abandoned.  Then  Hill  was  ordered  to  advance  en 
Zalamea  de  la  Serena,  wiicre  he  commanded  ecjual- 
ly,  tlie  passes  leading  to  Cordoba  in  front,  tlicsc  lead- 
ing to  La  Mancha  on  the  left,  and  those  leading  by 
Truxillo  to  the  Tagus  in  the  rear  ;  so  that  he  could 
at  pleasure  either  join  Wellington,  follow  Drcuet 
towards  Grenada,  or  interpose  between  Soult  and 
Madrid,  if  he  should  turn  towards  the  Dcspenas  Per- 
ros :  meanwhile  Skerrit's  troops  were  marcliing  to 
join  him,  and  the  rest  of  the  Anglo-Portuguese  gar- 
rison of  Cadiz  sailed  to  Lisbon,  with  intent  to  join 
Wellington  by  the  regular  line  of  operations. 

During  these  transactions  the  affairs  in  Old  Cas- 
tile had  become  greatly  deranged,  for  wliere  Wel- 
lington was  not,  the  FrencJi  warfare  generally  assu- 
med a  severe  and  menacing  aspect.  Castanos  had, 
in  person,  conducted  the  siege  of  Astorga,  after  the 
battle  of  Salamanca,  yet  with  so  little  vigour,  that 
it  appeared  rather  a  blockade  than  a  siege.  The 
fi^rts  at  Tore  and  Zamora  had  also  been  invest- 
ed, the  first  by  the  partidas,  the  second  by  Silvei- 
ra's  militia,  who  with  great  spirit  iiad  passed  tlieir 
own  frontier,  although  well  aware  that  tliey  could 
not  be  legally  compelled  to  do  so.  Thus  all  tlie 
French  garrisons  abandoned  by  Clauzel's  retreat 
were  endangered,  and  though  tiie  slow  progress  of 
the  Spaniards  before  Astorga  was  infinitely  dis- 
graceful to  their  military  prowess,  final  success 
seemed  certain. 

General  H.  Clinton  wns  at  Cuellar,  Sant.ocildes 
occupied  Valladolid,  Anson's  cavalry  was  in  the  val- 
ley of  the  Esqueva,  and  the  front  looked  fair  enough. 
But  in  the  rear,  the  line  of  communication,  as  far  as 
tlie  frontier  of  Portugal,  was  in  great  disorder;  the 
discipline  of  the  army  was  deteriorating  rapidly,  and 
excesses  were  committed  on  all  the  routes.  A  de- 
tachment of  Portuguese,  not  more  than  a  thousand 
strong,  either  instigated  by  want  or  by  their  liatred 
of  the  Spaniards,  had  perpf^trated  such  enormities  on 
their  march  from  Pinhel  to  Salamanca,  that  as  an 
example,  five  were  executed  and  many  others  se- 
verely punished  by  stripes,  yet  even  this  did  not 
check  the  growing  evil,  the  origin  of  which  may  be 
partly  traced  to  the  license  at  the  storming  of  Ciu- 
dad  Itodrigo  and  Badajos,  but  principally  to  the  suf- 
ferings of  the  soldiers. 

All  the  hospitals  in  the  rear  were  crowded,  and 
Salamanca  itself,  in  which  there  were  six  thousand 
sick  and  wounded,  besides  French  prisoners,  was  the 


1812.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


519 


very  abode  of  misery.  The  soldiers  endured  much 
dwnn^  the  tirst  two  or  three  days  after  the  battle, 
and  the  inferior  officers'  sufl'erinj^s  were  still  more 
heavy  and  protracted.  They  had  no  money,  and 
many  sold  their  horses  and  otiier  property  to  sustain 
life  ;  some  actually  died  of  want,  and  though  Wel- 
lington, hearing  of  tiiis,  gave  orders  tiiat  they  should 
be  supplied  fn^n  tiie  purveyor's  stores  in  the  same 
manner  aj  the  soldiers,  the  relief  came  late.  It  is  a 
common,  yet  erroneous  notion,  that  the  English  sys- 
tem of  iiospitals  in  the  Peninsula  was  admirable,  and 
that  the  I'^rench  hospitals  were  neglected.  Strenu- 
ous and  unceasing  exertions  were  made  by  lord  Wel- 
l.ng^  jn  anfl  tlie  chiefs  of  the  medical  staff  to  form 
good  hospital  establishments,  but  the  want  of  mon- 
ey, and  still  more  the  want  of  previous  institutions, 
fb'.led  tiieir  utmost  efforts.  Now  there  was  no  point 
of  warfare  which  more  engaged  Napoleon's  attention 
than  the  care  of  his  sick  and  wounded  ;  and  he  being 
monarch  as  well  as  general,  furnished  his  hospitals 
with  all  tilings  requisite,  even  with  luxuries.  Un- 
der his  fostering  care  also,  baron  Larrey,  justly  cel- 
ebrated, were  it  for  tliis  alone,  organized  tiie  estab- 
lisimient  called  the  hospital  "Ambulance  ;"  that  is 
to  say,  waggons  of  a  peculiar  construction,  well 
horsed,  served  by  men  trained  and  incorporated  as 
soldiers,  and  subject  to  a  strict  discipline.  Reward- 
ed for  their  courage  and  devotion  like  other  soldiers, 
they  were  always  at  hand,  and  whether  in  action  or 
on  a  march,  ready  to  pick  up,  to  salve,  and  to  ccrry '. 
off  wounded  men  ;  and  the  astonishing  rapidity  with 
which  the  fallen  French  soldiers  disappeared  from 
a  field  of  battle  attested  the  excellence  of  the  insti- 
tution 1 
But  in  the  British  army,  the  carrying  cfF  the  j 
wounded,  depended,  partly  upon  the  casual  assist-, 
since  of  a  weak  waggon  train,  very  badly  disciplined,  i 
furnishing  only  tliree  waggons  to  a  division,  and  not  | 
originally  appropriated  to  that  service  ;  partly  upon 
tlie  spare  commissariat  animals,  but  principally  up-  [ 
on  the  resources  of  the  country,  whether  of  bullock 
carts,  mules,  or  donkeys,  and  hence  the  most  doleful  | 
scenes  after  a  battle,  or  when  an  hospital  was  to  be  j 
evacuated.  The  increasing  numbers  of  the  sick  and  i 
wounded,  as  tiie  war  enlarged,  also  pressed  on  the  I 
limited  number  of  regular  medical  officers,  and  Wei-  ! 
lington  complained,  that  when  he  demanded  more,! 
the  military  medical  board  in  London  neglected  his 
demands,  and  thwarted  his  arrangements.  Shoals  of 
hospital  mates  and  students  were  indeed  sent  out, 
and  they  arrived  for  the  most  part  ignorant  alike 
of  war,  and  their  own  profession  ;  wliile  a  hetero- 
geneous mass  of  purveyors  and  their  subordinates, 
acting  without  any  military  organization  or  effectual 
superintendence,  continually  bade  defiance  to  the  ex- 
ertions of  those  medical  officers,  and  they  were  ma- 
ny, whose  experience,  zeal,  and  talents  would,  v/ith 
a  good  institution  to  work  upon,  have  rendered  this 
branch  of  the  service  most  distinguished.  Nay, 
many  even  of  the  well  educated  surgeons  sent  out, 
^ere  for  some  time  of  little  use,  for  superior  profes- 
sional skill  is  of  little  value  in  comparison  of  expe- 
rience in  military  arrangement  ;  where  one  soldier 
d.es  from  the  want  of  a  delicate  operation,  hundreds 
perish  from  the  absence  of  military  arrangement. 
War  tries  the  strength  of  the  military  frame-work  ; 
it  is  in  peace  that  the  frame- work  itself  must  be 
formed,  otherwise  barbarians  would  be  the  leading 
soldiers  of  the  world;  a  perfect  army  can  only  be 
made  by  civil  institutions,  and  those,  rightly  consid- 
ered, would  tend  to  confine  the  horrors  of  war  to  tlie 
field  of  battle,  which  would  be  the  next  best  thing 
to  the  perfection  of  civilization,  that  would  prevent 
war  altogether. 


Such  was  the  state  of  affairs  on  the  allies'  line  of 
communication,  when,  on  the  14th  of  August,  Clau- 
zel  suddenly  came  down  the  Pisucrga.  Anson'a 
cavalry  immediately  recrossed  the  Duero  at  Tude- 
la,  Santocildes,  following  Wellington's  instructions, 
fell  back  to  Torrelobaton,  and  on  the  ]&th  the  French 
assembled  at  Valladolid  to  the  number  of  twenty 
thousand  infantry,  two  thousand  cavalry,  and  fiity 
guns  well  provided  with  ammunition.  Five  thou- 
sand stragglers,  who  in  the  confusion  of  defeat  had 
fled  to  Burgos  and  Vittoria,  were  also  collected  and 
in  march  to  join.  Ciauzel's  design  was  to  be  at  hand 
when  .Toseph,  reinforced  from  the  south,  should  drive 
Wellington  from  Madrid,  for  he  thought  the  latter 
must  then  retire  by  Avila,  and  the  Yalle  de  Ambles, 
and  he  purposed  to  gain  the  mountains  of  Avila  him- 
self, and  harass  the  English  general's  flank.  Mean- 
while Foy  proposed  with  two  divisions  of  infantry, 
and  sixteen  hundred  cavalry,  to  succour  the  garri- 
sons of  Tore,  Zamora,  and  Astorga,  and  Clauzel  con- 
sented, though  he  appears  to  have  been  somewhat 
fearful  of  this  dangerous  experiment,  and  did  not  be- 
lieve Astorga  was  so  near  its  fall. 

Foy  wislied  to  march  on  the  1.5th,  by  Placentia, 
yet  he  was  not  despatched  until  the  evening  of  the 
17th,  and  then  by  the  line  of  Toro,  the  garrison  of 
which  place  he  carried  off  in  passing.  The  19th,  lie 
sabred  some  of  the  Spanish  rear-guard  at  Castro 
Gonzalo,  on  the  Esla  ;  the  20th,  at  three  o'clock  in 
the  evening,  he  reached  La  Baneza,  but  was  mortified 
to  learn,  that  Castanos,  by  an  artful  negotiation  had, 
the  day  before,  persuaded  the  garrison  of  Astorga, 
twelve  hundred  good  troops,  to  surrender,  although 
there  was  no  breach,  and  the  siege  was  actually  be- 
ing raised  at  the  time.  The  Gallicians  being  safe 
in  their  mountains,  the  French  general  turned  to  the 
left,  and  marched  upon  Carvajales,  hoping  to  encloeo 
Silveira's  militia  between  the  Duero  and  the  Esla, 
and  sweep  them  off  in  his  course  ;  then  relieving  Za- 
mora, he  purposed  to  penetrate  to  Salamanca,  and 
seize  the  trophies  of  the  Arapiles.  And  this  would 
infallibly  have  happened,  but  for  the  judicious  activ- 
ity of  sir  Howard  Douglas,  who,  divining  Foy's  ob- 
ject, sent  Silveira  with  timeful  notice  into  Portugal ; 
yet  so  critical  was  the  movement,  that  Foy's  cavalry 
skirmished  with  the  Portuguese  rear-guard  near 
Constantin  at  day-break  on  the  24th.  The  2.5th,  Iho 
French  entered  Zamora,  but  Wellington  was  now  in 
movement  upon  Arevalo,  and  Clauzel  recalled  Foy 
at  the  moment  when  his  infantry  were  actually  in 
march  upon  Salamanca  to  seize  the  trophies,  and 
his  cavalry  was  moving  by  Ledesnia,  to  break  up  the 
line  of  communication  with  Ciudad  Rodrigo, 

That  Foy  was  thus  able  to  disturb  the  line  of 
communication  was  certainly  Clinton's  error.  Wel- 
lington left  eighteen  thousand  men,  exclusive  of  the 
troops  besieging  Astorga,  to  protect  his  flank  and 
rear,  and  he  had  a  right  to  think  it  enough,  becauee 
he  momentarily  expected  Astorga  to  fall,  and  the 
French  army,  a  beaten  one,  was  tiien  in  full  retreat. 
It  is  true  none  of  the  French  garrisons  yielded 
before  Clauzel  returned,  but  Clinton  alone  had 
eight  thousand  good  troops,  and  might,  with  the 
aid  of  Santocildes  and  the  partidas,  have  bafllcd  the 
French;  he  might  even  have  menaced  Valladolid, 
after  Foy's  departure,  which  would  have  certainly 
brought  that  general  back.  And  if  he  dared  notve/i- 
ture  so  much,  he  should,  following  his  instructione, 
have  regulated  his  movements  along  the  left  of  thfli 
Duero,  so  as  to  be  always  in  a  condition  to  protect 
Salamanca  ;  that  is,  he  should  have  gone  to  Olmedo 
when  Clauzel  first  occupied  Valladolid,  hut  ho  re- 
tirf  d  to  Arevalo,  which  enabled  Foy  to  advance. 

The  mere  escape  of  the  ga  rrisons,  frcm  Toro  and 


MO 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


LBooK  XIX. 


Zamora,  was  by  the  English  oreneral  thought  no 
misfortune.  It  would  have  cost  him  a  long  march 
and  two  sieges  in  tlie  iiottest  season  to  have  reduced 
them,  wliicii,  in  the  actual  state  of  affairs,  was  more 
than  they  were  worth;  yet,  to  use  his  own  words, 
"  ft  was  not  very  encouraging  to  Jind,  that  the  best 
Spanish  army  was  unable  to  stand  before  the  remains 
of  .Marm&$j^  beaten  troops;  that  in  more  than  two 
inonths,  it  Imd  been  unable  even  to  breach  Astorga, 
aiid  that  all  important  operations  must  still  he  per- 
formed by  the  British  troops.'^  The  Spaniards,  now 
in  the  fifth  year  of  the  war,  were  still  in  the  state 
described  by  sir  John  Moore,  "  without  an  army, 
without  a  government,  without  a  general .'" 

While  tiiese  events  were  passing  in  Castile,  Pop- 
ham's  armament  remained  on  the  Biscay  coast,  and 
the  partidas  tims  encouraged  became  so  active,  that 
with  exception  of  8antona  and  Gueteria,  all  the  lit- 
toral posts  were  abandoned  by  Caffarelli  ;  Porlier, 
iienovalles,  and  3Iendizabel,  the  nominal  command- 
ers of  all  the  bands,  immediately  took  possession  of 
Castro,  Santander,  and  even  of  Bilbao,  and  though 
general  Rouget  came  from  Vittoria  to  recover  the 
last,  he  was,  after  some  sharp  fighting,  obliged  to  re- 
tire again  to  Durango.  Meanwhile  Reille,  deluded 
by  a  rumour  that  Wellington  was  marching  through 
the  centre  of  Spain  upon  Zaragoza,  abandoned  sev- 
eral important  outposts,  Aragon,  hitherto  so  tran- 
quil, became  unquiet,  and  all  the  northern  provinces 
were  ripe  for  insurrection. 


CHAPTER  III. 

Wellington's  combinations  clesrrihei' — Foolish  nrransfenients 
of  the  En^^liih  mifii-ters  relative  to  Spanish  riothino: — Want 
of  nionev  —  FoliticHJ  persecution   in  Mmlrid — Mi-prable  s-late 

of    tlictt'  cilv — ChatMCtcr    of    the    Macliileno Wellington 

marches  ajjainst  Clauzt-I — D<  vice  of  the  Portuguese  legmcv 
to  avorri  suppiyini;  tlieir  troops — Wellington  enters  Vallailo- 
li<l — Waits  for  Caslanos — His  opinion  of  ttie  Spaniards — 
Clauzel  ri  treats  to  Burgos — His  able  irenf  rilship — The  allies 
enter  Burgos,  which  is  in  danger  of  destiuction  fioni  tie 
partidas — Rellections  upon  the  uiovenitnts  of  tlie  two  armies 
— Siege  of  the  castle  of  Burgns. 

While  the  various  military  combinations,  de- 
scribed in  the  foregoing  chapter,  were  thickening, 
Wellington,  as  we  liave  seen,  remained  in  Madrid, 
apparently  inactive,  but  really  watching  the  fitting 
moment  to  push  his  operations,  and  consolidate  his 
Biiccess  in  the  north,  preparatory  to  the  execution  of 
liis  designs  in  the  south.  The  result  was  involved 
in  a  mixed  question,  of  time,  and  of  combinations 
dependant  upon  his  central  position,  and  upon  the 
activity  of  the  partidas  in  cutting  off  all  correspon- 
dence bitvveen  tlie  French  armies.  His  mode  of 
paralyzing  Suclict's  and  Caffarelli's  armies,  by  the 
Hicilian  armament  in  the  east  and  Popham's  arma- 
ment in  the  north,  iias  been  already  described,  but 
his  internal  combinations,  to  oppose  the  united  forces 
ofSoult  and  tlie  king,  were  still  more  important  and 
Dxtensive. 

When  it  was  certain  that  Soult  had  actually  aban- 
doned Andalusia,  Hill  was  directed  upon  Toledo,  by 
the  bridge  of  Almaraz,  and  colonel  Sturgeon's  genius 
had  rendered  that  stupendous  ruin,  altiioiigh  more 
lofty  than  Alcantara,  passable  for  artillery.  Elio 
also  was  induced  to  br  ng  the  army  of  Murcia  to  tlie 
name  quarter,  and  Ballesteros  was  desired  to  take 
post  on  tlie  mountain  of  Alcaraz,  and  look  to  the  for- 
tress of  Ciiinchilla.  which,  situated  at  the  confines 
of  Murcia  and  La  xMancha,  and  perched  on  a  rugged 
isolated  hill  in  a  vaet  plain,  vas  peculiarly  strong 
both  from  construction  and  sit*:,  and  it  was  the  knot 
of  all  the  great  lines  of  comn:_':ication.     The  parti- 


zan  corps  of  Bassecour,  Villa  Campa,  and  the  Empe- 
cinado,  were  desired  to  enter  La  Mencha,  and  thus, 
as  Hill  could  bring  up  above  twenty  thousand  men, 
and  as  tlie  third,  fourth,  and  liglit  divisions,  two 
brigades  of  cavalry,  and  Carles  D"Espafia's  troops, 
were  to  remain  near  Madrid,  whilct  the  rest  of  the 
army  marched  into  Old  Castile,  above  sixty  thou; and 
men,  thirty  thousand  being  excellent  troops  and  well 
commanded,  would  have  been  assembled,  with  tlie 
fortified  post  of  Chinchilla  in  front,  before  Soult  could 
unite  with  the  king. 

The  Britisii  troops  at  Carthagena  were  directed, 
when  Soult  should  have  passed  that  city,  to  leave 
only  small  garrisons  in  the  forts  there,  and  join  tlie 
army  in  Alicant,  which,  with  tiie  reinforcements 
from  Sicily,  would  then  be  sixteen  thousand  strong, 
seven  thousand  being  British  troops.  While  this 
force  was  at  Alicant,  Wellington  judged  that  the 
French  could  not  bring  more  that  fifty  tliousand 
against  Madrid  without  risking  the  less  of  Valencia 
itself.  Not  that  he  expected  the  lieterogeneous  mass 
he  had  collected  could  resist  on  a  fair  field  the  vet- 
eran and  powerfully  constituted  army  which  would 
finally  be  opposed  to  them  ;  but  he  calculated  that  ere 
the  French  generals  could  act  seriously,  the  rivera 
would  be  full,  and  Hill  could  then  hold  his  groujid, 
sufficiently  long  to  enable  the  army  to  come  back 
from  Burgos.  Indeed  he  had  little  doubt  of  reduc- 
ing that  place  and  being  again  on  the  Tagus  in  time 
to  take  the  initial  movements  himself. 

Meanwhile  the  allies  had  several  lines  of  opera- 
tion. 

Ballesteros  from  the  mountains  of  Alcaraz,  could 
harass  the  flanks  of  the  advancing  French,  and  when 
they  passed,  could  unite  with  Maitland  to  overpower 
Suchet. 

Hill  could  retire,  if  pressed,  by  Madrid,  or  by  To- 
ledo, and  could  either  gain  the  passes  of  the  Guada- 
rama,  or  the  valley  of.the  Tagus. 

Elio,  Villa  Campa,  Bassecour,  and  the  Empecina- 
do  could  act  by  Cuenca  and  Requcfia  against  Suchet, 
or  against  3Iadrid  if  the  French  tbllowcd  Hill  obsti- 
nately ;  or  they  could  join  Ballesteros.  And  besides 
all  these  forces,  there  were  ten  or  twelve  thousand 
new  Spanish  levies  in  the  Isla  waiting  for  clothing 
and  arms,  which  under  the  recent  treaty  were  to 
come  from  England. 

To  lord  Wellington,  the  Englisli  ministers  had  no- 
minally confided  the  distribution  of  these  succours, 
but  following  their  usual  vicious  manner  of  doing 
business,  they  also  gave  3Ir.  Stuart  a  control  over 
it,  without  Wellington's  knowledge,  and  hence  the 
stores,  expected  by  the  latter  at  Lisbon  or  Cadiz, 
were  by  Stuart  unwittingly  directed  to  Coruna,  with 
which  ])lace  the  English  general  had  no  secure  com- 
munication ;  moreover  there  were  very  few  Spanish 
levies  there,  and  no  confidential  person  to  superin- 
tend the  delivery  of  them.  Other  i)olitical  crosses, 
which  sliall  be  noticed  in  due  time,  lie  also  met  with, 
but  it  will  suffice  here  to  say,  that  the  want  of  mon- 
ey was  an  evil  now  become  intolerable.  Tlie  army 
was  many  months  in  arrears  ;  those  officers  who  went 
to  the  rear  sick,  suOered  tiie  most  cruel  prlvatloiip, 
and  tliose  who  remained  in  IMadrid,  temj)ted  by  the 
pleasures  of  tiie  capital,  obtained  some  dollars  at  an 
exorbitant  premium  from  a  money  broker,  and  it  wjib 
grievously  susj)ected  that  his  means  resulted  from 
the  nefarious  iirooecdings  of  an  under  commissary  ; 
but  the  soldiers,  equally  tempted,  having  no  such  re- 
source, plundered  tlio  stores  of  the  Retire.  In  fine, 
discipline  became  relaxed  throughout  the  army,  and 
the  troops  kept  in  the  field  were  gloomy,  envying 
those  whe  remained  in  3Iadrid. 

That  city  exhibited  a  sad  mixture  of  luxury  and 


1812  j 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


521 


desolation.  When  iX  was  first  entered,  a  violent, 
cruel,  and  unjust  persecution  of  those  who  were 
called  "  A/ran cesados,^''  was  commenced,  and  con- 
tinued, until  the  Engdish  general  interfered,  and  as 
an  example  made  no  distinction  in  his  invitations 
to  the  palace  feasts.  Truly  it  was  not  necessary  to 
increase  the  suil'erings  of  the  miserable  people,  for 
thoug'h  tho  markets  were  full  of  provisions,  there 
was  no  money  wherewith  to  buy  ,  and  though  the 
houses  were  full  of  rich  furniture,  there  were  nei- 
ther purchasers  nor  lenders;  even  noble  families 
eeorctly  sought  charity  that  they  might  live.  At 
night  the  groans  and  stifled  cries  of  famishing  peo- 
ple ware  heard,  and  every  morning  emaciated  dead 
bodies,  cast  into  the  streets,  shewed  why  tiiose  cries 
had  ceased.  The  calm  resignation  with  which  these 
terrible  sufferings  were  borne  was  a  distinctive  mark 
of  the  national  character;  not  many  begged,  none 
complainel,  there  was  no  violence,  no  reproaches, 
very  tew  thefts  ;  the  allies  lost  a  few  animals,  noth- 
ing more,  and  these  were  generally  thought  to  be 
taken  by  robbers  from  the  country.  But  with  this 
patient  endurance  of  calamity  the  "  JIadrilenos'''' 
discovered  a  deep  and  unaffected  gratitude  for  kind- 
ness received  at  the  Iiands  of  the  British  officers, 
who  contributed,  not  much  for  they  had  it  not,  but, 
enough  of  m  )ney  to  form  soup  charities,  by  which 
hundreds  were  succoured.  It  was  the  third  division, 
and  I  believe  the  forty-fifth  regiment  which  set  the 
example,  and  surely  this  is  not  the  least  of  the  many 
honourable  distinctions  those  brave  men  have  earned. 

Wellington,  desirous  of  obtaining  shelter  from 
the  extreme  heat  for  his  troops,  had  early  sent  four 
divisions  and  the  cavalry,  to  the  Escurial  and  St. 
Ildofonso,  from  whence  they  could  join  Hill  by  the 
valley  of  the  Tagus,  or  Clinton  by  Arevalo  ;  but 
when  he  knew  that  the  king's  retreat  upon  Voiencia 
was  decided,  that  Soult  had  abandoned  Cordoba,  and 
that  Clinton  was  falling  back  before  Clauzel,  he  or- 
dered the  first,  fifth,  and  seventh  divisions,  Pack's 
and  Bradf  )rd's  Portuguese  brigades,  Ponsonby's  liglit 
horsem3n,  and  the  heavy  German  cavalry,  to  move 
rapidly  upon  Arevalo,  and  on  the  1st  of  September 
quitted  Madrid  himself  to  take  the  command.  Yet 
his  army  had  been  so  diminished  by  sickness  that 
only  twenty-one  thousand  men,  including  three 
thousand  cavalry,  were  assembled  in  that  town,  and 
he  had  great  difficulty  to  feed  the  Portuguese  sol- 
diers, who  were  also  very  ill  equipped. 

The  regency,  instead  of  transmitting  money  and 
store's  to  supply  their  troops,  endeavoured  to  throw 
off"  the  burthen  entirely  by  an  ingenious  device  ;  for 
having  always  had  a  running  account  with  the  Span- 
ish government,  they  now  made  a  treaty,  by  which 
the  Spaniards  were  to  feed  the  Portuguese  troops, 
and  check  olf  the  expense  on  the  national  account, 
which  was  then  in  favour  of  the  Portuguese  ;  that 
is,  the  soldiers  were  to  starve  under  tlie  sanction  of 
this  treaty,  because  the  Spaniards  could  not  feed 
tli^ir  own  men,  and  would  not,  if  they  could,  have 
fed  tlie  Portuguese.  Neither  could  the  htter  take 
provisions  from  the  country,  because  Wellington 
demanded  the  resources  of  the  valleys  of  the  Duero 
and  Pisuerga  for  the  English  soldiers,  as  a  set-otT 
against  the  money  advanced  by  Sir  Henry  Wellesley 
to  tlie  Spanish  regency  at  Cadiz.  Wiierefore  to  force 
the  Portuguese  regency  from  this  shameful  expedi- 
ent he  stopped  the  payments  of  tlieir  subsidy  from 
the  chest  of  aids  Then  the  old  discontents  and  dis- 
putes revived  and  acquired  new  force  ;  the  regency 
became  more  intractable  than  ever,  and  the  whole 
military  system  of  Portugal  was  like  to  fall  to 
pieces. 

On  the  4th,  the  allies  quitted  Arc/r  d,  the  6th, 


they  passed  the  Duero  by  the  ford  above  Puente  de 
Duero,  the  7th,  they  entered  Valladolid,  and  mean- 
while the  Callicians,  who  had  returned  to  the  Etla, 
when  Foy  retreated,  were  ordered  to  join  the  Anglo- 
Portuguese  army.  Clauzel  abandoned  \  alladolid  u. 
the  night  of  the  6th,  and  tliougii  closely  followed  by 
Ponsonby's  cavalry,  crossed  the  Pisuerga  and  de- 
stroyed the  bridge  of  Berecal  on  that  r^ver.  The 
8th,  the  allies  halted,  for  rest,  and  to  as^-ait  the  ar 
rival  of  Castafios  ;  but  seldom  during  tiiis  war  did  a 
Spanish  general  deviate  into  activity  ;  and  Welling 
ton  observed  that  in  his  whole  intercourse  with  tliat 
people,  from  the  beginning  of  the  revolution  to  that 
moment,  he  had  not  met  with  an  able  Spaniard, 
while  amongst  the  Portuguese  he  had  Ibund  several- 
The  Gallicians  came  not,  and  the  French  retreated 
slowly  up  the  beautiful  Pisuerga  and  Arlanzan  val- 
leys, wliich,  in  denial  of  tiie  stories  about  French 
devastation,  were  carefully  cultivated,  and  filled  tn 
repletion  with  corn,  wine,  and  oil. 

Nor  were  they  deficient  in  military  strength.  Oft" 
the  high  road,  on  both  sides,  ditches  and  rivuleta 
impeded  the  troops,  while  cross  ridges  continually 
furnished  strong  paralleJ  positions  flanked  by  the 
lofty  hills  on  either  side.  In  these  valleys  Clauzel 
bafiled  his  great  adversary  in  the  most  surprising 
manner.  Each  day  he  ofi'ered  battle,  but  on  ground 
which  Wellington  was  unwilling  to  assail  in  front, 
partly  because  he  momentarily  expected  the  Galli- 
cians up,  but  chiefly  because  of  the  declining  state 
of  his  own  army  from  sickness,  which,  combined  with 
the  hope  of  ulterior  operations  in  the  south,  made 
him  unwilling  to  lose  men.  By  flank  movements  he 
dislodged  the  enemy,  yet  each  day  darkness  fell  ere 
they  were  completed,  and  the  morning's  sun  always 
saw  Clauzel  again  in  position.  At  Cigales  and 
Duenas,  in  the  Pisuerga  valley,  at  Magoz,  Torque- 
mada,  Cordobilla,  Revilla,  Vallejera,  and  Pampliega 
in  the  valley  of  the  Arlanzan,  the  French  general 
thus  ofi^ered  battle,  and  finally  covered  Burgos  on  the 
16th,  by  taking  the  strong  position  of  Cellada  del 
Camino. 

But  eleven  thousand  Spanish  infantry,  three  hun- 
dred cavalry,  and  eight  guns,  had  now  joineii  the 
allies,  and  Wellington  would  have  attacked  frankly 
on  the  17th,  had  not  Clauzel,  alike  wary  and  skilful, 
observed  the  increased  numbers,  and  retired  in  the 
night  to  Frandovinez  ;  his  rear-guard  was,  hov.'ever, 
next  day  pushed  sharply  back  to  the  heights  of  Bur- 
gos, and  in  the  following  night  he  passed  through 
that  town,  leaving  behind  him  large  stores  of  grain. 
CalTarelli,  who  had  come  down  to  place  the  costle  of 
Burgos  in  a  state  of  defence,  now  joined  him,  and 
the  two  generals  retreated  upon  Briviesca,  where 
they  were  immediately  reinforced  by  that  reserve 
which,  with  such  extraordinary  foresight,  the  empe- 
ror  had  directed  to  be  assembled  and  exercised  on 
the  Pyrennees,  in  anticipation  of  Marmont's  disas- 
ter. The  allies  entered  IJurgos  amidst  great  confu- 
sion, for  the  garrison  of  the  castle  had  set  fire  to 
some  houses  impeding  the  defence  of  the  fortress  ; 
the  conflagration  spread  widely,  and  the  partidas, 
who  were  already  gatiiered  like  wolves  round  a  car- 
cass, entered  the  town  for  mischief.  3Ir.  Sydenham, 
an  eye-witness,  and  not  unused  to  scenes  of  war, 
thus  describes  their  proceedings  :  "  Wliat  with  the 
flames,  and  the  plundering  of  the  Guerillas,  who  are 
as  bad  as  Tartars  and  Cossacks  of  the  Kischack  or 
Zagatay  hordes,  I  was  afraid  Burgos  would  be  en- 
tirely destroyed  ;  but  order  was  at  lengtli  restored 
by  the  manful  exertions  of  Don  Miguel  Alava." 

The  series  of  beautiful  movements  executed  by 
Clatizel,  merit  every  |)raise  ;  but  it  may  bo  ques. 
tioned  if  the  English  general's  marches  wore  in  the 


523 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Bock  XIX. 


true  direction,  or  made  in  good  time  ;  for  thougli 
Clinton's  retreat  upon  Arevalo  influenced,  it  did  not 
absolutely  dictata,  the  line  of  operations.  Welling- 
ton had  expactad  Clauzel's  advance  to  Valladolid ;  it 
was  tlierefore  no  surprise  ;  and  on  the  26th  of  Au- 
gust, Foy  was  still  at  Zamora.  At  that  period,  the 
English  general  might  have  iiad  his  army,  Clinton's 
troops  excepted,  at  Segovia  ;  and  as  the  distance 
from  thance  to  Valladolid  is  rattier  less  than  from 
Valladolid  to  Zamora,  a  rapid  march  upon  the  for- 
mor,  Clinton  advancing  at  the  same  time,  might 
have  ssparated  Clauzel  from  Foy.  Again,  Welling- 
ton niigiit  have  marched  upon  Burgos  by  Aranda  de 
Dusro  and  Lerma,  tliat  road  being  as  short  as  by 
Valladolid  ;  he  might  also  have  brought  forward  the 
third,  or  the  light  division,  by  the  Somosierra,  from 
Madrid,  and  directed  Clinton  and  the  Spaniards  to 
close  upon  the  French  rear.  He  would  thus  have 
turned  the  valleys  of  the  Pisuerga  and  the  Arlanzan, 
and  could  from  Aranda,  or  Lerma,  have  fallen  upon 
Clauzel  while  in  march.  That  general  having  Clin- 
ton and  the  Gallicians  on  his  rear,  and  Wellington, 
reinforced  by  the  divisions  from  Madrid,  on  his  front 
or  flank,  would  then  have  had  to  fight  a  decisive 
battle  under  every  disadvantage.  In  fine,  the  object 
was  to  crusli  Clauzel,  and  this  should  have  been  ef- 
fected though  Madrid  had  been  entirely  abandoned  to 
secure  success.  It  is,  however,  probable  that  want 
of  money,  and  means  of  transport,  decided  the  line 
of  operations  ;  for  the  route  by  the  Somosierra  was 
Bavage  and  barren,  tmd  the  feeding  of  the  troops, 
even  by  Valladolid,  was  from  hand  to  mouth,  or  pain- 
fully supported  by  convoys  from  Portugal. 

SIEGE    OF    THE    CASTLE    OF    BURGOS. 

Caffarelli  had  placed  eighteen  hundred  infantry, 
besides  artillery-men,  in  tliis  place,  and  general  l)u- 
breton,  the  gsvernor,  was  of  such  courage  and  skill 
that  lie  surpassed  even  the  liopes  of  his  sanguine  and 
warlike  countryman.  The  castle  and  its  works  en- 
closed a  rugged  hill,  between  which  and  the  river, 
the  city  of  Burgos  was  situated.  An  old  wall,  with 
a  new  parapet  and  flanks  constructed  by  the  French, 
offered  the  first  line  of  defence  ;  the  second  line, 
which  was  within  the  other,  was  earthen,  of  the 
nature  of  a  field  retrenchment,  and  well  palisaded  ; 
the  third  line  was  similarly  constructed,  and  con- 
tained the  two  most  elevated  points  of  the  hill,  on 
one  of  which  was  an  entrenched  building  called  the 
Wliite  Church,  and  on  the  other  the  ancient  keep  of 
the  castle  ;  this  last  was  the  highest  point,  and  was 
not  only  entrenched,  but  surmounted  by  a  heavy 
casemated  work  called  the  Napoleon  battery.  Thus 
there  were  five  separate  enclosures. 

The  Napoleon  battery  commanded  every  thing 
around  it,  save  to  the  north,  where,  at  the  distance 
of  tliree  hundred  yards,  there  was  a  second  height 
Bcarcely  less  elevated  tiian  that  of  the  fortress.  It 
was  called  the  Hill  of  San  Micliael,  and  was  defend- 
ed by  a  large  horn-work,  with  a  hard  sloping  scarp 
twenty-five,  and  a  counterscarp  ten,  feet  higli.  This 
outwork  was  unfinished,  and  only  closed  by  strong 
palisades  ;  but  it  was  under  the  fire  of  the  Napoleon 
battery,  was  well  flanked  by  the  castle  defences,  and 
covered  in  front  by  slight  entrenchments  for  the  out 
picquets.  The  French  had  already  mounted  nine 
heavy  guns,  eleven  field-pieces,  and  six  mortars  or 
howitzers  in  the  fortress,  and  as  the  reserve  artillery 
und  ritoijs  of  the  army  of  Portugal  were  also  depos- 
ited there,  they  could  increase  their  armament. 

FIRST    ASSAULT. 

The  batteries  so  coinidetely  commanded  all  the 
bridges  and  fords  over  the  Arlanzan  that  two  days 


elapsed  ere  the  allies  could  cress;  but  on  the  I'Jth, 
the  passage  of  the  river  being  eflccted  above  tiie 
town,  by  the  first  division,  major  Someis  Cocke, 
supported  by  Pack's  Portuguese,  drove  in  tlie  French 
outposts  on  the  hill  of  San  Michael.  In  tlie  night, 
the  same  troops,  reinforced  with  the  forty-second 
regiment,  stormed  the  horn-work.  The  conri.ct  was 
murderous  ;  for  though  the  ladders  were  fairly  placed 
by  tlie  bearers  of  tiiem,  the  storming  column,  which, 
covered  by  a  firing  party,  marched  against  the  front, 
was  beaten  with  great  loss,  and  the  attack  would 
have  failed  if  tlie  gallant  leader  of  the  seventy -ninth 
had  not  meanwhile  forced  an  entrance  by  the  gorge. 
The  garrison  was  tiius  actually  cut  ofi';  but  Cocks, 
thougli  followed  by  the  second  battalion  of  the  forty- 
second  regiment,  was  not  closely  supported,  and  the 
French  being  still  five  hundred  strong,  broke  through 
his  men  and  escaped.  This  assault  gave  room  for 
censure  ;  the  troops  complained  of  each  other,  and 
the  loss  was  above  four  hundred,  while  that  of  tl»e 
enemy  was  less  than  one  hundred  and  fifty. 

Wellington  was  now  enabled  to  examine  the  de- 
fences of  the  castle.  He  found  them  feeble  and  in- 
complete ;  and  yet  his  means  were  so  scant  that  he 
had  slender  hopes  of  success,  and  relied  more  upon 
the  enemy's  weakness  than  upon  his  own  power.  It 
was,  however,  said  that  water  was  scarce  with  the 
garrison,  and  that  their  provision  magazines  could 
be  burned  ;  wherefore,  encouraged  by  this  informa- 
tion, lie  adopted  the  following  plan  of  attack. 

Twelve  thousand  men,  composing  the  first  and 
sixth  divisions,  and  the  two  Portuguese  brigades, 
were  to  undertake  the  works  ;  the  rest  of  the  troops, 
about  twenty  thousand,  exclusive  of  the  partidas, 
were  to  form  the  covering  army. 

The  trenches  were  to  be  opened  from  the  suburb 
of  San  Pedro,  and  a  parallel  formed  in  the  direction 
of  the  hill  of  San  Michael. 

A  battery  for  five  guns  was  to  be  established  close 
to  the  right  of  the  captured  horn-work. 

A  sap  was  to  be  pushed  from  the  parallel  as  near 
the  first  wall  as  possible,  without  being  seen  into 
from  tlie  upper  works,  and  from  thence  the  engineer 
was  to  proceed  by  gallery  and  mine. 

Wiien  the  first  mine  sliould  be  completed,  the  bat- 
tery on  the  hill  of  San  iMichael  was  to  open  against 
the  second  line  of  defence,  and  the  assault  was  to  be 
given  on  the  first  line.  If  a  lodgement  was  formed, 
the  approaches  were  to  be  continued  against  the 
second  line,  and  the  battery  on  San  Michael  was  to 
be  turned  against  the  third  line,  in  front  of  tlie  Wiiite 
Church,  because  the  defences  there  were  exceeding- 
ly weak  Meanwhile  a  trench  for  musketry  was  to 
be  dug  along  the  brow  of  San  Jlichael,  and  a  con- 
cealed battery  was  to  be  prepared  within  the  horn- 
work  itself,  with  a  view  to  the  final  attack  of  the 
Napoleon  battery. 

The  head-quarters  were  fixed  at  Villa  Toro; 
colonel  Burgoyne  conducted  the  operations  of  the 
engineers,  colonel  Robe  and  colonel  Dickson  those 
of  the  artillery,  wliicli  consisted  of  three  eighteen- 
pounders,  and  the  five  iron  twenty-four-pound  liow- 
itzers  used  at  the  siege  of  the  Salamanca  forts  ;  and 
it  was  with  regard  to  these  slender  means,  rather 
tlian  the  defects  of  the  fortress,  that  the  line  of  attack 
was  chosen. 

When  the  horn-work  fell,  a  lodgement  had  been 
immediately  commenced  in  tlie  interior,  and  it  was 
continued  vigorously,  although  under  a  destructive 
fire  from  tlie  Napoleon  battery,  because  the  besieg- 
ers feared  the  enemy  would  at  day-light  endeavour 
to  retake  tlie  work  by  the  gorge  ;  good  cover  wns, 
however,  obtained  in  tlie  night, and  the  first  buttery 
was  also  begun. 


ISIV.J 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


523 


The  21st,  the  garrison  mounted  several  fresh  field- 
guns,  and  at  night  kept  up  a  heavy  tire  ot'rrrape  and 
Bhcils  on  tlie  workmen  who  were  digging  the  mus- 
ketry tr3nch  in  front  of  the  first  battery. 

'I'he  22d,  the  fire  of  the  besieged  was  redoubled  ; 
but  tlie  besiegers  worked  with  little  loss,  and  their 
niusket.eers  galled  the  enemy.  In  the  the  night,  tlie 
first  battery  was  armed  with  two  eighteen-pounders 
and  tliree  howitzers,  and  the  secret  battery  witiiin 
the  horn-work  was  commenced  ;  but  lord  Welling- 
ton, deviating  from  his  first  plan,  now  resolved  to 
try  an  escalade  against  tiie  first  line  of  defence.  He 
selected  a  point  half-way  betv/esn  the  suburb  of  8an 
Pedro  and  tlie  !iorn-work,  and  at  midnight  four  hun- 
dred men  provided  witli  ladders,  were  secretly  posted 
in  a  hollo'.^rnad  fifty  yards  from  the  wall,  which  was 
from  twsnly-lhree  to  twenty-five  feet  higii,  but  had 
no  flanks.  This  was  the  main  column  ;  a  Portuguese 
battalion  was  also  assembled  in  the  town  of  Enrgos, 
to  make  a  combined  flank  attack  on  that  side. 

SECOND    ASSAULT. 

The  storm  was  commenced  by  the  Portuguese,  but 
they  were  repelled  by  the  fire  of  the  common  guard 
alone;  and  the  princiaal  escalading  party,  whicli 
was  composed  of  detacliments  from  different  regi- 
ments, under  major  Lav.-rie,  79th  regiment,  though 
acting  with  more  courage,  had  as  little  success. 
The  ladders  were  indeed  placed,  and  the  troops 
entered  the  ditch,  yet  altogether,  and  confusedly  ; 
Lav/rie  was  killed,  and  the  bravest  soldiers  who 
first  mounted  the  ladders  were  bayonetted  ;  combus- 
tible missiles  were  then  thrown  down  in  great  abun- 
dance, and,  after  a  quarter  of  an  hour's  resistance, 
the  men  gave  way,  leaving  half  their  number  behind. 
The  wounded  were  brought  oil' the  next  day,  under  a 
truce.  It  is  said  that  on  the  body  of  one  of  the  ofii- 
cers  killed,  tlie  French  found  a  complete  plan  of  the 
siege,  and  it  is  certain  that  this  disastrous  attempt, 
wliich  delayed  the  regular  progress  of  the  siege  for 
two  days,  increased  the  enemy's  courage,  and  pro- 
duced a  bad  effect  upon  the  allied  troops,  some  of 
whom  were  already  dispirited  by  the  attack  on  the 
horn-work. 

The  original  plan  being  now  resumed,  the  hollow 
way  from  whence  the  escaladers  iiad  advanced,  and 
which,  at  only  fifty  yards'  distance,  run  along  the 
front  of  defence,  was  converted  into  a  parallel,  and 
connected  with  the  suburb  of  San  Pedro.  The 
trenches  were  made  deep  and  narrow,  to  secure 
them  from  the  plunging  shot  of  the  castle,  and  mus- 
keteers were  also  planted  to  keep  down  the  enemy's 
fire;  but  heavy  rains  incommoded  the  troops,  and 
though  the  allied  marksmen  got  the  mastery  over 
tliose  of  the  French  irnmedintely  in  their  front,  the 
latter,  liaving  a  raised  and  palisaded  work  on  their 
own  right,  which  in  some  measure  flanked  the  ap- 
proaches, killed  so  many  of  the  besiegers  that  the 
latter  were  finally  withdrawn. 

In  tiie  night  a  flying  sap  was  commenced  from  the 
right  of  the  parallel,  and  was  pushed  within  twenty 
fards  of  the  enemy's  first  line  of  defence  ;  but  tlie 
directing  engineer  was  killed,  and  with,  him  mnny 
men,  for  the  French  plied  their  musketry  sharply, 
and  rolled  large  shells  down  the  steep  side  of  the 
hill.  The  head  of  the  sap  was  indeed  so  command- 
ed as  it  approached  the  wall,  that  a  six-feet  trench, 
added  to  the  height  of  the  g.ibion  above,  scarcely 
protected  the  workmen  ;  wherefore  the  gallery  of  tlie 
mine  was  opened,  and  worked  as  rapidly  as  the  in- 
experience of  the  miners,  who  were  merely  volun- 
teers from  the  line,  would  permit. 

The  conceajr-^d  battery  within  the  horn-work  of 
San  Michael   being  now  completed,  two  eigiitcin- 


pounders  were  removed  from  the  first  battery  to  arm 
it,  and  they  were  replaced  by  two  iron  howitzers, 
which  opened  upon  the  advanced  palisade  below,  to 
drive  the  French  marksmen  from  that  point;  but 
ai'tcr  firing  one  h.undred  and  forty  rounds  without 
success,  this  jiroject  was  relirquishcd,  and  ammuni- 
tion was  so  scarce  that  the  soldiers  were  paid  to  col- 
lect the  enemy's  bullets. 

This  day  also  a  zigzag  was  commenced  in  front  of 
the  first  battery,  and  down  the  face  of  San  Michael, 
to  obtain  footing  for  a  musketry  trench  to  overlook 
the  enemy's  defences  below;  and  though  the  work- 
men v.'ere  exposed  to  the  whole  fire  of  the  castle,  at 
the  distance  of  two  hundred  yards,  and  were  knocked 
down  fast,  the  work  went  steadily  on. 

On  the  2(3th,  the  gallery  of  the  mine  was  advanced 
eighteen  feet,  and  the  soil  was  found  favourable  ;  but 
the  men,  in  passing  the  sap,  were  hit  fast  by  the 
French  marksmen,  and  an  assistant  engineer  was 
killed.  In  the  niglit,  the  parallel  was  prolonged  on 
the  right  within  twenty  yards  of  the  enemy's  ram- 
parts, with  a  view  to  a  second  gallery  and  mine, 
and  musketeers  were  planted  there  to  oppose  the 
enemy's  marksmen,  and  to  protect  the  sap  ;  at  the 
same  time  the  zigzag  on  the  hill  of  San  Michael  was 
continued,  and  the  musket  trench  there  was  com- 
pleted under  cover  of  gabions,  and  with  little  loss, 
although  the  whole  fire  of  the  castle  was  concen- 
trated on  the  spot. 

The  27th,  the  French  were  seen  strengthening 
their  second  line,  and  they  had  already  cut  a  step 
along  the  edge  of  the  counterscarp,  tcr  a  covered 
way,  and  had  palisaded  the  communication.  INiean- 
whila  the  besiegers  finished  the  musketry  trench  on 
tlie  right  of  their  parallel,  and  opened  the  gallery  for 
the  second  mine  ;  but  the  first  mine  went  on  slowly, 
the  men  in  the  sap  were  galled  and  disturbed  by 
stones,  grenades,  and  small  shells,  which  the  French 
threw  into  the  trenches  by  hand  ;  and  the  artillery 
fire  also  knocked  over  the  gabions  of  tlie  musketry 
trench  on  San  3Iichael  so  last  that  the  troops  were 
withdrawn  during  the  day. 

In  the  night,  a  trench  of  communication,  forming 
a  second  parallel  behind  the  first,  was  begun,  and 
nearly  completed,  from  the  hill  of  San  Michael  to- 
wards the  suburb  of  San  Pedro,  and  the  musketry 
trench  on  the  hill  was  deepened. 

The  25th,  an  attempt  was  made  to  perfect  this 
new  parallel  of  com.munication,  but  the  French  fire 
was  heavy,  and  tlie  shells,  which  passed  over,  came 
rolling  down  the  hill  again  into  the  trench  ;  so  the 
work  was  deferred  until  niglit,  and  was  then  per- 
fected. The  back  roll  of  the  shells  continued  indeed 
to  gall  the  troops,  but  the  wliole  of  this  trench,  that 
in  front  of  the  horn-work  above,  and  that  on  the  right 
of  the  parallel  below,  w'ere  filled  with  men  whose 
fire  was  incessant.  Moreover,  the  first  mine  was 
now  completed  and  loaded  with  more  than  a  thousand 
weight  of  powder,  the  gallery  was  strongly  tamped 
for  fifteen  feet  with  bags  of  clay,  and  all  being  ready 
for  the  explosion,  Wellington  ordered  the 

THIRD    ASSAULT. 

At  midnight  the  hollow  road,  fifty  yards  from  the 
mine,  was  lined  with  troops  to  fire  on  the  defences, 
and  three  hundred  men,  composing  the  storming 
party,  were  assembled  there,  attended  by  others  who 
carried  tools  and  materials  to  secure  the  lodgement 
when  the  breach  should  be  carried.  The  mine  was 
then  exploded,  the  wall  fell,  and  an  ciflicer  with 
twenty  men  rushed  forward  to  the  assault.  The  ef- 
fect of  the  explosion  was  not  so  great  as  it  ought  to 
have  been,  yet  it  brought  the  wall  down,  the  enemy 
was  stupified,  and  the  forlorn  hope,  consisting  of  % 


524 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR 


[Book  XIX 


sergeant  and  four  daring  soldiers,  gained  the  summit 
of  the  bread),  and  tiiere  stood  until  tlie  French,  re- 
covering, drove  them  down  pierced  with  bayonet 
wounds.  Meanwhile,  tlie  otiicer  and  the  twenty  men, 
who  were  to  have  been  followed  by  a  party  of  tifty, 
and  these  by  the  remainder  of  tlie  stormers,  missed 
the  breacli  in  the  dark,  and  tinding  the  wall  unbrok- 
en, returned,  and  reported  that  there  was  no  breach. 
The  main  b  idy  immediately  regained  the  trendies, 
and  before  the  sergeant  and  his  men  returned  with 
btreaming  wounds  to  tell  tlieir  tale,  the  enemy  was 
reinforced  ;  and  such  was  the  scarcity  of  ammunition 
that  no  artillery  practice  could  be  directed  against 
the  breacli,  during  tlie  nigiit;  hence  the  Frencii 
were  enabled  to  raise  a  jjarapet  behind  it,  and  to 
place  obstacles  on  the  ascent,  which  deterred  the  be- 
siegers from  renewing  the  assault  at  daylight. 

This  failur>3  arose  from  the  darkness  of  the  night, 
and  the  want  of  a  conducting  engineer;  for  out  of 
four  regular  officers  of  that  branch,  engaged  in  the 
siege,  one  had  been  killed,  one  badly  wounded,  and 
one  was  sick,  wherefore  the  remaining  one  was  ne- 
cessarily reserved  for  tlie  conducting  of  tiie  works. 
The  aspect  of  affairs  was  gloomy.  Twelve  days  had 
elapsed  since  the  siege  commenced,  one  assault  had 
succeeded,  two  had  failed,  twelve  hundred  men  had 
been  killed  or  wounded,  little  progress  had  been 
made,  and  the  troops  generally  showed  symptoms  of 
despondency,  especially  the  Portuguese,  wlio  seemed 
to  be  losing  their  ancient  spirit.  Discipline  was 
relaxed,  the  soldiers  wasted  ammunition,  and  the 
work  in  the  trenches  was  avoided  or  neglected  both 
by  officers  and  men  ;  insubordination  was  gaining 
ground,  and  reproachful  orders  were  issued,  the 
guards  only  being  noticed  as  presenting  an  honour- 
able exception. 

In  this  state  it  was  essential  to  make  some  change 
in  the  operations,  and  as  the  French  marksmen,  in 
the  advanced  palisadoed  work  below,  were  now  be- 
come so  expert  that  every  thing  which  could  be  seen 
from  tlience  was  hit,  tiie  howitzer  battery  on  San 
Michael  was  reinforced  with  a  French  eight-pounder, 
by  the  aid  of  which  this  mischievous  post  was  at 
last  demolished.  At  the  same  time,  the  gallery 
of  the  second  mine  was  pushed  forward,  and  a  new 
breaching  battery  for  three  guns  was  constructed 
behind  it,  so  close  to  the  enemy's  defences  that  the 
latter  screened  the  work  from  the  artillerj'^  fire  of 
their  upjier  fortress  ;  but  the  parapet  of  the  battery 
was  only  made  mu.sket-proof,  because  the  besieged 
had  no  guns  on  the  lower  line  of  this  front. 

In  the  night,  the  three  eighteen-pounders  were 
brought  from  tlie  hill  of  San  ^lichacl  without  being 
discovered,  and  at  daylight,  though  a  very  galling 
fire  of  muskets  thinned  the  workmen,  they  persever- 
ed until  nine  o'clock,  when  the  battery  was  finished 
and  armed.  But  at  that  moment  the  watchful  Du- 
breton  brought  a  howitzer  down  from  the  ujiper 
works,  and  with  a  low  charge  threw  shells  into  the 
battery  ;  then  making  a  hole  through  a  flank  wall, 
he  thrust  out  a  ligiit  gun,  which  sent  its  bullets 
whizzing  through  the  thin  parapet  at  every  round, 
and  at  the  same  time  his  marksmen  |)lied  tlieir  shot 
so  sharply  that  the  allies  were  driven  from  their 
pieces  w;tliout  firing  a  shot.  More  French  cannon 
were  now  brourrlit  from  the  upper  works,  the  defences 
of  the  battery  ware  quite  demolished,  two  of  the  gun- 
carriagrss  were  disabled,  a  trunnion  was  knocked  off 
one  of  the  eighteen-pounders,  and  the  muzzle  of  an- 
other was  s,)lit.  It  was  in  vain  that  the  besiegers' 
marksmen,  aided  by  some  officers  who  considered 
themselves  good  shots,  endeavoured  to  quell  the  ene- 
my's fire  ;  the  French  being  on  a  heigiit,  were  too 
well  covered,  and  remained  ir.asters  of  the  fight. 


In  the  night,  a  second  and  more  solid  battery  wae 
formed,  at  a  point  a  little  to  the  lelt  of  the  ruined 
one;  but  at  daylight  the  French  observed  it,  and 
their  fire,  plunging  from  above,  made  the  parapet  fly 
ofi"  so  rapidly  tliat  the  English  general  relinquished 
his  intention,  and  returned  to  his  galleries  aiid  mii.es, 
and  to  his  breaching  battery  on  the  hill  of  .San  A/i- 
cliael.  The  two  guns  ttill  serviceable  were  there 
fore  removed  towards  the  upper  battery,  to  beat 
down  a  retrenchment  formed  by  the  French  behind 
the  old  breach.  It  was  intended  to  have  jjlacod 
tiiem  on  this  new  position,  in  the  night  of  the  Id  ; 
but  the  weather  was  very  wet  and  stormy,  and  the 
workmen,  those  of  the  guards  only  excepted,  aban- 
doned the  trenches;  hence,  at  daylight,  the  guns 
were  still  short  of  their  destination,  and  ncthirg 
more  could  be  done  until  the  following  night. 

On  the  4th,  at  nine  o'clock  in  the  nicrning,  the 
two  eighteen  pounders  and  tliree  iron  hcwitzeis, 
again  opened  from  San  Michael's,  and  at  four  o'clock 
in  the  evening,  the  old  breach  being  cleared  of  pll 
incumbrances,  and  the  second  mine  being  strcrgly 
tamped  tor  explosion,  a  double  assault  was  ordereo. 
The  second  battalion  of  the  twenty-fourth  British 
regiment,  commanded  by  captain  Hecderwick,  was 
selected  for  this  operation,  and  was  formed  in  the 
hollow  way,  having  one  advanced  party,  under  Mr. 
Holmes,  pushed  forward  as  close  to  the  new  mine  as 
it  was  safe  to  be,  and  a  second  party,  under  Mr.  i<  ra- 
zor, in  like  manner  pushed  towards  the  old  breach. 

FOURTH    ASSAULT. 

At  five  o'clock  the  mine  wes  exploded  witn  a  ter- 
rific efiect,  sending  many  of  the  French  up  into  the 
air  and  breaking  down  one  hundred  feet  of  the  wall : 
the  next  instant  Holmes  and  his  brave  men  went 
rushing  tlirough  the  smoke  and  crumhiiusr  ruins, 
and  Frazer,  as  quick  and  brave  as  his  brother  cff;- 
cer,  was  already  fighting  with  the  defenders  on  the 
summit  of  the  old  breech.  The  supports  followed 
closely,  and  in  a  few  minutes  bcth  points  were  car- 
ried with  a  loss  to  the  assailants  of  thirty-seven 
killed  and  two-hundred  wounded,  seven  of  the  latter 
being  officers,  and  amongst  them  the  conducting  en- 
gineer. During  the  night  lodgements  were  formed, 
in  advance  of  the  old,  and  on  tiie  ruins  of  the  new 
breach,  yet  very  imperfectly,  and  under  a  heavy  de- 
structive fire  of  the  upper  defences.  But  thi-s  hap- 
py attack  revived  the  spirits  of  the  army,  vessels 
with  powder  were  coming  coastwise  from  Coru- 
fia,  a  convoy  was  expected  by  land  from  Ciudad 
Rodrigo,  and  as  a  supply  of  ammunition  sent  by  sir 
Home  Popham  had  already  reached  the  camp,  from 
Santander,  the  howitzers  continued  to  knock  away 
the  palisades  in  the  ditch,  and  the  battery  on  Sen 
Michael's  was  directed  to  open  a  third  breach  at  a 
point  where  the  first  French  line  of  defence  was 
joined  to  the  second  line. 

This  promising  state  of  affairs  was  of  short  dura- 
tion. 

On  the  5th,  at  five  o'clock  in  the  evening,  while 
the  working  parties  were  extending  the  lodgements, 
three  hundred  French  came  swiftly  down  the  hill, 
and  sweeping  away  the  labourers  and  guards  from 
the  trenches,  killed  or  wounded  a  hundred  and  fifty 
men,  got  possession  of  the  old  breach,  destroyed  the 
works  and  carried  off  all  the  tools.  However  in  the 
night  the  allies  repaired  the  damage  and  pushed 
saps  from  each  flank  to  meet  in  the  centre  near  the 
second  French  line,  and  to  serve  as  a  parallel  to 
check  future  sallies.  Meanwhile  the  howitzers  on 
the  San  Michael  continued  their  fire,  yet  inefiectu- 
ally,  against  the  palisades  ;  the  breaching  battery  in 
the  horn-work  alto  opened,  but  it  was  badly  con- 


1812.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


525 


etriicte:!,  and  the  guns  beinj;'  unable  to  see  the  wall 
euihoieiitly  low,  soon  ceased  to  speak,  the  embrasures 
ware  therefore  masked.  On  the  otlier  hand,  the  be- 
sieijad  were  unable,  from  the  steepness  of  the  castle 
hill,  to  depress  tlieir  guns  sufficiently  to  bear  on  the 
lodgement  at  the  breacJies  in  the  first  line,  but  their 
musketry  was  destructive,  and  they  rolled  down 
large  shells  to  retard  the  ai)proache3  towards  the 
second  line. 

O'"  the  7th,  the  besiegers  had  got  so  close  to  the 
wa"  below  that  the  liowitzers  above  could  no  longer 
play  without  danger  to  the  workmen,  wherefore  two 
French  field-pieces,  taken  in  the  horn-work,  were 
fiubstituted  and  did  good  service.  The  breaching 
battery  on  San  Michael's  being  altered,  also  renew- 
ed its  fire,  and  at  five  o'clock  had  beaten  down  fifty 
feet  from  the  parapet  of  the  second  line  ;  but  the 
enemy's  return  was  heavy,  and  another  eighteen 
pounder  lost  a  trunnion.  However,  in  the  night 
block-carriages  with  supports  for  the  broken  trun- 
nions v/ere  provided,  and  tlie  disabled  guns  were  ena- 
bled to  recommence  their  fire,  yet  with  low  charges. 
But  a  constant  rain  had  now  filled  the  trenches,  the 
communications  were  injured,  the  workmen  were 
negligent,  the  approaches  to  the  second  line  went 
on  slowly,  and  again  Dubreton  came  thundering 
down  from  the  upper  ground,  driving  the  guards  and 
workmen  from  the  new  parallel  at  the  lodgements, 
levelling  all  the  works,  carrying  off  all  the  tools, 
and  killing  or  wounding  two  hundred  men.  Colo- 
nel Cocks,  promoted  for  his  gallant  conduct  at  the 
storming  of  San  Michael,  restored  the  fight,  and  re- 
pulsed the  French,  but  he  fell  dead  on  the  ground 
he  had  recovered.  He  was  a  young  man  of  a  mod- 
est demeanour,  brave,  thoughtful,  and  enterprising, 
and  he  lived  and  died  a  good  soldier. 

After  this  severe  check  the  approaches  to  the  sec- 
ond line  were  abandoned,  and  the  trenches  were  ex- 
tended so  as  to  embrace  the  whole  of  the  fronts  at- 
tacked ;  the  battery  on  San  Michael  had  meantime 
formed  a  practicable  breach  twenty-live  feet  wide, 
and  the  parallel,  at  the  old  breach  of  the  first  line,  was 
prolonged  by  zigzags  on  the  left  towards  this  new 
breach,  while  a  trench  was  opened  to  enable  marks- 
man to  fire  upon  the  latter  at  thirty  yards  distance. 
Nevertheless  another  assault  could  not  be  risked,  be- 
cause the  great  expenditure  of  powder  had  again 
exhausted  the  magazines,  and  without  a  new  sup- 
ply the  troops  might  have  found  themselves  without 
ammunition  in  front  of  the  French  army,  which  was 
nov/  gathering  head  near  Briviesca.  Heated  sliot 
wer:;,  however,  thrown  at  the  White  Church  with  a 
view  to  burn  the  magazines;  and  the  miners  were 
directed  to  drive  a  gallery,  on  the  other  side  of  the 
castle,  against  the  church  of  San  Roman,  a  building 
pushed  out  a  little  beyond  tlio  French  external  line 
of  defence  on  the  side  of  the  city. 

On  the  10th,  when  the  besiegers'  ammunition  was 
nearly  all  gone,  a  fresh  supply  arrived  from  Santan- 
der,  but  no  effect  had  been  produced  upon  tlie  Wiiitc 
Church,  and  Dubreton  had  strengthened  his  works 
to  meet  the  assault;  he  had  also  isolated  the  new 
breacli  on  one  flank  by  a  strong  stockade  extending 
at  right  angles  from  the  second  to  the  third  line  of 
def'.Mice.  The  fire  from  the  Napol3on  battery  had 
obliged  the  besiegers  again  to  withdraw  their  bat- 
tering guns  within  the  horn-work,  and  the  attempt 
to  burn  the  White  Church  was  relinquished,  but  the 
ga.llery  against  San  Roman  was  continued.  In  this 
state  things  remained  for  several  days  with  little 
change,  save  that  the  French,  maugre  the  musketry 
from  the  nearest  zigzag  trench,  had  scarped  eight 
feet  at  the  top  of  the  new  breach  and  formed  a  small 
trench  at  the  back. 


On  the  l.'ith,  the  battery  in  the  horn-work  was 
again  armed,  and  the  guns  pointed  to  breach  the 
wall  of  the  Najjoleon  battery  ;  they  were,  however, 
overmatched  and  silenced  in  three  quarters  of  an 
hour,  and  the  embrasures  were  once  more  altered, 
tiiat  the  guns  migiit  bear  on  the  breach  in  the  sec- 
ond line.  Some  sligjit  works  and  counter-works 
were  also  made  on  difi'erent  points,  but  the  besieg- 
ers were  principally  occupied  reparlng  the  mischief 
done  by  the  rain,  and  in  pushing  tlie  gallery  under 
San  Roman,  where  the  French  were  now  distinctly 
heard  talking  in  the  church,  wheretbre  the  mine 
there  was  formed  and  loaded  with  nine  hundred 
pounds  of  powder. 

Un  the  17th,  the  battery  of  the  horn-work  being 
renewed,  the  fire  of  the  eighteen-pounders  cleared 
away  the  enemy's  temporary  defences  at  the  breach, 
the  howitzers  damaged  the  rampart  en  each  side, 
and  a  small  mine  was  sprung  on  the  extreme  right 
of  the  lower  parallel,  with  a  view  to  take  possession 
of  a  cavalier  or  mound  which  the  P>ench  had  raised 
there,  and  from  which  they  had  killed  many  men  in 
the  trenches  ;  it  was  successful,  and  a  lodgement 
was  effected,  but  the  enemy  soon  returned  in  force 
and  obliged  the  besiegers  to  abandon  it  again. 
However,  on  the  18th,  the  new  breach  was  render- 
ed practicable,  and  Vv'ellington  ordered  it  to  be 
stormed.  The  explosion  of  the  mine  under  San  Ro- 
man was  to  be  the  signal ;  that  church  was  also  to 
be  assaulted;  and  at  the  same  time  a  third  detach- 
ment was  to  escalade  the  works  in  front  of  the  an- 
cient breach,  and  thus  connect  the  attacks. 

FIFTH    ASSAULT. 

At  half-past  four  o'clock,  the  springing  of  the 
mine  at  San  Roman  broke  down  a  terrace  in  front 
of  that  building,  yet  with  little  injury  to  the  church 
itself;  the  latter  was,  however,  resolutely  attacked 
by  colonel  Browne,  at  the  head  of  some  Spanish  and 
Portuguese  troops,  and  though  the  enemy  sprung  a 
countermine,  which  brought  the  building  down,  the 
assailants  lodged  themselves  in  the  ruins.  Mean- 
while two  hund'-ed  of  the  foot-guards,  witli  strong 
supports,  poured  throug'h  the  old  breach  in  the  first 
line  and  escaladed  the  second  line,  beyond  which,  in 
the  open  ground  between  the  second  and  third  lines 
they  were  encountered  by  the  French,  and  a  sharp 
musketry  fight  commenced.  At  the  same  time  a 
like  number  of  the  German  legion,  under  major 
Wurmb,  similarly  supported,  stormed  the  new 
breach  on  the  left  of  the  guards  so  vigorously  that  it 
was  carried  in  a  moment,  and  some  men,  mounting 
the  hill  above,  actually  gained  the  third  line.  Un- 
happily, at  neither  oftliese  assaults  did  the  supports 
follow  closely,  and  the  Germans  being  cramped  on 
their  left  by  the  enemy's  stockade,  extended  by  their 
right  towards  the  guards,  and  at  that  critical  mo- 
ment, Dubreton,  who  held  his  reserves  well  in  hand, 
came  dashing  like  a  torrent  from  the  upper  ground, 
and  in  an  instant  cleared  the  breaches.  Wurmb 
and  many  other  brave  men  fell,  and  then  the  French, 
gathering  round  th.e  guards,  who  were  still  unsup- 
ported, forced  them  beyond  the  outer  line.  More 
than  two  hundred  men  and  ofticers  were  killed  or 
wounded  in  tliis  combat,  and  tlie  next  night  the  en- 
emy recovered  San  Roman  by  a  sally. 

The  siege  was  thus  virtually  terminated,  for 
though  the  French  were  beaten  out  of  St.  Roman 
again,  and  a  gallery  was  opened  from  that  church 
against  the  second  line  ;  and  though  two  twenty- 
four  pounders,  sent  from  Santandcr  by  sir  Home 
Popham,  had  passed  Reynosa  on  their  way  to  Bur- 
gos, these  were  mere  demonstrations.  It  is  now 
time  to  narrate  the  difiereut  contemporary  events 


526 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Boos  XIX 


vrhich  oblig'ed  the  Enoflish  general,  with  a  victori- 
ous army,  to  abandon  tlie  siege  of  a  tliird-rate  fort- 
ress, strong  in  nothing  but  tiie  skill  and  bravery  of 
the  governor  and  his  gallant  soldiers. 


CHAPTER  lY 

State  of  the  war  in  various  parts  of  Spain — Jceph's  distress  for 
nioMe\ — Ma^sfna  ileclwn's  the  Conimaii'l  of  tlie  army  I't  Por- 
tu>ral — ("attaielli  joins  that  arnn  — Reinforcements  come  from 
Franctr — Mi-i:hit(  orcasioned  hy  llie  English  nrwspa|)«  r- — 
Soiiliam  take-  the  commaiK": — Operations  of  llie  pai;iila> — 
Hill  reaches  Toledo — Snuhani  ailvances  to  relieve  the  caslle 
of  Butijos — Skirmish  at  Monasterio — Wtllington  taktsa  po- 
sition of  battle  in  Iront  of  Burgos — Second  skiimisli — Wtl- 
Ijngton  weak  in  aitiilerv — ]\egii(;ence  of  the  British  srovern- 
nient  on  lliat  head — The  rel.it've  situation  of  the  btlliierenls 
— Wellington  otiered  the  chief  command  of  the  Spanish  ar- 
mies—  His  reasons  for  accepting  it — Contumacious  conduit 
of  Balle>teios — He  is  arrested  and  sent  to  Ct-uta— Suchet 
and  Jourdan  refuse  the  command  of  the  army  ol  the  south — 
Soult  reduces  Chinchilla — The  king  communicates  with  Sou- 
ham — Hill  communicates  with  \\Vllington — Relreat  from 
Burgos — Combat  of  Veiite  de  Pozo — Drunkenness  atTorque- 
niada — Com'Dat  on  the  Carioii — VVtHin^ton  n  tires  heliiiid 
the  Pisiierga — Disorders  in  the  rear  of  the  army — Souh^ni 
skirmishes  at  the  brit'ge  of  C^begoii — Wellington  orders 
Hill  to  retreat  Iron)  the  Tfigus  to  llie  Ad  ija — Souhani  fail- 
to  force  the  bridges  of  Valladoliil  and  Simaiica* — The  French 
captain  Guin^iret  swims  the  Duero  and  surprises  the  biidge 
of  Tordesillas — Wdlington  retires  behind  the  Duero — 
Makes  a  rapid  movement  to  gain  a  position  in  front  of  the 
bridge  of  Tordesilla?,  and  destroys  the  liridges  of  Toro  and 
Zaniora,  which  arrests  the  march  of  the  French. 

When  king  Joseph  retreated  to  Valencia  he  earn- 
estly demanded  a  reinforcement  of  forty  thousand 
men  from  France,  and,  more  earnestly,  money. 
Three  milliono  of  francs  he  obtained  from  Suchet, 
yet  his  distress  was  greater  even  than  that  of  the 
allies,  and  Wellington  at  one  time  supposed  that 
this  alone  would  driv^  the  French  from  the  Penin- 
sula. The  Anglo-Portuguese  soldiers  had  not  re- 
ceived pay  for  six  months,  but  the  French  armies  of 
the  south,  of  the  centre,  and  of  Portugal,  were  a 
whole  year  behind-hand  ;  and  the  salaries  of  the  min- 
isters and  civil  servants  of  the  court  were  tv.'o  years 
in  arrears.  Huchet's  army,  the  only  one  which  de- 
pended entirely  on  the  country,  was,  by  tiiat  mar- 
shal's excellent  management,  regularly  paid,  and  the 
eifect  on  its  discipline  v/as  conformable  ;  his  troops 
refrained  from  plunder  themselves,  and  repressed 
some  excesses  of  Joseph's  and  8oult"s  soldiers  so  vig- 
orously as  to  come  to  blows  in  defence  of  the  inhab- 
itants. And  thus  it  will  ever  be,  since  paid  soldiers 
only  may  be  kept  under  discipline.  Soldiers  with- 
out mon-jy  must  become  robbers.  Napoleon  knew 
the  king's  necessity  to  be  extreme,  but  the  war  with 
Russia  liad  so  absorbed  the  resources  of  France  that 
little  money,  and  only  twenty  thousand  men,  princi- 
pally conscripts,  couhl  be  sent  to  Spain. 

The  artny  of  Portugal,  at  the  moment  when  the 
siege  of  tiie  castle  commenced,  had  been  quartered 
between  Vittoria  and  Burgos  ;  that  is  to  say,  at  Pan- 
corbo  and  along  the  Fibro  as  far  as  Logrona,  an  ad- 
vanced guard  only  remaining  at  Br;viesca;  on  this 
line  they  were  recruited  and  reorganized,  and  Mas- 
sena  was  appointed  with  full  powers  to  command  in 
the  northern  provinces.  A  fine  opportunity  to  re- 
venge his  own  retreat  fi'om  Torres  Vcdras  was  thus 
furnished  to  the  old  warrior ;  but  whether  he  doubt- 
ed the  issue  of  atfairs,  or  was  really  tamed  by  age, 
he  pleaded  illness,  and  sent  general  Souham  to  the 
army  of  Portugal.  Then  arose  contentions,  for  .^lar- 
mont  had  designated  Olauzel  as  the  fittest  to  lead, 
Massena  insisted  that  Souliam  was  the  abler  gener- 
al, and  t'n  king  desired  to  appoint  Drouet.  Clau- 
Bcl's  abilities     sre  certainly  not  inferior  to  those  of 


any  French  general,  and  to  more  perfect  acquaint- 
ance witli  the  theatre  of  war,  he  added  a  better 
knowledge  of  the  enemy  he  had  to  contend  witii  ;  he 
was  also  more  known  to  his  own  soldiers,  and  had 
gained  their  confidence  by  his  recent  operations,  ro 
mean  considerations  in  such  a  matter.  However, 
Souiiam  was  appointed.  J 

Catfarelli  anxious  to  succour  the  castle  of  Bugop^  ^ 
which  belonged  to  his  command,  had  united  at  A  it- 
toria  a  thousand  cavalry,  sixteen  guns,  and  eight 
thousand  infantry,  of  which  three  thousand  were  of 
the  young  guard.  The  army  of  Portugal,  reinforced 
from  France  with  twelve  thousand  men,  iiad  thirty- 
five  thousand  present  under  arms,  reorganized  in  six 
divisions,  and,  by  Clauzel's  care,  its  former  excellent 
discipline  had  been  restored.  Thus  forty-four  thou- 
sand good  troops  were,  in  the  beginning  of  October, 
ready  to  succour  the  castle  of  Burgos  ;  but  the  gen- 
erals, although  anxious  to  effect  that  object,  awaited 
first  the  arrival  of  Souham,  and  then  news  from  the 
king,  with  whose  operations  it  was  essential  to  com- 
bine their  own.  They  had  no  direct  tidings  from 
him,  because  the  lines  of  correspondence  were  so 
circuitous,  and  so  beset  by  the  partidas,  that  the 
most  speedy  as  well  as  certain  mode  of  communica- 
tion, was  through  the  minister  of  war  at  Paris  ;  ar.d 
that  functionary  found  the  information,  best  suited 
to  his  purpose,  in  the  English  newspapers.  For  the 
latter,  while  deceiving  the  British  public  by  ac- 
counts of  battles  which  were  never  fought,  victories 
wliich  were  never  gained,  enthusiasm  and  vigcur 
which  never  existed,  did,  with  most  accurate  assi- 
duity, enlighten  the  enemy  upon  the  numbers,  situa- 
tion, movements,  and  reinforcements  of  the  allies. 

Souham  arrived  the  3rd  of  October  with  the  last 
of  the  reinforcements  from  France,  but  he  imagined 
that  lord  Wellington  had  sixty  thousai.d  troops 
around  Burgos,  exclusive  of  the  partidas,  and  that 
three  divisions  were  marching  from  Madrid  to  his 
aid;  whereas  none  were  coming  from  that  capital, 
and  little  more  than  thirty  thousand  were  present 
under  arms  round  Burgos,  eleven  thousand  being 
Gallicians,  scarcely  so  good  as  the  partidas.  Wel- 
lington's real  strength  was  in  his  Anglo-Portuguese, 
then  not  twenty  thousand,  for  besides  those  killed  or 
wounded  at  the  siege,  the  sick  had  gone  to  the  rear 
faster  than  the  recovered  men  came  up.  Some  un- 
attached regiments  an  descorts  were,  indeed,  about 
Segovia,  and  other  points  north  of  the  C-uadarama, 
and  a  reinforcement  of  five  thousand  men  had  been 
sent  from  England  in  September ;  hut  the  former 
belonged  to  Hill's  army,  and  of  the  latter,  the  life- 
guards and  blues  had  gone  to  Lisbon.  Hence  a  reg- 
iment of  foot  guards,  and  some  detachments  for  the 
line,  in  all  about  three  thousand,  were  tlie  only 
available  force  in  the  rear. 

During  the  first  part  of  the  siege,  the  English  gen- 
eral seeing  the  French  scattered  along  the  Ebro,ond 
only  reinforced  by  conscripts,  did  not  fear  any  inter- 
ruption, and  the  less  so,  that  sir  Home  Poj)hrm  waa 
again  menacing  the  coast  lino.  Even  now,  when  tl  • 
French  were  beginning  to  concentrate  their  troops, 
he  cared  little  for  them,  and  was  resolved  to  give 
battle  ;  for  he  thought  that  Pojiham  and  the  guerillas 
would  keep  CafTarelli  employed,  and  he  felt  himself 
a  match  for  the  army  of  Portugal.  Nor  were  the 
partidas  inactive  on  any  point,  and  their  successes, 
thoagli  small  in  themselves,  were  exceedingly  har- 
assing to  the  enemy. 

Mina  having  obtained  two  or  three  thousand  stand 

of  English  aruis  had  re-entered  Aragon  and  domi 

neered  on  th^  left  bank  of  the  Ebro,  while  Duran, 

I  with    four  thousand  men,  operated  uncontrolled  on 

the  riglit  bank.    The  Empecinado,  Villa  Campa,  and 


1812.  ] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


527 


Bassecour  descended  from  Cuenca,  the  first  against 
Kequeaa,  the  others  ag-ainst  Albacete.  'i'he  1'  rayle 
in'odrruutad  the  coiunmaiL^ations  between  \  alcncia 
and  'i'ortoza.  Saornil,  Cueata,  Firmin,  and  others, 
were  in  La  3Iancha  and  Estreniadura,  Juan  Pakirea, 
called  Jie  Medico,  was  near  rfegovia,  and  though 
Marquinez  had  been  murdered  by  one  of  liis  own 
men,  liis  partida  and  that  of  Julian  Sanchez  acted 
as  regular  troops  with  Wellington's  army.  Mean- 
while sir  Home  Popham,  in  conjunction  with  I\lendi- 
zabel,  Poriier,  and  Renovales,  who  had  gathered  all 
the  minor  partidas  under  their  banners,  assailed 
Gueteria,  but  unsucoessfully  .  for  on  the  ol  th  of 
September,  the  Spanish  chiefs  were  driven  away, 
and  Popham  lost  some  guns  whicii  had  been  landed. 
About  tiie  same  time  the  Empecinado  being  defeat- 
ed at  Requeha,  retired  to  Cuenca,  yet  he  failed  not 
from  thence  to  infest  the  Frencii  quarters. 

Duran,  when  Soria  was  abandoned,  fell  upon  Cal- 
atayuci,  but  was  defeated  by  Severol'i,  wlio  withdrew 
the  garrison.  Then  the  Spanish  ciiief  attacked  the 
castle  of  Almunia,  which  was  only  one  march  from 
Zaragoza,  and  when  Severoli  succoured  this  place 
also,  and  dis)nantled  the  castle,  Duran  attacked  Bor- 
ja,  between  Tudela  and  Zaragoza,  and  took  it  before 
Severoli  could  come  up.  Tims  Zaragoza  was  grad- 
ually deprived  of  its  out-posts,  on  the  right  of  the 
Ebro;  on  the  left,  Mina  hovered  close  to  the  gates, 
and  his  lieutenant,  Chaplangara,  meeting  near  Ay- 
erbe,  with  three  hundred  Italians,  killed  forty,  and 
would  have  destroyed  the  whole  but  for  the  timely 
succour  of  some  mounted  gens-d'armes.  At  last  Re- 
ille  being  undeceived  as  to  Wellington's  march,  re- 
stored the  smaller  posts  which  he  had  abandoned,  and 
Suchet  ordered  the  castle  of  Almunia  to  be  relitted, 
but  during  these  events,  Bassccour  and  Villa  Campa 
united  to  infest  Joseph's  quarters  about  Albacete. 

Soult's  march  from  Andalusia  and  his  junction 
with  the  king,  has  been  described  ;  but  while  he  was 
yet  at  (ircnada,  Hill,  leaving  three  Portuguese  reg- 
iments of  infantry  and  one  of  cavalry  at  Almendra- 
lejo  and  Truxillo,  to  protect  his  line  of  supply,  had 
niarclied  to  cross  the  Tagus  at  Almaraz,  and  Arzo- 
bispo.  He  entered  Toledo  tlie  i'-'th  of  September, 
and  tne  same  day  Elio  took  a  small  French  garrison 
left  in  Consuegra.  Hill  soon  after  occupied  a  line 
from  Toledo  to  Aranjuez,  where  he  was  joined  by  the 
fourth  division,  Victor  Alten's  cavalry,  and  the  de- 
tachments quartered  about  Ildefonso  and  Segovia. 
On  the  8th,  hearing  of  Soult's  arrival  at  Hellm,  he 
pushed  his  cavaliy  to  Belmonte  on  the  San  Clemente 
road,  and  here  in  La  Mancha  as  in  Old  Castile,  the 
stories  of  French  devastation  were  belied  by  the 
abundance  of  provisions. 

Bassacour,  Villa  Campa,  and  the  Empecinado,  now 
united  on  the  road  leading  from  Cuenca  to  Valen- 
cia, while  the  Medico  and  other  chiefs  gathered  in 
the  Toledo  mountains.  In  this  manner  the  allies  ex- 
tiuded  from  Toledo  on  the  right,  by  Belmonte,  Cu- 
enca, and  Calatiyud  to  near  Jacca  on  tlie  left,  and 
were  in  military  communication  with  the  coast ;  for 
Carfarelli's  disposable  force  was  now  concentrated  to 
relieve  Burgos,  and  Mina  had  free  intercourse  with 
Mendizabel  and  Renovales,  and  withPopham's  fleet. 
But  the  French  line  of  correspondence  between  the 
armies  in  the  eastern  and  northerri  provinces,  was 
BO  interrupted  tliat  tlie  English  newspapers  became 
tlieir  surest,  quickest,  and  most  accurate  channels  of 
intelligence. 

Souiiam,  who  over-rated  the  force  of  his  adversary, 
and  fiared  a  dijfeat  as  being  himself  the  only  barrier 
left  between  Wellington  and  I'rance,  was  at  first  so 
far  from  meditating  an  advance,  that  he  expected  and 
dreaded  an  attack  from  the  allies  ;  and  as  the  want 


of  provisions  would  not  let  him  concentrate  his  army 
permanently  near  Monasterio,  his  dispcs.tions  were 
made  to  figiit  on  the  Ebro.  The  minister  of  war  had 
even  desired  him  to  detach  a  division  against  the 
partidas.  But  when  by  the  English  nev.spapers,  and 
other  information  sent  from  Paris,  he  learned  that 
Soult  was  in  march  from  (Grenada, — that  the  king 
intended  to  move  upon  iMadrid, — that  no  English 
troops  had  left  that  capital  to  join  Wellington, — 
that  the  army  of  the  latter  was  not  very  numerous, 
and  that  the  castle  of  Burgos  was  sorely  pressed,  he 
called  up  Cafi'arelli's  troops  from  Vittoria,  concen- 
trated his  own  at  Briviesca,  and  resolved  to  raise 
the  siege. 

On  the  13th,  a  skirmish  took  place  on  the  stream 
beyond  Monasterio,  where  captain  Perse  of  the  six- 
teenth dragoons  was  twice  forced  from  the  bridge  and 
twice  recovered  it  in  the  most  gallant  manner,  main- 
taining his  post  until  colonel  F.  Ponsonby,  who  com- 
manded the  reserves,  arrived.  Ponsonby  and  Perse 
were  both  wounded,  and  this  demonstration  was  fol- 
lowed by  various  others  until  the  evening  cf  the  l£th, 
when  the  whole  French  army  was  united,  and  the  ad- 
vanced guard  captured  a  picquet  of  the  Brunswick- 
ers  which,  contrary  to  orders,  had  remained  in  St. 
Olalla.  This  sudden  movement  apparently  prevent- 
ed Wellington  from  occupying  the  position  of  Mon- 
asterio, his  out-posts  fell  back,  on  the  19th,  to  Quin- 
tanapala  and  Olmos,  and  on  the  ridges  behind  those 
places  he  drew  up  his  army  in  order  of  battle.  The 
right  was  at  Ibeas  on  the  Arlanzan  ;  the  centre  at 
Riobena  and  Majarradas  on  the  main  road  behind 
Olmos  ;  the  left  was  thrown  back  near  Soto  Pallacio, 
and  rested  on  a  small  river. 

The  2Cth,  Maucune,  with  two  divisions  of  infant- 
ry and  one  of  cavalry,  drove  the  allies  Ircni  Ciuintan- 
apala,  but  Olmos  was  successiully  delended  by  the 
Chasseurs  Brittaniques,  and  Maucune,  having  no 
supports,  was  immediately  outflanked  en  the  right 
and  forced  back  to  Monasterio,  by  two  divisions  un- 
der sir  Edward  Paget.  There  were  new  in  jiosition, 
including  Pack's  Portuguese,  which  blockaded  the 
castle,  about  thirty-three  thousand  men  under  arms, 
namely,  twenty-one  thousand  Anglo-Portuguese  in- 
fantry and  cavalry,  eleven  thousand  Cail;cians,  and 
the  liorsemen  of  Slarquinez  and  Juliari  Sanchez. 
Thus,  there  were  four  thousand  troopers,  but  only 
two  thousand  six  hundred  of  these  were  I'jritish  and 
German,  and  the  Spanish  horsemen,  regular  or  irreg- 
ular, could  scarcely  be  counted  in  the  line  of  battle. 
The  number  of  guns  and  howitzers  was  only  fcrty- 
two,  including  twelve  Spanish  pieces,  extremely  ill 
equipped  and  scant  of  ammunition. 

Lord  Wellington  had  long  felt  the  want  of  artil- 
lery, and  had  sent  a  m.emoir  upon  the  subject  to  the 
British  government,  in  the  beginning  cf  the  year, 
yet  his  ordnance  establishment  had  not  been  aug- 
mented, hence  his  difliculties  during  the  s'ege  ;  and 
in  the  field,  instead  of  ninety  British  and  Portuguese 
cannon,  which  was  the  just  complement  for  his  ar- 
my, he  had  now  only  fifty  serviceable  pieces,  of 
which  twenty-four  were  with  general  Hill;  and  al'. 
were  British,  for  the  Portusjucse  artillery  had,  from 
the  abuses  and  the  poverty  of  their  government,  en- 
tirely melted  away.  Now  the  French  had,  as  I  have 
before  stated,  forty-four  thousand  men,of  whicli  near- 
ly five  thousand  were  cavalry,  and  they  had  more  tlinn 
sixty  guns,  a  matter  of  no  small  importance  ;  for  be- 
sides the  actual  power  of  artillery  in  an  action,  sol- 
diers are  excited  when  the  noise  is  greatest  on  their 
side.  Vy'ellington  stood,  therefore,  at  disadvantage 
in  numbers,  composition,  and  real  strength.  In  hia 
rear  was  the  castle,  and  the  river  Arlanr.an,  the  fords 
and  bridges  of  which  were  commanded  by  the  gun« 


528 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


[Book  XIX. 


of  the  fortress  ;  his  generals  of  division,  Paget  ex- 
cepted, were  not  of  any  marked  ability,  his  troops 
v/ere  somewhat  desponding,  and  deteriorated  in  dis- 
cipline. His  Situation  was  therefore  dangerous,  and 
critical ;  a  victory  could  scarcely  be  expected,  and  a 
defeat  would  have  been  destructive  ;  he  should  not 
have  provolicd  a  battle,  nor  would  he  have  done  so, 
had  he  known  tliat  Caffarelli's  troops  were  united  to 
Souham"s. 

On  tiie  other  hand,  Souham  should  by  all  means 
have  forced  on  an  action,  because  his  ground  was 
etroiig,  his  retreat  open,  his  army  powerful  and  com- 
pact, his  soldiers  full  of  confidence,  his  lieutenants, 
Clauzel,  Maucune,  and  Foy,  men  of  distinguished 
talents,  able  to  second,  and  able  to  succeed  him  in 
the  cl'ief  command.  The  chances  of  victory  and  tlie 
profit  to  be  derived  were  great,  the  chances  of  defeat, 
and  the  dangers  to  be  incurred  comparatively  small. 
And  it  was  thus  indeed  that  he  judged  the  matter 
himself,  for  3Iaucune's  advance  wasTntended  to  be 
tlie  prelude  to  a  great  battle,  and  the  English  gen- 
eral, as  we  have  seen,  was  willing  to  stand  the  trial. 
Bat  generals  are  not  absolute  masters  of  events, 
and  as  the  extraneous  influence  which  restrained 
both  sides,  on  this  occasion,  came  from  afar,  it  was 
fitting  to  show  how,  in  war,  movements,  distant,  and 
apparently  unconnected  with  those  immediately  un- 
der a  general's  eye,  will  break  his  measures,  and 
make  him  appear  undecided  or  foolish,  when  in  truth 
he  is  both  wise  and  firm. 

While  Wellington  was  still  engaged  with  the 
siege,  the  cortes  made  him  commander  of  all  the 
Spanish  armies.  He  had  before  refused  this  respon- 
sible situation,  but  the  circumstances  were  now 
changed,  t<:)r  tlie  Spaniards,  having  lost  nearly  all 
their  cavalry  and  guns  in  the  course  of  the  war, 
could  not  safely  act,  except  in  connexion  with  the 
Anglo-Portuguese  forces,  and  it  was  absolutely  ne- 
cessary that  one  head  should  direct.  The  English 
general  therefore  demanded  leave  of  his  own  govern- 
ment to  accept  the  offer,  although  he  observed,  that 
ttie  Spanish  troops  were  not  at  all  improved  in  their 
discipline,  their  equipments,  or  their  military  spirit ; 
but  he  thought  that  conjoined  with  the  British  they 
might  behave  well,  and  so  escape  any  more  of  those 
terrible  disasters  which  liad  heretofore  overwhelmed 
the  country  and  nearly  bro'jght  the  war  to  a  conclu- 
sion. He  was  willing  to  save  the  dignity  of  the 
Spanish  government,  by  leaving  it  a  certain  body  of 
men  wherewitii  to  operate  after  its  own  ph'ns  ;  but 
that  he  might  exercise  his  own  power  efficiently, 
and  to  the  profit  of  the  troops  under  himself,  he  de- 
sired that  the  English  government  would  vigorously 
insist  upon  the  strict  application  of  the  subsidy  to 
the  payment  of  the  Spanish  soldiers  acting  with  the 
British  army*  otherwise  the  care  of  the  Spanish 
troops,  he  said,  would  only  cramp  his  own  opera- 
tions. 

In  his  reply  to  the  cortes,  his  acceptance  of  the 
offer  was  rendered  dependent  upon  the  assent  of  his 
own  government;  and  he  was  careful  to  jruard  him- 
self from  a  danger,  not  unlikely  to  arise,  namely, 
that  the  cortes,  when  he  should  finally  accept  the 
offer,  would  in  virtue  of  that  acceptance  assume  the 
right  of  directing  the  whole  operations  of  the  war. 
Tfie  intermediate  want  of  power  to  move  the  Span- 
iVn  armies,  he  judged  of  little  consequence,  because 
hitherto  his  suggestions  having  been  cheerfully  at- 
tended to  by  the  Spanish  chiefs,  he  had  no  reason  to 
expect  any  change  in  that  particular,  but  there  he 
was  grievously  mistaken. 

Previous  to  this  offer  the  Spanish  government 
had,  at  liis  desire,  directed  Ballesteros  to  cross  the 
Morena,  and  place  himself  at  Alcaraz  and  in  support 


of  the  Chinchilla  fort,  where  jjined  by  Cruz  Mur- 
geon,  by  Elio,  and  by  the  partidas,  1  e  would  have 
liad  a  corps  of  thirty  thousand  men,  would  have  been 
supported  by  Hills  army,  and,  having  the  moun- 
tains behind  him  for  a  retreat,  could  have  safely 
menaced  the  enemy's  flank,  and  delayed  the  march 
against  Madrid,  or  at  least  have  obliged  the  king  to 
leave  a  strong  corps  of  observation  to  watch  liini. 
But  Ballesteros,  swelling  with  arrogant  lolly,  never 
moved  from  Grenada,  and  when  he  found  ii:at  W  el- 
lington  was  created  generalissimo,  he  published  a 
manifesto  appealing  to  the  Spanish  prit'e  against 
the  degradation  of  serving  under  a  foreigner;  he 
thus  sacrificed  to  his  own  spleen  the  welfare  of  his 
country,  and  with  a  result  he  little  expected  ;  fi^r 
while  he  judged  jrimselfa  man  to  sway  the  destinies 
of  Spain,  he  suddenly  found  himself  a  criminal  and 
nothing  more.  The  cortes  caused  him  to  be  arrest- 
ed in  the  midst  of  his  soldiers,  who,  indifiercnt  to 
his  fate,  suffered  him  to  be  sent  a  prisoner  to  Ceuta. 
The  count  of  Abisbal  was  then  declared  captain 
general  of  Andalusia,  and  the  duke  rcl  Parque  was 
appointed  to  command  Ballesteros*  etn!y,  which  ge- 
neral Yerues  immediately  led  by  ,^ren  towards  La 
Mancha,  but  Soult  was  t!-en  on  the  Tormes. 

That  marshal  united  v>  .tii  ti  e  king  on  the  2d  of 
October.  His  troops  required  rest,  his  r.nmerouB 
sick  were  to  be  sent  to  the  Valencian  hospitals,  and 
his  first  interview  with  Joseph  was  of  a  wrrm  na- 
ture, for  each  had  his  griefs  and  paesions  to  declare 
Finally  the  mona,rch  yielded  to  the  superior  mental 
power  of  his  opponent  and  resolved  to  profit  frcni  his 
great  military  capacity,  yet  reluctantly  and  more 
from  prudence  than  liking;  for  the  duke  of  Feltre, 
minister  of  war  at  Paris,  although  secretly  eh  cne 
mv  of  Scult,  and  either  believing,  or  pretending  to 
believe  in  the  foolish  cliarges  of  disorderly  ambiticn 
made  against  that  commander,  opposed  any  decided 
exercise  of  the  king's  authority  until  the  emperor's 
will  was  known:  yet  this  would  not  have  restrained 
the  king  if  the  marshals  .Tourdan  and  Sucliet  had  net 
each  declined  accepting  the  duke  of  Dalmatia's  com 
mand  when  Joseph  ofiered  it  to  them. 

Souk's  first  operation  was  to  reduce  Chinchilla,  & 
well-constructed  fort,  which,  being  in  the  midtt  of 
his  quarters,  commanded  the  great  roads  so  as  to 
oblige  his  army  to  move  under  its  fire  or  avoid  it  by 
circuitous  routes.  A  vigorous  defence  v/as  expect- 
ed, but  on  the  6th  it  fell,  after  a  few  hours"  attack  ; 
for  a  thunder-storm  suddenly  arising  in  a  clear  sky 
had  discharged  itself  upon  the  fort,  and  killed  the 
governor  and  many  other  persons,  whereupon  the 
garrison,  influenced,  it  is  said,  by  a  superstitious 
fear,  surrendered.  This  was  the  first  bitter  fruit  of 
Ballesteros'  disobedience,  'or  neither  cculd  Soult 
have. taken  Chinchilla,  nor  scattered  iiis  troops,  as 
he  did,  at  Albacete,  Almanza,  Yecla,  and  Hellin,  if 
thirtv  thousand  Spnn'ards  had  been  posted  between 
Alcaraz  and  Chinchilla,  and  supported  by  thirty 
thousand  Angio-Portuguese  at  Toledo  nnc'er  Hill. 
These  extended  quarters  were  however  essential  for 
the  feeding  of  the  French  general's  numbers,  and 
now,  covered  by  the  fort  of  Chinchilla,  his  troops 
were  well  lodged,  his  great  conveys  of  sick  ai:d 
maimed  men,  his  Spanisli  families,  and  other  imi>e.- 
diments,  safely  a^d  leisurely  sent  to  Valencia,  while 
his  cavalry,  scouring  the  country  of  La  Mancha  in 
advance,  obliged  Bassecour  and  Villa  Campa  to  fall 
back  upon  Cuenca. 

The  detail  of  the  operations  which  followed,  be- 
longs to  another  i)lace.  It  will  suffice  to  say  here, 
that  the  king,  being  at  the  head  of  more  tlian  seventy 
thousand  men,  was  enabled  without  risking  Valencia 
to  advance  towards  the  Tagus,  having  previously 


18]  2.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


5:i9 


eent  Souham  a  specific  order  to  combine  his  move- 
ments in  co-operation,  but  strictly  to  avoid  finrhtingr. 
General  Hill  also  finding  himself  threatened  by  such 
powerful  forces,  and  reduced  by  Ballesteros'  defec- 
tion to  a  simple  defence  of  the  Tagus,  at  a  moment 
when  that  river  was  becoming  fordable  in  all  places, 
gave  notice  of  his  situation  to  lord  Wellington. 
Joseph's  letter  was  dispatched  on  the  1st,  and  six 
others  followed  in  succession  day  by  day,  yet  the 
last  carried  by  colonel  Lucotte,  an  officer  of  tiie  roy- 
al staff',  first  reached  Souham  ;  the  advantages  de- 
rived from  the  allies'  central  position,  and  from  the 
partidas,  were  here  made  manifest ;  for  Hill's  letter, 
though  only  dispatched  the  Hth,  reached  Welling- 
ton at  the  same  moment  that  Joseph's  reached  Sou- 
ham. The  latter  general  was  thus  forced  to  relin- 
quish his  design  of  fighting  on  the  2(Jth  ;  neverthe- 
less having  but  four  days'  provisions  left,  he  design- 
ed, wiien  those  should  be  consumed,  to  attack,  not- 
v.'ithstanding  tlie  king's  prohibition,  if  Wellington 
should  still  confront  him.  But  the  English  general 
considering  that  his  own  army,  already  in  a  very 
critical  situation,  would  be  quite  isolated  if  the  king 
ehouM,  as  was  most  probable,  force  the  allies  from 
the  Tagus,  now  resolved,  though  with  a  bitter  pang, 
to  raise  t:ie  siege  and  retreat  so  far  as  would  enable 
bim  to  secure  his  junction  with  Hill. 

Wiiile  tiie  armies  were  in  presence  some  fighting 
had  taken  place  at  Burgos,  Dubreton  had  again  ob- 
tained i)ossession  of  the  ruins  of  the  church  of  San  Ro- 
man and  was  driven  away  next  morning  ;  and  now  in 
pursuance  of  Wellington's  determination  to  retreat, 
mines  of  destruction  were  formed  in  the  horn-work 
by  the  besiegers,  and  the  guns  and  stores  were  re- 
moved from  the  batteries  to  the  pare  at  Villa  Toro. 
But  the  greatest  part  of  the  draught  animals  had 
been  sent  to  Reynosa,  to  meet  the  powder  and  artil- 
lery coming  from  Santander,  and  hence,  the  eigh- 
tecn-pounders  could  not  be  carried  off,  nor,  from 
some  error,  were  the  mines  of  destruction  exploded. 
The  rest  of  the  stores  and  the  howitzers  were  put 
in  march  by  the  road  of  Villaton  and  Frandovinez 
fiir  Celada  del  Camino.  Thus  the  siege  Avas  raised, 
after  five  assaults,  several  sallies  and  thirty-three 
days  of  investment,  during  which  the  besiegers  lost 
more  than  two  thousand  men  and  the  besieged  six 
hundred  in  killed  or  wounded;  the  latter  had  also 
Butfered  severely,  from  continual  labour,  want  of 
water,  and  bad  weather,  for  the  fortress  was  too 
small  to  afford  shelter  for  the  garrison,  and  the  great- 
er part  bivouacked  between  the  lines  of  defence. 

RETREAT    FROM    BURGOS. 

This  operation  was  commenced  on  the  night  of 
the  21fit,  by  a  measure  of  great  nicety  and  boldness, 
for  the  road,  divaricating  at  Gamonal,  led  by  Villa- 
toro  to  the  bridge  of  Villaton  on  the  one  hand,  and 
the  bridge  of  Burgos  on  the  other,  and  Wellington 
chose  the  latter,  which  was  the  shortest,  though  it 
passed  the  Arlanzan  river  close  under  the  guns  of 
the  castle.  The  army  quitted  tiie  position  afler 
dark  without  being  observed,  and  having  the  artil- 
lery-wheels muffl.^d  with  strav/,  defiled  over  the 
liri'lg3  of  Burgos  with  such  silence  and  celerity,  tliat 
Dubreten,  watchful  and  suspicious  as  he  was,  knew 
riotliing  of  their  marcli  until  the  partidas,  failing  in 
n-irve,  commenced  galloping;  then  he  poured  a  de- 
Blructive  fire  down,  but  soon  lost  the  range.  By 
tliis  d-^lirate  operation  the  infantry  gained  Cellada 
del  (bmino  and  Horm.illas  that  night,  but  the  light 
cavalry  halted  at  Estepar  and  the  bridge  of  Villa 
Ban'el.  Souham,  who  did  not  discovi;r  the  retreat 
until  hte  in  the  even'ng  of  the  22d,  was  therefore 
fain  to  follow,  and  by  t  forced  march,  to  overtake  the 
35 


allies,  whereas,  if  Vrellington,  to  aAiid  the  fire  of 
the  castle,  had  gone  by  Villaton,  and  Frandovinez, 
the  French  niiglit  have  forestalled  him  at  Cellac'a 
del  Camino. 

Tlie  2Md,the  infantry  renewing  their  march,  croF«- 
ed  the  Pisuerga,  at  Cordovillas,  and  Torquemada,  & 
a  little  above  and  below  its  junction  with  the  Ar- 
lanzan ;  but  while  the  main  body  made  this  long 
march,  the  French  having  passed  Burgf  s  in  tie 
night  of  the  22d,  vigorously  attacked  the  allies'  rear- 
guard. This  was  comjioted  of  the  cavalry  and  eoaie 
horse-artillery,  connnanded  by  JSorman  kanisay  and 
major  Downman  ;  of  two  battalions  of  Germans  un- 
der Colin  Halket ;  and  of  the  partidas  of  Marquirez 
and  Sanchez,  the  latter  being  on  the  left  of  the 
Arlanzan,  and  the  whole  under  the  command  of  sir 
Stapleton  Cotton.  The  piquets  of  light  cavalry  wero 
vigorously  driven  from  the  bridge  of  Baniel  as  early 
as  seven  o'clock  in  the  morning;  but  they  rallied 
upon  their  reserves  and  gained  the  Hormaza  strecin, 
which  was  disputed  for  some  time,  and  a  charge 
made  by  captain  Perse  of  the  sixteenth  dragoons, 
was  of  distinguished  bravery.  However,  the  trench 
cavalry  finally  forced  the  passage,  and  the  British 
retiring  behind  Cellada  Camino,  took  post  in  a  large 
plain.  On  their  left  was  a  range  of  hills,  the  Funnnit 
of  which  was  occupied  by  the  partida  of  Marqu^ntz, 
and  on  their  right  was  the  Arlanzan,  beyond  which 
Julian  Sanchez  was  posted.  Across  the  middle  ot 
the  plain  run  a  marshy  rivulet  cutting  the  main 
road,  and  only  passable  by  a  little  bridge  near  u 
house  called  the  Venta  de  Pozo,  and  half  way  be- 
tween this  stream  and  Cellada  there  was  a  broad 
ditch  with  a  second  bridge  in  front  of  a  small  vil- 
lage. Cotton  immediately  retired  over  the  marshy 
stream,  leaving  Anson's  horsemen  and  ITalket's  in- 
fantry as  a  rear-guard  beyond  the  ditch  ;  and  Anson, 
to  cover  his  own  passage  of  that  obstacle,  left  the 
eleventh  dragoons  and  the  guns  at  Cellada  Camino 
which  was  situated  on  a  gentle  eminence. 

COBIBAT    OF    \ENTA    DE    POZO. 

When  the  French  approached  Cellada,  msjor  Mo- 
ney of  the  eleventh,  who  was  in  advance,  gt'llopii  g 
out  from  the  left  of  the  village  at  the  head  cf  two 
squadrons,  overturned  their  leading  horsemen,  and  the 
artillery  plied  them  briskly  with  shot,  but  the  main 
body  advancing  at  a  tret  along  the  road  scon  cut- 
flanked  the  British,  and  obliged  Money's  squadrons 
to  rejoin  the  rest  of  the  regiment  while  the  guns 
went  on  beyond  the  bridge  of  Venta  de  Pozo.  Mean- 
while the  French  general  Curto  with  a  brigade  of 
hussars  ascended  the  hills  on  the  left,  and  being  fol- 
lowed by  Boyer's  dragoons,  put  Marquinez'  partida 
to  flight;  but  a  deep  ravine  run  along  the  foot  of 
these  hills,  next  the  plain,  it  could  only  be  passed 
at  certain  places,  and  towards  the  first  of  these  the 
partidas  galloped,  clcpely  chased  by  the  hussars,  at 
the  moment  when  the  leading  French  fquadrcns  en 
the  plain  were  forming  in  front  of  Cellada  to  attack 
the  eleventh  regiment.  The  latter  charged  and 
drove  the  first  line  upon  the  second,  but  then  both 
lines  coming  forward  together,  the  British  were 
pushed  precipitately  to  the  ditch,  and  got  over  by 
the  bridge  with  some  difficulty,  thcugh  with  little 
loss,  being  covered  by  the  fire  of  Halket's  infantry 
which  was  in  the  little  village  behind  the  bridge. 

The  left  flank  of  this  new  line  was  already  turned 
by  the  hussars  on  the  hills,  wherefore  Arson  fell 
back  covered  by  the  sixteenth  dragoons,  aid  in  good 
order,  with  design  to  cross  the  second  bridge  at 
Venta  de  Pozo ;  during  this  movement  Marquinez* 
imrt'da  came  pouring  down  from  the  hills  in  full 
flight,  closely  pursued  by  the  French  husssare,  who 


530 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR 


[Book  XIX 


mixed  with  the  fugitives,  ami  the  whole  mass  fell 
upon  the  H;ink  of  the  sixteenth  dragoons  ;  and  at  the 
same  nioin3nt,  these  last  were  also  cliarged  by  the 
enemy's  dragoons,  who  had  followed  them  over  the 
ditch  Tiie  commander  of  tlie  partida  was  wound- 
ed, colonel  Polly,  with  another  otTicer,  and  tliirty 
men  of  tlie  sixteenth,  fell  into  the  enemy's  hands, 
and  all  were  driven  in  confusion  upon  the  reserves. 
But  while  the  French  were  reforming  their  scattered 
pquadrons  after  this  charge,  Anson  got  his  people 
over  tlie  bridge  of  Venta  de  Pozo,  and  drew  up  be- 
yond tlia  rivulet,  and  to  the  left  of  the  road,  on  which 
Halket's  battalions  and  tlie  guns  had  already  taken 
post,  and  tiie  heavy  German  cavalry,  an  imposing 
mass,  stood  in  line  on  the  right,  and  farther  in  the 
rear  than  the  artillery. 

Hitherto  the  action  had  been  sustained  by  the 
cavalry  of  the  army  of  Portugal,  but  now  Caffarelli's 
horsemen,  consisting  of  the  lancers  of  Berg,  the  fif- 
teenth dragoons,  and  some  squadrons  of  "  gens  (T- 
armes"  all  fresh  men,  came  down  in  line  to  the  riv- 
ulet, and  finding  it  impassable,  with  a  quick  and 
daring  decision  wheeled  to  their  right,  and  despite 
of  the  heavy  pounding  of  the  artillery,  trotted  over 
the  bridge,  and  again  formed  line  in  opposition  to 
the  Germ'in  dragoons,  having  the  stream  in  their 
rear.  The  position  was  dangerous,  but  they  were 
full  of  mettle,  and  though  the  Germans,  who  had  let 
too  many  come  over,  chai-ged  with  a  rough  shock, 
and  broke  the  right,  the  French  left  had  the  advan- 
tage, and  the  others  rallied  ;  then  a  close  and  furious 
Bword  contest  had  place,  but  the  '^ gens  d'armes''^ 
fought  so  fiercely  that  the  Germans,  maugre  their 
BJze  and  courage,  lost  ground,  and  finally  gave  way 
in  disorder.  The  French  followed  on  the  spur,  with 
ehrill  and  eager  cries,  and  Anson's  brigade,  which 
was  thus  outflanked,  and  threatened  on  both  sides, 
fell  back  also,  but  not  happily,  for  Beyer's  dragoons 
having  continued  their  march  by  the  hills  to  tlie 
village  of  Balbaces,  there  crossed  the  ravine,  and 
came  thundering  in  on  the  left.  Then  the  British 
ranks  were  broken,  the  regiments  got  intermixed, 
and  all  went  to  the  rear  in  confusion;  finally,  hov/- 
ever,  the  Germans,  having  extricated  themselves 
from  their  pursuers,  turned  and  formed  a  fresh  line 
on  the  left  of  the  road,  and  tlie  others  rallied  upon 
them. 

The  ^^ gens  d'armes"  and  lancers,  who  had  suffered 
severely  from  the  artillery,  as  well  as  in  the  sword- 
fight,  now  halted  ;  but  Beyer's  dragoons,  forming  ten 
squadrons,  again  came  to  the  charge,  and  with  the 
more  confidence  that  the  allies'  ranks  appeared  still 
confused  and  wavering.  When  within  a  hundred 
yards,  the  German  officers  rode  gallantly  out  to  fight, 
and  their  men  follovred  a  short  way,  but  the  enemy 
was  too  powerful,  disorder  and  tumult  again  ensued, 
the  swiftness  of  the  English  horses  alone  prevented 
a  terrible  catastrophe,  and  though  some  favourable 
ground  enabled  the  line  to  reform  once  more,  it  was 
only  to  be  again  broken.  However,  Wellington, 
who  was  present,  had  plac(!d  Halket's  infantry  and 
the  guns  in  a  position  to  cover  the  cavalry,  and  they 
remained  tranquil  until  the  enemy,  in  full  pursuit 
after  the  last  charge,  came  galloping  down,  and  lent 
their  lefl  flank  to  the  infantry  ;  then  the  power  of 
this  arm  v/as  made  manifest ;  a  tempest  of  bullets 
emptied  the  French  saddles  by  seores,  and  their 
hitherto  victorious  horsemen,  afler  three  fruitless 
attempts  to  charge,  each  weaker  than  the  other, 
reined  up  and  drew  off  to  the  hills  ;  the  British  cav- 
alry, covered  by  the  infantry,  made  good  tlicir  retreat 
to  0,11  In  tan  a  la  Puente,  near  the  Pisuerga,  and  the 
bivoua':s  of  the  enemy  were  established  at  Villadri- 
go.     The  lose  in  this  combat  was  very  considerable 


on  both  sides;  the  F-ench  suffered  most,  but  ttiey 
took  a  colonel  and  seventy  other  prisoners,  and  they 
had,  before  the  fight,  also  captured  a  small  conimis- 
sariat  store  near  Burgos. 

Wliile  the  rear-guard  was  thus  engaged,  drunken- 
ness and  insubordination,  the  usual  concomitantb  of 
an  English  retreat,  were  exhibited  at  Torquemada, 
where  the  well-stored  wine-vaults  became  the  prey 
of  the  soldiery  :  it  is  said  that  twelve  thousand  men 
were  to  be  seen  at  one  time  in  a  state  of  lielj)lesa 
inebriety.  This  commencement  was  bad,  snd  the 
English  general,  who  had  now  retreated  some  fifty 
miles,  seing  the  enemy  so  hot  and  menacing  in  pur- 
suit, judged  it  fitting  to  check  his  course  ;  for  though 
the  arrangements  were  surprisingly  well  combined, 
the  means  of  transport  were  so  scanty,  and  the 
weather  so  bad,  that  the  convoys  of  sick  and  wounded 
were  still  on  the  wrong  side  of  the  Duero.  Where- 
fore, having  with  a  short  march  crossed  the  Caricn 
river  on  the  24th,  at  its  confluence  with  the  Pisuer- 
ga,  he  turned  and  halted  behind  it. 

Here  he  was  jsined  by  a  regiment  of  the  guards, 
and  by  detachments  coming  from  Corufia,  and  his 
position,  extending  fi-om  Villa  Muriel  to  i>i;enas,  be- 
low the  meeting  of  the  waters,  was  strong.  Tlie 
troops  occupied  a  range  of  hills,  lofty,  yet  descend- 
ing with  an  easy  sweep  to  the  Carion  ;  that  river 
covered  the  front,  and  the  Pisuerga  did  the  same  by 
the  right  wing.  A  detachment  had  been  left  to  de- 
stroy the  bridge  of  Bafios,  on  the  Pisuerga  ;  colonel 
Campbell,  with  a  battalion  of  the  royals,  was  sent  to 
aid  the  Spaniards  in  destroying  the  bridges  at  Pa- 
lencia  ;  and  in  Wellington's  immediate  front,  some 
houses  and  convents  beyond  the  rivers  furnii^hed  good 
posts  to  cover  the  destruction  of  the  bridges  of  Mu 
riel  and  San  Isidro  on  the  Carion,  and  that  of  Due 
nas  on  the  Pisuerga. 

Souham,  excited  by  his  success  on  the  2nd,  fol 
lowed  from  Yilladrigo  early  on  the  24th,  and  having 
cannonaded  the  rear-gurrd  at  Torquemada,  passed 
the  Pisuerga.  He  immediately  directed  Foy's  divi- 
sion upon  Palencia,  and  ordered  3Iaucune,  with  the 
advanced  guard,  to  pursue  the  allies  to  the  bridges 
of  Bafios,  Isidro,  and  Muriel  ;  but  lie  halted  himself 
at  Magoz,  and  if  fame  does  not  lie,  because  t'le  num- 
ber of  French  drunkards  at  Torquemada  were  even 
more  numerous  than  those  of  the  British  army. 

COMBAT    ON    THE    CARION. 

Before  the  enemy  appeared,  the  summits  of  the 
hills  were  crowned  by  the  allies,  all  the  bridges 
were  mined,  and  that  of  San  Isidro  was  strongly 
protected  by  a  convent  which  was  filled  w'th  troops. 
The  left  of  the  position  was  equally  strong,  yet  gen- 
eral Oswald,  who  had  just  arrived  from  England  and 
taken  the  command  of  the  fifth  division  on  the  in- 
stant, overlooked  the  advantages  to  be  derived  from 
the  dry  bed  of  a  canal  with  high  banks,  which,  on 
his  side,  run  parallel  with  the  (Marion,  and  he  had  not 
occupied  the  vilhige  of  Jluriel  in  sufficiej't  strength. 
In  this  state  of  affairs  Foy  reached  Palencia,  where, 
according  to  some  French  writers,  a  trcadieroufc 
attemj)t  was  made,  under  cover  of  a  parley,  to  kill 
him  ;  he,  however,  drove  the  allies  with  some  loss 
from  the  town,  and  in  such  haste  that  all  the  bridg- 
es were  abandoned  in  a  perfect  condition,  and  the 
French  cavalry,  crossing  the  river  and  spreading 
abroad,  gathered  up  both  baggage  and  prisoners. 

This  untoward  event  obliged  Wellington  to  throw 
back  his  left,  composed  of  the  fifth  division  and  the 
Spaniards,  at  Muriel,  thus  offering  two  fronts,  the 
one  facing  Palencia,  the  other  the  (.arion.  (-swald's 
error  then  became  manifest;  for  Maucune  having 
dispersed  the  eiglith  ctt^adores,  who  were  defending 


1812.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


531 


a  ford  between  3Turiel  and  San  Isidro,  fell  with  a 
strong  body  of  infuntry  and  guns  upon  the  allies  at 
Muriel,  and  this  at  the  moment  when  the  mine  liav- 
iiig  baen  exploded,  the  party  covering  the  bridge 
were  passing  the  broken  arch  by  means  of  ladders. 
The  [day  of  the  mine,  which  was  eiiectual,  checked 
tiie  advance  of  the  French  for  an  instant,  but  sud- 
d;Mily  a  horseman,  darting  out  at  full  spei;d  from  the 
column,  rode  down  under  a  fliglit  of  bullets  to  the 
bridge,  calling  out  that  he  was  a  deserter;  he  reach- 
ed the  edge  of  the  chasm  made  by  the  explosion,  and 
then  violently  checking  his  foaming  horse,  held  up 
his  liands,  exclaiming  that  he  was  a  lost  man,  and 
with  hurried  accents  asked  if  there  was  no  ford 
near.  The  good-natured  soldiers  pointed  to  one  a 
little  way  olf,  and  the  gallant  fellow,  having  looked 
earnestly  for  a  few  moments,  as  if  to  fix  the  exact 
point,  wheeled  his  horse  round,  kissed  his  hand  in 
derision,  and,  bending  over  his  saddle-bow,  dashed 
back  to  his  own  comrades,  amidst  showers  of  shot, 
and  shouts  of  laughter  from  both  sides.  The  next 
moment  .Maucune's  column,  covered  by  a  concen- 
trated fire  of  guns,  passed  the  river  at  the  ford  thus 
discovered,  made  some  prisoners  in  the  village,  and 
lined  the  dry  bed  of  the  canal. 

Lord  Wellington,  who  came  up  at  this  instant, 
immediately  turned  some  guns  upon  the  enemy,  and 
desired  that  the  village  and  canal  might  be  retaken. 
Oswald  thought  that  they  could  not  be  held  ;  yet 
V/ellington,  whose  retreat  was  endangered  by  the 
presence  of  the  enemy  on  that  side  of  the  river,  was 
peremptory  ;  he  ordered  one  brigade,  under  general 
Barnes,  to  attack  the  main  body,  while  another  bri- 
gade, under  general  Pringle,  cleared  the  canal,  and 
hg  strengthened  the  left  with  the  Spanish  troops  and 
Brunswickers.  A  very  sharp  fire  of  artillery  and. 
musketry  ensued,  and  the  allies  suffered  some  loss, 
especially  by  cannon-shot,  which,  from  the  otlier 
side  of  the  river,  plumped  into  the  reserves.  The 
Spaniar 's,  unequal  to  any  regular  movement,  got 
into  confusion,  and  were  falling  back,  when  their 
fi  3ry  countryman,  .Miguel  Alava,  running  to  their 
h  ^ad,  with  exhortation  and  example,  for  though 
wounded  he  would  not  retire,  urged  them  forward 
to  the  fight ;  finally  the  enemy  was  driven  over  the 
river,  the  village  was  reoccupied  in  force,  and  the 
canal  was  lined  by  the  allied  troops.  During  these 
events  at  Villa  Muriel,  other  troops  attempted  with- 
oit  success  to  seize  the  bridge  of  San  Isidro,  and  the 
mine  was  exploded;  but  they  were  more  fortunate 
at  the  bridge  of  Banos,on  the  Pisuerga,  for  the  mine 
there  failed,  and  the  French  cavalry,  galloping  over, 
mide  both  the  working  and  covering  party  prison- 
ers. 

The  strength  of  the  position  was  now  sapped,  for 
Souham  could  assemble  his  army  on  the  allies'  left, 
by  Palencia,  and  force  them  to  an  action  with  their 
bick  upon  the  Pisuerga,  or  he  could  pass  that  river 
on  his  own  left,  and  forestall  them  on  the  Duero,  at 
Tudela.  If  Wellington  pushed  his  army  over  the 
Pisuerga  by  the  bridge  of  Duenas,  Souham,  having 
t!ie  initial  movement,  might  be  first  on  the  ground, 
,  and  could  attack  the  heads  of  the  allied  columns, 
while  Foy's  division  came  down  on  the  rear.  If 
Vrdlington,  by  a  rapid  movement  along  the  right 
bank  of  the  Pisuerga,  endeavoured  to  cross  at  Cabe- 
zon,  which  was  the  next  bridge  in  his  rear,  and  so 
^"ain  the  Duero,  Souham,  by  moving  along  the  left 
bank,  might  fall  upon  him  while  in  march  to  the 
Duero,  and  huinpered  between  thnt  river,  the  Pisu- 
erga, and  the  Esquevilla.  An  action  under  such 
circumstances  would  have  been  formidable,  and  the 
English  general  once  cut  off  from  the  Duero,  must 
have  retired  through  Valladolid  and  Simancas  to 


Tordesillas  or  Toro,  giving  up  hie  communications 
with  Hill.  In  tills  critical  state  of  ahairs  V.'elling- 
ton  made  no  delay.  H(i  kept  good  watch  upon  the 
left  of  the  Pisuerga,  and  knowing  that  the  ground 
there  was  rugged,  and  the  reacts  narrow  and  bad, 
while  on  the  right  bank  they  were  good  and  wide, 
sent  his  baggage  in  the  night  to  \  alladolid,  and 
withdrawing  the  troops  betore  day-break  on  the 
26th,  made  a  clean  march  of  sixteen  miles  to  Cabe- 
zon,  where  he  passed  to  the  left  of  the  Pisuerga,  and 
barricaded  and  mined  the  bridge.  Then  sending  a 
detachment  to  hold  the  bridge  of  Tudela,  on  the 
Duero,  behind  him,  he  caused  the  seventh  division, 
under  lord  Dalhousie,  to  secure  the  bridges  of  Valla- 
dolid, Simancas,  and  Tordesillas.  His  retreat  be- 
hind the  Duero,  which  river  was  now  in  full  water, 
being  thus  assured,  he  again  halted,  partly  becaus^e 
the  ground  was  favourable,  partly  to  give  the  com- 
missary general  Kennedy  time  for  some  indispensa- 
ble arrangements. 

This  fiinctionary,  who  had  gone  to  England  sick 
in  the  latter  end  of  1811,  and  had  returned  to  the 
army  only  the  day  before  the  siege  of  Burgos  was 
raised,  in  passing  from  Lisbon  by  badajos  to  I\ladrid, 
and  thence  to  Burgos,  discovered  that  the  inexperi- 
ence of  the  gentleman  who  conducted  the  department 
during  his  absence,  had  been  productive  of  some  se- 
rious errors.  The  magazines  established  between 
Lisbon  and  Badajos,  and  from  thence  by  Almaraz  to 
the  valley  of  the  Tagus,  for  the  supply  of  the  army 
in  Madrid,  had  not  been  removed  again  when  the 
retreat  commenced,  and  Soult  would  liave  found 
them  full,  if  his  march  had  been  made  rapidly  on  that 
side  ;  on  the  other  hand,  the  magazines  on  the  line 
of  operations,  between  Lisbon  and  Salamanca,  were 
nearly  empty.  Kennedy  had,  therefor?,  the  double 
task  on  hand  to  remove  the  magazines  from  the  scuth 
side  of  the  Tagus,  and  to  bring  up  stores  upon  the 
line  of  the  present  retreat ;  and  his  dispositions  were 
not  yet  completed  when  Wellington  desired  him  to 
take  measures  for  the  removal  of  the  sick  and  wound- 
ed, and  every  other  incumbrance,  from  Salamsnca, 
promising  to  hold  his  actual  position  on  the  Pisuerga 
until  the  operation  was  effected.  Now,  there  we-s 
sufficient  means  of  transport  for  the  occasion,  but  the 
negligence  of  many  medical  and  escorting  officers 
conducting  the  convoys  of  sick  to  the  rear,  and  the 
consequent  bad  conduct  of  the  soldiers,  for  wliere 
the  officers  are  careless  the  soldiers  will  be  licen 
tious,  produced  the  worst  efiects.  Such  outrages 
were  perpetrated  on  the  inhabitants  along  the  wlole 
line  of  march,  that  terror  was  every  where  predomi- 
nant, and  the  ill-used  drivers  and  muleteers  deserted, 
some  with,  some  without  their  cattle,  by  hundreds. 
Hence  Kennedy's  operation  in  some  measure  failed, 
the  greatest  distress  was  incurred,  and  the  ccmmie- 
sariat  lost  nearly  the  whole  of  the  animals  and  cer- 
riages  employed  ;  the  villages  were  abandoned,  and 
the  under-commissaries  were  bewildered,  or  para- 
lyzed, by  the  terrible  disorder  thus  spread  along  the 
line  of  communication. 

Souham  having  repaired  the  bridges  on  the  Cari- 
on,  resumed  the  pursuit  on  the  2Gth,  by  the  right  of 
the  Pisuerga,  being  deterred,  probably,  from  moving 
to  the  left  hank,  by  the  rugged  nature  of  the  ground, 
and  by  the  king's  orders  not  to  risk  a  serious  action. 
In  the  morning  of  the  27th,  his  whole  army  was  col- 
lected in  front  of  Cabezon,  but  he  contented  himself 
with  a  cannonade  and  a  display  of  his  force  ;  the  for- 
mer cost  the  allies  colonel  Robe  of  the  artillery,  a 
practised  officer  and  a  worthy  man  ;  the  latter  ena- 
bled the  English  general,  for  the  first  time,  to  dis~ 
I  cover  the  numbers  he  ha(i  to  contend  with,  and  they 
;  convinced  him  that  he  could  hold  neither  tne  PibU- 


532 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  aIA 


erga  iior  the  Duero  permanently.  However,  his 
objecl:  beinjj  to  gain  time,  he  held  his  position,  and 
when  the  French,  leaving  a  division  in  trout  of  Ca- 
bezon,  extended  their  right,  by  Cigales  and  Vallado- 
lid,  to  Simancas,  he  caused  tlie  bridges  at  the  two 
latter  places  to  be  destroyed  in  succession. 

Congratulating  himsel?  that  lie  had  not  fought  in 
front  of  Burgos  with  so  powerful  an  army,  Welling- 
ton now  resolved  to  retire  behind  the  Duero  and  tin- 
ally,  if  pressed,  behind  the  Tormes.  lint  as  the 
troops  on  the  Tagus  would  then  be  exposed  to  a  tiank 
attack,  similar  to  that  which  tiic  siege  of  Burgos 
liad  bean  raised  to  avoid  on  his  own  part ;  and  as  this 
would  be  more  certain  if  any  ill  fortune  befell  the 
troops  on  the  Duero,  he  ordered  Ilill  to  relinquish 
the  defence  of  tlie  Tagus  at  once  and  retreat,  giving 
him  a  discretion  as  to  the  line,  but  desiring  him,  if 
possible,  to  come  by  the  Guadarama  passes  ;  for  he 
designed,  if  all  went  well,  to  unite  on  the  Adaja  riv- 
er in  a  central  position,  intending  to  keep  Souham 
in  check  with  a  part  of  his  army,  and  with  the  re- 
mainder to  fall  upon  Soult. 

On  the  28th,  Souham,  still  extending  his  right, 
with  a  vievvf  to  dislodge  the  allies  by  turning  their 
lelt,  endeavoured  to  force  the  bridges  at  Yalladolid 
and  Simaiicas  on  the  Pisuerga,and  that  of  Tordesil- 
las  on  tlie  Duero.  The  tirst  was  easily  defended  by 
t!i3  main  body  of  the  seventh  division,  but  Halket, 
an  able  offi,;er,  tinding  the  French  strong  and  eager 
at  the  se::ond,  destroyed  it,  and  detached  the  regi- 
ment of  Brunswick  Uels  to  ruin  that  of  Tnrdesillas. 
It  was  done  in  time,  and  a  tower  behind  the  ruins 
was  occupied  by  a  detachment  while  the  remainder 
of  the  Brunsv/ickers  took  post  in  a  pine-wood  at 
some  distance.  The  French  arrived,  and  seemed 
for  some  time  at  a  loss,  but  very  soon  sixty  French 
officers  and  non-commissioned  oiiicers,  headed  by 
ca'ptain  Guingret,  a  daring  man,  formed  a  small  raft 
to  hold  their  arms  and  clothes,  and  then  plunged  in- 
to the  water,  holding  their  swords  with  their  teeth, 
aud  swimming  and  pushing  their  raft  before  them. 
Uivder  protection  of  a  cannonade  they  thus  crossed 
t'lis  great  river,  though  it  was  in  full  and  Btrong 
water  and  the  weather  very  cold,  and  having  reached 
tliQ  other  side,  naked  as  they  were,  stormed  the  tow- 
cr.  The  Brunswick  regiment  then  abandoned  its 
posit'on,  and  these  gallant  soldiers  remained  mas- 
ters of  the  bridge. 

Wellington  having  heard  of  the  attack  at  Siman- 
cas,  and  having  seen  the  whole  French  army  in 
mirch  to  its  right  along  the  hill  beyond  the  Pisuer- 
gi  on  the  evening  of  the  S'^th,  destroyed  the  bridges 
ij.t  Valladolid  and  Cabecon,  and  crossed  the  Duero 
at  Tudela  and  Pu'^nte  de  Duero  on  the  29th,  but 
8cvircely  had  he  etiectsd  this  operation  when  intelli- 
gence of  Guingret's  splendid  action  at  Tordcsillas 
reached  him.  Witli  the  instant  decision  of  a  great 
captain  he  marched  by  his  left,  and  having  reached 
the  heights  between  Rueda  and  TordosilHs  on  the 
Wth,  fronted  the  enemy  and  forbade  further  progress 
rn  that  point;  the  bridge  was  infieed  already  repair- 
rd  by  t'.ie  French,  but  Souham's  main  body  had  not 
vet  arrived,  and  Wellington's  menncing  position  was 
too  significant  to  be  misunderstood,  'j'he  bridges  of 
'i'oro  and  Zamora  were  now  destroyed  by  detach- 
ments, and  thougli  the  French,  spreading  along  the 
river  bank,  commenceil  repairing  the  f<  rmer,  the 
junction  with  Hill's  army  was  ensured  ;  and  the 
Fnirlish  general,  judging  that  the  bridge  of  Toro 
cculd  not  be  restored  for  several  days,  even  hoped  to 
maintain  the  line  of  the  Duero  permanently,  because 
he  expec-ted  that  Hill,  of  whose  oporntlons  it  is  now 
time  to  speak,  would  be  ou  the  Aduja  by  the  I'rd  of 
November. 


CHAPTER  V. 

The  kin?  and  Soidt  advanre  from  Viilciicia  to  the  Tagii!" — Gen- 
eral Hill  takes  a  position  o(  baltli — The  Fienrh  pii>s  (ha 
'l'a^u^ — Skirmish  at  the  Fuenle  Laifjo — Hill  l)lo\v>  U(»  He 
Ketiro  and  abandons  Madrid — Riot  in  that  citv — Altac  l,iiiei;t 
ol  t!it  iMadr.lenos  loivaids  the  Biitish  troops- — The  hostil*- 
armifii  pa-s  the  (jiia<laiama — Souham  nstores  the  hridjje  of 
I'oio — VVeIiin;;tan  retr.ats  towards  Salamani'a  and  orders 
Hill  to  r»  treat  upon  Alba  cle  Torme« — 'J'he  ai'ies  lake  a  pc>- 
sition  of  battle  behind  tlie  Tormes — The  Spaniards  at  Sala- 
manca dispiiv  a  hatred  of  the  British — Ir.slaiirrs  of  their  fe- 
ro'ily — Soult  cannonades  the  castle  of  A'br. —  The  king-  reor- 
};aiiizrs  the  Trench  armies — Soult  and  Jourdan  |/ropose  flif- 
fereiit  |)l.ins — Soult's  plan  adopted — !■  rt  n' h  pass  the ')"oi  nii« 
— Wellington  by  a  remarkable  movecit  i.t  gams  the  Valniu.-a 
river  and  retreats — Misconduct  of  Ihs  troops — Sir  Edward 
Fao;t't  taken  prisoner — Combat  on  the  Hn*!bra — Anccf'ote  — 
Retreat  from  thence  to  Ciudad  Rodrigo — the  armit sun  both 
sides  take  winter  cantonments. 

FRENCH     PASSAGE     OF    THE    TAG  (J6- -RETREAT     FROM 
MADRIU. 

King  .Joseph's  first  intention  was  to  unite  a  great 
part  of  Suchet's  forces  as  well  as  Soult's  with  his 
own,  and  Soult,  probably  influenced  by  a  false  report 
that  Ballesteros  had  actually  reached  La  fllancha, 
urged  tins  measure.  Suchet  resisted,  observing 
that  Valencia  must  be  defended  against  tlic  increas- 
ing power  of  the  Anglo-Sicilian  and  Spanish  armies 
at  Alicant,  and  the  more  so,  thnt  imtil  the  French 
army  could  cross  the  Tagus  and  open  a  new  line  of 
communication  with  Zaragoza,  Valencia,  would  be 
tlie  only  base  for  the  king's  operations,  .loseph 
then  resolved  to  incorporate  a  portion  of  the  army 
of  the  south  with  the  army  of  the  centre,  giving  the 
command  to  Drouet,  who  was  to  move  by  tiie  road 
of  Cuenca  and  Tarancon  towards  the  Tagus  ;  but 
this  arrangement,  which  seems  to  have  been  dicta- 
ted by  a  desire  to  advance  Drouet's  authority,  wns 
displeasing  to  Soult.  He  urged  that  his  army,  so 
powerfully  constituted,  physically  and  morally,  as 
to  be  the  best  in  the  Peninsula,  ov/ed  its  excel- 
lence to  its  peculiar  organization,  and  it  would  be 
dangerous  to  break  that  up.  Nor  was  tliere  any 
good  reason  for  this  change;  for  if  .Joseph  only 
wished  to  have  a  strong  body  of  troops  on  the  Cuer- 
ca  road,  the  army  of  tlie  centre  could  be  reinforced 
with  one  or  two  divisions,  and  the  whole  could  unite 
again  on  the  Tagus  without  injury  to  the  army  cf 
the  south.  It  would,  however,  be  better,  he  said, 
to  incorporate  the  army  of  the  centre  with  the  army 
of  the  south,  and  march  altogether  by  the  road  of 
San  Clemente,  leaving  only  a  few  troops  on  the  Cu- 
enca road,  who  might  be  reinforced  by  Suchet.  But 
if  the  king's  plan  arose  from  a  desire  to  march  in  per- 
son with  a  large  body,  he  could  do  so  with  greater 
dignity  by  joining  tlie  army  of  the  south,  which  was 
to  act  on  the  main  line  of  operations.  .loseph's  re- 
ply was  a  peremptory  order  to  obey  or  retire  to 
France,  and  Drouet  marched  to  Cuenca. 

Soult's  army  furnished  thirty-five  thousand  infant- 
ry, six  thousand  excellent  cavalry  under  arms,  with 
seventy-two  guns,  making  with  the  artillerymen  a 
total  of  forty-six  thousand  veteran  combatants.  'I'iic 
army  of  the  centre,  including  the  king's  guards,  fur- 
nished about  twelve  thousand,  of  which  two  ttiou- 
sand  were  good  cavalry  with  twelve  guns.  'I'hus 
fifty-eight  thousand  fighting  men,  eight  thousand 
being  cavalry,  with  eighty-four  pieces  of  artillery, 
were  put  in  motion  to  drive  Hill  from  the  'I'agus. 
.Joseph's  project  was  to  pass  that  river  and  operate 
against  Wellington's  rear,  if  he  should  continue  the 
siegeof  Burgos  ;  but  if  he  concentrated  on  the'I'iigue, 
Souham  was  in  like  manner  to  operate  on  his  rejir 
by  Aranda  de  Duero,  ;ind  the  Soninsierra,  sending 
detachments  towards  Guadalaxara  to  be  met  by  eth- 
er detachments  coming  from  the  king  through  Sace- 


1812.1 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


533 


don.  Finally,  if  Wellington,  as  indeed  happened, 
should  abandon  both  Burgos  and  Madrid,  the  united 
French  forces  were  to  drive  him  into  Portugal. 
The  conveying  of  Soult's  convoys  of  sick  men  to 
Valencia  and  other  difficulties,  retarded  the  com- 
mencement of  operations  to  the  king's  great  discon- 
tent, and  meanwhile  he  became  very  uneasy  for  his 
eupplies,  because  the  people  of  La  Manclia,  still 
reioenibering  Montbrun's  devastations,  were  dying 
with  their  beasts  and  grain,  and  from  frequent  repe- 
tition were  becouie  exceedingly  expert  in  evading 
the  researches  of  the  foragers.  .Such,  however,  is 
the  advantage  of  discipline  and  order,  that  wtiile  La 
Manclia  was  thus  desolated  from  fear,  confidence 
and  tranquillity  reigned  in  Valencia. 

However,  on  the  IStii  of  October,  .loseph  marched 
from  Requona  u[>on  Cuenca,  where  he  found  Drouet 
with  a  division  of  Soult'a  infantry  and  some  cavalry. 
He  then  proceeded  to  'J'arancon,  which  was  the  only 
artillery  road  on  that  side  leading  to  the  Tagus,  and 
during  tliis  time  Soult  marched  by  8an  Clemente  up- 
on Ucaha  and  Aranjuez.  General  Hill  immediate- 
ly sent  tliat  notice  to  lord  Wellington  which  caused 
the  retreat  from  Burgos,  but  he  was  in  no  fear  of 
tlie  enemy,  for  he  had  withdrawn  all  his  outposts 
and  united  his  whole  force  behind  the  Tagus.  His 
r'ght  vt'as  at  Toledo,  his  left  at  Fuente  Duehas,  and 
there  were  Spanish  and  Portuguese  troops  in  the 
valley  of  the  Tagus  extending  as  far  as  Talavera. 
The  I'agus  was,  however,  fordable  from  its  junction 
witli  the  Jarama  near  Aranjuez,  upwards;  and  more- 
over, tliis  part  o"  the  line,  weak  from  its  extent, 
could  not  easily  be  supported,  and  the  troops  guard- 
ing it  would  have  been  too  distant  from  the  point  of 
a::tion  if  the  French  should  operate  against  Tole- 
do. Hill  therefore  drew  his  left  behind  the  Tajuna, 
which  is  a  branch  of  the  Jarama,  and  running  near- 
ly parallel  to  the  Tagus.  His  right  occupied  very 
strong  ground  from  A  never  to  Toledo,  he  destroyed 
the  bridg3s  at  Aranjuez,  and  securing  that  below 
t!ie  confluence  of  the  Jarama  and  Henares,  called  the 
Puente  Larga,  threw  one  of  boats  over  the  former 
river  a  little  above  Bayona.  The  light  division  and 
I'jl'.o's  troops,  forming  the  extreme  left,  were  directed 
to  march  upon  Arganda,  and  the  head-quarters  were 
fixed  at  Cienpozuelos. 

Tlie  bulk  of  the  troops  were  thus  held  in  hand, 
ready  to  move  to  any  menaced  point,  and  as  Sker- 
rit's  brigade  had  just  arrived  from  Cadiz,  there  was, 
including  the  Spanish  regulars,  forty  thousand  men 
in  line,  and  a  multitude  of  partidas  were  hovering 
about.  The  lateral  communications  were  easy  and 
tlie  scouts  passing  over  the  bridge  of  Toledo  covered 
all  the  country  beyond  the  Tagus.  In  this  state  of 
ari'airs  the  bridges  at  each  end  of  the  line  furnished 
the  means  of  sallying  upon  the  flanks  of  any  force  at- 
tacking the  front ;  the  PVench  must  have  made  sev- 
eral marches  to  force  the  right,  and  on  the  left  the 
Jarama  with  its  marshy  banks,  and  its  many  conflu- 
ents, oflsred  several  {)ositions,  to  interpose  between 
the  enemy  and  Madrid 

Drouet  passed  the  Tagus  the  29th,  at  the  aband- 
oned fords  of  Fuente  Duenas  and  Villa  Maurique, 
Hud  the  king,  with  his  guards,  repaired  to  Zara  de 
la  Cruz.  Meanwhile  Soult,  whose  divisions  were 
coming  fasi  up  to  Ocana,  restored  the  bridge  of  Ar- 
anjuez, and  passed  the  Tagus  also  v/ith  his  advanced 
guard.  On  the  liOth,  he  attacked  general  Cole  who 
commanded  at  the  Puente  Larga  with  several  regi- 
ments and  some  guns,  but  though  the  mines  failed, 
and  the  French  attempted  to  carry  the  bridge  with 
th"  bayonet,  they  were  vigorously  repulsed  by  the 
forty-seventh  under  colonel  Skerrit.  After  a  heavy 
cannonade  and  a  sharp  musketry  which  cost  the  al- 


lies sixty  men,  Soult  relinquished  the  attem;  t  and 
awaited  the  arrival  of  his  main  body.  Had  the  ini- 
ente  Larga  been  forced,  the  fourth  division  which 
was  at  Anover  would  have  been  cut  off  Ircm  Mad- 
rid, but  the  weather  being  thick  and  rainy,  Soult 
could  not  discover  what  supporting  Ibrce  was  on  tl-e 
high  land  of  Valdenioro  bciiind  tliC  bridge,  and  was 
afraid  to  push  forward  too  fast. 

The  king,  disconteiited  with  this  cautious  mode  of 
proceeding,  now  designed  to  operate  by  'J  cledo,  hut 
during  the  night  the  Puente  Larga  was  abandoned, 
and  Soult,  being  still  in  doubt  of  Hill's  real  clject, 
advised  Joseph  to  unite  the  army  of  the  centre  at 
Arganda  and  Chinchon,  throwing  bridges  for  retreat 
at  Villa  Maurique  and  Fuente  Duefias  as  a  ])recau- 
tion  in  case  a  battle  should  take  [lace.  Hill's  move- 
ment was  however  a  decided  retreat,  which  would 
have  commenced  twenty-four  hours  Bocner  but  fcr 
tlie  failure  of  the  mines  and  the  combat  at  the  Pu- 
ente Larga.  Wellington's  orders  had  reached  him 
at  the  moment  when  Soult  first  appeared  on  the  Ta- 
gus, and  the  affair  was  so  sudden,  that  the  light  di- 
vision, which  had  just  come  from  Aicala  to  Argan- 
da to  close  the  left  of  the  position,  was  obliged,  with- 
out halting,  to  return  again  in  the  n;ght;  the  total 
journey  being  nearly  foi-ty  miles. 

Wellington,  foreseeing  that  it  might  be  dfilcult 
for  Hill  to  obey  his  instructions,  had  given  iiim  a 
discretionary  power  to  retire  either  by  the  valley  of 
the  Tagus,  or  by  the  Guadarama  ;  and  a  position  ta- 
ken up  in  the  I'ormer,  on  the  flank  of  the  enemy, 
would  have  prevented  tiie  king  from  patsing  the 
(iuadarama,  and  at  the  tame  time  have  covered  Lis- 
bon ;  whereas  a  retreat  by  the  Guadarama  exposed 
Lisbon.  Hill,  thinking  the  valley  of  the  Tagus,  in 
that  advanced  season,  would  not  support  the  French 
army,  and  knowing  Wellington  to  be  pres!^ed  by  su- 
perior forces  in  the  north,  chose  the  Guadarama 
Wherefore,  burning  his  pontoons,  and  causing  La 
China  and  the  stores  remaining  there  to  be  destroy- 
ed in  the  night  of  the  ;i(.ith,  he  retreated  by  diflerent 
roads,  and  united  his  army  on  the  iUst  of  October, 
near  Majadahonda.  Meanwhile  the  magazines  alcng 
the  line  of  communication  to  Badajos,  were,as  I  have 
already  noticed,  in  danger  if  the  enemy  had  detacheo 
troops  to  seize  them,  neither  were  the  removal  and 
destruction  of  the  stores  in  3Iadrid  efiected  without 
disorders  of  a  singular  nature. 

The  municipality  had  demanded  all  the  provis'cn 
remaining  there  as  if  they  wanted  them  for  the  ene- 
my, and  when  this  was  refused,  they  excited  a  mob 
to  attack  tlie  magazines  ;  some  firing  even  took 
place,  and  the  assistance  of  the  fourth  division  was 
required  to  restore  order;  a  portion  of  wheat  was 
finally  given  to  the  poorest  of  the  people,  and  Mad- 
rid was  abandoned.  It  was  afiecting  to  see  the  car- 
nest  and  true  friendship  of  the  population.  Men  and 
women,  and  children,  crowded  around  the  trccps  be- 
wailing their  departure.  They  moved  witii  them  in 
one  vast  mass,  for  more  than  two  miles,  and  loft  their 
houses  empty  at  the  very  instant  when  the  French 
cavalry  scouts  were  at  the  gates  on  the  other  sicie. 
This  emotion  was  distinct  from  political  feeling,  be- 
cause there  was  a  very  strong  French  party  in  Mad- 
rid ;  and  amongst  the  causes  of  wailing  the  return  of 
the  plundering  and  cruel  partidas,  iinciiecked  I y  the 
presence  of  the  British,  was  very  loudly  proclaimed. 
The  "  Madrilenos"  have  been  et'gmatized  as  a  sav 
age  and  faithless  people;  the  British  army  fcuid 
them  patient,  gentle,  generous,  and  loyal  ;  nor  is 
this  fact  to  be  dis[)uted,  because  of  the  riot  wl.'irh 
occurred  in  the  destruction  of  the  magnzincs,  for  the 
provisions  liad  been  obtained  by  requisition  from  the 
country  around  Madrid,  under  an  agreement  with  th'3 


f)34 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XIX 


Spanish  government  to  pay  at  the  end  of  the  war  ; 
and  it  was  natural  lor  tlie  people,  excited  as  they 
were  by  the  authorities,  to  endeavour  to  pfet  tlieir 
own  flour  back,  ratiier  than  have  it  destroyed  wlien 
they  were  starving. 

Witli  tiie  Anglo-Portuguese  troops,  marclied  Pen- 
ne  Villeinur,  Morillo,  and  Carlos  D'F.spaua,  and  it 
was  Wellington's  wish  that  Elio,  Bassccour,  and 
Villa  Canipa  should  now  throw  tiieniselves  into  the 
vallry  of  the  Tagus,  and  crossing  the  bridge  of  Ar- 
zobispo,  join  Ballestcros'  army,  now  under  Virues, 
A  great  body  of  men,  including  the  Portuguese  regi- 
ni'3nts  left  by  Hill  in  Estrcmadura,  would  tiius  liave 
been  placed  on  the  flank  of  any  French  army  march- 
ing upon  Lisbon,  and  if  the  enemy  neglected  this 
line,  the  Spaniards  could  operate  against  Madrid  or 
against  Suchet  at  pleasure.  Elio,  however,  being 
cut  oft" from  Hill  l)y  the  F'rench  advance,  remained  at 
the  bridge  of  Aunion,  near  Sacedon,  and  was  there 
joined  by  Villa  Campa  and  the  Empecinado 

Soult  now  brought  up  his  army  as  quickly  as  pos- 
sible to  Valdemoro,  and  his  information,  as  to  Hill's 
real  force,  was  becoming  more  distinct;  but  there 
was  also  a  rumour  that  Wellington  was  close  at  hand 
with  three  British  divisions,  and  the  French  gener- 
al's movements  wore  consequently  cautious,  lest  he 
should  And  himself  suddenly  engaged  in  battle  be- 
fore  his  wiiole  force  was  collected,  for  his  rear  was 
still  at  Ocana.  and  the  army  of  the  centre  had  not 
yet  passed  the  'I'i'.jufia.  This  disposition  of  his 
troops  was  prohiibly  intentional  to  prevent  the  king 
from  figliting,  for  Soult  did  not  think  this  a  fitting 
time  for  a  great  battle  unless  upon  great  advantage. 
In  the  disjointed  state  of  their  aifairs,  a  defeat  would 
have  been  :i!ore  injurious  to  the  French  than  a  vic- 
tory would  have  been  beneficial  :  the  former  would 
have  lost  Spain,  tiie  latter  would  not  have  gained 
Portugal. 

On  the  Ist  of  November,  the  bulk  of  Soult's  army 
bsing  assembled  at  Getafe,  he  sent  scoutinji  parties 
in  all  directions  to  feel  for  the  allies,  and  to  ascer- 
tain the  direction  of  their  march  ;  the  next  day  the 
army  of  the  centre  and  that  of  the  south  were  reuni- 
ted not  far  from  ^Madrid,  but  Hill  was  then  in  full  re- 
treat for  the  Guadarama  covered  by  a  powerful  rear- 
guard under  general  Cole. 

The  'M,  Soult  pursued  the  allies,  and  the  king  en- 
tering ]\Iadrid,  placed  a  garrison  in  tlic  Retiro  for 
the  protection  of  his  court  and  of  the  Spanish  fami- 
lies attaclied  to  his  cause  ;  this  was  a  sensible  re- 
lief, for  hitherto  in  one  great  convoy  they  had  im- 
peded the  movements  of  tiie  army  of  the  centre.  On 
tlic  4th,  .Joseph  rejoined  Soult  at  the  Guadarama 
with  his  guards,  which  always  moved  as  a  separate 
body  ;  bat  he  had  left  Palombini  beyond  the  Tagus 
near  Tarancon  to  scour  the  roads  on  the  side  of  Cu- 
tmca,  and  some  dragoons  being  sent  towards  Huete, 
were  surprised  by  tlie  partidjis,  and  lost  forty  men, 
whereupon  Palombini  rejoined  the  army. 

General  Hill  was  moving  upon  A revalo, slowly  fol- 
lowed by  tlie  French,  when  fresh  orders  from  Welling- 
ton, founded  on  new  combinations,  changed  the  direc- 
tion of  his  march.  Souhnm  had  repaired  the  bridire  of 
"^I'oro  on  the  4t!i,  several  days  sooner  than  the  Eng- 
lish general  had  expected,  and  thus  when  he  was 
keenly  watching  for  the  arrival  of  Hill  on  the  Adaja, 
tnat  he  might  sudilenly  join  him  and  attack  Sonlt, 
his  designs  were  again  baffled  ;  for  he  dared  not  make 
such  a  movement  lest  Souham,  possessing  noth  Toro 
and  Tordesillas,  should  fall  upon  his  rear;  neither 
could  he  bring  up  Hill  to  the  Duero  and  attack  Sou- 
liam,  because  he  liad  no  means  to  pass  that  river, 
and  meanwhile  Sonlt,  mov'  'g  by  the  Fontiveros, 
would   reach   tlie   Tormes      Seeing  then  that  his 


combinations  had  failed,  and  his  central  position  no 
longer  available,  either  for  oflerce  or  delence,  Iws  di- 
rected ILll  to  gain  Alba  de  Tormes  at  once  by  the 
road  of  Fontiveros,  and  on  the  Ctii,  he  fell  bnck  him- 
self, from  his  position  in  front  of  the  Tordcsdlas,  by 
Naval  del  Rey  and  Pitucga  to  the  heights  of  San 
Christoval. 

Josejih,  thinking  to  prevent  Hill's  junction  with 
Wellington,  had  gained  Arevclo  by  the  Segovia 
road  on  the  .5th  and  6th  ;  the  ^th,  Sculiam's  scouts 
were  met  with  at  Jledina  del  Camjo,  and  for  the 
first  time,  since  he  had  quitted  A  alencia,  the  king 
obtained  news  of  the  army  of  Portugal.  One  hun- 
dred thousand  combatants,  of  which  above  twelve 
thousand  were  cavalry,  with  a  hundred  and  thirty 
pieces  of  artillery,  were  thus  assembled  on  these 
plains  over  which,  three  months  bei'cre,  3iarmc].t 
had  marched  with  so  much  confidence  to  his  own 
destruction.  Soult,  then  expelled  from  Andalusia  hy 
jNIarmont's  defeat,  was  now,  alter  having  made  half 
the  circuit  of  the  Peninsula,  ccme  to  drive  into  Por- 
tugal, that  very  army  whose  victory  had  driven  l.im 
from  the  south  ;  and  thus,  as  AVellingtcn  had  lore- 
seen  and  foretold,  the  acquisition  of  Andalusia,  po- 
litically important  and  useful  to  the  caute,  proved 
injurious  to  himself  at  the  moment,  infcmuth  as 
the  French  had  concentrated  a  mighty  power,  frcm 
which  it  required  both  skill  and  fortune  to  escape. 
jMeanwhile  the  Spanish  armies,  let  loose  by  this 
union  of  all  the  French  troops,  kept  aloof,  or  ccmir.g 
to  aid,  were  found  a  burthen,  rather  than  a  help. 

On  the  7th,  Hill's  main  body  passed  the  Tormes, 
at  Alba,  and  the  bridge  there  was  mined  ;  the  ligl  t 
division  and  Long's  cavalry  remained  on  the  right 
bank  during  the  night,  but  the  next  day  the  fcrruer 
also  crossed  the  river.  Wellington  himself  was  in 
the  position  of  San  Christoval,  and  it  is  curious, 
that  the  king,  even  at  this  late  period,  was  doubtlul 
if  Ballestcros'  troops  had  or  had  net  joined  the  al- 
lied army  at  Avila.  Wellington  also  was  still  un- 
certain of  the  real  numbers  of  the  enemy,  but  he 
was  desirous  to  maintain  the  line  of  the  Tormrs 
permanently,  and  to  give  his  troops  rejicse.  He  had 
made  a  retreat  of  two  hundred  miles  ;  Hill  I.ad  made 
one  of  the  same  distance  besides  his  march  ficm  F.s- 
tremadura  ;  Skerrit's  people  had  come  from  Cadiz 
and  the  whole  army  required  rest,  (or  the  soldiers, 
especially  those  who  besieged  Burgos,  had  been  in 
the  field,  with  scarcely  an  interval  of  repose,  since 
January;  they  were  bare-footed,  and  their  equip- 
ments were  spoiled,  the  cavalry  were  becoming 
weak,  their  horses  were  ont  of  condition,  and  the 
discipline  of  all  was  failing. 

The  excesses  committed  on  the  retreat  f n  m  Pur- 
ges have  already  been  touched  upon,  and  curing  the 
first  day's  march  Irom  the  Tagus  1o  Madrid,  seme  of 
general  Hill's  men  had  not  behaved  bett'r.  Five 
hundred  of  the  rear-guard  under  Cole,  chiefly  of  ere 
regiment,  finding  the  inhabitants  had  fled  according 
to  their  custom,  whichever  side  was  apjncpching, 
broke  open  the  houses,  plundered  and  got  (irur.k.  A 
multitude  were  left  in  the  cellars  of  Valdemoro,  and 
two  hundred  and  fifty  fell  into  the  hands  cf  the  ere- 
my.  The  rest  of  the  retreat  being  unmolested,  wrs 
made  with  more  regulnrity,  hut  the  excctfcs  still 
committed  hy  some  of  the  soldiers  were  glnrli  g  and 
furnished  proof  that  the  moral  conduct  of  n  general 
cannot  be  fairly  judged  by  following  in  tlie  wake  of 
a  retreating  army.  On  this  occasion  tl.ere  was  no 
want  of  provisions,  no  hardships  to  exasperate  the 
men, and  yet  I, the  author  of  this  history,  counted  on 
the  first  day's  marcli  from  IMadrid,  seventeeji  bodies 
of  murdered  peasants;  by  whom  killed,  or  for  -vhat, 
whether  by  English,  or  Germans,  by  Spj.niards,  or 


1812.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


535 


Portuguese,  whether  in  dispute,  in  robbery,  or  in 
wanton  vill.vny,  I  kiaow  not,  but  their  bodies  were  in 
the  dit:hes,  and  a  shallow  observer  might  thence 
have  flr^wii  the  most  false  conclusions  against  the 
English  gJiieral  and  nation. 

Another  notable  thing  was  the  discontent  of  the 
veteran  troops  with  the  arrangements  of  the  staff 
officers.  For  the  assembling  of  the  sick  men,  at  the 
place  and  lime  prescribed  to  form  the  convoys,  was 
p  actually  attended  to  by  the  regimental  officers  ; 
noi  so  by  tiie  others,  nor  by  the  commissaries  who 
had  charge  to  provide  the  means  of  transport ;  hence 
delay  and  groat  suffering  to  the  sick,  and  the  wearing 
out  of  the  healthy  men's  strength  by  waiting,  with 
their  packs  on,  for  the  negligent.  And  when  the 
light  division  was  left  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Tormes  to  cover  the  passage  at  Alba,  a  prudent  or- 
der that  all  baggage  or  other  impediments,  should 
pass  rapidly  over  the  narrow  bridge  at  that  place 
without  baking  at  all  on  the  enemy's  side,  was,  by 
those  charged  with  the  execution,  so  rigorously  in- 
terpreted, as  to  deprive  the  light  division  of  their 
ration  bullocks  and  flour  mules,  at  the  very  moment 
of  distribution  ;  and  the  tired  soldiers,  thus  absurdly 
denied  their  food,  had  the  farther  mortitication  to  see 
a  string  of  commissariat  carts  deliberately  passing 
their  post  many  hours  afterwards.  All  regimental 
officers  know  tliat  the  anger  and  discontent  thus  cre- 
ated is  one  of  the  surest  means  of  ruining  tlie  disci-  ■ 
pline  of  an  army,  and  it  is  in  these  particulars  that  1 
the  value  of  a  good  and  experienced  staff  is  found. 

Lord  Wellington's  position  extended  from  Christo-  i 
val  to  Aldea  Lengua  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Tormes,  ; 
and  on  the  left  of  that  river,  to  the  bridge  of  Alba, 
where  the  castle  which  was  on  tlie  right  bank  was 
garrisoned  by  Howard's  brigade  of  the  second  divi- 
sion Hamilton's  Portuguese  were  on  the  left  bank 
as  a  reserve  for  Howard  ;  the  remainder  of  the  sec- 
ond division  watched  the  fords  of  Huerta  and  Enci- 
na.  and  beliind  them  in  second  line  the  third  and 
fourth  divisions  occupied  the  heights  of  Calvariza  de 
Ariba,  The  light  division  and  the  Spanish  infantry 
entered  Salamanca,  the  cavalry  were  disposed  be- 
yond the  Tormes,  covering  all  the  front,  and  thus 
posted,  the  English  general  desired  to  bring  affairs 
to  the  decision  of  a  battle.  For  the  heights  of 
Christoval  were  strong  and  compact,  the  position  of 
the  Arapiles  on  the  other  side  of  the  Tormes  was 
glorious  as  well  as  strong,  and  the  bridge  of  Sala- 
manca and  t'le  fords  furnished  the  power  of  concen- 
tiating  on  either  side  of  that  river  by  a  shorter  line 
than  the  enemy  could  move  upon. 

But  while  Wellington  prepared  for  a  battle,  he  al- 
so looked  to  a  retreat.  His  sick  were  sent  to  the 
rear,  small  convoys  of  provisions  were  ordered  up 
from  Ciudad  Rodrigo  to  certain  halting  places  be- 
tween tliat  place  and  Salamanca;  the  overplus  of 
ammunition  in  the  latter  town  was  destroyed  daily 
by  small  explosions,  and  large  stores  of  clothing,  of 
arms  and  accoutrements,  were  delivered  to  the  Span- 
ish troops,  who  were  thus  completely  furnished  ;  one 
hour  after,  the  English  general  had  the  mortification 
to  see  tliem  selling  their  equipments  even  under  his 
own  windows.  Indeed  Salamanca  presented  an  ex- 
traordinary scene,  and  the  Spaniards,  civil  and  m;l- 
ilfjry,  began  to  evince  hatred  of  the  British.  Daily 
did  they  attempt  to  perpetrate  murder,  and  one  act 
of  pe?uliar  atrocity  merits  notice.  A  horse,  led  by 
an  English  soldier,  being  frightened,  backed  against 
a  Spanish  officer  commanding  at  a  gate,  he  caused 
the  soldier  to  be  dragged  into  his  guard-house  and 
there  bayonetted  him  in  cold  blood,  and  no  redress 
could  be  had  for  this  or  other  crimes,  save  by  coun- 
ter-violence, which  was  not  long  withheld.    A  Span-  i 


ish  officer,  while  wantonly  stabbing  at  a  rifleman, 
was  shot  dead  by  the  latter;  and  a  British  volunteer 
slew  a  Spanish  officer  at  the  Lead  of  his  own  regi- 
ment in  a  sword  fight,  the  troops  of  both  nations 
t  looking  on,  but  here  there  was  nothing  dishonourable 
on  either  side. 

j  The  civil  authorities,  not  less  savage,  were  more 
^insolent  than  the  military,  treating  every  English 
person  with  an  intolerable  arrogance.  Even  the 
prince  of  Orange  was  like  to  have  lost  his  lite ;  for 
upon  remonstrating  about  quarters  with  the  sitting 
junta,  they  ordered  one  of  their  guards  to  kill  him  ; 
and  he  would  have  been  killed  had  not  Mr.  Steele  of 
the  forty-third,  a  bold  athletic  person,  felled  the  man 
before  he  could  stab  ;  yet  both  the  prince  and  his  de- 
fender were  obliged  to  fly  instantly  to  avoid  the  sol- 
dier's comrades.  The  exasperation  caused  by  these 
things  was  leading  to  serious  mischief  when  tiie  en- 
emy's movements  gave  another  direction  to  the  sol- 
j  diers'  passions. 

On  the  9th  Long's  cavalry  had  been  driven  in  up- 
on Alba,  and  on  the  U'th  Soult  opened  a  concentra- 
ted fire  of  eighteen  guns  against  that  place.  The 
castle,  which  crowned  a  bare  and  rocky  knoll,  had 
been  hastily  entrenched,  and  furnished  scarcely  any 
shelter  from  this  tempest ;  for  two  hours  the  garri- 
son could  only  reply  with  musketry,  but  finally  it 
was  aided  by  the  lire  of  four  pieces  from  the  left 
bank  of  the  river,  and  the  post  was  defended  until 
dark,  with  such  vigour  that  the  enemy  dared  not 
venture  on  an  assault.  During  the  night  general 
Hamilton  reinforced  the  garrison,  repaired  the  dam- 
aged walls,  and  formed  barricades,  but  the  next 
morning,  after  a  short  cannonade  and  seme  musket- 
ry firing,  the  enemy  v.ithdrew.  This  combat  cost 
the  allies  above  a  hundred  men. 

On  the  11th,  the  king  coming  up  from  IMedina  del 
Campo,  reorganized  his  army.  That  is,  he  united  the 
army  of  the  centre  with  the  army  of  the  south,  plac- 
ing the  whole  under  Soult,  and  he  removed  Scuham 
from  the  command  of  the  army  of  Portugal  to  make 
way  for  Drouet.  Caffarelli  had  before  this  returnee 
to  Burgos,  with  his  divisions  and  guns,  and  as  Sou- 
ham,  besides  his  losses  and  stragglers,  had  placed 
garrisons  in  Toro,  Tordesillas,  Zamora,  and  Valla- 
dolid;  and  as  the  king  also,  had  left  a  garrison  in 
the  Retire,  scarcely  ninety  thousand  combatants  of 
all  arms  were  assembled  on  the  Tormes  ;  but  twelve 
thousand  were  cavalry,  nearly  all  were  veteran 
troops,  and  they  had  at  least  one  hundred  and  twen- 
ty pieces  of  artillery.  Such  a  mighty  power  could 
not  remain  idle,  for  the  country  was  exhausted  of 
provisions,  the  soldiers  were  already  wanting  bread, 
and  the  king,  eager  enough  for  battle,  for  he  was  of 
a  brave  spirit  and  had  something  of  his  brother's 
greatness  of  soul,  sought  counsel  how  to  deliver  it 
with  most  advantage. 

Jourdan,  with  a  martial  fire  unquenched  by  age, 
was  for  bringing  afiairs  to  a  crisis  by  tiie  boldest 
and  shortest  mode.  He  had  observed  that  \A'ellirg- 
ton's  position  was  composed  of  three  parts,  namely, 
the  right  at  Alba  ;  the  centre  at  Calvariza  Ariba; 
the  left,  separated  from  the  centre  by  the  Tormes,  at 
San  Christoval;  the  whole  distance  being  about  fif- 
teen miles.  ISow  the  Tormes  was  still  fordable  in 
many  places  above  Salamanca,  and  hence  he  propos- 
ed to  assemble  the  Frencii  army  in  the  niglit,  paEs 
the  river  at  day-break,  by  the  lords  between  Villa 
Gonzalo  and  Huerta,  and  so  make  a  concentrated  at- 
tack upon  Calvariza  de  Ariba,  which  would  force 
Wellington  to  a  decisive  battle. 

Scult  opposed  this  project,  he  objected  to  attack- 
ing Wellington  in  a  position  whicli  he  was  so  well 
acquainted  Vrith,  which  he  might  have  fortified,  and 


ft36 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XIX. 


where  the  army  must  fi^ht  its  way,  even  from  the 
fords,  to  gain  room  for  an  order  of  battle.  He  propos- 
ed instead,  to  move  by  the  letl  to  certain  fords,  tliree 
in  number,  between  Exems  and  Galisancho,  some 
seven  or  eight  miles  above  Alba  de  Tormes.  They 
were  easy  in  themselves,  he  said,  and  well  suited, 
*.Tom  the  conformation  of  the  banks,  for  forcing  a 
yassag.  if  it  should  be  disputed  ;  and  by  making  a 
fl.ight  circuit,  the  troops  in  march  could  not  be  seen, 
by  the  enemy.  Passing  there,  the  French  army 
would  gain  two  marches  upon  the  allies,  would  be 
placed  upon  their  Hank  and  rear,  and  could  tight  on 
j^round  chosen  by  its  own  generals,  instead  of  deliv- 
ering battle  on  ground  chosen  by  the  enemy  ;  or  it 
could  force  on  an  action  in  a  new  position  whence 
the  allies  could  with  difficulty  retire  in  the  event  of 
disaster.  Wellington  must  then  fight  to  disadvan- 
tage, or  retire  hastily,  sacrificing  part  of  his  army 
to  save  the  rest ;  and  the  eifect,  whether  militarily 
or  politically,  would  be  the  same  as  if  he  was  beat- 
en by  a  front  attack.  .lourdan  replied,  that  this  was 
prudent,  and  might  be  successful  if  Wellington  ac- 
cepted battle,  but  that  general  could  not  thereby  be 
forced  to  fight,  which  was  the  great  object ;  he  would 
have  time  to  retreat  before  the  French  could  reach 
the  line  of  his  communications  with  Ciudad  Rodrigo, 
and  it  was  even  supposed  by  some  generals  that  he 
would  !r3treat  to  Almeida,  at  once,  by  San  Felices 
and  Barba  de  Puerco. 

Neither  Soult  nor  .lourdan  knew  the  position  of 
the  Arapiles  in  detail,  and  the  former,  though  he  urg- 
ed his  own  plan,  offered  to  yield  if  the  king  was  so 
inclined.  Jourdan's  proposition  was  supported  by 
all  the  generals  of  the  army  of  Portugal,  except 
Clauzel,  who  leaned  to  Soult's  opinion  ;  but  as  that 
marshal  commanded  two-thirds  of  the  army,  while 
Jourdan  had  no  ostensible  command,  the  question 
was  finally  decided  agreeably  to  his  counsel.  Nor 
ia  it  easy  to  determine  Vv'hich  was  right,  for  though 
Jourdan's  reasons  were  very  strong,  and  the  result 
did  not  bear  out  Soult's  views,  we  shall  find  the  fail- 
ure was  only  in  the  execution.  Nevertheless,  it 
would  seem  so  great  an  army  and  so  confident,  for 
the  French  soldiers  eagerly  demanded  a  battle,  should 
have  grappled  in  the  shortest  way;  a  just  and  rapid 
developm'?nt  of  Jourdan's  plan  would  probably  have 
cut  oft"  Hamilton's  Portuguese  and  the  brigade  in  the 
castle  of  Alba,  from  Calvariza  Ariba. 

On  the  otiier  hand,  Wellington,  who  was  so  well 
acquainted  with  his  ground,  desired  a  battle  on  either 
Bide  of  the  Tormes  ;  his  hope  was  indeed  to  prevent 
the  passage  of  that  river  until  the  rains  rendered  it 
unfordable,  and  thus  force  the  French  to  retire  from 
want  of  provisions  or  engage  him  on  the  position 
of  Christoval  ;  yet  he  also  courted  a  fight  on  the 
Arapiles,  those  rocky  monuments  of  his  former  vic- 
tory. He  had  sixty-eight  thousand  combatants  un- 
der arms,  fifty-two  thousand  of  which,  including  four 
thousand  British  cavalry,  were  Anglo-l'ortuguese, 
and  he  had  nearly  seventy  guns.  Tliis  force  he  had 
«o  disposed,  that  besides  Hamilton's  Portuguese, 
Chree  divisions  guarded  the  fords,  which  were  moreo- 
ver defended  by  cntr(>nchments,  and  the  whole  army 
might  have  been  united  in  good  time  upon  the  strong 
ridv«a  of(Jalvariza  Arihn,  and  on  the  two  Arapiles, 
where  the  superiority  of  fifteen  thousand  men  would 
B!;arcely  have  availed  the  French.  A  defeat  would 
only  have  sen*,  the  allies  to  Portugal,  whereas  a  victo- 
ry would  have  taken  them  once  more  to  Madrid.  To 
draw  in  Hamilton's  Portuguese,  and  the  troops  from 
Alba,  in  time,  would  have  been  a  vital  point;  but 
as  the  French,  if  they  did  not  surprise  the  allies, 
must  have  fought  their  way  up  from  the  river,  this 
danger  might  have  proved  less  than  could  have  been 


supposed  at   first  view.     In   fine,  the   general  was 
Wellington,  and  he  knew  his  ground. 

FRENCH  PASSAGE  OF  THE  TORMES.   RETREAT  TO  CIU- 
DAD RGDRIUO. 

Soult's  plan  being  adopted,  the  troops  in  the  dis- 
tant quarters  were  brought  up  ;  the  army  of  Portu- 
gal was  directed  to  make  frequent  demonstrationa 
against  Christoval,  Aldea,  Lengua,  and  the  fords 
between  Huerta  and  Alba  ;  the  road  over  the  hills  to 
the  Galisancho  fords  was  repaired,  and  two  trestle- 
bridges  were  constructed  for  the  passage  of  the  ar- 
tillery. The  design  was  to  push  over  the  united  ar- 
mies of  the  centre  and  the  south,  by  these  fords  ;  and 
if  this  operation  should  oblige  the  allies  to  withdraw 
from  Alba  de  Tormes,  the  army  of  Portugal  wus  to 
pass  by  the  bridge  at  that  place  and  by  the  fi)rds, 
and  assail  Wellington's  rear  ;  but  if  the  allies  main- 
tained Alba,  Drouet  was  to  follow  Soult  at  Gali- 
sancho. 

At  daybreak  on  the  14th  the  bridges  were  thrown, 
the  cavalry  and  infantry  passed  by  tiie  fords,  the  al- 
lies' outposts  were  driven  back,  and  Soult  took  a  po- 
sition at  Mozarbes,  having  the  road  from  Alba  to 
Tamames,  under  his  left  flank.  Meanwhile  Welling- 
ton remained  too  confidently  in  Salamanca,  and  when 
the  first  report  informed  him  that  the  enemy  were 
over  the  Tormes,  made  the  caustic  observation,  that 
he  would  not  recommend  it  to  some  of  them.  Soon, 
however,  the  concurrent  testimony  of  many  reports 
convinced  him  of  his  mistake,  he  galloped  to  the 
Arapiles,  and  having  ascertained  the  direction  of 
Soult's  march,  drew  off  the  second  division,  the  cav- 
alry, and  some  guns  to  attack  the  head  of  the  French 
column.  The  fourth  division  and  Hamilton's  Portu- 
guese remained  a.t  Alba,  to  protect  this  movement ; 
the  third  division  secured  tlie  Arapiles  rockf  ^ntil 
the  troops  from  San  Christoval  should  arrive  ;  and 
Wellington  wns  still  so  confident  to  drive  the  French 
back  over  the  Tormes,  that  the  bulk  of  the  troops  ('id 
not  quit  San  Christoval  that  day.  Nevertheless, 
when  he  reached  Mozarbes,  he  found  the  French, 
already  assembled  there,  too  strong  to  be  seriously 
meddled  v.'ith.  However,  under  cover  of  a  cannon- 
ade, which  kept  ofi' their  cavalry,  he  examined  their 
position,  which  extended  from  Mozarbes  to  the 
heights  of  Neustra  Sefiora  de  Utiero,  and  it  was 
so  good  that  the  evil  was  without  remedy  ;  where- 
fore drawing  oft"  the  troops  from  Alba,  and  destroy- 
ing the  bridge,  he  left  three  hundred  Sjinniards  in 
the  castle,  with  orders,  if  the  army  retired  the  next 
day,  to  abandon  the  place  and  save  themselves  aa 
they  best  could. 

During  the  night  and  the  following  morning  the 
allied  army  wns  united  in  the  position  of  the  Ara- 
piles, and  Wellington  still  hoped  the  French  would 
give  battle  there  ;  yet  he  placed  the  first  division 
at  Aldea  Tcjada,  on  the  Junguen  strenm,  to  secure 
that  passage  in  case  Soult  should  finally  oblige  him 
to  choose  between  Salamanca  and  Ciudad  Rodrigo. 
Meantime  the  army  of  Portugal  finding  the  bridge 
of  Alba  broken,  and  the  casth^  ocrui)ied,  crossed  the 
Tormes  at  Galisancho,  and  moved  u|)  to  the  rii'ge  of 
Sefiora  de  Utiera  ;  Soult,  who  had  commenced  forti- 
fying Mozarbes,  extended  his  left  at  the  snme  time 
to  the  height  of  Sefiora  de  la  Buena.  near  the  Ciudad 
Rodrigo  road,  yet  slowly,  because  the  ground  was 
heavy,  deep,  and  the  many  sources  of  the  .Tunguen 
and  the  Valmusa  streams,  were  fast  filling  from  the 
rain  and  impeded  his  march.  This  evolution  was 
nearly  the  same  as  that  practised  by  the  duke  of  Ha- 
gusa  at  the  battle  of  Salamanca  ;  but  it  was  made 
on  a  wider  circle,  by  a  second  ntnge  of  heights  en- 
closing, as  It,  were,  those  by  which  the  duke  of  Ragu- 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


537 


Ba  moved  on  that  day,  and  consequently,  b-eyond  the 
raach  of  sucii  a  sudden  attack  and  catastroplio.  The 
result  in  eacli  case  was  remarkable.  Marmont  clos- 
ing with  a  short  quick  turn,  a  falcon  striking  at  an 
eagle,  rCvieived  a  buffet  that  broke  his  pinions,  and 
spoiled  his  fligat.  Soult,  a  wary  kite,  sailing  slow- 
ly and  with  a  wide  wheel  to  seize  a  helpless  prey, 
lost  it  akogether. 

About  two  o'clock  lord  Wellington,  feeling  him- 
eelt"too  weak  to  attack,  and  seeing  the  French  cav- 
alry pointing  to  the  Ciudad  Rodrigo  road,  judged 
t!iS  king's  design  was  to  establish  a  fortified  head  of 
cantonments  at  Mozarb.'s,  and  then  operate  against 
tiie  allies'  communication  witii  Ciudad  Rodrigo; 
wherefore  suddenly  casting  his  army  into  three  col- 
umns, lie  crossed  the  Junguen,  and  tlien  covering 
his  left  rtank  with  his  cavalry  and  guns,  defiled,  in 
order  of  battle,  before  the  enemy  at  little  more  than 
cannon-siiot.  With  a  wonderful  boldness  and  facil- 
ity, and  good  fortune  also,  for  there  was  a  thick  fog 
and  a  heavy  rain  which  rendered  the  bye-ways  and 
fields  by  wiiich  the  enemy  moved  nearly  impassable, 
while  the  allies  had  the  us^  of  the  high-roads,  he 
carried  his  whole  army  in  one  mass  quite  round  the 
French  left:  thus  he  gained  the  Valmusa  river, 
where  he  halted  for  the  night,  in  the  rear  of  those 
who  had  been  threatening  him  in  front  only  a  few 
hours  before.  This  exjjloit  was  certainly  surpris- 
ing, but  it  was  not  creditable  to  tiie  generalsliip  on 
either  side  ;  for  first,  it  may  bo  asked,  v/liy  the  Eng- 
lish commander,  having  somewhat  carelessly  suffer- 
ed Soult  to  pass  the  Tormes  and  turn  his  position, 
waited  so  long  on  the  Arapiles  as  to  render  this 
dangerous  movement  necessary,  a  movement  which 
a  combination  of  bad  roads,  bad  weather,  and  want 
of  vigour  on  the  other  side,  rendered  possible  and  no 
m)re. 

It  has  been  said,  that  the  only  drawback  to  the 
duke  of  Dalmatia's  genius,  is  his  want  of  prompt- 
ness to  strike  at  tiie  decisive  moment.  It  is  cer- 
tainly a  great  thing  to  fight  a  great  battle  ;  and 
against  such  a  general  as  Wellington  and  such 
troops  as  the  British,  a  man  may  well  be  excused  if 
he  thinks  twice  ere  he  puts  his  life  and  fame,  and 
the  lives  and  fame  of  thousands  of  his  countrymen, 
the  weal  or  woe  of  nations,  upon  the  hazard  of  an 
event,  which  may  be  decided  by  the  existence  of  a 
ditch  five  feet  wide,  or  the  single  blunder  of  a  single 
fool,  or  the  cojifision  of  a  coward,  or  by  any  other  cir- 
cumGtanoe  however  trivial.  To  make  such  a  throw 
fijr  such  a  stake  is  no  light  matter.  It  is  no  mean 
consideration,  that  the  praise  or  the  hatred  of  na- 
tions, universal  glory  or  universal,  perhaps  eternal 
contempt,  waits  on  an  action,  the  object  of  which 
niiy  be  more  safely  gained  by  other  means,  for  in 
v/ar  there  is  infinit?  variety.  But  in  this  case  it  is 
impossible  not  to  perceive  that  the  French  general 
vacillated  after  the  passage  of  the  river,  purposely, 
perhaps,  to  avoid  an  action,  since,  as  I  liave  before 
shown,  lie  thought  it  unv/ise,  in  the  disjointed  state 
of  the  French  affairs  and  without  any  fixed  base  or 
reserves,  in  case  of  defeat,  to  fight  a  decisive  battle. 
Nor  do  I  blame  this  prudence,  for  though  it  be  cer- 
tain that  Ii3  v/ho  would  be  great  in  war  must  be  dar- 
ing, to  set  all  upon  one  throv/  belongs  only  to  an  ir- 
responsible chief,  not  to  a  lieutenant  whose  task  is 
but  a  portion  of  the  general  plan  ;  neither  is  it  wise, 
in  monarch  or  general,  to  fight  wlien  all  may  be  lost 
by  defeat,  unless  all  may  be  won  by  victory.  How- 
ever, the  king,  more  unfettered  than  Soult,  desired 
a  battle,  and  with  an  army  so  good  and  numerous, 
the  latter's  prudence  seems  misplaced  ;  he  should 
have  grappled  with  his  enemy,  and,  once  engaged 
at  any  point,  Wellington  could  not  have  continued 


his  retreat,  especially  with  the  Spaniards,  wlio  were 
incapable  of  dexterous  movements. 

On  the  16tli,  the  allies  retired  by  the  tliree  roads 
which  lead  across  the  Matilla  stream,  tlirough  'i'a- 
mames,  San  Munos,  and  Martin  del  Itio,  to  (Jiudad 
Rodrigo;  tlie  ligiit  division  and  the  cavalry  closed 
tlie  rear,  and  the  country  was  a  forest,  penetrab  e  in 
all  directions.  I'lie  army  bivouacked  in  the  eve- 
ning behind  the  Matilla  stream;  but  though  this 
march  was  not  more  tlian  twelve  miles,  the  strag- 
glers were  numerous,  for  the  soldiers,  meeting  with 
vast  herds  of  swine,  quitted  their  colours  by  liundreda 
to  shoot  them,  and  such  a  rolling  musketry  echoed 
through  the  forest  that  Wellington  at  fir^t  thought 
tlie  enemy  was  upon  him.  It  was  in  vain  tiiat  the 
stafi'ollicers  rode  about  to  stop  this  disgraceful  prac- 
tice, which  had  indeed  commenced  tlie  evening  be- 
fore ;  it  was  in  vain  that  Wellington  himself  cauEcd 
two  offenders  to  be  hanged,  the  hungry  toldiers  ttiil 
broke  from  the  columns,  the  property  of  whole  dis- 
tricts was  swept  away  in  a  few  hours,  and  tlie  army 
was  in  some  degree  placed  at  the  mercy  of  the  ene- 
my ;  tlie  latter,  however,  were  contented  to  glean  the 
stragglers,  of  vv'hom  they  captured  two  thousand,  and 
did  not  press  the  rear  until  evening  near  Matilla, 
where  their  lancers  fell  on,  but  were  soon  checked 
by  the  light  companies  of  the  twenty-eighth,  and 
afterwards  charged  by  the  fourteenth  dragoons. 

The  17th,  presented  a  difi'erent  yet  a  net  less  cu- 
rious scene.  During  the  night  the  cavalry  immedi- 
ately in  front  of  tiie  light  division  had,  ibr  tome  un 
known  reason,  filed  off"  by  the  flanks  to  the  rear 
without  giving  any  intimation  to  the  ini'antry,  wlio, 
trusting  to  the  horsemen,  had  thrown  out  their  pic- 
quets  at  a  very  short  distance  in  front.  At  day- 
break, while  the  soldiers  were  rolling  their  blanks- ta 
and  putting  on  their  accoutrements,  some  strange 
horsemen  were  seen  in  the  rear  of  the  bivouac  and 
were  at  first  taken  for  Spaniards,  but  very  soon  their 
cautious  movements  and  vivacity  of  gestures  shewed 
them  to  be  Frencli ;  the  troops  stood  to  arms,  and  in 
good  time,  for  five  hundred  yards  in  front  the  wood 
opened  on  to  a  large  plain,  on  which,  in  place  of  the 
British  cavalry,  eight  thousand  French  horsemen 
were  discovered  advancing  in  one  solid  mass,  yet 
carelessly  and  without  suspecting  the  vicinity  of 
tiie  British.  The  division  was  immediately  formed 
in  columns,  a  squadron  of  the  fourteeiith  dragoons 
and  one  of  the  German  hussars  came  hast'ly  up  frcm 
the  rear,  Julian  Sanchez'  cavalry  appeared  in  small 
parties  on  the  right  flank,  and  every  precaution  was 
taken  to  secure  the  retreat.  This  checked  the  ene- 
my, but  as  the  infantry  fell  back,  the  French,  though 
fearing  to  approach  their  heavy  masses  in  the  wood, 
sent  many  squadrons  to  the  right  and  left,  some  of 
which  rode  on  the  flanks  near  enough  to  bandy  wit, 
in  the  Spanish  tongue,  with  the  British  soldiers, 
wlio  marched  without  firing.  \'ery  soon,  however, 
the  signs  of  mischief  became  visible,  the  road  was 
strewed  with  baggage,  and  the  bat-men  came  run- 
ning in  for  protection,  some  wounded,  some  without 
arms,  and  all  breathless  as  just  escaped  from  a  sur- 
prise. The  thickness  of  the  forest  liad  enabled  the 
French  horsemen  to  pass  along  unpcrceived  on  the 
flanks  of  the  line  of  march,  and,  as  opportunity  of- 
fered, they  galloped  from  side  to  side,  sweeping 
away  the  baggage  and  sabreing  the  conchictors  and 
guards;  they  had  even  menaced  one  of  the  columns, 
but  were  checked  by  the  fire  of  the  artillery.  In 
one  of  these  charges  general  Paget  was  carried  off, 
as  it  were  from  the  midst  of  his  own  men,  and  it 
might  have  been  Wellington's  fortune,  for  he  also 
was  continually  riding  between  the  column!^  and 
without  an  escort.     Hov.-cver,  the  main  body  of  the 


538 


NAPIER'S   PEMNSULAk  WAR. 


[Book  XIX. 


army  soon  ])cpsecl  the  Huebra  river  and  took  post 
belund  it.  llie  rigiit  at  Tamames,  tlie  Isft  near  Boa- 
dilla,  tlie  centre  at  San  jlunoz,  Baena  Barba,  and 
GalI.;;fro  ile  Huebra. 

Wlieii  the  lig'iit  division  arrived  at  the  edge  of 
the  tabk'-land,  which  overhangs  the  fords  at  the  last 
named  place,  the  French  cavalry  suddenly  thicken- 
ed, and  t!ie  sharp  whistle  of  musket  bullets,  with 
the  splintering  of  branches  on  the  left,  showed  that 
their  infantry  were  also  up.  Soult,  in  the  hope  of 
forestalling  the  allies  at  Tamames,  had  pushed  his 
columns  towards  that  place  by  a  road  leading  from 
Salamanca  through  Vecinos,  but  finding  Hill's  troops 
in  his  front  turned  short  to  his  riglit  in  hopes  to  cut 
'vfthe  rear-guard,  which  led  to  the 

COMBAT    OF    THE    HfEBRA. 

The  English  and  German  cavalry,  warned  by  the 
musketry,  crossed  the  fords  in  time,  and  the  light 
division  should  have  followed  without  delay;  be- 
cause the  forest  ended  on  the  edge  of  the  table-land, 
and  the  descent  from  thence  to  the  river,  about  eight 
hundred  yards,  was  open  and  smooth,  and  the  fords 
of  the  Huebra  were  deep.  Instead  of  taking  the 
troops  down  quickly,  an  order,  more  respectful  to 
the  enemy's  cavalry  than  to  his  infantry,  was  given 
to  form  squares.  The  officers  looked  at  each  other 
in  amiz3mant,  but  at  that  moment  Wellington  for- 
tunately appeared,  and  under  his  directions  the  bat- 
talions instantly  glided  otf  to  the  fords,  leaving  four 
companies  of  the  forty-third  and  one  of  the  riflemen 
to  cover  the  passage.  These  companies,  spreading 
as  skirmishers,  were  immediately  assailed  in  front 
and  on  both  flanks,  and  with  such  a  fire  that  it  was 
evident  a  large  force  was  before  them  ;  moreover,  a 
drj^'ing  rain  and  mist  prevented  them  from  seeing 
their  adversaries,  and  being  pressed  closer  each  mo- 
ment they  gathered  by  degrees  at  the  edge  of  the 
wi»od,  where  they  maintained  their  ground  for  a 
quarter  of  an  hour,  then,  seeing  the  division  was  be- 
yond the  river,  they  swiftly  cleared  the  open  slope 
of  the  hill  and  passed  the  fords  under  a  very  sharp 
musketry.  Only  twenty-seven  soldiers  fell,  for  the 
tempest,  beating  in  the  Frenclimen's  faces,  baffled 
their  aim,  and  Ross'  guns,  playing  from  the  low 
ground  with  grape,  checked  the  pursuit,  but  the 
deep  bellowing  of  thirty  pieces  of  heavy  French  ar- 
tillery showed  how  critically  timed  was  the  passage. 

The  banks  of  the  Huebra  were  steep  and  broken, 
but  the  enemy  spread  his  infantry  to  the  riglit  and 
lift  along  the  edge  of  the  forest,  making  demonstra 
tions  on  every  side,  and  tliere  were  several  fords  to 
be  guarded ;  tlie  fifty-second  and  the  Portuguese  de 
fended  tliose  b^low,  Ross'  guns,  supported  by  the  ri 
flymen  and  tlie  forty-third  defended  those  above,  and 
b-iliind  the    right   of  the  light  division,  on  higher 
ground,  was  the  seventh  division.     The  second  di- 
vision, Hamilton's  Portuguese,  and  a  brigade  of  cav- 
alry were  in  front  of  Tamames,  and  thus  the  bulk  of 
the  army  was  massed  on  the  right,  huirging  tlie  Pe- 
na  da  Francia,  and  covering  the  roads  leading  toCi 
udad^as  well  as  tliose  leading  to  the  passes  of  the 
Gata  hills. 

In  this  situation  me  brisk  attempt  made  to  force 
the  forls  guarded  oy  the  fift.y-sei-ond,  wns  vigor- 
ously reoulsed  by  that  regiment,  but  the  skirmish- 
ing, and  tlie  cannonade,  which  never  slackened,  con- 
tinued until  dark  ;  and  heavily  the  French  artillery 
played  upon  the  light  ?nd  seventh  divisions.  The 
former,  forced  to  ke^p  near  the  fjrds,  and  in  column, 
lest  a  sudden  rush  of  cavalry  should  cnrry  off"  the 
guns  on  the  flat  ground,  were  plun;rfd  into  at  every 
round,  yet  suffered  little  loss,  becnusn  tlie  clnyoy  soil, 
aaturated  with  rain,  swallowed  the  shot  and  smoth- 


ered the  shells  ;  but  it  was  a  matter  of  astonishment 
to  see  the  seventh  division  kept  on  open  and  harder 
ground  by  its  commander,  and  in  one  luge  mnss, 
tempting  the  havoc  of  this  fire  for  hours,  wnen  a 
hundred  yards  in  its  rear  the  rise  of  the  hill,  and  the 
thick  forest,  would  have  entirely  covered  it  without 
in  any  manner  weakening  the  jwsition. 

On  the  18th,  the  army  was  to  have  drawn  off  be- 
fore daylight,  and  the  English  general  was  anxioua 
about  the  result,  because  the  position  of  the  Huebra, 
though  good  for  defence,  was  diflicult  to  remo\  e  from 
at  this  season  ;  the  roads  were  hollow  and  narrow, 
and  led  up  a  sleep  bank  to  a  table-land,  which  was 
open,  flat,  marshy,  and  scored  with  water  gull'.es  ; 
and  from  the  overflowing  of  one  of  the  streams  the 
principal  road  was  impassable  a  mile  m  rear  of  the 
position;  hence  to  bring  the  columns  off  in  time, 
without  jostling,  and  if  possible  without  being  at- 
tacked, required  a  nice  management.  All  the  bag- 
gage and  stores  had  marched  in  the  night,  with  or- 
ders not  to  halt  until  they  reached  the  high  lam-s 
near  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  but  if  the  preceding  days  had 
produced  some  strange  occurrences,  the  16th  was 
not  less  fertile  in  tliem. 

In  a  former  part  of  this  work  it  has  been  observed, 
that  even  tht  confirmed  reputation  of  lord  Welling- 
ton could  not  protect  him  from  the  vanity  and  pre- 
sumption of  subordinate  officers.  The  allusion  fixes 
here.  Knowing  that  the  most  direct  road  was  im- 
passable, he  had  directed  the  divisions  by  another 
road,  longer,  and  apparently  more  diflicult;  thia 
seemed  such  an  extraordinary  proceeding  to  some 
general  officers,  that,  after  consulting  together,  they 
deemed  their  commander  unfit  to  conduct  the  army, 
and  led  their  troops  by  what  appeared  to  them  the 
fittest  line  of  retreat !  3Icanwhile  Wellington,  who 
had,  before  daylight,  placed  liiinself  at  an  important 
point  on  his  own  road,  waited  impatiently  for  the 
arrival  of  the  leading  division  until  dawn,  and  then 
suspecting  something  of  what  had  happened,  gallop- 
ed to  the  other  road  and  found  the  would-be  com- 
manders, stopped  by  that  flood  which  his  arrange- 
ments had  been  made  to  avoid.  The  insubordina- 
tion, and  the  danger  to  the  whole  army,  were  alike 
glaring,  yet  tlie  practical  rebuke  was  so  severe  and 
well  timed,  the  humiliation  so  complete  and  so  deep- 
ly felt,  that,  with  one  proud  sarcastic  observation,, 
indicating  contempt  more  than  anger,  he  led  back 
the  troops  and  drew  otf  all  his  forces  safely.  How- 
ever some  confusion  and  great  danger  still  attended 
the  operation,  for  even  on  this  road  one  water-gully 
was  so  deep  that  the  light  division,  which  covered 
the  rear,  could  only  pass  it  man  by  man  over  a  felled 
tree,  and  it  was  fortunate  that  Soult,  unable  to  feed 
his  troopc  a  day  longer,  stopped  on  the  Huebra  with 
his  maiiv  body  and  only  sent  some  cavalry  to  Ta- 
mames. Thus  the  allies  retired  unmolested,  but 
whether  from  necessity,  or  from  negligence  in  the 
subordinates,  the  means  of  transport  were  too  scan- 
ty for  the  removal  of  the  wounded  men,  most  of 
whom  were  hurt  by  cannon-shot ;  many  were  lell 
bshind,  and  as  the  enemy  never  passed  the  Huebra 
at  this  point,  those  miserable  creatures  perished  by 
a  horrible  and  lingering  death. 

The  marshy  plains,  over  which  the  army  was  now 

marching,  exhausted   the   strength  of  the   wearied 

'  soldiers,  tliousands  straggled,  tlie  depredations  on  the 

herds  of  swine  were  repeated,  and  the  temper  of  the 

army,  sfenerally,  prognosticated  the  greatest  misfor- 

'  tunes  if  the  retreat  should  be  continued.    This  was, 

however,  tlie  last  day  of  trial,  for  towards  evening 

the  weather  cleared  up,  the  hills  near  Ciudad   Rod 

rigo  afforded  dry  bivouacs  and  fuel,  the  distribution 

,  of  good  rations  restored  the  strength  and  spirits  of 


I912.J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


539 


llie  ni3n,  and  tlie  next  day  Ciudad  Rodrijjo  and  the 
Eeighbouriiig  villages  were  occupied  in  tianqiiillity. 
The  cavalry  was  then  sent  oat  to  the  forest,  and  b.-- 
ing  aided  by  Julian  Sanchez'  partidas,  brought  in 
fro'Ti  a  thousand  to  fifteen  hundred  fetnigglers  who 
must  otherwise  have  perished.  During  these  events 
Jo&e,)h  occupied  Salamanca,  but  colonel  Miranda, 
the  Spanish  oMicer  left  at  Alba  de  Tormes,  held  that 
place  until  tlie  27th,  and  then  carried  oif  his  garri- 
son in  the  night. 

Thus  ended  tiie  retreat  from  Burgos.  The  French 
gathered  a  good  spoil  of  baggage  ;  what  the  loss  of 
the  allies,  in  men.  was,  cannot  be  exactly  determin" 
ed,  because  no  Spanisii  returns  were  ever  seen.'  An 
approximation  may,  however,  be  easily  made.  Ac- 
cording to  the  muster-rolls,  the  Anglo-Portuguese 
under  Wellington,  had  about  one  thousand  men  kill- 
ed, wounded  and  missing,  between  the  2:st  and  29th 
of  October,  which  was  the  period  of  their  crossing 
the  Duero,  but  this  only  refers  to  loss  in  action  ; 
Hill's  loss  between  the  Tagus  and  the  Tormes  was, 
including  stragglers,  about  four  hundred,  and  the  de- 
fence of  the  castle  of  Alba  de  Tormes  cost  one  hun- 
dred. Nov/  if  the  Spanish  regulars,  and  partidas, 
inarching  with  the  two  armies,  be  reckoned  to  have 
lost  a  thousand,  which,  considering  their  want  of 
discipline,  is  not  exaggerated,  the  whole  lops,  pre- 
vious to  the  French  passage  of  the  Tormes,  will 
amount  perhaps  to  three  thousand  men.  But  the 
loss  between  the  Tormes  and  the  Agucda  was  cer- 
tainly greater,  for  nearly  three  hundred  were  killed 
and  wounded  at  the  Huebra,  many  stragglers  died  in 
the  woods,  and  we  have  marshal  Jourdan's  testimo- 
ry,  that  the  prisoners,  Spanish,  Portuguese  and 
English,  brought  into  Salamanca  up  to  the  2Cth  No- 
vember, were  three  thousand  five  hundred  and  twen- 
ty. The  whole  loss  of  the  double  retreat  cannot, 
therefore,  be  set  down  at  less  than  nine  thousand, 
including  the  cost  of  men  in  the  siege  of  Burgos. 

I  have  been  the  more  precise  on  this  point,  be- 
cause some  French  writers  have  spoken  often  tl'ou- 
Band  being  taken  between  the  Tormes  and  the  Agu- 
eda,  and  general  Souham  estimated  the  previous 
loss,  including  the  siege  of  Burgos,  at  seven  thou- 
cand.  But  the  king,  in  his  despatches,  called  the 
whole  loss  twelve  thousand,  including  therein  tlie 
garrison  of  Chinchilla,  and  he  observed  that  if  the 
generals  of  cavalry,  Soult  iind  Tilley,  had  followed 
the  allies  vigorously  from  Salamanca,  the  loss  would 
have  been  much  greater.  Certainly  the  army  was 
so  little  pressed,  that  none  would  have  supposed  the 
French  horsemen  were  numerous.  On  the  other 
hand,  English  authors  have  most  unaccountably  re- 
duced the  British  loss  to  as  many  hundreds. 

Alt!iough  the  French  halted  on  the  Huebra,  the 
English  general  kept  his  troops  together  behind  the 
Agae-^a,  because  Soult  retired  with  the  troops  under 
his  immediate  command  to  Los  Santos  on  the  Upper 
Tormes,  thus  pointing  towards  the  pass  of  Bancs, 
and  it  was  rumoured  he  designed  to  march  th;it  way, 
with  a  view  to  invade  Portugal  by  the  \alley  of  tiie 
Tagub'.  Wellington  disbelieved  this  rumour,  but  he 
CDulil  not  disregard  it,  because  nearly  all  his  chan- 
nels of  intelligence  had  been  suddenly  dried  up  by  a 
tyrannical  and  foolish  decree  of  the  cortes,  which 
obliged  every  man  to  justify  himself  for  having  re- 
mained in  a  district  occupied  by  the  enemy,  and 
l)3nce,  to  avoid  persecution,  those  who  used  to  trans- 
n'lit  infirmation,  fled  from  their  homes.  Hill's  divi- 
Bion  was,  therefore,  moved  to  the  right  as  far  as  Ro- 
bledo,  to  cover  the  pass  of  Perales,  the  rest  of  the 
troops  were  r^ady  to  follow,  and  Penne  Villernur, 
leading  the  fifth  Spanish  army  over  the  Gata  moun- 
Uins,  occupied  Coria. 


.Joseph,  after  hesitating  whether  lie  should  leave 
the  army  of  the  £outli,  or  the  army  of  I'ortugal  in 
Castile,  finally  ordered  the  head-quarters  of  the  lat- 
ter to  be  fixed  at  \  alladolid,  and  of  the  tbrnier  at 
Toledo;  the  one  to  maintain  the  couiitry  between 
+  tie  Tormes  and  the  Eela,  tlie  other  to  occupy  La 
-Uancha  with  its  left,  tlie  valley  oftlie  Tagus,  as  far 
as  the  Tietar,  with  its  centre,  and  Avila  with  its 
right.  The  army  of  the  centre  went  to  Segovia, 
where  the  king  joined  it  with  his  guards,  and  when 
these  movements,  which  took  place  in  December, 
were  known,  Wellington  placed  his  army  also  in 
winter  quarters. 

The  fifth  Spanish  army,  crossing  the  Tagus  at 
Alacantara,  entered  Estrcmadura, 

Hill's  division  occupied  Coria  and  Placentia,  and 
held  the  town  of  Bejar  by  a  detachment. 

Two  divisions  were  quartered  on  a  second  line  he- 
hind  Hill,  about  Castello  Branco,  and  in  the  Upper 
Beira. 

The  light  division  remained  on  the  Agueda,  and 
the  rest  of  the  infantry  were  distributed  along  the 
Duero  from  Lamego  downwards. 

The  Portuguese  cavalry  were  placed  in  Moncor- 
vo,  and  the  British  cavalry,  with  the  exception  of 
Victor  Alton's  brigade,  which  was  attached  to  the 
light  division,  occupied  the  valley  of  the  Mcndego. 

Carlos  D'Espafia's  troops  garrisoned  Ciudad  kod- 
rigo,  and  the  Gallicians  marched  through  the  Tras 
OS  Monies  to  their  own  country. 

In  these  quarters  the  Anglo-Portuguese  were  ea- 
sily fed,  because  the  improved  navigation  of  the  Ta- 
gus, the  Douro,  and  the  Mondego,  furnished  water 
carriage  close  to  all  tlieir  cantonments  ;  moreover, 
the  army  could  be  quickly  collected  on  either  fron- 
tier, for  the  front  line  of  communication  from  Es- 
trcmadura, passed  by  the  bridge  of  Alcantara  to  Co 
ria,  and  from  thence  tlirongh  tiie  pass  of  Perales  to 
the  Agueda.  The  second  line  run  by  Penamacor 
and  Guinaldo;  and  both  were  direct;  but  the  post  of 
Bejar,  although  necessary  to  secure  Hill's  quarters 
from  a  Burpr.Ee,was  itself  exposed. 

The  French  also  had  double  and  direct  communi- 
cations across  the  Gredos  mountaiiis.  On  their  firs-t 
line  they  restored  a  Roman  road  leading  frcm  Hor- 
cajada,  on  the  Upper  Tormes,  by  the  Puerto  de  Pico 
to  Monbeltran,  and  from  thence  to  Talavcra.  To 
ease  their  second  line  they  finished  a  road,  begun  the 
year  before  by  Marmont,  leading  from  Avila,  by  the 
convent  of  Guisando  and  Escalona  to  Toledo.  But 
these  communications,  though  direct,  were  in  win- 
ter so  difficult,  that  general  Laval,  crossing  the 
mountains  from  Avila,  was  forced  to  harness  forty 
horses  to  a  carriage;  moreover,  Wellington,  having 
the  interior  and  shorter  lines,  was  in  a  more  meiiac 
ing  position  for  ofTence,  and  a  more  easy  pcsitioi: 
for  defence;  wherefore,  though  he  had  ordered  aL 
boats  to  be  destroyed  at  Almaraz,  Arzcbispo,  v.nu 
other  ]ioints  where  the  great  roads  came  down  to  the 
Tagus,  the  French,  as  anxious  to  prevent  him  from 
passing  that  river,  as  he  was  to  prevent  them,  sent 
parties  to  destroy  what  had  been  overlooked.  Each 
feared  that  the  other  would  move,  and  yet  neither 
wished  to  continue  the  campaign,  Wellington,  be- 
cause his  troops  wanted  rest,  more  than  cnc-third 
being  in  the  hospitals!  the  French,  because  they 
could  not  feed  their  men,  and  had  to  refix  their  gen- 
eral base  of  operations,  broken  up  and  deranged  as  it 
WHS  by  the  guerillas. 

The  English  general  was,  however,  most  at  his 

ease.    He  knew  that  the  best  French  officers  thought 

it  useless  to  continue  the  contest  in  Spain,  unless 

the  British   army  was  first  mastered,  Soult's  inter- 

I  cepted  letters  showed  him  how  that  general  desired 


540 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


LBooK  XIX. 


to  fix  the  war  in  Portunral,  and  there  was  now  a  most 
powerful  force  on  tlie  frontier  of  that  kingdom.  i3ut 
on  the  othor  hand  Badajos,  Ciudad  Rocirigo,  and  Al- 
meida, blocked  the  j)rincipal  entrances,  and  thnugli 
the  two  Ibnner  were  very  ill  provided  by  the  Span- 
iards, tiiey  were  in  little  daiigr^r,  because  tlie  last 
campaign  liad  deprived  the  French  of  all  their  ord- 
nance, arsenals,  and  magazines,  in  Anihilasia,  Al- 
maraz,  Madrid,  Salamanca,  and  Valladolid  ;  and  it 
was  nearly  impossible  for  them  to  make  any  impres- 
sion upon  Portugal,  until  new  establishments  were 
formed.  Wherefore  Wellington  did  not  fear  to 
spread  his  troops  in  good  and  tranquil  quarters,  to 
receive  reinforcements,  restore  their  equipments, 
and  recover  their  health  and  strength. 

This  advantage  was  not  reciprocal.  The  second- 
ary warfare  which  tlie  French  sustained,  and  which 
it  is  now  time  again  to  notice,  would  have  been  suf- 
ficient to  establisii  the  military  reputation  of  any  na- 
tion before  TSapoleon's  exploits  had  raised  the  stan- 
dard of  military  glory.  For  when  disembarrassed 
of  their  most  tbrmidable  enemy,  they  were  still  obli- 
ged to  chase  the  partidas,  to  form  sieges,  to  recover 
and  restore  tiie  posts  they  had  lost  by  concentrating 
their  armies,  to  send  moveable  columns  by  long  win- 
ter marches  over  a  vast  extent  of  country  for  food, 
fighting  for  what  tliey  got,  and  living  hard,  because 
the  magazines,  filled  from  the  fertile  districts,  were 
of  necessity  reserved  for  the  field  operations  against 
Wellington.  Certainly  it  was  a  great  and  terrible 
war  they  had  in  iiand,  and  good  and  formidable  sol- 
diers they  were  to  sustain  it  so  long  and  so  manfully 
amidst  the  many  errors  of  their  generals. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

Contimintioii  of  the  partizan  warfare — General  Lamf  th  niacle 
governor  of  S^ntcina — Reillc  tiike?  the  coniinaiKl  of  the  arin\ 
of  Portuiral — Droiiet,  count  D'Erlon,  coiiiiiiands  thai  of  ihe 
centre — Work*  of  Astor<;;a  (le-lroved  by  tlie  Spaniards — Mi- 
na's  operations  in  Aragon — Villa  Cainpa's  o|)eratton« — lunpe- 
rina  lo  an  I  others  ent»  r  Madrid — The  duke  Del  I'arcpie  end  r» 
La  Mane  ha — Klio  and  Bassecour  march  to  A  Ihacele  and  roin- 
nuiniiate  with  the  Anfflo-Sicllian  armv — The  kui'^  <  nt(  rs 
Madrid — Souk's  cavalry  sCour  La  Maiich-i--Siifh(  t's  opera- 
tions— (it-iiiial  Donkin  iiit  naces  D'liia — General  VV.  Cf  nlon 
takes  the  cocuinand  of  the  A  nulo-Sicilian  annv — Suchel  en- 
trenchf^s  a  cani[)  at  Xativa — J'he  A  n:;la-Sicilian  ariuv  f^ll^ 
inlo  disrepute- — G''neral  Canipl)ell  takes  the  coninian'! — Li- 
activity  of  the  army — T>»<!  Frayle  surpri-e>i  a  convov  of 
French  ariillery — Operation!'  in  Catalonia — Dissentioiis  in 
that  |)rc)vinc< — Krole«  and  Codi-iii^t'ui  menace  Tarragona — 
F,r  )lt-i  snip  ises  a  l'"renc,h  detschiiient  at  Arhecp. — Larv 
threaleiis  Afitaro.  and  Hostalrlch  returns  to  Viil. — Manso 
defeats  a  I'li  iich  delartnni^nt  near  Molino  del  Re\ — Decaen 
clef.-al-  the  united  Catalonian  army,  and  penetrates  tsi  Vici. — 
The  Spanish  divi'-ions  separati — Coloml  Villainil  atleiiipts 
to  surprise  San  Felinpe  de  JJela^ner — Attacks  it  a  second 
time  in  i-oivcert  with  Codrin';ton — The  place  suci-oured  b\ 
the  parrisoii  of  Tortuzt — Lacy  sullirs  a  Fr  nch  convoy  to 
reach  Barrel  ma.  is  accnseil  of  treachery  and  clisnUctd  — 
The  reirular  warl'are  in  Catalonia  ciases — The  partii^n  war 
fare  continues — England  the  real  support  ot  the  war. 

CONTINTJATION    OF    THE    PARTIZAN    WARFARE. 

I.N  the  north,  wliile  Souham  was  gathering  in 
front  of  Wellington,  some  of  IMonilizabars  bands 
blockaded  Santnna  by  lund,  and  Popliam,  after  his 
failure  nt  (lU'it'sria,  blockaded  it  by  sen.  It  was  not 
very  well  provisioned,  but  Na[)oleon,  alwnys  wntch- 
fut,  had  sent  an  especial  governor,  general  T.ameth, 
and  a  chosen  (sngineer,  general  D'Abadie,  from  Paris 
to  coin[)lete  tiie  works.  Hy  their  activity,  a  hun- 
dred and  twenty  pieces  of  c^innon  were  soon  mount- 
ed, and  they  had,  including  t!ie  crew  of  a  corvette, 
a  garris'n  of  eighteim  hundred  men.  I.ameth,  who 
was  obliged  to  fight  his  way  into  the  place  in  Sep- 


tember, also  formed  an  armed  flotilla,  with  which, 

when  the  English  squadron  was  driven  off  the  port 
by  gales  of  wind,  he  made  frequent  captures.  ]\lean- 
wh.le  Mendizabel  surprised  the  garrison  of  Brivies- 
ca,  Longa  captured  a  large  convoy  with  its  escort, 
near  Burgos,  and  all  the  bands  had  visibly  increased 
in  numbers  and  boldnes-s. 

When  Catfarelli  returned  from  the  Duero,  ReiUe 
took  the  command  of  the  army  of  Portugal,  Drtuet 
assumed  that  of  the  army  of  the  centre,  and  ^cuhaui, 
being  thus  cast  olf,  returned  to  France.  The  arn.y 
of  Portugal  was  then  Vvidely  spread  over  the  country. 
Avila  vvas  occupied,  Sarrut  took  pcsscssion  of  I  eon, 
tiie  bands  of  Marquinez  and  8alazar  were  bcsten.  and 
Foy,  marcliing  to  seize  Astorga,  surprised  and  cap- 
tured ninety  men  employed  to  ditmsntle  that  lort- 
ress  ;  but  above  twenty  breaches  had  already  been 
opened,  and  the  jilace  ceased  to  be  of  any  import- 
ance. Meanwliilc  Caf.arclli,  troubled  by  tlie  care  of 
a  number  of  convoys,  one  of  whicii,  under  general 
Frimont,  although  strongly  escorted,  and  having  two 
pieces  of  cannon,  fell  into  Longa's  hunds  the  >A  th  of 
November,  was  unable  to  commence  active  cj:ora- 
tious  until  the  29th  of  December.  Then  his  dctacii- 
ments  cliased  the  bands  from  Bilbao,  while  he  march- 
ed himself  to  succour  and  {.'rovision  Santcna  and  Gu- 
eteria,  and  to  re-cstabli&h  his  other  poets  olcng  the 
coasts:  but  while  he  was  near  Santona,  the  Sj^an 
iards  attacked  St.  Domingo  in  Navarre,  and  invett 
ed  Logrofia. 

Sir  Home  Popham  had  suddenly  quitted  the  bey  of 
Biscay  with  his  squadron,  leaving  a  lijvv  vessels  t'. 
continue  the  littoral  warfare,  which  enabled  Cafa 
roUi  to  succour  Santona  ;  important  events  IbHowed, 
but  the  account  of  them  must  be  deferred  as  belong- 
ing to  the  transactions  of  1810.  Meanwhile  tracii  g 
the  mere  chain  of  guerilla  operations  from  Biscay  to 
the  otiier  parts,  we  find  Abbe,  who  commanded  in 
Pampeluna,  Severoli,  who  guarded  tiie  right  of  the 
Ebro,  and  Pari?,  who  had  returned  from  A  alencia  to 
Zaragoza,  continucilly,  and  at  times  succej^siully,  at- 
tacked in  the  latter  end  of  1812;  for  after  Chrplan- 
garra's  exploit  near  Jacca,  Mina  intercepted  all  com- 
munication with  France,  and  on  the  22d  of  Novem- 
ber surprised  and  drove  back  to  Zaragoza,  with  loss 
a  very  large  convoy.  Then  he  besieged  the  cattle  cf 
lluesca,  and  wlien  a  considerable  force,  coming  iix-m 
Zaragoza,  iorced  him  to  desist,  he  reappeared  r t 
Barbastro.  Finally,  in  a  severe  action  fougiit  on  the 
heights  of  Sefiora  del  Poya,  towards  the  end  of  De- 
cember, his  troops  were  dispersed  by  colonel  Colbert, 
yet  tlie  French  lost  seventy  men,  nnd  in  a  few  weeks 
Mina  took  the  field  again,  with  tierces  mere  numer- 
ous tlian  he  had  ever  iiefbre  commanded. 

About  this  time  Villa  Canipa,  who  had  ertrenclied 
himself  near  Segorbe,  to  harass  Suchet's  recr,  wrs 
driven  from  thence  by  general  Panetier,  but  being 
afterwards  joined  by  (^ayan,  they  invested  the  cas- 
tle of  Daroca  with  three  thousand  men.  Severoli, 
marching  from  Zaragoza,  succoured  the  place,  yet 
Villa  Cam])a  reassembled  his  whole  force  near  Cari- 
nefia,  behind  Severoli,  who  was  forced  to  fight  his 
w.;y  home  to  Zaragoza.  Tlie  S|)aniards  reajipeared 
at  Almunia,  and  on  the  22nd  of  December,  another 
battle  was  fougiit,  when  Villa  Campa  being  defested 
with  considerable  slaughter,  retired  to  New  Castile, 
and  there  soon  repaired  his  losses.  Meanwhile,  in 
the  centre  of  Spain,  Elio,  Bassecour,  and  Fmiiecin- 
ado,  luiving  waited  until  the  great  French  armies 
passed  in  pursuit  of  Hill,  came  down  u[ion  Madrid. 
Wellington,  when  ot  Salamanca,  expected  that  this 
movement  would  call  off  some  trooj^s  from  the  Tor- 
mes,  but  trie  only  efiect  was  to  cause  the  garrison 
left  by  Joseph,  to  follow  the  great  army,  which  it 


isiy.1 


NAPIER'S  PENINSULAR  WAR. 


541 


rejoined,  betweer  die  Dcero  and  the  Tormes,  with 
a  great  encumbranca  of  civil  servants  and  families. 
Tti3  partidas  tiien  entered  the  city,  and  committed 
(Treat  excessea,  treating  the  people  as  enemies. 

Sotilt  and  Joseph  had  been  earnest  with  8uchet 
to  send  a  strong  division  by  Cuenca  as  a  protection 
for  Madrid,  and  that  marshal  did  move  in  person 
v/ith  a  considerable  body  of  troojis  as  far  as  Ileque- 
lia  on  the  2Sth  of  November,  but  being  in  fear  for 
b^s  line  towards  Alicant,  soon  returned  to  Valencia 
\.  a  state  of  indecision,  leaving  only  one  brigade  at 
Ceqaefia.  He  had  been  reinforced  by  three  thousand 
fresh  men  from  Catalonia,  yet  he  would  not  under- 
take any  operation  until  he  knew  something  of  the 
king's  progress,  and  at  Requena  he  had  gained  no 
intelligence  even  of  the  passage  of  the  Tagus.  The 
Spaniards  being  thus  uncontrolled,  gathered  in  all 
d^re'Jtions. 

'['he  duke  Del  Pamue  advanced  with  Ballesteros' 
army  to  Villa  Nueva  de  los  Infantes,  on  the  La  Slan- 
cha  side  of  the  Sierra  Morena,  his  cavalry  entered 
the  plains,  and  some  new  levies  from  Grenada,  came 
to  Aliiraz  on  his  right.  Elio  and  Bassecour,  leav- 
ing Madrid  to  the  partidas,  marched  to  Albacete, 
without  hindrance  from  Suchet,  and  reopened  the 
communication  witii  Alicant;  hence,  exclusive  of 
the  Sicilian  army,  nearly  thirty  thousand  regular 
Spanish  troops  were  said  to  be  assembled  on  the 
borders  of  Murcia,and  six  thousand  new  levies  came 
to  Cordoba  as  a  reserve.  However,  on  the  3d  of  De- 
cember, Joseph,  at  the  head  of  his  guards,  and  the 
army  of  the  centre,  drove  all  the  partidas  from  the 
capital,  and  reoccuijied  Guadalaxnra  and  the  neigh- 
bouring posts ;  Soult  entered  Toledo,  and  his  caval- 
ry advanced  towards  Del  Parque,  who  immediately 
recrossed  the  3Iorena,  and  then  the  French  horse- 
man swept  La  Mancha  to  gather  contributions  and 
to  fill  the  magazines  at  Toledo. 

By  these  operations,  Del  Parque,  now  joined  by 
the  Grenadan  troops  from  Alcaraz,  was  separated 
from  Elio,  and  Suchet  was  relieved  from  a  danger 
wiiich  he  had  dreaded  too  much,  and  by  his  own  in- 
action contributed  to  increase.  It  is  true  he  had  all 
tlie  sick  men  belonging  to  the  king's  and  to  Soult's 
ar;jiy  on  his  hands,  but  he  had  also  man)'  etfective 
in  m  of  those  armies ;  and  though  the  yellow  fever 
had  s'lewn  itself  in  some  of  his  hospitals,  and  though 
he  was  also  very  uneasy  for  the  security  of  his  base 
in  Vragon,  where  the  partida  warfare  was  reviving, 
y  ;t,  with  a  disposable  force  of  fifteen  thousand  in- 
fuitry,  and  a  fine  division  of  cavalry,  he  should  not 
hav^  permitted  Elio  to  pass  his  flank  in  the  manner 
h'.  did.  He  was  afraid  of  the  Sicilian  army,  which 
had  indeed  a  great  influence  on  all  the  preceding  op- 
erations, for  it  is  certain  that  Suchet  would  other- 
wise have  detached  troops  to  Madrid  by  the  Cuenca 
road,  and  then  Soult  would  probably  have  sought  a 
battle  between  the  Tagus  and  the  Guadarama  moun- 
tains ;  but  this  influence  arose  entirely  from  the  po- 
E'^tion  of  the  Alicant  army,  not  from  its  operations, 
wiileh  were  feeble  and  vacillating. 

Maitland  had  resigned  in  the  beginning  of  Oc- 
tober, and  his  successor,  Mackenzie,  immediately 
pushed  out  some  troops  to  the  front,  and  there  was  a 
Biiglit  descent  upon  Xabea  by  the  navy,  but  the  gene- 
ral remained  without  plan  or  object,  the  only  signs  of 
vitality  being  a  fruitless  demonstration  against  the 
castle  of  Denia,  wliere  general  Donkin  disembarked 
0:1  the  4th  of  October  with  a  detachment  of  the 
eighty-first  regiment.  The  walls  had  been  reprc- 
fiented  as  weak,  but  they  were  found  to  be  high  and 
(Strong,  and  the  garrison  had  been  unexpectedly 
doubled  that  morning,  hence  no  attack  took  place, 
and   iu   the  evening  a  second  reinforcement  arriv- 


ed, whereupon  the  British  re-embarked.  However, 
the  water  was  so  full  of  pointed  rocks  that  it  waa 
only  by  great  exertions  lieutenant  Penruddocke, 
of  the  Fame,  could  pull  in  the  boats,  and  the  sol- 
diers, wading  and  fighting,  got  on  board  with  little 
loss  indeed,  but  in  confusion. 

Soon  after  this,  general  William  Clinton  came 
from  Sicily  to  take  the  command,  and  Wellington, 
who  was  tlien  before  Burgos,  thinking  Suchet  would 
weaken  his  army  to  help  the  king,  recommended  an 
attempt  upon  the  city  of  Valencia,  either  by  a  coast 
attack  or  by  a  land  operation,  warning  Clinton,  how- 
ever, to  avoid  an  action  in  a  cavalry  country.  This 
was  not  very  difficult,  because  the  land  was  gener- 
ally rocky  and  mountainous,  but  Clinton  would  not 
stir  without  first  having  possession  of  the  citadel  of 
Alicant,  and  thus  all  things  fell  into  disorder  and 
weakness.  For  the  jealous  Spanish  governor  would 
not  suffer  the  British  to  hold  even  a  gate  of  the 
town,  na)"^,  he  sent  Elio  a  large  convoy  of  clothing 
and  other  stores  with  an  escort  of  only  twenty  men, 
that  he  might  retain  two  of  that  general's  battal- 
ions to  resist  the  attempt  which  he  believed  or  pre- 
tended to  believe  Clinton  would  make  on  the  cita- 
del. Meanwhile  that  general,  leaving  Whittingham 
and  Roche  at  Alcoy  and  Xixona,  drew  in  his  other 
troops  from  the  posts  previously  occupied  in  front 
by  Mackenzie ;  he  feared  Suchet's  cavalry,  but  the 
marshal,  estimating  the  allied  armies  at  more  than 
fifty  thousand  men,  would  undertake  no  serious  en- 
terprise while  ignorant  of  the  king's  progress  against 
lord  Wellington.  He,  however,  diligently  strength- 
ened his  camp  at  St.  Felippe  de  Xativa,  threw  an- 
other bridge  over  the  Xucar,  entrenched  the  passoa 
in  his  front,  covered  Denia  with  a  detachment, 
obliged  Whittingham  to  abandon  Alcoy,  dismantled 
the  extensive  walls  of  Valencia,  and  Ibrtified  a  cita- 
del there. 

It  was  in  this  state  of  affairs  that  Elio  came  down 
to  Albacete,  and  priding  himself  upon  the  dexterity 
with  which  he  had  avoided  the  French  armies,  pro- 
posed to  Clinton  a  combined  attack  upon  Suchet. 
Elio  greatly  exaggerated  his  own  numbers,  and  giv- 
ing out  tha.t  Del  Parque's  force  was  under  his  com- 
mand, pretended  that  he  could  bring  forty  thousand 
men  into  the  field,  four  thousand  being  cavalry. 
But  the  two  Spanish  armies,  if  united,  would  scarce- 
ly have  produced  twenty  thousand  really  effective 
infantry  ;  moreover,  Del  Parque,  a  sickly  unwieldy 
person,  was  extremely  incapable,  his  soldiers  were 
discontented  and  mutinous,  and  he  had  no  intention 
of  moving  beyond  Alcaraz. 

With  such  allies  it  was  undoubtedly  difficult  for 
the  English  general  to  co-operate,  yet  it  would  seem 
sometliing  considerable  might  have  been  effected 
while  Suchet  was  at  Requena,  even  before  Elio  ar- 
rived, and  more  surely  after  that  general  had  reached 
Albacete.  Clinton  had  then  twelve  thousand  men 
of  which  five  thousand  were  British:  there  was  a 
fleet  to  aid  his  operations,  and  the  Spanish  infantry 
under  Elio  were  certainly  ten  thousand.  Nothing 
was  done,  and  it  was  because  nothing  was  attempt- 
ed, that  Napoleon,  who  watched  this  quarter  close- 
ly, assured  Suchet,  tliat  however  difficult  his  posi- 
tion was  from  the  extent  of  country  he  had  to  keep 
in  tranquillity,  the  enemy  in  his  front  was  not  real- 
ly formidable.  Events  justified  this  observation. 
The  French  works  were  soon  completed,  and  the 
British  army  fell  into  surh  disrepute,  that  the  Span- 
iards, with  sarcastic  malice,  affirmed  it  was  to  be 
put  under  Elio  to  make  it  useful. 

Meanwhile  Roche's  and  Wliittingham's  division 

continued  to  excite  the  utmost  jealousy  in  the  other 

[Spanish  troops,  who  asked,  very  reasonably,  what 


542 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XIX. 


they  did  to  merit  such  advantages  1  England  paid 
and  clothed  them,  and  the  Spaniards  were  bound  to 
feed  tlieni ;  tiiey  did  not  do  so,  and  Canga  Arguelles, 
the  inteniiant  of  the  province,  asserted  that  he  had 
twice  provided  magazines  ibr  them  in  Alicant,  which 
were  twice  plundered  by  the  governor;  ;ind  yet  it  is 
certain  that  the  othar  .Spanisli  troops  were  far  worse 
olf  than  these  divisions.  But  on  evwry  side  in- 
trigues, discontent,  vacillation,  and  woal<ness  were 
visible,  and  again  it  was  shewn,  that  it"  England  was 
the  stay  of  the  Peninsula,  it  was  Wellington  alone 
who  supported  the  war. 

On  tiie  22nd  of  November,  the  obstinacy  of  the 
governor  being  at  last  overcome,  he  gave  up  the  cit- 
adel of  Alicant  to  the  Britisli,  yet  no  offensive  oper- 
ations followed,  though  Sucliet,  on  the  26th,  drove 
Roche's  troops  out  of  Alcoy  with  loss,  and  defeated 
the  Spanish  cavalry  al  Yecla.  However,  on  tiie  2nd 
of  December,  general  Campbell,  arriving  from  Sicily 
with  four  thousand  men,  principally  British,  assum- 
ed the  command,  making  the  fourth  general-in-chief 
in  the  same  number  of  months.  His  presence,  the 
strong  reinf  ircemsnt  he  brought,  and  the  intelli- 
gence that  lord  William  Bentinck  was  to  follow 
with  another  reinforcement,  again  raised  the  public 
expectation,  aiid  Elio  immediately  proposed  that 
the  British  should  occupy  the  enemy  on  the  Lower 
Xucar,  while  the  Spaniards,  crossing  that  river,  at- 
tacked Requeua.  However,  general  Campbell,  af- 
ter making  some  feeble  demonstrations,  declared  he 
would  await  lord  William  Bentinck's  arrival.  Then 
the  Spanish  general,  wlio  had  hitherto  abstained 
from  any  disputes  with  the  British,  became  ex- 
tremely discontented,  and  dispersed  his  army  for 
subsistence.  On  the  other  hand,  the  English  gen- 
eral complained  that  Elio  had  abandoned  him 

Suchct,  expecting  Campbell  to  advance,  had  with- 
drawn his  outposts  to  concentrate  at  Xatlva,  but 
when  he  found  him  as  inactive  as  liis  predecessors, 
and  saw  the  Spanisli  troops  scattered,  he  surprised 
one  Spanish  post  at  Onteniente,  another  in  Ibi,  and 
reoccupied  all  his  former  offensive  positions  in  front 
of  Alicant.  Soult's  detachments  were  now  also  felt 
in  La  Mancha,  wherefore  Elio  retired  into  Murcia, 
and  Del  Parque,  as  we  have  seen,  went  over  the 
Morena.  Thus  the  storm  which  had  menaced  tlie 
French  disappeared  entirely,  for  Campbell,  follow- 
ing his  instructions,  refused  rations  to  Wliitting- 
ham's  corps,  and  desired  it  to  separate  for  the  sake 
of  suljsistence  ;  and  as  the  rest  of  the  Spanish  troops 
wers  actually  starving,  no  danger  was  to  be  appre- 
hended from  them:  nay,  Hahert  marched  up  to  Ali- 
cant, killed  and  wounded  some  men  almost  under 
the  walls,  and  the  Anglo-Italian  soldiers  deserted  to 
him  by  whole  companies  when  opportunity  offered. 

Suchet  did  as  he  pleased  towards  his  front,  but  he 
was  unquiet  for  his  nar,  for  besides  the  operations 
of  Villa  Cninpa,  Ciayan,  Duran  and  Mina  in  /Vragon, 
tiie  Frayh:"  aiid  other  portida  chiefs  continually  vexed 
his  coiii'iiunications  with  Tortoza.  Fifty  men  had 
been  surprised  and  destroyed  near  Segorbe  the  22nd 
of  November,  by  Villa  Campa;  and  general  Pane- 
tier,  wlio  was  sent  against  that  chief,  though  he 
took  and  destroyed  his  entrenched  camp,  was  unable 
to  bring  him  to  action  or  to  prevent  him  from  going 
to  Aragon  and  attacking  Daroca,  as  I  have  bef>:;re 
Bhown.  Meanwhile  the  Frayle  surprised  and  de- 
stroyed an  ordnance  convoy,  took  sever.il  guns  and 
four  hundred  horses,  and  killed  in  cohl  blood,  after  the 
action,  above  a  hundred  artillery-men  and  officers. 
A  moveable  column  being  immediately  despatched 
against  him,  destroyed  his  depots  and  many  of  his 
men,  but  the  Frayle  himself  escaped  and  soon  reap- 
peared upon  the  communications     'J  he  loss  of  this 


convoy  was  the  first  disgrace  of  the  kind  which  ha4 
betliUen  the  army  of  Aragon,  and  to  use  Suchet's  ex- 
pression, a  battle  would  have  cost  him  less. 

Nor  were  the  Spaniards  quite  inactive  in  Catalo- 
nia, although  the  departure  of  general  Maitland  had 
so  disjiirited  them  tliat  the  regular  warfare  was  upon 
the  point  of  ceasing  altogether.  The  active  army 
was  indeed  stated  to  be  twenty  thousand  strong,  and 
the  tercios  of  reserve  lorty-tive  tliousand  ;  yet  a  col- 
umn of  nine  hundred  French  controlled  the  sea-line 
and  cut  olF  all  supplies  landed  for  the  interior.  La- 
cy, who  remained  about  Vich  with  seven  thousand 
men,  affirmed  tliat  he  could  not  teed  his  army  on  the 
coast,  but  captain  Codrington  says  that  nineteen 
feluccas,  laden  with  flour,  had,  in  two  nights  only, 
landecrtheir  cargoes  between  3Iattaro  and  Barcelona 
for  tiie  supply  of  the  latter  city,  and  that  these  and 
many  other  ventures  of  the  same  kind  might  have 
been  captured  without  ditficulty;  that  Claros  and 
ALilaus  continued  corru'ptly  to  connive  at  the  pas- 
sage of  French  convoys  ;  that  the  rich  merchants  of 
Mattaro  and  Arens  invited  the  enemy  to  protect 
their  contraband  convoys  going  to  France,  and  yet 
accused  him  publicly  of  interrupting  their  lawful 
trade,  when  in  fact  he  was  only  disturbing  a  trea- 
sonable commerce,  carried  on  so  openly  that  he  was 
forced  to  declare  a  blockade  of  the  whole  coast.  A 
plot  to  deliver  up  tiie  Medas  islands  was  also  dis- 
covered, and  when  Lacy  was  pressed  to  call  cut  the 
Somatenes,  a  favourite  project  with  the  English 
naval  officers,  he  objected  that  he  could  scarcely  feed 
and  provide  ammunition  for  the  regular  troops.  He 
also  observed  tliat  the  general  eflorts  of  that  nature 
hitherto  made,  and  under  more  favourable  circum 
stances,  had  produced  only  a  waste  of  life,  of  treas- 
ure, of  provisions,  of  ammunition  and  of  arms,  and 
now  the  French  possessed  all  the  strong  places. 

At  this  time  so  bitter  were  the  party  dissensions 
that  sir  Edward  Pellew  anticipated  the  ruin  of  the 
princlpaliiy  from  that  cause  alone.  Lacy,  Sarzfield, 
Eroles,  and  captain  Codrington,  continued  their  old 
disputes,  and  Sarzfield,  wiio  was  then  in  Aragon, 
had  also  quarrelled  with  Mina;  Lacy  made  a  tbrnial 
requisition  to  have  Codrington  recalled,  tlie  junta  of 
Catalonia  made  a  like  demand  to  the  regency  re- 
si)ecting  Lacy,  and  meanwhile  such  was  tlie  mitx'ry 
of  the  soldiers,  tliat  the  ofhcers  of  one  regiment  ac- 
tually begged  at  tlie  doors  of  private  houses  to  ob- 
tain old  clothing  for  their  men,  and  even  this  poor 
succour  was  denied.  A  few  feeble  isolated  etlorts 
by  some  of  the  partizan  generals,  were  tlie  only 
signs  of  war  when  Wellington's  victory  at  Salaman- 
ca again  raised  the  spirit  of  the  province.  'J'hcn 
also,  for  the  first  time,  the  new  constltuticn  adopted 
by  tlie  cortes  was  proclaimed  in  Catalonia,  tlie  junta 
of  that  province  was  suppressed,  Eroles,  the  peo- 
ple's favourite,  obtained  greater  powers,  and  was 
even  flattered  with  the  hope  of  becoming  ccptain- 
general,  for  the  regency  had  agreed  at  last  to  rcca! 
Lacy.  In  fine,  the  aspect  of  atlairs  chsnged,  and 
many  thousand  I'higllsh  muskets  and  ether  weap- 
ons, were,  by  sir  Edward  Pellew,  given  to  the  par'i- 
zans  as  well  as  to  tlie  regular  troops,  which  enabh  d 
them  to  receive  cartridges  from  the  ships  instead 
of  the  loose  powder  tormerly  demanded  on  account 
of  the  difi(3rence  in  the  bore  of  the  Spanisli  muskets. 
The  effect  of  these  happy  coincidences  was  scon  dis- 
jdayed.  Eroles,  who  had  raised  a  new  division  of 
three  thousand  men,  contrived,  in  concert  with  Cod- 
'  rington,  a  combined  movement  in  Sejiteniber  against 
iTaragona.  Marching  in  the  night  of  the  27th,  from 
Reus  to  the  mouth  of  the  Francoli,  he  was  met  by 
I  the  boats  of  tiie  squadron,  and  having  repulsed  a  sal- 
ly from    the   fijrtress,   drove   some   Catalans   in  the 


1812.] 


NAPIER'S    PEN  INSULA  [t    WAR. 


543 


French  service  from  the  ruins  of  the  Olivo,  while 
the  boats  swept  the  mole,  taking  five  vessels.  Af- 
ter this  affair  Eroles  encampad  on  the  liill  separa- 
ting Lerida,  Taragona,  and  Tortoza,  meaning  to  in- 
tercept the  communication  bjtween  those  places  and 
to  keep  up  an  intercourse  with  the  fleet,  now  tlie 
more  necessary  because  Lacy  had  lost  tliis  advant- 
age eastward  of  Barcelona.  While  thus  posted  he 
heard  tliat  a  French  detachment  had  come  from  Le- 
rida to  Arbsca,  wherefore  making  a  forced  march 
over  tiie  mountains  he  surprised  and  destroyed  the 
greatest  part  on  the  2nd  of  October^  and  then  re- 
turned to  his  former  quarters. 

Meanwiiile  Lacy  embarked  scaling  ladders  and 
battering  guns  on  board  the  English  ships,  and 
made  a  pompous  movement  against  Mattaro  with 
his  whole  force,  yet  at  the  moment  of  execution 
changed  his  plan  and  attempted  to  surprise  Hostal- 
rich,  but  he  let  this  design  be  known,  and  as  the 
enemy  prepared  to  succour  the  place,  he  returned  to 
Vich  without  doing  any  thing.  During  these  oper- 
ations Manso  defeatsd  two  hundred  French  near 
Molino  del  Rey  gained  some  advantages  over  one 
Pelligri.  a  French  miguelette  partizan,  and  captur- 
ed some  French  boats  at  Mattaro  after  Lacy's  de- 
parture. However,  SarzAeld's  mission  to  raise  an 
army  in  Aragon  had  failed,  and  Decaen,  desiring  to 
check  the  reviving  spirit  of  tlie  Catalans,  made  a 
combined  movement  against  Vich  in  tiie  latter  end 
of  October.  Lacy  immediately  drew  Eroles,  Man- 
so,  and  Milans  towards  that  point,  and  thus  the  fer- 
tile country  about  Reus  was  again  resigned  to  the 
French,  the  intercourse  with  the  fleet  totally  lost, 
and  the  garrison  of  Taragona,  which  had  been  great- 
ly straitened  by  tlie  previous  operations  of  Eroles, 
was  relieved.  Yet  the  defence  of  Vich  was  not  se- 
cured, f)r  on  the  3rd  of  November,  one  division  of 
the  French  forced  the  main  body  of  the  Spaniards, 
under  Lacy  and  3Iilans,  at  the  passes  of  Puig  Gra- 
cioso  and  Congosto,  and  though  the  other  divisions 
were  less  successful  against  Eroles  and  31anso,  at 
St.  Filieu  de  Codenas,  Decaen  readied  Vich  the 
4th.  Tae  Catalans,  who  had  lost  altogether  above 
five  hundred  men,  then  separated  ;  Lacy  went  to  the 
h'Us  n3ar  Momblanch,  Milans  and  Rovira  towards 
UloL,  and  Manso  to  Montserrat. 

Eroles  returned  to  Reus,  and  was  like  to  have 
surprised  the  Col  de  Bala.guer,  for  he  sent  a  deiach- 
nient  under  colonel  Villamil,  dressed  in  Italian  uni- 
forms, which  had  been  taken  by  Rovira  in  Figueras, 
and  his  men  were  actually  admitted  within  the  pal- 
isade of  the  fort  before  the  garrison  perceived  the 
deceit.  A  lieutenant  with  sixteen  men  placed  out- 
side were  taken,  and  tiiis  loss  was  magnified  so 
ni'jch  to  Eroles  t'lat  he  ordered  Villamil  to  make 
a  more  r:!gu1ar  attack.  To  aid  him  Codrington 
brought  up  the  Blake,  and  landed  some  marines,  yet 
no  impression  was  made  on  the  garrison,  and  the  al- 
lies retired  on  the  17th  at  the  approach  of  two  thou- 
sind  men  sent  from  Tortoza.  Eroles  and  Manso 
then  vainly  united  near  Manresa  to  oppose  Decaen, 
who,  coming  down  from  Vich,  forced  his  way  to 
Reus,  seized  a  vast  quantity  of  corn,  supplied  Tara- 
gona, and  then  marched  to  Barcelona. 

These  operations  indisjiutably  proved  that  there 
was  no  real  power  of  resistance  in  the  Catalan  ar- 
my, but  as  an  absurd  notion  prevailed  that  Sonlt, 
Suchet,  and  .Joseph  were  coming  with  their  armies 
in  one  body  to  France,  through  Catalonia,  Lacy  en- 
deavoured to  cover  his  inactivity  by  pretending  a 
design  to  raise  a  large  force  in  Aragon,  v/ith  which 
to  watch  this  retreat,  and  to  act  as  a  flanking  corps 
to  lord  Wellington,  who  was  believed  to  be  then  ap- 
proaching Zaragoza.    Such  r.raours  served  to  amuse 


the  Catalans  for  a  short  time,  but  the  sense  of  their 
real  weakness  soon  rcturne<l.  In  December,  I?crto- 
letti,  the  governor  ot  Taragona,  marched  upon  Kens, 
and  defeated  some  hundred  men  who  had  reussem- 
bled  there;  and  at  tiie  same  time  a  I'rench  con- 
voy for  Barcelona,  escorted  by  three  thcutand  men, 
passed  safely  in  the  face  of  six  thousand  Catalan  sol- 
diers, who  were  desirous  to  attack,  but  were  pre- 
vented by  Lacy. 

The  anger  of  the  people  and  of  the  troops  also,  on 
this  occasion,  was  loudly  expressed.  Lacy  was  open- 
ly accused  of  treachery,  and  was  soon  after  recalled. 
However,  Eroles,  who  had  ccme  to  Cape  Salcu  to 
obtain  succour  from  the  squadron  for  his  suffering 
soldiers,  acknowledged  that  the  resources  of  Catalo- 
nia were  worn  out,  the  spirit  of  the  people  broken 
by  Lacy's  misconduct,  and  the  army,  reduced  to  less 
than  seven  thousand  men,  naked  and  famishing.  Af- 
fairs w'ere  so  bad,  that  expecting  to  be  made  captain- 
general  he  was  reluctant  to  accept  that  ctiice,  and 
the  regular  warfare  was  in  fact  extinguislied,  for 
Sarzlield  was  now  acting  as  a  partizon  on  the  Ebro 
Nevertheless,  tiie  French  were  greatly  dismayed  at 
the  disasters  in  Russia;  their  three  was  weakened 
by  the  drafts  made  to  fill  up  the  ranks  of  ISapoleon's 
new  army  ;  and  the  war  of  the  partidas  continued, 
especially  along  the  banks  of  the  Ebro,  where  Sarz- 
field,  at  the  head  of  Eroles'  ancient  division,  which 
he  had  carried  with  him  out  of  Catalonia,  acted  in 
concert  with  Mina,  Duran,  Villa  Campa,  tlie  Frayle, 
Pendencia,  and  other  chiefs,  who  were  busy  upon 
Suchet's  communication  between  Tortoza  and  Va- 
lencia. 

Aragon  being  now  unquiet,  and  Navarre  and  Bis- 
cay in  a  state  of  insurrection,  the  French  forces  in 
the  interior  of  Spain  were  absolutely  invested. 
Their  front  was  opposed  by  regular  armies,  iheir 
flanks  annoyed  by  the  British  squadrons,  and  their 
rear,  from  the  Bay  of  Biscay  to  the  Mediterrane- 
an, plagued  and  stung  by  this  chain  of  partidas  and 
insurrections.  And  England  was  the  cr.use  of  all 
this.  England  was  the  real  deliverer  of  the  penin- 
sula. It  was  her  succours  thrown  into  Biscay  that 
liad  excited  the  new  insurrection  in  the  northern 
provinces,  and  enabled  Mina  and  the  other  chiefs  to 
enter  Aragon,  while  Wellington  drew  the  great 
masses  of  the  French  towards  Portugal.  It  was 
that  insurrection,  so  forced  on,  which,  notwithstand- 
ing the  cessation  of  the  regular  warfare  in  Catalo- 
nia, gave  life  and  activity  to  the  partidas  of  the 
south.  It  was  the  army  from  Sicily  which,  though 
badly  commanded,  by  occupying  the  attention  of 
Suchet  in  front,  obliged  him  to  keep  his  forces  to- 
gether instead  of  hunting  down  the  bands  on  his 
communications.  In  fine,  it  was  the  troops  of  Eng- 
land who  had  shocked  the  enemy's  front  of  biittle, 
the  fleets  of  England  which  had  menaced  liis  flanka 
with  disembarkations, the  money  and  stores  of  Eng- 
land which  liad  supported  the  partidas.  Every  part 
of  the  Peninsula  was  pervaded  by  her  influence,  or 
her  warriors,  and  a  trembling  sense  of  insecurity 
was  communicated  to  the  French  wherever  their 
armies  were  not  united  in  masses. 

Such  then  were  the  various  mil'.tiry  events  of  the 
year  1812,  and  the  Eiiglish  general,  taking  a  view 
of  the  whole,  judged  that  hov.-ever  anxious  the 
French  might  be  to  invade  Portugal,  they  would  be 
content  during  the  v/inter  to  gatlier  provisions  and 
wait  for  reinforcements  from  France  wherewith  to 
strike  a  decisive  blow  at  his  army.  But  those  rein- 
forcements never  came.  Napoleon,  unconquered  of 
man,  had  been  vanquished  by  tiie  elements  The 
fires  vM  the  snows  of  Moscow  combined,  had  shat- 
tered his  strength,  and  in  confessed  madness,  nations 


514 


NAPir:R'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XIX. 


and  riilors  rojoiced,  that  n.n  enterprise,  at  once  the 
grandest,  tha  most  provident,  the  most  benclicial, 
ever  att3mpt3d  by  a  warrior-btatesmen,  liad  been 
f  jilod :  they  rejoiced  that  Napoleon  had  failed  to  re- 
efjtablisli  uahappy  Poland  as  a  barrier  against  the 
most  formidable  and  brutal,  the  most  swinish  tyran- 
ny, th;it  lias  ever  menaced  and  disgraced  Euro])ean 
civilization. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Gf  neral  o')s<>rvatir)n« — ^Wrll'ii.tin   reproaches   the  army — Hi- 

reiisiir'S    in  li-irriiiiin.itc Vunlyis  ol    his   CMiiioaion — Ciil;- 

risiiis  of.Ioiiini  aivl  uthets  exaniiie.  ' — E^^or^^  of  fx<cuii'>ii — 
The  FmiiC  I  iip^  rntiari-i  aiial'.zed — Sir  John  JVluorc's  rctr.ai 
cuiiii)iired  w;t!i  lor.l  VVellin:;t>n',-. 

GENERAI.    OBSERVATIONS. 

Lord  Wcllinf^ton,  exasperated  by  the  conduct  of 
the  ormy  and  by  the  many  crossings  he  had  experi- 
enced during  the  campaign,  had  no  sooner  taken  his 
winter  quarters,  than  he  gave  vent  to  his  indigna- 
tion in  a  circular  letter  addressed  to  the  superior  of- 
ficers, which,  being  ill-received  by  the  army  at  the 
time,  has  bisn  frequently  referred  to  since  with  an- 
gry ddnunc:ations  of  its  injustice.  In  substance  it 
declared,  "that  disf^ipline  had  deteriorated  during 
the  campaign  i)i  a  greater  degree  than  he  had  ever 
toitne^iscd  or  ever  read  of  in  any  army,  and  this  with- 
out any  disistsr,  any  unusual  privation  or  hardship 
save  that  of  inclement  wcp.ther  ;  that  the  officers 
had,  fi'om  the  first,  lost  all  command  over  their  men, 
end  hence  excesses,  outrages  of  all  kinds,  and  inex- 
cusable losses  had  occurred  ;  that  no  army  had  over 
made  shorter  marches  in  retreat,  or  had  longer  rests  ; 
no  ariny  h:id  ever  been  so  little  pressed  by  a  pursu- 
ing enemy,  and  that  t!ie  true  cause  of  this  unhappy 
Btate  of  affairs  was  to  be  found  in  the  habitual  neg- 
lect of  duty  by  the  regimental  officers." 

Thjse  severe  reproaches  were  generally  deserved, 
and  only  partially  unjust;  yet  the  statements  on 
which  they  were  founded,  were  in  some  particulars 
un.ntenti  jnally  inaccurat.^,  especially  as  regarded  the 
retreat  from  Salamanca.  The  marches,  though  short 
as  to  distance,  alter  qu'tting  tlie  Tormes,  were  long 
as  to  time,  and  it  is  the  time  an  English  soldier 
b3ars  his  burthen,  for  like  the  ancient  Roman  he 
carries  the  l')ad  of  an  ass,  that  crushes  his  strength. 
So:n3  rjgim^nts  liad  c;tm3  from  Cadiz  without  halt- 
ing, and  as  long  garrison  duty  had  weakened  their  bo- 
dies, both  tiieir  constitutions  and  their  inexperience 
W3re  too  heav  ly  t-ixsd.  The  line  of  march  from 
Salamanca  was  tlirough  a  flooded,  and  flat,  and  clay- 
ey country,  not  much  easier  to  the  allies  than  the 
marshes  of  the  Arnus  were  to  Hannibal's  army  ;  and 
mounted  officers,  as  that  great  general  well  knew 
when  he  placed  the  Carthaginian  cavalry  to  keep 
up  the  Gallic  re.ir,  never  judge  correctly  of  a  foot- 
soldier's  exertions;  they  measure  his  strength  by 
their  horses'  pov/^rs.  On  this  occnsion  the  troops. 
Plopping  ankle  deep  in  clay,  mid-lsg  in  water,  lost 
tlieir  shoes,  and  with  strained  sinews  heavily  made 
their  wny,  and  withal  they  had  but  two  rations  in 
five  d?ys. 

Wellington  thought  otherwise,  for  he  knew  not 
that  the  commissariat  stores,  which  he  had  ordered 
ui>.  Old  not  arrive  regularly  becauso  of  the  extreme 
Ibulgue  of  the  animals  who  carried  them  ;  and  those 
tiiat  did  arrive  were  not  available  for  the  troops,  be- 
cause, as  the  rear  of  an  army,  and  especially  a  re- 
treating army,  is  at  once  t!ie  birtli-place  and  the  re- 
cipient of  false  rejjorts,  the  subordinate  commissa- 
ries and  conductors  of  the  temporary  depots,  alarmed 
with  rumours  that  the  enemy's  cavali-y  had  forestall- 


ed the  allies  on  the  march,  carriLAi  off"  or  def?trnyed 
the  field-stores;  hence,  the  soldiers  were  actually 
feeding  on  acorns  when  their  commander  sui.>posed 
them  to  be  in  tlie  receipt  of  good  rations.  'I'lie  de- 
struction of  tlie  swine  may  be  therclbre,  in  some 
measure  palliated;  but  there  is  neither  palliation 
nor  excuse  to  be  olfered  for  the  excesses  and  outrn gea 
committed  on  the  inhabitants,  nor  lor  many  officers' 
habitual  inattention  to  their  duty,  of  wiiich  tiie  gen- 
eral justly  conijilained.  Certainly  ti;e  most  intoler- 
able disorders  had  marked  the  retreat,  and  great 
part  of  the  sutlerings  of  the  army  nrose  from  these 
and  previous  disorders,  for  it  is  too  common  w.th 
soldiers,  fir&t  to  break  up  tlie  arrangements  of  their 
general  by  want  of  discipline,  and  tlien  to  complain 
of  the  misery  which  those  arrangements  were  de- 
signed to  obviate.  Nevertlieless,  Wellington's  cir- 
cular was  not  strictly  just,  because  it  excepted  none 
from  blame,  though  in  conversation  he  admitted  the 
reproach  did  not  apply  to  the  light  division  nor  to 
the  guards. 

With  respect  to  the  former  the  proof  of  its  disci- 
pline was  easy,  though  ^^'eHingtoll  hrrd  not  said  to 
much  in  its  favour;  for  how  could  tliose  ti'oops  be 
upbraided,  who  held  together  so  clcsr-ly  with  their 
colours,  that,  exclusive  t.l  iL.t-"  k  lied  in  s.ction, 
they  did  not  leave  thirty  men  behind.  Never  did 
the  extraordinary  vigour  and  excellence  of  their  dis- 
cipline merit  praise  more  than  in  this  retre.it.  IJut 
it  seems  to  be  a  drawback  to  the  greatness  of  lord 
Wellington's  character,  that  while  capable  of  re- 
pressing insubordination,  either  by  firmness  or  dex- 
terity, as  the  case  may  require,  capable  also  of 
magnanimously  disregarding,  or  dangerously  re 
senting  injuries,  his  praises  and  his  censures  are  be- 
stowed indiscriminately,  or  so  directed  as  to  ac- 
quire partizans  and  personal  friends  rather  than  the 
attachment  of  the  multitude.  He  did  not  make  the 
hard-working  military  crowd  feel  that  their  honest 
unobtrusive  exertions  were  appreciated.  In  this 
he  diffi^rs  not  from  many  other  great  generals  and 
statesmen,  but  he  thereby  fails  to  influence  masses, 
and  his  genius  falls  short  of  that  sublime  fligljt  bv 
which  Hannibal  in  ancient,  and  Napoleon  in  mod- 
ern times,  commanded  tlie  admiration  of  the  v.'orld. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  only  by  a  comparison  with  such 
great  men  that  he  can  be  measured,  i.or  will  any 
slight  examination  of  his  exploits  suffice  to  convey 
a  true  notion  of  his  intellectual  povrer  End  rescUi'- 
ces.     Let  this  campaign  be  taken  as  an  exam.ple. 

It  must  be  evident  that  it  in  no  manner  bears  out 
the  cliaracter  of  an  easy  and  triumphant  marcli, 
which  English  writers  have  given  to  it.  ISothing 
happened  according  to  the  original  plan.  The  gen- 
eral's operations  were  one  continual  struggle  to 
overcome  obstacles,  occasioned  by  the  enemy's 
numbers,  the  insuhordinaticn  of  liis  own  troop.s,  tiie 
slowness,  incapacity,  and  unfaitliful  conchict  of  the 
Spanish  commanders,  the  want  of  money,  and  the 
active  folly  of  the  different  governments  lie  served 
For  first,  his  design  was  to  menace  the  French  in 
Spain  so  as  to  bring  their  forces  ujion  him  frcm 
other  parts,  and  then  to  retire  into  Portugal,  again 
to  issue  forth  when  want  should  cause  them  to  dis 
perse.  Ho  was  not  without  hopes,  indeed,  to  strike 
a  decisive  blow,  yet  he  was  content,  if  the  occasion 
came  not,  to  wear  out  the  French  by  continual 
marching,  and  lie  trusted  that  the  frequent  opjiortu- 
nities  tlius  given  to  the  Sjianiards  would  finally 
urge  them  to  a  general  eflbrt.  Hut  he  found  his 
enemy,  from  the  first,  too  powerful  for  him,  even 
without  drawing  succour  from  distant  parts,  and  he 
would  have  fiilh-n  back  at  once,  were  it  not  lor  Aiar- 
mont's    rashness.      Nor   would   the    victory  of  the 


1812.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    \VAR. 


545 


Arapiles  itself  have  produced  any  proportionate 
effect  but  for  the  errors  of  the  king,  and  his  rejec- 
tion of  Soult's  advice.  Those  errors  caused  tlie 
evacuation  of  Andahisia,  yet  it  was  only  to  concen- 
trate an  ovcrwhehning  force  with  which  the  French 
finally  drove  the  victors  back  to  Portugal. 

Again,  Wellington  designed  to  tinish  his  cam- 
paign in  the  southern  provinces,  and  circumstances 
obliged  him  to  remain  in  the  nortliern  provinces. 
He  would  have  taken  Burgos,  and  he  could  not ;  he 
would  have  rested  longer  on  the  Carion,  and  his 
flanks  were  turned  by  the  bridges  of  Palencia  and 
Banos ;  he  would  have  rested  behind  the  Douro,  to 
profit  of  his  central  position,  but  the  bridge  at  Tor- 
desiilas  was  ravished  from  him,  and  the  sudden 
reparation  of  that  at  Toro,  obliged  him  to  retire. 
He  would  have  united  with  Hill  on  the  Adaja,  and 
he  could  only  unite  with  him  behind  the  Tormes ; 
and  on  this  last  river  also  he  desired  either  to  take 
liis  winter  quarters,  or  to  have  delivered  a  great 
battle  with  a  view  to  regain  Madrid,  and  he  could 
do  neither.  Finally,  he  endeavoured  to  make  an 
orderly  and  an  easy  retreat  to  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  and 
his  army  was  like  to  have  dissolved  altogetlicr. 
And  yet  in  all  these  varying  circumstance^,  his 
Bagacity  as  to  the  general  course  of  the  war,  his 
promptness  in  taking  advantage  of  particular  op- 
portunities, was  conspicuous.  These  are  the  dis- 
tinguishing characteristics  of  real  genius. 

Passing  over,  as  already  sulTiciently  illustrated, 
that  master-stroke,  the  battle  of  Salamanca,  the 
reader  would  do  well  to  mark,  how  this  great  com- 
mander did,  after  that  event,  separate  the  king's 
army  from  Marmont's,  forcing  the  one  to  retreat 
upon  Burgos,  and  driving  the  other  from  Madrid  ; 
how  he  thus  broke  up  the  French  combinations,  so 
that  many  weeks  were  of  necessity  required  to  re- 
unite a  power  capable  of  disturbing  him  in  the 
field ;  how  he  posted  Clinton's  division  and  the 
Gp.Uicians,  to  repress  any  light  excursion  by  the 
beaten  army  of  Portugal ;  how,  foreseeing  Soult's 
plan  to  establish  a  new  base  of  operations  in  Anda- 
lus'a,  he  v/as  prepared,  by  a  sudden  d(.'scent  from 
Madrid,  to  drive  Soult  himself  from  that  province  ; 
how  promptly,  when  the  siege  of  Burgos  failed,  and 
his  combinations  were  ruined  by  the  fault  of  others, 
how  promptly  I  say,  he  commenced  his  retreat, 
sacrificing  all  his  high-wrought  expectation  of  tri- 
umph in  a  campaign  which  he  burned  to  finish,  and 
otherwise  would  have  finished,  even  with  more 
splendour  than  it  had  commenced. 

If  Burgos,  a  mean  fortress  of  the  lowest  order, 
had  fallen  early,  the  world  would  have  seen  a  noble 
stroke.  For  the  Gallicians,  aided  by  a  weak  divis- 
ion of  Wellington's  army,  and  by  the  British  rein- 
fjrcem'^nts  making  up  from  Corufia,  would,  covered 
by  Burgos,  have  sufficed  to  keep  the  army  of  Portu- 
gfal  in  check,  while  Popham's  armament  would  have 
fomented  a  general  insurrection  of  the  northern 
provinces.  Meanwhile  Wellington,  gathering  forty- 
five  thousand  Anglo-Portuguese,  and  fifteen  thou- 
sand Spaniards,  on  tlie  Tagus,  would  have  marched 
towards  Murcia  ;  Ballesteros'  army,  and  the  sixteon 
thousand  men  composing  the  Alicant  army,  would 
tliere  have  joined  him,  and  w'th  a  hundred  tliou- 
eand  soldiers  he  would  have  delivered  such  a  battle 
to  the  united  P'rencli  armies,  if  indeed  tliey  could 
have  united,  as  would  have  shaken  all  Europe  with 
its  martial  clangor.  To  exchange  this  glorious 
vision,  for  the  cold  desolate  real'ty  of  a  dangercus 
winter  retreat  w-s,  for  Welling-ton,  hut  a  momen- 
tary mental  struggle,  and  it  vvas  simultrneous  with 
t'l-^t  daring  conception,  tlie  pass-ge  of  the  bridge  of 
Burgcs  under  the  fire  of  the  cnstlo, 
36 


Let  him  be  traced  now  in  retreat.  Pursued  by  a 
superior  army,  and  seeing  liis  cavalry  delcated,  lie 
turned  as  a  savage  lion  at  tlie  Carion,  nor  would  ho 
have  removed  so  quickly  from  that  lair,  if  the 
bridges  at  Palencia  and  Banos  had  been  destroyed 
according  to  his  order.  Neither  is  his  ccol  self- 
possession  to  be  overlooked  ;  for  when  both  his 
flanks  were  thus  exposed,  instead  of  tailing  hack  in 
a  hurried  manner  to  tlie  Duero,  he  juf'getl  exactly 
the  value  of  the  rugged  ground  on  the  left  bank  of 
the  Pisuerga,  in  op))ositicn  to  the  double  advantage 
obtained  by  the  enemy  at  Palencia  and  Baf.os  ;  nor 
did  the  difficulty  which  Souliam  and  Cafiiirelli,  in- 
dependent commanders,  and  neither  of  them  accus- 
tomed to  move  large  armies,  would  find  in  sudderi- 
Iv  changing  their  line  of  operations,  escape  him. 
His  march  to  Cabe^on  and  his  position  on  t''e  left 
of  tiie  Pisu-'^rga  was  not  a  retreat,  it  was  the  shif^ 
of  a  practised  captain. 

When  forced  to  withdraw  Hill  from  the  Tagus, 
he,  on  the  instant,  formed  a  new  combination  to 
fight  that  great  battle  on  the  Adaja  which  he  had 
intended  to  deliver  near  the  Guadalaviar;  and 
though  the  splendid  exploit  of  captain  Guingret,  Bt 
Tordesillas,  baffled  this  intent,  he,  in  return,  bafiled 
Souham  by  that  ready  stroke  of  generalihip,  th.e 
posting  of  his  whole  army  in  front  of  Rueda,  thus 
forbidding  a  passage  by  the  restored  bridge.  Final- 
ly, if  he  could  not  maintain  the  line  of  the  Duero, 
nor  that  of  the  Tormes,  it  was  because  rivers  can 
never  be  permanently  defended  against  superior 
forces,  and  yet  he  did  not  quit  the  last  without  u 
splendid  tactical  illustration.  I  mean  that  surpris- 
ing movement  from  the  Arapiles  to  the  Valmusa,  a 
movement  made  not  in  confusion  and  half  flight, 
but  in  close  order  of  battle,  his  columns  ready  for 
action,  his  artillery  and  cavalry  skirmishing,  j  9ss- 
ing  the  Junguen  without  disorder,  filing  along  the 
front  of  and  winding  into  the  rear  of  a  most  power 
ful  French  army,  the  largest  ever  collected  in  ono 
mass  in  the  Peninsula,  an  army  having  twice  as 
many  guns  as  the  allies,  and  twelve  thcusand  able 
horsemen  to  boot.  And  all  these  great  and  skilful 
actions  were  executed  by  lord  Wellington  with  au 
army  composed  of  different  nations;  to'i»liers,  fierce 
indeed,  and  valiant,  terrible  in  battle,  but  charac- 
terised by  himself,  as  more  deficient  in  good  disci- 
pline than  any  army  of  wliich  he  had  ever  read  ! 

Men  engaged  only  in  civil  affairs,  and  especially 
book-men,  are  apt  to  undervalue  military  genius, 
talking  as  if  simple  bravery  w^ere  the  highest  quali- 
fication of  a  general;  and  they  have  another  mode 
of  appeasing  an  inward  sense  of  inferiority,  name- 
ly, to  attribute  the  successes  of  a  great  captain  to 
the  prudence  of  some  discreet  adviser,  who  in  se- 
cret rules  the  general,  amends  his  errors,  and  leaves 
him  all  the  glory.  Thus  Napoleon  had  Perthier, 
Wellington  has  sir  George  ]Murray  I  but  in  this,  the 
most  skilful,  if  not  the  most  glorious  of  Welling- 
ton's campaigns,  sir  George  Murray  was  not  pres- 
ent, and  tlie  staff"  of  the  army  was  governed  by 
three  yourg  lieutenant-colonels,  namely,  lord  Fitz- 
roy  Somerset,  Waters,  and  Delancey ;  for  thrugh 
sir  Willougliby  Gordon  joined  the  army  as  quarter- 
master-general after  the  battle  of  Salamanca,  he 
was  inexperienced,  and  some  bodily  suffering  im- 
peded his  personal  exertions. 

Such  then  were  the  principal  points  of  skill  die- 
played  by  Wellington;  yet  so  vast  and  intricate  an 
art  is  war,  that  the  apophthegm  of  Turcrne  will  al- 
ways be  found  applicable  :  he  who  has  made  vo  ni/s- 
taf'es  ill  war,  has  acldtnn  mode  u-ar."'  Seme  military 
writ'^rs,  among  them  the  celebrated  .^omini,  blrme 
the  English  general,  that  with  a  conquering  army, 


54G 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XIX. 


and  an  insurgent  nation  at  liis  back,  he  should  in 
three  months  ;ifter  his  victory  have  attempted  noth- 
ing more  tiian  the  unsuccessful  siege  of  Burgos. 
This  censure  is  not  entirely  unfounded;  the  king 
certainly  escaped  very  easily  from  Madrid  ;  yet 
tliere  are  many  points  to  be  argued  ere  the  question 
can  be  decided.  The  v/ant  of  money,  a  want  pro- 
gressively increasing,  had  become  almost  intolera- 
ble. Wellington's  army  was  partly  fed  from  Ciudad 
Rodrigo,  partly  from  the  valley  of  the  I'isuerga  ; 
Hill's  troaps  were  fed  from  Lisbon  ;  the  Portuguese 
in  their  own  country,  and  the  'Spaniards  everywhere 
lived  as  the  French  did,  by  requisition  ;  but  the  Brit- 
ish professed  to  avoid  that  mode  of  subsistence,  and 
they  made  it  a  national  boast  to  all  Europe  that  they 
did  so;  the  movements  of  the  army  were  therefore 
always  subservient  to  this  principle,  and  must  be 
judged  accordingly,  because  want  of  money  was  with 
them  want  of  motion. 

Now  four  modes  of  operation  were  open  to  Wel- 
lington. 

1st.  After  the  victory  of  Salamanca,  to  follow  the 
king  lu  f'alencia iVpiip  with  the  Alicant  army,  and, 
having  thus  separated  Soult from  Joseph  and  Suchet, 
to  act  according  to  events. 

To  have  thus  moved  at  once,  without  money,  into 
Valencia,  or  JMurcia,  new  countries  where  he  had  no 
assured  connexions,  and  which  were  scarcely  able  to 
feed  the  French  armies,  would  have  exposed  him  to 
great  difficulties;  and  he  must  have  made  extensive 
arrangements  with  the  fleet  ere  he  could  have  acted 
vigorously,  if,  as  was  probable,  the  French  concen- 
trated all  their  forces  behind  the  Guadalaviar. 
Meanwhile  the  distance  between  the  main  allied 
army  and  those  troops  necessarily  left  in  the  north, 
being  considered,  the  latter  must  have  been  strength- 
ened at  the  expense  of  those  in  the  south,  unless  the 
army  of  Portugal  joined  the  king,  and  then  Welling- 
ton would  have  been  quite  overmatched  in  Valencia  ; 
that  is,  if  Soult  also  joined  the  king,  and  if  not,  he 
would  have  placed  the  English  general  between  two 
fires.  If  a  force  was  not  left  in  the  north,  the  army 
of  Portugal  would  have  had  open  field,  either  to 
march  to  the  king's  assistance  by  Zaragoza,  or  to 
have  relieved  Astorga,  seized  Salamanca,  recovered 
the  prisoners  and  the  trophies  of  tiie  Arapiles,  and 
destroyed  all  the  great  lines  of  magazines  and  de- 
pots even  to  the  Tagus.  Moreover,  the  yellow  fever 
raged  in  Murcia,  and  this  would  have  compelled  the 
English  general  to  depend  upon  the  contracted  base 
of  operations  oftcred  by  Aiicant,  because  the  advance 
of  Clauzel  would  have  rendered  it  impossible  to  keep 
it  on  the  Tagus.  Time,  therefore,  was  required  to 
arrange  the  means  of  operating  in  this  manner,  and 
meanwhile  the  army  was  not  unwisely  turned  an- 
other way. 

2 1.    To  march  directly  against  Sorilt  in  Andalusia. 

This  project  Wellington  was  prepared  to  execute, 
when  the  king's  orders  rendered  it  unnecessary,  but 
if  Joseph  had  ado[)ted  Soult's  phvn,  a  grand  field  for 
the  dis[)lay  of  military  art  would  have  been  opened. 
The  king,  going  by  the  Despenas  Peros,  and  having 
the  advantage  of  time  in  the  march,  could  have  join- 
ed Soult,  with  the  army  of  the  centre,  before  the  En- 
glish general  could  have  joined  Hill.  The  sixty 
t!iou?3,nd  combstants  thus  united  could  have  kept 
the  field  until  Suchet  had  also  joined  ;  but  they  could 
scarcely  hp..ve  maintained  the  blockade  of  Cadiz  al- 
so, and  hence  the  error  of  Wellington  scerns  to  have 
been,  that  he  did  not  make  an  etfnrt  to  overtake  the 
king,  either  upon  or  b'^-yond  t)ie  Tagus  ;  for  the  ar- 
my of  tlie  centre  would  certainly  hav(;  joined  Soult 
by  the  Despenas  Peros,  if  Maitland  had  not  that  mo- 
ment landed  at  Aiicant. 


Hd.  To  follow  the  army  of  Portugal  after  the 
victonj  of  Salamanca. 

The  rcasc^is  for  moving  upon  Madrid,  instead  of 
adopting  this  line  of  ojjerations,  having  been  already 
shewn  in  former  observations,  need  not  be  here  re- 
peated, yet  it  may  bo  added  that  the  destruction  of 
the  great  arsenal  and  depot  of  the  Retiro  was  no 
small  object  with  reference  to  the  safety  (  i'  Portugal. 

4th.    The  plan  %vkich  was  actually  J'oUowcd. 

The  English  general's  stay  in  the  capital  was  un- 
avoidable, seeing  tliat  to  observe  the  development  of 
the  French  operations  in  the  south,  was  of  such  im- 
portance. It  only  remains,  therefore,  to  trace  him 
after  he  quitted  Madrid.  Now  the  choice  of  his  line 
of  march  by  Yalladolid  certaiidy  appears  common- 
place, and  deficient  in  vigour,  but  it%\as  probably 
decided  by  the  want  of  money,  and  of  means  of  trans- 
port;  to  which  may  be  added  the  desire  to  bring  the 
Gallicians  forward,  which  he  could  only  attain  by 
putting  himself  in  actual  military  communication 
with  them,  and  covering  their  advance.  Yet  this 
will  not  excuse  the  feeble  pursuit  of  Clauzel's  re- 
treating army  up  the  valley  of  the  Pisuerga.  The 
Spaniards  would  not  the  less  have  come  up  if  tha\ 
general  had  been  defeated,  nor  would  the  want  of 
their  assistance  have  been  much  felt  in  the  action 
Considerable  loss  would,  no  doubt,  have  been  suffer- 
ed by  the  Anglo-Portuguese,  and  they  could  ill  bear 
it,  but  the  result  of  the  victory  would  have  amply  re- 
paid the  damage  received;  for  the  time  gained  by 
Clauzel  was  employed  by  Caff'arelli  to  strengthen 
tlie  castle  of  Burgos,  which  contained  the  greatest 
French  depot  in  this  part  of  Spain.  A  victory, 
therefore,  would  have  entirely  disarranged  the  ene- 
my's means  of  defence  in  the  north,  aid  would  have 
sent  the  twice  broken  and  defeated  army  of  Portugal 
behind  the  Ebro  ;  then  neither  the  conscript  rein- 
forcements, nor  tlie  junction  of  Cafiareili's  trooj)s. 
would  have  enabled  Clauzel,  with  all  his  activity 
and  talent,  to  reappear  in  the  field  before  Burgos 
would  have  fallen.  But  that  fortress  v.  ould  nicst 
probably  have  fallen  at  once,  in  which  case  the  Eng- 
lish general  might  have  returned  to  the  Tagus,  and 
perhaps  in  time  to  have  met  Soult  as  he  issued  forth 
from  the  mountains  in  his  march  from  Andalusia. 

It  may  be  objected,  that  as  Burgos  did  not  yield, 
it  would  not  have  yielded  under  any  circumstances 
without  a  vigorous  defence.  This  is  no,t  so  certain, 
the  efisct  of  a  defeat  would  have  been  ver}"^  difierent 
from  the  effect  of  such  a  splendid  operation  as  Clau- 
zel's retreat ;  and  it  appears,  also,  that  the  ]irclongcd 
defence  of  the  castle  may  be  traced  to  some  errors  of 
detail  in  the  attack,  as  well  as  to  want  of  sufficient 
artillery  means.  In  respect  of  the  great  features  of 
the  campaign,  it  may  be  assumed  that  Wellington's 
judgment  on  the  sj^ot,  and  with  a  full  knowledge  both 
of  his  own  and  his  adversaries'  situation,  is  of  mere 
weight  than  that  of  critics,  however  able  and  acute, 
who  knew  nothing  of  his  difficulties.  But  in  the 
details  there  was  something  of  error  exceedingly 
strange.  It  is  said,  I  believe  truly,  that  sir  How 
ard  Douglas,  being  con^ulted,  objected  to  the  pro- 
ceeding by  gallery  and  mine  against  an  outward,  a 
middle,  and  an  inward  line  of  defence,  as  likely  to 
involve  a  succession  of  tedious  and  difficult  enter- 
prises, v/hich,  even  if  successful,  would  still  leave 
the  White  Church,  and  the  upper  castle  or  keep  to 
be  carried  ; — that  this  castle,  besides  other  artillery 
armament,  was  surmounted  by  a  powerful  battery  of 
heavy  guns,  hearing  directly  upon  the  face  of  the 
horn-work  of  San  Michael,  the  only  point  from  which 
it  could  be  breached,  and  until  it  was  breached,  the 
governor,  a  gallant  man,  would  certainly  not  surren- 
der.    It  couli  not,  however,  be  breached,  without  a 


I'^ia.i 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR    WAR. 


547 


larger  battering  trs'-*  than  the  allies  possessed,  and 
would  not,  as  he  suoposed,  be  effected  by  mines; 
wiierefore  proposing  to  take  tiie  guns  from  two  frig- 
ates, tlien  lying  at  Santander,  he  prctl'ered  to  bring 
them  up  in  time. 

In  this  reasoning  lord  Wellington  partly  acqui- 
esced, but  his  hopes  of  success  were  principally 
founded  on  the  scarcity  of  water  in  the  castle  and 
upon  the  facility  of  burning  the  provision  maga- 
zines; nor  was  he  without  hope  that  his  fortune 
would  carry  him  through,  even  with  the  scanty 
uieans  he  possessed.  Towards  the  end  of  the  siege, 
however,  he  did  resort,  though  too  late,  to  the  plan 
of  getting  guns  up  from  Santander.  But  while  sir 
Howard  Douglas  thus  counselled  him  on  the  spot, 
sir  Edw-nnl  Pakenham,  then  in  Madrid,  assured  the 
author  of  this  istory,  at  the  time,  that  he  also,  fore- 
seeing tlie  artillery  means  were  too  scanty,  had  pro- 
posed to  send  by  the  LSoniosierra,  twelve  fine  Russian 
battering  guns,  then  m  the  Retiro  ;  and  he  pledged 
himself  to  procure,  by  an  appeal  to  the  officers  in  the 
ca^iital,  animals  sufficient  to  transport  them  and  their 
amnmnition  to  Burgos  in  a  few  days.  The  offer  was 
not  accepted. 

Something  also  may  be  objected  to  the  field  opera- 
tions, as  connected  with  the  siege  ;  for  it  is  the  rule, 
although  not  an  absolute  one,  that  the  enemy's  active 
army  sliould  first  be  beaten,  or  driven  beyond  some 
strong  line,  such  as  a  river,  or  chain  of  mountains, 
before  a  siege  is  commenced.  Now  if  Wellington 
had  masked  the  castle  after  the  horn-work  was  car- 
ried on  the  19th,  and  had  then  followed  Clauzel,  the 
Frencii  generals,  opposed  to  him,  admit,  that  they 
would  have  gene  over  the  Ebro,  perhaps  even  to 
Pampeluna  and 'St.  Sebastian.  In  that  case  all  the 
f!iinor  depots  must  have  been  t)roken  up,  and  the  re- 
organization of  the  army  of  Portugal  retarded  at 
least  a  month  ;  before  tliat  time  the  guns  from  San- 
tander would  have  arrived  and  the  castle  of  Burgos 
would  have  fallen.  In  Souham's  secret  despatches, 
it  is  Slid,  of  course  on  the  authority  of  spies,  that 
Castanos  urged  an  advance  beyond  Burgos  instead 
of  a  siege;  of  this  I  know  nothing,  but  it  is  not  un- 
r.kely,  because  to  advance  continually,  and  to  sur- 
round an  enemy,  constituted,  with  Spanish  generals, 
t'le  whole  art  of  war.  Ilowbeit,  on  this  occasion, 
the  advice,  if  given,  was  not  unreasonable  ;  and  it 
needed  s  tarcely  even  to  delay  the  siege  while  the 
covering  army  advanced,  because  one  division  of  in- 
fjmtry  might  have  come  up  from  Madritl,  still  leaving 
two  of  the  finest  in  the  army,  and  a  brigade  of  cav- 
alry, nt  that  capital,  which  was  sufficient,  seeing 
that  II  11  was  coming  up  to  Toledo,  that  Ballesteros' 
disobedience  was  then  unknown,  and  tliat  the  king 
was  in  no  condition  to  advance  before  Soult  arrived. 

The  last  point  to  which  it  is  fitting  to  advert,  was 
the  stopping  too  long  on  the  Tormes  in  hopes  of 
fighting  in  the  position  of  the  Arapiles.  It  was 
a  stirring  thought,  indeed,  for  a  great  mind,  and  the 
error  was  brilliantly  redeemed,  but  the  remedy  does 
r.ot  efface  the  original  fault ;  and  this  subject  leads 
to  a  consideration,  of  some  speculative  interest, 
camely,  why  Wellington,  desirous  as  he  was  to  keep 
ihe  line  of  the  Tormes,  and  knowing  with  what  dif- 
ficulty the  French  fed  their  large  army,  did  not  or- 
der everything  in  his  rear  to  take  refuge  in  Ciudad 
Rodrigo  and  Almeida,  and  entrench  himself  on  St. 
Christoval  and  in  Salamanca.  Thus  posted,  with  a 
bridge-liead  on  the  lefl  bank,  that  he  might  operate 
on  either  side  of  the  Tormes,  he  might  have  waited 
until  fiimine  obliged  the  enemy  to  separate,  which 
would  have  been  in  a  very  few  days;  but  perhaps 
the  answer  would  b?  that  the  Spaniards  had  left  Ci- 
udad llodr'go  in  a  defenclejs  etate 


Turning  now  to  the  French  side,  we  shall  find 
that  they  also  committed  errors. 

Souham's  pursuit,  after  tlie  cavalry  combat  at 
Vente  de  Pozo,  was  feeble.  Wellington,  speaking 
of  his  own  army,  said,  "no  troops  were  ever  less 
l)rcssed  by  an  enemy."  The  king's  orders  were, 
however,  positive  not  to  fight,  and  as  the  English 
general  continually  offered  Souliam  battle  in  strong 
positions,  the  man  had  no  power  to  do  mischi(;l 
Soult's  pursuit  of  Hill,  which  was  also  remarkably 
cautions,  arose  from  other  motives.  He  was  not  de- 
sirous of  a  battle,  and,  until  the  Guadarama  was  pass- 
ed, Hill  had  the  larger  force,  for  then  only  was  the 
whole  French  army  united.  The  duke  of  Dalmatia 
wished  to  have  marched  in  one  great  mass  through 
La  Mancha,  leaving  only  a  small  corps,  or  a  detach- 
ment of  Sucliet's  army,  on  the  Cuenca  road  ;  but  the 
king  united  the  whole  of  the  army  of  the  centre,  his 
own  guards  and  seven  thousand  men  of  the  army 
of  the  south,  on  the  Cuenca  line,  and  there  were 
no  good  cross  communications  except  by  Taracon 
Soult,  therefore,  advanced  towards  the  Tagus  with 
only  thirty-five  thousand  men,  and,  from  commissa- 
riat difficulties  and  other  obstacles,  he  was  obliged 
to  move  by  divisions,  which  followed  each  other  at 
considerable  distances ;  when  his  advanced  guard 
was  at  Valdemoro,  his  rear-guard,  not  having  reach- 
ed Ocafia,  was  two  marches  distant.  The  danger  of 
this  movement  is  evident.  Hill  might  have  turned 
and  driven  him  over  the  Tagus  ;  or  if  his  orders  had 
permitted  liim  to  act  offensively  at  first,  he  might, 
after  leaving  a  small  corps  on  tlie  upper  Tagus  to 
watch  the  king,  have  passed  that  river  at  Toledo, 
and  without  abandoning  his  line  of  operations  by  the 
valley  of  the  Tagus,  have  attacked  Soult  while  on 
the  march  towards  Ocana.  The  latter,  in  despite 
of  his  numerous  cavalry,  must  then  have  fallen  back 
to  concentrate  his  forces,  and  this  would  have  de 
ranged  the  whole  campaign. 

The  duke  of  Dalmatia,  who  thought  Ballesteros 
was  with  Hill,  naturally  feared  to  press  his  adversa- 
ry under  such  a  vicious  disposition  of  the  French 
army,  neither  could  that  disposition  be  changed  dur- 
ing the  operation,  because  of  the  w-ant  of  good  cross 
roads,  and  because  Souham  had  been  taught  that  the 
king  would  meet  him  on  the  side  of  Guadalaxara. 
In  fine,  Soult  had  learned  to  respect  his  adversaries, 
and  with  the  prudence  of  a  man  whose  mental  grasp 
embraced  the  whole  machinery  of  the  war,  he  avoid- 
ed a  doubtful  battle,  where  a  defeat  would,  from  the 
unsettled  state  of  the  French  affairs,  have  lost  the 
whole  Peninsula.  Wellington  had  Portugal  to  fiill 
back  upon,  but  the  French  armies  must  have  gone 
behind  the  Ebro. 

These  seem  to  be  the  leading  points  of  intercut  in 
this  campaign,  but  it  will  not  be  uninteresting  to 
mark  the  close  affinities  between  Wellington's  re- 
treat and  that  of  sir  John  Moore.  This  last-npmed 
general  marched  from  Portugal  into  the  north  of 
Spain,  with  the  political  view  of  saving  Andalusia, 
by  drawing  on  himself  the  French  power,  having 
before-hand  declared  that  he  expected  to  be  over- 
whelmed. In  like  manner,  Wellington  moved  into 
the  same  country  to  deliver  Andalusia,  and  thus 
drew  on  himself  the  whole  power  of  the  enemy  ;  like 
Moore,  declaring  also  before-hand,  tliat  the  political 
object  being  gained,  his  own  military  position  would 
be  endangered.  Both  succeeded,  and  both  were,  as 
they  had  foretold,  overwhelmed  by  superior  forces. 
Moore  was  to  have  been  aided  by  Romana's  Sjianish 
army,  but  he  found  it  a  burthen  ;  so  also  Wellington 
was  impeded,  not  assisted,  by  the  Gallicians,  and 
both  generals  were  without  money. 

Moore,   having    approached   Soult   and   menaced 


548 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XIX. 


Burgos,  was  forced  to  retreat,  because  Napoleon  | 
moved  from  ]\L?drid  on  his  right  flank  and  towards  I 
his  rear.  Wellington  having  actually  besieged  Bur- 1 
gos  wasobliged  to  raise  t!ie  siege  and  retire,  lest  the 
king,  coining  through  .Madrid,  should  pass  his  right 
flank  and  gat  into  his  rear.  Moore  was  only  followed 
by  Soult  to  the  Esla,  Wellington  was  only  followed 
by  Souham  to  the  Duero.  The  one  general  looked 
to  the  mountains  of  Gallicia  for  positions  which  he 
could  maintain,  but  the  apathy  of  the  Spanish  peo- 
ple in  the  south,  permitted  Napoleon  to  bring  up 
euch  an  overwhelming  force  that  this  plan  could  not 
be  sustained  ;  the  other  general  had  the  same  no- 
tion with  respect  to  the  Duero,  and  the  defection  of 
IJallesteros  enabled  the  king  to  bring  up  such  a 
power  tliat  further  retreat  became  necessary. 

Moore's  soldiers,  at  the  commencement  of  the 
operation,  evinced  want  of  discipline;  they  com- 
mitted great  excesses  at  Valderas.  and  disgraced 
themselves  by  tlieir  inebriety  at  Bembibre  and  Villa 
Franca.  In  like  manner  Wellington's  soldiers  broke 
the  bonds  of  discipline;  disgraced  themselves  by 
drunkenness  at  Torquemada  and  on  the  retreat 
from  the  Puente  Larga  to  Madrid  ;  and  they  com- 
mitted excesses  every  where.  3Ioore  stopped  behind 
the  Esla  river  to  check  the  enemy,  to  restore  order, 
and  to  enable  his  commissariat  to  remove  the  stores; 
\Vellington  stopped  behind  the  Carion  for  exactly 
he  same  purposes.  The  one  general  was  imme- 
diately turned  on  his  left,  because  the  bridge  of  Man- 
tilla was  abandoned  unbroken  to  Franceschi ;  the 
other  general  was  also  turned  on  his  left,  because  the 
bridge  of  Palencia  was  abandoned  unbroken  to  Foy. 

3Ioore's  retreat  vvas  little  short  of  three  hundred 
miles;  Wellington's  was  nearly  as  long,  and  both 
were  in  the  w  inter  season .  The  first  ha  Ited  at  Bene- 
vente,  at  Villa  Franca,  and  at  Lugo  ;  the  last  halted 
at  Duenas,  at  Cabc^on,  Tordesillas,  and  Salamanca. 
The  principal  loss  sustained  by  the  one,  was  in  the 
last  marches  betv/een  Lugo  and  Corufia ;  so  also  the 
principal  loss  sustained  by  the  other,  was  in  the  last 
marches  between  the  Tormes  and  the  Agueda.  Some 
of  Moore's  generals  murmured  against  his  proceed- 
ings, some  of  Wellington's  generals,  as  we  have 
Been,  went  further;  the  first  were  checked  by  a  re- 
primand, the  second  were  humbled  by  a  sarcasm. 
Finally,  both  generals  reproached  their  armies  with 
want  of  discipline ;  both  attributed  it  to  the  negli- 
gence of  the  otncers  generally,  and  in  both  cases  the 
justice  of  the  reproaches  was  proved  by  tiie  excep- 
tions. The  reserve  and  the  foot  guards  in  Moore's 
campaign,  the  Ijght  division  and  the  foot  guards  in 
Wellington's,  gave  signal  proof,  that  it  was  negli- 
gence of  discipline,  nit  hardshijis,  tliough  the  latter 
were  severe  in  both  armies,  that  caused  the  losses. 
Not  that  I  would  be  understood  to  say  that  those 
regiments  only  preserved  order ;  it  is  certain  that 
many  others  were  eminently  well  conducted,  but 
those  ware  the  troops  named  as  exceptions  at  the 
timf. 

Such  were  the  resemblances  of  these  two  retreats. 
The  di.Terences  were,  that  .^looro  had  only  twenty- 
three  thousand  men  in  the  first  part  of  his  retreat, 
and  only  nineteen  thousand  in  the  latter  part,  where- 
as Wellington  had  thirty-three  thous;;nd  in  the  first 
part  of  his  retreat,  and  sixty-e:g!it  thousand  men  in 
the  latter  part.  3Ioore's  army  were  all  of  one  nation 
and  young  soldiers,  Wellington's  were  of  diff'erent 
nations,  but  they  were  veterans.  Tiic  first  marched 
through  mountains,  where  the  wcatlier  was  infinite- 
ly more  inclement  than  in  the  plains,  over  which 
the  seoond  moMil:  aril  until  he  r'a'hedtlie  Esln, 
Moore's  flank  was  r|uite  exi'Os?',  wiicre.is  Wcil'ng- 
lon's   flank  was   covered   bv    II. Us  stt.""'  until  he 


gained  the  Tormes.  V.'ellipgton,  with  veteran 
troops,  vvas  opposed  to  Souh:;m,  to  Soult,  to  tlie 
king,  and  to  Jourdan,  men  not  accordirg  in  their 
views;  and  their  whole  army,  when  united,  did  not 
exceed  the  allies  by  more  than  twenty  thousand 
men.  .Moore,  with  young  soldiers,  was  at  first  op- 
posed to  four  times,  and,  latterly,  to  three  times  his 
own  numbers;  for  it  is  remarkable,  that  the  French 
army  assembled  at  .\storga  was  above  eighty  the  ;• 
sand,  including  ten  thousand  cavalry,  which  is  nearly 
the  same  as  tlie  number  assembled  against  WelliTig- 
ton  on  the  Tormes  ;  but  Moore  had  little  more  than 
twenty  thousand  men  to  oppose  to  this  overwhelm- 
ing mass,  and  Wellington  had  nearly  seventy  thou- 
sand. The  partidas  abounded  at  the  time  of  Wel- 
lington's retreat ;  they  were  unknown  at  the  time  of 
Moore's  retreat ;  and  this  general  was  confronted  by 
Napoleon,  who,  despotic  in  command,  was  also  un- 
rivalled in  skill,  in  genius,  and  in  vigour.  Welling- 
ton's army  was  not  pressed  by  the  enerny,  and  he 
made  short  marches  ;  yet  he  lost  more  stragglers 
than  Moore,  who  was  vigorously  pressed,  made  long 
marches,  and  could  only  secure  an  embarkation  by 
delivering  a  battle,  in  which  he  died  iicst  honourably. 
His  character  was  immediately  vilified.  V»'clling- 
ton  was  relieved  from  his  pursuers  hj'  the  operaticn 
of  a  famine,  and  had  therefore  no  occasion  to  deliver 
a  battle,  but  he  also  was  vilified  at  the  time, 
with  equal  injustice;  and  if  he  liad  then  died,  it 
would  have  been  with  equal  malice  His  subse- 
quent successes,  his  great  name  and  power,  havo 
imposed  silence  on  his  detractors,  or  converted  cen- 
sure into  praise;  for  it  is  the  natuie  of  mankind, 
especially  of  the  ignorant,  to  cling  to  fortune. 

Moore  attributed  his  difficulties  to  the  apathy  of 
the  Spaniards;  his  friends  charged  them  on  tt.n 
incapacity  of  the  English  government.  Wellington 
attributed  his  ultimate  failure  to  the  defection  of 
Ballesteros ;  his  brother,  in  the  House  of  Lords, 
charged  it  on  the  previous  contracted  policy  of 
Perceval's  government,  which  had  cripjded  the  ger- 
eral's  means;  and  certainly  Wellington's  reasorirg, 
relative  to  Ballesteros,  was  not  quite  sound.  'J'h;  t 
general,  he  said,  might  either  have  forced  Soult  to 
take  the  circuitous  route  to  Valencia,  Roquena,  ard 
Cuenca,or  leave  a  strong  corps  in  obseri^ticn,  and 
then  Hill  might  have  detached  men  to  the  north. 
He  even  calculated  upon  Ballestercs  being  able  to 
stop  both  Soult  and  Souham,  altogether;  for,  as  the 
latter's  operat>ions  were  prescribed  by  the  king,  and 
dependent  upon  his  proceedings,  Wellington  judged 
that  he  would  have  remained  tranquil  it  .Tcseph  had 
not  advanced.  This  was  the  error.  Souham's  des- 
patches clearly  shew,  that  the  king's  inrtructions 
checked  instead  of  forwarding  his  movements;  and 
that  it  vvas  his  intention  to  have  delivered  battle  at 
the  end  of  four  days,  without  regard  to  the  king's 
orders;  and  such  vvas  his  force,  that  Wellingtrn 
!  admitted  his  own  inability  to  keep  the  field.  I'r.l- 
j  lesteros' defection,  therefore,  cannot  be  pleaded  in 
,  bar  of  all  further  investigation  ;  but  whatever  fail- 
ures there  were,  and  however  imposing  the  height 
to  which  the  English  general's  reputation  has  since 
attained,  this  campaign,  including  the  sieges  of 
Ciudad  Rodrigo,  Badajos,  the  forts  of  Salamanca, 
and  of  Burgos,  the  assault  of  Almnraz,  and  the  bat- 
tle <%f  Salamanca,  will  probably  be  ccrsidered  hia 
finest  illustration  of  the  art  of  war.  Waterloo  mry 
be  called  a  more  glorious  exploit,  because  of  tlie 
great  man  who  was  there  vanquislied;  Asrye  may 
be  deemed  a  wonderful  action,  one  indeed  to  be  com- 
pared with  the  victory  which  I  u;u!lus  gained  over 
Ty<franes,  but  Siilamnrca  will  be  alwnye  referred  to 
¥"  ''■  •  most  skilful  of  Wellington's  buttles 


18i2.' 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


549 


BOOK    XX. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Politiral  iiffii'rs— Th^il•  influence  on  the  war — Napoleon's  in- 
va-ion  <jf  Rus-ia — Its  iiilliieiine  on  tlie  coiittst*  in  the  IViiin- 
mla — Stale  of  terliiig  in  En^lantl — Lord  Welle-ley  charijes 
the  in:ni-t(i-si,  and  e>|ieriall_v  Mr.  Perceval  witii  iMil)e<:ilit\  — 
His  proofs  thereof — Ability  and  zeal  of  lord  VVtllington  and 
Mr.  Stf  wart  shewn — .Absurd  plans  of  the  co'int  of  Funchal  — 
Mr.  Vdii' r»  and  Mr.  V'ansittarl — Tlie  English  ministers  pro- 
1  ose  to  s«Il  the  Portuguese  rrown  and  church  lands — The 
'  llv  .-111  I  injustice  of  tt>ese,  and  other  schemes  exposed  by 
liird  Wr  lllll^tlln — He  tfot*  to  (-adiz — His  rece])tion  there — 
Nt  w  or^aniz  ition  of  the  Spanish  armies — Wiliin^ton  (joes 
to  Lisljon,  where  he  is  enthusiastically  received — His  de- 
parture from  Cadiz  the  signal  for  renewed  dissensions — Car- 
iotta  s  intrij^iiis — Decree  to  a!>olish  the  Inquisition  opfiosed 
hy  the  cler:;y — The  reg-ency  aiil  the  clergy — Are  displaced 
bv  tile  cortes — New  re^jency  appointed — The  Ameiican  pirty 
in  tie  codes  adopt  Carlotta's  cause — Fail  from  fear  of  tlie 
people — Many  bi.shop*  and  church  dignitaries  are  arrested, 
and  others  i\\  into  Pnrtugal — The  Pope's  nuncio,  Gravina, 
opposes  the  coites — His  benefices  sequestered — He  flies  to 
Portugal  —  His  intrigues  there — Secret  overtures  made  to 
Joseph  by  some  of  the  Spainsh  armies. 

While  the  armies  were  striving,  the  political 
affairs  had  become  exceedingly  complicated  and 
unsteady.  Their  vvoriviugs  were  little  known  or 
observed  by  tlie  p-ablic  ;  but  the  evils  of  bad  govern- 
ment in  England,  Hpain,  and  Portugal  ;  the  incon- 
gruous alliance  of  bigoted  aristocracy  with  awaken- 
ed d2inooracy,  and  the  inevitable  growth  of  national 
jealousies,  as  external  danger  seemed  to  recede, 
were  becoming  so  powerful,  that  if  relief  had  not 
been  obtained  from  extraneous  events,  even  the 
vigour  of  Wellington  must  have  sunk  under  the 
pre.ssure.  The  secret  causes  of  disturbance  shall 
now  be  laid  bare  ;  and,  it  will  then  be  seen,  that  the 
catastrophe  of  Napoleon's  Russian  campaign  was 
ebsolutely  necessary  to  the  final  success  of  the 
British  arms  in  the  Peninsula.  I  speak  not  of  the 
physical  power  which,  if  his  host  had  not  withered 
on  the  snowy  wastes  of  Muscovy,  the  emperor  could 
have  poured  into  Spain  ;  but  of  those  moral  obstacles 
which,  springing  up  on  every  side,  corrupted  the 
very  life-blood  of  the  war. 

If  Russia  owed  her  safety  in  some  degree  to  the 
contest  in  the  Peninsula,  it  is  undoubted  that  the 
fate  of  the  Peninsula  was,  in  return,  decided  on 
the  plains  of  Russia  ;  for  had  the  French  veterans, 
who  there  perished,  returned  victorious,  the  war 
could  have  been  maintained  for  years  in  Spain, 
with  all  its  waste  of  treasures  and  of  blood,  to 
the  absolute  ruin  of  England,  even  though  her 
army  might  have  been  victorious  in  every  battle. 
Yet  who  shall  say  with  certainty  what  termination 
any  war  will  ever  have  !  Who  will  prophecy  of 
an  art  always  varying,  and  of  such  intricacy  that 
its  secrets  seem  beyond  the  reach  of  human  in- 
tellect!  Wiiat  vast  preparations;  what  astonishing 
combinations  were  involved  in  the  plan,wiiat  vigour 
and  ability  displayed  in  the  execution  of  Napoleon's 
march  to  Moscow!  And  yet,  when  the  winter 
came,  only  four  days  sooner  than  he  expected, 
the  giant's  scheme  seemed  a  thing  for  children  to 
laugh  at ! 

Nevertheless,  the  political  grandeur  of  that  ex- 
pedition will  not  be  hereafter  judged  from  the  wild 
triumphs  of  his  enemies;  nor,  its  military  merits, 


from  the  declamation  which  has  hitherlo  pas;i&d  as 
the  history  of  tlie  wondrous,  though  unfortunate 
enterprise.  It  will  not  be  the  puerilities  of  La- 
baume,  of  Segur,  and  their  imitators;  nor  even  that 
splendid  military  and  political  essuy  of  general  Jo- 
mini,  called  the  "  Life  of  jXapoleon ,'''  whicii  posterity 
will  accept  as  the  measure  of  a  general,  who  carried 
four  hundred  tiiousand  men  across  the  Niemen,  and 
an  hundred  and  sixty  thousand  men  to  Moscow. 
And  vviih  such  a  military  providence;  with  such  a 
vigilance,  so  disposing  his  reserves,  so  guarding  his 
flanks,  so  guiding  his  masses  ;  that  while  constantly 
victorious  in  front  no  post  was  lost  in  his  rear;  no 
convoy  failed,  no  courier  was  stopped  ;  not  even  a 
letter  was  missing:  the  communication  with  his 
capital  was  as  regular  and  certain  as  if  that  im- 
mense march  had  been  but  a  summer  excursion  of 
pleasure  !  However,  it  failed,  and  its  failure  was 
the  safety  of  the  Peninsula. 

In  England  the  retreat  from  Burgos  was  viewed 
with  the  alarm  and  anger  which  always  accompan- 
ies the  disappointment  of  higli-raised  i)ublic  expec- 
tation ;  the  people  had  been  taught  to  believe  the 
French  weak  and  dispirited  ;  they  saw  them  so 
strong  and  daring,  that  even  victory  could  not  ena- 
ble the  allies  to  make  a  iiermanent  stand  beyond  the 
frontiers  of  Portugal.  Hence  arose  murmurs,  and 
a  growing  distrust  as  to  the  ultimate  result,  which 
would  not  have  failed  to  overturn  the  war  faction, 
if  the  retreat  of  the  French  from  Moscow,  the  de- 
fection of  Prussia,  and  the  strange  unlooked-for 
spectacle  of  Napoleon  vanquished,  had  not  come  in 
happy  time  as  a  counterpoise. 

When  the  parliament  met,  lord  Wellesley  under 
took,  and  did  very  clearly  show,  that  if  the  success 
es  in  the  early  part  ot  tlie  year  had  not  been,  by  his 
brother,  pushed  to  the  extent  expected,  and  had 
been  followed  by  important  reverses,  tiie  causes 
were  clearly  to  be  traced  to  the  imbecile  adminis- 
tration of  Mr.  Perceval  and  his  coadjutors,  whose 
policy  he  truly  characterized  as  having  in  it  "  noth- 
ing regular  but  con/vsioit."  With  a  very  accurate 
knowledge  of  facts,  he  discussed  the  military  ques- 
tion, and  maintained  that  twelve  thousand  infantry 
and  three  thousand  cavalry,  added  to  the  army  in 
the  beginning  of  the  year,  would  have  rendered  the 
campaign  decisive,  because  the  Russian  contest, 
the  incapacity  of  Joseph,  and  the  dissensions  of  the 
French  generals  in  Spain,  had  produced  the  most 
fivourable  crisis  for  striking  a  vital  blow  at  tlie 
enemy's  power.  The  cabinet  were  aware  of  t'lis, 
and  in  good  time,  but  thougli  there  were  abundance 
of  soldiers  idling  at  home,  when  tl;e  welfare  of  tlie 
state  required  their  presence  in  the  Peninsula,  nay, 
although  the  ministers  had  actually  sent  within  five 
thousand  as  many  men  as  were  neccsFnry,  they  luul. 
with  the  imbecility  which  marked  all  their  procecii- 
ings,  so  contrived,  that  few  or  none  should  reach 
the  theatre  of  war  until  the  time  ibr  success  had 
passed  away.  Then  touching  upon  the  financial 
question,  with  a  rude  hand  he  tore  to  pieces  the 
ministers'  pitiful  pretexts,  that  the  want  of  specie 
had  necessarily  put  bounds  to  their  efforts,  and  that 
the  general  himself  did  not  complain.     "  No  '."  ex- 


550 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Bock  XX 


claimed  lord  Wellesley,  "he  does  not  complain, 
because  it  is  the  sacred  duty  of  a  soldier  not  to 
complain.  But  he  does  not  say  that  with  greater 
means  he  could  not  do  fjreater  things,  and  his  coun- 
try will  not  be  satisfied  if  these  means  are  withheld 
by  men,  who,  having  assumed  the  direction  of  af- 
fairs in  such  a  crisis,  have  only  incapacity  to  plead 
in  extenuation  of  tlieir  failures." 

This  stern  accuser  was  himseY  fresh  from  the 
ministry,  versed  in  state  matters  and  of  unques- 
tionable talents;  he  was  well  acquainted  with  tiie 
actual  resources  and  difficulties  of  the  moment;  he 
was  sincere  in  his  opinions,  because  he  had  aban- 
doned office  rather  than  be  a  party  to  such  a  misera- 
ble mismanagement  of  England's  power;  he  was, 
in  fine,  no  mean  authority  against  his  former  col- 
leagues, even  tiiough  the  facts  did  not  so  clearly 
bear  him  out  in  his  views. 

That  England  possessed  the  troops,  and  that  they 
were  wanted  by  Wellington,  is  undeniable.  Even 
in  September  there  were  still  between  fifty  and  six- 
ty thousand  soldiers  present  under  arms  at  home, 
and  tliat  any  additional  force  could  have  been  fed  in 
Portugal  is  equally  beyond  doubt,  because  the  re- 
serve magazines  contained  provisions  for  one  hun- 
dred thousand  men  for  nine  months.  The  only 
question  then,  was  the  possibility  of  procuring 
enough  of  specie  to  purchase  those  supplies  which 
could  not  be  had  on  credit.  Lord  Wellington  had, 
indeed,  made  the  campaign  almost  without  specie, 
and  a  small  additional  force  would  certainly  not 
have  overwhelmed  his  resources;  but,  setting  this 
argument  aside,  what  efforts,  what  ability,  what 
order,  what  arrangements  were  made  by  tiie  govern- 
ment to  overcome  the  difficulties  of  the  time  !  Was 
there  less  extravagance  in  tlie  public  offices,  the 
])ublic  works,  public  salaries,  public  contracts] 
The  very  snuff-boxes  and  services  of  plate  given  to 
diplomatists,  tlie  gorgeous  furniture  of  palaces,  nay, 
the  gaudy  trappings  wasted  on  Whittingham's, 
Roche's  and  Downie's  divisions,  would  almost  have 
furnished  the  wants  of  the  additional  troops  deman- 
ded by  lord  Wellesley.  Where  were  all  the  mil- 
lions lavished  in  subsidies  to  the  Spaniards  ;  where 
the  millions  which  South  America  had  transmitted 
to  Cadiz;  where  those  sums  spent  by  the  soldiers 
during  the  war!  Real  money  had,  indeed,  nearly 
disappeared  from  England,  and  a  base  paper  had 
usurped  its  place ;  but  gold  had  not  disappeared 
from  the  world,  and  an  able  ministry  would  have 
found  it.     These  men  only  knew  iiow  to  squander. 

The  subsidy  granted  to  Portugal  was  paid  by  the 
commercial  speculation  of  lord  Wellington  and 
Mr.  Stuart,  speculations  which  also  fed  the  army, 
saved  the  whole  population  of  Portugal  from  fam- 
ine, and  prevented  tlie  war  from  stopping  in  1811; 
and  yet,  so  little  were  the  ministers  capable  even  of 
understanding,  much  less  of  making  such  arrange- 
ments, that  they  now  rebuked  their  general  for 
having  adopted  them,  and,  aflor  tiieir  own  imbecile 
manner,  insisted  uj)on  a  new  mode  of  providing 
supplies.  Every  movement  they  made  proved  their 
incapacity.  They  had  permitted  lord  William  Ben- 
tin.dt  to  engage  in  the  scheme  of  invading  Italy 
when  additional  troops  were  wanted  in  Portugal; 
and  they  sullered  him  to  bid,  in  the  money-market, 
against  lord  Wellington,  and  thus  sweep  away  two 
millions  of  dollars  at  an  exorbitant  premium,  for  a 
chimera,  when  the  war  in  the  Peninsula  was  upon 
the  point  of  stopping  altogether,  in  default  of  tiiat 
very  money  which  Wellington  could  have  otiiorwise 
procured  —  nay,  had  actually  been  promised  at  a 
reasonable  cost.  Nor  was  tliis  the  full  measure  of 
their  folly 


Ijord  Wellesley  affirmed,  and  they  were  unable  to 
deny  the  fact,  that  dollars  might  have  been  obtain- 
ed from  South  America  to  any  amount,  if  the  gov- 
ernment would  have  consented  to  pay  the  market- 
price  for  them  ;  they  would  not  do  it,  and  yet  after- 
wards sought  to  purchase  the  same  dollars  at  a  high- 
er rate  in  the  European  markets.  He  told  them, 
and  they  could  not  deny  it,  tlsat  they  liad  empower- 
ed five  different  agents,  to  purchase  dollars  for  fiv9 
dilfi.5rent  services,  without  any  controlling  head; 
that  these  independent  agents  were  bidding  against 
each  other  in  every  money-market,  and  the  res-tric- 
tions  as  to  the  price  were  exactly  in  the  inverse 
proportion  to  the  importance  of  the  service  :  the 
agent  for  the  troops  in  Malta  was  permitted  to  ofler 
the  highest  price,  lord  Wellington  was  restricted  to 
the  lowest.  And  besides  this  folly,  lord  Wellesley 
shewed  that  they  had,  under  their  licensing  system, 
permitted  French  vessels  to  bring  French  goods, 
silks  and  gloves,  to  England,  and  to  carry  bullion 
away  in  return.  Napoleon  thus  paid  his  army  in 
Spain  with  the  very  coin  which  should  have  subsis- 
ted the  English  troops. 

Incapable,  however,  as  the  ministers  were  of  mak- 
ing the  simplest  arrangements ;  neglecting,  as  they 
did,  the  most  obvious  means  of  supplying  the  wants 
of  the  army;  incapable  even,  as  we  have  seen,  of 
sending  out  a  few  bales  of  clothing  and  arms  for  the 
Spaniards  without  producing  the  utmost  confusion, 
they  were  heedless  of  the  counsels  of  their  general, 
prompt  to  listen  to  every  intriguing  adviser,  and 
ready  to  plunge  into  the  most  absurd  and  complica- 
ted measures,  to  relieve  that  distress  which  their 
own  want  of  ability  had  produqed.  When  the  war 
with  the  United  States  broke  out,  a  war  provoked  by 
themselves,  they  suffered  the  Admiralty,  contraiy  to 
the  wishes  of  Mr.  Stuart,  to  reduce  the  naval  force 
at  Lisbon,  and  to  neglect  Wellington's  express  re- 
commendation as  to  the  stationing  of  shijis  for  the 
protection  of  the  merchantmen  bringing  flour  and 
stores  to  Portugal.  Thus  the  American  privateers, 
being  unmolested,  run  down  the  coast  of  Africa,  in 
tercepted  the  provision  trade  from  the  Brazils,  which 
was  one  of  the  principal  resources  of  the  army,  and 
then,  emboldened  by  in)punity,  infected  the  coast  of 
Portugal,  captured  fourteen  ships  loaded  with  fiour 
off'  the  Douro,  and  a  large  vessel  in  the  very  mouth 
of  the  Tagus.  These  things  happened  also  when  tlie 
ministers  were  censuring  and  interfering  with  the 
general's  commerciaf  transactions,  and  seeking  to 
throw  the  feeding  of  his  soldiers  into  the  hands  of 
British  speculators  ;  as  if  tiie  supply  of  an  army  was 
like  that  of  a  common  market!  never  considering 
that  they  thus  made  it  the  merchant's  interest  to 
starve  the  troops  with  a  view  to  increase  profits; 
never  considering  that  it  was  by  that  very  com- 
merce, which  they  were  putting  an  end  to,  that  the 
general  had  paid  the  Portuguese  subsidy  for  them, 
and  had  furnished  his  own  military  chett  with  spe 
cie,  when  their  administrative  capacity  was  quite 
unequal  to  the  task. 

Never  was  a  government  better  served  tlian  the 
British  government  was  by  lord  Wellington  and 
Mr.  Stuart.  With  abilities,  vigilance,  and  indus- 
try seldom  equalled,  they  had  made  themselves  mas- 
ters of  all  tliat  related  to  tiie  Portuguese  policy, 
whether  foreign  or  domestic,  military,  or  civil,  or 
judicial.  They  knew  all  the  causes  of  mischief, 
tiioy  had  faithfully  represented  them  both  to  the  Por- 
tuguese and  British  governments,  and  had,  more- 
over, devised  effectual  remedies.  But  tiie  former 
met  them  with  the  most  vexatious  opposition,  and 
the  latter,  neglecting  their  advice,  lent  themselves 
to  those  foolish  financial  schemes  which  I  have  be* 


1812. 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


551 


fore  touched  upon  as  emanating  from  Mr.  Villiers, 
Mr.  Vansitlart,  and  the  count  of  Funchal.  The 
first  had  bjcn  deficient  as  an  ambassador  and  states- 
in-.i:i,  t!ie  second  was  universally  derided  as  a  finan- 
cier, and  tiie  third,  from  his  long  residence  in  Lon- 
don, icnew  very  little  of  the  state  of  Portugal,  had 
derived  tliat  little  from  tlie  information  of  his  broth- 
er, tlie  restless  Principal  8ouza,  and  in  all  his 
Kchemas  had  reference  only  to  his  own  intrigues  in 
tlie  Brazils.  Their  plans  were  necessarily  absurd. 
Funchal  revived  the  old  project  of  an  English  loan, 
and,  in  concert  with  his  coadjutors,  desired  to  estab- 
lisii  a  bank  after  the  manner  of  the  English  institu- 
tion ;  and  thoy  likewise  advanced  a  number  of  minor 
details  and  propositions,  most  of  which  had  been 
before  suggested  by  Principal  Souza  and  rejected  by 
lord  Wellington,  and  all  of  which  went  to  evade, 
not  to  remedy  the  evils.  Finally,  they  devised,  and 
the  English  cabinet  actually  entertained  the  plan, 
of  selling  the  crown  and  church  property  of  Portu- 
gal. This  spoliation  of  the  Catholic  church  was  to 
be  effected  by  commissioners,  one  of  whom  was  to 
be  Mr.  Sydenham,  an  Englishman  and  a  Protestant; 
and  as  it  was  judged  that  tlie  pope  would  not  readi- 
ly yield  his  consent,  they  resolved  to  apply  to  his 
nuncio,  who,  being  in  their  power,  they  expected  to 
find  more  pliable. 

Having  thus  provided  for  the  financial  difficulties 
of  Portugal,  the  ministers  turned  tiieir  attention  to 
the  supply  of  the  British  army,  and  in  the  same 
spirit  concocted  what  they  called  a  modified  system 
of  requisitions,  after  the  manner  of  the  French 
armies"!  Their  speeches,  their  manifestoes,  their 
whole  scheme  of  policy,  which  in  the  working  had 
nearly  crushed  the  liberties  of  England,  and  had 
plunged  the  whole  v/orld  into  war;  that  p ilicy, 
whose  aim  and  scope  was,  they  said,  to  support  es- 
tat)li;lied  religion,  the  rights  of  monarchs,  and  the 
independence  of  nations,  was  now  disregarded  or 
forgotten.  Yes,  these  men,  to  remove  ditficulties 
caused  by  tlieir  own  incapacity  and  negligence, 
were  ready  to  adopt  all  that  they  had  before  con- 
demned and  reviled  in  the  French;  they  were  eager 
to  meddle,  and  in  the  most  oifensive  manner,  with 
the  Catholic  religion,  by  getting  from  tiie  nuncio, 
who  was  in  their  power,  what  they  could  not  get 
from  the  pope  voluntarily  they  were  ready  to  in- 
terfere with  the  rights  of  the  Portuguese  crown  by 
Belling  its  property,  and  finally,  they  would  have 
adopted  that  system  of  requisitions  which  they  had 
60  often  denounced  as  rendering  the  very  name  of 
France  abhorrent  to  the  world. 

All  these  schemes  were  duly  transmitted  to  lor;J 
Wellington  and  to  Mr.  Stuart,  and  the  former  had. 
in  the  field,  to  unravel  the  intricacies,  to  detect  the 
fall  icies,  and  to  combat  the  wild  speculations  of 
men,  who,  in  profound  ignorance  of  facts,  were  giv- 
ing a  loose  to  their  imaginations  on  such  complica- 
ted questions  of  state.  It  was  while  preparing  to 
fi:fht  Marmont  tliat  he  had  to  expose  the  futility  of 
relying  upon  a  loan;  it  was  on  the  heights  of  San 
Caristoval,  on  the  field  of  battle  itself,  that  he  de- 
monstrated the  absurdity  of  •attempting  to  cstablisii 
a  Portuguese  bank  ;  it  .was  in  the  trendies  of  Burgos 
that  he  dissected  FunchaTs  and  Villiers'  schemes  of 
fiiauce,  and  exposed  the  folly  of  attempting  the  sale 
•)f  church  property  ;  it  was  at  tiie  termination  of  the 
/etreat  that,  witii  a  mixture  of  rebuke  and  reason- 
mr.  he  quelled  tl'C  proposal  to  live  by  forced  requi- 
«itions;  and,  on  each  occasion,  he  shewed  himself  as 
well  acquainted  with  these  subjects  as  he  was  with 
die  tnschanism  of  armies. 

Reform  abuses,  raise  your  actual  taxes  with  vig- 
our and  impartiality,  pay  your  present  debt  before 


you  contract  a  new  one,  was  his  constant  reply  to 
tlie  propositions  for  loans,  and  when  tlie  Englith 
ministers  pressed  the  other  plans,  which,  besides 
the  bank,  included  a  rccoinage  of  dollars  into  criiza- 
dos,  in  other  words,  the  depreciation  of  the  silver 
standard,  he,  with  an  unsparing  hand,  laid  their  fol- 
ly bare.  The  military  and  political  state  of  Portu- 
gal, he  said,  was  such  that  no  man  in  his  senses, 
whether  native  or  foreigner,  would  place  his  capital 
where  he  could  not  withdraw  it  at  a  moment's  no- 
tice. Vriien  Massena  invaded  that  country,  un- 
reasonable despondency  had  prevailed  amongst  tho 
ministers,  and  now  they  seemed  to  have  a  confi- 
dence as  wild  as  their  former  fear ;  but  he  wlio 
knew  tiie  real  state  of  affairs  ;  he  who  knew  the 
persons  that  were  expected  to  advance  money  ;  he 
who  knew  the  relative  forces  of  the  contending  ar- 
mies, tiie  advantages  and  disadvantages  attending 
each  ;  he  who  knew  the  absolute  weakness  of  the 
Portuguese  frontier  as  a  line  of  defence,  could  only 
laugh  at  the  notion,  that  the  capitalists  would  take 
gold  out  of  their  own  chests  to  lodge  it  in  the  chests 
of  the  bank,  and  eventually  in  those  of  the  Portu- 
guese treasury,  a  treasury  deservedly  without  cred- 
it. The  French  armies  opposed  to  him  in  the  field 
(he  was  then  on  San  Christoval)  were,  he  said,  just 
double  his  own  strength,  and  a  serious  accident  to 
Ballesteros,  a  rash  general  with  a  bad  army,  would 
oblige  the  Anglo-Portuguese  force  to  retire  into  Por- 
tugal, and  the  prospects  of  the  campaign  v.  ould  van- 
ish; and  this  argument  left  out  of  the  question  any 
accident  which  might  happen  to  himself  or  to  gene- 
ral Hill.  Portugal  would,  he  hoped,  be  saved,  but 
its  security  was  not  such  as  these  visionaries  would 
represent  it. 

But  they  hjd  proposed,  also,  a  British  security, 
in  jewels,  for  tiie  capital  of  their  bank,  and  tlieir 
reasonings  on  this  head  were  equally  fallacious. 
This  security  was  to  be  supported  by  collecting  the 
duties  on  wines,  exported  from  Portugal  to  England, 
and  yet  they  had  not  even  ascertained  whether  the 
existence  of  these  duties  was  conformable  to  the 
treaty  with  England.  Then  came  the  former  ques- 
tion. Would  Great  Britain  guarantee  the  capital  of 
the  subscribers,  wliether  Portugal  was  lost  or  saved  1 
If  the  country  should  be  lost,  the  new  possessors 
would  understand  the  levying  the  duties  upon  wines 
as  well  as  the  old  ;  w  "".iJd  England  make  her  drink- 
ers of  port  pay  two  duties,  the  one  for  the  benefit  of 
the  !  ank  capitalists,  the  other  for  the  benefit  of  the 
French  conquerors  .'  If  all  these  difficulties  could 
be  got  over,  a  bank  would  be  the  most  efficacious 
mode  in  which  England  could  use  her  credit  for  the 
benefit  of  Portugal  ;  but  all  the  other  plans  proposed 
i  were  mere  spendtlirill  schemes  to  defray  the  ex- 
penses of  the  war,  and  if  the  English  government 
could  descend  to  entertain  them,  they  would  fail, 
because  the  real  obstacle,  scarcity  of  specie,  wou.d 
remain. 

A  nation  desirous  of  establishing  public  credit 
should  begin,  he  said,  by  acquiring  a  revenue  equal 
to  its  fixed  expenditure,  and  must  manifest  an  incli- 
nation to  be  honest  by  pertbrming  its  engagements 
w  ith  respect  to  public  debts.  This  maxim  he  had 
constantly  entbrced  to  tlie  Portuguese  government, 
and  if  they  had  minded  it,  instead  of  trusting  to  tho 
fallacious  hope  of  getting  loans  in  England,  the  de- 
ficiency of  tlieir  revenue  would  have  been  made  up, 
without  imposing  new  taxes,  and  even  with  the  re- 
peal of  many  which  were  oppressive  and  uiyu.st 
The  fair  and  honest  collection  of  taxes,  which  ought 
to  exist,  would  have  been  sufficient.  For,  afler  pro- 
tracted and  unsparing  exertions,  and  by  refusing  to 
accept  their  paper  money  on  any  other  condition  in 


552 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XX 


hia  commissariat  transactions,  he  had  at  last  forced 
the  Portuguese  authorities  to  pay  the  interest  of 
tliat  paper  and  of  their  exchequer  bills,  called  "  Ap- 
olocies  grandes,"  and  the  clfect  had  been  to  increase 
the  resiources  of  the  government,  though  tlie  govern- 
ment had  even,  in  the  execution,  evinced  its  corrup- 
tion. Then,  showing  in  detail  how  this  benefit  had 
been  produced,  he  traced  the  mischief  created  by 
men  wliom  he  called  the  sharks  of  Lisbon  and  otlier 
ijreat  towns,  meaning  si)ecuhitors,  principally  Eng- 
lishmen, whose  nefarious  cupidity  led  them  to  cry 
•town  the  credit  of  tiie  army-bills  and  then  purchase 
l.hem,  to  the  injury  of  tlie  public  and  of  the  poor 
people  who  furnished  the  supplies. 

A  plan  of  recoining  the  Spanish  dollars,  and  so 
fjaining  eight  in  the  hundred  of  pure  silver,  which 
they  contained  above  that  of  the  Portuguese  cru- 
xado,  he  treated  as  a  fraud,  and  a  useless  one.  In 
Lisbon,  where  the  cruzado  was  current,  some  gain 
might  perhaps  be  made  ;  but  it  was  not  even  there 
certain,  and  foreigners,  Englishmen  and  Americans, 
from  whom  the  great  supplies  were  purchased, 
would  immediately  add  to  their  prices  in  proportion 
to  the  deterioration  of  the  coin.  Moreover,  the  op- 
erations and  expenditure  of  the  army  were  not  con- 
fined to  Lisbon,  nor  even  to  Portugal,  and  the  cru- 
xado  would  not  pass  for  its  nominal  value  in  Spain  ; 
thus,  instead  of  an  advantage,  the  greatest  inconveni- 
ence would  result  from  a  sclieme,  at  the  best  unwor- 
thy of  the  British  government.  In  fine,  the  reform 
of  abuses,  the  discontinuence  of  useless  expenses, 
economy,  and  energy,  were  the  only  remedies. 

Such  was  his  reasoning,  but  it  had  little  effect  on 
his  persecutors  ;  for  wiien  his  best  men  v/ere  falling 
by  hundreds,  his  brightest  visions  of  glory  fading  on 
the  smoky  walls  of  Burgos,  he  was  again  forced  to 
examine  and  refute  anew,  voluminous  plans  of  Por- 
tuguese finance,  concocted  by  Funchal  and  Villiers, 
with  notes  by  Vansittart.  All  the  old  schemes  of 
the  Principal  Souza,  which  had  been  so  often  before 
analyzed  und  rejected  as  impracticable,  were  revi- 
ved, with  the  addition  of  a  mixed  Anglo-Portu- 
guese commission  for  the  sale  of  the  crown  and 
church  lands.  And  these  projects  were  accompani- 
ed with  complaints  that  frauds  had  been  practised 
on  the  custom-house,  and  violence  used  towards  the 
inhabitants  by  the  British  commissaries,  and  it 
was  insinuated  such  misconduct  had  been  the  real 
cause  of  the  financial  distresses  of  Portugal.  The 
patient  industry  of  genius  v/as  never  more  severely 
tax 3d. 

Wellington  began  by  repelling  the  charges  of 
exactions  and  frauds,  as  applied  to  the  army  ;  he 
ehowed  that  to  reform  the  custom-house  so  as  to 
prevent  frauds,  had  been  his  unceasing  recommen- 
dation to  t';e  Portuguese  government ;  that  he  had 
as  repeatedly,  and  in  detail,  shewed  the  government 
how  to  remedy  the  evils  they  complained  of,  how  to 
increase  tlieir  customs,  how  to  levy  their  taxes, 
how,  in  fine,  to  arrange  their  whole  financial  sys- 
tem in  a  manner  that  would  have  rendered  their  re- 
venues equal  to  their  expenses,  and  without  that 
oppression  and  injustice  which  they  were  in  the 
habit  of  practising ;  for  the  extortions  and  violence 
complained  of,  were  not  perpetrated  by  the  English, 
but  by  the  Portuguese  commissariat,  and  yet  the 
troops  of  that  nation  were  starving.  Having  ex- 
posed Eunchal's  ignorance  of  financial  facts  in  de- 
tail, and  chTllenged  him  to  the  proof  of  tlie  charges 
against  the  Britisli  army,  he  entered  deeply  into  the 
consideration  of  the  gr.^at  question  of  the  sale  of  the 
crown  and  church  lands,  which  it  had  been  proposed 
to  substitute  for  that  economy  and  renrtii  of  abuses 
which  he  so  long,  so  often  and  so  vainly  had  pressed 


I  upon  the  regency.  The  proposal  was  not  quite  new. 
"I  have  already,"  he  observed,  "  had  belbre  me  a 
proposition  for  the  sale,  or  rather  transfer,  to  the 

I  creditors  of  tlie  '  Junta  dc  Viveres  '  of  crown  lands  ; 
but  these  were  the  uncultivated  lands  in  Alemtejo, 
and  I  pointed  out  to  the  government  the  great  im- 
probability that  any  body  would  take  sucii  lands  in 
payment,  and  the  injury  that  would  be  done  to  tl;e 
public  credit  by  making  the  scheme  public,  if  not 
likely  to  be  successful.  My  opinion  is,  that  there 
is  nobody  in  Portugal  possessed  of  capital  who  en- 
tertains, or  wiio  ought  to  entertain,  sucli  an  opinion 
of  the  state  of  affairs  in  the  Peninsula,  as  to  lay  out 
his  money  in  the  purchase  of  crown  lands.  The 
loss  of  a  battle,  not  in  the  Peninsula  even,  but  else- 
where, would  expose  his  estate  to  confiscation,  or  at 
all  events  to  ruin,  by  a  fresh  incursion  of  tiie  enemy. 
Even  if  any  man  could  believe  that  Portugal  is  se- 
cure against  the  invasion  of  the  enemy,  and  his  es- 
tate and  person  against  the  'violence,  cxacliims,  and 

frauds''  (these  v/ere  FunchaFs  words  respecting  the 
allied  army)  of  the  enemy,  he  is  not,  during  tlie  ex- 
istence of  the  war,  according  to  the  Conde  de  Fun- 
chal's  notion,  exempt  from  those  evils  from  his  own 
countrymen  and  their  allies.  Try  tiiis  experiment, 
ofier  the  estates  of  the  crown  for  sale,  and  it  will  be 
seen  whether  I  have  formed  a  correct  judgment  on 
this  subject."  Then  running  with  a  rapid  hand  over 
many  minor  though  intricate  fallacies  for  raising 
the  value  of  the  Portuguese  paper  money,  he  thus 
treated  the  great  question  of  the  church  lands. 

First,  as  in  the  case  of  crown  lands,  there  would 
be  no  purchasers,  and,  as  nothing  could  render  the 
measure  pulatable  to  the  clergy,  the  influence  of  the 
church  would  be  exerted  against  the  allies,  instead 
of  being,  as  hitherto,  strongly  exerted  in  their  favour. 
It  would  be  useless,  if  the  experiment  of  tlie  crown 
lands  succeeded,  and  if  that  failed  the  sale  of  cluirch 

.lands  could  not  succeed  ;  but  the  attempt  would  ali- 

j  enate  the  good  wishes  of  a  very  powerfiil  party  in 
Spain,    as    well    as    in    Portugal.     Moreover,  if  it 

I  should  succeed,  and  be  honestly  carried  into  execu- 
tion, it  would  entail  a  burthen  on  the  finances  of 
five  in  the  hundred,  on  the  purchase-money,  for  the 
support  of  the  ecclesiastical  owners  of  the  estates;. 
The  best  mode  of  obtaining  for  the  state  eventually 
the  benefit  of  the  church  property,  v.ould  be  to  pre- 
vent the  monasteries  and  nunneries  from  receiving 
novices,  and  thus,  in  the  course  of  time,  the  pope 
might  be  brought  to  consent  to  the  sale  of  tiic  es- 
tates, or  the  nation  might  assume  possession  when 
the  ecclesiastical  cor[)orations  thus  became  extinct. 
He,  however,  thought  that  it  was  no  disadvantage 
to  Spain  or  Portugal,  that  large  portions  of  land 
should  be  held  by  the  church.  The  bishops  and 
monks  were  the  only  proprietors  who  lived  on  theii 
estates,  and  spent  the  revenues  amongst  the  labour- 
ers by  whom  those  revenues  had  been  produced  ; 
and,  until  the  habits  of  the  new  landed  prnprietors 
changed,  the  transfer  of  the  property  in  land  from 
the  clergy  to  the  laymen  would  be  a  misfortune. 
This  memoir,  sent  from  tiie  trendies  of  Burgos, 
quashed  Funchal's  projects;  but  that  intriguer's  ob- 
ject was  not  so  much  to  remove  financial  (Mfficulti'^s 
as  to  get  rid  of  iiis  brother's  opponents  in  the  ref,y-,n. 
cy,  by  exciting  jiowerful  interests  ngiiirst  them; 
wherefore,  failing  in  this  proposal,  he  ordered  Re- 
dondo,  now  marquis  of  Borba,  the  minister  of  fin 
ance,  to  repair  to  the  Brazils,  intending  to  sujiply  his 
place  with  one  of  his  own  faction.  Wellington  and 
Stuart  were  at  this  time  doggedly  opposed  by  Bor- 
ba, but  as  the  credit  of  the  Portuguese  treasury  wao 
supported  by  his  character  for  probity,  they  forbade 

i  him  to  obey  the  order,  and  represented  the  matte* 


1812.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


553 


so  forcibly  to  the  prince  recent,  tliat  Funchal  was 
eeverely  ruprimanded  for  liis  audacity. 

It  was  amidst  those  vexations  that  Wellington 
made  his  retreat,  and  in  su^h  destitution,  tliat  he 
declared  all  former  distress  for  money  had  been  sliglit 
in  comparison  of  his  present  misery.  So  low  were 
tlie  resources,  that  IJritish  naval  stores  had  been 
trucked  fir  corn  in  Egypt;  and  the  English  minis- 
ters, finding  that  Russia,  intent  upon  pusiiing  her 
Buecessas,  was  gathering  specie  from  all  quarters, 
desired  Mr.  Stuart  to  prevent  the  ICnglisli  and  Amer- 
ican captains  of  merchant  vessels  from  carrying  coin 
away  from  Lisbon  ;  a  remedial  measure,  indicating 
their  total  ignorance  of  the  nature  of  commerce.  It 
was  not  attempted  to  be  enforced.  Then,  also,  tliey 
transmitted  their  plan  of  supplying  tlie  English  army 
by  requisitions  on  the  country,  a  plan,  the  particu- 
ulars  of  which  may  be  best  gathered  from  the  an- 
swers to  it. 

Mr.  Stuart,  firm  in  opposition,  shortly  observed, 
that  it  was  by  avoiding  and  reprobating  such  a  sys- 
tem, althoagli  pursued  alike  by  the  natives  and  by 
t^e  enemy,  tnat  the  British  character  and  credit  liad 
been  established  so  firmly,  as  to  be  of  the  greatest 
use  in  the  operations  of  tiie  war.  Wellington  enter- 
ed more  deeply  into  the  subject. 

Nothing,  he  said,  could  be  procured  from  the  coun- 
try in  the  mode  proposed  by  the  ministers'  memoir, 
unless  rescrt  was  also  had  to  tiie  French  mode  of 
enforcing  tiieir  requisitions.  The  proceedings  of 
the  Freucli  armies  were  misunderstood.  It  was  not 
true,  as  supposed  in  tiie  memoir,  that  the  French 
never  paid  for  supplies  They  levied  contributions 
where  money  was  to  be  had,  and  witli  this  paid  for 
provioions  in  .>ther  parts;  and  when  requisitions  for 
money  or  clothing  were  made,  they  were  taken  on 
account  of  the  regular  contributions  due  to  tlie  gov- 
ernmeut.  Tliey  were,  indeed,  heavier  than  even  an 
usurping  government  was  entitled  to  demand,  still 
it  was  a  regular  government  account,  and  it  was  ob- 
vious the  British  army  could  not  liave  recourse  to  a 
similar  plan  without  depriving  its  allies  of  tlieir  own 
legitimate  resources. 

The  requisitions  were  enforced  by  a  system  of  ter- 
ror. A  magistrate  was  ordered  to  provide  for  the 
troops,  and  was  told  that  the  latter  wouhi,  in  case  of 
failure,  take  the  provisions  and  punish  the  village  or 
district  in  a  variety  of  ways.  Now,  were  it  expedi- 
ent to  follow  this  mode  of  requisition,  there  must  be 
two  armies,  one  to  light  the  enemy,  and  one  to  en- 
force the  requisitions,  for  the  Si)nniards  would  never 
submit  to  such  proceedings  Vv'ithout  the  use  offeree. 
The  conscription  gave  the  French  armies  a  more 
moral  description  of  soldiers,  but  even  if  this  sec- 
ond army  was  provided,  the  British  troops  could  not 
be  trusted  to  intiict  an  exact  measure  of  punishment 
on  a  disobedient  village,  they  would  plunder  it  as 
well  as  the  otliers  readily  enough,  but  their  princi- 
pal object  would  be  to  get  at  and  drink  as  much  li- 
qu'jr  as  they  could,  and  then  to  destroy  as  much  val- 
uable propjrty  as  should  fall  in  their  way  ;  mesin- 
while  the  obj  ?v^ts  of  their  mission,  the  bringing  of 
supplies  to  tlie  army,  and  the  infliction  of  an  exact 
measure  of  punishment  on  the  magistrates  or  dis- 
trict would  not  be  accomplished  at  all.  Moreover, 
the  holders  of  supplies  in  Spain,  being  unused  to 
commercial  habits,  would  regard  pnyment  for  these 
requisitions  by  bills  of  any  description,  to  be  rather 
worse  than  the  mode  of  contribution  followed  by  the 
French,  and  would  resist  it  as  forcibly.  And  upon 
S'lch  a  nice  point  did  the  war  hang,  tlint  if  they  ac- 
cepted the  bi'ils  and  were  onco  to  discover  the  mode 
of  procuring  cash  for  them  by  discounting  high,  it 
would  be  the  most  fatal  blow  possible  to  the  credit 


and  resources  of  the  British  army  in  tlie  Peninsula. 
The  war  would  then  soon  cease. 

The  memoir  asserted  that  sir  John  ]\Ioore  had 
been  well  furnished  with  money,  and  tliat,  never- 
theless, the  Spaniards  would  not  give  him  provi- 
sions ;  and  this  fact  was  urged  as  an  argument  for  en- 
forcing requisitions.  But  the  assertion  tiiat  Moore 
was  furnished  with  money,  which  wiis  itself  the  in- 
dex to  the  ministers'  incapacity,  Wellington  told 
them  was  not  true.  "Moore,"  he  said,  "  l:ad  iieen 
even  worse  furnished  than  himself;  that  general  had 
borrowed  a  little,  a  very  little  money  at  Suianuuica, 
but  he  had  no  regular  sujjply  for  the  military  chest 
until  the  army  had  nearly  reached  Coruna  ;  and  the 
Spaniards  were  not  very  wrong  in  their  reluctance 
to  meet  his  wants,  for  the  debts  of  his  army  were 
still  unpaid  in  the  latter  end  of  1812."  In  fine, 
there  was  no  mode  by  which  supplies  could  be  pro- 
cured from  the  country  without  payment  on  the  spot, 
or  soon  after  the  transaction,  except  by  prevailing 
on  tlie  Spanish  government  to  give  the  English  ar- 
my a  part  of  the  government  contributions,  and  a 
part  of  the  revenues  of  the  royal  domains,  to  be  re- 
ceived from  the  peojde  in  kind  at  a  reasonable  rate. 
This  had  been  already  done  by  himself  in  the  prov- 
ince of  Salamanca  with  success,  and  the  same  sys- 
tem might  be  extended  to  other  provinces  in  propor- 
tion as  the  legitimate  government  was  re-establish- 
ed. But  this  only  met  a  part  of  the  evil  ;  it  would, 
indeed,  give  some  supplies,  cheaper  than  they  could 
otherwise  be  procured,  yet  they  must  al"terv,-ards  be 
paid  for  at  Cadiz  in  specie,  and  thus  less  money 
would  come  into  the  military  chest,  which,  as  befora 
noticed,  was  only  supported  by  liie  mercantile  spec- 
ulations of  the  general. 

Such  were  the  discussions  forced  upon  Wfdllng- 
ton,  when  all  his  faculties  were  demanded  en  tho 
field  of  battle,  and  such  was  the  hardiness  of  his  in- 
tellect to  sustain  the  additional  labour.  Such,  also, 
were  the  men  calling  themselves  statesmen  who  then 
wielded  the  vast  resources  of  Great  Britain.  The 
expenditure  of  that  country  for  the  year  1612,  waa 
above  one  hur.dred  millions,  the  ministers  who  con- 
trolled it  were  yet  so  ignorant  of  the  elementary 
prin.cijjles  of  finance,  as  to  throw  upon  their  general, 
even  amidst  the  clangor  and  tumult  of  battie,  the 
task  of  exposing  such  fallacies.  And  to  reduce  these 
persons  from  the  magnitude  of  statesmen  to  their  nat- 
ural smallness  of  intriguing  debaters,  is  called  peli- 
tical  prejudice!  But  though  power  may  enable  men 
to  trample  upon  reason  for  a  time  with  impunity, 
tliey  cannot  escape  lier  ultimate  vengeance,  slie  re- 
assumes  her  sway  and  history  delivers  them  to  the 
justice  of  posterity. 

Perverse  as  the  proceedings  of  the  English  minis- 
ters were,  those  of  the  Portuguese  and  Spanish  gov- 
ernments were  not  less  vexatious  ;  and  at  this  t.nie, 
the  temper  of  the  S])anish  rulers  was  of  infinite  im- 
portance, because  of  the  misfortunes  which  had  be 
fallen  the  French  emperor.  The  opportunity  given 
to  strike  a  decisive  blow  at  his  power  in  the  l^enin- 
sula,  demanded  an  early  and  vigorous  campaign  in 
Spain,  and  the  experience  of  ]Hi2  liad  taught  Wel- 
lington, that  no  aid  could  be  derived  from  the  Sjian- 
ianis,  unless  a  change  was  made  in  their  military 
system.  Hence  the  moment  he  was  asi-ured  that 
the  French  armies  had  taken  winter-quarters,  he 
resolved  before  all  otlier  matters,  in  person  to  urge 
upon  the  cortes  the  necessity  of  giving  him  the  real 
as  well  OS  the  nominal  command  of  their  troops, 
seeing  that  without  an  immediate  reformation,  tha 
Spanish  armies  could  not  take  the  field  in  due  sea- 
son. 

During  the  past  campaign, and  especially  after  tha 


554 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XX. 


conde  de  Abispal,  indignant  at  the  censure  passed 
in  tlie  cortes  on  his  brother's  conduct  at  Castella, 
had  resigned,  the  weakness  of  the  Spanish  govern- 
ment had  become  daily  more  deplorable ;  nothing 
was  done  to  ameliorate  the  military  system  ;  an  ex- 
treme jealousy  raged  between  the  cortes  and  the  re- 
gency;  and  when  tlie  former  olVered  lord  Welling- 
ton the  command  of  tlieir  armies,  Mv,  Wclleslcy  ad- 
vised him  to  accept  it,  not  so  mucii  in  th.e  hope  of 
elfecting  any  beneiicial  change,  as  to  oiler  a  point 
upon  wiiich  the  Spaniards,  wlio  were  still  true  to  the 
English  alliance  and  to  the  aristocratic  cause,  might 
rally  in  case  of  I'everse.  Tiie  disobedience  of  Bal- 
lesteros  had  been  indeed  promptly  punished  ;  but  the 
vigour  of  tiie  cortes  on  that  occasion,  was  more  the 
result  of  offended  pride  than  any  consideration  of 
sound  policy,  and  the  retreat  of  the  allies  into  Por- 
tugal, was  the  signal  lor  a  renewal  of  those  danger- 
ous intrigues,  which  the  battle  of  Salamanca  had  ar- 
rested without  crushing. 

Lord  Wellington  reached  Cadiz  on  the  18th  of  De- 
cember, he  was  received  without  enthusiasm,  yet 
with  due  honour,  and  his  presence  seemed  agreeable 
b3th  to  the  cortes  and  to  tlie  people  ;  the  passions 
which  actuated  the  different  parties  in  the  state 
subsided  for  the  moment,  and  the  ascendency  of  his 
genius  was  so  strongly  felt,  that  he  was  heard  with 
patience,  even  when  in  private  he  strongly  urged 
the  leading  men  to  turn  their  attention  entirely  to 
the  war,  to  place  in  obeyance  their  flictious  dis- 
putes, and,  above  all  things,  not  to  put  down  the  in- 
quisition, Isst  they  should  drive  the  fjowerful  church 
panv  into  the  arms  of  the  enemy.  His  exhortation 
upon  this  last  point,  had  indeed  no  cflect  save  to  en- 
courage the  serviles  to  look  more  to  England,  yet  it 
did  not  prevent  the  cortes  yielding  to  him  the  entire 
control  of  fifcy  thousand  men  which  were  to  be  paid 
from  the  English  subsidy;  they  promised,  also,  that 
the  commanders  should  not  be  removed,  nor  any 
change  made  in  the  organization  or  destination  of 
Buch  troops  without  his  consent. 

A  fresh  organization  of  the  Spanish  forces  now 
had  place.  They  were  divided  into  four  armies  and 
two  reserves. 

The  Catalans  formed  the  first  army. 

Elio's  troops,  including  the  divisions  of  Duran, 
Bassecoiir,  and  Villa  Campa,  received  the  name  of 
the  second  army. 

The  forces  in  the  ]Morena,  formerly  under  Balles- 
teros,  were  constituted  the  third  army,  under  Del 
Parque. 

'i'iie  troops  of  Estremndura,  Leon,  Gallicia,  and 
the  Asturias,  including  Morillo's,  Penne  Villemur's, 
Downie's,  and  Carlos  d'Espaua's  separate  divisions, 
were  called  the  fourth  army,  and  given  to  Castafios, 
whose  appointment  to  Catalonia  was  cancelled,  and 
his  former  dignity  of  captain-general  in  Estremadu- 
ra  and  Gallicia  restored.  The  partidas  of  Longa, 
Mina,  Porlier,  and  t.he  other  chiefs  in  the  northern 
provinces,  were  afterwards  united  to  this  army  as 
ecjiarate  divisions. 

The  conde  d' Abispal,  made  captain-general  of  An- 
dalusia, conimanded  the  first  reserve,  and  Lacy,  re- 
called from  Catalonia,  where  he  was  replaced  by  Co- 
pons,  was  ordered  to  form  a  second  reserve  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  San  Roque.  Such  were  the  new 
dispositions,  but  when  Wellington  had  completed 
this  important  negotiation  with  the  Spanish  gov- 
ernment, some  inactivity  was  for  the  first  time  dis- 
covered in  his  wn  proceedings.  Ilis  stay  was  a 
little  prolonged  without  apparent  reason,  and  it  was 
whispered,  that  if  he  resembled  C.esar,  Cadiz  could 
produce  a  Cleopatra ;  but  whether  true  or  not,  he 
Boon  returned  to  the  army,  first,  however,  visiting 


Lisbon,  where  he  was  greeted  with  extraordinary 
honours,  aiid  the  most  unbounded  enthusiasm,  espo 
cially  by  the  peoi)le. 

His  departure  from  Cadiz,  was  the  signal  for  all 
the  political  dissensions  to  break  out  witii  more  vio 
lence  than  before  ;  the  dissensions  of  the  liberals 
and  serviles  became  more  rancorous,  and  the  execu- 
tive was  always  on  the  side  of  the  latter,  the  major- 
ity of  the  cortes  on  the  side  of  the  former;  neither 
enjoyed  the  confidence  of  the  people  nor  of  the  allies 
and  the  intrigues  of  Carlotta,  which  never  ceased, 
advanced  towards  their  completion.  A  strong  in- 
clination to  make  her  sole  regent  was  manifested, 
and  sir  Henry  Wellesley,  tired  of  fruitless  opposi- 
tion, remained  neuter,  with  the  apjjrobation  of  hia 
brother.  One  of  the  principal  causes  of  this  feeling 
for  Carlotta,  was  the  violence  she  had  shewn  against 
the  insurgents  of  Buenos  Ayres,  and  another,  was 
the  disgust  given  to  tlie  merchants  of  Cadiz,  by  cer- 
tain diplomatic  measures  which  lord  Stranglbrd  had 
held  with  that  revolted  state.  The  agents  of  the 
ptincess  represented  the  policy  of  England  toward 
the  Spanish  colonies,  as  a  smuggling  policy,  and  not 
without  truth,  for  the  advice  of  lord  Wellington  up- 
on that  subject  had  been  unheeded.  Lord  Castle- 
reagh  had  indeed  offered  a  new  mediation  scheme, 
whereby  the  old  commission  was  to  proceed  under 
the  Spanish  restriction  of  not  touching  at  Mexico, 
to  which  country  a  new  mission',  composed  of  Span 
iards,  was  to  proceed,  accompanied  by  an  English 
agent,  without  any  ostensible  character.  This  pro- 
posal, however,  ended  as  the  others  had  done,  and 
the  Spanish  jealousy  of  England  increased. 

In  the  beginning  of  the  year  181J3,  Carlotta's  cause, 
ably  and  diligently  served  by  Pedro  Souza,  had  gain- 
ed a  number  of  adherents  even  amongst  the  liberals 
in  the  cortes.  She  was  ready  to  sacrifice  even  the 
rights  of  her  posterity,  and  as  she  promised  to  main- 
tain all  ancient  abuses,  the  clergy  and  ilie  serviles 
v/ere  in  no  manner  averse  to  her  success.  Mean- 
while, the  decree  to  abolioh  the  inquisition,  which 
was  become  the  great  test  of  political  party,  passed 
on  the  7th  of  March,  and  the  regency  were  ordered 
to  have  it  read  in  the  churches.  The  clergy  of  Ca- 
diz resisted  the  order,  and  intimated  their  refusal 
throug'i  the  medium  of  a  public  letter,  and  the  re- 
gency encouraged  them  by  removing  the  governor  of 
Cadiz,  admiral  Valdez,  a  known  liberal  and  opponent 
of  the  inquisition,  appointing  in  his  stead  general 
Alos,  a  warm  advocate  for  that  horrid  institution. 
But  in  the  vindication  of  official  power,  tlie  Spaniards 
are  generally  prompt  and  decided.  On  the  Fth,  Au- 
gustin  Arguelles  moved,  and  it  was  instantly  car- 
ried, that  the  sessions  of  the  extraordinnry  cortes 
should  be  declared  permanent,  with  a  view  to  mea- 
sures worthy  of  the  nation,  and  to  prevent  the  evils 
with  which  the  state  was  menaced  by  the  opposition 
of  the  regency  and  the  clergy  to  the  cortes.  A  de- 
cree was  then  pro])osed  for  sufipressing  tlie  actual 
regency,  and  replacing  it  with  a  provisional  govern- 
ment, to  be  composed  of  the  three  eldest  councillors 
of  state.  This  being  conformable  to  the  constitu- 
tion, was  carried,  by  a  majority  of  eighty-six  to  fif- 
ty-eight, while  another  jiroposition,  that  two  mem- 
bers of  the  cortes,  publicly  elected,  should  be  added 
to  the  regency,  was  rejected  as  an  innovation,  by 
seventy-two  against  sixty-six.  The  councillors, 
Pedro  Agar,  Gabriel  Ciscar,  and  the  cardin;!  Bour- 
bon, archbishop  of  Toledo,  were  immediately  instal- 
led as  regents. 

A  committee,  which  liad  been  appointed  to  con- 
sider of  the  best  means  of  improving  a  system  of 
government,  felt  by  all  parties  to  be  imperfect,  now 
recommended  that  the  cardinal  archbishop,  who  was 


IS13.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


555 


of  tho  blood  royal,  should  be  presidant  of  the  rsgcn- 
cy,  leaving  Ca,rlotta's  claims  unnotic3d,  and  as  «Jis- 
tjr  and  Agar  hud  boeii  formerly  rtnioved  from  the 
n'^;";iiicy  for  incapacity,  it  was  g"2ne/r.  i'.y  supposed, 
t!i:it  the  intention  was  to  make  the  aiciu  ishoj)  in 
i'l.t  sole  regent.  Very  soon,  however,  Carlotta's  in- 
f  ;i  "ace  was  again  felt,  for  a  dispute  iiaving  arisen  in 
ti; »  cortes  between  wiiat  were  called  the  Americans 
and  the  liberals,  about  the  annual  Acapulco-ship, 
tnn  former,  to  the  number  of  twenty,  joined  the  [)ar- 
tv  of  tiie  princess,  and  it  was  resolved  that  Ruicz 
Pedron,  a  distinguished  opponent  of  the  inquisition, 
Blioiild  propose  her  as  the  head  of  the  regency.  They 
W3re  almost  sure  of  a  majority,  when  the  scheme 
transpired,  and  the  people,  who  liked  her  not,  became 
60  furious,  that  her  parti zaris  were  afraid  to  speak. 
Then  the  opposite  side,  fearing  her  power,  proposed 
on  tiie  instant,  that  the  prov.sional  regency  thould 
be  made  permanent,  which  was  carried.  Thus, 
chance  rather  than  choice  ruling,  an  old  prelate  and 
two  imbecile  councillors  were  entrusted  with  tlie 
government,  and  the  intrigues  and  rancour  of  the 
di:f:rei'it  parties  exploded  more  frequently  as  tlic 
pressure  from  above  became  slight 

31'jre  than  all  other.',  the  clergy  were,  as  might 
be  expected,  violent  and  daring,  yet  tiie  cortes  was 
not  to  be  frightened.  Four  canons  of  the  cathedrals 
were  arrested  in  Mayj^and  orders  were  issued  to  ar- 
rest the  archbishop  of  St.  Jago,  and  many  bishops, 
because  of  a  pastoral  letter  they  had  published 
agiinst  the  abolition  of  tho  inquisition  ;  for,  accord- 
in  r  to  the  habits  of  their  craft  of  all  sects,  they 
i:  ined  religion  trampled  under  foot  when  the  pow- 
er of  levying  money  and  spilling  blood  was  denied 
lo  mil  isters  professing  the  faith  of  Christ.  Nor 
an:ridst  those  broils  did  the  English  influence  fail  to 
erlfi;r;  the  democratic  spirit  advanced  hastily,  the 
Cadiz  press  teemed  with  writings,  intended  to  ex- 
cite the  people  against  the  ultimate  designs  of  the 
English  cabinet,  and  every  eiFort  was  made  to  raise 
a  hatred  of  the  British  general  and  his  troops. 
Tliese  eiforts  were  not  founded  entirely  on  false- 
hoods, and  were  far  from  being  unsuccessful,  be- 
cause the  eager  desire  to  preserve  the  inquisition, 
displayed  by  lord  Wellington  and  his  brother,  al- 
though arising  from  military  considerations,  was  too 
much  in  accord  with  the  known  tendency  of  the 
English  cabinet's  policy,  not  to  excite  the  suspicions 
of  the  whole  liberal  party. 

The  bishops  of  Longrofio,  Mondonedo,  Astorga, 
Lugo,  and  Salamanca,  and  the  archbishop  of  St.  .Ta- 
gT,  were  arrested,  but  several  bishops  escaped  into 
Portu^ral,  and  were  there  protected  as  martyrs  to  the 
cause  of  legitimacy  and  despotism.  The  bishop  of 
Orense,  and  the  ex-regent  Lardizabal  had  before 
fled,  the  latter  to  Algarve,  the  former  to  the  Tras  os 
Montes,  from  whence  he  kept  up  an  active  inter- 
course with  Gallicia,  and  the  cortes  v/ere  far  from 
popular  there  ;  indeed  the  flight  of  the  bishops  crea- 
ted great  irritation  in  every  part  of  Spain,  for  the 
liberal  party  of  the  cortes  was  stronger  in  the  Isla 
than  in  other  parts,  and,  by  a  curious  anomaly,  the 
nffi','ers  and  soldiers  all  over  Spain  were  generally 
their  partizans,  while  the  people  were  generally  the 
partizans  of  the  clergy.  Nevertheless,  the  seeds  of 
fr(>edoni,  though  carelessly  sown  by  the  French  on 
one  side,  and  by  the  cortes  on  the  other,  took  deep 
root,  and  have  since  sprung  up  into  strong  plants, 
in  due  time  to  burgeon  and  bear  fruit. 

When  the  bishops  fled  from  Spain,  Gravina.  the 
pope's  nuncio,  assumed  such  a  tone  uf  hot.tHity,  tiiat 
notwithstanding  the  o-ood  offices  of  sir  He^iry  Welles- 
ley,  which  were  for  some  time  succL-ssful  in  screen- 
ing him  f.om  the  vengej  nee  of  the  cortes,  the  latter, 


encouraged  by  the  English  newspapers,  finally  dis- 
missed him  and  seques-tered  his  benefices,  lie  also 
took  refuge  in  Portugnl,  and  like  the  rest  of  the  ex- 
pelled clergy,  sought  by  all  means  to  renc'cr  ilu;  pro- 
ceedings of  the  cortes  odious  in  Spain,  lie  formed 
a  strict  alliance  with  the  Portuguese  nuncio.  Vi- 
cente Machiechi,  and  working  together  witli  grent 
activity,  they  interfered,  not  with  the  cf  ncerns  of 
Sjjain  only,  but  with  the  Catholics  in  the  British  ar- 
my, and  even  extended  their  intrigues  to  Ireland, 
Hence,  as  just  and  honest  governujent  had  never 
formed  any  part  of  the  English  policy  tow pi-ds  that 
country,  alarm  pervaded  the  cabinet,  and  the  nun 
cio,  protected  when  opposed  to  the  cortes,  was  now 
considered  a  very  troublesome  and  indi^creot  person. 

Such  a  state  of  feud  could  not  last  long  without 
producing  a  crisis,  and  one  of  a  most  Ibrmic'able  and 
decisive  nature  was  really  at  hand.  Alreaciy  many 
persons  in  the  cortes  held  secret  intercourse  with  Jo- 
seph, in  a  view  of  acknowledging  his  dyiiatty,  on 
condition  that  he  would  accede  to  the  general  ];oHcy 
of  the  cortes  in  civil  government;  that  mo.'.arch 
had,  as  we  have  seen,  organized  a  large  native 
force,  and  the  coasts  of  Spain  and  Portugal  swarm 
ed  with  French  privateers  manned  with  Spanish  sea- 
men. The  victory  at  Salamanca  had  withered  these 
resources  for  the  moment,  but  Wellingtcn's  failure 
at  Burgos  and  retreat  into  Portugal,  again  revived 
them,  and  at  the  same  time  gave  a  heavy  shock  to 
public  confidence  in  the  power  of  England,  a  shock 
which  nothing  but  the  misfortunes  of  Napoleon  in 
Russia  could  have  prevented  from  being  fatal. 

The  emperor,  indeed,  with  that  wcnderfiil  intel- 
lectual acrivity  and  energy,  which  made  him  the 
foremost  man  of  the  world,  had  raised  a  fresh  army, 
and  prepared  once  more  to  march  into  tlie  heart  of 
Germany,  yet,  to  do  this  he  was  forced  to  withdraw 
such  numbers  of  old  soldiers  from  Spain,  ihat  the 
French  array  could  no  longer  hope  permanently  lo 
act  on  the  olYensive  This  stayed  the  PcRinsuk,r 
cause  upon  the  very  brink  of  a  precipice,  for  in  that 
very  curious,  useful,  and  authentic  work,  called 
"  Boiirricnne  and  his  erroi's,"  it  appears  that  early 
in  181^^,  the  ever  factious  conde  de  Mont'jo,  then  a 
general  in  Elio's  army,  had  secretly  made  proposals 
to  pass  over,  with  the  forces  under  his  comnjand,  to 
the  king;  and  soon  afterwards  the  whcle  army  of 
Del  Parque,  having  advanced  into  La  3Iancha,  made 
ofiers  of  the  same  nature. 

'fhey  were  actually  in  negotiation  with  Joseph, 
when  the  emperor's  orders  obliged  tho  French  army 
to  abandon  Madrid,  and  take  up  the  line  of  the  Due- 
ro.  Then  the  Spaniards,  advertised  of  the  French 
weakness,  feared  to  continue  their  negotiations. 
Wellington  soon  afterwards  advanced,  and  as  this 
feeling  in  favour  of  the  intrusive  monarch  was  cer- 
tainly not  general,  the  resistance  to  the  invaders  re- 
vived with  the  successes  of  the  British  general. 
But,  if  instead  of  diminishing  his  forces,  Nanoleon, 
victorious  in  Russia,  had  strengthened  ihcm,  this 
defection  would  certainly  have  taken  place,  and 
would  probably  have  been  followed  by  others.  The 
king,  at  the  head  of  a  Spanish  army,  would  then 
have  reconquered  Andalusia,  Vt'elllngtrn  would  have 
been  confined  to  the  defence  of  Portugal,  and  it  ia 
scarcely  to  be  supposed  that  England  would  have 
purchased  the  independence  of  that  country  with  her 
own  permanent  ruin. 

This  conspiracy  is  not  related  by  me  with  entire 
confi<!ence,  because  no  trace  of  the  transaction  is  to 
be  found  in  the  correspondence  of  the  king,  taken  at 
Yittoria.  Nevertheless,  there  are  abundant  proofs 
that  the  work  called  "  Bonrricnne  and  his  errors'* 
inasmuch  as  it  relates  to  Joseph's  transactions  in 


556 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR, 


[Book  XX. 


Sjiain,  is  arcuratoly  compiled  from  that  monarch's 
correspondence.  Many  of  his  papers  taken  at  Vit- 
toria  were  lost  or  abstracted  at  the  time,  and  as,  in 
a  case  involvin-^  so  many  persons'  livcL^,  he  would 
probably  have  destroyed  the  proofs  of  a  conspiracy 
which  had  failed,  there  seems  little  reason  to  doubt 
that  the  general  lact  is  correct.  Napoleon,  also,  in 
his  memoirs,  speaks  of  secret  negotiations  with  the 
cortes  about  tiiis  time,  and  his  testimony  is  corrobor- 
ated by  the  correspondence  of  the  British  embassy 
at  Cadiz,  and  by  tlie  continued  intrigues  against  the 
British  influence.  The  next  ciiapter  will  show  that 
the  policy  of  tipain  was  not  the  only  source  of  un- 
easiness to  lord  Wellington. 


CHAPTER  II. 

Politiral  state  of  Portugal — Welhngton's  difficulties — Improper 
coiitliH'l  i>(  souii'  Eiijli?h  s  .ips  oi  war — i'.Mtlcil  viiilmre  of 
a  Sfoli-h  uieif  Kaiitiiian — Di-orilers  in  the  iiiililarv  sysffiii — 
Irrilr.tiDii  ol  thi-  peo|)lc — Mi-Conduct  of  the,  iiiagistrMtt^ — 
VV.  lliiiifton  anil  Stuart  grapple  with  the  disorderr  of  tlie 
adi.iinistiation — I  he  latter  calls  for  the  iiitei  fereiice  of  tfn' 
BritirM  government — Wellington  writes  a  remarkabli-  letter 
to  lliii  pilnce-rtgent,  and  requests  him  to  return  to  Poituf;al 
—  Fititial  anifiidinent — The  etiiciency  o(  the  a;  my  restnied, 
but  the  cu'.inliy  remains  in  an  iinseille  I  slate— The  prince 
uiia'.ile  to  ((uit  the  Ur.z  !• — C'arlotla  prepares  to  Co  ne  alone 
— 1«  .«IOi)|jt-d  hy  the  i iitei  ftreiice  of  (he  Briti-h  government 
— An  aLi\ilinry  Russian  force  is  otieieJ  to  lord  VVilliiLton 
by  admiral  Grei^ — Tie  Russian  aml)assa<lor  in  London  dis- 
Btovts  the  ofiVr — The  emperor  Alexander  prop  ises  to 
Mie.iiate  bttween  Knglan  I  and  Ameri'-a — The  e  nperor  of 
Au-tri  1  oilers  to  meuiate  fur  a  general  peace — B.i.h  otier.- 
Hrf-  iefu>eil. 

NoTJUNO  could  be  more  complicated  than  the 
political  state  of  Portugal  with  reference  to  the  situ- 
ation of  the  Englisli  gmeral.  His  object,  as  I  have 
rspealedly  shown,  was  to  bring  the  whole  resources 
of  the  country  to  bear  on  the  war ;  but  to  effect  this 
he  had  to  run  counter  to  the  habits  and  customs, 
both  of  the  people  and  of  tiie  government ;  to  detect 
the  intrigues  of  the  subordinate  authorities,  as  well 
as  those  of  the  higher  powers  ;  to  oppose  the  vio- 
lence of  factious  men  in  the  local  government;  and 
what  is  still  more  difficult,  to  stimulate  the  sluggish 
apathy,  and  to  combat  tha  often  lionest  obstinacy  of 
those  who  ware  not  factious.  These  things  he  was 
to  effect  without  the  power  of  recompensing  or  chas- 
tising, and  even  wliilo  forced  to  support  those  who 
merited  rebuke,  against  the  still  more  formidable 
intriguers  of  the  court  of  Brazil  ;  for  the  best  men  of 
Portugal  actually  formed  the  local  government;  and 
he  was  not  foiled  so  much  by  the  men  as  by  tlie 
sluggish  system  which  was  national  ;  and  although 
dull  for  good  purposes,  vivacious  enough  for  mis- 
chief. Tiie  dread  of  ultimate  personal  consequences 
attached,  not  to  neglect  of  the  war,  but  to  any 
vigorous  exertions  in  support  of  it. 

T!ij  proceedings  of  the  court  of  R"o  Janeiro  were 
not  liss  mischievous  ;  for  there  the  personal  intrigues 
fostered  Ijy  the  peculiar  disposition  of  the  English  en- 
voy ;  by  the  weak,  y3t  dogged  habits  of  the  [)rince  ; 
and  by  the  m'^ddling  nature  and  violent  passions  of 
the  princess  (Jarlotta, stifled  all  great  national  views. 
There  also  t!ie  power  of  the  Souza's,  a  family  dcH- 
cicnt  neither  in  activity  nor  in  talent,  w-as  predomi- 
nant;  and  the  object  of  all  was,  to  st'miilate  the 
government  in  Portugal  against  the  English  gene- 
ral's military  policy.  To  this  he  could,  md  had 
opposed,  as  we  have  seen,  the  power  o(  the  English 
government,  with  some  effect  at  diii'erent  times; 
but  that  resource  was  a  dangerous  one,  and  only  to 
be  resorted  to  in  extreme  circumstances.  Hence, 
when  to  all  tlies2  things  is  added  a  continual  otrug- 


gle  with  the  knavery  of  merchants  of  ail  nations, 
his  difiiciilties  must  be  admitted,  his  inromitauie 
vigour,  iiis  patience,  and  his  extraordinary  mental 
resources  admired  ;  and  the  whole  scene  nnist  do 
considered  as  one  of  tiie  most  curious  and  instructive 
lessons  in  the  study  cf  nations. 

Wellington  was  not  simi-ly  a  general  who  with 
greater  or  less  means,  was  to  jdan  liis  military  oper- 
ations, leaving  to  otliers  the  care  of  settling  the 
political  difficulties  which  might  arise.  He  ha(!, 
coincident  with  his  military  duties,  to  regenerate  a 
whole  people  ;  to  Ibrce  them  againtt  the  current  of 
their  prejudices  and  usages  on  a  dangerous  and  pain- 
ful course  ;  he  had  to  teacii  at  once  the  pofaikce  ai.d 
the  government;  to  inliise  s])irit  and  crcer  witl:out 
the  aid  of  rewards  or  punishments  ;  to  excite  enth.u- 
siasm  thrcugii  the  medium  of  corrupt,  oppressive 
institutions  ;  and  far  from  makirg  any  revcluLionary 
appeal  to  su[)press  all  tendency  towards  that  resource 
of  great  minds  on  the  like  occasions.  Thus  oiily 
could  he  maintain  an  army  at  all;  and  as  it  was 
beyond  the  power  of  man  to  continue  such  a  strug- 
gle for  any  length  of  time,  he  was  rncre  than  ever 
anxious  to  gati)er  strength  for  a  decisive  blow, 
which  the  enemy's  situation  now  rei.dered  possible, 
that  he  might  free  himself  from  tiie  critical  and 
anomalous  relation  in  which  he  stood  towards  Por- 
tugal. 

It  may  indeed  be  wondered,  that  he  so  long  1  ore  up 
against  the  increasing  pressure  of  tliese  distract'ng 
alfairs;  and  certain  it  is,  that  more  than  once  ha 
was  like  to  yield,  and  would  have  yielded  if  fortune 
had  not  ofl'ered  him  certain  happy  military  chances  ; 
and  yet  sucli  as  few  but  himself  could  have  profited 
from.  In  1810,  on  the  ridge  of  Inteaco,  and  in  tlie 
lines,  the  military  succer-s  was  rather  over  the  Por- 
tuguese government  than  the  enemy.  At  Santnrcni, 
in  1811,  the  glory  of  arms  scarcely  compensated  for 
the  destitution  of  the  troops.  At  Fuentes  Ontro, 
and  en  the  Caya,  after  the  second  unsuccessful  siep;e 
of  Badajos,  the  Portuguese  army  had  nearly  dissolv- 
ed; and  the  astonishing  sieges  of  Ciudad  Rodr  go 
and  Badajos  in  1812,  v/ere  necessary  to  save  the 
cause  from  dying  of  inanition  and  despair.  Even 
then,  tlie  early  deliverance  of  Andalusia  was  frus- 
trated ;  and  time,  more  valuable  than  geld  or  life,  in 
war,  w^as  lost ;  the  enemy  became  the  strongest  in 
the  field  ;  and  in  despite  of  the  victory  of  Salaman- 
ca, the  bad  effects  of  the  English  general's  j)olitical 
situation  were  felt  in  the  repulse  from  Burgos,  and 
in  the  double  retreat  from  that  j-lace  and  from  Mad- 
rid. Accumulated  mischiefs  were  now  to  be  en- 
countered in  Portugal. 

It  has  been  shown  how  obstinately  the  regency 
opposed  Wellington's  plans  of  financial  refrrm,  how 
they  disputed  and  complained  upon  every  circum- 
stance, whetiier  serious  or  trivial,  on  which  a  com- 
plaint could  be  founded  ;  for  thinking  Portugal  no 
longer  in  danger  they  were  tired  of  their  British 
allies,  and  had  no  desire  to  aid,  nor  indeed  any  wish 
to  see  Hpain  delivered  from  her  difficulties.  I'hey 
designed  therefore  to  harass  the  English  general, 
hoping  either  to  drive  him  away  altogetiier,  or  to 
force  liim,  and,  through  him  his  govcrrment,  to 
grant  them  loans  or  now  subsidies.  But  Wellington 
knew  ti'.at  Portugal  couhl,  and  he  was  resolved 
it  sf:oul:l  find  resources  within  itself,  wherefore, 
afler  the  battle  of  Salnmanca,  when  they  demanded 
a  fresh  subsidy,  he  would  not  listen  to  them  ;  and 
when  tlipy  adopted  that  scheme,  which  I  have 
already  exposed,  of  feeding,  or  rather  starving  their 
troops,  through  the  medium  of  a  treaty  with  the 
Spanish  government,  lie  checked  the  sliameful  and 
absurd  plan,  by  applying  a  part  of  the  ntoncy  ia 


i9in  J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


557 


tlte  chest  of  aids,  intended  for  the  civil  service,  to 
tli  !  relief  of  the  Portuguese  troops.  Yet  the  re- 
P  acy  did  not  entirely  fail  in  their  object,  inasmuch 
iiH  many  persons  dependent  upon  tlie  subsidy  were 
t!;  IS  deprived  of  their  payments  ;  and  their  com- 
1  liints  hurt  tlie  Britisli  credit,  and  reduced  the 
li-.lish  intluonce  with  tlie  people,  whose  faithful 
a*t  ichinent  to  tlie  alliance  no  intrigues  had  hitherto 
b  '  a  able  to  sliake. 

Into  every  branch  of  government,  however  mi- 
nut^,  the  regency  now  infused  their  own  captious 
a:iJ  discontented  spirit.  They  complained  falsely, 
tli:it  general  Campbell  had  insulted  the  nation  by 
tmning  some  Portuguese  residents  publicly  out  of 
(i  !)raltar  in  comi)any  with  Jews  and  Moors;  they 
r  'iiised  the  wheat  wiiicli  was  delivered  to  them  by 
1  or.l  Wellington  in  lieu  of  tlieir  subsidy,  saying,  it 
Wis  not  fit  for  food,  notwithstanding  that  the  Eng- 
lisii  troops  were  tlien  living  upon  parcels  of  the 
Kaine  grain  ;  that  their  own  troops  were  glad  to 
gTt  it,  and  that  no  other  was  to  be  had.  \Vhen 
a  '.vooden  jetty  was  to  be  thrown  in  the  Tagus  for 
til!  convenience  of  landing  stores,  they  sujtported 
ono  Caldas,  a  rich  proprietor,  in  his  refusal  to  per- 
rnt  the  trees  wanted  for  the  purpose  to  be  felled, 
all  jJging  the  riglits  of  property,  although  he  was  to 
b;  [)aid  largely;  and,  although  they  had  themselves 
then,  and  always,  disregarded  the  rights  of  property, 
especially  when  poor  men  were  concerned,  seizing 
upon  whatever  was  required,  eitlier  for  the  public 
aerrice  or  for  the  support  of  their  own  irregularities, 
witliout  any  payment  at  all,  and  in  shameful  viola- 
lion  both  of  law  and  humanity. 

The  commercial  treaty,  and  the  proceedings  of 
the  Oporto  wine  company,  an  opj)ressive  corporation 
unfair  in  all  its  dealings,  irresponsible,  established 
in  violation  of  that  treaty,  and  supported  without 
regard  either  to  the  interests  of  tlie  prince-regent 
or  his  British  allies,  furnished  them  with  continual 
8;Kjjects  for  disputes;  and  nothing  was  too  absurd 
or  too  gross  for  their  interference.  Under  the  man- 
ag'^rnent  of  Mr.  Stuart  who  had  vigorously  enforced 
Wellington's  plans,  their  paper  money  had  obtained 
a  reasonable  and  increasing  circulation,  and  their 
custom-iiouse  resources  had  increased,  the  expenses 
of  their  navy  and  of  their  arsenal  had  in  some  degree 
been  reduced;  and  it  was  made  evident  that  an  ex- 
tensive and  vigorous  application  of  the  same  prin- 
ciples would  enable  them  to  overcome  all  their 
financial  diificulties  ;  but  there  were  too  many  per- 
sonal interests ;  too  much  shameful  profit  made, 
under  the  abuses,  to  permit  such  a  reform.  The 
naval  establishment,  instead  of  being  entirely  trans- 
ferred, as  Wellington  desired,  to  the  Brazils,  was 
continued  in  the  Tagus;  and  with  it  the  arsenal  as 
its  natural  appendage.  The  infamous  Junta  de 
Yivores  had  been  suppressed  by  the  prince-regent, 
yet  the  government,  under  the  false  pretext  of  pay- 
ing its  debts,  still  disbursed  above  ten  thousand 
pounds  a  month  in  salaries  to  men  whose  offices 
had  been  formally  abolished. 

About  this  time  also,  the  opening  of  the  Spanish 
ports  in  those  provinces  from  whence  tlic  enemy  had 
bejn  driven,  deprived  Lisbon  of  a  monopoly  of  trade 
enjoyed  for  the  last  three  years  ;  and  the  regency  ob- 
serving the  consequent  diminution  of  revenue,  witli 
inexjiressible  effrontery  insisted  that  the  grain, 
iinported  by  Wellington,  by  which  tiieir  army  and 
their  nation  had  been  saved  from  famine,  and  by 
which  their  own  subsidy  had  been  provided,  should 
enter  the  public  warehouses  under  specific  regu- 
l:itions,  and  pay  duty  for  so  doing.  So  tenaciously 
did  thoy  hold  to  tliis  point,  that  Wellington  was 
forced  lo   menace  a  formal    appeal  to  the,  English 


cabinet,  for  he  knew  that  the  subordinate  officers 
of  tiie  government,  knavisli  in  tlie  extreme,  would 
have  sold  the  secrets  of  the  army  magazines  to  the 
speculators  ;  and  the  latter,  in  whose  hands  the  (ur- 
nishing  of  the  army  would  under  the  neu'  jdan  of 
the  I'higlish  ministers  be  placed,  being  tiius  accu- 
rately instructed  of  its  resources,  \v'ould  have  regu- 
lated their  supplies  with  great  nicety,  so  as  to  havo 
famished  the  soldiers,  and  paralyzea  the  operationa 
at  the  greatest  possible  ex].-cnse. 

But  the  supply  of  the  army,  under  any  system, 
was  now  becoming  extremely  precarious,  fur  besidea 
the  activity  of  the  American  privateers-,  English 
ships  of  war  used,  at  times,  to  capture  tlic  vessels, 
secretly  employed  in  bringing  provision  under 
licences  from  Mr.  Stuart  and  Mr.  Forster.  Nay, 
the  captain  of  a  Scotch  merchant  vessel,  engaged 
in  the  same  trade,  and  having  no  letter  of  marque, 
had  the  piratical  insolence,  to  seize  in  the  very 
mouth  of  the  Tagus,  and  under  the  Portuguese 
batteries,  an  American  vessel  sailing  under  a  license 
from  Mr.  Forster,  and  to  carry  her  into  Greenock, 
thus  violating,  at  once,  the  license  of  the  English 
minister,  the  independence  of  Portugal,  and  tlie 
general  law  of  nations.  Alarm  immediately  spread 
far  and  wide  amongst  the  American  traders;  the 
indignation  of  the  Portuguese  government  was 
strongly  and  justly  excited,  and  the  matter  became 
extremely  embarrassing ;  because,  no  measure  of 
punishment  could  be  inflicted  without  exposing  the 
secret  of  a  system  which  had  been  the  principal 
support  of  the  army.  However,  the  congress  soou 
passed  an  act,  forbidding  neutrals  to  ship  flour  in 
the  American  ports;  and  this  blow,  chiefly  aimed 
at  the  Portuguese  ships,  following  upon  the  non- 
importation act,  and  being  combined  with  the  ille- 
gal violence  of  the  English  vessels,  nearly  dried  up 
this  source  of  supply,  and  threw  the  army  princi- 
pally upon  the  Brazil  trade,  which,  by  the  negli- 
gence of  the  Admiralty  v/as,  as  I  have  before  no- 
ticed, exposed  to  the  enterprise  of  the  United  States' 
privateers. 

During  Wellington's  absence  in  Spain  the  mili- 
tary administration  of  Portugal  was  necessarily  in 
the  hands  of  the  regency,  and  all  the  ancient  abuses 
were  fast  reviving.  The  army  in  the  field  received 
no  succours;  the  field  artillery  had  entirely  disap- 
peared ;  the  cavalry  was  in  the  worst  condition  ;  the 
infantry  was  reduced  in  numbers  ;  the  equipments 
of  those  who  remained  were  scarcely  fit  for  service, 
and  the  spirit  of  the  men  had  waned  from  enthu- 
siasm to  despondency.  There  was  no  money  in  the 
military  chest,  no  recruits  in  the  depots,  and  the 
transport  service  was  neglected  altogether.  Peres- 
ford's  severity  had  failed  to  check  desertion,  because 
want,  the  parent  of  crimes,  had  proyed  too  strong 
for  fear;  the  country  swarmed  with  robbers,  and  as 
no  fault  civil  or  military  was  punished  by  the  regen- 
cy, every  where  knaves  trium])hed  over  the  vveliare 
of  the  nation. 

Meanwhile  all  persons  whose  indolence  or  timidi- 
ty led  them  to  fly  from  the  active  defence  of  their 
country  to  the  Brazils,  were  there  received  and 
cherished  as  martyrs  to  their  personal  afiections  for 
the  prince;  they  were  lauded  for  their  opposition  to 
the  regency,  and  were  called  victims  to  the  injustice 
of  Beresford,  and  to  the  encroachments  of  the  Eng- 
lish oflicers.  This  mischief  was  accompanied  by 
another  of  greater  moment,  for  the  prince  continual- 
ly permitted  oftlcers  possessing  family  interest  to 
retire  from  active  service,  retaining  their  pay  and 
rank,  thus  ofiering  a  ])rem;um  for  had  men  to  enter 
the  army  with  the  intent  of  quitting  it  in  this  dis- 
graceful manner.     Mult  tudes  did  so,  promotion  be 


558 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


PBooK  XX. 


came  rapid;  the  nobility,  wnose  influence  over  tlie 
poor  classes  was  very  great,  and  might  have  been 
benelicially  employed  in  keaping  up  the  zeal  of  tlie 
men,  disa|)peared  rapidly  from  the  regiments,  and 
tiie  foul  stream  of  knaves  and  cowards,  thus  con- 
tinually pouring  through  the  military  ranks,  des- 
troyed all  cohesion,  and  tainted  every  thing  as  it 
passed. 

Interests  of  the  same  nature,  prevailing  with  the 
regency,  polluted  the  civil  administration.  The 
rich  and  powerful  inhabitants,  especially  those  of 
the  great  cities,  were  suflered  to  evade  the  taxes 
and  to  disobey  the  regulations  for  drawing  forth  the 
resources  of  the  country  in  the  military  service  ; 
and  during  Wellington's  absence  in  Spain,  the  En- 
glish under-commissaries,  and  that  retinue  of  vil- 
lains which  invariably  gather  on  the  rear  of  armies, 
being  in  sonje  measure  freed  from  the  immediate 
dread  of  his  vigilance  and  vigour,  violated  all  the 
regulations  in  the  most  daring  manner.  The  poor 
husbandmen  were  cruelly  oppressed,  their  farming 
animals  were  constantly  carried  off  to  supply  food 
for  the  army,  and  agriculture  was  thus  stricken  at 
the  root ;  the  breed  of  horned  cattle  and  of  horses 
had  rapidly  and  alarmingly  decreased,  and  butcher's 
meat  was  scarcely  to  be  procured  even  for  the  troops 
who  remained  in  Portugal. 

Tiiese  irregularities,  joined  to  the  gross  miscon- 
duct of  the  military  detachments  and  convoys  of 
sick  men,  on  all  the  lines  of  communication,  not 
only  produced  great  irritation  in  the  country,  but 
offered  the  m^ans  for  malevolent  and  factious  per- 
sons to  assail  the  character  and  intentions  of  the 
English  general  ;  every  where  writings  and  stories 
were  circulated  against  the  troops,  the  real  outra- 
ges were  exaggerated,  others  were  invented  and  the 
drift  of  all  was  to  render  Wellington,  and  the  Eng- 
lish, odious  to  the  nation  at  large.  Nor  was  this 
scheme  confined  to  Portugal  alone,  agents  were  also 
busy  to  the  same  purpose  in  London,  and  when  the 
enthusiasm,  which  Wellington's  presence  at  Lisbon 
had  created  amongst  the  people,  was  known  at  Ca- 
diz, the  press  there  teemed  with  abuse.  Divers 
agents  of  the  democratic  party  in  Spain  came  to 
Lisbon  to  aid  the  Portuguese  malcontents,  writings 
were  circulated  accusing  Wellington  of  an  inten- 
tion to  subjugate  the  I'eninsula  for  his  own  ambi- 
tious views,  and,  as  consistency  is  never  regarded 
on  such  occasions,  it  was  diligently  insinuated  that 
he  encouraged  the  excesses  of  his  troops  out  of  per- 
sonal hatred  to  the  Portuguese  people  ;  the  old  base- 
ness of  sending  virulent  anonymous  letters  to  the 
English  general  was  also  revived.  In  fine  the  re- 
publican sj)irit  was  extending  beyond  the  bounds  of 
Spain,  and  the  Portuguese  regency,  terrified  at  its 
approach,  appealed  to  Mr.  Stuurt  ibr  the  assistance 
of  England  to^heck  its  formidable  progretis  Neith- 
er were  they  wanting  to  themselves.  They  forbade 
the  Portuguese  newspapers  to  admit  any  observa- 
tions on  the  political  events  in  Spain,  they  checked 
the  introduction  of  Spanish  democratic  publications, 
they  ordered  their  diplomatists  at  Cadiz  to  encour- 
age writings  of  an  opposite  tendency,  and  to  sup- 
port the  election  of  deputies  who  were  known  for 
their  love  of  despotism.  This  last  measure  was 
however  bafHsd  by  the  motion  of  Arguelles,  already 
mentiomd,  wliich  rendered  the  old  cortes  perma- 
nent; and  .Mr.  Stuart,  judging  the  time  unfavou;-a- 
ble,  advised  the  Portugmse  government  to  reserve 
the  exertion  of  its  power  against  t!ie  demonrats, 
until  the  military  success  which  the  state  of  the 
contin-mt,  and  t!ie  weakness  of  the  French  troops 
in  Spain,  promised,  should  enable  the  victors  to  put 
down  suvh  doctrines  with  sffe.-t;  aJvici  which  was 


not  unmeaning,  as  I  shall  have  occasion  hereafter  to 
show. 

All  these  malignant  efforts  Wellington  viewed 
with  indifference.  "  Every  leading  man,"  he  said, 
"  was  sure  to  be  accused  of  criminal  personal  an:bi- 
tion,  and,  if  he  was  conscious  of  the  charge  beinif 
false,  the  accusation  did  no  harm."  Nevertheless 
his  position  was  thereby  rendered  more  difiicult,  and 
these  intrigues  were  accompanied  by  other  misciiiefa 
of  long  standing  and  springing  Irom  a  ditlerent 
source,  but  even  of  a  more  serious  character,  for 
the  spirit  of  cajitious  discontent  had  reached  the  in- 
ferior magistracy,  who  endeavoured  to  excite  the 
people  against  the  military  generally.  Complaints 
came  in  from  all  quarters  of  outrages  on  the  part  of 
the  troops,  some  too  true,  but  many  of  them  false, 
or  frivolous  ;  and  when  tlie  English  general  ordered 
court-martials  for  the  trial  of  the  accused,  the  ma- 
gistrates refused  to  attend  as  witnesses,  because 
Portuguese  custom  rendered  such  an  attendance  de- 
grading, and  by  Portuguese  law  a  magistrate's  writ- 
ten testimony  was  efficient  in  courts-martial.  Wel- 
lington in  vain  assured  them  that  English  law 
would  not  suffer  him  to  punish  men  upon  such  testi- 
mony ;  in  vain  he  pointed  out  the  mischief  which 
must  infallibly  overwhelm  the  country  if  the  sol- 
diers discovered  they  might  thus  do  evil  with  impu- 
nity. He  offered  to  send  in  each  case,  li&ts  of  Por- 
tuguese witnesses  required,  that  they  miglit  be  sum- 
moned by  the  native  authorities,  but  nothing  could 
overcome  the  obstinacy  of  the  magistrates  ;  they 
answered  that  his  method  was  insolent;  and  with 
a  sullen  malignity  they  continued  to  accnmulata 
charges  against  the  troops,  to  refuse  attendance  in 
the  courts,  and  to  call  the  soldiers,  their  own  as  well 
as  the  British,  "licensed  spoliators  of  the  commu- 
nity." 

For  a  time  the  generous  nature  of  the  poor  peo- 
ple, resisted  all  these  combining  causes  of  discon- 
tent;  neither  real  injuries,  nor  the  exaggerations,, 
nor  the  falsehoods  of  these  who  attempted  to  stir  up 
wrath,  produced  any  visible  effect  upon  the  great 
bulk  of  the  population  ;  yet  by  degrees  affection  for* 
the  British  cooled,  and  Wellington  expressed  his 
fears  that  a  civil  war  would  commence  between  the 
Portuguese  people  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  troops 
of  both  nations  on  the  other.  Wherefore  his  activi- 
ty was  redoubled  to  draw,  while  he  could  still  con- 
trol affairs,  all  the  military  strength  to  a  head,  and 
to  make  such  an  irruption  into  Spain  as  would  es- 
tablish a  new  base  of  operations  beyond  the  power 
of  such  fatal  dissensions. 

These  matters  were  sufficiently  vexatious  and 
alarming,  but  what  made  him  tremble,  was,  the 
course  which  the  misconduct  of  the  Portuguese 
government,  and  the  incapacity  of  the  English  cabi- 
net, had  forced  upon  the  native  furnisliers  of  th?; 
supplies.  Those  persons,  coming  in  the  winter  to 
Lisbon  to  have  their  bills  on  the  military  chest  paid, 
could  get  no  money,  and  in  their  distresses  had  sold 
the  bills  to  speculators,  the  Portuguese  holders,  at  a 
discount  of  fifteen,  the  Spanish  holders  at  a  ditcouit 
of  forty  in  the  lumdrod.  The  credit  of  the  che;  i. 
immediately  fell,  prices  rose  in  proportion,  and  as 
no  military  enterprise  could  carry  the  army  beyoi:d 
the  flight  of  this  harpy,  and  no  revenues  could  sat- 
isfy its  craving,  the  contest  must  have  ceased,  if 
Mr.  Stuart  had  not  fi)und  a  momentary  and  partial 
remedy,  by  publicly  guaranteeing  the  payment  of 
the  bills  and  granting  iiiterest  until  they  could  be 
taken  up.  The  expejise  was  thus  augmented,  but 
the  increase  fell  far  short  of  tl^e  cnlianced  cost  of 
the  supplies  which  had  alrendy  resulted  even  from 
this  restricted  practice  of  the   bill-holders,  and  of 


1613.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


559 


two  evi-s  tiia  least  was  cliosen.  It  may  seem  strange 
that  siicli  transactions  should  belong  to  th^  history 
of  tho  military  operrtious  in  the  Peninsula,  tliat  it 
phoiild  be  the  general's  int^tead  of  the  ministers' 
task,  to  encounter  such  evils,  and  to  fmd  the  reme- 
dy. Such  iiovvever  was  the  nature  of  the  war,  and 
no  adequate  notion  of  lord  Wellington's  vigorous 
capacity  and  Herculean  labours  can  be  formed,  with- 
out an  intimate  knowledge  of  the  financial  and  po- 
litical diiHoulties  which  oppressed  him,  and  of  wliich 
this  work  has  necessariJ}'  only  given  an  outline. 

The  disorders  of  the;  Portuguese  military  system 
had  brought  Beresford  back  to  Lisbon  while  the 
siege  of  Burgos  was  still  in  progress,  and  now,  un- 
der Wellington's  direction,  he  strained  every  nerve 
to  restore  the  army  to  its  former  efficient  stjite.  To 
recruit  the  regiments  of  the  line  he  disbanded  all 
the  militia-men  fit  for  service,  replacing  them  with 
fathers  of  families  ;  to  restore  the  field-artillery,  he 
embodied  all  the  garrison  artillery-men,  calling  out 
the  ordenan(;a  gunners  to  man  the  fortresses  and 
coast-batteries  ;  the  worst  cavalry  regiments  he  re- 
duced to  render  the  bast  more  efiicient,  but  several 
circumstances  prevented  this  arm  from  attaining 
any  excellence  in  Portugal.  Meanwhile  lord  Wel- 
lington and  Mr.  Stuart  strenuously  grappled  with 
the  disorders  of  the  civil  administration,  and  their 
enbrts  prodticed  an  immediate  and  considerable  in- 
crease of  revenue.  But  though  the  regency  could 
not  deny  this  beneficial  effect,  tliough  they  could 
not  deny  the  existence  of  the  evils  which  they  were 
urged  to  remedy,  though  they  admitted  that  the  re- 
form of  their  custom-house  system  was  still  incom- 
plete, that  their  useless  navy  consumed  large  sums 
which  v/ere  wanted  for  the  army,  and  tiiat  the  taxes, 
especially  the  '^  Decima,"  were  partially  collected, 
and  unproductive,  because  the  rich  people  in  the 
great  towns,  who  had  benefitted  largely  by  the  war, 
escaped  the  imposts  which  the  poor  people  in  tlie 
country,  who  had  suffered  most  from  the  war,  paid  ; 
thcugh  they  acknowledged  that  while  the  soldiers' 
hire  was  in  arrears,  the  transport  service  neglected, 
and  all  persons,  having  just  claims  upon  the  govern- 
ment, sudering  severe  privations,  the  tax-gatherers 
were  allowed  to  keep  a  month's  tribute  in  their 
hands  even  in  the  districts  close  to  the  enemy  ; 
tiiougli  all  these  things  were  admitted,  the  regency 
would  not  alter  their  system,  and  Borba,  the  minis- 
ter of  finance,  combatted  Wellington's  plans  in  de- 
tail witii  such  unusual  obstinacy,  that  it  became 
evident  nothing  could  be  obtained  save  by  external 
pressure.  Wherefore  as  the  season  for  military 
operations  approached,  Mr.  Stuart  called  upon  lord 
Castlero-igh  to  bring  the  power  of  England  to  bear 
at  once  upon  the  court  of  Rio  Janeiro  ;  p^id  Wel- 
lington, driven  to  extremity,  sent  the  Portuguese 
prince-regent  one  of  those  clear,  powerful,  and  ner- 
vous statements,  which  left  those  to  whom  they 
were  addressed,  no  alternative  but  submission,  or  an 
acknowledgment  that  sense  and  justice  were  to  be 
disregarded, 

"I  call  your  highners'  attention,"  he  said,  "to 
the  fe'tate  of  your  troop.s  and  of  all  your  establish- 
ments ;  the  army  of  operations  has  been  unpaid  since 
September,  the  garrisons  since  June,  the  militia 
since  February  1812.  The  trans;)ort  service  has 
never  been  regularly  paid,  and  lias  received  nothing 
since  June.  To  these  evils  I  have  in  vain  called 
trie  attention  of  the  local  government,  and  I  am  now 
going  to  open  a  new  campaign,  with  troops  to  whom 
greater  arrears  of  pay  are  due  than  when  the  last 
cam:iaign  terminated,  although  the  subsidy  from 
Great  Britain  granted  especisilly  for  the  mainten- 
ance of  those  trjo^.s,  has  been  rjgularly  and  exactly 


furnished  ;  and  although  it  has  been  proved  tliat  the 
revenue  for  the  last  three  months  has  exceeced,  by 
a  third,  any  former  quarter.  The  honour  of  your 
highness'  arms,  the  cause  of  your  allies,  is  thus 
seriously  afiected,  and  the  uniform  relusal  of  tiie 
governors  of  the  kingdom  to  attend  to  any  cue  of  the 
measures  v/hich  I  have  recommended,  either  for  per- 
manent or  temporal  relief,  has  at  last  obliged  iije  to 
go  as  a  complainant  into  your  royal  higlmess'  pres- 
ence, for  here  I  cannot  prevail  against  the  influence 
of  the  chief  of  the  treasury. 

"I  have  recommended  the  entire  reform  of  the 
customs  system,  but  it  has  only  been  paitially  car- 
ried into  effect.  I  have  advised  a  method  of  actual- 
ly and  really  collecting  the  taxes,  and  of  making 
the  rich  merchants,  and  capitalists,  pay  the  tenth  of 
their  annual  profits  as  an  extraordinary  contribution 
for  the  war.  I  declare  that  no  person  knows  better 
than  I  do,  the  sacrifices  and  the  sufierings  of  ycur 
people,  for  there  is  no  one  for  the  last  four  years  has 
lived  so  much  amongst  those  people  ;  but  it  is  a  fiict, 
sir,  that  the  great  cities,  and  even  some  of  the  small- 
est places,  have  gained  by  the  war,  and  the  mercan- 
tile class  has  enriched  itself;  there  are  divers  i  of - 
sons  in  Lisbon  and  Oporto  who  have  amassed  im- 
mense sums.  Now  your  government  is,  both  from 
remote  and  recent  circumstances,  unable  to  draw  re- 
sources from  the  capitalists  by  loans;  it  can  cnly 
draw  upon  them  by  taxes.  It  is  not  denied  that  the 
regular  tributes  nor  the  extraordinary  imposts  on 
the  mercantile  profits  are  evaded  ;  it  is  not  denied 
that  the  measures  I  have  proposed,  vigorcutly  car- 
ried into  execution,  would  furnish  the  government 
with  pecuniary  resources,  and  it  remains  for  that 
government  to  inform  your  highness,  why  they  have 
neither  enforced  my  plans,  nor  any  others  which  the 
necessity  of  the  times  calls  for.  They  fear  to  be- 
come unpopular,  but  such  is  the  knowledge  I  have 
of  the  people's  good  sense  and  loyalty,  such  my  zeal 
for  the  cause,  that  I  have  ofiered  to  become  respon- 
sible for  the  happy  issue,  and  to  take  upcn  myse^i  a^l 
tiie  odium  of  enforcing  my  own  measuret-.  1  have 
offered  in  vain  ! 

"  Never  vvas  a  sovereign  in  t!ie  world  so  ill  served 
as  your  highness  has  been  by  the  ^  Jmtta  de  Vive- 
res,^  and  I  zealously  forwarded  your  interests  when 
I  obtained  its  abolition  ;  and  yet,  under  a  lake  pre- 
text of  debt,  the  government  still  disburse  fii'ty  mil- 
lions of  reis  monthly  on  account  of  that  Lizard.  It 
has  left  a  debt  undoubtedly,  and  it  is  of  importance 
to  pay  it,  although  not  at  this  moment ;  but  let  the 
government  state  in  detail  how  these  fifty  millior.s, 
granted  monthly,  have  been  applied;  let  them  sry 
if  all  the  accounts  have  been  called  in  and  liquida- 
ted] who  has  enforced  the  operation!  to  what  does 
tlie  debt  amount!  has  it  been  classified'.'  how  much 
is  really  still  due  to  those  who  have  received  instal- 
ments ?  finally,  have  these  millions  been  ai)}d'ed  tc 
the  payment  of  salaries  instead  of  debt  ?  Put  were 
it  convenient  now  to  pay  the  debt,  it  cannot  be  de- 
nied that  to  pay  the  army  which  is  to  defend  the 
country,  to  protect  it  from  the  sweeping  destructive 
hand  of  the  enemy,  is  of  more  pressing  importance  ; 
the  troops  will  be  neither  able  nor  willing  to  fight 
if  they  are  not  paid." 

Then  touching  upon  the  abuse  of  permitting  the 
tax-gatherers  to  hold  a  month's  taxes  in  their  hands, 
and  upon  the  opposition  he  met  with  from  the  regen- 
cy, he  continued. 

"  I  assure  your  royal  highness  that  I  give  my  ad- 
vice to  the  governor  of  the  kingdom  actuated  solely 
by  an  earnest  zeal  for  your  service,  with.out  any  per- 
sonal interest.  I  can  have  rone  relative  to  Portu- 
gal, and  none  with  regard  to  individuak,  for  I  havt 


5fi0 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XX. 


no  private  ralation  with,  and  scarcely  am  acquainted 
With  thoda  v\  ho  direct,  or  would  wish  to  direct  your 
aii'airs.  'i'liosa  reforms  recommended  by  me,  and 
v.'hich  have  at  last  bjen  partially  cilcctad  in  the 
cubtom-housa,  in  the  arsenal,  in  the  navy,  in  the 
payment  of  tiie  interest  of  the  national  debt,  in  the 
tb/mation  of  a  military  ciiest,  have  succeeded,  and  I 
may  tiierafore  say  t!iat  the  other  measures  I  propose 
would  have  similar  results.  I  ara  ready  to  allow 
that  I  may  deceive  myself  on  this  point,  but  cer- 
tainly tiiay  ara  suggested  by  a  desira  for  tiie  orood  of 
your  service;  hence,  in  the  most  earnest  and  deci- 
ded manner,  I  express  my  ardent  wisli,  and  it  is 
common  to  all  your  faithful  servants,  that  j'ou  will 
return  to  the  kingdom  and  take  charge  yourself  of 
the  government." 

These  vigorous  measures  to  bring  the  regency  to 
terms,  succeeded  only  partially.  In  May  they  pro- 
mulgated a  new  system  for  the  collection  of  taxes, 
which  relieved  the  iiaancial  pressure  on  the  army 
for  the  mom?nt,  but  which  did  not  at  all  content 
Wellington,  because  it  was  mada  to  square  with  old  j 
habits  and  prejudices,  and  thus  left  the  roots  of  all  | 
the  evils  alive  and  vigorous.  Every  moment  fur- 
nished new  proofs  of  the  hopelessness  of  regenera- 
ting a  nation  through  the  medium  of  a  corrupted 
govarnment ;  and  a  variety  of  circumstances,  more 
or  less  serious,  continued  to  embarrass  the  march  of 
public  afliiirs. 

In  the  JIadeiras  the  authorities  vexatiously  pre- 
vantod  the  English  money-agents  from  exporting 
epacie,  and  their  conduct  was  approved  of  at  Rio 
.Taneiro.  At  Bisao,  in  Africa,  the  troops  had  mu- 
tinied for  want  of  pay,  and  in  the  Cape  de  Verde 
lalands  disttirbances  arose  from  the  over-exaction  of 
taxes;  for  when  tlia  people  were  weak,  the  rv:!gency 
were  vigorous  ;  pliant  only  to  the  powerful.  These 
commotions  were  trifling  and  soon  ended  of  them- 
eal/as,  yet  expeditions  were  seat  against  the  offend- 
ers in  botli  places,  and  the  troops  thus  emploj'^ed  im- 
nii.!iat..jly  committed  fir  worse  excesses,  and  did 
mora  mischief  than  that  which  they  were  sent  to 
eupprass.  At  the  same  time  several  French  frigates, 
linding  tlie  coast  of  Africa  unguarded,  cruized  suc- 
cessfully against  the  Brazil  trade,  and  aided  the 
American  privateer?  to  contract  the  already  too 
Btraitenad  resources  of  the  army. 

Ami  1st  all  tliese  dilh^ulties,  however,  the  extra- 
ordinary exertions  of  tha  British  officers  had  restor- 
ed the  numbers,  discipline,  and  si)irit  of  the  Portu- 
guese army.     Twenty-seven  thousand  excellent  sol- 
diars  ware  again  under  arms  and  ready  to  commence 
tlie  campaign,  although  tha  national  discontent  was 
daily  increasing  ;  and  indeed  tlie  very  feeling  of  se- 
curity, created  by  t!ie  appearance  of  such  an  army, 
rendered  tha  citizens  at  larga  less  willing  to  bear 
the    inconveniences   of  the    war.      Distant   danger 
never   atlacts   the   multitude,  and  the  billett'rg  ofj 
troops,  who,  from  long  habits  of  war,  little  regarded 
the  rights  of  tha  citizens  in  comparison  with  their  i 
own  necessities,  being  combined  with  requisitions,  I 
and  with  a  recruiting  system  becoming  every  year } 
mora    irksorn;,  formed  an  aggregate  of  inconveni- 
ences intolerable  to  men  who  desired  ease  and  no 
Wiger  dreaded  to  find  an  enemy  on    their   hearth- I 
Btonas.     Tha  powarfal  classes  were  naturally  more  | 
affected  than  tiie  ])oorer  classes,  because  of  their  in-  i 
dolent  habits;  but  their  impatience  was  aggravated,  I 
because  thay  had   generally  been    debarred   of  the 
highest  situations,  or  supplanted,  by  tlie  British  in- 
terferenca  in  the  alfairs  of  the  cotuitry,  and  unlike 
those  of  Spain,  the  nobles  of  Portugal  liad  lost  little 
cr  none  of  their  hereditary   influence.     Discontent; 
tl'as  thus  extended  wid'^ly,  and,  maraovcr,  the  old, 


dread  of  French  power  was  entirely  gene;  unlimited 
coniidence  in  the  s;trengt!i  and  resources  of  England 
had  succeeded,  and  tiiis  conhder.ce,  to  ut-e  tha  words 
of  Mr.  Stuart,  "  baing  opposed  to  the  irrogulr.r.t:es 
which  had  been  practised  by  individuals,  and  to  tiie 
liifi'arence  of  manners,  and  of  religion,  placed  the 
British  in  the  singular  posit'cn  of  a  clat-s  whose  ex- 
ertions were  necessary  for  the  country,  but  who,  for 
t!ie  above  reasons,  were  in  every  other  respect  as 
distinct  from  the  natives  as  persons  with  wiiom, 
from  some  criminal  cjuisc,  it  was  necessary  to  sus- 
pend communication."  Hen'^e  he  judged  that  the 
return  of  the  prince-regent  would  be  a  j. roper  epoch 
for  the  British  to  retire  ft'om  all  situations  in  Portu- 
gal not  strictly  military,  for  if  any  thing  should  de- 
lay that  event,  tlie  time  was  approaching  wiien  the 
success  of  the  army  and  the  tranquillity  of  the  coun- 
try would  render  it  necessary  to  yield  to  the  frrst 
manifestations  of  national  feeling.  In  fine,  notwith- 
standing the  great  benefits  conferred  upon  tiie  Por- 
tuguese by  the  British,  the  la,tter  were,  and  it  will 
always  be  so  on  the  like  occasions,  i ,  ganlcd  by  the 
upper  classes  as  a  captain  regar 'r^  gylley-slaves, 
their  strength  was  required  to  spaed  the  vessel,  but 
they  were  feared  and  h;!t'=':'. 

The  prince-regent  did  iwl  return  to  Portugal  ac- 
cording to  Wellington's  advica,  but  Carlctta  imme- 
diately prepared  to  come  alone;  orders  were  g'ven 
to  furnish  her  apartments  in  the  difiercnt  palaces, 
and  her  valuable  eflects  had  actually  arrived.  Ill 
health  was  the  pretext  for  the  voyage,  but  tlie  real 
object  was  to  be  near  Spain  to  forvk-ard  her  views 
upon  the  government  there ;  for  intent  upon  mis- 
chief, indefatigable  and  of  a  violence  approachM.g 
insanity,  she  had  sold  even  her  plate  and  jewels  to 
raise  money  wherewith  to  corrupt  tlie  leading  men;- 
bars  of  the  cortes,  and  was  resolved,  if  that  should 
not  promise  success,  to  distribute  the  money  amongst 
the  Spanish  partidas,  and  so  craate  a  powariul  mil- 
itary support  for  iier  schemes.  Fortunatcdy,  tlie 
prince,  dreading  the  intriguing  advisers  of  h.is  wife, 
would  not  suller  her  to  quit  Rio  Janeiro  u'til  the 
wish  of  the  British  cabinet  upon  the  subj^^ct  was 
known,  and  that  was  so  decidedly  adverse,  that,  it 
was  thought  better  to  do  without  the  jirince  him- 
self than  to  have  him  accompanied  by  Carlctta;  so 
they  both  remained  in  the  Brazils,  and  this  formid- 
able cloud  passed  away,  yet  left  no  sunshine  on  tha 
land. 

It  was  at  this  period  tliat  the  offer  of  a  Russian 
auxiliary  force,  before  alluded  to,  being  made  to 
Wellington,  by  admiral  Greig,  was  accepted  by  him 
to  the  amount  of  fifteen  tliousand  men,  and  yet  was 
not  fulfilled  because  the  Russian  ambassador  in 
London  declared  that  the  emperor  knew  nothing  of 
it!  Alexander  however  proposed  to  mediate  in  tlie 
dispute  between  Great  Britain  and  America,  but 
the  English  ministers,  wliile  lauding  Irm  as  a  par- 
agon of  magnanimity  and  justice,  in  regard  to  tiie 
war  against  Napoleon,  remembered  the  armed  neu- 
trality and  quadrurde  alliance,  and  wisely  declned 
trusting  England's  maritime  pretensions  to  his  faith- 
less  grasping  policy.  Neither  would  they  listen  to 
Austria,  who  at  tiiis  time,  whetlior  with  good  faith 
or  merely  as  a  cloak  I  know  not,  desired  to  mediate 
a  generul  pcaca.  However,  amidst  this  political 
confusion,  the  progress  of  ^.lie  military  preparations 
was  visible;  and  contemporary  with  tlie  Portuguese, 
the  Spanish  troops  under  Wellington's  influence  and 
providence  acquired  more  consistence  t'lnn  they  had 
ever  bef;:)re  possessed  ;  a  m'ghty  power  was  in  arms, 
but  the  flood  -if  war  with  which  the  English  gener- 
al fi.-aliy  poured  into  Spain,  and  the  channels  by 
which  he  directed  the  overwhelming  torrent,  must 


Ifil3.1 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


561 


be  reserved  for  another  place.  It  is  now  time  to 
treat  of  the  political  situation  of  king  Joseph,  and 
to  rssume  the  narrative  of  tiiat  secondary  warfire 
which  occupied  the  French  armies  while  Welling- 
ton was  uninterruptedly,  as  far  as  the  enemy  were 
roncerned,  reorganizing  his  power. 


CHAPTER  III. 

Napoleon's  embarrassed  posilioii — His  wonderful  activity — 
His  de>i^n*  explained —  The  war  in  Spain  becomes  secontia 
ry — M  my  thousand  old  soldiers  withdrawn  Iroin  the  armies 
—  Tiie  pariidas  become  nio  e  disci;  lined  aid  dangerous — 
New  bands  are  raided  in  Biscay  ana  Guipuscoa,  and  the  ir- 
suirection  of  the  nort.jt  rn  prounces  creeps  on — jVa|  o'e  n 
orders  the  king  to  fix  his  quarters  at  Valladolid,  to  menace 
I'orIu2:al,  anJ  to  reinforce  the  army  of  the  nortli — Joseph 
complains  of  his  ifencal*,  and  especially  ot  Souit — iVapo- 
leon's  masjnanimity — Joseph's  complaints  not  altogether 
without  foundation. 

In  war  it  is  not  so  much  the  positive  strength  as 
the  relative  situations  of  tiie  hostile  parties,  which 
gives  the  victory.  Joseph's  position,  thus  judged, 
was  one  of  great  weakness,  principally  because  he 
Wis  incapable  of  combining  the  materials  ji.t  his 
disposal,  or  of  wielding  them  when  combined  by 
othars.  France  had  been  suddenly  thrown,  by  her 
failure  in  Russia,  into  a  new  and  embarrassing  atti- 
tude!, more  embarrassing  even  than  it  appeared  to 
her  enemies,  or  than  her  robust  warlike  proportions, 
nourished  by  twelve  years  of  victory,  indicated. 
Nap'd9on,the  most  indefatigable  and  active  of  man- 
kind, turned  his  enemy's  ignorance  en  this  head  to 
proiit ;  for  scarcely  was  it  known  that  he  had  reach- 
ed Paris  by  that  wise,  that  rapid  journey,  from 
Smorghoni,  which,  baffling  all  his  enemies'  hopes, 
l^.it  tliam  only  the  power  of  foolish  abuse  ;  scarcely, 
1  say,  was  his  arrival  at  Paris  known  to  the  world 
tlian  a  new  and  enormous  army,  the  constituent 
parts  of  which  he  had,  with  his  usual  foresiglit, 
created  while  yet  in  the  midst  of  victory,  was  in 
march  from  all  parts  to  unite  in  the  heart  of  Ger- 
many. 

On  this  magical  rapidity  he  rested  his  hopes  to 
support  the  tottering  fabric  of  his  empire  ;  but  well 
aware  of  the  critical  state  of  his  affairs,  his  design 
was,  while  presenting  a  menacing  front  on  every 
side,  so  to  conduct  his  operations  tliat  if  he  failed 
in  his  first  stroke  he  might  still  contract  his  system 
gradually  and  without  any  violent  concussion.  And 
good  reason  for  hope  he  had.  His  military  power 
was  rather  broken  and  divided  than  lessened,  for  it 
is  certain,  that  the  number  of  men  employed  in  1813 
w;is  infinitely  greater  than  in  1812 ;  in  the  latter  four 
hundred  thousand,  but  in  the  former  more  than  sev- 
en hundrsd  thousand  men  and  twelve  himdred  field- 
pieces  were  engaged  on  different  points,  exclusive 
of  the  armies  in  Spain.  Then  on  the  Vistula,  on 
the  Oder,  on  the  Elbe,  he  had  powerful  fortresses 
and  numerous  garrisons,  or  rather  armies  of  strength 
and  goo  Iness  to  re-establish. his  ascendancy  in  Eu- 
rope, if  he  could  reunite  tH8fn  in  one  systarn  by  pla- 
cing a  new  host  victoriously  in  the  centre  of  Ger- 
many. And  thus  also  he  could  renew  the  adhesive 
qualities  of  those  allies  who  still  clung  to  him, 
tiiough  evidently  feeling  the  attraction  of  his  ene- 
mies' success. 

But  this  was  a  gigantic  contest,  for  his  enemies, 
by  deceiving  their  subjects  with  false  promises  of 
liberty,  had  brought  whole  nations  against  him. 
More  than  eight  hundred  thousand  men  were  in 
arms  in  Germany  alone ;  pecret  societies  were  in 
full  activity  all  o\er  the  continent;  and  in  France 
a  conspiracy  was  commencoJ  by  inen  w'ic  desirad 
37 


rather  to  see  their  country  a  prey  to  foreigners  and 
degraded  with  a  Bourbon  king,  than  have  it  ince- 
pendent  and  glorious  under  ISapolon.  \V  hereion.-, 
tliat  great  monarch  had  now  to  make  ap[.licat;cn, 
on  an  immense  scale,  of  t!ie  maxim  wliicli  prefccrihi-s 
a  skilful  offensive  as  tiie  best  del'encc,  and  i:e  had  to 
sustain  two  systems  of  operation,  not  always  coni- 
patible  ;  the  one  depending  upon  moral  lorce,  to 
hold  the  vast  fabric  of  his  former  policy  together, 
the  other  to  meet  the  actual  exigencies  of  tiie  war. 
The  first  was  infinitely  more  important  than  tho 
last,  and  as  Germany  and  France  were  the  jiroper 
theatres  for  its  display,  the  Spanish  contest  sunk  at 
once  from  a  principal  into  an  accessary  war.  Yet 
this  delicate  conjuncture  of  affairs  made  it  cf  vital 
importance  that  Napoleon  should  liave  consti:nt  and 
rapid  intelligence  from  Spain,  because  the  ascer- 
dancy,  which  he  yet  maintained  over  the  world,  by 
his  astounding  genius,  might  have  been  broken  dov.  n 
in  a  moment,  if  Wellington,  overstepping  the  ordi- 
nary rules  of  military  art,  had  suddenly  abandoned 
the  Peninsula,  and  thrown  his  army,  or  a  part  cf  it, 
into  France.  For  then  would  have  been  deranged 
all  the  emperor's  calculation  ;  then  would  the  defec- 
tion of  all  his  allies  have  ensued  ;  then  would  iie 
have  been  obliged  to  concentrate  botii  his  new  fcrcea 
and  his  Spanish  troops  for  the  defence  cf  his  ov.rt 
country,  abandoning  all  his  fortresses  and  his  still 
vast,  though  scattered,  veteran  armies  in  Germany 
and  Poland,  to  the  unrestrained  efforts  of  his  ene- 
mies beyond  the  Rhine.  Nothing  could  have  been 
more  destructive  to  Napoleon's  moral  power,  than 
to  have  an  insult  offered  and  commotions  raised  on 
his  own  threshold  at  the  moment  when  he  was  ae- 
suming  the  front  of  a  conqueror  in  Germany. 

To  obviate  this  danger,  or  to  meet  it,  alike  requir- 
ed that  the  armies  in  the  Peninsula  siiould  adopt  a 
new  and  vigorous  system,  under  which,  relinquish- 
ing all  real  permanent  offiensive  movements,  they 
should  yet  appear  to  be  daring  and  enterprising, 
even  while  they  prepared  to  abandon  •^heir  former 
conquests.  But  the  emperor  wanted  old  officers  an<l 
non-commissioned  officers  and  experienced  scldiers, 
to  give  consistency  to  the  young  levies  with  which 
he  was  preparing  to  take  tiie  field,  and  he  cculd  on- 
ly supply  this  want  by  drawing  from  tlie  veterans 
of  the  Peninsula:  wherefore  he  resolved  to  recal  the 
division  of  the  young  guard,  and  with  it  many  thou- 
sand men  and  officers  of  the  line  most  remarkable 
for  courage  and  conduct.  In  lieu  he  sent  tlie  re- 
serve at  Bayonne  into  Spain,  replacing  it  with  an- 
other, which  was  again  to  be  replaced  in  May  by 
further  levies;  and,  besides  this  succour,  twenty 
tliousand  conscripts  were  appropriated  for  tiie  Pen- 
insula. 

The  armies  thus  weakened  in  numbers,  and  con- 
siderably so  during  the  transit  of  the  troops,  were 
also  in  quality  greatly  deteriorated,  and  at  a  very 
critical  time,  for  not  only  was  Wellington  being 
powerfully  reinforced,  but  the  audacity,  the  spirit, 
the  organization,  the  discipline,  and  the  numbers 
of  the  partidas,  were  greatly  increased  by  English 
supplies,  liberally,  and  now  useftilly  dealt  out.  And 
the  guerilla  operations  in  the  northern  parts,  being 
combined  with  the  British  naval  squadrons,  had  dur 
ing  the  absence  of  the  French  armies,  employed  to 
drive  tlie  allies  back  to  Portugal,  aroused  anew  the 
spirit  of  insurrection  in  Navarre  and  Biscay  ;  a  spirit 
exacerbated  by  some  recent  gross  abuses  of  military 
authority  perpetrated  by  some  of  the  French  local 
commanders. 

The  position  of  the  invading  armies  was  indeed 
become  more  complicated  than  ever.  They  had  on- 
ly been  relieved  from  the  crusliing  pressure  of  lord 


562 


NAPIER'S    PENINSITTAR   WAR. 


Wellington's  grand  operations  to  struggle  in  the 
meslics  of  the  guerilla  and  insurrectional  warfare  of 
the  Spaniards.  Nor  was  the  importance  of  these 
now  to  h3  measured  by  former  efforts.  The  parLida 
chiefs  had  become  more  experienced,  and  more  do- 
cile to  tiie  suggestions  of  the  British  chief;  they 
had  free  communication  with,  and  were  constantly 
Bupplied  with  arms,  ammunition,  and  money  from 
the  squadrons  on  tiie  coast ;  they  possessed  several 
fortified  posts  and  harbours,  their  bands  were  swel- 
ling to  the  size  of  armies,  and  their  military  know- 
ledge of  the  country  and  of  the  French  system  of 
invasion  was  more  matured  ;  their  own  depots  were 
better  liidden,  and  they  could,  and  at  times  did,  bear 
the  shock  of  battle  on  nearly  equal  terms.  P'inally, 
new  and  large  bands  of  another  and  far  more  respec- 
table and  inrtuential  nature,  were  formed  or  forming 
both  in  Navarre  and  Biscay,  where  insurrectional 
juntas  were  organized,  and  where  men  of  the  best 
families  had  enrolled  numerous  volunteers  from  the 
villages  and  towns. 

These  volunteers  were  vi^ell  and  willingly  supplied 
by  the  country,  and  of  course  not  obnoxious,  like  tlie 
partidas,  from  their  rapine  and  violence.  In  Biscay 
alone,  several  battalions  of  this  description,  each 
mustering  a  thousand  men,  were  in  the  field,  and 
the  communication  with  France  was  so  completely 
interrupted,  that  the  French  minister  of  war  only 
heard  that  Joseph  had  received  his  dispatches  of  the 
4th  of  January,  on  the  18th  of  March,  and  then 
through  the  medium  of  Suchet !  The  contributions 
could  no  longer  be  collected,  the  magazines  could 
not  be  filled,  the  fortresses  were  endangered,  the  ar- 
mies had  no  base  of  operations,  the  insurrection  was 
spreading  to  Aragon,  and  the  bands  of  the  interior 
were  also  increasing  in  numbers  and  activity.  The 
Frencli  armies,  sorely  pressed  for  provisions,  were 
widely  disseminated,  and  every  where  occupied,  and 
each  general  was  averse  either  to  concentrate  his 
own  forces  or  to  aid  his  neighbour.  In  fine,  the 
problem  of  operations  was  become  extremely  com- 
plicated, and  Napoleon  only  seems  to  have  seized 
the  true  solution. 

WhiMi  informed  by  Caffarelli  of  the  state  of  affairs 
in  the  north,  he  thus  wrote  to  the  king,  "  hold  Mad- 
rid only  as  a  point  of  observation  ;  fix  your  quarters, 
not  as  monarch,  but  as  general  of  the  French  forces 
at  Valladolid  ;  concentrate  the  armies  of  the  south, 
of  the  centre,  and  of  Portugal  around  you;  the  allies 
will  not  and  indeed  cannot  make  any  serious  offen- 
sive movement  for  several  hionths  ;  wherefore  it  is 
your  business  to  profit  from  their  forced  inactivity, 
to  put  down  the  insurrection  in  the  northern  prov- 
inces, to  free  tlie  communication  with  ?''rance,  and 
to  re-establish  a  good  base  of  operations  before  the 
comm  mcement  of  anf)ther  campaign,  tiiat  the  French 
army  may  be  in  condition  to  fight  the  allies  if  the 
latter  advance  towards  France."  Very  important 
indeed  did  Napoleon  deem  this  object,  and  so  earnest 
was  he  to  have  constant  and  rapid  intelligence  from 
his  armies  in  the  Peninsula,  that  the  couriers  and 
their  escorts  were  directed  to  be  despatched  twice  a 
week,  travelling  day  and  night  at  the  rate  of  a  league 
an  hour.  He  commanded  also,  that  the  army  of  the 
nortii  should  be  reinforced  even  by  the  whole  army 
of  Portugal,  if  it  was  necessary  to  effect  the  imme- 
diate pacification  of  Biscay  nnd  Navarre;  and  while 
this  pacification  was  in  progress,  Josepli  was  to  hold 
the  rest  of  his  forces  in  a  position  ofi'ensive  towards 
Portugal,  making  Wellington  feel  that  his  whole 
fmver  wns  required  on  the  frontier,  nnd  thnt  neither 
his  main  body  nor  eveji  any  ronsiderable  det:u-}m)er]t 
could  safely  embark  to  disturb  I'rance.  In  short  tliat 
he  must  cover  Lisbon  strongly,  and  on  the  f/ontier,  or 


[Book  XX.  | 

expect  to  see  the  French  army  menacing  that  capital. 
These  instructions,  well  understood,  and  vigorously 
executed,  would  certainly  have  put  down  tiie  insur- 
rection in  the  rear  of  the  king's  position,  and  tlie 
spring  would  have  seen  that  monarch  at  the  head  of 
ninety  thousand  men,  having  their  retreat  ui>cn 
France  clear  of  all  impediments,  and  consequently 
free  to  fight  the  allies  on  the  Tormes,  the  Diu-ro,  tliC 
Pisuerga,  and  the  Ebro  ;  and  with  several  suiJjiorting 
fortresses  in  good  state. 

Joseph  was  quite  unable  to  view  the  matter  in 
this  common-sense  point  of  view.  He  could  not  * 
make  his  kingly  notions  subservient  to  military 
science,  nor  his  military  movements  subservient  to 
an  enlarged  policy.  Neither  did  he  perceive  that 
his  beneficent  notions  of  government  were  misplaced 
amidst  the  din  of  arms.  Napoleon's  orders  were  im- 
perative, but  the  principle  of  them,  Josepii  could  not 
previously  conceive  himself  nor  execute  the  details 
al\er  his  brother's  conception.  He  was  not  even  ac- 
quainted with  the  true  state  of  the  northern  provin- 
ces, nor  would  lie  at  first  credit  it  when  told  to  him. 
Hence  while  his  .'.houghts  were  intent  upon  his  Span- 
ish political  projects,  and  the  secret  negotiations  with 
Del  Parque's  army,  tlie  northern  partidas  and  insur- 
gents became  masters  of  all  his  lines  of  communica- 
tion in  the  north  ;  the  emperor's  orders.  des[)atched 
early  in  January,  and  reiterated  week  after  week 
only  reached  the  king  in  the  end  of  February  ;  theii 
execution  did  not  take  place  until  the  end  of  March, 
and  then  imperfectly.  The  time  tlius  lost  was  irre- 
parable ;  and  yet  as  the  emperor  reproachfully  observ- 
ed, the  bulletin  which  revealed  the  extent  of  his  dis- 
asters in  Russia  might  alone  have  taught  tiie  king 
what  to  do. 

Joseph  was  nearly  as  immovable  in  his  resolu- 
tions as  his  brother,  the  firmness  of  the  one  being 
however  founded  upon  extraordinary  sagacity,  and 
of  the  other  upon  the  want  of  that  quality.  Regard- 
ing opposition  to  his  views  as  the  result  of  a  disloyal 
malevolence,  he  judged  the  refractory  generals  to  be 
enemies  to  the  emperor,  as  well  as  to  himself.  Re- 
ille,  Cafft\relli,  Suchet,  alike  incurred  his  displeas- 
ure, and  tiie  duke  of  Feltre,  French  minister  of  war 
also,  because  of  a  letter  in  which,  evidently  by  the 
orders  of  the  emperor,  he  rebuked  the  king  for  hav- 
ing removed  Souham  from  the  command  of  the  army 
of  Portugal. 

Feltre's  style,  addressed  to  a  monarch,  was  very 
offensive,  and  Joseph  attributed  it  to  the  inllucnce 
of  Soult,  for  his  hatred  of  the  latter  was  violent  and 
implacable  even  to  absurdity.  "  The  duke  of  Dal- 
niatia  or  himself,"  he  wrote  to  the  emperor,  "  must 
i  quit  Spain.  At  Valencia  he  had  forgotton  iiis  own 
injuries,  he  had  suppressed  his  just  indignation,  and 
instead  of  sending  marshal  Soult  to  France,  had  giv- 
en him  the  direction  of  the  operations  against  the  al- 
lies, but  it  was  in  the  hope  that  shame  for  the  past, 
combined  with  his  avidity  for  glory,  would  urge  him 
to  extraordinary  exertions  ;  nothing  of  the  kind  liac' 
happened  ;  Soult  was  a  man  not  to  be  trusted.  Rest 
less,  intriguing,  ambitious,  he  would  sacrifice  every 
thing  to  his  own  advancement,  and  possessed  just 
that  sort  of  talent  which  would  lead  him  to  mount  a 
scafibld  when  he  thought  he  was  ascending  the  steps 
of  a  throne,  because  he  would  want  the  courage  to 
strike  when  the  crisis  arrived."  He  acquitted  him, 
he  said,  with  a  coarse  sarcasm,  "of  treachery  at  the 
passage  of  tiie  Tormes,  because  there  fear  alone  op- 
erated to  prevent  him  from  bringing  the  allies  to  a 
decisive  action,  but  lie  was  nevertheless  treacherous 
to  the  emperor,  and  his  proceedings  in  S)iain  were 
probably  connected  with  the  conspiracy  of  Malet  at 
Paris."' 


1813.J 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


563 


Such  v:as  the  language  with  which  Joseph  in  his 
auger  asfailed  one  of  the  greatest  commanders  and 
most  taitiii'ul  servants  of  liis  broliier  ;  and  such  the- 
gieetings  which  awaited  Napoleon  on  his  arrival  at 
l-'aris  aicer  t!ie  disasters  of  Russia.  In  the  most 
calm  and  prosperous  state  of  ati'airs,  coming  from 
tiiis  source,  the  charges  might  well  liave  excited  the 
jjilous  wrath  of  the  strongest  mind  ;  but  in  tiie  ac- 
tual criss,  wlien  the  emperor  had  just  lost  liis  great 
army,  and  found  the  smoking  embers  of  a  suppressed 
conspiracy  at  his  very  palace  gates,  when  his  friends 
Wire  failing,  and  his  enemies  accumulating,  it  seem- 
ed scarcely  possible  that  these  accusations  should 
not  have  proved  the  ruin  of  Soult.  Yet  they  did 
not  even  ruiHe  the  tamper  of  Napoleon.  Magnani- 
mous as  he  was  sagacious,  he  smiled  at  the  weak- 
U'Jss  of  Joseph,  and  though  he  removed  Soult  from 
Spain,  because  the  feud  between  him  and  the  king 
would  not  permit  them  to  serve  beneficially  togeth- 
er, it  was  only  to  make  him  the  commander  of  the 
imperial  guard  ;  and  that  no  mark  of  his  confidence 
might  be  wanting,  he  afterwards  chose  him,  from 
iuiongst  all  his  generals,  to  retrieve  the  affairs  of 
i,he  Peninsula  when  Joseph  was  driven  from  that 
country,  an  event,  the  immediate  causes  of  which 
Wire  now  being  laid. 

It  has  been  already  shown,  that  when  Wellington 
took  his  winter-quarters,  the  French  armies  occupied 
a  line  stretching  from  the  sea-coast  at  Valencia  to 
the  foot  of  the  Gallician  mountains.  In  these  posi- 
tions Suchet  on  the  extreme  left  was  opposed  by  the 
allies  at  Alicant  Soult,  commanding  the  centre, 
liad  his  head-quarters  at  Toledo,  with  one  detach- 
ment at  the  foot  of  the  Sierra  Morena  to  wat^^h  the 
army  of  Del  Parque,  and  two  others  in  the  valley  of 
the  Tagus.  Of  these  last  one  was  at  Talavera  and 
one  on  the  Tietar.  The  first  observed  Morillo  and 
Penne  Villemur,  who  from  Estremadura  were  con- 
stantly advancing  towards  the  bridges  on  the  Tagus, 
and  menacing  tiie  rear  of  the  French  detachment 
which  was  on  the  Tietar  in  observation  of  general 
]{  11,  then  at  (^oria.  Soult's  advanced  post  in  the 
valley  of  the  Tagus  communicated  by  the  Gredos 
m  )Ui.i;ains  with  Avila,  where  Foy's  division  of  the 
army  of  Portugal  was  posted  partly  for  the  sake  of 
food,  partly  to  watch  Bejar  and  the  Upper  Tormes, 
because  tiie  allies,  possessing  the  pass  of  Bejar, 
night  have  suddenly  united  north  of  the  mountains, 
and  breaking  the  French  line  have  fallen  on  Madrid. 

On  the  right  of  Foy,  the  remainder  of  the  army  of 
Portugal  occupied  Salamanca,  Ledesma,  and  Alba 
on  the  l^ower  Tormes;  Valladolid,  Toro,  and  Tor- 
dosillas  on  the  Duero  ;  Benevente,  Leon,  and  other 
pjints  on  the  Esla,  Astorga  being,  as  I  have  before 
observed,  dismantled  by  the  Spaniards.  Behind  the 
right  of  this  great  line,  the  army  of  the  north  had 
retaken  its  old  positions,  and  the  army  of  the  centre 
was  hxed  as  before,  in  and  around  Madrid,  its  oper- 
ations being  bounded  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Tagus 
by  the  mountains  which  invest  that  capital,  and  on 
the  left  bank  of  the  Tagus  by  the  districts  of  Aran- 
juez,  Taran^on,  and  Cuenca. 

Joseph,  while  disposing  his  troops  in  this  manner. 
Issued  a  royal  regulation  marking  the  extent  of  coun- 
try which  each  army  was  to  forage,  requiring  at  the 
Bame  time  a  certain  and  considerable  revenue  to  be 
collected  by  his  Spanish  civil  authorities  for  the  sup- 
port of  his  court.  The  subsistence  of  the  French  ar- 
mies was  thus  made  secondary  to  the  revenue  of  the 
crown,  and  he  would  have  had  the  soldiers  in  a 
time  of  war,  of  insurrectional  war,  yield  to  the  au- 
thority of  the  Spanish  civilians  ;  an  absurdity  height- 
ened by  the  peculiarly  active,  vigoTJUs,  and  promp* 
military  method  of  the  French   a-^    contrasted  with 


the  dilatory,  improvident,  promise  breaking  and  vi- 
sionary system  of  the  Spaniards  Hence,  scarcely 
was  the  royal  regulation  issued,  when  the  generals 
broke  through  it  in  a  variety  of  ways,  and  the  king 
was,  as  usual,  involved  in  tlie  most  acrimonious  dis- 
putes with  all  the  emperor's  lieutenants.  If  he  or- 
dered one  commander  to  detach  troops  to  the  assifct- 
ance  of  another  commander,  he  was  told  that  he 
should  rather  send  additional  troops  to  Llie  first.  If 
he  reprimanded  a  general  for  raising  contributions 
contrary  to  the  regulations,  he  was  answered  that 
the  soldiers  were  starving  and  must  be  fed.  At  all 
times  also,  the  authority  of  the  prefects  and  inten- 
dants  was  disregarded  by  all  the  generals  ;  and  this 
was  in  pursuance  of  Napoleon's  order;  for  that  mon- 
arch continually  reminded  his  brother,  that  as  the 
war  was  carried  on  by  the  French  armies,  their  in- 
terests were  paramount;  that  the  king  of  Spain 
could  have  no  authority  over  them,  and  must  never 
use  his  military  authority  as  lieutenant  of  the  em- 
pire, in  aid  of  his  kingly  views,  for  with  those  the 
French  soldiers  could  have  nothing  to  do  ;  their  wel- 
fare could  not  be  confided  to  Spanish  ministers  whose 
capacity  was  by  no  means  apparent,  and  of  whose 
fidelity  the  emperor  had  no  security. 

Notiiing  could  be  clearer  or  wiser  than  these  in- 
structions, but  Joseph  would  not  see  this  distinc- 
tion between  his  military  and  his  monarchical  duties, 
and  continually  defended  his  conduct  by  reference  to 
what  he  owed  his  subjects  as  king  of  Spain.  His 
sentiments,  explained  with  great  force  of  feeling 
and  great  beneficence  of  design,  were  worthy  of  all 
praise  if  viewed  abstractedly,  but  totally  inapplica- 
ble to  the  real  state  of  affairs,  because  tlie  Spaniards 
were  not  his  faithful  and  attached  subjects,  they 
were  his  inveterate  enemies ;  and  it  was  quite  im- 
possible to  unite  the  vigour  of  a  war  of  conquest 
with  the  soft  and  benevolent  government  of  a  pater- 
nal monarch.  Thus  one  constant  error  vitiated  all 
the  king's  political  proceedings,  an  error  apparently 
arising  from  an  inability  to  view  his  situation  ps  a 
whole  instead  of  by  parts,  for  his  military  opera- 
tions were  vitiated  in  the  same  manner. 

As  a  man  of  state  and  of  war  he  seems  to  have 
been  acute,  courageous,  and  industrious,  with  re- 
spect to  any  single  feature  presented  for  his  consid- 
eration, but  always  unable  to  look  steadily  on  the 
whole,  and  consequently  always  working  in  tiie  drrk. 
Men  of  his  character,  being  conscious  of  the  merit 
of  labour  and  good  intentions,  are  commonly  obsti- 
nate ;  and  those  qualities,  which  render  them  so  use- 
ful under  the  direction  of  an  able  chief,  lead  only  to 
mischief  when  they  become  chiefs  themselves.  For 
in  matters  of  great  moment,  and  in  war  especially, 
it  is  not  the  actual  importance,  but  the  comparative 
importance  of  the  operations,  which  should  deter- 
mine the  choice  of  measures  ;  and  when  all  are  very 
important  this  choice  demands  judgment  of  the 
highest  kind,  judgment  which  no  man  ever  possess- 
ed more  largely  than  Napoleon,  and  which  Joseph 
did  not  possess  at  all. 

He  was  never  able  to  comprehend  the  instruc- 
tions of  his  brother,  and  never  would  accept  the  ad- 
vice of  those  commanders  whose  capacity  approach- 
ed in  some  degree  to  that  of  the  emperor.  When 
he  found  that  every  general  complained  of  insufh- 
cient  means,  instead  of  combining  their  forces  so  as 
to  press  with  the  principal  mass  against  the  most 
important  point,  he  disputed  with  each,  and  turned 
to  demand  from  the  emperor  additional  succours  foi 
all.;  at  the  same  time  unwisely  repeating  and  urging 
his  own  schemes  upon  a  man  so  infinitely  his  supe- 
rior in  intellect.  Tiic  insurrection  in  the  northern 
provinces  he  treated,  not  as  a  military,  but  a  politi- 


564 


NAPIER'S    PENINSti.-AR   WAR. 


[Book  XX. 


cal  quGPtion,  attributing  it  to  the  anger  of  the  peo- 
ple at  StJ-iing  tli3  ancient  supreme  council  oi' .Navarre 
unceremoniously  dismissed  and  some  of  the  members 
im.irisoned  by  a  French  general,  a  cause  very  inade- 
quate to  the  eilect.  Neither  was  his  judgment  truer 
witu  respect  to  the  fitness  of  time.  He  projjosed,  if 
a  continuation  of  the  Russian  war  should  ])revent  the 
emperor  from  s:niding  more  men  to  Spain,  to  mal^e 
Burgos  the  royal  residence,  to  transport  there  the 
archives  and  all  that  constituted  a  capital;  then  to 
have  all  the  provinces  behind  the  Ebro,  Catalonia 
exceptad,  governed  by  himself,  through  the  medium 
of  his  Spanish  ministers,  and  ac*  a  country  at  peace, 
while  tho5e  bi\vond  the  Ebro  should  be  given  up  to 
the  generals  as  a  country  at  war. 

In  tills  state  his  civil  administration  would,  he 
eaid,  remedy  the  evils  inflicted  by  the  armies,  would 
conciliate  the  people,  by  keeping  all  the  Spanish 
families  and  authorities  in  safety  and  comfort,  would 
draw  all  those  who  favoured  his  cause  from  all  parts 
of  Spain,  and  would  encourage  the  display  of  tliat 
attachment  to  his  person  which  he  believed  so  many 
f^pimards  to  entertain.  And  while  he  declared  the 
violence  and  injustice  of  the  French  armies  to  be 
the  sole  cause  of  the  protracted  resistance  of  the 
Spaniards,  a  declaration,  false  in  fact,  that  violence 
being  only  one  of  many  causes,  he  was  continually 
urging  t!ie  propriety  of  beating  the  English  first  and 
then  pacifying  the  people  by  jvist  and  benevolent 
measures.  As  if  it  were  possible,  olT-hand,  to  beat 
Wellington  and  his  veterans,  embedded  as  they 
w?r?  in  the  strong  country  of  Portugal,  and  having 
British  filets  with  troops  and  succours  of  all  kinds, 
hovering  on  the  flanks  of  the  French,  and  feeding 
and  sustaining  the  insurrection  of  the  Spaniards  in 
their  rear. 

Napoleon  was  quite  as  willing  and  anxious  as  Jo- 
eenh  could  be  to  drive  the  English  from  the  Penin- 
Bula,  and  to  tranquillize  the  people  by  a  regular  gov- 
ernment; but  with  a  more  profound  knowledge  of 
war,  of  politics,  and  of  human  nature,  he  judged  that 
the  first  could  only  be  done  by  a  methodical  combi- 
nation, in  unison  with  that  rule  of  art  which  pre- 
scribes the  eirtablishment  and  security  of  the  base  of 
operations,  security  which  could  not  be  obtained  if 
the  benevolent,  but  weak  and  visionary,  schemes  of 
the  king  were  to  supersede  military  vigour  in  the 
field.  The  emperor  laughed  in  scorn  when  his 
brother  assured  him  that  tlie  Peninsulars,  with  all 
their  fiery  passions,  their  fanaticism,  and  their  ig- 
norance, would  receive  an  equable  government  as  a 
benefit  from  the  hands  of  an  intrusive  monarch  be- 
fore they  had  lost  all  hope  of  resistance  by  arms. 

Yet  it  is  not  to  be  concluded  that  Joseph  was  to- 
tally devoid  of  grounds  for  his  opinions  ;  he  was  sur- 
rounded by  difficulties  and  deeply  affected  by  the 
misery  which  he  witnessed,  his  Spanish  ministers 
were  earnest  and  importunate,  and  many  of  the 
French  gjnernls  gave  him  but  too  much  reason  to 
complain  of  their  violence.  The  length  and  muta- 
tions of  the  war  had  certainly  created  a  large  party 
willing  enough  to  obtain  tranquillity  at  the  price  of 
submission,  while  otiiers  were,  as  we  have  seen,  not 
indisposed,  if  he  would  hold  the  crown  on  their 
terms,  to  accept  his  dynasty  as  one  essentially 
springing  from  democracy,  in  preference  to  the  des- 
potic, base,  and  superstitious  family  which  the  na- 
tion was  called  upon  to  uphold.  It  was  not  unnat- 
ural, therefore,  for  Joseph  to  desire  to  retain  his 
capitil  while  the  negotiations  with  Del  Parque's 
army  were  still  in  existenc^^  it  was  not  strange  that 
he  siiniil  I  be  dispha-sed  with  Soult  aftir  reading  that 
marshal's  honest  but  oflensive  letter,  and  certainly 
it  was  highly  creditable  to  his  cliaracter  as  a  ii.an 


and  as  a  king  that  he  would  not  silently  suffer  hia 
subjects  to  bo  oppressed  by  tlie  generals. 

"  I  am  in  distre!^s  for  money,''  he  often  exclaimed 
to  Napoleon,  "  such  distress  as  no  king  everentiund 
before,  my  plate  is  sold,  and  on  state  occasions  th;! 
ajjpea ranee  of  magnificence  is  supported  by  fals-o 
metal.  My  ministers  and  houscliold  are  actually 
starving,  misery  is  on  every  face,  and  men,  other- 
wise willing,  are  thus  deterred  from  joining  a  kirg 
so  little  able  to  support  them.  My  revenue  is  seized 
by  the  generals  for  tlie  supply  of  their  troops,  and  I 
cannot  as  a  king  of  Spain,  without  dishonour,  par- 
take of  the  resources  tlius  torn  by  rapine  from  my 
subjects  whom  I  have  sW'Orn  to  protect ;  I  cannot, 
in  fine,  be  at  once  king  of  Spain  and  general  of  the 
French  ;  let  me  resign  both  and  live  jjeaceably  in 
France.  Your  majesty  does  not  know  what  scenes 
are  enacted,  you  will  shudder  to  hear  that  men  for- 
merly rich  and  devoted  to  our  cause  have  been  driv- 
en out  of  Zaragoza  and  denied  even  a  ration  of  food 
The  marquis  Caballero,  a  councillor  of  state,  minis- 
ter of  justice,  and  known  personally  to  your  majesty, 
has  been  thus  used.  He  has  been  seen  actually  beg- 
ging for  a  piece  of  bread  !  " 

If  this  Caballero  was  the  old  minister  to  Charhs 
the  IVth,  no  misery  was  too  great  a  punishment  for 
liis  tyrannical  rule  under  that  monarch,  yet  it  was 
not  from  the  hands  of  the  French  it  should  have 
come  ;  and  Joseph's  distress  for  money  must  certain- 
ly have  been  great,  since  that  brave  and  honest  man 
Jourdan,  a  marshal  of  France,  ninjcr-gonefnl  of  tiie 
armies,  and  a  personal  favourite  of  the  king's,  com- 
plained that  the  non-payment  of  his  appointments 
had  reduced  him  to  absolute  penury,  and  after  bor- 
rowing, until  his  credit  was  exhausted,  he  cculd 
with  d'fficulty  procure  subsistence.  It  is  now  time 
to  describe  the  secondary  operations  of  the  war,  but 
as  these  were  spread  over  two-thirds  of  Spain,  and 
were  simultaneous,  to  avoid  complexity  it  will  bo 
necessary  to  class  them  under  tv.o  great  iionrs. 
namely,  those  which  took  place  north  and  those 
which  took  place  south  of  the  Tagua 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Operationi  south  of  the  Tan:iis — Eroles  snH  Codrinptnn  sefk 
to  eiitran  the  governor  of  Taratroiia — Thty  f;iil — Sa  zfield 
and  Villa  Ciinipa  unite,  hut  disperse  at  ihe  approach  of  I'nn- 
netier  anil  Severoli—Siichet's  position — Gr«at  force  of  the 
allies  in  his  front — The  younger  Suull  enga>ies  tite  Spanish 
cavalry  in  La  Mancha — Oeniifl  DaiicKU  niairh<  s^vith  a  col- 
umn towards  Valenfia--Riceives  a  lar^fe  convoy  and  n  turns 
to  I-,a  Manrha — Absurd  rumours  about  Ihe  Enj;li-h  army  rife 
in  the  French  rain|>^Sonie  of  Ion!  Wellinslons -pies  detect- 
ed— Soult  is  retailed— Gaza n  assumes  the  command  of  ihe  ar* 
my  of  the  south — Suchit's  fiosKion  described — Sir  John  Mur- 
ray takes  the  comiiiaiid  of  the  Ancln-Siiili'm  troops  at  Ali- 
ca'nt — Allackr  the  Frf  r.ch  posts  at  Alcoy — His  want  of  vigour 
—  He  |ir(jjects  a  maritime  attack  on  the  cily  of  Valencia,  but 
c!ro|s  the  design  because  lord  \\'iUiam  Bentiiick  recalU  some 

of  his  troo]) Remarks  Ufion    his  prorf  eding Sucliet  sur- 

pii-e«  a  Spanish  division  at  Yec  la.  and  then  advance-  against 
Munay — Takts  a  thousand  Spani-h  prisoni  rs  in  Villena — 
Muiray  takes  a  position  it  Castalla — Mis  advanced  guard 
driven  ironi  Eiar — Second  batile  ol  C<tstidla — Remarks. 

OPERATIONS    SOUTH    OF    TUE    TAGU8. 

In  December,  1812,  general  Capons  had  been  ap- 
pointed captain-general  of  Catalonia  instead  of  Ero 
les,  but  his  arrival  was  delayed,  and  the  province 
was  not  relieved  from  Lacy's  mischievous  sway  un- 
til February  IRIH,  when  Eroles,  taking"  the  tempo- 
fpry  command,  re-Ofctablishcd  the  hccd-quarters  at 
Vich.  'I'he  French,  being  then  unmolested,  save 
by  the  English  ships.  i;assed  an  erormcus  convoy  to 
Fran  e,  but  Eroles  was  not  long  it.lc.     Through  the 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


565 


(ncdiuiii  of  a  double  spy,  he  sent  a  forged  letter  to  open  a  communication  with  Suchet  by  Albacetd,  de 
the  governor  of  I'aragona,  desiring  him  to  detach  feated  some  of  Elio's  cavalry,  with  tiie  hits  ul  hlljr 
men  to  Villa  Nueva  de  Sitjos,  with  carts  to  trans-  men,  and  pursued  them  until  thoy  rallied  o!i  t.lieir 
port  sojne  stores  ;  at  the  same  time  he  gave  out  that  main  body,  under  Ereyre  ;  the  latter  offered  battle 
he  was  himself  going  to  the  Cerdaua,  which  brought  with  nine  hundred  horsemen  in  front  of  the  ilelile 
the  Eranch  moveable  column  to  that  quarter,  and  leading  to  Albaccte  ;  but  Soult,  <liblikii!g  his  np- 
tiien  Eroles,  .vlanso,  and  \  illamil,  making  forced  pearance,  turned  off  to  the  right,  and,  piissiijg' 
marches  from  different  points,  reached  Torre  dom  through  Villa  IS  ueva  de  los  Infantes  joined  a  I'rench 
IJarra,  where  tliey  met  the  British  squadron.  The  post  established  in  Valdepeha  at  the  foot  of  the  Ai.o- 
intention  was  to  cut  off  the  Erench  detachment  on  rena,  where  some  skirmishes  had  aho  taken  place 
its  march  to  Villa  Nueva  and  then  to  attack  Tara-  with  Del  Parque's  cavalry.  The  elder  Soult  thus 
gona  ;  but  fortune  rules  in  war;  the  governor  receiv-  learned  that  Ereyre,  with  two  thousand  five  Lun- 
eJ  a  litter  from  Maurice  Mathieu  of  a  dilierent  ten-  dred  horsemen,  covered  all  the  roads  hading  from 
or  from  the  forged  letter,  and  with  all  haste  regain-;  La  Manclia  to  Valencia  and  jVlurcia  ;  that  Eiio"s  in- 
iag  his  fortress  balked  this  well  contrived  plan.  i  fantry    was    at    Tobara    and    llellin,    Lei    Paique's 

riarzlield,  at  enmity  with  Eroles,  was  now  com- ;  head-quarters  at  Jaen  ;  that  the  passes  of  the  luore- 
biniug  his  operations  with  Villa  Campa,  and  they  na  were  guarded,  and  magazines  formed  at  Andujor, 
meuaced  Alcanitz  in  Aragon;  but  general  Pannetier, '  Linares,  and  Cordoba,  while  on  the  other  siiie  ol  la 
wno  had  remained  at  Terucl  to  watch  Villa  Campa,  Mancha,  the  Empecinado  had  come  to  Hinijoto 
iinJ  to  protJct  Suchet's  communications,  immedi-  with  fifteen  hundred  horsemen,  and  the  coluii;n  tent 
ately  niarclied  to  Daroca,  Heveroli  came  i'rom  Zara-  from  the  army  of  the  centre  was  afraid  to  encoun- 
goza,  to  tlie  same  point,  and  the  Spaniards,  alarmed    ter  him. 

by  tlieir  junction,  dispersed.  Sarzfield  returned  to.  These  dispositions,  and  the  strength  of  the  Ppan- 
Cataionia,  Bassecour  and  the  Empecinado  remained  ■  iards,  not  only  ju-evented  the  younger  Soult  I'n.m 
near  Cuenca,  and  Villa  Campa,  as  usual,  hung  upon  penetrating  into  Murcla,  but  delayed  the  march  of  a 
tliJ  southern  skirts  of  the  Albaracyn  mountain,  rea- '  column,  under  general  Daricau,  destined  to  commu- 
dy  to  pounce  down  on  the  Ebro  or  on  the  the  Guad-  nicate  with  Suchet,  and  brirg  up  the  detachments, 
ftlquiver  side,  as  advantage  might  offer.  Meanwhile  j  baggage,  and  stores,  wliicli  the  armies  of  the  south 
Suchet  was  by  no  means  at  ease.  The  successes  in  and  centre  had  left  at  Valencia.  The  scouting  pir- 
(3atalonia  did  not  enable  him  to  draw  reinforcements  \  ties  of  both  sides  now  met  at  differer.t  points,  ar.d 
ffoin  thence,  because  Napoleon,  true  to  his  principle  i  on  the  27th  of  January,  a  sharp  cavalry  light  hap- 
of  securing  the  base  of  operations,  forbade  him  to  :  pened  at  El  Corral,  in  which  tiie  Erench  conin;ancler 
weaken  tlie  army  there,  and  Montmarie's  brigade  j  was  killed,  and  the  Spaniards,  though  far  the  mott 
v/as  detached  from  Valencia  to  preserve  the  conimu-  numerous,  defeated.  Meanwhile,  Daricau,  whose 
nicat;on  between  Saguntum  and  Tortoza.  But  Ar-  column  had  been  reinforced,  reached  Etiel,  opened 
agon,  which  was  3uchet's  place  of  arms  and  princi-  :  the  communication  with  Suchet  by  Ilequena,  cut  off 
pal  magazine,  being  infested  by  Mina,  Duran,  Villa  i  some  small  parties  of  the  enemy,  and  then  continuing 
Campa,  the  Empecinado,  and  Sarzfield,  was  becom- i  his  march  received  a  great  convoy,  ccnsisting  of 
ing  daily  more  unquiet,  wherefore  Pannetier's  brig-  two  thousand  lighting  men,  six  luindred  travellers, 
ade  remained  between  Segorbe  and  Daroca  to  aid  i  and  the  stores  and  baggage  belonging  to  Soult's  and 
Saveroii.  Thus,  although  the  two  armies  of  Aragon  j  the  king's  armies.  This  convoy  had  marched  in  m 
and  Catalonia  mustered  more  than  seventy  thousand  ;  Madrid  by  the  way  of  Zaragoza,  but  was  recalled 
injn,  that  of  Aragon  alone  having   forty  thousand    wiien  Daricau  arrived  ;  and,  under  his  escort,  aided 


with  fifty  held  pieces,  Suchet  could  not  fight  with 
more  tiian  SiXteen  thousand  infantry,  two  thousand 
cavalry,  and  perhaps  thirty  guns,  beyond  the  Xucar. 
ILs  riglit  flank  was  always  liable  to  be  turned  by 
Reciuena,  his  left  by  the  sea,  which  was  entirely  at 
his  adversary's  command,  and  his  front  was  menaced 
bv  tifty  thousand  men,  of  which  three  thousand 
might  be  cavalry  with  hfty  pieces  of  artillery. 

Tlie  component  parts  of  the  allied  force  were  the 
Anglo-'^icilians,  which,  including  Whittingham's 
and  Roche's  divisions,  furnished  eighteen  thousand 
solJiers.  Elio's  army  furnishing  twelve  thousand 
exclusive  of  the  divisions  of  Bassecour,  Villa  Campa 
and  tlie  Empecinado,  which,  though  detached,  be- 
longed to  him.  Del  Parque's  army  reinforced  by 
new  levies  from  Andalusia,  and  on  paper  twenty 
thousand.  Numerically  this  was  a  formidable  pow- 
er if  it  had  been  directed  in  mass  against  Suchet ; 
but  on  his  right  tlie  duke  of  Dnlmatia,  whose  head- 
quarters were  at  Toledo,  sent  forward  detachments 
which  occupied  the  army  of  Del  Parque  ;  moreover, 
the  secret  negotiations  for  the  defection  of  the  lat- 
ter were  now  in  full  activity,  and  from  the  army  of 
tne  centre  a  column  was  sent  towards  Cuenca,  to 
draw  Bassecour  and  the  I'^mpecinado  from  Suchet's 
right  flank  ;  but  those  cliiefs  had  five  tliousand  men, 
and  in  return  continually  harrassed  the  army  of  the 
centre. 

Oil  the  side  of  the  Morena  and  Murcia,  Soult's 
operations  were  confined  to  skirmishes  and  foraging 


by  a  detachment  of  Suchet's  army,  placed  at  ^  nies 
ta,  it  reached  Todelo  in  the  latter  end  of  Eebruary 
safely,  though  Villa  Campa  came  down  j;o  the  Ca 
briel  river,  to  trouble  the  march. 

During  these  different  operations  numerous  absurd 
and  contradictory  reports,  principally  originating 
in  the  Spanish  and  English  newspapers,  obtained 
credit  in  the  Erench  armies,  such  as,  that  sir  Henry 
Wellesley  and  Infantado  had  seized  the  govern- 
ment at  Cadiz;  that  Clinton,  by  an  intrigue,  had 
got  possession  of  Alicant;  that  Ballesteros  had 
shewn  Wellington  secret  orders  from  the  cortes  not 
to  acknowledge  him  as  generalissimo,  or  even  as  a 
grandee ;  that  the  cortes  had  removed  the  regency 
because  the  latter  permitted  Wellington  to  ai)point 
intendants  and  other  officers  of  the  Spanish  pro- 
vinces; that  Hill  had  devastated  the  frontier,  and 
retired  to  Lisbon,  though  forcibly  oj)posed  by  Mo- 
rillo  ;  that  a  nephew  of  Ballesteros  had  raited  the 
standard  of  revolt;  that  Wellington  was  advancing, 
and  that  troops  had  been  embarked  at  Lisbon  lor  a 
maritime  expedition,  with  other  stories  of  a  like 
nature,  which  seem  to  have  disturbed  all  the  Erench 
generals,  save  Soult,  whose  information  as  to  the 
real  state  of  affairs  continued  to  he  sure  and  accu- 
rate. He  also  at  this  time  detected  four  or  hve 
of  Wellington's  emissaries;  nmongtt  them,  was  a 
Portuguese  officer  on  his  own  stall';  a  man  called 
Piloti,  who  served  and  betrayed  both  sides;  and  an 
amazon  called  Erancisca  de  la  Eiierfe,  w  ho,  tlicugh 


parties.     Early  in  January,  his  brother,  seeking  to  only  twenty-two  years  old,  had  already  commanded 


566 


NAPIER'S    PENINSUi.  VR    WAR. 


[Book  XX. 


a  partida  of  sixty  men  with  some  success,  and  was 
now  a  spy.  But  in  tlie  latter  end  of  February  the 
duice  of  Dalmatia  was  recalled,  and  the  command 
of  his  army  foil  to  Gazan,  whose  movements  belong 
rather  to  the  operations  north  of  the  Tagus. 
Wherefore  turning  to  Suchet,  I  shall  jjroceed  to 
give  an  exact  notion  of  his  resources,  and  of  the 
nature  of  the  country  where  his  operations  were 
conducted. 

The  city  of  Valencia,  though  nominally  the  seat 
of  his  power,  was  not  so.  He  had  razed  all  tiie  de- 
fences constructed  by  the  Spaniards,  contining  his 
iiold  to  the  old  walls,  and  to  a  small  fortitied  post 
within  the  town  sufficient  to  resist  a  sudden  attack, 
and  capable  of  keeping  the  population  in  awe  :  his 
real  place  of  arms  was  Saguntum,  and  between  that 
and  Tortoza  he  had  two  fortresses,  namely,  Oropesa 
and  Peniscola  ;  he  had  also  another  line  of  commu- 
nication, but  for  infantry  only,  through  Morella,  a 
fortitied  post,  to  Mequinenza.  Besides  these  lines 
there  were  roads  both  from  Valencia  and  Saguntum, 
leading  through  Segorbe  to  Teruel  a  fortified  post, 
and  from  thence  to  Zaragoza  by  Daroca,  another 
fortified  post.  These  roads  were  eastward  of  the 
Guadalaviar,  and  westward  of  that  river  Suchet  had 
a  line  of  retreat  from  Valencia  to  Madrid,  by  Reque- 
na,  which  was  also  a  fortified  post.  Now  if  the 
whole  of  the  French  general's  command  be  looked 
to,  his  forces  were  very  numerous,  but  that  command 
was  wide,  and  in  the  field  his  army  was,  as  I  have 
before  shewn,  not  very  numerous.  Valencia  was, 
in  fact,  a  point  made  on  hostile  ground  which,  now 
that  the  French  were  generally  on  the  defensive, 
was  only  maintained  with  a  view  of  imposing  upon 
the  allies,  and  drawing  forth  the  resources  of  the 
country,  as  long  as  circumstances  would  permit. 
The  proper  line  for  covering  Valencia  and  the  rich 
country  immediately  around  it  was  on  the  Xucar,  or 
rather  beyond  it,  at  San  Felippe  de  Xativa  and 
Mox3nt9,  where  a  double  range  of  mountains  af- 
forded strong  defensive  positions,  barring  the  prin- 
cipal roads  leading  to  Valencia.  On  this  position 
Suchet  had  formed  his  entrenched  camp,  much 
talked  of  at  the  time,  but  slighter  than  fame  repre- 
sented it ;  the  real  strength  was  in  the  natural  for- 
mation of  the  ground. 

Beyond  his  laft  flank  the  coast  road  was  blocked 
by  the  castle  of  Denia,  but  his  right  could  be  turned 
from  Yecla  and  Almanza,  through  Cofrentes  and 
Requefia,  and  he  was  forced  to  keep  strict  watch 
and  strong  detachments  always  towards  the  defile  of 
Almanza,  lest  Filio's  army  and  Del  Parque's  should 
march  that  way.  This  entrenched  camp  was  Su- 
chet's  permanent  position  of  defence,  but  there  were 
reasons  wliy  he  should  endeavour  to  keep  his  troops 
generally  more  advanced;  the  country  in  his  front 
was  full  of  fertile  plains,  or  rather  coves,  within  the 
hill,  which  run  in  nearly  parallel  ranges,  and  are 
remarkably  rocky  and  precipitous,  enclosing  the 
plains  like  walls,  and  it  was  of  great  importance 
who  should  command  their  resources,  llence,  as 
the  principal  point  in  Suchet's  front  was  tiie  large 
and  flourishing  town  of  Alcoy,  he  occupied  it,  and 
from  thence  threw  oft'  smaller  bodies  to  Biar,  Cas- 
talla,  Ibi,  and  Onil,  which  were  of  the  same  strong 
ridge  as  tlie  position  covering  the  cove  of  Alcoy. 
On  his  riijht  there  was  another  plain  in  which  Fu- 
ente  La  Higuera,  Villena,  and  Yecla  were  delinea- 
ted at  opposite  points  of  a  triangle,  and  as  this  plain, 
and  tlie  smaller  valleys  ministered  to  Sachet's  wants 
beoause  of  his  superior  cavalry,  the  subsistence  of 
the  French  troops  was  eased,  while  the  cantonments 
and  foraging  districts  of  the  Sicilian  army  were  con- 
tracted: the  outposts  of  the  allied  army  were  in  fact 


confined  to  a  fourth  and  fifth  parallel  range  of  moun 
tains,  covering  the  towns  of  Elda,  Tibi,  Xixona,  ant 
Villa  Joyosa,  whicii  was  on  the  sea-coast. 

Suchet  thus  assumed  an  insulting  superiority  ovei 
an  army  more  numerous  than  his  own  ;  but  out 
ward  a[>f»earances  are  deceitful  in  war:  the  Frencb 
general  was  really  the  strongest,  because  want,  ig 
norance,  dissension  and  even  treachery,  were  in  hir 
adversary's  camps.  Del  Parque's  army  remainer 
behind  the  Morena,  Elio's  was  at  Tobarra  and  Hel 
lin,  and  of  the  Anglo-Sicilian  army,  the  British  on 
ly  were  available  in  the  hour  of  danger,  and  thej 
were  few.  When  general  Campbell  quarrelled  witl 
Elio,  the  latter  retired  for  a  time  towards  Mur 
cia;  but,  after  Wellington's  journey  to  Cadiz,  he 
again  came  forward,  and  his  cavalry  entering  La 
Mancha,  skirmished  with  general  Soult's,  and  ccm- 
municating  with  Bassecour  and  the  Empecinado 
delayed  the  progress  of  Daricau  towards  Valcncij. 
Meanwhile  general  Campbell  remained  quiet,  in 
expectation  that  lord  William  Bentinck  would  come 
with  more  troops  to  Alicant,  but  in  February  fresh 
troubles  broke  out  in  Sicily,  and  in  the  latter  end  of 
that  month,  sir  John  Murray  arriving,  assumed  the 
command.  Thus,  in  a  few  months,  five  ciiiefs  with 
difl'erent  views  and  prejudices,  successively  came  to 
the  command,  and  the  army  was  still  unorganizca 
and  unequipped  for  vigorous  service.  The  Sicilians, 
Calabrese,  and  French  belonging  to  it  were  eager 
to  desert;  one  Italian  regiment  had  been  broken  tin 
misconduct  by  general  Maitland,  the  Britisii  and 
Germans  were  humiliated  in  spirit  by  the  part  they 
were  made  to  enact,  and  the  Spaniards  under  Whit- 
tingham  and  Roche  were  starving;  for  Wellington, 
knowing  by  experience  how  the  Spanish  govern- 
ment, though  receiving  a  subsidj-,  would,  if  per- 
mitted, throw  the  feeding  of  their  troops  entirely 
upon  the  British,  forbade  their  being  supjdied  from 
the  British  stores,  and  the  Spanish  intendants  neg- 
lected them. 

Murray's  first  care  was  to  improve  the  equipment 
of  his  troops,  and  with  the  aid  of  Elio  he  soun  put 
them  in  a  better  condition.  The  two  armies  to- 
gether furnished  thirty  tliousand  effective  men,  of 
which  about  three  thousand  were  cavalry,  and  they 
had  thirty-seven  guns,  yet  very  inadequately  horsed, 
and  Whittingham's  and  Elio's  cavalry  were,  from 
want  of  forage,  nearly  unfit  tor  duty.  The  transjiort 
mules  were  iiired  at  an  enormous  price,  the  expense, 
being  at  the  rate  of  one  hundred  and  tnirty  thousand 
pounds  annually,  and  yet  the  supply  was  bad,  for 
here,  as  in  all  other  parts  of  Spain,  corruption  and 
misuse  of  authority  prevailed.  The  ricii  sent  their 
fine  animals  to  Alicant  for  sanctuary,  and  bribed  tho 
alcaldes ;  the  mules  of  the  poor  alone  were  pressed, 
tlie  army  was  ill  provided,  and  yet  the  country  wai 
harassed.  In  this  state  it  was  necessary  to  do  some 
thing,  and  as  the  distress  of  Whittingham  an^ 
Roche's  troops  could  not  be  removed,  save  by  en 
larging  their  cantonments,  Murray,  after  some  hesi- 
tation, resolved  to  drive  the  French  from  the  moun- 
tains in  his  front,  and  he  designed,  as  tlie  firtt  step, 
to  surprise  fifteen  hundred  men  whicli  they  had 
placed  in  Alcoy.  Now  five  roads  led  towards  the 
French  positions.  1st.  On  the  left,  the  great  road 
from  Alicant,  passing  through  Monforte,  Flda,  Sax, 
Villena,  and  Fuente  de  la  Higuera,  wliere  it  joins 
the  great  road  from  Valencia  to  Madrid,  which  runs 
through  Almanza.  This  way  turned  both  the  ridges 
occupied  by  the  armies.  2d.  A  good  road  leading 
by  Tibi  to  Castalla,  from  whence  it  sent  oft"  two 
branches  on  the  left  hand;  one  leading  to  Sax,  the 
other  through  the  pass  to  Villena  ;  two  other  branch- 
es on  the  right  hand  went,  the  one  through  Ibi  to  Al« 


1813  ] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR    >VAR. 


567 


;oy,  the  other  through  Onil  to  the  same  place.  3d. 
I'he  road  from  Alicant  to  Xixona,  a  bad  road,  lead- 
ing over  tl^  very  steep,  rugged  ridge  of  that  name  to 
Alcoy.  At  Xixona  also  tiiere  was  a  narrow  way 
on  the  right  hand,  through  tlie  mountains  to  Alcoy, 
which  wi'.«  followed  by  Roche  when  he  attacked  that 
place  in  the  tirst  battle  of  Castalla.  4th.  A  car- 
riage-road running  along  the  sea-coast,  as  far  as 
Villa  Joyosa,  from  whence  a  narrow  mountain-way 
leads  to  the  village  of  Conscntayna,  situated  in  the 
cove  of  AL;oy,  and  behind  that  town. 

On  the  6th  of  March  the  allied  troops  moved  in 
four  columns,  one  on  the  left  by  Elda,  to  watch  tlie 
great  Madrid  road  ;  one  on  tlie  right  composed  of 
Spanish  troops  under  colonel  Campbell,  from  Villa 
Joyosa,  to  get  to  Consentayna  beliind  Alcoy ;  a 
third,  under  lord  Frederick  Bentinck,  issuing  by  Ibi, 
was  to  turn  the  French  riglit  ;  the  fourth  was  to 
march  from  Xixona  straight  against  Alcoy,  and  to 
pursue  the  remainder  of  Habert's  division,  which 
was  behind  that  town.  Lord  Frederick  Bentinck 
attacked  indue  time,  but  as  colonel  Campbell  did  not 
appear  the  surprise  failed  ;  and  when  the  French 
saw  the  main  body  winding  down  the  Sierra,  in 
front  of  Alcoy,  they  retired,  pursued  by  general 
Donkin  with  the  second  battalion  of  the  twenty- 
seventh  regiment.  The  head  of  lord  Frederick 
Bentinck's  column  was  already  engaged,  but  the  rear 
had  nr t  arrived,  and  the  whole  of  Habert's  division 
was  soon  concentrated  a  mile  beyond  Alcoy,  and 
there  offered  battle  ;  yet  sir  John  Murray,  instead 
of  pushing  briskly  forward,  halted  ;  and  it  was  not 
until  several  demands  for  support  had  reached  him, 
that  he  detached  tlie  fifty-eighth  to  the  assistance 
of  the  troops  engaged,  who  had  lost  about  forty  men, 
chiefly  of  the  twenty-seventh.  Habert,  fearing  to 
be  cut  off  by  Consentayna,  and  seeing  the  fifty- 
eiglith  coming  on,  retreated,  and  tlie  allies  occupied 
Alcoy,  which  greatly  relieved  their  quarters  ;  but 
the  want  of  vigour  displayed  by  sir  John  Murray 
when  he  had  gained  Alcoy  did  not  escape  the  notice 
of  the  troops. 

After  this  affair  the  armies  remained  quiet  until 
the  15th,  wlien  Whittingham  forced  the  French 
posts  with  some  loss  from  Albayda,  and  general 
Donkin  taking  two  battalions  and  some  dragoons 
from  Ibi,  drove  back  their  outposts  from  Rocayrente 
and  Aisafara,  villages  situated  beyond  the  range 
bounding  the  plain  of  Alcoy.  He  repassed  the  hills 
higher  up  with  the  dragoons  and  a  company  of  the 
grenadiers  of  the  twenty-sevenj,h,  under  captain 
Waldron,  and  returned  by  t'rie  main  road  to  Alcoy, 
having  in  his  course  met  a  ^'rench  battalion,  through 
which  the  gallant  Waldron  broke  with  his  grena- 
diers. Meanwhile,  sir  John  Murray,  after  much 
vacillation,  at  one  time  resolving  to  advance,  at 
another  to  retreat,  thinking  it  impossible  first  to 
force  Suchet's  entrenched  camp,  and  then  his  second 
line  behind  the  Xucar,  a  difficult  river  with  muddy 
banks,  believing  also  that  tlie  French  general  had 
his  principal  magazines  at  Valencia,  conceived  the 
idea  of  seizing  the  latter  by  a  maritime  expedition. 
He  judged  that  tiie  garrison,  which  he  estimated  at 
ci*ht  hundred  infantry,  and  one  thousand  cavalry, 
would  .be  unable  to  resist,  and  that  the  town  once 
taken,  the  inhabitants  would  rise  ;  Suchet  could  not 
then  detach  men  enough  to  quell  them  without  ex- 
posing himself  to  defeat  on  the  Xucar,  and  if  he  mov- 
ed with  all  his  force  he  could  be  closely  followed  by 
the  allies,  and  driven  upon  Requena.  In  this  view 
he  made  fresh  dispositions. 

On  the  18th,  Roche's  division,  reinfiirced  by  some 
troops  from  Elio's  army  and  by  a  British  grenadier 
battalion,  was  selected  for  the  maritime  attack,  and 


the  rest  of  the  army  was  concentrated  on  the  left  at 
Castalla  witli  tlie  exception  of  Whittingiiam's  troops, 
which  remained  at  Alcoy,  for  SucJiet  was  said  to  be 
advancing,  and  Murray  resolved  to  fight  him.  But 
to  form  a  plan  and  to  execute  it  vigorously,  wens 
with  sjr  John  Murray  very  different  things.  Al- 
though far  from  an  incapable  officer  in  the  cabinet, 
he  shewed  none  of  the  qualities  of  a  commander  iu 
the  field.  His  indecision  was  remarkable.  On  the 
morning  of  the  18th  he  resolved  to  fight  in  front  of 
Castalla,  and  in  the  evening  he  assumed  a  weaker 
position  behind  that  town,  abandoning  the  command 
of  a  road,  running  from  Ibi  in  rear  of  Alcoy,  by 
which  Whittingham  might  have  been  cut  off.  And 
when  the  strong  remonstrances  of  his  quarter-master 
general  induced  him  to  relinquish  this  ground,  he 
adopted  a  third  position,  neither  so  strong  as  the 
first  nor  so  defective  as  the  last. 

In  this  manner  aftairs  wore  on  until  the  26th, 
when  Roche's  division  and  the  grenadier  battalion 
marched  to  Alicant  to  embark,  with  orders,  if  they 
failed  at  Valencia,  to  seize  and  fortify  Cullera  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Xucar;  and  if  this  also  failed  to  be- 
siege Denia.  But  now  the  foolish  ministerial  ar- 
rangements about  the  Sicilian  army  worked  out  their 
natural  result.  Lord  Wellington,  though  he  was 
permitted  to  retain  the  Anglo-Sicilian  army  in  Spain 
beyond  the  period  lord  William  Bentinck  had  as- 
signed for  its  stay,  had  not  the  full  command  given 
to  him  ;  he  was  clogged  with  reference  to  the  state 
of  Sicily,  until  the  middle  of  March,  and  this  new 
arrangement  was  still  unknown  to  lord  William 
Bentinck  and  to  sir  John  Murray.  Thus  there  were 
at  this  time,  in  fact,  three  commanding  officers ; 
Wellington  for  the  general  operations,  ]\!-urray  for 
the  particular  operations,  and  lord  William  Ben- 
tinck still  empowered  to  increase  or  diminish  the 
troops,  and  even  upon  emergency  to  withdraw  the 
whole.  And  now  in  consequence  of  the  continued 
dissensions  in  Sicily,  the  king  of  that  country  hav- 
ing suddenly  resumed  the  government,  lord  William 
did  recal  two  thousand  of  Murray's  best  troops,  and 
amongst  them  the  grenadier  battalion  intended  to 
attack  Valencia.  That  enterprise  instantly  fell  to 
the  ground. 

Upon  this  event  sir  John  Murray,  or  some  person 
writing  under  his  authority,  makes  the  following 
observations.  "  The  most  careful  combination  could 
not  have  selected  a  moment  when  the  danger  of  such 
authority  was  more  clearly  demonstrated,  more  se- 
verely felt.  Had  these  orders  been  received  a  very 
short  time  before,  the  allied  army  would  not  have 
been  committed  in  active  operations;  had  they  reach- 
ed sir  John  Murray  a  week  later,  there  is  every  rea- 
son to  believe  that  the  whole  country  from  Alicant 
to  Valencia  would  have  passed  under  the  authority 
of  the  allied  ajmy,  and  that  marshal  Suchet,  cut  off 
from  his  magazines  in  that  province,  and  in  Aragon, 
would  have  been  compelled  to  retire  tlirough  a 
mountainous  and  barren  country  on  Madrid.  But 
the  order  of  lord  William  Bentinck  was  peremptory, 
and  tlie  allied  army,  which  even  before  was  scarcely 
balanced,  was  now  so  inferior  to  the  enemy  that  it 
became  an  indispensable  necessity  to  adopt  a  systenj 
strongly  defensive,  and  all  hope  of  a  brilliant  com- 
mencement of  the  campaign  vanished." 

Upon  this  curious  passage  it  is  necessary  to  re- 
mark, 1st,  that  Suchet's  great  magazines  were  not 
at  Valencia  but  at  Saguntum  ;  3nd,  that  from  the 
castle  of  Denia  the  fleet  would  have  been  (!escried, 
and  the  strong  garrison  of  Saguntum  could  have  re- 
inforced the  troops  in  Valencia;  31ontniarie's  bri- 
gade also  would  soon  have  come  up  from  Oropesa. 
These  were  doubtless  contingencies  not  much  to  be 


568 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XX. 


regarded  in  bar  of  such  an  entsrprise,  but  Suchet 
would  b}-  no  means  have  been  forced  to  retire  by 
Ilequena  upon  Madrid,  he  would  have  retired  to 
jjiria,  the  road  to  which  steered  more  than  five  miles 
t  U'ar  of  Valencia.  He  could  have  kept  tiiat  city  in 
check  while  passing',  in  despite  of  sir  John  Murray, 
and  at  Liria  he  would  have  been  again  in  his  natur- 
al position,  tliat  is  to  say,  in  full  command  of  his 
principal  lines  of  communication.  Moreove  how- 
ever disag-reeable  Lo  Suchet  personally  it  migh,have 
been  to  be  forced  back  upon  Madrid,  that  event 
would  have  been  extremely  detrimental  to  the  gen- 
eral cause,  as  tending  to  reinforce  the  king  against 
Wellington.  But  the  singular  part  of  the  passage 
quoted,  is  the  assertion  that  the  delay  of  a  vv^eek  in 
lord  William  IJ.^^ntinck's  order  would  have  ensured 
Kuch  a  noble  stroke  against  the  French  army.  Now 
lord  William  Bentinck  only  required  the  troops  to 
l>roceed  in  the  first  instance  to  Mahon  ;  what  a  dull 
flagging  spirit  then  was  his,  who  dared  not  delay 
obedience  to  such  an  order  even  for  a  week  ! 

The  recalled  troops  embarked  for  Sicily  on  the  5th 
of  April,  and  Suchet,  alarmed  at  the  offensive  posi- 
tion of  the  allies,  which  he  attributed  to  the  gener- 
al state  of  atiairs,  because  tiie  king's  march  to  Cas- 
tile permitted  all  the  Spanish  armies  of  Andalusia 
to  reinforce  Elio,  resolved  to  strike  first,  and  with 
the  greater  avidity  because  Elio  had  pushed  general 
illijares  with  an  advanced  guard  of  three  or  four 
thousand  men  to  Yecla,  where  they  were  quite  un- 
tiupported.  This  movement  had  been  concerted  in 
March,  with  Murray,  who  was  to  occupy  Villena, 
and  be  prepared  to  fall  upon  the  French  left,  if  the 
Spaniards  were  attacked  at  Yecla  ;  and  in  return 
the  Spaniards  were  to  fall  on  the  French  right  if 
Murray  was  attacked.  Elio  however  neglected  to 
strengthen  his  division  at  Yecla  with  cavalry,  which 
I13  had  promised  to  do,  nor  did  Murray  occupy  Vil- 
lena in  force ;  nevertheless  Mijares  remained  at 
Yocla,  Elio  with  the  main  body  occupied  Hellin, 
end  the  cavalry  were  posted  on  the  side  of  Albacete, 
until  the  departure  of  the  troops  for  Sicily.  Roche 
then  joined  the  army  at  Castalla,  and  Elio's  main 
body  occupied  Elda  and  Sax  to  cover  the  main  road 
tVom  Madrid  to  Alicant. 

On  the  night  of  the  Ilth  Suchet,  having  by  a 
forced  march  assembled  sixteen  battalions  of  infan- 
try, ten  squadrons  of  cavalry,  and  twelve  pieces  of 
artill  ry  at  Fuente  la  Higuera,  marched  straigjit 
upon  (Jaudete,  while  Harispe's  division  by  a  cross 
road  endeavoured  to  surprise  the  Spaniards  at  Yecla. 
The  latter  retired  fighting  towards  .Tumilla  by  the 
hills,  but  the  French  artillery  and  skirmishers  fol- 
lowed close,  and  at  last  the  Spaniards  being  pierced 
in  the  centre,  one  part  broke  and  fled,  and  the  other 
part  after  some  firtlier  resistance  surrendered.  Two 
hundred  were  killed,  and  fifteen  hundred  prisoners, 
including  wounded,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  vic- 
tors, who  lost  about  eighty  men  and  ofiicers. 

Suclict's  movement  on  Fuente  la  Higuera  was 
known  in  the  night  of  the  l^th  at  Castalla,  where 
nil  the  Anglo-Sicilian  army  was  in  position,  because 
Whittingham  had  come  from  /Vlcoy,  leaving  only  a 
detachment  on  that  side  Hence  while  Harispe  was 
defeating  Mijares  at  Yecla,  Suchet  in  person  re- 
mained at  Caudete  with  two  divisions  and  the  heavy 
cavalry  in  order  of  battle,  lest  Murray  should  ad- 
vance by  Biar  and  Villena.  The  latter  town,  pos- 
sessing an  old  wall  and  a  castle,  was  occupied  by 
the  regiment  of  Vclez-Malaga,  a  thousand  strong, 
and  in  the  course  of  the  day  Murray  also  came  up 
with  the  allied  cavalry  and  a  brigade  of  infantry. 
Mere  he  was  joined  b  '  Elio,  without  troops,  and 
*hen   towards  evening   Harispe's  fight  being  over 


and  the  prisoners  secured,  Suchet  advanced,  Murriy 
retired  with  the  cavalry  through  the  pass  of  Biar 
leaving  his  infantry,  under  colonel  Adam,  in  front 
of  tliat  defile.  He  wisJied  also  to  draw  the  Spanish 
garrison  from  Villena,  but  Elio  would  not  sui.er  it, 
and  yet  during  the  night,  repenting  of  his  obstina- 
cy, came  to  Castalla  entreating  l^lurray  to  carry  off 
that  battalion.  It  was  too  late,  Suchet  i;ad  broken 
the  gates  of  the  town  the  evening  belbro,  and  the 
castle  with  the  best  equipped  and  finest  regiment  in 
the  Spanish  army  had  already  surrendered. 

Murray's  final  position  was  about  three  miles  from 
the  i)ass  of  Biar.  His  left,  composed  of  Whitting- 
ham's  Spaniards,  was  entrenched  on  a  rugged  sierra 
ending  abruptly  above  Castalla,  which,  with  its  old 
castle  crowning  an  isolated  sugar-loaf  hill,  closed 
tlie  right  of  that  wing  and  was  occupied  ii.  strength 
by  Mackenzie's  division. 

A  space  between  Whittingham's  troops  and  the 
town  was  left  on  the  sierra  for  the  advanced  guard, 
then  in  the  pass  of  Biar  ;  Castalla  itself,  covered  by 
the  castle,  was  prepared  for  definice,  and  the  princi- 
pal approaches  were  commanded  by  strong  batteries, 
for  JMurray  had  concentrated  nearly  all  his  gur:s  at 
this  point.  The  cavalry  was  partly  beiiind,  partly  in 
front  of  the  town,  on  an  extensive  plain  which  was 
interspersed  with  olive  plantationc. 

The  right  wing,  composed  of  Clinton's  division 
and  Roche's  Spaniards,  was  on  comparatively  hiw 
ground,  and  extended  to  the  rear  at  rigiit  angles 
with  the  centre,  but  well  covered  by  a  "  barrar.co" 
or  bed  of  a  torrent,  the  precijjitous  sides  of  wiiich 
were,  in  some  places,  one  hundred  feet  deep. 

Suchet  could  approach  this  position,  either  through 
the  pass  of  Biar,  or  turning  that  defile,  by  the  way 
of  Sax  ;  but  the  last  road  was  supposed  to  be  occu- 
pied by  Elio's  army,  and  as  troops  coming  by  it 
must  make  a  flank  march  along  the  front  of  the  po- 
sition, it  was  not  a  favourable  line  of  attack  ;  more- 
over the  allies,  being  in  j)ossession  of  the  defiles  of 
Biar,  and  of  Alcoy,  might  have  gained  the  Xucar, 
either  by  Fuentes  de  la  Higuera  or  by  Alcoy,  see- 
ing that  Alicant,  which  was  their  base,  was  safe, 
and  the  remnants  of  Elio's  army  could  easily  have 
got  away.  Murray's  army  was  however  scarcely 
active  enough  for  such  an  operation,  and  Suchet  ad- 
vanced very  cautiously,  as  it  behovod  him  to  do,  for 
the  ground  liciween  Castalla  and  Biar  was  just  such 
as  a  prompt  opponent  would  desire  for  a  decisive  blow. 

The  advanced  guard,  in  the  pass  of  I5iar,  about 
two  thousand  five  hundred  men,  was  composed  of  two 
Italian  regiments  and  a  battalion  of  the  twenty- 
seventh  British  ;  two  companies  of  German  rifle- 
men, a  troop  of  foreign  hussars  and  six  guns,  four  of 
which  were  moui;tain-pieces.  The  ground  was  very 
strong  and  difficult,  but  at  two  o'clock  in  the  after- 
noon the  French,  having  concentrated  in  front  of  tlie 
pass,  their  skirmishers  swarmed  up  the  steep  rocks 
on  either  flank,  with  a  surprising  vigour  and  agili- 
ty, and  when  they  had  gained  the  summit,  the  sup- 
porting columns  advanced.  Then  the  allies,  who 
had  fought  with  resolution  for  about  two  hours,  aban- 
doned the  pass  with  the  loss  of  two  guns  and  about 
thirty  prisoners,  retreating  however  in  good  order 
to  the  main  position,  for  they  were  not  followiMl  be- 
yond the  mouth  of  the  defile.  The  next  day,  that  is 
tiie  Kith,  about  one  o'clock,  the  Frencii  cavalry, 
issuing  cautiously  from  the  pass,  extended  to  tho 
left  in  the  plain  as  fur  as  Onil,  and  they  wkire  fljllow- 
ed  by  tlie  infantry  who  immediately  occupied  a  low 
ridge  about  a  mile  in  front  of  the  allies'  hdl ;  the 
cavalry  then  gained  ground  to  the  front,  and  closing 
towards  the  right  of  the  allies  menaced  the  road  to 
Ibi  and  Alcoy, 


18130 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


569 


Murray  had  only  occupied  his  ground  the  night 
before,  but  he  had  studied  ii  and  entrenched  it  in 
parts.  His  right  wing  was  quite  refused,  and  so 
well  covered  by  the  barranco  tliat  nearly  all  the 
troops  could  have  been  employed  as  a  reserve  to  the 
left  wing,  which  was  also  very  strongly  posted  and 
presented  a  front  about  two  miles  in  extent.  But 
notwitiistanding  the  impregnable  strength  of  tlie 
ground  tiia  Etiglish  general  shrunk  from  tlie  contest, 
and  while  the  head  of  the  French  column  was  ad- 
vancing from  the  detile  of  Biar,  thrice  he  gave  his 
quarter-master  general  orders  to  put  the  aruiy  in  re- 
treat, and  the  last  time  so  peremptorily,  that  obedi- 
ence must  have  ensued  if  at  that  moment  the  tiriiig 
between  the  picquets  and  the  French  light  t.oops 
had  not  begun 

BATTLE    OF    CASTALLA. 

Suchet's  dispositions  were  made  slow'y  '/id  as  .f 
he  also  had  not  made  up  his  mind  *•;  light,  bv  „  a 
crooked  jut  of  the  sierra,  springing  ^-om  about  the 
middle  of  the  ridge,  hid  from  hir.  all  the  British 
troops,  and  two-tliirds  of  the  whr'.ii  army,  hence  his 
first  movement  was  to  send  a  cjiuni.i  towards  Cas- 
talla,  to  turn  this  jut  (f  the  sij7ra  and  discover  the 
conditions  of  the  position.  M-^'inwhile  he  foniicd 
two  strong  columns  immediately  opposite  the  left 
wing,  and  his  cavalry,  dispiaying  a  formidable  line 
in  the  plain  closed  gradually  towards  tlie  barranco. 
The  French  general  however  soon  discovered  that 
the  right  of  the  allies  wj.s  unattackable.  Where- 
fore retaining  his  reserve  on  the  low  ridge  in  front 
of  the  left  wing,  and  ;tiil  hohling  the  exploring  col- 
umn of  infantry  nei  i  Castalla,  to  protect  his  flank 
egainst  any  sally  fr  ii .  tliat  point,  he  opened  his  ar- 
tillery against  tht  r.  antre  and  right  wing  of  the 
allies,  and  forming  ci^jral  columns  of  attack  com- 
menced the  action  .|;ainst  the  allies'  left  on  both 
sides  of  tlie  jut  befi    r  spoken  of. 

The  ascent  in  fra  .t  of  Whittingham's  post,  being 
very  rugged  and  ste  .",  and  the  upper  parts  entrench- 
ed, the  biittle  th  3  v  resolved  itself  at  once  into  a 
fight  of  light  tnjo  » ,  in  which  the  Spaniards  main- 
tained their  grcui  /  with  resolution  ;  but  on  the  oth- 
er side  of  the  ju'  the  French  mounted  the  heights, 
slowly  indeed  a  '1  with  many  skirmishers,  yet  so 
firmly,  that  if.  v  is  evident  nothing  but  gooil  fighting 
would  send  th  in  down  again.  Their  light  troops 
spread  over  t'  -i  whole  I'ace  of  the  sierra,  and  here 
and  there  a'^'.'..,ining  the  summit  were  partially  driv- 
en down  3/.uin  by  the  Anglo-Italian  troops;  but 
where  the  nain  body  came  upon  the  second  battal- 
ion of  the  twenty -seventh,  there  was  a  terrible 
crash.  For  the  ground  having  an  abrupt  declina- 
tion near  the  top  enabled  the  French  to  form  a  line 
under  cover,  close  to  the  Britisli,  who  were  lying 
down  waiting  for  orders  to  charge;  and  while  the 
former  were  unfolding  their  masses  a  grenadier  offi- 
cer, advancing  alone,  challenged  the  captain  of  the 
twenty-seventh  grenadiers  to  single  combat.  Wal- 
dron,  an  agile  vigorous  Irishman  and  of  boiling  cour- 
age, instantly  sprung  forward,  the  hostile  lines  look- 
ed on  witliout  firing  a  shot,  tho  swords  of  the  cham- 
pions glittered  in  the  sun,  tiie  Frenchman's  head 
was  clefi;  in  twain,  and  the  next  instant  the  twcnty- 
sevent'i,  jumping  up  with  a  deafening  shout,  fired  a 
deadly  volh^y,  at  Ivalf  pistol-shot  distance,  nnd  then 
charged  witii  such  a  shock  thnt,  maugre  their  bra- 
very and  iiuinbTrs,  the  enemy's  soldiers  were  over- 
thrown and  the  side  of  the  sierra  was  covered  with 
the  killed  and  wounded.  Jn  Murray's  despatch  this 
exploit  was  erroneously  attributed  to  rolonel  Adam, 
out  it  was  ordered  and  conducted  by  colonel  Reeves 
alone. 


The  French  general  seeing  his  principal  ccdunin 
thus  overtlirown,  and  at  every  ether  point  having  tho 
worst  of  the  figiit,  made  two  secondary  attacks  to 
cover  the  rallying  of  tlie  defeated  columns,  but  tlies« 
also  failing,  his  army  was  separated  in  tliree  parte, 
namely,  tiie  beaten  troops  which  were  in  great  con 
fusion,  the  reserve  on  the  miner  heights  from  whence 
the  attacking  columns  had  advanced,  and  the  caval 
ry,  wliich  being  far  on  the  left  in  the  plain,  was  also 
separated  from  the  point  of  action  by  tiie  bed  of  th«! 
torrent,  a  bridge  over  which  was  commanded  by  tiie 
allies.  A  vigorous  sally  from  Castalla,  and  a  gf/i- 
eral  pdvance  would  have  obliged  the  French  reserv-^f 
to  fail  back  upon  Biar  in  confusion,  before  the  caval- 
ry could  come  to  their  assistance,  and  the  vict(jrjr 
might  have  been  thus  completed  ;  but  31urray,  wiio 
had  remained  during  the  whole  action  behind  Castal- 
la, gave  the  French  full  time  to  rally  all  their  forct's 
and  retire  in  order  towards  the  pass  of  Biar.  'I'lien 
gradually  passing  out  by  the  right  of  the  town,  with 
a  tedious  pedantic  movement,  lie  cliauged  liis  fr^^.it, 
forming  two  lines  across  the  valley,  keeping  his  leit 
at  the  foot  of  the  heiglits,  and  extending  liis  right, 
covered  by  the  cavalry,  towards  the  sierra  of  C'nil. 
^Meanwhile,  Mackenzie  moving  cut  by  the  left  of 
Castalla  with  three  British,  and  one  German  battal- 
ion, and  eight  guns,  followed  the  enemy  more  rap 
idly. 

Suchet  had  by  this  time  plunged  Into  the  pass  witl 
his  infantry,  cavalry  and  tumbrils,  in  one  mass,  lea>; 
ing  a  rear-guard  of  three  battalicns  with  ejgl:t  guji^ 
to  cover  the  passage  ;  but  these  being  pressed  by  Mac 
kenzie,  and  heavily  cannonaded,  were  soon  lurced  t-. 
form  lines  and  offer  battle,  answering  gun  for  gun. 
The  I'rench  soldiers  we^  heavily  crusrhed  by  the 
English  shot,  the  clatter  of  musketry  was  beginning, 
and  one  well-directed  vigorous  charge  wculd  have 
overturned  and  driven  the  French  in  a  coni'used  mass 
upon  the  other  troops  then  wedged  in  the  narrow  de- 
file ;  but  Mackenzie's  movement  had  been  made  by 
Older  of  the  quarter-master  general  Donkln,  without 
Murray's  knowledge,  and  the  latter,  instead  of  sup- 
porting it  strongly,  sent  repeated  orders  to  withdraw 
the  troops  already  engageiJ,  and  in  despite  of  all  re- 
monstrance caused  them  to  fall  back  on  the  main 
body,  when  victory  was  in  their  grasp,  f^uchet  thus 
relieved  at  a  most  critical  moment  immediately  oc- 
cupied a  position  across  the  defile  with  his  flanks  on 
the  heights,  and  though  iMurray  finally  sent  some 
light  companies  to  attack  his  leit,  the  eltort  was  fee- 
ble and  produced  no  result;  he  retained  his  position 
and  in  the  night  retired  to  Fuenta  de  la  Higuera. 

On  the  14th,  Murray  marched  to  Alcoy,  where  a 
small  rart  of  Whittingliam's  forces  had  remained  in 
observation  cf  a  French  detachment  left  to  hcdd  the 
pass  of  Albayda,  and  through  this  pass  he  proposed 
to  intercept  the  retreat  of  Suchet,  but  his  movements 
were  slow,  his  arrangem^^nts  bad,  and  the  army  be- 
came so  disordered,  that  h  ;  halted  the  1.5th  at  Alcoy. 
A  feeble  demonstration  cii  the  following  days  to- 
wards Albayda  terminated  his  operations. 

In  this  battle  of  Castalla  the  allies  had,  Including 
Roche's  division,  about  seventeen  tliousand  of  all 
arms,  and  the  French  abour.  fifteen  tlioutand.  Su- 
chet says  that  the  action  was  brouglit  on,  against 
his  wish,  by  the  impetuosity  of  his  llglit  troops,  and 
that  he  lost  only  eight  hundred  men  ;  his  statement 
is  confirmed  by  Vacani,  the  Italian  historian.  Sir 
.John  Murray  affirms  that  it  was  a  pitched  battle  and 
that  the  French  lost  above  three  thousand  men. 
The  reader  may  choose  between  these  accounts.  In 
favour  of  Suchet's  version  it  may  be  remarked  thct 
neither  the  place,  nor  the  time,  nor  the  mode  of  at 
tack,  was  suv\:  ^s  might  be  expected  from  his  ta  cnts 


570 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XX. 


and  experience  in  war,  if  he  had  really  intended  a 
pitched  battle  :  and  though  the  action  was  stronf^ly 
contested  on  the  principal  point,  it  is  scarcely  pos- 
sible that  so  many  as  three  thousand  men  could  have 
been  killed  and  wounded.  And  yet  eight  hundred 
Boems  too  few,  because  the  loss  of  the  victorious 
troops  with  all  advantages  of  ground  was  more  than 
Bix  hundred.  One  thing  is,  iiowever,  certain,  that 
if  Suchet  lost  three  tiiousand  men,  wliich  would  have 
been  at  least  a  fourtii  of  his  infantry,  he  must  have 
bj.;n  so  disabled,  so  crippled,  tiiat  whai  with  the 
narrow  defile  of  Biar  in  the  rear,  and  the  distance  of 
his  cavalry  in  tiie  plain,  to  have  escaped  at  all  was 
extremely  discreditable  to  iMurray's  generalsliip. 
An  able  commander,  liaving  a  superior  force,  and 
the  allies  were  certainly  the  most  numerous,  would 
never  have  suil'ered  the  pass  of  Biar  to  be  forced  on 
the  l:2ch,  or  if  it  were  forced,  he  would  have  had  his 
army  well  in  hand  behind  it,  ready  to  fall  upon  the 
head  of  the  French  column  as  it  issued  into  the  low 
ground. 

Suchet  violated  several  of  the  most  important 
maxims  of  art.  For  without  an  adequate  object,  he 
fought  a  battle,  having  a  defile  in  his  rear,  and  on 
ground  where  his  cavalry,  in  which  he  was  superior, 
could  not  act.  Neither  the  general  state  of  the 
French  alfajrs,  nor  the  particular  circumstances,  in- 
vited a  decisive  offensive  movement  at  the  time, 
wherefore  tiie  French  general  should  have  been  con- 
tented v.'ith  his  first  successes  against  the  Spaniards, 
and  against  colonel  Adam,  unless  some  palpable  ad- 
vantage had  been  offered  to  him  by  Murray.  But 
the  latter's  position  was  very  strong  indeed,  and  the 
French  army  was  in  imminent  danger,  cooped  up 
between  the  pass  of  Biar  ahd  the  allied  troops ;  and 
this  danger  would  have  been  increased  if  Elio  had 
executed  a  nrovement  which  Murray  had  proposed  to 
him  on  the  night  of  the  12tli,  namely,  to  push  troops 
into-  the  )muntains  from  Sax,  which  would  have 
strengthened  Whittingham's  left  and  menaced  the 
right  flank  of  the  enemy.  Elio  disregarded  this  re- 
quest, and  during  the  whole  of  the  operations  the 
two  armies  were  unconnected,  and  acting  without 
concert,  although  only  a  few  miles  distant  from  each 
other.  This  might  have  been  avoided  if  they  had  pre- 
viously put  tiie  castle  and  town  of  Villena  in  a  good 
state  of  defence,  and  occupied  the  pass  of  Biar  in 
force  beliind  it.  The  two  armies  would  then  have 
been  secure  of  a  junction  in  advance,  and  the  plain 
of  Villena  would  have  been  commanded.  To  the 
courage  of  the  troops  belongs  all  the  merit  of  the 
success  obtained ;  tliere  was  no  generalship,  and 
hence,  though  much  blood  was  spilt,  no  profit  was 
derived  from  victory. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Opernlions  north  of  the  Tapu? — Position  of  the  French  annles 
— Pnloiii')iiii  inarches  from  Madrid  to  join  the  arinv  of  the 
north — VririiiiH  cnni!iiit«  lakp  phice  ivilh  the  partii'as  —  Fox 
fail-i  tn  «ur|)ii-e  the  liriti>h  postal  Bcjar — CHfTai-elli  (ieniaiids 
TJi'iforcr  iiif nt« — Joseph  miscoiictives  the  emperor's  plans — 
WeHiofjtoii'si  plans  vini'irated  a<rainst  French  writers — Soult 
BHvises  Joseph  to  hold  Madrid  and  the  monntains  of  Avila  — 
Indecision  of  the  kin" — He  ^oes  to  Valladolid  —  Concentrates 
the  French  armies  in  Olfl  CasI  le — A  division  under  Leval 
rennins  at  Madiirl — Reille  sends  riinforcements  to  the  army 
of  the  north — Varions  skirmishes  with  Ihe  partidas — Leval 
decei\e(l  bv  fnl-e  rnmonr-'at  Madrid — Josenh  wishes  to  ahnn- 
don  tdat  capit.d — Noitiiern  insurrection — Operations  ofCaf- 
farelli,  I'ahindiini,  Mendir.ahel,  Lonfra,  and  Minn — Napoleon 
recalls  Cairartlli — Clauzt  I  takes  the  conirnand  of  the  armv  of 
the  nottli — as«ault«  Castro  but  fails — Palondiini  skirmishes 
with  Meiidmabe! — Introducei  a  convoy  into  Saiitona — 
Marches  to  succour  Bilbao — His  operations  in  Guipuscua — 


The  insurrection  gains  strength — Clauzd  marches  into  IVa 
varre — Defeats  INlina  in  tlie  vallty  of  I-ioniiil  and  pur.-ucs 
him  into  Ara^un — toy  acts  on  the  Coa-t — Takes  t^astro — 
Returns  to  Bdbao — Deftuts  the  Biscnyen  voliintttrs  under 
M  uj^arlejjui  at  Viliato.and  those  ofGnipu>-coa  under  Artula 
at  Lttjuitio — The  insiiireclioiial  junta  iiics — Htinjeo  and 
Isuro  are  taken — Operations  of  the  parliuas  on  the  grt  at  Una 
sf  comniunicbtion. 

OPERATIONS    NORTH    OF    THE    TAGliS. 

On  this  side  as  in  the  south,  one  part  of  the 
French  fronted  lord  Wellington's  forces,  while  the 
rest  warred  with  the  partidas,  watclied  the  English 
fleets  on  the  coast,  and  endeavoured  to  maintain  a 
free  intercourse  with  France ;  but  the  extent  of 
country  was  greater,  the  lines  of  communication 
longer,  the  war  altogether  more  difficult,  and  the 
various  operations  more  dissevered. 

lour  distinct  bodies  acted  north  of  the  I'agus. 

1st.  The  army  of  Portugal,  composed  of  six  di- 
visions under  lieille,  observing  the  allies  from  be- 
liind the  Tormes ;  the  Gallicians  from  behind  the 
Esla. 

2nd.  That  part  of  the  army  of  the  south,  which, 
posted  in  the  valley  of  the  Tagus,  observed  Hill 
from  behind  the  ^J'ietar,  and  the  Spaniards  of  Estre- 
niadura  from  behind  the  Tagus. 

Sd.  The  army  of  the  north,  under  Caffarelli, 
whose  business  was  to  watch  the  English  squadrons 
in  the  Bay  of  Biscay,  to  scour  the  great  line  of  com- 
munication with  France,  and  to  protect  the  fortress- 
es of  Navarre  and  Biscay. 

4th.  The  army  of  the  centre,  under  count  D'Erlon, 
whose  task  was  to  fight  the  partidas  in  the  central 
part  of  Spain,  to  cover  Madrid  and  to  connect  the 
other  armies  by  means  of  movable  columns  radia- 
ting from  that  capital.  Now  if  the  reader  will  l(:)l]ow 
the  operations  of  these  armies  in  the  order  of  their 
importance,  and  will  mark  their  bearing  on  the  main 
action  of  the  campaign,  he  will  be  led  gradually  to 
understand  how  it  was,  that  in  1813,  the  French, 
although  apparently  in  their  full  strengtli,  were  sud- 
denly, irremediably,  and  as  it  were  by  a  whirlwind, 
swept  from  the  Peninsula. 

The  army  of  the  centre  was  composed  of  Darmag- 
nac's  and  Barrois'  French  divisions,  of  Palcmbini's 
Italians,  Casa  Palacio's  Spaniards,  Trielhard's  cav- 
alry, and  the  king's  French  guards.  It  has  been  al- 
ready shcv/n  how,  marching  from  the  Tonnes,  it 
drove  the  Empecinado  and  Bassecour  from  tlfe  capi- 
tal ;  but  in  passing  the  Guadarama  one  hundred  and 
fifty  men  were  frozen  to  death,  a  catastrophe  pro- 
duced by  the  rash  use  of  ardent  spirits.  Palombini 
immediately  occupied  Alcala,  and,  having  foraged 
the  country  towards  Guadalaxara,  brought  in  a  large 
convoy  of  provisions  to  that  capital.  He  would  then 
have  gone  to  Zaragoza  to  receive  the  recruits  and 
stores  which  had  arrived  from  Italy  for  his  division, 
but  Cafl'arelli  was  at  this  time  so  prossed  that  the 
Italian  division  finally  marched  to  his  succour,  not 
by  the  direct  road,  such  was  the  state  of  the  north- 
ern provinces,  but  by  the  circuitous  route  of  Valla- 
dolid and  Burgos.  The  king's  guards  then  replaced 
tlie  Italians  at  Alcala,  and  excursions  were  commen- 
ced on  every  side  against  the  partidas,  which  being 
now  recruited  and  tauglit  by  French  deserters,  were 
become  exceedingly  wary  and  fought  obstinately. 

On  the  8th  of  .January,  Espert,  governor  of  Sego- 
via, beat  Saornil  not  far  from  Cuellar. 

On  the  nd  of  February,  general  Viciiory,  march- 
ing upon  Medina  Celi,  muted  a  regiment  of  horse 
called  the  volunteers  of  Madrid,  and  took  six  hun- 
dred prisoners.  The  Empocinado  with  two  tiiousand 
infantry  and  a  thousand  cavalry  intercepted  iiim  on 
his  return,  but  Vichery  beat  him  with  considerable 
elaughter,  and  made  tiie  retreat  good  with  a  loss  of 


]SlXj 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR    ,V  A  R. 


571 


only  fipvcnly  men  Ilowovcr,  tiie  guerilla  chief  be- 
iug  reinforced  by  Saornil,  and  Abril,  still  kept  tiie 
hilla  about.  Guadalaxara,  and  when  D'Erlon  sent 
freaii  troops  against  him,  he  attacked  a  detachment 
under  colonel  Prieur,  killed  twenty  men,  took  the 
bag:fage  and  recovered  a  heavy  contribution. 

During  these  operations,  the  troops  in  the  valley 
of  the  Tagus  were  continually  harassed,  especially 
by  a  chief  called  Cussta,  who  was  sometimes  in  the 
Cruadalupe  mountains,  sometimes  on  the  Tietar, 
sonietimf's  in  the  Vera  de  Placentia,  and  he  was 
supported  at  times  on  tiie  side  of  the  Guadalupe  by 
^iorillo  and  Penne  Villemur.  The  French  were, 
however,  most  troubled  by  Hill's  vicinity,  for  that 
general's  successful  enterprises  had  made  a  profound 
impression,  and  the  slightest  change  of  his  quarters, 
or  even  the  appearance  of  an  English  unitbrm  be- 
yond the  line  of  cantonments  caused  a  concentration 
of  French  troops  as  expecting  one  of  his  sudden 
blows. 

Nor  was  the  army  of  Portugal  tranquil.  The 
Gallicians  menaced  it  from  Puebla  Senabria  and  the 
gorges  of  the  Bierzo;  Silveira  from  the  Tras  os 
Monies;  the  mountains  separating  Leon  from  the 
Asturias,  were  full  of  bands  ;  Wellington  was  on  the 
Agueda;  and  Hill,  moving  from  Coria  by  the  pass 
of  Bejar,  might  make  a  sudden  incursion  towards 
Avila.  Finally,  the  communication  with  the  army 
of  the  north  was  to  be  kept  up,  and  on  every  side 
the  partidas  were  enterprising,  especially  the  horse- 
men in  the  plains  of  Leon.  Reille,  however,  did 
not  fiil  to  war  down  these  last. 

Early  in  January,  Foy,  returning  fror^  Astoig'a  to 
relieve  general  Leval,  then  at  Avjla,  killed  some  of 
Marquinez's  cavalry  ir:  San  Pedro,  and  more  of  them 
at  Mota  la  Toro  ;  and  on  the  15th  of  that  montli  the 
French  crptain  Mathis  killed  or  took  four  hundred 
of  the  same  partida  at  Valdcras.  A  convoy  of  guer- 
illa stares  coming  from  the  Asturias  was  intercepted 
by  general  Boyer's  detachments,  and  one  Florian,  a 
celebrated  Spanish  partizan  in  the  French  service, 
destroyed  the  band  of  Garido,  in  the  Avila  district. 
The  same  Florian  on  the  1st  of  February  defeated 
the  Medico  and  another  inferior  chief,  and  soon  af- 
ter, passing  the  Tormes,  ca])tured  some  Spanish  dra- 
goons who  had  come  out  of  Ciudad  llodrigo.  On  tht; 
1st  of  Ttiarch  he  cruslied  the  band  of  I'onto,  and  at 
the  sam'i  time  captain  ^lathis,  acting  on  the  side  of 
the  Carion  river,  again  surprised  Marquinez'  band 
at  Melgar  Abaxo,  and  that  partida,  reduced  to  two 
hundred  men  under  two  inferior  chiefs  called  Tobar 
and  Mnrccs,  ceased  to  be  formidable. 

Previous  to  this  some  Gallician  troops  having  ad- 
vanced to  (Jastro  (i-onzalo  on  the  Esla,  were  attack- 
ed by  Boy?r,  vviio  beat  them  through  Benevente  with 
the  loss  of  one  Imndred  and  fifty  men,  and  then  driv- 
ing the  P.Ipanish  garrison  from  Puebla  Senabria, 
raised  contributions  wit':  a  rigour  and  ferocity  said 
to  be  habitu'il  to  him.  His  detachments  afterwards 
penetrating  into  the  Asturias,  menaced  Oviedo,  and 
vexed  the  country  in  despite  of  Porlier  and  Barcefia, 
who  were  in  that  province.  General  Foy  also  hav- 
ing fixed  his  quarters  at  Avila,  feeling  uneasy  as  to 
Hiirs  intentions,  had  endeavoured  on  the  2llth  of 
P'ebruary  to  surprise  Bejar  witli  the  view  of  ascer- 
taining if  any  large  body  was  collected  behind  it, 
b.tt  iie  was  vigorously  repulsed  by  the  fiftieth  regi- 
ment and  sixtii  ca^adores  under  the  command  of  col- 
onel H:irrit:on.  However,  this  attack  and  the  move- 
nnnts  of  Florian  beyond  the  I'ormes,  induced  lord 
Wellington  to  bring  up  another  division  to  the  Ag- 
ued;i,  which,  by  a  reaction,  caused  the  French  to 
bnliPve  the  allies  were  ready  to  advance. 

During  thass  events,  Calfarelli  vainly  urged  Reille 


to  send  him  reinforcements,  the  inpurroction  in  the 
north  gained  stiength,  and  tlie  communications  were 
entirely  intercepted  until  Palombini,  driving  away 
Mendizabel  and  Longa  from  Burgos,  enabled  the 
great  convoy  and  all  Najioleon's  desjiEtciies,  wliich 
had  been  long  accu'nulating  there,  to  reach  Madrid 
in  the  latter  end  of  February.  .loseph  tiien  reluc- 
tantly prepared  to  abandon  his  capital  and  concen- 
trate the  armies  in  Castile,  but  he  negle(;ted  these 
essential  ingredients  of  tlie  emperor's  plan,  rajiidity 
and  boldness.  By  the  firit.  Napoleon  i)roposed  to 
gain  time  lor  the  suppression  of  the  insurrection  in 
the  nortliern  provinces.  By  the  second  to  impose 
upon  lord  Wellington  and  keep  him  on  the  defensive. 
Joseph  did  neither;  he  was  slow  and  assumed  the 
defensive  himself,  and  he  and  the  other  French  gen- 
erals expected  to  be  attacked,  for  they  had  not  lath- 
omed  the  English  general's  political  difficulties  ;  and 
French  writers  since,  misconceiving  the  character 
of  his  warfare,  have  attributed  to  slowness  in  the 
man  what  was  really  the  long-reaching  policy  of  a 
great  commander.  The  allied  army  was  not  so  litlie 
as  the  French  army  ;  the  latter  carried  on  occasion 
ten  days'  provisions  on  the  stldiers'  backs,  or  it  lived 
upon  the  country,  and  was  in  respect  of  its  organi- 
zation and  customs  a  superior  military  machine; 
the  former  never  carried  mere  tl.an  three  days'  pro- 
visions, never  lived  upon  tlie  country,  avoided  the 
principle  of  making  the  war  support  the  war,  payed 
or  promised  to  pay  for  every  thing,  and  often  carried 
in  its  marches  even  the  corn  for  its  cavalry.  The 
difference  of  this  organization  resulting  from  the  dif- 
ference of  policy  between  the  two  nations,  was  a 
complete  bar  to  any  great  and  sudden  excursion  on 
the  part  of  the  British  general,  and  must  always  be 
considered  in  judging  his  operations. 

It  is  true  that  if  Wellington  had  then  passed  the 
Upper  Tormes  with  a  considerable  ibrce,  drawing 
Hill  to  him  through  Bejar,  and  moving  rapidly  by 
Avila,  he  might  have  broken  in  upon  the  defensiv'o 
system  of  the  king  and  beat  his  armies  in  detail,  and 
much  the  French  feared  such  a  blow,  which  would 
have  been  quite  in  the  manner  of  Napoleon.  But 
Wellington's  views  were  directed  by  other  than 
mere  military  principles.  Thus  striking,  he  was 
not  certain  that  his  blow  would  be  decisive,  his  Por- 
tuguese forces  would  have  been  ruined,  his  British 
soldiers  seriously  injured  by  the  attempt,  and  the  re- 
sources of  France  would  have  rej.aired  the  lofs  cf 
the  enemy,  sooner  than  he  could  have  recovered  the 
weakness  which  must  necessarily  have  followed  such 
an  unseasonable  exertion.  His  plan  was  to  bring  a 
great  and  enduring  power  early  into  the  field,  for 
like  Phocion,  he  desired  to  have  an  army  fitted  for  a 
long  race  and  would  not  start  on  the  sliort  course. 

Joseph,  though  he  conceived  the  probability  and 
dreaded  the  ettect  of  such  a  sudden  attack,  could  by 
no  means  conceive  the  spirit  of  his  brother's  plans. 
It  was  in  vain  that  Napoleon,  while  admitting  the 
bad  moral  effect  of  abandoning  the  capital,  pointed 
out  the  difference  between  flying  from  it  and  making 
a  forward  movement  at  the  head  of  an  army  ;  the 
king  even  maintained  that  Madrid  was  a  better  mil- 
itary centre  of  operations  than  Valladolid,  because  it 
hnd  lines  of  communication  by  Segovia,  Aranda  de 
Duero,  and  Zaragoza  ;  nothing  could  be  mor»>  unmil- 
itary,  unless  he  was  prepared  to  march  direct  upon 
Lisbon  if  the  allies  marcbed  upon  the  Duero.  His 
extreme  reluctance  to  quit  Madrid  induced  slowness, 
but  the  actual  position  of  his  troops  at  the  moment, 
likewise  presented  obstacles  to  the  immediate  exe- 
cution of  the  emperor's  orders  ;  for  as  Daricon's  divi- 
sion liad  not  returned  from  ^■illcncia,  the  French 
outposts  towards  the  Morena  could  not  be  wilhdrawo. 


72 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XX. 


I  -  could  the  ari:^y  of  tlie  centre  march  upon  Valla- 
0  id  until  the  army  of  the  south  relieved  it  at  Mad- 
r  '  iMoreover,  8oult's  counsels  had  troubled  the 
k  ig's  judf^rnent ;  for  that  marshal,  agreeing  that  to 
al  andun  .\ladrid  at  that  time  was  to  abandon  Spain, 
oli^red  a  project  for  reconciling  the  possession  of  the 
caoital  vvith  the  emperor's  views.  This  was  to 
pi  ice  the  army  of  Portugal,  and  the  army  of  the 
f^o.'.th,  in  position  along  the  slopes  of  the  Avila  nioun- 
ta^as,  andon  the  Upper  Tormes,  menacing  Ciudad 
R'  drigo,  while  tlie  king  with  the  army  of  the  cen- 
tra remained  at -Madrid  in  reserve.  In  this  situa- 
ti  n  he  said  they  would  ho  an  over-match  for  any 
fo  ce  the  allies  could  bring  into  the  field,  and  the  lat- 
te.  could  not  move  either  by  the  valley  of  the  Tagus 
ox  upon  tlie  Duero  without  exposing  themselves  to  a 
flank  attack. 

The  king  objected  that  such  a  force  could  only  be 
fed  in  that  country  by  the  utter  ruin  of  the  people, 
which  he  would  not  consent  to ;  but  he  was  deceived 
by  his  ministers  ;  the  comfortable  state  of  tlie  houses, 
the  immense  pj^ains  of  s^^nding  corn  seen  by  the  al- 
lies in  their  march  from  the  Esla  to  the  Carion, 
proved  that  the  people  were  not  much  impoverished. 
Soult,  well  acquainted  with  the  resources  of  the 
country,  and  a  better  and  more  practised  master  of 
such  operations,  looked  to  the  military  question 
rather  than  to  the  king's  conciliatory  policy,  and 
positively  affirmed  tlial  the  armies  could  ue  subsist- 
e  1 ;  yet  it  does  not  appear  that  he  had  taken  into  his 
consideration  how  tlie  insurrection  in  tlie  northern 
provinces  was  to  be  suppressed,  which  was  the  prin- 
cipal object  of  Napoleon's  plan.  He  no  doubt  expec- 
ted that  t!ie  emperor  would,  from  France  send  troops 
for  that  purpose,  but  Napoleon,  knowing  the  true 
state  of  his  affairs,  foresaw  that  all  the  resources  of 
France  would  be  required  in  another  quarter. 

Hatred  and  suspicion  would  have  made  Joseph  re- 
ject any  plan  suggested  by  Soult,  and  the  more  so, 
tliat  the  latter  now  declared  the  armies  could  ex- 
ist without  assistance  in  money  from  France ;  yet 
his  mind  was  evidently  unsettled  by  that  marshul's 
proposal,  and  by  the  coincidence  cf  his  ideas  as  to 
holding  Madrid,  for  even  when  the  armies  were  in 
.  niovemr^nt  towards  the  nortiiern  parts,  he  vacillated 
in  his  resolutions,  at  one  time  thinking  to  stay  at 
Madrid,  at  another  to  march  with  the  army  of  the 
centre  to  Burgos,  instead  of  Valladolid.  However, 
upon  the  IWth  of  March  he  quitted  the  capital,  leav- 
ing tlie  Spanish  ministers  Angulo  and  Almenara  to 
govern  there  in  conjunction  with  Gazan.  The  army 
of  the  south  then  moved  in  two  columns,  one  under 
Couroux  across  the  Gredos  mountains  to  Avila,  the 
other  under  Gazan  upon  Madrid  to  relieve  the  army 
of  the  centre,  vviiicli  immediately  marclicd  to  Aran- 
da  de  Du3ro  and  Lerma,  with  orders  to  settle  at 
Burgos.  Meanwhile  Villatte's  division  and  all  the 
outposts  withdrawn  from  La  Mancha  remained  on 
the  Alberche,  and  the  army  of  the  south  was  thus 
con>^.entrated  between  that  river,  Madrid   and  Avila. 

North  of  tin  Tagus  the  troops  were  unmolested, 
save  by  the  bn.nds  during  tliese  movements,  which 
were  not  completed  before  April,  but  in  La  .Minc-ha, 
the  retiring  French  posts  had  been  followed  by  Del 
Parqu'^'s  advanceil  guard  under  Oiiz  Murgeon  ;is  far 
as  Yebenes,  and  at  the  bridge  of  Algob;ir  the  Fnmch 
Civalry  checked  the  Spanish  horsemen  so  roughly, 
uhat  Cruz  ^lurgeon  retired  again  towards  the  More- 
na.  At  the  same  time  on  the  Cuenca  side,  the  Fm- 
pecinado  having  attempted  to  cut  oft'  a  party  of 
French  cavalry,  escorting  the  marquis  of  Salices  to 
collect  his  rents  previous  to  quitting  Madrid,  was 
defented  with  tlie  loss  of  seventy  troofjors.  Mean- 
while the  great  depot  at  Madrid  being   partly   re- 


moved, general  Villatte  marched  upon  Salamanca, 
and  Gazan  tixed  his  head-quarters  at  Arevalo.  1  he 
army  of  the  soutii  was  thus  cantoned  between  the 
Tormes,  the  Duero,  and  the  Adaja,  with  exception 
of  six  chosen  regiments  of  infantry  and  tour  of  cav- 
alry, in  all  about  ten  thout;and  men  ;  thete  remained 
at  Madrid  under  Leval,  who  was  ordered  to  push  ad- 
vanced guards  to  Toledo  and  tiie  Alberche,  lest  the 
allies  should  suddenly  march  that  way  and  turn  tiiC 
left  of  the  French  army.  But  beyond  the  Alberche 
there  were  roads  leading  from  the  valley  of  the  '1  a- 
gus  over  the  Gredos  mountains  in  the  rear  of  the  ad- 
vanced positions  which  the  French  had  on  the  Lp- 
per  'I'ormes,  wherefore  these  last  were  now  vvuh- 
drawn  from  Pedrahita  and  Pueiite  Congosto. 

In  proportion  as  the  troops  arrived  in  Castile,  Re- 
ille  sent  men  to  the  army  of  the  north,  and  contract- 
ing his  cantQnments,  concentrated  his  remaining 
forces  about  iMedlna  de  Rio  Seco,  with  his  cavalry 
on  the  Esla.  But  the  men,  recalled  by  the  emperor, 
were  now  in  full  march,  the  French  were  in  a  t-tiite 
of  great  confusion,  the  people,  urged  by  ^^'ellir■gtcn's 
emissaries,  and  expecting  great  events,  every  \v  here 
showed  their  dislike  by  withholding  provisions,  and 
the  partida  warfare  became  as  lively  in  the  interior 
as  on  the  coast,  yot  with  worse  ibrtune.  Captuin 
Giordano,  a  Spaniard  of  Joseph's  guard,  killed  one 
hundred  and  filty  of  Saornil's  people  near  Arevalo, 
and  the  indefatigable  Florian  defeated  Morales'  b&nil, 
seized  a  depot  in  the  valley  of  the  Tietar,  beat  the 
Medico  there,  and  then  crossing  the  Greccs  nicun- 
tains,  destroyed  near  Segovia  on  t!ie  2*'tli,  the  Land 
of  Purchas  ;  the  king's  Sjianish  guards  ako  cruthcd 
some  smaller  partidas,  and  lienovales  vvitli  his  whole 
staff  was  captured  at  Carvajales  and  carried  to  Val- 
ladolid. Meanwhile  the  Empecinado  gairicd  the 
hills  above  Sepulveda  and,  joining  with  Merino, 
obliged  the  peojile  of  the  Segovia  district,  to  aban- 
don their  houses  and  refuse  the  supplies  demanded 
by  the  army  of  the  centre.  V»'hen  D'Armagnac  and 
Cassagne  marched  against  them,  31crino  returned  to 
his  northern  haunts,  the  Empecinado  to  the  Togus, 
and  D'Erlon  then  removed  his  head-quarters  to  Cu- 
ellar. 

During  April,  Leva!  was  very  much  disturbed, 
and  gave  false  alarms,  wliich,  extending  to  Valla- 
dolid, caused  an  unseasonable  concentraticii  of  the 
troops,  and  D'Erlon  abandoned  Cuelliir  and  Sepulve- 
da. Del  Parque  and  the  Empecinado  were  said  to 
liave  established  the  bridge  of  Araijuez,  Elio  to  be 
advancing  in  La  Mancha,  Hill  to  be  in  the  valley  of 
the  Tagus  and  moving  by  Mombeltran  with  the  in- 
tention of  seizing  the  passes  of  the  Guadarama.  All 
of  this  was  false.  It  was  the  Empecinado  and  Abu- 
elo  who  were  at  Aranjuez,  the  partidas  of  Firmin, 
iJuesta,  Rivero,  and  El  Medico  who  were  collecting 
at  Arzobispo,  to  mask  the  march  of  the  Spanish  di- 
visions from  Estreinadura,  and  of  the  reserve  from 
Andalusia;  it  was  the  prince  of  Anglona  who  was 
advancing  in  La  Mancha  to  cover  the  movement  of 
Del  I'iirque  upon  Murcia.  ^Yhen  disabused  of  his 
error,  Leval  easily  drove  away  the  Empecinado  wl  o 
had  advanced  to  Alcala  ;  afterwards  cli;isii;g  Firmin 
from  Valdcmoro  into  the  valley  of  the  l^gus,  he  re- 
established his  advanced  posts  of  'J'oledo  and  on  the 
Alberciie,  and  secured  the  whole  country  around. 
But  Joseph  himself  was  anxious  to  abandon  3iadrid 
altogether,  and  was  only  restrained  by  the  ejnperor's 
orders  and  by  the  hope  of  still  gathering  some  con 
tributions  there  to  support  his  court  at  Valladolid. 
With  reluctance  also  he  had  obeyed  hie  brother's  re- 
iterated orders  to  bring  the  army  of  the  centre  over 
tlie  Duero  to  replace  the  detached  divisions  of  the 
army  of  Portugal.     He  wished  D'Erlon  rather  than 


1813.1 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


573 


Reille,  to  reinforce  the  north,  and  nothing  could 
mora  clearly  show  how  entirely  the  subtle  spirit  ot" 
Napoleon's  instructions  had  escaped  his  perception. 
It  was  necessary  tiiat  Madrid  should  be  held  to  watch 
the  valley  of  the  Tagus,  and,  if  necessary,  to  ena- 
ble tiie  French  armies  to  fall  back  on  Zaragoza, 
but  principally  to  give  force  to  the  moral  eli'ect  of 
llie  offensive  movement  towards  Portugal.  It  was 
equally  important,  and  for  the  same  rea^n,  that  the 
anny  of  Portugal,  instead  of  the  army  of  the  centre, 
Rliuukl  furnish  reinforcements  for  the  north. 

In  the  contracted  positions  which  the  armies 
nuw  occupied,  the  difficulty  of  subsisting  was  in- 
creased, and  each  general  was  dissatisfied  with  his 
district,  disputes  multiplied,  and  the  court  clashed 
With  tlie  arm.y  at  every  turn.  Leval  also  inveighed 
against  the  conduct  of  the  Spanish  ministers  and 
minor  authorities  left  at  Madrid,  as  being  hurtful  to 
both  troops  and  people,  and  no  doubt  justly,  since  it 
appears  to  have  been  precisely  like  that  of  the  Por- 
tuguese and  Spanish  authorities  on  the  other  side 
towards  the  allies.  .Joseph's  letters  to  his  brother 
bicamo  daily  more  bitter.  Napoleon's  regulations 
for  the  support  of  the  troops  were  at  variance  with 
his,  and  when  the  king's  budget  shewed  a  delicit  of 
many  millions,  the  emperor  so  little  regarded  it  that 
ha  reduced  the  French  subsidy  to  two  millions  per 
month,  and  strictly  forbade  the  application  of  the 
money  to  any  other  purpose  than  the  pay  of  the  sol- 
diers. When  Joseph  asked,  how  he  was  to  lind  re- 
sources'? his  brother,  with  a  just  sarcasm  on  his  po- 
litical and  military  blindness,  desired  him  to  seek 
what  was  necessary  in  those  provinces  of  tl;c  north 
wliich  were  rich  enough  to  nourish  the  partidas  and 
the  insurrectional  junti's.  The  king  thus  pushed  to 
the  wall  prevailed  upon  Gazan,  secretly,  to  lend  him 
fifly  thousand  francs  for  the  support  of  his  court  from 
tiie  chest  of  the  army  of  the  south  ;  but  with  the  oth- 
er generals  he  could  by  no  means  agree,  and  instead 
of  liie  vigour  and  vigiiai.'.ce  necessarj'  to  meet  the 
coining  campaign  there  was  weakness,  disunion  and 
ill-blood. 

All  the  movements  and  arrangements  for  concen- 
trating the  French  forces,  as  made  by  Joseph,  dis- 
pleased Napoleon.  The  manner  in  which  the  army 
of  the  centre  stole  away  from  Madrid,  by  the  road 
of  Lerma,  was,  he  said,  only  calculated  to  expose  his 
real  views,  and  draw  the  allies  upon  the  French  be- 
fore the  communication  v/ith  France  v/as  restored. 
But  more  tlian  all,  his  indignation  was  aroused  by 
the  conduct  of  the  king  after  the  concentration.  The 
French  armies  were  held  on  the  defensive  and  the 
allies  miglit,  without  fear  for  Portugal,  embark 
troops  to  invade  France,  whereas  a  bold  and  confi- 
dent Oifensive  movement  sustained  by  the  formation 
of  a  battering  train  at  Burgos,  as  if  to  besiege  Ciu- 
dad  Rodrigo,  would  have  imposed  upon  the  English 
general,  secured  France  from  the  danger  of  such  an 
insult,  and  would  at  the  same  time  have  masked  the 
necessary  measures  for  suppressing  the  insurrection 
in  the  northern  provinces.  To  quell  that  insurrec- 
tion was  of  vital  importance,  but  from  the  various 
circumstances,  already  noticed,  it  had  now  existed 
tor  seven  months,  tive  of  which  the  king,  although 
at  the  head  of  ninety  thousand  men,  and  uninterrupt- 
ed by  Wellington,  had  wasted  unprofitably,  having 
done  no  m.ore  than  chase  a  few  inferior  bands  of  the 
interior,  while  this  formidable  v.arfare  was  consoli- 
dating in  his  rear;  and  while  his  great  adversary 
was  organizing  the  most  powerful  army  which  had  , 
yet  taken  the  field,  in  his  front.  Tt  is  thus  king-' 
doms  are  lost.  I  shall  now  trace  the  progress  of  the  i 
northern  insurrection,  so  unaccountably  neglected  by  ' 
the  king,  and  to  the  last  misunderatood  by  him ;  for, 


when  Wellington  wps  actually  in  movement,  when 
the  dispersed  l<'n;nch  corps  were  rushing  and  crowd- 
ing to  the  rear  to  avoid  the  ponderous  mass  which 
tiie  English  general  was  pushing  forward  ;  even 
then,  the  king,  who  had  done  every  thing  jjossibie 
to  render  deieat  certain,  was  urging  upon  ISapoleon 
the  propriety  of  hrst  beating  the  allies  and  after 
wards  reducing  the  iusurrection  by  the  establish 
ment  of  a  Spanish  civil  government  beyond  the 
Ebro! 

NOUTHERN    INSURRECTION. 

It  has  been  already  shewn  how  the  old  partidas 
had  been  strengthened,  and  new  corps  organized 
on  a  better  tooting  in  Biscay  and  Navarre  ;  how  in 
the  latter  end  of  1812,  Caffarelli  marched  to  succour 
Santona,  and  how  Longa,  taking  advantage  of  liia 
absence,  captured  a  convoy  near  Burgos,  while  oth- 
er bands  menaced  Logrono.  All  the  littoral  pests, 
with  the  exception  of  Santona  and  Gueteria,  were 
then  in  the  possession  of  the  Spaniards,  and  Mendi- 
zabel  made  an  attempt  on  Bilbao,  the  6th  of  Janua- 
ry. Repulsed  by  general  Rouget  he  rejoined  Lon- 
ga, and  togetlicr  they  captured  the  little  fort  of  Sa- 
linas de  Anara,  near  the  Ebrc,  and  that  of  Cuba  in 
the  Bureba,  while  the  bands  of  liOgrofia  invested 
Domingo  Cal«;ada  in  the  Rioja.  On  the  26th  of 
January,  Catfarelli,  having  returned  from  Santona, 
detached  Fandermaesen  and  Dubreton  to  drive  the 
Spaniards  from  Santander,  and  they  seized  many 
stores  there,  but  neglected  to  moke  any  movement 
to  aid  Santona,  which  w?e  ?gain  blockaded  by  the 
partidas  ;  meanv.hile  the  convoy  with  all  the  empe- 
ror's despatches  was  stopped  at  Burgos.  Palombini 
reopened  the  communications  and  enabled  the  con- 
voy to  reach  Madrid,  but  his  division  did  not  muster 
more  than  three  thousand  men,  and  various  detach- 
ments belonging  to  the  other  armies  were  now  in 
march  to  the  interior  of  Spain.  The  regiments  re- 
called to  France  from  all  parts  were  alino  in  full 
movement,  together  with  many  convoys  and  escorts 
for  the  marshals  and  generals  quitting  the  Peninsu 
ia ;  thus  the  army  of  the  north  was  reduced  as  its 
duties  increased,  and  the  young  French  sohliersdied 
fast  of  a  peculiar  malady  which  especially  attacked 
them  in  small  garrisons.  Meanwhile  the  S['aniards' 
forces  increased.  In  February  Mendizabel  and  Lon- 
ga were  again  in  the  Bureba  intercepting  the  com- 
munication between  Burgos  and  Bilbao,  and  they 
menaced  Pancorbo  and  Brivicsca.  This  brought 
Catfarelli  from  Yittoria  and  Palombini  from  Burgcs. 
The  latter,  surj-rised  by  Longa,  lost  many  men  near 
Poza  de  Sal,  and  only  saved  himself  by  his  courage 
and  firmnet-s,  yet  he  finally  drove  the  S])aniarfia 
away.  But  now  Mina,  returning  from  Aragon  ailer 
his  unsuccessful  action  near  Huesca,  surprised  and 
burned  the  castle  of  Fuenterrabia  in  a  most  daring 
manner,  on  the  11th  of  March,  after  which,  having 
assembled  five  thousand  men  in  Guipuscca,  he  ob- 
tained guns  from  t!ie  English  fleet  at  Motrico,  in- 
vested Villa  Real  within  a  few  leagues  of  Vittoria, 
and  repulsed  six  hundred  men  who  came  to  relieve 
the  fort.  This  brought  Catfarelli  back  from  Pan- 
corbo. Mina  then  raised  the  siege,  and  Palombini 
marching  into  the  Rioja,  succoured  the  garrison  of 
San  Domingo  Cal^ada  and  drove  the  partidas  to- 
wards Soria.  The  conimunicntion  witii  1  ogroho 
was  thus  reopened,  and  tlie  Italians,  passing  the 
Ebro,  marched  by  Vittoria  towards  Bilbao,  where 
they  arrived  the  21st  of  February  ;  but  the  gens-d'- 
armes  and  imperial  guards  immediately  moved  from 
Bilbao  to  France,  Cafi'arclli  went  with  them,  and 
the  Spanish  chiefs  remained  mr.'ters  of  Navarre  and 
Biscay.     The  people  now  refused  war  contributiona 


! 


67  i 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[  Book  XX. 


both  in  money  and  kind,  tho  harvest  was  not  ripe, 
and  the  distress  of  the  French  increased  in  an  alarm- 
ing maunor,  bscause  the  weatiier  enabled  the  Eng- 
lislj  Hoots  to  keep  uppn  the  coast  and  intercept  all 
Bupi)iies  from  France  by  sea.  The  communications 
were  all  broken  ;  in  front  by  Longa,  who  was  again 
at  the  ^lerile  of  Pancorbo  ;  in  the  rear  by  31ina,  who 
was  in  the  hills  of  Arlaban  ;  on  the  left  by  a  collec- 
tion of  bands  at  Caroncal  in  Navarre.  Abbe,  gov- 
ernor of  Pampeluna,  severely  checked  the.se  last,  but 
l\lina  soon  restored  aiiiiirs;  for,  leaving  the  volun- 
teers of  Guipuscoa  to  watch  the  defiles  of  Arlaban, 
he  assembled  all  the  bands  in  Navarre,  destroyed 
the  bridges  leading  to  Tatl'alla  from  Fambeluna  and 
from  Puonte  la  Reyna,  and,  though  Abbe  twice  at- 
tacked liim,  he  got  stronger,  and  bringing  up  two 
English  guns  from  the  coast  besieged  Taffalla. 

Napoleon,  discontented  with  Catfarelli's  mode  of 
conducting  the  war,  now  gave  Clauzel  the  command 
in  the  north,  with  discretionary  power  to  draw  as 
raany  troops  from  the  army  of  Portugal  as  he  judged 
necessary.  He  was  to  correspond  directly  with  the 
emperor  to  avoid  loss  of  time,  but  was  to  obey  the 
king  in  all  things  not  clashing  with  Napoleon's  or- 
ders, which  contained  a  complete  review  of  what 
had  passed  and  what  was  necessary  to  be  done. 
"The  partidas,"  the  emperor  said,  "were  strong, 
organized,  exercised,  and  seconded  by  the  exalta- 
tion of  spirit  which  the  battle  of  Salamanca  had 
produced.  The  insurrectional  juntas  had  been  re- 
vived, the  posts  on  the  coasts,  abandoned  by  the 
French  and  seized  "by  the  Spaniards,  gave  free  inter- 
course with  the  English  ;  the  bands  enjoyed  all  the 
resources  of  the  country,  and  the  system  of  warfare 
hitherto  followed  had  favoured  their  progress.  In- 
stead of  forestalling  their  enterprises  the  French 
had  waited  fur  their  attacks,  and  contrived  to  be  al- 
ways be'.iind  the  event;  they  obeyed  the  enemy's 
imi)ulsion,  and  the  troops  were  fatigued  without 
gaining  their  object.  Clauzel  was  to  adopt  a  con- 
trary system  ;  ho  was  to  attack  suddenly,  pursue 
rapidly,  nnd  combine  his  movements  with  reference 
to  the  features  of  the  country.  A  few  good  strokes 
against  the  Spaniards'  magazines,  hospitals,  or  de- 
pots of  arms  would  inevitably  trouble  their  opera- 
tions, and  after  one  or  two  military  successes  some 
political  measures  would  suffice  to  disperse  the  au- 
thorities, disorganize  the  insurrection,  and  bring 
the  young  men  who  had  been  enrolled  by  force  back 
to  tlieir  homes.  All  the  generals  recommended,  and 
the  emperor  approved  of  the  construction  of  block- 
houses on  well-chosen  points,  especially  where  ma.ny 
roads  met;  the  forests  would  furnish  the  materials 
cheaply,  and  these  posts  should  support  each  other- 
and  form  chains  of  communication.  With  respect  to 
the  greatsr  fortr 'sses,  Pampeluna  and  Santona  were 
the  most  important,  and  the  enemy  knew  it,  for  Mina 
was  intent  to  famish  the  first,  and  the  English 
squadron  to  get  hold  of  the  second.  To  supply 
Pampeluna  it  was  only  necessary  to  clear  the  com- 
flsunications,  the  country  around  being  rich  and  fer- 
tile, Santona  required  combinations.  The  empe- 
ror wished  to  supply  it  by  sea  from  I'ayonr.e  and  St. 
Sebastian,  but  the  French  marine  officers  would 
never  attempt  the  passage,  even  with  favourable 
winds  and  when  the  English  squadron  were  away, 
unless  all  the  intermediate  ports  were  occupied  by 
tlie  la!id  forces. 

"Six  months  before,  these  ports  had  been  in  the 
hands  of  tlic  French,  but  Caff'arelli  had  lightly  aban- 
doned them,  leaving  the  field  open  to  the  insurgents 
in  his  rear,  while  he  marched  with  Souham  against 
Wellington.  Since  that  period  the  English  and 
Spaniards  held  thorn.     For  four  months  the  emperor 


had  unceasingly  ordered  the  retaking  of  Bermeo  and 

Castro,  but  whether  from  the  difficulty  of  the  opera- 
tions or  the  necessity  of  answering  more  pressing 
calls,  no  efibrt  had  been  made  to  obey,  and  the  fine 
season  now  permitted  the  English  ships  to  aid  in 
the  defence.  Castro  was  said  to  be  strongly  fortifi- 
ed by  the  English  ;  no  v.'onder,  Cafiarelli  had  given 
them  sufficient  time  and  they  knew  its  valiie.  In 
one  month  every  post  on  the  coast  from  the  mouth  of 
the  Bidassao  to  St.  Ander  should  be  again  reoccupi- 
ed  by  the  French,  and  St.  Ander  itself  should  be  gar- 
risoned strongly.  And  simultaneous  with  the  coast 
operations  should  be  Clauzel's  attack  on  Mina  in  Tsa- 
varre,  and  the  chasing  of  the  partidas  in  the  interior 
of  Biscay.  The  administration  of  the  country  also 
demanded  reform,  and  still  more  the  organization 
and  (iiscipline  of  the  army  of  the  north  should  be 
attended  to.  It  was  the  pith  and  marrow  of  the 
French  power  in  Spain,  all  would  fail  if  that  failed, 
whereas  if  the  north  was  strong,  its  administration 
sound,  its  fortresses  well  provided,  and  its  state 
tranquil,  no  irreparable  mitjfortune  could  happen  in 
any  other  part." 

Clauzel  assumed  the  command  on  the  22nd  of 
February,  Abbe  was  then  confined  to  Pampeluna; 
Mina,  master  of  Navarre,  was  besieging  Tafialla  ; 
Pastor,  Longa,  Campiilo,  JMerino,  and  others  ranged 
through  Biscay  and  Castile  unmolested;  and  the 
spirit  of  the  country  was  so  changed  that  fathers 
now  sent  their  sons  to  join  partidas  which  had  hith- 
erto been  composed  of  robbers  and  deserters.  Clau- 
zel demanded  a  reinforcement  of  twenty  thousand  . 
men  from  the  army  of  Portugal,  but  Joseph  was  still 
in  Madrid,  and  proposed  to  send  D'Erlon  with  tie 
army  of  the  centre  instead,  an  arrangement  to  which 
Clauzel  would  not  accede.  Twenty  thousand  troops 
were,  he  said,  wanted  beyond  the  Ebro.  Two  inde- 
pendent chiefs,  himself  and  D'Erlon,  could  not  act 
together;  and  if  the  latter  was  only  to  remain  quiet 
at  Burgos,  his  army  would  devour  the  resources 
without  aiding  the  operations  of  the  army  of  the 
north.  The  king  might  choose  another  command- 
er, but  the  troops  required  must  be  sent.  Joseph 
changed  his  plan,  yet  it  was  the  end  of  March  be- 
fore Reille's  divisions  moved,  three  upon  Navarre, 
and  one  upon  Burgos.  Meanwhile  Clr.uzel  repaired 
with  some  troops  to  Bilbao,  where  general  Rouget 
had  eight  hundred  men  in  garrison  besides  Palcnibi- 
ni's  Italians. 

This  place  was,  in  a  manner,  blockaded  by  the 
partidas.  The  Pastor,  with  three  thousand  men, 
was  on  the  right  of  the  Durango  river  in  the  hills  of 
Guernica,  and  Navarnis  between  Bilbao  and  tiie  fort 
of  Bermeo.  Mendizabel,  with  from  eight  to  ten 
th.ousand  men,  was  on  the  left  cf  the  Durango  in  tho 
mountains,  menacing  at  once  Santona  and  Bilbao, 
and  protecting  Castro.  However,  the  French  had 
a  strong  garrison  in  the  town  of  Durango,  the  ccn- 
struction  of  new  works  round  Bilbao  was  in  pro- 
gress, nnd  on  the  22d  of-3Iar(h,  Clfiuzel  moved  with 
the  Italians  and  a  French  regiment  to  assault  Ca* 
tro.  Campiilo  and  Mendizabel  immediately  appear- 
ed from  difl'erent  sides,  and  the  garrison  made  a  sal- 
ly ;  the  Spaniards,  after  some  sharp  fighting,  regain- 
ed the  high  valleys  in  disorder,  and  the  design  of 
escalading  Castro  was  restimed,  but  again  interrupt 
ed  by  tlie  return  of  Mendizabel  to  'I'rucios,  only  sev 
en  miles  from  the  French  camp,  and  by  intelligence 
that  the  Pastor,  with  the  volunteers  of  Biscay  and 
Guipuscoa,  was  menacing  Bilbao.  Clauzel  immedi- 
ately marched  with  the  French  regiments  to  the 
latter  place,  leaving  Palombini  to  oppose  Mendiza- 
btd.  Finding  oil  safe  at  Bilbao,  he  sent  Rouget 
with  two  French  battalions  to  reinforce  the  Ital 


1813] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


575 


ians,  who  then  drovs  Mendizabel  from  Trucios  into 
the  liilld  Libout  Viilmaceda.  It  baing  now  necessary 
to  attack  Castro  in  form,  Palombini  occupied  the 
heights  of  Ojaba  and  Ramales,  from  whence  he 
Cijuuiiunicated  with  the  garrison  of  8antona,  intro- 
duced a  convoy  of  money  and  fresh  provisions  there, 
received  ammunition  in  return,  and  directed  the 
governor  Lamef.h  to  prepare  a  battering  train  of  six 
pieces  for  the  siege.  Tiiis  done,  the  Italians,  who 
had  lost  many  rr.en,  returned  hastily  to  Bilbao,  for 
the  Pastor  was  again  menacing  that  city. 

On  tiie  evening  of  the  31st,  Palombini  marched 
againbt  this  new  enemy,  and  tinding  him  too  strong 
retreated,  but  being  promised  a  reinforcement  of 
two  regiments  from  Durango  he  returned;  Pastor 
was  then  with  three  thousand  men  in  poijiticn  at 
Navarnis,  Palombini  gave  him  battle  on  the  3d,  and 
was  defeated  with  the  loss  of  eighty  men,  but  on  the 
.5th,  being  joined  by  the  French  regiments  from  Du- 
rango, he  beat  the  Spaniards.  They  dispersed,  and 
wli:ia  some  collected  in  the  same  positions  behind 
him,  and  others  under  Pastor  gained  the  interior, 
one  column  retired  by  the  coast  towards  the  Deba 
on  the  side  of  St.  Sebastian.  Palombini  eagerly 
pursued  these  last,  because  he  expected  troops  from 
that  f  )rtress  to  line  the  Deba,  and  hoped  thus  to  sur- 
round the  Spaniards,  but  the  English  squadron  was 
at  Lequitio  and  carried  them  otf.  Pastor  mean- 
while descending  the  Deba  drove  the  French  from 
that  river  to  the  very  walls  of  St.  Sebastian,  and 
Palombini  was  forced  to  make  for  Bergara  on  the 
road  to  Vittoria. 

At  Bergara  he  left  his  wounded  men  with  a  gar- 
rison to  protect  them,  and  returning  on  the  9th  of 
April  attacked  the  volunteers  of  Guipuscoa  at  As- 
coytia  ;  repulsed  in  this  attempt  he  retired  again 
towards  Bergara,  and  soon  after  took  charge  of  a 
convoy  of  artillery  going  from  St.  Sebastian  for  the 
siege  of  Castro.  Meanwhile  Bilbao  was  in  great 
danger,  for  the  volunt-sers  of  Biscay  coming  from 
the  Arlaban,  made  on  the  10th  a  false  attack  at  a 
bridge  two  miles  above  the  entrenched  camp,  while 
Tapia,  Dos  Pelos,  and  Campillo  fell  on  seriously 
fi'om  the  side  of  Valmaceda.  3Iendizabel,  who  com- 
manded, did  not  combine  his  movements  v/ell  and 
was  repulsed  by  Rouget,  although  v.-ith  difficulty  ; 
the  noise  of  the  action  reached  Palombini,  who  has- 
tened his  march,  and  having  deposited  his  convoy, 
followid  ihs  volunteers  of  Biscay  to  Guernica  and 
drove  them  upon  Bermeo,  where  they  got  on  board 
the  English  vessels. 

During  these  events  Clauzel  was  at  Vittoria  ar- 
ranging the  general  plan  of  operations.  Mina  had 
on  the  1st  of  April  defeated  one  of  his  columns  near 
Lerin  with  the  loss  of  five  or  six  hundred  men.  The 
four  divisions  sent  from  the  army  of  Portugal,  to- 
gether with  some  unattached  regiments,  furnished, 
according  to  Reille,  the  twenty  thousand  men  de- 
manded!, yet  only  seventeen  thousand  reached  Clau- 
zel ;  and  as  the  unattached  regiments  merely  re- 
placed a  like  number  belonging  to  the  other  armies, 
and  now  rejulled  from  the  north,  the  French  gener- 
al found  his  expected  reinforcements  dwindled  to 
thirteen  thousand.  Hence  notwithstanding  Palom- 
bini's  activity,  the  insurrection  was  in  the  begin- 
ning of  April  rrore  formidable  than  ever;  the  line 
of  correspondence  rrom  Torquemada  to  Burgos  was 
quite  unprotected  for  want  of  troops,  neither  was 
tiie  line  from  Burgos  to  Irun  so  well  guarded  that 
couriers  could  pass  without  powerful  escorts,  nor  al- 
v/ays  then.  The  fortifications  of  the  castle  of  Bur- 
gos were  to  have  been  improved,  but  there  was  no 
money  to  pay  for  the  works,  the  French,  in  default 
of  transport,  could    not  collect   provi?  ms  for    the 


magazines  ordered  to  be  formed  there  by  tlic  king 
and  two  generals,  La  Martiniere  and  Rey,  were  dia 
jHiting  for  the  command.  Nearly  forty  thousand  ir- 
regular Spanish  troops  were  in  the  field.  The  gar- 
rison of 'I'atl'alla,  five  hundred  strong,  had  yielded  to 
Mina,  and  that  cliief,  in  concert  with  Luran,  Amor, 
Tabueca,  the  militia  men  of  Logrona,  and  some 
minor  guerillas,  occupied  both  sides  of  the  Ebro,  be- 
tween Calahora,  Logrona,  Santa  Cruz  de  Campero, 
and  Guardia.  They  could  in  one  day  unite  e'gliteen 
thousand  infantry  and  a  thousand  horsemen.  Men- 
dizabel, Longa,  Campillo,  Herrera,  El  Pastor,  and 
the  volunteers  of  Biscay,  Guipuscoa,  and  Alava,  in 
all  about  sixteen  thousand,  were  on  tiie  coast  acting 
in  conjunction  with  the  English  squadrons  ;  Santan- 
der,  Castro,  and  Bermeo  were  still  in  their  hands, 
and  maritime  expeditions  were  preparing  at  Coruna 
and  in  the  Asturias. 

This  partizan  war  thus  presented  three  distinct 
branches,  that  of  Navarre,  that  of  the  coast,  and 
that  on  the  lines  of  communication.  The  last  alone 
required  above  fiJteen  thousand  men  ;  namely,  ten 
thousand  from  Irun  to  Burgos,  and  the  line  between 
Tolosa  and  Pampeluna,  v-hich  was  destroyed,  re- 
quired fifteen  hundred  to  restore  it,  while  fcur  thou- 
sand were  necessary  between  Mondragon  and  Bil- 
bao, comprising  the  garrison  of  the  latter  place  ; 
even  then  no  post  would  be  safe  from  a  sudden  at- 
tack. Nearly  all  the  army  of  the  north  was  appro- 
priated to  the  garrisons  and  lines  of  conimunication, 
but  the  divisions  of  Abbe  and  Vandermaesen  could 
be  used  on  the  side  of  ]*ampeluna,  and  there  were 
besides,  disposable,  PaIoiJii>;ni's  Italians  and  the 
divisions  sent  by  Reiiie  But  one  of  these,  Sarrut's, 
was  still  in  march,  and  all  the  sick  of  the  armies  in 
Castile  were  now  pouring  into  Navarre,  when,  from 
the  loss  of  the  contributions,  there  was  no  money  to 
provide  assistance  for  them.  Clauzel  had  however 
ameliorated  both  the  civil  and  the  mil'tary  adminis- 
trations, improved  tiie  works  of  Gueteria,  cciiimenc- 
ed  the  construction  of  block-houses  between  Irun 
and  Vittoria,  and  as  we  have  seen  had  shaken  tie 
bands  about  Bilbao.  Now  dividing  hi.s  forces  he 
destined  Palombini  to  besiege  Castro,  ordering  Foy 
and  Sarrut's  divisions,  when  the  latter  should  arrive 
to  cover  the  operation  and  to  oppose  any  disembark 
at  ion. 

The  field  force  thus  appropriated,  together  with 
the  troops  in  Bilbao  under  Rouget,  was  about  ten 
thousand  men,  and  in  the  midfUe  of  Ai)ril,  Clauzel, 
beating  Mina  from  Taffalla  and  Estella,  assembled 
the  remainder  of  the  active  army,  composed  of  Tau- 
pin's  and  Barbout's  divisions  of  the  army  of  Portu- 
gal, Vandermaesen's  and  Abbe's  divisioKs  of  the  ar- 
my of  the  north,  in  all  about  thirteen  thcufMud  men, 
at  Puent.e  la  Reyna  in  Navarr".  He  urgsd  general 
L'Huil^"'"*,  who  commanded  the  reserve  at  Bayonne, 
to  reinforce  St.  Sebastian  and  Gueteria  and  to  push 
forward  his  troops  of  observation  into  the  valley  of 
Bastan,  and  he  also  gave  the  commandant  of  Zara 
goza  notice  of  his  arrival,  that  he  m.ight  watcl 
Mina  on  that  side.  From  Puente  la  Reyna  ho  made 
some  excursions,  but  he  lost  men  uselosf^ly,  for  the 
Spaniards  would  only  fight  at  advantage,  and  to  hunt 
Mina  without  first  barring  all  his  passages  of  flight, 
was  to  destroy  the  French  soldiers  by  fatigue.  And 
here  the  king's  delay  was  most  seriously  felt,  be- 
cause the  winter  season,  when  the  tops  of  the 
mountains  being  covered  with  sncw,  the  partidas 
could  only  move  along  the  ordinary  roads,  was  most 
favourable  for  the  French  operations,  and  it  had 
passed  away.  Clauzel,  despairing  to  effect  any 
thing  with  so  few  troops,  was  even  going  to  sepa- 
rate his  forces  and  maj  th  to  the  cosBt,  when  in  May 


676 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


[IJOOK    XX. 


Mina,  who  had  t.aken  post  in  the  valley  of  Rental, 
furnished  an  occasion  which  did  not  escape  the 
French  general. 

On  the  i;^tli,  Abbe's  and  Vandermaesen's -divis- 
ions, and  the  cavalry,  entered  t'lat  valley  at  once  by 
the  upper  and  lower  parts,  and  suddenly  closing 
upon  the  guerilla  chief,  killed  and  wounded  a  thou- 
6an<l  of  his  men  and  dispersed  the  rest ;  one  part 
fiad  by  the  mountains  to  Navarquez,  on  the  side  of 
iSangu^ssa,  with  the  wounded,  whom  they  dropped 
at  diiierent  places  in  care  of  the  country  people. 
Cliaplangarra,  Cruchaga,  and  Carena,  IMina's  lieu- 
tenants, went  orf,  each  witii  a  column,  in  the  op- 
posite direction  and  by  dilferent  routes  to  the  valley 
of  the  Aragon  ;  they  passed  tliat  river  at  St.  Gilla, 
and  made  their  way  towards  t!ie  sacred  mountain  of 
La  Pana,  near  Jacca.  The  French  cavalry  follow- 
ing them  by  Villa  Real,  entered  that  town  the  14th 
on  one  side,  while  3Iina,  with  twelve  men,  entered 
it  on  the  other,  but  he  escaped  to  IMartes,  wliere 
another  ineffectual  attempt  v/as  made  to  surprise 
him.  Abbe's  columns  then  descended  the  smaller 
valleys  leading  towards  tlie  upper  valley  of  the  Ara- 
gon, while  Vandermaesen's  infantry  and  the  cavalry 
eijtered  the  lower  part  of  the  same  valley,  and  the 
former  approaching  Jacca  sent  his  wounded  men 
tliere  and  got  fresh  ammunition. 

Meanwhile  Mina  and  the  insurgent  junta,  making 
a  push  to  regain  Navarre  by  the  left  of  the  Aragon 
river,  were  l;ke  to  have  been  taken,  but  again  es- 
caped towards  tlie  valley  of  the  G allege,  whither 
also  the  greater  part  of  their  troops  now  sought  re- 
fuge. Clauzel  v,-as  careful  not  to  force  them  over 
that  river,  lest  they  should  remain  there  and  inter- 
cept the  communication  from  Zaragoza  by  Jacca, 
wliich  was  the  only  free  line  the  French  now  pos- 
sessed, and  too  far  removed  from  Clauzel's  true  the- 
atre of  operations  to  be  watched.  Abbe  therefore 
returned  to  Rental  in  search  of  the  Spanish  depots, 
and  Vandermaesen  entered  Sos  at  one  end,  just  as 
Mina,  who  had  now  one  hundred  and  fifty  horsemen 
and  was  always  intent  upon  regaining  Navarre, 
passed  out  at  the  other  ;  the  light  cavalry  pursuing 
overtook  liim  at  Sos  Fuentes  and  he  fled  to  Carcas- 
tillo,  but  there  unexpectedly  meeting  some  of  his 
own  squadrors,  which  had  wandered  over  the  moun- 
t.iins  after  the  action  at  Ron^i'l,  he  gave  battle,  was 
defe::t3d  with  the  loss  of  fifty  men,  and  fled  once 
more  to  Aragon,  whereupon  tlie  insurrectional  junta 
dispersed,  and  dissensions  arose  between  Mina  and 
the  minor  chiefs  under  his  command.  Clauzel,  anx- 
ious to  increase  this  discord,  sent  troops  into  all  the 
valbys  to  seek  out  the  Siwnish  depots  and  to  attack 
their  scattered  men,  and  he  v/as  well  served  by  the 
Aragonese,  ibr  Suchet's  wise  administration  was 
etill  proof  against  the  insu,rrect;onal  juntas. 

During  these  events  four  battalions  eft  by  Mina 
at  Santa  Cruz  de  Campero,  in  the  Amilscoas,  wore 
chased  by  Taupin,  who  had  remained  at  Fstella 
when  the  other  divisions  marched  up  the  valley  of 
Ron(jil  Mina,  Iiowever,  reassembled  at  Barbastro, 
in  Aragon,  a  strong  column,  crowds  of  deserters 
from  the  other  S[)anish  armies  were  daily  increas- 
ing his  power,  and  so  completely  had  he  organized 
Navarre,  that  the  presence  of  a  single  s(  Idler  of  his 
in  a  village  sufficed  to  have  any  courier  without  a 
strong  escort  stopped.  Many  bands  als(  were  still 
ill  the  Rioja,  and  two  French  regiments  rnshly  forag- 
ing towards  Lerim  were  nearly  all  destroyed.  In 
fine  the  losses  were  well  balanced,  and  Clauzel  de- 
manded more  troops,  especially  cavalry,  to  scour  the 
Rioja.  Nevertheless  the  dispersion  of  .Alina's  troops 
lowered  tiie  reputation  of  tiiat  chief,  and  the  French 
general,  taking  up  his  quartsrs   in   Pampeluna,  so 


improved  this  advantage  by  addrecs  'hat  many  town- 
ships withdrew  from  the  insurrection,  and  recalling 
their  young  men  frcm  the  bsiu't,  commenced  the  for- 
mation of  eiglit  Iree  Spanish  companies  to  serve  on 
tiie  French  side  Corps  of  this  sort  were  raised 
with  so  much  facility  in  every  part  of  Spain,  that 
it  would  seem  nations,  as  well  as  individuals,  have 
an  idiosyncrasy,  and  in  these  cliargeable  warriors 
we  again  see  the  Mandonius  and  Indibilis  of  an- 
cient days. 

Joseph,  urged  by  Clauzel,  now  sent  Maucure'a 
division  and  some  light  cavalry  of  the  army  of  Por- 
tugal, to  occupy  Pampleiga,  Burgos,  and  Br'.viesca, 
and  to  protect  the  great  communication,  wliich  the 
diverging  direction  of  Clauzefs  double  operations 
had  again  exposed  to  the  pallidas.  MeiT.while  the 
French  troops  had  not  been  less  successful  in  Eiscay 
than  in  Navarre.  Foy  reached  Bilbao  tliC  24th  of 
April,  and  finding  all  things  thep  ready  for  thr. 
siege  of  Castro,  marched  to  Santona  to  hat-ten  tl:o 
preparations  at  that  place,  and  he  atti^mpted  also  to 
surprise  the  chiefs  Campillo  and  llerrera,  in  the 
hills  above  Santona,  but  was  v/ortted  ir  the  combat. 
The  two  battering  trains  then  erdcav cured  to  pro- 
ceed from  Bilbao  and  S;pt'-n-i  by  fea  to  Castro,  but 
the  English  vessels,  ccm^ig  to  t!.e  mouth  of  the 
Duraiigo,  stopped  those  a.t  Bilbao,  and  obliged  them 
to  proceed  by  land,  but  thus  gave  an  opportunity  for 
these  at  Santona  to  make  the  sea-run  in  salety. 

SIEGE    OF    CASTRO. 

This  place,  situated  en  a  promontory,  was  garri- 
soned by  twelve  hundred  men,  under  the  ccmmand 
of  Don  Pedro  Alvarez  ;  three  English  sloops  of  war, 
commanded  by  the  captains  Eloye,  Bremen,  and 
Tnyler,  were  at  hand,  some  gun-boats  were  in  the 
harbour,  and  twenty-seven  guns  were  mounted  on 
the  works.  An  outward  wall,  with  towers,  extend- 
ed from  sea  to  sea  on  the  low  neck  v.hich  connected 
the  promontory  with  the  main  land  ;  this  lire  of  de- 
fence was  strengthened  by  some  fortifi' d  convents, 
behind  it  came  the  town,  and  behind  the  town,  at 
the  extremity  of  the  promontory,  stood  the  castle. 

On  the  4th  of  May,  Foy,  Sarrut,  end  Palnmbini, 
took  post  at  difierent  points  to  cover  tie  siege  ;  tlie 
Italian  general  St.  Paul  invested  the  place;  the  en- 
gineer "S'acani  conducted  the  works,  having  twelve 
guns  P.t  his  disposal.  The  defence  was  l.vely  and 
vigorous,  and  captain  Tayler,  with  great  l;;bcur, 
landed  a  heavy  ship-gun  on  a  rocky  islai.-d  to  the 
riglit  of  the  town,  looking  from  the  sea,  which  he 
worked  with  efiect  against  the  French  counter-bat- 
teries. On  the  11th,  a  second  gun  was  mount- 
ed on  this  island  ;  but  that  day  the  brcr.chirg  bnt- 
teries  opened,  and  in  a  few  hours  broke  the  wall, 
while  the  counter-batteries  tet  fire  to  seme  houses 
with  shells,  wherefore  the  English  guns  were  re- 
moved from  the  island.  Tlie  assault  was  tl'.en  or- 
dered, but  delayed  by  a  sudden  accident,  for  a  forrg-* 
ing  party  having  been  sent  into  the 'hills,  came  fly- 
ing back  pursued  by  a  column  of  Sj>aniards,  which 
had  passed  unpcrceived  thn  ugh  the  positions  of  the 
French  ;  and  the  besiegers  were  for*  some  time  in 
confusion,  as  thinking  the  covering  army  had  been 
beaten  ;  however,  tliey  soon  recovered,  and  the  as- 
sault and  escalade  took  place  in  the  night. 

The  attack  was  rapid  and  fierce;  the  walls  were 
carried,  and  the  garrison  driven  through  the  town 
to  the  castle,  which  was  maintained  by  two  comi>an- 
ies,  while  the  flying  troops  got  on  hoard  the  English 
vessels  ;  finally  tl:e  Italians  stormed  the  cas*.lc,  but 
every  gun  had  been  destroyed,  and  the  iwo  compan- 
ies safely  rojoined  their  couiitrymen  on  board  the 
ships,     i'he  English  had  ten  seamen  wounded,  the 


1813.J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


577 


Spaniards  lost  about  a  hundred  and  eighty,  and  the 
remainder  were  immediately  conveyed  to  Bermco, 
from  whence  they  marched  inland  to  join  Longa. 
'J'he  bes'Bgers  lost  only  lifty  men  killed  and  wound- 
ed, and  tlu  Italian  soldiers  committed  great  excess- 
es, setting  fire  to  the  town  in  many  places.  Foy 
and  Sarrut,  separating  after  the  siege,  marched,  the 
former  through  the  district  of  Incartaciones  to  Bil- 
bao, defeating  a  battalion  of  Biscay  volunteers  on 
his  route;  the  latter  to  Urdufia,  with  the  design  of 
destroying  Longa  ;  but  that  chief  crossed  the  Ebro 
at  Puente  Lara,  and  finding  the  additional  troops 
eent  by  Jos3ph  were  beginning  to  arrive  in  the  vi- 
cinity of  Burgos,  recrossed  the  river,  and  after  a 
lonf  chase,  escaped  in  the  mountains  of  Espinosa. 
Sarrut,  having  captured  a  few  gun-carriages  and  one 
of  Longa's  forest  depots  of  ammunition,  returned 
towards  Bilbao,  and  Foy  immediately  marched  from 
that  place  against  the  two  remaining  battalions  of 
D;scay  volunteer^,  wliich,  under  the  chiefs  Mugarte- 
gui  and  Artola,  were  now  at  Villaro  and  Guernica. 

These  battalions,  each  a  thousand  strong,  raised 
by  conscription,  and  officered  from  the  best  families, 
we  e  the  champions  of  Biscay  ;  but  though  brave 
and  well-equipped,  the  difficulty  of  crushing  iliem 
and  the  volunteers  of  Guipuscoa,  was  not  great,  be- 
cause nether  would  leave  tlieir  own  peculiar  prov- 
inces. The  third  battalion  had  been  already  dis- 
persed in  the  district  of  Incartaciones,  and  Foy, 
having  in  the  night  of  the  29th,  combined  the  march 
of  several  columns  to  surround  Yillaro,  fell  at  day- 1 
break  upon  3Iugartegui's  battalion,  and  dispersed  it  | 
with  the  loss  of  all  its  baggage.  Two  hundred  of  ) 
the  volunteers  immediately  returned  to  their  homes,  j 
and  tiie  French  general  marched  rapidly,  th'rough 
Durango,  against  Artola,  who  was  at  Guernica. 
The  Italians,  who  were  still  at  Bilbao,  immediately 
turned  Guernica  on  the  west  by  IVIungia,  while  a 
Frsnch  column  turned  it  eastward  by  Marquinez; 
then  Artola  fled  to  Lequito,  but  the  column  from 
Marquinez  coming  over  the  mountain,  fell  upon  his 
rijht  flank  just  as  he  was  defiling  by  a  narrow  way 
along  the  sea-coast.  Artola  himself  escaped,  but 
two  hundred  Biscayens  were  killed  or  drou'ned  ;  more 
than  three  hundred,  with  twenty-seven  officers,  were 
taken,  and  two  companies,  which  formed  his  rear- 
guard, dispersed  in  the  mountains,  and  some  men, 
finding  a  few  boats,  rowed  to  an  English  vessel.  The 
perfect  success  of  this  action,  which  did  not  cost  the 
French  a  man  killed  or  wounded,  was  attributed  to 
the  talents  and  vigour  of  captain  Guingret,  the  dar- 
ing officer  who  won  the  passage  of  the  Douro  at 
Tordesillas,  in  Wellington's  retreat  from  Burgos. 

When  the  three  battalions  of  Biscay  were  thus 
disposed  of,  all  their  magazines,  hospitals,  and  de- 
pots f-^U  into  Foy's  hands  ;  the  junta  dispersed,  the 
privatesrs  quitted  the  coast  for  Santander,  Pastor 
abandoned  Guipuscoa,  and  the  Italians  recovered 
,^9rmeo,  from  which  the  garrison  fl:'d  to  the  English 
sliips.  Tiiey  also  destroyed  the  works  of  the  little 
islmd  of  Isi'ro,  which,  being  situated  three  thousand 
yards  from  tlie  shore,  and  having  no  access  to  the 
eumrnit,  save  by  a  staircase  cut  in  the  rock,  was 
deemed  impregnable,  and  used  as  a  depot  for  the 
English  stores  ;  but  this  was  the  last  memorable  ex- 
ploit of  Palomhini's  division  in  the  north.  That 
g3neral  himself  had  already  gone  to  Italy  to  join 
Napoleon's  reserves,  and  h's  troops  being  ordered  to 
march  by  Aragon  to  join  Suchet,  were  in  movement 
w'len  new  events  caused  them  to  remain  in  Guipus- 
coj,  with  the  reputation  of  being  brave  and  active 
bit  Pirocious  soldiers,  barbarous  rnd  devastating, 
difr^ri ng  little  froui  their  Roman  nncettors. 

It  has  been  alroa-'y  observed  that,  curing  these! 
38 


double  operations  of  the  French  on  the  coaet  and  in 
Navarre,  the  partidas  had  fallen  upon  the  line  of 
communication  with  France,  tiius  working  out  the 
third  branch  of  the  insurrectional  warfare.  'J'lieir 
success  went  nigh  to  balance  all  tlieir  losses  on  each 
flank.  For  Mendizabel  settled  with  Longa's  parti- 
da  upon  tlie  line  between  Burgcs  and  IMiranda  de 
Ebro;  the  volunteers  of  Alava  and  Biscay,  and  pait 
of  Pastor's  bands,  concentrated  on  the  mountains  of 
Arlaban  above  tlie  defiles  of  Salinas  and  Descarga ; 
Merino  and  Salazar  came  up  from  the  country  be- 
tween the  Ebro  and  tlie  Duero  ;  and  the  three  bat- 
talions left  by  Mina  in  tlie  Amescoa,  after  etcoping 
from  Taupin,  reassembled  close  to  Vittoria.  Every 
convoy  and  every  courier's  escort  was  attacked  at 
one  or  other  of  these  points,  without  hindering  Men- 
dizabel from  making  sudden  descents  towards  the 
coast  when  occasion  offered.  Thus,  on  the  Uth  of 
April,  as  we  have  seen,  he  attacked  Bilbao.  On  thn 
25th  of  April,  Longa,  who  had  four  tliousand  men 
and  several  guns,  was  repulsed  at  Armifiion,  between 
]\Iiranda  and  Trevino,  by  some  of  the  drafted  men 
going  to  France;  but  on  the  third  of  IMay,  at  tho 
same  place,  Longa  met  and  obliged  a  large  convoy, 
coming  from  Castile  witli  an  escort  of  eigiit  Imn- 
dred  men,  to  return  to  Miranda,  and  even  canncnt'- 
ded  that  place  on  the  5th.  Thouvenot,  the  com- 
mandant of  the  government,  immediately  detached 
twelve  hundred  men  and  three  guns  from  Vittoria  to 
relieve  the  convoy  ;  but  then  Mina's  battalions  en- 
deavoured to  escalade  Salvatierra,  and  they  were  re- 
pulsed with  difficulty.  Meanwhile  the  voluntccra 
of  Alava  gathered  above  the  pass  cf  Salinas  to  inter 
cept  the  rescued  convoy,  and  finding  that  the  latter 
would  not  stir  from  Vittoria,  they  went  on  tl;e  I(  tli 
to  aid  in  a  fresh  attack  on  Salvatierra  ;  being  again 
repulsed,  they  returned  to  the  Arlaban,  v/here  they 
captured  a  courier  w'ith  a  strong  escort,  in  the  pats 
of  Descarga,  near  Villa  Real.  A  French  reg'mer.t, 
sent  to  succour  Salvatierra,  finally  drove  these  vol- 
unteers towards  Bilbao,  where,  as  we  have  seen,  Foy 
routed  them  ;  but  Longa  continued  to  iniest  the  post 
of  Armifiion,  until  Sarrut,  arriving  from  the  siega 
of  Castro,  chased  him  also. 

Notwithstanding  these  successes,  Clauzel,  wl  cse 
troops  were  worn  down  with  fatigue,  declared  thet 
it  would  require  fifty  thous?.nd  men  and  three  mcntha 
time  to  quell  the  insurrection  entirely.  And  >.'apo- 
leon,  more  discontented  than  ever  with  the  king, 
complained  that  the  happy  enterprises  of  Clauzel, 
Foy,  Sarrut,  and  Palombini,  had  brought  no  safety 
to  his  couriers  and  convoys  ;  that  his  orders  about 
the  posts  and  the  infantry  escorts  had  been  neglect- 
ed ;  that  the  reinforcements  sent  to  the  north  from 
Castile  had  gone  slowly  and  in  succession,  instead 
of  at  once ;  finally,  that  the  cautious  movement  cf 
concentration  by  the  other  armies,  was  inexcusable, 
since  the  inaction  of  the  allies,  their  distance,  their 
want  of  transport,  their  ordinary  and  even  timid  cir- 
cumspection in  any  operation  out  of  tlie  ordinary 
course,  enabled  the  French  to  act  in  the  most  con- 
venient manner.  Tlie  growing  dissensions  between 
the  English  nnd  the  Spaniards,  the  journey  of  Wel- 
lington to  Cadiz,  and  the  changes  in  h's  army,  were, 
he  said,  all  favourable  circumstances  for  the  P'rench, 
but  the  king  had  taken  no  advantage  of  them;  the 
insurrection  continued,  and  the  object  cf  interest 
was  now  changed.  Joseph  defended  himself  with 
more  vehemence  than  reason  against  these  chnrgee, 
but  Well'ngton  soon  vindicated  Napoleon's  judg- 
ment, and  the  voice  cf  controversy  was  smothered 
by  the  din  of  b?t':le,  for  th)  Engl'sh  general  was 
nga^n  abroad  in  his  strength,  and  the  chug  of  his 
"rms  '■osounded  through  the  Peninsula 


578 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


L  Book  XX. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

WellinsTton  re«forps  the  ciisripline  of  the  allicH  arniv — Rela- 
tiv»-  sirtnith  of  th«  bf  lli,Ti  enl  f.)n-fc< — VVellin^jtoiVj  pl.nis 
describtfil — Lui\l  VV.  Beniinrk  a^ain  j3iO|)Oses  toiinailc  Italy 
—  Wrlliii^ioii  (ip;io-eN  it — Tlie  0|)eniri!i  ot  thi:  caiii|K;ij;ii  dt - 
la_\  e  I  i)v  t.'if  uratiier — Siate  of  the  Frenrh  ar.iiy — lU  aiove- 
iiieiits  previous  t)  the  opening  of  llie  cmnpaigi). 

WiiiLK  the  Frer.o.i  power  in  Spain  was  being  dis- 
organized by  the  various  circumstances  related  in  the 
former  chapter,  lord  Wellington's  diligence  and  en- 
ergy had  reorganized  the  allied  army  with  greater 
strength  than  before.  Large  reinforcements,  espe- 
cially of  cavalry,  had  come  out  from  England.  The 
efficiency  and  the  spirit  of  the  Portuguese  had  been 
restored  in  a  surprising  manner,  and  discipline  had 
been  vindicated,  in  both  services,  with  a  rough  but 
salutary  hand ;  rank  had  not  screened  cflenders  ; 
eome  had  been  arrested,  some  tried,  some  dismissed 
for  breach  of  duty  ;  the  negligent  were  terrified,  the 
zealous  encouraged;  in  short,  every  department  was 
reformed  with  vigour,  and  it  was  full  time.  Confi- 
dential officers,  commissioned  to  detect  abuses  in  the 
general  hospitals  and  depots,  those  asylums  for  mal- 
ingerers, discovered  and  drove  so  many  skulkers  to 
their  duty,  that  the  second  division  alone,  recovered 
six  hundred  bayonets  in  one  month  ;  and  this  salu- 
tary scouring  was  rendered  more  efficient  by  the  es- 
lAblishment  of  both  permanent  and  ambulent  regi- 
mental hospitals,  a  wise  measure,  and  founded  on  a 
principle  which  cannot  be  too  widely  extended;  for 
It  is  certain,  that  as  the  character  of  a  battalion  de- 
pends ou  its  fitness  for  service,  a  moral  force  will 
always  be  brought  to  bear  upon  the  execution  of  or- 
ders under  regimental  control,  which  it  is  in  vain  to 
look  for  elsewhere. 

The  Douro  had  been  rendered  navip'able  as  high 
jp  ^s  Castillo  de  Alva,  above  the  contiuence  of  the 
Agueda  ;  a  pontoon  train  of  thirty-five  pieces  had 
been  formed  ;  carts  of  a  peculiar  construction  had 
been  built  to  repair  the  great  loss  of  mules  during 
the  retreat  from  Burgos,  and  a  recruit  of  these  ani- 
mals was  ulso  obtained  by  emissaries,  who  purchas- 
ed them  with  English  merchandise,  even  at  Mad- 
rid, un:lor  the  beards  of  the  enemy,  and  at  the  very 
time  v,-hen  Clauzel  was  unable,  for  want  of  trans- 
port to  fill  the  magazines  of  Burgos.  The  ponder- 
ous iron  camp-kettles  of  the  soldiers  had  been  laid 
aside  for  lighter  vessels  carried  by  men,  the  mules 
being  destined  to  carry  tents  instead;  it  is,  howev- 
er, doubtful  if  these  tents  were  really  useful  on  a 
march  in  wet  weather,  because  when  soaked  they 
became  too  heavy  for  the  animal,  and  seldom  arrived 
in  time  for  use  at  the  end  of  a  march.  Their  great- 
est advantage  was  found  when  the  soldiers  halted  for 
a  few  days.  Besides  these  amendments  many  other 
changes  and  improvements  had  taken  place,  and  the 
Anglo-Portuguese  troops,  conscious  of  a  superior  or- 
ganization, v/ere  more  proudly  confident  than  ever, 
while  the  French  v/ere  again  depressed  by  intelli- 
gence of  the  defection  of  the  Prussians,  following  on 
the  disasters  in  Russia.  Nor  had  the  English  gen- 
eral faiJsd  to  amend  the  condition  of  those  Spanish 
troops  v/liich  the  cortes  had  placed  at  his  disposal. 
By  a  strict  and  jealous  watcii  over  the  application 
of  the  rubsidy,  he  had  kept  them  clothed  and  fed 
during  the  winter,  and  now  reaped  the  benefit,  by 
having''  several  powerful  bodies  fit  to  act  in  conjunc- 
tion wit!i  his  own  forces.  Wherefore,  being  thus 
prepared,  he  was  anxious  to  strike,  anxious  to  fore- 
Btall  the  effects  of  his  Portuguese  political  difficul- 
ties, as  well  as  to  keep  pace  with  Napoleon's  efforts 
in  Germany,  and  his  army  was  ready  to  take  tlic 
field  in  April;  but  he  could  not  concentrate  before 
the  groon  fjrage  was  fit  for  use,  and  deferred  the 


execution  of  his  plan  until  May.  What  that  plan 
was,  and  what  the  means  for  executing  it,  shall  now 
be  shewn. 

The  relative  strength  of  the  contending  armies  in 
the  Peninsula  was  no  longer  in  favour  of  the  Freiicii. 
Their  force,  which,  at  tlie  termination  of  ^^'elling 
ton's  retreat  into  Portugal,  was  above  two  hundred 
and  sixty  thousand  men  and  tliirty-two  thcus^and 
horses,  two  hundred  and  sixteen  thousand  being 
present  with  the  eagles,  was,  by  the  loss  in  subse- 
quent operations,  and  by  drafts  for  the  arniy  in 
Germany,  reduced  in  March,  1813,  to  two  hundred 
and  thirty-one  thousand  men  and  twenty-nine  thou- 
sand horses.  Thirty  thoueand  of  these  were  in  hos- 
pital, and  only  one  hundred  and  ninety-seven  thou- 
sand men,  including  the  reserve  at  Bayonne,  were 
present  with  the  eagles.  Of  this  number  sixty- 
eight  thousand,  including  sick,  were  in  Aragon, 
Catalonia,  and  Valencia.  The  remainder,  witii  the 
exception  of  t!ie  ten  thousand  left»  at  iMadrid,  were 
distributed  on  the  northern  line  of  communication, 
from  the  Tormes  to  Bayonne,  and  it  has  been  alrea- 
dy shewn  how  scattered  and  how  occupied. 

But  Wellington  had  so  well  used  the  five  months' 
cessation  of  active  operations,  that  nearly  tv.o  hun- 
dred thousand  allied  troops  were  ready  to  take  tlie 
field,  and  on  each  flank  there  was  a  Britit-h  fleet, 
now  a  more  etTcctive  aid  than  before,  because  the 
French  lines  of  retreat  run  parallel  to,  and  near  the 
sea-coast  on  each  side  of  Spain,  and  every  part 
opened  by  the  advance  of  the  allies  wculd  furnish 
a  fresh  depot  for  the  subsistence  of  tlieir  armies 
This  mass  of  troops  was  composed  in  the  following 
manner. 

The  first  army,  under  Copons,  nominally  ten  thou 
sand,  really  about  six  thousand  strong,  was  in  Cata 
Ionia. 

The  second  army,  under  Elio,  was  in  Murcia 
about  twenty  thousand,  including  the  divisions  of 
Villa  Campa,  Bassecour,  Duran,  and  Empecinado. 

The  Anglo-Sicilian  army,  under  Murray,  neai 
Alicant,  about  sixteen  thousand. 

The  third  army,  under  Del  Parque,  in  the  More- 
na,  about  twelve  thousand. 

The  first  army  of  reserve,  under  the  conde  d'Abia 
pa],  in  Andalusia,  about  fifteen  thousand. 

The  fourth  army,  under  Castafios,  which  includec 
the  Spanish  divisions  in  Estremadura,  .Tulicn  San- 
chez' partida,  and  the  Gallicians  under  Giron,  the 
Asturians  under  Porlier  and  Barcena,  togetlier  with 
the  partidas  of  Longa  and  Mina,  likewise  belonged 
to  this  army  and  were  mustered  amongst  its  divis 
ions.  This  army  was  computed  at  forty  thousand 
men,  to  which  may  be  added  the  minor  bands  and 
volunteers  in  various  parts. 

Lastly,  there  was  tlie  noble  Anglo-Portuguese  ar- 
my, which  now  furnished  more  than  seventy  thou- 
sand fighting  men,  with  ninety  pieces  of  artillery; 
and  the  real  difference  between  the  French  and  the 
allies  was  greater  than  the  apparent  difi'erence 
The  French  returns  included  officers,  sergear.ta 
drummers,  artillery-men,  engineers,  and  waggoners, 
whereas  the  allies'  numbers  were  all  sabres  and 
bayonets.  Moreover,  this  statement  of  the  French 
number  was  on  the  ITith  of  March,  and  as  there 
were  drafts  made  by  Napoleon  after  thst  ;  eriod,  and 
as  Clauzel  and  Foy's  losses,  and  the  reserves  at  Ba 
yonne,  must  be  deducted,  it  would  be  probtihly  more 
correct  to  assume  that  the  whole  number  of  sabrca 
and  bayonets  in  June,  was  not  more  than  one  hun- 
dred and  sixty  thousand,  of  which  one  hundred  and 
ten  thousand  were  on  the  northern  line  of  invasion. 

The  campaign  of  1812  had  taught  the    EngliRh- 
general  the  strength  of  the  French  lines  of  defence, 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


579 


especially  on  the  Diiero,  wliich  they  had  since  en- 
trenc.had  in  dirterent  parts,  and  most  of  the  bridges 
over  it  he  iiad  liiinself  destroyed  in  his  retreat.  But 
for  many  reasons,  it  was  not  advisable  to  operate  in 
tlie  central  provinces  of  !5pain  The  country  there 
was  oxliausted,  the  lines  of  supply  woul^l  be  longer 
and  more  exposed,  the  army  thrther  removed  from  the 
Bsa,  the!  Gallicians  could  not  be  easily  brought  down 
to  co-oj)erate,  the  services  of  the  northern  partidas 
would  not  hi  so  advantageous,  and  the  ultimate  re- 
ei'.lt  would  ba  less  decisive  than  operations  against 
th3  great  line  of  communication  with  France  ; 
wherefore,  against  the  northern  provinces  he  had 
early  resolved  to  direct  his  attack,  and  had  well 
considered  how  to  evade  those  lines  wliich  he  could 
scarcely  hope  to  force. 

All  the  enemy's  defences  on  the  Lower  Duero 
could  b2  turned,  by  a  movement  on  the  right,  across 
tiie  Upper  Tormes,  and  from  thence,  skirting  the 
mountains  towards  the  Upper  Duero  ;  but  that  line, 
although  most  consonant  to  the  rules  of  art,  because 
tlio  army  would  thus  be  kept  in  one  mass,  led 
tiirough  a  very  difhcult  and  wasted  country  ;  the  di- 
rect aid  of  the  Gallicians  must  have  been  dispensed 
witli,  and,  moreover,  it  was  there  the  French  look- 
ed for  the  allies.  Hence,  Wellington  resolved  not 
to  operate  by  his  right,  and  with  great  skill  and 
dexterity  he  had,  by  the  disposition  of  his  troops  in 
winter-quarters,  by  false  reports  and  false  move- 
metit.5,  uiasked  his  real  intentions.  For  the  gather- 
ing of  the  partidas  in  the  valley  of  the  Tagus,  the 
demonstrations  made  in  Estremadura  and  La  Man- 
cha  by  Penne  Villemur,  Morillo  and  Del  Parque's 
army,  together  with  the  presence  of  Hill  at  Coria, 
that  general's  hold  of  the  passes  of  I5ejar,  and  the 
magazines  formed  there,  all  intimated  a  design  of 
moving  either  by  the  valley  of  the  Tagus  or  by  the 
dii-trict  of  Avila;  and  the  great  magazines  collected 
ai  Celerjco,  Viseu,  Penamacor,  Almeida,  and  Ciu- 
dad  Rodrigo,  in  no  manner  belied  the  other  indica- 
tions. Bat  half  the  army,  widely  cantoned  in  the 
interior  of  Portugal,  apparently  for  the  sake  of  sub- 
sistenca  or  health,  was  really  so  placed  as  to  be  in 
tiie  direction  of  the  true  line  of  operations,  v/hich 
was  by  the  leil  through  the  Tras  os  Montes. 

Woiiington's  [dan  was  to  pass  the  Duero,  within 
th3  Portuguese  frontier,  with  a  part  of  his  army  ;  to 
ascend  the  right  bank  of  that  river  towards  Zamora, 
(iiiit  then,  crossing  the  i^^sla,  to  unite  v/ith  the  Gal- 
lician  forces,  while  the  remainder  of  the  army,  ad- 
vancing from  the  Agueda,  forced  the  passage  of  the 
Tormes.  By  this  great  movement,  which  he  hoped 
to  effect  so  suddenly  that  the  king  would  not  have 
lime  to  concentrate  the  French  armies  in  opposi- 
tion, the  front  of  the  allies  would  be  changed  to 
thjir  riglit,  the  Duero  and  the  Pisuerga  would  be 
timed,  and  the  enemy  forced  in  confusion  over  the 
Carion.  Then,  with  his  powerful  army  well  in  iiand, 
the  English  general  could  mnrch  in  advance  with- 
oiit  fear,  strong  enough  to  fight  and  strong  enough 
to  turn  the  right  flank  of  any  position  which  the 
French  might  take  up  ;  and  v/ith  this  advantage  al- 
so, that  at  each  step  he  would  gain  additional  help 
jy  the  junction  of  the  irreginar  Spanish  forces,  until 
he  gave  his  hand  to  the  insurgents  in  Biscay,  and 
every  port  opened  would  furnish  him  a  new  depot 
8m1  magazines. 

But  in  executing  this  movement  the  army  would 
net;3ssarily  bo  divided  into  three  separate  divisions, 
each  too  weak  to  beat  the  whole  French  force  sin- 
gly ;  tlie  in8.rch  of  the  centre  division,  by  the  Tras  os 
Monte?,  upon  the  nice  execution  of  which  the  con- 
centration of  the  whole  deoeiided,  would  be  through 
an  eiitroiuely  dilfuult  aud  mountainous  couiit'y,  and 


tiiere  were  three  great  rivers  to  pars.     The  opera- 
tion was,  therefore,  one  of  extreme  dolic;  <  y,  requir- 
ing nice  and  extensive  afiai  gemei  ts  ;  jet  there  was 
not  much  danger  to  be  apprehended    in  m    failure; 
because,  as  each  separate  corps  hud  a  stroj-ig  coun- 
try to  retire  upon,  the  probable  extent  of  the  m.'8 
chief  would  only  be  the  loss  of  time,  and  the  disad- 
vantage of  pursuing  other  operations  wl.en  tl;e  har- 
vest, being   ripe,  the  French  could  easily  keep  in 
masses.     The   secret,  then,  was  to   hide  the    true 
plan  as  long  as  poss^Ujle,  to  gain  seme  marclies  for 
tlie   centre    corps,  ami    by  all    menns    to    keep   the 
French  so  scattered  and  occupied  by  minor  crmbi- 
nations,  that  they  should   be  unable  to  nssemble  in 
time  to  profit  from   their  central    positions.     Now 
the    bridge   equipage,  being  j)reparcd    at  Abrantea 
in  the  interior  of  Portugal,  was  unkrown,  ami  gave 
no    intimation  of  the  real  design,  for  tlse  bullocks 
which  drew  it  came  with  cars  from  Spain  to  1  ame- 
go,  and  from  thence  went  down  to  Abrantes;  the 
free  navigation  of  the  Douro  up  to  the  i^gucda  was 
more  conducive  to  a  movement  by  the  r:ght,  and  it 
furnislied  abundance  of  large    boats  w'herewiih    to 
pass  that  river,  without  creating  any  suspicion  from 
their  presence  ;  the  wide  cantonments  cf  the  allies 
permitted  various  changes  of  quarters  under  the  pre- 
tence of  sickness,  and   the    trocps    thus    grachially 
closed  upon  the  Douro,  within  the  Portuguese  fron 
tier,  unobserved  of  the  enemy,  who  wes    likewise 
deceived  by  many  reports  purj.'osely  spread  abroad. 
The  menacing  head  which  Hill,  and  the  Spaniards 
in  southern  Estremsidura  and  Andalusia,  carried  to- 
wards  the    valley   of  the   Tagus,  and   towards    the 
Avila  district,  also  contributed  to  draw  the  enen-y's 
attention  away  from  the  true  point  of  danger;  tut 
more  than   all   other   things,  the   vigorous    excite- 
ment of  the  insurrection  in  the  north  occupied  the 
French,   scattered    their   forces,   and   rendered    the 
success  of  the  English  general's  phn  nearly  certain. 
Neither  did  lord  Wellington   fail  to  give  amjile 
employment  to  Suchet's  forces,  for  his  wings  were 
spread  for  a  long  flight,  even  to  the  Pyrennees,  and 
he  had  no  desire  to  find  that  marshal's  army  joined 
with  the   other  French  forces   on   the  Ebro.     The 
lynx  eyes  of  Napoleon  had  scanned  this  point  of  war 
also,  and  both  the  king  and  Glnuzel  had  received  or- 
ders to  establish  the  shortest  and  most  certain  line 
of  correspondence  possible  with  Suchet,  bees  use  the 
emperor's  plan  contemplated  the  arrival  of  the  army 
of  Aragon  in  the  north,  but  Wellington  furnished  a 
task    for    it   elsewhere.     Sir  John   Murray,   as   we 
have  seen,  had  just  repulsed  the  French  at  Caslalla, 
and  general  Frcre's  cavalry  had  joined  the  Andelu- 
sian  reserve  under  Abispal.  but  Flio,  with  tbe  third 
army,  remained  near  Alicant,  and  Wellington  des- 
tined Del  Parque's  army  to  join  him.     Tliis,  with 
the  Anglo-Sicilian  army,  made  more  than  filly  tliru- 
sand  men,  including  the  divisions  of  Durai-i,  Vilhi 
Campa,  the    Empecinado,  and   other  part-zars,  al- 
ways lying  on  Suchet's  right  flank  and  rear.     P.'ow, 
with  such  a  force,  or  even  half  this  number  of  good 
troops,  the  sim];lest  plan  would  have  been  to  turn 
Suchet's  right  flank  and  bring  him  to  action  with 
his  back  to  the  sea;  but  the  Spanish  armies  were 
not    efficient    for    such  work,  and   Wellington's  in- 
structions were  adapted  to  the  actual  circumstances. 
To  wMn  the  open  part  of  the  kingdom,  to  obtain  a 
permanent  footing  on  the   coast  beyond  the   Ebro, 
and  to  force  the  enemy  from  the  lower  line  of  that 
river,  by  acting  in  conjunction  with  the  Catalans, 
these  were  the  three  objects  which  V/ellington  pro 
posed  to  reach,  and  in  tlie  ibllc'wing  manner.     Biur 
ray  was  to  sail  against  T:>ragoi.a  ;  to  save  it  Suchet 
would  have  to  weaken  his  army  in  Valencia ;  Elio 


580 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[13ooK  XX. 


and  "DA  Parque  niijht  then  seize  that  kingdom.  If" 
Tarai^ona  fjll,  good.  It* the  French  proved  too  strong 
Murray  could  return  instantly  by  sea,  and  secure 
possession  of  the  country  gained  by  the  Spanish 
gijn^rals.  These  last  were,  however,  to  remain 
Btnctly  on  the  defensive  until  31urray's  operations 
drew  Suchet  awuy,  for  they  were  not  able  to  fight 
alone,  and  above  all  things,  it  was  necessary  to 
avoid  a  defeat,  which  would  leave  the  French  gen- 
eral free  to  move  to  the  aid  of  tiie  king. 

The  force  necessary  to  atti^k  Taragona,  Welling- 
ton judged  at  ten  thousand,  and  if  Murray  could  not 
embark  that  number  there  was  anotiier  mode  of  ope- 
rating. Some  Spanisli  divisions,  to  go  by  sea,  were 
then  to  reinforce  Copons  in  Catalonia,  and  enable 
him  to  hold  the  country  between  Taragona,  Torto- 
za,  and  Lerida;  meanwhile  Murray  and  Elio  were 
to  advance  against  Suchet  in  front,  and  Del  Parque, 
in  conjunction  with  the  Portuguese  troops,  to  turn 
his  right  flnnk  by  liequena  ;  and  this  operation  was 
to  be  repeated  until  the  allies  communicated  with 
Copons  by  J,lieir  left,  the  partizans  advancing  in 
proportion  and  cutting  off  all  communication  with 
the  nortiiern  parts  of  Spain.  Thus,  in  either  case. 
Such3t  would  be  kept  away  from  the  Upper  Ebro, 
and  there  was  no  reason  to  expect  any  interruption 
from  that  Quarter. 

But  Wellinjfton  was  not  aware  that  the  infantry  of 
t!i3  army  of  Portugal  were  beyond  tlie  Ebro  ;  the 
spies,  deceived  by  the  multitude  of  detachments 
passing  in  and  out  of  the  Peninsula,  supposed  the 
divisions  which  reinforced  Clauzel  to  be  fresh  con- 
Bcripts  from  France  ;  the  arrangements  for  the  open- 
ing of  the  campaign  were,  therefore,  made  in  the 
expectation  of  meeting  a  very  powerful  force  in  Le- 
on. Hence  Freire's  cavalry,  and  the  Andalusian  re- 
serve under  the  conde  de  Abisjial,  received  orders 
to  march  upon  Almaraz,  to  pass  th(^  Tagus  there  by 
a  pontoon  bridge  wliicli  was  established  for  them, 
and  then,  crossing  tlie  Gredos  by  IJejar  or  Mombel- 
tran,  to  march  upon  Valladolid,  while  the  partidas 
of  that  quarter  should  harass  the  inarch  of  Leval 
from  Madrid.  Meanwhile  the  Spanish  troops  in  Es- 
tremadura  were  to  join  those  forces  on  the  Agueda 
which  were  destined  to  force  the  passage  of  the 
Torraes.  The  Gallicians,  under  Giron,  were  to 
come  down  to  the  Esla,  and  unite  with  the  corps 
destined  to  pass  tliat  river  and  turn  the  line  of  the 
Duero.  Thus  seventy  thousand  Portuguese  and 
British,  eight  thousand  Spaniards  from  Estremadu- 
ra,  and  twelve  thousand  Gallicians,  tliat  is  to  say, 
ninety  thousand  figliting  men  would  be  suddenly 
placed  on  a  new  front,  and  marching  abreast  against 
the  surprised  and  separated  masses  of  the  enemy, 
would  drive  tliem  refluent  to  the  Pyrennees.  A 
grand  design,  and  grandly  it  was  executed!  For 
high  in  lieart,  and  strong  of  hand,  Wellington's  vet- 
ei-ans  marclied  to  tlie  encounter;  the  glories  of 
twelve  victories  played  about  their  bayonets,  and 
he,  the  leader  so  proud  and  confident,  that  in  pass- 
ing the  stream  wiiich  marks  tiie  frontier  of  Spain, 
he  rose  in  his  stirrups,  and,  waving  iiis  hand,  cried 
out  "  Farewell,  Portugal !  " 

Hut  while  straining  every  nerve,  and  eager  to 
strike,  as  well  to  escape  from  the  Portuguese  poli- 
tics as  to  kee|)  pace  with  Napnljon's  etibrts  in  Ger- 
many, the  English  general  was  mortified  by  having 
again  to  <liscuss  the  question  of  a  descent  on  Italy, 
lord  William  IJentinck  had  relinquislied  his  views 
ii'ion  tliat  country  with  great  reluctance,  and  now, 
tliinkiiig  allairs  more  fivourable  tlriri  ever,  atrain 
proposed  to  land  at  Naples,  and  put  iorwTrd  the  diik? 
of  Orleans  or  the  arch-.luke  Francis.  Hi  urged  in 
favjur  of  this  proje:-t  t;:e   we-.k  tiziz  ol"  Mural's 


kingdom,  the  favourable  disposition  of  the  inhabit- 
ants, tlie  oiler  of  fitleen  thousand  auxiliary  Rus- 
sians made  by  admiral  Greig,the  slicck  wiiicli  would 
be  given  to  Napoleon's  power,  and  tiie  more  eliec- 
tual  diversion  in  favour  of  Spain.  He  supported  his 
opinion  by  an  intercepted  letter  of  tiie  queen  of  Na- 
ples to  iSaj)oleon,  and  by  other  autlientic  documents, 
and  tiius,  at  tlie  moment  of  execution,  Wellingtoira 
vast  plans  were  to  be  disarranged  to  meet  a  new 
scheme  of  war  which  he  had  already  discussed  and 
disapproved  of,  and  which,  however  promising  in 
itself,  would  inevitably  divide  tlie  power  of  Eng- 
land and  weaken  the  operations  in  botli  countries. 

His  reply  was  decisive.  His  opinion  on  tlie  state 
of  affairs  in  Sicily  was,  he  said,  not  changed,  by  the 
intercepted  letters,  as  3Iurat  evidently  thouglii  him- 
self strong  enough  to  attack  the  allies.  Lord  Wil- 
liam Hentinck  should  not  land  in  Italy  with  less 
than  forty  thousand  men,  of  all  arms,  perfectly 
equipped,  since  that  army  would  have  to  depend 
upon  its  own  means  and  to  overcome  all  opposition 
before  it  could  expect  the  people  to  aid  or  even  to 
cease  to  oppose  it.  The  information  stated  that  the 
people  looked  for  protection  from  the  French,  and 
they  preferred  England  to  Austria.  There  could  be 
no  doubt  of  this  ;  the  Austrians  would  demand  pro- 
visions and  money,  and  would  insist  upon  governing 
them  in  return,  whereas  the  English  would,  as  else- 
where, defray  their  own  expenses  and  probably  give 
a  subsidy  in  addition.  The  south  of  Italy  was  pos- 
sibly, for  many  reasons,  the  best  place  next  to  t!o 
Spanish  Peninsula,  for  the  operations  of  a  British 
army,  and  it  remained  for  the  government  to  chonvn 
whether  they  would  adopt  an  attack  on  the  former 
upon  such  a  scale  as  he  had  alluded  to.  But  of  one 
thing  they  might  be  certain,  tliat  if  it  were  com- 
menced on  a  smaller  scale,  or  with  any  other  inten- 
tion than  to  persevere  to  the  last,  and  by  raising, 
feeding,  and  clothing  armies  of  the  natives,  the  jilan 
would  fail  and  the  troops  would  re-embark  with  loss 
and  disgrace. 

This  remonstrance  at  last  fixed  the  wavering 
judgment  of  the  ministers,  and  Wellington  v.'i-a 
enabled  to  proceed  with  his  own  j)lans.  He  design- 
ed to  open  the  campaign  in  the  beginning  ol'  Ma} , 
and  as  the  green  forage  was  well  advanced,  on  the 
21st  of  April,  he  directed  Murray,  Del  Parque,  Elio, 
and  Copons  to  commence  their  operations  on  tl.u 
eastern  coast;  Abispal  and  Freire  were  already  in 
march  and  expected  at  Almaraz  on  the  24th  ;  the 
Spanish  divisions  of  Estremadura  had  come  up  to 
the  Coa,  and  the  divisions  of  the  Anglo-Portugiiese 
force  were  gradually  closing  to  the  front.  But 
heavy  rains  broke  up  the  roads,  and  the  cumbrous 
pontoon  train  being  damaged,  on  its  way  from  the 
interior,  did  not  reach  Sabugal  before  the  ]^!th,  and 
was  not  repaired  before  the  1.5th.     Thus  the  ofien- 

I  ing  of  the  campaign  was  delayed  ;  yet  the  chock 
proved  of  little  consequence,  lor  on  the  P'rench  side 
nothing  was  prepared  to  meet  the  danger. 

Napoleon  had  urged  the  king  to  send  hie  heavy 

I  baggage  and  stores  to  the  rear  and  to  fix  his  hospi- 
tals  and    depots    at   Burgos,  Vittoria,  Pampeluna, 

j  Tolosa  and  San  Sebastian.  In  neglect  of  this  the 
impediments    remained  with    the  armies,  the  sick 

I  were  poured  along  the  communications,  and  in  dis 

,  order  thrown  upon  Clauzel  at  the  moment  when  that 
general  was  scarcely  able  to  make  head  "against  the 

I  northern  insurrection. 

I      Napoleon  had  early  and  clearly  fixed  the  king'a 

'authority  as  generalissimo,  and  li-rbi;de  him  to  tx 
ercise  his  monarchical  authority  t.ov/rrds  the  French 
armies,      f  ;sei)h  w.is  at  this  m.-^ment  in  liigh  dis* 

,  pute  with  all  his  generals  upcn  tl.ose  very  j-oints. 


1813.J 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


5S1 


Napfiloou  had  directed  tlic  king  to  enlarge  and 
Btrengtlieii  the  works  of  liurgos  castle,  and  to  form 
magazines  in  that  i)lace  and  at  Santona,  lor  the  use 
of  the  armies  in  tiie  field.  At  this  time  no  maga- 
zines had  been  formed  at  either  place,  and  altiiough 
a  commencement  liad  been  made  to  strengthen  tiie 
castle  of  Burgos,  it  was  not  yet  capable  of  sustain- 
ing four  liours'  bombardment,  and  offered  no  support 
for  the  armies. 

Napoleon  had  dtsired  that  a  more  secure  and 
shorter  line  of  correspondence  than  that  by  Zara- 
g^za  siiould  be  established  with  Suchet ;  for  his 
plan  emi)raced,  though  it  did  not  prescribe,  tlie 
march  of  that  general  upon  Zaragoza,  and  he  had 
warned  the  king  repeatedly  how  dangerous  it  would 
be  to  have  Suchet  isolated  and  unconnected  with 
the  nortiiern  operations.  Nevertheless,  tlie  line  of 
correspondence  remained  the  same,  and  the  allies 
possessed  the  means  of  excising  Suchet's  army  from 
the  operations  in  tiie  nortli. 

Najjoleon  had  long  and  earnestly  urged  the  king 
to  put  down  the  northern  insurrection  in  time  to 
make  head  against  the  allies  on  the  'I'ormes.  Now, 
when  the  English  general  was  ready  to  act,  that  in- 
surrection was  in  full  activity,  and  all  the  army  of 
tbe  north  and  the  greatest  part  of  the  army  of  Por- 
tag:l  was  employed  to  suppress  it  instead  of  being 
on  the  lower  Duero. 

Napoleon  had  clearly  explained  to  the  king  the 
necessity  of  keeping  his  troops  concentrated  to- 
wards tiie  Tormes  in  an  offensive  position,  and  he 
had  desired  that  3Iadrid  miglit  be  held  in  such  a 
manner  that  it  could  be  abandoned  in  a  moment. 
The  campaign  was  now  being  opened  ;  the  French 
armies  were  scattered  ;  Leval  was  encumbered  at 
Madrid,  with  a  part  of  the  civil  administration, 
with  large  stores  and  pares  of  artillery,  and  with  the 
care  of  families  attached  to  .Joseph's  court,  while 
tbe  other  generals  were  stretching  their  imagina- 
t  ons  to  devise  which  of  the  several  projects  open  to 
him  Wellington  would  adopt.  Would  he  force  the 
passage  of  the  Tormes  and  the  Duero  with  his 
wiiole  army,  and  thus  turn  the  French  right!  Would 
he  march  straight  upon  Madrid,  eitlier  by  the  dis- 
trict of  Avila  or  by  the  valley  of  the  Tagus,  or  by 
both  ;  and  would  he  then  operate  against  the  north, 
or  upon  Zaragoza,  or  towards  the  south  in  co-opera- 
t  on  with  the  Anglo-Sicilians  J  Every  thing  was 
vague,  uncertain,  confused. 

The  generals  complained  that  the  king's  conduct 
was  not  military,  and  Napoleon  told  him,  if  he  would 
command  an  army  he  must  give  himself  up  entirely 
to  it,  thinking  of  nothing  else  ;  but  .Joseph  was  al- 
ways deimnding  gold  when  he  should  have  trusted 
to  iron.  His  skill  was  unequal  to  the  arrangements 
and  comh'nations  for  taking  an  initiatory  and  offen- 
sive position,  and  he  could  neither  discover  nor  force 
his  adversary  to  show  his  real  design.  Hence  the 
French  armies  were  thrown  upon  a  timid  defensive 
system,  and  every  movement  of  the  allies  necessari- 
ly produced  alarm,  and  the  dislocation  of  troops 
without  an  object.  The  march  of  Del  Parque's  ar- 
my towards  Alcaraz,  and  that  of  the  Spanish  divis- 
ions from  ]''streinadura  towards  the  Agueda,  in  the 
latter  end  of  A[)ril,  were  judged  to  be  the  commence- 
ment of  a  general  movement  against  Madrid,  be- 
cause the  first  was  covered  by  the  advance  of  some 
cavalry  into  I^a  Mancha,  and  the  second  by  the  con- 
centration of  the  partidas,  in  the  valley  of  tiie  'J"a- 
gus.  Thus  the  whole  French  army  was  shaken  by 
the  demonstration  of  a  few  horsemen  ;  for  wiicn  Le- 
va! took  the  alarm,  Gazan  marched  towards  the 
Guadarama  with  tliree  divisions,  and  D'Erlon  gatii- 
cred  the  army  jf  the  centre  around  Segovia. 


Early  in  May,  a  fiflh  division  of  the  army  of  Por- 
tugal was  employed  on  the  line  of  communication  at 
Pampliega,  liurgos  and  Hriviesca,  and  lleillc  re- 
mained at  V'alladolid  with  only  one  division  of  in- 
fantry and  his  guns,  his  cavalry  being  on  the  I^tla. 
J)'Erlon  was  then  at  Segovia  and  (iazan  at  Arevalo, 
Conroux's  division  was  at  Avila,  and  Leval  still  at 
Madrid  with  outposts  at  Toledo.  The  king,  who 
was  at  Yalladolid,  could  not,  therefore,  concentrate 
more  than  thirty-hve  thousand  infantry  on  tt:e  JJuero. 
He  had,  indeed,  nine  thousand  excellent  cavalry  and 
one  hundred  pieces  of  artillery;  but  with  such  dis- 
positions to  concentrate  for  a  battle  in  advance,  was 
not  to  be  thought  of,  and  the  Hrst  decided  movement 
of  the  allies  was  sure  to  roll  his  scattered  forces 
back  in  contusion.  The  lines  of  the  Tonnes  and 
the  Duero  were  effaced  from  the  system  of  opera- 
lions. 

About  the  middle  of  May.  D'Armagnac's  division 
of  the  army  of  the  centre  came  to  v'alladolid,  \  il- 
latte's  division  of  the  army  of  the  south,  reinforced 
by  some  cavalry,  occupied  the  line  of  the  'J'ormcs 
from  Alba  to  Ledesma.  Daricau's,  Digeon's,  i.r.d 
D'Armagnac's  divisions  were  at  Zamora,  Toro,  arcl 
other  places,  on  both  sides  of  the  Duero,  and  Re  die's 
cavalry  was  still  on  the  Esla.  The  front  of  the 
French  was  thus  defined  by  these  rivers,  for  the  le!t 
was  covered  by  the  Tormes,  the  centre  by  the  Due- 
ro, the  right  by  the  Esla.  Gazan's  head-quarters 
were  at  Are\alo,  D'Erlon's  at  Segovia,  and  the  pf  int 
of  concentration  was  at  Valladcdid  ;  but  Conroux 
was  at  Avila,  and  Leval  being  still  at  iMadrid,  \v;:s 
thrown  entirely  out  of  the  circle  of  ojierations.  At 
tnis  moment  Wellington  entered  upon  what  lias  hern 
in  England  called,  not  very  appropriately,  the  march 
to  Vittoria.  That  march  was  but  one  portion  of 
the  action.  The  concentration  of  the  arniy  on  the 
banks  of  the  Duero  was  the  commencement,  the 
movement  towards  the  Ebro  and  the  passage  of  that 
river  was  the  middle,  the  battle  of  Vittoria  was  the 
catastrophe,  and  the  crowning  of  the  Pyrennees  the 
end  of  the  splendid  drama. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Dans:prous  rlisronfpnt  of  the  Fortiif^uese  ariin — Allavr'l  hy 
W«  lliiifjloii — iNohle  rondiict  of  the  sol(lin> — 'i  In  l<  (I  uiii;^ 
of  the  !-.||i(S  ijiulu-  g^f  neral  Graham  marches  tliroi/jili  tlie 
Tras  o3  Monies  to  the  F,-1h — The  lifcht  wiciit  under  Wtllui:;- 
ton  advaiK  es  aijaiiist  Salnmaiica — (,'oiiihat  there — The  alius 
pa^s  the  Tormes — Wellington  goes  in  person  to  the  E-j^- 
Pa'sage  of  that  river- — Cavalry  combat  at  Moiales — The  two 
wings  of  the  allied  army  unite  at  Toro  on  the  Duero — He- 
maiks  on  that  event — Wellington  marches  in  advanct — 1  re- 
vious  movements  of  the  French  described — Th<y  |  a~s  tiie 
('arion  an<l  Fisuerga  in  retreat — The  hllifs  pass  ir.<  Carion 
in  pur^uit — Joseph  takes  post  in  front  of  Burgos — Wflling- 
lon  turns  the  Pisueft;a  with  his  left  ning  and  attacks  the 
enemy  with  his  rigl(l  wing — Combat  on  the  Honnaia — TIib 
French  retreat  beliind  fancorbo  and  blow  up  the  casile  of 
Burgos — Wellington  crosses  the  Upper  Ebro  and  turns  the 
French  line  of  defence — Satitander  is  adopted  as  a  depot 
station  and  the  military  establishments  in  Portugal  are  bro- 
ki  n  up— Joseph  changes  hi*  dispo-itiims  ol  (UlVnce — 'i  he 
alli.s  advance— Combat  of  O.-nia— Combat  of  St.  Millan — 
Coinhal  of  Subijaiia  ^lorilla^ — The  FreiK  h  arniies  Concen- 
trate in  the  basin  of  Vittoria  beliind    the  Zaduia. 

In  the  latter  part  of  April  the  Spanish  troops  from 
I'^stremadura  being  assembled  on  tiie  'I'orfncs  near 
Almada,  Carlos  d'J'^spafia's  division  moved  to  Mi- 
randa del  Castanar,  and  every  thing  was  reu('y  to 
open  :.he  campaign,  when  an  unex[)ected  and  formi- 
dable danger,  menacing  ruin,  arose.  Seme  si)ecie 
sent  from  England  had  enabled  the  general  to  pay 
up  the  British  soldiers' arrears  to  November,  1812  • 
but  the  Portuguese  trooi-s  were  still  neglected  by 


5S2 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XX 


their  government, ;  a  whole  yc:ir's  pay  was  due  to 
tiiem  ;  a  suspicion  that  a  systematic  dirierence  in 
this  respect  was  to  be  estabiisiied,  pervaded  their 
minds,  and  at  the  same  time  many  regiments,,which 
had  b?:on  raised  for  a  limited  period  and  wliose  term 
of  servicf*  was  nov  expired,  murmured  for  their  dis- 
charge, wliich  could  not  be  legally  refused.  The 
moment  was  critical  ;  but  Wellington  applied  suita- 
ble rem:;dies.  He  immediately  tiireatened  to  inter- 
cept the  British  subsidy  for  the  payment  of  the 
troops,  w  h'lch  brouglit  the  Portuguese  regency  to  its 
B'jnses,  and  he  then  made  an  appeal  to  the  honour 
jind  patriotism  of  the  Portuguese  soldiers,  whose 
time  had  expired.  Such  an  appeal  is  never  made  in 
vain  to  the  poorer  classes  of  any  nation  ;  one  and 
all  those  brave  men  remained  in  the  service,  not- 
withstanding the  shameful  treatment  they  had  en- 
dured from  their  government.  This  noble  emotion 
would  seem  to  prove  that  Beresford,  whose  system 
of  military  reform  was  chiefly  founded  upon  severi- 
ty, might  have  better  attained  his  object  in  another 
manner;  but  harsliness  is  the  essence  of  the  aristo- 
cratic principle  of  government,  and  tlie  marshal 
only  moved  in  the  straight  path  marked  out  for  him 
by  the  policy  of  the  day. 

When  this  dangerous  affair  was  terminated,  Cas- 
tanos  returned  to  Gallicia,  and  the  British  cavalry, 
of  the  left  wing,  wliich  had  wintered  about  the  Mon- 
ilego,  crossed  t!ie  Dusro,  some  at  Oporto,  some  near 
Lamego,  and  ent'^;red  the  Tras  os  Montes.  The 
Portuguese  cavalry  had  been  already  quartered  all 
tho  winter  in  tliat  province,  and  the  enemy  supposed 
that  Silveira  would,  as  firmerly,  advance  from  Bra- 
ganza  to  connect  the  Gallicians  with  the  allies. 
But  Silveira  was  tlien  commanding  an  infantry  di- 
vision on  tlie  Ague  la;  and  a  very  different  power 
was  menacing  the  French  on  the  side  of  Braganza. 
For  about  the  middle  of  May,  the  cavalry  were  fol- 
lowed by  many  divisions  of  inikntry,  and  by  the  pon- 
toon equipage,  thus  Ibrming,  with  the  horsemen  and 
aitiilery,  a  mass  of  more  than  forty  tliousand  men, 
under  general  Graham.  The  infantry  and  guns, 
being  rapidly  placed  on  the  right  of  the  Duero  by 
means  of  large  boats  assembled  between  Lamego 
and  Castello  de  Alva,  near  the  mouth  of  the  Ague- 
da,  marched  in  several  columns  towards  the  lower 
Esla  ;  the  cavalry  moved  down  to  the  same  point  by 
Braganza. 

On  the  :20th,  Hill  came  to  Bojar  with  the  second 
di\  ision,  an  1  on  the  '22d  of  May,  Graham,  being  well 
advanced,  Wellington  quitted  his  head-quarters  at 
Freneda,  and  put  his  right  wing  in  motion  towards 
the  Tornr^s.  It  consisted  of  five  divisions  of  Anglo- 
Portuguese  and  Spanish  infantry,  and  five  brigades 
of  cavalry,  in::lu  ling  Julian  Ssinchuz'  horsemen,  the 
whole  forming,  with  the  artillery,  a  mass  of  from 
twenty-five  to  thirty  thousand  men.  The  right,  un- 
der general  Hill,  moved  from  Bejar  upon  Alba  de 
Tonnes;  tlie  left,  under  Wellington  himself,  by  3Ia- 
tilla  upon  Salamanca. 

On  the  24th,  Villatte  withdrew  his  detachment 
from  LeJesmi,  and  on  the  2otli,  at  ten  o'clock  in  the 
morning,  the  iieads  of  tlie  allied  columns,  with  ad- 
mirable concert,  appeared  on  all  tlie  different  routes 
leading  to  the  Tonnes.  ^lorillo's  and  Long's  caval- 
ry menaced  Alba  ;  Hill,  coming  from  Tamames,  bent 
towards  t!ie  fords  above  Salamanca,  and  Welling- 
ton, coining  from  Mat. 11a,  marched  straight  against 
that  city. 

Villatte,  a  gool  officer,  barricaded  the  bridge  and 
the  streets,  sf^nt  his  bnrrgage  to  the  rear,  called  in 
his  detachment  from  Alba,  and  being  resolved  to  dis- 
cover tiio  real  firce  of  liis  enemy,  waited  for  their 
approai:hing  masses  on  the  heigiits  above  the  ford  of 


Santa  Marta.  Too  long  e  .vaited,  for  tlie  ground 
on  the  left  side  of  the  rivt-  Ijud  er.ablcd  V^'ellaigton 
to  conceal  his  movements,  and  already  Fane's  liorse- 
men,  with  six  guns,  were  passing  the  ford  at  Santa 
Marta  in  Villatte's  rear,  while  \  ictor  Alten's  caval- 
ry removed  the  barricades  on  the  bridge  and  push- 
ed through  the  town  to  attack  him  in  I'ront.  The 
French  general  being  thus  suddenly  pressed,  gained 
the  heights  of  Cabrerizos,  marching  towards  Babila 
Fuente,  before  Fane  got  over  the  river  ;  but  he  had 
still  to  pass  the  defiles  of  Aldea  Lengua,  and  was 
overtaken  by  both  columns  of  cavalry. 

Tiie  guns,  opening  upon  the  Frencii  squares,  kill- 
ed thirty  or  forty  men,  and  the  Englisli  horsemen 
charged  ;  but  horsemen  are  no  match  for  such  infan- 
try, whose  courage  and  discipline  nothing  could 
quell ;  they  fell  before  the  round  shot,  and  nei'rly  one 
hundred  died  in  the  ranks  without  a  wound,  from 
the  intolerable  heat ;  yet  the  cavalry  made  no  im- 
pression on  those  dauntless  soldiers,  and  in  the  face 
of  tliirty  thousand  enemies,  they  made  their  way  to 
Babila  Fuente,  where  they  were  joined  by  general 
Lefol  with  the  troops  from  Alba;  and,  finally,  the 
whole  disappeared  from  the  sight  of  their  admiring 
and  applauding  opponents.  Nevertheless,  two  hun- 
dred had  sunk  dead  in  the  ranks,  a  like  number,  un- 
able to  keep  up,  were  made  prisoners,  and  a  leading 
gun,  having  been  overturned  in  the  (iefilo  of  Aldea 
Lengua,  six  others  were  retarded,  and  the  whole  tell 
in  the  allies'  hands,  together  with  their  tumbrils. 

The  line  of  the  Tormes  being  thus  gained,  the  al- 
lied troops  were,  on  the  27th  and  2^'tli,  pushed  for- 
ward with  their  left  towards  Miranda  and  Zamora, 
and  their  right  towards  Toro  ;  so  placed,  the  atter 
covered  the  communications  with  Ciudad  iioJrigo, 
while  the  former  approached  the  point  on  the  Due- 
ro, where  it  was  proposed  to  throw  the  bridge  for 
communication  with  Graham's  corjis.  This  doi;e, 
Wellington  lei\  general  Hill  in  command,  and  went 
off  suddenly,  for  he  was  uneasy  about  his  combina- 
tions on  the  Esla.  On  the  29th,  he  passed  the  Due- 
ro at  IMiranda,  by  means  of  a  basket  slung  en  a  rope, 
which  was  stretched  from  rock  to  rock,  the  river 
foaming  several  hundred  feet  below.  The  oLth,  he 
reached  Carvajales. 

Graham  had  met  with  many  difficulties  in  his 
march  through  the  rugged  Tras  os  Montes ;  and 
though  the  troops  were  now  close  to  the  Esla, 
stretching  from  Carvajales  to  Tabara,  and  their  left 
was  in  communication  with  the  Gallicians,  who 
were  coming  down  to  Benevente,  the  combination 
had  been  in  some  measure  thwarted  by  the  difficulty 
of  crossing  the  Esla.  The  general  combination  re- 
quired that  river  to  be  passed  on  the  2(H.h,  at  which 
time  the  right  wins',  continuing  its  march  frcm  the 
Tormes  without  halting,  could  have  been  close  to 
Zamora,  and  the  passage  of  tlie  Duero  wtuld  have 
been  insured.  The  French  armies  wiuld  then  have 
been  entirely  surprised  and  separated,  and  seme  of 
their  divisions  overtaken  and  beaten.  They  were, 
indeed,  still  ignorant  that  a  whole  army  was  on  the 
Esla  ;  but  the  opposite  bank  of  that  river  was  watch- 
ed by  picque\s  of  cavalry  and  infantry  ;  the  stream 
was  full  and  rapid,  the  banks  steep,  the  fords  hard 
to  find,  difficult  and  deep,  with  stony  beds,  ard  tiie 
alarm  had  spread  from  the  Tormes  through  all  the 
cantonments. 

At  daybreak  on  the  31st,  some  squadrons  of  hus- 
sars, with  infantry  holding  by  their  stirru;)S,  enter- 
ed the  stream  at  the  ford  of  Almendra,  and  at  the 
same  time  Graham  approached  the  right  bank  with 
all  his  forces.  A  French  i>icquet  of  thirty  men  waa 
surprised  in  the  village  of  Villa  Perdrices.  by  the 
i  hussars,  the  pontoons  were  immediately  laid  dowu# 


1813,1 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


583 


and  the  columns   commenced    passing,  but   several 
men,  evm  of  tlu',  cavalry,  had  been  drowned  at  the 

fon.'s. 

On  the  1st  of  June,  while  the  rear  was  still  on 
the  lOshi,  the  head  of  the  allies  entered  Zamora, 
wliich  tiie  French  evacuated  after  destroying  the 
bridije.  They  retired  upon  Toro,  and  the  next  day, 
having  destroyed  the  bridge  there  also,  they  again 
(ell  back  ;  but  their  rear-guard  was  overtaken  near 
the  village  of  Morales  by  tlie  hussar  brigade,  under 
colonel  Urant.  Their  horsemen  immediately  pass- 
ed a  bridge  and  swamp  under  a  cannonade,  and  then 
ftcing  about  in  two  lines,  gave  battle,  whereupon 
major  Roberts,  with  the  tenth  regiment,  supported 
by  the  tiftejnth,  broke  both  the  lines  with  one 
charge,  and  pursued  them  for  two  miles,  and  they 
lost  above  two  hundred  men  ;  but  finally  rallied  on 
the  infantry  reserves. 

Tiie  junction  of  the  allies'  wings  on  the  Duero, 
was  now  secure,  for  that  river  was  fordable  ;  and 
Wellington  had  also,  in  anticipation  of  failure  on 
one  point,  made  arrangements  for  forming  a  boat- 
bridge  below  the  confluence  of  the  Esla  ;  and  he 
could  also  throw  his  pontoons  without  difficulty  at 
Toro,  and  even  in  advance,  because  Julian  Sanchez 
had  surprised  a  cavalry  picquet  at  Castronufio,  on 
the  left  bank,  and  driven  the  French  outposts  from 
the  fords  of  Polios.  But  the  enemy's  columns  were 
concentrating,  it  miglit  be  for  a  battle,  wherefore 
the  English  general  halted  the  :3d,  to  bring  the  Gal- 
Jicians  in  conjunction  on  his  left,  and  to  close  up  his 
own  rear,  which  had  been  retarded  by  the  difficulty 
of  passing  tlie  Esla  The  two  divisions  of  his  right 
wirg,  namely,  t!ie  second  and  light  division,  passed 
the  Daero  on  the  m.orning  of  the  3rd;  the  artillery 
and  baggage  by  a  ford,  the  infantry  at  the  bridge  of 
Toro,  which  was  ingeniously  repaired  by  the  lieu- 
tenant of  engineers,  Pringle,  who  dropped  ladders  at 
each  side  of  the  broken  arch,  and  then  laid  planks 
from  one  to  the  other  just  above  the  water  level. 
Thus  the  English  general  mastered  the  line  of  t::e 
Duero,  and  those  who  understand  war  may  say 
whether  it  was  an  effort  worthy  of  the  man  and  his 
army. 

Let  them  trace  all  the  combinations,  follow  the 
movement  of  Graham's  columns,  some  of  which 
marched  one  hundred  and  fifty,  some  more  than  two 
hundred  and  fifty  miles,  through  the  wild  districts 
of  the  Tras  os  Montes.  Through  those  regions,  held 
to  be  nearly  impracticable  even  for  small  corps,  for- 
ty thousand  men,  infintry,  cavalry,  artillery,  and 
pontoons,  had  been  carried  and  placed,  as  if  by  a 
supernatural  power,  upon  the  Esla,  before  the  ene- 
my knew  even  that  they  were  in  movement!  Was 
it  fortune  or  skill  that  presided]  Not  fortune,  for 
tlie  difficulties  were  such  that  Graham  arrived  later 
on  the  Esla  than  Wellington  intended,  and  yet  so 
soon,  that  the  enemy  could  make  no  advantage  of  the 
delay.  For  had  the  king  even  concentrated  his 
troops  behind  the  Esla  on  the  Slst,  the  Gallicians 
would  St  1!  have  been  at  Benevente  and  reinforced  by 
Penne  Villcmur's  cavalry,  which  had  marched  with 
Graham's  corps  ;  and  the  Asturians  would  have  been 
at  Leon  on  the  Upper  Esla,  which  was  fordable. 
Then  the  final  passage  of  that  river  could  have  been 
e'.fected  by  a  repetition  of  the  same  combinations  on 
a  smaller  scale,  because  the  king's  army  would  not 
have  been  numerous  enough  to  defend  tlie  Duero 
against  Hill,  the  Lower  Esla  against  Wellington, 
an<l  the  Upper  Esla  against  the  Spaniards  at  the 
eame  time.  Wellington  had,  also,  as  we  have  seen, 
prepared  the  means  of  bringing  Hill's  corps,  or  any 
part  of  it,  over  ths  Duero  b?low  tlie  confluence  of 
the  Esla,  and  all  these  combinations,  these  surpris- 


ing exertions  had  been  made  merely  to  gain  a  fair 
field  of  battle. 

But  if  Napoleon's  instructions  had  been  ablj 
worked  out  by  tlie  king  during  the  winter,  this  greet 
movement  could  not  have  succeeded,  for  the  intur- 
rection  in  the  nortii  would  have  been  crushed  in 
time,  or  at  least  so  far  quelled,  that  sixty  thcusand 
French  infantry,  ten  thousand  cavalry,  and  cue  hun- 
dred pieces  of  artillery,  would  have  been  diBposablo, 
and  such  a  force  held  in  an  offensive  position  on  tlio 
Tormes,  would  probably  have  obliged  Wellington  to 
adopt  a  different  plan  of  campaign.  If  concentrated 
between  the  Duero  and  the  Esla  it  would  have  baf- 
fled him  on  that  river,  because  operations,  which 
would  have  been  ell'ectual  against  thirty-five  thou- 
sand infantry,  would  have  been  powerless  against 
sixty  thousand.  Joseph,  indeed,  complained  that 
he  could  not  put  down  the  insurrection  in  the  north, 
that  he  could  not  feed  such  large  armies,  that  a 
thousand  obstacles  arose  on  every  side  which  he 
could  not  overcome  ;  in  fine,  that  he  could  not  exe- 
cute his  brother's  instructions.  They  could  have 
been  executed  notwithstanding.  Activity,  the  tak- 
ing time  by  the  forelock,  would  have  quelled  the  in- 
surrection; and  for  the  feeding  of  the  troops,  the 
boundless  plains  called  the  "  Tlerras  de  Canipos,"' 
where  the  armies  were  now  operating,  were  covered 
with  the  ripening  harvest ;  the  only  difuculty  was  to 
subsist  that  part  of  the  French  army  not  engaged 
in  the  northern  provinces  during  the  winter.  Jo- 
seph could  not  find  the  means,  though  Soult  told 
him  they  were  at  hand,  because  the  difficulties  of 
his  situation  overpowered  liim :  tiiey  would  not 
have  overpowered  Napoleon;  but  the  diflerence 
between  a  common  general  and  a  great  captain 
is  immense,  the  one  is  victorious  when  the  other 
is  defeated 

The  field  was  now  clear  for  the  shock  of  ba-ttlc, 
but  the  forces  on  either  side  were  unequally  match- 
ed. Wellington  had  ninety  thousand  men,  with 
ir.ore  than  one  hundred  pieces  of  artillery.  Twelve 
thousand  were  cavalry,  and  the  British  and  Portu- 
guese present  with  the  colours,  were,  including  Ser- 
jeants and  drummers,  above  seventy  thousand  sa- 
bres and  bayonets  ;  the  rest  of  the  army  was  Spanish. 
Besides  this  mass,  there  were  the  irregulars  on  the 
wings,  Sanchez'  horsemen,  a  thousand  strong,  on  the 
right  beyond  the  Duero;  Porlier,  Barcena,  Snlazar, 
and  Manzo  on  the  left  between  the  Uj)per  Esla  and 
the  Carion.  Saornil  had  moved  upon  Avila  ;  tlie 
Empecinado  was  hovering  about  Leval.  Finally, 
the  reserve  of  Andalusia  had  crossed  the  Tagus  ut 
Almaraz  on  the  30th,  and  numerous  minor  bands 
were  swarming  round  as  it  advanced.  On  tiie  oili- 
er hand,  though  the  French  could  collect  nine  or  ten 
thousand  horsemen  and  one  hundred  guns,  their  in- 
fantry was  less  than  half  the  number  of  the  allies, 
being  only  thirty-five  thousand  strong,  exclusive  of 
Leval.  Hence  the  way  to  victory  was  open,  and  on 
the  4th,  Wellington  marched  forward  with  a  con- 
quering violence. 

The  intrusive  monarch  was  in  no  condition  to 
stem  or  to  evade  a  torrent  of  war,  the  drjith  and 
violence  of  wliich  he  was  even  now  igiiorRnt  uf; 
and  a  sligiit  sketch  of  his  jirevious  operations  vviH 
siiew  that  all  his  dis[iositions  were  made  in  tho 
dark,  and  only  calculated  to  bring  him  into  trouble. 
Early  in  May,  he  would  have  marched  the  army  of 
the  centre  to  the  Upper  Duero,  when  Leval's  rejjortit 
checked  the  movement  On  the  15th  of  that  month, 
a  spy,  sent  to  Bejar  l)y  D'I">lon,  broiigiit  inttlligcnce 
that  a  great  number  of  country  carts  had  been  col- 
lected there  and  at  Placentia.  to  I-  How  the  troops  in 
a  march  upon  Talavera,  but  after  two  days  were  een-. 


58t 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XX 


back  to  thoir  villajrcs ;  tliat  fifty  mules  had  been 
purchased  at  I3ejar  and  sent  to  Ciudad  Uodrigo  ;  that 
about  the  same  time  the  first  and  fourth  divisions 
and  the  German  cavalry  liad  moved  from  the  interi- 
or towards  the  frontier,  saying  they  were  going,  the 
first  to  Zainora,  and  the  last  to  Fuente  Guinaldo  ; 
that  many  troops  were  already  gathered  at  Ciudad 
llodrigo  under  Wellington  and  Castafios  ;  that  the 
divisions  at  Coria  and  Placentia  were  expected 
tliere,  the  reserves  of  Andalusia  were  in  movement, 
aad  tlie  pass  of  IJanos,  wiiich  had  been  before  re- 
trenched and  broken  up,  was  now  repaired;  that  the 
)jnglish  soldiers  were  paid  tiieir  arrears,  and  every 
bjdy  said  a  grand  movement  would  commence  on  the 
1:2th.  All  this  was  extremely  accurate;  but  with 
tiie  exception  of  tiie  march  to  Zamora,  which  seemed 
to  be  only  a  blind,  the  information  obtained  indica- 
ted the  principal  movement  as  against  the  Tormes, 
cind  threw  no  light  upon  the  English  general's  real 
design. 

On  t!ie  other  flank,  Reille's  cavalry,  under  Boyer, 
having  made  an  exploring  sweep  round  by  Astorga, 
La  Baneza  and  Benevente,  brought  intelligence  that 
a  Gallician  expedition  was  embarking  for  America, 
that  another  was  to  follow,  and  that  several  English 
divisions  were  also  embarking  in  Portugal.  The 
'3^ld  of  May,  a  repoi-t  from  the  same  quarter  gave  no- 
tice that  Salazar  and  Manzo  were,  with  seven  hun- 
ilred  horsemen,  on  the  Upper  Esla,  that  Porlier  was 
<;oming  from  the  Asturias  to  join  them  with  two 
thousand  five  hundred  men,  and  Giron,  with  six 
thousand  Gallicians,  had  reached  Astorga;  but  it 
was  uncertain  if  Silveira's  cavalry  would  come  from 
Braganza  to  connect  the  left  of  the  English  with 
the  Gallicians,  as  it  had  done  the  year  before. 

Thus,  on  the  24tli  of  3Iay,  the  French  were  still 
entirely  in  the  dark  with  respect  to  Graham's  move- 
ment ;  and  although  it  was  known  the  26th,  at  Val- 
ladolid,  that  Wellington  had  troops  in  tlie  country 
bayond  t!ie  Esla,  it  was  not  considered  a  decisive 
movetnont,  because  the  head-quarters  were  still  at-^ 
Freneda.  However,  on  the  29th,  Reille  united  hvi 
cavalry  at  Valderas,  passed  tiie  Esla,  entered  Bene- 
vente and  sent  patroles  towards  Tobara  and  Carva- 
jales  ;  from  their  reports,  and  other  sources,  he  un- 
derstood the  whole  allied  army  was  on  the  Esla;  and 
as  his  detachments  were  closely  followed  by  the 
British  scouting  parties,  he  recrossed  the  Esla  and 
broke  the  bridge  of  Castro  Gonzalo,  leaving  his 
light  horsemen  to  watch  it.  But  the  delay  in  the 
jvissage  of  tlie  Esln,  after  Graham  had  reached  Car- 
vnjales,  made  Reille  doubt  both  the  strength  of  the 
allies  and  their  inclination  to  cross  tliat  river.  He 
expected  the  main  attack  on  the  Tormes,  and  pro- 
I>osed,  in  conjunction  with  Daricau's  infantry,  and 
Digeon's  dragoons,  then  at  Toro  and  Zamora,  to  de- 
fend the  Duero  and  the  Lower  Esla,  leaving  the 
(jJallicians,  whose  force  he  despised,  to  pass  the  Up- 
per Esla  at  their  peril. 

D'Armagnac's  division  was  now  at  Rio  Seco,  and 
Hi'.icune's  division,  which  had  been  spread  along 
tlie  road  to  Burgos,  was  ordered  to  concentrate  at 
Palencia  on  the  Carion  ;  but  meanwhile  Gazan,  on 
the  other  flank  of  the  French  position,  was  equally 
deceived  by  the  movements  of  tlie  English  general. 
The  7th  of  May  he  heard  from  the  Tormes  that  the 
allies'  preparations  indicated  a  movement  towards 
that  river.  Leval  wrote  from  Madrid  that  lie  had 
abandoned  Toledo,  because  fifteen  thousand  English 
and  ten  thous-ind  Spaniards  were  to  advance  by  the 
valley  of  the  Tagus,  tliat  rations  had  been  ordered 
at  Esf-alona  for  Long's  English  cavalry,  and  that 
magazines  were  formed  at  Bejar.  At  the  same  time, 
from  a  third  quarter,  came  news  that  three  divisions 


would  pass  the  Duero,  to  join  the  Gallicians  and 
march  upon  Valladolid. 

Gazan  rightly  judging  that  tlie  magazines  at  Be- 
jar were  to  bupply  Hill  and  the  Spaniards,  in  their 
movement  to  join  Wellington,  expected  at  first,  tliat 
the  whole  would  operate  by  the  Etla :  but  on  tlie 
14th,  fresh  reports  changed  tliis  opinion;  he  then 
judged  Hill  would  advance  by  the  Fuente  Ccngosto 
upon  Avila,  to  cut  Leval  oft  from  the  army,  while 
Wellington  attacked  Salamanca.  On  the  24th, 
however,  his  doubts  vanished.  Yillatte  told  him 
that  Wellington  was  over  the  Agueda,  Graham  over 
tlie  Lower  Douro  ;  and  at  the  same  time,  Uaricau 
writing  from  Zamora,  told  him  that  Graham's  caval- 
ry had  already  reached  Alcanizas,  only  one  march 
from  the  Esla.  Conroux  was  instantly  directed  to 
march  from  Avila  to  Arevalo,  Tilly  to  move  with 
the  cavalry  of  tlie  army  of  the  soutli,  from  JVladrigal 
towards  tlie  Trabancos,  Daricau  to  send  a  brigade 
to  Toro,  and  Leval  to  come  over  the  Guadarama 
pass  and  join  D'Erlon  at  Segovia. 

On  the  26th,  Gazan,  thinking  Wellington  slow, 
and  crediting  a  report  that  he  was  sick  and  travel- 
ling in  a  carriage,  relapsed  into  doubt.  He  now 
judged  the  passage  of  the  Agueda  a  feint,  thought 
the  allies'  operations  would  be  in  mats  towards  the 
Esla,  and  was  positively  assured  by  his  cmisf-aries 
that  Hill  would  move  by  the  Puentc  Congotto 
against  Segovia.  However,  on  the  27th,  he  heard 
of  the  passage  of  the  Tormes  and  of  Villatte's  re- 
treat;  whereupon,  evacuating  Arevalo,  he  fixed  his 
head-quarters  at  Rueda,  and  directing  Conroux,  who 
was  marching  upon  Arevalo,  and  so  hastily  that  he 
left  a  movable  column  behind  him  qn  the  Upper 
Tormes  to  come  to  the  Trabancos. 

Gazan  at  first  designed  to  take  post  behind  that 
river  ;  but  there  was  no  good  position  there,  end  the 
2etli  lie  rallied  Conroux's,  Rcy's,  and  Villatte's  in- 
fantry and  Tilly's  cavalry  behind  the  Zapardiel. 
Daricau's  division  was,  meanwhile,  concentrated  at 
Toro,  and  Digeon's  at  Zamora ;  a  bridge-head  was 
commenced  at  Tordesillas,  which  was  the  }joint  of 
retreat,  and  guards  were  placed  at  Pcllcs,  where  the 
fords  of  the  Duero  were  very  low,  though  as  yet  im- 
practicable. These  movements  were  made  in  tran- 
quillity, for  Hill  had  no  desire,  by  driving  the  French 
over  the  Duero,  to  increase  the  number  of  their 
troops  on  the  Esla.  However,  on  the  .';(lth,  Gazan. 
hearing  that  Hill  was  advancing,  and  tliat  the  troops 
on  the  Esla  were  likely  to  attempt  tlie  passage  of 
that  river,  crossed  the  Duero  in  the  nigiit,  and  took 
post  at  Tordesillas,  intending  to  concentrate  the 
w'hole  army  of  the  south  on  the  right  of  that 
river,  but  Leval,  though  lie  had  quitted  3Iadrid  on 
the  27th,  was  not  yet  arrived,  and  a  large  artillery 
convoy,  the  ministers  and  Spanish  families,  and  the 
pictures  from  the  palace  of  Madrid,  were  likewise  on 
the  road  from  that  capital  by  the  Segovia  |)asses. 

At  this  time,  the  army  of  Portugal  and  D'Armag- 
nac's division  was  extended  from  the  Esla  to  the 
Carion;  the  king's  guards  were  at  Valladolid,  and 
D'Erlon  was  in  march  to  the  Puente  Duero,  from 
Segovia  and  Sepulveda,  yet  slowly  and  apparently 
not  aware  of  the  crisis.  Meanwhile,  the  ])assage  of 
the  Esla  had  been  efiected,  and  hence,  if  tiiat  rivfir 
had  been  crossed  at  the  time  fore-calculated  by  Wel- 
lington, and  a  rajdd  push  made  u[ion  Placentia  end 
Valladolid,  while  Hill  n;arclicd  upon  Rueda,  the 
whole  French  army  miffht  have  btien  cauglit  in 
what  Napoleon  calls  '■'■Jlag-ranle  dcliclo^''  and  des- 
troyed. And  even  now  it  would  seem  that  \\'elling- 
ton  could  have  profited  more  by  marching,  than  by 
halting  at  Toro  on  tiie  Td,  for  though  I  cval  s  troopa 
and  part  of  the  army  of  the  centre  were  '.hen  between 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


5S5 


the  Piicnte  DiiPr,.  and  "\  alladolid,  D'Erlon  had  left  a 
large  diviyiim  a,t  Tudela  dt;  Duero  to  protect  the  ar- 
rival of  tlie  convoy  from  .Madrid,  vvliich  had  not  yet 
crosse;!  tlie  Daero  ;  anotlier  great  convoy  was  still 
on  the  loft  bank  of  the  lower  Pisuerya,  and  tlie  [larcs 
ol"  the  armies  of  Portugal,  and  of  t;ie  south,  were 
waitinnr  on  the  right  bank  of  that  river,  until  the 
tirtit  convoy  iiad  passed  over  the  Carion.  Neverthe- 
less, it  waii  prudent  to  gather  well  to  a  head  first, 
and  the  general  combinations  had  been  so  profound- 
ly made,  that  the  evil  day  for  the  Frencli  was  only 
deferred. 

Oil  tlie  ^^nth,  Joseph's  design  was  to  oppose  Wel- 
lington's principal  force  witli  tlie  army  of  the  south, 
while  the  army  of  the  centre  held  the  rest  in  check, 
the  army  of  Portugal  to  aid  either  as  tlie  case  might 
be;  and  such  was  iiis  infatuation  as  to  his  real  posi- 
tion, tiiat  even  now,  from  the  Duero,  he  was  press- 
ijig  upon  his  brother  tiie  immediate  establishment  of 
a  civil  -Spanish  administration  for  the  provinces  be- 
liind  liie  Ebro,  ^.s  the  only  remedy  for  tlie  insurrec- 
tion, and  for  th(  rendering  of  the  army  of  the  north 
disposable.  Ho  rven  demanded  an  order  from  the 
emperor  to  dra*"  Clauzel's  troops  away  from  the 
Ebro,  that  he  m«  ht  drive  the  allies  back  to  the 
Coa,  and  take  the  i  -ng-urged  offensive  position  to- 
wards Portugal,  Nt  oleon  being  then  at  Dresden, 
and  Wellington  oi   iir   Duero! 

On  tlie  2d,  wheii  tht.  ^.Uies  had  passed  the  Esla, 
the  king,  who  expected  them  at  Toro  tlie  1st,  be- 
came disturbed  to  hnd  his  front  unmolested,  and  con- 
cluded, as  lie  had  received  no  letter  from  Reillc,  that 
Wellington  had  cut  his  communication,  turned  his 
right,  and  was  maiehing  towards  the  Carion.  His 
piarm  was  consideiuble,  and  with  reason  ;  but  in  the 
fcvening  of  the  2d  he  heard  from  Rcille,  who  had  re- 
tired unmolested  tc  Rio  Seco  and  there  rallied  D'- 
Arinagnac's  troops  ,  but  iMaucune's  division  was 
still  in  march  from  liflerent  ]jarts  to  concentrate  at 
Palencia.  The  haU  of  the  ?.d  wiis  therefore  to  the 
profit  of  the  French,  for  during  that  time  tliey  re- 
ceived tiie  iMadrid  convoy  and  insured  the  concentra- 
tion of  all  their  troops,  recovering  even  Conrcux's 
movable  column,  v/hich  joined  Leval  near  Olme- 
dn.  They  also  destroyed  t!ie  bridges  of  Tudela  and 
Puente  Duero  on  the  Duero,  and  that  of  Siinancas 
and  CabeQon  on  the  Pisuerga,  and  they  passed  tlieir 
convoys  over  tiie  Carion,  directing  tliem,  under  es- 
cort of  Casa  Palacios'  Spanish  division,  upon  Bur- 
gos. 

The  army  of  the  south  now  moved  upon  Torrelo- 
baton  and  Penaflor,  tiie  army  of  tiie  centre  upon  Du- 
enas,  tiie  army  of  Portugal  upon  Palencia;  and  the 
spirits  of  all  v/ere  raised  by  intelligence  of  the  em- 
peror's victory  at  Lutzen.  and  by  a  report  that  the 
Toulon  fleet  had  made  a  successful  descent  on  Sicily. 
It  would  appear  that  Napoleon  certainly  contempla- 
ted an  attack  upon  tliat  island,  ^nd  lord  William  IJen- 
tinck  thouTht  it  would  be  successful  ;  but  it  was  pre- 
vented tiy  .Murat's  discontent,  wlio  instead  of  attack- 
ing, f.dl  oiffrom  Napoleon,  and  opened  a  negotiation 
with  tiie  liritisli. 

The  4th.  Wellington  moved  in  advnnce,  his  bridge 
of  communication  was  ehtablislied  at  Polios,  and  con- 
eiderable  stores  of  ammunition  were  formed  at  Val- 
ladolid;  some  had  also  been  taken  at  Zaniora,  and 
the  cavalry  flankers  captured  large  magnzines  of 
grain  at  Arev.ilo.  Towards  the  Carion  the  allies 
marclied  rapidly  by  parallel  roads,  and  in  compact 
order,  tlie  (Jallicians  on  the  extreme  left,  Morillo 
and  .Julian  Sanchez  on  tlie  extreme  riglit,  and  tiie 
Englisli  general  expected  the  enemy  would  nialce  a 
Btand  beliind  tiiat  river;  but  the  report  of  tlie  pris- 
ojjcrs  and  the  hasty  movement  of  'he  French  col- 


umns soon  convinced  him  that  they  were  in  full  re- 
treat lor  Burgcs.  Un  tlie  Gth,pli  tlie  Frencli  arm;ed 
were  over  the  Carion  ;  Reille  had  even  reached  1  al- 
encia  on  the  4th,  and  tliere  rallied  Maucur.e's  divi- 
sion and  a  brigade  of  light  cavalry  which  Lad  been 
employed  on  the  communicatiors. 

Although  the  king's  force  was  now  about  fifty- 
five  thousand  fighting  men,  exclusive  of  his  Spanis-h 
division,  which  was  escorting  the  convoys  and  hi'g- 
gage,  he  did  not  judge  tiie  Carion  a  good  position, 
and  retired  behind  the  upper  Pituerga,  desiring,  if 
liossible,  to  give  battle  there.  He  tent  Jourdiin  to 
examine  t!ie  state  of  Burgos  castle,  and  exjiedited 
fre^h  letters,  for  he  had  already  written  from  Valia- 
dolid  on  the  27th  and  tliith  of  May,  to  Fey,  Sarrut, 
and  Cluuzel,  calling  them  towards  the  plains  of  Bur- 
gos ;  and  others  to  fSuchet,  directing  him  to  m&rch 
immediately  upon  Zaragoza,  and  hoping  he  was  al- 
ready on  his  way  there  ;  but  Suchet  was  then  en- 
gaged in  Catalonia,  Clauzel's  troops  were  on  the 
borders  of  Aragon,  Foy  and  Palombini's  Italians 
were  on  the  coast  of  Guipuscoa,  and  .Sarrut's  divi- 
sion was  pursuing  Longa  in  the  Montana. 

Joseph  was  still  unacquainted  with  his  enemy. 
Higher  than  seventy  or  eighty  thousand  he  did  net 
estimate  the  allied  forces,  and  he  was  C'esirous  of 
fighting  them  on  the  elevated  plains  of  Burgos.  But 
more  tlian  one  hundred  thousand  men  were  before 
and  around  him.  For  all  the  partidas  of  the  Astnri- 
as  and  the  Montana  were  drawing  together  en  his 
right,  Julian  Sanchez  and  the  partidas  of  Cestile 
were  closing  on  his  left,  and  Abispal  with  the  re- 
serve and  Frere's  cavalry  had  already  pacC^d  the 
Gredos  mountains  and  were  in  fu;:  march  for  Valla- 
dolid.  Nevertheless  the  king  was  sanguine  of  suc- 
cess if  he  could  rally  Clauzel's  and  Foy's  divisicna 
in  time,  and  his  despatches  to  the  former  were  ire-  j^ 
quent  and  urgent.  Come  witli  the  inf;  ntry  cf  the 
army  of  Portugal  !  Conic  with  the  army  of  the 
north  and  we  shall  drive  the  allies  over  the  Duero! 
Such  w!,s  his  cry  to  Clauzel,and  again  he  urged  his 
political  schemes  upon  his  brother;  but  he  was  not 
a  statesaian  to  advise  Napoleon,  nor  a  general  to 
contend  with  Vv^ellington  ;  his  was  not  the  military 
genius,  nor  were  his  the  arrangements  that  could 
recover  the  init.iatory  movement  at  such  a  crisis  and 
against  fuch  an  adversary. 

While  the  king  was  on  the  Pisuerga  he  received 
Jourdan's  report.  The  castle  of  Burgos  was  untena- 
ble ;  there  were  no  magazines  of  provisions  ;  the  new 
works  were  quite  unfinished,  and  they  commanded 
the  old,  which  were  unable  to  hold  out  a  day 
of  Clauzel's  and  Foy's  divisions  nothing  hnd  beer 
heard.  It  was  resolved  to  retire  behind  the  Ebro. 
All  the  French  outposts  in  the  Bureba  and  31orta- 
na  were  immediately  withdrawn,  and  the  great  de- 
pot of  Burgos  was  evacuated  upon  Vittoria,  which 
was  thus  encumbered  with  tlie  artillery  depots  of 
Madrid,  of  Valladolid,  and  of  Burgos,  and  with  the 
baggage  and  stores  of  so  many  armies  and  so  many 
fugitive  families  ;  and  at  this  moment,  ako,  arrived 
from  France  a  convoy  of  treasure  whicli  had  long 
waited  for  an  escort  at  Bayonne. 

Meanwhile  the  tide  of  war  flowed  onwards  with 
terrible  power.  The  allies  had  crossed  the  Carion 
on  the  7th,  and  Joseph,  quitting  Torquemada,  had 
retired  by  the  high  road  to  Burgos  with  his  left 
winsr,  composed  of  the  army  of  the  south  and  centre, 
while  Reille,  with  that  of  Portugal,  forming  the 
right  wing,  movtjd  by  Castro  Xcrez.  But  Welling- 
ton, following  hard,  and  conducting  his  operations 
continually  on  tlie  same  principle,  pushed  his  left 
wing  and  tlie  G.-illicians  along  hye-roaiis,  and  passed 
tiie  upper  Pisuerga  on  the  6th,  9th,  and  ll'tli.    Hav 


586 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


fBooK  XX. 


inj  thus  tnrnecl  the  line  of  the  Pisuerj^a  entirely, 
and  outila:iked  Reille,  he  made  a  short  journey  the 
11th,  and  lialted  the  TJth,  with  his  left  wing,  for  he 
had  outmarched  his  supplies,  and  had  to  arrange  the 
farther  feeding  of  his  troops  in  a  country  wide  of  his 
line  of  commanication.  Nevertheless,  he  pushed 
Iiis  rigiit  v-"ing,  under  general  Hill,  along  the  main 
road  to  llurgos,  resolved  to  make  the  French  yield 
the  castle  or  tight  for  the  possession  ;  ?nd,  mean- 
while, Julian  Sanchez,  acting  beyond  the  Arlanzan, 
cut  oif  small  posts  and  straggling  detachments. 

Reille  had  regained  the  great  road  to  Burgos  on 
the  9th,  and  was  strongly  posted  behind  the  Horma- 
7.3.  stream,  iiis  right  near  Hormillas,  his  left  en  the 
Arlanzan,  barring  the  way  to  Burgos;  the  other  two 
armies  were  in  reserve  behind  Estepar,  and  in  this 
situation  they  had  remained  for  three  days,  and  were 
again  cheered  by  intelligence  of  Napoleon's  victory 
at  Bautzen  and  the  consequent  armistice.  But  on 
t!ie  12t!i,  WelUngton's  columns  came  up  and  the  light 
division,  preceded  by  Grant's  hussars  and  Ponson- 
by's  dragoons,  immediately  turned  the  French  right, 
while  t!ie  rest  of  the  troops  attacked  the  whole 
range  of  heights  from  Hormillas  to  Estepar.  Reille, 
whose  object  was  to  make  the  allies  shew  their 
force,  seeing  their  horsemen  in  rear  of  his  right 
flank  while  his  front  was  so  strongly  menaced,  made 
for  the  bridge  of  Baniel  on  the  Arlanzan  ;  then  Gar- 
diner's horse-artillery  raked  his  columns,  and  cap- 
tain Milles  of  the  fourteenth  dragoons  charging, 
took  some  prisoners  and  one  of  his  guns,  which  had 
been  disabled.  Meanwhile  the  right  of  the  allies, 
press-r.J  forward  towards  the  bridge  of  Baniel,  en- 
deavored to  cut  off  the  retreat;  but  the  French  re- 
pelled the  minor  attacks  with  the  utmost  firmness, 
bore  the  fire  of  the  artillery  without  shrinking,  and 
I  evading  the  serious  attacks  by  their  rapid  yet  order- 
ly movement,  finally  passed  the  river  with  a  loss  of 
only  thirty  men  killed  and  a  few  taken. 

The  three  French  armies  being  now  covered  by 
the  Urbel  and  Arlanzan  rivers,  which  were  swelled 
by  the  rain,  could  not  be  easily  attacked,  and  the 
stores  of  Burgos  were  removed  ;  but  in  the  night 
.Toseph  again  retreated  along  the  high  road  by  Bri- 
viesca  to  Pancorba,  into  which  place  he  threw  a 
garrison  of  six  hundred  men.  The  castle  of  Burgos 
was  prepared  also  for  destruction,  and  whether  from 
hurry,  or  negligence,  or  want  of  skill,  the  mines  ex- 
jilodel  outwards,  and  at  the  very  moment  when  a 
column  of  infantry  was  defiling  under  the  castle. 
Several  streets  were  laid  in  ruins,  tliousands  of  shells 
and  other  combustibles,  which  had  been  left  in  the 
place,  were  ignited  and  driven  upwards  witli  a  hor- 
rible crash,  the  hills  rocked  above  tlie  devoted  col- 
umn, and  a  sliower  of  iron,  timber  and  stony  frag- 
neiits.  falling  on  it,  in  an  instant  destroyed  more 
than  three  huiilred  men!  Fewer  deaths  might  have 
EUiiiced  to  determine  the  crisis  of  a  great  battle! 

But  such  an  art  is  war!  So  fearful  is  the  conse- 
quence of  error,  so  terrible  the  responsibility  of  a 
peneral.  Strongly  and  wisely  did  Napoleon  speak 
when  he  told  Joseph,  that  if  he  would  command,  he 
must  give  himself  up  entirely  to  the  business,  la- 
bouring day  and  night,  thinking  of  nothing  else. 
Here  was  a  noble  army  driven  like  sheep  before 
prowling  wolves;  yet  in  every  action  tiie  inferior 
generals  had  been  prompt  and  skilful,  the  soldiers 
biava,  ready  and  daring,  firm  and  obedient  in  the 
most  trying  circumstnnces  of  battle.  Infantry,  ar- 
tillery, and  cavalry,  all  were  excellent  nnd  numer- 
ous, and  the  country  strong  nnd  favourable  for  de- 
fence ;  but  that  soul  of  armies,  t!ie  mind  of  a  great 
commnnder,  was  wanting,  and  the  Fsia,  the  Tor- 
mes,  tiie  Duero,  the  Carioa,  tiie  Pisuerga,  the  Ar- 


lanzan, seemed  to  be  dried  up—  tlie  rocks,  the  moun<» 
tains,  the  deep  ravines  to  be  levelled.  Clauzel' 
strong  positions,  Dubreton's  thundering  cattle,  hao 
disappeared  like  a  dream,  and  sixty  thousand  voter 
an  soldiers,  tliough  v.'illing  to  fight  at  every  step 
were  hurried  with  all  the  tumult  and  confusion  of 
defeat  across  the  Ebro.  Nor  was  that  barrier  found 
of  more  avail  to  mitigate  the  rushing  violence  of 
their  formidable  enemy. 

Joseph,  having  possession  of  the  impregnable 
rocks,  and  the  defile  and  forts  of  Pancorbo,  now 
thought  he  could  safely  await  for  his  reinforcements, 
and  extended  his  wings  for  the  sake  of  subsistence. 
On  the  16th,  D'Erlon  marched  to  Aro  on  the  left, 
leaving  small  posts  of  communication  between  that 
place  and  Miranda,  and  sending  detachments  to- 
wards Domingo  Cal9ada  to  watch  the  road  leading 
from  Burgos  to  Logrono.  Gezan  remained  in  the 
centre  with  a  strong  advanced  guard  beyond  Pan- 
corbo; for  as  the  king's  hope  was  to  retake  the  of- 
fensive, he  retained  the  power  of  issuing  beyond 
the  defiles,  and  his  scouting  parties  were  pushed 
forward  towards  Briviesca  in  front,  to  Zerezo  on 
the  loft  and  to  Poya  do  Sal  on  the  right.  Tlie  rest 
of  the  army  of  the  south  was  cantoned  by  divisions 
as  far  as  Armifiion  behind  the  Ebro;  and  Reille, 
v.'ho  had  occupied  Busto,  marched  to  Fspejo,  also 
behind  the  Ebro  and  on  the  great  road  to  Bilbao. 
There  being  joined  by  Sarrut's  division  from  Ordu- 
na  he  took  post,  placing  Maucune  at  Friae,  Sarrut 
at  Osma,  and  La  Martiniere  at  Espejo ;  guarding 
also  the  Puente  Lara,  and  sending  strong  scouting 
parties  towards  Medina  de  Pomar  and  Yillarcayo  on 
one  side,  and  towards  Orduna  on  the  other. 

While  these  movements  were  in  progress,  all  the 
encumbrances  of  the  armies  were  assembletl  in  the 
basin  of  Vittoria,  and  many  small  garrisons  of  the 
army  of  the  north  came  in  ;  for  Clauzel,  having  re- 
ceived the  king's  first  letter  on  the  15th  of  June, 
had  stopped  the  pursuit  of  3Iina,  and  proceeded  to 
gather  up  his  scattered  columns,  intending  to  move 
by  the  v,ay  of  Logrono  to  the  Ebro.  He  had  with 
him  Taupin's  and  Barbout's  divisions  of  the  army  of 
Portugal ;  but  after  providing  for  his  garrisons  only 
five  thousand  men  of  the  army  of  the  ncrtli  were  dis- 
posable, so  that  he  could  not  bring  more  than  four- 
teen thousand  men  to  aid  the  king ;  nevertheless, 
the  latter,  confident  in  the  strength  of  his  front, 
was  still  buoyant  with  the  liope  of  assembling  an 
army  powerful  enough  to  retake  the  ofi'ensive.  Hia 
dream  was  short-lived. 

The  13th,  while  the  echoes  of  the  explosion  at 
Burgos  were  still  ringing  in  the  hills,  Wellington's 
whole  army  was  in  motion  by  its  left  towards  the 
country  about  the  sources  of  the  Ebro.  The  Galli- 
cians  moved  from  Aguilar  de  Campo  high  up  on 
the  Pisuerga  ;  Graham,  with  the  British  lefl  wing, 
moved  from  Villa  Diego,  and  in  one  march,  reach- 
inGT  the  river,  passed  it  on  the  14th  at  the  bridges  of 
Rocamunde  and  San  .Martin,  'i'he  centre  of  the  a.r 
my  fijllowed  on  the  ]r)tii,and  the  same  dsy  '^le  light 
wing  under  Hill  mMrched  througli  the  Bureba  and 
crossed  at  the  Puente  Arenas.  'I'his  general  move 
ment  was  masked  by  the  cavalry  and  by  the  Span- 
ish irregulars,  who  infi'sted  the  rear  of  the  French 
on  the  roads  to  Briviesca  and  Domingo  Cal(jada  ; 
and  the  allies,  beinor  thus  suddenly  placed  between 
the  sources  of  the  Ebro  and  the  great  nifumtains  of 
Reynosa,  cut  the  French  entirely  off  from  V  e  sea- 
coast.  All  the  ports  except  Santona  and  Miibao, 
were  immediately  evacuated  by  the  enemy  ;  Santo- 
na was  invested  by  Mendizabel,  Porlier,  Barcena, 
and  Campillo,  and  the  I'higlish  vessels  cnterinl  Sant 
Andcro,  where   a   depot   and    hospital   station  was 


1S13] 


NAPIERM    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


587 


<jsi.ri;>iishec],  because  the  royal  roarl  from  tlionre 
tlirougli  ilayuosa  to  Burgos  furnisiied  a  free  conimii 
nicotion  with  tlie  army.  This  single  blow  sever 
cd  tiie  connection  of  the  English  force  with  Por- 
tiJij'al.  'I'liat  country  was  cast  otF  by  tlie  army  as  a 
heavy  ten.'er  is  cast  from  its  towing  rope,  ami  all 
the  Hriti.sh  mihtary  estaiilishments  were  broken  up 
an  i  traudlerred  by  sea  to  the  coast  of  Biscay. 

The  Eng-l.sh  general  had  now  liis  ciioice  of  two 
modes  of  action.  The  one  to  marcli  bodily  down 
tiie  lefc  bank  of  tlie  Ebro,  and  fall  upon  tlie  enemy 
wherever  he  could  meet  with  them  ;  the  other  to  ad- 
vance, Sbill  turning-  the  king's  right,  and  by  enter- 
ing Guipascoa,  to  |)lace  the  army  on  tlie  great  com- 
numicatiou  with  France,  while  the  fleet,  keeping 
pace  with  this  movement,  furnished  fresh  depots  at 
Bilbao  and  other  ports.  The  first  plan  was  a  deli- 
cate and  uncertain  operation,  because  of  the  many 
narrow  and  dangerous  defiles  which  were  to  be 
passed;  but  the  second,  which  could  scarcely  be 
contravened,  was  secure  even  if  the  first  should  fail ; 
botii  were  compatible  to  a  certain  point,  inasmuch 
as  to  gain  the  great  road  leading  from  Burgos  by 
OrJuna  to  Bilbao,  was  a  good  step  for  either,  and 
failing  in  that,  the  road  leading  Ijy  Valmaceda  to 
Bilbao  was  still  in  reserve.  Wherefore,  with  an 
eagle's  sweep,  Wellington  brought  his  left  wing 
round,  and  pouring  his  numerous  columns  through 
all  t!ie  deep  narrow  valleys  and  rugged  defiles,  dc- 
BCsnded  towards  the  great  road  of  Bilbao  between 
Frias  and  Orduna.  At  Medina  de  Pomar,  a  cen- 
t.al  point,  he  left  the  sixth  division  to  guard  his 
stores  and  supplies,  but  the  march  of  the  other  di- 
visions was  unmitigated  ;  neither  the  winter  gullies 
nor  the  ravines,  nor  the  precipitate  passes  amongst 
the  rocks,  retarded  the  march  even  of  the  artillery  ; 
wh"  0  iiorses  could  not  draw,  men  hauled,  and  when 
tbj  wheels  would  not  roll,  the  guns  were  let  down 
or  lifted  up  with  ropes;  and  strongly  did  the  rough 
veteran  infantry  work  tlieir  way  through  tliose  wild 
"but  beautiful  regions  ;  six  days  they  toiled  unceas- 
ingly ;  on  the  seventh,  swelled  by  the  junction  of 
Longa's  division  and  all  the  smaller  bands  which 
came  trickling  from  the  mountains,  they  burst  like 
raging  streams  from  every  defile,  and  went  foaming 
into  the  basin  at  Vittoria, 

Duri:igthis  time  many  reports  reached  the  French, 
8ome  absurdly  exaggerated,  as  that  Wellington  had 
oni;  hundred  and  ninety  thousand  men  ;  but  all  indi- 
cating more  or  less  distinctly  the  true  line  and  di- 
rection of  his  march.  As  early  as  the  15th,  Jour- 
dan  had  warned  Joseph  that  the  allies  would  proba- 
bly turn  his  right ;  and  as  the  reports  of  iMaucune's 
Bcouts  told  of  the  presence  of  English  troo])s,  that 
day,  on  the  side  of  Puente  Arenas,  he  pressed  the 
king  to  send  the  army  of  Portugal  to  Valmaceda, 
and  to  close  the  other  armies  towards  the  same  quar- 
ter. Josei)h  yielded  so  far,  that  Re'lle  was  ordered 
to  concentrate  his  troops  at  Osma  on  tlie  morning  of 
the  IHth,  with  the  view  of  gaining  Valmaceda  by 
Orduna,  if  it  was  still  possible;  if  not  he  was  to  de- 
scend fH.pidly  from  l-odio  upon  Bilb.-io,  and  to  rally 
Foy's  division  and  the  garrisons  of  Biscay  upon  the 
army  of  Portugal.  At  the  same  time  (iazan  was 
directed  to  send  a  division  of  infentry  and  a  regi- 
ment of  dragoons  from  the  army  of  tlie  south  to  re- 
lieve Reille's  ti'oops  at  Puente  Tiara  and  Espejo, 
but  no  g  iueral  and  decided  dispositions  were  made. 

Il'^ille  immediately  ordered  M-iucune  to  quit  Fri- 
as and  join  liim  at  0.-:ina  with  his  division  :  yet  hav- 
ing some  fears  f^r  his  safef.y,  gave  him  the  ^lioice  of 
coming  by  tlie  direct  road  across  the  hills,  or  by  the 
circuitous  route  of  Puente  Lara.  Maiicune  st;irted 
late  in  the  night  of  the  17th  by  the  direct  road,  and 


I  vyhen  Reille  himself  rc:iched  Osma,  with  La  Mar- 
I  tiniore's  and  .Sarrut's  divisions,  on  the  inurning  of 
j  the  18th,  he  fouud  a  strong  English  column  is.suing 
from  the  denies  in  his  front,  and  the  head  of  it  was 
already  at  Barbarcna  in  posscrsion  of  the  liigh  road 
to  Orduna.  This  was  general  (iJraham  With  the 
first,  tliird,  and  fiftli  divisions,  and  a  cciisiderable 
body  of  cavalry.  'i"he  French  gcnerul,  who  had 
about  eiglit  tliousand  infantry  and  fourteen  guns,  at 
first  made  a  demontztration  with  Harrut's  division  in 
the  view  of  forcing  the  British  to  shew  their  wiiole 
force,  and  a  sharp  skirmish  and  heavy  cannonade  en- 
sued, wherein  fifty  men  fell  on  the  side  of  the  allies, 
above  a  hundred  on  that  of  the  enemy.  But  at  ];alf 
past  two  o'clock,  Maucune  had  not  arrived,  .•■.nd  be- 
yond the  mountains,  on  the  lell  of  the  French,  the 
sound  of  a  battle  arose,  wiiich  seemed  to  advance 
Rlong  the  valley  of  Boveda  into  the  rear  of  O&ma; 
Reille,  suspecting  what  had  hapj)ened,  instantly  re- 
tired, fighting,  towards  Espejo,  where  the  mouths  of 
the  valleys  opened  on  each  other;  and  from  that  of 
Boveda,  and  the  hills  on  the  lelt,  Maucune's  trooi'g 
rushed  forth  begrimed  with  dust  and  powder,  breath- 
less, and  broken  into  confused  masses. 

That  general,  proverbially  daring,  marched  over 
the  Ara^ena  ridge  instead  of  going  by  the  Puente 
Lara;  and  his  leading  brigade,  after  clearing  the 
defiles,  had  halted  on  the  bank  of  a  rivulet  near  the 
village  of  .San  Millan,  in  the  valley  of  Boveda.  In 
this  situation,  without  planting  picquets,  they  were 
waiting  for  their  other  brigade  and  the  baggi'ge, 
when  suddenly  the  light  division  which  had  been 
moving  by  a  line  parallel  with  Graham's  march,  ap- 
peared on  some  rising  ground  in  their  ficnt ;  the 
surprise  was  equal  on  both  sides,  but  the  British  ri- 
flemen instantly  dashed  down  the  hill  with  Icud 
cries  and  a  bickering  fire  ;  the  fifty-second  followed 
in  support,  and  the  French  retreated  figiitiig  as  they 
best  could.  The  rest  of  the  English  reginicnts  hav- 
ing remained  in  reserve,  were  watching  this  combat 
and  tliinking  all  their  enemies  were  before  them, 
when  the  second  French  brigade,  Ibllowed  by  the 
baggage,  came  liastily  out  from  a  narrow  chdt  in 
some  perpendicular  rocks  on  the  right  hand.  A  very 
confused  action  now  commenced,  for  the  reserve 
scrambled  over  some  rough  intervening  ground  to 
attack  this  new  enemy,  and  the  French,  to  avoid 
them,  made  for  a  hill  a  little  way  in  their  front, 
whereu])on  the  fifty-second,  whose  rear  was  thus  me- 
naced, wheeled  round,  and  running  at  full  speed  up 
the  hill,  met  them  on  the  summit.  However,  the 
French  soldiers,  without  losing  their  presei:ce  of 
mind,  threw  oft'  their  packs,  and  half  flying,  half 
fighting,  escaped  along  tlie  side  of  the  mcuntaina 
towards  Miranda,  while  the  first  brigade,  still  re- 
treating on  the  road  towards  Espejo,  were  pursued 
by  the  riflemen.  31eaiiwliile  the  sumpter  animals, 
being  afl'righted,  run  wildly  about  the  rocks  with  a 
wonderful  clamour  ;  and  though  the  escort,  liudciled 
togetlier,  fought  desperately,  all  the  baggage  became 
the  spoil  of  the  victors,  and  four  hundred  of  the 
French  fell  or  were  taken  ;  the  rest,  thanks  to  their 
unyielding  resolution  and  activity,  escaped,  though 
pursued  through  the  mountains  by  some  Spanish  ir- 
regulars ;  and  Reille,  being  still  jiressed  by  Graham, 
then  retreated  behind  Salinas  de  Afiara. 

A  knowledge  of  those  events  reached  the  kir^ 
that  night  ;  yet  neitlier  Reille  nor  the  few  [)risoner8 
he  had  made,  could  account  ibr  more  than  six  Anglo- 
Portuguese  divisions  at  tiie  defiles  ;  hence,  as  no 
troops  liad  been  felt  on  the  great  road  from  Burgos, 
it  was  judged  tliat  Hill  was  marching  with  the  oth- 
ers by  Valmaceda  into  (Jiiipuscon.  to  menace  the 
great   communicatiou  with    France.      However,  it 


68 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XX. 


was  clear  that  six  divisions  were  conccntratsd  on 
the  right  and  rearoftlie  French  armies,  and  no  time 
was  to  ba  hjst  in  extricatini]^  the  hitter  from  its  criti- 
cal situation  ;  wlierelbre  Gazan  and  D'Erlon  march- 
ed in  tli3  nigiit  to  units  at  Arminon,  a  central  point 
behind  tlie  Zadora  river,  up  the  left  bank  of  which 
it  was  necessary  to  file  in  order  to  gain  the  basin  of 
ViLtoria.  But  the  latter  could  only  be  entered,  at 
that  side,  through  the  pass  of  Puebla  de  Arganzan, 
which  was  two  miles  long,  and  so  narrow  as  scarce- 
ly to  furnish  room  lor  the  great  road  ;  Ueille  there- 
fore, to  cover  this  dangerous  movement,  fell  back 
during  tiie  night  to  Subijana  Morillas,  on  the  Bayas 
river.  lEs  oru'ers  were  to  dispute  the  grotind  vig- 
orously ;  for  by  that  route  WellingtoH  could  enter 
the  basin  before  Gazan,  and  D'Erlon  could  thread 
the  pass  of  Puebla  ;  he  could  also  send  a  corps  from 
Frias  to  attack  thsir  rear  on  tlie  Miranda  side,  while 
they  were  engaged  in  the  defile.  One  of  these 
things,  by  all  means,  he  should  have  endeavoured  to 
accomplish ;  but  the  troops  had  made  very  long 
marches  on  the  18th,  and  it  was  dark  before  the 
fourth  division  had  reached  Esptjo.  D'Erlon  and 
Gazan,  therefore,  united  at  Armiilon  without  diffi- 
culty, about  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  19th, 
and  immediately  comm-:^nced  the  passage  of  the  de- 
file of  Puobla,  and  the  head  of  their  column  appear- 
ed on  the  other  side  at  the  moment  when  Welling- 
ton was  driving  Reille  back  upon  the  Zadora. 

The  allies  had  reached  Bayas  before  mid-day  of 
the  19th,  and  if  they  could  have  forced  the  passage 
ut  once,  the  armies  of  the  centre  and  of  the  south 
would  have  been  cut  off  from  Vittoria  and  destroy- 
ed ;  but  the  army  of  Portugal  was  strongly  posted, 
the  front  covered  by  the  river,  the  right  by  the  vil- 
lage of  .Subijana  de  Morrillas,  which  v.'as  occupied 
as  a  bridge-liead,  and  the  left  secured  by  some  very 
rugged  heights  opposite  the  village  of  Pobes.  This 
position  was  turned  by  the  light  division,  while  the 
fourth  division  attacked  it  in  front ;  and  after  a  skir- 
mish, in  which  about  eighty  of  the  French  lell.  Reil- 
le was  forced  over  the  Zadora  ;  but  the  army  of  the 
centre  had  then  passed  the  deiile  of  Puebla,  and  was 
in  position  behind  that  river  ;  the  army  of  the  south 
was  coming  rapidly  into  second  line  ;  the  crisis  had 
passed,  the  combat  ceased,  and  the  allies  pitched 
their  tents  on  the  Bayas.  Tiie  French  armies  now 
formed  three  lines  behind  the  Zadora,  and  the  king 
hearing  thatClauzel  was  at  Logrono,  eleven  leagues 
distant,  expedited  orders  to  him  to  march  upon  Vit- 
toria ;  general  Foy  also,  who  was  in  march  for  Bil- 
bao, was  directed  to  halt  at  Durango,  to  rally  all  the 
garrisons  of  iJiscay  and  Guipuscoa  there,  and  then 
to  come  down  on  Vittoria.  These  orders  were  re- 
ceived too  late. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

Confused  state  of  (he  French  in  the  basin  of  ViftoriR — Tivo 
Cdmvovs  »!•>■  sent  tii  tfie  rear — Flic  kin^  taKes  npa  new  onler 
ot"  liatllt- — Tlie  G;iHirians  march  to  s<  iz.i-  Orduna  hut  nn-  re- 
called— («r:ihain  niarchis  across  the  hi!U  to  Mingnia — R.  la- 
tive  str<  ii^jth  and  pot'ilion  of  the  hostile  anmes — liallle  of 
Vittoria— J  )-e|)li  retreats  by  Sdralierra — VV,  II  injiioii  (inr- 
suts  hiiM  ni)  lire  HoriMulia  and  Araquil  \alle^■.■ — Sends  I,oii- 
pa  and  (iiicn  into  tiuipii-io:i — Juscfili  li  .|ls  al  Yrursiin — De- 
taches Ihe  ar.uv  cit  I'ljiiiigal  to  the  liida'soa — Ril.eals  vvilli 
the  army  of  the  centre  and  (tie  army  ol  llie  south  to  I'an:;  e- 
luna — \Vellini;ton  tietaches  Graham  throiifjh  the  niount^/in- 
by  tlie  |)  iss  ol  St.  Adrian  iiit  i  Gui|)iisc..a  and  marches  him- 
self to   Panipeliina — Combat   wild    Ihe    Fif-nch    rear-{;uard  — 

Jose).|i  red.  Ills  up   I  ,e  valley  of    Honceialh GentrrtI    Fo\ 

rallies  the  Fr>  iich  troops  in  Guipuscoa  and  fi»its  the  SjinM- 
isrds  al  Mdiitdriooii — R.-lreat*  to  l?erj;;ira  and  Villa  Franca 
— tjral:ain  enteis  Guiou-coa — Coiiibal  on  the  Op'o  river — 
Foy  relirtc  tj  'ioljsa — Combai  '.litre — Ihe  I  ftach  m^U  on 


the  sea-coa-t  abandoned  with  exception  of  Saiitona  and  St 
b<t)aslii;n — Foy  retires  behind  th^j  bidassoa — (^lai.ztl  advan- 
ces towards  Vittoria — Retires  to  Lof;iono — Wellington  en- 
<ieu\oiirs  to  surround  him — He  makes  a  loiced  manh  to 
Tu(l<  la — Is  in  g^reat  danger — F.scapes  to  Z:iragoza — Haltn 
tht  re — is  dcCt  iv<  d  bv  -Miiia  and  finally  man  lies  to  Jaccn — 
G:.z;in  It-enters  S|;ain  and  occupies  the  \  alley  o(  lia-laci — 
O  Donel  reduces  the  forts  of  I'aiK'orbo — Hill  di!>es  G.izaii 
Iroin  the  valley  of  Bastaii — Obsei  vations. 

The  basin  into  which  the  king  h.ad  new  poured  all 
his  troops,  his  pares,  convoys,  and  encumbuuices  cf 
every  kind,  was  about  eight  miles  brctid  by  ten  in 
length,  V  ittorla  being  at  the  further  end.  1  he  river 
Zadora,  narrow  and  with  rugged  banks,  nfter  past- 
ing very  near  that  town,  runs  towards  tiie  ELro  with 
many  windings,  and  divides  the  bcsin  untqually, 
the  largest  portion  being  on  the  right  bai:k.  A 
traveller  coming  from  Miranda  by  the  royal  Mat'rid 
road,  would  enter  the  basin  by  the  pass  cf  Puebla, 
through  which  the  Zadora  flows  between  two  veiy 
high  and  rough  mountain  ridges,  the  one  on  his  right 
hand  being  called  the  heights  of  Puebla,  that  on  Ijis 
lel't  hand  the  heights  of  I\i,orillas.  The  road  leads 
up  the  left  bank  of  the  river,  and  en  emerging  from 
the  pass,  on  the  lelt  hand  at  the  distance  ot  t:bout 
six  miles  would  be  seen  the  village  ct  Subijana  t'e 
Morillas,  furnishing  tht-.t  opening  into  the  basin 
which  Reille  defended  while  the  other  armies  pass- 
ed the  delila  of  Puebla.  The  spires  of  Vittoria 
would  appear  about  eight  miles  distant,  and  frrni 
that  town  the  road  to  Lcgroiio  goes  off  en  tl/C  right 
hand,  the  road  to  Bilbao,  by  Murgia  and  Grtiuila,  on 
the  left  hand,  crossing  the  Zadora  at  a  bridge  near 
the  village  of  Ariaga;  further  on,  the  roads  to  Es- 
tella  and  to  Pampeluntt  branch  oil  on  the  right,  a 
road  to  Durango  on  the  left,  and  between  them  the 
royal  causeway  leads  over  the  great  Arloban  ridge 
into  the  mountains  of  Guiiiuscoa  by  the  formidable 
deriles  of  Salinas.  But  of  all  these  roads,  though 
several  were  practicable  for  gin:s,  especially  that  to 
Pampelur.a,  the  royal  causeway  alone  cculd  huflice 
for  the  retreat  of  such  an  encumbered  army.  Aiid 
as  the  allies  were  behind  the  hills  forming  tl.e  basin 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  Zadora,  tiieir  line  being 
parallel  to  the  great  causeway,  it  Icllowcd,  that  by 
prolonging  their  left  they  would  infallibly  cut  otl'the 
French  from  that  route. 

Joseph  felt  the  danger,  and  his  first  thought  was 
to  march  by  .Salinas  to  Durango,  with  a  view  to 
cover  his  communications  with  France,  and  to  rally 
Foy's  troops  and  the  garrisons  of  Guipuscca  r.nd 
Biscay.  But  in  that  rough  country,  neitlier  his  ar- 
tillery nor  his  cavalry,  on  which  he  greatly  depend- 
ed, though  the  cavalry  and  artillery  of  the  allies 
were  scarcely  less  powerful,  could  act  or  subsist,  and 
he  would  have  to  send  them  into  France  ;  and  if 
l)ressed  by  Wellington  in  front,  and  turrcunded  by 
all  tiie  bands  in  a  mountainous  region,  favcurable 
for  those  irregulars,  he  could  not  Icng  remain  in 
Spain.  It  was  then  proposed,  if  forced  from  the 
basin  of  Vittoria,  to  retire  by  Salvatierra  to  Vi'm- 
peluna  and  bring  Suchet's  army  u]j  to  Zarpgoza  ;  but 
Joseph  feared  thus  to  lose  tlie  great  communication 
with  France,  because  the  Spanish  regular  army, 
aided  by  all  the  bands,  could  seize  Tolosa,  wlile 
Wellington  operated  against  him  on  the  side  of  Na 
varre.  It  was  replied,  tiiat  troops  detached  from  the 
army  of  the  north  and  from  that  of  Portugal  might 
oppose  them  ;  still  the  king  hesitated,  for  though  tiie 
road  to  Pampeluna  w;is  called  practicable  for  wheels, 
it  required  something  more  for  the  enormous  mass 
of  guns  and  carriages  of  all  kinds  now  heaped  around 
Vittoria. 

One  large  convoy  had  already  marched  on  the 
19th,  bv  the  royal  causeway,  for  France;  unoth:;r 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR    WAR. 


58 


stiH  larg-er,  was  to  move  on  the  21st,  under  escort  of 
I  Mancuiic's  division  ;  tlie  tightinjj  men  in  front  of  the 
flnomy  were  tJi'is  diminished,  and  yet^the  plain  was 
still  covered  with  artillery  pares  and  equipages  of 
all  kinds;  and  Joseph,  shut  up  in  the  basin  of  Vit- 
toria,  vacillating  and  infirm  of  purpose,  continued  to 
waste  time  in  vain  conjectures  about  his  adversary's 
movements.  '  Hence,  on  the  19th,  nothing  was  done, 
but  the  2:Jth,  some  infantry  and  cavalry  of  the  army 
of  Portugal  passed  the  Zadora  to  feel  for  the  allies 
towards  Murgula  ;  and  being  encountered  by  Longa's 
Spaniards  at  the  distance  of  six  miles,  after  some 
«u:;cessful  skirmishing,  recrossed  the  Zadora  with 
the  loss  of  twenty  men.  On  the  21st,  at  three 
o'clock  in  the  morning,  Maacuno's  division,  more 
tiiaTi  three  thousand  good  soldiers,  marched  with  the 
eeoond  convoy,  and  tiie  king  took  up  a  new  line 
of  battle. 

R^ille's  army,  reinforced  by  a  Franco-Spanish 
brigade  of  infantry,  and  by  Digeon's  division  of 
dragoons  from  the  army  of  the  south,  now  formed  the 
extreme  right,  having  to  defend  the  passage  of  the 
Zadora,  where  the  Bilbao  and  Durango  roads  cross- 
ed it  by  the  bridges  of  Gamara  Mayor  and  Ariaga. 
The  French  division  defended  the  bridge  ;  the  Fran- 
co-Spanish brigade  was  pushed  forward  to  Durana 
on  t!ie  royal  road,  and  was  supported  by  a  French 
battalion  and  a  brigade  of  light  horsemen  ;  Digeon's 
dragoons  and  a  second  brigade  of  light  cavalry  were 
in  reserve  behind  the  Zadora,  near  Zuazo  de  Alava 
and  Hermandad.  The  centre  of  the  king's  army, 
distant  six  or  eight  miles  from  Gamara,  following 
the  course  of  the  Zadora,  was  on  another  front,  be- 
cause the  stream,  turning  suddenly  to  the  left  round 
t!ie  heights  of  Margarita,  descends  to  the  defile  of 
Puebla,  nearly  at  right  angles  with  its  previous 
coarse.  Here,  covered  by  tlie  river  and  on  an  easy 
open  range  of  heights,  for  the  basin  of  Vittoria  is 
broken  by  a  variety  of  ground,  Gazan's  right  exten- 
ded from  the  royal  road  to  an  isolated  hill  in  front  of 
the  village  of  Margarita.  His  centre  was  astride 
tiie  royal  road,  in  front  of  the  village  of  Arinez  ;  his 
left  occupied  more  rugged  ground,  being  placed  be- 
hind Subij^na  de  Alava  on  the  roots  of  the  Puehla 
mountain,  focing  the  defile  of  that  name  ;  and  to 
cover  this  wing,  a  brigade  under  general  Maransin 
was  posted  on  the  Puel)la  mountain.  D'Erlon's  ar- 
my was  in  second  line.  The  principal  mass  of  the 
cavalry  with  many  guns,  and  the  king's  guards, 
formed  a  reserve,  beliind  the  centre,  about  tlie  vil- 
lage of  Gomecha,  and  fifty  pieces  of  artillery  v^'ere 
massed  in  the  front,  pointing  to  the  bridges  of  3Ien- 
doza,  Tres  Puent-^s,  Villodas,  and  Nanclarcs. 

While  the  king  was  making  conjectures,  Welling- 
ton was  making  virions  dispositions  for  the  different 
operations  which  might  occur.  He  knew  that  the 
Andalusian  reserve  would  be  at  Burgos  in  a  few 
days,  and  thinking  that  Joseph  would  not  fight  on 
the  Zadora.  detached  (iiron  with  the  Gallicians  on 
the  19th,  to  seize  Orduna;  Graham's  corps  was  at 
first  destined  to  follow  Giron,  but  finally  penetrated 
through  difficult  mountain  ways  to  Murguia,  thus 
cutting  tlie  enemy  off  from  Bilbao  and  menacing  hie 
communications  with  France.  However,  the  rear 
of  the  army  had  been  so  much  scattered  in  the  pre- 
vious marches,  that  Wellington  halted  on  the  2(/th 
to  rally  his  columns  ;  and  taking  that  opportunity  to 
examine  the  position  of  the  French  armi'^K,  observ- 
ed that  tliey  seemed  steadfast  to  fight ;  whereupon, 
immediately  changing  his  own  dispositions,  he  gave 
(Jraham  fresh  orders,  and  hastily  recalled  Giron  from 
Orduna. 

The  long  expected  battle  was  now  at  hand,  and 
on  neither  side  were  the  numbers  and  courage  of  the 


troops  of  mean  account.  The  allies  had  !v<«  about 
two  hundred  killed  and  wounded  in  the  jjre-ious  op- 
erations, and  tlie  sixtii  division,  six  thousand  five 
hundred  strong,  was  left  at  Medina  de  Pomar  , 
hence,  only  sixty  thousand  Anglo-Portuguese  sa- 
bres and  bayonets,  with  ninety  i)icces  of  canndn, 
were  actually  in  the  field;  but  the  Spanish  auxil- 
iaries were  above  twenty  thousand,  and  the  wliolo 
army,  including  Serjeants  and  artillery-men,  exceed- 
ed eighty  thousand  combatants.  For  the  French 
side,  as  the  regular  muster-roll  of  tlieir  troops  was 
lost  with  the  battle,  an  approximation  to  their 
strength  must  suffice.  The  number  killed  and  taken 
in  diiferent  combats,  from  tlie  Etla  and  'J'ornics  to 
the  Zadora,  was  about  two  thousand  men,  and  some 
five  thousand  had  marched  to  France  with  the  two 
convoys.  On  the  other  hand,  Sarrut's  division,  the, 
garrison  of  Vittoria,  and  the  many  smaller  posts  re- 
linquished by  the  army  of  the  nortli,  had  increased 
the  king's  forces  ;  and  hence,  by  a  comparison  with 
former  returns,  it  v.'ould  appear,  that  in  -the  gross, 
about  seventy  thousand  men  were  present.  W  here- 
fore,  deducting  tiie  officers,  the  artillery-men,  sap- 
pers, miners,  and  non-combatants,  which  are  al- 
ways borne  on  the  French  muster-rolls,  the  sabres 
and  bayonets  would  scarcely  reach  sixty  thousand  ; 
but  in  the  number  and  size  of  their  guns  tlie  French 
had  the  advantage. 

The  defects  of  tlie  king's  position  were  apparent 
both  in  the  general  arrangement  and  in  the  details. 
His  best  line  of  retreat  was  on  the  prolongation  of 
his  right  flank,  which,  being  at  Gamara  Mayor, 
close  to  Vittoria,  was  too  distant  to  be  supported  by 
the  main  body  of  the  army  ;  and  yet  the  safety  of 
the  latter  depended  upon  the  preservation  of  Reill^'s 
position.  Instead  of  having  the  rear  clear,  and  the 
field  of  battle  free,  many  thousand  carriages  and 
impediments  of  all  kinds  were  lieaped  about  Vitto- 
ria, blocking  all  the  roads,  and  creating  confusion 
amongst  the  artillery  pares.  Maransin's  brigade, 
placed  on  the  heights  above  Puebla,  was  isolated 
and  too  weak  to  hold  that  ground.  The  centre,  in- 
deed, occupied  an  easy  range  of  hills  ;  its  front  was 
open,  with  a  sloj^e  to  the  river,  and  powerful  batter- 
ies seemed  to  ba  all  access  by  the  bridges ;  never- 
theless, many  ol  i  "e  guns  being  pushed  with  an  ad- 
vanced post  into  ij  deep  loop  of  tiie  Zadora,  were 
within  musket-shot  of  a  wood  on  the  right  bank, 
which  was  steep  and  rugged,  so  that  the  allies  found 
good  cover  close  to  the  river. 

There  were  seven  bridges  within  the  scheme  of 
the  operations,  namely,  the  bridge  of  la  Pucbla,  on 
the  French  left  beyond  the  defile;  the  bri('ge  of 
Nanclares,  facing  Subijana  de  Alava,  and  the  I'  rencJi 
end  of  the  defile  of  Puebla;  then  three  bridges 
which,  placed  around  the  deep  loop  of  the  river  be- 
fore mentioned,  opened  altogether  upon  the  right  of 
the  French  centre,  that  of  Mendoza  being  highest 
up  the  stream,  tliat  of  Vellodas  lowest  down  the 
stream,  and  that  of  Tres  Puentes  in  the  centre  ; 
lastly,  the  bridges  of  Gamara  Mayor  and  Ariaga  on 
the  Upper  Zadora,  opposite  Vittoria,  which  were 
guarded  by  Riello,  completed  the  number,  and  none 
of  tlie  seven  were  either  broken  or  entrenched. 

Wellington,  having  well  observed  tlicse  things, 
formed  his  army  for  tliree  distinct  battles. 

Sir  Tiiomas  Graham,  moving  from  Murguia  by 
the  Bilbao  road,  was  to  fall  on  Reillo,  and,  if  jiossi 
ble,  to  force  the  passage  of  the  river  at  (Jamara 
Mayor  and  Ariaga  ;  by  tiiis  movement  the  French 
would  be  completely  turned,  and  tlie  greatest  part 
of  their  forces  shut  up  between  tlie  Puobla  moun- 
tains on  one  side  and  tlie  Zadora  on  the  other  The 
first   and    fifth    Angle-Portuguese   divisions,   Brad- 


&90 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XX. 


ford's  and  Pack's  indopendont  Portugtiosc  brigades, 
Longa'tf  Spanish  division,  and  Anson's  and  IJock's 
cavalry,  in  all,  nearly  twenty  thousand  men  with 
eighteen  pieces  of  cannon,  v/ere  destined  for  this  at- 
tack ;  and  Giron's  Gai'.icians,  recalled  trom  Ordufia, 
Came  up  by  a  forced  march  in  snpport. 

Sir  Rowland  Hill  was  to  attack  the  enemy's  left; 
and  his  corps,  also  about  twenty  tliousaiid  strong, 
was  composed  of-Morillo"s  Sjianiards,  Silveira's  Por- 
tuguese, and  the  second  British  division,  together 
with  some  cavalry  and  guns.  It  was  collected  on 
the  southern  slope  of  the  ridge  of  Morillas,  between 
tiie  Bayas  and  the  Lower  Zadora,  pointing  to  the 
village  of  Pucbla,  and  was  destined  to  force  the  pas- 
sage cf  the  river  at  that  point;  to  assail  the  French 
troops  on  the  heigfits  beyond  ;  to  thread  the  defile  of 
La  Puobla,  and  to  enter  the  basin  of  \  ittoria  ;  thus 
turning  and  menacing  all  the  French  left,  and  secur- 
ing the  passage  of  the  Zadora  at  the  bridge  of  Nan- 
clares. 

The  centre  attack,  directed  by  Wellington  in  per- 
son, consisted  of  the  third,  fourth,  seventh  and  light 
divisions  of  infantry,  the  great  mass  nf  the  artillery, 
the  heavy  cavalry,  and  U'Urban's  Portuguese  horse- 
men, in  all,  nearly  thirty  thousand  combatants. 
They  were  encam])ed  along  the  Bayas  from  Subi- 
jana  Morillas  to  Ulivarre,  and  had  only  to  march 
across  the  ridges  which  formed  the  basin  ofYitto- 
ria  on  that  side,  to  come  down  to  their  different 
points  of  attack  on  the  Zadora  ;  that  is  to  say,  the 
bridges  of  Alendoza,  Tres  Puentes,  Villodas  and 
Nanclares.  But  so  rugged  was  the  country,  and  the 
communications  between  the  different  columns  so 
ditRcult,  that  no  exact  concert  could  be  expected, 
and  each  general  of  division  was  in  some  degreo 
master  of  his  movements. 

BATTLE  OF  VITTORIA. 

At  day-break  on  the  21st,  the  weather  being 
rainy,  with  a  thick  vapour,  the  troops  moved  from 
their  camps  on  the  Bayas  ;  and  tlie  centre  of  the  ar- 
my, advancing  by  columns  from  the  right  and  le!t  of 
the  line,  passed  the  ridges  in  front,  and  entering  the 
basin  of  Vittoria,  slowly  approached  the  Zadora. 
The  left-hand  column  pointed  to  Mendoza,  the  right- 
hand  column  skirted  the  ridge  of  Morillas,  on  the 
other  side  of  which  Hill  was  marching;  and  that 
general  having  seized  the  village  of  Puebla  about 
ten  o'clock,  commenced  passing  the  river  there. 
Morillo's  Spaniards  led,  and  their  first  brigade, 
moving  on  a  bye-way,  assailed  the  mountain  to  the 
right  of  the  great  road  ;  the  ascent  was  so  steep 
that  the  soldiers  appeared  to  climb  rather  than  to 
walk  up,  and  the  second  Spanish  brigade,  being  to 
connect  the  first  with  the  British  troops  below,  as- 
cended otily  half  way;  little  or  no  opposition  wss 
made  nntil  the  first  brigade  was  near  the  summit, 
when  a  sliarp  skirmishing  commenced,  and  Morilio 
was  wounded,  but  would  not  quit  tiie  fi^ld  ;  his  sec- 
ond brigade  joined  him,  and  the  T'rench,  feeling  the 
importance  of  the  height,  reinforced  Maransin  with 
a  fresh  regiment.  Tlien  Hill  succoured  Morillo  with 
the  seventy-first  regiment,  and  a  battalion  of  light 
infantry,  both  under  colonel  fJadogan  ;  yet  the  figiit 
wa?  doubtful,  for  though  the  British  secured  the  sum- 
mit, and  gained  ground  along  the  side  of  the  moun- 
tain, (Jadngan,  a  brave  officer  and  of  high  prom- 
ise, f'll.  and  (iazan,  calling  Villatte's  div'S'on  from 
behind  Arlfiez,  sent  it  to  the  succour  of  his  side; 
and  so  strongly  did  these  troops  fight,  that  t*e  bpt- 
tle  remained  stationary,  the  allies  iseing  scarcely 
able  to  hold  their  ground.  H  11,  however,  again 
6"nt  fresh  troops  to  tlicir  assistnnco.  vnd  with  the 
remainder  of  his  corps  passing  the  Z;.dora,  tliread- 


'  ed  the  long  defile   of  Puebla,  and    fiercely  issuing 
;  forth  on  the  other  side,  won  tfie  villuge  of  Subijana 
de  Alava  in  front  of  Gazan's  l.ne  ;  he  thus  connect- 
,  ed  his  own  right  with  the  troops  on  the  mountain, 
j  and  maintained  this  forward  position  in  despite  of 
j  the  enemy's  vigorous  efiorts  to  dislodge  him. 
I      Meanwiiile    Wellington   had   brought  the    fourth 
I  and  light  divisions,  the  heavy  cavalry,  the  hussara 
i  and  Durban's  Portuguese  horsemen,  from  Sub.jana 
j  Morillas,  and  Montcvite,  down  by  Lilabarre  to  the 
I  Zadora.     The  fourth  division  vvus  placed  opposite 
the  bridge  of  Nanclares,  the  light  division  opposite 
the  bridge  of  A'illodas,  both  well  covered  by  rugged 
ground  and  woods;    and  the  light  division  was  so 
close  to  the  water,  that  their  skiimisher^  could  with 
ease  have  killed  the  P'rench  gunners  of  the  advanc- 
ed post  in  the  loop  of  the  river  at  Villodas.     The 
weather  had  cleared  up,  and  when  Hill's  battle  bo 
gan,  the  riflemen  of  the  light  division,  spreading 
along  the  bank,  exchanged  a  biting  fire  with  tlie 
enemy's    skirmishers ;    but    no    serious    efiort    wag 
made,    because    the    third    and    seventh    divisions, 
meeting  with  rough  ground,  had  not   reached  their 
point  of   attack ;  and   it   would    have    been    impru- 
dent   to  push  the  fourth  division  and   the    cavalry 
over  the  bridge  of  Nanclares,  and  thus  crowd  a  great 
body  of  troops  in  front  of  the  Puebla  defile,  before 
the  other  divisions  were  ready  to  attack  the  right 
and  centre  of  the  enemy. 

While  thus  waiting,  a  Spanish  peasant  told  Wel- 
lington that  the  bridge  of  Tres  Puentes  on  the  letl 
of  the  light  division,  was  unguarded,  and  oliered  to 
guide  the  troops  over  it.  Kempt's  brigade  of  the 
light  division  was  instantly  directed  towards  this 
point;  and  being  concealed  by  some  locks  from  the 
French,  and  well  led  by  the  brave  peasant,  they 
passed  the  narrow  bridge  at  a  running  pace,  mount- 
ed a  steep  curving  rise  of  ground,  and  htlted  ckse. 
under  the  crest  on  the  enemy's  side  of  the  river,  be- 
ing then  actually  behind  the  king's  advanced  pott, 
and  within  a  few  hundred  yards  of  his  line  cf  battle. 
Some  French  cavalry  immediately  approached,  and 
two  round  shots  were  fired  by  ti:e  enemy,  one  of 
which  killed  the  poor  peasant  to  whose  courage  and 
intelligence  the  allies  were  so  much  inf'ebted  ;  but 
as  no  movement  of  attack  was  made,  Kempt  called 
the  fifteenth  huts ars  over  the  river,  and  they  came 
at  a  gallop,  crossing  the  narrow  bridge  one  by  one, 
horseman  after  hcrsemr n,  and  still  the  French  re- 
mained torpid,  shewing  that  there  was  en  army 
there  but  no  general. 

It  was  now  one  o'clock  ;  Hill's  assault  on  the  vil- 
lage of  Subijana  de  Alava  u'as  developed,  and  a 
curling  smoke,  Ikintly  seen  far  up  the  Zadora  on  the 
enemy's  extreme  riglit,  being  followed  by  the  dull 
sound  of  distant  guns,  shewed  that  GrahBui's  ottack 
liad  ;;lso  commerced.  Then  the  king,  findir.g  loth 
his  flanks  in  danger,  caused  his  reserve  about  Goni- 
ccha  to  file  off  towards  Vittcria,  and  gave  Gazsn  or- 
ders to  retire  by  successive  masses  w  ith  the  arniy  of 
the  south.  But  at  that  uiom.ent  the  third  and  sev 
entli  divisions,  having  reached  their  ground,  were 
seen  moving  rapidly  down  to  the  bridge  of  Mendoza  ; 
the  enemy's  artillery  opened  ujicn  tl-orn  ;  a  body  of 
cavalry  drew  near  the  bridge,  and  the  French  I'ght 
troops,  which  were  very  strong  there,  commenced  a 
vigorous  musketry.  Some  British  guns  rejdied  to 
the  French  cannon  from  the  opposite  bank,  and  the 
value  of  Kempt's  forward  position  was  instantly 
made  manifi^it;  fo-  colonel  Andrew  Burnard,  spring- 
ing i!)rward,  led  the  riflemen  of  the  light  division,  , 
in  tiie  most  daring  manner,  between  the  French 
cavalry  and  the  river,  taking  their  light  troops  and  ! 
gunners  in  flan'c,  and  crgagirg  them  so  clo'-cly  that  : 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


591 


the  English  artillery-men,  thinking  his  darkly  cloth- 
ed troops  were  enemies,  played  upon  both  alike. 

This  singular  attack  enabled  a  brigade  of  the 
third  division  to  pass  the  bridge  of  JMendoza  with- 
out opposition  ;  the  other  brigade  forded  the  river 
higher  up,  and  the  seventh  division  and  Vandeleur's 
brigade  of  the  light  division  followed.  The  Frencii 
advanced  post  immediately  abandoned  the  ground  in 
front  of  Yillodas,  and  the  battle,  which  had  before 
somewhat  slackened,  revived  with  extreme  violence. 
Hill  pressed  tiie  enemy  harder;  the  fourth  division 
passed  tiie  bridge  of  Nanclares ;  the  smoke  and 
sound  of  Graham's  attack  became  more  distinct,  and 
the  banks  of  the  Zadora  presented  a  continuous  line 
of  fire.  However,  the  French,  weakened  in  the  cen- 
tre by  the  draft  made  of  Villatte's  division,  and  hav- 
ing their  confidence  shaken  by  tiie  king's  order  to 
retreat,  were  in  evident  perplexity,  and  no  i-egu- 
lar  retrograde  movement  could  be  made,  the  allies 
were  too  close 

The  seventh  division,  and  Colville's  brigade  of  the 
third  division,  which  had  forded  the  river,  formed 
the  left  of  the  British,  and  they  were  immediately 
engaged  with  the  French  right  in  front  of  Margar- 
ita and  Hermandad.  Almost  at  the  same  time  lord 
Wellington,  seeing  the  hiU  in  front  of  Arinez  near- 
ly denuded  of  troops  by  the  withdrawal  of  Villatte's 
troops,  carried  Picton  and  the  rest  of  the  third  divi- 
sion in  close  columns  of  regiments,  at  a  running 
pace,  diagonally  across  the  front  of  both  armies  to- 
wards that  central  point;  this  attack  was  headed  by 
Barnard's  ritlamen,  and  followed  by  the  remainder 
of  Kempt's  brigade  and  the  hussars  ;  but  the  otiier 
brigade  of  the  light  division  acted  in  support  of  the 
seventh  division.  At  the  same  time  general  Cole 
advanced  with  the  fourth  division  from  the  bridge  of 
Nanclares,  and  the  heavy  cavalry,  a  splendid  body, 
also  passing  the  river,  galloped  up,  squadron  after 
squadron,  into  the-plain  ground  between  Cole's  riglit 
and  HiU'sleft 

The  French  thus  caught  in  the  midst  of  their  dis- 
positions for  retreat,  threw  out  a  prodigious  number 
of  skirmishers,  and  fifty  pieces  of  artillery  played 
v/ith  astonishing  activity.  To  answer  this  fire, 
^VeHin;•:ton  brought  over  several  brigades  of  British 
guns,  and  both  sides  were  shrouded  by  a  dense  cloud 
of  smoke  and  dust,  under  cover  of  which  the  P^ench 
retired  by  degrees  to  the  second  range  of  heights,  in 
front  of  Gomecha,  on  which  their  reserve  had  been 
posted;  but  they  still  held  the  village  of  Arinez  on 
the  main  road  Picton's  troops,  headed  by  the  rifle- 
men, plunged  into  that  village  amidst  a  heavy  fire 
of  musA3ts  and  artillery,  and  in  an  instant  three  guns 
were  captured  ;  but  the  post  was  important;  fresh 
French  troops  came  down,  and  for  some  time  the 
emoke  and  dust  and  clamour,  the  fl'tshing  of  the  fire- 
arms, and  the  shouts  and  cries  of  the  combatants, 
mixed  with  the  tliundering  of  the  guns  were  terrible, 
yet  finally  the  British  troops  issued  forth  victorious 
on  the  other  side.  During  tliis  conflict  the  seventh 
division,  reinforced  by  Vandeleur's  brigade  of  the 
light  d. vision,  was  heavily  raked  by  a  battery  at  the 
villige  of  Margarita,  until  the  fin.y-second  regi- 
ment, hd  by  colonel  Gibbs,  with  an  impetuous 
cliirge  drove  the  French  guns  away  and  carried  the 
village,  and  at  the  same  time  the  eighty-seventh, 
under  colonel  Gough,  won  the  vllHge  of  Herman- 
d.id.  Tlien  the  v/liole  advanced  fighting  on  the  left 
of  Picton's  attack,  and  on  tlie  riglit  hnnd  of  tliat 
general  the  fourth  division  also  made  way,  though 
more  pdnwly,  because  of  the  rugged  ground. 

When  Picton  and  Kempt's  brigades  had  cnrried 
the  villarre  of  Arinez,  and  gainerl  the  main  road,  the 
Frenc'i  troops  near  Subjana  de  Alava  v/ere  turned, 


and  being  Iiard-pressed  on  their  front,  and  on  their 
left  dank  by  the  troops  on  tlie  summit  of  the  moun- 
tain, fell  back  for  two  miles  in  a  disordered  mass 
striving  to  regain  the  great  line  of  retreat  to  Vitto- 
ria.  It  was  tliought  that  some  cavalry,  launched 
against  them  at  the  moment,  would  have  totally 
disorganized  the  whole  French  battle  and  tiecur.d 
several  thousand  prisoners,  but  this  was  not  dene; 
the  confused  multitude,  shooting  ahead  of  the  ad- 
vancing British  lines,  recovered  order,  and  as  th« 
ground  was  exceedingly  diversified,  being  in  some 
jdaces  wooded,  in  others  open,  here  covered  with 
high  corn,  there  broken  by  ditches,  vineyards  and 
hamlets,  the  action  for  six  miles  resolved  itself  into 
a  rimning  fight  and  cannonade,  tlie  dust  and  smoke 
and  tumult  of  which  filled  all  the  basin,  parsing  on- 
wards towards  Vittoria. 

Many  guns  were  taken  as  the  army  advanced,  and 
at  six  o'clock  the  French  reached  the  last  defensible 
height,  one  mile  in  front  of  Vittoria.  Behind  them 
was  the  plain  in  which  the  city  stood,  and  beyond 
the  city,  thousands  of  carriages  and  animals,  and 
non-combatants,  men,  women  and  children,  were 
crowding  together,  in  ail  the  madness  of  terror  ;  and 
as  the  English  shot  went  booming  over  head,  the 
vast  crowd  started  and  swerved  with  a  convulsive 
movement,  v/hile  a  dull  and  horrid  sound  of  distrets 
arose  ;  but  tliere  was  no  hope,  no  stay  for  army  or 
multitude.  It  was  the  wreck  of  a  nation  Howev- 
er, the  courage  of  the  French  soldier  was  net  yet 
quelled,  Reille,  on  whom  every  tiling  now  depended, 
maintained  his  post  on  the  Upper  Zadora,  and  the 
armies  of  the  south  and  centre  drawing  up  on  their 
last  heights,  betv.-een  the  villnges  of  All  and  Ar- 
mentia,  made  their  muskets  flash  like  liglitning, 
while  more  than  eighty  pieces  of  artillery,  massed 
together,  pealed  with  such  a  horrid  uproar,  that  the 
hills  laboured  and  shock,  and  streamed  with  fire 
and  smoke,  amidst  which  the  dark  figures  of  the 
French  gunners  were  seen,  bounding  with  a  frantic 
energy. 

This  terrible  cannonade  and  musketry  kept  the 
allies  in  check,  and  scarcely  could  the  third  divif- 
ion,  which  was  still  the  Ibremost,  and  bore  t!>e 
brunt  of  this  storm,  maintain  its  advanced  position. 
A.gain  the  battle  became  stationary,  and  the  French 
generals  had  commenced  drawing  oft"  their  infartry 
in  succession  from  the  right  wing,  when  suddenly 
the  fourth  division,  rushing  forward,  carried  the  hill 
on  the  French  left,  and  the  heiglits  were  at  once 
abandoned.  It  was  at  this  very  moment  that  .Jo- 
seph, finding  the  royal  road  so  completely  blocked 
by  carriages  that  the  artillery  could  not  pass,  iD(]i- 
cated  the  road  of  Salvatierra  as  the  line  of  rttrest; 
and  the  army  went  oft"  in  a  confused  yet  compact 
body  on  that  side,  leaving  Vittoria  on  its  left.  Tl'e 
British  infantry  followed  hard,  and  the  light  cavalry 
galloped  through  the  town  to  intercept  the  new  line 
of  retreat,  which  was  through  a  marsh;  but  this 
road  also  was  choked  with  carriages  and  fugitive 
people,  wliile  on  each  side  there  were  i}erp  drain? 
Thus  all  became  disorder  and  mischief;  the  guns 
were  left  on  the  edge  of  the  mari?h  ;  tlie  artillery- 
men and  drivers  fled  with  the  iiorses,  and,  breaking 
through  the  miserable  multitude,  the  vanquished 
troops  wont  oft"  by  ^letauco  towards  Salvstierra  ; 
however,  their  cavalry  still  covered  the  retreat  with 
some  vigour,  and  many  of  those  generous  liorsemen 
were  seen  taking  up  children  aiid  women  to  carry 
oft"  from  the  dreadful  scene. 

The  result  of  the  last  attack  had  placed  Re'llc,of 
whose  battle  it  is  now  time  to  treat,  in  great  dan- 
^rer.  His  advanced  troops,  under  Sarrut,  liad  been 
placed  at  the  village  of  Arangu'si,  and  they  also  oo- 


592 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[  Book  XA 


cupied  some  hsights  on  their  rit^ht,  which  covered 
both  the  bridges  of  Ariaga  and  Gamara  Mayor;  but 
they  had  b^^en  driven  from  both  the  village  and  the 
height  a  little  after  twelve  o'clock,  by  general  Os- 
wald, who  coinmanded  the  head  of  Graham's  col- 
umn, consisting  of  the  fifth  division,  Lor.gas  Span- 
iards, and  Pack's  Portngusse.  Longa  then  seized 
Gamara  Msnor  on  t"ie  Duraugo  road,  while  another 
detaohmsnt  gained  the  royal  road  still  further  on 
the  lefl,  and  tbrced  the  Franco-Spaniards  to  retire 
from  Dtirana.  Tims  the  liret  blow  on  this  side  liad 
deprived  the  king  of  his  best  line  of  retreat,  and 
confined  him  to  the  road  of  Pampeluna.  However, 
Sarrut  recrossed  the  river  in  good  order,  and  a  new 
disposition  was  made  by  Reille.  One  of  Sai'rut's 
brigadis  defended  the  bridge  of  Ariaga  and  the  vil- 
lage of  Abechuco  beyond  it;  the  other  was  in  re- 
nerve,  equally  supporting  Sarrut  and  La  Martiniere 
who  defended  the  bridge  of  Gamara  Mayor  and  the 
village  of  that  name  boyonn  the  river.  Digeon's 
dragoons  were  formed  behind  the  village  of  Ariaga, 
and  Reille's  own  dragoons  being  called  up  from  Her- 
mandad  and  Zuazo,  took  post  behind  the  bridge  of 
Gam  ira  ;  a  brigade  of  light  cavalry  was  placed  on 
the  extreme  right  to  sustain  tHe  Franco-Spanish 
troops,  which  were  now  on  the  Upper  Zadora  in 
front  of  Betonio,  and  the  remainder  of  the  light  cav- 
alry, under  general  Curto,  was  on  the  French  left, 
extending  down  the  Zadora  between  Ariaga  and 
Govea. 

Oswald  commenced  the  attack  at  Gamara  with 
some  guns  and  Robinson's  brigade  of  the  fifth  divi- 
sion. Longa's  Spaniards  were  to  have  led,  and  at 
an  early  hour,  when  Gamara  was  feebly  occupied, 
bat  they  did  not  stir,  and  the  village  was  meanwhile 
reinforced  However,  Robinson's  brigade  being 
formed  in  three  columns,  made  the  assault  at  a  run- 
ning pace.  At  first  the  fire  of  artillery  and  musket- 
ry was  so  heavy  that  the  British  troops  stopped  and 
commenced  firing  also,  and  the  three  columns  got 
intermi::ed  ;  yet  encouraged  by  their  officers,  and 
especially  by  the  example  of  general  Robinson  an 
in3\'p3rienc3d  man  but  of  a  high  and  daring  spirit, 
thjy  renewed  the  charge,  broke  through  the  village 
and  even  crossed  the  bridge.  One  gun  was  captur- 
ed, and  the  passage  seemed  to  be  won,  when  Reille 
suddenly  turned  twelve  pieces  upon  the  village,  and 
La  M.irtinier-B,  rallying  iiis  division  under  cover 
of  th's  cannonade,  retook  tiie  bridge  ;  it  was  witli 
difiijulty  the  allied  troops  could  even  hold  the  vil- 
lage until  tlioy  were  reinforced.  Then  a  second 
British  brigide  came  down,  and,  the  royals  leading, 
the  bridge  was  again  carried,  but  again  these  new 
troops  w^re  driv.;n  hack  in  the  same  manner  as  the 
others  had  been.  Thus  the  bridge  remained  forbid- 
den ground.  Graham  had,  meanwhile,  attacked  the 
villdg3  of  Abcchuco  which  covered  tlie  bridge  of 
Ariagi,  and  it  was  carried  at  once  by  colonel  Hal- 
kett's  Germans,  who  were  supported  by  Bradford's 
Portuguese  and  by  the  fire  of  twelve  guns  ;  yet  here, 
as  at  Gamara,  the  Frencli  maintained  the  bridge, 
and  at  both  places  the  troops  on  each  side  remained 
stationary  under  a  reciprocal  fire  of  artillery  and 
small  arms. 

Reilb,  though  considerably  inferior  in  numbers, 
continued  to  interdict  the  passage  of  the  river,  until 
the  tumult  of  Wellington's  battle,  coming  up  the 
Zadora,  reached  Vittoria  itself,  nnd  a  part  of  the 
British  horsemen  rode  out  of  tliat  city  upon  Sarrut's 
rear.  Digeon's  dragoons  kept  this  cavalry  in  check 
for  the  moment ;  and  some  time  before,  Reille,  see- 
ing the  retrograde  movement  of  the  king,  had  form- 
ed a  reserve  of  infantry  under  general  l''ririon  at  Be- 
bonio,  which  now  proved  hio  safv.*ty.  For  Sarrut  was 


killed  at  the  bridge  of  Ariaga,  and  general  Menre, 
the  next  in  command,  could  scarcely  draw  otf  liia 
troops,  while  Digeon's  dragoons  held  the  British 
cavalry  at  point;  but  with  the  aid  of  FririrnV  re- 
serve, .Reille  covered  the  movement  and  rallied  all 
his  troops  at  Betonio.  He  had  now  to  make  head 
on  several  sides,  because  the  allies  were  coming 
down  from  Ariaga,  from  Durana,  and  from  Vittoria; 
yet  he  fought  his  way  to  Mctauco  on  t!ie  .Salvatier- 
ra  road,  covering  the  general  retreat  with  some  de- 
gree of  order.  \  eliemently  and  closely  did  the  Brit- 
ish purf^ue  ;  and  neitlier  the  resolute  <!emearour  of 
the  French  cavalry,  which  was  covered  on  T.iie  flanks 
by  some  liglit  troops,  ar.d  made  several  vigorous 
charges,  nor  the  night,  which  now  fell,  could  st- 
their  victorious  career  until  the  flying  masses  of  the 
enemy  had  cleared  all  obstacles,  and  passing  Metau- 
co,  got  beyond  tlie  reach  of  I'urther  irjury.  Tins 
ended  the  battle  of  Vittoria;  the  Frencli  escaped 
indeed  with  comparatively  little  loss  of  men,  but  to 
use  Gazan's  words,  "  they  lost  all  tlieir  equipages, 
all  their  guns,  all  their  treasure,  si]  their  stores,  all 
their  papers,  so  that  no  man  could  (ircve  liow  much 
pay  was  due  to  him;  generals  and  tubordinute  offi- 
cers alike  were  reduced  to  the  rl(  thcs  on  their 
backs,  and  most  of  thein  wj;e  ijnr?  i-iored." 

Never  was  an  army  more  harciy  uted  by  its  com- 
mander, for  the  soldiers  were  not  half  beaten,  and 
never  was  a  victory  more  complete.  The  trojihies 
were  innumerable.  'The  French  carried  ofi  but  two 
pieces  of  artillery  from  the  battle.  .Icnrran's  baton 
of  command,  a  stand  of  colours,  one  hundred  and  for- 
ty-three brass  pieces,  one  hundred  of  which  h.ad 
been  used  in  the  fight ;  all  the  pares  and  c'?-vit8 
from  Madrid,  Valladolid,  and  Burgos  ;  carriages, 
ammunition,  treasure;  every  thing  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  victors.  The  loss  in  men  did  not, 
however,  exceed  six  thousand,  exclusive  of  some 
hundreds  of  prisoners;  the  loss  of  the  olhes  was 
nearly  as  great,  the  gross  numbers  being  five  thou- 
sar.d  one  hundred  and  seventy-six,  killed,  wounded 
and  missing.  Of  these,  one  thousand  and  forty-nine 
were  Portuguese,  and  five  hundred  and  fifTy-three 
were  Spanish;  hence  the  loss  of  the  English  was 
more  than  double  that  of  the  Portuguese  and  Span- 
iards together;  and  yet  both  fough't  well,  and  esjie- 
cially  the  Portuguese  ;  hut  British  troojis  are  the  sol- 
diers of  battle.  Marshal  Jourdan's  baton  was  tal^en 
by  the  eighty-seventh  regiment,  and  the  spoil  was 
immense;  but  to  such  extent  was  j)!under  carried, 
princi])ally  by  the  followers  and  non-ccmbatants, 
for  with  some  exceptions  the  fighting  troops  may  be 
said  to  have  marched  upon  gold  and  silver  witliout 
stooping  to  pick  it  up,  that  of  five  milliors  and  a 
half  of  dollars  indicated  by  the  French  accounts  to 
be  in  the  money  chests,  not  one  dollar  came  to  the 
public  ;  and  Wellington  sent  fifteen  oflicers  with 
power  to  stop  and  examine  all  loaded  animals  pass- 
ing the  Ebro  and  the  Duero,  in  hojjos  to  recover  the 
sums  so  shamefully  carried  ofl".  Neither  was  this 
disgraceful  conduct  confined  to  ignorant  and  vulgar 
people.  Some  oflicers  were  seen  mixed  up  with  the 
mol)  and  contending  fiu-  tiie  disgracofiil  gain. 

On  the  2'2d,  tljc  allies  followed  the  retreating  ene- 
my, and  (riron  and  Longa  entered  («ui[)Uscoa,  by  the 
royal  road,  in  pursuit  of  the  convoy  which  had  mov- 
ed under  Maucuue  on  the  morning  of  the  battle  ;  the 
heavy  cavalry  and  D'Urban's  Portuguese  remained 
at  Vittoria,  and  general  Pakenham,  with  the  sixth 
division,  came  up  from  IMedliia  Pomar;  the  remain- 
der of  the  army  pursued  .losepli  towards  Pampeluna, 
for  he  had  continued  his  retreat  u[)  the  Borundia 
and  Araquil  valleys  all  night.  The  weather  was 
rainy,  the  roads  heavy,  and  the  French  rear-guord. 


1813.]  NAPIEil'S   PENINSULAR  WAR.  r,93 

having  neither  time  nor  materials  to  destroy  the  to  Giron  and  honga,  thoujrh  three  times  his  rum- 
bridges,  set  fire  to  the  villages  behind  them  to  de-  bers,  at  Montdragon ;  the  Spaniards  had  ti.e  adv3ii- 
lay  the  pursuit.  At  live  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  tage  and  the  French  fell  back,  yet  t-lowly  iuid  iight- 
the  22d,  ileille  had  rallied  his  two  divisions  and  all  ing,  to  Bergara  ;  hut  they  lost  two  hundred  and  Fifty 
his  cavalry  in  front  of  Salvatierra.  where  he  halted   men  and  six  guns. 

until  he  was  assured  that  all  the  French  had  pass- |  On  the  2od,  Foy  marched  to  Villa  Real  de  (Jtii- 
ed  ;  and  tiien  continued  his  march  to  Huerta,  in  the  puscoa  ;  and  that  evening  the  head  of  (J  ru ham's  col- 
valley  of  Araqull,  thirty  miles  from  the  field  of  bat-  umn,  having  crossed  tlie  Mutiol  mountain  by  the* 
tie.  Josepli  was  tiiat  day  at  Yrursun,  a  town  situa-  pass  of  Adrian,  descended  upon  Segurn.  It  v.as 
tsd  behind  one  of  the  sources  of  the  Arga,  and  from  then  as  near  to  Tolosa  as  P'oy  was,  and  tlie  lattf  r'a 
which  roads  branched  oti"  to  Pampeluna  on  one  side,  situation  became  critical ;  yet  such  were  the  dilli- 
and  to  Tolosa  and  St.  Estevan  on  the  other.  At  culties  of  passing  the  mountain,  that  it  was  h  te  en 
this  place  he  remained  all  the  2.'^d,  sending  orders  to  the  24th,  ere  Graham,  who  had  then  only  collected 
diii'erent  points  on  the  French  frontier  to  prepare  ■  Anson's  light  cavalry,  two  Portuguese  brigades  of 
provisions  and  succours  for  his  suiiering  army  ;  and  infantry,  and  Halket's  Germans,  could  move  towards 
he  directed  Reille  to  proceed  rapidly  by  St.  Estevan  I  Villa  Franca.  The  Italians  and  Maucuno's  divi- 
to  the  Bidassor  with  the  infantry,  six  hundred  se-  sions,  which  composed  the  French  rear,  were  just 
I'jct  cavalry,  the  artillery-men  and  horses  of  the  ar-.  entering  Villa  Franca,  as  Graham  came  in  sigiit ; 
my  of  Portugal  ;  meanwhile,  Gazan's  and  D'Erlon's  ;  and  to  cover  that  town  they  took  post  at  the  villago 
army  marched  upon  Pampeluna,  intending  to  cross  '  of  Veasaya  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Orio  river 
the  frontier  at  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port.  Joseph  |  Halket's  Germans,  aided  by  Pack's  Portuguese,  im- 
reachcd  Pampeluna  the  24th,  but  the  army  bivou- i  mediately  drove  Maucune's  people  from  tlic  vilLige 
acked  on  the  glacis  of  the  fortress,  and  in  sucli  a  with  the  loss  of  two  hundred  men,  and  Bradford's 
Btate  of  destitution  and  insubordination,  that  the  brigade,  having  engaged  the  Italians  on  the  French 
governor  would  not  suffer  them  to  enter  the  town.  '  rigiit,  killed  or  wounded  eighty,  yet  the  Italians 
The  magazines  were,  indeed,  reduced  very  low  by  claimed  tlie  advantage;  and  the  whole  position  whs 
Mina's  long  blockade,  and  some  writers  assert  that  so  strong,  that  Graham  had  recourse  to  flank  opera- 
it  was  even  proposed  to  blow  up  the  works  and  aban-  tions,  whereupon  Foy  retired  to  Tolosa.  Giron  and 
don  the  place;  however,  by  great  exertions  addi- ,  Longa  now  came  up  by  the  great  road,  and  Alendiz- 
tional  provisions  were  obtained  from  the  vicinity  ;  abel,  having  quitted  the  blockade  of  Santona,  arriv- 
the  garrison  was  increased  to  three  thousand  men,   ed  at  Aspeytia  on  the  Deba. 

and  the  army  marched  towards  France,  leaving  aj  The  25th,  Foy  again  ofiered  battle  in  front  of  To- 
rear-guard  at  a  strong  pass  about  two  leagues  oft".      i  losa ;  but  Graham  turned  his  left  with  Longa's  divi- 

Tlie  2;;d,  Wellington  having  detached  Graham's  sion,  and  Mendizabel  turned  his  right  from  Aspey- 
corps  to  Guipuscoa  by  the  pass  of  Adrian,  left  the  tia  ;  while  tiiey  were  in  march,  colonel  Williams, 
fifth  division  at  Salvatierra,  and  pursued  the  king  with  the  grenadiers  of  the  first  regiment  end  three 
with  tlie  rest  of  the  army.  j  companies  of  Pack's  Portuguese,  dislodged  him  from 

On  the  24th,  the  light  division  and  Victor  Alten's  an  advantageous  hill  in  front,  and  the  fight  was 
cavalry  came  up  with  the  French  rear-guard  ;  two  then  purposely  prolonged  by  skirmishing,  until  six 
battalions  of  the  riflemen  immediately  pushed  the  in-  o'clock  in  the  evening,  when  the  Spaniards,  having 
faiitry  back  through  the  pass,  and  then  Ross's  horse  reached  their  destination  on  the  flanks,  a  general 
artillery,  galloping  forward,  killed  several  men  and  attack  was  made  on  all  sides.  The  French,  being 
dismounted  one  of  the  only  two  pieces  of  cannon  cannonaded  on  the  causeway,  and  strongly  pushed 
carried  off" from  Vittoria.  'by  the  infantry  in  front,  while  Longa,  with  equal 

The  2.Jth,  the  enemy,  covered  by  the  fortress  of  vigour  drove  their  left  from  the  heights,  were  soon 
Pampeluna,  went  up  the  valley  of  Roncesvalles.  He  forced  beyond  Tolosa  on  the  flanks;  but  that  town 
was  followed  by  the  light  division,  which  turned  the  was  strongly  entrenched  as  a  field-pott,  and  they 
town  as  far  as  Vilalba;  and  he  was  harassed  by  the  maintained  it  until  Graham  brought  up  his  guns, 
Spanish  irregular  troops,  now  swarming  on  every  and  bursting  one  of  the  gates,  opened  a  passage  for 
Bide.  jhis  troops;    nevertheless,  Foy,  profiting    from    the 

Meanwhile  Foy  and  Clauzel  were  placed  in  very  darkness,  made  his  retreat  good  with  a  loss  of  only 
difficult  positions.  The  former  had  reached  Berga-  four  hundred  men  killed  and  wounded,  and  tome 
ra  tiie  21st,  and  the  garrison  of  Bilbao  and  the  prisoners,  who  were  taken  by  Mendizabel  and  Lon- 
It-.illan  division  of  St.  Paul,  formerly  Palombini's,  ga.  These  actions  were  very  severe  ;  the  loss  of 
had  reached  Durango  ;  the  first  convoy  from  Vitto-  the  Spaniards  was  not  known,  but  the  Anglo-Portn- 
ria  was  that  day  at  Bergara,  and  Maucune  was  with  guese  had  more  than  four  hundred  killed  and  wound- 
tho  second  at  Montdragon.  Tiie  22d,  the  garrison  ed  in  the  two  days'  operations,  and  Graham  himself 
of  Castro  want  off  to  Santona  ;  the  same  day  the  fu-   was  hurt. 

gitivesfrom  the  battle  spread  such  an  alarm  through  :  The  26th  and  27th,  the  allies  halted  to  hear  of 
the  country  that  the  forts  of  Arlaban,  Montdragon,  lord  Wellington's  progress;  the  enemy's  convoy's 
and  Salinas,  which  commanded  the  passes  into  Gui-  entered  France  in  safety,  and  Foy  occupied  a  pcsi- 
pi.scoa  were  abandoned,  and  Longa  and  Giron  pen-  lion  between  Tolosa  and  Ernani  behind  the  Anezo 
etrated  them  without  hindrance.  j  His  force  was  now  increased  by  the  successive  arri- 

Foy,  who  had  only  one  battalion  of  his  division  val  of  the  smaller  garrisons  to  sixteen  thousand 
in  hani,  immediately  rallied  the  fugitive  garrisons,  '  bayonets,  four  hundred  sabres,  and  ten  pieces  of  ar- 
anJ  marching  upon  Montdragon,  made  some  prison-  tillery  ;  and  tlie  2Hth,  he  thr^^w  a  garrison  of  two 
ers  and  acquired  exact  intelligence  of  the  battle,  thousand  six  hundred  good  troops  into  St.  Sebastian 
Then  h?  ord'jred  the  convoy  to  move  day  and  night,  and  passed  the  Urumia.  The  20th  he  passed  the 
towards  France;  the  troops  at  Durango  to  march  Oyarsun,  and  halted  the  SOth,  leaving  a  small  gar- 
upon  Bii-gara,  and  the  troops  from  all  the  other  posts  risen  at  Passages,  which,  however,  surrendered  the 
to  unite  at  Tolosa,  to  which  jil  ice  tlie  artillery,  bag-    next  day  to  Longa. 

g-aga,  and  sick  m?n  were  now  hastening  from  every  !      On  tlie  1st  of  .laly,  the  garrison  of  Gueteria  es- 
p\d-i ;  an  1  to  cover  tlnir  con^entrition,  Foy,  rein-    caped  by  sea  to  St.  Sebastian,  and  Foy  passed  the 
forcing  himself  with  MrjU'-une's  troops,  gave  battle    Bidassoa,  his  rear-guard  fighting  with  Giron's  Gal- 
39 


394 


NAPIER'S   PKJV  INSULAR   WAR. 


[  Book  XX. 


liciajiH  ;  but  Reille's  troops  were  now  at  Vera  and 
V'iriatu:  tlicy  had  received  ammunition  and  artil- 
lery from  l?ayonne,  and  thus  twenty-five  tliousand 
men  of  the  army  of  Portugal  occupied  a  defensive 
tine  from  Vera  to  the  bridge  of  IJehobie,  the  ap- 
proaches to  which  last  were  defended  by  a  block- 
house. Graham  immediately  invested  .St.  Sebas- 
tian, and  Giron,  concentrating  tiie  tire  of  his  own 
artillery  and  that  of  a  British  battery  upon  the 
block-house  of  Bchobie,  obliged  the  French  to  blow 
it  up  and  destroy  the  bridge. 

While  these  events  were  passing  in  Guipuscoa, 
Clauzel  was  in  more  imminent  danger.  On  the 
evening  of  the  2:2d,  lie  had  approached  the  field  of 
battle  at  the  head  of  fourteen  thousand  men,  by  a 
way  which  falls  into  the  Estella  road,  at  Aracete, 
and  not  far  from  Sahatierra.  Pakenham,  with  the 
sixth  division,  was  then  at  Vittoria,and  the  Frenoli 
general,  learning  the  state  of  alfairs,  scoij  retired  to 
Logrono,  where  he  halted  until  the  evening  of  the 
25th.  This  delay  was  like  to  have  proved  fatal ;  for 
on  that  day,  Wellington,  who  before  thought  he  was 
at  Tudela,  discovered  his  real  position,  and  leaving 
general  Hill  with  the  second  division  to  form  the 
siege  of  Pampeluna,  marched  himself  by  Tafalla 
with  two  brigades  of  light  cavalry  and  the  third, 
fourth,  seventh,  and  light  divisions  of  infantry.  The 
fiflh  and  sixth  divisions  and  the  heavy  cavalry  and 
D'Urban's  Portuguese  marched  at  the  same  time 
from  Sahatierra  and  Vittoria  upon  Logrofio  ;  and 
Mina  also,  who  had  now  collected  all  his  scattered 
battalions  near  Estella,  and  was  there  joined  by 
Julian  Sanchez'  cavalry,  followed  hard  on  Clauzel's 
rear. 

The  French  general,  moving  by  Calahorra,  reach- 
ed Tudela  on  the  evening  of  the  l?7th,  and  thinking 
that  by  this  forced  march  of  sixty  miles  in  forty 
hours  with  scarcely  a  halt,  he  had  outstripped  all 
pursuers,  would  have  made  for  France  by  Olite  and 
Tafalla.  Wellington  was  already  in  possession  of 
those  places  expecting  him  ;  but  an  alcalde  gave 
Clauzel  notice  of  the  danger,  whereupon  recrossing 
the  Ebro,  he  marched  upon  Zaragoza  in  all  haste, 
and  arriving  the  1st  of  July,  took  post  on  the  Galle- 
go,  gave  out  that  he  would  there  wait  until  Suchet, 
or  the  king,  if  the  latter  retook  the  offensive,  should 
cornc  up.  Wellington  immediately  made  a  flank 
movement  to  his  own  left  as  far  as  Caseda,  and 
could  still,  with  an  exertion,  have  intercepted  Clau- 
zel by  tiie  route  of  Jacca  ;  but  he  feared  to  drive 
him  back  upon  Suchet,  and  contented  himself  with 
letting  .'\rina  press  the  French  general.  That  chief 
acted  with  great  ability  ;  for  he  took  three  hundred 
prisoners,  and  having  every  where  declared  that  the 
whole  allied  army  were  close  at  hand  in  pursuit,  he 
imposed  upon  Clauzel,  Vv^lio,  being  thus  deceived, 
destroyed  some  of  his  artillery  and  heavy  baggage, 
and  leaving  the  rest  at  Zaragoza  retired  to  Jacca. 

During  this  time  Joseph,  not  being  pressed,  had 
sent  the  army  of  the  south  again  into  Spain  to  take 
possession  of  the  valley  of  Bastan,  which  was  very 
fertile  and  full  of  strong  positions.  But  O'Donel, 
count  of  Abispal,  had  now  reduced  the  forts  at  Pan- 
corbo,  partly  by  capit  ilation,  partly  by  force,  and 
was  marching  towards  Pampeluna  ;  wherefore  gener- 
al Hill,  without  abandoning  the  siege  of  that  place, 
moved  two  British  and  two  Porr,ugu"se  brigades  in- 
to the  valley  of  Bastan,  and  on  Ihe  4th,  .')th,6th,  and 
7th,  vigorously  driving  Gaz-',n  from  all  his  positions, 
cleared  the  valley  with  a  loss  of  only  one  hundred 
and  twenty  men.  The  whole  line  of  the  S[)anish 
frontier  from  Uoncesvalles  to  the  mouth  of  the  Bi- 
dassoa  river  was  thus  occupied  by  the  victo'ous  al- 
lies, and  Pampeluna  and  St.  Sebastian  wt  r?    iveet- 


cd.  .Joseph's  roign  was  over  ;  the  crown  had  fallen 
from  his  head,  and  after  years  of  toil,  and  combats 
which  had  been  rather  admired  than  understood,  the 
English  general,  emerging  from  the  chaos  of  the 
Peninsular  struggle,  stood  on  tlie  summit  of  tlie  Py- 
rennees,  a  recognised  conqueror.  On  tliose  lofiy  pin- 
nacles the  clangor  of  his  trumpets  pealed  clear  and 
loud,  and  the  splendour  of  his  genius  appeared  as  a 
flaming  beacon  to  warring  nations. 

OBSERVATIONS. 

1st.  In  this  campaign  of  six  weeks,  Wellington, 
with  one  hundred  thousand  men,  marched  six  liun- 
dred  miles,  passed  six  great  rivers,  gained  one  deci- 
sive battle,  invested  two  fortresses,  and  drove  a  hun- 
dred and  twenty  thousand  veteran  troops  from  Sj  ain. 
This  immense  result  could  not  have  been  attained  if 
Joseph  Jiad  followed  Napoleon's  instructions  ;  Wel- 
lington could  not  then  have  turned  the  line  of  the 
Duero.  It  could  not  have  been  attained  if  Joseph 
had  acted  with  ordinary  skill  after  the  line  of  the 
Duero  was  passed  Time  was  to  him  most  pre- 
cious ;  yet  when  contrary  to  his  expectations  he  had 
concentrated  his  scattered  armies  behind  the  Cari- 
on,  he  made  no  efTort  to  delay  his  enemy  on  that  riv- 
er. He  judged  it  an  unfit  position,  that  is,  unlit  for 
a  great  battle;  but  he  could  have  obliged  AA'elling- 
ton  to  lose  a  day  there,  perhaps  two  or  three,  and 
behind  the  Upper  Pisuerga  he  might  have  saved  a 
day  or  two  more.  Reille,  who  was  with  the  army 
of  Portugal,  on  the  right  of  the  king's  line,  com- 
plained that  he  could  find  no  officers  of  that  army 
who  knew  the  Pisuerga  sufficiently  to  place  the 
troops  in  position  ;  the  king  then  liad  Ccuse  to  re 
member  Napoleon's  dictum,  namely,  that  "to  com- 
mand an  army  well,  a  general  must  think  of  nothing 
else."  For  why  was  the  courpe  of  the  Pisuerga  un- 
known when  the  king's  head-quarters  had  been  lor 
several  months  within  a  day's  journey  of  iti 

2nd.  The  Carion  and  the  Pisuerga  being  given  up, 
the  country  about  the  Hormaza  was  occu:  ied,  ar.d 
the  three  French  armies  were  in  mass  between  that 
stream  and  Burgos  ;  yet  Well'ngtcn's  right  wirg 
only,  that  is  to  say,  only  twenty-three  thousand  in- 
fantry and  three  brigades  of  cavalry,  drove  Keille's 
troops  over  the  Arlanzan,  and  the  castle  of  Burgos 
was  abandoned.  This  was  on  the  12th  ;  the  tliree 
French  armies,  not  less  than  fifty  thousand  fightirg 
men,  had  been  in  position  since  the  Otii,  and  the 
king's  letters  prove  that  he  desired  to  fight  in  that 
country,  which  was  favourable  for  all  arms.  Noth- 
ing then  could  be  more  opportune  than  Wellington's 
advance  on  the  12th,  because  a  retrograde  defisnsive 
system  is  unsuited  to  French  soldiers,  whose  impa- 
tient courage  leads  them  always  to  attack,  and  the 
news  of  Napoleon's  victory  at  Bautzen  had  just  ar- 
rived to  excite  their  ardour.  Wherefore  Joseph 
should  have  retaken  the  offensive  on  the  12th,  at 
the  moment  when  Wellington  approached  the  Hor- 
maza ;  and  as  the  left  and  centre  of  the  allies  were 
at  Villa  Diego  and  Castroxerez,  the  greatest  part  at 
the  former,  that  is  to  say,  one  march  distant,  the 
twenty-six  thousand  men  immediately  under  Wel- 
lington, would  j)robably  have  been  forced  back  over 
the  Pisuerga,  and  the  king  would  have  gained  time 
for  Sarrut,  Foy  and  Clauzel  to  join  him.  Did  tlie 
English  general  then  owe  his  success  to  fortune,  1o 
his  adversary's  fiuilt  rather  than  to  his  own  skill  I 
Not  so.  He  had  judged  the  king's  military  capa'^i- 
ty  ;  he  had  seen  tiie  haste,  the  confusion,  tlie  trouble 
of  the  enemy,  and  knowing  well  the  moral  power  of 
rapidity  and  boldness  in  such  circumstances,  had 
acted,  daringly  indeed,  but  wisely  ;  for  such  daring 
is  admirable,  it  is  the  highest  part  of  war. 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


595 


Old.  The?  manner  in  which  Wellington  turned  the 
line  ol'tlie  Ebro  was  a  line  strategic  illustration.  It 
was  by  no  means  C(  rtain  of  success  yet  failure 
would  liave  still  lefl  great  advantages.  He  was 
c  n-lain  of  gaining  Santander  and  fixing  a  new  base 
of  o[)eration3  on  tiie  coast,  and  he  would  still  have 
had  ttie  power  of  continually  turning  t!ie  king's 
right  by  operating  between  iiirn  and  the  coast;  the 
errors  of  his  adversary  only  gave  him  additional 
advantages,  which  he  expected,  and  seized  with 
prom.)iaess.  But  if  Joseph,  instead  of  spreading 
his  arjny  from  Espejo  on  his  right  to  the  Logrono 
road  on  his  left,  iiad  kept  only  cavalry  on  the  latter 
route  and  on  tlie  main  road  in  front  of  Pancorbo  ; 
if  he  bad  massed  his  army  to  his  right,  pivoting  up- 
on Miranda,  or  Frias,  and  had  scoured  all  tlie  roads 
towards  tlie  sources  of  the  Ebro  with  the  utmost  dil- 
igence, the  allies  could  never  have  passed  tlie  de- 
files and  descended  upon  Vittoria.  They  would 
have  marched  then  by  Valmaceda  upon  Bilbao  ;  but 
Josapli  could  by  the  road  of  Urduiia  have  met  them 
there,  and  with  his  force,  increased  by  Foy's  and 
Harrut's  divisions  and  the  Italians.  Meanwhile 
Clauzel  would  have  come  down  to  Vittoria,  and 
the  heap3d  convoys  could  have  made  their  way  to 
France  in  safety. 

4th.  Having  finally  resolved  to  fight  at  Vittoria, 
the  king  should,  on  the  19th  and  20th,  have  broken 
8ome  of  the  bridges  on  the  Zadora,  and  covered  oth- 
ers with  field-works  to  enable  him  to  sally  forth  up- 
on the  attacking  army  ;  he  should  have  entrenched 
the  defil3  of  Puebla,  and  occupied  the  heights  above 
in  strength ;  his  position  on  the  Lower  Zadora 
would  then  have  been  formidable.  But  his  greatest 
fault  was  in  the  choice  of  his  line  of  operation. 
His  reasons  for  avoiding  Guipuscoa  were  valid  ; 
bis  true  lin3  was  on  the  other  side,  down  the  Ebro. 
Zaragoza  siiould  have  been  his  base,  since  Aragon 
was  fertile  and  mora  friendly  tlian  any  other  prov- 
ince of  S,)ain.  It  is  true,  that  by  taking  this  new 
line  of  operations  he  would  have  abandoned-  Foy  ; 
but  that  general,  reinforced  with  the  reserve  from 
Bayonne,  wo'ild  have  had  twenty  thousand  men  and 
tlie  fortreiis  of  St.  Sebastian  as  a  support,  and  Wel- 
lington must  have  left  a  strong  corps  of  observation 
to  watch  him.  The  king's  army  would  have  been 
immediately  increased  by  Clauzel's  troops,  and  ulti- 
mately by  Sachet's,  which  would  have  given  him 
on?  hundred  thousand  men  to  oppose  the  allied  army, 
weakened  as  that  would  have  been  by  the  detach- 
mmt  left  to  watch  Foy.  And  there  were  political 
reasons,  to  be  told  hereafter;  for  the  reader  must 
not  imagine  Wellington  had  got  thus  far  without 
rju-^h  trammels,  which  would  have  probably  rendered 
t!iis  plan  so  efficacious  as  to  oblige  the  British  army 
ti  abandon  Spain  altogether.  Then  new  combina- 
tions would  have  been  made  all  over  Europe,  which 
it  is  useless  to  speculate  upon. 

5th.  In  tlie  battle  the  operations  of  the  French, 
with  tlie  exception  of  Reilla's  defence  of  the  bridges 
of  Gamara  and  Ariaga,  were  a  series  of  errors,  the 
most  extraordinary  b^ing  the  suffering  Kempt's 
brigade  of  the  light  division,  and  the  hussars,  to 
p^ss  the  bridg:?  of  Tres  Puentes  and  establ'sh  them- 
sdves  closs  to  the  king's  line  of  battle,  an  upon  the 
flank  of  his  advanced  posts  at  the  bridge?  of  Mendo- 
za  and  Villodas.  It  is  quite  clear  from  this  alone, 
that  he  decided  upon  retreating  the  moment  Gra- 
ham's attack  commenced  against  his  right  flank, 
and  his  position  was  therefore  in  his  own  view  I'n- 
t.en;)ble.  Tha  fitting  thing,  then,  was  to  have  occu- 
pied the  hei^lits  of  Puebla  strongly,  but  to  have 
jdace  i  t!ie  bulk  of  his  infantry  by  corps,  in  succet  • 
Bion,  th;  right  rafus^d,  towards  Vittoria,  while-  hie 


cavalry  and  guns  watched  the  bridges  and  the  mouth 
of  the  Puebla  defile  ;  in  this  situut.ciii  lie  cuuhJ  have 
succoured  Reille,  or  marched  to  his  front,  according 
to  circumstances,  and  his  retreat  would  have  been 
secure. 

6th.  The  enormous  fault  of  heaping  up  the  bag- 
gage and  convoys  and  pares  behind  Vittoria  requires 
no  comment;  but  the  king  added  another  and  nioro 
extraordinary  error,  namely,  tiie  remaining  to  the 
last  moment  undecided  as  to  his  line  of  retreat. 
Nothing  but  misfortunes  could  attei  d  upon  sucii 
bad  dispositions;  and  that  the  catastrophe  was  not 
more  terrible  is  owing  entirely  to  an  error  which 
Wellington  and  Graham  seem  alike  to  have  fallen 
into,  namely,  that  Reille  had  two  divisions  in  re- 
serve behind  the  bridges  on  the  Upper  Zadora.  They 
knew  not  that  Maucune's  division  had  marched  with 
the  convoy,  and  thought  Clauzel  had  only  one  divi- 
sion of  the  army  of  Portugal  with  him,  whereas  he 
had  two,  Taupin's  and  Barbout's.  Reille's  reserves 
were  composed,  not  of  divisions,  but  of  brigades 
drawn  from  La  Martiniere's  and  Sarrut's  divisions, 
which  were  defending  the  bridges;  and  his  whole 
force,  including  the  French-Sj^aniards,  who  were 
driven  back  from  Durana,  diii  not  exceed  ten  thou- 
sand infantry  and  two  thousand  five-hundred  caval- 
ry. Now  Graham  had,  exclusive  of  Giron's  Galii- 
cians,  nearly  twenty  thousand  of  all  arms,  and  it  ia 
said  that  the  river  might  have  been  passed  both 
above  and  below  the  points  of  attack  ;  it  is  certain 
also  that  Longa's  delay  gave  the  French  time  to  oc- 
cupy Gamara  Mayor  in  force,  which  was  not  the 
case  at  first.  Had  the  passage  been  won  in  time, 
very  few  of  the  French  army  could  have  escaped 
from  the  field  ;  but  the  truth  is,  Reille  fought  most 
vigorously, 

7th.  As  the  third  and  seventh  divisions  did  not 
come  to  the  point  of  attack  at  the  time  calculated 
upon,  the  battle  was  probably  not  fought  after  the 
original  conception  of  lord  Wellington;  it  is  likely 
that  his  first  project  was  to  force  the  passage  of  the 
bridges,  to  break  the  right  centre  of  the  enemy  from 
Arinez  to  Margarita,  and  then  to  envelope  the  left 
centre  with  the  second,  fourth,  and  light  divisions 
and  the  cavalry,  while  the  third  and  seventh  divi- 
sions pursued  the  others.  But  notwithstanding  the 
unavoidable  delay,  which  gave  tlie  French  time  to 
commence  their  retreat,  it  is  not  easy  to  understand 
how  Gazan's  left  escaped  from  Suhijana  de  Alava, 
seeing  that  when  Picton  broke  the  centre  at  Arinez, 
he  was  considerably  nearer  to  Vittoria  than  the 
French  left,  which  was  cut  oft'  from  the  main  road 
and  assailed  in  front  by  Hill  and  Cole.  The  having 
no  cavalry  in  hand  to  launch  at  this  time  and  point 
of  the  battle  has  been  already  noticed  ;  lord  Wel- 
lington says,  that  the  country  was  generally  unfa- 
vourable for  the  action  of  that  arm,  and  it  is  certain 
that  neither  side  used  it  with  much  efiect  at  any 
period  of  the  battle  ;  nevertheless,  there  are  alwaya 
some  suitable  openings,  some  happy  moments  to 
make  a  charge,  and  this  seems  to  have  been  one 
which  was  neglected. 

8th.  Picton's  sudden  rush  from  the  bridge  of  Tres 
Puentes  to  the  village  of  Arinez,  with  one  brigade, 
has  been  much  praised,  and  certainly  nothing  could 
be  more  prompt  and  daring;  but  the  merit  of  the 
conception  belongs  to  the  genera]  in  chief,  who  di- 
rected it  in  person.  It  was  suggested  to  him  by  the 
denuded  state  of  the  hill  in  fror.t  of  that  village,  and 
viewed  as  a  stroke  for  the  occasion,  it  is  to  be  ad- 
mired. Yi-'t  it  had  its  disadvantages.  For  the  bri- 
gade which  tluis  crossed  n  part  cf  the  front  of  both 
armies  to  place  itself  in  advance,  not  only  drew  a 
flank  fire  from  the  enemy,  but  was  exposed,  if  the 


596 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


Book  XXI. 


French  rni'alryhad  been  prompt  and  daring,  to  a 
charge  in  Hauiv  ;  it  also  prevented  tiie  advance  of  the 
other  troops  in  tlieir  proper  arrangement,  and  thus 
crowded  tiie  centre  for  tiie  rest  of  the  action.  How- 
ever, t.'iese  sudden  movements  cannot  be  judged  by 
rules  ;  tliey  are  bad  or  good  according  to  the  result. 
This  was  entirely  successful,  and  tlie  hill  thus  car- 
ried was  callsd  the  Englishmen's  liill,  not,  as  some 
recent  writers  liave  supposed,  in  commemoration  of 
a  victory  gained  by  the  Black  Prince,  but  because 
of  a  disaster  which  there  befel  a  part  of  his  army. 
His  b;ittle  was  fought  between  Navarrette  and  Na- 
jera,  many  leagues  from  Vittoria,  and  beyond  the 
Kbro  ;  but  on  this  hill  the  two  gallant  knights,  sir 
Tiiomas  and  sir  William  Felton,  took  post  with 
two  hundred  companions,  and  being  surrounded  by 
Don  Tello,  with  six  thousand,  all  died  or  were 
taken  afier  a  long,  desperate,  and  heroic  resist- 
ance. 

f^th.  It  has  bsen  observed  by  French  writers,  and 
the  opinion  has  been  also  entertained  by  many  Eng- 
lish olhcers,  that  after  the  battle  Wellington  should 


'  have  passed  the  frontier  in  mn^s,  and  marched  u})on 
IJayonne  instead  of  chasing  Clauzel  and  Foy  on  th« 
right  and  lult ;  and  if,  as  the  siane  authors  assert, 
liayonne  was  not  in  a  state  of  defence  and  must  have 
fallen,  there  can  be  little  question  that  the  critici.vn« 
'  is  just,  because  the  fugitive    French  army,  having 
lost  all  its  guns,  and  being  without  musket  nniniu- 
:  nition,  could  not  have  faced  its   pursuers  for  a  nio- 
!  mont.     But  if  Bayonne  had  resitted,  and  it  was  im- 
I  possible  for  Wellington  to  suspect  its  real  condition, 
I  much  mischief  might  have  accrued  from  such  a  has- 
I  ty  advance.      Foy  and  Clauzel  coming  down  upon 
the  field  of  Vittoria,  would  have  driven  away  if  tlu-y 
;  did  not  destroy  the  sixth  division  ;  they  would   have 
I  recovered  all  the  trophies;  the  king's  army,  return- 
ing  by  Jacca  into  Aragon,  would  have  reorganized 
itself  from   Suchet's  depots,  and   that  marshal  was 
actually  coming  up  with  his  army  from  Valencia  ; 
little  would  then  have  been   gained  by  the  battle. 
This  question   can,  however,  be  more  profitably  dis- 
cussed when  the  great  events  which  follovved    the 
battle  of  Vittoria  have  been  described. 


BOOK    XXI. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Lord  W^IIinjfton  blockades  Paniptluna,  besief^es  San  Seb^is 
liaii — O|jeiatioiis  on  the  eastern  coast  of  Spain — General 
Klio's  iiii^iconiliirl — Sir  John  Murray  sails  to  attack  Tarra- 
piiiia — C.ilonel  Pr<-vot  takes  St.  PVlipede  Balauuer — Second 
^i»(;e  of  Tana^nna — Siirhet  and  iVlaiirire  iVlatiiieu  endeav- 
(iiir  lo  rt  lieve  the  place — Sir  John  Murray  raises  the  siege — 
Knibarks  with  the  loss  of  his  ffiins — Diseinbaiks  again  at  St. 
Felipe  He  Bala^uer — Lord  William  Bentinck  arrives — Sir 
John  Murray's  trial — Observations. 

The  fate  of  Spain  was  decided  at  Vittoria,  but  on 
the  fields  of  Lutzen  and  Bautzen  Napoleon's  genius 
restored  the  general  balance,  and  tiie  negotiations 
wiiicli  followed  those  victories  affected  the  war  in 
the  Peninsula. 

Lord  Wellington's  first  intention  wns  to  reduce 
Pampeluna  by  force,  and  the  sudden  fall  of  the  Pan- 
corbo  forts,  which  o[)ened  the  great  3Iadrid  road, 
wcs  a  favourable  event :  but  Portugal  being  relin- 
quished as  a  place  of  arms,  a  new  base  of  operations 
WHS  required,  lest  a  change  of  fortune  should  force 
the  allies  to  return  to  tiiat  country  when  ail  the 
grent  military  establishments  were  broken  up,  when 
the  opposition  of  the  native  government  to  British 
influence  was  become  rancorous,  and  the  public  sen- 
tinisnt  quite  averse  to  English  supremacy.  The 
western  Pyrenees,  in  conjunction  vvitli  the  ocean, 
offered  such  a  base  ;  yet  tlie  harbours  were  few,  and 
the  English  general  desired  to  secure  a  convenient 
one,  near  tlie  new  positions  of  the  army  ;  wherefore, 
to  redu:;e  San  Sebastian  was  of  more  immediate 
importance  than  to  reduce  Pampeluna  ;  and  it  was 
essential  to  etfect  this  during  the  fine  season,  be- 
cause the  coast  was  iron-bound  and  very  dangerous 
in  w.ntcr. 

Pamp-duna  v/as  strong.  A  regular  attack  requir- 
ed three  weeks  for  the  br  nging  up  of  ordnnnce  and 
stores,  five  or  six  weeks  more  for  the  attick,  and 
from  fifiocn  to  twenty  tl  ousand  of  the  bes'    ion,  be- 


cause British  soldiers  were  warted  for  the  npsnull  ; 
but  an  investment  could  be  maintained  by  fewer  and 
inferior  troops,  Spaniards  and  Portuguet-e,  and  the 
enemy's  magazines  were  likely  to  fail  under  blockado 
sooner  than  his  ramparts  would  crumble  under  fire. 
Moreover,  on  the  eastern  coast  misfortune  and  dis- 
grace had  befallen  the  English  arms.  Sir  John  Mur- 
ray had  failed  at  Tarragona.  He  had  lest  the  hcn- 
oured  battering-train  intrusted  to  his  charge, and  his 
artillery  equipage  was  supposed  to  be  ruined.  Tiie 
French  fortresses  in  Catalonia  and  \  alencia  were 
numerous,  the  Anglo-Sicilian  army  could  neither  un- 
dertake an  important  siege,  nor  seriously  menace 
the  enemy  without  obtaining  some  strong  place  as  a 
base.  Suchet  was  therefore  free  to  march  on  Zara- 
goza,  and  uniting  with  Clauzel  and  Paris,  to  operate 
with  a  powerful  mass  against  the  right  flank  of  the 
allies.  For  these  reasons  Wellington  finally  con- 
cluded to  blockade  Pampeluna  and  besiege  San  Se- 
bastian, and  the  troops,  as  they  returned  from  tiie 
pursuit  of  Clauzel,  ma»"chcd  to  form  a  covering  army 
in  the  mountains.  The  peasantry  of  the  vicinity 
were  then  employed  on  the  works  of  the  blockade, 
which  was  ultimately  intrusted  to  O'Donel's  Anda- 
lusian  reserve. 

Confidently  did  the  English  general  expect  tha 
immediate  fall  of  San  Sebastian,  and  he  was  intent 
to  have  it  before  the  negotiations  for  the  armistice 
in  fJermany  should  terminate  ;  but  mighty  pains  and 
difiiculties  awaited  him,  and  ere  those  can  be  treat- 
ed of,  the  progress  of  the  war  in  other  parts,  during 
his  victorious  march  from  Portugal  to  the  Pyrenees, 
must  be  treated  of. 

CONTINUATION  OF  THE    OPERATIONS  ON  THE    EASTERN 
COAST. 

It  will  b°  remembered  that  the  duke  del  Parquo 
was  to  move  from  the  Sierra  Moreiia,  iy  Alman^a^ 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   \A  A  R. 


597 


to  join  Elio,  whose  army  had  been  reinforced  from 
Minorca;  the  united  troops  were  then  to  act  against 
Suchet,  OH  the  Xucar,  wliile  sir  John  Murray  sailed 
to  attack  Tarragona.  Del  Parque  received  his  or- 
dars  the  24th  of  April,  he  had  long  known  of  the 
project,  and  the  march  was  one  of  twelve  days,  yet 
lie  did  not  reacii  his  destination  until  tlie  end  of  May. 

Tiiis  delay  resulted,  partly  from  the  bad  state  of 
his  army,  partly  from  the  usual  procrastination  of 
Spaniards,  partly  from  the  conduct  of  Klio,  whose 
proceedings,  tiiough  probably  springing  from  a  dis- 
like to  serve  under  Del  Parque,  created  doubts  of  his 
own  tidelity. 

It  has  been  already  shown,  how,  contrary  to  his 
agreenjent  with  Murray,  Elio  witlirew  his  cavalry 
wneu  3Iijares  was  at  Vecla,  whence  sprung  that 
general's  misfortune;  how  he  placed  the  regiment  of 
Velez  Malaga  in  Villena,  a  helpless  prey  for  Suchet: 
how  he  left  the  Anglo-Sicilian  army  to  fight  the 
battle  of  Castalla  unaided.  He  now  persuaded  Del 
Parque  to  move  towards  Utiel  instead  of  Almanza, 
and  to  send  a  detachment  under  iMijares  to  Requena, 
thereby  tlireatening  .Suchet's  right,  but  exposing  the 
Spanish  army  to  a  sudden  blow,  and  disobeying  his 
instructions,  which  prescribed  a  march  by  Almanza. 

Tins  false  movement  Elio  represented  as  Del 
Parque's  own ;  but  the  latter,  when  Murray  remon- 
strated, quickly  approached  Catalla  by  .lumilla,  de 
claring  his  earnest  desire  to  obey  Wellington's  or- 
dera.  The  divergence  of  his  former  march  had,  how- 
ever, already  placed  him  in  danger;  his  left  flank  was 
60  exposed,  while  coming  by  Jumilla,  that  Murray 
postponed  his  own  embarkation  to  concert  with  Elio 
a  combined  operation, from  Biar  and  Sax,  against  Fu- 
ente  de  la  Higuera,  wiiere  Suchet's  troops  were  lying 
in  wait.  Previous  to  tiiis  epoch  Elio  had  earnestly 
urgjd  the  English  general  to  disregard  Del  Parque 
altogether  and  embark  at  once  for  Tarragona,  and 
undertaking  himself  to  secure  the  junction  with  his 
fellow-commander.  And  now,  after  agreeing  to  co- 
operate with  Murray,  he  secretly  withdrew  his  cav- 
alry from  Sax,  sent  Whittingham  in  a  false  direc- 
tion, placed  Roche  without  support  at  Alcoy,  retired 
liimself  to  the  city  of  Murcia,  and  at  the  same  time 
one  of  his  regiments  quartered  at  Alicante  fired  upon 
a  British  guard.  Roche  was  attacked  and  lost  eigh- 
ty men,  and  Dil  Parque's  flank  was  menaced  from 
Fuente  de  la  Higuera;  but  the  British  cavalry,  as- 
sembling at  Biar,  secured  his  communication  with 
Murray  on  tbe  25th,  and  the  27th  the  Anglo-Sicilians 
broke  up  from  their  quarters  to  embark  at  Alicante. 

The  French  were  now  very  strong.  Suchet,  un- 
molested for  forty  days  after  the  battle  of  Castalla, 
had  improved  his  defensive  works,  chased  the  bands 
frr.m  his  rear,  called  up  his  reinforcements,  rehorsed 
his  cavalry  and  artillery,  and  prepared  for  new  oper- 
ations, without  losing  the  advantage  of  foraging  the 
fertile  districts  immediately  in  front  of  Xucar.  On 
the  other  hand  lord  William  BentincK,  alarmed  by 
inLeHigen,?e  of  an  intended  descent  upon  Sicily,  had 
recrilled  more  British  troops  ;  and  as  Whittingham's 
cavalry,  and  Roche's  division,  were  left  at  Alicante, 
the  force  actually  embarked  to  attack  Tarragona,  in- 
cluding a  fresh  English  regiment  from  Carthagena, 
B'"arcely  exceeded  fourteen  thousand  present  under 
arms.  Of  these,  less  than  eght  tliousand  were  Brit- 
ish or  German,  and  the  h  -semen  were  only  seven 
Inmdred.  Yet  the  armament  was  formidable,  for  the 
battering  train  was  complete  and  powerful,  the  ma- 
terials for  gabions  and  fascines  previously  colle.-ted 
at  Vvica.  and  the  naval  squadron,  under  admiral  Hal- 
-owel,  consisted  of  several  line-of-b;iti:le  ships,  frig- 
ates, bomb -vessels  and  gun-boats,  besides  the  trans- 
Uurts.     There  was,  however,  no  cordiality  between 


general  Clinton  and  Murray,  nor  between  the  latter 
and  his  quartermaster-general,  Dcnkin,  nor  between 
Donkin  and  the  admiral  ;  subordinate  oflicers,  also, 
in  both  services,  adopting  false  notions,  some  tioni 
vanity,  some  from  hearsay,  added  to  the  unerty  feel- 
ing which  prevailed  amongst  the  chiefe.  iSeitl.er  ad- 
miral nor  general  seem  to  have  had  t-anguine  hopes 
of  success  even  at  the  moment  of  embarkation,  and 
there  was  in  no  quarter  a  clear  unders-tandirg  of  lord 
Wellington's  able  plan  for  the  ojieratioiig. 

While  Del  Parque's  army  was  yet  in  march,  Su- 
chet, if  he  had  no  secret  understanding  with  Elio  or 
any  of  his  officers,  must  have  been  doubtful  of  the 
allies'  intentions,  although  the  strength  of  the  bat- 
tering train  at  Alicante  indicated  seme  siege  of  im- 
portance. He,  however,  recalled  Pannetier's  brig- 
ade from  the  frontier  of  Aragon,  and  placed  it  on 
the  road  to  Tortosa  ;  and  at  the  same  time,  knowing 
Clauzel  was  then  warring  down  the  ])arti-.ab  in  Na- 
varre, he  judged  Aragon  safe,  and  dre.v'  Stveroli's 
Italian  brigade  from  thence,  leaving  on^y  ihe  garri- 
sons, and  a  few  thousand  men  under  general  Paris  as 
a  reserve  at  Zaragoza  :  and  this  was  the  rea!:,cn  the 
army  of  Aragon  did  not  co-operate  to  crus-ji  Mina 
after  his  defeat  by  Clauzel  in  the  valley  of  Rcncal. 
Decaen  also  sent  some  reinforcements  ;  wl.eretbre, 
after  completing  his  garrisons,  Suchet  could  furnish 
the  drafts  required  by  Napoleon,  and  yet  brinir  twen- 
ty thousand  men  into  the  field.  He  was,  however, 
very  unquiet,  and  notwithstanding  Clauzel's  opera- 
tions, in  fear  for  his  troops  in  Aragon,  v.liere  Paris 
had  been  attacked  by  Goyan,  even  in  Zarego^a  ; 
moreover,  now.  for  the  first  time  since  its  subju- 
gation, an  unfriendly  feeling  was  perceptible  in 
V  alencia. 

On  the  .'31st  of  May,  Murray  sailed  f,om  Alicante. 
Suchet  immediately  ordered  i'annetier's  brigade  to 
close  towards  Tortosa,  but  kept  his  own  positions  in 
front  of  Valencia  until  the  fleet  was  seen  to  pass  the 
Grao  with  a  fair  wind.  Then,  feeling  assured  the 
expedition  aimed  at  Catalonia,  he  prepared  to  aid 
that  principality  ;  but  the  column  of  tucceur  being 
drawn  principally  from  the  camp  of  Xativa,  forty 
miles  from  Valencia,  he  could  not  quit  the  latter  be- 
fore the  7th  of  .lune.  He  took  with  him  nine  thou- 
sand men  of  all  arms,  leaving  Harispe  on  the  Xucar, 
with  seven  thousand  infantry  and  cavalry,  exclusive 
of  Severoli's  troops,  which  were  in  full  march  from 
Teruel.  Meanwhile  sir  John  Murray's  armament, 
having  very  favourable  weather,  ancl.ored  on  the 
evening  of  the  2nd,  in  the  bay  of 'J'arragcna,  whence 
five  ships  of  war  under  captain  Adam,  and  two  bat- 
talions of  infantry  with  some  guns  under  colonel 
Prevot,  were  detached  to  attack  San  Felipe  de  Bala- 
guer. 

The  strength  and  value  of  this  fort  arose  from  ita 
peculiar  position.  The  works,  garrisoned  by  a  hun- 
dred men,  were  only  sixty  feet  square,  but  the  site 
was  a  steep  isolated  rock,  standing  in  the  very  gorge 
of  a  pass,  and  blocking  the  only  carriage-way  from 
Tortosa  to  'J'arragor.a.  Tlie  mountains  on  either 
hand,  although  commanding  the  fort,  were  nearly 
inaccessible  themselves,  and  great  labour  was  requi- 
red to  form  the  batteries. 

Prevot,  landing  on  the  ;3rd,  was  joined  by  a  Spanish 
brigade  of  Copen's  army,  and  in  concert  with  the 
navy  immediately  commenced  operations  by  placing 
two  eix-pounders  on  the  heights  south  of  the  pass, 
from  whence  at  six  or  seven  hun(h-e()  yards'  ilittance 
they  threw  shrapnel-shells;  but  this  projectile  ip, 
when  used  with  guns  of  small  calibre,  insignificant 
save  as  a  round  shot. 

On  tlie  4tli,  two  twelve-pounders  and  a  howitzer, 
being  brouglit  to  the  same  point  by  iho  sailors,  open- 


598 


NAPIER'S    PENI\SUx,aR    WAR. 


[Book  XXI 


ed  their  fire  and  at  night  the  seamen  with  extraor- 
dinary exertions  dragged  up  five  twenty-four-pound- 
ers  and  their  stores.  The  troops  then  constructed 
one  batttry,  for  two  howitzers,  on  the  slope  of  the 
grand  ridge  to  the  northward  of  the  pass,  and  a  sec- 
ond, for  four  lieavy  guns,  on  the  rock  where  the  fort 
stood  at  a  distance  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  yards. 
To  form  these  batteries,  earth  was  carried  from  be- 
low, and  every  thing  else,  even  water,  brought  from 
the  ships,  though  the  landing-place  was  more  than  a 
inila  and  a  half  off".  Hence,  as  tiie  time  was  valua- 
bli3,  favourable  terms  were  offered  to  the  garrison, 
bat  thi'  ollsr  was  refused.  The  5th,  the  fire  was 
continued,  but  with  slight  success,  the  howitzer  bat- 
tery on  the  great  ridge  was  relinquished,  and  at 
niglit  a  very  violent  storm  retarded  the  construction 
of  the  breacliing  batteries.  Previous  to  this,  colonel 
Prevot  had  warned  Murray,  that  his  means  w-ere  in- 
sufficient, and  a  second  Spanish  brigade  was  sent  to 
him.  Yet  the  breaching  batteries  were  still  incom- 
plete on  the  6th,  so  severe  was  the  labour  of  carry- 
ing up  the  guns,  and  out  of  three,  already  mounted, 
one  was  disabled  by  a  shot  from  the  fort. 

Suchet,  who  was  making  forced  marches  to  Tor- 
tosa,  liad  ordered  the  governor  of  that  place  to  suc- 
cour San  Felipe.  He  tried,  and  would  undoubtedly 
have  succeeded,  if  captain  Peyton  of  the  Thames 
frigate,  had  not  previously  obtained  from  admiral 
Hdllowel  two  eight-inch  mortars,  which  being  pla- 
ced just  uuder  the  fort  and  worked  by  Mr.  James  of 
the  marine  artillery,  commencing  at  daybreak  on 
the  7th,  soon  exploded  a  small  magazine  in  the  fort, 
wliereupon  the  garrison  surrendered.  The  besiegers, 
who  had  lost  abo'.'t  fifty  men  and  officers,  then  occu- 
pied the  place,  and,  meanwhile,  sir  John  Murray 
had  commenced  the 

SECOXD  SIEGE  OF  TARRAGONA. 

Although  the  fleet  cast  anchor  in  the  bay  on  the 
evening  of  the  2J,  the  surf  prevented  the  disembark- 
ation of  the  troops  until  the  next  day.  The  ram- 
part of  the  lower  town  had  been  destroyed  by  Suchet, 
but  Fort  Royal  remained,  and  though  in  bad  condi- 
tion, served,  together  with  the  ruins  of  the  San  Car- 
los bastion,  to  cover  the  western  front,  which  was 
the  weakest  line  of  defence.  The  governor,  Berto- 
letti,  an  Italian,  was  supposed  by  Murray  to  be  dis- 
aii'ected,  but  lie  proved  himself  a  loyal  and  energetic 
olh^^r  ;  and  his  garrison,  sixteen  hundred  strong,  five 
hundred  being  privateer  seamen  and  Franco-Span- 
iards, served  him  well. 

The  Olivo  and  Loretto  heights  were  occupied  the 
first  day  by  Clinton's  and  Wiiittingham's  divisions, 
the  other  troops  remained  on  tlie  low  ground  about 
the  Francoli  river;  the  town  was  then  bombarded 
during  the  niglit  by  the  navy,  but  the  fire  was  sharp- 
ly returned,  and  the  flotilla  suffered  tiie  most.  The 
H'ext  day  two  batteries  were  commenced  six  hundred 
Yards  from  San  Carlos,  and  nine  hundred  yards  from 
Fort  Royal.  Tiiey  opened  the  6tii,  but  being  too 
distant  to  produce  much  effect,  a  third  was  com- 
menced six  hundred  yards  from  Fort  Royal.  The 
8th.  a  practic«ble  breach  was  made  in  tliat  outwork, 
yet  tlic  assault  was  deferred,  and  some  pieces  remov- 
ed to  pliy  from  the  Olivo;  wiiereu[)on  the  besieged, 
finding  the  fire  slacken,  repaired  tiie  broacii  at  Fort 
Roy  il  and  increased  the  defences.  The  subsequent 
j)roceedings  cannot  be  understood  without  an  ac- 
curate knowledge  of  the  relative  positions  of  the 
Frencli  and  allied  armies. 

Tarragona,  thougii  situated  on  one  of  a  cluster  of 
heights  wliich  terminate  a  range  descending  from 
the  northward  to  tlie  sen,  is,  with  the  exception  of 
that  range,  surrounded  by  an  open  coun!  y  called  the 


Campo  de  Tarragona,  which  is  again  environed  by 
very  rugged  mountains,  through  wliich  tlie  several 
roads  descend  into  the  plain. 

Westward  there  were  only  two  carriage  ways, 
one  direct,  by  the  Col  de  BalaEuer  to  'I'nrragona ; 
the  other  circuitous,  leading  by  Mora,  Falcet,  Aion- 
blanc  and  Reus.  The  first  was  blocked  by  the  tnk- 
ing  of  San  Felipe  ;  the  second,  although  used  by 
Suchet  for  his  convoys  during  tiie  Frencli  siege  of 
Tarragona,  was  now  in  bad  order,  and  at  bett  only 
available  for  small  mountain  guns. 

ISorthward  there  was  a  carriage  way,  leading  from 
Lerida,  which  united  with  that  from  Falcet  at  Mon- 
blanc. 

Eastward  there  was  the  royal  causeway,  coming 
from  Barcelona,  through  Villa  Franca,  Arbos,  V  en- 
drils,  and  Torredembarra ;  this  road,  after  jjassing 
Villa  Franca,  sends  oft'  two  branches  to  the  rigiit, 
one  passing  tiirough  tlie  Col  de  Cristina,  the  other 
through  Masarbones  and  Col  de  Leibra,  leading  upon 
Braffin  and  Vails.  It  was  by  the  latter  brancii  that 
Macdonald  passed  to  Reus  in  1810:  he  had,  however, 
no  guns  or  carriages,  and  his  wliole  army  laboured 
to  make  the  way  practicable. 

Between  these  various  roads  the  mountains  were 
too  rugged  to  permit  any  direct  cross  communica- 
tions ;  and  troops,  coming  from  different  sides,  could 
only  unite  in  the  Campo  de  Tarragona,  now  occupied 
by  the  allies.  \\'herefore,  as  Murray  had,  including 
sergeants,  above  fifteen  tiiousand  fighting  men,  and 
Copons,  reinforced  witli  two  regiments  sent  by  sea 
from  Coruha,  was  at  Reus  with  six  thousand  regu- 
lars besides  the  irregular  division  of  Manso,  twenty- 
five  thousand  combatants  were  in  possession  oi'  the 
French  point  of  junction. 

The  Catalans,  after  Lacy's  departure,  had,  with 
the  aid  of  captain  Adam's  ship,  destroyed  two  small 
forts  at  Perillo  and  Ampolla,  and  Kroles  had  blocka- 
ded San  Felipe  de  Balaguer  for  tliirty-six  days;  but 
it  was  then  succoured  by  IMaurice  Matliieu  ;  and  the 
success  at  Perillo  was  more  than  balanced  by  a  check 
which  Sarsfield  received  on  the  8rd  of  April,  from 
some  of  Pannetier's  troops.  The  partida  warfare 
had,  however,  been  more  active  in  Upper  Catalonia, 
and  Copons  claimed  two  considerable  victories,  one 
gained  by  himself  on  the  17th  of  May,  at  La  Bispal, 
near  the  Col  de  Cristina,  where  he  boasted  to  have 
beaten  six  thousand  Frencli  with  iialf  their  numbers, 
destroying  six  hundred,  as  they  returned  from  suc- 
couring San  Felipe  de  Balaguer.  In  the  other,  won 
by  colonel  Lander  near  (Mot  on  the  7th  of  May,  it 
was    said  twelve  hundred  of  Lamarque's   men  fell 

These  exploits  are  by  I>ench  writers  called  skir 
mishes,  and  the  following  description  of  the  Catalan 
army,  given  to  sir  John  ]\lurniy  by  Cabanos,  the 
cliief  of  Copons'  staff,  renders  the  French  version 
the  most  credible. 

"  We  do  not,"  said  that  officer,  "  exceed  nine  or 
ten  thousand  men,  extended  on  different  points  of  a 
line  running  from  the  neiglibourhood  of  Reus  along 
the  high  mountains  to  the  vicinity  of  Clot.  The 
soldiers  are  brave,  but  without  discipline,  without 
subordination,  without  clothing,  without  artillery, 
without  ammunition,  without  magazines,  without 
money,  and  wittiout  means  of  trnnsport !'' 

Copons  himself,  when  ne  came  down  to  the  Cam- 
po, very  frankly  told  IMurrny,  that  as  his  troops  could 
only  fight  in  position,  he  would  not  join  in  any  ope- 
ration which  endangered  his  retreat  into  the  high 
mountains.  However,  with  the  exception  of  twelve 
hundred  men  left  at  Vich  under  Eroles,all  nls  forces, 
the  best  perhaps  in  Spain,  were  now  at  Reus  and 
the  Col  de  Halaguer,  ready  to  intercept  the  commu- 
nications of  the  diflerent  French  corps,  and  to  bar 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


599 


ess  tlieir  marches  if  they  should  descend  into  the 
Campo.  31urray  could  also  calculate  upon  seven 
•>r  ei^ht.  liuiidrGd  seamen  and  marines  to  aid  him  in 
•  •jsliing  on  the  works  of  the  siege,  or  in  a  battle 
near  tlie  shore  ;  and  he  expected  three  thousand  addi- 
tional troops  from  Sicily.  tSir  Edward  Pellew,  com- 
manding tli3  great  Mediterranean  fleet,  had  promis- 
ed to  divert  the  attention  of  the  French  troops  by  a 
dsscent  eastward  of  Barcelona,  and  the  armies  of 
Dol  Parquo  and  Elio  were  to  make  a  like  diversion 
woslward  of  Tortosa.  Finally,  a  general  raising  of 
the  somatenes  might  have  been  eti'ected,  and  those 
mountaineers  were  all  at  Murray's  disj^osal,  to  pro- 
cure intelligence,  to  give  timely  notice  of  the  ene- 
my's approach,  or  to  impede  his  march  by  breaking 
up  the  roads. 

On  tlie  French  side  there  was  greater  but  more 
scattered  power.  Sucliet  had  marched  with  nine 
tliousand  men  fron  Valencia,  and  what  with  Panne- 
tier's  brigade  and  some  spare  troops  from  Tortosa, 
eleven  or  twelve  thousand  men  with  artillery  might 
have  come  to  the  succour  of  Tarragona  from  that 
side,  if  the  sudden  fall  of  San  Felipe  de  Balaguer 
had  not  barred  the  only  carriage  way  on  the  west- 
ward. A  movement  by  Mora,  Falcet,  and  Monblanc, 
remained  open,  3'et  it  would  have  been  tedious,  and 
the  disposable  troops  at  Lerida  were  few.  To  the 
eastward,  therefore,  the  garrison  looked  for  the  first 
succour.  Maurice  Mathieu,  reinforced  with  a  bri- 
gade from  Upper  Catalonia,  could  bring  seven  thou- 
sand men  with  artillery  from  Barcelona,  and  Deca- 
en  couJd  move  from  the  Ampurdan  with  an  equal 
numbc:  ,  hence  twenty-five  thousand  men  might  fi- 
nally bear  upon  the  allied  army. 

But  Suchet,  measuring  from  the  Xucar,  had  more 
than  one  hundred  and  sixty  miles  to  march  ;  Maurice 
Mathieu  was  to  collect  liis  forces  from  various  places 
and  march  seventy  miles  after  Murray  had  disem- 
barked ;  nor  could  lie  stir  at  all,  until  Tarragona  was 
actually  besieged,  lest  the  allies  should  reimbark 
and  attack  Barcelona.  Decaen  had  in  like  manner 
to  look  to  the  security  of  the  Ampurdan,  and  he 
v/as  one  hundred  and  thirty  miles  distant.  Where- 
fore, however  active  the  French  generals  might  be, 
the  English  general  could  calculate  upon  ten  days' 
clear  operations,  after  investment,  before  even  the 
heads  of  the  enemy's  colunms,  coming  from  different 
quarters,  could  issue  from  the  hills  bordering  the 
Campo.  Some  expectation  also  he  might  have,  that 
Suchet  would  endeavour  to  cripple  Del  Parque,  be- 
fore he  marched  to  the  succour  of  Tarragona  ;  and  it 
was  in  liis  favour,  that  eastward  and  westward,  the 
royal  causeway  was  in  places  exposed  to  the  fire  of 
the  naval  squadron.  The  experience  of  captain  Cod- 
rington  during  the  first  siege  of  Tarragona  ;  had  prov- 
ed indeed,  that  an  army  could  not  be  stopped  by  this 
fire,  yet  it  was  an  impediment  not  to  be  left  out  of 
the  calculation.  Thus  the  advantage  of  a  central  po- 
sition ;  the  possession  of  the  enemy's  point  of  junc- 
t'on,  t!ie  initial  movement,  the  good  will  of  the  peo- 
ple, and  the  aid  of  powerful  flank  diversions,  belong- 
e  1  to  Murray  ;  superior  numbers  and  a  better  army 
to  the  Freneii,  since  the  allies,  brave  and  formida- 
ble to  fight  in  a  position,  were  not  well  constitu- 
ted for  general  operations. 

Tarragona,  if  the  resources  for  an  internal  defence 
be  disregarded,  was  a  weak  place.  A  simple  reve- 
tsment  three  feet  and  a  half  thick,  without  ditch  or 
counterscarps,  covered  it  on  the  west;  the  two  out- 
works of  Fort  Royal  and  San  Carlos,  sliglit  obsta- 
cles at  best,  were  not  armed,  nor  even  repaired  until 
after  the  investment,  and  the  garrison,  too  weak  for 
the  extent  of  rampart,  was  oppressed  with  labour. 
Here  then,  time  being  precious  to  both  sides,  ordin- 


ary rules  should  have  been  set  aside  r.nd  daring  op- 
erations adopted.  Lord  Wellington  had  judged  ten 
tliousand  men  sufiicient  to  take  'J'arragoiia.  Mur- 
ray brought  seventeen  thousand,  of  which  iinirteeu 
tliousand  were  efiective.  To  do  this  he  had,  liU  taid, 
so  reduced  his  equipments,  stores,  and  uicuns  of  lund 
transport,  that  his  army  could  not  move  from  tlie 
shipping  ;  he  was  yet  so  unready  for  tiic  siege,  that 
Fort  Royal  was  not  stormed  on  the  8th,  because  llie 
engineer  was  unprepared  to  profit  from  a  succosslul 
assault. 

This  excuse,  founded  on  the  scarcity  of  stores, 
was  not,  however,  borne  out  by  facts.  The  equip- 
ments left  behind,  were  only  draft  animals  and  com- 
missariat field-store^  ;  the  thing  wanting  was  vig- 
our in  the  genera,  dnd  this  was  made  manifest  in 
various  ways.  Co,'ons,  like  all  regular  Spanish  offi- 
cers, was  averse  to  calling  out  tlie  somatenes,  and 
Murray  did  not  press  the  matter.  Suchet  took  San 
Felipe  de  Balaguer  by  escalade.  Murray  attacked 
in  form,  and  without  sufficient  means  ;  for  if  captain 
Peyton  had  not  brought  up  the  mortars,  which  was 
an  after-thought  extraneous  to  the  general's  arrange- 
ments, the  fort  could  not  have  been  reduced  before 
succour  arrived  from  Tortosa.  Indeed  the  surrender 
was  scarcely  creditable  to  the  French  commandant, 
for  his  works  were  uninjured,  and  only  a  small  part 
of  his  powder  destroyed.  It  is  also  said,  I  believe 
truly,  that  one  of  the  oflncers  employed  to  regulate 
the  capitulation  had  in  his  pocket,  an  order  frcm 
Murray  to  raise  the  siege  and  embark,  spiking  the 
guns  !  At  Tarragona,  the  troops  on  the  low  ground, 
did  not  approach  so  near,  by  three  hundred  yards,  aa 
they  might  have  done;  and  the  outworks  should 
have  been  stormed  at  once,  as  Wellington  stormed 
Fort  Francisco  at  the  siege  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo. 
Fort  Francisco  was  a  good  outwork,  and  complete. 
The  outworks  of  Tarragona  were  incomplete,  ill- 
flanked,  without  palisades  or  casements,  and  their 
fall  would  have  enabled  the  besiegers  to  form  a  par- 
allel against  the  body  of  the  place,  as  Suchet  hsd 
done  in  the  former  siege  ;  a  few  hours'  firing  would 
then  have  brought  down  the  wall,  and  a  general  as- 
sault might  have  been  delivered.  The  French  had 
stormed  a  similar  breach  in  that  front,  although  de- 
fended by  eight  thousand  Spanish  troops,  and  the 
allies,  opposed  by  only  sixteen  hundred  French  and 
Italians,  soldiers  and  seamen,  were  in  seme  niccs- 
ure  bound  by  lionour  to  follow  that  example,  since 
colonel  Skerrett,  at  the  former  siege,  refused  to  com- 
mit twelve  hundred  British  troojis  in  the  place  en 
the  special  ground  that  it  was  indefensible,  though 
so  strongly  garrisoned.  Murray's  troops  were  brave, 
they  had  been  acting  together  for  nearly  a  3-ear;  and 
after  the  fight  at  Castalla  had  become  so  eager,  that 
an  Italian  regiment,  which  at  Alicante,  was  ready 
to  go  over  bodily  to  the  enemy,  now  volunteered 
to  lead  the  assault  on  Fort  Royal.  This  confidence 
was  not  shared  by  their  general.  Evt'n  at  the  mo- 
ment of  victory,  he  had  resolved,  if  Suchet  advanced 
a  second  time,  to  relinquish  the  position  of  Castalla 
and  retire  to  Alicante  ! 

It  is  clear,  that,  up  to  the  8th,  sir  .John  Miirrpy'a 
proceedings  were  ill-judged,  and  his  after-operations 
were  more  injudicious. 

As  early  as  the  .5th,  false  reports  had  made  Snclict 
reach  Tortosa,  and  had  put  two  thousand  French  in 
movement  from  Lerida.  Murray  then  opfsnly  avow- 
ed his  alarm  and  his  regret  at  having  left  Alicante  ; 
yet  he  proceeded  to  construct  two  licavy  counter-bat- 
teries near  the  Olivo,  sent  a  detaclmient  to  Vails  in 
observation  of  the  I.erida  road,  and  desired  Manto 
to  watch  that  of  Barcelona. 

On  the  0th,  his  emissaries  said  the  French  wer« 


600 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[BookXXT 


coming  from  the  east,  and  from  the  west ;  and  would 
when  united,  exceed  twenty  thousand.  Murray  im- 
mediately soujfht  an  interview  with  tiie  admiral,  de- 
claring his  intention  to  raise  the  siege  ;  his  views 
were  changed  during  the  conference,  but  he  was  dis- 
contented ;  and  the  ""o  commanders  were  now  evi- 
dently at  variance,  for  Hallowel  refused  to  join  in  a 
bummons  to  tiie  governor,  and  his  flotilla  again  bom- 
barded the  place. 

The  10th,  the  spies  in  Barcelona  gave  notice  that 
flight  or  ten  tliousand  French  with  fourteen  guns, 
would  march  from  that  city  the  next  day.  Copons 
immediately  joined  Manso  and  Murray,  as  if  he  now 
disdained  his  enemy,  continued  to  disembark  stores, 
landed  several  mortars,  armed  the  batteries  at  the 
Ulivo,  and  on  the  11th  opened  their  fire,  in  concert 
with  that  from  the  ships  of  war. 

This  was  the  first  serious  attack,  and  the  English 
general,  professing  a  wish  to  fight  the  column  com- 
ing from  Barcelona,  sent  the  cavalry  under  lord 
Frederick  Bentinck  to  Altafalla,  and  in  person 
Bougiit  a  position  of  battle  to  the  eastward.  He  left 
orders  to  storm  the  outworks  that  night,  but  return- 
ed, before  the  hour  appointed,  extremely  disturbed 
by  intelligence  that  Maurice  Mathieu  was  at  Villa 
Franca  with  eight  thousand  combatants,  and  Su- 
chet  closing  upon  the  Col  De  Balaguer.  The  infir- 
mity of  his  mind  was  now  apparent  to  the  whole 
army.  At  eight  o'clock  he  repeated  his  order  to 
assault  the  outworks  ;  at  ten  o'clock  the  storming 
i)arty  was  in  the  dry  bed  of  the  Francoli,  await- 
ing the  signal,  when  a  countermand  arrived  ;  the 
siege  was  tiien  to  be  raised  and  the  guns  removed 
immediately  from  the  Olivo  ;  the  commander  of  the 
nrtillery  remonstrated,  and  the  general  then  promis- 
ed to  hold  the  batteries  until  the  next  night.  Mean- 
while, the  detachment  at  Vails  and  the  cavalry  at 
Altafalla  were  called  in  without  any  notice  to  gen- 
eral Copons,  though  he  depended  on  their  support, 

The  park  and  all  the  heavy  guns  of  the  batteries 
on  the  low  grounds  were  removed  to  the  beach  for 
embarkation  on  the  morning  of  the  12th,  and  at 
twelve  o'clock  lord  Frederick  Bentinck  arrived  from 
Altafalla  with  the  cavalry.  It  is  said  he  was  order- 
ed to  shoot  his  horses,  but  refused  to  obey,  and  moved 
towards  the  Col  de  Balaguer.  The  detachment  from 
Yalls  arrived  next,  and  the  infantry  marciied  to 
(Jape  Salou  to  embark,  but  the  horsemen  followed 
l.>rd  Frederick,  and  were  themselves  followed  by 
fourteen  pieces  of  artillery  ;  each  body  moved  inde- 
]>endcntly,  and  all  was  confused,  incoherent,  afflict- 
ing, and  dishonourable  to  the  British  arms. 

While  the  seamen  were  embarking  the  guns,  the 
quartermaster-general  came  down  to  the  beach,  witli 
orders  to  abandon  that  business  and  collect  boats  f<)r 
the  reception  of  troops,  the  enemy  being  supposed 
close  at  hand  ;  and  notwithstanding  Murray's  prom- 
ise to  hold  the  Olivo  until  nightfall,  fresh  directions 
were  given  to  sj)ike  the  guns  there,  and  burn  the 
carriages.  Then  loud  murmurs  arose  on  every  side, 
and  from  both  services  ;  army  and  navy  were  alike 
indignant,  and  so  excited,  that  it  is  said  personal 
insult  was  offered  to  the  general.  Three  staff-offi- 
cera  repaired  in  a  body  to  Murray's  quarters,  to  offer 
plans  and  opinions,  and  the  admiral,  who  it  would 
appear  did  not  object  to  raising  the  siege,  but  to  tlie 
manner  of  doing  it,  would  not  suffer  the  seamen  to 
discontinue  the  embarkation  of  artillery.  He  even 
urged  an  attack  upon  the  column  coming  from  Bar- 
cjlona,  and  opposed  the  order  to  spike  the  guns  at 
t)»e  Olivo,  offering  to  be  responsible  for  carrying  all 
clear  off  during  the  night 

Thus  pressed,  Murray  again  waverf'd.  Denying 
Itxat  he  had  ordered  the  battering  pieces  to  be  spik  • 


od,  he  sent  counter-orders,  and  directed  a  pr.rt  of 
Clinton's  troops  to  advance  towards  the  Gaya  river 
Yet  a  few  hours  afterwards  lie  reverted  to  liis  f<)r- 
mer  resolution,  and  peremptorily  renewed  tiie  order 
for  the  artillery  to  spike  the  guns  on  the  Clivo, 
and  burn  tlie  carriages.  Nor  was  even  this  unhappy 
action  performed  without  confusion.  The  dilierenl 
orders  received  by  Clinton  in  the  course  of  the  vsy 
had  indicated  the  extraordinary  vacillation  of  thp 
commander-in-chief,  and  Clinton  himself,  forgetful 
of  his  own  arrangements,  with  an  obsolete  courtesy, 
took  off  his  hat  to  salute  an  enemy's  battery  wliich 
had  fired  upon  him  ;  but  this  waving  of  his  hat  from 
that  particular  spot  was  also  the  conventional  signal 
for  the  artillery  to  spike  the  guns,  and  they  werp 
thus  spiked  prematurely.  The  troops  were,  howev- 
er, all  embarked  in  the  night  of  tiie  12th,  and  many 
of  the  stores  and  horses  were  shipped  on  tlie  U'tli, 
without  the  slightest  interruption  from  tlie  enemy  ; 
but  eigliteen  or  nineteen  battering  pieces,  whose 
carriages  had  been  burned,  were,  with  all  the  plat- 
forms, fascines,  gabions,  and  small  ammunition,  in 
view  of  the  fleet  and  army,  triumpliantly  carried 
into  the  fortress.  Sir  J.  Murray,  meanwli.le,  seem- 
ingly unaftected  by  this  misfortune,  sliipped  himself 
on  the  evening  of  the  12th,  and  took  his  usual  re- 
pose in  bed. 

While  the  English  general  was  thus  precipitately 
abandoning  the  siege,  the  French  generals,  unable 
to  surmount  the  obstacles  opposed  to  their  junction, 
unable  even  to  communicate  by  their  emissaries, 
were  despairing  of  the  saf?ty  of  Tarragona.  Suchet 
did  not  reach  Tortosa  before  the  10th,  but  a  detach- 
ment from  the  garrison,  had  on  tlie  8th,  attempted 
to  succour  San  Felipe,  and  nearly  captured  tlie  na- 
val captain  Adam,  colonel  Prevot,  and  other  oflicers, 
who  were  examining  the  country.  On  the  other  side 
Maurice  Mathieu,  having  gatlierod  troops  from  va- 
rious places,  reached  Villa  Franca  early  on  the  Ifth, 
and  deceiving  even  his  own  people  as  to  his  num- 
bers, gave  out  that  Decaen,  whom  he  really  expect- 
ed, was  close  behind  with  a  powerful  force.  To  give 
effect  to  this  policy,  he  drove  Copons  from  Arbcs  on 
the  11th,  and  his  scouting  parties  entered  Vendrils, 
ae  if  he  was  resolved  singly  to  attack  Murray.  Sir 
Edward  Pellew  had,  however,  landed  his  marines  at 
Rosas,  which  arrested  Decaen's  march  ;  and  Maurice 
Matliieu,  alarmed  at  the  cessation  of  fire  about  Tar- 
ragona, knowing  nothing  of  Suchet's  niovementp, 
and  too  weak  to  fight  the  allies  alone,  fell  back  in 
the  night  of  the  12th  to  the  Llobregat,  his  main  bo- 
dy never  having  passed  Villa  Franca. 

Suchet's  operations  to  the  v/estwa.rd  were  even 
less  decisive.  His  advanced  guard  under  Pannotier, 
reached  Perillo  the  lOth.  The  11th,  not  iiearing 
from  his  spies,  he  caused  Pannetier  to  pass  by  liii 
left  over  the  mountains  through  Valdillos  to  som'» 
heights  which  terminate  abruptly  on  tlie  Campo, 
above  Monroig.  Tlie  12th,  tlmt  officer  reached  tho 
extreme  verge  of  the  hills,  being  then  about  twenty- 
five  miles  from  Tarragona.  His  [latrols  descendiiiT 
into  the  plains,  met  with  lord  Frederick  Beiitinck's 
troopers,  reported  that  IMurrny's  whole  army  was  at 
hand,  wherefore  he  would  not  enter  the  Cnnipo,  but 
at  night  he  kindled  large  fires  to  encourage  the  gar- 
rison of  Tarragona.  These  signals  were  liow(!ver 
unobserved,  the  country  people  had  disappeared,  no 
intelligence  could  be  procured,  and  Suchet  could  not 
follow  him  with  a  large  force  into  those  wild  desert 
hills,  where  there  was  no  water.  Thus  on  both  sides 
of  Tarragona  the  succouring  armies  were  (]uite  baf- 
fled at  the  moment  chosen  by  Murray  for  flight. 

Suc^het  now  received  alnniiing  intelligence  from 
Valencia ;  yet  still  anxious  for  Tarragona,  he  pushed. 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


601 


en  the  1-^lth,  alang  the  coast-road  towards  San  Fe- 
lipe dc  Balaguer,  thinking  to  tind  Prevot's  division 
alone  ;  but  the  liead  of  his  column  was  suddenly  can- 
nonaded by  the  Thames  frigute,  and  he  was  wonder- 
fully surprised  to  see  the  whole  British  fleet  anchor- 
ed otT  San  Felipe,  and  disembarking'  troops.  Mur- 
ray's operations  were  indeed  as  irregular  as  those 
ot"  a  partisan,  yet  without  partisan  vigour.  He  had 
heard  in  the  night  of  the  1:2th,  from  colonel  Prevot, 
of  Pannetier's  march  to  Tvlonroig,  and  to  jirotect  tlie 
cavalry  and  guns  under  lord  Frederick  Bentinck, 
sent  .M'Kenzie's  division  by  sea  to  Balaguer  en  the 
1."  th,  following  with  the  wliole  army  on  the  14th. 
M'Kenzie  drove  back  the  French  posts  on  both  sides 
of  the  pass,  the  embarkation  of  the  cavalry  and  artil- 
lery then  commenced,  and  Sachet,  still  uncertain  if 
Tarragona  had  fallen,  moved  towards  Valdillos  to 
bring  on  Pannetier. 

At  this  precise  period,  ]\Iurray  heard  that  Man- 
rice  Jvlathieu's  column,  which  he  always  erroneously 
supposed  to  bo  under  Decaen,  had  retired  to  the  Llo- 
bregat,  that  Copons  was  again  at  Reus,  and  that 
Tarragona  had  not  been  reinforced.  Elated  by  this 
information,  he  revolved  various  projects  in  his  mind, 
at  one  tir-ie  thinking  to  fall  upon  Suchet,  at  another 
to  cut  olf  Pannetier,  now  resolving  to  march  upon 
Cambrils,  and  even  to  menace  Tarragona  Bgain  by 
land;  then  he  was  for  sending  a  detachment  by  sea 
to  surprise  the  latter,  but  finally  he  disembarked  his 
whole  force  on  the  1.5th,  and  being  ignorant  of  Su- 
chet's  last  movement,  decided  to  strike  at  Pannetier. 
In  this  view,  he  detached  >''Kenzie,  by  a  rugged 
valley  leading  from  the  eastward,  to  Valdillos,  and 
that  officer  reached  it  on  the  16th  ;  but  Suchet  had 
already  carried  off  Pannetier's  brigade,  and  the  next 
day  the  British  detachment  was  recalled  by  Murray, 
who  now  only  thought  of  reimbarking. 

T.T.s  determination  was  caused  by  a  fresh  alarm 
from  the  eastward;  for  Maurice  Mathieu,  whose 
whole  proceedings  evinced  both  skill  and  vigour, 
Hearing  that  the  siege  of  Tarragona  was  raised,  and 
the  allies  relanded  at  the  Col  de  Balaguer,  retraced 
his  steps  and  boldly  entered  Cambrils  the  17th.  On 
that  day,  however,  M'Kenzie  returned,  and  Murray's 
whole  army  was  thus  concentrated  in  the  pass.  Su- 
chet was  then  behind  Perillo,  Copons  at  Reus,  hav- 
ing come  there  at  Murray's  desire  to  attack  31aurice 
Mathieu,  and  the  latter  would  have  suflered,  if  the 
English  general  liad  been  capable  of  a  vigorous 
stnike.  On  the  otiier  hand,  it  was  fortunate  for 
M'Kenzie  that  Suchet,  too  anxious  for  Valencia,  dis- 
regarded his  movement  upon  Valdillos ;  but  taught, 
by  the  disembarkation  of  the  whole  English  army, 
*hat  the  fate  of  Tarragona,  whether  for  good  or  evil, 
was  decided,  he  had  sent  an  emissary  to  Maurice 
Mathieu  on  the  16th,  and  then  retired  to  Perillo  and 
Amposta.  He  reached  the  latter  place  the  17th,  at- 
tentive only  to  the  movement  of  the  fleet,  and,  mean- 
while, Maurice  Mathieu  endeavoured  to  surprise  the 
Catalans  at  R^us. 

Copons  was  led  into  this  danger  by  sir  John  ]Mur- 
ray,  who  had  desired  him  to  harass  Maurice  31a- 
thieu's  rear,  with  a  view  to  a  general  attack,  and 
then  changed  his  plan  without  giving  the  Spanish 
general  any  notice.  However,  he  escaped.  The 
French  moved  upon  Tarragona,  and  Murrey  was  left 
free  to  embark  or  to  remain  at  the  Col  de  Balaguer. 
He  called  a  council  of  war,  and  it  was  concluded  to 
reimbark,  but  at  that  moment,  the  great  Mediterra- 
nean fleet  appeared  in  the  nfllng,  and  admiral  Hal- 
lowel,  observing  a  signal  announcing  lord  \^'illlam 
Bentinck's  arrival,  answered  with  more  promptitude 
than  propriety,  "  Tfr  are  all  delighted.''^ 

Sir  John  Murray's  command  having  thus  termina- 


ted, the  general  discontent  rendered  it  impossible  lo 
avoid  a  public  investigation,  yet  tliC  d.fliculty  of 
holding  a  court  in  Spain,  and  seme  disposition  at 
home  to  shield  him,  caused  great  deky.  He  was  at 
last  tried  in  England.  Acquitted  of  two  charges,  en 
the  third  he  was  declared  guilty  of  sn  error  in  ju<"g- 
ment,  and  sentenced  to  be  admonished;  but  even 
that  slight  mortification  was  not  ii.flictet'. 

This  decision  does  not  preclude  the  ju('gmer.t  cf 
history,  nor  will  it  sway  that  of  posterity.  'J'l.e 
court-martial  was  assembled  twcr.ty  mcrths  aiter 
the  event,  when  the  war  being  happily  tciminattd, 
men's  minds  were  little  disposed  to  treat  past  fail- 
ures with  severity.  There  were  two  distinct  prcbe- 
cutors,  having  different  views;  the  proceedings  were 
conducted  at  a  distance  from  the  scene  cfactcn,  (de- 
fects of  memory  could  not  be  rcmedi^ed  by  references 
to  localities,  and  a  dcor  was  opened  lor  contrcdittit  n 
and  doubt  upon  important  points.  There  was  lo 
indication  that  the  members  of  the  court  were  ur.en- 
inious  in  their  verdict;  they  were  ccr.fired  to  speci- 
fic charges,  restricted  by  legal  rules  of  evidence,  end 
deprived  of  the  testimony  of  all  il.e  Spanish  cti;cers, 
who  were  certainly  discontented  with  Jlurray's  ccn- 
duct,  and  whose  absence  caused  the  serious  chcrge 
of  abandoning  Copons' army  to  be  suppresfed.  More- 
over, the  warmth  of  temper  displayed  by  tie  ]ir'r.- 
cipal  prosecutor,  admiral  Hallowel,  together  with  his 
signal  on  lord  William  Bentinck's  arrival,  whereby, 
to  the  detriment  of  discipline,  he  manifested  his  con- 
tempt for  the  general  with  whcnri  he  was  acting,  gave 
Murray  an  advantage  which  he  improved  ikillully, 
for  he  was  a  man  sufficiently  acnte  and  prfn;!pt  when 
I  not  at  the  head  of  en  army.  He  charged  the  armi- 
\  ral  with  deceit,  factious  dealings,  and  disregard  of 
the  service;  described  him  as  a  man  cf  a  passionate, 
overweening,  busy  disposition,  troubled  with  excess 
of  vanity,  meddling  with  every  thing,  and  thinking 
himself  competent  to  manage  both  trcojs  and  ships 
!  Nevertheless,  sir  John  Murray  had  signally  failed, 
,  both  as  an  independent  general,  and  as  a  l.eutei  ant 
]  acting  under  superior  orders.  Cn  his  trial,  blending 
these  different  capacities  together,  with  expert  so- 
phistry he  pleaded  his  instructions  in  excuse  for  liis 
errors  as  a  free  commander,  and  his  discreticrary 
power  in  mitigation  of  his  disobedience  as  a  lieuten- 
ant; but  his  operations  were  indefensible  in  both  ca- 
pacities. Lord  Wellington's  instructions,  precise, 
and  founded  upon  the  advantages  of.'ered  by  a  com- 
mand of  the  sea,  prescribed  an  attack  upon  Tarra- 
gona, with  a  definite  object,  namely,  to  deliver  Va- 
lencia. 

"You  tell  me,"  said  he,  "  that  the  line  of  the  Xu- 
car,  v.hich  covers  Valencia,,  is  too  strong  to  force; 
turn  it  then  by  the  ocean,  assail  the  rear  of  the  ene- 
my, and  he  will  weaken  his  strong  line  to  protect 
his  commiUnication ;  or.  he  will  give  you  an  oppor- 
tunity to  establish  a  new  base  of  operations  behind 
him." 

This  plan,  however,  demanded  promptness  and 
energy,  and  ^lurray  possessed  neither.  The  weath- 
er was  so  favourable,  that  a  voyage  which  m'ght 
have  consumed  nine  or  ten  days,  was  performed  in 
two,  the  Spanish  troops  punctually  efi'ected  their 
junction,  the  initial  operations  were  secured,  Fort 
I3alaguer  fell,  the  p'rench  moved  from  all  sides  to 
the  succour  of  Tarragona,  the  line  of  the  Xucar  was 
weakened,  the  diversion  was  complete.  In  the  night 
of  the  12th,  the  bulk  of  3Iiirray's  army  was  again 
afloat,  a  few  hours  would  have  sufficed  to  enilfirk  tlie 
cavalry  at  the  Col  de  Balaguer,  and  the  wlcie  might 
have  sailed  for  the  city  of  Valencia,  while  Sud.et'a 
advanced  guard  was  still  on  the  hills  above  Mor.roig, 
and  he,  still  ut:«  rtain  as  to  the  fate  of  Tarragona, 


602 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XXL 


one  liun(]r3il  and  fifty  miles  from  the  Xucar.    In  fine,  ■■ 
Murray  had  tailed  to  attain  the  first  object  pointed' 
out  by  VVellinirton's  instructions,  but  the  second  was 
within  his  reach;  instead  of  j^rasping  it,  he  loitered 
about  the  Col  de  Balaguer,  and  gave  Suchet,  as  we  ^ 
ehall  rind,  time  to  reach  Valencia  again.  I 

Now  wliether  tiie  letter  or  tiie  spirit  of  Welling-] 
ton's  instructions  be  considered,  there  was  here  a' 
manifes*  dereliction  on  the  part  of  Murray.  Wliat 
was  tliat  oillccr's  defence  !  That  no  specific  period  \ 
bs.ng  named  fur  his  return  to  Valencia,  he  was  en- i 
titled  to  exercise  liis  discretion  !  Did  he  then  as  an  | 
independent  general  perform  any  useful  or  brilliant ! 
action  to  justify  liis  delay]  No!  his  tale  was  one 
of  Joss  and  dishonour!  The  improvident  arrange- 
ments for  the  siege  of  San  Felipe  de  Balaguer,  and 
the  unexpected  fortune  whicii  saved  him  from  the 
shame  of  abandoning  his  guns  tliere  also  liave  been 
noted  ;  and  it  has  been  shown,  that  when  the  gain 
of  time  was  the  great  element  of  success,  he  neither 
urged  Copons  to  break  up  the  roads,  or  pushed  tlie 
siege  of  Tarragona  with  vigour.  The  feeble  formal- 
ity cf  this  latter  operation  has  indeed  been  imputed 
to  the  engineer  .Major  Thacl^ary,  yet  unjustly  so.  It 
was  the  part  of  tliat  ofiicer  to  form  a  plan  of  attack 
agreeable  to  the  rules  of  art,  it  might  be  a  bold  or  a 
cautious  plan,  and  many  persons  did  think  Tarra- 
gona was  treated  by  liiin  witii  too  much  respect ;  but 
it  was  the  part  of  the  commander-in-chief  to  decide 
if  the  general  scheme  of  operations  required  a  devia- 
tion from  the  regular  course.  The  untrammelled  en- 
ginaer  could  then  have  displayed  his  genius.  Sir 
John  Murray  made  no  sign.  His  instructions  and 
his  ultimate  views  were  withheld  alike,  from  his 
naval  colleague,  from  his  second  in  command,  and 
from  his  quartermaster-general  ;  and  while  the  last- 
named  functionary  was  quite  shut  out  from  the  con- 
fidi^nce  of  his  commander,  the  admiral,  and  many 
otiiers,  both  of  the  army  and  navy,  imagined  liim  to 
be  the  secret  author  of  the  proceedings  whicli  were 
hourly  exciting  tlieir  indignation.  Murray,  howev- 
er, declared  on  liis  trial,  that  he  had  rejected  gene- 
ral Donkin's  advice,  an  avowal  consonant  to  facts, 
since  that  officer  urged  him  to  raise  the  siege  on 
the  9tii,  and  had  even  told  him  where  four  hundred 
draught  bullocks  were  to  be  had,  to  transport  his 
heavy  artillery.  On  the  12th,  he  opposed  the  spik- 
ing of  the  guns,  and  urged  Murray  to  drag  them  to 
Cape  Salon,  of  which  place  he  iiad  given  as  early  as 
the  third  day  of  the  siege,  a  military  plan,  marking 
a  position,  strong  in  itself,  covering  several  landing 
places,  and  capable  of  being  flanked  on  both  sides 
by  the  ships  of  war :  it  had  no  drawback  save  a  scar- 
city of  water,  yet  ther^  were  some  springs,  and  the 
fleet  would  have  sui)[)ried  the  deficiency. 

It  is  true  that  Donkin,  unacquainted  with  Wel- 
lington's instructions,  and  liaving  at  Castalla  seen 
no  reason  to  rely  on  sir  John  Murray's  military  vig- 
our, was  averse  to  the  enterprise  against  Tarra- 
gona. He  tiiought  the  allies  should  have  worked 
Suchet  out  of  Valencia  by  operating  on  his  right 
flank.  And  so  Wellington  would  have  thought,  if  he 
liad  only  looked  at  their  numbers  and  not  at  tlieir 
quality  ;  he  had  even  sketched  such  a  fflan  i'or  31  ur- 
rny,  if  the  attack  u[)on  Tarragona  should  be  found 
impracticable.  But  he  knew  the  Spaniards  too  well, 
to  like  such  combinations  for  an  army,  two-thirds  of 
which  were  of  that  nation,  and  not  even  under  one 
head  ;  an  army,  ill-equipped,  and  with  the  excep- 
tion of  Del  Parque's  troops,  unused  to  active  field 
oi)erations.  Wherefore  calculating  their  power  with 
remarkable  nicety,  he  preferred  the  sea-flank,  and 
the  aid  of  an  English  fleet. 

Here  it  may  be  observed,  that  Napoleon's  plan  of 


invasion  did  not  embrace  the  coast-lines  where  they 
could  be  avoided.  It  was  an  obvious  disadvantage 
to  give  the  British  navy  opportunities  of  acting 
against  his  communications.  The  p  rendu  indeed, 
seized  Santona  and  St.  Ander  in  the  Bay  jf  Biscay, 
because,  these  being  the  only  good  ports  on  tiiat 
coast,  the  English  ships  were  thus  in  a  manner  shut 
out  from  the  north  of  Spain.  They  likewise  work- 
ed their  invasion  by  the  Catalonian  and  Valencian 
coast,  because  the  only  roads  practicable  for  artille- 
ry run  along  that  sea-line  ;  but  their  general  scheme 
was  to  hold,  with  large  masses,  the  interior  of  the 
country,  and  keep  their  communications  aloof  from 
the  danger  of  combined  operations  by  sea  and  land. 
The  providence  of  the  plan  was  proved  by  Sachet's 
peril  on  this  occasion. 

Sir  John  Murray,  when  tried,  grounded  his  justi- 
fication on  the  following  points: — 1st.  That  he  did 
not  know  with  any  certainly  until  the  night  of  the 
llth,  that  Suchet  was  near; — 2d.  That  tlie  fall  of 
Tarragona  being  the  principal  object,  and  the  draw- 
ing of  the  French  from  Valencia  the  accessary,  he 
persisted  in  the  siege  because  he  expected  reinforce- 
ments from  Sicily,  and  desired  to  profit  from  the 
accidents  of  war ; — J?d.  That  looking  onl)'  to  the 
second  object,  the  diversion  would  have  been  incom- 
plete, if  the  siege  had  been  raised  sooner,  or  even 
relaxed  ;  hence  the  landing  of  guns  and  stores  after 
he  despaired  of  success; — 4tli.  That  he  dared  not 
risk  a  battle  to  save  his  battering  train,  because 
Wellington  would  not  pardon  a  defeat.  Now  had  he 
adopted  a  vigorous  plan,  or  persisted  until  the  dan- 
ger of  losing  his  army  was  apparent,  and  then  made 
a  quick  return  to  Valencia,  this  defence  would  have 
been  plausible,  though  inconclusive.  But  when  ev 
ery  order,  every  movement,  every  express  on,  dis- 
covered his  infirmity  of  purpose,  his  pleading  can 
only  be  regarded  as  the  subtle  tale  of  an  advocate. 

The  fault  was  not  so  much  in  the  raising  of  the 
siege  as  in  the  manner  of  doing  it,  and  in  the  feeble- 
ness of  the  attack.  For,  first,  however  numerous 
the  chances  of  war  are,  fortresses  expecting  suc- 
cour do  not  surrender  without  being  vigorously  as- 
sailed. The  arrival  of  reinfiircements  from  Sicily 
was  too  uncertain  for  reasonable  calculation;  and  it 
was  scarcely  possible  for  the  governor  of  Tarrago- 
na, while  closely  invested,  to  discover  that  no  fresh 
stores  or  guns  were  bei'ng  landed  ;  still  less  could  he 
judge  so  timeously  of  Murray's  final  intention  by 
that  fact,  so  to  advertise  Suchet  that  Tarragona  was 
in  no  danger.  Neither  were  the  spies,  if  any  were 
in  tiie  allies'  camp,  more  capable  of  drawing  such 
conclusions,  seeing  that  sufticient  artillery  and  stores 
for  the  siege  were  landed  the  first  week.  And  the 
landing  of  more  guns  could  not  have  deceived  them, 
when  the  feeble  operations  of  the  general,  and  the 
universal  discontent,  furnished  surer  guides  for  their 
reports. 

Murray  designed  to  raise  the  siege  as  early  as  the 
0th,  and  only  deferred  it,  after  seeing  the  admiral, 
from  his  natural  vacillation.  It  was  therefore  mero 
ci'sulstry  to  say,  that  he  first  obtained  certain  infor- 
mation of  TMichet's  advance  on  the  night  of  the  llth. 
On  the  ^th  and  1<  th,  through  various  channels,  he 
knew  the  French  mnrshal  was  in  march  forTortosa, 
and  that  his  advanced  guard  menaced  the  Cnl  de  Ba- 
laguer. The  approncli  of  Maurice  3InthiLMi  on  the 
other  side  was  also  known;  he  should,  therefore, 
have  been  prepared  to  raise  the  siej^e  without  the 
loss  of  Lis  guns  on  the  12th.  Why  were  they  lost  at 
all  ]  They  could  not  be  saved,  he  said,  without  risk- 
ing a  b;itL!e  in  a  bad  position,  and  Wcllinsrlon  liaH 
declared  he  would  not  pardon  a  defeat  !  This  was 
the  aiter-thought  of  a  sophistcr,  and  not  warranted 


ISIS."! 


NAPIEIl'S    PENINSULAR   WAR 


G33 


by  Wellington's  instructions,  which  on  that  head, 
referred  only  to  the  dulte  del  Paique  and  Elio. 

But  \\;is  it  necessary  to  ii^ht  ii  battle  in  a  bad  po- 
tJit'oa  tu  ;:ave  the  g"uns  !  all  persons  admitted  that 
they  could  liave  been  embarked  before  mid-day  on 
the  loth.  Pannetier  was  then  at  Moiiroig,  i-«u- 
cii3t  stJI  behind  Perillo,  ^laurice  Muthieu  Falling 
b.i';lv  from  Villa  Franca.  The  French  on  each  side 
were  therefore  respectively  thiny-six  and  tliirty- 
four  miles  distant  on  the  niglit  of  the  12tli,  and 
tiieir  point  of  junction  was  Reus.  Yet  how  fjrm  that 
jiinjtion  !  The  road  from  Villa  Franca  by  the  Cul 
de  <Jristina  was  partially  broken  up  by  Copons,  the 
road  from  Perillo  to  Reus  was  always  impracticable 
fir  artillery,  and  from  the  latter  place  to  Tarragona 
was  six  miles  of  very  rugged  country.  The  allies 
w  're  in  possession  of  the  point  of  junction,  Maurice 
Mithieu  was  retiring,  not  advancing.  And  if  the 
Freneli  could  have  marched  thirty-four  and  thirty- 
six  miles,  through  the  mountains,  in  one  night,  and 
been  disposed  to  attack  in  the  morning  without  ar- 
tillery, they  must  still  have  ascertained  the  situa- 
tio!i  of  Murray's  army  ;  they  must  have  made  ar- 
rangem3nts  to  watch  Copons,  Manso,  and  Prevot, 
who  would  have  been  on  their  rear  and  flanks  ;  they 
must  have  formed  an  order  of  battle  and  decided  up- 
on the  mode  of  attack  before  they  advanced.  It  is 
true  that  their  junction  at  Reus  would  have  forced 
Murray  to  suspend  his  embarkation  to  fight ;  but 
not,  as  he  said,  in  a  bad  position,  with  his  back  to 
the  beach,  where  the  ships'  guns  could  not  aid  him, 
and  where  he  might  expect  a  dangerous  surf  for 
days.  The  naval  officers  denied  the  danger  from 
surf  at  tiiat  season  of  the  3''ear ;  and  it  was  not  right 
to  destroy  the  guns  and  stores  when  the  enemy  was 
not  even  in  march  for  Reus.  Coolness  and  con- 
eideration  would  have  enabled  Murray  to  see  that 
there  was  no  danger.  In  fact  no  emissaries  escaped 
from  the  town,  and  the  enemy  had  no  spies  in  the 
camp,  since  no  comnmnication  took  place  between 
the  French  columns  until  the  17th.  On  the  15th, 
Sucliet  knew  nothing  of  the  fate  of  Tarragona 

The  above  reasoning  leaves  out  the  possibility  of 
profiting  from  a  central  position  to  fall  with  supe- 
rior forces  upon  one  of  the  French  columns.  It  sup- 
poses, however,  that  accurate  information  was  pos- 
sessed by  the  French  generals;  that  Maurice  Ma- 
thieu  was  as  strong  as  he  pretended  to  be,  Suchet 
eager  and  resolute  to  form  a  junction  with  him. 
But  in  truth  Suchet  knew  not  what  to  do  after  the 
fall  of  Fort  Halaguer,  Maurice  Mathieu  had  less 
than  seven  thousand  men  of  all  arms,  he  was  not 
followed  by  Decaen,  and  he  imagined  the  allies  to 
have  twenty  thousand  men,  exclusive  of  the  Cata- 
lans, liesides  which  the  position  at  Cape  Halou 
was  only  six  miles  distant,  and  Murray  might,  with 
the  aid  of  the  draft  bullocks  discovered  by  J)onkin, 
have  dragged  all  his  heavy  guns  there,  still  main- 
taining the  investment;  he  miglit  have  shipped  his 
battering  train,  and  when  the  enemy  approached 
Reus,  have  marched  to  the  Col  de  Balaguer,  where 
he  could,  as  he  afterwards  did,  embrrk  or  disembark 
in  the  presence  of  the  enemy.  The  danger  of  a 
flank  march,  Suchet  being  at  Reus,  could  not  have 
deterred  him,  because  he  did  send  his  cavalry  and 
fitlil  artillery  by  that  very  road  on  the  12th,  when 
the  French  advanced  guard  was  at  Monroig,  and 
actually  skirmished  with  lord  Frederick  Hentlnck. 
Finally,  he  could  have  embarked  his  main  body, 
'eaving  a  small  corps  with  some  cavalry  to  keep  the 
jfarrison  in  check  and  bring  off  his  guns.  Such  a 
detachment,  together  with  the  heavy  guns,  would 
have  been  afloit  in  a  couple  of  hours,  and  on  board 
the  6hips  in  four  hours;  it  could  have  embarked  on 


the  open  beach,  or,  if  fearful  of  being  molcited  by 
the  garrison,  might  have  marched  to  Cape  Salou,  or 
to  the  Col  de  Balaguer;  and  if  the  gurs  had  thna 
been  lost,  the  necessity  would  have  been  apparent, 
and  the  dishonour  lessened.  It  is  clear  therel(>re 
that  there  was  no  military  need  toftacriiice  the  b;it 
tering  pieces.  And  those  were  the  guns  that  shook 
tlie  bloody  ramparts  of  Badajos  ! 

Wellington  felt  their  loss  keenly;  sir  John  Mur 
ray  spoke  of  them   lightly  :  "  They  were   of  sma 
value,  old  iron  !   he  attached  little  importance  to  the 
sacrilice  of  artillery,  it  was  his  principle,  lie  had  ap 
proved  of  colonel  Adam  losing  his  guns  at  Biar,  and 
he    had   also  desired    colonel    Prevot,   if  pretsed,  to 
abandon  his  battering  train  before  the  fort  of  Bala- 
guer ....  Such  doctrine  might  appear  strange  to 
a  British  army,  but  it  was  the  rule  with  the  conti- 
nental armies,  and  the  French  owed  much  of  their 
successes  to  the  adoption  of  it." 

Strange  indeed  !  Great  commanders  have  risked 
their  own  lives,  and  sacrificed  their  bravest  men, 
charging  desperately  in  person,  to  retrieve  even  a 
single  piece  of  cannon  in  a  battle.  They  knew  the 
value  of  moral  force  in  war,  and  that  of  all  the  va- 
rious springs  and  levers  on  wliich  it  depends  uiilita- 
ry  honour  is  the  most  powerful.  No  !  it  was  not  to 
the  adoption  of  such  a  doctrine,  that  the  French 
owed  their  great  successes.  It  was  to  the  care  with 
which  Napoleon  fostered  and  cherished  a  contruiy 
feeling.  Sir  John  Murray's  argument  would  have 
been  more  pungent,  more  complete,  if  he  had  lost 
his  colours,  and  pleaded  that  they  were  oiily  wooden 
staves,  bearing  old  pieces  of  silk  I 


CHAPTER  II. 

Danger  of  Sirllv — Avertrd  bv  Mural's  serrel  dfferlion  from 
the  eiiipnor — Lord  William  Bentiiick  reiiiiharks — His  de- 
sign of  altadiin^  the  <:ily  of  Valmr ia  fru'trnled — Dt  1  Parqne 
is  (If  fealed  on  the  Xiicar — The  Aiiglo-Sirilians  di-eiiihark 
at  Aliiaiite — Sucliet  prepares  to  altaik  the  allies — I'revt  iit- 
ed  bv  the  bailie  of  Vitloria  —  Abandons  Valencia — Mairh- 
es  towards  Zara<ji'za — Claiiztj  retreats  to  Frame — Paris 
evacuates  Zar.i;;oza--  Sucliet  retires  to  Tarragona — Mines 
the  walls — Lord  Willinin  Beiilinck  passes  the  Kbrn — Se- 
cures the  Col  de  Balai^-iier — Invests  Tarragona — Partial 
insurre clioii  in  Upnfr  Catalonia — Combat  of  Sabid — Del 
Parcpie  j(.ins  lord  William  Hentinck  wlio  projects  an  atlnclc 
upon  Suchel's  canlonuients — Suchet  roncentrales  Ins  army 
— Is  joined  liv  Decaen — Advances — The  allies  retreat  to  tlie 
ninuiilains — De!  Par(|ue  invests  Tortosa — His  rear-guard  at- 
ticked  bv  the  garrison  while  passing  the  F.bro — Suchet 
blc)v^s  up  (he  wails  of  Tarragona — Lord  William  disiies  to 
111  siege  Tortosa — Hears  that  Suchet  has  detached  troops — 
Sends  Dtl  Pni(|Ue's  ariiiv  (o  join  lord  Wellington — Advanc- 
es to  Villa  Franca — Coiidjat  of  Ordal — The  allic  s  retreat — 
Lord  Fredeiick  Bentinck  fights  with  the  French  general 
]\l>ersaiid  wounds  him — Lord  William  returns  to  Sicily  — 
Observations. 

Lord  William  Bentinck  arrived  without  troops, 
for,  having  removed  the  queen  from  Sicily,  he  feared 
internal  dissension,  and  Najioleon  had  direct<ul  .Mu- 
rat  to  invade  the  island  with  twenty  thousand  nuui, 
the  Toulon  squadron  being  to  act  in  concert.  Sir 
Edward  Pellew  admitted  that  the  iatter  might  easi- 
ly gain  twenty-four  hours'  start  of  his  fleet,  and  lord 
William  judged  that  ten  thousand  invaders  would 
suffice  to  conquer.  Murat,  however,  opened  a  secret 
negotiation,  and  thus  that  monarch,  Bernadotle,  and 
the  emperor  Francis,  endeavoured  to  destroy  a  hero 
connected  with  tncm  by  marriage,  and  to  wliouj 
they  all  owed  their  crowns  either  by  gift  or  clem- 
ency I 

This  early  defection  of  IMtirat  is  certain,  and  hia 
declaration  that  he  had  instriiciions  to  invade  Sicily 
was  corroborated  by  a  rumour,  rife  ia  iSc  French 


604 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XXI. 


camps  before  the  battle  of  Vittoria,  that  the  Toulon 
flaet  liad  sailed  and  the  descent  actually  been  made. 
Nevertiieless,  there  is  some  obscurity  about  the  niat- 
t3r.  The  negotiation  was  never  completed,  .Murat 
left  Italy  to  command  ISapoleon's  cavalry,  and  at 
tiie  battle  of  Dresden  contributed  much  to  the  suc- 
cess of  that  day.  iNovv  it  is  conceivable  that  he 
eliould  masii  his  jilans  by  joining  tiie  grand  army, 
and  tliat  his  tiery  spirit  sliould  in  tlie  battle  Ibrget 
every  tiling  except  victory.  iJut  to  disobey  Napo- 
leon's orders  as  to  the  invasion  of  Sicily  and  dare  to 
face  that  monarch  immediately  after,  was  so  unlike- 
ly as  to  indicate  rather  a  paper  demonstration  to 
alarm  lord  Wellington  than  a  real  attack.  And  it 
would  seem  from  the  short  observation  of  the  latter 
in  answer  to  lord  William  Bentinck's  detailed  com- 
munication on  this  subject,  namely,  "  Sicily  is  in  no 
da//^er,"  that  he  viewed  it  so,  or  tiiought  it  put  for- 
ward by  Murat  to  give  more  value  to  his  defection. 
However,  it  sutiiced  to  hinder  reinforcements  going 
to  Murray. 

Lord  William  Bentinck  on  landing  was  inform- 
ed that  Suchet  was  at  Tortosa  witli  from  eight  to 
twelve  thousand  man,  Maurice  Matliieu  witli  seven 
thousand  at  Cambrils.  To  drive  tlie  latter  back 
and  reinvest  Tarragona  was  easy,  and  the  place 
would  have  fallen,  because  the  garrison  had  exhaust- 
ed all  their  power  in  the  first  siege  ;  but  tliis  lord 
William  did  not  know,  and  to  renew  the  attack  vig- 
orously was  impossible,  because  all  the  howitzers 
and  platforms  and  fascines  had  been  lost,  and  the 
animals  and  general  equipment  of  the  army  were 
too  much  deteriorated  by  continual  embarkations, 
and  disembarkations,  to  keep  the  tield  in  Catalonia. 
Wherefore  he  resolved  to  return  to  Alicante,  not 
witiiout  hope  still  to  fulfil  Wellington's  instructions 
by  Ian  ling  at  Valencia  between  Suchet  and  Harispe. 
The  raim  »arkation  was  unmolested,  the  tort  of  Bala- 
guer  was  destroyed,  and  one  regiment  of  Whitting- 
ham's  division,  destined  to  reinforce  Copons'  army, 
being  detached  to  erfect  a  landing  northward  of  Bar- 
celona, the  fleet  put  to  sea ;  but  misfortune  continued 
to  pursue  tliis  unhappy  armament.  A  violent  tem- 
pest impeded  the  voyage,  fourteen  sail  of  transports 
struck  upon  the  sands  off  the  mouth  of  the  Ebro,  and 
the  army  was  not  entirely  disembarked  at  Alicante 
before  the  2'ith.  Meanwhile  marshal  Suchet,  seeing 
the  English  fleet  under  sa'l,  and  taught  by  the  de- 
struction of  the  fort  of  Bilagusr  that  the  allies  had 
relinquished  operations  in  Lower  Catalonia,  marched 
with  such  extraordinary  diligence  as  to  reach  Valen- 
cia in  forty-eight  hours  after  quitting  Tortosa,  thus 
frustrating  lord  William's  projact  of  landing  at  Va- 
lencia. 

During  his  absence  Harispe  had  again  proved  the 
weakness  of  the  Spanish  armies,  and  demonstrated 
the  sagacity  and  prudence  of  lord  Wellington.  Tliat 
great  nun's  warning  about  defeat  was  distinctly  ad- 
dressed to  the  Spanish  generals,  because  tiie  chief 
object  of  the  operations  was  not  to  defeat  Suciiet, 
but  to  keep  him  from  aiding  the  French  armies  in 
the  north.  Pitched  battles  war;,',  therefore,  to  be 
avoided,  their  issue  being  always  doubtful,  and  the 
presence  of  a  numerous  and  increasing  force  on  tiie 
front  and  fl  ink  of  the  French  was  more  sure  to  obtain 
the  end  in  view.  But  all  Spanish  generals  desired  to 
light  great  battles,  soothing  their  national  pride  by 
attrihutiii'T  defeats  to  want  of  cavalry.  It  was  at 
first  duuhtful  if  Murray  could  transitort  his  horsemen 
to  Tarragima,  and  if  left  behind  they  woulil  have 
been  under  Flio  and  Del  Parque,  wliL'reby  those  offi- 
cers would  have  been  encfiuraged  to  fight.  Hence 
the  I'nglish  general's  menacing  intimation.  And 
he  also  considered  tliat  as  the  army  of  Del  Parque 


had  been  for  three  years  in  continued  activity  under 
Ballesteros  without  being  actually  dispersed,  it  must 
be  more  capable  than  Elio's  in  tiie  dodging  warfare 
suitable  for  Spaniards.  Moreover,  Elio  was  best  ac- 
quainted with  the  country  between  the  Xucar  aid 
Alicante.  Wherefore  Del  Parque  was  directed  to 
turn  the  enemy's  right  flank  by  Uequefia,  Elio  to 
menace  the  front,  which,  adverting  to  the  support 
and  protection  furnished  by  Alicante  and  the  moun- 
tains behind  Castalla,  was  the  least  dangerous  ope- 
ration. 

But  to  trust  Spanish  generals  was  to  trust  the 
winds  and  the  clouds.  General  Elio  nersuaded  the 
duke  Del  Parque  to  adopt  the  front  attack,  took  the 
flank  line  himself,  and  detached  general  Mijares  U> 
fall  upon  Requena.  And  though  Suchet  had  weak- 
ened his  line  on  the  2d  of  June,  Del  Parque  was  nut 
ready  until  the  Btli,  thus  giving  the  French  a  week 
for  the  relief  of  Tarragona,  and  for  the  arrival  of 
Severoli  at  Liria. 

At  this  time  Haris])e  had  about  eight  thousand 
men  of  all  arms  in  front  of  the  Xucar.  The  Sjian- 
iards,  including  Roche's  and  Mijares'  divisions  and 
Whittingham's  cavalry,  were  twenty-five  thousand 
strong;  and  the  Empccinado,  Villa  Campa,  and  the 
Frayle  Nebot,  waited  in  the  Cnenca  i.i.d  AlLarazin 
mountains  to  operate  on  the  French  rear.  Notw.th- 
standing  this  disproportion,  the  contest  was  short, 
and  for  the  Spaniards,  disastrous.  They  advanced 
in  three  columns:  Elio,  by  the  pass  of  Almanza  ;  Del 
Parque  by  ViUena  and  Fuonte  de  la  Higiiera,  menac- 
ing Moxente  ;  Roche  and  the  prince  of  Anglona  from 
Alcoy,  by  Unteniente  and  the  pass  of  Albayda,  me- 
nacing San  Felipe  de  Xativa  and  turning  Moxente. 

Harispe  abandoned  those  camps  un  the  11th,  and 
took  the  line  of  the  Xucar,  occupying  the  intrench- 
ments  in  front  of  his  bridges  at  Aicira  and  Barca  del 
Rey,  near  Alberique  ;  and  during  this  retrograde 
movement  general  Mesclop,  commanding  the  rear- 
guard, being  pressed  by  the  Spanish  horsemen, 
wheeled  round  and  drove  them  in  great  confusion 
upon  the  infantry. 

On  the  15tli,  Mijares  took  the  fort  of  Requefia, 
thus  turning  the  line  of  the  Xucar,  and  securing  the 
defiles  of  Cabrillas  through  which  the  Cuenca  road 
leads  to  Valencia.  Villa  Campa  immediately  joined 
him,  thereby  preventing  Severoli  from  uniting  wiili 
Harispe;  and  meanwhile  Del  Parque,  after  razing 
the  French  works  at  Moxente  and  San  Felipe,  ad- 
vanced towards  Aicira  in  two  columns,  the  one  mov- 
ing by  the  road  of  Ca*rgagente,  the  other  by  the  read 
of  Gandia.  General  Habert  overthrew  the  first  with 
one  shock,  took  five  hundred  prisoners,  and  marched 
to  attack  the  other,  but  it  was  already  routed  by  gen- 
eral Gudin.  After  this  contest  Del  Parque  and  Ha- 
rispe maintained  their  respective  positions,  while 
Elio  joined  Mijares  at  Requena.  Villa  Campa  then 
descended  to  Chiva,  and  Harispe's  jjosition  wr.s  be- 
coming critical,  when  on  the  'S-id  the  head  of  Sa- 
chet's column  coming  from  the  Ebro  entered  Valen- 
cia, and  on  the  24th  Del  Parque  resumed  the  posi- 
tion of  Castalla. 

Thus,  in  despite  of  Wellington's  precautions,  eve- 
ry thing  turned  contrary  to  his  des'gns.  Elio  had 
operated  by  the  flank,  Del  Parque  by  the  front,  and 
the  latter  was  defeated  because  he  attacked  the  ene- 
my in  an  irtrenched  position.  Murray  tiad  failed 
entirely.  His  precipitancy  at  Tarragona  and  his 
fielays  at  Balaguer  were  alike  hurtful,  and  would 
have  caused  the  destruction  of  one  or  both  of  tiie 
Spanish  armies  but  for  the  battle  of  Vittoria.  For 
Suchet,  having  first  detached  general  Meusnier  to  re- 
cover the  fort  of  Requena  and  drive  back  Villa  Cam- 
pa, had  assembled  the  bulk  of  his  forces  in  his  old 


isi:^.j 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR 


603 


positions,  of  San  Felipu  and  Moxcnte,  before  the  re- 
t.iirn  of  the  Anglo-Sicilian  troops;  and  as  Elio,  un- 
Biii?  to  subsist  at  Utiel,  had  then  returned  towards 
ho  former  quarters,  the  French  marshal  was  upon 
the  point  ot  striking  a  fatal  blow  against  him,  or 
Del  Parque,  or  both,  when  the  news  of  Wellington's 
victory  averted  the  danger. 

Here  the  firmness,  the  activity  and  coolness  of 
Sucliet,  may  be  contrasted  with  the  infirmity  of  pur- 
po^s  displayed  by  Murray.  Slow  in  attack,  precipi- 
tate in  retreat,  the  English  commander  always  mis- 
timed his  movements  ;  the  French  marshal  doubled 
his  force  by  rapidity.  The  latter  was  insolated  by 
t!i3  operations  of  lord  Wellington ;  his  communica- 
tion with  Aragon  was  interrupted,  and  that  prov- 
ince placed  in  imminent  danger  ;  the  communication 
between  Val^nca  and  Catalonia  was  exposed  to  the 
utticks  of  the  Anglo-Sicilian  army  and  the  fleet; 
nearly  thirty  thousand  Spaniards  menaced  him  on 
the  Xucar  in  front ;  Villa  Campa,the  Frayle  and  tlie 
Empecinado  could  bring  ten  thousand  men  on  his 
rio-ht  flank;  yet  he  did  not  hesitate  to  leave  Harispe 
with  only  seven  or  eight  thousand  men  to  oppose 
the  Spaniards,  while  with  the  remainder  of  his  ar- 
my he  relieved  Tarragona,  and  yet  returned  in  time 
to  save  Valencia. 

Such  was  the  state  of  affairs  when  lord  William 
B^ntinck  brought  the  Anglo-Sicilian  troops  once 
more  to  Alicante.  His  first  care  was  to  reorganize 
th?  means  of  transport  for  the  commissariat  and  ar- 
tillery, but  this  was  a  matter  of  difficulty.  Sir  John 
JMurray.  with  a  mischievous  economy,  and  strange 
disregard  of  that  part  of  Wellington's  instructions 
which  prescribed  active  field  operations  in  Valencia 
if  he  should  be  forced  to  return  from  Catalonia, 
had  discharged  six  hundred  mules,  and  two  hun- 
dred country  carts,  that  is  to  say  five-sixths  of  the 
whole  field  equipment,  before  he  sailed  for  Tarra- 
gona. The  army  was  thus  crippled,  while  Suchet 
gathered  strong  in  front,  and  Meusnier's  division, 
retaking  Requena,  forced  the  Spaniards  to  retire 
from  that  quarter.  Lord  William  urged  Del  Parque 
to  advance  meanwhile  from  Castalla,  but  he  had 
not  means  of  carrying  even  one  day's  biscuit,  and  at 
the  same  time  Elio,  pressed  by  famine,  went  off"  to- 
wards Cuenca.  It  was  not  until  the  1st  of  July  that 
the  Anglo-Sicilian  troops  could  even  advance  to- 
w  irds  Alcoy. 

Lord  William  Bentinck  commanded  the  Spanish 
armies  as  well  as  his  own,  and  letters  passed  be- 
twe3n  him  and  lord  Wellington  relative  to  further 
o:j?rations.  The  latter,  keeping  to  his  original 
vews,  advissd  a  renewed  attack  on  Tarragona  or' 
on  Tortosa,  if  the  ordnance  still  in  possession  of  the  i 
army  would  admit  of  such  a  measure  ;  but  supposing 
this  could  not  be,  he  recommended  a  general  ad- 
vance to  seize  the  open  country  of  Valencia,  the 
British  keeping  close  to  the  sea  and  in  constant 
communication  with  the  fleet. 

Lord  William's  views  were  different.     He  found  | 
th?    Spanish    soldiers  robust  and  active,  but  their  i 
ri.,'imental  officers  bad,  and  their  organizaiion  gen- i 
erally  so  deficient  th.at  they  could  not  stnnd  against! 
even'a  small  French  force,  as  proved  by  their  recent; 
daf^at  at   Alcira.     The    generals,  however,  pleased 
him  at   first,  especialy  Del  Parque,  that  is,  like  all 
Spaniards,  they  had    fair    words  at  command,  and 
lord  William  Bentinck,  without  scanning  very  nice- 
ly their  deeds,  thought  he  could  safely  undertake  a 
grand  strategic  operation  in  conjunction  with  them. 

To  force  the  line  of  the  Xu?ar  he  deemed  unadvi- 
eable,  inasmucli  as  there  were  only  two  carriage 
roads,  both  of  which  led  to  Suchet's  intrenched  bridg- 
es ;  and  though  the  river  was  fordable,  the  enemy's 


bank  was  so  favourable  for  defence  as  to  render 
the  passage  by  force  dangerout.  The  Anglo-Sici- 
lians were  unaccut^tomed  to  great  tactical  move- 
ments, the  Spaniards  altogether  incapable  of  them. 
Wherefore,  relinquishing  an  attack  in  front,  lord 
William  proposed  to  move  the  allied  armies  in  one 
mass  and  turn  the  enemy's  right  flank  either  by 
Utiel  and  Requer.a,  or  by  a  wiiier  march,  to  reach 
Cuenca,  and  from  thence  gaining  tlie  Madrid  road 
to  Zaragoza,  communicate  with  Wellington's  army 
and  operate  down  the  Ebro.  In  either  cat^e  it  wag 
neceFsary  to  cross  the  Albarazin  mountains,  and 
there  were  no  carriage  roads,  save  those  of  Utiel 
and  Cuenca.  But  the  passes  near  Utiel  were  strong- 
ly fortified  by  the  French,  and  a  movement  on  that 
line  would  necessarily  lead  to  an  attack  upon  Su- 
chet, which  was  to  be  avoided.  The  line  of  Cuen- 
ca was  preferable,  though  longer,  and  being  in  the 
harvest  season,  provisions,  he  said,  would  not  fail. 
The  allies  would  tlius  force  Suchet  to  cross  the 
Ebro,  or  attack  him  in  a  ch.osen  position,  where 
AVellington  could  reinforce  them  if  necessary,  and 
in  the  event  of  a  defeat  they  could  retire  iijr  shel- 
ter upon  his  army. 

Wellington,  better  acquainted  with  Spanish  war- 
fare, and  the  nature  of  Spanish  co-operation,  told 
him,  provisions  would  fail  on  the  march  to  Cuenca, 
even  in  harvest  time,  and  without  money  he  would 
get  nothing;  moreover,  by  separating  himself  from 
the  fleet,  he  would  be  unable  to  return  suddenly  to 
Sicily  if  that  island  should  be  really  exposed  to  any 
imminent  danger. 

While  these  letters  were  being  exchanged,  the 
Anglo-Sicilians  marched  towards  Villena,  on  Del 
Parque's  left,  and  Suchet  was  preparing  to  attack, 
when  intelligence  of  the  battle  nfVittoria,  reaching 
both  parties,  totally  changed  the  aspect  of  tfairs. 
The  French  general  instantly  abandoned  Valencia, 
and  lord  William  entered  that  city. 

Suchet  knew  that  Clauzel  was  at  Zaragoza,  and 
desirous  of  maintaining  himself  there  to  secure  a 
point  of  junction  for  the  army  of  Aragcn  with  the 
king's  army,  if  the  latter  should  re-enter  Spain.  It 
was  possible,  therefore,  by  abandoning  ell  the  fort- 
resses in  Valencia  and  some  of  those  in  Catalonia, 
to  have  concentrated  more  than  thirty  thousand  men 
with  which  to  join  Clauzel,  and  tie  latter  having 
carried  off'  several  small  garrisons  during  his  re- 
treat, had  fifteen  thousand.  Lord  Wellington's  po- 
sition would  then  have  been  critical,  since  forty-five 
thousand  good  troops,  having  many  supporting  tbrt- 
rcsses,  would  have  menaced  his  right  flank  at  the 
moment  when  his  fi"ont  was  assailed  by  a  new  gen- 
eral and  a  powerful  army.  But  if  this  junction  with 
Clauzel  invited  Suchet  on  the  one  hand,  on  the 
other,  with  a  view  of  influencing  the  general  nego- 
tiations during  the  armistice  in  Germany,  it  was 
important  to  appear  strong  in  Spain.  On  such  occa- 
sions men  generally  endeavour  to  reconcile  both  ob- 
jects, and  obtain  neither.  Suchet  resolved  to  March 
upon  Zaragoza,  and  at  the  seme  time  re.ain  his 
grasp  upon  Valencia  by  keeping  large  garrisons  in 
the  fortresses.  This  reduced  his  field  force,  a  great 
error:  it  was  so  proved  by  the  result.  But  if  the 
war  in  the  north  of  Spain  and  in  Germany  had  taken 
a  difl^erent  turn,  his  foresight  and  prudence  would 
have  been  applauded. 

The  army  of  Aragon  now  counted  thirty-two  thou- 
sand effective  men.  Four  thousand  were  in  Zarago- 
za, two  thousand  in  Mequinenza,  Venatque,  Monzon, 
Ayerbe,  Jaca,  and  some  smaller  posts.  Twenty-six 
thousand  remained.  Of  these  one  liurdred  ind  ten 
were  left  in  Denia,  with  previsions  for  eight  months  ; 
twelve  hundred  and  fifty  in  Saguntum,  where  there 


606 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XXI. 


were  immense  stores,  einflit  months'  provisions  for 
the  iraiTiS!)!!,  and  two  nKMiths'  subsistence  for  the 
whole  army;  fonr  hundred  with  provisions  for  a  year, 
were  in  I'eiiiscola,  and  in  Morella  one  liundred  and 
twenty  with  magazines  for  six  months.  Into  Tor- 
tosa,  wliere  there  was  a  large  artillery  park,  Suchet 
threw  a  g-arrison  of  nearly  iive  thousand  men,  and 
then  destroying  the  bridges  on  the  Xucar,  marched 
from  Valencia  on  the  5th  of  July,'  taking  the  coast 
road  for  Tortosa. 

The  inhabitants,  grateful  for  the  discipline  he  had 
maintained,  were  even  friendly,  and  while  tiie  main 
body  tlius  moved,  Meusnier  retreated  from  licqueua 
across  tiie  mountains  towards  Ctispe,  the  point  of 
concentration  for  the  whole  army ;  but  ere  it  could 
reach  that  point,  Clauzel's  flight  to  Jaca,  unneces- 
sary, for  he  was  only  pursued  from  Tudela  by  .>[ina, 
became  known,  and  tiie  etfect  was  fital.  All  the 
partidas  immediately  united  and  menaced  Zaragoza, 
whereupon  Suchet  ordered  Paris  to  retire  upon  Cas- 
pe,  and  pressed  forward  himself  to  Favara.  3Ieus- 
nier,  meanwhile,  reached  the  former  town,  having 
on  the  march  picked  up  Severoli's  brigade  and  the 
garrisons  of  Teruel  and  Alcaniz.  Thus  on  the  12th, 
the  whole  army  was  in  military  communication,  but 
extended  along  the  Ebro  from  Tortosa  to  Caspe. 
Mina  had,  however,  seized  the  Monte  Torrero  on 
the  8th,  and  general  Paris  evacuated  Zaragoza  in 
the  niglit  of  the  9th,  leaving  live  hundred  men  in 
the  castle  with  much  ordnance.  Encumbered  with 
a  great  train  of  carriages  he  got  entangled  in  the 
deliles  of  Alcubiere,  and  being  attacked  lost  many 
men  and  all  h's  baggage  and  artillery.  Instead  of 
joining  Suchet  he  fled  to  Huesca,  wiiere  he  rallied 
the  garrison  of  Ayerbe  and  then  made  for  Jaca, 
reaching  it  on  the  14th  at  the  moment  when  Clauzel, 
after  another  ineffectual  attempt  to  join  the  king, 
had  returned  to«tliat  place.  Duran  then  invested  tiie 
castle  of  Zaragoza,  and  the  fort  of  Daroca.  The 
first  surren'lered  on  the  30tli,  but  Daroca  did  not  fall 
until  the  11th  of  August. 

This  sudden  and  total  loss  of  Aragon  made  Suchet 
think  it  no  longer  possible  to  fix  a  base  in  that  pro- 
vince, nor  to  rally  Clauzel's  troops  on  his  own.  He 
could  not  remain  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Ebro, 
neither  could  he  feed  his  army  permanently  in  the 
Bterile  country  about  Tortosa  while  Aragon  was  in 
possession  of  the  enemy.  Moreover,  the  allies  hav- 
ing the  command  of  the  sea,  might  land  trooi)s.  nnd 
seize  tiie  passes  of  the  hills  behind  him;  wherefore 
fixing  upon  the  fertile  country  about  Tarragona  for 
his  position,  he  passed  the  Ebro  at  Tortosa,  3Iora, 
and  M?(juinenza,  on  the  14th  and  15th,  detaching 
Isidore  Lamarque  to  fetch  off"  the  garrisons  of  Bel- 
chite,  Fuentes,  Pina,  and  TJujarola,  and  bring  tiie 
whole  to  Lerida.  3Ieanwhile  tlie  bulk  of  the  army 
moving  on  the  road  from  Tortosa  to  Tarragona,  al- 
though cannonaded  by  the  English  fleet,  reached 
Tarragona  with  little  Inirt,  and  the  walls  were  m'ned 
for  destruction,  but  the  place  was  still  held  with  a 
view  to  fi'^ld  operations. 

The  general  state  of  the  war  seems  to  have  been 
too  little  considered  by  Suchet  at  tliis  time,  or  he 
would  liave  made  a  more  vigorous  effort  to  establish 
himself  in  Aragon.  Had  he  persisted  to  march  on 
Zaragoza  he  would  have  raised  th(i  siege  of  the  cas- 
tle, perrlmncs  have  given  a  blow  to  Mitio  wliose  or- 
ders were  to  retire  upon  Tudela  where  Wcdlington 
designed  to  oiler  battle;  but  Sucliet  might  have 
avoided  t'lis,  and  to  have  appeared  upon  Welling- 
ton's flank,  were  it  only  for  a  fortniglit,  would,  as 
shall  be  hereafler  shown,  have  changed  the  aspect 
of  th'i  ciim;)aiirn.  Suchet's  previous  rapidity  anfi 
excellent  arrangements  had  lefl  the  allies  in  Valen- 


cia far  behind,  they  could  not  have  gathered  in  force 
soon  enough  to  meddle  with  him,  and  their  pursuit, 
now  to  be  described,  was  not  so  cautiously  cuiiduclcd 
but  that  he  might  have  turned  and  defeated  iheui. 

The  9th  of  July,  four  days  after  the  l^'rencii  aban- 
doned  Valencia,  lord  William  Bentinck  entered  that 
city  and  made  it  his  place  of  arms  instead  of  Ali- 
cante. On  the  Itith,  marching  by  the  coast-road,  in 
communication  with  the  fleet,  and  masking  Penis- 
cola,  a  fortress  now  of  little  importajice,  he  tbllo\\(  d 
the  enemy  ;  but  Suchet  had  on  that  day  completed 
tlie  passage  of  the  I'lbro,  he  might  have  been  close  to 
Zaragoza,  and  Del  Parque's  army  was  still  near  Ali- 
cante in  a  very  disorderly  condition.  And  though 
Elio  and  Rociie  were  at  Valencia,  the  occujjation 
of  that  town,  and  the  blockades  of  Denia  and  xMur- 
viedro,  proved  more  than  a  sufficient  task  for  tiiem: 
the  garrison  of  the  latter  place  received  provisions 
continually,  and  were  so  confident  as  to  assemble 
in  order  of  battle,  on  the  glacis,  when  tlie  allies 
marched  past. 

The  20th,  lord  William  entered  Vinaroz  and  re- 
mained there  until  the  2Gth.  Suchet  might  then 
have  been  at  Tudela  or  Sanguesa,  and  it  shall  be 
shown  that  Wellington  could  not  have  met  him  at 
the  former  place  as  he  designed. 

During  this  period  various  reports  were  receiv- 
ed :  "  The  French  had  vainly  endeavoured  to  regain 
France  by  Zaragoza  ;"  "  Tarragona  was  destroyed  ;" 
"  The  evacuation  of  Spain  was  certain  ;"  "  A  large 
detachment  had  already  quitted  Catalonia."  The 
English  general,  who  had  little  time  to  spare  from 
the  pressure  of  Sicilian  affairs,  became  eager  to 
advance.  He  threw  a  flying  bridge  over  the  Ebro 
at  Amposta,  and  having  before  embarked  Clinton's 
division  with  a  view  to  seize  the  Col  de  Balaguer," 
resolved  to  follow  Suchet  wiLh  the  remainder  of  his 
army,  v/hich  now  included  Whittingham's  cavalry. 
A  detachment  from  Tortosa  menaced  his  bridge  oii 
the  25th,  but  the  troops  were  reinforced  and  the  pas- 
sage of  the  Ebro  comjjleted  on  the  27  th.  The  next 
day  Villa  Campa  arrived  with  four  thousand  men, 
and  meanwhile  the  Col  de  Balaguer  was  secured. 

On  the  29lh,  the  cavalry  being  in  march  was 
threatened  by  infiintry  from  Tortosa,  near  the  (^ol  de 
Alba,  but  the  movements  generally  were  unoppos- 
ed, and  the  army  got  possession  of  the  mountains 
beyond  the  Ebro. 

Suchet  Wins  at  this  time  inspecting  the  defences 
ofi.eridaand  3Iequinenza,  and  his  escort  was  ne- 
cessarily large,  because  Copons  was  hanging  on  his 
flanks  in  the  mountains  about  Manresn  ;  but  his  po- 
sition about  Villa  Franca  was  exceedingly  stron;:. 
Tarragona  and  Tortosa  covered  the  front;  Barcelo- 
na, the  rear  ;  the  communication  with  Decaen  w;i.s 
secure,  and  on  the  right  flank  stood  I  erida,  to 
which  the  small  forts  of  Mequinenza  and  Monzon 
served  as  outposts. 

The  Anglo-Sicilian  troops,  reinfi  reed  v/itli  Wliit- 
tingham's  cavalry,  did  not  exceed  ten  tlmusniMl  ef- 
fective men,  of  wliich  one  division  was  on  board  ship 
from  the  22d  to  the  26th.  Elio  and  Roche  v/ere 
at  Valencia  in  a  destitute  condition.  1>;.1  Parque's 
army,  thirteen  thousand  strong,  including  \^'hifting- 
liam's  infantry,  was  several  marches  in  the  rear,  it 
was  paid  from  the  British  subsidy,  but  very  ill-pro- 
vided, and  the  duk'^  himself  disinclined  to  obedience. 
Villa  Campa  did  not  join  until  the  2?th,:ind  Copons 
was  in  the  mountains  above  Vich.  Lord  V\'iHiain 
therefore  remained  witli  ten  thousand  men  and  a 
large  train  of  carriages,  for  ten  days,  without  any 
position  of  battle  behind  him  nearer  than  the  hills 
about  Saguntiiin.  His  bridge  over  the  Ebro  was 
thrown  within    ton  miles  of  Tortosa,  whore  there 


1813.] 


NAPIER  S   PENINSULAR    WAR. 


607 


was  a  garrison  of  five  thousand  men,  datachments 
from  wliich  could  approach  uiiperceived  throug^h  tlie 
rujrged  injuntains  near  the  fortress  ;  and  .Suchet's 
\veil-o:-:>;anizeil  experienced  army  was  within  two 
march;is.  Tliat  marshal,  liowaver,  expecting  a 
sharp  warfare,  was  visiting  his  fortresses  in  person, 
and  his  troops  quartered  for  the  facility  of  feeding 
wore  unprepared  to  strike  a  sudden  blow  ;  moreover, 
judging  his  enemy's,  strength  in  offence  what  it 
might  Jiave  been  ratiier  than  what  it  was,  he  await- 
ed the  arrival  of  Decaen's  force  from  Upper  Catalo- 
nia betbrc  he  offered  battle.  | 

But  D3caen  was  himself  pressed.  The  great  En- 
glish rlaet  menacing  Kosas  and  Palamoshad  encour- 
aged a  partial  insurrection  of  the  somatenes,  which 
was  supported  by  the  divisions  of  Eroles,  Manso, 
and  Viliamil.  Several  minor  combats  took  place  on 
the  side  of  Besala  and  Olot,  Eroles  invested  Baiio- 
las,  anl  thougli  beaten  there  in  a  sharp  action  by 
Lamarque  on  the  23d  of  June,  the  insurrection 
spread.  To  quell  it  Decaen  combined  a  double  op- 
eration from  tiie  side  of  Gerona  upon  Vich,  which 
was  generally  the  Catalan  head-quarters.  Design- 
ing to  attack  by  the  south  himself,  he  sent  ]\Iaximil- 
ian  Lam;irqu8,  with  fifteen  hundred  French  troops 
and  som3  miguelotes,  by  the  mountain  paths  of  San 
Felice  de  Pallarols  and  Amias.  On  the  Sth  of  .Tuly, 
that  olilcer  gained  the  heights  of  Salad,  seized  the 
road  from  Olot  and  descended  from  tiie  north  upon  ' 
Roda  and  3Ianlieu,  in  the  expectation  of  seeing '. 
Decaen  attacking  from  the  other  side.  He  perceiv- 
ed bslow  him  a  heavy  body  in  march,  and  at  the 
pame  time  heard  the  sound  of  cannon  and  inuskot-  ] 
ry  about  Vich.  Concluding  this  was  Decaen,  he  ' 
advanced  confidently  against  the  troops  in  his  front, 
althoug'i  vary  numerous,  thinking  they  were  in  re- 
treat bat  they  fought  him  until  dark  without  ad  van-  ' 
tage  on  cither  side. 

In  the    night  an  officer  came  with   intelligence, 
that  Decaen's  attack  had  been  relinquished  in  conse- 
quence of  Sachet's  orders  to  move  to  the  tlobregat, 
and  it  then  appeared  that  a  previous  despatch  had 
been  intercepted,  that  the  whole  Catalan  force  to 
the  amount  of  six  or  seven  thousand  combatants  was 
upon  Lamarque's  hands,  and  the  firing  heard  at  Vich  ! 
was  a  rejoicing    for  lord  Wellington's  victories  in 
Navarre.     A  retreat  was  imperative.     The  Span-' 
iards  followed  at  daylight,  and  Lamnrque    getting] 
entangi'led  in  difficult  ground  near  Salud,  was  forced  I 
to  deliver  battle.     The  fight  lasted  many  hours,  all  '■ 
his  ammunition  was  expended,  he  lost  four  hundred  | 
men  and  was  upon  the  point  of  destruction,  when  ■ 
general  Beurmann  came    to    his  succour  with  four ; 
fresh  battalions,  and  the  Catalans  were  finally  de-  ■ 
feated  with  great  loss.     After  this  vigorous  action,  j 
Decaen  marched  to  join  Suchet,  and  the  Catalans, ' 
moving  by  the  mountains  in  separate  divisions,  ap-  j 
proich?n  lord  William  Bentinck.  j 

The  allies  having  thus  passed  the  Ebro,  several  , 
ot^^ers  of  both  nations  conceived  the  siege  of  Tor-  I 
tosa  would    be    the    best    operation.     Nearly  forty  ! 
thousand   men,  that  is  to  say.  Villa  Campa's,  Co-  I 
pons',  D?l  Parque's.  Whittingham's,  some  of  Elio's 
forces  and  the  Anglo-'^icilians,  could  be  united  for 
the  siege,  and  the  defiles  of  the  mountains  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Ebro  would  enable  them  to  resist 
Suchet's  attempts  to  succour  the  place  on  that  side, 
and  force  h  m  to  move  by  the  circuitous  route  of  Le- 
rida.     Wellington  also  leaned  towards  this  opera-  I 
tion,  but  lord  William  Bcntinck  rcpolved  to  push  at ! 
once   for  Tarragona,  and  even  looked  to  an  attack! 
upon  Barcelona  ;  certainly  a  rash  proceeding,  inas-  , 
much  as  Suchet  awaited  his  approach  with  an  army 
every  way  superior.     It    does    not  however  follow  I 


that  to  besiege  Tortosa  would  have  been  advisable 
fur  tliough  the  battering  train,  much  Lrger  tlian 
Murray's  losses  gave  reason  at  first  to  expect,  was 
equal  to  the  reduction  of  the  place,  the  tbrmal  siege 
of  such  a  fortress  was  a  great  undertaking.  Tlie  vi- 
cinity was  unhealthy,  and  it  would  have  b^jeu  difli- 
cult  to  feed  tlie  Spanish  troops.  They  were  qu^te 
inexperienced  in  sieges,  this  was  sure  to  be  long, 
not  sure  to  be  successful,  and  Suchet  seeing  tlie 
allies  engaged  in  such  a  difficult  operation  might 
have  marched  at  once  to  Aragon. 

It  would  seem  lord  William  Bcntinck  was  at  this 
time  misled;  partly  by  the  reports  of  the  Catalans, 
partly  by  lord  Wellington's  great  successes,  into  a 
beliel'that  the  French  were  going  to  abandon  Cata- 
lonia His  mind  also  ran  upon  Italian  alialrs  ;  and 
he  did  not  perceive  that  Suchet,  judiciously  posted 
and  able  to  draw  reinibrcements  from  Decaen,  was 
in  fact  much  stronger  than  all  the  allies  united. 
The  two  armies  of  Aragon  and  Catalonia  numbered 
sixty-seven  thousand  men.  Of  these,  about  twenty- 
seven  thousand,  including  Paris'  division,  then  at 
Jaca,  were  in  garrison,  five  thousand  were  sick, 
the  remainder  in  tiie  field.  In  Catalonia  the  allies 
were  not  principals,  they  were  accessories.  'J'hey 
were  to  keep  Suchet  from  operating  on  the  flank  of 
the  allies  in  Navarre,  and  their  defeat  would  have 
been  a  great  disaster.  So  entirely  was  this  lord 
Wellington's  views,  that  the  duke  del  Parque's  ar- 
my v.'as  to  make  forced  marches  on  Tudela  if  Su- 
chet should  either  move  himself  or  detach  largely 
towards  Aragon.  Lord  William,  after  passing  the 
Ebro,  could  have  secured  the  defiles  of  the  moun- 
tains with  his  own  and  Villa  Campa's  troops,  that  is 
to  say,  with  twenty  thousand  men,  including  Vrhit- 
tingham's  division.  He  could  have  insulted  the  gar- 
rison of  Tortosa,  and  commenced  the  making  of 
gabions  and  fascines,  which  would  have  placed  Su- 
chet in  doubt  as  to  his  ulterior  objects,  while  he 
awaited  the  junction  of  Del  Parque's,  Copons',  and 
the  rest  of  Elios'  troops.  Thus  forty  thousand  men, 
three  thousand  being  cavalry  and  attended  by  a  fleet, 
could  have  descended  into  ttiC  Campo,  st.ll  leaving  a 
detachment  to  watch  Tortosa.  If  Suchet  then  came 
to  the  succour  of  Tarragona,  the  allies,  superior  in 
numbers,  could  have  fought  in  a  position  chosen  be. 
forehand.  Still  it  is  very  doubtful  if  all  these  corps 
would,  or  could  have  kept  together. 

Lord  William  Bentinck's  operations  were  head- 
long. He  had  prepared  platforms  and  fascines  for 
a  siege  in  the  island  of  Yvica,  and  on  the  TCth, 
quitting  the  mountains,  suddenly  invested  Tarra- 
gona with  less  than  six  thousand  men,  occui^ying 
ground  three  hundred  yards  nearer  to  the  walls  the 
first  day,  than  jMurray  had  ever  done.  He  thus 
prevented  the  garrison  from  abandoning  the  place, 
if,  as  was  supposed,  they  had  that  intention  ;  yet  the 
fortress  could  not  be  besieged  because  of  Suchet's 
vicinity  and  the  dissemination  of  t!ie  allies.  The 
31st,  the  bridge  at  Amposta  was  accidentally  broken, 
three  hundred  bullocks  were  drowned,  and  the  head 
of  Del  Parque's  army,  being  on  the  left  of  the  Ebro, 
fell  back  a  day's  march.  However,  Whittinglipm's 
division  and  the  cavalry  came  up,  and  on  tl.e  .*Jd  of 
August,  the  bridge  being  restored,  Del  Parquc  alpo 
joined  the  investing  army.  Copons  then  promised 
to  bring  up  his  Catalans,  Sarsfield's  division,  now 
belonging  to  the  second  army,  arrived,  and  Elio 
had  been  ordered  to  reinforce  it  with  three  addition- 
al battalions,  while  Villa  Campa  observed  Torto- 
sa. Meanwhile  lord  William,  seeing  that  Sucl:ct'3 
troops  were  scattered  and  the  marshal  himself  at 
Barcelona,  thought  of  surprising  his  [losts  and  seiz- 
ing the  mountain  line  of  Llobregat     but  Elio  sent 


603 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


Book  XXI. 


no  battalions,  Copons,  jealous  of  some  communica- 
tions betwean  the  English  general  and  Eroles,  was 
slow,  the  jfiirrison  of"  Tortosa  burned  the  bridge  at 
Aiuposta,  and  Sachet,  taking  alHrni,  suddenly  re- 
turned from  Bacelona,  and  concentrated  liis  army. 

U{)  to  this  time  the  Spaniards,  giving  copious  but 
false  information  to  lord  William,  and  no  informa- 
tion at  all  to  Suchet,  had  induced  a  series  of  faults 
on  both  sides,  balancing  each  other,  a  circumstance 
not  uncommon  in  war,  which  demands  mU  the  facul- 
ties of  the  greatest  minds.  The  Englishman,  think- 
ing his  enemy  retreating,  had  pressed  rashly  for- 
ward. The  Frenchman,  deeming  from  the  other's 
boldness  the  wiiole  of  the  allies  were  at  hand, 
thought  himself  too  weak,  and  awaited  the  arrival 
of  Decaen,  whose  junction  was  retarded,  as  we  have 
BJeu,  by  the  combined  operations  of  the  Catalan  ar- 
my and  the  English  fleet. 

In  this  state  of  alfairs,  Suchet  heard  of  new  and 
important  successes  gained  in  Navarre  by  lord  Wel- 
lington, one  of  his  Italian  battalions  was  at  the 
sams  time  cut  off  at  San  Sadurni  by  Manso,  and 
lord  William  Bentinck  took  a  position  of  battle  be- 
yond the  Gaya.  His  left,  composed  of  Whitting- 
ham's  division,  occupied  Braffin,  ,he  Col  de  Liebra, 
and  Col  de  Cristina,  his  right  covered  the  great 
coast-road.  These  were  the  only  carriage  ways  by 
which  the  enemy  could  approach,  but  they  were  ten 
miles  apart,  Copons  held  aloof,  and  Whittingham 
thought  himself  too  weak  to  defend  the  passes 
alone  ;  hence,  when  Suchet,  reinforced  by  Decaen 
with  eight  thousand  sabres  and  bayonets,  finally  ad- 
vanced, lord  William,  who  had  landed  neither  guns 
nor  stores,  decided  to  refuse  battle.  For  such  a  res- 
olute oliicer,  this  must  have  been  a  painful  decision. 
lie  had  now  nearly  thirty  thousand  fighting  men,  in- 
cluding a  thousand  marines  which  had  been  landed 
to  join  the  advanced  guard  at  Altafalla  ;  he  had  as- 
sumed the  offensive,  invested  Tarragona,  where  the 
military  honour  of  England  had  suffered  twice  be- 
fore, in  fine,  provoked  the  action  which  he  now  de- 
clined. But  Suchet  had  equal  numbers  of  a  better 
qualitv  ;  the  banks  of  the  Gaya  were  rugged  to  pass 
in  retreat  if  the  fight  should  be  lost ;  much  must 
have  been  left  to  general  officers  at  different  points  ; 
Del  Parqna  was  an  uneasy  coadjutor,  and  if  any  part 
was  forced  the  whole  line  would  have  been  irretriev- 
ably lost.  His  reluctance  was  however  manifest, 
for,  though  he  expected  the  enemy  on  the  9th,  he 
did  not  send  his  field  artillery  and  baggage  to  the 
Tear  until  the  11th,  the  day  on  which  Decaen  reach- 
od  Villa  Franca. 

The  French  general,  dreading  the  fire  of  the  fleet, 
endeavoured  by  false  attacks  on  the  coast-road  to 
draw  the  allies  from  the  defiles  beyond  Braffin,  to- 
wards whicli  he  finally  carried  his  whole  army,  and 
those  defiles  were  indeed  abandoned,  not  as  his 
Metnoirs  state,  because  of  tliese  demonstrations,  but 
because  lord  William  had  previously  determined  to 
retreat.  On  the  IGth,  finding  the  passes  unguarded, 
he  poured  through  and  advanced  upon  Vails,  thus 
turning  the  allies;  but  he  had  lost  time,  and  the 
latter  were  in  full  retreat  towards  the  mountains, 
the  left  wing  by  Re\is,  the  right  wing  by  Cambrils. 
The  march  of  the  former  was  covere^l  by  lord  Fred- 
erick Bmtinck,  who  leading  the  British  and  (Ger- 
man cavalry,  defeated  the  fourth  I'rench  hussars 
with  a  loss  of  fi.rty  or  fifty  men;  and  it  is  said  that 
either  general  Haber  or  Ilarispe  was  taken,  but  es- 
caped in  the  confusion. 

The  Anglo-Sicilians  and  Whittingham's  division 
now  entrenched  themselves  near  the  (Jol  de  Bala- 
puer,  and  Del  Parqiie  marched  with  his  own  and 
Sarsiield's  troops  to  invest  Tortosa,  but  the  garri- 


son fell  upon  his  rear  while  pasSiPg  the  Ebro  and 
some  loss  was  su&tainer).  Meanwhile  Suchet,  more 
swayed  by  the  remembrance  of  Castalla  than  by  hia 
recent  success,  would  not  again  prove  the  courago 
of  the  British  troojis  on  a  mountain  position.  Con- 
trary to  the  wishes  of  his  army,  he  returned  to  Tar- 
ragona and  destroyed  the  ancien*  -hIIs,  which  from 
the  extreme  hardness  of  the  HomaL  cement  proved 
a  tedious  and  difficult  matter:  then  resuming  his  old 
position  about  Villa  Franca  and  on  the  I.lobregat, 
he  sent  Deraen  to  Ujiper  Catalonia.  This  termina- 
ted lord  William  Bentinck's  first  effort,  and  the  gen- 
eral result  was  favourable.  He  had  risked  niucli  on 
insufficient  grounds;  yet  his  enemy  made  no  profit, 
and  lost  Tarragona  with  its  fertile  Campo,  Tortosa 
was  invested  and  Suchet  was  kept  away  from  Na- 
varre. 

It  is  strange  that  this  renowned  French  general 
suffered  his  large  force  to  be  thus  paralysed  at  such 
a  crisis.  Above  twenty-seven  tliousand  of  his  sol- 
diers, if  we  include  the  isolated  division  of  Paris, 
were  shut  up  in  garrison,  but  thirty-two  thousand 
remained  with  which  he  marched  to  and  fro  in  Cat- 
alonia while  the  war  was  being  decided  in  Navarre. 
Had  he  moved  to  that  province  by  Aragon  before 
the  end  of  July,  lord  V  cii  n!,^t<;i'  wi  uld  liave  been 
overpowered.  What  was  to  be  feared]  That  lord 
William  Bentinck  would  follow,  or  attack  one  of  hia 
fortresses'!  If  the  French  were  successful  in  Na- 
varre the  loss  of  a  fortress  in  Catalonia  would  have 
been  a  trifle,  it  was  not  certain  that  any  would  have 
fallen,  and  lord  William  could  not  abandon  the 
coast.  Suchet  pleaded  danger  to  France  if  he  aban- 
doned Catalonia  ;  but  to  invade  France,  guarded  as 
she  was  by  her  great  military  reputation,  and  to  do 
so  by  land,  leaving  behind  the  fortresses  of  Valencia 
and  Catalonia,  the  latter  barring  all  the  carriage 
roads,  was  chimerical.  Success  in  Navarre  would 
have  made  an  invasion  by  sea  pass  as  a  partisan 
descent,  and,  moreover,  France,  wartiiig  Suchet'e 
troops  to  defend  her  in  Navarre,  was  ultimately  in- 
vaded by  Wellington  and  in  a  far  more  forniic'able 
manner.  This  question  shall  however  be  treated 
more  largely  in  another  place ;  it  is  sufficient  to  ob- 
serve here,  that  Clarke,  the  minister  of  war,  a  mm 
without  genius  or  attachment  to  the  emperor's 
cause,  discouraged  any  great  combined  plan  of  ac- 
tion, and  Napoleon,  absorbed  by  his  own  immense 
operations,  did  not  interpose. 

Lord  William,  now  intent  upon  the  siege  of  Tor- 
tosa, wished  lord  Wellington  to  attack  Mequinenza 
with  a  detachment  of  his  army;  but  this  the  situa- 
tion of  affairs  in  Navarre  and  Guipuscoa  did  not  ad- 
mit of,  and  he  soon  discovered  that  to  pssail  Tor- 
tosa was  an  undertaking  be3'Ond  his  own  means. 
Elio,  when  desired  to  gather  provisions  and  assist 
in  the  operations,  demanded  three  weeks  for  prepar- 
ation ;  all  the  Spanish  troops  were  in  want,  Ilociie's 
division,  blockading  jMurviedro,  although  so  close  to 
Valencia,  was  on  half  rat'ons;  and  the  siege  of  Tor- 
tosa was  necessarily  relinquished,  because  no  great 
or  sustained  operation  could  be  conducted  in  concert 
with  such  generals  'uul  such  armies  Snchet's  fear 
of  them  was  an  illustration  of  Napol  en's  maxim, 
that  war  is  an  affair  at'  discrimination.  It  is  more 
essential  to  know  the  quality  than  the  quantity  of 
enemies. 

It  was  difficult  for  lord  William  Bentinck  to  ap- 
ply iiis  mind  vigorously  to  the  campaign  lie  waa 
conducting,  because  fresh  charges,  injurious  to  the 
British  policy,  in  Sicily,  called  him  to  that  island, 
and  liis  thonglits  were  running  upon  the  invasion  of 
Italy  ;  bur  as  the  Spaniards,  deceived  by  the  move- 
ments of  escorts  and  convoys,  reported  that  Suchet 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


ft09' 


had  marcel'''  /vith  twelve  thousand  men  to  join 
Soiilt.  lie  once  more  fixed  his  head-quarters  at  Tar- 
ragona, and  following-  lord  Wellington's  instruc- 
tions, dftiiched  Del  I'arque's  troops  by  forced  march- 
es u;)on  Tudela. 

On  the  oth  of  September,  tlie  army  entered  Villa 
Franca,  and  the  12th,  detachments  of  Calabrese, 
Swiss,  (:ierman,  and  British  infantry,  a  squadron  of 
cavalry  and  one  battery,  in  all  about  twelve  hundred 
men,  under  colonel  Adam,  occupied  the  heights  of 
Ordal.  At  this  i)lace,  ten  miles  in  advance  of  Villa 
Franca,  being  joined  by  three  of  Sarsfield's  battal- 
ions and  a  Spanish  squadron,  they  took  a  position  ; 
but  it  now  appeared  that  very  few  French  troops 
had  been  detached  ;  that  Suchet  had  concentrated 
his  whole  force  on  the  Llobregat ;  and  that  his  army 
was  very  superior  in  numbers,  because  the  allies, 
reduced  by  the  loss  of  Del  Parque's  troops,  had  also 
left  Whittingham's  division  at  Reus  and  Vails,  to 
procure  food.  Sarsfield's  division  was  feeding  on 
the  British  supplies,  and  lord  William  again  looked 
to  a  retreat:  yet,  thinking  the  enemy  disinclined  to 
advance,  desired  to  preserve  his  forward  position  as 
long  as  possible. 

He  had  only  two  lines  of  operation  to  watch :  the 
one  menacing  his  front  from  Molino  del  Rcy  by  the 
main  road,  which  colonel  Adam  blocked  by  his  posi- 
tion at  (Jrdal  ;  the  other  from  3Iartorel,  by  San  Sa- 
durni,  menacing  his  left;  but  on  this  route,  a  diffi- 
cult one,  he  had  pushed  the  Catalans  under  Eroles 
and  Manso,  reinforcing  them  with  some  Calabrese  ; 
there  was  indeed  a  third  line  by  Avionet  on  his 
right,  but  it  was  little  better  than  a  goat-path.  He 
had  designed  to  place  his  main  body  close  up  to  the 
Ordal  on  the  evening  of  the  12th,  yet  from  some 
slight  cause  delayed  it  until  the  next  day.  Mean- 
r.  hilc  he  viewed  the  country  in  advance  of  that  de- 
file without  discovering  an  enemy.  His  confiden- 
tial emissaries  assured  him  the  French  were  not 
going  to  advance,  and  he  returned,  satisfied  that 
Adam's  detachment  was  safe,  and  so  expressed  him- 
Belf  to  that  officer.  A  report  of  a  contrary  tendency 
was  indeed  made  by  colonel  Reeves  of  the  twenty- 
eeventh,  on  the  authority  of  a  Spanish  woman  who 
had  before  jiroved  her  accuracy  and  ability  as  a  spy  ; 
Bhe  was  now  however  disbelieved,  and  this  incredu- 
lity was  unfortunate.  For  Suchet  thus  braved,  and 
his  communication  with  Lerida  threatened  by  Man- 
eo  on  the  side  of  3Iartorel,  was  already  in  march  to 
attack  Ordal  with  the  army  of  Aragon,  while  De- 
caen  and  Maurice  Mathieu,  moving  with  the  army 
of  Catalonia  from  3Iartorel  by  San  Sadurni,  turned 
the  left  of  the  allies. 

COMBAT  OF  ORDAL. 

The  heights  occupied  by  colonel  Adam,  although 
rugged,  rose  gradually  from  a  magnificent  bridge, 
by  which  the  main  road  was  carried  over  a  very 
deep  and  impracticable  ravine.  The  second  battal- 
ion of  the  twenty-seventh  British  regiment  was  post- 
ed on  the  righi ;  the  Germans  and  De  Roll's  Swiss, 
with  the  artillery,  defended  an  old  Spanish  fort  com- 
manding the  main  road  ;  the  Spaniards  were  in  the 
centre,  the  Calabrese  on  the  left  ;  and  the  cavalry 
were  in  reserve.  A  bright  moonlight  facilitated 
t!ie  movements  of  the  French,  and  a  little  before 
midnight,  their  leading  column  under  general  Mes- 
clop  passing  the  bridge  without  let  or  hinderance, 
mounted  the  heights  with  a  rapid  pace,  and  driving 
back  the  piquets  gave  the  first  alarm.  The  allied 
tro(ii)s  lying  on  their  arms  in  order  of  battle  were 
roady  instantly,  and  the  fight  commenced.  The 
firirr  eff()rt  was  against  the  twenty-seventh,  then  the 
(j  •i'mdus  and  the  Spinish  battailous  were  vigorous- 
40 


I  ly  assailed  in  succession  as  the  French  columns  got 

jfree  of  the  bridge,  bui  the  Calabrese  were  too  far  on 

j  the  left  to  take  a  share  in  the  action.     'I"iie  combat 

I  was  fierce  and  obstinate.    Hanspe,  who  commanded 

the  French,  constantly  outflanked  the  right  of  the 

allies,  and  at  the  same  time  pressed  tiieir  centre, 

where  the  Spaniards  fought  gallantly. 

Colonel  Adam  was  wounded  very  early,  the  rrm- 
mand  devolved  upon  colonel  Reeves,  and  that  officer 
seeing  his  flank  turned  and  his  men  falling  fast,  ip 
short,  finding  himself  engaged  with  a  wliole  army 
on  a  position  of  which  colonel  Adam  had  lost  the 
key  by  neglecting  the  briilge,  resolved  to  retrest. 
In  this  view  he  first  ordered  the  guns  to  fi'll  back, 
and  to  cover  the  movement  charged  a  column  of  tlio 
enemy  which  was  pressing  forward  on  the  high 
road;  but  he  was  severely  wounded  in  this  attack, 
and  there  was  no  recognised  commander  on  the  spot 
to  succeed  him.  Then  the  affair  became  confused. 
For  though  the  order  to  retreat  was  given,  the  Span- 
iards were  fighting  desperately,  and  the  twenty- 
seventh  thought  it  shame  to  abandon  them  ;  where- 
fore the  Germans  and  Del  Roll's  regiment  etill  held 
the  old  fort,  and  the  guns  came  back.  The  action 
was  thus  continued  with  great  fury.  Colonel  C'arev 
now  brought  the  Calabrese  into  line  from  tlie  left, 
and  menaced  the  right  flank  of  the  French,  but  ho 
was  too  late  ;  the  Spaniards  overwhelmed  in  the 
centre  were  broken,  the  right  was  completely  turr- 
ed,  the  old  fort  was  lost,  the  enemy's  skirmisliers  get 
into  the  allies'  rear,  and  at  three  o'clock  the  whole 
dispersed,  the  most  part  in  flight;  the  Spanish  cav- 
alry were  then  overthrown  on  the  main  road  by  the 
French  hussars,  and  four  guns  were  taken  in  the  tu- 
mult. 

Captain  Waldron,  with  the  twenty-seventh,  re- 
duced  to  eighty  men,  and  captain  Muller  with  about 
the  same  number  of  Germans  and  Sv»'iss,  breaking 
through  several  small  parties  of  the  enemy,  effected 
their  retreat  in  good  order  by  the  hills  on  each  side 
of  the  road.  Colonel  Carey  endeavoured  at  first  to 
gain  the  road  of  San  Sadurni  on  the  left,  but  meet- 
ing with  Decaen's  people  on  that  side  he  retraced 
his  steps,  and  crossing  the  field  of  battle  in  the  rear 
of  Suchet's  columns  made  for  Villa  Nueva  tie  Sitjes, 
j  There  he  finally  embarked  without  loss,  save  a  few 
stragglers  who  fell  into  the  hands  of  a  flanking  bat- 
talion of  French  infantry  which  had  moved  through 
the  mountains  by  Begas  and  Avionet.  The  over- 
throw was  complete,  and  the  prisoners  were  at  first 
very  numerous,  but  the  darkness  enabled  many  to 
escape,  and  two  thousand  men  reached  Manso  and 
Eroles. 

Suchet,  pursuing   his  march,  came  up  with  lord 
William    about    eight  o'clock.     The   latter  retired 
skirmishing  and  with  excellent  order  beyond  Villa 
Franca,  followed  by  the  French  horsemen,  some  of 
which  assailed  his  rear-guard  while  others  edged  to 
their  riglit  to  secure  the  communication  with  De- 
caen.     The    latter  was    looked  for  by  both  parties 
with   great  anxiety,  but  he  had  been  delayed   by  the 
resistance  of  Manso  and  Kroles  in  the  rugged  coun- 
try between  jNIartorel  and  San  Sadurni.     Suchet's 
cavalry  and    artillery  continued    however  to  infest 
the  rear  of  the  retreating  army  until   it  reached  a 
deep  baranco,  near  the  Venta  de  Monjos,  where  the 
j  passage  being  dangerous  and  the  French  liorsemen 
{importunate,  that    brave    and    honest    soldier,  lord 
Frederick  Bentinck,  charged  their  right,  and  fight- 
]  ing  hand  to  hand  with  the  enemy's  general  Myers, 
;  wounded  him  and  overthrew  his  light  cavalry  ;  they 
rallied  ui)on  their  dragoons  and  advanced  again,  cn- 
,  deavouring  to  turn  the  flank,  but  were  stopped  by 
the  fire  of  two  guns  which  general  Clinton  opened 


610 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XXI. 


upon  them.  Meanwhile  the  cuirassiers,  on  the  left, 
pressed  the  Brunswick  hussars  and  menaced  the 
infantry ;  yet  they  were  finally  checked  by  the  lire 
of  the  l('th  regiment.  This  cavalry  action  was  vig- 
orous ;  tlie  twentieth  and  the  Germans,  although  few 
in  numbers,  lost  more  than  ninety  men.  The  ba- 
ranco  was,  however,  safely  passed,  and  about  three 
o'clock  the  army,  having  reached  Arbos,  tiie  pursuit 
eeased.  The  Catalans,  meanw!.:le,  had  retreated 
towards  Igualada,  and  the  Anglo-Sicilians  retired 
to  Tarragona. 

It  was  now  thought  Suchet  would  make  a  move- 
ment to  carry  off  tiie  garrisons  of  Lerida  and  Tor- 
tosa,  but  this  did  not  happen,  and  lord  .William 
went  to  Sicily,  leaving  the  command  of  the  army  to 
eir  William  Clinton. 

OBSERVATIONS. 

1st.  Lord  William  Bentinck  committed  errors  ; 
yet  he  has  been  censured  without  discrimination. 
"  He  advanced  rashly  ;"  "  He  was  undecided  ;"  "  He 
exposed  his  advanced  guard  without  support:"  such 
were  the  opinions  expressed  at  the  time.  Their 
justness  may  bs  disputed.  His  first  object  was  to 
retain  ail  the  French  force  in  Catalonia  ;  his  sec- 
ond, to  profit  from  Suchet's  weakness  if  he  detached 
largely.  He  could  do  neither  by  remaining  inac- 
tive on  the  barren  hills  behind  Hospitalet,  because 
the  Spaniards  would  have  dispersed  for  want  of  pro- 
visions, and  the  siege  of  Tortosa  was  found  to  be 
impracticable.  It  was  therefore  the  part  of  a  bold 
and  skilful  general  to  menace  his  enemy,  if  he  could 
be  sure  of  retreating  again  without  danger  or  dis- 
honour. The  position  at  Villa  Franca  fulfilled  this 
condition.  It  was  strong  in  itself  and  ofi'ensive  ;  sir 
Edward  Pellew's  fleet  was  in  movement  to  create 
diversions  in  Upper  Catalonia,  and  all  the  emissa- 
ries and  Spanish  correspondents  concurred  in  de- 
claring, though  falsely,  that  the  French  general  had 
detaclied  twelve  tliousand  men. 

It  is  indeed  one  of  tiie  tests  of  a  sagacious  gener- 
al to  detect  false  intelligence,  yet  the  greatest  are 
at  times  deceived,  and  all  must  act,  if  they  act  at 
all,  upon  what  appears  at  the  time  to  be  true.  Lord 
William's  advance  was  founded  on  erroneous  data, 
but  his  position  in  front  of  Villa  Franca  was  well 
chosen.  It  enabled  him  to  feed  Whittingham's  di- 
vision in  the  fertile  country  about  Reus  and  Vails, 
and  there  were  short  and  easy  communications  from 
Villa  Franca  to  the  sea-coast.  The  army  could  on- 
ly be  seriously  assailed  on  two  lines.  In  front,  by 
the  main  road,  which,  though  broad,  was  from  Mo- 
lino  del  Rey  to  the  heights  of  Ordal,  one  continued 
defile.  On  the  left,  by  San  Sadurni,  a  road  still 
more  rugged  and  difficult  than  the  other.  And  the 
Catalans  were  launched  on  this  side  as  their  natu- 
ral line  of  operations,  because,  without  losing  their 
hold  of  the  mountains  they  protected  the  left  of  the 
allies,  menacing  at  the  same  time  the  right  of  the 
enemy  and  his  communications  with  Lerida.  Half 
a  march  to  the  rear  would  bring  the  army  to  Ven- 
drils,  beyond  which  the  enemy  could  not  follow 
witliout  getting  under  the  fire  of  the  ships  ;  neither 
could  he  forestall  this  movement  by  a  march  through 
the  Liebra  and  Cristina  defiles,  because  the  Cata- 
lans, falling  back  on  Whittingham's  division,  could 
hold  him  in  check. 

2nd.  Ordal  and  San  Sadurni  were  the  keys  of  the 
position.  The  last  was  well  secured,  the  first  not 
BO,  and  there  was  the  real  error  of  lord  William 
Bentinck.  It  was  none,  however,  to  push  an  ad- 
vanced guard  of  three  thousand  five  hundred  men, 
with  cavalry  and  artillery,  to  a  distance  often  miles 
for  a  few  hours.     He  had  a  right  to  expect  the  com- 


mander of  such  a  force  would  maintain  his  post  until 
supported,  or  at  least  retreat  witliout  disaster.  An 
officer  of  capacity  would  have  done  so.  But  who- 
ever relies  upon  the  capacity  of  sir  Frederick  Adam, 
eitlier  in  peace  or  war,  will  be  disappointed. 

In  1810,  lord  Wellington  detaclied  general  Robert 
Crawfurd  with  two  or  three  thousand  men  to  a  much 
greater  distance,  not  for  one  night,  but  l-br  many 
weeks.  And  that  excellent  officer,  though  close  to 
IMasscna's  immense  army,  the  cavalry  of  which  was 
double  his  whole  numbers  ;  though  he  had  the  long 
line  of  the  Agueda,  a  fordable  river,  to  guard; 
though  he  was  in  an  open  country  and  co:  finually 
skirmishing,  never  lost  so  much  as  a  patrol,  and  al- 
ways remained  master  of  his  movements,  for  his 
combat  on  the  Coa  was  a  studied  and  wilful  error. 
It  was  no  fault  therefore  to  push  colonel  Adam's  de- 
tachment to  Ordal,  but  it  was  a  fault  that  lord  Wil- 
liam, having  determined  to  follow  him  with  his 
whole  force,  should  have  delayed  doing  so  for  one 
night,  or  that  delaying,  he  did  not  send  some  sup- 
porting troops  forward.  It  was  a  fault  not  to  do 
so,  because  there  was  good  reason  to  do  so,  and  to 
delay  was  to  tempt  fortune.  There  was  good  rea- 
son to  do  so  as  well  to  profit  of  the  advantage  of  the 
position  as  to  support  Adam.  Had  lord  William 
Bentinck  been  at  hand  with  his  main  body  when 
the  attack  on  Ordal  commenced,  the  head  of  Su- 
chet's force,  which  was  kept  at  bay  for  three  hours 
by  a  detachment  so  ill  commanded,  would  have  been 
driven  into  the  ravine  behind,  and  the  victorious  al- 
lies would  still  have  had  time  to  march  against  De- 
caen  by  the  road  along  which  colonel  Carey  endea- 
voured to  join  Manso.  In  fine  Suchet's  dispositions 
were  vicious  in  principle  and  ought  not  to  have  suc- 
ceeded. He  operated  on  two  distinct  lines,  having 
no  cross  communications,  and  before  an  enemy  in 
possession  of  a  central  position  with  good  commu- 
nications. 

3rd.  It  was  another  fault  that  lord  William  Ben- 
tinck disregarded  the  Spanish  woman's  report  to 
colonel  Reeves;  his  observations  made  in  front  of 
the  bridge  of  Ordal  on  the  evening  of  the  12th,  ac- 
corded indeed  with  the  reports  of  his  own  emissaries, 
but  the  safe  side  should  always  be  the  rule  cf  pre- 
caution. He  also,  although  on  the  spot,  overlooked 
the  unmilitary  dispositions  of  colonel  Adam  on  the 
heights  of  the  Ordal.  The  summit  could  not  be  de- 
fended against  superior  numbers  with  a  small  corps, 
and  that  officer  had  nevertheless  extended  the  Cala- 
brese  so  far  on  the  left  that  they  could  take  no  share 
in  the  action,  and  yet  could  not  retreat  without 
great  difficulty.  A  commander  who  understood  his 
business,  would  have  blocked  up  the  bridge  in  front 
of  the  heights,  and  defended  it  by  a  strong  detach- 
ment, supporting  that  detachment  by  others  placed 
in  succession  on  the  heights,  but  keeping  his  main 
body  always  in  hand,  ready  either  to  fall  on  the  head 
of  the  enemy's  column  of  attack,  or  to  rally  the  ad- 
vanced detachments  and  retreat  in  order.  There 
were  plenty  of  trees  and  stone  to  block  the  bridge 
its  own  parapet  would  have  supplied  materials,  and 
the  ravine  was  so  deep  and  rugged,  that  the  enemy 
could  not  have  crossed  it  on  the  flanks  in  the  dark. 

It  is  no  defence  to  say  colonel  Adam  only  took  his 
ground  in  the  evening  after  a  march  ;  that  he  expect- 
ed the  main  body  up  the  next  morning,  and  that  lord 
William  assured  him  he  was  safe  from  attack. 
Every  officer  is  responsible  for*  the  security  of  his 
troops,  and  the  precaution  prescribed  by  the  rules  of 
war  should  never  be  dispensed  with  or  delayed  at  any 
outpost.  Now  it  does  not  appear  that  colonel  Adam 
ever  placed  an  infantry  piquet  on  the  bridge,  or  sent 
a  cavalry  patrol  beyond  it ;  and  I  have  been  inform- 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


Cll 


ed  by  a  French  soldier,  one  of  a  party  eent  to  ex- 
plore the  position,  that  they  readied  tlie  crest  of 
the  htii^hts  vvitiiuut  oi)position  and  returned  salely, 
wiiereupun  Mesclop's  brigade  instantly  crossed  the 
bruii^tj  and  attacked 

4th  Urdal  misrht  be  called  a  suprise  with  respect 
to  liie  yencral-in-chief,  yet  the  troops  engaged  were 
noL  surprised  :  tliey  were  beaten  and  dispersed  be- 
cause culunel  Adam  was  unskilful.  The  French  gen- 
eral's victory  was  complete  ;  but  lie  has  in  his  Me- 
niuirs  exaggerated  his  difficulties  and  the  impor- 
tance of  his  success;  his  private  report  to  the  em- 
P'jror  was  more  accurate.  The  Memoirs  state, 
that  tlie  English  grenadiers  defended  certain  works 
wiiich  commanded  tiie  ascent  of  the  main  road,  and 
in  tlie  accompanying  atlas  a  perspective  view  of 
well-conditioned  redoubts  with  colours  flying,  is  giv- 
en. The  reader  is  thus  led  to  imagine  these  were 
regular  forts  of  a  fresh  construction,  defended  by 
select  troops ;  but  in  the  private  report  they  are  cor- 
rectly designated  as  ancient  retrenchments,  being  in 
fact  tlie  ruiUs  of  some  old  Spanish  field-works,  and 
of  no  more  advantage  to  the  allies  than  any  natural 
inequality  of  ground.  Again,  in  the  Memoirs,  the 
attack  of  the  French  cavalry  near  Villa  Franca  is 
represented  as  quite  successful;  but  the  private  re- 
port only  says  the  rear  was  harassed  by  repeated 
charges,  which  is  true,  and  moreover,  those  charges 
were  vigorously  repulsed.  The  whole  French  loss 
was  about  tliree  hundred  men  ;  that  of  the  allies,  hea- 
vy at  Ordal,  was  lightened  by  escape  of  prisoners 
during  the  night,  and  ultimately  did  not  exceed  a 
thousand  men,  including  Spaniards. 


CHAPTER  III. 

Sieg'e  of  San  Se'jastian — Convent  of  San  Bartolonieo  storn c) — 
Assault  on  the  place  fail- — Causes  theieof — Sitge  tuint-il  i:i 
tu  a  blockade,  and  the  guns  enibaiktd  al  Passages — French 
make  a   successful  $:illy. 

Turning  from  the  war  in  Catalonia  to  the  opera- 
tions in  Navarre  and  Guipuscoa,  we  shall  find  lord 
Wellington's  indomitable  energy  overcoming  every 
dirtiouity.  It  has  been  already  shown  how,  chang- 
ing liis  hrst  views,  he  disposed  the  Anglo-Portu- 
guese divisions  to  cover  the  siege  of  San  Sebastian 
and  the  blockade  of  Painpeluna,  at  the  same  time 
attacking  with  the  Spanish  divisions  Santono  on  the 
coast,  and  the  castles  of  Daroca,  Morella,  Zaragoza, 
and  the  forts  of  Pancorbo  in  the  interior.  These 
operations  required  many  men,  but  the  early  fall  of 
Pancorbo  enabled  O'DoneTs  reserve  to  blockade 
Pampeluna,  and  Don  Carlos  d'Espaha's  division,  four 
thousand  strong,  which  remained  at  31iranda  del 
Castanar,  to  imi)rove  its  organization  when  lord 
Wellington  advanced  to  the  Ebro,  was  approaching 
to  reinforce  him. 

The  iiarbour  of  Passages  was  the  only  port  near 
liie  scene  of  operations  suited  for  the  supply  of  the 
army.  Yet  it  had  this  defect,  that  being  situated 
between  the  covering  and  the  besieging  army,  the 
Btores  and  guns  once  landed  were  in  danger  from 
every  movement  of  the  enemy.  The  Deba  river, 
between  San  Sebastian  and  Bilbao,  was  unfit  for 
large  vessels,  and  hence  no  permanent  depot  could 
be  established  nearer  than  Bilbao.  At  that  port 
therefore  and  at  St.  Ander  and  Coruna,  the  great 
depots  of  the  army  were  fixed,  the  stores  being 
transported  to  tiiern  from  the  establishments  in  Por- 
tugal ;  but  the  French  held  Santona,  and  their  pri- 
vateers interrupted  the  communication  along  the 
«<>a8t  of  Spain,  while  American  privateers  did   the 


same  between  Lisbon  and  CoruTiD.  On  the  (itlier 
hand,  the  intercourse  between  Sun  Sebtistian  and 
the  ports  of  France  was  scarcely  molctted,  and  the 
most  urgent  remonstrances  failed  to  procure  a  sufii- 
cient  naval  force  on  the  coast  of  Biscay.  It  was  in 
these  circumstances  Wellington  commenced 

THE  SIEGE  OF  SAN  SEBASTIAN. 

This  place  was  built  on  a  low  sandy  isthmus, 
formed  by  the  harbour  on  one  side  and  the  river 
Urumea  on  the  other.  Behind  it  rose  the  Mci  te  Or« 
gullo,  a  rugged  cone,  nearly  four  hundred  feet  high, 
waslied  by  the  ocean,  and  crowned  with  the  small 
castle  of  La  Mota.  Its  southern  face,  overlooking 
the  town,  was  yet  cut  off  from  it  by  a  line  of  defen- 
sive works,  and  covered  with  batteries ;  but  La 
Mota  itself  was  commanded,  at  a  distance  of  thir- 
teen hundred  yards,  by  the  Monte  Olia,  on  the  other 
side  of  the  Urumea. 

The  land  front  of  San  Sebastian  was  three  hun- 
dred and  fifty  yards  wide,  stretching  quite  across  the 
isthmus.  It  consisted  of  a  high  curtain  or  rampart, 
very  solid,  strengthened  by  a  lofty  casemated  flat 
bastion,  or  cavalier,  placed  in  the  centre,  and  by 
half  bastions  at  either  end.  A  regular  hornwork 
was  pushed  out  from  this  front,  and  six  hundred 
yards  beyond  the  hornwork  tlie  isthmus  was  closed 
by  the  ridge  of  San  Bartolomeo,  at  the  foot  of  which 
stood  the  suburb  of  San  Martin. 

On  the  opposite  side  of  the  Urumea  were  certain 
sandy  hills,  called  the  Chofres,  through  which  the 
road  from  Passages  passed  to  the  wooden  bridge  over 
the  river,  and  thence,  by  the  suburb  of  Santa  Cata- 
lina,  along  the  top  of  a  sea-wall,  which  formed  a 
fausse-hraie  for  the  hornwork. 

The  flanks  of  the  town  were  protected  by  simple 
ramparts.  The  one  was  washed  by  the  water  of  the 
harbour,  the  other  by  the  Urumea,  which,  at  high 
tide,  covered  four  of  the  twenty-seven  feet  comprised 
in  its  elevation.  This  was  the  weak  side  of  the  for- 
tress ;  for  though  covered  by  the  river,  there  was 
only  a  single  wall,  ill-flanked  by  two  old  towers  and 
by  the  half  bastion  of  St.  Elmo,  which  was  situated 
at  the  extremity  of  the  rampart,  close  under  the 
Monte  Orgullo.  There  was  no  ditch,  no  counter- 
scarp, or  glacis  ;  the  wall  could  be  seen  to  its  base 
from  the  Chofre  hills,  at  distances  varying  from  five 
hundred  to  a  thousand  yards,  and  when  the  tide  was 
out  the  Urumea  left  a  dry  strand  under  the  rampart 
as  far  as  St.  Elmo.  However,  the  guns  from  the 
batteries  at  Monte  Orgullo,  especially  that  called 
the  Mirador,  could  see  this  strand. 

The  other  flank  of  the  town  was  secured  by  the 
harbour,  in  the  mouth  of  which  was  a  rocky  island, 
called  Santa  Clara,  where  the  French  had  establish- 
ed a  post  of  twenty-five  men. 

When  the  battle  of  Vittoria  happened,  San  Sebas- 
tian was  nearly  dismantled  ;  many  of  the  guns  had 
been  removed  to  form  battering-trains,  or  to  arm 
smaller  ports  on  the  coast  ;  there  were  no  bomb' 
proofs  nor  palisades  nor  outworks  ;  the  wells  were 
foul,  and  the  place  was  supplied  with  water  by  a 
single  aqueduct.  Joseph's  defeat  restored  its  impor- 
tance as  a  fortress.  General  Emanuel  Rcy  entered  it 
the  22d  of  .Tune,  bringing  with  him  the  escort  of  the 
convoy  which  had  quitted  Vittoria  the  day  before 
the  battle.  The  town  was  thus  filled  with  emigrant 
Spanish  families,  with  the  ministers  and  other  per- 
sons attached  to  the  court ;  the  pojiulation,  ordinari- 
ly eight  thousand,  was  increased  to  sixteen  thou- 
sand, and  disorder  and  confusion  were  predominant. 
Key,  pushed  by  necessity,  in'mediutcly  forced  all 
persons,  not  residents,  to  march  at  once  to  France, 
granting   them  a  guard  of  only  one   hundred  men 


612 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XXI. 


The  pfople  of  quality  went  by  sea,  the  others  by 
land,  auiJ  fortuiiutaly  all  arrived  gafely  ;  for  the  par- 
tidas  woukl  have  given  them  no  quarter. 

On  tiie  27th,  general  Foy,  vyhile  retreating  before 
sir  Tlioinas  Graham,  threw  a  reinforcement  into  the 
pJaee.  Tiie  next  day,  Mendizabal's  Spaniards  ap- 
peared on  the  hills  behind  the  ridge  of  San  Bartolo- 
meo  and  on  the  Chofres,  whereupon  general  Key 
burned  the  wooden  bridge  and  botli  the  suburbs,  and 
commenced  fortifying  the  heights  of  San  Bartolo- 
meo.  Tl:e  29th,  the  Spaniards  slightly  attacked 
San  Bartolomeo,  and  were  repulsed. 

The  1st  of  July  the  governor  of  Guetaria  aban- 
doned tiiat  place,  and,  with  detsstable  ferocity,  se- 
cretly left  a  lighted  train,  which  exploded  the  maga- 
zine, and  destroyed  many  of  the  inhabitants.  His 
troops,  three  Imndred  in  number,  entered  San  Sebas- 
tian, and  at  the  same  time  a  vessel  from  St.  Jean 
de  Lnz  arrived  with  fifty-six  cannoneers  and  some 
workmen  ;  the  garrison  was  thus  increased  to  three 
thousand  men,  and  all  persons  not  able  to  provide 
subsistence  tor  themselves  in  advance,  were  ordered 
to  quit  the  place.  Meanwhile  Mendizabal,  having 
cut  plfthe  aqueduct,  made  some  approaches  towards 
tlie  head  of  tlie  burned  bridge,  on  the  right  of  the 
Urnmea,  and  molested  the  workmen  on  the  heights 
of  San  Bartolomeo. 

On  the  3d,  tiie  Surveillante  frigate  and  a  sloop, 
with  some  small  craft,  arrived  to  blockade  the  har- 
bour, yet  the  French  vessels  from  St.  Jean  de  Luz 
continued  to  enter  by  night.  The  same  day  the  go- 
Tcrnor  made  a  sally  with  eleven  hundred  men,  in 
three  columns,  to  obtain  news,  and  after  some  hours' 
skirmishing,  returned  with  a  few  prisoners. 

Tiie  6t.h,  some  French  vessels,  with  a  detachment 
of  troops  and  a  considerable  convoy  of  provisions, 
cam3  from  St.  .lean  de  Luz. 

The  7th,  Mendizabal  tried,  unsuccessfully,  to  set 
tire  to  the  convent  of  San  Bartolomeo. 

On  t!ie  9th,  sir  Thomas  Graham  arrived  w'ith  a 
corps  of  British  and  Portuguese  troops,  and  on  the 
i;5th  the  Spaniards  marched,  some  to  reinforce  the 
force  blockading  Santona,  the  remainder  to  rejoin 
the  fourth  army  on  the  Bidassoa. 

At  this  time  p-cneral  Reille  held  the  entrances  to 
the  Bastan  by  Vera  and  Echallar ;  but  Wellington 
drove  hini  thence  on  the  L^th,  and  established  the 
seventh  and  light  divisions  there,  thus  covering  the 
passes  over  the  Peiia  de  Haya,  by  which  the  siege 
mifrht  have  been  interrupted. 

Before  general  Graham  arrivcl,  the  French  had 
constructed  a  redoubt  on  the  heights  of  San  Barto- 
lomeo, and  connected  it  with  the  convent  of  that 
name  which  they  also  fortified.  These  outworks 
were  supported  by  posts  in  the  ruined  houses  of  the 
suburb  of  San  Martin,  behind,  and  by  a  low  circu- 
lar redoubt,  formed  of  casks,  on  the  main  road,  half- 
way between  the  convent  and  the  horn-work.  Hence 
to  reduce  the  place,  working  along  the  isthmus,  it 
was  necessary  to  carry  in  succession  three  lines  of 
defence  covering  the  town,  and  a  fourth  at  the  foot 
of  Monte  Orgullo,  before  the  castle  of  La  Mota  could 
be  Rssaiiid.  Seventy-six  pieces  of  artillery  were 
mounted  upon  these  works,  and  others  were  after- 
w.irds  obtained  from  I'^rance  by  sea. 

Tlie  besieging  army  consisted  of  ths  fifth  divis- 
ion, under  general  Oswald,  and  the  independent 
PortU'juese  brigades  of  J.  Wilson,  and  Bradford, 
reinforced  by  detachments  from  the  first  division. 
Thus,  including  the  artillery-men,  some  seamen 
commanded  by  lieutenant  O'Reilly  of  the  Surveil- 
lante, and  one  hundred  r^'xiilar  sappers  and  miners, 
low  for  the  first  time  used  in  the  sieges  of  the  Pen- 
Dijula,  nearly  ten  thousand  men  v/ere   employed. 


The  guns  available  for  the  attack.  In  the  first  in 
stance,  were  a  new- battering  train  originally  jire- 
pared  for  the  siege  of  Burgos,  consisting  of  fourteen 
iron  twenty-four-pounders,  six  eiglit-incii  brass  how- 
itzers, four  sixty-cight-pound  iron  carronades,  and 
four  iron  ten-inch  mortars.  To  these  were  added  six 
twenty-four-i)ounders  lent  by  the  shi{>s  of  war,  and 
six  eighteen-pounders  which  iiad  moved  with  the 
army  from  Portugal,  making  altogctiier  forty  pieces, 
commanded  by  colonel  Dickson.  The  distance  from 
the  depot  of  siege  at  Passages  to  the  Chofre  sand- 
hills was  one  mile  and  a  half  of  good  road,  and  a 
pontoon  bridge  was  laid  over  the  Urumea  river  above 
the  Chofres,  but  from  thence  to  the  height  of  San 
Bartolomeo  was  more  than  five  miles  of  very  bad 
road.  ' 

Early  in  July,  the  fortress  had  been  twice  closely 
examined  by  major  Smith,  the  engineer  who  had  so 
ably  defended  Tarifa.  He  proposed  a  plan  of  siege 
founded  upon  the  facility  furnished  by  the  Chofre 
hills  to  destroy  the  flanks,  rake  the  principal  front 
and  form  a  breach  with  the  same  batteries,  the  works 
being  at  the  same  time  secured,  except  at  low  wa- 
ter, by  the  Urumea.  Counter-batteries,  to  be  con- 
structed on  the  left  of  that  river,  were  to  rake  the 
line  of  defence  in  which  the  breach  was  to  be  form- 
ed ;  and  against  the  castle  and  its  outworks  he  re- 
lied principally  upon  a  vertical  fire,  instancing  the 
reduction  of  Fort  Bourbon  in  the  West  Indies  in 
proof  of  its  eflicacy.  This  plan  would  probably  hove 
reduced  San  Sebastian  in  a  reasonable  time  without 
any  remarkable  loss  of  men,  and  lord  Wellington 
approving  i  f  it,  though  he  doubted  the  ethcacy  of 
the  vertical  fire,  ordered  the  siege  to  be  crmmenced. 
He  renewed  his  approval  afterwards  when  l.e  had 
examined  the  works  in  person,  and  all  his  orders 
were  in  the  same  spirit;  but  neither  t!ie  plan  nor 
his  orders  were  followed;  the  siege,  which  should 
have  been  an  ordinary  event  of  war,  has  obtained 
a  mournful  celebrity,  and  lord  Wellington  has  been 
unjustly  charged  with  a  contempt  for  the  maxims  of 
the  great  masters  of  the  art.  Anxious  he  was  no 
doubt  to  save  time,  yet  he  did  not  for  that  urge  the 
engineer  beyond  the  rules.  Take  the  place  in  the 
quickest  manner,  yet  do  vol  from,  overspccd  fail  to 
take  it,  was  the  sense  of  his  instructions  ;  but  sir 
Thomas  Graham,  one  of  England's  best  soldiers,  ap- 
pears to  have  been  endowed  with  a  genius  for  war 
intuitive  rather  than  reflective;  and  this  joined  to 
his  natural  modesty  and  a  certain  easiness  of  tem- 
per, caused  him  at  times  to  abandon  his  own  correct 
conceptions,  for  the  less  judicious  counsels  of  those 
about  him  who  advised  deviations  from  the  original 
plan. 

Active  operations  were  commenced  on  the  night 
of  the  10th,  by  the  construction  of  two  batteries 
against  the  convent  and  redoubt  of  San  liartolomeo. 
And  on  the  night  of  the  13th,  four  batteries,  to  con- 
tain twenty  of  the  heaviest  guns  and  four  eight-inch 
howitzers,  were  marked  out  on  the  Chofre  sand-hillr, 
at  distances  varying  from  six  hundred  to  thirteen 
hundred  yards  from  the  eastern  rampart  of  the  town. 
The  river  was  supposed  to  be  unfordable,  wherefore 
no  parallel  of  support  was  made,  yet  good  trenches 
of  communications,  and  subsequently  regular  ap- 
proaches were  formed.  Two  attacks  were  thus  es- 
tablished. One  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Frumea,  in- 
trusted to  the  unattached  Portujiucse  brigades  ;  one 
on  the  left  bank,  to  the  fifth  division  ;  but  most  of 
the  troops  were  at  first  encamped  on  the  right  bank, 
to  facilitate  a  junction  with  tlie  covering  army  in 
the  event  of  a  general  battle. 

On  the  14th,  a  French  slr>op  entered  the  harbour 
with  supplies,  and   the   batteries  of  the  loft  attack, 


ISlo.J 


NAPIER'S  PENINSULAR  WAR. 


613 


under  the  direction  of  the  German  major  Hartman, 
opened  against  San  Bartolomeo,  throwing  hot  shot 
into  that  building.  The  besieged  responded  with 
musketry  from  the  redoubt,  with  heavy  guns  from 
the  town,  and  with  a  field-piece,  which  they  had 
mounted  on  the  belfry  of  the  convent  itself. 

The  15th  of  July,  sir  Richard  Fletcher  took  the 
chief  command  of  the  engineers,  but  major  Smith 
retained  tlie  direction  of  the  attack  from  the  Chofre 
bills,  and  lord  Wellington's  orders  continued  to  pass 
tiirough  his  hands.  'J'his  day  the  batteries  of  the 
left  attack,  aided  by  some  howitzers  from  the  right 
of  the  Urumea,  set  tlie  convent  on  fire,  silenced  the 
musketry  of  the  besieged,  and  so  damaged  the  defen- 
ces tliat  the  Portuguese  troops  attached  to  the  fifth 
division  were  ordered  to  feel  the  enemy's  post.  They 
were  however  repulsed  with  great  loss,  the  French 
sallied,  and  the  firing  did  not  cease  until  nightfall. 

A  battery  for  seven  additional  guns  to  play  against 
San  Bartolomeo  was  now  commenced  on  the  right 
of  the  Urumea,  and  the  original  batteries  set  fire  to 
the  convent  several  times,  but  the  flames  were  ex- 
tiuguislied  by  the  garrison. 

In  the  night  of  the  16th,  general  Rey  sounded  the 
Urumea  as  high  as  Santa  Catalina,  designing  to 
pass  over  and  stonn  the  batteries  on  the  Chofres; 
but  the  fords  discovered  were  shifting,  and  the  diffi- 
culty of  execution  deterred  him  from  this  project. 

The  17th,  the  convent  being  nearly  in  ruins,  the 
assault  was  ordered  without  waiting  for  the  effect 
of  the  new  battery  raised  on  the  other  side  of  the 
Urumea.  The  storming  party  was  fprmed  in  two 
columns.  Detachments  from  Wilson's  Portuguese, 
supported  by  the  light  company  of  the  ninth  British 
regiment  and  three  companies  of  the  Royals,  com- 
posed the  right,  which  under  the  direction  of  gen- 
eral H;iy  was  destined  to  assail  the  redoubt.  Gen- 
eral Bradford  directed  the  left,  which  being  composed 
of  Portuguese,  supported  by  three  companies  of  the 
ninth  British  regiment  under  colonel  Cameron,  was 
ordered  to  assail  the  convent. 

ASSAULT  OF  SAN   BARTOLOMEO. 

At  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning  two  heavy  six- 
pounders  opened  against  the  redoubt;  and  a  sharp 
fire  of  musketry  in  return  from  the  French,  who  had 
been  reinforced  and  occu[)ied  the  suburb  of  San  Mar- 
tin, announced  their  resolution  to  fight.  The  allied 
troops  were  assembled  behind  the  crest  of  the  hill 
overlooking  the  convent,  and  the  first  signal  was 
given,  out  the  Portuguese  advanced  slowly  at  both 
attacks,  and  the  supporting  companies  of  the  ninth 
regiment  on  each  side,  passing  through  them,  fell 
upon  the  enemy  with  the  usual  impetuosity  of  Bri- 
tish soldiers.  Colonel  Cameron,  while  leading  his 
grenadiers  down  the  face  of  the  hill  was  exposed  to 
a  heavy  cannonade  from  the  horn  work,  but  he  soon 
gained  the  cover  of  a  wall  fifty  yards  from  the  con- 
vent and  there  awaited  the  second  signal.  How- 
ever, his  rapid  advance,  which  threatened  to  cut  off 
the  garrison  from  the  suburb,  joined  to  the  firo  of 
the  two  six-pounders  and  that  of  some  other  field- 
pieces  on  the  farther  side  of  the  Urumea,  caused  the 
French  to  abandon  the  redoubt.  Seeing  this,  Cam- 
eron jumped  over  the  wall  and  assaulted  both  the 
con\i3nt  and  the  houses  of  the  suburb.  At  the  latter 
a  fierce  struggle  ensued,  and  cayitain  Woodman  of 
the  ninth  was  killed  in  the  upper  room  of  a  house 
after  figiiting  his  way  from  below  ;  but  the  grena- 
diers carried  the  convent  with  such  rapidity  that  the 
French,  unable  to  explode  some  small  mines  they 
had  prepared,  hastily  joined  tiie  troops  in  the  suburb. 
There,  however,  the  fighting  continued,  and  colonel 
Cameron's  force  being  very  much  reduced,  the  afikir 


was  becoming  doubtful,  when  the  remaining  com- 
panies of  his  regiment,  which  he  had  tent  for  alter 
tlie  attack  commenced,  arrived,  and  the  suburb  was 
with  much  fighting  entirely  won.  At  the  right  at- 
tack, the  company  of  the  ninth,  although  retarded 
by  a  ravine,  by  a  thick  hedge,  by  tlie  slcwncts  of 
the  Portuguese  and  by  a  heavy  fire,  er.tcrtd  the 
abandoned  redoubt  with  little  loss,  but  the  tro(,p8 
were  then  rashly  led  against  the  cask-rec'oubt,  con- 
trary to  general  Oswald's  orders,  and  were  beaten 
back  by  the  enemy. 

The  loss  of  the  French  was  two  hundred  and  for- 
ty men,  that  of  the  allies  considerable  ;  the  compa- 
nies of  the  ninth  under  colonel  Cameron,  alcne,  had 
seven  officers  and  sixty  men  killed  or  wounded,  snd 
the  operation  althougli  successful  was  an  error.  The 
battery  erected  on  the  right  bank  of  tlic  Urumea  was 
not  opened,  wherefore,  either  the  assault  wus  preci- 
pitated or  the  battery  not  necessary  ;  but  the  loss 
justified  the  conception  of  the  battery. 

When  the  action  ceased,  the  engineers  made  a  lodg- 
ment in  the  redoubt,  and  commenced  two  batteries 
for  eight  pieces  to  rake  the  hornwork  and  the  east- 
ern rampart  of  the  place.  Two  other  batteries,  to 
contain  four  sixty-eight-pound  carronadcs  and  lour 
ten-inch  mortars,  were  also  commenced  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Urumea. 

The  18th,  the  besieged  threw  up  traverses  on  the 
land  front  to  meet  the  raking  fire  of  the  besiegers, 
and  the  latter  dragged  four  pieces  up  the  Jlonte  Clia 
to  plunge  into  tiie  Mirador  and  other  batteries  on 
the  Monte  Orgullo.  In  the  night,  a  lodgment  was 
made  on  the  ruins  of  San  Martin,  the  two  batteries 
at  the  right  attack  were  armed,  and  two  additional 
mortars  dragged  up  the  Monte  Ulia. 

The  lOtli,  all  the  batteries  at  both  attacks  were 
armed,  and  in  tlie  night  two  approaches  being  com- 
menced from  the  suburb  of  San  Martin  towards  the 
cask-redoubt,  the  French  were  driven  from  that 
small  work. 

On  the  2Cth,  the  whole  of  the  batteries  opened 
their  fire,  the  greatest  part  being  directed  to  form 
the  breach. 

Major  Smith's  plan  was  similar  to  that  follcwed 
by  marshal  Berwick  a  century  before.  He  proposed 
a  lodgment  on  the  hornwork,  before  the  breach 
should  be  assailed,  but  he  had  not  then  read  the 
description  of  that  siege,  and  therefore  unknowingly 
fixed  the  breaching-point  precisely  where  the  wall 
had  been  most  strongly  rebuilt  after  Berwick's  at- 
tack This  was  the  first  fault,  yet  a  slight  one,  be- 
cause the  wall  did  not  resist  the  batteries  very  long, 
but  it  was  a  serious  matter  that  sir  Thomas  Gra- 
ham, at  the  suggestion  of  the  commander  of  the  ar- 
tillery, began  his  operations  by  breaching.  JMajcr 
Smith  objected  to  it,  and  sir  R.  Fletcher  acquiesced 
reluctantly  on  the  understanding  that  the  ruining  of 
the  defences  was  only  postponed,  an  understanding 
afterwards  unhappily  forgotten. 

The  result  of  the  first  day's  attack  was  not  satis- 
factory, the  weather  proved  bad,  the  guns  mounted 
on  ship-carriages  failed,  one  twenty-four-]''onnder 
was  rendered  unserviceable  by  the  enemy,  anotlier 
became  useless  from  an  accident,  a  cn[>tnin  of  or.gi- 
neers  was  killed,  and  the  besiegers'  shot  liad  little 
effect  upon  the  solid  wall.  In  tiie  nigiit,  however, 
tlie  ship-guns  were  mounted  on  better  carriages,  and 
a  parallel  across  the  isthmus  was  projected  ;  but  the 
greatest  part  of  the  workmen,  to  avoid  a  tempest, 
sougiit  shelter  in  the  suliurbs  of  San  Martin,  and 
when  day  broke  only  one  third  of  the  work  was  (ler- 
forma\ 

The  2l6t,  the  besiegers'  batteries  ceased  firing  to 
allow  of  a  summons,  but  the  governor  refused  to  -e* 


614 


NAPIER'S  PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Rook  XXI. 


ceive  Lhe  letter,  and  the  firing  was  resumed.  The 
main  wall  still  resisted,  yet  the  parapets  and  embra- 
sures crumbled  away  fast,  and  the  batteries  on  Mon- 
te Olia  plunsred  into  the  hornwork,  altliough  at  six- 
teen hundred  yards'  distance,  with  such  effect,  that 
the  besieged,  having  no  bomb-proofs,  were  forced  to 
dig  trenches  to  protect  themselves.  The  counter- 
fire  directed  solely  against  the  breaching  batteries 
was  feeble,  but  at  midnight  a  shell  thrown  from  the 
castle  into  the  bay  gave  the  signal  for  a  sally,  and 
during  the  firing  which  ensued  several  French  ves- 
sels with  supplies  entered  the  harbour.  This  night 
also  the  besieged  isolated  the  breach  by  cuts  in  the 
rampart  and  other  defences.  On  the  other  hand  the 
besiegers'  parallel  across  the  isthmus  was  completed, 
and  in  its  progress  laid  bare  the  mouth  of  a  drain, 
four  feet  high  and  three  feet  wide,  containing  the 
pipe  of  the  aqueduct  cut  oft"  by  the  Spaniards. 
Through  this  dangerous  opening  lieutenant  Reid  of 
the  engineers,  a  young  and  zealous  officer,  crept 
even  to  the  counterscarp  of  the  hornwork,  and  find- 
ing the  passage  there  closed  by  a  door,  returned  with- 
out an  accident.  Thirty  barrels  of  powder  were  pla- 
ced in  this  drain,  and  eight  feet  was  stopped  with 
sand-bags,  thus  forming  a  globe  of  compression  de- 
signed to  blow,  as  through  a  tube,  so  much  rubbish 
over  the  counterscarp  as  might  fill  the  narrow  ditch 
of  the  hornwork. 

On  the  22d,  the  fire  from  the  batteries,  unexam- 
pled from  its  rapidity  and  accuracy,  opened  what 
appeared  a  practicable  breach  in  the  eastern  flank 
wall,  batween  the  towers  of  Los  Hornos  and  Las 
Mesquitas.  The  counter-fire  of  the  besieged  now 
Blackened,  but  the  descent  into  the  town  behind  the 
breach  was  more  than  twelve  feet  perpendicular, 
and  the  garrison  were  seen  from  Monte  Olia  dili- 
gently working  at  the  interior  defences  to  receive 
the  assault:  they  added  also  another  gun  to  the  bat- 
tery of  St.  Elmo,  just  under  the  Mirador  battery,  to 
flank  the  front  attack.  On  the  other  hand  the  be- 
siegers had  placed  four  sixty-eight-pound  carronades 
in  battery  to  play  on  the  defences  of  the  breach  ;  but 
the  fire  on  both  sides  slackened,  because  the  guns 
were  greatly  enlarged  at  the  vents  with  constant 
practice. 

On  the  23d,  the  sea  blockade  being  null,  the 
French  vessels  returned  to  France  with  the  badly 
wounded  men.  This  day  the  besiegers,  judging  the 
breach  between  the  towers  quite  practicable,  turned 
the  guns,  at  the  suggestion  of  general  Oswald,  to 
break  the  wall  on  the  right  of  the  main  breach. 
Major  Smitli  opposed  this,  urging,  that  no  advan- 
tage would  be  gained  by  making  a  second  opening, 
to  get  at  which  the  troops  must  first  pass  the  great 
breach;  that  time  would  be  thus  uselessly  lost  to 
tlie  besiegers,  and  tiiat  there  was  a  manifest  objec- 
tion on  account  of  the  tide  and  depth  of  water  at 
the  now  point  attacked.  His  counsel  was  overruled, 
and  in  the  course  of  the  day,  the  wall  being  thin, 
the  stroke  heavy  and  quick,  a  second  breach  thirty 
feet  wide  was  rendered  practicable. 

The  defensive  fire  of  tlie  besieged  being  now  much 
diminished,  the  ten-inch  mortars  and  sixty-eight- 
pound  carronades  wore  turned  uf)on  the  defence  of 
the  great  breach,  and  upon  a  stockade  wliich  separa- 
ted the  high  curtain  on  tbe  land  front,  from  the  low- 
er works  of  the  flank  against  which  the  attack  was 
conducted.  The  houses  near  the  breach  were  soon 
in  flames  which  spread  rapidly,  dest.*oyed  some  of 
the  defences  of  the  besieged  and  mena(;ed  the  whole 
town  with  destruction.  The  assault  was  ordered 
for  the  next  morning.  But  when  the  troops  assem- 
bled in  tlie  trenc!ies,  the  burning  houses  appeared 
80  formidable  that  the  attack  was  deferred  and  the 


batteries  again  opened,  partly  against  the  second 
breach,  partly  against  the  defences,  partly  to  break 
the  wall  in  a  third  place  between  the  half  bastion 
of  St.  John  on  the  land  front  and  the  main  breacli. 

During  the  night,  the  vigilant  governor,  expect- 
ing the  assault,  mounted  two  field-piecee  on  the  cav- 
alier, in  the  centre  of  the  land  front,  which  being 
fifteen  feet  above  the  other  defences  commanded  tlie 
high  curtain,  and  they  still  had  on  the  liornwork  a 
little  piece,  and  two  casemated  guns  on  the  flank  of 
the  cavalier.  Two  otiier  field-pieces  were  mount- 
ed on  an  intrenchment,  which  crossing  the  ditch  of 
the  land  front,  bore  on  the  approaches  to  the  main 
breach  ;  a  twenty-four  pounder  looked  from  the  tow- 
er of  Las  Mesquitas,  between  the  main  breach  and 
where  the  third  opening  was  being  made,  and  conse- 
quently flanking  both ;  two  four-pounders  were  in 
the  tower  of  Hornos  ;  two  heavy  guns  were  on  the 
flank  of  St.  Elmo,  and  two  others,  placed  on  the 
right  of  the  Mirador,  could  play  u[)on  the  breaches 
from  within  the  fortified  line  of  Monte  Orgullo. 
Thus  fourteen  pieces  were  still  available  for  de- 
fence, the  retaining  sea-wall,  or fausse-braie,  which 
strengthened  the  flank  of  the  hornwork,  and  between 
which  and  the  river  the  storming  parties  must  ne- 
cessarily advance,  was  covered  with  live  shells,  to 
roll  over  on  the  columns,  and  behind  the  flaming 
houses,  near  the  breach,  other  edifices  were  loop- 
holed  and  filled  with  musketeers.  However,  the  fire 
extending  rapidly  and  fiercely,  greatly  injured  the 
defences  ;  the  French,  to  save  their  guns,  withdrew 
them  until  the  moment  of  attack,  and  the  British 
artillery  officers  were  confident  that  in  daylight  they 
could  silence  the  enemy's  guns,  and  keep  the  para- 
pet clear  of  men  ;  wherefore  sir  Thomas  Graham  re- 
newed the  order  for 

THE  ASSAULT. 

In  the  night  of  the  24th,  two  thousand  men  of  the 
fifth  division  filed  into  the  trenches  on  the  isthmus. 
This  force  was  composed  of  the  third  battalion  of  the 
Royals,  under  major  Frazer,  destined  to  storm  the 
great  breach  ;  the  thirty-eighth  regiment,  under 
colonel  Greville,  designed  to  assail  the  lesser  and 
most  distant  breach  ;  the  ninth  regiment  under  col- 
onel Cameron,  appointed  to  support  the  Royals; 
finally,  a  detachment,  selected  from  the  light  com- 
panies of  all  those  battalions,  was  placed  in  the  cen- 
tre of  the  Royals,  under  the  command  of  lieutenant 
Campbell,  of  the  ninth  regiment.  This  chosen  de- 
tachment, accompanied  by  the  engineer  Machel, 
with  a  ladder  party,  was  intended  to  sweep  the  high 
curtain,  after  tlie  breach  should  be  won. 

The  distance  from  the  trenches  to  the  points  of 
attack  was  more  than  three  hundred  yards,  along  the 
contracted  space  lying  between  the  retaining  wall 
of  the  hornwork  and  the  river;  the  ground  was 
strewed  with  rocks  covered  by  slippery  seaweeds; 
the  tide  had  left  large  and  deep  pools  of  water;  the 
parapet  of  the  hornwork  was  entire,  as  well  as  the 
retaining  wall  ;  the  parapets  of  tiie  other  works  and 
the  two  towers,  which  closely  flanked  the  breach,  al- 
though injured,  were  far  from  being  ruined,  and  eve- 
ry place  was  thickly  garnished  with  musketeers. 
The  difficulties  of  the  attack  were  obvio.is,  and  a 
detachment  of  Portuguese,  placed  in  a  treuth,  o])en- 
ed  beyond  the  paio'lel  on  tlie  isthmus,  within  sixty 
yards  of  the  rampaiis,  was  ordered  to  quell,  if  possi- 
ble, the  fire  of  the  hornwork. 

While  it  was  still  dark,  the  storming  columns 
moved  out  of  the  trenches,  and  the  globe  of  compr(w- 
eion  in  tlic  drain,  was  exjjloded  with  great  effect 
against  the  counterscarp  and  glacis  of  the  hornwork. 
The  garrison,  astonished  by  the  unlooked-for  event, 


1813-1 


NAPIER'S  PENINSULAR  WAR. 


615 


abandoned  the  flanking  parapet ;  and  the  troops  rush- 
ed onwards,  the  storniers  for  the  main  breach  leading, 
and  suffering  more  from  the  fire  of  their  own  batte- 
ries on  the  right  of  the  Ururnea  tlian  from  the  ene- 
my. Major  Frazsr  and  the  engineer  Harry  Jones 
first  reached  the  breach.  The  enemy  had  fallen 
back  in  confusion  beiiind  the  ruins  of  the  still  burn- 
ing houses,  and  those  brave  officers  rushed  up,  ex- 
pecting tiiat  tiieir  troops  would  follow ;  but  not 
many  followed,  for  it  was  extremely  dark,  the  natu- 
ral difficulties  of  the  way  had  contracted  the  front 
f.nd  disordered  the  column  in  its  whole  length,  and 
the  soldiers,  straggling  and  out  of  wind,  arrived  in 
sraiill  disconnected  parties  at  the  foot  of  the  breach. 
Tiie  foremost  gathered  near  their  gallant  leaders  ; 
but  the  depth  of  the  descent  into  the  town  and  the 
volumes  of  flame  and  smoke  which  still  issued  from 
the  burning  houses  behind  awed  the  stoutest;  and 
more  than  two-thirds  of  the  storming  column,  irrita- 
ted by  the  destructive  flank  Are,  had  broken  oft'  at 
the  demi-bastion,  to  commence  a  musketry  battle 
with  the  enemy  on  the  rampart.  Meanwhile  the 
shells  from  tiie  Monte  Orgullo  fell  rapidly,  the  de- 
fenders of  the  breach  rallied,  and  with  a  smashing 
musketry  from  the  ruins  and  loopholed  houses  smote 
tlie  head  of  the  column,  while  the  men  in  the  tow- 
ers smote  them  on  tiie  flanks,  and  from  every  quar- 
ter came  showers  of  grape  and  hand-grenades,  tear- 
ing the  ranks  in  a  dreadful  manner. 

Major  Frazer  was  killed  on  the  flaming  ruins,  the 
intrepid  Jones  stood  there  awhile  longer,  amidst  a 
few  heroic  soldiers,  hoping  for  aid  ;  but  none  came, 
and  he  and  those  with  him  v/ere  struck  down.  The 
engineer  Machel  had  been  killed  early,  and  the  men 
bearing  ladders  fell,  or  were  dispersed.  Thus  the 
rear  of  the  column  was  in  absolute  confusion  before 
the  head  was  beaten.  It  was  in  vain  tliat  colonel 
GrenviUa  of  the  thirty-eighth,  colonel  Cameron  of 
the  ninth,  captain  Archimbeau  of  the  Royals,  and 
many  other  regimental  officers,  exerted  themselves 
to  rally  their  discomfited  troops  and  refill  the  breach; 
it  was  in  vain  that  lieutenant  Campbell,  breaking 
through  the  tumultuous  crowd,  with  the  survivors  of 
his  chosen  detachment,  mounted  the  ruins  ;  twice  he 
ascended,  twice  he  was  wounded,  and  all  around  him 
died.  The  Royals  endeavouring  to  retire,  got  in- 
termixed with  the  thirty-eighth  and  with  some 
companies  of  the  ninth,  which  had  unsuccessfully 
endeavoured  to  pass  them,  and  get  to  the  lesser 
breach.  Then  swayed  by  ditferent  impulses,  and 
pent  up  in  the  narrow  way  between  the  hornwork 
and  the  river,  the  mass  reeling  to  and  fro,  could 
neither  advance  nor  go  back,  until  the  shells  and 
musketry,  constantly  plied  both  in  front  and  flank, 
had  thinned  the  concourse,  and  the  trenches  were 
regained  in  confusion.  At  daylight  a  truce  was 
agreed  to  for  an  hour,  during  which  the  French, 
wlio  had  already  humanely  removed  the  gallant 
Jones  and  the  other  wounded  men  from  the  breach, 
now  carried  ofl"  the  more  distant  sufferers,  lest  they 
should  be  drowned  by  the  rising  of  the  tide. 

Five  officers  of  engineers,  including  sir  Richnrd 
Fletcher,  and  forty-four  officers  of  the  line,  with  five 
hundred  and  twenty  men,  had  been  killed,  wounded, 
or  made  prisoners  in  this  assault,  the  failure  of 
which  Wis  sigual,  yet  the  causes  were  obvious,  and 
miy  be  classed  thus: 

1st.  Deviation  from  the  original  project  of  siege, 
and  from  lord  Wellington's  instructions  ; 

2nd.  Bad  arrangements  of  detail  ; 

3rd.  Want  of  vigour  in  the  execution. 

In  respect  of  the  first,  lord  Wellington,  having 
visited  the  Chofre  trenches  on  the  2"2d,  confirmed 
his  former  approval  of  Smith's  plan,  and  gave  that 


officer  final  directions  for  the  attach  finishing  thus, 
"  Fair  daylight  must  be  taken  for  the  r.ufsaw/<."  I'hese 
instructions  and  their  emphatic  termination  were 
repeated  by  major  Smith  in  the  proper  quarter;  but 
they  were  not  followed  ;  no  lodgment  was  made  on 
the  hornwork,  the  defences  were  nearly  entire  both 
in  front  and  flank,  and  the  assault  was  made  in 
darkness.  Major  Smith  had  also,  by  calculation 
and  by  consultations  with  the  fishermen,  ascertained 
that  the  ebb  of  tide  would  serve  exactly  at  daybreak 
on  the  24th  ;  but  the  assault  was  made  on  the  25th, 
and  then  before  daylight,  when  the  water  being  too 
high,  contracted  the  ground,  increased  the  obstacles, 
and  forced  the  assaulting  column  to  march  on  a  nar- 
row front  and  a  long  line,  making  an  uneasy  pro- 
gress, and  trickling  onwards,  instead  of  dashing 
with  a  broad  surge  against  the  breach.  In  fine,  the 
rules  of  art  being  neglected,  and  no  extraordinary 
resource  substituted,  the  operation  failed. 

The  troops  filed  out  of  the  long  narrow  trenches 
in  the  night,  a  tedious  operation,  and  were  imme- 
diately exposed  to  a  fire  of  grape  from  their  own 
batteries  on  the  Chofres.  This  fire,  intended  to 
keep  down  that  of  the  enemy,  should  have  ceased 
when  the  globe  of  compression  was  sprung  in  the 
drain  ;  but,  owing  to  the  darkness  and  the  noise,  the 
exjdosion  could  neither  be  seen  nor  heard.  The  ef- 
fect of  it,  however,  drove  the  enemy  from  the  horn- 
work, the  Portuguese  on  that  side  advanced  to  the 
ditch,  and  a  vigorous  escalade  would  probably  have 
succeeded,  but  they  had  no  ladders.  Again  the 
stormers  of  the  great  breach  marched  first,  filling 
up  the  way,  and  rendering  the  second  breach,  as 
major  Smith  had  foretold,  useless,  and  the  ladder- 
bearers  never  got  to  their  destination.  The  attack 
was  certainly  ill-digested,  and  there  was  a  neglect 
of  moral  influence,  followed  by  its  natural  conse- 
quence, want  of  vigour  in  execution. 

The  deferring  of  the  assault  from  the  24th  to  the 
25th,  expressly  because  the  breach  was  too  difficult, 
rendered  the  troops  uneasy ;  they  suspected  some 
hidden  danger,  and  in  this  mood  emerging  from  the 
trenches,  they  were  struck  by  the  fire  of  their  own 
batteries  ;  then  wading  through  deep  pools  of  water, 
or  staggering  in  the  dark  over  slippery  rocks,  and 
close  under  the  enemy's  flanking  works,  whence 
every  shot  told  with  fatal  effect,  how  could  they  man- 
ifest their  natural  conquering  energy?  It  is  possible 
that  a  second  and  more  vigorous  assault  on  the  great 
breach  might  have  been  effected  by  a  recognized 
leader :  but  no  general  or  staff-officer  went  out  of 
rhe  trenches  with  the  troops,  and  the  isolated  exer- 
tions of  the  regimental  officers  were  unavailing. 
Nor  were  there  wanting  other  sinister  influences. 
•(General  Oswald  had  in  the  councils  earnestly  and 
justly  urged  the  dangers  arising  from  the  irregular 
mode  of  attack  ;  but  this  anticipation  of  ill-success, 
in  which  other  officers  of  rank  joined,  was  freely  ex- 
pressed out  of  council,  and  it  is  said  even  in  the 
hearing  of  tlie  troops,  abating  that  daring  confidence 
which  victory  loves. 

Lord  Wellington  repaired  immediately  to  San  Se- 
bastian. The  causes  of  the  failure  were  apparent, 
and  he  would  have  renewed  the  attack,  but  wanting 
ammunition,  deferred  it  uniil  the  powder  and  addi- 
tional ordnance,  which  he  had  written  for  to  F^ng- 
land,  as  early  as  the  2Cth  of  June,  should  arrive. 
The  next  day  other  events  caused  him  to  resort  to  a 
blockade,  and  the  battering  train  was  transported  tc 
Passages,  two  guns  and  two  howitzers  only  being 
retained  on  the  Chofres  and  the  Monte  Olia.  Tliia 
operation  was  completed  in  the  night  of  'Jie  26th; 
but  at  daybreak  the  garrison  made  a  sally  from  the 
hornwork,  surprised  the  trenches,  ar.d  swept  ofl"  two 


616 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XXI* 


hundred  Portuguese  and  thirty  British  soldiers.  To  ' 
avoid  a  rt-petition  of  tiiis  disaster,  the  guards  of  the  ' 
trenches  were  concentrated  in  the  left  parallel,  and 
oatrols  only  were  sent  out,  yet  one  of  those  also  was 
cut  off  on  the  1st  of  August.  Thus  terminated  the 
tirst  part  of  the  siege  of  San  Sebastian,  in  which 
the  allies  lost  thirteen  hundred  soldiers  and  seamen, 
exclusive  of  Spaniards  during  Mendizabel's  blockade. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Soult  appointed  the  emperor's  lieutenant — Arrives  at  Bavonne 
— Joseph  goes  to  Pan? — Sketch  of  Jsapolfon's  poliliral  anil 
n)ilitary  situation — His  greatness  of  mind — Soiiit's  aciivit\  — 
Theatre  of  operations  described — Soult  resolves  to  succour 
Famieluna — Relative  positions  and  numbers  of  the  contend- 
ing armies  described. 

The  battle  of  Vittoria  was  fought  on  the  21st  of 
June. 

The  1st  of  July,  marshal  Soult,  under  a  decree  is- 
sued at  Dresden,  succeeded  Joseph  as  lieutenant  to 
the  emperor,  who  thus  showed  how  little  his  mind 
had  been  affected  by  his  brother's  accusations. 

The  12th,  Soult,  travelling  with  surprising  expe- 
dition, assumed  the  command  of  the  armies  of  the 
"  north,"  the  "  centre  "  and  the  "  south,"  now  reor- 
ganized in  one  body,  called  "  the  army  -'f  Spain." 
And  he  had  secret  orders  to  put  Josep  forcibly 
aside  if  necessary  ;  but  that  monarch  voluntarily 
retired  from  the  army. 

A*;  this  period,  general  Paris  remained  at  Jaca, 
as  belonging  to  Suchet's  command ;  but  Clauzel  had 
entered  France,  and  the  "army  of  Spain,"  rein- 
forced from  the  interior,  was  composed  of  nine  divis- 
ions of  infantry,  a  reserve,  and  two  regular  divisions 
of  cavalry,  besides  the  light  horsemen  attached  to 
the  infantry.  Following  the  imperial  muster-rolls, 
this  army,  including  the  garrisons  and  thirteen 
German,  Italian,  and  Spanish  battalions  not  be- 
longing to  the  organization,  amounted  to  one  hun- 
dred and  fourteen  thousand  men  ;  and  as  the  armies 
of  Catalonia  and  of  Aragon  numbered,  at  the  same 
period,  above  sixty-six  thousand,  the  whole  force  still 
employed  against  Spain  exceeded  one  hundred  and 
eighty  thousand  men  with  twenty  thousand  horses  ; 
and  of  this  number  one  hundred  and  fifty-six  thou- 
Band  were  present  under  arms;  while  in  (Germany 
and  Poland  above  seven  hundred  thousand  French 
soldiers  were  in  activity. 

Such  great  forces,  guided  by  Napoleon,  seemed 
sufficient  to  defy  the  world,  but  moral  power,  which 
he  has  himself  described  as  constituting  three- 
fourths  of  military  strength,  that  power  which  puny* 
essayists,  declaiming  for  their  hour  against  the  ge- 
nius of  warriors,  are  unable  to  comprehend,  al- 
though by  far  the  most  important  part  of  the  art 
which  they  decry,  was  wanting.  One-half  of  this 
force,  organized  in  peace  and  setting  forth  in  hope 
at  the  boginning  of  a  war,  would  have  enabled  Na- 
poleon to  conquer ;  but  now  near  tlic  close  of  a  ter- 
rible strugirle,  with  a  declining  fate  and  the  nation- 
al confidence  in  his  fortune  and  genius  shaken, 
although  that  genius  was  never  more  surpassingly 
displayed,  his  military  power  was  a  vast  but  un- 
sound machine.  The  public  mind  was  bewildered 
by  'he  intricacy  and  greatness  of  combinations,  the 
fu'l  scope  of  vvliich  lie  alone  could  see  clearly;  and 
generals  and  ministers  doubted  and  feared  when 
they  should  have  supported  him,  neglecting  their 
duty  or  coldly  executing  his  orders  when  their  zeal 
should  have  redoubled.  The  unity  of  impulse  so 
•asential  to  success  was  thus  lost,  and  his  numer- 


ous armies  carried  not  with  them  proportionate 
strength.  To  have  struggled  with  liope  uiidur  such 
astounding  difficulties,  was  scarcely  to  be  expected 
from  ttie  greatest  minds,  but  like  the  emperor,  to 
calculate  and  combine  the  most  stupendous  ehorts 
with  calmness  and  accuracy,  to  seize  every  lavcura- 
ble  chance  with  unerring  rapidity,  to  sustain  evt-ry 
reverse  with  undisturbed  constancy,  never  urged  to 
rashness  by  despair,  yet  enterprising  to  tlie  utmost 
verge  of  daring  consistent  with  reason,  was  a  dis- 
play of  intellectual  greatness  so  surpassing,  that  it 
is  not  without  justice  Napoleon  has  been  called,  in 
reference  as  well  to  past  ages  as  to  the  present,  the 
foremost  of  mankind. 

The  suddenness,  as  weU  as  the  completeness,  of 
the  destruction  caused  by  the  snows  of  liussia,  had 
shattered  the  emperor's  military  and  political  sys- 
tem, and  the  broken  parts  of  the  former,  scattered 
widely,  were  useless  until  he  could  again  bind  them 
together.  To  effect  this  he  rushed  with  a  raw  army 
into  the  midst  of  Germany,  for  his  hope  was  to  ob- 
tain by  celerity  a  rallying  point  for  iiis  veterans, 
whp  having  survived  the  Russian  winter  and  the 
succeeding  pestilence,  were  widely  dispersed.  His 
first  effort  was  successful,  but  without  good  cavalry 
victory  cannot  be  pushed  I'ar,  and  the  practised  horse- 
men of  France  had  nearly  disappeared;  their  suc- 
cessors, badly  mounted  and  less  skilful,  were  too  lew 
and  too  weak,  and  thus  extraordinary  exertion  was 
required  from  soldiers  whose  youth  and  inexperience 
rendered  them  unfit  even  for  the  ordinary  hardships 
of  war. 

The  measure  of  value  for  Wellington's  campaign 
is  thus  attained,  for  if  Joseph  had  opposed  him  with 
only  mooerate  ability  and  had  avoided  a  great  battle, 
not  less  than  iiftj'  thousand  veterans  could  have  been 
drawn  off  to  reinforce  and  give  stability  to  the  young 
soldiers  in  Germany.  On  the  side  of  Spain  those 
veterans  were  indeed  still  numerous,  but  the  spirit 
of  the  French  people  beiiind  them,  almost  worn  out 
by  victory,  was  now  abashed  by  defeat,  and  even  the 
military  men  who  had  acquired  grandeur  and  riclies 
beyond  their  hopes,  were  with  few  exceptions  averse 
to  further  toil.  Napoleon's  astonishing  firmness  of 
mind  was  understood  by  few  in  high  stations,  shared 
by  fewer;  and  many  were  the  traitors  to  him  and  to 
France  and  to  the  glories  of  both.  However,  his 
power  was  still  enormous,  and  wherever  he  led  iu 
person  his  brave  and  faithful  soldiers,  fighting  with 
the  true  instinct  of  patriotism,  conquered.  Where 
he  was  not  their  iron  hardihood  abated. 

Marshal  Soult  was  one  of  the  few  men  whose  in- 
defatigable energy  rendered  them  worthy  lieutenants 
of  the  emperor;  and  with  singular  zeal,  vigour  and 
ability,  he  now  served.  His  troops,  nominally  abovi 
one  hundred  thousand  men,  ninety-seven  thousan 
being  present  under  arms,  with  eighty-six  pieces  of 
artillery,  were  not  all  available  for  field  o])erations. 
The  garrisons  of  Pampeluna,  San  Sebastian,  Saiito- 
na,  and  Rayonne,  together  with  the  foreign  battal- 
ions, absorbed  seventeen  thousand;  and  niot^t  of  the 
latter  had  orders  to  regain  their  own  countries  with 
a  view  to  form  the  new  levies.  The  permanent  "  ar- 
my of  Spain"  furnished  therefore  only  seventy-seven 
thousand  five  luindred  men  present  under  arms,  seven 
thousand  of  which  were  cavalrv,  and  its  condition 
was  not  satisfactory.  The  people  on  the  frontier 
were  flying  from  the  allies,  the  military  adiginistra- 
tion  was  disorganized,  and  the  recent  disasters  had 
discouraged  tlie  soldiers  and  deteriorated  their  dis- 
cipline. Under  these  circumstances  Soult  was  de- 
sirous of  some  delay  to  secure  his  base  and  restore 
order  ere  he  attempted  to  regain  the  offensive,  but 
his  instruciions  on  that  point  were  imperative. 


I813.J 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


617 


Napoleon's  system  was  perfcctly  adapted  for  great 
efforts,  civil  or  military  ;  but  so  rapid  had  been  lord 
Wellington's  advance  Irom  Portugal,  so  decisive  his 
operations,  tliat  tiie  resources  of  France  were  in  a 
certain  degree  paralysed,  and  tlie  army  still  reeled 
and  rocked  from  the  blows  it  iiad  received.  liay- 
onne,  a  fortress  of  no  great  strength  in  itself,  had  been 
entirely  neglected,  and  the  arming  and  provisioning 
that  and  other  places  was  indispensable.  The  res- 
toration of  an  intrenciied  camp  originally  traced  by 
Vauban  to  cover  Hayonnc  followed,  and  the  enforce- 
ment of  discij)line,  the  removal  of  the  immense  train 
of  Spanish  families,  civil  administrators,  and  other 
wasteful  followers  of  .Joseph's  court,  the  arrange- 
ment of  a  general  system  for  supply  of  money  and 
provisions,  aided  by  judicious  efforts  to  stimulate  tlie 
civil  authorities  and  excite  the  national  spirit,  were 
aiTiongst  the  lirst  indications  that  a  great  commttiul- 
cr  was  in  the  tiekl.  The  sohiiers'  coviJidence  soon 
'cvivtid,  and  some  leading  mei-chants  of  Jkiyonne 
zealously  seconded  the  general ;  but  tlie  people  of 
the  south  were  generally  more  inclined  to  avoid  the 
burden  of  deteading  their  country  than  to  answer 
appeals  to  tlieir  patriotism. 

On  the  14lh,  8oult  examined  the  line  of  military 
positions,  and  ordered  lieille,  who  then  occupied  the 
passes  of  Vera  and  Ecliallar,  to  prepare  pontoons 
for  throwing  two  bridges  over  tlie  IJidassoa  at  Biri- 
atti.  That  gonerul,  as  we  have  se6n,  was  driven 
from  those  passes  the  next  day,  but  he  i)rci)ared  his 
bridges  ;  a,nd  such  was  Soult's  activity  that  on  the 
16th  all  the  combinations  for  a  gigaiuic  oMensive 
movement  M^orc  digested,  the  mear.s  of  executing  it 
rapidly  advancing,  and  orders  were  issued  I'or  the 
preliminary  dispositums. 

At  this  time  the  French  army  was  divided  into 
thruc  corps  of  battle,  and  a  reserve.  Clauzel,  com- 
manding the  left  wing,  was  at  St.  .lean  Pied  de  Port 
and  in  communication,  by  the  French  frontier,  with 
general  Paris  at  .laca.  Drouet,  count  d'Erlon,  com- 
Riandiiig  iIjc  centre,  occupied  the  heights  near  Es- 
pelctte  and  Aiuhoa,  v/ith  an  advanced  guard  behind 
Urdax.  General  lieille,  commanding  tlie  right  wing, 
was  in  position  on  the  mountains  overlooking  \'era 
from  the  side  of  France.  The  reserve,  under  V'il- 
Ihiio,  con^jjrising  a  separate  body  of  light  horsemen 
and  the  foreign  battalions,  guarded  the  banks  of  the 
liidassoa  from  the  mouth  upwards  to  Irun,  at  which 
place  the  stone  bridge  was  destroyed.  The  division 
of  lieavy  cavalry  under  Treilhard,  and  that  of  light 
cavalry  under  Pierre  Sonlt,  tlie  marshal's  brother, 
were  on  the  banks  of  the  Nive  and  Adour. 

The  counter-disposition  of  the  allies  was  as  fol- 
lows : 

Byng's  brigade  of  Britisli  infantry,  detached  from 
the  sec-fitid  divisicoi  oiid  reinRirccd  by  ^lorilio's  Sjjan- 
iards,  was  or;  the  extreme  riglit.  These  troops  had 
early  in  the  month  driven  the  French  from  the  vil- 
lage oC  V;tl  Carlos  in  the  valley  of  tiiat  name,  and 
had  foraged  the  French  territory,  but  iinding  no  good 
permanent  position,  retreated  again  to  the  rocks  in 
front  of  the  passes  of  Roncevalles  and  Ibaneta. 

On  the  left  of  fiyng,  Campbell's  brigade,  detached 
from  Hamilt.on's  Portuguese  division,  was  posted  in 
the  Aldiiides  and  supiiorteu  by  geuera.1  Cole,  who 
was  with  tiie  fourth  division  at  Viscayret  in  the  val- 
ley of  Urroz. 

On  the  left  of  Campbell,  general  Hill  defended  the 
Bastau  witii  the  remainder  of  the  second  division, 
and  wilh  Ilajailton's  Portuguese,  now  commanded 
by  Sylveira,  condc  d'Amarante.  Picton,  with  the 
third  division,  was  stationed  at  Olaguc  as  a  reserve 
to  those  trt]ops  and  to  Cole 

On  the  left  of  Hill,  the  seventh  and  lig*'^;  division 


occupied  a  chain  of  mountains  running  by  Ecliallar 
to  \  era,  and  behind  them  at  the  town  of  St.  Estevan 
was  posted  the  sixth  divisi(,n. 

Longa's  Spaniards  continued  the  line  of  dt-fence 
from  Vera  to  general  Ciron's  position,  which  extend- 
ing along  tJie  mountains  bordering  tin;  Jiidi.ssna  to 
the  sea,  crossed  the  great  road  of  Irun.  IJciiissd  (Ji- 
ron  was  the  besieging  army  under  sir  Tiiomas  Cra- 
ham. 

Thirty-six  pieces  of  field  artillery,  and  some  re- 
giments of  British  and  Portuguese  cavnlrv,  were 
with  the  right  wing  and  centre,  but  the  bulk  of  i;,e 
horsemen  and  the  heavy  guns  were  behind  the  moun- 
tains, chieily  about  Tatitlla.  The  great  hospitals 
W'cre  in  A'ittoria,  the  commissariat  depots  were  prin- 
cipally  on  the  coast,  and  to  suj'ply  the  troops  in  the 
mountains  was  exceedingly  dillicuit  and  onerous. 

Henry  O'Donel,  conde  de  I'Abispal,  blockaded. 
Pamiieluna  with  the  Andaiusian  army  of  reserve, 
and  Carlos  d'Espana's  division  was  on  tlie  march  to 
join  him.  jMina,  .Julian  Sanchez,  Duran,  Empeci- 
nado,  (loyan  and  some  smaller  bands,  were  on  the 
side  of  Zaragoza  and  Daroca,  cutting  the  communi- 
cation between  Soult  and  Suchet,  and  the  latter, 
thinking  Aragon  lost,  was,  as  we  have  seen,  tailing 
back  uj)on  Catalonia. 

1'he  whole  force  under  lord  Wellington's  immc 
diate  command,  that  is  to  say  in  Navarre  and  (iui  ' 
puscoa,  was  certainly  above  one  hundred  tlionsant. 
men,  of  which  the  Anglo-Portuguese  furnisheii  fiftv- 
scven  thousand  present  under  arms,  seven  thou.-and 
being  cavalry;  but  the  S]ianish  regulars  under  Gi- 
ron,  L'Abispal  and  Carlos  d'Esiiana,  including  I  on- 
ga's  division  and  some  of  Jlendizabal's  army,  scarce- 
ly amounted  to  twenty-five  thousand.  According  to 
the  respective  muster-rolls,  the  troops  in  line  actual- 
ly under  arms  and  facing  each  other  were,  of  tlio 
allies  about  eighty-two  thousand,  of  the  French 
about  seventy-eight  thousand  ;  but  as  the  rolls  cf  the 
latter  include  every  man  and  officer  of  all  arms  be- 
longing  to  the  organization,  and  tlie'l'ritish  and  Por- 
tuguese rolls  so  quoted,  would  furnish  between  ten 
and  twelve  thousand  additional  combatants,  the 
French  force  must  be  reduced,  or  th.e  allies  augment- 
ed in  that  proportion.  This  surplus  was  however 
now  comjjcnsated  by  the  foreign  battalions  tempora- 
rily attached  to  Soult's  army,  and  by  the  numerous 
national  guards,  all  mountaineers,  fierce,  warlike 
and  very  useful  as  guiueis.  In  other:  respects  lord 
Wellington  stood  at  a  disadvantage. 

The  theatre  of  operation  was  a  trapezoid,  with 
sides  from  forty  to  sixty  miles  in  length,  and  having 
Bayonne,  St.  .lean  Pied  de  Port,  San  Sebastian  and 
Pampeluna,  all  firtresses,  in  possession  of  the  French 
at  the  angles.  The  interior,  broken  and  tormented 
by  dreadful  mountains,  narrow  craggy  passes,  ('<cp 
water-courses,  preci))ices  and  forests,  would  at  first 
sight  appear  a  wilderness  which  no.  military  ccin- 
binations  could  embrace,  and  suscejitible  only  of  ir- 
regular and  parti.'-an  operations,  liut  the  great  spi- 
nal ridge  of  the  Pyrenees  furnishes  a  clue  to  the  la- 
byrinth of  hills  and  valleys.  Running  diagonally 
across  the  quadrilateral,  it  separated  Bayonne,  St 
Jean  Pied  de  Port  and  San  Sebastian  from  Pampelu- 
na, and  thus  the  portion  of  the  allied  army  which 
more  especially  belonged  to  the  blockade  of  I'ampe- 
luna,  was  in  a  manner  cut  off  from  that  whicli  be- 
longed to  the  siege  of  San  Sebastian.  They  were 
disfinct  armies,  each  having  its  particular  object, 
and  the  only  direct  communication  between  them 
was  the  great  road  r.inning  bel.iud  the  mountania 
from  Tolosa,  by  Ynir/.un.  to  Pampeluna.  The  ci-n- 
tre  of  the  allies  was  indeed  an  army  of  succour  at  d 
connexion,  but  of  necessity  very  much  scutiorcd,  and 


618 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   Vi 


[Book  XXI. 


witl<  lateral  commuTiications  so  few,  difficult  and  in- 
direct, as  to  prevent  any  unity  of  movement;  nor 
could  general  Hill's  corps  move  at  all  until  an  attack 
was  decidedly  pronounced  against  one  of  tiie  extrem- 
ities, lest  tiic  most  direct  gun-road  to  Pampeluna 
which  it  covered  siiould  be  unwarily  opened  to  tlie 
enemy.  In  short,  the  French  general,  taking  the 
otidnsive,  could  by  beaten  roads  concentrate  against 
any  part  of  the  English  general's  line,  which,  neces- 
sarily a  passively  defensive  one,  followed  an  irregu- 
lar trace  of  more  than  fifty  miles  of  mountains. 

Wollingion  having  his  battering  train  and  stores 
a'ai  at  >San  .Sebastian,  which  was  also  nearer  and 
more  accessible  to  the  enemy  than  Pampeluna,  made 
his  army  lean  towards  that  side.  His  left  wing,  in- 
cluding tiie  army  of  siege,  was  twenty-one  thousand 
Btrong,  with  singularly  strong  positions  of  defence, 
and  the  centre,  about  twenty-four  tliousand  strong, 
could  in  two  marches  unite  with  the  left  wing  to 
cover  the  seige  or  fall  upon  the  flanks  of  an  enemy 
advancing  by  the  high  road  of  Irun  ;  but  three  days 
or  more  were  required  by  those  troops  to  concentrate 
for  the  security  of  the  blockade  on  the  right.  Soult 
however  judged  that  no  decisive  result  would  attend 
a  direct  movement  upon  San  Sebastian  ;  because 
Guipuscoa  was  exhausted  of  provisions,  and  the  cen- 
tre of  the  allies  could  fall  on  his  flank  before  he 
readied  Ernani,  which,  his  attack  in  front  failing, 
would  place  iiim  in  a  dangerous  position.  Moreover 
by  means  of  his  sea  communications  he  knew  that 
San  Sebastian  was  not  in  extremity  ;  but  he  had  no 
communication  with  Pampeluna,  and  feared  its  fall. 
Wherefore  he  resolved  to  operate  by  his  left 

Profiting  by  the  roads  leading  to  St.  Jean  Pied  de 
Port,  and  covering  iiis  movement  by  the  Nivelle  and 
Nive  rivers  and  by  the  positions  of  his  centre,  he 
hoped  to  gather  on  Wellington's  right  quicker  than 
that  general  could  gather  to  oppose  him,  and  thus 
compensating  by  numbers  the  disadvantage  of  assail- 
ing mountain  positions  force  a  way  to  Pampeluna. 
That  fortress  once  succoured,  he  designed  to  seize 
the  road  of  Yrurzun,  and  keeping  in  mass  either  fall 
upon  the  separated  divisions  of  the  centre  in  detail 
as  they  descended  from  the  hills,  or  operate  on  the 
rear  of  the  force  besieging  San  Sebastian,  while  a 
corps  of  observation,  which  he  proposed  to  leave  on 
the  lower  Bidassoa,  menaced  it  in  front  and  followed 
it  in  retreat.  The  siege  of  San  Sebastian,  the  block- 
ade of  Pampeluna,  and  probably  that  of  Santona, 
would  be  tiius  raised,  and  the  French  army,  united 
in  an  abundant  country,  and  its  communication  with 
Snchct  secured,  would  be  free  either  to  co-operate 
with  that  marshal  cr  to  press  its  own  attack. 

In  this  view,  and  to  mislead  lord  Wellington  by 
vexing  his  right  simultaneously  with  the  construc- 
tion of  the  bridges  against  his  left.  Soult  wrote  to 
general  Paris,  desiring  him  to  march  when  time 
suited  from  .lacn  by  the  higlicr  vp.lleys  towards  Aviz 
or  Sanguesa,  to  drive  the  partisans  from  that  side 
and  join  the  left  of  the  army  when  it  should  have 
reached  Pampeluna.  Mennwhile  Clauzel  was  direct- 
ed to  repair  the  roads  in  his  own  front,  to  push 
the  heads  of  liis  columns  towards  ih.e  passes  of  Ron- 
cevalles,  and  by  sending  a  strong  detachment  into 
the  Val  de  Baigorri,  towards  the  lateral  pass  of 
Yspegui,  to  menace  Hills's  flank  which  was  at  that 
pass,  and  the  front  of  Campbell's  brigade  in  the 
Al'luides. 

On  tiie  2nth,  Reille's  troops  on  the  heights  above 
V^era  and  Sarre,  being  cautiously  relieved  by  Villat- 
)e,  marched  throngii  Cambo  towards  St.  Jean  Pied  de 
Port.  They  were  to  reach  the  latter  early  on  the 
22d,  and  on  that  day  also  the  two  divisions  of  caval- 
ry and  the  park  of  artillery  were  to  be  concentrated 


at  the  same  place.  D'Erlon  with  the  centre  mean- 
while still  held  his  positions  at  Espelette,  Ainhor.e 
or  Ainlioa,  and  Urdax,  thus  covering  and  masking 
tiie  great  movements  taking  place  behind. 

Villatte,  who  including  the  foreign  battalions  had 
eighteen  thousand  troops  on  the  rolls,  lurnishing 
about  ritteen  tliousand  sabres  and  bayonets,  remained 
in  observation  on  the  Bidassoa.  If  threatened  by 
superior  forces  he  was  to  retire  slowly  and  in  inasa 
upon  tlie  intrenched  camp  commeiued  at  Bayonne, 
yet  halting  successively  on  the  jjositions  of  Borde- 
gain  in  front  of  St.  Jean  de  Luz,  and  on  the  heights 
of  Bidart  in  rear  of  that  town.  He  was  especially 
directed  to  show  only  French  troops  at  the  advanced 
posts,  and  if  the  assailants  made  a  point  with  a  small 
corps,  to  drive  them  vigorously  over  the  Bidassoa 
again.  But  if  the  allies  should,  in  consequence  of 
Soult's  operations  against  their  right,  retire,  Vil 
lotte  was  to  relieve  San  Sebastian  and  to  follow 
them  briskly  by  Tolosa. 

Rapidity  was  of  vital  importance  to  the  French 
general,  but  heavy  and  continued  rains  swelled  the 
streams,  and  ruined  the  roads  in  the  deep  country 
between  Bayonne  and  the  hills  ;  the  head-quarters, 
which  should  have  arrived  at  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port 
on  the  20th,  only  reached  Olhonce,  a  few  miles  short 
of  that  place,  the  21st;  and  Reille's  troops,  unable 
to  make  way  at  all  by  Cambo,  took  the  longer  road 
of  Bayonne.  The  cavalry  was  retarded  in  like  man- 
ner, and  the  whole  army,  men  and  horses,  were  worn 
down  by  the  severity  of  the  marches.  Two  days 
were  thus  lost,  but  on  the  24t]i,  more  than  sixty 
thousand  fighting  men,  including  cavalry,  national 
guards  and  gendarmes,  with  sixty- six  pieces  of  ar- 
tillery, were  assembled  to  force  the  passes  of  Ron- 
cevalles  and  Maya.  The  main  road  leading  to  the 
former  was  repaired,  three  hundred  sets  of  bullocks 
were  provided  to  draw  the  guns  up  tlie  mountain, 
and  the  national  guards  of  the  frontier  on  tlie  leil 
were  ordered  to  assemble  in  the  night  on  the  heights 
of  Yropil  to  be  reinforced  on  the  morning  of  the 
25th,  by  detachments  of  regular  troops,  with  a  view 
to  vex  and  turn  the  right  of  the  allies,  which  ex- 
tended to  the  foundry  of  Orbaiceta. 

Such  were  Soult's  first  dispositions,  but  as  moun- 
tain warfare  is  complicated  in  the  extreme,  it  will 
be  well  to  consider  more  in  detail  the  relative  posi- 
tions and  objects  of  the  hostile  forces  and  the  nature 
of  the  country. 

It  has  been  already  stated  that  the  great  spine  of 
the  hills,  trending  westward,  ran  diagonally  across 
the  theatre  of  operations.  From  this  spine  huge 
ridges  shot  out  on  either  hand,  and  the  communica- 
tions between  the  valleys  thus  formed  on  both  sides 
of  the  main  chain  passed  over  certain  comparative- 
ly low  places,  called  "co/s,"  by  the  French,  and 
puerlns  by  the  Spaniards  'I'he  Bastan,  the  Val  Car- 
los, and  the  Val  de  Baigorri,  the  upper  part  of  which 
is  divided  into  the  Alduides  and  the  Val  de  Ayra, 
were  on  the  French  side  of  the  great  chain  ;  on  the 
Spanish  side  were  the  val.eys  of  the  Ahescoa  or  Or- 
baiceta, the  valley  of  Iscua  or  Roncevalles,  the  val- 
ley of  T'rroz,  the  Val  de  Zubiri,  and  the  valley  of 
Lanz,  the  two  latter  leading  down  directly  upon 
Pampeluna,  which  stands  within  two  miles  of  the 
junction  of  their  waters.  Such  being  the  relative 
situations  of  the  valleys,  the  disi)Osition  and  force 
of  the  armies  shall  now  be  traced  from  left  to  right 
of  the  French,  and  from  right  to  left  of  the  allies. 
But  first  it  must  be  observed  that  the  main  chain, 
throwing  as  it  were  a  shoulder  forward  from  Ronce- 
valles towards  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port,  placed  the  en- 
trance to  the  Sfianish  valley  of  Anescoa  or  Orbairo 
ta,  in  the  power  of  Soult,  who  could  thjs,  by  Yropil,. 


1813.1 


NAPIER'S   PEN    NSULAR  WAR. 


619 


turn  the  extreme  right  of  ins  adversary  with  detach- 
in«nts,  although  not  vvitii  an  army 

f^al  Carlos. — Two  issues  led  from  this  vallc}'  over 
»ne  main  ciiain,  namely,  the  Ibaneta  and  Mendichuri 
passes;  and  there  was  also  the  lateral  pass  of  Ata- 
losti  lending  into  the  Alduides,  all  comprised  within 
a  space  of  two  or  three  miles. 

The  high  road  fror.;  f?t.  Jean  Pied  de  Port  to  Pam- 
peluna,  ascending  the  left-hand  ridge  or  boundary  of 
Val  Carlos,  runs  along  the  crest  until  it  joins  the 
superior  cliain  of  mountains,  and  then  along  tiie 
6umn\it  of  tliat  also  until  it  reaches  the  pass  of  Iba- 
neta, whence  it  descends  to  lloncevalles.  Ibaneta 
may  therefore  be  called  the  Spanish  end  of  the  pass  : 
but  it  is  also  a  pass  in  itself,  because  a  narrow  road, 
leading  through  Arnegui  and  the  village  of  Val  Car- 
los, ascends  directly  to  Ibaneta  and  falls  into  the 
main  road  behind  it. 

Clauzel's  three  divisions  of  infantry,  all  the  artil- 
lery and  the  cavalry,  were  formed  in  two  columns  in 
front  of  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port.  The  head  of  one 
was  placed  on  some  heights  above  Arnegui  about 
two  miles  from  the  village  of  Val  Carlos;  the  head 
of  t!ie  other  at  the  Venta  de  Orrisson,  on  tlie  main 
road  and  within  two  miles  of  the  remarkable  rocks 
of  Chateau  Pifion,  a  little  beyond  which  one  narrow 
way  descended  on  the  right  to  the  village  of  Val 
Carlos,  and  another  on  the  left  to  the  foundry  of  Or- 
baiceta. 

On  the  right-hand  boundary  of  Val  Carlos,  near 
the  rock  of  Ayrola,  Reille's  divisions  were  concen- 
trated, with  orders  to  ascend  that  rock  at  daylight, 
and  march  by  the  crest  of  the  ridge  towards  a  cul- 
minant point  of  the  great  chain  called  the  Lindouz, 
which  gained,  ReiUe  was  to  push  detachments 
through  the  passes  of  Ibaiieta  and  iVIendichuri  to 
the  villages  of  Roncevalles  and  Espinal.  He  was 
at  the  same  time,  to  seize  the  passes  of  Sahorgain 
and  Urtiaga  immediately  on  his  right,  and  even  ap- 
proach th'j  more  distant  passes  of  Ilenecabal  and 
Bellate,  thus  closing  the  issues  from  the  Alduides, 
and  menacing  those  from  the  Bastan. 

f'^al  de  Ayra ;  the  Alduides;  Val  de  Baignrri. — 
The  ridge  of  Ayrola,  at  the  foot  of  which  Reille's 
troops  were  posted,  separates  Val  Carlos  from  these 
Valleys,  wliich  must  be  designated  by  the  general 
name  of  the  Alduides  for  tlie  upper  part,  and  the 
Val  de  Baigorri  for  the  lower.  The  issues  from  the 
Alduides  over  the  great  chain  towards  Spain  were 
the  passes  of  Sahorgain  and  Urtiaga;  and  there  was 
also  a  road  running  from  the  village  of  Alduides 
through  the  Atalosti  pass  to  the  Ibafieta,  a  distance 
of  eight  miles,  by  which  general  Campbell's  brigade 
cornmunicatad  with  and  could  join  Byng  and  Mo- 
rillo. 

Bastan. — This  district,  including  the  valley  of 
Lerins  and  the  Cinco  Villas,  is  separated  from  the 
Alduides  and  Val  de  Baigorri  by  the  lofty  mountain 
of  La  Houssa,  on  which  the  national  guards  of  the 
Val  de  Baigorri  and  the  Alduides  were  ordered  to 
assemble  on  the  night  of  the  24th,  and  to  light  fires 
80  as  to  make  it  appear  a  great  body  was  menacing 
the  Bastan  by  that  flank.  The  Bastan  however 
does  not  belong  to  the  same  geographical  system  as 
the  other  valleys.  Instead  of  openinjr  to  tlie  Frencii 
territory,  it  is  entirely  enclosed  with  high  moun- 
tains, and  while  tiie  waters  of  the  Val  (Jarlos,  the 
Alduides,  and  Val  de  Baigorri  run  off  northward  by 
the  Nive,  those  of  the  Bassan  run  off  westward  by 
tlie  Bidassna,  from  which  they  are  separated  by  the 
Mandale,  Commissari,  La  Rhune,  Santa  Barbara, 
Ivantelly,  Atchiola  and  other  mountains. 

The  entrances  to  the  Bastan,  with  reference  to 
the  position  of  the  French  army,  were  by  the  passes 


of  Vera  and  Echellar  on  its  right;  by  the  Col  de 
3Lnya  and  Arietta  passes  in  the  centre  ;  and  on  tiio 
left  by  the  lateral  passes  of  Ysi)egui,  I.orriotta,  and 
Berderez,  which  led  from  the  Val  cie  Baigorri  and  the 
Alduides.  The  issues  over  the  principal  cliain  of 
the  Pyreness  in  the  direct  line  from  the  Maya  en 
trances,  were  the  passes  of  Kenocaijal  and  Bellate; 
the  hrst  leading  into  the  valley  of  Zuhiri,  the  sec- 
ond into  the  valley  of  Lanz.  There  was  also  the 
pass  of  Artesiaga  leading  into  the  Val  de  Zubiri. 
but  it  was  nearly  impracticable,  and  all  the  roada 
through  the  Bastan  were  crossed  by  strong  position? 
dangerous  to  assail. 

The  Col  de  jMaya  comprised  several  passages  in  a 
space  of  four  miles,  all  of  which  were  menaced  by 
D'Erlon  from  Espelette  and  Urdax  ;  and  he  liad 
twenty-one  thousand  men,  furnishing  about  eigh- 
teen thousand  bayonets.  His  communications  with 
Soult  were  maintained  by  cavalry  posts  through  the 
Val  de  Baigorri,  and  his  orders  were  to  attack  the 
allies  when  the  combinations  in  the  Val  Carlos  and 
on  the  Houssa  mountain  should  cause  them  to  aban- 
don the  passes  at  Maya;  but  he  was  especially  di- 
rected to  operate  by  his  left,  so  to  secure  the  passes 
leading  towards  Reille  with  a  view  to  the  concen- 
tration of  the  whole  army.  Thus  if  Hill  retreated 
by  the  pass  of  Bellate,  D'Erlon  was  to  move  by 
Bcrderez  and  the  Alduides  ;  but  if  Hill  retired  upon 
St.  Estevan,  D'Erlon  was  to  move  by  the  pa;-s  of 
Bellate.  Such  being  the  dispositions  of  the  French 
general,  those  of  the  allies  shall  now  be  traced. 

General  Byng  and  Moriilo  guarded  the  passes  in 
front  of  Roncevalles.  Their  combined  force  consist- 
ed of  sixteen  hundred  British  and  from  three  to  four 
thousand  Spaniards.  Byng's  brigade  and  two  Span- 
ish battalions  occupied  the  rocks  of  Altobiscar  on 
the  high  road  facing  Chateau  Pinon;  one  Spnnieh 
battalion  was  at  the  foundry  in  the  valley  of  Orbai- 
ccta  on  their  right;  Moriilo,  with  the  remainder  of 
the  Spaniards,  occupied  the  heights  of  Iroulepe,  on 
the  left  of  the  road  leading  to  the  village  of  Val 
Carlos  and  overlooking  the  nearest  houses  of  that 
straggling  place. 

Tliese  positions,  distant  only  four  and  five  miles 
from  the  French  columns  assembled  at  Venta  de 
Orrisson  and  Arnegui,  were  insecure.  The  ground 
was  indeed  steep  and  difficult  of  access,  but  too  ex- 
tensive ;  moreover,  although  the  passes  led  into  the 
Roncevalles,  that  valley  did  not  lead  direct  to 
Pampeluna ;  the  high  rnad  after  descending  a  few 
miles  turned  to  the  right,  and  crossing  two  ridges 
and  ttie  intervening  valley  of  Urroz  entered  the  val- 
ley of  Zubiri,  down  which  it  was  conducted  to  Pam- 
peluna :  wherefore,  after  passing  Ibaneta  in  retreat, 
the  allied  troops  could  not  avoid  lending  their  right 
flank  to  Reille's  divisions  as  far  as  Viscayret,  in 
the  valley  of  Urroz.  It  was  partly  to  obviate  this 
danger,  partly  to  support  O'Donel,  while  Clauzel's 
force  was  in  the  vicinity  of  Jaca,  that  the  fourth 
division,  about  six  thousand  strong,  occupied  Vis- 
cayret, six  miles  from  the  pass  of  Ibaneta,  ten 
miles  from  Morillo's  position,  and  twelve  miles 
from  Byng's  position.  But  when  Clauzel  retired  to 
France,  general  Cole  was  directed  to  observe  the 
roads  leading  over  the  main  chain  from  the  Aldu- 
ides district,  and  to  form  a  rallying  point  and  re- 
serve for  Cami)bell,  Byng,  and  Moriilo,  his  instruc- 
tions being  to  maintain  the  Roncevalles  passes 
against  a  front  attack,  but  not  to  commit  his  troops 
in  a  desperate  battle  if  the  flanks  were  insecure. 

On  the  left  of  Byng  and  Moriilo,  Campbell's  I'or- 
tuguese,  about  two  thousand  strong,  were  encamped 
above  the  village  of  Alduides  on  a  mountain  called 
Mizpira.     They  observed  the  national  guards  of  tho 


G20 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XXI. 


Val  cle>  Ha.LfcMri,  preserv*  d  the  communication  be- | 
tween  iJyng  ami  Hill,  ami  in  some  measure  covered 
Hie  riglit  flank  of  the  latter.  From  the  Alduides, 
Campbell  could  retreat  through  the  pass  of  Sahor- 
gain  upon  Viscayret  in  tiie  valley  of  Urroz,  and 
through  the  passes  of  Urtiagt  r.nd  Renacabal  upon 
Eugui  in  the  Val  de  Zubiri  ;  finally,  by  the  lateral 
pass  of  Atalosti  he  c  luld  joia  liyng  and  the  fourth 
division.  The  communication  between  all  these 
posts  was  maintained  by  Long's  cavalry. 

Continuing  the  line  of  positions  to  the  left,  gene- 
ral Hill  occupied  the  Bastan  with  the  second  Brit- 
ish division,  Sylveira's  Portuguese,  and  some  squad- 
ron's of  horse  ;  but  Byng's  and  Campbell's  brigades 
being  detached,  he  had  not  more  than  nine  thousand 
sabres  and  bayonets.  His  two  British  brigades  un- 
der general  William  Stewart  guarded  the  Col  de 
Maya  ;  Sylveira's  Portuguese  were  at  Erazu,  on  the 
right  of  Stewart,  observing  the  passes  of  Arietta, 
Yspegui  and  Elliorita  ;  of  which  the  two  former 
were  occupied  by  major  Brotherton's  cavalry  and  by 
the  sixth  cacjaciores.  The  direct  line  of  retreat  and 
point  of  concentration  for  all  these  troops  was  Eli- 
Fondo. 

From  Elisondo  the  route  of  Pampeluna  over  the 
»  great  chain  was  by  the  pass  of  Bellate  and  the  val- 
ley of  Lanz.  The  latter  running  nearly  parallel 
with  the  valley  of  Zubiri  is  separated  from  it  by  a 
wooded  and  ruggad  ridge,  and  between  them  there 
were  but  three  communications:  the  one  high  up, 
leading  from  Lanz  to  Eugui,  and  prolonged  from 
thence  to  Viscayret,  in  the  valley  of  Urroz;  the 
other  two  lower  down,  leading  from  Ostiz  and 
Olague  to  the  village  of  Zubiri.  At  Olague  the 
third  division,  furnishing  four  thousand  three  hun- 
dred bayonets  under  Picton,  was  posted,  ready  to 
support  Cole  or  Hill  as  occasion  required. 

Continuing  the  front  line  from  the  left  of  Stew- 
art's position  at  the  Col  de  Maya,  the  trace  ran 
along  the  mountains  forming  the  French  boundary 
of  the  Bastan.  It  comprised  the  passes  of  Echallar 
and  Vera,  guarded  by  the  seventh  division  under 
lord  Dalhousie,  and  by  the  light  division  under  gen- 
eral Charles  Alten.  The  former,  furnishing  four 
thousand  seven  hundred  bayonets,  communicated 
with  general  Stewart  by  a  narrow  road  over  the  At- 
chiola  mountain, and  the  eighty-second  regiment  was 
encamped  at  this  junction  with  the  Elisondo  road, 
about  three  milas  behind  the  pass  of  Maya.  The 
iight  division,  four  thousand  strong,  was  at  Vera, 
guarding  the  roads  which  led  behind  the  mountains 
through  Sumbilla  and  St.  Estevan  to  Elisondo. 

These  two  divisions  being  only  observed  by  the 
left  wing  of  Villatte's  reserve  were  available  for  the 
Buccour  of  either  wing,  and  behind  them,  at  the 
town  of  St.  Estevan,  was  the  sixth  division  of  six 
thousand  bayonets,  now  under  general  Pack.  Plac- 
ed at  equal  distances  from  Vera  and  Maya,  having 
free  communication  with  both  and  a  direct  line  of 
march  to  Pampeluna,  over  the  main  chain  of  the 
Pyrenees  by  the  Puerto  de  Arraiz,  sometimes  call- 
ed the  pass  of  Dona  JIaria,  tliis  division  was  avail- 
able for  any  object,  and  could  not  have  been  better 
posted. 

Around  Pampeluna,  the  point  to  which  all  the 
lin'?s  of  march  converged,  the  Sp-inisii  troops  under 
O'Donel  maint.iined  the  blockade,  and  they  were 
afterwards  joined  by  Carlos  d'Espniia's  division 
at  a  very  critical  moment.  Thus  reinforced  they 
amounted  to  eleven  thousand,  of  which  seven  thou- 
sand could  be  broiif/lit  into  action  without  abandon- 
ing the  works  of  blockade. 

Head-quarters  weie  at  T.esaca,  and  the  line  of 
correspondence  with  the  left  wing  was  over  the 


Pena  de  Haya,  that  with  the  right  wing  by  St.  Es- 
tevan, Elisondo  and  the  Alduides.  The  line  ol  cor- 
respondence between  sir  Thomas  Graham  and  Pam- 
peluna was  by  Goizueta  and  the  high  road  of  Yrur- 
zun. 

As  the  French  were  almost  in  contact  with  the 
allies'  positions  at  Roncevalles,  which  was  also  the 
point  of  defence  nearest  to  Pampeluna,  it  Jblluwed 
that  on  the  rapidity  or  slowness  with  which  Soult 
overcame  resistance  in  that  quarter  depended  hie 
success;  and  a  comparative  estimate  of  numbers 
and  distances  will  give  the  measure  of  his  chances 

Clauzel's  three  divisions  furnished  about  sixteen 
thousand  bayonets,  besides  the  cavalry,  tiie  artillery, 
and  the  national  guards  menacing  the  valley  of  Or- 
baiceta.  Byng  and  Morillo  were  therefore  with  five 
thousand  infantry,  to  sustain  thf  assault  of  sixteen 
thousand  until  Cole  could  reinforce  them  ;  but  Cole 
being  twelve  miles  distant  could  not  come  up  in 
fighting  order  under  four  or  five  hours.  And  as 
Reille's  divisions,  of  equal  strength  with  Clauzel's, 
could  before  that  time  seize  the  Lindouz  and  turn 
the  left,  it  was  clear  the  allied  troops,  although  in- 
creased to  eleven  thousand  by  the  junction  of  the 
fourth  division,  must  finally  abandon  their  ground 
to  seek  a  new  field  of  battle  where  the  third  divis- 
ion could  join  them  from  the  valley  of  Lanz,  and 
Cam[)beirs  brigade  from  the  Alduides.  Thus  raised 
to  seventeen  or  eighteen  thousand  bayonets,  with 
some  guns,  they  might  on  strong  ground  oppote 
Clauzel  and  Reille's  thirty  thousand;  but  as  Pic- 
ton's  position  at  Olague  was  more  than  a  day's 
march  from  Byng's  position  at  Altobiscar,  their 
junction  could  only  be  made  in  the  valloy  of  the 
Zubiri  and  not  very  distant  from  Pamjieluna.  And 
when  seve«  thousand  Spaniards  from  the  blockade, 
and  two  or  three  thousand  cavalry  from  the  side  of 
the  Ebro  are  added,  we  have  the  full  measure  of  the 
allies'  strength  in  this  quarter. 

General  Hill,  menaced  by  D'Erlon  with  a  very 
superior  force,  and  having  the  pass  of  Maya,  half  a 
day's  march  farther  from  Pampeluna  than  the  pass- 
es of  Roncevalles,  to  defend,  could  not  give  ready 
help.  If  he  retreated  rapidly,  D'Erlon  could  follow 
as  rapidly,  and  though  Picton  and  Cole  would  thus 
be  reinforced  with  ten  thousand  men,  Soult  would 
gain  eighteen  thousand.  Hill  could  not,  however, 
move  until  he  knew  that  Byng  and  ColeVere  driven 
from  the  Roncevalles  passes  ;  in  fine,  he  could  not 
avoid  a  dilemma.  For  if  he  maintained  the  passes 
at  Maya  and  affairs  went  wrong  near  Pampeluna, 
his  own  situation  would  be  imminently  dangerous  ; 
if  he  maintained  Irueta,his  next  position,  the  same 
danger  was  to  be  dreaded  ;  and  the  passes  of  JMaya, 
once  abandoned,  D'Erlon  moving  by  his  own  left  to- 
wards the  Alduides,  could  join  Soult  in  tlie  valley 
of  Zubiri  before  Hill  could  join  Cole  and  Picton  by 
the  valley  of  lanz.  But  if  Hill  did  not  maintain 
the  position  of  Irueta,  D'Erlon  could  follow  and  cut 
the  sixth  and  seventh  divisions  off  from  the  valley 
of  Lanz.  The  extent  and  power  of  Soult's  combi- 
nations are  thus  evinced.  Hill,  forced  to  await  or- 
ders, and  hampered  by  the  operations  of  D'Erlon, 
required  it  might  be  three  days  to  get  into  line  near 
Pampeluna  ;  but  D'Erlon,  after  gaining  Maya,  could 
in  one  day  and  a  half,  by  the  passes  of  Berderez  anil 
Urtiaga,  join  Soult  in  the  Val  de  Zubiri.  Mean- 
while Byng,  Morillo,  Cole,  Cami)bell,  and  Picton 
would  be  exposed  to  the  operations  of  double  their 
own  numbers;  and  however  firm  and  able,  individ- 
uallv,  those  generals  might  be,  they  could  not.  when 
suddenly  brought  together,  be  exjiected  to  seize  the 
whole  system  of  operations  and  act  with  that  decis- 
ion and  nicety  of  judgment  which  the  occasion  de- 


18I3.J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


j2: 


mantled.  It  was  clear,  therefore,  that  Hill's  force 
must  be  in  some  measure  paralysed  at  ilrst,  and 
finally  thrown  with  the  sixth,  seventh,  and  light 
divisions,  upon  an  external  line  of  operations,  while 
the  French  moved  upon  internal  lines. 

On  the  other  hand  it  is  also  clear  that  the  corps 
of  Byng,  Morillo,  Campbell,  Cole,  Picton,  and  Hill 
ware  only  pieces  of  resistance  on  lord  Wclling-ton's 
board,  and  that  the  sixth,  seventh,  and  light  divis- 
ions were  those  with  which  he  meant  to  win  his 
game.  There  was  however  a  great  difterence  in 
t.heir  value.  The  light  division  and  tlie  seventh, 
especially  the  former,  being  at  the  greatest  distance 
from  Pampeluna,  having  enemies  close  in  front  and 
certain  points  to  guard,  were,  the  seventh  division 
a  day,  the  light  division  two  days,  behind  the  sixth 
division,  which  was  quite  free  to  move  at  an  in- 
stant's notice,  and  was,  the  drag  of  D'Erlon's  corps 
considered,  a  day  nearer  to  Pampeluna  than  Hill. 
Wherefore  upon  the  rapid  handling  of  this  well- 
placed  body  the  fate  of  the  allies  depended.  If  it 
arrived  in  time,  nearly  thirty  thousand  infantry  with 
suiHcient  cavalry  and  artillery  would  be  established, 
under  the  immediate  command  of  the  general-in- 
chief,  on  a  position  of  strength  to  check  the  enemy 
until  the  rest  of  the  army  arrived.  Where  that 
position  was  and  how  the  troops  were  there  gather- 
ed and  fought  shall  now  be  shown. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Sniilt  tiKanks  the  ri^lit  of  the  allies — Combnt  of  Roncevalles— • 
Ca(iitj:it  of  Linzoain — Count  d'Erlon  attacks  the  allies'  right 
rentre — Combat  of  Maya — Gi-nerai  Hill  takes  a  position  at 
Inieta — General  Pictoii  arid  Cole  retreat  down  the  V'al  de 
Zuliiri — They  turn  at  Huarte  and  offer  battle — Lord  VVel- 
liniJton  arrives — Combat  of  the  27th — V\rA  battle  of  Saii- 
roren — Various  inovements — D'Erlon  ioins  Soult  who  Bl- 
acks general  Hill — Second  battle  of  Sanroren — Foy  is  cut 
off  from  the  main  army — JNight  march  of  the  light  di\ision 
— S.>ult  retreats — Combat  of  D.ma  Maria — Dangerous  posi- 
tion of  the  French  al  St.  Estevan — Soult  marches  down  the 
Bi  iassoa — Forced  march  of  the  light  division — Terrible 
fcene  lit  ar  the  brji  ge  of  Yanzi — Combats  of  Echallar  and 
I\aiitelly — Narrow  escape  of  lord  Wellington— Observa- 
tions. 

BATTr.ES    OF    THE    PYRENEES COMBAT     OF     RONCE- 
VALLES. 

On  the  23d,  Soult  issued  an  order  of  the  day  re- 
mirkable  for  its  force  and  frankness.  Tracing  with 
a  rapid  pen  the  leading  events  of  the  past  cam- 
paign, he  showed  that  the  disasters  sprung  from  the 
incapacity  of  the  king,  not  from  the  weakness  of 
the  soldiers,  whose  military  virtue  he  justly  extol- 
y'id,  and  whose  haughty  courage  he  inflamed  by  al- 
lusions to  former  glories.  He  has  been,  by  writers 
who  disgrace  English  literature  with  unfounded  as- 
persions of  a  courageous  enemy,  accused  of  unseem- 
ly boasting  as  to  his  ultimate  operations  at  this 
time,  but  the  calumny  is  refuted  by  the  following 
passage  from  his  despa,tch  to  the  mini.^ter  at  war. 

•'  I  shall  move  directly  upon  Pampeluna,  and  if  I 
8L-.cc3ed  in  relieving  it  I  will  operate  towards  my 
ri.rht  to  embarrass  the  enemy's  troops  in  Guipuscoa, 
Hiscay,  and  Alava,  and  to  enable  the  reserve  to  join 
nn,  which  will  relieve  San  Sebastian  and  Santona. 
If  this  should  happen,  I  will  then  consider  what  is 
to  be  done,  either  to  push  my  own  attack  or  to  help 
the  army  of  Aragon,  but  to  look  so  far  ahead  would 
now  be  temerity." 

It  is  true,  that  conscious  of  superior  abilities,  he 
did  not  suppress  the  sentiment  of  his  own  worth  as 
a  commander,  but  he  was  too  proud  to  depreciate 
brave  adversaries  on  the  eve  of  battle. 


"  Let  us  not,"  he  said,  "  defraud  the  encmj  of  tlie 
praise  which  is  due  to  him.  The  dispositi  )ns  of 
the  general  have  been  prompt,  skilful,  and  ci/nsecu- 
tive,  the  valour  and  steadiness  of  his  troops  have 
been  praiseworthy." 

Having  thus  stimulated  the  ardour  of  his  troops, 
he  put  liimself  at  the  head  of  Clauzel's  divisions 
and  on  the  25th  at  daylight  led  them  up  against  the 
rocks  of  Altobiscar. 

General  Byng,  warned  the  evening  before  that 
danger  was  near,  and  jealous  of  some  hostile  indica- 
tions towards  the  village  of  Val  Carlos,  had  sent  the 
fifty-seventh  regiment  down  there,  but  kept  the  rest 
of  his  men  well  in  hand  and  gave  notice  to  general 
Cole,  who  had  made  a  new  disposition  of  his  troops 
Ross's  brigade  was  now  at  Espinal  two  miles  in  ad- 
vance of  A'iscayret,  six  miles  from  the  pass  of  Iba- 
iieta,  and  eleven  from  Byng's  position,  but  some- 
what nearer  to  Morillo.  Anson's  brigade  was  close 
behind  Ross,  Stubb's  Portuguese  behind  Anson,  and 
the  artillery  was  at  Linzoain. 

Such  was  the  exact  state  of  affairs  when  Soult, 
throwing  out  a  multitude  of  skirmishers  and  push- 
ing forward  his  supporting  columns  and  guns  as  fast 
as  the  steepness  of  the  road  and  difficult  nature  of 
the  ground  would  permit,  endeavoured  to  force 
Byng's  position;  but  the  British  general,  undis- 
mayed at  the  multitude  of  assailants,  fought  strong- 
ly, the  French  fell  fast  among  the  rocks,  and  the 
rolling  musketry  pealed  in  vain  for  hours  along  that 
cloudy  field  of  battle  elevated  five  thousand  fee.  above 
the  level  of  the  plains.  Their  numbers  however 
continually  increased  in  front,  and  the  national 
guards  from  Yropil,  reinforced  by  Clauzel's  detach- 
ments, skirmished  with  the  Spanish  battalions  at 
the  foundry  of  Orbaiceta  and  threatened  to  turn  the 
right.  The  Val  Carlos  was  at  the  same  time  men- 
aced from  Arnegui,  and  Reille's  divisions,  ascend 
ing  the  rock  of  Ayrole,  turned  IMorillo's  left. 

About  mid-day  general  Cole  arrived  at  Altobis 
car,  but  his  brigades  were  still  distant,  and  the 
French,  renewing  their  attack,  neglected  the  Val 
Carlos  to  gather  more  thickly  on  the  front  of  Byng. 
He  resisted  all  their  efforts,  but  Reille  made  pro- 
gress along  the  summit  of  the  Ayrola  ridge.  Mo- 
rillo then  fell  back  towards  Ibaneta,and  the  French 
were  already  nearer  to  that  pass  than  the  troops  at 
Altobiscar  were,  when  Ross's  brigade,  coming  up 
the  pass  of  Mendichuri,  suddenly  appeared  on  the 
Lindouz,  at  the  instant  when  the  head  of  Reille's 
column,  being  close  toAtalosti,  was  upon  the  point 
of  cutting  the  communication  with  Campbell.  This 
officer's  picquets  had  been  attacked  early  in  the 
morning  by  the  national  guards  of  the  Val  de  Bai- 
gorri,  but  he  soon  discovered  that  it  was  only  a 
feint,  and  therefore  moved  by  his  right  towards  At- 
alosti  when  he  heard  the  firing  on  that  side.  His 
march  was  secured  by  the  Val  d'Ayra  which  sepa- 
rated him  from  the  ridge  of  Ayrola  along  which 
Reille  was  advancing;  but  noting  that  general's 
strength,  and  at  the  same  time  seeing  Ross's  bri- 
gade labouring  up  the  steep  ridge  of  Mendichuri, 
Campbell  judged  that  the  latter  was  ignorant  of 
what  was  going  on  above.  Wherefore  sending  ad- 
vice of  the  enemy's  proximity  and  strength  to  Cole, 
he  offered  to  pass  the  Atalosti  and  join  in  the  battle 
if  he  could  be  furnished  w'th  transport  for  liis  sick, 
and  provisions  on  the  new  line  of  operations. 

Before  this  message  could  reach  Cole,  the  head  of 
Ross's  column,  composed  of  a  wing  of  the  twentieth 
regiment  and  a  company  of  Brunswickers,  was  on  the 
summit  of  the  Lindouz,  where  most  unexpectedly  it 
encountered  Reille's  advanced  guard.  The  moment 
was  critical ;  but  Ross,  an  eager  hardy  soldier,  call 


622 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


[Book  XXI. 


ed  aloud  to  charge,  ano  c  ptain  Tovey  of  the  twen- 
tietii,  ruim.iijr  forward  with  his  coinj)any,  crossed  a 
Blijrhl.  wuoded  hollow  and  full  against  the  front  of 
the  sixtii  French  lij^fiit  infantry  dashed  with  the  bay- 
onet. Brave  men  fell  by  that  weapon  on  botii  sides  ; 
but  numbers  prevailing,  these  daring  soldiers  were 
pushed  back  again  by  the  French.  Ross  however 
gained  his  object,  the  remainder  of  his  brigade  had 
come  up  and  the  pass  of  Atalosti  was  secured,  yet 
with  a  loss  of  one  hundred  and  forty  men  of  the 
twentieth  regiment  and  forty-one  of  the  liruns- 
wickers. 

Previous  to  this  vigorous  action,  general  Cole, 
geeing  the  Frencii  in  the  Val  Carlos  an<l  in  t!ie  val- 
ley of  Orbaiceta,  that  is  to  say,  on  both  flanks  of 
Byng,  whose  front  was  not  the  less  pressed,  had  or- 
dered Anson  to  reinforce  the  Spaniards  at  the  foun- 
dry, and  Stubbs  to  enter  the  Val  Carlos  in  support 
of  the  lifty-seventh.  He  now  recalled  Anson  to  as- 
sist in  defence  of  the  Lindouz,  and  learning  from 
Campbell  how  strong  Reille  was,  caused  Byng, 
with  a  view  to  a  final  retreat,  to  relinquish  his  ad- 
vanced position  at  Altobiscar  and  take  a  second 
nearer  the  Ibaneta.  This  movement  uncovered  the 
road  leading  down  to  the  foundry  of  Orbaiceta,  but 
it  concentrated  all  the  troops,  and  at  the  same  time 
general  Campbell,  although  he  could  not  enter  the 
line  of  battle,  because  Cole  was  unable  to  supply  his 
demands,  made  so  skilful  a  display  of  iiis  Portuguese 
as  to  impress  Reille  with  the  notion  that  their  num- 
bers were  considerable. 

During  these  movements  the  skirmishing  of  the 
light  troops  continued,  but  a  thick  fog  coming  up 
the  valley,  prevented  Soult  from  making  disposi- 
tions for  a  general  attack  with  his  six  divisions, 
and  when  night  fell,  general  Cole  still  held  the 
great  chain  of  the  mountains  with  a  loss  of  only 
three  hundred  and  eighty  men  killed  and  wounded. 
His  right  was,  however,  turned  by  Orbaiceta,  he  had 
but  t^'ti  or  eleven  thousand  bayonets  to  oppose  to 
thirty  thousand,  and  his  line  of  retreat  being  for 
four  or  five  miles  down  hill  and  flanked  all  the  way 
by  the  Lindouz,  was  uneasy  and  unfavourable. 
Wherefore  putting  the  troops  silently  in  march  af- 
ter dark,  he  threaded  the  passes  and  gained  the  val- 
ley of  Urroz.  Ilis  rear-guard  composed  of  Anson's 
brigade  followed  in  tlie  morning,  general  Campbell 
retired  from  the  Alduides  by  the  pass  of  Urtiaga  to 
Eugui  in  the  valley  of  Zubiri,  and  the  Spanish  bat- 
talion, retreating  from  the  foundry  of  Orbaiceta  by 
the  narrow  way  of  Navala,  rejoined  IMorillo  near 
Espinal.  The  great  chain  was  thus  abandoned,  but 
the  result  of  the  day's  operation  was  unsatisfactory 
to  the  French  general  ;  he  acknowledged  a  loss  of 
four  hundred  men,  he  had  not  gained  ten  miles,  and 
from  the  passes  now  abandoned,  to  Pampeluna,  the 
distance  was  not  less  than  twenty-two  miles,  with 
strong  defensive  positions  in  the  way  where  in- 
creasing numbers  of  intrepid  enemies  were  to  be 
expected. 

Soult's  combinations,  contrived  for  greater  suc- 
cess, had  been  thwarted,  partly  by  fortune,  partly 
by  errors  of  execution,  tiie  like  of  wliich  all  generals 
mast  expect,  nnd  the  most  experienced  are  the  most 
reyignod  as  knowing  them  to  be  inevitable.  The 
interference  of  fortune  was  felt  in  tiie  fog  which 
rose  at  the  moment  when  he  was  ready  to  thrust 
forward  his  heavy  masses  of  troops  entire.  The 
failure  in  execution  was  Reille's  tardy  movement. 
His  orders  wore  to  gain  witli  all  expedition  the 
Lindouz,  that  is  to  say,  the  knot  tying  the  heads  of 
the  Alduides,  the  Val  Carlos,  the  Roncevalles,  and 
the  valley  of  Urroz.  From  that  position  he  would 
have  commanded  the  Mendichuri,  Atabeti,  Ibaneta 


and  Sahorgain  passes,  and  by  moving  along  the 
crest  of  the  hills  could  menace  the  Urtiaga,  Rena- 
cabal,  and  Bellate  passes,  thus  endangering  Camp- 
bell's and  Hill's  lines  of  retreat.  But  when  he 
should  have  ascended  the  rocks  of  Ayrola,  he  iialted 
to  incorporate  two  newly  arrived  conscript  battal 
ions  and  to  issue  provisions,  and  the  hours  thus  lost 
would  have  sufficed  to  seize  the  Lindouz  before  gen 
eral  Ross  got  through  the  pass  of  Mendichuri.  The 
fog  would  still  have  stopped  the  spread  of  the 
French  columrA;  to  the  extent  designed  by  Soult, 
but  fifteen  or  sixteen  thousand  men,  placed  on  tlie 
flank  and  rear  of  Byng  and  Morillo,  would  have 
separated  them  from  the  fourth  division,  and  forced 
the  latter  to  retreat  beyond  Viscayret. 

Soult  however  overrated  the  forces  opposed  to 
him,  supposing  it  to  consist  of  two  British  divisions 
besides  Byng's  brigade  and  Morillo's  Spaniards. 
He  was  probably  deceived  by  the  wounded  men, 
who  hastily  questioned  on  the  field  would  declare 
they  belonged  to  the  second  and  fourth  divisions, 
because  Byng's  brigade  was  part  of  the  former ; 
but  that  general  and  the  Spaniards  had  without  aid 
sustained  Soult's  first  efforts,  and  even  when  the 
fourth  division  came  up,  less  than  eleven  thousand 
men,  exclusive  of  sergeants  and  officers,  were  pres- 
ent in  the  fight.  Campbell's  Portuguese  never  en- 
tered the  line  at  all,  the  remainder  of  the  second 
division  was  in  the  Bastan,  and  the  third  division 
was  at  Olague  in  the  valley  of  Lanz. 

On  the  26th,  the  French  general  put  Clauzel's 
wing  on  the  track  of  Cole,  and  ordered  Reille  to  fol- 
low the  crest  of  the  mountains  and  seize  the  posses 
leading  from  the  Bastan  in  Hill's  rear  while  D'Er- 
lon  pressed  him  in  front.  That  general  would  thus, 
Soult  hoped,  be  crushed  or  thrown  on  the  side  of  St. 
Estevan ;  D'Erlon  could  then  rencli  his  proper  place 
in  the  valley  of  Zubiri,  while  the  right  descended 
the  valley  of  Lanz  and  prevent^^d  Picton  quitting  it 
to  aid  Cole.  A  retreat  by  those  generals  ai;d  on 
separate  lines  would  thus  be  inevitable,  and  the 
F'rench  army  could  issue  forth  in  a  compact  order 
of  battle  from  the  mouths  of  the  two  valleys  against 
Pampeluna. 

COMBAT    OF    LINZOAIN. 

All  the  columns  were  in  movement  at  day-break, 
but  every  hour  brought  its  obstacle.  The  fog  still 
hung  heavy  on  the  mountain-tops,  Reille's  guides, 
bewildered,  refused  to  lead  the  troops  along  the 
crests,  and  at  ten  o'clock,  liaving  no  other  resource, 
he  marched  down  the  pass  of  3Iendichuri  upon  Es- 
pinal, and  fell  into  the  rear  of  the  cavalry  and  ar- 
tillery following  Clauzel's  divisions.  Meanwhile 
Soult,  although  retarded  also  by  the  fog  and  the 
difficulties  of  tlie  ground,  overtook  Cole's  rear-guard 
in  front  of  Viscayret.  The  leading  troops  struck 
hotly  upon  some  British  light  comiianies  incorjjora- 
ted  under  tlie  command  of  colonel  Wilson  of  the  for- 
ty-eighth, and  a  French  squadron  passing  round 
tlieir  flank  fell  on  the  rear;  but  Wilson,  facing 
about,  drove  off  these  horsemen,  and  thus  fighting. 
Cole,  about  two  o'clock,  reached  the  heights  of  Lin- 
zoain  a  mile  beyond  Viscayret,  where  general  Pic- 
ton met  him  with  intelligence  that  Canijibell  had 
reached  Eugui  from  the  Alduides,  nnd  that  the  third 
division  having  crossed  the  hills  from  Olague  was 
at  Zubiri.  Tlie  junction  of  nil  these  troops  was 
thus  secured,  the  loss  of  the  day  was  loss  than  two 
hundred,  and  neither  wounded  men  nor  baggage  had 
been  left  behind.  However  the  French  gathered  in 
front,  and  at  four  o'clock  seized  some  heights  on  the 
allies'  left,  which  endangered  their  position,  v/hcrc- 
fore  again  falling  back  a  mile,  Cole  ofTered  battle  on 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


G23 


tVe  ridge  separating  the  valley  of  Urroz  from  that 
of  Zubiri.  During  tliis  skirmisli  Campbell,  coming 
from  Eugui,  showed  his  Portuguese  on  the  rid<res 
above  the  rigiit  flank  of  tlie  French,  but  they  were 
distant,  Picton's  troops  were  still  at  Zubiri,  and 
there  v/as  light  for  an  action.  tSoult,  however,  dis- 
turbed with  intelligence  received  from  D'Erlon,  and 
perhaps  doubtful  what  Campbell's  trooi)s  niiyht  be, 
put  ort'tiio  attack  until  next  morning,  and  alter  dark 
the  junction  of  all  the  allies  was  etlected. 

This  delay  on  the  part  of  the  French  general 
seems  injudicious.  Cole  was  alone  for  five  hours. 
Every  action,  by  increasing  the  number  of  wounded 
men  and  creating  confusion  in  the  rear,  would  have 
augmented  tiie  difficulties  of  the  retreat;  and  the 
troops  were  fatigued  with  incessant  fighting  and 
inarching  for  two  days  and  one  night.  Moreover, 
the  alteration  of  Reille's  march,  occasioned  by  the 
fog,  had  reduced  the  chances  dependent  on  the  pri- 
mary combinations  to  the  operations  of  D'Erlon's 
corps;  but  the  evening  reports  brought  the  mortify- 
ing conviction  that  he  also  had  gone  wrong,  and  by 
rough  fighting  only  could  Soult  now  attain  his  ob- 
ject. It  is  said  that  his  expressions  discovered  a 
secret  anticipation  of  failure  ;  if  so,  his  temper  was 
too  steadfast  to  yield,  for  he  gave  the  signal  to 
inarch  the  next  day,  and  more  strongly  renewed  his 
orders  to  D'Erlon,  whose  operations  must  now  be 
noticed. 

That  general  had  three  divisions  of  inflmtry,  fur- 
nishing twenty-one  thousand  men,  of  which  about 
eighteen  thousand  were  combatants.  Early  on  the 
morning  of  the  25th,  he  assembled  two  of  them  be- 
hind some  heiglits  near  the  passes  of  Maya,  having 
caused  the  national  guards  of  Baigorri  to  make  pre- 
vious demonstrations  towards  the  passes  of  Arietta, 
Yspeguy,  and  Lorietta.  No  change  had  been  made 
ia  the  disposition  of  general  Hill's  force,  but  gene- 
ral .Stewart,  deceived  by  the  movements  of  the  na- 
tional guards,  looked  towards  Sylveira's  posts  on  tlie 
right  rather  tlian  to  his  own  front;  his  division, 
consisting  of  two  British  brigades,  was  consequent- 
ly noither  posted  as  it  should  be,  nor  otherwise  pre- 
pared for  an  attack.  The  ground  to  be  defended 
was  indeed  very  strong;  but  however  rugged  a 
mounta-in  position  may  be,  if  it  is  too  extensive  for 
the  troops,  o"  those  troops  are  not  disposed  with 
judgment,  the  very  inequalities  constituting  its  de- 
fensive strength  become  advantageous  to  an  as- 
sailant. 

There  were  three  passes  to  defend.  Aretesque 
on  the  right,  Lessessa  in  the  centre,  Maya  on  the 
left,  and  from  these  entrances  two  ways  led  to  Ell- 
sondo  in  parallel  directions;  one  down  the  valley 
through  the  town  of  May;i,  receiving  in  its  course 
the  Erazu  road;  the  other  along  the  Atchiola  moun- 
tain. General  Pringle's  brigade  was  ciiarged  to  de- 
fend the  Aretesque,  and  colonel  Cameron's  brigade 
the  Maya  ;ind  I/Ossessa  passes.  The  Col  itself  was 
broad  on  the  summit,  about  three  miles  long,  and  on 
each  flank  lofty  rocks  and  ridges  rose  one  above  an- 
other;  those  on  the  right  blending  with  the  Gora- 
misivJi  mountains,  those  on  the  left  witli  the  Atchi- 
ola, near  the  summit  of  whicii  the  eighty-second 
regiment  belonging  to  the  seventh  division  was 
posted. 

Cameron's  brigade,  encamped  on  the  left,  had  a 
clear  view  of  troops  coming  from  Urdax  ;  but  at  Ar- 
etesque a  great  round  hill,  one  mile  in  front,  mask- 
ed the  movements  of  an  enemy  coming  from  Espc- 
lette.  This  hill  was  not  occu;iied  at  niglit,  nor  in 
the  daytime  save  by  some  Portuguese  cavalry  ve- 
dettes, and  the  next  guard  was  an  inl  itry  piquet 
posted  on  that  slope  of  the  Col  whicl     "'ontcd  the 


great  hill.  Behind  this  piquet  of  eighty  men  there 
was  no  immediate  suj)port,  but  four  liglit  coini:anies 
were  encamped  one  mile  down  tiie  reverse  f.lnpe 
whicli  was  more  rugged  and  difficult  of  access  tiian 
that  towards  the  enemy.  The  rest  of  general  I'rin- 
ple's  brigade  was  disiiosed  at  various  distances  from 
two  to  three  miles  in  the  rear,  and  the  signal  li)r 
assembling  on  the  position  was  to  be  the  fire  of 
four  Portuguese  guns  from  tiie  rocks  above  tlie 
Maya  pass.  Thus  of  six  British  regiments  furnish- 
ing more  than  three  tliousand  figiiting  men,  half 
only  were  in  line  of  battle,  and  those  cbielly  massed 
on  the  left  of  a  position,  wide,  open,  and  of  an  easy 
ascent  from  the  Aretesque  side,  and  tiibir  gen- 
eral, Stewart,  quite  deceived  as  to  the  real  state  of 
affairs,  was  at  l']lisondo,  when  about  n.id-day  D'Er- 
lon commenced  the  battle. 

COMBAT    OF    MAYA. 

Captain  Moyle  Sherer,  the  office  commanding 
the  picquet  at  the  Areletque  pass,  was  told  by  hia 
predecessor,  tliat  at  dawn  a  glimpse  liad  been  ob- 
tained of  cavalry  and  infantry  in  movement  along 
the  hills  in  front,  some  peasants  also  announced  the 
approach  of  the  Frencii,  and  at  nine  o'clock  major 
Thorne,  a  staff-officer,  having  patrolled  round  the 
great  liill  in  front  of  tiie  pass,  discovered  sufficient 
to  make  him  order  up  the  light  companies  to  sup- 
port the  piquet.  These  companies  had  \nti  formed 
on  the  ridge  with  their  left  at  the  rock  of  Are- 
tesque, when  D'Armagnac's  division  coming  fn.in 
Espelette  mounted  the  great  liill  in  front,  Abbo  fol- 
lowed, and  general  Maransin  with  a  third  division 
advanced  from  Ainhoa  and  Urdax  against  the  Maya 
pass,  meaning  also  to  turn  it  by  a  narrow  way  lead- 
ing up  the  Atchiola  mountain. 

D'Armagnac's  men  pushed  forward  at  once  in 
several  columns,  and  forced  the  jiiquet  back  with 
great  loss  upon  the  light  companies,  wiio  £ustain'e'< 
his  vehement  assault  with  infinite  difhculty.  ^'u^ 
alarm  guns  were  now  heard  from  the  Maya  pays, 
and  general  Pringle  hastened  to  the  front,  but  hia 
regiments  moving  hurriedly  from  difierent  camps 
were  necessarily  brought  into  action  one  alter  tiie 
other.  The  tliirty-fourth  came  up  first  at  a  running 
pace,  yet  by  companies,  not  in  mass,  and  breatlilcts 
from  the  length  and  ruggedneso  of  tiie  aiicejit ;  the 
thirty-ninth  and  twenty  eighth  followed,  hut  not  im- 
mediately nor  together,  and  meanwhile  D'Armag- 
nac,  closely  supported  by  Abbe,  witii  domineerirg 
numbers  and  valour  combined,  maugre  the  desperate 
fighting  of  the  piquet,  of  the  light  companies  and 
of  the  thirty-fourth,  had  established  his  columns  on 
the  broad  ridge  of  the  position. 

Colonel  Cameron  then  sent  the  fiftieth  from  the 
left  to  the  assistance  of  the  overmatched  troo])s,  and 
that  fierce  and  formidable  old  regiment  charging 
tlie  head  of  an  advancing  column  drove  it  clear  out 
of  the  pass  of  l.essessa  in  the  centre.  Yet  the 
French  were  so  many  that,  checked  at  one  point 
tliey  assembled  v/ith  increasc'd  force  at  another  ;  nor 
could  general  Pringle  restore  the  b:iUle  with  the 
thirty-ninth  and  twenty-eighth  regiments,  winch, 
cut  off  from  the  otliers,  were,  though  fighting  des- 
perately, forced  back  to  a  second  and  lower  ridge 
crossing  the  main  road  to  I'lisondo.  Tliey  were 
followed  by  D'Armagnac  ;  but  Abbe  continued  to 
press  the  fiftieth  and  tliirty-fnurtli,  whose  natural 
line  of  retreat  was  towards  the  Atchiola  road  on  the 
left,  because  the  position  trended  backward  from 
Aretesque  towards  that  point,  and  bcu-ause  Camer- 
on's brigade  was  there.  And  tliat  officer,  still  hold- 
ing the  pass  of  Maya  with  tlie  left  wings  of  the 
seventy-first  and  ninety-second  regiments,  brought 


624 


T^APIER'S    PENINSULAR    W^R. 


their  right  wings  and  the  Portiignese  guns  into  ac- 
tion and  tiius  maintained  the  fight  ;  but  so  dreadftil 
was  the  slaughter,  especially  of  the  ninety-second, 
that  it  is  said  the  advancing  enemy  was  actually 
stopped  by  tlie  heaped  mass  of  dead  and  dying;  and 
than  the  left  wing  of  that  noble  regiment  coming 
down  from  the  higher  ground  smote  wounded  friends 
and  exulting  foes  alike,  as  mingled  together  they 
stood  or  crawled  before  its  tire. 

It  was  in  this  state  of  atfairs  that  general  Stewart 
returning  froui  Elisondo  by  the  mountain  road,  reach- 
ed tlie  field  of  battle.  The  passes  of  Lessessa  and 
Aretesqus  were  lost,  tliat  of  Maya  was  still  held  by 
the  left  wing  of  the  seventy-first;  but  Stewart,  see- 
ing Maransin's  men  gatliered  thicivly  on  one  side  and 
Abbe's  men  on  the  other,  abandoned  it  to  take  a 
new  position  on  tlie  first  rocky  ridge  covering  the 
road  over  the  Atchiola ;  and  he  called  down  the 
eighty-second  regiment  from  the  highest  part  of 
that  mountain,  and  sent  messengers  to  demand  fur- 
ther aid  from  the  seventh  division.  Meanwhile,  al- 
though wounded  himself,  he  made  a  strenuous  re- 
sistance, for  he  was  a  very  gallant  man  ;  but  during 
the  retrograde  movement,  Maransin  no  longer  seek- 
ing to  turn  the  position,  suddenly  thrust  the  head 
of  his  division  across  the  front  of  tlie  British  line 
and  connected  his  left  with  Abbe,  throwing  as  he 
passed  a  destructive  fire  into  the  wasted  remnant  of 
the  ninety-second,  which  even  then  sullenly  gave 
way,  for  the  men  fell  until  two-thirds  of  the  whole 
had  gone  to  the  ground.  Still  the  survivors  fought, 
and  the  left  wing  of  the  seventy-first  came  into  ac- 
tion :  but  one  after  the  other  all  the  regiments  v/ere 
forced  back,  and  the  first  position  was  lost  together 
with  the  Portuguese  guns. 

Abbe's  division  now  followed  D'Armagnac  on  the 
road  to  the  town  of  Maya,  leaving  IMaransin  to  deal 
with  Stewart's  new  position,  and  notwithstanding 
its  extreme  strength  the  French  gained  ground  un- 
t.l  six  o'clock,  for  the  British,  shrunk  in  numbers, 
also  wanted  ammunition,  and  a  part  of  the  cighty- 
eecond  under  nuijor  Fitzgerald  were  forced  to  roll 
down  stones  to  defend  tlic  rocks  on  which  they  were 
posted.  In  this  desperate  condition  Stewart  was  upon 
the  point  of  abandoning  the  mountain  entirely,  when 
a  brigade  of  the  seventh  division,  commanded  by 
general  Barnes,  arrived  from  Echallar,  and  that  oth- 
cer  charging  at  tlie  head  of  the  sixth  regiment  drove 
the  French  back  to  the  .Maya  ridge.  Stev.'art  thus 
remained  master  of  tiie  Atchiola  ;  and  the  count 
D'Erlon,  who  probably  thought  greater  reinforce- 
ments had  come  up,  recalled  his  other  divisions  from 
the  Maya  road  and  reunited  his  whole  corps  on  tlie 
Col.  He  had  lost  fifteen  hundred  men"  and  a  gener- 
al; but  he  took  four  guns,  and  fourteen  hundred 
British  soldiers  were  killed  or  wounded. 

Such  was  the  fight  of  Maya,  a  disaster,  yet  one 
much  exaggerated  by  French  writers,  and  by  an 
English  autlior  misrepresented  as  a  surprise  caused 
hy  the  negligence  of  the  cavalry.  General  Stewart 
was  surprised,  his  troops  were  not,  and  never  did 
soldiers  figiit  better,  seldom  so  well.  The  stern 
valour  of  the  niuoiy-socond,  principally  composed  of 
Irishmen,  would  have  graced  Thermopylfe.  The 
J'ortuguese  cavalry  patrols,  if  any  went  out,  which 
is  uncertain,  might  have  neglected  their  duty,  and 
doubtless  the  front  should  have  bsen  scoured  in  a 
more  military  manner;  but  the  infantry  piquets, 
and  the  light  companies  so  happily  ordered  up  by 
nnjor  Thorne,  were  ready,  and  no  man  wondered  to 
see  the  French  columns  crown  the  great  hill  in  front 
of  the  pass.  Stewart  expecting  no  attack  at  3Iaya, 
had  gone  to  Elisondo,  leaving  orders  for  the  soldiers 
t0   cook:    from    his   erroneous   views  therefore   the 


[Book  XXI     || 

misfortune  sprung  and  from  ro  other  source,  Hav 
ing  deceived  himself  as  to  tlie  true  point  of  attack 
lie  did  not  take  proper  military  precauticvi*  on  hi» 
own  front;  his  position  was  only  half  occupied 
his  trooi)s  brouglit  into  action  wildly,  and  linally  h« 
caused  the  loss  of  his  guns  by  a  misdirection  as  ti 
the  road.  General  Stewart  was  a  brave,  energetic 
zealous,  indefatigable  man,  and  of  a  magnanimoui 
spirit,  but  he  possessed  neither  the  calm  reflectivf 
judgment  nor  the  intuitive  genius  which  belongs  t( 
nature's  generals. 

It  is  difiicult  to  understand  count  d'Erlon's  opera 
tions.  Why,  when  he  liad  carried  the  right  of  the 
position,  did  he  follow  two  weak  regiments  with 
two  divisions,  and  leave  only  one  division  to  attack 
five  regiments,  posted  on  the  strongest  ground  and 
having  hopes  of  succour  from  Echaliar?  Certainly 
if  Abbe's  division  had  acted  with  31aransin's,  Stew- 
art, who  was  so  hardly  pressed  by  the  latter  alone, 
must  have  passed  the  road  from  Echallar  in  retreat 
before  general  Barnes's  brigade  arrived.  On  the 
other  hand,  Soult's  orders  directed  I/Erlon  to  oper- 
ate by  his  left,  with  the  view  of  connecting  the 
whole  army  on  the  summit  of  the  I'yrenees.  He 
should  therefore  cither  have  used  his  whole  force  to 
crush  the  troops  on  the  Ai>-i.;ila  boiiire  they  could 
be  succoured  from  Echallar  ;  or,  leaving  Maransin 
there,  have  inarclied  by  the  IMaya  road  upon  Aris- 
cun  to  cut  Sylveira's  line  of  retreat ;  instead  of  this 
he  remained  inactive  upon  the  Col  de  31aya  for 
twenty  hours  after  the  battle!  And  general  Hill 
concentrating  his  whole  force,  now  augmented  by 
Barnes's  brigade,  would  probably  have  fallen  upon 
him  from  the  commanding  rocks  of  Atchiola  the 
next  day,  if  intelligence  of  Cole's  retreat  from  the 
Roncevalles  passes  had  not  come  through  the  Aldu- 
ides.  This  rendered  the  recovery  of  the  Col  de 
]Maya  useless,  and  Kill  withdrawing  all  his  troopv<j 
during  the  night,  posted  the  British  brigades  which 
had  been  engaged,  together  with  one  Portuguese 
brigade  of  infantry  and  a  Portuguese  battery,  on 
the  heights  in  rear  of  Irueta,  fifteen  miles  from 
the  scene  of  action.  The  other  Portuguese  brigade 
he  left  in  front  of  Elisondo,  thus  coverirg  the  road 
of  St.  Estevan  on  his  left,  that  of  Berderez  on  his 
right,  and  the  pass  of  Vellate  in  his  rear. 

Such  was  the  commencement  of  Soult's  opera- 
tions to  restore  the  fortunes  of  France.  Three  con- 
siderable actions  fought  on  the  same  day  iiad  each 
been  favourable.  At  San  Sebastian  tlie  allies  were 
repul£cd,at  Roncevalles  they  abandoned  the  passe'?; 
at  Maya  they  were  defeated,  but  the  decisive  blow 
iiad  not  yet  been  struck. 

J.ord  Wellington  heard  of  the  fight  at  Maya  on 
his  way  back  from  San  Sebastian,  but  with  the 
fake  addition  that  D'Erlon  v/as  beaten.  As  early  as 
the  22d  he  had  known  tliat  Soult  was  preparing  a 
great  offensive  movement,  but  the  immovable  atti- 
tude of  the  French  centre,  the  skilful  disposition  of 
tlieir  reserve  which  was  twice  as  strong  as  he  at 
first  supposed,  together  with  tlie  preparations  made 
to  throw  bridges  over  the  Bidassoa  at  Biriatu,  were 
all  calculated  to  mislead  and  did  mislead  him. 

Soult's  complicated  combinations  to  bring  D'E' 
Ion's  divisions  finally  into  line  on  the  crest  of  the 
great  chain  were  impenetrable,  and  the  English 
general  could  not  believe  his  adversary  would  throw 
himself  with  only  thirty  thousand  men  into  the  val- 
ley of  the  Ebro  unless  sure  of  aid  from  Suchet,  and 
that  general's  movements  indicated  a  determination 
to  remain  in  ('atalonia  ;  moreover  ^Vellington,  in 
contrast  to  Soult,  knew  that  Pampeluna  was  not  in 
extremity,  and  before  the  failure  of  the  as&auP 
tiiought  that  San  Sebastian  was.     Hence  the  opera 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


625 


tions  ag-ainst  his  right,  their  full  extent  not  known, 
appeared  a  feint,  and  he  judged  the  real  etfort  would 
be  to  throw  bridges  over  the  Bidassoa  and  raise  the 
siege  of  San  Sebastian.  Hut  in  the  night  correct 
intelligence  of  the  Maya  and  Roncevalles  affairs  ar- 
rived. Souk's  object  was  tiien  scarcely  doubtful,  and 
eir  T.  Graliam  was  ordered  to  turn  the  siege  into  a 
blockade,  to  embark  his  guns  and  stores,  and  hold 
his  spare  troops  in  hand  to  join  Giron,  on  a  position 
of  battle  marked  out  near  the  Bidassoa.  General 
Cotton  was  ordered  to  move  the  cavalry  up  I.o  Pam- 
peluna,  and  O'Donel  was  instructed  to  hold  some  of 
his  Spanish  troo})s  ready  to  act  in  advance.  Tliis 
done,  Wellington  arranged  his  line  of  correspondence 
and  proceeded  to  St.  Estevan,  which  he  reached 
early  in  the  morning. 

While  the  embarkation  of  the  guns  and  stores  was 
g'oing  on,  it  was  essential  to  hold  the  posts  at  Vera 
and  Echallar,  because  D'Erlon's  object  was  not  pro- 
nounced, and  an  enemy  in  possession  of  those  places 
could  approach  San  Sebastian  by  the  roads  leading 
over  the  Peiia  de  Haya,  a  rocky  mountain  behind 
Lesaca,  or  by  the  defiles  of  Zubietta  leading  round 
that  mountain  from  the  valley  of  Lerins.  Wliere- 
fore  in  passing  through  St.  Estevan  on  the  moining 
of  tlie  26th,  Wellington  merely  directed  general 
Pack  to  guard  the  bridges  over  the  Bidassoa.  But 
when  he  reached  Irueta,  saw  the  reduced  state  of 
Stewart's  division,  and  heard  that  Picton  had  march- 
ed from  Olague,  he  directed  all  the  troops  within  his 
power  upon  Pampeluna  ;  and  to  prevent  mistakes, 
indicated  the  valley  of  Lanz  as  the  general  line  of 
movement.  Of  Picton's  exact  position  or  of  his  in- 
tentions nothing  positive  was  known,  but  supposing 
him  to  have  joined  Cole  at  Linzoain,  as  indeed  he 
had,  Wellington  judged  that  their  combined  forces 
vould  be  sufficient  to  check  the  enemy  until  assist- 
ance could  reach  tiiem  from  the  centre  or  from  Pam- 
peluna, and  he  so  advised  Picton  on  the  evening  of 
the  '-^eth. 

In  consequence  of  these  orders,  the  seventh  divi- 
sion abandoned  Echallar  in  the  night  of  the  2Gth, 
the  sixth  division  quitted  St.  Estevan  at  daylight 
on  the  27th,  and  general  Hill  concentrating  his  own 
troojjs  and  Barnes's  brigade  on  the  heights  of  Irueta, 
halted  until  the  evening  of  the  27th,  but  marched 
during  the  night  through  the  pass  of  Vellate  upon 
the  town  of  Lanz.  Meanwhile  the  light  division, 
quitting  Vera  also  on  the  27th,  retired  by  Lesaca  to 
the  summit  of  the  Santa  Cruz  mountain,  overlook- 
ing the  valley  of  Lerins,  and  there  halted,  apparent- 
ly to  cover  the  pass  of  Zubieta  until  Longa's  Span- 
iards should  take  post  to  block  the  roads  leading 
over  the  Peiia  de  Haya  and  protect  the  embarkation 
of  the  guns  on  that  flank.  That  object  being  effect- 
ed, it  was  to  thread  the  passes  and  descend  upon 
Lecumberri  on  the  great  road  of  Yrurzun,  thus  se- 
curing sir  Thomas  Graham's  communication  with 
the  army  round  Pampeluna.  These  various  move- 
ments spread  fear  and  confusion  fnr  and  wide.  All 
the  narrow  valleys  and  roads  were  crowded  with 
baggage,  commissariat  stores,  artillery  and  fugitive 
families  ;  reports  of  the  most  alarming  nature  were 
as  usual  rife;  each  division,  ignorant  of  what  had 
really  happened  to  the  other,  dreaded  that  some  of 
the  numerous  misfortunes  related  might  be  true; 
none  knew  what  to  expect  or  where  they  vvei-R  to 
meet  the  enemy,  and  one  universal  hubbub  lilled 
the  wild  regions  through  which  the  French  army 
was  now  working  its  fiery  path  towards  Pampeluna. 

D'E  1  n's    innct^vity    gve    great    uneasim'ss    to 

Soult,  who  repeated  the  order  to  push  forward  by 

his  left  whatever  might  be  the  force  ojiposed,  and 

thus   stimulated    he   adv:'n?ed   to   Elitondo   on   the 

41 


27th,  but  thinking  the  sixth  diviBion  was  still  at  St. 
Estevan,  again  halted,  and  it  was  not  until  the 
morning  of  the  28tii,  when  general  Hill's  retreat 
iiad  opened  the  way,  that  he  followed  through  tie 
pass  of  Vellate.  His  further  progress  belongs  to 
other  combinations  arising  from  Soult's  direct  ojier- 
ations,  wiiich  are  now  to  be  continued. 

General  Picton,  having  assumed  the  command  of 
all  the  troops  in  the  valley  of  Zubiri  on  the  evening 
of  the  26th,  recommended  the  retreat  before  dawn 
on  the  27th,  and  witiiout  the  hope  or  intention  cf 
covering  Pampeluna.  Soult  followed  in  tlie  morn- 
ing, having  first  sent  scouts  towards  the  ridges 
where  Campbell's  troops  had  appeared  the  evening 
before.  Reille  marched  by  the  left  bank  cf  the  Guy 
river,  Clauzel  by  the  right  hank,  tlie  cavalry  and  ar 
tillery  closed  the  rear,  and  as  the  whole  moved  in 
compact  order  the  narrow  valley  was  overgorged 
with  troops,  a  hasty  bicker  of  musketry  alone 
marking  the  separation  of  the  hostile  forces.  jMean- 
while  the  garrison  of  Pampeluna  made  a  sally,  and 
O'Donel  in  great  alarm  spiked  some  of  his  guns,  ce- 
stroyed  his  magazines,  and  would  have  tufiered  a 
disaster,  if  Carlos  d'Espafia  had  not  fortunately  ar- 
rived with  his  division  and  checked  the  garrison. 
Nevertheless  the  danger  was  imminent,  for  geiieral 
Cole,  first  emerging  from  the  valley  of  Zubiri,  had 
passed  Villalba,  only  three  miles  from  Pampeluna, 
in  retreat;  Picton,  following  close,  was  at  Huarte, 
and  O'Donel's  Spaniards  were  in  confusion ;  in  fir.t 
Soult  was  all  but  successful  when  Picton,  feeling  the 
importance  of  tlie  crisis,  suddenly  turned  on  some 
steep  ridges,  which,  stretching  under  the  names  of 
San  Miguel,  Mont  Escava  and  San  Cr'.stoval  quite 
across  the  mouths  of  the  Zubiri  and  Lanz  valleys, 
screen  Pampeluna. 

Posiing  the  third  division  on  the  right  of  Huarte, 
he  prolonged  his  line  to  the  left  with  Morillo's  Spar 
iards,  called  upon  O'Donel  to  support  him,  and  di 
rected  Cole  to  occupy  some  heights  between  Uricain 
and  Arietta.  But  that  general  having  with  a  surer 
eye  observed  a  salient  hill  near  Zabaldica,  one  mile 
in  advance  and  commanding  the  road  to  Huarte,  de- 
manded and  obtained  permission  to  occupy  it  in- 
stead of  the  heights  first  appointed.  Two  ►'Spanish 
regiments  belonging  to  the  blockading  troops  were 
still  posted  there,  and  towards  them  Cole  directed 
his  course.  Soult  had  also  marked  this  hill,  a 
French  detachment  issuing  from  the  mouth  of  tl.o 
Val  de  Zubiri  was  in  full  career  to  seize  it,  and  the 
hostile  masses  were  rapidly  approaching  the  sumn;it 
on  either  side  when  the  Spaniards,  seeing  the  Brit- 
ish so  close,  vindicated  their  own  post  by  a  sudden 
charge.  This  was  for  Soult  the  stroke  of  fate.  His 
double  columns  just  then  emerging,  exultant,  from 
the  narrow  valley,  were  arrested  at  the  sight  of  ten 
thousand  men  which  under  Cole  crowned  the  sum- 
mit of  the  mountain  in  opposition  ;  and  two  miles 
further  back  stood  Picton  with  a  greater  number,  for 
O'Donel  had  now  taken  post  on  Morillo's  left.  To 
advance  by  the  Huarte  road  was  impossible,  and  to 
stand  still  was  dangerous,  because  the  French  ar- 
my, contracted  to  a  span  in  front,  was  cleft  in  its 
whole  length  by  the  river  Guy,  and  compressed  on 
each  side  by  the  mounta.  is  which  in  that  part  nar- 
rowed the  valley  to  a  quarter  of  a  mile.  Soult,  how- 
ever, like  a  great  and  ready  commander,  at  cnce 
shot  the  head  of  Clauzcl's  columns  to  his  right  across 
the  mountain  which  separated  the  Val  de  Zubiri 
from  the  Val  de  Lanz,  and  at  the  same  time  tlirew 
one  of  Keille's  divisions  of  infantry  and  a  body  of 
cavalry  across  the  mountains  on  his  left,  beyond  the 
Guy  river,  as  far  as  the  village  of  IHran^,  to  men- 
ace the  front  and  right  flank  of  Picton's  position  at 


62G 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR 


[Book  XXI. 


lluarte.  The  other  two  divisions  of  infantry  he  es- 
-abliehcd  at  tlie  village  of  Zabaldica  in  the  Val  de 
Znbiri,  close  under  Cole's  right,  and  meanwhile 
Olauzel  seized  the  village  of  Sauroren  close  under 
that  general's  left. 

While  tlie  French  general  thus  formed  his  line  of 
battle,  lord  Wellington,  who  had  quitted  sir  Row- 
land Hill's  quarters  in  the  Bastan  very  early  on  the 
27th,  crossed  the  main  ridge  and  descended  the  val- 
ley of  Lanz  without  having  been  able  to  learn  any 
thing  of  Picton's  movements  or  position,  and  in  this 
Btate  of  uncertainty  reached  Ostiz.  a  few  miles  from 
Sauroren,  where  he  found  general  Long  with  the 
brigade  of  light  cavalry  which  had  furnished  the 
posts  of  correspondence  in  the  mountains.  Here 
learning  that  Picton  having  abandoned  the  heights 
of  Linzoain  was  moving  on  Huarte,  he  left  his  quar- 
termaster-general with  instructions  to  stop  all  the 
troops  coming  down  the  valley  of  Lanz  until  the 
etate  of  alTairs  at  Huarte  should  be  ascertained. 
Then  at  racing  speed  he  made  for  Sauroren.  As 
he  entered  that  village  he  saw  Clauzel's  divisions 
moving  from  Zabuldica  along  the  crest  of  the  moun- 
tain, and  it  was  clear  that  the  allied  troops  in  the 
valley  of  Lanz  were  intercepted,  wherefore  pulling 
up  his  horse  he  wrote  on  tire  parapet  of  the  bridge 
of  Sauroren  fresh  instructions  to  turn  every  thing 
from  that  valley  to  the  right,  by  a  road  which  led 
through  Lizasso  and  Marcalain  behind  the  hills  to 
the  village  of  Oricain,  tiiat  is  to  say,  in  rear  of  the 
position  now  occupied  by  Cole.  Lord  Fitzroy  Som- 
erset, t!ie  only  staft-cfficer  who  had  kept  up  with 
him,  gjJloped  with  these  orders  out  of  Sauroren  by 
one  road,  the  French  light  cavalry  dashed  in  by  an- 
other, and  the  English  general  rode  alone  up  the 
mountain  to  reach  his  troops.  One  of  Campbell's 
Portuguese  battalions  first  descried  him  and  raised 
a  cry  of  joy,  and  the  shrill  clamour  caught  up  by 
the  next  regiments  swelled  as  it  ran  along  the  line 
into  that  stern  and  appalling  shout  which  the  Brit- 
ish soldier  is  wont  to  give  upon  the  edge  of  battle, 
and  which  no  enemy  ever  heard  unmoved.  Lord 
Wellington  suddenly  stopped  in  a  conspicuous  place, 
he  desired  that  both  armies  should  know  he  was 
there,  and  a  double  spy  who  was  present  pointed  out 
Soult,  then  so  near  that  his  features  could  be  plain- 
ly distinguished.  The  English  general,  it  is  said, 
fixed  his  eyes  attentively  upon  this  formidable  man, 
and  speaking  as  if  to  himself,  said,  "  Yonder  is  a 
greai  commander,  but  he  is  a  cautious  one  and  will 
delay  his  attack  to  ascertain  the  cause  of  these 
cheers;  that  will  give  time  for  the  sixth  division  to 
arrive  and  I  shall  beat  him."  And  certain  it  is 
that  the  French  general  made  no  serious  attack 
that  day. 

The  position  adopted  by  Cole  jvas  the  summit  of 
a  mountain  mass  which  filled  all  the  space  between 
the  Guy  and  the  Lanz  rivers  as  far  back  as  Huarte 
and  Villalba.  It  was  highest  in  the  centre,  and 
boldly  defined  towards  the  enemy,  but  the  trace  was 
irregular,  the  right  being  thrown  back  towards  the 
village  of  Arietta  so  as  to  flank  the  high  road  to 
Huarte.  This  road  was  also  swept  by  some  guns 
placed  on  a  lower  range,  or  neck,  connecting  the 
right  of  Cole  with  Picton  and  Morillo. 

Overlooking  Zabaldica  and  the  Guy  river  was  the 
bulging  hill  vindicated  by  the  Spaniards;  it  was  a 
distinct  point  on  the  right  of  the  fiuirth  division,  de- 
pendent upon  the  centre  of  the  position,  but  consid- 
erably lower.  The  left  of  tlie  position  also  abating 
in  heiglit  was  yet  extremely  rugged  and  steep, 
overloolving  the  Lanz  river  and  tlio  road  to  Villalba. 
General  Ross's  brigade  of  the  fourth  division  was 
posted  on  that  eid^,  having  a  Portuguese  battalion, 


whose  flank  rested  on  a  small  chapel,  irt  his  front 
General  Cami)bell  was  on  tiie  right  of  Ross.  Gen- 
eral Anson  was  on  the  highest  ground,  j)artly  be- 
hind, and  partly  on  the  right  of  Campbell.  General 
Byng's  brigade  was  on  a  second  mass  of  hills  in  re- 
serve, and  the  Spanish  hill  was  reinforced  by  a  bat- 
talion of  the  fourth  Portuguese  regiment. 

The  front  of  battle  being  less  than  two  miles  waa 
well  filled,  and  the  Lanz  and  Guy  river  washed  the 
flanks.  Those  torrents,  continuing  their  course, 
break  by  narrow  passages  through  the  steep  ridges 
of  San  Miguel  and  San  Cristoval,  and  then  flowing 
past  Huarte  and  Villalba  meet  behind  those  plains 
to  form  the  Argo  river.  On  the  ridges  thus  cleft  by 
the  waters  the  second  line  was  posted,  that  is  to 
say,  at  the  distance  of  two  miles  from,  and  nearly 
parallel  to  the  first  position,  but  on  a  more  extend- 
ed front.  Picton's  left  was  at  Huarte,  his  right, 
strengthened  with  a  battery,  stretched  to  the  village 
of  Goraitz,  covering  more  than  a  mile  of  ground  on 
that  flank.  Morillo  prolonged  Picton's  le!t  along 
the  crest  of  San  Miguel  to  Villalba,  and  O'Donel 
continued  the  line  to  San  Cristoval ;  Carlos  d'Espa- 
na's  division  maintained  the  blockade  behind  these 
ridges,  and  the  British  cavalry  under  general  Cot- 
ton, coming  up  from  Tafalla  and  Olite,  took  post, 
the  heavy  brigades  on  some  open  ground  behind 
Picton,  the  hussar  brigade  on  his  right.  This 
second  line  being  on  a  wider  trace  than  the  first 
and  equally  v/ell  filled  with  troops,  entirely  barred 
the  openings  of  the  two  valleys  leading  down  to 
Pampeluna. 

Soult's  position  was  also  a  mountain  filling  the 
space  between  the  two  rivers.  It  was  even  more 
rugged  than  the  allies'  mountain,  and  thej'  were  on- 
ly separated  by  a  deep  narrow  valley,  Clauzel's 
three  divisions  leaned  to  the  right  on  the  village  of 
Sauroren,  which  was  quite  down  in  the  valley  of 
Lanz,  and  close  under  the  chapel  height  where  the 
left  of  the  fourth  division  was  posted.  His  left  waa 
prolonged  by  two  of  Reille's  divisions,  V'liicli  also 
occupied  the  village  of  Zabaldica  quite  down  in  the 
valley  of  Zubiri  under  the  right  of  the  allies.  The 
remaining  division  of  this  wing  and  a  division  of 
cavalry  were,  as  I  have  before  stated,  thrown  for- 
ward on  the  mountains  on  the  other  side  of  the  Guy 
river,  menacing  Picton  and  seeking  for  an  opportu- 
nity to  communicate  with  the  garrison  of  Pampe- 
luna. Some  guns  were  pushed  in  front  of  Zabaldi- 
ca, but  the  elevation  required  to  send  the  shot  up- 
ward rendered  their  fire  ineffectual,  and  the  greatest 
part  of  the  artillery  remained  therefore  in  the  nar- 
row valley  of  Zubiri. 

COMBAT    OF    THE    27tH. 

Soult's  first  eflTort  was  to  gain  the  Spaniards'  hill 
and  establish  himself  near  the  centre  of  the  allies' 
line  of  battle.  'J'he  attack  was  vigorous,  but  the 
French  were  valiantly  repulsed  about  the  time  lord 
Wellington  arrived,  and  he  immediately  reinforced 
that  post  with  the  fortieth  British  regiment.  There 
was  then  a  general  skirmish  along  the  front,  under 
cover  of  which  Soult  carefully  examined  the  whole 
position,  and  the  firing  continued  on  the  mountain- 
side until  evening,  when  a  terrible  storm,  the  usual 
precursor  of  English  battles  in  the  Peninsula, 
brought  on  premature  darkness  and  terminated  th«» 
dispute.  This  was  the  state  of  aflairs  at  daybreah 
on  the  28th,  but  a  signal  alteration  had  ])lace  before 
the  great  battle  of  that  day  commenced,  and  the 
movements  of  the  wandering  divisions  by  which  lliia 
change  was  efl'ected  must  now  be  traced. 

It  has  been  shown  that  the  Lanz  covered  the  left 
of  the  allies  and  the  right  of  the  French.     Never- 


I813.J 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


627 


theless  the  lieig-hts  occupied  by  either  army  were 
jirolongcd  beyond  tl;-:it  river,  the  continuation  of  the 
allies'  ridtre  sweeping  forward  so  as  to  look  into  the 
re:ir  of  Hauroren,  while  the  continuation  of  the 
French  heights  fell  back  in  a  direction  nearly  paral- 
li^i  to  tlie  forward  inclination  of  the  opposing  ridge. 
'J'hoy  were  botb  steep  and  high,  yet  lower  and  less 
rugged  than  the  heights  on  which  the  armies  stood 
opposed,  for  the  latter  were  mountains  where  rocks 
j)iljd  on  rocks  stood  out  like  castles,  difficult  to  ap- 
proach and  so  dangerous  to  assail  that  the  hardened 
veterans  of  the  Peninsula  only  would  have  dared  the 
trial.  Now  the  road  by  which  the  sixth  division 
marched  on  the  27tli,  after  clearing  the  pass  of  Dona 
Maria,  sends  one  branch  to  I.anz,  another  to  Ostiz, 
a  third  tlirough  Lizasso,  and  Marcalain  :  the  first 
and  second  fall  into  the  road  from  Bellate  and  de- 
scend the  valley  of  I;anz  to  Sauroren ;  the  third 
passing  behind  the  ridges  just  described  as  prolong- 
ing the  positions  of  the  armies,  also  falls  into  tlie 
valley  of  Lanz,  but  at  the  village  of  Oricain,  that 
is  to  say,  one  mile  behind  the  ground  occupied  by 
general  Cole's  left. 

It  was  by  this  road  of  Marcalain  that  Wellington 
now  expected  the  sixth  and  seventh  divisions,  but 
the  rapidity  with  which  Soult  seized  Sauroren  caus- 
ed a  delay  of  eighteen  hours.  For  the  sixth  divis- 
ion having  reached  Olague  in  the  valley  of  Lanz 
about  one  o'clock  on  the  27th,  halted  there  until 
four,  and  then  following  the  orders  brought  by  lord 
Fitzroy  Somerset  marched  by  Lizasso  to  gain  the 
Marcalain  road;  but  the  great  length  of  these 
snountnin  marches,  and  the  heavy  storm  which  had 
nrmin'.ted  the  action  at  Zabaldica  sweeping  with 
equal  violence  in  this  direction,  prevented  the  divis- 
ioL  from  passing  Lizasso  tliat  night.  However  the 
in-iTc.  .  was  renewed  at  daylight  on  tiie  28th,  and 
meanwhile  general  Hill,  having  quitted  the  Bastan 
o  I  the  evening  of  tlie  27th,  reached  the  town  of 
Lanz  on  the  morning  of  the  28th,  and  rallying  gen- 
eral I/ong's  cavalry  and  his  own  artillery,  which 
were  in  that  valley,  moved  likewise  upon  Lizasso. 
At  that  pla.-e  he  met  the  seventh  division  coming 
from  St.  Estevan,  and  having  restored  general 
Barnes's  brigade  to  lord  Dalhousie,  took  a  position 
on  a  ridge  covering  the  road  to  Marcalain.  The 
seventh  division  being  on  his  right  was  in  military 
communication  witli  the  sixth  division,  and  thus 
lord  Wellington's  left  was  prolonged,  and  covered 
the  great  road  leading  from  Pampeluna  by  Yrurzun 
to  Tolosa.  And  during  these  important  movements, 
which  were  not  completed  until  tlie  evening  of  the 
2^th,  whicii  brought  six  thousand  men  into  the 
allies'  line  of  battle,  and  fifteen  thousand  more  into 
military  communication  with  their  left,  D'Erlou 
remained  planted  in  his  position  of  observation  near 
El'snndo ! 

Tiie  near  approacli  of  the  sixth  division  early  on 
the  morning  of  the  28th  and  the  certainty  of  Hill's 
junction,  made  Wellington  imagine  that  Soult 
would  not  venture  an  attack,  and  certainly  that 
marslial,  disquieted  about  D'Erlon.  of  whom  he  only 
knew  that  he  had  not  followed  his  instructions, 
viewed  the  strong  position  of  his  adversary  with 
uneasy  anticipations.  Again  with  anxious  eyes  he 
took  cognizance  of  all  its  rugged  strengtii,  and 
peemed  dubious  and  distrustful  of  his  fortune.  He 
could  not  operate  with  advantage  by  his  own  left 
beyond  the  (iuy  river,  because  the  mountains  there 
were  rough,  and  Wellington  having  shorter  lines  of 
movement  could  meet  him  with  all  arms  combined  : 
and  meanwhile  the  French  artillery,  unable  to 
emerge  from  the  Val  de  Ziibiri  except  by  the  Hu- 
arte  road,  would  have  beer,  exposed  to  a  counter  at- 


tack, lie  crossed  the  Lanz  river  and  ascendfvd  the 
prolongation  of  the  allies'  ridge,  which,  as  he  had 
possession  of  the  bridge  of  Sauroren,  was  for  the 
moment  his  own  ground  From  this  height  he 
could  see  all  the  left  and  rear  of  Cole's  position, 
looking  down  the  valley  of  Lanz  as  far  as  Villalba, 
but  the  country  beyond  the  ridge  towards  Marcalain 
was  so  broken  that  h.e  could  not  discern  the  march 
of  the  sixth  division;  he  knew,  however,  from  the 
deserters,  that  M  cllington  expected  four  fresh  divis- 
ions from  that  side,  that  is  to  say,  the  second,  sixth, 
and  sevcntii  British,  and  Sylveira's  Portuguese  di 
vision,  which  always  marched  witli  Hill  This  in- 
formation and  the  nature  of  the  ground  decided  the 
plan  of  attack.  The  valley  of  Lanz  growing  wider 
as  it  descended,  offered  the  means  of  assailing  the 
allies'  left  in  front  and  rear  at  one  moment,  and  the 
same  combination  would  cut  off'  the  reinforcements 
expected  from  the  side  of  Marcalain. 

One  of  Clauzel's  divisions  already  occupied  Sauro- 
ren, and  the  other  two  coming  from  tiie  mountain 
took  post  upon  each  side  of  that  village.  The  di- 
vision on  the  right  hand  was  ordered  to  throw  some 
flankers  on  the  ridge  from  whence  Soult  was  taking 
his  observations,  and  upon  a  signal  given  to  move 
in  one  body  to  a  convenient  distance  down  the  val- 
ley, and  then  wheeling  to  its  left,  assail  the  rear  of 
tlie  allies'  left  flank  while  the  other  two  divisions 
advancing  from  their  respective  positions  near  Sau- 
roren assailed  the  front.  Cole's  left,  whicli  did  not 
exceed  Ave  thousand  men,  would  thus  be  enveloped 
by  sixteen  thousand,  and  Soult  expected  to  crush  it 
notwithstanding  the  strength  of  the  ground.  Mean- 
while Reille's  two  divisions  advancing  from  the 
mountain  on  the  side  of  Zabaldica,  were  each  to 
send  a  brigade  against  the  hill  occupied  by  the  for- 
tieth regiment;  the  right  of  this  attack  was  to  be 
connected  with  the  left  of  Clauzel,  the  remaining 
brigades  were  closely  to  support  the  assailing  mass- 
es, the  divisions  beyond  the  Guy  were  to  keep  Pic- 
ton  in  check,  and  Soult,  who  had  no  time  to  lose, 
ordered  his  lieutenants  to  throw  their  troops  frankly 
and  at  once  into  action. 

FIRST    BATTLE    OF    SAUROREN. 

It  was  on  the  fourth  anniversary  of  the  battle  of 
Talavera. 

About  mid-day  the  French  gathered  at  the  foot 
of  the  position,  and  their  skirmishers,  rushing  for- 
ward, spread  over  the  face  of  the  mountain,  work- 
ing upward  like  a  conflagration  ;  but  the  columns  of 
attack  were  not  all  prepared,  when  Clauzel's  divis- 
ion in  the  valley  of  I/anz,'too  impatient  to  await 
the  general  signal  of  battle,  threw  out  its  flankers 
on  the  ridge  beyond  tlie  river  and  pushed  down  the 
valley  in  one  mass.  With  a  rapid  pace  it  turned 
Cole's  left  and  was  preparing  to  wheel  up  on  his 
rear,  when  a  Portuguese  brigade  of  the  sixth  divis- 
ion, suddeidy  appearing  on  the  crest  of  the  ridge 
beyond  the  river,  drove  the  French  flankers  back 
and  instantly  descended  with  a  rattling  fire  upon 
the  right  and  rear  of  the  column  in  the  valley 
And  almost  at  the  same  instant,  the  main  body  of 
the  sixth  division  emerging  from  behind  the  fame 
ridge,  near  the  village  of  Oricain,  formed  in  order 
of  battle  across  the  front.  It  was  the  counter- 
stroke  of  Salamanca  !  The  French,  striving  to  en- 
compass the  left  of  the  allies,  were  themselves  en- 
compassed, for  two  brigades  of  the  fourth  division 
turned  and  smote  them  from  the  lefl,  the  Portuguese 
smote  them  from  the  right;  and  while  thus  scathed 
on  both  flanks  with  fire,  they  were  violently  shocked 
and  puslied  back  with  a  mighty  forre  by  the  sixth 
division,  yet  not  in  flght,  but  figliting  fiercely  and 


628 


NA. 


CR'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XXI. 


strewinar  the  gfround  with  their  enemies'  bodies  as 
well  as  with  their  own. 

Clauzel's  second  division,  seeing  this  dire  con- 
flict, with  a  hurried  movement  assailed  the  chapel 
height  to  draw  oiF  the  tire  from  the  troops  in  the 
valley,  and  gallantly  did  the  French  soldiers  throng 
up  tne  craggy  steep,  but  the  general  unity  of  the 
attack  was  ruined  ;  neither  their  third  division  nor 
Reillc's  brigades  had  yet  received  the  signal,  and 
tlieir  attacks,  instead  of  being  simultaneous,  were 
made  in  succession,  running  from  right  to  left  as 
the  necessity  of  aiding  the  others  become  apparent. 
It  was,  however,  a  terrible  battle  and  well  fought. 
One  column  darting  out  of  the  village  of  Sauroren, 
silently,  sternly,  without  firing  a  shot,  worked  up  to 
the  chapjl  under  a  tempest  of  bullets  which  swept 
away  whole  ranks  without  abatinsr  the  speed  and 
power  of  the  mass.  The  seventh  catjadores  shrutik 
abashed,  and  that  part  of  the  position  was  won. 
hiooa,  however,  they  rallied  upon  general  Ross's 
IJritish  brigade,  and  the  whole  running  forward 
charged  the  French  with  a  loud  shout  and  dashed 
them  down  the  hill.  Heavily  stricken  they  were, 
yet  ui;dismiyed,  and  recovering  their  ranks  again, 
they  ascended  in  the  same  manner  to  be  again  bro- 
ken and  overturned.  But  the  other  columns  of  at- 
tack were  now  bearing  upwards  tiirougli  the  smoke 
and  flame  with  which  the  skirmishers  had  covered 
the  face  of  the  mountain,  and  the  tenth  Portuguese 
regiment,  fighting  on  the  right  of  Ross's  brigade, 
yielded  to  their  fury;  a  heavy  body  crowned  the 
heights,  and  wheeling  against  the  exposed  flank  of 
Ross  forced  that  gallant  officer  also  to  go  back. 
His  ground  was  instantly  occupied  by  the  enemies 
with  whom  he  had  been  engaged  in  front,  and  the 
light  raged  close  and  desperate  on  the  crest  of  the 
position  ;  charge  succeeded  charge,  and  each  side 
yielded  and  recovered  by  turns  ;  yet  this  astounding 
etfort  of  French  valour  was  of  li'tle  avail  Lord 
Wellington  brought  Byng's  brigade  forward  at  a 
running  pace,  and  sent  the  twenty-seventh  and  for- 
ty-eighth British  regiments,  belonging  to  Anson's 
brigade,  down  from  the  higher  ground  in  the  centre 
against  the  crowded  masses,  rolling  them  back- 
ward in  disorder  and  throwing  them  one  after  the 
other  violently  down  the  mountain-side  ;  and  with 
no  child's  play  ;  the  two  British  regiments  fell  upon 
the  enemy  tiiree  separate  times  with  the  bayonet, 
and  lost  more  tlian  half  their  own  numbers. 

During  this  battle  on  the  mountain-top.  the  Brit- 
ish brigarles  of  the  sixth  division,  strengthened  by 
a  battery  of  guns,  gained  ground  in  tlie  valley  of 
Lanz  and  arrived  on  the  same  front  with  the  left  of 
the  victorious  troops  about  the  chapel.  liord  Wel- 
lington then  seeing  the  momentary  disorder  of  the 
enemy,  ordered  Madden's  Portuguese  brigade,  which 
had  never  ceased  its  fire  against  the  right  flank  of 
the  French  column,  to  assail  tlie  village  of  Sauro- 
ren in  the  rear,  but  the  state  of  the  action  in  other 
parts  and  the  exhaustion  of  the  troops  soon  induced 
him  to  countermand  this  movement.  IMeanwhile 
Reille's  brigades,  connecting  their  right  with  the 
lefl  of  Clxuzel's  third  division,  had  environed  the 
Spanish  hill,  ascended  it  unchecked,  and  at  the  mo- 
ment when  the  fourth  division  was  so  hardly  press- 
ed made  the  regiment  of  I''l  Pravia  give  way  on  the 
left  of  the  fortieth.  A  Portuguese  battalion  rush- 
ing forward  covered  the  flank  of  tiiat  invincible  reg- 
iment, which  wiited  in  stern  silence  until  the 
French  set  their  feet  upon  the  broad  summit;  but 
wiien  their  glitt?ring  arms  appeared  over  the  brow 
of  tlie  mountain,  tlie  charging  cry  was  heard,  the 
crowded  mass  was  broken  to  pieces,  and  a  tempest 
of  bulljts  followed  its  flgl.t.     Four  fmes  t!.is  as- 


sault was  renewed,  and  the  French  officers  were 
seen  to  pull  up  their  tired  men  by  the  belts,  so  fierce 
and  resolute  they  were  to  win.  It  was,  however, 
the  labour  oi'  Sisyphus.  The  veiienient  shout  and 
shock  of  tiie  British  soldier  always  prevailed,  and  at 
last,  with  thinned  ranks,  tired  llmb^■,  hearts  faint- 
ing, aiid  hopeless  from  rejioated  failures,  tLcy  were 
so  abashed  that  three  British  companies  sufliced  to 
bear  down  a  whole  brigade. 

While  the  battle  was  thus  being  fought  on  the 
height,  tho  French  cavalry  beyond  the  Cuy  river, 
passed  a  rivulet,  and  with  a  fire  of  carbines  forced 
the  tenth  hussars  to  yield  some  rockj^  ground  on 
Picton's  right,  but  the  eighteenth  hussars  having 
better  fire-arms  than  the  tenth,  renewed  the  combat, 
killed  two  ofilcers,and  finally  drove  the  French  over 
the  rivulet  again. 

Such  were  the  leading  events  of  this  sanguinary 
struggle,  which  lord  Wellington,  fresh  from  the 
fight,  with  homely  emphasis  called  "  blvdgpon  work." 
Two  generals  and  eighteen  hundred  men  had  been 
killed  or  wounded  on  the  French  side,  fiL/llowirg 
their  official  reports,  a  number  far  below  the  esti- 
mate made  at  the  time  by  the  allies,  whose  loss 
amounted  to  two  thousand  six  hundred.  These  dis- 
crepancies between  hostile  calculations  ever  occur, 
and  there  is  little  wisdom  in  disputing  where  proof 
is  unattainable  ;  but  the  numbers  actually  engag- 
ed were,  of  French,  twenty-five  thousand,  of  the 
allies  twelve  thousand,  and  if  the  strength  of  the 
latter's  position  did  not  save  them  from  the  greater 
loss,  their  steadfast  courage  is  to  be  the  more  ad- 
mired. 

The  29th,  the  armies  reste-d  in  position  without 
firing  a  shot,  but  the  wandering  divisions  on  bcth 
sides  were  now  entering  the  line. 

General  Hill,  having  sent  all  iiis  baggage,  artil- 
lery and  wounded  men  to  Berioplano,  beliind  the 
Crlstoval  ridge,  still  occupied  his  strong  ground 
between  Lizasso  and  Arestegui,  covering  tlio  Mur- 
calain  and  Yrurzun  roads,  and  menacing  that  lead- 
ing from  Lizasso  to  Olague  in  the  rear  of  Soult's 
right.  His  comnmnication  with  Oricaln  was  main- 
tained by  the  seventh  division,  and  the  light  divis- 
ion was  approaching  his  left.  Thus  on  Welling- 
ton's side  the  crisis  was  over.  He  had  vindicated 
his  position  with  only  sixteen  thousand  combatants, 
and  now,  including  the  troops  still  maintaining  the 
blockade,  he  had  fifty  thousand,  twenty  thousand 
being  British,  in  close  military  combination.  Thir- 
ty thousand,  flushed  with  recent  success,  were  in 
hand,  and  Hill's  troops  were  well  placed  for  retuk- 
ing  the  offensive. 

Soult's  situation  was  proportionably  difficult. 
Finding  that  he  could  not  force  the  allies'  position 
in  front,  he  had  sent  his  artillery,  part  of  his  cavalry 
and  ills  wounded  men  back  to  France  immediately 
after  the  battle,  ordering  the  two  former  to  join  Vil- 
latte  on  the  lower  Bidassoa  and  tiiere  await  further 
instructions.  Having  shaken  off  this  burden,  he 
awaited  D'Erlon's  arrival  by  the  valley  of  l.anz, 
and  that  general  reached  Ostiz  a  few  miles  above 
Sauroren  at  mid-day  on  the  29th,  bringing  intelli- 
gence, obtained  indirectly  during  his  march,  that 
general  Graham  had  retired  from  the  Bidassoa  and 
Villatte  had  crossed  that  river.  This  gave  Soult  a 
hope  that  his  first  movements  had  disengaged  San 
Sebastian,  and  he  instantly  oonccived  a  new  plen 
of  oi)erations,  dangerous  Indeed  yet  conibrmable  to 
the  critical  state  of  his  aflairs. 

No  success  was  to  be  ex[)ectcd  from  onotlior  at- 
tack, yet  he  could  not  at  the  moment  o^'  being  rein- 
forced with  eighteen  thousand  men,  retire  by  the 
road  he  came  witiiout  some  dishonour;  nor  cuuld  he 


1813.^ 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


029 


HMnain  where  he  was.  because  his  supplies  of  pro- 
visions and  ammunition,  derived  from  distant  mag- 
azines by  slow  and  small  convoys,  was  unequal  to 
t'le  consumption.  Two-thirds  of  the  British  troops, 
the  i^reatest  part  of  the  Portuguese,  and  all  the 
Spaniards  were,  as  he  supposed,  assembled  in  his 
front  under  Wellington,  or  on  his  right  flank  under 
Hill,  and  it  was  probable  that  otlier  reinforcements 
were  on  the  march;  wherefore  he  resolved  to  pro- 
lonj;-  his  right  with  D'Erlon's  corps,  and  then  cau- 
tioui^ly  drawing  off  the  rest  of  his  army  place  him- 
self b.-^twecn  the  allies  and  the  IJastan,  in  military 
connexion  with  his  reserve  and  closer  to  his  fron- 
tier magazines.  Thus  posted  and  able  to  combine 
all  his  troops  in  one  operation,  he  expected  to  re- 
lieve San  Sebastian  entirely  and  profit  from  the  new 
state  of  affairs. 

In  the  evening  of  the  29th,  the  second  division 
of  cavalry,  wiiich  was  in  the  valley  of  Zubiri,  pass- 
ed over  tiie  position  to  the  valley  of  Lanz,  and  join- 
ed D'Erlon,  who  was  ordered  to  march  early  on  the 
S()th  by  Etulain  upon  Lizasso,  sending  out  strong 
scouting  parties  to  his  left  on  all  the  roads  leading 
upon  Pampeluna,  and  also  towards  Letassa  and  Yrur- 
zun.  During  the  ii'ght  the  first  division  of  cavalry 
and  La  Martiniere's  division  of  infantry,  both  at 
Elcano  on  the  extreme  left  of  the  Frsnch  army,  re- 
tired over  the  mountains  by  Illurdos  to  Engui,  in 
the  upper  part  of  the  valley  of  the  Zubiri,  having 
orders  to  cross  the  separating  ridge,  enter  the  val- 
ley of  Lanz  and  join  D'Erlon.  The  remainder  of 
lleille's  wing  was,  at  the  same  time,  to  march  by 
tlie  crest  of  the  position  from  Zabaldica  to  the  vil- 
lage of  Sauroren,  and  gradually  relieve  Clauzel's 
troops,  which  were  then  to  assemble  behind  Sauro- 
r>!n,  that  is  to  say,  towards  Ostiz,  and  thus  follow- 
ing the  march  of  D'f'rlon  were  to  be  themselves 
followed  in  like  manner  by  Reille's  troops.  To 
cover  these  last  movements,  Clauzel  detached  two 
regiments  to  occupy  the  French  heights  beyond  the 
Lanz  river,  and  they  were  also  to  maintain  his  con- 
nexion with  D'Erlon,  whose  line  of  operations  was 
ju.=t  beyond  those  heights.  He  was,  however,  to 
hold  by  Ueille  rather  than  by  D'Erlon,  until  the  for- 
mer had  perfected  his  dangerous  inarch  across  Wel- 
lington's fi-ont. 

In  the  night  of  the  29th,  Soult  heard  from  the 
deserters  that  three  divisions  were  to  make  an  offen- 
sive movement  towards  Lizasso  on  the  30th,  and 
v/lien  daylight  came  he  was  convinced  the  men 
6;)oke  truly,  because  from  a  point  beyond  Sauroren 
he  d'scerned  certain  columns  descending  the  ridge 
of  Cristoval  and  the  heights  above  Oricain,  while 
others  were  in  march  on  a  wide  sweep  apparently 
to  turn  Clauzel's  right  flank.  These  columns  were 
Mor;lI;)'s  Spaniards,  Campbell's  Portuguese,  and  the 
seventh  division,  the  former  rejoining  Hill,  to  whose 
corps  they  properly  belonged,  the  others  adapting 
themselves  to  a  new  dispositon  of  Wellington's  line 
of  battle,  which  shall  be  presently  explained. 

At  six  o'clock  in  the  morning,  Foy's  division  of 
Reille's  wing  wns  in  mir.-h  along  the  crest  of  the 
mountain  from  Zabaldica  towards  Sauroren,  where 
Mauciine's  division  had  already  relieved  Conroux's  ; 
Ihe  latter,  belonging  to  Clauzel's  wing,  was  moving 
up  the  valley  of  Lanz  to  rejoin  that  general,  who 
ha.d,  with  exception  of  the  two  flanking  regiments 
before  mfntionr-d,  concentrated  his  remaining  divis- 
ions betwer^n  Olabe  and  Ostiz.  In  this  state  of 
affairs  Wellington  opened  his  batteries  from  the 
chapel  height,  sent  skirmishers  agains-t  Sauroren. 
and  the  fire  spreading  to  the  allies'  right  b'/'cnme 
br'sk  between  Cole  and  Foy.  It  subsided,  howover, 
at  Sauroren   and  Soult,  relying  on  the  strength  of 


the  position,  ordered  Reillc  to  maintain  it  until 
nightfall  unless  hardly  jiressed,  and  went  oti' liiuihelf 
at  a  gallop  to  join  D'Erlon,  for  his  design  was  to 
fall  upon  the  divisions  attempting  to  turn  his  right 
and  crush  them  with  superior  numbers:  a  dar.ng 
project,  well  and  quickly  conceived,  but  he  had  to 
deal  with  a  man  wiiose  rapid  perception  and  rough 
stroke  rendered  sleight  of  hand  dangerous,  'i  lie 
marshal  overtook  D'Erlon  at  the  moment  when 
that  general,  having  entered  the  valley  of  Ulzcma 
with  three  divisions  of  infantry  and  two  divisions 
of  heavy  cavalry,  was  making  dispositions  to  assail 
Hill,  who  was  between  Bueuza  and  Arestcgui. 

COMBAT    OF    BUENZA. 

The  allies,  who  were  about  ten  thousand  fight'ng 
men,  including  Long's  brigade  of  light  cavalry,  oc- 
cupied a  very  extensive  mountain  ridge.  Their 
right  was  strongly  posted  on  rugged  ground,  but  the 
left  prolonged  towards  Buenza  was  insecure,  and 
D'Erlon  who,  including  his  two  divisions  of  heavy 
cavalry,  had  not  less  than  twenty  thousand  sabres 
and  bayonets,  was  followed  by  La  Martinitre's  di- 
vision of  infantry  now  coming  from  Lanz.  Soult's 
combination  was  therefore  extremely  pov.erful. 
The  light  troops  were  already  engaged  when  he  ar- 
rived, and  the  same  soldiers  on  both  sides  v.ho  had 
so  strenuously  combated  at  Maya  on  the  25th  were 
again  opposed  to  each  other. 

D'Armagnac's  division  was  directed  to  make  a 
false  attack  u!)on  Hill's  right;  Abbe's  divisicn, 
emerging  by  Lizasso,  endeavoured  to  turn  the  allies' 
left,  and  gain  the  summit  of  the  ridge  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Buenza  ;  iMaransin  followed  Abbe,  and  the 
divisions  of  cavalry,  entering  the  line,  supported 
and  connected  the  two  attacks.  The  action  was 
brisk  at  both  points:  but  D'Arniagnac,  pushing  his 
feint  too  far,  became  seriously  engaged,  end  was 
beaten  by  Da  Costa  and  Ashworth's  Portuguese, 
aided  by  a  part  of  the  twenty-eighth  British  regi- 
ment. Nor  were  the  French  at  first  more  succets- 
ful  on  the  other  flank,  being  repeatedly  repulsed,  un- 
til Abbe,  turning  that  wing,  gained  the  summit  of 
the  mountain  and  rendered  the  position  untenable 
General  Hill,  who  had  lost  about  four  hundred  men. 
then  retired  to  the  heights  of  Eguarcs  behind  Aves- 
tegui  and  Berasin,  thus  drawing  towards  ilarca- 
lain  with  his  right  and  throwing  back  his  left. 
Here  being  joined  by  Campbell  and  Morillo  he  again 
offered  battle  ;  but  Soult,  whose  principal  loss  was 
in  D'.\rmagnac'8  division,  had  now  gained  his  main 
object:  he  had  turned  HiU's  left,  secured  a  fresh 
line  of  retreat,  a  shorter  communication  with  Yil- 
latte  by  the  pass  of  Dono  Maria,  and  withal,  the 
great  Yrurzun  road  to  Toloso,  distant  only  one  league 
and  a  half,  was  in  his  power.  His  first  tliought, 
was  to  seize  it  and  march  through  Lecumberri  either 
uj)on  Tolosa,  or  Andoain  and  Ernani.  There  was 
nothing  to  oppose  except  the  light  divisicn,  whose 
movements  shall  be  noticed  hereafter;  but  neither 
the  French  marshal  nor  general  Hill  knew  of  its 
presence,  and  the  former  thought  himself  strong 
enough  to  force  his  way  to  San  Sebastian  and 
there  unite  with  Yillattc  and  his  artillery,  which, 
following  his  previous  orders,  was  now  on  the  lower 
Bidassoa. 

This  project  was  feasible.  la  Martini*"  re's  divis- 
ion of  Reille's  wing,  coming  from  T  anz,  wes  not  far 
off.  Clauzel's  th.rfie  divisions  were  mcmentarily 
expected,  and  Heillo's  during  the  night.  On  tlie 
:31st,  therefore,  Soult,  with  at  least  fifty  thousand 
men,  would  have  broken  into  Guipuscoa,  tliruKting 
aside  the  light  diviskm  in  his  march,  and  menacing 
sir   Thomas   Graham's   position   in   reverse,  while 


630 


NAPIER'S      ENINSULAR  WAR. 


[Book  XXI. 


Villatte's  reserve  attacked  it  in  front.  The  country 
about  Lecuinberri  was,  however,  very  strong'  for  de- 
lence,  and  lord  Wellington  would  have  tbllowed,  yet 
scarcely  in  time,  for  he  did  not  suspect  his  views, 
and  was  ignorant  of  his  strength,  thinking  D'Erlon's 
force  to  be  originally  two  divisions  of  infantry,  end 
now  only  reinforced  with  a  third  division,  whereas, 
that  general  had  three  divisions  originally,  and  was 
now  reinforced  by  a  fourth  division  of  infantry  and 
two  of  cavalry.  This  error,  however,  did  not  pre- 
vent him  from  seizing  with  the  rapidity  of  a  great 
commander,  the  decisive  point  of  operation,  and  giv- 
ing a  counter-stroke  which  Sonlt,  trusting  to  the 
strength  of  Reille's  position,  little  expected. 

When  Wellington  saw  that  La  Martiniere's  divis- 
ion and  the  cavalry  had  abandoned  the  mountains 
above  Elcano,  and  that  Zabaldica  was  evacuated,  he 
ordered  Picton,  reinforced  with  two  squadrons  of  ca- 
valry and  a  battery  of  artillery,  to  enter  the  valley 
of  Zubiri  and  turn  the  French  left;  the  seventh  di- 
vision was  directed  to  sweep  over  the  hills  beyond 
the  Lanz  river  upon  the  French  right ;  the  march 
of  Campbell  and  .Morillo  ensured  the  communication 
with  Hill  ;  and  that  general  was  to  point  his  col- 
umns upon  Olague  and  Lanz,  threatening  the  French 
rear;  but  meeting,  as  we  have  seen,  with  D'Erlon, 
w:is  forced  back  to  Eguaros.  The  fourth  division 
v/as  to  assail  Foy's  position,  but  respecting  its  great 
•strength  the  attack  was  to  be  measured  according 
to  the  effect  produced  on  the  flanks.  Meanwhile 
Byng's  brigade  and  the  sixth  division,  the  latter 
having  a  Lattery  of  g;::ns  and  some  squadrons  of  ca- 
valry, were  combined  to  assault  Sauroren.  L'Abis- 
pal's  Spaniards  followed  the  sixth  division.  Fane's 
horsemen  were  stationed  at  Berioplano  with  a  de- 
tachment pushed  to  Yrurzun,  the  heavy  cavalry  re- 
mained behind  Muarte,  and  Carlos  d'Espaiia  main- 
tained the  blockade. 

•  SECOND  BATTLE  OF  SAUROREN. 

Thepp  movements  began  at  daylight.  Picton's 
advance  was  rapid.  He  gained  the  valley  of  Zubiri 
and  threw  his  skirmishers  at  once  on  Foy's  flank, 
and  r»hout  the  same  time  general  Inglis,  one  of  those 
vefrans  who  purchase  every  step  of  promotion  with 
thai;  blood,  advancing  with  only  live  hundred  men 
of  ihe  seventh  division,  broke  at  one  shock  the  two 
French  regiments  covering  Clauzel's  right,  and 
drove  them  down  into  the  valley  of  Lanz.  He  lost, 
indeed,  one-third  of  his  own  men,  but  instantly 
spreading  the  remainder  in  skirmishing  order  along 
the  descent,  opened  a  biting  fire  upon  the  flank  of 
Conroux's  division,  which  was  then  moving  up  the 
ralley  from  Sauroren,  sorely  amazed  and  disordered 
■)y  this  sudden  fall  of  two  regiments  from  the  top  of 
•„he  mountain  iiito  the  midst  of  the  column. 

Foy's  division,  marching  to  support  Conroux  and 
Maucune.  was  on  the  crest  of  the  mountains  between 
Zabaldica  and  Sauroren  at  the  moment  of  attack,  but 
too  far  off  to  give  aid,  and  his  own  l-'ght  troops  were 
engaged  with  the  skirmishers  of  the  fourth  division  ; 
and  Inglis  had  been  so  sudden  and  vigorous,  that  be- 
fore the  evil  could  be  well  perceived  it  was  past  re- 
medy. For  Wellington  instantly  pushed  the  sixth 
divisif  n,  now  commanded  by  general  Pakenham, 
Pack  naving  been  wounded  on  the  28th,  to  the  left 
of  Sauroren,  and  shoved  Byng's  brigade  headlong 
down  from  the  chapel  height  against  that  village, 
which  was  defended  by  Maucune's  division.  Byng's 
vigorous  assault  was  simultaneously  enforced  from 
the  opposite  direction  by  .Madden's  Portuguese  of 
the  sixth  division,  and  at  the  same  time  the  battery 
near  the  chapel  sent  its  bullets  crashing  through  the 
houses  and  booming  up  the  valley  toward.-  Couro:x'£ 


column,  which  Inglis  never  ceased  to  vex,  and  he 
was  closely  supported  by  the  remainder  of  the  sev- 
enth division. 

The  village  and  bridge  of  Sauroren  and  the  straits 
beyond  were  now  covered  with  a  pall  of  smoke,  tie 
musketry  pealed  frequent  and  loud,  and  the  tumult 
and  aflray  echoing  from  mountain  to  mountain,  filled 
all  the  valley.  Byng,  with  hard  fighting,  carried 
the  village  of  Sauroren,  and  fourteen  liunured  pris- 
oners were  made,  for  the  two  French  divisions  thus 
vehemently  assailed  in  the  front  and  flank  were  en- 
tirely broken.  Part  retreated  along  the  valley  to- 
wards Clauzel's  other  divisions,  which  were  now  be- 
yond Ostiz  ;  part  fled  up  the  mountain-side  to  seek 
a  refuge  with  Foy,  who  had  remained  on  the  sum- 
mit a  helpless  spectator  of  this  rout ;  but  though  l.e 
rallied  the  fugitives  in  great  numbers,  he  had  soon 
to  look  to  himself,  for  by  this  time  his  skirmisiiers 
had  been  driven  up  the  mountain  by  those  of  tl  e 
fourth  division,  and  his  left  was  infested  by  Pictcn's 
detachments.  Thus  pressed,  he  abandoned  hisftrcrg 
position,  and  fell  back  along  the  summit  of  the  moun- 
tain between  the  valley  of  Zubiri  and  the  valley  of 
Lanz,  and  the  woods  enabled  him  to  effect  his  retreat 
without  much  loss  ;  but  he  dared  not  descend  into 
either  valley,  and  thinking  himself  entirely  cut  off, 
sent  advice  of  his  situation  to  Soult,  and  then  retir- 
ed into  the  Alduides  by  the  pass  of  Urtiaga.  Mean- 
while Wellington,  pressing  up  the  valley  of  lanz, 
drove  Clauzel  as  far  as  (Jlague,  and  the  latter,  now 
joined  by  La  Martinitre's  division,  took  a  position 
in  the  evening  covering  the  roads  of  Lanz  and  Li- 
zasso.  The  English  general,  whose  pursuit  had 
been  damped  by  hearing  of  Hill's  action,  also  halt- 
ed near  Ostiz. 

The  allies  lost  nineteen  hundred  men  killed  and 
wounded,  or  taken,  in  the  two  battles  of  this  day, 
and  of  these  nearly  twelve  hundred  were  Portuguese, 
the  soldiers  of  that  nation  having  borne  the  brunt 
of  both  fights.  On  the  French  side  the  loss  was 
enormous.  Conroux's  and  .Maucune's  divisions  were 
completely  disorganized  ;  Foy  with  eight  thousand 
men,  including  the  fugitives  he  had  rallied,  was  en- 
tirely separated  from  the  main  body  ;  two  thousand 
men  at  the  lowest  computation  had  been  killed  or 
wounded,  many  were  dispersed  in  the  woods  and  ra- 
vines, and  three  thousand  prisoners  were  taken. 
This  blow,  joined  to  former  losses,  reduced  Soult's 
fighting  men  to  thirty-five  thousand,  of  which  tie 
fifteen  thousand  under  Clauzel  and  Reille  were  dis- 
pirited by  defeat,  and  the  whole  were  placed  in  a 
most  critical  situation.  Hill's  force,  now  increased 
to  fifteen  thousand  men  by  the  junction  of  Morillo 
and  Campbell,  was  in  front,  and  thirty  thousand  were 
on  the  rear  in  the  valley  of  Lanz,  or  on  the  hills  at 
each  side,  for  the  third  division  finding  no  more  ene- 
mies in  the  valley  of  Zubiri,  had  crowned  the  heights 
in  conjunction  with  the  fourth  division. 

Lord  Wellington  had  detached  some  of  I-'AbiFpal's 
Spaniards  to  Marcalain  when  he  heard  of  Hill's  ac- 
tion, but  he  was  not  yet  aware  of  the  true  state  of 
afi'airs  on  that  side.  His  operations  were  f(:>unfled 
upon  the  notion  that  Soult  was  in  retreat  towan's 
the  Bastan.  He  designed  to  follow  closely,  pushing 
his  own  left  forward  to  support  sir  Thomas  Graham 
on  the  Bidassoa,but  always  underrating  D'Erlon 's 
troops  he  thought  La  IVLartinit  re's  division  had  re- 
treated by  the  Roncevalles  road  ;  and  as  Foy's  col- 
umn was  numerous  and  two  divisions  had  betn  brok- 
en at  Sauroren,  he  judged  the  force  immediately  un- 
der Soult  to  be  weak,  and  made  dispositions  accord- 
ingly. The  sixth  division  and  the  thirteenth  light 
dragoons  were  to  march  by  Eugiii  to  join  the  third 
division,  which  was  directed  upon  Liuzoain  and  Ron 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


631 


csvalls^s.  The  fourth  division  was  to  descend  into 
the  valloy  of  Lanz.  General  Hill,  supported  by  the 
Spaniards  at  Marcalain,  was  to  press  Soult  closely, 
always  turninpf  his  right  but  directing-  his  own 
march  upon  Lanz,  ffoni  whence  he  was  to  send 
Cain.)b'jli's  brigade  to  the  Alduides.  I'he  seventh 
division,  whicli  had  halted  on  the  ridges  between 
Hill  and  Wellington,  was  to  suller  the  fbrnier  to  cross 
ics  front  aur  then  march  for  the  pass  of  Dona  Maria. 

It  appears  from  tiiese  arrangements,  tliat  Weliino-- 
ton  expecting  >Soult  would  rejoin  Clauzel  and  make 
t'oT  the  Hiistan  by  the  pass  of  Vellate,  intended  to 
conlino  and  pre^s  him  closttly  in  that  district.  But 
tlie  French  marshal  was  in  a  worse  position  than 
his  adversary  imagined,  being  too  far  advanced  to- 
wards Buenza  to  return  to  Lanz  ;  in  line  he  was  be- 
tween two  fires  and  without  a  retreat  save  by  the  pass 
of  Dona  Maria  upon  8t.  Estevan.  Wherefore  call- 
ing in  Clauzel,  and  giving  D'Erlon,  whose  divisions 
hitherto  successful  were  in  good  order  and  undismay- 
ed, the  rear-guard,  he  commenced  his  march  soon 
after  midnight  towards  the  pass.  But  mischief  was 
thickening  around  him. 

Sir  Thomas  Graliam,  having  only  the  blockade  of 
SanlSebastian  to  maintain,  was  at  the  head  of  twen- 
ty thousand  men  ready  to  make  a  forward  movement, 
and  there  remained  besides  tiie  division  under 
Charles  Alten,  of  whose  operations  it  is  time  to 
speak.  That  general,  as  we  have  seen,  took  post  on 
the  mountains  of  Santa  Cruz  the  27th.  From  thence 
on  the  evening  of  the  28th,  he  marched  to  gain  Le- 
cumberri  on  the  great  road  of  Yrurzun  ;  but  whether 
by  orders  from  sir  Thomas  Graham  or  in  default  of 
orders,  the  difficulty  of  communication  being  extreme 
in  those  wild  regions,  I  know  not,  he  commenced  his 
descent  into  the  valley  of  Lerins  very  late.  His 
leading  brigade,  getting  down  with  some  difficulty, 
readied  Leyza  beyond  the  great  chain  by  the  pass  of 
Goriti  or  Zubieta,  but  darkness  caught  the  other  bri- 
gade, and  the  troops  dispersed  in  tliat  frightful  wil- 
derness of  woods  and  precipices.  Many  made  fagot 
torches,  waving  them  as  signals,  and  thus  moving 
about,  the  lights  served  indeed  to  assist  those  who 
carried  them,  but  misled  and  bewildered  others  who 
saw  them  at  a  distance.  The  heights  and  the  ra- 
vines were  alike  studded  witli  these  small  fires,  and 
the  soldiers  calling  to  each  other  for  directions  filled 
the  wiiole  region  with  their  clamour.  Thus  they 
continued  to  rove  and  shout  until  morning  showed 
the  face  of  the  mountain  covered  witii  tired  and  scat- 
tered men  and  animals  who  had  not  gained  half  a 
league  of  ground  beyond  their  starting  place,  and  it 
was  many  hours  ere  tliey  could  be  collected  to  join 
the  other  brigade  at  Leyza. 

General  Alten,  who  had  now  been  separated  for 
three  days  from  the  army,  sent  mounted  officers  in 
var'.ous  directions  to  obtain  tidings,  and  at  six  o'clock 
in  tlie  evening  renewed  his  march.  At  Areysa  he 
halted  for  some  time  without  suffering  fires  to  be 
liglited,  for  he  knew  nothing  of  the  enemy  and  was 
fearful  of  discovering  his  situation,  but  at  night  he 
again  moved  and  finally  established  his  bivouacs 
rear  Lecumberri  early  on  the  30th.  The  noise  of 
HU's  battle  at  Buenza  was  clearly  heard  in  the 
course  of  the  day,  and  the  light  division  was  thus 
again  comprised  in  the  immediate  system  of  opera- 
tions directed  by  Wellington  in  person.  Had  Soult 
continued  his  march  upon  Guipuscoa,  Alten  would 
have  been  in  great  danger,  but  the  French  general 
being  forced  to  retreat,  the  light  division  was  a  new 
power  thrown  into  his  opponent's  hands,  the  value 
of  which  will  be  seen  by  a  reference  to  the  peculiar- 
ity of  the  country  through  which  the  French  gen- 
eral was  now  to  move. 


I  It  has  been  shown  that  Foy,  cut  off  from  the  main 
army,  was  driven  towards  the  Alduides  ;  that  the 

j  French  artillery  and  part  of  tlie  cavalry  were  again 
on  the   Bidtissoa,  whence  Villatte,  contrary  to  tho 

1  intelligence  received  by  Soult,  had  not  advanced, 
though  he  had  skirmished  with  Longa,  leavir.g  the 

,  latter  however  in  possession  of  the  heiglits  abovi! 

j  Lesaca.     The  trooiis  under  Souk's  inunediate  com- 

i  rnand  were  therefore  completely  isolated,  and  liad 
no  resources  save  what  his  ability  and  their  own  cou- 
rage could  supply.  His  single  line  of  retreat  by  tiie 
pass  of  Dona  31aria  was  secure  as  far  as  St.  Fstevan, 
and  from  that  town  he  could  march  up  the  Bidassoa 
to  Elisondo,  and  so  gain  France  by  tlie  Col  de  Mayo, 
or  down  the  same  river  towards  Vera  by  Sumbilla 
and  Yanzi,  from  both  of  whicli  places  roads  branch- 
ing off  to  the  right  lead  over  the  mountains  to  the 
passes  of  Echallar.     There  was  also  a  third  moun- 

,  tain  road  leading  direct  from  St.  Estevan  to  Zuga- 
ramurdi  and  Urdax,  but  it  was  too  steep  and  rugged 

'  for  his  wounded  men  and  baggage. 

The  road  to  Elisondo  was  very  good,  but  that 
down  the  Bidassoa  was  a  long  and  terrible  defile, 
and  so  contracted  about  the  bridges  of  Yanzi  and 
Sumbilla  that  a  few  men  only  could  march  abreast. 
This  then  Soult  had  to  dread:  that  Wellington,  who 
by  the  pass  of  Vellate  could  reach  Elisondo  before 
him,  would  block  his  passage  on  that  side  ;  that  Gra- 
ham would  occupy  the  rocks  about  Yanzi,  blocking 
the  passage  there,  and  by  detachments  cut  off  his 
line  of  march  upon  Echallar.  Then  confined  to  the 
narrow  mountain-way  from  St.  Estevan  to  Zugara- 
murdi,  he  would  be  followed  hard  by  general  Hill, 
exposed  to  attacks  in  rear  and  flank  during  his  march, 
and  perhaps  be  headed  at  Urdax  by  the  allied  troops 
moving  through  Vellate,  Elisondo  and  the  Col  de 
Maya.  In  this  state,  his  first  object  being  to  get 
through  the  pass  of  Dona  31aria,  he  commenced  his 
retreat,  as  we  have  seen,  in  the  night  of  the  POth, 
and  Wellington,  still  deceived  as  to  the  real  state  of 
affairs,  did  not  take  the  most  fitting  measures  to  stop 
his  march  ;  that  is  to  say,  he  continued  in  his  firt-t 
design,  halting  in  the  valley  of  Lanz,  while  Hill 
passed  his  front  to  enter  the  Bastan,  into  which  dis- 
trict he  sent  Byng's  brigade  as  belonging  to  the  se- 
cond division.  But  early  on  the  31st,  when  Soult's 
real  strength  became  known,  he  directed  the  seventh 
division  to  aid  Hill,  followed  Byng  through  the  pass 
of  Vellate  with  the  remainder  of  his  forces,  and 
thinking  the  light  division  might  be  at  Zubieta  in 
the  valloy  of  Lerins,  sent  Alten  orders  to  head  the 
French  if  possible  at  St.  Estevan,  or  at  Sumbilla, 
in  fine  to  cut  in  upon  their  line  of  march  somewhere  ;. 
Longa  also  was  ordered  to  come  down  to  the  defilea 
at  Yanza,  thus  aiding  the  light  division  to  block  the 
way  on  that  side,  and  sir  Thomas  Graham  was  ad- 
vertised to  hold  h."s  army  in  readiness  to  move  in  the 
same  view,  and  it  would  appear  that  the  route  of  the 
sixth  and  third  divisions  were  also  changed  for  a  time. 

COMBAT    OF    DONA    MARIA. 

At  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  31st,  general 
Hill  overtook  Soult's  rear-guard  between  Lizasso  and 
the  Puerto.  The  seventh  division,  coming  from  the 
hills  above  Olague,  was  already  ascending  the  moun- 
tain on  his  right,  and  the  French  only  gained  a  wood 
on  the  summit  of  the  pass  under  the  fire  of  Hill's 
guns.  There,  however,  they  turned,  nnd  throwing 
out  their  skirmishers,  made  strong  battle.  General 
Stewart,  leading  the  attack  of  the  second  division, 
now  for  the  third  time  engnged  with  D'Erlon's 
troops,  was  again  wounded,  and  his  first  brigade  wna 
rejjulsed  ;  but  general  Priiigle,  who  succeeded  to  the 
command,  renewed  the  attack  with  the  second  bri- 


632 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XXI. 


{jade,  and  the  thirty-fourth  regiment  leading,  broke 
the  enemy  at  the  moment  that  the  seventh  division 
<lid  the  same  on  tiie  right.  Some  prisoners  were  ta- 
ken, but  a  thick  fog  prevented  further  pursuit,  and 
the  loss  of  tlie  French  in  the  action  is  unknown, 
probably  loss  than  that  of  the  allies,  which  was 
eomething  short  of  four  hundred  men. 

The  seventh  division  remained  on  the  mountain, 
but  Hill  fell  back  to  Lizasso,and  then,  following  his 
orders,  moved  by  a  short  but  rugged  way,  leading 
between  the  passes  of  Dona  ^laria  and  Vellate  over 
the  great  chain  to  Almandoz,  to  join  Wellington, 
who  had,  during  tlie  combat,  descended  into  the  Bas- 
tan  by  the  pass  of  Vellate.  Meanwhile  Byng  reach- 
ed Elisondo,  and  captured  a  large  convoy  of  provis- 
ions and  ammunition  left  under  guard  of  a  battalion 
by  D'Erlon  on  the  29th;  he  made  several  hundred 
prisoners  also  after  a  sliarp  skirmish,  and  then  push- 
ed forward  to  the  pass  of  Maya.  Wellington  now 
occupied  the  hills  through  wliich  the  road  leads  from 
JfOlisondo  to  St.  Estevan,  and  full  of  hope  he  was  to 
strike  a  terrible  blow  ;  for  Soult,  not  being  pursued 
alter  passing  Dona  Maria,  had  halted  in  St.  Este- 
van, although  by  his  scouts  he  knew  that  the  convoy 
had  been  taken  at  Elisondo.  He  was  in  a  deep  nar- 
row valley,  and  three  British  divisions  with  one  of 
•Spaniards  were  behind  the  mountains  overlooking 
the  town  ;  the  seventh  division  was  on  the  mountain 
of  Dona  Maria  ;  the  light  division  and  sir  Thomas 
Graham's  Spaniards  were  marching  to  block  the 
Vera  and  Echallar  exits  from  the  valley  ;  Byng  was 
already  at  Maya,  and  Hill  was  moving  by  Almandoz 
ust  behind  Wellington's  own  position.  A  few  hours 
gained  and  the  French  must  surrender  or  disperse. 
Wellington  gave  strict  orders  to  prevent  the  light- 
ing of  tires,  the  straggling  of  soldiers,  or  any  other 
indication  of  tlie  presence  of  troops  ;  and  he  placed 
himself  amongst  some  rocks  at  a  commanding  point, 
from  whence  he  could  observe  every  movement  of 
the  enemy.  Soult  seemed  tranquil,  and  four  of  his 
getidarmes  were  seen  to  ride  up  the  valley  in  a  care- 
1 338  manner.  Some  of  the  staff  proposed  to  cut  them 
otF;  the  English  general,  whose  object  was  to  hide 
hie  own  presence,  would  not  suffer  it,  but  the  next 
laoment  three  marauding  English  soldiers  entered 
thi3  valley  and  were  instantly  carried  off  by  the 
liorsemen.  Half  an  hour  afterwards  the  French 
drums  beat  to  arms  and  their  columns  began  to  move 
out  of  St.  Estevan  towards  Sumbilla.  Thus  the 
disobedience  of  three  plundering  knaves,  unworthy 
of  the  name  of  soldiers,  deprived  one  consummate 
<;ommander  of  the  most  splendid  success,  and  saved 
another  from  tlie  most  terrible  disaster. 

The  captives  walked  from  their  prison,  but  their 
chains  hung  upon  them.  'J'he  way  was  narrow,  the 
multitude  great,  and  the  baggage,  and  wounded  men 
borne  on  their  comrades'  shoulders,  filed  with  such 
long  procession,  tiiat  Clauzel's  divisions,  forming 
the  rear-guard,  were  still  about  St.  Estevan  on  the 
morning  of  the  first  of  August,  and  scarcely  had  they 
marched  a  league  of  ground,  when  the  skirmishers 
of  the  fourth  division  and  the  Spaniards  thronging 
along  the  heights  on  the  right  flank,  opened  a  fire 
to  which  little  reply  could  be  made.  The  troops 
and  baggage  then  got  mixed  with  an  entreme  disor- 
der, numbers  of  the  former  fled  up  the  hills,  and  the 
commanding  energy  of  Soult,  whose  personal  exer- 
tions were  conspicuous,  could  scarcely  prevent  a 
general  dispersion.  However,  prisoners  and  bag- 
gage fell  at  every  step  into  the  hands  of  the  pursu- 
ers, the  boldest  were  dismayed  at  the  peril,  and 
worse  would  have  awaited  thi^m  in  front,  if  Wel- 
lington had  been  on  other  points  well  seconded  by 
hia  subordinate  general 


I  The  head  of  the  French  cclumn,  instead  of  taking 
.  the  first  road  leading  from  Sumbilla  to  Echallar,  had 
passed  onward  towards  that  Itadirg  htm  the  bricge 
j  near  Yanzi  ;  the  valley  narrowed  to  a  mere  cleit  in 
'the  rocks  as  they  advanced,  tl^e  Bidaseoa  wos  tui 
their  left,  and  there  was  a  tributiiry  torrei.t  to  crcts, 
the  bridge  of  which  was  defended  by  a  battalion  of 
Spanish  ca^adores,  detached  to  that  point  from  the 
heights  of  Vera  by  general  Barcenas.  1  he  fror^t 
was  now  as  much  disordered  as  the  rear,  and  had 
Longa  or  Barcenas  reinforced  the  cac^adores,  thcte 
only  of  the  French  who,  being  near  Sumbilla,  could 
take  the  road  from  that  place  to  Echallar,  wi  uld  have 
escaped;  but  the  Spanish  generals  kept  aloof,  and 
D'Erlon  won  the  defile.  Howevei,  IteiUe's  divis- 
ions were  still  to  pass,  and  when  they  came  up  a 
new  enemy  had  appeared. 

It  will  be  remembei-ed  that  the  light  uivisicn  was 
directed  to  head  the  French  army  at  St.  Estevan  cr 
Sumbilla.  Tliis  order  was  received  on  the  evenirg 
of  the  31st,  and  the  division,  repassing  the  defiles  of 
the  Zubieta,  descended  the  deep  valley  of  Lerirs  and 
reached  Elgoriaga  about  mid-(sy  oii  tie  Jtt  of  Au- 
gust, having  then  marched  twenty-four  miles,  and 
being  little  more  than  a  league  ircm  St.  Es^vcn 
and  about  the  same  distance  frcm  Sumbilla.  I  he 
movement  of  the  French  along  the  Bida^sca  was 
soon  discovered,  but  the  division,  ^cstecd  of  moving 
on  Sumbilla,  turned  to  tlie  left,  clambered  up  the 
great  mountain  of  Santa  Cruz,  and  made  lor  the 
bridge  of  Yanzi.  The  weather  was  exceedinfily 
sultry,  the  mountain  steep  and  hard  to  overccnio, 
many  men  fell  and  died  convulsed  and  frcthiijg  at 
the  mouth,  while  others,  whose  spirit  and  stjeigth 
had  never  before  been  quelled,  leaned  on  tlioir  n-us- 
kets  and  muttered  in  sullen  tones  that  they  yielded 
for  the  first  time. 

Towards  evening,  after  marching  for  ninetern 
consecutive  hours  over  forty  miles  of  mountain 
roads,  the  head  of  the  exhausted  column  reached  the 
edge  of  a  precipice  near  the  bridge  of  Yanzi.  Be- 
low, witliin  pistol-shot,  Reille's  divisions  v.ere  seen 
hurrying  forward  along  the  horrid  defile  in  v.h;ch 
they  were  pent  up,  and  a  fire  of  musketry  commei'c- 
ed,  slightly  from  the  British  on  the  high  rock, 
more  vigorously  from  seme  low  ground  near  the 
bridge  of  Yanzi,  where  the  riflemen  had  ensconced 
themselves  in  the  brushwood.  The  scei:e  which 
followed  is  thus  described  by  an  eye-witness. 

"  AVe  overlooked  the  enemy  at  stone's  threw,  and 
from  the  summit  of  a  tremendous  precipice.  '1  he 
river  separated  us,  but  the  French  were  wedged  in 
a  narrow  road  with  inaccessible  rocks  on  one  side 
and  the  river  on  the  other.  Confusion  impossible  to 
describe  followed,  the  wounded  were  thrown  down 
in  the  rush  and  trampled  upon,  the  cavalry  drew 
their  swords  and  endeavoured  to  charge  up  tlie  jass 
of  Echallar,  but  the  infantry  beat  them  beck,  and 
several,  horses  and  all,  were  precipitated  ii.to  the 
river;  some  fired  vertically  at  us,  tlie  wounded  call- 
ed out  for  quarter,  while  others  pointed  to  them  sup- 
ported as  they  were  on  brandies  of  trees,  on  which 
were  suspended  great  coats  clotted  with  gore,  and 
blood-stained  sheets  taken  frcm  difi'erent  habitations 
to  aid  the  sufl'erers  " 

On  these  miserable  supplicants  brave  men  could 
not  fire,  and  so  piteous  was  the  spectacle  that  it  was 
with  av6rted  or  doubtful  aim  they  shot  at  the  others, 
although  the  latter  rapidly  plied  their  muskets  in 
passing,  and  some  in  their  veteran  hardihood  even 
dashed  across  the  bridge  of  Yanzi  to  make  a  coun- 
ter-attack. It  was  a  soldier-like  but  a  vain  efi'ort ! 
tlie  night  found  the  British  in  possession  of  the 
bridge,  -nd  though  the  great  body  of  the  enemy  es 


1813.1 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


633 


cai)ed  by  the  road  to  Echallar,  the  baggage  was  cut 
oil'  and  fell,  together  with  many  prisoners,  into  the 
hands  of  the  light  troops  which  ware  still  hanging 
on  the  rear  in  pursuit  from  8t.  Estevan. 

The  loss  of  the  French  this  day  was  very  great, 
that  of  the  allies  about  a  hundred  men,  of  which 
sixty-rive  were  British,  principally  of  the  tburth  di- 
vision. Ncvertiieless,  lord  Wellington  was  justly 
discontented  with  the  result.  Neitlier  Longa  nor 
g.Mieral  Alton  had  fultilled  tlieir  mission.  The  for- 
mer excused  himself  as  being  too  feeble  to  oppose 
the  mass  Soult  led  down  the  valley  ;  but  the  rocks 
were  so  precipitous  tliat  the  French  could  not  have 
readied  him,  and  the  resistance  made  by  the  Span- 
ish ca<^adores  was  Longa's  condemnation.  A  lam- 
entable fatuity  prevailed  in  many  quarters.  If 
Barcenas  had  sent  his  whole  brigade  instead  of  a 
weak  battalion,  the  small  torrent  could  not  have 
hiQ'.x  forced  by  D'Erlon  ;  and  if  Longa  had  been  near 
the  bridge  of  Yanzi  the  French  must  have  surren- 
dered, for  the  perpendicular  rocks  on  their  riglit  for- 
bade even  an  escape  by  dispersion.  Finally,  if  the 
light  division,  instead  of  marcliing  down  the  valley 
of  Lerins  as  far  as  Elgoriaga,  had  crossed  the  Santa 
Cruz  mountain  by  the  road  used  tlie  night  of  the  28th, 
it  would  have  arrived  much  earlier  at  the  bridge  of 
Yanzi,  and  then  belike  Longa  and  Harceuas  wolild 
also  have  come  down.  Alten's  instructions  indeed 
prescribed  Sumbilla  and  St.  Estevan  as  the  first 
points  to  head  the  French  army,  but  judging  them 
too  strong  at  Sumbilla  he  marched  as  we  have  seen 
upon  Yanzi  ;  and  if  he  had  passed  the  bridge  there 
and  seized  the  road  to  Echallar  with  one  brigade, 
while  the  ether  plied  the  flank  with  lire  from  the 
l^fl  of  t!ie  Didassoa,  he  would  have  struck  a  great 
bl')W.  It  was  lor  tliat  the  soldiers  had  made  such  a 
prodigious  exertion,  yet  the  prize  was  thrown  away. 

During  the  night  Soult  rallied  his  divisions  about 
Echallar,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  2d  occupied  the 
"■Piierli)''^  of  that  name.  Mis  hift  was  placed  at  the 
rocks  of  Zugiramurdi  ;  his  right  at  the  rock  of 
Ivantelly  communicating  with  the  left  of  Yillatte's 
reserve,  which  was  in  position  on  the  ridges  be- 
tween Soult's  right  and  the  head  of  the  great  Rhune 
mountain.  Meanwhile  Clauzel's  three  divisions, 
now  reduced  to  six  thousand  men,  took  post  on  a 
Btrong  hill  between  the  Puerto  and  town  of  Echal- 
lar This  position  was  momentarily  adopted  by 
Soult  to  save  time,  to  examine  the  country,  and  to 
make  Wellington  discover  his  final  object,  but  that 
genei-al  would  not  suifer  the  affront.  He  had  sent 
the  third  and  sixth  divisions  to  reoccupy  the  passes 
of  Roncevallis  and  the  Alduides;  Hill  had  reached 
the  Col  de  Maya,  and  liyng  was  at  Urdax  ;  the 
fourth,  seventh,  and  light  divisions  remained  in 
hand,  and  with  these  he  resolved  to  fall  upon  Clau- 
zel,  whose  position  was  dangerously  advanced. 

COMBATS  OF  ECHALLAR  AND  IVANTELLY. 

The  light  division  held  the  road  running  from  the 
bridge  of  Yanzi  to  Echallar  until  relieved  by  the 
fourth  division,  and  tlien  marched  by  Lesaca  to  Santa 
Barbara,  thus  turning  Clauzel's  right.  The  f3urth 
division  marched  from  Yanzi  upon  I'^^challar  to  attack 
his  front,  and  the  seventh  moved  from  Sumbilla 
against  his  left;  but  Barnes's  brigade,  contrary  to 
lord  Wellington's  intention,  arrived  unsupported  be- 
fore tlie  fourth  and  light  divisions  were  either  seen 
or  felt,  and  without  awaiting  the  arrival  of  more 
troops  assailed  Clauzel's  strong  position.  The  fire 
became  vehement,  but  neither  the  steepness  of  the 
mountain  nor  tlie  overshadowing  multitude  of  the 
enemy  clustering  above  in  stipport  of  tiieir  skirm- 
ishers cou.d  arrest  the  assailants,  and  then  was  seen 


the  astonishing  spectacle  of  fifteen  hundred  men 
driving,  by  sheer  valour  and  force  of  arms,  six  thou- 
sand good  troops  from  a  position,  so  rugged  that 
t!iere  would  have  been  little  to  boast  of  it  the  num- 
bers had  been  reversed  and  the  defence  made  good. 
It  is  true  that  tiie  fourth  division  arrived  towards 
the  end  of  the  action,  that  the  French  had  iuililled 
their  mission  as  a  rear-guard,  that  they  were  worn 
with  fatigue  and  ill-i)rovided  with  ammunition.  Lav- 
ing exhausted  all  tiieir  reserve  stores  during  the  re- 
treat, but  the  real  cause  of  their  inferiority  belongs 
to  the  highest  part  of  war. 

The  British  soldiers,  their  natural  fierceness  stim- 
ulated by  the  remarkable  personal  daring  of  their 
general,  Barnes,  were  excited  by  the  pride  of  suc- 
cess ;  and  the  French  divisions  were  those  which 
had  failed  in  the  attack  on  the  26th,  whicii  had  been 
utterly  defeated  on  the  SCth,  and  which  had  sufiered 
so  severely  the  day  before  about  Sumbilla.  Such 
then  is  the  preponderance  of  moral  power.  The 
men  wdio  had  assailed  the  terrible  rocks  above  Sau- 
roren,  with  a  force  and  energy  that  all  the  valcur  of 
the  hardiest  British  veterans  scarcely  sufficed  to  re- 
pel, were  now,  only  five  days  afterwards,  although 
posted  so  strongly,  unable  to  sustain  the  shock  of 
one-fourth  of  their  own  numbers.  And  at  this  very 
time  eighty  British  soldiers,  the  comrades  and 
equals  of  those  who  achieved  this  wonderful  exploit, 
having  wandered  to  plunder,  surrendered  to  somo 
French  peasants,  whom  lord  Wellington  truly  ob- 
served, "  they  would  under  other  circumstancea 
have  eat  up  !"  What  gross  ignorance  of  human 
nature,  then,  do  those  writers  display,  \v!:o  assert, 
that  the  employing  of  brute  force  is  tiie  highest 
qualification  of  a  general! 

Ciauzel,  thus  dispossessed  of  the  mountain,  fell 
back  figliting  to  a  strong  ridge  beyond  ti.«  pass  of 
Echallar,  having  his  right  covered  by  the  Ivantelly 
mountain,  which  was  strongly  occupied.  Mean- 
while the  light  division  emerging  by  lesaca  from 
the  narrow  valley  of  the  Bidassoa,  ascended  the 
broad  heights  of  Santa  Barbara  without  opposition, 
and  halted  there  until  the  oj-erations  of  the  fourth 
and  seventh  divisions  were  far  enough  advanced  to 
render  it  advisable  to  attack  the  Ivantelly.  This 
lofty  mountain  lifted  its  head  on  the  right,  rising  as 
it  were  out  of  the  Santa  Barbara  heights,  and  sejia- 
rating  them  from  the  ridges  through  which  the 
French  troops,  beaten  at  Echallar,  were  new  retir- 
ing. Evening  was  coming  on,  a  thick  mist  capped 
the  crowning  rocks  which  contained  a  strong  French 
regiment,  the  British  soldiers,  besides  their  long  and 
terrible  march  the  previous  day,  had  been  for  two 
days  without  sustenance,  and  were  leaning,  weak 
and  fainting,  on  their  arms,  when  tl;o  advancing 
fire  of  Barnes's  action  about  Echallar  indicated  the 
necessity  of  dislodging  the  enemy  from  Ivantelly. 
Colonel  Andrew  liarnard  instantly  led  five  coniiianicB 
of  his  riflemen  to  the  attack,  and  four  companies  of 
the  forty-third  followed  in  support.  The  misty  clcv.d 
had  descended,  and  the  riflemen  were  soon  lost  to  the 
view,  but  the  sharp  clang  of  their  weai)ons,  heard  in 
distinct  reply  to  the  more  sonorous  rolling  musketry 
of  the  French,  told  what  work  was  going  on.  For 
some  time  the  echoes  rendered  it  doubtful  how  the 
action  went,  but  the  fidlowing  companies  of  the  for- 
ty-third could  find  no  trace  of  an  enemy  save  the 
killed  and  wounded.  Barnard  had  fought  his  way 
unaided  and  without  a  check  to  tlie  summit,  where 
his  dark-clothed  swarthy  veterans  raised  their  vic- 
torious shout  from  the  higiiest  peak,  just  as  the  com- 
ing night  showed  tlie  long  ridges  of  the  mountains 
beyond  sparkling  with  tlie  last  musket  flashes  fnun 
Clauzel's  troops  retiring  in  disorder  from  Echallar, 


634 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


[Book  XXI. 


This  (lay's  figliting'  cost  the  British  four  luindred 
mcjn,  and  lord  N\'elling'ton  narrowly  escaped  the  ene- 
my's hands.  He  had  carried  with  him  towards  Ech- 
allar  half  a  company  of  the  forty-tliird  as  an  escort, 
and  placed  a  sergeant  named  Blood  with  a  party  to 
watch  in  front  wJiile  he  examined  his  maps.  The 
French,  who  were  close  at  hand,  sent  a  detaclunent 
to  cut  the  party  oft";  and  sucli  was  the  nature  of  the 
ground  that  tlieir  troops,  rushing-  on  at  sjjeed,  would 
infallibly  have  fallen  unawares  upon  lord  Welling- 
ton, if  Blood,  a  young  intelligent  man,  seeing  the 
danger,  had  not  with  surprising  activity,  leaping 
ratiier  than  running  dow^n  the  precipitous  rocks  he 
was  posted  on,  given  tlie  general  notice,  and  as  it 
was,  the  French  arrived  in  time  to  send  a  volley  of 
shot  after  him  as  he  galloped  away. 

Soult  now  caused  count  d'Erlon  to  reoccupy  the 
hills  about  Ainhoa,  Clauzel  to  take  post  on  the 
heights  in  advance  of  Sarre,  and  Reille  to  carry  his 
two  divisions  to  St.  Jean  de  Luz  in  second  line  be- 
liind  Yillatte's  reserve.  Foy,  who  had  rashly  un- 
covered St.  .lean  Pied  de  Port  by  descending  upon 
Cambo,  was  ordered  to  return  and  reinforce  his 
troops  with  all  that  he  could  collect  of  national 
guards  and  detachments. 

Wellington  had,  on  the  1st,  directed  general  Gra- 
ham to  collect  forces  and  bring  up  pontoons  for 
crossing  the  Bidassoa,  but  he  finally  abandoned  this 
design,  and  the  two  armies  therefore  rested  quiet  in 
their  respective  positions,  after  nine  days  of  contin- 
ual movement,  during  w^hich  they  had  fought  ten 
serious  actions.  Of  the  allies,  including  the  Span- 
iards, seven  thousand  three  Imndred  officers  and  sol- 
diers had  been  killed,  wounded  or  taken,  and  many 
were  dispersed  from  fatigue  or  to  plunder.  On  the 
French  s'de  the  loss  was  terrible,  and  the  disorder 
rendered  the  official  returns  inaccurate.  Neverthe- 
less, a  close  approximation  may  be  made.  Lord 
Wellington  at  first  called  it  twelve  thousand,  but 
hearing  that  the  French  officers  admitted  more,  he 
raised  iiis  estimate  to  fifteea  thousand.  The  engi- 
neer, Bebnas,  in  his  Journals  of  Sieges,  compiled 
from  official  documents  by  order  of  the  French  gov- 
ernment, sets  down  above  thirteen  thousand.  Soult, 
in  his  despatches  at  the  time,  stated  fifteen  hundred 
as  the  loss  at  Maya,  four  hundred  at  Ronoevalles, 
two  hundred  on  the  27th,  and  eighteen  hundred  on 
the  2'-tli,  after  which  he  speaks  no  more  of  losses 
l)y  battle.  There  remains  therefore  to  be  added  the 
killed  and  wounded  at  the  combats  of  Linzoain  on 
the  2oth,  the  double  battles  of  Sauroren  and  Buenza 
on  the  8(ith,  the  combats  on  the  31st,  and  those  of 
the  1st  and  2d  of  August ;  finally,  four  thousand  un- 
wounded  prisoners.  Let  this  suffice.  It  is  not 
needful  to  sound  the  stream  of  blood  in  all  its  horrid 
depths. 

OBSERVATIONS. 

1st.  The  allies'  lino  of  defiance  was  v/eak.  Was 
it  therefore  injudiciously  adopted] 

Tlie  French,  beaten  at  Vittoria,  were  disorganized, 
and  retreated  witliout  artillery  or  baggage  on  eccen- 
tric lines;  Foy  by  (Juipuscoa,  Clauzel  by  Zaragoza, 
Reilie  by  St.  I'^stevan,  tlie  king  by  Pampeluna. 
There  was  no  reserve  to  rally  upon,  tlie  people  fled 
from  the  frontier,  Bayonne  and  St.  Jean  Pied  de 
Port,  if  not  defenceless,  were  certainly  in  a  very 
P'iglected  state,  and  the  English  general  might  have 
undertaken  any  operation,  assumed  any  position,  of- 
fensive or  dpfcnslvc,  which  seemed  good  to  liim. 
Why  then  did  he  not  establish  the  Anglo-Portu- 
guese beyond  the  mountains,  leaving  the  Spaniards 
to  blockade  the  fortresses  behind  hiin?  The  an- 
swer to  this  question  involves  the  difTerences  be- 
tween the  practice  and  the  theory  of  war. 


"The  soldiers,  irstead  jf  preparing  food  tiiid  rest- 
ing themselves  after  the  battle,  dispersed  in  the 
night  to  plunder,  and  were  so  fatigued,  that  when 
the  rain  came  on  the  next  day  they  were  incapable 
of  marching,  and  had  more  stragglers  than  tlie  l)eat- 
en  enemy.  Eighteen  days  after  the  victory  twelve 
thousand  five  hundred  men,  chiefly  British,  were  ab- 
sent, most  of  them  marauding  in  the  mountains." 

Sucli  were  the  reasons  assigned  bv  the  English 
general  for  his  slack  pursuit  after  the  battle  (jf  Vit- 
toria, yet  he  had  commanded  tliat  army  fi^r  six  years  ! 
Was  he  then  deficient  in  the  first  qualification  of  a 
general,  the  art  of  disciplining  and  inspiring  trcopn, 
or  was  tiie  English  military  system  defective!  It 
is  certain  that  he  always  exacted  the  confidence  of 
his  soldiers  as  a  leader.  It  is  not  so  certain  that  he 
ever  gained  their  affections.  The  barbarity  of  the 
English  military  code  excited  public  horror,  the  in- 
equality of  promotion  created  public  •fjiscontcnt ;  yet 
the  general  complained  he  had  no  adequate  power  to 
reward  or  punish,  and  he  condemned  alike  the  sys- 
tem and  the  soldiers  it  produced.  The  latter  "were 
detestable  for  every  thing  but  fighting,  and  the  offi- 
cers as  culpable  as  tlie  men."  The  vehemence  of 
these  censures  is  inconsistent  with  hi,s  celebrated 
observation,  subsequently  made,  namely,  "  that  he 
thought  he  could  go  any  where  and  do  any  thing  with 
the  army  that  fought  on  the  Pyrenees, '  and  al- 
though it  cannot  be  denied  that  his  comfdaints  were 
generally  too  well  founded,  there  were  thousands  of 
true  and  noble  soldiers,  and  zealous  worthy  officers, 
who  served  their  country  honestly  and  merited  no 
reproaches.  It  is  enough  that  they  have  been  since 
neglected,  exactly  in  proportion  to  their  wont  of  that 
corrupt  aristocratic  influence  which  produced  the 
evils  complained  of. 

2nd.  When  the  misconduct  of  the  troops  had  thus 
weakened  the  effect  of  victory,  the  question  of  fol- 
lowing Joseph  at  once  into  France  assumed  a  new 
aspect.  Wellington's  system  of  warfare  had  never 
varied  after  the  battle  of'Talavera.  Rejecting  dan- 
gerous enterprise,  it  rested  on  profound  calculation, 
both  as  to  time  and  resources,  for  the  accomplish- 
ment of  a  particular  object,  namely,  the  gradual  lib- 
eration of  Spain  by  the  Anglo-Portuguese  -army. 
Not  tliat  he  held  it  impossible  to  attain  that  object 
suddenly,  and  his  battles  in  India,  the  passage  of  the 
Duero,  the  advance  to  Talavera,  [irove  tliat  by  na- 
ture he  was  inclined  to  daring  operations  ;  but  such 
efforts,  however  glorious,  could  not  be  adopted  by  a 
commander  who  feared  even  the  loss  of  a  brigade, 
lest  the  government  he  served  should  put  an  end  to 
the  war.  Neither  was  it  suitable  to  tlie  statt  of  his 
relations  with  the  Portuguese  and  Spaniards;  vheir 
ignorance,  jealousy  and  passionate  pride,  fierce  in 
proportion  to  their  weakness  and  improvidence, 
would  have  enhanced  every  danger. 

No  man  could  have  anticipated  the  extraordinary 
errors  of  the  French  in  1813.  Wellington  did  not  ex- 
pect to  cross  the  Ebro  before  the  end  of  the  raniiiaign, 
and  his  battering  train  was  prepared  for  the  siege  of 
Burgos,  not  for  that  of  Bayonne.  A  sudden  invasion 
of  I'rance,  her  military  rejiutation  considered,  was 
therefore  quite  out  of  the  pale  of  his  methodized  sys- 
tem of  warfare,  which  was  founded  upon  jiolitical  aa 
well  as  military  considerations;  and  of  the  most  com- 
plicated nature,  seeing  that  he  had  at  all  times  to 
deal  with  the  personal  and  factious  interests  and  pas- 
sions, as  well  as  the  great  state  intercets  of  three  dis- 
tinct nations,  two  of  which  abhorred  each  other.  At 
this  moment,  also,  the  uncertain  state  of  affairs  in 
Germany  strongly  influenced  his  views.  An  armis- 
tice which  might  end  in  a  separate  peace,  excluding 
England,  would  have  brought  Napoleon's  whole  force 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR 


635 


to  the  Pyrenees,  and  Wellington  held  cheap  botli  the 

Diilitary  and  political  proceedings  of  the  coalesced 

j    power:-.     "  /  would  not  move  a  corporal's  guard  in 

I    reliance  vpon   such  a  sysfeni,"  was   the   significant 

I    phrase  he  employed  to  express  his  contempt. 

■        These  considerations  jiistitied  his  caution  as  to  in- 

'    vading  France,  but  there  were  local  military  reasons 

:    equally  cogent.     1st.  He   could   not  dispense   with 

\    a  secure  harbour,  becuuse  the  fortresses  still  in  pos- 

;    ecssion  of  tlie   French,  namely,  Santona,  Pancorbo, 

Pampeliina,  and  San  .Sebastian,  interrupted  his  com- 

munica!;,.)ns  with  the  interior  of  Spain  ;  hence  the 

.    E-iege    oj    the    latter  place.     2nd.  He  had  to  guard 

against  the  union  of  Suchet  and  Clauzel  on  his  right 

flank  ;    hence  his  efforts  to  cut  off  the  last  named 

general ;  hence  also  the  blockade  of  Pampeluna  in 

preference  to  siege,  and  the  launching  of  31ina  and 

the  bands  on  the  side  of  Zaragoza. 

3rd.  After  Yittoria,  the  nature  of  the  campaign 
depended  upon  Suchet's  operations,  which  were  ren- 
dered more  important  by  Murray's  misconduct.  The 
allied  force  on  the  eastern  coast  was  badly  organized, 
it  did  not  advance  from  Valencia,  as  we  have  seen, 
until  the  IGth,  and  then  only  partially  and  by  the 
coast,  whereas  Sucliet  had  assembled  more  than 
twenty  thousand  excellent  troops  on  the  Ebro  as  ear- 
ly as  the  12th  of  July  ;  and  had  he  continued  his 
march  upon  Zaragoza  he  would  have  saved  the  castle 
of  that  place  with  its  stores.  Then  rallying  Paris's 
division  he  could  have  menaced  Wellington's  flank 
with  twenty-five  thousand  men,  exclusive  of  Clau- 
zel's  force,  and  if  that  general  joined  him,  with  forty 
thousand. 

On  the  16th,  the  day  lord  William  Bentinck  quit- 
ted Valencia,  Suchet  might  have  marched  from  Za- 
ragoza on  Tudela,  or  Sanguesa,  and  Souk's  prepara- 
tions, originally  made  as  we  have  seen  to  attack  on 
the  2:^d  instead  of  the  25th,  would  have  naturally  been 
hastened.  How  difficult  it  would  then  have  been 
for  the  allies  to  maintain  themselves  beyond  the 
Ebro  is  evident,  mucii  more  so  to  hold  a  forward  po- 
sition in  France.  That  Wellington  feared  an  ope- 
ration of  thij  nature  is  clear  from  his  instructions 
to  lord  William  Bentinck  and  to  Mina  ;  and  because 
Picton's  and  Cole's  divisions,  instead  of  occupying 
the  passes,  were  kept  behind  the  mountains  solely 
to  watch  Clauzel;  when  the  latter  had  regained  the 
frontier  of  France,  Cole  was  permitted  to  join  Byng 
and  Morillo.  It  follows  that  the  operations  after  the 
battle  of  Vittoria  were  well  con.sidered  and  conso- 
nant to  lord  Wellington's  genera]  system.  Their 
wisdom  would  have  been  proved  if  Suchet  had  seized 
tlie  advantages  within  his  reach. 

4th.  A  general's  capacity  is  sometimes  more  taxed 
to  profit  from  a  victory  than  to  gain  one.  Welling- 
ton, master  of  all  Spain,  Catalonia  excepted,  desired 
to  establish  himself  solidly  in  the  Pyrenees,  lest  a 
separate  peace  in  Germany  should  enable  Napoleon 
to  turn  his  whole  force  against  the  allies.  In  this 
expectation,  witli  astonishing  exertion  of  body  and 
mind,  lie  had  in  three  days  achieved  a  rigorous  exa- 
mination of  the  wliole  mass  of  the  western  Pyrenees, 
and  concluded  that  if  Pampeluna  and  San  Sebastian 
fell,  a  defensive  position  as  strong  as  that  of  Portu- 
gal, and  a  much  stronger  one  than  could  be  found 
behind  Ihe  Ebro,  might  be  established.  But  to  in- 
vest those  places  and  maintain  so  difficult  a  covering 
line  was  a  greater  task  than  to  win  the  battle  of  V  it- 
toria.  However,  the  early  fall  of  San  Sebastian  he 
expected,  because  the  errors  of  execution  in  that 
siege  could  not  be  foreseen,  and  also  for  gain  of  time 
he  counted  upon  the  disorganized  state  of  the  French 
army,  upon  .Joseph's  want  of  military  capacity,  and 
upon  the  moral  ascendency  which  his  own   troops 


had  acquired  over  the  enemy  by  their  victcrios.  He 
;  could  not  aniicipate  the  expeditious  journey,  tlie  sud- 
j  den  arrival  of  Scult,  whose  rapid  reorganization  ol 
;  the  French  army,  and  whose  vigorous  operations, 
I  contrasted  with  Joseph's  abandonmeiit  of  Spain,  il- 
'lustrated  the  old  Greek  saying,  ti^at  a  herd  ol'  deer 
I  led  by  a  lion  are  more  dangerous  than  a  herd  of  lions 
I  led  by  a  deer. 

•jth.  The  duke  of  Dalmatia  was  little  beholden  to 
I  fortune  at  the  commencement  of  his  uiovcments. 
I  Her  first  contradiction  was  the  had  weather,  which, 
;  breaking  up  the  reads,  delayed  the  concentration  of 
i  his  army  at  St.  Jean  Pied  ce  Port  lor  two  days  ;  all 
i  officers  know  the  efiect  which  heavy  rain  and  hard 
I  murclies  have  upon  the  vigour  and  confidence  of  sol- 
j  diers  who  are  going  to  attack.  If  Soult  had  com- 
menced on  the  2;:d  instead  of  the  25th,  the  surprise 
I  would  have  been  more  complete,  his  army  more 
brisk  ;  and  as  no  conscript  battalions  would  have  ar- 
rived to  delay  Reille,  that  general  would  ja-obably 
have  been  more  ready  in  his  attack,  and  might  pos- 
sibly have  escaped  tiie  fog  which,  on  the  26lh,  stop- 
ped his  march  along  the  superior  crest  of  the  moun- 
tain towards  Vellate.  On  the  other  hand,  the  allies 
would  have  been  spared  the  unsuccessful  assault  on 
San  Sebastian;  and  the  pass  of  Maya  might  have 
been  better  furnished  with  troops.  However,  Scult's 
combinations  were  so  well  knit  that  more  than  one 
error  in  execution,  and  more  tiian  one  accident  of 
fortune,  were  necessary  to  baffle  him.  Had  count 
D'Erlon  followed  his  instructions  even  on  the  25th, 
general  Hill  would  probably  have  been  shouldered 
off  the  valley  of  Lariz,  and  Soult  would  have  had 
twenty  thousand  additional  troops  in  the  combats  of 
the  2'ith  and  2^th.  Such  failures,  however,  general 
ly  attend  extensively  combined  movements,  and  it 
is  by  no  means  certain  that  the  count  would  liave 
been  able  to  carry  the  position  of  the  Co!  de  Maya 
on  the  25th,  if  all  general  Stewart's  forces  had  been 
posted  there.  It  would,  therefore,  perhaps  l.ave  been 
more  strictly  within  the  rules  of  art,  if  D"Erlcn  had 
been  directed  to  leave  one  of  his  three  divisions  to 
menace  the  Col  de  Maya,  while  he  marched  with 
the  other  two  by  St.  Etienne  de  Baigorri  up  the  Al- 
duides.  This  movement,  covered  by  the  national 
guards,  who  occupied  the  mountain  of  I  a  Houssa, 
could  not  have  been  stopped  by  Campbell's  Por- 
tuguese brigade,  and  would  have  dislodged  Hill 
from  the  Bastan,  while  it  secured  the  junction  of 
D'Erlon  with  Soult  on  the  crest  of  the  superior 
chain. 

6th.  The  intrepid  constancy  with  which  Byng  and 
Ross  defended  their  several  positions  on  the  25th, 
the  able  and  clean  retreat  made  by  general  Cole  as 
far  as  the  heights  of  Linzoain,  gave  full  effect  to  the 
errors  of  Reille  and  D'Erlon,  and  would  probably 
have  baffled  Soult  at  an  early  period  if  general  Pic- 
ton  had  truly  comprehended  the  importance  of  his 
position.  Lord  Wellington  says,  that  the  concen- 
tration of  the  army  would  have  been  effected  on  the 
27th,  if  that  officer  and  general  Cole  iiad  not  agreed 
in  thinking  it  impossible  to  make  a  stand  behind 
Ijinzoain  ;  and  surely  the  necessity  of  retreating  en 
that  day  may  be  (piestioned.  For  if  Cole  with  ten 
thousand  men  maintained  the  position  in  front  of 
Altobiscar,  Ibaneta,  and  Atalosti,  Picton  might  have 
maintained  tlie  more  contracted  one  behind  Linzcain 
and  Erro  with  twenty  tliousand.  And  that  number 
he  could  have  assembled,  because  Camjibeli's  Portu- 
guese reached  Eugui  long  before  the  evening  of  the 
26th,  and  lord  Wellington  had  directed  O'Donel  to 
keep  three  thousand  live  hundred  of  the  blockading 
troops  in  readiness  to  act  in  advance,  of  wliich  Pic- 
ton could  not  have  been  ignorant.     It  was  impoesi- 


es6 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XXI. 


ble  to  turn  him  by  the  valley  of  Urroz,  that  line 
bein^  too  raa'ued  for  tlie  march  of  an  army  and  not 
leading  directly  upon  Pampeluna.  The  only  roads 
into  the  Val  de  Zubiri  were  by  Erro  and  Linzoain, 
lyings  close  together,  and  both  leading  upon  the  vil- 
lage of  Zubiri  over  the  ridges  which  Picton  occu- 
pied, and  the  strength  of  which  was  evident  from 
Soiilt's  declining  an  attack  on  the  evening  of  tiie 
28th,  when  Cole  only  was  before  him.  To  abandon 
this  ground  so  hastily,  wiien  the  concentration  of 
the  army  depended  upon  keeping  it,  appears  there- 
fore an  error,  aggravated  by  the  neglect  of  sending 
tiuiiily  information  to  the  commander-in-chief,  for 
lord  VV^ellingfon  did  not  know  of  the  retreat  until  the 
morning  of  the  21  th,  and  then  only  from  general 
Long.  It  might  be  that  Picton's  messenger  failed, 
but  many  should  have  been  sent,  when  a  retrograde 
novament  involving  the  fate  of  Pampeluna  was 
contemplated. 

It  has  been  said  that  general  Cole  was  the  advis- 
er of  this  retreat,  whicli,  if  completed,  would  have 
ruined  lord  Wellington's  campaign.  This  is  incor- 
rect ;  Picton  was  not  a  man  to  be  guided  by  others. 
General  Cole  indeed  gave  him  a  report,  drawn  up 
by  colonel  Bell,  one  of  the  ablest  stalf-officers  of  the 
army,  which  stated  that  no  position  suitable  for  a 
very  inferior  force  existed  between  Zubiri  and  Pam- 
peluna, and  this  was  true  in  the  sense  of  the  report, 
whicli  had  reference  only  to  a  division,  not  to  an  ar- 
my ;  moreover,  althougli  the  actual  battle  of  Sauro- 
ren  was  fouglit  by  inferior  numbers,  the  whole  posi- 
tion, including  tiie  ridges  of  the  second  line  occu- 
pied by  Picton  and  the  Spaniards,  was  only  main- 
tained by  equal  numbers  ;  and  if  Soult  had  made  the 
attiick  of  the  28th  on  the  evening  of  the  27th,  be- 
fore the  sixth  division  arrived,  the  position  would 
have  been  carried.  However,  there  is  no  doubt  that 
colonel  Bell's  report  influenced  Picton,  and  it  was 
only  when  his  troops  had  reached  Huarte  and  Vil- 
lalba  that  he  suddenly  resolved  on  battle.  That  was 
a  military  resolution,  vigorous  and  prompt ;  and  not 
the  less  worthy  of  prnise  that  he  so  readily  adopted 
Cole's  saving  proposition  to  regain  the  more  forward 
heights  above  Zabaldica. 

7th.  Marshal  Soult  appeared  unwilling  to  attack 
on  the  evenings  of  the  26th  and  27th.  Yet  success 
depended  upon  forestalling  the  allies  at  their  point 
of  concentration  ;  and  it  is  somewliat  inexplicable 
that  on  the  28th,  having  possession  of  the  bridge 
beyond  the  Lanz  river  and  plenty  of  cavalry,  he 
should  have  known  so  little  of  the  sixth  division's 
movements.  The  gancral  conception  of  his  scheme 
on  the  3()th  has  also  been  blamed  by  some  of  his 
own  countrymen,  api)p.rently  from  ignorance  of  the 
facts  and  because  it  failed.  Crowned  with  success, 
it  would  iiave  been  cited  as  a  tine  illustration  of  the 
art  of  war.  To  have  retired  at  once  by  the  two  val- 
leys of  Zubiri  and  Lanz  after  being  reinforced  with 
twenty  tiiousand  men  would  have  given  great  impor- 
tance to  his  repulse  on  the  2'~th  ;  his  reputation  as 
a  general  capable  ot  restoring  the  French  affiirs 
would  have  vanished,  and  mischief  only  have  accru- 
ed, even  though  he  should  have  effected  his  retreat 
safely,  whicli,  regard  being  had  to  the  narrowness 
of  the  valleys,  the  position  of  general  Hill  on  his 
right,  and  the  boldness  of  his  adversary,  was  not 
certain.  To  abandon  the  valley  of  Zubiri  and  se- 
cure that  of  L;inz;  to  obtain  another  and  s!iorter 
line  of  rs'tri'at  by  the  Dona  Maria  pass;  to  crush 
general  Hill  vvitii  superior  numbers,  and  tlius  gain- 
ing the  Yrurzun  road  to  succour  San  S(ibastian,  or. 
failing  of  tliat,  to  secure  the  union  of  the  whole  ar- 
my and  give  to  his  rdreat  the  appearance  of  an  able 
ofl'ensive  movement ;  to  combine  all  these  cliauce^ 


by  one  operation  immediately  aRer  a  severe  check, 
was  Soult's  plan:  it  was  not  impracticable,  and  was 
surely  the  concejition  of  a  great  commander. 

To  succeed,  however,  it  was  essential  cither  tc 
beat  general  Hill  off-hand  and  thus  draw  Wellington 
to  that  side  by  the  way  of  iMarcalain,  or  to  secure 
the  defence  of  the  French  left  in  such  a  solid  man- 
ner that  no  efforts  against  it  should  prevail  to  the 
detriment  of  the  offensive  movement  on  the  right: 
neither  was  effected.  The  French  general  intk^ed 
brought  an  overwlielming  force  to  be!«.r  upon  Hill, 
and  drove  him  from  the  road  of  Yrurzun  ;  but  he 
did  not  crush  him,  because  that  general  fought  so 
strongly  and  retired  with  such  good  order,  that  be- 
yond the  loss  of  the  position  no  injury  was  sustain- 
ed. Meanwhile  the  left  wing  of  the  French  was 
completely  beaten,  and  thus  the  advantage  gained 
on  the  right  was  more  than  nullified.  Soult  trusted 
to  the  remarkable  defensive  strength  of  the  ground 
occupied  by  his  left,  and  he  had  reason  to  do  so,  for 
it  was  nearly  impregnable.  Lord  \^'cHington  turn- 
ed it  on  both  flanks  at  the  same  time,  but  neither 
Picton's  advance  into  the  valley  of  Zubiri  on  Foy's 
left,  nor  Cole's  front  attack  on  tiiat  general,  nor 
Byng's  assault  upon  the  village  of  Sauroren,  would 
liave  seriously  damaged  the  French  without  the  sud- 
den and  complete  success  of  general  Inglis  beyond 
the  Lanz  The  other  attacks  would  indeed  have 
forced  the  French  to  retire  somewhat  hastily  up  the 
valley  of  the  Lanz,  yet  they  could  have  held  togeth- 
er in  mass  secure  of  their  junction  with  Soult.  Hut 
when  the  ridges  running  between  them  and  tlie 
right  wing  of  the  French  army  were  carried  by  In- 
glis, and  the  whole  of  the  seventh  division  was 
thrown  upon  their  flank  and  rear,  the  front  attncK 
became  decisive.  It  is  clear  therefore  that  the  key 
of  the  defence  was  on  the  ridge  beyond  the  Lanz, 
and  instead  of  two  regiments,  Clauzel  should  have 
placed  two  divisions  there. 

8th.  Lord  Wellington's  quick  perception  and  vig- 
orous stroke  on  the  ;^,Oth  were  to  be  expected  from 
such  a  consummate  commander,  yet  he  certainly  wus 
not  master  of  all  the  bearings  of  the  French  gener- 
al's operations;  he  knew  neither  the  extent  of  Hill's 
danger  nor  the  difficulties  of  Soult,  otherwise  it  is 
probable  that  he  would  have  put  stronger  columns  in 
motion,  and  at  an  earlier  hour,  towards  the  pass  of 
Dona  Maria  on  the  morning  of  the  81st.  Hill  did 
not  commence  his  march  that  day  until  8  o'clock, and 
it  has  been  shown  that  even  with  the  help  of  the 
seventh  division  he  was  too  weak  against  the  heavy 
mass  of  the  retreating  French  army.  The  faults 
and  accidents  which  baffled  Wellington's  after-oper- 
ations have  been  sufficiently  touched  upon  in  the 
narrative,  but  he  halted  in  the  midst  of  his  victo- 
rious career,  when  Soult's  army  was  broken  and  fly- 
ing, when  Suchet  had  retired  into  Catalonia,  and  all 
things  seemed  fr.vourable  for  the  invasion  of  France. 

His  motives  for  this  were  strong.  He  knew  th? 
armistice  in  Germany  had  been  renewed  with  a 
view  to  peace,  and  he  had  therefore  reason  to  ex 
pect  Soult  would  be  reinforced.  A  forward  position 
in  France  would  have  lent  his  right  to  the  enemy, 
who,  pivoting  upon  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port,  could 
operate  against  his  flank.  His  arrangen^ents  for 
supply,  and  intercourse  with  his  depots  and  hospi- 
tals, would  have  been  more  difficult  and  complicated 
and  as  the  enemy  possessed  all  the  French  and  Span 
ish  fortresses  commanding  the  great  roads,  his  neen 
to  gain  one,  at  least,  before  the  season  closed,  was 
absolute,  if  he  would  not  resign  his  communications 
with  the  interior  of  Spain.  Then  long  marches  and 
frequent  combats  had  fatigued  his  troops,  destroyed 
their  shoes  and  used  up  tlieir  musket  ammunition; 


1S13.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   W>  R. 


637 


and  the  loss  of  men  had  been  great,  especially  of 
British  in  the  second  division,  where  their  propor- 
tion to  foreig-n  troops  was  become  too  small.  The 
dilticulty  of  re-equipping  the  troops  would  have  been 
increasjd  by  entering  an  enemy's  state,  because  the 
English  system  did  not  make  war  support  war,  and 
his  communications  would  have  been  lengthened. 
Finally,  it  was  France  that  was  to  be  invaded, 
France  in  which  every  persoh  was  a  soldier,  where 
tiie  whole  population  was  armed  and  organized  un- 
der men,  not  as  in  other  countries  inexperienced  in 
war,  but  who  had  all  served  more  or  less.  Beyond 
tlie  Adour  the  army  could  not  advance,  and  if  a  sep- 
arate peace  was  made  by  the  northern  powers,  if 
iny  misfortune  befell  the  allies  in  Catalonia,  so  as  to 
leave  Suchet  at  liberty  to  operate  towards  Pampe- 
luna,  or  if  Soult,  profiting  from  the  possession  of  St. 
Jean  Pied  de  Port,  should  turn  the  right  flank  of  the 
new  position,  a  retreat  into  Spain  would  become  ne- 
cessary, and  however  short  would  be  dangerous  from 
the  hostility  and  warlike  disposition  of  the  people 
directed  in  a  military  manner. 

These  reasons,  joined  to  the  fact  that  a  forward 
position,  although  ofiering  better  communications 
from  right  to  left,  would  have  given  the  enemy 
greater  tacilities  for  operating  against  an  army 
which  must,  until  the  fortresses  fell,  hold  a  defen- 
sive and  somewhat  extended  line,  were  conclusive 
as  to  the  rashness  of  an  invasion  ;  but  they  do  not 
apjiear  so  conclusive  as  to  tiie  necessity  of  stopping 
short  after  the  action  of  the  2d  of  August.  The 
questions  were  distinct.  The  one  was  a  great  mea- 
sure involving  vast  political  and  military  conditions, 
tlie  other  was  simply  whether  Wellington  should 
profit  of  his  own  victory  and  tlie  enemy's  distress; 
and  in  this  view  the  objections  above  mentioned, 
eave  the  want  of  shoes,  the  scarcity  of  ammunition, 
and  the  fatigse  of  the  troops,  are  inapplicable. 
But  in  the  two  last  particulars  tlie  allioB  were  not 


so  badly  off  as  the  enemy,  and  in  the  first  not  so  de- 
ficient as  to  criyjjle  the  army  ;  wiierefore  if  tiie  ad- 
vantage to  De  gained  was  worth  the  efibrt,  it  was  an 
error  to  iialt. 

The  solution  of  this  problem  is  to  be  found  in  the 
comparative   condition   of  tlie   armies.     Soult    iiad 
recovered  his  reserve,  his  cavalry  and  artillery,  but 
Wellington    was    reinforced    by    general    (iraham'p 
j  corfjs,  which  was  more  numerous  and  ))ower!ul  than 
Villatte's  reserve.     The  new  chances  then  were  lor 
■  the  allies,  and  the  action  of  the  second  of  August 
demonstrated  that  their  opponents,  however  strong- 
t  ly  posted,  could   not  stand   before  them  ;  one  more 
I  victory  would  have  gone  nigh  to  destroy  the  French 
force   altogether;    for  such   was   the   disorder,  that 
Maucune's  division  had  on  the  2d  only  one  thousand 
men  left  out  of  more  tiian  five  thousand,  and  on  the 
6th  it  had  still  a  thousand  stragglers,  besides  killed 
and  wounded.     Conroux's  and  La  Martinitre's  di- 
i  visions  were  scarcely  in  better  plight,  and  the  loss- 
I  es  of  the  other  divisions,  although  less  remarkable, 
I  were  great.    It  must  also  be  remembered  that  general 
!  Foy,  with  eight  thousand  men,  was  cut  off  from  the 
main  body  ;  and  the  Nivelle,  the  sources  of  which 
were  in  the  allies'  power,  was  behind  the  French. 
With  their  left  pressed  from  the  pass  of  Maya,  and 
their  front  vigorously  assailed  by  the  main  body  of 
the   allies,  they   could   hardly    have   kept  together, 
since  more  than  twenty-one  thousand  men,  exclusive 
of  Foy's  troops,  were  then  absent  from  their  colours. 
And  as  late  as  the  12lli  of  August,  Soult  warned  the 
minister  of  war  that  he  was  indeed  preparing  to  as- 
sail his  enemy  again,  but  he  had  not  the  means  ot 
resisting  a  counter-attack,  although  he  lield  a  difi'er- 
ent  language  to  his  army  and  to  the  people  of  the 
country. 

Had  CiEsar  halted  because  his  soldiers  were  fa- 
tigued, Pharsalia  would  have  been  but  a  common 
battle. 


638 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


I  Book  XXII. 


BOOK  XXII. 


CHAPTER  I. 

New  position*  of  the  army  —  Lord  Melville's  niismanai^enieiit 
of  the  naval  CO-operatinn — Siege  of  San  Sebastian — Progress 
ol  the  sccouil  attack. 

After  the  combat  of  Echallar,  Soult  adopted  a 
permanent  position  and  reorganized  his  army.  The 
left  wing^  under  D'Erlon  occupied  the  hills  of  Ain- 
hoa,  with  an  advanced  guard  on  the  heights  over- 
looking Urdax  and  ZugaramUrdi.  The  centre  under 
Clauzel  was  in  advance  of  Sarre,  guarding  the  issues 
from  Vera  and  Echallar,  his  right  resting  on  the 
greatest  of  the  Rhune  mountains.  The  right  wing 
under  Reille,  composed  of  Maucune's  and  La  Marti- 
niere's  divisions,  extended  along  the  lower  Bidassoa 
to  the  sea.  Villatte's  reserve  was  encamped  behind 
the  Nivelle  near  Serres  ;  and  Reille's  third  division, 
under  Foy,  covered  in  conjunction  with  the  national 
guards  St.  .lean  Pied  de  Port  and  the  roads  leading 
into  France  on  that  side  The  cavalry  for  the  con- 
venience of  forngc  were  quartered,  one  division  be- 
tween the  Nive  and  the  Nivelle  rivers,  the  other  as 
far  back  as  Dax. 

Lord  Wellington  occupied  his  old  position  from 
the  pass  of  Roncevalles  to  the  mouth  of  the  Bidas- 
soa, but  the  disposition  of  his  troops  was  different. 
Sir  Rowland  Hill,  reinforced  by  Morillo,  held  the 
Roncevalles  and  Alduides,  throwing  up  field-works 
at  the  former.  The  third  and  sixth  divisions  were 
in  the  Bastan  guarding  the  Puerto  de  Maya,  and  the 
seventh  division,  reinforced  by  O'Donel's  army  of 
reserve,  occupied  the  passes  at  Echallar  and  Zuga- 
ramurdi.  Tbe  light  division  was  posted  on  the 
Santa  Barbara  heights,  having  piquets  in  the  town 
of  Vera;  their  left  rested  on  the  Bidassoa,  their 
right  on  the  Ivantelly  rock,  round  which  a  bridle 
communication  with  Echallar  was  now  made  by  the 
labour  of  the  soldiers.  Longa's  troops  were  beyond 
the  Bidnssoa  on  the  left  of  the  light  division;  the 
fourth  division  was  in  reserve  behind  him,  near  Le- 
eaca ;  the  fourth  Spanish  army,  now  commanded  by 
general  Freyra,  prolonged  the  line  from  the  left  of 
Longa  to  the  sea;  it  crossed  the  royal  causeway, 
occupied  Irun  and  Fontarabia  and  guarded  the  .?aiz- 
quibel  mountain.  The  first  division  was  in  reserve 
behind  these  Spaniards  ;  tlie  fifth  division  was  des- 
tined to  resume  the  siege  of  San  Sebastian  ;  the 
blockade  of  Pampeluna  was  maintained  by  Carlos 
d'Espana's  troops. 

This  disposition,  made  with  increased  means, 
was  more  powerful  for  defence  than  the  former  oc- 
cu[)!i.tion  of  the  saine  ground.  A  strong  corps  under 
a  single  command  was  well  intrenched  at  Ronce- 
valles: and  in  the  B;istan  two  British  divisions,  ad- 
monished by  Stewart's  error,  were  more  thnn  suffi- 
cient to  defend  the  Puerto  de  Maya.  The  Echnllar 
mountains  were,  with  the  aid  of  O'Donel's  Span- 
iards, eqmlly  sescure  ;  and  the  reserve,  instead  of 
occupying  St.  l-'^stevan,  was  posted  near  I,esaca  in 
support  of  tfie  left,  now  become  the  mofct  important 
part  of  the  line. 

The  castlos  of  Zaragoza  and  Daroca  had  fallen, 
the  Empecinado  was  directed  upon  Alcaniz,  and  he 
maintained  the  communication  between  the  Catalan 
army  and  Mina.     The  latter,  now  joined  by  Duran, 


was  gathering  near  Jaca,  from  whence  his  line  of 
retreat  was  by  Sanguesa  upon  Pampeluna  ;  in  tni» 
position  he  menaced  general  Paris,  who  marched 
after  a  slight  engagement  on  the  llth  into  France, 
leaving  eight  hundred  men  in  the  town  and  castle. 
At  this  time  lord  William  Bentinck,  having  crossed 
the  Ebro,  was  investing  Tarragona  ;  and  thus  the 
allies,  acting  on  the  otiensive,  were  in  direct  mili- 
tary communication  from  the  Mediterranean  to  the 
bay  of  Biscay,  while  Suchet,  though  holding  the 
fortresses,  could  only  communicate  with  Soult 
through  France, 

This  last  named  marshal,  being  strongly  posted, 
did  not  much  expect  a  front  attack,  but  the  augmen- 
tation of  the  allies  on  the  side  of  Roncevalles  and 
Maya  gave  him  uneasiness,  lest  they  should  force 
him  to  abandon  his  position  by  operating  along  the 
Nive  river.  To  meet  this  danger,  general  Paris 
took  post  at  Oloron  in  second  line  to  Foy,  and  the 
fortresses  of  St.  .Jean  Pied  de  Port  and  ISavarreins 
were  put  in  a  state  of  defence  as  pivots  of  operation 
on  that  side,  while  Bayonnc  served  a  like  purpote 
on  the  other  flank  of  the  army.  But  with  great  dil- 
igence the  French  general  fortified  his  line  from  the 
mouth  of  the  Bidassoa  to  the  rocks  of  Mondarain 
and  the  Nive. 

Lord  Wellington,  whose  reasons  for  not  invading 
France  at  this  period  have  been  already  noticed, 
and  who  had  now  little  to  fear  from  any  renewal  of 
the  French  operations  against  his  right  wing,  turn- 
ed his  whole  attention  to  the  reduction  of  San  Se- 
bastian. In  this  object  he  was,  however,  crossed  in 
a  manner  to  prove  that  the  English  ministers  were 
tlie  very  counterparts  of  the  Sjianish  and  Portuguete 
statesmen.  Lord  Melville  was  at  the  head  of  the 
board  of  admiralty;  under  his  rule  the  navy  of  Eng- 
land for  the  first  time  met  with  disasters  in  battle, 
and  his  neglect  of  the  general's  demands  for  mari- 
time aid  went  nigh  to  fasten  the  like  misfortunes 
upon  the  army.  This  neglect,  combined  with  the 
cabinet  scheme  of  employing  lord  V^ellington  in 
Germany,  would  seem  to  prove  that  experience  had 
taught  the  English  ministers  nothing  as  to  the  na- 
ture of  the  Peninsular  war,  or  tliat,  elated  with  the 
array  of  sovereigns  against  Kaj)oleon,  they  were 
now  careless  of  a  cause  so  mixed  up  with  democra- 
cy. Still  it  would  be  incredible  that  lord  Melville, 
a  man  of  ordinary  capacity,  should  have  been  suller- 
ed  to  retard  the  great  designs  and  endanger  the  final 
success  of  a  general,  whose  sure  judgment  and  ex- 
traordinary merit  were  authenticated  by  exploits 
unparalleled  in  English  warfare,  if  lord  Wellirg- 
ton's  correspondence  and  that  of  Mr.  Stuart  did  not 
establish  the  following  facts: 

1st.  Desertion  from  the  enemy  was  stof)ped. 
chiefly  because  the  admiralty,  of  which  lord  Melville 
was  tiie  head,  refused  to  let  the  ships  of  war  carry 
deserters  or  prisoners  to  England  :  they  were  tlius 
heaped  u[)  by  himdrcds  at  Lisbon  and  maltreated  by 
the  Portuguese  government,  which  checked  all  de- 
sire in  the  French  troops  to  come  over. 

2nd.  When  the  disputes  with  America  com- 
menced, Mr.  Stuart's  eflbrts  to  obtain  flour  for  the 
army  were  most  vexatiously  thwarted  by  the  board 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR  WAR. 


639 


of  admiralty,  wliich  permitted,  if  it  did  not  encour- 
age the  Eno-lieh  siiips  of  war  to  capture  American 
vessels  grading  under  the  secret  licenses. 

;-5rd.  Tiie  refusal  of  the  admiralty  to  establish  cer- 
tain cruisers  along  the  coast,  as  recommended  by 
lord  Wellington,  caused  the  loss  of  many  store-ships 
and  mercliantmen,  to  the  great  detriment  of  the  ar- 
my before  it  quitted  Portugal.  Fifteen  were  taken 
otf  Oporto,  and  one  close  to  the  bar  of  Lisbon  in 
May.  \nd  afterwards  the  Mediterranean  packet 
bearing  despatches  from  lord  William  Bentinck  was 
captured,  which  led  to  lamentable  consequences;  for 
the  papers  were  not  in  cipher,  and  contained  detail- 
ed accounts  of  plots  against  the  French  in  Italy, 
with  the  names  of  the  principal  persons  engaged. 

4th.  A  like  neglect  of  the  coast  of  Spain  caused 
Bhips  containing  money,  shoes,  and  other  indispen- 
sable stores  to  delay  in  port,  or  risk  the  being  taken 
on  the  passage  by  cruisers  issuing  from  Santona, 
Bayonne  and  Bordeaux.  And  while  the  communi- 
cations of  the  allies  were  thus  intercepted,  the 
French  coasting  vessels  supplied  their  army  and 
fortresses  without  difficulty. 

5th.  After  the  battle  of  Vittoria  lord  Wellington 
was  forced  to  use  French  ammunition,  though  too 
small  for  the  English  muskets,  because  the  ord- 
nance store-ships  which  he  had  ordered  from  Lisbon 
to  St.  Ander  could  not  sail  for  want  of  convoy. 
When  the  troops  were  in  the  Pyrenees,  a  reinforce- 
ment of  five  thousand  men  was  kept  at  Gibraltar  and 
Lisbon  waiting  for  ships  of  war,  and  the  transports 
employed  to  convey  them  were  thus  withdrawn  from 
the  service  of  carrying  home  wounded  men,  at  a 
time  when  the  Spanish  authorities  at  Bilbao  re- 
fused even  for  payment  to  concede  public  buildings 
for  hospitals. 

6th.  When  snow  was  falling  on  the  Pyrenees  the 
soldiers  were  without  proper  clothing,  because  the 
ship  containing  their  great  coats,  though  ready  to 
sail  in  August,  was  detained  at  Oporto  until  Novem- 
ber waiting  for  convoy.  When  the  victories  of  July 
were  to  be  turned  to  profit  ere  the  fitting  season  for 
the  saige  of  San  Sebastian  should  pass  away,  the 
attack  of  that  fortress  was  retarded  sixteen  days  be- 
cause a  battering  train  and  amnumition,  demanded 
several  months  before  by  lord  Wellington,  had  not 
yet  arrived  from  England. 

7th.  During  the  siege  the  sea  communication 
with  Bayonne  was  free.  "  Any  thing  in  the  shape 
of  a  naval  force,"  said  lord  Wellington,  "  would 
drive  away  sir  George  Collier's  squadron."  The 
garrison  received  reinforcements,  artillery,  ammuni- 
tion and  all  necessary  stores  for  its  defence,  sending 
away  the  sick  and  wounded  men  in  empty  vessels. 
The  Spanish  general  blockading  Santona  complain- 
ed at  the  same  time  that  the  exertions  of  his  troops 
were  useless,  because  the  French  succoured  the 
place  by  sea  when  they  pleased  ;  and  after  the  bat- 
tle of  Vittoria  not  less  than  five  vessels  laden  with 
stores  and  provisions,  and  one  transport  having 
British  soldiers  and  clothing  on  board,  were  taken 
by  cruisers  issuing  out  of  that  port.  The  great  ad- 
vantage of  attaciiing  San  Sebastian  by  water  as 
well  as  by  land  was  foregone  for  want  of  naval 
means,  and  from  the  same  cause  British  soldiers 
were  withdrawn  from  their  own  service  to  unload 
store-ships  ;  the  gun-boats  employed  in  the  blockade 
were  Spanish  vessels  manned  by  Spanish  soldiers 
withdrawn  from  the  army,  and  the  store-boats  were 
navigated  by  Spanish  women. 

Pth.  The  coasting  trade  between  Bordeaux  and 
Bayonne  being  quite  free,  the  French,  whose  mili- 
tary means  of  transport  had  been  so  crippled  by 
their  losses   at    Vittoria   that   they   could   scarcely 


have  collected  magazines  witli  land  carriage  only, 
received  tlieir  supplies  by  water,  and  were  tlius 
saved  trouble  and  expense  and  the  unpopularity  rt- 
tending  forced  requisitions. 

Between  April  and  August,  more  than  twenty 
applications  and  remonstrances  were  adrlressed  by 
lord  Wellington  to  the  government  upon  tiiese 
points,  without  })roducing  tiie  slightest  attention  to 
liis  demands.  3Ir.  Croker,  the  under-Eecretary  of 
the  admiralty,  of  whose  conduct  lie  particularly 
complained,  was  indeed  permitted  to  write  an  oflen- 
sive  official  letter  to  him  ;  but  his  demands  and  the 
dangers  to  be  apprehended  from  neglecting  them 
were  disregarded,  and  to  use  his  own  words,  "  Since 
Great  Britain  had  been  a  naval  power,  a  British 
army  had  never  before  been  left  in  such  a  situation 
at  a  most  imf-irtant  moment." 

Nor  is  it  easy  to  determine  whether  negligence 
and  incapacity,  or  a  grovelling  sense  of  national 
honour,  prevailed  most  in  the  cabinet,  when  we  find 
this  renowned  general  complaining  that  tiie  govern- 
ment, ignorant  even  to  ridicule  of  military  opera- 
tions, seemed  to  know  nothing  of  the  nature  of  the 
element  with  which  England  was  surrounded,  and 
lord  Melville  so  insensible  to  the  glorious  toils  of 
the  Peninsula  as  to  tell  him  that  his  army  was  the 
last  thing  to  be  attended  to. 

RENEWED    SIEGE    OF    SAN    SEBASTIAN. 

Vilatte's  demonstration  against  Lorga,  on  the 
28th  of  July,  had  caused  the  ships  laden  v.ith  the 
battering  train  to  put  to  sea,  but  on  the  5tli  of  Au- 
gust the  guns  were  relanded,  and  the  works  against 
the  fortress  resumed.  On  the  Fth,  a  notion  having 
spread  that  the  enemy  was  mining  under  the  cask- 
redoubt„the  engineers  siezed  the  occasion  io  exer- 
cise the  inexperienced  miners  by  sinking  a  shaft 
and  driving  a  gallery.  The  men  soon  acquired  ex- 
pertness,  and  as  the  water  rose  in  the  sliaft  at 
twelve  feet,  the  work  was  discontinued  when  the 
gallery  had  attained  eighty  feet.  MeEnwhile  the 
old  trenches  were  repaired,  the  heights  of  Srn  Bar- 
tolomeo  were  strengthened,  and  the  convent  of  An- 
tigua, built  on  a  rock  on  the  left  of  thc&e  heights, 
was  fortified  and  armed  with  two  guns  to  scour  the 
open  beach  and  sweep  the  bay.  The  siege,  howev- 
er, languished  for  want  of  ammunition  ;  and  during 
this  forced  inactivity  the  garrison  received  supplies 
and  reinforcements  by  sea,  their  damaged  works 
were  repaired,  new  defences  constructed,  the  maga- 
zines filled,  and  sixty-seven  pieces  of  artillery  put 
in  a  condition  to  play.  Eight  hundred  and  fifty  men 
had  been  killed  and  wounded  since  the  commence- 
ment of  the  attack  in  July,  but  as  fresh  men  came 
by  sea,  more  than  two  thousand  six  hundred  good 
soldiers  were  still  present  under  arms.  And  to 
show  that  their  confidence  was  unabated,  they  sele- 
brated  the  emperor's  birthday  by  crowning  the  cas- 
tle with  a  splendid  illumination  ;  encircling  it  with 
a  fiery  legend  to  his  honour  in  characters  so  largo 
as  to  be  distinctly  read  by  the  besiegers. 

On  the  19tli  of  August,  that  is  to  say,  after  a  de- 
lay of  sixteen  days,  the  battering  train  arrivei!  from 
England,  and  in  the  night  of  the  22(1  fifteen  her.vy 
pieces  were  placed  in  battery,  eight  at  the  right  at- 
tack and  seven  at  the  left.  A  second  battery  trnin 
came  on  the  2:^d,  augmenting  the  number  of  pieces 
of  various  kinds  to  a  hundred  and  seventeen,  iiK-lud- 
ing  a  large  S[)anlsh  mortar;  but  with  chararterlB- 
tic  negligence,  this  enormous  armameiU  l:ad  been 
sent  out  from  England  with  no  more  shot  and  shells 
than  would  suffice  fv  one  day's  consumption  ! 

In  the  niglit  of  tiie  2:^d,  the  batteries  on  the  Cho 
fre  sand-hills  were  reinforced  with  four  long  pieces 


610 


NAPIEU'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


LBooK  XXII. 


and  four  sixty-eight-pound  carronades,  and  the  left 
attack  with  six  additional  guns.  Ninety  sappers 
and  miners  had  come  witii  the  train  from  England, 
the  seamen  nr!d3r  Mr.  O'Reilly  were  again  attaciied 
to  the  batter. es,  and  part  of  tlie  field  artillery-men 
were  brought  to  tlie  siege. 

On  the  2-i'ih,  the  attack  was  recommenced  with 
activ)ty.  The  Chofre  batteries  were  enlarged  to 
contain  forty-eiglit  pieces,  and  two  batteries  for 
thirteen  pieces  were  begun  on  the  heights  of  8an 
Bartolomso,  designed  to  breach  at  seven  hundred 
yards  distance  the  faces  of  the  left  demi-bastion,  of 
the  hornwork,  that  of  St.  Jojin  on  the  main  front, 
and  the  end  of  the  high  curtain,  for  these  works  ris- 
ing in  gradation  one  above  another,  were  in  the 
same  line  of  shot.  The  approaches  on  the  isthmus 
were  now  also  pushed  forward  by  th  •  sap,  but  tlie 
old  trenches  were  still  imperfect,  and  before  day- 
light on  tlie  25th  the  French  comintj  from  the  horn- 
work  swept  the  left  of  the  parallel,  injured  tiie 
sap,  and  made  some  prisoners  before  they  were  re- 
pulsed. 

On  the  night  of  the  25th,  the  batteries  were  all 
armed  on  both  sides  of  the  Urumea,  and  on  the  26th 
fifty-seven  pieces  opened  with  a  general  salvo,  and 
continued  to  play  with  astounding  noise  and  rapid- 
ity until  evening.  The  firing  from  the  Chofre  hills 
destroyed  the  i-evetement  of  the  demi-bastion  of  St. 
John,  and  nearly  ruined  the  towers  near  the  old 
breach  togetlier  with  the  wall  connecting  them  ; 
but  at  the  isthmus,  the  batteries,  although  they  in- 
jured the  hornwork,  made  little  impression  on  the 
miin  front,  from  which  they  were  too  distant. 

Lord  Wellington,  present  at  this  attack  and  dis- 
contented with  the  operation,  now  ordered  a  battery 
for  six  gnns  to  be  constructed  amongst  some  ruined 
houses  on  the  right  of  the  parallel,  only  three  hun- 
dred yards  from  the  main  front,  and  two  shafts  were 
sunk  with  a  view  to  drive  galleries  for  the  protec- 
tion of  this  new  battery  against  the  enemy's  mines, 
but  the  work  was  slow  because  of  the  sandy  nature 
of  the  soil. 

At  three  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  27th,  the 
boats  of  the  squadron,  commanded  by  lieutenant 
Arbuthnot  of  the  Surveillante,  and  carrying  a  hun- 
dred soldiers  of  the  ninth  regiment  under  captain 
Cameron,  pulled  to  attack  the  island  of  Santa  Clara. 
A  heavy  fire  was  opened  on  them,  and  the  troops 
\anded  with  some  difficulty,  but  the  island  was  then 
easily  taken  and  a  lodgment  made  with  the  loss  of 
only  twenty-eight  men  and  officers,  of  which  eigh- 
teen were  sea  men. 

In  the  nijjht  of  the  27th,  about  three  o'clock,  the 
French  sallied  against  the  new  battery  on  the  isth- 
mus ;  bul  as  colonel  Cameron  of  the  ninth  regiment 
met  them  on  the  very  edge  of  the  trenches  with  the 
bayonet,  the  attempt  failed,  yet  it  delayed  the  arm- 
ing of  the  bnttery.  At  daybreak  the  renewed  fire 
of  the  besiegers,  especially  tiiat  from  the  Chofre 
sand-hills,  was  extremely  heavy,  and  the  shrapnel 
shells  were  sui)posed  to  be  very  destructive  ;  never- 
theless the  practice  with  that  missile  was  very  nn- 
fcertainjthe  bull'Jts  frequently  flew  amongst  the  guards 
in  the  parallel,  and  one  struck  the  field  officer.  In 
the  course  of  the  day  another  sally  was  commenced, 
but  the  enemy  being  discovered  and  fired  upon  did 
not  persist.  The  trenches  were  now  furnished  with 
banquettes  and  j^arapets  as  fast  as  the  quantity  of 
gabions  and  fascines  would  permit;  yet  the  work 
was  slow,  because  tlie  Spanish  authorities  of  Gui- 
puscoa,  like  those  in  every  other  part  of  Spain,  ne- 
glected to  provide  carts  to  convey  tiie  materials 
from  the  woods,  and  this  hard  labour  was  performed 
by  tho  Portuguese  soldiers.     It  would  seem,  how- 


ever, an  error  not  to  have  prepared  all  the  materials 
of  this  nature  during  the  blockade. 

Lord  Wellington  again  visited  the  works  this 
day,  and  in  the  night  the  advanced  battery,  which 
at  the  desire  of  sir  Richard  Fletcher  had  bet.i  con- 
structed for  only  tour  guns,  was  armed.  Tiie  2Bth  it 
opened  ;  but  an  accident  had  jirevented  the  arrival 
of  one  gun,  and  the  fire  of  the  enemy  soon  dismount- 
ed another,  so  that  only  two  instead  of  six  guns,  as 
lord  Wellington  had  designed,  smote  at  short  range 
the  face  of  the  demi-bastion  of  St.  John  and  the  end 
of  the  high  curtain  ;  however,  the  general  firing 
was  severe  both  upon  the  castle  and  the  town-works, 
and  great  damage  was  done  to  the  defences.  By  this 
time  the  French  guns  were  nearly  silenced,  end  as 
additional  mortars  were  mounted  on  the  Chofre  bat- 
teries, making  in  all  sixty-three  ])ieces,  of  which 
twenty-nine  threw  shells  or  spherical  case-shot,  the 
superiority  of  the  besiegers  was  established. 

The  Urumea  was  now  discovered  to  be  fordable. 
Captain  Alexander  3i'Donald  of  the  artillery,  with- 
out orders,  waded  across  in  the  night,  passed  close 
under  the  works  to  the  breach  and  rcliirned  safely. 
Wherefore  as  a  few  minutes  would  tiiliice  to  bring 
the  enemy  into  the  Chofrr  butter. ■.^t,  to  save  tlie 
guns  from  being  spikec,  llieir  xeixis  were  covered 
with  iron  plates  fastened  by  chains;  and  this  was 
also  done  at  the  advanced  battery  on  the  isthmus. 

This  day  the  materials  and  ordnance  for  a  battery 
of  six  pieces,  to  take  the  defences  cf  the  M  )rAe  Or- 
gullo  in  reverse,  were  sent  to  the  island  of  Santa 
Clara ;  and  several  guns  in  the  Chofre  batteries 
were  turned  upon  the  retaining  wall  of  the  horn- 
work, in  the  hope  of  shaking  down  any  mines  the 
enemy  might  have  prepared  there,  without  destroy- 
ing tlie  wall  itself,  which  ofiered  cover  for  the  troops 
advancing  to  the  assault. 

The  trenches  leading  from  the  parallel  on  the 
isthmus  were  now  very  wide  and  good,  the  sap  was 
pushed  on  the  right  close  to  the  demi-bastion  of  the 
liornwork,  and  the  sea-wall  supporting  the  high  road 
into  the  town,  which  had  increased  the  march  and 
cramped  the  formation  of  the  columns  in  the  first 
assault,  was  broken  through  to  give  access  to  the 
strand  and  shorten  the  approach  to  the  breaclies. 
The  crisis  was  at  hand,  and  in  the  night  of  the  29th 
a  false  attack  was  ordered  to  make  the  enemy  spring 
his  mines;  a  desperate  service,  and  bravely  execut- 
ed by  lieutenant  M'Adam  of  the  ninth  regiment. 
The  order  was  sudden,  no  volunteers  were  demand- 
ed, no  rewards  ofiered,  no  means  of  excitement  re- 
sorted to;  yet  such  is  the  inherent  bravery  of  Brit- 
ish soldiers,  that  seventeen  men  of  the  Royals,  the 
nearest  at  liand,  immediutely  leaped  forth  ready  and 
willing  to  encounter  what  seemed  certain  death. 
With  a  rapid  pace,  all  the  breaching  batteries  jday- 
ing  hotly  at  the  time,  they  reached  the  foot  of  the 
breach  unperceivcd,  and  then  mounted  in  extended 
order  shouting  and  firing;  but  the  French  were  too 
steady  to  be  imposed  upon,  and  their  musketry  laid 
the  whole  party  low  with  the  exception  of  their 
commander,  who  returned  alone  to  the  trenches. 

On  the  ;^Oth,  the  sea-flank  of  the  place  being 
opened  from  the  half-bastion  of  St.  John,  on  tiie 
right  to  the  most  distant  of  the  old  breaches,  that 
is  to  say,  for  five  hundred  feet,  the  batteries  on  the 
Chofres  w<sre  turned  against  the  castle  and  other  de- 
fences of  the  Monte  Orgullo,  while  the  advanceo 
battery  on  tlie  isthmus,  now  containing  three  gnns, 
demolished,  in  conjunction  with  the  fire  from  the 
Chofres,  the  face  of  the  half-bastion  of  St.  Jolin'a 
and  the  end  of  the  high  curta  n  above  it.  The  whole 
of  that  quarter  was  in  ruins,  cud  at  the  same  time 
the  batteries  on  San  Bartolomco  broke  the  face  of 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


641 


the  demi-bastion  o  '  chc  hornwork  and  cut  away  the 
pa',  isades. 

The  3Uth,  tiie  oatteries  continued  their  fire,  and 
about  three  o'clock  lord  \\'eliington,  after  examining 
the  enemy's  defence,  resolved  to  make  a  lodgment 
on  tlie  breach,  and  in  that  view  ordered  the  assault 
♦.o  be  made  tJie  next  day  at  eleven  o'clock,  when  the 
ebb  of  tide  would  leave  full  space  between  tiie  horn- 
work  and  the  water. 

The  galleries  in  I'rout  of  the  advanced  battery  on 
the  isthmus  were  now  pushed  close  up  to  the  sea- 
wallj  under  which  three  mines  were  formed  with 
t^e  double  view  of  opening  a  short  and  easy  way 
for  the  troops  to  reach  the  strand,  and  rendering 
useless  any  subterranean  works  the  enemy  might 
have  made  in  that  part.  At  two  o'clock  in  the 
morning  of  the  31st,  they  were  sprung,  and  opened 
three  wide  passages  which  were  immediately  con- 
nected, and  a  traverse  of  gabions,  six  feet  high,  was 
run  across  the  mouth  of  tiie  main  trench  on  the  left, 
to  screen  the  opening  from  tlie  grape-shot  of  the 
rastle.  Every  thing  was  now  ready  for  the  assault, 
but  before  describing  that  terrible  event  it  will  be 
fitting  to  show  the  exact  state  of  the  besieged  in 
defence. 

Sir  Thomas  Graliam  had  been  before  the  place  for 
fifty-two  d;iy«,  during  thirty  of  which  the  attack 
was  suspended.  All  this  time  the  garrison  had  la- 
boured incessantly,  and  though  the  heavy  fire  of  the 
Desiegers  since  the  2fith  ap[)eared  to  have  ruined  the 
defences  of  the  enormous  breach  in  the  sea-flank,  it 
was  not  so.  A  perpendicular  fall  behind  of  more 
than  twenty  feet  barred  progress,  and  beyond  that, 
aaongst  the  ruins  of  the  burned  houses,  was  a  strong 
counter-wall  fifteen  faet  high,  loopholed  for  musket- 
ry, and  extending  in  a  parallel  direction  with  tlie 
breaches,  which  were  also  cut  off  from,  the  sound 
part  of  the  rampart  by  traverses  at  the  extremities. 
The  only  really  practicable  road  into  the  town  was 
by  the  narrow  end  of  the  high  curtain  above  the 
half-bastion  of  St.  John. 

In  front  of  the  counter-wall,  about  the  middle  of 
the  great  breach,  stood  the  tower  of  Los  Hornos, 
still  capable  of  some  defence,  and  beneath  it  a 
mine  charged  with  twelve  hundred-weight  of  pow- 
der. The  streets  were  all  trenched,  and  furnished 
with  traverses  to  dispute  the  passage  and  to  cover  a 
retreat  to  the  Monte  Orgullo  ;  but  before  the  assail- 
ants could  reach  the  main  breach  it  was  necessary 
either  to  form  a  lodgment  in  the  hornwork,  or  to 
pass  as  in  the  former  assault  under  a  flanking  fire  of 
musketry  for  a  distance  of  nearly  two  hundred  yards. 
And  the  first  step  was  close  under  the  sea-wall  cov- 
ering the  salient  angle  of  the  covert-way,  where 
two  mines  charged  with  eight  hundred  pounds  of 
powder  were  prepared  to  overwlielm  the  advancing 
columns. 

To  support  thi8  system  of  retrenchments  and 
mines,  the  P>ench  had  still  some  artillery  in  re- 
serve. One  sixteen-pounder  mounted  at  St.  Elmo 
flanked  the  left  of  the  breaches  on  the  river  face  ; 
n  twelve  and  an  eight-pounder  preserved  in  the 
c?,semates  of  the  cavalier  were  ready  to  flank  the 
land  face  of  the  half-bastion  of  St.  John;  many  guns 
from  tlie  Mnnte  Orgullo,  especially  those  of  the 
Mirador,  could  phiy  upon  the  columns,  and  there 
was  a  four-pounder  hidden  on  the  hornwork  to  be 
brought  into  action  when  the  assault  commenced. 
Neither  the  resolution  of  the  governor  nor  the  cour- 
age of  the  gnrrison  were  abated,  b.it  the  overwhelm- 
ing fire  of  the  last  few  days  iiad  reduced  the  number 
of  fighting  msn  ;  general'lley  had  only  two  hundred 
^n:i  fifty  m^n  in  reserve,  and  he  demanded  of  Soult 
....ether  his  brave  garrison  should  be  exposed  to  an 
42 


other  assault.     "  The  army  would  endeavour  to  suc- 
cour him,"  was  tlie  reply,  and  he  abided  his  fate. 

Napoleon's  ordinance;,  wliicii  forbade  the  surren- 
der of  a  fortress  without  having  stood  at  least  one 
assault,  has  been  strongly  censured  by  English  wri- 
ters upon  slender  grounds.  The  obstinate  dufenccs 
made  by  French  governors  in  the  I'eniusula  were 
tlie  results,  and  to  condemn  an  enemy's  system  from 
which  we  have  ourselves  suffered,  will  scarcely 
bring  it  into  disrepute.  But  the  argument  rups, 
that  the  besiegers  working  by  the  lules  of  art  must 
make  a  way  into  the  place,  and  to  risk  an  assault 
for  the  sake  of  military  glory  or  to  augment  the  loss 
of  the  enemy  is  to  sacrifice  brave  men  uselessly  ; 
that  capitulation  always  followed  a  certain  advance 
of  the  besiegers  in  Louis  the  Fourteenth's  time,  and 
to  suppose  Napoleon's  upstart  generals  possessed  of 
superior  courage  or  sense  of  military  honour  to  the 
high-minded  nobility  of  that  age  was  quite  inadmis- 
sible ;  and  it  has  been  rather  whimsically  added  that 
obedience  to  the  emperor's  order  might  suit  a  pre- 
destinarian  Turk,  but  could  not  be  tolerated  by  a  re- 
flecting Christian.  From  this  it  would  seem,  that 
certain  nice  distinctions  as  to  the  extent  and  manner 
reconcile  human  slaughter  with  Christianity,  and 
that  the  true  standard  of  military  honour  was  fixed 
by  the  intriguing,  depraved  and  indolent  court  of 
Louis  the  Fourteenth.  It  may  however  be  reasona- 
bly supposed,  that  as  the  achievements  of  Majxv 
Icon's  soldiers  far  exceeded  tne  exploits  of  Louis's 
cringing  courtiers,  they  possessed  greater  military 
virtues. 

But  the  whole  argument  seems  to  rest  upon  fake 
grounds.  To  inflict  loss  upon  an  enemy  is  the  very 
essence  of  war,  and  as  the  bravest  men  and  olhcorH 
will  always  be  foremost  in  an  assault,  the  loss  tlnia 
occasioned  may  be  of  the  utmost  importance.  To 
resist  when  nothing  can  be  gained  or  saved  is  an  act 
of  barbarous  courage  which  reason  spurns  at;  but 
how  seldom  does  that  crisis  happen  in  warl  Napo- 
leon wisely  insisted  upon  a  resistance  which  should 
make  it  dangerous  for  the  besiegers  to  hasten  a 
siege  beyond  the  rules  of  art ;  he  would  not  have  a 
weak  governor  yield  to  a  simulation  of  force  nut 
really  existing;  he  desired  that  military  honour 
should  rest  upon  the  courage  and  resources  of  men 
rather  than  upon  Jie  strength  of  walls  ;  in  fine,  he 
made  a  practical  application  of  the  proverb  that 
"  necessity  is  the  mother  of  invention." 

Granted  that  a  siege  artfully  conducted  anc  with 
sufficient  means  must  reduce  the  fortress  attacked; 
still  there  will  be  some  opportvunity  for  a  governor 
to  display  his  resources  of  mind.  Yauban  adjnits 
of  one  assault  and  several  retrenchments,  after  a 
lodgment  is  made  on  the  body  of  the  place  ;  Napo- 
leon only  insisted  that  every  effort  which  courf^ge 
and  genius  could  dictate  should  be  exhausted  before 
a  surrender,  and  those  eflbrts  can  never  be  defined 
or  bounded  b-efbrehand.  Tarifa  is  a  happy  example 
To  be  cons- 'Stent,  any  attack  which  deviates  from 
the  rules  of  art  must  also  be  denounced  as  barba- 
rous ;  yet  how  seldom  has  a  general  all  the  neccssa 
ry  means  at  his  disposal.  In  Spain  not  one  siege 
could  be  conducted  by  the  British  army  according 
to  the  rules.  And  there  is  a  manifest  weakness  in 
jiraising  the  Spanish  defence  of  Zar:igoza,  and  con- 
demning Napoleon  because  he  demanded  from  regu- 
lar troops  a  devotion  similar  to  that  displayed  by 
peasants  and  artisans.  What  governor  was  ever  in 
a  more  desperate  situation  than  general  Bizanet  at 
Berg'm-op-Zoom,  when  sir  Thomas  Graham,  with  a 
hardihood  and  daring  which  would  alone  place  him 
amon;.'st  the  foremost  men  of  enterprise  which  V.u 
ro]>e  can  boast  of,  threw   more  than  two  thousand 


642 


NAPIER'S    PEN  INSTIL  A  K    WAR. 


[Book  XXTl. 


tt.»?;i  upon  the  ramparts  of  that  almost  impregnable 
fortress.    The  young  soldiers  of  the  garrison,  fright- ' 
ened   by  a  surprise   in   the   night,  were   dispersed, ' 
were  flying.     The  assailants  had  possession  of  the 
walls  for  several  hours ;   yet  some   cool  and   brave 
officers,  rallying  the  men  towards  morning,  charged 
up  the  narrow  ramps  and  drove  the  assailants  over ' 
the  parapets  into  the  ditch.     They  wlio  cou'd  not  at 
first  defend   their  works  were  now  ablo  to   lOtake  ' 
them,  and  so  completely  successful  and  illustrative 
of  Napoleon's  principle  was  this  counter-attack  that 
the  number  of  prisoners  equalled  that  of  the  garri- 
son.   There  are  no  rules  to  limi*  energy  and  genius, 
and  no  man  knew  better  than  Napoleon  how  to  call 
those  qualities  forth  ;  he  possessed  them  himself  in 
the  utmost  perfection,  and  created  them  in  others 


CHAPTER  II. 

Sformins:  of  Son  Sebastian — Lord  Wtllington  calls  for  volun- 
.t-ers  from  tif  fir<t,  fonrth  aii'l  li^ht  division*- — The  plare  i> 
assaulted  and  taken — The  town  l)iiined — The  castle  is  boni- 
bai-ded  and  suirendera — Ob-ervatiuns. 

STORMING    OF    SAN    SEBASTIAN. 

To  assault  the  breaches  without  having  destroyed 
the  enemy's  defences  or  established  a  lodgment  on 
the  hornwork,  was,  notwithstanding  the  increased 
fire  and  great  facilities  of  the  besiegers,  obviously 
a  repetition  of  the  former  fatal  error.  And  the  same 
generals  who  had  before  so  indiscreetly  made  their 
disapproval  of  such  operations  public,  now  even 
more  freely  and  imprudently  dealt  out  censures, 
which  not  ill-founded  in  themselves  were  most  ill- 
timed,  since  there  is  much  danger  when  doubts 
come  down  from  the  commanders  to  the  soldiers. 
Lord  Wellington  thought  the  fiftlk  division  had  been 
thus  discouraged,  and  incensed  at  the  cause,  de- 
manded fifty  vr'unteers  from  each  of  the  fifteen  reg- 
iments composing  the  first,  fourth  and  light  divis- 
ions, "  men  who  could  show  other  troops  how  to 
mount  a  breach."  This  was  the  phrase  employed, 
and  seven  hundred  and  fifty  gallant  soldiers  instant- 
ly marched  to  San  Sebastian  in  answer  to  the  ap- 
peal. Colonel  Cooke  and  major  Robertson  led  the 
guards  and  Germans  of  the  first  division,  major  Rose 
comrnanded  the  men  of  the  fourth  division,  and  col- 
onel Hunt,  a  daring  oSicer  who  had  already  won  his 
promotion  at  former  assaults,  was  at  the  head  of  the 
fierce  rugged  veterans  of  the  liglit  division;  yet 
there  were  good  officers  and  brave  soldiers  in  the 
fifth  division. 

It  being  at  first  supposed  that  lord  Wellington 
merely  designed  a  simple  lodgment  on  the  great 
breach,  the  volunteers  and  one  brigade  of  the  fifth 
division  only  were  ordered  to  be  ready  ;  but  in  a 
council  held  at  night  major  Smith  maintained  that 
the  orders  were  misunderstood,  as  no  lodgment 
could  be  formed  unless  the  high  curtain  was  gained. 
General  Oswald  being  called  to  the  council  was  of 
the  same  opinion,  whereupon  the  remainder  of  the 
fifth  division  was  brought  to  the  trenches,  and  gen- 
eral Bradford  having  offered  the  services  of  his  Por- 
tuguese brigade,  was  told  he  might  ford  the  Urumea 
and  assail  the  farthest  breach  if  he  judged  it  ad- 
visable. 

Sir  .Tames  Leith  had  resumed  the  command  of 
the  fifth  division,  and  being  assisted  by  general  Os- 
v/ald  directed  the  attack  from  the  isthmus.  He 
was  extremely  offended  by  the  arrival  of  the  volun- 
teers and  would  not  suffer  them  to  lead  the  assault ; 
Bome  he  spread  along  the  f'^nchcs  to  keep  down  the 
fire  of  the  hornwork,  tht  -r  )aiuv«r  were  held  as 


a  reserve  along  with  genera'  Hay's  British  and 
Sprye's  Portuguese  brigades  oi  the  fiftii  division. 
To  general  Robinson's  brigade  the  assault  was  con- 
fided It  was  formed  in  two  columns,  one  to  ct- 
sault  the  o.d  breach  between  the  towers,  the  otb- 
er  to  suorm  the  bastion  of  St.  John  and  the  end 
of  the  high  curtain.  The  small  breach  on  the  ex- 
treme right  was  left  for  general  Bradiijrd's  Portu- 
guese, who  were  drawn  up  on  tiie  Chofre  hills, 
some  large  boats  filled  with  troops  were  directed  to 
make  a  demonstration  against  the  sea-line  of  the 
Monte  Orgullo,  and  sir  Thomas  Graham  overlooked 
the  whole  operations  from  the  right  bank  of  the 
river. 

The  morning  of  the  31st  broke  h'^avily,  a  thick 
fog  hid  every  object,  and  the  besiegers'  batteries 
could  not  open  until  eight  o'clock.  From  tliat  hour 
a  constant  shower  of  heavy  missiles  was  poured  up- 
on the  besieged  until  eleven,  when  Robinson's  bri- 
gade getting  out  of  the  trenches  passed  through  the 
openings  in  the  sea-wall  and  was  launched  boldly 
against  the  breaches.  While  the  head  of  the  col- 
umn was  still  gathering  on  the  strand,  about  thirty 
yards  from  the  salient  angle  of  the  hornwork,  twelve 
men,  commanded  by  a  sergeant,  whose  heroic  death 
has  not  sufficed  to  preserve  his  name,  running  vio- 
lently forward  leaped  upon  the  covert-way  with  in- 
tent .to  cut  the  sausage  of  the  enemy's  mines.  The 
French,  startled  by  this  sudden  assault,  fired  the 
train  prematurely,  and  though  the  sergeant  and 
his  brave  followers  were  all  destroyed  and  the  hi^'i 
sea-wall  was  thrown  with  a  dreadful  crash  upon  the 
head  of  the  advancing  column,  not  more  than  "<r,  j 
men  were  crushed  by  the  ruins,  and  the  rush  of  u>fo 
troops  was  scarcely  checked.  The  forlorn  hope  had 
already  passed  beyond  the  play  of  the  mine,  and 
now  speeded  along  the  strand  amidst  a  slower  of 
grape  and  shells  ;  the  leader,  .eutenant  M'Giiire  of 
the  fourth  regiment,  conspicuous  from  his  long 
white  plume,  his  fine  figure  and  his  swiftnesp, 
bounded  far  ahead  of  his  men  in  all  the  pride  of 
youthful  strength  and  courage,  but  at  the  foot  of  the 
great  breach  he  fell  dead,  and  the  stormers  went 
sweeping  like  a  dark  surge  over  his  body  ;  many 
died,  however,  with  him,  and  the  trickling  ot 
wounded  men  to  the  rear  was  incessui.. 

This  time  there  was  a  broad  strand  left  by  the 
retreating  tide  and  the  sun  had  dried  the  rooks,  yet 
they  disturbed  the  order  and  closeness  of  the  forma- 
tion, the  distance  to  the  main  breach  was  still  near- 
ly two  hundred  yards,  and  the  French,  seeing  the 
first  mass  of  assailants  pass  the  hornwork  regardless 
of  its  broken  bastion,  immediately  abandoned  the 
front,  and  crowding  on  the  river  face  of  that  work 
poured  their  musketry  into  the  flank  of  the  second 
column  as  it  rushed  along  a  few  yards  below  them  ; 
but  the  soldiers,  still  running  forward  towards  the 
breach,  returned  this  fire  without  slackening  theii 
speed.  The  batteries  of  the  Monte  Orgullo  and  the 
St.  Elmo  now  sent  their  showers  of  shot  and  shells, 
the  two  pieces  on  the  cavalier  swept  the  face  of  the 
breach  in  the  bastion  of  St.  John,  and  the  four- 
pounder  in  the  hornwork  being  suddenly  mounted 
on  the  broken  bastion  poured  grape-shot  into  their 
rear. 

Tlius  scourged  with  fire  from  all  sides,  the  etorm- 
ers,  their  array  broken  alike  by  the  shot  and  by  the 
rocks  they  passed  over,  reached  their  destinations^ 
and  the  head  of  the  first  column  gained  the  top  of 
the  great  breach  ;  but  the  unexpected  gulf  below 
could  only  be  passed  at  a  few  places  where  meagre 
parcels  of  the  burned  houses  were  still  attached  to 
the  rampart,  and  the  deadly  clatter  of  the  French 
muskets    from    the    loopholcd    wall    beyond    soon 


1813.] 


xVAPIER'S   PENIT^SULAR   WAR. 


643 


Btrawed  the  narrow  crest  of  Llie  niiiis  wuli  dead. 
In  vain  the  following  multitude  covered  the  ascent, 
seeking  an  eiUrance  at  every  part ;  to  advance  was 
iiuposs.ble,  and  the  mass  of  assailants,  slowly  sink- 
••:>•  downwards,  remained  stubborn  and  immoveable 
'nthe  lower  part  of  the  breach.  Here  they  were 
covered  from  the  musketry  in  front,  but  from  sev- 
eral isolated  points,  especially  the  tower  of  Los 
H(-  nos,  under  which  the  great  mine  was  placed, 
t!ie  Fiench  still  smote  them  with  small  arms,  and 
the  artillery  from  the  Monte  OrguUo  poured  shells 
•and  grape  without  intermission. 

Such  was  the  state  of  affairs  at  the  great  breach, 
and  at  the  half-bastion  of  St.  John  it  was  even 
worse  The  access  to  the  top  of  the  high  curtain 
biing  quite  practicable,  the  efforts  to  force  a  way 
were  more  persevering  and  constant,  and  the  slaugh- 
ter was  in  proportion  ;  for  the  traverse  on  the  flank, 
cutting  it  off  from  the  cavalier,  was  defended  by 
French  grenadiers  who  would  not  yield  ;  the  two 
pieces  on  the  cavalier  itself  swept  along  the  front 
face  of  the  opening,  and  the  four-pounder  and  the 
musketry  from  the  hornwork  swept  in  like  manner 
along  the  river  face.  In  the  midst  of  this  destruc- 
tion some  sappers  and  a  working  party  attached  to 
the  assaulting  columns  endeavoured  to  form  a  lodg- 
ment, but  no  artificial  materials  had  been  provided, 
and  most  of  the  labourers  were  killed  before  they 
could  raise  the  loose  rocky  fragments  into  cover. 

During  this  time  the  besiegers'  artillery  kept  up 
a  constant  counter-fire  which  killed  many  of  the 
Francii.  and  the  reserve  brigades  of  the  fifth  divis- 
ion W3ra  pushed  on  by  degrees  to  feed  the  attack 
until  the  left  wing  of  the  ninth  regiment  only  re- 
mained in  the  trenches.  I'iie  vrlunteers  also  who 
Lad  been  with  difficulty  restrained  in  the  trenches, 

calling  .It  to  know  why  they  had  been  brought  j 
there  if  tl:'  ■  were  not  to  lead  the  assault,"  these 
men,  whose  -vresence  had  given  such  offence  to  gen- 
eral Leith  that  he  would  have  kept  them  altogether 
from  the  assault,  being  now  let  loose,  went  like  a 
whirlwind  to  the  breaches,  and  again  the  crowded 
masses  swarmed  up  the  face  of  the  ruins,  but  reach- 
ing the  crest  line  they  came  down  like  a  falling 
wall ;  ci-owd  after  crowd  were  seen  to  mount,  to  tot- 
ter, and  to  sink,  the  deadly  French  fire  was  una- 
bated, the  smoke  floated  away,  and  the  crest  of  the 
breach  bore  no  living  man. 

Sir  Thomas  Graham,  standing  on  the  nearest  of 
the  Chofre  batteries,  beheld  this  frightful  destruc- 
tion with  a  stern  resolution  to  win  at  any  cost;  and 
ne  was  a  man  to  have  put  himself  at  the  head  of  the 
.ast  company  and  died  sword  in  hand  upon  the 
breach  rather  than  sustain  a  second  defeat,  but 
neither  his  confidence  nor  his  resources  were  yet 
exhausted.  He  directed  an  attempt  to  be  made  on 
the  hornwork,  and  turned  all  the  Ciiofre  batteries 
and  on-r-  on  the  isthnms,  that  is  to  say,  the  concen- 
trated fire  of  fifty  heavy  pieces,  upon  the  high  cur- 
tain. The  shot  ranged  over  the  heads  of  the  troops, 
who  now  were  gathered  at  the  foot  of  the  breach, 
and  the  stream  of  missiles  thus  poured  along  the 
upper  surface  of  the  high  curtain  broke  down  the 
traverses,  and  in  its  fearful  course  shattering  all 
things  strewed  the  rampart  with  the  mangled  limbs 
of  the  defenders.  When  this  flight  of  bullets  first 
swept  over  the  heads  of  the  soldiers,  a  cry  arose, 
Irom  some  inexperienced  people,  "  to  retire,  because 
the  batteries  were  firing  on  the  stormers  ;"  but  the 

eterans  of  the  light  division  under  Hunt  being  at 
that  point  were  not  to  be  so  disturbed,  ;ind  in  the 
very  lieat  and  fury  of  the  cannonade  efi'ected  a  solid 
lodgment  in  some  ruins  of  houses  actually  witliin 
thc'ranipart,  on  the  right  of  the  great  breach 


For  half  an  li.)ur  this  horrid  tempest  emnt'?  upon 
the  works  and  the  iiouso;  behind,  ajid  then  sudden 
ly  ceasing  the  small  (datter  of  the  b'rench  musivots 
showed  ttiat  the  assailants  were  again  in  activity; 
and  at  the  same  time  the  thirteenth  Portuguese 
regiment,  led  by  major  Snodgrass,  and  followed  by 
a  detachment  of  the  twenty-fourth  under  colonel 
M'Bean,  entered  the  river  from  the  Ciiofres.  The 
tbrd  was  deep,  tiie  water  rose  above  the  waist,  and 
when  the  soldiers  reached  the  middle  of  the  stream, 
which  was  two  hundred  yards  wide,  a  heavy  gux. 
struck  on  the  head  of  the  column  with  a  shower  of 
grape;  the  havoc  was  fearful,  but  the  survivors 
closed  and  moved  on.  A  second  discharge  from  the 
same  piece  tore  the  ranks  from  front  to  rear,  still 
the  regiment  moved  on,  and  amidst  a  confu!-ed  fire 
of  musketry  from  the  ramparts,  and  of  artillery  from 
St.  Elmo,  from  the  castle,  and  from  the  Mirtidor, 
landed  on  the  left  bank  and  rushed  against  the  third 
breach.  M'Bean's  men,  who  had  followed  with 
equal  bravery,  then  reinforced  the  great  breach, 
about  eighty  yards  to  tlie  left  of  the  other,  altliough 
the  line  of  ruins  seemed  to  extend  the  whole  way. 
The  fighting  now  became  fierce  and  obstinate  again 
at  all  the  breaches,  but  the  French  musketry  still 
rolled  with  deadly  eflect,  the  heaps  of  ylain  in- 
creased, and  once  more  the  great  mass  of  stormers 
sunk  to  the  foot  of  the  ruins  unable  to  win  ;  the 
living  sheltered  themselves  as  they  could,  but  the 
dead  and  wounded  lay  so  thickly  that  hardly  could 
it  be  judged  whether  the  hurt  or  unhurt  wore  most 
numerous. 

It  was  now  evident  that  the  assault  must  fail  un- 
less some  accident  intervened,  for  the  tide  was 
rising,  the  reserves  all  engaged,  and  no  greater 
effort  could  be  expected  from  men  whose  courage 
had  been  already  pushed  to  the  verge  of  madnesa 
In  this  crisis  fortune  interfered.  A  number  of  pOA- 
der  barrels,  live  shells,  and  combustible  materials 
v.'hich  the  French  had  accumulated  behind  the  trav- 
erses for  their  defence,  caught  fire,  a  bright  consum- 
ing flame  wrapped  the  whole  of  the  high  curtain,  a 
succession  of  loud  explosions  were  heard,  hundreds 
of  the  French  grenadiers  were  destroyed,  the  rest 
were  thrown  into  confiision,  and  while  the  ramparts 
were  still  involved  with  suffocating  eddies  of  smoke 
the  British  soldiers  broke  in  at  the  first  traverse. 
The  defenders  bewildered  by  this  terrible  disaster 
yielded  for  a  moment,  yet  soon  rallied,  and  a  close 
desperate  struggle  took  place  along  the  summit  of 
the  high  curtain  ;  but  the  fury  of  the  stormers  v.liose 
numbers  increased  every  moment  could  not  be  stem- 
med. The  French  colours  on  the  cavalier  were 
torn  away  by  lieutenant  Gethin  of  the  eleventli 
regiment.  The  hornwork  and  the  land  front  below 
the  curtain,  and  the  loopholed  wall  behind  the  grer.t 
breach,  were  all  abandoned  ;  the  light  division  su\- 
diers,  who  had  already  established  themselves  in  the 
ruins  on  the  French  left,  immediately  penetrated  to 
the  streets  ;  and  at  the  same  moment  the  Portuguese 
at  the  small  breach,  mixed  with  British  who  had 
wandered  to  that  point  seeking  for  an  entrance 
burst  in  on  their  side. 

Five  hours  the  dreadful  bottle  had  lasted  ot  the 
walls,  and  now  the  stream  of  war  went  pouring  int.. 
the  town.  The  undaunted  governor  still  disiuitet! 
the  victory  for  a  short  time  with  the  aid  of  his  bar- 
ricades, but  several  hundreds  of  his  men  being  cut 
off  iind  taken  in  the  hornwork,  his  garrison  wus  s( 
reduced  that  even  to  effect  a  retreat  behind  the  line 
of  defences  wliich  separ.ited  the  town  from  the 
Monte  Orgullo  was  diffii  iilt.  Many  of  his  troouh 
flying  from  the  hcrnwork  along  the  harbour  flai.*.  A 
I  the  t'own,  broke  through  a  bodv  of  the  British  who 


644 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[BookXXII. 


had  reaoliod  thi  vicinity  of  the  fortifisd  convent  of 
Santa  Theresa  before  them,  and  this  post  was  tiie 
only  om  retained  by  tlie  Frencli  in  the  town.  It 
wari  thouifht  by  some  distingiiislied  otliccrs  engaged 
in  the  action  that  3Ionte  Urgullo  might  iiave  been 
carried  on  this  day,  if  a  commander  of  sufficient 
ranli  to  direct  tl)e  troops  had  been  at  hand  ;  but 
vvhetlier  from  wounds  or  accident  no  general  entered 
the  place  until  long  after  tiie  breach  had  been  won, 
the  commanders  of  battalions  were  embarrassed  for 
want  of  orders,  and  a  thunder-storm,  vvliich  came 
down  from  the  mountains  with  unbounded  fury  im- 
mediately aller  the  place  was  carried,  added  to  the 
confusion  of  the  fight. 

This  storm  seemed  to  be  the  signal  of  hell  for  the 
perpetration  of  villany  which  would  have  shamed 
the  most  ferocious  barbarians  of  antiquity.  At 
Ciuchid  Uodrigo  intoxication  and  plunder  liad  been 
the  principal  object  ;  at  Badajoz  lust  and  murder 
were  joined  to  rapine  and  drunlienness  ;  but  at  Han 
Sebastian,  the  direst,  the  most  revolting  cruelty 
was  added  to  the  catalogue  of  crimes.  One  atroci- 
ty, of  which  a  girl  of  seventeen  was  the  victim, 
staggers  the  mind  by  its  enormous,  incredible,  in- 
describable barbarity.  Some  order  was  at  first 
maintained,  but  the  resolution  of  tlie  troops  to  throw 
oiT  discipline  was  quiclvly  made  manifest.  A  Brit- 
ish staff-officer  was  pursued  witli  a  volley  of  small 
arms,  and  escaped  with  difficulty  from  men  who 
mistook  him  for  the  provost-martial  of  the  fifth  di- 
vision ;  a  Portuguese  adjutant,  who  endeavoured  to 
prevent  some  atrocity,  was  put  to  death  in  tlie  mar- 
ket-place, not  with  sudden  violence  from  a  single 
ruliian,  but  delib?rately  by  a  number  of  English  sol- 
diers. iMany  officers  exerted  tliemselves  to  preserve 
order,  many  men  were  well  conducted,  but  the  ra- 
pine and  vitdence  commenced  by  villains  soon  spread, 
the  camp-followers  crowded  into  the  place,  and  the 
disorder  continued  until  the  flames  following  the 
steps  of  the  plunderer  put  an  end  to  his  ferocity  by 
destroying  tlie  whole  town. 

Three  generals,  Leith,  Oswald  and  Robinson,  had 
been  hurt  in  tlie  trenches  ;  sir  Richard  Fletcher,  the 
chief  engineer,  a  brave  man  who  had  served  his  coun- 
try honourably,  was  killed,  and  colonel  Burgoyne 
the  next  in  command  of  tiiat  arm  was  wounded. 

The  carnage  at  the  breaches  was  appalling.  The 
valunteers,  although  brought  late  into  tlie  action, 
had  neiirly  half  their  number  struck  down,  most  of 
tl»9  regiments  of  the  fifth  division  suffered  in  i.he 
same  proportion,  and  the  whole  loss  since  the  re- 
newal of  the  siege  exceeded  two  thousand  five  hun- 
dred men  and  officers. 

'J'ho  town  being  thus  taken,  the  Monte  OrguUo 
was  to  be  attacked,  but  it  was  very  steep  and  diffi- 
cult to  assail.  The  castle  served  as  a  citadel,  and 
just  below  it  four  batteries  connected  with  masonry 
stretched  across  tlie  face  of  the  hill.  From  the 
Mirador  and  Queen's  batteries  at  the  extremities  of 
this  line,  ramps,  protet^ted  by  redans,  led  to  the  con- 
vent of  Santa  Tlieresa,  which  was  tiie  most  salient 
part  of  the  defence.  On  the  side  of  Santa  Clara  and 
h^liind  the  mount'iin  were  some  sea  batteries,  and 
if  all  these  works  had  been  of  good  construction,  tlie 
troojjs  fresh  and  well  supplied,  the  siege  would  have 
been  long  and  difficult;  but  tiie  garrison  was  shat- 
tered by  the  recent  assault,  most  of  the  engineers 
and  leaders  killed,  the  governor  and  many  others 
wounded,  i\v(i  hundred  men  were  sick  or  hurt,  tlie 
pddiers  fit  for  dufy  did  not  exceed  thirteen  hundred, 
»nd  they  had  four  hundred  prisoners  to  guard.  'I'he 
castle  was  small,  the  bomb-proofs  scnrcdy  sufiicerl 
to  protect  the  ammunition  and  provisions,  and  only 
ten  guns  remained  in  a  condition  for  service,  t'-irc^' 


of  which  were  on  the  sea-line.  There  was  very  lit- 
tle water,  and  the  troops  were  forced  to  lie  out  oa 
the  naked  rock,  exposed  to  tiie  fire  of  the  bcsieg 
ers,  or  only  covered  by  the  asperities  of  ground 
(ieneral  Rey  and  his  brave  garrison  were,  however, 
still  resolute  to  fight;  and  they  received  nightly  by 
sea  supplies  of  ammunition,  tliough  in  small  quan- 
tities. 

Lord  VVellington  arrived  the  day  after  the  as- 
sault. Regular  approaciies  could  not  be  carried  up 
the  steep  naked  rock,  he  doubted  the  power  of  verti- 
cal fire,  and  ordered  batteries  to  be  formed  on  the 
captured  works  of  the  town,  intending  to  breach  the 
ene'.ny's  remaining  lines  of  defence  and  then  storm 
the  Orgullo.  And  as  the  convent  of  Santa  Theresa 
would  enable  the  French  to  sally  by  the  rampart  on 
the  left  of  the  allies'  position  in  the  town,  he  com- 
posed his  first  line  with  a  few  troops  strongly  bar- 
ricaded, placing  a  supporting  body  in  the  market- 
place, and  strong  reserves  on  the  high  curtain  and 
flank  ramparts.  Meanwhile  from  the  convent,  which 
being  actually  in  \he  town  might  have  been  easily 
taken  at  first,  the  enemy  killed  many  of  the  besieg- 
ers ;  and  when  after  several  days  it  was  assaulted, 
they  set  the  lower  parts  on  fire,  and  retired  by  a 
communication  made  from  the  roof  to  a  ramp  on  the 
hill  behind.  All  this  time  the  flames  were  destroy- 
ing the  town,  and  the  Orgullo  was  overwhelmed 
with  shells  shot  upward  from  the  besiegers'  bat- 
teries. 

On  the  3d  of  September,  the  governor  being  sum- 
moned to  surrender  demanded  terms  inadmissible, 
his  resolution  was  not  to  be  shaken,  and  the  vertical 
fire  was  therefore  continued  day  and  nigiit,  though 
the  British  prisoners  suffered  as  well  as  the  enemy  ; 
for  the  officer  commanding  in  the  castle,  irritated 
by  the  misery  of  the  garrison,  cruelly  refused  to  let 
the  unfortunate  captives  make  trenches  to  cover 
themselves.  The  French,  on  the  other  hand,  com- 
plain that  their  wounded  and  sick  men,  althoii<rh 
placed  in  an  empty  magazine  with  a  black  flag  fly- 
ing, were  fired  upon  by  the  besiegers,  although  the 
English  prisoners  in  their  red  uniforms  were  placed 
around  it  to  strengthen  the  claim  of  humanity. 

The  new  breaching  batteries  were  now  com- 
menced, one  for  three  pieces  on  the  isthmus,  the 
other  for  seventeen  pieces  on  the  land  front  of  the 
hornwork.  These  guns  were  brought  from  the  Clio- 
fres  at  low  water  across  the  Urumea,  at  first  in  the 
night,  but  the  difficulty  of  labouring  in  the  water 
during  darkness  induced  the  artillery  officers  to 
transport  the  remainder  in  daylight,  and  within 
reach  of  the  enemy's  batteries,  which  did  not  fire  a 
shot.  In  the  town  the  besiegers'  labours  were  im- 
peded by  the  flaming  houses,  but  near  the  loot  of 
tlie  hill  the  ruins  furnished  slielter  for  the  musket- 
eers employed  to  gall  the  garrison,  and  the  guns  on 
the  island  of  Santa  Clara  being  reinforced  were  ac- 
tively worked  by  the  seamen.  The  besieged  repli- 
ed but  little,  their  ammunition  was  scarce,  and  the 
horrible  vertical  fire  subdued  their  energy.  In  this 
manner  the  action  was  prolonged  until  the  8th  of 
September,  when  fifty-nine  heavy  battering  pieces 
opened  at  once  from  the  island,  the  isthmus,  the 
iiornwork  and  the  Chofres.  In  two  hours  both  th,e 
]\Iirador  and  the  Q,ueen  battery  were  broken,  the 
fire  of  the  besieged  was  entirely  extinguished,  and 
the  summit  and  face  of  the  hill  torn  and  furrowed  in 
a  frigiitiul  manner;  the  bread-ovens  were  destroyed, 
a  magazine  exfdoded,  and  the  castle,  small  ar.d 
crowded  with  men,  was  overlaid  with  the  descend- 
ing shells.  Tlien  tlie  governor,  prcudly  tjending  to 
his  fate,  surrendered.  On  the  9th,  this  brave  man 
and  his  heroic  garrieou.  reduced  to  one-third  of  thej/ 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


645 


original  number  and  Isavintr  five  hundred  wounded 
behind  them  in  the  hospital,  marched  out  with  the 
lionours  of  war.  The  Spanish  flag  was  hoisted  un- 
der a  salute  of  twenty-one  guns,  and  the  siege  ter- 
minated aller  sixty-tli-ree  days  open  trenches,  pre- 
cisely when  the  tempestuous  season,  beginning  to 
vex  the  coast,  would  have  rendered  a  continuance 
of  the  sea  blockade  impossible. 

OBSERVATIONS, 

1st.  San  Sebastian,  a  third-rate  fortress  and  in 
bad  condition  when  first  invested,  resisted  a  besieg- 
ing army,  possessing  an  enormous  battering  train, 
for  sixty-three  days.  This  is  to  be  attributed  part- 
ly to  the  errors  of  the  besiegers,  principally  to  ob- 
structions extraneous  to  the  military  operations. 
Amongst  the  last  are  to  be  reckoned  the  misconduct 
of  the  admiralty,  and  the  negligence  of  the  govern- 
ment r-elative  to  the  battering  train  and  supply  of 
ammunition  ;  the  latter  retarded  the  second  siege 
fjr  sixteen  days  ;  the  former  enabled  the  garrison  to 
keep  up  and  even  increase  its  means  as  the  siege 
proceeded. 

Next,  in  order  and  importance,  was  the  failure  of 
tiie  Spanish  authorities,  who  neglected  to  supply 
carts  and  boats  from  the  country,  and  even  refused 
the  use  of  their  public  buildings  for  hospitals.  Thus 
between  the  s^a  and  the  shore,  receiving  aid  from 
neither,  lord  Wellington  had  to  conduct  an  opera- 
tion of  war,  which  more  than  any  other  depends  for 
success  upon  labour  and  provident  care.  It  was 
probably  the  first  time  that  an  impoilant  siege  was 
maintained  by  women's  exertions  ;  the  stores  of  the 
besiegers  were  landed  from  boats  rowed  by  Spanish 
girls  I 

\nother  impediment  was  Soult's  advance  towards 
Painpeluna;  but  the  positive  effect  of  this  was 
slight,  since  the  want  of  ammunition  would  have 
equally  delayed  the  attack.  The  true  measure  of 
the  English  government's  negligence  is  thus  obtain- 
ed. It  was  more  mischievous  than  the  operations 
of  s'xty  thousand  men  under  a  great  general. 

2nd.  The  errors  of  execution,  having  been  before 
touched  upon,  need  no  further  illustration.  The 
greatest  difterence  between  the  first  and  second  part 
of  tlie  siege  preceding  the  assaults,  was  that  in  the 
latter,  the  approaches  near  the  isthmus  being  car- 
ried further  on  and  openings  made  in  the  sea-wall, 
the  troops  more  easily  and  rapidly  extricated  them- 
selves from  the  trenches,  the  distance  to  the  breach 
was  shortened,  and  the  French  fire  bearing  on  the 
fronts  of  attack  was  somewhat  less  powerful.  These 
advantages  were  considerable,  but  not  proportionate 
to  the  enormous  increase  of  the  besiegers'  means  ; 
and  it  is  quite  clear  from  the  terrible  effects  of  the 
cannonade  during  the  assault,  that  the  whole  of  the 
definces  might  have  been  ruined,  even  those  of  the 
Ci?tle,  if  this  overwhelming  fire,  had  in  compliance 
with  tlie  rules  of  art  been  first  employed  to  silence 
the  enemy's  fire.  A  lodgment  in  the  hornwork  could 
then  have  been  made  with  little  difficulty,  and  the 
breach  attacked  without  much  danger. 

3rd.  As  the  faults  leading  to  failure   in  the  first 
part  of  the  siege  were  repeated  in  the  second,  while 
tlie  enemy's  resources  had  increased  by  the  gain  of 
time,  and  because  his  intercourse  with  France  by 
sea  never  was  cut  off,  it  follows  that  there  was  no 
reasonable  security  for  success  ;  not  even  to  make  a 
lodgment  on  the  breach,  since  no  artificial  materials 
were  prepared,  and  the  workmen  failed  to  eflert  that  j 
object.     But  the  first  arrangem'^nt  and  the  change  j 
adopted   in   the  council  of  war,  the  option  given  to  j 
general   Bradford,  the  remarkable  fact,  tiiat  the  si-' 
jiultaneous  attack  on  tlie  hornwork  was  ouly  tiiought , 


of  when  tlie  first  efforts  against  ^he  breach  had  fail 
ed,  all  prove  that  the  enemy's  defensive  means  were 
underrated,  and  tlie  extent  of  the  success  exceeced 
the  preparations  to  obtain  it. 

The  place  was  won  by  accident.  For  first,  the 
explosion  of  the  great  mine  under  the  towe^-  ot  I.os 
Hornos  was  only  prevented  by  a  happy  siiot  wnich 
cut  tiie  sausage  of  the  train  during  the  tight,  and 
this  was  followed  by  the  ignition  of  the  French 
powder-barrels  and  shells  along  the  high  curtain, 
which  alone  opened  the  way  into  the  town.  Sir 
Thomas  Graham's  firmness  and  perseverance  in  tiie 
assault,  and  the  judicious  usage  of  his  artillery 
ag-ainst  the  high  curtain  during  the  action,  an  oi;er- 
ation,  however,  which  only  belcnged  to  daylight, 
were  no  mean  helps  to  the  victory.  It  was  on  such 
sudden  occasions  that  his  prompt  genius  shone  con- 
spicuously ;  yet  it  was  nothing  wonderful  that  hea- 
vy guns  at  short  distances^  the  range  being  perfect- 
ly known,  should  strike  with  certainty  along  a  line 
of  rampart  more  than  twenty-seven  feet  above  the 
heads  of  the  troops.  Such  practice  was  to  be  ex- 
pected from  British  artillery,  and  Graham's  genius 
was  more  evinced  by  the  promptness  of  the  tiitught 
and  the  trust  he  put  in  the  valour  of  his  soldiers. 
It  was  far  more  extraordinary  that  the  stormers  did 
not  relinquish  their  attack  when  thus  exposed  to 
their  own  guns,  for  it  is  a  mistake  to  say  that  r.o 
mischief  occurred  ;  a  sergeant  of  the  ninth  regiment 
was  killed  by  the  batteries  close  to  his  commanding 
officer,  and  it  is  probable  that  other  casualties  also 
had  place. 

4th.  The  explosion  on  the  ramparts  is  generally 
supposed  to  have  been  caused  by  the  cannonade  from 
the  Chofre  batteries  ;  yet  a  cool  and  careful  obser- 
ver, whose  account  I  have  adopted,  because  he  was 
a  spectator  in  perfect  safety  and  undisturbed  by  hav- 
ing to  give  or  receive  orders,  afiirms  that  the  can- 
nonade ceased  before  colonel  Snodgrass  fcrc'ed  the 
river,  whereas  the  great  explosion  did  not  hajiven 
until  half  an  hour  after  that  event.  By  some  per- 
sons that  intrepid  exploit  of  the  Portuguese  was 
thought  one  of  the  principal  causes  of  success,  and 
it  appears  certain  that  an  entrance  was  i-nade  at  tiie 
small  breach  by  several  soldiers,  British  and  Portu- 
guese, many  of  the  former  having  wandered  frcm 
the  great  breach  and  got  mixed  with  the  latter,  be- 
fore the  explosion  happened  on  the  high  curtain. 
Whether  those  men  would  have  been  followed  by 
greater  numbers  is  doubtful,  but  the  lodgment  macie 
by  the  light  division  volunteers  within  the  great 
breach  was  solid  and  could  have  been  maintained. 
The  French  call  the  Portuguese  attack  a  feint.  Sir 
Thomas  Graham  certainly  did  not  found  much  upon 
it.  He  gave  general  Bradford  the  option  to  nttack 
or  remain  tranquil,  and  colonel  ^I'Bean  actually  re- 
ceived counter-ordeis  when  his  column  was  already 
in  the  river  and  too  far  advanced  to  be  withdrawn. 

.5th.  When  the  destruction  of  San  Sebastian  be"> 
came  known,  it  was  used  by  the  anti-British  jiarty 
at  Cadiz  to  excite  the  people  against  England.  The 
political  chief  of  Guipuscoa  publicly  accused  sir 
Thomas  Graham,  "  that  he  sacked  and  burred  the 
place  because  it  had  formerly  traded  entirely  with 
France  ;"  his  generals  were  said  to  have  excited 
the  furious  soldiers  to  the  horrid  work,  and  his  infe- 
rior officers  to  have  boasted  of  it  afterwards.  A 
newspaper  edited  by  an  agent  of  the  Spanish  gov- 
ernment, repeating  these  accusations,  rulleil  upon 
the  people  to  avenge  the  injury  upon  the  British 
army,  and  the  Spanish  minister  of  war,  designated 
by  lord  Wellington  as  the  abettor  and  even  the  wri- 
ter of  this  and  other  miilignant  libels  ])ublished  a< 
Cadiz,  officially  demanded  explanations. 


646 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR  WAR. 


[Book  XXll. 


Lord  Wellington  addressed  a  letter  of  indignant 
denial  and  remonstrance  to  sir  Henry  Wcllesley. 
'•  It  was  absurd,"  he  said,  "  to  suppose  the  officers 
of  the  army  would  have  risked  the  loss  of  all  their 
labours  and  gallantry,  by  encouraging  the  disper- 
sion of  the  men  while  tlie  enemy  still  held  the  cas- 
tle. To  him  tiie  town  was  of  tlie  utmost  value  as  a 
secure  place  for  magazines  and  hospitals.  He  had 
refused  to  bombard  it  wlien  advised  to  do  so,  as  he 
had  previously  refused  to  bombard  Ciudad  Rodrigo 
and  Badajoz,  because  the  injury  would  fall  on  the 
inhabitants  and  not  upon  the  enemy  ;  yet  nothing 
could  have  been  more  easy  or  less  suspicious  tlian 
this  method  of  destroying  the  town,  if  lie  had  been 
so  minded.  It  was  the  enemy  who  set  fire  to  the 
houses,  it  was  part  of  the  defence  ;  the  British  offi- 
cers strove  to  extinguish  the  flames,  some  in  doing 
80  lost  tlieir  lives  by  the  French  musl^etry  from 
tlie  castle,  and  the  difficulty  of  communicating  and 
working  through  the  fire  was  so  great,  that  he  had 
been  on  *he  point  of  withdrawing  the  troops  alto- 
gether. He  admitted  the  plunder,  observing,  that 
he  knew  not  whether  that  or  the  libels  made  him 
most  angry  ;  he  had  taken  measures  to  stop  it,  but 
when  two-thirds  of  the  officers  had  been  killed  or 
W'Ounded  in  the  action,  and  when  many  of  the  in- 
habitants taking  part  with  the  enemy  fired  upon  the 
troops,  to  prevent  it  was  impossible.  Moreover,  he 
was  for  several  days  unable  from  other  circumstan- 
ces to  send  fresh  men  to  replace  the  stormers." 

This  was  a  solid  reply  to  the  scandalous  libels  cir- 
culated, but  the  broad  facts  remained.  8an  Sebas- 
tian was  a  heap  of  smoking  ruins,  and  atrocities  de- 
grading to  human  nature  had  been  perpetrated  by 
the  troops.  Of  these  crimes,  the  municipal  and  ec- 
clesiastic bodies,  the  consuls  and  principal  persons 
of  San  Sebastian,  afterwards  published  a  detailed 
statement,  solemnly  affirming  the  truth  of  each 
case  ;  and  if  Spanish  declarations  on  this  occasion 
are  not  to  be  heeded,  four-fifths  of  the  excesses  at- 
tributed to  the  French  armies  nmst  be  effaced  as 
resting  on  a  like  foundation.  That  the  town  was 
first  set  on  fire  behind  the  breaches  during  tlie  ope- 
rations, and  that  it  spread  in  the  tumult  following 
the  assault,  is  undoubted;  yet  it  is  not  improbable 
that  plunderers,  to  forward  their  own  views,  in- 
creased it,  and  certainly  the  great  destruction  did 
not  bafall  until  long  after  the  town  was  in  possess- 
ion of  the  allies.  I  h-^v^  been  assured  by  a  surgeon, 
that  he  was  lodged  t..e  third  day  after  the  assault  at 
a  house  well  furnished,  and  in  a  street  then  untouch- 
ed by  fire  or  plunderers,  but  house  and  street  were 
afterwards  plundered  and  burned.  The  inhabitants 
could  only  hnvx  "ind  upon  the  allies  the  first  day, 
and  it  migut  well  have  been  in  self-defence,  for 
they  were  barbarously  treated.  The  abhorrent  case 
alluded  to  was  notorious,  so  were  many  others.  I 
have  myself  heard  around  the  piquet  fires,  when 
soldiers,  as  every  ex|)erienced  officer  knows,  speak 
without  reserve  of  tlieir  past  deeds  and  feelings,  the 
abominable  actions  mentioned  by  the  municipality 
related  with  little  variation,  hm'j  before  tliat  narra- 
tive was  publislied  ;  told,  however,  wltli  sorrow  for 
the  sufferers  and  indignation  against  the  perpetra- 
tors, for  these  last  were  not  so  numerous  as  might 
be  supposed  from  the  extent  of  the  calamities  they 
inflicted. 

It  is  a  common,  but  shallow  and  mischievous  no- 
tion, that  a  villain  makes  never  the  worse  soldier 
for  an  assault,  because  the  appetite  for  plunder  sup- 
plies the  place  of  honour  ;  as  if  the  compatibility  of 
vice  and  bravery  rendered  the  union  of  virtue  and 
courag;  nnnecessnry  in  warlike  matters.  In  all  the 
host  whicli  stormed  San  Sebastian,  there  was  not  a 


man  who  being  sane  would  for  plunder  only  have 
encountered  the  danger  of  that  assault,  yet^  under 
the  spell  of  discipline  all  rushed  eagerly  to  meet  it. 
Discipline,  however,  has  its  root  in  patriotism,  or 
how  could  armed  men  be  controlled  at  all !  and  it 
would  be  wise  and  far  from  difficult  to  graft  modera- 
tion and  humanity  upon  such  a  noble  stock.  The 
modern  soldier  is  not  necessarily  the  stern  bloody- 
handed  man  the  ancient  soldier  was;  there  is  aa 
much  difference  between  them  as  between  the 
sportsman  and  the  butcher ;  the  ancient  warrior, 
fighting  with  the  sword  and  reaping  his  harvest  of 
death  when  the  enemy  was  in  flight,  became  habit- 
uated to  the  act  of  slaying.  The  modern  soldier 
seldom  uses  his  bayonet,  sees  not  his  peculiar  vic- 
tim fall,  and  exults  not  over  mangled  limbs  as  proofs 
of  personal  prowess.  Hence,  preserving  his  origi- 
nal feelings,  his  natural  abhorrence  of  murder  and 
crimes  of  violence,  he  differs  not  from  other  men 
unless  often  engaged  in  the  assault  of  towns,  where 
rapacity,  lust,  and  inebriety,  unchecked  by  the  re- 
straints of  discipline,  are  excited  by  temptation.  It 
is  said  that  no  soldier  can  be  restrained  ufter  storm- 
ing a  town,  and  a  British  soldier  least  of  all,  be- 
cause he  is  brutish  and  insensible  to  honour  !  Shame 
on  such  calumnies!  What  makes  the  British  soldier 
fight  as  no  other  soldier  ever  fights!  Jlis  pay  J 
Soldiers  of  all  nations  receive  pay.  At  the  period 
of  this  assault,  a  sergeant  of  the  twenty-eighth  regi- 
ment, named  Ball,  had  been  sent  with  a  party  to  the 
coast  from  Roncevalles,  to  make  purchases  for  his 
officers.  He  placed  the  money  he  was  intrusted 
with,  two  thousand  dollars,  in  the  hands  of  a  commis- 
sary, and  having  secuj-ed  a  receipt  persuaded  his  par- 
ty to  join  in  the  storm.  He  survived,  reclaimed  the 
money,  made  his  purchases,  and  returned  to  his  reg- 
iment. And  thes5  are  the  men,  these  the  spirits, 
who  are  called  too  brutish  to  work  upon  excej)t  by 
fear.  It  is  precisely  fear  to  which  they  are  most 
insensible. 

Undoubtedly  if  soldiers  hear  and  read  that  it  is 
impossible  to  restrain  their  violence,  they  will  not 
be  restrained.  But  let  the  plunder  of  a  town  after 
an  assault  be  expressly  made  criminal  by  the  arti- 
cles of  war,  with  a  due  punishment  attached  ;  let  it 
be  constantly  impressed  upon  the  troops  that  such 
conduct  is  as  much  opposed  to  military  honour  and 
discipline  as  it  is  to  morality;  let  a  select  perma- 
nent body  of  men  receiving  higher  pay  form  a  part 
of  the  army,  and  be  charged  to  follow  s*orming  col- 
umns to  aid  in  preserving  order,  and  with  povver  to 
inflict  instantaneous  punishment,  death  if  it  be  ne- 
cessary. Finally,  as  reward  for  extraordinary  val- 
our should  keep  pace  with  chastisement  for  crimes 
committed  under  such  temptation,  it  would  be  fit- 
ting that  money,  apportioned  to  the  danger  and  im- 
portance of  the  service,  should  be  insured  to  the 
successful  troops  and  always  paid  without  delay. 
This  money  might  be  taken  as  a  ransom  from  ene- 
mies, but  if  the  inhabitants  are  friends,  or  too  poor, 
government  should  furnish  the  amount.  With  sucli 
regulations,  the  storming  of  towns  would  not  pro- 
duce more  military  disorders  than  the  gaining  of 
battles  iu  the  field. 


CHAPTER  in. 

SouU's  views  and  positions  durln;;  the  sieje  Hesrritipd — He 
endeavours  to  siirrour  the  place — Attacks  lord  Welling-- 
ton — Combats  of  S^in  Marrinl  ami  VerH — 'J'hc  French  wre 
repulsed  the  sBnie  day  thai  San  ?eba«li»in  is  stormed — Soult 
rf  solves  to  adopt  a  defensive  system — O'-Jervations. 

W^iLE  San  Sebastian  was  being  stormed,  Soult 
fought  a  battle  witli  the  covering  force,  not  wiling* 


I8iy] 


NAPIER  S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


647 


ly  nor  witli  nidcli  hope  of  success,  but  he  was  averse 
to  let  San  .Sebastian  fall  without  another  effort,  and 
thouirht  a  bold  demeanour  would  best  iiide  his  real 
weakness.  Guided,  however,  by  the  progress  of  the 
siege,  which  he  knew  pertectly  through  his  sea 
couiiuunicition,  he  awaited  the  last  moment  of  ac- 
tion, striving  meanwhile  to  improve  his  resources 
and  to.  revive  the  confidence  of  the  army  ard  of  the 
people.  Of  his  dispersed  soldiers  eiglit  tliousand 
had  rejoined  their  regiments  by  the  12tli  of  August, 
and  he  was  promised  a  reinforcement  of  thirty  tliou- 
sand conscripts:  tiiese  last  were,  however,  yet  to 
be  enrolled,  and  neither  the  progress  of  the  siege, 
nor  the  general  panic  along  the  frontier  which  re- 
curred with  increased  violence  after  the  late  battles, 
would  sutler  him  to  remain  inactive. 

He  was  in  no  manner  deceived  as  to  his  enemy's 
superior  strength  of  position,  number  and  military 
confidence  ;  but  his  former  efforts  on  the  side  of 
Pampeluna  liad  interrupted  the  attack  of  San  Sebas- 
tian, and  another  offensive  movement  would  neces- 
sarily produce  a  like  effect ;  wherefore  he  hoped  by 
repeating  the  disturbance,  as  long  as  a  free  inter- 
course by  sea  enabled  him  to  reinforce  and  supply 
the  garrison,  to  render  the  siege  a  wasting  opera- 
tion for  the  allies.  To  renew  the  movement  against 
Pampeluna  was  most  advantageous,  but  it  required 
fifty  tliousand  infantry  for  the  attack,  and  twenty 
thousand  as  a  corps  of  observation  on  the  lower 
Bidassoa,  and  lie  had  not  such  numbers  to  dispose  of. 
The  subsistence  of  his  troops  also  was  uncertain, 
because  the  loss  of  all  the  military  carriages  at  Vit- 
toria  was  still  felt,  and  the  resources  of  the  country 
were  reluctantly  yielded  by  the  people.  To  act  on 
the  side  of  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port  was,  therefore, 
impracticable.  And  to  attack  the  allies'  centre,  at 
A'era,  Ecliallar,  and  the  Bastan,  was  unpromising, 
seeing  that  two  mountain-chains  were  to  be  forced 
before  the  movement  could  seriously  affect  lord  Wel- 
lington :  moreover,  the  ways  being  impracticable 
for  artillery,  success,  if  such  should  befall,  would 
lead  to  no  decisive  result.  It  only  remained  to  at- 
tack the  left  of  the  allies  by  the  great  road  of  Irun. 

Against  that  quarter  Soult  could  bring  more  than 
forty  thousand  infanLry,  but  the  positions  were  of 
perilous  strength.  The  upper  Bidassoa  was  in  Wel- 
lington's power,  because  the  light  division,  occupy- 
ing Vera  and  the  heights  of  Santa  Barbara  on  the 
right  bank,  covered  all  the  bridges  ;  but  the  lower 
Bidassoa,  flowing  from  Vera  with  a  bend  to  the  left, 
separated  the  hostile  armies,  and  against  this  front, 
about  nine  miles  wide,  Soult's  operations  were  ne- 
cessarily directed.  On  his  right,  that  is  to  say, 
from  the  broken  bridge  of  Behobia  in  front  of  Irun 
to  the  sea,  the  river,  broad  and  tidal,  offered  no  ap- 
parent facility  for  a  passage  ;  and  between  the  fords 
of  Biriatu  and  those  of  Vera,  a  distance  of  three 
miles,  there  was  only  the  one  passage  of  Andarlasa 
about  two  miles  below  Vera  ;  along  this  space  also 
the  banks  of  the  river,  steep  craggy  mountain  ridges 
without  roads,  forbade  any  great  operations.  Thus 
tlie  points  of  attack  were  restricted  to  Vera  and  tlie 
fords  between  Biriatu  and  the  broken  bridge  of 
Behobia. 

To  raise  the  siege  it  was  only  necessary  to  force 
a  way  to  Oyarzun,  a  small  town  about  seven  or  eiglit 
miles  beyond  the  Bidassoa,  from  thence  the  assail- 
ants could  march  at  once  upon  Passages  and  upon  the 
Uruinea.  To  gain  Oyarzun  was  therefore  the  object 
of  the  French  marslial's  combinations.  The  royal 
road  led  directly  to  it  by  the  broad  valley  which 
sejiarates  the  Pefia  de  Haya  from  the  Jaizquibol 
mountain.  T'r.t;  latter  was  on  the  sea-coast,  but  the 
Peua  de  Haya,  commonly  called  the  four-crowned 


mountain,  filled  with  its  dependent  ridges  all  tho 
space  between  Vera,  Lesaca,  Irun  and  Oyarzun. 
Its  staring  head  bound  with  a  rocky  diadem  waa 
impassible,  but  from  tiie  bridges  of  Vera  and  Lesaca, 
several  roads,  one  of  them  not  absolutely  impracti- 
cable for  guns,  passed  over  its  enormous  flanks  to 
Irun  at  one  side  and  to  Oyarzun  on  the  other,  fall- 
ing into  the  royal  road  at  both  j)laces.  Soult's  first 
design  was  to  unite  Clauzel's  and  D'Erlon's  troops, 
drive  the  light  division  from  the  heights  of  Santa 
Barbara,  and  then  using  the  bridges  of  Lesaca  and 
Vera  force  a  passage  over  the  Pena  de  Haya  on  the 
left  of  its  summit,  and  push  the  heads  of  columns  to- 
wards Oyarzun  and  the  upper  Uruniea  ;  meanwhile 
Reille  and  Yillatte,  passing  the  Bidassoa  at  Biriatu, 
were  to  fight  their  way  also  to  Oyarzun  by  the  roy- 
al road.  He  foresaw  that  Wellington  miglit  during 
this  time  collect  his  right  wing  and  seek  to  envel- 
ope the  French  army,  or  march  upon  Bayonne  ;  but 
he  thought  the  general  state  of  his  affairs  required 
bold  measures,  and  the  progress  of  the  besiegers  at 
San  Sebastian  soon  drove  him  into  action. 

On  the  29th,  Foy,  marching  by  the  road  of  La 
Houssoa,  crossed  the  Nive  at  Canibo  and  reached 
Espelette,  leaving  behind  him  six  hundred  men,  and 
the  national  guards,  who  were  very  numerous,  with 
orders  to  watch  the  roads  and  valleys  leading  upon 
St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port.  If  pressed  by  superior  forces, 
this  corps  of  observation  was  to  fall  back  upon  that 
fortress,  and  it  was  supported  with  a  brigade  of 
light  cavalry  stationed  at  St.  Palais. 

In  the  night,  two  of  D'Erlon's  divisions  were  se- 
cretly drawn  from  Ainhoa,  Foy  continued  his  march 
through  Espelette,  by  the  bridges  of  Amotz  and 
Serres  to  St.  Jean  de  Luz,  from  whence  the  reserve 
moved  forward,  and  thus  in  the  morning  of  the  30tli 
two  strong  French  columns  of  attack  were  assem- 
bled on  the  lower  Bidassoa. 

The  first,  under  Clauzel,  consisted  of  four  divis- 
ions, furnishing  twenty  thousand  men  with  twenty 
pieces  of  artillery.  It  was  concentrated  in  the 
woods  behind  the  Commissari  and  Bayonnette 
mountains,  above  Vera. 

The  second,  commanded  by  general  Reille,  was 
composed  of  two  divisions  and  Villatte's  reserve,  in 
all  above  eighteen  thousand  men  ;  but  Foy's  divis- 
ion and  some  light  cavalry  were  in  rear,  ready  to 
augment  this  column  to  about  twenty-five  thousand, 
and  there  were  thirty-six  pieces  of  artillery  and  two 
bridge  equipages  collected  behind  the  camp  of 
Urogne  on  the  royal  road. 

Reille's  troops  were  secreted,  partly  behind  the 
Croix  des  Bouquets  mountain,  partly  behind  that  of 
Louis  XIV  and  the  lower  ridges  of  the  Mandale 
near  Biriatu.  Meanwhile  D'Erlon,  having  Con- 
roux's  and  Abbe's  divisions  and  twenty  pieces  of 
artillery  under  his  command,  held  tiie  camps  in 
advance  of  Sarre  and  Ainhoa.  If  the  allies  in  his 
front  marched  to  reinforce  their  left  on  the  crowned 
mountain,  he  was  to  vex  and  retard  their  move- 
ments, always  liowever  nvoiding  a  serious  engage- 
ment, and  feeling  to  his  right  to  secure  his  connex- 
ion with  Clauzel's  column  ;  that  is  to  say,  he  was 
with  Abbe's  division,  moving  from  Ainlioa,  to  men- 
ace the  allies  towards  Zugaraniurdi  and  the  Puerto 
de  Echallar;  and  with  Conroux's  division,  then  in 
front  of  Sarre,  to  menace  the  light  division,  to  seize 
the  rock  of  Ivantelly  if  it  was  abandoned,  and  be 
ready  to  join  Clauzel  if  occasion  offered.  On  the 
other  hand,  should  the  allies  assemble  a  large  force 
and  operate  ollensivcly  by  the  Nive  und  Nivejle 
rivers,  D'Erlon,  without  losing  his  connexion  with 
the  main  army,  was  to  concentrate  on  the  siope» 
descending  from  the  Rhune  mountains  towards  St. 


648 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    W  .\  R 


[Bock  XXII. 


Pe.  Finally,  if  the  attack  on  the  lower  Bidassoa 
succeeded,  he  was  to  join  Clauzel,  either  by  Vera, 
or  by  the  heights  of  Echallar  and  the  bridge  of  Le- 
saca  Soult  also  desired  to  support  D'Erlon  with 
the  two  divisions  of  iieavy  cavalry,  but  forage  could 
only  be  obtained  for  the  artillery  horses,  two  regi- 
ments of  light  horsemen,  six  chosen  troops  of  dra- 
o-oons  and  two  or  three  hundred  gendarmes,  which 
were  all  assembled  on  the  royal  road  behind  Reil- 
le's  column. 

It  was  the  French  marshal's  intention  to  attack 
at  daybreak  on  the  JJOth,  but  his  preparations  being 
incomplete  he  deferred  it  until  the  31st,  and  took 
rigorous  precautions  to  prevent  intelligence  passing 
over  to  the  allies'  camps.  Nevertheless  Welling- 
ton's emissaries  advised  him  of  the  movements  in 
the  night  of  the  29th,  the  augmentation  of  troops  in 
front  of  Irun  was  observed  in  the  morning  of  the 
IvOth,  and  in  the  evening  the  bridge  equipage  and 
the  artillery  were  descried  on  the  royal  road  beyond 
Ihe  Bidassoa.  Thus  warned,  he  prepared  for  battle 
with  little  anxiety.  For  the  brigade  of  English 
foot-guards,  left  at  Oporto  when  the  campaign  com- 
menced, was  now  come  up;  most  of  the  marauders 
and  men  wounded  at  Yittoria  had  rejoined;  and 
three  regiments  just  arrived  from  England  formed  a 
new  brigade  under  lord  Aylmer,  making  the  total 
augmentation  of  British  troops  in  this  quarter  little 
ess  than  five  thousand  men. 

The  extreme  left  was  on  tiie  Jaizquibel.  This  nar- 
row mountain  ridge,  seventeen  hundred  feet  high, 
runs  along  the  coast,  abutting  at  one  end  upon  the 
Passages  harbour  and  at  the  other  upon  the  naviga- 
ble mouth  of  the  Bidassoa.  Offering  no  mark  for  an 
uttack,  it  was  only  guarded  by  a  flanking  detach- 
ment of  Spaniards,  and  at  its  foot  the  small  fort  of 
Figueras  commanding  the  entrance  of  the  river 
was  garrisoned  by  seamen  from  the  naval  squadron. 
Fontarabia,  a  walled  place,  also  at  its  base,  was  oc- 
aupied,  and  the  low  ground  between  that  town  and 
Irun  defended  by  a  chain  of  eight  large  field  re- 
doubts, which  connected  the  position  of  Jaizquibel 
with  the  heights  covering  the  royal  road  to  Oyar- 
zun. 

On  the  right  of  Irun,  between  Biriatu  and  the 
burned  bridge  of  Behobia,  there  was  a  sudden  bend 
in  the  river,  the  concave  towards  the  French,  and 
their  positions  commanded  the  passage  of  the  fords 
b<ilow  ;  but  opposed  to  them  was  the  exceedingly 
Btiff'  and  lofty  ridge,  called  San  Marcial,  terminat- 
ing one  of  tlie  great  flanks  of  the  Pefia  de  Haya. 
The  water  flowed  round  tlie  left  of  this  ridge,  con- 
fining the  road  leading  from  the  bridge  of  Behobia 
to  Irun,  a  distance  of  one  mile,  to  the  narrow  space 
biJtween  its  channel  and  the  foot  of  the  height,  and 
Irun  itself,  strongly  occupied  and  defended  by  a  field- 
work,  blocked  this  way.  It  followed  that  the  French, 
after  forcing  the  passage  of  the  river,  must  of  neces- 
sity win  San  Marcial  before  their  army  could  use 
the  great  road. 

About  six  thousand  men  of  the  fourth  Spanish 
army  now  under  general  Freyre,  were  established 
on  the  crest  of  San  Marcial,  which  was  strengthened 
by  abatis  and  temporary  field-works. 

Behind  Irun  the  first  Britisli  division,  under  gen- 
eral Howard,  was  [)0.sted,  and  lord  Aylmcr's  brigade 
was  pushed  somewhat  in  advance  of  Howara's  right 
to  support  tiie  left  of  the  Spaniards. 

The  right  of  San  Marcial  falling  back  from  the 
river  was,  although  distinct  as  a  position,  connected 
with  the  Pena  de  Haya,  and  in  some  degree  exposed 
to  an  enemy  passing  the  river  above  Biriatu ; 
wherefore  Longa's  Spaniards  were  drawn  ofl^  from 
those  slopes  of  the  Pefia  de  Haya  which  descended 


towards  Vera,  to  be  posted  on  these  descending  to- 
wards Biriatu  In  this  situation  he  protected  and 
supported  the  right  of  San  Marcial. 

Eighteen  thousand  figiiting  men  were  th'is  direct- 
ly opposed  to  the  progress  of  the  enemy,  and  tlie 
fourth  division  quartered  near  Lesaca  was  still  dis- 
posable. From  this  body  a  Portuguese  brigade  had 
been  detached,  to  replace  Longa  on  the  heights  op- 
posite Vera,  and  to  cover  the  roads  leading  I'rom  the 
bridge  and  fords  of  that  place  over  tlic  flanks  of  the 
Pena  de  Haya.  Meanwhile  the  British  brigades  of 
the  division  were  stationed  up  the  mountain,  close 
under  the  foundry  of  St.  Antonio,  and  cc:nriianding 
the  intersection  of  the  roads  coming  frcm  Vera 
and  Lesaca  ;  thus  furnishing  a  reserve  to  tiie  Portu- 
guese brigade,  to  Longa  and  to  Freyre,  they  tied 
the  whole  together.  The  Portuguese  brigade  was, 
however,  somewhat  exposed,  and  too  weak  to  guard 
the  enormous  slopes  on  which  it  was  placed  ;  where- 
fore Wellington  drew  general  Inglis's  brigade  of  the 
seventh  division  from  Echallar  to  reinforce  it,  and 
even  then  the  flanks  of  the  Pena  de  Haya  were  so 
rough  and  vast  that  the  troops  seemed  sprinkled 
here  and  there  with  little  coherence.  Tlie  English 
general,  aware  that  his  positions  were  too  exten- 
sive, had  commenced  the  construction  of  several 
large  redoubts  on  commanding  points  of  the  moun- 
tain, and  had  traced  out  a  second  fortified  camp  on 
a  strong  range  of  heights,  which  imniedititely  in 
front  of  Oyarzun  connected  the  Haya  with  the  Jaiz- 
quibel, but  these  works  were  unfinisiied. 

During  the  night  of  the  .'^('th,  Soult  garnished 
with  artillery  all  the  points  commanding  the  fords 
of  Biriatu,  the  descent  to  the  broken  bridge  and 
the  banks  below  it,  called  the  "  Bas  de  Behobia." 
This  was  partly  to  cover  tlie  passage  of  the  fords 
and  the  formation  of  the  bridges,  partly  to  stop  gun- 
boats coming  up  to  molest  the  troops  in  crossing; 
and  in  this  view  also  he  spread  Casa  Palacio's  bri- 
gade of  Joseph's  Spanish  guards  along  the  river  as 
far  down  as  Andaie,  fronting  Fontarabia. 

General  Reille,  commanding  La  Martinicre's, 
Maucune's,  and  Villatte's  divisions,  directed  the  at- 
tack. His  orders  were  to  storm  the  camp  of  San 
Marcial,  and  leaving  there  a  strong  reserve  to  keep 
in  check  any  reinibrcement  coming  from  tiic  sice 
of  Vera  or  descending  from  the  Pcfia  de  Haya,  to 
drive  the  allies  with  the  remainder  of  his  force  from 
ridge  to  ridge,  until  he  gained  that  fiank  of  the 
great  mountain  which  descends  upon  Oyarzun 
The  royal  road  being  thus  opened,  Foy's  division 
with  the  cavalry  and  artillery  in  one  column,  was 
to  cross  by  bridges  to  be  laid  during  the  attack  on 
San  Marcial.  And  it  was  Soult's  intention  under 
any  circumstances  to  retain  this  last-named  ri«ige, 
and  to  fortify  it  as  a  bridge-head  with  a  view  to 
subsequent  operations. 

To  aid  Reille's  progress  and  to  provide  for  the 
concentration  of  the  whole  army  at  Oyarzun,  Clau- 
zel was  directed  to  make  a  simultaneous  attack  from 
Vera,  not  as  at  first  desigp.-ed  by  driving  the  allies 
from  Santa  Barbara  and  seizing  the  bridges,  but  leav- 
ing one  division  and  his  guns  on  the  ridges  above 
Vera  to  keep  the  light  division  in  clieck,  to  cross 
the  river  by  two  fords  just  below  the  town  of  Vera 
with  the  rest  of  his  troops,  and  assail  that  slope  of 
the  Pena  de  Haya  wliere  the  Portuguese  brigade 
and  the  troops  under  general  Inglis  were  posted. 
Then  forcing  his  way  upwards  to  the  forge  of  St. 
Antonio,  which  commanded  the  intersection  of  the 
roads  leading  round  the  head  of  the  mountain,  he 
could  aid  Reiile  directly  by  falling  on  the  rear  of 
ISan  Marcial,  or  meet  him  at  Oyarzun  by  turning 
,  tiie  rocky  summit  of  the  Pena  de  Haya. 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


649 


COMBAT    OF    SAN    MARCIAL. 

At  daylight  on  the  31st  of  August,  Reille,  under 
protection  of  the  French  guns,  forded  tlie  river 
aoovc  Bi'-iatu  with  two  divisions  and  two  pieces  of 
artillery.  He  quickly  seized  a  detached  ridge  of 
inferior  lieiglits  just  under  8an  Marcial.  and  leaving 
there  one  brigade  as  a  reserve,  detached  another  to 
at  .ack  the  S])anish  left  by  a  slope  winch  descended 
if  that  quarter  to  the  river.  Meanwhile  witli  La 
Martiniere's  division  he  assailed  their  right.  But 
the  side  of  the  mountain  was  covered  with  brush- 
wood and  remarkably  steep,  the  French  troops  be- 
ing ill-managed  preserved  no  order,  the  supports 
and  the  skirmishers  mixing  in  one  mass  got  into 
confusion,  and  when  two  thirds  of  the  height  were 
gained  the  Spaniards  charged  in  columns  and  drove 
the  assailants  headlong  down. 

During  this  action  two  bridges  were  thrown,  part- 
ly ou  trestles,  partly  on  boats,  below  the  fords,  and 
the  head  of  V^illatte's  reserve  crossing  ascended  the 
ridge  and  renewed  the  fight  more  vigorously  ;  one 
brigade  even  reached  the  chapel  of  .San  i\iarcial, 
and  the  left  of  the  Spanish  line  was  siiaken  ;  but  the 
eighty-fifth  regiment,  belonging  to  lord  Aylmer's 
brigade,  advanced  a  little  way  to  support  it,  and  at 
that  moment  lord  Wellington  rode  up  with  his  stall'. 
Then  the  Spaniards,  who  cared  so  little  for  their  own 
officers,  with  that  noble  instinct  whicli  never  aban- 
dons tiie  poor  people  of  any  country,  acknowledged 
real  greatness  without  reference  to  nation,  and  shout- 
ing aloud  dashed  their  adversaries  down  with  so 
much  violence  that  many  were  driven  into  the  river, 
and  some  of  the  French  pontoon  boats  coming  to 
their  succour  were  overloaded  and  sunk.  It  was 
several  hotirs  before  the  broken  and  confused  masses 
could  be  rallied,  and  tlie  bridges,  which  jiad  been 
broken  up  to  let  the  boats  save  the  drowning  men, 
repaired  When  tliis  was  etfected,  Soult  who  over- 
looked the  action  from  the  summit  of  the  mountain 
Jiouis  XIV.,  sent  the  remainder  of  Villatto's  re- 
serve over  the  river,  and  calling  up  Foy's  division 
prepared  a  more  formidable  and  better  arranged  at- 
tack ;  and  he  expected  greater  success,  inasmuch  as 
the  operation  from  the  side  of  Vera,  of  which  it  is 
time  to  treat,  was  now  making  considerable  pro- 
gress up  the  Pena  de  Haya  on  the  allies'  right. 

COMBAT    OF    VESA. 

General  Clauzel  had  descended  the  Bayonnette 
and  Commissari  mountains  immediately  after  day- 
break, under  cover  of  a  thick  fog,  but  at  seven 
o'clock  the  weather  cleared,  and  three  divisions 
formed  in  heavy  columns  were  seen,  by  the  troops 
on  Santa  Barbara,  making  for  the  fords  below  Vera 
in  the  direction  of  two  hamlets  called  the  Salinas 
and  the  Bario  de  Lesaca.  A  fourth  division  and  the 
guns  remained  stationary  on  the  slopes  of  the  moun- 
tiin,  and  the  artillery  opened  now  and  then  upon  the 
little  town  of  Vera,  from  which  the  piquets  of  the 
light  division  were  recalled  with  exception  of  one 
post  in  a  fortified  house  commanding  the  bridge. 

About  eiglit  o'clock,  the  enemy's  columns  began 
to  pass  the  fords,  covered  by  the  fire  of  their  artille- 
ry ;  but  the  first  shells  thrown  fell  into  the  midst  of 
their  own  ranks,  and  the  British  troops  on  Santa 
Barbara  cheered  the  French  battery  with  a  derisive 
shout.  Their  march  was,  however,  sure,  and  a  bat- 
talion of  chosen  light  troops,  without  knapsacks, 
quickly  commenced  the  battle  on  the  left  bank  of 
the  river,  witn  the  Portuguese  brigade,  and  by  their 
extreme  activity  and  rapid  fire  forced  the  latter  to 
retire  up  the  slopes  of  tlie  mountain.  General  Ing- 
lis  then  reinforced  the  line  of  skirmishers,  and  the 


whole  of  his  brigade  was  soon  afterwards  Oiigaged; 
but  Clauzel  menaced  his  left  flank  frum  the  lower 
ford,  and  the  French  troops  still  forced  their  way 
upwards  in  front  without  a  check,  until  the  whole 
mass  disappeared  fighting  amidst  the  asjierities  of 
the  Pena  de  Haya.  Ii.glis  lost  two  iiuiulred  and 
seventy  men  and  twenty-two  officers,  but  he  finally 
halted  on  a  ridge  commanding  the  intersection  of 
the  roads  leading  from  \  era  and  Lesaca  to  Irun  and 
Oyarzun ;  that  is  to  say,  somewhat  below  the  foun- 
dry of  St.  Antonio,  where  the  fourth  division,  hav- 
ing now  recovered  its  Portuguese  brigade,  was,  in 
conjunction  with  Longa's  Spaniards,  so  placed  as  to 
support  and  protect  equally  the  left  of  Inglis  and  the 
right  of  Freyre  on  San  Alarcial. 

These  operations,  from  the  great  height  and  as- 
jierity  of  the  mountain,  occupied  many  hnurs,  and  it 
was  past  two  o'clock  before  even  the  Lead  of  Clau- 
zel's  columns  reached  this  point.  Meanwhile  as  the 
French  troops  left  in  front  of  Santa  Barbara  made 
no  movement,  and  lord  Wellington  had  before  di- 
rected the  light  division  to  aid  general  Ingl.s,  a 
wing  of  the  forty-third  and  three  companies  of  the 
riflemen  from  general  Kempt's  brigade,  with  three 
weak  Spanish  battalions  drawn  from  O'Donol's  An 
dalusians  at  Echallar,  crossed  the  Bidatroa  by  the 
Lesaca  bridge,  and  marched  towards  some  lower 
slopes  on  the  right  of  Inglis,  where  they  covered 
another  knot  of  minor  communications  coming  from 
Lesaca  and  Vera.  They  were  followed  by  the  re 
mainder  of  Kempt's  brigade  which  occupied  Lesaca 
itself',  and  thus  the  chain  of  connexion  and  defence 
between  Santa  Barbara  and  the  positions  of  th'e 
fourth  division  on  the  Pena  de  Haya  was  com- 
pleted 

Clauzel,  seeing  these  movements,  and  thinking 
the  allies  at  Echallar  and  Santa  liarbara  were  only 
awaiting  the  proper  moment  to  take  him  in  flank  and 
rear,  by  the  bridges  of  Vera  and  Letaca,  if  he  en- 
gaged farther  up  the  mountain,  now  abated  his  bat- 
tle and  sent  notice  of  his  situation  and  views  to 
Soult.  This  opinion  was  well  founded  ;  lord  Wel- 
lington was  not  a  general  to  let  half  his  army  be 
paralysed  by  D'Erlon's  divisions.  On  the  Jilth, 
when  he  observed  Soult's  first  preparations  in  front 
of  San  Marcial,  he  had  ordered  attacks  to  be  made 
upon  D'Erlon  from  the  Puerto  of  Echallar,  Zugara- 
murdi  and  Maya  ;  general  Hill  was  also  directed  to 
show  the  heads  of  columns  towards  St.  Jean  Pied 
de  Port.  And  on  the  Sl&t,  when  tlie  force  and  direc- 
tion of  Clauzel's  columns  were  known,  he  ordered 
lord  Dalhousie  to  bring  the  remainder  of  the  seventh 
division  by  Lesaca  to  aid  Inglis. 

Following  these  orders  Giron,  who  commanded 
the  Spaniards,  O'Donel  being  sick,  slightly  skirm- 
ished on  the  30th  with  Conroux's  advanced  posts 
in  front  of  Sarre,  and  on  the  31st  at  daybreak  the 
whole  of  the  French  line  was  assailed.  That  is  to 
say  Giron  again  fought  with  Conroux,  feebly  as  be- 
fore ;  but  two  Portuguese  brigades  of  the  sixth  and 
seventh  divisions,  directed  by  lord  Dalhousie  and 
general  Colville  from  the  passes  of  Zugaramurdi  and 
3Iaya,  drove  the  French  from  their  camp  behind 
Urdax  and  burned  it.  Abbe,  who  commanded  there, 
being  thus  pressed,  collected  his  whole  force  in 
front  of  Ainhoa  on  an  intrenched  position,  and 
making  strong  battle,  repulsed  the  allies  with  some 
loss  of  men  by  the  sixth  division.  Thus  five  com- 
bats were  fought  in  one  day  at  different  points  of 
the  general  line,  and  D'Erlon,  who  had  lost  three  or 
four  hundred  men,  seeing  a  fresh  column  coming 
from  Maya  as  if  to  turn  his  left,  judged  tliat  a  great 
movement  against  Bnyonne  was  in  progress,  and 
sent  notice  to  Soult.    He  was  mistaken.    Lord  Wei- 


650 


NAPIER'S    PENI.-fSULAR  WAR. 


[Book  XXII. 


lington  being  entirely  on  the  defensive,  only  sought 
by  ttiese  demoasirations  to  disturb  the  plan  of  at- 
tack, and  t!ie  seventh  division,  following  the  second 
order  sent  to  lord  Dalliousie,  marched  towards  Lesa- 
ca  ;  but  the  hgiiting  at  Urdax  having  lasted  until 
mid-day,  the  movement  was  not  completed  that 
evening. 

D'Erlon's  despatch  reached  Soult  at  the  same 
time  that  Clauzel's  report  arrived.  All  his  arrange- 
ments for  a  nnal  attack  on  San  Marcial  were  then 
completed  ;  but  tiiese  reports  and  the  ominous  can- 
nonade at  San  Sebastian,  plainly  heard  during  the 
morning  induced  him  to  abandon  this  object  and 
hold  liis  army  ready  for  a  general  battle  on  the  Ni- 
vella.  In  this  view  he  sent  Foy's  division  which 
had  not  yet  crossed  the  Bidassoa  to  the  heights  of 
Serres,  behind  the  Xivelle,  as  a  support  to  D'Erlon, 
and  caused  six  chosen  troops  of  dragoons  to  march 
upon  St.  Pe  higher  up  on  that  river.  Clauzel  re- 
ceived orders  to  arrest  his  retreat  and  repass  the 
Bidassoa  in  the  night.  He  was  to  leave  Maransin's 
division  upon  the  Bayonnette  mountain  and  the  Col 
de  Bera,  and  with  the  other  three  divisions  to 
march  by  Ascain  and  join  Foy  on  the  heights  of 
Serres. 

Notwithstanding  these  movements,  Soult  kept 
RsiUe's  troops  beyond  the  Bidassao,  and  the  battle 
went  on  sharply,  for  the  Spaniards  continually  de- 
tached men  from  the  ridge,  endeavouring  to  drive 
the  French  from  the  lower  positions  into  the  river, 
until  about  four  o'clock,  when  their  hardihood  aba- 
ting tliey  desired  to  be  relieved;  but  Wellington, 
careful  of  their  glory,  seeing  the  French  attacks 
were  exhausted  and  thinking  it  a  good  opportunity 
to  fix  tlie  military  spirit  of  his  allies,  refused  to  re- 
lieve or  to  aid  them ;  yet  it  would  not  be  just  to 
measure  their  valour  by  this  fact.  The  English 
general  blushed  while  he  called  upon  them  to  fight, 
knowing  that  they  had  been  previously  famished  by 
their  vile  government,  and  that  there  were  no  hos- 
pitals to  receive,  no  care  for  them  when  wounded. 
The  battle  was,  however,  arrested  by  a  tempest 
which  commencing  in  the  mountains  about  three 
o'clock,  raged  for  several  hours  with  wonderful  vio- 
lence. Huge  branches  were  torn  from  the  trees  and 
whirled  through  the  air  like  featliers  on  the  howl- 
ing winds,  while  the  tliinnest  streams  swelling  into 
torrents  dashed  down  the  mountains,  rolling  innum- 
erable stones  along  with  a  frightful  clatter.  Amidst 
this  turmoil  and  under  cover  of  the  niglit  the  French 
recrossed  the  river,  and  the  head-quarters  were  fixed 
at  St.  Jean  de  Luz. 

Clauz'-'l's  retreat  was  more  unhappy.  Having  re- 
ceived the  order  to  retire  early  in  the  evening  when 
the  storm  had  already  put  an  end  to  all  fighting,  he 
repassed  tlie  fords  in  person  and  before  dark  at  the 
head  of  two  brigades,  ordering  general  Yandermae- 
6cn  to  follow  with  the  remainder  of  his  divisions. 
It  would  appear  that  he  expected  no  difficulty,  since 
he  did  not  take  possession  of  the  bridge  of  ^'era  nor 
of  t!ie  fortified  house  covering  it;  and  ap[)arent]y 
ignorant  of  the  state  of  his  own  troops  on  the  other 
bank  of  the  river,  occupied  himself  with  suggesting 
new  projects  disjdoasing  to  Soult.  Meanwhile  Van- 
dermaesen's  situation  became  critical.  Many  of  his 
soldiers,  attempting  to  cross,  were  drowned  by  the 
rising  waters,  and  finally,  unable  to  effect  a  passage 
at  the  fords,  that  general  marched  up  the  stream  to 
eeize  tlie  bridge  of  Vera.  His  advanced  guard  sur- 
prising a  corporal's  [jiqiiet  rushed  over,  but  was 
driven  back  by  a  rifle  company  posted  in  the  forti- 
fied house.  'I'his  iiappened  about  three  o'clock  in 
the  morning,  and  the  riflemen  defended  the  passage 
until  dayliglit,  when  a  second  company  and  some 


Portuguese  ca^adores  came  to  their  aid.  But  the 
Frencli  reserve  left  at  \era,  seeing  hew  matters 
stood,  opened  a  fire  of  guns  against  the  fortified 
house  from  a  high  rock  just  above  the  town,  and 
their  skirmishers  approaclied  it  on  the  right  bank, 
while  Yandermaesen  plied  his  musketry  from  the 
left  bank.  Tlie  two  rifle  captains  and  niany  men  • 
fell  under  this  cross  fire,  and  the  pass.-ige  was 
forced  ;  but  Yandermaesen  urging  the  attack  in  per- 
son was  killed,  and  more  than  two  hundred  of  hia 
soldiers  were  hurt. 

Soult  now  learning  from  D'Erlon  that  all  ofien- 
sive  movements  on  ihe  side  of  Maya  had  ceased  at 
twelve  o'clock  on  the  .Slst,  contemplated  anotlier  at- 
tack on  San  Marcial  ;  but  in  the  course  of  the  day 
general  Rey's  report  of  the  assault  on  San  Sebas- 
tian reached  him,  and  at  the  same  time  he  heard 
that  general  Hill  was  in  movement  on  the  side  of 
St.  .lean  Pied  de  Port.  This  state  of  afiairs  brought 
reflection.  San  Sebastian  was  lost,  a  fresh  attempt 
to  carry  off  the  wasted  garrison  from  the  castle 
would  cost  five  or  six  thousand  good  soldiers,  and 
the  safety  of  the  whole  army  would  be  endangered 
by  pushing  headlong  amongst  the  terrible  asperities 
of  the  crowned  mountain.  For  Wellington  could 
throw  his  right  wing  and  centre,  forming  a  mass  of 
at  least  thirty-five  thousand  men,  upon  the  French 
left  during  the  action,  and  he  would  be  nearer  to 
Bayonne  than  the  French  right  when  once  the  bat- 
tle was  engaged  beyond  the  lower  Bidassoa.  The 
army  had  lost  in  the  recent  actions  tliree  thousand 
six  hundred  men.  General  Yandermaesen  had  beeu 
killed,  and  four  others,  La  Martinitre,  Meune,  Re- 
mond,  and  Guy,  wounded,  the  first  mortally  ;  all  the 
superior  ofiicers  agreed  that  a  fresh  attempt  would 
be  most  dangerous,  and  serious  losses  might  dra^r 
on  an  immediate  invasion  of  France  before  the  ne 
cessary  defensive  measures  were  completed. 

Yielding  to  these  reasons,  he  resolved  to  recover 
his  former  positions  and  thenceforward  remain  en- 
tirely on  the  defensive,  for  which  his  vast  know- 
ledge of  war,  his  foresight,  his  talent  for  methodical 
arrangement,  and  his  firmness  of  character,  peculiar- 
ly fitted  him.  Twelve  battles  or  combats,  fought 
in  seven  weeks,  bore  testimony  that  he  had  striven 
hard  to  gain  the  offensive  for  the  French  army,  and 
willing  still  to  strive  if  it  might  be  so,  ho  had  called 
upon  Suchet  to  aid  him  and  demanded  fresh  orders 
from  the  emperor;  but  Suchet  helped  him  not,  and 
Napoleon's  answer  indicated  at  once  his  own  diffi- 
culties and  his  reliance  u]jon  the  duke  of  Dalma- 
tia's  capacity  and  fidelity. 

"  I  have  given  you  my  confidence,  pnd  can  add 
neither  to  your  means  nor  to  your  instructions." 

The  loss  of  the  allies  was  one  thousand  Arglo- 
Portuguese  and  sixteen  hundred  Sjianiards.  AA  here- 
fore  the  cost  of  men  on  this  day,  including  the  storm- 
ing of  San  Sebastian,  exceeded  five  thousand,  but 
t,he  battle  in  no  manner  disturbed  the  siege.  The 
French  army  was  powerless  against  such  strong  po- 
sitions. Soult  had  brougiit  forty-five  thousand  men 
to  bear  in  two  columns  upon  a  square  of  less  than 
five  miles,  and  the  thirty  thousand  French  actually 
engaged  were  repulsed  by  ten  thousand,  for  that 
number  only  of  the  allies  fought. 

But  the  battle  was  a  half  measure  and  ill-judged 
on  Soult's  part.  Lord  Wellington's  experience  of 
French  warfare,  his  determined  character,  coolness 
and  thorojjgh  acquaintance  with  the  principles  of  his 
art,  left  no  hope  that  he  would  sufi'er  two-thirds  of 
his  army  to  be  kept  in  check  by  D'Erlon's  two  divi- 
sions ;  and  accordingly,  the  moment  D'Erlon  was 
menaced,  Soult  stopped  his  own  attack  to  make  a 
counter-movement  and  deli/er  a  decisive  Lattlc  on 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


G51 


farourabje  ground.  Perhaps  his  secret  hope  was  to 
draw  his  opjjonent  to  such  a  corclusion,  but  if  so, 
the  combat  of  Sun  Marcial  was  too  dear  a  price  to 
pay  for  the  chance. 

A  £ff  neral  who  had  made  up  his  mind  to  i'orcG  a 
way  to  San  Sebastian,  wouhl  have  organized  iiis  rear 
so  tliat  no  serious  embarrassment  coukl  arise  from 
aijV  partial  incursions  towards  Bayonne  ;  he  would 
have  concentrated  his  whole  army,  and  have  calcu- 
lated his  attack  so  as  to  be  felt  at  San  Sebastian  be- 
fore his  adversary's  counter-movement  could  be  telt 
towards  Bayonne.  In  this  view  D'Erlon's  two  di- 
visions should  have  come  in  the  night  of  the  SOth 
to  Vera,  which,  without  weakening  the  reserve  op- 
posed to  the  light  division,  would  have  augmented 
Clauzd's  force  by  ten  thousand  men  ;  and  on  the 
most  important  line,  because  San  Marcial  offered 
no  I'ront  for  the  action  of  great  numbers,  and  the 
secriit  of  mountain  warfare  is,  by  surprise  or  the 
power  of  overwhelming  numbers,  to  seize  such  com- 
manding points  as  shall  force  an  enemy  either  to 
abandon  his  strong  position,  or  become  the  assailant 
to  recover  those  he  has  thus  lost.  Now  the  difficulty 
of  defending  the  crowned  mountain  was  evinced  by 
the  ra])id  manner  in  which  Clauzel  at  once  gained 
the  ridges  as  far  as  the  foundry  of  St.  Antonio;  with 
ten  thousand  additional  men  he  might  have  gained  a 
commanding  position  on  the  rear  and  left  Hank  of 
San  ]\Iarcial,  and  forced  the  allies  to  abandon  it. 
That  lord  Wellington  thought  himself  weak  on  the 
Haya  mountain  is  proved  by  his  calling  up  the  sev- 
enth division  from  Echallar,  and  by  his  orders  to 
the  light  division. 

Soult's  object  was  to  raise  the  siege  ;  but  his  plan 
involved  the  risk  of  having  thirty-five  thousand  of 
tlie  allies  interposed  during  his  attack  between  him 
and  Bayonne,  clearly  a  more  decisive  operation  than 
the  raising  of  the  siege,  therefore  the  enterprise 
may  be  pronounced  injudicious.  He  admitted,  in- 
deed, that  excited  to  the  enterprise  partly  by  insinua 
tions,  whether  from  the  minister  of  war  or  his  own 
lieutenants  does  not  appear,  partly  by  a  generous  re- 
pugnance to  abandon  the  brave  garrison,  he  was  too 
precipitate,  acting  contrary  to  his  judgment  ;  but  he 
was  probably  tempted  by  the  hope  of  obtaining  at 
least  the  camp  of  San  Marcial  as  a  bridge-head,  and 
thus  securing  a  favourable  point  for  after  combina- 
tions. 

Lord  Wellington,  having  resolved  not  to  invade 
France  at  this  time,  was  unprepared  for  so  great  an 
operation  as  throwing  his  right  and  centre  upon 
Soult's  left  ;  and  it  is  obvious  also  that  on  the  SCth, 
he  expectad  only  a  partial  attack  at  San  IMarcial. 
The  order  he  first  gave  to  assail  D'Erlon's  position, 
and  then  the  counter-order  for  the  seventh  division 
to  come  to  Lesacn,  prove  this,  because  the  latter 
was  issued  after  Clauzel's  numbers  and  the  direction 
of  his  attack  were  ascertained.  The  efforts  of  two 
Portuguese  brigades  against  D'Erlon  sufficed,  there- 
fore, to  x^nder  null  the  duke  of  Dalmatia's  great 
combinations,  and  his  extreme  sensitiveness  to  their 
operat'ons  marks  the  vice  of  his  own.  Here  it  may 
fee  obs<?rved,  that  the  movement  of  the  forty-third, 
the  rifle  companies  and  the  Spaniards,  to  secure  the 
right  flmk  of  Inglis,  was  ill  arranged.  Despatched 
bv  different  roads,  without  knowing  precisely  the 
point  they  were  to  concentrate  at,  each  fell  in  witli 
the  enemy  at  different  places  ;  the  Spaniards  got  un- 
der fire  and  were  forced  to  alter  their  route  ;  the  for- 
ty-third companies,  stumbling  on  a  French  division, 
had  to  fall  back  half  a  mile  ;  it  v/as  only  by  thus 
feeling  the  enemy  at  different  points  that  the  destin- 
ed position  was  at  last  fnnnd,  and  a  disaster  was 
fcarcely  prevented  by  the  fury  of  the  tempest.    Nev- 


I  ertheless  those  detachments  were  finally  well  placed 
to  have  struck  a  blow  the  next  morning,  because 
their  post  was  only  half  an  hour's  march  from  th.e 
high  ground  behind  Vanderniaesen's  colunin  when 
he  forced  the  bridge  at  Vera,  and  the  firing  would 
iiave  served  as  a  guide.  The  remainder  of  Kempt's 
brigade  could  also  have  moved  upon  the  some  point 
from  Lesacar  It  is,  however,  very  difiicult  to  seize 
such  occasions  in  mountain  warfare,  where  so  little 
can  be  seen  of  the  general  state  of  aflairs. 

A  more  obvious  advantage  was  neglected  by  gen- 
eral Skerrett.  The  defence  of  the  bridge  at  Vera  by 
a  single  company  of  rifles  lasted  more  than  an  lour, 
and  four  brigades  of  the  enemy,  crossing  in  a  tumult- 
uous manner,  could  not  have  cleared  the  narrow  pas- 
sage after  it  was  won  in  a  moment.  Lord  ^^'elli^ig- 
ton's  despatch  erroneously  describes  the  French  as 
passing  under  the  fire  of  great  part  of  general  Sker- 
rett's  brigade,  whereas  that  otlicer  remained  in  order 
of  battle  on  the  lower  slopes  of  Santa  Barbara,  half 
a  mile  distant,  and  allowed  the  enemy  to  escape. 
It  is  true  that  a  large  mass  of  French  troops  were 
on  the  counter-slopes  of  the  Bayonnette  mountain, 
beyond  Vera,  but  the  seventh  division,  being  then 
close  to  Santa  Barbara,  would  have  prevented  any 
serious  disaster  if  the  blow  had  failed.  A  great 
opportunity  was  certainly  lost,  but  war  in  rough 
mountains  is  generally  a  series  of  errors. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

The  duke  of  Berry  froposes  to  invade  France,  promising 
the  aid  of  twenty  thoiismid  insiirgfnl? — Lord  Wf  iliiiglon's 
views  on  this  subject — His  peisona)  arriniony  ai;nin>t  Tsa- 
poUon — That  nionarrti's  policy  and  character  rltfticled  — 
Dan-ierous  stale  of  afiairs  in  Calalonii; — Lord  Willinnton 
d<  signs  to  go  there  himself,  hut  at  the  desire  ol  the  allied 
sovereigns  and  the  En^li«h  government  I'estdvfs  to  istablish 
a  part  of  his  army  in  France — His  [ilans  retarded  by  accl- 
di-nts  and  bad  weather  Souk  unable  to  divine  his  project — 
Passage  of  the  Bidassoa—  Second  conibat  of  Vera — Cnloni  I 
Colborne's  great  presence  of  mind  -Gallant  artion  of  lieu- 
ti  nanl  Havelock — The  French  lo«e  the  redoubt  ot  Sarre  and 
aliani.on  the  great  Rhune — Observations. 

SouLT,  now  on  the  defensive,  was  yet  so  fearful 
of  an  attack  along  the  Nive,  that  his  uneasy  move- 
ments made  the  allies  think  he  was  again  j.'reparing 
for  offensive  operations  This  double  misunderstand- 
ing did  not,  however,  last  long,  and  each  army  re- 
sumed its  former  position. 

The  fall  of  San  Sebastian  had  given  lord  Welling- 
ton a  new  port  and  point  of  support,  had  increased 
the  value  of  Passages  as  a  depot,  and  let  loose  a 
considerable  body  of  troops  for  field  operations;  the 
armistice  in  Germany  was  at  an  end,  Austria  had 
joined  the  allies,  and  it  seemed,  therefore,  certain 
that  he  would  immediately  invade  France.  The 
English  cabinet  had  promised  the  continental  sove- 
reigns that  it  should  be  so  when  the  French  were  ex- 
pelled from  Spain,  meaning  iSavarre  and  fJuijjuscoa  ; 
and  the  news])aper  editors  were,  as  usual,  actively 
deceiving  the  people  of  all  coimtries  by  their  dicta- 
torial absurd  projects  and  assumptions.  Meanwhile 
the  partisans  of  the  Bourbons  were  secretly  endeav- 
ouring to  form  a  conspiracy  in  the  south,  and  the 
duke  of  Berry  desired  to  join  the  British  army,  pre- 
tending that  twenty  thousand  Frenchmen  were  al- 
ready armed  and  organized,  at  the  head  of  which  he 
woul(^  place  himself.  In  fine  all  was  e.xultation  and 
extravagance.  But  lord  Wellington,  well  iir.der- 
standing  the  inflated  nature  of  such  hopes  and  prom- 
ises, while  affecting  to  rebuke  the  absurdities  of  the 
newspapers,  took  the  o[)i)ortunity  to  check  similar 
folly  in  higher  places,  by  observing,  "that  if  he  had 


653 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XXII 


done  all  that  was  expected,  he  should  have  been  be- 
fore that  period  in  ihe  moon." 

With  respect  to  tlie  dake  of  Berry's  views,  it  was 
for  tli3  sovereigfris,  he  said,  to  decide  whether  the 
restoration  of  the  IJoiirboiis  should  forr^  part  of  their 
policy,  but  as  yet  no  tixed  line  of  conduct  on  that 
or  anv  other  political  points  was  declared.  It  was 
for  thoir  interest  to  get  rid  of  Napoleon,  and  there 
could  be  no  question  of  the  advantage  or  propriety 
of  accepting  the  aid  of  a  Bourbon  party,  without 
pledging  themselves  to  dethrone  the  emperor.  The 
Bourbons  might  indeed  decline,  in  default  of  such  a 
pledge, to  involve  their  partisans  in  rebellion,  and  he 
advised  them  to  do  so,  because  Napoleon's  power 
rested  intarnally  upon  the  most  extensive  and  expen- 
sive system  of  coruption  ever  established  in  any 
cojntry,  externally  upon  his  military  force,  which 
was  supported  almo.n  exclusively  by  foreign  contri- 
butions:  once  coniined  to  the  limits  of  France,  he 
would  be  unable  to  bear  the  double  expense  of  his 
government  and  army,  the  reduction  of  either  would 
be  fual  to  him,  and  the  object  of  the  Bourbons 
would  thus  be  obtained  without  risk.  But,  if  they 
did  not  concur  in  this  reasoning,  the  allies  in  the 
north  of  Europe  must  declare  they  would  dethrone 
Napoleon  before  the  duke  of  Berry  should  be  allowed 
to  JLjin  the  army  ;  and  the  Britisli  government  must 
mxke  up  its  rniud  upon  the  question. 

This  reasoning  put  an  end  to  the  project,  because 
neither  the  Englisli  cabinet  nor  the  allied  sovereigns 
wen  ready  to  ado[)t  a  decisive  open  line  of  policy. 
The  ministers,  exulting  at  the  progress  of  aristo- 
cratic domination,  had  no  thought  save  that  of  wast- 
ing [''ngland's  substance  by  extravagant  subsidies  and 
supplies,  taken  without  gratitude  by  the  continental 
powers,  who  held  themselves  nowise  bound  tljereby 
to  uphold  the  common  cause,  which  each  secretly 
designed  to  make  available  for  peculiar  interests. 
Moreover,  they  all  still  trembled  before  the  conquer- 
or, and  none  would  pledge  themselves  to  a  decided 
policy.  Lord  Wellington  alone  moved  with  a  firm 
composure,  the  result  of  profound  and  well  under- 
stood calculations;  yet  his  mind,  naturally  so  dis- 
passionate, was  strangely  clouded  at  this  time  by 
personal  hatred  of  Napoleon. 

Where  is  the  proof,  or  even  probability,  of  that 
great  man's  system  of  government  being  internally 
dependent  upon  "the  most  extensive  corruption  ever 
established  in  any  country]"' 

The  annuiil  expenditure  of  France  was  scarcely 
half  that  of  England,  and  Napoleon  rejected  public 
loans  which  are  the  very  life-blood  of  state  corrup- 
tion. He  left  no  debt.  Under  him  no  man  devoured 
the  public  substance  in  idleness  merely  because  he 
was  of  a  privileged  class;  the  state  servants  were 
\argely  paid,  but  they  were  made  to  labour  eilectual- 
ly  for  the  state.  They  did  not  eat  their  bread  and 
sleep.  His  system  of  public  accounts,  remarkable 
for  its  exactness, simplicity  and  comprehensiveness, 
was  vitally  opposed  to  public  fraud,  and  therefore 
extremely  unfavorable  to  corruption.  Napoleon's 
power  vvjs  supported  in  France  by  that  deep  sense 
of  his  goodness  as  a  sovereign,  and  that  admiration 
for  his  genius  whicli  pervaded  the  poorer  and  middle 
classes  of  tlie  peojde  ;  by  the  love  which  they  bore 
towards  him,  and  still  bear  for  his  memory,  because 
ne  cherished  the  princi[)les  of  a  just  ecpiality.  They 
loved  him  also  for  his  incessant  activity  in  the  pub- 
lic service,  his  freedom  from  all  private  vices,  and 
because  his  public  works,  wondrous  for  their  number, 
their  utility  and  grandeur,  never  stood  still  ;  under 
him  the  poor  man  never  wanted  work.  To  France 
he  gave  noble  institutions,  a  comparatively  just  code 
of  laws,  and  glory  unmatched  since  the  days  of  the 


Romans.  His  Cadastre,  more  extensive  and  perfect 
than  the  Doomsday  Book,  that  monument  of  tlia 
wisdom  and  greatness  of  our  Norman  conqueror, 
was  alone  suthcient  to  endear  him  to  the  nation. 
Rapidly  advancing  under  his  vigorous  superintend- 
ence, it  registered  and  taught  every  man  the  true 
value  and  nature  of  his  property,  and  all  its  liabili- 
ti(!s  public  or  private.  It  was  designed  and  most 
ably  adapted  to  tix  and  secure  titles  to  property,  to 
prevent  frauds,  to  abate  litigation,  to  apportion  the 
weight  of  taxes  equally  and  justly,  to  repress  the  in- 
solence of  the  tax-gatherer  without  irjury  to  tlie 
revenue,  and  to  secure  the  sacred  freedom  of  the 
poor  man's  home.  The  French  Cadastre,  although 
not  original,  would,  from  its  comprehensiveness, 
have  been  when  coni[deted  the  greatest  boon  ever 
conferred  upon  a  civilized  nation  by  a  statesman. 

To  say  that  rfie  emperor  was  supported  by  his  sol- 
diers, is  to  say  that  he  was  su;)ported  by  the  people ; 
because  the  law  of  conscription,  that  mighty  stutf 
on  which  France  leaned  when  all  Euroi)e  attempted 
to  push  her  down;  the  conscription,  witiuiut  which 
she  could  never  have  sustained  the  dreadful  war  of 
antagonist  principles  entailed  upon  her  by  the  revo- 
lution ;  that  energetic  law,  which  he  did  not  estab- 
lish, but  which  he  freed  from  abuse,  and  rendered 
great,  national,  and  endurable,  by  causing  it  to 
strike  equally  on  all  classes;  the  conscription  made 
the  soldiers  the  real  representatives  of  the  people. 
The  troops  idolized  Napoleon,  as  well  they  migiit, 
and  to  assert  that  their  attachment  commenced  or.ly 
when  they  became  soldiers,  is  to  acknowlec'ge  thot 
his  excellent  qualities  and  greatness  of  mind  turned 
hatred  into  devotion  the  moment  he  was  approached. 
But  Napoleon  never  was  hated  by  the  people  of 
France  ;  he  was  their  own  creation,  and  they  lo\ed 
him  so  as  never  monarch  was  loved  before.  His 
march  from  Cannes  to  Paris,  surrounded  by  hundreds 
of  thousands  of  poor  men,  who  were  not  soldiers, 
can  never  be  effaced  or  even  disfigured.  For  six 
weeks,  at  any  moment,  a  single  assassin  might  by  a 
single  shot  have  acquired  the  reputation  of  a  tyran- 
nicide, and  obtained  vast  rewards  besides  from  the 
trembling  monarchs  and  aristocrats  of  the  eartli, 
who  scrupled  not  to  instigate  men  to  the  sliamelul 
deed.  Many  there  were  base  enough  to  undertake, 
but  none  so  hardy  as  to  execute  the  crime,  and  Na- 
poleon, guarded  by  the  people  of  France,  passed  un- 
harmed to  a  throne  from  whence  it  required  a  mil- 
lion of  foreign  bayonets  to  drive  him  again.  From 
the  throne  they  drove  him,  but  not  from  the  thoughts 
and  hearts  of  men. 

Lord  Wellington,  having  shaken  off" the  weight  of 
the  continental  policy,  proceeded  to  consider  tl  e 
question  of  invading  France  simply  as  a  military 
operation,  which  might  conduce  to  or  militate 
against  the  security  of  the  Peninsula,  while  Napo- 
leon's power  was  weakened  by  the  war  in  Germany  ; 
and  such  was  his  inflexible  probity  of  character, 
that  no  secret  ambitious  promptings,  no  facility  of 
o-aining  personal  reputation,  diverted  him  from  this 
object,  all  the  renown  of  which  he  already  enjoyed, 
the  embarrassments,  mortifications  and  ditficulties, 
enormous,  although  to  the  surface-seeing  public 
there  appeared  none,  alone  remaining. 

The  rupture  of  the  congress  of  Prague,  Aus- 
tria's accession  to  the  coalition,  and  tlie  tall  of  San 
Sebastian,  were  favourable  circumstances;  but  le 
relied  not  much  on  the  military  skill  of  the  banded 
sovereigns,  and  a  great  defeat  might  at  any  momei'.t 
dissolve  their  alliance.  Napoleon  could  then  rein- 
i  force  Soult  and  drive  the  allies  back  upon  Spnin, 
where  the  I'Vench  still  possessed  the  fortresses  of 
,  Santona,  Pampeluna,  Jaca,  Venasque,  Monzon,  Fra 


1613., 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


653 


ja,  Lerida,  Mequinenza,  Figueras,  Gerona,  Hostal- 
rich,  Barcelona,  Tortosa,  Morella,  Peniscola,  Sarrun- 
tiuuanci  Denia.  Meanwhile  lord  William  lientinck, 
niibled  by  false  information,  had  committed  a  seri- 
ous error  in  sending  Del  Parque's  army  to  Tudela, 
hi^oause  the  Urdal  disaster  and  subsequent  retreat 
showed  that  Suchet  was  strong  enough,  if  it  so 
pleased  him,  to  drive  the  Anglo-^Sicilian  army  back 
even  to  the  Xucar  and  recover  all  his  strong  places. 
In  tine,  the  atlairs  of  Catalonia  were  in  the  same 
unsatisfactory  state  they  had  been  in  from  the  first. 
It  was  not  even  certain  that  a  British  army  would 
remain  there  at  all;  for  lord  William,  assured  of 
i'lliirat's  defection,  was  intent  upon  invading  Italy; 
and  the  ministers  seemed  to  have  leaned  towards  the 
I)ri;J9ct,  since  Wellington  now  seriously  desired  to 
know  whether  the  Anglo-Sicilians  were  to  go  or 
ttay  in  Spain. 

Ivord  William  himself  had  quitted  that  army, 
making  the  seventh  change  in  fifteen  months;  this 
alon'3  was  sufficient  to  account  for  its  misfortunes, 
and  the  Spanish  generals,  who  had  been  placed  un- 
der the  English  commander,  ridiculed  tlie  latter's  ill 
success  and  spoke  vauntingly  of  themselves.  Stren- 
uously did  lord  Wellington  urge  the  appointment  of 
some  commander  for  the  Anglo-Sicilian  troops  who 
would  devote  his  u'hole  attention  to  his  business,  ob- 
serving that  at  no  period  of  the  war  would  he  have 
quitted  his  own  army  even  for  a  few  days  without 
danger  to  its  interests.  But  the  English  minister's 
ignorance  of  every  thing  relating  to  war  was  pro- 
found, and  at  this  time  he  was  himself  being  stript 
of  generals.  Graham,  Picton,  Leith,  lord  Dalhou- 
sie,  H.  Clinton,  and  Skerrett,  had  gone  or  were  go- 
ing to  England  on  account  of  ill-liealth,  wounds  or 
private  business;  and  marshal  Beresfbrd  was  at  Lis- 
bon, where  dangerous  intrigues,  to  be  noticed  here- 
after, menaced  the  existence  nf  the  Portuguese 
army.  Castanos  and  Giron  had  been  removed  by 
the  Spanish  regency  from  their  commands,  and 
O'Donel,  described  as  an  able  officer  but  of  the  most 
im:)racticable  temper,  being  denied  the  chief  com- 
mand of  Elio's,  Copons',  and  Del  Parque's  troops, 
quitted  the  army  under  pretext  that  his  old  wounds 
had  broken  out;  v^hereupon  Giron  was  placed  at  the 
hsad  of  the  Andalusians.  The  operations  in  Cata- 
lonia were  however  so  important,  that  lord  Welling- 
ton thought  of  going  there  himself:  and  he  would 
liHve  done  so,  if  the  after-misfortunes  of  Napoleon  in 
(Germany  had  not  rendered  it  impossible  for  that 
monarch  to  reinforce  his  troops  on  the  Spanish  fron- 
tier. 

These  general  reasons  for  desiring  to  operate  on 
the  side  of  Catalonia  were  strengthened  also  by  the 
consideration,  that  the  country  immediately  beyond 
the  Bidassoa,  being  sterile,  the  difficulty  of  feeding 
the  army  in  winter  v/ould  be  increased;  and  the 
twenty-five  thousand  half-starved  Spaniards  in  his 
army  would  certainly  plunder  for  subsistence  and  in- 
cense the  people  of  France.  Moreover,  Soult's  ac- 
tUril  position  was  strong,  his  troops  still  numerous, 
and  his  intrenched  camp  furnished  a  sure  retreat. 
Rjyonne  and  wSt.  Jean  Pied  de  Port  were  so  placed 
that  no  serious  invasion  could  be  made  until  one  or 
both  were  taken  or  blockaded,  which,  during  the 
tempestuous  season,  and  while  the  admiralty  refused 
to  furnish  sufficient  naval  means,  was  scarcely  pos- 
sible; even  to  get  at  those  fortresses  would  be  a 
work  of  time,  difficult  against  Soult  alone,  imi)racti- 
cable  if  Suchet,  as  he  well  miglit,  came  to  the  oth- 
ers support.  Towards  Catalonia,  therefore,  lord 
Wellington  desired  to  turn  vrhen  the  frontier  of  the 
western  Pyrenees  should  be  secured  by  the  fall  of 
Pampeluna.      Yet  ho  thought  it  not  amiss  mean- 


while to  yield  something  to  the  aH':?  5C'  TcigES 
and  give  a  sjuir  to  public  feeling  by  -iccupying  a 
menacing  position  within  the  French  territory.  A 
simple  tiling  this  seemed,  but  the  English  general 
made  no  slight  concession  when  he  thus  bent  his 
military  judgment  to  political  considerations. 

The  French  position  was  the  base  of  a  triangle 
of  which  Bayonne  was  the  ajiex,  and  the  great  roada 
leading  from  thence  to  Irun  and  St.  Jean  Pied  de 
Port  were  the  sides.  A  rugged  mass  of  mountains 
intervened  between  the  left  and  centre,  but  nearly 
all  the  valleys  and  communications,  coming  from 
Spain  beyond  the  Nive,  centred  at  St.  Jean  Pied  de 
Port,  and  were  embraced  by  an  intrenched  camp 
which  Foy  occupied  in  front  of  that  fortress.  That 
general  could,  without  falling  upon  Paris  who  was 
at  Oloron.  bring  fifteen  tliousand  men  including  the 
national  guards  into  action,  and  serious  dispositicr.s 
were  necessary  to  dislodge  him  ;  but  these  could  rot 
be  made  secretly,  and  Soult  calculated  upon  having 
time  to  aid  him  and  deliver  a  general  battle  on  cho- 
sen ground.  Meanwhile  Foy  barred  any  movement 
along  the  right  bank  of  the  Nive.  and  he  could, 
either  by  the  great  road  leading  to  Bayonne  or  by 
shorter  communications  through  Bidaray,  reach  the 
bridge  of  Cambo  on  the  INive  and  so  gain  Espelette 
beliind  the  camps  of  Ainhoa.  From  thence,  pass- 
ing the  Nivelle  by  the  bridges  at  Amotz  and  Serres, 
he  could  reach  St.  Jean  de  Luz,  and  it  was  by  this 
route  he  moved  to  aid  in  the  attack  of  San  Marcial. 
However,  the  allies,  marching  from  the  Akiuides 
and  the  Bastan,  could  also  penetrate  by  St.  Martin 
d'Arosa  and  the  Gorospil  mountain  to  Bidaray,  that 
is  to  say,  between  Foy's  and  I)"]M"lon's  positions. 
Yet  the  roads  were  very  difficult,  and  as  the  French 
sent  out  frequent  scouring  detachments,  and  the 
bridge  of  Cambo  was  secured  by  v.-orks,  Foy  could 
not  be  easily  cut  off  frrm  the  rest  of  the  army. 

D'Erlon's  advanced  camps  were  near  Urdax  and 
on  the  31ondarain  and  Choupera  mountains,  but  his 
main  position  was  a  broad  ridge  behind  Ainhoa,  the 
right  covering  the  bridge  of  Amotz.  Beycnd  that 
bridge  Clauzel's  position  extended  along  a  range  cf 
strong  hills,  trending  towards  Ascain  and  Serres, 
and  as  the  Nivelle  swept  with  a  curve  quite  round 
his  rear,  his  right  fiank  rested  on  that  river  alto. 
The  redoubts  of  St.  Barbe  and  the  camp  of  Sane, 
barring  the  roads  leading  from  the  Vera  and  the 
Puerto  de  Echallar,  were  in  advance  of  his  left,  and 
the  greater  Rhune.  whose  bare  rocky  head  lifted 
two  thousand  eight  hundred  feet  above  the  sea  level 
overtopped  all  the  neighbouring  mountains,  formed, 
in  conjunction  with  its  dependents  the  Commissari 
and  Bayonnette,  a  mask  for  his  right. 

From  the  Bayonnette  the  French  position  ran 
along  the  summit  of  the  Mandale  or  Sulcogain 
mountain,  on  a  single  line,  but  from  thence  to  the 
sea  the  ridges  suddenly  abated  and  there  were  two 
lines  of  defence  ;  the  first  along  the  Bidassoa,  the 
second,  commencing  near  St.  Jean  de  Luz,  stretch- 
ed from  the  heiglits  of  Bordegain  towards  Ascain, 
having  the  camps  of  Urogne  and  the  Sans  Culottes 
in  advance.  Reille's  divisions  guarded  these  lines, 
and  tlie  second  was  connected  with  Clauzel's  posi« 
tion  by  Villatte's  reserve  which  was  posted  at  As- 
cain. Finally,  the  whole  system  of  defence  was 
tied  to  that  of  St.  Jean  Pied  "de  Port  by  tlic  double 
bridge-head  at  Cambo,  which  secured  the  junction 
of  Foy  with  the  rest  of  the  army. 

The  French  worked  diligently  on  their  i>itrench- 
mcnts,  yet  they  wore  but  little  advanced  when  the 
castle  of  San  Sebastian  surrendered,  and  Welling- 
ton had  even  then  matured  a  plan  of  attack  as  dar- 
ing as  any  undertaken  during  the  whole  war.     Tliia 


654 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Boor  XXII. 


was  to  siozc  the  ^reat  Rliune  mountain  and  its  de- 
pendents, and  at  the  same  time  to  force  the  passage 
of  the  lower  BiJassoa  and  establisli  his  left  wing 
in  the  French  territory.  Ke  would  thus  bring  the 
Rhune,  Commissari  and  Bayonnette  mountains, 
forming  a  salient  menacing  point  of  great  altitude 
and  strength  towards  the  French  centre,  within  his 
own  system,  and  shorten  his  communications  by 
gaining  tlie  command  of  the  road  running  along  the 
river  from  Irun  to  Vera.  Tlais  also  he  would  ob- 
tain the  port  of  Fontarabla,  which,  though  bad  in 
winter,  was  some  advantage  to  a  general  whose 
supplies  came  from  the  ocean,  and  who  with  scanty 
means  of  land  transport  had  to  encounter  the  per- 
verse negligence  and  even  opposition  of  the  Span- 
ish authorities.  Moreover  Passages,  his  nearest 
port,  was  restricted  in  its  anchorage  ground,  hard 
10  make  from  the  sea,  and  dangerous  when  full  of 
vessels. 

He  designed  this  operation  for  the  middle  of  Sep- 
tember, immediately  after  the  castle  of  San  Sebas- 
tian fell  and  before  the  French  works  acquired 
strengtli,  but  some  error  retarded  the  arrival  of  his 
pontoons,  the  weather  became  bad,  and  the  attack, 
which  depended  as  we  shall  tind  upon  the  state  of 
the  tides  and  fords,  was  of  necessity  deferred  until 
the  7th  of  October.  Meanwhile,  to  mislead  Soult, 
to  ascertain  Foy's  true  position  about  St.  Jean  Pied 
de  Port,  and  to  strengthen  his  own  right,  he  brought 
part  of  Del  Parque's  force  up  from  Tudela  to  Pamp- 
eluna.  The  Andalusian  division  which  had  remain- 
ed at  the  blockade  after  the  battle  of  Sauroren  then 
rejoined  Giron  at  Echallar,  and  at  the  same  time 
Mina's  troops  gathered  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Ron- 
cevalles.  Wellington  himself  repaired  to  that  quar- 
ter on  the  1st  of  October,  and  in  his  way,  passing 
through  the  Alduides,  he  caused  general  Campbell 
to  surprise  some  isolated  posts  on  the  rock  of  Ayro- 
la ;  a  French  scouting  detachment  was  also  cut  off 
near  the  foundry  of  Baigorri,  and  two  thousand 
sheep  were  swept  from  the  valley. 

These  affairs  awakened  Soult's  jealousy.  He  was 
in  daily  expectation  of  an  attack,  without  being 
able  to  ascertain  on  what  quarter  the  blow  would 
fall;  and  at  first,  deceived  by  false  information  that 
the  fourth  division  had  reinforced  Hill,  he  thought 
the  march  of  3Iina's  troops  and  the  Andalusians 
was  intended  to  mask  an  offensive  movement  by  the 
Val  de  Baigorri.  The  arrival  of  light  cavalry  in 
the  Bastan,  lord  Wellington's  presence  at  Ronce- 
valles,  and  the  loss  of  the  post  at  Ayrola,  seemed  to 
confirm  this  ;  but  he  knew  the  pontoons  were  at 
Oyarzun,  and  some  deserters  t'dd  him  that  the  real 
object  of  the  allies  was  to  gain  the  great  Rhune. 
On  the  other  hand,  a  French  commissary,  taken 
at  San  Sebnstian  and  exchanged  after  remaining 
twelve  days  at  Lesaca,  assured  him,  that  nothing  at 
Wellington's  head-qnarters  indicated  a  serious  at- 
tack, although  the  officers  spoke  of  one,  and  there 
were  many  movements  of  troops;  and  this  weighed 
much  with  the  French  general,  because  the  slow- 
march  of  the  pontoons  and  the  wet  weather  had 
caused  a  delay  contradictory  to  the  reports  of  the 
spies  and  deserters.  It  was  also  beyond  calculation 
that  Wellinfrton  should,  against  his  military  judg- 
ment, push  his  left  wing  into  Franco  merely  to  meet 
the  wishes  of  the  allie;!  sovereigns  in  Germany,  and 
as  the  moFt  obvious  line  for  a  permanent  invasion 
was  by  his  right  and  centre,  there  was  no  apparent 
cause  for  deferring  his  operations. 

The  true  reason  of  the  procrastination,  namely, 
the  state  of  the  tides  and  fords  on  tlie  lower  Bidas- 
soa,  was  necessarily  hidden  from  Soult,  who  finally 
inclined  to  the  notion  tliat  Wellington  only  design- 


ed to  secure  his  blockade  at  Pampeluna  from  inter- 
rujition  by  menacing  the  French  and  imf>eding  ti.eir 
labours,  the  results  of  which  were  now  becomiTig 
visible.  However,  as  all  the  deserters  and  spies 
came  with  the  same  story,  he  recommended  increas- 
ed vigilance  along  the  whole  line.  And  yet  so  little 
did  he  anticipate  the  nature  of  his  opponent's  pro- 
ject, tiiat  on  the  6th  he  reviewed  D'Erlon's  divis- 
ions at  Ainhoa,  and  remained  that  night  at  Fspeletle. 
doubting  if  any  attack  was  intended,  and  no  wiiv 
suspecting  that  it  would  be  against  his  right.  But 
Wellington  could  not  diminish  his  troops  on  the  side 
of  Roncevalles  and  the  Alduides,  lest  Foy  and  Paris 
and  the  light  cavalry  under  Pierre  Soult  should 
unite  at  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port  to  raise  the  block- 
ade of  Pampeluna  ;  the  troops  at  Maya  were  already 
posted  offensively,  menacing  Soult  between  the 
Xive  and  the  Nivelle,  and  it  was,  therefore,  only 
with  his  left  wing  and  left  centre,  and  against  the 
French  right,  that  he  could  act. 

Early  in  October  a  reinforcement  of  twelve  hun- 
dred British  soldiers  arrived  from  England.  Mina 
was  then  in  the  Ahescoa,  on  the  right  of  general 
Hill,  who  was  thus  enabled  to  relieve  Campbell's 
Portuguese  in  the  Alduides  ;  and  the  latter,  march- 
ing to  Maya,  replaced  the  third  division,  which, 
shifting  to  its  left,  occupied  the  heights  above  Zu- 
garamurdi,  to  enable  the  seventh  division  to  relieve 
Giron's  Andalusians  in  the  Puerto  de  Echallar. 

These  dispositions  were  made  with  a  view  to  the 
attack  of  the  great  Rhune  and  its  dependents,  the 
arrangements  for  which  shall  now  be  described. 

Giron,  moving  with  his  Andalusiars  from  t!ie  In- 
vantelly,  was  to  assail  a  lofty  ridge  or  saddle,  uni- 
ting the  Commissari  and  the  great  Rhune.  A  bat- 
talion, stealing  up  the  slopes  and  hollows  on  his 
rigiit  flank,  was  to  seize  the  rocky  head  ot  the  last 
named  mountain,  and  after  placing  detachments 
there  in  observation  of  the  roads  leading  round  it 
from  Sarre  and  Ascain,  was  to  descend  upon  the 
saddle  and  menace  the  rear  of  the  enemy's  position 
at  the  Puerto  de  Vera.  Meanwhile  the  principal 
attack  was  to  be  made  in  two  columns  ;  but  to  pro- 
tect the  right  and  rear  against  a  counter  attack 
from  Sarre,  the  Spanish  general  was  to  leave  one 
brigade  in  the  narrow  pass  leading  from  Vera,  be- 
tween the  Invantelly  and  the  Rhune  to  that  place. 

On  the  left  of  Giron  the  light  division  was  to  as- 
sail the  Bayonnette  mountain  and  the  Puerto  de 
Vera,  connecting  its  right  with  Giron's  left  by  skirm- 
ishers. 

Longa,  who  had  resumed  his  old  positions  above 
the  Salinas  de  Lesaca,  was  to  move  in  two  columns 
across  the  Bidassoa.  One,  passing  by  the  ford  of 
Salinas,  was  to  aid  the  left  wing  of  the  light  divis- 
ion in  its  attack  on  the  Bayonnette ;  the  other, 
passing  by  the  bridge  of  Vera,  was  to  move  up  llie 
ravine  separating  the  slopes  of  the  Bayonnette  from 
the  Puerto  de  Vera,  and  thus  connect  the  two  at- 
tacks of  the  light  divisions.  During  these  opera- 
tions Longa  was  also  to  send  some  men  over  the 
river  at  Andarlasa,  to  se'ze  a  telegraph  which  the 
French  used  to  communicate  between  the  left  and 
centre  of  their  line. 

Behind  the  light  divis'on  general  Cole  was  to 
take  post  with  tiie  fourth  division  on  Santa  Barbara, 
pushing  forward  detachments  to  secure  the  com- 
manding points  gained  by  the  fighting  troops  in 
front.  The  sixth  division  was  meanwhile  to  make 
a  demonstration  on  the  right,  by  llrdax  and  Zugar- 
amurdi,  against  D'Erloi/s  advanced  posts.  Tims, 
without  weakening  his  line  between  Ronccvallea 
and  Echallar,  lord  Wellington  put  nearly  twenty 
thouspnd  men   in  motion  agr.inst  the  Rhune  nioua- 


1!513.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


655 


tain  and  its  dependents,  and  he  had  still  twenty-four 
tliousand  disposable  to  force  the  passage  of  the  low- 
er Bidussoa. 

It  has  been  already  shown  that  between  Andar- 
lasa  and  Biriatu,  a  distance  of  three  miles,  there 
were  neitlier  roads  nor  fords  nor  brids^es.  The 
French,  trustinof  to  this  difficulty  of  approach,  and 
to  their  intrenchments  on  the  CTa.ggy  slopes  of  the 
RIandale,  had  collected  their  troops  principally 
wliere  the  Bildox  or  Green  mountain  and  the  in- 
treaclied  camp  of  Biriatu  overlooked  the  fords. 
Agy.inst  these  piints  Wellington  directed  general 
Freyre's  8pania  ds,  who  were  to  descend  from  San 
Ma-.cial,  cross  the  upper  fords  of  Biriatu,  assail  the 
Bihlox  and  Mandale  mountains,  and  turn  the  left 
of  tnat  part  of  the  enemy's  line  which  being  pro- 
longed from  Biriatu  crossed  the  royal  road  and  pass- 
ed behind  the  town  of  Andaie. 

Britwesn  Biriatu  and  the  sea  the  advanced  points 
of  defence  were  the  mountain  of  Louis  XIV.,  the 
ridge  called  the  Cafe  Republicain,  and  the  town  of 
x\ndaie.  Behind  these  the  Calvaire  d'Urogne,  the 
Croix  des  Bouquets,  and  the  camp  of  the  Sans  (Jul- 
ottes,  served  as  rallying  posts. 

For  the  assault  on  these  positions  Wellington  de- 
signed to  employ  the  first  and  fifth  divisions  and  the 
unattached  brigades  of  Wilson  and  lord  Aylmer,  in 
all  about  fifteen  thousand  men.  By  the  help  of 
Spanish  fishermen  he  had  secretly  discovered  three 
fords,  practicable  at  low  VvMt&r,  between  the  bridge 
of  Behobia  and  the  sea,  and  his  intent  was  to  pass 
his  column  at  the  old  fords  above,  and  at  the  new 
fords  below  the  bridge,  and  this  though  the  tides 
rose  sixteen  feet,  leaving  at  the  ebb  open  heavy 
sands  not  less  than  half  a  mile  broad.  The  left 
bank  of  the  river  alfjo  was  completely  exposed  to 
observation  from  the  enemy's  hills,  which  though 
low  in  comparison  of  the  mountains  above  the 
bridge,  were  nevertheless  strong  ridges  of  defence  ; 
but  relying  on  his  previous  measures  to  deceive  the 
enemy,  the  English  general  disdained  these  dan- 
gers, and  his  anticipations  were  not  belied  by  the 
result. 

The  unlikelihood  that  a  commander,  having  a 
better  line  of  operations,  would  pass  such  a  river  as 
the  Bidassoa  at  its  moutli,  deceived  the  French  gen- 
eral. M;?anwhile  his  lieutenants  were  negligent. 
Of  Reille's  two  divisions  La  Martiniere's,  now  com- 
manded by  general  Beyer,  was  at  the  camp  of  Urog- 
ne,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  seventh  was  dis- 
persed as  usual  to  labour  at  the  works;  Villatte's 
reserve  was  at  Ascain  and  Serres ;  the  five  thou- 
sand men  composing  Maucune's  division  were  in- 
deed on  the  first  line,  but  unexpectant  of  an  attack, 
and  though  the  works  on  the  Mandale  were  finished, 
and  those  at  Biriatu  in  a  forward  state,  from  the 
latter  to  the  sea  they  were  scarcely  commenced. 

PASSAGE    OF    THE    BIDASSOA. 

The  night  set  in  heavily.  A  sullen  thunder-storm 
gathering  about  the  craggy  summit  of  the  Pena  de 
Haya  came  slowly  down  its  flanks,  and  towards 
morning  rolling  over  the  Bidassoa  fell  in  its  great- 
est violence  upon  the  French  positions.  During 
this  turmoil  Wellington,  whose  pontoons  and  artil- 
lery were  close  up  to  Irun,  disposed  a  number  of 
guns  and  howitzers  along  the  crest  of  San  Marcial, 
and  his  columns  attained  their  respective  stations 
along  the  banks  of  the  river.  Freyre's  Spaniards, 
one  brigade  of  the  guards  and  Wilson's  Portuguese, 
stretching  from  the  Biriatu  fords  to  that  near  the 
broker  nridge  of  Beliobia,  were  ensconced  behind 
the  ii'itached  ridge  which  the  PVcnch  had  first  seized 
in  their  attack  of  the  31st.     The  tiecond  brigade  of 


guards  and  the  Germans  of  the  first  division  wero 
concealed  near  Irun,  close  to  a  ford  below  tlie  bridge 
of  Beliobia,  called  "  the  great  Jonco."  Tlie  British 
brigades  of  the  fifth  division  covered  themfccives  be- 
hind a  large  river  embankment  opposite  Andaie, 
Sprye's  Portuguese  and  Lord  Aylmer's  brigade  were 
posted  in  the  ditch  of  Fontarabia. 

As  all  the  tents  were  left  standing  in  the  camps 
of  the  allies,  the  enemy  could  perceive  no  cliange  on 
the  morning  of  the  lx,h,  but  at  seven  o'clock,  the 
fifth  division  and  lord  Aylmer's  brigade  emerging 
from  their  concealment  took  the  sands  in  two  col- 
umns, that  on  the  left  pointing  against  the  French 
camp  of  the  Sans  Culottes,  that  on  tlie  right  agains-t 
the  ridge  of  Andaie.  No  shot  was  fired,  but  when 
they  had  passed  the  fords  of  tlie  low-water  channel 
a  rocket  was  sent  up  from  the  steeple  of  Fontarabia 
as  a  signal.  Then  the  guns  and  howitzers  opened 
from  San  Marcial,  the  troops  near  Irun,  covered  by 
the  fire  of  a  battery,  made  for  the  Jonco  ford,  and 
the  passage  above  the  bridge  also  commenced. 
From  the  crest  of  San  Marcial  seven  columiiS  could 
be  seen  at  once,  attacking  on  a  line  of  five  miles, 
those  above  the  bridge  plunging  at  once  into  the 
fiery  contest,  those  below  it  appearing  in  the  dis- 
tance like  huge  sullen  snakes  winding  over  the 
heavy  sands.  The  Germans  missing  the  Jonco  ford 
got  into  deep  water,  but  quickly  recovered  the  true 
line,  and  the  French,  comf^etely  surprised,  |;ermit- 
ted  even  the  brigades  of  the  fifth  division  to  gan 
the  right  bank  and  form  their  lines  before  a  l.o&tile 
musket  flashed. 

The  cannonade  from  San  Marcial  was  heard  by 
Soult  at  Espelette,  and  at  the  same  time  the  sixth 
division,  advancing  beyond  Urdax  and  Zugaramurdi 
made  a  false  attack  on  D'Erlon's  positions;  the  Por- 
tuguese brigade  under  colonel  Douglas  were,  how- 
ever, pushed  too  far  and  repulsed  with  the  loss  cf 
one  hundred  and  fifty  men,  and  the  French  marshal 
instantly  detecting  the  true  nature  of  this  attack 
hurried  to  his  right,  but  his  camps  on  the  Bidassoa 
were  lost  before  he  arrived. 

When  the  British  artillery  first  opened  Maucuue'a 
troops  had  assembled  at  their  difierent  potts  of  de- 
fence, and  the  French  guns,  established  principally 
near  the  mountain  of  Louis  XI Y.  and  the  C<;fe  Rt- 
publicain,  commenced  firing.  The  alarm  sj.read, 
and  Boyer's  marched  from  the  second  line  behind 
Urogne  to  support  Maucune  without  waiting  lor  the 
junction  of  the  working  parties;  but  his  brigades 
moved  separately  as  tiiey  could  collect,  and  before 
the  first  came  into  action,  Sprye's  Portuguese,  form- 
ing the  extreme  left  of  the  allies,  menaced  the  camp 
of  the  Sans  Culottes  ;  thither  therefore  (jnc  of  Boy- 
er's regiments  was  ordered,  while  the  others  ad- 
vanced by  the  royal  road  towards  tiie  Croix  des 
Bouquets.  But  AndaiC,  guarded  only  by  a  p'.quet, 
was  abandoned,  and  Reille,  thinking  tlie  camp  of  the 
Sans  Culottes  would  be  lost  before  Boyer's  men 
reached  it,  sent  a  battalion  there  from  the  centre, 
thus  weakening  his  force  at  the  chief  point  of  at 
tack  ;  for  the  British  brigades  of  the  fifth  division 
were  now  advancing  left  in  front  from  Andaie.  and 
bearing  under  a  sharp  fire  of  artillery  and  musketry 
towards  the  Croix  des  Bouquets. 

By  this  time  the  columns  of  the  first  division  had 
passed  the  river,  one  above  the  bridge  preceded  by 
Wilson's  Portuguese,  one  below  preceded  by  Colin 
llalket's  German  light  troops,  who,  aided  by  the  fire 
of  the  guns  on  San  Marcial,  drove  back  tlie  ene- 
my's advanced  posts,  won  the  Cafe  Republicain, 
the  mountain  of  Louis  XIV.,  and  drove  the  French 
from  those  heights  to  the  Croix  des  Bouquets:  this 
was  the  key  of  the  posit'on,  and  towar.'s    it  guna 


bo6  NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR.  [Book  XXII. 

and  troops  were  now  liaFtening  from  every  side,  these  brigades;  the  ether  half,  after  crossing  the 
The  Germans,  who  had  lost  many  men  in  the  previ-  ford  of  Salinas,  drew  np  on  Colborne's  lell.  The 
ous  attacks,  were  liere  brought  to  a  check,  for  tlie  whola  of  the  narrow  vale  of  Vera  was  thus  filled 
he. gills  were  very  strong,  and  Boyer's  leading  bat-  with  troops  ready  to  ascend  the  mountains,  and 
talions  were  close  at  hand  ;  but  at  this  critical  mo-  general  Cede  disi)laying  his  force  to  advantage  on 
mont  colonel  Cameron  arrived  with  the  ninth  regi-  the  heiglits  of  Santa  Barbara  presented  a  formidable 
Dient  of  the  fifth  division,  and  passing  through  the   reserve. 

German  skirmishers  rushed  with  great  vehemence  'I'aupin's  division  guarded  the  enormous  positions 
to  the  summit  of  the  first  lieight.  The  French  in-  in  front  of  the  allies.  His  right  was  on  the  Bayon- 
fantry  instantly  opened  tlieir  ranks  to  let  their  guns  nette,  from  whence  a  single  slope  descended  to  a 
retire,  and  then  retreated  themselves  at  full  speed  small  plain  about  two  parts  down  the  mountain. 
to  a  second  ridge  somewhat  lower,  but  where  they  From  this  platform  three  distinct  tongues  shot  inlo 
could  only  be  approached  on  a  narrow  front.  Cam-  the  valley  below,  each  was  defended  by  an  advanced 
eron  as  quickly  tiirew  his  men  into  a  single  column  post,  and  the  platform  itself  secured  by  a  star  re- 
and  bore  against  this  new  position,  which  curving  doubt,  behind  which,  about  half  way  up  the  single 
inwards  enabled  the  French  to  pour  a  concentrated  slope,  there  was  a  second  retrenchment  with  abatis. 
fire  upon  his  regiment  ;  nor  did  his  violent  course  Another  large  redoubt  and  an  unfinished  breastwork 
seem  to  dismay  them  until  he  was  within  ten  yards,  on  the  superior  crest  completed  the  system  of  de- 
when  appalled  by  the  furious  shout  and  charge  of   fence  tor  the  Bayonnette. 

the  ninth  they  gave  way,  and  the  ridges  of  the  The  Commissari,  which  is  a  continuation  of  the 
Croix  des  Bouquets  were  won  as  far  as  the  royal  Bayonette  towards  the  great  Khnnr;,  was  covered 
road.  The  British  regiment,  however,  lost  many  by  a  profound  gulf  thickly  wooded  a)i(l  defended  with 
men  and  officers,  and  during  the  fight  the  French  skirmishers,  and  between  this  gulf  ard  another  of  the 
artillery  and  scattered  troops,  coming  from  different  same  nature  the  main  road  leading  hs^ni  Vera  over 
points  and  rallying  on  Beyer's  battalions,  were  gath-  the  Puerto  pierced  the  rentm  of  the  s''ret;ch  position, 
ered  on  the  ridges  to  the  French  left  of  the  road.  Rugged  and  ascending  w.i,ii  tl.t  iv.  iibrupt  turns  this 

The  intrenched  camp  above  Biriatu  and  the  Bil-  road  was  blocked  at  every  uncovered  point  with 
dox,  had  been  meanwhile  defended  with  success  in  abatis  and  small  retrenchments;  each  obstacle  wes 
front,  but  Freyre  turnc#  thein  with  his  right  wing,  commanded  at  half  musket-shot  by  small  detach- 
which  being  opposed  only  by  a  single  battalion  soon  ments  })laced  on  all  the  projecting  parts  overlcok- 
won  the  Mandale  mountain,  and  the  French  fell  ing  the  ascent,  and  a  regiment  intrenched  ab'ove  on 
back  from  that  quarter  to  the  Calvaire  d'Urogne  and  the  Puerto  itself,  connected  the  troojis  on  the  crest 
JoUimont.  lleiile  thus  beaten  at  the  Croix  des  !  of  the  Bayonette  and  Commissari  with  those  on  the 
Bouquets,  and  his  flanks  turned,  the  left  bv  the  saddle-ridge,  against  which  Giron's  attack  was  di- 
Spaniards  on  the   Mandale,  the  right  by  the  allies   rected. 

along  the  sea-coast,  retreated  in  great  disorder!  But  between  Alton's  right  and  Giron's  left  was  an 
along  the  royal  causeway  and  the  old  road  of  Bay-  isolated  ridge,  called  by  the  soldiers  "  the  Boars 
onne.  He  passed  through  the  village  of  Urogne,  Back,"  the  summit  of  which,  about  half  a  mile  long 
and  the  British  skirmishers  at  first  entered  it  in  and  rounded  at  each  end,  was  occupied  by  four 
pursuit,  but  they  were  beaten  out  again  by  the  sec-  French  companies.  This  huge  cavalier,  thrown  as 
end  brigade  of  Boyer's  division,  for  Soult  now  ar-  it  were  into  the  gulf  to  cover  the  Puerto  and  sade'le 
rivcJ  with  part  of  V'iliatte's  reserve  and  many  guns,  ridges,  although  of  mean  height  in  comparison  of 
and  by  his  presence  and  activity  restored  order  and  the  towering  ranges  behind,  was  yet  so  great  that 
revived  the  courage  of  the  troops  at  tli-e  moment  the  few  warning  shots  fired  from  the  summit  by  the 
when  the  retreat  was  degenerating  into  a  flight.         -enemy,  reached  the  allies  at  its  base  with  that  slow 

Reille  lost  eight  pieces  of  artillery  and  about  four  singing  sound  which  marks  the  dying  force  of  a 
humlred  men;  the  allies  did  not  lose  more  than  six  musket-ball.  It  was  essential  to  take  "the  Boar's 
hundred,  of  which  half  were  Spaniards,  so  slight  and  ,  Back"  before  the  general  attack  commenced,  and 
easy  had  the  skill  of  the  general  rendered  this  stu-  five  companies  of  British  riflemen,  supported  by  the 
pendous  operation.  But  if  the  French  commander,  (  seventeenth  Portuguese  regiment,  were  ordered  to 
penetrating  Wellington's  design  and  avoiding  the  assail  it  at  the  Vera  end,  while  a  battalion  of  Gi- 
surprise,  had  opposed  all  his  troops  amounting  with  ,  ron's  Spaniards,  preceded  by  a  detached  company  of 
what  Villatte  could  spare  to  sixteen  thousand,  in- 1  the  forty-third,  attacked  it  on  the  other, 
etead  of  the  five  thousand  actually  engaged,  the  |  At  four  o'clock  in  the  morning,  Clauzel  had  re- 
passage  could  scarcely  have  been  forced;  and  a  ;  ceived  intelligence  that  the  Bayonnette  was  to  be 
check  woull  have  been  tantam.ount  to  a  terrible  de-  !  assaulted  that  day  or  the  next,  and  at  seven  o'clock 
feat,  because  in  two  hours  tlfe  returning  tide  would  ;  he  heard  from  Conroux,  who  commanded  at  Sarre, 
have  come  with  a  swallowing  flood  upon  the  rear.     I  that  Giron's  camps  were   abandoned,  although  the 

Equally  unprepared  and  equally  unsuccessful  were  tents  of  the  seventh  division  were  still  standing ;  at 
the  French  on  the  side  of  Vera,  although  the  strug-  [  the  same  time  the  sound  of  musketry  was  heard  on 
gle  there  prove!  more  fierce  and  constant.  j  the  side  of  Urdax,  a  cannonade  on  the  side  of  Irun, 

At  daybreak  (Jiron  iiad  descended  from  the  Ivan-  and  then  came  Taupin's  report  that  the  vale  of  Vera 
telly  rocks  and  general  Alten  from  Santa  Barbara  ;  was  filled  with  troops.  To  this  last  quarter  Clau- 
the  first  to  the  gorge  of  the  pass  leading  from  Vera  zel  hurried.  The  Spaniards  had  already  driven 
to  Sarre,  the  last  to  tiie  town  of  Vera,  where  he  Conroux's  outposts  from  the  gorge  loading  to  Sarre, 
was  joined  by  half  of  Longa's  force.  j  and  a  detachment  was  creeping  up  towards  the  un- 

One  brigade,  consisting  of  the  forty-third,  the  guarded  head  of  the  great  liliune.  He  immediately 
eevonteenth  Portugu'^se  regiment  of  the  line  and  ;  ordered  four  regiments  of  Conroux's  division  to  oc- 
the  first  and  third  battalions  of  riflemen,  drew  up  in  cupy  the  summit,  the  front  and  flanks  of  that  nioun- 
column  on  an  open  space  to  the  right  of  Vera.  The  tain,  and  he  formed  a  reserve  of  two  other  regi- 
other  brigade  under  colonel  Colborne,  consisting  of  i  ments  behind.  Witii  these  troops  he  designed  to 
the  fifty-second,  two  battalions  of  cncjadores  and  al  secure  the  mountain  and  support  Taupin,  but  ere 
battalion  of  British  riflemen,  was  disposed  on  the  they  could  reach  their  destination  that  general's 
'ef^  rf  Vera.     Half  of  Longa's  division  was  between  .  fate  was  decided 


1813 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAK 


657 


SECOND    COJIBAT    OF    VERA. 

Soon  after  seven  o'clock  a  few  cannon-shot  from 
some  mountain-guns,  of  which  each  side  had  a  bat- 
tery, were  followed  by  the  Spanish  musketry  on  the 
right,  and  the  next  moment  "  the  Boar's  Back"  was 
simultaneously  assailed  at  both  ends.  The  riflemen 
on  the  Vera  side  ascended  to  a  small  pine  wood  two- 
thirds  of  tlie  way  up  and  t'lere  rested,  but  soon  re- 
suming their  movement  wiih  a  scornful  gallantry 
they  swept  the  French  off  the  top,  di«dai'iing  to  use 
their  rifles  beyond  a  few  shots  down  the  reserve  side, 
to  show  tiiat  they  were  masters  of  the  ridge.  This 
was  the  signal  for  the  general  attack.  The  seven- 
teenth Portuguese  followed  the  victorious  sharp- 
shooters, the  forty-third,  preceded  by  their  own 
skirmishers  and  by  the  remainder  of  the  riflemen  of 
the  right  wing,  plunged  into  the  rugged  pass,  Lon- 
ga's  troops  entered  tiie  gloomy  wood  of  the  ravine  on 
4he  left,  and  beyond  them  Colborne's  brigade  moving 
by  narrow  patiis  and  throwing  out  skirmishers  as- 
sailed the  Hayonnette,  the  fifty-second  took  the  mid- 
dle tongue,  the  caijadores  and  riflemen  the  two 
outermost,  and  all  bore  with  a  concentric  movement 
against  the  star  redoubt  on  the  platform  aoove. 
Longa's  second  brigade  should  have  flanked  the  left 
of  this  attack  with  a  wide  skirting  movement,  but 
neither  he  nor  his  starved  soldiers  knew  much  of 
such  warfare,  and  therefore  quietly  followed  the  rifle- 
men in  reserve. 

Soon  the  open  slopes  of  the  mountains  were  cov- 
ered with  men  and  with  fire,  a  heavy  confused  sound 
of  mingled  shouts  and  musketry  filled  the  deep  hol- 
lows between,  and  the  white  smoke  came  curling  up 
above  the  dark  forest  trees  which  covered  their 
gloomy  recesses.  The  French  compared  with  their 
assailants  seemed  few  and  scattered  on  the  moun- 
tain side,  and  Kempt's  brigade  soon  forced  its  way 
without  a  check  through  all  the  retrenchments  on 
the  main  pass,  his  skirmishers  spreading  wider  and 
breaking  into  small  detachments  of  support  as  the 
depth  of  the  ravine  lessened  and  the  slopes  melted 
into  the  higher  ridges.  When  about  half-way  up 
an  open  platform  gave  a  clear  view  over  the  Bayon- 
nette  slope,  and  all  eyes  were  turned  that  way. 
Longa's  right  brigade,  fighting  in  the  gulf  be- 
tween, seemed  labouring  and  overmatched,  but  be- 
yond, on  the  broad  open  space  in  front  of  the  star 
fort,  the  ca(;adores  and  riflemen  of  Colborne's  bri- 
gade were  seen  coming  out,  in  small  bod'f^",  from  a 
forest  which  covered  the  three  tongues  of  land  op  to 
the  edge  of  the  platform.  Their  fire  was  sharp, 
their  pace  rapid,  and  in  a  few  moments  they  closed 
upon  the  redoubt  in  a  mass  as  if  resolved  to  storm 
it.  The  fifty-second  were  not  then  in  sight,  and  the 
Frencli,  thinking  from  the  dark  clothing  that  all 
were  Portuguese,  rushed  in  close  order  out  of  the 
intrenchment ;  they  were  numerous  and  very  sud- 
den ;  the  rifle  as  a  weapon  is  overmatched  by  the 
musket  and  bayonet,  and  tliis  rough  charge  sent  tlie 
scattered  assailants  back  over  the  rocky  edge  of  the 
descent.  With  siirill  cries  the  French  followed, 
but  just  then  the  fifty-second  appeared,  partly  in 
line,  partly  in  column,  on  the  platform,  and  raising 
ttieir  shout  rushed  forward.  Tlie  red  uniform  and 
full  career  of  this  rjgiinent  startled  the  liitherto  ad- 
venturous French,  they  stopped  sliort,  wavered,  and 
then  turning  fled  to  their  intrenchment;  the  fifty- 
second  following  hard  entered  the  works  with  tliem, 
the  riflemen  and  ca (^adores  who  had  meanwhile  ral- 
lied passed  it  on  both  lankg.  and  for  a  few  moments 
'!very  thing  was  hidden  by  a  dense  volume  of  smoke. 
Soon  however  the  Briti-ih  shout  pealed  again,  and 
the  whole  mass  emerged  on  the  other  side,  the 
43 


French,  now  the  fewer,  flying,  the  others  pursuini^ 
until  the  second  intrenchment,  halfway  up  the  pa 
rent  slope,  enabled  the  retreating  troops  to  make 
another  stand. 

The  exulting  and  approving  cheers  of  Kcmpt'fl 
brigade  now  echoed  along  the  mountain  side,  and 
with  renewed  vigour  tiie  men  continued  to  scale  the 
craggy  mountain,  fighting  tiieir  toilsome  way  to  the 
top  of  the  Puerto.  Meanwhile  Colborne,  after  hav- 
ing carried  the  second  intrenchment  above  the  star 
fort,  Vv-as  brought  to  a  check  by  the  works  on  the 
very  crest  of  tlie  mountain,  from  whence  the  French 
not  only  plied  his  troops  with  musketry  at  a  great 
advantage,  but  rolled  huge  stones  down  the  sleep. 

These  works  were  extensive,  well  lined  with  men 
and  strengthened  by  a  large  redoubt  on  tlie  right; 
but  the  defenders  soon  faltered,  for  their  left  flank 
was  turned  by  Kempt,  and  the  effects  of  lord  Wel- 
lington's skiltiil  combinations  were  now  felt  in  an- 
other quarter.  Freyre's  Spaniards,  after  carryirg 
the  Mandale  mountain,  hetween  Biriatu  and  the 
Bayonette,  had  pushed  to  a  road  leading  from  the  lat- 
ter by  Joliimont  to  St.  Jean  de  Luz,  and  this  was  the 
line  of  retreat  from  the  crest  of  the  Bayonette  for 
Taupin'a  right  wing;  but  Freyre's  Spaniards  got 
there  first,  and  if  Longa's  brigade  instead  of  slowly 
following  Colborne  had  spread  out  widely  on  the  left, 
a  military  line  would  have  been  comjdeted  from  Gi- 
ron  to  Freyre.  Still  Taupin's  right  was  cut  off  on 
that  side,  and  he  was  forced  to  file  it  under  fire  along 
the  crest  of  the  Bayonette  to  reach  the  Puerto  re 
Vera  road,  where  he  was  joined  by  his  centre.  He 
efiected  this,  but  lost  his  mountain  battery  and  three 
hundred  men.  These  last,  apparently  tiie  garri.scn 
of  the  large  fort  on  the  extreme  right  of  the  I'aycn- 
ette  crest,  were  captured  by  Colborne  in  a  remarka- 
ble manner.  Accompanied  by  only  one  of  his  staff 
and  half  a  dozen  riflemen,  he  crossed  their  march 
unexpectedly,  and  with  great  presence  of  mind  and 
intrepidity  ordered  them  to  lay  down  their  arms,  an 
order  which  they,  thinking  themselves  entirely  cut 
ofl^,  obeyed.  Meanwhile  the  French  skirmishers  in 
the  deep  ravine,  between  the  two  lines  of  attack, 
being  feebly  pushed  by  Longa's  troops,  retreated  too 
slowly,  and  getting  among  some  rocks  from  whence 
there  was  no  escape  surrendered  to  Kempt's  brigade. 

The  right  and  centre  of  Taupin's  division  being 
now  completely  beaten  fled  down  the  side  of  the 
mountain  towards  Olette  ;  they  were  pursued  by  a 
part  of  the  allies  until  they  rallied  upon  Villatte's 
reserve,  which  was  in  order  of  battle  on  a  ridge  ex- 
tending across  the  gorge  of  Olette  between  Urogne 
and  \scain.  The  Bayonette  and  Commissari,  with 
the  Puerto  de  Vera,  were  thus  won  after  five  hours'" 
incessanj  fighting  and  toiling  up  their  craggy  sides. 
Nevertheless  the  battle  was  still  maintained  by  the 
French  troops  on  the  Rhune. 

Giron,  after  driving  Conroux's  advanced  post  from 
the  gorge  leading  from  Vera  to  Sarre,  had  following 
his  orders  pushed  a  battalion  from  that  side  tou'ards 
the  head  of  the  great  Riiunc,  and  placed  a  reserve  in 
the  gorge  to  cover  his  rear  from  any  counter-attack 
which  Conroux  might  make.  And  when  his  left  wing 
was  rendered  free  to  move  by  the  cajiturc  of  "the 
Boar's  Back,"  lie  fought  his  way  up  abreast  with  the 
British  line  until  near  the  saddle-ridge,  a  little  to  his 
own  right  of  the  Puerto.  Tiiere  however  he  was  ar- 
rested by  a  strong  line  of  abatis,  from  behind  which 
two  French  regiments  poured  a  heavy  fire.  The 
Spaniards  stopped,  and  though  the  adventurer  Dov/- 
nie,now  a  Spanish  general,  encouraged  them  with  his 
voice  and  they  kej)t  their  ranks,  tliey  seemed  irre- 
solute and  did  not  advance.  'J'hcre  happened  to  be 
present  an  officer  of  the  forty -third  regiment,  named 


658 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  Xaii 


Havelock,  who  being  attached  to  general  Alten's '  camp  and  works  taken  the  day  before  if  the  Span- 
staff,  was  sent  to  ascertain  Giroii's  progress.     His    iards  iiad  not  succoured  tliem. 

fiery  temper  could  not  brook  the  check.  He  took  |  The  wiiole  loss  on  tiie  three  days  of  fighting  was 
off  his  hat,  he  called  upon  the  Spaniards  to  follow  :  about  fourteen  hundred  French  and  sixteen  hundred 
him,  and  putting  spurs  to  his  horse,  at  one  bound  ;  of  the  allies,  one  half  being  Spaniards,  but  many  of 
cleared  the  abatis  and  went  headlong  amongst  the  the  wounded  were  not  brought  in  until  the  third  day 
enemy.  Then  the  soldiers,  shouting  for  "  £/  c/ii'co  j  after  the  actions,  and  several  perished  miserably 
bianco,''^  '•'■  the  fair  boy,"  so  they  called  him,  for  he  where  they  fell,  it  being  impossible  to  discover  them 
was  very  young  and  had  light  hair,  with  one  shock  in  those  vast  solitudes.  Some  men  were  also  lost 
broke  througli  the  French,  and  this  at  the  very  mo- !  from  want  of  discipline  ;  having  descended  into  the 


m^Ht  when  their  centre  was  flying  under  the  fire  of 
Kempt's  skirmishers  from  the  Puerto  de  Vera. 

The  two  regiments  thus  defeated  by  the  Spaniards 
retired  by  their  left  along  the  saddle-ridge  to  the 
flanks  of  the  Rhune,  so  that  Clauzel  had  now  eight 
regiments  concentrated  on  this  great  mountain. 
Two  occupied  the  crest  including  the  highest  rock 
called  -'the  Hermitage;"  four  were  on  the  flanks, 
descending  towards  Ascain  on  one  hand,  and  towards 
Sarre  on  the  other;  the  remaining  two  occupied  a 
lower  and  parallel  crest  behind  called  "  the  small 
Rhune."  In  this  situation  they  were  attacked  at 
four  o'clock  by  G iron's  right  wing.  The  Spaniards 
first  dislodged  a  small  body  from  a  detached  pile  of 
crags  about  musket-shot  below  the  summit,  and  then 
assailed  the  bald  staring  rocks  of  the  Hermitage  it- 
eelf,  endeavouring  at  the  same  time  to  turn  it  by 
their  right.  In  both  objects  they  were  defeated 
with  loss.  The  Hern^.itago  was  impregnable,  the 
French  rolling  down  stones  large  enough  to  sweep 
away  a  whole  column  at  once,  and  the  Spaniards  re- 
Borted  to  a  distant  musketry  which  lasted  until 
night.  This  day's  fighting  cost  Taupin's  division 
two  generals  and  four  hundred  men  killed  and  wound- 
ed, and  five  hundred  prisoners.  The  loss  of  the  al- 
lies was  nearly  a  thousand,  of  which  about  five  hun- 
dred were  Spaniards,  and  the  success  was  not  com- 
plete, for  while  the  French  kept  possession  of  the 
summit  of  the  Rhune,  the  allies'  new  position  was 
ixisecure. 

The  front  and  the  right  flank  of  that  great  moun- 
tain were  impregnable  ;  but  lord  Wellington  observ- 
ing that  the  left  flank,  descending  towards  Sarre, 
was  less  inaccessible,  concentrated  the  Spaniards 
on  that  side  on  the  8th,  designing  a  combined  attack 
against  the  mountain  itself,  and  against  the  camp 
cf  Sarre.  At  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  the 
rocks  which  studded  the  lower  part  of  the  Rhune 
slope  were  assailed  by  the  Spaniards,  and  at  the  same 
time  detachments  of  the  seveiith  division  descended 
from  the  Puerto  de  Echallar  upon  the  fort  of  St. 
Barbe,  and  other  outworks  covering  the  advanced 
French  camp  of  Sarre.  The  Andalusians  soon  won 
the  rocks  and  an  intrenched  height  that  commanded 
the  camp,  for  Clauzel,  too  easily  alarmed  at  some 
slight  demonstrations  made  by  the  sixth  division  to- 
wards the  bridge  of  Amotz  in  rear  of  his  left,  thought 
he  should  be  cut  off  from  his  great  camp,  and  very 
suddenly  abandoned  not  only  the  slope  of  the  moun 


French  villages,  they  got  drunk,  and  were  taken  the 
next  day  by  the  enemy.  Nor  was  the  number  small 
of  those  who  plundered  in  defiance  of  lord  Welling- 
ton's proclamation :  for  he  thought  it  necessary  to 
arrest  and  send  to  England  several  ofiicers,  and  re- 
newed his  proclamation,  observing  that  if  he  had 
five  times  as  many  men  he  could  not  venture  to  in- 
vade France  unless  marauding  was  prevented.  It 
is  remarkable  that  the  French  troops  on  the  same 
day  acted  towards  their  own  countrymen  in  the  same 
manner;  but  Soult  also  checked  the  mischief  with 
a  vigorous  hand,  causing  a  captain  of  some  reputa 
tion  to  be  shot  as  an  example,  for  having  suffered 
his  men  to  plunder  a  house  in  Sarre  during  the  ac- 
tion. 

With  exception  of  the  slight  checks  sustained 
at  Sarre  and  Ainhoa,  the  course  of  these  operations 
had  been  eminently  successful,  and  surely  the  bravery 
of  troops  who  assailed  and  carried  such  stupendous 
positions  must  be  admired.  To  them  tlie  unfinished 
state  of  the  French  works  was  not  visible.  Day 
after  day,  for  more  than  a  month,  intrenchment  had 
risen  over  intrenchment,  covering  the  vast  slopes  of 
mountains  which  were  scarcely  accessible  from  their 
natural  steepness  and  asperity.  This  they  could  ?ee, 
yet  cared  neither  for  the  growing  strength  of  the 
works,  the  height  of  the  mountains,  nor  the  breadth 
of  the  river  with  its  heavy  sands,  and  its  mighty 
rushing  tide ;  all  were  despised,  and  while  they 
marched  with  this  confident  valour,  it  was  observed 
that  the  French  fought  in  defence  of  their  dizzy 
steeps  with  far  less  fierceness  than  when,  striving 
against  insurmountable  obstacles,  they  attempted 
to  storm  the  lofty  rocks  of  Sauroren.  Continual 
defeat  had  lowered  their  spirit,  but  the  feebleness 
of  the  defence  on  this  occasion  may  be  traced  to  an- 
other cause.  It  was  a  general's,  not  a  soldier's  bat- 
tle. Wellington  had  with  overmastering  combina- 
tions overwhelmed  each  point  of  attack.  Taupin's 
and  INIaucune's  divisions  were  each  less  than  five 
thousand  strong,  and  they  were  separately  assailed, 
the  first  by  eighteen,  the  second  by  fifteen  thousand 
men,  and  at  neither  point  were  Reille  and  Clauzel 
able  to  bring  their  reserves  into  action  before  the 
positions  were  won. 

Soult  complained  that  he  had  repeatedly  told  hii 
lieutenants  an  attack  was  to  be  expected,  and  recom 
mended  extreme  vigilance  ;  yet  they  were  quite  un 
prepared,  although  they  heard  the  noise  of  the  guns 


tain,  but  all  his  advanced  works  in  the  basin  below, '  and  pontoons  about  Irun  on  the  night  of  the  5th,  and 
including  the  fort  of  St.  Barbe.  His  troops  were  '  again  on  the  night  of  the  sixth.  The  passage  of  the 
thus  concentrated  on  the  height  behind  Sarre,  still  |  river,  he  said,  had  commenced  at  seven  o'clock,  long 
holding  with  their  right  the  smaller  Rhune  ;  but  the  I  after  daylight,  the  allies'  masses  were  then  clearly 
consequences  of  his  error  were  soon  made  apparent,  to  be  seen  forming  on  the  banks,  and  there  was  full 
Wellington  immediately  established  a  strong  body  time  for  Boyer's  division  to  arrive  before  the  Croix 
of  the  Spanish  troops  close  up  to  the  rocks  of  the  des  Bouquets  was  lost.  The  battle  was  fought  in 
Hermitage,  and  the  two  French  regiments  there,  disorder  with  less  than  five  thousand  men,  instead 
Bcsing  the  lower  slopes  and  the  fort  of  St.  Barbe  of  with  ten  thousand  in  good  order,  and  supported 
given  up,  imagined  they  also  would  be  cut  off,  and  by  a  part  of  Villatte's  reserve.  To  this  negligence 
without  orders  abandoned  the  impregnable  rocks  of  the  generals  added  also  discouragement.  They  had 
the  llermitaee  and  retired  in  the  night  to  the  small-  so  little  confidence  in  the  strength  of  their  positions 
er  Rhune.  The  next  morning  some  of  the  seventh  that  if  the  allies  had  pushed  vigorously  forward  be- 
ilivision  rashly  pushed  into  the  village  of  Sarre,  but  fore  the  marshal's  arrival  from  Espelctte,  they  would 
hey  were  quickly  repulsed,  and  would  have  lost  the   have  entered  St    .lean  de   Luz,  turned  the  right  of 


1813.1 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


6o9 


,he  second  position,  and   forced   the   French  army 
back  upon  the  Nive  and  the  Adour. 

This  reasoning  of  Soult  was  correct,  but  such  a 
stroke  did  not  belong  to  lord  Wellington's  system. 
He  could  not  go  beyond  the  Adour,  he  doubted 
whether  he  could  even  maintain  his  army  during 
the  winter  in  the  position  he  had  already  gained, 
and  he  was  averse  to  the  experiment  while  Pampe- 
Itina  held  out,  and  the  war  in  Germany  bore  an  un- 
decided asDect 


CHAPTER  V. 

Soult  retakes  the  redoubt  of  Sarre — Wellington  orsfanizes  the 
iiriMv  in  three  fftrat  divisions  under  sir  Ro«Tai]d  Hill,  marshal 
Bereslord,  and  sir  Johti  Hope — Disinterested  conduct  of  the 
mst-naiiied  officer — Soiiit's  ininiense  intrenchnients  de- 
»riibed  —  His  correspondence  with  Siichet — Proposes  to 
jetake  the  ofiensive  and  unite  their  armies  in  Anigon  — 
•"iichet  v^ill  not  accede  to  his  vit-ws,  and  makes  inaccurate 
ttatt-nients — Lord  Wellington,  hearing  of  advantages  gaiued 
nv  the  allied  sovereigns  in  German}',  resolves  to  invade 
*'rance — Blockade  and  ia!l  of  Pampeluna — Lord  Wellington 
l.rt:anizts  a  brigade  under  lord  Aylnier  to  besiege  Santona, 
^nt  afterwards  charges  his  design. 

SouLT  was  apprehensive  for  some  days  that  lord 
Wellington  would  push  his  offensive  operations  fur- 
ther; but  when  he  knew  by  Foy's  reports,  and  by 
the  numbers  of  the  allies  assembled  on  his  right, 
fhat  there  was  no  design  of  attacking  his  left,  he  re- 
sumed his  labours  to  advance  the  works  covering  St. 
.fean  de  Luz.  He  also  kept  a  vigilant  watch  from 
his  centre,  holding  his  divisions  in  readiness  to  con- 
<'.entrate  towards  Sarre,  and  when  he  saw  the  heavy 
masses  in  his  front  disperse  by  degrees  into  different 
ciimps,  he  directed  Clauzel  to  recover  the  fort  of  St. 
Barbe  This  work  was  constructed  on  a  compara- 
tiveif  low  ridge  barring  issue  from  the  gorge  leading 
nut  of  the  vale  of  Vera  to  Sarre,  and  it  defended  the 
narrow  ground  between  the  Rliunes  and  the  Nivelle 
river.  Abandoned  on  the  Stli  without  reason  by  the 
French,  since  it  did  not  naturally  belong  to  the  posi- 
tion of  the  allies,  it  was  now  occupied  by  a  Spanish 
piqu'^t  of  forty  men.  Some  battalions  were  also  en- 
ciimped  in  a  small  wood  close  behind:  but  many 
otncers  and  men  slept  in  the  fort,  and  on  the  night 
of  the  12th,  about  eleven  o'clock,  three  battalions 
of  Conroux's  division  reached  the  platform  on  which 
the  fort  stood  without  being  perceived.  The  work 
was  then  escaladed,  the  troops  behind  it  went  off  in 
•■nnfusion  at  tiie  first  alarm,  and  two  hundred  soldiers 
with  fifteen  officers  were  made  prisoners.  The 
Spaniards,  ashamed  of  the  surprise,  made  a  vigorous 
offf)rt  to  recover  the  fort  at  daylight ;  they  were  re- 
pulsed, and  repeated  the  attempt  with  live  battal- 
ions, but  Clauzel  brought  up  two  guns,  and  a  sharp 
pkirinish  took  place  in  the  wood  which  lasted  for 
several  hours,  the  French  endeavouring  to  regain 
the  whole  of  their  old  intrenchments,  and  the  Span- 
iards to  recover  the  fort.  Neither  succeeded,  and 
St.  Barbe,  too  near  the  ejiemy's  position  to  be  safely 
held,  was  resigned,  with  a  loss  of  two  hundred  men 
by  the  French  and  five  hundred  by  the  Spaniards. 
Soon  after  this  isolated  action  a  French  sloop, 
freighted  with  stores  for  Santona,  attempted  to  run 
from  St.  Jean  de  Luz,  and  being  chased  by  three 
English  brigs  and  cut  off  from  the  open  sea,  her 
crew,  atler  exchanging  a  few  distant  shots  with  one 
of  the  brigs,  set  her  on  fire  and  escaped  in  their  boats 
to  the  Adour. 

Head-quarters  were  now  fixed  in  Vera,  and  the 
allied  army  was  organized  in  three  grand  divisions. 
The  right,  having  Mina's  and  Morillo's  battalions 
attached  to  it,  wns  commanded  by  sir  Rowland 
Hill,  and  extended  from  Roncevalles  to  the  Bastan. 


The  centre,  occupying  Maya,  the  Echallar.  Rhune 
and  Bayonette  mountains,  was  given  to  marshal 
Beresfbrd.  'J"he  left,  extending  from  tije  Mandale 
mountain  to  the  sea,  was  under  sir  John  Hope. 
This  officer  succeeded  Graham,  wiio  had  returned 
to  England.  Commanding  in  chief  at  Coruha  after 
sir  John  Moore's  death,  he  was  superior  in  rank  to 
lord  Wellington  during  tlie  early  part  of  the  Penin- 
sular war;  but  when  tiie  latter  obtained  the  batoon 
of  field-marshal  at  Vittoria,  Hope  with  a  jjatriotisni 
and  modesty  worthy  of  the  pupil  cf  Abercrombie,  the 
friend  and  comrade  of  Moore,  offered  to  serve  as  sec- 
ond in  command,  and  lord  Wellington  joyfullv  ac- 
cepted him,  observing  that  he  was  tlie  "  ablest  officer 
in  the  army." 

The  positions  of  the  right  and  centre  were  offen- 
sive and  menacing,  but  the  left  was  still  on  the 
defensive,  and  the  Bidassoa,  impassable  at  high 
water  below  the  bridge,  was  close  behind.  How- 
ever the  ridges  were  strong,  a  powerful  artillery 
was  established  on  the  right  bank,  field-works  were 
constructed,  and  although  the  fords  below  Behobia 
furnished  but  a  dangerous  retreat  even  at  low  water, 
those  above  were  always  available,  and  a  pontoon 
bridge  laid  down  for  the  passage  of  the  guns  during 
the  action  was  a  sure  resource.  The  front  was 
along  the  heights  of  the  Croix  des  Bouquets  facing 
Urogne  and  the  camp  of  the  Sans  Culottes,  and  there 
was  a  reserve  in  an  intrenched  camp  above  Andaie. 
The  right  of  the  line  rested  on  the  Mandale,  and 
from  that  mountain  and  the  Bayonnette  the  allies 
could  descend  upon  the  flank  of  an  attacking  army. 

Soult  had  however  no  intention  of  renewing  the 
offensive.  He  had  now  lost  many  thousand  men  in 
battle,  and  the  old  soldiers  remaining  did  not  exceed 
seventy-nine  thousand  present  under  arms,  including 
officers  and  artillery-men.  Of  this  number  the  gar- 
risons absorbed  about  thirteen  thousand,  leaving 
sixty-six  thousand  in  the  field  ;  whereas  the  allies, 
counting  3Iina's  and  Del  Parque's  troops,  now  at 
Tudela,  Pampeluna  and  the  Val  de  Irati,  exceeded 
one  hundred  thousand,  seventy-three  thousand,  in- 
cluding officers,  sergeants  and  artillery-men,  being 
British  and  Portuguese.  And  this  was  below  the 
calculation  of  the  French  general ;  for  deceived  by 
the  exaggerated  reports  which  the  Spaniards  always 
made  of  their  forces,  he  thought  Del  Parque  Lad 
brought  up  twenty  thousand  men,  and  that  there 
were  one  hundred  and  forty  thousand  combatants  in 
his  front.  But  it  was  not  so,  and  as  conscripts  of  a 
good  description  were  now  joining  tlie  French  army 
rapidly,  and  the  national  guards  of  the  Pyrenees 
were  many,  it  was  in  the  number  of  soldiers,  rather 
than  of  men,  that  the  English  general  had  the  ad- 
vantage. 

In  this  state  of  affairs  Soult's  policy  was  to  main- 
tain a  strict  defensive,  under  cover  of  which  the 
spirit  of  the  troops  might  be  revived,  the  country 
in  the  rear  organized,  and  the  conscripts  disciplined 
and  hardened  to  war.  The  loss  of  the  lower  Bidas- 
soa was  in  a  political  view  mischievous  to  him,  it 
had  an  injurious  effect  upon  the  spirit  of  the  frontier 
departments,  and  gave  encouragement  to  the  secret 
partisans  of  the  Bourbons  ;  but  in  a  military  view  it 
was  a  relief.  The  great  developement  of  the  moun- 
tains bordering  the  Bidassoa  had  rendered  their  de- 
fence difficult;  while  holding  them  he  had  continual 
fear  that  his  »ine  would  be  pierced  and  his  army 
suddenly  driven  beyond  the  Adour.  His  position 
was  now  more  concentrated. 

The  right  under  Reille  formed  two  lines.  One 
across  the  royal  road  on  the  fortified  heights  of 
Urogne  and  the  camp  of  the  Sars  Culottes  ;  the  other 
in  tiie  intrenched  camps  of  Bourdegain  and  Belchena, 


6G0 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XXII. 


covering  St.  Jean  dp  Luz  and  barring  the  gorges  of 
Olette  and  JoUiniont 

The  cenirp  under  Cianzel  was  posted  on  the  ridges 
between  Aseain  and  Amotz  holding  the  smaller 
Rhune  in  advance  ;  but  one  divisi-^n  was  retained  by 
Soult  in  the  camp  of  Serres,  on  the  right  of  the  Is'i- 
velle,  overhanging  Ascain.  To  replace  it,  one  of 
D'Erlon's  divisions  crossed  to  the  left  of  the  Nivelle 
end  reinforced  Clauzel's  left  rank  above  Sarre. 

Villatte's  reserve  was  about  St.  Jean  de  Luz,  but 
Iiaving  the  Italian  brigade  in  tiie  camp  of  Serres. 

D'Erlon's  remaining  divisions  continued  in  their 
old  position,  the  right  connected  with  Clauzel's  line 
by  the  bridge  of  Amotz;  the  left,  holding  the  Chou- 
pera  and  Mondarain  mountains,  bordered  on  the 
Nive. 

Behind  Clauzel  and  D'Erlon  Soult  had  commenced 
a  second  chain  of  intrenched  camps,  prolonged  from 
the  camp  of  Serres  up  the  right  bank  of  the  Nivelle 
to  St.  Pe,  thence  by  Suraide  to  the  double  bridge- 
head of  Cambo  on  the  Nive,  and  beyond  that  river 
to  the  Ursouia  mountain,  covering  tlie  great  road 
from  Bayonne  to  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port.  He  had 
also  called  general  Paris  up  from  Oloron  to  the  de- 
fence of  the  latter  fortress  and  its  intrenched  camp, 
and  now  drew  Foy  down  the  Nive  to  Bidaray,  half 
way  between  St  Jean  Pied  de  Port  and  Cambo. 
There  watching  the  issues  from  the  Yal  de  Baigorri 
he  was  ready  to  occupy  the  Ursouia  mountain  on  the 
right  of  the  Nive,  or,  moving  by  Cambo,  to  reinforce 
the  great  position  on  the  left  of  that  river,  according 
to  circumstances. 

To  complete  these  immense  intrenchments,  which 
between  tne  Nive  and  the  sea  were  double  and  on  an 
opening  of  sixteen  miles,  the  whole  army  laboured 
incessantly  and  all  tlie  resources  of  the  country 
whether  of  materials  or  working  men  were  called 
out  by  requisition.  Nevertheless  this  defensive 
warfare  was  justly  regarded  by  the  duke  of  Dalmatia 
as  unsuitable  to  the  general  state  of  atfairs.  Otien- 
Hive  operations  were  most  consonant  to  the  character 
of  the  P'rench  soldiers  and  to  the  exigencies  of  the 
time.  Recent  experience  had  shown  the  impregna- 
ble nature  of  the  allies'  positions  against  a  front  at- 
tack, and  he  was  too  weak  singly  to  change  the 
theatre  of  operations.  But  when  he  looked  at  the 
strength  of  the  armies  appropriated  by  the  emperor 
to  the  Spanish  contest,  he  thought  France  would  be 
ill-served  if  her  generals  could  not  resume  the  oflen- 
sive  successfully.  Suchet  had  just  proved  his  power 
at  Ordal  against  lord  William  Bentinck,  and  that 
nobleman's  successor,  with  inferior  rank  and  power, 
with  an  army  unpaid  and  feeding  on  salt  meat  from 
the  ships,  witli  jealous  and  disputing  colleagues 
tmongst  the  Spanish  generals,  none  of  whom  were 
willing  to  act  cordially  with  him  upon  a  fixed  and 
well  considered  plan,  was  in  no  condition  to  menace 
the  French  seriously.  And  that  he  was  permitted 
at  this  important  crisis  to  paralyze  from  fifty  to  sixty 
thousand  excellent  French  troo[)s,  possessing  all  the 
strong  places  of  the  country,  was  one  of  the  most 
singular  errors  of  the  war. 

Exclusive  of  national  guards  and  detachments  of 
the  line,  disposed  along  the  wliole  frontier  to  guard 
tlie  passes  of  the  Pyrenees  against  sudden  maraud- 
ing excursions,  tlie  French  armies  counted  at  this 
time  about  one  hundred  and  seventy  thousand  men 
and  seventeen  thousand  horses.  Of  tliese  one  hun- 
dred and  thirty-eight  thousand  were  present  under 
arms,  and  thirty  thousand  conscripts  were  in  march 
to  join  them.  Tlic^y  held  all  tlie  fortresses  of  Valen- 
cia and  Catalonia,  and  most  of  tiiose  in  Aragon, 
Navarre  and  (Juipuscoa,  and  they  could  unite  beliind 
tht'  Pyrenees  for  a  combined  etlbrt  in  safety.     Lord 


Wellington  could  not,  including  the  Anglo-Sicilinni 
and  all  the  Spaniards  in  arms  en  the  eastern  coast, 
bring  into  line  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men  ; 
he  had  several  sieges  on  his  hands,  and  to  unite  his 
forces  at  any  point  required  great  dispositions  to 
avoid  an  attack  during  a  fliink  march.  Suchet  had 
above  thirty  tliousand  dispostible  men,  he  could  in- 
crease them  to  forty  thousand  by  relinquishing  some 
important  posts,  his  means  in  artillery  were  im- 
mense, and  distributed  in  all  his  strong  places,  so 
that  he  could  furnish  himself  from  almost  any  point. 
It  is  no  exaggeration  therefore  to  say  that  two  hun- 
dred pieces  of  artillery  and  ninety  tliousand  old  sol- 
diers miglit  have  united  at  this  period  upon  the  flank 
of  lord  Wellington,  still  leaving  thirty  thousand 
conscripts  and  the  national  guards  of  the  frontier, 
supported  by  the  fortresses  and  intrenched  camps  of 
Bayonne  and  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port,  the  castle  of 
Navarreins  and  Jaca  on  one  side,  and  tlic  numerous 
garrisons  of  the  fortresses  in  Catalonia  on  the  other, 
to  cover  France  from  invasion. 

To  make  this  great  power  bear  in  a  right  direction 
was  the  duke  of  Dalmatia's  object,  and  his  plans 
were  large  and  worthy  of  his  reputation.  Yet  he 
could  never  persuade  Suchet  to  adopt  his  projects, 
and  that  marshal's  resistance  would  appear  to  have 
sprung  from  personal  dislike  contracted  during 
Soult's  sojourn  near  Valencia  in  1812.  It  has  been 
already  shown  how  lightly  he  abandoned  Aragon  and 
confined  himself  to  Catalonia  after  quitting  Valen- 
cia. He  did  not,  indeed,  then  know  that  Soult  had 
assumed  the  command  of  the  army  of  Spain,  and 
was  preparing  for  his  great  effort  to  relieve  Pampe- 
luna  ;  but  he  was  aware  that  Clauzel  and  Paris  were 
on  the  side  of  Jaca,  and  he  was  too  good  a  general 
not  to  know  that  operating  on  tiie  allies'  flank  was 
the  best  mode  of  palliating  the  ('cieat  of  Vittoria 
He  might  have  saved  both  his  garrison  and  castle  of 
Zaragoza  ;  the  guns  and  other  materials  of  a  very 
large  field-artillery  equipment  wore  deposited  there, 
and  from  thence,  by  Jaca,  he  could  have  opened  a 
sure  and  short  communication  with  Soult,  obtaii:ed 
information  of  that  general's  projects,  and  saved 
Pampeluna. 

It  may  be  asked,  why  the  duke  of  Dalmatia  did 
not  endeavour  to  communicate  with  Suchet  1  The 
reason  was  simple.  The  former  quitted  Dresden 
suddenly  on  the  4th  of  July,  reached  Bayonne  tlie 
12th,  and  on  the  20th  his  troops  were  in  full  march 
towards  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port,  and  it  was  during 
this  very  rapid  journey  that  the  other  marshal  aban- 
doned Valencia.  Soult,  tlierefore,  knew  neither  Su- 
chet's  plans  nor  the  force  of  his  army,  nor  his  move- 
ments, nor  his  actual  position,  and  there  was  no  time 
to  wait  for  accurate  information.  However,  between 
the  6th  and  the  16th  of  August,  tha>t  is  to  say,  im- 
mediately after  his  own  retreat  from  Sauroren,  he 
earnestly  prayed  that  the  army  of  Aragon  shruld 
march  upon  Zaragoza,  open  a  communication  by 
.Taca,  and  thus  drawing  off"  some  of  Wellington's 
forces  facilitate  the  eflTorts  of  the  army  of  Spain  to 
relieve  San  Sebastian.  In  this  communication  he 
stated,  that  his  recent  operations  had  caused  trcopa 
actually  in  march  under  general  Hill  towards  Cata 
Ionia  to  be  recalled.  This  was  an  error.  His  emis 
saries  were  deceived  by  the  movements  and  counter- 
movements  in  pursuit  of  Clauzel  immediately  after 
the  battle  of  Vittoria,  and  by  the  change  in  Welling- 
ton's plans  as  to  the  siege  of  Pampeluna.  No  troops 
were  sent  towards  Catalonia  ;  but  it  is  remarT<able 
that  Picton,  Hill,  Graham,  and  the  conde  de  I'Abis- 
pal  were  all  mentioned,  in  this  correspondence  be- 
tween Soult  and  Suchet,  as  being  actually  in  C;ita- 
i  Ionia,  or  on  the  march,  the  three  first  having  been 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


661 


really  sounded  as  to  taking  the  command  in  that 
quarter,  and  the  last  having  demanded  it  himself. 

Suchet  treated  Soult's  proposal  as  chimerical. 
His  moveable  troops,  he  said,  did  not  exceed  eleven 
thousand,  and  a  march  upon  Zaragoza  with  so  few 
men  would  be  to  renew  tlie  disaster  of  IJaylen,  un- 
less he  could  fly  into  France  by  Venasque,  where  he 
had  a  garrison.  An  extraordinary  view  of  affairs, 
which  he  supported  by  statements  still  more  extra- 
ordinary ! 

•'General  Hill  had  joined  lord  William  Bentinck 
with  twenty-four  thousand  men."  "  L'Abispal  had 
arrived  with  lifteen  thousand."  "  There  were  more 
than  two  hundred  thousand  men  on  the  Ebro."  "  The 
Spanish  insurrection  was  general  and  strongly  organ- 
ized." "  He  had  recovered  the  garrison  of  Tarra- 
gona and  destroyed  the  works,  and  he  must  revictual 
Barcelona,  and  then  withdraw  to  the  vicinity  of  Ge- 
rona  and  remain  on  the  defensive  !" 

This  letter  was  written  on  the  23d  of  August, 
when  lord  William  Bentinck  had  just  retreated  from 
tlie  Gaya  into  the  mountains  above  Hospitalet.  The 
imperial  muster-rolls  prove  that  the  two  armies  of 
Catalonia  and  Aragon,  both  under  his  command,  ex- 
ceeded sixty-five  thousand  men,  fifty-six  thousand 
being  present  under  arms.  Thirty  thousand  were 
united  in  the  field  when  he  received  Soult's  letter. 
There  was  nothing  to  prevent  him  marching  upon 
Tortosa,  except  lord  William  Bentinck's  army, 
which  had  just  acknowledged  by  a  retreat  its  inabil- 
ity to  cope  with  him;  there  was  nothing  at  all  to 
prevent  him  marcliing  to  Lerida.  The  count  of 
I'Abispal  had  thrown  up  his  command  from  bad 
health,  leaving  his  troops  under  Giron  on  the  Echal- 
lar  mountains.  Sir  Rowland  Hill  was  at  Roncevalles, 
and  not  a  man  had  moved  from  Wellington's  army. 
Elio  and  Roche  were  near  Valencia  in  a  starving 
condition.  The  Anglo-Sicilian  troops,  only  four- 
teen thousand  strong,  including  Whittingham's  di- 
vision, were  on  thebarren  mountains  above  Hospit- 
alet. where  no  Spanish  army  could  remain  ;  Del  Par- 
que's  troops  and  Sarsfield's  division  had  gone  over 
the  Ebro,  and  Copons'  Catalans  had  taken  refuge  in 
the  mountains  of  Cervera.  In  fine,  not  two  hundred 
thousand,  but  less  than  thirty-five  thousand  men, 
half  organized,  ill-fed,  and  scattered  from  Vich  to 
Yinaroz,  were  opposed  to  Suchet ;  and  their  generals 
had  different  views  and  different  lines  of  operations. 
The  Anglo-Sicilians  could  not  abandon  the  coast ; 
Copons  could  not  abandon  the  mountains.  Del  Par- 
que's  troops  soon  afterwards  marched  to  Navarre, 
and  to  use  lord  Wellington's  phrase,  there  was  no- 
thing to  prevent  Suchet  "tumbling  lord  William 
Bentinck  back  even  to  the  Xucar."  The  true  nature 
of  the  great  insurrection  which  the  French  general 
pretended  to  dread  shall  be  shown  when  the  political 
condition  of  Spain  is  treated  of. 

Suchet's  errors  respecting  the  allies  were  easily 
detected  by  Soult  ;  those  touching  the  French  in 
Catalonia  he  could  not  Fuspect.  and  acquiesced  in 
the  objections  to  his  first  plan  :  but  fertile  of  re- 
source, he  immediately  proposed  another,  akin  to 
that  which  he  had  urged  Joseph  to  adopt  in  1812  af- 
ter the  buttle  of  Salamanca,  namely,  to  change  the 
theatre  of  war.  The  fortresses  in  Spain  would,  he 
said,  inevitably  fall  before  the  allies  in  succession 
if  the  French  armies  remained  on  the  defensive, 
and  the  only  mode  of  rendering  offensive  operations 
Buccessful  was  a  general  concentration  of  means 
and  unity  of  action.  The  levy  of  conscripts  under 
an  imperial  decree,  issued  in  August,  would  furnish, 
in  conjunction  with  *he  depots  of  the  interior,  a 
reinforcement  of  forty  thousand  men.  Ten  tliou^and 
would  form  a  sufficient  corps  of  observation  about 


Gerona.  The  armies  of  Aragon  and  Catalonia 
could,  he  hoped,  by  sacrificing  some  posts  produce 
twenty  thousand  iniiuitry  in  the  field.  The  imperial 
muster-rolls  prove  that  they  could  have  produced 
forty  thousand,  but  Soult,  misled  by  Suchet's  erro- 
neous statements,  assumed  only  twenty  tlicusand, 
and  he  calculated  tliat  he  could  himself  bring  tiiiity- 
five  or  forty  tliousand  good  infantry  and  all  his  cav- 
alry to  a  given  point  of  junction  tor  tlie  two  bodies 
between  Tarbes  and  Pan.  Fifteen  tliousand  of  the 
remaining  conscripts  were  also  to  be  directed  on  that 
place,  and  thus  seventy  or  seventy-five  thousand  in- 
fantry, all  the  cavalry  of  both  armies  and  one  hun- 
dred guns,  would  be  suddenly  assembled,  to  thread 
the  narrow  pass  of  Jaca  and  descend  upon  Aragon. 
Once  in  that  kingdom  they  could  attack  the  allied 
troops  in  Navarre  if  the  latter  were  dispert-ed,  and 
if  they  were  united  retire  upon  Zaragoza,  there  to 
fix  a  solid  base  and  deliver  a  general  battle  upon  the 
new  line  of  operations.  Meanwhile  tlie  filteen  thou- 
sand unappropriated  conscripts  might  reinforce  the 
twenty  or  twenty-five  thousand  old  soldiers  lelt  tr» 
cover  Bayonne. 

An  army  so  great  and  strongly  constituted  ap- 
pearing in  Aragon,  would,  Soult  argued,  necessarily 
raise  the  blockades  of  Pampeluna,  Jaca,  Fraga  and 
Monzon,  the  two  last  being  now  menaced  by  the 
bands,  and  it  was  probable  that  Totosa  ar.d  even 
Saguntum  would  be  relieved.  The  great  difficulty 
was  to  pass  the  guns  by  Jaca,  yet  he  was  resolved 
to  try,  even  though  he  should  convoy  them  upon 
trucks  to  be  made  in  Paris  and  sent  by  post  to  Pau. 
He  anticipated  no  serious  inconvenience  from  the 
union  of  the  troops  in  France,  since  Suchet  had  al- 
ready declared  his  intention  of  retiring  towards  Ge- 
rona ;  and  on  the  Bayonne  side  the  army  to  be  left 
there  could  dispute  tlie  intrenched  line  between 
Cambo  and  St.  Jean  de  Luz.  If  driven  from  thence 
it  could  take  a  flanking  position  behind  tiie  Nive,  the 
right  resting  upon  the  intrenched  camp  of  Bayonne, 
the  left  upon  the  works  at  Cambo,  and  holding  com- 
munication by  the  fortified  mountain  of  Ursouia 
with  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port.  But  there  could  be  lit- 
tle fear  for  this  secondary  force  when  the  great 
army  was  once  in  Aragon.  That  which  he  most 
dreaded  was  delay,  because  a  fall  of  snow,  always  to 
be  expected  after  the  middle  of  October,  would  en- 
tirely close  the  pass  oi"Jaca. 

This  proposition,  written  the  2d  of  September, 
immediately  after  the  battle  of  San  Marcial,  reach- 
ed Suchet  the  11th,  and  was  peremptorily  rejectee!. 
If  he  withdrew  from  Catalonia,  discouragement,  he 
said,  would  spread,  desertion  would  commence,  anrl 
France  be  immediately  invaded  by  lord  William 
Bentinck  at  the  head  of  fifty  thousand  men.  The 
pass  of  Jaca  was  impracticable,  and  the  power  of 
man  could  not  open  it  for  carriages  under  a  year's 
labour.  His  wish  was  to  act  on  tlie  defensive,  but 
if  an  offensive  movement  was  absolutely  necessary, 
he  offered  a  counter  project;  that  is,  he  would  first 
make  the  English  in  his  front  re-embark  at  Tarrago- 
na, or  he  would  drive  them  over  the  Ebro,  and  then 
march  with  one  hundred  guns  and  thirty  tliousand 
men  by  Lerida  to  the  Gallego  river  near  Zaragoza 
Soult's  army,  coming  by  Jaca  without  guns,  might 
there  meet  him,  and  tiie  united  forces  could  then  do 
what  was  fitting.  But  to  effect  this  he  required  a 
reinforcement  of  conscripts,  and  to  have  Paris's  di- 
vision and  the  artillery-men  end  draft  horses  of 
Soult's  army  sent  to  Catalonia  ;  he  demanded  also 
that  two  thousand  bullocks  for  the  subsistence  of 
his  troops  should  be  [irovided  to  meet  him  on  the 
Gal  <go.  Then  touching  ui>on  the  difMculties  of  the 
rot..  '*oin  Sanguesa  to  Pampeluna,  he  declared,  that 


662 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR 


[Book  XXIT. 


after  forcing  Wellington  across  the  Ebro,  he  would 
return  to  Catalonia  to  revictual  his  fortresses  and 
prevent  an  invasion  of  France.  This  plan  he  judg- 
ed far  less  dangerous  than  Soult's,  yet  lie  enlarged 
u|)on  its  difficulties  and  its  dangers  if  the  combined 
movements  were  not  exactly  executed.  In  fine,  he 
continued,  "The  French  armies  are  entangled 
amongst  rocks,  and  the  emperor  should  direct  a  third 
army  upon  iSpain,  to  act  between  the  Pyrenees  and 
the  Ebro  in  the  centre,  whi^e  the  army  of  Spain, 
sixty  thousand  strong,  and  that  of  Aragon,  thirty 
thousand  strong,  operate  on  the  flanks.  Thus  tlie 
reputation  of  the  English  army,  too  easily  acquired 
at  Salamanca  and  Vittoria.  will  be  abated." 

This  illibHjral  remark,  combined  with  the  defects 
of  this  project,  proves  that  the  duke  of  Albufera  was 
far  below  the  duke  of  Dalmatia's  standard  both  in 
magnanimity  and  in  capacity.  The  one  giving  his 
adversary  just  praise,  thought  the  force  already 
supplied  by  the  emperor  sufficient  to  dispute  for 
victory  ;  the  other  with  an  unseemly  boast,  desired 
overwhelming  numbers. 

Soult's  letter  reached  Suchet  the  day  before  the 
combat  of  Ordal,  and  in  pursuance  of  his  own  plan 
he  should  have  driven  lord  William  Bentinck  over 
the  Ebro,  as  he  could  well  have  done,  because  the 
Catalan  troops  there  separated  from  the  Anglo-Sicil- 
ians. In  his  former  letters  he  had  estimated  the 
enemies  in  liis  front  at  two  hundred  thousand  fight- 
ing men,  and  affirmed  that  his  own  disposable  force 
was  only  eleven  thousand,  giving  that  as  a  reason 
why  he  could  not  march  to  Aragon.  Now,  forgetful 
of  his  previous  objections  and  estimates,  he  admit- 
ted that  he  had  thirty  thousand  disposable  troops, 
and  proposed  the  very  movement  which  he  had  re- 
jected as  madness  when  suggested  by  the  duke  of 
Dalmatia.  And  the  futility  of  his  arguments  rela- 
tive to  tiie  general  discouragement,  the  desertion  of 
his  soldiers,  and  the  temptation  to  an  invasion  of 
France  if  he  adopted  Soult's  plan,  is  apparent ;  for 
these  things  could  only  happen  on  the  supposition 
that  he  was  retreating  from  weakness,  a  notion 
which  would  have  effectually  covered  the  real  de- 
sign until  the  great  movement  in  advance  should 
change  tlie  public  opinion.  Soult's  plan  was  surer, 
better  imagined,  and  grander  than  his;  it  was  less 
dangerous  in  the  event  of  failure,  and  more  conform- 
able to  military  principles.  Suchet's  project  involv- 
ed double  lines  of  operation  without  any  sure  com- 
munications, and  consequently  without  any  certain- 
ty of  just  co-operation  ;  his  point  of  junction  was 
within  the  enemy's  power,  and  the  principal  army 
was  to  be  deprived  of  its  artillery.  There  was  no 
solidity  in  this  design;  a  failure  would  have  left  no 
resource.  But  in  Soult's  project  the  armies  were  to 
be  united  at  a  point  beyond  the  enemy's  reach,  and 
to  operats  afterwards  in  mass  with  all  arms  com- 
plete, which  was  conformable  to  the  principles  of 
war.  Suchet,  indeed,  averred  the  impracticability 
of  moving  the  guns  by  .Jaca,  yet  Soult's  counter-opin- 
ion claims  more  respect.  Clauzel  and  Paris,  who  had 
lately  passed  with  troops  through  that  defile,  were  in 
his  camp,  he  had  besides  made  very  exact  inquiries 
of  the  country  people,  had  caused  the  civil  engi- 
neers of  roafis  and  bridges  on  tlie  frontiers  to  exam- 
ine the  route,  and  from  their  reports  he  judged  the 
difficulty  to  be  not  insurmountable. 

Neither  the  inconsistency,  nor  the  exaggeration 
of  Suchet's  statements,  escaped  Soult's  observation  ; 
but  anxious  to  eft'ect  something  while  Pampeluna 
still  held  out,  and  the  season  permitted  operations 
in  the  mountains,  he  frankly  accepted  the  other's 
modification,  and  adopted  every  stipulation,  save 
that  of  sending  the  artillery-men  and  horses  of  his 


army  to  Catalonia,  wh  :.i  he  considered  dangerous. 
Moreover  he  doubted  nci  o  pass  his  own  guns  by 
Jaca.  The  preparations  for  tiiis  great  movement 
were,  therefore,  immediately  commenced;  and  Su- 
chet on  his  part  seemed  equally  earnest,  although  he 
complained  of  increasing  difliculties,  pretended  that 
Longa's  and  Morillo's  divisions  had  arrived  in  Cata- 
lonia, that  general  Graham  was  also  in  march  with 
troops  to  that  quarter,  and  deplored  the  loss  of  Fra- 
ga,  from  whence  the  Empecinado  had  just  driven 
his  garrison.  This  pest  commanded  indeed  a  bridge 
over  the  Cinca,  a  river  lying  in  his  way  and  dangei- 
ous  from  its  sudden  and  great  floods,  but  he  still  pos- 
sessed the  bridge  of  Monzon. 

During  this  correspondence  between  the  French 
marshals.  Napoleon  remained  silent ;  yet  at  a  later 
period  he  expressed  his  discontent  at  Suchet's  inac- 
tivity, and  indirectly  approved  of  Soult's  plans  by 
recommending  a  movement  towards  Zaragoza,  which 
Suchet  however  did  not  execute.  It  would  appear 
that  the  emperor,  having  given  all  the  reinforce- 
ments he  could  spare,  and  full  powers  to  both  mar- 
shals to  act  as  they  judged  fitting  for  his  service 
would  not,  at  a  distance  and  while  engaged  in  such 
vast  operations  as  tliose  he  was  carrying  on  at  Dres- 
den, decide  so  important  a  question.  The  vigorous 
execution  essential  to  success  was  not  to  be  expect- 
ed if  either  marshal  acted  under  constraint  and 
against  his  own  opinion  :  Soult  had  adopted  Suchet's 
modification,  and  it  would  have  been  unwise  to  sub- 
stitute a  new  plan  which  would  have  probably  dis- 
pleased both  commanders.  Meanwhile  Wellington 
passed  the  Bidassoa,  and  Suchet's  project  was  an- 
nulled by  the  approach  of  winter  and  by  the  further 
operations  of  the  allies. 

If  the  plan  of  uniting  the  two  armies  in  Aragon 
had  been  happily  achieved,  it  would  certainly  have 
forced  Wellington  to  repass  the  Ebro  or  tight  a 
great  battle  with  an  army  much  less  strongly  con- 
stituted than  the  French  army.  If  he  chose  the  lat- 
ter, victory  would  have  profited  him  little,  because 
his  enemy,  strong  in  cavalry,  could  have  easily  re- 
tired on  the  fortresses  of  Catalonia.  If  he  received 
a  check  he  must  have  gone  over  the  Ebro,  perhaps 
back  to  Portugal,  and  the  French  would  liave  recov- 
ered Aragon,  Navarre  and  Valencia.  It  is  not  prob- 
able, however,  that  such  a  great  operation  could 
have  been  conducted  without  being  discovered  in 
time  by  Wellington.  It  has  been  already  indicated 
in  this  history,  that  besides  the  ordinary  spies  and 
modes  of  gaining  intelligence  employed  by  aJl  gen- 
erals, he  had  secret  emissaries  amongst  Joseph's 
courtiers,  and  even  amongst  French  officers  of"  rank  ; 
and  it  has  been  sliown  that  Soult  vainly  endeavoured 
to  surprise  him  on  the  yist  of  August,  when  the 
combinations  were  only  two  days  old.  It  is  true 
that  the  retreat  of  Suchet  from  Catalonia,  and  his 
junction  with  Soult  in  France  at  the  moment  when 
Napoleon  was  pressed  in  Germany,  together  with 
the  known  difficulty  of  passing  g\ins  by  Jaca,  would 
naturally  have  led  to  the  belief  tliat  it  was  a  move- 
ment of  retreat  and  fear ;  nevertheless  the  secret 
must  have  been  known  to  more  than  one  person 
about  each  marshal,  and  the  English  general  cer- 
tainly had  agents  who  were  little  sjspected.  Soult 
would  however  still  have  had  the  power  of  returning 
to  his  old  positions,  and  with  his  numbers  increased 
by  Suchet's  troops,  could  have  repeated  his  former 
attack  by  the  Roncevalles,  It  might  be  that  his 
secret  design  viies  thus  to  involve  that  marshal  in 
his  operations,  and  being  disappointed  he  was  not 
very  eager  to  adopt  the  modified  plan  of  the  latter, 
which  tiie  approach  of  the  bad  season,  and  the  men- 
acing position  of  Wellington,  rendered  each  daf 


IS  13.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


663 


less  promising.  His  own  project  was  hardy,  and 
danj^erous  for  the  allies,  and  well  did  it  prove  lord 
Wellington's  profound  acquaintance  with  his  art. 
For  he  had  entered  France  only  in  compliance  with 
the  wishes  of  the  allied  sovereigns,  and  always 
watched  closely  for  Suchet.  avei'ing  that  the  true 
military  line  of  operations  was  towards  Aragon  and 
Catalonia.  Being  now  however  actually  established 
in  France,  and  the  war  in  Germany  having  taken  a 
fevourable  turn  for  the  allies,  he  resolved  to  continue 
the  operations  on  his  actual  front,  awaiting  only  the 

FALL    OF    PAMPELUNA. 

This  event  was  produced  by  a  long  blockade,  less 
fertile  of  incident  than  the  siege  of  San  Sebastian, 
yet  very  honourable  to  the  firmness  of  the  governor, 
general  Cassan. 

The  town,  containing  fifteen  thousand  inhabit- 
ants, stood  on  a  bold  table-land  on  which  a  num- 
ber of  valleys  opened,  and  where  the  great  roads, 
coming  from  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port,  Sanguesa,  Tu- 
dula,  EstsUa,  Vittoria  and  Yrurzun,  were  concen- 
trated. The  northern  and  eastern  fronts  of  the  for- 
tress were  covered  by  the  Arga,  and  the  defences 
tliere  consisted  of  simple  walls  edging  the  perpen- 
dicular rocky  bank  of  the  river,  but  the  other  fronts 
were  regularly  fortified  with  ditches,  covert-way 
and  half-moons.  Two  bad  unfinished  outworks  were 
constructed  on  the  south  front,  but  the  citadel,  which 
stood  on  the  southwest,  was  a  regular  pentagon, 
with  bomb-proofs  and  magazines,  vaulted  barracks 
for  a  thousand  men,  and  a  complete  system  of  mines. 

Pampeluna  had  been  partially  blockaded  by  Mina 
for  eighteen  months  previous  to  the  battle  of  Vit- 
toria, and  when  Joseph  arrived  after  the  action 
the  place  was  badly  provisioned.  The  stragglers  of 
his  army  increased  the  garrison  to  something  more 
tiian  three  thousand  five  hundred  men  of  all  arms, 
who  were  immediately  invested  by  the  allies.  Many 
of  the  inhabitants  went  off"  during  the  short  interval 
between  the  king's  arrival  and  departure,  and  gene- 
ral Cassan,  finding  his  troops  too  lew  for  action,  and 
yet  too  many  for  the  food,  abandoned  the  two  out- 
works on  the  south,  demolished  every  thing  which 
could  interfere  with  his  defence  outside,  and  com- 
menced such  works  as  he  deemed  necessary  to 
improve  it  inside.  Moreover,  foreseeing  that  the 
French  army  might  possibly  make  a  sudden  march 
without  guns  to  succour  the  garrison,  he  prepared  a 
field  train  of  forty  pieces  to  meet  the  occasion. 

It  has  been  already  shown  that  Wellington,  al- 
though at  first  inclined  to  besiege  Pampeluna,  final- 
ly established  a  blockade,  and  ordered  works  of  con- 
travallation  to  be  constructed.  Cassan's  chief  ob- 
ject was  then  to  obtain  provisions,  and  on  the  28th 
and  .30th  of  June  he  sustained  actions  outside  the 
place  to  cover  his  foragers.  On  the  1st  of  July  he 
burned  the  suburb  of  Madalina,  beyond  the  river 
Arga,  and  forced  many  inhabitants  to  quit  the  place 
before  the  blockaders'  works  were  completed.  Skirm- 
ishes now  occurred  almost  daily,  the  French  always 
seeking  to  gather  the  grain  and  vegetables  which 
were  ripe  and  abundant  beyond  the  walls,  and  the 
allies  endeavouring  to  set  fire  to  the  standing  corn 
within  range  of  the  guns  of  the  fortress. 

On  the  14th  of  July,  O'Donel's  Andalusians  were 
permanently  established  as  the  blockading  force, 
and  the  next  day  the  garrison  made  a  successful 
forage  on  the  south  side  of  the  town.  This  opera- 
tion was  repeated  towards  the  east  beyond  the  Arga 
on  the  19th,  when  a  sharp  engagement  of  cavalry 
took  place,  during  which  the  remainder  of  the  gar- 
rison carried  away  a  great  deal  of  corn. 

The  26th,  the  sound  of  Soult's  artillery  reached 


the  place,  and  Cassan,  judging  rigl  tly  that  the  mar- 
shal was  in  march  to  succour  Pampeluna,  made  a 
sally  in  the  night  by  the  lloncevalles  road  ;  he  was 
driven  back,  but  tiie  next  morning  he  came  oul 
again  with  eleven  hundred  men  and  two  guns,  over- 
threw the  Spanish  outguards,  and  advanced  towards 
Villalba  at  the  moment  when  Picton  was  fulling 
back  with  the  third  and  fourth  divisions.  Theu 
O'Donel,  as  I  have  before  related,  evacuated  some 
of  the  intrenchments,  destroyed  a  great  deal  of  am- 
munition, spiked  a  number  of  guns,  and  but  for  the 
timely  arrival  of  Carlos  d'Espaua's  division,  and  the 
stand  made  by  Picton  at  Huarte,  would  have  aban- 
doned the  blockade  altogether. 

Soon  the  battle  on  the  mountains  of  Oricain  com 
menced,  the  smoke  rose  over  the  intervening  heights 
of  Escava  and  San  Aliguel,  the  French  cavalry  ap- 
peared on  the  slopes  above  El  Cano,  and  the  bag- 
gage of  the  allies  was  seen  filing  in  the  opposite 
direction  by  Berioplano  along  the  road  of  Yrurzun. 
The  garrison  thought  deliverance  sure,  and  having 
reaped  a  good  harvest  withdrew  into  the  place.  The 
bivouac  fires  of  the  French  army  cheered  them  du- 
ring the  night,  and  the  next  morning  a  fresh  sally 
being  made  with  the  greatest  confidence,  a  great 
deal  of  corn  was  gathered  v/ith  little  loss  of  men. 
Several  deserters  from  the  foreign  regiments  in  the 
English  service  also  came  over  with  intelligence 
exaggerated  and  coloured  after  the  manner  of  such 
men,  and  the  French  re-entered  the  place  elated  with 
hope  ;  but  in  the  evening  the  sound  of  the  conflict 
ceased,  and  the  silence  of  the  next  day  showed  that 
the  battle  was  not  to  the  advantage  of  Soult.  How- 
ever the  governor,  losing  no  time,  made  another 
sally,  and  again  obtained  provisions  from  the  south 
side. 

The  30th,  the  battle  recommenced,  but  the  re 
treating  fire  of  the  French  told  how  the  conflict  waa 
decided,  and  the  spirit  of  the  soldiers  fell.  Never- 
theless their  indefatigable  officers  led  another  sally 
on  the  south  side,  v/hence  they  carried  off' grain  and 
some  ammunition  which  had  been  left  in  one  of  the 
abandoned  outworks. 

On  the  31st,  Carlos  d'Espana's  troops  and  two 
thousand  of  O'Donel's  Andalusians,  in  all  about 
seven  thousand  men,  resumed  the  blockade,  and 
maintained  it  until  the  middle  of  September,  when 
the  prince  of  Anglona's  division  of  Del  Parque's 
army  relieved  the  Andalusians,  who  rejoined  their 
own  corps  near  Echallar.  The  allies'  works  of  con- 
travallation  were  now  augmented,  and  when  Paris 
retired  into  France  from  Jaca,  part  of  Mina's  troops 
occupied  the  valleys  leading  from  the  side  of  San- 
guesa to  Pampeluna,  and  made  intrenchments  to  bar 
the  escape  of  the  garrison  that  way. 

In  September,  Cassan  put  his  fighting  men  upon 
rations  of  horse-flesh,  four  ounces  to  each,  with 
some  rice,  and  he  turned  more  families  out  of  tlie 
town,  but  this  time  they  were  fired  upon  by  their 
countrymen  and  forced  to  re-enter. 

On  the  9th  of  September,  baron  Maucune,  who 
had  conducted  most  of  the  sallies  during  the  block- 
ade, attacked  and  carried  some  fortified  houses  on  the 
east  side  of  the  place  ;  he  was  immediately  assailed 
by  the  Spanish  cavalry,  but  he  beat  them  and  pur- 
sued  the  fugitives  close  to  Villalba.  ('arlos  d'Es- 
pana  then  advanced  to  their  aid  in  person  with  a 
greater  body,  and  the  French  were  driven  in  with 
the  loss  of  eighty  men  ;  yet  the  Spaniards  lost  a  far 
greater  number, Carlosd'Espafia  hinjself  wns  wound- 
ed, and  the  garrison  obtained  some  corn,  which  was 
their  princijial  object. 

The  soldiers  were  now  feeding  on  rats  and  other 
disgusting  animals ;  seeking  also  for  roots  beyool 


664 


NAPIER'S    PENINSUrilAR   WAR. 


[Book  XXII. 


the  walls,  many  in  their  hung^er  poisoned  them- 
selves with  hemlock,  and  a  number  of  others  unable 
,o  bear  their  misery  deserted.  In  tliis  state  Cassan 
made  a  general  sally  on  tiie  lOth  of  October,  to  as- 
certain the  strength  of  the  lines  nround  him,  with  a 
view  to  breaking  through,  but  after  some  righting, 
his  troops  were  driven  in  with  the  loss  of  seventy 
nj<?r.,  and  all  hope  of  escape  vanished.  Yet  he  still 
spoke  of  attempting  it,  and  the  public  manner  in 
which  he  increased  the  mines  under  the  citadel 
induced  Wellington  to  reinforce  the  blockade,  and 
to  bring  up  -his  cavalry  into  the  vicinity  of  Pampe- 

The  scurvy  now  invaded  the  garrison.  One  thou- 
sand men  were  sick,  eiglit  hundred  had  been  wound- 
ed, the  deaths  by  battle  and  disease  exceeded  four 
hundred,  one  hundred  and  twenty  had  deserted,  and 
the  governor,  moved  by  the  great  misery,  offered  on 
the  26th  to  surrender  if  he  was  allowed  to  retire 
into  France  witii  his  troops  and  six  pieces  of  can- 
non. Tiiis  being  refused,  he  proposed  to  yield  on 
condition  of  not  serving  for  a  year  and  a  day,  which 
being  also  denied,  he  broke  off  the  negotiation,  giv- 
ing out  that  he  would  blow  up  the  works  of  the  for 
tress  and  break  through  the  blockade.  To  deter 
him  a  menacing  letter  was  thrown  to  his  outposts: 
and  lord  Wellington,  being  informed  of  his  design, 
denounced  it  as  contrary  to  the  laws  of  war,  and 
directed  Carlos  d'Espana  to  put  him,  all  his  officers 
and  non-commissioned  officers,  and  a  tenth  of  the 
soldiers,  to  death,  when  the  place  should  be  taken, 
if  any  damage  were  done  to  the  works. 

Cassan's  object  being  merely  to  obtain  better 
terms,  this  order  remained  dormant,  and  happily  so, 
for  the  execution  would  never  have  borne  the  test 
of  public  opinion.  To  destroy  the  works  of  Pampe- 
Jiina  and  break  through  the  blockading  force,  as 
Brenier  did  at  Almeida,  would  have  been  a  very 
noble  exploit,  and  a  useful  one  for  the  French  army, 
if  Soult's  plan  of  changing  the  theatre  of  war  by  de- 
scending into  Aragon  had  been  followed.  There 
could  therefore  be  nothing  contrary  to  the  laws  of 
war  in  a  resolute  action  of  that  nature.  On  the 
other  hand,  if  the  governor,  having  no  chance  what- 
ever of  success,  made  a  hopeless  attempt  the  pre- 
tence for  destroying  a  great  fortress  belonging  to 
the  Spaniards  and  depriving  the  allies  of  the  fruits 
of  their  long  blockade  and  glorious  battles,  the  con- 
querors miglit  have  justly  exercised  that  severe  but 
undoubted  rigiit  of  war,  refusing  quarter  to  an  en- 
emy. But  lord  VV^ellington's  letter  to  Espana  in- 
volved another  question,  namely,  the  putting  of 
prisoners  to  death.  For  the  soldiers  could  not  be 
decimated  until  captured,  and  their  crime  would 
have  been  only  obedience  to  orders  in  a  matter  of 
which  they  dared  not  judge.  This  would  have  been 
quite  contrary  to  the  usages  of  civilized  nations, 
and  the  threat  must  undoubtedly  be  considered  only 
as  a  device  to  save  the  works  of  Pampeluna  and  to 
avoid  the  odium  of  refusing  quarter. 

A  few  days  longer  the  governor  and  garrison  en- 
dured their  distress,  and  then  capitulated,  having 
defended  themselves  more  than  four  months  with 
jjreat  constancy.  The  officers  and  soldiers  became 
prisoners  of  war.  The  first  were  allowed  to  keep 
their  arms  and  baggage,  the  second  their  knapsacks, 
expressly  on  tl)e  ground  that  they  had  treated  tlie 
inhabitants  well  during  the  investment.  This  com- 
pliment was  honourat)le  to  both  sides ;  but  there 
was  another  article,  enforced  by  Espana,  without 
being  accepted  by  the  garrison,  for  which  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  assign  any  motive  but  the  vindictive  feroci- 
ty of  the  Spanish  character.  No  person  of  eitiior 
•tjx  was  permitted  to  follow  the  French  troops,  and 


women's   affections  were   thus  barbarously  brough', 
under  the  action  of  the  sword. 

There  was  no  stronghold  now  retained  by  the 
French  in  the  north  of  Spain  except  Santona,  and 
as  tiie  blockade  of  that  place  had  been  exceedingly 
tedious,  lord  Wellington,  whose  sea  communica- 
tions were  interrupted  by  the  privateers  from  thence, 
formed  a  small  Britisli  corps  under  lord  Aylmer 
with  a  view  to  attack  Laredo,  which  being  on  the 
opposite  point  of  the  harbour  to  Santona  command- 
ed the  anchorage.  Accidental  circumstances  how- 
ever prevented  this  body  from  proceeding  to  its  des- 
tination, and  Santona  remained  in  the  enemy's  pos- 
session. With  this  exception  tlie  contest  in  the 
northern  parts  of  Spain  was  terminated,  and  the 
south  of  France  was  now  to  be  invaded  ;  but  it  is 
fitting  first  to  show  with  what  great  political  labour 
Wellington  brought  the  war  to  this  state,  what 
contemptible  actions  and  sentiments,  wliat  a  faith- 
less alliance,  and  what  vile  governments  his  daz- 
zling glory  hid  from  the  sight  of  the  world 


CHAPTER  VI. 

Political  stale  of  Portugal — Violence,  ingratitude  and  folly  of 
the  government  of  liial  country — Foliliial  stiite  of  Sfia'in — 
Various  factions  described,  llieir  violtuce,  insolen(  e  and 
foil}- — Scandalous  scenes  at  Cadiz — Stveial  Spanisli  gi  rie.- 
lals  desire  a  revolution — Lord  Wellington  describes  the 
miserable  state  of  the  couiitiy  —  Aiiticifiates  the  necessitj-  >f 
pntliiig  down  the  cortez  by  force — Ri  signs  his  coniniand  cf 
the  Spanish  armies — The  English  ministers  piOfiose  to  re- 
move hirn  to  Germany — 'I'lie  new  cort»z  reinstate  Idni  as 
generalissimo  on  liis  own  terms — He  exfirejves  leais  that 
the  cause  will  finally  fail,  and  advises  the  English  ministers 
to  withdraw  tlie  British  army. 
^' 
POLITICAL    STATE    OF    PORTUGAL. 

In  this  country  the  national  jealousy,  which  had 
been  compressed  by  the  force  of  invasion,  expanded 
again  with  violence  as  danger  receded,  and  the  in- 
fluence of  England  sunk  precisely  in  the  mensure 
that  her  army  assured  the  safety  of  Portugal.  W  hen 
Wellington  crossed  the  Ebro,  the  Souza  faction, 
always  opposed  in  the  council  to  the  British  policy,, 
became  elate  ;  and  those  members  of  tlie  govern- 
ment who  had  hitherto  cherished  the  British  ascen- 
dency because  it  sustained  them  against  the  Brazil- 
ian court  intrigues,  now  sought  popularity  by  taking 
an  opposite  direction.  Each  person  of  tl'.e  regency 
had  his  own  line  of  opposition  marked  out.  Ko- 
guera  vexatiously  resisted  or  suspended  commer- 
cial and  financial  operations;  the  principal,  Souza, 
wrangled  more  fiercely  and  insolently  at  the  council- 
board  ;  the  pntriarch  fomented  ill-will  at  Lisbon 
and  in  the  northern  provinces;  Forjns,  ambitious  to 
command  the  nh.*ional  troops,  became  the  orgcn  of 
discontent  upon  military  matters.  The  return  of 
the  prince  regent,  the  treaty  of  commerce,  the  Op- 
orto company,  the  privileges  of  the  British  factory 
merchants,  tiie  mode  of  paying  tlie  subsidy,  the 
means  of  military  transport,  tlie  convention  with 
Spain  relative  to  the  supply  of  the  Portuguese 
troops  in  that  country,  tlie  recruiting,  the  organiza- 
tion,  the  command  of  the  national  army,  and  the 
honours  due  to  it.  all  furnislied  occosionn  for  factious 
proceedings,  which  were  conducted  with  the  igno- 
ble subtlety  that  invariably  characterizes  the  poli- 
tics of  the  Peninsula.  Moreover  tlie  expenditure  of 
the  British  army  had  been  immense,  the  trade  and 
commerce  dependent  upon  it,  now  removed  to  the 
Spanish  ports,  enormous.  Portugal  had  lived  upon 
England.  Her  internal  taxes,  carelessly  or  partial- 
ly enforced,  were  vexatious  to  the  paevlc  withou* 


1813  J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


6(15 


lioing^  profitablG  to  the  government.  Nine-tcnihs  of 
tne  revenue  accrued  from  duties  upon  British  trade, 
and  the  sudden  cessation  of  markets  and  of  emiiloy- 
ment,  the  absence  of  ready  money,  the  loss  of  prolit, 
public  and  private,  occasioned  by  the  departure  of 
the  army,  \v)iile  the  contributions  and  other  exac- 
tions remained  the  same,  galled  all  classes,  and  the 
whole  nation  was  ready  to  siiake  off  the  burden  of 
gratitude. 

In  this  state  of  feeling  emissaries  were  employed 
to  promulgate  in  various  directions  tales,  some  true, 
some  false,  of  the  disorders  perpetrated  by  the  mili- 
tary detachments  on  the  lines  of  communication, 
adding  tliat  tliey  w^ere  the  result  of  secret  orders 
from  Wellington  to  satisfy  his  personal  hatred  of 
Portugal  !  At  the  same  time  discourses  and  wri- 
tings against  the  British  influence  abounded  in  Lis- 
bon and  at  Rio  Janeiro,  and  were  re-echoed  or  sur- 
passed by  the  London  newspapers,  whose  state- 
ments, overflowing  of  falsehood,  could  be  trnced  to 
the  Portuguese  embassy  in  that  capital.  It  was 
asserted  that  England,  intending  to  retain  her  pow- 
er in  Portugal,  opposed  the  return  of  the  prince  re- 
gent;  that  the  war  itself  being  removed  to  the  fron- 
tier of  France  was  become  wholly  a  Spanish  cause  ; 
that  it  was  not  for  Portugal  to  levy  troops,  and  ex- 
haust her  resources,  to  help  a  nation  wliose  aggres- 
sions she  must  be  called  upon  sooner  or  later  to 
resist. 

iMr  Stuart's  diplomatic  intercourse  with  the  gov- 
ernment, alwavs  difficult,  was  now  a  continual  re- 
monstrance and  dispute  ;  his  complaints  were  met 
with  insolence  or  subterfuge,  and  illegal  violence 
against  tiie  persons  and  property  of  British  subjects 
was  pushed  so  far,  that  Mr.  Sioane,  an  English  gen- 
tleman upon  whon"  no  suspicion  rested,  was  cast 
into  prison  for  three  months  because  he  had  come 
to  Lisbon  witliout  a  passport.  The  rights  of  the 
English  factory  were  invaded,  and  the  Ojjorto  com- 
pany, which  had  been  established  as  its  rival  in 
violation  of  treaty,  was  openly  cherished.  Irrespon- 
sible and  rapacious,  this  pernicious  company  rob- 
bed every  body  ;  and  the  prince  regent,  i)rom!sing 
either  to  reform  or  totally  abolish  it,  ordered  a  pre- 
paratory investigation,  but  to  use  the  words  of  Mr. 
Stuart,  the  regency  acted  on  the  occasion  no  less 
unfairly  by  tlieir  sovereign  than  unjustly  by  their 
ally. 

Especial  privileges  claimed  by  the  factory  mer- 
chants were  another  cause  of  disquiet.  They  pre- 
tended to  exemption  from  certain  taxes,  and  from 
billets,  and  that  a  fixed  number  of  their  clerks,  do- 
HK^stics  and  cattle  should  be  exonerated  of  military 
service.  These  pretensions  were  disputed.  The 
one  touching  servants  and  cattle,  doubtful  at  best, 
had  been  grossly  abused,  and  that  relating  to  billets 
unfounded  ;  but  the  taxes  were  justly  resisted,  and 
the  merchants  offered  a  voluntary  contribution  to 
the  same  amount.  The  government  rudely  refused 
this  offer,  seized  their  property,  imprisoned  their 
persons,  impressed  their  cattle  to  transport  supplies 
that  never  reached  the  troops,  and  made  soldiers  of 
their  clerks  and  servants  without  any  intention  of 
reinforcing  tlie  army.  Mr.  Stuart  immediately  de- 
ducted from  the  subsidy  the  amount  of  the  property 
thus  forcibly  taken,  and  repaid  tlie  suflerers.  Tlie 
regency  then  commenced  a  dispute  upon  the  fourth 
article  of  the  treaty  of  commerce ;  and  the  prince, 
though  he  openly  ordered  it  to  be  executed,  secretly 
permitted  count  Funchal.  his  prime  minister,  to  re- 
main in  London  as  ambassador  until  the  disputes 
arising  upon  tiiis  treaty  generally  were  arranged. 
Funchal,  who  disliked  to  quit  London,  took  care  to 
interpose  many  obstacles  to  a  tinal  decision,  always 


advising  delay  under  pretence  of  rcndei..!g  ultmiato 
concession  of  value  in  other  negotiations  then  dfi- 
pending. 

When  the  battle  of  Vittoria  became  known,  tho 
regency  proposed  to  entreat  the  return  of  the  i^rince 
from  the  Brazils,  hoping  tiiereby  to  excite  the  oppo- 
sition of  Mr.  Stuart;  but  when  he,  contrary  to  their 
exi)ectations,  a[)proved  of  the  jjroposal,  they  deferred 
the  execution.  The  British  cabinet,  which  iiad  long 
neglected  Wellington's  suggestions  on  this  head, 
then  pressed  the  matter  at  Uio  Janeiro  ;  and  Fun- 
chal, who  had  been  at  first  averse,  now  urged  it 
warmly,  fearing  that  if  the  prince  remained  he  could 
no  longer  defer  going  to  the  Brazils.  However  few 
of  the  Portuguese  nobles  desired  the  return  of  tho 
royal  family,  and  when  the  thing  was  proposed  to 
the  regent  he  discovered  no  inclination  for  the 
voyage 

But  the  most  important  subject  of  discord  was  the 
army.  The  absence  of  the  sovereign  and  the  in- 
trigues which  ruled  the  court  of  Rio  Janeiro  had 
virtually  rendered  the  government  at  Lisbon  an  oli- 
garchy without  a  leader,  in  other  wor(is,  a  govern- 
ment formed  for  mischief.  The  whole  course  of 
this  history  has  shown  that  all  Wellington's  energy 
and  ability,  aided  by  the  sagacity  and  firmness  of 
Mr.  Stuart  and  by  the  influence  of  England's  power 
and  riches,  were  scarcely  sufficient  to  meet  the  evils 
flowing  from  this  foul  source.  Even  while  the 
French  armies  were  menacing  the  capital,  the  re- 
gency was  split  into  factions, the  financial  resources 
were  neglected  or  wasted,  tiie  public  servants  were 
insolent,  incapable  and  corrupt,  the  poorer  people 
oppressed,  and  the  military  force  for  wnnt  of  suste- 
nance was  at  the  end  of  1812  on  the  point  of  dissolv- 
ing altogether.  The  strenuous  interference  of  the 
English  general  and  envoy,  secon<led  by  the  extraor- 
dinary exertions  of  the  British  officers  in  tlie  Portu- 
guese service,  restored  indeed  tiie  efficiency  of  ihe 
army,  and  in  the  campaign  of  1813  the  spirit  of  the 
troops  was  surpassing.  Even  the  militia-men,  who 
had  been  deprived  of  their  colours  and  drafted  into 
the  line  to  punish  their  conduct  at  Guarda  under 
general  Trant  in  181'2,  nobly  regained  their  stand- 
ards on  the  Pyrenees. 

But  this  state  of  affairs,  acting  upon  the  naturally 
sanguine  temperament  and  vanity  of  the  Portu- 
guese, created  a  very  exaggerated  notion  of  their 
military  prowess  and  importance,  and  withal  a  mor- 
bid sensitiveness  to  praise  or  neglect.  General  Pic- 
ton  had  thrown  some  slur  upon  the  conduct  of  a  reg- 
iment at  Vittoria,  and  marshal  Bcresfbrd  complained 
tliat  fiill  justice  had  not  been  done  to  their  merits. 
The  eulogiums  passed  in  the  English  parliament  and 
in  the  despatches  upon  the  conduct  of  tiie  British 
and  Spanish  troops,  but  not  extended  to  tiie  Portu- 
guese, galled  the  whole  nation,  and  the  remarks  and 
omissions  of  the  London  newspapers  were  as  worm- 
wood. 

Meanwhile  the  regency,  under  pretext  of  a  dis- 
pute with  .Spain  relative  to  a  breach  of  the  military 
convention  of  supply,  neglected  the  subsistence  of 
the  army  altogether;  and  at  the  same  time  so  many 
obstacles  to  the  recruiting  were  raised,  that  the  de- 
pots, which  ought  to  have  furnished  twelve  thousand 
men  to  replace  the  losses  sustained  in  the  campaign, 
only  contain  •(!  fimr  thousand,  who  were  also  without 
the  means  of  tiiking  the  field.  'I'his  matter  be(  ame 
BO  serious  thit  Beresford,  quitting  the  army  in  Octo- 
ber, came  lo  Lisbon,  to  propose  a  new  regulation 
wiiicli  should  disregard  the  exemptions  claimed  by 
the  nobles,  the  clergy  and  the  English  merchants 
for  their  servnnts  and  followers.  On  his  arrival 
V:.rjr«.s  urged  the  public  discontent  at  the  political 


066 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


[IJOOK    XXII. 


posii'on  of  the  Portuguese  troops.  They  were,  he 
Baid,  general]}'  incorporated  with  the  Britisli  divis- 
ions, commanded  by  British  officers,  and  having  no 
distinct  recognized  existence  their  services  were  un- 
noticed and  the  glory  of  the  country  suffered.  Tiie 
world  at  large  knew  not  how  many  men  Portugal 
furnished  for  the  war.  It  was  tSnown  indeed  that 
tliere  were  Portuguese  soldiers,  as  it  was  known 
that  there  were  Brunswickers  and  Hanoverians, 
but  as  a  national  army  notliing  was  known  of 
Jiem  :  their  exertions,  their  courage,  only  went  to 
swell  the  general  triumph  of  England,  while  the 
''jpaniards,  inferior  in  numbers,  and  far  inferior  in  all 
military  qualities,  were  flattered,  praised,  thanked 
in  the  public  despatches,  in  the  English  newspapers, 
and  in  the  discourses  and  votes  of  the  British  par- 
liament. He  proposed  therefore  to  have  the  Portu- 
guese formed  into  a  distinct  army  acting  under  lord 
Wellington. 

It  was  objected  that  the  brigades  incorporated 
with  the  British  divisions  were  fed  by  the  British 
commissariat,  the  cost  being  deducted  from  the  sub- 
sidy, an  advantage  the  loss  of  which  the  Portuguese 
could  not  sustain.  Forjas  rtjoinsd  that  they  could 
feed  their  own  troops  cheaper  if  the  subsidy  was 
paid  in  money;  but  J3eresford  referred  him  to  his 
scanty  means  of  transport,  so  scanty  that  the  few 
stores  they  were  then  bound  to  furnish  for  the  unat- 
tached brigades  depending  upon  the  Portuguese 
coflimissariat  v/ere  not  forwarded.  Foiled  on  this 
point,  Forjas  proposed  gradually  to  withdraw  the 
bast  brigades  from  the  English  divisions,  to  incor- 
porate them  with  the  unattached  brigades  of  native 
troops,  and  so  form  an  auxiliary  corps ;  but  the  same 
objection  of  transport  still  applied,  and  this  matter 
dropped  for  the  moment.  The  regency  then  agreed 
to  reduce  the  legal  age  of  men  liable  to  the  conscrip- 
tion for  the  army  ;  but  the  islands,  which  ought  to 
have  given  three  hundred  men  yearly,  were  exempt 
from  their  controul.  and  the  governors,  supported  by 
the  prince  regent,  refused  to  permit  any  levies  in 
their  jurisdictions,  and  even  granted  asylums  to  all 
those  who  wished  to  avoid  the  levy  in  Portugal. 
In  the  islands  also  the  persons  so  unjustly  and  cru- 
elly imprisoned  in  1810  were  still  kept  in  durance, 
although  the  regency,  yielding  to  the  persevering 
rsmonstrances  of  Mr.  Stuart  and  lord  Wellington, 
had  released  those  at  Lisbon. 

Soon  after  this  Beresford  desired  to  go  to  England, 
and  the  occasion  was  seized  by  Forjas  to  renew  his 
complaints  and  his  proposition  for  a  separate  army, 
which  he  designed  to  command  himself.  General 
Sylveira's  claim  to  that  honour  was  however  sup- 
ported by  the  Souzas,  to  whose  faction  he  belonged, 
and  the  only  matter  in  which  all  agreed  was  the  dis- 
play of  ill-will  towards  ICngland.  Lord  Wellington 
bacame  indignant.  The  English  newspapers,  he 
said,  did  much  mischief  by  their  assertions,  but  he 
never  suspected  they  could  by  their  omissions  alien- 
ate the  Portuguese  nation  and  government.  The 
latter  complained  that  their  troops  were  not  praised 
in  parliament,  nothing  could  be  more  different  from 
a.  debate  within  the  house  than  the  representation  of 
it  in  the  newspapers.  The  latter  seldom  stated  an 
event  or  transaction  as  it  really  occurred,  unless  when 
they  absolutely  copied  what  was  written  for  them  ; 
and  even  then  tlieir  observations  branched  out  so  far 
from  the  text,  tliat  thoy  appeared  absolutely  incapa- 
ble of  understanding,  much  less  of  stating  the  truth 
upon  any  subject.  The  Portuguese  peo()le  should 
thnrefRre  be  cautious  of  taking  English  newspapers 
UB  a  test  of  the  estimation  in  which  the  Portuguese 
army  was  held  in  I'^ngland,  where  its  character  stood 
high  and  was  rising  daily.     "  Mr.  Forjas  is,"  said 


lord  Wellington,  "  the  ablest  man  of  oiisiness  I  .lave 
met  with  in  the  Peninsula  ;  it  is  to  be  hujicd  he  will 
not  on  such  grounds  have  the  folly  to  alter  a  success- 
ful military  system.  I  understand  something  of  the 
organization  and  feeding  of  troops,  and  ]  assure  hiin 
that,  sej)arated  from  the  British,  the  Portuguese 
army  could  not  keep  the  field  in  a  guod  state,  although 
their  government  were  to  incur  ten  tir.ies  the  ex- 
pense under  the  actual  system  ;  and  if  they  are  not  in 
a  fitting  state  for  the  field,  they  can  gain  Jio  honour, 
they  must  suffer  dishonour!  The  vexatious  disputes 
vvitii  Spain  are  increasing  daily,  and  if  the  omissiona 
or  assertions  of  newspapers  are  to  be  the  causes  of 
disagreement  with  the  Portuguese  I  will  quit  the 
Peninsula  for  ever!" 

This  remonstrance  being  read  to  the  regency,  For- 
jas replied  oflicially  : 

"  The  Portuguese  government  demanded  nothing 
unreasonable.  The  happy  campaign  of  1813  was 
not  to  make  it  heedless  of  sacrifices  beyond  its  means 
It  had  a  right  to  expect  greater  exertions  from  Spain, 
which  was  more  interested  than  Portugal  in  the  ac- 
tual operations,  since  the  safety  of  the  latter  was 
obtained.  Portugal  only  wanted  a  solid  peace  ;  she 
did  not  expect  increase  of  territory,  nor  any  advan- 
tage save  the  consideration  and  influence  which  the 
services  and  gallantry  of  her  troops  would  give  her 
amongst  European  nations,  and  which,  unhappily, 
she  would  probably  require  in  her  future  intercourse 
with  Spain.  The  English  prince  regent,  his  minis- 
ters and  his  generals,  had  rendered  full  justice  to  her 
military  services  in  the  ofBcial  reports,  but  that  did 
not  suflice  to  give  them  weight  in  Europe.  Official 
reports  did  not  remove  this  inconvenience.  It  was 
only  the  public  expressions  of  the  English  prince 
and  his  ministers  that  could  do  justice.  The  Portu- 
guese army  was  commanded  by  marshal  Beresford 
marquis  of  Campo  Mayor.  It  ought  always  to  be  so 
considered  and  thanked  accordingly  for  its  exploits, 
and  with  as  much  form  and  solemnity  by  the  English 
parliament  and  general  as  was  used  towards  the 
Spanish  army.  The  more  so  that  the  Portuguese 
had  sacriflced  their  national  pride  to  the  common 
good,  whereas  the  Spanish  pride  had  retarded  the 
success  of  the  cause  and  the  liberty  of  Europe.  It 
was  necessary  also  to  form  good  native  generals  to 
be  of  use  atler  the  war  ;  but  putting  that  question 
aside,  it  was  only  demanded  to  have  the  divisions 
separated  by  degrees  and  given  to  Portuguese  ofM- 
cers.  Nevertheless  such  grave  objections  being  ad- 
vanced, they  were  willing,  he  said,  to  drop  the  mat- 
ter altogether." 

The  discontent  however  remained,  for  the  argu- 
ment had  weight,  and  if  any  native  officer's  rejiuta- 
tion  had  been  suflicient  to  make  the  proceeding  plau- 
sible, the  British  officers  would  have  been  driven 
from  the  Portuguese  service,  the  armies  teparated, 
and  both  ruined.  As  it  was,  the  regency  terminated 
the  discussion  from  inability  to  succeed  ;  from  fear, 
not  from  reason.  The  persons  who  pretended  to  the 
command  were  Forjas  and  Sylveira  ;  but  the  English 
officers,  who  were  as  yet  well  liked  by  the  troops 
would  not  have  served  under  the  former;  and  Wel- 
lington objected  strongly  to  the  latter,  having  by  ex- 
perience discovered  that  he  was  an  incapable  ollicer, 
seeking  a  base  and  pernicious  popularity  by  encour- 
aging tlie  views  of  the  soldiers.  Bereslbrd  then  re- 
linquished his  intention  of  going  to  England,  and 
the  justice  of  the  complaint  relative  to  the  reputa- 
tion of  the  Portuguese  army  being  obvious,  the  gen- 
eral orders  became  more  marked  in  favour  of  the 
troops.  But  the  most  efl(3ctual  check  to  the  project 
of  tiie  regency  was  the  significant  intimation  of  JMr. 
Stuart,  that  England  being  bound  hj  no  conditiona 


1813.1 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


667 


in  the  payment  of  tlie  subsidy,  had  a  right,  if  it  was 
not  applied  in  the  manner  most  agreeable  to  lier,  to 
wilhdraw  it  altogether. 

To  have  this  subsidy  in  specie  and  to  supply  their 
own  troops  continued  to  be  tiie  cry  of  tiie  regency, 
until  their  inability  to  ellect  tlie  latter  became  at 
last  KO  apparent  that  they  gave  the  matter  up  in  des- 
pair Indeed  Forjas  was  too  able  a  man  ever  to  have 
Buppot-ed  that  the  badly  organized  administration  o*" 
Portugal  was  capable  of  supi)orting  an  etlicient  army 
in  tlie  field  rive  hundred  miles  from  its  own  country  ; 
the  real  object  was  to  shake  off  the  British  infiuence 
if  possible  without  losing  the  subsidy.  For  the  hon- 
our of  the  army  or  the  welfare  of  tlic  soldiers  nei- 
ther the  regency  nor  the  prince  himself  had  any  care. 
While  the  former  were  thus  disputing  for  the  com- 
mand, they  suffered  their  subordinates  to  ruin  an 
establishment  at  Runa,  the  only  asylum  in  Portugal 
for  mutilated  soldiers,  and  turned  the  helpless  vete- 
rans adrift.  And  the  prince,  while  he  lavished  hon- 
ours upon  the  dependents  and  creatures  of  his  court 
at  Rio  Janeiro,  placed  those  officers  whose  fidelity 
and  hard  righting  had  preserved  his  throne  in  Portu- 
gal at  the  bottom  of  the  list,  amongst  the  menial 
eervants  of  the  palace  who  were  decorated  with  the 
same  ribands  !  Honour,  justice,  humanity,  were 
alike  despised  by  the  ruling  men,  and  lord  Welling- 
ton thus  expressed  his  strong  disgust: 

"  The  British  army  which  I  have  the  honour  to 
command  has  met  with  nothing  but  ingratitude  from 
the  government  and  authorities  in  Portugal  for  their 
services;  every  thing  that  could  be  done  has  been 
done  by  the  civil  authorities  lately  to  oppress  the 
officers  and  soldiers  on  every  occasion  in  which  it 
has  by  any  accident  been  in  their  power.  I  hope 
however  that  we  have  seen  the  last  of  Portugal !'' 

Such  were  the  relations  of  the  Portuguese  govern- 
ment with  England,  and  with  Spain  they  were  not 
more  friendly.  Seven  envoys  from  that  country  had 
succeeded  each  other  at  Lisbon  in  three  years.  The 
Portuguese  regency  dreaded  the  democratic  opinions 
which  had  obtained  ground  in  Spain,  and  the  leading 
party  in  the  cortez  were  intent  to  spread  those  opin- 
ions over  the  whole  Peninsula.  The  only  bond  of 
symnathy  between  the  two  governments  was  hatred 
of  the  English,  who  had  saved  both.  On  all  other 
points  they  differed.  The  exiled  bishop  of  Orense, 
from  his  asylum  on  the  frontier  of  Portugal,  excited 
the  Gallicians  against  the  cortez  so  vigorously,  that 
his  expulsion  from  Portugal,  or  at  least  his  removal 
from  the  northern  frontier,  was  specially  demanded 
by  the  Spanish  minister;  but  though  a  long  and  an- 
gry discussion  followed,  the  bishop  was  only  civilly 
requested  by  the  Portuguese  government  to  abstain 
from  acts  disagreeable  to  the  Spanish  regency.  The 
latter  then  demanded  that  he  should  be  delivered  up 
as  a  delinquent,  whereupon  the  Portuguese  quoted  a 
decree  of  the  cortez  which  deprived  the  bishop  of 
his  rights  as  a  Spanish  citizen  and  denaturalized 
him.  However  he  was  removed  twenty  leagues 
from  the  frontier.  Nor  was  the  Portuguese  govern- 
ment itself  quite  free  from  ecclesiastic  troubles. 
The  bishop  of  Braganza  preached  doctrines  which 
were  offensive  to  the  patriach  and  the  government  ; 
he  was  confined,  but  soon  released,  and  an  ecclesias- 
tical sentence  pronounced  against  him,  which  only 
increased  his  followers  and  extended  the  influence 
of  his  doctrines. 

Another  cause  of  uneasiness,  at  a  later  period, 
was  the  return  of  Ballesteros  from  his  exile  atCeuta. 
He  had  been  permitted  towards  the  end  of  ]81M, 
and  as  lord  Wellington  thought  with  no  good  intent, 
to  reside  at  Frejensl.  The  Portuguese  regency, 
fearing  that  he  would  rally  round  him  other  discon- 


tented persons,  set  agents  to  watch  his  proceedings, 
and  under  pretence  of  putting  down  rob;  "rs  who 
abounded  on  that  frontier,  establisiied  a  hm.  "  cav- 
alry and  called  out  the  militia,  thus  making  it  rr«ini- 
fest  that  but  a  little  was  wanting  to  kindle  a  wai 
between  the  two  countries. 

POLITICAL    STATE    OF    SPAIN. 

Lord  Wellington's  victories  had  put  an  end  to  the 
intercourse  between  Joseph  and  the  Spaniards  who 
desired  to  make  terms  with  the  Frencli  ;  but  those 
people,  not  losing  hoj^e,  formed  a  strong  anti-English 
party,  and  watched  to  profit  by  the  dis|,utes  between 
the  two  great  factions  at  Cadiz,  which  had  now  be- 
come most  rancorous  and  dangerous  to  the  couimen 
cause.  The  serviles,  extremely  bigoted  both  in  re- 
ligion and  politics,  had  the  whole  body  of  tiic  clergy 
on  their  side.  They  were  the  most  numerous  in  the 
cortez,  and  their  views  were  generally  in  accord 
with  the  feelings  of  the  people  beyond  the  Isla  de 
Leon,  altiiough  their  doctrines  were  comprised  in 
two  sentences, — An  absolute  king, — An  intolerant 
church.  The  liberals,  su])ported  and  instigated  by 
all  ardent  innovators,  by  the  commercial  body  and 
populace  of  Cadiz,  had  also  partisans  beyond  the 
Isla;  and  taking  as  guides  tlie  revolutionary  wri- 
tings of  the  French  philosophers,  were  hastening 
onwards  to  a  democracy,  without  regard  to  ancient 
usages  or  feelings,  and  without  practical  ability  to 
carry  their  theories  into  execution.  There  was 
also  a  fourth  faction  in  the  cortez,  formed  by  the 
American  deputies,  who  were  secretly  labouring  for 
the  independence  of  the  colonies;  they  sometimea 
joined  the  liberals,  sometimes  the  serviles,  as  it 
suited  their  purposes,  and  thus  often  produced  anoma- 
lous results,  because  they  were  mimercus  enough  to 
turn  the  scale  in  favour  of  the  side  which  they  espous- 
ed. Jealousy  of  England  was  however  ccmmcn  to  ail, 
and  '■^  Iiig-lesismo''  was  used  as  a  term  of  contempt. 
Posterity  will  scarcely  believe,  that  when  lord  Wel- 
lington was  commencing  the  campaign  of  I8I0,  the 
cortez  was  with  diff.culty,  and  by  threats  rather 
than  reason,  prevented  from  passing  a  law  forbiddii;g 
foreign  troops  to  enter  a  Spanish  fortress.  Alicante, 
Tarifa,  Cadiz  itself  where  they  held  their  sittings, 
had  been  preserved  ;  Ciudad  Ilodrigo,  Badajcz,  had 
been  retaken  for  them  by  British  valour;  English 
money  had  restored  their  broken  walls  and  replen- 
ished their  exhausted  magazines  ;  English  and  Por- 
tuguese blood  still  smoked  from  their  ramparts  ;  but 
the  men  from  whose  veins  that  Wood  had  flowed 
were  to  be  denied  entrance  at  gates  which  they 
could  not  approach  without  treading  on  the  bones  of 
slaughtered  comrades  who  had  sacrificed  their  lives 
to  procure  for  this  sordid  ungrateful  assembly  the 
power  to  offer  the  insult. 

The  subjection  of  the  bishops  and  other  clergy, 
who  had  in  Gallicia  openly  o])posed  tiie  abolition  of 
the  inquisition  and  excited  the  peojde  to  resistance, 
was  an  object  of  prominent  interest  with  an  active 
section  of  the  liberals  called  the  "Jacobins."  And 
this  section  generally  ruled  the  cortez  because  the 
Americans  leaned  strongly  tov^zi as  tneir  ooci,:.;  ss, 
and  t)  e  interest  of  'he  anti-English  or  French  party 
was  t'  produce  dissensions,  v/hich  could  be  best  ef- 
fected by  supporting  the  most  violent  public  men. 
A  fierce  and  obi-tinate  faction  they  were,  and  they 
compelled  the  churchmen  to  submit  for  the  time,  but 
not  until  the  dispute  became  so  serious  that  lord 
Wellington  when  in  the  Pyrenees  expected  a  civiJ 
war  on  his  communications,  and  thought  the  clergy 
and  the  peasantry  would  take  part  with  the  French, 
'J'iiis  notion,  wiiich  gives  his  measure  for  the  patri- 
otism of  both  parties,  proved   however  unfounded; 


668 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


fBooK  XXII 


his  extreme  discontent  at  the  pronfress  of  liberal 
doctrines  had  somewhat  warped  his  judgnient ;  the 
people  were  less  attached  to  the  churcii  than  he  im- 
agined ;  tlie  clergy  of  Gallicia,  meetinij  with  no  solid 
support,  submitted  to  the  cortez,  and  the  archbishop 
of  Santiago  fled  to  Portugal. 

Deep  unmitigated  hatred  of  democracy  was  indeed 
the  moving  spring  of  tiie  English  tories'  ])olicv'. 
Napoleon  was  warred  against,  not  as  they  pretendeo 
oecause  he  was  a  tyrant  and  usurper,  for  he  was 
neither;  not  because  his  invasion  of  Spain  was  un- 
jui^t,  but  because  he  was  the  powerful  and  successful 
enemy  of  aristocratic  privileges.  The  happiness  and 
independence  of  the  Peninsula  were  words  without 
meaning  in  their  state  papers  and  speeches,  and 
their  anger  and  mortilication  were  extreme  when 
thsy  found  success  against  the  emperor  had  fostered 
that  democracy  it  was  r.heir  object  to  destroy.  'J'hey 
were  indeed  only  prevented  by  the  superior  prudence 
and  sagacity  of  their  general  from  interfering  with 
the  interna!  government  of  Spain  in  so  arrogant 
and  injudicious  a  manner,  that  an  open  rupture, 
wherein  the  Spaniards  would  have  had  all  appear- 
ance of  justice,  must  have  ensued.  This  folly  was 
however  stifled  by  Wellington,  who  desired  to  wait 
until  tlie  blow  could  be  given  with  some  effect,  and 
he  was  quite  willing  to  deal  it  himself;  yet  the 
conduct  of  the  cortez,  and  that  of  the  executive  gov- 
ernment which  acted  under  its  control,  was  so  in- 
jurious to  Spain  and  to  his  military  operations,  and 
so  unjust  to  him  personally,  tiiat  the  warmest  friends 
of  freedom  cannot  blame  his  enmity.  Rather  should 
his  moderation  be  admired,  when  we  find  liis  aristo- 
cratic liatred  of  the  Spanisli  constitution  exacerbated 
by  a  state  of  affairs  thus  described  by  Vegas,  a  con- 
siderable member  of  tiie  cortez  and  perfectly  ac- 
quainted vVltli  tlie  siibjtct. 

Speaking  of  the  "Afrancesados,"  or  French  party, 
more  numerous  than  was  supposed,  and  active  to  in- 
crease their  numbers,  he  says,  "The  thing  which 
tliey  most  enforced,  and  which  made  most  pro- 
gress, was  the  diminution  of  the  English  influence. 
Amongst  tlie  servijes  tiiey  gained  proselytes  by  ob- 
jecting to  the  English  religion  and  constitution, 
which  restricted  the  power  of  the  sovereign.  Witli 
the  liberals  they  said  the  same  constitution  gave  the 
sovereign  too  much  power  ;  and  the  Spanish  consti- 
tution, having  brought  tlie  king's  autliority  under 
tliat  of  tlie  cortez,  was  an  object  of  jealousy  to  the 
English  cabinet  and  aristocracy,  who,  fearing  the 
example  would  encourage  the  reformers  of  England, 
were  resolverl  that  the  Spani.^h  constitution  should 
not  stnnd.  To  the  Americans  they  observed  that 
lord  Wellington  opposed  them,  because  he  did  not 
help  them,  and  permitted  expeditions  to  be  sent 
om  Spain  ;  but  to  the  Europeans  who  wished  to 
Ptaiii  the  colonies  and  exclude  foreign  trade,  they 
represented  the  English  as  fomenters  and  sustainers 
of  the  colonial  rebellion,  because  they  did  not  join 
their  forces  with  Sp&in  to  put  it  down.  To  the 
honest  patriots  of  all  parties  they  said  that  every 
concession  to  the  I'wiglish  general  was  an  offence 
against  tlie  dignity  and  independence  of  the  nation. 
If  he  was  active  in  the  field,  he  was  intent  to  subju- 
gate Spain  rather  than  defeat  the  enemy  ;  if  he  was 
careful  in  preparation,  his  delay  was  to  enable  the 
French  to  conquer;  if  he  was  vigorous  in  urging 
the  government  to  useful  measures,  liis  desi<rn  was 
to  impose  his  own  laws  ;  if  he  neglected  the  Spanish 
armies,  he  desired  thev  should  be  beaten  ;  if  he  med- 
dled witli  them  usefully,  it  was  to  gain  the  soldiers, 
turn  the  army  afrainst  the  country,  and  thus  render 
Spain  dependent  on  I'^ntrland."  And  thes"  perfidious 
insinuations  were  effectual,  because  they  flattered 


the  national  pride,  as  proving  that  the  Spaniards 
could  do  every  thing  lor  themselves  without  the  aid 
of  foreigners.  "l<'inally.  that  nothing  could  stoj) 
the  spread  of  such  dangerous  doctrines  hut  new  vic- 
tories, wliich  would  bring  the  simple  honesty  and 
gratitude  of  the  people  at  large  into  activity." 
j  Those  victories  came,  and  did  indeed  stifie  the 
French  party  in  Spain,  but  many  of  their  arguments 
were  too  well  founded  to  be  stifled  with  their  party. 

The  change  of  government,  which  had  jdace  in 
the  beginning  of  the  year,  gave  hope  that  tlie  dem- 
ocratic violence  of  the  cortez  wcuhl  decline  un 
der  the  control  of  the  cardinal  Bourbon;  but  that 
prince,  who  was  not  of  the  true  royal  blood  in  tlie 
estimation  of  the  Spaniards,  because  his  father  had 
married  without  the  consent  of  the  king,  was  from 
age,  and  infirmity,  and  ignorance,  a  nullity.  The 
new  regency  became  theretbre  more  the  slaves  of 
the  cortez  than  their  predecessors;  and  the  Cadiz 
editors  of  newspapers,  pre-eminent  in  falsehood  and 
wickedness  even  amongst  their  unprincii)led  Euro- 
pean brotherhood,  being  the  champions  of  the  Jac- 
obins, directed  the  populace  of  that  city  as  they 
pleased.  And  always  the  serviles  yielded  under  the 
dread  of  personal  violence.  Their  own  crimes  had 
become  their  punishment.  They  had  taught  the 
people  at  the  commencement  of  the  contest  that 
murder  was  patriotism,  and  now  their  sjiirit  buiik 
and  quailed,  because  at  every  step,  to  use  the  ter- 
ribly significant  expression  of  \A'ellington,  "  The 
ghost  of  Solano  was  staring  them  i)i  llie  J'ace.^^ 

The  principal  points  of  the  Jacobins'  policy  in 
support  of  their  crude  constitution,  which  they  con- 
sidered as  perfect  as  an  emanation  from  the  Deity, 
were, —  1st.  The  abolition  of  the  inquisition,  the  ar- 
rest and  punishment  of  tlie  Gallician  bishojis,  and 
the  consequent  warfare  with  the  clergy.  2nd.  The 
putting  aside  the  claim  of  Carlotta  to  the  regency 
?rd.  The  appointment  of  captain-generals  and  other 
officers  to  suit  their  factious  purposes.  4th.  The 
obtaining  the  money  for  their  necessities,  without 
including  therein  the  nourishment  of  the  armies. 
5th.  The  control  of  the  elections  for  the  new  cortez 
so  as  to  procure  an  assembly  of  their  own  way  of 
thinking,  or  to  prevent  its  assembling  at  the  legal 
period  in  October. 

The  matter  of  the  bishops,  as  we  have  seen,  nearly 
involved  them  in  a  national  war  with  Portugal,  and 
a  civil  war  with  Gallicia.  The  affair  of  the  prin- 
cess was  less  serious  ;  but  she  had  never  ceased  in- 
triguing, and  her  pretensions,  wisely  opposed  by 
the  British  ministers  and  general  while  the  army 
was  cooped  up  in  Portugal,  were,  although  she  was 
a  declared  enemy  to  the  English  alliance,  row  rather 
favoured  by  sir  Henry  Wellesley  as  a  mode  of  check- 
ing the  sj)read  of  democracy.  T,ord  ^^  ellington 
however  still  held  aloof,  observing  that  if  appointed 
according  to  the  constitution,  she  would  not  be  less 
a  slave  to  the  cortez  than  her  predecessors,  and 
England  would  have  the  discredit  of  giving  power 
to  "  the  worst  woman  in  existence." 

To  remove  the  seat  of  government  from  the  influ 
ence  of  the  Cadiz  populace  was  one  mode  of  abating 
the  power  of  the  democratic  party,  and  the  yellow 
fever,  coming  immediately  after  the  closing  of  the 
general  cortez  in  September,  had  apparently  given 
the  executive  government  some  freedom  ofacti'n, 
and  seemed  to  furnish  a  favourable  opjiortunity  for 
the  English  ambassador  to  effect  its  removal.  The 
regency,  dreading  the  epidemic,  suddenly  resf)lved 
to  proceed  to  Matlrid,  telling  sir  Henry  Welh^sley, 
who  joyfully  hastened  to  offer  pecuniary  aid,  that  to 
avoid  the  sickness  was  their  sole  motive.  They  had 
secretly  formed  this  resolution   at  night,  and  pro 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


669 


posed  to  commence  the  journey  next  day,  but  a  dis- 
turbance arose  in  the  city,  and  the  alarmed  regents 
convoked  the  extraordinary  cortez ;  the  ministers 
wore  immediately  called  before  it,  and  bending  in 
t'jar  bsljre  their  masters,  declared  with  a  scanda- 
lous disregard  of  truth  that  there  was  no  intention 
to  quit  the  Isla  without  consulting  the  cortez.  Cer- 
tain deputies  were  thereupon  appointed  to  inquire 
if  there  was  any  fever,  and  a  few  cases  being  dis- 
covered, the  deputation,  apparently  to  shield  the 
regents,  recommended  that  they  should  remove  to 
Port  8t.  Mary. 

This  did  not  satisfy  the  assembly.  The  govern- 
m3nt  was  commanded  to  remain  at  Cadiz  until  the 
new  genera]  cortez  should  be  installed,  and  a  com- 
mittee v.'as  appointed  to  probe  the  whole  affair,  or 
rather  to  pacify  the  populace,  who  were  so  offended 
with  the  report  of  the  first  deputation,  that  the 
rf|)ecch  of  Arguelles  on  presenting  it  was  hissed 
from  the  galleries,  although  he  was  the  most  popu- 
lar and  eloquent  member  of  the  cortez.  The  more 
moderate  liberals  thus  discovered  that  they  were 
equally  with  the  sc-viles  the  slaves  of  the  news- 
paper writers.  Nevertheless  the  inherent  excel- 
lence of  freedom,  though  here  presented  in  such  fan- 
tastic and  ignoble  sliapes,  was  involuntarily  admit- 
ted by  lord  Wellington,  when  "he  declared,  that 
wherever  the  cortez  and  government  should  fix 
themselves,  the  press  would  follow  to  control,  and 
the  people  of  Seville,  Grenada,  or  Jladrid,  would 
become  as  bad  as  the  people  of  Cadiz. 

The  composition  of  the  new  cortez  was  naturally 
an  object  of  hope  and  fear  to  all  factions,  and  the 
result  being  uncertain,  the  existing  assembly  took 
such  measures  to  prolong  its  own  power  that  it  was 
ex;>ected  two  cortez  would  be  established,  the  one 
at  Cadiz,  the  other  at  Seville,  each  striving  for 
mastery  in  the  nation.  However  the  new  body 
after  many  delays  was  installed  at  Cadiz  in  Novem- 
b=;r,  and  the  Jacobins,  strong  in  the  violence  of  the 
populace,  still  swayed  the  assembly,  and  kept  the 
seat  rf  government  at  Cadiz  until  the  rapid  spread 
of  the  fever  brought  a  stronger  fear  into  action. 
Then  the  resolution  to  repair  to  IMadrid  was  adopt- 
ed, and  the  sessions  in  the  Isla  closed  on  the  29th 
of  November.  Yet  not  without  troubles.  For  the 
general  belief  being  that  no  person  could  take  the 
sickness  twice,  and  almost  every  resident  family 
had  already  suffered  from  former  visitations,  the 
merchants  with  an  infamous  cupidity  declaring  that 
t'.iere  was  no  fever,  induced  the  authorities  flagi- 
tiously to  issue  clean  bills  of  health  to  ships  leaving 
tlie  port,  and  Endeavoured  by  intimidation  to  keep 
the  regency  and  cortez  in  the  city. 

An  exact  and  copi/)us  account  of  these  factions 
and  disputes,  and  of  the  permanent  influence  which 
these  discussions  of  the  principles  of  government, 
tiiis  constant  collision  of  opposite  doctrines,  had 
upon  the  character  of  the  people,  would,  if  saga- 
ciously traced,  form  a  lesson  of  the  highest  interest 
for  nations.  But  to  treat  the  subject  largely  would 
be  to  write  a  political  history  of  the  Spanish  revo- 
lution, and  it  is  only  the  effect  upon  the  military 
operations  which  properly  appertains  to  a  history  of 
tlie  war.  That  effect  was  one  of  unmitigated  evil  ; 
b'lt  it  must  be  observed  that  this  did  not  necessari- 
ly spring  from  the  democratic  system,  since  precise- 
ly the  same  mischiefs  were  to  be  traced  in  Portugal, 
where  arbitrary  power,  called  legitimate  govern- 
ment, was  prevalent.  In  both  cases  alike,  the  peo- 
ple and  the  soldiers  suffered  for  the  crimes  of  factious 
politicians. 

It  has  been  shown  in  the  first  part  of  this  volume, 
that  one  Spanish  regency  contracted  an  engagement 


with  lord  Wellington  on  the  faith  of  which  he  took 
the  command  of  their  armies  in  IfeK^.  It  was  scru- 
puh)usly  adhered  to  by  him,  but  systematically  vio- 
lated by  the  new  regency  and  minister  of  war  al- 
most as  soon  as  it  was  concluded.  His  recommen- 
dations for  promotion  after  Yittoria  were  disre- 
garded, orders  were  sent  direct  to  the  subordinate 
generals,  and  changes  were  made  in  the  commands 
and  in  the  destinations  of  the  troops  without  hie 
concurrence,  and  without  passing  througli  him  as 
generalissimo.  Scarcely  had  lie  crossed  the  Ebro 
when  Castafios,  captain-general  of  Gallicia,  Estre- 
madura  and  Castile,  was  disgracefully  removed 
from  his  government  under  pretence  of  calling  him 
to  assist  in  the  council  of  state.  His  nephew,  gen- 
eral Giron,  was  at  the  same  time  deprived  of  his 
command  over  the  Gallician  army,  although  both  he 
and  Castafios  had  been  largely  commended  for  their 
conduct  by  lord  Wellington.  General  Freyre,  ap- 
pointed captain-general  of  Castile  and  Estremadura, 
succeeded  Giron  in  command  of  the  troops,  and  the 
infamous  Lacy  replaced  Castafios  in  Gallicia,  ciio- 
sen,  it  was  believed,  as  a  fitter  tool  to  work  out  the 
measure  of  the  Jacobins  against  the  clergy  in  that 
kingdom.  Nor  was  the  sagacity  of  that  faction  at 
fault,  for  Castafios  would,  according  to  lord  \N'elling- 
ton,  have  turned  his  arms  against  the  cortez  if  an 
opportunity  had  offered.  He  and  others  were  now 
menaced  with  death,  and  the  cortez  contemplated 
an  attack  ujion  the  tithes,  upon  the  feudal  and  royal 
tenths,  and  upon  the  estates  of  the  grandees.  All 
except  the  last  very  fitting  to  do,  if  the  times  and 
circumstances  had  been  favourable  for  a  peaceful 
arrangement ;  but  most  insane,  when  the  nation  gen- 
erally was  averse,  and  there  was  an  invader  in  the 
country  to  whom  the  discontented  could  turn.  The 
clergy  were  at  open  warfare  with  the  government, 
many  generals  were  dissatisfied  and  menacing  in 
their  communications  with  the  superior  civil  au- 
thorities, the  soldiers  were  starving,  and  the  people, 
tired  of  their  miseries,  only  desired  to  get  rid  of  the 
invaders,  and  to  avoid  the  burden  of  supplying  the 
troops  of  either  side.  The  English  cabinet,  after 
having  gorged  Spain  with  gold  and  flattery,  was 
totally  without  influence.  A  terrible  convulsion  was 
at  hand,  if  the  French  could  have  maintained  the 
war  with  any  vigour  in  Spain  itself;  and  the  fol- 
lowing passages  from  Wellington's  letters  to  the 
ministers  prove  that  even  he  contemplated  a  forci- 
ble change  in  the  government  and  constitution. 

"  If  the  mob  of  Cadiz  begin  to  remove  heads  from 
shoulders  as  the  newspapers  have  threatened  Casta- 
fios, and  the  assembly  seize  upon  landed  proj.erty  to 
supply  their  necessities,  I  am  afraid  we  must  do 
something  more  than  discountenance  them.  ...  It 
is  quite  impossible  such  a  system  can  last.  What 
I  regret  is,  that  I  am  the  person  that  maintains  it. 
If  I  was  out  of  the  way,  there  are  plenty  of  generals 
who  would  overturn  it.  Ballcsteros  positively  in- 
tended it,  and  I  am  much  mistaken  if  O'Donel,  and 
even  Castafios,  and  probably  others,  are  not  equally 
ready.     If  the  king  should  return  he  also  will  over 

turn  the  whole  fabric  if  he  lias  any  spirit I 

wish  you  would  let  me  know  whether,  if  I  should 
find  a  fair  opportunity  of  striking  at  the  democracy, 
the  government  would  approve  of  my  doing  it." 
And  in  another  letter  he  seriously  treated  the  ques 
tion  of  withdrawing  from  the  contest  altogetlier 
"  The  government  were  the  best  judges,"  he  said, 
"  of  w'hether  they  could  or  ought  to  withdraw  ;  but 
he  did  not  bclime  that  Spain  could  be  a  useful  ally, 
or  at  all  in  alliance  with  England,  if  the  republican 
system  was  not  put  down."  Meanwhile  lie  recom- 
mended  to   the    Englisli    government   and   to   hia 


670 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[  Book  XXTI. 


brother,  to  take  no  part  either  for  or  ag'ainst  the 
princess  of  Brazil,  to  discountenance  the  democrat- 
ical  principles  and  measures  of  the  cortez,  and  if 
their  opinion  was  asked  regarding  the  formation  of 
a  new  regency,  to  recommend  an  alteration  of  that 
part  of  the  constitution  which  lodged  all  power  with 
the  cortez,  and  to  give  instead  some  authority  to 
the  executive  government,  whether  in  the  liands  of 
king  or  regent.  To  till  the  latter  office  one  of  royal 
blood,  uniting  the  strongest  claims  of  birth  with  the 
best  capacity,  should,  he  thought,  be  selected  ;  but 
if  capacity  was  wanting  in  the  royal  race,  then  to 
choose  the  Spaniard  who  was  most  deserving  in  the 
public  estimation!  Thus  necessity  teaches  privi- 
lege to  bend  before  merit. 

The  whole  force  of  Spain  in  arms  was  at  this  pe- 
riod about  one  hundred  and  sixty  thousand  men. 
Of  this  number  not  more  than  fifty  thousand  were 
available  for  operations  in  the  field,  and  those  only 
because  they  were  paid,  clothed  and  armed  by  Eng- 
land, and  kept  together  by  the  ability  and  vigour 
of  the  English  general.  He  had  proposed  when 
at  Cadiz  an  arrangement  for  the  civil  and  politi- 
cal government  of  the  provinces  rescued  from  the 
French,  with  a  view  to  the  supply  of  the  armies; 
but  his  plan  was  rejected,  and  his  repeated  repre- 
sentations of  the  misery  the  army  and  the  people 
endured  under  the  system  of  the  Spanish  govern- 
ment were  unheeded.  Certain  districts  were  allot- 
ted for  the  support  of  each  army ;  yet,  with  a  jeal- 
ous fear  of  military  domination,  the  government  re- 
fused tlie  captain-generals  of  those  districts  the 
necessary  powers  to  draw  forth  the  resources  of  the 
country,  powers  which  lord  Wellington  recommend- 
ed tiiat  they  should  have,  and  wanting  which  the 
whole  system  was  sure  to  become  a  nullity.  Each 
branch  of  administration  was  thus  conducted  by 
chiefs  independent  in  their  attributes,  yet  each  too 
restricted  in  authority,  generally  at  variance  with 
one  another,  and  all  of  them  neglectful  of  their  duty. 
The  evil  etfect  upon  the  troops  was  thus  described 
by  the  English  general  as  early  as  August: 

*' More  than  half  of  Spain  has  been  cleared  of  the 
enemy  above  a  year,  and  the  whole  of  Spain  except- 
ing Catalonia  and  a  small  part  of  Aragon  since  the 
months  of  May  and  June  last.  The  most  abundant 
harvest  has  been  reaped  in  all  parts  of  the  country  ; 
millions  of  money  spent  by  the  contending  armies 
»re  circulating  every  where,  and  yet  your  armies 
however  wfiak  in  numbers  are  literally  starving. 
The  allied  British  and  Portuguese  armies  under  my 
command  have  been  subsisted,  particularly  latterly, 
almost  exclusively  upon  the  magazines  imported  by 
sea,  and  I  am  concerned  to  inform  your  excellency, 
that  besides  money  for  the  pay  of  all  the  armies, 
which  has  been  given  from  the  military  chest  of  the 
British  army,  and  has  been  received  from  no  other 
quarter,  the  British  magazines  have  supplied  quan- 
tities of  provisions  to  ail  the  Spanisli  armies  in  order 
to  enable  them  to  remain  in  the  field  at  all.  And 
notwithstanding  this  assistance,  I  have  had  the  mor- 
tification of  seeing  the  Spanish  troops  on  the  out- 
posts obliged  to  plunder  the  nut  and  apple  trees  for 
Bubsistsnce,  and  to  know  that  the  Spanish  troops, 
employi?d  in  tlie  blockade  of  Panipehina  and  Saiito- 
na,  were  starving  upon  half  an  allowance  of  bread, 
while  the  enemy  whom  they  were  blockading  were 
at  the  same  time  receiving  their  full  allowance. 
The  system  then  is  insufficient  to  procure  supj)lies 
for  the  army,  and  at  the  same  time  I  assure  your  ex- 
cellency tliat  it  is  the  most  oppressive  and  injurious 
to  the  country  that  could  be  devised.  It  cannot  be 
pretended  that  the  country  does  not  produce  the 
means  of  maintaining  the  men  necessary  for  it%  t'.- 


fence  ;  those  means  are  undoubted!/  superabundant, 
and  the  enemy  has  proved  that  armies  can  be  main- 
tained in  Spain,  at  the  expense  of  tiie  Spanish  nation, 
infinitely  larger  than  are  necessary  for  its  defence." 

These  evils  he  attributed  to  the  incapacity  of  tlie 
public  servants,  and  to  their  overwhelming  numbers, 
that  certain  sign  of  an  unprosperous  state;  to  the 
disgraceful  negligence  and  disregard  of  public  du- 
ties, and  to  there  being  no  power  in  the  country  lor 
enforcing  the  law  ;  the  collection  of  the  revenue 
cost  in  several  branches  seventy  and  eighty  per  cent. 
IMeanwhile  no  Spanish  officers  capable  of  command- 
ing a  large  body  of  troops  or  keeping  it  in  an  effi- 
cient state  had  yet  appeared,  no  etficient  stafi^,  no 
system  of  military  administration  had  been  formed, 
and  no  shame  for  these  deficiencies,  no  exertions  to 
amend,  were  visible. 

From  this  picture  two  conclusions  are  to  be  drawn  : 
1st.  That  the  provinces,  thus  described  as  supera- 
bonnding  in  resources,  having  been  for  several  years 
occupied  by  the  French  armies,  the  warfare  of  tiie 
latter  could  not  have  been  so  devastating  and  bar 
barous  as  it  was  represented.  2nd.  That  Spain, 
being  now  towards  the  end  as  helpless  as  she  had 
been  at  the  beginning  and  all  through  the  war,  was 
quite  unequal  to  her  own  deliverance  either  by  arms 
or  policy  ;  that  it  was  English  valour,  English  steel, 
directed  by  the  genius  of  an  English  general,  which 
rising  superior  to  all  obstacles,  whether  presented 
by  his  own  or  the  Peninsular  governments,  or  by  the 
perversity  of  national  character,  worked  out  her 
independence.  So  utterly  inefficient  were  the  Span- 
iards themselves,  that  now,  at  the  end  of  six  years' 
war,  lord  Wellington  declared  thirty  thousand  of 
their  troops  could  not  be  trusted  to  act  separate. y  ; 
they  were  only  useful  when  mixed  in  the  line  with 
large  numbers  of  other  nations.  And  yet  all  men 
in  authority  to  the  lowest  alcalde  were  as  presump- 
tuous, as  arrogant,  and  as  perverse  as  ever.  Seem- 
ing to  be  rendered  callous  to  public  misery  by  the 
desperate  state  of  affairs,  they  were  reckless  of  the 
consequences  of  their  actions,  and  never  suffered 
prudential  considerations  or  national  honour  to  check 
the  execution  of  any  [)roject.  The  generals  from 
repeated  failures  had  become  insensible  to  m'sfor- 
tuncs,  and  without  any  remarkable  display  of  per- 
sonal daring,  were  always  ready  to  deliver  battle  on 
slight  occasions,  as  if  that  were  a  common  matter 
instead  of  being  the  great  event  of  war. 

The  government  agents  were  corrujit,  and  the  gov- 
ernment itself  was,  as  it  had  ever  been,  tyrannical, 
faithless,  mean  and  equivocating  to  the  lowest  de- 
gree. In  1812,  a  Spaniard  of  known  and  active  pa- 
triotism thus  commenced  an  elaborate  plan  of  de- 
fence for  the  provinces:  "Catalonia  abhors  France 
as  her  oppressor,  but  she  abhors  still  more  the  des- 
potism which  has  been  carried  on  in  all  the  branches 
of  her  administration  since  the  beginning  of  the 
war."  In  fine,  there  was  no  healtiiy  action  in  any 
part  of  the  body  politic,  every  thing  was  rotten  ex- 
cept the  hearts  of  the  poorer  peo[)le.  Even  at  Ca 
diz  Spanish  writers  compared  the  state  to  a  vessel 
in  a  hurricane,  without  captain,  pilot,  compass, 
chart,  sails  or  rudder,  and  advised  the  crew  to  cry 
to  heaven  as  their  sole  resource.  But  they  only 
blasphemed. 

When  Wellington,  indignant  at  the  systematic 
breach  of  his  engagement,  remonstrated,  he  was  an 
swered  that  the  actual  regency  did  not  hold  itself 
bound  by  the  contracts  of  the  former  government 
Hence  it  was  plain  no  considerations  of  truth,  for 
they  had  themselves  also  accepted  the  contract,  nor 
of  honest  policy,  nor  the  usages  of  civilized  states 
with  respect  to  national  faith,  had  any  influence  on 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


671 


their  conduct.  Enraged  at  this  scandalous  subter- 
fuge, he  was  yet  conscious  how  essential  it  was  he 
should  retain  his  command.  And  seeing  all  Spanish 
generals  more  or  less  engaged  in  polit.cal  intrigues, 
none  capable  of  co-operating  with  him.  and  that  no 
Spanish  army  could  possibly  subsist  as  a  military 
body  under  the  neglect  and  bad  arrangement  of  tlie 
Spanish  authorities,  conscious  also  that  public  opin- 
ion in  Spain  would,  better  than  the  menaces  of  the 
English  government,  enable  him  to  obtain  a  coun- 
terpoise to  the  democratic  party,  he  tendered  indeed 
his  resignation  if  the  government  engagement  was 
not  fultilled,  but  earnestly  endeavoured  by  a  due  mix- 
ture of  mildness,  argument  and  reproof  to  reduce  the 
ruling  authorities  to  reason.  Nevertheless  there 
were,  he  told  them,  limits  to  his  forbearance,  to  his 
submission  under  injury,  and  he  had  been  already 
most  unworthily  treated,  even  as  a  gentleman,  by 
the  Spanish  government. 

From  the  world  these  quarrels  were  covered  by  an 
appearance  of  the  utmost  respect  and  honour.  He 
was  made  a  grandee  of  the  first  class,  and  the  estate 
of  Soto  de  Roma  in  Genada,  of  which  the  much- 
maligned  and  miserable  prince  of  Peace  had  been 
despoiled,  was  settled  upon  him.  He  accepted  the 
gift,  but,  as  he  had  before  done  with  his  Portuguese 
and  Spanish  pay,  transferred  the  proceeds  to  the  pub- 
lic treasury  during  the  war.  The  regents,  however, 
under  the  pressure  of  the  Jacobins,  and  apparently 
bearing  some  personal  enmity,  although  one  of 
them,  Ciscar,  had  been  instrumental  in  procuring 
him  the  command  of  the  Spanish  army,  were  now 
intent  to  drive  him  from  it;  and  the  excesses  com- 
mitted at  San  Sebastian  served  their  factious  wri- 
ters as  a  topic  for  exciting  the  people  not  only  to  de- 
mand his  resignation,  but  to  commence  a  warfare  of 
assassination  against  the  British  soldiers.  Moreo- 
ver, combining  extreme  folly  with  wickedness,  they 
pretended,  amongst  other  absurdities,  that  the  nobil- 
ity had  oifered,  if  he  would  change  his  religion,  to 
make  him  king  of  Spain.  This  tale  was  eagerly 
adopted  by  the  English  newspapers,  and  three  Span- 
ish grandees  thought  it  necessary  to  declare  that 
they  were  not  among  the  nobles  who  made  the 
proposition.  His  resignation  was  accepted  in  the 
latter  end  of  September,  and  he  held  the  command 


only  until  the  assembling  of  the  new  cortcz ;  but 
the  attempt  to  render  him  odious  failed  even  at  (^a- 
diz,  owing  chiefly  to  tiie  personal  ascendency  whidi 
all  great  minds  so  surely  attain  over  the  masses  in 
troubled  times.  Both  the  people  and  tlie  soldiei-s 
respected  him  more  than  they  did  their  own  govern- 
ment, and  tiie  Spanish  officers  had  generally  yielded 
as  ready  obedience  to  his  wishes  before  he  was  aj)- 
pointed  generalissimo,  as  they  did  to  his  orders  when 
holding  that  high  office.  It  was  this  aBcendcncy 
which  enabled  him  to  maintain  the  war  with  such 
troublesome  allies;  and  yet  so  little  were  the  Eng- 
lish ministers  capable  of  appreciating  its  impor- 
tance, that  after  the  battle  of  Vittoria  they  enter- 
tained the  design  of  removing  him  from  Spain  to 
take  part  in  the  German  operations.  His  answer 
was  short  and  modest,  but  full  of  wisdom: 

"  Many  might  be  found  to  conduct  matters  as  well 
as  I  can  both  here  and  in  Germany,  but  nobo(!y 
would  enjoy  the  same  advantages  here,  and  I  siiculd 
be  no  better  than  another  in  Germany." 

The  egregious  folly  which  dictated  this  proposi- 
tion was  thus  checked,  and  in  December  the  new 
cortez  decided  that  he  should  retain  the  (Command 
of  the  armies,  and  the  regency  be  bound  to  fultil  its 
predecessor's  engagements.  Nevertheless,  so  deeply 
had  he  been  ofl'ended  by  the  libels  relative  to  San 
Sebastian,  that  a  private  letter  to  his  brother  termi- 
nated thus: — •'  It  will  rest  with  the  king's  govern- 
ment to  determine  what  they  will  do  upon  a  consid- 
eration of  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case  ;  but  if 
I  was  to  decide,  I  would  not  keeji  the  army  in  Spain 
for  one  hour."  And  to  many  other  persons  at  dili'er- 
ent  times  he  expressed  his  tears  and  conviction  that 
the  cause  was  lost  and  that  he  should  fail  at  last. 
It  was  under  these  and  other  enormous  difficultica 
he  carried  on  his  military  operations.  It  was  with 
an  enemy  at  his  back  more  to  be  dreaded  than  the 
foe  in  his  front  that  he  invaded  t!ie  south  of  France  ; 
and  that  is  the  answer  to  those  French  writers  who 
have  described  him  as  being  at  the  head  of  more 
than  two  hundred  thousand  well-furnished  soldiers, 
supported  by  a  well  organized  insurrection  of  the 
Spanish  people,  unembarrassed  in  his  movements, 
and  luxuriously  rioting  in  all  the  resources  of  the 
Peninsula  and  of  England. 


072 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


C  Book  XXIII 


BOOK  XXIII. 


CHAPTER  I. 

War  in  the  south  of  Fianre — Soull's  politiral  difficulties — 
l'rivaiion~  of  thp  allied  troops — LorH  W<llingtoii  appeals  to 
thiir  inililiirv  honour  with  flTect — Averse  to  olTnisive  opera- 
tions, but  when  jN'ap  ileon's  disasters  in  Gerniiiny  becauie 
known  again  jitKls  to  the  wishes  of  the  allied  soverti^iis — 
Hi?  disposition'*  of  altai  k  retaidtd — They  are  described — 
Ballli-  of  the  Niveilf — Ohseivations — Deaths  and  characteis 
of  Mr.  Edward  Freer  and  colonel  Thomas  Llojd. 

WAR  IN  THE  SOUTH  OF  FRANCE. 

While  Pampeluna  held  out,  Soult  laboured  to 
complete  his  works  of  defence,  especially  tlie  in- 
trenciied  camp  of  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port,  that  he 
rniglit  be  free  to  cliange  the  theatre  of  war  to  Ara- 
goii.  He  pretended  to  entertain  this  project  as  late 
as  November ;  but  he  must  have  secretly  renounced 
all  hope  before  that  jjeriod,  because  the  snows  of  an 
early  and  severe  winter  had  rendered  even  the  pass- 
es of  the  lower  Pyrenees  impracticable  in  October. 
Meanwhile  his  political  difficulties  were  not  less 
than  lord  Wellington's,  all  his  efforts  to  draw  forth 
the  resources  of  France  were  met  with  apathy,  or 
secret  hostility,  and  there  was  no  money  in  the  mil- 
itary chest  to  answer  the  common  daily  expenses. 
A  junta  of  the  leading  merchants  in  JJayonne  volun- 
tarily provided  for  the  most  pressing  necessities  of 
the  troops,  but  their  means  were  limited,  and  Soult 
vainly  urgod  the  merchants  of  IJordeaux  and  Tou- 
louse to  follow  the  patriotic  exami)le.  It  required 
therefore  all  his  firmness  of  character  to  support  the 
crisis  ;  and  if  the  English  naval  force  had  been  suf- 
ficient to  intercept  the  coasting  vessels  between 
Bordeaux  and  Bayonne,  the  Frencli  army  must  have 
retired  beyond  the  Adour.  As  it  was,  the  greatest 
part  of  the  field  artillery  and  all  the  cavalry  were 
sent  so  far  to  the  rear  for  forage,  that  they  could  not 
be  counted  a  part  of  the  fighting  troops  ;  and  the 
infantry,  in  addition  to  their  immense  labours,  were 
f<)rced  to  carry  their  own  provisions  from  the  navi- 
gable points  of  the  rivers  to  the  top  of  the  moun- 
tains. 

Soult  was  strongly  affected.  "Tell  the  emperor," 
lie  wrote  to  tiie  minister  of  war,  "tell  him  when 
you  make  your  next  report,  that  on  the  very  soil  of 
France,  this  is  the  situation  of  the  army  destined 
to  defend  the  southern  |)rovinces  from  invasion;  tell 
him  also  tfiat  the  unheard-of  contradictions  and 
obstacles  I  meet  with  shall  not  make  me  fail  in  my 
duty." 

The  French  troops  suffered  much,  but  the  priva- 
tions of  the  allies  were  perhaj)s  greater,  for  being 
on  higher  mountains,  more  extended,  more  depend- 
ent upon  the  sea,  their  distress  was  in  proportion 
to  their  distance  from  the  coast.  A  much  shorter 
line  had  been  indeed  gained  for  the  supply  of  the 
centre,  and  a  bridge  was  laid  down  at  Andarlasa 
wliich  gave  access  to  the  roots  of  tlie  Bnyonnette 
mour^*,ain,  yet  the  troops  were  fed  with  difficulty  ; 
and  so  scantily,  that  lord  Wellington  in  amends  re- 
duced the  usual  stoppage  of  pay,  and  invoked  the 
army  by  its  military  honour  to  sustain  with  firmness 
the  unavoidable  pressure.  The  eifect  was  striking. 
The  murmurs,  loud  in  the  cami)s  before,  were  hush- 
ed instantly,  although  the  soldiers  knew  that  some 


commissaries,  leaguing  with  the  speculators  upon 
the  coast,  secretly  loaded  the  provision  mules  with 
condiments  and  other  luxuries  to  sell  on  the  moun- 
tains at  enormous  profit.  The  desertion  was  how- 
ever great,  more  than  twelve  hundred  men  went 
over  to  the  enemy  in  less  than  four  months  ;  and 
they  were  all  Germans,  Englishmen  or  Sj)aniardp, 
for  the  Portuguese  who  abandoned  tlicir  colours  in- 
variably went  back  to  their  own  country. 

This  difficulty  of  feeding  the  Anglo-Portuguese, 
the  extreme  distress  of  the  Spanian's,  imd  the  cer- 
tainty that  they  would  plunder  in  h'rance,  and  so 
raise  the  people  in  arms,  together  w  th  the  uneasy 
state  of  the  political  affairs  in  the  Peninsula,  ren 
dered  lord  Wellington  very  averse  to  further  offen- 
sive operations  while  K;:;.'  lr'(  n  :  o  i.'iiacicusly  main- 
tained his  positions  on  the  Libo  agaii.st  the  allied 
sovereigns.  It  was  impossible  to  make  a  formidable 
and  sustained  invasion  of  France  with  the  Anglo- 
Portuguese  alone,  and  he  had  neither  money  nor 
means  of  transport  to  feed  the  Spaniards,  even  if 
policy  warranted  such  a  measure.  The  nature  of 
the  country  also  forbade  a  decisive  victory,  and 
hence  an  advance  was  attended  with  the  risk  of  re- 
turning to  Spain  again  during  the  winter,  when  a  re- 
treat would  be  dangerous  and  dishonouring.  But  on 
the  20th  of  October  a  letter  from  the  governor  of 
Pampeluna  was  intercepted,  and  lord  Fltzroy  Somer- 
set, observing  that  the  compliment  of  ceremony  at  the 
beginning  was  also  in  numerals,  ingeniously  lollowed 
the  cue  and  made  out  tlie  whole.  It  announced  that 
the  i)lace  could  not  hold  out  more  than  a  week,  and 
as  intelligence  of  Napoleon's  disssters  in  Germany 
became  known  at  the  same  time,  lord  Wellirgton 
was  induced  to  yield  once  more  to  the  wislies  of  the 
allied  sovereigns  and  the  English  ministers,  who 
were  earnest  that  he  should  invade  France. 

His  intent  was  to  attack  Soult's  intrench.ed  camp 
on  the  26th,  th'nking  Pampeluna  would  lull  before 
that  period  In  this  he  was  mistaken;  and  bad 
weather  stopped  his  movements,  for  in  the  passes 
aoove  Roncesvalles  the  troops  were  knee-deep  in 
snow.  The  preparations  however  continued,  and 
strict  precautions  were  taken  to  baflie  the  enemy's 
emissaries  Soult  was  nevertheless  perfectly  in- 
formed by  the  deserters  of  the  original  design  and 
the  cause  of  the  delay  ;  and  (le  likewise  obtained 
from  a  sergeant-major  of  artillery,  who  losing  his 
road  was  taken  on  the  2i)th,  certain  letters  and  or- 
ders indicating  an  attack  in  tlie  direction  of  the 
bridge  of  Amotz,  between  D'l'rion's  right  and  Clau- 
zel's  left.  Some  French  peasants  also,  who  had 
been  allowed  to  pass  the  allied  outposts,  declared 
they  had  been  closely  questioned  about  that  bridge 
and  the  roads  leading  to  it.  The  defences  there 
were,  therefore,  augmented  with  new  redoubts  and 
abatis,  and  Soult  having  thus,  as  he  judged,  suffi- 
ciently provided  for  his  safety,  and  being  in  no  pain 
for  his  right,  nor  for  Clauzel's  i)osltion,  covered  as 
the  latter  was  by  the  smaller  Rhune,  turnedthis  at- 
tention towards  Foy's  corps. 

That  general  had  been  posted  at  Bidaray,  half 
way  between  St.  .Tean  Pied  de  Pt)rt  and  Cambo,  to 
watch  certain  roads,  which  leading  to  the  Nive  from 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR    WAR. 


673 


Val  Baijjorri  by  St.  Martin  d'Arosa,  and  from  the 
Bastan  by  Yspe<ifiii  and  tlie  GJorospil  mountain,  gave 
Soult  anxiety  for  his  left;  but  now  expecting  the 
principal  attack  at  the  bridge  of  Aniotz,  and  not  by 
these  roads,  nor  by  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port,  as  he  at 
first  supposed  and  as  lord  Wellington  had  at  one 
time  designed,  he  resolved  to  use  1^'oy's  division  of- 
fensively. In  this  view,  on  the  3d  of  November  he 
instructed  him  if  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port  siiould  be 
only  slightly  attacked,  to  draw  all  the  troops  he 
could  possibly  spare  from  its  defence  to  Bidaray, 
and  when  the  allies  assailed  D'Erlon,  he  was  to 
seize  the  Gorospil  mountain  and  fall  upon  their  right 
as  they  descended  from  the  Puerto  de  xMaya.  If,  on 
the  other  hand,  he  was  himself  assailed  by  those 
lines,  he  was  to  call  in  all  his  detnched  troops  from 
St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port,  repass  the  Nive  by  the  bridge 
of  Bidaray,  make  the  best  defence  possible  behind 
that  river,  and  open  a  communication  with  Pierre 
Soult  and  TreiUiard,  whose  divisions  of  cavalry  were 
at  St.  Palais  and  Orthez. 

On  the  6th,  Foy,  thinking  the  Gorospil  difficult 
to  pass,  proposed  to  seize  the  Col  de  Yspegui  from 
the  side  of  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port,  and  so  descend 
into  the  Bastan.  Soult,  however,  preferred  Bida- 
ray as  a  safer  point  and  more  united  with  the  main 
body  of  the  army  ;  but  he  gave  Foy  a  discretionary 
power  to  march  along  the  left  of  the  Nive  upon 
Itzatzu  and  Espelette,  if  he  judged  it  fitting  to 
reinforce  D'Erlon's  left  rather  than  to  attack  the 
enemy. 

Having  thus  arranged  his  regular  defence,  the 
French  general  directed  the  prelect  of  the  Lower 
Pyrenees  to  post  the  organized  national  guards  at 
the  issues  of  all  the  valleys  about  St.  Jean  Pied  de 
Port,  but  to  keep  the  mass  of  the  people  quiet  until 
the  allies  penetrating  into  the  country  should  at 
once  provoke  and  offer  facilities  for  an  irregular 
warfare. 

On  the  9th,  being  still  uneasy  about  the  St.  Mar- 
tin d'Arosa  and  Gorospil  roads,  he  brought  up  his 
brother's  cavalry  from  St.  Palais  to  the  heights 
above  Cambo,  and  the  next  day  the  long  expected 
storm  burst. 

Allured  by  some  fine  weather  on  the  6th  and  7th 
of  November,  lord  Wellington  had  moved  sir  Row- 
land Hill's  troops  from  the  Roncesvalles  to  the 
Bastan,  with  a  view  to  attack  Soult,  leaving  Mina 
on  the  position  of  Altobiscar  and  in  the  Alduides. 
The  other  corps  had  also  received  their  orders,  and 
the  battle  was  to  commence  on  the  8th  ;  but  general 
Freyre  suddenly  declared,  that  unable  to  subsist  on 
tlie  mountains,  he  must  withdraw  a  part  of  his 
troops.  This  was  a  scheme  to  obtain  provisions 
fnra  the  English  magazines,  and  it  was  successful, 
f<».-  the  projected  attack  could  not  be  made  without 
his  aid.  Forty  thousand  rations  of  flour,  with  a 
fv-mil  intimation  that  if  he  did  not  co-operate  the 
whole  army  must  retire  again  into  Spain,  contented 
Freyre  for  the  moment;  but  the  extravagant  abuses 
of  the  Spanish  commissariat  were  plainly  exposed 
when  the  chief  of  tho  staff  declared  that  the  flour 
would  only  suffice  for  two  days,  although  there  were 
Ipss  than  ten  thousand  soldiers  in  the  field.  Spain, 
therefore,  furnished  at  the  rate  of  two  rations  for 
every  fighting  rnan,  and  yet  her  troops  were  starv- 
ing ! 

When  this  difficulty  was  surmounted,  heavy  rain 
caused  the  attack  to  be  again  deterred  ;  but  on  the 
10th,  ninety  thousand  combatants  of  ail  arms  and 
ranks,  above  seventy-four  thousand  being  Anirlo- 
Portuguese,  descended  to  the  battle,  and  with  them 
w?i)t  ninr^ty-five  pieces  of  artillery,  v.'hi.'di  under  tiie 
command  of  co'onel  Dickson  were  all  with  in'-on- 
44 


ceivable  vigour  and  activity  thrown  into  action. 
Nor  in  this  liost  do  I  reckon  t()ur  thousand  five  liuii- 
dred  cavalry,  nor  the  Sj)aniar(ls  of  the  blockading 
division  which  remained  in  reserve.  Un  the  other 
hand,  the  French  numbers  were  now  increased  by 
the  new  levy  of  conscripts,  but  many  had  deserted 
again  into  the  interior,  and  the  fighting  men  did 
not  exceed  seventy-nine  thousand  including  the  gar- 
risons. Six  thousand  of  these  were  cavalry,  and  as 
Foy's  operations  were  extraneous  to  the  line  of  de- 
fence, scarcely  sixty  thousand  infantry  and  artillery 
were  opposed  to  the  allies. 

Lord  Wellington,  seeing  that  the  right  of  Soult's 
line  could  not  be  forced  without  great  loss,  resolved 
to  hold  it  in  check  while  he  turned  it  by  forcing  the 
centre  and  left,  pushing  down  the  Nivelle  to  St.  Pe. 
In  this  view  the  second  and  sixth  British  divisions, 
Hamilton's  Portuguese,  iMorillo's  Spaniards,  four  of 
Mina's  battalions,  and  Grant's  brigade  of  light  cav- 
alry, in  all  twenty-six  thousand  fighting  men  and 
officers  with  nine  guns,  were  collected  under  general 
Hill  in  the  Bastan  to  attack  D'Erlon.  The  position 
of  Roncesvalles  was  meanwhile  occupied  by  the  re- 
mainder of  Mina's  troops,  supported  by  the  olocjad- 
ing  force  under  Carlos  d'Espana. 

The  third,  fourth  and  seventh  ivisions,  and  Gi- 
ron's  Andalusians,  tlie  whole  unde  the  command  cf 
marshal  Beresford,  were  dispose,  about  Zugara- 
murdi,  the  Puerto  de  Echallar,  and  the  lower  parts 
of  those  slopes  of  the  greater  Rhune  which  descend- 
ed upon  Sarre.  On  the  left  of  this  body  the  light 
division  and  Longa's  Spaniards,  both  under  Charles 
Alten,  were  disposed  on  those  slopes  cf  the  greater 
Rhune  which  led  down  towards  Asc^in.  \  ictor 
Alten's  brigade  of  light  cavalry  and  tiiree  British 
batteries  were  placed  on  the  road  to  Sarre,  and  six 
mountain-guns  followed  Giron's  and  Cha'Ics  Alten's 
troops.  Thus  thirty-six  thousand  fighting  men  and 
officers,  with  twenty-four  guns,  were  concentrated 
in  this  quarter  to  attack  Clauzel. 

General  Freyre's  .Spaniards,  about  nine  thousand 
strong,  with  six  guns,  were  disposed  on  Alten's  ]e\\, 
at  the  fort  of  Calvaire  and  towards  Jollimont,  ready 
to  fall  upon  any  troops  which  might  be  detached 
from  the  camp  of  Serres  by  the  bridge  of  Ascain  to 
support  ('lauzel. 

General  Hope,  having  the  first  and  fifth  divisions, 
Wilson's,  Bradford's  and  lord  Ayhner's  brigades  of 
infantry,  Vandeleur's  brigade  of  light  dragoons,  and 
the  heavy  German  cavalry,  in  all  about  nineteen 
thousand  men  and  officers,  with  fifty-four  guns,  was 
opposed  to  Soult's  right  wing  ;  and  the  naval  squad- 
ron hovering  on  Hope's  left  flank  was  to  aid  the  land 
operations. 

On  the  French  side  each  lieutenant-general  had  a 
special  position  to  defend.  D'Erlon's  first  line,  its 
left  resting  on  the  fortified  rocks  of  Mondarain, 
which  could  not  be  turned,  ran  from  thence  along 
the  Choupera  and  Atchuleguy  mountains  by  the 
forge  of  Urdax  to  the  Nivelle.  This  rang.e  was 
strongly  intrenched  and  occupied  by  one  of  Abbe's 
and  one  of  D'Armagnac's  brigades,  Espelette  being 
behind  the  former  and  Ainhoa  behind  the  latter. 
The  second  line  or  main  position  was  several  miles 
distant  on  a  broad  ridge,  behind  Ainhoa,  and  it  was 
occupied  by  the  remaining  brigades  of  the  two  divi- 
sions. The  left  did  not  extend  beyond  the  centre 
of  the  first  line,  but  tlie  right  reaching  to  the  bridge 
of  Amotz  stretclied  with  a  wider  flank,  because  the 
Nivelle  flowing  in  a  slanting  direction  towards  the 
French  gave  greater  space  as  their  positions  re- 
ceded. Three  great  redoubts  were  constructed  in  a 
line  on  this  ridgi\  and  a  fourth  had  been  commenced 
close  to  tiie  bridge 


674 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


TBooK  XXIII. 


Un  the  rig'ht  of  D'Erlon's  second  line,  that  is  to 
nay,  beyond  the  bridge  of  Amotz,  Clauzers  position 
extended  to  Ascain,  also  along  a  strong  range  of 
heights  fortified  with  many  redoubts,  trenches  and 
abatis;  and  as  the  Nivelle  after  passing  Amotz 
8wept  in  a  curve  completely  round  the  range  to  As- 
cain, botii  flanks  rested  alike  upon  that  river,  hav- 
ing communication  by  the  bridges  of  Amotz  and 
Ascain  on  the  right  and  left,  and  a  retreat  by  the 
bridges  of  St.  Pe  and  Harastagui  which  were  in  rear 
of  the  centre.  Two  of  Clauzel's  divisions,  reinforced 
by  one  of  D'Erlon's  under  general  ilaransin,  were 
here  posted.  In  front  of  the  left  were  the  redoubts 
of  St.  Barbe  and  Grenada,  covering  the  village  and 
ridge  of  Sarre.  In  front  of  the  right  was  the  small- 
er Rhune,  which  was  fortified  and  occupied  by  a 
brigade  of  Maransin's  division.  A  new  redoubt 
with  abatis  was  also  commenced  to  cover  the  ap- 
proaches to  the  bridge  of  Amotz. 

On  the  right  of  this  line,  beyond  the  bridge  of 
Ascain,  Daricau's  division  belonging  to  Clauzel's 
corps,  and  the  Italian  brigade  of  St.  Pol  drawn  from 
Villatte's  reserve,  were  posted  to  hold  the  intrenched 
camp  of  Serres  and  to  connect  Clauzel's  position 
with  Villatte's,  which  was,  as  I  have  before  said, 
on  a  ridge  crossing  the  gorges  of  Olette  and  Jolli- 
mont.  The  French  right  wing  under  Reille,  strong- 
ly fortified  on  the  lower  ground  and  partially  covered 
by  inundations,  was  nearly  impregnable. 

Soult's  weakest  point  of  general  defence  was  cer- 
tainly the  opening  between  the  Rhune  mountains 
and  the  Nivelle.  Gradually  narrowing  as  it  ap- 
proached the  bridge  of  Amotz  this  space  was  the 
most  open,  the  least  fortified,  and  the  Nivelle  being 
fordable  above  that  bridge  could  not  hamper  the 
allies'  movements.  Wherefore  a  powerful  force  act- 
ing in  this  direction  could  pass  by  D'Erlon's  first 
line,  and  breaking  in  upon  the  main  position  be- 
tween the  right  of  that  general's  second  line  and 
Clauzel's  left,  turn  both  by  the  same  attack. 

Lord  Wellington  thus  designed  his  battle.  Gene- 
ral Hill,  leaving  Mina's  four  battalions  on  the  Go- 
rospil  mountain  facing  the  rocks  of  Mondarain,  mov- 
ed iii  the  night  by  the  different  passes  of  the  Puerto 
de  Maya,  Morillo's  Spaniards  being  to  menace  the 
French  on  the  Choupera  and  Atchuleguy  mountains, 
the  second  division  to  attack  Ainhoa  and  Urdax. 
The  sixth  division  and  Hamilton's  Portuguese  were 
to  assault  the  works  covering  the  bridge  of  Amotz, 
either  on  the  right  or  left  bank  of  the  Nivelle  ac- 
cording to  circumstances.  Thus  the  action  of  twen- 
ty-six thousand  men  was  combined  against  D'Erlon's 
position,  and  on  their  left  Beresford's  corps  was  as- 
sembled. The  third  division  under  general  Colville, 
descending  from  Zugaramurdi,  was  to  move  against 
the  unfinished  redoubts  and  intrenchments  covering 
the  approaches  to  tiie  bridge  of  Amotz  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  Nivelle,  thus  turning  D'Erlon's  right  at 
the  moment  when  it  was  attacked  in  front  by  Hill's 
corps.  On  the  left  of  the  third  division,  the  seventh, 
descending  from  the  mouth  of  the  Echallar  pass, 
was  to  storm  the  Grenada  redoubt,  and  then  passing 
the  village  of  Sarre  assail  Clauzel's  main  position 
abreast  with  the  attack  of  the  third  division.  On 
the  left  of  the  seventh,  the  fourth  division,  assem- 
bling on  the  lower  slopes  of  the  grqater  Rhune,  was 
to  descend  upon  the  redoubt  of  St.  Barbe,  and  then 
moving  through  Sarre  also  to  assail  Clauzel's  main 
position  abreast  with  the  seventh  division.  On  the 
left  of  the  fourth  division,  Giron's  Spaniards,  gath- 
ered higher  up  on  the  flank  of  the  great  Rhune,  were 
to  move  abreast  with  the  others  leaving  Sarre  on 
♦.heir  rigiit.  They  were  to  drive  'b  enemy  from 
Mie  lower  slopes  of  the  small sr  Rhune,  and  then  in 


concert  with  the  rest  attack  Ciauzel's  main  position. 
In  this  way  Hill's  and  i'erestord's  corps,  lorniing  a 
mass  of  more  than  forty  tiioui^and  infiintry,  were  to 
be  thrust,  on  both  sides  of  the  bricge  of  Anictz,  be- 
tween Clauzel  and  D'Erlon,  to  break  their  line  of 
battle. 

Charles  Alten,  with  the  light  division  and  Longa's 
Spaniards,  furnishing  together  about  eight  thousand 
men,  was  likewise  to  attack  Clauzel's  line  on  the 
left  of  (riron,  while  Freyre's  Gallicians  approached 
the  bridge  of  Ascain  to  prevent  reinforcements  com- 
ing from  the  camp  of  Serres.  But  ere  Alten  could 
assail  Clauzel's  right  the  smaller  Rhune  which  cover- 
ed it  was  to  be  stormed.  This  mountain  outwork 
was  a  hog's-back  ridge  rising  abruptly  out  of  table- 
land and  parallel  witii  the  greater  liLune.  It  was 
inaccessiWe  along  its  front,  which  was  precipitous 
and  from  fifty  to  two  hundred  feet  high  ;  but  on  the 
enemy's  left  these  rocks  gradually  decreased,  descend- 
ing by  a  long  slope  to  the  valley  of  Sarre,  and  about 
two-thirds  of  the  way  down  the  thirty-fourth  French 
regiment  was  placed,  with  an  advanced  post  en  some 
isolated  crags  situated  in  the  hollow  between  the 
two  Rhunes.  On  the  enemy's  right  the  hog's-back 
sunk  by  degrees  into  the  plain  or  platform.  It  was 
however  covered  at  that  point  by  a  marsh  scarcely 
passable,  and  the  attacking  troops  were  therefore 
first  to  move  up  against  the  perpendicular  rocks  in 
front,  and  then  to  file  to  their  left  under  lire,  between 
the  marsh  and  the  lower  crags,  until  they  gained  an 
accessible  point  from  whence  they  could  fight  their 
way  along  the  narrow  ridge  of  the  hog's-back.  But 
the  bristles  of  the  latter  were  huge  perpendicular 
crags  connected  with  walls  of  loose  stones  ?o  as  to 
form  several  small  forts  or  castles  communicating 
with  each  other  by  narrow  footways,  and  rising  one 
above  another  until  the  culminant  point  was  attain- 
ed. The  table-land  beyond  this  ridge  was  extensive 
ana  terminated  in  a  very  deep  ravine  on  every  side, 
save  a  narrow  space  on  the  right  of  the  marsh,  where 
the  enemy  had  drawn  a  traverse  of  loose  stones,  run- 
ning perpendicularly  from  behind  the  hog's-back  and 
ending  in  a  star  fort  which  overhung  the  edge  of  the 
ravine. 

This  rampart  and  fort,  and  the  hcg's-back  itself, 
were  defended  by  Barbot's  brigade  of  Maransin's 
division,  and  the  line  of  retreat  was  towards  a  lew 
narrow  neck  of  land,  which  bridging  the  deep  ravine 
linked  the  Rhune  to  Clauzel's  main  position  :  a  re- 
serve was  placed  here,  partly  to  sustain  the  thirty- 
fourth  French  regiment  posted  on  the  slope  of  the 
mountain  towards  Sarre,  partly  to  protect  the  neck 
of  land  on  the  side  of  that  village.  As  this  neck 
was  the  only  approach  to  the  French  position  in  that 
part,  to  storm  the  smaller  Rhune  was  a  necessary 
preliminary  to  the  general  battle;  wherefore  Alten, 
filing  his  troops  atler  dark  on  the  9th  from  the  Her- 
mitage, the  Commissari  mountain  and  the  Puerto  d« 
Vera,  collected  them  at  midnight  on  that  slope  of 
the  greater  Rhune  which  descender!  towards  Ascain. 
The  main  body  of  the  light  division,  turning  the 
marsh  by  the  left,  was  to  assail  the  stone  traverse 
and  lap  over  the  star  fort  by  the  ravine  beyond 
Longa,  stretching  still  farther  on  the  left,  was  to 
turn  the  smaller  Rhune  altogether;  and  the  forty- 
third  regiment,  supported  by  the  seventeenth  Por- 
tuguese, was  to  assail  the  hog's  back.  One  battalion 
of  riflemen  and  the  mcuntain-guns  were  however  left 
Dn  the  summit  of  the  greater  Rhune,  witli  orders  to 
assail  the  craggy  posts  between  the  Rhunes  and  con- 
nect Alten's  attack  with  that  of  Giron's  Spaniards. 
All  these  troops  gained  their  respective  stations  eo 
secretly  that  the  enemy  had  no  suspicion  of  their 
presence,  although  for  several  hours  the   columns 


1813.J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


675 


were  lying  within  half  inusket-shot  of  the  works. 
'I'owarils  morning-  indeed  five  or  six  guns,  tired  in  a 
hurried  manner  from  the  low  ground  near  the  sea, 
broke  the  stillness,  but  the  French  on  the  Rhune 
remained  quiet,  and  the  British  troops  awaited  the 
rising  of  tiie  sun,  when  three  guns  fired  from  the  At- 
chubia  mountain  were  to  give  the  signal  of  attack. 

BATTLE    OF    THE    NIVELLE. 

The  day  broke  with  splendour,  and  as  the  first  ray 
of  liglit  played  on  the  summit  of^  the  lofty  Atchubia 
the  signal  guns  were  fired  in  rapid  succession  from 
its  summit.  The  soldiers  instantly  leaped  up,  and 
the  French  beheld  with  astonishment  several  columns 
rushing  forward  from  the  flank  of  the  great  Rhune. 
Running  to  their  defences  with  much  tumult  they 
opened  a  few  pieces,  which  were  answered  from  the 
top  of  the  greater  Rhune  by  the  mountain  artillery, 
and  at  the  same  moment  two  companies  of  the  forty- 
third  were  detached  to  cross  the  marsh,  if  possible, 
and  keep  down  the  enemy's  fire  from  the  lower  part  j 
of  the  hog's-back.  The  action  being  thus  com- 
menced, the  remainder  of  the  regiment,  formed  part- 
ly in  line,  partly  in  a  column  of  reserve,  turned  the 
marsh  by  the  right  and  advanced  against  the  high 
rocks.  From  these  crags  the  French  shot  fast  and 
thickly,  but  the  quick  even  movement  of  the  Britisli 
line  deceived  their  aim,  and  the  soldiers,  running 
forward  very  swiftly  though  the  ground  was  rough, 
turned  suddenly  between  the  rocks  and  the  marsh, 
and  were  immediately  joined  by  the  two  companies 
which  had  passed  that  obstacle  notwithstanding  its 
deptli.  Then  all  together  jumped  into  the  lower 
works,  but  the  men  exhausted  by  their  exertions, 
■'for  they  had  passed  over  half  a  mile  of  very  difficult 
ground  with  a  wonderful  speed,  remained  tor  a  few 
minutes  inactive  within  half  pistol-shot  of  the  first 
stone  castle,  from  whence  came  a  sharp  and  biting 
musketry.  When  they  had  recovered  breath  they 
arose,  and  with  a  stern  shout  commenced  the  assault. 

The  defenders  were  as  numerous  as  the  assailants, 
and  for  six  weeks  they  had  been  labouring  on  their 
well-contrived  castles;  but  strong  and  valiant  in 
arms  must  the  soldiers  have  been  who  stood  in  that 
hour  before  the  veterans  of  the  forty-third.  One 
French  grenadier  officer  only  dared  to  sustain  the 
rush.  Standing  alone  on  the  high  wall  of  the  first 
castle,  and  flinging  large  stones  with  both  his  hands, 
a  noble  figure,  he  fought  to  the  last  and  fell,  while 
his  men  shrinking  on  each  side  sought  safety  among 
the  rocks  on  his  flanks.  Close  and  confused  then 
was  the  action,  man  met  man  &*  every  turn,  but  with 
a  rattling  fire  of  musketry,  sometimes  struggling  in 
the  intricate  narrow  paths,  sometimes  climbing  the 
loose  stone  walls,  the  British  soldiers  won  their  des- 
perate way  until  they  had  carried  the  second  castle, 
called  by  the  French  •'  the  place  of  arms,"  and  "  the 
magpie's  nest,"  because  of  a  lofty  pillar  of  rock 
v/hich  arose  above  it  and  on  which  a  few  marksmen 
were  perched.  From  these  points  the  defenders 
were  driven  into  their  last  castle,  which  being  high- 
er and  larger  than  the  others,  and  covered  by  a  natu- 
ral ditch  or  cleft  in  the  rocks  fifteen  feet  deep,  was 
called  •'  the  Donjon."  Here  they  made  a  stand,  and 
the  assailants,  having  advanced  so  far  as  to  look  into 
the  rear  of  the  rampart  and  star  fort  on  the  table- 
land below,  suspended  the  vehement  throng  of  their 
attack  fur  a  while,  partly  to  gather  a  head  for  storm- 
ing tiie  Donjon,  partly  to  fire  on  the  enemy  beneath 
them,  who  were  now  warmly  engaged  with  the  two 
battalions  of  riflemen,  the  Portuguese  ca(^adores,  and 
the  seventeenth  Portuguese.  This  last  regiment 
was  to  have  followed  the  forty-third,  but  seeing  how 
rapidly  and  surely  the  latter  were  carrying  the  rocke, 


had  moved  at  once  against  the  traverse  on  the  other 
side  of  the  marsh;  and  very  soon  the  Frencli  defend- 
ing the  rampart,  being  thus  pressed  in  frc  nt,  and 
warned  by  the  direction  of  the  fire  that  they  were 
turned  on  the  ridge  above,  seeing  also  the  fifty - 
second,  forming  tiie  extreme  left  of  the  division,  now 
emerging  from  the  deep  ravine  beyond  the  star  ibrt 
on  the  other  flank,  abandoned  tiieir  works,  'I'hen 
the  forty-third,  gathering  a  strong  liead,  stormed  the 
Donjon.  Some  leaped  with  a  shout  down  the  dee[> 
cleft  in  the  rock,  others  turned  it  by  the  narrow 
paths  on  each  flank,  and  the  enemy  abandoned  the 
loose  walls  at  the  moment  they  were  being  scaled. 
Thus  in  twenty  minutes  six  hundred  old  soldiers 
were  hustled  out  of  this  labyrinth  ;  yet  not  so  easi- 
ly but  that  the  victors  lost  eleven  ofricers  and  sixty- 
seven  men. 

The  whole  mountain  was  now  cleared  of  the 
French,  for  the  riflemen,  dropping  perpendicularly 
down  from  the  greater  Rhune  upon  the  post  of  crags 
in  the  hollow  between  the  Rhunes,  seized  it  with 
small  loss  ;  but  they  were  ill-seconded  by  G iron's 
Spaniards,  and  were  hardly  handled  by  the  tliirty- 
fourth  French  regiment;  which  maintaining  i's 
post  on  the  slope,  covered  the  flight  of  the  confused 
crowd  which  came  rushing  down  the  mountain  be- 
hind them  towards  the  neck  of  land  leading  to  the 
main  position.  At  that  point  they  all  rallied  and 
seemed  inclined  to  renew  the  action,  but  after  some 
hesitation  continued  their  retreat.  This  favourable 
moment  for  a  decisive  stroke  had  been  looked  for  by 
the  commander  of  Xie  forty-third,  but  the  officer  in- 
trusted with  the  reserve  companies  of  the  regiment 
had  thrown  tliem  needlessly  into  the  fight,  thus  ren- 
dering it  impossible  to  collect  a  body  strong  enough 
to  assail  such  a  heavy  mass. 

The  contest  at  tlie  stone  rampart  and  star  fort, 
being  shortened  by  tlie  rapid  success  on  the  hcg"e- 
back,  was  not  very  severe,  but  general  Kempt,  al- 
ways conspicuous  for  his  valour,  was  severely 
wounded,  nevertheless  he  did  not  quit  the  field,  and 
soon  re-formed  his  brigade  on  the  platform  he  had 
thus  so  gallantly  won.  Meanwhile  the  fifty-second, 
having  turned  the  position  by  the  ravine,  was  now 
approaching  the  enemy's  line  of  retreat,  when  gene- 
ral Alten,  following  his  instructions,  halted  the  di- 
vision partly  in  the  ravine  itself  to  the  left  of  the 
neck,  partly  on  the  table-land,  and  during  this  ac- 
tion Tonga's  Spaniards  having  got  near  Ascain 
were  in  connexion  with  Freyre's  Gallicians.  In 
this  position,  with  the  enemy  now  and  then  can- 
nonading Longa's  people  and  the  troops  in  the  ra- 
vine, Alten  awaited  the  progress  of  the  army  on  his 
right,  for  the  columns  there  had  a  long  way  to 
march,  and  it  was  essential  to  regulate  the  move- 
ments. 

The  signal-guns  from  the  Atchubia,  which  sent 
the  light  division  against  the  Rhune,  had  also  put 
the  fourth  and  seventh  divisions  in  movement 
against  the  redoubts  of  St.  Barbe  and  Grenada. 
Eighteen  guns  were  immediately  placed  in  battery 
against  the  former,  and  while  they  poured  their 
stream  of  shot  the  troops  advanced  with  scaling  lad- 
ders, and  the  skirmishers  of  the  fourth  division  got 
into  the  rear  of  the  work,  whereupon  the  l'"rench 
leaped  out  and  fled.  Ross's  battery  of  horse  artil- 
lery, galloping  to  a  rising  ground  in  rear  of  the 
Grenada  fort,  drove  the  enemy  from  there  also,  and 
then  the  fourth  and  seventh  divisions  carried  the 
village  of  Sarre  and  the  position  beyond  if^  and  ad- 
vanced to  the  attack  of  Clauzel's  main  position. 

It  was  now  eight  o'clotk,  and  from  the  smaller 
Rhune  a  splendid  spectacle  of  war  opened  upon  tfio 
view.     On  one  hand  the  bhips  of  war  blowly  sailiug 


676 


NAPIEl   S    PEN      -VSULAR   WAR 


I  Book  XXHI. 


to  and  fro  wor«  exchanginfr  shots  with  the  fort  of 
Socoii  Hope  menacing  all  the  French  lines  in  the 
low  grronnd  sent  the  sound  of  a  hundreJ  pieces  of 
artillery  bellowing  up  the  rocks,  and  they  were 
answered  by  nearly  as  many  from  the  tops  of  the 
mountains.  On  tbe  other  hand,  tlie  summit  of  the 
great  Atchubia  was  just  lighted  by  the  rising  sun, 
and  tifty  thousand  men  rushing  down  its  enormous 
elopes  with  ringing  sliouts  seemed  to  chase  the  re- 
ceding shadows  into  the  deep  valley.  The  plains  of 
France,  so  long  overlooked  from  the  towering  crags 
of  the  Pyrenees,  were  to  be  the  prize  of  battle  ;  and 
the  half-famished  soldiers  in  tlieirfur)'  broke  through 
the  iron  barrier  erected  Jy  Soult  as  if  it  were  but  a 
screen  of  reeds. 

The  principal  action  was  on  a  space  of  seven  or 
eight  miles,  but  the  skirts  of  battle  spread  wide, 
and  in  Jio  [)oint  had  the  combinations  failed.  Far 
on  the  riglit,  general  Hill,  after  a  long  and  difficult 
night  marcli,  had  got  within  reach  of  the  enemy  a 
little  before  seven  o'clock.  Opposing  Morillo's  and 
!RIina's  Spaniards  to  Abbe's  troops  on  the  Monda- 
rain  and  Atcluileguy  rocks,  he  directed  the  second 
division  against  D'Armagnac's  brigade  and  brushed 
it  back  from  the  forge  of  Urdax  and  the  village  of 
Ainhoa.  Meanwhile  the  aid  of  the  sixth  division 
and  Hamilton's  Portuguese  being  demanded  by  him, 
they  passed  the  Nivelle  lower  down  and  bent  their 
march  along  the  right  bank  towards  the  bridge  of 
Amotz.  Thus,  while  Mina's  battalions  and  Moril- 
lo's division  kept  Abbe  in  check  on  the  mountains, 
the  three  A.nglo-Portuguese  divisions,  marching  left 
flank  in  advance,  approached  D'Erlon's  second  po- 
sition, but  tlie  country  being  very  rugged  it  was 
eleven  o'clock  before  they  got  within  cannon-shot  of 
the  French  redoubts.  Each  of  these  contained  five 
liunored  men,  and  they  were  placed  along  the  sum- 
mit of  a  high  ridge  which,  being,  thickly  clothed 
with  bushes,  and  covered  by  a  deep  ravine,  was 
very  difficult  to  attack.  However  general  Clinton, 
leading  the  sixth  division  on  the  extreme  left,  turn- 
ed this  ravine  and  drove  the  enemy  from  the  works 
covering  the  approaches  to  the  bridge,  after  which 
wheeling  to  his  right  he  advanced  against  the  near- 
e'vt  redoubt,  and  the  garrison  not  daring  to  await 
the  assault  abandoned  it.  Then  the  Portuguese  di- 
vision, p;{ssing  the  ravine  and  marching  on  the  right 
of  the  sixth,  menaced  the  second  redoubt,  and  the 
second  division  in  like  manner  approaclied  the  third 
redoubt.  D'Armagnac's  troops  now  set  fire  to  their 
hutted  camp  and  retreated  to  Helbacen  de  Borda  be- 
hind St.  Pe,  pursued  by  the  sixth  division.  Abbe's 
second  brigade,  forming  the  French  left,  was  sepa- 
rated by  a  ravine  from  D'Armagnac's  ground,  but 
he  also  after  some  hesitation  retreated  towards  Es- 
pelette  and  Cambo,  where  his  other  brigade,  which 
had  rneanwliile  fallen  back  from  the  Mondarain  be- 
fore Moriilo,  rejoined  him. 

It  was  the  progress  of  the  battle  on  the  left  of  the 
Nive  that  rendered  D'FCrlon's  defence  so  feeble.  Af- 
ter the  fnll  of  the  St.  Barhe  and  Grenada  redoubts, 
Conroux's  right  and  centre  endeavoured  to  defend 
the  village  and  heights  of  Sarre ;  but  while  the 
fourth  and  seventh  divisions,  aided  by  the  ninety- 
fourth  regiment  detached  from  the  third  division, 
attacked  and  carried  those  points  the  third  division 
being  on  their  right  and  less  opposed  jaished  rapid- 
ly towarils  the  bridge  of  Amotz,  forming  in  con- 
junction with  the  sixth  division  the  narrow  end  of 
the  wedge  into  which  Beresford's  and  Hill's  corps 
were  now  thrown.  The  French  were  thus  driven 
from  all  their  new  unfinished  works  covering  tiie 
approaches  to  that  bridge  on  both  sides  of  tlie  Ni- 
velle, and  Conroux's  division,  spreading  from  Surro 


to  Amotz,  was  broken  by  superior  nuu:'bers  at  every 
point.  That  general  indeed  vigorously  uef-^nded  the 
old  works  around  the  bridge  itself;  but  he  soon  fell 
mortally  wounded,  his  troops  were  again  broken, 
and  the  third  division  seized  the  bridge  and  ettab' 
lished  itself  on  the  heiglits  between  that  structure 
and  tlie  redoubt  of  Louis  XIV.,  which  having  been 
also  lately  commenced  was  unfinished.  This  hap- 
pened about  eleven  o'clock  ;  and  DT*^rlon  fearing  tr 
be  cut  off  from  St.  Pe  yielded,  as  we  have  seen,  p  , 
once  to  the  attack  of  tlie  sixth  division,  and  at  t'  9 
same  time  the  remainder  of  Conroux's  trooj)s':jM 
back  in  disorder  from  Sarre,  closely  pursued  by  thti 
fourth  and  seventh  divisions,  which  were  immediate- 
ly established  on  the  left  of  the  third.  Thus  the 
communication  between  Clauzel  and  D'Erlon  was 
cut  off.  the  left  flank  of  one  and  the  right  flank  of 
the  other  broken,  and  a  direct  communication  be- 
tween Hill  and  Beresford  secured  by  the  same  blow. 

D'Erlon  abandoned  his  position,  but  Clauzel  stood 
firm  with  Taupin's  and  Maransin's  divitims.  The 
latter,  now  completed  by  the  return  of  Barbel's  bri- 
gade from  tiie  smaller  Rliune,  occupied  the  redoubt 
of  Louis  XIV.,  and  supported  with  eigiit  field-piecee 
attempted  to  cover  the  flight  of  Conroux's  troops. 
The  guns  opened  briskly,  but  they  were  silenced  by 
Ross's  battery  of  horse  artillery,  tiie  only  one Avhich 
had  eurmounted  the  difficulties  of  the  ground  after 
passing  Sarre;  the  infantry  were  then  assailed,  in 
front  by  the  fourth  and  seventh  divisions,  in  flank 
by  the  third  division;  the  redoubt  of  Louis  XIV. 
was  stormed,  the  garrison  bayoneted  ;  Conroux's 
men  continued  to  fly,  Maransin's,  after  a  stifi'  corn- 
bat,  were  cast  headlong  into  the  "av'npo  behind 
their  position,  and  31aransin  himself  .vas  taken,  out 
escaped  in  the  confusion.  Giron's  Spaniards  now 
came  up  on  the  left  of  the  fourth  division,  somc\Ahat 
late,  however,  and  after  having  abandoned  the  rifle- 
men on  the  lower  slopes  of  the  smaller  Rluine. 

On  the  French  side,  Taujr.n's  division  and  a 
large  body  of  conscripts  forming  Clauzcl's  right 
wing  still  remained  to  fight.  The  left  rested  on  a 
large  work  called  "the  signal  redoubt,"  which  had 
no  artillery,  but  overlooked  the  whole  position  ;  the 
right  was  covered  by  two  redoubts  overhanging  a 
ravine  which  separated  them  from  the  camp  of  Ser- 
res,  and  some  works  in  the  ravine  itself  protected 
the  communication  by  the  bridge  of  Ascain.  Be- 
hind the  signal  redoubt,  on  a  ridge  crossing  the  road 
to  St.Pe,  and  along  which  Maransin's  and  Conroux's 
beaten  divisions  were  now  flying  in  disorder,  there 
was  another  work  called  the  redoubt  of  Harastuguia, 
and  Clauzel,  thinking  he  might  still  dispute  the  vic- 
tory if  his  reserve  division,  posted  in  the  camp  of 
Serres,  could  come  to  his  aid,  drew  the  thirty-first 
French  regiment  from  Taupin  and  posted  it  in  front 
of  this  redoubt  of  Ilarastaguia,  His  object  was  to 
rally  Maransin's  and  Conroux's  1roo[)s  there,  and  to 
form  a  new  line,  the  left  on  the  Ilarastaguia,  tiie 
rigl't  on  the  signal  redoubt,  into  which  last  he  threw 
six  Hundred  of  the  eighty-eighth  regiment.  In  this 
position,  having  a  retreat  by  the  bridge  of  Ascain, 
he  resolved  to  renew  the  battle  ;  but  his  plan  failed 
at  the  moment  of  conception,  because  Taupin  could 
not  stand  before  the  light  division,  which  was  now 
again  in  full  action. 

About  half  past  nine,  general  Alton,  seeing  the 
whole  of  tiie  columns  on  his  right,  as  far  as  the  eye 
could  reach,  well  engaged  with  the  enemy,  had 
crossed  the  low  neck  of  land  in  his  front.  It  was 
first  passed  by  the  fifty-second  /egiment  with  a  rap- 
id i^ace  and  a  very  narrow  front,  under  a  destructive 
cannonade  and  fire  of  musketry  from  tlie  intrench- 
mentc  which  covered  the  side  of  the  opposite  mcun- 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


G77 


tiiin  ;  a  ruad  coining  from  Ascain   by  the  ravine  led 
up  tlie  position,  and  as  the  litty-second  pushed  tlieir 
tultacli   along   it  the  enemy  abandoned  his  intronch- 
ments  on  each  side,  and  forsook  even  his  crowning 
v\orks  above.     This  formidable    regiment  was   fol- 
lowed by  the  remainder  of  Alten's  troops  ;  and  Tau- 
pin,  though  his    division  was  weak  from  its  losses 
on  the  7th  of  October,  and  now  still  further  dimin- 
ished  by  the    absence  of  the  thirty-first  regiment, 
awaited  the  assault  above,  being  supported  by  the 
conscripts  drawn  up  in  his  rear.     But  at  this  time 
Longa,  having  turned  the  smaller  Rhune,  approach- 
ed Ascain,  and   being  joined    by   part    of  Freyre's 
troops,  tiieir  skirmishers  opened  a  distant  musketry 
against  the  works  covering  the  bridge  on  Taupin's 
right;  a  panic  immediately  seized  the   French,  the  ! 
seventieth  regiment    abandoned    the    two    redoubts 
above,  and  tiie  conscripts  were  withdrawn.    Clauzel  ! 
ordered  Taupin   to   retake    the   forts  ;  but  this  only  ; 
added  to  the  disorder,  the  seventieth  regiment  in-! 
Btsad  of  facing  about  disbanded  entirely,  and  were  ! 
not  reassembled  until  next  day.      There  remained  ] 
only  four  regiments  unbroken, one,  the  eighty-eighth,  I 
was  in  the  signal  redoubt,  two  under  Taupin  in  per- 
son kept  together  in  rear  of  the  works  on  the  right, 
and  the  thirty-first  covered  the  fort  of  Harastagiiia, 
now  the  only  line  of  retreat. 

In  this  emergency,  Clauzel,  anxious  to  bring 
off  tiie  eighty-eighth  regiment,  ordered  Taupin  to 
charge  on  one  side  of  the  signal  redoubt,  intending 
to  do  the  same  himself  on  the  other  at  the  head  of 
the  thirty-first  regiment;  but  the  latter  was  now 
vigorously  attacked  by  the  Portuguese  of  the  seventh 
division,  and  the  fjurth  division  was  rapidly  inter- 
posing between  that  regiment  and  the  signal  re- 
doubt. Moreover,  Alten  previous  to  this  had  di- 
rected the  forty-third,  preceded  by  Barnard's  rifle- 
men, to  turn  at  the  distance  of  musket-shot  the  right 
flank  of  the  signal  redoubt;  wherefore  Taupin,  in- 
Etead  of  charging,  was  himself  charged  in  front  by 
the  riflemen,  and  being  menaced  at  the  same  time 
in  flank  by  the  fourth  division,  retreated,  closely 
pursued  by  Barnard,  until  that  intrepid  officer  fell 
dangerously  wounded.  During  this  struggle  the 
seventli  division  broke  the  thirty-first,  the  rout  was 
complete  ;  the  French  fled  to  the  different  bridges 
over  the  Nivelle,  and  the  signal  redoubt  was  left  to 
its  fate. 

This  formidable  work  barred  the  way  of  the  light 
division,  but  it  was  of  no  value  to  the  defence  when 
the  forts  on  its  flanks  were  abandoned.  Colborne 
approached  it  in  front  with  the  fifty-s3cond  regi- 
ment, Giron's  Spaniards  menaced  it  on  Colborue's 
right,  the  fourth  division  was  passing  to  its  rear, 
and  Kempt's  brigade  was,  as  we  have  seen,  turning 
it  on  the  left.  Colborne,  whose  military  judgment 
was  seldom  at  fault,  halted  under  the  brow  of  the 
conical  hill  on  which  tiie  work  was  situated;  but 
some  of  Giron's  Spaniards,  making  a  vaunting 
though  feeble  demonstration  of  attacking  it  on  his 
right,  were  beaten  back,  and  at  that  moment  a  staff"- 
OiRcer,  williout  warrant,  (for  general  Alten,  on  the 
spot,  assur  *d  the  author  of  this  history  that  he  sent 
no  such  order,)  rode  up  and  directed  Colborne  to  ad- 
vance. It  was  not  a  moment  for  remonstrance,  and 
his  troops  covered  by  the  steepness  of  the  hill  reach- 
ed the  flat  top,  which  was  about  forty  yards  across 
to  the  redoubt ;  then  tliey  mnde  their  rush,  but  a  wide 
ditch,  thirty  feet  deep,  well  fraised  and  palisaded, 
stopped  them  short,  and  the  fire  of  the  enemy  stretch- 
ed all  the  foremost  men  dead.  The  intrepid  Colborne, 
cscajjing  n\iraculously,  for  he  was  always  at  the 
head  and  on  horseback,  immediately  led  the  regi- 
ment under  cover  of  the  brow  to  another  point,  and 


thinking  to  take  the  French  unawares,  made  an- 
other rush,  yet  with  the  same  result.  At  ttiree  dif- 
ferent places  did  he  rise  to  the  surface  in  tiiis  man- 
ner, and  each  time  the  Frencii  fire  swept  away  tlie 
head  of  his  column.  Resorting  then  to  persuasion, 
he  held  out  a  white  handkerchief  and  summinied  tlio 
commandant,  pointing  out  to  him  how  hit:  work  was 
surrounded  and  how  hopeless  hie  defence  ;  \\  here- 
upon the  garrison  yielded,  having  had  only  one  man 
killed,  whereas  on  tiie  British  side  there  fell  two 
hundred  soldiers  of  a  regiment  never  surpassed  in 
arms  since  arms  were  first  borne  by  men. 

During  this  affair  Clauzel's  divisions  had  crossed 
the  Nivelle  in  great  disorder,  IMaransin's  and  Con- 
roux's  troops  near  St.  Pe,  tlie  thirty-firtt  regiment 
at  Ilarastaguia,  Taupin  between  that  place  and  the 
bridge  of  Serres.  They  were  pursued  by  the  third 
and  seventh  divisions,  and  the  skirmislicrs  of  tlie 
former,  crossing  by  Amotz  and  a  bridge  above  St. 
Pe,  entered  that  place  while  the  French  were  in  the 
act  of  passing  the  river  below.  It  was  now  past 
two  o'clock  ;  Conroux's  troops  pushed  on  to  Helbacen 
de  Borda,  a  fortified  position  on  the  road  from  St 
Pe  to  Bayonne,  where  they  were  joined  by  Taupin 
and  by  D'Erlon  with  D'Armagnac's  division,  but 
Clauzel  rallied  Maransin's  men  and  took  post  on 
some  heights  immediately  above  St.  Pe.  Meanwhile 
Soult  had  hurried  from  St.  Jean  de  luz  to  tl:e  camp 
of  Serres  with  all  his  reserve  artillery  and  spare 
troops  to  menace  the  allies' left  flank  by  Ascain,  and 
Wellington  thereupon  halted  the  fourth  and  light 
divisions  and  Giron's  Spaniards  on  the  reverse 
slopes  of  Clauzel's  original  position,  facing  the  camp 
of  Serres,  waiting  until  the  sixth  division,  then  fol- 
lowing D'Armagnac's  retreat  on  the  right  of  tiie 
Nivelle,  was  well  advanced.  When  he  was  assured 
of  Clinton's  progress,  he  crossed  the  Nivelle  with 
the  third  and  seventh  divisions,  and  drove  Maransin 
from  his  new  position  after  a  hard  struggle,  in  which 
general  Inglis  was  wounded  and  the  fifty-first  and 
sixty-eiglith  regiments  handled  very  rougnly.  Thi:^ 
ended  the  battle  in  the  centre,  for  darkness  wls 
coming  on  and  the  troops  were  exhausted,  especial- 
ly tlie  sixth  division,  which  had  been  marching  or 
fighting  for  twenty-four  hours.  However  three  di- 
visions were  firmly  established  in  rear  of  Soult's 
right  wing,  of  whose  operations  it  is  now  time  to 
treat. 

In  front  of  Reille's  intrenchments  were  two  ad- 
vanced positions,  tiie  camp  of  the  Sans  Culottes  on 
the  right,  tiie  Bon  Secours  in  the  centre  covering 
Urogne.  The  first  had  been  attacked  and  carried 
early  in  the  morning  by  the  fifth  division,  which  ad- 
vanced to  the  inundation  covering  the  heights  of 
Bordegain  and  Sibourre.  The  second  after  a  sliort 
cannonade  was  taken  by  Halket's  Germans  and  the 
guards,  and  immediately  afterwards  the  eighty-fifth 
regiment,  of  lord  Aylmer's  brigade,  drove  a  1*  rench 
battalion  out  of  Urogne.  The  first  division,  being 
on  the  right,  tlien  menaced  the  camp  of  Bekhena, 
and  the  German  skirniisiiers  passed  a  small  stream 
covering  this  part  of  the  line,  but  they  were  driven 
back  by  the  enemy,  whose  musketry  and  cannonade 
were  brisk  along  the  whole  front.  Meanwiiile 
Freyre,  advancing  in  two  columns  from  .Jollimont 
and  the  Calvaire  on  tlie  right  of  the  first  division, 
placed  eight  guns  in  battery  against  the  Nassau  re- 
doubt, a  large  work  constructed  on  the  ridge  occujiied 
by  Villatte  to  cover  tlie  approaches  to  Ascain.  The 
Spaniards  were  here  ojijiosed  by  their  o  n  country- 
men under  Casa  Palacios.  who  commanded  the  re 
mains  of  Joseph's  Spanish  guards,  and  during  the 
fight  general  Freyre's  skirniisiiers  on  the  right  nnit- 
ed  with  LoDija's  men.     Thus  a  kind  of  f»J&e  battle 


678 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XXIIJ 


was  maintiined  along  the  whole  line  to  the  sea  un- 
til nigiitfall,  with  equal  loss  of  men,  but  great  ad- 
vantage to  the  allies,  because  it  entirely  occupied 
Reille's  two  divisions  and  Villatte's  reserve,  and 
prevented  the  troops  in  the  camp  of  Serres  from 
passing  by  the  bridge  of  Ascain  to  aid  Clauzel,  who 
was  thus  overpowered.  When  tiiat  event  happened 
and  lord  Wellington  had  passed  tlie  Nivelle  at  St. 
Pe,  Uaricau  and  the  Italian  brigade  withdrew  from 
Serres,  and  Villatte's  reserve  occupied  it,  whereupon 
Freyre  and  Longa  entered  the  town  of  Ascain.  Yil- 
latte  however  held  the  camp  above  until  Reille  had 
withdrawn  into  St.  Jean  de  Luz  and  destroyed  all 
the  bridges  on  the  lower  Nivelle  ;  when  that  was  ef- 
fected tlie  whole  retired,  and  at  daybreak  reached 
the  heights  of  Bidart  on  the  road  to  Bayonne. 

During  the  nigiit  the  allies  halted  on  the  position 
they  had  gained  in  the  centre,  but  an  accidental  con- 
flagration catching  a  wood  completely  separated  the 
piquets  towards  Ascain  from  the  main  body,  and 
spreading  far  and  wide  over  the  heath  lighted  up  all 
the  hills,  a  blazing  sign  of  war  to  France. 

On  the  11th,  the  army  advanced  in  order  of  battle. 
Sir  John  Hope  on  tlie  iefl,  forded  the  river  above  St. 
Jean  de  Luz  with  his  infantry,  and  marched  on  Bi- 
dart. 3Iarshal  Beresford  in  tiie  centre  moved  by  the 
roads  leading  upon  Arbonne.  General  Hill,  com- 
municating by  his  right  with  Morillo  who  was  on 
the  rocks  of  Mondarain,  brought  his  left  forward  in- 
to communication  with  Beresford,  and  with  his  cen- 
tre took  possession  of  Suraide  and  Espelette  facing 
towards  Cambo.  The  time  required  to  restore  the 
bridges  for  the  artillery  at  Sibourre,  and  the  change 
of  front  on  the  right  rendered  these  movements 
slow,  and  gave  the  duke  of  Dalmatia  time  to  rally 
his  army  upon  a  third  line  of  fortified  camps  which 
he  had  previously  commenced,  the  right  resting  on 
the  coast  at  Bidart,  the  centre  at  Helbacen  de  Bor- 
da,  the  left  at  Ustaritz  on  the  Nive.  This  front  was 
about  eight  miles,  but  tlie  works  were  only  slightly 
advanced,  and  Soult  dreading  a  second  battle  on  so 
wide  a  field  drew  back  his  centre  and  left  to  Arbonne 
and  Arauntz,  broke  down  the  bridges  on  the  Nive 
at  Ustaritz,  and  at  two  o'clock  a  slight  skirmish, 
commenced  by  the  allies  in  the  centre,  closed  the 
day's  proceedings.  The  next  morning  the  French 
retired  to  the  ridge  of  Beyris,  having  their  right  in 
advance  at  Anglet  and  their  left  in  the  intrenched 
camp  of  Bayonne  near  Marac.  During  this  move- 
ment a  dense  fog  arrested  the  allies,  but  when  the 
day  cleared  sir  John  Hope  took  post  at  Bidart  on 
the  left,  and  Beresford  occupied  Ahetze,  Arbonne, 
and  the  hill  of  St.  Barbe,  in  the  centre.  General 
Hill  endeavoured  to  pass  the  fords  and  restore  the 
broken  bridges  of  Ustaritz,  and  he  also  made  a  de- 
monstration against  tlie  works  at  Cambo;  but  the 
rain  which  fell  heavily  in  the  mountains  on  the  11th 
rendered  the  fords  impassable,  and  both  points  were 
defended  successfully  by  Foy,  whose  operations  had 
been  distinc-t  from  the  rest. 

In  the  night  of  the  9th,  D'Erlon,  mistrusting  the 
fitrength  of  liis  own  position,  had  sent  that  general 
orders  to  march  from  Bidaray  to  Espelette.  but  the 
niessenTfer  did  not  arrive  in  time,  ami  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  lOtli,  about  eleven  o'clock.  Foy,  follow- 
ing Soult's  previous  instructions,  drove  iMina's  bat- 
talioiis  from  the  Goros[)il  mountain;  tlien  pressing 
against  the  flank  of  Morillo  he  forced  iiim  also  back 
fighting  to  the  Puerto  de  Maya.  However  D'Er- 
lon's  buttle  was  at  tliis  poriod  receding  fiist ;  and 
hoy,  f^arinij  to  be  cut  olT,  retired  with  the  loss  of  a 
colonel  and  one  hundred  and  fifty  men,  liaving  how- 
ever taken  a  quantity  of  baggage  anrl  a  hundred 
prisoners.      Continuing    his    retreat    all    niffht    he 


I  reached  Camto  and  Ustaritz  on  the  11th,  just  in 
■  time  to  relieve  Abbe's  divisions  at  those  posts,  and 
tui  the  12th  defended  them  against  general  Hill. 
Such  were  the  principal  circumstances  of  the  battle 
of  the  Nivelle,  whereby  Soult  was  driven  irom  a 
mountain  position  which  he  had  been  fortifying  :;r 
three  months.  He  lost  four  thousand  two  hundred 
and  sixty-five  men  and  officers  including  twelve  or 
fourteen  hundred  prisoners,  and  one  general  was 
killed.  His  field  magazines  at  St.  Jean  de  Luz  and 
Espelette  fell  into  the  liands  of  the  victors,  and  fif- 
ty-one pieces  of  artillery  were  taken,  the  greater 
part  having  been  abandoned  in  the  redoubts  of  the 
low  country  to  sir  John  Hope.  The  allies  had  two 
generals.  Kempt  and  Byng,  wounded,  and  they  lot-t 
two  thousand  six  hundred  and  ninety-four  men  aud 
officers. 

OBSERVATIONS. 

1st.  Soult  fared  in  this  battle  as  most  generals 
will  who  seek  by  extensive  lines  to  supply  the  want 
of  numbers  or  of  hardiness  in  the  troops.  Against 
rude  commanders  and  undisciplined  soldiers  lines 
may  avail,  seldom  against  accomplished  generalkii, 
never  when  the  assailants  are  the  better  soldiers. 
Ca;sar  at  Alesia  resisted  the  Gauls,  but  his  lines 
served  him  not  at  Dyrrachium  against  Pompey. 
(!rassus  failed  in  Calabria  against  Sparta cus,  and  in 
modern  times  the  duke  of  Marlborough  broke  through 
all  the  French  lines  in  Flanders.  If  Wellington 
triumphed  at  Torres  Vedras  it  was  perhaps  betauso 
his  lines  were  not  attacked,  and,  it  may  be,  Soult 
was  seduced  by  that  example.  His  works  were  al- 
most as  gigantic  and  upon  the  same  plan,  that  is  to 
say,  a  river  on  one  flank,  the  ocean  on  the  other, 
and  the  front  upon  mountains  covered  with  redoubts 
and  partially  protected  by  inundations.  But  the 
duke  of  Dalmatia  had  only  three  months  to  com- 
plete his  system,  his  labours  were  under  the  gaze  of 
his  enemy,  his  troops,  twice  defeated  during  the  ex- 
ecution, were  inferior  in  confidence  and  numbers  to 
the  assailants.  Lord  Wellington's  lines  at  Torres 
Vedras  had  been  laboured  for  a  whole  year.  Masse- 
na  only  knew  of  them  when  they  stopped  his  pro- 
gress, and  his  army  inferior  in  numbers  had  been  re- 
pulsed in  the  recent  battle  of  Busaco. 

It  is  not  meant  by  this  to  decry  intrenched  camps 
within  compass,  and  around  which  an  active  army 
moves  as  on  a  pivot,  delivering  or  avoiding  battle 
according  to  circumstances.  The  objection  applies 
only  to  those  extensive  covering  lines  by  v»'hich  sol- 
diers are  taught  to  consider  themselves  inferior  in 
strength  and  courage  to  their  enemies.  A  general 
is  thus  precluded  from  showing  himself  at  important 
points  and  at  critical  periods;  he  is  unable  to  en- 
courage his  troops  or  to  correct  err(jrs  ;  his  sudden 
resources  and  the  combinations  of  genius  are  ex- 
cluded by  the  necessity  of  adhering  to  the  works, 
while  the  assailants  may  make  whatever  dispositions 
they  like,  nn^nace  every  point,  and  select  where  to 
break  through.  The  defenders,  seeing  large  ninsscs 
directed  against  them  and  unable  to  draw  confidence 
from  a  like  display  of  numbers,  become  fearful,  know- 
ing there  must  be  some  weak  })oint  which  is  the 
measure  of  strenji!th  for  the  whole.  The  assailants 
fall  on  with  that  heat  and  vehemence  which  belonj's 
to  those  who  act  voluntarily  and  on  the  ofliensive; 
each  mass  strives  to  outdo  those  on  its  right  and 
left,  and  failure  is  only  a  repulse,  whereas  the  as- 
sailed having  no  resource  but  victory  look  to  their 
flanks,  and  are  more  anxious  about  their  neighbours' 
fighting  than  their  own. 

All  these  disadvantages  were  experienced  at  the 
battle  of  the  Nivelle.    D'Erlon  attributed  his  defeat 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


679 


to  the  loss  of  the  bridge  of  Amotz  by  Conroux's  di- 
vision, and  to  this  cause  also  Maransin  traced  his 
misfortunes.  Taupin  laid  his  defeat  at  Maransin's 
door,  but  Clauzel  on  the  other  hand  ascribed  it  at 
once  to  want  of  iirmness  in  the  troops,  although  he 
also  asserted  that  if  Daricau's  division  had  come  to 
his  aid  from  the  camp  of  Serres,  he  would  iiavc  main- 
tained Ills  ground.  Soult,  however,  traced  Clauzel's 
dafoat  to  injudicious  measures  That  general,  he 
eaid,  attempted  to  defend  the  village  of  8arre  after 
the  redoubts  of  ,St.  Barbe  and  Grenada  were  carried, 
whereby  Conroux's  division  was  overwhelmed  in  de- 
tail and  driven  back  in  flight  to  Amotz.  Clauzel 
should  rather  have  assembled  his  three  divisions  at 
once  in  the  main  position  which  was  his  battle- 
ground, and  there,  covered  by  the  smaller  Rhune, 
ought  to  have  been  victorious.  It  was  scarcely  cred- 
ible, h-3  observed,  that  such  intrenchments  as  Clau- 
zel's and  D'Erlon's  should  have  been  carried.  For  his 
part,  he  relied  on  their  strength  so  confidently  as  to 
think  the  allies  must  sacrifice  twenty-five  thousand 
men  to  force  them,  and  perhaps  fail  then.  He  had 
been  on  the  right  when  the  battle  began,  no  reports 
came  to  him,  he  could  judge  of  events  only  by  the 
fire,  and  when  he  reached  the  camp  of  Serres  with 
his  reserve  troops  and  artillery  Clauzel's  works  v.'ere 
lost!  His  arrival  had,  however,  paralyzed  the  march 
of  three  divisions.  This  was  true  ;  yet  there  seems 
some  fuuudation  for  Clauzel's  complaint,  namely,  that 
he  had  for  five  hours  fought  on  his  main  position, 
and  during  that  time  no  help  had  come,  although  the 
camp  of  Serres  was  close  at  hand,tlie  distance  from 
St.  Jean  de  Luz  to  that  place  only  four  miles,  and 
the  attack  in  the  low  ground  evidently  a  feint.  This 
then  was  Soult's  error.  He  suffered  sir  John  Hope 
to  hold  in  play  twenty-five  thousand  men  in  the  low 
ground,  while  fifteen  thousand  under  Clauzel  lost  the 
battle  on  the  hills. 

<!nd.  Tlie  French  army  was  inferior  in  numbers, 
and  many  of  the  works  were  unfinished  ;  and  yet 
two  strong  divisions,  Daricau's  and  Foy's,  were  quite 
tlirown  out  of  the  fight,  for  the  slight  offensive 
movement  made  by  the  latter  produced  no  effect 
wliatever.  Vigorous  counter-attacks  are  no  doubt 
essential  to  a  good  defence,  and  it  was  in  allusion  to 
til  is  that  Napoleon,  speaking  of  Joseph's  position 
behind  the  Ebro  in  the  beginning  of  the  war,  said, 
'•  If  a  river  were  as  broad  and  rapid  as  the  Danube, 
it  would  be  nothing  without  secure  points  for  pass- 
ing to  the  offensive."  The  same  maxim  applies  to 
lines,  and  Soult  grandly  conceived  and  applied  this 
principle  when  he  proposed  the  descent  upon  Aragon 
to  Suchet.  But  he  conceived  it  meanly  and  poorly 
when  he  ordered  Foy  to  attack  by  the  Gorospil 
mountain.  That  genei-al's  numbers  were  too  few, 
and  the  direction  of  the  march  false  ;  one  regiment 
in  the  field  of  battle  at  the  decisive  moment  would 
have  bean  worth  three  on  a  distant  and  secondary 
point.  Foy's  retreat  was  inevitable  if  D'Erlon  fail- 
ed, and  wanting  the  other's  aid,  he  did  fail.  What 
success  could  Foy  obtain  1  He  might  have  driven 
Mina's  battalions  over  the  Puerto  de  Maya  and  quite 
through  the  IJastan  ;  he  might  have  defeated  Morillo 
and  perhaps  have  taken  general  Hill's  baggage: 
yet  all  this  would  have  weighed  little  against  the 
allies' success  .at  Amotz;  and  the  deeper  he  pene- 
trated the  more  difficult  would  have  been  his  retreat. 
The  incursion  into  the  Bastan  by  Yspeguy  proposed 
by  him  on  the  6tii.  aitliough  properly  rejected  by 
Soult,  would  probably  have  produced  greater  effects 
than  the  one  executed  by  Gorospil  on  the  10th.  A 
(surprise  on  the  6th,  Hill's  troops  being  then  in 
march  by  brigades  through  the  Alduides,  might  have 
Drought  some  advantages  to  the  French,  and  perhaps 


delayed  the  general  attack  beyond  the  ICth,  when 
the  heavy  rains  which  set  in  on  the  11th  would  have 
rendered  it  difficult  to  attack  at  all:  Soult  would 
thus  have  had  time  to  comjjlete  his  works. 

3rd.  It  has  been  observed  that  a  minor  cause  of 
defeat  was  the  drawing  up  of  the  French  troops  in 
front  instead  of  in  rear  of  the  redoubts.  This  may 
possibly  have  happened  in  some  places  from  error 
and  confusion,  not  by  design,  for  Clauzel's  report 
expressly  states  that  Maransin  was  directed  to  form 
in  the  rear  of  the  redoubts,  and  charge  the  alliea 
when  they  were  between  the  works  and  the  abatis. 
It  is  however  needless  to  pry  closely  into  these 
matters,  when  the  true  cause  lies  broad  on  the  sur- 
face. Lord  Wellington  directed  superior  numbers 
with  superior  skill.  The  following  analysis  will 
prove  this,  but  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  con- 
scripts are  not  included  in  the  enumeration  of  the 
French  force:  being  quite  undisciplined,  they  were 
kept  in  masses  behind  and  never  engaged 

Abbe's  division,  furnishing  five  thousand  old  sol- 
diers, was  posted  in  two  lines  one  behind  the  other, 
and  they  were  both  paralyzed  by  the  position  of 
Morillo's  division  and  Mina's  battalions.  Foy's  di- 
vision was  entirely  occupied  by  the  same  troops. 
Six  thousand  of  Wellington's  worst  soldiers  there- 
fore sufficed  to  employ  twelve  thousand  of  Soult's 
best  troops  during  the  whole  day.  Meanwhile  Hill 
fell  upon  the  decisive  point  where  there  was  only 
D'Armagnac's  division  to  oppose  him,  that  is  to 
say,  five  thousand  against  twenty  thousand.  And 
while  the  battle  was  secured  on  the  right  of  the  Ni- 
velle  by  this  disproportion,  Beresford  on  the  other 
bank  thrust  twenty-four  thousand  against  the  ten 
thousand  composing  Conroux's  and  Maransin's  divi- 
sions. Moreover,  as  Hill  and  Beresford,  advancing, 
the  one  trom  his  left,  the  other  from  his  right,  form- 
ed a  wedge  towards  the  bridge  of  Amotz,  forty-four 
thousand  men,  composing  the  six  divisions  under 
these  generals,  fell  upon  the  fifteen  thousand  com- 
posing the  divisions  of  D'Armagnac,  Conroux  and 
3Iaransini  and  these  last  were  also  attacked  in  de- 
tail, because  part  of  Conroux's  troops  were  defeated 
near  Sarre,  and  Barbot's  brigade  of  Maransin's  corps 
was  beaten  on  the  Rhune  by  the  light  division  be- 
fore the  main  position  was  attacked.  Finally,  Al- 
ten,  with  eight  thousand  men,  having  first  defeated 
Barbot's  brigade,  fell  upon  Taupin  who  had  only 
three  thousand,  while  the  rest  of  the  French  army 
was  held  in  check  by  Freyre  and  Hope.  Thus  more 
than  fifty  thousand  troops,  full  of  confidence  from  re- 
peated victories,  were  suddenly  thrown  upon  the 
decisive  point  where  there  were  only  eighteen  thou- 
sand, dispirited  by  previous  reverses,  to  oppose  them. 
Against  such  a  thunderbolt  there  was  no  defence  in 
the  French  works.  Was  it  then  a  simple  matter 
for  Wellington  so  to  combine  his  battle  1  The 
mountains  on  whose  huge  flanks  he  gathered  his 
fierce  soldiers,  the  roads  he  opened,  the  horrid  crags 
he  surmounted,  the  headlong  steeps  he  descended, 
the  wild  regions  through  which  he  poured  the  de- 
structive fire  of  more  than  ninety  guns,  these  and 
tiie  reputation  of  the  French  commander  furnish  the 
everlasting  reply. 

And  yet  he  did  not  compass  all  that  he  designed. 
The  French  right  escaped,  because  when  he  passed 
the  Nivelle  at  St.  Pe  he  had  only  two  diviuions  in 
hand,  the  sixth  had  not  come  up.  three  were  in  obser- 
vation of  the  camp  at  Serres,  and  before  he  could  as- 
semble men  enough  to  descend  upon  the  enemy  in  the 
low  ground  the  day  had  closed.  The  great  object  of 
the  battle  was  therefore  unattaineil;  and  it  may  be 
a  question,  seeing  the  shortness  of  the  days  and  the 
difficulty  ol"  the  roads  were  not  unexpected  obstacles. 


fiSO 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XXIII 


whether  the  combinations  would  not  have  been 
Kurer  it'  the  principal  attack  had  been  directed  en- 
tirely against  (Jlauzel's  position.  Carlos  d'Espaua's 
force  and  the  remainder  of  Mina's  battalions  could 
have  reinforced  .Alorillo's  division  with  live  thousand 
men  to  occupy  D'Erlon's  attention;  it  was  not  es- 
nential  to  defeat  him,  for  though  he  attributed  his 
retreat  to  Clauzel's  reverse,  that  general  did  not 
complain  that  D'Erlon's  retreat  endangered  his  po- 
sition. This  arrangement  would  have  enabled  the 
rest  of  Hill's  troops  to  reinforce  Beresford,  and  have 
given  lord  Wellington  three  additional  divisions  in 
hand  with  which  to  cross  the  Nivelle  before  two 
o'clock.  Soult's  right  wing  could  not  then  have  es- 
caped. 

4th.  In  the  report  of  the  battle,  lord  Wellington 
from  some  oversight  did  but  scant  and  tardy  justice 
to  the  light  division.  Acting  alone,  for  Longa's 
Spaniards  went  off  towards  Ascain  and  scarcely 
fired  a  shot,  this  division,  furnishing  only  four  thou- 
sand seven  hundred  men  and  officers,  first  carried 
the  smaller  Riiune  defended  by  Barbot's  brigade, 
(lad  then  beat  Taupin's  division  from  the  main  po- 
Hition,  thus  driving  superior  numbers  from  the 
strongest  works.  In  fine,  being  less  than  one-sixth 
of  the  whole  force  employed  against  Clauzel,  they 
defeated  one-third  of  that  general's  corps.  Many 
brave  men  they  lost,  and  of  two  who  fell  in  this  bat- 
tle I  will  speak. 

The  first,  low  in  rank,  for  he  was  but  a  lieutenant, 
rich  in  honour,  for  he  bore  many  scars,  was  young 
of  days.  He  was  only  nineteen.  But  he  had  seen 
more  combats  and  sieges  than  he  could  count  years. 
iSo  slight  in  person,  and  of  such  surpassing  and  deli- 
cate beauty  that  the  Spaniards  often  thought  him  a 
girl  disguised  in  men's  clothing,  he  was  yet  so  vig- 
orous, so  active,  so  brave,  that  the  most  daring  and 
experienced  veterans  watched  his  looks  on  the  field 
of  battle,  and  implicitly  following  where  he  led, 
would,  like  children,  obey  his  slightest  sign  in  the 
most  difficult  situations.  His  education  was  incom- 
piste,  yet  were  his  natural  powers  so  happy,  the 
keenest  and  best  furnished  intellects  shrunk  from  an 
encounter  of  wit,  and  every  thought  and  aspiration 
was  proud  and  noble,  indicating  future  greatness  if 
destiny  had  so  willed  it.  Such  was  Edward  Freer 
of  the  forty-third,  one  of  three  brothers  who  covereri 
with  wounds  have  all  died  in  the  service.  Assailed 
the  night  befJjre  the  battle  with  that  strange  antici- 
pation of  coming  death  so  often  felt  by  military  men, 
h;}  was  pierced  with  three  balls  at  the  first  storming 
of  the  Rhune  rocks,  and  the  sternest  soldiers  in  the 
r3gim8nt  wept  even  in  the  middle  of  the  fight  when 
they  heard  of  his  fate. 

On  th'5  same  day  and  at  the  same  hour  was  killed 
colonal  Thomas  Lloyd.  He  likewise  had  been  a 
long  time  in  the  forty-third.  Under  him  Freer  had 
]i?arned  the  rudiments  of  his  profession,  but  in  the 
course  of  the  war  promotion  placed  Lloyd  at  the 
head  of  the  ninety-fourth,  and  it  was  leading  that 
regiment  he  fell.  In  him  also  were  combined  men- 
til  and  bodily  powers  of  no  ordinary  kind.  A  grace- 
ful symmetry  combined  with  Herculean  strength,  and 
a  countenance  at  once  frank  and  majestic,  gave  the 
true  index  of  his  nature,  for  his  capacity  was  great 
and  commanding,  and  his  military  knowledge  exten- 
sive both  from  experience  anc  study.  On  liis  mirth 
and  wit,  so  well  known  in  the  army,  I  will  not  dwell, 
gave  to  remark  that  he  used  the  latter  without  of- 
fence, yet  so  as  to  increase  his  ascendency  over 
those  with  whom  he  held  intercourse,  for  though 
gentle  he  was  valiant,  ambitions,  and  conscious  of 
Lis  fitness  for  great  exploits.  He,  like  Freer,  was 
prescient  of,  and  predicted  his  own  fall,  yet  with  no 


abatement  of  courage.  When  he  received  the  mortal 
wound,  a  most  painful  one,  he  would  not  suffer  him- 
self to  be  moved,  but  remained  watcliiiig  the  battle 
and  making  observations  U{)oii  the  changes  in  it  until 
death  came.  It  was  thus,  at  tlie  age  of  thirty,  ti-at 
the  good,  the  brave,  the  generous  1  loyd  died.  Tri- 
butes to  his  merit  have  been  published  by  lord  Wel- 
lington, and  by  one  of  his  own  poor  soldiers  !  by  the 
highest  and  by  the  lowest!  To  their  tebtimony  I 
add  mine  :  let  those  who  served  on  equal  terms  with 
him  say  whether  in  aught  I  have  exceeded  bia 
deserts. 


CHAPTER  II. 

Souh  orrupies  the  intieiiclied  camii  of  Bavonne,  and  the  line 
ot  the  Ps'ive  river — Lord  Wellington  unable  to  piUMH  his 
victory  from  the  s.t;)te  of  ihe  roads — Bri(lf;e  he:id  of  C'aiiibo 
abandonefl  by  the  French  —  Excesses  of  the  Spanish  troops 
— Lord  Wellington's  indignation — He  sends  tlieni  biick  to 
Spain — Vaiioiis  skirmishes  in  front  of  Ba\unne — The  gene- 
rals John  Wilson  and  Vandeleur  are  .vouiuii  d-  Mina  plun- 
ders the  Val  de  Baigorri — Is  beaten  by  the  nnlioniil  guards 
—  Pa^silge  of  the  Nive  and  battles  in  (Vimt  of  Ba\oniiP — 
Conibal  of  the  10th— Combat  of  the  llth — rombat  of  the 
12th — Battle  of  St.  Pierre — Observations. 

SouLT,  having  lost  the  Nivelle,  at  first  designed 
to  leave  part  of  his  forces  in  the  intrenched  camj)  of 
Bayonne,  and  with  the  remainder  take  a  flanking 
position  behind  the  Nive,  half  way  between  Bayonne 
and  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port,  securing  his  left  l^y  tiie 
intrenched  mountain  of  Ursouia,  and  his  rigl.t  on 
the  heights  above  Cambo,  the  bridge-head  of  which 
would  give  him  the  power  of  making  otlensivc 
movements.  He  could  tlius  keep  his  troops  tcgothet 
and  restore  their  confidence,  while  he  confined  th» 
allies  to  a  small  sterile  district  of  P>ance  between 
the  river  and  tiie  sea,  and  rendered  their  situation 
very  uneasy  during  the  winter  if  they  did  not  retire. 
However  he  soon  modified  this  plan.  The  works  of 
the  Bayonne  camp  were  not  complete,  and  his  pres- 
ence was  necessary  to  urge  their  progress.  The 
camp  on  the  Ursouia  mountain  had  been  neglected 
contrary  to  his  orders,  and  the  bridge-liead  at  Cam- 
bo was  only  commenced  on  the  riglit  bank.  On  the 
]ef\  it  was  indeed  complete,  but  constructed  on  a 
bad  trace.  Moreover  he  found  that  tiie  Nive  in  dry 
weather  was  fordable  at  Ustaritz  below  Cambo,  and 
at  many  places  above  that  point.  Remaining  there- 
fore at  Bayonne  himself  with  six  divisions  and  Vil- 
latte's  reserve,  he  sent  D'Erlon  with  three  divisions 
to  reinforce  Foy  at  Cambo.  Yet  neither  D'Erlon's 
divisions  nor  Soult's  whole  army  could  have  stopped 
lord  Wellington  at  this  time,  if  other  circumstances 
had  permitted  the  latter  to  follow  up  his  victory  as 
he  dt^signed. 

The  hardships  and  privations  endured  on  the 
mountains  by  the  Anglo-Portuguose  troops  had  beer, 
beneficial  to  them  as  an  army.  l"he  fine  air  and  the 
impossibility  of  the  soldiers  committing  their  usual 
excesses  in  drink  had  rendered  them  unusually 
healthy,  while  the  facility  of  enforcing  a  strict  dis- 
cipline, and  their  natural  impatience  to  win  the  fair 
plains  s[)read  out  before  them,  had  rai.ced  their  moral 
and  pliysical  qualities  in  a  wonderlul  degree.  Dan- 
ger was  their  sport,  and  their  experienced  gene- 
ral, in  the  prime  and  vigour  of  life,  was  as  impatient 
for  action  as  his  soldiers.  Neither  the  works  of  the 
Bayonne  camp,  nor  the  barrier  of  the  Nive,  sudden- 
ly manned  by  a  beaten  and  dispirited  army,  could 
have  long  withstood  the  [irogrcss  of  such  a  fiery  host, 
and  if  Wellington  could  have  let  their  strength  and 
fury  loose  in  the  first  days  succeeding  the  battle  of 
the  Nivelle   France  would  have  felt  Lis  conquering 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


681 


footsteps  to  her  centre.  But  the  country  at  the  foot 
of  ttie  Pyrenees  is  a  deep  clay,  quite  impassable  af- 
ter rain  excej)t  by  the  royal  road  near  the  coast,  and 
tiiat  of  8t.  Jean  Pied  de  Port,  botli  of  which  were 
in  the  power  of  the  French.  On  tiie  by-roads  tlie 
infantry  sunk  to  the  midleg,  the  cavalry  above  tiie 
horses'  knees,  and  even  to  tlie  saddle-o-jrths  in  some 
places.  The  artillery  could  not  move  at  all.  'I'he 
rain  had  commenced  on  the  11th,  the  mist  in  the 
early  part  of  the  12th  had  given  .Soult  time  to  re- 
g'ain  his  camp  and  secure  the  high  road  to  St.  Jean 
Pied  de  Port,  by  which  h's  troops  easily  gained 
their  proper  posts  on  the  Nive,  while  his  adversary, 
Hxed  in  the  swamps,  could  only  make  the  inetfect- 
ual  demonstration  at  Ustaritz  and  Cambo  already 
aoticed. 

Wellington,  uneasy  for  his  riglit  flank  while  the 
French  commanded  the  Cambo  passage  across  the 
Nive,  directed  general  Hill  to  menace  it  again  on 
the  I6th  Foy  had  received  orders  to  preserve  the 
bridge-heod  on  the  right  bank  in  any  circumstances, 
but  he  was  permitted  to  abandon  tlie  work  on  the 
left  bank  in  the  event  of  a  general  attack  ;  however 
at  Hill's  approach  the  officer  placed  there  in  com- 
mand destroyed  all  the  works  and  the  bridge  itself. 
This  was  a  great  cross  to  Soult,  and  the  allies'  flank 
being  tlius  secured  they  were  put  into  cantonments, 
to  avoid  the  rain  which  fell  heavily.  The  bad  wea- 
ther was  however  not  the  only  obstacle  to  the  Eng- 
lish general's  operations.  On  tiie  very  day  of  the 
battle,  Freyre's  and  Longa's  soldiers  entering  As- 
cain  [Jillaged  it  and  murdered  several  persons?  the 
next  day  the  whole  of  the  Spanish  troops  continued 
these  excesses  in  various  places,  and  on  the  right 
Mina's  battalions,  some  of  whom  were  also  in  a 
st^ts  of  mutiny,  made  a  plundering  and  murdering 
incursion  from  the  mountains  towards  Hellette. 
The  Portuguese  and  British  soldiers  of  the  left 
wing  had  commenced  the  like  outrages,  and  two 
French  persons  were  killed  in  one  town  ;  however 
the  ad^^l^itant-general,  Pakenham,  arriving  at  the 
moment,  saw  and  instantly  put  the  perpetrators  to 
death,  tlius  nipping  this  wickedness  in  the  bud,  but 
at  his  own  risk,  for  legally  ho  had  not  that  power. 
This  general,  whose  generosity,  humanity  and  cniv- 
alric  spirit  excited  the  admiration  of  every  honour- 
able person  who  approached  him,  is  the  man  who 
afterwards  fell  at  New  Orleans,  and  who  has  been 
so  foully  traduced  by  American  writers.  He  who 
was  pre-eminently  distinguished  by  his  detestation 
of  inhumanity  and  outrage,  has  been  with  astound- 
ing falsehood  represented  as  instigating  his  troops 
to  tiie  most  infamous  excesses.  But  from  a  people 
holding  millions  of  their  fellow-beings  in  the  most 
horrible  slavery,  while  they  prate  and  vaunt  of  lib- 
erty until  all  men  turn  with  loathing  from  the  sick- 
ening folly,  what  can  be  expected] 

Terrified  by  these  excesses,  the  French  people 
fled  even  from  the  larger  towns,  but  Wellington 
quickly  relieved  their  terror.  On  tlie  12th, although 
expecting  a  battle,  he  put  to  death  all  the  Spanish 
maniuderg  he  could  take  in  the  act,  and  then  with 
ijiany  reproa'ihes,  and  despite  of  the  discontent  of 
tfieir  generals,  forced  the  whole  to  withdraw  into 
their  own  country.  He  disarmed  tiie  insubordinate 
battalions  under  Mina,  quartered  G iron's  Andalti- 
eiana  in  the  Bastan  where  O'Donel  resumed  the 
command;  sent  Freyre's  Gallicians  to  the  district 
between  Irun  and  Ernani.and  Longa  over  the  Ebro. 
Morillo's  division  alone  remained  with  the  army. 
These  decisive  proceedings,  marking  the  lofty  char- 
acter of  the  man,  proved  not  less  politic  than  reso- 
lute. The  French  people  immediately  returned, 
ftud  finding  the  strictest  discipline  preserved,  and 


all  thirgs  paid  for,  adopted  an  amicable  intercourse 
with  the  invaders.  However,  the  loss  of  such  a 
mass  of  troops  and  the  etl'ects  of  weather  on  the 
roads  reduced  the  army  for  the  moment  to  a  state  of 
inactivity  ;  the  head-quarters  were  suddenly  lixed  at 
St.  Jean  de  I,uz,  and  the  troops  were  establ.thed  in 
permanent  cantonments  with  the  following  line  of 
battle. 

The  left  wing  occiipief?  a  broad  rir'ge  on  both 
sides  of  the  great  road  beyond  Bidart,  the  princii,al 
post  being  at  a  mansion  belonging  to  the  mayor  of 
Biarritz.  The  front  was  covered  by  a  small  .--tream 
spreading  here  and  there  into  la^ge  ponds  or  tanks, 
between  which  the  road  was  conducted.  The  cen- 
tre, posted  partly  on  the  continuation  of  this  ridge 
in  front  of  Arcangues,  partly  on  the  hill  of  St. 
Barbe,  extended  by  Arauntz  to  Ustaritz,  the  right 
being  thrown  back  to  face  count  D'Erlon's  position 
extended  by  Cambo  to  Itzassu.  From  this  position, 
which  might  stretch  about  six  miles  on  the  front 
and  eight  miles  on  the  flank,  strong  piquets  were 
pushed  forwards  to  several  points,  and  the  infar.try 
occupied  all  the  villages  and  towns  behind  as  far 
back  as  Espelette,  Suriade,  Ainhoa,  St.  Pe,  Sane 
and  Ascain  One  regiment  of  Vandeleur's  cavaliy 
was  with  the  advanced  post  on  the  left,  the  remain- 
der were  sent  to  Andaie  and  Urogne,  Victor  Alten'a 
horsemen  were  about  St.  Pe,  and  the  heavy  cavalry 
remained  in  Spain. 

In  this  state  of  affairs  the  establishment  of  the 
different  posts  in  front  led  to  several  skirmishes.  In 
one  on  the  18th,  general  John  Wilson  and  genera. 
Vandeleur  were  wounded;  but  on  the  same  da^ 
Beresford  drove  the  French  from  the  bridge  of  T^r 
dains,  near  the  junction  of  the  Ustaritz  and  St.  P 
roads,  and  though  attacked  in  force  the  next  day  h 
maintained  his  acquisition.  A  more  serious  action 
occurred  on  the  2;id  in  front  of  Arcangues.  This 
village,  held  by  the  piquets  of  the  light  division,  was 
two  or  three  miles  in  front  of  Arbonne,  where  the 
nearest  support  was  cantoned.  It  is  built  on  the 
centre  of  a  crescent-shajjcd  ridge,  and  the  sentries  of 
both  armies  were  so  close  that  the  reliefs  and  patrols 
actually  passed  each  other  in  tiicir  rounds,  so  that 
a  surprise  was  inevitable  if  it  suited  either  side  to 
attempt  it.  Lord  Wellington  visited  this  post,  and 
the  fleld-ofiicer  on  duty  made  known  to  him  its  dis- 
advantages, and  the  means  of  remedying  them,  by 
taking  entire  possession  of  the  village,  pushing  pi- 
quets along  the  horns  of  the  crescent,  and  establish- 
ing a  chain  of  posts  across  the  valley  between  them. 
He  appeared  satisried  with  tiiis  project,  and  two  dayE 
afterwards  the  forty -third  and  some  of  the  riflemen 
were  employed  to  effect  it,  the  greatest  part  of  the 
division  being  brought  up  in  support.  The  French, 
after  a  few  shots,  abandoned  Arcangues,  Busr^ussory 
and  both  horns  of  the  crescent,  retiring  belbre  the 
piquets  to  a  large  fortified  house  situated  at  the 
moutii  of  the  valley.  The  project  suggested  by  the 
fleld-oflicer  was  thus  executed  witii  the  loss  of  only 
five  men  wounded,  and  the  action  should  have  ceas- 
ed, but  the  piquets  of  the  forty-third  suddenly  re- 
ceived orders  to  attack  the  fortified  hou«e,  and  the 
columns  of  support  were  shown  at  several  points  of 
the  semi-circle;  the  French,  then  conceiving  they 
were  going  to  be  seriously  assailed,  reinforced  their 
post;  a  sharp  skirmish  ensued, and  the  piquete  were 
finally  withdrawn  to  the  ground  they  liad  originally 
gained,  and  beyond  which  they  should  never  have 
been  pushed.  This  ill-managed  affair  cost  eighty- 
eigiit  men  and  oificers,  of  which  eighty  were  of  the 
forty-third. 

Lord  Wellington,  whose  powerful  artillery  and 
cavalry,  the  Ibrmc-  consisting  of  noarly  one  bundled 


682 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR 


[Book  XXIIl 


field-pieces  and  the  latter  furnishing  more  than  eight 
thousand  six  hundred  sabres,  were  paralyzed  in  the 
contracted  space  he  occupied,  was  now  anxious  to 
pass  the  Nive  ;  but  the  rain,  which  continued  to 
fall,  bathed  him,  and  meanwhile  Mina's  Spaniards, 
descending  once  more  from  the  Alduides  to  plunder 
Baigorri,  were  beaten  by  the  national  guards  of  that 
valley.  However,  early  in  December,  tiie  weather 
amended,  forty  or  fifty  pieces  of  artillery  were 
brought  up,  and  other  preparations  made  to  surprise 
or  force  the  passage  of  the  Nive  at  Cambo  and  Usta- 
ritz.  And  as  this  operation  led  to  sanguinary  bat- 
tles, it  is  fitting  first  to  describe  the  exact  position 
of  the  French. 

Bayonne,  situated  at  the  confluence  of  the  Nive 
and  tiie  Adour,  commands  tlie  passage  of  both.  A 
weak  fortress  of  the  third  order,  its  importance  was 
in  its  position,  and  its  intrenched  camp,  exceedingly 
etrong  and  commanded  by  the  fortress,  could  not  be 
safely  attacked  in  front,  wherefore  Soiilt  ke|)t  only 
six  divisions  there.  His  right,  composed  of  Reille's 
two  divisions  and  Villatte's  reserve,  touched  on  the 
lower  Adour  where  there  was  a  flotilla  of  gun-boats. 
It  was  covered  by  a  swamp  and  artificial  inundation, 
through  which  the  royal  ruad  led  to  St.  Jean  de  Luz, 
and  tlie  advanced  posts,  well  intrenched,  were  push- 
ed forward  beyond  Anglet  on  this  causeway.  His 
left  under  Clauzel,  composed  of  three  divisions,  ex- 
tended from  Anglet  to  the  Nive ;  it  was  covered 
partly  by  the  swamp,  partly  by  the  large  fortified 
house  which  the  light  division  assailed  on  the  23d, 
partly  by  an  inundation  spreading  below  Urdains  to- 
wards the  Nive.  Thus  intrenched,  the  fortified  out- 
posts may  be  called  the  front  of  battle,  the  intrench- 
ed camp  the  second  line,  and  the  fortress  the  citadel. 
The  country  in  front,  a  deep  clay  soil,  enclosed  and 
covered  with  small  wood  and  farmhouses,  was  very 
difficult  to  move  in. 

Beyond  the  Nive  the  intrenched  camp,  stretching 
from  that  river  to  the  Adour,  was  called  the  front 
of  Mousserolles.  It  was  in  the  keeping  of  D'Er- 
lon's  four  divisions,  which  were  also  extended  up  tiie 
right  bank  of  the  Nive  ;  that  is  to  say,  D'Armag- 
nac's  troops  were  in  front  of  Ustaritz,  and  Foy  pro- 
longed the  line  to  Cambo.  The  remainder  of  D'Er- 
lon's  corps  was  in  reserve,  occupying  a  strong  range 
%f  heights  about  two  miles  in  front  of  Mousserolles, 
the  right  at  Villefranque  on  the  Nive.  the  left  at 
Old  Moguerre  towards  the  Adour.  D'Erlon's  com- 
munications with  the  rest  of  the  army  were  double, 
one  circuitous  through  Bayonne,  the  other  direct  by 
a  bridge  of  boats  thrown  above  that  place. 

After  the  battle  of  tlie  Nivelle,  Soult  brought  gen- 
eral Puris's  division  from  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port  to 
Lahoussoa, close  under  the  Ursouia  mountain,  where 
it  was  in  connexion  with  Foy's  left,  communicating 
by  the  great  road  to  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port  which 
ran  in  a  parallel  direction  to  the  river. 

The  Nive,  the  Adour,  and  the  Gave  de  Pau,  which 
falls  into  the  latter  many  miles  above  Bayonne,  were 
all  navigable,  the  first  as  far  as  Ustaritz,  the  second 
to  Dax,  the  third  to  Peirehorade,  and  the  great 
French  magazines  were  collected  at  the  two  latter 
places  But  the  army  was  fed  with  difficulty  :  and 
hence,  to  restrain  Soult  from  the  country  beyond  the 
Nive,  to  intercept  his  communications  with  St.  Jean 
Pied  de  Port,  to  bring  a  powerful  cavalry  into  activ- 
ity, and  to  obtain  secret  intelligence  from  the  inte- 
rior of  France,  were  Wellington's  inducements  to 
force  a  passage  over  the  Nive.  Yet  to  place  the 
troops  on  both  sides  of  a  navigable  river,  with  com- 
nmnications  bad  at  all  times  and  subject  to  entire 
interruptions  from  rain  ;  to  do  this  in  face  of  an 
army  possessing  short  communications,  good  roads 


and  intrenched  camps  for  retreat,  was  a  delicate  and 
dangerous  operation. 

On  the  7th,  orders  were  issued  for  forcing  the  pas- 
sage on  the  9th.  On  that  day  sir  John  Hope  and 
Cliarles  Alten,  w  ith  the  first,  filth  and  light  divis- 
ions, the  unattached  brigades  of  infantry,  Vunde« 
leur's  cavalry  and  twelve  guns,  in  all  about  twonty- 
Ibur  thousand  combatants,  were  to  drive  back  the 
French  advanced  posts  along  the  whole  front  of  the 
intrenched  camp  between  the  ISive  and  the  sea. 
This  movement  was  partly  to  examine  the  courtie  of 
the  lower  Adour  with  a  view  to  subsequent  opera- 
tions, but  principally  to  make  Soult  discover  his  dis- 
positions of  defence  on  that  side,  and  to  keep  his 
troops  in  check  while  Bereslbrd  and  Hill  crossed  the 
Nive.  To  support  this  double  ojieration,  the  fourth 
and  seventh  divisions  were  secretly  brought  uj)  Irom 
Ascain  and  Espelette  on  the  fcth,  the  latter  to  tiie 
hill  of  St.  Barbe,  from  whence  it  detached  one  bri- 
gade to  relieve  the  poets  of  the  third  division.  There 
remained  the  second,  the  third  and  the  sixth  divis- 
ions, Hamilton's  Portuguese,  and  Morillo's  Span- 
iards, for  the  passage.  Beresford,  leading  the  third 
and  sixth,  reinforced  with  six  guns  and  a  squadron 
of  cavalry,  was  to  cross  at  Ustaritz  with  pontoons; 
Hill  having  the  second  division,  Hamilton's  Portu- 
guese, Vivian's  and  Victor  Alton's  cavalry,  and  Ibur- 
teen  guns,  was  to  ford  the  river  at  Cambo  and  Lar- 
restore.  Both  generals  were  then  to  repair  the 
bridges  at  these  respective  points  with  materials 
prepared  beforehand;  and  to  cover  Hill's  movement 
on  tJje  right  and  protect  the  valley  of  the  Nive  from 
Paris,  who  being  at  Lahoussoa  might  have  penetra- 
ted to  the  rear  of  the  army  during  the  operations, 
Morillo's  Spaniards  were  to  cross  at  Itzassu.  At 
this  time  Foy's  division  was  extended  from  Halzoii 
in  front  of  Larressore  to  the  fords  above  Cambo,  thu 
Ursouia  m.ountain  being  between  his  left  and  Pans. 
The  rest  of  U'Erlon's  troops  remained  on  the  heights 
of  Moguerre  in  front  of  Mousserolles. 

PASSAGE    OF    THE     NIVE,     AND    BATTLES     IN     FRONT 
OF    BATONNE. 

At  Ustaritz  the  French  had  broken  both  bridges, 
but  the  island  connecting  them  was  in  pcssession  of 
the  British.  Beresford  laid  his  pontoons  down  on 
the  hither  side  in  the  night  of  the  fcth,  and  in  the 
morning  of  the  9th  a  beacon  lighted  en  the  heights 
above  Cambo  gave  the  signal  of  attack.  The  pas- 
sage was  immediately  forced  under  the  fire  of  the 
artillery,  the  second  bridge  was  laid,  and  U'Armag- 
nac's  brigade  was  driven  back  by  the  sixth  divis- 
ion ;  but  the  swampy  nature  of  the  country  between 
the  river  and  the  high  road  retarded  the  all.es'  march 
and  gave  the  French  time  to  retreat  with  little  loss. 
At  the  same  time  Hill's  troops,  also  covered  by  the 
fire  of  artillery,  forced  the  passage  in  three  columns 
above  and  below  Cambo  with  slight  resistance, 
though  the  fords  were  so  deep  that  several  horsemen 
were  drowned,  and  the  P'rench  strongly  posted,  es- 
pecially at  Halzou,  where  there  was  a  deep  ind 
strong  mill-race  to  cross  as  well  as  tli^rfiver. 

Foy,  seeing  by  the  direction  of  I^esford's  firg 
that  his  retreat  was  endangered,  retired  hastily  wiffl 
his  left,  leaving  his  rfght  wing  under  generol  Ber- 
lier  at  Halzou  without  orders.  Hence  when  general 
Pringle  attacked  the  latter  from  Larressore,  the 
sixth  division  was  already  on  the  high  road  between 
Foy  and  Berlier,  who  escaped  by  cross  roads  towards 
Hasparren,  but  did  not  rejoin  his  division  until  two 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  Meanwhile  Morillo  cross- 
ed at  Itzassu,  and  Paris  retired  to  Hellette,  where 
he  was  joined  by  a  regiment  of  light  cavalry  belong- 
ing to  Pierre  Soult,  who  was  then  on  the  Bidouza 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSUl  A  R     V  A  R. 


683 


river.  Morillo  followed,  and  in  one  village  near 
Hallette  his  troops  killed  fifteen  peasants,  amongst 
tiiein  several  women  and  cliildren  ' 

General  Hill,  having  won  the  passage,  placed  a  I 
brigade  of  infantry  at  Urcuray  to  cover  the  bridge 
of  Cambo,  and  to  support  the  cavalry  which  he  des- 
patched to  scour  t!ia  roads  towards  Lahoussoa,  St. ' 
Jean  Piad  de  Port,  and  Hasparren,  and  to  observe 
PariL  and  Pierre  8oult.  With  the  rest  of  his  troops 
he  marched  to  the  heights  of  Lormenthoa  in  front 
of  the  hills  of  Moguerre  and  Villefranque,  and  was 
there  joined  by  the  sixth  division,  the  third  remain- 
ing to  cover  the  bridge  of  Ustaritz.  It  was  now 
about  one  o'clock,  and  Soult,  coming  hastily  from 
Bayonne,  approved  of  the  disposition  made  by  D'Er- 
lon,  and  offered  battle,  his  line  being  extencied  so  as 
to  bar  tlte  high  road.  D'Armagnac's  brigade  which  ; 
had  retired  from  Ustaritz  was  now  in  advance  at ' 
\' illetranque,  and  a  heavy  cannonade  and  skirmish 
ensued  along  the  front,  but  no  general  attack  was 
made  because  the  deep  roads  had  retarded  the  rear 
of  Hill's  columns.  However  the  Portuguese  of  the 
sixth  division,  descending  from  Lormenthoa  about 
three  o'clock,  drove  D'Armagnac's  brigade  with 
eharp  fighting  and  after  one  repulse  out  of  Ville-j 
franque.  A  brigade  of  the  second  division  was  then  ' 
established  in  advance,  connecting  Hill's  corps  with 
the  troops  in  Villefranque.  Tims  three  divisions 
of  infantry,  wanting  the  brigade  left  at  Urcuray, 
hemmed  up  four  French  divisions  ;  and  as  the  latter, 
notwithstanding  their  superiority  of  numbers,  made 
no  advantage  of  the  broken  movements  of  the  allies 
caused  by  the  deep  roads,  the  passage  of  the  Nive 
may  be  judged  a  surprise.  Wellington  thus  far  over- 
reached his  able  adversary,  yet  he  had  not  trusted 
to  this  uncertain  chance  alone. 

The  French  masses  falling  upon  the  heads  of  his  , 
columns   at   Lormenthoa,  while  the   rear  was  still 
1  ibouring  in  the  deep  roads,  might  have  caused  some  | 
disorder,  but  could  not  have  driven  either  Hill  or; 
IJeresford  over  the  river  again,  because  the   third  | 
division  was  close  at  hand  to  reinforce  the  sixth,' 
and  the  brigade  of  the  seventh,  left   at  St.  Barbe,  ■ 
could  have  followed  by  the  bridge  of  Ustaritz,  thus' 
giving  the  allies  the  superiority  of  numbers.     The 
greatest  danger  was,  that  Paris,  reinforced  by  Pierre  ^ 
Soult's  cavalry,  should  have  returned  and  fallen  eitli-  ' 
er  upon  Monlla  or  the  brigade  left  at  Urcuray  in  the 
r.ear,  while   Soult,  reinforcing   D'Erlon   with  fresh 
divisions  brought  from  the  other  side  of  the  Nive, ' 
attacked    Hill   and   Beresford    in  front.     It  was  to  i 
prevent  this  that  Hope  and  Alten,  whose  operations! 
are  now  to  be  related,  pressed  the  enemy  on  the  left 
bank. 

The  first  named  general,  having  twelve  miles  to 
march  from  St.  Jeande  Luz  before  he  could  reach  j 
t.'>3  French  works,  put  liis  troops  in  motion  during 
the  night,  and  about  eight  o'clock  passed  between 
the  tanks  in  front  of  Barrouilhet  with  his  right, 
wlnle  his  left  descended  from  the  platform  of  Bidart 
and  crossed  the  valley  towards  Biarritz.  The  French 
outposts  retired  fighting,  and  Hope,  sweeping  with 
a  half  circle  to  his  right,  and  being  preceded  by  the 
fire  of  his  guns  and  many  skirmishers,  arrived  in 
front  of  the  intrenched  camp  about  one  o'clock.  His 
left  then  rested  on  the  lower  Adour,  his  centre  m.en- 
acod  a  very  strong  advanced  v/ork  on  the  ridge  of 
Beyris  b^;yond  Anglet,  and  his  right  was  in  com- 
munication with  Alten.  That  general,  having  a 
shorter  distance  to  move,  halted  about  Bussussary 
and  Arcangues  until  Hoj)e's  fiery  crescent  was  clos- 
ing on  the  F'rench  camp,  diid  then  he  also  advanced, 
but  with  the  exception  of  a  sliglit  skirmish  at  the 
fortified  house  there  was  no  resistance.    Three  divis- 


ions, some  ca-. airy,  and  the  unattached  brigadco, 
equal  to  a  fourth  division,  sufficed  therctbre  to  keep 
six  French  divisions  in  check  on  tliis  side. 

When  evening  closed,  the  allies  fell  back  towards 
their  original  positions,  but  under  heavy  rain,  and 
with  great  fatigue  to  Hope's  wing,  for  even  tiie  roy- 
al road  was  knee-deep  of  mud,  and  his  troops  were 
twenty-four  liours  under  arms.  'J'he  whole  day's 
fighting  cost  about  eight  hundred  men  for  eacli  side, 
the  loss  of  the  allies  being  ratiier  greater  on  the  left 
bank  of  theJSive  than  on  the  right. 

Wellington's  wings  being  now  divided  by  the 
Nive,  the  French  general  resolved  to  fall  upon  one 
of  tiiem  with  the  whole  of  his  forces  united  ;  and 
misled  by  the  prisoners  who  assured  him  that  the 
third  and  fourth  divisions  were  both  on  the  heights 
of  Lormenthoa,  he  resolved,  being  able  to  assemble 
his  troops  with  great  facility  on  the  left  of  the  Nive 
where  also  the  allies'  front  was  most  extended,  to 
choose  that  side  for  his  counter-stroke.  The  garri  ■ 
son  of  Bayonne  was  eight  thousand  strong,  partly 
troops  of  the  line,  partly  national  guards,  with  which 
he  ordered  the  governor  to  occupy  the  entrenched 
camp  of  Mousserolles  ;  then  stationing  ten  gun-boats 
on  the  upper  Adour  to  watch  tiiat  river  as  high  ng 
the  confluence  of  tlie  Gave  dc  Pau,  he  made  D'l-^rlon 
file  his  four  divisions  over  the  bridge  of  boats  be- 
tween the  fortress  and  Mousserolles,  directing  him 
to  gain  the  camp  of  j\!arac  and  take  post  behind 
Clauzel's  corps  on  tlie  other  side  of  the  river.  He 
thus  concentrated  nine  divisions  of  infantry  and  \  il- 
latte's  reserve,  a  brigade  of  cavalry  and  forty  guns 
furnishing  in  all  about  sixty  thousand  combatants  in- 
cluding conscripts,  to  assail  a  quarter  where  the 
allies,  although  stronger  by  one  divisio  .  than  the 
French  general  imagined,  and  yet  only  thirty-thou- 
sand infantry  with  twenty-four  pieces  of  cannon. 

The  French  marshal's  first  design  was  to  burst 
with  his  whole  army  on  the  table-land  of  Bussussa- 
ry and  Arcangues,  and  then  act  tiS  circumstances 
should  dictate;  and  he  judged  so  well  of  his  position 
that  he  desired  t!ie  minister  of  war  to  expect  good 
news  for  the  next  day.  Indeed  the  situation  ol  the 
allies,  although  better  than  he  knew  of,  gave  him 
some  right  to  anticipate  success.  On  no  point  was 
there  any  expectntion  of  this  formidable  counter-at- 
tack. Lord  Wellington  was  on  the  left  of  the  Nive, 
preparing  to  assault  the  heights  where  he  had  last 
seen  the  French  the  evening  before.  Hope's  troops, 
with  the  exception  of  Wilson's  Portuguese  now  com- 
manded by  general  Campbell  and  posted  at  Barrou- 
ilhet, had  retired  to  their  cantonments;  the  first 
division  was  at  St.  Jean  de  Luz  and  Sibourre,  more 
than  six  milec  distant  from  the  outposts;  the  fifth 
division  was  bstween  these  places  and  Bidart,  and 
all  exceedingly  fatigued.  The  light  division  had 
orders  to  retire  from  Bussussary  to  Arbonne,  a  dis- 
tance of  four  miles,  and  part  of  the  second  bri- 
gade had  already  marched,  when  fortunately  general 
Kempt,  somewhat  suspici(  us  of  the  enemy's  move- 
ments, delayed  obedience  tntil  he  could  see  what 
was  going  on  in  his  front;  he  thus,  as  the  event 
proved, saved  the  position. 

The  extraordinary  difliculty  of  moving  through 
the  country  even  for  single  horsemen,  the  numer- 
ous enclosures  and  copses  which  denied  any  distinct 
view,  the  easy  success  of  tlie  operation  to  cross  the 
Nive,  and  a  certain  haughty  confidence,  the  sure  at- 
tendant of  a  long  course  of  victory,  seems  to  have 
rendered  the  ICnglish  general  at  this  time  some- 
what negligent  of  his  own  security.  Undoubtedly 
the  troops  were  not  disposed  as  if  a  battle  wna  ex- 
pected. The  general  i)osition,  composed  of  two  dis- 
tinct parts,  was  indeed  very  strong;    the  ridge  of 


684 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR, 


[Book  XXIII. 


Barrouilhet  could  only  be  attacked  along  the  royal 
road  on  a  narrow  frort  between  the  tanks,  and  he 
had  directed  intrenchn  ents  to  be  made  ;  but  there 
was  only  on9  brigade  tiiere,  and  a  road  made  with 
difficulty  by  liie  engineers  supplied  a  bad  flank  com- 
munication with  the  light  division.  This  Barrou- 
ilhet ridge  was  prolonged  to  the  platform  of"  Bussus- 
eary,  but  in  its  winding  bulged  out  too  near  the  en- 
emy's works  in  the  centre  to  be  safely  occupied  in 
forc3,  and  behind  it  there  was  a  deep  valley  or  basin 
extending  to  Arboi.nc. 

I'he  ridge  of  Arcangues  on  the  other  side  of  this 
basin  was  the  position  of  battle  for  the  centre. 
Three  tongues  of  land  shot  out  from  tiiis  part,  to  the 
front,  and  the  valleys  between  them  as  well  as  their 
slopes  were  covered  with  copse-woods  almost  im- 
penetrable. Tiie  church  of  Arcangues,  a  gentle- 
man's house,  and  parts  of  the  village,  furnished  i al- 
lying points  of  defence  for  the  piquets,  which  were 
necessarily  numerous  because  of  the  extent  of  front. 
At  this  time  the  left-hand  ridge  or  tongue  of  land 
was  occupied  by  the  fifty-second  regiment,  which 
had  also  posts  in  the  great  basin  separating  the  Ar- 
cangues position  from  that  of  Barrouilhet:  tiie  cen- 
tr;il  tongue  was  held  by  the  piquets  of  the  forty- 
third,  with  supporting  companies  placed  in  succes- 
sion towards  Bussussary,  wiiere  was  an  open  com- 
mon across  which  troops  in  retreat  would  have  to 
pass  to  the  church  of  Arcangues.  The  third  tongue 
was  guarded,  partly  by  the  forty-third,  partly  by  the 
riflemen,  but  the  Valley  between  was  not  occupied, 
and  the  piquets  on  the  extreme  right  extended  to  an 
inundation,  across  a  narrow  part  of  which,  near  the 
house  of  the  senator  Garrat,  there  was  a  bridge: 
the  facility  for  attack  was  there,  however,  small. 

One  brigade  of  the  seventh  division  continued 
this  line  of  posts  to  the  Nive,  holding  the  bridge  of 
Urdains ;  the  rest  of  the  division  was  behind  St. 
Barbe,  and  belonged  rather  to  Ustaritz  than  to  this 
front.  The  fourth  division  was  several  miles  be- 
hind the  right  of  the  light  division. 

In  tnis  state  of  affairs,  if  Soult  had,  as  he  first  de- 
signed, burst  with  his  w'hole  army  upon  Bussussary 
and  Arcangues,  it  would  have  been  impossible  for 
the  light  division,  scattered  as  it  was  over  such  an 
extent  of  ditiicult  ground,  to  have  stopped  him  tor 
half  an  hour;  and  there  was  no  support  within  sev- 
eral miles,  no  superior  otHcer  to  direct  t!ie  concen- 
tration of  the  ditierent  divisions.  Lord  Wellington 
had  indeed  ordered  all  the  line  to  be  intrenched  ;  but 
tiie  works  were  commenced  on  a  great  scale,  and,  as 
is  common  when  danger  does  not  spur,  the  soldiers 
had  laboured  so  carelessly  that,  beyond  a  few  abatis, 
the  tracing  of  some  lines  and  redoubts,  atjd  the  open- 
ing of  a  road  of  communication,  the  ground  remain- 
ed in  its  natural  state.  The  French  general  would, 
therefore,  quickly  have  gained  the  broad  open  hills 
beyond  Arcangues,  separated  the  fourth  and  seventh 
divisions  from  the  light  division,  and  cut  them  otf 
from  Hope.  Soult,  however,  in  the  course  of  the 
night,  for  reasons  which  I  do  not  find  stated,  chang- 
ed liis  project,  and  at  day  break  Ueille  marched  with 
Boyer's  and  Maucune's  divisions,  Sparre's  cavalry 
and  from  twenty  to  thirty  guns,  against  Hope  by  the 
main  road.  Ho  was  fnllowed  by  Foy  and  Villatte, 
but  Clauzel  assembled  his  trooi>s  under  cover  of  the 
ridges  near  ti)e  fortifi';ii  iiouse  in  frt)iit  of  Bussussary, 
and  one  of  D'Erlon's  divisions  approached  tlie  bridge 
of  Urdains. 

COMHAT  OF   THE   IOtII. 

A  heavy  rain  fi-ll  in  the  night,  yet  the  morning 
broke  fair,  and  sonn  after  d.ivvn  the  French  infantry 
were  observed  by  th    p ';.uc/.s  of  the  forty-tliird  push- 


ing each  other  about  as  if  at  gambols,  yet  lining  by 
degrees  the  nearest  ditches  ;  a  general  ofiicer  was 
also  seen  behind  a  farmhouse  close  to  the  sentinels, 
and  at  the  same  time  the  heads  of  coluums  cculd  be 
perceived  in  the  rear.  Thus  warned,  some  compa- 
nies of  the  forty-third  were  thrown  on  the  risht  into 
tlie  basin  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  penetrating 
that  way  to  the  small  plain  between  Bussussary  and 
Arcangues.  General  Kempt  was  with  the  piquets, 
and  his  foresight  in  delaying  his  march  to  Arboi.iie 
now  saved  the  position,  for  he  immediately  placed 
the  reserves  of  his  brigade  in  the  churcli  and  man- 
sion house  of  Arcangues.  Meanwhile  the  French, 
breaking  forth  with  loud  cries  and  a  rattling  mus- 
ketry, fell  at  a  running  pace  upon  the  piquets  cf  the 
forty-third  both  on  the  tongue  and  in  the  basin,  and 
a  cloud  of  skirmishers  descending  on  their  left,  pen- 
etrating between  them  and  the  fifty-seccnd  regi- 
ment, sought  to  turn  Both.  The  right  tongue  was 
in  like  manner  assailed,  and  at  the  same  time  the 
piquets  at  the  bridge  near  Garrat's  house  were  driv- 
en back. 

The  assault  was  so  strong  and  rapid,  the  enemy 
so  numerous,  and  the  ground  so  extensive,  that  it 
would  have  been  impossible  to  have  reached  the 
small  plain  beyond  Bussussary  in  time  to  regain  tlte 
church  of  Arcangues  if  any  serious  resistance  had 
been  attempted  ;  wherefore  delivering  their  fire  at 
pistol-shot  distance  the  piquets  fell  back  in  succes- 
sion, and  never  were  the  steadiness  and  intelligence 
of  veteran  soldiers  more  eminently  displayed  ;  for 
though  it  was  necessary  to  run  at  full  speed  to  gain 
the  small  plain  before  the  enemy,  who  was  constant- 
ly outflanking  the  line  of  posts  by  the  basin,  though 
the  ways  were  so  deep  and  narrow  that  no  formation 
could  be  preserved,  thcurrh  the  fire  of  the  F'rench 
was  thick  and  close,  aijo  their  cries  veliement  ai» 
they  rushed  on  in  pursuit,  the  instant  the  open 
ground  at  Bussussary  was  attained,  the  .i,.pareutly 
disordered  crowd  of  fugitives  became  a  compact  and 
well-formed  body,  defying  and  deriding  the  fruitless 
eiibrts  of  their  adversaries. 

Tlie  fifty-second,  being  about  half  a  mile  to  tl.e 
left,  though  only  slightly  assailed,  fell  back  also  to 
the  main  ridge  ;  for  tliough  the  closeness  of  the 
country  did  not  permit  colonel  Colborne  to  observe 
the  strength  of  the  enemy,  he  could  see  the  rapid 
retreat  of  the  forty-tiiird,  and  thence  judging  how 
serious  the  afi'air  was,  so  well  did  the  regiments  of 
the  light  division  understand  each  other's  qualities, 
w'ithdrew  his  outposts  to  secure  the  main  position. 
And  in  good  time  he  did  so. 

On  the  right  hand  tongue  the  troops  were  not  so 
fortunate;  for  whether  they  delayed  their  retreat 
too  long,  or  that  the  country  was  more  intricate, 
the  enemy,  moving  by  the  basin,  reached  Bussussa- 
ry before  the  rear  arrived,  and  about  a  iiundred  of 
the  forty-third  and  riflemen  were  thus  intercepted. 
The  I'rench  were  in  a  hollow  road  and  careless, 
never  doubting  that  the  officer  of  the  forty-third, 
ensign  Campbell,  a  youth  scarcely  eighteen  years 
of  age,  would  surrender;  but  he  with  a  shout  broke 
into  their  column  sword  in  hand,  and  though  the 
struggle  was  severe,  and  twenty  of  the  forty-third 
and  thirty  of  the  riflemen  witli  their  officer  remain- 
ed [jrisoners,  reached  the  church  with  the  rest. 

D'Armagnac's  division  of  DT'rlon's  corps  now 
pubhed  close  up  to  the  bridge  of  Urdains,  and  Clau- 
zel  assembled  his  three  divisions  by  degrees  at  Bus- 
sussary, opening  meanwhile  a  sharp  fire  of  musketry. 
Tiie  position  was  however  safe.  The  mansion  iiouse 
on  tlie  right,  covered  by  abtitis  and  not  easily  acces- 
i  siblo,  was  defended  by  a  rifle  battalion  and  tiie  Por- 
',  tuguese.     The   church  and  churchyard  vvtre  occu- 


1813.; 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


6S5 


pied  by  the  forty  third,  who  were  supported  with 
two  mountain-guiis,  their  front  being  covered  by  a 
declivity  of  thick  copse-wood  tilled  with  riflemen, 
and  only  to  be  turned  by  narrow  hollow  roads  lead- 
in^^  on  each  side  to  the  church.  On  tlie  left  the 
fifty-second,  now  supported  by  the  remainder  of  the 
division,  spread  as  far  as  the  great  basin  which 
B;;parated  the  right  wing  from  the  ridge  of  Barrou- 
ilhet,  towards  wtiich  some  small  posts  were  pushed, 
but  there  was  still  a  great  interval  between  Alten's 
and  Hope's  positions. 

Tlie  skirmishing  tire  grew  hot,  Clauzel  brought 
tip  twelve  guns  to  the  ridge  of  Bussussary,  with 
wliich  he  threw  shot  and  shells  into  the  churchyard 
of  Arcangues,  and  four  or  live  hundred  infantry  then 
made  a  rush  forwards  ;  but  a  heavy  lire  from  the 
forty-third  sent  them  back  over  the  ridge  where 
their  guns  were  posted.  Yet  the  practice  of  the 
latter,  well  directed  at  first,  would  have  been  mur- 
derous if  this  musketry  from  the  churchyard  had  not 
made  the  French  gunners  withdraw  their  pieces  a 
little  behind  the  ridge,  which  caused  their  shot  to 
fly  wild  and  high.  General  Kempt,  thinking  the 
distance  too  great,  was  at  first  inclined  to  stop  this 
fire,  but  the  moment  it  lulled  the  French  gunners 
pushed  tlieir  pieces  forwards  again,  and  their  shells 
knocked  down  eiglit  men  in  an  instant.  The  small 
arms  then  recommenced  and  the  shells  again  flew 
high.  The  French  were  in  like  manner  kept  at 
bay  by  the  riflemen  in  the  village  and  mansion- 
house,  and  the  action,  hottest  where  the  fifty-second 
fought,  continued  all  day.  It  was  not  very  severe  ; 
but  it  has  been  noticed  in  detail,  because  both 
French  and  English  writers,  misled  perhaps  by  an 
inaccurate  phrase  in  the  public  despatch,  have  rep- 
resented it  as  a  desperate  attack  by  which  the  light 
division  was  driven  into  its  intrenchments,  where- 
as it  was  the  piquets  only  that  were  forced  back, 
there  were  no  intrenchments  save  those  made  on 
Ihe  spur  of  the  moment  by  the  soldiers  in  the  church- 
yard, and  the  French  can  hardly  be  said  to  have  at- 
tacked at  all.     The  real  battle  was  at  Barrouilhet. 

On  that  side  Reille,  advancing  with  two  divis- 
ions, about  nine  o'clock,  drove  Campbell's  Portu- 
guese from  Anglet,  and  Sparre's  cavalry  charging 
<l'iring  the  fight  cut  down  a  great  many  men.  The 
French  infantry  then  assailed  the  ridge  at  Barrouil- 
h:H,  but  moving  along  a  narrow  ridge  and  confined 
on  each  flank  by  the  tanks,  only  tw^o  brigades  could 
gn  into  action  by  the  main  road,  and  the  rain  of  the 
preceding  night  had  rendered  all  the  by-roads  so 
deep  that  it  was  midday  before  the  French  line  of 
b'tili  was  filled.  This  delay  saved  the  allies,  for 
the  attack  here  also  was  so  unexpected  that  the  first 
dvision  and  Lord  Ayliner's  brigade  were  at  rest  in 
St.  .Jean  de  Luz  and  Bidart  when  the  action  com- 
m3nced.  The  latter  did  not  reach  the  position  be- 
fore eleven  o'clock  ;  the  footguards  did  not  march 
from  St.  .lean  until  after  twelve,  and  only  arrived  at 
three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  when  the  fight  was 
done  ;  all  the  troops  were  exceedingly  fatigued,  only 
ten  guns  could  be  brought  into  play,  and  from  some 
negligence  part  of  the  infantry  were  at  first  witliout 
ammunition. 

Robinson's  brigade  of  the  fifth  divison  first  ar- 
rived to  support  Campbell's  Portuguese,  and  fight 
the  battle.  The  French  spread  tlicir  skirmishers 
along  the  whole  valley  in  front  of  Biarritz,  but  their 
principal  effort  was  directed  by  the  great  road,  and 
against  the  platform  of  Barrouilliet  about  the  may- 
or's house,  where  the  ground  was  so  thick  of  hedges 
and  coppice-wood  that  a  most  confused  fight  took 
place.  The  assailants  cutting  ways  through  tMc 
ii3dge3  poured  on  in  smaller  or  larger  bodies  as  the 


openings  allowed,  and  wore  immediately  engaged 
witli  the  defenders  ;  at  some  points  tliey  were  suc- 
cessful, at  others  beaten  back,  and  few  knew  what 
was  going  on  to  the  right  or  left  of  where  tliey  stood. 
By  degrees  Reille  engaged  both  his  divisions,  and 
some  of  Yillatte's  reserve  also  entered  the  fight,  and 
then  Bradfind's  Portuguese  and  lord  Aylmer's  brigade 
arrived  on  the  allies'  side,  which  enabled  colonel 
Grevillo's  brigade  of  the  filth  division,  hitherto  kept 
in  reserve,  to  relieve  Robinson's ;  that  general  was 
however  dangerously  wounded,  and  his  troops  suf- 
fered severely. 

And  now  a  very  notable  action  was  performed  by 
the  ninth  regiment,  under  colonel  Cameron.  This 
officer  was  on  the  extreme  left  of  CJrcville's  brigade, 
Robinson's  being  then  shifted  in  second  line  and 
towards  the  right,  Bradford's  brigade  was  at  the 
mayor's  house  some  distrnce  to  the  left  of  the  ninth 
regiment,  and  the  space  between  was  occupied  by  a 
Portuguese  battalion.  There  was  in  front  of  Grev- 
ille's  brigade  a  tliick  hedge;  but  immediately  oppo- 
site the  ninth  was  a  coppice-wood  possessed  by  tlie 
enemy,  whose  skirmisliers  were  continually  gather- 
ing in  masses,  and  rushing  out  as  if  to  assail  the 
line  :  they  were  as  often  driven  back,  yet  the  ground 
v/as  so  broken  tliat  nothing  could  be  seen  beyond  the 
flanks,  and  when  some  time  had  passed  in  this  man- 
ner, Cameron,  wlio  had  received  no  orders,  heard  a 
sudden  firing  along  the  main  road  close  to  his  lefl. 
His  adjutant  was  sent  to  look  out,  and  returned  im- 
mediately with  intelligence  that  there  was  little 
fighting  on  the  road,  but  a  French  regiment,  which 
must  have  passed  unseen  in  small  bodies  through 
the  Portuguese,  between  the  ninth  and  the  mayor's 
house,  was  rapidly  filing  into  line  on  the  rear. 
The  fourth  British  regiment  was  then  in  close  col- 
umn at  a  short  distance,  and  its  commander,  colonel 
Piper,  was  directed  by  Cameron  to  face  about, 
march  to  the  rear,  and  then  bring  up  his  left  shoul- 
der, when  he  would  infallibly  fall  in  with  tlte  French 
regiment.  Piper  marched,  but  whether  he  misun- 
derstood the  order  and  took  a  wrong  direction,  oi 
mistook  the  en-imy  for  Portuguese,  he  passed  them 
No  firing  was  heard ;  the  adjutant  again  hurried  to 
the  rear,  and  returned  with  intelligence  that  tlie 
fourth  regiment  was  not  to  be  seen,  but  the  enemy's 
line  was  nearly  formed.  Cameron,  leaving  fiily  men 
to  answer  the  skirmishing  fire  which  now  increased 
from  the  copse,  immediately  faced  about  and  march- 
ed in  line  against  the  new  enemy,  who  was  about 
his  own  strength,  as  fast  as  the  rough  nature  of  the 
ground  would  permit.  The  French  fire,  slow  at 
first,  increased  vehemently  as  the  distance  lessened  ; 
but  when  the  ninth,  coming  close  up,  sprung  for- 
wards to  the  charge,  the  adverse  line  broke  and  fled 
to  the  flanks  in  the  utmost  disorder.  Those  who 
made  for  their  own  right  brushed  tiie  left  of  Grev- 
ille's  brigade,  and  even  carried  off  an  officer  of  the 
royals  in  their  rush  ;  yet  the  greatest  number  were 
made  prisoners,  and  the  ninth,  liaving  lost  about 
eighty  men  and  officers  resumed  their  old  ground. 

The  final  result  of  the  battle  at  Barrouilhet  was 
the  repulse  of  Reille's  divisions;  but  Villatte  still 
menaced  the  right  flank,  and  Foy,  taking  possession 
of  the  narrow  ridge  connecting  Bussussary  with  the 
platform  of  Barrouilhet,  threw  his  skirmishers  into 
the  great  basin  leading  to  Arbonne,  and  connecting 
his  right  with  Reille's  left  menaced  Hope's  flank  at 
Barrouilhet.  This  was  about  two  o'clock.  Soult, 
whose  columns  were  now  all  in  hand,  gave  orders  to 
renew  the  battle,  and  his  masses  were  beginning  to 
move  when  Clauzel  reported  that  a  large  body  of 
fresh  troops,  -.pparently  coming  from  the  other  side 
of  the  Nive,  was  menacing  D'Aimagnac's  division 


686 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR 


[BookXXIH 


from  the  heinfhts  above  Urdains.  Unable  to  account 
for  this,  .Soiilt,  who  saw  the  guards  and  Germans 
moving  up  fast  trom  St.  Jean  de  Luz,  and  all  the 
unattaciied  brigades  already  in  line,  hesitated,  sus- 
pended his  own  attack,  and  ordered  D'Erlon,  who 
had  two  divisions  in  reserve,  to  detach  one  to  the 
support  of  D'Armagnac:  before  this  disposition 
could  be  comploted  the  night  fell. 

The  fresh  troops  seen  by  Clauzel  were  the  third, 
fourth,  sixth  and  seventh  divisions,  whose  move- 
ments during  the  battle  it  is  time  to  notice  Wher 
lord  Wellington,  who  remained  on  the  right  of  the 
Nive  during  the  night  ol  the  9th,  discovered  at  day- 
break t!iat  the  French  had  abandoned  the  heights  in 
Hill's  front,  he  directed  that  officer  to  occupy  them, 
and  push  parties  close  up  to  the  intrenched  camp 
of  MousseroUes,  while  his  cavalry  spread  beyond 
Hasparren  and  up  the  Adour.  3Ieanwhile  the  can- 
nonade on  the  left  bank  of  the  Nive  being  heard,  he 
repaired  in  person  to  that  side,  first  making  the 
third  and  sixth  divisions  repass  the  river,  and  di- 
recting Beresford  to  lay  another  bridge  of  communi- 
cation lower  down  the  Nive,  near  ViUefranque,  to 
shorten  the  line  of  movement.  When  he  reached 
the  left  of  the  Nive,  and  saw  how  the  battle  stood, 
he  made  the  seventh  division  close  to  the  left  from 
the  hill  of  St.  Barbe,  placed  the  third  division  at 
Urdains,  and  brought  up  the  fourth  division  to  an 
open  heathy  ridge  on  a  hill  about  a  mile  behind  the 
church  of  Arcangues.  From  this  point  general  Cole 
sent  Ross's  brigade  down  into  the  basin  on  the  left 
of  Colborne,  to  cover  Arbonne,  being  prepared  him- 
self to  march  with  his  whole  division  if  the  enemy 
attempted  to  penetrate  in  force  between  Hope  and 
Alten.  These  dispositions  were  for  the  most  part 
completed  about  two  o'clock,  and  thus  Clauzel  was 
held  in  check  at  Bussussary,  and  the  renewed  attack 
by  Foy's,  Villatte's  and  Reille's  divisions  on  Bar- 
rouilhet  prevented. 

This  day's  battle  cost  the  Anglo-Portuguese  more 
than  twelve  hundred  men  killed  and  wounded,  two 
generals  were  amongst  the  latter,  and  about  three 
hundred  men  were  made  prisoners.  The  French 
had  one  general  (Villatte)  wounded,  and  lost  about 
two  thousand  men.  But  when  the  action  termi- 
nated, two  regiments  of  Nassau  and  one  of  Frank- 
fort, the  whole  under  the  command  of  a  colonel 
Krusc,  came  over  to  the  allies.  These  men  were 
not  deserters.  Their  prince,  having  abandoned  Na- 
poleon in  Germany,  sent  secret  instructions  to  his 
troops  to  do  so  likewise,  and  in  good  time,  for  orders 
to  disarm  them  reached  Soult  the  next  morning. 
The  generals  on  each  side,  the  one  hoping  to  profit, 
the  other  to  prevent  mischief,  immediately  trans- 
mitted notice  of  the  event  to  Catalonia  wliere  seve- 
ral regiments  of  the  same  nation  were  serving.  Lord 
Wellington  failed  for  reasons  to  be  hereafter  men- 
tioned, but  Suchet  disarmed  his  Germans  with  re- 
luctance, thinking  they  could  be  trusted  ;  and  the 
Nassau  troops  at  Bayonne  were  perhaps  less  influ- 
enced by  patriotism  than  by  an  old  quarrel;  for 
when  belonging  to  the  army  of  the  centre  they  had 
forcibly  foraged  Soult's  district  early  in  the  year, 
and  carried  off  the  spoil  in  defiance  of  his  authority, 
which  gave  rise  to  bitter  disputes  at  the  time,  and 
was  probuDJy  not  forgotten  by  him. 

COMBAT    OF    THE    IItH. 

In  the  night  of  tlie  10th,  Reille  withdrew  behind 
the  tanks  as  far  as  Pucho,  Foy  and  Villatte  likewise 
drew  back  along  the  connecting  ridge  towards  Bus- 
sussary, thus  uniting  v\ith  Clauzol's  left  and  D"Er- 
lon's  reserve,  so  that  on  the  morning  of  tiie  11th  the 
French  army    wiV-  the    exception  of  D'Armagnao's 


division,  which  remained  in  front  of  Urdains,  was 
concentrated,  for  Soult  feared  a  counter-attack.  The 
French  deserters  indeed  declared  that  Clauzel  had 
formed  a  body  of  two  thousand  choice  grenadiers  to 
assault  the  village  and  church  of  Arcangues,  but  the 
day  passed  without  any  event  in  that  quarter  save  a 
slight  skirmish  in  which  a  few  men  were  \vouni:ed 
Not  so  on  the'  side  of  Barrouilhet.  There  was  a 
thick  fog,  and  lord  Wellington,  desirous  to  ascertain 
what  the  French  were  about,  directed  the  ninth  re- 
giment about  ten  o'clock  to  open  a  skirmish  beyond 
the  tanks  towards  Pucho,  and  to  push  the  action  if 
the  French  augmented  their  force.  Cameron  did  so, 
and  the  fight  was  becoming  warm,  when  colonel  De- 
lancey,  a  stafi'-ofiicer,  rashly  directed  the  ninth  to 
enter  the  village.  The  error  was  soon  and  sharply 
corrected,  for  the  fog  cleared  up,  and  Soult,  who  had 
twenty-four  thousand  men  at  that  point,  observing 
the  ninth  unsupported,  ordered  a  counter-attack, 
which  was  so  strong  and  sudden  that  Cameron  only 
saved  his  regiment  with  the  aid  of  some  Portuguet-e 
troops  hastily  brought  up  by  sir  John  Hope.  The 
fighting  then  ceased,  and  lord  Wellington  went  to 
the  right,  leaving  Hope  with  orders  to  push  back 
the  French  piquets  and  re-establish  his  former  out- 
posts on  the  connecting  ridge  towards  Bussussary. 

Soult  had  hitherto  appeared  undecided,  but  roused 
by  this  second  insult,  he  ordered  Daricau's  division 
to  attack  Barouilhet  along  the  connecting  ridge, 
while  Boyer's  division  fell  on  by  the  main  road  be- 
tween the  tanks.  This  was  about  two  o'clock,  rnd 
the  allies  expecting  no  battle  had  dispersed  to  gather 
fuel,  for  the  time  was  wet  and  cold.  In  an  instant 
the  F'rench  penetrated  in  all  directions,  they  out- 
flanked the  right,  they  passed  the  tanks,  seized  the 
out-buildings  of  the  mayor's  house,  and  occupied  the 
coppice  in  front  of  it;  they  were  indeed  quickly 
driven  from  the  out-buildings  by  the  royals,  but  the 
tumult  was  great,  and  the  coppice  was  filled  with 
men  of  all  nations  intermixed  and  fighting  in  a  j:er- 
ilous  manner.  Robinson's  brigade  was  very  han'ly 
handled,  the  officer  commanding  it  was  wounded,  a 
squadron  of  French  cavalry  suddenly  cut  down  seme 
of  the  Portuguese  near  the  wood,  and  on  the  right 
the  colonel  of  the  eighty-fourth,  having  unwisely 
engaged  his  regiment  in  a  hollow  road  where  the 
French  possessed  the  high  bank,  was  killed  with  a 
great  number  of  men.  However  the  ninth  regiment, 
posted  on  the  main  road,  plied  Boyer's  flank  with  fire, 
the  eighty-fifth  regiment  of  lord  Aylmer's  brigade 
came  into  action,  and  sir  .Tohn  Hope,  conspicuous 
from  his  gigantic  stature  and  heroic  courage,  was 
seen  wherever  danger  pressed  rallying  and  encourag- 
ing the  troops  ;  at  one  time  he  was  in  the  midst  of 
the  enemy,  his  clothes  were  pierced  with  bullets, 
and  he  received  a  severe  wound  in  the  ankle,  yet  he 
would  not  quit  the  field,  and  by  his  great  presence 
of  mind  and  calm  intrepidity  restored  the  battl'.^. 
The  French  were  finally  beaten  back  from  the  i-.osi- 
tion  of  Barouilhet;  yet  they  had  recovered  their 
original  posts,  and  continued  to  gall  the  allies  with 
a  fire  of  shot  and  shells  until  the  fall  of  night.  Ti'e 
total  loss  in  this  fight  was  about  six  hundred  men  of 
a  side  ;  and  as  the  fifth  division  was  now  considera- 
bly reduced  in  numbers,  tlie  first  division  took  its 
place  on  the  front  line.  IMeanwhile  Soult  sent  his 
cavalry  over  the  Nive  to  MousseroUes  to  check  the 
incursions  of  Hill's  horsemen. 

COMBAT    OF    THK    12tH. 

The  rain  fell  heavily  in  the  night,  and  though  the 

morning  broke  fair,  neither  side  seemed   inclined  to 

recommence  hostilities.     The  advanced  posts  were 

]  however  very  close  to  each  other,  and  about  ten 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR  WAR. 


087 


©'clock  a  misunderstanding  arose.  The  French  gen- 
eral, observing  the  fresh  regiments  of  the  first  divis- 
ion close  to  his  posts,  imagined  the  allies  were  go- 
ing to  attack  him,  and  immediately  reinforced  his 
front:  tiiis  movement  causing  an  English  battery 
to  fall  into  a  like  error,  it  opened  upon  the  advancing 
French  troops,  and  in  an  instant  tiie  whole  line  of 
posts  was  engaged.  Soult  then  brought  up  a  number 
of  guns,  the  firing  continued  without  an  object  for 
many  hours,  and  three  or  four  hundred  men  of  a  side 
were  killed  and^woundcd  ;  but  the  great  body  of  the 
French  army  remained  concentrated  and  quiet  on 
tlie  ridge  between  Barrouilhet  and  Bussussary. 

Lord  Wellington,  as  early  as  the  10th,  had  expect- 
ed Soult  would  abandon  this  attack  to  fall  upon  Hill, 
and  therefore  had  given  Beresford  orders  to  carry 
the  sixth  division  to  that  general's  assistance  by 
the  new  bridge,  and  the  seventh  division  by  Ustaritz, 
without  waiting  for  further  instructions,  if  Hill  was 
assailed;  now,  observing  Souk's  tenacity  at  Barrou- 
ilhet, he  drew  the  seventh  division  towards  Arbonne. 
Beresford  had  however  made  a  movement  towards 
the  Nive,  and  this,  with  the  march  of  the  seventh 
division  and  some  clianges  in  the  position  of  the 
fourth  division,  caused  Soult  to  believe  the  allies 
were  gatliering  witli  a  view  to  attack  his  centre  on 
the  morning  of  the  KHh  ;  and  it  is  remarkable  that 
the  deserters  at  this  early  period  told  him  the  Span- 
iards had  re-entered  France,  although  orders  to  that 
effect  were  not,  as  we  shall  find,  given  until  the  next 
day.  Convinced  then  tiiat  his  bolt  was  shot  on  the 
left  of  the  Nive,  he  left  two  divisions  and  Villatte's 
reserve  in  the  intrenched  camp,  and  marched  with 
the  other  seven  to  Mousserolles,  intending  to  fall 
upon  Hill. 

That  general  had  pushed  his  scouting  parties  to 
the  Gambouri,  and  wiien  general  Sparre's  horsemen 
arrived  at  3Iousserulles  on  the  12th,  Pierre  Soult 
advanced  from  the  Bidouze  with  all  tlie  light  caval- 
ry. He  was  supported  by  the  infantry  of  general 
Paris,  and  drove  the  allies'  posts  from  Hasparren. 
Colonel  Vivian,  who  commanded  there,  immediately 
ordered  major  Brotlierton  to  charge  with  the  four- 
teenth dragoons  across  the  bridge;  but  it  was  an  ill- 
judged  order,  and  the  impossibility  of  succeeding  so 
manifest,  that  when  Brotherton,  noted  throughout 
tlie  army  for  his  daring,  galloped  forward,  only  two 
men  and  one  subaltern,  lieutenant  Southwell,  passed 
the  narrow  bridge  with  him,  and  they  were  all  tak- 
en. Vivian  then,  seeing  his  error,  charged  with  his 
whole  brigade  to  rescue  them,  yet  in  vain  ;  he  was 
forced  to  fall  back  upon  Urcuray,  where  Morillo's 
Spaniards  had  relieved  the  British  infantry  brigade 
on  the  11th.  This  threatening  movement  induced 
general  Hill  to  put  the  British  brigade  in  march 
again  for  Urcuray  on  the  12th,  but  he  recalled  it  at 
sunset,  having  then  discovered  Soult's  columns  pas- 
sing the  Nive  by  tlie  boat-bridge  above  Bayonne. 

Lord  Wellington  now,  feeling  the  v.'ant  of  num- 
bers, brought  forward  a  division  of  Gallicians  to  St. 
.fean  de  Luz,  and  one  of  Andalusians  from  the  Bas- 
tan  to  Itzassu,  and  to  prevent  their  plundering  fed 
them  from  the  British  magazines.  'J"he  Gallicians 
were  tc^  support  Hope,  the  Andalusians  to  watch  the 
upper  valley  of  the  Nive  and  protect  the  rear  of  the 
army  from  Paris  and  Pierre  Soult,  who  could  easily 
be  reinforced  with  a  strong  body  of  national  guards. 
Meanwhile  Hill  had  taken  a  position  of  battle  on  a 
front  of  two  miles. 

His  left  composed  of  the  twenty-eiglith,  thirty- 
fourth  and  thirty-ninth  regiments,  under  general 
l*-'ngl3,  occupied  a  wooded  and  broken  range  crown- 
ed by  the  chateau  of  Villefranque  ;  it  covered  tiie 
new  por.toon  bridge  of  communication,  which  was  a 


mile  and  a  half  higher  up  the  river,  but  it  was  sepa- 
rated from  the  centre  by  a  small  stream  forming  a 
chain  of  ponds  in  a  very  deep  and  marshy  valley. 

The  centre,  placed  on  both  sides  of"  the  iiigh  read 
near  the  hamlet  of  St.  Pierre,  occu[)icd  a  crescent- 
shaped  height,  broken  with  rocks  and  close  brush- 
wood on  the  left  hand,  and  on  the  right  hand  ench  s- 
ed  with  high  and  thick  hedges,  one  of  which,  cover- 
ing, at  the  distance  of  a  hundred  yards,  jiart  of  the 
line,  was  nearly  impassable.  ITere  Ashwoith'a 
Portuguese  and  Barnes'  British  brigade  of  the  sec- 
ond division  were  posted.  The  sever.ty-first  regi- 
ment was  on  the  left,  the  fiftieth  in  the  centre,  the 
ninety-second  on  the  right.  Ashwortlfs  PortugTiese 
were  posted  in  advance  immediately  in  front  of  St. 
Pierre,  and  their  skirmishers  occupied  a  small  wood 
covering  their  right.  Twelve  guns  under  the  colo- 
nels Ross  and  Tullock  were  concentrated  in  front  of 
the  centre,  looking  down  the  great  road,  and  half  a 
mile  in  rear  of  this  point  Lecor's  Portuguese  division 
was  stationed  with  two  guns  as  a  reserve. 

The  right  under  Byng  was  composed  of  the  third, 
fifty-seventh,  thirty-fir^t  and  sixty-sixth.  Cne  of 
these  regiments,  the  third,  was  posted  on  a  height 
running  nearly  parallel  with  the  Adcur,  called  the 
ridge  of  Partouhiria,  or  Old  Moguerre,  because  a 
village  of  that  name  was  situated  upcn  the  summit. 
This  regiment  was  pushed  in  advance  to  a  point 
where  it  could  only  be  approached  by  crossing  the 
lower  part  of  a  narrow  swampy  valley  which  se|)a- 
rated  3Ioguerre  from  the  heights  of  St.  Pierre.  The 
upper  part  of  this  valley  was  held  by  Byng  with  the 
remainder  of  his  brigade,  and  his  post  was  well  cov- 
ered by  a  mill-pond  leading  towards  the  enemy  and 
nearly  filling  all  the  valley. 

One  mile  in  front  of  St.  Pierre  was  a  range  of 
counter-heights  belonging'  to  the  French,  but  the 
basin  between  was  broad,  open,  and  commanded  in 
every  part  by  the  fire  of  the  allies,  and  in  all  parts 
the  country  was  too  lieavy  and  too  much  enclosed 
for  the  action  of  cavalry.  Nor  could  the  enemy  ap- 
proach in  force,  <!xcept  on  a  narrow  front  of  battle 
and  by  the  high  road,  until  within  cannon-shot, 
when  two  narrow  difficult  lanes  branched  off'  to  the 
right  and  left,  and  crossing  the  swampy  valleys  on 
each  side,  led,  the  one  to  the  height  where  the  tliird 
regiment  was  posted  on  the  extreme  right  of  the 
allies,  the  other  to  general  Pringle's  position  on  the 
left. 

In  the  night  of  the  12th  the  rain  swelled  the  Nive 
and  carried  avvay  the  allies'  bridge  of  communica- 
tion. It  was  soon  restored,  but  on  the  morning  of 
the  l^th  general  Hill  was  completely  cut  off'  from 
the  rest  of  the  army  ;  and  while  seven  French  divis- 
ions of  infantry,  furnishing  at  least  thirty-five  thou- 
sand combatants,  approached  him  in  frunt,  r.n  eighth 
under  general  Paris  and  the  cavalry  division  of 
Pierre  Soult  menaced  him  in  rear.  To  meet  the 
French  in  his  front  he  had  less  than  fourteen  thou- 
sand, men  and  officers,  with  fourteen  guns  in  posi 
tion  ;  and  there  were  only  four  thousand  Spaniards 
with  Vivian's  cavalry  at  Urcuray. 

BATTLE    OF    6T.   PIKRRE. 

The  morning  broke  with  a  heavy  mist,  under 
cover  of  which  Soult  formed  his  order  of  lattle. 
D'Erlon,  having  D'Arniagnac's,  Abbe's  and  Dari- 
cau's  divisions  of  infantry,  Sparre's  cavalry  and 
twenty-two  guns,  marched  in  front ;  he  was  follow- 
ed by  Foy  and  IMaransin,  but  the  rema'nder  of  the 
French  army  was  in  reserve,  for  the  roads  would 
not  allow  of  any  other  order.  The  mist  hung  heavi- 
ly, and  the  French  masses,  at  one  moment  quite 
shrouded  in  vapour,  at  another  dimly  seen  or  loom 


688 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XXIII. 


.ng  sadder  end  large  and  dark  at  different  points, 
ajj^ieared  like  thunder-clouds  gathering  before  the 
storm.  At  half  iiast  eiglit  Soult  pusiied  back  the 
British  piqiiatri  in  the  centre;  the  sun  burst  out  at 
that  inom'int,  the  sj)arkling  tire  of  tiie  light  troops 
spread  wide  in  the  valley,  and  crept  up  tlie  hills  on 
either  dink,  while  the  bellowing  of  forty  pieces  of 
artillery  eiiook  the  banks  of  tlie  Nive  and  tlie  Adour. 
Daricau,  marching  on  the  French  riglit,  was  direct- 
ed against  general  Pringle.  D'Arniagnac,  moving 
on  their  left  and  taking  Old  Moguerre  as  itie  point 
of  direction,  was  ordered  to  force  Byng's  right. 
Abbe  assailed  the  centre  at  St.  Pierre,  where  gene- 
ral Stewart  commanded,  for  sir  Rowland  Hill  had 
taken  his  station  on  a  commanding  mount  in  the 
rear,  from  whence  he  could  see  the  whole  battle  and 
direct  tiis  movements. 

Abbe,  a  man  noted  for  vigour,  pushed  his  attack 
with  great  violence,  and  gained  ground  so  rapidly 
with  his  light  troops  on  the  left  of  Ashworth's  Por- 
tuguese, that  Stewart  sent  the  seventy-tirst  regiment 
and  two  guns  from  St.  Pierre  to  the  latter's  aid  ;  the 
French  skirmishers  likewise  won  the  small  wood  on 
Ashwortli's  right,  and  half  of  the  tiftieth  regiment 
was  also  detached  from  St.  Pierre  to  that  quarter. 
The  wood  was  thus  retaken,  and  the  flanks  of  Stew- 
art's position  secured ;  but  this  centre  was  very 
much  weakened,  and  the  fire  of  the  French  artillery 
was  concentrated  against  it.  Abbe  then  pushed  on 
a  column  of  attack  there  with  such  a  power  that  in 
despite  of  the  play  of  musketry  on  his  flanks  and  a 
crashing  cannonade  in  his  front,  he  gained  the  top 
of  the  position,  and  drove  back  the  remainder  of 
Ashwortirs  Portuguese  and  the  other  half  of  the  fif- 
tieth regiment  which  had  remained  in  reserve. 

General  Barnes,  who  had  still  the  ninety-second 
regiment  in  hand  behind  St.  Pierre,  immediately 
brougiit  it  on  with  a  strong  counter-attack.  The 
French  skirmishers  fell  back  on  each  side,  leaving 
two  regiments  composing  the  column  to  meet  the 
charge  of  the  ninety-second  ;  it  was  rough  and  push- 
ed home,  the  French  mass  wavered  and  gave  vray. 
Abbe  immediately  replaced  it;  and  Soult,  redoub- 
ling the  heavy  play  of  his  guns  from  the  height  he 
occupied,  sent  forward  a  battery  of  horse  artillery, 
whicli  galloping  down  into  the  valley  opened  its  fire 
close  to  the  allies' with  most  destructive  activity. 
The  cannonade  and  musketry  rolled  like  a  prolonged 
peal  of  thunder,  and  the  second  French  column,  re- 
gardl3ss  of  Ross's  guns,  though  they  tore  the  ranks 
in  a  liorrible  manner,  advanced  so  steadily  up  the 
high  road  that  the  ninety-second  yielding  to  the 
tempest  slowly  regained  its  old  position  behind  St. 
Pierre.  The  Portuijuese  guns,  their  British  com- 
manding officer  having  fallen  wounded,  then  lim- 
bered up  to  retire,  and  the  French  skirmishers 
reached  the  impenetrable  hedge  in  front  of  Ash- 
worth's right.  Gcjneral  Barnes  now  seeing  that 
h-ird  righting  only  could  save  the  position,  made  the 
Portuguese  guns  resume  their  fire,  and  the  wing  of 
the  fiftieth  and  the  cacjadores  gallantly  held  the 
small  wood  on  the  right;  but  Barnes  was  soon 
wounded,  the  greatest  part  of  his  and  general  Stew- 
art's staff  were  hurt,  and  tha  matter  seemed  desper- 
ate. For  tlie  light  troops,  overpowered  by  numbers. 
Wire  all  driven  in  except  those  in  the  wood,  the  ar- 
tillery-men were  falling  at  the  guns.  Asliworth's 
line  of  Portuguese  crumbled  away  rapidly  before  the 
musketry  and  cannonade,  the  ground  was  strewed 
with  tlie  de.  d  in  front,  and  the  wounded  crawling  to 
tiie  rear  weri;  many. 

If  the  French  light  troops  could  then  have  pene- 
trated through  the  thick  hedge  in  front  of  the  Por- 
tuguese, deleat  would  have  been  iu'-yitable  on  this 


point,  for  the  main  column  of  attack  still  steadily 
advanced  up  tlie  main  road,  and  a  second  column 
launciied  on  its  riglit  was  alrcac.y  victorious,  becy^use 
the  colonel  of  the  seventy-first  had  shamefully  with- 
drawn that  gallant  regiment  out  of  action  and  aban- 
doned the  Portuguese.  Pringle  was  indeed  fightijjg 
strongly  against  Daricau 's  superior  numbers  on  ti.e 
hill  of  Villefranque,  but  on  tiie  extreme  right  the 
colonel  of  the  tliird  regiment  had  also  abandoned  iiis 
strong  post  to  D'Arniagnac,  whose  loading  brigade 
was  thus  rajiidly  turning  Byng's  other  regiments  on 
that  side.  And  now  Foy's  and  Maransin  s  divisions, 
hitherto  retarded  by  the  deep  roads,  were  coming 
into  line  ready  to  support  Abbe,  and  this  at  tlie  mo- 
ment when  the  troops  opposed  to  him  were  deprived 
of  their  reserve.  For  when  general  Hill  beheld  the 
retreat  of  the  third  and  seventy-fir^t  regiments,  he 
descended  in  haste  from  his  mount,  met,  and  turned 
the  latter  back  to  renew  the  fight,  and  then  in  per- 
son leading  one  brigade  of  Lecor's  reserve  division 
to  the  same  quarter,  sent  the  other  against  D'Ar- 
magnac  on  the  iiill  of  Old  Moguerre.  Tiius  at  tlie 
decisive  moment  of  the  battle  ti.e  French  reserve 
v/as  augmented,  and  that  of  the  allii-.^  tlirown  as  a 
last  resource  into  action.  Hcwver  ti.e  right  wing 
of  the  fiftieth  and  Ashworth's  cori^t. ores,  both  spread 
as  skirmishers,  never  lost  the  small  wood  in  front, 
upholding  the  fight  there  and  towards  the  high  road 
with  sucii  unflinching  courage  tliat  the  ninety-second 
regiment  had  time  to  re-form  behind  tiie  hamlet  of 
St.  Pierre.  Then  its  gallant  colonel,  Cameron, once 
more  led  it  down  the  road,  with  colours  flying  and 
music  playing,  resolved  to  give  the  shock  to  what- 
ever stood  in  the  way.  At  this  sight,  the  British 
skirmishers  on  the  flanks,  suddenly  changing  from 
retreat  to  attack,  rushed  forward  and  drove  those  of 
the  enemy  back  on  each  side  ;  yet  the  battle  seemed 
hopeless,  for  Ashworth  was  badly  wounded,  his  line 
was  shattered  to  atoms,  and  Barnes,  who  had  net 
quitted  the  field  for  his  former  hurt,  was  now  shot 
through  the  body. 

The  ninety-second  was  but  a  small  body  compared 
with  the  heavy  mass  in  its  front,  and  the   French 
soldiers   seemed   willing  enough   to  close  with   tl;e 
bayonet ;  but  an  officer  riding  at  their  head  sudden- 
ly turned  his  horse,  waved  his  sword,  and  appeared 
to  order  a  retreat;  then  they  faced  about  rnd  imme- 
diately retired  across  t!ie  valley  to  tlie;r  original  po- 
sition, in  good  order  however,  and  scarcely  pursued 
by  the  allies,  so  exhausted  were  the  victors.     This 
retrograde  movement,  for  there  was  no  panic  or  dis- 
order, was  produced   partly  by  the  galltmt  acivance 
of  the  ninety-second  and  the  returning  rush  of  the 
skirmishers,  partly  by  the  state  of  aliiiirs  immedi- 
ately on  tlie  right  of  the  French  column.     For  the 
seventy-first,  indignant  at  their  colonel's  conduct, 
had   returned    to   the  fight  with  such  alacrity,  and 
j  were  so  well  aided   by  Lecor's  PortuguCbC,  geneicls 
j  Hill  and  Stewart  each  in  person  leading  an  attack, 
I  that  the  hitherto  victorious  French  were  overthrown 
I  there  also  in  the  very  moment  when  the  ninety-scic- 
ond  came  with  such  a  brave  show  down  the  niai:* 
road  :   Lecor  was  however  wounded. 
I      This  double  action  in  the  centre  being  set-n  from 
the  hill  of  Villofranque,  Daricnu's  division,  alrcac'y 
roughly  handled  by  I'ringle,  fell   back  in  confusion  ; 
land  meantime  on  the  right,  Buchan's  Portuguese, 
1  detached  by  Hill  to  recover  the  Moguerre  or  Partou- 
[  hiria  ridge,  crossed  the  valley,  and  ascending  under 
i  a  heavy  flank  fire  from  Soult's  guns  rallied  tiie  third 
I  regiment;    in    happy   time,  for    DWrmngnac's   first 
'brigade,  having  already  passed  the  flank  of  Byng's 
j  regiments  at  the  mill-pond,  v.as  actually  in  rear  of 
1  the  allies'  lines.     It  was  now  twelve  o'clock,  and 


1813.J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


689 


\*hilo  tlie  fire  of  the  light  troops  in  the  front  and  the 
cannonade  in  the  centre  continued,  the  contending 
generals  restored  tiieir  respective  orders  of  battle. 
Soult's  right  wing  had  been  quite  repulsed  by  Prin- 
gle,  his  left  wing  was  giving  way  before  Buchan, 
and  the  difficult  ground  forbade  his  sending  immedi- 
ate succour  to  either  ;  moreover  in  the  exigency  of 
the  moment  he  had  called  D'Arniagnac's  reserve 
brigade  to  sustain  Abbe's  retiring  columns.  How- 
e^'f.r  that  brigade  and  Foy's  and  Maransin's  divisions 
wure  in  hand  to  renew  the  fight  in  the  centre,  and 
tiie  al'ies  could  not,  unsuccoured,  have  Sustained  a 
fresh  assault ;  for  their  ranks  were  wasted  wifh  fire, 
nearly  all  the  staff  had  been  killed  or  wounded,  and 
three  generals  had  quitted  the  field  badly  hurt- 
In  this  crisis,  general  Hill,  seeing  that  Buchan 
was  now  well  and  successfully  engaged  on  the  Par- 
touhiria  ridge,  and  that  Byng's  regiments  were 
quite  masters  of  their  ground  in  tiie  valley  of  the 
mill-pond,  drew  the  fifty-seventh  regiment  from  the 
latter  place  to  reinforce  his  centre.  At  the  same 
t.ma  the  bridge  above  Villefranque  having  been  re- 
elored,  the  sixth  division,  whicli  had  been  marching 
since  daybreak,  appeared  in  order  of  battle  on  the 
mount  from  whence  Hill  had  descended  to  raLy  the 
eeventy-tirst.  It  was  soon  followed  by  the  fourth 
division,  and  that  again  by  the  brigades  of  the  third 
division  ;  two  other  brigades  of  the  seventh  division 
were  likewise  in  march.  With  the  first  of  these 
troops  came  lord  Wellington,  who  had  hurried  from 
Barrouilhet  when  the  first  sound  of  the  cannon 
reached  him  ;  yet  he  arrived  only  to  witness  the 
close  of  the  battle,  the  crisis  was  past.  Hill's  day  of 
plory  was  complete.  Soult  had,  according  to  the 
French  method,  made  indeed  another  attack,  or 
rather  demonstration,  against  the  centre,  to  cover 
his  new  dispositions,  an  effort  easily  repulsed,  but 
at  the  same  moment  Buchan  drove  D'Armagnac 
headlong  off  the  Partouhiria  ridge.  Tlie  sixtii  di- 
vision then  appeared  on  the  commanding  mount  in 
the  rear  of  St.  Pierre,  and  though  the  French  masses 
BtiU  maintained  a  menacing  position  on  the  high 
road,  and  on  a  hillock  rising  between  the  road  and 
the  mill-pond,  they  were  quickly  disposse;5sed.  For 
the  English  general  being  now  supported  by  the 
sixth  division,  sent  Byng  with  two  battalions  against 
the  hillock,  and  some  troops  from  the  centre  against 
those  on  the  high  road.  At  this  last  point  the  gen- 
erals and  staff  had  been  so  cut  down  that  colonel 
Currie,  the  aid-de-camp  who  brought  the  order, 
could  find  no  superior  officer  to  deliver  it  to,  and  led 
the  troops  himself  to  the  attack  ;  but  both  charges 
W3re  successful,  and  two  guns  of  the  light  battery 
6?nt  down  in  the  early  part  of  the  fight  by  Soult, 
and  which  had  played  without  ceasing  up  to  this 
moment,  were  taken. 

The  battle  now  abated  to  a  skirmish  of  light 
troops,  under  cover  of  which  the  French  endeavour- 
ed to  carry  off  their  wounded  and  rally  tlicir  strng- 
flers  ;  but  at  two  o'clock  lord  Wellington  command- 
ed a  general  advance  of  the  v/hole  line.  Then  the 
Fr.'inch  retreated  fiirhting,  and  the  allies  following 
chse  on  the  side  of  the  Nive  plied  them  with  mus- 
ketry until  dark.  Yet  they  maintained  their  line 
towards  the  Adour,  fijr  Sparre's  cavalry  passing  out 
that  way  rejoined  Pierre  Soult  on  tlie  side  of  II as- 
parren.  This  last-named  general  and  Paris  had  dur- 
ing the  day  menaced  Morillo  and  Vivian's  cavalry 
at  llrcuray  ;  however  not  more  than  thirty  mon  of  a 
side  were  hurt,  and  when  Soult's  ill  success  became 
known,  the  French  retired  to  B mloc. 

In  this  bloody  action   Soult  hid  designed  to  cm- 
ploy  seven  divisions  of  infantry  with  one  brigade  of 
cavalry  ^n   the   front,  and  one  brigi'c'e   of  infantry 
4a 


with  a  division  of  cavalry  on  the  rear  ;  but  the  state 
of  the  roads  and  the  narrow  front  he  was  forced  to 
move  upon  did  not  permit  more  than  five  divifiona 
to  act  at  St.  Pierre,  and  only  half  of  tho.';e  were  se- 
riously engaged.  His  loss  was  certainly  three  thou- 
sand, making  a  total  on  the  five  days'  fighting  of 
six  thousand  men,  with  two  generals,  Villatte  and 
3Iaucomble,  wounded.  The  estimate  made  by  the 
British  at  the  time  far  exceeded  this  number,  and 
one  French  writer  makes  their  loss  ten  thousand, 
including  probably  the  Nassau  and  Frankfort  regi- 
ments. The  same  writer,  however,  estimates  the 
loss  of  the  allies  at  sixteen  thousand  !  whereas  Hill 
had  only  three  generals  and  about  fifteen  hundred 
men  killed  and  wounded  on  the  V^ih,  and  Morillo  lost 
but  twenty-six  men  at  Urcuray.  The  real  loss  of 
the  allies  in  the  whole  five  days'  fighting  was  only 
five  thousand  and  nineteen,  including,  however,  five 
generals,  Hope,  Robinson,  Barnes,  Lecor  and  Ash- 
worth.  Of  this  number  five  hundred  were  prisoners. 
The  duke  of  DaJjnatia,  baffled  by  the  unexpected 
result  of  the  battle  of  St.  Pierre,  left  U'Erlon's  three 
divisions  in  front  of  the  camp  of  Alousserolles,  sent 
two  others  over  the  Nive  to  Marac.  and  passing  the 
Adour  himself  during  the  night  with  Foy's  division, 
spread  it  along  the  right  bank  of  that  river  as  far  as 
the  confluence  of  the  Gave  de  Pau. 

OBSERVATIONS. 

1st.  The  French  general's  plan  was  conceived 
with  genius,  but  the  execution  offers  a  great  con- 
trast to  the  conception.  What  a  difierence  between 
the  sudden  concentration  of  his  whole  army  on  the 
platforms  of  Arcangues  and  Bussussary,  where  there 
were  only  a  few  piquets  to  withstand  hirn,  and  from 
whence  he  could  have  fallen  with  the  roll  of  an  Eva- 
lanche  upon  any  point  of  the  allies'  line!  wiiat  a 
difference  between  that  and  the  petty  attack  of 
Clauzel,  which  a  thousand  men  of  the  light  division 
sufficed  to  arrest  at  the  village  and  church  of  Arcan- 
gues. There,  beyond  question,  was  the  weak  pan 
of  the  English  general's  cuirass  The  spear  pushed 
home  there  would  have  drawn  blood  For  the  dis- 
position and  movements  of  the  third,  fourth  and  sev- 
enth divisions  were  made  more  with  reference  to  the 
support  of  Hill  than  to  sustain  an  attack  from 
Soult's  army;  and  it  is  evident  that  Wellington, 
trusting  to  the  effect  of  his  victory  on  the  ICth  of 
November,  had  treated  the  French  general  and  his 
troops  more  contemptuously  than  he  could  have  just- 
ified by  arms  without  the  aid  of  fortune.  I  know 
not  what  induced  marshal  Soult  to  direct  his  main 
attack  by  Anglet  and  the  connecting  ridge  of  Bus- 
sussary,  against  Barrouilhet,  instead  of  assailing 
Arcangues,  as  he  at  first  proposed  ;  but  this  is  cer- 
tain, that  for  three  hours  after  Clauzel  first  attacked 
the  piquets  at  the  latter  place,  there  were  not  troops 
enough  to  stop  three  French  divisions,  much  less  a 
whole  army.  And  this  point  being  nearer  to  the 
bridge  by  which  D'Erlon  passed  tiie  Nive,  the  con- 
centration of  the  French  troops  could  have  been 
made  sooner  than  at  Barrouilhet,  where  the  want  of 
unity  in  tlie  attack  caused  by  the  difficulty  of  the 
roads  ruined  the  French  combinations. 

The  allies  were  so  unexpectant  of  an  attack,  that 
the  battle  at  Barrouilhet,  which  might  have  been 
fought  with  seventeen  thousand  men,  was  actually 
fought  by  ten  thousand.  And  those  were  not  brought 
into  action  at  once,  for  Robinson's  brigade  and 
Campbell's  Portuguese, favoured  by  the  narrow  open 
ing  between  the  tanks,  resisted  Rcille's  divisions  fff 
for^two  hours,  and  gave  time  for  the  rest  of  the  fitlli 
division  and  Bradford's  brigade  to  arrive.  But  ir 
Foy's  division  and  Villatte't  reserve  had  been  able 


o90 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XXIII 


to  assail  the  flank  at  the  same  time,  by  the  ridge 
comirii^  from  Bussussary,  the  battle  would  have  been 
won  by  tlie  French;  and  maanwhile  three  divisions 
under  Clauzel  and  two  under  D'Erlon  remained  hesi- 
tating byfore  Urdains  and  Arcangues,  tor  the  can- 
nonade and  skirmishing  at  the  lattc-  place  were,  the 
very  marks  and  signs  ot"  indecision 

2nd.  On  the  lltli,  the  inactivit}  of  the  French 
during  the  morning  may  be  easilj  accounted  for. 
The  defection  of  the  German  regim<nts,  the  neces- 
sity of  disarming  and  removing  those  that  remained, 
the  care  of  the  wounded,  and  the  time  required  to 
re-examine  the  allies'  position  and  ascertain  what 
changes  had  taken  place  during  the  night,  must  have 
given  ample  employment  to  the  French  general. 
His  attack  in  the  afternoon  also  was  well  judged,  be- 
cause already  he  must  have  seen  from  tiie  increase 
of  troops  in  his  front,  from  the  intrenched  battery 
and  other  works  rapidly  constructed  at  the  church 
of  Arcangues,  that  no  decisive  success  could  be  ex- 
Ijected  on  the  left  of  the  Nive,  and  that  his  best 
chance  was  to  change  his  line  of  attack  again  to  the 
right  bank.  To  do  this  with  effect,  it  was  necessa- 
ry, not  only  to  draw  all  lord  Wellington's  reserves 
from  the  right  of  the  Nive,  but  to  be  certain  that 
they  had  come,  and  this  could  only  be  done  by  re- 
peating the  attacks  at  Harrouilhet.  The  same  cause 
operated  on  the  12th,  for  it  was  not  until  the  fourth 
and  seventh  divisions  were  seen  by  him  on  the  side 
of  Arbonne  that  he  knew  his  v/ile  had  succeeded. 
Yet  again  the  execution  was  below  the  conception, 
for  first,  the  bivouac  fires  on  the  ridge  of  Bussussa- 
ry  were  extinguished  in  the  evening,  and  then  others 
were  lighted  on  the  side  of  MousseroUes,  thus  plain- 
ly indicating  the  march,  which  was  also  begun  too 
early,  because  the  leading  division  was  by  Hill  seen 
to  pass  the  bridge  of  boats  before  sunset. 

These  were  serious  errors,  yet  the  duke  of  Dal- 
matia's  generalship  cannot  be  thus  fairly  tested. 
There  are  many  circumstances  which  combine  to 
prove,  that  when  he  complained  to  the  emperor  of 
the  contradictions  and  obstacles  he  had  to  encoun- 
ter, he  alluded  to  military  as  well  as  to  political  and 
financial  difficulties.  It  is  a  part  of  human  nature 
to  dislike  any  disturbance  of  previous  habits,  and 
soldiers  are  never  pleased  at  first  with  a  general 
who  introduces  and  rigorously  exacts  a  system  of 
discipline  ditfering  from  what  they  have  been  accus- 
tomed to.  Its  utility  must  be  proved  and  confirmed 
by  habit  ere  it  will  find  flivour  in  their  eyes.  Now 
Soult  suddenly  assumed  the  command  of  troops  that 
had  been  long  serving  under  various  generals  and 
were  usad  to  much  license  in  Spain.  They  were 
therefore,  men  and  officers,  uneasy  at  being  suddenly 
subjected  to  the  austere  and  resolute  command  of 
one  who,  from  natural  character  as  well  as  the  exi- 
gency of  the  times,  the  war  being  now  in  his  own 
country,  demanded  a  ready  and  exact  obedience,  and 
a  regularity  which  long  habits  of  a  different  kind 
rendered  onerous.  Hence  we  find  in  all  the  French 
writers,  and  in  Souk's  own  reports,  manifest  proofs 
that  his  designs  were  frequently  thwarted  or  disre- 
garded by  his  subordinates  when  circumstances  pro- 
mised impunity.  His  greatest  and  ablest  military 
combinations  were  certainly  rendered  abortive  by 
the  errors  of  his  lieutenants  in  the  ♦^rst  operations 
to  relieve  Pampeluna,  and  on  the  ,'ilst  of  August  a 
manifest  negligence  of  his  earnest  recommendations 
to  vigilance  led  to  scrif)us  danger  and  loss  at  the 
passage  of  the  lower  Ridassoa.  Co;n(>laint  and  re- 
crimination were  rife  in  al!  quarters  about  tlie  de- 
feat on  the  lOth  of  November,  and  on  the  19th  the 
bridge-he-ad  of  Cam  bo  was  destroyed  con'rxry  to  the 
spirit  of  hie  instructions.     These  ih'ngi  joined  to 


the  acknowledged  jealousy  and  disputes  prevalent 
amongst  the  French  generals  employed  in  .Spain, 
would  indicate  that  the  discrepancy  between  the 
conception  and  execution  of  the  operations  in  front 
of  Bayonne  was  not  the  error  of  the  commander-in- 
chief.  Perhaps  king  Josei)h's  taction,  so  inimical 
to  the  duke  of  Dalmatia,  was  still  powerful  in  the 
army  and  difficult  to  deal  with. 

8rd.  Lord  Wellington  has  been  blamed  for  put- 
ting his  troops  in  a  thlse  position,  and  no  doubt  he 
undervalued — it  was  not  the  first  time — the  military 
genius  and  resources  of  his  able  adversary,  when  ho 
exposed  Hill's  troops  on  the  left  of  the  Nive  to  a 
species  of  surprise.  But  tlie  passage  of  the  Nive 
itself,  the  rapidity  vj'ith  which  he  moved  his  divis- 
ions from  bank  to  bank,  and  the  confidence  with 
which  he  relied  upon  the  valour  of  his  troops,  so  far 
from  justifying  the  censures  which  have  been  pass- 
ed upon  him  by  the  French  writers,  emphatically 
marked  his  mastery  in  the  art.  Tiie  stern  justice 
of  sending  the  Spaniards  back  into  Spain  after  the 
battle  of  the  Nivelle  is  apparent,  but  tlie  magnanim- 
ity of  that  measure  can  only  be  understood  by  con- 
sidering lord  Wellington's  military  situation  at  the 
time.  The  battle  of  the  Nivelle  was  delivered  on 
political  grounds;  but  of  what  avail  would  his  gain- 
ing it  have  been  if  he  had  remained  enclosed  as  it 
were  in  a  net  between  the  Nive  and  the  sea,  Bay- 
onne and  the  Pyrenees,  unable  to  open  communica- 
tions with  the  disaffected  in  France,  and  having  the 
beaten  army  absolutely  forbidding  him  to  forage  or 
even  to  look  beyond  the  river  on  his  right !  The 
invasion  of  France  was  not  his  own  operation,  it 
was  the  project  of  the  English  cabinet  and  the  allied 
sovereigns  ;  both  were  naturally  urging  him  to  com- 
plete it,  and  to  pass  the  Nive  and  free  his  flanks 
was  indispensable  if  he  would  draw  any  profit  from 
the  victory  of  the  10th  of  November.  But  he  cov'.d 
not  pass  it  with  his  whole  army  unless  he  resigned 
the  sea  coast  and  his  communications  with  Spain. 
He  was  therefore  to  operate  with  a  portion  only  of 
his  force,  and  consequently  required  all  the  men  he 
could  gather  to  ensure  success.  Yet  at  that  crisis 
he  divested  himself  of  twenty-five  thousand  Spanish 
soldiers  ! 

Was  this  done  in  ignorance  of  the  military  glory 
awaiting  him  beyond  the  spot  where  he  stood  ] 

"  If  I  had  twenty  thousand  Spaniards  paid  and 
fed,"  he  wrote  to  lord  Bathurst,  "  I  should  have  Bay- 
onne. If  I  had  Ibrty  thousan*!,  I  do  not  know  where 
I  should  stop.  Now  I  have  both  tlie  twenty  thou- 
sand and  the  forty  thousand,  but  I  have  not  the 
means  of  paying  and  supplying  them,  and  if  they 
plunder  they  will  ruin  all." 

Requisitions  which,  the  French  expected  as  a  part 
of  war  would  have  enabled  him  to  run  this  cr.reer, 
but  he  looked  ftirther;  he  had  promised  the  j.eople 
protection,  and  his  greatness  of  mind  was  disclosed 
in  a  single  sentence.  "  I  must  tell  your  lordship 
that  our  success,  and  every  thing,  depends  upon  our 
moderation  and  justice."  Rather  than  infringe  on 
either,  he  sent  the  Spaniards  to  the  rear,  and  passed 
the  Nive  with  the  British  and  Portuguese  only, 
thus  violating  the  military  rule  which  forbids  a  gen- 
eral to  disseminate  his  troops  before  an  enemy  who 
remains  in  mass,  lest  he  should  be  beaten  in  detail. 
But  genius  begins  where  rules  end.  A  great  gen- 
eral always  seeks  moral  power  in  preference  to  phy- 
sical force.  Wellington's  choice  here  was  between 
a  shameful  inactivity  or  a  dangerous  enterprise. 
Trusting  to  the  influence  of  his  reputation,  to  his 
previous  victories,  and  to  the  ascendency  of  his 
I  troops  in  the  field,  he  chose  the  latter,  and  the  re- 
1  Gult,  though  he  ccmmitted  some  errors  of  execution. 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S   PEMNSULAR   WAR. 


691 


•ustifie/l  his  boldness.  H.  iurprised  the  passage  of 
the  Nive,  kid  liis  bi-idg-e^i  of  communication,  and 
but  for  the  rain  of  the  night  before,  whicli  ruined 
the  roads  and  retarded  the  march  of  Hill's  cohiuins, 
he  wouUi  have  won  the  heights  of  .St.  Pierre  tiie 
same  day.  Soult  could  not  tlien  have  withdrawn 
i  his  divisions  from  the  left  bank  witiiout  being  ob- 
eerved.  8till  it  was  an  error  to  have  the  troops  on 
the  left  bank  so  unprepared  for  the  battle  of  the 
l()t!i.  It  was  perhaps  another  error  not  to  have  oc- 
cupied the  valley  or  basin  between  Hope  and  Alten, 
and  surely  it  was  negligence  not  to  intrencli  Hill's 
position  on  the  10th,  11th  and  12th.  Yet  with  all 
this,  so  brave,  so  hardy,  so  unconquerable  were  his 
soldiers,  that  he  was  successful  at  every  point,  and 
that  is  the  justification  of  his  generalship.  Hanni- 
bal crossed  the  Alps  and  descended  upon  Italy,  not 
in  madness,  but  because  he  knew  himself  and  his 
troops. 

4th.  It  is  agreed,  by  French  and  English,  that 
the  battle  of  St.  Pierre  was  one  of  the  most  desper- 
ate of  the  whole  war.  Lord  Wellington  declared 
that  he  had  never  seen  a  field  so  thickly  strewn  with 
dead,  nor  can  the  vigour  of  the  combatants  be  well 
denied  where  five  thousand  men  were  killed  or 
wounded  in  three  hours  upon  a  space  of  one  mile 
equare.  How  then  did  it  happen,  valour  being  so 
conspicuous  on  both  sides,  that  six  English  and 
Portuguese  brigades,  furnishing  less  than  fourteen 
thousand  i..en  and  officers  with  fourteen  guns,  were 
enabled  to  withstand  seven  French  divisions,  cer- 
tainly furnishing  thirty-five  thousand  men  and  offi- 
cers with  twenty-two  guns]  The  analysis  of  this 
fact  shows  upon  what  nice  calculations  and  acci- 
dents war  depends. 

If  Hill  had  not  observed  the  French  passing  their 
bridge  on  the  evening  of  the  12tii,  and  their  bivouac 
fires  in  the  night,  Barnes's  brigade,  with  which  he 
saved  the  day,  would  have  been  at  Urcuray,  and 
Soult  could  not  have  been  stopped.  But  the  French 
general  could  only  bring  five  divisions  into  action, 
E,nd  those  only  in  succession,  so  that  in  fact  three 
divisions,  or  about  sixteen  thousand  men  with  twen- 
ty-two guns,  actually  fought  the  battle.  Foy's  and 
.■\larans;n's  troops  did  not  engage  until  after  the 
crisis  had  passed.  On  the  other  hand,  the  proceed- 
ings of  colonel  Peacocke  of  the  seventy-first,  and 
Ciiionel  Bunbury  of  the  third,  for  which  they  were 
both  obliged  to  quit  the  service,  forced  general  Hill 
to  carry  his  reserve  away  from  the  decisive  point  at 
that  critical  period  which  always  occurs  in  a  well- 
disputed  field,  and  which  every  great  general  watch- 
es for  with  the  utmost  anxiety.  This  was  no  error, 
it  was  a  necessity,  and  the  superior  military  quality 
of  the  British  troops  rendered  it  successful. 

The  French  officer  who  rode  at  the  head  of  the 
second  attacking  column  might  be  a  brave  man, 
doubtless  he  was  ;  he  might  be  an  able  man,  but  he 
had  not  the  instinct  of  a  general.  On  his  right  flank 
indeed  Hill's  vigorous  counter-attack  was  success- 
ful, but  the  battle  wa?  to  be  won  in  the  centre  ;  his 
column  was  heavy,  undismayed,  and  only  one  weak 
battalion,  the  ninety-second,  was  before  it ;  a  short 
exhortation,  a  decided  gesture,  a  daring  example, 
and  it  would  have  overborne  the  small  body  in  its 
front :  Foy's,  Maransin's  and  the  half  of  D'Armag- 
nac's  divisions  would  then  have  followed  in  tJie  j)ath 
tlius  marked  out.  Instead  of  this,  he  weighed 
chances,  and  retreated.  How  different  was  the  con- 
duct of  tlie  British  generals,  two  of  whom  and  near- 
ly all  their  staff"  fell  at  this  point,  resolute  not  to 
yield  a  step  at  such  a  critical  period  ;  how  desper- 
ately did  the  fiftieth  and  Portuguese  figlit  to  give 
time  for  the  ninety-second  to  rally  and  re-form  be- 


hind St.  Pierre  ;  how  gloriously  did  that  regiment 
come  forth  again  to  charge  witii  their  colours  flying 
and  theii;  national  music  playing  as  if  going  to  a  re- 
view. This  was  to  understand  war.  The  man  wjio 
in  that  moment  and  immediately  after  a  repulse 
thought  of  such  military  pomp  was  by  nature  a 
soldier. 

I  have  said  that  sir  Rowland  Hill's  employment 
of  his  reserve  was  no  error,  it  was  indeed  worthy  of 
all  praise.  From  the  commanding  mount  on  which 
he  stood,  he  saw  at  once,  that  the  misconduct  of  the 
two  colonels  would  cause  the  loss  of  his  position 
j  more  surely  than  any  direct  attack  upon  it,  and  with 
I  a  promptness  and  decision  truly  military  he  descend- 
i  ed  at  once  to  the  spot,  playing  the  soldier  as  well  as 
the  general,  rallying  the  seventy-first  and  leading 
the  reserve  himself;  trusting  meanwhile  with  a 
noble  and  well-placed  confidence  to  the  courage  of 
the  ninety-second  and  the  fiftieth  to  sustain  the 
fight  at  St.  Pierre.  He  knew  indeed  that  the  sixth 
division  was  then  close  at  hand,  and  that  the  battl« 
might  be  fougiit  over  again,  but  like  a  thorough 
soldier  he  was  resolved  to  win  his  own  fight  with 
his  own  troops  if  he  could.  And  he  did  so  after  a 
manner  that  in  less  eventful  times  would  have  ren 
dered  him  the  hero  of  a  nation. 


CHAPTER  III. 

Respective  situations  anH  views  of  lord  Weill nnffon  and  Soult 
—  Parti--an  warfare — The  Basques  of  the  Vn\  rle  Baioforri 
excited  to  arms  by  the  excesses  of  Mina's-  troops — Gener.il 
Harispe  takes  the  conunand  of  the  insurgents — Clanzt^l  ad- 
vances beyond  the  Bidouze  river — General  niovenients — 
Partisan  combats — Rxcfsses  committed  bv  the  Spaniard" — 
Lord  Wellington  reproaches  their  genertils — His  vigorous 
and  resolute  conduct — He  menaces  the  French  insurgents 
of  the  (alleys  with  fire  and  sword,  and  the  insurrection  sub- 
sides—Soull  henis  in  the  allies'  right  dosf  Iv — Partisan  com- 
bats continued- — R(  iiiarkable  instances  of  the  habits  esiaD- 
llshed  between  the  French  and  Britisa  soldiers  of  the  Lght 
division — Shipwrecks  on  the  coast. 

To  understand  all  the  importance  of  the  battle  of 
St.  Pierre,  the  nature  of  the  country  and  tne  rela- 
tive positions  of  the  opposing  generals  before  and 
after  that  action  must  be  considered.  Bayonne,  aj- 
though  a  mean  fortress  in  itself,  was  at  this  period 
truly  designated  by  Napoleon  as  one  of  the  great 
bulwarks  of  France.  Covered  by  its  intrenched 
camp,  which  the  innundations  and  the  deep  country 
rendered  impregnable  while  there  was  an  ariuy  to 
defend  it,  tliis  place  could  not  be  assailed  until  that 
army  was  drawn  away,  and  it  was  obviously  impos- 
sible to  pass  it  and  leave  the  enemy  to  act  upon  the 
communications  with  Spain  and  the  seacoost.  To 
force  the  French  army  to  abandon  Bayonne  was 
therefore  lord  Wellington's  object,  and  his  first  step 
was  the  passage  of  the  Nive:  he  thus  cut  Soull's 
direct  communication  with  St.  .lean  Pied  de  Port, 
obtained  an  intercourse  with  the  malcontents  in 
France,  opened  a  large  tract  of  fertile  country  for 
his  cavalry,  and  menaced  the  navigaticm  of  the 
Adour,  so  as  to  render  it  difficult  for  the  French 
general  to  receive  supplies.  This  was  however  but 
a  first  step,  because  the  country  beyond  tiie  Nivo 
was  still  the  same  deep  clayey  soil  with  bad  roads  ; 
and  it  wns  traversed  by  many  rivers  more  or  less 
considerable,  which  flooding  with  every  shower  in 
the  mountains,  formed  in  their  concentric  courses 
towards  the  Adour  a  number  of  successive  barriers, 
beliind  wliich  Soult  could  maintnin  himself  on  lord 
Wellington's  right  and  hold  c(>nHminication  with 
St.  Jean  Pied  de  I'ort.  He  could  thus  still  hem  in 
the  allies  as  before ;  upoa  a  more  extended  scale 


692 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   \,    1 R 


[JOOK   XXI II 


however,  and  with  le?s  effect,  for  he  was  thrown 
more  on  the  defensive,  liis  line  was  now  tlie  longest, 
and  his  adversary  possessed  the  central  pftsition. 

On  the  other  hand,  lord  Wellington  could  not,  in 
that  deep  impracticable  country,  carry  on  the  wide 
operations  necessary  to  pass  the  rivers  on  his  right, 
and  render  tlie  French  position  at  Hayonne  untena- 
ble, until  tine  weather  hardened  the  roads,  and  the 
winter  of  1813  was  peculiarly  wet  and  inclement. 

From  this  exposition  it  is  obvious  that  to  nourish 
their  own  armies,  and  circumvent  their  adversaries 
in  that  respect,  were  the  objects  of  both  generals  ; 
Soult  aimed  to  make  Wellington  retire  into  Spain, 
Wellington  to  make  Soult  abandon  Bayonne  entire- 
ly, or  so  reduce  his  force  in  the  intrenched  camp 
that  the  works  might  be  stormed.  The  French  gen- 
eral's recent  losses  forbade  him  to  maintain  his  ex- 
tended positions  except  during  the  wet  season  ;  three 
days'  tine  weather  made  him  tremble  ;  and  the  works 
of  his  camp  were  still  too  untinished  to  leave  a 
small  force  there.  The  difficulty  of  the  roads  and 
want  of  military  transport  threw  his  army  almost 
entirely  upon  water  carriage  for  subsistence,  and 
his  great  magazines  were  therefore  established  at 
Dax  on  the  Adour,  and  at  Peirehorade  on  the  Gave 
tie  Pau,  the  latter  being  about  twenty-four  miles 
from  Bayonne.  These  places  he  fortified  to  resist 
eudden  incursions,  and  he  threw  a  bridge  across  the 
Adour  at  the  port  of  Lanne,  just  above  its  conflu- 
ence with  tiie  Gave  de  Pau.  But  che  navigation  of 
the  Adour  below  that  point,  especially  at  Urt,  the 
stream  being  confined  there,  could  be  interrupted  by 
the  allies  who  were  now  on  the  left  bank.  To  rem- 
edy this,  Soult  ordered  Foy  to  pass  the  Adour  at 
Urt  and  construct  a  bridge  with  a  head  of  works; 
but  the  movement  was  foreseen  by  Wellington,  and 
Foy,  menaced  with  a  superior  force,  recrossed  the 
river.  The  navigation  was  then  carried  on  at  nigjit 
by  stealth,  or  guarded  by  the  French  gun-boats  and 
exposed  to  the  tire  of  the  allies.  Thus  provisions 
became  scarce,  and  the  supply  would  have  been 
quite  unequal  to  the  demand  if  the  French  coasting 
trade,  now  revived  between  Bordeaux  and  Bayonne, 
had  been  interrupted  by  the  navy  ;  but  lord  Wel- 
lington's representations  on  this  head  were  still  un- 
heeded. 

Soult  was  embarrassed  by  Foy's  failure  at  Urt. 
He  reinforced  him  with  Beyer's  and  D'Armagnac's 
divisions,  which  were  extended  to  the  Port  de  Lanne  ; 
then  leaving  Reille  with  four  divisions  to  guard  the 
intrenched  camp  and  to  finish  the  works,  he  complet- 
ed the  garrison  of  Bayonne,  and  transferred  his  head- 
quarters to  Peirehorade.  Clauzel,  with  two  divisions 
of  infantry  and  the  liglit  cavalry,  now  took  post  on 
the  Bidouze,  being  supported  with  Treilhard's  heavy 
dragoons,  and  having  his  left  in  communication  with 
Paris  and  with  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port,  where  there 
was  a  garrison  of  eighteen  hundred  men  besides  na- 
tional guards.  He  soon  pushed  his  advanced  posts 
to  the  .Toyeuse  or  Gambouri,  and  tlie  Aran,  streams 
which  unite  to  fall  into  the  Adour  near  Urt,  and  he 
also  occupied  Hellette,  Mondionde,  Bonloc  and  the 
Bastide  de  Clerence.  A  bridge-head  was  construct- 
ed at  Peirehorade,  Hastingue  was  fortified  on  the 
(iave  de  Pau,  Guiche,  Bidache  and  Came  on  the 
Bidouze,  and  tlic  works  of  Navarreins  were  aug- 
mented. In  fine.  Soult  with  equal  activity  and  in- 
telligence profited  from  tlie  rain  which  stopped  the 
allies'  operations  in  that  deep  country. 

Lord  Wellington  also  made  some  changes  of  posi- 
tion. Having  increased  his  works  ;:t  BrirrouiliiCt 
he  was  enabled  to  shift  some  of  Hope's  troo[>s  to- 
wards Arcangups,  and  he  jdaced  the  sixtli  division 
on    the    heights  of  Villefranq-ie,  which   permitted 


general  Hill  to  extend  his  right  up  the  Adour  to  Urt 
The  third  division  was  posted  near  Urcuray,  the 
ligiit  cavalry  on  the  Joyeuse  facing  Clauzel's  out- 
posts, and  a  chain  of  telegrajdi*  was  established  fn  ni 
the  right  of  the  ]\ive  by  the  hill  of  St.  Barbc  to  St. 
Jean  de  Luz.  Freyre's  Gallicians  were  placed  in 
Tv  serve  about  St.  Pe,  and  Morillo  was  withdrawn 
to  Itzassu,  where,  supported  by  the  Andalusiar  di- 
vision and  by  Freyre,  he  guarded  the  valley  of  the 
upper  Nive  and  watched  general  Paris  beyond  th( 
Ursouia  mountain.  Such  was  the  state  of  afiliirii 
in  the  beginning  of  January,  but  some  minor  actions 
happened  before  these  arrangements  were  completed 
In  December  the  allies  seized  tlie  if-land  of  Hol- 
riague,  near  La  Honce  on  the  Adour,  which  gave 
them  a  better  command  of  that  river;  but  P"oy  kept 
possession  of  the  islands  of  Berens  and  Broc  above 
Holriague.  The  allies'  bridges  of  communication 
on  the  Nive  were  now  carried  away  by  floods,  which 
occasioned  some  embarrassment ;  and  meanwhile, 
without  any  orders  from  lord  Wellington,  probably 
with  a  view  to  plunder,  for  his  troops  were  exceed- 
ingly licentious,  Morillo  obtained  from  Victor  Alten 
two  squadrons  of  the  eighteenth  hussars,  under  pre 
tence  of  exploring  the  enemy's  position  towards 
iMendionde  and  Maccaye.  Their  commander,  major 
Hughes,  having  with  difficulty  ascertained  that  he 
was  to  form  an  advanced  guard  in  a  close  wooded 
country,  demanded  the  aid  of  some  Spanish  ca^ado- 
res,  and  then  moving  forwards  drove  in  the  piquets, 
crossed  the  bridge  of  3Iendionde  and  commenced  a 
skirmish.  But  during  this  action  IMorillo  withdrew 
his  division  without  giving  any  notice,  and  at  the 
same  time  the  ca^adores  fled  in  a  shameful  manner 
from  the  left :  the  cavalry  were  thus  turned  and  es- 
caped with  difficulty,  having  had  one  captain  killed, 
two  other  captains  and  a  lieutenant,  and  Ilughea 
himself,  badly  wounded.  The  unfortunate  is^ue  of 
this  skirmish  was  attributed  at  the  time  to  the  had 
conduct  of  the  eighteenth  hussars,  against  whom  lord 
Wellington  was,  by  malicious  misrepresentation, 
previously  prejudiced  ;  for  at  Vittoria  they  were  un- 
justly accused  of  being  more  licentious  than  others 
in  plundering  the  captured  property  on  the  field, 
whereas  they  had  fought  well  and  pluncered  less 
than  many  who  were  praised  for  their  orderly  de- 
meanour. 

.  About  the  same  time  that  this  disaster  cccurrrd 
at  Mendionde,  Mina,  acting  independently,  and  being 
pressed  for  provisions  in  the  mountains,  invaded  the 
Val  de  Baigorri  and  the  Yal  des  Usses,  wl  ere  his 
men  committed  the  greatest  enormities,  plundering 
and  burning, and  murdering  men,  women  and  children 
without  distinction.  The  people  of  these  valleys, 
distinguished  amongst  the  Basques  for  their  v.-arlike 
qualities,  immediately  took  arms  under  the  command 
of  one  of  their  principal  men,  named  I'ltchevery,  and 
being  reinforced  with  two  hundred  and  fifty  men  frrm 
St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port,  surprised  one  of  Mina's  bat- 
talions, and  attacked  the  rest  with  great  vigour. 
This  event  gave  Soult  hopes  of  exciting  the  Basques 
to  commence  such  a  war  as  they  had  carried  on  at 
the  commencement  of  the  French  revolution.  His 
efi'orts  to  accomplif-h  it  were  unceasing,  and  he  had 
for  two  months  been  expecting  the  arrival  of  general 
Harispe,  an  officer  whose  courage  and  talents  linve 
been  frequently  noticed  in  this  history,  and  who  be- 
ing the  head  of  an  ancient  Bas-que  family  had  great 
local  influence,  which  wp-s  increased  by  his  military 
reputation.  It  was  thought  that  if  he  had  crn;e 
when  first  expected,  about  November,  lord  Welling- 
ton's strict  discipline  being  then  ui  !-nov,n  to  tl  o  {  oe- 
ple,  lie  would  l.ave  raised  a  formif'able  partifrn  wn 
in  the  mcuntains.     Put  now  the  Fnglieh  gc7:era!"a 


IS  13.] 


NAPIER'S    PENIxXSULAR   WAR 


693 


attention  to  all  complaints,  his  proclamation,  and 
the  proof  he  gave  of  his  sincerity  by  sending  the 
Spaniards  back  when  they  misconducted  themeelves, 
had,  in  conjunction  with  the  love  of  gain,  that  mas- 
ter passion  with  all  mountaineers,  tamed  tlie  Basque 
spirit  and  disinclined  them  to  exchange  ease  and 
profit  for  turbulence  and  ravage.  Nevertheless  tliis 
incursion  by  Alina,  and  the  licentious  conduct  of 
Morillo's  troops,  awakened  tiie  v.'arlike  propensities 
of  the  Val  de  Baigorri  Basques,  and  Harispe  was 
enabled  to  make  a  levy  with  which  he  immediately 
commence  i  active  operations,  and  was  supported  by 
g;neral  Paris. 

Soult,  with  a  view  to  aid  Harispe,  to  extend  his 
own  cantonments,  and  to  restrict  those  of  the  allies, 
now  resolved  to  drive  tlie  latter's  detachments  alto- 
gether from  the  side  of  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port,  and 
fix  Clauzel's  left  at  Hellette,  the  culminant  point  of 
the  great  road  to  that  fortress.  To  effect  this,  on 
the  ;3d  of  January,  lie  caused  Clauzel  to  establish 
two  divisions  of  infantry  at  the  heights  of  La  Costa 
near  tlie  Bastide  deClerence  and  beyond  tlie  Joyeuse 
river.  Buchan's  Portuguese  brigade,  placed  in  ob- 
servation there,  was  thus  forced  to  retreat  upon 
Briscon's,  and  at  the  same  time  Paris  advancing  to 
Bonloc  connected  his  right  with  Clauzel's  left  at 
Ayherre,  while  the  light  cavalry  menaced  all  the  al- 
lies' line  of  outposts.  Informed  of  this  movement 
by  telegraph,  Wellington,  thinking  Soult  was  seek- 
ing a  general  battle  on  the  side  of  Hasparren,  made 
the  tilth  division  and  lord  Aylmer's  brigade  relieve 
the  light  division  which  marched  to  Arauntz  ;  the 
fourth  division  then  passed  the  Nive  at  Ustaritz; 
and  the  sixth  division  made  ready  to  march  from 
Viilefranque,  by  the  high  road  of  St.  Jean  Pied  de 
Port,  towards  Hasparren,  as  a  reserve  to  the  third, 
fourth  and  seventh  divisions.  The  latter  were  con- 
centrated beyond  I'rcuray  on  the  4th,  their  left  in 
communication  with  Hill's  right  at  Briscons,  and 
tlieir  right,  supported  by  Morillo,  who  advanced  from 
Itzassu  tor  this  purpose. 

The  English  general's  intent  was  to  fall  upon  the 
enemy  at  once,  but  the  swelling  of  the  small  rivers 
prevented  him.  However,  on  the  fifth,  having  as- 
certained the  true  object  and  dispositions  of  the 
French  general,  and  having  twenty-four  thousand 
infantry  in  hand  with  a  division  of  cavalry  and  four 
or  five  brigades  of  artillery,  he  resolved  to  attack 
Clauzel's  divisions  on  the  heights  of  La  Costa.  In 
tliis  view  Lecor's  Portuguese  marched  against  the 
French  right,  the  fourth  division  marched  against 
tiieir  centre,  the  third  division  supported  by  cavalry 
against  their  left;  the  remainder  of  the  cavalry  and 
the  seventh  division,  the  whole  under  Stapleton  Cot- 
ton, were  posted  at  Hasparren  to  watch  Paris  on  the 
eide  of  Bonloc.  Soult  was  in  person  at  the  Bastide 
de  Clerence,  and  a  general  battle  seemed  inevitable, 
but  the  intention  of  the  English  general  was  merely 
to  drive  back  the  enemy  from  the  Joyeuse,  and  the 
French  general,  thinking  the  whole  allied  army  was 
in  movement,  resolved  to  act  on  the  defensive,  and 
directed  the  troops  at  La  Costa  to  retire  fighting 
upon  the  Bidouze:  the  affair  terminated  therefore 
with  a  sliglit  skirmish  on  the  evening  of  the  6th. 
The  allies  then  resumed  their  old  positions  on  the 
right  of  the  Nive,  tlie  Andalusians  were  ordered 
back  to  the  Bastan,  and  Carlos  d'Espana's  Gallicians 
ft-ere  brought  up  to  Ascain  in  their  place. 

When  Clauzel  saw  that  nothing  serious  was  de- 
signed, lie  sent  his  horsemen  to  drive  away  general 
Hill's  detachments,  which  had  taken  advantage  of 
the  great  movements  to  forage  on  the  lower  parts  of 
the  Joyeuse  and  Aran  rivers.  Meanwhile  Soult, 
observing  how  sensitive  his  adversary  was  to  any 


demonstration  beyond  the  Bidouze,  resolved  to  main- 
tain the  line  of  those  two  rivers.  In  this  view  he 
reduced  his  defence  of  the  Adour  to  a  l.ue  drawn 
from  the  confluence  of  the  Aran  to  Bayonne,  which 
enabled  him  to  reinforce  Clauztl  with  Foy's  division 
and  all  the  light  cavalry.  Meantime  general  Haris- 
pe, having  the  division  of  Paris  and  the  brigade  of 
general  Dauture  placed  under  his  orders  to  support 
his  mountaineers,  fixed  his  quarters  at  Hellette  and 
commenced  an  active  partisan  warfare.  On  the  &th, 
he  fell  upon  jNIina  in  the  Val  des  Csses  and  drove 
him  with  loss  into  Baigorri.  On  the  U.th,  return- 
ing to  Hellette,  he  surprised  Morillo's  foragers  with 
some  English  dragoons  on  the  side  of  ilaccaye,  and 
took  a  few  prisoners.  On  the  12th,  he  again  at- 
tacked jNIina  and  drove  him  up  into  the  Alduides. 
During  these  affairs  at  the  outposts  lord  Wellington 
might  have  stormed  the  intrenched  camp  in  front 
of  Bayonne,  but  he  could  not  hold  it  except  under 
the  fire  of  the  fortress,  and  not  being  prepared  for  a 
siege  avoided  that  operation.  Nor  would  the  weath- 
er, which  was  again  become  terrible,  permit  him  to 
make  a  general  movement  to  drive  Harispe  frcm  '■lis 
position  in  the  upper  country  ;  wherefore  he  pret<. 
red  leaving  that  general  in  quiet  posession  to  irr) 
tating  the  mountaineers  by  a  counter-warfare.  He 
endeavoured  however  to  launch  some  armed  beats 
on  the  Adour  above  Bayonne,  where  Scult  had  in- 
creased the  flotilla  to  twenty  gun-boats  for  the  pro- 
tection of  his  convoys,  which  were  notwithstanding 
forced  to  run  past  Urt  under  the  fire  of  a  battery 
constructed  by  general  Hill. 

Lord  Wellington  now  dreading  the  bad  effect 
which  the  excesses  committed  by  Mina's  and  Mo- 
rillo's men  were  likely  to  produce,  for  the  Basques 
were  already  beginning  to  speak  of  vengeance,  j,>ut 
forth  his  authority  in  repression.  Rebuking  Morillo 
for  his  unauthorized  and  disastrous  advance  upon 
Mendionde,  and  for  the  excesses  of  his  troops,  he  or- 
dered him  to  keep  the  latter  constantly  under  arms. 
This  was  resented  generally  by  the  Spanish  officers, 
and  especially  by  Morillo,  whose  savage,  untracta- 
ble  and  bloody  disposition,  since  so  horribly  display- 
ed in  South  America,  prompted  him  to  encourage 
violence.  He  asserted  falsely  that  his  troops  were 
starving,  declared  that  a  settled  design  to  ill-use  the 
Spaniards  existed,  and  that  the  British  soldiers  were 
suffered  to  commit  every  crime  with  impunity.  I'he 
English  general,  in  reply,  explained  himself  both  to 
Morillo  and  to  Freyre,  who  had  alluded  to  the  libels 
about  San  Sebastian,  with  a  clearness  and  resoluti<^u 
that  showed  how  hopeless  it  would  be  to  btrive 
against  him. 

"  He  had  not,"  he  said,  "  lost  thousands  of  men 
to  pillage  and  ill-treat  the  French  peasantry  ;  he 
preferred  a  small  army  obedient  to  a  large  one  diso- 
bedient and  -jndisciplined.  If  his  measures  to  en- 
force good  order  deprived  him  of  the  Spanish  troops, 
the  fault  would  rest  with  those  who  sufiered  their 
soldiers  to  commit  disorders.  Professions  without 
corresponding  actions  would  not  do,  he  was  deter- 
mined to  enforce  obedience  one  way  or  another,  and 
would  not  command  insubordinate  troops.  The 
question  between  them  was  whether  they  should  or 
should  not  pillage  the  French  peasants.  His  meas- 
ures were  taken  to  prevent  it,  and  the  conduct  which 
called  them  forth  was  more  dishonouring  to  the  Span- 
iards than  the  measures  themselves.  For  libels  he 
cared  not,  he  was  used  to  them,  and  did  not  believe 
the  union  of  the  two  nations  depended  upon  such 
things;  but  if  it  did,  he  desired  no  union  founded 
upon  such  an  infamous  interest  as  [)illage.  He  had 
not  lost  twenty  thousand  mei  in  the  campaign  to 
enable  Morillo  to  plunder,  and  he  would  not  permit 


694 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WA   I. 


[Book  XXIIl 


it.  If  the  Spaniards  were  resolved  to  do  so,  let 
them  march  their  great  armies  into  France  under 
their  own  generals ;  he  would  meanwhile  cover 
Spain  itself,  and  they  would  find  they  could  not  re- 
main in  France  for  fifteen  days.  They  had  neither 
money  nor  magazines,  nothing  to  maintain  an  army 
in  the  field,  the  country  behind  was  incapable  of 
supporting  them,  and,  were  he  scoundrel  enough  to 
permit  pillage,  France,  rich  as  it  was,  could  not  sus- 
tain the  burden.  Even  with  a  view  to  living  on  the 
enemy  by  contributions,  it  would  be  essential  to 
prevent  plunder;  and  yet,  in  defiance  of  all  these 
reasons,  he  was  called  an  enemy  by  the  Spanish 
generals  because  he  opposed  such  conduct,  and  his 
measures  to  prevent  it  were  considered  dishonour- 
ing! 

"  Something  also  he  could  say  against  it  in  a  po- 
litical point  of  view  ;  but  it  was  unnecessary,  be- 
cause, careless  whether  he  commanded  a  large  or  a 
email  army,  he  was  resolved  that  it  should  obey  him 
and  should  not  pillage. 

"  General  Alorillo  expressed  doubts  of  his  right  to 
interfere  with  tlie  Spaniards.  It  was  his  right  and 
his  duty,  and  never  before  did  he  hear  that  to  put 
soldiers  under  arms  was  a  disgrace.  It  was  a  meas- 
ure to  prevent  evil  and  misfortunes.  Mina  could 
tell  by  recent  experience  what  a  warfare  the  French 
peasants  could  carry  on,  and  Morillo  was  openly 
menaced  with  a  like  trial.  It  was  in  vain  for  that 
general  to  palliate  or  deny  the  plundering  of  his  di- 
vision, after  having  acknowledged  to  general  Hill 
that  it  was  impossible  to  prevent  it,  because  the 
officers  and  soldiers  received  by  every  post  letters 
from  their  friends,  congratulating  them  upon  their 
good  luck  in  entering  France,  and  urging  them  to 
seize  the  opportunity  of  making  fortunes.  General 
Morillo  asserted  that  the  British  troops  were  allowed 
to  commit  crimes  with  impunity.  Neither  he  nor 
any  other  man  could  produce  an  instance  of  injury 
done,  where,  proof  being  adduced,  the  perpetrators 
had  escaped  punishment.  Let  him  inquire  how 
many  soldiers  had  been  hanged,  how  many  stricken 
with  minor  chastisements  and  made  tn  pay  for  dam- 
ages done.  But  had  the  English  troops  no  cause 
of  complaint  against  the  Spaniards!  Officers  and 
soldiers  were  frequently  shot  and  robbed  on  the  high 
roads,  and  a  soldier  had  been  lately  murdered  be- 
tween Oyarzun  and  Lesaca ;  the  English  stores  and 
convoys  were  plundered  by  the  Spanish  soldiers,  a 
British  officer  had  been  put  to  death  at  Vittoria,  and 
others  were  ill-treated  at  St.  Ander."' 

A  sullen  obedience  followed  this  correspondence 
for  the  moment,  but  the  plundering  system  was  soon 
renewed;  and  this,  with  the  mischief  already  done, 
was  sufficient  to  rouse  the  inhabitants  of  Bidaray, 
as  welfas  those  of  the  Val  de  Baigorri,  into  action. 
They  commenced  and  continued  a  partisan  warfare, 
until  lord  Wellington,  incensed  by  their  activity, 
issued  a  proclamation  calling  upon  them  to  take 
arms  openly  and  join  Soult,  or  stay  peaceably  at 
home,  declaring  that  he  would  otherwise  burn  their 
villages  and  hang  all  the  inliabitants.  Thus  it  ap- 
peared that,  nntwitlistanding  all  the  outcries  ni.xv". 
against  tiie  French  for  resorting  to  th's  system  oi 
repressing  the  warfare  of  peasants  in  Spain,  it  was 
considereil  by  the  English  general  both  justifiable 
and  necessary.  However  the  threat  was  sufficient 
for  this  occasion.  The  Basques  set  the  pecuniary 
advantages  to  be  derived  from  the  friendship  of  the 
British  and  Portuguese  troops  and  the  mise^  of  an 
avenging  warfare  against  the  evils  of  vSpanish  plun- 
der, and  generally  disregarded  Harispe's  appeals  to 
their  patriotism. 

Meanwhile  Soult,  who  expected  reinforcements. 


seeing  that  little  w  as  to  be  gained  by  insurrection 
and  being  desirous  to  resume  the  oflensive,  ordered 
Harispe  to  leave  only  the  troops  absolutely  neces- 
sary for  the  defence  of  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port  and 
its  intrenched  camp  with  a  few  Basques  as  scouts  in 
the  valleys,  and  to  concentrate  the  remainder  of  his 
force  at  Mendionde,  Hellette  and  La  Houssoa,  thus 
closely  hemming  in  the  right  of  the  allies'  line  with 
a  view  to  making  incursions  beyond  the  upper  Nive. 
This  was  on  the  14th  ;  on  the  23d,  Harispe,  get- 
ting information  that  3Iorillo  was  to  forage  in  force 
on  the  side  of  Bidaray,  endeavoured  to  cut  him  ofl  ; 
the  supporting  troops,  consisting  of  Spanish  infantry 
and  some  English  hussars,  repulsed  his  first  attack, 
but  they  were  finally  pushed  back  with  some  loss  in 
horses  and  mules.  About  the  same  time,  one  of 
Hill's  posts  near  the  confluence  of  the  Aran  with 
the  Adour  was  surprised  by  some  French  companies, 
who  remained  in  advance  until  fresh  troops  detach- 
ed from  Urt  forced  them  to  repass  the  river  again. 
This  affair  was  a  retaliation  for  the  surprise  of  a 
French  post  a  few  days  before  by  the  sixth  division, 
which  was  attended  with  some  circumstances  repug- 
nant to  the  friendly  habits  long  established  between 
the  French  and  British  troops  at  the  out[)osts.  The 
value  of  such  a  generous  intercourse  old  soldiers  well 
understand,  and  some  illustrations  of  it  at  this  pe- 
riod may  be  quoted. 

On  the  9th  of  December  the  forty-third  was  as- 
sembled in  column  on  an  open  space  within  twenty 
yards  of  the  enemy's  out-sentry,  yet  the  latter  con- 
tinued to  walk  his  beat  for  an  hour  without  concern, 
relying  so  confidently  on  the  customary  system  that 
he  placed  his  knapsack  on  the  ground  to  ease  his 
shoulders.  When  at  last  the  order  to  advance  was 
given,  one  of  the  British  soldiers  stepping  out  told 
him  to  go  away,  and  helped  him  to  replace  his  pack  ; 
the  firing  then  commenced.  The  next  morning  the 
French  in  like  manner  warned  a  forty-third  sentry 
to  retire.  But  the  most  remarkable  instance  hap- 
pened on  the  occasion  of  lord  Wellington's  being  de- 
sirous of  getting  to  the  top  of  a  hill  occupied  by  the 
enemy  near  Bayonne.  He  ordered  the  riflemen  who 
escorted  him  to  drive  the  French  away,  and  seeing 
the  former  stealing  up,  as  he  thought,  too  close, 
called  out  to  commence  firing  ;  with  a  loud  voice 
one  of  those  old  soldiers  replied,  "  JVo  firing!"  and 
then  holding  up  the  butt  of  his  rifle  towards  the 
French,  tapped  it  in  a  peculiar  way.  At  the  well- 
understood  signal,  which  meaned  "  TVe  must  have 
the  hill  for  a  short  time,''''  the  French,  who,  though 
they  could  not  maintain,  would  not  have  relin- 
quished the  post  without  a  fight  if  they  had  been 
fired  upon,  quietly  retired.  And  this  signal  would 
never  have  been  made  if  the  post  had  been  one  capa- 
ble of  a  permanent  defence,  so  well  do  veterans  un- 
derstand war  and  its  proprieties. 

The  English  general  now  only  waited  until  the 
roads  were  practicab' "•,  to  take  the  ofl'onsive  with  an 
army  superior  in  evi  -y  point  of  view  to  Sonlt's. 
That  general's  numbeu's  were  also  about  to  be  re- 
duced. His  conscripts  were  deserting  fast,  and  the 
inclemency  of  the  weather  was  filling  his  hospitals, 
while  the  bronzed  veterans  of  Wellington's  army, 
impassive  to  fatigue,  patient  to  endure,  fierce  in  ex- 
ecution, were  free  from  serious  maladies,  ready  and 
able  to  plant  their  colours  wherever  their  general 
listed.  At  this  time  however  the  country  was  a 
vast  quagmire  ;  it  was  with  difficulty  that  provisions 
or  even  orders  could  be  conveyed  to  the  difl'erent 
quarters,  and  a  Portuguese  brigade  on  the  right  of 
the  Nive  was  several  days  without  food  from  the 
swelling  of  the  rivulets,  which  stopped  the  comrnis 
sariat  mules      At  the  sea-side  the  troops  were  bet 


1S13.J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


695 


ter  off,  yet  wilh  a  horrible  counterpoise,  for  on  that 
iron-bound  coast  storms  and  sbipwrfecks  were  so  fre- 
quent tliat  scarcely  a  day  passed  but  some  veesel, 
Bonistimes  many  together,  were  seen  embayed  and 
drifting  towards  the  reefs  which  shoot  out  like  nee- 
dles for  several  miles.  Once  in  this  situation  there 
was  no  human  lielp  !  a  faint  cry  might  be  heard  at 
inter\als,  but  the  tall  ship  floated  slowly  and  solemn- 
ly onwards  until  the  first  rock  arrested  iier,  a  roaring 
surge  then  dashed  her  to  pieces,  and  the  siiore  was 
etrewed  with  broken  timbers  and  dead  bodies. 
December  and  January  were  thus  passed  by  the 
allies,  but  February  saw  Wellington  break  into 
France,  the  successful  invader  of  that  mighty  coun- 
try. Yet  neither  his  nor  Soult's  military  operations 
can  be  understood  without  a  previous  description  of 
political  afiairs,  which  shall  be  given  in  the  next 
chapter. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Political  state  of  Porlugal — Political  state  of  Spain — Lord 
Wellington  advises  the  English  government  to  ptvpare  Ibi- 
a  war  uith  Spain  anri  to  seize  San  Sibastian  as  a  security  tor 
the  withdrawal  of  the  British  and  Portuguese  tioips — The 
seat  ot  goveninient  and  the  new  cortez  are  removed  to  Ma- 
drid— The  duke  of  San  Carlos  arrives  secretly  with  the  trea- 
ty of  Valenc.iv — It  is  rejected  bj-  the  Spanish  regency  and 
cortez— Lord  Wellington's  views  on  the  subject. 

PORTUGAL. 

It  has  been  shown  that  marshal  Beresford's  arriv- 
al at  Lisbon  put  a  momentary  check  upon  the  in- 
trigues of  the  regency  relative  to  the  command  of 
the  troops  ;  when  he  rejoined  tlie  army  the  vexatious 
conduct  of  the  government  was  renewed  with  greater 
violence,  and  its  ill-will  was  vented  upon  the  Eng- 
lish residents,  whose  goods  were  arbitrarily  seized 
and  their  persons  imprisoned  without  regard  to  jus- 
tice or  international  law  The  supply  and  reinforcing 
of  the  army  were  the  pretences  for  these  exactions, 
yet  the  army  was  neither  supplied  nor  recruited,  for 
though  the  new  regulations  had  produced  nine  thou- 
sand trained  soldiers,  they  were,  in  contempt  of  the 
subsidizing  treaty,  retained  in  the  depots.  At  first 
this  was  attributed  to  the  want  of  transport  to  ena- 
ble them  to  march  through  Spain  ;  but  though  lord 
Wellington  obtained  in  the  beginning  of  1814  ship- 
ping to  convey  them  to  the  army,  the  Portuguese 
government  still  withheld  the  greatest  nrmber,  al- 
leging in  excuse  the  ill-conduct  of  the  Spaniards 
relative  to  the  military  convention  established  be- 
tween the  two  countries. 

This  convention  had  been  concluded  in  1812.  to 
enable  the  Portugue.se  troops  to  establish  hospitals, 
and  to  draw  certain  resources  from  Spain  upon  fixed 
conditions.  One  of  these  was  that  all  supplies 
might  be  purchased,  half  with  ready  money,  half 
with  bills  on  the  Portuguese  treasury  ;  nevertheless, 
in  Dec&mber,  1818,  the  Spanish  envoy  at  Lisbon  in- 
formed the  Portuguese  government  that  to  give  up 
the  shells  of  certain  public  buildings  for  hospitals 
was  the  only  effect  they  would  give  to  the  conven- 
iion.  Wherefore  as  neither  troo[)s  nor  horses  could 
march  through  .Spain,  and  the  supply  of  those  already 
with  the  army  became  nearly  impossible,  the  regen- 
cy detained  the  reinforcements.  Lord  Wellington 
strongly  reproached  the  Spanish  government  for  this 
foul  conduct,  yet  observed  with  great  force  to  the 
Portuguese  regency,  that  the  treaty  by  which  a  cer- 
tain number  of  soldiers  were  to  be  constantly  in  the 
field  was  made  with  England,  not  with  Spain  ;  and 
as  the  government  of  the  former  country  continued 
to  pay  the  subsidy  and  provided  ships  for  the  trans- 


port of  the  troops,  ihere  was  no  excuse  for  retaining 
them  in  Portugal. 

His  remonstrances,  Beresford's  orders,  and  Mr. 
Stuart's  exertions,  altiiough  backed  by  the  menaces 
of  lord  Castlereagh,  were  however  alike  powerless  ; 
the  regency  embarked  only  three  thousand  men  out 
of  nine  thousand,  and  those  not  until  the  month  of 
March,  when  the  war  was  on  tiie  point  of  terminat- 
ing. Thus,  instead  of  thirty  thousand  Portuguese 
under  arms,  lord  Wellington  had  less  than  twenty 
thousand  ;  and  yet  Mr.  Stuart  alarmed  that  by  doin^ 
away  with  the  militia  and  introducing  the  Prussian 
system  of  granting  furloughs,  one  hundred  thousand 
troops  of  the  line  might  have  been  furnished  and 
supported  by  Portugal,  without  pressing  more  se- 
verely on  the  finances  of  the  country  than  the  actual 
system  which  supplied  these  twenty  thousand.  The 
regency  were  now  more  than  usually  importunate  to 
have  the  subsidy  paid  in  specie,  in  which  case  their 
army  would  have  disappeared  altogether.  Mr.  Stu- 
art firmly  opposed  this,  knowing  the  money  would 
be  misapplied  if  it  fell  into  their  hands,  and  think- 
ing their  importunity  peculiarly  ill-timed  when  their 
quota  of  troops  was  withheld,  and  when  lord  Wel- 
lington, forced  to  pay  ready  money  for  his  supplies 
in  France,  wanted  all  the  specie  that  could  be  pro- 
cured for  the  military  chest.  Such  was  the  counte- 
nance assumed  by  Portugal  towards  Pmgland  in  re- 
turn for  the  independence  which  the  latter  had  se- 
cured for  her;  and  it  is  obvious  that  if  the  war  had 
not  terminated  immediately  afterwards,  the  alliance 
could  not  have  continued.  The  British  army,  de- 
serted by  Portugal  and  treated  hostilely,  as  we  shall 
find,  by  the  Spaniards,  must  then  have  abandoned 
the  Peninsula. 

SPAIN. 

The  malice  evinced  towards  lord  Wellington  by 
the  Spanish  government,  the  libels  upon  him  and 
upon  the  Anglo-Portugue,-e  army,  the  vices  of  the 
system  by  which  the  Spanish  troops  were  supplied, 
and  their  own  evil  propensities  fostered  by  long  and 
cruel  neglect  and  suffering,  the  activity  of  those  in- 
triguing politicians  who  were  inimical  to  the  British 
alliance,  the  insolence  and  duplicity  of  the  minister 
of  war,  the  growing  enmity  between  Spain  and  Por- 
tugal, the  virulence  of  all  parties,  and  the  absolute 
hostility  of  the  local  authorities  towards  the  British 
army,  the  officers  and  soldiers  of  which  were  on  all 
occasions  treated  as  if  thrjy  were  invaders  rather 
than  friends,  drove  lord  Wellington  in  the  latter  end 
of  November  to  extremity.  He  judged  the  general 
disposition  of  the  Spanish  people  to  be  still  favoura- 
ble to  the  English  alliance,  and  with  the  aid  of  the 
serviles  hoped  to  put  down  the  liberals  ;  but  an  open 
rupture  with  the  government  he  thought  inevitable, 
and  if  the  liberal  influence  should  prove  most  power- 
ful with  the  people  he  might  be  unable  to  effect  a 
retreat  into  Portugal.  Wherefore  he  recommended 
the  British  minister  to  take  measures  with  a  view 
to  a  war  against  Spain  !  And  this  at  the  very  mo- 
ment when,  victorious  in  every  battle,  he  seemed  to 
have  placed  the  cause  he  supported  beyond  the  power 
of  fortune.  Who,  when  Napoleon  was  defeated  at 
Leipzig,  when  all  Europe  and  even  part  of  Asia 
were  pouring  their  armed  hordes  into  tlie  northern 
and  eastern  parts  of  France,  when  Soult  was  unable 
to  defend  the  western  frontier;  who  then,  looking 
only  on  the  surface,  could  have  supposed  that  Wel- 
lington, the  long-enduring  general,  whose  profound 
calculations  and  untiring  vigour  in  war  had  brought 
tlie  affairs  of  the  Peninsula  to  their  apparently  i)ro»- 
perous  state;  that  he,  the  victorious  commander, 
could  with  trutli  thus  describe  his  own  uneasy  situ- 
ation to  hid  government'? 


696 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


rUooK  XXII 1. 


*'  Matters  are  becoming  bo  bad  between  us  and 
<he  Spaniards,  that  I  think  it  necessary  to  draw 
your  attention  seriously  to  the  subject.  You  will 
have  seen  the  libels  about  San  Sebastian,  which  1 
know  were  written  and  publislied  by  an  officer  of 
tlie  war  department,  and  I  believe  under  tiie  direc- 
tion ol"  the  minister  at  war,  don  Juan  O'Donoghue. 
Advantage  has  been  taken  of  the  impression  made 
by  these  libels  to  circulate  others  in  which  the  old 
ftories  are  repeated  about  the  outrages  committed 
by  sir  John  More's  army  in  Gallicia,  and  endeav- 
ours are  made  to  irritate  the  public  mind  about  our 
Btill  keeping  garrisons  in  Cadiz  and  Carthagena, 
and  particularly  in  Ceuta.  They  exaggerate  the 
conduct  of  our  traders  in  South  America,  and  every 
Jittle  concern  ot'  a  master  of  a  ship  who  may  behave 
ill  in  a  Spanish  port  is  represented  as  an  attack  upon 
the  sovereignty  of  the  Spanish  nation.  I  believe 
Uiese  libels  all  proceed  from  the  same  source,  the 
government  and  their  immediate  servants  and  offi- 
cers;  and  although  I  have  no  reason  to  believe  that 
they  have  as  yet  made  any  impression  on  the  nation 
at  large,  they  certainly  have  upon  tiie  officers  of  tiie 
government,  and  even  upon  the  principal  officers  of 
the  army.  These  persons  must  see  that  if  the  libels 
are  not  written  or  encouraged  by  the  government, 
they  are  at  least  not  discouraged  ;  they  know  that  we 
are  odious  to  the  government,  and  they  treat  us  ac- 
cordingly. The  Spanish  troops  plunder  every  thing 
they  approach,  neither  their  own  nor  our  magazines 
f  are  sacred.  Until  recently  there  was  some  sem- 
blance of  inquiry,  and  of  a  desire  to  punish  offend- 
ers;  lately  these  acts  of  disorder  have  been  left  en- 
tirely unnoticed,  unless  when  I  have  interfered  with 
my  authority  as  commander-in-chief  of  the  Spanish 
army.  The  civil  magistrates  in  the  country  have 
not  only  refused  us  assistance,  but  have  particularly 
ordered  the  inhabitants  not  to  give  it  for  payment; 
and  when  robberies  have  been  discovered,  and  the 
property  proved  to  belong  to  the  commissariat,  the 
lavs  has  been  violated  and  possession  withheld.  This 
was  the  case  lately  at  Tolosa. 

"  Then,  what  is  more  extraordinary  and  more  dif- 
flcull  to  understand,  is  a  transaction  which  occurred 
lately  at  Fontarabia.  It  was  settled  that  the  British 
and  Portuguese  hospitals  should  go  to  that  town. 
There  is  a  building  there  which  has  been  a  Spanish 
hospital,  and  the  Spanish  authority  who  gave  it  over 
wanted  to  carry  off",  in  order  to  burn  as  lire-wood,  the 
beds,  that  our  soldiers  might  not  have  the  use  of 
tiiem.  And  these  are  the  people  to  whom  we 
have  given  medicines,  instruments,  and  other  aids: 
whom,  when  wounded  and  sick,  we  have  taken  into 
our  hospitals,  and  to  whom  we  have  rendered  every 
service  in  our  power  after  having  recovered  their 
country  from  tiie  enemy !  These  are  not  the  people 
of  Spain,  but  the  officers  of  government,  who  would 
not  dare  to  conduct  themselves  in  this  manner  if 
they  did  not  know  that  their  conduct  was  agi-eeable 
to  their  employers.  If  this  spirit  is  not  checked,  if 
we  do  not  show  that  we  are  sensible  of  the  injury 
done  to  our  characters,  and  of  the  injustice  apd  un- 
friendly nature  of  such  proceedings,  we  must  expect 
that  the  people  at  large  will  soon  behave  towards  us 
in  the  same  manner,  and  that  we  shall  have  no 
friend,  or  none  who  will  dare  to  avow  him  as  such 
in  Spain.  Consider  what  will  be  the  consequence 
of  this  state  of  affairs  if  any  reverse  should  happen, 
or  if  an  aggravation  of  the  insults  and  injuries,  or 
any  other  cause,  should  cause  the  English  army  to 
be  withdrawn.  I  think  I  should  experience  great 
difficulty,  the  Spanish  people  being  hostile,  in  retir- 
ing through  Spain  into  Portugal  from  the  peculiar 
nature  of  our  equipments,  and  1  think  I  mignt  be 


able  to  embark  the  army  at  Passages  in  spite  of  all 
tiie  French  and  Spanish  armies  united.  Bnt  I  should 
be  much  more  certain  of  getting  clear  off",  as  v,e 
ought,  if  we  had  possession  of  San  Sebastian;  and 
this  view  of  the  subject  is  the  motive  for  tl;fc  advice 
I  am  about  to  give  you,  as  the  remedy  for  the  evils 
with  which  I  have  made  you  acquainted. 

"  First,  then,  1  recommend  to  you  to  alter  the  na 
ture  of  your  political  relations  with  Sjmin,  and  to 
have  nothing  there  but  a  '  charge  d'affaires.'  Sec- 
ondly, to  complain  seriously  of  the  conduct  of  tiie 
government  and  their  servants  ;  to  remind  them  that 
Cadiz,  Carthagena,  and,  I  believe,  Centa,  were  gar- 
risoned by  British  troops  at  their  earnest  request, 
and  that  the  troops  were  not  sent  to  the  two  former 
till  the  government  agreed  to  certain  conditions. 
If  we  had  not  garrisoned  the  last,  it  would  before 
now  have  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  Moors.  Third- 
ly, to  demand,  as  security  for  the  safety  of  the  king's 
troops  against  the  criminal  disposition  of  the  gov- 
ernment and  of  those  in  authority  under  them,  that 
a  British  garrison  should  be  admitted  into  San  Se- 
bastian, giving  notice  that  unless  this  demand  was 
complied  with  the  tro^ns  should  be  withdrawn. 
Fourthly,  to  withdraw  tht  troops  if  this  demand  be 
not  complied  with,  be  the  consequences  what  they 
may,  and  to  be  prepared  accordingly.  You  may  re- 
ly upon  this,  that  if  you  take  a  ffrm  decided  line 
and  show  your  determination  to  go  through  with  it, 
you  will  have  the  Spanish  r.ation  with  you,  and  will 
bring  the  government  to  their  senses,  and  you  will 
put  an  end  at  once  to  all  the  petty  cabals  and  coun- 
ter-action existing  at  the  present  moment,  and  yciu 
will  not  be  under  ilie  necessity  of  bringing  matters 
to  extremities  :  if  you  take  any  other  than  a  decided 
line,  and  one  which  in  its  consequences  will  involve 
them  in  ruin,  you  may  depend  upon  it  you  will  gain 
nothing,  and  will  only  make  matters  worse.  I  re- 
commend these  measures,  whatever  may  be  the  de- 
cision respecting  my  command  of  the  army.  They 
are  probably  the  more  necessary  if  I  should  keep  my 
command.  The  truth  is,  that  a  crisis  is  approach- 
ing in  our  connexion  with  Spain,  and  if  yen  do  not 
bring  the  government  and  nation  to  their  senses  be- 
fore they  go  too  far,  you  will  inevitably  lose  all  the 
advantages  which  you  might  expect  from  services 
rendered  to  them." 

Thus  it  appears  that  lord  Wellington,  at  the  end 
of  the  war,  described  tlie  Spaniards  precisely  as 
sir  John  More  described  them  at  the  beginning. 
But  the  seat  of  government  was  now  transferred 
to  Madrid,  and  tlie  new  cortez,  as  I  have  already 
noticed,  decided,  against  the  wishes  of  the  regen- 
cy, that  the  English  general  should  keep  the  com- 
mand of  the  Spanish  armies.  The  liberals  indeed, 
with  great  diligence,  had  previously  sought  to  estab- 
lish a  system  of  control  over  tlie  cortt'z  by  means  of 
the  populace  of  Madrid  as  they  had  done  at  Cadiz  ; 
and  they  were  so  active,  and  created  so  much  alarm 
by  their  apparent  success,  that  the  servJles,  backed 
by  the  Americans,  were  ready  to  make  the  |)rinceB8 
Carlotta  sole  regent,  as  the  only  resource  for  f^tom- 
niing  the  progress  of  democracy.  Mowevc^,  when 
they  had  i)roved  their  strength  upon  the  question  of 
lord  Wellington's  command,  tliey  deferred  the  prin- 
cess's affair,  and  resolved  to  opjiose  tlieir  adversa- 
ries more  vigorously  in  the  assembly.  They  were 
encouraged  also  by  a  tumult  which  hajipened  at  Ma- 
drid, where  the  populace,  instigated  by  their  agents, 
or  disliking  the  new  constitution,  for  the  measures 
of  the  demooratic  party  were  generally  considered 
evil  in  the  great  towns  beyond  the  Isla,  rose  and 
forced  the  authorities  to  imprison  a  number  of  ob- 
■I'^Tcious  persons :  the  new  cortez  then  arrived,  tha 


I 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


G97 


Berviles  got  the  upper  hand,  and  being  resolved  to 
change  the  regency,  took  as  their  ground  of  attack 
its  conduct  towards  the  English  general.  Pursuing 
t!iis  scheme  of  opposition  with  ardour,  they  caused 
tlie  minister  of  war  to  be  dismissed,  and  were  ready 
to  attack  the  regency  itself,  expecting  full  success, 
wb3n  to  their  amazement  and  extreme  anger  lord 
Wellington,  far  from  desiring  to  have  his  personal 
enemies  thrust  out  of  power,  expressed  his  earnest 
desire  to  keep  them  in  their  stations. 

To  men  v/ho  were  alike  devoid  of  patriotism  or 
principle,  and  whose  only  rule  of  action  was  the 
momentary  impulse  of  passion,  such  a  proceeding 
was  incomprehensible;  yet  it  was  a  wise  and  well- 
considered  political  change  on  his  part,  showing  that 
private  feelings  were  never  the  guides  of  his  conduct 
in  public  matters,  and  that  he  ever  seemed  to  bear 
in  mind  the  maxim  which  Sophocles  has  put  into 
tlie  mouth  of  Ajax,  "  Carrying  himself  towards  his 
friends  as  if  they  might  one  day  become  enemies, 
and  treating  his  toes  as  men  who  might  becoma 
friends."  'I'he  new  spirit  had  given  him  no  hopes 
of  any  general  alteration  of  the  system,  nor  was  he 
less  convinced  that  sooner  or  later  he  must  come  to 
extremities  with  the  Spaniards;  but  he  was  averse 
to  any  appearance  of  disunion  becoming  public  at 
tlie  moment  he  was  invading  France,  lest  it  should 
check  his  projects  of  raising  an  anti-Napoleon  party 
in  that  country.  He  therefore  advised  the  British 
government  to  keep  his  hostile  propositions  in  abey- 
ance, leaving  it  to  him  and  to  his  brother  to  put 
them  in  execution  or  not  as  events  might  dictate. 
Meanwhile  he  sent  orders  to  evacuate  Cadiz  and 
Carthagena,  and  opposed  the  projected  change  in  the 
Spanish  government,  observing  that  "  the  minister 
of  war  being  dismissed,  the  most  obnoxious  opponent 
of  military  arrangement  was  gone;  that  the  mob  of 
Madrid,  being  worked  upon  by  the  same  press  in  the 
hands  of  the  same  people  who  had  made  the  mob  of 
Cadiz  so  ungovernable,  would  become  as  bad  as 
tiiese  last,  and  though  the  mercantile  interest  would 
not  have  so  much  power  in  the  capital,  they  would 
not  want  partisans  when  desirous  of  carrying  a  ques- 
tion by  violence.  The  grandees  were  too  poor  to 
retain  their  former  natural  influence,  and  the  con- 
etitution  gave  them  no  political  power.  The  only 
chance  which  the  serviles  had  was  to  conduct  them- 
selves with  prudence,  and  when  in  the  right  with  a 
firm  contempt  for  the  efforts  of  the  press  and  the 
mob;  but  tliis  was  v/hat  no  person  in  Spain  ever 
did,  and  the  smaller  party  being  wiser,  bolder  and 
more  active,  would  soon  govern  the  cortez  at  Madrid 
as  tliey  did  that  at  Cadiz." 

No  permanent  change  for  the  belter  could  be  ex- 
pected ;  and  meanwhile  the  actual  government, 
alarmed  by  the  tumults  in  the  capital,  by  the  strength 
of  the  serviles  in  the  cortez,  by  the  rebukes  and  re- 
monstrances of  the  English  general  and  ministers, 
and  by  the  evident  danger  of  an  open  rupture  with 
I'^ngland,  dis[)lnyed,  according  to  lord  Wellington, 
the  utmost  prudence  and  fairness  in  a  most  important 
affair  which  occurred  at  this  time.  That  is  to  say, 
their  ov/n  views  and  interests  coinciding  with  those 
of  the  English  commander  and  government,  there 
was  a  momentary  agreement,  and  Wellington  wise- 
ly preferr'^'d  this  opening  for  conciliation  to  the 
more  dangerous  mode  he  had  before  recommended. 

The  event  which  called  forth  his  approval  of  their 
conduct  was  the  secret  arrival  of  the  duke  of  San 
Carlos  at  Madrid  in  December.  He  broTisrlit  with 
him  a  treaty  of  peace,  proposed  by  Napoleon  and 
accepted  by  Ferdinand,  called  the  treaty  of  Valen- 
^ay.  It  acknowledged  Ferdinand  ns  king  of  Spain 
and  the  Indies  and  the  integrity  of  the  Spanish  em- 


pire was  recognized  He  was  in  return  to  make  the 
I'^nglisii  evacuate  Spain,  and  tlie  French  troo[)s  were 
to  abandon  the  country  at  the  same  time.  The  con- 
tracting powers  were  to  maintain  tlieir  respective 
maritine  rights,  as  they  had  been  stijiulated  by  t];e 
treaty  of  Utrecht  and  observed  until  1792.  'J'he 
sales  of  the  national  domains  made  by  .T(.seph  wero 
to  be  confirmed  ;  all  the  Spaniards  who  had  attached 
tliemselves  to  the  French  cause  were  to  he  reinstat- 
ed in  their  dignities  and  property,  tiiose  who  ciicte 
to  quit  Spain  were  to  have  ten  years  to  dispose  <f 
their  possessions.  Prisoners,  including  all  those  de- 
livered up  by  Spain  to  the  Englith,  were  to  be  sent 
iiome  on  both  sides.  The  king  was  to  pay  annually 
thirty  millions  of  reals  to  his  father  Cl:arles  IV.,ard 
two  millions  to  his  widow;  a  treaty  cf  commerce 
was  to  be  arranged. 

Ferdinand,  being  entirely  devoid  of  priRcij)le,  act- 
ed with  that  cunning  which  marked  his  infamous 
career  through  life.  He  gave  the  duke  of  San  Car- 
los secret  instructions  to  tell  the  serviles,  if  he  found 
them  all-powerful  in  the  cortez,  to  ratify  this  treaty 
with  a  secret  resolution  to  break  it  when  time  serv- 
ed; but  if  the  Jacobins  were  strongest,  San  Carles 
was  merely  to  ask  theu|  to  ratify  it,  Ferdinand  in 
that  case  reserving  to  himself  the  task  of  viclatirg 
it  on  his  own  authority.  These  instructirns  were 
made  known  to  the  English  ministers  nnd  the  Eng- 
lish general  ;  but  they,  putting  no  trust  in  such  a 
negotiator,  and  thinking  his  intention  was  rather  to 
deceive  the  allies  than  Napoleon,  thwarted  him  as 
nmch  as  they  could,  and  in  this  they  were  joined  by 
the  Portuguese  government.  The  British  author 
ities  were  naturally  little  pleased  with  the  prospect 
of  being  forced  to  abandon  Sp'ain  under  a  treaty 
which  would  necessarily  give  Napoleon  great  in- 
fluence over  that  country  in  after- times,  and  for  the 
present  enable  him  to  concentrate  all  the  old  troopp 
on  the  eastern  frontier  of  his  empire;  nor  was  the 
.Jacobinical  Spanish  government  more  content  to 
have  a  master.  Wherefore,  all  parties  being  agreed, 
the  regency,  keeping  the  matter  secret,  dismissed 
San  Carlos  on  the  Rth  of  January  with  a  copy  of  the 
decree  passed  bv  the  cortez,  which  rendered  null  and 
void  all  acts  of  Ferdinand  while  a  prisoner,  and  for- 
bade negotiation  for  peace  while  a  French  army  re- 
mained in  the  Peninsula.  And  that  the  king  might 
fully  understand  them,  they  told  him,  "the  monster 
despotism  had  been  driven  from  the  thrcne  of  Spain." 
Meanwhile  Jos'iph  Palafox,who  had  been  a  prisoner 
ever  since  the  siege  of  Zaragoza,  was  by  the  French 
emperor  first  eent  to  Yalen^ay,  after  which  he  was 
to  follow  San  Carlos,  and  he  arrived  at  Madrid  four 
days  after  the  latter's  departure.  Put  his  negotia- 
tions were  equally  fruitless  with  the  regency;  and 
i  in  the  secret  sittings  of  the  cortez  measures  were 
discussed  for  watching  the  king's  movements  and 
forcing  him  to  swear  to  the  constitution  and  to  the 
cortez  before  he  passed  the  frontier. 
I  Lord  Wellington  was  alarmed  at  the  treaty  of  Va- 
lenqay.  He  had,  he  said,  long  suspected  Napoleon 
!  would  adopt  such  an  expedient,  and  if  he  had  shown 
;  less  pride  and  more  common  sense  it  wculd  have 
succeeded.  This  sarcasm  was  perhaps  well  applied 
to  the  measure  as  it  appeared  at  the  time  ;  but  the 
emperor's  real  proceedinffs  he  was  unacquainted 
with,  and  this  sjdenetic  ebullition  only  indicated  his 
own  vexation  at  approaching  mischief,  for  he  was 
forced  to  acknowledge  that  tlie  project  was  not  un- 
likely even  then  to  succeed,  because  the  misery  of 
Spain  was  so  great  and  so  clearly  to  be  traced  to  the 
views  of  the  government  and  of  the  new  constitution, 
that  many  persons  must  have  been  (iesirous  to  put 
an  <snd  to  the  general  sud'ering  under  the  sanctioa 


693 


NAPIEK   S    PENINSULAR 


/VR 


[Book  XXIIl. 


of  this  treaty.  *'  If  Napoleon,"  he  said,  "  had  with- 
drawn the  garrisons  from  Catalonia  and  Valencia, 
and  sent  Ferdinand,  who  must  be  as  useless  a  per- 
son in  France  as  he  would  probably  be  in  Spain,  at 
once  to  the  frontier,  or  into  the  Peninsula,  peace 
would  have  been  made,  or  the  war  at  least  rendered 
60  diihcult  as  to  be  almost  impracticable  and  with- 
out hope  of  great  success."  Now  this  was  precise- 
ly what  Ni  poleon  had  designed,  and  it  seems  nearly 
ceitain  that  he  contemplated  the  treaty  of  Valen^ay 
tnd  tlie  restoration  of  Ferdinand  as  early  as  the 
period  of  tiie  battle  of  Vittoria,  if  not  before. 

The  scheme  was  one  which  demanded  the  utmost 
eecrecy,  that  it  miglit  be  too  sudden  for  tiie  English 
influence  to  defeat  it ;  the  emperor  had  therefore 
arranged  that  Ferdinand  sliould  enter  Spain  early  in 
November,  that  is,  at  the  very  moment  when  it 
would  have  been  most  injurious  to  the  English  in- 
tarest,  because  then  the  disputes  in  the  cortez  be- 
tween the  serviles  and  Jacobins  were  most  rancor- 
ous, and  the  hostility  of  the  regencies  both  in  Portu- 
gal and  Spain  towards  the  English  general  and 
English  influence  undisguised.  Suchet  had  then 
also  proved  his  superiority  to  the  allies  in  Catalo- 
nia, and  Souk's  gigantic  lines  being  unessayed 
seemed  impregnable.  But  in  Napoleon's  council 
were  persons  seeking  only  to  betray  him.  It  was 
the  great  misfortune  of  his  life  to  have  been  driven 
by  circumstances  to  suffer  such  men  as  Talleyrand 
and  Fouche,  whose  innate  treachery  has  become 
proverbial,  to  meddle  in  his  aflairs  or  even  to  ap- 
proach his  court.  Mischief  of  this  kind  however 
necessarily  awaits  men  who,  like  Napoleon  and  Ol- 
iver Cromwell,  have  the  courage  to  attempt,  after 
great  convulsions  and  civil  wars,  the  rebuilding  of 
the  social  edifice  without  spilling  blood.  Either 
to  croite  universal  abhorrence  by  tiieir  cruelty,  or  to 
employ  the  basest  of  men,  the  Talleyrands,  Fouchcs, 
and  Monks,  of  revolutions,  is  their  inevitable  fate; 
and  never  can  they  escape  the  opposition,  more  dan- 
gerous still,  of  honest  and  resolute  men,  who  unable 
to  comprehend  the  necessity  of  the  times,  see  no- 
thing but  tyranny  in  the  vigour  which  prevents 
anarchy. 

The  treaty  of  Valen^ay  was  too  important  a  mea- 
sure to  escape  the  sagacity  of  the  traitors  around 
Napoleon,  and  when  their  opi)osition  in  the  council 
ami  their  secret  insinuations  proved  unavailing  to 
dissuade  liim  from  it,  they  divulged  the  secret  to 
the  partisans  of  tlie  Bourbons.  Taking  advantage 
of  the  troubled  state  of  public  alfairs,  which  occu- 
pied the  emperor's  time  and  distracted  his  attention, 
they  contrived  that  Ferdinand's  emissaries  should 
precede  him  to  Madrid,  and  delayed  his  own  depart- 
ure until  March,  when  the  struggle  was  at  an  end. 
Nevertheless  the  chances  of  success  for  this  scheme, 
even  in  its  imperfect  execution,  were  so  many  and 
BO  alarming  that  lord  Wellington's  sudden  change 
from  fierce  enmity  to  a  warm  support  of  the  regen- 
cy, when  he  found  it  resolute  and  frank  in  its  rejec- 
tion of  the  treaty,  although  it  created  so  much  sur- 
prise and  danger  at  the  moment,  cannot  be  judged 
otherwise  than  as  the  wise  and  prudent  proceeding 
of  a  consummate  statesman.  Nor  did  he  fail  to 
point  out  to  his  own  government  the  mon;  distant  as 
well  as  the  immediate  danger  to  l']nghind  and  Spain 
involved  in  this  singularly  complicated  and  impor- 
tant affair. 

The  evils  as  affecting  the  war  and  English  alli- 
ance with  Spain  were  obvious  ;  but  tin  two  articles 
relating  to  the  provision  for  Ferdinand's  father  and 
nrother,  and  to  the  future  state  of  the  Spaniards 
who  had  joined  the  Frencli,  involved  great  interests. 
It  was  essmtial,  he  said,  that  the  Spanish  govern- 


ment should  explijiiiy  -leclare  its  intentions*  Ne- 
gotiations tor  a  general  peace  were  said  to  be  com- 
menced ;  of  th«*.li3  knew  nothing,  but  he  Eupposed, 
such  being  the  caie,  that  a  basis  would  be  embod- 
ied in  a  preliminary  treaty  which  all  the  belliger- 
ents would  ratify,  eacli  power  then  to  arrange  its 
own  peculiar  treaty  with  France  under  protection 
of  the  general  conlederation.  Napoleon  would  ne- 
cessarily put  forward  his  treaty  with  l'"erdinaud.  It 
could  be  got  rid  of  by  the  statement  that  the  latter 
was  a  prisoner  when  negotiating  ;  but  r.ew  art'cles 
would  then  have  to  be  framed,  and  therefore  the 
Spanish  government  should  be  called  upon  previous- 
ly to  declare  wliat  their  intentions  were  as  to  the 
two  articles  in  the  treaty  of  Valen^ay.  His  objec- 
tions to  them  were  that  the  allowance  to  Charles  IV. 
was  beyond  the  financial  means  of  Spain,  and  were 
it  not  so.  Napoleon  should  not  be  allowed  to  stipu- 
late for  any  provision  for  him.  Neither  siiould  he 
be  suffered  to  embody  or  establish  a  permanent 
French  party  in  Spain,  under  protection  of  a  trea- 
ty, an  article  of  which  provided  for  the  restora- 
tion of  the  Spaniards  who  had  taken  part  with  the 
French.  It  would  give  him  the  right,  which  he 
would  not  fail  to  exercise,  of  interfering  in  their 
favour  in  every  question  of  property,  or  otiier  inter- 
est, and  the  Spanish  government  would  be  involved 
in  perpetual  disputes  with  France.  It  was  probable 
the  allied  sovereigns  would  be  desirous  of  getting 
rid  of  this  question,  and  would  think  it  desirable 
that  Spain  should  pardon  her  rebellious  subjects. 
For  this  reason  he  had  before  advised  the  Spanish 
government  to  publish  a  general  amnesty,  with  the 
view  of  removing  the  difficulty  when  a  general 
peace  should  come  to  be  negotiated,  and  this  difli- 
culty  and  danger  be  enhanced,  if  not  before  pro- 
vided for,  by  the  desire  which  each  of  the  allied 
powers  would  feel,  when  negotiating  on  their  sepa- 
rate grounds,  to  save  their  finances  by  disbanding 
their  armies. 

This  suggestion  of  an  amnesty,  made  ten  days 
before  the  battle  of  Vittoria,  illustrates  V\'eilington's 
sagacity,  his  long  and  provident  reach  of  mind,  his 
discriminating  and  magnanimous  mode  of  viewing 
the  errors  and  weaknesses  of  human  nature.  Let  it 
be  remembered  that  in  the  full  tide  of  success,  after 
having  passed  the  Duero,  and  when  Joseph  sur- 
prised and  bewildered  was  flying  before  iiim,  that 
he  who  had  been  called  the  iron  duke,  in  the  midst 
of  his  bivouac  fires,  found  time  to  consider,  and  had 
BufRcient  humanity  and  grandeur  of  mind  thus  to 
addre&s  the  Sj)anish  government,  on  tliis  subject. 

"  A  large  number  of  Spaniards  wiio  have  taken 
the  side  of  the  French  are  now  with  the  enemy's 
army  :  many  of  these  are  highly  meritorious,  and 
have  rendered  most  essential  service  to  the  cause 
even  during  the  period  in  which  they  have  been  in 
the  service  of  the  enemy.  It  is  also  a  known  fact 
that  fear,  the  misery  and  distress  Vv'hicii  they  suffer- 
ed during  the  contest,  and  despair  of  the  result, 
were  the  motives  which  induced  many  of  these  un- 
fortunate persons  to  take  the  part  which  they  have 
taken  ;  and  I  would  suggest  for  consideration  wheth- 
er it  is  expedient  to  involve  the  country  in  all  the 
consequences  of  a  rigid  adherence  to  the  existing 
law  in  order  to  punish  such  persons.  I  am  the  last 
man  who  will  be  found  to  diminish  tlie  merit  of 
those  Spaniards  who  have  adhered  to  the  cause  of 
the  country  during  the  severe  trial  which  I  hope 
has  passed,  particularly  of  those  who,  having  re- 
mained amongst  the  enemy  without  entering  their 
service,  have  served  their  country  at  the  risk  of 
their  lives.  But  at  the  same  tJme  that  I  can  ap- 
preciate the  nicrus  of  these  individuals  and  of  tho 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


699 


nalioii  at  large,  I  can  forfjive  the  weakness  of  those 
wlio  iiav3  baen  induced  by  terror,  by  distress,  or  by 
despair,  to  pursue  a  different  line  of  conduct. 

"  1  entreat  the  government  to  advert  to  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  commencement  and  of  the  diller- 
eut  stages  of  this  eventful  contest,  and  to  the  numer- 
ous occasions  in  wiiicli  all  men  must  have  imagined 
tiiat  it  was  impossible  for  the  powers  of  the  Penin- 
sula, although  aided  by  Great  Britain,  to  withstand 
,the  colossal  power  by  wliich  they  were  assailed  and 
nearly  overcome.  Let  them  reflect  upon  the  weak- 
ness of  the  country  at  the  commencement  of  the 
contest,  upon  the  numerous  and  almost  invariable 
disasters  of  the  armies,  and  upon  tlie  ruin  and  disor- 
ganization that  followed,  and  let  them  decide  wheth- 
er those  who  were  witnesses  of  these  events  are 
guilty  because  tliey  could  not  foresee  what  has  since 
occurred.  The  majority  are  certainly  not  guilty  in 
any  other  manner,  and  many  now  deemed  guilty  in 
the  eye  of  the  law,  as  having  served  the  pretended 
king,  have  by  that  very  act  acquired  the  means  of 
serving  and  have  rendered  important  services  to 
their  country.  It  is  my  opinion  that  the  policy  of 
Spain  should  lead  the  government  and  the  cortez 
to  grant  a  general  amnesty  witli  certain  exceptions. 
Tins  subject  deserves  consideration  in  the  two  views 
of  failing  or  succeeding  in  freeing  the  country  from 
its  oppressors.  If  the  eifort  fail,  the  enemy  will  by 
an  amnesty  b3  deprived  of  tlie  principal  means  now 
in  his  hands  of  oppressing  the  country  in  which  his 
armies  will  be  stationed:  he  will  see  clearly  that  he 
can  pbice  no  reliance  on  any  partisans  in  Spain,  and 
he  will  not  have  even  a  pretence  for  supposing  that 
tlie  country  is  divided  in  opinion.  If  the  effort  suc- 
ceed, the  obJ3ct  of  the  government  should  be  to  pa- 
cify the  country  and  to  heal  the  divisions  which  the 
contest  has  unavoidably  occasioned.  It  is  impossi- 
ble to  accomplish  this  object  while  there  exists  a 
great  body  of  the  Spanish  nation,  some  possessing 
the  largest  property  in  the  country  and  others  en- 
dowed with  considerable  talents,  who  are  proscribed 
for  their  conduct  during  the  contest,  conduct  which 
has  been  caused  by  the  misfortunes  to  which  I  have 
above  adverted.  These  persons,  their  friends  and 
relations,  will  if  persecuted  naturally  endeavour  to 
perpetuate  the  divisions  in  the  country,  in  the  hope 
at  sometime  to  take  advantage  of  them  ;  and  ad- 
verting to  their  number,  and  to  that  power  which 
they  must  derive  from  their  property  and  connex- 
ions, it  must  be  feared  that  they  will  be  too  success- 
ful. 

"  But  there  are  other  impor,.ant  views  of  this 
question.  First,  should  the  effort  to  free  the  coun- 
try from  its  oppressors  succeed,  at  some  time  or 
other  approaches  to  peace  must  be  made  between 
the  two  nalio'ns,  and  the  amnesty  to  the  persons 
above  described  will  remove  the  greatest  difficulty 
in  the  way  of  sucli  an  arrangement.  Secondly, 
should  even  Spain  be  at  peace  with  France,  and  the 
proscription  against  these  persons  be  continued, 
tlicy  will  remain  in  France,  a  perpetual  instrument 
in  the  hands  of  that  restless  power  to  disturb  tlic  in- 
ternal tranquillity  of  Spain  ;  and  in  case  of  a  renew- 
al of  the  war,  which  will  be  their  wish  and  object, 
they  will  be  the  most  miscliievous  and  most  inveter- 
ate enemies  of  their  country,  of  that  country  which 
with  mistaken  severity  aggravates  her  misfortunes 
by  casting  off  from  her  thousands  of  her  useful  sub- 
yyzts.  On  every  ground  then  it  is  desirable  that  the 
measure  should  be  adopted,  and  the  present  moment 
ehould  he  siezed  for  adopting  it." 

Then  pointing  out  with  great  accuracy  and  jus- 
tice those  wlio  should  be  exempted  from  an  amnesty, 
he  thus  terminated  tliis  record  of  his  own  true  great- 


ness, and  of  the  llttlencsss  of  tlic  people  to  -.vhom  it 
was  fruitlessly  addressed. 

"  In  bringing  this  subject  under  the  consideration 
of  the  government,  1  am  jjerhajis  intruding  my  opin- 
ion on  a  subject  in  whicli  as  a  stranger  I  iiave  no 
concern;  but  liaving  liad  an  advantage  enjoyed  by 
few  of  being  acquainted  with  the  concerns  of  tlie 
country  since  the  commencement  of  tlie  contest,  and 
having  been  sensible,  botli  in  the  latt  and  present 
campaign,  of  the  disadvantages  sntlered  by  Spain 
from  the  want  of  a  measure  of  this  description,  I 
liave  thought  it  proper,  as  a  well-wisher  to  the  cause, 
to  bring  it  under  the  consideration  of  the  govern- 
ment, assuring  tliem  at  the  same  time  that  1  have 
never  had  the  slightest  communication  on  the  tub- 
ject  with  the  government  of  my  country,  nor  do  I 
believe  that  they  have  ever  turned  their  attention 
to  it.  What  I  have  above  stated  are  my  own  opin- 
ions, to  which  I  may  attribute  more  weight  than 
they  merit,  but  they  are  founded  upon  a  sincere  de- 
votion to  the  interests  of  the  country." 

Such  v/as  the  general  political  state  of  the  Penin- 
sula as  bearing  upon  the'  military  ojjerations  at  the 
close  of  the  year  1813,  and  the  state  of  England  and 
France  shall  be  shown  in  the  next  chapters.  Put 
however  hateful  and  injurious  to  England  the  con- 
duct of  the  Peninsular  government  appears,  and 
however  just  and  well-founded  were  the  greatest 
part  of  lord  Wellington's  comjdaints,  it  is  not  to  be 
assumed  that  the  Spanish  government  and  cortez 
were  totally  without  excuse  tor  their  hostility  or  in- 
gratitude. It  was  not  solely  upon  military  grounds 
that  tliey  were  obnoxious  to  the  English  general. 
He  united  heartily  with  the  Englisli  government  in 
hatred  of  democratic  institutions  as  opposed  to  aris- 
tocratic domination.  Spain  with  the  former  seemed 
scarcely  worth  saving  from  France,  and  in  a  letter 
written  about  that  period  to  the  conde  de  I'Abispal. 
who  it  would  appear  proposed  some  immediate  .-troke 
of  violence  against  the  regency,  he  openly  avows  that 
he  was  inimical  to  the  constitution,  because  it  ad- 
mitted a  free  press,  and  refused  to  pro]  erty  any  po- 
litical influence  beyond  what  naturally  belonged  to 
it.  That  is,  it  refused  to  heap  undue  honours,  privi- 
leges and  power  upon  those  who  already  [iossessed 
all  the  luxury  and  happiness  which  riches  can  be- 
stow ;  it  refused  to  admit  the  principle  tiiat  those 
who  have  much  should  have  more ;  that  the  indo- 
lence, corrujjtion  and  insolence  naturally  attendant 
upon  wealth  should  be  supported  and  increased  by 
irresponsible  power;  that  those  who  laboured  and 
produced  all  things  should  enjoy  nothing  ;  that  tlie 
rich  should  be  tyrants  and  the  poor  slaves.  But 
these  essential  principles  of  aristocratic  government 
have  never  yet  been,  and  never  will  be,  quietly  re- 
ceived and  submitted  to  by  any  thinking  people: 
where  tliey  prevail  there  is  no  real  freedom.  Prop- 
erty inevitably  confers  power  on  its  possessors,  and 
far  from  adding  to  that  natural  power  by  pclitical 
privileges,  it  should  be  the  object  of  all  men  who  love 
liberty  to  balance  it  by  raising  the  jioorer  classes  to 
[)olit!cal  importance:  the  influence  and  insolence  of 
riches  ouglit  to  be  tamed  and  sub(hied,  instead  of 
being  inflated  and  excited  by  political  institutions. 
This  was  the  guiding  princijile  of  the  most  celebra- 
tetj  (iroek  legislators;  tlie  ojjposite  principle  pro- 
(hiced  the  domestic  dissensions  of  the  Romans,  and 
was  the  ruin  of  Carthage.  It  was  the  cause  also  of 
the  French  revolution.  But  after  many  years  of 
darkness,  the  light  of  reason  is  now  breaking  forth 
again,  and  that  ancient  principle  of  justice  which 
places  the  right  of  man  in  himself,  above  tlie  right 
of  property,  is  beginning  to  bo  understood.  A  char 
perception  of  it  has  jjroduced  t!  e  American  repLiblic. 


700 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XXIII. 


France  and  Spain  have  admitted  it,  and  England 
ripens  f()r  its  adoption.  Yet  pure,  and  bright,  and 
baautiful,  and  iieaitlitul,  as  the  light  of  freedom  is  in 
itself,  it  fell  at  this  time  on  such  foul  and  stagnant 
pools,  such  horrid  repulsive  objects,  that  millions 
turned  at  first  from  its  radiance  with  disgust,  and 
wished  for  darkness  again. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Politiral  slate  of  Napoleon — fJuiK  fill  policy  of  ihp  all'nd  sov- 
er<i^iis--M.  de   Si-  AigiiMii — (jeiunil    leflectioii!; — Unsetlled 

fn,lii_v  of  ihc  Eii-jlisii  iuii)i*lei> — I'b«'_v  iiPglect  lord  Wel- 
iiigloii — He  reiuoii.-lrales  and  exposes  the  denuded  state  of 
liis  Mnn\ . 

The  force  and  energy  of  Napoleon's  system  of 
government  was  evinced  in  a  marvellous  manner  by 
tiie  rapidity  with  wiiich  he  returned  to  Germany,  at 
the  head  of  an  enormous  urmy,  before  his  enemies 
had  time  even  to  understand  the  extent  of  his  mis- 
fortunes in  the  Russian  campaign.  The  victories 
of  Lutzen  and  Bautzen  then  seemed  to  reinstate  him 
as  the  arbiter  of  Europe.  But  those  battles  were 
fought  with  the  heads  of  columns  the  rear  of  which 
were  still  filing  out  of  France.  They  were  foagiit 
also  with  young  troops.  Wherefore  the  emperor, 
when  he  had  given  himself  a  fixed  and  menacing 
position  in  Germmy,  more  readily  listened  to  the 
fraudful  negotiations  of  his  trembling  opponents, 
partly  in  hopes  of  attaining  his  object  without  fur- 
ther appeal  to  arms,  partly  to  obtain  time  to  organ- 
ize and  discipline  his  soldiers,  confident  in  his  own 
unmatched  skill  in  directing  them  if  war  was  finally 
to  decide  his  fate  He  counted  also  upon  the  family 
tics  between  him  and  Austria,  and  believed  that 
power  willing  to  mediate  sincerely.  Not  that  he 
was  so  weak  as  to  imagine  the  hope  of  regaining 
some  of  its  former  power  and  possessions  was  not 
uppermost,  nor  was  he  unprepared  to  make  conces- 
sions ;  but  he  seems  to  iiave  been  quite  unsuspect- 
ing of  the  long  course  of  treachery  and  dece;t  fol- 
lowed by  tlie  Austrian  politicians. 

It  has  been  already  shown  that  while  negotiating 
with  France  an  olfensive  and  defensive  treaty  in 
1812,  the  Austrian  cabinet  was  cognizant  of,  and 
secretly  aiding,  the  plan  of  a  vast  insurrection  ex- 
tending from  tiis  Tyrol  to  Calabria  and  the  lUyrian 
provinces.  The  management  of  this  scheme  was 
?ntrusted  by  the  English  cabinet  to  genera!  Nugent 
and  Mr,  King,  who  were  at  Vienna:  their  agents 
went  from  thence  to  Italy  and  the  Illyrian  coast;  ma- 
ny Austrian  officers  were  engaged  in  the  project ;  and 
Italians  of  groat  families  entered  into  commercial 
houses  to  enable  them  witii  more  facility  to  carry  on 
tills  i)lan.  Moreover  Austria,  while  actually  signing 
tiie  treaty  witii  Napoleon,  was  with  unceasing  im- 
portunity urging  Prussia  to  join  tiie  Russians  in  oj)- 
position  to  liim.  Tiie  feeble  ojjerations  of  jjrince 
Schwartzcnberg,  the  manner  in  whicli  he  uncovered 
the  emperor's  right  flank  and  permitted  Tchitcha- 
golY  to  move  to  tiia  Beresina  in  the  liussinn  cam- 
paign, were  but  continuations  of  this  deceitful  poli- 
cy. And  it  was  openly  advanced  as  a  merit  by  tiie 
Austrian  cabinet,  that  tiie  offer  of  mediation  after 
the  battl:!  of  Bautzen  was  made  sohily  with  the  view 
of  gaining  time  to  organize  the  army  wiiicii  was  to 
join  the  Russians  snri  Prussians.  Finally,  tlie  arm- 
istice itself  was  violated,  hostilities  being  com- 
menced before  its  termination,  to  enable  the  Rus- 
sian troops  safely  to  join  the  Austrians  in  Bohemia. 

Nevertheless  Napoleon's  genius  triumphed  at 
Dresden  over  tlie  uriskilfiil  operations  of  the  allies, 
directed  by  Schw^  ♦.zeul ..Tg,  whose  incapacity  acs  a 


commander  wai  made  manifest  in  this  campaijrn. 
Nor  would  the  after  misfortunes  of  Vandamme  and 
marshal  Macdonald,  or  the  defeat  of  Gudinot  ami 
Ney,  have  prevented  the  emperor's  final  success,  but 
for  the  continuation  of  a  treachery,  which  seemed  at 
the  time  to  be  considered  a  virtue  by  sovereigns  who 
were  unceasingly  accusing  their  more  nobie  adver- 
sary of  the  very  baseness  that  they  were  practising 
so  unblusliingly.  He  had  conceived  a  project  so 
vast,  BO  original,  so  hardy,  so  far  above  the  imagin- 
ations of  his  contemporary  generals,  that  even  VVel- 
lington's  sagacity  failed  to  pierce  it,  and  he  cen- 
sured the  emperor's  long  stay  on  the  Elbe  as  an  ob- 
stinacy unwarranted  by  the  rules  of  art.  But  Na- 
poleon had  more  profoundly  judged  his  own  situa- 
tion. The  large  forces  he  had  left  at  Dresden,  at 
Torgau,  and  Wittenberg,  for  whicli  he  has  been  so 
much  blamed  by  shallow  military  critics  as  lessen 
ing  his  numbers  on  the  field  of  Leipzig,  were  essen 
tial  parts  of  his  gigantic  plan.  He  quitted  Dres 
den,  apparently  in  retreat,  to  deceive  his  enemies, 
but  v.'ith  the  intention  of  marching  down  the  Elbe, 
recrossing  that  river,  and  throwing  his  opponents 
into  a  false  position.  Then  he  would  have  seized 
Berlin,  and  reopening  his  communications  with  his 
garrisons  both  on  the  Elbe  and  the  Gder,  have  oper- 
ated between  those  rivers  ;  and  with  an  army  much 
augmented  in  power,  because  he  would  have  recov- 
ered many  thousand  old  soldiers  cooped  up  in  the 
garrisons;  an  army  more  compact  and  firmly  estab- 
lished also,  because  he  would  have  been  in  direct 
communication  with  the  Danes  and  with  Davoust's 
force  at  Hamburgh,  and  both  his  flanks  would  have 
been  secured  by  his  chains  of  fortresses  on  the  two 
rivers.  Already  had  Blucher  and  the  Swedes  felt 
his  first  stroke  ;  the  next  would  have  taught  the  al- 
lies that  the  lion  was  still  abroad  in  his  strength,  if 
at  tlie  very  moment  of  execution,  without  any  pre- 
vious declaration,  the  Bavarians,  upon  whose  opera- 
tions he  depended  for  keeping  the  Austrians  in  the 
valley  of  the  Danube  in  check,  had  not  formed  com- 
mon cause  with  his  opponents,  and  the  whole  march- 
ed together  towards  the  Rhine.  The  battle  of  Leip- 
zig followed,  the  well-known  treason  of  the  Sax<m 
troops  led  to  the  victory  gained  there  by  the  allies, 
and  Napoleon,  now  the  prey  of  misfortune,  reached 
France  with  only  one-third  of  his  army,  having  on 
the  way,  however,  trampled  in  the  dust  the  Bava- 
rian Wrede,  who  attemjited  to  stop  his  passage  at 
Hanau. 

Meanwliile  the  allied  sovereigns,  by  giving  hopes 
to  their  subjects  that  constitutional  liberty  would 
be  the  reward  of  the  prodigious  poj)u]ar  exertions 
against  France,  hopes  which  with  the  most  detest- 
able baseness  they  had  previously  resolved  to  de- 
fraud, assembled  greater  forces  than  tliey  were  able 
to  wield,  and  prepared  to  pass  the  Rhine.  But  dis- 
trusting even  tlieir  immense  superiority  of  numbers, 
they  still  pursued  tlieir  faithless  system.  When 
Napoleon,  in  consequence  of  the  Bavarian  defection, 
marched  to  Leipzig,  he  sent  orders  to  Gouvion  St.Cyr 
to  abandon  Dresden  and  unite  with  the  garrisons  on 
the  lower  Elbe  :  the  messengers  were  intercepted, 
and  St.  Cyr,  too  little  enterprising  to  execute  such 
a  plan  of  his  own  accord,  surrendered  on  condition 
of  being  allowed  to  regain  France.  The  capitula- 
tion was  broken,  and  general  and  soldiers  remained 
prisoners. 

After  the  Leipzig  battle.  Napoleon's  adherents  fell 
away  by  nations.  Murat,  the  husband  of  his  sister, 
joined  Austria,  and  thus  forced  prince  Eugene  to 
abandon  his  position  on  the  Adia."".  A  successful 
insurrection  in  iiivour  of  the  jirince  of  (Jrange  broke 
out  in  Holland.     The  neutrality  of  Switzerland  waa 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSU:    VR    WAR. 


701 


tiolated,  and  more  than  half  a  million  of  armed  men 
were  poured  across  the  frontiers  of  Trance  in  all  the 
violence  of  brute  force  ;  for  their  military  combina- 
tions were  contemptible,  and  tiieir  course  marlicd  by 
murder  and  devastation,  liut  previous  to  this  tlie 
allies  gave  one  more  notable  example  of  their  faith- 
less cunning. 

8t.  Aignan,  the  French  resident  minister  at  Go- 
tha,  had  been  taken  at  Leipzig,  and  treated  at  first 
as  a  prisoner  of  war.  He  remonstrated,  and  being 
known  to  entertain  a  desire  for  peace  was  judged  a 
good  tool  with  which  to  practice  deception.  ]\apo- 
loon  had  orfercd  on  the  field  of  battle  at  Leipzig  to 
negotiate:  no  notice  was  taken  of  it  at  tlie  time, 
but  now  the  Austrian  Metternich  and  the  Russian 
Nesselrode  had  an  interview  with  St.  Aignan  at 
Frankfort,  and  they  assured  him  the  Prussian  min- 
ister agreed  in  all  things  with  them.  They  had 
previously  arranged  that  lord  Aberdeen  should  come 
in  during  tlie  conference  as  if  by  accident ;  nothing 
wag  put  down  in  writing,  yet  St.  Aignan  was  suf- 
fered to  make  minutes  of  their  proposals  in  reply  to 
the  emperor's  offer  to  negotiate.  These  were  gene- 
rally, that  the  alliance  of  the  sovereigns  was  indis- 
soluble— that  they  would  Jiave  only  a  general  peace 
— that  France  was  to  be  confined  to  lier  natural 
limits,  viz.  the  Alps,  the  Rhine  and  the  Pyrenees — 
that  the  independence  of  Germany  was  a  thing  not 
to  be  disputed — that  the  Spanish  Peninsula  should 
be  free,  and  the  Bourbon  dynasty  be  restored — that 
Austria  must  have  a  frontier  in  Italy,  the  line  of 
which  could  be  afterwards  discussed,  but  Italy  itself 
was  to  be  independent  of  any  preponderating  power 
— that  Holland  was  also  to  be  independent,  and  her 
frontier  to  be  matter  for  after-discussion — that  Eng- 
land was  ready  to  make  great  sacrifices  for  peace 
u;jon  these  bases,  and  would  acknowled^-e  that  free- 
dom of  commerce  and  of  navigation  w  r.ch  France 
had  a  right  to  pretend  to.  St.  Aignan  here  observ- 
ed that  Napoleon  believed  England  was  resolved  to 
r-3strict  France  to  the  possession  of  thirty  sail  of 
the  line:  lord  Aberdeen  replied  that  it  was  not 
true. 

This  conference  had  place  at  the  emperor  of  Aus- 
tria's head-quarters  on  the  10th  of  jNovember,  and 
l.-trd  Aberdeen  enclosed  the  account  of  it  in  a  des- 
l)atch  dated  at  Smalcalde  the  16th  of  November. 
He  had  objected  verbally  to  the  passage  relating  to 
the  maritime  question  with  England,  nevertheless 
he  permitted  it  to  remain  in  St.  Aignan's  minutes. 
It  was  decided  also  that  the  military  operations 
sliould  go  on  notwithstanding  the  negotiation,  and 
in  truth  the  allies  had  not  the  slightest  design  to 
make  peace.  They  thought  Napoleon  would  refuse 
the  basis  proposed,  which  would  give  them  an  op- 
portunity to  declare  he  was  opposed  to  all  reasona- 
ble modes  of  putting  an  end  to  the  war,  and  thus 
work  upon  the  French  people.  This  is  proved  by 
wliat  followed.  For  when  contrary  to  their  exi)ect- 
ationa  the  emperor's  minister  signified,  on  the  16th 
of  November,  that  he  accepted  the  propositions,  ob- 
Berving  that  the  independence  of  all  nations  at  sea 
as  well  as  by  land  had  been  always  Napoleon's  ob- 
ject, Metternich  in  his  reply,  on  the  25th  of  No- 
vember, pretended  to  consider  this  answer  as  avoid- 
ing the  acceptation  of  the  basis.  The  emperor  how- 
ever put  that  obstacle  aside,  on  the  2d  of  December, 
by  accepting  explicitly  the  basis,  generally  and  sum- 
marily, such  as  it  had  been  presented  to  liim,  ad- 
ding that  France  would  make  great  sacrifices,  but 
the  emperor  was  content  if,  by  like  sacrifices  on  the 
part  of  England,  that  general  peace  whicli  was  the 
declared  object  of  the  allies  could  be  obtained.  Met- 
ternich, thus  driven  from  his  subterfuge,  required 


Napoleon  to  send  a  like  declaration  to  each  of  the 
allies  separately,  when  negotiations  might,  lie  said, 
commence. 

Meanwhile  lord  Aberdeen,  who  had  permitted  St. 
Aignan  to  retain  the  article  relating  to  maritime 
rights  in  his  minutes  of  conference,  presented  to 
Metternich, on  the  27th  of  November,  a  note  decl»- 
ing  that  England  would  not  admit  the  turn  given  by 
France  to  her  share  of  the  negotiation  ;  that  she  was 
ready  to  yield  all  the  rights  of  commerce  and  navi- 
gation which  France  had  a  right  to  pretend  to,  but 
the  question  would  turn  upon  what  tliat  right  was. 
England  would  never  permit  her  navigation  laws  to 
be  discussed  at  a  congress,  it  was  a  matter  essen- 
tially foreign  to  the  object  of  such  an  assembly,  and 
England  would  never  depart  from  the  great  princi- 
ple thereby  announced  as  to  her  maritime  rights. 
3Ietternich  approved  of  lord  Aberdeen's  views,  say- 
ing they  were  his  own  and  those  of  his  court ;  thus 
proving  that  the  negotiation  had  been  a  deceit  from 
the  beginning.  This  fact  was  however  placed  be- 
yond doubt  by  lord  Castlereagh's  simultaneous  pro- 
ceedings in  London. 

In  a  note,  dated  the  3Cth  of  November,  that  min- 
ister told  lord  Aberdeen,  England  admitted  as  a 
basis,  that  the  Alps,  the  Rhine  and  the  Pyrenees 
should  be  the  frontier  of  France,  subject  to  such 
modifications  as  might  be  necessary  to  give  a  secure 
frontier  to  Holland,  and  to  Switzerland  also,  although 
the  latter  had  not  been  mentioned  in  the  proposals 
given  by  St.  Aignan.  He  applauded  the  resolution 
to  pursue  military  operations  notwithstanding  the 
negotiations,  and  he  approved  of  demanding  nothing 
but  what  they  were  resolved  to  have.  Nevertheless 
he  said  that  any  sacrifice  to  be  made  by  England 
was  only  to  secure  the  independence  of  Holland  and 
Switzerland,  and  the  former,  having  alre;.dy  declared 
for  the  house  of  Nassau,  was  now  out  of  the  pale  of 
discussion.  Finally,  he  recommended  that  any  un- 
necessary delay  or  equivocation  on  the  part  of  the 
enemy  should  be  considered  as  tantamount  to  a  re- 
jection of  the  basis,  and  that  the  allies  should  then 
put  forward  the  offer  of  peace,  to  show  that  it  was 
not  they,  but  France,  that  opposed  an  honourable 
termination  of  the  war.  Having  thus  thrown  fresh 
obstacles  in  the  way  of  that  peace  which  the  allies 
pretended  to  have  so  much  at  heart,  he,  on  the  21fct 
December,  sent  notes  to  the  difierent  ambassadors 
of  the  allied  powers  then  in  London,  demanding  ex- 
plicit answers  about  the  intentions  of  their  courts 
as  to  England's  maritime  code.  To  this  they  all 
responded,  that  their  cabinets  would  not  suffer 
any  questions  relative  to  that  code  to  be  entertained 
at  a  congress  in  which  England  was  represented, 
and  this  on  the  express  ground  that  it  would  mar  the 
great  object  of  peace. 

Lord  Castlereagh,  thus  provided  declared  that 
France  should  be  informed  of  their  resolutions  be- 
fore negotiations  commenced  ;  but  twenty  days  be 
fore  this.  Napoleon  having  decreed  a  fresh  levy  of 
three  himdred  thousand  conscripts,  the  allies  had 
published  a  manifesto  treating  this  measure,  eo  es- 
sentially a  defensive  one  since  they  would  not  sus- 
pend their  military  operations,  as  a  fresh  provoca- 
tion on  his  i)art,  because  the  motives  .assigned  for 
the  conscription  contained  a  just  and  powerful  de- 
scription of  their  past  deceits  and  violence  with  a 
view  to  rouse  the  national  spirit  of  France.  Thug 
iiaving  first,  by  a  pretended  desire  for  peace  and  a 
willingness  on  the  part  of  England  to  consent  to  an 
arrangement  about  iier  maritime  code,  inveigled  the 
French  emperor  into  negotiations,  and  thereby  aa« 
certained  that  the  maritime  question  v.as  uppermost 
in  his  mind  and  the  only  obstacle  to  peace,  they  de- 


702 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XXIII. 


dared  that  vital  question  should  not  even  be  discuss- 
ed :  and  when  by  this  subtlety  they  had  rendered 
peace  irnj>o.ssible,  proclaimed  that  Napoleon  alone 
resisted  tho  desire  of  the  world  for  tranquillity. 
And  at  this  very  moment  Austria  was  secretly  en- 
deavouring to  obtain  Enjrland's  consent  to  her  seiz- 
ing upon  Alsace,  a  project  which  was  stopped  by 
lord  Wellington,  who  forcibly  pointed  out  the  danger 
of  rousing  France  to  a  general  insurrection  by  such 
a  proceeding. 

The  contrast  between  these  wiles  to  gain  a  mo- 
mentary advantage,  and  the  manly,  vigorous  policy 
of  lord  Wellington,  must  make  honest  men  of  all 
nations  blush  for  the  cunning  which  diplomatists 
call  policy.  On  one  side,  the  arts  of  guileful  nego- 
tiation masked  with  fair  protestations,  but  accom- 
panied by  a  savage  and  revolting  system  of  warfare  ; 
on  tlico-ther,  a  broad  open  hostility  declared  on  man- 
ly and  just  grounds,  followed  up  with  a  strict  regard 
to  humanity  and  good  faith;  nothing  put  forward 
with  an  equivocal  meaning,  and  the  actions  true  to 
the  word.  On  the  eastern  frontier,  the  Cossack  let 
loose  to  ravage  with  all  the  barbarity  of  Asiatic 
warfare.  On  the  western  frontier,  the  Spaniards 
turned  back  into  their  own  country  in  the  very 
midst  of  triumph,  for  daring  to  pass  the  bounds  of 
discipline  prescribed  by  the  wise  and  generous  poli- 
cy of  their  commander.  Terror  and  desolation,  and 
the  insurrection  of  a  people  rendered  frantic  by  the 
cruelty  of  the  invaders,  marked  the  progress  of  the 
ferocious  multitudes  who  crossed  the  Rhine.  Order 
and  tranquillity,  profound  even  on  the  very  edge  of 
the  battlo-tield,  attended  the  march  of  the  civilized 
army  which  passed  the  Bidassoa.  And  what  were 
the  military  actions  !  Napoleon,  rising  even  above 
himself,  hurtled  against  the  armed  myriads  opposed 
to  him  with  such  a  terrible  energy  that  though  ten 
times  his  number  they  were  rolled  back  on  every 
side  in  confusion  and  dismay.  But  Wellington  ad- 
vanced without  a  check,  victorious  in  every  hattle, 
although  one  half  of  the  veterans  opposed  to  him 
would  have  decided  the  campaign  on  the  eastern 
frontier.  Nor  can  this  be  gainsaid,  since  Napo- 
leon's career  in  this  campaign  was  only  stayed  by 
the  defection  of  his  brother-in-law  Murat,  and  by 
the  sickening  treachery  of  two  marshals  to  whom  he 
had  been  prodigal  of  benefits.  It  is  undeniable  that 
Lord  Wellington  with  sixty  tliousand  Anglo-Portu- 
guese, acting  in  the  south,  effected  more  than  half  a 
million  of  the  allies  were  able  to  etlijct  on  the  oppo- 
site side  of  France  ;  and  yet  Soult's  army,  on  the 
10th  of  November,  was  stronger  than  that  with 
which  Napoleon  fought  the  battle  of  Brienne. 

That  great  man  was  never  personally  deceived  by 
the  allies'  pretended  negotiations.  He  joined  issue 
with  them  to  satisfy  the  French  people  that  he  was 
nut  averse  to  peace,  but  his  instructions,  dated  the 
4th  of  January,  and  addressed  to  Caulincourt.  prove 
at  once  his  sagacity  and  firmness.  "  I  think,"  he 
said,  "that  both  tlie  aHies'  good  faith  and  the  wish 
of  England  to  make  peace  is  doubtful ;  for  my  part  I 
desire  peace,  but  it  must  be  solid  and  honourable. 
I  have  accepted  the  basis  proposed  at  Frankfort,  yet 
it  is  more  than  probable  the  allies  have  other  no- 
tions. These  propositions  are  but  a  mask,  tlie  ne- 
gotiations are  placed  under  the  influence  of  the  mil- 
itary operations,  andMt  is  easy  to  foresee  what  the 
consequence  of  such  a  system  must  b?.  It  is  neces- 
sary therefore  to  listen  to  and  observe  every  thing. 
It  is  not  certain  even  thnt  you  will  be  admitted  to 
the  heod-qiiarters  of  the  allies.  The  Russians  anU 
the  English  watch  to  prevest  any  opening  for  ex- 
planation nnd  reconciliation  with  the  emperor  of 
Austria.     You  must  therefore  endeavour  to  ascer- 


tain the  real  views  of  the  allies,  and  let  me  know 
day  by  day  what  you  learn,  that  I  may  frame  in- 
structions for  which  at  present  I  have  no  sure 
grounds." 

The  internal  state  of  France  was  more  disquiet- 
ing to  his  mind  than  foreign  negotiations  or  the 
number  of  invaders.  The  sincere  republicans  were 
naturally  averse  to  him  as  the  restorer  of  monarchy  ; 
yet  they  should  have  felt  that  the  sovereign  whose 
ruin  was  so  eagerly  sought  by  the  legitimate  kings 
and  nobles  of  Europe  could  not  be  really  opposed  to 
liberty.  Meanwhile  the  advocates  of  legitimacy 
shrunk  from  him  as  a  usurper,  and  all  those  tired  of 
war,  and  they  were  a  majority  of  the  nation,  judging 
from  the  stupendous  power  of  his  genius  that  he  had 
only  to  will  peace  to  attain  it  with  security,  blamed 
his  tardiness  in  negotiation.  An  unexpected  oppo- 
sition to  his  wishes  was  also  displayed  in  the  legis- 
lative body,  and  the  partisans  of  the  Bourbons  were 
endeavouring  to  form  a  great  conspiracy  in  favour 
of  that  house.  There  were  many  traitors  likewise 
to  him  and  to  their  country,  men  devoid  of  princi- 
ple, patriotism  or  honour,  who  with  instinctive  ha- 
tred of  a  failing  cause  plotted  to  thwart  his  projects 
for  the  defence  of  the  nation.  In  fine,  the  men  of 
action  and  the  men  of  theories  were  alike  combined 
for  mischief.  Nor  is  this  outbreak  of  passion  to  be 
wondered  at,  when  it  is  considered  how  recently 
Napoleon  had  stopped  the  anarchy  of  the  revolution 
and  rebuilt  the  social  and  political  structure  in 
France.  But  of  all  who  by  their  untimely  opposi- 
tion to  the  emperor  hurt  their  country,  the  most 
pernicious  were  those  silly  politicians,  whom  he  so 
felicitously  described  as  "  discussing  abstract  sys- 
tems of  government  when  the  battering  ram  was  at 
the  gates." 

Such  however  has  been  in  all  ages  the  conduct  of 
excited  and  disturbed  nations,  and  it  seems  to  be 
inherent  in  human  nature,  because  a  saving  policy 
can  only  be  understood  and  worked  to  good  by  mas- 
ter-spirits, and  they  art?  few  and  far  between,  tlieir 
time  on  earth  short,  their  task  immense.  They 
have  not  time  to  teach,  they  must  command,  al- 
though they  know  that  pride  and  ignorance  and  even 
honesty  will  carp  at  the  despotism  which  brings 
general  safety.  It  was  this  vain  short-sighted  im- 
patience that  drove  Hannibal  into  exile,  caused  the 
assassination  of  Csesar,  and  strewed  thorns  beneath 
the  gigantic  footsteps  of  Oliver  Cromwell.  It  raged 
fiercely  in  Spain  against  lord  Wellington,  and  in 
France  against  Napoleon,  and  always  with  the  most 
grievous  injury  to  the  several  nations.  Time  only 
hallows  human  institutions.  Under  that  guarantee 
men  will  yield  implicit  obedience  and  respect. to  tlie 
wildest  caprices  of  the  most  stupid  tyrant  that  ever 
disgraced  a  throne,  and  wanting  it  they  will  cavil 
at  and  reject  the  wisest  measur?s  of  the  most  sub- 
lime genius.  The  painful  notion  is  thus  excited, 
that  if  governments  are  conducted  v.ith  just  the  de- 
gree of  stability  and  tranquillity  which  they  deserve 
and  no  more,  the  people  of  all  nations,  much  as  they 
may  be  oppressed,  enjoy  upon  an  average  of  years 
precisely  the  degree  of  liberty  they  are  fitted  for. 
National  discontents  mark,  according  to  tlieir  bit- 
terness and  constancy,  not  so  much  the  opprcsiiion 
of  the  rulers,  as  the  real  progress  of  the  ruled  in 
civilization  and  its  attendant  political  knowledge 
When  from  peculiar  circumstances  these  discon- 
tents explode  in  violent  revolutions,  shattering  the 
fabric  of  society  and  giving  free  vent  and  activity  to 
all  the  passions  and  follies  of  mankind,  fortunate  is 
the  nation  which  possesses  a  Napoleon  or  an  Oliver 
Cromwell,  "  to  step  into  their  state  of  dominion, 
witl    9_"  "it  to  control  and  capacity  to  subdue   tna 


1813.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


703 


factions  of  the  hour,  and  reconstruct  the  frame  of 
reasonable  government." 

For  great  as  tliese  two  men  were  in  the  field  of 
battle,  especially  the  former,  they  were  inlinitely 
greater  when  they  placed  themselves  in  the  seat  cf 
power,  and  put  forth  the  gigantic  despotism  of  ge- 
nius essential  to  the  completion  of  their  holy  work. 
Nor  do  I  hold  the  conduct  of  Washington  to  be  com- 
parable to  either  of  those  men.  His  situation  was 
one  of  infinitely  less  difficulty,  and  there  is  no  rea- 
son to  believe  that  his  capacity  would  have  been 
equal  to  the  emergencies  of  a  more  formidable  crisis 
than  he  had  to  deal  with.  Washington  could  not 
have  made  himself  master  of  all,  had  it  been  neces- 
eary  and  he  so  inclined,  for  he  was  neither  the  fore- 
most general  nor  the  foremost  statesman  of  his  na- 
tion. His  forbearance  was  a  matter  of  necessity, 
and  his  love  of  liberty  did  not  prevent  him  from  be- 
queathing his  black  slaves  to  his  widow. 

Such  was  Napoleon's  situation  ;  and  as  he  read 
the  signs  of  the  times  truly,  he  knew  that  in  his 
military  skill  and  the  rage  of  the  peasants  at  the 
ravages  of  the  enemy  he  must  find  the  means  to  ex- 
tricate himself  from  his  ditRculties,  or  rather  to  ex- 
tricate his  country,  for  self  had  no  place  in  his  poli- 
cy save  as  his  personal  glory  was  identified  with 
France  and  her  prosperity.  Never  before  did  the 
world  see  a  man  soaring  so  high  and  devoid  of  all 
selfish  ambition.  Let  those  who  honestly  seeking 
truth  doubt  this,  study  Napoleon  carefully  ;  let  them 
read  the  record  of  his  second  abdication  published 
by  his  brotlier  Lucien,  that  stern  republican  who  re- 
fused kingdoms  as  the  price  of  his  principles,  and 
they  will  doubt  no  longer.  It  is  not  however  with 
these  matters  that  this  history  has  to  deal,  but  with 
the  emperor's  measures  affecting  his  lieutenants  on 
the  Spanish  frontier  of  France.  There  dissaffec- 
tion  to  his  government  was  extensive,  but  princi- 
pally from  local  causes.  The  conscription  was  pe- 
culiarly hateful  to  the  wild  mountaineers,  who  like 
most  borderers  cherish  very  independent  notions. 
The  war  with  England  had  ruined  the" foreign  com- 
merce of  their  great  towns,  and  the  advantage  of 
increased  traffic  by  land  on  the  east  was  less  direct- 
ly felt  in  the  south.  There  also  the  recollection  of 
the  V'endean  struggle  still  lingered,  and  the  parti- 
sans of  the  Bourbons  had  many  connexions.  But 
the  chief  danger  arose  from  the  just  and  politic  con- 
duct of  lord  Wellington,  which,  offering  no  cause  of 
anger  and  very  much  of  private  advantage  to  the 
people,  gave  little  or  no  hope  of  insurrection  from 
Bufferings. 

While  France  was  in  this  state,  England  present- 
ed a  scene  of  universal  exultation.  Tory  politics 
were  triumphant,  opposition  in  the  parliament  was 
nearly  crushed  by  events,  the  press  was  either  sub- 
dued by  persecution  or  in  the  pay  of  the  ministers, 
and  the  latter  with  undisguised  joy  hailed  the 
coming  moment  when  aristocratic  tyranny  was  to 
be  firmly  established  in  England.  The  most  enor- 
mous subsidies  and  military  supplies  were  poured 
into  the  continent,  and  an  act  was  passed  to  enable 
three-fourths  of  the  militia  to  serve  abroad.  They 
were  not  however  very  forward  to  volunteer,  and  a 
new  army  which  ought  to  have  reinforced  Welling- 
ton, was  sent,  under  the  command  of  general  Gra- 
ham, to  support  the  insurrection  of  Holland,  where 
it  was  of  necessity  engaged  in  trifling  or  unsuccess- 
ful ope-ations  in  no  manner  affecting  the  great  ob- 
jects of  the  war.  3Ieanwhile  the  importance  of 
lord  Wellington's  army  and  views  was  quite  over- 
looked or  misunderstood.  The  ministers  persevered 
in  the  foolish  plan  of  removing  him  to  another  quar- 
ter of  Europe,  and  at  the  same  time,  instigated  by 


the  ambassadors  of  the  allied  sovereigns,  were  con- 
tinually urging  him  to  push  his  operations  with 
more  vigour  in  France.  As  if  he  was  the  juan  who 
had  done  least ! 

His  letters  were  filled  with  strong  and  well-found- 
ed complaints  that  his  army  was  neglected.  Let 
his  real  position  be  borne  in  mind.  He  had,  not  as 
a  military  man,  but  with  a  political  view,  and  to 
meet  the  wishes  of  the  allied  sovereigns  backed  by 
the  importunities  of  his  own  government,  placed 
himself  in  a  confined  and  difficult  district  cf  France, 
where  his  operations  were  cramped  by  rivers  and 
fortresses  and  by  a  powerful  army  occupying  strong 
positions  on  his  front  and  flanks.  In  this  situation, 
unable  to  act  at  all  in  wet  weather,  he  was  necessa- 
rily dependent  upon  the  ocean  for  supplies  and  rein- 
forcements, and  upon  the  Spanish  authorities  for  his 
hospitals,  depots,  and  communications.  Numbers 
were  requisite  to  balance  the  advantages  derived  by 
the  enemy  from  the  peculiar  conformation  of  the 
country  and  the  position  of  the  fortresses.  Money 
also  was  wanted  to  procure  supplies  which  he  could 
not  carry  with  him,  and  must  pay  for  exactly,  if  he 
would  avoid  a  general  insurrection  aijd  the  conse- 
quent ruin  of  the  political  object  for  which  he  had 
adopted  such  critical  military  operations.  But 
though  he  had  undertaken  the  invasion  of  France  at 
the  express  desire  of  the  government,  the  latter 
seemed  to  be  alike  ignorant  of  its  importance  and  of 
the  means  to  accomplish  it,  at  one  moment  urging 
progress  beyond  reason,  at  another  ready  to  change 
lightly  what  they  had  proposed  ignorantly.  Tiieir 
unsettled  policy  proved  their  incapacity  even  to 
comprehend  the  nature  of  the  great  tide  of  events  en 
which  they  floated  rather  than  sailed.  Lord  Wel- 
lington was  forced  day  by  day  to  teach  tlicm  the 
value  of  tlieir  own  schemes,  and  to  show  them  how 
small  their  knowledge  was  of  the  true  bearing  of 
the  political  and  military  afiairs  they  pretended  to 
direct. 

"  Assure,"  he  wrote  on  the  21st  of  Deccmhcr  to 
lord  Bathurst,  in  reply  to  one  of  their  ill-founded  re- 
monstrances, "  assure  the  Russian  ambassador  there 
is  nothing  I  can  do  to  forward  the  general  interest 
that  I  will  not  do.  What  do  they  require"!  I  am 
already  further  advanced  on  the  French  territory 
than  any  of  the  allied  powers,  and  better  prepared 
to  take  advantage  of  any  opportunities  which  might 
offer  as  a  consequence  of  my  own  situation  or  of 
their  proceedings.  .  .  .  In  militBry  operations  there 
are  some  things  which  cannot  be  done,  and  cne  is 
to  move  troops  in  this  country  during  or  immediate- 
ly after  a  violent  fall  of  rain.  To  attempt  it  will 
be  to  lose  more  men  than  can  be  replaced,  a  guilty 
waste  of  life.  .  .  . 

"  The  proper  scene  of  action  for  the  army  was  un- 
doubtedly a  question  for  the  government  to  decide; 
but  with  thirty  thousand  men  in  the  Peninsula,  he 
had  for  five  years  held  two  hundred  thousand  of  JNa- 
poleon's  best  soldiers  in  check,  since  it  was  ridicL' 
lous  to  suppose  that  the  Spaniards  end  Portuguese 
could  have  resisted  for  a  moment  if  the  British 
troops  had  been  withdrawn.  The  French  armies 
actually  employed  against  him  could  not  be  less 
than  one  hundred  thousand  men,  more  if  he  included 
garrisons,  and  the  French  newspapers  spoke  of  or- 
ders to  form  a  fresh  reserve  of  one  hundred  thousand 
at  Bordeaux.  Was  there  any  man  weak  enough  to 
suppose  one  third  of  the  number  first  mentioned 
would  be  employed  against  the  Spaniards  and  Por- 
tuguese if  the  British  were  withdrawn!  They 
would  if  it  were  an  object  with  Bonaparte  to  con- 
quer the  Peninsula,  and  he  would  in  that  case  suc- 
ceed ;   ijut  he  was  more  likely  to  give  peace  to  the 


ro4 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XXIIl 


Peninsula,  and  turn  against  the  allied  sovereigns 
his  two  hundred  thousand  men,  of  which  one  hun- 
dred thousand  were  juch  troops  as  their  armies  had 
not  yet  dealt  with.  The  war  every  day  oti'ered  a 
crisis  the  result  of  which  might  atfect  the  world  for 
Eges,  and  to  change  the  scene  of  operations  for  the 
British  army  would  render  it  incapahle  of  fighting 
for  four  months,  even  if  tJie  scene  were  Holland,  and 
it  would  even  then  be  a  deteriorated  machine. 

"  The  ministers  might  reasonably  ask  how,  by 
remaining  wlicre  he  was,  he  could  induce  Napoleon 
to  make  peace.  The  answer  was  ready.  He  held 
a  commanding  situation  on  the  most  vulnerable 
frontier  of  France,  probably  the  only  vulnerable 
one,  and  if  he  could  put  twenty  thousand  Spaniards 
iij  activity — and  he  could  do  it  if  he  had  money  and 
was  properly  supported  by  the  fleet — Bayonne,  the 
only  fortress  on  the  frontier,  if  it  could  be  called  a 
fortress,  would  fall  to  him  in  a  short  time.  If  he 
could  put  forty  thousand  Spaniards  in  motion  his 
posts  would  soon  be  on  the  Garonne;  and  did  any 
man  believe  that  Napoleon  would  not  feel  an  army 
in  such  a  position  more  than  he  would  feel  thirty  or 
forty  thousand  British  troops  laying  siege  to  one  of 
his  fortresses  in  Holland  J  The  resources  in  men  and 
money  of  which  the  emperor  would  be  thus  deprived, 
and  the  loss  of  reputation,  would  do  ten  times  more 
to  procure  peace  than  ten  armies  on  the  side  of  Flan- 
ders. But  if  he  was  right  in  believing  a  strong 
Bourbon  party  existed  in  France,  and  that  it  pre- 
ponderated in  the  south,  what  mischief  would  not 
an  advance  to  the  Garonne  do  Napoleon !  What 
sacrifices  would  he  not  make  to  get  rid  of  the  dan- 
ger ! 

"  It  was  for  the  government,  not  for  him,  to  dis- 
pose of  the  nation's  resources,  he  had  no  right  to 
give  an  o;)inion  upon  the  subject ;  but  military  ope- 
rations in  Holland  and  in  the  Peninsula  could  not  be 
maintained  at  the  same  time  with  British  troops: 
one  or  other  must  be  given  up,  the  British  military 
establishment  was  not  equal  to  maintain  two  ar- 
mies iu  the  riald.  He  had  begun  the  recent  cam- 
paign with  seventy  thousand  Anglo-Portuguese,  and 
if  the  men  got  from  tiie  English  militia,  and  the 
Portuguese  recruits  which  he  expected,  had  been 
added  to  his  force,  even  though  the  Germans  were 
removed  from  his  army  according  to  the  ministers' 
plan,  he  might  have  taken  the  field  early  in  1814 
witli  eighty  tliousand  men.  That  was  now  im|)os- 
eible.  Tne  formation  of  a  Hnnoverian  army  was 
the  most  reasonable  plan  of  acting  on  the  continent, 
but  the  withdrawal  of  tlie  Germans  would  reduce 
his  force  to  fifty  thousand  men,  unless  he  received 
real  and  efficient  assistance  to  bring  up  the  Por- 
tuguese recruits.  This  would  increase  his  num- 
bers to  fifty-five  or  even  sixty  thousand,  if  his  own 
wounded  recovered  well  and  he  had  no  more  bat- 
tles ;  but  he  would  even  then  be  twenty  thousand 
less  than  he  had  calculated  upon,  and  it  was  certain 
that  if  the  government  extended  their  operations  to 
other  countries  new  means  must  be  put  in  activity, 
or  the  war  must  be  stinted  on  the  old  stage.  He 
did  not  desire  to  complain,  but  every  branch  of  the 
service  in  the  Peninsula  was  already  stinted,  espe- 
cially in  what  concerned  the  navy  and  the  supplies 
which  came  directly  from  England!" 

Wliilst  thus  combating  the  false  views  of  the 
English  cabinet  as  to  the  general  state  of  affairs,  he 
had  also  to  struggle  with  its  negligence  and  even 
opposition  to  his  measures  in  details. 

The  general  clothing  of  the  Spanish  troops  and 
the  ereat-coats  of  the  British  soldiers  for  18].'>  were 
not  rerdy  in  January,  1814,  because  the  inferior  de- 
partments could  not  comprehend   that  the  oi>ening 


of  new  scenes  of  exertion  required  new  means,  ano 
the  soldiers  had  to  brave  the  winter  half  nakeo,  first 
on  the  snowy  mountains,  then  in  the  more  cliillirig 
cian)ps  of  the  low  country  about  Bayonne.  The 
clothing  of  the  British  soldiers  for  lbl4  should  ha\e 
arrived  in  the  end  of  18i;},  when  the  army,  lying  in- 
active near  the  coast  by  reason  of  the  bad  weather, 
could  have  received  and  fitted  it  without  difi,culty. 
It  did  not  however  arrive  until  the  troops  were  in 
progress  towards  the  interior  of  France  ;  whereJbre, 
there  being  no  means  of  transporting  it  by  land, 
many  of  the  best  regiments  were  obliged  to  return 
to  the  coast  to  receive  it,  and  the  army,  as  we  shall 
find,  had  to  fight  a  critical  battle  without  them. 

He  had,  upon  commencing  the  invasion  of  France, 
issued  a  proclamation  promising  protection  to  per- 
sons and  property.  This  was  construed  by  the 
French  to  cover  their  vessels  in  the  Nivelle  when 
the  battle  of  that  name  gave  the  allies  St.  .lean  de 
Luz.  Lord  AVellington,  sacrificing  personal  profit 
to  the  good  of  the  service,  admitted  this  claim,  as 
tending  to  render  the  people  amicahlf  ;  but  it  clash- 
ed with  the  prize-money  pretensicn?  of  lord  Keith, 
who  commanded  the  fleet  of  whicli  C(  Dior's  squad- 
ron formed  a  detached  portion,  'i  l.e  t-erious  evils 
endured  by  the  army  in  Cfiauii  of  sufi^xcient  naval  as- 
sistance had  been  treated  as  of  very  slight  impor- 
tance;  the  object  of  a  trifling  personal  gain  for  the 
navy  excited  a  marvellous  activity  and  vigorous  in- 
terference on  the  part  of  the  government.  Upon 
these  subjects,  and  others  of  a  like  vexatious  nature, 
affecting  his  operations,  lord  Wellington  repeatedly 
and  forcibly  declared  his  discontent  during  the 
months  of  December,  January  and  February. 

"  As  to  the  naval  affairs,"  he  said,  "  t!ie  reports 
of  the  number  of  ships  on  the  stations,  striking  off 
those  coming  out  and  going  home,  would  show 
whether  he  had  just  ground  of  complaint,  and  what- 
ever their  numbers  there  remained  the  right  of  com- 
plaint because  they  did  not  perform  the  service  re- 
quired. The  French  had  recommenced  their  coast 
navigation  from  Bordeaux  to  Bayonne,  and  if  the 
blockade  of  Santona  had  been  maintained  the  place 
would  have  been  forced  to  surrender  at  an  early  pe- 
riod. The  proclamation  of  protection  which  he  had 
issued,  and  the  licenses  which  he  had  granted  to 
French  vessels,  every  act  of  that  description,  and 
two-thirds  of  the  acts  which  he  performed  every  dny, 
could  not,  he  knew,  be  considered  of  any  avail  as 
affecting  the  king's  government,  unless  ap[)roved  of 
and  confirmed  by  the  prince  regent ;  and  he  knew 
that  no  power  short  of  the  regent's  could  save  the 
property  of  French  subjects  on  the  seas  from  the 
British  navy.  For  that  reason  lie  had  requested 
the  sanction  of  the  government  to  the  sea  passports 
which  he  had  granted.  His  proclamation  of  j)rotec- 
j  tion  had  bG<?n  construed,  whether  rightfully  or  wrong- 
fully, to  protect  the  French  ships  in  the  rivers;  his 
personal  interest,  greater  than  others,  would  lead 
him  to  deny  this,  but  he  sacrificed  his  profit  to  the 
general  good. 

"  Were  lord  Keith  and  sir  George  Collier,  because 
the  latter  happened  to  have  a  brig  or  two  cruising 
off  the  coast,  to  claim  as  prizes  all  the  vessels  lying 
in  every  river  which  the  army  might  pass  in  its 
operations?  and  this  to  the  detriment  of  the  cause 
which  required  the  strictest  respect  for  private  prop- 
erty! For  the  last  five  years  he  had  been  acting 
in  the  confidence  that  his  conduct  would  he  approved 
of  and  supported,  and  he  concluded  it  would  be  so 
still ;  but  he  was  placed  in  a  novel  situation,  and 
asked  for  legal  advice  to  determine  whether  lord 
Keith  and  the  channel  fleet  were  to  be  considercJ 
as  engaged   in  a  conjoint  expedition  with  the  army 


I8!3.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


705 


onder  his  command  against  the  subjects  of  France, 
neither  having  any  specific  instructions  from  gov- 
ernment, and  the  fleet  having  nothing  to  do  with 
the  operations  by  land.  He  only  required  that  fleet 
to  give  him  a  free  communication  with  the  coast  of 
Spain,  and  prevent  the  enemy's  sea  communication 
between  the  Garonne  and  the  Adour,  and  this  last 
was  a  part  of  its  duty  before  the  army  arrived.  Was 
his  proclamation  of  protection  to  hold  good  as  re- 
garded the  siiips  in  the  rivers'!  He  desired  to  have 
it  sanctioned  by  the  prince  regent,  or  that  he  might 
be  permitted  to  issue  another  declaring  that  it  was 
of  no  value." 

This  remonstrance  produced  so  much  effect  that 
Jord  Keith  relinquished  his  claims,  and  Admiral 
Penrose  was  sent  to  command  upon  the  station  in- 
Btead  of  sir  George  Collier.  The  immediate  inter- 
course of  lord  Wellington  with  the  navy  was  thus 
ameliorated  by  the  superior  power  of  this  officer, 
who  was  remarkable  for  his  suavity  Yet  the  li- 
censes given  to  the  French  vessels  were  strongly 
condemned  by  the  government,  and  rendered  null, 
for  we  find  him  again  complaining  that  "he  had 
granted  them  only  in  hopes  of  drawing  money  and 
supplies  from  France,  and  of  interesting  the  French 
mercantile  men  to  aid  the  army  ;  but  he  feared  the 
government  were  not  aware  of,  and  did  not  feel  the 
difficulties  in  which  he  was  placed  at  all  times  for 
w:int  of  money,  and  judged  his  measures  without  ad- 
verting to  the  necessity  which  occasioned  them  ; 
hence  their  frequent  disapprobation  of  what  he  did." 

Strange  this  may  sound  to  those  who  seeing  the 
dr.'ie  of  Wellington  in  the  fulness  of  his  glory  have 
been  accustomed  to  regard  him  as  the  star  of  Eng- 
land's greatness  ;  but  those  who  at  that  period  fre- 
quented the  society  of  ministers  know  well  that  he 
was  then  looked  upon  by  those  self-sufficient  men  as 
a  person  whose  views  were  wild  and  visionary,  re- 
quiring the  corroboration  of  older  and  wiser  heads 
before  they  could  be  assented  to.  Yea  !  even  thus 
at  the  eleventh  hour  was  the  giant  Wellington  meas- 
ured by  the  political  dwarfs. 

Although  he  gained  something  by  making  St.  Jean 
de  Luz  a  free  port  for  all  nations  not  at  war  with 
France,  his  financial  situation  was  nearly  intolera- 
ble, and  at  the  moment  of  greatest  pressure  colonel 
Bunbury,  under-secretary  of  state,  was  sent  out  to 
protest  against  his  expenses.  One  hundred  thousand 
pounds  a  month  was  the  maximum  in  specie  which 
the  government  would  consent  to  supply,  a  sum  quite 
inadequate  to  his  wants.  And  this  remonstrance 
was  addressed  to  this  victorious  commander  at  the 
very  crisis  of  his  stupendous  struggle,  when  he  was 
overwhelmed  with  debts  and  could  scarcely  stir  out 
of  his  quarters  on  account  of  the  multitude  of  credi- 
tors waiting  at  his  door  for  payment  of  just  claims. 

"  Some  of  his  muleteers,"  he  said,  "  were  twenty- 
six  months  in  arrears,  and  recently,  instigated  by 
the  British  merchants,  they  had  become  so  clamor- 
ous that  rather  than  lose  their  services  he  had  given 
them  bills  on  th?  treasury  for  a  part  of  their  claims, 
though  he  knew  they  would  sell  these  bills  at  a  dis- 
count to  the  sharks,  who  had  urged  them  to  be  thus 
importunate,  and  wlio  were  waiting  at  the  ports  to 
taKR  aavanvdge  uf  the  public  distresses.  A  danger- 
ous measure,  which  he  desired  not  to  repeat. 

"  It  might  be  true  that  the  supply  of  one  hundred 
thousand  pounds  a  month  had  been  even  exceeded 
for  8om3  time  past,  but  it  was  incontestable  that  the 
English  army  and  all  its  departments,  and  the  Span- 
ish and  Portuguese  armies,  were  at  the  moment 
pn.ralyzod  for  want  of  money.  The  arrears  of  pay  to 
t'l'^  s.)ldicrs  was  entering  the  seventh  month,  the 
debt  was  imaionss,  and  tiin  kin^^'s  engigements  with 

4a 


the  Spanish  and  Portuguese  governments  \\(  re  not 
fulfilled.  Indebted  in  every  part  of  Spain,  1  e  waa 
becoming  so  in  France;  the  price  of  all  ccn  modi- 
ties  was  increasing  in  proportion  to  tlfC  delay  <  f  pay- 
ment, to  the  difficulty  of  getting  food  at  ail,  jnd  the 
want  of  credit  into  which  all  the  departments  of  ihe 
army  had  fallen.  Of  two  hundred  thousand  doUara 
given  to  marshal  Beresford  for  the  pay  of  his  trot;[;8 
on  account  of  the  Portuguese  subsidy,  he  had  been 
forced  to  take  back  fifty  thousand  to  keep  the  Span- 
iards together,  and  was  even  then  forced  to  with- 
hold ten  thousand  to  prevent  the  British  cavalry 
from  perishing.  Money  to  pay  the  Span  i  a  re's  had 
sailed  from  Cadiz  ;  but  the  vessel  conveying  it,  and 
another  containing  the  soldiers'  great-coats,  were 
by  the  admiralty  arrangements  obliged  to  go  first  to 
Coruna,  and  neither  had  arrived  there  in  January, 
although  the  money  had  been  ready  in  October.  But 
the  ship  of  war  designed  to  carry  it  did  not  arrive 
at  Cadiz  until  the  end  of  December.  Sixteen  thou- 
sand Spanish  troops  were  thus  rendered  useless,  be- 
cause without  pay  they  could  not  be  trusted  in 
France.  .  .  . 

"  The  coramissary-in-chief  in  England  had  been 
regularly  informed  of  the  state  of  the  supplies  of  the 
military  chest,  and  of  the  wants  and  prcsi'ccts  of 
the  army,  but  those  wants  are  not  attended  to.  The 
monthly  hundred  thousand  pounds  spoken  of  as  the 
maximum,  even  if  it  had  been  given  regularly, 
would  not  cover  the  ordinary  expenses  of  the  troops  ; 
and  there  were  besides  the  subsidies  ether  outlays 
requiring  ready  money,  such  as  meat  for  tlie  toi- 
diers,  hospital  expenses,  commissariat  labourers, 
and  a  variety  of  minor  engagements.  The  Portu- 
guese government  had  been  reduced  to  a  monthly 
sum  of  two  hundred  thousand  dollnrs  out  of  a  subsi- 
dy of  two  millions  sterling.  The  Spanish  govern- 
ment got  what  they  could  out  of  a  subsidy  of  ere 
million.  And  when  money  was  obtained  for  the 
government  in  the  markets  of  Lisbon  and  C-adiz,  it 
came  not  in  due  time,  because,  such  were  the  admi- 
ralty arrangements,  there  were  no  ships  to  cciivey 
the  treasure  to  the  north  coast  of  Spain.  The  whole 
sum  which  had  passed  through  the  military  che;-.l 
during  the  past  year  was  scarcely  more  than  two 
millions  four  hundred  thousand  pounds,  cut  of  which 
part  of  the  subsidies  had  been  paid.  This  was  quite 
inadequate  :  the  government  had  desired  him  to  pus-h 
his  operations  to  the  Garonne  during  the  winter  ;  ho 
was  prepared  to  do  so  in  every  point  exceptirg 
money,  and  he  knew  the  greatest  advantages  would 
accrue  from  such  a  movement,  but  he  could  not  stir 
His  posts  were  already  so  distant  from  the  coasi 
that  his  means  of  transport  were  daily  destroyed  by 
the  journeys:  he  had  not  a  shilling  to  pay  for  ary 
thing  in  the  countrj',  and  his  credit  was  gone.  He 
had  been  obliged  privately  to  borrow  the  expense 
of  a  single  courier  sent  to  general  Clinton.  It  was 
not  his  duty  to  suggest  the  fitting  measures  for  re- 
lief, but  it  was  obvious  that  an  immediate  and  large 
supply  from  England  was  necessary,  and  that  ships 
should  he  provided  to  convey  that  which  was  obtain- 
ed at  Lisbon  and  Cadiz  to  trie  army." 

Such  was  the  denuded  state  of  the  victorious 
Wellington  at  a  time  when  millions,  and  the  worth 
of  more  millions,  were  being  poured  by  the  English 
ministers  into  the  continent ;  when  every  petty  Ger- 
man sovereign,  partisan  or  robber,  who  raised  a  band 
or  a  cry  against  Napoleon,  was  supplied  to  satiety. 
And  all  this  time  there  was  not  in  England  one  pub- 
lie  E-alary  reduced,  one  contract  checked,  ere  abuse 
corrected,  one  public  servant  rebuked  for  negligci.ce  , 
not  a  writer  cared  to  expose  the  mifchicf  lest  he 
should  be  crushed  by  persecuticn  ;  no  minister  cca?- 


706 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XXIII. 


ed  to  claim  and  to  receive  the  boasting  congratula- 
tions of  the  tories  ;  no  whig  had  sense  to  discover 
or  spirit  to  dsnounce  tlie  iniquitous  system  ;  no  voice 
of  reprehension  was  heard  from  that  sclfisii  faction, 
unless  it  were  in  sneering  contempt  of  the  general 
v/hose  mighty  genius  sustained  England  under  this 
load  of  folly. 

Nor  were  these  difficulties  all  that  lord  Wellington 
had  to  contend  with.  We  have  seen  that  the  Por- 
tuguese regency  withheld  his  reinforcements,  even 
when  he  had  provided  transports  for  their  convey- 
ance. The  dulie  of  York  meanwhile  insisted  upon 
withdrawing  his  provisional  battalions,  which  being 
all  composed  of  old  soldiers,  the  remains  of  regi- 
ments reduced  by  the  casualties  of  war,  were  of 
more  value  in  a  winter  campaign  than  three  times 
their  numbers  of  new  men.  With  respect  to  tlie 
English  militia  regiments,  he  had  no  desire  for  tliem, 
because  they  possessed,  he  said,  all  the  worst  faults 
of  the  regulars  and  some  peculiar  to  themselves  be- 
sides. AVhat  he  desired  was  that  eight  or  ten  thou- 
sand men  should  be  drafted  from  them  to  fill  up  his 
ranks,  he  could  then  without  much  injury  let  his 
foreign  battalions  be  taken  away  to  re-form  a  Hano- 
verian army  on  the  continent ;  and  this  plan  he  was 
inclined  to,  because  the  Germans,  brave  and  strong 
soldiers,  were  yet  extremely  addicted  to  deser- 
tion, and  in  that  particular  set  a  bad  example  to 
the  British.  This  suggestion  was  however  dis- 
regarded, and  other  reinforcements  were  promised 
to  him. 

But  the  most  serious  of  all  the  secondary  vexations 
he  endured  sprung  from  tlie  conduct  of  the  Spanish 
authorities  His  hospitals  and  depots  were  for  the 
most  part  necessarily  in  the  Spanish  territories,  and 
principally  at  St.  Ander.  To  avoid  inconvenience 
to  the  inhabitants  he  had  caused  portable  wooden 
houses  to  be  brought  from  England  in  which  to  shel- 
ter his  sick  and  wounded  men;  and  he  paid  extrava- 
gantly and  regularly  for  every  aid  demanded  from 
the  natives.  Nevertheless  the  natural  arrogance  or 
ill-will  which  produced  the  libels  about  San  Sebas- 
tian, the  insolence  of  the  minister  of  war,  and  the 
Bullen  insubordination  of  ^Morillo  and  other  generals, 
broke  out  here  also.  After  much  underhand  and 
irritating  conduct  at  different  times,  the  municipali- 
ty, resolute  to  drive  the  hospitals  from  their  town, 
suddenly,  and  under  the  false  pretext  that  there  was 
a  cc<ntagious  fever,  p'aced  all  the  British  hospitals 
with  tiieir  officers  and  attendants  under  quarantine. 
This  was  in  the  middle  of  January.  Thirty  thou- 
sand men  had  been  wounded  since  June  in  the  ser- 
vice of  Spain,  and  the  return  was  to  make  those 
wounded  men  close  prisoners,  and  drive  their  general 
to  the  necessity  of  fixing  his  hospitals  in  England. 
Vessels  coming  from  St.  Ander  were  thus  rendered 
objects  of  dread,  and  the  nuiniripalitios  of  the  other 
ports,  either  really  fearing  or  pretending  to  fear  the 
contagion,  would  not  sufler  them  to  enter  their  wa- 
ters. To  such  a  height  did  this  cowardice  and  vil- 
lany  attain,  that  the  political  chief  of  Guipuscoa, 
without  giving  any  notice  to  lord  Wellington,  shut 
all  the  ports  of  that  province  agninst  vessels  coming 
from  St.  Ander,  and  the  alcalde  of  Fontarabia  en- 
deavoured to  prevent  a  Portuguese  military  officer 
from  assisting  an  Engiisii  vessel  wnich  was  about 
to  be,  and  was  afterwards  actually  cast  away,  be- 
cause she  came  from  St.  Ander. 

Now  in  consequence  of  the  difficulties  and  dangers 
of  navigating  the  bay  of  Biscay  in  the  winter,  and 
the  badness  of  the  ports  near  the  positions  of  the  ar- 
my, all  the  stores  and  provisions  coining  by  sea  wont 
III  the  first  instance  to  St.  Ander,  the  only  good  port. 
iljcre  to  wait  until  fivourablc  opportunities  occurred 


for  reaching  the  more  eastern  harbours.  Moreovef 
all  the  provision  magazines  of  the  Spanish  army 
were  there;  but  this  blow  cut  them  off,  tlie  army 
was  reduced  to  the  smaller  magazines  at  Passages 
which  could  only  last  for  a  few  days,  and  when  that 
supply  was  expended  lord  Wellington  would  have 
had  no  resource  but  to  v/ithdravv  across  tlie  Pyre- 
nees !  "  Here,"  he  exclaimed,  "  here  are  the  conse- 
quences of  the  system  by  which  these  provinces  are 
governed  !  Duties  of  the  highest  description,  mili- 
tary operations,  political  interests,  and  the  salvation 
of  the  state,  are  made  to  depend  upon  the  caprices 
of  a  few  ignorant  individuals,  who  have  adopted  a 
measure  unnecessary  and  harsh  without  adverting  to 
its  objects  or  consequences,  and  merely  with  a  view 
to  their  personal  interests  and  convenience." 

They  carried  it  into  exerution  also  with  the  ut- 
most harshness,  caprice  and  injustice,  regardless  of 
the  loss  of  ships  and  lives  which  must  follow,  and 
finally  desired  lord  Wellington  to  relinquish  the  har- 
bour and  town  of  St.  Ander  altogether  as  a  depot '. 
However  his  vigorous  remonstrances  stopped  this 
nefarious  proceeding  in  time  to  avert  the  danger 
which  it  menaced. 

Be  it  remembered  now,  that  these  dangers,  and 
difficulties,  and  vexations,  although  related  in  sue 
cession,  happened,  not  one  after  another,  but  all 
together;  that  it  was  when  crossing  the  Bidas- 
soa,  breaking  through  the  mountain  fortificatLona 
of  Soult,  passing  the  Nive,  fighting  the  battles  in 
front  of  Bayonne,  and  when  still  greater  and  more 
intricate  combinations  were  to  be  arranged,  that  al2 
these  vials  of  folly  and  enmity  were  poured  upon  his 
head.  Who  then  shall  refuse  to  admire  the  undaunt- 
ed firmness,  the  unwearied  temper  and  vigilance,  the 
piercing  judgment  with  which  he  steered  his  gallant 
vessel,  and  with  a  flowing  sail,  unhurt  through  this 
howling  storm  of  passion,  this  tumultuous  sea  of 
folly  ] 


CHAPTER   V. 

Continuation  of  the  war  in  the  ea»t(  fii  provinre« — Siirhft'g 
fironeons  statements — Sir  \ViHiani  ("liuton  rfpairs  Tarra- 
gona—  Advances  to  Villa  Franca — Suthct  endeavour*  to  sur- 
prise him — Fail- — The  French  cavalry-  cut  off  an  Engli-h 
detachment  at  Ordal — The  duke  ol'  San  Carlos  passes 
through  the  French  post? — Copons  favourable  to  hi?  mission 
— Clinton  and  Manso  endeavour  to  cut  oH  the  French  troop* 
at  Molino  del  Rev — They  fail  through  the  misconduct  of 
Copons — Kapoleon  recalls  a  great  body  of  Suchel's  troops, 
whereupon  he  reinforces  the  garrison  of  Barcelona  and  re- 
tires to  Gerona — Van  Halen — He  endeavours  to  l)eguile  the 
governor  of  Tortosa — Fails — Succeeds  at  Leiida,  Mequintn- 
za  and  Monzon — Sketch  of  lhesit<ie  of  Monzon — It  is  de- 
fended by  ttie  Italian  soli'ier  St.  Jacques  fur  one  hujx'red 
and  forty  (!avs--(ninton  aud  Copons  invest  Barcelona — The 
beg-uiled  garrisons  of  Lerida,  Meqninenzaan<i  iMonzon  arrive 
at  Marlorel — Are  surrounded  and  surrender  on  terms — Capit- 
ulation violated  l)y  Copons — King  Ferciinand  returns  to  Spain 
—  His  character — Clinton  breaks  up  his  army — His  conduct 
eulogized  —  l,amental)le  sally  from  I^arcelona — The  Fiencti 
jairisons  bevoud  the  F.bro  return  to  France  and  Habert 
evacuates  Haicelona — Fate  of  the  piince  of  Coiiti  and  lh» 
duchess  of  Hourbon — Siege  of  Santona. 

CONTINUATION    OF  THE  WAR    IN  THE    EASTERN    PARTS 
OF    SPAIN. 

When  general  Clinton  succeeded  lord  William 
Bentinck,  liis  whole  force,  composed  of  the  Anglo- 
Sicilians,  Whittingham's  and  Sarsfield's  Spaniards, 
and  two  battalions  of  Roche's  division,  did  not  fur- 
nish quite  nineteen  thousand  men  under  arms.  Co- 
pons, blockading  Mcquinenza,  Lerida  and  ■Monzon, 
and  having  garrisons  in  Cardona  and  the  Sen  d'Ur- 
g'.'.,  tlie  only  places  in  his  posse-sion,  could  not 
b;i.ig  more  than  nine  thousand  men  into  the  field. 
E.  -  had  nominally  twenty-five  thousand,  but  this 


1F14.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


707 


Included  Sarsfield's  and  Roche's  troops,  the  greater 
part  of  which  were  with  Clinton.  It  included  like- 
wise the  bands  of  ViUe  Campa,  Diiran  and  the  Em- 
pricinado.  all  scattered  in  Castile,  Aragon  and  Va- 
lencia, and  acting  according  to  the  caprices  of  their 
chiefs.  His  fores,  daily  diminishing  also  from  the 
extr3ii\a  imhealthiness  of  the  country  about  Tortosa, 
was  scarcely  sufficient  to  maintain  the  blockades  of 
the  French  fortresses  beyond  the  Ebro. 

Copons'  army  having  no  base  but  the  mountains 
about  Vich  and  31ontserrat,  having  no  magazines 
or  depots  or  place  of  arras,  having  very  little  artil- 
lery and  scarcely  any  cavalry,  lived  as  it  could  from 
day  to  day;  in  like  manner  lived  Sarsfield's  and 
Whittingham's  troops,  and  Clinton's  army  was  chief- 
ly fed  on  salt  provisions  from  the  ships.  The  two 
former  having  no  means  of  transport  were  unable  to 
make  even  one  day's  march  with  ease,  they  were 
continually  upon  tlie  point  of  starvation,  and  could 
never  be  reckoned  as  a  moveable  force.  Nor  indeed 
could  the  Anglo-Sicilians,  owing  to  their  scanty 
means  of  transport,  make  above  two  or  three  march- 
es from  the  sea;  and  they  were  at  this  time  more 
than  usually  hampered,  being  without  pay  and  shut 
out  from  tlieir  principal  depots  at  Gibraltar  and  Mal- 
ta, by  plague  at  the  first  and  yellow  fever  at  the 
B3cond  place.  In  fine,  the  courage  and  discipline 
of  the  British  and  Germans  set  aside,  it  would  be 
difficult  to  find  armies  less  efficient  for  an  offensive 
campaign  than  those  of  the  allies  in  Catalonia. 
Moreover  lord  William  Bentinck  had  been  invested 
with  the  command  of  all  the  Spanish  armies;  but 
('linton  had  only  Whittingham's  and  Sarsfield's 
troops  under  him,  and  notwithstanding  his  constant 
endeavours  to  conciliate  Copons,  the  indolence  and 
incapacity  of  that  general  impeded  or  baffled  all  use- 
ful operations  :  and  to  these  disqualifications  he  add- 
ed an  extrejne  jealousy  of  Eroles  and  JManso,  men 
designated  by  the  public  voice  as  the  most  worthy 
of  command. 

This  analysis  shows  that  Elio  being  entirely  en- 
gaged in  Valencia,  and  Sarsfield  and  Whittingham 
unprovided  with  the  means  of  movement,  the  army 
of  Copons  and  the  Anglo-Sicilians,  together  furnish- 
ing, when  the  posts  and  escorts  and  the  labourers 
employed  on  the  fortifications  of  Tarragona  were 
deducted,  not  more  than  eighteen  thousand  men  in 
line  of  battle,  were  the  only  troops  to  be  counted  on 
to  oppos-i  Suchet,  who  having  sixty-five  thousand 
m3n,  of  which  fifty-six  thousand  were  present  under 
arms,  could  without  drawing  a  man  from  his  garri- 
sons attack  them  with  thirty  thousand.  But  Copons 
and  Clinton  could  not  act  together  above  a  few  days, 
b3cause  their  bases  and  lines  of  retreat  were  on  dif- 
ferent sides.  The  Spaniard  depended  upon  the  moun- 
tains and  plains  of  the  interior  for  security  and  sub- 
sistence, the  Englishman's  base  was  Tarragona  and 
the  fleet.  Hence  the  only  mode  of  combining  on  a 
single  line  was  to  make  Valencia  a  common  base, 
and  throwing  bridges  over  the  Ebro  construct  works 
on  both  sides  to  defend  them.  This  was  strongly 
recommended  by  lord  Wellington  to  lord  William 
and  to  Clinton.  But  the  former  had  several  times 
lost  his  bridges,  partly  from  the  rapidity  of  the 
strram.  partly  from  the  activity  of  the  garrison  of 
Tortona;  and  for  general  Clinton  the  difficulty  was 
enhanced  by  distance,  because  Tarragona,  where  all 
liis  materials  were  deposited,  was  sixty  miles  from 
Amposta,  and  all  his  artificers  were  required  to  res- 
tore the  defences  of  the  former  place.  'I'he  blockade 
of  Tortosa  was  therefore  always  liable  to  be  raised, 
and  the  troops  employed  th^re  exposed  to  a  sudden 
and  fital  ettac':,  since  Suchet,  sure  t  :  separate  the 
Anglo-Siciliaus    from    Copons   wli«u     -::    advance', 


could  penetrate  between  them;  and  while  the  for- 
mer rallied  at  Tarragona  and  the  I',;tter  at  Igualada, 
his  march  would  be  direct  upon  Tortos^n.  He  could 
thus  either  carry  oft"  his  strong  garrison,  or  passing 
the  Ebro  by  the  bridge  of  the  fortress,  move  without 
let  or  hindrance  upon  Peniscola,  Saguntum  and  Va- 
lencia, and  driving  Elio  back  upon  Alicante,  collect 
his  garrisons  and  return  too  powerful  to  be  meddled 
with. 

In  these  circumstances  lord  Wellington's  opinion 
was,  that  the  blockade  of  Tortosa  should  be  given 
up,  and  the  two  armies  acting  on  their  own  peculiar 
lines,  the  one  from  Tarragona,  the  other  from  the 
mountains,  harass  in  concert  the  enemy's  flanks  and 
rear,  alternately  if  he  attacked  eitlicr,  but  together 
if  he  moved  upon  Tortosa.  To  besiege  or  blockade 
that  place  with  safety  it  was  necessary  to  throw  two 
bridges  over  the  Ebro  below,  to  enable  the  armies 
to  avoid  Suchet,  by  either  bank,  when  he  should  suc- 
cour the  place,  as  he  was  sure  to  do.  But  it  was 
essential  that  Copons  should  not  abandon  Catalonia, 
and  difficult  for  him  to  do  so;  wherefore  it  would  be 
advisable  to  make  Tarragona  the  point  of  retreat  for 
both  armies  in  the  first  instance,  after  which  they 
could  separate  and  infest  the  French  rear. 

The  difficulties  of  besieging  Tortosa  he  thought 
insuperable,  and  he  especially  recommended  that 
they  should  be  well  considered  beforehand,  and  if  it 
was  invested,  that  the  troops  should  be  intrenched 
around  it.  In  fine,  all  his  instructions  tended  to- 
wards defence,  and  were  founded  upon  his  conviction 
of  the  weak  and  dangerous  position  of  the  allies; 
yet  he  believed  them  to  have  more  resources  than 
they  really  had,  and  to  be  superior  in  number  to  the 
French,  a  great  error,  as  I  have  already  shown. 
Nothing  therefore  could  be  more  preposterous  than 
Suchet's  alarm  for  the  frontier  of  France  at  this 
time,  and  it  is  unquestionable  that  his  personal  re- 
luctance was  the  only  bar  to  aiding  Souk,  either  in- 
directly by  marching  on  Tortosa  and  Valencia,  or 
directly  by  adopting  that  marshal's  great  project  of 
uniting  the  two  armies  in  Aragon.  So  certcin  in- 
deed is  this,  that  general  Clinton,  seeing  the  difficul- 
ties of  his  own  situation,  only  retained  tlie  command 
from  a  strong  sense  of  duty  ;  and  lord  Wellington, 
despairing  of  any  advantage  in  Catalonia,  recom- 
mended that  the  Anglo-Sicilian  army  should  be 
broken  up  and  employed  in  other  places.  The 
French  general's  inactivity  was  the  more  injurious 
to  the  interests  of  his  sovereign,  because  any  re- 
verse, or  appearance  of  reverse,  to  the  allies  would 
at  this  time  have  gone  nigh  to  destroy  the  alliance 
between  Spain  and  England  ;  but  personal  jealousy, 
the  preference  given  to  local  and  momentary  inter- 
ests before  general  considerations,  hurt  the  French 
cause  at  all  periods  in  the  Peninsula,  and  enabled 
the  allies  to  conquer. 

General   Clinton    had    no  thoughts   of  besieging 
Tortosa,  his  eflx)rts  were  directed  to  the  obtaining  a 
secure  place  of  arms  ;  yet,  despite  of  his  intrinsic 
weakness,  he  resolved  to  show  a  confident  front,  hop- 
ing thus  to  keep  Suchet  at  arm's  length.     In  thi-s 
view  he  endeavoured  to  render  Tarragona  once  more 
defensible,  notwithstanding  the  nineteen   breaches 
which  had  been  broken  in  its  walls  ;  the  prcgresa 
of  the  work  was  however  tedious  and  vexatious,  be- 
cause he  depended  for  his  materials  ujjon  the  Span- 
ish  authorities.     Thus    immersed   in  difficulties  of 
all  kinds,  he  could  make  little  chance  in  his  posi 
tions,  which  were  jrenerally  about  the  Campo,  Sars- 
field's division  only  bf^ing  pushed  to  Villa   Franca 
Suchet  meanwiiile  held   the  line  of  the    I  lobregat 
and   apparently  to  colour  his   refusal   to  join  Soult 
grounded  on  the  great  strength  uf  the  allies  in  Cata 


708 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


lCook  XXIII. 


Ionia,  ho  s;:ftered  general  Clinton  to  remain  in  tran- 
quillity. 

Towards  the  end  of  October,  reports  that  the 
French  were  concentrating,  for  what  purpose  was 
not  known,  caused  tlie  English  general,  although 
'I'arragona  was  still  indefensible,  to  make  a  forward 
nioveni3nt.  Hj  dared  not  indeed  provoke  a  battle, 
but  unwilling  to  yield  the  resources  which  Villa 
Franca  and  other  districts  occujiied  by  the  allies 
still  olferod,  he  adopted  the  resolution  of  pushing  an 
advanced  guard  to  the  former  place.  He  even  fixed 
his  head-quarters  there,  appearing  ready  to  fight; 
yet  his  troops  were  so  disposed  in  succession  at  Ar- 
bos,  Vendnls  and  Torredembarra,  that  he  could  re- 
tnjat  witlioat  dishonour  if  the  French  advanced  in 
tbrce,  or  could  concentrate  at  Villa  Franca  in  time 
to  harass  their  flank  and  rear  if  tjiey  attempted  to 
carry  off  tiieir  garrisons  on  the  Segre.  In  tliis  state 
of  atfairs  Suchet  made  several  demonstrations,  some- 
times against  Copons,  sometimes  against  Clinton  ; 
but  the  latter  maintained  his  offensive  attitude  with 
firmness,  and  even  in  opposition  to  lord  Wellington's 
implied  opinion  tliat  the  line  of  the  Ebro  was  tlie 
nost  suitable  to  his  weakness:  for  he  liked  not 
to  abandon  Tarragona,  the  repairs  of  which  were 
now  advancing,  though  slowly,  to  completion.  His 
perseverance  was  crowned  with  success;  he  pre- 
served the  few  resources  left  for  the  support  of  the 
Hpanisli  troops, and  furnished  vSuchet  with  that  sem- 
blance of  excuse  which  he  desired  for  keeping  aloof 
from  SouJt. 

In  this  manner  October  and  November  were  pass- 
ed ;  but  on  the  first  of  December  the  French  general 
attempted  to  surprise  the  allies'  cantonments  at  Villa 
Franca,  as  he  had  before  surprised  them  at  Ordal. 
He  moved  in  the  same  order.  One  column  marched 
by  San  Sadurni  on  his  right,  another  by  Bejer  and 
Avionet  on  Iiis  left,  and  tlie  main  body  kept  the 
great  road.  But  lie  did  not  find  colonel  Adam  there. 
(ylinton  had  blocked  the  Ordal  so  as  to  render  a 
night  sur|)rise  impossible,  and  the  natural  dithculties 
of  the  other  roads  delayed  the  flanking  columns. 
H.::nce  when  the  French  reached  Villa  Franca,  Sars- 
li  jld  was  in  full  march  for  Igualada,  and  the  Anglo- 
i?icilians,  who  had  only  three  men  wounded  at  one 
of  tha  advanced  posts,  were  on  the  strong  ground 
about  Arbos,  where  being  joined  by  the  supporting 
division.^  they  offered  battle;  but  Suchet  retired 
to  Llobrogat,  ai)i)arently  so  mortified  by  his  failure 
that  he  has  not  even  mentioned  it  in  his  Memoirs. 

Clinton  now  resumed  his  former  ground;  yet  his 
embarrassments  increased,  and  though  he  transfer- 
red two  of  Whittingham's  regiments  to  Copons,  and 
sent  Roc>he's  battalions  back  to  Valencia,  the  coun- 
try was  so  exh-'ustPfl  that  the  enduring  constancy  of 
tiie  Spanish  soldiers  under  privations  alone  enabled 
Sarsfield  to  remain  in  the  fieh).  More  tlian  once 
tliat  general,  a  man  of  undoubted  firmness  and  cour- 
age, was  upon  the  point  of  recrossing  the  Ebro  to 
eave  his  soldiers  from  perishing  of  famine.  Here, 
as  in  other  parts,  tlie  Spanish  government  not  only 
starved  their  troops,  but  would  not  even  provide 
a  piece  of  ordnance  for  the  defence  of  Tarragona, 
now  by  tiie  exertions  of  the  Englisli  general,  ren- 
dered defensible.  Nay,  when  admiral  Hallowel,  in 
conjunction  with  Q,uosada,  the  Spanish  commodore 
at  Port  Mahon,  brouglit  some  ship-guns  from  tliat 
place  to  the  fortress,  t!ie  minister  of  war,  O'Dono- 
^hue,  ex;)resHed  his  disapprobation,  obsf^rving  with 
a  sneer  that  the  English  might  provide  the  guns 
wanting  from  ttie  Spauish  ordnance  moved  intoCiib- 
raltar  by  general  Campbell  when  he  (lettroyed  the 
lines  of  San  Roque  ! 

The  9th,  Suchet  pushed  a  small  corps  by  Bejer  be- 


tween the  Ordal  and  Sitjes,  and  on  the  ICth  tiir- 
prised  at  the  ostei  of  Ordal  an  officer  and  thirty  Uiea 
of  the  Anglo-Sicilian  cavalry.  This  disaster  wad 
the  result  of  negligence.  The  detachment  after 
patrolling  to  the  front  had  dismounted  without  ex- 
amining the  buildings  of  the  inn,  and  toniC  French 
troopers  who  were  concealed  within  immediately 
seized  the  horses  and  captured  the  whole  party. 

On  the  17th,  French  troops  appeared  at  Martorel, 
the  Ordal  and  Bejer,  witli  a  view  to  mask  the  march 
of  a  large  convoy  coming  from  Upper  Catalonia  to 
Barcelona;  they  then  resumed  their  former  posi- 
tions ;  and  at  the  same  time  Soult's  and  lord  Wel- 
lington's respective  letters  announcing  the  defection 
of  the  Nassau  battalions  in  front  of  Bayonne  arriv- 
ed. Lord  Wellington's  came  first,  and  enclosed  a 
i  communication  from  colonel  Kruse  to  his  country- 
man, colonel  Meder,  who  was  serving  in  Barcelona, 
and  as  Kruse  supposed  willing  to  abandon  the  French. 
But  when  Clinton,  by  the  aid  of  JManso,  transmitted 
the  letter  to  Meder,  that  officer  lianded  it  to  general 
Habert,  who  had  succeeded  Maurice  Mathieu  in  the 
command  of  the  city.  All  the  German  regiments, 
principally  cavalry,  were  immediately  disarmed  and 
sent  to  France.  Severoli's  Italiaiis  were  at  the 
same  time  recalled  to  Italy,  and  a  number  of  French 
soldiers,  selected  to  fill  the  wasted  ranks  of  the  im- 
perial guards,  marched  w'ith  them:  two  thousand 
officers  and  soldiers  were  likewise  detached  to  the 
depots  of  the  interior  to  organize  the  conscripts  of 
the  new  Levy  destined  to  reinforce  the  army  of  Cat- 
alonia. Besides  these  drafts  a  thousand  gendarmes, 
hitherto  employed  on  the  Spanish  frontier  in  aid  of 
the  regular  troops,  were  withdrawn;  Suchet  thue 
lost  seven  tiiousand  veterans,  yet  he  had  still  an 
overwhelming  power  compared  to  the  allies. 

It  was  in  this  state  of  afi'airs  that  the  duke  of 
San  Carlos,  bearing  the  treaty  of  Valen^ay,  arrived 
secretly  at  the  French  head-quarters  on  his  way  to 
Madrid.  Copons  knew  tliis,  and  it  seems  certain 
was  only  deterred  from  openly  acceding  to  the  views 
of  the  French  emperor,  and  concluding  a  military 
convention,  by  the  decided  conduct  of  the  corti'z, 
and  tlie  ascendency  which  lord  Wellington  had  ob- 
tained over  him  in  common  with  the  other  Spanis-li 
officers :  an  ascendency  which  had  not  escaped 
Soult's  sagacity,  for  he  early  warned  the  Frencli 
minister  that  nothing  could  be  expected  from  thern 
while  under  the  powerful  spell  of  the  English  gene- 
ral. Meanwhile  Clinton,  getting  information  that 
the  French  troops  were  diminished  in  numbers,  es- 
pecially in  front  of  }{arcelona  and  on  the  I.lobregat, 
proposed  to  pass  that  river  and  invest  Barcelona,  if 
Copons,  who  was  in  the  mountains,  would  undertake 
to  provision  Sarsfield's  division  and  keep  the  French 
troops  between  Barcelona  and  Cerona  in  check. 
For  this  purpose  he  ofi'ercd  him  the  aid  of  a  Spai,- 
ish  regiment  of  cavalry,  which  Elio  had  lent  for  the 
operations  in  Catalonia;  hut  Copons,  whether  influ- 
enced by  San  Carlos'  mission  and  his  secret  wishes 
for  its  success,  or  knowing  that  the  enemy  were 
really  stronger  than  Clinton  imagined,  declared  thai 
he  was  unable  to  hold  the  French  troops  between 
(ierona  and  Barcelona  in  check,  and  that  he  could 
not  provision  either  Sarsfield's  division  or  the  regi- 
ment of  cavalry.  He  suggested,  instead  of  Clinton's 
l)lan,a  combined  attack  upon  some  of  Suchet's  posts 
on  the  Iilobregat,  promising  to  send  Manso  to  Villa 
Franca  to  confer  upon  the  execution.  Clinton's  j)ro- 
posal  was  made  early  in  .lanuary  ;  yet  it  was  the 
middle  of  that  month  before  Copons  re]die(l,  and 
then  he  only  sent  Manso  to  offer  the  aid  of  his  bri- 
1,'ade  in  a  combined  attack  upon  two  thcui-;;nd  I'rcncji 
who  were  at  .Mcl'.no  del  Key,     It  vvai;  however  at 


1814.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


705 


last  arranged  that  Manso  should,  at  daybreak  on  the 
lOth,  seize  the  high  ground  above  Molino,  on  the 
left  of  the  Llobregat,  to  intercept  the  enemy's  re- 
treat upon  Barcelona,  while  the  Anglo-Sicilians  fell 
upon  them  from  tlie  right  bank. 

Success  depended  upon  Clinton's  remaining  quiet 
until  tiie  moment  of  execution,  wherefore  he  could 
only  use  the  troops  immediately  in  hand  about  Villa 
Franca,  in  all  six  thousand  men  with  three  pieces 
of  artillery  ;  but  witli  these  he  made  a  niglit  march 
of  eighteen  miles,  and  was  close  to  the  ford  of  San 
Vicente  about  two  miles  below  the  fortihcd  bridfre 
of  Molino  del  Key  before  daylight.  The  Frencli 
were  tranquil  and  unsuspicious,  and  he  anxiously 
but  vairily  awaited  the  signal  of  Manso's  arrival. 
When  the  day  broke,  the  French  piquets  at  San  Vi- 
cente descrying  his  troops  commenced  a  skirmish, 
and  at  the  same  time  a  column  with  a  piece  of  ar- 
tille.ry,  coming  from  Molino,  advanced  to  attack  him, 
thinking  there  was  only  a  patrolling  detachment  to 
deal  with,  for  he  had  concealed  his  main  body.  Thus 
pressed  he  opened  liis  guns  perforce,  and  crippled 
tlie  French  piece,  whereupon  the  reinforcements  re- 
tired hastily  to  the  intrenchments  at  Molino;  he 
could  then  easily  have  forced  the  passage  at  the  ford 
and  attacked  the  enemy's  works  in  the  rear,  but  this 
would  not  have  ensured  the  capture  of  their  troops, 
wherefore  he  still  awaited  Manso's  arrival,  relying 
on  that,  partizan's  zeal  and  knowledge  of  the  coun- 
try. He  appeared  at  last,  not,  as  agreed  upon,  at 
St.  Filieu  between  JMolino  and  Barcelona,  but  at 
Papiol  above  Molino,  and  the  French  immediately 
retreated  by  San  Filieu.  Sarsfield  and  the  cavalry, 
Vtfhich  Clinton  now  detached  across  the  Llobregat, 
f)llowed  them  hard,  but  the  country  was  difficult, 
the  distance  6hort,  and  they  soon  gained  a  second 
intrenched  camp  above  San  Filieu.  A  small  garri- 
son remained  in  tiie  masonry-works  at  Molino,  gen- 
oral  Clinton  endeavoured  to  reduce  them,  but  his 
guns  were  not  of  sUiUcient  calibre  to  break  the 
walls,  and  the  enemy  was  strongly  reinforced  to- 
wards evening  from  Barcelona;  whereupon  Manso 
went  o-:T  to  the  mountains,  and  Clinton  returned  to 
Villa  Franca,  having  killed  and  wounded  about  one 
hundred  and  eighty  French,  and  lost  only  sixty-four 
men,  all  Spaniards. 

Manso's  fail-ire  surprised  the  English  general,  be- 
cause that  officer,  unlike  the  generality  of  his  coun- 
trymen, was  zealous,  skilful,  vigilant,  modest  and 
humane,  and  a  sincere  co-operator  with  the  British 
officers.  He  however  soon  cleared  himself  of  blame, 
assuring  Clinton  tliat  Copons,  contrary  to  his  pre- 
vious declarations,  had  joined  him  with  four  thou- 
sand men,  and  taking  the  control  of  his  troops,  not 
only  commenced  the  march  two  hours  too  late,  but 
without  any  reason  halted  for  three  hours  on  the 
way.  Nor  did  that  general  offer  any  cause  or  ex- 
planation of  his  conduct,  merely  observing  that  the 
plan  having  failed,  nothing  more  could  be  done,  and 
he  must  return  to  his  mountainous  asylum  about 
Vich.  A  man  of  any  other  nation  would  have  been 
accused  of  treachery,  but  with  the  Spaniards  there 
is  no  limit  to  absurdity,  and  from  their  actions  no 
conclusion  can  be  drawn  as  to  their  motives. 

The  great  events  of  the  general  war  were  now 
beginning  to  affect  the  struggle  in  Catalonia.  Su- 
chet,  finding  that  Copons  dared  not  agree  to  the  mil- 
itary convention  dependent  upon  the  treaty  of  Valen- 
(jay,  resigneil  all  thongiits  of  carrying  off  his  garri- 
sons beyond  the  Ebro,  and  secretly  instructed  the 
governor  of  Tortosa,  that  when  his  provisions,  cal- 
culated to  last  until  April,  were  exhausted,  he  should 
march  upon  Mequinenza  and  Lerida.  unite  the  gar- 
rison there  to  his  own,  and  make  way  by  Vcnasque 


into  France.  Meanwhile  he  increased  the  garrison 
of  Barcelona  to  eight  thousand  men  and  prepared  to 
take  the  line  of  the  Fluvia;  for  the  alUed  .sovereigna 
were  in  France,  and  Napoleon  had  recalled  more  of 
his  cavalry  and  infantry,  in  all  ten  thousand  men 
with  eighty  pieces  of  artillery,  from  Catalonia,  de- 
siring that  they  should  march  as  soon  as  the  results 
expected  from  the  mission  of  San  Cailos  were  telt 
by  the  allies.  Suchet  prepared  the  troops,  but  pro- 
posed that  instead  of  waiting  for  the  uncertain 
result  of  San  Carlos's  mission,  P'erdinand  ^■huu!<l 
hi.mself  be  sent  to  Spain  through  Catalonia,  umi 
be  trusted  on  his  faith  to  restore  the  garrisc.ns  in 
Valencia.  Then,  he  said,  he  could  march  with  his 
whole  army  to  Lyons,  which  would  be  more  effica- 
cious than  sending  detachments.  The  restoration 
of  Ferdinand  was  the  emperor's  great  object;  but 
this  plausible  proposition  can  only  be  viewed  as  a 
coloured  counter-project  to  Soult's  plan  for  a  junc- 
tion of  the  two  armies  in  Beam,  since  the  emperor 
was  undoubtedly  the  best  judge  of  what  was  requir 
ed  for  the  wartiire  immediately  under  his  own  di 
rection. 

It  was  in  the  midst  of  these  operations  that  Clin- 
ton attacked  Molino  del  Rey,  and,  as  we  have  seen, 
would,  but  for  the  interference  of  Copons,  have 
stricken  a  great  blow,  which  was  however  soon  in- 
flicted in  another  manner. 

There  was  at  this  time  in  the  French  service  a 
Spaniard,  of  Flemish  descent,  called  Van  Halen. 
This  man,  of  fair  complexion,  handsome  person,  ami 
a  natural  genius  for  desperate  treasons,  appears  to 
have  been  at  lirst  attached  to  Joseph's  court.  After 
that  monarch's  retreat  from  Spain,  he  was  placed  by 
the  duke  de  Feltre  on  Suchet's  staff;  but  the  French 
party  was  now  a  failing  one,  and  Van  lialen  oiily 
sought  by  some  notable  treachery  to  make  iiis  peace 
with  his  country.  Through  the  medium  of  a  young 
widow,  who  followed  him  without  sutrering  their 
connexion  to  appear,  he  informed  Eroles  of  his  ob- 
ject. He  transmitted  through  the  same  channel 
regular  returns  of  Suchet's  force  and  other  matters 
of  interest,  and  at  last,  having  secretly  opened  Su- 
chet's portfolio,  he  copied  the  key  of  his  cipher,  and 
transmitted  that  also,  with  an  intimation  that  he 
would  now  soon  pass  over  and  endeavour  to  perforiu 
some  other  service  at  the  same  time.  The  opportu- 
nity soon  offered.  Suchet  went  to  Gerona  to  meet 
the  duke  of  San  Carlos,  leaving  Van  Halen  at  Bar- 
celona, and  the  latter  immediately  taking  an  escort 
of  three  hussars  went  to  Granollers,  where  the  cui- 
rassiers were  quartered.  Using  the  marshal's  name, 
he  ordered  them  to  escort  him  to  the  Spanish  out- 
posts, which  being  in  the  mountains  could  only  be 
approached  by  a  long  and  narrow  pass  where  caval- 
ry would  be  helpless.  In  this  pass  he  ordered  the 
troops  to  bivouac  for  the  night,  and  when  their  col- 
onel expressed  his  uneasiness.  Van  Halen  quieted 
him  and  made  a  solitary  mill  their  common  quarters. 
He  had  before  this  however  sent  the  widow  to  give 
Eroles  information  of  the  situation  into  which  he 
would  bring  the  troops,  and  now  with  anxiety  await- 
ed his  attack;  but  the  Spanish  general  tiiiled  to 
come,  and  at  daybreak  Van  Halen.,  still  pretending 
he  carried  a  flag  of  truce  from  Suchet,  rode  off  with 
his  first  escort  of  hussars  and  a  trumpeter  to  the 
Spanish  lines.  There  he  ascertained  that  the  widow 
had  been  detained  by  the  outposts,  and  immediately 
delivered  over  his  escort  to  their  enemies,  giving 
notice  also  of  the  situation  of  the  cuirassiers  with 
a  view  to  their  destruction,  but  they  escaped  the 
danger. 

Van  Halen  and  Eroles  now  forged  Suchet's  signa- 
ture, and  tlie  former  addressed  letters  in  cipher  to 


710 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[  ^    OK  XXIII 


the  governors  of  Tortosa,  Lerida,  Mequinenza  and 
Moiizon,  telling  them  that  the  emperor,  in  conse- 
quence of  his  reverses,  required  large  drafts  of  men 
from  Catalonia,  and  had  given  orders  to  negotiate 
a  convention  by  which  the  garrisons  south  of  the 
Llobregat  were  to  join  the  army  with  arms  and  bag- 
gage and  followers.  The  result  was  uncertain,  but 
if  the  treaty  could  not  be  effected  the  governors 
were  to  join  the  army  by  force,  and  they  were  there- 
fore immediately  to  mine  their  principal  bastions 
and  be  prepared  to  sally  forth  at  an  appointed  time. 
The  marches  and  points  of  junction  were  all  given 
in  detail,  yet  they  were  told  that  if  the  convention 
took  place  the  marshal  would  immediately  send  an 
officer  of  his  stall"  to  them,  with  such  verbal  instruc- 
tions as  might  be  necessary.  The  document  finished 
with  deploring  the  necessity  which  called  for  the  sac- 
rifice of  conquests  achieved  by  the  valourof  the  troops. 

Spies  and  emissaries  who  act  for  both  sides  are 
common  in  all  wars,  but  in  the  Peninsula  so  many 
pretended  to  serve  the  French,  and  were  yet  true  to 
the  Spaniards,  that  to  avoid  the  danger  of  betrayal 
Suchet  had  recourse  to  the  ingenious  artifice  of 
placing  a  very  small  piece  of  light-coloured  hair  in 
the  ciphered  paper,  the  latter  was  then  enclosed  in 
a  quill,  sealed  and  wrapped  in  lead.  When  received, 
the  small  parcel  was  carefully  opened  on  a  sheet  of 
white  paper,  and  if  the  hair  was  discovered  the 
communication  was  good,  if  not,  the  treachery  was 
apparent,  because  the  hair  would  escape  the  vigi- 
lance of  uninitiated  persons  and  be  lost  by  any  in- 
termediate examination.  Van  Halen  knew  this  se- 
cret .also,  and  when  his  emissaries  had  returned 
utter  delivering  the  preparatory  communication,  he 
proceeded  in  person  with  a  forged  convention,  first 
to  Tortosa,  for  Suchet  has  erroneously  stated  in  his 
Memoirs  that  the  primary  attempts  were  made  at 
Lerida  and  3Iequinenza.  He  was  accompanied  by 
several  Spanish  officers  and  by  some  French  desert- 
ers dressed  in  the  uniforms  of  the  hussars  he  had 
betrayed  to  the  Spanish  outposts.  The  governor, 
Robert,  though  a  vigilant  officer,  was  deceived,  and 
prepared  to  evacuate  the  place.  During  the  night 
however  a  true  emissary  arrived  with  a  letter  from 
Suchet  of  later  date  tlian  the  forged  convention. 
Robert  then  endeavoured  to  entice  Van  Halen  into 
the  fortress,  but  the  other  was  too  wary  and  pro- 
ceeded at  once  to  Mequinenza  and  Lerida,  where  he 
completely  overreached  the  governors,  and  then 
went  to  Monzon. 

This  small  fortress  had  now  been  besieged  since 
the  28th  of  September,  1813,  by  detachments  from 
the  Catalan  army  and  the  bands  from  Aragon.  Its 
means  of  defence  were  slight,  but  there  was  within 
a  man  of  resolution  and  genius  called  St.  Jacques. 
He  was  a  Piedmontese  by  birth  and  only  a  private 
soldier  of  engineers  ;  but  the  commandant,  appreci- 
ating his  worth,  was  so  modest  and  prudent  as  to 
yield  the  direction  of  the  defence  entirely  to  him. 
Abounding  in  resources,  he  met,  and  at  every  point 
baffled  the  besiegers  who  worked  principally  by 
mines,  and  being  as  brave  as  he  was  ingenious,  al- 
ways led  the  numerous  counter-attacks  which  he 
contrived  to  check  the  approaches  above  and  below 
ground.  The  siege  continued  until  the  18th  of  Feb- 
ruary, when  the  subtle  Van  Halen  arrived,  and  by 
his  Spanish  wiles  obtained  in  a  few  hours  what 
Spanish  courage  and  perseverance  had  vainly  strivod 
to  gain  for  one  hundred  and  forty  days.  The  com- 
mandant vas  suspicious  at  first,  but  when  Van  Ha- 
len suffiired  him  to  send  an  ofiicer  to  ascertain  that 
Lerida  and  Mequinenza  were  evacuated,  he  was  be- 
guiled like  the  others  and  marched  to  join  the  garri- 
sons uf  those  places. 


Sir  William  Clinton  had  been  informed  of  thia 
project  by  Eroles  as  early  as  the  22d  of  January, 
and  though  he  did  not  expect  any  French  general 
would  be  so  egregiously  misled,  readily  })romised 
the  assistance  of  liis  army  to  capture  the  garrisons 
on  their  march.  But  Suchet  was  now  falling  back 
upon  the  Fluvia,  and  Clinton,  seeing  the  fortified 
line  of  the  Llobregat  weakened  and  being  uncej-tain 
of  Suchet's  real  strength  and  designs,  reiiewcd  hia 
former  proposal  to  Copons  for  a  combined  attack 
which  should  force  the  French  general  to  discover 
his  real  situation  and  projects.  Ere  he  could  ob- 
tain an  answer,  the  want  of  Ibrage  obliged  liim  to 
refuse  the  assistance  of  the  Spanish  cavalry  lent  to 
him  by  Elio,  and  Sarsfield's  division  was  reduced  to 
its  last  ration.  The  French  thus  made  their  retreat 
unmolested,  for  Clinton's  project  necessarily  involv- 
ed the  investment  of  Barcelona  after  passing  the 
Llobregat,  and  the  Anglo-Sicilian  cavalry,  beir.g 
mounted  on  small  Egyptian  animals,  the  greatebt 
part  of  which  were  foundered  or  unserviceable  from 
sand-cracks,  a  disease  very  common  amongst  the 
horses  of  that  country,  were  too  weak  to  act  with- 
out the  aid  of  Elio's  horsemen.  Moreover  as  a  di- 
vision of  infantry  was  left  at  Tarragona  awaiting 
the  effect  of  Van  Halen's  wiles  against  Tortosa,  the 
aid  of  Sarsfield's  troops  was  indispensable. 

Copons  accepted  the  proposition  towards  the  end 
of  January  ;  the  Spanish  cavalry  was  then  gone  to 
the  rear,  but  Sarsfield  having  with  great  difficulty 
obtained  some  provisions,  the  army  was  put  in 
movement  on  the  3d  of  February,  and  as  Suchet 
was  now  near  Gerona,  it  passed  the  Llobregat  at 
the  bridge  of  Molino  del  Rey  without  resistance. 
On  the  5th,  Sarsfield's  piquets  were  vigorously  at- 
tacked at  San  Filieu  by  the  garrison  of  Barcelona  ; 
he  however  supported  them  with  his  whole  division, 
and  being  reinforced  with  some  cavalry,  repulsed 
the  French  and  pursued  them  to  the  walls.  On  tl.** 
7th,  the  city  was  invested  on  the  land  side  by  Co. 
pons,  who  was  soon  aided  by  IManso ;  on  the  sea- 
board by  admiral  Hallowel,  who  following  the 
movements  of  the  army  with  the  fleet  blockaded  the 
harbour  with  the  Castor  frigate,  and  anchored  the 
Fame  a  seventy-four  oft"  Mataro.  On  the  8th,  intel- 
ligence arrived  of  Van  Halen's  failure  at  Tortosa: 
but  the  blockade  of  Barcelona  continued  uninter- 
rupted until  the  IGth,  when  Clinton  was  informed 
by  Copons  of  the  success  at  Lerida,  Mequinenza  and 
Monzon.  The  garrisons,  he  said,  would  march  upon 
Igualada,  and  Eroles  who,  under  pretence  of  causing 
the  convention  to  be  observed  by  the  somatenes, 
was  to  follow  in  their  rear,  proposed  to  undeceive 
and  disarm  them  at  that  place.  On  the  llth,  how- 
ever, he  sent  notice  that  i\Iartorel  hud  been  fixed 
upon  in  preference  to  Igualada  for  undeceiving  and 
disarming  the  French,  and  as  they  would  be  at  the 
former  place  that  evening,  general  Clinton  was  de- 
sired to  send  some  of  his  troops  there  to  ensure  the 
success  of  the  project. 

This  change  of  plan,  and  the  short  warning,  for 
Martorel  was  a  long  march  from  Barcelona,  together 
witii  the  doubts  and  embarrassments  which  Cojjons' 
conduct  always  caused  nclined  the  English  general 
to  avoid  meddling  wit-  \ie  matter  at  all  ;  yet  fear- 
ing that  it  would  fail  i  the  Spaniards'  Jiands,  l)e 
finally  drafted  a  strong  division  of  troops  and  marcli- 
ed  in  person  to  Martorel.  There  he  met  Copons, 
who  now  told  him  that  the  Frencli  would  not  pas-s 
Esparaguera  that  night,  that  Eroles  was  close  in 
their  rear,  and  another  division  of  the  Catalan  army 
at  Bispal  blocking  the  bridge  of  Martorel.  Clinton 
immediately  und(;rtook  to  pass  the  Llobregat,  meet 
the  French  column,  and  block  the  road  of  San  S»« 


1814] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


711 


durni ;  and  ho  arranged  vvitli  Copons  the  necessary 
precautions  and  signals. 

About  nine  o'clock  general  Isidore  Lamarque  ar- 
rived with  ths  garrisons  at  Martorel,  followed  at  a 
short  distance  by  Eroles.  No  other  troops  were  to 
b;i  seen,  and  after  a  short  halt  the  French  continued 
their  march  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Llobregat, 
wlaere  the  Barcelona  road  enters  a  narrow  pass  be- 
tween the  river  and  a  precipitous  hill.  When  they 
were  completely  entangled,  Clinton  sent  an  officer 
to  forbid  their  further  progress,  and  relerred  them 
to  Copons  who  was  at  Martorel  for  an  explanation ; 
then  giving  the  signal  all  the  heights  around  were 
instantly  covered  with  armed  men.  It  was  in  vain 
to  otier  resistance,  and  two  generals,  having  two 
thousand  six  hundred  men,  four  guns  and  a  rich 
military  chest,  capitulated,  but  upon  conditions, 
which  were  granted  and  immediately  violated  with 
circumstances  of  great  harsliness  and  insult  to  the 
prisoners.  The  odium  of  this  baseness,  which  was 
quite  gratuitous,  since  the  French  helpless  in  the 
defile  must  have  submitted  to  any  terms,  attaches 
entirely  to  the  Spaniards.  Clinton  refused  to  med- 
dle in  any  manner  with  the  convention,  he  had  not 
been  a  party  to  Van  Halen's  deceit,  he  appeared 
only  to  ensure  the  surrender  of  an  armed  force  in 
the  field  which  the  Spaniards  could  not  have  sub- 
dued without  his  aid,  he  refused  even  to  be  present 
at  any  consultation  previous  to  the  capitulation, 
and  notwithiitanding  an  assert;  in  to  the  contrary  in 
Suchet's  Memoirs,  no  appeal  on  the  subject  from 
that  marshal  ever  reached  him. 

During  the  whole  of  these  transactions  the  in- 
fatuation of  the  French  leaders  was  extreme.  The 
cliief  of  one  of  the  battalions,  more  sagacious  than 
his  general,  told  Lamarque,  in  the  night  of  the  16th; 
at  Igualada,  that  he  was  betrayed,  at  the  same  time 
urging  him  vainly  to  abandon  his  artillery  and  bag- 
gage and  march  in  the  direction  of  Vich,  to  which 
place  they  could  force  their  way  in  despite  of  the 
Spaniards.  It  is  remarkable  also  that  Robert,  when 
he  had  detected  the  imposture  and  failed  to  entice 
Van  Halen  into  Tortosa,  did  not  make  a  sudden 
sally  upon  him  and  the  Spanish  officers  who  were 
with  him,  all  close  to  the  works.  And  still  more 
notable  is  it  that  the  other  governors,  the  more  es- 
pecially as  Van  Halen  was  a  foreigner,  did  not  in- 
sist upon  the  bearer  of  such  a  convention  remaining 
to  accompany  their  march.  It  has  been  well  ob- 
served by  Suchet  that  Van  Halen's  refusal  to  enter 
the  gates  was  alone  sufficient  to  prove  hie  treachery. 

The  detachment  recalled  by  Napoleon  now  moved 
into  France,  and  in  March  was  followed  by  a  second 
column  of  equal  force  which  was  at  first  directed 
upon  Lyons  ;  but  the  arrival  of  lord  Wellington's 
troops  on  t!ie  Garonne  caused,  as  we  shall  hereafter 
find,  a  change  in  its  destination.  Meanwhile,  by 
order  of  the  minister  at  war,  Suchet  entered  into  a 
fresh  negotiation  with  Copons,  to  deliver  up  all  the 
fortresses  held  by  his  troops  except  Figueras  and 
Rosas,  [jrovided  the  garrisons  were  allowed  to  re- 
join the  army.  The  Spanish  commander  assented, 
and  the  autliorities  generally  were  anxious  to  adopt 
f]i3  proposal  ;  but  the  regency  referred  the  matter 
to  lord  Wellington,  who  rejected  it  without  hesita- 
tion, as  tending  to  increase  the  force  immediately 
opposed  to  him.  Thus  baffled  and  overreached  at 
bU  points,  Suchet  destroyed  the  works  of  Olot,  Be- 
6m1u.  Bascara  and  Palamos,  dismantled  Gerona  and 
Rosas,  and  concentrated  his  forces  at  Figueras.  He 
was  followed  by  Copons;  but  though  he  still  had 
twelve  thousand  veterans  besides  the  national  guards 
and  depots  of  the  French  departnients,  he  continued 
ohstinutely  to  refuse  any  aid  to  Soult,  and  yet 


remained  inactive  himself.  The  bVckade  of  Barc« 
lona  was  therefore  maintained  by  the  allies  without 
difficulty  or  danger  save  what  arose  from  their  com 
missariat  embarrassments  and  the  efiorts  of  the  gar- 
rison. 

On  the  2M  of  February^  Habert  made  a  sail/ 
with  six  battalions,  thinking  to  surprise  Sarsfield  , 
he  was  however  beaten,  and  colonel  Meder,  the 
Nassau  officer  who  had  before  shown  his  attach- 
ment to  the  French  cause;  was  killed.  The  block- 
ade was  thus  continued  until  the  12th  of  March 
when  Clinton  received  orders  from  lord  Wellingtoa 
to  break  up  his  army,  send  the  foreign  trooj)8  to 
lord  William  Bentinck  in  Sicily,  and  march  with 
the  British  battalions  by  Tudela  to  join  the  great 
army  in  France.  Clinton  at  first  prepared  to  obey  ; 
but  Suchet  was  still  in  strength,  Copons  appeared 
to  be  provoking  a  collision  though  he  was  quite  un- 
able to  oppose  the  French  in  the  field,  and  to  main- 
tain the  blockade  of  Barcelona  in  addition,  after  the 
Anglo-Sicilians  should  depart,  was  quite  impossi- 
ble. The  latter  therefore  remained,  and  on  the 
19th  of  March  king  Ferdinand  reached  the  French 
frontier. 

This  event,  which  happening  five  or  even  three 
months  before  v/ould  probably  have  changed  the 
fate  of  the  war,  was  now  of  little  consequence. 
Suchet  first  proposed  to  Copons  to  escort  Ferdinand 
with  the  French  army  to  Barcelona,  and  put  him  in 
possession  of  that  place  ;  but  this  the  Spanish  gene- 
ral dared  not  assent  to,  for  he  feared  lord  Welling- 
ton and  his  own  regency,  and  was  closely  watched 
by  colonel  Coflin,  who  had  been  placed  near  him  l)y 
sir  William  Clinton.  The  French  general  then 
])roposed  to  the  king  a  convention  for  the  recovery 
of  his  garrisons,  ti-  which  Ferdinand  agreed  with 
the  facility  of  a  faise  heart.  His  great  anxiety  waa 
to  reach  Valencia,  because  the  determination  of  tha 
cortez  to  bind  him  to  conditions  before  he  recover- 
ed his  throne  was  evident,  the  Spanish  ge  terals 
were  apparently  faithful  to  the  cortez,  and  the  Br'4.- 
ish  influence  was  sure  to  be  opposed  to  him  while 
he  was  burdened  with  French  engagements. 

Suchet  had  been  ordered  to  demand  securities  for 
the  restoration  of  his  garrisons  previous  to  Ferdi- 
nand's entry  into  Spain;  but  time  was  precious, 
and  he  determined  to  escort  him  at  once  with  the 
whole  French  army  to  the  Fluvia,  having  first  re- 
ceived a  promise  to  restore  the  garrisons.  He  also 
retained  his  brother  don  Carlos  as  a  hostage  for 
their  return,  but  even  this  security  he  relinquished 
when  the  king,  in  a  second  letter  written  from  Ge- 
rona, solemnly  confirmed  his  first  promise.  On  the 
24th,  therefore,  in  presence  of  the  Catalan  and 
French  armies,  ranged  in  order  of  battle  on  either 
bank  of  the  Fluvia,  Ferdinand  passed  that  river  and 
became  once  more  king  of  Spain.  He  had  been  a 
rebellious  son  in  the  palace,  a  plotting  traitor  at 
Aranjuez,  a  dastard  at  Bayonne,  an  efi'eniinate  su- 
perstitious fawning  slave  at  Valen^ay,  and  now 
after  six  years'  captivity  he  returned  to  his  own 
country  an  ungrateful  and  cruel  tyrant.  He  would 
have  been  the  most  odious  and  contemptible  of 
princes,  if  his  favourite  brother  don  Carlos  had  not 
existed.  Reaching  the  camp  at  Barcelona  on  the 
30th,  he  dined  with  sir  William  Clinton,  reviewed 
the  allied  troops,  and  then  i)roceedcd  first  to  Zara- 
goza  and  finally  to  Valencia.  Marshal  Suchet  eaya 
the  honours  of  war  were  paid  to  him  by  all  the 
French  garrisons,  but  tliis  was  not  the  case  at  Bar- 
celona:  no  man  ap[)eared  oven  on  riie  walls.  After 
this  event  the  French  marshal  repassed  the  Pyre- 
nees, leaving  only  one  division  at  Fi-gueras;  and 
Clinton  proceeded  to  break  up  his   army,  but  wa» 


712 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XXIII. 


Bgain  stopped  by  the  vexatious  conduct  of  Copons, 
who  would  not  relieve  the  Anglo-Sicilians  at  the 
blockpde,  nor  indeed  take  any  notice  of  the  English 
general's  communications  on  the  subject  before  the 
llth  of,  April.  On  the  14th,  however,  the  troops 
marched,  part  to  embark  at  Tarragona,  part  to  join 
lord  Wellington.  Copons  then  became  terrified  lest 
general  Robert,  abandoning  Tortosa,  should  join 
Ilabert  at  Barcelona,  and  enclose  him  between  them 
aud  the  division  at  Figueras ;  wherefore  Clinton 
once  more  halted  to  protect  the  Spaniards. 

Copons  had  indeed  some  reason  to  fear,  for  Ha- 
bert  about  this  time  received,  and  transmitted  to 
Robert,  the  emperor's  orders  to  break  out  of  Tortosa 
und  gain  Barcelona,  instead  of  passing  by  the  val- 
ley of  Venasque  as  Suchet  had  before  prescribed  : 
the  twelve  thousand  men  thus  united  were  then  to 
push  into  France.  This  letter  was  intercepted, 
copied,  and  sent  on  to  Robert ;  whose  answer,  being 
likewise  intercepted,  showed  that  he  was  not  pre- 
pared and  had  no  inclination  for  the  enterprise. 
This  seen,  Clinton  continued  his  embarkation,  and 
thus  completed  his  honourable  but  difficult  task. 
With  a  force  weak  in  numbers,  and  nearly  destitute 
of  every  thing  that  constitutes  strength  in  the  field, 
he  had  maintained  a  forward  and  dangerous  position 
for  eight  months  ;  and  though  Copons'  incapacity 
and  ill-will,  and  other  circumstances  beyond  control, 
did  not  permit  him  to  perform  any  brilliant  actions, 
he  occupied  the  attention  of  a  very  superior  army, 
fcuifered  no  disaster,  and  gained  some  advantages. 

While  his  troops  were  embarking,  Habert,  in  fur- 
therance of  the  emperor's  project,  made  a  vigorous 
tsally  on  the  18th,  and  though  repulsed  with  loss 
lie  killed  or  wounded  eight  hundred  Spaniards. 
This  was  a  lamentable  combat.  The  war  had  ter- 
minated long  before,  yet  intelligence  of  the  cessa- 
tion of  hostilities  only  arrived  four  days  later.  Ha- 
bert was  now  repeatedly  ordered  by  Suchet  and  the 
duke  of  Feltre  to  give  up  Barcelona,  but  warned  by 
the  breach  of  former  conventions,  he  hold  it  until  he 
was  assured  that  all  the  French  garrisons  in  ^  alen- 
cia  had  returned  safely  to  France,  which  did  not 
happen  until  the  28th  of  May,  wnen  he  yielded  up 
the  town  and  m.arched  to  his  own  country.  This 
event,  the  last  operation  of  the  whole  war,  released 
the  duchess  of  Bourbon.  She  and  the  old  prince  of 
Conti  had  been  retained  prisoners  in  the  city  during 
the  Spanish  struggle:  the  prince  died  early  in  1814, 
the  duchess  survived  and  now  returned  to  France. 

How  strong  Napoleon's  hold  of  the  Peninsula  had 
been,  how  little  the  Spaniards  were  able  of  their 
own  strength  to  shake  hiin  off,  was  now  apparent  to 
all  the  world.  For  notwithstanding  lord  Welling- 
ton's gr;iat  victories,  notwithstanding  the  invasion 
of  France,  seven  fortresses,  Figueras,  Barcelona, 
Tortosa,  Morella.  Peniscola,  Saguntum  and  Denia, 
were  recovered,  not  by  arms,  but  by  the  general 
peace.  And  but  for  the  deceits  of  Van  Halen  there 
would  have  been  three  others  similarly  situated  in 
the  eastern  parts  alone,  while  in  tlie  north  Santo- 
na  was  recovered  in  the  same  manner;  for  neither 
the  long  blockade,  nor  the  active  operations  against 
that  place,  of  which  some  account  shall  now  be 
given,  caused  it  to  surrender. 

The  site  of  Santona  is  one  of  those  promontories, 
frequent  on  the  coast  of  Spain,  which,  connected  by 
low  Bandy  necks  with  the  main  land,  offer  good  har- 
bours. Its  waters,  deep  and  capacious,  furnished 
two  bays.  The  outer  one,  or  roadstead,  was  com- 
manded' by  the  works  of  Santona  itself,  and  by  those 
of  Laredo,  a  considerable  town  lying  at  the  foot  of  a 
mountain  on  the  ojiposite  point  of  the  harbour.  A 
narrow  entrance  to  the  inner  port  was  between  a 


spit  of  land,  called  the  Puntal,  and  the  low  i£thn:ue 
on  which  the  town  of  Santona  is  built.  The  natural 
strength  of  the  ground  was  very  great,  but  the  im- 
portance of  Santona  arose  from  its  peculiar  situation 
as  a  harbour  and  fort  of  support  in  the  jVIontaha  de 
St.  Ander.  By  holding  it  the  French  shut  cut  the 
British  shipping  from  the  only  place  which  being 
defensible  on  the  land  side  furnished  a  good  harbour 
between  San  Sebastian  and  Corufia  ;  they  thus  pro- 
tected the  sea-flank  of  their  long  line  of  invasion, 
obtained  a  port  of  refuge  for  their  own  coasting  ves- 
sels, and  a  post  of  support  for  the  moveable  columns 
sent  to  chase  the  partidas,  which  abounded  in  that 
rough  district.  And  when  the  battle  of  Vittoria 
placed  the  allies  on  the  Bidassoa,  from  Santona  is- 
sued forth  a  number  of  privateers  who,  as  we  have 
seen,  intercepted  lord  Wellington's  supplies,  and  in- 
terrupted his  communication  with  Corufia,  Oporto, 
Lisbon,  and  even  with  England. 

The  advantages  of  possessing  Santona  were  felt 
early  by  both  parties  ;  the  French  seized  it  at  once, 
and  although  the  Spaniards  recovered  possession  of 
it  in  1810,  they  were  driven  out  again  immediately 
The  English  ministers  then  commenced  deliberating 
and  concocting  extensive,  and  for  that  reason  inju- 
dicious and  impracticable  plans  of  offensive  opera 
tions,  to  be  based  upon  the  possession  of  Santcna  ; 
meanwhile  Napoleon  fortified  it,  and  kept  it  to  the 
end  of  the  war.  In  August,  1812,  its  importance 
was  better  understood  by  the  Spaniards,  and  it  was 
continually  menaced  by  the  numerous  bands  of  Bis- 
cay, the  Austurias  and  the  Montana.  Fourteen 
hundred  men,  including  the  crew  of  a  corvette,  then 
fornica  its  garrison,  the  works  were  not  very  strorg, 
and  only  ibrly  pieces  of  artillery  were  mounted. 
Napoleon  however  foreseeing  the  disasters  which 
Marmont  was  provoking,  sent  general  Lameth,  a 
chosen  ofhcer,  to  take  charge  of  tiie  defence.  He 
immediately  augmented  the  works,  and  constructed 
advanced  redoubts  on  two  hills,  called  the  CJromo 
and  the  Brusco,  which,  like  San  Bartolomeo  at  San 
Sebastian,  closed  the  isthmus  inland.  He  also 
erected  a  strong  redoubt  and  blockhouse  on  the 
Puntal,  to  command  the  straits,  and  to  sweep  the 
roadstead  in  conjunction  with  the  fort  of  Laredo, 
which  he  repaired.  This  done,  he  formed  several 
minor  batteries,  and  cast  a  chain  to  secure  the  nar- 
row entrance  to  the  inner  harbour,  and  then  covered 
the  rocky  promontory  of  Santona  itself  with  delisn- 
sive  works. 

Some  dismounted  guns  remained  in  the  arsenal, 
others  which  had  been  thrown  into  the  sea  by  the 
Spaniards  when  they  took  the  place  in  1810  were 
fished  up,  and  the  garrison,  felling  trees  in  the 
vicinity,  made  carriages  for  them  :  by  these  means 
a  hundred  and  twenty  guns  were  finally  placed  in 
battery,  and  there  was  abundance  of  amnmnition. 
The  corvette  was  not  seaworthy,  but  the  governor 
established  a  flotilla  of  gun-boats,  and  other  small 
cralt,  which  sallied  forth  whenever  the  signal-posts 
on  the  headland  gave  notice  of  the  approach  of  ves- 
sels liable  to  attack,  or  of  French  coasters  bringing 
provisions  and  stores.  The  garrison  had  previously 
lost  many  men.  killed  in  a  barbarous  manner  by  the 
partidas,  and  in  revenge  they  never  gave  quarter  to 
their  enemies.  Lameth,  shocked  at  their  inhumani- 
ty, resolutely  forbade  under  pain  of  death  any  farther 
reprisals,  rewarded  those  men  who  brought  in  pris- 
oners, and  treated  the  latter  with  gentleness:  the 
Spaniards,  discovering  this,  also  changed  their  sys- 
tem, and  civilization  resumed  its  rights.  From  tiiis 
time  military  operacions  were  incessant;  the  garri- 
son sometimes  made  sallies,  sometimes  sustaintJ 
partial  attacks,  sometimes  aided  the  moveable  col- 


1614.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


713 


umns  employed  by  the  different  g'enerals  of  the  army 

oftlia  north  to  put  down  the  partisan  warfare,  which 
was  seldom  even  lulled  in  the  Montana. 

Ajftcr  the  battle  of  Vittoria,  Santona  bein^  left  to 
its  own  resources  was  invested  on  the  land  side  by 
a  part  of  the  troops  composing  the  Gallician  or  fourth 
Spanish  army.  It  was  blockaded  on  the  seaboard  by 
the  English  ships  of  war,  but  only  nominally,  for 
the  garrison  received  supplies,  and  the  flotilla  vexed 
lord  Wellington's  communications,  took  many  of  his 
store-ships  and  other  vessels,  delayed  his  convoys. 
And  added  greatly  to  the  difliculties  of  his  situation. 
The  land  blockade  thus  also  became  a  nullity,  and 
the  Spanish  otiicers  complained  with  reason  that 
they  suffered  privations  and  endured  hardships  with- 
out an  object.  These  complaints  and  his  own  em- 
barrassments, caused  by  lord  Melville's  neglect,  in- 
duced lord  Wellington,  in  October,  ISKi,  when  he 
could  ill  spare  troops,  to  employ  a  British  brigade 
under  lord  Aylmer  in  the  attack  of  Santona;  the 
project,  for  reasons  already  mentioned,  was  not  exe- 
cuted, but  an  English  engineer,  captain  Wells,  was 
Bent  with  some  sa.ppers  and  miners  to  quicken  the 
operations  of  the  Spanish  officers,  and  his  small  de- 
tachment has  been  by  a  French  writer  magnified 
into  a  whole  battalion. 

Captain  Wells  remained  six  months,  for  the  Span- 
ish generals  though  brave  and  willing  were  tainted 
with  the  national  defect  of  procrastination.  The 
siege  made  no  progress  until  the  lliih  of  Eebruary, 
1814,  when  general  Barco,  the  Spanish  commander, 
carried  tiie  fort  of  Puntal  in  the  night  by  escalade, 
killing  thirty  men  and  taking  twenty-three  prison- 
ers ;  yet  the  fort  being  under  the  heavy  fire  of  the 
Sanona  works  was  necessarily  dismantled  and  aban- 
(Jor-ed  the  nex.*:  mining.  A  piquet  was  however 
left  there  ar..:  '-.he  French  opened  their  batteries, 
but.  as  this  did  not  dislodge  the  S[)aniards,  Lameth 
embarked  a  detachment  and  recovered  his  fort. 
However,  in  the  night  of  the  21st,  general  Barco  or- 
dered an  attack  to  be  made  with  a  part  of  his  force 
upon  the  outposts  of  El  Grumo  and  Brusco,  on  the 
Santona  side  of  the  harbour,  and  led  the  remainder 
of  his  troops  in  person  to  storm  the  fort  and  town  of 
Laredo.  He  carried  the  latter  and  also  some  outer 
defences  of  the  fort,  which  being  on  a  rock  was  only 
to  be  approached  by  an  isthmus  so  narrow  as  to  be 
cljseiJ  b)'  a  single  fortified  house.     In  the  assault  of 


the  body  of  this  fort  Barco  was  killed,  and  the  at- 
tack ceased,  but  the  troops  retained  what  they  had 
won,  and  established  themselves  at  the  loot  of  the 
rock,  where  they  were  covered  from  fire.  The  at- 
tack on  the  other  side,  conducted  by  c( lonel  i lo- 
rente,  was  successful ;  he  carried  the  smallest  of  the 
two  outworks  on  the  Brusco,  and  closely  invested 
the  largest  after  an  ineffectual  attempt  by  mine  and 
assault  to  take  it.  A  large  breach  was  however 
made,  and  the  commandant,  seeing  he  could  no  long- 
er defend  his  post,  valiantly  broke  through  the  in- 
vestment and  gained  the  work  of  the  Grumo.  He 
was  however  aided  by  the  appearance  on  the  isth- 
mus of  a  strong  column,  which  sallied  at  the  same 
time  from  the  works  on  the  Santona  promontory, 
and  the  next  day  the  Grumo  itself  was  abandoned 
by  the  French. 

Captain  Wells,  who  had  been  wounded  at  the 
Puntal  escalade,  now  strenuously  urged  the  Span- 
iards to  crown  the  counterscarp  of  the  ibrt  at  Laredo 
and  attack  vigorously,  but  they  preferred  establish 
ing  four  field-pieces  to  batter  it  in  form  at  the  dis 
tance  of  six  hundred  yards.  These  guns,  as  might 
be  expected,  were  dismounted  the  mcjnent  they  be- 
gan to  fire,  and  thus  corrected,  the  S|-anish  generals 
committed  the  direction  of  the  attack  to  Wells. 
He  immediately  opened  a  heavy  musketry  fire  on 
the  fort  to  stifle  the  noise  of  his  workmen,  tlien  push- 
ing trenches  up  the  hill  close  to  the  counterscarp  in 
the  night,  he  was  proceeding  to  burst  ojjen  the  gate 
with  a  few  field-pieces  and  to  cut  down  the  palisades, 
when  the  Italian  garrison,  whose  muskets  from  con- 
stant use  had  become  so  foul  that  tew  would  go  off, 
mutinied  against  their  commander,  and  making  him 
prisoner  surrendered  the  place.  This  event  gave 
the  allies  the  command  of  the  entrance  to  the  har 
hour,  and  Lameth  ofllsred  to  capitulate  in  April  upon 
condition  of  returning  to  France  with  his  garrison- 
Lord  Wellington  refused  the  condition,  Santona 
therefore  remained  a  few  days  longer  in  possession 
of  the  enemy,  and  was  finally  evacuated  ai  the  gen- 
eral cessation  of  hostilities. 

Having  now  terminated  the  narrative  of  all  mili- 
tary and  political  events  which  happened  in  the 
Peninsula,  the  reader  will  henceforth  be  enabled  to 
follow  without  interruption  the  events  of  the  war  in 
the  south  of  France,  whicii  shall  be  continued  in  the 
next  book. 


714 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR 


f  Book  X2nV 


BOOK  XXIV. 


I 


CHAPTER  I. 

\apalfnn  rfcaliri  Sfveial  divisidiis  of  infantry  and  ravalrv  frnni 
SouU's  aiui)-  —  Einbarrassiiimt'i  of  that  marshal — -"M  Balbt- 
K.nt,  H  banker  of  Bayonne,  ofiVrs  to  aid  the  allies  serretiv  w  ilh 
iiioiiev  and  prov'ij^ioiis — La  Rorhe-Jarqn* Tin  and  other  Bour- 
bon partisans  arrive  at  the  allies'  hfadtiiiarters — The  (iuk( 
of  An^oiilenie  arrives  there — Lord  Wellinjjton's  ['olitical 
views — Gentral  rellertions — Soult  end)arrassed  by  the  hos- 
tility of  tlie  I-'reiich  people — Lord  Wellington  en'^barrassed 
by  the  hoi-tility  of  the  Spaniard- — Soult's  remarkable  project 
for  the  defence  of  France — Napoleon's  reasons  for  neglect- 
ing it  put  h\  pothetically — Lord  Wellington's  situation  sud- 
denly ameliorated — His  wise  policy,  (bresight  and  diligence 
— Resolves  ti)  throw  a  bridge  over  the  Adoui'  below  Ba^  onne, 
and  to  drive  Soult  tVoni  that  river — Soult's  systeni  of  de- 
fence— Numbers  of  the  contending;  aunies — J^issage  of  the 
Gaves — Combat  of  Gairis — Lord  Wellington  forces  the  line 
of  the  Hidouze  and  Gave  de  Manleon — Soult  take?  the  line 
of  the  Gaved'OUron  and  resolves  to  change, his  system  of 
peralion. 

Lord  Wellington's  difficultie?  have  been  des- 
cribed. Those  of  his  adversary  were  even  more 
embarrassing  because  the  evil  was  at  the  root ;  it 
was  not  misapplication  of  power,  but  tlie  watit  of 
power  itself,  which  paralyzed  Soult's  operations. 
Napoleon  trusted  much  to  the  effect  of  his  treaty 
with  Ferdinand,  who,  following  his  inteiitions, 
ehould  have  entered  Spain  in  November ;  but  the 
intrigues  to  retard  his  journey  continued,  and  though 
Napoleon,  when  the  refusal  of  the  treaty  by  the 
Spanish  government  became  known,  permitted  him 
to  return  without  any  conditions,  as  thinking  his 
presence  would  alone  embarrass  and  perhaps  break 
the  English  alliance  with  Spain,  he  did  not,  as  we 
have  seen,  arrive  until  March.  Hov/  the  emperor's 
views  were  frustrated  by  his  secret  enemies  is  one 
of  the  obscure  parts  of  French  history,  at  this  peri- 
od, whicii  time  may  possibly  clear,  but  probably  only 
with  a  feeble  and  uncertain  light.  For  truth  can 
never  be  expected  in  the  memoirs,  if  any  should  ap- 
pear, of  such  men  as  Talleyrand,  Fouciie,  and  other 
politicians  of  tiieir  stamp,  whose  plots  rendered  his 
supernatural  efforts  to  rescue  France  from  her  inva- 
ders abortive.  Meanwliile  there  is  nothing  to  check 
and  expose  the  political  and  literary  empirics  who 
never  fail  on  such  occasions  to  poison  the  sources 
of  history. 

Relying  upon  the  effect  which  the  expected  jour- 
ney of  Ferdinnnd  would  produce,  and  pressed  by  the 
necessity  of  augmenting  liis  own  weak  army.  Napo- 
leon gave  notice  to  Suiilt  ihal.  he  must  ultimately 
take  from  him  two  divisions  of  infantry  and  one  of 
cavalry.  Tlie  undecided  nature  of  his  first  battle 
ut  Bricnne  ciitised  him  to  enforce  this  notice  in  the 
beginning  of  February,  but  he  had  previously  sent 
imperifil  commissaries  to  the  different  departments 
of  France,  with  instructions  to  hasten  the  new  con- 
scription, to  form  national  and  urban  guards,  to  draw 
forth  nil  the  resources  of  the  country,  and  to  aid  the 
operations  of  the  armies  by  the  action  of  the  peoj)le. 
These  measures  however  failed  generally  in  tlie 
south.  The  urban  cohorts  were  indeed  readily  form- 
ed as  a  menus  of  police,  and  the  cons(;ription  was 
successful,  but  the  j)eoplc  remained  sullen  and  apa- 
thetic;  and  the  civil  commissaries  are  said  to  have 
been,  with  some  exceptions,  pompous,  declrimntory, 
and  affecting  great  state  and  dignity,  without  en- 


ergy and  activity.  Ill-will  was  also  produced  oy 
the  vexatious  and  corrupt  conduct  of  the  subordinate 
government  agents,  wlio  seeing  in  the  general  dis- 
tress and  confusion  a  good  opportunity  to  forward 
their  personal  interests,  oppressed  the  people  for 
their  own  profit.  This  it  was  easy  to  do,  because 
the  extreme  want  of  money  rendered  requisitions 
unavoidable,  and  under  the  confused  direction  of  civ- 
ilians, partly  ignorant  and  unused  to  difficult  times, 
partly  corrupt,  and  partly  disaffected  to  the  em- 
peror, the  abuses  inevitably  attendant  uj.on  such  a 
system  were  numerous  ;  and  to  the  people  so  oflen- 
sive,  that  numbers  to  avoid  them  passed  with  tlteir 
carts  and  utensils  into  the  lines  of  the  allies.  An 
official  letter  written  from  Bayonne  at  this  period 
ran  thus:  "The  English  general's  jiolicy  and  the 
good  discipline  he  maintains  do  us  more  harm  than 
ten  battles.  Every  peasant  wishes  to  be  under  his 
protection." 

Another  source  of  anger  was  Soult's  works  near 
Bayonne,  where  the  richer  inhabitants  could  not 
bear  to  have  their  country  villas  and  gardens  des- 
troyed by  the  engineer,  he  who  spares  not  for  beauty 
or  for  pleasure  where  his  military  traces  are  crossed. 
The  merchants,  a  class  nearly  alike  in  all  nations, 
with  whom  profit  stands  for  country,  had  been  with 
a  few  exceptions  long  averse  to  ISapolcon's  policy, 
which  from  necessity  interfered  with  their  com- 
merce. And  this  feeling  must  have  been  very  strorg 
in  Bayonne  and  Bordeaux  ;  for  one  Batbedat,  a  bank- 
er of  the  former  place,  having  obtained  leave  tc  go 
to  St.  .lean  de  Luz  under  pretence  of  settling  the 
accounts  of  English  officers,  prisoners  of  war,  to 
whom  he  had  advanced  money,  ofiered  lord  Welling- 
ton to  supply  his  army  with  various  commodities, 
and  even  to  provide  money  for  bills  on  the  English 
treasury.  In  return  he  demanded  licenses  for  twen- 
ty vessels  to  go  from  Bordeaux,  Rochelle  and 
Nantes,  to  St.  Jean  de  Luz,  and  they  were  given  on 
condition  that  he  should  not  carry  back  colonial  pro- 
duce. The  English  navy  however  showed  so  little 
inclination  to  respect  them  that  the  banker  and  his 
coadjutors  hesitated  to  risk  their  vessels,  and  thus 
saved  them,  for  the  English  ministers  refused  t« 
sanction  the  licenses,  and  rebuked  their  general. 

During  these  events  the  partisans  of  the  Bour- 
bons, coming  from  Britnny  and  I  a  Vend*  e,  spread 
themselves  all  over  the  south  of  France  and  entered 
into  direct  communication  with  lord  Wellington. 
One  of  the  celebrated  family  of  La  Koche-Jacque- 
lin  arrived  at  his  Jiead-quarters,  Bernadotte  sent  en 
agent  to  those  parts,  and  the  count  of  Grammont, 
then  serving  as  a  captain  in  the  British  cavalry, 
was  at  the  desire  of  the  marquis  do  JMailhos^  an- 
other of  the  malcontents,  sent  to  I'^.ngland  to  call 
the  princes  of  the  house  of  Bourbon  forward.  Fi- 
nally, the  duke  of  Angoulenic  arrived  sudtienly  at 
the  head-quarters,  and  he  was  received  with  respect 
in  private,  though  not  suffered  to  attend  the  move- 
ments of  the  army.  The  English  general  indeed, 
being  persuaded  that  the  great  body  of  the  French 
people,  especially  in  the  south,  were  inimical  to  ISa- 
polcon's  government,  was  sanguine  as  to  the  utility 
of  encouraging  a  Bourbon  party.     Yet  he  held  h'\» 


1?!4J 


NAPIER  S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


715 


judc^ment  in  abeyance,  sagaciously  observinfj  that 
he  could  not  come  to  a  sate  conclusion  merely  from 
th**  feolings  of  some  people  in  one  corner  of  France  ; 
and  as  tlie  allied  sovereigns  seemed  backward  to  take 
tliR  muttir  in  hand  unless  some  positive  general 
nio/em-3iit  in  favour  of  the  Bourbons  was  made,  and 
ther',  were  negotiations  for  jieace  actually  going  on, 
it  would  be,  he  observed,  unwise  and  ungenerous  to 
precipitate  the  partisans  of  tlie  fallen  house  into  a 
premaluro  outbreak,  and  then  leave  them  to  tiie  ven- 
geance of  tlie  enemy. 

Tiiat  lord  Wellington  should  have  been  convinced 
the  prevailing  opinion  was  against  Napoleon  is  not 
surprising,  because  every  appearance  at  the  time 
would  seem  to  prove  it  so;  and  certain  it  is  that  a 
very  strong  Bourbon  party,  and  one  still  stronger 
averse  to  the  continuation  of  war,  existed.  But 
in  civil  commotions  nothing  is  more  dangerous,  no- 
thing more  deceitful,  than  the  outward  show  and 
declar-''tions  on  such  occasions.  The  great  mass  of 
men  in  all  nations  are  only  endowed  with  moderate 
capaf'ity  and  spirit,  and  as  their  thoughts  are  intent 
upon  tlie  praservation  of  their  families  and  property 
they  must  bend  to  circumstances;  thus  fear  and  sus- 
picion, ignorance,  baseness  and  good  feeling,  all 
com'yine  to  urge  men  in  troubled  times  to  put  on  the 
mask  of  enthusiasm  for  the  most  powerful,  while 
selfish  knaves  ever  shout  with  the  loudest.  Let  the 
scfiie  change  and  the  multitude  will  turn  with  the 
facility  of  a  weathercock.  Lord  Wellington  soon 
discovered  that  the  count  of  Yiel  Castel,  Berna- 
dotte's  agent,  while  pretending  to  aid  the  Bourbons, 
was  playing  a  double  part;  and  only  one  year  after 
this  period  Napoleon  returned  from  Elba,  and  neither 
the  presence  of  the  duke  of  Angouleme,  nor  the  en- 
ergj  of  the  dutchess,  nor  all  the  activjty  of  their 
partisans,  could  raise  in  this  very  country  more  than 
I,  e  semblance  of  an  opposition  to  him.  The  tri- 
»,o  ^ur  was  every  where  hoisted  and  the  Bourbon 
party  vanished.  And  this  was  the  true  test  of  na- 
tional feeling,  because  in  1814  the  white  colours 
were  supported  by  foreign  armies,  and  misfortune 
had  bowed  tlie  great  democratic  chief  to  the  earth  : 
but  when  rising  again  in  his  wondrous  might  he 
came  back  alone  from  Elba,  the  i)oorer  people,  with 
whom  only  patriotism  is  ever  really  to  be  found,  and 
that  because  they  are  poor  and  therefore  unsophisti- 
cated, crowded  to  meet  him  and  hail  him  as  a  fatlier. 
Not  because  tliey  held  him  entirely  blrmeless.  W"ho 
born  of  woman  is  .'  They  demanded  re  dress  of  griev- 
ances even  while  they  clung  instinctively  to  him  as 
their  stay  and  protection  against  the  locust  tyranny 
of  aristocracy. 

There  was  however  at  this  period  in  France 
enough  of  discontent,  passion  and  intrigue,  enough 
of  treason,  and  enough  of  grovelling  spirit  in  adver- 
sity, added  to  the  natural  desire  of  escaping  the  ra-v- 
ages  of  war,  a  desire  so  carefully  fostered  by  the  ad- 
mirable policy  of  tlie  English  general,  as  to  render 
tlie  French  general's  position  extremely  difficult  and 
dangerous.  Nor  is  it  tiie  least  rcnnarkable  circum- 
stance of  this  remarkable  |)eriod,  that  while  8oult 
expected  relief  by  the  Spaniards  falling  awny  from 
tlie  English  alliance,  lord  Wellington  received  from 
the  French  secret  and  earnest  warnings  to  beware 
of  some  great  act  of  treachery  meditated  by  the 
Spaniards.  It  v/as  at  this  period  also  that  MoriUo 
and  other  generals  encouraged  their  soldiers'  licen- 
tiousness, and  dis[)l;iyed  their  own  ill-will  by  sullen 
discontent  and  captious  comphiints,  while  the  civil 
authorities  disturbed  the  communications  and  made 
war  in  their  fashion  against  the  hospitals  and  mag- 
azines. 

lli^s  apprehensions  and  vigilance  aro  olainiy  to  he 


traced  in  his  correspondence.  Writing  abouT  gen- 
eral Copons,  he  says,  "  His  conduct  is  quite  unjusti- 
fiable both  in  concealing  what  he  knew  of  the  duke 
de  .San  Carlos'  arrival  and  the  nature  of  his  mis- 
sion." In  another  letter  he\)bscrves,  tluit  the  Span- 
ish military  peo|)le  about  himself  desired  peace 
with  Napoleon  according  to  the  treaty  of  Valen^ay; 
tliat  they  all  had  some  notion  of  what  had  occurred, 
and  yet  had  been  quite  silent  about  it  ;  that  he  had 
repeated  intelligence  from  the  French  of  some  act 
of  treachery  meditated  by  the  Spaniards;  that  sev- 
eral persons  of  that  nation  had  come  from  Bayonne 
to  circulate  reports  of  peace,  and  charges  against 
the  Britisli  which  he  knew  would  be  received  on 
that  frontier;  that  he  had  arrested  a  man  calling 
himself  an  agent  of,  and  actually  bearing  a  letter  of 
credence  from,  Ferdinand. 

But  the  most  striking  proof  of  the  alarm  he  fel 
was  his  great  satisfaction  at  the  conduct  of  tlie 
Spanish  government  in  rejecting  the  treaty  brought 
by  San  Carlos  and  Palafox.  Sacriiicing  all  his  Ibr- 
mer  great  and  jus*,  resentment,  he  changed  at  once 
from  an  entray  'ic  a  friend  of  the  regency,  supported 
the  members  «;':'  it  against  the  serviles.  spoke  of  the 
matter  as  being  the  most  important  concern  of  all 
that  had  engaged  his  attention,  and  when  the  count 
of  TAbispal,  the  deadly  enemy  of  the  regency,  pro- 
posed some  violent  and  decided  action  of  hostility 
which  a  few  weeks  before  would  have  been  received 
with  pleasure,  he  checked  and  softened  him,  observ- 
ing that  the  conduct  of  the  government  about  the 
treaty  should  content  every  Spaniard,  that  it  was 
not  possible  to  act  with  more  frankness  and  loyalty, 
and  that  they  had  procured  honour  for  themselves 
and  for  their  nation  not  only  in  England  but  all  over 
Europe.  Such  is  the  light  mode  in  which  words 
are  applied  by  public  men,  even  by  the  noblest  and 
greatest,  when  their  wishes  are  fullilled.  This  glo- 
rious and  honourable  conduct  of  the  regency  was 
oimply  a  resolution  to  uphold  their  }.>jrsonal  power' 
and  that  of  their  faction,  both  of  "  i.c".  would  have 
been  destroyed  by  the  arrival  of  tlie  niiig. 

Napoleon,  hoping  much  from  the  ehect  of  these 
machinations,  not  only  intimated  to  Soult,  as  I  hnve 
already  shown,  that  he  wo'ild  require  ten  thousand 
of  his  infantry  immediately,  but  that  twice  that 
number  with  a  division  of  cavalry  wvuld  be  called 
av/ay  if  the  Spaniards  fell  oft"  from  the  English  alli- 
ance. The  duke  of  Dalmatia  then,  foreseeing  the 
ultimate  result  of  liis  own  operations  against  \^'el- 
lington,  conceived  a  vast  general  plan  of  action, 
which  showed  how  capable  a  man  he  was  to  treat 
the  greatest  questions  of  military  policy. 

"Neither  his  numbers  nor  means  of  supply  after 
Wellington  had  gained  the  banks  of  the  Adour 
above  Bayonne  would,  he  said,  suffice  to  maintain 
his  positions  covering  that  fortress  and  menacing 
the  allies'  right  flank  ;  the  time  therefore  approach- 
ed when  lie  must,  even  without  a  reduction  of  force, 
abandon  liayonne  to  its  own  resources,  and  tight  his 
battle.'!  on  the  numerous  rivers  which  run  with  con- 
centric courses  from  the  Pyrenees  to  the  Adour. 
Leval's  and  Boyer's  divisions  of  infantry  were  to 
join  the  grand  army  on  the  eastern  frontier.  Abbe's 
division  was  to  reinforce  the  garrison  of  Ihiyonne 
and  Its  camp  to  fourteen  thousand  men,  but  he  con- 
sidered this  force  too  great  for  a  simple  general  of 
division  and  wished  to  give  it  to  general  Rcille, 
whose  corps  would  be  broken  up  by  the  departure  of 
the  detachments.  That  officer  was  however  alto 
gether  averse,  and  as  an  unwilling  commander  would 
be  half  beaten  before  the  battle  commenced,  he  de 
sired  that  count  d'Erlou  should  be  appointed  in  Reil 
1  la's  place. 


716 


NAPIER-S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Cook  XXIV. 


"The  active  army  remaining  could  not  then  be  1 
expected  to  tij^ht  the  allies  in  pitched  battles,  and  he 
therefore  recommended  the  thro.ving'  it  as  a  great 
partisan  corps  on  the  left,  touching  always  on  the  ! 
Pyrenees  and  ready  to   'all   upon  lord  Wellington's  : 
flank  and  rear  if  he  should  oenetrate  into  France. 
Clauzel,  a  native  of  those  parts  and  speaking  tlie 
country  languag3,  was  by  his  military  qualities  and 
knowledge   the   most   suitable   person  to  command. 
General   lieiUe   could  then   march  witli   the   troops 
called  to  the  great  army,  and  as  there  would  be  no- 
thing left  for  tiim,  8oult,to  do  in  these  parts,  he  de-  1 
sired  to  be  employed  where  he  could  aid  the  em-  [ 
peror  with  more  eliect.     This  he  pressed  urgently  I 
because,  notwithstanding  the  refusal  of  the  cortez  j 
to  receive  the  treaty  of  Valenqay,  it  was  probable  j 
the  war  on  the  eastern  frontier  would  oblige  the  em-  i 
peror  to  recall  all  the  troops  designated.     It  would 
then  become  imperative  to  change  from  a  regular  to  ; 
an  irregular  warfare,  in  which  a  numerous  corps  of  ■ 
partisans  would  be  more  valuable  than  the  shadow  j 
of  a  regular  army  without  value  or  confidence,  and 
likely  to  be  destroyed  in  the  first  great  battle.     For  j 
these  partisans  it  was  necessary  to  have  a  central 
power  and  director.     Clauzel  was  the  man  most  fit- 
ted for  the  task.     He  ought  to  have  under  his  orders 
all  the  generals  who  were  in  command  in  the  mili- 
tary departments  between  the  Garonne  and  the  Py- 
renees, with  power  to  force  all  the  inhabitants  to 
take  arms  and  act  under  his  directions. 

"  I  am  sensible,"  he  continued,  "  that  this  sys- 
tem, one  of  the  least  unhappy  consequences  of  which 
would  be  to  leave  the  enemy  apparently  master  of 
all  the  country  between  the  mountains  and  the  Ga- 
ronne, can  only  be  justified  by  the  n^^cessity  of  form- 
ing an  army  in  the  centre  of  France  sufRciently 
powerful  to  fend  off  the  multitude  of  our  enemies 
from  the  capital;  but  if  Paris  falls  all  v.ill  be  lost, 
whereas  if  it  be  saved  the  loss  of  a  few  large  towns 
'in  the  south  can  be  repaired.  I  propose  then  to  form 
a  great  army  in  front  of  Paris  by  a  union  of  all  the 
disposable  troops  of  the  armies  on  the  different  fron- 
tiers, and  at  the  same  time  to  spread  what  remains 
of  the  latter  as  partisans  wherever  the  enemy  pene- 
trates or  threatens  to  penetrate.  All  the  marshals 
of  France,  the  generals  and  other  officers,  either  in 
activity  or  in  retirement,  who  shall  not  be  attached 
to  the  great  central  army,  should  then  repair  to  their 
departments  to  organize  the  partisan  corps  and  bring 
those  not  actively  useful  as  such  up  to  the  great 
point  of  union,  and  they  should  have  military  po\ver 
to  make  all  men  able  to  bear  arms  find  them  at  their 
own  expense.  This  measure  is  revolutionary,  but 
will  infallibly  produce  important  results,  while  none 
or  at  least  a  vry  ff^ebie  effect  will  be  caused  by  the 
majority  of  the  imperial  commissioners  already  sent 
to  the  military  divisions.  They  are  grand  persons, 
they  temporize,  make  proclamations,  and  treat  every 
thin?  as  civilians,  instead  of  actinsT  with  vigour  to 
obtain  promptly  a  result  which  would  astonish  the 
world  ;  for  notwithstanding  the  cry  to  the  contrary, 
the  resources  of  France  are  not  exhausted,  what  is 
wanted  is  to  make  those  who  possess  resources  use 
them  for  the  defence  of  the  throne  and  the  emperor." 
Kaving  thus  explained  his  views,  he  again  re- 
quested to  be  recalled  to  Paris  to  serve  near  the  empe- 
ror, but  declared  that  he  was  ready  to  obey  any  order 
and  serve  in  any  manner;  all  he  demanded  vvns  clear 
instructions  with  reference  to  the  events  that  might 
occur: — 1st.  What  he  should  do  if  the  treaty  ar- 
rangements with  Ferdinand  had  no  effect  and  the 
Spanish  troops  remained  with  lord  Wellington; — 
2nd.  if  those  troops  retired,  and  the  British,  seeing 
tlie  French  v/eakeued  by  detachments,  should  alone 


penetrate    into    France : — ^rd.    If   the   changes    in 
Spain  should  cause  the  allies  to  retire  altogetlier. 

Such  was  Soult's  plan  of  action;  but  his  great 
project  was  not  adopted,  and  the  emperor's  reasons 
for  neglecting  it  liave  not  been  made  known.  Nor 
can  the  workings  of  that  caf)ricious  mirid  be  judged 
of  without  a  knowledge  of  all  the  objects  and  condi- 
tions of  his  combinations.  Yet  it  is  not  improbable 
that  at  this  period  he  did  not  despair  of  rejecting 
the  allies  beyond  the  Rhine  either  by  force  of  arms, 
by  negotiation,  or  by  working  upon  the  fjjmily  pride 
of  the  emperor  of  Austria.  With  this  hope  he 
would  be  naturally  averse  to  incur  the  risk  of  a 
civil  war  by  placing  France  under  martial  law,  or 
of  reviving  the  devouring  fire  of  revolution  which 
it  had  been  his  project  for  so  many  years  to  quell  ; 
and  this  is  the  more  probable,  because  it  seon)s 
nearly  certain  that  one  of  his  reasons  for  replacing 
Ferdinand  on  the  Spanish  throne  was  his  fear  Ust 
the  republican  doctrines  which  had  gained  grour.d 
in  Spain  should  spread  to  France.  Was  he  wrong  ! 
The  fierce  democrat  will  answer,  Yes!  But  the 
man  who  thinks  that  real  liberty  was  never  attained 
under  a  single  unmixed  form  of  goveri-ment  giving 
no  natural  vent  to  the  swelling  pride  of  honour, 
birth  or  riches;  those  who  measure  the  weakness 
of  pure  republicanism  by  the  miserable  state  of 
France  at  home  and  abroad  when  N.-ipoleon  by  as- 
suming power  saved  her;  those  who  saw  America 
with  all  her  militia  and  her  licentious  liberty 
unable  to  prevent  three  thousand  British  soldiers 
from  passing  three  thousand  miles  of  ocean  end 
burning  her  capital,  will  hesitate  to  condemn  him. 
And  this  without  detriment  ..o  tne  democratic  jjrin- 
ciple,  which  in  substance  may  and  should  always 
govern  under  judicious  forms.  Napcdeon  early  judg- 
ed, and  the  event  has  proved  he  judged  truly,  tl.at 
the  democratic  spirit  of  France,  however  violent, 
was  unable  to  overbear  the  aristocratic  and  mon- 
archic tendencies  of  Europe.  Wisely  therefore, 
while  he  preserved  the  essence  of  the  first  by  foster- 
ing equality,  he  endeavoured  to  blend  it  with  the 
other  two  ;  thus  satisfying  as  far  as  the  nature  of 
human  institutions  would  permit  tl;e  conditions  of 
the  great  problem  he  had  undertaken  to  solve.  Hie 
object  was  the  reconstruction  of  the  social  fabric 
which  had  been  shattered  by  the  French  revolution, 
mixing  with  the  new  materials  all  that  remained  of 
the  old  sutiiciently  unbroken  to  build  with  again. 
If  he  failed  to  render  his  structure  stable  it  was  be- 
cause his  design  was  misunderstood,  and  the  terri- 
ble passions  let  loose  by  the  previous  stupendfus 
explosion  were  too  mighty  even  for  him  to  com- 
press. 

I'o  have  accepted  Soult's  project  would  have  been 
to  endanger  his  work,  to  save  himself  at  tlip  expenfe 
of  his  system,  and  probably  to  plunge  France  again 
into  the  anarchy  from  which  he  had  with  so  much 
care  and  labour  drawn  her.  But  as  I  have  before 
said,  and  it  is  true,  Napoleon's  ambition  was  for  the 
greatness  and  |)rosperity  of  France,  for  the  regen- 
eration of  Europe,  for  .Mie  stability  of  the  system 
which  he  had  formed  wi*h  that  end,  never  for  him- 
self personally  ;  and  hence  it  is  that  the  multitudes 
of  many  nations  instinctively  revere  his  memory 
And  neither  the  monarch  nor  the  aristocrat,  domi- 
nant though  they  be  by  his  fall,  fe(!l  themselves  so 
easy  in  their  high  places  as- to  rejoice  much  in  thei. 
victory. 

Whatever  Napoleon's  motive  was,  he  did  not 
adopt  Soult's  project,  and  in  February  two  tli visions 
of  infantry  and  Treilhard's  cavalry  with  many  bat- 
teri-es  were  withdrawn.  Two  thousand  of  the  best 
soldiers    were    also   selected    to  join   the    imperii! 


1814] 


NAPIER'S    PEN   -sSTJLAf?    W  A  I? 


717 


guards,  and  all  tha  gendarmes  were  sent  to  the  inte- 
rior, Tlie  total  number  of  old  soldiers  lell  did  not, 
including'  the  division  of  general  Paris,  exceed  forty 
thousand  exclusive  of  the  garrison  of  Bayonne  and 
other  posts,  and  the  conscripts,  beardless  youtlis, 
were  for  the  most  part  unlit  to  enter  the  line,  nor 
were  there  enough  of  muskets  in  the  arsenals  to  arm 
them.  It  is  remarkable  also,  as  showing  how  easily 
military  operations  may  be  atfected  by  distant  oper- 
ations, that  Soult  expected  and  dreaded  at  this  time 
the  descent  of  a  great  English  army  upon  the  coast 
of  La  Vendee,  led  thereto  by  intelligence  of  an  ex- 
pedition preparing  in  England,  under  sir  Thomas 
Graham,  really  to  aid  the  Dutch  revolt. 

While  tlie  French  general's  power  was  thus  di- 
minished, lord  Wellington's  situation  was  as  sud- 
denly  ameliorated.     First   by   the  arrival   of  rein- 
forcements, next   by  the  security  he  felt  from  the 
rejection  of  the  treaty  of  Valen^ay,  lastly  by  the  ap- 
proach of  better  weather,  and  the  acquisition  of  a 
very  large  sum  in  gold,  which  enabled  him  not  only  '. 
to  put  his  Anglo-Portuguese  in  activity,  but  also  to 
bring  the  Spaniards  again  into  line  with  less  dan- 
ger of  their  plundering  the  country.     During  the 
forced  cessation  of  o[)erations  he  had  been  actively 
engaged  preparing  the   means  to  enter  France  with  i 
power  and  security,  sending  before  him  the  fame  of  | 
a  just  discipline  and   a  wise  consideration  for  the  ; 
people  who  were  likely  to  fall  under  his  power;  for' 
there  was  nothing  he  so  much  dreaded  as  the  parti-  ! 
Ban  and  insurg-ent  warfare  proposed  by  Soult.     The 
peasants  of  Baigorri  and  Bidaray  had  done  him  more  ' 
mischief  titan  the  French  army,  and  his  terrible  me- 
nace of  destroying  their  villages,  and  hanging  all  the  j 
population  he  could  lay  his  hands  upon  if  they  ceased  j 
not  their  hostility,  marks  his  apprehensions  in  the  j 
Btrongest  manner.     Yet  he  left  all  the  local  authori-  ; 
ties  free  to  carry  on  their  internal  government,  to  ; 
draw  their  salaries,  and  raise  the  necessary  taxes  in  ; 
the  same  mode  and  with  as  much  tranquillity  as  if  ; 
perfect  peace  prevailed  ;    he  opened  the  ports,  and  , 
drew  a  large  commerce  which  served  to  support  his  j 
own  army  and  engage  the  mercantile  interests  in  his  j 
favour  ;  he  established  many  sure  channels  for  intel- 
ligence political  and  military,  and  would  have  ex- 
tended his  policy  further  and  to  more  advantage  if  I 
the  English  ministers  had  not  so  abruptly  and  igno- 1 
rantly  interfered  with  his  proceedings.    Finally,  fore- 1 
seeing  that  the  money  he  had  received  would,  being  i 
in  foreign  coin,  create  embarrassment,  he  adopted  i 
an  expedient  which  he  had  before  practised  in  India 
to  obviate  this.     Knowing  that  in  a  British  arniy  a  • 
won-Ierful  variety  of  knowledge  and  vocations,  good] 
and  bad,  may  be  found,  he  secretly  caused  the  coin-  I 
ers  and  die-sinkers  amongst  the  soldiers  to  be  sougiit  i 
out,  and  once  assured  that  no  mischief  was  intended 
them,  it  was  not  difficult  to  persuade  them  to  ac- 
knowledge tlieir  peculiar  talents.     With  these  men 
he  estal^lished  a  secret  mint  at  which  he  coined  gold 
Napoleons,  marking  them  with  a  private  stamp  and 
carefully  preserving  their  just  fineness  and  weight 
with   a  view  of  enabling  the   French  governmejit, 
when  peace  should  be  established,  to  call  them  in 
again.     Ho  thus  avoided  all  the  difficulties  of  ex- 
change, an  J  removed  a  very  fruitful  source  of  quar- 
rels and  ill-will  between  tlie  troops  and  the  country- 
people  and  shopkeepers;  for  the  latter  are  always 
fastidious  in  taking  and  desirous  of  abating  the  cur- 
rent worth  of  strange  coin,  and  the  former  attribute 
to   fraud   any  declination   from  the  value  at  which 
they  receive  tlieir  money.     This  sudden  increase  of 
the  current  coin  tended  also  to  diminish  the  pressure 
necessarily  attendant  tipon  troubled  times. 

Nor  was   his  provident  sagacity  less  eminently 


d'sfiayed  ih  pi-relv  military  matters  thau  in  his  ad 
ministrative  and  political  operations.  I/ur.ng  the 
bad  weather  tie  had  formeu  lai'ge  magazines  at  the 
ports,  examined  the  course  of  the  Adour,  and  care- 
fully meditated  upon  his  future  plans.  I'o  penetrate 
into  France  and  rally  a  great  Bourbon  party  undei 
the  protection  of  his  army  was  tlie  system  he  de- 
sired to  follow;  and  though  the  last  point  depended 
upon  the  political  proceedings  and  successes  of  the 
allied  sovereigns,  the  military  operations  most  suita- 
ble at  the  moment  did  not  clash  with  it.  To  drive 
the  Frencli  army  from  Bayonne  and  either  blockade 
or  besiege  that  place  were  the  first  steps  in  either 
case.  But  this  required  extensive  and  daring  com- 
binations. For  the  fortress  and  its  citadel,  compris- 
ing in  their  circuit  the  confluence  of  the  Nive  and 
the  Adour,  could  not  be  safely  invested  with  less 
than  tliree  times  the  number  necessary  to  resist  the 
garrison  at  any  one  point,  because  the  communica- 
tions of  the  invested  being  short,  internal  and  secure, 
those  of  the  investers  external,  ditlicult  and  unsafe 
it  behooved  that  each  division  should  be  able  to  re- 
sist a  sally  of  the  whole  garrison.  Hence,  though 
reduced  to  the  lowest  point,  the  whole  must  be  so 
numerous  as  seriously  to  weaken  the  forces  operat- 
ing towards  the  interior. 

How  and  where  to  cross  the  Adour  with  a  view 
to  the  investment  was  also  a  subject  of  solicitude 
It  was  a  great  river  with  a  strong  current  and  well 
guarded  by  troops  and  gun-boats  above  Bayonne  ; 
still  greater  was  it  below  the  town ;  there  the  ebb 
tide  ran  seven  miles  an  hour,  there  also  there  were 
gun-boats,  a  sloop  of  war,  and  several  mercliant- 
vessels  which  could  be  armed  and  employed  to  in- 
terrupt the  passage.  The  number  of  pontoons  or 
other  boats  required  to  bridge  the  stream  across  ei- 
ther above  or  below,  and  the  carriage  of  them,  an 
immense  operation  in  itself,  would  inevitably  give 
notice  of  the  design  and  render  it  abortive,  unless 
the  French  army  were  first  driven  away,  and  even 
then  the  garrison  of  Bayonne,  nearly  fifteen  tlieusand 
strong,  might  be  sufficient  to  baffle  the  attempt 
Nevertheless  in  the  face  of  these  difficulties  he  re- 
solved to  pass,  the  means  adopted  being  proportion- 
ate to  the  greatness  of  the  design. 

He  considered  that,  besides  the  difficulty  of  bring- 
ing the  materials  across  the  Nive  and  througli  the 
deep  country  on  each  side  of  that  river,  he  could  not 
throw  his  bridge  above  Bayonne  without  first  driv- 
ing Soult  entirely  from  the  confluents  of  the  Adour 
and  from  the  Adour  itself;  that  when  he  had  effected 
tliis  his  own  communications  between  the  bridge  and 
his  magazines  at  the  sea-ports  would  still  be  difficult 
and  unsafe,  because  his  convoys  would  liave  a  flank 
march,  passing  the  Nive  as  well  as  the  Adour,  and 
liable  to  interruption  from  the  overflowing  cf  those 
rivers;  finally  that  his  means  of  transport  would  be 
unequal  to  the  wear  and  tear  of  the  deep  roads  and 
be  interrupted  by  rain.  But  throwing  his  bridge 
below  the  town  he  would  have  the  Adour  itself  as  a 
harbour,  while  his  land  convoys  used  the  royal 
causeway  leading  close  to  the  river  and  not  liable  to 
be  interrupted  by  weather.  His  line  of  retreat  also 
v/ould  then  be  more  secure  if  any  unforeseen  mis- 
fortune should  render  it  necessary  to  break  up  the 
investment.  He  had  no  fear  that  Soult,  while  re- 
tiring before  the  active  force  he  intended  to  employ 
against  him  on  the  upper  parts  of  the  rivers,  would 
take  his  line  of  retreat  by  the  great  Bordeaux  road 
and  fall  upon  the  investing  force  :  that  road  led  be- 
hind Bayonne  through  the  sandy  wilderness  called 
the  Landes,  into  which  the  French  general  would 
not  care  to  throw  himself,  lest  his  opponent's  opera- 
tions along  the  edge  of  the  desert  should   pri;vciit 


718 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


1  Book  XXIV . 


him  from  ever  gottinu  out.  To  draw  the  attention 
ef  the  French  army  by  an  attack  on  their  left  near 
the  roots  of  tlie  Pyrenees  would  be  sure  to  keep  the 
lower  Adour  free  from  any  formidable  defensive 
force,  because  the  rapidity  and  breadrh  of  the  stream 
there  denied  the  use  of  commoii  j-cntoons,  and  the 
mouth,  about  six  miles  below  'Jay*.;ine_  was  so  bar- 
red with  sand,  so  beaten  by  surg-er  and  so  dilficult 
of  navig^ation  oven  with  the  help  of  *ii-.»  'and-marks, 
8ome  of  wiiich  had  been  removed,  tliat  tiie  French 
would  never  expect  small  vessels  fit  forvconstructing 
a  uridge  could  enter  that  way.  Yet  it  was  thus  lord 
Wellington  designed  to  achieve  his  object.  He  had 
collected  forty  large  sailing  boats  of  from  fifteen  to 
thirty  tons  burthen,  called  "  chasse-maree,"  as  if 
for  the  commissariat  service,  but  he  secretly  loaded 
them  witli  planks  and  other  materials  for  his  bridge. 
These  and  some  gun-boats  he  designed,  with  the  aid 
of  the  navy,  to  run  \ip  the  Adour  to  a  certain  point 
upon  which  he  meant  also  to  direct  the  troops  and 
artillery,  and  tiien  with  hawsers  and  pontoons  form- 
ed into  rafts,  to  tlirow  over  a  covering  body  and  de- 
stroy a  small  battery  near  the  mouth  of  the  river. 
He  trusted  to  the  greatness  and  danger  of  the  at- 
tempt for  success,  and  in  this  he  was  favoured  by 
fortune. 

The  French  trading  vessels  in  the  Adour  had  of- 
fered secretly  to  come  out  upon  licenses  and  enter 
the  service  of  liis  commissariat,  but  he  was  obliged 
to  forego  the  advantage  because  of  the  former  inter- 
ference and  dissent  of  the  English  ministers  about 
the  passports  he  had  previously  granted.  This  add- 
ed greatly  to  the  difficulty  of  the  enterprise.  He 
was  thus  forced  to  maltreat  men  willing  to  be  friends, 
to  prepare  grates  for  heating  shot,  and  a  battery  of 
congreve  rockets  with  which  to  burn  their  vessels 
and  the  sloop  of  war,  or  at  least  to  drive  them  up 
the  river,  after  which  he  proposed  to  protect  his 
bridge  with  tiie  gun-boats  and  a  boom. 

While  he  was  thus  preparing  for  offensive  opera- 
tions the  Fr;inch  general  was  active  in  defensive 
measures.  He  had  fortified  all  the  main  passes  of 
the  rivers  by  the  great  roads  leading  against  his 
left:  but  the  diminution  of  his  force  in  January 
obliged  him  to  witiulraw  his  outposts  from  Anglet, 
which  enabled  lord  Wellington  to  examine  the  whole 
course  of  tiie  Adour  below  Bayonne  and  arrange  for 
the  passage  with  more  facility.  Soult  then,  in  pur- 
suance of  Napoleon's  system  of  warfare,  which 
always  prescribed  a  recourse  to  moral  force  to  cover 
physical  weakness,  immediately  concentrated  his 
left  wing  against  the  allies' right  beyond  the  Nive, 
and  redoubled  that  iiarassing  partisan  warfare  which 
I  have  already  noticed,  endeavouring  to  throw  his 
adversary  entirely  upon  the  defensive.  Thus,  on  the 
26th  of  .January,  Morillo  having  taken  possession 
of  an  advanced  post  near  IMendiondc  not  properly 
belonging  to  him,  Soult,  who  desired  to  ascertain 
the  feelings  of  the  Spaniards  about  the  English  al- 
\ia,nce,  caused  Harispe  under  pretence  of  remon- 
Ptrating  to  sound  him;  he  did  not  respond,  and  Ha- 
rispe then  drove  him,  not  without  a  vigorous  resist- 
ance, from  the  post. 

The  French  n)arshal  had  however  no  hope  of 
checking  the  allies  long  by  these  means.  He  judsfed 
justly  that  Wellington  was  resolved  to  obtain  Bor- 
deaux and  the  line  of  the  Garonne,  and  foreseeing 
that  his  own  line  of  retreat  must  ultimately  be  in  a 
parallel  direction  with  the  Pyrenees,  he  desired  to 
organize  in  time  a  strong  del'cnsive  system  in  the 
country  behind  him,  and  to  cover  Bordeaux  if  possi- 
ble. In  tliis  view  lie  sent  general  Dnricau,  n  native 
of  the  Landes,  to  prepare  an  insurgei  t  levy  in  that 
wildernetrs  ;  and  directed  Maransin  to  the  high  Pyr- 


enees, to  extend  tl.e  inesurrection  of  the  mountain, 
eers  already  commenced  in  the  lower  Pyrenees  by 
Harispe.  The  castle  of  Jaca  was  still  held  by  eight 
hundred  men,  but  they  were  starving,  and  a  convoy 
collected  at  Navarrems  being  stopped  by  the  snow 
in  the  mountain-passes  made  a  surrender  inevitable. 
Better  would  it  have  been  to  have  withdrawn  the 
troops  at  tin  early  period  ;  for  though  the  Spaniards 
would  thus  have  gaintd  access  to  the  rear  of  the 
Frjnch  army,  and  perhaps  ravaged  a  part  of  the 
frontier,  they  could  have  done  no  essential  mischief 
to  the  army  ;  and  their  excesses  would  have  dispos- 
ed the  people  of  those  parts,  who  had  not  yet  felt 
the  benefit  of  lord  Wellington's  politic  discipline, 
to  insurrection. 

At  Bordeaux  there  was  a  small  reserve  command- 
ed by  general  La  Huillier:  Soult  urged  the  minister 
of  war  to  increase  it  with  conscripts  from  the  inte- 
rior. Meanwhile  he  sent  artillery-men  from  Bay- 
onne, ordered  fifteen  hundred  national  guards  to  be 
selected  as  a  garrison  for  the  citadel  of  Blaye,  and 
desired  that  the  Medoc  and  Pute  forts  and  the  bat- 
teries along  the  banks  of  the  Garonne  should  be  put 
in  a  state  of  defence.  The  vessels  in  that  river,  fit 
for  the  purpose,  he  desired  might  be  armed,  and  a 
flotilla  of  fifty  gun-boats  established  below  Bordeaux, 
v/ith  a  like  number  to  navigate  that  river  above  the 
city  as  far  as  Toulouse.  But  these  orders  were  fee- 
bly carried  into  execution  or  entirely  neglected,  for 
there  was  no  public  spirit,  and  treason  and  disallec- 
tion  were  rife  in  the  city. 

On  the  side  of  the  lower  Pyrenees  Soult  enlarced 
and  improved  the  works  of  Navarreins,  and  design- 
ed to  commence  an  intrenched  camp  in  front  of  it. 
The  castle  of  Lourdes  m  the  high  Pyrenees  wns  al- 
ready defensible,  and  he  gave  orders  to  fortify  the 
castle  of  Pau,  thus  providing  a  number  of  support- 
ir.g  points  for  the  retreat  which  he  foresaw.  At 
Mauleon  he  put  on  foot  some  partisan  corps,  and  the 
imperial  commissary  Caffarelli  gave  him  hopetJ  of 
being  able  to  form  a  reserve  of  seven  or  eight  thou- 
sand national  guards,  gendarmes  and  artillery-»iPn 
at  Tarbes.  Dax,  containing  his  principal  depots, 
was  already  being  fortified,  and  the  conimunicatien 
with  it  was  maintained  across  the  rivers  by  the 
bridges  and  bridge-heads  at  Port  de  lanne,  Hastin- 
gue,  Peirehorade  and  Sauveterre ;  but  the  floods  in 
the  beginning  of  February  carried  away  his  bridge 
at  the  Port  de  Lanne,  and  the  communication  be- 
tween Bayonne  and  the  left  of  the  army  was  thus 
interrupted  until  he  established  a  flying  bridge  in 
place  of  the  one  carried  away. 

Such  was  the  situation  of  the  French  general 
when  lord  Wellington  advanced,  and  as  the  fbrnier 
supposed  with  one  hundred  and  twenty  thousand  in- 
fantry and  fifteen  thousand  cavalry,  fiir  he  knew  no- 
thing of  the  various  political  and  financial  difficul- 
ties which  had  reduced  the  English  general's  p.^wer 
and  prevented  all  the  reinforcements  he  cxp'Ctcd 
from  joining  him.  His  emissaries  told  him  that 
Clinton's  force  was  actually  broken  up,  and  the  Brit- 
ish part  in  march  to  join  Wellington  ;  that  the  gar- 
risons of  Carthagena,  Cadiz  and  Ceuta  were  o\\  tiie 
point  of  arriving,  and  that  reinforcements  were  com- 
ing from  England  and  Portugal.  This  informition 
made  him  conclude  that  there  was  no  intentiin  of 
pressing  the  war  in  Catalonia,  and  that  all  the  al- 
lied troop. s  would  be  united  and  march  against  h\m  ; 
wherefore,  with  more  earnestness  than  before,  he 
urged  that  Suchet  should  be  ordered  to  join  him, 
that  their  united  forces  might  form  a  "dike  against 
the  torrent"  which  threatened  to  overwhelm  the 
south  of  France.  The  real  power  opposed  to  him 
was  however  very  mucli  below  his  calculations.   TliC 


1814.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


719 


twenty  thousand  British  and  Portuguese  reinforce- 
msiitfi  promised  had  not  arrived,  Clinton's  army  was 
BtiU  in  Catalonia  ;  and  tliough  it  is  im;)ossible  to  fix 
the  exact  numbors  of  the  ^Spaniards,  their  regular 
forces  available,  and  tliat  only  partially  and  with 
great  caution  on  account  of  their  licentious  conduct, 
did  not  exceed  the  following'  approximation  : 

Twelve  thousand  Gallicians,  under  Freyre,  inclu- 
ding Carlos  d'Espafia's  division  ;  four  thousand  un- 
der iMoriUo  ;  six  thousand  Andalusians,  under  O'- 
Donfi ;  eight  thousand  of  Del  Parque's  troops,  un- 
der the  prince  of  Anglona.     In  all  thirty  thousand. 

The  Anglo-Portuguese  present  under  arms  were 
by  the  morning  states  on  the  loth  of  February,  the 
day  on  which  the  advance  commenced,  about  seven- 
ty thousand  men  and  officers  of  all  arms,  nearly  ten 
thousand  being  cavalry. 

The  whole  force,  exclusive  of  Mina's  bands  which 
were  spread  as  we  have  seen  from  Navarre  to  the 
borders  of  Catalonia,  was,  therefore,  one  hundred 
thousand  men  and  officers,  with  one  hundred  pieces 
of  field  artillery  of  which  ninety-five  were  Anglo- 
Portuguese. 

It  is  difficult  to  fix  with  precision  the  number  of 
the  French  army  at  this  period,  because  the  impe- 
rial muster-rolls,  owMng  to  the  troubled  state  of  the 
emperor's  aff'airs,  were  either  not  continued  beyond 
December,  1813,  or  have  been  lost.  But  from 
Soult's  correspondence  and  other  documents  it  would 
appear,  that  exclusive  of  his  garrisons,  his  reserves 
and  detachments  at  Bordeaux  and  in  the  department 
of  the  high  Pyrenees,  exclusive  also  of  the  con- 
scripts of  the  second  levy  which  were  now  begin- 
ning to  arrive,  he  could  place  in  line  of  battle  about 
thirty-five  thousand  soldiers  of  all  arms,  three  thou- 
sand being  cavalry,  with  forty  pieces  of  artillery. 
But  Bayonne  alone,  without  reckoning  the  fortress- 
es of  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port  and  Navarreins,  occu- 
pied twenty-eight  thousand  of  the  allies  ;  and  by 
this  and  other  drains  lord  Wellington's  superiority 
in  the  field  was  so  reduced,  that  his  penetrating 
into  France,  that  France  which  liad  made  all  Europe 
tremble  at  her  arms,  must  be  viewed  as  a  surpri- 
sing example  of  courage  and  fine  conduct,  military 
and  political. 

PASSAGE  OF  THE  GAVES. 

In  the  second  week  of  February  the  weather  set 
in  with  a  strong  frost,  the  roads  became  practica- 
ble, and  the  English  general,  eagerly  seizing  the 
long  expected  opportunity,  advanced  at  the  moment 
when  general  Paris  had  again  marched  with  the 
convoy  from  Navarreins  to  make  a  last  efibrt  for  the 
relief  of  Jaca.  But  the  troops  were  at  this  time  re- 
ceiving the  clothing  which  had  been  so  long  delayed 
in  England,  and  the  regiments  wanting  the  means 
of  carriage  marched  to  the  stores ;  the  English 
general's  first  design  was  therefore  merely  to  threat- 
en the  French  left  and  turn  it  by  the  sources  of  the 
rivers  with  Hill's  corps,  which  was  to  march  by  the 
roots  of  the  Pyrenees,  while  Beresford  kept  the  cen- 
tre in  check  upon  the  lower  parts  of  the  same  rivers. 
Soult's  attention  would  thus  he  hoped  be  drawn  to 
that  side,  while  the  passage  of  the  Adour  was  being 
made  below  Bayonne.  And  it  would  seem  that,  un- 
certain if  he  should  be  able  to  force  the  passage  of 
the  tributary  rivers  with  his  right,  he  intended,  if 
his  bridge  was  happily  thrown,  to  push  his  main 
operations  on  that  side  and  thus  turn  the  Gaves  by 
the  right  bank  of  the  Adour  :  a  fine  conception,  by 
which  his  superiority  of  numbers  would  have  best 
availed  him  \o  seize  Dax  and  the  Port  de  Lanne  and 
cut  Soult  oft  from  Bordeaux. 

On  the  12th  and  loth,  Hill's  corps   which  inclu- 


ding Picton's  division  and  fi\e  regiments  of  cavalry 
furnished  twenty  thousand  combatants  witii  sixteen 
guns,  being  relieved  by  the  sixth  and  seventh  divis- 
ions in  front  of  ^lousserolles  and  on  the  Adour,  was 
concentrated  about  IJrcuray  and  Haspaireii.  The 
14th,  it  marched  in  two  columns:  one  by  I;onloc,to 
drive  the  French  posts  beyond  the  Joyeuse  ;  an- 
other by  the  great  road  of  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port, 
against  Harispe  who  was  at  Hcllette  This  second 
column  had  the  Ursouia  mountain  on  the  right ;  and 
a  third,  composed  of  Jlorillo's  Spaniards,  having 
that  mountain  on  its  left,  marched  from  La  Houssoa 
against  the  same  point.  Harispe,  who  had  onlj 
three  brigades,  principally  conscripts,  retired  skir- 
mishing in  the  direction  of  St.  Palais  and  took  a 
position  lor  the  night  at  Meharin.  Not  more  than 
thirty  men  on  each  side  were  hurt,  but  the  line  of 
the  Joyeuse  was  turned  by  the  allies,  the  direct 
communication  with  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port  cut,  end 
that  place  was  immediately  invested  by  Mina's  bat- 
talions. 

On  the  15th,  Hill,  leaving,  the  fifty-seventh  regi- 
ment at  Hellette  to  observe  the  road  to  St.  .lean 
Pied  de  Port,  marched  through  Meharin  upon  Gar- 
ris,  eleven  miles  distant,  but  that  road  being  im- 
practicable lor  artillery  the  guns  moved  by  Armen- 
daritz,  more  to  the  right.  Harispe's  rear  guard  v.as 
overtaken  and  pushed  back  fighting,  and  meanwhile 
lord  Wellington  directed  Beresford  to  send  a  bri- 
gade of  the  seventh  division  from  the  h.eights  of  La 
Costa  across  the  Gambouri  to  the  Bastiiie  de  Cle- 
rence.  The  front  being  thus  extended  from  Urt  by 
Briscons,  the  Bastide  and  Isturitz,  towards  Garris, 
a  distance  of  more  than  twenty  miles,  v.as  too  at- 
tenuated ;  whererore  he  caus-ed  the  fourtii  division 
to  occupy  La  Costa  in  support  of  the  troops  at  the 
Bastide.  At  the  same  time  learning  that  the  I'  rcnch 
had  weakened  their  force  at  3Iousserolles,  and  think- 
ing that  might  be  to  concentrate  on  the  heights  of 
Anglet,  which  would  have  frustrated  his  plan  for 
throwing  a  bridge  over  the  Adour,  he  directed  Hope 
secretly  to  occupy  the  back  of  those  heights  in  force, 
and  prevent  any  intercourse  between  Bayonne  and 
the  country. 

Soult  knew  of  the  intended  operations  against  his 
left  on  the  12th  ;  but  hearing  the  allies  had  collect- 
ed boats  and  constructed  a  fresh  battery  near  Urt  on 
the  upper  Adour,  and  that  the  pontoons  had  reached 
Urcuray,  he  thought  lord  Wellington  designed  to 
turn  his  left  with  Hill's  corps,  to  press  him  on  the 
Bidouze  with  Beresford's,  and  to  keep  the  garrison 
of  Bayonne  in  check  with  the  Spaniards  while  Hope 
crossed  th.e  Adour  above  that  fortress.  Wherefore, 
on  the  14th,  when  Hill's  movement  commenced,  he 
repaired  to  Passorou  near  the  Bastide  de  Cltrcnce 
and  made  liis  dispositions  to  dispute  the  passage, 
first  of  the  Bidouze  and  the  Soissons  or  Gave  do 
Mauleon,  and  then  of  the  Gave  d'Uloron.  He  had 
four  divisions  in  hand,  with  which  he  occupied  a 
position,  on  the  15th,  along  the  Bidouze  ;  and  lie  r€^ 
called  general  Paris,  posting  him  on  the  road  be- 
tween St.  Palais  and  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port,  with  a 
view  to  watch  Mina's  battalions  which  he  supposed 
to  be  more  numerous  than  they  really  were.  Jaca 
thus  abandoned  capitulated  on  the  lith,  the  garri- 
son returning  to  France  on  condition  of  not  serving 
until  exchanged.  This  part  of  the  capitulation  it 
appears  was  broken  by  the  French  ;  but  the  recent 
violation  by  the  Spaniards  of  the  convi'nlion  made 
with  the  deluded  garrisons  of  Lcrida,  Mequinenza 
and  Monzon  furnished  a  re{)Iy. 

Harispe,  having  Paris  under  his  command  and 
being  supported  by  Pierre  Soult  with  a  brigode  of 
light  cavalry,  now  covered  the  road  t'loia  St    Jeaj 


720 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


lUooK  XXIV. 


Pied  de  Port  with  his  lefu,  and  the  upper  line  of  the 
Bidouze  with  his  right.  Lower  down  tiiat  river, 
Villatte  occupied  Ilharre,  Taujiin  was  on  the  heiglits 
of  IJergoney  bolow  Villatte,  and  Foy  guarded  the 
banks  of"  the  river  from  Came  to  its  confluence  with 
the  A'.iour.  The  rest  of  tiie  army  remained  under 
D'Erlon  on  the  right  of  the  latter  river. 

COMBAT    OF    GARRIS. 

Harispe  had  just  taken  a  position  in  advance  of 
the  Bidouze,  on  a  height  caWed  the  Garris  mountain 
which  stretched  to  !St.  Palais,  when  his  rear-guard 
came  plunging  into  a  deep  ravine  in  his  front,  closo- 
ly  followed  by  tlie  ligiit  troops  of  the  second  divis- 
ion. Upon  the  parallel  counter-ridge  thus  gained 
by  the  allies  general  Hill's  corps  was  immediately 
established,  and  though  the  evening  was  beginning 
to  close  the  skirmishers  descended  into  the  ravine, 
and  two  guns  played  over  it  upon  Harispe's  troops. 
Those  last  to  the  number  of  four  thousand  were 
drawH  up  on  the  opposite  mountain,  and  in  this 
9tate  of  aii'airs  Wellington  arrived.  Ha  was  anx- 
ious to  turn  the  line  of  the  Bidouze  before  Soult 
2ould  strengthen  himself  there,  and  seeing  that  the 
communication  with  general  Paris  by  St.  Palais 
was  not  well  maintained,  sent  Morillo  by  a  flank 
march  along  the  ridge  now  occupied  by  the  allies 
towardo  that  place ;  then  menacing  the  enemy's 
centre  witli  Lecor's  Portuguese  division,  he  at  the 
8ume  time  directed  the  thirty-ninth  and  twenty- 
eigiith  regiments  forming  Pringle's  brigade  to  at- 
tack, observing  with  a  concise  energy,  "  You  must 
take  the  hill  before  dark." 

The  expression  caught  the  attention  of  the  troops, 
and  it  was  repeated  by  colonel  O'Callaghan  as  he 
and  general  Pringle  placed  themselves  at  the  head 
of  the  thirty-ninth,  which,  followed  by  the  twenty- 
eighth,  rushed  with  loud  and  prolonged  shouts  into 
the  ravine.  The  French  fire  was  violent,  Pringle 
ftil  wounded,  and  most  of  the  mounted  othcers  had 
tlieir  horses  killed;  but  the  troops,  covered  by  the 
thick  wood,  gained  with  little  loss  the  summit  of 
the  Garris  rouuntain,  on  the  right  of  the  enemy, 
who  thought  from  the  shouting  tliat  a  larger  force 
was  coming  against  them  and  retreated.  The  thir- 
ty-nintli  tlien  wheeled  to  their  own  riglit,  intending 
to  sweep  the  summit;  but  soon  the  French  discov- 
ering their  error  came  back  at  a  charging  pace,  and 
receiving  a  volley  without  flinching  tried  the  bay- 
onet. Colonel  O'Callaghan,  distinguished  by  his 
strength  and  courage,  received  two  strokes  of  that 
weapon,  but  repaid  them  with  fatal  power  in  each 
instance ;  and  the  French,  nearly  all  conscripts, 
were  beaten  off.  Twice  however  they  came  back, 
and  fought  until  the  fire  of  the  twenty-eighth  was 
bjginning  to  be  felt,  when  Harisj)e,  seeing  the  re- 
mainder of  the  s-^cond  division  ready  to  support  the 
attack,  Lecor's  Portuguese  advancing  against  the 
centre,  and  the  Spaniards  in  march  towards  St. 
Palais,  retreated  to  that  town,  and  calling  in  Paris 
from  the  side  of  .Mauleon  immediately  broke  down 
tile  bridges  over  the  Bidouze.  He  lost  on  this  day 
nearly  live  hundred  men,  of  whom  two  hundred 
wery  prisoners,  and  he  would  hardly  have  escaped 
if  Morillo  had  not  br^en  slow.  The  allies  lost  only 
one  hundred  and  sixty,  of  whom  not  more  than  fifty 
fell  at  Garris,  and  these  chiefly  in  the  bayonet  con- 
test, for  the  trees  and  the  darkness  screened  them 
at  first. 

During  these  operations  at  Garris,  Picton  moved 
from  Bonloc  to  Ortque  on  Hill's  left,  menacing  Vil- 
latte ;  but  though  Beresford's  scouting  parties,  act- 
ing on  the  left  of  Picton,  approached  the  Bidouze 
itcing  Taupin  and  Foy,  his  principal  force  remain- 


ed on  the  Gambouri,the  pivot  upon  which  Wo'.lir.r- 
ton's  line  hinged,  while  tiie  right  sweeping  forward 
turned  the  French  positions.  Foy,  iiowevor,  thougQ 
in  retreat,  observed  the  movement  of  tiie  fourth  and 
seventh  divisions  on  the  heigiits  between  the  iSive 
and  tli^^dour,  pointing  their  march  as  he  thought 
towards  the  French  leil,  and  his  reports  to  that 
efiect  reached  Soult  at  the  moment  that  general 
Blondeu  gave  notice  of  the  investment  of  St.  .lean 
Pied  de  Port.  The  French  general  being  thus  con- 
vinced that  lord  Wellington's  design  was  not  to  pass 
the  Adour  above  Bayonne,  but  to  gain  the  line  of 
that  river  by  constantly  turning  the  French  left, 
made  new  dispositions. 

The  line  of  the  Bidouze  was  strong,  if  he  could 
have  supported  Harispe  at  St.  Palais,  and  guarded 
at  the  same  time  the  passage  of  the  Soissciis  at 
Mauleon;  but  this  would  have  extended  his  front, 
already  too  wide,  wherefore  he  resolved  to  abandon 
both  the  Bidouze  and  the  Soissons,  and  take  tiie  line 
of  the  Gave  d'Oloron,  placing  his  right  at  Piereho- 
rade  and  his  left  at  Navarriens.  In  tliis  view  D'Er- 
lon  was  ordered  to  pass  the  Adour  iy  the  flying 
bridge  at  the  Port  de  Lanne,  and  tr.ke  post  on  the 
left  bank  of  that  river,  whi''-  FT;ir'i-re,  having  Paris' 
infantry  still  attached  to  his  o.vibion,  defended  the 
Gave  de  Mauleon  and  pushed  parties  on  his  left  to- 
wards the  town  of  that  name.  Villatte  occupied 
Sauveterre,  where  the  bridge  was  fortified  with  a 
head  on  the  left  bank,  and  from  thence  Taupin  lined 
the  right  bank  to  Sordes,  near  the  confluence  of  the 
Gave  de  Pou.  Foy  occupied  the  works  of  the  bridge- 
head at  Peirehorade  and  Hastingue,  guarding  that 
river  to  its  confluence  with  the  Adour;  this  line 
was  prolonged  by  D'Erlon  towards  Dax,  but  Soult 
still  kept  advanced  parties  on  tlie  lower  Bidouze  at 
the  different  intrcnclied  passages  of  that  river.  One 
brigade  of  cavalry  was  in  reserve  at  Sauveterre, 
another  distributed  along  the  line.  Hend-quarters 
were  transported  to  Orthez,  and  the  park  of  artil- 
lery to  Aire.  The  principal  magazines  of  ammu- 
nition were  however  at  Bayonne,  Navarreins  ond 
Dax  ;  and  the  French  general,  seeing  thut  his  com- 
munications with  all  these  places  were  likely  to  be 
intercepted  before  he  could  remove  his  stores,  anti- 
cipated distress,  and  wrote  to  the  minister  of  war  to 
form  new  depots. 

On  the  16th,  lord  Wellington  repaired  the  broken 
bridges  of  St.  Palais,  after  a  skirmish  in  which  a 
few  men  were  wounded.  Hill  then  crossed  the  Bi- 
douze, the  cavalry  and  artillery  by  the  repaired 
bridge,  the  iniantry  by  the  fords  ;  but  tiic  day  being 
spent  in  the  operation  the  head  of  the  column  only 
marched  beyond  St.  Palais.  JMeanwhile  the  fourth 
and  part  of  the  seventh  divisions  occupied  the  Bas- 
tide  de  Clcrence  en  the  right  of  the  Joyeuse,  and 
the  light  division  came  up  in  support  to  the  heights 
of  T.a  Costn,  on  the  left  bank  of  that  river. 

The  17th,  Hill,  marching  at  eight  o'clock,  passed 
through  Domezain  towards  the  Soissons,  while  the 
third  division  advancing  /rom  Oreque  on  his  left 
passed  bv  Masparraute  to  the  heights  of  Soiiiber- 
rautc.  both  corps  convergirg  u])on  general  Paris, 
who  was  in  position  at  Arriveriette  to  defend  the 
Soissons  above  its  confluence  with  the  (Jave  d'Olor- 
on. The  French  outposts  were  immediately  driven 
across  the  CJave.  General  Paris  attempted  to  des- 
troy the  bridge  of  Arriveriette,  but  lord  Wellington 
was  too  quick;  the  ninety-second  regiment,  covered 
by  the  fire  of  some  guns,  crossed  at  a  ford  above 
the  bridge,  and  beating  two  French  battalions  from 
the  village  secured  the  passisge.  The  allies  then 
halted  for  the  day  near  Arriveriette,  having  march- 
ed onlv  five  miles,  and  lost   one   niau  killed  with 


J8U. 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


721 


twenty-tireo  wounded.  Paris  relinquished  the  Sois- 
fons,  but  remained  between  the  two  rivers  during 
the  niglit,  and  retired  on  the  morning  of  the  Ibth. 
The  allies  then  seized  the  great  road,  which  here 
runs  from  Sauveterre  to  Navarreins  up  the  left  bank 
of  the  Oloron  Gave. 

Harispe,  Villatte  and  Paris,  supported  by  a  bri- 
gade of  cavalry,  were  now  at  Sauveterre  occupying 
the  bridge-head  on  the  left  bank,  Taupin's  division 
was  opposite  the  Bastide  de  Beam  lower  down  on 
the  right,  Foy  on  the  right  of  Taupin,  and  D'Erlon 
on  the  lefl  of  the  Adour  above  its  confluence  with 
the  Gave  de  Pau.  Meanwhile  the  fourth  division 
advanced  to  Bidache  on  the  Bidouze,  and  the  light 
division  folh  wed  in  support  to  tlic  Bastide  de  Cle- 
rence,  the  seventh  division  remaining  as  before, 
partly  in  that  vicinity,  partly  extended  on  the  left 
to  the  Adour.  The  cavalry  of  the  centre,  under  sir 
Stapleton  Cotton,  arrived  also  on  the  banks  of  the 
Bidouze,  connecting  tlie  fourth  with  the  third  divis- 
ion at  Somberraute.  In  this  state  of  affairs  Hill 
Bent  3Iorillo  up  the  Soissons  to  guard  the  fords  as 
high  as  Nabas,  then  spreading  Fane's  cavalry  and 
he  British  and  Portuguese  infantry  between  that 
river  and  the  Gave  d'Oloron,  he  occupied  ail  the 
villages  along  the  road  to  Navarreins,  and  at  the 
Bam3  time  cannonaded  the  bridge-head  of  Sauve- 
terre. 

Soult,  thrown  from  the  commencement  of  the 
operations  entirely  -tpon  the  defensive,  was  now  at 
R  loss  to  discover  his  adversary's  object.  The  situ- 
ation of  the  seventh  division,  and  the  march  of  'the 
f^irth  and  light  divisions,  led  him  to  think  his 
works  at  Hastingue  and  Peirehorade  v/ould  be  as- 
sailed. The  weakness  of  his  line,  he  having  only 
Tiupin's  division  to  guard  the  river  between  Saave- 
t&rre  and  Sordes  a  distance  of  ten  miles,  made  him 
foar  the  passage  of  the  Gave  would  be  forced  near 
the  Bistide  de  Beam,  to  which  post  there  was  a 
pool  road  from  Came  and  Bidache.  On  the  other 
han'l.  the  prolongation  of  Hill's  line  up  the  Gave  to- 
wards Navarreins  indicated  a  design  to  march  on 
Pau,  or  it  might  be  to  keep  him  in  check  on  the 
Gaves  while  the  camp  at  Bayonne  was  assaulted. 
In  this  uncertainty  he  sent  Pierre  Soult,  with  a  cav- 
alry brigade  and  two  battalions  of  infantry,  to  act 
between  Oloron  and  Pau,  and  keep  open  a  commu- 
nication with  the  partisan  corps  forming  at  3Iau- 
leon.  That  done  he  decided  to  hold  the  Gaves  as 
long  as  he  could,  and  when  they  were  forced,  to 
abandon  the  defensive,  concentrate  his  whole  force 
at  Orthez,  and  fall  suddenly  upon  the  first  of  the 
allies'  converging  columns  that  approached  him. 


CHAPTER  11. 

Lord  Ws-llin^ton  arrp«ts  his  moveiii  nt»  and  rptiirn?  in  person 
III  St  JpHH  de.  Lnz  to  throw  his  biidge  over  the  Adour — I- 
prt-veiited  bv  bad  wtHther  and  return-'  to  the  GavV  de  Maii- 
ie  >n — Fassag-e  of  the  Adour  by  sir  John  Hopi — DitTictilty 
of  the  ooi-ration* — Thf  llotilla  passes  he  bar  and  enter'^  the 
river — The  Fren  h  ^■•Uv  from  Ba\on'ie,  but  are  rejiul-ed, 
and  the  slupend.nii  liri  lofe  is  cast — Citadel  invested  nftt-r  a 
severe  artion — Lord  Wt^llino-ton.  parses  the  (iave  tt'Oloron 
hi\(\  iiivesl'i  Navarreins — Soult  ronientrates  his  army  at  Or- 
thez— Beresfiid  pa-ses  the  (iive  de  Pan  near  Peiiehonde — 
IJaltk'  of  Or  h^^ — S  juU  rhanges  his  line  of  operaiions — Cuni- 
bnt  of  Air. O  jservalions. 

The  French  general's  various  conjectures  em- 
braced every  project  but  the  true  one  of  the  English 
general.  The  latter  did  indeed  design  to  keep  him 
in  check  upon  the  rivers,  not  to  obtain  an  opportu- 
nity of  assaulting  the  camp  of  Bayonne,  but  to 
th.-ow  his  atupa.iious  bridge  over  the  Adour;  yet 
47 


were  his  combinations  so  made  that  failing  in  that 
he  could  still  pursue  hip  operations  on  the  Gaves. 
When  therefore  he  had  established  his  olt'eusive  line 
strongly  beyond  the  Soissons  and  the  Bidouze,  and 
knew  that  his  pontoon  train  was  well  advanced  to- 
wards Garris,he  on  the  19th  returned  rapidly  to  St. 
Jean  de  Luz.  Every  thing  there  depending  on  man 
was  ready  ;  but  the  weather  was  boisterous  with 
snow  for  two  days,  and  Wellington,  fearful  of  letting 
Soult  strengthen  himself  on  the  Gave  d'Oloron,  re- 
turned on  the  21st  to  Garris,  having  decided  to  press 
his  operations  on  that  side  in  person,  and  leave  sir 
John  Hope  and  admiral  Penrose  the  charge  of  ef- 
fecting 

THE  PASSAGE  OF  THE  ADOUR. 

The  heights  of  Anglet  had  been  occupied  since 
the  15th  by  the  guards  and  Germans,  small  parties 
were  cautiously  pushed  towards  the  river  througli 
the  pine  forest  called  t!ie  wood  of  Bayonne,  and  the 
fifth  division,  now  commanded  by  general  Colville, 
occupied  Bussussary  and  the  bridge  of  Urdains.  On 
the  21st,  Colville  relieved  the  sixth  division  in  the 
blockade  of  Mousserolles  on  the  right  of  the  Nive. 
To  replace  these  troops  at  Bussussary,  Freyre'a 
Spaniards  passed  the  Bidassoa,but  the  Andalusians, 
and  Del  Parque's  troops  and  the  heavy  British  and 
Portuguese  cavalry  were  still  retained  within  the 
frontiers  of  Spain.  Sir  John  Hope  had  therefore 
only  two  British  and  two  Spanish  divisions,  three 
independent  brigades  of  Anglo-Portuguese  infantry 
and  Vandeleur's  brigade  of  cavalry,  furnishing  alto- 
gether about  twenty-eight  thousand  men  and  officers 
with  twenty  pieces  of  artillery.  There  were  how- 
ever two  regiments  which  had  been  sent  to  the  rear 
sick,  and  several  others  expected  from  England  des- 
tined to  join  him. 

In  the  night  of  the  22d,  the  first  division,  six 
eighteen-pounders  and  the  rocket  battery  were  cau 
tiously  filed  from  the  causeway  near  Anglet  towards 
the  Adour;  but  the  road  was  deep  and  heavy.  aTid 
one  of  the  guns  falling  into  a  ditch  delayed  the 
march.  Nevertheless  at  daybreak  the  whole  reach- 
ed some  sand-downs  which  extended  behind  the  pine 
forest  to  the  river.  The  French  piquets  were  then 
driven  into  the  intrenched  camp  at  Beyris,  tie  pon- 
toon train  and  the  field  artillery  were  brouglit  down 
to  the  Adour  opposite  to  the  village  of  Boucaut,  and 
the  eighteen-pounders  were  placed  in  battery  on  the 
bank.  Tl>e  light  troops  meanwhile  closed  to  tiie 
edge  of  the  marsh  which  covered  the  right  of  the 
French  camp,  and  Carlos  d'Espana's  division  taking 
post  on  the  heights  of  Anglet,  in  concert  with  the 
independent  brigades,  which  were  at  Arcangues  and 
the  bridge  of  Urdai?"s,  attracted  the  enemy's  atten- 
tion Dy  false  attacks  which  were  prolonged  beyond 
the  Nive  by  the  fifth  division. 

It  was  intended  that  the  arrival  of  the  gun-boats 
and  chasse-marees  at  the  mouth  of  the  Adour  should 
have  been  simultaneous  with  that  of  the  troopji ;  but 
the  wind  having  continued  contrary  none  were  to  be 
seen,  and  sir  John  Hope,  whose  firmness  no  untoward 
event  could  ever  shake,  resolved  to  attempt  the  pas- 
sage with  the  army  alone.  The  French  flotilla 
opened  its  fire  on  his  columns  about  nine  o'clock  ; 
his  artillery  and  rockets  retorted  upon  the  French 
gun-boats  and  the  sloop  of  war  so  fiercely  that  three 
of  the  fi)rmer  were  destroyed,  and  the  sloop  so  hard- 
ly handled,  that  about  one  o'clock  the  whole  took 
refuge  higher  up  the  river.  Meanwhile  sixty  men 
of  the  guards  were  rowed  in  a  pontoon  across  the 
mouth  of  the  river  in  the  face  of  a  French  piquet, 
which,  seemingly  bewildered,  retired  without  firing. 
A  rail  was  then  formed  with  the  remainder  of  the 


722 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XXIV 


ponf  ons,  and  a  hawser  being  stretched  across,  six 
hundred  of  the  guards  and  the  sixtieth  regiment, 
with  a  part  of  tlie  rocket  battery,  the  whole  under 
colonel  f5topford,  passed,  yet  slowly,  and  at  slack- 
water  only,  for  the  tide  ran  strongly  and  the  waters 
were  wide. 

During  this  operation  general  Thouvenot,  de- 
ceived by  spies  and  prisoners,  thought  tliat  the  light 
division  was  with  Hope  as  well  as  the  first  division, 
and  that  tifteen  thousand  men  were  embarked  at  St. 
Jean  de  Luz  to  land  between  Capo  Breton  and  the 
Adour.  Wherefiire  fearing  to  endanger  his  garrison 
by  sending  a  strong  force  to  any  distance  down  the 
river,  when  he  heard  Stopford's  detachment  was  on 
the  right  bank,  he  detacued  only  two  battalions  un- 
der general  JMacomble  to  ascertain  the  state  of  af- 
fairs, for  tlie  pine  forest  and  a  great  bending  of  the 
fiver  prevented  him  from  obtaining  any  view  from 
Bayonne.  iMacomble  made  a  show  of  attacking  Stop- 
ford  :  but  the  latter,  flanked  by  the  field-artillery 
from  the  left  bank,  received  him  with  a  discharge 
of  rockets,  projectiles  which  like  the  elephants  in 
ancient  warfare  often  turn  upon  their  own  side. 
This  time,  however,  amenable  to  their  directors, 
they  smote  the  French  column  and  it  f2ed,  amazed, 
and  witli  aloss  of  thirty  wounded.  It  is  nevertheless 
obvious  that  if  Thouvenot  had  kept  strong  guards, 
with  a  field-battery,  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Adour, 
sir  Joiin  Hope  could  not  have  passed  over  the  troops 
in  pontoons,  nor  could  any  vessels  have  crossed  the 
bar;  no  resource  save  that  of  disembarking  troops 
between  the  river  and  Cape  Breton  would  then  have 
remained.  This  error  was  fatal  to  the  French.  The 
British  continued  to  pass  all  nifj-ht,  and  until  twelve 
o'clock  on  the  24i,h,  when  the  flotilla  was  seen  under 
a  press  of  sail  making  with  a  strong  breeze  for  the 
mouth  of  the  river. 

To  enter  the  Adour  is  from  the  flatness  of  the 
coast  never  an  easy  task  :  it  was  now  most  difficult, 
because  the  high  winds  of  the  preceding  days  had 
raised  a  great  sea,  and  the  enemy  had  removed  one 
of  tlie  guiding  flag-staves  by  which  the  navigation 
was  ordinarily  directed.  In  front  of  tlie  flotilla 
came  the  boats  of  the  men-of-war,  and  ahead  of  all 
the  naval  captain,  O'Reilly,  ran  his  craft,  a  chosen 
Spanish  vessel^  into  the  midst  of  the  breakers, 
which  rolling  in  a  frightful  manner  over  the  bar 
dashed  her  on  to  the  beach.  That  brave  officer, 
stretched  senseless  on  the  shore,  would  have  perished 
with  his  crew  but  for  the  ready  succour  of  the  sol- 
diers; however  a  few  only  were  drowned,  and  the 
remainder  with  an  intrepid  spirit  launched  their  boat 
again  to  aid  the  passage  of  the  troops  which  was 
still  going  on.  O'Reilly  was  followed,  and  success- 
fully, Ijy  lieutenant  Debenham  in  a  six-oared  cutter; 
but  the  tide  was  falling,  wherefore  the  remainder 
of  the  boats,  the  impossibility  of  passing  until  high 
water  being  evident,  drew  ofl^,  and  a  pilot  was 
landed  to  direct  the  line  of  navigation  by  concerted 
eignals. 

When  the  water  rose  again  the  crews  were  prom- 
ised rewards  in  proportion  to  their  successful  dar- 
ing, and  the  whole  flotilla  approached  in  close  order; 
but  with  it  came  black  clouds  and  a  driving  gale 
which  covered  the  line  of  coast  with  a  rough  tum- 
bling sea,  dashing  and  foaming  without  an  interval 
of  dark  water  to  mark  the  entrance  of  the  river. 
The  men-of-war's  bonts  first  drew  near  this  terrible 
line  of  surge,  and  Mr,  Bloye  of  the  Lyra,  liaving 
i>\\e  chief  pilot  with  him,  heroically  led  into  it; 
but  in  an  >nstant  his  barge  was  engulfed,  and  he  and 
all  w;t!i  him  were  drowned,  'i'lie  Lyra's  boat  thus 
ewallovved  up,  the  following  vessels  swerved  from 
th^ir  course,  and  shooting  up  to  the  right  and  lefl 


kept  hovering  undecided  on  the  edge  of  the  torment- 
ed waters.  Suddenly  lieutenant  Cheyne  of  tliR 
Woodlark  pulled  ahead,  and  strikirig  tlie  right  line, 
with  courage  and  fortune  combined,  safely  passed 
the  bar.  The  wind  then  lulle(i,  tiie  waves  as  if  con- 
quered abated  somewhat  of  tiieir  rage,  and  the  ciias- 
se-marees,  manned  with  Spanish  seamen  but  having 
an  engineer  officer  with  a  party  of  sappers  in  each, 
who  compelled  them  to  follow  the  men-of-war's 
boats,  came  plunging  one  after  another  throiigh  tho 
huge  breakers,  and  reached  the  point  designed  for 
the  bridge.  Thus  was  achieved  this  perilous  aitd 
glorious  exploit ;  but  captain  Elliot  of  the  Martial, 
witli  his  launch  and  crew  and  three  transports' 
boats,  perished  close  to  the  shore,  in  despite  of  the 
most  violent  eflbrts  made  by  the  troops  to  save 
them  ;  three  other  vessels,  cast  on  tlie  beach,  lost 
part  of  their  crews;  and  one  large  chasse-marce, 
full  of  men,  after  passing  the  line  of  surf  safely,  was 
overtaken  by  a  swift  bellying  wave  which  breaking 
on  her  deck  dashed  her  to  pieces. 

The  whole  of  the  first  division  and  Bradford's  Por- 
tuguese, in  all  eight  thousand  men,  being  now  on 
the  right  bank,  took  post  on  the  sand-hills  for  the 
night.  The  next  morning,  sweeping  in  a  half  circle 
round  the  citadel  and  its  intrenchments,  they  placed 
their  left  on  the  Adour  above  the  fortress,  and  their 
right  on  the  same  river  belov/  the  place  ;  for  the 
water  here  made  such  a  bend  in  their  favour  tiiat 
their  front  was  little  more  than  two  miles  wide,  and 
for  the  most  part  covered  bj'  a  marshy  ravine.  This 
nice  operation  was  effected  without  opposition,  be- 
cause the  intrenched  camps,  menaced  by  the  troops 
on  the  other  side  of  the  Adour,  were  so  enormous 
that  Thouvenot's  force  was  scarcely  sufficient  to 
maintain  them.  Meanwhile  tlie  bridge  was  con- 
structed, about  three  miles  below  Bayonne,  at  a 
place  were  the  river  was  contracted  to  eiglit  hun- 
dred feet  by  strong  retaining  walls,  built  with  the 
view  of  sweeping  away  the  bar  by  increasing  the 
force  of  the  current.  The  plan  of  the  bridge  and 
boom  were  the  conception  of  colonel  Sturgeon  and 
major  Todd,  but  the  execution  was  confided  ei/tirely 
to  the  latter,  who,  with  a  mind  less  brilliant 
than  Sturgeon's  but  more  indefatigable,  very  ably 
and  usefully  served  his  country  throughout  this 
war. 

Twenty-six  of  the  chasse-marees,  moored  head 
and  stern  at  distances  of  forty  feet,  reckoning  from 
centre  to  centre,  were  bound  together  with  ropes, 
two  tliick  cables  were  then  carried  loosely  across 
their  decks,  and  the  ends  being  cast  over  the  walls 
on  each  bank  were  strained  and  fastened  in  various 
modes  to  the  sands.  They  were  sufficiently  slack 
to  meet  the  spring-tides  which  rose  fourteen  feet, 
and  planks  were  laid  upon  them  without  any  sup- 
porting beams.  The  boom,  moored  with  anchors 
above  and  below,  was  a  double  line  of  masts  con- 
nected with  chains  and  cables,  so  as  to  form  a  suc- 
cession of  squares,  in  the  design  that  if  a  vessel 
broke  through  the  outside,  it  should  by  the  shock 
turn  round  in  the  square  and  become  entangled  with 
the  floating  wrecks  of  the  line  through  which  it  had 
broken.  Gun-boats,  with  aiding  batteries  on  the 
banks,  were  then  stationed  to  protect  the  boom,  and 
to  keep  oft"  fire-vessels  :  many  row-boats  were  fur- 
nished with  grappling  irons.  The  whole  was,  by 
I  the  united  labour  of  seamen  and  soldiers,  finished  on 
the  2f)th.  And  contrary  to  the  general  opinion  on 
such  matters,  major  Todd  assured  the  author  of  this 
history,  that  he  found  the  soldiers,  with  minds  quick- 
ened by  the  wider  range  and  variety  of  knowlc.'ge 
attendant  on  tiieir  ser-ire  more  ready  of  resource, 
and  their  eflbrte.  combined  by  a  more  regular  discip« 


1814.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


733 


line,  of  more  a/ail,  with  less  loss  of  time,  than  the 
irregular  activity  of  the  seamen. 

The  agitation  of  tlie  water  in  the  river  from  the 
force  of  the  tides  was  generally  so  great  that  to 
maintain  a  i)ontoon  bridge  on  it  was  impossible.  A 
knowledge  of  this  had  rendered  the  French  officers 
too  careless  of  watch  and  defence,  and  tliis  year  the 
shifting  sands  had  given  the  course  of  tlie  Adour 
BU'^h  a  slanting  direction  towards  the  west  that  it 
ran  for  some  distance  almost  parallel  to  the  shore  ; 
the  outer  bank  thus  acting  as  a  breakwater  lessened 
the  agitation  within,  and  enabled  the  large  two- 
masted  boats  employed  to  ride  safely  and  support  the 
heaviest  artillery  and  carriages.  Nevertheless  tiiis 
fortune,  tlie  errors  of  the  enemy,  the  matchless  skill 
and  daring  of  the  British  seamen,  and  the  discipline 
and  intrepidity  of  the  British  soldiers,  all  combined 
by  the  genius  of  Wellington,  were  necessary  to  the 
success  of  this  stupendous  undertaking,  wliich  must 
always  rank  amongst  the  prodigies  of  war. 

When  the  bridge  was  finished,  sir  John  Hope  re- 
solved to  con.ract  his  line  of  investment  round  the 
citadel.  This  was  a  serious  affair.  The  position 
of  the  French  outside  that  fort  was  exceedingly 
strong,  for  the  flanks  were  protected  by  ravines  the 
sides  of  which  were  covered  with  fortified  villas; 
and  in  the  centre  a  ridge,  along  which  the  great 
roads  from  Bordeaux  and  Peirohorade  led  into  Bay- 
onne,  was  occupied  by  the  village  and  church  of  St. 
Etienne,  both  situated  on  rising  points  of  ground 
strongly  intrenched  and  under  the  fire  of  the  citadel 
guns.  The  allies  advanced  in  three  converging  col- 
umns covered  by  skirmishers.  Their  wings  easily 
it.tained  the  edges  of  the  ravines  at  either  side, 
.•esting  tlieir  flanks  on  the  Adour  above  and  below 
the  town,  at  about  nine  hundred  yards  from  the  ene- 
Diy's  works.  But  a  severe  action  took  place  in  the 
centre.  The  assailing  body,  composed  of  Germans 
and  a  brigade  of  guards,  was  divided  into  three  parts 
which  should  have  attacked  simultaneously,  the 
guards  on  the  left,  the  light  battalions  of  Germans 
on  the  right,  and  their  heavy  infantry  in  the  centre. 
The  flanks  were  retarded  by  some  accident,  and  the 
centre  first  attacked  the  heights  of  St.  Etienne. 
The  French  guns  immediately  opened  from  the  cita- 
del, and  the  skirmishing  fire  became  heavy;  but  the 
Germans  stormed  church  and  village,  forced  the  in- 
tr!mched  line  of  houses,  and  took  a  gun,  which  how- 
ever they  could  not  carry  oft' under  the  close  fire  from 
t!i2  citadel.  The  wings  then  gained  their  positions, 
and  the  action  ceased  for  a  time  ;  but  tlie  people  of 
Bavonne  were  in  such  consternation  that  Thouvenot 
to  reassure  them  sallied  at  the  head  of  the  troops. 
He  cliarged  the  Germans  twice,  and  fought  well,  but 
was  wounded  and  finally  lost  his  gun  and  the  position 
of  St.  Etienne.  There  is  no  return  of  the  allies' 
loss  ;  it  could  not  have  been  less  than  five  hundred 
men  and  oflicors,  of  which  fear  hundred  were  Ger- 
mans ;  and  the  latter  were  dissatisfied  that  their 
conduct  was  unnoticed  in  the  despatch  :  an  omission 
somewhat  remarkable,  because  their  conduct  was 
by  sir  John  Hope  always  spoken  of  with  great  com- 
mendation. 

The  new  position  thus  gained  was  defended  by 
ravines  on  each  flank,  and  the  centre  being  close  to 
the  enemy's  works  on  the  ridge  of  St.  Etienne  was 
intrenched.  Preparations  for  besieging  the  citadel 
wore  then  commenced  under  the  direction  of  the 
German  colonel  Hartmann,  a  code  of  signals  was 
established,  and  infinite  pains  taken  to  protect  the 
bridge  and  to  secure  a  unity  of  action  between  the 
three  investing  bodies.  Tlie  communications  how- 
ever required  complicated  arrangements,  for  the 
ground  on  the  right  bank  of  the  hver  be'ng  low  was 


overflowed  every  tide,  and  would  have  occasioned 
great  difficulty  but  for  the  retaining  wall,  v.hich 
being  four  feet  thick  was  made  use  of  as  a  carriage 
road. 

While  these  events  were  in  i)rogress  at  Bayonne, 
lord  Wellington  pusiied  his  operations  on  the  Gaves 
with  great  vigour.  Or.  the  21st,  he  returned  as  we 
have  seen  to  Garris;  the  pontoons  had  already 
reached  that  place,  and  on  the  2od  they  were  car- 
ried beyond  the  Gave  de  Mauleon.  During  his  ab- 
sence the  sixth  and  light  divisions  had  come  up, 
and  thus  six  divisions  of  infantry  and  two  brigades 
of  cavalry  were  concentrated  beyond  that  river  on 
the  Gave  d'Oloron,  between  Sauveterre  and  >^var- 
reins.  Beresford  meanwhile  held  the  line  of  the  Bi- 
douze  down  to  its  confluence  with  the  Adour,  and 
apparently  to  distract  the  enemy  threw  a  battalion 
over  the  latter  river  near  Urt,  and  collected  boats  as 
if  to  form  a  bridge  there.  In  the  evening  he  recall- 
ed this  detaciiment,  yet  continued  the  appearance 
of  preparations  for  a  bridge  until  late  on  the  2;^d, 
when  he  moved  forward  and  drove  Foy's  posts  from 
the  works  at  Oeyergave  and  Hastingue,  on  the  lower 
parts  of  the  Oloron  Gave,  into  the  intrencliments  of 
the  bridge-head  at  Peirehorade.  The  allies  lost  fif- 
ty men,  principally  Portuguese;  but  Soult"s  right 
and  centre  were  thus  held  in  check ;  for  Beresford, 
having  the  fourth  and  seventh  divisions  and  Vivian's 
cavalrv,  was  strong  enough  for  Foy  at  Peirehorade 
and  Taupin  at  the  Bastide  of  Beam.  The  rest  of 
the  French  army  was  distributed  at  Orthez  and  Sau- 
veterre, feeling  towards  Navarreins,  and  on  the  24th 
Wellington  put  his  troops  in  motion  to  pass  the 
Gave  d'Oloron. 

During  the  previous  days  his  movements  and  tlie 
arrival  of  his  reinforcements  had  again  deceived  the 
French  general,  who  seems  to  have  known  nothing 
of  the  presence  of  the  light  division,  and  imagined 
the  first  division  was  at  Came  on  the  22d,  as  well 
as  the  fourth  and  seventh  divisions.  However  his 
dispositions  remained  the  same  ;  he  did  not  expect 
to  hold  the  Gave,  and  looked  to  a  final  concentration 
at  Orthez. 

On  the  24th,  Morillo,  reinforced  with  a  strong  de- 
tachment of  cavalry,  moved  to  the  Loussette,  a  small 
river  running  in  front  of  Navarreins,  where  rough 
ground  concealed  his  real  force,  while  his  scouters 
beat  back  the  French  outposts,  and  a  battaliou 
marching  higher  up  menaced  the  fords  of  the  Gave 
at  Doguen.  with  a  view  to  draw  the  attention  of  the 
garrison  of  Navarreins  from  the  ford  of  Villenave. 
This  ford,  about  three  miles  below  Doguen,  was 
the  point  where  lord  Wellington  designed  reafly  to 
pass,  and  a  great  concentric  movement  was  now  in 
progress  towards  it.  Lecor's  Portuguese  division 
marched  from  Gestas ;  the  light  division  frrm 
Aroue,  crossing  the  Soissons  at  Nabas;  the  second 
division,  three  batteries  of  artillery,  the  pontoons, 
and  four  regiments  of  cavalry  moved  from  other 
points.  Favoured  by  the  hilly  nature  of  the  coun- 
try, the  columns  were  well  concealed  from  the  ene- 
my, and  at  the  same  time  the  sixth  division  ad- 
vanced towards  the  fprds  of  Montfort  about  three 
miles  below  that  of  Villenave.  A  battalion  of  the 
second  division  was  sent  to  menace  the  ford  of  Bar- 
raute  below  Montfort,  while  the  third  division,  rein- 
forced with  a  brigade  of  hussars  and  the  batteries 
of  the  second  division,  marched  by  Osserain  and  Ar- 
riveriette  against  the  bridge-head  of  Sauveterre, 
with  orders  to  make  a  feint  of  forcing  a  passage 
there.  The  bulk  of  the  li^ht  cavalry  remained  in 
reserve  under  Cotton,  but  Vivian's  hussars  coming 
up  from  Beresflird's  right,  threutened  ell  the  forda 
between  Picton's  left  and  the  Biittide  of  Btarn  ;  and 


724 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XXIV 


below  this  Rastide  somR  detachments  were  directed 
upon  the  fords  ofSindos,  Castas^nette  and  Hauterive. 
During  this  movement  Berestbrd,  kee|)ing  Foy  in 
meek  at  Peirehorade  with  the  seveutli  division,  sent 
tlio  li)urth  towards  Hordes  and  lieren,  above  the  con- 
tiuence  ot"  the  Gaves,  to  seek  a  tit  place  to  throw  a 
bridge.  'J'lius  the  whole  of  the  French  front  was 
menaced  on  a  line  of  twenty-five  miles,  but  the  great 
Ibrce  was  above  Sauveterre. 

The  first  operations  were  not  happily  executed. 
The  columns  directed  on  the  side  of  Sindos  missed 
the  fords.  Picton  opened  a  cannonade  against  the 
bridge-head  of  Sauveterre  and  made  four  companies 
of  Keane's  brigade  and  some  cavalry  pass  the  Gave 
in  tiie  vicinity  of  the  bridge  ;  they  were  immediate- 
ly assailed  by  a  French  regiment  and  driven  across 
tlie  river  again,  with  a  loss  of  ninety  men  and  offi- 
cers, of  whom  some  were  drowned  and  tliirty  were 
made  prisoners:  wiiereupon  the  cavalry  returned  to 
the  left  bank  and  tlie  cannonade  ceased.  Neverthe- 
less ttie  diversion  was  complete  and  the  general  ope- 
rations were  successful.  Soult  on  the  first  alarm 
drew  Harispe  fro:n  the  Sauveterre  and  placed  him 
Y>n  the  road  to  Orthez  at  Monstrueig,  where  a  range 
of  liills  running  parallel  to  the  Gave  of  Oloron  sepa- 
rates it  from  that  of  Pau;  tims  only  a  division  of  in- 
fantry and  Berton's  cavalry  remained  under  \  illatte 
at  Sauveterre,  and  that  general,  notwithstanding  his 
success  against  the  four  companies,  alarmed  by  the 
vigour  of  Picton's  demonstiations,  abandoned  his 
works  on  the  lell  bank  and  destroyed  tlie  bridge. 
Meanwliile  the  sixth  division  passed  without  oppo- 
sition at  Montfort  above  Sauveterre ;  and  at  the 
Fame  time  the  great  body  of  the  other  troops,  com- 
ing down  upon  the  ford  of  Villenave,  met  only  witti 
a  small  cavalry  piquet,  and  crossed  with  no  more! 
loss  than  two  men  drowned:  a  happy  circumstance, 
for  the  waters  were  deep  and  rapid,  the  cold  intense,  | 
and  tlie  ford  so  narrow  that  the  passage  was  not 
completed  before  dark.  To  have  forced  it  in  face  of 
nn  enemy  would  have  been  exceedingly  difficult  and 
dangerous,  and  it  is  remarkable  that  Soult  who  was 
with  Harispe,  only  five  miles  from  3Iontfort  and 
about  seven  from  Villenave,  should  not  have  sent 
that  general  down  to  oppose  the  passage.  The 
heads  of  tlie  allies'  columns  immediately  pushed  for- 
ward to  the  range  of  hills  before  spoken  of,  the  right 
being  established  near  Loubeing,  the  left  towards 
Sauveterre,  from  whence  Villatte  and  Berton  had 
been  withdrawn  by  Clauzel,  who  commanding  at 
this  part  seems  to  have  kept  a  bad  watch  when 
Clinton  passed  at  Montfort. 

Tiie  French  divisions  now  took  a  position  to  give 
time  forTaupin  to  retire  from  the  lower  parts  of  the 
(Jave  of  Oloron,  towards  the  bridge  of  Berenx  on  the 
(Jave  of  Pau  ;  for  both  he  and  Foy  had  received  or- 
ders to  march  upon  Orthez  and  break  down  all  the 
bridges  as  they  passed.  When  the  niglit  fell,  Soult 
sent  Harispe's  division  also  over  the  bridge  of  Or- 
thez, and  D'Erlon  was  already  established  in  that 
town,  but  general  Clauzel  remained  until  the  morn- 
ing at  Orion  to  cover  the  movement.  Meanwhile 
Pierre  Soult,  posted  beyond  Navarreins  with  his 
cavalry  and  two  battalions  of  infantry  to  watch  the 
road  to  Pau,  was  pressed  by  Morillo.  and  being  cut 
oir  from  tlie  army  by  the  passage  of  the  allies  at 
Villenave  was  forced  to  retreat  by  .\I(^neins. 

On  the  2oth,  at  daylight,  lord  Wellinglon  with 
some  cavalry  and  guns  pushed  ClauzeTs  rear-guard 
from  .Magret  into  tiie  suburb  of  Orthez,  vvhicii  cov- 
or.^d  tlie  bridge  of  that  place  on  the  lelt  bank.  He 
also  cannonaded  the  French  troops  beyond  tlie  riv- 
er; and  the  Portuguese  of  the  light  division,  skir- 
Qjishing  with  the  French  iu  the  houses  to  prcvcuJ. 


the  destruction  of  the  bridge,  lost  twenty-five  men. 
The  second,  sixth  and  liglit  divisions,  Hamilton'e 
Portuguese,  five  regiments  of  cavalry,  and  three  bat- 
teries were  now  massed  in  front  of  Orthez  .  tiie  third 
division  and  a  brigade  of  cavalry  was  in  front  ot  tJie 
broken  bridge  of  Berenx,  about  hve  miles  lower  dov.  n 
the  Gave;  the  fourth  and  seventh  divisions  with 
Vivian's  cavalry  were  in  front  of  Peirehorade,  iTvin 
whence  Foy  retired  by  the  great  13ayonne  road  to 
Orthez.  Ali'airs  being  in  this  state,  ^iorillo  was  di- 
rected to  Navarreins.  And  as  Mina's  battalions 
were  no  sure  guarantee  against  the  combined  efibrta 
of  the  garrison  of  St.  .Jean  Pied  de  Port  and  tlie 
warlike  inhabitants  of  Baigorri,  five  British  regi- 
ments, which  had  gone  to  the  rear  for  clothing  and 
were  now  coming  up  separately,  were  ordered  to 
halt  at  St  Palais  in  observation,  relieving  each  othe 
in  succession  as  they  arrived  at  that  place. 

On  the  morning  of  the  26th,  Beresfbrd,  findinp 
that  Foy  had  abandoned  the  French  works  at  Peire 
horade,  passed  the  Gave,  partly  by  a  pontoon  bridge 
partly  by  a  ford,  where  the  current  ran  so  strong 
that  a  column  of  the  seventh  division  was  like  t* 
have  been  carried  away  bodily.  He  had  previously 
detached  the  eighteenth  hussars  to  find  another  ford 
higher  up,  and  this  being  efiiected  under  tiie  guidance 
of  a  miller,  the  hussars  gained  the  high  road  abcu. 
halfway  between  Peirehorade  and  Orthez,  and  dro%e 
some  French  cavalry  through  Puyoo  and  Ranious. 
The  French,  rallying  upon  their  reserves,  tnrnt;d 
and  beat  back  the  foremost  of  the  pursuers  ;  but  they 
would  not  await  the  shock  of  the  main  body,  now 
reinforced  by  Vivian's  brigade  and  commnnded  by 
Beresford  in  person.  In  this  afi'air  major  Sewell,  an 
officer  of  the  staff,  who  had  frequently  distinguished 
himself  by  his  personal  prowess,  happening  to  be 
without  a  sword,  pulled  a  large  stake  from  a  hedge, 
and  with  that  weapon  overthrew  two  hussars  in  suc- 
cession, and  only  relinquished  the  ccmbat  when  a 
third  had  cut  his  club  in  twain. 

Beresford  now  threw  out  a  detachment  to  Htibae 
on  his  left  to  intercept  the  enemy's  communication 
with  Dax,  and  lord  Wfdlington  immediately  ordered 
lord  Edward  Somerset's  cavalry  and  the  third  divis- 
ion to  cross  the  Gave  by  fords  below  the  broken 
bridge  of  Berenx.  Then  directing  Beresford  to  take 
a  position  for  the  night  on  some  heights  near  the 
village  of  Baights,  he  proceeded  to  throw  a  pontoon 
bridge  at  Berenx,  and  thus  after  a  circuitous  march 
of  more  than  fifty  miles  with  his  right  wing  fie  again 
united  it  with  his  centre  and  secured  a  direct  com 
munication  with  Kope. 

During  the  25th  and  26th,  he  had  carefully  exam 
ined  Soult's  position.  The  bridge  of  Orthez  cou'id 
not  be  easily  forced.  That  ancient  and  beautifu* 
structure  consisted  of  several  irregular  arches,  with 
a  high  tower  in  the  centre,  the  gateway  of  whicK 
was  built  up  by  the  French,  the  principal  arch  in 
front  of  the  tower  was  mined,  and  the  houses  on 
both  sides  contributed  to  the  defiance.  The  rivei 
above  and  below  was  deep  and  full  of  tail  pointed 
rocks,  but  above  the  town  the  water  spreading  wido 
with  flat  banks  presented  the  means  of  crossing 
Lord  Wellington's  first  design  was  to  pass  there 
with  Hill's  troops  and  the  light  diviwior..  bv.t  when 
he  heard  that  Beresford  had  crossed  the  Gave  h^ 
suddenly  changed  his  design,  and,  as  we  have  seen, 
passed  the  third  division  over  and  threw  his  bridge 
at  Berenx.  This  operation  was  covered  by  lieres- 
ford,  while  Soult's  attention  was  diverted  by  tiie 
contirual  skirmish  nt  tlie  suburbs  of  Orthez,  by  tlu 
apiienrnnce  of  ILll's  columns  above,  and  by  W'A 
lington's  taking  cognizance  of  the  positioji  icar  'he 
bridge  so  openly  as  to  draw  a  cajii:oiiatIe. 


I 


1814.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


725 


The  Enoflish  g'eneral  did  not  expect  Soult  would, 
when  he  found  Beresibrd  and  Piclon  were  over  the 
(lave,  await  a  battle,  and  his  emissaries  reported 
that  the  Frencli  army  was  already  in  retreat:  a  cir- 
cumstance to  be  borne  in  mind,  because  the  next 
day's  operation  required  success  to  justify  it.  Hope's 
happy  passage  of  the  Adour  being  now  icnown,  that 
olficer  was  instructed  to  establish  a  line  of  commu- 
nication to  the  Port  of  Lanne,  where  a  permanent 
bridge  was  to  be  formed  with  boats  brought  up  from 
llrt.  A  direct  line  of  intercourse  was  thus  secured 
with  the  army  at  Bayoiuie.  But  lord  Wellington 
felt  that  he  was  pushing  his  operations  beyond  his 
strength  if  Suchet  should  send  reinforcements  to 
Soult;  wherefore  he  called  up  Freyre's  Spaniards, 
ordering  that  general  to  cross  the  Adour  below  Bay- 
onne,  with  two  of  his  divisions  and  a  brigade  of 
Portuguese  nine-pounders,  and  join  him  by  the  Port 
of  Lanne.  O'Donel's  Andalusians  and  the  prince 
of  Anglona's  troops  were  also  directed  to  be  in  read- 
iness to  enter  France. 

These  orders  were  given  with  the  greatest  reluc- 
tance. 

The  feeble  resistance  made  by  the  French  in  tlie 
difficult  country  already  passed  left  him  without 
much  uneasiness  as  to  the  power  of  Soult's  army  in 
the  ti3ld,  but  hi.-"  disquietude  was  extreme  about  the 
danger  of  an  insurgent  wartiire.  "  Maintain  the 
strictest  discipline,  without  that  we  are  lost,^'  was 
his  expression  to  general  Freyre,  and  he  issued  a 
proclamation  authorizing  the  people  of  the  districts 
he  had  overrun  to  arm  themselves  for  the  preserva- 
tion of  order  under  the  direction  of  their  mayors. 
He  invited  thern  to  arrest  all  straggling  soldiers  and 
followers  of  the  army,  and  all  plunderers  and  evil- 
doers, and  convey  them  to  head-quarters  with  the 
proof  of  their  crimes,  promising  to  punish  the  cul- 
pable and  to  pay  for  all  damages.  At  the  same  time 
he  confirmed  all  the  local  authorities  who  chose  to 
retain  their  offices,  on  the  sole  condition  of  having 
no  political  or  military  intercourse  with  the  coun- 
tries still  possessed  by  the  French  army.  Nor  was 
his  proclamation  a  dead  letter  ;  for  in  the  night  of 
the  25th,  the  inhabitants  of  a  village,  situated  near 
the  road  leading  from  Sair  dterre  to  Orthez,  shot  one 
English  soldier  dead  a^  ^  wounded  a  second  who  had 
come  with  others  to  puinder.  Lord  Wellington  caus- 
ed the  wounded  man  to  be  hung  as  an  example,  and 
he  also  forced  an  English  colonel  to  quit  the  army 
f:)r  suffering  his  soldiers  to  destroy  the  municipal 
archives  of  a  small  town. 

Soult  hrd  no  thought  of  retreating.  His  previou'; 
retrograde  movements  had  been  effected  with  order, 
his  army  was  concentrated  with  its  front  to  the  Gave, 
and  every  bridge,  except  the  noble  structure  at  Or- 
thez, the  ancient  masonry  of  which  resisted  his 
mines,  had  been  destroyed.  One  regiment  of  caval- 
ry was  detached  on  the  right  to  watch  the  fords  as 
far  as  I'eirehorade,  three  others  with  two  battalions 
of  infantry  under  Pierre  Soult  watched  those  be- 
tween Orthez  and  Pau,  and  a  body  of  horsemen  and 
gendarmes  covered  the  latter  town  from  Morillo's 
incursions.  Two  regiments  of  cavalry  remained 
with  the  army,  and  the  French  general's  intention 
was  to  ftU  upon  the  head  of  the  first  column  vvhicii 
should  cross  the  Gave.  But  the  negligence  of  the 
officer  stationed  at  Payoo,  who  had  suH'ered  Vivian's 
hussars,  as  we  have  seen,  to  pass  on  the  26th  with- 
out opj)osition  and  without  making  any  report  of  the 
ev<».i-(t,  enabled  Beresford  to  make  his  movement  in 
eafety,  when  otherwise  he  would  have  been  assailed 
by  at  least  two-thirds  of  the  French  army.  It  was 
not  until  three  o'clock  in  the  evening  that  Soult  re- 
ceived intelligence  of  his  march    find  his  columns 


were  then  close  to  Ba'-'ghts  on  the  right  flnnk  of  the 
French  army,  his  scouters  were  on  the  Dax  road  in 
its  rear,  and  at  tiie  same  time  the  sixth  and  liglit 
divisions  were  seen  descending  by  difierent  roacis 
from  the  heights  beyond  the  river  pointing  towarcs 
Berenx. 

In  this  crisis  the  French  marshal  hesitated  wheth- 
er to  fall  upon  Beresibrd  and  Picton  while  the  latter 
was  still  passing  the  river,  or  take  a  (ieieriSive  posi- 
tion;  but  linally  judging  that  he  had  net  time  to 
form  his  columns  of  attack  he  decided  upon  the  lat- 
ter. Wherefore  under  cover  of  a  skirmish,  sustain- 
ed near  Baghts  by  a  battalion  of  inlantry  which 
coming  from  the  bridge  of  Berenx  was  joined  by  the 
light  cavalry  from  Puyoo,  he  hastily  threw  L'b.rlon's 
and  Reille"s  divisions  on  a  new  line  across  tlie  read 
from  Peirehorade.  The  right  extended  to  the  hcigliis 
of  St.  Boi's,  along  which  ran  the  road  from  Ortl/ez 
to  Dax,  and  this  line  was  prolonged  by  Clruzers 
troops  to  Caste  Tarbe,  a  village  close  to  tlie  Gave. 
Having  thus  opposed  a  temporary  front  to  Beresford, 
he  made  his  dispositions  to  receive  battle  the  next 
morning,  bringing  \  illatte's  infantry  and  Pierre 
Soult's  cavalry  from  the  other  side  of  Orthez  through 
that  town,  and  it  was  this  movement  that  led  lord 
Wellington's  emissaries  to  report  that  the  army  was 
retiring. 

Soult's  new  line  was  on  a  ridge  of  hills,  partly 
wooded,  partly  naked. 

In  the  centre  was  an  open  rounded  hill,  from 
whence  long  narrow  tongues  were  pushed  cut,  en 
the  French  left  towards  the  high  road  of  Peireho- 
rade, on  their  right  by  St.  Bo>s  towards  the  high 
church  of  Ba  glits,  the  whole  presenting  a  concave 
to  the  allies. 

The  front  was  generally  covered  by  a  deep  and 
marshy  ravine,  broken  by  two  short  tongues  of  land 
which  jutted  out  from  the  principal  hill. 

The  road  from  Orthez  to  Dax  passed  behind  the 
front  to  the  village  of  St.  Bois,  and  thence  along 
the  ridge  forming  the  right  flank. 

Behind  the  centre  a  succession  of  undulat'rg  bary 
heathy  hills  trended  for  several  miles  to  the  rear, 
but  behind  the  right  the  country  was  low  and  deep. 

The  town  of  Orthez,  receding  from  the  river  up 
the  slope  of  a  steep  hill,  and  terminating  with  an 
ancient  tower,  was  behind  t!ie  left  wing. 

General  Reille,  having  Taupin's,  Koguet's  and 
Paris'  divisions  under  him,  commanded  on  the  right, 
and  occupied  all  the  ground  from  the  village  of  St. 
Bots  to  the  centre  of  the  position. 

Count  D'Erlon,  commanding  Foy's  and  D'Armag- 
nac's  divisions,  was  on  the  left  of  Reille.  He  placed 
the  first  along  a  ridge  extending  towards  the  road 
of  Peirehorade,  the  second  in  reserve.  In  rear  of 
this  last  V illatte's  division  and  the  cavalry  were 
posted  above  the  village  of  Rontun,  that  is  to  say, 
on  the  open  hills  behind  the  main  position.  In  this 
situation,  with  the  right  overlooking  the  low  coun- 
try beyond  St.  Bos,  and  the  left  extended  towards 
Orthez,  this  division  furnished  a  reserve  to  both 
D'Erlon  and  Reille. 

Harispe,  whose  troops  as  well  as  Y  illatte's  were  un- 
der Clauzel,  occupied  Orthez  and  the  bridge,  having 
a  regiment  near  tlie  ford  of  Sonars  above  the  town. 

Thus  the  French  army  extended  from  St.  I»o«s  to 
Orthez,  but  the  great  mass  was  disf^osed  towards 
ttie  centre.  Twelve  guns  wore  attached  to  general 
Harispe's  troops,  twelve  were  uf)on  the  round  hill  in 
the  centre,  sweeping  in  their  range  the  ground  be- 
yond St.  Bo>  s,  and  sixteen  were  in  reserve  on  the 
Dax  road. 

The  27th.  at  daybreak,  tl'O  sixth  and  light  divis- 
j  ions,  having  passed  tlie  (^»ve  near  Berenx  by  the 


726 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


fBooK  XXIV. 


1 


pontoon  bridge  thrown  in  the  night,  wound  up  a 
narrow  way  between  high  rocks  to  the  great  road 
of  Peirelioradc.  The  third  division  and  lord  Ed- 
ward Somerset's  cavalry  were  already  established 
there  in  columns  of  march,  with  skirmishers  pushed 
forwards  to  the  edge  of  the  wooded  height  occupied 
by  D'Erlon's  left;  and  Beresford,  with  the  fourth 
and  seventh  divisions  and  Vivian's  cavalry,  had 
meanwhile  gained  the  ridge  of  St.  Bois  and  ap- 
proached the  Dax  road  beyond.  Hill  remained  with 
the  second  British,  and  Lecor's  Portuguese  divis- 
ions, menacing  the  bridge  of  Orthez  and  the  ford  of 
Souars.  Between  Beresford  and  Picton,  a  distance 
of  a  mile  and  a  half,  there  were  no  troops  ;  but 
about  half  way,  exactly  in  front  of  the  French  cen- 
tre, was  a  Roman  camp  crowning  an  isolated  peer- 
ing hill  of  singular  appearance  and  nearly  as  lofty  as 
the  centre  of  Soult's  position. 

On  this  camp,  now  covered  with  vineyards,  but 
then  open  and  grassy  with  a  few  trees,  lord  Wel- 
lington, after  viewing  the  country  on  Beresford's 
left,  stopped  for  an  hour  or  more  to  examine  the  en- 
emy's disposition  lor  battle.  During  this  time  the 
two  divisions  were  coming  up  from  the  river,  but  so 
hemmed  in  by  rocks  that  only  a  few  men  could 
'Tiarch  abreast,  and  their  point  of  union  with  the 
third  division  was  little  more  than  cannot-shot  from 
the  enemy's  position.  The  moment  was  critical ; 
Picton  did  not  conceal  his  disquietude  ;  but  Wel- 
linglon,  undisturbed  as  the  deep  sea,  continued  his 
observations  without  seeming  to  notice  the  danger- 
ous position  of  his  troops.  When  they  had  reached 
tiie  main  road,  he  reinforced  Picton  with  the  sixth, 
and  drew  the  light  division  by  cross  roads  behind 
the  Roman  camp,  thus  connecting  his  wings  and 
forming  a  central  reserve.  From  this  point  by- 
ways led  on  the  left  to  the  high  church  of  Baights 
and  the  Dax  road,  on  the  right  to  the  Peirehorade 
road,  and  two  others  led  straight  across  the  marsh 
to  the  French  position. 

This  marsh,  the  open  hill  about  which  Soult's 
guns  and  reserves  were  principally  gathered,  the 
form  and  nature  of  the  ridges  on  the  flanks,  all  com- 
bined to  forbid  an  attack  in  front,  and  the  flanks 
were  scarcely  more  promising.  The  extremity  of 
the  French  left  sunk  indeed  to  a  gentle  undulation 
in  crossing  the  Peirehorade  road,  yet  it  would  have 
been  useless  to  push  troops  on  that  line  towards 
Orthez,  between  D'Erlon  and  Caste  Tarbe,  for  the 
town  was  strongly  occupied  by  Harispe,  and  was 
there  covered  by  an  ancient  wall  and  the  bed  of  a 
torrent.  It  was  equally  difficult  to  turn  the  St. 
lioi's  flank,  because  of  the  low  marshy  country  into 
which  the  troops  must  have  descended  beyond  the 
Dax  road;  and  the  brows  of  tiie  hills  ti;ending  back- 
wards from  the  centre  of  the  French  position  would 
liave  enabled  Soult  to  o|)pose  a  new  and  formidable 
front  at  right  angles  to  his  actual  position.  The 
whole  of  the  allied  army  must  therefore  have  made 
a  circuitous  flank  movement  within  gun-shot  and 
through  a  most  difficult  country,  or  Beresford's  left 
must  have  been  dangerously  extended  ami  the  whole 
line  weakened.  M()r  could  tlie  movement  be  hid- 
den, been  use  the  hills,  although  only  moderately 
high,  were  abrupt  on  tliat  side,  affording  a  full  view 
of  the  low  country,  and  Soult's  cavalry  detachments 
were  in  observation  on  every  brow. 

It  only  remained  to  assail  the  French  flanks 
along  the  ridges,  making  tiie  principal  efforts  on  the 
side  of  St  Bo  s,  with  intent  if  successful  to  overlap 
the  French  right  b«yon(l,  and  seize  the  road  of  St. 
Sever,  while  Hill  passed  the  (iave  at  Sonars  and 
cut  off  the  road  Ut  I'au,  thus  enclosing  the  beaten 
army  in  Orthez     Tliis  was  however  no  slight  affair. 


On  Picton *s  side  >♦.  was  easy  u  '.^-ain  a  footing  on 
the  flank  ridge  near  the  high  i.'ad,  but  beyond  that 
the  ground  rose  rapidly  and  the  French  were  gath- 
ered thickly  with  a  narrow  fron'  and  plenty  of  guns. 
On  Bereslbrd's  side  they  could  only  be  assailed 
along  the  summit  of  the  St.  Bo's  ridge,  advancing 
from  the  high  church  of  Baights  and  the  Dax  road. 
But  the  village  of  St  Bo's  was  strongly  cccujjied, 
the  ground  immediately  behind  it  was  strangled  to 
a  narrow  pass  by  the  ravine,  and  the  French  reserve 
of  sixteen  guns,  placed  on  the  Dax  road,  l)ehind  the 
hill  in  the  centre  of  Soult's  line,  and  well  covered 
from  counter-tire,  was  in  readiness  to  crush  .tl.o 
head  of  any  column  which  should  emerge  from  the 
gorge  of  St.  Bois. 

BATTLE    OF   ORTHEZ. 

During  the  whole  morning  a  slight  skirmish  with 
now  and  then  a  cannot-shot  had  been  going  on  with 
the  third  division  on  the  right,  and  the  1<  rench  cav- 
alry at  times  pushed  parties  forward  on  each  flank, 
but  at  nine  o'clock  Wellington  commenced  the  real 
attack.  The  third  and  sixth  divisions  wen  without 
difficulty  the  lower  part  of  the  ridges  opposed  to 
them,  and  endeavoured  to  extend  their  left  along  the 
French  front  with  a  sharp  fire  of  nmsketry  ;  but  the 
main  battle  way  on  the  other  flank.  There  general 
Cole,  keeping  Anson's  brigade  of  the  fcurtii  division 
in  reserve,  assailed  St.  Bo^'s  with  Ross's  British 
brigade  and  Vasconcelles'  Portuguese  ;  his  object 
was  to  get  on  to  the  open  ground  beyond-  it,  but 
fierce  and  slaughtering  was  the  struggle.  Five 
times  breaking  through  the  scatte-ed  houses  did 
Ross  carry  his  battle  into  the  wider  space  beyond; 
yet  ever  as  the  troops  issued  forth  the  French  guns 
from  the  open  hill  smote  them  in  fron-t,  and  the  re- 
served battery  on  the  Dax  road  swept  tiirough  them 
with  grape  from  flank  to  flank.  And  then  'Jaujiin's 
supporting  masses  rushed  tbrwards  with  a  wasting 
fire,  and  lapping  the  flanks  with  skirmishers,  which 
poured  along  the  ravines  on  either  hand,  forced  the 
shattered  columns  back  into  the  village.  It  was  in 
vain  that  with  desperate  valour  the  allies  time  alter 
tune  broke  through  t]>o  narrow  way  and  struggled 
to  spread  a  front  beyo,  d :  Ross  fell  dangerously 
wounded,  and  Taupin,  whoe,^  troops  were  clustered 
thickly  and  well  supported,  otfied  their  utmost  ef- 
forts. Nor  was  Soult  less  happy  on  the  other  side. 
I'he  nature  of  the  ground,  would  not  permit  the 
third  and  sixth  divisions  to  engage  many  men  at 
once,  so  that  no  progress  was  made  :  and  one  small 
detachment  which  Picton  extended  to  his  left,  hav 
ing  made  an  attempt  to  gain  the  smalJer  tongue 
jutting  out  from  the  central  hill,  was  suddenly 
charged,  as  it  neared  the  summit,  by  Foy,  and  driv- 
en down  again  in  confusion,  losing  several  prisoners. 

When  the  combat  had  th;.s  continued  with  un- 
abated fury  on  the  side  of  St.  Boi's  for  about  three 
hours,  lord  Wellington  sent  a  ca^adore  regiment  of 
the  light  division  trom  the  Roman  camp  to  protect 
the  right  flank  of  Ross's  brigade  agaiist  the  French 
skirmishers;  but  this  was  of  no  avail,  for  \i!scon-, 
cellos'  Portuguese,  unable  to  sustain  the  violence  of 
the  enen)y  any  longer,  gave  way  in  disorder,  and 
the  French  pouring  on,  the  I5ritish  troops  retreated 
through  St.  Bo's  with  difficulty.  As  this  hajipened 
at  the  moment  wjien  the  detachment  on  Picton's  left 
was  repulsed,  victory  seemed  to  declare  for  t.he 
French,  and  Soult,  cons{)icuous  on  his  commandii-g 
o|)en  hill,  the  knot  of  all  his  combinaticns,  seeing 
his  enemies  thus  broken  and  thrown  backwards  on 
each  side,  ))ut  all  his  reserves  in  movement  to  com- 
plete the  success.  It  is  said  that  in  tlie  exnlt.'ition 
of  the  moment  he  smote  his  thigh  exclaiming,  "w3/ 


1814.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR  WAR. 


727 


/«s/  /  have  him  "  Whether  this  be  so  or  not,  it  was 
no  vain-glorious  speecii,  for  the  moment  was  most 
dangerous.  There  was  however  a  small  black  cloud 
rising  just  beneath  him,  unheeded  at  first  amidst 
the  ttuindi?ring  din  and  tumult  that  now  siiook  the 
field  ot"  battle,  but  which  soon  burst  with  irresisti- 
ble violence.  Wellington,  seeing  that  St.  Bos  was 
inexpugnable,  had  suddenly  changed  iiis  plan  of  bat- 
tle. Supporting  Ross  with  Anson's  brigade,  which 
h?d  not  hitherto  been  engaged,  he  backed  both  with 
tiie  seventh  division  and  Vivian's  cavalry,  now 
forming  one  heavy  body  towards  the  Dax  road. 
Tiien  he  ordered  the  third  and  sixth  divisions  to  be 
thrown  in  mass  upon  Foy's  left  flank,  and  at  the 
same  time  sent  the  tifty-second  regiment  down  from 
the  Roman  camp  with  instructions  to  cross  the 
marsh  in  front,  to  mount  the  French  ridge  beyond, 
and  to  assail  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  troops  engag- 
ed with  the  fourth  division  at  St.  Boi's. 

Colonel  Colborne,  so  often  distinguished  in  this 
war,  immediately  led  the  fifty-second  down  and 
crossed  the  marsh  under  fire,  the  men  sinking  at 
every  step  above  the  knees,  in  some  places  to  the 
middle,  but  ttill  pressing  forwards  with  that  stern 
resolution  and  order  to  be  expected  from  the  veter- 
ans of  the  light  division,  soldiers  who  had  never  yet 
met  their  match  in  the  field.  They  soon  obtained 
footing  on  firm  land,  and  ascended  the  heights  in 
line  at  the  moment  that  Taupin  was  pushing  vig- 
orously through  St.  Bofs,  Foy  and  D'Armagnac, 
hitherto  more  than  masters  of  their  positions,  being 
at  the  same  time  seriously  assailed  on  the  other 
flank  by  the  third  and  sixth  divisions.  With  a 
mighty  shont  and  a  rolling  fire  the  fifty-second  sol- 
diers dashed  forvi'ards  between  Foy  and  Taupin, 
beating  down  a  French  battalion  in  their  course  and 
throwing  every  thing  before  them  into  disorder. 
General  Bechaud  was  killed  in  Taupin's  division, 
Foy  was  dangerously  wounded,  and  his  troops,  dis- 
couraged by  his  fall  and  by  this  sudden  burst  from  a 
quarter  where  no  enemy  was  expected,  for  the 
march  of  the  fifty-second  had  been  hardly  perceived 
save  by  the  skirmishers,  got  into  confusion,  and  the 
disorder  spreading  to  Reille's  wing  he  was  also 
forced  to  fall  back  and  take  a  new  position  to  re- 
store his  line  of  battle.  The  narrow  pass  behind 
St.  Boi'b  was  thus  opened  ;  and  Wellington,  seizing 
the  critical  moment,  thrust  the  fourth  and  seventh 
divisions,  Vivian's  cavalry  and  two  batteries  of  ar- 
tillery through,  and  spread  a  front  beyond. 

The  victory  was  thus  secured.  For  the  third  and 
sixth  divisions  had  now  won  D'Armagnac's  por-ition 
and  establis'ied  a  battery  of  guns  on  a  knoll,  from 
whence  their  shot  ploughed  through  the  French 
masses  from  one  flank  to  another.  Suddenly  a  squad- 
ron of  French  chasseurs  came  at  a  hard  gallop  down 
the  main  road  of  Orthez  to  charge  these  guns,  and 
sweeping  to  their  right  they  rode  over  some  of  the 
sixth  division  which  had  advanced  too  far;  but 
pushing  this  charge  too  madly,  got  into  a  hollow 
lane  and  were  nearly  all  destroyed.  The  third  and 
seventh  divisions  then  continued  to  advance  and  the 
wings  of  the  army  were  united.  The  French  gen- 
eral rallied  all  his  forces  on  the  open  hills  beyond 
the  Dax  road,  and  with  Taupin's,  Roguet's,  Paris' 
and  D'Armngnac's  divisions  made  strong  battle  to 
cover  the  re-formation  of  Foy's  disordered  troops  ; 
but  his  toes  were  not  all  in  front.  This  part  of  the 
battle  was  fought  wiih  only  two-thirds  of  the  allied 
army.  Hill,  who  had  remained  with  twelve  thou- 
sand combatants,  cavalry  and  infantry,  before  the 
bridge  of  Orthez,  received  orders,  when  Wellington 
changed  his  plan  of  attack,  to  force  the  passage  of 
the  Gave,  j)artl.s'  in  the  view  of  preventing  Ilarispe 


from  falling  upon  the  flank  of  the  sixth  division, 
partly  in  the  hope  of  a  successful  issue  to  the  at- 
tempt: and  so  it  happened.  Hill,  though  unable  to 
force  the  bridge,  forded  the  river  above  at  Souars, 
and  driving  back  tlie  troops  posted  there  seized  the 
heights  above,  cut  oft"  the  French  from  the  road  to 
Pau,  and  turned  the  town  of  Orthez.  He  thus  me- 
naced Soult's  only  line  of  retreat  by  Salespi^.e,  on 
the  road  to  St.  Sever,  »t  the  very  moment  when  the 
fifty-second  having  opened  the  defile  of  St.  Bois  the 
junction  of  the  allies'  wings  was  effected  on  the 
French  position. 

Clauzel  immediately  ordered  Harispe  to  abandon 
Orthez  and  close  towards  Villatte  on  the  heights 
above  Rontun,  leaving  however  some  conscript  bat- 
talions on  a  rising  point  beyond  the  road  of  St.  Se- 
ver called  the  "  J)Iotle  de  Turcnve."  Meanwhile  in 
person  he  endeavoured  to  keep  general  Hill  in  check 
by  the  menacing  action  of  two  cavalry  regiments 
and  a  brigade  of  infantry  ;  but  Soult  arrived  at  the 
moment,  and  seeing  that  the  loss  of  Souars  had  ren- 
dered his  whole  position  untenable,  gave  orders  for 
a  general  retreat. 

This  was  a  perilous  matter.  The  heathy  hills 
upon  which  he  was  now  fighting,  although  for  a 
short  distance  they  furnished  a  succession  of  paral- 
lel positions  favourable  enough  for  defence,  soon  re- 
solved themselves  into  a  low  ridge  running  to  the 
rear  on  a  line  parallel  with  the  road  to  St.  Sever; 
and  on  the  opposite  side  of  that  road,  about  can- 
non-shot distance,  was  a  corresponding  ridge  along 
which  general  Hill,  judging  by  the  firing  how  mat- 
ters went,  was  now  rapidly  advancing.  Five  miles 
distant  was  the  Luy  de  Beam,  and  four  miles  be- 
yond that  the  Luy  de  France,  two  rivers  deep  and 
with  difhcult  banks.  Behind  these  the  Lutz,  the 
Gabas  and  the  Adour,  crossed  the  line  ;  and  though 
once  beyond  the  wooden  bridge  of  Sault  de  Navail- 
les  on  the  Luy  de  Beam,  these  streams  would  ne- 
cessarily cover  the  retreat,  to  carry  off  by  one  road 
and  one  bridge  a  defeated  army  still  closely  engaged 
in  front  seemed  impossible.  Nevertheless  Soult  did 
so.  For  Paris  sustained  the  fight  on  his  right  until 
Foy  and  Taupin's  troops  rallied,  and  when  the  im- 
petuous assault  of  the  fifty-second  and  the  rush  of 
the  fourth  and  seventh  divisions  drove  Paris  back, 
D'Armagnac  interposed  to  cover  him  until  the  union 
of  the  allies'  wings  was  completed  ;  then  both  re- 
tired, being  covered  in  turn  by  Villatte.  In  this 
manner  the  French  yielded,  step  by  step  and  with- 
out confusion,  the  allies  advancing  with  an  inces- 
sant deafening  musketry  and  cannonade,  yet  losing 
many  men,  especially  on  the  right,  where  the  third 
division  were  very  strongly  opposed.  However,  ch 
the  danger  of  being  cut  off  at  Salespice  by  Hill 
became  more  imminent,  the  retrograde  movements 
were  more  hurried  and  confused  ;  Hill  seeing  this, 
quickened  his  pace,  until  at  last  both  sides  began 
to  run  violently,  and  so  many  men  broke  from  the 
French  ranks  making  across  the  fields  towards  the 
fords,  and  such  a  rush  was  necessarily  made  by  the 
rest  to  gain  the  bridge  of  Sault  de  Navailles,  thst 
the  whole  country  was  covered  with  scattered  bands. 
Sir  Stajdeton  Cotton,  then  breaking  with  lord  Ed- 
ward Somerset's  hussars  through  a  small  covering 
body  ojjposed  to  him  by  Harispe,  sabred  two  or 
three  hundred  men,  and  the  seventh  hussars  cut  off 
about  two  thousand  who  threw  down  their  arms 
in  an  enclosed  field  ;  yet  some  confusion  or  misman- 
agement occurring,  the  greatest  part  recovering 
their  weapons  escaped,  and  the  pursuit  ceased  at 
the  T>uy  of  Btarn. 

The  French  army  appeared  to  be  entirely  dispers- 
ed ;  but  it  was  more  disordered  in  appearance  than 


728 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XXIV. 


reality,  for  Soiilt  passed  the  Liiy  of  Beam  and  de- 
Btroyed  the  bridge  with  the  loss  of  only  six  jjuns  and 
less  than  four  thousand  men  killed,  wounded  and 
prisoners.  Mar^y  thousands  of  conscripts  however 
threw  away  their  arms,  and  we  shall  find  one  month 
afterwards  the  strag';Tlers  still  amounting  to  three 
thousand.  Nor  would  the  passage  of  the  river  have 
been  effected  so  happily  if  lord  Wellington  had  not 
been  struck  by  a  musket-baW  just  above  the  thigh, 
which  caused  him  to  ride  with  difficulty,  whereby 
the  vigour  am  inity  of  the  pursuit  was  necessarily 
abated.  The  jss  of  the  allies  was  two  thousand 
three  hundred,  of  which  fifty  with  three  officers  were 
taken,  but  among  the  wounded  were  lord  Welling- 
ton, general  Walker,  general  Ross,  and  the  duke  of 
Richmond,  then  lord  3Iarch.  He  had  served  on  lord 
Wellington's  personal  statf  during  the  whole  war 
without  a  hurt,  but  being  made  a  captain  in  the  fif- 
ty-second, like  a  good  soldier  joined  his  regiment 
the  night  before  the  battle.  He  was  shot  through 
the  chest  a  few  hours  afterwards,  thus  learning  by 
Rxperience,  the  difference  between  the  labours  and 
dangers  of  staff  and  regimental  officers,  which  are 
g'enerally  in  the  inverse  ratio  to  their  promotions. 

General  Berton,  stationed  between  Pan  and  Or- 
thez  during  the  battle,  had  been  cut  off  by  Hill's 
movement,  yet  skirting  that  general's  march  he  re- 
treated by  Mant  and  Samadet  with  his  cavalry,  pick- 
ing up  two  battalions  of  conscripts  on  the  road. 
Meanwhile  Soult,  having  no  position  to  rally  upon, 
continued  his  retreat  in  the  night  to  St.  Sever,  break- 
ing down  all  the  bridges  behind  him.  Lord  Welling- 
ton pursued  at  daylight  in  three  columns,  the  right 
by  Lacadee  and  St.  Medar  to  Samadet,  the  centre 
by  the  main  road,  the  left  by  St.  Cricq.  At  St.  Sev- 
er he  hoped  to  find  the  enemy  still  in  confusion,  but 
ha  was  too  late  ;  the  French  were  across  the  river, 
the  bridge  was  broken,  and  the  army  halted.  The 
result  of  the  battle  was  however  soon  made  knov/n 
tar  and  wide,  and  Daricau  who  with  a  few  hundred 
soldiers  was  endeavouring  to  form  an  insurgent  levy 
at  Dax,  the  works  of  which  were  incomplete  and 
still  unarmed,  immediateJy  destroyed  part  of  the 
Ktores,  the  rest  had  been  removed  to  Mont  de  Mar- 
san,  and  retreated  through  the  Landes  to  Langon  on 
the  Garonne. 

From  St.  Sever,  which  offered  no  position,  Soult 
turned  short  to  the  right  and  moved  upon  Barce- 
lonne,  higher  up  the  Adour  ;  but  he  left  D'Erlon  with 
two  divisions  of  infantry,  some  cavalry  and  four 
guns  at  Cazt'res  on  the  right  bank,  and  sent  Clauzel 
to  occupy  Aire  on  the  other  side  of  the  river.  He 
thus  abandoned  his  magazines  at  Mont  de  Marsan 
and  left  open  the  direct  road  to  Bordeaux  ;  but  hold- 
ing Cazeres  with  his  right  he  commanded  another 
road  by  Rochefort  to  that  city,  while  his  left  being 
at  Aire  protected  the  magazines  and  artillery  park 
at  that  place,  and  covered  the  road  to  Pau.  Mean- 
while the  main  body  at  Barcelonne  equally  support- 
ed Clauzel  and  D'Krlon,  and  covered  the  great  roads 
lr»ading  to  Agon  and  Toulouse  on  the  Garonne,  and 
to  the  mountains  by  Tarbes. 

In  this  situation  it  was  difficult  to  judge  what  line 
of  operations  he  meant  to  adopt.  Wellington  how- 
ever passed  the  Adour  about  one  o'clock,  partly  by 
the  repaired  bridge  of  St.  Sever,  partly  by  a  deep 
ford  below,  and  immediately  detached  Beresford 
with  the  light  division  and  Vivian's  cavalry  to  seize 
the  magazines  at  Mont  de  Marsan;  at  the  same 
time  he  pushed  the  head  of  a  column  towards  Ca- 
leres,  where  a  cannonade  and  charge  of  cavalry  took 
place,  and  a  few  men  and  officers  were  hurt  on  both 
eides.  The  next  day  Hill's  corps,  marching  from 
SdDiadet,  reached  the  Adour  between  St.  Sever  and 


Aire,  and  D'Erlon  was  again  assailed  on  the  right 
bank  and  driven  back  skirmishing  to  Barcelonne 
This  event  proved  that  Soult  had  abandoned  Bor- 
deaux ;  but  the  English  general  could  not  push  the 
pursuit  more  vigorously,  because  every  bridge  was 
broken,  and  a  violent  storm  on  the  evening  of  the 
1st  of  March  had  filled  the  smaller  rivers  and  tor- 
rents, carried  away  the  pontoon  bridges,  and  cut  off 
all  communication  between  the  troops  and  the  sup- 
plies. 

The  bulk  of  the  army  was  now  necessarily  halted 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  Adour  until  tiie  bridges 
could  be  repaired;  but  Hill  who  was  on  the  lelt 
bank  marched  to  seize  the  magazines  at  Aire.  Mov- 
ing in  two  columns  from  St.  Savin  and  St.  Gillies, 
on  the  2d  of  March,  he  reached  his  destination  about 
three  o'clock,  with  two  divisions  of  infantry,  a  bri- 
gade of  cavalry  and  a  battery  of  horse-artillery  ;  he 
expected  no  serious  opi)osition,  but  general  Clauzel 
had  arrived  a  few  hours  before,  and  was  in  order  of 
battle  covering  the  town  with  Villatte's  and  Ha- 
rispe's  divisions  and  some  guns.  The  French  occu- 
pied a  steep  ridge  in  front  of  Aire,  high  and  wooded 
on  the  right  where  it  overlooked  the  river,  but  merg- 
ing on  the  left  into  a  wide  table-land  over  which  iho 
great  road  led  to  Pau.  The  position  was  strong  lor 
battle,  yet  it  could  be  readily  outflanked  on  the  left 
by  the  table-land,  and  was  an  uneasy  one  for  retreat 
on  the  right  where  the  ridge  was  narrow,  the  ravine 
behind  steep  and  rugged,  with  a  mill-stream  at  the 
bottom  between  it  and  the  town.  A  branch  of  the 
Adour  also  flowing  behind  Aire  cut  it  off  from  Bar- 
celonne, while  behind  the  left  wing  was  the  greater 
Lys,  a  river  with  steep  banks  and  only  one  bridge. 

COMBAT    OF    AIRE. 

General  Hill,  arriving  about  two  o'clock,  attack- 
ed without  hesitation.  General  Stewart  with  two 
Britisii  brigades  fell  on  the  French  right,  a  Portu- 
guese brigade  assailed  their  centre,  and  the  other 
brigades  followed  in  columns  of  march.  The  action 
was  however  very  sudden  ;  the  Portuguese  v.ere 
pushed  forward  in  a  slovenly  manner  by  general  Da 
Costa,  a  man  of  no  ability,  and  the  French  under 
Harispe  met  them  on  the  flat  summit  of  the  height 
with  so  rough  a  charge  that  they  gave  way  in  flight. 
The  rear  of  the  allies'  column  being  still  in  march 
the  battle  was  like  to  be  lost ;  but  general  Stewart, 
having  by  this  time  won  the  heights  on  the  French 
right,  where  Villatte,  fearing  to  be  enclosed,  made 
but  a  toeble  resistance,  immediately  detached  gen- 
eral Barnes  with  the  fiftieth  and  ninety-second  regi- 
ments to  the  aid  of  the  Portuguese.  The  vehement 
charge  of  these  troops  turned  the  stream  of  battle, 
the  French  were  broken  in  turn  and  thrown  back  on 
their  reserves,  yet  they  rallied  and  renewed  the  ac- 
tion with  great  courage,  fighting  obstinately  until 
general  Byng's  British  brigade  came  up,  when  Ha- 
rispe was  driven  towards  the  river  lys,  and  Villatte 
quite  through  the  town  of  Aire  into  the  space  be- 
tween the  two  branches  of  the  Adour  behind. 

General  Reillo,  who  was  at  Barcelonne  when  the 
action  began,  brought  up  Rouget's  division  to  sup- 
port Villatte,  the  combat  was  thus  continued  until 
night  at  that  point ;  meanwliile  Harispe  crossed  tha 
Lys  and  broke  the  bridge,  but  the  French  lost  many 
men.  Two  generals.  Dauture  and  Gnsquet,  were 
wounded,  a  colonel  of  engineers  was  killed,  a  hun- 
dred prisoners  were  taken,  many  of  Hnrispe's  con- 
srripts  threw  away  their  arms  and  fled  to  their 
homes,  and  the  magazines  fell  into  the  conqueror's 
hands.  The  loss  of  the  British  troops  was  one  hun- 
dred nnd  fifty,  general  Barnes  was  wounded  and  col- 
onel How!  killed.     The  loss  of  the  Portuguese  wa« 


1814.J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


729 


never  officially  statecl,  yet  it  could  not  have  been 
less  than  that  of  the  British,  and  the  vigour  of  the 
action  proved  tluit  the  French  courage  was  very  lit- 
tle abated  by  the  battle  of  Orthez.  Soult  inunsdi- 
ately  retreated  up  the  Adour,  by  both  banks,  towards 
Maubourguet  and  i\Iarciac  ;  and  lie  was  not  followed, 
for  new  combinations  were  now  opened  to  the  gene- 
rals on  both  sides. 

OBSERVATIONS. 

1st.  On  the  T4th  of  February,  the  passage  of  the 
Oaves  was  commenced  by  Hill's  attack  on  }Iarispe 
at  Hellette.  On  the  21  of  March,  the  tirst  scries  of 
operations  was  terminated  by  the  combat  at  Aire. 
In  these  sixteen  days  lord  Wellington  traversed  with 
hiS  right  wing  eighty  miles,  passed  live  large  and 
eeveral  small  rivers,  forced  the  enemy  to  abandon 
two  I'ortihed  bridge-heads  and  many  minor  works, 
gained  one  great  battle  and  two  combats,  captured 
eix  guns  and  about  a  thousand  prisoners,  seized  the 
magazines  at  Dax,  3Iont  de  Marsan  and  Aire,  forced 
Soult  to  abandon  I3ayonne,and  cut  him  o If  from  Bor- 
deaux. And  in  this  time  he  also  threw  his  stupen- 
dous bridge  below  Bayonne,and  closely  invested  that 
fortress  after  a  sharp  and  bloody  action.  Success  in 
war,  like  charity  in  religion,  covers  a  multitude  of 
sins  ;  but  success  often  belongs  to  fortune  as  much 
as  skill,  and  the  combinations  of  Wellington,  pro- 
found and  sagacious,  might  in  this  manner  be  con- 
founded with  the  lucky  operations  of  the  allies  on 
the  other  side  of  France,  where  the  presumption 
and  the  vacillation  of  ignorance  alternately  predom- 
inated. 

2n(l.  Soult  attributed  the  loss  of  his  positions  to 
the  superior  forces  of  the  allies.  Is  this  well- 
founded  ]  The  French  general's  numbers  cannot  be 
determined  exactly  ;  but  after  all  his  losses  in  De- 
cember, after  the  detachments  made  by  the  empe- 
ror's order  in  January,  and  after  completing  the  gar- 
rison of  Bayonne  to  fourteen  tiiousand  men,  he  in- 
formed the  minister  of  war  thai  thirty  thousand  in- 
fantry, three  thousand  cavalry  and  forty  pieces  of 
artillery  were  in  line.  This  did  not  include  the 
conscripts  of  the  new  levy,  all  youths  indeed  and 
hastily  sent  to  the  army  by  battalions  as  they  could 
be  armed,  but  brave,  and  about  eight  thousand  of 
them  might  have  joined  before  the  battle  of  Orthez. 
Wherefore,  deducting  the  detachments  of  cavalry 
and  infantry  under  Berton  on  the  side  of  Pan,  and 
under  Daricau  on  the  side  of  Dax,  it  may  bo  said 
that  forty  thousand  combatants  of  all  arms  were  en- 
gaged in  that  action.  I'hirty-five  thousand  were 
very  excellent  soldiers,  for  the  conscripts  of  the  old 
levy  who  joined  beftn'e  the  bnttle  of  the  Nivelle  were 
Btout  men;  their  vigorous  fighting  at  Garris  and 
Aire  proved  it,  for  of  them  was  Harispe's  division 
Composed. 

Now,  lord  Wellington  commenced  his  operations 
witli  ttie  second,  third,  fourth  and  seventh  British 
divisions,  the  independent  Portuguese  division  un- 
d'ir  Lecor,  MoriUo's  Sj^aniards,  forty-eight  pieces  of 
artillery,  and  only  four  brigades  of  light  cavalry,  for 
Vandeleur's  brigade  remained  with  Hope,  and  all 
the  heavy  cavalry  and  the  Portuguese  were  left  in 
Spain.  Following  the  morning  states  of  the  army, 
this  would  furnish,  exclusive  of  MoriUo's  Spaniards, 
something  more  than  forty  thousand  fighting  rnen 
and  nificers  of  all  arms,  of  which  four  thousand  were 
horsemen.  But  five  regiments  of  infantry,  and 
amongst  them  two  o-^  the  strongest  British  regi- 
ments of  the  light  division,  were  absent  to  receive 
their  clothing ;  deduct  these,  and  we  have  about 
thirty-seven  thousand  Anglo-l'ortugtiese  combat- 
&Qts      It  is  true  that  Mina's  battalions  and  Muri)- 


lo's  aided  in  the  commencement  of  the  operations, 
but  the  first  immediately  invested  St.  .lean  Pied  de 
Port,  and  the  latter  invested  Navarreins.  Lord 
Wellington  was  therefore  in  the  battle  superior  by 
a  thousand  horsemen  and  eight  guns,  but  Soult  out- 
numbered him  in  infantry  by  four  or  five  tJDUsand, 
conscripts  it  is  true,  yet  useful.  Why  then  was  the 
passage  of  the  Gaves  so  feebly  disjjuted  .'  Because 
the  French  general  remained  entirely  on  the  defen- 
sive in  positions  too  extended  for  his  numbers. 

J5rd.  Offensive  operaliniis  imist  he  the  hanis  of  a 
good  defensive  syslcm.  Let  Soult's  operations  be 
tried  by  this  rule.  On  the  12th.  he  knew  that  the 
allies  were  in  motion  for  some  great  operation,  and 
he  judged  rightly  that  it  was  to  drive  iiim  from  tl  o 
Gaves.  From  the  14th  to  the  16th,  his  left  was 
continually  assailed  by  very  superior  numbers  ;  but 
during  |)art  of  that  time  IJereslbrd  could  only  oppose 
to  his  right  and  centre  the  fourth  and  a  portion  of 
the  seventh  divisions  with  some  cavalry  :  and  those 
not  in  a  body  and  at  once,  but  parcelled  and  extend- 
ed ;  for  it  was  not  until  the  16th  that  the  fourth, 
seventh  and  light  divisions  were  so  closed  towards 
the  Bidouze  as  to  act  in  one  mass.  On  the  1.5th 
lord  Wellington  admitted  that  his  troops  were  too 
extended;  Villatte's,  Taupin's  and  Foy's  divisions 
were  never  menaced  until  the  18th,  and  there  was 
nothing  to  prevent  D'Erlon's  divisions,  which  only 
crossed  the  Adour  on  the  17th,  from  being  on  the 
Bidouze  the  15th.  Soult  might  thereibre,  by  rapid 
and  well-digested  combinations,  have  united  lour  di- 
visions of  infantry  and  a  brigade  of  cavalry  to  at- 
tack Beresford  on  the  1.5th  or  16r.h,  between  the 
Nive  and  tl;e  Adour.  If  successful,  the  defeated 
troops,  pushed  back  upon  the  sixth  division,  must 
have  fought  for  life  with  the  rivers  en  their  flanks, 
Soult  in  front,  and  the  garrison  of  B;iyonne  issuing 
from  the  works  of  IMousserolles  on  their  rear.  ]f 
unsuccessful,  the  French  retreats  behind  the  Gave 
d'Oloron  could  not  have  been  preventeo. 

It  is  however  to  be  pleaded  that  Soult  was  not  ex- 
actly informed  of  the  numbers  and  situation  of  his 
opponents.  He  thought  Beresford  had  the  first  di- 
vision also  on  the  lower  Bidouze  ;  he  knew  that 
Wellington  had  large  reserves  to  employ,  and,  that 
general's  design  of  passing  the  Adour  below  Bay- 
onne being  unknown  to  him,  he  naturally  supposed 
they  would  be  used  to  support  the  operations  on  the 
Gaves:  he  therefore  remained  on  the  defensive.  It 
might  possibly  also  have  been  difficult  to  brLiig 
D'Erlon's  divisions  across  the  Adour  by  the  Port  de 
Lanne  before  the  17th,  because  the  regular  bridge 
had  been  carried  away  and  the  connnunicjitions  in- 
terrupted a  few  days  before  by  the  floods.  In  fine, 
there  are  many  matters  of  detail  in  war,  known 
only  to  a  general-in-chief,  which  forbid  the  best 
combinations;  and  this  it  is  that  makes  the  art 
so  difficult  and  uncertain.  Great  captains  worship 
Fortune. 

On  the  24th,  the  passage  of  the  Gave  d'Oloron 
was  elfected.  Soult  then  recognized  his  error,  and 
concentrated  his  troops  at  Orthez  to  retake  the  of- 
fensive. It  was  a  fine  movement  and  eflected  with 
ability,  but  he  suficred  another  favourable  opportu. 
nity  of  giving  a  counter-blow  to  escape  him.  The 
infantry  under  Villatte,  Harispe  and  Paris,  support- 
ed by  a  brigade  of  cavalry,  were  about  Sauvcierre. 
that  is  to  sayt,  four  miles  from  3IontIbrt  ard  only 
seven  from  \  illenave,  where  the  i)rincipal  passage 
was  eflected,  where  the  ford  was  deep,  the  strearr* 
rapid,  and  the  loft  hank,  although  favourable  for  the 
passage,  not  entirely  commanding  the  right  bank.. 
How  then  did  it  hai>pen  that  the  operation  was  ef- 
fected  without  opposition  1    Amongst  t.\e  allies  it  wag 


730 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAl 


rBooK  XXIV 


rumoHred  at  llic  time  that  Soult  complained  of  the 
negligi'iicc  of  a  g-eneral  who  had  orders  to  march 
agaiiiht  t!ie  passing  troops.  The  position  of  Ha- 
rispe's  division  at  Monstrueig,  forming  a  reserve 
at  equal  distances  from  Sauveterre  and  Villenave, 
would  seem  to  have  been  adopted  with  that  view; 
but  I  Had  no  contirmation  of  tiie  report  in  Soult's 
correspondence,  and  it  is  certain  he  thought  Pic- 
ton's  demonstration  at  Sauveterre  was  a  real  attack. 

4th,  The  position  adoj)ted  by  the  French  general 
at  Urthez  was  excellent  tor  oti'ence.  It  was  not  so 
for  defence,  when  Beresford  and  Picton  had  crossed 
the  Gave  below  in  force.  Lord  Wellington  could 
then  throw  his  whole  army  on  that  side,  and  secure 
his  comnmnication  with  Hope,  after  wliich  outflank- 
ing tlie  right  of  the  French  he  could  seize  the  defile 
of  .Sauli  de  Navailles,  cut  them  otf  from  their  maga- 
zines at  Dax,  Mont  de  Marsan  and  Aire,  and  force 
thsm  to  retreat  by  the  Pau  road  leaving  the  way 
open  to  Bordeaux.  To  await  this  attack  was  there- 
fore an  error;  but  Soult's  original  design  was  to  as- 
sail the  head  of  the  tirst  coJumn  which  should  come 
near  him,  and  Beresford's  approach  to  Baghts  on 
the  26th  furnished  the  opportunity.  It  is  true  that 
the  French  light  cavalry  gave  intelligence  of  that 
ganeral's  march  too  late,  and  marred  the  combina- 
tion, but  tiiere  was  still  time  to  fall  on  the  head  of 
the  column  v/hile  the  third  division  was  in  the  act 
of  passing  tlie  river  and  entangled  in  the  narrow 
way  leading  from  the  ford  to  the  Peirehorade  road  : 
it  is  said  the  French  marshal  appeared  disposed  to 
do  this  at  tirst,  but  tinally  took  a  defensive  position 
in  which  to  receive  battle. 

However,  when  the  morning  came,  he  neglected  an- 
other opportunity.  For  two  hours  the  third  division 
and  the  hussars  remained  close  to  him,  covering  the 
march  of  the  sixth  and  light  divisions  through  the 
narrow  ways  leading  from  the  bridge  of  Berenx  up 
to  the  main  road;  the  infantry  had  no  defined  posi- 
tion, the  cavalry  had  no  room  to  extend,  and  there 
were  no  troops  between  them  and  Beresford,  who 
was  then  in  march  by  the  heights  of  Barghts  to  the 
Dax  road.  If  the  French  general  had  pushed  a  col- 
umn across  the  marsh  to  seize  the  Roman  camp  he 
would  have  separated  the  wings  of  the  allies  ;  then 
pouring  down  the  Peirehorade  road  with  Foy's, 
D'Armagnac's  and  Villatte's  divisions,  he  would 
probably  have  overwhelmed  the  third  division  be- 
fore the  other  two  could  have  extricated  themselves 
fr*m  the  defibs.  Picton  therefore  had  grounds  for 
uneasiness. 

With  a  subtle  skill  did  Soult  take  his  ground  of 
battle  at  Ortliez,  fiercely  and  strongly  did  he  fight, 
and  wonderfully  did  he  effect  his  retreat  across  the 
Luy  of  Beam  ;  but  twice  in  twenty-four  hours  he 
had  neglected  those  hnppy  occasions  which  in  war 
taki  birth  and  tlight  at  the  same  instant ;  and  as  the 
value  of  his  position,  essentially  an  offensive  one, 
was  thereby  lost,  a  slowness  to  strike  may  be  ob- 
ji;cted  to  his  generalship.  Yet  there  is  no  com- 
mander, unless  a  Haimibal  or  a  Napoleon  surpassing 
the  human  jjrojjortions,  but  will  abate  sometliing  of 
hia  confidence  and  hesitate  after  repeated  defeats. 
Soult  in  this  campaign,  as  in  many  others,  proved 
himself  a  har.ly  ca|)tain  full  of  resources. 

.'>th.  Lord  Wellington,  with  a  vastness  of  concep- 
tion and  a  capacity  for  arrangement  and  combina- 
tion equal  to  his  opponent,  possessed  in  a  high  de- 
gree that  daring  promptness  of  action,  that  faculty 
of  inspiration  for  suddenly  deciding  the  fate  of  whole 
campaigns,  with  wliich  Napoleon  was  endowed  be- 
yond a'l  mankind.  It  is  this  which  especially  con- 
Btilutes  inilitary  genius.  For  so  vast,  so  compli- 
cated arc  I'le  combinations  of  war,  so  easily  and  by 


such  slight  causes  are  ihey  aiTeci-jd,  that  the  best 
generals  do  but  grope  in  the  dark,  aiid  they  acknow- 
ledge the  humiliating  truth.  By  the  number  and 
extent  of  their  fine  dispositions  men,  »,nd  not  by 
their  errors,  the  merit  of  commanuers  is  to  be  meas- 
ured. 

In  this  campaign,  lord  Wellington  designed  to 
penetrate  France,  not  with  a  hasty  incursion  but 
solidly,  to  force  Soult  over  the  Garonne,  and  if  pos 
sible  in  the  direction  of  Bordeaux,  because  it  was 
the  direct  line,  because  the  citizens  were  inimical 
to  the  emperor,  and  the  town,  lying  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  river,  could  not  be  defended  ;  because  a  June 
tion  with  Suchet  would  thus  be  prevented.  Final- 
ly, if  by  operating  against  Soult's  left  he  could 
throw  tlie  French  army  into  the  ],andes,  where  hie 
own  superior  cavalry  could  act,  it  would  probably  be 
destroyed. 

To  operate  against  Soult's  left  in  the  direction  of 
Pau  was  the  most  obvious  method  of  preventing  a 
junction  with  Suchet,  and  rendering  the  jiositions 
which  the  I^'rench  general  had  fortified  on  tlie  (iaves 
useless.  But  the  investment  of  Bayonne  required  a 
large  force,  which  was  yet  weak  against  an  outer 
attack  because  separated  in  three  parts  by  the  riv- 
ers ;  hence  if  lord  Wellington  had  made  a  wide 
movement  on  Pau,  Soult  might  have  ])laced  the 
Adour  between  him  and  the  main  army,  and  then 
fallen  upon  Hope's  troops  on  the  right  side  of  that 
river.  The  English  general  was  thus  reduced  to 
act  upon  a  more  contracted  line,  and  to  cross  all  the 
Gaves.  To  effect  this  he  collected  his  principal 
mass  on  his  right  by  the  help  of  the  great  road  lead- 
ing to  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port,  then  by  rapid  marchen 
and  reiterated  attacks  he  forced  the  passage  of  the 
rivers  above  the  points  which  Soult  had  fortified  for 
defence,  and  so  turned  that  general's  left  with  a 
view  of  finally  cutting  him  ofi'  from  Suchet  and 
driving  him  into  the  wilderness  of  the  I.andes. 
During  these  marches  he  left  Beresford  on  the  lower 
parts  of  the  rivers  to  occupy  the  enemy's  atten- 
tion and  cover  the  troops  blockading  3Iousserolles. 
Me-rnwhile,  by  the  collection  of  boats  at  Urt  and 
other  demonstrations  indicating  a  design  of  throw- 
ing a  bridge  over  the  Adour  above  Bayonne,  he  di- 
verted attention  from  the  point  chosen  below  the 
fortress  for  that  operation,  and  at  the  snme  time  pro- 
vided tA\e  means  of  throwing  another  bridge  at  the 
Port  de  Lanne  to  secure  the  communication  with 
Hope  by  the  right  bank  whenever  Scnlt  should  be 
forced  to  abandon  the  Gaves.  These  were  fine  com- 
binations. 

I  have  shown  that  Beresford's  corps  was  so  weak 
at  first  that  Soult  might  have  struck  a  counterblow. 
Lord  AVellington  admitted  the  error.  AN'riting,  on 
the  L5th,  he  says,*' If  the  eiiemy  stand  upon  the  Bi- 
douze  I  am  not  so  strong  as  I  ought  to  be,"  and  ho 
ordered  up  the  fourth  and  light  divisions;  but  this 
excepted  his  movements  were  conformable  to  the 
principles  of  war.  He  chose  the  best  strategic  line 
of  operations,  his  main  attack  was  made  with  heavy 
masses  against  tlie  enemy's  weakest  points,  and  in 
execution  he  was  prompt  and  daring.  His  conduct 
was  conformable  also  to  his  _ieculiar  situation.  He 
had  two  distinct  operations  in  hand,  namely  to  throw 
his  bridge  below  Bayonne,  and  to  force  the  Gaves. 
He  had  the  numbers  required  to  obtain  these  objects, 
but  dared  not  use  them  lest  he  should  put  the  Span- 
ish troops  into  contact  witJi  the  French  people  ;  yet 
he  could  not  entirely  dispense  with  them  ,  wlierefore 
bringing  Freyre  up  to  Bayonne,  Morillo  to  Navar- 
reins,  and  Mina  to  St.  .lean  Pied  de  Port,  he  seemed 
to  put  his  whole  army  in  motion,  thus  gaining  tha 
appearance  of  military  strength  with  us  little  politi 


I H  14.1 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR 


731 


caldanfjeras  possible.  Nevertheless  so  terrible  had 
the  Spaniards  already  made  themselves  by  tiieir  cru- 
el lawless  habits  tliat  tlieir  inare  return  across  the 
frontier  threw  the  whole  country  into  consternation. 

eth.  When  in  front  of  (J-rthez,  it  would  at  tir.st 
sig'lit  apjiear  as  if  lord  Wellingion  had  changed  his 
plan  of  driving  the  enemy  upon  the  Landes,  but  it 
was  not  so.  He  did  not  expect  a  battle  on  tlie  :27th. 
This  is  proved  by  his  letter  to  sir  Joim  Hope,  in 
wliich  he  t-,'lls  that  general,  that  he  anticipated  no 
difficnity  in  passing  the  Gave  of  Pau,  that  on  the 
evening  of  the  26lh  tlie  enemy  were  retiring,  and 
that  he  designed  to  visit  the  position  at  Bayonne. 
To  pass  tiie  Gave  in  the  quickest  and  surest  man- 
ner, to  rs-e-stablish  the  direct  communications  with 
Hope,  and  to  unite  witli  Berestijrd,  were  his  imme- 
diate objects;  if  he  tinally  worked  by  his  lift,  it  was 
a  sudden  act  and  extraneous  to  the  general  design, 
which  was  certainly  to  operate  with  Hill's  corps  and 
the  light  division  by  the  right. 

It  was  after  passing  the  Gave  at  Berenx  on  the 
morning  of  tiie  27th,  lord  Wellington  first  discover- 
ed Soult's  intention  to  fight,  and  that  consequently 
he  was  himself  in  a  false  position.  Had  he  shown 
any  hesitation,  any  uneasiness,  had  he  endeavoured 
to  take  a  defensive  position  witli  eitlier  Beresford's 
or  Picton's  troops,  he  would  inevitably  have  drawn 
the  attention  of  the  enemy  to  his  dangerous  situa- 
tion. Instead  of  this,  judging  that  Soult  would  not 
on  the  instant  change  from  the  defensive  to  the  of- 
fensive, he  confidently  pushed  Picton's  skirmishers 
forward  as  if  to  assail  tiie  left  of  the  French  posi- 
tion, and  put  Beresford  in  movement  against  their 
right,  and  this  with  all  the  coolness  imaginable. 
Tlie  success  was  complete.  Soult,  wlio  supposed 
the  allies  stronger  than  they  really  were,  naturally 
imagined  the  wings  would  not  be  so  bold  unless  well 
supported  in  the  centre  where  the  Roman  camp 
Could  hide  a  multitude.  He  therefore  held  fiist  to 
his  position  until  tlie  movement  was  more  developed, 
and  in  two  hours  the  sixth  and  light  divisions  were 
up  and  the  battle  commenced.  It  was  well  fought 
on  both  sides,  but  the  crisis  was  decided  by  the  fifty- 
second,  and  wlien  that  regiment  was  put  in  move- 
ment only  a  single  Portuguese  battalion  was  in  re- 
serve behind  the  Roman  camp;  upon  such  nice  com- 
binations of  time  and  place  does  the  fate  of  battles 
turn. 

7th.  Soult  certainly  committed  an  error  in  receiv- 
ing ba,ttle  at  Orthez,  and  it  has  been  said  that  lord 
Wellington's  wound  at  the  most  critical  period  of 
the  retreat  alone  saved  the  hostile  army.  Neverthe- 
less the  clear  manner  in  which  the  French  general 
carried  his  troops  away,  his  prompt  judgment,  shown 
in  the  sudden  change  of  his  line  of  retreat  at  St.  Sev- 
er, the  resolute  manner  in  which  he  halted  and  show- 
ed front  again  at  Cazeres,  Barcelonne  and  Aire, 
were  all  {)roofs  of  no  common  ability.  It  was  Wel- 
lington's aim  to  drive  the  French  on  to  the  Landes, 
Soult's  to  avoid  this;  he  therefore  shifted  from  the 
Bordeaux  line  to  that  of  Toulouse,  not  in  confusion, 
but  with  the  resolution  of  a  man  ready  to  dispute 
every  foot  of  ground.  The  loss  of  the  magazines  at 
iAIont  de  Marsan  was  no  fault  of  his;  he  had  given 
orders  for  transporting  them  towards  the  Toulouse 
Bide  fifteen  da,ys  before,  but  the  matter  depending 
upon  the  civil  authorities  was  neglected.  He  was 
blamed  by  some  of  his  officers  for  fighting  at  Aire, 
yet  it  WK.S  necessary  to  cover  the  magazines  there, 
and  essential  to  his  design  of  keeping  up  the  cour- 
age of  the  soldiers  under  the  ailverse  circumstances 
which  he  anticipated.  And  here  the  i)alm  of  gene- 
ralship remained  with  him,  for  certainly  the  battle 
of  Urthez  was  less  decisive  than  it  should  have  been. 


I  speak  not  of  the  pursuit  .'    Snult  de  Navdiilcs,  nor 
of  the  next  day's  march  uof/ii  St.  Sever,  but  of  Hill'a 
march  on  the  right.     That  primeral  halted  near  Sa- 
niadet  the  ^"'th  of  February,  reached  St.  Savin  on 
the  Adour  on  the  1st,  and  fought  the  battle  of  Aire 
on  the  evening  of  the  second  of  March.     But  from 
I  Samadet  to  Aire  is  not  longer  than  from  Samadet  to 
j  St.  Savin,  where  he  was  on  tlie  1st.    He  could  there- 
I  fore,  if  his  orders   had   prescribed  it  so,  have  seized 
Aire  on  the    1st   before   Clauzel   arrived,  and  thua 
I  spared  the  obstinate  combat  at  that  place.     It  may 
j  also  be  observed  that  his  attack  did  not  receive  a 
!  right  direction.     It  should  have  been  towards  the 
j  French  left,  bvcause  they  were  more  weakly  posted 
'  there,  and  the  ritlge  held  by  their  right  was  so  (iifii- 
j  cult  to  retire  from  that  no  troops  would  stay  on   it 
if  any  progress  was  made  on  the  left,     'i'his  was 
'  however  an  accident  of  war;  general  Hill  had  no 
;  time  to  examine  the  ground,  his  orders  were  to  at- 
!  tack,  and  to  fall  without  hesitation  upon  a  retiring 
enemy  after  sucli  a  defeat  as  Orthez  was  undoubted- 
ly the  right  thing  to  do.    But  it  cannot  be  said  tha* 
lord   Wellington    pushed   the   pursuit   with    \igour. 
Notwithstanding  the  storm  on  the  evening  of  the 
1st,  he  could  have  reinforced  Hill,  and  should  not 
have  given  the  French  army  time  to  recover  from 
their  recent  defeat.     "  The  secret  of  war,"  says  Na- 
poleon, "  is  to  march  twelve  leagues,  fight  a  battle, 
and  march  twelve  more  in  pursuit." 


CHAPTER  in. 

Soult's  perilou«  situation — He  falls  hack  to  Tarhe." — Najiolecn 
sencU  liiiiiH  plnn  of  opeialion> — His  reply  and  views  >.tatfd-  — 
Loid  '.Velliiigton's  eiiiharrassiiieiils — Soult's  proriamatio'i — 
Ohseiiations  U[ion  it — Lnrcl  ^VeUln^toi)  calls  up  ¥iv',re'» 
Gallicians  and  detarhs-s  Beiesford  af;air.»t  Bor(Uau}.--The 
ni;i\or  ot  that  city  rnolts  from  JVapolton — l5eifs!ord  filters 
Bordeaux  and  i-.  followed  hytlie  duke  of  Aii{;oulenie— -Ffnrs 
of  a  reaction— The  niHyor  issues  a  false  pro'lamalicfi — Lord 
VWIIinofon  expiesses  his  indignation — Rebukts  the  riuke  of 
Angoulenif — Ricalis  Berestbrd,  but  leaves  1;  id  Dalhousie 
ivilh  the  seventh  flivi'ion  and  some  raval]>  — Dccaen  coiu- 
ninues  the  or^;rtnizati()n  of  the  aTiny  of  the  Giiondt — Adnii- 
lal  Penrose  enters  the  Garonnf — Heiiiarkable  opioil  ol  the 
C(:rnniis?ar_v  Ogilvie — Lord  Dalhousie  pa.-seg  the  Garor  iie 
and  the  Dordoiine,  and  defeats  L'Huillier  at  Ivtauliers — Ad- 
miral Penrose  destroys  the  French  fiolil  la--The  French  set 
fire  to  their  ships  of  war — The  British  stamen  and  uiarines 
land  and  destroy  all  the  I'rench  battel  ies  fioni  Llaje  to  the 
mouth  of  the  Garonne. 

Extremely  perilous  and  disheartening  was  the 
situation  of  the  French  general.  His  army  was 
greatly  reduced  by  his  losses  in  battle  and  by  the 
desertion  of  the  conscripts,  and  three  thousand  strag- 
glers, old  soldiers  who  ought  to  have  rejoined  their 
eagles,  were  collected  by  difierent  generals,  into 
whose  districts  they  had  wandered,  and  employed  tc 
strengthen  detached  corps  instead  of  being  restored 
to  the  army.  All  his  magazines  were  taken;  dis- 
content, the  natural  offspring  of  mislbrtune,  prevail- 
ed amongst  his  ofiicers  ;  a  powerful  enemy  was  in 
front,  no  certain  resources  of  men  or  money  behind, 
and  his  efibrts  were  ill  seconded  by  the  civil  authori- 
ties. The  troops,  indignant  at  the  people's  apathy, 
behaved  with  so  much  violence  and  insolence,  espe- 
cially during  tiie  retreat  from  St.  Sever,  that  Soult, 
who  wanted  officers  very  badly,  proposed  to  fill  the 
vacancies  from  the  national  guards,  that  he  might 
have  "  men  who  would  rpsi)e(;t  property."  On  the 
other  hand,  the  people  comparing  the  conduct  of 
their  own  army  with  the  disciidine  of  the  Anglo- 
J'ortuguese,  and  contrasting  the  requisitions  neces- 
sarily imposed  by  their  countrymen  with  the  ready 
and  copious  disbursements  in  gold  made  by  their 


732 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XXIV 


I 


tiiemies,  for  now  one  commissary  preceded  each  di- 
vision to  order  rations  lor  tlie  troops  and  another 
followed  to  arrange  and  pay  on  the  spot,  were  be- 
come so  absolutely  averse  to  the  French  army,  that 
Soult  writing  to  the  minister  of  war  tlms  expressed 
him-selt':  "  if  the  population  ot'tlie  departments  oi'tiie 
Landes,  the  Gcrs,  and  tlie  Lower  Pyrenees,  were 
animated  with  a  good  spirit,  this  is  tiie  moment  to 
make  the  enemy  sutler  by  carrying  oif  his  convoys 
and  prisone-s;  but  they  appear  more  disposed  to  fa- 
vour the  invaders  than  to  second  the  army.  It  is 
scarjely  possible  to  obtain  a  carriage  for  transport, 
and  I  shall  not  be  surprised  to  find  in  a  short  time 
these  inliabitants  taking  arms  against  us."  Soult 
was  however  a  man  fijrmed  by  nature  and  by  exj)e- 
rienca  to  struggle  against  difficulties,  always  appear- 
ing greater  vvtien  in  a  desperate  condition  than  when 
more  iiappily  circumstanced.  At  Genoa  under  Mas- 
sena,  at  Oporto,  and  in  Andalusia,  he  liad  been  in- 
nured  to  military  distress,  and  probably  for  that  rea- 
son the  emperor  selected  him  to  sustain  tnis  danger- 
ous contest  in  preference  to  others  accounted  more 
ready  tacticians  on  a  field  of  battle. 

On  tlie  ;3d  and  4th  of  March,  he  retreated  by  Plai- 
eance  and  Madiran  to  Kabasteins,  Marciac  and 
Maubourgiiet,  where  he  halted,  covering  Tarbes,  for 
his  design  was  to  keep  in  mass  and  await  the  devel- 
opement  of  the  allies'  plans.  In  this  view  he  called 
in  the  detachments  of  cavalry  and  infantry  which 
had  been  left  on  the  side  of  Pau  before  the  battle  of 
Orthez,  and  hearing  that  Daricau  was  at  Langon 
with  a  thousand  men,  he  ordered  him  to  marcli  by 
Agen  and  join  the  army  immediately.  He  likewise 
put  the  national  guards  and  gendarmes  in  a-ctivity 
on  the  side  of  tlie  Pyrenees,  and  directed  the  coni- 
nanders  of  the  military  districts  in  his  rear  to  keep 
their  old  soldiers,  of  which  there  were  many  scat- 
tered through  the  country,  in  readiness  to  aid  the 
army. 

While  thus  acting  he  received  from  the  minister 
of  war  a  note  dictated  by  the  emperor. 

"Fortresses,"  said  Napoleon,  "are  nothing  in 
themselves  when  the  enemy,  having  the  command 
of  the  sea,  can  collect  as  many  shells  and  bullets 
and  guns  as  he  pleases  to  crush  them.  Leave  tliere- 
fore  only  a  few  troops  in  Bayonne  ;  the  way  to  pre- 
vent the  siege  is  to  keep  the  army  close  to  the  place. 
Resume  the  ou'ensive,  fall  upon  one  or  other  of  the 
enemy's  wings,  and  though  you  should  have  but 
twenty  thousand  men,  if  you  seize  the  proper  mo- 
ment and  attack  hardily,  you  ought  to  gain  some 
advantage.  You  have  enough  talent  to  understand 
my  meaning." 

This  note  came  fourteen  days  too  late.  But  what 
if  it  had  come  before!  Lord  Wellington,  after  win- 
ning the  battle  of  St.  Pierre  the  U'.th  of  Decem.ber, 
was  firmly  established  on  the  Adour  above  Bayonne, 
p.nd  able  to  interrupt  the  French  convoys  as  they  de- 
ecended  from  the  Port  de  Lanne.  It  was  evident 
then  that  when  dry  weather  enabled  the  allies  to 
move  Soult  must  abandon  Bayonne  to  defend  the 
passage  of  the  Gaves,  or  risk  being  turned  and  driv- 
en upon  the  Landes  from  whence  it  would  be  diffi- 
cult for  iiim  to  escape.  Napoleon  however  desired 
liim  to  leave  only  n  lew  men  in  Bayonne,  another 
division  would  thus  have  been  added  to  his  field  ar- 
my, and  this  diminution  of  the  garrison  would  not 
have  increased  lord  Wellington's  active  fort'cs,  be- 
cause tiie  investment  of  Bnyonne  would  still  have 
required  tiiree  separate  corps:  moreover,  until  the 
bridge-head  et  Poirrliorade  was  aban('oned  to  con- 
ccntr.ite  at  Ortliez,  Bayonne  was  not,  rigorously 
Bpeaking,  left  to  its  own  defence. 

To  the  emperor'e  obscrvationB  Soult  therefore  re- 


plied, that  several  months  before  he  had  told  the 
minister  of  war  Bayonne  was  incapable  cf  sustain 
ing  fifteen  days  open  trenches  unless  tliC  intrenched 
camp  was  well  occupied,  and  he  had  been  by  the 
minister  authorized  so  to  occupy  it.  'J'aking  that 
as  his  base,  he  had  left  a  garrison  of  thirteen  thou- 
sand five  hundred  men  ;  and  now  that  he  knew  the 
emperor's  wishes,  it  was  no  longer  in  his  j.icwer  to 
withdraw  them.  With  respect  to  ieepirg  close  to 
the  place,  he  had  done  so  as  long  as  he  ccuid  without 
endangering  the  safety  of  the  army  ;  but  lord  Wel- 
lington's operations  had  forced  him  to  abandon  it, 
and  he  had  only  changed  his  line  of  ojterations  st 
St.  Sever  when  he  was  being  puslied  back  u[^on  Err- 
deaux  with  little  prospect  of  being  able  to  pass  the 
Garonne  in  time.  Lie  had  for  several  months 
thought  of  establishing  a  ])ivot  of  support  for  his 
movements  at  Dax,  in  the  design  of  still  holdirg  by 
Bayonne,  and  with  that  view  had  ordered  the  cid 
works  of  the  former  place  to  be  repaired  and  a  camp 
to  be  fortified  ;  but  frcm  poverty  of  means  even  the 
body  of  the  place  was  not  completed  or  armed  at  the 
moment  when  the  battle  of  Orthez  forced  iiim  to  re- 
linquish it.  Moreover  the  insurgent  levy  of  the 
Landes  upon  which  he  depended  to  man  the  works 
had  failed,  not  more  than  two  hundred  men  had  come 
forward.  Neither  was  lie  very  confident  of  the  ad- 
vantage of  such  a  position,  because  Wellington  with 
superior  numbers  would  probably  have  turned  his 
left,  and  forced  him  to  retire  precipitately  towards 
Bordeasix  by  the  desert  of  the  greater  1  andes. 

The  emperor  ordered  him  to  take  the  ofiensive, 
were  it  only  with  twenty  thousand  men.  He  wouid 
obey  witli  this  observation,  that  from  the  14th  of 
February  to  that  moment  he  had  had  no  power  to 
take  the  initiatory  movement,  having  been  constant- 
ly attacked  by  infinitely  su|)erior  numbers.  He  had 
defended  himself  as  he  could,  but  had  nee  expected 
to  succeed  against  the  enormous  disi)roportion  of 
force.  It  being  thus  impossible,  ev°n  though  he  sa- 
crificed his  last  man  in  the  attempt,  to  stop  the  ene- 
my, he  now  sought  to  prolong  the  war  as  much  as 
possible  on  the  frontier,  and  by  defending  every  posi- 
tion to  keep  the  invaders  in  check  and  prevent  them 
from  attacking  Bordeaux  or  Toulouse,  save  by  de- 
tachments. He  had  taken  his  line  of  operatic  ns  by 
the  road  of  Tarbes,  St.  Gaudens  and  Toulouse,  that 
is  to  say,  by  the  roots  of  the  Pyrenees,  calculating 
that  if  lord  Wellington  sent  small  detachments 
against  Bordeaux  or  Toulouse,  the  generals  com- 
manding at  those  places  would  be  able,  if  the  na- 
tional guards  would  fight  for  their  country,  to  defend 
them. 

If  the  enemy  made  large  detachments,  an  attack 
in  front  while  he  was  thus  weakened  would  bring 
them  back  again.  If  he  marched  with  his  whole 
army  upon  Bordeaux,  he  could  be  followed  and  forced 
to  face  about.  If  he  attempted  to  march  by  Audi 
against  Toulouse,  he  might  be  stopped  by  an  attack 
in  flank.  If  he  remained  stationary,  he  should  be 
provoked  by  an  advance  to  develope  his  obejcls. 
But  if,  as  was  to  be  expected,  the  French  army  was 
itself  attacked,  it  would  deiend  it;s  position  vigorous- 
ly, and  then  retreating  by  St.  Gaudens  draw  the 
allies  into  a  difficult  mountain  country,  where  the 
ground  might  be  disputed  step  by  ste[),  the  war  be 
kcjit  still  on  the  frontier,  and  the  passage  of  the  Ga- 
ronne be  delayed.  He  had  meditated  deejjly  upon 
his  task,  and  could  find  no  better  mode.  But  his 
army  was  weakened  by  combats,  still  more  by  deser- 
tion ;  the  conscripts  went  oil  so  fast  that  of  five  bat- 
talions Uuely  called  up  from  Toulouse  two-thirds 
were  already  gone  without  having  seen  nn  enemy. 

Scult  was  Djistaken  as  to  the  real  force  of  the  al- 


1814.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


733 


tres  in  the  recent  opprations.  In  other  respects  lie 
'.displayed  clear  views  and  threat  activity.  He  re- 
OFiXanized  his  army  in  six  divisions,  called  in  his  de- 
tachments, urged  the  imperial  commissioners  and 
^cal  authorities  to  hasten  the  levies  and  restore  de- 
serters, and  he  prepared  a  plan  of  action  for  the  par- 
i.saas  which  had  been  organized  towards  the  moun- 
tains. Nevertheless  his  ditticulties  increased.  The 
conscripts  who  did  arrive  were  for  the  most  part 
without  arms,  and  he  had  none  to  spare.  The  im- 
perial commissary  Cornudet  and  the  prefect  of  the 
Oironde  quitted  Bordeaux,  and  when  general  L'Huil- 
lier  attempted  to  move  the  military  stores  belonging 
to  the  army  from  Langon,  Podensac  and  Bordeaux, 
the  inferior  autliorities  opposed  him.  There  was  no 
money  they  spid  to  pay  the  expense  ;  but  in  truth  Bor- 
deaux was  tne  focus  of  Bourbon  conspiracy,  and  the 
mayor.  Lynch,  was  eager  to  betray  his  sovereign. 

Nor  was  Wellington  without  embarrassments. 
The  storms  prevented  him  following  up  his  victory 
while  the  French  army  was  in  confusion.  Nov/  it 
was  reorganized  on  a  new  line,  and  could  retreat  for 
many  days  in  a  direction  parallel  to  the  Pyrenees 
with  strong  defensive  positions.  Should  he  press  it 
closely  ]  his  army  weakened  at  every  step  would 
have  to  move  between  the  mountains  and  the  Ga- 
ronne, exposing  its  flanks  and  rear  to  the  operations 
of  any  force  which  the  French  might  be  able  to  col- 
lect on  those  boundaries,  that  is  to  say,  all  the  pow- 
er of  France  beyond  the  Garonne.  It  was  essential 
to  find  some  counterpoise  and  to  increase  his  field 
army.  To  establish  a  Bourbon  party  at  Bordeaux 
w  as  an  obvious  mode  of  attaining  the  first  object. 
Should  he  then  seize  that  city  by  a  detachment  !  he 
must  employ  twelve  thousand  men,  and  remain  witii 
twenty-six  thousand  to  oppose  Soult,  who  he  erro- 
neously believed  was  being  joined  by  the  ten  thou- 
sand men  which  Suchet  had  sent  to  Lyons.  The 
five  regiments  detached  for  their  clothing  had  rcjoin- 
ei  the  army  and  all  the  reserves  of  cavalry  and  ar- 
tillery were  now  called  up,  but  the  reinforcements 
from  England  and  Portugal,  amounting  to  twenty 
thousand  men,  upon  which  he  had  calculated,  were 
detained  by  the  respective  governments.  Where- 
fore, driven  by  necessity,  he  directed  Freyre  to  join 
him  by  the  Port  de  Lanne  with  two  divisions  of  the 
(jallician  army,  a  measure  which  was  instantly  fol- 
lowed by  innumerable  complaints  of  outrages  and 
excesses,  although  the  Spaniards  were  entirely  pro- 
vided from  the  English  military  chest.  Now  also 
Clinton  was  ordered  to  send  the  British  and  Ger- 
mans of  the  Anglo-Sicilian  army  to  St.  Jean  de  Luz. 
This  done  he  determined  to  seize  Bordeaux.  Mean- 
while he  repaired  the  destroyed  bridges,  brought  up 
one  of  Morillo's  brigades  from  Navarreins  to  the  vi- 
cinity of  Aire,  sent  Campbell's  Portuguese  dragoons 
to  Roquefort,  general  Fane  with  two  regiments  of 
cavalry  and  a  brigade  of  infantry  to  Pau,  and  pushed 
posts  towards  Tarbes  and  Vic  en  Bigorre. 

Sou't,  now  fearing  the  general  apathy  and  ill-will 
of  the  people  would  become  fatal  to  him,  endeavour- 
ed to  arouse  the  energies  of  the  people  and  the  army 
by  the  following  proclamation,  which  has  been  un- 
reasonably railed  at  by  several  English  writers,  for 
it  was  a  judicious,  well-timed  and  powerful  address. 
'Soldiers!  at  the  battle  of  Ortliez  you  did  your 
duty,  tiie  enemy's  losses  surpassed  yours,  his  blood 
moistened  all  the  ground  he  gained.  You  may  con- 
sider that  feat  of  arms  as  an  advantage.  Other 
combats  are  at  hand,  no  repose  for  us  until  his  army, 
f)rmed  of  such  extraordinary  elements,  shall  evacu- 
ate the  French  tei-ritory  or  be  annihilated.  Its  num- 
bers and  progress  may  be  great,  but  at  hand  are  un- 
expected perils.     Time  will  teach  the  enemy's  gen- 


eral that  French  honour  is  not  to  be  outraged  with 
impunity. 

"Soldiers!  he  has  had  the  indecency  to  provoke 
you  and  your  countrymen  to  revolt  and  sedition  ;  he 
speaks  of  peace,  but  fire-brands  of  discord  follow 
him  !  He  speaks  of  peace,  and  excites  the  French 
to  a  civil  war  !  Thanks  be  to  him  for  making  known 
his  projects,  our  forces  are  thereby  centupled  ;  and 
he  himself  rallies  round  the  imperial  eagles  all  those 
who,  deceived  by  appearances,  believed  our  enemies 
would  make  a  loyal  v/ar.  No  peace  with  the  dis- 
loyal and  perfidious  nation  !  no  peace  with  the  Eng- 
lish and  their  auxiliaries  until  they  quit  the  French 
territory  !  they  have  dared  to  insult  the  national 
honour,  the  infamy  to  incite  Frenchmen  to  become 
perjured  towards  the  emperor.  Revenge  the  ofi'ence 
in  blood.  To  arms!  Let  this  cry  resound  through 
the  south  of  France,  the  Frenchman  that  hesitates 
abjures  his  country  and  belongs  to  her  enemies. 

"  Yet  a  few  days,  and  those  who  believe  in  Eng- 
lish delicacy  and  sincerity  will  learn  to  their  cost 
that  cunning  proinises  are  made  to  abate  their  cour- 
age and  subjugate  them.  They  will  learn  also  that 
if  the  English  pay  to-day  and  are  generous,  they 
will  to-inorrow  retake,  and  with  interest,  in  contri- 
bution what  they  disburse.  Let  the  pusillanimous 
beings  who  calculate  the  cost  of  saving  tlieir  coun- 
try remember  that  the  English  have  in  view  to  re- 
duce P'renchmen  to  the  same  servitude  as  the  Span- 
iards, Portuguese  and  Sicilians,  who  groan  under 
their  domination.  Past  history  will  recall  to  those 
unworthy  Frenchmen  who  prefer  momentary  enjoy- 
ment to  the  safety  of  the  great  family,  the  English 
making  Frenchmen  kill  Frenchmen  at  Ciuiberon; 
it  will  show  them  at  the  head  of  all  conspiracies,  all 
odious  political  intrigues,  plots  and  assassinations, 
aiming  to  overthrow  all  principles,  to  destroy  all 
grand  establishments  of  trade,  to  satisfy  their  im- 
measurable ambition,  their  insatiable  cupidity. 
Does  there  exist  upon  the  face  of  the  globe  a  point 
known  to  the  English  where  they  have  not  destroy- 
ed by  seditious  and  violence  all  manufactures  which 
could  rival  their  own]  Thus  they  v/ill  do  to  the 
French  establishments  if  they  prevail. 

"Devote  then  to  opprobrium  and  execration  all 
Frenchmen  who  favour  their  insidious  projects,  aye  ! 
even  those  who  are  under  his  power  if  they  seek  not 
to  hurt  him.  Devote  to  opprobrium  and  reject  as 
Frenchmen  those  who  think  under  specious  pretexts 
to  avoid  serving  their  country  ;  and  those  also  who, 
from  corruption  or  indolence,  hide  deserters  instead 
of  driving  them  back  to  their  colours.  With  such 
men  we  have  nothing  in  common,  and  history  will 
pass  their  names  with  execrations  lo  posterity.  As 
to  us  soldiers,  our  duty  is  clear.  Honour  and  fideli- 
ty. This  is  our  motto,  and  we  will  fight  to  the  hist 
the  enemies  of  our  emperor  and  France.  Respect 
persons  and  j)roperty.  Grieve  for  those  who  have 
momentarily  fallen  under  the  enemy's  yoke,  and 
hasten  the  moment  of  their  deliverance.  Be  obedi- 
ent and  disciplined,  and  bear  implacable  hatred  to- 
wards traitors  and  enemies  of  the  French  name! 
War  to  death  against  those  who  would  divide  us  to 
destroy  us  ;  and  to  those  cowards  who  desert  the 
imperial  eagles  to  range  themselves  under  another 
banner.  Remember  always  that  fifteen  ages  of  glo- 
ry, triumphs  innumerable,  have  illustrated  our  coun- 
try. Contemplate  the  prodigious  efforts  of  our  great 
sovereign,  his  signal  victories  which  immortalize 
the  French  name.  Let  us  be  worthy  of  him,  and 
we  can  then  bequeath  without  a  taint  to  our  poster- 
ity the  inheritance  we  hold  from  our  fathers.  Be, 
in  fine,  Frenchmen,  and  die  arms  in  hand  sooner 
than  survive  dishonour." 


734 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WaR. 


[BookXXI^, 


Let  the  time  and  the  occasion  of  this  proclama- 
tion be  considered.  Let  it  be  remembered  that  no 
English  writer,  orator  or  politician,  had  for  many 
years  used  milder  terms  than  robbers,  murderers, 
atheists,  and  tyrant,  wiien  speakinsr  of  Frenchmen 
and  tlieir  sovereign  ;  tiiat  lord  Wellington  even  at 
this  time  refused  that  sovereign  his  title  of  empe- 
ror, calling  him  Bonaparte  ;  that  on  entering  France 
he  had  published  an  order  of  the  day  accusing  the 
French  commanders  of  autliorizing  and  encouraging 
the  cruelties  of  their  soldiers  in  Spain  ;  finally,  that 
for  six  years  the  Spanish,  Portuguese  and  English 
Btate  papers  were  filled  with  most  otiensive  ribald 
abuse  of  Napoleon,  liis  ministers  and  commanders. 
Let  all  this  be  remembered,  and  the  acrimony  of 
Soult's  proclamation  cannot  be  justly  blamed,  while 
the  noble  energy,  the  loyalty  of  the  sentiments,  the 
exciting  passionate  feeling  of  patriotism  which  per- 
vades it,  must  be  admired.  Was  he,  sprung  from 
the  ranks,  a  soldier  of  the  republic,  a  general  of  the 
empire,  after  fighting  thirty  years  under  the  tri- 
colour, to  be  tame  and  measured^  squeamishness 
in  his  phrases  when  he  saw  his  coontry  invaded  by 
foreigners,  and  a  pretender  to  the  throne  stalking 
behind  their  bayonets,  beckoning  his  soldiers  to  de- 
sert their  eagles,  inviting  his  countrymen  to  betray 
their  sovereign  and  dishonour  tlieir  nation  1  Why 
the  man  was  surrounded  by  traitors,  and  proud  and 
Bcornful  of  danger  was  his  spirit  to  strive  so  mighti- 
ly against  defeat  and  treason  combined  I 

It  has  been  said  in  condemnation  of  him  that  the 
English  general  did  not  encourage  the  Bourbon  par- 
ty. Is  tiiat  true  J  Did  it  so  appear  to  the  French 
general  .'  Had  not  the  duke  of  Angouleme  come  to 
the  English  head-quarters  with  mystery,  and  follow- 
ing the  invading  army  and  protected  by  its  arms 
assemble  round  him  all  the  ancient  partisans  of  his 
house,  sending  forth  agents,  scattering  proclamations 
even  in  Soult's  camp,  endeavouring  to  debauch  his 
Boldiers  and  to  aid  strangers  to  subjugate  France"! 
Soult  not  only  knew  this,  but  was  suffering  under 
the  eflects.  On  every  side  he  met  o[)position  and 
discontent  from  tiie  civil  authorities,  his  movements 
were  made  known  to  tlie  enemy  and  his  measures 
thwarted  in  all  directions.  At  Bordeaux  a  party 
were  calling  aloud  with  open  arms  to  tlie  invaders. 
At  Tarbes  the  fear  of  provoking  an  action  near  the 
town  had  caused  the  dispersion  of  the  insurrectional 
levy  organized  by  tlie  imperial  commissioner  Cafi'a- 
relii.  At  Pau  the  aristocracy  had  secretly  assem- 
bled to  otter  homage  to  the  duke  of  Angouleme,  and 
there  was  a  rumour  that  he  was  to  be  crowned  at 
the  castle  of  Henry  IV.  Was  the  French  general  to 
disregard  tiiese  facts  and  symptoms  because  his  op- 
ponent had  avoided  any  public  declaration  in  favour 
of  the  Bourbon  family!  Lord  Wellington  would 
have  been  the  first  to  laugh  at  his  sinij>licity  if  he 
had. 

And  what  is  the  renson  that  the  English  general 
did  not  openly  call  upon  the  Bourbon  partisans  to 
raise  the  standard  of  revolt'!  Simply  that  Napo- 
leon's astounding  genius  had  so  bafil«d  tlie  banded 
sovereigns  and  their  innumerable  hordes  that  a 
peace  seemed  inevitable  to  avoid  fatal  disasters  ; 
and  therefore  lord  Wellington,  who  had  instructions 
from  his  government  not  to  embarrass  any  negotia- 
tion for  [)eace  by  pledges  to  a  Bourbon  party,  acting 
as  an  honest  statesman  and  commander,  would  not 
excite  men  to  their  own  ruin  for  a  momentary  ad- 
vantage. But  so  far  from  discouraging  treason  to 
Napoleon  on  any  other  ground,  he  avowed  his  anx- 
ious desire  lor  it,  and  his  readiness  to  encourage 
every  enemy  of  that  monarch.  Ha  had  t-ecn  and 
coubulteJ  with  La  Roch^-Jacquslin,  Vv'ith  De  Mail- 


hos  and  other  vehement  partisans  for  an  immediate 
insurrection  ;  and  also  with  Viel  Castel,  an  agent 
of  Bernadotte's,  until  he  Ibund  him  intriguing 
against  the  Bourbons.  He  advised  the  dnhe  of  An- 
gouleme to  fcn-m  regular  battalions,  promised  him 
arms,  and  actually  collectc-d  eighty  thousnnd  stand, 
to  arm  the  insurgents.  Finally,  he  rebuked  the 
timid  policy  of  the  English  ministers,  who  luiving 
such  an  opportunity  of  assailing  Napoleon  refrained 
from  doing  it.  Before  Soult's  proclamation  appear- 
ed he  thus  wrote  to  lord  Bathurst: 

"  I  find  the  sentiment  as  we  advance  in  the  coun- 
try still  more  strong  against  the  Bonaparte  dynasty 
and  in  favour  of  the  liourbons,  but  lam  quite  cer- 
tain there  will  be  no  declaration  on  the  part  of  the 
people  if  the  allies  do  not  in  some  manner  declare 
themselves.  I  cannot  discover  the  policy  of  not  hit- 
ting one's  enemy  as  hard  as  one  can  and  in  the  most 
vulnerable  place.  I  am  certain  that  he  would  so 
act  by  us,  he  would  certainly  overturn  the  British 
authority  in  Ireland  if  it  were  in  his  power." 

Soult  and  Wellington  acted  and  wrote  each  in 
tlie  manner  most  suitable  to  their  situation  ;  but  it 
was  not  a  little  remarkable  that  Ireland  should  so 
readily  occur  to  the  latter  as  a  parallel  case. 

It  was  in  this  state  of  affairs  that  the  English 
general  detached  Beresford  with  twelve  thousand 
men  against  Bordeaux,  giving  him  instructions  to 
occupy  that  city  and  acquire  the  Garonne  as  a  port 
for  the  allies,  but  to  make  the  French  authorities 
d'eclare  whether  they  would  or  would  not  continue 
to  exercise  their  functions  under  the  conditions  an- 
nounced by  proclamation.  For  hitherto  lord  Wel- 
lington had  governed  the  country  he  advanced  in 
this  public  manner,  thus  nullifying  the  misrepresen- 
tations of  political  intriguers,  obviating  the  dangers 
of  false  reports  and  rumours  of  his  projects,  making 
his  justice  and  moderation  known  to  the  poorest 
peasant,  and  securing  the  French  local  authorities 
who  continued  to  act  under  him  from  any  false  and 
unjust  representation  of  their  conduct  to  the  imi;e- 
rial  government  if  peace  sliould  be  made  with  Napo 
leon.  This  expedition  against  Bordeaux  however 
involved  political  as  well  as  military  interests.  Be- 
resford was  instructed  that  there  were  many  parti- 
sans of  the  Bourbons  in  that  city,  who  might  pro- 
pose to  hoist  the  white  standard  and  proclaim  l.ouis 
the  Eighteenth  under  protection  of  the  troo[;s.  They 
were  to  be  told  that  the  British  nation  and  its  allies 
wished  well  to  their  cause,  and  while  public  tran- 
quillity was  maintained  in  the  districts  occupied  by 
the  troops  there  would  be  no  hinderance  to  their 
political  proceedings:  they  or  any  party  opposed  to 
Napoleon  would  receive  assistance.  Nevertheless 
as  the  allied  sovereigns  were  negotiating  with  the 
French  emperor,  however  well  inclined  the  I'^nglish 
general  might  be  to  support  a  party  against  the  lat- 
ter during  war,  he  could  give  no  help  if  peace  were 
concluded,  and  this  they  must  weigh  well  before 
they  revolted.  Beresfljrd  was  therefore  not  to  med 
die  with  any  declaration  in  favour  of  l.ouis  the 
lOigliteenth  ;  but  he  was  not  to  oppose  it,  and  if  re- 
volt took  place  he  was  to  supply  the  revolters  with 
the  arms  and  ammunition  collected  at  I)ax. 

On  the  8tfi,  Beresford  marched  towards  Langon 
with  the  fourth  and  seventh  divisions,  Vivian's 
horsemen  and  some  guns  ;  he  was  joined  on  the  road 
by  some  of  Vandeleiir's  cavalry  Trom  Bayonne,  and 
he  had  orders  to  observe  the  enemy's  movements  to- 
wards Agen,  for  it  was  still  in  Soult's  power  by  a 
forced  march  on  that  side  to  cross  the  Garonne  and 
enter  Bordeaux  before  him.  La  Roche-.Iacquelin 
preceded  the  troops,  and  the  duke  of  Angouleme  fol- 
lowed closely  ;   but  his  partisans  in  the  city,  fright- 


141 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


735 


#ied  at  tue  clanger  of  their  enterprise,  now  besought 
{'jresfbrd  to  delay  his  march.  La  l{ociic-.)acquelin 
vehemently  ccdemned  their  hesitation,  and  his  in- 
fluence, sui)|)ortjd  by  the  consternation  wiiich  tiie 
battle  of  Orthez  had  created  among  the  Napoleon- 
ists,  decided  the  quest 'on  in  favour  of  revolt. 

Long  before  this  epoch,  Soult,  foreseeing  that  the 
probable  course  of  the  war  would  endanger  Bor- 
deaux, had  given  orders  to  place  the  forts  in  a  state 
of  defence,  to  arm  the  flotilla  and  to  organize  the 
national  guards  and  the  urban  legions  ;  he  had  iirged 
these  measures  again  when  the  imperial  commis- 
sioner Cornudet  tirst  arrived,  but  according  to  tlie 
usual  habits  of  civilians  who  have  to  meddle  with 
military  affairs  every  thing  was  promised  and  no- 
thing done.  Cornudet  and  the  prefect  quitted  the 
city  as  early  as  the  4th,  first  burning  with  a  silly 
affectation  of  vigour  some  ships  of  war  upon  the 
stocks  ;  general  L'Huiilier,  unable  to  oppose  the 
allies,  then  destroyed  the  fort  of  Medoc  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  Garonne,  disarmed  some  of  the  river 
batteries,  and  passing  in  the  night  of  the  11th  to 
the  rigiit  bank  occupied  the  fortress  of  Blaye,  the 
Pate  and  other  points.  Meanwliile  Beresford,  who 
reached  Langon  on  the  ICth,  letl  lord  Dalhousie 
there  with  the  bulk  of  the  forces,  and  advanced  with 
eight  hundred  cavalry. 

Entering  Bordeaux  the  12th,  he  met  the  munici- 
pality and  a  great  body  of  Bourbonists,  at  the  head 
of  whom  was  the  mayor,  count  Lynch,  decorated 
with  the  scarf  of  his  office  and  the  legion  of  honour, 
both  conferred  upon  him,  and  probably  at  his  own 
solicitation,  by  the  sovereign  he  was  then  going  to 
betray.  After  some  formal  discourse,  in  wiiich  Be- 
resford explicitly  made  known  his  instructions. 
Lynch  very  justly  tore  the  tri-colour.  the  emblem 
of  his  country's  glory,  from  his  own  shoulders,  the 
white  fl:ig  was  then  displayed,  and  tlie  allies  took 
peaceable  possession  of  the  city.  The  duke  of  An- 
goa\Amo  arrived  on  the  same  day,  and  Louis  the 
Eighteenth  was  formally  proclaimed.  This  event, 
the  act  of  a  party,  was  not  generally  approved  ;  and 
the  njayor,  conscious  of  W'iakness,  immediately 
issued,  with  the  connivance  of  the  duke  of  Angou- 
leme,  a.  proclamation,  in  which  he  asserted,  that 
"  the  Brit  sh,  Portuguese  and  Spanish  armies  were 
united  in  the  south,  as  the  other  nations  were  united 
in  tlie  north,  solely  to  destroy  Napoleon  and  replace 
him  by  a  Bourbon  king,  who  was  conducted  hither 
by  these  generous  allies,  and  only  by  accepting  that 
king  could  the  French  appease  the  resentment  of 
the  Spaniards."  At  the  same  time  the  duke  of  An- 
gouleme.  as  if  quite  master  of  the  country,  appoint- 
ed prefects  and  other  authorities  in  districts  beyond 
the  limits  of  Bordeaux. 

Both  the  duke  and  the  mayor  soon  repented  of 
their  prcjcipitancy.  The  English  fleet,  which  should 
have  acted  Eimultaneously  with  the  troops,  had  not 
arrived  ;  the  ilegulus,  a  French  seventy-fmir,  with 
eeverd  inferior  vessels  of  war,  were  ancliored  below 
Blaye,  and  Beresford  was  recalled  with  the  fourth 
division  and  Vivian's  cavalry  Lord  Dalhousie  re- 
mained with  only  the  seventh  division  and  three 
Bq\iadrons  to  oppose  L'Huillier's  troops  and  other 
French  corps  which  were  now  on  the  Garonne.  He 
could  not  gu'rd  the  river  below  Bordeaux,  and  some 
French  troops  recrossing  again  took  possession  of 
the  fort  of  Grave  near  the  mouth  ;  a  new  army  was 
forming  under  ganeral  Decaen  beyond  the  Garonne, 
the  Napoleonists  recovering  from  their  first  stupor 
began  to  stir  themselves,  and  a  partisan  oflicer, 
coming  down  to  St.  Macaire  on  tlie  IHth,  surprised 
fifty  m^en  which  lord  I)alho^„ie  had  sent  across  the 
tiaronne  froi.:  Langon  to  take  possession  of  a  French 


magazine.  In  the  Landes  the  peasants  forming 
bands  burned  the  houses  of  the  gentlemen  vvlio  had 
joined  the  white  standard,  and  in  Bordeaux  itself  a 
counter-insurrection  was  i)reparing  whenever  De- 
caen shoulu  be  ready  to  advance. 

The  prince,  frightened  at  these  symptoms  of  re- 
action, desired  lord  Dalhousie  to  bring  his  troops 
into  Bordeaux  to  awe  the  ISapoleonists.  and  mean- 
while each  party  strove  to  outvie  the  other  in  idle 
rumours  and  falsehoods  relating  to  the  emperor.  \  ic- 
tories  and  defeats  were  invented  or  exaggerated, 
Napoleon  was  dead  from  illness,  had  committed  sui- 
cide, was  poisoned,  stabbed  ;  and  all  these  things 
were  related  as  certain  with  most  circumstantial 
details.  j\Ieanwhile  Wellington,  writing  to  the 
duke  of  Angouleme,  denied  the  veracity  of  the  may- 
or's proclamation,  and  expressed  his  trust  that  the 
prince  was  not  a  party  to  such  a  mendacious  docu 
ment.  The  latter  however,  with  some  excuses 
about  hurry  and  confusion,  avowed  his  participation 
in  its  publication,  and  defended  the  mayor's  con- 
duct. He  also  forwarded  a  statement  of  the  danger 
his  party  was  exposed  to,  and  demanded  aid  of  men 
and  money,  supporting  his  application  by  a  note  of 
council  ill  which,  with  more  ingenuity  tlian  justice, 
it  was  argued,  that  as  civil  government  could  not 
be  conducted  without  executive  power,  and  as  lord 
Wellington  had  suffered  the  duke  of  Angouleme  to 
assume  the  civil  government  at  Bordeaux  without 
an  adequate  executive  force,  he  was  bound  to  supply 
the  deficiency  from  his  army,  and  even  to  furnish 
money  until  taxes  could  be  levied  under  the  protec- 
tion of  tiie  soldiers. 

The  Englisli  general  was  not  a  man  to  bear  with 
such  sophistry  in  excuse  for  a  breach  of  failli.  Sor- 
ry he  was,  he  said,  to  find  that  the  principle  by 
which  he  regulated  his  conduct  towan'.s  the  Bour. 
bon  party,  though  often  stated,  had  made  so  little 
impression  that  the^'uke  could  not  perceive  how  in- 
consistent it  was  with  the  mayor's  ;^'-oclamaticn 
Most  cautious  therefore  must  be  his  future  conduct, 
seeing  that  as  the  chief  of  an  army,  and  the  confi- 
dential agent  of  three  independent  nations,  he  could 
not  permit  his  views  to  be  misrepresented  upon  such 
an  important  question.  He  had  occujiied  Bordeaux 
as  a  military  point ;  but  certain  persons,  contrary  to 
his  advice  and  opinion,  thought  proper  to  proclaim 
Louis  the  Eighteenth.  Those  persons  made  no  ex- 
ertions, subscribed  not  a  shilling,  raised  not  a  sol- 
dier ;  yet  because  he  would  not  extend  the  posts  of 
his  army  beyond  what  was  prope-r  and  convenient, 
merely  to  protect  their  families  and  property,  expos- 
ed to  danger,  not  on  account  of  their  exertions,  for 
they  had  made  none,  but  on  account  of  their  prema- 
ture declaration  contrary  to  his  advice,  they  took 
him  to  task  in  a  document  delivered  to  lord  Dnl 
housie  by  the  prince  himself.  The  writer  of  that 
paper  and  all  such  persons  however  might  be  assur- 
ed tiiat  nothing  should  make  him  swerve  from  what 
he  thought  his  duty  to  the  sovereigns  who  employee' 
him,  he  would  not  risk  even  a  company  of  iiifantrj| 
to  save  properties  and  families  placed  in  a  state  of 
danger  contrary  to  his  advice.  The  duke  had  better 
then  conduct  his  policy  and  compose  his  manifestoes 
in  such  a  manner  as  not  to  force  a  public  contradic- 
tion of  them.  His  royal  highness  was  free  to  act 
as  he  pleased  for  himself,  but  he  was  not  free  to  ad- 
duce the  name  and  autliority  of  the  allied  govern- 
ments in  supfiort  of  his  own  measures,  when  they 
had  not  been  consulted,  nor  of  their  general,  when 
he  had  been  consulted,  but  had  given  his  opinion 
against  those  measures. 

He  had  told   him  that  if  any  great  town  or  exten- 
sive district  declared  in  favour  of  the  Bourbons  b« 


736 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XXIV. 


would  not  interfere  with  the  government  of  that 
town  or  district,  and  if  there  was  a  general  declara- 
tion in  favour  of  his  house,  he  would  d-eliver  the 
<'ivi]  government  of  all  the  country  overrun  by  the 
army  into  his  hands  ;  but  the  fact  was,  tiiat  even  at 
Bordeaux  the  movement  in  favour  of  the  Bourbons 
was  not  unanimous.  The  spirit  had  not  spread  else- 
where, not  even  to  La  Vendee,  nor  in  any  part  oc- 
"■'oied  by  the  army.  The  events  contemplated  had 
no-  therefore  occurred,  and  it  would  be  a  great 
breach  of  duty  towards  tlie  allied  sovereigns,  and 
cruel  to  the  inhabitants,  if  he  v/erc  to  deliver  them 
over  to  his  royal  highness  prematurely  or  against 
their  inclinations.  He  advised  him  therefore  to 
withdraw  his  prefects  and  confine  his  government 
to  Bordeaux.  He  could  give  him  no  money,  and  af- 
ter what  had  passed,  he  was  doubtful  if  he  should 
afford  him  any  countenance  or  protection.     The  ar- 

fument  of  the  note  of  council,  affirming  that  he  was 
uund  to  support  the  civil  government  of  his  royal 
highness,  only  rendered  it  more  incumbent  upon 
him  to  bev.are  how  he  gave  further  encouragement, 
or  to  speak  p\ii\n]y,  permissioii  to  the  Bourbonists, 
to  declare  themselves.  It  was  disagreeable  to  take 
any  step  which  should  publicly  mark  a  want  of  good 
understanding  between  himself  and  the  duke,  but 
count  Lynch  had  not  treated  him  with  common  fair- 
ness nor  with  truth  ;  wherefore  as  he  could  not  allow 
the  character  of  tlie  allied  sovereigns  or  his  own  to 
be  doubted,  if  his  royal  highness  did  not  within  ten 
days  contradict  the  objectionable  parts  of  the  may- 
or's proclamation  he  would  do  so  himself. 

Thus  it  appeared  tiiat  with  the  French,  as  with 
the  .Spaniards  and  Portuguese,  neither  enthusiastic 
declarations  nor  actual  insurrection  offered  any  guar- 
antee for  sense,  truth  or  exertion  ;  and  most  surely 
all  generals  and  politicians  of  every  country  who 
trust  to  sudden  popular  commotions  will  find  that 
noisy  declamations,  vehement  demonstrations  of 
feeling,  idle  rumours  and  boasting,  the  life-blood  of 
such  aii'airs,  are  essentially  opposed  to  useful  public 
exertions. 

When  Beresford  marched  to  rejoin  the  army  the 
line  of  occupation  was  too  extensive  for  lord  Dalhou- 
Bie,  and  lord  Wellington  ordv-^red  him  to  keep  clear 
of  tiie  city  and  hold  his  troops  together,  observing 
that  his  own  projected  operations  on  the  upper  Ga- 
ronne would  keep  matters  quiet  on  the  lower  part 
of  that  river.  Nevertheless,  if  the  war  had  contin- 
ued for  a  month,  that  officer's  situation  would  have 
been  critical.  For  when  Napoleon  knew  that  Bor- 
deaux had  fallen,  he  sent  Decaen  by  post  to  I-i- 
bourne  to  form  the  ^^  army  of  the  Gironde.''''  For 
this  object  g^-neral  Despeaux,  acting  under  Soult's 
orders,  collected  a  body  of  gendarmes,  custom-house 
Dfficers  and  national  guards  on  the  upper  Garonne, 
''etween  Agen  and  La  Reole.  and  it  was  one  of  his 
detachtusnts  that  surprised  lord  Dalhousie's  men  at 
St  .Macaire  on  the  IHth.  A  battery  of  eight  guns 
was  sent  down  from  Narbonne,  other  batteries  were 
despatched  from  Paris  to  arrive  at  Perigueux  on  the 
11th  of  April,  and  three  or  four  hundred  cavalry, 
coming  from  the  side  of  La  Rochelle,  joined  L'Huil- 
lier  who  with  a  thousand  infantry  was  in  position 
at  St.  Andre  de  Cubzac  beyond  tlie  Dordogne.  Be- 
hind these  troops  all  the  national  guards,  custom- 
house officers  and  gendarmes  of  five  departments 
WTre  ordered  to  assemble,  and  march  to  the  Dor- 
dogne; but  the  formidable  part  of  the  intended 
army  was  a  body  of  Suchet's  veterans,  six  thousand 
in  number,  under  general  Beurman,  wiio  had  been 
turned  from  the  road  of  I/yons  and  directed  upon 
Libourne. 

Decaen  entered  Mucidan  on  the  1st  of  April,  but 


Beurman's  troops  had  not  then  reached  Perigueux 
and  lord  Dalhousie's  cavalry  were  in  Libcunie  be- 
tween him  and  L'Huilli<^r.  The  power  of  concen- 
tration was  tlius  deiiied  to  the  French,  and  mean- 
while admiral  Penrose  had  secured  the  command  of 
the  Garonne.  It  appears  lord  Wellington  thought 
this  officer  dilatory  ;  but  on  the  2'7th  of  Alarch,  he 
arrived  with  a  seventy-four  and  two  frigates,  where- 
upon the  Regulus.  and  other  French  vessels  then  at 
Royan,  made  sail  up  the  river,  and  were  chased  to 
the  shoal  of  Talmont.  but  they  escaped  through  the 
narrow  channel  on  the  north  side  and  cast  imchor 
under  some  batteries.  Previous  to  this  event,  Mr. 
Ogilvie,  a  commissary,  being  on  the  river  in  a  boat 
manned  with  Frenchmen,  discovered  the  Requin 
sloop,  half  French  half  American,  pierced  for  twen- 
ty-two guns,  lying  at  anchor  not  far  below  Bor- 
deaux ;  at  the  same  time  he  saw  a  sailor  leap  hasti- 
ly into  a  boat  above  him  and  row  for  the  vessel. 
This  man  being  taken  proved  to  be  the  armourer  of 
the  Requin;  he  said  there  were  net  msny  men  on 
hoard;  and  Mr.  Ogilvie  observing  li;s  alarm,  and 
judging  that  the  crew  would  also  be  fearful,  with 
ready  resolution  bore  down  upon  the  Requin,  boarded 
and  took  her  without  any  opposition  either  from  her 
crew  or  that  of  his  own  lio::t,  :'ltl  oiigh  the  had  four- 
teen guns  mounted  and  eleven  men  with  two  oi  icers 
on  board. 

The  naval  co-operation  being  thus  assured,  lord 
Dalhousie  crossed  the  Garonne  above  the  city,  drove 
the  French  posts  beyond  the  Dordogne,  pushed  scour- 
ing parties  to  La  Reole  and  Marmande,  and  sending 
his  cavalry  over  the  Dordogne  intercepted  Decaen's 
and  L'Huillier's  communications:  the  former  was 
thus  forced  to  remain  at  Mucidan  with  two  hundred 
and  fifty  gendarmes  awaiting  the  arrival  of  Beur- 
man, and  he  found  neither  arms  nor  ammunition  nor 
a  willing  spirit  to  enable  him  to  organize  the  nation- 
al guards. 

The  English  horsemen  repassed  the  Dordogne  on 
the  2d  of  April;  but  on  the  4th,  lord  Dalhonsie 
crossed  it  again  lower  down,  near  St.  Andre  de  (Jub- 
zac,  with  about  three  thousand  men,  intending  to 
march  upon  Blaye,  but  hearing  that  L'Huillior  had 
halted  at  Etauliers  he  turned  sKddenly  upon  him. 
The  French  general  formed  liis  line  on  an  open  com- 
mon, occupying  some  woods  in  front  with  his  de- 
tachments. Overmatched  in  infantry,  he  had  three 
hundred  cavalry  opposed  to  one  weak  squadrrn,  and 
yet  his  troops  would  not  stand  the  siiock  of  tlie  bat- 
tle. The  allied  infantry  cleared  the  woods  in  a  mo- 
ment, the  artillery  then  opened  upon  the  main  body, 
which  retired  in  disorder,  horsemen  and  irfantry  to- 
gether, through  Etauliers,  leaving  behind  several 
scattered  bodies  upon  whom  the  British  cavalry  gal- 
loped and  mr.de  two  or  three  hundred  men  and  thir» 
ty  officers  prisoners. 

If  the  six  thousand  old  troops  under  Beurman 
had,  according  to  Napoleon's  orders,  arrived  at  this 
time  in  lord  Dalhousie's  rear,  his  position  wouk 
have  been  embarrassing,  but  tiiey  were  delayed  oi 
the  road  until  the  10th.  Meanwhile  admiral  Pen 
rose,  having  on  the  2d  observed  the  French  flotilla 
consisting  of  fifteen  armed  vessels  and  gun-boat? 
coming  down  from  Blnye  to  join  the  Regulus  at  Tal 
inont,  sent  the  boats  of  his  fleet  to  attack  them  . 
whereupon  the  French  vessels  ran  on  shore,  and  thj 
crews  aided  by  two  hundred  soldiers  from  Blnye  lin- 
ed the  beach  to  protect  them.  Lieutenant  Dunlop, 
who  commanded  the  I'^nglish  boats,  landing  all  his 
seamen  and  marines,  beat  these  troops  and  carried 
off  or  destroved  the  whole  flotilla,  with  a  loss  to 
himself  of  only  fix  men  wouniled  and  missing.  This 
operation    completed    and    the    action   at   Etauliers 


1814.] 


NAPIER'S  PENINSULAR    WAR. 


737 


known,  the  atlniiral .  now  reinforced  with  a  second 
ship  of  the  line,  resolved  to  attack  the  French  squad- 
ron and  the  shore  batteries,  but  in  the  night  of  the 
t)th  tiie  enemy  set  fire  to  their  vessels.  Captain 
Harris  of  tiie  Belle  Poule  frigate  tlien  landed  with 
eix  hundred  seamen  and  marines,  and  destroyed  the 
batteries  and  forts  on  the  rig-ht  bank  from  Talmont 
to  the  Courbe  point.  Blaye  still  held  out;  but  at 
Paris  treason  had  done  its  work,  and  Napoleon,  the 
man  of  mightiest  capacity  known  for  good,  was  over- 
thrown to  make  room  for  despots,  who  with  minds 
enlarged  only  to  cruelty,  avarice  and  dissoluteness, 
were  at  the  very  moment  of  triumph  intent  to  de- 
fraud the  people,  by  whose  strength  and  suffering 
they  had  conquered,  of  the  only  reward  they  demand- 
ed, just  government.  The  war  was  virtually  over, 
but  on  the  side  of  Toulouse,  Bayonne  and  Barcelona, 
tlie  armies  ignorant  of  this  great  event  were  still 
battling  with  unabated  fury. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

V/tllin^ton's  and  Soult's  situations  and  forrp«  desciibed — Fnl- 
Iv  ot  the  Cnglish  ministers — Frpvie's  Gallicians  and  Pdii 
sotibv's  heavy  cavalry  join  lord  VVellin^toii — He  orders  Gi- 
rotj's  Aiidaliisiaiis  iind  Dtl  Farqne's  army  to  enter  Frame — 
Sinilt  suddenly  takes  the  offensive — Conibals  of  cavalry  — 
Partisan  expedition  of  captain  Dania — V\  ell:n:;ton  menaces 
the  peasEiitrv  with  fire  and  sword  i(  they  lake  up  arms — 
Soult  retires — Lord  Wellington  advances — Combat  of  Vic 
en  Hiu;orre — Deith  and  character  of  colonel  Henry  Sturgeon 

—  Daring  exploit  of  captain  William  Light — Comiiat  of  rar- 
hr-s — S  lult  retreats  by  (breed  ijiarches  to  Toulouse — Wei 
liiigton  follows  more  slowly — Cavalry  combat  at  St.  Gaudens 

—  I'tie  allies  arrive  in  front  of  Toulouse — Reflections. 

WmiiE  Beresford  was  moving  upon  Bordeaux, 
Soult  and  Wellington  remained  in  observation,  each 
thinking  the  other  stronger  than  himself.  For  the 
English  general,  having  intelligence  of  Beurman's 
march,  believed  that  his  troops  were  intended  to  re- 
inforce and  had  actually  joined  Soult.  On  the  other 
hand,  that  marshal,  who  knew  not  of  Beresford's 
march  until  the  loth  of  March,  concluded  Welling- 
ton still  had  the  twelve  thousand  men  detached  to 
Bordeaux.  The  numbers  on  each  side  were  how- 
ever nearly  equal.  The  French  army  was  thirty- 
one  thousand,  infantry  and  cavalry  ;  yet  three  thou- 
sand bsing  stragglers  detained  by  the  generals  of 
the  military  districts,  Soult  could  only  put  into  line, 
exclusive  of  conscripts  without  arms,  twenty-eight 
tliousand  sabres  and  bayonets,  with  thirty-eight 
pieces  of  artillery.  On  the  allies'  side  twenty-sev- 
en thousand  sabres  and  bayonets  were  under  arms, 
witli  forty-two  guns  ;  but  from  this  number,  detach- 
ni^nts  had  been  sent  to  Pau  on  one  side.  Roquefort 
on  the  other,  and  the  cavalry  scouts  were  pushed 
into  the  Landes  and  to  the  upper  Garonne. 

Lord  Wellington,  expecting  Soult  would  retreat 
upon  .\uch  and  designing  to  follow  hii.n.  hj'.d  caused 
Bereaf)rd  to  keep  the  bulk  of  his  troops  towards  the 
up[)er  Garonne  that  he  might  the  sooner  rejoin  the 
army  ;  but  the  French  general,  having  early  fixed 
his  line  of  retreat  by  St.  Gaudens,  was  only  pre- 
vented from  retaking  the  offensive  on  tlie  l)th  or 
lOtli  by  t!ie  loss  of  his  magazines,  which  firced  him 
firit  to  organize  a  system  of  requisition  for  the  sub- 
sistence of  his  army.  Meanwhile  his  equality  of 
inTce  passed  away,  for  on  the  Kkh  Froyre  came  up 
with  eight  thousand  Spanisli  infantry,  and  the  next 
dny  Ponsonhy's  heavy  cavalry  arrived.  Lord  Wel- 
lington was  then  the  strong.'st,  yet  he  still  awaited 
Heresfbrd's  troops,  and  was  uneasy  ubout  his  own 
f  mint  ion.  He  dreaded  the  junction  of  Suchet.'s  ar- 
niy.  for  it  was  otthis  time  the  !ipanish  regency  re- 
48 


ferred  the  convention,  proposed  by  that  marshal  fof 
the  evacuation  of  the  fortresses,  to  his  decision. 
He  gave  a  peremptory  negative,  observing  tiiat  it 
would  furnish  twenty  tlioui-and  veterans  ibr  Soult, 
while  the  retention  of  Uosas  and  Figueras  would 
bar  the  action  of  tiie  Spanish  armies  of  Catalonia 
in  his  favour.  But  his  anxiety  was  great,  becousa 
he  foresaw  that  Ferdinand's  return  and  his  engage- 
ment with  Suchet,  already  related,  together  with 
the  evident  desire  of  Copons  that  the  garrisons 
should  be  admitted  to  a  convention,  would  finally 
render  that  measure  inevitable.  Meanv/hile  the 
number  of  his  own  army  was  likely  to  decrease, 
'JMie  English  cabinet,  less  considerate  even  tlian  tht* 
Spanish  government,  had  sent  the  militia,  permitted 
by  the  recent  act  of  parliament  to  volunteer  for  for- 
eign service,  to  Holland,  and  with  them  the  other 
reinforcements  originally  promised  for  the  ?rmy  in 
France:  two  or  three  regiments  of  militia  only 
came  to  the  Garonne  when  the  war  was  over.  'J'o 
make  amends,  the  ministers  proposed  that  lord  Wil- 
liam Bentinck  should  send  four  thousand  men  from 
Sicily  to  land  at  Rosas,  or  some  point  in  France, 
and  so  join  lord  Wellington,  who  was  thus  expected 
to  extend  his  weakened  force  from  the  boy  of  I3iscay 
to  the  Mediterranean  in  order  to  cover  the  junction 
of  this  uncertain  reinforcement.  In  line,  experience 
had  tauglit  the  English  statesmen  so  little,  that  we 
find  their  general  thus  addressing  them  only  one 
week  previous  to  the  termination  of  the  war. 

Having  before  declared  that  he  should  be,  contra- 
ry to  his  wishes,  forced  to  bring  more  Spaniards  in- 
to France,  he  says  : — 

"  There  are  limits  to  the  numbers  with  which  this 
army  can  contend,  and  I  am  convinced  your  lordship 
would  not  wish  to  see  the  safety  and  honour  of  this 
handful  of  brave  men  depend  upon  the  doubtful  exer- 
tions and  discipline  of  an  undue  proportion  of  Span- 
ish troops.  .  .  .  The  service  in  Holland  may  doubt- 
less be  more  important  to  the  national  interest  than 
that  in  this  country,  but  I  hope  it  will  be  considered 
that  that  which  is  most  important  of  all  is  not  to  lose 
the  brave  army  which  has  struggled  through  its  diffi- 
culties for  nearly  six  years." 

The  French  infantry  was  now  reorganized  in  six 
divisions,  commanded  by  Daricau,  D'Armagnac, 
Taupin,  Maransin,  Villatte  and  Harispe;  general 
Paris's  troops,  hitherto  acting  as  an  unattached  body, 
were  thus  absorbed  ;  the  cavalry,  composed  of  Ber- 
ton's  and  Vial's  brigades,  was  commanded  by  Pierre 
Soult;  and  there  was  a  reserve  division  of  seven 
thousand  conscripts,  infantry,  under  general  Tra- 
vot.  The  division  into  wings  and  a  centre,  each 
commanded  by  a  lieutenant-general,  continued,  yet 
this  distinction  was  not  attended  to  in  tiie  move- 
ments. Reille.  thougli  commanding  the  riglit  wing, 
was  at  Maubourgnet  on  tiie  left  of  the  line  of  battle; 
D'Erlon,  commanding  the  centre,  was  at  Marciac  on 
the  right,  covering  the  road  to  Aiich  ;  Clauzel  waa 
at  Rabastens,  forming  a  reserve  to  both.  Tlie  ad- 
vanced guards  were  toward.^  Plaisance  on  the  right, 
Madiran  in  the  centre,  and  Lembcie  on  the  led. 
Soult  thu:3  covered  Tarbts,  and  could  move  on  a  di- 
rect line   by  good  roads  cither  to  Auch  or  Pau. 

Lord  Wellington,  driven  by  necessity,  now  sent 
orders  to  G iron's  Andalusians  ard  Del  Parque's 
troops  to  enter  France  from  the  Bastan,  altiioiigli 
Freyre's  soldiers  had  by  their  outrages  already  cre- 
ated a  wide-s|)read  consternation.  His  head-quar- 
ters were  fixed  at  Aire,  his  army  was  in  position  on 
each  side  of  tiie  Adour,  he  had  repaired  all  the 
bririges  behind  liini,  restored  that  over  the  I.ys  in 
his  front,  and  dispersed  some  small  bands  whicii  liad 
appeared  upon   his   loft  Ih'.nk  and   rear:    Soult   had 


738 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR  WAR. 


[Book  XXIV. 


\ 


however  org'anizcd  a  :^^^c  powerful  system  of  parti- 
fans  towards  the  mo mtains,  and  only  wanted  money 
to  ;mt  tlieiii  in  activity.  Tiie  main  bodies  of  tlie  two 
armies  were  a  lonar  day's  march  asunder,  but  their 
advanced  posts  were  not  very  distant,  the  regular 
tHvalry  had  frequent  encounters,  and  both  generals 
claimed  tlie  superiority,  though  neither  made  any 
particular  report. 

On  the  night  of  the  7th,  Soult,  thinking  to  find 
only  sonv  weak  parties  at  Pan,  sent  a  strong  de- 
tachmen)  there  to  arrest  tlie  nobles  who  had  assem- 
bled to  welcome  the  duke  of  Angoulcme  ;  but  gener- 
al Fane  getting  there  before  him  with  a  brigade  of 
infantry  and  two  regiments  of  cavalry,  the  stroke 
failed  ;  however  the  French,  returning  by  another 
road,  made  prisoners  an  officer  and  four  or  five  Eng- 
lish dragoons.  Meanv.'hile  a  second  detachment, 
penetrating  between  Pau  and  Aire,  carried  oft"  a 
post  of  corresponclence  ;  and  two  days  after,  when 
Fane  had  quitted  Pau,  a  French  officer  accompanied 
by  only  four  hussars  captured  there  thirty-four  Por- 
tuguese with  their  comn;ander  and  ten  loaded  mules. 
The  Frencii  general,  having  by  these  excursions  ob- 
tained exact  intelligence  of  Beresford's  march  to 
IJordeaux,  resolved  to  attack  the  allies,  and  the  more 
re».dily  that  Napoleon  had  recently  sent  him  instruc- 
tions to  draw  the  war  to  the  side  of  Pau,  keeping  his 
left  resting  on  the  Pyrenees,  which  accorded  with 
bis  own  designs. 

Lord  Wellington's  main  body  was  now  concentra- 
ted round  Aire  and  Barcelonne,  yet  divided  by  the 
Adour,  and  the  advanced  guards  were  pushed  to 
Garlin,  Conchez,  Vielle,  Riscle  and  Pouydraguien, 
that  is  to  say,  a  semicircle  to  the  front  and  about 
half  a  march  in  advance.  Soult  therefore  thought 
to  strike  a  good  blow,  and  gathering  his  divisions 
on  the  side  of  Mauhourguet  the  12th,  marched  on 
the  l.'^th,  designing  to  throw  himself  upon  the  high- 
er tabular  land  between  Pau  and  Aire,  and  then  act 
according  to  circumstances. 

The  country  was  suited  to  the  action  of  all  arms, 
offering  a  number  of  long  and  nearly  parallel  ridges 
of  moderate  height,  the  sides  of  which  were  some- 
times covered  with  vineyards,  but  the  summits  com- 
monly so  open  that  troops  could  move  along  them 
without  much  difficulty,  and  between  these  ranges  a 
number  of  small  rivers  and  muddy  fords  descended 
from  the  Pyrenees  to  the  Adour.  This  conformation 
determined  the  order  of  the  French  general's  march, 
which  followed  the  courpes  of  these  rivers  Leav- 
ing one  regiment  of  cavalry  to  watch  the  valley  of 
the  Adour,  he  moved  with  the  rest  of  his  army  by 
Lembeie  upon  Conchez  down  the  smaller  Lys 
Clauzel  thus  seized  the  high  land  of  Daisse  and 
pushed  troops  to  Portet ;  Reille  supported  him  at 
Conchez;  D'Erlon  remained  behind  that  place  in 
rese've.  In  tliis  position  the  head  of  the  columns, 
pointing  direct  upon  Aire,  separated  Vielle  from 
Garlin,  which  was  the  right  of  general  Hill's  posi- 
tion, and  menaced  that  general's  posts  on  the  great 
Lys.  Meanwhile  Pierre  Soult,  marching  with  three 
regiments  of  cavalry  along  the  high  land  between 
the  two  Lys,  reached  ]\I;iscara8  and  the  castle  of 
Sault;  he  tluis  covered  the  'eft  flank  of  the  F'rench 
army,  and  pushed  Fane's  cavalry  posts  back  with 
the  loss  of  two  officers  taken  and  a  few  men  wounded. 
During  this  movement,  Berton,  advancing  from  Ma- 
diran  with  two  regiments  of  cavalry  towards  Vielle, 
on  the  right  flank  of  the  French  army,  endeavoured 
to  cross  the  Saye  river  at  a  difficult  muddy  ford  near 
the  broken  bridge.  Sir  .Tohn  Campbell,  leading  a 
Bquadron  .ftlie  fourtli  Portuguese  cavnlry,  overthrew 
the  liead  :i  his  column  ;  but  tlie  Portuguese  horse- 
men were   :50  few  to  dispute  the  passage,  and  Ber- 


ton finally  getting  a  regiment  over  higher  up,  gained 
the  table-land  above,  and  charging  the  rear  of  tlie 
retiring  troops  in  a  narrow  way  leading  to  the  Aire 
road,  killed  several  and  took  some  prisoners, amongst 
them  Bernardo  de  Sa,  the  since  well  known  count 
of  Bandeira. 

This  terminated  the  French  operations  for  the 
day;  and  lord  Wellington,  imagining  the  arrival  of 
Suchet's  troops  had  made  Soult  thus  bold,  resolved 
to  keep  on  the  defensive  until  his  reinforcements 
and  detachments  could  come  up.  Hill  however 
passed  the  greater  Lys,  partly  to  support  his  posts, 
partly  to  make  out  the  force  and  true  direction  of 
the  French  movement;  but  he  recrossed  that  river 
during  the  night,  and  finally  occupied  the  strong 
platform  between  Aire  and  Garlin  which  Soult  had 
designed  to  seize.  Lord  Wellington  immediately 
brought  the  third  and  sixth  divisions  and  the  heavy 
cavalry  over  the  Adour  to  his  support,  leaving  the 
light  division  with  the  hussar  brigade  still  on  the 
right  bank.  The  bulk  of  the  army  thus  occupied  a 
strong  position  parallel  with  the  Pau  road.  The 
right  was  at  Garlin,  the  left  at  Aire,  the  front  cov- 
ered by  the  greater  Lys,  a  river  difticult  to  pass ; 
Fane's  cavalry  was  extended  along  tl.e  Pau  road  as 
far  as  Boelho,  and  on  the  left  of  the  Adour  the  hus- 
sars pushed  the  French  cavalry  regiment  left  there 
back  upon  Plaisance. 

On  the  morning  of  the  14th,  Soult,  intending  to 
fall  on  Hill  whose  columns  he  had  seen  the  evening 
before  on  the  right  of  the  Lys,  drove  in  the  advanced 
posts  which  had  been  left  to  cover  the  retrograde 
movement,  and  then  examined  the  allies'  new  posi- 
tion ;  but  these  operations  v/asted  the  day,  and  to- 
wards evening  he  disposed  his  army  on  the  heights 
between  the  two  Lys,  placing  Clauzel  and  D'Erlon 
at  Castle  Pugon  opposite  Garlin,  and  Reille  in  re- 
serve at  Portet.  Meanwhile  Pierre  Soult  carried 
three  regiments  of  cavalry  to  Clarac,  on  the  Pau 
road,  to  intercept  the  communications  with  that 
town  and  to  menace  the  right  flank  of  the  alliep, 
against  which  the  whole  French  army  wus  now 
pointing.  Fane's  outposts  being  thus  assailed  re- 
tired with  some  loss  at  first,  but  they  were  soon 
supported  and  drove  the  French  horsemen  in  disor- 
der clear  oft'  the  Pau  road  to  Carere. 

Soult  now  seeing  the  strength  of  the  position 
above  Aire,  and  hearing  from  the  peasants  that  forty 
or  fifty  thousand  men  were  concentrated  there,  fear- 
ed to  attack,  but  charging  his  plan,  resolved  to  hov- 
er about  the  right  flank  of  the  allies  in  the  hopes  of 
enticing  them  from  their  vantage-ground.  lord 
Wellington,  on  the  other  hand,  drew  his  cavalry 
posts  down  the  valley  of  the  Adour,  and  keeping 
close  on  that  side  massed  his  forces  on  the  right  in 
expectation  of  an  attack.  In  fine,  each  general, 
acting  uj)on  false  intelligence  of  the  other's  strength, 
was  afraid  to  strike.  The  English  commander's 
error  as  to  the  junction  of  Suchet's  troojis  was  en- 
couraged by  Soult,  who  had  formed  his  battalions 
upon  two  ranks  instead  of  three  to  give  himself  an 
appearance  of  strength,  and  in  the  same  view  had 
caused  his  reserve  of  conscripts  to  move  in  rear  of 
his  line  of  battle.  And  he  also  judged  the  allies' 
strength  by  what  it  rnight  have  been  rather  than  by 
what  it  was  ;  for  though  Freyre's  Spaniards  and 
Ponsonby's  dragoons  were  now  up,  the  whole  force 
did  not  exceed  thirty-six  thousand  men,  including 
the  light  division  and  the  luissars  who  were  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Adour.  This  number  was  how 
ever  increasing  every  hour  by  the  arrival  of  detach 
ments  and  ropervo?  ;  and  it  behooved  Soult,  wlo  was 
entangled  in  a  country  extremely  difficult  if  rain 
should  fall,  to  watch  that  Wellington,  while  helding 


1814.] 


NAPIETR'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


739 


the  F"'rench  in  check  with  his  right  wing^,  did  not 
Ptrike  with  his  left  by  Maubourguet  and  Tarbes,  and 
thus  cast  them  upon  the  mountains  about  Lourdes. 

Tiiis  danger,  and  tlie  intelligence  now  obtained 
of  t!ie  fall  of  Bordeaux,  induced  the  French  general 
to  retire  before  day  on  the  16th  to  Lembeie  and  Si- 
macourb'3,  where  he  occupied  both  sides  of  the  two 
branches  of  the  Lys  and  the  heights  between  them  ; 
however  his  outposts  remained  at  Conchez,  and 
Pierre  Soult,  again  getting  upon  the  Pau  road,  de- 
tached a  hundred  chosen  troopers  against  the  allies' 
communication  with  Orthez.  Captain  Dania,  com- 
manding these  men,  making  a  forced  march,  reached 
llagetmau  o*.  nightfall,  surprised  six  officers  and 
eigiit  medical  men  with  their  baggage,  made  a  num- 
ber of  other  prisoners,  and  returned  on  the  evening 
of  the  18th.  This  enterprise,  extended  to  such  a 
distance  from  the  army,  was  supposed  to  be  executed 
by  the  bands,  and  seemed  to  indicate  a  disposition 
for  insurrection  ;  wherefore  lord  Wellington  to  check 
it  seized  the  civil  authorities  at  Hagetmau,  and  de- 
'■lared  that  he  would  hang  all  the  peasants  caught 
in  arms  and  burn  their  villages. 

The  offensive  movement  of  the  French  general 
had  now  terminated,  he  sent  his  conscripts  at  once 
to  Toulouse,  and  prepared  for  a  rapid  retreat  on  that 
place.  His  recent  operations  had  been  commenced 
too  late  ;  he  should  have  been  on  the  Lys  the  ICth 
or  11th,  when  there  were  not  more  than  twenty 
thousand  infantry  and  two  thousand  five  hundred 
cavalry  to  oppose  him  between  Aire  and  Garlin. 
On  t'i3  other  hand,  the  passive  state  of  Wellington, 
which  had  been  too  much  prolonged,  was  now  also 
at  an  end  ;  all  his  reinforcements  and  detachments 
were  either  up  or  close  at  hand,  and  he  could  put  in 
motion  six  Anglo-Portuguese  and  three  Spanish  di- 
visions of  infantry  furnisliing  forty  thousand  bayo- 
nets, with  five  brigades  of  cavalry  furnishing  nearly 
six  thousand  sabres,  and  from  nfly  to  sixty  pieces 
of  artillery. 

On  the  evening  of  the  17th,  the  English  general 
pushed  the  hussars  up  the  valley  of  the  Adour,  to- 
wards Plaisance,  supporting  them  with  the  light  di- 
vision, which  was  followed  at  the  distance  of  half  a 
march  by  the  fourth  division  coming  from  the  side 
of  Roquefort,  on  its  return  from  Langon. 

The  18th,  at  daylight,  the  whole  army  was  in 
movement,  the  hussars  with  the  light  and  the  fourth 
division,  forming  the  left,  marched  upon  Plaisance  ; 
Hill's  troops,  forming  the  right,  marched  from  Gar- 
lin upon  Conchez,  keeping  a  detacliment  on  tlie 
road  to  Pau  in  observation  of  Pierre  Soult's  cavalry. 
Tlie  main  body  moved  in  the  centre,  under  Welling- 
ton in  person,  to  Vielle,  by  the  high  road  leading 
from  Aire  to  Maubourguet.  The  French  right  was 
thus  turned  by  the  valley  of  the  Adour,  while  general 
Hill  with  a  sharp  skirmish,  in  which  about  eighty 
13r;tish  and  Germans  were  killed  and  wounded, 
drove  back  their  outposts  upon  I^embeie. 

Soult  retired  during  the  night  to  a  strong  ridge, 
having  a  small  river  with  rugged  banks,  called  the 
Laiza,  in  his  front,  and  his  rigjit  under  D'Erlon  was 
extended  towards  Vic  en  Bigorre  on  the  great  road 
of  Tarbes.  3Ieanwhile  Berton's  cavalry,  one  regi- 
ment of  which  retreating  from  Vielle  on  the  16th 
disengaged  itself  with  some  difficulty  and  loss,  reach- 
ed ^laubourguet  and  took  post  in  column  behind  that 
place,  tlie  road  being  confined  on  each  side  by  deej) 
and  wide  ditches.  In  this  situation,  pressed  by 
Bock's  cavalry,  which  preceded  the  centre  column 
of  the  i'llies,  the  French  horsemen  suddenly  charged 
tlie  Gr^rmnns,  at  first  with  success,  taking  an  officer 
and  some  men,  but  finally  tliey  were  beaten  and  re- 
treated througii  Vic  en  Bigorre.     Soult,  thinking  a 


flanking  column  only  was  on  this  side  in  the  valley 
of  the  Adour,  resolved  to  fall  upon  it  with  his  whole 
army;  but  lie  recognized  the  skill  of  his  opponent 
when  he  found  tiiat  the  whole  of  the  allies'  centre, 
moving  by  .Madiran,  had  been  thrown  on  to  the  Tar- 
bes road  while  he  was  retiring  from  Lembeie.  This 
lieavy  mass  was  now  approachii:g  Vic  en  Bigorre, 
tlie  light  division,  coming  from  Plaisance  up  the 
right  bank  of  the  Adour  were  already  near  Auriebat, 
pointing  to  Rabasteins,  upon  wiiich  place  the  hus- 
sars had  already  driven  the  French  cavalry  left  in 
observation  when  the  army  first  advanced:  Vic  en 
Bigorre  was  thus  turned,  E»erton's  horsemen  hao 
passed  it  in  retreat,  and  the  danger  was  imminent. 
The  French  general  immediately  ordered  Berton  to 
support  the  cavalry  regiment  at  Rabasteins-,  and 
cover  that  road  to  Tarbes.  Then  directing  D'Erlon 
to  take  post  at  Vic  en  Bigorre  and  check  the  allies 
on  the  main  road,  he  marched,  in  person  and  in  all 
haste,  with  Clauzel's  and  Reille's  divisions,  to  Tar 
bes  by  a  circuitous  road  leading  through  Ger-sur- 
Landes. 

D'Erlon,  not  seeming  to  comprehend  the  crisis, 
moved  slowly,  with  his  baggage  in  front,  and  hav- 
ing the  river  Lechez  to  cross,  rode  on  before  his 
troops,  expecting  to  find  Berton  at  Vic  en  Bigorre  i 
but  he  met  the  German  cavalry  there.  Then  in 
deed  he  hurried  his  march,  yet  he  had  only  time  tc 
place  Daricau's  division,  now  under  general  Paris, 
amongst  some  vineyardy,  two  miles  in  front  of  Vic 
en  Bigorre,  when  hither  came  Picton  to  the  supporl 
of  the  cavalry  and  fell  upon  him. 

COMBAT    OF  VIC    EN    BIGORRK. 

The  French  lefl  flank  was  secured  by  the  Lechez 

river,  but  their  right,  extending  towards  the  Adcur, 

I  being  loose  was  menaced  by  the  German  cavalry, 

1  while  the  front  was  attacked  by  Picton.   The  action 

commenced  about  two  o'clock,  and  Paris  was  soon 

'driven  back  in  disorder,  but  then  D'Armagnac's  di- 

1  vision  entered  the  line  and  extending  to  the  Adour 

renewed  the  fight,  which  lasted  until  D'Erlon,  after 

losing  many  men,  saw  his  right  turned,  beyond  tlie 

■  Adour,   by  the  ligiit  division  and  by  the   hussars, 

I  who  were  now  close  to  Rabasteins  ;  whereupon  t  e 

likewise  fell   back  behind  Vic  en  Bigorre,  and  took 

post  for  the  night.  The  action  was  vigorous.  About 

,  two  hundred  and  fifty  Anglo-Portuguese,  men  and 

I  officers,  fell,  and  amongst  them  died  colonel  Henry 

j  Sturgeon,  so  often  mentioned  in  this  history.     Skil- 

!  led  to  excellence  in  almost  every  branch  of  war,  ond 

[  possessing  a  variety  of  accom]dishments,   he   used 

I  his  gifts  so  gently  for  himself  and  so  usefully  for  ti^e 

service  that  envy  ofi'ered  no  bar  to  admiration,  and 

[  the   whole    army   felt   painfully   mortified   that  ins 

I  merits    were    passed  unnoticed   in  the   public  dct- 

I  patches. 

Soult's  march  through  the  deep  sandy  plain  of  Goj 
was  harassing,  and  would  have  been  dangerous  if 
'Wellington  had  sent  Hill's  cavalry,  now  reinforced 
I  by  two  regiments  of  heavy  dragoons,  in  pursuit ,  but 
the  country  was  unfavourable  for  quick  observation, 
and  the  French  covered  their  movements  with  rear- 
1  guards  whose  real  numbers  it  was  difficult  to  ascer- 
'.  tain.     One  of  these  bodies  was  posted  on  a  hill  the 
I  end  of  which  abutted  on  tlie  high   road,  the  elope 
being  clothed  with  trees  and  defended  by  skirmish- 
ers.   Lord  \"\'eHington  was  desirous  to  know  wheth- 
er a  small  or  a  large  force  thus  barred  his  way,  but 
'  all  who  endeavoured  to  ascertain  the  fact  were  stop- 
j  ped  by  the  fire  of  the  enemy.     At  last  captain  Wil- 
jiiam  Liglit,  distinguished   by  the  variety  of  his  at- 
tainments, an  artist,  musician,  mechanist,  seaman 
'and  soldier,  mace  tlie  trial.      He  rode  forward  as  if 


740 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XXIV. 


he  would  force  his  way  throuorh  the  French  skir- 
mishers, hilt  when  in  the  wood  dropped  his  reins 
".nd  leaned  back  as  if  badly  wounded  ;  his  horse  ap- 
peared to  canter  wiMly  along  tlie  front  of  the  ene- 
my's light  troops,  and  tliey  thinking  him  mortally 
hurt  ceased  tiieir  tire  and  took  no  further  notice. 
He  thus  passed  unobserved  through  the  wood  to  the 
other  side  of  tlie  hill,  where  tiiere  were  no  skir- 
mishers, and  ascending  to  the  open  summit  above, 
put  spurs  to  his  horse  and  galloped  along  the  French 
main  line  counting  their  regiments  as  he  passed. 
His  sudden  appearance,  his  blue  undress,  his  daring 
confidence  and  his  speed,  made  the  French  doubt  if 
he  was  an  enemy,  and  a  few  shots  only  were  dis- 
charged, while  he,  dashing  down  the  opposite  de- 
clivity, broke  from  the  rear  through  the  very  skir- 
mishers whose  tire  he  had  tirst  essayed  in  fi'ont. 
Reaching  the  spot  where  lord  Wellington  stood,  he 
told  him  there  were  but  five  battalions  on  the  hill. 

fSoult  now  felt  that  a  rapid  retreat  upon  Toulouse 
by  St.  Gaudens  was  inevitable,  yet  determined  to 
disput3  every  position  whicli  offered  the  least  ad- 
vantage, his  army  was  on  the  morning  of  the  20th 
again  in  line  of  battle  on  tlie  heiglits  of  Oleac,  two 
or  three  miles  behind  Tarbes,  and  covering  Tournai 
on  the  road  to  St.  Gaudens ;  however  he  still  held 
Tarbes  with  Clauzel's  corps,  which  was  extended  on 
the  right  towards  Trie,  as  if  to  retain  a  power  of 
T'titreat  by  tliat  road  to  Toulouse.  The  plain  of  Tar- 
bss,  altliough  apparently  open,  was  full  of  deep 
ditches  which  forbade  the  action  of  horsemen; 
wherefore  he  sent  his  brother  with  five  regiments 
of  cavalry  to  tiie  Trie  road,  with  orders  to  cover  the 
right  flank  and  observe  the  route  to  Auch,  for  he 
th-d.T.'.d  lost  Wellington  should  intercept  his  retreat 
by  that  line. 

At  da}  break  the  allies  again  advanced  in  two 
columns.  The  right  under  Hill  moved  along  the 
high  road.  The  left  under  Wellington  in  person 
was  composed  of  the  light  division  and  hussars, 
I'onsonby's  heavy  cavalry,  the  sixth  division  and 
Freyre's  Spaniards.  It  marched  by  the  road  from 
Rabasteins,  and  general  Cole,  still  making  forced 
inarches  with  the  fourth  division  and  Vivian's  cav- 
alry, followed  from  Beaumarchez  and  La  Uevese, 
sending  detachments  through  Marciac  to  watch 
Pierre  Soult  on  the  side  of  Trie. 

COMBAT    OF   TARBES. 

The  Adour  separated  Wellington's  columns,  but 
v/hcn  tlie  left  approached  Tarbes,  the  light  division 
and  the  hussars  bringing  up  their  riglit  shoulders 
attacked  the  centre  of  Harispe's  division,  which  oc- 
cupied the  heights  of  Orleix  and  commanded  the 
road  from  Rabasteins  witii  two  guns.  Under  cover 
of  this  attack,  general  Clinton  made  a  flank  move- 
ment to  his  left  througli  the  villiige  of  Dours,  and 
opening  a  cannonade  against  Harispe's  right  en- 
deavoured to  get  between  that  general  and  Soult's 
main  position  at  Oleac.  Meanwliile  general  Hill, 
moving  by  the  other  bank  of  the  Adour,  assailed  the 
town  and  bridge  of  Tarbes,  which  was  defended  by 
Villatte's  division.  These  operations  were  design- 
ed to  envelope  and  crush  Clauzel's  two  divisions, 
which  seemed  the  more  easy  because  there  appeared 
to  be  only  a  fine  plain,  fit  for  the  action  of  all  the 
cavalry  between  him  and  Soult.  The  latter  how- 
ever, having  sent  his  baggage  and  oiicuuibrances  off" 
during  the  night,  saw  the  movement  without  alarm  ; 
he  was  better  acquainted  with  tlie  n;;ture  of  the 
plain  belrnd  Harispe,  and  had  made  roads  to  enable 
him  to  retreat  upon  the  second  position  witlmut 
passing  tlirough  Tarbes.  Nfivrtheless  Clauzel  wiis 
in  some  danger,  for  while  Hill  menaced  hib  left  at 


Tarbes,  the  light  division  supported  with  cavalry 
and  some  guns  fell  upon  his  centre  at  Orleix,  and 
general  Clinton  opening  a  brisk  cannonade  passed 
tiirough  the  villages  of  Oleat  and  Boulin,  penetrti- 
ted  between  Harispe  and  Pierre  Soult,  and  cut  the 
latter  oli' from  the  army. 

The  action  was  begun  about  twelve  o'clock. 
Hill's  artillery  thundered  on  the  right,  Clinton's 
answered  it  on  the  left,  and  Alten  tlirew  the  liglit 
division  in  mass  upon  the  centre,  where  Harispe's 
left  brigade  posted  on  a  strong  hill  was  tnddeii. y 
assailed  by  three  rifle  battalions.  Here  tlie  fight 
was  short,  yet  wonderfully  fierce  and  violent ;  for 
the  French,  probably  thinking  their  opponents  to  be 
Portuguese  on  account  of  their  green  dress,  charged 
with  great  hardiness,  and  being  encountered  by  men 
not  accustomed  to  yield,  they  tbught  muzzle  to  muz- 
zle, and  it  was  difficult  to  judge  at  first  who  would 
win.  At  last  the  French  gave  way,  and  Harispe's 
centre  being  thus  suddenly  overthrown  he  retired 
rapidly  through  the  fields,  by  the  ways  previouidy 
opened,  before  Clinton  could  get  into  his  rear. 
Meanwhile  Hill  forced  the  passage  of  the  Adour  at 
Tarbes,  and  Villatte  also  retreated  along  the  tiigh 
road  to  Tournai,  but  under  a  continued  cannonade. 
The  flat  country  was  now  covered  with  ccnfiised 
masses  of  pursuers  and  pursued,  all  moving  precipi- 
tately with  an  eager  musketry,  the  Frencli  guns 
also  replying  as  they  could  to  the  allies'  artillery. 
The  situation  of  the  retreating  troo[)s  seemed  des- 
perate, but  as  Soult  had  foreseen,  the  deep  ditches 
and  enclosures  and  the  small  copses,  villages  and 
farm-houses,  prevented  the  Britisli  cavalry  from 
acting  ;  Clauzel  therefore,  extricating  his  troops 
with  great  ability  from  their  dangerous  situation, 
finally  gained  the  main  position,  where  lour  frefdi 
divisions  were  drawn  up  in  order  of  battle,  and  im- 
mediately opened  all  their  batteries  on  the  allies. 
The  pursuit  was  thus  checked,  and  before  lord  Wel- 
lington could  make  arrangements  for  a  new  attack 
darkness  came  on.  and  tlie  army  halted  on  the  banks 
of  the  Larret  and  Larros  rivers.  The  loss  of  the 
French  is  unknown;  that  of  the  allies  did  not  ex- 
ceed one  hundred  and  twenty,  but  of  that  number 
twelve  oflicers  and  eighty  men  were  of  the  rifle  bat- 
talions. 

During  the  night  Soult  retreated  in  two  columns, 
one  by  the  main  road,  the  other  on  the  left  of  it, 
guided  by  fires  lighted  on  difierent  hills  as  points  of 
direction.  The  next  day  he  reached  St.  Gaudens 
with  D'Erlon's  and  Reille's  corps,  while  Clauzel, 
who  had  retreated  across  the  fields,  halted  at  Mon- 
rejeau,  and  was  there  rejoined  by  Pierre  Soult's  cav- 
alry. This  march  of  more  than  thirty  miles  was 
made  with  a  view  to  gain  Toulouse  in  the  most 
rapid  manner.  For  the  French  general,  having  now 
seen  nearly  all  Wellington's  infantry  and  his  five 
thousand  horsemen,  and  hearing  from  his  brother 
that  the  fourth  division  and  Vivian's  cavalry  were 
pointing  towards  Mielan  on  his  right,  feared  that 
the  allies  would  by  Trie  and  Castelnau  sudden)/ 
gain  the  plains  of  Muret  and  intercept  his  retreat 
upon  Toulouse,  which  was  his  great  depot,  the  knot 
of  all  his  future  combinations,  and  the  only  position 
wliere  he  could  hope  to  make  a  successful  stand 
with  his  small  army. 

The  allies  pursued  in  three  columns  by  St.  Gau- 
dens, Galan  and  Trie,  but  their  marches  were  short. 

On  the  2]6t,  Beresford  who  had  assumed  the  com- 
mand of  tlie  left  column  was  at  Caste ""nau,  Hill  in 
the  vicinity  of  Lanneniezan,  Wellingt''!  at  'J'ournai. 

'J'he  0'3d,  Bercsfiird  was  at  Ca?tclnau,  Wellington 
at  (talan.  Hill  at  Monrejeau,  a  id  Fane's  horeeni«-n 
pushed  forwards  to  St.  Gauden  .     Here  Lur  cquiLd- 


1814.] 


NAPIER  S    PENINSULAR   WAR 


741 


rons  of  French  cavalry  were  drawn  uj)  i  front  of 
the  town.  Uvertiirown  by  two  squaciroi  3  of  the 
thirteentli  dragoons  at  the  hrst  shock,  they  galloped 
in  disorder  through  .St.  Gaadcns,  yet  rallied  on  the 
other  side  and  were  again  brolven  and  pursued  for 
two  iniies,  many  being  sabred  and  above  a  hundred 
taken  prisoners.  Im  this  action  the  veteran  major 
Dogberty  of  the  thirteenth  was  seen  cliarging  be- 
tween his  two  sons  at  tlie  head  of  the  leading  squad- 
ron. 

On  the  23d,  Hill  was  at  St.  Gaudens,  Beresford 
at  Puymauren,  Wellington  at  Bouloigne 

The  24th,  Hill  was  in  St.  Martori,  Beresford  in 
Lombez,  Wellington  at  Isle  en  Dodon. 

'I'he  25th,  Hill  entered  Cazeres,  Beresford  reach- 
ed St.  Foy,  and  Wellington  was  at  Samatan. 

The  2otb,  Beresford  entered  St.  Lys,  and  march- 
ing in  order  of  battle  by  his  left,  while  his  cavalry 
skirmished  on  the  right,  took  post  on  the  Auch  road 
behind  the  Aussonnelle  stream,  facing  the  French 
army,  which  was  on  the  Touch  covering  Toulouse. 
The  allies  thus  took  seven  days  to  march  what  Soult 
had  done  in  four. 

This  tardiness,  idly  characterized  by  French  mil- 
itary writers  as  the  sign  of  timidity  and  indecision 
of  character,  has  been  by  English  writers  excused 
on  the  score  of  wet  weather,  and  the  encumbrance 
of  a  large  train  of  artillery  and  pontoons  ;  yet  the 
rain  equally  affected  the  French,  and  the  pontoons 
might  have  been  as  usefully  waited  for  on  the  Ga- 
ronne, after  tlie  French  army  had  been  pressed  in 
its  retreat  of  ninety  miles.  It  is  more  probable  that 
the  English  general,  not  exactly  informed  of  Soult's 
real  numbers  nor  of  his  true  line  of  retreat,  nor  per- 
fectly acquainted  with  the  country,  was  cautious ; 
because,  being  then  acrimoniously  disputing  with 
the  duke  of  Angouleme,  lie  was  also  uneasy  as  to 
the  state  of  the  country  behind  him  and  on  his 
flanks.  The  partisans  were  beginning  to  stir,  his 
reinforcements  from  England  and  Portugal  were 
stopped,  and  admiral  Penrose  had  not  yet  entered 
the  Garonne.  On  the  other  hand,  Ferdinand  had 
entered  S,iain  and  formed  that  engagement  with 
Suchet  about  the  garrisons  already  mentioned.  In 
fine,  lord  Wellington  found  himself  with  about  forty- 
five  thousand  men  composed  of  different  nations,  the 
Spaniards  being  almost  as  dangerous  as  useful  to 
him,  op[)os8d  to  an  able  and  obstinate  enemy,  and 
engaged  on  a  line  of  operations  running  more  than 
a  hundred  and  fifty  miles  along  the  F'"ench  frontier. 
His  right  flank  was  likely  to  be  vexed  by  the  parti- 
sans forming  in  the  Pyrenees,  his  left  flank  by  those 
behind  the  Garonne,  on  the  right  bank  of  which  a 
considerable  regular  force  was  also  collecting,  while 
the  generals  commanding  the  military  districts  be- 
yond Toulouse  were  forming  corps  of  volunteers, 
national  guards  and  soldiers  of  the  regular  depots : 
and  ever  he  expected  Suchet  to  arrive  on  his  front 
and  overmatch  him  in  numbers.  He  was  careful 
therefore  to  keep  his  troops  well  in  hand,  and  to 
spare  them  fatigue  that  the  hospitals  might  not  in- 
crease. In  battle  their  bravery  would,  he  knew, 
bring  him  through  any  crisis,  but  if  wearing  down 
their  numbers  by  forced  marches  he  should  cover 
the  country  with  small  posts  and  hospital  stations, 
the  French  people  would  be  tempted  to  rise  against 
him.  So  little  therefore  was  his  caution  allied  to 
timidity  that  it  was  no  slight  indication  of  daring 
to  have  advanced  at  all. 

It  does  seem,  however,  that  with  an  overwhelm- 
ing cavalry,  and  great  superiority  of  artillery,  he 
should  not  have  suffered  the  French  general  eo  to 
escape  his  hands.  It  must  be  admitted  also  that 
Soult  proved  himself  a  very  able  commander.     His 


halting  on  the  Adour,  his  success  in  reviving  the 
courage  of  his  army,  and  the  front  he  showed  in 
hopes  to  prevent  his  adversary  from  detach icg  trooj.'S 
against  Bordeaux,  were  proofs  not  only  of  a  tirni  un- 
yielding temper,  but  of  a  clear  and  ready  judgment. 
For  though,  contrary  to  his  hopes,  lord  \\  eilington 
did  send  Beresford  against  Bordeaux,  it  was  not  on 
military  grounds,  but  because  treason  was  there  ti» 
aid  him.  Meanwhile  he  was  forced  to  keep  his  ar- 
!  my  lor  tifleen  days  passive  within  a  few  miles  cf  an 
army  he  had  jubt  defeated,  permitting  his  adversary 
to  reorganize  and  restore  the  discipline  and  ccnri.ge 
of  the  old  troops,  to  rally  the  dispersed  conscripts, 
j  to  prepare  the  means  of  a  partisan  warfare,  to  tend 
off  all  his  encumbrances  and  sick  to  Toulouse,  ard 
I  to  begin  fortifying  that  city  as  a  final  and  secure  re- 
treat;  for  the  works  there  were  commenced  on  the 
3d  or  4th  of  March,  and  at  this  time  the  intrcnch- 
ments  covering  the  bridge  and  suburb  of  St.  Cyprien 
were  nearly  completed.  The  French  general  wss 
even  the  first  to  retake  the  ofiensive  after  Ortiiez, 
too  late  indeed,  and  he  struck  no  impcrtant  blow, 
i  and  twice  placed  his  army  in  dangerrais  situations; 
but  his  delay  was  a  matter  of  necessity  arising  from 
the  loss  of  his  magazines,  and  if  he  got  into  difficul- 
ties they  were  inseparable  from  his  operations,  and 
he  extricated  himself  again. 

j      That  he  gained  no  advantages  in  fight  is  rather 
'  argument  for  lord  Wellington   than  against  Soult. 
The  latter  sought  but  did  not  find  a  favourable  op- 
portunity to  strike,  and  if  would  have  been  unwise, 
because  his  adversary  gave  him  no  opening,  to  have 
fallen  desperately  upon  superior  numbers  in  a  strong 
position   with    an   army   so   recently   defeated,  and 
whose  restored  confidence  it  was  so  essential  not  to 
shake  again  by  a  repulse.     He  increased  that  confi- 
I  dence  by  appearing  to  insult  the  allied  army  with 
j  an  inferior  force,  and  in  combination  with  his  ener 
\  getic  proclamation  encouraged  the  Napolecnists  and 
.  alarmed  the  Bourbonists  ;  lastly,  by  his  rapid  retreat 
from  Tarbes  he  gained  two  days  to  establish   and 
strengthen  himself  on   his   grand   position  at  Tou- 
louse.    And  certainly  he  deceived  his  adversary,  no 
'  Common  general,  and  at  the  head  of  no  comnicn  ar- 
my ;  for  so  little  did  Wellington  expect  him  to  make 
a  determined  stand  there,  that  in  a  letter  written  r^n 
the   26th  to   sir  .Tohn  Hope,  he  seys,  "I  fear  the 
Garonne  is  too  full  and  large  for  cur  bridge  :   if  net 
j  we  shall  be  in  that  town  (Toulouse)  I  hope  imme- 
I  diately."' 

The  French  general's  firmness  and  the  extent  cf 

'  his  views  cannot  however  be  fairly  judged  by  merely 

I  considering   his   movements   in   the   field.     Having 

early   proved  the   power  cf  his  adversary,  he  had 

'  never  deceived  himself  about  the  ultimate  course  of 

i  the  campaign,  and  therefore  struggled  without  hope 

;  a  hard  and  distressing  task  ;  yet  he  showed  ro  faint- 

ness,  fighting  continually,  and  always  for  delay,  as 

thinking  Suchet  would  fiirally  cast  personal  feelings 

aside  and  strike  for  his  country.    Nor  did  he  fbrbecr 

I  importuning  that  marshal  to  do  so.     ^otMMthetanc!- 

ing  his  previous  disappointments,  he  wrote  to  him 

again  on  the  9th  February,  urging  the  i^anger  3f  th.e 

crisis,  the  certainty  that  the  allies  would  make  the 

greatest  effort  on  the  western  frontier,  and  prayin^f 

him  to  abandon  Catalonia  and  come  with  the  hulk 

of  his  troops  to  Beam:   in  the  same  strain  he  wrote 

to  the  minister  of  war,  and  his  letters  reached  their 

I  destinations  on  the  i:  th.     Suchet.  liaving  no  orders 

'  to  the  contrary,  could  therefore  have  joined  him  with 

thirteen  thousand  men  before  the  battle  of  Oni.rz , 

but  that  marshal,  giving  a  deceptive  statement  of  his 

forces   in  rcj  ly,  coldly  observed  that  if  he  marched 

!  any  vhere  it  would  be  to  join  the  emperor  and  not 


r42 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XXIV. 


the  duke  of  Dalmatia.  The  latter  continued,  not- 
withstanding, to  iiitbnn  hiui  of  all  his  battles  and 
his  movements,  and  liis  accunnilating  distresses, 
yet  in  vain;  and  Sachet's  apathy  would  be  incredible 
bnt  for  the  unequivocal  proofs  of  it  furnished  in  the 
work  of  the  French  engineer  Choumara. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Views  of  the  rommanders  on  each  side — Wellinglon  designs 
to  throw  a  bridge  over  the  Garonne  at  Portet  above  Tou- 
louse, but  below  the  conliuence  ot"  the  Arriege  and  Garonne 

The  river  is  found  too  wide  for  the  pontoons — He  changes 

his  design— Cavalry  action  at  St.  Martin  de  Touch — Cent- 
ral Hill  passe*  the  Garonne  at  Pensaguel  above  the  conflu- 
ence of  the  Arritge — Marches  upon  Cintegabelle— Crosses 
the  Arrici^e — Finds  the  country  too  deep  for  his  artdlery 
and  returns  to  Pen^aguel — Recrosses  the  Garonne — Soull 
fortifies  Toulouse  and  the  Mont  Rave — Lortl  Wellington 
fends  his  pontoons  down  the  Garonne — Passes  that  river  at 
Grenade,  fifteen  miles  below  Toulouse,  with  twenty  thou- 
sand men— The  river  floods  and  his  bridge  is  taken  up— 
The  waters  subside — The  bridge  is  again  laid^Thc  Sp.<n- 
iards  pass — Lord  Wellington  advances  up  the  right  bank  to 
Feniuilhet — Combat  of  cavalry— The  eighteenth  hussars 
win  the  bridge  of  Croix  d'Orade — Loid  Wellinglon  resolves 
to  attack  Soult  on  the  9lh  of  April — Orders  the  pontoons  to 
be  taken  up  and  relaid  higher  up  the  Garonne  at  Seilh,  in 
the  night  of  the  8tii — Time  is  lost  in  the  execution  and  the 
attack  is  deferred --The  light  division  cross  at  Seilh  on  tlie 
nvjrning  of  the  10th — Battle  of  Toulouse. 

The  two  armies  being  now  once  more  in  presence 
of  eacli  other,  and  with  an  equal  resolution  to  tight, 
it  is  fitting  to  show  the  peculiar  calculations  upon 
which  the  generals  founded  their  respective  combi- 
nations. Soult,  born  in  the  vicinity,  knew  the  coun- 
try, and  chose  Toulouse  as  a  strategic  post,  because 
that  ancient  capital  of  the  south  contained  fifty  thou- 
sand inhabitants,  commanded  the  principal  passage 
of  the  Garonne,  was  the  centre  of  a  great  number 
of  roads  on  botli  sides  of  iha^  river,  and  the  chief 
military  arsenal  of  the  south  of  France.  Here  he 
could  most  easily  feed  liis  troops,  assemble,  arm  and 
discipline  the  conscripts,  control  and  urge  the  civil 
authorities,  and  counteract  the  machinations  of  the 
discontented.  Posted  at  Toulouse  he  was  master 
of  various  lines  of  operations.  He  could  retire  upon 
Suchet  by  Carcassonne,  or  towards  Lyons  by  Albi. 
He  could  take  a  new  position  behind  the  Tarn,  and 
prolong  the  contest  by  defending  successively  that 
river  and  the  Lot,  retreating  if  necessary  upon  De- 
caen's  army  of  the  Gironde,  and  thus  drawing  the 
allies  down  the  right  bank  of  the  Garonne  as  he  had 
before  drawn  them  up  the  left  bank,  being  well  as- 
sured tiiat  lord  Wellington  must  follow  him,  and 
with  weakened  forces,  as  it  would  be  necessary  to 
leave  troops  in  observation  of  Suchet. 

His  first  care  wss  to  place  a  considerable  body  of 
troops,  collected  from  the  depots  and  other  parts  of 
the  interior  at  Montauban,  under  the  command  of 
general  Loverdo,  with  orders  to  construct  a  bridge- 
head on  the  left  of  the  Tarn.  The  passage  of  that 
river,  and  a  strong  point  of  retreat  and  assembly  for 
all  the  detachments  sent  to  observe  the  Garonne  be- 
low Toulouse,  was  thus  secured,  and  withal  the  com- 
mand of  a  number  of  great  roads  leading  to  the  in- 
terior of  France,  consequently  the  power  of  making 
fresh  combinations.  To  maintain  himself  as  long 
as  possible  in  Toulouse  was  however  a  great  politi- 
cal object.  It  was  the  last  point  which  connected 
him  at  once  with  Suchet  and  with  Decaon  ;  and 
while  he  held  it  botli  the  latter  general  and  the  par- 
tigans  in  the  mountains  about  Lourdes  could  act, 
each  on  their  own  side,  against  the  long  lines  of 
communications  maintained  by  Wellington  with 
Bordeaux  and  Bayoune.     Suchet  also  could  do  the 


same,  either  by  marching  with  his  whole  force  oi 
sending  a  detachment  through  the  Arriege  dcjjart- 
ment  to  the  upper  Garonne,  where  general  Laftitie 
having  seven  or  eight  hundred  men,  national  guarca 
and  otiier  troops,  was  already  in  activity.  Tliet-e 
operations  Soult  now  strongly  urged  Suchet  to  adopt ; 
but  the  latter  treated  the  proposition,  as  he  had  cone 
all  those  before  made  from  the  same  quarter,  witll  ■ 
contempt. 

Toulouse  was  not  less  valuable  as  a  position  of 
battle. 

The  Garonne,  flowing  on  the  west,  presented  to 
the  allies  a  deep  loop,  at  t'-e  bottom  of  which  was 
the  bridge,  completely  cove  ed  by  the  suburb  of  St. 
Cyprien,  itself  protected  hv  an  ancient  brick  wall 
three  feet  tliick  and  flanked  by  two  massive  towers; 
these  defences  Soult  had  improved,  and  he  added  a 
line  of  exterior  intrenchments. 

Beyond  the  Garonne  was  the  city,  surrounded  by 
an  old  wall  flanked  with  towers,  and  so  thick  as  to 
admit  sixteen  and  twenty-four-pound  guns. 

The  great  canal  of  Languedoc,  whicli  joined  the 
Garonne  a  few  miles  below  the  town,  wound  ibr  the 
most  part  within  point  blank  shot  of  the  walls,  cov- 
ering them  on  the  north  and  east  as  the  Garonne 
and  St.  Cyprien  did  on  the  west. 

The  suburbs  of  St.  Etienne  and  Gjillemerie,  built 
on  both  sides  of  this  canal,  furnished  outworks  on 
the  west,  for  they  were  intrenched  and  connected 
with  and  covered  by  the  hills  of  Sacarin  and  Cem- 
bon,  also  intrenched  and  flanking  the  api)rcaches  to 
the  canal  both  above  and  below  these  suburbs. 

Eight  hundred  yards  beyond  these  hills  a  strong 
ridge,  called  the  Mont  Rave,  ran  nearly  parallel 
with  the  canal :  its  outer  slope  was  exceedingly  rug- 
ged and  overlooked  a  marshy  plain  through  which 
the  Ers  river  flowed. 

The  south  side  of  the  town  opened  on  a  plain  ;  bnt 
the  suburb  of  St.  Michel  lying  there,  between  the 
Garonne  and  the  canal,  furnisljed  another  advanced 
defence,  and  at  some  distance  beyond,  a  range  of 
heights  called  the  Pech  David  commenced,  trending 
up  the  Garonne  in  a  direction  nearly  parallel  to  that 
river. 

Such  being  the  French  general's  position,  he  cal- 
culated that  as  lord  Wellington  could  not  force  the 
passage  by  the  suburb  of  St.  Cyprien  without  an 
enormous  sacrifice  of  men,  he  must  seek  to  turn 
the  flanks  above  or  below  Toulouse,  and  leave  a  suf- 
ficient force  to  blockade  St.  Cyprien  under  pain  of 
having  the  French  army  issue  on  that  side  against 
his  communications.  If  he  passed  the  Garonne 
above  its  confluence  with  the  Arriege,  he  would 
have  to  cross  that  river  also,  which  could  not  be  ef- 
fected nearer  than  Cintegabelle,  one  march  higher 
up.  Then  he  nmst  come  down  by  the  right  of  the 
Arrit^ge,  an  operation  not  to  be  feared  in  a  country 
which  the  recent  rains  had  rendered  impracticable 
for  guns.  If  the  allies  passed  the  Garonne  below 
the  confluence  of  the  Arriege,  Soult  judged  tliat  he 
could  from  the  Pech  David,  and  its  continuation, 
overlook  their  movements,  and  that  he  should  be  in 
position  to  fall  upon  the  head  of  their  column  w  hile 
in  the  disorder  of  passing  the  river:  if  he  failed  in 
this  he  had  still  Toulouse  and  th.e  heights  of  ]Mont 
Rave  to  retire  upon,  where  he  could  fight  again,  his 
:  ■  *reat  being  secure  upon  IMontanban. 

For  these  reasons  the  passage  of  the  Garonne 
arove  Toulouse  would  lead  to  no  decisive  result,  and 
he  did  not  fear  it ;  but  a  passage  below  tlie  city  was 
a  different  matter.  Lord  Wellington  could  tlms  cut 
him  off  from  Montauban  and  attack  Toulouse  from 
the  northern  and  eastern  quarters  ;  and  if  the  French 
then  lost  the  battle  tl  cy  could  only  retreat  by  Car 


1814.J 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR    WAR. 


743 


cassonne  to  form  a  junctici  -^-ith  Suchet  in  Roussil- 
lon,  where,  havinof  their  bacKs  to  tiie  mountains  and 
the  allies  between  them  and  France,  they  could  not 
exist.  Hence,  feeling  certain  the  attack  would  fi- 
nally bs  on  that  side,  8oult  lined  the  left  bank  of  the 
Garonne  with  his  cavalry  as  far  as  the  confluence  of 
the  Tarn,  and  called  up  general  Despeaux's  troops 
from  Agen  in  the  view  of  confining  the  allies  to  the 
space  between  the  Tarn  and  the  Garonne  :  for  his 
first  design  was  to  attack  them  there  rather  than 
loss  liis  communication  with  Montauban. 

On  the  other  hand,  lord  Wellington,  whether  from 
error,  from  necessity,  or  for  the  reasons  I  have  be- 
fore touflied  upon,  having  suffered  the  French  army 
to  gain  three  day's  march  in  the  retreat  from  Tar- 
bes,  had  now  little  choice  of  operations.  He  could 
not  halt  until  the  Andalusians  and  Del  Parque's 
troops  should  join  him  from  the  Bastan,  without  giv- 
ing Soult  all  ihe  time  necessary  to  strengthen  him- 
self and  organize  his  plan  of  defence,  nor  without 
appearing  fearful  and  weak  in  the  eyes  of  the 
French  people,  which  would  have  been  most  dan- 
gerous. Still  less  could  he  wait  for  the  fall  of  Bay- 
onne.  He  had  taken  the  oiTensive,  and  could  not 
resume  the  defensive  with  safety  :  the  invasion  of 
France  once  begun  it  was  imperative  to  push  it  to  a 
conclusion.  Leading  an  army  victorious  and  supe- 
rior in  numbers,  his  business  was  to  bring  his  ad- 
versary to  battle  as  soon  as  possible,  and  as  he  could 
not  force  his  way  through  8t.  Cyprien  in  face  of  the 
whole  French  army,  nothing  remained  but  to  pass 
the  Garonne  above  or  below  Toulouse. 

It  has  been  already  shown  that  in  a  strategic  view 
this  passage  should  have  been  made  below  that  town, 
but  seeing  that  the  soutli  side  of  the  city  was  the 
most  open  to  attack,  the  English  general  resolved  to 
cast  his  bridge  at  Portet,  six  miles  above  Toulouse, 
designing  to  throw  his  right  wing  suddenly  into  the 
open  country  between  the  Garonne  and  the  canal  of 
I>anguedoc,  while  with  his  centre  and  left  he  assail- 
ed the  suburbs  of  Cyprien.  With  this  object,  at 
eight  o'clock  in  the  evening  of  the  27th,  one  of 
Hill's  brigades  marched  up  from  Muret,  some  men 
were  ferried  over  and  tlie  bridge  was  commenced, 
the  remainder  of  that  general's  troops  being  to  pass 
at  midniglit.  But  when  the  river  was  measured  the 
width  was  found  too  great  for  the  pontoons,  and  there 
were  no  means  of  substituting  trestles,  wherefore  this 
plan  was  abandoned.  Had  it  been  executed,  some 
considerable  advantage  would  probably  have  been 
gained,  since  it  does  not  appear  that  Soult  knew  of 
the  attempt  until  two  days  later,  and  then  only  by 
his  emissaries,  not  by  his  scouts. 

Wellington,  thus  baffled,  tried  another  scheme; 
he  drove  the  enemy  from  the  Touch  river  on  the 
2Sth,  and  collected  the  infantry  of  his  left  and  cen- 
tre about  Portet,  masking  the  movement  with  his 
cavalry.  In  the  course  of  the  operation  a  single 
squadron  of  the  eighteenth  hussars,  under  major 
Hughes,  being  inconsiderately  pushed  by  colonel 
Vivian  across  the  bridge  of  St.  Martin  de  la  Touch, 
Buddenly  came  upon  a  whole  regiment  of  French 
cavalry  ;  the  rashness  of  the  act,  as  often  happens 
in  war.  proved  the  safety  of  the  British,  for  tiie  ene- 
my tiiinking  that  a  strong  support  must  be  at  hand 
dis';harged  their  carbines  and  retreated  at  a  canter. 
Hughes  followed,  the  speed  of  both  sides  increased, 
and  as  the  nature  of  the  road  did  not  admit  of  any 
PLTress  to  the  sides,  this  great  body  of  French  horse- 
men was  jjushed  headlong  by  a  few  men  under  the 
batteries  of  .St.  Cy[)rien. 

During  these  movements  Hill's  troops  were  with- 
Jrawn  to  St.  Roque  ;  but  in  the  night  of  the  .3()th,  a 
oew   bridge   being  laid   near  Pensaguel,  two  miles 


above  the  confluence  of  the  Arriogo,  that  general 
passed  the  Garonne  with  two  divisions  of  infantry, 
Morillo's  Spaniards,  Gardiner's  and  Maxwell's  ar- 
tillery, and  Fane's  cavalry,  in  all  thirteen  thousand 
sabres  and  bayonets,  eighteen  guns,  and  a  rocket 
brigade.  The  advanced  guard  moved  with  all  ex- 
j)edition  by  the  great  road,  having  orders  to  seizo 
}  the  stone  bridge  of  Cintcgabelle,  fifteen  miles  up  the 
Arrit'ge,  and,  on  the  march,  to  secure  a  ferry-boat 
known  to  be  at  Vinergue.  The  remainder  of  the 
troops  followed,  the  intent  being  to  pass  the  Arricge 
river  hastily  at  Cintegabelle,  and  so  come  down  tho 
right  bank  to  attack  Toulouse  on  the  south  while 
lord  Wellington  assailed  St.  Cyprien.  This  march 
was  to  have  been  made  privily  in  the  night ;  but 
the  bridge,  though  ordered  for  the  evening  of  the 
30th,  was  not  finished  until  five  o'clock  in  the  morn- 
ing of  the  31st.  Soult  thus  got  notice  of  the  enter- 
prise in  time  to  observe  from  the  heights  of  Old 
Toulouse  the  strength  of  the  column,  and  to  ascer- 
tain that  the  great  body  of  the  army  still  remained 
in  front  of  St.  Cyprien.  The  marshy  nature  of  the 
country  on  the  right  of  the  Arriege  was  known  to 
him,  and  the  suburbs  of  St.  Michel  and  St.  Etienne 
being  now  in  a  state  to  resist  a  partial  attack,  the 
matter  appeared  a  feint  to  draw  off  a  part  of  his  ar- 
my from  Toulouse  while  St.  Cyprien  was  assaulted, 
or  the  Garonne  passed  below  the  city.  In  this  per- 
suasion he  kept  his  infantry  in  hand,  and  sent  only 
his  cavalry  up  the  right  bank  of  the  Arriege  to  ol>- 
serve  the  march  of  the  allies  ;  but  he  directed  gener- 
al Laflitte,  who  had  collected  some  regular  horsemen 
and  the  national  guards  of  the  department,  to  hang 
upon  their  skirts  and  pretend  to  be  the  van  of  Su- 
chet's  army.  He  was  however  somewhat  disquieted, 
because  the  baggage,  which  to  avoid  encumbering 
the  march  had  been  sent  up  the  Garonne  to  cross  at 
Carbonne,  being  seen  by  his  scouts  v.as  reported  to 
be  a  second  column,  increasing  Hill's  force  to 
eighteen  thousand  men. 

While  in  this  uncertainty  he  heard  of  the  meas- 
urement of  the  river  made  at  Portet  on  the  night  of 
the  27th,  and  that  many  guns  were  still  collected 
there;  wherefore,  being  ignorant  of  the  cause  why 
the  bridge  was  not  thrown,  he  concluded  there  war 
a  design  to  cross  there  also  when  Hill  should  tie 
scend  the  Arriege.  To  meet  this  danger,  he  put 
four  divisions  under  Clauzel,  with  orders  to  fall  upon 
the  head  of  the  allies  if  they  should  attempt  the 
passage  before  Hill  came  down,  resolving  in  the 
contrary  case  to  fight  in  the  suburbs  of  Toulouse 
and  on  the  Mont  Rave,  because  the  positions  on  the 
right  of  the  Arriege  were  all  favourable  to  the  as- 
sailants. He  was  however  soon  relieved  from  anxi- 
ety. General  Hill  effected  indeed  the  passage  of 
the  Arriege  at  Cintegabelle,  and  sent  his  cavalry 
towards  Villefranclie  and  Nailloux,  but  his  artillery 
were  quite  unable  to  move  in  the  deep  country 
there;  and  as  success  and  safety  alike  depended  en 
rapidity,  he  returned  during  the  night  to  Pensaguel, 
recrossed  the  Garonne,  and  taking  up  his  pontoons 
left  only  a  flying  bridge  with  a  si.jall  guard  of  in- 
fantry and  cavalry  on  the  right  ba;ik.  His  retrcct 
was  followed  by  Laffitte's  horcsemen,  who  picked  uj) 
a  few  stragglers  and  mules,  but  no  other  event  oc- 
curred, and  Soult  remained  well  jjleased  that  his  ad- 
versary had  thus  lost  three  or  four  important  days. 

The  French  general  was  now  sure  the  next  at- 
tempt would  be  below  'J'oulouse,  yet  he  changed  iiis 
design  of  marching  down  the  Garonne  to  fight  be- 
tween that  river  and  the  Tarn  ratlier  than  lose  U'xa 
communications  with  Montauban.  Having  com- 
pleted his  works  of  defence  for  the  city  and  tlie  sub- 
urbs, and  fortified  all  the  branches  over  the  canal 


744 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[  Book  XXIV 


he  concluded  not  to  abandon  Toulouse  under  any 
circumstances,  and  therefore  set  his  whole  army 
and  all  the  working  population  to  intrench  the  Mont 
liave,  between  the  canal  and  tiie  Ers  river,  think- 
ing he  might  thus  securely  meet  the  shock  of  battle 
let  it  come  on  which  side  it  would.  Meanwhile  the 
Garonne  continued  so  full  and  rapid  that  lord  Wel- 
lii'gton  was  forced  to  remain  inactive  before  St. 
Cyprien  until  the  evening  of  the  'M  of  April;  then 
the  waters  falling,  the  pontoons  were  carried  in 
the  night  to  Grenade,  fifteen  miles  below  Toulouse, 
where  the  bridge  was  at  last  thrown  and  thirty 
guns  placed  in  battery  on  the  left  bank  to  protect  it. 
The  third,  fourth  and  sixth  divisions  of  infantry  and 
three  brigades  of  cavalry,  the  whole  under  Beresford, 
immediately  passed,  and  the  cavalry  being  pushed 
out  two  leagues  on  the  frout  and  flanks  captured  a 
large  herd  of  bullocks  destined  for  the  French  army. 
JJut  now  the  river  again  swelled  so  fast,  that  the 
light  division  and  the  Spaniards  were  unable  to  fol- 
low, the  bridge  got  damaged,  and  the  pontoons  were 
taken  up. 

This  passage  was  made  known  to  Soult  immedi- 
ately by  his  cavalry  scouts,  yet  he  knew  not  the  ex- 
act force  which  had  crossed  ;  and  as  Morillo's  Span- 
iards, whom  he  mistook  for  Freyre's,  had  taken  the 
outposts  in  front  of  St.  Cyprien,  he  imagined  Hill 
also  had  moved  to  Grenade,  and  that  the  greatest 
j)art  of  the  allied  army  was  over  the  Garonne. 
Wherefore  merely  observing  Beresford  with  his  cav- 
alry, he  continued  to  strengthen  his  field  of  battle 
about  Toulouse,  his  resolution  to  keep  that  city  be- 
ing confirmed  by  hearing,  on  the  7th,  that  the  allied 
sovereigns  had  entered  Paris. 

On  the  8th  the  waters  subsided,  the  allies'  bridge 
was  again  laid  down,  Freyre's  Spaniards  and  the 
Portuguese  artillery  crossed,  and  lord  Wellington 
taking  the  command  in  person  advanced  to  the 
heights  of  Fenouilhet  within  five  miles  of  Toulouse. 
JMarching  up  both  banks  of  the  Ers,  his  columns 
were  separated  by  that  river,  which  was  impassable 
without  pontoons,  and  it  was  essential  to  secure  as 
Eoon  as  possible  one  of  the  stone  bridges.  Hence 
when  his  left  approached  the  heights  of  Kyrie  Elei- 
Bon,  on  the  great  road  of  Albi,  Vivian's  horsemen 
drove  Berton's  cavalry  up  the  right  of  the  Ers  to- 
wards the  bridge  of  Bordes,  and  the  eighteenth  hus- 
siirs  descended  towards  that  of  Croix  d'Orade.  The 
latter  was  defended  by  Vial's  dragoons,  and  after 
some  skirmishing  the  eighteenth  was  suddenly  men- 
aced by  a  regiment  in  front  of  the  bridge,  the  oppo- 
site bank  of  the  river  being  lined  with  dismounted 
carbineers.  The  two  parties  stood  facing  each 
other,  hesitating  to  begin,  until  the  approach  of 
some  British  infantry,  when  both  sides  sounded  the 
cnarge  at  the  same  moment;  but  tiie  English  horses 
were  so  quick,  the  French  were  in  an  instant  jam- 
med up  on  the  bridge,  their  front  ranks  were  sa- 
brsd,  and  the  mass  breaking  away  to  the  rear  went 
olF  in  disorder,  leaving  many  killed  and  wounded 
».nd  above  a  hundred  prisoners  in  the  hands  of  the 
v'ccors.  They  were  pursued  through  the  village  of 
('roix  d'Orade,  but  beyond  it  they  rallied  on  the  rest 
of  their  brigade  and  advanced  again  :  the  hussr»»"R 
then  recrossed  the  bridge,  which  was  now  defended 
by  the  British  in^ntry  whose  fire  stopped  the  French 
cavalry.  The  communication  between  the  allied 
columns  was  thus  secured. 

The  credit  of  this  brilliant  action  was  given  to 
colonel  Vivian  ii  the  despatch,  incorrectly,  for  that 
ofhcer  was  wounded  by  a  carbine  shot  previous  to 
the  charge  at  the  bridge:  the  attack  was  conceived 
and  conducted  entirely  by  major  Ilup'^ee  of  the 
eigbteeitch. 


Lord  Wellington,  from  the  heights  of  Kyrie  Elei- 
son,  carefully  examined  the  Frencli  general's  posi- 
tion, and  resolved  to  attack  on  the  VJth.  3ieanwhile 
to  shorten  his  communications  with  general  Hill  he 
directed  the  pontoons  to  be  removed  from  Grciiade 
and  relaid  higher  up  at  Seilh.  The  light  division 
was  to  cross  at  the  latter  place  at  daybreak,  but  tiie 
bridge  was  not  relaid  until  late  in  the  day,  and  the 
English  general,  extremely  incensed  at  tiie  failure, 
was  forced  to  defer  his  battle  until  the  llth. 

Soult's  combinations  were  now  crowned  with  suc- 
cess. He  had  by  means  of  his  fortresses,  his  battles, 
the  sudden  change  of  his  line  of  operations  after  Ur- 
thez,  his  rapid  retreat  from  Tarbes  and  his  clear 
judgment  in  fixing  upon  Toulouse  as  his  next  point 
of  resistance,  reduced  the  strength  of  his  adversary 
to  an  equality  with  his  own.  He  had  gained  seven- 
teen days  for  preparation,  had  brought  the  allies  to 
deliver  battle  on  ground  naturally  adapted  for  de- 
fence, and  well  fortified  ;  wliere  one-third  of  their 
force  was  separated  by  a  great  river  from  the  n  st, 
where  they  could  derive  no  advantage  from  their 
numerous  cavalry,  and  were  overmatched  in  artil- 
lery notwithstanding  their  previous  superiority  ii 
that  arm. 

His  position  covered  three  sides  of  Toulouse 
Defending  St.  Cyprien  on  the  west  with  his  leit,  he 
guarded  the  canal  on  the  north  with  his  centre,  and 
with  his  right  held  the  Mont  Rave  on  the  east.  Hif 
reserve  under  Travot  manned  the  ramparts  of  Tou 
louse,  and  the  urban  guards  while  maintaining  trai.- 
quillity  aided  to  transport  the  artillery  and  omninni- 
tion  to  different  posts.  Hil!  was  opposed  to  his  left, 
but  while  the  latter,  well  fortified  at  St.  Cyprien, 
had  short  and  direct  communication  with  the  centre 
by  the  great  bridge  of  Toulouse,  the  fcTmer  could 
only  communicate  with  the  main  body  under  Wel- 
lington by  the  pontoon  bridge  at  Seilh,  a  circuit  of 
ten  or  twelve  miles. 

The  English  general  was  advancing  from  the 
north,  but  his  intent  was  still  to  assail  the  city  on 
the  south  side,  where  it  was  weakest  in  defence 
With  this  design  he  had  caused  th.e  country  on  the 
left  of  the  Ers  to  be  carefully  examined,  in  the  view 
of  making  under  cover  of  that  river  a  flank  march 
round  the  eastern  front,  and  thus  gaining  the  o|;en 
ground  which  he  had  formerly  e'-.deavoured  to  reach 
by  passing  at  Portet  and  Pensaguel.  But  again  he 
was  baffled  by  the  deep  country,  which  he  could  ncit 
master  so  as  to  pass  the  Ers  by  force,  because  all  tiie 
bridges,  with  the  exception  of  that  of  Croix  d'Orade, 
were  mined  or  destroyed  by  Soult,  and  the  whole  of 
the  pontoons  were  on  the  Garonne.  There  was  tiien 
no  choice  save  to  attack  from  the  northern  and  east- 
ern sides.  The  first,  open  and  flat,  and  easily  ap- 
proached by  the  great  roads  of  Montauban  and  Albi, 
was  yet  impregnable  in  defence,  because  the  canni, 
the  bridges  over  which  were  strongly  defended  by 
works,  was  under  the  fire  of  the  ramparts  of  Tou- 
louse, and  for  the  most  part  within  musket-shot. 
Here  then,  as  at  St.  Cyprien,  it  was  a  f(_>rtres6  and 
not  a  position  which  was  opposed  to  him,  and  hia 
field  of  battle  was  necessarily  confined  to  the  Mont 
Rave  or  eastern  front. 

This  range  of  heights,  naturally  strong  and  rug- 
ged, and  covered  by  the  Ers  river,  wliich  as  we 
have  seen  was  not  to  be  forded,  presented  two  dis- 
tinct [datfornis,  that  of  Calvinet,  and  tiiat  of  St.  Sy- 
piere  on  which  the  extreme  right  of  the  French  was 
posted.  Between  them,  where  the  ground  dipped  a 
little,  two  roads  leading  from  I.avaur  and  Caramau 
were  conducted  to  Toulouse,  passing  the  canal  be- 
hind the  ridge  at  the  suburbs  of  Guillemerie  and  St 
Etienii". 


1814.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR    SV  A  R 


715 


The  Calvinel  platform  was  fortified  on  its  extreme 
left  with  a  s[)ecics  of  hornwork,  consisting  of  several 
open  retrenchments  and  small  works,  supported  by 
two  large  redoubts,  one  of  whicii  ria)\ked  the  ap- 
proaches to  the  canal  on  the  north  :  a  i  inge  of  aba- 
tis was  also  formed  there  by  felling  the  trees  on  the 
Albi  road.  Continuing  this  line  to  the  right,  two 
other  large  fort.s,  called  tlie  Calvinet  and  the  Co- 
lombette  redoubts,  terminated  the  works  on  this 
platform. 

On  that  of  St.  Sypiere  there  were  also  two  re- 
doubts, one  on  the  extreme  right  called  St.  Svfjiire, 
the  otiier  without  a  name  nearer  to  the  road  of  Cara- 
man. 

The  whole  range  of  heights  occupied  was  about 
two  miles  long,  and  an  army  attacking  in  front 
would  have  to  cross  the  Ers  under  tire,  advance 
through  ground  naturally  steep  and  marshy,  and 
now  rendered  almost  impassable  by  means  of  artifi- 
cial inundations,  to  the  assault  of  the  ridge  and  tiie 
works  on  the  summit;  and  if  the  assailants  should 
even  force  between  the  two  platforms,  they  would, 
while  tlieir  flanks  were  battered  by  the  redoubts 
above,  come  upon  the  works  of  Cambon  and  Sacarin. 
If  these  tell,  the  suburbs  of  GuiUemerie  and  St.  Eti 
enne,  the  canal,  and  finally  the  ramparts  of  the  town, 
would  still  have  to  be  carried  in  succession.  But  it 
was  not  practicable  to  pass  the  Ers  except  by  the 
bridge  of  Croix  d'Orade,  which  had  been  seized  so 
happily  on  the  8th-  Lord  Wellington  was  therefore 
reduced  to  make  a  flank  march  under  fire,  between 
the  Ers  and  the  .Mont  Rave,  and  then  to  carry  the 
latter  with  a  view  of  crossing  the  canal  above  the 
suburb  of  GuiUemerie,  and  establishing  his  army  on 
the  south  side  of  Toulouse,  where  only  the  city 
could  be  assailed  with  any  hope  of  success. 

To  impose  this  march  upon  him  all  Souk's  dispo- 
Bicions  had  been  directed.  For  this  he  had  mined 
all  the  bridges  on  the  Ers,  save  only  that  of  Croix 
d'Orade,  thus  facilitating  a  movement  between  the 
Ers  and  the  31f)nt  Rave,  while  he  impeded  one  be- 
yond that  river  by  sending  half  his  cavalry  over  to 
dispute  the  passage  of  the  numerous  streams  in  the 
deep  country  on  the  right  bank.  His  army  was  now 
disposed  in  the  following  order.  General  Ileille  de- 
fended the  suburb  of  St.  Cyprien  with  Taupin's  and 
Maransin's  divisions.  Daricau's  division  lined  the 
canal  on  the  north  from  its  junction  with  the  Ga- 
ronne to  the  road  of  Albi,  defending  with  his  left 
tlie  bridge-head  of  Jumeaux,  the  convent  of  the  ,"\Iin- 
imes  with  his  centre,  and  the  Matabiau  bridge  with 
his  right.  Havispe's  division  was  established  in 
the  works  on  the  Mont  Rave.  His  right  at  St.  Sy- 
piere looked  towards  the  bridge  of  Bordes,  his  cen- 
tre was  at  the  Colombette  redoubt,  about  which 
Vial's  horsemen  were  also  collected  ;  his  left  looked 
down  the  road  of  Albi  towards  the  bridge  of  Croix 
d'Orade.  On  this  side  a  detached  emliience  within 
cannon-shot,  called  "the  hill  of  Pugade,"  was  oc- 
cupied by  St.  Pol's  brigade,  drawn  from  Yillatte's 
division.  The  two  remaining  division:^  of  infintry 
were  formed  in  columns  at  certain  points  behind  the 
Mont  Rave,  and  Travot's  reserve  continued  to  man 
tlie  walls  of  Toulouse  behind  the  canal.  This  line 
of  battle  presented  an  angle  towards  the  Croix 
d'Orade,  each  side  about  two  miles  in  length  and 
the  apex  covered  by  the  brigade  on  the  Pugndc. 

WellinTTton  having  well  observed  the  grouud  on 
the  8th  and  9th,  made  the  following  disposition  of 
nttack  for  the  IC'th.  General  Hill  was  to  menace 
St.  Cyprien,  augmenting  or  abating  his  efforts  to 
draw  the  enemy's  attention  according  to  the  prog- 
ress of  the  battle  on  the  right  of  the  Garonne,  which 
he  could  easily  discern.     The  third  and  light  divis- 


ions ana  Freyre's  Spaniards,  Leing  already  on  the 
left  of  the  Ers,  were  to  advance  against  t!ie  ncnli- 
ern  front  of  Toulouf.e.  'J'he  two  first,  supported  by 
Hock's  German  cavalry,  were  to  make  dtinonstra- 
tions  against  the  line  of  canal  defended  by  Daiicau-. 
Tliat  is  to  say,  Picton  was  to  menace  tiie  bridge  of 
.Tumeaux  and  the  convent  of  the  Minimcs,  while 
Alton  maintained  the  communication  between  him 
and  Freyre,  who,  reinforced  with  the  i'ortugueso 
artillery,  was  to  carry  the  hill  of  Pugade  anij  then 
halt  to  cover  Beresford's  column  of  march.  Thid 
last,  composed  of  the  Iburth  and  sixth  divisions  witli 
tiiree  batteries,  was,  after  passing  the  bridije  of 
Croix  d'Orade,  to  move  round  the  left  of  the  Pugnde 
and  along  the  low  ground  between  the  French 
heights  and  the  Ers,  until  the  rear  should  pass  the 
road  of  Lavaur,  when  the  two  divisions  were  to 
wheel  into  line  and  attack  the  platform  of  St.  Sy- 
piere. Freyre  was  then  to  assail  that  of  Calvinet, 
r.nd  Ponsonby's  dragoons  following  cIofc  were  to 
connect  that  general's  left  with  Beresford's  column. 
Meanwhile  lord  EdwaVd  Somerset's  hustars  were 
to  move  up  the  left  of  the  Ers,  while  Vivian's  caval- 
ry moved  up  the  right  of  that  river,  each  destined 
to  observe  Berton's  cavalry,  which  havii'.g  possess- 
ion of  the  bridges  of  Bordes  and  3Iontaudran  higher 
up,  could  pass  from  the  right  bank  to  the  left,  and 
destroying  the  bridge  fall  upon  the  head  of  Beres- 
ford's troops  while  in  march. 

BATTLE    OF    TOULOUSE. 

The  10th  of  April,  at  two  o'clock  in  the  morning, 
the  light  division  passed  the  Garonr.e  by  the  bridge 
at  Seilh,  and  about  six  o'clock  the  whole  army  mov- 
ed forwards  in  the  order  assigned  for  the  ilirlerent 
columns.  Picton  and  Alten,  on  the  right,  drov; 
the  French  advanced  posts  behind  the  works  at  the 
bridge  over  the  canal.  P'reyre's  columns,  marching 
along  the  Albi  road,  were  cannonaded  by  St.  Pol 
with  two  guns  until  they  had  passed  a  small  stream 
by  tlie  help  of  some  temporary  bridges,  when  the 
French  general  following  his  instructions  retired  to 
the  hornwork  on  the  Calvinet  platform.  Tlie  Span- 
iards were  thus  established  on  the  Pugade,  from 
whence  the  Portuguese  guns  under  major  A  rents- 
child  opened  a  heavy  cannonade  against  Calvinet. 
Meanwhile  Beresford,  preceded  by  the  hussars, 
marched  from  Croix  d'Orade  in  three  columns  abreast. 
Passing  behind  the  Pugade,  through  the  village  of 
3Iontbianc,  he  entered  the  marshy  ground  between 
tlie  Ers  river  and  the  Mont  Rave,  but  he  left  his 
artillery  at  Montblanc,  fearing  to  engage  it  in  that 
deep  and  difUcult  country  under  the  fire  of  an  ene- 
my. Beyond  the  Ers  on  his  left,  Vivian's  cavalry, 
now  under  colonel  Arentschild,  drove  Berton's  horse- 
men back  with  loss,  and  nearly  seized  the  bridge  of 
Bordes,  which  the  French  general  passed  and  des- 
troyed with  difficulty  at  the  last  mom.ent.  How- 
ever the  German  hussars  succeeded  in  gaining  the 
bridge  of  Montaudran  higher  up,  though  it  was  bar- 
ricaded, and  defended  by  a  detachment  of  cavalry 
sent  there  by  Berton,  wl)o  remained  himself  in  po- 
sition near  t]ie  bridge  of  Bordes,  looking  down  the 
left  of  the  Ers. 

While  these  operations  were  in  progress,  general 
Freyre,  who  had  asked  as  a  favour  to  lead  the  battle 
at  Calvinet,  whether  from  error  or  impatience  as- 
sailed the  hornwork  on  that  platlbrm  about  eleven 
o'clock,  and  while  Beresford  was  still  in  march. 
The  Spaniards,  nine  thousand  strong,  moved  in  two 
lines  and  a  reserve,  and  advanced  with  great  resolu- 
tion at  first,  throwing  forwards  their  flunks  so  as  lo 
embrace  the  end  of  the  Calvinet  hill.  The  French 
musketry  and  great  guns  thinned  the  ranks  at  every 


746 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAK    WAR. 


[Book  XXIV. 


BtCj),  yet  closing  upon  their  centre  they  still  ascend- 
ed ilie  hill,  the  formidable  fire  they  were  exposed  to 
incre-asing  in  violeac-e  until  their  rig;ht  wing,  which 
was  also  ralced  from  the  bridge  of  i^latabiau,  unable 
to  endure  t.lie  torment  wavered.  The  leading  ranks 
rusliing  madly  onwards  jumped  for  shelter  into  a 
ItoUow  road,  twenty-five  teet  deep  in  parts,  and  cov- 
ciing  this  part  of  the  French  intrenchmeiits  ;  but 
tli3  leli  wing  and  the  second  line  ran  back  in  great 
disorder,  the  Cantabrian  fusiliers  under  colonel  Le- 
on de  Sicilia  alone  maintaining  their  ground  un- 
der cover  of  a  bank  which  protected  them.  Then 
the  French  came  leaping  out  of  their  works  with 
loud  cries,  and  lining  tlie  edge  of  the  hollow  road 
poured  an  incessant  stream  of  shot  upon  the  help- 
less crowds  entangled  in  the  gulf  below,  while  the 
battery  frouj  tlie  bridge  of  Matabiau,  constructed 
to  rake  this  opening,  sent  its  bullets  from  flank  to 
flank  hissing  through  the  quivering  mass  of  flesh 
and  bones. 

The  .Spanish  generals  rallying  the  troops  who  had 
fled,  led  them  back  again  to  the  brink  of  the  fatal 
hollow,  but  the  frightful  carnaga  below  and  the 
unmitigated  fire  in  front  filled  tliem  with  horror. 
Again  they  fled,  and  again  the  French  bounding 
from  their  trenches  pursued,  whila  several  battal- 
ions sallying  from  the  bridge  of  ALitabiau  and  from 
behind  the  Oalvinet  followed  hard  along  the  road  of 
Albi.  The  country  was  now  cover jd  with  fugitives 
whose  iieadlong  flight  could  not  bi  restrained,  and 
witli  pursuers  whose  numbers  an  i  vehemence  in- 
creased, until  lord  Wellington,  who  was  at  that 
point,  covered  the  panic-stricken  troops  with  Pon- 
Bonby's  cavalry,  and  the  reserve  artillery,  which 
opened  with  great  vigour.  Meanwhile  the  Portu- 
guese guns  on  the  Pugade  never  ceased  firing,  and 
a  brigade  of  the  light  division,  wheeling  to  its  left, 
menaced  the  flank  of  the  victorioLis  French,  who 
immediately  retired  to  their  intrenchments  on  Cal- 
vinet :  but  more  than  fifteen  hundred  Spaniards 
had  been  killed  or  wounded,  and  their  defeat  was 
not  the  only  misfortune. 

General  Picton,  regardless  of  his  orders,  which, 
his  temper  on  such  occasions  being  known,  were 
especially  given,  had  turned  his  false  attack  into  a 
real  one  against  the  bridge  of  Jumcaux,  and  the 
enemy  fighting  from  a  work  too  high  to  be  forced 
without  ladders  and  approachable  only  along  an 
open  flat,  repulsed  him  with  a  loss  of  nearly  four 
hundred  men  and  officers:  amongst  the  latter  colo- 
nel Forbes  of  the  forty-fifth  was  killed,  and  general 
Brisbane  who  commanded  the  brigade  was  wound- 
ed. Thus  from  the  hill  of  Pugade  to  the  Garonne 
the  French  had  completely  vindicated  tiieir  posi- 
tion, the  allies  had  suffered  enormously,  and  beyond 
the  Garonne,  although  general  Hill  had  now  forced 
the  first  line  of  intrenchments  covering  8t.  Cyprien 
and  was  menacing  the  second  line,  the  latter  being 
mucli  more  contracted  and  very  strongly  fortified 
could  not  be  stormed.  The  musketry  battle  there- 
fore subsided  for  a  time  ;  but  a  prodigious  cannon- 
ade was  kept  up  along  the  whole  of  the  French  line, 
and  on  the  allies'  side  from  St.  Cyprien  to  Mont- 
blanc,  where  the  artillery  left  by  Beresford,  acting 
in  conjunction  with  tlie  Portuguese  guns  on  the  Pu- 
gade, poured  its  shot  incessantly  against  the  works 
on  the  Oalvinet  platform  :  injudiciously,  it  has  been 
said,  because  the  ammunition  thus  used  for  a  sec- 
ondary ol)jsct  was  afterwards  wanted  when  a  vital 
advantage  might  have  been  gained. 

It  was  now  evident  that  the  victory  must  be  won 

or  lost  by    Deresford,  and  yet   from    J'icton's    error 

lord  Wellington  had  no  reserves  to  enforce  the  de- 

&      cifc'iou-  fur  the  ligiit  division  and  the  ho-ivy  cavalry 


only  remaine  •'  in  hand,  and  these  troops  were  neces- 
sarily retained  to  cover  the  rallying  of  the  Span- 
iards, and  to  protect  the  artillery  employed  to  keep 
the  enemy  in  check.    The  crisis  therefore  approach- 
ed with   all  happy  {)romise  to  the  French  general. 
The  repulse  of  Picton,  the  utter  dispersion  of  the 
Spaniards,  and  the  strength  of  the  second  line  of 
intrenchments  at  St.  Cyprien,  enabled  liiin  to  draw, 
first  Taupin's  v/hole  division,  and  then  one  of  xVla- 
ransin's  brigades  from  that  quarter,  to  reinforce  hie 
battle  on  the  Mont  Rave.    Thus  three  divisions  and 
his  cavalry,  that  is  to  say  nearly  fifteen  thousand 
I  combatants,  were  disposable  for  an  ollbusive  inove- 
!  ment  without  in  any  manner  weakening  the  defence 
j  of  his  works  on  Mont  Rave  or  on  the  canal.     With 
I  this    mass    he    might    have   fallen    u])on  Beresford, 
j  whose  force,  originally  less  than  tiiirteen  thousand 
I  bayonets,  was  cruelly  reduced  as  it  made  slow  and 
j  difficult  way  for  two  miles   through  a  deep  marshy 
country    crossed   and    tangled    with    water-courses. 
j  For  sometimes  moving    in    mass,  sometimes  filing 
under  tlic  French  musketry,  and  always  under  the 
I  fire  of  their  artillery  from  the  Mont  Rave,  without  a 
I  gun  to  reply,  the  length  of  the  column  had  augment- 
1  ed  so  much  at  every  step  from  the  difficulty  of  the 
I  way  that  frequent  halts  were  necessary  to  close  up 
j  the  ranks. 

The  flat  miry  ground  between  the  river  and  the 
j  heights  became  narrower  and  deeper  as  the  troops 
I  advanced,  Berton's  cavalry  was  ahead,  an  impassa- 
ble river  was  on  the  left,  and  three  French  divis- 
ions supported  by  artillery  and  horsemen  overshad- 
owed the  riglit  flank.  Fortune  came  to  their  aid. 
Soult,  always  eyeing  their  march,  had,  when  the 
Spaniards  were  defeated,  carried  Taupin's  division 
to  the  platform  of  St.  Sypiere,  and  supporting  it 
with  a  brigade  of  D'Armagnac's  division  disposed 
the  whole  about  the  redoubts.  From  thence,  after 
a  short  hortative  to  act  vigorously,  he  ordered  'J'au- 
pin  to  fall  on  with  the  utmost  fury,  at  the  same 
time  directing  a  regiment  of  Vial's  cavalry  to  de- 
scend the  heights  by  the  Lavaur  road  and  intercept 
the  line  of  retreat,  while  Berton's  horsemen  assailed 
the  other  flank  from  the  side  of  the  bridge  of  Bordes. 
But  this  was  not  half  of  the  force  which  the  French 
general  might  have  employed.  Taupin's  artillery, 
retarded  in  its  march,  was  still  in  the  streets  of 
Toulouse,  and  that  general  instead  of  attacking  at 
once  took  ground  to  his  right,  waiting  until  Beres- 
ford having  completed  his  flank  march  had  wheeled 
into  lines  at  the  foot  of  tlio  heights. 

Tnupin's  infantry,  unskilfully  arranged  for  action 
it  is  said,  at  last  poured  down  the  hill  ;  but  some 
rockets  discharged  in  good  time  ravaged  the  ranks, 
and  with  their  noise  and  terrible  aj)pearance,  un 
known  before,  dismayed  the  French  soldiers.  Then 
the  British  skirmishers  running  forwards  plied  them 
wiih  a  biting  fire;  and  Lambert's  brigade  of  the 
sixth  division,  aided  by  Anson's  brigade  and  some 
provisional  battalions  of  the  fourth  division — for  it  is 
an  error  to  say  the  sixth  division  alone  re])ulsed  this 
attack — Lambert's  brigade,  I  say,  rushed  forwards 
with  a  terrible  shout,  and  the  French  turning  fled 
back  to  the  upper  ground.  Vial's  horsemen  trotting 
down  the  Lavaur  road  now  charged  on  the  right 
flank  ;  but  the  second  and  third  lines  of  the  sixth 
division  being  thrown  into  squares  rejiulsed  them  ; 
and  on  the  other  flank  general  Cole  had  been  so  sud- 
den in  his  advance  up  the  heights,  that  Ifeiton's 
cavalry  had  no  opportunity  to  charge.  Jjanihcrt  li)l- 
lowing  hard  upon  the  beaten  infantry  in  his  front, 
killed  Taupih,  wounded  a  general  of  brigade,  and 
without  a  check  won  the  summit  of  the  platform, 
his  skirmishers  even  descended  in  pursuit  on  the  ro 


1814.1 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


'47 


verse  slope  ;  and  meanwhile,  on  his  left  general  Cole 
ijieeting  with  I6s3  resistance  had  still  more  rapidly 
gained  tlie  height  at  that  side  :  so  complete  was  the 
rout  that  the  two  redoubts  were  abandoned  from 
panic,  and  the  IVench  with  the  utmost  disorder 
Bought  shelter  in  the  works  of  Sacarin  and  Cambon. 

Soult,  astonished  at  tliis  weakness  in  troops  from 
whom  he  iiad  expected  so  mucli,  and  who  had  just 
before  given  him  assurances  of  their  resolution  and 
conrtdeuce,  was  in  fear  tiiat  Jieresford  jiushing  his 
success  would  seize  the  bridge  of  the  Demoiselles 
on  the  canal.  Wherefore,  covering  the  liigiit  as  he 
could  with  the  remainder  of  Vial's  cavalry,  he  has- 
tily led  D'Armagnac's  reserve  brigade  to  the  works 
of  Sacarin,  checked  the  foremost  British  skirmish- 
ers and  rallied  the  fugitives  ;  Taupin's  guns  arrived 
from  the  town  at  the  same  moment,  and  the  mis- 
chief being  stayed  a  part  of  Travot's  reserve  imme- 
diately moved  to  defend  the  bridge  of  the  Demoi- 
selles. A  fresh  order  of  battle  was  thus  organized  ; 
but  the  indomitable  courage  of  the  British  soldiers 
overcoming  all  obstacles  and  all  opposition,  had  de-  ! 
cided  the  first  great  crisis  of  tlie  hght.  } 

Lambert's    brigade    immediately  wheeled   to    its  I 
right  across  the  platform  on  tlie  line  of  the  Lavaur 
Toa.d,  menacing  the  flank  of  the  French  on  the  Cal-  i 
vinet  platform,  while    Pack's    Scotcli   brigade    and  j 
Douglas's    Portuguese,  composing    tiie    second  and  ' 
third  lines  of  the  sixth  division,  were  disposed  on  1 
the  right  witb  a  view  to  march  against  the  Colom-  i 
bettc  redoubts  on  the  original  front  of  the  enemy.  } 
And  now  also  the  eighteenth  and  German  hussars,  1 
having  forced  the  bridge  of  Montaudran  on  the  Ers 
river,  came  round  the  south  end  of  the  Mont  Rave, 
where,  in  conjunction  with  the  skirmishers  of  the 
fourth  division,  they  menaced  the  bridge  of  the  De- 
moiselles, from  whence  and  from  the  works  of  Cam- 
bon   and  Sacarin  the   enemy's  guns  played   inces- 
santly. 

The  aspect  and  form  of  the  battle  were  thus  en- 
tirely changed.  The  French  thrown  entirely  on  the 
defensive  occupied  three  sides  of  a  square.  Their 
right  extending  from  the  works  of  Sacarin  to  tlie  re- 
doubts of  Calvlnet  and  Colombette,  was  closely  me- 
naced by  Lambert,  who  was  solidly  posted  on  the 
platform  of  St.  Sypiere,  while  the  redoubts  them- 
selves were  menaced  by  Pack  and  Douglas.  The 
French  left  thrown  back  to  the  bridge-head  at  Ma- 
tabiau  awaited  the  renewed  attack  of  the  Spaniards, 
and  the  whole  position  was  very  strong,  not  exceed- 
ing a  thousand  yards  on  each  side,  with  the  angles 
all  defended  by  formidable  works.  The  canal  and 
c.ty  of  Toulouse,  its  walls  and  intrenched  suburbs, 
oifered  a  sure  refuge  in  case  of  disaster,  while  tlie 
Matabiau  on  one  side,  Sacarin  and  Cambon  on  the 
other,  ensured  the  power  of  retreat. 

In  this  contracted  space  were  concentrated  Vial's 
cavalry,  the  whole  of  Villatte's  division,  one  brigade 
of  Maransin's,  another  of  D'Armagnac's,  and,  with 
the  exception  of  the  regiment  driven  from  the  St. 
Sypiere  redoubt,  the  whole  of  Harispe's  division. 
On  the  allies'  side  therefore  defeat  had  been  staved 
off,  but  victory  was  still  to  be  contended  for,  and 
with  apparently  inadequate  means  ;  for  Picton  being 
Kuccessfully  opposed  by  Daricau  was  so  far  paralyz- 
ed, the  Spaniards  rallying  slowly  were  not  to  be  de- 
pended upon  for  another  attack,  and  there  remained 
only  the  heavy  cavalry  and  the  light  division,  which 
[uTii  Wellington  could  not  venture  to  thrust  into  the 
action  under  pain  of  being  left  without  any  reserve 
in  the  event  of  a  repulse.  The  final  stroke,  there- 
fore, was  still  to  be  made  on  the  Inft,  and  with  a 
very  small  force,  seeing  that  Lambert's  brigade  and 
the   fourth  division  were  necessarilj  employed    to 


keep  in  check  the  French  troops  at  the  bridge  of  the 
Demoiselles,  Cambon,  and  ISacarin.  'I'his  heavy 
mass,  comprising  one  brigade  of  '1  ravot's  reserve, 
the  half  of  D'Armagnac's  division,  and  all  of  Tau- 
pin's, together  with  the  regiment  belonging  to  Ha- 
rlspe  which  had  abandoned  the  forts  of  St.  Sypicre, 
was  commanded  by  general  Clauzel,  who  disposed 
the  greater  i^art  in  aavance  of  the  intrenchments,  as 
if  to  retake  the  oti'ensive. 

Such  was  the  state  of  affairs  about  half  past  two 
o'clock,  when  Beresford  renewed  tlie  action  with 
Pack's  Scotch  brigade,  and  the  Portuguese  of  the 
sixth  division  under  colonel  Douglas.  '1  hese  troops, 
ensconced  in  the  hollow  Lavaur  read  en  Lambert's 
right,  had  been  hitherto  well  protected  from  the  fire 
of  the  French  works;  but  now  scrambling  up  the 
steep  banks  of  that  road,  they  wheeled  to  their  left 
by  wings  of  regiments  as  they  could  get  out,  and 
ascending  the  heights  by  the  slope  facing  the  Ers, 
under  a  wasting  fire  of  cannon  and  musketry,  car- 
ried all  the  French  breast-works  and  the  Colombette 
and  Calvinet  redoubts.  It  was  a  surprising  action 
when  the  loose  disorderly  nature  of  the  attack,  im- 
posed by  the  difficulty  of  the  ground,  is  considered  ; 
but  the  French,  although  they  yielded  at  fir&t  to  the 
thronging  rush  of  the  British  trcops,  scon  rallied 
and  came  back  with  a  reflux.  Their  cannonade  was 
incessant,  their  reserves  strong,  and  the  struggle 
became  terrible.  For  Harispe,  who  commanded  in 
person  at  this  part,  and  under  whom  the  French 
seemed  always  to  fight  with  redoubled  vigour, 
brought  up  fresh  men,  and  surrounding  the  two  re- 
doubts with  a  surging  multitude  absolutely  broke 
into  the  Colombette,  killed  or  wounded  four-fifths  of 
the  forty-second,  and  drove  the  rest  out.  The  Brit- 
ish troops  were  however  supported  by  the  seventy- 
first  and  ninety-first,  and  the  whole  clinging  to  the 
brow  of  the  hill  fought  with  a  wonderlul  courage 
and  firmness,  until  so  many  men  had  fallen  that 
their  order  of  battle  was  reduced  to  a  thin  line  of 
skirmishers.  Some  of  the  British  cavalry  then  rode 
up  from  the  low  ground  and  attempted  a  charge,  but 
they  were  stopped  by  a  deep  hollow  road,  of  which 
there  were  immy,  and  some  of  the  foremost  troopers 
tumbling  headlong  in  perished.  Meanwhile  the 
combat  about  the  redoubts  continued  fiercely  ;  the 
French,  from  their  numbers,  had  certainly  the  ad- 
vantage ;  but  they  never  retook  the  CaUinet  fort, 
nor  could  they  force  their  opponents  down  from  the 
brow  of  the  hill.  At  last  when  the  whole  of  the 
sixth  division  had  rallied  and  again  assailed  them, 
flank  and  front,  when  their  generals  Harispe  and 
Baurot  had  fallen  dangerously  wounded,  and  the  Co- 
lombette was  retaken  by  the  seventy-ninth,  the  bat- 
tle turned,  and  the  French  finally  abandoned  the 
platform,  falling  back  partly  by  their  right  to  Saca- 
rin, partly  by  their  left  towards  the  bridge  of  Mata- 
biau. 

It  was  now  about  four  o'clock.  The  Spaniards 
during  this  contest  had  once  more  partially  attacked, 
but  they  were  again  put  to  flight,  and  the  French 
thus  remained  master  of  their  intrenchments  in  that 
quarter;  for  the  sixth  division  had  been  very  hardly 
handled,  and  Beresford  halted  to  re-form  his  order  of 
battle  and  receive  his  artillery  .-  it  come  to  him  in- 
deed about  th's  time,  yet  with  great  difficulty  and 
with  little  ammunition  in  consequence  of  the  heavy 
cannonade  it  had  previously  furnished  from  Moni- 
blanc.  However  Soult,  seeing  that  the  Spaniards, 
supported  by  the  light  division,  had  rallied  a  fourth 
time,  that  Picton  again  menaced  the  bridge  of  Ju- 
meaux  and  the  Minime  convent,  while  Beresford, 
master  of  three-fourths  of  .Mont  Rave,  was  now  ad- 
vancing along  the  summit,  deemed  farther  resist- 


748 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


[Book  XXIV 


ance  useless,  and  rolinquished  the  northern  end  of 
the  Calvinet  pliilforin  also.  About  five  o'clock  he 
withdrew  his  whole  army  behind  tiie  canal,  still 
liowever  hol,lin;r  the  advanced  works  of  Sacarin  and 
C'iuiibon.  Lord  VV'ellinp^ton  then  established  the 
Spaniards  in  the  abandoned  works,  and  so  became 
master  of  the  :Mont  Rave  in  all  its  extent. 

Thus  terminated  the  battle  of  Toulouse.  The 
French  had  live  generals  and  perhaps  three  thousand 
men  killed  or  wounded,  and  they  lost  one  piece  of 
artillery.  The  allies  lost  four  generals  and  four 
thousand  six  hundred  and  iifty-nine  men  and  officers, 
of  which  two  thousand  were  Spaniards.  A  lament- 
able spilling  of  blood,  and  a  useless,  for  before  this 
period  Napoleon  had  abdicated  the  throne  of  France 
and  a  provisional  government  was  constituted  at 
Paris. 

Daring  the  night  the  Frencl  general,  defeated 
but  undismayed,  replaced  the  ammunition  expended 
in  the  action,  reorganized  and  augmented  his  field- 
artillery  from  the  arsenal  of  Toulouse,  and  made  dis- 
positions for  fighting  tiie  next  morning  beliind  the 
canal.  Yet  looking  to  the  final  necessity  of  a  re- 
treat, he  wrote  to  Suchet  to  inform  him  of  the  result 
of  the  contest,  an<.  proposed  a  combined  plan  of  ope- 
ration illustrative  of  the  firmness  and  pertinacity  of 
liis  temper.  "March,"  said  he,  "with  the  whole 
of  your  forces  by  Q,uillan  upon  Carcassone,  I  will 
meet  you  there  with  njy  army,  we  can  then  retake 
the  initiatory  movement,  transfer  the  seat  of  war  to 
the  upper  Garonne,  and  holding  on  by  tiie  mountains 
oblige  the  enemy  to  recall  his  troops  from  Bordeaux, 
which  will  enable  Decaen  to  recover  that  city  and 
make  a  diversion  in  our  favour." 

On  the  morning  of  the  11th  he  was  again  ready 
to  fight,  but  tlie  English  general  was  not.  The 
Frencli  position,  within  musket-shot  of  the  walls  of 
Toulouse,  was  still  inexpugnable  on  tiie  northern 
and  eastern  fronts.  l"he  possession  of  Mont  Rave 
was  only  a  preliminary  step  to  the  passage  of  the 
canal  at  the  bridge  of  the  Demoiselles  and  other 
points  above  the  works  of  Sacarin  and  Cambon,  with 
tiie  view  of  tiirowing  the  army  as  originally  design- 
ed on  the  south  side  of  the  town.  But  tliis  was  a 
great  ad'air  requiring  fresh  dispositions,  and  a  fresh 
provision  of  ammunition  only  to  be  obtained  from 
the  park  on  the  other  side  of  tiie  Garonne.  Hence 
to  accelerate  the  preparations,  to  ascertain  the  state 
of  general  HilTs  position,  and  to  give  that  general 
farther  instructions,  lord  Wellington  repaired  on  the 
11th  to  St.  Cyprien  ;  but  tlioagh  he  had  shortened 
his  communications  by  removing  the  pontoon  bridge 
from  Grenade  to  Seilli,  the  day  was  spent  before  tlie 
ammunition  arrived  and  tiie  final  arrangements  for 
the  passage  of  tlie  canal  could  be  couipieted.  The 
attack  was  therelbre  deferred  until  daylight  on  the 
12th. 

Meanwh'le  all  the  light  cavalry  were  sent  np  the 
canal,  to  interrupt  the  communications  with  Suchet 
and  menace  Soult's  retreat  by  tlie  road  leading  to 
Carcassonne.  'J'he  apjiearance  of  these  horsemen  o" 
the  heights  of  St.  Martin,  above  Bazitgis,  together 
with  t!r^  preparations  in  his  front,  taught  Soult  tliat 
lie  could  no  longer  delay  if  he  would  not  be  shut  up 
in  Toi" louse.  Wherefore,  having  terminated  all  his 
arrangements,  he  left  eigiit  pieces  of  heavy  artillery, 
two  generals,  the  gallant  Harispe  being  one,  and  six- 
teen h  mdred  men,  whose  wounds  were  severe,  to 
the  iiumanity  of  the  conquerors;  then  filing  out  of 
the  citf  vvitli  surprising  order  and  abil'ty,  he  made 
a  forced  rnircli  of  twenty-two  miles,  cut  tiie  bridges 
over  the  raiial  and  tiie  uijoer  Ers,  and  the  r2tli  es- 
tai^lished  his  army  at  V lllefranche.  On  the  sane 
day  general  H  ill's  troops  were  pushed  close  to  Bazi- 


eges  in  pursuit,  and  the  light  cavalry,  acting  on  the 
side  of  Montlaur,  beat  the  French  with  the  loss  of 
twenty-five  men  and  cut  off  a  like  number  of  gen 
darmes  on  the  side  of  Revel. 

Lord  Wellington  now  entered  Toulouse  in  triumph, 
the  white  flag  was  displayed,  and,  as  at  Bordeaux, 
a  great  crowd  of  persons  adopted  the  Bourbon  col- 
ours;  but  the  mayor,  faithful  to  his  sovereign,  had 
retired  with  the  French  army.  The  Britisli  gener- 
al, true  to  his  honest  line  of  policy,  did  not  fail  to 
warn  the  Bourbonists  that  their  revolutionary  move- 
ment must  be  at  their  own  risk.  But  in  the  after- 
noon two  officers,  the  English  colonel  Cooke,  and 
the  French  colonel  St.  Simon,  arrived  from  Paris, 
charged  with  the  abdication  of  Napoleon;  tiiey  had 
been  detained  near  Blois  by  the  officiousness  of  the 
police  attending  the  court  of  tlie  empress  Louisa, 
and  the  blood  of  eight  thousand  brave  men  had  ever- 
flowed  the  Mont  Rave  in  consequence.  Nor  did 
their  arrival  immediately  put  a  stop  to  the  war. 
When  St.  Simon,  in  pursuance  of  his  mission,  reach- 
ed Soult's  quarters  on  the  l."3tii,  tiiat  marshal,  not 
without  just  cause,  demurred  to  his  authority,  and 
proposed  to  suspend  hostilities  until  authentic  infor- 
mation could  be  obtained  ii-om  the  ministers  of  the 
emperor:  then  sending  all  his  encumbrances  by  the 
canal  to  Carcassonne,  he  took  a  position  of  observa- 
tion at  Castelnaudari  and  awaited  the  progress  of 
events.  Lord  Wellington  refused  to  accede  to  his 
proposal,  and  as  general  Loverdo,  commanding  at 
Montauban,  acknowledged  the  authority  of  the  pro- 
visional government  and  readily  concluded  an  armis- 
tice, he  judged  that  Soult  designed  to  make  a  civil 
war  and  therefore  marciied  against  him.  The  ]";th, 
the  outposts  were  on  tlie  point  of  engaging  when  the 
duke  of  Dalmatia,  who  had  now  received  official  in- 
formation from  the  chief  of  the  emperor's  start",  noti- 
fied his  adhesion  to  the  new  state  of  afi'airs  in 
France;  and  with  tiiis  honourable  distinction,  that 
he  had  faithfully  sustained  tlie  cause  of  his  great 
monarch  until  the  very  last  moment. 

A  convention  which  included  Suchet's  army  was 
immediately  agreed  upon;  but  that  marshal  had 
previously  adopted  the  white  colours  of  his  own  mo- 
tion, and  lord  Wellington  instantly  trar.smitted  the 
intelligence  to  general  Clintcn  in  Catalonia  and  to 
the  troops  at  Bayonne.  'I'oo  late  it  came  for  both, 
and  useless  battles  were  fought.  'That  at  Barcelona 
has  been  already  described,  but  at  Bayonne  misfor- 
tune and  sufi'ering  had  fallen  upon  one  of  the  brifiht 
est  soldiers  of  the  British  army. 

SALLY  FROM    BAYONNE. 

During  the  progress  of  the  main  army  in  the  inte 
rior,  sir  John  Hope  conducted  the  investment  of 
Bayonne,  with  all  the  zeal,  the  intelligence  and  un- 
remitting vigilance  and  activity  which  the  difficult 
nature  of  the  operation  required.  He  had  gathered 
great  stores  of  gabions  and  fascines  and  platforms, 
and  was  ready  to  attack  the  citadel  when  rumours  of 
:'ie  events  at  Paris  reached  him,  yet  indirectly  ani. 
without  any  official  character  to  warrant  a  formal 
communication  to  the  garrison  without  lord  Wei 
lington's  authority.  These  rumours  were  howcvt 
made  known  at  the  outposts,  and  perhaps  lulled  the 
vigilance  of  the  besiegers;  but  to  such  irregular 
communications,  which  might  be  intendod  to  de- 
ceive, the  governor  naturally  paid  little  attention. 

The  piquets  and  fortified  posts  at  St.  l''tienne 
were  at  this  time  furnished  by  a  brigade  of  the  fifth 
division,  but  from  thence  to  the  extreme  riglit  the 
guards  had  charge  of  the  line,  and  they  had  also  one 
company  in  St.  Eticnne  itself.  General  Hinuber's 
German  brigade  was  encamped  as  a  support  to  the 


1814.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


749 


left,  the  romainder  of  the  first  division  was  encamped 
in  the  rear,  towards  Baucaut.  In  this  state,  about 
one  o'cloeli  in  the  niorninof  of  the  14th,  a  deserter, 
comin?  over  to  general  Hay  who  commanded  tlie 
outpo-sts  that  night,  gave  an  exact  account  of  the 
projected  sally.  The  general,  not  able  to  speak 
Fr.ench,  sent  him  to  general  Hinuber,  who  immedi- 
ately interpreting  the  man's  story  to  general  Hay, 
assembled  his  own  troops  under  arms,  and  transmit- 
ted the  intelligence  to  sir  Joiin  Hope.  It  would 
apjiear  that  Hay,  perhaps  disbelieving  the  man's 
story,  took  no  additional  precautions,  and  it  is  prob- 
able that  neither  the  German  brigade  nor  the  re- 
serves of  the  guards  would  have  been  put  under 
arms  bui  for  the  activity  of  general  Hinuber.  How- 
ever at  three  o'clock  the  French,  commencing  with 
a  false  attack  on  the  left  of  the  Adour  as  a  blind, 
poured  suddenly  out  of  the  citadel  to  the  number  of 
three  thousand  combatants.  They  surprised  the 
piquits,  and  with  loud  shouts  breaking  through  the 
chain  of  posts  at  various  points,  carried  with  one 
rush  the  church,  and  the  wliole  of  the  village  of  St. 
Etienne,  with  the  exception  of  a  fortified  house 
wliich  was  defended  by  captain  Forster  of  the  thir- 
ty-eighth regiment.  Masters  of  every  other  part, 
and  overthrowing  all  who  sto'^d  before  them,  they 
drove  tlse  piquets  and  supports  in  heaps  along  tlie 
Peirehorade  road,  killed  general  Hay,  took  colonel 
Townsend  of  the  guards  prisoner,  divided  the  wings 
of  the  investing  troops,  and  passing  in  rear  of  tlie 
right  threw  the  whole  line  into  confusion.  Then  it 
was  that  Hinuber,  having  his  Germans  well  in  hand, 
moved  up  on  the  side  of  St.  Etienne,  rallied  some  of 
t!ie  fifth  division,  and  being  joined  by  a  battalion  of 
general  Bradford's  Portuguese  from  the  side  of  St. 
Esprit,  bravely  gave  the  counter-stroke  to  the  ene- 
my and  regained  the  village  and  church. 

The  combat  on  the  right  was  at  first  even  more 
disastrong  than  in  the  centre,  neither  the  piquets 
nor  the  reserves  were  able  to  sustain  the  fury  of  the 
assault,  and  the  battle  was  most  confused  and  terri- 
ble ;  for  on  both  sides  the  troops,  broken  into  small 
bodies  by  the  enclosures  and  unable  to  recover  their 
order,  came  dashing  together  in  the  darkness,  fight- 
ing often  with  the  bayonet,  and  sometimes  friends 
encountered,  sometimes  foes :  all  was  tumult  and 
horror.  The  guns  of  the  citadel  vaguely  guided  by 
the  flashes  of  tlie  musketry  sent  their  shot  and  shells 
booming  at  random  through  the  lines  of  fight,  and 
the  gun-boats  dropping  down  the  river  opened  their 
fire  upon  the  flanks  of  the  supporting  columns,  which 
being  put  in  motion  by  sir  John  Hope  on  the  first 
alarm  were  now  coming  up  from  the  side  of  Baucaut. 
Thus  nearly  one  hundred  pieces  of  artillery  were  in 
full  play  at  once,  and  the  shells  having  set  fire  to 
the  fascine  depots  and  to  several  houses,  the  flames 
cast  a  horrid  glare  over  the  striving  masses. 

Amidst  this  confusion  sir  John  Hope  suddenly 
disappeared,  none  knew  how  or  wherefore  at  the 
time,  but  it  afterwards  appeared  that,  having  brought 
up  tlie  reserves  on  tiie  right,  to  stem  the  torrent  in 
that  quarter,  he  pushed  for  St.  Etienne  by  a  hollow 
road  wiiicii  led  cJosc  behind  the  line  of  piquets  ;  the 
French  had  however  lined  both  banks,  and  when  he 
en'l'^avoured  to  return  a  sliot  struck  him  in  tiie  arm, 
wliilo  his  horse,  a  large  one  as  was  necessary  to 
sustain  the  gigantic  warrior,  received  eight  bullets 
end  fell  upon  liis  leg.  His  followers  liad  by  this 
time  escaped  from  the  defile,  but  two  of  them,  cap- 
tain Ilerries  and  iMr.  More,  a  nephew  of  sir  John 
More,  seeing  his  helpless  state  turned  back,  and 
alighting  endeavoured  amidst  the  heavy  fire  of  the 
enemy  to  draw  him  from  beneath  the  horse.  Wliile 
thus  engaged  they  were  both  struck  down  v.'ith  dan- 


gerous wounds,  the  French  carried  them  all  off",  and 
sir  Joiin  Hope  was  again  severely  hurt  in  tiie  foot 
by  an  Englisli  bullet  before  they  gained  the  citadel. 

The  day  was  now  beginning  to  break,  and  tlie  al- 
lies were  enabled  to  act  with  more  unity  und  etie.:t. 
The  Germans  were  in  possession  of  St.  Etienne,  and 
the  reserve  brigades  of  the  guards,  being  properly 
disposed  by  general  Howard,  who  had  succcc(ied  lo 
the  command,  suddenly  raised  a  loud  shout,  and  run- 
ning in  upon  the  French  drove  them  back  into  tlie 
works  with  such  slaughter  that  their  own  writers 
admit  a  loss  of  one  general  and  more  than  nine  hun- 
dred men.  But  on  tiie  British  side  general  Stopford 
was  wounded,  and  the  whole  loss  was  eight  hundred 
and  thirty  men  and  oflicers.  Of  these  more  than 
two  hundred  were  taken,  besides  the  commander-in- 
chief;  and  it  is  generally  acknowledged  that  captain 
Forster's  firm  defence  of  the  fortified  house  first, 
and  next  the  readiness  and  gallantry  with  which 
general  Hinuber  and  his  Germans  retook  St.  Eti- 
enne, saved  the  allies  from  a  very  terrible  disaster. 

A  few  days  after  this  piteous  event  the  conven- 
tion made  with  Soult  became  known  and  hostilities 
ceased. 

All  the  French  troops  in  the  south  were  now  re- 
organized in  one  body  under  the  command  of  Suchet ; 
but  they  were  so  little  inclined  to  acquiesce  in  the 
revolution,  that  prince  Polignac,  acting  for  the  duke 
of  Angouleme,  applied  to  the  British  commissary- 
general  Kennedy  tor  a  sum  of  money  to  quiet  them. 

The  Portuguese  ai-my  returned  to  Portugal.  The 
Spanish  army  to  Spain,  the  generals  being,  it  is 
said,  inclined  at  first  to  declare  for  the  cortez  against 
the  king;  but  they  were  diverted  from  their  purpose 
by  the  influence  and  authority  of  lord  Wellington. 

The  British  infantry  embarked  at  Bordeaux,  some 
for  America,  some  for  England,  and  tlie  cavalry 
inarching  through  France  took  shipping  at  Bou- 
logne. 

Thus  the  war  terminated,  and  with  it  all  remem- 
brance of  the  veteran's  services. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

GENKRAL   OBSERVATIONS  AND    REFLECTIONS. 

Marshal  Soult  and  general  Thouvenot  have 
been  accused  of  fighting  with  a  full  knowledge  of 
Napoleon's  abdication.  This  charge,  circulated 
originally  by  the  Bourbon  party,  is  utterly  unfound- 
ed. The  extent  of  the  information  conveyed  to 
Thouvenot  through  the  advanced  posts  has  been  al- 
ready noticed  ;  it  was  not  sufficiently  authentic  to 
induce  sir  John  Hope  to  make  a  forma!  cominunici- 
tion,  and  the  governor  could  only  treat  it  as  an  idle 
story  to  insult  or  to  deceive  him,  and  bafiie  his  de- 
fence by  retarding  his  counter-operations  while  tiie 
works  tor  the  siege  were  advancing.  J'or  how  un- 
likely, nay  impossible,  must  it  have  appeared,  that 
the  emperor  Napoleon,  whose  victories  at  Montmi- 
rail  and  Champaubert  were  known  before  the  close 
investment  of  Bayonne,  should  have  been  deprived 
of  his  crown  in  the  space  of  a  few  weeks,  and  the 
stupendous  event  be  only  hinted  at  the  outposts  with- 
out any  relaxation  in  tiie  preparations  for  tlie  siege 

As  false  and  unsubstantial  is  the  cliarge  against 
Soult. 

The  acute  remark  of  an  English  military  writer, 
that  if  the  duke  of  Dalmatia  had  known  of  the  peace 
before  he  t()uglit,  he  would  certainly  have  annouiiccd 
it  after  the  battle,  were  it  only  to  maintain  himself 
in  that  city  and  claim  a  victory,  is  unanswtrabla  . 


750 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


I  Book  XXIV. 


but  there  arc*  direct  proofs  of  the  falsehood  of  the 
accusation.  How  was  the  intelligence  to  reach 
him  !  It  was  not  until  the  7th  tliat  the  provisional 
government  wrote  to  liim  from  Paris,  and  the  bearer 
could  not  have  readied  Toulouse  under  three  days 
even  by  the  most  direct  way,  which  was  tliroujjh 
Miint-uutau.  Now  the  allies  were  in  possession  of 
tiiat  road  on  the  -Ith,  and  on  the  9th  the  French  ar- 
my was  acvucvily  invested.  The  intelligence  from 
Paris  must  therefore  have  reached  the  allies  first,  as 
in  fact  it  did,  and  it  was  not  .Soult,  it  was  lord  Wel- 
lington who  commenced  the  battle.  The  charge 
would  tlierefore  bear  more  against  the  English  gen- 
eral, who  would  yet  have  been  the  most  insane  as 
well  as  the  wickedest  of  men  to  have  risked  his  ar- 
my and  iiis  fame  in  a"  battle  where  so  many  obsta- 
cles seemed  to  deny  success.  He  also  was  the  per- 
son of  all  others  called  upon  by  honour,  gratitude, 
justice  and  patriotism,  to  avenge  the  useless  slaugh- 
ter of  his  soldiers,  to  proclaim  the  infamy  and  seek 
the  punisiiment  of  his  inhuman  adversary. 

Did  he  ever  by  word  or  deed  countenance  the  cal- 
umny ] 

Lord  Aberdeen  after  the  passing  of  the  English 
reform  bill,  repeated  the  accusation  in  the  house  of 
lords,  and  reviled  the  minister  for  being  on  amicable 
political  terms  with  a  man  capable  of  such  a  crime. 
Lord  Wellington  rose  on  the  instant  and  emphati- 
cally declared  that  marshal  Soult  did  not  know,  and 
that  it  was  impossible  he  could  know  of  the  emper- 
or's abdication  when  he  fought  the  battle.  "  The  de- 
testable distinction  of  sporting  with  men's  lives  by 
wholesale,  attaches  to  no  general  on  the  records  of 
history,  save  the  Orange  William,  the  murderer  of 
Glencoe.  And  though  marshal  Soult  had  known  of 
the  emperor's  abdication  he  could  not  for  that  have 
been  justly  placed  beside  that  cold-blooded  prince 
who  fought  at  St.  Denis  with  the  peace  of  Nimeguen 
in  his  pocket,  because  •'  he  would  not  deny  himself 
a  safe  lesson  in  his  trade  " 

The  French  marshal  was  at  the  head  of  a  brave 
army,  and  it  was  impossible  to  know  whether  Napo- 
leon had  abdicated  voluntarily  or  been  constrained. 
The  autliority  of  such  men  as  Talleyrand,  Fouche 
and  other  intriguers,  forming  a  provisional  govern- 
ment self-instituted  and  under  the  protection  of  for- 
eign bayonets,  demanded  no  respect  from  Soult.  He 
had  even  the  right  of  denying  the  emperor's  legal 
|:ower  to  abdicate.  He  had  the  right,  if  he  thought 
himself  strong  enough,  to  declare,  that  he  v.-^uld  not 
suffer  the  throne  to  become  tlie  plaything  of  foreign 
invaders,  and  that  he  would  rescue  France  even 
though  Napoleon  yielded  the  crown.  In  line,  it  was 
a  question  of  patriotisnr.  and  of  calculation,  a  na- 
tional question  which  the  general  of  an  army  had 
a  right  to  decide  for  himself,  having  reference  alwaye 
to  the  real  will  and  desire  of  the  people  at  large. 

It  was  in  this  liglit  that  Soult  viewed  the  matter, 
even  after  tiie  battle  and  when  he  had  seen  colonel 
St.  Simon. 

Writing  to  Talleyrand,  on  the  2'^d  of  April,  he 
says:  "The  circumstances  which  preceded  my  act 
of  adhesion  are  so  extraordinary  as  to  create  aston- 
ishment. The  7th,  the  provision^.l  government  in- 
formed me  of  the  events  which  had  happened  since 
the  1st  of  April.  The  6th  and  7th,  count  Dupont 
wrote  to  me  on  the  same  subject.  On  the  Hth,  the 
fluke  of  Foltre,  in  his  quality  of  war  minister,  gave 
me  notice,  timt  having  left  the  mil'tary  cipher  at 
Paris  ne  would  immediately  fiirward  to  me  another. 
The  9th,  the  prince  IJerthier,  vice-constable  and  ma- 
jor-general, wrote  to  me  from  Fontaineli^au,  trans- 
mitting tiie  copy  of  a  convention  and  nrmistice 
which   had  been  arranged  at   Paris  w'h    : -.3  allied 


powers  ;  hf'demanded  at  the  same  time  a  state  of 
the  force,  alid  condition  of  my  army  :  but  neitlier  tlie 
prince  nor  the  duke  of  Feltre  mentioned  events;  we 
had  then  only  knowledge  of  a  proclamation  of  the 
empress,  dated  the  'M,  which  foi'hade  us  to  recognize 
any  thing  coming  from  Paris. 

'■•  The  10th,  I  was  attacked  near  Toulouse  by  the 
v;hole  allied  army  under  the  orders  of  lord  Welling- 
ton. This  vigorous  action,  where  the  t'rench  army, 
the  weakest  by  half,  showed  all  its  worth,  cost  the 
allies  from  eight  to  ten  thousand  men  :  lord  Wel- 
lington might  perhaps  have  dispensed  with  it. 

"The  12th,  I  received  through  the  English  the 
first  hint  of  the  events  at  Paris.  I  proposed  an  ar- 
mistice, it  was  refused;  I  renewed  tlie  demand,  it 
was  again  refused.  At  last  I  sent  count  Gazan  to 
Toulouse,  and  my  reiterated  proposal  for  a  suspen- 
sion of  arms  was  accepted  and  signed  the  18th,  the 
armies  being  then  in  the  presence  of  each  other. 
The  19th,  I  ratified  this  convention,  and  gave  my 
adhesion  to  the  re-establishment  of  Louis  XVllI. 
And  upon  this  subject  I  ought  to  declare  that  I 
sought  to  obtain  a  suspension  of  arms  before  I  man 
ifested  my  sentiments  in  order  that  my  will  and  tliat 
of  the  army  should  be  free  :  that  neither  France 
nor  posterity  should  have  the  power  to  eay  it  was 
torn  from  us  by  force  of  arms.  To  follow  only  the 
will  of  the  nation  was  a  homage  I  owed  to  my  coun 
try." 

The  reader  will  observe  in  the  above  letter  certain 
assertions,  relative  to  the  numbers  of  the  contending 
armies  and  the  loss  of  the  allies,  which  are  at  va- 
riance with  the  statements  in  this  history  ;  and  this 
loose  but  common  mode  of  assuming  the  state  of  an 
adverse  force  has  been  the  groundwork  <br  great  ex- 
aggeration by  some  French  writers,  who  strangely 
enough  claim  a  victory  for  the  French  army,  although 
the  French  general  himself  made  no  such  claim  at 
the  time,  and  so  far  as  appears  has  not  done  so  since. 

Victories  are  determined  by  deeds  and  their  con- 
sequences. By  this  test  we  shall  know  who  won 
the  battle  of  'I'oulouse. 

Now  all  persons,  French  and  English,  who  have 
treated  the  subject,  including  the  generals  on  both 
sides,  are  agreed,  that  Soult  fortified  Toulouse,  the 
canal  and  the  Mont  Rave  as  positions  of  battle  ; 
tiiat  he  was  attacked,  tliat  Taupin's  division  was 
beaten,  that  the  Mont  Rave  witli  all  its  redoubts 
and  intrcnch'.nents  fell  into  the  allies'  power.  Fi- 
nally, that  the  French  army  abandoned  Toulouse, 
leaving  there  three  wounded  generals,  sixteen  hun- 
dred men,  several  guns  and  a  quantity  of  stores  at 
the  disor'^tion  of  their  adversaries:  and  this  with- 
out any  fresh  forces  having  joined  the  allies,  or  any 
remarkable  event  afiecting  the  operations  happening 
elsewhere. 

Was  Toulouse  worth  preserving]  Was  tlie  aban- 
donment of  it  forced  or  voluntary  I  Let  the  French 
general  speak"!  "I  have  intrenched  the  suburb  of 
St.  (!yprien  which  forms  a  good  bridge-head.  'I'lie 
enemy  will  not,  I  think,  attack  me  there  unless  he 
desires  to  lose  a  part  of  his  army.  Two  nights  ago 
he  made  a  demonstration  of  passing  the  (»Mrf)nne 
two  leagues  above  the  city,  but  he  will  probably  try 
to  pass  it  below,  in  which  case  I  will  attack  him 
whatever  his  force  may  be,  because  it  is  of  the  ut- 
most importance  to  me  not  to  be  cut  olf  from  Mon- 
tnuban,  where  I  have  made  a  bridg(>-liead.  ...  1 
think  the  enemy  will  not  move  on  your  side  unlesa 
I  move  that  way  first,  and  I  am  determined  to  avoid 
that  as  long  as  I  can.  ...  If  I  could  remain  a 
month  on  the  Garonne,  I  should  be  able  to  put  six 
or  eight  thousand  conscripts  into  the  ranks  who  now 
embarrass  me,  and  who  want  arms,  which  1  expect 


I 


1814.J 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR 


751 


with  great  impatience  from  Pcrpigna"  ...  I  am 
resolved  to  deliver  the  battle  near  Toulouse  what- 
eter  may  be  the  superiority  of  the  enemy.  In  this 
view  1  have  fortilied  a  position,  which,  supported 
by  the  town  and  the  canal,  furnishes  me  with  a  re- 
trenched camp  susceptible  of  detence.  ...  I  have 
received  the  unhappy  news  of  the  enemy's  entrance 
into  Paris.  Tliis  misfortune  strengthens  my  deter- 
mination to  defend  Toulouse  whatever  may  happen. 
The  preservation  of  a  place  which  contains  estab- 
lishments of  all  kinds  is  of  the  utmost  importance 
to  us,  but  if  unhappily  I  am  ibrced  to  quit  it,  my 
movements  will  naturally  bring  me  nearer  to  you. 
In  tliat  case  you  cannot  sustain  yourself  at  Perpig- 
nan  because  the  enemy  will  inevitably  follow  me. 
.  .  .  The  enemy  appears  astonished  at  the  deter- 
mination I  have  taken  to  defend  Toulouse.  Four 
days  ago  he  passed  the  Garonne  and  has  done  no- 
thing since;  perha|')s  the  bad  weather  is  the  cause." 

From  these  extracts  it  is  clear  that  Soult  resolved 
if  possible  not  to  fall  back  upon  Suchet,  and  was  de- 
termined even  to  fight  for  the  preservation  of  his 
communications  with  Montauban:  yet  he  finally  re- 
signed this  important  object  for  the  more  important 
one  of  defjnding  Toulouse.  And  so  intent  upon  its 
preservation  was  he,  that  having  on  the  25th  of 
March  ordered  all  the  stores  and  artillery  not  of  im- 
mediate utility  to  be  sent  away,  lie  on  the  2d  of 
April  forbade  lurther  progress  in  that  work  and  even 
had  those  tilings  already  removed  brought  back. 
Moreover  he  very  clearly  remarks  that  to  abandon 
the  city  and  retreat  towards  Suchet  will  be  the 
signs  and  consequences  of  a  defeat. 

These  points  being  fixed,  we  find  him,  on  the 
evening  of  the  10th,  writing  to  the  same  general 
thus: 

"  The  battle  which  I  announced  to  you  took  place 
to-day,  tiie  enemy  has  been  horribly  maltreated,  but 
he  succeeded  in  establishing  himself  upon  a  position 
which  1  occupied  to  the  right  of  Toulouse.  The 
general  of  division,  Taupin,  has  been  killed,  general 
Harispe  has  lost  his  foot  by  a  cannon-ball,  and  three 
generals  of  brigade  are  wounded.  I  am  prepared  to 
recommence  to-morrow,  if  the  enemy  attacks ;  but 
I  do  not  believe  I  can  stay  in  Toulouse  ;  it  might 
even  happen  that  I  shall  be  forced  to  open  a  passage 
to  get  out." 

On  the  11th  of  April  he  writes  again  : 

"  As  I  told  you  in  my  letter  of  yesterday,  I  am  in 
the  necessity  of  retiring  from  Toulouse,  and  I  fear 
being  obliged  to  fight  my  way  at  Bazieges  where 
the  enemy  is  directing  a  column  to  cut  my  commu- 
nications. To-morrow  I  will  take  a  position  at  Vil- 
lefranche,  because  I  have  good  hope  that  this  obsta- 
cle will  not  prevei't  my  passing." 

To  the  minister  of  war  he  also  writes  on  the 
11th  : 

"  To-day  I  rest  in  position.  If  the  enemy  attacks 
me  I  will  defend  myself.  1  have  great  need  to  re- 
plenish my  means  before  I  [)ut  the  army  in  march, 
vet  I  believe  that  in  the  coming  nigiit  I  shall  be 
forced  to  abandon  Toulouse,  and  it  is  probable  I 
shall  direct  my  movements  so  as  to  rally  upon  the 
troops  of  the  duke  of  Albufera." 

Soult  lays  no  claim  here  to  victory.  He  admits 
that  all  tlie  events  previously  indicated  by  iiim  as 
the  consequences  of  defeat  were  fulfilled  to  the  let- 
ter;  that  is  to  say,  the  loss  of  the  position  of  bat- 
tla,  the  consequ:Mit  evacuation  of  the  city,  and  tlie 
march  to  join  Suchet.  On  tiie  other  hand,  lord  Wel- 
lington clearly  obtained  all  that  he  sought.  He  de- 
sired to  pass  the  Garonne,  and  he  did  pass  it;  he 
desired  to  win  the  position  and  works  of  .Mont  Rave, 
and  he  did  win  them  ;  he  desired  to  enter  Toulouse, 


and  he  did  enter  it  as  a  conque'  t  at  the  head  of  his 
troop's. 

Amongst  the  French  writers  who  (without  deny- 
ing these  facts)  lay  claim  to  a  victory,  (Jhouinara  i8 
most  deserving  of  notice.  This  gentleman,  known 
as  an  able  engineer,  with  a  praiseworthy  di-sire  to 
render  justice  to  the  great  capacity  of  marshal  Soult, 
shows  very  clearly  that  his  genius  would  have  shone 
in  this  campaign  with  fiir  greater  lustre  if  marshal 
Suchet  had  adopted  his  plans  and  sni)ported  h.im  in  a 
cordial  manner.  IJut  Choumara,  heated  by  his  sub- 
ject, comjdetes  the  picture  by  a  crownii,g  victory 
at  Toulouse,  which  the  marshal  himself  ajij  ears  not 
to  recognize.  The  work  is  a  very  valuable  histori 
cal  document  with  respect  to  the  disjrutes  between 
Soult  and  Suchet,  but  with  respect  to  the  battle  of 
Toulouse  it  contains  grave  errors  as  to  facts,  and 
the  inferences  are  untenable,  though  the  premises 
were  admitted. 

The  substance  of  Choumara's  argumoi:t  is,  that 
the  position  of  Toulouse  was  of  the  nature  of  a  for- 
tress. That  the  canal  was  the  real  position  of  bat- 
tle, the  Mont  Rave  an  outwork,  the  loss  of  which 
weighed  little  in  the  balance,  because  the  Frei.ch 
army  was  victorious  at  Calvinet  against  the  Span- 
iards, at  the  convent  of  the  Minimes  against  the 
light  division,  at  the  bridge  of  Jumcaux  against 
Picton,  at  St.  Cyprien  against  general  Hill.  Fi- 
nally, that  the  French  general  certainly  won  the  vic- 
tory because  he  olfered  battle  the  next  day  and  did 
not  retreat  from  Toulouse  until  the  following  night. 

Now  admitting  that  all  these  facts  were  establish- 
ed, the  fortress  was  still  taken. 

But  the  facts  are  surprisingly  incorrect.  For 
first,  marsh.al  Soult  himself  tells  Suchet  that  the 
Mont  Rave  was  his  position  of  bailie,  and  that  the 
town  and  the  canal  svjiporled  it.  Nothing  could 
be  more  accurate  than  this  description.  For  when 
he  lost  the  IMont  Rave,  the  town  and  tlie  canal  en- 
abled him  to  rally  his  army  and  take  measures  for  a 
retreat.  But  the  loss  of  tlie  Mont  Rave  rendered 
the  canal  untenable:  why  else  was  Toulouse  aban- 
doned !  That  the  line  of  the  canal  was  a  more  li'r- 
midable  one  to  attack  in  front  thrn  the  JMont  Rave 
is  true,  yet  that  did  not  constitute  it  a  position;  it 
was  not  necessary  to  attack  it,  except  partially  at 
Sacarin  and  Cambon  and  the  bridge  cf  the  Demoi- 
selles :  those  points  once  forced  and  the  canal  would, 
with  the  aid  of  the  Mont  Rave,  have  helped  to  keep 
the  French  in  Toulouse  as  it  had  before  liel[)ed  to 
keep  the  allies  out.  Lord  Wellington,  once  estab- 
lished on  the  south  side  of  the  city  and  lidding  the 
Pech  David,  could  have  removed  the  bridge  from 
Seilh  to  Portet,  above  Toulouse,  thus  shortening  and 
securing  his  communication  with  Hill:  the  French 
army  must  then  have  surrerdered,  or  br^ken  out,  no 
easy  matter  in  such  a  difiicnlt  and  strangled  country. 
The  Mont  Rave  was  therciiire  not  only  the  position 
of  battle,  it  was  also  the  key  of  the  position  behind 
the  canal;  and  Choumara  is  [)]aced  in  this  dilemma 
He  must  admit  the  allies  won  the  figlst,  or  coTifestt 
the  main  position  was  so  badly  chosen  that  a  slight 
reverse  at  an  outwork  was  sufficient  to  make  the 
French  army  abandon  it  at  every  other  point. 

But  were  the  French  victorious  at  every  other 
point l  Against  the  Spaniards  they  were,  and  Pic 
ton  also  was  repulsed.  'J"he  order  of  movements  for 
the  battle  proves  indeed  tl.at  this  general's  attack 
!  was  intended  to  be  a  false  one  ;  he  disobeyed  his  or- 
ders however  and  one  of  his  brigades  was  repulsed  • 
but  to  check  one  brigade  witli  a  loss  of  three  or  four 
hundred  men.  is  a  small  matter  in  a  bisttle  where 
more  than  eighty  thousand  combatants  were  en- 
ffnged. 


''52 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR     WAR. 


Book  XXIV. 


The  light  division  made  a  demonstrntion  against 
the  convent  of  the  Minimfos  and  notliing  more.  Its 
OSS  on  the  wliole  d;iy  was  only  fifty-six  men  and 
oilicers,  anil  no  French  veteran  of  the  Peninsula  but 
Would  laujh  at  the  notion  that  a  real  attack  by  that 
matchless  division  could  be  so  stopped. 

It  is  said  the  exterior  line  of  intrenchments  at  St. 
Cyprien  was  occupied  with  a  view  to  offensive  move- 
niJuts,  and  to  prevent  the  allies  from  establishing 
batteries  to  rake  the  line  of  the  canal  from  that  side 
ot'  the  Garonne  ;  but  whatever  may  have  been  the 
object,  general  Hill  got  possession  of  it,  and  was  so 
far  victorious.  He  was  ordered  not  to  assail  the 
second  line  seriously;  and  he  did  not,  for  his  whole 
loss  scarcely  exceeded  eighty  men  and  officers. 

From  these  undeniable  facts,  it  is  clear  that  the 
French  gained  an  advantage  against  Picton,  and  a 
marked  success  against  the  Spaniards  ;  but  Beres- 
fbrd's  attack  was  so  decisive  as  to  counterbalance 
these  failures,  and  even  to  put  the  defijated  Spaniards 
in  possession  of  the  height  tliey  had  originally  con- 
tended for  in  vain. 

Choumara  attributes  Beresford's  success  to  Tau- 
pin's  errors  and  to  a  vast  superiority  of  numbers  on 
t!ie  side  of  the  allies.  "  Fifty-three  thousand  infan- 
try, more  than  eight  thousand  cavalry,  and  a  reserve 
of  eighteen  thousand  men  of  all  arms,  opposed  to 
twenty-five  thousand  French  infantry,  two  thousand 
live  hundred  cavalry,  and  a  reserve  of  seven  thousand 
conscripts,  three  thousand  of  which  were  unarmed." 
Such  is  the  enormous  disproportion,  assumed  on  the 
authority  of  general  Vaudoncourt. 

Now  the  errors  of  Taupin  may  have  been  great, 
and  his  countrymen  are  the  best  judges  of  his  de- 
merit;  but  the  numbers  here  assumed  are  most  in- 
accurate. The  imperial  muster-rolls  are  not  of  a 
.f'.ter  date  than  December,  1813,  yet  an  official  table 
of  the  organization  of  Soult's  army,  published  by  the 
French  military  his'^orian  Kock,  gives  thirty-»w: 
thousaiid  six  hundred  and  thirty-five  combatants  en 
t!ie  lOth  of  JMarch.  Of  these,  in  round  numbers, 
twenty-eight  thousand  six  hundred  were  infantry, 
two  thousand  seven  hundred  cavalry,  and  five  thou- 
Rand  seven  hundred  were  artillery-men,  engineers, 
miners,  sap[)ers,  gendarmes  and  military  workmen. 
Notliing  is  said  of  the  reserve  division  of  conscripts 
commanded  by  general  Travot ;  but  general  Vaudon- 
court's  table  of  the  same  army,  on  the  1st  of  April, 
adopted  by  Choumara,  supplies  the  deficicncj'.  The 
conscripts  are  there  set  down  seven  tiiousand  two 
hundred  and  sixty-seven,  and  this  cipher  being  add- 
ed to  Kock's,  g':ves  a  total  of  forty-three  thousand 
nine  hundred  lighting  men.  The  loss  in  combats 
and  marches  from  the  lOth  of  March  to  the  1st  of 
April  must  be  deducted  ;  but  on  tlie  other  hand  we 
find  Soult  informing  the  minister  of  war,  on  the  7th 
of  March,  that  tiir?o  thousand  soldiers  dispersed  by 
the  battle  of  Orthez  v;ere  still  wandering  behind  the 
army:  the  greatest  part  must  have  joined  before  the 
battle  of  Toulouse.  There  wus  also  the  regular  gar- 
rison of  that  city,  composed  of  the  depots  of  several 
regiments  and  the  urban  guards,  all  under  Travot. 
Thus  little  less  than  fifty  thousand  men  were  at 
Soult's  disposal. 

Let  twelve  thousand  be  deducted  for,  1st.  the  ur- 
ban guard  which  was  only  employed  to  maintain  the 
police  of  the  town  ;  2nil.  tlie  unarmed  conscripts  ; 
I'rd.  the  military  workmen  not  brouglit  into  action  ; 
4th.  the  detachments  employed  on  the  flanks  to  com- 
municate with  Lafitte  in  the  Arrit'ge,  and  to  rein- 
fierce  general  Lovcrdo  at  Alontauban.  There  will 
remain  thirty-eight  thousa'nd  fin^hting  men  of  all 
arms.  And  with  a  very  powerful  artillery;  for  we 
find  Soult  after  the  action  directin;:  seven  field-bat- 


teries of  eight  pieces  each  to  attetid  the  army  ;  and 
the  I'rcnch  writers  mention,  beside  this  field-train, 
1st.  fifteen  pieces  which  were  transferred  during  the 
battle  from  the  exterior  line  of  St.  Cyprien  to  the 
nortiiern  and  eastern  fronts  ;  2nd.  four  twenty-four- 
pounders  and  several  sixteen-pounders  mounted  on 
the  walls  of  the  city  ;  3rd.  the  armaments  of  the 
bridge-heads,  the  works  on  Calvinet  and  those  at 
Sacarin  and  Cambon.  Wherefore  not  loss  than 
eighty,  or  perhaps  ninety,  pieces  of  French  artillery 
were  engaged. 

An  approximation  to  the  strength  of  the  French 
army  being  thus  made,  it  remains  to  show  the  num- 
ber of  the  allies,  and  with  respect  to  the  Anglo-Por- 
tuguese troops  that  can  be  done  very  exactly,  not 
by  approximative  estimates,  but  positively  from  the 
original  returns. 

The  morning  state  delivered  to  lord  Wellington 
on  the  lUth  of  April  bears  forty-three  thousand  sev- 
^•n  hundred  and  forty-four  British  and  Germans,  and 
twenty  thousand  seven  hundred  and  ninety-three 
Portuguese,  in  all  sixty-four  thonsard  live  hundred 
and  thirty-seven  soldiers  and  officers  j'resent  under 
arms,  exclusive  of  artillery-men.  Cf  tiiis  number 
nearly  ten  thousand  were  cpvalry.  eleven  hundred 
and  eighty-eight  being  l'urtugl;e^e. 

The  Spanish  auxiliaries,  exclusive  of  Mina'a 
bands  investing  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port,  were,  1st. 
Giron's  Andalusians  and  the  third  army  under  gen- 
eral O'Donel,  fifteen  thousand  ;  2nd.  tiie  Gallicians 
under  general  Freyre,  fourteen  thousand  ;  '.hd.  three 
thousand  Gallicians  under  Morillo,  and  as  many 
more  under  Longa  ;  making  with  the  Anglo-Portu- 
guese a  total  of  ninety  thousand  combatants,  with 
somewhat  more  than  a  hundred  pieces  of  field-artil- 
lery. 

Of  this  force,  O'Donel's  troops  were  in  the  valley 
of  the  Bastan,  Longa's  on  the  upper  Ebro  ;  one  di- 
vision of  Freyre's  Gallicians  was  under  C-arlos  d'Es- 
paiia  in  front  of  Baycnne  ;  one-half  of  Morillo's  di- 
vision was  blockading  Navarreins,  the  other  half 
and  the  nine  thousand  Gallicians  remaining  under 
Freyre,  were  in  front  of  Toulouse.  Of  the  Anglo- 
Portuguese,  the  first  and  fifth  divisions,  and  three 
unattached  brigades  of  infantry  with  one  brigade  of 
cavalry,  were  with  sir  John  Hope  at  Bayonne  ;  tlie 
seventh  division  was  at  Bordeaux  ;  the  household 
brigade  of  heavy  cavalry  was  on  the  march  from  tlie 
Ebro,  where  it  had  passed  the  winter;  the  Portu- 
guese horsemen  were  partly  employed  on  the  com- 
munications in  the  rear,  partly  near  Agon,  where 
sir  .lohn  Campbell  commanding  the  fourth  regiment 
had  an  engagement  on  the  11th  with  the  celebrated 
partisan  Florian.  The  second,  third,  fourth,  sixth 
and  light  divisions  of  infantry,  and  Lecor's  Portu- 
guese, called  the  unattached  division,  were  with 
lord  Wellington,  who  had  also  Bock's,  Ponsonby's, 
Fane's,  Vivian's  and  lord  Edward  Somerset's  brig- 
ades of  cavalry. 

These  troops  on  the  mornirg  of  the  ICth  mustered 
under  arms,  in  round  numbers,  thirty-one  thousand 
infantry,  of  whicii  four  thousand  three  hundred  were 
officers,  sergeants  and  drummers,  leaving  twenty-six 
thousand  and  six  hundred  bayrmets.  Add  twelve 
thousand  Spaniards  under  Freyre  and  Morillo,  and 
we  have  a  total  of  forty-three  thousand  five  hundred 
infantry,  'i'he  cavalry  amounted  to  seven  thousand, 
and  there  were  sixty-flmr  pieces  of  artillery.  Hence 
about  fifty-two  thousand  of  all  ranks  and  arms  were 
in  line  to  fight  thirty-eight  thousand  French  with 
more  than  eiiihty  pieces  of  artillery,  some  being  of 
the  largest  calibre. 

But  of  the  allies  only  twenty-four  thousand  men 
witii  fifty-two  guns  can  be  said  to  have  been  seri- 


i814.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


753 


oiisly  engr,rr,^(l.  Thirteen  thousand  sabres  and  bayo- 
nets with  eitrhteen  f^uns  were  on  the  left  of  the  Ga- 
ronne under  o^erieral  Mill.  Neither  the  lig-ht  divis- 
ion, nor  Poiisonhy's  heavy  cavalry,  nor  Bo'ck's  Ger- 
mans ware  really  engaged'.  \\  herotbre  twelve  thou- 
sand six  hundred  sabres  and  l)ayonets  under  Beres- 
furd,  nine  thousand  bayonets  under  Freyre,  and  two 
thousand  five  hundred  of  Picton's  diviyion  really 
fought  the  battle.  Thus  the  enormous  disproportion 
assumed  by  the  French  writers  disappears  entirely; 
for  if  the  allies  had  t!je  advantage  of  numbers  it  was 
chiefly  in  civiilry,  and  horsemen  were  of  little  avail 
against  the  intrenched  position  and  preponderating 
artille.ry  of  tlie  French  general. 

The  duke  of  Ualmatia's  claim  to  the  admiration 
of  his  countrymen  is  well-founded  and  requires  no 
assumption  to  prop  it  up.  Vast  combinations,  in- 
exiiaustibls  personal  resources,  a  clear  judgment, 
unshaken  firmness  and  patience  under  difficulties, 
unwavering  fidelity  to  his  sovereign  and  his  coun- 
try, are  what  no  man  can  justly  deny  him.  In  tiiis 
celebrated  campaign  of  only  nine  months,  although 
counteracted  by  the  treacherous  hostility  of  many 
of  his  countrymen,  he  repaired  and  enlarged  the 
works  of  five  strong  y)laces,  and  intrenr-hed  five  great 
camps  with  suc!i  works  as  Mariirs  himself  would  not 
have  disdained;  once  he  changed  his  line  of  opera- 
tions and  either  nttacking  or  defending  delivered 
iwenty-tour  battles  and  combats.  Defeated  in  all 
he  yet  fought  tl(.>  last  as  fiercely  as  the  first,  remain- 
ing unconquered  in  mind,  and  still  intent  upon  re- 
•  n:^>A'lng  the  struggle  when  peace  came  to  put  a  stop 
tO  his  prodigious  efiorts.  Those  efibrts  were  fruit- 
less, b£!cnus3  Suohet  renounced  him,  because  the 
people  ot  the  south  were  apathetic  and  fortune  was 
adverse ;  because  he  was  opposed  to  one  of  tlie 
greatest  generals  of  the  world  at  the  head  of  uncon- 
querable troops.  For  v/hat  Alexander's  Macedoni- 
ans were  at  Arbela,  Hannibal's  Africans  at  CannfP^ 
CjBsar's  Romans  at  Pharsalia,  Napoleon's  gunrds  at 
Auiterlitz,  such  were  Wellington's  Britisli  soldiers 
at  this  period.  The  same  men  who  had  fought  at 
Vimiera  and  Talavtva  contended  at  Orthez  and 
Toulouse.  Six  years  of  uninterrupted  success  had 
engrafted  on  their  natural  strength  and  fierceness  a 
confidence  which  rendered  them  invincible.  It  is 
by  this  measure  Soult's  firmness  and  the  constancy 
of  his  army  is  to  be  valued,  and  the  equality  to 
which  he  reluced  his  great  adversary  at  Toulouse 
is  a  proof  of  ability  which  a  judicious  friend  would 
put  forward  ratiier  than  suppress. 

Was  he  not  a  great  general,  who  being  originally 
opposed  on  the  Adour  by  nearly  double  his  own  num- 
bers, for  such  was  tlic  proportion  after  the  great  de- 
tachments were  withdrawn  from  the  French  army 
by  the  emperor  in  January,  did  yet  by  the  aid  of  his 
fortresses,  by  his  able  marches  and  combinations, 
oblige  his  adversary  to  employ  so  many  tniops  for 
blockades,  sieges  and  detached  posts,  that  at  Tou- 
louse his  army  was  scarcely  more  numerous  than 
the  French?  Was  it  nothing  to  have  drawn  Wel- 
lington from  such  a  distance  along  the  frontier,  and 
tovcii  him  at  last,  eit'-.'^r  to  fight  a  battle  under  the 
most  astonishing  disiidvantages  or  to  retrt'at  with 
dislionour'!  And  this  not  because  the  English  gene- 
ral had  committed  any  fault,  but  by  the  force  of  com- 
binations wliich,  embracing  all  the  advantages  of- 
fered by  the  country,  left  him  no  option. 

That  -Soult  made  some  mistakes  is  true,  and  per- 
haps the  most  important  v.'as  that  which  the  empe- 
ror warned  liiin  asfii'S't,  trioufrli  too  late,  the  leavinir 
6'^  rnnny  men  in  B:iyonne.  \{'.  diil  so,  he  says,  he- 
c^Mjse  the  place  could  not  hold  out  fifteen  days  with- 
out the  intrenjIicJ  cr.m'>,  rnd  the  latter  required 
49 


men;  but  the  result  i)roved  Napoleon's  sagacity,  for 
the  allies  made  no  attempt  to  try  the  stremrtii  of  tha 
can)p,  and  on  the  18th  of  March  lord  Wellington 
knew  not  the  real  force  of  the  garrisfin.  Up  to  tint 
period  sir  .lohn  Hope  was  inclined  to  blockade  tisn 
place  only,  and  from  tlie  difiiculty  of  gathering  th>i 
necessary  stores  and  ammuniton  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  Adour,  the  si-ge.  though  resolved  upon,  was 
not  even  commenced  on  the  Mtii  of  April,  when  thut 
bloody  and  most  lamentable  sally  wiis  made.  Jlenre 
the  citadel  could  not,  even  with  a  weaker  garrii^oT' 
have  been  taken  before  the  end  of  Ajjril,  ai.d  Soult 
might  have  had  Abbe's  division  of  six  thcus!:i:il 
good  troops  in  the  battles  of  Orthez  and  'I'oulouso 
Had  Suchet  joined  him,  his  army  would  have  been 
numerous  enough  to  bar  lord  Wellington's  j)rogret8 
altogether,  especially  in  the  latter  position,  lleie 
it  is  impossible  not  to  admire  the  sagacity  of  the 
English  general,  who  from  the  first  was  averse  to 
entering  France,  and  only  did  so  for  a  political  ol- 
ject,  under  the  promise  of  great  reinforcenier.ta 
and  in  tlie  expectation  that  he  should  be  allowed  to 
organize  a  Bourbon  army.  What  could  he  li::ve 
doii«  if  Soult  had  retained  the  twenty  thousand  mea 
drafted  in  January,  or  if  Suchet  had  joined,  or  the 
people  had  taken  arms'! 

How  vvu'l  Soult  chose  his  ground  at  Tculouse, 
how  confidently  he  trusted  that  his  adversary  would 
eventually  pass  the  Garonne  below  and  not  abcv;j 
the  city,  with  what  foresight  he  constructed  thu 
bridge-head  at  iMontauban,  and  prepared  the  difiicul- 
ties  lord  V/ellington  had  to  encounter,  have  been 
already  touched  upon.  But  Choumara  has  assumed 
that  the  English  generoTs  reas-on  for  relinquishing 
the  passnge  of  the  Garonne  at  Portet  on  tiio  nigl.t 
of  the  2'ith,  was  not  the  want  of  pontoons',  but  the 
fear  of  being  attacked  during  the  op;eriition,  ad('uc- 
ing  in  proof  Soult's  orders  to  assail  the  hear's  of  hit* 
columns.  Those  orders  are  however  dated  the  Blfci, 
three  days  after  the  attem[)t,  of  which  Soult  appears 
to  have  known  nothing  at  the  time  ;  they  were  giv- 
en in  the  supposition  that  Ifird  Wellirgtcn  wif-hcd 
to  effect  a  second  j)assage  at  that  point  to  aid  gcn<- 
ral  Hill  while  descending  the  Arrifge.  And  wh.ct 
reason  has  any  man  to  suppose  that  the  same  gene- 
ral and  troops  who  passed  the  Nive  nnd  dcfcDted  n 
like  counter-attack  near  Bnyonne,  would  he  deterred 
by  the  fear  of  a  battle  from  attcmptirg  it  on  tim 
Garonne?  The  passage  of  the  Nive  was  clearly 
more  dangerous,  because  the  communication  with 
the  rest  of  the  army  was  more  difficult,  Soult's  dis- 
posable force  larger,  his  counter-movements  more 
easily  hidden  until  the  moment  of  execution.  At 
Portet  the  passage,  designed  for  the  night  tcason, 
would  have  been  a  surprise,  and  the  whole  army 
drawn  close  to  that  side,  could  have  been  thrown 
over  in  three  or  four  hours  w  ith  the  excej)tion  of  the 
divisions  ('estined  to  keep  the  French  in  check  ut 
St.  Cyjirien.  Soult's  orders  did  not  embrace  such 
an  o|)Crntion.  They  directed  Clauzcl  to  fall  U[<rn 
the  head  of  the  troops  and  crush  them  while  in  thft 
disorder  of  a  later  passage  which  was  expected  and 
watched  for. 

General  Clauzel  having  four  divisions  in  hand 
was  no  doubt  a  formidable  enemy,  and  Soult's  notion 
of  defending  tlic  river  by  a  counter-attack  was  ex- 
cellent in  princifde;  but  to  conceive  is  one  thing, 
to  execute  is  another.  His  orders  were,  as  I  havo 
said,  only  issued  on  the  :31st,  when  Hill  was  across 
both  the  Garonne  and  the  Arrirge.  Lord  Welling- 
ton's design  was  then  not  to  force  a  passage  at,  IV)**- 
t -t,  hut  to  menrco  that  point,  and  really  attack  Si. 
(lyprien  when  Hdl  should  have  descended  the  Ar- 
ricge.     Nor  did  Soult  himself  much   jxpect  Clauzcl 


754 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


[Book  XXIV. 


%voulil  have  any  opportunity  to  attack,  for  in  his  let-  ! 
ter  to  t!ie  minister  of  war  tie  said,  the  positions  be- 
tween the  Arriege  and  tiie  canal  were  all  disativan- 
tngeoiis  to  the  French,  and  his  intention  was  to  fight 
in  Tou'iouse  if  the  allies  approached  from  the  south  ; 
yet  lie  ^till  believed  Hill's  movement  to  be  only  a 
blind,  and  that  ord  Wellington  would  finally  attempt 
the  ()assage  bcljw  Toulouse. 

T!ie  French  general's  views  an^'  measures  were 
profounlly  reasoned,  but  extremei^  simple.  His 
iirstcaie  on  arriving  at  Toulouse  wa.-  to  secure  the 
only  bridge  over  the  Garonne  by  cinipleting  the 
works  of  St.  Cyprien,  which  he  had  begun  while 
the  army  was  still  at  Tarbes.  He  thus  gained  time, 
and  as  he  felt  sure  that  the  allies  could  not  act  in 
the  Arriege  district,  he  next  directed  his  attention 
to  the  bridge-head  of  Montauban  to  secure  a  retreat 
behind  the  Tarn  and  the  power  of  establishing  a 
fresh  line  of  operations.  Meanwhile,  contrary  to 
his  expectations,  lord  Wellington  did  attempt  to  act 
on  tli,e  Arriege,  and  the  French  general,  turning  of 
necessity  in  observation  to  that  side,  intrenched  a 
position  on  tiie  south  ;  soon  liowever  he  had  proof 
that  his  first  notion  was  well-founded,  that  his  ad- 
versary after  losing  much  time  must  at  last  pass  be- 
low Toulouse;  wJiersfore  he  proceeded  with  prodi- 
gious activity  to  fortify  the  Mont  Rave  and  prepare 
a  field  of  battle  on  the  northern  and  eastern  fronts 
of  the  city  These  works  advanced  so  rapidly, 
while  the  wet  weatiier  by  keeping  the  rivers  flooded 
reduced  lord  Wellington  to  inactivity,  that  Soult  be- 
came confident  in  their  strength,  and  being  influ- 
enced als'i  by  the  news  from  Paris,  relinquished  his 
first  desir-n  of  opposing  the  passage  of  the  Garonne 
and  preserving  the  line  of  operations  by  Montauban. 
To  hold  Toulouse  then  became  his  great  object,  nor 
was  he  diverted  from  this  by  the  accident  which  be- 
fell lord  Wellington's  bridge  at  Grenade.  ]Most  wri- 
ters, French  and  English,  have  blamed  him  for  let- 
ting slip  that  opportunity  of  attacking  Beresford. 
It  is  said  that  general  Reille  first  informed  him  of 
the  rupture  of  the  bridge,  and  strongly  advised  him 
to  attack  the  troops  on  the  right  bank.  But  Chou- 
inara  has  well  defended  him  on  that  point:  the  dis- 
tance was  fifteen  miles,  the  event  uncertain,  the 
works  on  the  Mont  Rave  would  have  stood  still 
meanwhile,  and  the  allies  might  perhaps  have  storm- 
ed St.  Cyprien. 

Lord  Wellington  was  however  under  no  alarm  foi 
Beresford,  or  rather  for  himself,  because  each  day 
lie  passed  the  river  in  a  boat  and  remained  on  that 
Bide.  His  force  was  no  less  than  twenty  thousand  in- 
cluding sergeants  and  officers,  principally  British; 
liis  i)osition  was  on  a  gentle  range,  the  flanks  covered 
by  tlie  Ers  and  tlu;  (Jaronne  ;  he  had  eighteen  guns  in 
battery  on  liis  front,  whicji  was  likewise  flanked  by 
thirty  other  pieces  placed  on  t\tc  left  of  the  Garonne. 
Nor  was  he  without  retreat.  He  could  cross  the 
Ers,  and  Soult  dared  not  have  followed  to  any  dis- 
tance lest  the  river  should  subside  and  the  rest  of 
the  army  pans  on  his  rear,  unless,  rf^vcrting  to  his 
original  design  of  operating  by  ]\Io'^:,auban,  he  light- 
ly abandoned  his  now  matured  plan  of  defending 
Toulouse.  Wisely  therefore  he  continued  to  streng- 
then liis  position  round  that  city,  his  combinations 
oeing  all  d'rcned  to  force  the  al''?s  to  attack  him 
lictwevn  t!ie  Ers  and  tiic  Mont  Rave  where  it  seem- 
ed scarcely  possible  to  succeed. 

He  has  been  also  charged  with  this  fault,  that 
lie  did  not  intrench  the  hill  of  Pugade.  Choumara 
holds  tliat  troops  placed  there  would  have  been  en- 
dangered without  adequate  advantage  This  does 
not  seem  conclusive.  'J"he  hil  was  under  the  shot 
of  the  main  hoi^ht,  it  might  have  been  intrenched 


with  works  open  to  the  rear,  and  St  Pol's  brigade 
would  tiius  have  incurred  no  more  danger  tlian  wlien 
placed  there  without  any  intrenchnicnts.  Bereslord 
could  not  have  moved  up  the  left  bai.k  cl'  the  F.rs 
until  these  works  were  carried,  and  this  would  have 
cost  men.  It  is  therefore  probable  that  wtnt  of  time 
caused  Soult  to  neglect  this  advantage.  He  com- 
mitted a  graver  error  during  the  battle  by  falling 
upon  Beresford  with  Tau[)in's  division  only,  when  he 
could  have  employed  D'Armagnac's  and  Villatte'a 
likewise  in  that  attack.  He  should  have  fallen  en 
him  also  while  in  the  deep  country  below,  and  be- 
fore he  had  formed  his  lines  at  the  foot  of  the 
heights.  What  hindered  him  !  Picton  was  rej  uls- 
ed,  Freyre  was  defeated,  the  light  division  was  jto- 
tecting  the  fugitives,  and  one  of  Maransin's  brigades 
withdrawn  from  St.  Cyprien  had  reinforced  the  vic- 
torious troops  on  the  extreme  lell  of  the  Calvinct 
platform.  Berestord's  column,  entangled  in  tl'.3 
marshy  ground,  without  artillery  and  menaced  both 
front  and  rear  by  cavalry,  could  not  lave  resisted 
such  an  overwhelming  mass,  and  lord  ^^'ellington 
can  scarcely  escape  criticism  for  placing  him  in 
that  predicament.         _•, 

A  commander  is  not*  indeed  to  refrain  from  high 
attempts  because  of  their  perilous  nature,  the  great- 
est have  ever  been  the  most  daring,  and  the  English 
general,  who  could  not  remain  inactive  before  Tou- 
louse, was  not  deterred  by  danger  or  difficulty  :  twice 
he  passed  the  broad  and  rapid  Garonne,  and  reckless 
of  his  enemy's  strength  and  skill  worked  his  way  to 
a  crowning  victory.  This  was  hardihood,  great 
ness.  But  in  Beresford's  peculiar  attack  he  did  not 
overstep  the  rules  of  art,  he  hurtled  .-igainst  tliem  : 
and  that  he  was  not  damaged  by  the  slax^k  is  ou-ing 
to  his  good  fortune,  the  fierceness  of  his  scddiers, 
and  the  errors  of  his  adversary.  What  if  Beresford 
had  been  overthrown  on  the  Ers]  Wellington  must 
have  repassed  the  Garonne,  happy  if  by  rapidity  he 
could  reunite  in  time  with  Hill  on  the  left  hank 
Beresford's  fliilure  would  have  been  ahs^olute  ruin, 
and  that  alone  refutes  the  French  claim  to  a  victory. 
Was  there  no  other  mode  of  attack  !  Tliat  can 
hardly  be  said  Beresford  passed  the  Lavaur  road 
to  assail  the  platform  of  St.  Sypiire.  and  Le  was 
probably  so  ordered  to  avoid  an  attack  in  flank  by 
the  Lavaur  road,  and  because  the  platform  of  Calvi- 
net  on  the  side  of  the  Ers  river  was  more  strrngly 
intrenched  than  that  of  St.  Sypii  re.  But  for  this 
gain  it  was  too  much  to  throw  his  column  into  the 
deep  ground  without  guns,  and  quite  separated  from 
the  rest  of  the  army,  seeing  that  the  cavalry  intend- 
ed to  maintain  the  connexion  were  unable  to  act  in 
that  miry  labyrinth  of  water-courses.  If  the  Span- 
iards were  judged  capable  of  carrying  the  strongest 
part  of  the  Colvinet  platform,  Beresford's  fine  An- 
glo-Portuguese divisions  were  surely  ecpial  to  attack- 
ing this  same  platform  on  the  immediate  left  of  the 
Spaniards,  and  an  advanced  guard  wouhl  have  suffic- 
ed to  protect  the  left  flank.  The  assault  would  then 
have  been  made  with  unity,  hy  a  great  mass  and  on 
the  most  important  point:  for  the  conquest  of  St 
Sypiere  was  hut  a  step  towards  that  of  Calvinet, 
but  the  conquest  of  Calvinet  would  have  rendered 
St.  Sypiere  untenable.  It  is  however  to  be  observ- 
ed that  the  Spaniards  attacked  too  soon,  and  their 
dispersion  exceeded  all  reasonable  calculation:  so 
panic-stricken  they  were  as  to  draw  from  lord  Wel- 
lington at  the  time  the  bitter  observation,  that  he 
had  seen  many  curious  spectacles,  hut  never  before 
saw  ten  thousand  men  running  a  race 

Soult's  retreat  fr-om  Toulouse,  a  model  of  order 
and  regularity,  was  made  in  the  night.  This  proves 
the  difficulty  of  his  situation.     Nevertheless  it  waa 


1811.] 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


7r-,t 


not  desp'irate  ;  nor  was  i  owing  to  his  adversary's 
p)n-3rous  torbsarance  tliat  lie  passed  utimolested  un- 
der tlie  allier'  g^iins  as  an  English  writer  has  erro- 
neously assurnrd.  For  first  those  guns  had  no  am- 
munition, and  this  was  one  reason  why  lord  Welling- 
ton, tliough  eager  to  fall  upon  him  on  tlie  11th,  could 
not  do  so.  On  the  r2th  Soult  was  gone,  and  his 
marcii  covered  by  the  great  canal  could  scarcely 
have  been  molested,  because  the  nearest  point  occu- 
pied by  the  allies  was  more  than  a  mile  and  a  half 
distant.  Nor  do  I  believe  that  Hoult,  as  some  other 
writers  have  imagined,  ever  designed  to  hold  Tou- 
louse to  the  last.  It  would  have  been  an  avowal  of 
military  insolvency  to  which  his  proposal,  that  8u- 
chet  sliould  join  him  at  Carcassonne  and  retake  the 
o.fensive,  written  on  the  night  of  the  11th,  is  quite 
opposed.  Neither  was  it  in  the  spirit  of  JVench 
warfare.  The  impetuous  valour  and  susceptibility 
of  that  people  are  ill-suited  for  stern  Numantian  de- 
spair. Place  an  attainable  object  of  war  before  the 
French  soldier  and  he  will  make  supernatural  efforts 
to  gain  it,  but  failing  he  becomes  proportionally  dis- 
couraged. Let  some  new  chance  be  opened,  some 
fresh  stimulus  applied  to  his  ardent  sensitive  tem- 
per, and  ha  will  rush  forward  again  with  unbounded 
energy  :  the  fnar  of  death  never  checks  him,  he  will 
attempt  any  thing.  Hut  the  unrelenting  vigour  of 
the  Hr.tish  infantry  in  resistance  wears  his  fury  out; 
it  was  so  proved  in  the  Peninsula,  where  the  sudden 
deafening  shout,  rolling  over  a  field  of  battle  more 
full  and  terrible  than  that  of  any  other  nation,  and 
followed  by  the  strong  unwavering  charge,  often 
startled  and  appalled  a  French  column  before  whose 
fierce  and  vehement  assault  any  other  troops  would 
h'aje  given  way. 

Napoleon's  system  of  war  was  admirably  adapted 
to  draw  forth  and  augment  the  military  excellence 
and  to  strengthen  the  weakness  of  the  national  char- 
acter. His  discipline,  severe  but  appealing  to  the 
fchilings  of  hoi)S  and  honour,  wrought  the  quick  torn- 
pr?rament  of  the  French  soldiers  to  patience  under 
hardships,  and  stron?  endurance  under  lire.  He 
tauglU  the  generals  to  rely  on  their  own  talents,  to 
look  to  the  country  wherein  they  made  war  for  re- 
sources, and  to  dare  every  thing  even  with  the 
smallest  numbers,  that  the  impetuous  valour  of 
France  might  have  full  play:  hence  the  violence  of 
their  attacks.  But  he  also  taught  them  to  combine 
ail  arms  together,  and  to  keep  strong  reserves  that 
sudden  disorders  niiglit  be  repaired,  and  the  discour- 
aged troops  have  time  to  rally  and  recover  their 
pristine  spirit,  certain  that  they  would  then  renew 
the  battle  with  the  same  confidence  as  before.  He 
thus  made  his  troops,  not  invincible  indeed,  nature 
had  put  a  bar  to  that  in  the  character  of  the  British 
soldier,  but  so  terrible  and  sure  in  war  that  the  num- 
bv!r  and  greatness  of  their  exploits  surpassed  those 
of  ah  other  nations;  the  Romans  not  excepted  if  re- 
gard be  had  to  the  shortness  of  the  period,  nor  the 
Macedonians  if  the  quality  of  their  opponents  be 
considered. 

Let  their  amnzing  toils  in  the  Peninsular  war 
elone,  which  though  so  great  and  important  was  but 
an  episode  in  their  military  history,  be  considered. 
"  In  Spain  lars:e  armies  will  starve  and  small  armies 
will  li  hcalen^''  was  the  saying  of  Henry  IV.  of 
France,  and  this  was  no  light  phrase  of  an  indolent 
monarch,  but  the  profound  conclusion  of  a  sagacious 
o-eneral.  Yet  Napoleon's  enormous  armies  were  so 
wonderfully  organized  that  they  existed  and  fought 
in  Spain  for  six  years,  and  without  cessation,  for  to 
thein  winters  and  summers  were  alike.  Their  large 
arniief  endured  incredible  toils  snd  privations,  but 
were  no    5*.arveu  out,  nor  were  their  small  armies 


I  beaten  by  the  Spaniards.  And  for  t^eir  c'prin!^  and 
resource  a  single  fact  recorded  by  lord  Wellington 
will  suffice  They  captured  more  than  one  strong 
place  in  Spain  without  any  provisicMi  of  bullets  save 
those  fired  at  them  by  their  enemies,  having  trusted 
to  that  chance  when  tliey  formed  the  fiege  1  Before 
the  British  troops  they  f;,'ll,  but  how  terrible  whs  the 
struggle!  how  many  defeats  they  recovered  from, 
how  many  brave  men  they  slew,  what  changes  and 
interpositions  of  fortune  occurred  before  they  could 
be  rolled  back  upon  their  own  frontiers!  And  this 
is  the  glory  of  England,  that  her  soldiers,  and  hert 
only,  were  capable  of  overthrowing  tiiem  in  ecjua 
battle.  I  seek  not  to  defraud  the  Portuguese  of  hi» 
well-earned  fame,  nor  to  deny  the  Spaniard  the  mer 
it  of  his  constancy.  I^ngland  could  not  alone  havi 
triumphed  in  the  struggle,  but  for  her  share  in  th* 
deliverance  of  the  Penin.-;ula  let  this  brief  sumiUHry 
speak. 

She  expended  more  than  one  hundred  milliors 
sterling  on  her-own  operations,  she  subsidized  Sjiaia 
and  Portugal  besides,  and  with  her  suj)plies  of  clotl  - 
ing,  arms  and  ammunition,  maintnined  the  arniies 
of  both,  even  to  the  guerillas.  From  thirty  up  to 
seventy  thousand  British  troops  were  employ '^;<1  by 
her  constantly,  and  while  her  naval  squadrons  con- 
tinually harassed  the  French  with  descents  .'oon 
the  coasts,  her  land  forces  fought  and  won  nineteen 
pitched  battles  and  innumerable  combats  ;  they  made 
or  sustained  ten  sieges,  took  four  great  fortresses, 
twice  expelled  the  French  from  Portugal,  preserved 
Alicante,  Carthagena.  Cadiz,  Lisbon;  they  killed, 
wounded  and  took  about  two  hundred  thousand  ene- 
mies, and  the  bones  of  forty  thousand  British  sol- 
diers lie  scattered  on  the  plains  and  mountains  of 
the  Peninsula. 

Finally,  for  Portugal  she  reorganized  a  native  ar- 
my and  supplied  ofhcers  who  led  it  to  victory,  and 
to  the  whole  Peninsula  she  gave  a  general  whose 
like  has  seldom  gone  forth  to  conquer.  And  all  this 
and  more  was  necessary  to  redeem  the  Peninsula 
from  France  ! 

The  duke  of  Wellington's  campaigns  furnish  les- 
sons for  generals  of  all  nations,  but  they  must  always 
be  peculiarly  models  for  British  commanders  In  fu- 
ture continental  wars,  because  he  modified  and  rec- 
onciled the  great  principles  of  art  with  the  peculiar 
difficulties  which  attend  generals  controlled  by  poli- 
ticians \;ho,  depending  upon  private  intrigue,  i)rel'er 
l)arliamentary  to  national  interests.  An  English 
commander  must  not  trust  his  fortune.  He  dare  not 
risk  much,  however  conscious  he  may  be  of  per.-onal 
resources,  when  one  disaster  will  be  his  ruin  ;it 
home.  His  measures  must  therefore  be  subordinate 
to  this  primary  consideration.  Lord  Wellington's 
caution,  springing  from  that  source,  has  led  friciids 
and  foes  alike  into  wrong  conclusions  as  to  his  sys- 
tem of  war.  The  French  call  it  want  of  enterprise, 
timidity  ;  the  English  have  denominated  it  the  Fab- 
ian system.  These  are  mere  [ihrases.  His  sysfeni 
was  the  same  as  that  of  all  great  generals.  He  held 
his  army  in  hand,  keeping  it  with  unmitigated  la- 
bour always  in  a  fit  state  to  march  or  to  tight  :  nnd 
thus  prepared,  he  acted  inditlcrentiy  as  occash'H  of- 
fered on  the  otliensivc  or  defensive,  display injj;  in 
both  a  complete  mastery  of  his  art.  Sometnius  iio 
was  indebted  to  fortune,  sometimes  to  his  natural 
genius,  but  always  to  his  untiring  industry,  fijr  he 
was  emphatically  a  pains-taking  man. 

That  he  was  less  vast  in  his  designs,  less  daring 
in  execution,  neither  so  rapid  nor  so  original  a  com- 
mander as  Na|)olcon,  niiift  be  adii^lted,  and  being 
later  in  the  field  of  glory  it  is  to  be  presumed  that 
he  learned  something  of  the  art  from  that  greatest 


756 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR  WAR. 


[Book  XXIV 


of  all  masters  ;  yet  something  besides  the  difference 
of  <j -ill ins  must  be  allowed  tor  tlie  diri'erence  of  situa- 
tion :  Nai)oleon  was  never,  even  in  his  first  campaign 
of  Italy,  so  harassed  by  the  Frencli  as  Wellington 
"vas  by  ttie  Englisli,  Spanisii  and  Portuguese  govern- 
ments. Their  systems  of  war  were  however  alike 
in  principle,  their  operations  being  necessarily  modi- 
fied by  tlieir  diiferent  political  positions  Great  bod- 
ily exertion,  unceasing  watchfulness,  exact  combi- 
nations to  protect  their  flanks  and  communications 
witliout  scattering  their  forces,  these  were  common 
to  both  In  defence  firm,  cool,  enduring;  in  attack 
tierce  and  obstinate  ;  daring  when  daring  was  poli- 
tic, but  always  operating  by  the  flanks  in  preference 
to  the  front:  in  these  things  they  were  alike,  but  in 
following  up  a  victory  the  Knglish  general  fell  short 
of  the  French  emperor.  The  battle  of  Wellington 
was  tlie  stroke  of  a  battering-ram,  down  went  the 
wall  in  ruins.  The  battle  of  Napoleon  was  tlie  swell 
iip.d  dash  of  a  mighty  wave,  before  wliich  the  barrier 
yielded  and  the  roaring  flood  poured  onwards  cover- 
ing all. 

Vet  was  there  nothing  of  timidity  or  natural  want 
of  enterprise  to  be  discerned  in  tlie  English  gener- 
al's campaigns.  Neither  was  he  of  the  Fabian 
school,  lie  recommended  that  commander's  system 
to  the  Spaniards,  but  he  did  not  follow  it  himself. 
His  military  policy  more  resembled  that  of  Scipio 
Africanus.  Fabius,  dreading  Hannibal's  veterans, 
red  with  the  blood  of  four  consular  armies,  hovered 
on  the  mountains,  refused  battle,  and  to  the  un- 
matched skill  and  valour  of  the  great  Carthaginian 
opposed  the  almost  inexhaustible  resources  of  Koine. 
Lord  Wellington  was  never  loth  to  figlit  when  there 
was  any  equality  of  numbers.  He  landed  in  Portu- 
gal with  only  nine  thousand  men,  with  intent  to  at- 
tack Junot  wlio  had  twenty-four  tiiousand.  At 
Roli^a  he  was  the  assailant,  at  Vimiera  lie  was  as- 
sailed, but  he  would  have  changed  to  the  offensive 
during  the  battle  if  others  had  not  interfered.  At 
Oporto  he  was  again  the  daring  and  successful  as- 
sailant. In  the  Talavera  campaign  he  took  the  in- 
itiatory movements,  although  in  the  battle  itself  he 
sustained  the  shock.  His  campaign  of  1810  in  Por- 
tugal was  entirely  defensive,  because  the  Portuguese 
army  was  young  and  untried;  but  his  pursuit  of 
Massena  in  ISll  was  as  entirely  aggressive,  al- 
though cautiously  so,'as  well  knowing  that  in  moun- 
tain warfare  those  wiio  attack  labour  at  a  disadvan- 
tage. The  operations  of  the  following  campaign, 
including  the  battles  of  Fuentes  Onoro  and  Albiiera, 
the  first  siege  of  15adajoz  and  the  combat  ofGuinaldo, 
were  of  a  m'ixed  character;  so  was  the  campaign  of 
Salamanca:  but  tiie  campaign  of  Vittoria  and  that 
in  tlie  south  of  France  were  entirely  and  eminently 
olfonsive. 

Slight  therefore  is  the  resemblance  to  the  Fabian 
warfare.  And  for  the  Englishman's  hardiness  and 
enterprise  bear  witness  the  passage  of  the  Duero  at 
Oporto,  the  capture  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  tiie  storming 
of  liadajoz,  the  surprise  of  the  forts  at  .Mirabete,  the 
march  to  Vittoria,  the  passage  of  the  Hidassoa,  the 
victory  of  the  N'ivolle,  the  passage  of  the  Adour  be- 
low IJayonne,  the  figiit  of  Orthez,  the  crowning  bat- 
tl3  of 'i'oulouse  !  To  say  tiiat  he  committed  faults 
i.s  only  to  say  that  he  made  war;  but  to  deny  him 
the  qualities  of  a  great  commander  is  to  rail  agninst 
the  clear  mid-day  sun  for  want  of  light.  How  f(!w 
of  his  combinations  failed.  How  many  battles  he 
fought,  victorious  in  all!  Iron  hardihood  of  body,  a 
quick  and  sure  vision,  a  grasping  mind,  untiring 
powei  of  thought,  and  the  habit  of  l.ihorious  minutJ 
investigation  anrt  arrniigeincnt ;  all  tiiese  qual  ties 
le  pousesscd,  and  with  them  that  i::0it  rare  faculty 


of  coming  to  prompt  and  sure  conclusions  on  suddet 
emergencies.  This  is  the  certain  mark  of  a  mas-ter 
sjiirit  in  war;  without  it  a  commander  may  be  dis 
tinguished,  he  may  be  a  great  man,  but  he  cannot  be 
a  great  captain.  VN  here  troops  nearly  alike  in  arms 
and  knowledge  are  opposed,  the  battle  generally 
turns  upon  the  decision  of  the  moment. 

At  the  Somosierra,  Napoleon's  sudden  and  what 
to  those  about  him  appeared  an  insensate  order,  sent 
the  Polish  cavalry  successfully  cluirging  up  tiie 
mountain,  when  more  studied  arraugenients  with 
ten  times  that  force  niiglit  have  failed.  At  Talave- 
ra, if  Joseph  had  not  yielded  to  the  irnj^:  idtnt  lieut 
of  Victor,  the  fate  of  the  allies  would  have  been 
sealed.  At  the  Coa,  Montbrun's  refusal  to  charge, 
with  his  cavalry  saved  general  Crawfurd's  division, 
the  loss  of  which  would  have  gone  fiir  towards  tlie 
evacuation  of  Portugal.  At  Busaco,  Massei;a  would 
not  suffer  Ney  to  attack  the  first  day,  and  thus  lott 
the  only  favourable  opportunity  for  assailing  that  for- 
midable position.  At  Fuentes  (Jnoro,  the  same  Mas- 
sena  suddenly  suspended  his  attack  when  a  powerful 
effort  would  probably  have  been  decisive.  At  .\lbii- 
era,  Soult's  column  of  attack,  instead  of  pushing  for- 
ward, halted  to  fire  from  the  first  height  they  had 
gained  on  Beresford's  right,  which  saved  th::t  gener- 
al from  an  early  and  total  defeat ;  ugain  at  a  later 
period  of  that  battle  the  unpremeditated  attack  cf 
the  fusiliers  decided  the  contest.  At  Barosa,  gener- 
al Graham  with  a  wonderful  promptitude  snatched 
the  victory  at  the  very  moment  when  a  terrible  de- 
feat seemed  inevitable.  At  Sabugal,  not  even  the 
astonishing  fighting  of  the  light  division  could  have 
saved  it  if  general  Regnier  had  possessed  tliis  essen- 
tial quality  of  a  general.  At  El  Bodon,  Marmor.t 
failed  to  seize  the  most  favourable  opportunity  which 
occurred  during  the  whole  war  for  crushing  the  al- 
lies. At  Orthez,  Soult  let  slip  two  opportunities  of 
falling  upon  the  allies  with  advantage,  and  at  Ton- 
louse  he  failed  to  crush  Berest^rd. 

At  Vimiera,  lord  Wellington  was  debarred  by  Bur- 
rard  from  giving  a  signal  illustration  of  this  iniuitive 
generalship  ;  but  at  Busaco  and  tiie  heights  of  Han 
Cristoval,  near  Salamanca,  he  suffered  Massena  end 
31armont  to  commit  glaring  faults  unpunislicd.  On 
the  other  hand  he  has  furnished  many  exanijiles  of 
that  successful  improvisation  in  which  Napoleon 
seems  to  liave  surpassed  all  mankind.  His  sudden 
retreat  from  Oropesa  across  the  Tngus  by  the  bridge 
ofArzobispo;  his  passage  of  the  Duero  in  1^(0;  his 
halt  at  Guinaldo  in  the  face  of  Marmont's  over- 
whelming numbers;  the  battle  of  Salamanca  ;  his 
sudden  rush  with  the  third  division  to  seize  the  hill 
of  Arinez  at  Vittoria;  his  counter-stroke  with  the 
sixth  division  at  Sauroren  ;  hi-^  battle  on  the  .''(  th, 
two  days  afterwards  ;  his  sudden  passage  of  the  Gave 
below  Orthez.  Add  to  these  his  wonderful  btillla 
of  Assye,  and  the  proofs  are  complete  that  he  pos- 
sesses in  an  eminent  degree  that  intuitive  jjcrcep- 
tion  which  distinguishes  the  greatest  generals. 

Fortune  however  always  asserts  her  supremacy  in 
war,  and  off.en  from  a  slight  mistake  such  disastrous 
consequences  flow  that  in  every  age  and  every  ra- 
tion the  uncertainty  of  arms  hns  been  [)roverbial. 
Napoleon's  march  upon  Madrid  in  I8t8,  before  he 
knew  the  exact  situation  of  the  British  army  is  an 
example.  By  that  mnrch  he  lent  his  flank  to  hla 
enemy.  Sir  .John  More  seized  the  advantage,  and 
tliough  the  French  emperor  repaired  the  error  for 
the  moment  by  his  astonishing  march  from  31adrid 
to  Astorgri,  the  fate  of  the  Penins  la  was  then  de. 
cided.  If  he  had  not  been  forced  to  turn  hgaiiut 
Jlore,  Lisbon  would  have  fjllcn,  Portugal  could  no 
iiave  been  orgauzed  for  resittance,  and  thv  jouiuusy 


1814.] 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR    WAR. 


757 


of  the  Spaniards  would  never  have  suffered  Welling- 
ton to  have  established  a  solid  base  at  Cadiz:  that 
general's  alter-successes  would  then  have  been  with 
the  things  that  are  unborn.  It  was  not  so  ordained. 
Wellington  was  victorious,  the  great  conqueror  was 
overthrown.  England  stood  tlie  most  triumphant 
nation  of  the  world.  But  with  an  enormous  debt,  a 
dissatisfied  people,  gaining  peace  without  tranquil- 
l.ty,  greatness  without  intrinsic  strength,  the  pres- 
ent time  uneasy,  tiie  future  dark  and  tlireatening 
Yet  she  rejoices  in  the  glory  of  her  arms!  And  it 
is  a  stirring  sound  !  War  is  the  coac'.tion  of  this 
world.  From  man  to  the  smal.esi  in.'-.i:.t  all  arc  at 
•triie .  -ui<l  the  jjlory  of  arms,  which  cannot  be  ob- 


tained without  the  exercise  of  honour,  fortitude, 
courage,  obedience,  modesty  and  tempernnce,  ex- 
cites the  brave  man's  patriotism  and  is  a  chastening 
corrective  for  the  rich  man's  pride.  It  is  yet  no  se- 
curity for  power.  Napoleon,  the  greatett  man  of 
whom  history  makes  mention.  Napoleon,  tlie  most 
wonderful  commander,  the  most  sagacious  pcditician, 
the  most  profound  statesman  lost  by  arms  Poland, 
Germany,  Italy,  Portugal,  Spain  and  France.  For- 
tune, that  name  for  the  unknown  combinations  of 
infinite  power,  was  wanting  to  liim,  and  witho'^t 
her  aid  the  dep'ijns  of  man  are  as  bubb  es  oa  a  tlCS* 
bled  o;.ea.i*. 


'Wt 


APPENDIX. 


No.  I. 

61B  ARTHUR  WELLESLEY  TO  SIR  HARRY  BURRARD. 

Hcad-qiiarlers,  at  Lavos,  August  8tk,  1808. 
silt, 

Having  received  instructions  from  the  secretary  of  state 
that  you  were  likely  to  arrive  on  the  coast  of  Portugal  with 
a  corps  of  ten  thousand  men,  lately  employed  in  the  north 
of  Europe  under  the  orders  of  sir  John  Moore,  I  now  sub- 
mit to  you  such  information  as  I  have  received  regarding 
the  general  state  of  the  war  in  Portugal  and  Spain,  and  the 
plan  of  operations  which  I  am  about  to  carry  into  execution. 

The  enemy's  force  at  present  in  Portugal  consists,  as  far 
as  I  am  able  to  form  an  opinion,  of  from  16,000  to  18,000 
men,  of  which  number  there  are  about  500  in  the  fort  of 
Almeida,  about  the  same  number  in  Elvas,  about  6  or  800 
in  Peuiclie,  and  16  or  1800  in  the  province  of  Alemtejo, 
at  Setuval,  &c. ;  and  the  remainder  are  disposable  for  the 
defence  of  Lisbon,  and  are  in  the  forts  of  St.  Julian  and 
Cascacs,  in  the  batteries  along  the  coast  as  far  as  the  Rock 
of  liisbon,  and  the  old  citadel  of  Lisbon,  to  which  the  ene- 
my have  lately  added  some  works. 

Of  the  force  disposable  for  the  defence  of  Lisbon,  the 
enemy  have  lately  detached  a  corps  of  about  2000,  under 
general  Thomieres,  principally  I  believe  to  watch  my  move- 
ments, which  corps  is  now  at  Alcobaca;  and  another 
corps  of  4000  men,  under  general  Loison,  was  sent  across 
the  Tagus  into  Alemtejo  on  the  26th  of  last  month,  the  ob- 
ject of  which  detachment  was  to  disperse  the  Portuguese 
insurgents  in  that  quarter,  to  force  the  Spanish  corps, 
consisting  of  about  2000  men,  which  had  advanced  into 
Portugal  as  far  as  Evora  from  Estremadura,  to  retire,  and 
then  to  be  enabled  to  add  to  the  force  destined  for  the  de- 
fence of  liishon  the  corps  of  French  troops  which  had 
been  stationed  at  Setuval  and  in  the  province  of  Alemte- 
jo;  at  all  events  Loison's  corps  will  return  to  Lisbon,  and 
the  French  corps  disposable  for  the  defence  of  that  place 
will  probably  be  about  14,000  men,  of  which  at  least 
3000  must  be  left  in  the  garrisons  and  forts  on  the  coast 
and  in  the  river. 

The  French  army  under  Dupont,  in  Andalusia,  sur- 
rendered on  the  20th  of  last  month  to  the  Spanish  ar- 
my under  Castaiios  ;  so  that  there  arc  now  no  French 
troops  in  the  south  of  Spain.  The  Spanish  army  of  Gal- 
licia  and  Castille,  to  the  northward,  received  a  check  at 
Rio  Seco,  in  the  province  of  Valladolid,  on  the  14th  of 
July,  from  a  French  corps  supposed  to  bf?  under  the  com- 
mand of  general  Bessieres,  which  had  advanced  from 
Burgos. 


The  Spanish  troops  retired  on  the  15th  to  Beneveiw 
te,  and  I  understand  there  has  since  been  an  affair  be. 
tween  the  advanced  posts  in  that  neighbourhood,  but  1 
am  not  certain  of  it ;  nor  am  I  acquainted  with  the  po- 
sition  of  the  Spanish  army,  or  of  that  of  the  French, 
since  the  14th  July.  When  you  will  have  been  a  short 
time  in  this  country,  and  will  have  observed  the  degree 
to  which  this  deficiency  of  real  information  is  supplied  by 
the  circulation  of  unfounded  reports,  you  will  not  be  sur- 
prised at  my  want  of  accurate  knowledge  on  these  subjects. 

It  is,  however,  certain  that  nothing  of  importance 
has  occurred  in  that  quarter  since  the  14th  of  July  ;  and 
from  this  circumstance  I  conclude  that  the  corps  called 
Bessieres'  attacked  the  Spanish  army  at  Rio  Scco  so.e- 
ly  with  a  view  to  cover  the  march  of  king  Joseph  Buo 
naparte  to  Madrid,  where  he  arrived  on  the  21st  July. 
Besides  their  defeat  at  Andalusia,  the  enemy,  as  you 
may  probably  liave  heard,  have  been  beat  off  in  an  attack 
upon  Zaragoza,  in  Aragon,  in  another  upon  the  city  of 
Valencia ;  (in  both  of  which  it  is  said  that  they  have 
lost  many  men  ;)  and  it  is  reported  that,  in  Catalonia, 
two  of  their  detachments  have  been  cut  off,  and  that  they 
have  lost  the  fort  of  Figucras  in  the  Pyrenees,  and  that 
Barcelona  is  blockaded.  Of  these  last-mentioned  actions 
and  operations  I  have  seen  no  official  accounts,  but  the 
report  of  them  is  generally  circulated  and  believed;  and 
at  all  events,  whether  these  reports  are  founded  or  other- 
wise, it  is  obvious,  that  the  insurrection  against  the  French 
is  general  throughout  Spain  ;  that  large  parties  of  Span- 
iards are  in  arms;  amongst  others,  in  particular,  an  ar- 
my of  20,000  men,  including  4000  cavalry,  at  Almarai 
on  the  Tagus,  in  Estremadura,  and  that  the  French  can- 
not carry  on  their  operations  by  means  of  small  corps.  I 
should  imagine,  from  their  inactivity,  and  from  the  misfor- 
tunes they  have  sufTored,  that  they  have  not  the  means  of 
collecting  a  force  sufTicicntly  large  to  oppose  the  progress  of 
the  insurrection  and  the  efforts  of  the  insurgents  and  to  afford 
supplies  to  their  different  detached  corps,  or  that  they  find 
that  they  cannot  carry  on  their  operations  with  armies  so 
numerous  as  they  must  find  it  necessary  to  emp.oy  without 
magazines. 

In  respect  to  Portugal,  the  whole  kingdom,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  the  neighbourhood  of  Lisbon,  is  in  a  state  of  in- 
surrection against  the  French  ;  their  means  of  resislanra 
are,  however,  less  powerful  than  those  of  the  Spaniards, 
their  troops  have  been  completely  dispersed,  their  olfircrs 
had  gone  off  to  the  Brazils,  and  their  arsenals  pillaged,  or 
in  the  power  of  the  enemy,  and  their  revolt  under  the  cir- 
cumstances in  which  it  had  taken  place  is  s  dl  more  extr^ 
ordinary  than  that  of  the  Spanish  nation. 


NAPIER'S    PEN    NSULAR   ".VAR. 


759 


The  Portugiiese  may  have  in  the  northern  part  of  the 
kingdom  about  10.000  men  in  arms,  of  which  numl)er  5000 
are  to  march  with  me  towards  Lisbon.  The  remainder 
with  a  Spanish  detachment  of  about  1,500  men  which 
came  from  Gallicia,  are  employed  in  a  distant  blockade  of 
Almeida,  and  in  the  protection  of  Oporto,  which  is  now  the 
Beat  of  government. 

The  insurrection  is  general  throughout  Alemtrjo  and  AI- 
garve  to  the  southward,  and  Entre  Minho  e  Duero  and 
Tras  OS  Montes  and  Buira  to  the  northward  ;  but  for  want 
of  arms  the  people  can  do  nothing  against  the  enemy. 

Having  consulted  sir  C.  Cotton,  it  appeared  to  him  and 
to  me  that  the  attack  proposed  upon  Cascaes-bay  was  im- 
practicable, because  the  bay  is  well  defended  by  the  fort  of 
Odscaes  and  the  other  works  constructed  for  its  defence, 
and  the  shifjs  of  war  could  not  approach  sufficiently  near  to 
silence  them.  'I'he  landing  in  the  Passa  d'Arcos  in  the 
Tagus  could  not  be  effected  without  silencing  fort  St.  Juli- 
an, which  appeared  to  be  impracticable  to  those  who  were 
to  carry  that  operation  into  execution. 

There  are  small  bays  within  which  might  admit  of  land- 
ing troops,  and  others  to  the  northward  of  the  rock  of  Lis- 
bon, but  they  are  all  defended  by  works  which  must  have 
been  silenced  ;  they  are  of  small  extent,  and  but  few  men 
could  have  landed  at  the  same  time.  There  is  always  a 
•uif  on  tlieai  which  alfects  the  facility  of  landing  at  differ- 
ent times  so  materially,  as  to  render  it  very  doubtful  whe- 
ther the  troops  first  landed  could  be  supported  in  sufficient 
time  by  others,  and  whether  the  horses  for  the  artillery  and 
cavalry,  and  the  necessary  stores  and  provisions  could  be 
landed  at  all.  These  inconveniences  attending  a  landing  in 
any  of  the  hays  near  the  rock  of  Lisbon  would  have  been 
aggrriVated  by  the  neighbourhood  of  the  enemy  to  the  land- 
ing-place, and  by  the  exhausted  state  of  the  country  in 
which  the  troops  would  have  been  landed.  It  was  obvious- 
ly the  best  plan,  therefore,  to  land  in  the  northern  parts  of 
i'ortugal,  and  I  fixed  upon  Mondego  bay  as  the  nearest 
place  which  afforded  any  facility  for  landing,  except  Peni- 
che,  the  landing-{)lace  of  which  peninsula  is  defended  liy 
a  fort  occupied  by  the  enemy,  which  it  would  be  necessary 
to  attack  regularly,  in  order  to  [)Iace  the  ships  in  safety. 

A  landing  to  the  northward  was  further  recommended, 
as  it  would  insure  the  cooperation  of  the  Portuguese  in  the 
expedition  to  Lisbon.  The  whole  of  the  corps  placed  un- 
der my  command,  including  those  under  the  command  of 
general  Spencer,  having  landed,  I  propose  to  march  on 
Wednesday,  and  I  shall  take  the  road  by  .AlcobaQa  and 
Obidos,  with  a  view  to  keep  up  my  communication  by 
the  sea-coast,  and  to  examine  the  situation  of  Peniche,  and 
I  shall  proceed  towards  Lisbon  by  the  route  of  Mafra,  and 
by  the  hills  to  the  northward  of  that  city. 

As  I  understand  from  the  secretary  of  state  that  a  body 
of  troops  under  the  command  of  brigadier-general  Ackland 
may  be  expected  on  the  coast  of  Portugal  before  you  ar- 
rive, I  have  written  to  desire  he  will  proceed  from  hence 
along  the  coast  of  Portugal  to  the  southward  ;  and  I  pro- 
pose to  communicate  with  him  by  means  of  captain  Bligh 
of  the  Alfred,  who  will  attend  the  movements  of  the  army 
with  a  few  transports,  having  on  board  provisions  and  mili- 
tary stores.  I  intend  to  order  brigadier-general  Ackland 
to  attack  Peniche,  if  I  should  find  it  necessary  to  obtain 
possession  of  that  place,  and  if  not,  I  propose  to  order  him 
to  join  the  fleet  stationed  off  the  Tagus,  with  a  view  to  dis- 
embark in  one  of  the  bays  near  the  rock  of  liisbon,  as  soon 
as  I  shall  approach  sufficiently  near  to  enable  him  to  perform 
that  operation.  If  I  imagined  that  general  Ackland'a  corps 
was  equipped  in  such  a  manner  as  to  be  enabled  to  move 


from  the  coast,  I  should  have  directed  him  to  land  at  Mon> 
dego,  and  to  march  upon  Santarcm,  from  which  station  h* 
■*ould  have  been  at  hand  either  to  assist  my  operations,  of 
to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  enemy,  if  he  should  endeavour 
to  make  it  either  by  the  north  of  the  Tagus  and  .'\lmeida, 
or  by  the  south  of  the  Tagus  and  Elvas;  but  as  I  om  con- 
vinced that  general  Ac'r.land's  corj)s  is  intended  to  form  • 
part  of  some  other  corps  wnich  is  provided  with  a  commin- 
sariat,  that  he  will  have  none  with  him,  and  consequently 
that  his  corps  must  depend  upon  the  country  ;  and  as  no 
reliance  can  be  placed  upon  the  resources  of  this  country, 
I  have  considered  it  best  to  direct  the  geneial's  attention 
to  the  sea-coast ;  if,  however,  the  command  of  the  army  re- 
mained in  my  hands,  I  should  certainly  land  the  corpit 
which  has  lately  been  under  the  command  of  sir  John 
Moore  at  Mondego,  and  should  move  it  upon  Santarem. 
I  have  the  honour  to  enclose  a  return  of  the  troops,  &c.  &c. 
(Signed)  Arthur  Welleslkt. 


SIR  ARTHUR  WELLESLEY  TO  SIR  HARRY  BURRARD. 
Camp  at  l,ugar,  8  miles  north  of  Lerya,  Jlitg7ist  10,  1808. 
Sir, 

Since  I  wrote  to  you  on  the  8th  inst.,  I  have  received 
letters  from  Mr.  Stuart  and  colonel  Doyle  at  CoruFia,  of 
which  I  enclose  copies.  From  them  you  will  learn  the 
state  of  the  war  in  that  part  of  Spain,  and  you  will  ob- 
serve that  Mr.  Stuart  and  colonel  Doyle  are  of  opinion  that 
marshal  Bessieres  will  take  advantage  of  the  inefficiency  of 
the  Gallician  army  under  general  Blake  to  detach  a  corps* 
to  Portugal  to  the  assistance  of  general  Junot;  we  have  not 
heard  yet  of  that  detachment  and  I  am  convinced  it 
will  not  be  made  till  King  Joseph  Buonaparte  will  cither 
be  reinforced  to  such  a  degree  as  to  be  in  safety  in  Madrid,  or 
till  he  shall  have  effected  his  retreat  into  France,  with  which 
view  it  is  reported  that  he  left  Madrid  on  the  29th  of  last 
month. 

I  conceive,  therefore,  that  I  have  time  for  the  opeiationa 
which  I  propose  to  carry  on  before  a  reinforcement  can  ar- 
rive from  Leon,  even  supposing  that  no  obstacles  would  bo 
opposed  to  its  march  in  Spain  or  Portugal;  but  it  is  not 
probable  that  it  can  arrive  before  the  different  reinforce- 
ments will  arrive  from  England ;  and  as  marshal  Bessierea 
had  not  more  than  20,000  men  in  the  action  at  Rio  Seco 
on  the  14th  July,  I  conceive  that  the  British  troops,  which 
will  be  in  Portugal,  will  be  able  to  contend  with  any  part 
of  that  corps  which  he  may  detach. 

The  possibility  that,  in  the  present  state  of  affairs,  the 
French  corps  at  present  in  Portugal  may  be  reinforced,  af- 
fords an  additional  reason  for  taking  the  position  at  San- 
tarem, which  I  apprised  you,  in  my  letter  of  the  8th.  I 
should  occupy,  ,'f  the  command  of  the  army  remained  iii 
my  hands,  aftei  'he  reinforcements  should  arrive.  Ifyoa 
should  occupy  ii,  fou  will  not  only  be  in  the  best  situation 
to  support  my  operations,  and  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  thtf 
enemy,  but  if  any  reinforcements  of  the  French  troopa 
should  enter  Portugal,  you  will  be  in  the  best  situation  to 
collect  youi  whole  force  to  oppose  him,  &c.  &c. 

(Signed)  Arthur  Welleslkt. 

No.  II. 

ARTICLES  OF  THE  DEFINITIVE  CONVEXTION    FOR    TfTB 
EVACUATION  OF  I'ORTUUAL  I!Y  THE  FKENCl!   ARMV. 

The  generals  commanding  in  chief,  &c.  &c.,  being  detei* 
mined  to  negotiate,  &c,  dec 


760 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


Article  1.  All  the  places  and  forts  in  the  kingilom  of 
Portugal  occupied  by  the  French  troops  shall  be  given  up 
to  t!»e  British  army  in  the  state  in  which  they  are  at  the 
period  of  the  signature  of  the  present  convention. 

Art.  2.  The  French  troops  shall  evacuate  Portugal  with 
their  arms  and  baggage,  they  shall  not  be  considered  as 
prisoners  of  war,  and  on  their  arrival  in  France  they  shall 
4ie  at  liberty  to  serve. 

Art.  3.  The  English  government  shall  furnish  the  means 
of  conveyance  for  the  French  army,  which  shall  be  disem- 
barked in  any  of  the  ports  of  France  between  Rochefort 
and  L'Orient  inclusively. 

Art.  4.  The  French  army  shall  carry  with  it  all  its 
artillery  cf  French  calibre,  with  the  horses  belonging  there- 
unto, and  the  tumbrils  supplied  with  sixty  rounds  per  gun  : 
ail  other  artillery  arms,  and  ammunition,  as  also  the  mili- 
tary and  naval  arsenals,  shall  be  given  up  to  the  British 
nrmy  and  navy,  in  the  state  in  which  they  may  be  at  the 
jicriod  of  the  ratification  of  the  convention. 

Art.  5.  The  French  army  shall  carry  with  it  all  its  equip- 
ments, and  all  that  is  comprehended  under  the  name  of 
property  of  the  army  ;  that  is  to  say,  its  military  chest,  and 
rarriages  attached  to  the  field  commissariat  and  field  hos- 
pital;  or  shall  be  allowed  to  dispose  of  such  part  of  the 
same  on  its  accounts,  as  the  commander-in-chief  may  judge 
it  unnecessary  to  embark.  In  like  manner,  all  individuals 
«f  the  army  shall  be  at  liberty  to  dispose  of  their  private 
property  of  every  description,  with  full  security  hereafter 
for  the  purchasers. 

Art.  6.  The  cavalry  are  to  embark  their  horses,  as  also 
the  generals  and  other  officers  of  all  ranks.  It  is,  however, 
fully  understood  that  the  means  of  conveyance  for  horses, 
at  the  disposal  of  the  British  commanders,  are  very  limit- 
ed;  some  additional  conveyance  may  be  procured  in  the 
port  of  Lisbon.  The  number  of  horses,  to  be  embarked 
by  the  troops  shall  not  exceed  600,  and  the  number  em- 
l)arked  by  the  staflT  shall  not  exceed  200.  At  all  events, 
every  facility  will  be  given  to  the  French  army  to  dispose 
of   the  horses  belonging  to  it  which  cannot  be  embarked. 

Art.  7.  In  order  to  facilitate  the  embarkation,  it  shall 
take  place  in  three  divisions,  the  last  of  which  will  be  prin- 
cipally composed  of  the  garrisons  of  the  places,  of  the  caval- 
ry, the  artillery,  the  sick,  and  the  equipment  of  the  army. 
The  first  division  shall  embark  within  seven  days  of  the 
date  of  the  ratification,  or  sooner  if  possible. 

Art.  8.  The  garrison  of  Elvas  and  its  forts,  and  of  Pen- 
jche  and  Pamela,  will  be  embarked  at  Lisbon.  That  of 
Almeida  at  Oporto,  or  the  nearest  harbour.  They  will  be 
accompanied  on  their  march  by  British  commissaries,  char- 
ged with  providing  for  their  subsistence  and  accommoda- 
tion. 

Art.  9.  All  the  sick  and  wounded  who  cannot  be  em- 
barked with  the  troops  are  entrusted  to  the  British  army. 
They  are  to  be  taken  care  of  whilst  they  remain  in  this 
country  at  the  expense  of  the  British  government,  under 
lh«  condition  of  the  same  being  reimbursed  by  France  when 
the  final  evacuation  is  effected.  The  English  government 
•will  provide  for  their  return  to  France,  which  will  take 
place  by  detachments  of  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  or  two 
hundred  men  at  a  time.  A  suflTicient  number  of  French 
medical  officers  shall  be  left  behind  to  attend  them, 

.\rt,  10.  -As  soon  as  the  vessels  employed  to  carry  the 
•rmy  to  France  shall  have  disembarked  in  the  har'ouurs 
■pecified,  or  in  any  other  of  the  ports  of  France  to  which 
•(tress  of  weather  may  force  them,  every  facility  shall  be 
givert  to  them  to  return  to  England  without  delay,  and  se- 
cority  against  capture  u    .'  their  arrival  in  a  friendlj  port. 


Art.  11.  The  French  army  shall  be  concentrated  in  Lis- 
bon, and  within  a  distance  of  about  two  leagues  from  it. 
The  English  army  will  approach  within  three  leagues  of  the 
capital,  and  will  be  so  placed  as  to  leave  about  one  league 
between  the  two  armies. 

Art.  12.  The  forts  of  St.  Julien,  the  Bugio,  and  Casca- 
cs,  shall  be  occupied  by  the  British  troops  on  the  ratilicatioa 
of  the  convention.  Lisbon  and  its  citadel,  together  with 
the  forts  and  batteries  as  far  as  the  lazaretto  or  Trafaria 
on  one  side,  and  fort  St.  Joseph  on  the  other,  inclusively, 
shall  be  given  up  on  the  embarkation  of  the  2d  division; 
as  shall  also  the  harbour  and  all  armed  vessels  in  it  of  ev- 
ery description,  with  their  rigging,  sails,  stores,  and  ammu- 
nition. The  fortresses  of  Elvas,  Almeida,  Peniche,  and 
Palmcla,  shall  be  given  up  as  soon  as  the  British  troops 
can  arrive  to  occupy  them.  In  the  meantime,  the  general- 
in-cliief  of  the  British  army  will  give  notice  of  the  present 
convention  to  the  garrisons  of  those  places,  as  also  to  the 
troops  before  them  in  order  to  put  a  slop  to  all  further  hos- 
tilities. 

Art.  13.  Commissioners  shall  be  named  on  both  sides 
to  regulate  and  accelerate  the  execution  of  the  arrangements 
agreed  upon. 

Art.  14.  Should  there  arise  doubts  as  to  the  meaning  of 
any  article,  it  will  be  explained  favourably  to  tht;  French 
army. 

Art.  15.  From  the  date  of  the  ratification  of  the  present 
convention,  all  arrears  of  contributions,  requisitions,  or 
claims  whatever,  of  the  French  government  against  suli- 
jects  of  Portugal,  or  any  other  individuals  residing  in  this 
country,  lounded  on  the  occupation  of  Portugal  by  the 
French  troops,  in  the  month  of  December,  1807.  whicn 
may  not  have  been  paid  up,  are  cancelled  ;  and  all  seques- 
tration laid  upon  their  property,  moveable  or  immoveable, 
are  removed,  and  the  free  disposal  of  the  same  is  restored 
to  the  proper  owners. 

Art.  16.  All  subjects  of  France,  or  of  powers  in  friend- 
ship or  alliance,  domiciliated  in  Portugal,  or  accidentally 
in  this  country,  shall  be  protected;  their  property  of  every 
kind,  moveable  and  immoveable,  shall  be  respected  ;  and 
they  shall  be  at  liberty  either  to  accompany  the  French  ar- 
my or  to  remain  in  Portugal.  In  either  case  their  proper- 
ty is  guaranteed  to  them,  with  the  liberty  of  retaining  or  of 
disposing  of  it,  and  passing  the  produce  of  the  sale  thereof 
into  France,  or  any  other  country  where  they  may  fix  their 
residence,  the  space  of  one  year  being  allowed  tbern  for  that 
purpose.  It  is  fully  understood  that  shi[ipiiig  is  excepted 
from  this  arrangement,  only  however  in  as  far  as  regards 
leaving  the  port,  and  that  none  of  the  sti[iul-.itions  above 
mentioned  can  be  made  the  pretext  of  any  commercial 
speculations. 

Art.  17.  No  native  of  Portugal  shall  be  rendered  ac- 
countable for  his  political  conduct  during  the  period  of 
the  occupation  of  this  country  by  the  French  army  ;  and 
all  those  who  have  continued  in  the  exercise  of  their  em- 
ployments, or  who  have  accepted  situations  under  the 
French  government,  are  placed  under  the  protection  of  the 
British  commanders  ;  they  shall  sustain  no  injury  in  th"ir 
persons  or  property  ;  it  not  having  been  at  their  option  lo 
be  obedient  or  not  to  the  French  government,  they  are  also 
at  liberty  to  avail  themselves  of  the  stipulations  of  the  16lh 
article. 

Art.  18.  The  Spanish  troops  detained  on  hoard  ship,  in 
the  port  of  Lisbon,  shall  be  given  up  to  the  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  British  army,  who  engages  lo  iibtain  of  tha 
Spaniards  to  restore  such  French  sulijecls,  either  military 
or  civil,  as  may  have  been  detained  in  Spain,  without  hav* 


I 


N  A  PURR'S    PENINSULAIt    ^AR. 


761 


ingbecn  taken  in  battle,  or  in  consequence  of  military  opera- 
tions, !ii:t  on  occasion  of  the  occurrences  of  the  29th  of  last 
May,  anil  the  days  immediately  fo. lowing. 

Art.  10.  There  shall  be  an  immediate  exchange  established 
for  all  ranks  of  prisoners  made  in  Portugal  since  the  com- 
mencement of  the  present  hostilities. 

Art.  20.  Hostages  of  the  rank  of  field  officers  shall  be  mu- 
tually furnished,  on  ths  part  of  the  Briti.sh  army  and  navy, 
nnd  on  that  of  the  French  army,  for  the  reciprocal  guarantee 
of  the  present  convention.  The  otiicer  of  the  British  army 
shall  be  restored  on  the  completion  of  the  articles  which  con- 
cern the  army;  and  the  oHicer  of  the  navy  on  ihe  disembarka- 
tion of  the  French  troops  in  their  own  country.  'I'he  like 
is  to  take  place  on  the  part  of  the  French  army. 

Art.  21.  It  shall  be  allowed  to  the  general-in-chief  of  the 
French  army  to  send  an  officer  to  France  with  intelligence 
of  the  present  convention.  A  vessel  will  be  furnished  by 
the  British  admiral  to  convey  him  to  Bourdeaux  or  Roche- 
fort. 

Art.  22.  The  Briti-h  admiral  will  be  invited  to  accom- 
modate his  excellency  the  commander-in-chief  and  the 
ether  principal  officers  of  the  French  army  on  board  ships 
of  war. 

Done  and  concluded  at  Lisbon,  this  30th  day  of  August, 
1808. 

(Signed)   George  Murhat,  quarter-master-general. 
Kellerman,  le  general  de  division. 

ADDITIOXAL  ARTICLES. 

Art.  1.  The  individuals  in  the  civil  employment  of  the 
•riiiy,  made  prisoners  either  by  the  British  or  Portuguese, 
in  any  part  of  Portugal,  will  be  restored,  as  is  customary, 
wuhout  exchange. 

Art.  2.  The  French  army  shall  be  subsisted  from  its  own 
magazines  up  to  the  day  of  embarkation.  The  garrisons 
up  to  the  day  of  the  evacuation  of  the  fortresses.  The  re- 
mainder of  the  magazines  shall  be  delivered  over  in  the  usu- 
al forms  to  the  British  government,  which  charges  itself 
with  the  subsistence  of  the  men  and  horses  of  the  army 
from  the  above  mentioned  periods  till  their  arrival  in 
France,  under  the  condition  of  being  reimbursed  by  the 
French  government  fi)r  the  excess  of  the  expense  beyond 
the  estimation  to  be  made  by  both  parties,  of  the  value  of 
the  magazines  delivered  up  to  the  Bnti.-h  army.  The  provis- 
ions on  board  the  ships  of  war  in  the  possession  of  the 
French  army  will  be  taken  on  account  by  the  British  gov- 
ernment, in  like  manner  with  the  magazines  of  the  fort- 
resses. 

Art.  3.  The  general  commanding  the  British  troops  will 
take  the  necessary  measures  for  re-estaulishing  the  free  cir- 
culation of  the  means  of  subsistence  between  the  country 
and  the  capital. 

Done  and  concluded  at  Lisbon,  this  30th  day  of  •\ugust, 
I80S. 

(Signed)   Gkorre  Murrat.  quarter-master-general. 
Kellerman,  le  general  de  division. 


No.  IIL 

This  despatch  from  the  count  of  Belvedere  to  the  count  of 
Florida  Blanca,  relative  to  the  battle  of  Gamonal,  is  an  ex- 
ample of  the  habitual  exaggerations  of  the  Spanish  generals. 

[Translation.] 

Since  my  arrival  at  Burgos  I  have  been  attacked  by  the 
«Bemv  ;  in  two  affairs  I  repulsed  him  ;  but  to-day,  after  hav- 


ing sustained  his  fire  for  thirteen  hours,  he  chari^ed  me  with 
double  my  force,  besides  cavalry,  as  I  believe  he  had  three 
thousand  of  the  latter,  and  six  thousand  infantry  at  least, 
and  1  have  suffered  so  much  that  I  have  retired  on  Lerma, 
and  mean  to  assemble  my  army  at  Araiida  de  Duero.  I 
have  sustained  a  great  loss  in  men,  equipage,  and  artillery  ; 
some  guns  have  been  saved,  but  very  few.  Don  Juan  Hen- 
estrosa,  v/ho  commanded  in  the  action,  disiingui.shcd  him- 
self and  made  a  glorious  retreat ;  but  as  soon  as  the  cava  - 
ry  attacked,  all  was  confusion  and  disorder.  I  shall  send 
your  excellency  the  particulars  by  an  officer  when  thi-y  can 
be  procured.  The  volunteers  of  Zafra,  of  Sezena,  of  Valen- 
cia, and  the  first  battalion  of  infantry  at  'i'ruxiUo,  and  the 
provincials  of  Badajos,  had  not  arrived  at  Burgos,  and  con- 
sequently I  bhall  be  able  to  sustain  myself  at  Aranda,  but 
they  are  without  cartridges  and  ammunition.  I  lament 
that  the  ammunition  in  Burgos  could  not  be  brought  off 
The  enemy  followed  me  in  small  numbers:  I  am  now  re- 
tiring (10  p.  M.),  fearing  they  may  foilow  me  in  the  mor- 
ning. I  yesterday  heard  from  general  Blake,  that  ho 
feared  the  enemy  would  atttack  him  to-day,  but  liis  dispo- 
.sitions  frustrated  the  enemy's  designs,  beginning  the  action 
at  eleven  at  night. 

(Signed)  Conde  de  Belaedere. 

No.  IV. 

EXTR.VCT  FROM  A  LETTER   FROM  THE  DUKE  OF  DAL 
.MATLA.  TO  THE  AUTilUR. 

bear   sir, 

In  the  letter  which  you  did  nie  the  honour  of  addressing 
to  me,  you  request  me  to  give  you  information  respecting 
the  pursuit  of  general  Sir  John  Moore,  when  he  retreated 
on  Coruna,  in  1809.  I  suppose  you  do  not  wish  the  de- 
tails of  that  operation,  for  they  must  be  perfectly  known  to 
you  ;  but  I  eagerly  embrace  the  opportunity  which  you 
give  me,  of  rendering  to  the  memory  of  Sir  John  Mooro 
this  merited  testimony,  that  he  always  made  the  best  dis- 
position of  his  troops  which  circumstances  permitted  him, 
and  that  by  a  skilful  improvement  of  any  advantage  wliich 
localities  could  afford  for  giving  scope  to  his  valour,  he  op- 
posed to  me,  every  where,  the  most  energetic  and  best  cal- 
culated resistance ;  in  this  manner,  he  found  a  glorious 
death  before  Coruna,  in  the  midft  of  a  conflict  which  must 
do  honour  to  his  memory. 

Paris,  15  jYovember,  1824. 

No.  V. 
The  following  General  Return,  extracted  from  especial  ro 
gimental  reports,  received  at  the  Horse  Guards,  contains 
the  whole  number  of  non-commissioned  officers  and  men, 
cavalry  and  infantry,  lost  during  sir  John  Moore's  cam- 
paign :— 

Lost  at  or  previous  to  the  arrival  of  the  I  Cnvnlry    •  -  •      TS  j 
army  at  the  position  ol'  Lugo (  Inlanlry  -  ■  -  •  130:2  ( 

Of  this  number  200  were  left  in  the  wine-vaults 

of  Bembibre,  and  nearly  500  were  stragglers  from 

the  troops  that  marched  to  Vigo. 

Lost  between  the  departure  of  the  army  1  Cavalry  ....      9  )  acyt 
from    Lugo  and    Ibo  cmbarltation  at  Vliil'uulry  -  •  -  2C27  ( 
Coruna i 


Tot«L 

lay? 


Of  the  whole  number,  above  800  contn'ved  to  escape  to 
Portugal,  and  being  united  with  the  kick  left  by  the  rcgimenta 


762 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


in  thai  country,  they  formed  a  corps  of  1876  men,  which 
being  re-enibodiecl  under  the  name  of  the  battalions  of  de- 
tachments, did  good   service  at  Oporto  and  Talavcra. 

The  pieces  of  artilL'jry  abandoned  during  the  retreat  were 
■six  3-pounders. 

'l"heso  guns  were  landed  at  Coruna  without  the  general's 
knowledge:  they  never  went  beyond  Villa  Franca,  and, 
not  being  horsed,  they  were  thrown  down  the  rocks  when 
the  troops  quitted  that  town. 

The  guns  used  in  the  battle  of  Coruna  were  spiked  and 
buried  in  the  sand,  but  the  French  discovered  them. 

N.  B.  Some  trifling  errors  may  possibly  have  crept  into 
tliO  regimental  states  in  consequence  of  the  ditHculty  of  as- 
certainiiig  exactly  where  each  man  was  lost,  but  the  inac- 
curacies could  not  alTect  the  total  amount  above  fifty  men 
more  or  less. 

No.  VI. 

The  following  letters  from  lord  CoUingwood  did  not  come 
into  my  possession  before  the  present  volume  was  in  the 
press.  It  will  be  seen  that  they  corroborate  many  of  the 
opinions,  and  some  of  the  facts  that  I  have  stated,  and  they 
will  doubtless  be  read  with  the  attention  due  to  the  obser- 
vations of  such  an  honourable  and  able  man. 

TO  SIR  HEW  DALRYMPLE. 
Ocean,  Gibraltar,  3Qth  ^iu^itst,  1808. 

MY    DEAR    SIR, 

I  have  been  in  great  expectation  of  hearing  of  your  pro- 
gress with  the  army,  and  hope  the  first  account  will  he  of 
your  success  whenever  you  move.  I  have  heard  nothing 
lately  of  Junot  at  Cadiz;  but  there  have  been  accounts,  not 
very  well  authenticated,  that  Joseph  Buonaparte,  in  his  re- 
tiring to  France,  was  stopped  by  the  mass  rising  in  Biscay, 
to  the  amount  of  fourteen  thousand  well-armed  men,  v.'hich 
obliged  him  to  return  to  Burgos,  where  the  body  of  the 
Freneh  army  was  stationed. 

At  Zaragoz.i,  the  French,  in  making  their  fourteenth  at- 
tack upon  the  town,  were  defeated,  repulsed  with  great  loss, 
ond  had  retired  fiom  it.  There  is  a  deputy  here  from  that 
city  with  a  commission  from  the  marquis  de  Palafox  to  re- 
quest supplies.  The  first  aid  upon  iheir  list  is  for  ten  or 
fifteen  thousand  troops.  The  deput}"  states  they  have  few 
regulars  in  the  province,  and  the  war  has  liitherto  been  car- 
ried on  by  all  being  armed.  In  this  gentleman's  conversa- 
tion I  observe,  what  I  had  before  remarked  in  others,  that 
he  had  no  view  of  Spain  beyond  the  kingdom  of  Aragon; 
ar>d  in  re[ily  to  the  observations  I  made  on  the  necessity  of 
^  «"«intral  gov*>rr>nfient,  he  had  little  to  say,  as  if  that  had  not 
yet  been  a  subject  of  much  consideration.  I  have  great 
hope  that  general  Castaiios,  Cuesta.  and  those  captains- 
general  who  will  now  meet  at  Madrid,  will  do  something 
eflcctual  in  simplifying  the  government.  In  a  conversation 
I  had  with  Morla  on  the  necessity  of  this,  he  seemed  to 
think  the  juntas  would  make  many  difficulties,  and  retain 
iheir  present  power  as  long  as  they  couid. 

I  hope,  my  dear  sir,  you  will  give  some  directions  about 
this  puzzling  island  (Perexil)  which  it  appears  to  me  will 
not  be  of  any  future  use;  but  the  people  who  are  on  it  will 
suffer  much  in  the  winter,  without  habitations,  except  tents  ; 
I  conceive  thp  purpose  for  which  it  was  occupied  is  past, 
and  will  probably  never  return  ;  whenever  they  quit  it,  they 
•hould  I  ring  the  stores  away  as  quietly  as  possible;  for,  if  I 
•at  not  mistaken,  the  emperor  has  an  intention  to  keep 


them,  and  w'"  remonstrate  against  their  going.     I  hopcyov 
have  received  good  accounts  from  lady  Dalrymple,  &c. 

•  ••••« 

I  am  to  sail  to-day  for  Toulon,  where  everything  indi» 
cates  an  intention  in  the  French  to  sail.  Mr.  Dull' brought 
a  million  of  dollars  to  Seville,  and  has  instructions  to  conh 
municate  with  the  junta ;  but  he  appears  to  me  to  be  too  old 
to  do  it  as  major  Cox  has  done  ;  he  is  still  there,  and  T  core* 
dude  will  wait  for  your  instructions.  Mr.  Marklana 
would  accept  with  great  thankfulness  the  proposal  you 
made  to  bim  to  go  to  Valencia. 

I  beg  my  kind  regards,  &c. 

CoLLIXGWOOD, 

p.  S.  Prince  Leopold  is  still  here,  and  I  understand  in 
tends  to  stay  until  ho  hears  from  Eng'and.  I  have  given 
passports  for  Dupont  and  a  number  of  French  <  (Ticcrs  to  go 
to  France  on  parole,  ninety-three  in  number.  General 
Morla  was  impatient  to  get  them  out  of  the  country.  The 
Spaniards  were  much  irritated  against  them  :  they  wero 
not  safe  from  their  revenge,  except  in  St.  Sebastian's  castle. 


TO  SIR  HEW  DALRYMPLE. 
Ocean,  off  Toulon,  October  18,  1808. 

MY    DEAR    Sin, 

I  have  received  the  favour  of  your  letters  of  the  27ih 
August  and  5th  September,  and  beg  to  offer  you  my  sin- 
cere congratulations  on  the  success  of  the  British  army  in 
Portugal,  which  I  hope  will  have  satisfied  the  French  that 
they  are  not  those  invii;cibLe  creatures  which  Buonaparte 
had  endeavoured  to  persuade  them  they  were. 

It  it  a  happy  event  to  have  rescued  Portugal  from  the 
government  of  France  ;  and  their  carrying  off  a  little  plun- 
der is  a  matter  of  very  secondary  consideration  ;  perhaps  it 
may  have  the  good  effect  of  keeping  up  the  animosity  of 
the  Portuguese  who  suffer,  and  incite  them  to  more  resist- 
ance in  future. 

The  great  business  now  is  to  endeavour  to  establish  thai 
sort  of  government,  and  organize  that  sort  of  military  force, 
which  nay  give  security  to  the  country  ;  and  the  great  dif- 
ficulty in  Portugal  will  be  to  find  men  who  are  of  ability  to 
place  at  the  head  of  the  several  departments,  wlio  have  pa- 
triotism ta  devote  themselves  to  its  service,  and  vigour  to 
maintain  its  independence.  In  a  country  exhausted  like 
Portugal,  it  will  require  much  ingenious  expedient  to  sup- 
ply the  want  of  wealth  and  of  everything  military.  If  it  is 
not  found  in  the  breasts  of  those  to  whom  the  pcojile  look 
up,  Portugal  will  remain  in  a  hapless  and  uncertain  state 
still. 

I  have  not  heard  from  sir  Charles  Cotton  how  he  set- 
tlod  his  terms  with  the  Russian  admiral :  but  as  soon  as  he 
has  got  possession  of  the  ships  to  be  sent  to  England,  they 
cannot  but  be  good.  The  hoisting  the  English  flag  on  the 
fort  which  surrendered  to  our  troops,  I  conclude,  would  bt, 
explained  to  the  Portuguese  as  not  to  be  understood  as  ta- 
king possession  by  England  for  other  purpose  than  to  be 
restored  to  its  prince,  as  was  done  at  Madeira;  but  in  this 
instance  it  ought  to  have  been  though.t  necessary  to  deprive 
Siniavin  of  the  argument  he  would  have  used  of  the  neu- 
trality of  the  Portuguese  flag,  with  whom  his  nation  was  I 
not  at  ivar.  ' 

I  left  Cadiz  the  moment  everything  in  that  quarter  was 
pacific;  and  Mr.  Duff  arrived  tlieie  with  a  million  of  dol- 
lars for  their  use  ;  this  money  was  sent  to  the  junta  of  Se« 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


753 


ville,  where  I  am  afraid  there  are  many  mcmbe^  unworlliy 
of  the  trust. 

I  have  only  heard  once  from  Cox  since  I  left  that  quarter. 
After  getting  the  money,  father  Gill  seemed  to  have  dropt 
his  coiumunications  with  major  C,  and  their  discussions 
were  not  of  a  nature  to  excite  much  public  interest ;  they 
cons'.sted  more  in  private  bickerings  than  of  grave  consult 
for  the  public  weal.  Tilly  seems  to  have  been  entirely  dis- 
appointed ia  his  project,  both  in  respect  to  the  annexation 
of  southern  Portugal  to  Andalusia  and  the  pension  of  12,- 
000  dollars  for  his  service  in  the  supreme  council:  of  those 
you  will  be  informed  by  major  f/ox.  I  am  afraid  I  related 
the  proceedings  to  his  majesty's  ministers  of  events  which 
were  passing  almost  under  my  eye,  and  gave  my  opinion 
on  thein  with  too  great  freedom  ;  I  mean  with  a  freedom 
that  is  not  usual  ;  but  they  were  facts  of  which,  without  be- 
ing possessed,  his  majesty's  ministers  could  not  have  a 
knowledge  of  the  real  state  of  affairs  in  Spain  ;  and  the 
sentiments  those  facts  inspired  were  necessary  to  explain 
my  motives  and  the  rule  of  conduct  which  I  pursued.  And 
still  I  consider  the  great  and  only  danger  to  which  Spain 
is  now  exposed  is,  the  supposition  that  the  whole  nation  is 
possessed  of  the  same  patriotism  which,  in  Andalusia,  Ar- 
agon,  and  Valencia,  led  to  such  glorious  results.  It  is  far 
otherwise.  There  are  not  many  Castanoses,  nor  Cuestas, 
nor  Palafoxes ;  and  take  from  Spain  the  influence  of  the 
clergy,  and  its  best  resource  of  power  would  be  lost ;  wher- 
ever tills  influence  is  least,  the  war  is  languid, 

I  wrote  to  you  some  time  since  to  represent  the  state  of 
Catalonia.  Nothing  can  be  more  indifferent  to  the  cause 
than  they  appear  to  be  ;  yet  the  common  peasantry  have 
not  less  spirit  nor  less  desire  to  repel  their  enemy.  They 
have  no  leaders.  Palacio,  the  captain-general,  stays  at  Vil- 
la Franca,  west  of  Barcelona,  talking  of  what  he  intends 
to  do  ;  and  the  people  speak  of  him  as  either  wanting  zeal 
in  their  cause  or  ability  to  direct  them;  while  the  French 
from  Barcelona  and  Figneras  do  just  what  they  please. 
When  the  French  attacked  Gerona,  he  did  nothing  lo 
buccour  it.  The  greatest  discomfiture  they  suffered  was 
from  Lord  Cochrane,  who,  while  they  were  employed  at 
the  siege,  blew  up  the  road,  making  deep  trenches  in  a  part 
where  the  fire  of  his  ships  could  be  brought  upon  ;  and 
when  they  came  tliere  he  drove  them  from  their  guns,  Idllcd 
many,  and  took  some  cannon. 

The  French  fleet  is  here  quite  ready  for  sea,  and  I  am 
doing  all  that  is  in  my  power  to  meet  them  when  they  do 
come  out.  It  is  an  arduous  service:  the  last  ten  days  vv'e 
have  had  qnlci  of  wind  incessantly  ;  the  difficulty  of  keep- 
ing a  suffi;i2nt  squadron  is  very  great.  I  think  the  storms 
from  those  Alpine  mountains  are  harder  than  in  England, 
und  of  more  duration.  I  beg  my  best  regards  lo  captain 
Dairy  mple,  and  my  sincerest  wishes  for  every  success  to 
attend  you. 

I  am,  my  dear  sir  Hew, 

Your  obedient  and  most  humble  servant, 

GOLLIXCWOOD. 

P.  S.  In  the  letter  which  I  wrote  to  you  on  the  state  of 
i^atalonia  I  represented  the  necessity  of  sending  a  body  of 
British  troops  to  Catalonia.  There  is  no  other  prospect  of 
the  French  being  kept  in  any  bounds.  The  avenues  to 
France  are  as  open  now  as  at  any  time  they  have  been. 

I  liave  kept  a  ship  always  at  Rosas  Bay  ;  her  marines 
have  garrisoned  the  castle,  and  her  com[)any  assisted  in  re- 
pairing the  works.  The  French  appear  to  have  designs  on 
that  place.  The  presence  of  the  English  alone  prevents 
them..     If  18,000  men  were  here  of  our  army,  I  think  they 


would  make  Mr.  Palacio  come  forward,  and  p'-n  tiie  whole 
country  into  activity,  which  till  then  I  don't  think  thej 
ever  will  be. 

CoLI.INOWOOD. 

They  want  an  English  resident  at  Gerona,  that  they  maj 
hHVe  somebody  to  apjily  to  for  succour     .... 
[The  rest  torn  off  in  the  original.] 


TO  SIR  HEW  DALRYMPLE. 

Ocean,  of  Minorca,  Jljiril  8,   1809. 

MT    DGAK    SIB, 

I  received  the  favour  of  your  letter  a  few  days  ago,  which 
gave  me  great  pleasure,  after  all  the  trouble  and  vexations 
you  have  had,  to  hear  you  were  all  well. 

I  was  exceedingly  sorry  when  I  saw  the  angry  mood  in 
which  the  convention  in  Portugal  was  taken  up,  even  be- 
fore the  circumstances  which  led  to  it  were  at  al!  known. 
Before  our  arniy  landed  in  Portugal,  the  French  forca 
was  reported  to  be  very  small.  I  remember  its  being  said 
that  a  body  of  5000  troops  were  all  that  was  necessary  to 
dispossess  Junot.  I  conclude  ihe  same  sort  of  report  went 
to  England  ;  and  this,  with  the  victory  that  was  obtained, 
led  people  to  expect  the  extermination  of  the  few  French 
which  were  supposed  to  be  there  ;  and  when  once  the  idea 
is  entertained,  people  shut  their  eyes  to  difliculties, 

I  remember  what  you  told  me,  the  last  lime  I  saw  yoa 
off  Cadiz,  of  the  communication  which  might  be  made  to 
you  by  an  officer  who  possessed  the  entire  confidence  of 
ministers.  I  thought  then,  that  whatever  ministers  had  to 
communicate  to  a  commander-in-chief,  could  not  be  done 
better  than  by  themselves  :  for  intermediate  communica- 
tions are  always  in  danger  of  being  misunsJerstood,  and  nev- 
er fail  to  cause  doubts  and  disturb  the  judgement.  I  hope 
now  it  is  all  over,  and  your  uneasiness  on  that  subject  at  an 
end. 

My  labours  I  think  will  never  cease.  I  am  worn  down 
hj'  fatigue  of  mind,  with  anxiety  and  sorrow  ;  my  health  is 
very  much  impaired;  and  while  our  affairs  require  an  in- 
creased energy,  I  find  myself  less  able  to  conduct  them 
from  natural  causes.  I  give  all  my  thoughts  and  lime,  but 
have  interruptions,  from  my  weak  state  of  body,  which  the 
service  will  scarcely  admit  of  I  never  felt  the  severity  of 
winter  more  than  this  last.  They  were  not  gales  of  wind, 
but  hurricanes  ;  and  the  consequence  is,  that  the  fleet  has 
suffered  very  much,  and  many  of  the  ships  very  infirm. 

I  would  not  have  kept  the  sea  so  long,  because  I  know 
the  system  of  blockading  must  be  ruinous  to  our  fleet  at  last, 
and  in  no  instance  that  I  can  recollect  has  prevented  the 
enemy  from  sailing.  In  the  spring  we  are  found  all  rags, 
while  they,  nursed  through  the  tempest,  are  all  trim.  I 
would  not  have  done  it ;  but  what  would  have  become  of 
me  if,  in  my  preserving  the  ships,  the  French  had  sailed, 
and  effected  any  thing  in  any  quarter!  The  clamour  would 
have  been  loud,  and  they  would  have  sought  only  for  the 
cause  ill  my  treachery  or  folly,  for  none  can  understand 
that  there  is  any  bad  weather  in  the  Mediterranean.  'I'ho 
system  of  blockade  is  ruinous  ;  but  it  has  continued  so  long, 
and  so  much  to  the  advantage  of  the  mercantile  part  of  the 
nation,  that  I  fear  no  minister  will  be  found  bo'd  enough  to 
discontinue  it.  We  undertake  nothing  against  the  enemy, 
but  seem  to  think  it  enough  to  i)revenl  him  taking  ou» 
brigs  ;  his  fleet  is  growing  lo  a  monstrous  r)rce,  while  ours 
every  day  gives  more  proof  of  its  Increasinji  decrepitude. 

Of  the  Spaniards  I  would  not  s.iy  much  ;  I  was  never 


764 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


■anguine  in  the  prospect  of  success,  and  have  no  reason  to 
change  my  opinion  ;  the  lower  class  of  people,  those  who 
are  under  the  influence  of  priests,  would  do  anything  were 
they  under  proper  direction ;  but  directors  are  ditiicult  to  be 
found.  'I'here  is  a  c:iiiker  in  the  state:  none  of  the  superior 
orders  are  serious  in  their  resistance  to  the  French,  and  have 
only  taken  i)art  against  them  tlius  far  from  ap[)r('hension  of 
the  reseiilrnent  of  the  people.  I  believe  the  junta  is  not  free 
from  the  taint  of  the  infection,  or  would  thoy  have  contin- 
ued Vives  Don  Miguel,  in  high  and  important  command 
after  such  evident  proofs  as  he  gave  of  want  of  loyalty? 
I  do  not  know  what  is  thought  of  Irifantado  in  England  ; 
but  in  my  mind,  the  man,  the  duke  (for  his  rank  has  a 
great  deal  to  do  with  it,)  who  would  seat  himself  in  Buo- 
rapartc's  council  at  Bayonne,  sign  his  decrees,  which  were 
<]istriliute<l  in  Spain,  and  then  say  he  was  forced  to  do  it, 
is  not  the  man  who  will  do  much  in  maintaining  the  glory 
or  the  independence  of  any  country  ;  no  such  man  should 
be  trusted  now.  The  Frenci  troops  are  mostly  withdrawn 
from  Spain,  except  such  as  a  e  necessary  to  hold  certain 
etrong  po?ts,  and  enable  them  to  return  without  impedi- 
ment. Figueras,  Barcelona,  and  Rosas,  are  held  here  in 
Catalonia,  and  of  course  the  country  quite  open  to  them. 
Will  the  Spaniards  dispossess  them?  The  junta  does  not 
seem  to  know  anything  of  the  provinces  at  a  distance  from 
them.  .\t  Tarragona  the  troops  are  ill-clothed,  and  with- 
out fay  ;  on  one  occasion  they  could  not  marcli  against  the 
enemy,  having  no  shoes,  and  yet  at  Cadiz  they  have  fifty- 
one  millions  of  dollars.  Cadiz  seems  to  be  a  general  depot 
01  cveiything  they  can  get  from  England.  If  they  are 
not  active  the  next  two  months.  Spain  is  lost. 
I  hope  lady  Dalrymple,  &lc.  &c. 
I  f'ei  t.r^,  my  dear  r,ir, 

Your  very  faithful  and  obedient  servant, 

CoLLISCWOOD. 

No.  VII. 

NAUKATtVE  OF  THE  PROCEKDIIVGS  OF  MAJOR  GENE 
RAl.  MACKENZIE'S  DETAC1IME\T  FROM  LISBON  TO 
CADIZ. 

"  The  detachment  sailed  from  Lisbon  on  the  2d  Febru- 
ary, 1809.  and  arrived  at  (3adiz  harbour  on  the  Ijth,  at  night. 
I  immediately  waiteil  on  rear-admiral  Purvis,  and  from  him 
I  learnt  there  are  some  difficulties  started  by  the  marquis 
Villel  (the  commissioner  from  the  central  junta,  as  well  as 
a  member  of  it)  to  our  landing  and  occupying  Cadiz.  I 
then  waited  on  Sir  (icorge  Smith,  on  shore,  where  this  in- 
telligence was,  in  some  degree,  confirmed  ;  but  Sir  George 
still  expBCSscil  an  expectation  that  the  ol>jections  would  l)e 
got  over.  These  objections  had  been,  it  seems,  but  lately 
started.  Next  morning  I  saw  Mr.  Charles  Stewart,  w-ho 
was  acting  under  a  diplomatic  authority  from  Mr  Frere, 
and  had  »  conference  with  him  and  sir  G.  Smith,  when  I 
exj)laint'd  the  nature  of  my  orders,  and  it  was  determined 
to  wait  on  the  marquis  Villel.  Mr.  Stuart  explained  to  the 
nnrquis  that  the  object  of  my  coming  was  to  offer  our  as- 
«istance  in  the  occupation  and  defence  of  Cadiz,  and  in 
making  the  necessary  preparations  for  such  an  event;  that 
we  were  only  the  advance  of  a  larger  corps  coming  from 
England,  to  act  from  this  side  against  the  common  enemy. 
The  marquis  hesitated,  and,  after  some  speeches  of  compli- 
anent.  paid  his  authority  did  not  exiet  J  so  far;  that  be  must 
wnit  for  irntructions  from  the  central  government;  and,  in 
the  mean  time,  said  he  coulil  permi*  our  landing  at  Port 
St.  Mary's.     This  I  ^.»:'.ined,  as  an  unnecessary  ,oss  of 


time,  and  •ontrary  to  my  orders;  and  it  was  then  agreed 
to  wait  for  the  drcision  of  the  central  junta  rom  Seville. 
I  thcreuji^n  wrote  to  Mr.  Frere,  and  sent  him  a  copy  of 
my  instructions  from  sir  J.  Cradock. 

'l"he  decision  of  the  junta  was  received  on  the  Rlh:  and 
I  received  a  letter  from  Mr.  Frere,  which  put  an  end,  for 
the  moment,  to  our  hope  of  occujiying  Cadiz.  'J'he  reason 
assigned  by  the  junta  was  of  the  most  flimsy  nature,  viz. 
"  'i'hat  they  had  ordered  two  of  their  own  battalions  to  oc- 
cupy Cadiz;"  a  measure  which  was  evidently  the  thought 
of  the  moment,  and  a  mere  pretext. 

Although  I  cannot  presume  to  judge  of  the  evil  political 
consequences  which  might  arise  from  such  a  measure,  as 
alluded  to  in  Mr.  Frere's,  yet  I  had  every  reason  to  believe, 
as  well  from  the  opinion  of  sir  G.  Smith,  as  of  all  others 
conversant  in  the  sentiments  of  the  people  of  Cadiz,  that 
our  landing  and  occupying  the  place  would  be  a  very  pop- 
ular measure.  Mr.  Frere's  letter  expressed  a  great  desire 
that  we  should  not  appear  to  have  made  an  olfcr  that  was 
refused  ;  and  was  desirous  that  we  should  not  immediately 
depart,  but  that  we  should  land  and  occupy  the  canton- 
ments ofiered  to  us.  On  consulting  with  sir  G.  Smith 
and  Mr.  Stuart,  this  appeared  to  be  contrary  to  the  grounds 
on  which  we  had  set  out;  but  as  we  were  equally  desirous 
not  to  appear  at  variance  with  the  Spanish  government,  we 
agreed  to  submit  to  Mr.  Frere,  whether  it  would  not  bo 
better  for  the  troops  to  remain  for  the  present  in  their  trans- 
ports, as  we  had  already  stated  that  we  were  in  expccta 
tion  of  being  immediatelj- joined  by  a  force  from  England, 
the  scene  of  whose  operations  was  uncertain  ;  and  our  re- 
maining in  the  harbour  under  this  idea  would  ans'.ver  every 
purpose  Mr.  Frere  proposed  by  a  landing. 

I  had,  besides,  some  military  objections  to  a  landing; 
for,  without  reckoning  the  uncertainty  of  an  embarkation 
from  Port  St.  Mary's,  I  knew  how  dilatory  all  proceedings 
are  in  Spain.  That  if  we  were  once  placed  in  the  scatter- 
ed cantonments  proposed,  and  we  had  a  sudden  call  for 
embarkation,  above  a  week  would  have  been  lost  in  effect- 
ing it ;  and  from  former  experience,  the  effects  of  a  certain 
disorder  would,  probably,  have  thrown  a  large  number  of 
our  men  into  the  hospitals.  It  is  further  evident  that  the 
detachment  could  not  have  been  re-embaiked  without  some 
stain  on  the  national  honour.  It  must  have  very  soon 
marched  into  the  interior  of  Spain,  and  thus  have  involved 
our  country  in  its  support,  without  having  obtained  tho 
object  for  which  it  was  detached — the  possession  of  Cadiz. 
On  all  these  considerations  I  thought  it  right  to  defer  land- 
ing, until  we  should  hear  further  from  Mr.  Frere,  to  whom 
both  Mr.  Stuart  and  myself  wrote,  and  I  presume  he  was 
satisfied  with  the  reasons  given.  In  all  these  proceedings 
I  had  the  cordial  approbation  of  sir  G.  Smith,  who,  not- 
withstanding unfavourable  appearances,  seemed  sanguine 
to  the  last  that  the  point  would  be  carried.  I  therefore 
wrote  to  sir  J.  Cradock,  by  the  Hope  brig,  on  the  9th, 
stating  what  had  been  done,  and  that  we  should  remain  in 
Cadiz  harbour  (with  Mr.  Frere's  approbation)  until  wo 
received  orders  from  him  or  from  England.  And  I  wrote, 
l)y  the  same  conveyance,  to  the  same  purport,  to  Lord  Cast- 
lereagh. 

On  the  I5th,  we  had  the  misfortune  to  lose  sir  G.  Smith, 
who  died  that  morning;  and  on  the  I8tb,  I  received  a  let- 
ter from  Mr.  Frere,  in  which  he  seemed  to  have  altered  his 
opinion  as  to  the  projiriety  of  our  occupying  Cadiz,  and 
stating  that  the  only  intHlc  which  appeared  to  him  likely  to 
succeed  in  obtaining  the  possession  was  my  leaving  a  small 
part  of  my  detachment  there,  and  proceeding  with,  the  rest 
to  joi_  Cuesta's  army;  that,  a:>  a  force  was  expected   from 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


765 


England  for  ihe  same  purpose  for  which  my  detachment 
came,  what  I  left  hehind  might  follow  me  on  their  arrival. 

I  confess  I  was  much  disappointed  at  this  proposal,  the 
whole  of  my  detachment  not  appearing  more  th.an  equal 
to  the  charge  of  the  place  ;  but  as  it  had  not  been  laid  be- 
fore the  junta,  I  considered  it  my  duty  to  state  the  objec- 
tions to  it,  as  they  arose  out  of  my  instructions.  Such  a 
measure  would  have  completely  committed  our  country,  in 
a  particular  point,  in  the  interior,  with  a  very  small  detach- 
ment, a  thing  which  I  was  instructed  his  majesty's 
ministers  wished  to  avoid ;  whilst  the  admittance  of  a 
handful  of  men  could  not  be  considered  as  any  possession 
of  the  placa,  where  there  were  about  four  thousand  volun- 
teers well  drilled.  I  therefore  submitted  to  Mr.  Frere, 
to  defer  the  proposition  of  this  measure  until  the  arrival  of 
the  troops  from  England,  which  might  be  looked  for,  ac- 
cording to  his  statement,  every  hour.  We  should  be,  then, 
in  a  condition  to  take  possession  of  Cadiz  effectually,  and 
advance,  in  some  point,  respectably,  towards  the  enemy. 
If,  however,  Mr.  Frere  should  determine  to  bring  forward 
the  measure  immediately,  I  further  informed  him,  that  I 
was  ready  to  move  on,  as  soon  as  we  could  obtain  the  ne- 
cessary equipments. 

Mr.  Stuart  embarked  on  the  21st,  on  board  the  Ambus, 
cade,  on  a  secret  mission.  On  the  22d,  and  before  I  re- 
ceived any  further  communication  from  Mr.  Frere,  a  popu- 
lar commotion  broke  out  suddenly  at  Cadiz,  in  consequence 
of  the  measure  which  the  junta  had  adopted,  of  marching 
Bome  of  their  own  troops  into  the  town,  as  the  reason  (or 
rather  pretext)  for  declining  to  receive  us.  The  regiment 
now  on  its  march  in,  was  composed  of  Poles,  Swiss,  and 
other  foreigners,  deserters  from  the  French  army,  whose 
entrance  the  people  were  determined  to  resist.  The  utmost 
care  was  taken  to  prevent  our  officers  or  soldiers  from  ta- 
king any  part  whatever  on  this  occasion;  and,  except  in 
some  cases  where  I  was  applied  to  by  the  governor,  for  the 
interference  of  some  British  olHoers  as  mediators,  we  steer- 
ed perfectly  clear.  It  was  now  evident  that  the  people 
_  were  favourable  to  our  landing  and  occupying  the  town, 
P        for  it  was  frequently  called  for  during  the  tumult. 

As  soon  as  I  could  safely  send  an  account  of  this  com- 
motion to  Mr.  Frere,  I  despatched  an  officer  (captain  Kelly, 
assistant  quarter-master-general)  with  a  detail.  The  Fis- 
guard  sailed  on  the  24th,  for  Lisbon  and  England,  by  which 
ship  I  informed  sir  J.  Cradock,  as  well  as  lord  Castlereagh, 
of  all  that  had  passed  since  my  last;  and  just  at  that  time 
colonel  Roche  arrived  from  Seville.  He  was  sent  down, 
by  M.  Frere,  to  Cadiz,  in  consequence  of  Mr.  Stuart's  mis- 
sion. I  had  till  now  expected  Mr.  Frere's  decision,  on  the 
subject  of  the  proposition  in  his  letter  of  the  18th  ;  but  as 
an  much  time  had  elapsed,  I  conjectured  he  might  have 
dropped  it  for  the  present ;  and  conceiving  that  something 
favourable  to  the  object  of  ray  mission  might  be  drawn 
from  the  present  state  of  things,  I  had  a  full  conversation 
with  colonel  Koche  on  the  subject.  He  told  me  the  junta 
were  dissatisfied  with  our  not  having  accepted  the  canton- 
ments offered  to  us  ;  but  he  did  not  seem  to  think  our  views 
unattainable,  particularly  at  the  present  moment.  I  asked 
his  opinion  as  to  the  practicability  of  general  Stuart's  being 
admitted,  with  two  of  my  three  battalions,  into  Cadiz,  if  I 
advanced  with  the  third  to  Seville  to  join  the  fortieth  regi- 
ment, thus  making  an  equal  division  of  my  force.  Colonel 
Roche  was  of  opinion  that  this  would  be  acceded  to;  and 
I,  therefore,  despatched  him,  as  soon  as  possible,  with  a 
proposal  to  this  effect  to  Mr.  Frere.  Though  two  battalions 
«.ould  not  be  considered  a  sufficient  garrison,  yet,  from  the 
evident  popularity  of  our  troops,  and  the  speedy  expecta- 


tion of  a  reinforcement  from  England,  1  ..jought  it  would 
be  extremely  jiroper  to  make  the  trial.  It  also  ajipearrd  to 
me  that  by  advancing  to  Seville  I  should  not  run  much 
risk  of  involving  those  two  battalions  in  any  operations  be- 
fore the  arrival  of  general  Slierbrooke,  which  could  embar- 
rass him  in  the  execution  of  the  orders  he  might  bring 
from  home. 

This  proposition  certainly  exceeded  any  thing  authori-^ 
zed  by  my  instructions,  but,  I  trust,  the  circums>tanccb  will 
be  found  to  warrant  it. 

After  colonel  Roche's  departure  for  Seville,  Captain 
Kelly  returned  from  thence,  on  the  2Cth,  with  a  verbal  con- 
fidential message  from  Mr.  Frere,  stating  that  marshal  Soult 
was  marching  from  Gallieia  into  Portugal,  in  three  col- 
umns, and  that  Mr.  Frere  would  write  to  me  by  express, 
or  by  next  post.  On  the  27th,  I  received  this  promised  let- 
ter, enclosing  the  copy  of  an  intercepted  letter  from  Soult 
to  Joseph  Buonaparte  ;  and  Mr.  Frere  expresses  his  opin- 
ion that  my  detachment  may  now  be  more  useful  in  Portu- 
gal than  at  Cadiz. 

Knowing,  as  I  did  before  I  left  Lisbon,  that  every  proper 
step  was  taking  for  evacuating  Portugal,  in  case  of  necessi- 
ty, and  that  nothing  else  than  succours  from  home  could 
enable  sir  John  Cradock  to  hold  his  ground  there,  it  be- 
came more  than  ever  necessary  to  ascertain  whether  his 
army  will  be  received  into  Cadiz,  in  case  of  the  evacuation 
of  Portugal.  In  case  the  present  negotiation  succeeded, 
I  had  arranged  with  admiral  Purvis  to  send  a  frigate  with 
the  intelligence  to  Lisbon  immediately.  If  it  failed,  every 
thing  was  in  readiness  to  sail  with  the  detachment  thither: 
for,  although  the  assistarfce  I  should  bring  might  not  be 
sufficient  of  itself  to  make  any  alteration  in  the  resolutions 
already  taken,  yet,  if  reinforcements  arrived  from  E)^gland, 
we  should  be  a  welcome  addition. 

On  the  morning  of  the  2d  of  March  I  received  a  letter 
from  colonel  Roche,  dated  February  2S,  stating  that  my 
proposition  had  not  yet  been  decided  on.  but  that  it  would 
be  taken  into  consideration  that  day.  He  expressed  much 
apprehension  of  a  party  in  the  French  interest. 

The  morning  of  the  3d  having  passed  without  any  letter 
from  Mr.  Frere  or  colonel  Roche,  as  I  had  been  assured 
by  the  latter  I  should  receive,  at  furthest  by  the  post  of 
that  morning,  I  despatched  another  courier,  dreading  some 
accident.  In  the  afternoon,  however,  I  received  a  long 
and  important  letter  from  Mr.  Frere,  from  which  I  conclu- 
ded the  negotiation  had  failed  (although  he  did  not  say  so 
in  terms  ;)  and  a  letter  I  received  shortly  afterwards  from 
colonel  Roche  confirmed  this  failure.  Mr.  Frere's  letter 
entered  very  minutely  into  the  state  of  the  Spanish  and 
French  armies;  mentioned  the  failure  of  Soult's  attempt  to 
penetrate  into  Portugal  by  the  Minho.  and  the  iini/robabil- 
ity  of  his  persisting  in  it,  from  the  position  of  the  Spanish 
army,  assisted  by  the  Portuguese.  He  then  points  out,  in 
strong  terms,  the  essential  use  my  detachment  would  be  of 
at  Tarragona,  in  giving  spirit  and  vigour  to  the  cause  in 
that  country,  where  it  is  most  in  need  of  support. 

As  the  return  of  my  detachment  to  Portugal,  except 
in  the  case  of  resisting  the  enemy,  would  not  have  a  fa- 
vourable appearance  ;  and  the  proceeding  to  Tarragona 
would  so  evidently  show  our  determination  to  support  the 
general  cause,  and  leave  the  Spanish  government  without 
an  excuse  afterwards  for  refusing  to  admit  our  troops 
into  Cadiz,  it  was  my  intention  to  have  complied  with 
Mr.  Frere's  solicitations,  as  the  employment  of  my  detach- 
ment on  the  seacoast  would  easily  admit  of  its  being  after- 
wards withdrawn,  without  committing  any  other  British 
force  for  its  support;  and  the  motives  urged  by  Mr.  Frera 


T6« 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


were  so  stronij,  that  I  scarcely  thought  myself  vindicablc 
ia  hesitating  to  comply. 

I  acconling'y  wrote  on  the  night  of  the  3J  March  to  this 
cfTect  to  Mr.  Frerc,  sir  J.  Crailock,  and  lord  Castlereagh. 
But  on  t!ic  4tii,  in  the  evening.  Captain  Cooke,  of  the 
Coldstream  guards,  arrived  from  England  with  despatches 
from  general  yhcrbrooke,  who  had  not  yet  arrived.  Cap- 
tain Cooke  came  in  the  Eclair  brig  of  war,  and  had  stopped 
■t  Lisbon,  which  he  again  left  on  the  evening  of  the  2d, 
and  brought  me  a  message  to  the  following  purport  from 
sir  J.  Cradock,  viz.  "  That  he  was  determined  to  defend 
Portugal  to  the  utmost  of  his  power;  that  in  this  situation 
he  considered  my  detachment  as  the  choice  part  of  his  little 
Krmy  ;  that  the  enemy  were  actually  on  the  borders,  though 
there  was  not  yet  any  intelligence  of  their  having  entered 
Portugal ;  and  that  unless  some  extraordinary  circumstance, 
ofwhicli  he  could  form  no  idea,  prevented  it,  he  should 
look  for  my  immediate  return  to  Lisbon." 

This  order,  of  course,  put  an  end  to  all  further  delibera- 
tion. Thi"  idea  of  proceeding  to  Tarragona  was  nbandon- 
ed.  I  wrote  to  this  effect  to  Mr.  Frere,  and  embarked  at 
midnight  on  the  4th.  Contrary  winds  detained  in  Cadiz 
harbour  tho  whole  of  the  5th,  but  on  the  6th  the  fleet  sailed, 
and  arrived  in  the  Tagus  on  the  12th. 

I  trust,  in  the  whole  of  these  proceedings,  in  a  very  in- 
tricate and  delicate  situation,  an  honest  and  anxious  desire 
has  been  evinced  on  my  part,  to  accomplish  the  object  of 
my  mission  ;  the  failure  of  which,  I  am  persuaded,  will  be 
found  to  aris'j  from  tlie  apprehensions  and  disunion  of  the 
central  junta,  and  not  from  the  inclinations  of  the  people  at 
Cadiz. 

(Signed)  J.   R.   Mackkxzie, 

J\Iajoi'-  General. 

Lisbon,  Jftirch  13,  1809. 

No.  VIIL 

SIR  ARTHUR  WELLESLEY  TO  SIR  J   CRADUCK. 

Lisbon,  April  23. 

Mr.  Villiers  will  have  informed  you  of  my  arrival  here 
yesterday,  and  of  the  concurrence  of  my  opinion  with  that 
which  you  appear  to  entertain  in  respect  to  the  further 
movements  to  the  northward.  I  conclude  that  you  will 
have  determined  to  halt  the  army  at  Leyria.  I  think  that. 
before  any  further  steps  are  taken  in  respect  to  Soult,  it 
would  be  desirable  to  consider  the  situation  of  Victor ;  how 
ftr  he  is  enabled  to  nrake  an  attack  upon  Portugal,  and 
the  means  of  defence  of  the  east  of  Portugal  while  the  Bri- 
tish will  be  to  the  northward,  and,  eventually,  the  means 
of  defence  of  Lisbon  and  the  Tagus,  in  case  this  attack 
should   be  made  upon  the  country. 

All  these  subjects  must  have  been  considered  by  you  ; 
and,  I  fear,  in  no  very  satisfactory  light,  as  you  appear  to 
have  moveil  to  the  northward  unwillingly  :  and  I  should  be 
glad  to  talk  ihem  over  with  you. 

In  order  to  consider  of  some  of  them,  and  to  make  vari- 
ous arrangements,  which  can  be  made  only  here,  I  have 
requested  marshal  Beresford  to  come  here,  if  he  should  not 
deem  his  al)Sf'nce  from  the  Portuguese  troops,  in  tlie  present 
state,  likelv  to  be  disad'-antageous  to  the  public  service  ; 
and  I  have  directed  him  to  let  you  know  whether  he  will 
OJmc  or  not. 

\.  might,  probably,  also  be  more  agreeable  and  conveni- 
ent to  yon  to  see  mc  here  than  with  the  army  ;  and  if  this 
should  be  the  case       irould  be  a  most  convenient  arrange- 


ment to  me  to  meet  you  here.  I  beg,  however,  that  yon 
will  consider  this  proposition  only  in  a  view  to  your  own 
convenience  and  wishes.  If  you  should,  however,  choosa 
to  come,  I  shall  be  very  much  obliged  to  you  if  you  will 
bring  with  you  the  adjutant-general  and  quarter-master- 
general,  the  chief  engineer  and  the  commanding  officer  of 
the  artillery,  and  the  commissary. 

Ever  yours,  &c. 

AnTHUR   Wellkslkt. 
N.  B.  Some  paragraphs  of  a  private  nature  arc  omitted. 


EXTRACTS  OF  A  LETTER   FROM  SIR  ARTHUR  WELLES. 
LEY  TO  LORD  CASTLERE.\GH. 

Lisbon,  Api-il  24,  1809. 
"  I  arrived  here  on  Saturday,  and  found  that  sir  John 
Cradock  and  general  Beresford  had  moved  up  the  country,, 
to  the  northward,  with  the  troops  under  their  command 
respectively ;  the  former  to  Leyria,  and  the  latter  to  Tho- 
mar.  Sir  John  Cradock,  however,  does  not  ap[)car  to  have 
entertained  any  decided  intention  of  moving  forward  ;  on 
the  contrary,  indeed,  he  appears,  by  his  letters  to  Mr.  Vil- 
liers, to  have  intended  to  go  no  further  till  he  should  hear 
that  Victor's  movements  were  decided,  and,  therefore,  I 
consider  affairs  in  this  country  to  be  exactly  in  the  state  in 
which,  if  I  found  them,  it  was  the  intention  of  the  king's 
minister  that  I  should  assume  the  command  ;  and,  accord- 
ingly, I  propose  to  assume  it  as  soon  as  I  shall  communi- 
cate with  sir  John  Cradock.  I  have  written  to  him,  and  to 
general  Beresford,  to  apprize  him  that  I  conceive  advantage 
will  result  from  our  meeting  here,  and  I  expect  them  both 
here  as  soon  as  possible.  In  respect  to  the  enemy,  Soult 
is  still  at  Oporto,  and  he  has  not  pushed  his  posts  to  the- 
southward  further  than  the  river  Vouga.  He  has  nothing 
in  Tras  os  Monies  since  the  loss  of  Chaves,  of  which  you 
have  been  most  probably  apprized  ;  but  he  has  some  posts 
on  the  river  Tamcga,  which  divides  that  province  from 
Minho,  and  it  is  supposed  that  he  wishes  to  reserve  for  him- 
self the  option  of  retreating  through  Tras  os  Monies  into 
Spain,  if  he  should  find  it  necessary.  General  Silveira, 
with  a  Portuguese  corps,  is  in  Tras  os  Monies,  but  I  am 
not  acquainted  with  its  strength  or  its  composition.  Gen- 
eral Lapisse,  who  commands  the  French  corps  which,  it 
was  supposed,  when  I  left  England,  was  marching  from  j. 
Salamanca  into  Portugal,  has  turned  off  to  his  left,  and  has 
marched  along  the  Portuguese  frontier  to  Alcantarai  where 
he  cro.ssed  the  Tagus,  and  thence  he  went  to  Merida,  on 
the  Guadiana.  where  he  is  in  communication  with,  indeed 
I  may  say,  part  of  the  armj'  of  Victor;  he  has  an  advanced 
post  at  Montejo,  nearer  to  the  Portuguese  frontier  than 
Merida.  Victor  has  continued  at  Mediilin  since  the  action 
with  C-ucsta ;  he  is  either  fortifying  that  post,  or  making 
an  entr(mched  camp  there.  Cuesta  is  at  Llercna,  collectr 
ing  a  force  again,  which,  it  is  said,  will  soon  be  twenty-five 
thousand  infantry  and  six  thousand  cavalry,  a  part  of  them 
good  troops  ;  I  know  nothing  of  the  marquis  de  ia  Romana, 
or  of  anything  to  the  northward  of  Portugal.  I  intend  to 
move  upon  Soult,  as  soon  as  I  can  make  some  arrange- 
ments upon  which  I  can  depend  for  the  defence  of  the  Ta- 
gus, cither  ti<  impede  or  delay  Victor's  progress,  in  case  he 
should  come  in  while  I  am  absent.  I  should  prefer  an  at- 
tack upon  Victor,  in  concert  with  Cuesta,  if  Soult  was  not 
in  possession  of  a  fertile  province  of  this  kingdom  and  of 
the  fivourite  town  of  Oporto,  nf  which  it  is  most  dcsirablo 
to  deprive  him  ;  and  if  any  operation  upon  Victor,  con* 
nected  with  Cuesta's  movements,  did  not  require  time  to 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


767 


I 


concert  it,  which  may  as  wrll  be  employed  in  dislodging 
Soult  from  the  north  of  Portugal.  If  Soult  should  go,  I 
think  it  most  advisable,  for  many  reasons,  in  which  I  need 
not  enter  at  present,  to  act  upon  the  defensive  in  the  north 
of  Portugal,  and  to  bring  the  British  army  to  the  eastern 
frontier.  If  the  light  brigade  should  not  have  left  England, 
when  you  receive  tliis  letter,  I  trust  that  you  will  send  Ihcm 
off  without  loss  of  time;  and  I  request  you  to  desire  the 
officer  commanding  them  to  endeavour  to  get  intelligence, 
as  he  will  go  along  the  coast,  particularly  at  Aveiro  and  the 
mouth  of  the  Mondego;  and  I  wish  that  he  should  stop  at 
the  latter  place  for  orders,  if  he  should  find  that  the  Britirh 
army  is  engaged  in  operations  to  the  northward,  and  if  he 
should  not  already  have  received  ordejj  at  Aveiro.  The 
twenty-third  dragoons  might  also  receive  directions  to  a 
similar  purport.  The  hussars,  I  conclude,  have  sailed  be- 
fore this  time.  We  are  much  in  want  of  craft  here;  now 
that  we  are  going  to  carry  on  an  operation  to  the  north- 
ward constant  convoys  will  be  necessary,  and  the  admiral 
does  not  appear  to  have  the  means  in  his  power  of  supply- 
ing all  that  is  required  of  him.  The  twenty-fourth  regi- 
ment arrived  this  day,  &,c.  &c. 

(Signed)  "  Arthur  Welleslet." 


LETTF.R    FROM    SIR    ARTHUR    VVELLESLEY   TO    LORD 
CASTLEREAGH. 

Mrantes,  June  22,   1809. 

KY    LORD, 

When  I  wrote  to  you  last  I  was  in  hopes  that  I  should 
have  marched  before  this  time,  but  the  money  is  not  yet 
arrived.  Tilings  are  in  their  progress  as  they  were  when 
1  wrote  on  the  17th.  The  French  are  continuing  their 
retreat.  Sebastiani  has  also  fallen  back,  towards  Toledo, 
and  Venei^as  has  advanced,  and  Cuesta  had  his  head-quar- 
ters at  Truxillo,  on  the  19lh.  I  a«»  apprehensive  that  you 
will  think  I  have  delayed  my  m<«rch  unnecessarily  since 
my  arrival  upon  the  Tagus.  But  it  was,  and  is,  quite  im- 
possible to  move  without  money.  Not  only  were  the  offi- 
cers and  soldiers  in  the  greatest  distress,  and  the  want  of 
money  the  cause  of  many  of  the  disorders  of  which  I  have 
hnd  occasion  to  complain  ;  but  we  can  no  longer  obtain  the 
supplies  of  the  country,  or  command  its  resources  for  the 
transport  of  our  own  supplies  either  by  land  or  by  water. 
Besides  this,  the  army  required  rest,  after  their  expedition 
to  the  frontiers  of  Gallicia,  and  shoes,  and  to  be  furbished 
up  in  different  ways;  and  I  was  well  aware  that,  if  neces- 
sity had  not  obliged  me  to  halt  at  the  present  moment,  I 
should  have  been  compelled  to  make  a  longer  halt  some 
time  hence.  To  all  this  add,  that,  for  some  time  after  I 
came  here,  I  believed  that  the  French  were  retiring,  (as 
appp^irs  by  my  letters  to  your  lordship,)  aiid  that  I  should 
have  no  opportunity  of  striking  a  blow  against  them,  even 
if  I  could  have  marched.  I  hope  that  you  will  attend  to 
my  requisitions  for  money  ;  not  only  am  I  in  want,  but  the 
Portuguese  government,  to  whom  Mr.  Villiers  says  that  we 
owe  £125.000.  I  repeat,  that  we  must  have  £200,000  a 
month,  from  England,  till  I  write  you  that  I  can  do  with- 
out it;  in  which  sum  I  include  £40,000  a  month  for  the 
Portuguese  government,  to  pay  for  twenty  thousand  men. 
If  the  Portuguese  government  are  to  receive  a  larger  sum 
from  Great  Britain,  the  sum  to  he  sent  to  Portugal  must 
be  proportionably  increased.  Besides  this,  money  must  be 
•ent  to  pay  the  Portuguese  debt  and  our  debts  in  Portugal. 
There  arc,  besides,  debts  of  si:  J;hn  Moore's  army  still  due 


in  Spain,  which  I  am  called  upon  to  pay.  In  sl;ort,  we 
must  have  £125,000,  and  £200,000  a  month,  reckoning 
from  the  beginning  of  .Vlay,  &c.  &c. 

(Signed)  "  Arthur  Wellesh.!." 


LETTER   FROM   LORD  WELLINGTON  TO  THE  MARaUIS 
WELLESLEY. 

Badajos,   October  30,   1809. 

MT    LORD, 

I  have  had  the  honor  of  receiving  your  excellency's  «lc»- 
patch,  (marked  I.)  of  the  17th  instant,  containing  a  copy- 
of  your  note  to  M.  de  Garay,  of  the  8th  of  September;  and 
a  copy  of  his  note,  in  answer  to  your  excellency,  of  the  3d 
of  October. 

I  am  not  surprised  that  M.  de  Garay  should  endeavour 
to  attribute  to  the  irregularities  of  the  English  commissari- 
at the  deficiencies  of  supplies  and  means  of  transport  expe- 
rienced by  the  British  army  in  its  late  service  in  Spain;  I 
am  not  disposed  to  justify  the  English  commissariat  where 
they  deserve  blame  ;  but  I  must  think  it  but  justice  to  them 
to  declare  that  the  British  army  is  indebted  to  their  exer- 
tions for  the  scanty  supplies  it  received. 

From  some  of  the  statements  contained  in  M.  de  Garay's 
note  it  would  appear  that  the  British  army  had  suffered  no 
distress  during  the  late  service;  others  have  a  tendency  to 
prove  that  great  distress  was  suffered,  at  a  very  early  peri- 
od, by  both  armies  ;  particularly  the  qtiotation  of  a  letter 
from  general  Cuesta,  of  the  1st  of  August,  in  answer  to  a 
complaint  which  I  am  supposed  to  have  made,  that  the 
Spanish  troops  and  (lieir  prisoners  were  better  supplied 
than  ih"  British  army.  The  answer  to  all  these  state.mcnts 
is  a  reference  to  the  fact  that  the  army  suffered  gre-it  dis- 
tress for  want  of  provisions,  forage,  and  means  of  etjuip- 
ment;  and,  although  that  distress  might  have  been  aggra- 
vated, it  could  not  have  been  occasioned  by  the  inexperi- 
ence or  irregularity  of  the  English  commissariat. 

I  know  nothing  of  the  orders  which  M.  de  Garay  states 
were  sent  by  the  government  to  the  difftrent  provincial 
juntas,  to  provide  provisions  and  means  of  transport  for  tho 
British  army  on  its  passage  through  the  different  towns  in 
the  provinces.  If  such  orders  were  sent,  it  v\-as  obvious, 
that  the  central  junta,  as  a  government,  have  no  power  or 
influence  over  the  provincial  juntas  and  magistrates,  to 
whom  their  orders  were  addressed,  as  they  produced  no  ef- 
fect ;  and  the  supplies,  such  as  they  were,  were  firocured 
only  by  the  requisitions  and  exertions  of  the  English  com- 
missaries. But  it  is  obvious,  from  M.dc  Garay's  account 
of  these  orders,  that  the  central  junta  had  taken  a  very  er- 
roneous view  of  the  operations  to  be  carried  on  by  the  ar- 
my, and  of  the  provision  to  be  made  for  the  troops,  while 
engaged  in  those  operations.  The  government  jirovided, 
liy  their  orders,  for  the  troops  only  while  on  their  passage 
through  the  towns  ;  relying  upon  their  immediate  success, 
and  making  no  provision  for  the  collection  of  one  body,  ol 
not  less  than  fifty  thousand  men,  even  for  one  iWiy.  At 
the  same  time,  that  they  were  guilty  of  this  unpardonable 
omission,  which  paralyzed  all  our  efforts,  they  rendered 
that  success  doubtful,  by  countermanding  the  orders  given 
to  general  Vencgas  by  general  Cuesta,  and  thus  exposing 
the  combined  armies  to  a  general  action  with  the  enemy's 
concentrated  force.  The  effect  of  tlieir  orders  will  appear 
more  fully  in  the  following  detail : — 

As  soon  as  the  line  of  my  operations  in  Spain  was  deci- 
ded, I  sent  a  commissary  to  Ciudad   Rodrigo,  to  endeavoui 


768 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


to  procure  mules  to  attend  the  army,  in  concert  with  don 
Lozano  ties  Torres,  that  city  and  its  neighbourhood  being 
the  places  in  which  the  army  commanded  by  the  late  sir 
John  Moore  had  been  most  lar2;ely  supplied.  M.  de  Garay 
expresses  the  astonishment  of  the  government,  that  the 
British  army  should  have  entered  8pain  unprovided  with 
tlie  means  of  transport,  notwithstanding  that  a  few  para- 
graplis  preceding  this  expression  of  astonishment,  he  in- 
forms your  excellency,  in  the  name  of  the  government, 
that  they  had  given  orders  to  the  provincial  juntas  of  Ba- 
dajos  and  Castile  (at  Ciudad  Rodrigo)  and  the  magistrates, 
to  provide  and  nippiy  us  with  the  means  which,  of  course, 
ihe.y  must  have  been  aware  that  we  should  require.  No 
army  can  carry  on  its  operations  if  unprovided  with  means 
of  transport ;  and  the  British  army  was,  from  circumstan- 
ces, particularly  in  want  at  that  moment. 

'J  he  means  of  transport,  commonly  used  in  Portugal, 
ate  carts,  drawn  by  bullocks,  which  are  unable,  without 
great  distress,  to  move  more  than  twelve  miles  in  a  day,  a 
distance  much  shorter  than  that,  which  the  state  of  the 
country  in  which  the  army  was  to  carry  on  operations  in 
Spain,  and  the  nature  of  the  country,  would  oblige  the 
army  to  march.  The  number  if  carts  which  we  had  been 
able  to  bring  from  Portugal  vi'as  not  suflicient  to  draw  our 
ammunition,  and  there  were  none  to  carry  provisions. 

Having  failed  in  procurirM^,  at  Ciudad  Rodrigo  and  in 
the  neighbourhood,  the  means  of  transport  wiiich  I  requi- 
red, I  wrote  to  general  O'Donaghue,  on  the  16th  of  July,  a 
letter,  in  which  after  stating  our  wants  and  the  failure  of 
the  country  in  supplying  them,  I  gave  notice  that  if  they 
were  not  supplied  I  should  discontinue  my  co-operation 
with  general  Cuesta,  after  I  should  have  performed  my 
part  in  the  first  operation  which  we  had  concerted,  viz. 
the  removal  of  the  enemy  from  the  Alberche  ;  and,  if  not 
supplied  as  I  required,  I  should  eventually  withdraw  from 
Spain  altogether.  From  this  letter  of  the  16th  July,  it 
will  appear,  that  I  called  for  the  supplies,  and  gave  notice 
that  I  should  withdraw  from  Spain,  if  they  were  not  fur- 
nished, not  only  long  previous  to  the  retreat  across  the  Tagus 
of  the  4th  of  August,  but  even  previous  to  the  commence- 
ment of  the  operations  of  the  campaign. 

Notwithstanding  that  this  letter  of  the  16th  of  July  was 
communicated  to  the  central  junta,  both  by  Mr.  Frere  and 
general  Cuesta,  the  British  army  has,  to  this  day,  received 
no  assistance  of  this  description  from  Spain,  excepting  twen- 
ty carts,  which  joined  at  Merida,  ten  on  the  30th  of  Au- 
gust, and  ten  on  the  2d  of  September;  and  about  three  hun- 
dred mules  of  about  five  hundred,  which  were  hired  at  Be- 
jar,  and  joined  at  a  subsequent  period.  None  of  the  mules 
stated  to  have  been  hired  and  despatched  to  the  army  from 
Seville,  or  by  Igea  or  Cevallos.  or  the  two  brigades  of  forty 
each,  or  the  horses,  have  ever  joined  the  British  army  ;  and 
I  conclude,  that  they  are  with  the  Spanish  army  of  Estrc- 
madura,  as  are  the  remainder  of  the  (one  hundred)  ten  brig- 
ades of  carts  which  were  intended  and  are  marked  for  the 
British  army.  But  none  of  these  mules  or  carts,  suppos- 
ing them  to  have  been  sent  froin  Seville  for  our  use,  reach- 
ed Estremadura  till  after  the  21st  of  August,  the  day  on 
which,  after  five  weeks'  notice,  I  was  obliged  to  separate 
from  the  Spanish  army. 

It  is  not  true,  therefore,  that  my  resolution  to  withdraw 
from  Spain,  as  tlicn  carried  into  execution,  was  «  sudden," 
or  ought  to  have  surprised  the  government:  nor  does  it  ap- 
pear to  have  been  perilous  from  what  has  since  appeared  in 
thi^  part  of  Spain. 

1  JUght,  probably,  on  the  IGth  of  July,  to  have  determin- 
ed to  suspend  all  operations   till   the   army  should  be  sup- 


plied with  the  means  required  ;  but  having,  on  the  1 1th  of 
Ju'y.  settled  with  general  Cuesta  a  j;lan  of  operations  to  ))e 
carried  into  execution  hy  the  armies  under  the  command  of 
general  Venegas,  general  Cuesta,  and  myself.  res[ieclively, 
I  did  not  think  it  proper  to  disappoint  general  Cuesta.  I 
believed  that  general  Yenegas  would  have  carried  into  exe- 
cution that  part  of  the  plan  of  operations  allotted  to  his  ar- 
my, although  I  was  afterwards  disappointed  in  lliat  expec- 
tation ;  and  I  preferred  that  the  British  army  should  suffer 
inconvenience  than  that  general  Venegas's  cor])s  sjiould  be 
exposed  alone  to  the  attack  of  the  enemy  ;  and,  above  all,  I 
was  induced  to  hope  that  I  should  be  supplit  d. 

Accordingly,  I  marched,  on  the  18th  of  July,  from  Pla- 
sencia,  the  soldiers  carrying  on  their  backs  their  provisions 
to  the  21st,  on  which  day  a  junction  was  formed  with  gen- 
eral Cuesta's  army  ;  and.  from  that  day  to  the  24lh  of  Au- 
gust, the  troops  or  their  horses  did  not  receive  one  regular 
ration.  The  irregularity  and  deficiency,  both  in  quality  and 
quantity,  were  so  great,  that  I  considered  it  a  matter  of 
justice  to  the  troops  to  remit  to  them,  during  that  period, 
half  of  the  sum  usually  stopped  from  their  pay  for  rations. 

The  forage  for  the  horses  was  picked  up  for  them  by 
their  riders  wherever  they  con'd  fii'.d  it.  and  was  generally 
wheat  or  rye,  which  are  coiibidnod  unwholesome  food  ; 
and  the  consequence  was  that,  exclusive  of  the  loss  by  en- 
gaging w^ith  the  enemy,  the  army  lost,  in  the  short  period 
of  five  weeks,  not  less  than  one  thousand  five  hundred  horse.?. 

I  have  no  knowledge  of  what  passed  between  general 
Cuesta  and  don  Lozano  des  Torres  and  the  intendant  of 
provisions  of  the  Spanish  army.  I  never  saw  the  latter 
gentleman  excepting  twice  ;  the  first  time  on  the  2"d  i>l 
July,  when  he  waited  upon  me  to  claim,  for  the  Sp-inish 
army,  sixteen  thousand  rations  of  bread  which  liad  been 
brought  into  Talavera,  and  had  been  sent  to  my  quuT'erf,  and 
which  were  delivered  over  to  him,  notwithstanding  liiat  the 
British  troops  were  in  want;  and  the  second  time,  on  the 
2.'jth  of  July,  when  he  waited  upon  me,  also  at  Talavera, 
to  desire  that  the  ovens  of  that  town  might  be  delivered  over 
for  the  use  of  the  Spanish  army,  they  having  moved  to  St. 
Ollalla,  and  the  British  army  being  still  at  Talavera.  This 
request,  which  was  not  complied  with,  is  an  examjile  of 
the  preference  which  was  given  to  the  British  troops  while 
they  were  in  Spain. 

The  orders  stated  to  have  been  given  by  the  central  to 
the  provincial  juntas  and  magistrates,  were  not  more  effec- 
tual in  procuring  provisions  than  in  procuring  means  of 
transport.  In  the  interval  between  the  l.'ith  and  2 1st  of 
July,  the  British  commissaries  had  made  contracts  with  the 
magistrates  in  the  different  villages  of  the  Vera  de  Plasen- 
cia,  a  country  abounding  in  resources  of  every  description, 
for  the  delivery  at  Talavera,  on  different  days  before  the 
24fh  of  July,  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  rations  of 
provisions.  These  contracts  were  not  performed  ;  the  Biit- 
ish  army  was  consequently  unable  to  move  in  pursuit  of 
the  enemy  when  he  retired  on  that  day  ;  and,  I  conclude, 
that  the  French  army  have  since  subsisted  on  these  re- 
sources. 

The  Britisli  army  never  received  any  salt  meat,  nor  any 
of  the  rice  or  other  articles  stated  to  have  been  sent  from 
Seville  fi)r  their  use,  excepting  to  make  up  the  miserable 
ration  by  which  the  men  were  onl)'  prevented  from  starv- 
ing during  the  period  to  which  I  have  adverted  ;  nor  was  it 
attended  by  the  troop  of  biscuit  bakers,  nor  did  it  enjoy 
any  of  the  advantages  of  thei.-  labours,  nor  was  the  suppos- 
ed magazine  of  four  hundred  thousand  pounds  of  biscuit 
ever  performed.  These  are  notorious  facts,  which  carinr)t 
be  disputed,  of  the  truth  of  which  every  officer  and  soldier 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


769 


In  the  army  can  bear  testimony.  I  assure  your  excellency, 
that  not  only  have  the  supplies  furnished  to  the  army  un- 
der my  command  been  paid  for  whenever  the  bills  for  them 
could  be  got  in,  but  the  old  debts  due  to  the  inhabitants 
for  supplies  furnished  to  the  army,  under  the  command  of 
the  late  sir  John  Moore,  have  been  discharged  ;  and  I  have 
repeatedly  desired  the  Spanish  agents,  and  others  acting 
with  the  army,  and  the  diiferent  juntas  with  which  I  have 
communicated,  to  let  the  people  know  that  all  demands 
upon  the  British  government,  which  could  be  substantiated, 
would  be  discharged. 

I  beg  to  refer  your  excellency  to  my  despatches  of  the 
21st  of  August,  No.  12,  for  an  account  of  the  state  of  the 
magazine  at  Truxillo,  on  the  20th  of  August.  Of  the  state 
of  supplies  and  provisions  at  that  period,  lieutenant-colonel 
Waters  had,  by  my  desire,  made  an  arrangement  with  the 
Spanish  commissariat  for  the  division  of  the  magazine  at 
Truxillo  between  the  two  armies  ;  and  he  as  well  as  I  was 
Eatisfied  with  the  principle  and  detail  of  that  arrangement. 
But  if  the  British  army  received  only  one-third  of  a  ration 
on  the  18th  of  August,  and  only  one-half  of  a  ration  on 
the  19th,  not  of  bread,  but  of  flour  ;  if  the  horses  of  the  ar- 
my received  nothing  ;  and  if  the  state  of  the  magazi.;e  at 
Truxillo  was  such,  at  that  time,  as  to  hold  out  no  hope, 
not  of  improvement,  (for  it  was  too  late  to  wait  for  ira- 
iirovement,)  but  of  a  full  and  regular  supply  of  provisions 
«nd  forage  of  all  descriptions,  I  was  justified  in  withdraw- 
ing from  Spain.  In  point  of  fact,  the  magazine  at  Truxillo, 
which,  under  the  arrangement  made  by  lieutenant-colonel 
Waters  was  to  be  the  sole  source  of  the  supply  to  both 
armies,  did  not  contain,  on  the  20th  of  August,  a  sufli- 
ciency  to  sivpply  one  day's  demand  upon  it. 

tJut  it  is  said  that  M.  de  Calvo  promised  and  engaged  to 
8  ipply  the  British  army  ;  upon  which  I  have  only  to  ob- 
erve  that  I  had  trusted  too  long  to  the  promises  of  the 
Spanish  agents,  and  that  I  had  particular  reason  for  want 
of  confidence  in  M.  de  Calvo;  as,  at  the  moment  he  was 
assuring  me  that  the  British  army  should  have  all  the  pro- 
■  isiuns  the  country  could  afford,  in  preference  to,  and  to 
the  exclusion  of  the  Spanish  army,  I  had  in  my  possession 
an  order  from  him,  (of  which  your  excellency  has  a  copy,) 
addressed  to  the  magistrates  of  Guadalupe,  directing  him 
to  send  to  the  head-quarters  of  the  Spanish  army  provisions 
which  a  British  commissary  had  ordered  to  be  prepared  and 
sent  to  the  magazines  at  Truxillo,  to  be  divided  between 
both  armies,  in  conformity  to  the  agreement  entered  into 
with  the  Spanish  commissaries  by  lieutenant-colonel  Wa- 
ters. 

As  the  state  of  the  magazine  et  Truxillo  was  the  imme- 
diate cause  (as  far  as  the  want  of  provisions  went)  of  my 
withdrawing  from  Spain,  I  beg  to  observe  to  your  excel- 
lency that  I  was  not  mistaken  in  my  opinion  of  its  insuffi- 
ciency ;  as,  if  I  am  not  misinformed,  general  Eguia's  army 
»  suffered  the  greatest  distress  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Trux- 
illo, even  after  that  part  of  the  country  and  the  magazines 
had  been  relieved  from  the  burthen  of  suj)porting  the  British 
arjny. 

In  respect  to  the  conduct  of  the  operations  in  Spain  by 
the  Spanish  general  officers,  many  things  were  done  of 
which  I  did  not  approve;  some  contrary  to  my  expecta- 
tions, an  J  some  contrary  to  positive  agreements. 

M.  de  Garay  has  stated  that  the  orders  of  the  marquis  de 
Romana  were  framed  in  conformity  with  suggestions  from 
marshal  Beresford  ;  and  thence  he  infers  that  the  operations 
of  that  corps  were  approved  of  by  me. 

The  marquis  de  R)m:ina  vras  still  at  Coruna  on  the  5th. 
and  I  l>e.lievc  as  late  as  the  Otl>  of  August ;  anJ  the  armies 
50 


of  Estremadura  retired  across  the  Tagus  oi  the  4th  of  Au- 
gust. This  reference  to  dates  shews  thai  there  was,  and 
could  have  been  no  connexion  in  the  opeiulions  of  those 
different  armies.  In  fact,  I  knew  nothing  of  the  marquis 
of  Romana's  operations;  and  till  I  heard,  on  the  3d  of  Au- 
gust, that  marshal  Ney's  corps  had  passed  through  tli« 
mountains  of  Estremadura  at  Banos,  and  was  at  Navyl 
Moral,  I  did  not  believe  that  that  part  of  the  enemy's  army 
had  quitted  Astorga,  or  that  the  marquis  was  at  liberty  or 
had  it  in  his  power  to  quit  Gallicia. 

Marshal  Beresford's  corps  was  collected  upon  tlie  fron- 
tiers of  Portugal  in  the  end  of  July,  principally  for  the  pur- 
pose of  forming  the  troops ;  and  it  was  hoped  he  would 
keep  in  check  the  enemy's  corps  under  Soult,  which  was 
at  Zamora,  and  threatened  Portugal ;  that  he  would  act  as 
a  corps  of  observation  in  that  quarter,  and  on  the  Iclt  of 
the  British  army  ;  and  I  particularly  requested  marshal  Be- 
resford to  attend  to  the  Puerto  de  Perales.  But  I  never 
intended,  and  never  held  out  any  hope  to  the  Spanish  offi- 
cers that  the  corps  under  marshal  Beresford  could  effect  any 
operations  at  that  period  of  the  campaign,  and  never  was  a 
party  to  any  arrangement  of  an  operation  in  which  that 
corps  was  to  be  concerned. 

In  the  cases  in  which  measures  were  carried  on  in  a  man- 
ner of  which  I  did  not  approve,  or  which  I  did  not  expect, 
or  contrary  to  the  yiositive  agreement,  those  who  acted 
contrary  to  my  opinion  may  have  been  right ;  but  still 
they  acted  in  a  manner  of  which  they  were  aware  I  did 
not  approve  :  and  the  assertion  in  the  note,  that  the  opera- 
tions were  carried  on  with  my  concurrence,  is  unfounded. 

I  expected,  from  the  communications  I  had  with  gencrj-.l 
Cuesta,  through  sir  Robert  Wilson  and  colonel  Roche,  thai 
the  Puerto  de  Banos  would  have  been  effectually  occupied 
and  secured  ;  and,  at  all  events,  that  the  troops  appointeil 
to  guard  that  point,  upon  which  I  was  aware  that  all  the 
operations,  nay,  the  security,  of  the  army  depended,  would 
not  have  retired  without  firing  a  shot. 

It  was  agreed,  between  general  Cuesta  and  me,  on  the 
1 1th  of  July,  that  general  Venegas,  who  was  under  his 
command,  should  march  by  Tembleque,  Ocana,  Puerte  Du- 
enos,  to  Arganda,  near  Madrid  ;  where  he  was  to  be  on  the 
22d  and  23d  of  July,  when  the  combined  armies  should  be 
at  Talavera  and  Escola.  This  agreement  was  not  perform- 
ed, and  the  consequence  of  its  non-performance  (which  had 
been  foreseen)  occurred  ;  viz.  that  the  combined  armies 
were  engaged  with  the  enemy's  concentrated  force.  I  havo 
heard  that  the  cause  of  the  non-performance  of  this  agree- 
ment was  that  the  central  junta  had  countermanded  the 
orders  which  general  Venegas  had  received  from  general 
Cuesta  ;  of  which  countermand  they  gave  us  no  notice.  I 
shall  make  no  observation  upon  this  proceeding,  excejl 
that  the  plan  of  operations,  as  agreed  upon  with  me,  was 
not  carried  into  execution,  by  general  Venegas,  in  this 
instance. 

It  was  agreed,  by  general  Cuesta,  on  the  2d  of  August, 
that  when  I  marched  against  Soult  on  the  3d,  he  would 
remain  at  Talavera.  That  agreement  was  broken  when  h« 
withdrew  from  Talavera,  in  my  opinion  without  sufficient 
cause.  And  it  is  also  my  opinion  that  he  ought  not  to 
have  withdrawn,  particularly  considering  that  he  had  the 
charge  of  my  hospital,  without  my  consent.  I  do  not  con- 
ceive that  if  general  Cuesta  had  remained  at  Talavera,  it 
would  have  made  any  difference  in  the  result  of  the  cam- 
])aign.  When  Soult  added  tliirty-fiur  thousand  to  tho 
numhrrs  already  opposed  to  the  combined  armies  in  Estre- 
ma(!ura,  the  enemy  was  too  strong  for  us;  and  it  was  ne>- 
ccssary  that  we  should   retire   across  the  Tagus.     But  if 


770 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


general  Cucsta  had  held  the  post  of  Talavera,  according  to 
ngrccnient,  I  should  have  been  al)le  to  remove  my  hosiiital, 
or,  at  leust,  to  know  the  exact  situation  oC  every  individual 
left  there  ;  and  I  think  that  other  disadvantages  might  have 
been  avoided  in  the  retreat. 

When  adverting  to  this  part  of  the  subject,  I  cannot 
avoid  to  ob.-erve  upon  the  ambiguity  of  language  used  in 
the  note  respecting  the  assistance  aflbrdcd  by  general  Cu- 
csta to  remove  the  hospital  from  'i'aiavera.  That  assistance 
amounted  to  four  carts  on  the  4lh  of  August,  at  Oropesa. 
In  the  subsequent  removal  of  the  wounded,  and  of  the  men 
eubsequently  taken  sick,  we  had  absolutely  no  assistance 
from  the  Spanish  army  or  the  country.  "We  were  obliged 
to  lay  down  our  ammunition,  which  was  delivered  over  to 
the  Spanish  army,  and  to  unload  the  treasure,  and  employ 
the  carts  in  the  removal  of  the  wounded  and  sick.  At 
Truxillo,  in  particular,  assistance  which  could  have  been 
afforded  was  withheld,  on  the  22d  and  23d  of  August,  M. 
dc  Calvo  and  don  Lozano  de  Torres  being  in  town. 

In  respect  to  the  refusal  to  make  movements  recommen- 
ded by  me,  I  am  of  opinion  that  if  general  Bassecourt  had 
been  detached  towards  Plasencia  on  tlie  30th  of  July,  when 
I  recommend  d  that  movement,  and  if  the  troops  had  done 
their  duty,  Soult  would  have  been  stopped  at  the  Tictar,  at 
least  for  a  sufficient  length  of  time  to  enable  me  to  secure 
the  passage  of  the  Tagus  at  .Mmaraz;  and  here  again  the 
hospital  would  have  been  saved. 

He  was  not  detached,  hovs'evcr,  till  the  2d  ;  and  then  I 
understood,  from  M.  de  Garay's  note,  that  it  was  general 
Cuesta's  opinion  that  the  movement  was  useless. 

It  could  not  have  been  considered  as  useless  by  general 
Cuesta  on  the  30th,  because  the  proposition  for  making  a 
detachment  from  the  combined  armies  originated  with  him- 
self on  that  day  ;  and  it  could  not  have  been  considered  as 
useless  even  on  the  morning  of  the  2d,  as,  till  the  evening 
of  that  day,  we  did  not  receive  intelligence  of  the  arrival  of 
Soult  at  Plasencia.  A  reference  to  the  date  of  the  period 
at  which  the  general  considered  this  detachment  as  useless 
would  have  been  desirable. 

I  cannot  account  for  the  surprise  stated  to  have  been  felt 
by  general  Cucsta  upon  finding  the  British  army  at  Orope- 
sa on  the  morning  of  the  4th  of  August.  The  army  had 
left  Talavera  on  the  morning  of  the  3d,  and  had  marched 
to  Oropesa,  six  leagues,  or  twenty-four  miles,  on  that  day; 
which  I  conceive  a  sulFieient  distance  for  a  body  of  men 
which  had  been  starving  for  many  days  before.  The  ac- 
counts received,  on  the  evening  of  the  3d,  of  the  enemy's 
position  at  Naval  Moral,  and  of  his  strength,  and  of  gene- 
ral Cuesta's  intended  march  on  that  evening,  leaving  my 
hospital  to  its  fate,  were  sufficient  to  induce  me  to  pause 
and  consider  our  situation,  and,  at  least  not  to  move  before 
daylight  on  the  4th  ;  shortly  after  which  time,  general  Cu- 
csta arrived  at  Oropesa. 

Upon  considering  our  situation  at  that  time,  it  was  evi- 
dent to  me  that  the  combined  armies  must  retire  across  the 
Tagus,  and  that  every  moment's  delay  must  expose  them 
to  the  risk  of  being  cut  off  from  their  oidy  remaining  point 
of  retreat.  A  battle,  even  if  it  had  been  successful,  could 
rot  have  improved  our  situation  ;  two  battles,  or  probably 
three,  must  have  been  fought  and  gained  before  our  diffi- 
culties, resulting  from  the  increased  strength  of  the  enemy 
in  Estremadura,  could  be  removed.  I  did  not  consider  the 
British  army,  at  least,  equal  to  such  an  exertion  at  that  mo- 
ment. It  is  unnecessary  to  make  any  observation  upon  the 
Spanish  armv  ;  but  the  occurrences  at  Arzobispo,  a  few 
days  afterwards,  shewed  that  they  were  r»)l  equal  to  any 
great  contest. 


M.  de  Garay  complains  of  the  alteration  in  the  line  of 
our  operations,  and  of  the  sudden  changes  in  the  direction 
of  our  marches,  to  which  he  attributes  the  deficiency  of  our 
supplies,  which,  in  this  part  of  the  note,  he  is  disposed  to 
admit  that  the  British  army  experienced.  I  know  of  but 
one  alteration  in  the  plan  of  operations  end  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  march,  which  was  occasioned  by  the  circum" 
stances  to  which  I  have  just  referred. 

When  intelligence  was  first  received  of  the  arrival  of  tha 
enemy  at  Plasencia,  and  of  the  retreat,  without  resistance, 
of  the  corps  appointed  to  guard  the  Puerto  de  Banos,  my 
intention  was  to  n)ove  towards  Plasencia,  to  attack  the  en- 
emy's corps  whicii  had  passed  through  the  Puerto.  That 
intention  was  altered  only  when  I  heard  of  the  numbers  of 
which  that  corps  consisted;  and  when  I  found  that,  by 
general  Cuesta's  movement  from  Talavera,  the  rear  of  the 
army  was  not  secure,  that  the  only  retreat  v^-as  liable  to  bo 
cut  off,  and  that  the  enemy  had  it  in  their  power,  and  at 
their  option,  to  join  or  to  attack  us  in  separate  bodies. 

It  could  not  be  attributed  to  me,  that  this  large  reinforce- 
ment was  allowed  to  enter  Estremadura,  or  that  we  had  not 
earlier  intelligence  of  their  approach. 

The  Puerto  de  Banos  was  abandoned,  without  firing  a 
shot,  by  the  Spanish  troops  sent  there  to  guard  it ;  and  the 
junta  of  Castile,  if  they  knew  of  the  collection  of  the  ene- 
my's troops  at  Salamanca,  sent  no  notice  of  it;  and  no  no- 
tice was  in  fact  received,  till  the  accounts  arrived  that  the 
enemy  had  ordered  rations  at  Fuente  Noble  and  Los  San- 
tos;  and  they  arrived  on  the  following  daj'.  But  when 
the  enemy  arrived  at  Naval  Moral,  in  Estremadura,  in 
such  strength,  and  the  post  of  Talavera  was  abandoned,  the 
central  junta  will  find  it  difficult  to  convince  this  country 
and  the  world  that  it  was  not  expedient  to  alter  the  plan  of 
our  operations  and  the  direction  of  our  march. 

But  this  alteration,  instead  of  aggravating  the  deficiency 
of  our  supplies,  ought  to  have  alleviated  our  distresses,  if 
any  measures  had  been  adopted  at  Seville  to  supply  the 
British  army,  in  consequence  of  my  letter  of  the  ICth  July. 
The  alteration  was  from  the  offensive  to  the  defensive;  the 
march  was  retrograde;  and  if  any  supplies  had  been  prepared 
and  sent,  the  army  must  have  met  them  on  the  road,  and 
must  have  received  them  sooner.  Accordini;:ly  we  did 
meet  supplies  on  the  road,  but  they  were  for  the  Sjianish  ar- 
my ;  and  although  our  troops  were  starving  at  the  time, 
they  were  forwarded,  untouched,  to  their  destination. 

I  have  sent  to  marshal  Bere.sford  a  co{)y  of  that  part  of 
M.  de  Garay's  note  which  refers  to  the  supplies  for  the 
Portuguese  army  under  his  command,  upon  which  he  will 
make  his  observations,  which  I  propose  to  forward  to  your 
excellency.  I  shall  here,  therefore,  only  repeat  that  the 
want  of  magazines,  and  the  apathy  and  disinclination  of 
the  magistrates  and  people  in  Spain  to  furnish  supplies  for 
the  armies,  even  for  j)ayment,  were  the  causes  that  the 
Portugese  army,  as  well  as  the  British  army,  suffered  great 
distress  from  want,  while  within  the  Spanish  frontier. 

Till  the  evils,  of  which  I  think  I  have  reason  to  complaiiv 
are  remedied,  till  I  shall  sec  magazines  established  for  the 
supply  of  the  armies,  and  a  regular  system  adopted  for  keep- 
ing them  filled,  and  an  army,  upon  whose  exertions  I  can 
depend,  commanded  by  oiTiccrs  capable  and  willing  to  car- 
ry into  execution  the  operations  which  may  have  been  plan- 
ned by  mutual  agreement,  I  cannot  enter  upon  any  system 
of  co-operation  with  the  Spanish  armies.  I  do  not  think  it 
necessary  now  to  enter  into  any  calculations  to  shew  the 
fallacy  of  M.  de  Garay's  calculations  of  the  relative  numerical 
strength  of  the  allies,  and  of  the  enemy,  in  the  Peninsula  ; 
if  the  falla  y  wae  not  so  great,  as  I  am  certain  it  is,  I  should 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


771 


be  of  ihc  same  opinion,  respecting  tho  expediency  of 
co-operating  with  the  Spanish  troops.  But  if  the  British 
and  the  Tortuguese  armies  should  not  actively  co-operate 
with  them,  they  will  at  least  do  them  no  injury  ;  and  if  M. 
de  Garay  is  not  mistaken,  as  I  believe  he  is,  in  his  calcula- 
tions of  numbers ;  and  if  the  Spanish  armies  are  in  a  state 
of  eliiciency  in  which  they  are  represented  to  be,  and  which 
they  ouijlit  to  be,  to  invite  our  co-operation,  the  deficiency 
of  thirty-six  thousand  men,  which  the  British  and  Portu- 
guese armies  might  add  to  their  Humbers,  can  be  no  objec- 
tion to  their  undertaking,  immediately,  the  operations  which 
M.  de  Garay  is  of  opinion  would  give  ti)  his  countrymen 
the  early  possession  of  those  blessings  for  which  they  are 
contending. 

1  have  the  honour  to  be,  &c. 

(Signed)  Wellinktojt. 


COPY    OF   A    LETTER    FROM    GENERAL    HILL    TO    SIR 
ARTHUR  WELLESLEY. 

Camp,  August  17,  1809. 

SIR, 

I  beg  leave  to  report  to  you  that  the  parties  sent  out  by 
the  officers  of  my  division,  yesterday,  to  procure  forage, 
were,  in  more  instances  than  one,  opposed  by  the  Span- 
iards. The  following  circumstances  have  been  made 
known  to  me,  and  I  take  the  liberty  of  repeating  them  for 
your  excellency's  information. 

My  servants  were  sent  about  three  leagues  on  the  Trux- 
illo  road,  in  order  to  get  forage  for  me ;  and  after  gathering 
three  mule  loads,  a  party  of  Spanish  soldiers,  consisting  of 
five  or  six,  came  up  to  them  with  their  swords  drawn,  and 
obliged  them  to  leave  the  corn  they  had  collected.  My  ser- 
vants told  me,  that  the  same  party  fired  two  shots  towards 
other  British  men  employed  in  getting  forage.  The  assist- 
ant commissary  of  my  division  likewise  states  to  me,  that  the 
men  he  sent  out  for  forage  were  fired  at  by  the  Spaniards. 
I  have  the  honour  to  be,  &c. 

^Signed)  R.  Hill,  major-general. 


COPY    OF    A     LETTER     FROM    COLONEL    STOPFORD    TO 
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  SHERBROOKE. 

Jaraceijo,  Jiu^st  16,  1809. 


I  beg  leave  to  inform  you  that  I  have  just  received  inti- 
mations of  some  Spaniards  having  fired  at  some  of  the 
guards,  for  taking  some  forage.  As  there  is  no  forage  giv- 
en us  by  the  commissary,  I  wish  to  know  what  I  am  to  do, 
in  order  to  get  some  for  the  horses, 

(Signed)    E.  Stopfouu,  second  brigade  of  gtiards. 


No.  IX. 

LETTER    FROM    MAJOR-GENERAL    F.    PONSONBY   TO 
COLONEL  NAPIER. 

After  the  very  handsome  manner  in  which  you  have 
tenticned  my  name,  in  your  account  of  the  battle  of  Tal- 
8  7era.  it  may  appear  extraordinary  that  I  should  trouble 
you  with  this  letter;  but  my  silence  might  l>e  interpreted  into 
the  wish  of  taking  praise  to  myself  which  I  do  not  deserve. 

The  whole  of  your  account  of  the  charge  made  by  gen- 
eral Anson's  brigade  is    substantially  c.>rrect :  you    have 


given  the  reason  for  it,  and  the  result ;  but  there  are  two 
points,  in  the  detail,  which  are  inaccurate.  The  first  af- 
fecting the  German  hussars;  the  other  respecting  myself. 

The  Germans,  on  the  left  of  the  twenty-third,  could  not 
reach  the  French  columns,  from  the  impracticability  of  the 
ravine  where  they  charged  ;  this  I  ascertained,  by  personal 
observation,  the  following  day  ;  the  obstacle  was  much  less 
serious  where  the  twenty-third  attacked,  headed  by  gen- 
eral Anson  and  colonel  Seymour.  The  mountain  torrent, 
which  gradually  decreased  as  it  descended  into  the  plain, 
was  about  thirty  yards  in  front  of  the  enemy,  and  the  twen- 
ty-third, though  much  broken  in  passing  this  obstacle, 
charged  up  to  the  columns,  and  was  repulsed,  no  rally  could 
be  attempted  ;  but  the  right  squadron,  under  captain  Drake, 
having  an  easier  passage  of  the  ravine,  and  no  French  col- 
umn immediately  in  front,  passed  through  the  intervals,  and 
caused  much  confusion,  which,  together  with  the  delay  oc- 
casioned by  the  charge,  prevented  the  masses  of  infantry 
which  were  in  readiness  on  the  French  right  flank,  from 
joining  in  the  general  attack  on  our  line. 

You  will  perceive  that  this  account,  which  I  believe  to 
be  the  exact  truth,  does  not,  in  the  slightest  degree,  affect 
the  accuracy  of  your  description  of  the  movement ;  but,  if 
I  am  correct,  it  proves  that  the  Germans  were  obliged  to 
halt  by  an  insuperable  difficulty,  and  that  I  had  no  particu- 
lar merit  in  the  execution  of  the  charge  of  the  twenty-third. 
Believe  me 

Very  sincerely  yours, 

F.    PoNSOKBT. 

Malta,  Dec.  30,  1829. 

No.  X. 

EXTRACTS  OF  LETTERS  FROM   LORD  WELLINGTON  TO 
LORD  LIVERPOOL. 

SECTIOX     1. 

"J\''ovember  30,  1809. 

"  I  enclose  copies  and  extracts  of  a  correspondence  which 
I  have  had  with  Mr.  Frere  on  the  subject  of  the  co-operation 
of  the  British  army  with  the  corps  of  the  duke  of  Albu- 
querque and  the  duke  Del  Parque  in  this  plan  of  diversion. 

"  Adverting  to  the  opinion  which  I  have  given  to  his  ma- 
jesty's ministers  and  the  ambassador  at  Seville,  it  will  not  be 
supposed  that  I  could  have  encouraged  the  advance  of  gen- 
eral Areizaga,  or  could  have  held  out  the  prospect  of  any  co- 
operation by  the  British  army. 

"  The  first  official  information  which  I  had  from  the 
government  of  the  movement  of  general  Areizaga  was  on 
the  18th,  the  day  before  his  defeat,  and  I  gave  the  answer  on 
the  19th  regarding  the  plan  of  which  I  now  enclose  a  copy. 

"  I  was  at  Seville,  however,  when  the  general  commenced 
his  march  from  the  Sierra  Morena,  and  in  more  than  one 
conversation  with  the  Spanish  ministers  and  members  of 
the  junta,  I  communicated  to  them  my  conviction  that  gen- 
eral Areizaga  would  be  defeated.  The  expectation,  how- 
ever, of  success  from  this  large  army,  stated  to  consist  of 
fifty  thousand  men,  was  so  general  and  so  sanguine  that 
the  possibility  of  disappointmentwas  noteven  conteniplateo, 
and,  accordingly,  your  lordship  will  find  that,  on  the  10th 
only,  the  government  began  to  think  it  necessary  to  endea- 
vour to  make  a  diversion  in  favour  of  general  Areizaga,  and  it 
is  probable  that  it  was  thought  expedient  to  make  this  diver- 
sion only  in  consequence  of  the  fall  of  the  general's  own 
hopes,  after  his  first  trial  with  the  enemy  on  the  night  of  the 
10th  instant." — "  I  am  anxious  to  cross  the  Tagus  witli  the 


772 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


British  army  and  to  station  if  on  the  frontiers  of  Old  Castile, 
from  tiiinkmg  that  the  point  in  which  I  can  be  of  most  use 
in  preventing  the  enemy  from  ejecting  any  important  ob- 
ject, and  which  l)e3t  answers  for  my  future  operations  in 
the  defence  of  Portugal.  With  this  view,  I  have  request- 
ed Mr.  Frere  to  urge  the  government  to  reinforce  the  duke 
DWlbuquerquii's  corps,  in  order  to  secure  the  passage  of 
the  lower  part  of  the  Tagus.  And,  although  the  state  of 
the  season  would  render  it  desirable  that  I  should  make  the 
jnovcment  at  an  early  period,  I  do  not  propose  to  make  it 
till  I  shall  see  most  clearly  the  consequences  of  that  defeat, 
and  some  prospect  that  the  city  of  Seville  will  be  secure  af- 
ter I  shall  move." 

SECTION    2. 

"  December  7,  1809. 
" 1  had   urged  the  Spanish  government  to  aug- 


ment the  army  of  the  duke  D'Albuquerque  to  twenty  thou- 
sand men,  in  order  that  it  might  occupy,  in  a  sufficient 
manner,  the  passage  of  the  Tagus  at  Almaraz  and  the  pas- 
ses through  the  mountains  leading  from  Arzobispo  to 
Truxillo,  in  vv'hich  position  they  would  have  covered  effec- 
tually the  province  of  Estremadura,  during  the  winter  at 
least,  and  would  have  afforded  time  and  leisure  for  prepar- 
ations f()r  farther  opposition  to  the  enemy,  and  I  delayed  the 
movement,  which  I  have  long  been  desirous  of  making,  to 
the  northward  of  the  Tagus,  till  the  reinforcements  could 
be  sent  to  the  duke  D'Albuquerque  which  I  had  lately  re- 
commended should  be  drawn  from  the  army  of  the  duke 
Del  Purque.  During  the  discussions  upon  the  subject,  the 
government  have  given  orders  to  the  duke  D'Albuquerque 
to  retire  with  his  corps  behind  the  Guadiana.  to  a  position 
which  he  cannot  maintain,  thus  leaving  open  the  road  into 
Estremaduni,  and  incurring  the  risk  of  the  loss  of  that  pro- 
irince  whenever  the  enemy  choose  to  take  possession  of  it." 

SECTION    3. 

"January  31,  1810. 
" There  is  no  doubt  that,  if  the  enemy's  reinforce- 
ments have  not  yet  entered  Spain,  and  are  not  considerably 
advanced  within  the  Spanish  frontiers,  the  operation  which 
they  have  undertaken  is  one  of  some  risk,  and  I  have  mature- 
ly considered  of  the  means  of  making  a  diversion  in  favour 
of  the  allies,  which  might  oblige  the  enemy  to  reduce  his 
force  in  Andalusia,  and  would  expose  him  to  risk  and  loss 
in  this  quarter.  But  the  circumstances,  which  are  detailed 
in  the  enclosed  copy  of  a  letter  to  Mr.  Frere,  have  obli- 
ged me  to  refrain  from  attempting  this  operation  at  pre- 
sent. I  have  not,  however,  given  up  all  thoughts  of  it, 
and  I  propose  to  carry  it  into  execution  hereafter,  if  cir- 
cumstances will  permit." 

BBCTIOW    4. 

"January  12,  1811. 
"  My  former  despatch  will  have  informed  your  lordship 
that  I  was  apprehensive  that  the  Spanish  troops  in  Estrema- 
dura would  not  make  any  serious  opposition  to  the  progress 
which  it  was  my  opinion  the  enemy  wouKl  attempt  to  make 
in  that  province;  but  as  they  had  been  directed  to  destroy 
the  bridges  on  the  Guadiana,  at  Merida  and  Medcllin,  and 
preparations  had  been  ordered  for  that  purpose,  and  to  de- 
fend the  passage  of  the  Guadiana  as  long  as  was  practicable, 
I  was  in  hopes  that  the  enemy  would  have  been  delayed  at 
least  some  days  before  he  should  be  allowed  to  pass  that 
river.  But  I  have  been  disuppointed  in  that  cx[)C(:tation, 
nnd  the  town  and  bridge  of  Merida  ap[K'nr  to  have  been 
given  up  to  an  advanced  guar.d  of  cavalry." 


sscTios   ii. 

"January  19,  1811. 

"  At  the  moment  when  the  <neniy  entered  Estremadura 
from  Seville  general  Ballasteros  received  an  order  from  the 
Kegency, dated  the  21st  December  last,  directing  him  to  pro- 
ceed with  tile  troops  under  his  connnand  into  the  Conda- 
do  de  Niebla.  The  force  in  Estremadura  was  thus  dimin- 
ished by  one-half,  and  the  remainder  are  considered  insuffi- 
cient to  attempt  the  relief  of  the  troops  in  Olivenza." 

"  The  circumstances  which  I  have  above  related  will  show 
your  lordship  that  the  military  system  of  the  Spanish  na- 
tion is  not  much  improved,  and  that  it  is  not  very  easy  to 
combine  or  regulate  operations  with  corps  so  ill  organised, 
in  possession  of  so  little  intelligence,  and  upon  whose  ac- 
tions so  little  reliance  can  be  placed.  It  will  scarcely  be 
credited  that  the  first  intelligence  which  general  Mendizabal 
received  of  the  assembly  of  the  enemy's  troops  at  Sevillo 
was  from  hence ;  and  if  any  combination  was  thtn  made, 
either  for  retreat  or  defence,  it  was  rendered  useless,  or  de- 
stroyed by  the  orders  from  the  Regency,  to  detach  general 
Ballasteros  into  the  Condado  de  Niebla,  which  were  dated 
the  21st  December,  the  very  day  on  which  Soult  broke  up 
from  Cadiz,  with  a  detachment  of  infantry,  and  marched 
to  Seville." 

SECTIOIf    6. 

"February  2,  1811. 
"  The  various  events  of  the  war  will  have  shown  your 
lordship  that  no  calculation  can  be  made  on  the  result  of 
any  operation  in  wliich  the  Spanish  troops  are  cng^igrd. 
But  if  the  same  number  of  troops  of  any  other  na'.ion  (ten 
thousand)  were  to  be  employed  on  this  operation,  (the 
opening  the  communication  with  Badajos,)  I  should  have 
no  doubt  of  their  success,  or  of  their  ability  to  prevent  the 
French  from  attacking  Badajos  with  the  forces  which  thty 
have  now  employed  on  this  service." 

SECTION    7. 

"February  9,  1811. 
"  General  Mendizabal  has  not  adhered  to  the  plan  which 
was  ordered  by  the  late  marquess  De  la  Romana,  which 
provided  for  the  security  of  the  communication  with  Elvaa 
before  the  troops  should  be  thrown  to  the  left  of  the  Gua- 
diana. I  don't  believe  that  the  strength  of  the  enemy,  on 
either  side  of  the  Guadiana,  is  accurately  known,  but  if 
they  should  be  in  strength  on  the  right  of  that  river,  it 
is  to  be  apprehended  that  the  whole  of  the  troops  will  bo 
shut  up  in  Badajos,  and  I  have  reason  to  believe  that  this 
place  is  entirely  unprovided  with  provisions,  notwithstand- 
ing that  the  siege  of  it  has  been  expected  for  the  last  year." 

SECTION    8. 

"February  23,  1811. 
"  Although  experience  has  taught  me  to  place  no  reliance 
upon  the  effect  of  the  exertions  of  the  Spanish  troops,  not- 
withstanding the  frequent  instances  of  their  bravery,  I  ac- 
knowledge that  this  recent  disaster  has  disappointed  and 
grieved  me  much.  The  loss  of  this  army  and  its  probable 
consequences,  the  fall  of  Badajos,  liave  materially  altered 
the  situation  of  the  allies  in  this  part  of  the  Peninsula,  and 
it  will  not  be  an  easy  task  to  place  them  in  the  situation 
in  which  they  were,  much  less  in  that  in  which  ihey  would 
have  been,  if  the  niisfoitune  had  not  occurred.  I  am  con- 
cerned to  add  to  this  melancholy  history,  thai  the  Portn- 
gucj^e  brigade  of  cavalry  did  not  boliavo  nuicli  better  than 
the  other  troops.     Brigadier-general    Madden    did  cvcrv- 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


773 


thing  in  his  power  to  induce  them  to  charge,  but  in  vain." 
"Tli(!  operations  of  the  Guerillas  continue  throughout  the 
interior ;  and  I  have  proofs  that  the  poUtical  hostility  of  the 
people  of  Spain  towards  the  enemy  is  increasing  rather 
than  diminishing.  But  I  have  not  yet  heard  of  any  mea- 
sure being  adopted  to  supply  the  regular  funds  to  pay  and 
support  an  armj,  or  to  raise  one." 

SECTIOS    9. 

"March  21,  1811. 
<'  It  (Campa  Mayor)  had  been  given  over  to  the  charge 
of  the  marquis  of  Roniana,  at  his  request,  last  year.  But, 
lately,  the  Sjianish  garrison  had  been  first  weakened  and 
then  withdrawn,  in  a  manner  not  very  satisfactorj'  to  me, 
nor  consistent  with  the  honourable  engagements  to  defend 
the  place  into  which  the  marquis  entered  when  it  was  de- 
livered over  to  his  charge.  I  am  informed,  however,  that 
marshal  Bessirres  has  collected  at  Zamora  about  seven 
thousand  men,  composed  principally  of  the  imperjn)  juatd, 
and  of  troops  taken  from  all  the  garrisons  in  Castile.  He 
thus  threatens  an  attack  upon  Gailicia,  in  which  province 
there  are,  I  understand,  sixteen  thousand  men  under  gen- 
eral Mahi ;  but,  from  all  I  hear,  I  am  apprehensive  that  that 
general  will  make  no  defence,  and  that  Gailicia  will  fall  in- 
t»  the  hands  of  the  enemy." 

SECTION     10. 

"Mat/  7,  1811, 
"  Your  lordship  will  have  observed,  in  my  recent  reports 
of  the  state  of  the  Portuguese  force,  that  their  numbers  are 
much  reduced,  and  I  don't  know  what  measure  to  recom- 
mend which  will  have  the  eflVct  of  restoring  them.  All 
measures  recommended  to  the  existing  government  a-re  ei- 
tlier  rejected,  or  are  neglected,  or  are  so  executed  as  to  be 
of  no  use  whatever  ;  and  the  countenance  which  the  prince 
regent  of  Portugal  has  given  to  the  governors  of  the  king- 
dom, who  have  uniformly  manifested  this  spirit  of  opposi- 
tion to  every  thing  proposed  for  the  increase  of  the  re- 
sources of  the  government,  and  the  amelioration  of  their 
military  system,  must  tend  to  aggravate  these  evils.  The 
radical  defect,  both  in  Spain  and  Portugal  is  want  of  mo- 
ney to  carry  on  the  ordinary  operations  of  the  government, 
much  more  to  defray  the  expenses  of  such  a  war  as  that 
in  which  we  are  engaged." 

"  I  have  not  received  the  consent  of  Castanos  anJ  Blake 
to  the  plan  of  co-operation  which  I  proposed  for  the  siege 
of  Badajos  ;  and  I  have  been  obliged  to  write  to  marshal 
Beresford  to  desire  him  to  delay  the  siege  till  they  will  pos- 
itively promise  to  act  as  therein  specified,  or  till  I  can  go 
to  him  with  a  reinforcement  from  hence." 

"Depend  upon  it  that  Portugal  should  be  the  foundation 
of  all  your  operations  in  the  Peninsula,  of  whatever  nature 
they  may  be,  upon  which  point  I  have  never  altered  my 
opinion.  If  they  are  to  be  offensive,  and  Spain  is  to  be 
the  theatre  of  them,  your  commander  must  be  in  a  situa- 
tion to  be  entirely  independent  of  all  Spanish  authorities; 
by  which  means  alone  he  will  be  enabled  to  draw  some  re- 
•ources  from  the  country  and  some  assistance  from  the 
Spanish  armies." 

SECTIOW    11. 

EXTRACT  f)F  A  LETTER  FROM  MR.  STUART  TO  LORD 
WELr,ESI,EY.  RET, ATI VE  TO  DISPUTES  WITH  THE  PA- 
TRIARCH  AN'D  SOUZA. 

"  Sept.  8,  1810. 
<•  I  could  have  borne  all  this  with  patience,  if  not  accom- 
pairied  by  a  direct  proposal  that  the  fleet  and  transport* 


should  quit  the  Tagus,  that  the  Regencv  should  send  an 
order  to  marshal  Beresford  to  dismiss  his>  quarter-nmster- 
general  and  military  secretary,  followed  by  a  rctleclion  on 
the  persons  composing  the  family  of  that  officer,  and  by 
hints  to  the  same  purpose  respecting  the  Portuguese  who 
are  attached  to  lord  Wellington." 

SECTION     12. 

LETTER   FROM   SIR   JOHN   MOOEE  TO   MAJOR  GENIAL 
MKENZIE,  COMMANDING  IN  POUTi  GAL. 


Salamanca,  29th  A'ovemder,  I  SOS. 


SIR, 


The  armies  of  Spain,  commanded  by  generals  Castanos 
and  Blake,  the  one  in  Biscay,  the  other  in  Arragoii,  have 
been  beaten  and  dispersed.  This  renders  my  junction  with 
sir  David  Baird's  corps  impracticable  ;  but  if  it  were,  I  can- 
not hope,  with  the  British  alone,  to  withstand  the  formidable 
force  which  France  has  brought  against  this  country  ;  and 
there  is  ncthing  else  now  in  Spaii  to  make  head  against  it. 

I  have  ordered  sir  David  Bairu  to  fi:ll  back  on  Coruna, 
re-embark,  and  proceed  to  the  Tagus;  I  myself,  with  'he 
corps  which  marched  from  Lisbon,  mea.)  to  retire  by  Ciu- 
dad  Rodrigo  or  Almeida,  and  by  taking  up  such  positions 
as  offer,  endeavour  to  defend,  for  a  time,  the  frontier  of 
Portugal,  and  cover  Lisbon.  But,  looking  forward  that 
this  cannot  be  done  for  any  considerable  time  against  su- 
perior numbers,  it  becomes  necessary  for  me  to  give  you 
this  notice,  that  you  may  embark  the  stores  of  the  army, 
keeping  on  shore  as  little  as  possible  that  may  impede  a  re- 
embarkation  of  the  whole  army  both  i.ow  with  you  and 
that  which  I  am  bringing. 

We  shall  have  great  difficulties  on  the  frontier  for  subsis 
tcnce ;  colonel  Murray  wrote  on  this  subject  to  colonel 
Donkin  yesterday,  that  supplies  might  be  sent  for  us  to 
Abrantes  and  Coimbra.  Some  are  already  at  Oporto,  and 
more  may  be  sent.  I  have  desired  sir  D.  Baird,  if  he  has 
with  him  a  victualler,  of  small  draft  of  water,  to  send  her 
there.  On  the  subject  of  provisions  the  commissary-gen- 
eral will  write  more  in  detail,  and  I  hope  you  will  use  your 
influence  with  the  government  of  Portugal  to  secure  its  aid 
and  assistance,  li  will  be  right  to  consider  with  the  Por- 
tuguese officers  and  engineers  what  points  may  he  immcd'- 
ately  strengthened  and  are  most  defensible,  and  wiiat  use 
you  can  make  of  the  troops  with  you  to  support  nie  in  my 
defence  of  the  frontiers,  and  I  shall  be  glad  to  hear  from 
jou  upon  this  subject.  I  cannot  yet  determine  the  line  I 
shall  take  up,  but  generally  it  will  be  Almeida,  Guarda, 
Belmonte,  Baracal,  Celerico,  Viseu.  The  Poituguese,  on 
their  own  mountains,  can  be  of  much  Otfe,  and  I  should 
hope,  at  any  rate,  that  they  vriii  defend  the  Tras  os  Monies. 
Mr.  Kennedy  will  probably  write  to  Mr.  Erskine,  who  now 
had  better  remain  at  Lisbon  ;  but  if  he  does  not  write  to 
him,  this,  together  with  colonel  Muiray's  letter  to  colonel 
Donkin,  will  be  sufficient  for  you  and  Mr.  Erskine  to  take 
means  for  securing  to  us  not  only  a  supply  of  biscuit  and 
salt  provisions,  but  the  supplies  of  the  country  for  ourselves 
and  horses,  &c.  In  order  to  alarm  as  little  as  possible,  it 
may  be  said  that  more  troojis  are  expected  from  England, 
to  join  us  through  Portugal ;  this  will  do  at  first,  but  grad- 
ually the  truth  will,  of  course,  be  known.  I  am  in  (ireat 
want  of  money,  and  nothing  else  will  secure  the  aid  of  the 
country. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be,  &c. 

J.  MooBX. 

P.  6.  Elvas  should  be  provisioned. 


774 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


No.  XI. 

EXTRACTS  OF  LETTERS  FROM  LORD  WELLINGTON. 
SECTIUK     1. 

Celerico,  May  11,  1810. 

"   I  observe  that  the  minister  don  Miguel  For- 

jas  considers  the  inconvenience,  on  which  I  had  the 
honour  of  addressing  you,  as  of  ordinary  occurrence,  and 
he  entertains  no  doubt  that  inconveniences  of  this  des- 
cription will  not  induce  nie  to  desist  from  making  the 
movements  which  I  might  think  the  defence  of  the  coun- 
try would  require.  !t  frequently  happens  that  an  army 
in  operation  cannot  procure  the  number  of  carriages 
which  it  requires,  eitlicr  from  the  unwillingness  of  the 
inhabitants  to  supply  them,  or  from  the  deficiency  of  the 
number  of  carriages  in  the  country.  But  it  has  rarely 
happened  that  an  army,  thus  unprovided  with  carriages, 
has  been  obliged  to  carry  on  its  operations  in  a  country 
in  which  there  is  literally  no  food,  and  in  which,  if  there 
was  food,  there  is  no  money  to  purchase  it;  and,  when- 
ever that  has  been  the  case,  the  army  has  been  obliged 
to  withdraw  to  the  magazines  which  the  country  had  re- 
fused or  been  unable  to  remove  to  the  army.  This  is 
precisely  the  case  of  the  allied  armies  in  this  part  of  the 
country ;  and,  however  trifling  the  difficulty  may  be 
deemed  by  the  regency  and  the  ministers,  I  consider  a 
starving  army  to  be  so  useless  in  any  situation,  that  I 
shall  certainly  not  pretend  to  hold  a  position  or  to  make 
any  movement  in  which  the  food  of  the  troops  is  not 
secured.  I  have  no  doubt  of  the  ability  or  the  willing- 
ness of  the  country  to  do  all  that  can  be  required  of 
them,  if  the  authority  of  the  government  is  properly  ex- 
jrted  to  force  individuals  to  attend  to  their  public  duties 
rather  than  to  their  private  interests  in  this  time  of  trial. 
I  have  writfcs  this  same  sentiment  to  the  government 
80  frequently,  xhx\.  they  must  be  as  tired  of  reading  it 
as  I  am  of  writing  it.  But  if  they  expect  that  individ- 
uals of  the  lower  orders  are  to  relinquish  the  pursuit  of 
their  private  interests  and  business  to  serve  the  public, 
and  mean  to  punish  them  for  any  omission  in  this  im- 
portant duty,  they  must  begin  with  the  higher  classes 
of  society.  These  must  be  forced  to  perform  their  duty, 
and  no  name,  however  illustrious,  and  no  protection, 
however  powerful,  should  shield  from  punishment  those 
who  neglect  the  performance  of  their  duty  to  the  public 
in  these  times.  Unless  these  measures  are  strictly  and 
invariai)ly  followed,  it  is  in  vain  to  expect  any  serious 
or  continued  exertion  in  the  country,  and  the  regency 
ought  to  be  aware,  from  the  sentiments  of  his  majesty's 
government,  which  I  have  communicated  to  them,  that 
the  continuance  of  his  majesty's  assistance  depends  not 
on  the  ability  or  the  inclination,  but  on  the  actual  effec- 
tual exertions  of  the  people  of  Portugal  in  their  own 
cause.  I  have  thought  it  proper  to  trouble  you  so  much 
at  length  upon  this  subject,  in  consequence  of  the  light 
manner  in  which  the  difficulties  which  I  had  stated  to 
exist  were  noticed  by  Monsieur  de  Forjas.  I  have  to 
mention,  however,  that,  since  I  wrote  to  you,  although 
there  exist  several  causes  »)f  complaint  of  different  kinds, 
and  that  some  examples  mast  be  made,  we  have  recei- 
ved such  assistance  as  has  enabled  me  to  continue  till 
this  time  in  our  positions,  and  I  hope  to  be  able  to  con- 
tinue as  long  as  may  be  necessary.  I  concur  entirely 
in  the  measure  of  appointing  a  special  commission  to  at- 
tend the  head  quarters  of  the  Portuguese  army,  and  I 
hope  that  it  will  be  adopted  without  delay.      I    enclose 


a  proclamation  which  I  have  issued,  which  I  lope  will 
have  some  effect.  It  describes  nearly  the  crinus,  or  rath- 
er the  omissions,  of  which  the  people  may  be  guilty  in 
respect  to  the  transport  of  the  army  ;  these  may  be  aa 
follow  : — 1st,  refusing  to  supply  carts,  boats,  or  beasts  of 
burthen,  when  required  ;  2dly,  refusing  to  remove  theii 
articles  or  animals  out  of  the  reach  of  the  enemy  ;  3dly, 
disobedience  of  the  orders  of  the  magistrate  to  proceed 
to  and  remain  at  any  stiition  with  carriages,  boats,  &c. ; 
4th,  desertion  from  the  service  either  with  or  without 
carriages,  &c. ;  5th,  embezzlement  of  provisions  or  stores 
which  they  may  be  employed  to  transport.  The  crimes 
or  omissions  of  the  inferior  magistrates  may  be  classed 
as  follows: — 1st,  disobedience  of  the  orders  of  their  su- 
periors; 2d,  inactivity  in  the  execution  of  them;  od,  re- 
ceivitig  bribes,  to  excuse  certain  persons  from  the  exe- 
cution of  requisitions  upon  them." 

SECTION    2. 
LORD  WELLINGTON  TO  M.  FORJAS. 

Gouvea,  September  6,   1810. 

MOST    ILLUSTRIOUS    SIR, 

I  have  received  your  letter  of  the  first  of  this  month,  in- 
forming me  that  you  had  placed  before  the  government  of 
this  kingdom  my  despatch  of  the  27th  of  August,  announ- 
cing the  melancholy  and  unexpected  news  of  the  loss  of 
Almeida,  and  that  the  government  had  learned  with  sor- 
row that  an  accident  unforeseen  had  prevented  my  mov- 
ing to  succour  the  place,  hoping,  at  the  same  time,  that 
the  depression  of  the  people,  caused  by  such  an  event, 
will  soon  vanish,  by  the  quick  and  great  successes  which 
they  expect  with  certainty  from  the  ed'orts  of  the  army 
I  have  already  made  known  to  the  government  of  the 
kingdom  that  the  fall  of  Almeida  vi'as  unexpected  by  me, 
and  that  I  deplored  its  loss  and  that  of  my  hopes,  con- 
sidering it  likely  to  depress  and  afllict  the  people  of  this 
kingdom.  It  was  by  no  means  my  intention,  however, 
in  that  letter,  to  state  whether  it  had  or  had  not  been 
my  intention  to  have  succoured  the  place,  and  I  now 
request  the  permission  of  the  government  of  the  kingdom 
to  say  that,  much  as  I  wish  to  remove  the  impression 
which  this  misfortune  has  justly  made  on  the  public,  I 
do  not  propose  to  alter  the  system  and  plan  of  opera- 
tions which  have  been  determined,  after  the  most  serious 
deliberation,  as  best  adequate  to  further  the  general  cause 
of  the  allies,  and,  consequently,  Portugal.  I  reque  t  the 
government  to  believe  that  I  am  not  insensible  to  the 
value  of  their  confidence  as  well  as  that  of  the  public; 
as,  also,  that  I  am  highly  interested  in  removing  the  anx- 
iety of  the  public  upon  the  late  misfortune;  but  I  should 
forget  my  duty  to  my  sovereign,  to  the  prince  regent,  and 
to  the  cause  in  general,  if  I  should  permit  public  cla- 
mour or  panic  to  induce  me  tc  change,  in  the  smallest 
degree,  the  system  and  plan  of  operations  which  I  have 
adopted,  after  mature  consideiation,  and  which  daily  ex- 
perience shews  to  be  the  only  one  likely  tc  produce  a 
good  end.  (Signed)  Wellington. 

8ECTI0X    3. 

Gouvea,  September  7,   1810, 
In  order  to  put  an  end  at  once  to  these  misera- 


ble intrigues,  I  beg  that  you  will  inform  the  government 
that  I  Toill  not  stay  in  the  country,  and  that  I  will  advise 
the  king's  government  to  withdraw  the  assistance  which 
his  majesty  affords  them,  if  they  interfere  in  any  mannei 
with   the   appointment  o.""  marshal    Bcesford's  staff,  foi 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


775 


which  he  is  responsible,  or  with  the  operations  of  the  army, 
or  with  any  of  the  points  which,  with  the  original  arrange- 
ments with  marshal  Bert'sford,  were  referred  exclusively  to 
hi  management.  I  propose,  also,  to  report  to  his  majesty's 
government,  and  refer  to  their  consideration,  what  steps 
ought  to  be  taken,  if  the  Portuguese  government  refuse  or 
delay  to  adopt  the  civil  and  political  arrangements  recom- 
mended by  me,  and  corresponding  with  the  military  opera- 
tions which  I  am  carrying  on.  The  preparatory  measures 
for  the  destruction  of,  or  rather  rendering  useless  the  mills, 
were  suggested  by  me  long  ago,  and  marshal  Beresford  did 
not  write  to  government  upon  them  till  I  had  reminded 
him  a  second  time  of  my  wishes  on  the  subject.  I  now 
beg  leave  to  recommend  that  these  preparatory  measures 
may  be  adopted  not  only  in  the  country  between  the  Ta- 
gus  and  the  Mondego,  laying  north  of  Torres  Vedras,  as  ori- 
ginally proposed,  but  that  they  shall  be  forthwith  adopted 
in  all  parts  of  Portugal,  and  that  the  magistrates  and  oth- 
ers may  be  directed  to  render  useless  the  mills,  upon  recei- 
ving orders  to  do  so  from  the  military  officers.  I  have 
already  adopted  this  measure  with  success  in  this  part  of 
the  country,  and  it  must  be  adopted  in  others  in  which  it 
is  probable  that  the  enemy  may  endear  our  to  penetrate  ; 
ind  it  must  be  obvious  to  any  person  who  will  reflect  upon 
the  subject,  that  it  is  only  consistent  with  all  the  other 
measures  which,  for  the  last  twelve  months,  I  have  recom- 
mended to  government  to  impede  and  make  difficult,  and 
if  possible  prevent,  the  advance  and  establishment  of  the 
enemy's  force  in  the  country.  But  it  appears  that  the 
government  have  lately  discovered  that  we  are  all  wrong ; 
they  have  become  impatient  for  the  defeat  of  the  enemy, 
and,  in  imitation  of  the  Central  Junta,  call  out  for  a  battle 
and  early  success.  If  I  had  had  the  power  I  would  have  pre- 
vented the  Spanish  armies  from  attending  to  this  call ;  and 
if  I  had,  the  cause  would  now  have  been  safe  ;  and,  having 
the  power  now  in  my  hands,  I  will  not  lose  the  only  chance 
'vhich  remains  of  saving  the  cause,  by  paying  the  smallest 
attention  to  the  senseless  suggestions  of  the  Portuguese 
government.  I  acknowledge  that  I  am  much  hurt  at  this 
change  of  conduct  in  the  government;  and,  as  I  must  at- 
tribute it  to  the  j)crsons  recently  introduced  into  the  gov- 
ernment, it  affords  additional  reason  with  me  for  disappro- 
ving of  their  nomination,  and  I  shall  write  upon  the  subject 
to  the  prince  regent,  if  I  should  hear  any  more  of  this  con- 
duct. I  leave  you  to  communicate  the  whole  or  any  part 
of  this  letter  that  you  may  think  proper  to  the  regency, 
(Signed)  VVellixotox. 

SECTIOJf    4. 

Rio  Mcyor,  October  6,    1810. 
You  will  do  me  the  favour  to  inform  the  regen- 


cy, and  above  all  the  principal  Souza,  that  his  majesty  and 
the  prince  regent  having  entrusted  me  with  the  command 
of  their  armies,  and  likewise  with  the  conduct  of  the  mili- 
tary operations,  I  will  not  suffer  them,  or  any  body  else,  to 
interfere  with  them.  That  I  know  best  where  to  station 
my  troops,  and  where  to  make  a  stand  against  the  enemy, 
and  I  shall  not  alter  a  system  formed  upon  mature  consid- 
eration, upon  any  suggestion  of  theirs.  I  am  responsible 
for  what  I  do,  and  they  are  not ;  and  I  recommend  to  them 
to  look  to  the  measures  for  which  they  are  responsible, 
which  I  long  ago  recommended  to  them,  viz.  to  provide  for 
the  tranquillity  of  Lisbon,  and  for  the  food  of  the  army  and 
of  the  people,  while  the  troops  will  be  engaged  with  the 
enemv.  As  for  principal  Souza,  I  beg  you  to  tell  him,  from 
me,  that  I  have  had  no  satisfaction  in  transacting  the  busi- 
ness of  this  '■-ountry  since  he  has  been  a  member  of  the  gov- 


ernment ;  that,  being  embarked  in  a  coarse  of  military  op» 
erations,  of  which  I  hope  to  sec  the  successful  termination, 
I  shall  continue  to  carry  them  on  to  the  end,  but  that  no 
power  on  earth  shall  induce  me  to  remain  in  the  Peninsu- 
la for  one  moment  after  I  have  obtained  his  majesty's 
leave  to  resign  my  charge,  if  princijial  Souza  is  to  remain 
either  a  member  of  the  government  or  to  continue  at  Lisbon. 
Either  he  must  quit  the  country  or  I  will ;  and,  if  I  should 
be  obliged  to  go,  I  shall  take  care  that  the  world,  or  PortU' 
gal  at  least,  and  the  prince  regent  shall  be  made  acquain- 
ted with  my  reasons.  From  the  letter  of  the  .3d,  which  I 
have  received  from  Monsieur  Forjas,  I  had  hoped  that  the 
government  was  satisfied  with  what  I  had  done,  and  intend- 
ed to  do,  and  that  instead  of  endeavouring  to  render  all  fur- 
ther defence  fruitless,  by  disturbing  the  minds  of  the  popu- 
lace at  Lisbon,  they  would  have  done  their  duty  by  adopt- 
ing measures  to  secure  the  tranquillity  of  the  town  ;  but  I 
suppose  that,  like  other  weak  individuals,  they  add  duplici- 
ty to  their  weakness,  and  that  their  expressions  of  approba- 
tion, and  even  gratitude,  were  intended  to  convey  censure. 

Wellikgtox. 

P.  S. — All  I  ask  from  the  Portuguese  Regency  is  tran- 
quillity in  the  town  of  Lisbon,  and  provisions  for  their  own 
troops  while  they  will  be  employed  in  this  part  of  the  coun- 
try. I  have  but  little  doubt  of  success ;  but,  as  I  have  fought 
a  sufficient  number  of  battles  to  know  that  the  result  of  any 
one  is  not  certain,  even  with  the  best  arrangements,  I  ara 
anxious  that  the  government  should  adopt  preparatory  ar- 
rangements, and  take  out  of  the  enemy's  way  those  persona 
and  their  families  who  would  suffer  if  they  were  to  fall  in- 
to their  hands. 

SECTION    5. 

Pero  J^egro,  October  28,  1810. 
The  cattle,  and  other  articles  of  supply,  which  the  gov- 
ernment have  been  informed  have  been  removed  from  the 
island  of  Lizirias,  are  still  on  the  island,  and  most  probably 
the  secretary  of  state,  Don  M.  Forjas,  who  was  at  Alhan- 
dra  yesterday,  will  have  seen  thein.  I  shail  be  glad  to  hear 
whether  the  government  propose  to  take  any  and  what  steps 
to  punish  the  magistrates  who  have  disobeyed  their  orders 
and  have  deceived  them  by  false  reports.  The  officers  anJ 
soldiers  of  the  militia,  absent  from  their  corps,  are  liable  to 
penalties  and  punishments,  some  of  a  civil,  others  of  a  mil- 
i  iiary  nature ;  first,  they  are  liable  to  a  forfeiture  of  all  their 
personal  pronst'ty,  up'^n  information  that  they  arc  absent 
from  thoir  co/p s  without  leave ;  secondly,  they  are  liable  to 
be  transferred  to  serve  as  soldiers  in  the  regiments  of  the 
line,  upon  the  same  information;  and,  lastly,  they  are  liable 
to  the  penalties  of  desertion  inflicted  by  the  military  tribu- 
nals. The  two  first  are  penalties  which  depend  upon  the 
civil  magistrate,  and  I  should  be  very  glad  to  have  heard 
of  one  instance  in  which  the  magistrates  of  Lisbon,  or  in 
which  the  government  had  called  upon  the  magistrates  at 
Lisbon  to  carry  into  execution  the  law  in  either  of  these  re^ 
spects.  I  entreat  them  to  call  for  the  names  of  those  ofll- 
cers  and  soldiers  absent  without  leave  from  any  one  of  the 
Lisbon  regiments  or  militia,  to  disgrace  one  or  more  of  the 
principal  officers,  in  a  public  manner,  for  their  shameful 
desertion  of  their  posts  in  the  hour  of  danger,  and  to  seize 
and  dispose  of  the  whole  property  of  the  militia  soldiers  ab- 
sent without  leave,  and  send  these  men  to  serve  with  any  of 
the  regiments  of  the  line.  I  entreat  them  to  adopt  these  mea- 
sures without  favour  or  distin'^lion  of  any  individuals  in 
respect  to  any  one  regiment,  and  to  execute  the  laws  bona 
Jide  upon  the  subject ;  and  I  shall  be  satisfied  of  their  gOJU 


776 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


intentions,  and  shall  believe  that  they  are  sincerely  desi- 
rous of  saving  the  country  ;  but,  if  we  are  to  go  on  as  wc 
have  hitherto,  if  Great  Britain  is  to  give  large  subsidies  and 
to  expend  hirge  sums  in  support  of  a  cause  in  which  those 
most  interested  sit  l)y  and  take  no  part,  and  those  at  the 
bead  of  the  government,  with  laws  and  power  to  force  the 
|-«ople  to  exertion  in  the  critical  circumstances  in  which 
tne  country  is  placed,  arc  aware  of  the  evil  but  neglect  their 
tluty  and  omit  to  put  the  laws  in  execution,  I  must  believe 
their  professions  to  be  false,  that  they  look  to  little  dirty 
popularity  instead  of  to  save  their  country  ;  that  they  are 
unfaithful  servants  to  their  master,  and  persons  in  whom 
bis  allies  can  place  no  confidence.  In  respect  to  the  milita- 
ry law,  it  may  be  depended  upon  that  it  will  be  carried  into 
«'.\ecution,  and  that  the  day  will  yet  come  on  which  those 
military  persons  who  have  deserted  their  duly  in  these  crit- 
ical times  will  be  punished  as  they  deserve.  The  governors 
of  the  kingdom  forget  the  innumerable  remonstrances 
which  have  been  forwarded  to  them  on  the  defects  in  the 
]rToceedings  of  courts  martial,  which,  in  times  of  active  war, 
render  them  and  their  sentences  entirely  nugatory.  As  an 
ndditional  instance  of  these  defects,  I  mention  tiiat  officers 
of  the  Olivera  regiment  of  militia,  who  behaved  ill  in  the 
action  with  the  enemy  at  V^illa  Nova  de  Fosboa,  in  the  be- 
ginning of  August  last,  and  a  court  martial  was  immedi- 
ately assembled  for  this  trial,  are  still,  in  the  end  of  Octo- 
ber, under  trial,  and  the  trial  will,  probably,  not  be  conclu- 
<led  till  Christmas.  In  like  manner,  the  military  trial  of 
these  deserters  of  the  militia,  after  assembling  officers  and 
•oldiers  at  great  inconvenience  for  the  purpose,  cannot  pos- 
sibly be  concluded  till  the  period  will  have  gone  by  in  which 
nny  benefit  might  be  secured  from  the  example  of  the  pun- 
ishment of  any  one  or  number  of  them.  The  defect  in  the 
administration  of  the  military  law  has  been  repeatedly  point- 
ed out  to  the  government,  and  a  remedy  for  the  evil  has 
been  proposed  to  them,  and  has  been  approved  of  by  the 
Prince  Regent.  But  they  will  not  adopt  it ;  and  it  would 
be  much  better  if  there  was  no  law  for  the  government  of 
the  army  than  that  the  existing  laws  should  continue  with- 

oot  being  executed." 

•'  Wellinktox." 

SECTION    6. 

"  October  29,   1810. 
In  answer  to  lord  Wellesley's  queries   rcspect- 


?ng  the  Portuguese  Regency,  my  opinion  is  that  the  Regen- 
cy ought  to  be  appointed  by  the  Prince  Regent,  but  during 
his  pleasure  ;  they  ought  to  have  full  power  to  act  in  every 
possible  case,  to  make  appointments  to  offices,  to  dismiss 
from  ofTire,  to  make  and  alter  laws,  in  short,  every  power 
■which  the  prince  himself  could  possess  if  he  were  on  the 
ppot.  They  ought  to  report,  in  detail,  their  proceedings  on 
every  subject,  and  their  reasons  for  the  adoption  of  every 
roeasure.  The  prince  ought  to  decline  to  receive  any  op- 
plication  from  any  of  his  officers  or  subjects  in  Portugal  not 
transmitted  through  the  regular  channels  of  the  government 
here,  and  ought  to  adopt  no  measure  respecting  Portugal  not 
recommended  by  the  Regency.  The  smaller  the  number  of 
persons  composing  the  Regency  the  better;  but  my  opin- 
wn  is  that  it  is  not  advisable  to  remove  any  of  the  persons 
now  composing  it  excepting  principal  Souza,  with  whom 
(  neither  can  nor  will  have  any  official  intercourse.  The 
patriarch  is,  in  my  opinion,  a  necessary  evil.  He  has  ac- 
quired n  kind  of  popularity  and  confidence  through  the 
c«»unfry  which  would  increase  if  he  was  removed  from  of- 
fice, and  he  is  the  kind  of  man  to  do  much  mischief  if  he 
|ras  not  employed.     If  we  should  succcca  in  removing  the 


principal  (which  must  be  done,)  I  think  the  patriarch  will 
take  warning,  and  will  behave  better  in  future.  In  respect 
to  military  ojierations,  there  can  be  no  interference  on  the 
[lart  of  the  Regency  or  any  body  else.  If  there  is  I  can  nc 
longer  be  responsible.  If  our  own  government  choose  to 
interfere  themselves,  or  that  the  Prince  Rege-nt  should  in- 
terfere, they  have  only  to  give  me  their  orders  in  detuil, 
and  I  will  carry  them  strictly  into  execution,  to  the  best  of 
my  abilities;  and  1  will  be  responsible  for  nothing  but  the 
execution  ;  but,  if  I  am  to  be  responsible,  I  must  have  fuM 
discretion  and  no  interference  on  the  part  of  the  Regency 
or  any  body  else.  I  should  like  to  see  princi|ial  Souza's 
detailed  instructions  for  his  •■<■  embnscudos"  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  'i'agus.  If  principal  Souza  does  not  go  to  England, 
or  somewhere  out  of  Portugal,  the  country  will  be  lost. 
The  lime  we  lose  in  discussing  matters  which  ought  to  be 
executed  immediately,  and  in  the  wrong  direction  given  to 
the  deliberations  of  the  government,  is  inconceivable.  The 
gentlemen  destined  for  the  Alcmtejo  ought  to  have  been  in 
the  province  on  the  evening  of  the  24th.  but,  instead  of 
that,  three  valuable  days  of  fine  weather  will  have  been  lost 
because  the  government  do  not  choose  to  take  part  in  oi 
arrangements,  which,  however  undeniably  beneficial,  will 
not  be  much  liked  by  those  whom  it  will  atToct ;  although 
it  is  certain  that,  sooner  or  later,  these  persons  must  and 
will  be  ruined,  by  leaving  behind  them  all  their  valuable 
property,  and,  as  in  the  case  of  this  part  of  the  country, 
everything  which  can  enable  the  enemy  to  remain  in  the 
country.  In  answer  to  M.  de  Forjas'  note  of  the  22d,  en- 
closed in  yours,  (without  date,)  I  have  to  say  that  I  knovr 
of  no  carriages  employed  by  the  British  army  excepting  by 
the  commissary-general,  and  none  are  detained  that  I  know 
of.  I  wish  that  the  Portuguese  government,  or  its  officers, 
would  state  the  names  of  those  who  have  detained  carriages, 
contrary  to  my  repiated  orders;  or  the  regiment,  or  where 
they  are  stationed  ;  but  this  they  will  never  do.  All  that 
wc  can  do  with  the  carriages  is  to  send  back  sick  in  them, 
when  there  are  any.  It  will  not  answer  to  make  an  en- 
gagement that  the  wheel-carriages  from  Lisbon  shall  not 
come  farther  than  Bucellas,  Montachique,  &c.  many  arti- 
cles required  by  the  army  cannot  be  carried  by  mules,  and 
the  carriages  must  con:e  on  with  them  here.  In  many 
cases  the  Portuguese  troops  in  particular  are  ill  provided 
with  mules,  therefore  this  must  be  left  to  the  commissary- 
general  of  the  army,  under  a  recommendation  to  him,  if 
possible,  not  to  send  the  Lisbon  wheel-carriages  beyond 
the  places  above  mentioned.  I  wish,  in  every  case,  that  a 
regulation  made  should  be  observed,  and  the  makers  of 
regulations  should  take  care  always  to  frame  them  as  they 
can  be  observed,  which  is  the  reason  of  my  entering  so 
particularly  into  this  point." 

«'  WELLixcToar." 

SECTION     9. 

"  Pero  J\'egro,  October  31,  1810. 
" 1  am  glad  that  the  gentlemen   feel   my  letters. 


and  I  hope  that  they  will  have  the  cfiTect  of  inducing  them 
to  take  some  decided  steps  as  well  regarding  the  jirovisions 
in  the  Alemtejo  as  the  desertion  of  the  militia.  The  ordc' 
nanza  artillery  now  begin  to  desert  from  the  works,  al- 
though they  arc  fed  by  us  with  English  rations  and  taken 
care  of  in  the  same  manner  as  our  own  troops.  Your  note, 
]Vo. — ,  of  29th,  is  strictly  true  in  all  its  parts,  the  Frvnch 
could  not  have  staid  here  a  week  if  all  the  provisions 
had  been  removed,  and  the  length  of  time  they  can  now  stay 
depends  upon  the  quantity  remaining  of  what  they  hav« 
found  in  places  from  which  there  existed  means  of  reiiioT- 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


777 


Ing  everything,  if  the  quantity  had  been  ten  times  greater. 
They  are  stopped  cfTectually  ;  in  front  all  the  roads  are  oc- 
cupied, and  lliey  can  get  nothing  from  their  rear;  but  all 
Ihe  military  arrangements  which  have  been  made  are  use- 
less if  they  can  find  subsistence  on  the  ground  which  they 
occupy.  For  what  I  know  to  the  contrary,  they  may  be 
able  to  maintain  their  position  till  the  who  e  French  army 
is  brought  to  their  assistance.  It  is  heart-breaking  to  con- 
template the  chance  of  failure  from  such  obstinacy  and 
folly." 

"  Wellingtox." 

BKCTinx    8. 

Ptro  JVe^ro,  J^ovember  1,  1810. 
•'  I  havt  no  doubt  that  the  government  can  produce  vol- 
umes of  papers  to  prove  that  they  gave  orders  upon  the 
several  subjects  to  which  the  enclosures  relate,  but  it  would 
be  very  desirable  if  they  would  state  whether  any  magis- 
trate or  other  person  has  been  punished  for  not  obejing 
those  orders.  The  fact  is  that  the  government,  afier  the 
appointmerit  of  principal  Souza  to  be  a  memlier  of  the  Re- 
gency, conceived  that  the  war  could  be  maintained  upon 
the  frontier,  contrary  to  the  opinion  of  myself  and  of  eveiy 
military  olficer  in  the  country,  and,  instead  of  giving  posi- 
tive orders  preparatory  to  the  event  which  was  most  likely 
to  occur,  viz.  that  the  allied  army  would  retire,  they  spent 
much  valuable  time  in  discussing,  with  me,  the  expediency 
of  a  measure  which  was  quite  imiiracticable,  and  omitted  to 
give  the  orders  which  were  necessary  for  the  evacuation  of 
the  country  between  the  Tagus  and  the  Mondego  by  the  in- 
habitants. Then,  when  convinced  that  the  army  would  re- 
tire, they  first  imposed  that  duty  on  me,  allbough  they  must 
have  known  that  I  was  ignorant  of  the  names,  the  nature 
OI  the  offices,  the  places  of  abode  of  the  different  magistrates 
who  were  to  superintend  the  execution  of  the  measure,  and, 
moreover,  I  have  but  one  gentleman  in  my  family  to  give 
me  any  ass-istonce  in  v^riting  the  Portuguese  language,  and 
they  afterwards  issued  the  orders  themselves,  still  making 
them  referable  to  me,  without  my  knowledge  or  consent, 
and  still  knowing  that  I  had  no  means  vk-hatever  of  commu- 
nicating with  the  country,  and  they  issued  them  at  the  ve- 
ry period  when  the  enemy  was  advancing  from  Almeida. 
If  I  had  lint  been  able  to  stop  the  enerny  sX  Susacc  he  rv-'ctX 
have  been  in  his  present  situation  long  before  the  order 
could  have  reached  those  to  whom  it  was  addressed.  All 
this  conduct  was  to  be  attributed  to  the  same  cause,  a  de- 
sire to  avoid  to  adopt  a  measure  which,  however  beneficial 
to  the  real  interests  of  the  country,  was  likely  to  disturb  the 
habits  of  indi>lencc  and  ease  of  the  inhabitants,  and  to  throw 
the  cdiuiM  of  the  measure  upon  me  and  upon  the  British  gov- 
ernment. I  avowed,  in  fr.y  proclamation,  that  I  was  the  au- 
th.ir  of  thatmeasure,  and  the  government  might  have  sheltrr- 
ed  themselves  under  that  authority,  but  the  principle  of  the 
government  has  lately  been  to  seek  for  popubirity,  and  they 
will  not  aid  in  any  measure,  however  beneficial  to  the  real 
Interests  of  the  country,  which  may  be  unpopular  with  the 
mob  of  Lisbon.  I  cannot  agree  in  the  justice  of  the  ex- 
pression of  the  astonishment  by  the  secretary  of  state  that 
the  measure  should  have  been  executed  in  this  part  of  the 
country  at  all.  The  same  measure  was  carried  into  com- 
plete execution  in  Upper  Beira,  notwithstanding  that  the 
army  was  in  that  province,  and  the  means  of  transport  were 
required  for  its  service,  not  o  soul  remained,  and,  excepting 
at  Coinibra,  to  which  town  my  personal  authority  and  influ- 
ence did  not  reach,  not  an  article  of  any  description  was 
I«ift  behind  ;  and  all  the  mills  upon  the  Cna  and  Mondego, 
•nd  their  dependent  streams  were  rendered  useless.     But 


there  were  no  discussions  there  upon  the  propriety  of  main* 
taining  the  war  upon  the  frontier.  The  orders  wi  re  given, 
and  they  were  obeyed  in  time,  and  the  enemy  suffered  ac- 
cordingly. In  this  part  of  the  country,  notv\ithstanding 
the  advantage  of  having  a  place  of  security  to  letire  to,  not- 
withstanding the  advantage  of  water-carriage,  notwithstand- 
ing that  the  Tagus  was  fordable  in  many  places  at  the  pe- 
riod when  the  inhabitants  should  have  passed  their  proper- 
ty to  the  left  of  the  river,  and  fortunately  filled  at  the  mo- 
ment the  enemy  approached  its  banks;  the  inhabitaii'.s  have 
tied  from  their  habitations  as  tliey  would  have  done  under 
any  circumstances,  without  waiting  orders  from  me  ir  from 
the  government;  but  they  have  left  behind  them  every 
thing  that  could  be  u.seful  to  the  enemy,  and  could  subsist 
their  army,  and  ail  the  mills  untouched;  accordingly,  the 
enemy  still  remain  in  our  front,  notwithstanding  that  their 
communication  is  cut  off  with  Spain  and  with  every  oth.^r 
military  body  ;  and  if  the  provisions  which  they  have  found 
will  last,  of  which  I  can  have  no  knowledge,  ihry  niay  :e- 
main  till  they  will  be  joined  by  the  whole  French  army  in 
Spain.  I  believe  that  in  Santarem  and  Villa  Franca  alone, 
both  towns  upon  the  Tagus,  and  both  having  the  advan- 
tage of  water-carriage,  Ihe  enemy  found  subsistence  for  their 
arrny  for  a  considerable  length  of  tiine.  Thus  will  appear 
the  difference  of  a  measure,  adopted  in  time,  and  the  delay 
of  it  till  the  last  moment ;  and  I  only  wish  that  the  coun- 
try and  the  allies  may  not  experience  the  evil  consequences 
of  the  ill  fated  propensity  of  the  existing  Portuguese  Re- 
gency to  seek  popularity.  In  the  same  manner  the  other 
measure  since  recommended,  viz.  the  removal  of  the  pro- 
perty of  the  inhabitants  of  Alemtejo  to  j. laces  of  security 
has  been  delayed  by  everj"  means  in  the  power  of  the  gov- 
ernment, and  has  been  adopted  at  hist  against  their  inclina- 
tion; as  usual,  they  commenced  a  discussion  with  me  upon 
the  expediency  of  preventing  the  enemy  from  crossing  the 
Tagus.  they  then  sent  their  civil  olncer  to  me  to  receive  in- 
structions, and  afterwards  they  conveyed  to  him  an  instruc- 
tion of  the ,  to  which  I  propose  to  draw  the  atten- 
tion of  his  ro}-al  highness  the  prince  Regent  and  of  his  ma- 
jesty's government.  His  royal  highness  and  his  majesty's 
government  viill  then  see  in  what  manner  the  existing  re- 
gency are  disposed  to  co-operate  with  me.  The  additional 
crdfr  of  the  30th  of  October,  marked  5  in  the  enclosures 
from  M.  Forjas,  shew  the  sense,  which  tl.e  regency  them- 
selves entertained  Crf  the  insufficiency  of  their  original  in- 
structions to  the  Disembargador  Paes  de  Mates.  I  may 
have  mistaken  the  system  of  defence  to  be  adopted  for  this 
country,  and  principal  Souza  and  other  members  of  the  Re- 
gency may  be  better  judges  of  the  capacity  of  the  troops 
and  of  the  operations  to  be  carried  on  than  I  am.  In  this 
case  they  should  desire  his  majesty  and  the  jirince  regent 
to  lemove  me  from  the  command  of  the  army.  But  they 
cannot  doubt  my  zeal  for  the  cause  in  which  we  are  enga- 
ged, and  they  know  that  not  a  moment  of  my  time,  nor  a 
faculty  of  my  mind,  that  is  not  devoted  to  promote  it ;  and 
the  records  of  this  government  will  shew  what  I  have  dona 
for  them  and  their  country.  If,  therefore,  they  do  not  mani- 
fest their  dissatisfaction  and  want  of  confidence  in  the  mea 
sures  which  I  adopt  by  desiring  that  I  should  be  removed 
they  are  bound,  as  honest  men  and  faithful  servants  to  theii 
prince,  to  co-operate  with  me  by  all  means  in  their  power, 
and  thus  should  neither  thwart  them  by  o|)position,  nor 
render  them  nugatory  by  useless  delays  and  discussions. 
Till  lately  I  have  had  the  pleasure  pf  receiving  the  support 
and  co-operation  of  the  government;  and  I  regret  that  his 
royal  highness  the  prince  regent  should  have  been  induced 
to  make  a  change  which  has  operated  so  materially  to  th« 


778 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


detriment  of  his  people  and  of  the  allies.  In  respect  to  the 
operations  on  the  left  of  the  Tagus,  I  was  always  of  opin- 
ion that  the  ordcnanca  would  be  able  to  prevent  the  enemy 
from  sending  over  any  of  their  plundering  parties;  and  I 
Was  unwiliinj^  to  adopt  any  measure  of  greater  solidity, 
from  my  knowledge,  that,  as  soon  as  circunistancis  should 
render  it  expedient,  on  any  account,  to  withdraw  the  troops, 
which  1  slionld  have  sent  to  the  left  of  the  Tagus,  the  orde- 
nanca  would  disperse.  The  truth  is  that,  notwithstanding 
the  opinion  of  some  of  the  government,  every  Portuguese, 
into  whose  hands  a  firelock  is  placed,  docs  not  become  a 
soldier  capable  of  meeting  the  enemy.  Experience,  which 
the  meml)crs  of  the  government  have  not  had,  has  taught  me 
this  truth,  and  in  what  manner  to  make  use  of  the  different 
descriptioTis  i>f  troops  in  this  country  ;  and  it  would  bt  very 
desirablf,  if  tlie  government  would  leave,  exclusively,  to 
marshal  Beresford  and  me,  the  adoption  of  all  military  ar- 
rangements. The  conduct  of  the  governor  of  8etuval  is, 
undoubtidly,  the  cause  of  the  inconvenience  now  felt  on 
the  left  of  the  Tagus.  He  brought  forward  his  garrison  to 
the  river  against  orders,  and  did  not  reflect,  and  possibly 
was  not  aware  as  I  am,  that  if  they  had  been  attacked  in 
that  situation,  as  they  probably  would  have  been,  they 
would  have  dispersed  ;  and  thus  Setuval,  as  well  as  the  re- 
giment, which  was  to  have  been  its  garrison,  would  have 
been  lost.  It  was  necessary,  therefore,  at  all  events,  to  pre- 
vent that  misfortune,  and  to  order  the  troops  to  retire  to 
Setuval,  and  the  ordenanca  as  usual  dispersed,  and  the 
government  will  lose  their  five  hundred  stand  of  new  arms, 
and,  if  the  enemy  can  cross  the  Tagus  in  time,  their  3- 
pounders.  These  are  the  consequences  of  persons  inter- 
fering in  military  operations,  who  have  no  knowledge  of 
them,  or  of  the  nature  of  the  troops  which  are  to  carry  them 
on.  I  am  now  under  the  necessity,  much  to  the  inconve- 
nience of  the  aruiy,  of  sending  a  detachment  to  the  left  of 
the  Tagus." 

SECTION  9. 

"December  5,  1810. 
"  .Ml  my  proceedings  have  been  founded  on  the  follow- 
ing principles:  First,  That,  by  my  appointment  of  mar- 
shal-general of  the  Portuguese  army  with  the  same  powers 
as  those  vested  in  the  late  due  de  la  Foens,  I  hold  the  com- 
mand of  the  army  independent  of  the  local  government  of 
Portugal.  Secondly,  That,  by  the  arrangements  made  by 
the  governors  of  the  kingdom  with  the  king's  government, 
when  sir  William  Beresford  was  asked  for  by  the  former 
to  command  the  Portuguese  army,  it  was  settled  that  the 
commander-in-chief  of  the  British  army  should  direct  the 
general  or)prations  of  the  con)bined  force.  Thirdly,  That, 
supposing  that  my  appointment  of  marshal-general  did  not 
give  me  the  independent  control  over  the  operations  of  the 
Portuguese  army,  or  that,  as  commander-in-chief  of  the 
British  army,  I  did  not  possess  the  power  of  directing  the 
operation  of  the  whole  under  the  arrangement  above  re- 
ferred to ;  it  follows  that  cither  the  operations  of  the  two 
armies  must  have  been  separated,  or  the  Portuguese  gov- 
ernment must  have  had  the  power  of  directing  the  opera- 
tions of  the  British  army.  Fourthly,  It  never  was  intend- 
ed that  both  armies  should  be  exposed  to  the  certain  loss, 
which  would  have  been  the  consequence  of  a  disjointed  ope- 
ration ;  and,  undoubtedly,  his  majesty's  government  never 
intended  to  give  over  the  British  army  to  the  government 
of  the  kingdom,  to  make  ducks  and  drakes  of.  'i"he  gov- 
ernment of  the  kingdom  must,  in  their  reply  to  my  letter, 
either  deny  the  truth  of  these  principles,  or  they  must 
prove  that  itiy  charge  against  them  is  without  foundation, 


and  that  tlvey  did  n(.t  delay  and  omit  to  adopt  varioot 
measures,  recommended  by  me  and  marshal  Beresford,  caU 
culatcd  to  assist  and  correspond  with  the  operations  of  th» 
armies,  upon  the  proposition  and  under  the  influence  of 
principal  Souza,  under  the  pretence  of  discussing  with  mi> 
the  propriety  of  my  military  arrangements. 

"  Wellixoton." 

SECTION    10. 

"  Curtuxo,  January  18,  1811 
"  It  is  necessary  that  I  should  draw  your  attention,  and 
that  of  the  Portuguese  government,  upon  the  earliest  oc- 
casion, to  the  sentiments  which  have  dropped  from  the 
Patriarch,  in  recent  discussions  at  the  meeting  of  the 
Regency.  It  af)pears  that  his  eminence  has  expatiated  on 
the  inutility  of  laying  fresh  burthens  on  the  people, '  which 
were  evidently  for  no  other  purpose  than  to  nourish  a  war 
in  the  heart  of  the  kingdom.'  It  must  be  recollected  that 
these  discussions  are  not  those  of  a  popular  assembly,  they 
can  scarcely  be  deemed  those  of  a  ministerial  council,  but 
they  are  those  of  persons  whom  his  royal  highness  the 
Prince  Regent  has  called  to  govern  his  kingdom  in  the 
existing  crisis  of  affairs.  I  have  always  been  in  the  habit 
of  considering  his  eminence  the  Patriarch  as  one  of  those 
in  Portugal  who  are  of  opinion  that  all  sacrifices  arc  to  be 
made,  provided  tli£  kingdom  could  preserve  its  independ- 
ence ;  and,  I  think  it  most  important  that  the  British  gov- 
ernment, and  the  government  of  the  Prince  Regent,  and 
the  world,  should  be  undeceived,  if  we  have  been  mistaken 
hitherto.  His  eminence  objects  to  the  adoption  of  mea- 
sures which  have  for  their  immediate  object  to  procure 
funds  for  the  maintenance  of  his  royal  highness's  armies, 
because  a  war  may  exist  in  the  heart  of  the  kingdom,  but 
I  am  apprehensive  the  Patriarch  forgets  the  mariner  in 
which  the  common  enemy  first  entered  this  kingdom,  in 
the  year  1807,  that  in  which  they  were  expelled  from  it, 
having  had  complete  possession  of  it  in  18C8,  and  that 
they  were  again  in  possession  of  the  city  of  Oporto,  and 
of  the  two  most  valuable  provinces  of  the  kingdom  in 
1809,  and  the  mode  in  which  they  were  expelled  from 
those  provinces.  He  forgets  that  it  was  stated  to  him  in 
the  month  of  February,  1810,  in  the  presence  of  the  Mar- 
quis of  Olhao,  of  Don  iVI.  Forjas.  and  of  Don  Joa  Antonio 
Saltar  de  Mendoza,  and  Marshal  Sir  W.  C.  Beresford,  that 
it  was  probable  the  enemy  would  invade  this  kingdom  with 
such  an  army  as  that  it  would  be  necessary  to  concentrate 
all  our  forces  to  oppose  him  with  any  chance  of  success, 
and  that  this  concentration  could  be  made  with  safety  in 
the  neighbourhood  of  the  capital  only,  and  that  the  general 
l)lan  of  the  campaign  was  communicated  to  him  which 
went  to  bring  the  enemy  into  the  heart  of  the  kingdom  ;  and 
that  he  expressed  before  all  these  persons  his  high  appro- 
bation of  it.  If  he  recollected  these  circumstances  he  would 
observe  that  nothing  had  occurred  in  this  campaign  that 
had  not  been  foreseen  and  provided  for  by  measures  of 
which  he  had  expressed  his  approbation,  of  whose  conse- 
quences he  now  disapproves.  'J'he  Portuguese  nation  are 
involved  in  a  war  not  of  aggression,  or  even  defence  on 
their  parts,  not  of  alliance,  not  in  consequence  of  their 
adherence  to  any  political  system,  for  they  abandoned  all 
alliances  and  all  political  systems  in  order  to  pro])itiate  the 
enemy.  The  inhabitants  of  Portugal  made  war  purely 
and  simply  to  get  rid  of  the  yoke  of  the  tyrant  whose  gov- 
ernment was  established  in  Portugal,  and  to  save  their  lives 
and  properties ;  they  chose  this  lot  for  themselves,  princi- 
pally at  the  instigation  of  his  eminence  the  Patriarch,  and 
they    ailed  upon  his  .majesty,  the  ancient  ally  of  Portugal 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   W  I  R. 


779 


whose  alliance  haJ  been  relinquished  at  the  requisition  of 
the  coannon  enemy,  to  aid  them  in  the  glorious  ein<rt  which 
they  wished  to  make,  and  to  restore  the  iiidi-|)endence  of 
their  country,  and  to  secure  the  lives  and  properties  of  its 
inhabitants.  I  will  not  state  the  manner  in  which  his 
majesty  has  answered  the  call,  or  enumerate  the  services 
rendered  to  this  nation  by  his  army;  whatever  may  be  the 
result  of  the  contest  nothing  can  make  me  believe  that  the 
Portujusse  nation  will  ever  forget  them;  but  when  a  nation 
has  adopted  the  line  of  resistance  to  the  tyrant  under  the 
circumstances  under  which  it  was  unanimously  adoj-tcd  by 
the  Pitrtugucse  nation  in  1808,  and  has  been  persevered 
in,  it  cannot  be  believed  that  they  intended  to  suffer  none 
of  the  miseries  of  war,  or  that  their  government  act  incon- 
Bistenlly  with  their  sentiments  when  they  expatiate  on  'the 
inutility  of  laying  fresh  burthens  on  the  people,  which 
were  evidently  for  no  other  purpose  than  to  nourish  a  war 
in  the  heart  of  the  kingdom.'  The  patriarch  in  particular 
forgets  his  old  principles,  his  own  actions  which  have 
principally  involved  his  country  in  the  contest  when  he 
talks  of  discontinuing  it,  because,  it  has  again,  for  the  tliird 
time,  been  brought  into  '  the  heart  of  the  kingdom.'  Al- 
though the  patriarch,  particularly,  and  the  majority  of  the 
existing  government  approved  of  the  plan  which  I  ex- 
plained to  them  in  February,  1810,  according  to  which  it 
was  probable  that  this  kingdom  would  be  made  the  seat 
of  war  which  has  since  occurred.  I  admit  that  his  eminence, 
or  any  of  those  members  may  fairly  disapprove  of  the  cam- 
9  paign,  and  c>i  the  continuance  of  the  enemy  in  Portugal. 
I  have  pointed  out  to  the  Portuguese  government,  in  more 
than  oqe  despatch,  the  difliculties  and  risks  which  attended 
any  attack  upon  the  enemy's  position  in  this  country,  and 
the  probable  success  not  only  to  ourselves  but  to  our  allies 
of  our  perseverance  in  the  plan  which  I  had  adopted,  and 
had  hitherto  followed  so  far  successfully,  as  that  the  allies 
have  literally  sustained  no  loss  of  any  description,  and  this 
army  is,  at  this  moment,  more  complete  than  it  was  at  the 
opening  of  the  campaign  in  April  last.  The  inhabitants 
of  one  part  of  the  country  alone  have  suffered  and  are  con- 
tinuing to  suffer.  But  without  entering  iato  discussions 
which  I  wish  to  avoid  on  this  occasion,  I  lepeat,  that  if 
my  counsels  had  been  followed  these  s-jffeiings  would  at 
least  have  been  alleviated,  and  I  observe  that  is  the  first 
time  I  have  heard  that  the  sufferings  of  a  p-irl,  and  but  a 
small  part  of  any  nation  have  been  deemed  a  reason  for 
refusing  to  ailofit  a  measure  which  h^.d  for  its  object  the 
deliverance  of  the  whole.  The  patriarch  may,  however, 
disapprove  of  the  system  I  have  followed,  and  1  conceive 
that  he  is  fully  justified  in  desiring  his  majesty  and  the 
prince  regent  to  remove  mc  from  the  command  of  these 
armies.  This  would  be  a  measure  consistent  v\'ith  his 
former  conduct  in  this  contest,  under  the  circumstances  of 
my  having  unfortunately  fallen  in  his  opinion,  but  this 
measure  is  entirely  distinct  from  the  refusal  to  concur  in 
laying  those  burthens  upon  the  people  which  are  necessarv 
to  carry  on  and  to  secure  the  object  of  the  war.  It  must  be 
obvious  to  his  eminence,  and  to  every  person  acquainted 
with  the  real  situation  of  the  affairs  of  Portugal,  unless  a 
great  effjrt  is  made  to  render  the  resources  more  adequate 
to  the  necessary  expv->nditure  all  plans  and  systems  of  ope- 
ration will  be  alike,  for  the  Portuguese  army  will  he  able 
to  carry  on  none.  At  this  moment  althonu'h  all  the  corps 
are  concentrated  in  the  neighbourhood  of  their  magazines, 
with  mr-ans  of  transport,  easy,  by  the  Tagus  the  Portu- 
guese troops  arc  frequently  in  want  of  provisions  because 
these  is  no  mom'y  to  pay  the  expense  of  tr.insport.  and  all 
the  departments  of  the   Portuguese   army,   including   the 


hospitals,  are  equally  destitute  of  funds  to  enable  ihem  ta 
defray  the  necessary  expenditure,  and  to  perfiirm  theil 
duty.  The  deficiencies  and  di'.liculties  have  existed  evef 
since  I  have  known  the  Portuguese  army,  and  it  is  well 
known  that  it  must  have  been  disbanded  more  than  once, 
if  it  had  not  been  assisted  by  the  provisions,  stores,  and 
funds,  of  the  British  army.  It  may  likewise  occur  to  hia 
eminence  that  in  jiroportion  as  the  operations  of  the  armies 
would  be  more  extended,  the  expense  would  increase,  and 
the  necessity  for  providing  adequate  funds  to  support  it 
would  become  more  urgent,  unless,  indeed,  the  course  of 
their  operations  should  annihilate  at  one  blow  both  army 
and  expenditure.  The  objection  then  to  adopt  measures 
to  improve  the  resources  of  the  government,  go  to  decide 
the  question  whether  the  war  should  be  carried  on  or  not 
in  any  manner.  By  desiring  his  majesty  and  the  prince 
regent  to  remove  me  from  the  command  of  their  armies, 
his  eminence  would  endeavour  to  get  rid  of  a  person 
deemed  incapable  or  unwilling  to  fulfil  the  duties  of  his 
situation.  By  objecting  to  improve  the  resources  of  the 
country  he  betrays  an  alteration  of  opinion  respecting  the 
contest,  and  a  desire  to  forfeit  its  advantages,  and  to  give 
up  the  independence  of  the  country,  and  the  security  of 
the  lives  and  properties  of  the  Portuguese  nation.  In  my 
opinion  the  Patriarch  is  in  such  a  situation  in  this  country 
that  he  ought  to  be  called  upon,  on  the  part  of  lus  majesty, 
to  state  distinctly  what  he  meant  by  refusing  to  concur  in 
the  measures  which  were  necessary  to  insure  the  funds,  to 
enable  this  country  to  carry  on  the  war;  at  all  events,  I 
request  that  this  letter  may  be  communicated  to  him  in  the 
Regency,  and  that  a  copy  of  it  may  be  forwarded  to  hia 
royal  highness  the  prince  regent,  in  order  that  his  royal 
highness  may  see  that  I  have  given  his  eminence  an  oppoi>» 
tunity  of  explaining  his  motives  either  by  stating  his  per- 
sonal objections  to  me,  or  the  alteration  of  his  opinions,  hid 
sentiments,  and  his  wishes,  in  respect  to  the  independence 
of  his  country. 

"  Wellisgto:*  " 

No.   XII. 

SECTIOX     1. 

LETTER  FROM  LIEUT-GENERAL  GRAHAM  TO  Tllli  RIGHT 
HOXOURABLE  HENRY  VVELLESLEY. 

Ma  de  Leon,  2Ath  March,  1811. 

SIR, 

You  will  do  justice  to  my  reluctance  to  entc  ii:to  any 
contn>versy  for  the  purpose  of  counteracting  the  effects  of 
that  obloquy  which  you  yourself  and  many  others  assured 
me  my  conduct  was  exposed  to  by  the  reports  circulated, 
at  Cadiz,  relative  to  the  issue  of  the  late  ex|)edition. 

But  a  copy  of  a  printed  statement  of  general  La  Pena 
having  been  shewn  to  me,  which,  by  implication  at  least, 
leaves  the  blame  of  the  failure  of  the  most  brilliant  pros* 
pects  on  me,  it  becomes  indispensably  necessary  that  I 
should  take  up  my  pen  in  self  defence. 

Having  already  sent  you  a  copy  of  my  despatch  to  the 
earl  of  Liver[)ool,  with  a  report  of  the  action,  I  will  not 
trouble  you  with  a  detail  of  the  first  movements  of  the  ar- 
my, nor  with  any  other  observation  relative  to  them,  than 
that  the  troops  suffered  much  unnecessary  fatigue  by  march* 
ing  in  the  night,  and  without  good  guides. 

Considering  the  nature  of  the  service  we  were  engaged  in, 
I  was  most  anxious  that  the  army  should  not  come  into  con- 
tent With  the  enemy  in  an  exhausted  state,  nor  be  exposed 


780 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


to  the  at'aok  of  the  eiinny  but  when  it  was  well  collected  ; 
and,  in  consequence  of  representations  to  this  cU'ect,  I  un- 
derstood that  the  march  of  the  afternoon  of  the  4th,  was  to 
be  a  shi>rt  one,  to  take  up  for  the  night  a  position  near  Co- 
nil  ;  to  prepare  which,  staff  otHcers,  of  both  nations,  were 
sent  forward  with  a  pro[)er  escort. 

The  march  was,  nevertheless,  continued  through  the 
nii^ht,  with  those  frequent  and  harassing  halts,  which  the 
necessity  of  groping  for  the  way  occasioned. 

When  ihe  British  division  began  its  march  from  the  po- 
sition of  I3.»rros.i  to  that  of  Hermeja,  /  left  the  tfeneral  on 
the  Jiurrosa  height,  no?'  ili<l  I  knoio  of  his  in'cntiov.s  of 
quitting  it ;  and,  when  I  ordered  the  division  to  counter- 
march in  the  wood,  I  did  so  to  support  the  troops  left  for 
its  defence,  and  believing  the  general  to  be  there  in  person. 
Ill  this  belief  I  sent  no  report  of  the  attack,  which  was  made 
so  near  the  spot  where  the  general  was  supposed  to  be,  and, 
•hough  conlident  in  the  bravery  of  the  British  troops,  I  was 
not  less  so  in  the  support  I  should  receive  from  the  Span- 
ish army.  The  distance,  however,  to  Bermeja  is  trifling, 
and  no  orders  were  given  from  head-quarters  for  the  move- 
ment of  any  corps  of  the  Spanish  army  to  support  the  Brit- 
ish division,  to  prevent  its  defeat  in  this  unequal  contest, 
or  to  profit  of  the  success  earned  at  so  heavy  expense.  The 
voluntary  zeal  of  the  two  small  battalions,  (Walloon  guards 
and  Ciudad  Real,)  which  had  been  detached  from  my  divi- 
sion, brought  them  alone  back  from  the  wood  ;  but,  notwith- 
standing tiieir  utmost  eiforts,  they  could  only  come  at  the 
close  of  the  action. 

Had  the  who'.e  body  of  the  Spanish  cavalry,  with  the 
horse-artillery,  been  rapidly  sent  by  the  .sca-bcach  to  form 
in  the  plain,  and  to  envelop  the  enemy's  left;  had  the 
greatest  part  of  the  infantry  been  marched  through  the 
jjine-wood,  in  our  rear,  to  turn  his  right,  what  success 
might  h.ive  been  expected  from  such  deci.«ive  movements'? 
The  enemy  must  either  have  retired  instantly,  and  without 
occasioning  any  serious  loss  to  the  British  division,  or  he 
Would  have  exposed  himself  to  absolute  destruction,  his  ca- 
valry greatly  outnumbered,  his  artillery  lost,  his  columns 
mixed  and  in  confusion  ;  ageneral  dispersion  would  have 
been  the  inevitable  consequence  of  a  close  pursuit;  our 
wearied  men  would  have  found  spirits  to  go  on  and  would 
have  done  so  trusting  to  finding  refreshments  and  repose  at 
Chidana.  This  moment  was  lost.  Within  a  quarter  of 
an  hour's  ride  of  the  scene  of  action,  the  general  remained 
ignorant  of  what  was  passing,  and  nothing  ^vas  done  ! 
Let  not,  then,  this  action  of  Barrosa  form  any  part  of  the 
gen:ral  result  of  the  transactions  of  the  day  ;  it  was  an  ac- 
cidciital  feature  ;  it  was  the  result  of  no  combination,  it 
Was  equally  unseen  and  unheeded  by  the  Spanish  staff; 
the  British  division,  left  alone,  suffered  the  loss  of  more 
than  one-fourth  of  its  number,  and  became  unfit  for  future 
exertion.  Need  I  say  more  to  justify  my  determination  of 
declining  any  further  co-operation  in  the  field  towards  the 
prosecution  of  the  object  of  the  expedition!  I  am,  how- 
ever, free  to  confess  that,  having  thus  placed  myself  and 
the  British  division  under  the  direction  of  the  Spanisii  com- 
mander-in-chief in  the  field,  (contrary  to  my  instructions.) 
I  should  not  have  thought  myself  justified  to  my  king  and 
country  to  risi,  the  absolute  destruction  of  this  division  in 
a  seconil  trial.  But  I  have  a  right  to  claim  credit  for  what 
would  have  been  m\  conduct  from  what  it  was  ;  and  I  will 
ask  if  it  can  be  doubtei',  after  my  zealous  co-operation 
throughout,  and  the  readv  assistance  afforded  t>  the  troops 
Ipfl  on  Barro.s.-*  height,  that  the  same  anxiety  for  the  suc- 
ress  of  the  Cuuse  would  not  have  secured  to  the  Spanish 


army  the  utmost  cffiirts  of  the  British  division  during  lh« 
whole  of  the  cnterprize,  had  -we  been  supported  as  we  had 
a  right  to  expect  ? 

There  is  not  a  man  in  the  division  who  would  not  glad- 
ly have  relinquished  his  claim  to  glory,  acquired  by  the  action 
of  Barrosa,  to  have  shared,  with  the  Spaniards,  the  ulliuiaie 
success  that  was  within  our  grasp  as  it  were. 

'i"he  people  of  Spain,  the  brave  and  persevciing  people, 
are  universally  esteemed,  respected,  and  admired  by  all  who 
value  liberty  and  independence;  the  hearts  and  hands  of 
British  soldiers  will  ever  be  with  them ;  the  cause  of  Spain 
is  felt  by  all  to  be  a  common  one. 

I  conclude  with  miiitioniiig  that  the  only  request  express- 
ed to  me,  at  head  quarters,  on  the  morning  of  the  Glh,  on 
knowing  of  my  intention  to  send  the  British  lroo[is  across 
the  river  St.  Petri,  was  that  the  oppavtitni:y  of  xvitlidvaio' 
ing  the  Spanish  troops,  during  the  night,  ivus  lost ;  and 
on  my  observing  that,  after  such  a  defeat,  there  was  no  risk 
of  attack  from  an  enemy,  a  very  contrary  opinion  w  as  main- 
tained. 

In  point  of  fact,  no  enemy  ever  appeared  during  several 
days  employed  in  bringing  off  the  wounded  and  burying 
the  dead.  It  may  be  proper  to  remark  on  the  report  pub- 
lished relative  to  the  enemy's  number  at  St.  Petri,  (4500 
men  of  Villat's  division,)  that,  by  the  concurrent  testimony 
of  all  the  French  ofiicers  here,  general  Villat's  division  had 
charge  of  the  whole  line, — what,  then,  must  be  the  strength 
of  that  division  to  have  afforded  4500  men  to  St.  Petri^ 
alone  1  In  order  to  establish,  by  authentic  documents,  facta 
which  may  have  been  disputed,  and  to  elucidate  others,  I 
enclose,  by  way  of  appendix,  the  reports  of  various  officeri 
of  this  division. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be,  &c.  «&c.  &c. 
(Signed^  Thos.  Gkahaim, 

Lt.-O'eneral 

P.  S.  I  must  add  this  postscript  distinctly  to  deny  my 
having  spoken,  at  head-(iuarters,  in  the  evening  of  the  .'ith. 
of  sending  for  more  troops,  or  for  provisions  from  the  Isla. 
My  visit  was  a  very  short  one,  of  mere  ceremony.  I  may 
have  asked  if  the  Spanish  troops  expected  were  arrived. 
This  error  must  have  arisen  from  the  difficulty  of  conversing 
in  a  foreign  language. 

With  this,  I  send  you  a  sketch  of  the  ground,  &c.  of  the 
action  of  Barrosa  ;  by  which  it  will  be  seen  how  impossi- 
ble, according  to  my  judgment,  it  would  be  for  an  enemy  to 
expose  his  left  flank,  by  making  a  direct  attack  through  the 
wood  on  the  Bermeja  position,  while  that  of  Barrosa  wa» 
occupied  in  force  by  the  allied  army. 

SECTION   2. BATTLE   OF     BARROSA. 

EXTRACT    FROM    A   LETTER   OF  GENERAL    FEEDERICK 
rONSONBY. 

"  T  proceeded  rapidly  towards  the  entrance  of  the  wood, 
found  the  Germans,  and  conducted  them  along  the  right 
flank  of  our  little  army.  We  came  in  contact  with  the 
French  dragoons,  whom  we  found  nearly  abreast  of  our 
front  line  and  about  three  hundred  yards  apart  from  it  on 
our  right  flank,  our  line  had  just  halted  and  the  firing  was 
gradually  decreasing  at  the  time  we  charged.  I  do  not 
imagine  the  French  dragoons  much  exceeded  us  in  num- 
ber, they  behaved  well,  but  if  we  had  had  half  a  dozen  stoul 
squadrons  the  mass  of  beaten  infantry  would  not  have  re* 
turned  to  their  camp." 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


781 


8ECTI0S    3. BATTLE    OF    ALBUEBA. 

EXTRACT  OF  A  LETTER  FROM  COLONEL  LIGHT,  SERVING 
IN  THE  4'Vll  DRAGOONS  AT  THE  BATTLE  OF  ALBUERA. 

"After  our  brigade  of  infantry,  first  engaged,  were  re- 
pulsed, I  was  desired  b_v  General  D'Urban  to  tell  the  Count 
de  Penne  Villaniur,  to  charge  the  lancers,  and  we  all  start- 
ed, as  I  thought,  to  do  the  thing  well ;  but  when  within 
a  few  paces  of  the  enemy  the  whole  pulled  up,  and  there 
was  no  getting  them  farther;  and  in  a  few  moments  after 
I  was  left  alone  to  run  the  gauntlet  as  well  as  I  could." 

No.  XIII. 

EXTRACTS  FROM  THE  CORRESPONDENCE  OF  CAPTAIN 
SQUIRE,  OF  THE  ENGINEERS. 

SECTION     1. 

"March  1,  1811. 

"  I  have  been  employed  in  constructing  batteries,  oppo- 
eite  the  mouth  of  the  Zezere,  for  twenty-five  guns  I  though 
we  have  only  one  brigade  of  nine  pounders  to  arm  them. 

"  Thank  God,  for  my  own  credit,  I  protested  against 
these  batteries  from  the  first,  in  my  reports  which  were 
sent  to  lord  Wellington,  and  now  I  verily  believe  the 
marshal  himself  is  ashamed  of  their  construction.  Pun- 
hete,  you  know,  is  situated  precisely  at  the  conrluence  of 
the  Zezere  with  the  Tagus,  the  enemy's  bridge  is  about 
half  a  mile  from  the  mouth  of  the  river,  and  one  mile,  by 
measurement,  from  the  nearest  of  our  heights,  which  we 
have  crowned  with  an  eight-gun  battery." 

SECTION    2. 

"  I  was  truly  sorry  to  hear  that  the  Spaniards  were  so 
thoroughly  routed  near  Badajos,  but  Mendizabcl  was  an 
idiot.  On  the  ISth  February,  the  enemy  threw  a  bridge 
over  the  Guadiana,  above  Badajos.  Don  Ca?los  Espana, 
«n  active  officer,  whom  I  know  very  well,  reconnoitred  the 
bridge,  and  made  his  report  to  Mendizabel,  vsrho  was  play- 
ing at  cards.  Very  well,  said  the  chief,  '.Tc'il  go  and  look 
ot  it  to-morrow  !  At  day-break  the  Sj-.Ar;;3ii  army  was 
surprised." 

SECTION    3. 

* 
"  May  17,  1811.  I  reconnoitred  the  ground  in  front  of 
Cristoval,  and  was  pressed,  by  Colonel  Fletcher,  who  was 
on  the  other  side  of  the  Guadiana,  to  commence  our  ope- 
rations that  evening.  The  soil  was  hard  and  rocky,  and 
our  tools  infamous.  I  made,  however,  no  difficulties,  and 
wo  began  our  battery  on  the  night  of  the  8th,  the  moon 
being  at  the  full:  our  work  was  barely  four  hundred  yards 
from  Cristoval.  In  spite,  however,  of  a  most  destructive 
fire  of  musketry,  and  shot,  and  shells,  from  various  parts 
of  the  body  of  the  place,  we  succeeded  in  completing  our 
battery  on  the  night  of  the  10th  ;  and,  on  the  morning  of 
the  11th,  at  four  a.  m.  its  first  fire  was  opened.  The 
enemy'a  fire  was,  however,  superior  to  our  own,  and 
before  sunset,  the  three  guns  and  one  howitzer  were  dis- 
abled, for  against  our  little  attack  was  the  whole  attention 
of  the  enemy  directed.  On  the  other  side  of  the  river  the 
intended  attack  had  not  yet  been  begun,  and  we  sustained 
the  almost  undivided  fire  of  Badajos  !  I  told  the  marshal, 
when  I  saw  him  on  the  11th,  that  to  continue  to  fight  our 
battery  was  a  positive  sacrifice ;  he  did  not,  however,  order 
OS  to  desist  till  oar  guns  were  silenced.     If  doubt  and  in- 


decision had  not  governed  all  our  cperations,  and  had  we 
begun  even  on  the  night  of  the  9th,  I  am  satisfied  that  our 
plan  of  attack  was  excellent,  and  that  we  should  have  en- 
tered the  place  on  the  loth.  It  is  true  that  two  distant 
batteries  were  erected,  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river,  against 
the  place,  but  they  scarcely  excited  the  enemy's  attention, 
our  little  corps  bore  the  brunt  of  the  enemy's  exertions, 
which  were  great  and  spirited.  Including  those  who  fell  in 
the  sortie,  our  loss  has  been  from  six  to  seven  hundred  men. 
Both  officers  and  men  were  exhausted,  mind  and  body  ,  they 
felt  and  saw  that  they  were  absurdly  sacrificed." 

SECTION  4. 

FJvas,jyiay  20,  1811. 
"  Had  our  operations  been  conducted  with  common 
activity  and  common  judgment,  Badajos  would  have  been 
in  our  hands  before  tlie  15th  of  May.  But  what  has  been 
the  fact  1  Our  little  corps  on  the  Cristoval  side  was  abso- 
lutely sacrificed.  The  whole  fire  and  attention  of  Badajos 
was  directed  against  our  unsupported  attack,  and  our  loss 
in  consequence  was  severe." — "  Our  operation  before  Cris- 
toval was  absurdly  pressed  forward  -without  any  co-opera- 
tion on  the  left  bunk  of  the  river.  The  marshal  hesitated 
— delayed,  and  at  last  withdrew  his  troops  at  such  a  mo- 
ment that  he  was  scarcely  time  enough  to  meet  the  enemy 
in  the  field  !" 

No.  XIV. 

EXTRACT  OF  A  LETTER  FROM  GENERAL  CAMPBELL  TO 
LORD  LIVERPOOL. 

"  Gibraltar,  October  23,  1810. 
"  The  troops  at  Malaga,  with  the  exception  of  three 
hundred  men,  moved  upon  Fuengirola,  of  which  lord  Blay- 
ney  was  apprised  ;  but,  in  place  of  his  lordship  taking  ad- 
vantage of  this  fortunate  event,  he  wasted  two  days  in  a 
fruitless  attack  on  the  fort  of  Fuengirola,  cannonading  it 
from  twelve-pounders,  although  he  perceived  that  no  im- 
pression had  been  made  on  it  by  the  fire  of  the  shipping 
and  gun-boats,  the  artillery  of  which  were  double  the  cali- 
bre. In  this  situation  he  was  surprised  by  an  inferior  force, 
and,  whilst  he  was  on  board  of  a  gun-boat,  his  guns  taken, 
and  the  whole  thrown  into  confusion  ;  at  this  moment  he 
was  informed  of  the  disaster,  and,  so  far  to  his  credit,  ho 
retook  his  guns,  but,  immediately  after,  conceiving  a  body 
of  French  cavalry  to  be  Spaniards,  he  ordered  the  firing  to 
cease,  when  he  was  surrounded  and  made  prisoiier ;  his 
men,  losing  confidence,  gave  way,  and,  hurrying  to  the 
beach,  relinquished  their  honour  and  the  field." 


No.  XV 

SECTION     1. 

SIEGE  OF  TARAGONA. 

CAPTAIN  CODRINGTON  TO  SIR  C.  COTTON. 

"  Taroffona,  J\ratj  15,  1811. 
"During  the  panic  which  seems  to  have  prevailed  upon 
the  unexpected  arrival  of  the  French  army,  the  greatest 
exertions  and  the  most  extensive  sacrifices  appear  to  have 
been  readily  submitted  to.  But  from  the  present  apathy 
and  indiTorcnco  in  those  who  should  set  an  example  cf 
activity,  and  from  tlic  general  deficiency  of  ordnance  stores, 


782 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


I  by  no  means  consider  the  place  in  that  state  of  security 
which  the  strength  of  its  works  and  position  would  other- 
wise lead  me  to  expect." 

"A  well  planned  sortie  was  made  yesterday,  hut  failed 
throu-rh  the  h.iekwardness  of  some  of  the  officers  employed 
in  it." — '■  I  had  the  satisfaction  of  being  assured  by  an 
officer,  who  conspicuously  did  his  duty  on  this  occasion, 
and  who  was  outflanked  by  the  enemy,  from  the  backward- 
ness of  the  column  directed  to  support  him,  that  he  attri- 
butes the  salvation  of  his  troops  entirely  to  the  fire  from 
the  shipping." 


CAPTAIN  CODRINGTON  TO  SIR  C.  COTTON. 

«'  Blake,  off  Villa  j\'jieva,  June  15,  1811. 
"Leaving  Taragona  on  the  16th  (May),  we  reached 
Peniscola  in  the  forenoon  of  the  17th." — "From  thence 
general  Uoyle  wrote  to  general  O'Donnel  an  account  of  the 
situation  of  Taragona  and  of  my  detaining  captain  .\dam 
at  Peniscola,  in  readiness  to  receive  any  reinforcement 
wliich  he  mi^ht  be  pleased  to  send  to  that  garrison.  Upon 
our  arrival  oil'  Murvicdro,  we  found  general  O'Donnel  had 
already  ordered  the  embarkation  of  two  thousand  three 
hundred  infantry  and  two  hundred  and  eleven  artillery- 
men."— '•  Delivering  to  general  O'Uonnel  two  thousand 
stand  of  arms,  accoutrements  and  clothing  to  enable  him 
to  bring  into  the  field  as  many  recruits  already  trained  as 
would  su[)iily  the  place  of  the  regular  soldiers;  thus  de- 
tached from  his  army,  we  proceeded  to  Valencia  and  landed 
the  remainder  of  our  cargo,  by  which  means  the  troops  of 
general  Villa  Campa,  then  dispersed  as  peasantry  for  want 
of  arms,  were  enabled  again  to  take  the  field,  and  the  corps 
of  Mina  and  the  Empecinado  completed  in  all  the  requi- 
cites  of  active  warfare." 

"  At  Alicant  we  proceeded  to  take  in  as  many  necessary 
materials  for  Taragona  as  the  ship  would  actually  stow, 
besides  eighty  artillery-men  and  a  considerable  quantity  of 
pQwder,  ball-cartridge,  &c.  sent  in  the  Paloma  Spanish 
corvette  from  Carthagena  in  company  with  a  Spanish 
transport  from  Cadiz,  deeply  laden  with  similar  supplies." 
«'  After  returning  to  Valencia,  where  we  landed  the  ad- 
ditional nrm-:,  &c.  for  the  Aragonese  army,  we  moved  on 
to  Murviedro,  where  the  conde  of  Bispal  proceeded  from 
Valencia  to  jom  us  in  a  consultation  with  his  brother,  al- 
though, on  account  of  his  wound,  he  was  very  unfit  for 
such  a  j'>urney.  The  result  of  this  conference  was  a  de- 
termination on  the  part  of  general  O'Donnel  to  commit  to 
my  protection,  for  the  succour  of  Taragona,  another  division 
of  his  best  troops  under  general  Miranda,  consisting  of  four 
thousand  men,  whilst  he  himself  would  move  forward  with 
the  remainder  of  his  army  to  the  batiks  of  the  Ebro," 

"  The  frequent  disappointments  which  the  brave  Cata- 
lonian  army  bad  heretofore  met  with  from  Valencian  pro- 
mises, made  the  sight  of  so  extensive  and  disinterested  a 
reinforcement  the  more  truly  welcome,  because  the  less 
expected,  and  the  admiration  which  was  thus  created  in 
the  besieged  appeared  to  produce  proportionate  anxiety  on 
the  part  „i  the  enemy." 

•'  I  shall  direct  the  whole  of  my  attention  to  the  neigh- 
bourhooel  of  Taragona,  in  readiness  for  harassing  the  re- 
treat of  the  French,  if  general  Suchet  should  unfortunately 
(My  obliged  to  raise  the  siege,  and  for  re-embarking  and  re- 
storing to  general  O'Donnel  whatever  may  remain  of  the 
Valencian  tnions,  according  to  the  solemn  pledge  he  exact- 
ed from  me  before  he  would  consent  thus  to  part  with  the 
Bower  and  strength  of  his  army.     lie  even  went  so  far  as 


to  declare,  in  the  presence  of  general  Miranda,  the  princi- 
pal otficer  of  his  staff,  general  Doyle,  captain  Adam,  cap- 
tain White,  and  myself,  that  he  considered  me  as  entirely 
answerable  for  the  safety  of  the  kingdom  of  Valencia,  and 
that  if  I  failed  in  redeeming  my  i)Icdge  he  would  resign 
his  command  for  that  particular  account.'' 

"  It  is  but  justice  to  myself,  however,  that  I  should  tell 
you  that  I  did  most  distinctly  warn  general  O'Donnel,  that 
I  would  in  no  case  answer  for  his  army  if  placed  under  the 
immediate  command  of  Campo  Verde,  for  any  distant  in- 
land operation,  more  particularly  as  I  knew  that,  in  addi- 
tion to  his  own  deficiency  in  ability,  he  was  surrounded  by 
people  whose  advice  and  whose  conduct  was  in  no  case  to 
be  relied  on." 


CAPTAIN  CODRINGTON  TO  SIR  C.  COTTON. 

'^  Blake,  Taragona,  June  22,  1811. 
"  I  found  upon  my  last  return  here  an  arrangement 
made,  that  in  case  of  the  enemy  gaining  the  Puerto,  gene- 
ral Sarsfield  should  retire  to  the  Mole  with  part  of  his 
division,  from  whence  I  had  only  to  assist,  but  was  much 
astonished  to  find,  by  a  message,  through  colonel  Green, 
from  general  Contreras,  that  although  he  had  heard  of 
such  a  disposition  being  made  by  general  Sarsfield,  and 
assented  to  by  the  English  squadron,  it  had  not  his  official 
knowledge  or  approbation." — "  I  understand  that  an  order 
had  arrived  in  the  morning  from  the  marquis  of  Campo 
Verde  for  general  Velasco  to  take  the  command  of  the 
Puerto,  and  for  general  Sarsfield  to  join  his  army,  that  the 
latter  had  given  up  his  command  to  some  colonel  at  about 
three  o'clock,  who  was,  by  his  own  confession,  totally  unfit 
for  it,  and  that  general  Velasco  only  arrived  in  time  to  find 
the  Spanish  troops  flying  in  confusion  from  the  want  of 
being  properly  commanded  and  the  French  assaulting  the 
place." 


CAPTAIN  CODRINGTON  TO  SIR  E.  PELLEW 

'^Jifattaro,  J^ox'ember  1,  1811. 
"  Having  stated  in  a  letter  to  Sir  Charles  Cotton,  on  the 
22d  .lune  last,  that  I  understand  general  Sarsfield  had 
quitted  the  Puerto  and  embarked  without  the  knowledge 
of  general  Contreras,  (which  indeed  was  the  substance  of 
a  message  sent  me  by  general  Contreras  himself.)  1  owe  it 
to  an  officer  of  general  Sarsfield's  high  military  character  to 
declare  my  conviction  that  the  statement  there  made  by  gen- 
eral Contreras  is  absolutely  false  and  unfounded,  and  I  beg 
leave  to  enclose  in  justification  of  my  present  opinion;  1st. 
a  passport  sent  by  general  Contreras  to  general  Sarsfield  in 
consequence,  as  he  alleged,  of  an  order  from  the  marquis 
of  Campo  Verde.  2d.  An  extract  from  the  manifesto  of 
the  marquis,  in  which  he  disavows  having  any  knowledge 
of  the  [)assporls.  3d.  \  letter  from  general  Contreras  to 
general  Sarsfield  in  answer  to  one  written  by  the  latter  re- 
questing to  see  the  order  by  which  he  was  directed  to  quit 
the  Puerto  at  such  a  critical  moment,  in  which  ho  says, 
'  that  he  cannot  send  him  a  copy  of  that  letter,  because  it 
is  confidential,  but  that  his  presence  is  necessary  at  the 
head  quarters  to  assist  in  the  operations  about  to  take  place 
for  the  relief  of  the  garrison,  and  that  he  has  not  a  moment 
to  lose.'  4th.  The  copy  of  another  letter  written  on  the 
same  day  by  general  Contreras  to  the  superior  j'anta,  in 
which  he  says  that  general  barsficid  quitted  the  Puerto 
without  his  knowledge! ! !" 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


783 


GENER.«  I.  DOYLE  TO  COLOXE/,  KOCME. 

»/M7tc  23,  1811. 
"  Ij  it  possible  to  conceive  any  thing  so  absurd,  and  I 
eould  almost  say  wicked,  as  the  conduct  of  the  junta  or 
captain-general  of  Cartagena  in  taking  away  the  firelocks 
from  the  regimonts  lU'^  sent  with  svch  a  parade  of  tkcir 
patriotism  to  relieve  Tarairona.  Two  thousand  men  are 
already  in  this  city  without  firelocks,  such  is  the  tlaily  de- 
etruction  of  arms  by  the  enemy's  fire,  and  the  getting  out 
of  repair  from  constant  use.'' 


CAPTAIN  CODRINGTOV  TO  SIR  CHARLES  COTTON. 
"  Off  Taragona,  Jwie  23,  1811. 
««  Another  regiment  arriveJ  from  Carlhagena  yesterday 
under  convoy  of  the  Cossack,  but,  as  on  a  former  occasion, 
their  arms  were  taken  from  them  by  colonel  Roche,  upon 
their  going  to  embark,  and  therefore,  as  being  of  no  use  to 
the  garrison,  I  have  by  desire  of  the  general  sent  them  to 
Villa  iVneva,  and  as  there  are  already  2000  men  in  the 
place  without  arms.  I  have  sent  the  Termagant  to  Cartha- 
gena,  to  endeavour  to  procure  those  which  have  been  thu  < 
inconsiderately  taken  from  the  troops  belonging  to  that 
place." 


CAPTAIN  CODRINGTON  TO  SIR  C.  COTTON. 
(Extract.) 

"Ji.ne  29,  1811. 
««The  Regulus  with  five  transports  inclriJ:?".g  a  victualler 
arrived  with  colonel  Skerrett  and  his  cctschmeuts  on  the 
26lh.  The  surf  was  so  great  on  that  (jay  ll'.nt  v,-e  had  no 
other  communication  in  the  forenoon  tlinn  by  a  man  swim- 
ming on  shore  with  a  letter,  and  upon  ccioi:al  SLor.-ett  put- 
ting questions  to  general  Doyle  and  myself  t.pon  the  con- 
duct he  should  pursue  according  to  his  orJet.^.  vve  cvvi\.?d 
in  our  opinion  that  although  the  arrival  of  the  troops  be- 
fore the  Puerto  (lower  town)  was  taken  would  probablv 
have  saved  the  garrison,  it  was  now  too  late,  a»id  that  he  r 
being  lauded,  if  practicable,  would  only  serve  to  prolong 
the  fate  of  the  place  fir  a  verj'  short  time  at  the  certain 
eacrince  of  the  whole  eventually.  This  opinion  was 
grounded  on  a  number  of  different  circumstances,  and  was 
in  perfect  coincidence  with  that  of  captains  Adam  and 
White.  In  the  evening  the  surf  abated  sufficiently  for 
general  Doyle,  colonel  Skerrett,  and  some  of  his  officers,  as 
well  as  the  cay)tains  of  the  squadron  and  myself,  to  wait 
upm  general  Coiitreras,  who  repeated  his  determination 
to  cut  !iis  way  out,  and  join  the  marquis  of  Campo  Verde 
the  iniia7it  the  enemy^t  breaching  baltiry  should  open, 
and  whi'.:h  he  expected  would  take  place  the  following 
morning,  and  who  agreed  tre  English  ought  not  to  land 
with  any  view  of  defending  the  town,  although  he  wished 
them  to  join  in  his  meditated  sortie." 


EXTRACTS  PROM  GENERAL  CONTRERAS'  REPORT. 

(Translated.) 
"1  saw  myself  reduced  to  my  own  garrison."  "I  con- 
sidered if  my  force  was  capable  of  this  effort  (defending 
the  brcachy  one  of  the  most  heroic  that  war  furnishes,  and 
to  which  lew  men  can  bring  themselves.  I  recollected 
howe^(•r  that  \  had  •till  eight  thousand  of  the  best  and 


most  experienced  troops  in  Spain."  "All  conspired 
against  this  poor  garrison.  Campo  Verde  in  quitting  the 
place  promised  to  come  back  quickly  to  its  succour,  but  ho 
did  not,  although  he  daily  renewed  his  promises.  The 
kingdom  of  Valencia  sent  Miranda  with  a  division  which 
disembarked,  and  the  day  following  re-embarked  and  went 
to  join  Campo  Verde. 

"  An  English  division  came  on  the  2Cth,  colonel  Sker- 
rett, who  commanded  them,  came  in  the  eveninjj  to  confer 
with  me  and  to  demand  what  I  wisl.:ed  him  to  do.  /  "r- 
plicd  that  if  he  -would  disembark  and  enter  the  place,  he 
should  be  received  -with  joy  and  treated  as  he  merttect} 
that  he  had  only  to  choose  the  poir.t  that  tie  -wished  to  de- 
fend and  I  -would  give  it  te  him,  but  thai  all  -was  at  hii 
choice,  since  I  tonuld  neither  command  nor  counsel  him. 
The  27th  the  English  commandants  of  artillery  and  en- 
gineers came  to  examine  tke  front  attacked,  and  being  con- 
vinced that  the  place  was  not  in  a  st".'?  to  resist,  refurnei 
to  their  vessels,  and  then  all  went  away  from  the  plac« 
they  came  to  succour. 

"  This  abandonment  on  the  part  of  those  ~.cho  came  to 
save  xvas  the  -.vorst  of  all ;  it  made  such  an  impression  on 
the  soldiers,  that  thej-  began  to  see  tiiat  they  were  last, 
became  low-spirited  and  only  resisted  from  my  continual 
exhortations,  and  because  they  saw  my  coolness  and  the 
confidence  I  had,  that  if  they  executed  my  orders  tho 
French  would  fail.  But  this  only  lasted  a  few  hours,  the 
notion  of  being  abandoned  again  seized  them  and  over 
came  all  other  ideas." 


CAPTAIN  CODRINGTON  TO  SIR  C.  COTTON. 

<^  I2th  July,  1811. 
"  The  vacillating  conduct  of  general  Contreras  regarding 
the  defence  of  Taragona  is  a  principal  feature  in  the  losa 
of  that  important  fortress." 


CAPTAIN  CODRINGTON  TO  SIR  E.  PELLEW. 

"  I2th  July,  1811. 
"  The  marquis  blames  generals  Caro  and  .Miranda,  whilst 
the  latter  retort  the  accusation  ;  and  I  am  inclined  to  think 
that  in  giving  full  credit  to  what  each  says  of  the  othei, 
neither  will  sufft>r  ignominy  beyond  that  to  which  his  con- 
duct has  entitled  him." 


CAPTAIN  CODRINGTON  TO  iMR.  WELLESLEY. 
(Extract.) 

"20/;i  July,  1811. 

"  The  disasters  which  have  befallen  the  principality  will 
produce  material  accusations  against  the  gene.'als  wh« 
lately  commanded  in  it,  without.  I  fear,  any  of  them  meet- 
ing the  punishment  which  is  their  due.  Some  of  the  eu 
closed  papers  may  help  you  to  form  a  just  opinion  of  then 
conduct  and  that  of  the  Spani.«h  marine  ;  and  those  re 
specting  the  arms  for  which  I  sent  to  Carthagena  will  show 
how  far  colonel  Roche  is  entitled  to  the  merit  which  he  sc 
largely  assumes  on  that  occasion. 

"  To  enable  you  to  form  a  correct  opinion  of  general 
Contreras  I  must  refer  you  to  general  Doyle,  an  from  his 
ignorance  of  our  service,  the  various  requests  and  proposals 
which  arose  from  the  vacillations  in  what  he  called  his  de- 
termi.'iations,  were  signified  to  mc  through  him.     It  does 


784 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


4ppear  to  me  that  he  ever  visited  ihe  works  himself,  or  it 
wiiu'd    not   have   fallen   to  the  lot  of  captain  Adams   and 
myself  to  remove  two  hoats,  two  large  stages,  sixteen  gun- 
carnages,  and  a  mortar  from  the  mole,  long  after  the  French 
were  advanced  be3'oiid  the  Francoli  battery,  and  two  nights  i 
previous  to  tlieir  gaining  the  Puerto;  an  accidental  visit  to  | 
the  mole  one  night,  just  after  placing  the  gun  boats  and  | 
launches,  discovered  to  me  this  mortar  with  no  less  than  j 
twelve  guns  in  readiness  for  forming  a  battery  ;  and  upon  ; 
general    Doyle,    by   my   request,   representing   this   to    the  i 
general  of  artillery,  he  talked  of  inquiring  into  it  to-mor-  | 
row." 

"  It  would  be  a  waste  of  words  to  describe  further  the  i 
conduct  of  the  general  of  artillery,  or  I  might  find  sufli-  ; 
cient  subject  in   the  events  of  every  passing  day  from  the  j 
first  investment  of  the   place." — "  I  shall  be  very  ready  to  | 
come  forward  personally  in  aid  of  that  justice  which  is  due 
to  the  numberless   brave  men  who  fell  a  sacrifice  to  the 
criminality  of  the  persons  alluded  to  who  have  so  grossly 
nii.sconducted  themselves." 


SECTIOX    2. 
CAPTAIN  CODRINGTON  TO  SIX  E.  PELLEW. 

«'29.','i  July,  1811. 
"  Had  colonel  Green,  the  military  agent  appointed  to  suc- 
ceed general  Doyle,  adopted  the  plan  of  his  predecessor  of 
continuing  at  the  head-quarters  of  the  army  and  in  personal 
communication  with  the  captain-general  instead  of  retiring 
to  Peniscola  with  the  money  and  arms  remaining,  we  should 
not  be  left  as  we  are  to  the  precarious  source  of  mere  acci- 
dental communications  for  receiving  intelligence." 


CAPTAIN  CODRINGTON  TO  PON  F.  SAVARTES,  VOCAL 
OF  THE  JUNTA. 

"28th  July,  ISll. 

" Colonel  Green,  the  British  military  agent,  being 

tt  Peniscola,  I  have  opened  the  letter  from  the  junta  to 
him." — •'  Had  I  not  in  this  instance  opened  the  letters  to 
the  admiral  and  the  military  agent,  the  junta  would  have 
received  no  answer  to  them  until  it  would  have  been  too 
lato  to  execute  their  object." 


CAPTAIN  THOMAS  TO  CAPTAIN  CODRINGTGN. 

(Extract.) 
"  H.  M.  S.  Undaunted,  off  Ar ens,  7th  Oct.  1811. 
"  Having  observed,  in  the  Catalonia  Gazette  of  the  24th 
of  September,  the  copy  of  a  letter  said  to  be  written  by  col- 
onel Green   to  his  excellency  general  Lacy,  relative  to  our 
operations  on  the  Medas  Islands,  from  the  surrender  of  the 
castle  to  the  period  of  our  quitting  them,  I  beg  leave  to  state 
to  you   my  surprise  and   astonishment  at  seeing   facts  so 
grossly  misrepresented,  and  request  you  will  be  jileased  to 
contradict  in  the  most  positive  manner  the  assertions  there 
made  u.'ie  of.     To  prove  how  inconsistent  this  letter  is  with 
real  facts,  it  may  be  necessary  for  me  only  to  say  that  col- 
onel Green,  in  the  presence  and  hearing  of  all  the  English 
o/riccrs,  on  my  asking  him  a  question  relative  to  the  practi- 
cability of  keeping  the  island,  did  declare  that  he  had  no- 
liing  to  do  with  the  expedition  ;  that  my  instructions  point- 
A  him  out  as  a  volunteer  only.     But  immediately  after,  in 


the  hearing  of  all,  did  declare  it  to  be  his  opinion  that  th« 
island  was  not  tenable. 

"  As  I  understood  it  was  intended  to  form  an  establish- 
ment on  the  larger  island,  I  judged  it  proper  to  retire  from 
it  for  a  short  time  and  destroy  the  remains  of  the  easile, 
which  might  induce  the  enemy  to  withdraw  from  the  work» 
he  had  thrown  up,  and  thereby  afford  our  ally  an  o()portu- 
nity  whenever  he  chose  to  occupy  them  again,  to  fortify 
himself  without  molestation  ;  and  this  supposition  it  has 
appeared  was  well  grounded.  But  while  the  ruins  of  the 
castle  stood,  it  was  an  object  of  jealousy  to  the  French  ; 
nor  would  they  in  my  opinion  have  quitted  the  ground 
they  occupied,  nor  the  Spaniards  have  been  enabied  to  net- 
tle themselves,  had  this  measure  not  been  adopted.  I  there- 
fore gave  orders  for  embarking  the  guns  and  stores. 

"  If  necessary,  I  could  say  much  more  on  the  subject  of 
this  most  extraordinary  letter  ;  the  few  remarks  I  have  made 
will,  I  think,  be  sufficient.  As  an  act  of  courtesy  to  col- 
onel Green,  on  landing  the  marines  1  directed  the  marine 
officers  to  receive  their  orders  from  him;  liut  military  aid 
was  not  necessary,  for  you  may  recollect  before  the  expe- 
dition sailed,  on  your  informing  me  that  general  Lacy  had 
offered  some  Spanish  troops,  and  asking  how  many  I 
thought  would  be  necessary,  my  aiiswer  was  '  about  forty  ;* 
and  I  have  no  hesitation  in  declaring  that  without  the  as- 
sistance of  even  a  single  soldier  the  castle  would  have  fallen 
into  our  hands  as  speedily  as  it  did  on  this  occasion." 


SECTION    3. 

CAPTAIN   CODRINGTON'S    ORDERS   TO  CAPTAIN  ADAM 
OF  THE  INVI.NCIBLE. 

"Jitlt/  lat,  1811. 
"  You  are  hereby  directed  in  consequence  of  a  represen- 
tation made  to  me  by  general  Doyle,  to  proceed  towards 
Majorca  in  search  of  the  Spanish  frigates  Prueba,  Diana, 
and  Astrea,  which  the  general  reports  to  be  going  to  that 
island  (contrary  to  orders)  with  the  treasure,  archives  of 
the  province,  and  the  vessels  laden  with  stores  and  ammu- 
nition destined  for  the  inland  fortresses  of  Catalonia,  to- 
gether with  the  officers  and  soldiers  which  were  sived  from 
Taragona,  and  which  are  required  to  join  the  army  imme- 
diately. Upon  meeting  them  you  are  to  deliver  the  nccom 
panying  order  for  them  to  return  here,  and  you  are,  if  ne 
cessary,  to  enforce  obedience." 


CAPTAIN  CODRINGTON  TO  gIR  CHARLES  COTTON. 
"  ni/a  jYneva,  2d  Jitli/,  1811. 

"  I  should  feel  the  more  hurt  by  being  driven  to  adopt 
such  a  measure  had  not  the  whole  conduct  both  of  the 
Prueba  and  Diana  made  their  captains  a  disgrace  to  the 
situation  they  hold.  These  two  frigates  remained  quiet 
spectators  of  the  British  squadron  engaging  the  batteries 
of  the  enemy  on  the  22d  of  last  month,  and  never  atlemj)t- 
ed  to  give  any  assistance  to  the  garrison,  except  by  now 
and  then  sending  a  gun-boat  to  join  those  manned  by  the 
English.  They  did  not  assist  in  the  embarkation  of  the 
numberless  women,  children,  and  wounded  soldiers,  until 
goaded  into  it  by  the  orders  of  general  Contreras,  after  I 
had  already  sent  above  two  thousand  to  this  [)lace  ;  and 
even  when  I  had  no  longer  any  transports  for  tlieir  recep- 
tion, the  captain  of  the  Prueba  refused  to  receive  some 
wounded  ofBccrs." 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


785 


CAPTAIN  CODRINGTON  TO  SIR  CHARLES  COTTON. 

"  ISthJultf,  1811. 

"  I  cannot  describe  to  you  the  difficulties  which  I  have 
been  put  to  by  the  misconduct  of  all  the  Spanish  ships  and 
vessels  of  war  which  I  have  had  to  communicate  with  upon 
the  coast,  with  exception  of  the  Astrea  frigate  and  the  Pa- 
loma  corvette.  In  the  others  I  have  seen  neither  courage 
to  oppose  the  enemy  nor  humanity  to  alleviate  the  dis- 
tresses of  their  countrymen." — "  I  have  heard  also  that  the 
Algesiras,  which  lately  arrived  at  Arens,  has  landed  the 
stores  and  ammunition,  with  which  she  was  charged,  at 
the  risk  of  their  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  and 
has  quitted  the  station  !" 


SECTION    4. 
CAPTAIN  CODRINGTON  TO  SIR  E,  PELLEW. 

"  I2th  July,  1811. 
«  General  Milans  is  collecting  a  mixture  of  troops,  con- 
sisting of  nfhose  who  have  escaped  the  enemy." 

"  He  speaks  loudly  of  his  indifference  to  a  command, 
while  he  boasts  that  if  he  were  captain-general  he  would 
raise  forty  thousand  men  and  clear  the  country  of  the  ene- 
my !  But  in  the  midst  of  this  disgusting  rodomontade 
it  is  not  difficult  to  see  that  self-interest  is  the  main  spring 
of  all  his  actions,  and  that  instead  of  raising  an  army  he 
is  more  likely,  by  the  system  he  has  adopted,  to  shake  the 
stability  of  that  which  is  still  left  for  the  defence  of  the 
principality." 


CAPTAIN  CODRINGTON  TO  SIR  H.  WELLESLEY. 
«'  September  1,  1811. 
"The  affair  of  general  Milans"  (namely,  the  sending  of 
corn  to  Barcelona  under  his  passport)  "  which  I  a'entioned 
to  3  ou  in  my  last  private  letter,  is  still  involved  in  nrystery, 
which  I  hope  however  to  penetrate  upon  my  return  to 
Arens  de  Mar.  The  Mataro  papers  reported  that  tsvo  sol- 
diers were  shot  and  a  serjeant  flogged  at  Arena  for  .offer- 
ing corn  to  pass  their  guard  at  Mongat  on  its  way  to  Bar- 
celona. The  fact  of  the  punishment  is  I  believo  truly 
stated,  but  the  cause  no  less  falsely,  entirely  as  I  suspect 
with  the  view  of  terminating  my  investigation  into  this  ne- 
farious traffic.  General  Lacy,  instead  of  answering  my 
letter,  refers  me  by  word  of  mouth  to  the  junta,  anil  the 
deputation  from  the  junta,  who  went  to  Mattaro  /as  they 
assured  me)  purposely  to  investigate  the  business,  now  tell 
me  that  it  is  an  affair  purely  military,  and  refer  me  to  gen- 
eral Milans  himself." 


SECTION    5. 

EXTRACT  FROM  A  MINUTE  MADE  BY  CAPTAIN  COD- 
RINGTON. 

^^  Mattaro,  July  6,  1811. 
«  Colonel  O'Ronan,  aid-du-c?mp  to  the  marquis  of  Cam- 
po  Verde,  arrived,  and  informed  me  that  he  came  from  the 
marquis,  who  was  on  his  march  to  this  town  or  Arens,  for 
the  purpose  of  embarking  all  the  infantry  not  Catalans, 
and  the  whole  of  the  remaining  cavalry,  leaving  the  horses 
on  the  beach.  Colonel  O'Ronan  said  this  determination 
was  the  result  of  a  junta,  composed  of  the  marquis,  gener- 
ral  St.  Juan,  general  Caro,  general  Miranda,  the  general 
of  artillery,  brigadier  Santa  Cruz,  Velasco,  and  Sarsfield  ; 
that  after  the  thing  had  been  proposed  and  discussed  a  long 
51 


time,  Sarsfield  was  the  first  to  give  his  vote,  that  he  rose 
from  his  seat  and  said,  <  any  officer  who  could  give  sucb 
an  opinion  must  be  a  traitor  to  his  country,  and  thnt  h» 
and  his  division  would  stand  or  fall  with  the  principality. 
Every  other  officer  was  of  a  contrary  opinion,  except  the 
marquis  (it  afterwards  appeared  that  Santa  Cruz  also  sup- 
ported Sarsfield,)  who  thought  with  Sarsfield,  and  yet  it 
seems  he  allowed  himself  to  be  led  on  by  the  other  gener- 
als. In  short,  it  appears  he  -was  resolved  to  abandon 
the  principality. 

"  I  told  him,  without  hesitation,  that  to  embark  the  Va- 
lencians  I  felt  a  duty  to  general  O'Donnel,  to  the  kingdom 
of  Valencia,  and  to  the  whole  nation,  but  that  I  felt  it 
equally  my  duty  upon  no  account  to  embark  the  army  of 
Catalonia,  and  thus  become  a  party  concerned  in  the  aban- 
donment of  a  province  I  had  been  sent  to  protect." — "  The 
colonel,  who  could  not  venture  on  shore  again,  lest  ho 
should  be  murdered  by  the  inhabitants  of  Mattaro,  for 
having  been  the  bearer  of  a  commission  to  arrest  brigadier 
Milans  about  a  monih  ago,  sent  to  the  marquis  my  answer." 


EXTRACT    FROM  A   MINUTE   OF   INFORMATION  GIVEN 
BY  THE  BARON  D'EROLES. 

"July  9,  1811. 
"  The  baron  d'Eroles  was  appointed  captain-general  of 
Catalonia  by  the  junta  of  general  officers,  of  which  tho 
marquis  of  Campo  Verde  was  president,  and  by  the  voice 
of  the  people.  His  reply  was,  that  so  long  as  the  army 
continued  in  the  principality,  and  that  there  was  a  senior 
general  officer,  he  would  not  admitjit,  but  that  the  moment 
the  army  passed  the  frontier  (it  was  then  at  Agramunt,  in 
full  march  to  Aragon),  he  would  accept  the  command,  un- 
mindful of  the  dreadful  situation  in  which  he  should  place 
himself,  but  he  would  do  so  in  order  to  continue  the  strug- 
gle, and  to  prevent  anarchy  and  confusion.  In  this  state 
things  were  when  general  Lacy  arrived.  The  baron  in- 
stantly sought  him,  could  not  find,  but  met  one  of  his  aid- 
du-camps,  by  whom  he  wrote  to  him  to  say  what  had  oc- 
curred, but  that  he  was  resolved  to  support  general  Lacy  in 
his  command,  not  only  with  all  his  local  influence,  but  by 
his  personal  exertions,  and  that  he  would  immediately  join 
him  to  put  this  resolution  in  practice." 


EXTRACT    FROM   GENERAL   DOYLE'S    LETTER    AFTER 
SEEING  THE  ABOVE. 

"  The  Valencian  division,  that  is  to  say,  two  thousand 
four  hundred  of  the  four  thousand  three  hundred  soldiers 
who  disembarked  in  this  province,  are  now  on  board  to 
return  to  Valencia.  General  Miranda  says  the  desertion 
took  place  in  consequence  of  the  marquis's  determination 
to  proceed  to  Aragon,  which  made  them  believe  they  would 
not  be  embarked.  In  short,  most  disgraceful  has  been  .v.» 
conduct  of  this  division,  and  the  marquis,  as  you  will  see 
by  this  letter  to  me,  attaches  to  it  no  small  portion  of 
blame." 


CAPTAIN  CODRINGTON  TO  THE  MARQUIS  OF  CAMPO 
VERDE. 

"£ lake,  July  5,  1811. 
"  I  have  to  remind  you  that  by  ordering  the  Valencian 
division  out  of  Taragona,  in  breach  of  the  terms  by  which 
I  bound  myself  when  I  brought  them,  you  yourself  broke 
the  pledge  given  by  me,  and  dissolved  the  contract." 


786 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


EXTRACTED  FROM  CAPTAIN   CODRINGTON'S  PAPERS. 

••  Minute  of  a  conference  betwixt  generals  Caro  and  Mi- 
randa with  general  Doyle  and  myself  this  day. 

"July  9,  1811. 

"  About  eight  o'clock  (jcnerals  Caro  and  Miranda  came 
#n  board  the  Blake,  After  being  seated  in  the  cabin  with 
gcneiai  Doyle  and  myself,  general  Caro  begged  general 
Doyle  would  explain  to  me,  that  they  were  come  in  con- 
ecquencc  of  my  promise,  to  request  I  would  embark  the 
division  of  Valcncian  troops  which  I  had  brought  from 
Peniscola.  I  desired  to  know  what  promise  general  Caro 
understood  me  to  have  made  1  He  answered,  that  I  would 
take  the  above  troops  back  to  Valencia.  I  denied  positively 
that  I  had  made  any  promise  tc  re-embark  them  if  they 
Ebauld  ever  join  the  marquis  of  Cr.mpo  Verde,  although  I 
had  deeply  pledged  myself  to  restore  them  to  general 
O'Donnel  if  they  joined  in  a  sortie  from  the  garrison, 
ivhich  I  was  confident  would  be  very  decisive  of  its  suc- 
cess. I  then  referred  general  Miranda  to  a  similar  explana- 
tion, which  I  gave  to  him,  through  general  Doyle,  on  the 
day  after  our  quitting  Peniscola,  when  he  had  said  he  was 
ordered,  both  by  his  written  instructions  and  by  verbal  ex- 
planation from  general  O'Donnel,  not  to  land  within  the 
garrison.  General  Miranda  instantly  repeated  that  so  he 
was;  ^pon  which  general  Doyle,  to  whom  he  had  shown 
those  instructions  joir:»ly  wiih  mj'self,  after  leaving  Tara- 
gona  for  Villa  Nueva,  when  ur.^er  a  difficulty  ?s  to  how 
he  should  proceed,  referred  him  to  theiri  iigain,  when  it  ap- 
pearing that  he  was  therein  positively  ordered  '  descmba- 
rcar  en  la  plaza  de  Tarragona,"  general  Doyle  stopped. 

'*  General  JMlraiida.  «  Ah  !  but  read  on.' 

"  General  Doyle.  '  No,  sir,  there  is  the  positive  proof  of 
your  receiving  such  an  order.' 

"  General  j\Ilvanda.  <  Well,  but  read  on.' 

"General  Doyle.  <No  sir.  This  (^ pointing  to  the 
paper")  is  the  positive  proof  of  your  receiving  such  an  or- 
der, which  we  wanted  to  establish,  because  you  positively 
denied  it' 

"  Upon  this  general  Caro,  shrugging  up  his  shoulders, 
eaid, '  he  was  not  aware  of  there  being  any  such  order.' 
And  general  Miranda  again  requested  general  Doyle  would 
read  on. 

"  General  Doyle.  '  For  what  purpose]' 

"  General  J\riranda.  <  To  prove  that  I  was  not  to  shut 
myself  up  with  the  division  in  the  plaza  de  Taragona.' 

"  General  Doyle.  '  There  is  no  occasion,  sir,  for  any 
proof  of  that,  for  it  was  a  part  cf  the  very  stipulalion  made 
by  captain  Codrington  when  he  strongly  pledged  himself 
to  general  O'Donnel.' 

"General  Doyle  continued, — 'And  now,  general  Caro, 
that  we  have  proved  to  you  that  general  Miranda  had  or- 
ders to  land  in  Taragona,  and  that  captain  Codrington  is 
t)ound  by  no  such  promise  as  you  had  injagined,  I  must 
Inform  you  that  he  has  been  eight  days  upon  the  coast 
with  all  the  ships  of  war  and  transports  which  are  wanted 
for  other  services,  for  the  sole  purpose  of  embarking  these 
troopa;  and  he  desires  me  to  add  that  in  consideration  of 
what  is  due  to  the  liberal  and  exemplary  assistance  afforded 
by  general  O'Donnel  and  Valencia  in  aid  of  Taragona,  but 
not  at  all  on  account  of  any  pledge  he  has  been  said  to 
have  given,  that  he  will  use  the  same  exertion  in  re-em- 
barking and  restoring  the  troops  which  he  would  have  done 
if  so  bound  by  his  word  of  honour.'  " 


MR.  WELLESLEY  TO  LORD  WEE1,ESLET. 

"  July  ae. 

"  The  morning  of  30th  of  June,  a  few  hours  after  the 
arrival  of  the  British  squadron  and  Spanish  vessels  in  ttie 
roadstead  of  Villa  Nueva,  five  thousand  Freiich  infantry 
and  five  hundred  cavalry  surprised  the  place  by  a  night- 
march,  and  seized  all  the  property  of  Taragona,  which  had 
been  sent  there  before  the  siege.  Twenty-five  thousand 
dollars  for  each  of  the  next  three  months  was  demanded, 
but  no  violence  or  p'under  allowed.  Eroles  narrowly 
escaped.  Lacy,  appointed  to  command  in  Catalonia,  ai- 
rived  1st  July  at  Villa  Nueva,  the  6th  went  to  Igualada  to 
join  Campo  Verde." 

"  Desertion  in  the  army  at  Mataro  has  been  earned  to  a 
most  alarming  extent  since  the  fall  of  Taragona  ;  the  first 
night  fifteen  hundred  men  disappeared,  nearly  three  hun- 
dred cavalry  had  likewise  set  olf  towards  Aragon  ;  and  thcso 
desertions  are  to  be   attributed   to  the  gross   neglect  and 

want  of  activity  on  the  part  of  the  officers." "  'J"he  only 

divi.sion   that  keeps  together  in  any  tolerable  order  is  that 

of  general  Sarsfield,  of  about  two  thousand  men." «  He 

had  however  disputes  with  Eroles,  and  the  people  called 
for  the  latter  to  lead  them." 


No.  XVL 
SIEGE  OF  TARIFA. 

(Extracts.) 
LORD  WELLINGTON  TO  LORD  LIVERPOOL. 

''January  9,  1812. 
"  From  the  accounts  which  I  have  received  of  tho  place 
(Tarifa)  it  appears  to  me  quite  impossible  to  defend  it, 
when  the  enemy  will  be  equipped  to  attack  it.  The  ut- 
most that  can  be  done  is  to  hold  the  island  contiguous  to 
Tarifa;  for  vvb'rh  object  colonel  Skerrett's  detachment 
does  not  appear  t.»  be  necessary.  I  don't  believe  that  the 
enemy  will  be  able  to  obtain  possession  of  the  island,  with- 
out which  the  town  will  be  entirely  useless  to  them,  and, 
indeed,  if  they  had  the  island  as  well  as  the  town,  I  doubt 
their  being  able  to  retain  these  possessions,  adverting  to 
the  means  of  attacking  them  with  which  general  Balleste- 
ros  might  be  supplied  by  the  garrison  of  Gibraltar,  unless 
they  should  keep  a  force  in  the  field  in  their  neighbour- 
hood to  protect  then:." 


LORD  WELLINGTON  TO  MAJOR  GE.VERAL  COOKE. 
"February  1,  1812. 

"  Sin, — I  have  omitted  to  answer  your  letters  of  tho 
27th  December  and  of  the  7lh  January,  relating  to  iho 
correspondence  which  you  had  had,  with  the  governor  of 
Gibraltar,  upon  the  conditional  orders,  which  you  hail  given 
colonel  Skerrett  to  withdraw  from  Tarifa,  because  1  con- 
clude that  you  referred  that  correspondence  to  the  secretary 
of  state  with  whom  alone  it  rests  to  decide  whether  it  wan 
your  duty  to  recal  colonel  Skerrett,  and  whether  you  per- 
formed that  duty  at  a  proper  period,  and  under  circum- 
stances which  rendered  it  expedient  that  you  should  give 
colonel  Skerrett  the  orders  in  question.  From  the  report 
of  colonel  Skerrett  and  Lord  Proby,  and  other  information 
which  I  had  received  respecting  Tarifa,  I  concurred  in  th« 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


787 


•rdcrs  that  you  gave  to  colonel  Skerrett,  and  my  opinion 
on  tliat  subject  is  not  at  all  changed  by  what  has  occur- 
red since.  We  have  a  right  to  expect  that  his  majesty's 
ofliccrs  and  troops  will  perform  their  duty  upon  every  oc- 
casion ;  but  we  have  no  right  to  expect  that  comparatively 
a  small  number  would  be  able  to  hold  the  town  of  Tarifa, 
commanded  as  it  is  at  short  distances,  and  enfiladed  in 
every  direction,  and  unprovided  with  artillery  and  the  walls 
scarcely  cannon  proof.  The  enemy,  however,  retired  with 
disgrace  infinitely  to  the  honour  of  the  brave  men  who  de- 
frnded  Tarifa,  and  it  is  useless  to  renew  the  discussion.  It 
is  necessary,  however,  that  you  should  now  come  to  an 
understanding  with  general  Campbell  regarding  the  troops 
which  have  been  detached  from  Cadiz  and  this  army  under 
colonel  Skorrett." 


LORD  WELLINGTON  TO  MAJOR  GENERAL  COOKE. 

'^February  25,  1S12. 
"I  have  already,  in  my  letter  of  the  1st  instant,  stated 
to  you  my  opinion  regarding  Tarifa,  I  do  not  think  that 
captain  Smith's  letter  throws  new  light  upon  the  subject. 
The  island  appears  still  to  be  the  principal  point  to  defend, 
and  the  easiest  to  be  defended  at  a  small  expense  and  risk 
of  loss.  Whether  the  town  and  the  hill  of  Santa  Catalina 
can  be  made  subservient  to  the  defence  of  the  island  de- 
pends upon  circumstances  upon  which  it  would  be  possible 
to  decide  only  by  having  a  local  knowledge  of  the  place. 
It  is  very  clear  to  me,  however,  that  the  enemy  will  not 
attack  Tarifa  in  this  spring,  and  that  you  will  not  be  called 
upon  to  furnish  troops  to  garrison  that  place  so  soon  as 
you  expect.  If  you  should  be  called  upon  either  by  the 
Spanish  government  or  the  governor  of  Gibraltar  you  must 
decide  the  question  according  to  the  suggestions  which  I 
made  to  you  in  my  despatch  of  the  15th  instant.  If  you 
should  send  a  detachment  from  Cadiz  at  the  desire  of  the 
Spanish  government  for  purposes  connected  with  the  ope- 
rations of  general  Ballesteros,  I  conceive  that  the  governor 
of  Gibraltar  has  nothing  to  say  to  such  detachments,  ii'  you 
should  send  one  to  Tarifa  at  the  desire  of  the  governor  of 
Gibraltar,  or  of  the  Spanish  government,  it  is  better  not  to 
discuss  the  question  whether  the  detachment  shall  or  shall 
not  obey  the  orders  of  the  governor  of  Gibraltar.  He  has 
occupied  Tarifa  permanently,  and  he  is  about  to  improve 
the  defences  of  the  place  which  he  conceives  to  be  under 
bis  orders;  but,  according  to  all  the  rules  of  his  majesty's 
eervice,  the  senior  officer  should  command  the  whole.  I 
have  nothing  to  say  to  the  division  of  the  command  of  the 
island  and  town  of  Tarifa,  which  I  conclude  has  been  set- 
tled by  the  governor  of  Gibraltar." 


EXTRACT  FROM  THE  NOTES  OP  AN  OFFICER  ENGAGED 
IN  THE  SIEGE. 

"Though  tbe  duke  of  Wellington  yielded  to  the  opinions 
ond  wishes  of  general  Cooke,  colonel  Skerrett,  and  lord 
I'roby,  yet  his  characteristic  and  never-failing  sagacity  seems 
!o  have  suggested  to  him  a  fear  or  a  fancy,  that  part  of  the 
case  was  kept  concealed.  A  local  knowledge  was  neces- 
sary, not  only  to  judge  of  the  relation  and  reciprocal  de- 
fences and  capabilities  of  the  town  and  island,  but  to  esti- 
mat?  the  vast  importance  of  the  post,  the  necessity  in  fact 
of  its  possession.  It  was  my  impression  then,  and  it 
•mounts  to  conviction  now,  that  the  island,  particularly 


during  the  winter,  half  fortified  as  it  was,  and  totally  des- 
titute of  shelter  from  bombardment  or  from  weatner,  could 
not  have  been  maintained  against  an  enemy  in  possession 
of  the  town,  the  suburb,  and  the  neighbouring  heights. 
But  even  if  it  had,  by  means  cf  British  bravery,  resolution, 
and  resource,  been  provisioned  and  defended,  still  the  ori- 
ginal and  principal  objects  of  its  occupation  would  have 
been  altogether  frustrated,  namely,  the  command  and  em- 
barkation of  supplies  for  Cadiz  and  the  fostering  of  the 
patriotic  flame.  It  is  demonstrable  that,  had  the  duke  of 
Dalmatia  once  become  possessor  of  the  old  walls  of  Tarifa, 
every  city,  village,  fort,  and  watch-tower  on  the  Andalusian 
coast,  would  soon  have  displayed  the  banner  of  king  Joseph, 
and  the  struggle  in  the  south  of  Spain  was  over." 


GENERAL  CAMPBELL  TO  LORD  LIVERPOOL. 

"  Gibrallar,  Jpril  2,  1812. 

"  Mr  LonB, — I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  re- 
ceipt of  your  lordship's  letter  of  the  8th  of  February  last, 
and  I  beg  leave  to  refer  your  lordsiiip  to  the  documents 
herewith,  particularly  to^he  report  of  captain  Smith,  royal 
engineers,  which  I  trust  will  prove  that  the  defence  of  the 
town  of  Tarifa  was  not  taken  up  on  slight  grounds,  .''nd 
that  the  detachment  from  Cadiz  under  the  orders  of  co'o- 
nel  Skerrett,  together  with  the  troops  from  hence  whi'-h 
formed  the  garrison  of  the  town,  were  never  in  any  danger 
of  being  cut  oil',  as  their  retreat  would  have  been  covered 
by  the  castle  of  the  Guzmans,  the  redoubt  of  Santa  Catah 
na,  and  the  island  :  the  two  first  of  these  points  being  cod 
nected  by  a  field  work,  and  the  whole  mounting  twenty- 
nine  pieces  of  cannon  and  mortars  exclusively  of  what  re 
mained  in  the  town  :  the  enemy's  batteries  being  complete 
ly  kept  in  check  during  such  an  operation  by  the  island  ant' 
castle  of  the  Guzmans.  My  lord,  colonel  Skerrett  stood 
alone  in  his  opinion  respecting  this  post,  and  in  direct  op 
position  to  my  own  and  that  of  captain  Smith,  royal  engin- 
eers, who  is  considered  by  his  corps  as  an  officer  of  first-rate 
professional  abilities.  Major-general  Cocke  must  therefore 
have  acted  on  the  reports  of  the  colonel  when  he  authoriz- 
ed him  to  abandon  his  post,  for  the  major-general  was  un- 
acquainted with  its  resources:  besides,  my  lord,  I  had  a 
right  to  expect  that  troops  sent  to  that  point  to  assist  in  its 
defence  should  not  be  withdrawn  viithout  my  consent. 
Had  the  place  been  lost,  my  lord,  by  such  misrepresentation, 
it  would  have  been  attributed  to  any  other  than  the  real 
cause,  and  the  odium  would  have  been  fixed  upon  me,  as 
having  taken  up  the  position ;  I  am  happy,  however,  that 
its  capability  has  been  proved  whilst  it  remained  under  my 
orders,  and  that  by  interposing  my  authority  the  valuable 
possession  of  Tarifa  has  been  saved  from  the  g)asp  of  the 
enemy.  I  was  besides  deeply  concerned  in  the  fate  of  the 
place  ;  a  great  quantity  of  military  stores  and  provision 
having  been  embarked  on  that  service  by  my  authority, 
from  a  conviction  that  they  were  fully  protected  by  this 
additional  force. 

"  After  the  execution  of  a  service,  my  lord,  from  which 
I  concluded  I  was  entitled  to  some  consideration,  it  is  no 
small  mortification  for  me  to  find  that  my  conduct  should 
be  deemed  questionable ;  but  I  flatter  myself  that  if  the 
government  of  his  royal  highness  the  prince  regent  will  do 
me  the  justice  to  :-ead  the  annexed  papers,  they  will  per- 
ceive that  if  I  had  done  less  his  majesty's  arms  must  have 
been  dishonoured.  In  regard  to  the  assumption  of  conv 
maud  on  that  occasion,  I  ^vi  only  to  observe  that,  consi 


78H 


NAPIER'S   PENINSULAR   WAR. 


Bering  the  post  of  Tarifa  as  a  dependency  of  Gibraltar, 
having  occupieu  it  exclusively  for  these  two  years  past, 
and  that  a  commandant  and  staff  were  appointed  from  my 
recommendation,  with  salaries  annexed,  and  this  with  the 
appro!i;nion  of  b  -th  governments,  these  circumstances,  add- 
ed to  what  I  have  seen  on  rimilar  occasions,  put  it  past  a 
doubt  in  my  mil  J,  and  colonel  Skcrrett  having  applied  to 
HIS  for  '  precise  orders,'  shows  that  he  was  aware  that  such 
was  the  case.  If,  my  loril,  I  ever  had  a  right  to  exercise 
an  authority  over  the  post  of  7^arifa  fion:  what  I  have 
stated,  tiie  entry  of  troops  from  another  quarter,  unless 
actually  commanded  by  an  officer  scnioi  to  myself,  could 
not,  according  to  the  custom  of  our  service,  dtprive  me  of 
it  ;  and  I  have  hoard  that  the  case  has  been  referred  to  lord 
Wellington,  who  wis  of  the  same  opinion.  This,  however, 
I  only  take  the  libe.'ty  to  advance  in  justification  of  my 
conduct,  and  not  in  opposition  to  the  opinion  formed  by 
the  government  of  his  royal  highness  the  prince  regent.  I 
trust,  therefore,  I  shall  be  excused  in  the  ej'es  of  govern- 
ment in  declaring  without  leserve,  that  if  I  had  not  re- 
tained the  command  the  place  would  not  now  be  in  our 
possession,  and  the  '^ants  of  our  enemies  would  have  been 
completely  supplied  by  ■/s  affordiiig  a  free  communication 
with  the  states  of  Barbary.  I  have  the  honour  to  report 
that  I  have  made  the  necessary  communication  with  niajor- 
peneral  Cooke  in  consequence  of  its  i/ei>ig  lY.^  wish  of  gov- 
ernment that  TariAi  shall  be  occupied  by  ti?ops  from  Ca- 
diz, The  major-general  informs  me,  in  ifr::Vf.T  thereto, 
that  he  has  communicated  with  lord  WelJin,  ion,  as  he  has 
not  received  ordert'  to  that  cfTect,  nor  has  he  the  mear^  at 
present  to  make  tlie  detachment  required,  ..ndvour  lordship 
is  aware  that  I  have  it  not  in  my  powei  to  reinforce  that 
post  in  case  of  need.''  &c.  &c. — P.  S.  "  Should  your  lord- 
ship wish  any  further  information  with  respect  to  that  post, 
It  will  be  found  on  referring  to  my  report  made  after  I  had 
vis'ted  Tarifa,  where  commodore  Penrose  and  colonel  sir 
Cbit  es  llolloway,  royal  engineers,  accompanied  me." 


EXTRACT  FRO^^  CAPTAIN  C.  F.  SMITH'S  REPORT. 
"  Tarifa,  December  14,  1811. 
"  I  do  not  hesitate  to  declare  that  I  place  the  utmost  re- 
liance on  the  resources  of  the  place,  and  consider  them  as 
such  as  ought  to  make  a  good  and  ultimately  successful 
defence." 


EXTRACT  FROM  CAPTALS  C.  F.  SMITH'S  REPORT. 
"  December  24,  1811. 
«  My  opinion  respecting  the  defences  of  this  post  is  un- 
alterable and  must  ever  remain  so, — that  till  the  island  is 
more  independent  in  itself,  there  is  a  necessity  of  fairly  de- 
fending the  town  as  an  outwork." 

No.  XVII. 

STORMING  OF  CIUDAD  RODRIGO  AND 
BADAJOS. 

|TTie  anonymoui  extracts  are  taken  from  the  memoirs  and  joarnals  of 
officere  cn;a;ed  in,  or  eye-witneKsea  of  tlie  action  dcur.ribcd.  The 
Konian  characters  mark  difTerent  sources  of  information  j 

szcTiox  1. — CIUDAD  Ro::r^ibO. 

A. 

"  The  duke  of  Wellington,  standing:  o^i  Jh?  lop  of  some 
nuDS  of  the  convent  of  Francisco,  pointed  out  to  colonel 


Colborne  and  to  major  Napier,'  commanding  the  storming* 
party  of  the  light  division,  the  spot  where  the  small  breach 
was.  Having  done  this,  he  said,  *  JVoxv  do  you  vnder- 
stand  exactly  the  -way  you  are  to  take  «o  as  to  a-rive 
at  the  breach  without  noise  or  confusion?'  He  was 
answered,  '  Yes,  perfectly.'  Some  one  of  the  staff  then 
said  to  major  Napier,  '  Why  don't  you  load?'  He  an- 
swered, 'No,  if  we  cannot  do  the  business  withoKt  loading 
we  shall  not  do  it  at  all.'  The  duke  of  Wellington  imme* 
diately  said,  '  Leave  him  alone.' 

"  The  cacadores  under  colonel  Elder  were  to  carry 

haybags  to  throw  into  the  ditch,  but  the  signal  of  attack 
having  been  given,  and  the  fire  commencing  at  the  great 
breach,  the  stormers  would  not  wait  for  the  hay-bags, 
which,  from  some  confusion  in  the  orders  delivered,  had  not 
yet  arrived;  but  from  no  fault  of  colonel  Elder  or  his  gal- 
lant regiment ;  they  were  always  ready  for  and  equal  to 
any  thing  they  were  ordered  to  do. 

"  The  troops  jumped  into  the  ditch;  the  'favsse  braye' 
was  faced  with  stone,  so  as  to  form  a  perpendicular  wall 
about  the  centre  of  the  ditch  ;  it  was  scaled,  and  the  foot 
of  the  breach  was  attained.  Lieutenant  Gurwood  had 
gone  too  far  to  his  left  with  the  forlorn  hope,  and  missed 
the  entrance  of  the  breach  ;  he  was  struck  down  with  a 
wound  on  the  head,  but  sprang  up  again,  and  joined  major 
Napier,  captain  Jones  52d  regt.,  Mitchell  95th,  Ferguson 
43d,  and  some  other  officers,  who  at  the  head  of  the  storm- 
ers were  all  going  up  the  breach  together." 

"  Colonel  Colborne,  although  very  badly  wounded 

in  the  shoulder,  formed  the  fifty-second  on  the  top  of  the 
ran:p"rt.  and  led  them  against  the  enemy." 

"  The  great  breach  was  so  strongly  barricaded,  so  fiercely 
defended,  that  the  third  division  had  not  carried  it,  and 
were  still  bravely  exerting  every  effort  to  force  their  way 
through  the  obstacles  when  colonel  M-Leod  of  the  forty- 
third  poured  a  heavy  flank  fire  upon  the  enemy  Jefend- 
ing  it." 

B. 

"  The  third  division  having  commenced  firing,  we  were 
obliged  to  hurry  to  the  attack.  The  forlorn  hope  led,  we 
advanced  rapidly  across  the  glacis  and  descended  into  the 
ditch  near  the  ravelin,  under  a  heavy  fire.  We  found  the 
forlorn  hope  placing  ladders  against  the  face  of  the  work, 
and  our  party  turned  towards  them,  when  the  engineer 
officer  called  out,  <  You  are  -wrong,  this  is  the  -way  to  the 
breach,  or  the  fausse  braye  -which  leads  to  the  breach  you 
are  to  attack.'  " 

"  We  ascended  the  breach  of  the  fausse  braye,  and 

then  the  breach  of  the  body  of  the  place,  without  the  aid 

of  ladders." "  We  were  for  a  short  time  on  the  breach 

before  we  forced  the  entrance.  A  gun  was  stretched  across 
the  entrance,  but  did  not  impede  our  march.  Near  it  some 
of  the  enemy  were  bayoneted,  amongst  the  number  some 
deserters,  who  were  found  in  arms  defending  the  breach." 

"  Major  Napier  was  wounded  at  the  moment  when 

the  men  were  checked  by  the  heavy  fire  and  determined 
resistance  of  the  enemy  about  two  thirds  up  the  ascent 
It  was  then  that  the  soldiers,  forgetting  they  were  not 
loaded,  as  the  major  had  not  permitted  them,  snapped  all 
their  firelocks." 

"  No   individual   could   claim   being  the  first  that 

entered  the  breach;  it  was  a  simultaneous  rush  of  about 
twenty  or  thirty.  The  forlorn  hope  was  thrown  in  some 
degree  behind,  being  engaged  in  fixing  ladders  against  the 


*  Brother  to  the  author  of  this  work. 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


789 


face  of  the  work,  which  they  mistook  for  the  point  of 
attack. 

"  Upon  carrying  the  breach,  the  parties  moved  as  before 
directed  by  major  Napier;  that  is,  the  fifty-second  to  the 
left,  the  forty-third  to  the  right.  The  forty-third  cleared 
the  ramparts  to  the  right,  and  drove  the  enemy  from  the 
places  they  attempttjd  to  defend,  until  it  arrived  near  the 
great  breach  at  a  spot  where  the  enemy's  defences  were 
overlooked.  At  this  time  the  great  breach  had  not  been 
carried,  and  v>wS  powerfully  defended  by  the  enemy.  The 
houses  being  on  -t  were  loop-holded,  and  a  deep  trench 
lined  with  muskeu/  bearing  directly  upon  it ;  the  flanks 
ol  the  breach  were  cut  off,  and  the  descent  into  the  town 
from  the  ramparts  at  the  top  of  it  appeared  considerable, 
BO  as  to  render  it  exceedingly  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to 
force  it  without  other  aid  than  a  front  attack." 

"  The   moment  the   light   division  storming-party 

arrived  at  the  spot  described,  they  opened  a  heavy  enfilad- 
ing fire  of  musketry  upon  the  trench,  which  was  the  main 
defence  of  the  great  breach,  and  drove  the  enemy  from  it 
with  the  aid  of  the  storming-party  of  the  third  division  that 
now  entered.  I  was  wounded  at  this  time,  and  retired  a 
short  way  back  on  the  rampart,  when  I  saw  the  first  ex- 
plosion on  the  rampart  near  the  great  breach.  It  was  in 
my  opinion  next  to  impossible,  as  I  have  said  before,  to 
force  the  great  breach  by  a  front  attack  as  long  as  the 
enemy  held  their  defences,  but  the  moment  the  light  divi- 
sion turned  their  defences  the  breach  was  instantly  carried." 


ABSTRACT  OF  THE  JOURNAL  OF  GENERAL  HARVEY, 
PORTUGUESE  SERVICE. 

"  I  stood  on  rising  ground  and  watched  the  progress  of 
the  attack.  The  great  breach  was  attacked  first.  At  the 
top  of  it  the  third  division  opened  their  fire  heavily,  and  it 
was  returned  heavily,  but  there  was  a  distressing  pause. 
Tht  small  breach  was  carried  first,  and  there  was  one  con- 
siderable explosion  and  two  or  three  smaller  ones  on  the 
ramparts." 


SECTIOW    2. 

BADAJOS.— ASSAULT  OF  PICURINA. 

C. 

"  An  engineer  officer,  who  led  the  attack,  told  me,  two 
d-iys  after,  '  that  the  place  never  would  have  been  taken 
had  it  not  been  for  the  intelligence  of  these  men  (a  detach- 
ment from  the  light  division)  in  absolutely  walking  round 
the  fort,  and  finding  out  the  gate,  which  was  literally  beaten 
down  by  them,  and  they  entered  at  the  point  of  the  bayo- 
net. Lieutenant  Nixon  of  the  fifty-second  was  shot  through 
the  body  by  a  Frenchman  a  yard  or  two  inside  the  gate." 

D. 

ASSAULT  OF  BADAJOS. 
"  For  the  descent  of  the  light  and  fourth  division  into 
the  ditch  only_^ve  ladders  were  placed,  and  those  five  lad- 
Jers  were  close  to  each  other.  The  advance  (or  storming- 
f  irty)  of  the  eighth  division  preceded  that  of  the  fourth 
division,  and  I  believe  that  no  part  of  the  fourth  division 
was  up  in  time  to  suffer  from  the  first  great  explosion,  and 
ihe  storming-party  only  had  entered  when  that  explosion 
took  place ;  but  observe  that  although  the  advance  of  the 
light  division  preceded  the  advance  of  the  fourth  division, 
[  only  mean  by  that,  that  the  head  of  the  light  division  en- 


tered the  ditch  sooner  than  the  head  oi  i)\e  fourth  d.  vision, 
for  the  main  bodies  of  the  two  divisions  joined  at  the  lad- 
ders, and  were  descending  into  the  ditch  at  the  same  time. 

"  I  consider  that  the  centre  breach  at  Badajos  wa*"  never 
seriously  attacked.  I  was  not  at  the  centre  breach  on  the 
night  of  the  assault,  therefore  I  cannot  positively  asseit 
what  took  place  there.  But  there  were  not  bodies  of  dead 
and  wounded  at  the  centre  or  curtain  breach  in  the  morn- 
ing to  indicate  such  an  attack  having  been  made  upon  it, 
and  being  in  the  curtain  it  was  far  retired  from  the  troops, 
and  the  approach  to  it  was  made  extremely  difficult  by 
deep  cuts,  and  I  think  it  passed  unobserved,  except  by  a 
straggling  few." 

"  I  consider  that  '  chevaux  de  /vise'  were  placed 

upon  the  summit  of  the  centre  breach  during  the  assault. 
I  was  there  at  day-break.  The  approach  to  it  was  ex- 
tremely diflicult,  both  from  the  difficulty  of  finding  it,  and 
from  the  deep  holes  that  were  before  it,  which  to  my  recol- 
lection resembled  the  holes  you  see  in  a  clay-field,  where 
they  make  bricks.  Another  great  obstruction  was  the  fire 
from  the  faces  and  flanks  of  the  two  bastions,  which 
crossed  before  the  curtain." 


EXTRACT  FROW  A  MEMOIR  BY  CAPTAIN  BARNEY,  CHAS- 
SEURS BRlTANNiaUES,  ACTING  ENGINEER  ATTHESIEGE. 

"  The  explosion  of  the  '  Bariqiies  foiidvoyuntes'  re- 
sembled '■fovgasses,^  and  I  expected  the  bastion  would 
have  crumbled  to  pieces.  At  this  moment  I  perceived  one 
person  in  the  midst  of  fire,  who  had  gained  the  top  of  the 
breach  in  the  face  of  the  bastion,  he  seemed  impelling  him- 
self forward  towards  the  enemy  in  an  oflensive  position 
when  he  sank  down,  apparently  destroyed  by  ihe  fire.  On 
examining  this  breach  at  day-light  I  found  a  Portuguese 
grenadier,  whom  I  suppose  to  be  the  person,  as  he  lay  dead 
the  foremost  on  this  breach." 

"  Twice    the    bugles    sounded    to  retire  from  the 

breaches.  The  fire  diminished,  and  passing  along  the 
glacis  of  the  ravelin  I  hastened  to  the  attack  of  general 
Picton,  and  found  but  ttvo  ladders,  one  only  just  long 
enough  to  reach  the  embrasure,  and  the  other  with  several 
of  the  upper  rounds  destroyed.  The  castle  was  full  of 
men,  and  had  the  enemy  thrown  shells  among  them,  I  do 
not  think  it  could  have  been  kept  possession  of.  Major 
Burgh  came  to  ascertain  the  result  of  the  attack,  and  the 
reserves  were  ordered  up.  On  coming  down  from  the  cas- 
tle I  met  general  Picton,  and  told  him  the  castle  was  full 
of  men,  but  they  had  not  advanced  into  the  town.  He 
immediately  ordered  sorties  to  be  made  to  clear  the  breach. 

and  a  good  look-out  to  be  kept  towards  Christoval." • 

"  Passing  in  front  of  the  battery  where  lord  Wellington 
was,  I  went  on  the  right  bank  of  the  inundation  till  I  coulJ 
cross,  and  going  towards  the  breach,  I  was  overtaken  by 
the  prince  of  Orange,  carrying  an  order  for  colonel  Barnarc 
to  occupy  the  breach.  The  enemy's  fire  had  ceased,  yel 
none  of  the  storming-party  knew  whether  we  were  sue 
cessful  or  not.  I  told  the  prince  I  was  just  come  from  tin 
castle,  which  was  occupied  in  force.  As  we  approached 
the  breach  the  stench  of  burnt  hair  and  scorched  flesh  was 
horrible,  and  on  the  crest  of  the  glacis  the  dead  and 
wounded  lay  in  such  numbers  it  was  impossible  to  pass 
without  treading  on  them." 

"  Here  I  also  found  but  three  ladders,  one  broken  so  as 
to  render  it  useless.  On  arriving  at  the  cxirtain-breack, 
some  men  of  the  light  division  assisted  me  in  removing  from 
the  top  the  chevuiix  de /rise  oj  sword-blades  and  piket. 


790 


NAPIER'S  PENINSULAR  WAR. 


No.  XVIII. 
ESCALADE  OF  ST.  VINCENT. 

EXTRACT  FROM  A  MEMOIR  BY  CAPTAIN  EDWARD  P. 
HOPKINS,  FOURTH  REGIMENT. 

"The  column  halted  a  few  j'ards  from  a  breastwork  sur- 
mounted wifh  a  stockade  and  a  chevaux  de  /rise,  concealing 
a  guard-house  on  the  covert-way,  and  at  this  moment  a  most 
awful  explosion  took  place,  followed  by  the  most  tremendous 
peals  of  musketry.  'That  is  at  the  breaches,'  was  the  whis- 
per amongst  our  soldiers,  and  their  anxiet)  to  be  led  forward 
was  intense,  but  their  firmness  and  obedience  were  equally 
conspicuous.  The  moon  now  appeared.  We  could  hear  the 
French  soldiers  talking  in  the  guard-house,  and  their  officers 
were  visiting  the  sentries.  The  engineer  officer  who  preced- 
ed the  column,  said, '  Now  is  the  time,-'  the  column  instantly 
moved  to  the  face  of  the  gateway.  It  was  only  at  this  mo- 
ment that  the  sentry  observed  us,  and  fired  his  alarm-shot, 
which  was  followed  by  musketry.  The  two  companies  of 
Portuguese  carrying  the  scaling-ladders  threw  them  down, 
and  deaf  to  the  voices  of  their  officers,  made  olT.  This  oc- 
currence did  not  in  the  least  shake  the  zeal  and  steadiness  of 
our  men,  who  occupied  immediately  the  space  left,  and  shoul- 
dering the  ladders  moved  on.  We  could  not  force  the  gate 
open,  but  the  breastwork  was  instantly  crowded,  and  the  im- 
Dedimcnts  cut  away  sufiiciently  to  allow  of  two  men  enter- 
ing abreast.  .  .  ,  The  engineer  officer  was  by  this  time 
killed.  We  had  no  other  assistance  from  that  corps,  and  the 
loss  was  most  severely  felt  at  this  early  period  of  the  attack. 

.  .  .  .  "The  troops  were  now  fast  filling  the  ditch; 
they  had  several  ladders,  and  I  sliall  never  forget  the  momen- 
tary disappointment  amongst  the  men  when  they  found  that 
the  ladders  were  too  short.  .  .  .  The  enemy  took  advan- 
tage of  this  to  annoy  us  in  every  way,  rolling  down  beams 
of  wood,  fire-balls,  etc.  together  with  an  enjiluding  fire. 

"  We  observed  near  us  an  embrasure  unfurnished  of  artil- 
lery, its  place  being  occupied  by  a  gabion  filled  with  earth. 
A  ladder  was  instantly  placed  under  its  mouth,  and  also  one 
at  each  side.  This  allowed  three  persons  to  ascend  at  once, 
but  only  one  at  a  time  could  enter  in  at  the  embrasure.  The 
first  several  attempts  were  met  with  instant  death.  The  lad- 
ders were  even  now  too  short,  and  it  was  necessary  for  one 
person  to  assist  the  other  by  hoisting  him  up  the  embrasure. 
.  .  .  Some  shots  were  fired  from  a  building  in  the  town, 
and  colonel  Piper  was  sent  with  a  party  to  dislodge  the  ene- 
my, while  general  Walker,  at  the  head  of  his  brigade,  at- 
tempted to  clear  the  rampart  to  the  right.     .     .     . 

"  The  enemy  retired  from  the  building  on  our  approach, 
and  colonel  Piper  did  not  return  to  the  ramparts,  but  moved 
into  the  body  of  the  town.  Could  we  have  divested  our 
minds  of  the  real  situation  of  tlie  town,  it  might  have  been 
imagined  tliat  the  inhabitants  wero  preparing  for  some  grand 
fete,  as  all  the  houses  in  the  stress  and  squares  were  bril- 


liantly illuminated,  from  the  top  to  the  first  floor,  with  no- 
merous  lamps.  This  illumination  scene  was  truly  remarka- 
ble: not  a  living  creature  to  be  seen,  but  a  continual  low  buzz 
and  whisper  around  us,  and  we  now  and  then  peict-ivcd  a 
small  lattice  gently  open  and  reshut,  as  if  more  closely  tc-  ob- 
serve the  singular  scene  of  a  small  English  party  perambulat- 
ing the  town  in  good  order,  the  buglcman  at  the  head  blow- 
ing his  instrument.  Some  of  our  men  and  officers  now  fell 
wounded ;  at  first  we  did  not  know  where  the  shots  came 
from,  but  soon  observed  they  were  from  the  sills  of  the  doors. 
W  e  soon  arrived  at  a  large  church  facing  some  grand  houses, 
in  a  sort  of  square.  The  party  here  drew  up,  and  it  was  aV 
first  proposed  to  take  possession  of  this  church,  but  that  idea 
was  abandoned.  We  made  several  prisoners  leading  some 
mules  laden  with  loose  ball-cartridges  in  large  wicker  baskets, 
which  they  stated  they  were  conveying  from  the  magazines 
to  the  breaches.  After  securing  the  prisoners,  ammunition, 
etc.  we  moved  from  the  square  with  the  intention  of  forcing 
our  way  u^-on  the  ramparts.  We  went  up  a  small  street  to- 
wards them,  but  met  with  such  opposition  as  obliged  us  to 
retire  with  loss.  We  again  found  ourselvi»s  in  the  square. 
There  an  English  soldier  came  up  to  us  who  had  been  con- 
fined in  the  jail,  probably  a  deserter.  He  said  our  troops  hod 
attacked  the  castle,  and  had  failed,  but  that  the  French  troops 
had  afterwards  evacuated  it.  At  this  period  rapid  changes 
took  place.  Several  French  officers  came  into  the  square; 
the  town  belonged  to  the  English;  the  great  W^eliington  was 
-victorious.  A  scene  of  sad  confusion  now  took  jilace ;  seve- 
ral French  officers  of  rank,  their  wives  and  children,  ran  into 
the  square  in  a  state  of  phrensy,  holding  little  caskets  con- 
taining their  jewels  and  valuables,  and  their  children  in  their 
arms.  The  situation  of  these  females  was  dreadful;  they 
implored  our  protection,  and  I  believe  this  party  escaped  the 
plunder  and  pillage  which  was  now  unfortunately  in  progiens. 
The  scene  that  now  commenced  surpassed  all  that  can  bo 
imagined;  drunkenness,  cruelty,  and  debauchery,  the  loss  of 
many  lives,  and  great  destruction  of  property,  was  one  boon 
for  our  victory.  The  officers  had  lost  all  command  of  their 
men  in  the  tcwn;  those  who  had  got  drunk  and  satisfied 
themselves  w'rU-.  plunder  congregated  in  small  parties  and 
fired  down  the  i  treets.  I  saw  an  English  soldier  pass  through 
the  middle  of  the  Street  with  a  French  knapsack  on  his  back, 
he  received  a  shot  through  his  hand  from  some  of  the  drunk- 
ards at  the  top  of  the  street;  he  merely  turned  round  and 
said,  '  Damn  them,  I  suppose  they  took  me  for  a  Frenchman.' 
An  officer  of  the  Brunswickers,  who  was  contending  with  a 
soldier  far  the  possession  of  a  canary  bird,  was  shot  dead  by 
one  of  those  insane  drunkards.  Groups  of  soldiers  wero 
seen  in  all  places,  and  could  we  have  forgotten  the  distressing 
part  of  the  scene,  never  was  there  a  more  complete  masquer- 
ade. Some  dicssed  as  monks,  some  as  friars,  some  in  court 
dresses,  man)-  carrying  furniture,  cloth,  provisions,  money, 
plate  from  the  i;hurchcs;  the  military  chest  was  cvg.t  got  at 
by  the  soldiers." 


NAPIER'S    PENINSULAR    WAR. 


791 


No.  XIX. 

The  following  extracts  of  letters  are  published  to  avoid 
any  future  cavils  upon  the  points  they  refer  to,  and  also  to 
show  how  difficult  "t  is  for  the  historian  to  obtain  certain  and 
accurate  details,  when  eyewitnesses,  having  no  wish  to  mis- 
lead, differ  so  much. 

BATTLE  OF  SALAMANCA. 

EXTRACT  OF  A  MEMOIR  BY  SIR  CFiARLES  DALBIAC, 
WHO  WAS  OXE  OF  LE  MARCHA^T'S  BRIGADE  OF 
HEAVY  CAVALRY. 

"  Throughout  these  charges  upon  the  enemy,  the  heavy 
brigade  was  unsupported  by  any  other  portion  of  the  caval- 
ry whatever;  but  was  followed,  as  rapidly  as  it  was  possible 
for  infantry  to  follow,  by  the  third  division,  which  had  so  glo- 
riously led  the  attack  in  the  first  instance  and  had  so  effect- 
ually turned  the  enemy's  extreme  left." 


ETtTRACT  FROM  A  MEMOIR  BY  COLONEL  MOXEY,  V7'J0 
WAS  ONE  OF  GENERAL  ANSON'S  BRIGADE  OF  LIGHT 
CAVALRY. 

*'  The  third  division  moved  to  the  right,  and  the  cavalry, 
Le  Marchant's  and  Anson's,  were  ordered  to  charge  as  soon 
as  ihe  tirailleurs  of  the  third  division  began  to  ascend  the 
right  flank  of  the  hill.  .  •  .  The  rapid  movement  of  the 
cavalry  which  now  began  to  gallop,  and  the  third  division 
pressing  them  (the  French,)  they  ran  into  the  wood,  which 
separated  them  from  the  srmy;  we  (Anson's  light  cavalr}-) 
charged  them  under  a  heavy  fire  of  musketry  and  artillery 
t'om  another  height;  near  two  thousar4d  threw  down  their 
arms  in  different  parts  of  the  wood,  and  we  continued  our 
charge  through  the  wood  until  our  brigade  came  into  an  open 
plain  of  ploughed  fields,  where  the  dust  was  so  great  we 
could  see  nothing,  end  halted ;  when  it  cleared  away,  we 
found  ourselves  within  three  hundred  yards  of  a  large  body 
of  French  infantry  and  artillery,  formed  on  the  declivity  of 
a  hill.  A  tremendous  battle  was  heard  on  the  other  side, 
which  prevented  the  enemy  from  perceiving  us.  At  last  they 
opened  a  fire  of  musketry  and  grape-shot,  and  we  retired  in 
good  order  and  without  any  loss." 


EXTRACT  FROM  A  LETTER  OF  COLONEL  TOWNSEND, 
FOURTEENTH  DRAGOONS. 

"  At  the  battle  of  Salamanca,  I  perfectly  recollect  seeing 
D'Urban's  cavalry  advance  up  the  hill  and  charge  the  French 
infmtry.  They  were  repulsed,  and  left  Watson  (now  sir 
Henry,)  who  led  his  regiment,  the  first  Portuguese,  badly 
wounded  on  the  field.  ...  I  am  almost  positive  the 
French  were  not  in  square,  but  in  line,  waiting  to  receive  iho 
attack  of  the  leading  brigade  of  the  third  division,  which 
gallantly  carried  every  thing  before  it." 


EXTRACT  OF  A  LETTER  FROM  SIR  HENRY  WATSON. 
COMMANDING  THE  FIRST  REGIMENT  OF  PORTUGUESE 
CAVALRY  UNDER  GENERAL  D'UKBAN. 

"When  Marmont,  at  the  battle  of  Salamanca,  advanced 
hLs  left,  lord  Wellington  ordered  down  the  reserve,  of  which 
the  first  and  tenth  Portuguese  cavalry  and  two  squadrons  of 
the  British  cavalry  under  captain  Townsend,  now  lieutenant- 
colonel  Townsend,  formed  a  part  under  sir  Benjamin  D'Ur- 
ban.  The  cavalry  was  pushed  forward  in  contiguous  col- 
umns, and  were  protected  from  the  enemy  by  a  small  rising 
ground,  which,  as  soon  as  I  had  passed,  I  was  ordered  to 
wheel  up,  and  charge  the  front  in  line.  The  enemy  had 
formed  a  square,  and  gave  us  a  volley  as  we  advanced,  the 
eleventh  and  fourteenth  remained  e7i  potence.  In  this  charge 
we  completely  succeeded,  and  the  enemy  appeared  panic- 
struck,  and  made  no  attempt  to  prevent  our  cutting  and 
thrusting  at  them  in  all  directions  until  the  moment  I  was 
about  to  withdraw ;  tlicn  a  soldier,  at  not  more  than  six  or 
eight  paces,  levelled  his  musket  at  me,  and  shot  me  through 
the  shoulder,  which  knocked  me  off  my  horse,  where  I  con- 
tinued to  lit  till  the  whole  of  our  infantry  had  passed  over."  [ 


No.  XX. 
MARMONT'S  OPERATIONS. 

COLONEL  LE  MESURIER,  COMMANDANT  OF  ALMEIDA, 
TO  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  TRANT. 

"Almeida,  March  28,  1812. 
"  WoEx  I  took  possession  of  the  fortress  ten  day.=  since,  I 
found  not  a  single  gun  in  a  state  for  working ;  either  owing 
to  the  want  of  side-arms  or  the  ill  assortment  of  shot  and 
ammunition,  not  a  single  platform  was  laid  down,  and  scarce- 
ly z  single  embrasure  opened  in  any  part  of  the  newly  repair- 
ed fronts.  My  powder  was  partly  in  an  outwork,  partly  in 
two  buildings  scarcely  weather-proof,  only  one  front  of  my 
covert-way  palisaded,  and  the  face  of  one  of  my  ravelins 
without  any  revetement  whatever;  the  revetcment  through- 
out the  whole  of  the  newly  repaired  fronts  not  being  inoro 
than  one-third  or  one-fourth  of  its  former  height.  Many  of 
these  defects  have  been  remedied;  we  have  platforms  and 
embrasures  throughout  the  new  fronts,  the  guns  posted  with 
their  proper  side-arms  and  shot-piles,  and  with  a  proper  as- 
sortment of  ammunition  in  the  caissons;  the  bulk  of  oui 
powder  and  ordnance-cartridges  being  distributed  in  bomb- 
proofs;  we  have  formed  a  respectable  inlrenchment  on  the 
top  of  the  breach  of  the  mined  ravehn,  which  it  is  proposed 
to  arm  with  palisades,  but  the  almost  total  want  of  transport 
has  prevented  our  being  able  to  complete  more  than  two 
fronts  and  a  half  of  our  covert-way  with  those  essential  de- 
fences. From  this  sketch  you  will  collect  that,  though  the 
fortress  is  not  to  be  walked  into,  it  is  yet  far  from  being  se- 
cure from  the  consequences  of  a  resolute  assault,  particularly 
ff  the  garrison  be  composed  of  raw  and  unsteady  troops." 


EXTRACT  FROM  A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  TRANT 

"Now  it  so  happened  that  on  this  same  night  Marmont 
had  marched  from  Sabugal  in  order  to  attack  me  in  Guarda, 
he  had  at  the  least  five  thousand  infantry,  some  reports  mada 
his  force  seven  thousand,  and  he  had  five  or  six  hundred  cav- 
alry. My  distrust  of  the  militia  with  regard  to  the  execution 
of  precautions  such  as  I  had  now  adopted,  had  induced  T^a 
at  all  times  to  have  a  drummer  at  my  bed-room  door,  in  reait- 
iness  to  beat  to  arms;  and  this  was  most  fortunately  the  cai-e 
on  the  night  of  the  13th  of  April,  iS12,  for  the  very  first  in- 
timation I  received  of  the  enemy  being  near  at  hand  was  giv- 
en me  by  my  own  servant,  on  bringing  me  my  coffee  at  day- 
break on  the  14th.  He  said  such  was  the  report  in  the  street, 
and  that  the  soldiers  were  assembling  at  the  alarm  rendez- 
vous in  the  town.  I  instantly  beat  to  arms,  and  the  beat 
being  as  instantly  taken  up  by  every  drummer  who  heard  it, 
Marmont,  who  at  that  very  moment  was  with  his  cavalry  at 
the  v^fy  entrance  of  the  town  (quite  open  on  the  SabugaJ 
side  more  than  elsewhere,)  retired.    He  had  cut  off  the  out> 


792 


NAPER'S    PENINSULAR   WAR. 


posts  without  their  firing  a  shot,  and,  had  he  only  dashed 
headlong  into  the  town,  must  have  captured  Wilson's  and 
my  militia  divisions  without  losing  probably  a  single  man.  I 
was  myself  the  first  out  of  the  town,  and  he  was  not  then 
four  hundred  yards  from  it,  retiring  at  a  slow  pace.  I  lost  no 
time  in  forming  my  troops  in  position,  and  sent  my  few  dra- 
goons in  observation.  When  a  couple  of  miles  distant,  Mai- 
mont  drew  up  fronting  Guarda,  and  it  turned  out,  as  I  infer- 
red, that  he  expected  infantry." 


No.  XXI. 

COMBAT  OF  MAYA. 

EXTRACT  FRO:\T  A  MANUSCRIPT   MEMOIR   BY  CAPTAIN 
NORTON,  THIRTY-FOURTH    REGIMENT. 

"  The  thirty-ninth  regiment,  commanded  by  the  honour- 
able colonel  O'Callaghan,  then  immediately  engaged  with 
the  French,  and  after  a  severe  contest  also  retired ;  the  fiftieth 
was  next  in  succession,  and  they  also  after  a  gallai^t  stand 
retired,  making  way  for  the  ninety-second,  which  met  the 
advancing  French  column  first  with  its  right  wing  drawn  up 
in  line,  and  after  a  most  destructive  fire  and  heavy  loss  on 
both  sides  the  remnant  of  the  right  wing  retired,  leaving  a 
line  of  killed  and  wounded  that  appeared  to  have  no  interval. 
The  French  column  advanced  up  to  this  line  and  then  halted, 
the  killed  and  wounded  of  the  ninety-second  forming  a  sort 
of  rampart;  the  left  wing  then  opened  its  fire  on  the  column, 
tnd  as  I  was  but  a  little  to  the  right  of  the  ninety-second,  I 
CO  jld  not  help  reflecting  painfully  how  many  of  the  wound- 
et\  of  their  right  wing  must  have  unavoidably  suffered  from 
the  fire  of  their  comrades.  The  left  wing,  after  doing  good. 
■ervicc  and  sustaining  a  loss  equal  to  the  first  line,  retired." 


No.  XXII.  f 

COMBAT  OF  KONCEVALLES. 
GENERAL  COLE  TO  LORD  WELUNGTON. 

"Heights  in  front  «f  rcrr:felvna,  July  27,  1515. 
.  .  .  "  The  enemy  having  in  the  course  of  the  nifbit 
turned  those  posts,  were  now  perceived  moving  in  very  c/»n« 
siderable  force  along  the  ridge  leading  to  the  Puerto  dc  Men- 
dichuri.  I  therefore  proceeded  in  that  direction  and  found 
tliat  their  advance  had  nearly  reached  the  road  leading  from 
the  Koncevalles  pass  to  Los  Alduides,  from  which  it  waa 
separated  by  a  small  wooded  valley.  Owing  to  the  difficulty 
of  the  communications,  the  head  of  major-general  Ross'a 
brigade  could  not  arrive  there  sooner;  the  major-general, 
however,  with  great  decision,  attacked  them  with  the  Bruns- 
wick company  and  three  companies  of  the  twentieth,  all  ho 
had  time  to  form;  these  actually  closed  with  the  enemy,  ar.d 
bayonneted  several  in  the  ranks.  They  were  however  forced 
to  yield  to  superior  numbers,  and  to  retire  across  the  valley 
the  enemy  attempted  to  follow  them,  but  were  repulsed  with 
loss,  the  remainder  of  the  brigade  having  come  up." 


MARSHAL  SOULT  TO  THE  MINISTER  OF  WAR. 

"Linzoin,  26  Ju/y,  1813. 
"  Their  losses  have  been  equally  considerable,  both  at  the 
attack  of  Linduz  by  general  Reille,  where  the  twentieth  regi- 
ment (English)  was  almost  entirely  destroyed  in  conseijuenca 
of  a  charge  with  the  bayonet,  performed  by  a  battalion  of  the 
sixth  light  infantry  (Foy's  division,)  and  at  the  attack  of  AU 
tobiijcar  bv  general  Clauzel." 


THE    END. 


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